

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Encyclopedia of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

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Encyclopedia of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

EDITED BY
CHERYL A. RUBENBERG

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For Marty

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PREFACE

A word about access to the information in this encyclopedia: As is usual, entries are arranged alphabetically. Care has been taken to provide numerous "blind entries" to cover variations of words or phrases (for example, alternate spellings of proper names) for which the reader might be searching. Within the body of the entries, words and phrases presented in SMALL CAPITAL LETTERS indicate full entries that appear in the encyclopedia. Entries also include extensive cross-references, and bibliographic references point to sources for further research. The comprehensive index offers access to the information at the most detailed level.

* * * * *

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Thanks also go to Chris Toensing and Elaine Hagopian for their early input with regard to writers. Philip Mattar was very obliging, and I profited from his experience of editing an ency-

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Finally, there is one person without whom there would *really* not be an encyclopedia, my husband, Marty, a retired physician who worked alongside me during the entire six years. I can hardly find words to express my indebtedness. In addition to continuous emotional support, he read and commented on every piece I wrote, he fixed my computer every time something went wrong (about three times a day), and he produced the maps and tables. I could not have completed this project without his constant help and affectionate sustenance. He is quite simply a prince among men.

* * *

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Nurith Gertz, George Khleifi, and Meital Alon wish to acknowledge the sponsorship of the Israeli Academy of Science, the Belgian government, the Israeli-Palestinian Science Organization (IPSO), and the *Chronicle of Palestinian Cinema*.

—Cheryl A. Rubenberg

A

Aaronsohn, Aaron (1876–1919)

Aaron Aaronsohn was an agronomist and an early Zionist who was born in Romania. At the age of six his parents brought him to Palestine, where his father was one of the founders of the settlement of Zikhron Ya'akov. After studying in FRANCE, Aaronsohn was employed by BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD as an agronomist at the settlement of Metullah. His extensive explorations in Palestine and neighboring countries led to his discovery, in 1906, of a specimen of wild wheat (*Triticum dicoccoides*) at Rosh Pinah, a finding that made him famous among botanists throughout the world. At the invitation of the US Department of Agriculture, Aaronsohn visited the UNITED STATES in 1909–1910. With the help of influential Jewish leaders and philanthropists, he raised funds for the establishment of an agricultural experiment station at Atlit near HAIFA.

In 1915, with members of his own family and the family of Avshalom Feinberg, Aaronsohn organized NILI, a secret intelligence group with the aim of assisting the British forces under General Edmund Allenby to conquer Palestine, thus helping to realize Zionist aspirations. After moving to Cairo, he assisted British headquarters in planning the campaign for the invasion of Palestine. In 1916 he visited London and circulated a memorandum on the future of Palestine that helped make the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine part of British policy. In 1917 Aaronsohn worked in conjunction with the ZIONIST COMMISSION in Palestine. In 1918 CHAIM WEIZMANN sent Aaronsohn on a political mission to the United States, during which he learned that the Nili organization had been uncovered by the OTTOMAN authorities and that his sister SARA AARONSOHN had committed suicide. In 1919 he cooperated with the Zionist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, dealing especially with the issue of the boundaries of a future Jewish homeland. On 15 May 1919, Aaronsohn was killed in an airplane crash over the English Channel.

See also ISRAEL ZANGWILL.

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Aaronsohn, Sara (1890–1917)

Sara Aaronsohn was born and died in Zikhron Ya'akov, a town near HAIFA. Sara, her brother AARON, and their friend Avshalom Feinberg formed and directed NILI, a ring of Jewish spies that worked for the British during World War I in their fight against the OTTOMANS. Sara is often called the "heroine of Nili." According to CHAIM HERZOG, the Aaronsohns were motivated to assist the British after witnessing genocidal acts against the Armenians by the Turks. While living briefly in Constantinople until she returned home to Zikhron Ya'akov to escape an unhappy marriage, Sara observed the atrocities of the Turks and began to sympathize with the enemies of the Ottomans. As an active member of Nili, she oversaw operations of the spy ring and traveled widely through Ottoman territory, collecting information useful to the British and bringing it to their headquarters in EGYPT. In 1917 she returned to Zikhron Ya'akov to continue her activities. That autumn the Turks captured and tortured her for three or four days in her house. Subsequently, she shot and killed herself.

See also CINEMA, ISRAELI

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Abandoned Areas Ordinance, 1948

On 24 June 1948 Israel passed the Law of Abandoned Areas, which defined an "abandoned area" as "any area or place conquered by or surrendered to armed forces or deserted by all or part of its inhabitants, and which has been declared by order to be an abandoned area." All properties within these areas were also declared abandoned, and the government is authorized to dispose of such lands and properties as it sees fit. Additionally, the government can "extend the whole or any part of the existing law to any abandoned area . . . and [carry out] the expropriation and confiscation of movable and immovable property, within any abandoned area." The Abandoned Areas Ordinance was part of a series of laws passed by Israel designed to legalize the usurpation of Palestinian land and property and transfer it to Jews. These laws include, among others, the 1950 ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW and the 1950 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (Transfer of Property Law).

See also PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROPERTY CLAIMS

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Abbas, Mahmud (1935–)

In March 2005, Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) became the second popularly elected president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). He was one of the founders of FATAH, and he played a key role in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO).

Abbas was born in Safad, and with his family he was dispossessed in 1948, becoming a refugee in SYRIA. He received a B.A. in law in Syria and a Ph.D. in history from MOSCOW Oriental College, writing a dissertation on the history of ZIONISM. Abbas met other Fatah members while he was in Qatar, where he worked as director of personnel in the civil service. He joined the first FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE (Fatah-CC) and has been a member of the PLO's PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) since 1968. He became a member of the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (EC) in April 1981 and took over the portfolio of the Occupied Territories after Israel assassinated his colleague KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad).

Abbas has long had a reputation as a "dove" in the PLO. In 1976, together with Israeli general MATTITYAHU PELED, he drafted a declaration on "PRINCIPLES OF PEACE" based on a two-state solution. In 1989 he held secret talks with Israelis through Dutch intermediaries and coordinated the Palestinian negotiation process at the MADRID CONFERENCE in 1991. He was also one of the main Palestinian architects of the secret negotiations that led to the OSLO ACCORDS.

Abbas returned from exile to Palestine in 1995, having chaired the PLO's Negotiation Affairs Department from its founding in 1994 and served as head of PLO international relations. In October 1995, together with Israeli MP YOSSI BEILIN, Abbas drafted the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement between Israel and the PLO" (better known as the Beilin–Abu Mazen Accord). In January 1996 Abbas headed the Central Election Commission for the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL elections and was himself elected as a representative from Qalqilya. That same year he was appointed secretary-general of the PLO's EC and led the Cairo-based negotiations that resulted in the first GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT.

Three years into the AL-AQSA INTIFADA and under intense US pressure for reforms in the PNA, in March 2003 YASIR ARAFAT created the position of prime minister and appointed Abbas. Arafat, however, refused to surrender authority over the security services, hindering most reform initiatives made by Abbas. Lack of support from the Fatah rank and file, as well as from Israel, also hampered him. Nevertheless, as a result of Abbas's efforts,

Palestinian violence declined significantly in the summer of 2003.

Frustrated by the absence of any quid pro quo from Israel and the empty hand Abbas received after visiting the White House, some Palestinian groups began to resume the ARMED STRUGGLE in August. Abbas's lack of control of the security situation became pronounced, and he resigned as prime minister on 6 September 2003, although he remained secretary-general of the PLO EC. When Arafat fell ill in October 2004, Abbas, along with AHMAD QUREI', took control of the PNA and the PLO. After Arafat's death on 11 November 2004, elections brought Mahmud Abbas to the PNA presidency in January 2005. During his presidency Abbas has evinced considerable deference to the United States, as well as a willingness to engage unconditionally with Israeli officials.

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Abbas, Muhammad

See ZEIDAN, MUHAMMAD AHMAD FAHD ABBAS

'Abd al-Hadi Family

See AL-HADI FAMILY

'Abd al-Nasir, Jamal

See AL-NASIR, JAMAL 'ABD

'Abd al-Shafi, Haydar

See AL-SHAFI, HAYDAR 'ABD

'Abd Rabbu, Yasir (1944–)

Yasir 'Abd Rabbu, also known as Abu Bashir, is a resistance leader and a politician. He was one of the founders of the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP), one of the most widely supported and influential factions within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). He later broke with the DFLP and founded the PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (FIDA). 'Abd Rabbu was born in JAFFA, and with his family he was dispossessed in 1948, becoming a refugee in LEBANON. He obtained an M.A. in economics and political science from the American University in Cairo. Originally a member of the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN) and the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), in 1968 'Abd Rabbu, together with NAYIF HAWATIMAH, founded the leftist DFLP. He was deeply committed to popular, grassroots resistance and generally worked closely with YASIR ARAFAT and FATAH, and he took part in the PLO-Jordanian dialogue (1988–1990). He led the PLO's team in the UNITED STATES–PLO DIALOGUE in Tunis. 'Abd Rabbu has served as minister of information (1977–1993) and minister of culture (1977–1990) in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). He has also been on the PLO Executive Committee since 1973.

In the early 1990s, tensions erupted between 'Abd Rabbu and Hawatma over Jordanian-PLO relations and 'Abd Rabbu's support for the peace process; their conflict led to an escalation of violence and a split in the DFLP. Both groups continued to use the name DFLP until 1993, when 'Abd Rabbu's group changed its name to FIDA. 'Abd Rabbu supported the OSLO ACCORDS, and in early 2000 Arafat appointed him to head the PNA's negotiating team for FINAL STATUS TALKS; however, he resigned in May, on learning of secret Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in Sweden authorized by Arafat. In October 2002, when Arafat drafted a new government authority and asked him to join, 'Abd Rabbu did not accept.

During the years since 2000, he has become an internationally visible spokesperson for the Palestinians. Together with former Israeli justice minister YOSSI BEILIN, he developed the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Coalition, also known as the

GENEVA ACCORD or the Geneva Initiative, and he has toured the UNITED STATES and Europe to promote his ideas. 'Abd Rabbu supported implementation of the TENET PLAN and the MITCHELL PLAN.

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Abdullah Ibn al-Husayn (1882–1951)

See JORDAN

Absentee Landlords

Owing to changes in Ottoman land laws in 1860 and 1861, much of the land of Palestine at the start of the BRITISH MANDATE was in the hands of wealthy families living in Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo. At the same time, a large number of Palestinian peasants had lost the legal right to their land and had become tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and rural wage laborers. One Beirut merchant family, the Sursoqs, bought 230,000 dunum (over 56,000 acres) of the land of seventeen villages. Other Lebanese families with significant holdings in Palestine included the Bustrus, Tuwayni, Farah, and Salaam. Such families were absentee landlords in that they lived outside Palestine, used middlemen to manage their properties, and readily sold Palestinian land to Zionists for hard capital. Many wealthy, large Palestinian land-owning families also sold land to Zionists.

See also ARAB NATIONALISTS' LAND SALES TO ZIONISTS

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Absentee Property Law

The Law for the Acquisition of Absentee Property, commonly referred to as the Absentee Property Law, was originally one of Israel's General Laws, adopted by the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) on 14 March 1950. The law decreed that any person who before September 1948 was out of the country in an area under the control of the ARAB LEAGUE Forces, or who had left his or her normal place of residence during the period prescribed in the law, or who was absent from his or her property at any time between 29 November 1947 and 1 September 1949, was an "absentee tenant" and would lose his or her property to the state of Israel. On 19 July 1960 the Absentee Property Law was transformed from a General Law to a BASIC LAW called the "Israel LAND LAW."

During the fighting in 1947–1948, many Palestinians left their homes and villages voluntarily, some moving only a few hundred yards, others fleeing to nearby countries for temporary safety. Still others were forcibly driven out by Israeli forces. At the war's end, some 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians were "absent" from their property, and Israel by this law forbade them from returning to their homes and lands. All that they owned, including livestock,

orchards, homes, furniture, jewelry, and bank accounts, became "absentee property." This property was vested in the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY, who then "sold" it to the Israeli DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, which in turn sold it to the state or the JEWISH AGENCY or the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF). The state and these NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS then leased it for Jewish-only use and settlement, and immigrant Jews occupied the property of the "absentees." Palestinians who had fled to a nearby area within Palestine/Israel were designated as PRESENT ABSENTEES; they also lost their land and property under this law.

Absentee property played an enormous role in making Israel a viable state. Estimates of the total amount of "abandoned" lands to which Israel laid claim vary between 4.2 and 5.8 million dunum (between 1 and 1.4 million acres). Of the 370 Jewish settlements founded between 1948 and 1953, 350 were built on absentee property. By 1954 more than a third of Israel's Jewish population lived in or on absentee property.

See also CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; LAND; PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROPERTY CLAIMS; STATE LAND; WAR, 1948

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Abu Ala'a

See QUREI', AHMAD

Abu al-Abbas/Abul Abbas

See ZEIDAN, MUHAMMAD AHMAD FAHD ABBAS

Abu al-Hawl

See AL-HAMID, HAYIL 'ABD

Abu Ali Hasan

See SALAMAH, 'ALI HASAN

Abu Ali Mustafa

See AL-ZABRI, MUSTAFA

Abu al-Lutf

See AL-QADDUMI, FAROUQ

Abu 'Ammar

See ARAFAT, YASIR

Abu Dis

Abu Dis is a suburb of JERUSALEM situated in the shadow of the Mount of Olives. During peace negotiations throughout the OSLO PROCESS, Palestinian negotiators proposed Abu Dis as the center of a compromise Palestinian capital that would have incorporated parts of East Jerusalem—the part of the city that Israel captured in 1967 and that Palestinians expect to be their future capital. Abu Dis is home to the building slated to hold the future Palestinian parliament and contains many other Palestinian government offices as well as the historic family home of former Palestinian prime minister AHMAD QUREI'. However, the twenty-five-foot-high BARRIER cuts through Abu Dis and severs it in half, separating thousands of Palestinian residents from Jerusalem, which they consider home.

The wall runs through Shayah Street, a road of shops and apartments that marked the once-



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The Barrier at Abu Dis

invisible divide between Abu Dis and the Jerusalem neighborhood of RAS AL-AMUD. This has meant that residents who once simply walked across the street to enter Jerusalem must now loop around the MA'ALE ADUMIM SETTLEMENT and that the closest hospitals are in the WEST BANK town of JERICHO, fifteen miles away and beset with CHECKPOINTS. From Israel's perspective, the Barrier seals its claim to all of Jerusalem as one indivisible city under permanent Israeli sovereignty.

In 2006, Irving Moskowitz announced that he had bought land in and around Abu Dis for the construction of another Jewish settlement known as *Kedmat Zion*.

See also SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SETTLER VIOLENCE; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Abu Iyad

See KHALAF, SALAH

Abu Jihad

See AL-WAZIR, KHALIL

Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim (1929–2001)

Ibrahim Abu-Lughod was an educator, institution builder, and activist in both North America and the Middle East. He was born in JAFFA, Palestine, fled during the 1948 WAR, and made his way to the UNITED STATES, where he earned B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Illinois and a Ph.D. in political science from Princeton University in 1957. Presaging his lifelong pattern of combining academic and activist pursuits, after receiving his Ph.D. Abu-Lughod spent four years in Cairo directing the social science research department of UNESCO. Upon returning to North America, Abu-Lughod taught at Smith College and McGill University before joining the faculty of Northwestern University in 1967 and serving three years as department chair. In the early 1980s he again worked for UNESCO, developing plans for a Palestine Open University that was to be based in Beirut; this project ended with the 1982 LEBANON WAR. In March 1988 Abu-Lughod and EDWARD SAID met with US secretary of state GEORGE SHULTZ as part of initial US moves toward recognition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

Abu-Lughod wrote or edited numerous books, including *Arab Rediscovery of Europe: A Study in Cultural Encounters* (1963); *The Evolution of the Meaning of Nationalism* (1963); *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective* (1970); *The Transformation of Palestine* (1971); *Settler Regimes in Africa and the Arab World: The Illusions of Endurance* (1974); *Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial* (1982); and *The Landscape of Palestine: Equivocal Poetry* (1999).

Politically engaged his entire life, Abu-Lughod was a passionate supporter of Palestinian democracy and human rights and lent his voice to numerous Palestinian organizations and initiatives around the world. In 1968 he was one of the founders of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) and, with Edward Said, established the AAUG's multidisciplinary journal *Arab Studies Quarterly* in 1978. Abu-Lughod was also a member of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL between 1977 and 1991. He was critical of the ossification of the Palestinian bureaucracy in the years following the OSLO ACCORDS, however, and was deeply troubled by autocratic elements within the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Thus, in his later years he chose to act primarily through nongovernmental channels. In 1992 Abu-Lughod retired from Northwestern University and moved to Ramallah, West Bank, where he continued to work on Palestinian educational, social, and cultural development. He taught political science at BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY and for several years served as the institution's vice president, in which capacity he initiated the development of a graduate faculty.

From 1995 to 1997, Abu-Lughod headed the Curriculum Development Center, which had the responsibility of developing an independent Palestinian national curriculum for primary and secondary schools. He then created A. M. QATTAN FOUNDATION for educational research, with the purpose of strengthening education at all levels in Palestine. At his death in 2001, he was also deeply involved in efforts to create a national library and a Museum of the Palestinian Memory that would trace Palestinian lives from prehistory until the present.

—Deborah J. Gerner

Abu Mazen

See ABBAS, MAHMUD

Abu Mazen–Beilin Plan

See GENEVA ACCORD

Abu Musa

See MURAGHA, SA'ID MUSA

Abu Nidal

See AL-BANNA, SABRI KHALIL

Abu Sa'id

See AL-HASAN, KHALID MUHAMMAD

Abu Salih

See SALIH, NIMR

Abu Salma

See AL-KARMI, 'ABD-AL-KARIM

'Abu-Sharar, Majed (1936–1981)

Majed 'Abu-Sharar was a writer, intellectual, and senior leftist FATAH militant. He was born in Dora, HEBRON, where he received his formal education, and then moved to Cairo for university study. He worked as a teacher in JORDAN and SAUDI ARABIA. Although his political activism began in the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, he evolved to become one of the most influential progressives within Fatah and, together with NIMR SALIH, led the "Soviet Group," those members of Fatah who believed that PLO interests would be best served by an alliance with MOSCOW. 'Abu-Sharar was secretary of the FATAH-REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL from September 1971 until his death and director of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) Unified Information Department. In 1973 he was elected to the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE. In March 1974 President NIXON sent General Vernon Walters, then deputy director of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, as his special representative for a secret meeting with two PLO leaders—'Abu-Sharar and KHALID AL-HASAN, who represented, respectively, the "left" and "right" wings of Fatah.

During his lifetime, 'Abu-Sharar published a collection of thirteen short stories and numerous articles and position papers. On 6 October 1981, while attending a writers' conference in Rome, he was assassinated by a bomb in his hotel room, allegedly by Israel's MOSSAD.

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Abu Sharif, Bassam Tawfiq (1946–)

Bassam Abu Sharif, also known as Abu Omar, is a leading Palestinian intellectual and activist. He was born in the Old City of JERUSALEM and grew up under the Jordanian Occupation, which lasted from 1948 until 1967. In 1967 he graduated from the American University in Beirut, where he had been active in the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS. He was a founding member of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), but he was expelled from the faction in 1987 because of his close ties to YASIR ARAFAT. During his ten years with the PFLP, Abu Sharif was deputy editor, then editor, of its magazine, *al-Hadaf,* and served as the PFLP spokesman. He was also the secretary of the General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists. Because Abu Sharif advocated closer cooperation between the PFLP and FATAH, he was removed from the politburo and demoted to running external relations in 1981, when a pro-SYRIA line came to dominate the PFLP. His closer ties to Arafat and his meeting with Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 1987 resulted in his expulsion from the PFLP. He then became a special adviser to Arafat, and in this nonpartisan role he floated compromise plans (e.g., his 1988 peace initiative articulating the two-state solution that appeared in the *New York Times* and was rejected by both the UNITED STATES and Israel) that helped prepare Palestinians for the MADRID and OSLO compromises. During the 1980s and 1990s, Abu Sharif articulated a moderate line and played a leading role in PLO peace diplomacy. He rejected political violence and was the main author of Yasir Arafat's statement renouncing TERRORISM and recognizing Israel at the 1988 UN General Assembly meeting in Geneva.

Since the early 1970s, Abu Sharif has been interviewed many times on CNN, ABC, and CBS, as well as European and Middle Eastern news channels. He is still being consulted by heads of state in Europe and the Middle East regarding how best to deal with various situations and Palestinian factions. He is regarded as "the voice of reason" in the Middle East. He still writes articles for the *Washington Post* and *Al Quds* as well as several online newspapers.

In July 1972 Abu Sharif was nearly killed, partially blinded, and permanently disfigured by a letter bomb, allegedly sent by MOSSAD. General Zvi Zamir, Mossad director at the time, considered Abu Sharif "one of the biggest and most dangerous hawks" Israel faced. In 1996, Israel allowed Abu Sharif to enter the GAZA STRIP to attend a meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, which was convened to amend the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER, but he was not permitted to remain. Abu Sharif maintained his role as Arafat's special adviser, though from outside the Occupied Territories, often writing unofficial statements of the Palestinian position until Arafat's death in 2004. He also coauthored a widely read book with an Israeli intelligence officer.

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Abu Za'im

See 'ATALLAH, 'ATALLAH

Achille Lauro

The *Achille Lauro,* a cruise ship, was hijacked on 7 October 1985 by four members of the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF), who, in the course of attempting to take over the ship, killed an elderly American Jew, Leon Klinghoffer.

The hijacking was in retaliation for the Israel bombing on 1 October of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) headquarters in Tunis, which killed more than seventy individuals. This bombing was revenge for the murder of three Israelis aboard their yacht, anchored in Larnaca, on 25 September, for which the PLO's FORCE 17 took responsibility. Indeed, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed an almost continuous cycle of violence between Israel and various Palestinian factions; Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR against the Palestinians, capped by the SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE and the expulsion of the PLO, left extreme bitterness among Palestinians, some of whom subsequently took extreme measures in retaliation.

While holding the passengers and crew hostage, the *Achille Lauro* hijackers directed the vessel to sail to Tartus, SYRIA, and demanded the release of fifty Palestinians then in Israeli prisons. Upon being refused permission to dock at Tartus, the hijackers killed the wheelchair-bound Klinghoffer and threw his body overboard. The ship headed back to Port Said, and after two days of negotiations the hijackers agreed to abandon the liner for safe conduct and were to be flown to Tunisia aboard an Egyptian commercial airliner.

However, the Egyptian plane was intercepted by US Navy fighters on 10 October and directed to land at Naval Air Station Sigonella, a NATO base in Sicily, where the hijackers were arrested by the Italians. The other passengers on the plane (possibly including PLF leader ZEIDAN) were allowed to continue on to their destination, despite protests by the UNITED STATES. EGYPT demanded, but did not receive, an apology from the United States for forcing the airplane off course.

Italy tried and convicted all four hijackers and convicted ZEIDAN (HEAD OF THE ALF) in absentia. Although the PLO was sued for the death of Leon Klinghoffer, the suit was dropped when the PLO paid an undisclosed sum to Klinghoffer's daughters. Nevertheless, the PLO paid an exceedingly high price for this PLF operation. When the PLO and Chairman YASIR ARAFAT declined the US demand that the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE expel Zeidan and publicly condemn the operation, Washington broke off the US-PLO DIALOGUE.

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Acre

One of the oldest cities in the world, Acre lies on the coast about fourteen miles north of HAIFA and twenty miles south of the present Israeli-Lebanese border. Long considered the "Key to Palestine" because of its commanding position on the shore of the broad coastal plain that joins the inland plain, Acre affords the easiest entrance to the interior of the country. Until the mid-twentieth century, Acre was one of Palestine's two major seaports, and it was a fortified town of considerable political importance throughout Palestinian-Arab history.

Acre's significance as a commercial and political center dates from the fifteenth century BCE, when the city served as a terminus for caravans and provided a vital strategic location for both defenders and potential conquerors. In 636 CE the city came under Arab rule, but in 1104 it fell to the Crusaders. In 1187, Acre was retaken by the Muslim leader SALADIN, but the Crusaders conquered it again, and it became the seat of the Kingdom of Acre established by Richard Lionheart in 1191. In 1291 the Muslim MAMLUKS succeeded in retaking the city.

Under the Arabs, who until the mid-twentieth century were the predominant inhabitants, the city had a strongly fortified port and shipbuilding center. In 1516 the OTTOMANS took administrative control, and by the early eighteenth century the Palestinian city was flourishing. Its trade networks with the increasingly dominant European economy were linked to the export of cotton, of which the leading Palestinian families of Acre held a monopoly. Acre's commercial growth and political power in the region grew during the reign of Ottoman Ahmad al-Jazzar (1775–1804), and the population grew rapidly. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Acre had a population of some 6,420, one-sixth of whom were Christian. By 1944 the population had doubled to approximately 12,300, with the same percentage of Christians.

Acre has a number of notable sites, and its history includes several memorable events, such as that of 4 May 1947, when the IRGUN broke into the Acre citadel prison to release Jewish activists imprisoned by the British. Twenty-seven inmates escaped (twenty from the Irgun and seven from LEHI). UNESCO has designated the old city of Acre as a World Heritage site.

From the beginning of the Zionist project, Jewish settlers fervently "reclaimed" Palestine's coastal land, and by the early 1920s, Acre was surrounded by Zionist colonies and also served as a center of Palestinian opposition to the Zionists and the British. In the UN Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181), Acre was designated part of the Palestinian state, but the Zionists wanted it, and on 17 May 1948 the HAGANA conquered Acre and expelled all but 3,200 of its Palestinian inhabitants. In addition, Israeli forces depopulated twenty-six of the villages in the District of Acre.

See also WAR, 1948

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—Betsy Folkins

Adalah

Adalah (Justice), an independent human rights organization registered in Israel, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan legal center that was established in November 1996 to serve Arab citizens of Israel, who number over 1 million people, or close to 20 percent of the population. Adalah works to protect human rights in general and the rights of the Arab minority in particular. Its main goals are to achieve individual and collective rights—LAND, civil, political, cultural, social, economic, religious, women's, and prisoners'—for the Arab minority in Israel. (http://www.adalah.org/).

See also ARAB ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; ASSOCIATION OF FORTY

Addameer: Prisoners Support and Human Rights Association

Addameer (Conscience) is a Palestinian nongovernmental, civil institution that focuses on human rights issues. It was established in Ramallah in 1992 by a group of activists interested in human rights. The center's activities focus on offering support for Palestinian PRISONERS, advocating the rights of political prisoners, and working to end torture through monitoring, legal procedures, and solidarity campaigns. (http://www.addameer.org/).

See also PRISONERS AND PRISON CONDITIONS

Aden-Algiers Accord

The Aden-Algiers Accord was signed in July 1984 between two factions within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)—the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE and the mainstream FATAH—after a major and bloody split within the PLO. The agreement called for extensive reform of Palestinian political structures and a different direction in the PLO's foreign policy. Under the accord, YASIR ARAFAT agreed (1) to repudiate his visit to Cairo and to cease contact with EGYPT; (2) to honor a prohibition on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to any future peace negotiation; (3) to reject the REAGAN PLAN and Israel's "JORDANIAN OPTION" and improve relations with SYRIA; and (4) to institute mechanisms that would secure the principle of collective leadership and expand the scope of democratic decisionmaking processes and institutions within the PLO. The agreement was never implemented because Arafat chose to pursue a unilateral direction.

See also LEBANON WAR, 1982

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Administrative Detention

Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial, authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree. Administrative detention orders are initially imposed for a six-month period, but an individual may have his/her detention renewed in six-month increments indefinitely. The practice is allowed under INTERNATIONAL LAW, but because of the serious damage to due process rights inherent in this measure and the danger of abuse, international law has placed rigid restrictions on its application. According to Israel, administrative detention is intended to prevent the danger posed to state security.

Within eight days after a detention order is signed, detainees accused of security offenses are brought before a military judge, who reviews the evidence; detainees may not see this evidence. A three-judge panel examines serious charges, and one judge examines lesser charges. Hearings are not open to the public. Once a court order is issued, the detainee is usually granted access to a lawyer, but any meeting must be coordinated two to four days in advance with the Israeli prison authorities, and lawyers are not permitted to see the evidence against their client.

Israeli authorities assert that administrative detention is not arbitrary because the orders are reviewed by judges; however, the term *judicial review* is misleading in the case of Palestinian detainees. ISRAELI MILITARY COURTS are established by the military commander, and all judges in the military court system are active Israeli army officers.

The military courts have almost always ruled in favor of detention and given the detainee a sentence of six months of imprisonment that can be extended and/or renewed indefinitely. In a few cases, the judge may take into account the period spent by the detainee in custody prior to the issuing of the order, thereby reducing the time still to be spent in detention. According to B'TSELEM, by January 2009, out of 548 administrative detainees, approximately 42 had spent a total of more than two years in prison. Five other detainees have been administratively detained for three to five years. Over the years, the orders governing administrative detention have been repeatedly amended through subsequent military orders to impose harsher procedural rules when deemed appropriate, or to grant Israeli military authorities wider latitude to make use of such orders.

Administrative detainees can appeal their detention order before an appellate judge in an Israeli military court, where a process similar to that of the initial hearing takes place. Such appeals, however, are regularly denied. Although a detainee can appeal to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, such a review does not include the right to see the evidence on which the detention is based.

As a practice, administrative detention originated in the British DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS of 1945. Although Britain repealed these regulations shortly before the end of the BRITISH

MANDATE, Israel adopted them, first applying them to its Palestinian-Arab citizens until 1965, and then resurrecting them two years later with the 1967 OCCUPATION. In 1970, Israel also enacted its own military orders relating to administrative detention through Article 87 of Military Order No. 378 in the WEST BANK and through an unnumbered order in the GAZA STRIP. These orders stipulate that an Israeli military commander, or anybody to whom he delegates his authority, can order the administrative detention of an individual if "he is a danger to the security of the area."

Israeli law recognizes that administrative detention is a radical measure that seriously infringes on a detainee's rights and therefore should only be used in exceptional circumstances. However, in practice, Israel has ignored this principle toward Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Several safeguards that exist in Israeli law are absent from the system of administrative detention put in place by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

The state does not disclose the evidence for the alleged threat posed by the detained individual, either to the detainee or to his or her attorney. Over the years, Israel has held Palestinians in prolonged detention without trying them and without informing them of the suspicions against them. If Israel has convincing evidence of an individual's wrongdoing or lawbreaking, it arrests, tries, and convicts that person in a military court.

Prior to the OSLO ACCORDS, Israel considered any expression of Palestinian nationalism a "security offense" subject to administrative detention. Administrative detention has also been the primary method to punish persons for their speech, writings, and alleged associations; to suppress political activities by Palestinians that oppose Israel's Occupation, including nonviolent activities; and to intimidate human rights defenders.

Within three years after the 1967 WAR, approximately 1,200 Palestinians were incarcerated under administrative detention orders. In the 1980s, Israel's use of administrative detention decreased significantly. From 1985 to 1987, mounting internal and international pressure resulted in a much smaller number of Palestinians—approximately 316—placed under administrative detention. During the First INTIFADA, Israel was charged with deploying administrative detention as a punitive measure, rather than as a preventive one. Between 1987 and 1992, Israeli authorities had issued more than 14,000 orders of administrative detention to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

In 1998 the number of Palestinians held in administrative detention again began to gradually decline. From 1999 to October 2001, the average annual number was less than twenty. Israel steadily increased the use of administrative detention after October 2001. This trend increased during and after OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD in 2002. Following the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, Israel stepped up its use of administrative detention. According to B'Tselem, the number of detainees increased from 12 by the end of 2000 to 34 by the end of 2001. By late 2004, there were approximately 860 administrative detainees. By the beginning of March 2003, Israel held more than a thousand Palestinians in administrative detention. In 2007, Israel held a monthly average of 830 administrative detainees, which was 100 higher than in 2006.

Israeli authorities have made family visits extremely difficult for Palestinian prisoners, including for child detainees. Defense for Children International (DCI)–Palestine Section estimates that from 2004 to 2007, an average of 27 children per year have served administrative detention sentences. By December 2008, out of approximately 330 children detained by Israel, 6 were held in administrative detention, including two girls. Administrative detention also violates the principle reiterated by Article 37 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, according to which deprivation of liberty of a child should "be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time." Israel is party to this convention.

Israel states that its practice of administrative detention complies with international legal standards. However, critics respond that by failing to adhere to the restrictions imposed on this practice by international human rights and humanitarian law, Israel has abused its policy of administrative detention of Palestinians. They have also argued that such detention constitutes a serious violation of the rights of administrative detainees—most notably the right to due process or a fair trial.

See also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN AUTHORITY; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; PRISONERS AND PRISON CONDITIONS

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—Rouba Al-Salem

Advisory Council

In October 1920, Great Britain's high commissioner, Sir HERBERT SAMUEL, created the Advisory Council as the first step in his concept of self-government for Palestine. The council was composed in equal parts of official (government) and nominated unofficial members. Of the ten unofficial members, seven were Palestinians—four Muslims and three Christians—and three were Jews. Although the Palestinian members stated that they did not represent the Palestinian population as a whole, they accepted the council because they believed it was temporary. In August 1922 Samuel announced that he intended to replace the Advisory Council with a LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL related to a new constitution for self-government in Palestine. Jewish leaders accepted the proposals, albeit reluctantly, but Palestinian leaders, believing that participation would signify their acceptance of the Mandate's commitment to the BALFOUR DECLARATION, rejected them.

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Agriculture, Palestinian

See ECONOMY: THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE PALESTINIANS

Agudat Yisrael

The name Agudat Yisrael (Association of Israel) refers to several related organizations; however, here it is examined as an Israeli political party that originated in the Agudat Yisrael Movement in Europe in the early twentieth century. Formally founded in Kattowitz in 1912, it represents ASHKENAZI and HAREDI Judaism and is currently the Hasidic wing of the UNITED TORAH JUDAISM (Yahadut HaTorah) Party, which comprises Agudat Yisrael (representing the Hasidim) and DEGEL HATORAH (representing the Misnagdim "opponents," referring to Ashkenazi religious Jews who opposed the rise and spread of early Hasidic Judaism).

Though the party has elected only a handful of members to the Knesset, it has often played a crucial role—at times holding the balance of power—in coalition governments because of the nature of Israel's system of proportional representation, and it has used its political leverage to integrate the Orthodox religious agenda into Israeli society. Although the party is not a member of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, it has cooperated with Israel's leadership in matters of IMMIGRATION, SETTLEMENT, and defense and has participated in all Knesset elections since 1948. As such, it has been able to participate in both LIKUD and LABOR-led coalitions. In the past, Agudat Yisrael's positions on Israeli foreign policy generally and the

Palestinian question in particular were relatively flexible. In more recent years, however, Agudat Yisrael has become increasingly sympathetic to the SETTLER movement in the Occupied Territories, primarily because a large number of Haredi now populate the settlements. As a consequence, Agudat Yisrael is unwilling to return land to the Palestinians, to cease building settlements in the WEST BANK, or to accept a Palestinian state.

See also DEGEL HATORAH; SETTLEMENTS; UNITED TORAH JUDAISM

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Ahdut Ha'avodah

Ahdut Ha'avodah (Unity of Labor) was an early forerunner of the Israeli LABOR PARTY that was started in 1919 by DAVID BEN-GURION (Israel's founder) as a right-wing faction of PO'ALE ZION and affiliated socialist groups. In 1920, Ahdut Ha'avodah established the HISTADRUT, which was the linchpin of Ben-Gurion's organization and of the Yishuv leadership. In 1930, Ahdut Ha'avodah merged with HAPOEL HATZAIR and created MAPAI, also dominated by Ben-Gurion. In 1968, in a merger with several smaller parties, it became the Labor Party.

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Ahdut Ha'avoda-Po'alei Zion

The Ahdut Ha'avoda-Po'alei Zion (Unity of Workers' Labor) was a workers' party established in 1946 following a split in MAPAI (the precursor to the Labor Party). Most of its leaders were members of the United Kibbutz movement. The party merged with MAPAM in 1948 and ran within the framework of that union for the First and Second Knessets. In 1954 it reemerged as an independent party because of ideological differences with Mapam when four Members of the Knesset left the Mapam parliamentary group. The party ran independently for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Knessets and was a member of all the governments formed in the course of these Knessets. Prior to elections for the Sixth Knesset, Ahdut Ha'avoda-Po'alei Zion merged with RAFI and Mapai, and in 1968 it was among the founders of the Israel LABOR PARTY. Following the 1967 WAR, many of its members, including the party's ideological leader, Yitzhak Tabenkin, supported the idea of a Greater Israel. Another leader, YIGAL ALLON, put forth a plan to retain permanent control of the territories captured in 1967.

See also LABOR PARTY

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Aid to Israel

See US AID TO ISRAEL

Airport, Palestinian

See RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT II

Al-Alami Family

The al-Alami family was a prominent Palestinian landowning family that played important civic and religious roles in JERUSALEM and GAZA beginning in the twelfth century. During the Ottoman period and the period of the BRITISH MANDATE, many notable public officials and religious scholars came from this family. Highly respected members from Jerusalem include MUSA AL-ALAMI (?–1881), an OTTOMAN official and mayor of Jerusalem; and Faydi (1865–1924), an Ottoman official, mayor of Jerusalem, and member of the British ADVISORY COUNCIL. Those from Gaza include Yusuf (1897–1939), a businessman and politician during the Mandate; Samih (1921–1997), a physician and

one of the founders of the Red Crescent; and Sami (1924–), a businessman, banker, and financial adviser to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. The Ottomans appointed the al-Alami family as caretakers of a *zawiya* (a religious place) on top of the Mount of Olives because a shrine to their ancestor, al-Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Omar al-Alami, who died in 1628 CE, is buried inside it. The *zawiya* has been renovated and is currently open for prayers and visitors.

Al-Alami, Musa (1897–1984)

A member of a prominent Palestinian landowning family, Musa al-Alami had an early political role in Palestinian affairs. Born in JERUSALEM, he was drafted into the OTTOMAN army in 1917 but, not wishing to serve the Turks, fled undercover to Damascus. During his stay in the Syrian capital, al-Alami became involved with Arab nationalists and was much influenced by their thinking. After studying law at Trinity College in Cambridge, he returned to Palestine in 1922 and worked as a junior legal adviser to the BRITISH MANDATORY administration from 1925 to 1929. His career flourished under the British and in 1932 the British appointed al-Alami private secretary to the HIGH COMMISSIONER. From this position, he attempted to persuade the British to take a more evenhanded approach to Palestinian and Zionist interests in Palestine. As a result, the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION launched a campaign against him, and in 1937 the British acquiesced and demoted him to a government advocate.

In 1934 and again in 1936, DAVID BEN-GURION, then chairman of the JEWISH AGENCY Executive Committee, asked to meet with al-Alami. Ben-Gurion wanted Palestinian support for a Jewish majority and a Jewish state in Palestine. Al-Alami agreed to the meeting because he hoped to convince the Zionists to moderate their goals, accept a canton solution short of statehood, and agree to a ceiling on the Jewish population below 50 percent. Given the conflicting aims of the two men, the talks bore no fruit, and in late 1936, in the context of the ARAB REVOLT, al-Alami circulated a petition among 137 Palestinian officials calling on the British government to accept all the demands made by the general strike, including the temporary suspension of Jewish IMMIGRATION. Although all 137 officials signed the petition, the British rejected it. That and his firing, which soon followed, drove al-Alami into exile from 1937 through 1942, first to Beirut and then to Baghdad. From the DIASPORA, he served as an independent delegate to the LONDON CONFERENCE in 1939 and was the sole Palestinian delegate at the Preparatory Conference for the Establishment of the ARAB LEAGUE, held in Alexandria in September–October 1944. Subsequently, he headed the league-funded Information Office in London. In 1948 al-Alami lost most of his property to the Zionists—including his Jerusalem home.

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Albright, Madeleine (1937–)

Madeleine Korbel Albright served as US ambassador to the UNITED NATIONS (1993–1996) and later as secretary of state (1996–2001) under the administration of President CLINTON. She was the first woman to hold the nation's top foreign policy position. A noted political scientist, she served as a professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and as a foreign policy adviser to prominent members of the Democratic Party, both before and after her time in government. Born in Czechoslovakia as the daughter of a prominent Czech diplomat, she spent her early years in Prague and London prior to immigrating with her family to the United States in 1948 and becoming a US citizen in 1957. She received her B.A. from Wellesley College and her Ph.D. at Columbia University.

Through the key foreign policy positions Albright held in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, she played a major role in asserting American unilateralism and weakening the role of the United Nations. This was especially apparent with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where she was at the forefront of the shift to the right in US foreign policy, supporting the Israeli

government's positions regarding the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES during the critical period spanning the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES and the outbreak of the Second INTIFADA.

Albright claimed—over the objections of the Palestinians and the consensus of international legal scholars—that previous UN resolutions on the outstanding issues of the conflict were rendered moot by the Declaration of Principles, arguing that "resolution language" referring to "FINAL STATUS" issues should be dropped, since these issues were now under negotiations by the parties themselves. These included REFUGEES, SETTLEMENTS, territorial sovereignty, and the status of JERUSALEM. Given the asymmetry of power between the Palestinians and their Israeli occupiers, blocking the United Nations from enforcing international legal standards gave the Israeli government enormous leverage to dramatically expand its illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories and to tighten its control over greater East Jerusalem.

This position was manifested in her actions as secretary of state, when Albright ordered the US representative to veto three UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israeli violations of the Fourth Geneva Conventions in the Occupied West Bank, thereby negating these otherwise unanimously supported resolutions of the fifteen-member body. Albright also put considerable pressure on the UN Secretariat to suppress critical reports regarding certain Israeli actions, such as the April 1996 Israeli attack on a UN base outside Qana, LEBANON, in which over 100 refugees were killed.

A number of key Albright advisers and appointees in the US State Department dealing with Israeli-Palestinian issues came from political circles that were strongly supportive of a number of controversial Israeli policies, such as MARTIN INDYK, who served as her assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs as well as US ambassador to Israel. Under Albright, issues concerning Israeli violations of INTERNATIONAL LAW and the failure to provide a framework for a viable Palestinian state alongside Israel were supplanted by efforts to end Palestinian violence against Israelis as the primary focus of US policy.

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—Stephen Zunes

Algiers Declaration, 1988

See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, PALESTINIAN

Algiers Summit, 1973

In November 1973, shortly after the OCTOBER WAR, 1973, the ARAB LEAGUE met in Algiers and affirmed the necessity of (1) liberating all the territories, including East JERUSALEM, conquered by Israel in 1967; and (2) restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people according to the decisions of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Most importantly, the league designated the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and effectively stripped JORDAN of the right to speak for the Palestinians. (Jordan's King Husayn refused to accept the draft resolution on the PLO but had little choice, a year later, at the RABAT SUMMIT in 1974, except to defer to the Arab consensus.) It was also decided at Algiers that the oil embargo imposed on the UNITED STATES during the 1973 War should be lifted, giving SAUDI ARABIA a face-saving device in the context of intense US pressure on Riyadh. Finally, a resolution was adopted stating that the US policy of complete alignment with Israel would adversely affect American interests in the region. At the close of the meeting, the leaders issued a statement declaring their willingness to participate in a peace process based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. This constituted a clear indication of the Arab regimes' willingness to recognize and accept Israel as a state in the Middle East; however, Israel and the United States completely rejected the Arab League's initiative.

See also ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC

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Al-Ali, Naji al-Azami (1936/7–1987)

Naji al-Ali was a political cartoonist whose drawings were distinguished by their biting critiques of the Arab regimes, including the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and their commentaries on the suffering of the Arab people. He was born in Galilee and together with his family was dispossessed in 1948. He grew up in Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camp in LEBANON and published his first drawings in Lebanese newspapers in the early 1970s. Al-Ali moved to KUWAIT in the early 1960s and then returned to Lebanon in 1971, where he served on the editorial board of the prominent Lebanese newspaper *al-Safir* and contributed cartoons to other prominent Arab newspapers. Fearing for his life, al-Ali left Lebanon again in 1983 and returned to Kuwait; however, under pressure from neighboring SAUDI ARABIA, Kuwait expelled him in 1985. Welcomed nowhere by Arab governments, he moved to London. An assassination attempt on 22 July 1987 led to his death on 30 August of the same year.

Naji al-Ali's cartoons typically contained a character called Hanzala ("bitterness," as in "the bitter truth")—a small, poor boy with his hands behind his back watching in silence the scene unfolding in front of him. Whether the subject was Israeli actions against the Palestinians, the corruption of Arab governments, or the hypocrisy of the world, Hanzala's silence represented the Arab masses and contained an indirect message to rise to the challenge. The murder of Naji al-Ali was intended to strike terror in the hearts of those who opposed the Arab regimes or the PLO leadership. Although several countries accused each other of being responsible for the murder, the truth is that all were pleased with his death. Yet his portrayal of Israeli savagery against the Palestinians and the Lebanese in Lebanon won him several international prizes and made him the most prominent cartoonist in the Arab world. In recognition of his contributions to freedom of expression, al-Ali was posthumously awarded the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers' Golden Pen Award in 1988.

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Aliya

Aliya (ascension or going up) is the quasi-biblical term given to Jews as individuals or groups from abroad who immigrate to Palestine or, as Zionists call it, the Land of Israel. Those who "ascend" for this purpose are known as *olim.* A series of waves of *olim* provided the population base for the establishment of the state of Israel. The First Aliya, from 1882 to 1903, came mostly from Eastern Europe and included a small contingent from Yemen; in that period 35,000 *olim* arrived, though over half left. The Second Aliya, from 1904 to 1914, came primarily from MOSCOW; 40,000 arrived and approximately half left. The Third Aliya, from 1919 to 1923, came mostly from Eastern Europe; approximately 40,000 came and few left. The Fourth Aliya, from 1924 to 1929, was primarily from Poland; approximately 82,000 came and 23,000 left. The Fifth Aliya, from 1929 to 1939, came primarily from GERMANY and Eastern Europe; nearly 250,000 came and approximately 20,000 left. During the years 1944–1948, illegal IMMIGRATION (*aliya bet*) was the major method of immigration because the British set a quota of 18,000 per year. Some 100,000 *aliya bet* reached Palestine during 1945–1948, and few left.

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Alliance Israélite Universelle

The Alliance Israélite Universelle is an International Jewish organization, founded by a group of French Jews in Paris in 1860 to protect Jewish rights as citizens and to promote modern educational facilities and professional development among Jews around the world. The stated goals of the alliance were "to work everywhere for the

emancipation and moral progress of the Jews; offer effective assistance to Jews suffering from ANTI-SEMITISM and to encourage all publications calculated to promote this aim."

The Alliance Israélite Universelle remains today one of the principal international organizations in the field of Jewish education and culture. Its objective rests on the diffusion of a type of Judaism that is simultaneously faithful to tradition, tolerant, and open to the modern world. Furthermore, the alliance strives to promote French language and culture abroad.

It acts as a major partner in defending human rights and dialogue between religions. Its work is made up of its network of schools in France and abroad, its schools of continuing studies (Section Normale des Études Juives and the Collège des Études Juives), and its extensive library and publications are of great benefit to those who are in a position to take advantage of them.

Originally the alliance tended to be assimilationist and was not receptive to ZIONISM. That has changed somewhat over the years.

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Allon, Yigal (1918–1980)

Yigal Allon was an Israeli military commander and statesman. Born at Kefar Tavor in the Lower Galilee, he graduated in 1937 from the Kaduri Agricultural School of the Hebrew University and later studied at St. Anthony's College, Oxford. Allon was a founding member of Kibbutz Ginosar and was active in underground military operations during 1936–1939, when he served in "special units" of the HAGANA. In 1941 he was among the founders of the PALMAH, the elite commando unit of the Hagana; in 1945 he became its commander. During the 1948 WAR, Allon was commander of the Southern Front, driving the Arab fighters from the whole of the Negev, including Eilat and part of the Sinai Peninsula. He was regarded as the most experienced field commander in the Israel Defense Forces.

After the war, Allon became one of the leaders of the AHDUT HA'AVODA-PO'ALEI ZION political party, and in 1954 he was elected to the Knesset. From 1961 to 1967, Allon served as minister of labor. In 1967 he was a member of the "inner war cabinet" that mapped out the Israeli strategy for the 1967 WAR. In 1968 Allon became deputy prime minister and in the following year also became minister of education and culture. In the YITZHAK RABIN government (1974–1977), Allon served as deputy prime minister. He is remembered for, among other things, the ALLON PLAN, a strategic program for Israel's retention of the WEST BANK, and for abstaining on the vote on the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS with EGYPT. Allon encouraged the GUSH EMUNIM in 1968 to establish a settlement on the outskirts of HEBRON–KIRYAT ARBA.

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Allon Plan

The Allon Plan was the political-strategic blueprint that Israeli statesman and military commander YIGAL ALLON formulated in the summer of 1967—immediately after the 1967 WAR—for holding on to the WEST BANK. Although his plan guaranteed secure borders based on firm topographical advantages and strategic depth—two security parameters that eluded Israel during its first two decades—it did not become the government's official plan in the postwar period, although its principles were incorporated into policymaking in all successive governments.

Allon's Strategic Thinking

As a member of Israel's political-security leadership, Allon belonged to a small coterie of senior military officers who realized the importance of developing a political-strategic concept that would orient the state's security thinking. Once it became clear that the highest offices in the military were barred to him, Allon turned to politics and began preparing for senior positions. His formal academic studies at Oxford University, together with his experience as a commanding general in the

1948–1949 operations, which influenced the demarcation of Israel's northern and southern boundaries, helped him develop a lucid, systematic, political-security vision.

Toward the end of the 1948 WAR, Allon perceived Israel's eastern boundaries with JORDAN as unsatisfactory. Therefore, he proposed seizing the West Bank and officially annexing it to Israel, believing that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were capable of carrying out such an operation. This "annexation through conquest" concept stemmed from Allon's political belief and party stand that the Jewish people were entitled to the entire area of Greater Israel. For this reason also, he opposed the ARMISTICE AGREEMENT with Jordan, believing that it precluded the permanent determination of defensible borders and strategic depth. Over the years Allon retained his dream of "retrofitted" borders, declaring as early as 1949 that additional areas of the historic "Land of Israel" would become an inseparable part of the state after another major Israeli-Arab clash.

After the 1948 War, Allon believed that Israel's ability to establish and maintain a defense network for the state's boundaries was woefully limited. In light of the Arabs' rapidly increasing military strength, Israel would have to develop an independent defense system (i.e., one not requiring foreign intervention) capable of resisting any combination of forces aligned against it. In other words, Israel would have to find a viable alternative to its strategic system. He was convinced that in 1948–1949, Israel missed the opportunity to gain the political, security, and economic advantages that a larger chunk of territory would have granted. He also felt that the armistice agreements denied Israel the strategic, operational, and logistical initiative and gave it instead to the Arab states.

By failing to reap the political fruits of the 1949 victory, Allon argued, Israel had allowed a situation to stabilize that left it divided territorially, surrounded by hostile states and bereft of clearly defined borders or strategic depth. He was also concerned that the Arabs would launch a "second round."

Allon assessed EGYPT's offensive concentration in Sinai on 15 May 1967 as the first step toward an actual attack. Egypt's redeployment violated the terms of the armistice agreement signed after the Sinai Campaign in 1956, which committed Egypt to refrain from concentrating military forces in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel could not allow the Arab armies to maintain what Allon believed were their quantitative advantages and operational initiative. Therefore, the IDF had to strike before Egypt completed its deployment. The Egyptians' blockade of the Straits of Tiran and curtailment of Israel's air and maritime freedom in the Red Sea were secondary matters compared to what Allon believed was a tangible threat to Israel's existence.



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Map 1. The Allon Plan

Allon claimed that the 1967 WAR was the ultimate expression of his concept of war management, arguing that a preemptive attack was necessary because Israel's vital interests were at risk and its security threatened. The advantages of this move were greater than the price that might have been paid by letting the enemy gain the tactical initiative. Strategically, Allon thought that the concept stood the severest of all tests—Israel's survival. The initiative succeeded primarily because of Israel's superior implementation of its military force. For the first time in its history, Israel gained topographical and geostrategic advantages that also enhanced its status.

Allon Plan in Detail

The 1967 War, more than any other Middle East war, was waged according to Allon's concept of the preemptive counterattack, especially on the Egyptian front. Israel's "lightning" victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria left the IDF deployed along the Suez Canal, Jordan River, and Golan Heights. One week after the fighting, the Israeli government, via US diplomatic channels, offered Syria and Egypt the return of the captured lands in exchange for face-to-face negotiations, political recognition, and peace agreements.

As for Jordan, Allon, who was the minister of labor at the time, formulated a different plan during the last days of the war. Brought before the Israeli government for discussion in the second half of July 1967, the plan was not officially adopted out of fear that the national coalition government, which had amalgamated on the eve of the 1967 War, would fall apart. Nevertheless, Allon's formulations became integral to Israel's policies vis-à-vis the West Bank. Submitted on 26 July, the plan called for the following government resolution:

- The Jordan River and the line cutting through the middle of the Dead Sea would constitute Israel's border with Jordan.
- "In order to assure a strong defensive deployment and the strategic integrity of Israel," the following territories would be joined to Israel:
  - A strip along the Jordan Rift Valley from the Beit She'an Valley to the north of the Dead Sea, with the inclusion of minimal Arab population.
  - A strip from north of the Dead Sea road to the north of greater Jerusalem, including Mount Hebron or "at least" the Judean Desert going toward the Negev.
- In the territories to be joined to Israel, new settlements would be established and permanent military bases would be built according to security needs.
- In eastern JERUSALEM, urban neighborhoods populated by Jews would be built, and the Jewish quarter of the old city would be rehabilitated and populated.
- Negotiations would be started with leaders and public figures from the West Bank about the establishment of an autonomous Arab district in areas not included in Israel's territory. The autonomous district would be connected to Israel in a joint economic framework and with a mutual defense treaty.
- The government would design a comprehensive plan for a solution to the problem of Palestinian REFUGEES on the basis of regional cooperation and international aid. "In addition, the government will start to establish a model settlement of refugees in the West Bank or Sinai in order to learn from the experience and demonstrate our good will at the same time."
- The GAZA STRIP would be designated an integral part of Israel after the refugees were rehabilitated elsewhere. Until then, the Gaza Strip would have the status of an occupied area held by a military government.

Analysis of the Allon Plan

From Allon's perspective, the plan constituted a long-term answer to three main issues that had been plaguing Israel since the end of the 1948 War:

1. Topography: It outlined defensible boundaries based on the contours of the land.
2. Demography: It provided a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees and at the same time safeguarded the Jewish nature of Israel by granting full autonomy to the inhabitants of the Arab territories.
3. Strategy: It offered a solution to Israel's security problems.

Allon's plan was designed to avert Israel's presence on the West Bank and domination over a large Palestinian population. His retreat from the idea of Greater Israel, which he had previously championed, and which the government's right-wing coalition partners still accepted, reflects the basic change in his worldview at the end of the war.

Nevertheless, the comprehensive plan was an attempt to solve Israel's security and political

needs after new conditions had been created on Israel's eastern border. In the short run, the plan called for Israel's total control of the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY by fixing the Jordan River as Israel's eastern border. The plan was divided into two main phases: (1) the establishment of a rural and urban settlement continuum along the length of the Jordan Rift Valley as a security border, and (2) having this continuum serve as a tool in the political struggle to finalize Israel's boundaries. Although the government did not ratify Allon's plan, it agreed de facto to construct security settlements as "influencing factors" that would pressure the "other side" to accept the entire plan at a future date.

In practice, the Allon Plan set up military settlements (NAHAL outposts) and civilian settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley and on the eastern slopes of the Samarian Mountains. Allon was an outspoken proponent of this settlement chain and hoped to "determine facts on the ground" in light of the inaction of the government, which preferred to leave the plan in limbo so that it could adapt it to the changing political reality. Allon felt that the plan remained relevant, but until the LIKUD PARTY ascended to government in May 1977, he saw little progress.

Until 1977, the plan was implemented selectively as the basis of Israel's settlement policy beyond the pre-1967 border. A decade after the plan was first presented to the government, it went through a number of modifications and was brought before international bodies—an indication that Israel was willing to make peace with Jordan. As long as the West Bank remained under Israeli control, however, Jordan's KING HUSAYN completely rejected the proposal. The other Arab countries also refused to consider any form of territorial compromise with Israel.

When Allon's party was relegated to the parliamentary opposition, he added another layer to the plan in November 1978. This was "The Plan for the Jordan's Banks"—an economic plan of considerable political significance but one that also failed to materialize. This scheme envisioned the excavation of a canal from the Mediterranean Sea, through Israel's northern valleys, to the Jordan Rift Valley. The canal would boost the rift's development by serving both Israeli and Jordanian interests. Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN's ardently nationalistic government, however, took no interest in the plan. The new Likud government unconditionally supported the concept of Greater Israel and the establishment of Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the West Bank but intended to keep them permanently rather than merely hold on to them as Allon had conceived.

After the Likud's ascendancy to power, Allon continued to advocate his concept, and, in an unpublished internal document in 1978, he stated: "The geostrategic conditions which have existed in the Middle East since June 1967 permit a solution based upon a fair compromise. This could provide Israel with the minimal defensible boundaries that are indispensable without impairing to any meaningful extent the basic interests of the other side, including those of the Palestinian Arab community. . . . According to the formula for compromise, which I personally advocate, Israel—within the context of peace settlements—would give up the vast majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 War.

"The Arabs, on the other hand, would have to concede their claim over certain zones which are of vital strategic and security importance to Israel, but only very sparsely populated by Arabs. These territories will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 War lines—a defense posture, which would enable the small, standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens could be mobilized. These security zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize and launch the counteroffensive needed to defeat any such aggression. . . .

"Since the West Bank is densely populated by Arabs, the strategic depth and topographical barrier cannot be attained by simply establishing Israel's boundaries along the old Mandatory border—i.e. the Jordan River. Rather, apart from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of the 'green line,' as for example at Latrun, this same goal can be achieved by the establishment of absolute Israeli control over the strategic zones to the east of the dense Arab population concentrated on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samarian and Judean mountains to the west—Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles, and it is almost devoid of population. The Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank would be outside the zone of Israeli sovereignty and revert to Arab rule. Cutting through the Israeli security zone along the Jordan Valley extending from north to south, it

would be possible to delineate a corridor running from west to east and placed under Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, between the Arab populated areas of the West and East Banks of the river. In this manner the only realistic solution can be materialized—one that also helps resolve the problem of the Palestinian identity that could then find its expression in a single Jordanian-Palestinian state.

"It would be unimaginable and absolute folly that Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any Arab or Muslim state, but was always the capital and center of the Jewish people, should be partitioned, the Holy City and adjacent areas, which are essential for its protection and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under Israeli sovereignty.

"Because of Jerusalem's universal character, resulting from its holy status in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as its heterogeneous population, a religious solution, not a political one, is called for. A possible solution would be to grant special rights to the representatives of the various faiths over the places holy to them, while the municipal structure of the city might be based upon sub-districts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account."

Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN, Allon's deputy during the 1948 War, outlined his view of the future map of Israel to the Knesset in October 1995, which he demarcated according to the principles that Allon had proposed in 1967. Rabin was assassinated before he could complete the task, but in 2005 Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON, after making a conceptual about-face, began to reshape Israel's borders according to these same principles.

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—Amir Bar-Or

All Palestine Government

On 22 September 1948, based on an ARAB LEAGUE resolution that was framed primarily to confront JORDAN over its plans to occupy the WEST BANK, the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE declared the establishment of an All Palestine Government (APG) located in the GAZA STRIP and headed by Ahmad Hilmi Abd al-Baqi, former military governor of JERUSALEM. The APG began by issuing passports and seeking international recognition. Two weeks later, on 30 September, it convened the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC). Despite being prohibited from entering any part of Palestine, the former mufti (religious leader) of Jerusalem, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, was the driving force behind the new government and slipped into Gaza City surreptitiously to attend the PNC meeting. The PNC elected him president of the government and 'Abd al-Baqi prime minister. A declaration of independence was issued on 1 October 1948, and the congress declared Jerusalem the capital of Palestine, adopted the FLAG of the 1936 ARAB REVOLT as the national symbol, and laid out the institutional structure of the government. In reality, however, the Palestine government had no administration, no money, no army except what remained after Israel's defeat of the ARAB LIBERATION ARMY, and very little territory.

Initially, under enormous British pressure, no Arab regime recognized the APG, and eight days after al-Hajj Amin's triumphal entrance into Gaza, the Egyptians unceremoniously deported him to Cairo, where they kept him under close surveillance. 'Abd al-Baqi and his ministers soon followed al-Hajj Amin into exile. In mid-October, however, Israel broke the second truce in the 1948 WAR with action against EGYPT; this development prompted IRAQ, SYRIA, EGYPT, LEBANON, and SAUDI ARABIA to recognize the APG, though their declarations were no more than empty gestures designed to placate the Arab masses.

Though short-lived and ill-starred, the All Palestine Government retains considerable political relevance because it highlights several of the basic dilemmas still facing Palestinians—especially the question of the Palestinians' relationships with the Arab states, Israel, and the world powers.

See also ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC

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Aloni, Shulamit (1929–)

Shulamit Aloni is an Israeli lawyer, human rights activist, founder of the RATZ political organization (Movement for Civil Rights and Peace), and former member of the Knesset. She was born in Tel Aviv to parents who had immigrated to Palestine from Poland. Aloni was a member of the HASHOMER HATZAIR (The Young Guard) youth movement and served in the HAGANA. Immediately after the 1948 WAR, she began to work with war refugee children in JAFFA and helped to establish a school for immigrant children in Ramla. Later she taught in Ramat Gan and Tel Aviv while studying at the Law and Economics College attached to the Shevach School, where she qualified as a lawyer. In 1959 she joined the LABOR PARTY, but she left it in 1973 and within forty-eight hours established Ratz. In the next election for the Knesset, the party won three seats.

During the 1970s Aloni was involved in attempts to create dialogue with the Palestinians in order to pave the way to peace. This involvement increased after the start of the LEBANON WAR, when she helped establish the International Center for Peace in the Middle East. In 1984, Ratz's parliamentary representation increased to five seats with members of PEACE NOW, including Ran Cohen from SHELLI, and later Yossi Sarid and Mordechi Virshubsky. In 1991 three parties, Ratz, SHINUI, and MAPAM, united to form MERETZ, which won twelve seats in the 1992 election. Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN appointed Aloni minister of education, but she was forced to resign because of pressure from ultra-Orthodox parties. During these years, a rift developed between Aloni and certain members of the movement under the leadership of Sarid, and in 1996 she retired from politics.

Today Aloni is involved in lecturing on topics related to human rights and peace with the Palestinians. Her political beliefs are reflected in the statement she gave to Attila Somfelve in an interview for Ynet (the website associated with Yedi'ot Aharanot): "Our society is being undermined by gross insensitivity and by adulation of force. I am disturbed by our moral disintegration. I am disturbed by the arrogant and light-hearted way in which we kill and murder Palestinians. I am disturbed that when 400 olive trees were uprooted in the Territories, no one was held to account. I cannot find any peace of mind anymore when I see this Wall [BARRIER] that we are building. We are pillaging the land and destroying the way of life of people who have lived in the same place for centuries . . . I cannot live with the way we continually wail that we are the victim and do not examine our own morality. It's important to realize that appalling as SUICIDE BOMBINGS are, aerial bombardment kills more. While we feel the pain of our 900 dead, we tend to forget that we have murdered 3000 Palestinian civilians. We are the violent ones; we are the cheats. Our very foundations have been undermined by our adulation of force, and all this is called a democracy. There cannot be democracy when we rule over 3 million people who have no voice. We simply have to get out of there. We do not even try to understand that what the Palestinians want is sovereignty and human rights."

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Altalena Affair

The *Altalena* Affair was a violent confrontation that took place in June 1948 between the newly formed ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI (National Military Organization), a paramilitary Jewish group and the armed expression of the ideology of Revisionist Zionism founded by VLADIMIR YEVGENIEVITCH (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY. The confrontation involved a cargo ship, *Altalena*, captained by Monroe Fein, which carried weapons and fighters to Palestine for the Irgun.

On 14 May 1948, as the BRITISH MANDATE was coming to an end, Jewish leaders proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel and the estab-

lishment of a provisional government and the Israel Defense Forces. The process of absorbing all military organizations into the IDF proved complicated, and several paramilitary groups continued their activities outside the IDF. One of the largest groups, Irgun, planned to ship weapons and fighters to the newly formed state. The plans included a ship purchased by Irgun members abroad, and originally intended to reach Israel on 15 May 1948.

Weapons purchase and organizational matters took longer than the Irgun had expected, while on 1 June, an agreement was signed between the government and the Irgun for the absorption of the Irgun into the IDF. One of the clauses stated that the Irgun had to cease all independent arms acquisition activities. Consequently, the Irgun was required to inform the government about the ship and its sailing schedule.

The Irgun headquarters in Paris did their best to keep the *Altalena*'s preparations for departure a secret, fearing that if the plans were discovered, the IDF might attempt to sabotage the *Altalena* at sea. But it was difficult to conceal the movement of 1,000 fighters and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. These precautionary measures proved fruitless, and MENAHEM BEGIN, head of the Irgun, decided to postpone the arrival of the ship. However, the ship had already left the day before the cable from Begin arrived.

On 15 June, Begin and his associates held a meeting with government representatives, at which he announced that the ship had sailed without his knowledge and that he wanted to hold consultations on how to proceed. In his diary for 16 June DAVID BEN-GURION, the head of the provisional government, wrote the following about the meeting: "[Government leaders] . . . met yesterday with Begin. Tomorrow or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 800–900 men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 50 bazookas, 10 Bren carriers. . . . They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown shore." Irgun representatives and Ministry of Defense personnel met, and the Irgun proposed directing the *Altalena* to Tel Aviv beach. Ministry of Defense representatives claimed that the Kfar Vitkin beach was preferable, because it would be easier to evade UN observers. The ship was therefore instructed to make for Kfar Vitkin.

In another meeting, Ben-Gurion agreed to Begin's initial request that 20 percent of the weapons be dispatched to the Irgun's Jerusalem Battalion, which was still fighting independently of the IDF. His second request, however, that the remainder be transferred to the IDF to equip the newly incorporated Irgun battalions, was rejected by the government representatives, who interpreted the request as a demand to reinforce an "army within an army."

The *Altalena* reached Kfar Vitkin in the late afternoon of Sunday, 20 June. Among the Irgun members waiting on the shore was Menahem Begin, who greeted the arrivals with great emotion. After the passengers had disembarked, members of the fishing village of Mikhmoret helped unload the cargo of military equipment. Concomitantly with the events at Kfar Vitkin, the government had convened in Tel Aviv for its weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion reported on the meetings that had preceded the arrival of the *Altalena* and was adamant in his demand that Begin surrender all of the weapons: "We must decide whether to hand over power to Begin or to order him to cease his separate activities. If he does not do so, we will open fire! Otherwise, we must decide to disperse our own army." The debate ended in a resolution to empower the army to use force if necessary to overcome the Irgun and to confiscate the ship and its cargo. Implementation of this decision was assigned to the Alexandroni Brigade, commanded by Dan Even (Epstein), which the following day surrounded the Kfar Vitkin area. Dan Even issued an ultimatum to Begin, stating that by order of the chief of the General Staff of the IDF, Irgun was to turn the weapons over to Even, and Begin was to report to the IDF command. If Irgun did not comply he would use all means at his disposal to implement the order. Begin was given ten minutes to respond.

The ultimatum was made, according to Even, "in order not to give the Irgun commander time for lengthy considerations and to gain the advantage of surprise." Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, and all attempts at mediation failed. A clash was now inevitable. Fighting ensued and there were a number of casualties. In order to prevent further bloodshed, the Kfar Vitkin settlers initiated negotiations between Begin's deputy and Dan Even, which ended in a general cease-fire and the transfer of the weapons on shore to the local IDF commander.

Begin had meanwhile boarded the *Altalena*, which was headed for Tel Aviv where the Irgun

had more supporters. Many Irgun members, who joined the IDF earlier that month, left their bases and concentrated on the Tel Aviv beach. A confrontation between them and the IDF units started. In response, Ben-Gurion ordered YIGAL YADIN (acting chief of staff) to concentrate large forces on the Tel Aviv beach and to take the ship by force. Heavy guns were transferred to the area and at four in the afternoon, Ben-Gurion ordered the shelling of the *Altalena*. One of the shells hit the ship, which began to burn.

There was danger that the fire would spread to the holds that contained explosives, and Captain Fein ordered all aboard to abandon ship. People jumped into the water, while their comrades on shore set out to meet them on rafts. Begin, who was on deck, agreed to leave the ship only after the last of the wounded had been evacuated. Sixteen Irgun fighters were killed in the confrontation with the army; six were killed in the Kfar Vitkin area and ten on Tel Aviv beach. Three IDF soldiers were killed: two at Kfar Vitkin and one in Tel Aviv.

After the shelling of the *Altalena*, more than 200 Irgun fighters were arrested on Ben-Gurion's orders. Most of them were released several weeks later, with the exception of five senior commanders who were detained for more than two months. (They were released on 27 August 1948 in response to public pressure.)

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Alternative Information Center

The Alternative Information Center (AIC) is a Palestinian-Israeli organization that disseminates information, research, and political analysis of Palestinian and Israeli societies as well as of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Founded in 1982, it has offices in JERUSALEM and Beit Sahour, West Bank. AIC promotes cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis based on the values of social justice, solidarity, and community involvement. Its activities and publications offer a critical discussion of the political realities that were created during and since the OSLO ACCORDS and their implementation, with special attention given to democratic struggles, critical perspectives on the nature of the state of Israel, and the authoritarian features of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. The AIC publishes the monthly *News from Within* and the twice-monthly *Settler Violence and Occupation Report.* (www.alternativenews.org/).

Amal

Amal (Harakat al-Mahrumin/Movement of the Disinherited) is a Shi'ia political party and militia in LEBANON founded in 1974 by a Lebanese cleric of Iranian descent, Imam Musa al-Sadr, and a member of the Lebanese parliament, Hussein el-Husseini. It sought to improve the underrepresented politically and economically disadvantaged majority Shi'ia community in particular, and to achieve social justice for all deprived in Lebanon. For many years it had cordial relations with the Palestinians and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION in Lebanon; however, over time, and as a result of Israel's punishing air attacks on Shi'ia villages in South Lebanon, Amal turned against the Palestinians. Subsequent to the 1982 Lebanon War, Amal, with Syrian backing, attacked the Palestinian refugee camps from April 1985 through April 1987 in what is known as the CAMPS' WAR.

See also CAMPS' WAR, 1985–1987; LEBANON; LEBANON WAR, 1982

Am Echad

Am Echad (One Nation Party) is an Israeli political party generally considered centrist in orientation. It was initially led by Amir Peretz, who later rejoined the LABOR PARTY and was elected its head. Peretz was also head of Israel's HISTADRUT labor federation. Although a small party, Am Echad has articulated a position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict:

- The issue of a Palestinian state will be determined as part of an overall agreement that would provide Israel with peace and security.
- Support for the promotion of a political and security process that will lead to a peace agree-

ment between the Israeli and Palestinian nations will put an end to the Jewish-Arab conflict and will lead to true peace among all the nations of the region.
- An improved quality of life for Palestinians and cooperation between nations, including support of a balanced economic agreement, will lead to the success of this process.
- The status of JERUSALEM will be determined in future negotiations.
- The status of the SETTLEMENTS in the territories will be determined as a part of an overall agreement that would provide Israel with peace and security.

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American-Israel Cooperative Enterprise

The American-Israel Cooperative Enterprise (AICE) is a pro-Israel, American Jewish organization. It is a leading provider of information for students and organizations interested in Jewish history, culture, and politics. AICE offers training on how to use this information to increase support for Israel among non-Jews. AICE is committed to encouraging students to be proactive in making the case for Israel and in responding to critics. To provide students with background on current events, it produces one-page "fact sheets" on major issues, such as the Palestinian right of return, the Bush Plan, and the status of JERUSALEM.

AICE and Barad Entertainment have also produced *On One Foot: A Middle East Guide for the Perplexed or How to Respond on Your Way to Class, When Your Best Friend Joins an Anti-Israel Protest*, a pocket-size, seventy-five-page book that provides responses to the toughest issues students face, along with a brief paragraph on the history of each issue. (http://israeloncampuscoalition.org/ or http://www.JewishVirtualLibrary.org).

See also AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

American-Israel Public Affairs Committee/AIPAC

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

American Jewish Committee

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

American Jewish Congress

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

American Jewish Organizations

The work of pro-Israel groups in the UNITED STATES has been immeasurably important in ensuring US support for Israel. This has been evident in the formulation of government policies and in propagation of pro-Israel sentiments in the MEDIA, on university campuses, and in popular culture. Pro-Israel groups have been highly successful in ensuring that the mass public, as well as the elites, overwhelmingly take Israel's side in its conflict with the Palestinians.

More than 100 organizations, 155 Jewish federations and community relations councils, as well as several thousand synagogues, are engaged to some degree or other in pro-Israel activities. The phenomenon is most obvious in Congress, where Democrats and Republicans routinely approve pro-Israel resolutions often with as many as 400 votes on a measure in the House and close to 100 votes in the Senate. On more than one occasion, Congress has voted to grant more money to Israel than a president has requested. This is generally attributed to the popular public support for Israel, as well as to contributions from pro-Israel funders on whom many members of Congress from both parties have come to depend.

The handful of organizations that represent Palestinian interests have no comparable clout. This is partly a reflection of the fact that, unlike Israel, which has been put forth by its supporters as a STRATEGIC ASSET and a surrogate for US interests in the Middle East, a role that has been strongly challenged by Israel's critics, the Palestinians are viewed as having no useful function in the US grand strategy, and therefore their fate is of little significance to Washington except as rhetoric for interest in a peace process. Whatever policies Israel has chosen to pursue vis-à-vis the Palestinians have generally been accepted by US governing elites. Whatever congressmembers may think, the domestic political price for challenging them and provoking a clash with pro-Israel groups has proven to be too great.

Some pro-Israel support groups work on a single issue, for example, the media or Congress, while other organizations involve themselves in a variety of issues that often overlap, but all are committed with a singularity of purpose to maintaining US support for Israel and whatever policies it pursues.

Political Groups

American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. The most visible pro-Israel group, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), is a formal lobbying organization that operates in the critical arena of government policymaking and budget allocations. Headquartered in Washington, DC, AIPAC has offices and members across the country, 165 employees, and a $47 million budget. Despite its pro-Israel advocacy, AIPAC is considered a domestic lobbying group and not required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. This allows AIPAC staff to engage in activities forbidden to agents of other governments. The most important of these is the authorization to sit in on congressional committee meetings related to Middle East issues, to consult in drafting pro-Israel legislation, and to meet with Jewish congressional members to plan strategy.

Few AIPAC staffers are registered lobbyists. Most provide research materials, talking points, and speeches for legislators or prepare AIPAC's *Near East Report*, a biweekly publication, now online, that is considered required reading on Capitol Hill. AIPAC gains additional access to Congress by providing volunteer interns to serve in congressional offices.

At election time, AIPAC mobilizes a disciplined army of volunteer lobbyists across the country and runs regional sessions to train them as donors and workers in the camp of every likely candidate for Congress from both parties. All prospective candidates are asked by AIPAC to make a statement expressing their support for Israel, which AIPAC provides to its members and prospective donors. Each spring, AIPAC holds a conference in Washington that is addressed by the US president, vice president, and/or high-ranking Cabinet members. Approximately half of Congress attends, including the Democratic and Republican leaders in the Senate and House, who pledge their support to Israel and their commitment to maintaining strong US-Israel ties. Names of congressional attendees are publicized by AIPAC to enhance their status among Jewish donors.

Regional AIPAC conferences are held across the country to which local politicians and public officials, including mayors, city council members, school superintendents, and police chiefs, are invited. They are usually addressed by an important member of Congress or a governor from another state, whose presence is reported only to the local Jewish media. Afterward, the local officials are likely to be sent on free trips to Israel by local Jewish community relations councils, federations, or other community organizations, where they meet the prime minister and key Israeli officials, tour Israel and West Bank settlements, and visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust museum. From this group of civil servants invariably emerge new members of Congress already supportive of the Israeli position by the time they reach Washington.

AIPAC is not a PAC (political action committee) and does not contribute directly to political campaigns, although individual members of AIPAC's board do contribute considerable amounts. AIPAC does provide honoraria to speakers at its functions as well as free trips to Israel for congressional members through the American Israel Education Fund, a tax-exempt foundation set up specifically for that purpose. AIPAC staff analyze congressional voting records on legislation relevant to Israel, information that organizations and individuals in the pro-Israel community use to determine where their contributions can be most effective, either directly or through one of several dozen Jewish PACs, some of which are led by AIPAC board members. AIPAC claims it does not endorse candidates, which would violate its legal status, but internal memos indicate that AIPAC has advised PACs where to send their donations. A suit brought against AIPAC in 1989 alleging collusion was unsuccessful. Between 1990 and 2004, the Center for Responsive Politics estimated, pro-Israel PACs gave almost $23 million to candidates and the major political parties, about 70 percent of which went to Democrats.

A hallmark of AIPAC's power is its ability to get an overwhelming number of senators from both parties to sign a letter to a US president to protest White House policies viewed as not in Israel's best interests. Among the most notable was the letter addressed to President GERALD FORD by 76 senators on 21 May 1975 after Ford suspended aid to Israel and threatened to reassess US policy, in the wake of Israel's refusal to participate in the Sinai II Accord in the aftermath of the 1973 War, and after months of intense shuttle diplomacy by

Secretary of State HENRY KISSINGER. As a result of the senators' letter, Ford backed down.

AIPAC had proved its clout with Ford's predecessor, RICHARD NIXON, when it pushed through the Senate the Jackson-Vanick Amendment to the 1972 US trade agreement with the SOVIET UNION, which tied US trade with Moscow to allowing the emigration of SOVIET JEWS. Both Nixon and Kissinger opposed the linkage, which guaranteed a specific annual quota of emigration of Jews and seriously set back the administration's efforts to establish detente with the Soviets. Senator J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), who opposed the amendment, told CBS's *Face the Nation* in 1973: "For many years I have felt that the situation in the Middle East was very nearly hopeless. The fundamental problem for us is that we have lost our freedom of action in the Middle East and are committed to policies that promote neither our own national interest nor the cause of peace. AIPAC and its allied organizations have effective working control of the electoral process. They can elect or defeat nearly any congressman or senator that they wish with their money and coordinated organization." AIPAC proved Fulbright's point by successfully targeting him for defeat when he ran for reelection.

AIPAC helped build support for both US wars against Iraq (1991 and 2003). While not taking a formal stand after Iraq invaded KUWAIT and with Congress split down the middle, AIPAC officials worked behind the scenes, lobbying senators sitting on the fence to get the 52–47 vote to go to war.

AIPAC survived an embarrassment in 1992 when David Steiner, then AIPAC president, boasted in a secretly recorded phone conversation that he had made a deal with the first BUSH administration to increase US aid to Israel and that he was negotiating with the incoming CLINTON administration over the appointment of a pro-Israel secretary of state. "We have a dozen people in his [Clinton's] headquarters and they are all going to get big jobs," he said. When the transcript was released, Steiner resigned. Subsequent events, however, proved him right. Madeleine Albright was appointed secretary of state; former AIPAC staffer Australian Martin Indyk was appointed ambassador to Israel, an appointment that required a special act of Congress to expedite his citizenship; and key Cabinet members in the Clinton administration (e.g., DENNIS ROSS, AARON DAVID MILLER, and Sandy Berger) and their staffs turned out to be "warm Jews," a term used in Israel for Jewish Americans who have a strong affinity for Israel.

In 2005, the embarrassment was more serious when the close relationship between AIPAC and the government led to federal indictments of two key AIPAC staff members, Steve Rosen and Keith Weismann, who were fired after being charged with receiving classified information from a high-level Pentagon official and passing it on to Israel. As of 1 March 2009, the case had still not come to trial.

AIPAC has not always been successful on policy promotion either. For example, in 1981 President RONALD REAGAN, considered a good friend of Israel, squeezed through the sale of AWAC intelligence-gathering planes to SAUDI ARABIA over the lobby's objections. But the administration did agree to the concession that the planes would be jointly flown by Americans and Saudis. In any case, AIPAC did not consider the sale a complete loss because it had forced Reagan to personally lobby to win the vote and thus enhanced AIPAC's reputation on Capitol Hill.

In September 1991, AIPAC suffered another setback when President GEORGE H. W. BUSH rejected Israel's demand for $10 billion in US guaranteed loans over a five-year period, when Congress appeared ready to approve the request by a large margin. Fearing that approval of the guarantees would allow Israel to withdraw from the upcoming MADRID CONFERENCE, Bush asked Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR to postpone the request for 120 days and made approval conditional on Israel freezing Jewish SETTLEMENTS and agreeing that no Russian immigrants would be allowed to settle in the Occupied Territories. Shamir refused, confident that Congress would prevail in a showdown with the president. On 12 September, with the knowledge that AIPAC had sufficient votes in Congress to override his veto and taking note of the more than a thousand American Jews representing various organizations mobilized by AIPAC who had come to Capitol Hill to express support for the loans, Bush called a press conference and made an extraordinary televised appeal to the US people. Pounding his fist on the lectern, he described Israel's insistence on the guarantees as undermining the forthcoming peace conference and threatened to use his veto power to keep that from happening. Bush told the public: "We are up against some powerful political forces,

very strong and effective groups that go up to the Hill. We have only got one lonely little guy down here doing it [but] I am going to fight for what I believe. I believe the American people will be with me." He also noted that during the current fiscal year, despite its own economic worries, the United States had provided Israel with more than $4 billion worth of aid, "nearly $1,000 for each Israeli man, woman, and child." Given the overwhelming public support for Bush's position in polls taken immediately afterward, AIPAC and Israel's supporters in Congress chose to pull back and defer to the four-month waiting period. In Israel, Bush's response was seen as a setback for Shamir and in the next election he was replaced by YITZHAK RABIN. With the 1992 elections in sight and losing ground in the polls, Bush then agreed to the loan guarantees with the proviso that the amount of money that Israel spent in the Occupied Territories be deducted from the total.

Yet such AIPAC setbacks pale in comparison to its achievements. AIPAC has been circumspect in targeting presidents at election time who have failed, in its perception, to adequately support Israel, but it has not hesitated to take on members of the House and Senate who have publicly taken an independent position with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There its victims have come from both parties. Among the more prominent have been Senator Fulbright (D-Ark.), Senator Charles Percy (R-Ill.), Senator Adlai Stevenson, Jr. (D-Ill.), Representative Paul (Pete) McCloskey (R-Calif.), and Representative Paul Findley (R-Ill.), who documented the lobby's role in his best-selling *They Dare to Speak Out*. Several other Democrats lost their seats largely due to the lobby's efforts: Gus Savage (Ill.), Earl Hilliard (Ala.), and Cynthia McKinney (Ga.), all members of the Congressional Black Caucus who had been critical of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians.

A member of Congress who supports Israel may not receive any tangible support from AIPAC but may have the assurance that it will not support an opponent. One who openly criticizes Israel, however, is sure to encounter a rival who will be backed by the lobby. Many members of Congress justify their support for Israel by declaring it to be in America's "national interest," but few ever mention their support for Israel in communications to their non-Jewish constituents.

What gives AIPAC such influence? It is a combination of factors, but certainly uppermost are the millions of dollars contributed to political candidates by wealthy Jews and pro-Israel PACs. That funding combined with the organization, sophistication, and political savvy of AIPAC itself in conjunction with the numerous other groups working on Israel's behalf as well as the fact that pro-Israel Jewish partisans are willing to set aside differences on domestic issues and sometimes over a particular Israeli policy to unite behind Israel with one voice. A 1976 study concluded that the multitiered structural pyramid that links individual Jews in local communities across the country to centralized national foreign policy leadership groups in Washington and New York is the primary organizational factor that can explain the ability of the pro-Israel movement to mobilize rapidly and in a coordinated fashion on a national scale when important foreign policy issues arise. The Internet has enhanced this process.

Political Action Committees. An estimated thirty-six known pro-Israel political action committees contribute money to members of Congress on the basis of their support for Israel. The largest is the National Political Action Committee (NATPAC). Although having no *formal* connection with AIPAC, NATPAC and other PACs receive information about the positions and votes of Congress members and their challengers on Israel and, it is assumed, advice as to who is most deserving of funds. Unlike other lobby groups, few of these PACs disclose the nature of their fundraising focus; for example, Americans for Better Citizenship, Americans United for Democracy, Desert Caucus, Northern Californians for Good Government, and St. Louisans for Good Government, are all pro-Israel PACs. For this reason, their critics have called them "stealth PACs."

The number of pro-Israel PACs has varied over the years. In 1988, 78 pro-Israel PACs donated $5.4 million to 477 candidates for Congress, more than any other special interest group. Between 1990 and 2004, pro-Israel groups contributed nearly $57 million to candidates of both parties and in 2006 the figure was $3 million. These figures do not include donations made by individuals outside of the PAC structure.

The second most influential pro-Israel political group is the fifty-two-member Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, or the Presidents Conference. Whereas AIPAC focuses on Congress, the Presidents Conference concentrates on the White House. As its name suggests,

this organization is composed of the heads of all the major Jewish groups in the United States and, through its executive director and rotating chair, carries out its responsibilities for liaising with the White House. It was founded during the DWIGHT EISENHOWER presidency at the request of Secretary of State JOHN FOSTER DULLES so that he would have to deal with only one spokesperson representing US Jewry. Subsequent presidents from the organization have had direct access to the US president and top officials in all administrations.

Under President Clinton, Presidents' Conference director Malcolm Hoenlein took credit for what became the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the first legislation targeting fund-raising endeavors of Islamic groups in the United States while adding 28 new death penalty crimes to the federal register. The degree of visible public activity by the Presidents Conference depends on who serves as its chair. During the buildup to the GULF WAR, the office was held by Mortimer Zuckerman, owner and publisher of *U.S. News and World Report* and the (New York) *Daily News,* who used the editorial space in both publications to lobby for the war, although the Presidents Conference took no official position.

The Presidents Conference issues a free five-day-a-week Daily Alert, prepared by the Israel-based Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, that summarizes and presents links to news stories favorable to Israel from the international, US, and Hebrew press, combined with commentary and pro-Israel talking points on issues related to Israel and the Middle East. It also sponsors America's Voices, a program that enables the nation's talk show hosts to visit Israel and do their broadcasts from there.

State and Local Groups. The national coordinating body for 13 national Jewish agencies and 125 local Jewish community relations councils, which represent the organized American Jewish community at the local level, is the Jewish Council of Public Affairs (JCPA). Pro-Israel resolutions passed at its national meetings are sent to Congress. The community relations councils act as critical sources for grassroots pro-Israel activity, which involves lobbying on Israel's behalf among local and federal politicians as well as through the media.

The component federations of United Jewish Communities (UJC), both a lobbying and philanthropic organization, carry out similar activities at the local level. UJC represents 155 Jewish federations and 400 independent Jewish communities across the United States. As with AIPAC, one of UJC's most important activities is sending delegations of local politicians (mayors, supervisors, city council members, etc.) on free trips to Israel. UJC also acts as the liaison between Israel and the American Jewish community, interfacing with the US government, the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the business community, the voluntary sector, opinion makers, the media, and the general public.

Four Small Political Organizations. The oldest and at one time the most important pro-Israel organization is the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA). Still influential today, the ZOA has become the voice of the most extreme right-wing elements in Israel, opposing a Palestinian state and, at times, condemning AIPAC and the Israeli government when it perceives it as capitulating to the Palestinians—for example, on the OSLO ACCORDS and ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA. The ZOA is close to the CHRISTIAN evangelicals who, for religious reasons, have adopted similar pro-Israel positions, a move that gives ZOA greater clout among Republicans with a rightist social agenda. The *Wall Street Journal* has called the ZOA "the most credible advocate for Israel on the American Jewish scene."

A smaller organization, Americans for a Safe Israel, lobbies Congress to keep "Judea, Samaria [the West Bank], Gaza and the Golan as integral parts of Israel" and "essential to US security."

From the other side of the spectrum and generally supporting Israel's Labor Party are Americans for Peace Now (APN) and the Israel Policy Forum (IPF). APN is affiliated with *Shalom Achshav* (Peace Now) and lobbies for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION. Their support of the US-Israel relationship is as strong as that of the hard-liners, but they are far less effective in getting their message across. Founded in 1993 after the Oslo Accords, the IPF supports Labor's two-state position and likewise has not been very effective.

Media

One of the most important elements in the work of the political organizations are the efforts it expends to ensure that television, radio, newspapers, and other media present Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a light that is favorable to Israel. A virtual phalanx of groups and individuals lobby the

media full-time, pressuring media owners, managers, producers, editors, reporters, and newscasters to take a pro-Israel perspective. This aspect of their work is arguably the most important because consistent pro-Israel government policymaking could not take place in the absence of supportive public opinion. Pro-Israel groups have instituted boycotts of the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *San Francisco Chronicle*, all Jewish-owned or -managed papers, yet accused of having a pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel bias.

The most visible and arguably most influential of the pro-Israel lobby's media monitoring agencies is the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA). It was established in the aftermath of Israel's invasion of LEBANON in 1982 to counter negative images of Israel arising from that war. While purportedly "devoted to promoting accurate and balanced coverage of Israel and the Middle East" and fostering "rigorous reporting," CAMERA quickly became a censor of print, radio, and television media that it deemed to have an anti-Israel or pro-Palestinian bias.

On its website CAMERA explains how it works: "CAMERA systematically monitors, documents, reviews and archives Middle East coverage, and staffers directly contact reporters, editors, producers and publishers requesting that they alter what CAMERA believes is distorted or inaccurate coverage, offering them 'factual' information to correct errors. CAMERA members are encouraged to write letters for publication in the print media and to communicate with correspondents, anchors and network officials in the electronic media. CAMERA's combination of rigorous monitoring, research, fact-checking, careful analysis, and grassroots efforts have had a documented impact."

The "documented impact" in one instance involved a public radio station. In 2002, CAMERA went after WBUR, the National Public Radio (NPR) affiliate in Boston where CAMERA maintains its headquarters. Charging that NPR's coverage of the Middle East was tilted against Israel, CAMERA was able to persuade the station's donors and underwriters to withdraw an estimated $1 million in funding.

Another important media-monitoring group is HonestReporting, or Middle East Media Watch, which describes itself as "one of the world's largest media watch groups." Its website heralds its mission: "Israel is in the midst of a battle for public opinion—waged primarily via the media." HonestReporting was founded in 2000 in response to what it considered anti-Israel reporting during the Second Intifada. Like CAMERA, it "scrutinize(s) the media for examples of anti-Israel bias, and then mobilize[s] subscribers to complain directly to the news agency concerned," providing a how-to guide, contact information, and letter-writing guidelines. With websites in English, Italian, Spanish, and Russian, HonestReporting claims to have 55,000 members around the world.

In June 2002, CNN instituted major editorial changes brought about by an intense lobbying campaign on the part of HonestReporting, which greatly shifted public perception of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in general and the SUICIDE BOMBERS in particular. The group's role was mentioned in the *New York Times*, and the *Jerusalem Post* noted that "HonestReporting.com readers sent up to 6,000 e-mails a day to CNN executives, effectively paralyzing their internal e-mail system." Its MediaBackspin.com offers a daily blog on coverage of Middle East issues.

A pro-Israel group that provides translations of articles from Arabic, Farsi, and Hebrew to English-language publications and journalists is the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Its objective is to promote the policies of the Israeli government and paint a negative picture of Palestinians, Muslims, Arabs, and Iranians. MEMRI produces sophisticated academic-style translations and research papers on political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends in the Middle East that are presented in English and also translated into German, Hebrew, Italian, French, Spanish, Turkish, and Russian. Many of the translations have been shown to slant material from the original sources.

During the Second Intifada, the Israeli government took a number of steps to improve its image in the United States, and The Israel Project (TIP) was one result. It was established in 2005 with the task of "educating the press and the public about Israel while promoting security, freedom and peace . . . working in close cooperation with the Israeli government." TIP brings reporters to Israel for briefings with top Israeli officials. Its initial project was "Intellicopter Tours," a guided helicopter ride for more than 100 journalists who reported on the removal of Jewish SETTLERS from Gaza—reporting that emphasized the tragedy of the settlers being forced from their homes. During Israel's bombardment of Gaza at the end of 2008

and the beginning of 2009, when Israel was forbidding foreign as well as Israeli reporters from entering Gaza, TIP provided trips to reporters on the Israeli side of the border where they were able to interview Israelis in towns that had been targeted by Palestinian rockets.

TIP's advisory board, as of January 2009, was composed almost exclusively of members of Congress: Senators Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Ben Cardin, (D-Md.), Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), Norm Coleman (R-Minn.), Tom Coburn (R-Okla.), Susan Collins (R-Me.), Judd Gregg, (R-N.H.), Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), Gordon Smith (R-Ore.), Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and House members Rob Andrews (D-N.J.), Shelley Berkley (D-Nev.), Tom Davis (R-Va.), Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), Frank Pallone (D-N.J.), Jon Porter (R-Nev.), Jim Saxton (R-N.J.), Brad Sherman (D-Calif.), and Joe Wilson (R-S.C.). The sole member of the board who was not in Congress was actor and film director Ron Silver. Note: Coleman will be removed if he loses his contested reelection bid.

Academia

University campuses in the United States have long been the sites of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, often nearly as intense as the real-life conflict in the Middle East. Professors and students who have participated in divestment or boycott campaigns against Israel or in pro-Palestinian campus activities have been subject to intense pressure from pro-Israel groups, which have countered by conducting forums, bringing in Israeli speakers, sending student delegations to Israel, and attempting to silence professors. More than one professor has been denied tenure or promotion due to pressure from pro-Israeli groups; for example, on 8 June 2007, DePaul University professor Norman Finkelstein was denied tenure; later the same year Columbia University professor Joseph Massad was denied tenure. In February 2009, Bard College fired Joel Kovel, who had for eighteen years held the Alger Hiss Chair of Social Studies. There are other instances, but the fear in academia caused by just these three cases has been enough to suppress open debate by professors across the country.

In 1979 the University Service Department of the now defunct (or transformed) American Zionist Youth Foundation issued *Israel on Campus: A Source-book for Activists,* which by its second printing in 1982 was 116 pages (school binder size). The book explained "basic" issues from a Zionist perspective, included organizing skills and how to implement "Israel and Zionist programming," and provided an extensive resource directory plus public relations and problem-solving tips. Since then, pro-Israel campus operations have become more extensive. In 2002, in response to the Second Intifada, a network of twenty-eight national Jewish organizations, large and small, and mostly based off-campus, formed the Israel on Campus Coalition (ICC) to work "collaboratively to assist students in fostering support for Israel on the college campus." Its member organizations have led the resistance to efforts by pro-Palestinian campus groups to get their colleges and universities to divest their holdings in Israeli companies and State of Israel Bonds, or to hold Palestine support rallies and invite pro-Palestinian speakers to their campuses.

One of ICC's most active members is AIPAC, which has a long history of campus involvement. In 1979 it formed a Political Leadership Development Program that "educates and trains young leaders in pro-Israel political advocacy." It also enlisted hundreds of college students to collect information on "pro-Palestinian" professors and student organizations. By 1983 the program had attracted more than 5,000 students on 350 campuses in all fifty states. In 1984 the students' findings were published in *The AIPAC College Guide: Exposing the Anti-Israel Campaign on Campus*, which examined 100 campuses and instructed students on how to counter a "steady diet of anti-Israel vituperation."

Among AIPAC's primary activities in this regard is bringing student body presidents to Washington, where they meet with high-level pro-Israeli lobbyists and American government officials who guide them in responding to pro-Palestinian or anti-Israeli activities on their respective campuses. AIPAC claims to have recruited and trained four student activists on each of sixty campuses in thirty-five states to combat "anti-Israel incidents." According to its website, AIPAC's goal is "nothing short of repositioning the American campus to be a tangible asset to the pro-Israel movement."

The Presidents Conference is also a part of the ICC, and its contribution, in collaboration with the Jewish Council of Public Affairs, was to send, every Sunday, *Israel Campus Beat,* an e-mail digest of news and opinion about Israel and the

Middle East, to "thousands of university students across North America." After publishing on a regular basis in 2006 and 2007, it came out only once in 2008, but reappeared with a special issue supporting Israel's war on Gaza in January 2009.

The American Jewish Committee (AJC, discussed in next section) is also a part of ICC and has supported efforts to silence university professors who have been critical of Israel. In the instance of Palestinian professor Sami Al-Arian, AJC mounted a failed effort to have him convicted of being linked to terrorists. In 2002, the AJC succeeded in getting more than 300 college and university presidents to sign a full-page ad in the *New York Times* "condemning intimidation on campus," noting in particular "such behavior directed toward Jews and Zionists." In 2007, in response to a vote by Britain's New University and College Union to boycott Israeli academic institutions, it produced a similar ad with as many signatures.

The Anti-Defamation League (discussed in the next section) has worked with the AJC and ZOA in lobbying for legislation that would curtail the teaching of professors of Middle East studies who espouse criticism of Israel and US Middle East policy.

ICC member Campus Watch is a project of the Middle East Forum (MEF), both of which are largely the efforts of Daniel Pipes, a pro-Israeli activist. What CAMERA is to the mainstream media, Campus Watch and MEF are to colleges and universities, reviewing and critiquing course syllabi, monitoring what professors say in the classroom, and attempting to alter Middle East studies in North America, "with an aim to improve them." In September 2002, Campus Watch created an Internet backlash when it posted "dossiers" on eight professors who had been critical of US foreign policy and Israel's treatment of the Palestinians. In response, more than 100 academics contacted Campus Watch asking to be added to the list. Pipes has since posted more than 140 new names, all identified as supporters of and "apologists for suicide bombings and militant Islam."

In 2002, following Israel's attack on Palestinian refugee camps, pro-Israel interests created The David Project (TDP), which became nationally known when it released a video, *Columbia Unbecoming,* which accused Columbia University of being hostile to Jews and Israel and targeted three professors of Middle Eastern background for dismissal, alleging that the three were biased against Israel and did not present or tolerate dissenting opinions. TDP's accusations, though disputed by students on the Columbia University campus, were supported by CAMERA. TDP also offers a Campus Fellows program that provides Jewish students with a training seminar so they can respond to "the anti-Semitism and anti-Israel sentiment they meet on campus."

Other organizations that are part of the ICC annually send hundreds of Jewish students and student leaders to Israel as part of their training to be pro-Israel advocates upon their return. They include Hadassah (see section on "Women's Groups"), through its Hamagshimim Israel Fellowships; Hasbara Fellowships, which entail working with Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Hillel, through Birthright Israel; and the Jewish National Fund (JNF), through its Caravan for Democracy.

The largest Jewish campus organization, with chapters at more than 500 colleges and universities, is Hillel: The Foundation for Jewish Campus Life. Hillel has focused on countering the on-campus divestment movements and all activities that it deems "anti-Israel." It also has close ties to the Israeli government. When, in October 2005, the Israeli government decided that its image in the United States could be improved by avoiding references to its conflict with the Palestinians or religious issues, Hillel became part of the program known as "Brand Israel." Hillel contributed "Israel Starts with I," which consisted of seven kickoff events at large schools, with Israeli bands and speakers, designed to portray Israel as a place "where there are cool, hip people."

Another group founded to counter criticism of Israel on college campuses as well as the divestment campaigns targeting Israel in the United States and abroad is Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (SPME), with "well over 600 members, representing 200 campuses worldwide." SPME's purpose is to assist faculty in responding to "the ideological distortions, including ANTI-SEMITIC and ANTI-ZIONIST slanders that poison debate and work against peace." It has worked with other ICC members to have Congress pass legislation that would mandate teaching of Middle East issues from a pro-Israel perspective.

Another organization working against divestment campaigns and the "anti-Israel bias" in the media and on college campuses is Stand With Us (SWU), which was particularly active during

Israel's war on Gaza at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009. SWU runs four programs:

1. Educational Action for Israel, which develops materials on the Israel-Palestine conflict and trains pro-Israel speakers
2. Call to Action for Israel, an umbrella group "to disseminate and share information" with other Jewish organizations
3. Media Action for Israel, which creates projects for the media to portray Israel in a favorable light
4. Campus Action for Israel, which sees its offices serving as a "hotline" for students, offering them speakers, films, flyers, and information on conferences

Multifunction Organizations

The American Jewish Committee (AJC) was founded in 1906 by German-Jewish immigrants to "strengthen Jews and Jewish life worldwide," and while supporting Jewish settlement in Palestine, it was officially non-Zionist up to the end of World War II. Now actively pro-Zionist, it serves as the foreign policy arm of pro-Israel groups. The AJC publishes articles and pamphlets on issues of concern to Jews and functions as an advocacy organization concerned with anti-Semitism, TERRORISM, "support of Israel's quest for security and peace," Jewish "Peoplehood," and other issues. The object of its foreign activities, according to its website, is "defending the core principles of human rights for all, the protection and well-being of Jewish communities abroad, support for a secure peace between Israel and its neighbors, and the fair treatment of Israel in the international community." Since 2007, it has been the leading public face of American Jewry in advocating a hard line toward IRAN's nuclear program. Although the AJC has been active internationally for many years, it increased its activity in that respect in 2004, when it established the Transatlantic Institute in Brussels, the site of the EUROPEAN UNION and NATO headquarters.

In Geneva, AJC operates UN Watch, which critically monitors the UNITED NATIONS' treatment of Israel. The AJC's consultative status at the UN gives it the right to testify at the organization's official proceedings. AJC staff and lay leaders regularly meet in foreign capitals with senior government officials, high-ranking military officers, and heads of local Jewish communities, while at its New York headquarters it hosts meetings with heads of state, foreign ministers, and military delegations when they visit the United States. As part of its extensive outreach to Latin American countries and to the burgeoning Hispanic community in the US, the AJC established the Latino and Latin American Institute.

The AJC has supplemented AIPAC's work on issues such as Soviet Jewry in the 1970s, opposing the Arab boycott of companies doing business with Israel, and calling for sanctions against Israel's enemies in the Middle East. Domestically, the AJC leads the pro-Israel organizations' opposition to the movement among churches to divest from companies doing business in Israel or the Occupied West Bank that support the Occupation. It continues to lobby ministers in churches that have voted to do so, such as the Presbyterian Church. It has succeeded in thwarting the Episcopalians and Congregationalists who were considering a similar divestment strategy.

Another multifunction pro-Israel organization, the American Jewish Congress, was founded in 1918 and has been primarily concerned with defending against what it perceives to be threats to Jewish interests at home and abroad. This has involved public policy advocacy in the courts, Congress, the executive branch, and local legislatures. Its mission has been (1) the safety and security of Israel and of Jews throughout the world in the face of the threat of worldwide terrorism; (2) protection of Jewish communities in the United States and overseas against the menace of anti-Semitism; and (3) preservation of separation of church and state in the United States. Additionally, the AJC Congress has been "actively engaged in political education and in the recruitment to our ranks of individuals of particular prominence in the political and public policy arenas."

A 16 August 2006 posting on its website entitled "Thanks to All Who Helped with House Passage of the US-Israel Energy Cooperation Act" refers to legislation initially drafted by the AJC Congress, put into legislative form by Representative Brad Sherman (D-Calif.) shepherded through Congress by Representatives John Shadegg (R-Ariz.), Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), and Sherman; and supported in the Jewish community by NORPAC (a pro-Israel political action committee), AIPAC, and JCPA (Jewish Council for Public Affairs). Originally founded as a liberal counterpoint to the American Jewish Committee, its strength and

numbers have been in steady decline in recent years.

The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) was founded in 1913 as part of a larger organization of German-Jewish immigrants, B'nai B'rith, specifically to fight anti-Semitism. According to its website, "Where once we protested admissions quotas at leading graduate schools, today we expose Internet sites devoted to Holocaust denial and white-supremacist propaganda. In the past, we challenged the anti-Semitic ranting of demagogues like Father Coughlin; in the present, we are no less vocal in opposition to Louis Farrakhan."

ADL was among the first Jewish organizations to target Israel's critics and "pro-Palestinian" professors and students at the university level. In 1983, the year after Israel invaded Lebanon, it published a booklet that was distributed to its members and the national media containing background information on "pro-Arab sympathizers who are active on college campuses." As an ICC member, the ADL continues to provide pro-Israel training materials to Jewish campus activists.

Maintaining support for Israel within the African-American community has long been a major concern of the pro-Israel establishment; it has been primarily ADL's job to handle this task.

Though the ADL's original mission was to combat anti-Semitism, according to the ADL's website, "soon after its establishment, ADL's mission expanded to include the eradication of bias and discrimination against people of all races and religions." Ironically, this led it to initiate the legal fight to overturn affirmative action legislation, because ADL opposed quotas. This action created friction between the ADL and leading African-American organizations, but not to such a degree as to cause a public rift, in part because, as in the case of the NAACP, black civil rights organizations have been heavily dependent on Jewish philanthropy since its inception.

ADL's concern with deflecting African-American criticism of Israel after the 1967 WAR coincided with the emergence in the US of a militant version of the black liberation struggle that was embodied in the Black Panther Party, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and the growth of the Nation of Islam (NOI) behind Malcolm X. These groups identified with third-world liberation movements and consequently with the plight of the Palestinians. They declared that the alliance between blacks and Jews from the early days of the civil rights movement was over.

In response, the ADL launched an attack on black professors and in particular on Louis Farrakhan, who had become the leader of the NOI following the death of its founder, Elijah Mohammed. In every city where he has spoken, the ADL and local Jewish leaders have demanded that leading black officials denounce him. In 1992, the ADL issued a 50-page booklet that contained the names and backgrounds of African-American professors and activists whom it classified as "demagogues" and "extremists." It was a roundup of what the ADL described as the "Anti-Semitism of Black Student Groups on Campus." It also contained a section on black newspapers and radio stations that the ADL claimed were anti-Semitic.

The ADL's overly aggressive pursuit of the NOI and Farrakhan caught the attention of the FBI in December 1992 and led to the FBI and the San Francisco Police Department raiding the group's San Francisco office. They uncovered a massive nationwide spying operation that the ADL had been conducting on progressive organizations for at least 25 years in the name of "intelligence gathering." Depositions taken at the time revealed that the ADL had illegally provided nonpublic information to the governments of Israel and South Africa regarding opponents of both regimes. In the computer of the ADL agent arrested by the police were, in addition to files on skinhead and neo-Nazi groups, files on over 12,000 individuals and 600 organizations separated into "Pinko," Arab, and anti-apartheid categories. In the Pinko (i.e., those with liberal or radical views) file were the NAACP and other black, Latino, and Asian political organizations. The ADL agent, who had been paid through a third party for 25 years, admitted he had also been spying on the African National Congress, black African exiles, and anti-apartheid activists for South African intelligence services. Nevertheless, as a result of high-level political pressure, the San Francisco district attorney dropped the case, and the ADL settled two related lawsuits out of court.

The ADL's surveillance activities had no long-term effects on its relation to law enforcement agencies overall, and it still maintains a working relationship with the FBI and local police departments in their investigation of hate crimes

and, since 11 September 2001, the pursuit of "the war on terrorism." To facilitate these interests, the ADL sends delegations of US police chiefs to Israel to study the counterterrorism measures it has employed against the Palestinians. In addition, it has established a Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network (LEARN) that it describes as a "new comprehensive and innovative initiative to assist law enforcement in the battle against extremists."

The ADL is also active in the public schools through its World of Difference Institute, the program of which includes "workshops and curricular materials for teachers, support staff, classified staff, administrators, and students from grades K–12" and extends through college campuses, the general community, and the workplace. It has expanded the program to Germany, the European Union, Israel, Austria, Japan, and Argentina. In addition, ADL's Braun Holocaust Institute has introduced an extensive Holocaust education program into the schools.

ADL is assisted in this project by Hadassah, which today operates the ADL-originated Curriculum Watch at the secondary school level, examining "American textbooks to detect inaccuracies and bias as relating to Judaism, the Holocaust, and the history of Israel." When its Academic Resource Corps detects a problem, it "alerts . . . [its] Academic Advisory Board, made up of university professors with related expertise," who review the texts "to determine whether they are factual, inclusive, and unbiased in their presentation."

When the exposure of ADL's national spying operation forced it to retreat from its aggressive pro-Israel public stance, Hadassah continued implementing Curriculum Watch and took the lead in pressuring the American Library Association to rescind a resolution it had passed in 1991 that criticized Israel's censorship of Palestinian libraries.

Think Tanks

The importance of think tanks in the policymaking process cannot be overstated. Not only do they produce important policy papers, but they serve as revolving doors for government officials, Israeli as well as American, when they are out of office. Copies of policy papers go directly to members of Congress and frequently serve as the basis for legislation. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) is one of the most influential think tanks. Although it cannot be classified as a specifically Jewish organization, it is decidedly pro-Israel. WINEP was founded in 1985 by Larry Weinberg, a past president of AIPAC, and its first executive director was a British-born Australian Jew, Martin Indyk, who had previously worked in AIPAC's research department and would later be named ambassador to Israel by President Clinton. The goal of WINEP, Weinberg told friends, was to alter the intellectual atmosphere surrounding Middle East discussions in the Capitol. WINEP has become an omnipresent authority in Washington's Middle East discussions and on the nation's TV news programs, and it directly influences critical decisions concerning US foreign policy that affects Israel.

WINEP appears to have been a major source for policy decisions of Presidents George H. W. and George W. Bush as well as for Bill Clinton regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A long list of WINEP alumni have been appointed to key policymaking positions in the higher echelons of the Executive Branch during their administrations, including the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Pentagon.

A recent addition to pro-Israel think tanks, although it does not identify itself as such, is the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD). It was founded two days after 9/11 by a group of Jewish philanthropists and policymakers "to support the defense of democratic societies under assault by terrorism and militant Islamism." Its main goals, however, appear to be building support for Israel and diminishing public outcry against Israeli violence. Among its leading donors are Leonard Abramson of US Healthcare; New York financier Michael Steinhardt; the late Edgar S. Bronfman Sr., patriarch of Seagram's and president of the World Jewish Congress, along with his brother Charles Bronfman; Lynne Schusterman, widow of Oklahoma oil executive Charles Schusterman and the major funder for the Israel on Campus Coalition; and Bernard Marcus, founder of Home Depot.

As indicated by its website, "FDD spokespersons appear in national, international, and Arabic-language media outlets on average seven times a day, seven days a week to deliver powerful, effective messages about the need to fight terrorism and promote democratic values." Despite the bipartisan appearance of the prestigious group of former and present government officials and current mem-

bers of Congress listed on its board of directors and advisory boards, the direction of the organization appears to be determined by the links maintained by its board members with leading pro-Israel and neoconservative think tanks such as WINEP, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the Center for Security Policy, and the Project for a New American Century (PNAC).

One of the most important pro-Israel think tanks, especially in regard to US-Israeli military cooperation, is the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA). Since its founding in 1976, it has played a major role in shaping US Middle East policy. JINSA has consistently advocated raising the military budget and curtailing US support for arms control while supporting the most right-wing elements in Israeli politics. A significant number of its members have either served or been appointed to upper-level policymaking positions in the White House, Defense and State Departments, and the CIA, where they have been able to pursue and realize their agenda in tandem with other right-wing Jewish lobbying groups. Identified closely with the neoconservative movement, JINSA board members are represented in significant numbers at leading Washington think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, the Hudson Institute, WINEP, and PNAC. On the domestic side, JINSA offers its Law Enforcement Exchange Program, a series of two-day conferences at which Israeli experts are brought to the United States to teach Israel's counterterror techniques to police officers from around the country. Some conferences have attracted as many as 1,400 attendees. Smaller groups are treated to similar training programs in Israel. Unlike WINEP and AEI, JINSA keeps a low public profile.

Labor Unions

In 1983, former AIPAC staff member, now CNN commentator, Wolf Blitzer wrote that it was not surprising that the lobby of the AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington holds a bust of former Israeli prime minister GOLDA MEIR, because "with the exception of the American Jewish community, the American labor movement has been, over the years, the single most important source of support for Israel in the United States."

The Jewish Labor Committee (JLC) has been the official Jewish voice in the labor movement since its 1934 founding in New York in response to the rise of Nazism in Germany. Its strength has been due largely to the presence of Jews among the leadership of many of the major international unions, even when there is no longer a significant Jewish working class.

The JLC's board of directors reflects its power within the union movement despite its relatively small size and the fact that only the public-sector unions today have a sizable number of Jewish members. JLC's board includes Morton Bahr, former president of the Communications Workers of America, who serves as its treasurer; and Andrew Stern, the president of the Service Employees International Union, one of the country's two largest unions. An estimated 1,700 labor unions have invested at least $5 billion of their members' pension funds in Israel bonds.

Longtime AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland claimed to have attended more Israel Bonds dinners "than any man alive," and his successor, John Sweeney, has made statements indicating he is no less dedicated to supporting Israel. Labor's official position was summarized by AFL-CIO secretary-treasurer Richard Trumka when he called on unionists "to invest in the [Israel] bonds that are such a tangible link between our movement and the continuing struggle to nurture and protect the State of Israel." Given that the labor unions are a major part of the funding base for the Democratic Party, the investment of US labor unions in Israel bonds has a powerful impact on US domestic politics.

Business

The Association of American-Israel Chambers of Commerce (AAICC) comprises eleven regional US-Israel chambers of commerce and state governmental agencies that focus on Israel. AAICC claims to be the only economic development group to promote the interests of the US-Israel business community, "ready to assist its members in capitalizing on Israel's strong scientific and industrial capabilities." A review of the major investments by US corporations in Israel makes it appear that the AAICC has been eminently successful.

A cornerstone of the US-Israel relationship is the State of Israel Bonds Organization. Sales of Israel government bonds run in the tens of billions of dollars and included, through 2004, "more than 1,700 labor unions [pension funds], over 1,800 foundations, and numerous corporations, insurance companies, associations, [at least 20 state] pension funds, universities, and other institutions

as well as private investors," according to Israel's Ministry of Finance.

Although information about the number of private bondholders is not readily available, it was estimated in 1986 that they included approximately 9,500 pension funds, 3,500 banks, and 500 insurance companies. Through these sales, Israel has, in effect, obliged the bondholders to lobby Congress to make sure that Israel's economy remains healthy so their investments are not jeopardized. Although the exact figures are not a matter of public record, labor unions are estimated to have invested at least $5 billion of their pension funds in Israel bonds.

Jewish Religious Bodies

The Jewish religious community is an increasingly formidable element of the pro-Israel lobby. The Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (RAC), which is oriented toward the Democratic Party, has been described as second only to AIPAC for its prowess on Capitol Hill. Its website allows visitors to contact their congressional representatives and offers access to their voting records. RAC's Advocacy Network and Cell Phone Advocacy Network can notify members of "crucial and pending legislation when their representatives are 'undecided' [on a] piece of legislation." The site provides the daily schedule of committee meetings of the House and Senate and a search engine to locate pending legislation. Since 1977, RAC has held a "flagship public policy conference" in Washington after a new Congress takes office. Attendees receive "high-level briefings on current issues and critical legislation."

Orthodox Jews received a boost in 1978 when newly elected Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN invited Christian evangelist leader Jerry Falwell to visit Israel. This led to greater support of Israel by the nation's evangelical movement and increased lobbying by Orthodox Jewry, which found itself in agreement with Israel's Christian supporters not only on Israeli issues but also on church-state separation, homosexuality, same-sex marriages, and abortion, which it opposes, as well as school vouchers, which it supports. On these positions, the Orthodox view differs sharply from that of secular and Reform Jews.

The lobbying arm of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America is the Orthodox Institute for Public Affairs (IPA), the largest Orthodox Jewish organization, with over 1,000 synagogues. The IPA furnishes Congress with policy briefings and coordinates an annual National Leadership Mission to Washington. Its Summer Internship Program places Orthodox Jewish college students in key governmental offices.

The National Council for Young Israel (NCYI) represents some 150 Orthodox congregations and nearly 25,000 families. At the far right among Jewish religious organizations, it is allied with the ZOA. NCYI lobbies Congress and the Jewish community against any agreement requiring Israel to give up any part of what it considers the Jewish biblical inheritance—Greater Israel, which means all of the West Bank, an undivided Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and Gaza. The NCYI sends delegations to Congress and floods its representatives with letters and e-mails when the need arises.

Of growing strength is the American Friends of Lubavitch (AFL), the proselytizing sect of Hasidic Jews that established a base in Washington for the Chabad-Lubavitch movement during the Reagan administration. Boasting of "the largest network of Jewish educational and social service institutions in the world," it has cultivated Washington-based diplomats from the 60 countries where it has taken a foothold. Its website claims that AFL's Capitol Jewish Forum is the largest Jewish group on Capitol Hill and has enhanced "the identity and sense of community among Jewish Congressional staffers, and members of congress and the administration."

Women's Groups

There are a number of Jewish women's groups in the United States, with the oldest and most active with regard to Israel being Hadassah. It annually holds a "Day on the Hill" that brings Hadassah chapters to Washington to meet members of Congress and receive briefings on issues relating to Israel. Hadassah's website enables visitors to contact the president and their congressional representatives and to sign up for action alerts. It also runs an "Influentials to Israel" program that encourages elected officials, policymakers, and public opinion leaders to visit Israel.

In 2002, Hadassah and twelve other Jewish women's groups united under the umbrella of One Voice—Jewish Women for Israel in response to criticism of Israel following its attack on the Palestinian refugee camp in JENIN in April 2002. Two months later and speaking "with a unified pro-

Israel voice in the name of one million Jewish women," One Voice launched its inaugural event, entitled Take Five: Call Congress for Israel. According to its website, thousands of Jewish women called their representatives to thank them for their "support [for] a strong and enduring US-Israel relationship." Three months later, One Voice organized a similar call-in "to thank President Bush for the strong support the US government had demonstrated for Israel." One Voice continued to organize annual Take Five call-ins to Congress and the White House through 2006 but it no longer is active.

See also ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; MEDIA, US; UNITED STATES; US AID TO ISRAEL

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—Jeffrey Blankfort

American Media

See MEDIA, US

Amir, Yigal (1970–)

Yigal Amir was a JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST student from Bar-Ilan University who, on 4 November 1995,

shot and killed Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN. Amir was from a SEPHARDI Yemenite religious-nationalist family in Tel Aviv, attended HAREDI elementary school, yeshiva for his formal education, and served in the Golani Brigade of the Israel Defense Forces. In October 1993 he began studies in computer technology and theology at the Bar Ilan University in the Negev. Increasingly, he became opposed to the policy of Rabin and organized student demonstrations and trips to HEBRON (home to the most extremist Jewish settlers). With his IDF weapons permit, he bought a Beretta pistol, which he later used to assassinate Rabin. Police had arrested Amir twice during demonstrations prior to Rabin's murder. Amir was a member of a highly secretive, violence-prone group called EYAL (Jewish Fighting Organization). Avishai Raviv, the group's leader, was also charged with involvement in the Rabin assassination. An Israeli court sentenced Amir to life imprisonment for his crime.

Rabin's murder occurred in the context of the OSLO PROCESS, which religious-nationalist settlers strongly opposed. The SETTLERS had mounted a vigorous campaign against Rabin, depicting him as a traitor and a Nazi. They were supported by several prominent rabbis in the UNITED STATES and Israel who made provocative statements and in several cases issued religious edicts providing religious justification for killing Rabin. One of these was Rabbi Abraham Hecht of Brooklyn, who stated in June 1995 that it was permissible according to *halakha* (Jewish religious law) to kill Rabin because of the alleged danger to other Jews caused by his government's peace policies. How much Amir was influenced by such incitement is difficult to ascertain, but its prevalence is a phenomenon that must be acknowledged.

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Amman Agreement, 1985

See HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1945–1946

As British power waned in the post–World War II period and the UNITED STATES under President HARRY TRUMAN began taking an increasing interest in the Palestine question, Truman called for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees from the HOLOCAUST. British IMMIGRATION policy had been set in the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which outlined a five-year plan for the immigration of 75,000 Jews to Palestine (10,000 per annum and a further 25,000 refugees), but thereafter no further immigration without Palestinian agreement. Responding to President Truman's pleas to admit more Jewish displaced persons to Palestine, British prime minister Clement Attlee proposed a joint commission to study means of resolving the crisis.

Thus, in 1945, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry Regarding the Problem of European Jewry and Palestine was established. Many Zionists considered the committee to be a stalling tactic on the part of the British, but Truman insisted on limiting the timetable of the committee to four months. The commission, composed of six British and six US delegates, heard testimony from witnesses in Washington, London, Europe, and the Middle East. The committee listened to Palestinians who argued against further Jewish immigration to Palestine and to Zionists who advocated unrestricted Jewish immigration.

The commission issued its report on 1 May 1946 and called for the Mandatory authorities to allow 100,000 Jews to enter the country immediately and to lift restrictions on Jewish LAND purchases. It proposed a BINATIONAL state in Palestine until a UN trusteeship could be implemented.

The US government accepted the commission's recommendations; however, the British did not. Zionist leaders in Palestine, including DAVID BEN-GURION, condemned the report, objecting to a future unified Palestine, and demanded the immediate establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, insisting that the JEWISH AGENCY be given responsibility for Jewish immigration. The Palestinians were equally unhappy with the commission's report and called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, an end to Jewish immigration, and a cessation of all land sales to Jews. The US and British governments then established the MORRISON-GRADY Commission to consider plans for the future of Palestine.

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Anglo-Palestine Bank

See JEWISH COLONIAL TRUST

Anti-Defamation League (ADL)

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

Anti-Incitement Presidential Decree

The Anti-Incitement Decree was an arbitrary order issued by PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) president YASIR ARAFAT that was announced in HEBRON on 19 November 1998 by his adviser Al-Tayeb Abdul-Rahim. The decree was part of Arafat's compliance with the 23 October WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM concluded between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) under the auspices of US president BILL CLINTON.

The decree specified a number of acts that were henceforth illegal and punishable by law, including racial discrimination and the use of violence and incitement to violence in a manner damaging to Palestinian relationships with foreign countries. The decree also prohibited the formation of illegal associations and incitement to violate agreements signed between the PLO and foreign countries. Although it satisfied part of the demands imposed by Israel and the United States at Wye River, in practice the anti-incitement decree served to heighten the PNA's repressive practices against those Palestinians who criticized the PNA or Arafat, or otherwise displeased the president.

See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY and WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, 1998

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Anti-Semitism

The phenomenon commonly known as anti-Semitism—the hostility toward or discrimination against Jews as a religious or ethnic group—was the principal motivation for the creation of political ZIONISM in 1896 and the establishment of modern Israel. The nature of anti-Semitism and its alleged and real contemporary manifestations continue to play a major role in international relations and Middle Eastern politics to this day.

A Semite is a person descended from a number of ancient peoples from southwestern Asia, which include the Hebrews, Akkadians, Phoenicians, and Arabs and those who speak Semitic languages, such as Hebrew, Arabic, Aramaic, and Amharic. The term *anti-Semitism* was popularized in the late 1800s by the GERMAN agitator Wilhelm Marr, who aimed to create a pseudo-scientific word to try to convince others that Jews were an inferior race and to provide for a more sophisticated-sounding euphemism to the then more commonly used term *Jew-hatred* (*Judenhass*). Marr helped build an organization, known as the Anti-Semites' League, that openly advocated discrimination against Jews. Despite the inaccuracy of the term and its origins by anti-Jewish Europeans, the term has been adopted more generally to describe the historical and ongoing phenomenon of discrimination against Jews.

Although anti-Semitic thought and violence have existed since before 135 BCE, several key events gave rise to modern Zionism. One was the Blood Libel, which took place in Damascus in 1840 after an Italian friar, Padre Tommaso, and his servant disappeared. Under the advice of the French consul to the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, Ratti-Menton, Capuchin monks with support from the local

Damascus government accused Jews of murdering the men to make Passover matzo. Two men described as bystanders to the alleged murders were tortured until they identified numerous well-known Jews in Damascus as the perpetrators. All of the accused were arrested and tortured. Furthermore, local officials kidnapped the children of the accused, some sixty-three Jewish children in total, and starved them until their parents confessed. Despite being sentenced to death, the remaining accused were freed through international protests led by prominent Jews such as Sir Moses Montefiore of London.

The events in Damascus had a profound effect on SEPHARDIC rabbi Yehuda Alkalai (1798–1878) of Sarajevo, who was one of the founders of modern political Zionist thought. The Damascus Blood Libel convinced Alkalai that Jews needed to have their own land, and the redistribution of the Balkan states based on nationality and ethnic identity led him to promote Jewish nationalism and a Jewish homeland. In 1871, after a major effort to raise financial and public support, Alkalai established a short-lived society for Jewish settlement in Palestine, where he settled in 1874 and died in 1878.

Meanwhile, anti-Jewish sentiment was again on the rise in Europe, particularly in the RUSSIAN Empire. Throughout history, Jews had been massacred and their property destroyed, primarily in the Christian world. Beginning in 1881, following the assassination of Czar Alexander II and the rumors of Jewish conspiracy that surrounded it, pogroms reached a new height of systematic oppression. Pogroms in Kiev, Odessa, and other parts of the Ukraine killed hundreds of Jews and destroyed a great deal of property, and they continued elsewhere in the Russian Empire for decades, resulting in the murder of tens of thousands of Jews and the exile of many more. In reaction to the pogrom campaign, HOVEVEI ZION (Lovers of Zion) groups began forming in 1882, becoming the largest precursor movement to modern political Zionism. Influenced and led by LEON PINSKER, author of *Autoemancipation,* Hovevei Zion promoted the idea of relocating Jews to Palestine to escape from anti-Semitism.

Perhaps the most significant single anti-Semitic event was the Dreyfus Affair in 1894, in which ALFRED DREYFUS (1859–1935), an assimilated Jew from Alsace and captain in the French army, was wrongfully accused and indicted for supplying information to the German military. In 1895 Dreyfus was tried for high treason, stripped of his rank, and deported to Devil's Island off the coast of Brazil. During the court proceedings many spectators called out "Death to Jews!" and throughout FRANCE anti-Jewish sentiment increased substantially. Despite subsequent evidence implicating another French officer—evidence showing that Dreyfus had been framed—his conviction was initially upheld. The Catholic Church added to the fury with a public accusation that the Dreyfus case was a Jewish conspiracy with the Freemasons to undermine the French army and, in effect, to destroy France.

THEODOR HERZL (1860–1904), founder of the Zionist movement, attended the original Dreyfus trial as a Paris correspondent for the Vienna newspaper *Neue Freie Presse*. At the time Herzl, a Hungarian-born assimilated Jew whose grandfather was a close friend of Rabbi Alkalai, believed that anti-Jewish sentiment in Europe arose from the inability of Jews to be absorbed by the new "national" cultures. Upon seeing the unfair trial of Dreyfus, Herzl concluded that the safety and longevity of Jews and Judaism depended on the creation of a Jewish state. In 1896, Herzl published *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), which essentially outlined the creation of Israel. He organized the FIRST ZIONIST CONGRESS in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897 and presided over its next six annual meetings. During this time the JEWISH COLONIAL TRUST and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND were created, which, with some alterations, still operate today. Until his death in 1904, Herzl campaigned for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and laid the groundwork for the creation of Israel in 1948.

In certain respects, it is ironic that it was not until well after the Enlightenment—which for the first time allowed Jews to participate in largely Christian societies and nationalism replaced religious identity as the unifying political force—that Jewish nationalism came into being. However, given that Jews were still perceived as "foreigners" and not true members of the nation, maintaining a strong Jewish identity raised questions regarding their loyalty to their new nation-states. To be treated as equal citizens, Jews had to assimilate, thereby negating many of the cultural and religious aspects of their heritage. Yet even assimilation was no guarantee that they would not become targets of persecution.

Throughout Europe and sometimes elsewhere in previous centuries, the ruling class of a given

country would, in return for granting limited religious and cultural autonomy, set up certain individuals from the Jewish community as its visible agents in positions such as tax collectors and moneylenders. When the population would threaten to rise up against the ruling class, the rulers could then blame the Jews, sending the wrath of an exploited people against convenient scapegoats, resulting in the pogroms and other notorious waves of repression that have taken place throughout the Jewish Diaspora.

Zionism was not initially widely accepted in the European Jewish community as the best response to anti-Semitism and had virtually no support outside of Europe. Jews who identified with communist, anarchist, and other left-wing movements argued that anti-Semitism was a direct consequence of class-based societies, which would no longer be an issue once the capitalist system was overthrown. In their view, Zionism, like any form of nationalism, would only serve to divide the working class in its struggle to end all forms of oppression. An Eastern European socialist movement known as the Jewish Labor Bund, which openly embraced a distinct Jewish identity, also opposed Zionism and argued that culture, not a state or a place, should be the unifying element in identifying Jewish people. Emigration to Palestine was seen as escapist, as giving up on working for a more just society in Europe. Additionally, many religious Jews—particularly among the ultra-Orthodox—argued that the return to Zion could take place only with the coming of the Messiah, and that the premature creation of a Jewish nation-state by temporal authorities was apostasy.

When the brief respite from persecution resulting from the Russian Revolution ended with the rise of Stalin, doubts began to emerge about whether socialist revolution was sufficient to end anti-Semitism. The Nazi genocide against Europe's Jews, and the failure of Western democracies to provide refuge for those attempting to flee persecution, reinforced the Zionists' claims that Jews would never be safe without a nation-state of their own.

During the centuries of the Jewish DIASPORA, Jews in the Arab and Islamic world often fared better than their counterparts in Europe. Though generally not treated as equals to Muslims, there were far fewer periods of outright persecution. Spanish Jews joined Spanish Muslims fleeing persecution during the Inquisition by migrating to North Africa and other Muslim-ruled areas. Under Ottoman rule, Jews—along with Christians—were able to establish their own legal system to deal with civil law. However, as Europeans increased their control of North Africa in the nineteenth century, they began to grant citizenship and other special privileges to Jews in an effort to use a divide-and-rule strategy, which led to a rise of popular resentment against the Jewish communities. In addition, growing anger in EGYPT, IRAQ, and the Levant at the failure of British and French colonialists to give them their promised independence led some anticolonial Arab leaders into a tactical alliance with Hitler's GERMANY, with some adopting the anti-Semitic rhetoric of the Nazis. Other nationalist leaders—such as Moroccan sultan Mohammed the Fifth—opposed anti-Semitism, openly resisting efforts by French fascists to deport Moroccan Jews to European concentration camps.

The small Jewish community in Palestine, as in other Arab countries, had historically lived at peace with its Muslim and Christian neighbors. With the influx of European Zionist immigrants early in the twentieth century, however, the situation deteriorated dramatically. Growing intercommunal violence included the 1929 pogrom against HEBRON's Jewish community in which sixty-seven Jews were killed, many of whom were not Zionists but were from old Palestinian Jewish families.

Though the Zionist movement continued to have little support among Jews in Arab and other predominantly Muslim countries, the establishment of Israel by Western powers and the expulsion of the Arab population of Palestine in 1948 led Arab countries to be suspicious toward their Jewish populations. Seeking to demonstrate their nationalist and anticolonial credentials, Arab governments moved to strip hundreds of thousands of Jews of their citizenship and property and, in many cases, engaged in the outright expulsions of their Jewish populations. Though in some instances, most notably in Iraq, Zionists appeared to have deliberately exacerbated the tensions to encourage a massive Jewish migration to Israel, in general the unprecedented rise of anti-Semitism in the Arab and Islamic world was the major factor that led the majority of MIZRAHIM and SEPHARDIM (Jews from outside of Europe) to join the majority of ASHKENAZIM (European Jews) in embracing Zionism.

In 1948, with the creation of the state of Israel, many Zionists hoped that the problem of

anti-Semitism had been largely resolved, as Jews suffering from persecution now had a homeland to which they would be welcome. Ironically, however, the rise of Zionism became yet another excuse to question Jewish citizens' loyalty to their country and for anti-Semitic persecution.

Some Western anti-Semites embraced Zionism as a means of addressing the "Jewish problem" by removing large numbers of Jews from Western nations. In more recent years, however, Israel's violations of internationally recognized human rights and legal norms have been used as an excuse for anti-Semites to criticize the world's only Jewish state and, by extension, Jews as a whole. Related to this has been an effort by some to represent Zionism in its worst historical manifestations and, in the process, use anti-Zionism as a cover for anti-Semitism. Although the Zionist movement and the state of Israel are not the cause of modern anti-Semitism, Western-supported Israeli policies have stimulated a growth in anti-Semitic attitudes throughout the world in recent years, particularly in Islamic countries, where anti-Semitism had previously been far less virulent than elsewhere. It should be noted, however, that not all critics of Israeli policies—many of whom are Jews—are anti-Semitic.

Jews, like every other categorization of people, are not monolithic. There are Jews living as citizens of virtually every other country in the world, who—like Christians, Muslims and others—represent a broad spectrum in terms of adherence to certain religious or cultural practices as well as attitudes on questions of political identity, including Zionism. In some Western countries, particularly the UNITED STATES, a rather small group of Zionist Jews have organized politically to pressure their respective governments to support certain controversial Israeli government policies and have sought to influence the public debate. In certain cases, along with the Israeli government, some Zionist groups have sought to manipulate Western guilt over historical anti-Semitism to support Israeli policies that would otherwise be considered unacceptable. Attacks against individuals and organizations raising concerns about specific Israeli government policies as "anti-Semitic" have often put a damper on public discourse regarding Israeli violations of human rights and INTERNATIONAL LAW. Many liberal intellectual and political leaders have been reluctant to criticize Israeli policies for fear they may be accused of anti-Semitism or might inadvertently reinforce anti-Semitic attitudes.

Although mainstream and conservative American Jewish organizations, which make up what has become known as the "Israel Lobby," have certainly played a role in influencing US policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there has emerged an exaggerated view of the power of American Jews in shaping US Middle East policy that in some cases parallels historic anti-Semitism by blaming Jews for unpopular policies considered detrimental to the national interest. Such an inflated view of Jewish political and economic power fails to acknowledge other factors that lead the US government to support Israeli policies and imply that US policy would be significantly more concerned with international law and human rights were it not for the power of predominantly Jewish organizations. This has complicated efforts to successfully challenge US policy in the region in the manner of previous movements opposing similar US policies in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and southern Africa.

Anti-Semitism has been called "a fool's socialism" in that it often takes on populist rhetoric in support of economic justice against capitalist exploitation yet exaggerates the power and influence of a tiny subsegment of the ruling class. In a similar way, ANTI-ZIONISM for some has become "a fool's anti-imperialism" in that the relationship of Israel with the West is depicted as a "tail-wagging-the-dog" situation, a view that ignores the role of powerful Western interests in making possible certain Israeli policies against their Arab neighbors. Furthermore, increasing numbers of nominally anti-imperialist activists are blaming Jews, not just for US policy toward Israel and the Palestinians, but also for US policies toward Iraq, IRAN, Sudan, and the Islamic world in general, ignoring the long-standing US interests in controlling Persian Gulf oil and other economic and strategic interests that predate the establishment of modern Israel. This view perpetuates the function anti-Semitism has played historically in scapegoating Jews as the oppressors, rather than challenging the oppressive system as a whole.

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—*Stephen Zunes*

Anti-Zionism

Palestinian-Arab resistance to Zionism, arguably the most significant form of contemporary anti-Zionism, derives from the reality of the dispossession and oppression created by Israel, far more than it does from the theoretical rejections of Zionism as an ideology per se.

While throughout the last century writers from dissimilar political and ideological backgrounds have debated—often heatedly—the ills and merits of Zionism, Palestinian Arabs, the primary victims of Zionism, have had to reckon with its concrete manifestations.

But Palestinians, far from being mere victims, have also played an active and crucial role at certain stages in determining the limits and setting the tone of international opposition to Zionism, beginning with the intensification of the Zionist conquest of Palestine in the early twentieth century until this time. During the height of Palestinian nationalism, from the late 1960s to the end of the 1980s, the Palestinian struggle for freedom and equality inspired and animated a worldwide movement, including principled solidarity groups in the West that opposed Zionism as a form of settler-colonialism, often in the same breath with the condemnation of South African apartheid. When, however, the Palestinian leadership finally accommodated itself, or attempted to, with a reformed brand of Zionism that tentatively recognized part of what until then had been termed the "inalienable rights" of the Palestinian people, the coherence and drive of the anti-Zionist movement subsided. Simultaneously, a vast wave of diplomatic openings for Israel occurred, including recognition not of its existence, which should be intuitive, but of its *right to exist as a Jewish state*. The difference between the two could not be greater: the former is an act of acknowledging a political reality; the latter amounts, in effect if not by intention, to an acceptance of the main tenet of ZIONISM.

With that, and because of several other concurrent global factors, not least of which is the rise to power in the UNITED STATES of the CHRISTIAN Right and the NEOCONSERVATIVES—decisively Zionist allies—anti-Zionism has ebbed to its lowest point in decades. In the West, it is considered an inappropriate, even offensive, term often equated with ANTI-SEMITISM; thus, few serious discussions of the ideology and its reality ever occur.

The greatest triumph of Zionism, a political movement that primarily aimed at the "ingathering" of the world's Jews to a safe haven of their own, is the establishment and development of a strong, prosperous Jewish state in Palestine as a "national Jewish home." Whether or not Jews constitute a nation, and if they do, whether they have a right to establish their nation-state by alienating a land uninterruptedly inhabited for centuries by another nation and dominating this indigenous nation, have been thematic questions raised by the various schools of anti-Zionism throughout most of the history of the Zionist movement. But insofar as anti-Zionism remains a political position, it is Israel's exclusivist character and inequitable policies, more than anything else, that animate it. The contemporary manifestations of political Zionism, which in turn fuel the main anti-Zionist currents in many parts of the world, include Israel's military OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories conquered in 1967, its denial of the internationally recognized rights of repatriation and reparations to Palestinian REFUGEES, and its less exposed but increasingly acknowledged system of "legalized discrimination" against its own PALESTINIAN CITIZENS.

Evolution of Anti-Zionism

If this is the case now, it was not so in the formative stage of Zionism, when the fiercest opposition came from within the Jewish communities in Europe and only later in the Arab/Muslim countries. In fact, anti-Zionism has hardly ever been a

monolithic concept or a unified movement with a set agenda. The nature and political programs within the host of anti-Zionist tendencies have varied from one context to the other and have evolved with time.

Chronologically, the main historic periods that witnessed significant changes affecting anti-Zionist discourse and actions can be divided into four stages: (1) the pre-Holocaust era (1881–1945); (2) the post-Holocaust period (1945–1967), including the establishment of the state of Israel and the 1967 WAR; (3) the period of heightened Palestinian national resistance (1967–1991), which coincided with the end of the Cold War and the final disintegration of the SOVIET UNION; and (4) the emergence of a unipolar world (1991–present) wherein the United States emerged as the sole hegemonic superpower.

Geographically, major opposition to Zionism flourished in roughly four distinct regions: (1) Western Europe and the United States (predominantly among Jews); (2) Eastern Europe (under socialist rule); (3) the Arab/Muslim world (including Palestinians and MIZRAHI, or Arab Jews); and (4) what some now term the Global South. Each of these can be further subdivided into categories of motivating ideologies or convictions: religious, socialist, liberal-democratic/humanist, and nationalist brands of anti-Zionism. It is also important to note that some of these tendencies coexisted in the same geographic unit and/or in the same period.

Pre-Holocaust Anti-Zionism (1881–1945)

In this period, from the modern resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe through the adoption of the earliest Zionist program by the First Zionist Congress in BASEL, Switzerland, in 1897, until the eve of the Nazi HOLOCAUST, firm majorities of Jews all over the world stood in opposition to Zionism, on both religious and secular grounds. Despite their relentless advocacy and mobilization efforts, Zionist leaders failed for decades to win over a majority of Jews in any Western country, even in Germany under Nazi rule. The WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION's (WZO) program called first and foremost for the establishment of a national home for "the Jewish People," a euphemism for the "Jewish nation" invented by Zionists to allow flexible religious and cultural interpretations of the advocated entity. It thereby improved its chances of acceptance by the largely assimilated Western Jews who refused any hint of dual national allegiances.

The second point of the Basel Program espoused the "binding together of the whole of Jewry" toward the first aim. The two fundamental premises of Zionism, as expressed by the movement's founder, THEODOR HERZL, were that Jews throughout the world constituted one distinct nation and that anti-Semitism was an ahistoric, eternal, and incurable phenomenon of an immutable essence. Herzl's principal conclusion was that Jewish assimilation among Gentiles was impossible. These ideas were partially inspired by what was then known, particularly in GERMANY, as romantic nationalism, which emphasized the concepts of the chosen (Aryan) race, fatherland, and blood bonds, and which were abhorred by social democrats and liberals alike.

Almost immediately after Zionist emissaries began advocating among European Jews for their colonial project, as they openly termed it at the time, Jewish anti-Zionism was born. The majority of European Jews rejected Zionism on principle, though from two different—not always mutually exclusive—perspectives: religious and social-democratic (with a distinctly Marxist branch). Only in the most underdeveloped regions of Europe, particularly in feudal Poland and czarist Russia, was there a noteworthy audience for Zionism. Polish Jews were frequent victims of rampant ANTI-SEMITIC attacks, evoked—according to the late Israeli academic and human rights advocate, ISRAEL SHAHAK—mainly but not exclusively by the role that Jews were compelled to play on behalf of the powerful and largely autonomous Christian nobility in oppressing the peasantry. Employed as tax collectors, bailiffs of manors, or lessees of feudal estates, Jews were often seen by the impoverished, enserfed peasants as their immediate exploiters, and they suffered the brunt of peasant revolts. Even then, support for Zionism was initially minimal, though later it grew quite strong.

From a religious perspective, almost all the Orthodox rabbis in Europe as well as in the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, including Palestine, held that the "return to Zion" cited in the Bible could only be implemented in accordance with God's will, and only after God had ascertained the Jews' fulfillment of their covenant obligations. They considered heretical the attempt by the secular Zionists to arrogate God's power in setting the timetable and modalities of this return without

meeting divine conditions. In that sense, the Orthodox can be regarded as politically anti-Zionist, despite their adherence to what may be called "religious Zionism." Examples of this faith-based opposition to Zionism ranged from the ancient Jewish community in Mesopotamia (Iraq) to the largest Orthodox communities in Eastern and Western Europe alike, as well as in the United States.

In a variant to this religious perspective, the US Reform Judaism movement, in its famed Pittsburgh Platform of 1885, rejected Zionism because Jews, from its viewpoint, were no longer a nation but a religious community and therefore did not aspire to "return" to Palestine. Later, in their Columbus Platform of 1937, influenced by the unfolding Nazi persecution of Jews, Reform leaders adopted some basic tenets of Zionism, effectively repudiating their initial stance. Nevertheless, most Jews in the United States identified themselves as "non-Zionists," a term coined by CHAIM WEIZMANN to attract wavering Jews to at least the cultural and religious aspects of Zionism.

Socialist Jewish antagonism to Zionism, on the other hand, was mainly, but not solely, articulated by radical Jewish leftist intellectuals, whose representation in the leadership of European socialist parties was disproportionately high. Among the most prominent of them were Karl Kautsky, Otto Bauer, and Rosa Luxemburg in Germany; Abram Leon in Belgium; and Leon Trotsky and the leaders of the Bund (General Jewish Labor Union) in Poland and Russia. To socialists, Jews were people of a shared faith—Judaism; they lacked common territory, language, and culture, all of which were necessary conditions for the formation of a nation. Throughout the Jewish DIASPORA, after the Roman Empire exiled the Jews from Palestine, by some controversial accounts, the only constant element in Jewish history, social democrats argued, was the Jewish religion and certain "ethnic" attributes associated with it.

Moreover, the "Jewish problem," from this perspective, had resulted from the relations of production in feudal or precapitalist society wherein Jews were relegated to defined roles, in particular to usury. In European societies, affected classes with their associated traditional religious values had conveniently scapegoated the Jews, who were considered "foreign" elements. These social classes overlooked the differences among Jewish intellectuals, musicians, craftsmen, beggars, and usurers, lumping them all together as a race that is different, even inferior. The advent of capitalism, which caused an upheaval in feudal modes and relations of production and a general breakup of the old society, obviated the traditional socioeconomic roles and demeaned the status previously occupied by European Jews. In the advancing capitalist economy, together with the Enlightenment, Jews were free to assume any social or professional role they chose and were no longer considered foreigners but rather equal citizens of the new states.

The alternative, progressive solution to the "problem," advocated by socialists, was the complete assimilation of the Jews in the societies where they lived. That, however, required first and foremost what Karl Marx called the "political emancipation" of those societies and eventually their "human emancipation" whereby religion and its "chains" would eventually disappear. In light of this analysis, socialists regarded Zionism as a reactionary movement that strove to turn the wheels of history backward by stirring up the spirit of the ghetto and by advocating Jewish separation and isolation instead of integration based on equal civil and political rights. Assimilation and equality were, after all, key objectives of the Jewish Enlightenment (*Haskalah),* a renaissance movement that began in Germany and Austria around 1780.

After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, communists adopted a strong position against Zionism, branding it a tool of imperial powers that sought to divide the Jewish proletariat from the rest and to hold back the development of its class consciousness. According to Lenin, Jews in prerevolution Russia formed a "caste," not a nation, because of their socioeconomic role and the anti-Semitic antagonism toward them. His absolute rejection of Jewish nationalism notwithstanding, Lenin, and later Stalin, in effect recognized the Jews of Russia as a national group similar to the Ukrainians, Uzbeks, and Armenians, giving them the right to their own schools and autonomous courts and encouraging them to use Yiddish (despite the fact that Yiddish was only spoken by a minority of Russian Jews, being primarily a German-Jewish linguistic form). Some historians saw this Soviet treatment of Jews as undoing a long process of assimilation that had almost succeeded in ending the "Jewish question" in Russia after the revolution. The Bund, which was the main representative

of Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish Jewish workers, also condemned Zionism without reservation and systematically advocated assimilation; at the same time, however, it demanded special national privileges for Jews per se, making some Marxists accuse them of falling under the influence of Zionists.

Another factor that alienated progressives and liberals alike, whether Jews or not, from the Zionist movement was its ties with the Italian Fascists and later its collaboration for many years with the Nazis—for example, in the famous transfer (HA'AVARA) agreement with Hitler, effectively subverting the trade boycott called in the West against the Germans. In fact, leading Zionist ideologues saw Nazi anti-Semitism as a blessing that finally encouraged German and other Jews to adopt Zionism and immigrate to Palestine.

To safeguard their crucial agreement and to ensure Hitler's cooperation in inducing Jewish immigration to Palestine and nowhere else, Zionists—with a few significant exceptions—never posed an effective challenge to the Nazis in consecutive conferences, and they also persistently prevented the escalation of anti-Nazi struggles waged by others in the United States and Europe. To them, the obsession with building a Jewish state came first and foremost: rights and liberties of Jews in Germany and other countries occupied by the Nazis were of secondary value. Labor Zionists, including some of Zionism's most prominent political and intellectual leaders, did not fare any better in this regard than their more extreme rivals in the Revisionist movement, which, ironically, attacked the agreement with the Nazis as treason, despite its own previous dealings with Fascists and Nazis.

With the sharp increase in hostility to and persecution of the Jews in Germany and countries that fell under its influence, anti-Zionist convictions quickly eroded and increasing numbers of Jewish immigrants fled to Palestine. In the same period, however, the influence of Zionism on Jews of Arab and Islamic countries remained marginal and stayed so until after the creation of Israel. In the Ottoman Empire, Jews were treated considerably better and in a more egalitarian way than in CHRISTIAN Europe. Throughout Arab-Islamic history, Jews were never expelled or massacred and, with rare exceptions, were never subjected to sustained mass persecution as they were in Christian Europe. Their life, however, was not idyllic. Like Christian Arabs, they were considered *dhimmis,* which entailed status discrimination in certain respects, such as in holding public office and taxation. Nevertheless, Jews under Arab-Islamic rule played an important role in commerce, translation, and administration, among other valued professions, directly contributing to the thriving economy and culture of the state. In the absence of anti-Semitism, Zionism found no fertile ground for support among the ancient Jewish communities of the Levant.

A peculiar feature of anti-Zionist discourse in this period was the conspicuous marginalization or altogether dismissal of the wishes and aspirations of the prime victims of Zionism, the Palestinian-Arabs. Although Zionists first tried to portray Palestine as a "land without a people," they knew quite well and many of them openly admitted that Palestine had been inhabited by Arabs for many centuries. AHAD HA'AM, a historic leader of "Cultural Zionism," was appalled at his fellow Zionists' lack of any consideration for the established presence of an indigenous population in Palestine. Other Zionist leaders, from VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY to DAVID BEN-GURION, recognized this presence but were clear about what was necessary to "redeem" the land of Palestine and make room for Jewish IMMIGRATION from Europe: dispossessing the Palestinians by enticing or forcing them off their LANDS. Still, the Palestinian dimension remained relatively obscured from public discussion in the West about Zionism. Most Zionist and anti-Zionist writers in this period may be accused of what some progressive Jewish writers termed Judeo-centrism, or focusing solely on what is best for the Jews, ignoring the fact that the Zionist conquest was not occurring in a vacuum or on some uninhabited island.

Mahatma Gandhi, the leader of Indian self-determination, was an exception to this tendency. Despite being repeatedly lobbied by renowned Zionist intellectuals and politicians to take a positive stance on Zionism, Gandhi stuck to his principled rejection of Zionist claims, expressing the views of many non-European intellectuals at the time. In a famous editorial in the *Harijan* weekly on 11 November 1938, he proclaimed, "Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. . . . Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that

Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their national home."

In Palestine, which until 1917 was part of the Ottoman Empire before falling under British rule, the general Arab population did not initially object to Jewish immigration. There are indicators that some privileged Palestinians even welcomed this influx of skilled and well-to-do Europeans who brought with them jobs and relative prosperity at a time of dire economic difficulties. In 1919, for example, the Palestinian delegation to the General Syrian Congress referred to the Palestinian Jews as "fellow citizens" who should continue to enjoy the same rights and bear the same responsibilities as Christian and Muslim Palestinians. Only when Jewish immigration to Palestine and Zionist activities in the country acquired the form of colonial conquest, with generous support from the British colonial authorities, did Palestinians begin to actively resist. This resistance peaked in the great ARAB REVOLT of 1936, which started with a spontaneous general strike that lasted for six months and quickly grew to engulf all sectors of Palestinian society. This revolt was as much against British policies as against Zionist land acquisition efforts that pushed peasants off their lands.

Throughout their resistance, Palestinians, significantly, called for a halt to the massive entry of new Jewish immigrants from Europe, not for the expulsion of Jews already in Palestine. The only significant exception to this was the main Palestinian leader at the time, the mufti (religious leader) of JERUSALEM, al-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, who first sought the help of the Italian Fascists to counter British colonial rule, and, when that effort failed, initiated an alliance with Hitler, Britain's archenemy. Al-Husayni represented the reactionary and feudal sectors of Palestinian society and kept the Palestinian masses at arm's length for fear they would eventually oust him and choose a more representative leadership instead. His support for Hitler's massacre of the Jews remains a blight on the history of the Palestinian national movement.

Post-Holocaust Anti-Zionism (1945–1967)

When the horrors of the Nazi annihilation of many Jewish communities in Europe became known, and particularly after the proclamation of the establishment of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, profound sentiments of solidarity with the new Jewish state, coupled with guilt for not having done enough to prevent the Holocaust, proliferated among Jews everywhere. Concerted Zionist propaganda and public pressure after the Holocaust succeeded in convincing most Jews—and Westerners in general—that Israel was indeed the home of *all* Jews, that anti-Semitism was an eternal phenomenon that cannot be explained historically or socioeconomically, and that Zionism was the true expression of Jewish nationalism. Another element of the Zionist public relations offensive was the concealment of the well-planned Zionist campaign of TRANSFER, or forcible displacement, which dispossessed and exiled more than 750,000 Palestinians, giving the impression to international public opinion that Palestinians abandoned their lands and took flight because Arab leaders instructed them to do so, a Zionist myth later discredited. It was a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts.

After 1948, the United States quickly reversed its previous position—which favored a unified Palestine with representation for all—and recognized Israel, gradually becoming its new benefactor, replacing the historic role of Britain. The US government, because of its interests in the Arab world, was also keen to be perceived as protecting the rights of the Palestinian REFUGEES. It played a key role in passing UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194, which called upon Israel to repatriate and compensate the Palestine refugees. Concurrently, most of the anti-Zionist groups in the United States, including the Reform movement, switched positions and supported Israel. For fear of accusations of "dual loyalty," some still kept a distance from the Zionist claim that Jews everywhere formed a separate nation. Some prominent anti-Zionist rabbis, however, formed the American Committee for Judaism in 1943, which remained true to the earlier principles of Reform Judaism, rejecting the main premises of Zionism, while at the same time accepting the need for absorbing the Jewish refugees in what became Israel. Even to the Reform Jews, the Palestinian plight was a secondary issue in this period.

The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies immediately recognized Israel, shattering the hopes of many Arab communists. Western European countries followed suit, while newly independent Arab states were too weak to have any influence on the world stage. Anti-Zionism as an organized movement was in tatters.

In spite of all the fervent, almost unqualified backing that Israel received from most Western Jews, this support was mostly political and finan-

cial. A fundamental principle of Zionism, ALIYA (the immigration of Jews to Palestine), failed to gain many adherents. And given the tragic depletion of the number of European Jews as a result of the Holocaust, the Zionist movement was compelled to look elsewhere for new immigrants. It was only then that the ASHKENAZI (i.e., European Jews) Zionists turned to the MIZRAHIM, or Jews of the Arab countries, for new immigrants.

Arab Jews—a term that was commonly used until then—were divided into a minority who aspired to immigrate to Israel and a majority who felt they belonged in their Arab countries and wished to remain there. Opposition to Zionism was the norm among Arab Jews, but several factors played into the hands of Israel in turning this around. Zionist propaganda and agitation—violent at times—among Arab Jews was one of them. In IRAQ, where the Jewish community had lived and prospered for more than two millennia—from Babylonian times—and formed an integral part of the Arab nation, anti-Semitism was almost unheard of, the Farhud of May 1941 being a tragic exception. In that incident, Zionist agents resorted to terror, planting bombs that targeted Jews and leading many to believe that the Iraqi government was behind the bombings. Like other unelected regimes that ruled most of the Arab countries then, the British-installed government of Iraq was no different in kowtowing to Zionist interests.

Another element that worked in the Zionists' favor was that Arab state regimes were concerned about deflecting the massive waves of popular anger at their humiliating defeat in the "War of Palestine," the 1948 WAR, and at their lack of legitimacy, having been installed by Europeans. Thus, many of these authoritarian Arab rulers encouraged popular anti-Jewish sentiments and launched official campaigns to persecute, harass, or even purge their respective Jewish communities. Exasperated by the extent of Jewish solidarity with Israel, many Arabs began viewing with suspicion their fellow Jewish citizens, eventually accusing them of complicity with the Zionists. The line between anti-Zionism and anti-Jewish feelings thus became blurred, and most Arab Jews immigrated to Israel, leaving behind their heritage and often their precious belongings.

In Israel, the Ashkenazi elite discriminated against Arab Jews, forcing them to identify themselves as either Arab or Jew. Their leading intellectuals have claimed that they were the "other victims" of Zionism. Becoming Israeli meant abandoning Arabism. The widespread prejudice by the Ashkenazi elite, who dominated the LABOR PARTY and every other institution in Israel, against early generations (some argue that even the current generation) of Mizrahi Jews resulted in their becoming ardent supporters of the opposition—the right-wing LIKUD and other parties. At the same time, most Mizrahi Jews developed a deep abhorrence of everything Arab—including the Palestinians. Some Mizrahi intellectuals perceived this as an expression of cultural "self-hatred."

In the West, support for Israel mushroomed while anti-Zionism lost even more ground. The Zionist movement succeeded in forging an image of Israel as an essentially Western, enlightened, and modern country in the midst of a sea of "Oriental backwardness." The iconic Israeli KIBBUTZ, for instance, was presented as an embodiment of social progress and egalitarianism, ignoring the fact that these settlements were often built on the sites of depopulated and bulldozed Palestinian villages and did not allow any Arabs to join, on principle. The fact that Israel had no constitution to protect the rights of its citizens and that three of its BASIC LAWS institutionalized and legalized widespread discrimination against the indigenous Palestinians—now citizens of Israel—was cloaked from world attention. Israel comprised two distinct statuses: citizenship (*izrachut)* and nationality (*le'um)*, each entailing different rights and responsibilities. Every Jew in the world was considered a *national,* and upon his or her "return" to Israel, he or she became a *citizen* automatically. The native Palestinians, on the other hand, were only citizens and could never become nationals in the exclusive home of the "Jewish nation." Prominent Jews in the West often criticized Zionist practices and political parties. In a letter to the *New York Times,* on 4 December 1948, a group of Jewish intellectuals, including Hannah Arendt, Albert Einstein, and Sidney Hook, attacked MENAHEM BEGIN and his HERUT PARTY, comparing them to "the Nazi and Fascist parties." A few Jewish writers even questioned whether a BINATIONAL state would have been preferable to an exclusively Jewish state.

Ultra-Orthodox Jewish sects, such as NETUREI KARTA and Satmar, maintained their opposition to Zionism as blasphemous and refused to recognize Israel. Members of Neturei Karta regarded themselves as Palestinian Jews who, like their fellow

Muslim and Christian Palestinians, were under Zionist OCCUPATION.

Toward the end of this stage, and after a long hiatus in the Palestinian national movement, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) was established in 1964 in JERUSALEM, supported by the pan-Arab leader of EGYPT, JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, and espousing a nationalist program to "liberate Palestine" from the "Zionist enemy." This ushered in a new phase in the Palestinian, Arab, and indeed international struggle against Zionism.

Heightened Palestinian Resistance to Zionism (1967–1991)

The most consequential event at the beginning of this stage was Israel's Occupation of the WEST BANK, including East Jerusalem, and the GAZA STRIP, unifying the last parts of Mandate Palestine under its control. This swift and decisive victory of Israel over almost the entire Arab nation, however, proved to be a mixed blessing for Zionism. By reuniting its Palestinian citizens with Palestinians who came under its Occupation, Israel unwittingly resurrected the former's long-suppressed national identity. It also erased in a short period its previous image as a bastion of enlightenment, replacing it with that of a "white" colonial power oppressing a "brown" native population, thereby inviting the wrath of the majority of the countries of the South, themselves former European colonies. Furthermore, the 1967 WAR proved to Palestinians as well as Arabs in general the utter inability of the Arab state system to defend itself, let alone liberate Palestine. This gave impetus to the eventual recognition of the PLO by the Arab governments as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians, which in turn led to the organization's establishment of diplomatic ties with more countries than Israel had at the time.

The PLO's resolutely anti-Zionist political program initially envisioned a democratic, secular state in historic Palestine, where Muslims, Christians, and Jews would enjoy equal citizenship. Later the PLO's leadership gradually abandoned the unitary state solution, opting instead for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, which was almost universally supported. Despite its shortcomings, particularly its inability to recognize the national attributes that evolved among Israeli Jews, the PLO's political platform exposed the basic discriminatory nature of Zionism. This boosted the PLO's diplomatic efforts in isolating Israel, whose own organic partnership with the United States, coupled with its alliance with South African apartheid and several right-wing dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere, further diminished its standing in the international community. This struggle against Zionism culminated in UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, on 10 November 1975, condemning Zionism as a form of racism. For the first time in its history, Zionism was attacked not for its effects on world Jewry but for the concrete ramifications of its "colonial project," as Herzl and his followers called it, on the ground. Without the support of the Soviet Union, this resolution would have never seen the light.

Though incensed by the UN denunciation of Zionism, many in the West began to question Israeli policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Unlike in the South, solidarity in the West did not translate into anti-Zionism as such for several reasons, including the prevalent feeling of guilt over the West's complicity or paralysis vis-à-vis the Holocaust and the immense power of the Zionist lobby in the United States and several other countries. Being against Israel's policies did not necessarily entail being anti-Zionist, and it certainly did not mean being anti-Semitic, despite strenuous Zionist efforts to tie them all together. The tactic of equating criticism of Israel or anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism became ubiquitous and indiscriminant, mainly as a tool to stifle such criticism. Still, new movements in solidarity with the Palestinian people sprung up in most Western countries, including the United States, presenting a challenge to the hitherto unchecked influence of the Zionist movement.

In this period, EGYPT's 1979 peace treaty with Israel was the most outstanding diplomatic achievement for Israel and the Zionist movement. It helped Israel break its isolation and drove a wedge in several international groupings where Egypt had played a major role, including the ARAB LEAGUE, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of African Unity. This opening did not last long. With the onset of the Palestinian INTIFADA in December 1987, Israel's harsh suppression of this popular, mostly nonviolent revolt cost it substantial support in the West and elsewhere. It became less taboo on campuses in the West, for instance, to criticize not just Israeli policies but the Zionist foundation of these policies.

Simultaneously, and under strong influence from Arab leaders acting on behalf of the United

States, the PLO's leadership embarked on a new approach of "reconciliation" that explicitly recognized Israel's *right* to exist in return for an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 Occupied Territory and the recognition of the rights of Palestinian refugees as stated in UN RESOLUTION 194. The PLO believed that by endorsing this compromise solution it would win recognition from the United States, by then the only major power with any influence over Israel. This new process reached its peak with the MADRID CONFERENCE, convened on 30 October 1991, when Palestinian leaders from the OPT—acting on behalf of the PLO—were allowed to join with JORDAN in peace negotiations between Arab states and Israel. The PLO at the same time opened a secret, direct channel of negotiations with Israel in Oslo, Norway. As a result of the OSLO PROCESS, beginning with the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, the Intifada began to lose direction and wane.

Although the PLO believed that it had made a historic breakthrough by gaining official recognition from Israel, and by extension the United States, it underestimated the irreparable damage caused by its own recognition of Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state. For the first time since the beginning of Zionist colonization of Palestine at the end of the nineteenth century, the official Palestinian leadership, for all intents and purposes, accepted one of the basic tenets of Zionism: its right to establish an *exclusivist* Jewish state in Mandate Palestine. This turning point in the Palestinian national movement's position on Zionism diluted the very definition of anti-Zionism and effectively aborted that aspect of its struggle against Israel. The rapid transformations in international geopolitics in the late 1980s, particularly the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, led to a sharp increase in US power and an unprecedented propensity to project that power on the world stage. A new era was born with the final collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Unipolar World (1991–present)

Israel and the Zionist movement did not wait long after the removal of the Soviet factor from the political equation to seek some sizable dividends. Through intense lobbying, they convinced the US government to demand the repeal of the UN's "Zionism is racism" resolution. On 16 December 1991, their wish came true. The General Assembly passed Resolution 4686, negating its 1975 declaration and removing a major obstacle on the course of Zionist and Israeli rehabilitation in the international community. In 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles, or what became known as the OSLO ACCORDS, engendering a new atmosphere of optimism and reconciliation. Soon after, Israel embarked on its most ambitious public relations and diplomacy campaign in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Arab world, establishing diplomatic ties and opening badly needed markets for its growing industries. Former sworn enemies suddenly warmed up to Israel, importing billions of dollars' worth of military hardware and other goods from it, while gaining the eagerly sought-after "most favored nation" status in trade with the United States. TURKEY, Jordan, CHINA, India, and Pakistan, to name a few, wooed Israel as if the road to Congress passed through Tel Aviv.

Anti-Zionism, again, became an "unacceptable" concept that could not be used in public discourse for fear of alienating Israel, which now translated into angering the United States and inviting its inevitable punishment. After the inauguration of GEORGE W. BUSH and the rise to power of his NEOCONSERVATIVE associates (some of whom were previously close advisers to the right-wing Israeli leader BENJAMIN NETANYAHU), Zionist influence in the White House matched its decades-old, almost unparalleled influence on Capitol Hill. This created a new political reality whereby Israel attained unprecedented weight in shaping US foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.

Israel enjoyed a decade of political and diplomatic triumphs that translated into rapid economic growth and a sharp increase in Jewish IMMIGRATION, particularly from the splinter republics of the former Soviet Union. The Zionist movement was at its historic peak by any standard.

After years of relative quiet, under the illusion of the peace process, paralleled by an enormous growth of Jewish SETTLEMENTS in Gaza and the West Bank, particularly in and around Arab East Jerusalem, the second Palestinian Intifada, the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, broke out in September 2000. The uprising put a damper on Israel's golden decade and reopened long-forgotten questions about whether a just peace could be achieved with a state characterized by exclusivity, ethnocentricity, and expansionism.

In its attempt to crush the Intifada, Israel implemented a policy that flouted INTERNATIONAL LAW and amounted to "war crimes," as declared by

Amnesty International and several other respected international human rights organizations. With this as a background, the UN World Conference against Racism in Durban in 2001 revived the 1975 debate on Zionism, though it failed to adopt a specific resolution because of threats from the United States. The Nongovernmental Organizations Forum at that same conference did, however, condemn Zionism as a form of racism and apartheid, while also condemning all other forms of racism, including anti-Semitism. A few years later, the International Court of Justice at the Hague, in a famous Advisory Opinion on 9 July 2004, condemned as illegal Israel's Wall ("Separation BARRIER") and the colonies built on occupied Palestinian land. The already cold peace with Egypt and Jordan became even colder. The Israeli economy stagnated for a while and is undergoing an aggressive process of privatization that threatens to destabilize the taken-for-granted benefits of the welfare state. Jewish emigration again exceeded immigration. Suddenly, mainstream churches, academic associations, and trade unions in Europe and the United States began calling for diverse forms of boycott, divestment, or sanctions, or "BDS," against Israel, similar in nature to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era.

Ironically, at its historic zenith, Zionism's "crisis" jumped to the top of the agenda. POST-ZIONISM emerged as a possible answer to the movement's loss of its raison d'être. The unitary, non-Zionist state solution has returned to the agenda, at least in small academic and intellectual circles, Palestinian and Israeli alike. New anti-Zionist Jewish movements have begun to spread in the West. After a century of almost uninterrupted success, Zionism today finds itself faced with some of the most basic dilemmas that have accompanied it since its birth. Its fundamental claim of the right of Jews to have an exclusivist, ethnocentric state, whose very definition excludes its indigenous citizens, and whose laws discriminate against non-Jews, is again being called into question. This is particularly so in developed countries where Jews were at the forefront of the fight for civil rights, democracy, equality before the law, and separation between church and state.

This era also poses important questions to the anti-Zionist movements, particularly the Palestinian-Arab national movement. What does anti-Zionism mean today? Does defining Israel as a Zionist, settler-colonial state necessitate a decolonization process that undoes everything that resulted from the Zionist conquest? What about the acquired and internationally recognized rights of Israeli Jews? Can they be reconciled with the UN-sanctioned rights of the indigenous people of Palestine to self-determination in accordance with international law? Can Israel avoid being anachronistic and become a true democracy for all its citizens without shedding its colonial nature and abandoning Zionism? Can the anti-Zionist movement maintain a coherent and unwavering position of rejecting anti-Semitism together with all other forms of racism? Without addressing these and similar questions with moral consistency and political prudence, the anti-Zionist movement cannot hope to pose a serious challenge to Zionism in today's world.

In 1967 I. F. Stone summed up the dilemma of Zionism, which remains relevant to this day: "For Israel is creating a kind of moral schizophrenia in world Jewry. In the outside world, the welfare of Jewry depends on the maintenance of secular, non-racial, pluralistic societies. In Israel, Jewry finds itself defending a society in which mixed marriages cannot be legalized, in which non-Jews have a lesser status than Jews, and in which the ideal is racist and exclusivist."

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—Omar Barghouti

Antonius, George (1893–1941)

George Antonius was an Arab educator and politician during the BRITISH MANDATE. Born in Cairo, he was a Greek-Orthodox Christian of Lebanese parentage. After graduating from Cambridge University in 1914, he worked for a period as deputy press censor in Alexandria during World War I. Antonius came to Palestine in 1921 and began a civil service career working for the British in their education department and secretariat. In 1930 he resigned from the British Executive in protest over British policy toward the Palestinians.

In 1934 and again in 1936, Antonius met with DAVID BEN-GURION and other Zionist leaders in unsuccessful attempts to persuade them to moderate their objectives in Palestine. For a period, Antonius advocated a Jewish canton within a Palestine state, which would subsequently federate with other Arab states; however, by 1938 he had abandoned the idea as impractical. In 1936 he worked with MUSA AL-ALAMI in circulating the June petition signed by major Arab leaders that supported the general strike.

In 1938 Antonius began work as Middle Eastern associate of C. R. Crane's Institute of Current World Affairs (New York) and wrote *The Arab Awakening,* an analysis of Arab nationalism beginning in the Ottoman era that depicts the treachery of Britain and FRANCE in denying the Arab world self-determination after World War II, as Great Britain had promised in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. The book is a classic and still read today. Antonius appeared before the PEEL COMMISSION (1936–1937) and participated in the Palestinian delegation to the LONDON CONFERENCE in 1939. He remained in London after the conference ended and helped to persuade British officials to include in the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER the provision that, after five years, Palestinians would have a say in Jewish IMMIGRATION as well as a qualified promise of Palestinian independence after ten years. The ARAB HIGHER COM-

MITTEE rejected the white paper, as did the Zionists, yet Antonius continued to promote Arab-British cooperation. He believed firmly that if the Jewish community in Palestine lost its special privileges, Jews and Palestinians could live together as equal citizens.

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Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem

The Applied Research Institute–Jerusalem (ARIJ) was established in Jerusalem in 1990 as a nonprofit Palestinian organization dedicated to promoting sustainable development in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and to increasing the self-reliance of the Palestinian people through greater control over their natural resources. The institute works specifically to augment the local stock of scientific and technical knowledge and to devise efficient methods of resource utilization and conservation, improved practices, and appropriate technology. To address problems of sustainable development and conservation of the environment that had been disregarded under the OCCUPATION, ARIJ maintains a Water Research Unit, a Rain Fed Farming Unit, an Environmental Research Unit, a Land Use Unit, and an Environmental Resource Planning and Assessment Unit.

ARIJ's website has a section called Eye-On-Palestine that monitors and assesses the magnitude of environmental degradation caused by politically induced changes to Palestine's LAND and natural resources. It presents a summary of individual and collective political activities, such as expansion and growth of Israeli SETTLEMENTS, land expropriation and closures, uprooting of trees, Israeli stone quarrying, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and sewage disposal from Israeli settlements. ARIJ also publishes a *Monthly Report on the Israeli Colonization Activities in the West Bank*. (www.arij.org).

Al-Aqsa Intifada

The al-Aqsa Intifada began on 29 September 2000 in spontaneous demonstrations against the Israeli OCCUPATION and continues at this writing in 2009. It is an explosion of anger and frustration at the collapse of the OSLO PROCESS, the continuing Occupation, rapid Israeli SETTLEMENT expansion, and the increasingly grave economic situation the Palestinians were experiencing during 1994–2000. It was triggered by Israeli right-wing opposition party leader ARIEL SHARON's visit to the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF on the TEMPLE MOUNT in Jerusalem, the third holiest site in Islam, with a LIKUD PARTY delegation and surrounded by hundreds of Israeli riot police.

Between 29 September 2000 and 26 December 2008, the Israeli human rights organization B'TSELEM reported total fatalities: 4,908 Palestinians killed, of whom approximately 60 to 70 percent were civilians, and about 31,000 Palestinians wounded (injuries according to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights—PCHR). Some 1,062 Israelis were killed, of whom 335 were members of the security forces and 727 were civilians. According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), during the period 2001 through 2007, of the 1062 fatalities there were 554 from 140 SUICIDE BOMBINGS. The IMFA also reported that during this same period 8,341 Israelis were wounded (5,676 civilians and 2,665 security force members).

Additionally, during the Israeli offensive in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead, from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009, PCHR reports a further 1,417 Palestinian fatalities, including 926 civilians, 236 fighters, and 255 police officers. The Palestinian Ministry of Health reported a total of 5,303 injuries, including 1,606 children and 828 women. Israel stated that 10 IDF soldiers were killed and 336 wounded. Out of the fatalities, 5 were killed engaging Hamas combatants, 4 were killed by friendly fire, and 1 was killed when Hamas rockets hit a military base inside Israel. Israel further reported that there were three civilian casualties and 182 injured, civilians and soldiers.

According to Likud spokesman Ofir Akounis, the purpose of Sharon's 2000 appearance at the Muslim holy site was to "show that under a Likud

government [the Temple Mount] will remain under Israeli sovereignty," which is to say that all the holy sites and Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty, dashing Palestinian expectations that East Jerusalem would be the capital of their independent state. Even without Akounis's clarification, the Palestinians well understood Sharon's symbolic visit, which had been approved by LABOR PARTY prime minister EHUD BARAK. Almost immediately, spontaneous Palestinian protests erupted everywhere and Israel responded with what B'Tselem described as "excessive force." In the first five days after Sharon's visit, Israeli security forces killed 47 Palestinians and wounded 1,885, while 5 Israelis were killed by Palestinians.

Beginning on 1 October 2000 and continuing for several days, Israeli-Arabs held a general strike and a series of demonstrations across northern Israel in support of Palestinian demonstrators in the Occupied Territories. This resulted in the deaths of 13 Arab-Israeli citizens of Israel and injuries to many more. The government appointed the Or Commission to investigate the police's use of force but its findings, which were published in September 2003, were inconclusive in ascertaining responsibility.

This was the second Palestinian uprising against Israeli Occupation. The First Intifada (1987–1990) too was fundamentally a protest against the Occupation, but it was overwhelmingly powered by nonviolent civil disobedience. It was triggered on 8 December 1987, when an Israeli army tank transporter ran into a group of Palestinians from Jabalya refugee camp in the GAZA STRIP, killing four and injuring seven. Protests spread quickly and widely across the Occupied Territories. Over the course of the First Intifada, B'Tselem reports that from 9 December 1987 through 30 December 1990, 782 Palestinians (mainly civilians) were killed by Israeli forces and settlers, while 65 Israelis (civilians and military) were killed by Palestinians.

Both Intifadas reflect the aspirations of an entire population for freedom and independence and a response to decades of Occupation, which have entailed arrests, DEPORTATIONS, killings, destruction of the national economy, usurpation of WATER RESOURCES, destruction of agricultural land in the Gaza Strip, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, continuous confiscation of LAND and SETTLEMENT expansion, nonenforcement of the law against vigilante settlers, TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, mass arrests and ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, severe restrictions on Palestinians' FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, collective punishment, CURFEWS, SIEGE, and more recently, CHECKPOINTS, ROADBLOCKS, and the separation BARRIER that is being constructed mostly on the Palestinian side of the Green Line.

Roots of the Uprising

Three years after the first Intifada was suppressed, PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT and Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN shook hands on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993 over the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), the first agreement between Israel and the Palestinians and the first in what came to be known as the OSLO ACCORDS. Suddenly the majority of Palestinians, at least those in the Occupied Territories, were infused with hope that their long-desired freedom in a sovereign state of their own was soon to be realized.

Under the Oslo Accords, Israel committed to the phased withdrawal of its forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and affirmed the Palestinian right to self-determination within those areas through the creation of a PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). For its part, the PLO formally recognized Israel's right to exist and committed to taking responsibility for internal security in population centers in the areas evacuated by Israel. Palestinian self-rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated, starting no later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, or May 1996, and concluded by the end of the interim period, or May 1999. The last agreement would include the resolution of FINAL STATUS issues, including JERUSALEM, Palestinian REFUGEES, BORDERS, settlements, security arrangements, and relations with neighboring states. None of these dates were met and Israel did not fulfill its commitments to redeploy from areas agreed upon in the various accords signed between 1993 and 2000, claiming that the PNA did not fulfill its security requirements.

In 1995, SHIMON PERES became prime minister after Rabin was assassinated. In the 1996 elections, Israelis chose a right-wing coalition led by the Likud candidate, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, who was opposed to Oslo from its outset. He was followed in 1999 by Labor Party leader Ehud Barak and in 2001 by right-wing Likudist Ariel Sharon.

While Rabin and Peres had limited, though not ceased, settlement construction at the request of the UNITED STATES, Netanyahu rapidly increased construction and put forward plans for an entirely new settler neighborhood, HAR HOMA, in East Jerusalem. At the same time, Israel built an elaborate system of bypass ROADS throughout the West Bank to connect the settlers to Israel, which entailed slicing up the area into inaccessible cantons for the Palestinians.

According to Peace Now, from 1993 to 2000 the settler population (excluding East Jerusalem) grew from 116,300 to 198,300; there were 21,999 new housing starts and 39 new outposts, and Peace Now researcher Dror Etkes notes, "In reality, outposts are new settlements." PNA leaders argued that this continued construction was contrary to the spirit of the DOP, prejudiced the outcome of final status negotiations, and undermined confidence in Barak's desire for peace.

Other promises, as well, of the Oslo process did not evolve as Palestinians expected. For instance, Israel continuously decreased the number of Palestinian workers permitted to enter Israel, setting off an economic free fall. No longer could Palestinians move freely among Israel, East Jerusalem, the WEST BANK, and GAZA due to an increasingly restrictive PERMIT system, in conjunction with a checkpoint regime that sliced the West Bank into ever smaller noncontiguous units and affected the ability of every Palestinian to move about normally. Life in general became more difficult for the Palestinians even as the PNA and Israel concluded agreement after agreement in the Oslo process.

From 11 to 25 July 2000, US president BILL CLINTON convened the CAMP DAVID Summit, at Barak's behest and despite PNA president Arafat's objections that the process had not come far enough to approach final status issues. Barak approached the final status negotiations with little regard for Palestinian views. A day before departing for Camp David, Barak emphasized that Israel would leave the West Bank and Gaza and return to the 4 June 1967 lines, that Israel would retain sovereignty over a united Jerusalem, that most of the Jewish settlers in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) would remain there in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty, and that Israel would not take upon itself any moral, legal, or financial responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. At the summit he put forward BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER in a take-it-or-leave-it framework. No Palestinian leader could possibly have accepted the terms Barak presented; the summit fell apart, and Israel and the United States blamed Arafat.

Palestinians felt that they had been misled and were going to achieve none of their interests or rights. Increasingly, they understood that the peace process had been designed according to a US-backed Israeli vision, which implied the exclusive implementation of Israeli terms. The results of seven years of the Oslo Process and all the agreements concluded therein were viewed as little more than devices intended to neutralize the rights of the Palestinian people. The significance of these conditions for Palestinians cannot be overstated and especially the main "facts" on the ground: the settlements and the growing network of Israeli highways. The settlements are aimed at extending Israel's sovereignty over as much of the West Bank as possible, preferably over all of it, and defeating Palestinian aspirations for freedom and independence. Any realistic discourse focused on the creation of a Palestinian state with the coexistence of Israeli settlements and bypass roads would imply a state without sovereignty. This has always been a main cause of conflict and confrontation.

The refugee problem is another basic issue at the heart of the Palestinian cause. Refugees were created as a direct result of the Zionist project in Palestine. So as to ensure a viable Jewish state it was necessary to reduce significantly the Palestinian population, which was a majority at the outset of the Zionist movement and remained so in 1948. To this end numerous tactics were employed, and, at the end of the 1948 WAR, 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians had lost their homes and land and were transformed into refugees. During the 1967 WAR, another 250,000 refugees were added to this number. Today there are approximately 4 million refugees—the original refugees and their offspring—living in LEBANON, SYRIA, JORDAN, the West Bank, and Gaza, mostly in squalid camps, and elsewhere. A lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be attained without addressing the needs of the refugees.

These are the facts and the foundation upon which the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted and continues. One of the most dangerous aspects for the Palestinians of the Oslo Process and the al-Aqsa Intifada has been Israel's success, abetted by Western governing and MEDIA elites, in portraying Israel and the Palestinians as "equal" part-

ners. But the vast disparities and asymmetries in power and resources, which existed between the two at the outset of the Oslo process, go a long way toward explaining its failure and are visibly reflected in the weapons differentials in the Second Intifada.

Violence as Defining Characteristic

Two kinds of military logic have combined to perpetuate the al-Aqsa Intifada and make violence its defining attribute. The first is the logic of tit-for-tat, by which every Israeli attack is a response to some earlier Palestinian attack, which in itself came to avenge martyrs fallen in a previous Israeli response. Second is the logic of escalation, which means that all responses have to be more dramatic or deadly than the attacks that triggered them, supposedly to put an end to the violence, but in fact pushing back the threshold of the acceptable.

The violence of the Second Intifada is reflected in the previously noted statistics on fatalities. The transformation of the Intifada from spontaneous protests occurred when Palestinian demonstrations moved to well-defined points of friction—usually the borders between Palestinian and Israeli-controlled areas. There Palestinians were faced by Israeli troops using military tactics and weapons rather than civilian law enforcement principles and methods of crowd control. As Israel increasingly mobilized military resources in its attempt to crush the uprising, Palestinian tactics also shifted to guerrilla-type actions and suicide bombings inside the Green Line, further altering the nature of the confrontation.

In a comprehensive report prepared by B'Tselem covering the period from 29 September until 2 December 2000, the Israeli human rights organization reported that "since the beginning of these events . . . 264 people were killed in the Occupied Territories, and over 10,000 were injured." The total figures are broken down as follows:

- 204 Palestinian civilians were killed by IDF forces, of them 73 minors aged 17 and under.
- 24 members of the Palestinian security forces were killed by IDF forces.
- 4 foreign nationals were killed by IDF forces.
- 3 Palestinian civilians (at least) were killed by Israeli settlers.
- 13 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinian civilians.
- 11 members of the Israeli security forces were killed by Palestinian civilians.
- 5 members of the Israeli security forces were killed by members of the Palestinian security forces.

B'Tselem continues with an analysis of these data. Among its conclusions: "Israel uses excessive and disproportionate force in dispersing demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Israel did not develop nonlethal methods to disperse demonstrations or train its soldiers to confront such demonstrations. This in spite of the fact that Israel was prepared for the events of the past few weeks. As a result, soldiers only had at their disposal rubber-coated metal bullets and live ammunition, which caused many Palestinian casualties, and many injuries to medical teams and journalists. Over the past few weeks there have been many incidents of settler attacks on Palestinians. In some of these incidents, IDF soldiers were present but did nothing to protect Palestinians, as they are obliged to do as the occupying force. This phenomenon is not new, and B'Tselem has warned in the past that Israeli authorities do not take sufficient measures to end this phenomenon. The Palestinian Authority does not make serious efforts to prevent children from participating in demonstrations, in spite of the grave danger. The Palestinian Authority does almost nothing to prevent Palestinians from attacking Israeli civilians. The establishment of settlements is a violation of international law and therefore illegal; however, this does not justify attacks on settlers or on settlements. Intentional attacks on civilians are absolutely prohibited, regardless of the circumstances. The Palestinian Authority does not prevent armed Palestinians from shooting from within populated areas, thereby exposing its civilian population to the IDF's response. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority prevent journalists from freely covering the events, thereby restricting freedom of speech. This is done in various ways, including physical attacks and property damage."

Military Weapons and Tactics

During the Intifada, Palestinian militant groups have waged a high-intensity campaign of guerrilla warfare and suicide bombings against Israeli targets. For the Israeli public, the suicide bombings were harmful physically and psychologically because of their randomness and the death toll. Palestinian military equipment consists mostly of

imported light arms and homemade weapons, such as hand grenades and explosive belts, assault rifles, and the Qassam rockets. The rockets are crude, often made from old pipes, and largely ineffectual. The first homemade Qassam rocket was fired across the Israeli border in October 2001. It was not until June 2004 that Israel suffered its first fatality, and, since then, 23 Israelis have been killed by Hamas rocket fire. In the latter years of the Intifada, Palestinians also increased the use of remote-controlled landmines and car bombings.

At the same time, Israel has had complete ground and air superiority. In its tactics—the use of utmost force as quickly as possible in order to crush Palestinian resistance—Israel uses the following: heavily armored Caterpillar D9 bulldozers; AH-64 Apache helicopters used as platforms for shooting guided missiles; heavily armored equipment such as the Merkava tank and various military aircraft, including F-16s, drone aircraft, and helicopter gunships; sniper towers that were used extensively in the Gaza Strip before ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT and then were increasingly employed in the West Bank; prolonged incursions and redeployment into PNA-controlled areas; unwilling Palestinian human shields; mass arrests and detentions; the Barrier wall inside West Bank territory; the imposition of a tightened siege on the Occupied Territories; and destruction of homes and civilian property, plus the destruction of almost all PNA facilities.

The Israeli policies considered the most harmful—physically and psychologically—to the Palestinians are the following.

Targeted Assassinations. From 28 September 2000 to 30 December 2008, Israel carried out 233 targeted assassinations against Palestinians, plus 386 Palestinian civilians were killed as "collateral damage" in the course of the assassinations. No other Israeli policy generates as much rage as these assassinations, which impel revenge, usually in the form of suicide bombs. The assassinations were initially said by Israel to be carried out only if it were necessary to "stop a terrorist cell on its way to commit an attack" (so-called ticking bombs). On 3 July 2001, new guidelines were issued by the Israeli kitchen cabinet to allow the killings of "known terrorists," even if they were not on the verge of committing a major attack. Israel has applied this term generously to most Palestinians fighting the Occupation regardless of the target or the means used.

The Israeli policy of assassinations has contributed significantly to the escalation of violence. Since the inception of the policy, Palestinian factions have justified most attacks against Israeli targets—from shooting incidents to suicide bombings—as retaliation for an assassination. In 2000 there were nine targeted assassinations—four FATAH members, three HAMAS members, and two from ISLAMIC JIHAD. In 2001 there were 27 assassinations—14 from Hamas, 7 from Fatah, 5 from Islamic Jihad, and the head of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, Abu Ali Mustapha. In 2002 there were 79 targeted assassinations. The means of killing ranged from missiles fired from helicopters to car bombs, shootings by soldiers, bombs in telephones, ground-to-ground antitank missiles, and many others. On 22 March 2004 Israel assassinated the sixty-seven-year-old, blind, crippled spiritual leader of Hamas, SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, with hellfire missiles as he was being wheeled out of a mosque after morning prayers. One month later his successor, physician ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI, was assassinated on 17 April. A December 2001 opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center revealed that Palestinians consider the policy of assassination to be the most harmful aspect of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

Incursions into Area A. Area A, according to the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PLO, is supposed to be under exclusive Palestinian control. On 1 April 2001, an Israeli squad entered Area A in the West Bank to arrest six Palestinians suspected of participation in terrorist attacks on settlers near Ramallah. The PNA issued a warning that Israel had "crossed a red line" by conducting a raid inside Area A. Yet, on 11 April 2001, Israeli tanks and bulldozers conducted a far deeper and larger incursion into Area A, in Gaza in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, leaving two Palestinians dead and destroying as many as 25 homes. On 16 April 2001, Israeli troops entered Beit Hanoun in the Gaza Strip, which they occupied for 24 hours, withdrawing only after a massive international outcry and heavy US pressure. Such incursions subsequently occurred regularly throughout Gaza as well as in the West Bank cities of JENIN, HEBRON, BETHLEHEM, Beit Jala, NABLUS, Ramallah, Tulkarm, and JERICHO, plus in their surrounding refugee camps. In the longest incursion in 2001, the Israeli army entered Beit Jala, a town on the West Bank opposite Bethlehem, on 28 August 2001 and remained for 48 hours. From 11

to 15 September 2001, the West Bank city of Jenin was surrounded by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF), conducting repeated raids inside the city during these four days.

In 2002 the incursions were far longer and far more deadly. They began with OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS on 21 January and lasting until 15 March 2002, followed by OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, which lasted for six weeks from 29 March to 10 May 2002. This was followed by OPERATION DETERMINED PATH, which began on 22 June and lasted approximately three months; and Operation Protective Wall, which somewhat overlapped the two and involved Israel's decision to construct the separation Barrier.

The year 2002 also saw a thirty-nine-day standoff from 2 April to 10 May 2002 between the IDF and Palestinians after Israel seized the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, in which 150 Palestinians, including both civilians and militants, had sought refuge. When it ended, thirteen militants were deported. Throughout the year, Israel continued full-scale invasions of Palestinian cities and reoccupied all of Area A. Among their incursions, they invaded Ramallah, leveled the Jenin refugee camp, destroyed the Old City of Nablus, imposed long curfews, and attacked human rights organizations and journalists. They also invaded Arafat's compound, eventually destroying four of the five buildings and leaving Arafat and a few of his aides confined to the second floor of the remaining building.

There were major incursions both in the West Bank and Gaza during the subsequent years, notably OPERATION RAINBOW in May 2004 in Gaza; Operation Days of Penitence in September 2004, also in Gaza; Operation Hot Winter from 25 February to 1 March 2007 in Nablus; 3–6 January 2008 in Nablus, an extension of Hot Winter; Operation Warm Winter from 27 February to 3 March 2008 in Gaza; and many other operations, named and unnamed. However, until OPERATION CAST LEAD in Gaza, which started on 27 December 2008 and ended on 18 January 2009, none were as destructive to life and property as those in 2002.

Use of Fighter Jets. On 19 May 2001, following a Palestinian suicide bombing that took the lives of five Israelis in front of a shopping mall in Netanya, Israel responded by using F-16 fighter jets to fire missiles at Palestinian security headquarters in Nablus, West Bank. The attack left at least nine Palestinians dead. The use of such powerful US-made weaponry was widely criticized both in Israel and abroad. Israel nevertheless sent its F-16s back into action both in mock attacks terrorizing the population and in actual strikes. On 10 August 2001, for example, F-16 jets bombarded the headquarters of the Palestinian civilian police in Nablus, killing nine following a suicide attack in Jerusalem that killed five. On 26 August 2001, F-15 and F-16 jets attacked and destroyed Palestinian security installations in the West Bank and Gaza, especially the headquarters of the Palestinian police in Gaza City. In Operation Cast Lead, F-16s and other major aircraft played a significant role in the nature of the ordinance they dropped.

Tank Fire. On 21 October 2000, tanks were used for the first time as a warning to the residents of Beit Jala, from which shots had been fired at the Israeli settlement of Gilo. The use by the Israeli army of such heavy weaponry against the Palestinian population signaled a new escalation in the conflict. This first tank shot was fired in an open area, causing no injuries or material damage. From then on, the use of tanks against civilian buildings, infrastructure, and so forth has been an almost daily occurrence.

Holding the PNA Responsible. On 10 August 2001, in response to a suicide bombing by Hamas in Jerusalem that killed fifteen, Israeli troops seized nine buildings belonging to the PNA in East Jerusalem and its outskirts, most notably the Palestinian governor's compound in ABU DIS and the ORIENT HOUSE. The attack on PNA compounds started in 2000 when, on 12 October, Israeli helicopters shelled a PNA infrastructure in retaliation for the lynching of two reserve soldiers by a Palestinian mob in Ramallah. Israel maintained that the PNA, and in particular President Yasir Arafat, was orchestrating the Intifada and was therefore responsible for every Palestinian action against Israeli targets, even when such attacks could not be directly linked to it. Whereas, at first, the Tanzim was the favored target of such strikes, retaliatory actions were soon also directed at FORCE 17, the National Security Service, the Civil Police, the Naval Police, and the General Intelligence. Yet such measures weakened the PNA both materially and politically, thereby decreasing further its ability to prevent attacks by Hamas or Islamic Jihad. In early December 2001, Israel placed Yasir Arafat under house arrest in his Ramallah headquarters, where he remained, except for a few "passes," until his death on 11 November

2004. During that time, Israel repeatedly bombed the headquarters until little was left except the one room in which Arafat lived. Still, Israel charged him directly responsible for every Palestinian action.

Administrative Detention. ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION involves incarceration without charge or due process in facilities run by the Israel Prison Service and the IDF. According to B'Tselem "conservative estimates" of the extent of this practice from 13 September 1993 through December 2008, "Israel has administratively detained some one thousand Palestinians for periods ranging from six months to five and a half years."

There is considerable range in the number of detainees being held at any one time. According to B'Tselem, the lowest number of persons under administrative detention was 13 in April 2001 and the highest was 1,127 in March 2003. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, administrative detention increased significantly. As of December 2008, some 540 Palestinians were under administrative detention. These figures do not include the thousands of Palestinians charged, tried, and convicted during the Intifada. B'Tselem reports that at the end of 2008, "About 7,900 Palestinians were held in Israel . . . the vast majority in facilities of the Israel Prisons Service, and a small number in IDF facilities. The figures are provided by the government authorities."

House Demolitions. The Israeli Committee on House Demolitions reports that between September 2000 and February 2009 the Israeli authorities demolished 10,111 Palestinian homes. Israel cites three main reasons for such demolitions:

1. Punitive demolitions: Houses demolished as punishment for the actions of people associated with the houses. "This policy was suspended by the IDF in February, 2005 after it reached the conclusion that rather than deterring attacks, punitive demolitions only enflame the people and lead to more attacks." The practice was resumed on 19 January 2009. Punitive demolitions account for only 8.5 percent of all defined demolitions.

2. Administrative demolitions: These are houses demolished for lack of a building permit. This happens mainly in Area C and in East Jerusalem, both under exclusive Israeli authority, though prior to the existence of Areas A, B, and C it occurred in other areas as well. "It is important to point out that in almost all cases, Palestinians have no choice but to build 'illegally' as permits will not be granted. It is also the case that in Area B, if a house is in close proximity to a military base or a road used by the military or settlers, it may also face administrative demolition." This type of demolition accounts for approximately 27 percent of defined demolitions.

3. Land-clearing operations/military demolitions: Houses demolished by the IDF in the course of military operations for the purpose of clearing off a piece of land (for whatever reason), achieving a military goal, or killing wanted persons as part of Israel's policy of extrajudicial executions. Military demolitions account for about 65.5 percent of defined demolitions.

Checkpoints. As of 15 November 2008, the Israeli army had sixty-three permanent security checkpoints inside the West Bank, eighteen of them in the city of Hebron. Forty-nine are regularly staffed, some around the clock, some only during the day, and some only a few hours a day. The IDF also operates forty permanent, staffed, around-the-clock checkpoints that are the last control points between the West Bank and Israeli sovereign territory. Most of these checkpoints are located inside the West Bank, up to several kilometers from the Green Line.

In addition, according to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, there was an average of eighty-nine flying checkpoints in the West Bank each week between September 2007 and the end of April 2008. Flying checkpoints are like regular checkpoints but are mobile, meaning they can pop up unannounced anywhere at any time. Soldiers block a road, and demand to see the papers and personal effects of anyone wanting to pass. The IDF believes this is a good way to catch militants. In comparison to the period above, the weekly average between January and August 2007 was sixty-six. As of July 2008, there were 66 gates in the separation Barrier, itself a product of the Intifada, only half of which are open to Palestinian use, and only if they have permits. The gates available for Palestinian use are open only part of the day.

Other Physical Obstructions. In addition to staffed checkpoints, the IDF has erected hundreds of physical obstructions (dirt piles, concrete blocks, boulders, trenches, fences, and iron gates) to block access to main roads and channel Palestinian traffic to staffed checkpoints. In recent years, the number of these obstructions has gradually risen. The average monthly total of physical obstructions for 2008 (January to September) was 537. In 2007, the

monthly average was 459; in 2006 the monthly average was 445; and in 2005, 410. Unlike at staffed checkpoints, security forces are not present at the obstruction to exercise discretion, even in emergency cases, on whether to permit passage.

Curfews. Throughout the al-Aqsa Intifada and prior to it, the IDF has routinely imposed curfews on villages, refugee camps, and cities in the West Bank. It has done so during all military operations and at times as punishment. Following stone throwing in a village, for instance, the army sometimes imposes a curfew on all or part of the village for a few hours or even a few days. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been imprisoned in their homes for months, except for short breaks during which the IDF allows them to go out to purchase basic necessities.

During Operation Defensive Shield, which lasted six weeks, the army imposed a curfew on most residents of the West Bank. In some areas, this curfew continued even after the operation ended. In Operation Determined Path, which lasted several months, the army reentered the West Bank and reinstated a curfew on all Palestinian cities except Jericho, as well as on many West Bank towns and villages. In the initial weeks of the operation, almost 2 million Palestinians were under curfew. About two months after the operation began, the army gradually lifted the curfew on the towns and villages, but continued it on the major cities for many more months. Nablus, from which several militant groups launched attacks, for example, was kept under curfew for over 100 consecutive days.

Nonviolent Resistance

Some of the Palestinian reaction to Israeli policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip has consisted of nonviolent protest. Groups such as the Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between People, which works out of Beit Sahour, a town near Bethlehem, formally encourages and organizes nonviolent resistance. Other groups, such as the International Solidarity Movement, advocate and practice nonviolent resistance. Some of these activities are done in cooperation with international organizations and Israelis, such as the weekly protests against the Barrier carried out in villages such as Bi'lin, Biddu, and Budrus in the West Bank. This model of resistance has spread to other villages, such as Beit Sira, Hebron, Saffa, and Ni'lein, also in the West Bank. Even during the May 2002 Israeli reinvasion of Jenin and Nablus, "A Call for a Non-violent Resistance Strategy in Palestine" was issued by two Palestinian Christian organizations.

Nonviolent tactics have at times been met with Israeli military force. For example, Amnesty International notes that "10-year-old Walid Naji Abu Qamar, 11-year-old Mubarak Salim al-Hashash and 13-year-old Mahmoud Tariq Mansour were among eight unarmed demonstrators killed in the early afternoon of 19 May 2004 in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip, when the Israeli army opened fire on a non-violent demonstration with tank shells and a missile launched from a helicopter gunship. Dozens of other unarmed demonstrators were wounded in the attack." According to Israeli army and government officials, the tanks shelled a nearby empty building and a helicopter fired a missile in a nearby open space in order to deter the demonstrators from proceeding toward Israeli army positions.

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM) is a nongovernmental organization that calls on civilians from around the world to participate in acts of nonviolent, civil protests against the Israeli military in the West Bank and previously in the Gaza Strip. The ISM was founded in 2001 by Palestinian and Israeli activists, later joined by British and American volunteers, but it has faced several serious reprisals:

1. On 22 November 2002, Caoimhe Butterly, an Irish ISM volunteer, was shot and seriously injured by IDF in Jenin.
2. On 16 March 2003, Rachel Corrie, a US ISM volunteer, was killed while trying to protect a Palestinian home from demolition. She was run over by an IDF armored bulldozer.
3. On 5 April 2003, British ISM volunteer Brian Avery was shot in the face by machine gun fire from an IDF armored personnel carrier while he was in the street escorting Palestinian medical personnel.
4. On 11 April 2003, British ISM volunteer Thomas Hurndall was left clinically brain-dead after he was shot in the head by an IDF soldier. Initially the soldier claimed the shooting occurred during an armed firefight between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian militants. Later he admitted firing a shot near him, as a deterrent, that had unintentionally hit him. Hurndall died on 13 January 2004.

In Israel, nonviolent protest took another form. More than a hundred members of Israel's army reserves released a signed statement on 1 February 2002, saying they would henceforth refuse to serve in the West Bank and Gaza. In their statement, the soldiers said, "The price of Occupation is the loss of the Israel Defense Forces' semblance of humanity and the corruption of all of Israeli society. . . . We will no longer fight beyond the Green Line with the aim of dominating, expelling, starving, and humiliating an entire people." According to the war resisters' group YESH G'VUL (There Is a Limit), approximately 400 Israelis refused to serve in the Occupied Territories. While most have been quietly released from duty, some forty faced disciplinary hearings and detentions.

Journalists and the Intifada

Journalists have faced difficulties from the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada. The International Press Institute (IPI) states that "between the outbreak of the second Intifada on 28 September 2000 and the end of 2004, journalists have featured heavily among the victims. . . . MEDIA workers and media outlets have repeatedly been targeted and attacked by Israeli soldiers, police, officials, settlers and civilians, as well as by Palestinian police, officials, militants and civilians."

The IPI detailed 562 press freedom violations during the first four years of the Palestinian Uprising (2000–2004), stating, "At least 478 press freedom violations were carried out by the Israeli state, including the government, the judiciary, and even the legislators. Sixteen violations were committed by Israeli settlers and civilians. Three were perpetrated jointly by Israeli soldiers and settlers. As a result, at least 497 abuses, or 88.4 percent of all violations, were perpetrated by Israelis. Another 29 violations were carried out by the Palestinian authorities plus 15 by Palestinian militants, 7 by Palestinian civilians, and one jointly by the Palestinian authorities and civilians." During this period twelve journalists were killed and scores injured, some for life.

Of the 562 violations, 213 violations involved "shootings, shelling, bombings, and missile attacks, 204 were carried out by Israelis, four by Palestinians, and five by unknown perpetrators." Journalists and media workers were targeted and injured with missiles, live ammunition, shelling, shrapnel, ricochets, and rubber-coated steel bullets, and harassed and physically assaulted in other ways. (Rubber-coated steel bullets are supposedly used by the Israeli army mainly against stone-throwers. Unlike rubber bullets, they are sometimes lethal.)

In all but a handful of cases, the perpetrators have gone unpunished. No one has been prosecuted for any of the journalist killings or severe injuries. This, according to IPI, has encouraged a climate of impunity in which Israeli soldiers, police officers, and settlers, as well as Palestinian police and militants, are given implicit, or even explicit, authority to commit press freedom violations. There were nine attacks on Palestinian media outlets targeted for destruction by the Israeli army. Another seven such attacks may have been for the same purpose.

Israel and Journalists. While the IPI's report ended with 2004, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has reported on more recent events. For example according to Reuters, on 16 April 2008, cameraman Fadel Shana, twenty-three, was killed and soundman Wafa Abu Mizyed, also in his twenties, was severely wounded after the crew stopped their car and began filming Israeli military forces located several hundred meters away. Shana was filming the tank when it apparently fired on the Reuters TV crew. CPJ stated, "We are asking the Israeli authorities to publicly commit to carrying out an exhaustive investigation. . . . [But] Previous investigations into journalist deaths at the hands of the IDF have been marred by a lack of transparency and accountability." Robert Mahoney, director of CPJ, stated: "In the Gaza Strip, anyone with a camera is fair game. That's the inescapable conclusion from the Israeli army's investigation into why one of its tank crews fired at least two shells at a Reuters television journalist openly filming them from a mile away."

Journalists working in the Palestinian territories said the Israeli military's apparent disregard for the safety of the press hurt their ability to work. Reporters covering peaceful demonstrations over Israel's construction of the Barrier in the West Bank found themselves particularly at risk. According to Reuters deputy bureau chief Julian Rake on 18 April 2008, "in the West Bank town of Bilein, Reuters photographer Amar Awad was struck by a rubber bullet fired by a border officer standing just 100 meters away. A demonstration set for later that day had not yet begun when Awad was shot; the cameraman was wearing a flak jacket identifying him as press." Steve Gutkin, chairman of the Foreign Press Association, commented that "many journalists say

that authorities at Bil'in have targeted the press with rubber bullets, stun grenades, and tear gas to inhibit coverage and stop protesters from seeking media attention." IDF spokesmen have told CPJ that it is not their policy to target journalists.

Palestinian journalists are harassed at Israeli border crossings and checkpoints, local journalists said. In one widely reported case, award-winning journalist Mohammed Omer was hospitalized after an interrogation at the Allenby Crossing between Jordan and the West Bank. Omer was returning to his home in the Gaza Strip after collecting the Martha Gellhorn Prize in London in recognition of his reporting for the US-based magazine *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* and the Rome-based news agency Inter Press Service. "Men he identified as agents of SHIN BET, the domestic intelligence service, interrogated him, stripped him naked at gunpoint, and humiliated him, Omer told CPJ. The journalist said agents dragged him across the floor and stepped on his neck while he was on the ground. He was eventually placed in an ambulance and brought to Jericho Hospital in the West Bank, where he was treated for broken ribs and psychological distress."

In a written statement to CPJ, the Israeli government said Omer was not subjected to abuse and that his belongings were searched because of suspicions "that he had been in contact with hostile elements." The statement acknowledged that Omer received medical care after the incident but cast doubt on the severity of his injuries.

The Israeli military was holding one journalist in prison on 1 December 2008, when CPJ conducted its annual census of imprisoned journalists. On 15 July 2008, Israeli military forces arrested Ibrahim Hamad, a soundman for the Gaza-based Ramattan news agency, in a 4 A.M. raid on his home in the Kalandia refugee camp near Ramallah in the West Bank, relatives and station staff told CPJ. The reason for his arrest was unclear. Authorities held Hamad in "administrative detention" without disclosing any charges against him.

Some foreign correspondents describe an increasingly dismissive IDF attitude toward journalist safety in the West Bank and Gaza. An IDF spokesman issued a statement on 7 May 2008 that it "wishes to emphasize that it does not take any responsibility for the presence of foreign journalists in operational or combat zones in Judea, Samaria [the West Bank] and the Gaza Strip."

"Any journalist who enters these areas is acting under his own will and responsibility," the statement said. "Their will be no coordination of press movement and activity in the areas of IDF operations."

The statement, journalists told CPJ, was released after an incident in which an ABC News crew in Gaza was alarmed by a circling Israeli Apache helicopter. The crew called the IDF and asked that the command be informed that journalists were in the vicinity. An IDF media officer dismissed their request, the journalists said.

The Palestinians and Journalists. After Hamas consolidated its power in Gaza in June 2007, journalists reported continued harassment and censorship by Hamas officials in Gaza and by officials with the Fatah-led Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank. Several journalists working for news outlets based in the West Bank and Gaza said they chose their words carefully in writing about human rights abuses and politics because they feared reprisals.

In 2008, violent clashes between the Palestinian factions, including a bomb blast that killed six on a Gaza beach in July, initiated waves of arrests of Fatah and Hamas supporters in both places. Journalists were among those swept up in the arrests and held for weeks or months. At least three were being held by Hamas security agents in Gaza when CPJ conducted its annual census of imprisoned journalists.

Fatah maintained its distribution ban on Gaza-based publications *Al-Risala* and *Falastin,* local journalists told CPJ. The government halted their distribution in the West Bank in June 2007, accusing the two newspapers of favoring Hamas. The Hamas-led government in the Gaza Strip was similarly intolerant of media perceived to have pro-Fatah bias. In July, Hamas banned distribution of three newspapers, *Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Al-Ayyam,* and *Al-Quds,* local journalists and human rights activists said.

Palestinian journalists working for international news agencies were also targeted amid violence between Fatah and Hamas. On 26 July 2008, Hamas security agents arrested a camera operator for the German broadcaster ARD TV at his home in Tel Al-Hawa. The arrest of Sawah Abu Seif followed an explosion in southwest Gaza that Hamas blamed on Fatah. AP reported that Abu Seif had not filmed the explosion or its aftermath, but was picked up in a roundup of Palestinians with sus-

pected links to Fatah. Abu Seif was held for five days and abused by security agents, ARD bureau chief Richard Schneider told CPJ. The agents interrogated him about his work and confiscated his laptop computer and cell phone, but did not charge him with any crime.

In the 27 December 2008–18 January 2009 assault on Gaza, Israel prohibited all journalists, photographers, filmmakers, and other media from entering Gaza.

Israeli Attacks on Medical Personnel and Ambulances

Throughout the al-Aqsa Intifada, medical personnel, ambulances, and patients have been victimized. Ambulances have been shot at, seized, and often destroyed. Doctors and other medical personnel have been shot and injured or killed. Patients have not received the care they need. The checkpoint and roadblock system by its very nature deters the free movement of ambulances attempting to get to patients or trying to ferry them to a hospital. Ambulances, like all vehicles, must stand in line, submit to searches and questions, and may or may not be allowed to pass.

In 2003 B'Tselem reported: "Palestinian ambulance teams never know if they will be able to reach the hospital. . . . Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances are able to reach the place where the sick or wounded are located only thirty percent of the time. In seventy percent of the cases, the sick or wounded must get to a location accessible to the ambulance on their own. . . . The physical roadblocks erected to maintain the siege—concrete blocks, trenches, and dirt piles—block timely access to villages and sometimes prevent access altogether. Soldiers are not stationed at these roadblocks, whose presence would enable Palestinians to explain the urgency involved. The only option available to ambulance teams is to travel along winding, rundown roads, which results in the sick people being unnecessarily shaken, loss of time in reaching the destination, and abnormal wear-and-tear to the vehicle. In some places, the medical teams must assist the sick in crossing the physical roadblocks using wheelchairs or stretchers."

During Operation Cast Lead, thirteen Palestine Red Crescent Society ambulances were damaged. Of these, four were completely destroyed. Amnesty International reported in January 2009 that "emergency medical rescue workers, including doctors, paramedics and ambulance drivers, repeatedly came under fire from Israeli forces while they were carrying out their duties. At least seven were killed and more than 20 were injured while they were transporting or attempting to collect the wounded and the dead." Such attacks on medical personnel have been standard throughout the Intifada. Israel has also targeted UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) facilities, especially in Gaza, in one instance bombing the largest food storage facility, ruining the food as well as the building.

International Peace Efforts during the al-Aqsa Intifada

There was a dearth of international efforts to bring about a halt to the al-Aqsa Intifada, and those that were attempted were deeply flawed and ultimately failed. This was largely because the United States is the only country with the power, prestige, and resources to effectively alter the status quo, but the administration of George W. Bush was so closely aligned with Ariel Sharon's right-wing Likud government that no matter what Israel did (e.g., reneging on formal agreements with the PLO, expanding settlements, carrying out targeted assassinations, using American-made F-16s to bomb civilians), Bush, parroting Sharon, defended and justified it as being within Israel's "security needs." Indeed, the United States undermined, by commission or omission, every initiative that emerged.

UN Security Council Resolutions and the United States. Between 2001 and 2006, the United States vetoed nine Security Council Resolutions attempting to bring some conclusion to the conflict:

1. 27 March 2001: Called for a United Nations Observer Force in the West Bank, Gaza.
2. 14 December 2001: Condemned all acts of terror, demanded an end to the violence, and called for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to bring in observers.
3. 19 December 2002: On the killing by Israeli forces of several UN employees and the destruction of the World Food Program warehouse.
4. 16 September 2003: Demanded that Israel halt threats to expel Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat.
5. 14 October 2003: Sought to bar Israel from extending Barrier wall.
6. 25 March 2004: Condemned Israel for assassinating Ahmed Yasin.

7. 10 May 2004: Called for Israel to halt Gaza operation.
8. 13 July 2006: Called for Israel to halt Gaza operation.
9. 11 November 2006: Called for Israel to halt Gaza operation.

Additionally, the United States was able to scuttle numerous draft resolutions critical of Israel or supportive of the Palestinians even before they moved to a vote. In the General Assembly there have been scores of occasions where the United States was the only country besides Israel (sometimes joined by a few small third world states dependent on US aid) to vote against otherwise unanimous resolutions.

On several occasions, however, the United States voted in the affirmative on a Security Council resolution, including UNSC Resolution 1397 (12 March 2002), in which for the first time a resolution refers to a Palestinian state to exist side by side with Israel. The council also passed Resolutions 1402 (30 March 2002) and 1403 (4 April 2002) without a US veto, both of which call for Israel to withdraw from Palestinian cities "without delay."

US Diplomacy and Other Peace Initiatives. In 2001, President Bill Clinton convened a summit in SHARM al-SHAYKH and persuaded the Israelis and Palestinians to agree to an American fact-finding mission concerning the causes of the Intifada. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, former member and majority leader for the US Senate, was appointed chair of a US commission to investigate the causes of the violence and to make recommendations. The Mitchell Commission Report, released in April 2001, called for an immediate cease-fire, a freeze on Jewish settlements, and a more determined action against violence by the PNA. Nevertheless, Israeli settlement building escalated, there was no cease-fire, and the Palestinians continued their resistance.

In June 2001, President Bush dispatched CIA director GEORGE TENET after both sides approved his "work plan" or blueprint for a "cessation of hostilities." Nothing came of the Tenet Plan and in December 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed retired Marine Corps general Anthony Zinni as his special envoy to the region. Zinni's mission was simply to bring about a cessation of hostilities; he had no mandate to attempt a settlement of the issues.

In March 2002, Saudi crown prince Abdullah drew up a comprehensive peace plan to settle all the outstanding issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Known as the ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, it was endorsed by the entire ARAB LEAGUE, including the PNA. The rest of the world applauded the plan; Israel denounced it and the United States ignored it.

In 2003, the EUROPEAN UNION (EU), RUSSIA, the UN, and the United States (together known as the QUARTET) developed a plan, named the ROAD MAP for Peace. It was designed to be implanted in three phases: to end "violence and terrorism," to reach a "final and comprehensive" settlement to the conflict by 2005, and to create an independent and democratic Palestinian state to live side by side with Israel. The United States, however, demanded that INTERNATIONAL LAW and UN Security Council resolutions not be major components of the Road Map, thus limiting from the outset its chances of producing a just peace and effectively marginalizing the United Nations. Palestinians accepted it immediately; Israel accepted it several months later, but subject to fourteen conditions that gutted its intent.

One of the provisions of the Road Map was for President Arafat to "reform" PNA governance, beginning with the appointment of a prime minister. Arafat complied, appointing Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to the position. Similar to the fate of other initiatives, the Road Map quietly disappeared.

At the Aqaba Summit, held on 4 June 2003 among US president Bush, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, and Palestinian prime minister Abu Mazen, Sharon committed to the formation of a Palestinian state and to removing "unauthorized OUTPOSTS" in the Occupied Territories. However, according to the Fourth Geneva Convention, all settlements imposed by an occupying power are illegal. Furthermore, of the very few outposts that were actually removed, most were uninhabited—"dummy" outposts erected by the settler movement to use as a tool for negotiations or public relations. Israel has historically used the removal of "unauthorized" settlements to legitimize other settlements in a "trade-off" with settler groups.

In December 2003 an unofficial draft peace agreement (the GENEVA ACCORD) was signed by leading Israeli and Palestinian political figures, which started from where the two sides had left off when Israel, backed by the United States, suspended negotiations in February 2001. The plan

received little to no attention from the Israeli and US governments.

Consequences of al-Aqsa Intifada

Israeli military incursions in the West Bank were at their most intense in 2002, followed by periods of relative calm and violent conflict—both in the West Bank and Gaza. Beginning in June 2007, after Hamas defeated Fatah in the latter's bid for power in Gaza, there was ever-increasing violence throughout the Occupied Territories. For instance, in November 2007 the IDF carried out 786 raids in the West Bank to search for Palestinian militants, especially those associated with Hamas; public and private properties were damaged; curfews were reimposed; and countless civilians were terrorized by armed soldiers and dogs. In the West Bank, Nablus was particularly affected: on 17 October 2007 the Israeli army raided the city in an operation named Hot Winter and indiscriminately fired tank shells. Nablus has been one of the most active sites of resistance to the Occupation, and as a result it was one of the hardest-hit cities/areas by Israel during the Intifada. Gaza too suffered intensely through the years, subject to a total embargo and several brutal invasions, including Operation Summer Rains and Operation Autumn Clouds in 2006 and Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 and January 2009.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza is catastrophic, although Gaza was near ruin even before Operation Cast Lead, because of the embargo Israel had imposed. In both the West Bank and Gaza, poverty and unemployment are at their highest levels ever; health and education have been undermined by military incursions, the Barrier, and checkpoints; and the social fabric of society is rapidly unraveling. The situation deteriorated throughout the uprising, but especially after 2006, when Hamas won the January Palestinian National Council elections, causing even European donor money to dry up.

The loss of lives, limbs, and material assets does not begin to reveal the devastation this conflict wrought in the Occupied Territories. While the suicide bombings and the Qassam rockets were experienced inside Israel, the Intifada was overwhelmingly waged on Palestinian territory, and there, unimaginable desolation and deprivation prevail. The construction of the Barrier, the expansion of settlements, the restrictions on freedom of movement, house demolitions, and military incursions have had a disastrous impact on the economy, health, education, and family life; the essence of the social fabric; and a decreasing standard of living for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

The economy, precarious before the Intifada, was ruined by Israeli incursions and security measures—the checkpoints, closures, and others. Farmers, workers, merchants, and businesspeople are unable to reach their places of employment or to sell their goods and services. Often businesses have been bombed with the same consequence. Losing their income, Palestinians are unable to purchase goods and services, generating a further decline in production and employment. A few individuals retained a work permit to enter Israel during the al-Aqsa Intifada, but they were often prevented by the closure from reaching their workplace. The United Nations Special Coordinator (UNSCO) commented in 2002: "Even if the siege was lifted now and the Intifada stopped instantly, the Palestinian economy would take years to recover." Six years later the situation had only worsened.

Settlement Expansion, 2000–2008. According to the Foundation for Middle East Peace, in 2008 the settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem stood at 479,500, up from 370,548 in 2000. This figure is based on two components: According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), in 2008, 285,800 settlers were living in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, up from 198,300 in 2000—the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada. The settler population in East Jerusalem at the end of 2008 was estimated at 193,700, up from 172,248 in 2000. In Hebron, to take a dramatic case, 600 Jewish settlers live in the midst of 160,000 Palestinians but control 20 percent of the city, including the holy sites sacred to both Muslims and Jews. Peace Now reports that there were 18,361 housing starts between 2000 and 2008, and 105 new outposts.

On 2 March 2009 the Israeli government announced plans to build more than 73,300 new housing units in the West Bank, of which 5,722 will be in East Jerusalem. Peace Now estimates that if all of the units are built, it will mean a 100 percent increase in the total number of Israeli settlers. The Peace Now report estimates that some settlements, including the two largest, Ariel and Ma'aleh Adumim, would double in size.

In a startling statistic, Peace Now reveals that 80.25 percent of the settlements and outposts sit (fully or partially) on private Palestinian land.

The separation Barrier consumes 8.6 percent of West Bank land and encompasses forty-nine settlements.

Since 1996, no government has officially decided upon the establishment of a new settlement on the West Bank. In order to continue to occupy additional land in the West Bank, the settlement leadership, with the close assistance of very senior elements within the government, decided to establish OUTPOSTS, intent on creating faits accomplis in the field and taking control of new areas. Most of the outposts have been established at key points in the midst of Palestinian population centers and deep into the West Bank, thereby attempting to create territorial continuity between the existing settlements and breaking up the contiguity existing between the Palestinian townships. Thus, the settlers, with government backing, are trying to thwart the possibility of the existence of a contiguous Palestinian state on the West Bank.

At the end of 2008, the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) contained 121 settlements that the Interior Ministry recognized as "communities," even though some of them contain stretches of land on which the built-up area is not contiguous. There are an additional 100+ unrecognized settlements, referred to in the MEDIA as outposts, which Peace Now says "are usually smaller than the recognized settlements, but are settlements nevertheless." In East Jerusalem there are twelve other large settlements built on land confiscated from Palestinians, annexed by Israel in 1967, and made part of Jerusalem. Additionally, in what Israel has termed "the Holy Basin"—the area surrounding the Old City—there are Jewish settlements in all the Palestinian neighborhoods, including Sheikh Jarrah, A-Tur, Ras al-Amud, Abu Dis, Silwan, and Abu Tor.

The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign reported in March 2009 that some 2,000 Palestinians are set to be displaced in East Jerusalem. "Demolition campaigns have increased tremendously in Jerusalem, and the Occupation municipality in Jerusalem has decided to demolish 88 houses in a Silwan neighborhood, housing 1500 people, and 55 houses around Ras Shahada in Shufat refugee camp, from which 500 people will be expelled." Jerusalem already is cut off from the rest of the West Bank, and Palestinian residents are slowly being forced into shrinking cantons. The attempt to transfer the soon-to-be-displaced residents of Silwan and Shufat to Beit Hanina and other areas is emblematic of a policy centered on controlling and destroying the Palestinian presence in the city.

Objectives of the Parties to the Intifada. The objectives of the Palestinians were discussed at the outset—an end to the Occupation and the creation of independent sovereign states in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. But what of Israel's objectives?

Israel frames all its actions—expanding settlements, house demolitions, targeted assassinations, and so on—in terms of its "security" requirements. Historically, war has played an integral part in maintaining the political cohesion of Israel, a deeply divided society—religious versus nonreligious, ASHKENAZI versus oriental/SEPHARDI, MILITARISM versus civil society, and so on. Domestic conflicts of such fundamental character in Israel have been subsumed under the higher cause of "survival," "eternal victimization," and a carefully crafted HOLOCAUST "memory"—that is, the experience of the Holocaust was mobilized and legitimized to justify all of Israel's offensive military operations and wars, making the case that Israel's survival was always at stake. *Security* is the catchword for these constructs.

As long as the state faced credible enemies on the outside, consensus could reign within. And Israel was able to exploit the threat further by becoming, during the 1960s, a staunch US ally against the Arab nationalist regimes. This was both a material and ideological prop: Israel became a massive recipient of US aid, while enjoying the prestige of a partnership with the world's foremost power. The Zionist project was sustained through these various mechanisms despite the fact that its initial impetus, European ANTI-SEMITISM, was by now irrelevant to the vast majority of Jews.

But the Palestinians were an "enemy" of a different sort. By their very existence and presence they challenged the legitimacy the state of Israel created over Palestine. From 1948 to 1993, Israel denied the existence of the Palestinians as a people despite Israel's policy of Occupation. Once the Oslo process began, Israel's strategy was "containment," convincing and then compelling Palestinians to accept that not even their most minimal demands will be met, whether through negotiations or violence. Regardless of who has been prime minister during this period—Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu, Barak, Sharon, or Olmert—Israel's negotiating strategy and final positions have changed little.

There is no dispute that Israel has the right to self-defense when threatened, and, arguably, suicide bombs and Qassam rockets are a threat to Israeli citizens. Yet the extraordinarily disproportionate response Israel has inflicted on the Palestinians—all the Palestinians—suggests that this was not merely a response to a security threat, but an attempt to break the will of the Palestinians once and for all. This was Israel's objective in the 1982 LEBANON WAR, and it failed. It seems unlikely that it will be successful in this round either. Moreover, a fundamental question is this: if Israel had approached the Oslo process with fairness, equity, and justice and the Palestinians had gained at least some of their goals, would there even have been a Second Intifada?

Thus, it is likely that the conflict will continue to cycle between periods of violence and negotiation while Israel strengthens its "facts on the ground" and Palestinians search for new strategies to prevent Israel's red lines from becoming their realities.

See also INTIFADAS: FIRST AND SECOND COMPARED; JERUSALEM; OCCUPATION; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION RAINBOW; SETTLEMENTS

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Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades

The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, about whom factual information is sketchy, is a collection of an unknown number of small cells of armed Palestinians that emerged shortly after the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. It was neither officially recognized nor openly backed by either YASIR ARAFAT or FATAH, nor by MAHMUD ABBAS, though Brigades members tend to come from the ranks of Fatah, and there have been allegations that Fatah funds the Brigades. The Brigades was formed in October 2000 in the Balata refugee camp adjacent to NABLUS (in the WEST BANK) by activists from the Fatah "young guard," who were frustrated at the methods used by the Fatah mainstream to fight the Israelis. Their objective was to attack Israeli targets with the aim of driving the Israeli military and SETTLERS from the West Bank, GAZA STRIP, and East JERUSALEM and establishing a Palestinian state.

Despite the religious connotations of the Brigades' name, its members are secular nationalists, and, unlike HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, they do not seek to establish an Islamic state. Some have argued that their military tactics are in part inspired by the success of Hizbullah in driving Israel out of southern LEBANON, but they do not share Hizbullah's ideology.

The Brigades' founders were Yasir Badawi and Nasser Awais, charismatic men about thirty years of age who wanted to form "a very strong, fearless group" and who became the Brigades' leaders. Much of the Brigades' support comes from refugee camps around Ramallah and Nablus in the West Bank.

Initially, most of the Brigades' attacks were directed at Israeli soldiers and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza; however, early in 2002, the strategy changed to include SUICIDE BOMBINGS inside

Israel's 1967 borders. Some have suggested that this change was intended to increase the popularity of Fatah over the Islamist groups whose suicide attacks had won them extensive support among the Palestinian public. But it has also been suggested that the change was prompted by Israel's assassination in January 2002 of Raed Karmi, one of the Brigades' leaders.

Marwan al-Barghuthi, claimed by the Brigades as its leader, but who denies any affiliation with them, was arrested by Israel and sentenced to five life terms in prison. Nasser Awais was arrested in April 2002 and is being held in isolation in the Beer Saba' prison. *Newsday* quoted Nasser's brother, Yasir Awais, as saying: "The al-Aqsa Brigades were not formed by a leadership decision and will not be disbanded by their decision. . . . The Brigades were created by the people, created from the womb of the Intifada, nourished and cherished by the people, and it will die only when the OCCUPATION vanishes."

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Al-Aqsa Mosque

The al-Aqsa Mosque (or al-Masjid al-Aqsa) is part of the complex of Muslim religious buildings (including the DOME OF THE ROCK) in JERUSALEM on the site known as AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF (the Noble Sanctuary), or Majed Mount to Muslims, and the Har Ha-Bayit, or TEMPLE MOUNT, to Jews. Since the early days of the BRITISH MANDATE, the mosque and the surrounding monuments and buildings on al-Haram ash-Sharif have been sites of almost continuous violence between Israelis and Palestinians.

According to Islamic law, the mosque, together with the whole area of al-Haram ash-Sharif, is sacred and inviolable and is the third holiest site in Islam (after Mecca and Medina). It is also the largest mosque in Jerusalem, capable of holding some 5,000 worshipers in and around the structure. Israeli prohibitions on Palestinian worship here have been a source of great bitterness. After 1967, Israel regulated who may pray at the mosque according to age, gender, and place of residence, excluding most Muslims from Israel and the Occupied Territories. Part of the mosque's surrounding wall (Buraq Wall) is the WESTERN WALL, venerated by Jews, and this too has been a source of conflict since the days of the Mandate.

Additionally, Muslims have accused Israel of weakening the walls of the mosque during archaeological excavations that began in 1967 and continue today. In response to concerns about the structure's stability, the Islamic Waqf Foundation is carrying out renovations, but these are fraught with Israeli-imposed complications. It was ARIEL SHARON's provocative visit, backed by hundreds of soldiers, to al-Haram ash-Sharif in 2000 that sparked the Second, or AL-AQSA, INTIFADA, named after the mosque.

In February 2007, major demonstrations ensued after Israel began digging up the stone ramp that formerly provided access to the Moughrabi Gate, which is normally used by non-Muslims to enter the compound and has been controlled by the Israeli authorities since the 1967 WAR. In the three previous years, an increasing number of Jews had been entering the site to pray, causing tensions with the Muslims. The work is the first stage of a plan to build a new raised walkway, which will replace the wooden walkway that was erected three years ago after a storm damaged the original ramp.

At the same time, archaeologists began conducting a "salvage dig," which Muslim authorities claim, together with other already existing digs around the compound, is threatening the founda-

tions of the al-Aqsa Mosque. King Abdullah of JORDAN, who has custodianship of the Muslim shrines, has described the work as a "blatant violation" and a "dangerous escalation. . . . These measures will only create an atmosphere that will not at all help in the success of efforts being undertaken to restore the peace process," he said.

Some European diplomats have suggested that the perceived threat from excavations may be a lesser factor in the protests than a fear that the new walkway will give easier access to Israeli forces and Jewish worshipers to the compound.

The name al-Aqsa Mosque translates as "the farthest mosque" and is derived from a quranic verse that describes a miraculous journey the Prophet Muhammad took in 621 CE in a single night on a winged steed, Buraq, from a sacred mosque (in Mecca) to the farthest mosque (al-Masjid al-Aqsa). From a large rock there (now covered by the Dome of the Rock), Muhammad again mounted the Buraq and briefly ascended to heaven, accompanied by the archangel Gabriel, and spent time visiting heaven and receiving the Islamic prayers before returning to his home on earth to communicate the prayers to the faithful.

Caliph 'Umar, the second successor to the Prophet Muhammad, conquered Jerusalem in 637 CE and constructed the original al-Aqsa Mosque. In 709–715 the Umayyad caliph al-Walid rebuilt al-Aqsa Mosque, distinguishing it with a silver dome. Earthquakes in 1927 and 1936 severely damaged the mosque and necessitated its almost complete rebuilding. In the process, ancient sections of the original mosque were brought to light. Analysis of wooden beams and panels removed from the building during the renovations demonstrated that they were made from cedar from Lebanon and Cyprus. Radiocarbon dating indicated a range of ages, but some of the wooden beams were as old as the ninth century BCE, showing that some of the wood had been salvaged from older buildings.

See also DOME OF THE ROCK; AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF; HASMONEAN TUNNEL; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Arab Agency

In October 1923, the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, meeting in London, conceived the idea of an Arab Agency, supposedly comparable to the JEWISH AGENCY, whereby the Palestinian community could represent itself to the Mandatory authorities. The HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE would appoint the Arab Agency's members, and they would advise the commissioner on social and cultural matters relating only to the Palestinian community. This meant they could not discuss matters pertaining to Jewish IMMIGRATION or LAND purchase; moreover, the proposed Arab Agency would have far less institutional autonomy than the Jewish Agency, which was an independent body created by Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate. Palestinian leaders believed that accepting an Arab Agency would signify acceptance of the Mandate and its commitment to ZIONISM through the incorporation of the BALFOUR DECLARATION. For all these reasons, Arab leaders declined to accept the proposed Arab Agency.

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Arab Association for Human Rights

The Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA) was established in NAZARETH in 1988 and was registered in 1990 as a nonprofit organization in Israel. Its mandate is the protection and promotion of international human rights standards for the Palestinian Arabs in Israel. By the mid-1990s, HRA had formalized its goals with its first three-year plan, dividing its activities into three major fields: human rights education, women's rights, and international advocacy. By 2005 the three fields were the core of HRA's activities, supported by the newly established Research and Reporting Unit. (www.arabhra.org).

See also ADALAH; ASSOCIATION OF FORTY

Arab Congresses

The Palestine-Arab Congresses, a manifestation of nationalist sentiment in Palestine during the BRITISH MANDATE, were countrywide events initially organized by the JERUSALEM and JAFFA MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS (MCAs) to formulate a united policy in the face of British and Zionist objectives. There were seven congresses in all.

The first congress, in 1919, attempted to formulate a position paper to be presented at the Paris Peace Conference; however, the participants were split on several major issues. They agreed only on rejecting the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, and on accepting British assistance so long as it did not compromise Palestinian independence. The second conference, in 1920, was called to protest the British Mandate and its inclusion of the Balfour Declaration; however, British authorities refused to permit the conference from taking place. Even though the congress was not held, Palestinians still designate it as the second. The third congress, held in HAIFA in December 1920, was more united than the first and called for the establishment of a "national government responsible to a representative assembly." It elected a Jerusalem-based executive committee, known as the ARAB EXECUTIVE, to run the daily activities of the Palestine National Movement.

The fourth congress met in Jerusalem in 1921 and selected a delegation to travel to London and argue against implementation of the Balfour Declaration and Jewish IMMIGRATION. MUSA AL-HUSAYNI led the delegation, which spent eleven fruitless months in Britain. The fifth congress, which was held in 1922 in NABLUS (in the WEST BANK) after the London failure, agreed to boycott the Legislative Council and to establish a permanent London information office. The sixth congress was held in Jaffa in 1923 and passed two strongly worded resolutions boycotting the British-proposed Legislative Council (and rejecting the Anglo-Hijazi Treaty). The seventh congress, convened in 1928, five years after the sixth, met in Jerusalem and passed several resolutions condemning British policy in Palestine and calling for the establishment of a representative government.

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Arab Democratic Party

The Arab Democratic Party (ADP, Hezb al-Democraty al-Arabi/Miflaga Democratit Aravit) is an Israeli-Arab party founded in 1988 by Abd al-Daroushe, a former LABOR PARTY Knesset member. The party was created against the backdrop of the First INTIFADA, which called for Israeli recognition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, establishment of a Palestinian state, and equality for Israeli Arabs. In the elections for the Twelfth and Thirteenth Knessets, the ADP ran independently; for the Fourteenth Knesset (1996) it ran on a joint slate with the UNITED ARAB LIST; and in the fifteenth (1999) and sixteenth (2003) elections, it merged with the United Arab List.

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Arab Executive

The Arab Executive led the Palestine national struggle from 1920 to 1934, with its most active period being from 1920 to 1923. It was initially composed of individuals selected at the third ARAB CONGRESS in HAIFA in December 1920, which also elected the chairman—MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI—who held the position through 1934. The Arab Executive was originally made up of nine individuals and expanded, in 1928, to forty-eight persons, including both Muslims and Christians. Throughout its fourteen-year history, it continuously met with British officials, sent delegates abroad to promote the Palestinian cause, and petitioned the British to end their support for ZIONISM, end Jewish IMMIGRATION, and allow the formation of a representative national government.

The British never acknowledged the Arab Executive as the official representative of the Palestinians and never wavered in its rejection of the group's petitions. Although the executive experienced several internal crises and factionalism, it provided an overall organizational structure for the Palestinians to express their grievances. Its methods were consistently nonviolent, but Britain's persistent refusal to recognize the executive or to support any of its nationalist objectives led the Palestinians to view it as ineffective. By the early 1930s, Palestinians began to call for demonstrations, strikes, tax withholding, and more militant action generally. In this context, in 1933 the executive endorsed public demonstrations. Al-Husayni died in 1934, and the Arab Executive was superseded by the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE in 1936.

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Arab Higher Committee

The Arab Higher Committee (AHC, al-Lajna al-Arabiyya al-Uliya) was formed in April 1936 in the context of a general strike by Palestinians and violence throughout Palestine between Arabs and Jews. AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, president of the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL, became AHC president. After its formation, the AHC assumed loose coordination of the general strike, which included various angry Palestinian groups such as local nationalist committees, labor societies, Muslim and Christian sports clubs, Boy Scouts, the JAFFA boatmen's association, women's committees, and the six leading political parties of the time (the ARAB PARTY, the ISTIQLAL PARTY, the NATIONAL BLOC PARTY, the NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY, the REFORM PARTY, and the Youth Congress).

By October 1936, harsh British measures against Palestinian militants and the intervention of several Arab monarchs led the AHC to call off the strike, believing that the Palestinians could instead present their demands to a British royal commission. Representatives from the AHC testified before the PEEL COMMISSION but rejected its June 1937 recommendations, which included the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state and the extension of Emir Abdullah of Transjordan's control over the Palestinian areas.

Palestinian anger was reignited by the report, and by September 1937 violence had spread throughout Palestine—the so-called ARAB REVOLT. In October, Britain banned the AHC and arrested and exiled to the Seychelles four of its members, while al-Husayni and the others escaped to surrounding Arab countries. Rather than quelling the nationalist movement, the arrests and DEPORTATIONS catalyzed the local people. Violence intensified in the towns and countryside. From exile, members of the AHC attempted to reconstitute the AHC and to supply military equipment and funds for the *mujahidin* (fighters). By 1939, the British were outlawing all manifestations of Palestinian nationalism, prohibiting political parties, arresting thousands, deporting activists, demolishing houses, and using other measures such as CURFEWS. In 1945 the ARAB LEAGUE revived the AHC, which was soon dominated by the HUSAYNIS, but the British did not allow al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni to return to Palestine, and the AHC soon became irrelevant to Palestinian politics.

See also ARAB REVOLT, 1936–1939

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Arab League

See LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

Arab Liberation Army

The Arab Liberation Army (ALA), or the Army of Salvation (Jaysh al-Inqadh), was a 10,000-volunteer force of Arab soldiers and officers who came together to support the Palestinians in response to a call from the LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES after the passage of UN RESOLUTION 181 in 1947, which called for a partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. It was nominally led by FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI, who in 1936 had recruited several hundred Arab volunteers to support the ARAB REVOLT and was appointed by the Arab League to gather volunteers from throughout the Arab world. However, only 4,600 of those who joined ever crossed into Palestine, and the units who did enter were concentrated in the northern and central regions of the country. There was little, if any, cohesion among the Arab fighters and no coordination between ALA troops and the local Palestinian forces known as the HOLY WAR ARMY or Army of the Holy Struggle (Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas), led by ABD AL-QADIR AL-HUSAYNI. With a few exceptions, the ALA was never particularly effective and was overshadowed by the regular Arab state armies that entered Palestine in 1948.

See also WAR, 1948

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Arab Liberation Front

The Arab Liberation Front (ALF, or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya) was established in 1969 by Iraqi BA'ATHIST Party officials as a means for IRAQ to influence Palestinian politics and to counter the influence of SYRIA exercised through SA'IQA, a pro-Syrian faction within the PLO. ALF joined the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), but it opposed the idea of a separate Palestinian identity, promoting instead a pan-Arabist ideology. Although it was a guerrilla organization, it was less active than Sa'iqa. Because of its close association with Iraq, ALF had almost no support among grassroots Palestinians. It was led by a series of relatively unknown individuals, all of whom were tied to Iraq and followed Iraq's line in Arab politics. Until the US war in Iraq in 2003, ALF had an office in Ramallah through which Baghdad provided money to the families of Palestinians killed or wounded in the AL-AQSA INTIFADA—by some estimates as much as $35 million.

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Arab Movement for Change

The Arab Movement for Change (AMC) was formed in Israel in 1996 by Dr. Ahmed Tibi (who had served as a personal adviser to YASIR ARAFAT), with the objective of creating a united party for all Palestinian citizens. Israeli opposition to Tibi and to the party required the AMC to make seven

attempts before it received registration as a legitimate political party. Just before the 1996 elections, the AMC withdrew from the campaign and instead formed a coalition with HADASH. In the 1999 elections, the AMC joined BALAD but split afterwards back into two parties, each with one seat.

The AMC's platform focuses on democratization in Israel and equality and civil rights in Israel and all Arab communities in the Middle East. PRISONERS are also high on the AMC's agenda. In November 2005, Tibi held a press conference to denounce Israel for defying INTERNATIONAL LAW, as stated in the Fourth Geneva Convention Article 77, by keeping Palestinian prisoners from the GAZA STRIP imprisoned after the end of the OCCUPATION. "Article 77 . . . stipulates that the end of military rule in an area obligates the occupying party to transfer all prisoners to the liberated area," said Tibi. "However, the Israeli prosecutor general insists that these prisoners from Gaza remain in prison on claims that violence is still ongoing in this liberated area," he said. The AMC submitted a legal appeal to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT for the release of Gaza Strip prisoners. As of this writing, Israel has not responded to Tibi's petition.

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Arab Nationalist Movement

See MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS

Arab Nationalists' Land Sales to Zionists

During the 1920s, a number of prominent Palestinian nationalist leaders sold significant tracts of land to the Zionists. Apparently capitalists before nationalists, these included MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, Jamal Husayni, AWNI 'ABD AL-HADI (whose sale to JOSHUA HANKIN in Wadi Hawarat involved evicting tenant farmers), Ragheb al-Nashashibi, MUSA AL-ALAMI (on whose land the Zionists established Kibbutz Tirat), the al-Shawa family of Gaza, the DAJANI FAMILY of Jerusalem, and the mayors of JAFFA and GAZA.

In addition, civic leaders, political activists, religious figures, businessmen, and other notables—both Muslim and Christian—sold land to the Zionists. By 1942 the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND had purchased from Arabs land totaling close to 1 million dunum (250,000 acres), on which some 230 settlements were constructed and 5 million trees were planted. A considerable part of this 250,000 acres was bought from rich landowners, although not all of them were Palestinian. Despite the land sales by Palestinian landowners, as well as those by ABSENTEE LANDLORDS, at the time of the Partition Resolution in November 1947, the Zionists had managed to purchase only 7 percent of the land in Palestine.

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Arab-Palestine Communist Party

The Arab-Palestine Communist Party (or the Palestine Communist Party) was formed in the early 1920s by Jewish and Palestinian communists. It was never very effective in mobilizing mass action, partly because, on one side, Zionists opposed it, and on the other, both the bourgeois landowners and the Islamic leaders objected to it. Within the party, tensions between the Jews and Palestinians grew, and in 1948 it split into the Palestine Communist Party (a primarily Arab party), later becoming the PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, and the mostly Jewish Israeli Communist Party, or MAKI.

See also COMMUNISTS IN ISRAEL

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Arab-Palestinian-Israeli Conflict

1. April 1920. Demonstrations in JERUSALEM were among protests by Palestinians that year against Zionist immigration and colonization. (*See* AL-NABI MUSA DEMONSTRATIONS)
2. 1929. Disturbances between Palestinians and Jews over the Western Wall involving Jerusalem, Safed, and Hebron. (*See* WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES)
3. 1936–1939. General strike and mass Palestinian uprising against Zionist immigration and colonization. (*See* ARAB REVOLT)
4. 1948. War (*See* WAR, 1948; REFUGEES)
5. 1948–1967. Infiltration and massive retaliation. (*See* QIBYA; INFILTRATION AND RETALIATION)
6. 1956. Invasion of Egypt—Sinai Suez War. (*See* Glossary)
7. 1967. War against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. (*See* WAR, 1967)
8. Post-1967. Occupation (*See* ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM; LAND; OCCUPATION; SETTLEMENTS; WATER; and other specific topics)
9. 1967–1970. War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt. (*See* ROGERS PLAN)
10. 1967–1982. Raids and massive retaliation.
11. 1971–1973. Palestinian-Israeli "Shadow War." (*See* BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION)
12. 1973. War between Israel and Egypt and Syria. (*See* Glossary)
13. 1978. Israel's invasion of Lebanon. (*See* OPERATION LITANI)
14. 1979. Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. (*See* CAMP DAVID ACCORDS)
15. 1982. Israel's invasion of Lebanon. (*See* LEBANON; LEBANON WAR; OPERATION BIG PINES; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE)
16. 1983–2000. Israeli and HIZBULLAH conflict in Lebanon (indirectly against Syria).
17. 1987–1993. Intifada. (*See* INTIFADA)
18. 1991. Gulf Crisis. (*See* GULF WAR)
19. 1992. Madrid Conference. (*See* MADRID CONFERENCE)
20. 1993. Oslo. (*See* BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES; OSLO ACCORDS for specific agreements; OSLO PROCESS for context and discussion of seven-year process)
21. 1994. Jordan-Israel peace treaty. (*See* JORDAN)
22. 2000. AL-AQSA INTIFADA. (*See* FIELD OF THORNS PLAN; INTIFADA; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION RAINBOW)
23. Post-Oslo era. (*See* ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; MECCA AGREEMENT)

Arab Party

The Arab Party (al-Majlisiyyun or Councilists) stood in opposition to the Mandate, Jewish IMMIGRATION, and LAND sales. It was established by the AL-HUSAYNI FAMILY in 1935 to counter the al-Mu'aridun (Opposition Party) or NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY formed by the NASHASHIBI FAMILY in 1934. The titular head of the party was Jamal al-Husayni, cousin and intimate aid of al-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, the preeminent leader of the Palestinian community. After the 1936 ARAB REVOLT, Britain suppressed all Arab political activity and outlawed the Arab Party and other Palestinian parties. Nevertheless, family factionalism, manifested in five clan-based parties by that time, was one of the weaknesses in the Palestinian struggle over Palestine.

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Arab Peace Initiative, 2002 and 2007

On 28 March 2002, the LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES drafted a declaration for peace, partially based on a proposal by SAUDI ARABIA'S Crown Prince Abdullah. In the declaration, made at a summit held in Beirut, LEBANON, the Arab states agreed to make peace with and recognize Israel if Israel withdrew from the Occupied Territories and accepted an independent Palestinian state with East JERUSALEM as its capital and a "just solution to the Palestinian REFUGEE problem." Israel and the UNITED STATES dismissed the initiative out of hand. Following is an excerpt: "Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council:

"(1) Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.

"Further calls upon Israel to affirm:

"(2) Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian

Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon. (3) Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194. (4) The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

"Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following: (1) Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region. (2) Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace. (3) Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries. (4) Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity. (5) Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to support this initiative. (6) Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim states and the European Union."

On 28 March 2007 the Arab League Summit met in Riyadh and reiterated its 2002 peace initiative. This came subsequent to the MECCA AGREEMENT and the formation by Palestinian factions of a National Unity Government. Israel, as it had in 2002, rejected the Arab peace proposals.

See also LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

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Arab Revolt, 1936–1939

In April 1936, Palestinian Arabs launched a general strike against the British Occupation and Zionist settlement of Palestine. The strike lasted six months and eventually evolved into an armed insurgency, known as the Great Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. Prior to 1948, it was the most important movement of anticolonial and ANTI-ZIONIST resistance mounted by the Palestinians.

The revolt was ignited by SHAYKH 'IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSAM, a radical Islamic preacher of Syrian origin who was based in HAIFA. Qassam, who for several years had been secretly organizing cells of fighters in Haifa and in the surrounding villages, attempted to launch an armed rebellion in November 1935, only to be discovered by British forces and killed, along with three of his men. Qassam's martyrdom electrified the Palestinian populace and intensified the prevailing atmosphere of crisis. A few months later, on 13 April 1935, two Jews were murdered by Arab insurgents—possibly Qassamites. This event inaugurated a series of reprisals and counterreprisals between the Palestinian and Jewish communities, and the British government eventually declared a state of emergency. In response, Palestinian activists formed "national committees" that declared a general strike in Arab cities and towns. The Palestinian national leadership, mostly composed of ruling families known as "notables," attempted to maintain control of this largely spontaneous popular movement that had emerged from below. On 25 April, Palestinian political parties met and formed the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (AHC) to coordinate the strike.

Headed by the grand mufti, al-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, the AHC included both notables and middle-class nationalists. The AHC proceeded to articulate the strike's demands: that Great Britain put an end to Jewish IMMIGRATION to Palestine, halt LAND sales to Jews, and grant Palestine its independence.

The general strike itself was mainly an urban affair, both a commercial and a labor strike. But opposition in the Palestinian countryside grew as well, as bands of peasant guerrillas, for the most part operating independently of the AHC, began to launch attacks against British forces, chiefly in the

central highlands and the hills of Galilee. The guerrillas' effectiveness increased when FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI, a pan-Arab nationalist of Syrian origin, entered Palestine and declared himself commander-in-chief of the armed revolt. A combination of tough British countermeasures against the revolt and the pressures exerted on the AHC by the Arab kings (of IRAQ, Transjordan, and SAUDI ARABIA) caused the leadership to call off the strike and the insurgency on 10 October 1936. It was understood, however, that the kings would then intercede with the British government and develop new proposals for the Palestine situation.

Britain sent to Palestine a Royal Commission of Inquiry, known as the PEEL COMMISSION, and, in July 1937, it issued a report that recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The report outraged Arab opinion, particularly because the plan called for the overwhelmingly Arab Galilee to be included in the proposed Jewish state. In September, Arab militants responded by assassinating the Galilee district commissioner, Lewis Andrews. The British in turn banned the AHC and arrested or DEPORTED hundreds of Palestinian leaders and activists. Others, like the mufti who decamped for Lebanon, escaped into exile. In the fall of 1937, the peasant guerrillas relaunched the armed revolt. After the urban-based national leadership, both notables and middle-class activists, was eliminated from the scene by the British, the helm of the insurgency was seized by the rebel bands that operated for the most part in the countryside.

The armed insurrection reached its high point in the summer and fall of 1938. Guerrillas gained effective control of the highlands and most of the Palestinian urban centers, including, for a time, Haifa, JAFFA, and the Old City of JERUSALEM. At this point, peasant insurgents imposed a kind of lower-class revenge on Palestine's urban elites. Rebel commanders declared a moratorium on debts, banned electricity use, canceled rents on departments, and enforced traditional and "national" dress codes, which compelled urban notables to take off the *tarbush* and put on the *kufiya.*

The rebels also imposed large "contributions" on wealthy Palestinians and, in a number of instances, brutalized those considered insufficiently nationalistic and imprisoned or assassinated many suspected of being traitors. In response, wealthy Palestinians fled the country in droves.

The military successes of the rebels were short-lived, however, as the British launched a counteroffensive, increasing their ground forces to 20,000 and deploying RAF aircraft, superior firepower, and classic anti-insurgency tactics, such as the incarceration of hundreds of suspects in concentration camps, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and retaliatory massacres. The British made use of the services of armed Zionist auxiliaries as well as groups of Palestinian counterrevolutionaries known as "peace bands," both of which received British military and financial support and training.

In addition to the military efforts to crush the rebellion, the British launched a parallel diplomatic offensive. In February 1939, the government brought Palestinian Arab and Zionist delegates to London for separate but inconclusive talks. In May 1939 the government issued the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which represented a partial concession to the Arab rebellion. It declared Britain's opposition to Palestine becoming a Jewish state, proposed strict regulations on land sales to Jews, proposed a limit on Jewish immigration of 75,000 over the next five years, and stated that an independent Palestinian state would be established over the next ten years. Although the AHC and the rebel leadership publicly rejected the white paper, the disposition of the Palestinian populace was somewhat more favorable.

Britain's diplomatic maneuvers and fierce military efforts, combined with serious mistakes made by the rebels (abuses and brutalities inflicted on Palestinian civilians, especially the wealthy, as well as a failure to create a centralized and disciplined leadership), led to the ultimate collapse of the revolt in September 1939, when war broke out between Britain and GERMANY.

The 1936–1939 revolt ultimately inflicted great losses on the Palestinian community, with an estimated 5,000 Palestinians (civilians and fighters) killed. The national leadership, most of its members imprisoned, deported, or in voluntary exile, was rendered weak and ineffective, while the most effective guerrilla commanders either were killed in battle or took refuge outside the country. The rank-and-file fighters suffered heavy casualties, and those who survived were effectively disarmed and disorganized. Thus, although the Great Revolt did seriously challenge British control over Palestine, its ultimate defeat left the Palestinian Arabs severely weakened and unable to mount an effective challenge in 1947 when war broke out with the Jewish community. The failure of the 1936–1939 rebellion and its drastic and debilitating effects on the Palestinian Arab community are often given as

one of the chief reasons for the Palestinian defeat called the Nakba, or catastrophe, of 1948.

Despite the fact that the 1936–1939 revolt was ultimately unsuccessful and despite the mistakes and failures of the armed guerrillas, it nonetheless continues to serve as a key historical symbol for Palestinian resistance. The revolt was frequently cited as an inspirational model by the armed Palestinian resistance movement launched in the mid-1960s. It was also frequently invoked by activists of the First INTIFADA (1987–1990). The most enduring figure associated with the revolt, however, was al-Qassam. Although Qassam fell in battle a few months prior to the 1936 strike, his name is indelibly associated with the rebellion, both because he played a key role in triggering and inspiring it and because his men were leading commanders of the armed guerrilla forces. Qassam's name and the memory of the revolt live on today especially (for better or worse) in the form of the AL-QASSAM BRIGADES (the name of the armed forces of HAMAS) and the QASSAM ROCKETS, intermittently fired by Islamist militants from the GAZA STRIP at communities inside Israel since 2001.

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—Ted Swedenburg

Arab State Peace Overtures, 1949–Present

The commonly accepted view for decades in the UNITED STATES and Europe was that Israel consistently reached out to Arab states with peace overtures only to face rejection each time. But recent research, primarily in Israeli government archives, refutes that interpretation and demonstrates that Arab states have frequently been willing to engage in peace talks and that, more often than not, Israel has been the stumbling block.

The First Period

The earliest direct negotiations held between Israel and any Arab government took place at Rhodes in 1949, at the conclusion of the first Arab-Israeli war. Under the auspices of the UNITED NATIONS, Israel negotiated directly with four separate Arab states: EGYPT, LEBANON, JORDAN, and SYRIA. Thus, a precedent was set early on for the two sides talking face-to-face. In each case, these negotiations resulted in an armistice, not a peace treaty, with the widely held belief that formal treaties would soon follow.

That hope proved to be unfounded. The two most contentious issues were BORDERS and REFUGEES. In the 1948 WAR, Israel significantly expanded its borders beyond the 1947 UN partition lines and was unwilling to surrender any territory. Moreover, it also refused to accept the return of any of the roughly 750,000 Palestinian refugees who had fled during the fighting. When Syrian leader Husni al-Za'im tried in 1949 to turn the armistice into a formal treaty and proposed a personal meeting between himself and Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION, he was flatly rejected. Ben-Gurion was in no hurry to make peace, believing that time—for acquisition of additional territory—was on Israel's side.

While the armistice negotiations were concluding, the United Nations brought the sides together under the auspices of the newly created PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION (PCC) at Lausanne, Switzerland. This time, the Arab states formed one delegation, which insisted on a return to the 1947 borders and Israeli responsibility for the refugee problem. They were considerably less flexible than the individual states had been at Rhodes, and Israel rejected both demands, although it did offer to take back 100,000 Palestinians. The talks broke down in September 1949.

That same year, Israel renewed bilateral discussions with King Abdullah of Jordan, who had held earlier meetings before the war with Zionist representatives in a joint plan to thwart the creation of a Palestinian state. Negotiations dragged on for two years, but the king was under enormous

pressure not to make a separate peace absent major concessions, which Ben-Gurion was unwilling to grant. In July 1951, Abdullah was assassinated at the AL-AQSA MOSQUE, which brought the talks to an end, although they were later resumed by his grandson, King Husayn. They continued sporadically until Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994.

The Arab States and Israel, 1953–1985

In 1953, Syria once again showed a willingness to negotiate with Israel. The two sides met from January to May to discuss WATER rights and control of demilitarized zones, but Israel was unwilling to compromise on key points, and the talks eventually terminated.

By 1954 JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR had emerged as the leader of Egypt and began contacts with MOSHE SHARETT, who had temporarily replaced Ben-Gurion as prime minister. The LAVON AFFAIR, in which Israeli agents set off bombs at British and US targets in Cairo, hoping to blame Egypt, severely undermined the contacts. Egyptian sources quickly caught the agents, and the plot was exposed. Despite that provocation, Nasir was still willing to talk, but when Egypt found the agents guilty and gave two of them a death sentence, Sharett called off all contacts. Then, when Israel conducted a raid on Gaza in early 1955, killing thirty-seven Egyptians, Nasir began to shift from a policy of seeking cooperation to one of confrontation. This began the chain of events that led up to the Suez Crisis a year later.

The 1956 Suez Crisis poisoned relations between Israel and Egypt for many years, and the situation was made worse by the 1967 WAR in which Israel captured the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the WEST BANK, GAZA, and East JERUSALEM. It was not until Nasir's death in 1970, which brought Anwar Sadat to Egypt's presidency, that a new initiative came about. In 1971, Sadat suggested that Israel withdraw some 25 miles (40 kilometers) from the Suez Canal to allow Egypt to reopen it. With the United States as mediator, discussions went back and forth for a year, but GOLDA MEIR, who had become Israeli prime minister in 1969, feared that any partial pullback would lead to demands for a return to the 1967 borders. Her refusal to commit to the proposal caused Sadat to abandon it, and instead he began to prepare to win back the Sinai by other means; these efforts led to the 1973 War.

Following that war, in which Egypt restored its national pride by performing well on the battlefield, the United States brokered two interim agreements that brought a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. But Sadat grew impatient with the lack of progress, and in 1977 he embarked on what became the most famous Arab peace initiative. In November he announced that he was willing to go to Israel in the interests of peace, a declaration that stunned the world. The newly installed LIKUD government under MENAHEM BEGIN promptly issued him an invitation, and less than two weeks later Sadat flew to Israel and addressed the Knesset with the goal of negotiating peace between the two countries. For the first time the whole world saw an Arab leader openly dealing with Israel.

But these talks too quickly bogged down. Egypt wanted a complete withdrawal from Sinai and a settlement of the Palestinian problem, while Israel desired full peace and diplomatic relations but no change in the Palestinian situation. With talks at an impasse, President JIMMY CARTER invited both sides to a summit at Camp David in September 1978. After two weeks of intense negotiations, the two sides signed the famous CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. With great fanfare, Carter announced that for the first time an Arab country and Israel were making peace. Left unstated was the fact that the initiative had come from the Arab side, as it had numerous times before. But the formal treaty took another six months before it was implemented, and in the end Sadat essentially sold out the Palestinian cause for Egypt's benefit. Israel returned the Sinai, albeit in several stages, and full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established.

The treaty was extremely unpopular in Egypt and in the wider Arab world. The ARAB LEAGUE expelled Egypt for having made a separate peace with Israel, excluding Syria, and ignoring the Palestinian question. The Egyptian president's domestic support steadily eroded, and in 1981, Sadat was assassinated while reviewing a military parade.

Nevertheless, a precedent of Arab state recognition of Israel had been set. The next Arab initiative came from an unexpected source—SAUDI ARABIA. In August 1981, Crown Prince (later King) Fahd announced a proposal known as the FAHD PLAN. Its eight points included calling for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, dismantling of all Jewish SETTLEMENTS, establishment of a

Palestinian state, and recognition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Although these were all common Arab demands, what was new was a "guarantee of peace among all states in the region," which by clear implication included Israel. Most observers saw the plan as a breakthrough, but the United States was dismissive of it, and the Israeli government completely rejected it, calling it a propaganda ploy. The Likud, ideologically committed to retaining the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Greater Land of Israel, had no intention of considering any peace proposal that required it to give up those territories.

Nevertheless, a revised Arab plan reemerged a year later in the midst of Israel's LEBANON WAR. After US president RONALD REAGAN put forth the REAGAN PLAN calling for the handover of the West Bank to Jordan, the Arab League held a summit in Fez, Morocco. Arab leaders reiterated most of the points from the Fahd Plan, which meant they continued to support recognition of the PLO, ignored the "Jordanian option" for the territories, and implicitly accepted Israel's right to live in peace. The FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE was adopted unanimously, meaning that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Syria for the first time recognized Israel's right to exist. Although the Reagan administration welcomed the plan as a step forward, it was not prepared to recognize the PLO or agree to a Palestinian state. Israel once again rejected it out of hand. Thus another Arab peace initiative fell by the wayside.

By the mid-1980s, the political situation in Israel had changed somewhat. The 1984 elections brought a national unity coalition between the LIKUD and LABOR Parties, with the unusual stipulation that Labor leader SHIMON PERES and new Likud head YITZHAK SHAMIR would rotate as prime minister. Peres assumed the premiership for the first two years and was eager to revive the Jordanian option. He found a willing partner in King Husayn, who had maintained contact with previous Labor leaders since his accession to the throne in 1953. The two began meeting in 1985, but Husayn had to work around the problem that the Arab League (at Rabat in 1974) had designated the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians. He did this by getting YASIR ARAFAT to agree to allow Israeli-Jordanian negotiations.

After two years of secret talks, Peres and Husayn signed the LONDON AGREEMENT, which set up an international conference as a "fig leaf" for Husayn, with most work conducted in bilateral meetings between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Neither side set preconditions. Unfortunately, by this time Peres had rotated to foreign minister and was replaced by Shamir, who was even more uncompromising than his predecessor Begin and viewed any international conference as an excuse to put pressure on Israel. Consequently, he vetoed the London Agreement, and negotiations between Israel and Jordan were suspended until Labor returned to power in the early 1990s.

Madrid and the Oslo Process

The next set of Arab-Israeli negotiations took place at the MADRID CONFERENCE, which began in 1991. By this time, a number of circumstances had changed. First, the INTIFADA, begun in 1987, had made a solution of the Palestinian problem much more urgent. Second, the end of the GULF WAR gave the United States the political capital to push for an overall solution in the Middle East. Invitations went out from Washington and were accepted by Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (whose delegation was to include non-PLO Palestinians). Only Israel was reluctant, once again fearing pressure to compromise. However, economic threats from the GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration persuaded him to participate.

The Madrid Conference led to a series of bilateral negotiations, most of which were held in Washington. In all of these talks, Israel refused to accept the principle of exchanging land for peace, arguing that it had fulfilled the terms of UN RESOLUTION 242 when it returned the Sinai. As a result, talks with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan ended in deadlock. The only positive aspect was the fact that, for the first time, Israeli officials held talks with Palestinian representatives who, although not officially belonging to the PLO, closely coordinated their actions with Arafat. But these talks brought no results either.

The 1992 elections in Israel removed Shamir from office and brought in a Labor-led coalition with YITZHAK RABIN as prime minister and Peres as foreign minister. Their government took a more conciliatory approach to negotiations, and, within a year and a half, it had signed the OSLO ACCORDS with the PLO. This agreement opened the door for King Husayn, who had long wanted peace with Israel but could not give the appearance of betray-

ing the Palestinians. Now he was able to negotiate openly, and when the Israelis offered to give Jordan a special role as protector of the al-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the Islamic holy site known as TEMPLE MOUNT to the Jews, a major hurdle was overcome. The treaty, Israel's second with an Arab state, was signed just thirteen months after Oslo. For Husayn, it was the culmination of forty years of seeking peace with Israel.

Rabin now attempted to deal with Syria's president, Hafez al-Assad, who had been in power since 1970. Assad's main goal was the recovery of the Golan Heights, lost in the 1967 War. In the Madrid talks, Shamir's refusal to consider that possibility had resulted in deadlock. Now Rabin requested US help in restarting the dialogue, and the Syrian leader signaled his consent.

Both sides accepted the "land for peace" formula, but there were numerous areas of disagreement: the final border (the 1923 or 1967 line), the depth of the peace, the timetable for withdrawal, and Israel's desire for early warning stations on the Golan. Neither side demonstrated much flexibility, and talks stalled in the months before Rabin's assassination (November 1995). Negotiations resumed with his successor, Peres, under US supervision, but in early 1996 they failed once again. A few months later, Peres was defeated at the polls by the Likud's BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, who, like Shamir, refused to consider trading land for peace. With no prospect of getting the Golan back, Assad canceled negotiations.

But talks resumed in 1999 after Labor's EHUD BARAK ousted Netanyahu in elections that summer. US president BILL CLINTON became personally involved, often sitting in at sessions held at Shepherdstown, West Virginia, but negotiations once again broke down in early 2000 over Israel's insistence on retaining Shebaa Farms (a small area of land located on the border between Lebanon and the Israeli-controlled part of the Golan Heights). Clinton made a personal appeal to Assad when they met in Geneva, but he was rebuffed, and there was no movement on that front again until 2007.

Post-Oslo Peace Initiatives

After the breakdown of the OSLO PROCESS at CAMP DAVID II talks and the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, the overall situation deteriorated rapidly. In early 2001, Barak was replaced as prime minister by hard-liner ARIEL SHARON, and violence between Israelis and Palestinians escalated alarmingly. In this situation, Saudi crown prince (now King) Abdullah in early 2002 made a bold offer. In an interview with *New York Times* columnist Tom Friedman, he proposed that all Arab states agree to full normalization of relations with Israel if Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders. The UNITED STATES, the UNITED NATIONS, and the EUROPEAN UNION all supported Abdullah's proposal. More importantly, in March the Arab League gave its backing, once again leaving the ball in Israel's hands. However, at that time Sharon was in the midst of a violent war to reoccupy all major Palestinian cities and gave the proposal no consideration. Also, Sharon opposed any return to the 1967 borders, and the Arab League's proposal was quietly buried.

After Sharon was incapacitated by a stroke, his deputy, Ehud Olmert, replaced him in 2006. In spring 2008, Olmert announced that new indirect negotiations with Syria had been going on for about a year, with Turkey as the mediator. But later that same year, the negotiations were suspended due to Olmert's announcement of his resignation, which was caused by his persistent legal problems.

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—John J. McTague

Arab States: Inter-Arab Politics

In the post–World War II period, interrelations among the Arab states have been largely driven by disunity, rivalry, competition, and conflict. The main objective for each state has been regime survival, which has meant pursuing policies to shore up domestic legitimacy, to extend regional influence, and sometimes to expand territory. The clash of interests among the Arab regimes adversely affected the Palestinians in their conflict with ZIONISM and Israel, and was a contributing factor in the 1948 loss of Palestine.

In the 1948 WAR, King Farouk of EGYPT was reluctant to enter the conflict against the Zionists. Together with most other Arab states, Farouk was more worried about King Abdullah of Transjordan's (JORDAN after 1950) expansionist ambitions vis-à-vis Palestine, and to lesser extent Syria, than about the Zionist movement. SYRIA too was concerned about Abdullah's schemes, and its president, Shukri al-Quwatli, proposed through the ARAB LEAGUE the formation of the ARAB LIBERATION ARMY (ALA) to fight in Palestine, leaving the Syrian army to guard the homeland against possible Transjordan encroachment. The ALA, however, fought poorly and did little to assist the Palestinians.

When the Arab armies (Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, LEBANON, and IRAQ) did enter Palestine on 15 May 1948, they sent only a total of 25,000 troops, 10,000 fewer than Israel fielded, and this disparity only grew wider as the war went on. By December the number of Israeli troops stood at 96,441, in a 2-to-1 ratio with the combined Arab forces. This troop imbalance (combined with an asymmetry in the quality and quantity of weapons) was one of the decisive factors in the Arab defeat. There was also a complete lack of coordination among the Arab armies; Israeli leaders were well aware of this situation and exploited it to the fullest. Significant also is the fact that no Arab army, including the ALA, attempted to engage Israel on territory that the UN Partition Resolution had assigned to the Jewish state. Finally, the Arabs were constrained by the special relationship King Abdullah had with the Zionists. At the war's end, the Arab states were totally defeated, demoralized, and disorganized. Palestine was lost, more than 750,000 of its people had become REFUGEES, and these dispossessed were massed within the borders of neighboring countries.

In the aftermath of the ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, truces that brought the 1948 WAR to an end, it is likely that most, if not all, Arab regimes would have concluded peace treaties with Israel if the refugee question could have been resolved. For example, Syria offered to take 100,000 refugees, but Israel's refusal to permit the return of any of the refugees precluded any settlement. On the other hand, although there appeared to be a condition of stasis throughout the Arab world, a number of emerging movements were about to pose unprecedented challenges to the old order.

The first shock came in 1952 when the Egyptian "Free Officers" staged a coup that deposed King Farouk and brought to power the pan-Arab nationalist JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. "Nasirism" soon became a regionwide movement with branches in most states, creating significant instability (and concomitant repression) within a number of Arab countries. After 'Abd al-Nasir consolidated his power, Egypt became a strong, if constrained, supporter of the Palestinians.

Prior to the Egyptian coup, the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN), with its origins in student politics at the American University of Beirut (AUB), had emerged in the late 1940s. Palestinian Christian GEORGE HABASH and Syrian Muslim Hani al-Hindi were among its most important leaders. In the mid-1950s, the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) joined a larger student group led by AUB professor Constantine Zureik, whose thinking helped clarify the group's ideology. Revolutionary and pan-Arabist, it emphasized the formation of a nationally aware intellectual elite that would play a vanguard role in a revolution of Arab consciousness, leading to Arab unity and social progress. Ideologically, it was committed to Arab socialism and secularism. Its Arab nationalism meant an uncompromising hostility to Western imperialism in general and toward Israel in particular. Initially, the ANM viewed Palestinian nationalism as parochial.

The group formed branches in various Arab states, and in 1958 it formally adopted the name Movement of Arab Nationalists. Subsequently, political divergence arose within the movement as many, especially in Syria and Iraq, became close to local Nasirite movements, while a more radical element moved toward Marxism. Nevertheless, the MAN challenged the Arab regimes in a variety of ways, and although the movement never took

power in any state, it did give rise to one of the most important Palestinian organizations, the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), and its various progeny. Whatever else, the MAN was an additional ingredient in the chaotic cauldron of Arab politics.

This same period saw the crystallization of another pan-Arab nationalist movement—BA'ATHISM (Renaissance). In 1945, Syrian Christian Michel Aflaq and Muslim Salah al Din Bitar founded the Ba'ath Party. A secular, socialist, and pan-Arab party, it threatened Arab regimes that had leanings toward Islam and/or monarchy. The motto of the party was unity, freedom, socialism *(wahda, hurriya, ishtirakiya)*. *Unity* refers to Arab unity; *freedom* is from foreign control and interference; and *socialism* refers to what has been termed "Arab socialism" rather than Marxism.

The Ba'ath functioned as a pan-Arab party with branches in various Arab countries but became strongest in Syria and Iraq, coming to power in both in 1963. (The Ba'ath Party came to power in Syria on 8 March 1963 and has held a monopoly on political power since later that year. The Ba'athists ruled Iraq briefly in 1963, and then from July 1968 until 2003.) However, in 1966 the Syrian and Iraqi parties split into two intensely rival organizations. Both Ba'ath parties retained the same name and maintained parallel structures in the Arab world, but Iraq and Syria remained enemies until the end. Each state competed for influence in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), created factions within the organization that functioned to support their state interests, and generally acted as a force militating against Palestinian unity and objectives.

With all these nationalist movements organizing and proselytizing, it is not surprising that, in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, there was a huge upsurge in Arab nationalism throughout the Arab world, as well as intense conflict among the regimes and the various pan-Arab movements. Inter-Arab conflict was fueled by yet another momentous event: the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt (the United Arab Republic), which had the potential to radically alter the balance of power in the region. However, because it dissolved in 1961, that threat never came to fruition. But Egypt's 'Abd al-Nasir was so intent on extending his influence that he committed a huge part of his military to fight alongside the Republicans in Yemen's bloody civil war. It was a decision that incurred the wrath of SAUDI ARABIA and the Gulf states, including KUWAIT (and the UNITED STATES), and left Egypt in a greatly weakened position in 1967, unable to defend itself from Israel's preemptive strike.

Ba'athist Syria resented Egypt's growing influence and set out to counter it. In 1963, Syria assumed a leadership role in mobilizing Arab opposition to Israel's planned diversion of water from Lake Tiberias. But the Egyptian-Syrian competition had negative consequences throughout the Arab world and negated any possibility for concrete action on either the water or the Palestinian issue—despite all the Arab nationalist rhetoric to the contrary.

The 1967 WAR was a watershed in Arab politics. No Arab state wanted to go to war with Israel, but the leaders became prisoners of their own oratory. Years of bravado and hostile speechifying finally brought them face-to-face with reality; in a mere six days Israel utterly defeated three major Arab states: Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. Of the war's multiple consequences, perhaps the most significant outcome was the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement. Its impact on inter-Arab politics was profound, and no state was exempt from its effects. Yet, in one way or another, the Palestine question had impinged on the politics of every state since 1948.

Inter-Arab Rivalry and the Palestinians

After the 1948 War, Transjordan's control of the West Bank greatly concerned Egypt, which feared that King Abdullah would eclipse Egyptian influence in the Arab east. Damascus, too, worried that Transjordan was conspiring to add Syria (and Lebanon) to its dominion. In fact, the 1949 coup in Syria was in part a result of Hashemite meddling. Consequently, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon joined together to block further Jordanian expansionism (in alliance with Iraq, another Hashemite monarchy). Egypt permitted, for a few weeks, the establishment of an ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT in GAZA headed by AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, the former mufti (religious leader) of Jerusalem. However, Egyptian officials deposed him and held him under virtual house arrest in Cairo. King Abdullah countered by uniting the WEST BANK and Transjordan in 1948, formally annexing the West Bank in 1950, and establishing the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. After signing the ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, the Arab states did not recognize Israel and further insisted on the Pales-

tinian refugees' return to their homes. Abdullah was the only Arab ruler to negotiate, albeit secretly, with Israel to consolidate his territorial gains through a peace treaty. Although Husni al-Za'im, the Syrian leader, indicated his willingness to do so, DAVID BEN-GURION refused to negotiate toward a peace treaty. The Jordanian-Israeli negotiations failed, however, after the Arabs found out about them, and in 1951 a Palestinian assassinated Abdullah. Jordan's annexation of the West Bank and Egypt's control of Gaza foiled the Palestinians' desire to establish their own sovereignty on what was left of Palestine.

Inter-Arab rivalry preoccupied 'Abd al-Nasir after 1952. Although he did not seek a confrontation with Israel, he was compelled to defend Egypt against the 1956 Israeli, British, and French invasion (the Suez War). Because of his commitments in Yemen after the 1961 Republican coup, 'Abd al-Nasir tried to avoid conflict with Israel over its plan to divert water from Lake Tiberias. At the same time, Egyptian relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, both supporters of the ousted Yemeni imam, were extremely tense. But the conflict over water, especially between Syria and Israel, and Syrian agitation to confront the planned diversion, compelled 'Abd al-Nasir to call for an Arab summit meeting in Cairo in January 1964. He hoped that this action would not provoke Israel and would placate Syria. In response to Israel's massive diversion project, which took water from Jordanian and Syrian sources to irrigate the Negev (the National Water Carrier), the summit decided to divert the tributaries of the River Jordan that were on Arab lands north of Lake Tiberias. Israel, however, bombed the Arab installations. At 'Abd al-Nasir's urging, the summit also established the PLO, which the Egyptian leader intended to control and to use as an instrument of Egyptian diplomacy in inter-Arab politics. Jordan initially forbade the PLO from operating in its territory lest it challenge Jordan's authority over the West Bank and its self-appointed role as spokesman for the Palestinians. Syria, too, opposed the PLO, regarding it as inadequate to the task of liberating Palestine.

The failure of the Arab states to implement any policies or take any actions on behalf of the Palestinians led a group of young, professional Palestinians, most working in the Gulf States, to take matters into their own hands. In 1958 they formed the Palestine National Liberation Movement (FATAH), and in 1965 they carried out their first guerrilla operation against Israel. Ba'athist Syria supported Fatah and believed that if Syria and Fatah cooperated, they could polarize the situation between the Arab states and Israel. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Nasir was able to maintain the course of action approved by the 1964 Arab summit, wherein Egypt controlled the PLO, until a 1966 coup in Syria brought to power an even more radical wing of Ba'athists. The Nur ed-Din al-Atasi government continued to allow Fatah to use Syria as a base and, unlike the previous regime, at times permitted it to attack Israel across the Syrian border.

Inter-Arab divisions resulted in yet another calamity for the Palestinians (and the Arabs). In the June 1967 WAR with Israel, Jordan lost the West Bank, Egypt the Sinai and Gaza, and Syria the Golan Heights, while more Palestinians became refugees. The 1967 War, however, changed the Arab states' position. With so much Arab land now in Israel's hands, Arab leaders felt compelled to reevaluate their relationship with the PLO and the various resistance groups, including Fatah.

The bankruptcy of the Arab regimes and the rise of the resistance movement as an alternative, especially after 1969, when the resistance came to dominate the PLO (evidenced in the assumption of the chairmanship by YASIR ARAFAT), spawned a host of new alliances in the Arab world. 'Abd al-Nasir, though no longer in control of the new PLO, as he was with the original, concluded that he could use the Palestinian militants in his plans to recover lost Egyptian territories. Additionally, 'Abd al-Nasir wanted a second front against Israel to take some pressure off Egypt in its WAR OF ATTRITION against Israel. When clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian guerrillas intensified after Israel's 1968 raid on Beirut's International Airport, in which it destroyed thirteen civilian aircraft on the ground, 'Abd al-Nasir was instrumental in crafting the 3 November 1969 CAIRO AGREEMENT, which allowed the PLO to operate from Lebanon, provided it did not interfere in Lebanese affairs.

By then, the PLO presence in Jordan was significant, and despite reservations, King Husayn supported it, for to do otherwise would have put the conservative monarchy outside the then-Arab consensus. Although 'Abd al-Nasir supported the resistance activities in Jordan, he was also looking for a way to negotiate with Israel to recover lost

Egyptian territories. King Husayn believed that he could recover the West Bank through negotiations with Israel, but the PLO was interested in the liberation of Palestine, not in having the West Bank returned to Jordan. In other words, the Arab states were planning to use the Palestinian movement, though still in its infancy, to serve their own interests.

On 9 December 1969, US secretary of state WILLIAM ROGERS announced his peace plan, based on UN RESOLUTION 242, which called on Israel to withdraw (with minor modifications) from the territories occupied in the 1967 War. Egypt and Jordan accepted the plan, but Israel rejected it. So did the PLO because the plan said nothing about Palestinian national interests (i.e., an independent state) or the repatriation of the refugees. By then the PLO had begun to undermine the legitimacy of King Husayn's regime, and he was keen to get it out of Jordan. Several hijacking operations by the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE provided the excuse, and in September 1970, King Husayn unleashed his army against the PLO. To help the Palestinians, the Syrian president sent an armored division; however, it was overrun by Jordanian forces when Hafez al-Asad, commander of the Syrian air force, decided to withhold promised air cover. Many thousands of lives were lost, but Jordan succeeded in driving the PLO from its borders, and it was forced to regroup in Lebanon. In fact, King Husayn had tacit support from all the Arab regimes and explicit support from Egypt for his actions in the BLACK SEPTEMBER disaster.

In November 1970, Hafez al-Assad took power in Syria and sought to improve relations with Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. He immediately denied the PLO use of Syrian territory to attack Israel and appeared to be moving toward a negotiated settlement with Israel to recover lost territory. He too wanted to control the PLO to serve Syria's interests. Assad did the same as the earlier Ba'athist regime: he mobilized SA'IQA, a Syrian-created and -controlled guerrilla group within the PLO, to influence PLO policy and activities on the ground, primarily in Lebanon, and manipulated control of arms shipments to several Palestinian guerrilla organizations within the PLO.

Having lost hope in the possibility of ending the "no-war, no-peace" limbo merely through negotiations, Egypt and Syria jointly launched a limited war in October 1973 to regain the territories they lost in 1967. Israel once again defeated the Arab states and occupied more territory of each than it held before the hostilities began. In the war's aftermath, Egypt, now ruled by Anwar al-Sadat, played an extremely deceptive game with Syria and concluded a separate peace with Israel.

Between 1970 and 1974, the PLO came under increasing pressure to abandon its objective of a democratic, secular state in all of Palestine and accept Israel as a Zionist, Jewish state. Thus, at the twelfth PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) in June 1974, the PLO issued a political communiqué that called for the establishment of "a Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian areas liberated from Israeli control." This was the first formulation of the idea of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. Having accepted the Arab consensus on this issue, at the October 1974 Rabat Arab Summit, the Arab states formalized an agreement made at a November 1973 meeting that recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. At first Jordan refused to sign the agreement, but in 1974, King Husayn came under intense pressure from key Arab states, and he had no choice but to relinquish Jordan's claim to the West Bank in favor of the PLO. The significance of Rabat was that no settlement concerning the Occupied Territories could be achieved without the PLO as a direct party to the negotiations.

Because Egypt needed the PLO as a cover for the land-for-peace negotiations it anticipated with Israel, Cairo played a major role in the Arab diplomacy that resulted in Yasir Arafat's invitation to address the UN General Assembly on 13 November 1974. On 10 November 1975, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3237, conferring on the PLO the status of observer-member in the assembly and in other international organizations.

The Lebanese civil war that began in April 1975 made control of the PLO by either Syria or Egypt a difficult task, partly because the divisions among the Arab states precluded a unified strategy and because the PLO was by then a significant player in the region with overwhelming popular support among the Arab masses. No one contemplated that Syria would turn against the PLO and especially its former Lebanese allies. But as the war dragged on, it became apparent that the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), with which the Palestinians had sided, was poised to defeat the Lebanese right-wing forces. Syria feared that Israel would enter the fray on the side of the

Lebanese right wing, and not wanting another confrontation with the Jewish state, Damascus turned on its traditional allies and sided with the Lebanese rightists to defeat the LNM/PLO. Syria was also concerned that the PLO was becoming a force that it could no longer control and that could work against its regional influence, making its defeat of the Palestinians even more satisfying. When the Lebanese civil war concluded, Syria signed an agreement with Arafat on 26 July 1976 that seemed to protect PLO interests, but neither Arafat nor the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE trusted Hafez al-Asad.

On 15 March 1978, Israel invaded the south of Lebanon and set up a sphere of influence in the border area, installing a cashiered Lebanese army colonel, Saad Haddad, as its surrogate. Haddad's assignment was to prevent Palestinian guerrilla incursions into Israel.

In November 1977, abandoning his Arab allies and negating the Arab consensus for an international conference, Egypt's Sadat seized the initiative for peace with Israel in a dramatic gesture—a visit to JERUSALEM and an address to the Knesset. In 1979 he signed two agreements with Israel, known as the Camp David Accords. They were, however, two separate, unrelated agreements. The first was ostensibly for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East involving Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives. Supposedly, the West Bank and Gaza would gain autonomy within a relationship with Jordan. The second accord was the framework for a bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, formally signed on 29 March 1979. However, since there was no linkage between the two agreements, nothing bound Israel to honor the first, and Tel Aviv did not respect any aspect of it, including granting autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza.

The PLO opposed the Camp David peace accords because it could not accept Egypt negotiating for Palestinian "self-government" without consulting the PLO and because the accord on autonomy fell far short of statehood. The danger, as the PLO saw it, was the establishment of a precedent for other states to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians without the PLO, thus obviating the Rabat consensus that recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Equally important, as a result of the Camp David Accords Egypt was neutralized in the Arab-Israeli conflict and isolated in the Arab world.

The next setback for the PLO was Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR. During the three-month siege of Beirut, no Arab state provided assistance to the Palestinians. Palestinian forces were forced to withdraw from Lebanon, a move that met with Syrian approval because Damascus had been attempting to weaken the PLO there. Subsequently, Syrian president Asad backed a Fatah rebellion that opposed Arafat's diplomatic maneuvers to reach a settlement with Israel in conjunction with Jordan. The SABRA AND SHATILA massacres, in addition to all their other losses, left the Palestinians utterly demoralized. The Arab states did not enter the scene again until after US president RONALD REAGAN announced a peace plan on 1 September 1982 that explicitly ruled out a Palestinian state and seemed intended to capitalize on the PLO's weakness by positing a negotiating process centered on Jordan. Meeting shortly thereafter in Fez, Morocco, Arab leaders and the PLO crafted and promoted a peace plan of their own. The FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE (based on the earlier FAHD PLAN of 1981) called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories and security guarantees for "all states in the region"—an implicit reference to Israel.

In November 1983, Egyptian diplomatic intervention secured a safe passage for Arafat from Tripoli, Lebanon, giving rise to the Palestinian leader's visit to Cairo en route to Tunis. This decision, however, incurred the wrath of the other Arab states that were maintaining a boycott against Egypt for the Camp David "sellout." It also deepened an already serious rift over strategy and tactics within the PLO.

Arafat convened the seventeenth PNC in Amman, Jordan, in November 1984. With the exception of Fatah, most of the other resistance organizations chose not to attend. In 1985 Arafat made a formal pronouncement in Egypt known as the "Cairo Declaration" in which he stated the PLO's condemnation of "all guerilla operations outside [Palestine] and all forms of TERRORISM." In February 1985, Arafat signed an accord with King Husayn of Jordan in which the concept of an independent Palestinian state was reduced to the notion of a "homeland" and self-government to a "confederation" with Jordan. The agreement also contained the idea of a joint Jordanian-PLO negotiating team, which in effect compromised the status of the PLO as the sole representative of the

Palestinian people. Six Palestinian factions within the PLO immediately denounced Arafat's decision, saying the accord would "liquidate the Palestine cause," and a month later they came together in the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT under Syrian sponsorship. In February 1986, the resolutions of the Amman PNC and the HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT were abrogated.

After the dissolution of the agreement with the PLO, King Husayn met with Israeli prime minister SHIMON PERES in Paris while simultaneously initiating a rapprochement with Syria to protect himself in the event of a peace deal with Israel. Meanwhile, Asad maintained pressure on the PLO by continuing to support the PLO dissidents, which included the Fatah rebels, Sa'iqa, and the PFLP. Asad also wanted to disperse or exile the pro-Arafat fighters who returned to the Palestinian refugee camps around Beirut. To this end he unleashed the Lebanese Shi'a AMAL militia and Shi'a units of the Lebanese army against the camps. Despite the killing of hundreds of civilians, the "CAMPS' WAR" served to unite the Palestinians, and Syria found itself increasingly isolated.

In April 1987, when the eighteenth session of the PNC convened, the various resistance groups were reunited. The PLO restated the objective of national self-determination in an independent state in part of Palestine. The emphasis on diplomacy was also reiterated with the PLO call for an international conference under the auspices of the UN Security Council, as the means to facilitate a solution to the question of Palestine. During this session, the PLO Executive Committee declared the Jordanian-PLO agreement "null and void." Thereafter, Arafat sought by all diplomatic means to make the PLO a full partner in a political settlement.

In March 1988, four months into the First INTIFADA, Arafat again publicly called for an international peace conference to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with full, independent PLO participation. He declared that the PLO accepted "all UN resolutions on Palestine," including 242 and 338; referred to the 1984 PNC resolution calling for "land in exchange for peace"; and concluded with the statement "With whom am I going to make peace at an international conference? With my enemies? With the Israeli government?" However, he quickly reversed his position after the Intifada's leadership condemned the lack of US support for Palestinian self-determination and denounced the Arab states for being excessively deferential to Washington. The Arab regimes were worried that the Intifada might spread to their countries.

Arafat continued his diplomatic initiative with a speech at the 13 December 1988 UN General Assembly meeting in Geneva, calling upon Israel to negotiate with the PLO. At a press conference the following day, he stated that he recognized Israel's *right* to exist and again renounced all forms of terrorism. Shortly thereafter, Arafat's much-sought official meeting with the United States came to fruition—the UNITED STATES-PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DIALOGUE, which commenced in December 1988 in Tunis. Nothing came of the dialogue, and eighteen months later the United States canceled it.

Egypt had been playing an important behind-the-scenes role in encouraging Arafat to make the concessions the United States was demanding; however, Arafat began to perceive President Husni Mubarak as so obsequious to Washington that he felt the need to balance the PLO-Egypt-US triangle. Syria was out of the question, given its actions in the post–1982 War period. On the other hand, Iraq was deeply committed to the Palestinian cause, having provided large sums of money to the PLO and strong diplomatic support.

Historically, Ba'athist Iraq had supported the PLO and Yasir Arafat, although Iraqi leader Saddam Husayn also attempted to manipulate Palestinian politics to serve Baghdad's interests through the Iraqi-sponsored ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF) and by other means. For years, inter-Arab politics had compelled Arafat to compromise Palestinian interests; now Saddam Husayn wanted to use the PLO to support him against Arab Gulf states. The Iraqi president backed the PLO in its quest to reach a settlement without interference from Arab states, and, in a February 1990 speech at the Arab Co-operation Council held in Amman, he was highly critical of the United States and Israel. After Husayn's speech, Arafat and the Palestinian masses believed that the Iraqi leader had a plan that might compel the United States to take the PLO more seriously. In this regional atmosphere, an abortive attack on Israel's Nizanim beach in Tel Aviv in May 1990 by the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF), to avenge the murder of seven Palestinian workers earlier in the month, was said by some to have had Iraqi sponsorship. An Iraqi role in the operation is, however, highly unlikely. The foiled attack garnered much criti-

cism from around the globe, including the Arab world, and when it was followed by the *ACHILLE LAURO* affair, also a PLF operation, combined with Yasir Arafat's failure to condemn it, the United States broke off its dialogue with the PLO.

In any case, the strength of the financial and diplomatic assistance provided by Saddam Husayn, plus the enormous mass support in the Occupied Territories for the Iraqi president, led the PLO to side with Iraq when it invaded Kuwait. An alignment with Baghdad in the GULF WAR may have seemed a logical decision to Arafat at the time, but it turned out to be disastrous for the PLO. After the war's end, Kuwait expelled at least 450,000 Palestinians, and Arafat and the PLO were at their lowest point, with catastrophic consequences for the Palestinian cause. First, the PLO had to submit to the terms of the MADRID CONFERENCE, from which it was excluded, and Israel would vet those "non-PLO Palestinians" who could attend.

One could count Madrid as a "procedural" defeat because no Arab state realized any of its interests at the conference. Far more serious was the weakened PLO, already in a vastly asymmetric power relationship with Israel, signing in 1993 the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES and embarking on the OSLO PROCESS on terms that were so disadvantageous as to make its demise inevitable. Yet, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, so isolated was the PLO among the Arab states and internationally, and in turn so weakened as an actor, that Arafat apparently concluded that the Oslo agreement was the most that he could get, even though it left the Palestinians without even bargaining power.

After the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS, the Arab states used the PLO's acquiescence to Israel to further their own interests. Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Syria engaged in an on-again, off-again negotiating process with Israel, anxious to conclude a peace treaty and willing to make numerous concessions that ultimately came to naught, though not for lack of Syrian flexibility. And Egyptian president Mubarak worked closely with US president BILL CLINTON to fulfill Shimon Peres's dream of an economically integrated region.

The Arab states eagerly participated in a regional economic project that Israel hoped would lead to the development of the Middle East economies through economic cooperation and in turn politically integrate Israel in the region. The US Foreign Relations Committee and the World Economic Forum sponsored the first Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summit in November 1994 in Casablanca. As one analyst noted, "Representatives of 64 countries took part and it represented a considerable breakthrough for the regional integration of Israel."

Participants in the summit stressed the need to strengthen cooperation among governments and business communities. The declaration signed in Casablanca underlined the importance of solid economic growth and palpable improvement of the life and security of peoples in the region. The Arab states agreed to take measures to lift the direct embargo against Israel, and all the participants agreed on the creation of a Middle East and North Africa Development Bank and a regional Chamber of Commerce.

The second MENA summit took place in Amman in October 1995. As a supplement to the institutions proposed in Casablanca, it was decided to set up a regional permanent economic organization-secretariat. The second MENA summit took place in the same friendly Arab-Israeli atmosphere as the first.

The third MENA meeting was held in Cairo in November 1996. Because of the slowing of the peace process after the election of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU and the halting of the Oslo Process, it was downgraded from being a summit to just a conference, and Israel was no longer the focal point of this event. The "Cairo Declaration" adopted in the conference underlined the idea that regional development had to be linked to the realization of peace. The United States announced that the Middle East and North Africa Development Bank would become operative by the end of 1997.

Despite considerable pressures from the United States, most Arab countries did not take part in the fourth MENA conference, which was held in Doha, Qatar, in November 1997. Because most of the Arab states had linked their presence in the conference to the progress made in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian National Authority, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates boycotted the event. The Arab participation was limited to Djibouti, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen. Not invited were Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan. No progress was made on the implementation of the development bank, or on the promo-

tion of Arab-Israeli direct economic and trade cooperation.

See also ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC; and individual countries: EGYPT, FRANCE, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA

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—Ibrahim G. Aoudé

Arab Studies Society

The Arab Studies Society (Jammayat el-Derasat el-Arabia), established in 1980 by Faysal al-Husayni, is a nongovernmental organization founded as a research and documentation center to record the historical, cultural, and political history of the Palestinians. Located in ORIENT HOUSE in East JERUSALEM, it consists of a library that holds some 14,000 books, documents, a press and personalities archive, and a photo and tape department. The facilities at the Arab Studies Society were open to the public until the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, when Israel closed it down. Funded by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), it was considered the center of PLO influence in Jerusalem, which made it a flashpoint of tension throughout the 1990s because of repeated Israeli closures. (www.orienthouse.org/arabstudies).

Arab Thought Forum

The Arab Thought Forum (ATF, al Multaqa, or "meeting place"), founded in 1977 in East JERUSALEM by Palestinian professionals and intellectuals, is one of the oldest and most venerable Palestinian think tanks. Its independent and unaffiliated status allows the ATF to broach a broad range of subjects from varying perspectives related to the Palestinian situation. The ATF attempts to identify the critical issues facing the Palestinians and engages in research, analysis, and public debate to influence social, economic, and political developments. Beginning with the OSLO PROCESS, it has focused on three main areas: (1) the future of Jerusalem, (2) democratic processes and nation building, and (3) promoting development awareness. (www.multaqa.org).

Arab Uprising, 1929

See WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES

Arab World and Palestine

See individual countries: EGYPT, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA

Arafat, Yasir (Mohammed Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husayn) (1929–2004)

Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar, or father of Ammar) was the founder and head of FATAH, chairman of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), and the single most important figure in the Palestinian nationalist struggle.

Arafat was born in Cairo and spent some of his childhood years in JERUSALEM. His father, Abd al Ra'uf, was a wholesale merchant who hailed from the Qudwa *hamula* of Gaza and Khan Yunis, a distant and minor clan in the AL-HUSAYNI FAMILY. His mother, Zahwa, came from the family of Abu al Sa'id, a distinguished *hamula* that claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. During the 1948 WAR, Arafat fought in GAZA with the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, after which he fled to EGYPT. Politically, Arafat was sympathetic to the Brotherhood, and his roots are found therein.

While in Egypt, Arafat was active in the Palestinian Students Union (PSU), a body set up in the early 1950s by Palestinian students residing in that country. The PSU brought together Palestinian students of various political persuasions, including Muslim Brothers, BA'ATHISTS, communists, and independents. In 1952 Arafat was elected president of the PSU on a platform of Palestinian identity and self-reliance. Through the PSU and his other activities in student politics, Arafat met KHALIL AL-WAZIR, SALAH KHALAF, and FAROUQ AL-QADDUMI, political colleagues with whom he later founded Fatah and who constituted its core leadership. Arafat's approach, even at this early stage and with so many pan-Arabist trends vying for support, was governed by his preference for independent Palestinian political and military action.

In early 1957, Arafat left Egypt after receiving an engineering degree from Cairo University and moved to KUWAIT in search of work. His first job was as an engineer for the Kuwaiti Public Works Department, and later he became owner of a profitable construction and contracting company. For nearly eight years Arafat remained in Kuwait, where, together with his Palestinian friends from Egypt, he organized Fatah, mobilizing Palestinian recruits and exercising leadership over the emerging underground network. He was never an advocate of overturning the existing Arab political order; rather, he sought independence from the Arab regimes for Palestinian political and military activity. By 1959, Fatah was producing an underground monthly Palestinian publication called *Filastinuna: Nida al-Hayat* (Our Palestine: The Call to Life), which helped win recruits for Fatah. Arafat also relied on support from Algeria and CHINA and on loyal colleagues, primarily Khalil al-Wazir.

Fatah organized itself in the winter of 1963 when the first FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE was formed. At the time, Arafat was only one of ten in the collective leadership and was in the minority with regard to tactics. Whereas he advocated immediate ARMED STRUGGLE against Israel, most of the others did not think the time was right. When, however, in 1964 Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR catalyzed the formation of the PLO at an Arab summit conference, the dynamics within Fatah changed. Arafat was able to persuade his colleagues that the only way to keep Fatah alive and to demonstrate that the Palestinians could play a real role in decisions related to their future was to embark on armed struggle without delay. In January 1965, Fatah launched its first raid into Israel. The operation was carried out under the name AL-'ASIFA (the Tempest), the title of the military arm

of Fatah. The raid was unsuccessful, but Arafat trumpeted it loudly and used it to raise money for Fatah and to recruit new members.

The reaction of key Arab governments to Fatah's raids was hostile because they feared Israeli reprisals and opposed Palestinian action that was not under their control. Thus, the skeptics inside Fatah attempted to persuade Arafat to cease operations, but he would not agree, and the Central Committee suspended his membership in Fatah and cut his access to funds. With the help of HANI AL-HASAN, who collected funds from Palestinian student organizations in West GERMANY and elsewhere, Arafat overcame his financial problems and thus kept the military option alive.

Arafat also needed an Arab state that would allow him to mount operations against Israel from its territory. His only realistic option was SYRIA. In the summer of 1966, Hafez al-Asad, then acting defense minister, agreed to permit Fatah to undertake cross-frontier forays, although with the caveat that the guerrillas had to accept whatever limitations Syria imposed. Arafat refused to abide by Syria's restraints, and in retaliation Asad imprisoned him for over a month in the summer of 1966. This episode marked the beginning of an intense personal enmity between Arafat and Asad.

Rise to Power

The period following the 1967 WAR saw the emergence of Arafat as the leader of the Palestinian national movement. The defeat and discrediting of the Arab regimes after the crushing blow delivered by Israel provided the opportunity for Arafat to implement his policies and led to a new wave of recruits. Arafat's strategy, summed up in the slogan "Revolution until Victory," did not, however, reflect an organized movement with an ideology aimed at changing the socioeconomic order but rather one dedicated to armed struggle until the total liberation of Palestine was achieved. But Arafat's militant policy immediately put him on a collision course with the governments of JORDAN and LEBANON. Initially, he focused on the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, moving secretly to the WEST BANK to determine whether conditions were ripe for the kind of guerrilla activities he had in mind. One of the first steps he took was to set up an organizational base in the old quarter of NABLUS, a West Bank town with a long history of nationalist struggle. But his attempts to organize a popular armed revolution failed because the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories were not ready for such a revolution. Additionally, the Israeli military government took extreme measures against suspected Fatah guerrillas and their sympathizers, including HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, imposing CURFEWS, and in many instances torturing them. Thus, by the early part of 1968, Arafat was compelled to flee the West Bank and turn east to JORDAN, where he began establishing operational bases for recruiting guerrillas and mounting hit-and-run raids against Israel.

In Jordan, Arafat focused on recruitment in the refugee camps, and by 1970 there were between 30,000 and 50,000 guerrillas in Jordan, most of whom were Fatah loyalists and therefore under the command of Arafat. One event in particular gave Arafat an opportunity to win large numbers of recruits. The 21 March 1968 battle in AL-KARAMA and the myths surrounding it proved a great enhancement to the guerrilla image. In the spring of 1968, the Central Council named Arafat as Fatah's spokesman. In recognition of Arafat's new authority, Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir included him as part of an Egyptian delegation that visited Moscow in the summer of 1968.

Fatah's soaring popularity provided other benefits for Arafat. Significantly, at the February 1969 session of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), Fatah and other Palestinian guerrilla groups used their new power and prestige to oust the old-guard politicians, and Arafat was elected chairman of the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, the supreme decisionmaking body in the PLO. As a result, the PLO was then under the control of the guerrilla organizations and under the leadership of Arafat.

In regard to PLO politics, Arafat's major challenge was to unite the diverse guerrilla groups under the PLO's umbrella, which he did by creating a broad front that incorporated the competing ideologies and organizations. As a result of Arafat's leadership, by the late 1960s, though he was never able to unite all the Palestinian groups, the PLO was a broad coalition of forces that acted as one body. His leadership was characterized by charisma, well-honed bargaining skills, and the judicious use of carrots and sticks—all in the service of maintaining consensus and unity in the organization.

Arafat convinced the PNC to adopt the core principle of Fatah: namely, the belief that the Palestinians had to articulate their own vision of

their political future and remain independent of the Arab regimes. Another key ingredient of the PLO strategy was to knit together DIASPORA Palestinians and mobilize them behind the struggle for national independence.

In 1970 Arafat attempted to prevent a military confrontation between the Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian regime; however, the activities of some groups, especially GEORGE HABASH's POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), eventually led to Jordan's expulsion of the PLO. Arafat was not entirely free of responsibility, because he gave explicit approval to spectacular demonstrations in Amman, Jordan, to protest the Egyptian and Jordanian acceptance of US secretary of state WILLIAM ROGERS's 1970 peace plan, which called for the implementation of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 of November 1967. The combined actions of the resistance groups threatened the Hashemite monarchy, and, in a bloody civil war known as BLACK SEPTEMBER, the Palestinians were defeated. Arafat was forced to flee Jordan disguised in a Kuwaiti robe given to him by the crown prince of KUWAIT.

The Palestinian guerrillas who survived the Black September conflict left Jordan for Jabal al Shaykh (Mount Hermon) in Syria and from there went to LEBANON. Arafat's legitimacy after the Jordanian disaster was in question, and he was not beyond playing the TERRORISM card to increase his stature. The most striking example of the terror weapon was Arafat's tolerance for or endorsement of the sensational terrorist activities of the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION, a Fatah offshoot.

Arafat remained in Lebanon between 1970 and 1982, where he organized Arab and international support for the PLO. In October 1974, the Rabat Arab Summit of Arab heads of state recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In November of the same year, the UN General Assembly granted the PLO observer status, and it later became a member of the nonaligned movement and of the Conference of Islamic States. By the end of the 1970s, more than 100 countries worldwide recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, with Arafat always playing the leading role in its diplomatic activities. While in Beirut, Arafat continuously consulted with his two senior colleagues, Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) and Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), but regardless of the issue or the argument, Arafat always had the final say. During the years in Lebanon, Arafat mastered the art of consensus building, but he also tolerated corruption and selected advisers on the basis of loyalty rather than merit. Over the years, patronage and tolerance of corruption proved to be among Arafat's principal instruments of political control and co-optation.

From Armed Struggle to Diplomacy

In the first decade of the post–1967 War era, Arafat made two of the most important decisions of his life—decisions that represented the first phase of an evolution toward pragmatism in his attitude toward Israel. One was his endorsement in mid-1968 of the idea of a secular democratic state in Palestine in which all citizens—Jewish, Christian, and Muslim—would live together on the principles of nonsectarian democracy, equality, and mutual respect. The second decision was his adoption of a policy of "stages" *(marhaliyya):* establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as an interim solution pending the realization of the PLO objective of creating a secular democratic state. Although the policy of stages, first introduced in the twelfth PNC of June 1974, was typically ambiguous with respect to ultimate PLO goals, it represented the first phase in the movement away from the earlier "Revolution until Victory" strategy to one that employed diplomatic as well as military means to achieve less ambitious goals. To show his readiness for a negotiated settlement, in the autumn of 1973 Arafat sent signals both to the UNITED STATES and to Israel through two senior aides, Dr. SA'ID HAMAMI, the PLO representative in London, and Dr. ISAM SARTAWI, a leading Palestinian activist. These signals, however, did not bring about a change in the position of the US or Israeli governments, both of which continued to reject the idea of dealing with the PLO.

Arafat's moderation put him at odds with a number of radical Palestinian organizations, particularly George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In the mid-1970s, Habash spearheaded the formation of the REJECTION FRONT to challenge Arafat's policy of accommodation with Israel. Arafat prevailed, primarily because of his charisma and the dominance of Fatah within the PLO. By the end of the 1970s, the Rejection Front was in disarray, divided by internal differences and by external Arab states who

favored Arafat's preference for a diplomatic settlement.

In the Lebanese Quagmire

The civil war that engulfed Lebanon in 1975 was perhaps Arafat's greatest challenge in the second half of the 1970s. Arafat found himself caught between the pressures of moderate Palestinians who wanted him to take a neutral stand and radical Palestinians who wanted Fatah to intervene in the internecine conflict. In the end, Arafat threw his weight behind the Lebanese Muslim and leftist alliance, thus shifting the balance in favor of the leftist forces in Lebanon. As a result, Syria, which traditionally had backed Fatah and the Lebanese left, intervened in Lebanon in the summer of 1976, launching an offensive against the Palestinian-leftist alliance, partly to prevent it from toppling the existing Lebanese regime and thus giving Israel a pretext for intervention but partly also to control the PLO and the Lebanese left. In June 1976, during the Palestinian-Syrian confrontation, right-wing Lebanese militias unleashed a massive assault against the Palestinian refugee camps at Tal al Za'tar and Jisr al-Basha. After a brutal siege that lasted for nearly two months and resulted in the killing of at least 1,500 camp residents, Tal al Za'tar fell, with the Syrian army sitting idle on the hilltops surrounding it. In these circumstances, Arafat's forces could do little to save the camp, which became a symbol of horror visited on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. By October 1976, Arafat's military encounter with the Syrian forces in Lebanon ended through the efforts of Arab summits held in Riyadh and Cairo aimed explicitly at terminating the Lebanese civil war.

Despite the disastrous experience in the civil war, Arafat was not deterred from his goal of consolidating the PLO's institutional presence in Lebanon. Under his leadership, the PLO created a highly developed infrastructure that incorporated social, educational, economic, and informational institutions responsible for dealing with the daily concerns of the Palestinian people in exile. Arafat was also instrumental in transforming the PLO fighters into a standing army outfitted with heavy weapons provided by the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc, as well as by Egypt, Syria, and a number of other Arab countries. Arafat also continued his pursuit of a diplomatic settlement with Israel. He welcomed Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev's peace proposal of February 1981, which called for a comprehensive peace, a Palestinian state, and security guarantees for all states in the region, including Israel. Arafat also welcomed the August 1981 peace plan of Saudi crown prince Fahd (later King Fahd), who proposed an eight-point peace plan that called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and implicitly recognized Israel within its pre-1967 borders.

The event that created the greatest dilemma for Arafat and the PLO was the 1978 Camp David agreement, which culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979. Arafat and the PLO strongly opposed the treaty because its only reference to the Palestinians was in a separate and unbinding document that called for limited autonomy for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and also because it removed Egypt from the Arab confrontation front, weakening the Palestinians by shifting the balance of power more heavily in favor of Israel. Indeed, the treaty made it possible for Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982 without concern about rear-guard action by Egypt, and the invasion resulted in the destruction of the entire PLO infrastructure in the country.

At the height of the Lebanon War, Arafat led the defense of Beirut during an Israeli siege of eighty-eight days. Throughout the siege, Arafat gathered about himself the secretaries-general of the non-Fatah guerrilla groups to help him make critical decisions, including the most painful and difficult one of August 1982: to evacuate Beirut. Arafat and his Palestinian colleagues felt they had no alternative but to leave the Lebanese capital. The resources at their disposal were no match for those of the Israeli military. Thus, by 1 September 1982, Arafat had led the evacuation of some 10,000 Palestinian fighters from Beirut to Yemen, Sudan, and elsewhere in the Arab world. Arafat himself went to Tunis, where he set up new headquarters with other senior Fatah officials.

Aftermath of the Lebanon War

After the Lebanon War, Arafat experienced several conflicts, some internal to the PLO and another specifically with Syria. Arafat was critical of what he and other senior PLO officials considered insufficient Syrian participation in the Lebanon battles. As Syria moved to capitalize on the dissension within PLO ranks, Arafat attempted to counter Damascus's influence and maintain the PLO's independence by improving the organization's

relations with Egypt, Jordan, and SAUDI ARABIA. These initiatives in turn provoked fears in Damascus that it might be left out of future diplomatic steps. Many pro-Syrian PLO leaders, including NIMR SALIH, a cofounder of Fatah and a member of its Central Committee, expressed similar concerns, arguing that Arafat might strike a deal with Israel in cooperation with Jordan, a country whose government the Syrians distrusted.

Against this background and with Syrian backing, FATAH dissidents in Lebanon in May 1983 rebelled against Arafat, accusing him of failing to make the necessary military preparations during the Israeli invasion and subsequently appointing incompetent cronies to high-level military positions. One month later, the Syrian government expelled Arafat from Damascus. This stiffened Arafat's resolve to assert PLO independence vis-à-vis Syria and to discredit the pro-Syrian dissidents who had rebelled against him. In December 1983, after regrouping his supporters in Lebanon, Arafat traveled in disguise to Tripoli, Lebanon, via Cyprus, but he was outgunned by the Fatah dissidents who enjoyed Syrian support, and he left Tripoli defeated and humiliated in December 1983.

In the aftermath of these events, Arafat revised his diplomatic strategy in the hope of achieving a breakthrough with Israel. The essence of the new strategy was rapprochement with Egypt and Jordan, a diplomatic process that intensified the animosity between Arafat and Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad and between Fatah and leftist factions within the PLO. On his forced departure from Tripoli, Arafat stopped in Egypt, where he met with Egyptian president Husni Mubarak. This was Arafat's first visit there since 1977, when Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat had embarked on peace with Israel. But, from Arafat's perspective, the rapprochement made sense. Egypt had supported Arafat during 1982 and 1983, and, strategically, the initiative toward Egypt was consistent with Arafat's desire to formulate a common peace strategy with Jordan's King Husayn, a strategy aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement with Israel.

The Jordanian component of Arafat's new strategy was part of his effort to move the PLO toward greater pragmatism, a path that had begun with his acceptance of the September 1982 FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE. In part, the strategy was intended as a concession to both Israel and the United States, given King Husayn's acceptability to the two governments as a negotiating partner. In line with his efforts to strengthen ties with Jordan, Arafat focused on achieving the sanction of popular legitimacy for a new relationship with King Husayn. Toward that end, Arafat attempted to work within the framework of the PNC, holding the November 1984 seventeenth session in Amman. In this session, attended almost exclusively by Fatah loyalists, the PNC called for an independent Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan, a proposal denounced by virtually every other Palestinian faction. Moreover, although initially promising, the Jordanian dimension did not yield the desired result; in February 1986, King Husayn abrogated the 1985 AMMAN AGREEMENT, which had called for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in peace talks.

Arafat's new political direction was unacceptable to most groups within the PLO. The Fatah rebels and several small factions formed the NATIONAL ALLIANCE, while the PFLP and NAYIF HAWATIMA'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP) coalesced in the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, both of which openly challenged Arafat. A relationship with Egypt, which was unacceptable because of Cairo's treaty with Israel, and reconciliation with Jordan were unthinkable given the memories of Black September.

Polarization of Palestinians

A major consequence, then, of the 1982 Lebanon War was the polarization of Palestinian politics. On one side stood Arafat and the core group in the Fatah Central Committee; on the other stood the anti-Arafat Fatah rebels and their supporters from other Palestinian groups backed by Syria. Indeed, a new anti-Arafat coalition emerged on 25 March 1985 when former PNC speaker Khalid al-Fahum announced from Damascus the formation of the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF), which included the National Alliance, the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT, and PFLP. In its founding statement, the PNSF condemned the Amman Agreement and called for "action to topple the trend of deviation and relinquishment" within the PLO.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the seeds of reconciliation were being sown. Arafat's initial response to the rebellion in PLO ranks was to attempt to use his enormous and exclusive financial control to bring fractious groups back to the fold. For a time, he abandoned the principle of

consensus in favor of majority rule, and he began the process of concentrating decisionmaking powers in his hands alone. More important, however, were the events on the ground that ultimately led the factions to return to the unity and independence of the PLO umbrella. For one, the Syrian-sponsored Amal (a political party and militia) "CAMPS' WAR" between 1985 and 1987, which claimed more than 2,500 lives, forged a practical unity among Fatah, the DFLP, and PFLP in defending the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and made a vital psychological contribution toward the reunification of the PLO. Both the DFLP and PFLP criticized Syrian policy for sponsoring Amal, and, as the Palestinian civil war in Lebanon deteriorated, these and other groups became disillusioned with Syria's part in the killing.

Israel provided another impetus for reunification. In the Occupied Territories, social and political conditions deteriorated through the 1980s. The introduction by Israel of what it termed an "iron fist" policy in August 1985; the growth of Palestinian protests; and the acceleration of arrests, detentions, DEPORTATION, use of lethal force, and other Israeli countermeasures over the next two years underlined the practical need for overall Palestinian political unity.

After Jordan suspended the Amman Agreement and indirectly called on Palestinians to produce an alternative political leadership, Jordan encouraged another rebellion against Arafat's leadership from within Fatah, this time by former head of Fatah military intelligence Colonel 'ATTALLAH 'ATTALLAH. King Husayn also made revisions in the structure of the Jordanian parliament (increasing the number of West Bank seats) and to Jordan's electoral law. When Fatah criticized these moves as contrary to the PLO's status as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, Jordan closed all Fatah offices in the country and deported a number of cadres (including Khalil al-Wazir).

By the fall of 1986, such developments, coupled with external mediation, led to active discussions between the major Palestinian groups on convening a new session of the PNC. In March, Fatah, the PFLP, DFLP, PALESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY (for the first time permitted to join the PLO), and ARAB LIBERATION FRONT agreed in Tunis to convene a meeting of the PNC the following month. On 20 April 1987, the eighteenth session of the Palestine National Council opened in Algiers with the participation of all groups except SA'IQA, the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT, and the PFLP GENERAL COMMAND. Political differences remained, but Arafat pulled the factions together behind a political platform that explicitly adopted the TWO-STATE SOLUTION and negotiations as the means to achieve it, thus laying the foundation for the international diplomacy he pursued over the next six years, culminating in the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

After he was forced to leave Beirut, Arafat's operational base was TUNIS. Most importantly, however, in the post-Lebanon era Arafat gradually shifted his focus from DIASPORA Palestinians, whose main aspiration was to return to those parts of Palestine that had been seized by Israel in 1948, to Gaza and West Bank Palestinians, whose overriding priority was ending the Israeli OCCUPATION and establishing a ministate in the Occupied Territories. His new strategy thus put him on the defensive vis-à-vis Diaspora Palestinians, but it had broad support among the Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank.

Despite the many conflicts after 1982, several factors sustained Arafat, enabling him to stay at the helm as the symbol of Palestinian nationalism. The Palestinians needed a leader, and Arafat's charisma, revolutionary past, and tactical skills helped him maintain his primacy within the PLO leadership. Besides evading the long arm of the Israeli MOSSAD and other hostile intelligence services, Arafat survived an Israeli air raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis in October 1985 and a plane crash in the Libyan desert in April 1992.

Change in Strategy

The INTIFADA, which broke out in December 1987, changed the political equation again and catapulted Arafat to the forefront of regional and international politics. Consequently, Arafat followed a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, he moved to assume ownership by the PLO of the Intifada. In this context, Israel assassinated Arafat's closest associate, Khalil al-Wazir, in his Tunisian home on 16 April 1988. The PLO outside the West Bank and Gaza provided the strategic framework for the resistance in the Occupied Territories, while grassroots activists in the territories coordinated the day-to-day activities of the uprising. These activists,

represented by the United National Leadership of the Uprising, accepted Arafat's leadership but often preferred operational independence. On the other hand, Arafat adopted a more moderate political program as outlined at the eighteenth PNC, hoping to set the stage for a dialogue with the United States as a means to negotiate with Israel.

In this regard, a number of steps stand out as significant aspects of Arafat's strategy. In November 1988, he mobilized all the resources at his disposal to convince the nineteenth PNC, still united, to adopt the Palestinian DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Together with the political program that accompanied it, the declaration explicitly spelled out the principle of Palestinian statehood, whose source of legitimacy was the UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION RESOLUTION 181 (II) OF 1947. This principle, as understood by Arafat in 1988, implied a peaceful settlement with an Israel contained within its pre-1967 borders and a Palestinian state alongside it. On 13 December 1988, the UN General Assembly convened a special session in Geneva to hear Arafat's address after the US State Department had refused him a visa the previous month and thus prevented him from addressing the General Assembly at the UN headquarters in New York.

The day after his speech in Geneva, Arafat stated more explicitly his acceptance of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 and reaffirmed his renunciation of TERRORISM and his acceptance of the *right* of Israel to exist. On the same day, the US government authorized the opening of a "substantive dialogue" with the PLO, which turned out to be rather insubstantive but nevertheless fulfilled one of Arafat's long-held objectives. By the end of the 1980s, Arafat's leadership of the PLO was reconsolidated. His acceptance of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, not as a transitional stage but as a final goal, was now explicit and complete. The "Revolution until Victory" slogan was a thing of the past.

But Arafat's renewed prestige soon dissipated. When Iraq seized KUWAIT on 2 August 1990, Arafat supported Iraq, which led to his and the PLO's isolation in Arab and international politics, loss of financial support, the dispossession of virtually the entire Palestinian community in Kuwait—some 400,000 persons—and ultimately the fiasco of Oslo for Arafat. Although there were reasons for Arafat's decision on Iraq, this was a test of leadership that he failed.

Peace Process

When the October 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE began under the administration of US president GEORGE H. W. BUSH, Arafat's and the PLO's ability to influence events was at its nadir. The PLO was excluded from the conference, and Palestinian participants were vetted by Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR, who stipulated that delegates could only come from the West Bank and Gaza—not from Jerusalem and not from the Diaspora—and could not have any affiliation with the PLO, and then could only appear in a joint delegation with Jordan. Nevertheless, Arafat attempted to micromanage from his headquarters in Tunis the delegates' negotiations with Israel.

When secret Israeli-PLO talks commenced in NORWAY in 1993, Arafat directed the Palestinian team that conducted the negotiations. The DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), the foundation of the OSLO ACCORDS, was approved by Arafat and consummated on the White House lawn when he shook hands with Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN. Portrayed by some as a watershed and an unprecedented breakthrough in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and conceived at the nadir of Arafat's and the PLO's power, the Oslo Accords contained the seeds of the destruction of any hope for Palestinian self-determination in a viable, independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. Had Arafat been less anxious to redeem himself, he might have sought expert examination of the document before signing on. What is more, the DOP in effect negated the right of return for the REFUGEES, the very fodder of all Arafat's previous canons. Indeed, the Diaspora was sacrificed on the altar of Arafat's return to Palestine.

Palestinian National Authority

The final phase of Yasir Arafat's leadership of Palestinian politics was as president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, to which he was elected by hopeful residents of the Occupied Territories. The PNA institutions that Arafat helped create were dominated by his trusted followers. Arafat continued to put a particularly high premium on political loyalty, and the echelons from among whom he filled senior PNA positions were largely Fatah people loyal to him. Loyalty also determined the selection process. Thus the best qualified and most capable Palestini-

ans did not reach the top political and administrative posts. Moreover, many of Arafat's appointees were corrupt. Additionally, to an unprecedented degree, Arafat concentrated power in his own hands, and he used various methods of political and economic control as well as outright repression of dissent to maintain a tight grip on every aspect of PNA affairs. Further, Arafat tolerated corrupt practices and human rights violations in the areas that came under his control. As a result, the question of political reform became a top priority for Palestinian intellectuals and political activists in the Occupied Territories.

In the latter part of the 1990s, the dream of creating an independent Palestinian state was still far from being realized. The status of Palestinian refugees was clearly not going to be resolved in a manner favorable to the refugees. The Palestinian economy deteriorated precipitously during the Oslo years, primarily as a result of Israeli-imposed CLOSURE of the West Bank and Gaza, but Arafat, bound by the Oslo Accords, was impotent to help his people. Worse, Israeli SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK were expanding. Perhaps Arafat's single most important act of leadership in the context of Oslo was his refusal to capitulate to President Clinton and Prime Minister EHUD BARAK at the July 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT. BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER would have sealed the fate of the Palestinians, banished them from international concern, and left unfulfilled even their most minimal objectives.

By March 2002, the OSLO PROCESS was finished, Israel had reoccupied the West Bank and Gaza, and Arafat was under virtual house arrest at his compound in Ramallah, which was almost totally destroyed and encircled by Israeli forces. Israeli security sources claimed that Palestinians who carried out suicide attacks were hiding in Arafat's compound, and the Israeli army periodically cut off water and electricity to the compound. In September 2002, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1435, in which it demanded that Israel immediately cease measures in and around Ramallah, "including the destruction of Palestinian civilian and security infrastructure." Yet, as of late 2004, Arafat continued to be under total lockdown by the Israeli military.

On 24 June 2002, US president GEORGE W. BUSH declared that peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis required a new and different Palestinian leadership, and absent that, the United States would not support the establishment of a Palestinian state. Bush called on the Palestinian people to elect "new leaders who are not compromised by terror" and to build democratic institutions capable of reaching new security arrangements with their neighbors. On 30 June 2002, US secretary of state COLIN POWELL said on ABC's *This Week* that the US government did not think that Arafat could use his leadership position and his moral authority to end terror and implement the reform measures outlined in the Bush speech.

On several occasions, Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON recommended to his security cabinet that Arafat be expelled, and several highly placed Israeli officials called for his assassination. To pursue its stated policy of marginalizing and ultimately replacing Arafat, the Bush administration sent Assistant Secretary of State William Burns to Europe as well as to Arab countries. One of the principal stated aims of Burns's visits was to convince US allies in Europe and the Arab world to find a way that would allow the Palestinian people to replace Arafat and reform their political and economic institutions.

Like Israel, the Bush administration continued to blame Arafat for the failure of Camp David (11–14 July 2000), the AL-AQSA INTIFADA (28 September 2000), and the US-sponsored efforts to stop the violence between Israelis and Palestinians, including the GEORGE J. MITCHELL plan (30 April 2001), the GEORGE TENET plan (13 June 2001), and the ROAD MAP (30 April 2003).

On 15 April 2004, President Bush gave a major speech that tilted far in the direction of Ariel Sharon's policies, which the Sharon government, not unreasonably, felt gave it a "green light" to do what it wished regarding Arafat and the Palestinians, including the ASSASSINATION of Palestinian leaders. Arafat now found himself under intense pressure from several directions. Besides the US and Israeli efforts to render him irrelevant, there was intense Palestinian pressure for political and economic reform and for an end to cronyism, nepotism, and corruption. Even Fatah, Arafat's traditional power base, was now split, and new Fatah factions were challenging Arafat and the OLD GUARD for control of the movement. These included a group led by MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, a security chief who wielded a relatively significant degree of power in Gaza and viewed himself as a legitimate successor of Arafat. Another group consisted of the

AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, originally organized by Arafat but now operating independently and unwilling to submit to Arafat's control. Mainstream Fatah was also becoming problematic for Arafat. As a consequence of Oslo, it had lost a substantial degree of its power, and its influence over Palestinian society and politics was significantly decreased. Thus individuals and small cliques were taking it upon themselves to establish power bases and initiate action. Finally, Arafat had to contend with HAMAS; although Hamas did not publicly challenge Arafat's authority, its campaign of SUICIDE BOMBINGS gave Sharon and the Bush administration a credible pretext that enabled them to put the blame for the suicide attacks on Arafat himself.

Totally isolated and neutralized by a hostile Israel and an antagonistic US administration, there was little prospect for Arafat to regain the international credentials and the mandate that had enabled him to be, for roughly seven years, a quasi-partner in the peace process. Indeed, Arafat's political future as well as his ability to fulfill the national demands of the Palestinians seemed to lie less in his hands than in the hands of much more powerful players in Washington and Tel Aviv.

Yasir Arafat died on 11 November 2004 at the age of seventy-five. Though in his final days he was taken to a Paris hospital for treatment, the cause of his death has never been identified. Many speculate that he was poisoned, but to date no proof has emerged.

It is difficult to sum up the life of such a man. It was filled with contrasts: from a man in a military cell in Kuwait advocating armed resistance to a diplomat at the United Nations who was respected on the international scene; from a long and bitter war with Israel to sharing of the Nobel Peace Prize with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister SHIMON PERES; from marriage to the Palestine cause to marriage in 1991 to Suha al-Tawil (1963–), an urbane Christian Palestinian woman who was almost thirty-five years his junior and with whom he had a daughter, Zahwa, in 1995. It is still possible to ask, "Who was Yasir Arafat?" He was a Palestinian patriot in an age of pan-Arabism; a dreamer who wanted to liberate all of Palestine when the Arab states, whose support he needed, were looking for ways to reach a compromise settlement with Israel; a pragmatist in a period during which the forces of radicalism were on the rise; and an autocrat in a society with democratic aspirations. This, however, does not begin to scratch the surface.

Arafat's greatest personal success was catalyzing the reemergence of Palestinian nationalism and leading the nationalist movement for some thirty-five years. Indeed, Yasir Arafat was *the* symbol of Palestinian nationalism, and no one else ever came near that status. That he was ultimately unsuccessful is due more to the nature and power of his enemy and its backer than to his own personal failings.

In conclusion, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, two renowned historians and diplomats, had the following to say about Arafat in May 2007: "Yasir Arafat took it [the Palestinian National Movement] over and molded it in his image over four decades ago. . . . Arafat achieved what, before him, was the stuff of unachievable dreams and after him, has become the object of wistful nostalgia: the identification of man and nation; the transcendence of party politics; and the expression of a tacit, unspoken consensus.

"Competing organizations, leftist and Islamist in particular, challenged him. He faced opposition and dissent within his own Fatah. One after another, Arab countries sought to bend the nationalist movement to their will. But by dint of hard work, personal charisma, and political acumen, and assisted in no small measure by the steady accumulation and astute use of arms and funds, Arafat managed to control Fatah, co-opt the leftists, keep the Islamists at bay and the Arab states at arm's length.

"Arafat never bothered with a detailed program. He trusted his instincts and inclinations, that disputed and contested as they were, . . . became those of the national movement as a whole. As both leader of the national movement and father of the political compromise, he could straddle two seemingly incompatible worlds, that of the revolutionary and that of the statesman, and embody both steadfast commitment to the original struggle of 1948 and pragmatic acceptance of a two state solution. On core issues, what he did mattered far more than what he said. Accused of indecisiveness and passivity, Arafat acted resolutely when he believed it necessary and when he saw fit."

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—Muhammad Muslih

Archaeology

Archaeology is not merely a decorative thread in the pattern of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it has contributed significantly to that pattern and in the process has itself been patterned by the conflict. As throughout Asia and Africa, archaeology in Palestine originated with the spread of European influence into the OTTOMAN EMPIRE. In the nineteenth century, archaeology was done by Europeans, enabled by European officials (frequently archaeologist and political official were one and the same), and the results were published and displayed for European readers and viewers.

Thus from the outset, archaeology was a subset of imperialism, linked to the politics of power. As a component of cultural imperialism, archaeology has shared in the cycle of conflict running from the age of empire through the wars of independence to the assertion of cultural self-sufficiency and local, non-European identity. The role of archaeology changed with the political fortunes of Palestine, through the late Ottoman era to the BRITISH MANDATE, Israeli independence, Jordanian and Egyptian control of the WEST BANK and GAZA, the Israeli OCCUPATION, and the post-Oslo Palestinian National Authority. During this same time the theory and practice of archaeology changed dramatically worldwide as the discipline matured. However, what sites were studied, what and how one dug, and what was saved and displayed were all distinctively shaped by the circumstances of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus the history of archaeology in Palestine can be traced through local labels—imperial, biblical, Israeli, Syro-Palestinian, and Palestinian—as well as through the theoretical cycle of international academic archaeology.

Late Ottoman Era, 1830–1921

Holy Land Travelers and Their Art. Archaeology in Palestine began with the "rediscovery" of the Holy Land by European travelers in the nineteenth century as Europe extended its influence into the Ottoman Empire. These travelers came with the blessings of their governments and

depicted Palestine's Christian historical sites for believers back home.

Among the most impressive and popular are the lithographs of David Roberts, produced from sketches made during an extensive tour of the Holy Land in 1838–1839. His art portrayed a landscape of exotic antiquities, always framed by colorfully dressed native Arabs lounging languidly at the ruins. In his travel diary he described the locations he visited in terms of biblical toponyms, with scarcely any reference to the modern geographic, cultural, and social contexts of the sites he was sketching. The result, amplified by his romantic style, is a dream world of a timeless biblical and exotic past disconnected from the present. The living people of the nineteenth century are virtually never mentioned in the diary. In his artistic vision of Palestine they exist only as props in his "biblical" landscapes.

Similarly, Christian missionaries' reports on the colorful costumes of Palestinian villagers served mainly to help congregations back home visualize how the contemporaries of Moses and Jesus might have looked. Serious ethnological study of Palestinian culture did not begin until the Mandate era. However even foundational research like Hilma Granqvist's 1920s study of wedding customs in a Palestinian village was done then in the context of biblical archaeology, for the express purpose of learning about the women of the Old Testament.

This incipient biblical archaeology was closely linked to imperial designs. An example is Lieutenant William Francis Lynch's 1848 expedition to the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, which was authorized by US president James Polk. Lynch's goals were simultaneously a scientific exploration of the biblical landscape, imperial US naval exercises down the Jordan and across the Dead Sea, and an economic expansion of US cotton markets. The Palestinians inhabiting the land were portrayed as uncouth barbarians. Lynch's publication of his exotic biblical-imperial adventure became as popular in the United States as Roberts's art was in Europe.

This linkage of biblical heritage and imperial destiny became universal in the West, as Dutch theologian Abraham Kuyper's 1905–1906 visit to the Holy Land illustrates. He noted that "the landscape, now in ruined ugliness and awaiting development by European Jewish and Christian colonists, is nevertheless testimony to its Bible-era splendor, only a dim reflection of God's spiritual promises and deeds." In the bright light of God's holiness that is manifested in biblical texts, the actual history of the people of Palestine becomes insignificant to Kuyper. He contrasts the present natives—without gumption and guilty of the ruin of the land—with the energetic population of biblical Israel that, with God's blessing, made Palestine a paradise of fertility.

Early Archaeology in Palestine. In the late nineteenth century, Western archaeological societies began working in the area, among them the British Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) in 1865 and the American Palestine Exploration Society in 1870 (the forerunner of the American Schools of Oriental Research founded in 1900). The foundational work of the PEF can serve as a model for their activities.

After a meticulous archaeological cartography and survey (1872–1878), in 1890 the PEF initiated scientific field excavations at Tell el-Hesi/Lachish, where Sir Flinders Petrie pioneered the ceramic typology of Palestine. The surveyors, Claude Conder and Herbert Kitchener, produced *The Survey of Western Palestine,* and their maps played key roles in the British defeat of the Ottoman imperial armies of the Levant and served to establish the Palestine Mandate boundary in 1921.

Conder and Kitchener's comprehensive survey described functioning settlements under "Topography," listing the settlements as containing this many stone houses and that many mud ones. When available, population statistics were given in terms of religious affiliation (Muslim, Druze, Christian, or Jewish) rather than as Palestinian or Arab, even though the surveyors called the map region "Palestine" and the people spoke Arabic. Under "Ancient sites" and "Archaeology," mostly pre-Islamic sites were subdivided as "Biblical" and "Non-biblical," with an obvious focus on biblical topography.

As was true everywhere, military engineers engaged in meticulous mapping to serve the political and cultural purposes of the empire. In this case, these explorations were not "discovery" but "recovery"—the detailed restoration in maps of the biblical landscape already known in other ways among English Christians. From the outset archaeology relegated Palestine's Arab population to historical, cultural, and political oblivion. As the land was abstracted in art and maps, so its population was removed from reality. The peasants became rustic fossils, exemplars but not inheritors of bibli-

cal culture, a people without a history of their own but caught between other histories: that of the biblical past and that of the Christian imperial present. As Nadia Abu el-Haj has explained it, archaeology created the impression that the real knowledge of Palestine, recovered by the "science" of archaeology, lay buried below the surface. Though this landscape was still called "Palestine," in the archaeological imagination it was not the land of the living Palestinians but of past biblical and nonbiblical peoples. This stereotype had a long life.

Period of the British Mandate, 1921–1947

Biblical Archaeology. During the Palestine Mandate under British political oversight, biblical archaeology flourished under the auspices of various foreign institutes but was largely influenced by the activities of the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR) and the brilliant scholarship of W. F. Albright. From 1928 to 1936 Albright excavated a number of Palestinian tells (mounds composed of the remains of successive settlements), such as Tell Beit Mirsim southwest of HEBRON, to delineate the history of the biblical Israelites from that of the ancient Canaanites. Using rigorous analysis he refined the typology of pottery so that it was presumed possible to identify sites as Israelite based on the presence of "Israelite" pottery in the strata. This served to confirm "scientifically" the "essential historicity" of Israel that Christians had previously accepted on faith from the Bible.

In his own era Albright oversaw and encouraged the excavation of major sites, including Tell el-Ful (Gibeah) and Tell Balatah (Shechem/Nablus), which became benchmarks in the superimposition of a biblical landscape on the map of Palestine. Over two generations of scholars—Americans beginning with Nelson Glueck and Israelis beginning with Eliezer Sukenik—followed his lead, which became known as the Albright School. There was scarcely a Palestinian among them.

Considering the entire geographic sphere of southwest Asia as the realm of "biblical" archaeology, Albright published a comprehensive synthesis, *From the Stone Age to Christianity,* in 1940. In a classic orientalist vein, he saw as the engine of history an "organismic" evolution from "undifferentiated to differentiated cultures" in a series of stages culminating in the "Progressive World Sweep of the West." According to Albright's perspective, the biblical stage, that is, the archaeological distinctiveness and cultural superiority of the Israelites, provided an unflinching rationale for the defeat and extermination of the Canaanites—an archaeologically demonstrated survival of the fittest. The book undoubtedly helped enshrine the centrality of ancient Israel's history among Western secular Christian and Judaic intellectuals. It has also fed anti-Palestinian biases in the dominant Western evaluation, which saw their "failure" against the Israeli armies as analogous to that of the ancient Canaanites.

Local Archaeology. The articles of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1921 stipulated and defined British authority over the antiquities of Palestine. Although the British civil administration ensured equal representation of Jews and Palestinians in its new Department of Antiquities and set up the British School of Archaeology in JERUSALEM for creating a pool of experienced local archaeologists, in over twenty-five years of Mandate rule no formal training was given to Palestinian Arabs. This left them completely unprepared for the development of a local Palestinian archaeology at the end of the Mandate.

On the other hand, when the League of Nations awarded Palestine to Britain in 1921, the Jewish Palestine Exploration Society (JPES), founded in 1914, was ready to begin its own program of excavations. In 1928 Eliezer Sukenik, trained and educated under the patronage of Albright and ASOR, became the first head of the Department of Archaeology at Hebrew University. Thus, the JEWISH AGENCY had a structure and a functioning archaeology program in place when the British left in 1948.

Ironically, the original Zionist movement ignored archaeology, preferring a more nationalist-secular identification of a modern Jewish state rather than the biblical archaeology mode of Western Christians. That attitude began to change during the Mandate for three reasons. First, Albright's research-based scheme of cultural evolution was not narrowly sectarian and could lend itself to a more secular-nationalist belief structure. Second, as the new Jewish immigrants settled into their agricultural labors, their own identity with the land, merely abstract in earlier ZIONISM, became tangible. Third, JPES programs brought together these first two factors in its excavations—for example, the discovery of Byzantine-era synagogues and the Hebraization/Judaization of

place-names, which were used in preparation of a Hebrew map of the land. Thus the Land of Palestine, or the Holy Land, became Eretz Yisrael in the minds of the Jewish settlers, and the results of biblical archaeology were borrowed for the construction of modern Israel's national epic.

Israeli Statehood and Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian Authority over the Antiquities of Palestine, 1947–1967

The Destroyed Villages. After the expulsion and flight of some 750,000 Palestinians in the 1948 WAR, approximately 400 vacated villages and towns, mostly in the coastal plain and the Galilee, were destroyed by Israel. Since the 1980s these ruins, often the top stratum in a deep cultural sequence of habitation, have been the subject of an archaeological study and mapping project by Palestinian geographers and the Documentation Center of Birzeit University.

Though some villages have disappeared completely under plowed soil and others have Israeli SETTLEMENTS built over them, many remain as robbed-out ruins in overgrown wooded areas; the quadrated-limestone wall-faces were quarried for reuse in neighboring Israeli settlements. Some, like the former Palestinian village of 'Amwas (ancient Emmaus), have been recycled into parks for Israeli picnickers. 'Amwas was transformed into Canada Park—in honor of the Canadian donors—by planting over the site with pine trees and placing picnic tables at the old village spring. Although nothing in the park signage indicates that it was once 'Amwas, the retainer walls used to groom the slopes are made of the limestone masonry that once served as faces for the village house-walls and originally adorned the Roman and Byzantine-era buildings of the ancient town of Emmaus. In season, ripe clusters of grapes protrude from the pines, and Sabr cacti poke through the needle-covered ground, a living stratum of 'Amwas's agricultural life.

Creating the Map of Israel. To create an official national map, Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION appointed cartography committees in 1949 to produce names for all map locations and features. From the outset it was understood that the landscape would be labeled with Hebrew names only, which would recall or emulate the biblical toponymy as much as possible. The basic data available were the old PEF cartography of Conder and Kitchener, which had been made for the express purpose of recording the archaeological landscape of Palestine. Already used for British field strategy in World War I, this map now became a nation-building instrument.

The process of replacing the Arab names, described by both MERON BENVENISTI and Nadia Abu el-Haj, was done according to several criteria: biblical names where sites could be identified with the biblical text, translation of Arab names into Hebrew, reproduction of the sounds of the Arab name in Hebrew, and commemoration of a modern event or person. Much of this was arbitrary, even for the selection of biblical site names, because in most instances the archaeological information for ancient site names was—and still is—insufficient or absent. Though the resulting map has the ring of biblical geography, it is actually misleading, especially to Jewish and Christian Holy Land pilgrims from overseas.

The erasure of the traditional Arab names from the maps not only destroyed their potential archaeological value but also the memory of Palestinian-Arab connections with the land. Although the naming committees discussed the implications of that, they saw the landscape of the new Israel as directly connected to that of ancient Israel and therefore considered the Arab names irrelevant. Besides, most sites under discussion were now empty of Arabs because of the dispossession of some 750,000 Palestinians in 1948. In the north and west of the country, this entailed mostly the destroyed villages. In the south,however—the Negev and Arabah—the mostly BEDOUIN Arab population was seen in the popular settler anthropology of the time not merely as disconnected from the land by its nomadic culture but as having *rejected* the land by not settling on it as agriculturalists.

Archaeology and Nationalism. After independence, the nation of newcomers still in search of symbols latched onto archaeology with such passion that it became the national pastime for several decades. Israeli archaeologists of this period became national heroes, with academic careers embedded in national politics, their exploits emulated as a national sport, and the sites they excavated enshrined in the national identity. Thus archaeology matured at one level as an academic discipline in the Israeli universities but at another level as the shaper of the modern Israeli national

myth in which the epic events of biblical antiquity became reflexive symbols of the formative events of the new country.

The career of YIGAL YADIN exemplifies this process. His archaeology was driven by a brilliant sense of history, faith in the historicity of biblical events, meticulous field discipline, a flair for dramatic press releases, dynamic public lectures, and scintillating publications assured and confident of his conclusions. This brilliant career in archaeology also contained periods of military command and government service as deputy prime minister, as Israel moved from war to war. The intertwining of these two careers helped blur the distinction between antiquity and the present in the formation of Israelis' national self-identity.

The excavations he conducted all focused on the history of ancient Israel and early Judaism and emulated the legacy of biblical archaeology. For Yadin and his contemporaries, archaeology was the study of the sites of conquest and First and Second Israelite Temples. Rather than being Arab sites, Hazor gave proof of the historicity of Joshua's defeat of the Canaanites and Megiddo reflected Solomon's glory. In 1960, upon his team's discovery of the famous Bar Kokhba correspondence in the Cave of Letters, he announced his find as a cache of letters written by "the last president of Israel eighteen hundred years ago," with the current president of Israel in the audience.

This flair for implanting archaeology into the national psyche peaked with the excavations of the Herodian palace-fortress of Masada. As Silberman put it in a masterly biography of Yadin, "The drama of the Masada excavations and the virtuoso brilliance with which Yadin conveyed the discoveries to the public made the project as much an exercise in patriotic inspiration as in scientific research." Yadin did not doubt that the excavations demonstrated the famous suicidal last stand of the Jewish rebels against Rome as told by the historian Josephus. Silberman ended his popular book on Masada with the statement that Israeli soldiers swear to their service that Masada will never fall again, with the oath "Four thousand years of your own history looks down on you!"

At the 1957 annual convention of the Israel Exploration Society, 1,500 persons showed up to hear Yadin lecture on the historical veracity of the fall of Hazor to Joshua's Israelite army. Other Israeli academics challenged him and in the end have carried the day, but to the lay members of the society, the school teachers, and young people who volunteered on his projects he was a hero, and Israeli archaeology had become civic religion. To US Christians it reinforced the belief that the founding of the modern state of Israel was a fulfillment of God's promises and strengthened their unreserved siding with Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Palestinian Archaeology Subsumed under Jordan and Egypt. During the 1948–1967 armistice years, antiquities in the West Bank and Gaza were managed by the Departments of Antiquity in JORDAN and EGYPT, respectively. One might have expected that a viable Palestinian archaeology—the study of the material cultural heritage of the current Palestinian population—could now flourish in areas under direct Arab control (rather than British or Jewish). That did not happen for two reasons.

First, in the nineteenth century, the central preoccupation of Western archaeological inquiry into the biblical landscape was engaged under the rubric "Archaeology of Palestine." This master story evolved into the "Archaeology of Israel," which in the fervor of nation building became "Israeli archaeology." Both Israeli and international archaeologists (working in Israel and Jordan, including the West Bank) were so caught up in these two master stories involving the histories of Palestine from the Bronze Age to Byzantine period that they failed to pay attention to later Islamic and Palestinian material remains. Such a critical mass of scholarly energy was spent on specific archaeological problems of the Bronze and Iron Ages (for example, determining the historicity of the Exodus and the Conquest and dating the Davidic and Israelite monarchies) that little mental space was left for anything else. At scholarly conferences such biblical issues were popular and relevant, while topics in later archaeological periods were not.

Second, the management of Palestinian antiquities in the West Bank and Gaza was not administered by Palestinians themselves but by Jordanian and Egyptian bureaucracies that gave priority to archaeology on the East Bank and in the Nile Valley. Jordan especially was preoccupied with management of its very large and complex archaeological heritage in the transition from British tutelage to independent administration. Besides, Jordan inherited the larger responsibility of overseeing and maintaining the historic Islamic sites of the West Bank, especially the AL-HARAM ASH-

SHARIF (the Noble Sanctuary to Muslims and the Har Ha-Bayit or Temple Mount to Jews) in Jerusalem, a challenge at once archaeological, religious, and political. Under Jordanian administration Western archaeologists undertook major projects in the West Bank under the auspices of foreign institutes such as ASOR (Tell Ti'inich/Ta'anach and Tell Balatah/Shechem), the British School (Tell Sultan/JERICHO), and the École Biblique (Qumran*)* in Jerusalem in the intellectual atmosphere described.

Kathleen Kenyon's excavations at Tel Sultan/Jericho in the 1950s, famous for their refinement of stratigraphic excavation methods, had two direct impacts on the relationship of archaeology to modern cultural issues. Her discovery of neolithic Jericho contributed to the broadening of archaeologists' intellectual horizons beyond Israelite history and back to the Stone Age, and the demonstrated absence of Joshua's notorious walls challenged archaeology's role in the affirmation of literal readings of the Bible and contradicted Yadin's interpretation of Hazor's destruction.

The discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls in 1946 and the subsequent excavation of the Qumran Caves by the École Biblique in 1949 triggered perhaps the most famous and most important instance of the influence of archaeology on nationalism. Father Roland de Vaux's interpretations of the site as a monastic sectarian Judaic scroll-writing community served to bolster the Israeli national epic. And Yadin's role in the black-market acquisition of major Dead Sea Scrolls for Israel is a major factor contributing to his aura of archaeological heroism.

Archaeology in and under Occupation, 1967–2005

The Occupation of East Jerusalem after June 1967 provided access to a host of sites of great religious and sentimental value to Israel. In traditional archaeology this involved efforts to recover the environs of the Old City, for example, the "City of David" and the "Pool of Siloam" (at SILWAN). But archaeology took a backseat to nationalism and religion in the destruction of the Arab Moroccan Quarter in order to create a prayer area at the WESTERN WALL and in the clearing and opening of an ancient sewage tunnel as a tourist passage connecting to the north side of the al-Haram ash-Sharif in 1996. This competition for sacred architecture is a major dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which the role of sacred architecture as part of the arsenal for national legitimacy has been as basic to historic conflicts over Jerusalem as bedrock is to landscape. Israel also immediately took over the Palestine Archaeological Museum—The Rockefeller Museum—and moved the Dead Sea Scrolls to the Shrine of the Book at the Israel Museum in West Jerusalem, which had been inaugurated in 1965.

With the Occupation of the West Bank, the traditional geography of the biblical monarchies was now accessible to Israeli archaeologists. Although excavation of sites under Occupation was in violation of the Geneva Convention, Israeli archaeologists Israel Finkelstein and Adam Zertal took the opportunity to do major surveys of the "hill country," the West Bank north of Jerusalem. Though Finkelstein's methods were more technically correct, Adam Zertal walked the land with Hebrew Bible in hand. As Palestinian archaeologists later discovered in their own survey of Wadi el-Far'a, he overlooked numerous Islamic (nonbiblical) sites. These two projects were representative of the intense Israeli survey and excavation archaeology in the West Bank and Gaza until the OSLO ACCORDS.

Palestinian Archaeology. After the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, foreign archaeologists based in East Jerusalem were cut off from projects east of the Jordan River and were forced to move their operating base to Amman, Jordan. This resulted in the opening of several archaeological institutes in Amman, such as the American Center of Oriental Research (ACOR). As foreigners shifted their energies to Jordan and continued working in Israel, virtually no foreign-organized archaeology was done in the West Bank and Gaza. This left a vacuum that was filled by the beginnings of the modern archeology of Palestine and helped develop a Palestinian archaaeology as a means of recovering self-identity in the Palestinian material heritage.

Though Palestinians themselves have become the major players, much credit for the initiative goes to the accomplishments of US archaeologist Albert Glock, whose story is both heroic and tragic. A seminary graduate who began fieldwork at Tell Balatah and Tell Ti'inich in the Albright tradition, he became aware after the 1967 WAR of the lack of connection between the research goals of traditional excavations of tell sites in Israel/Palestine and the material and cultural heritage of

the living people of Palestine. So while other foreigners shifted to projects elsewhere, Glock stayed to adapt his research goals to the recovery of Palestine's history, that is, to initiate a distinctly Palestinian archaeology. To achieve this he joined the faculty of BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY to teach archaeology in 1976 and was the driving force behind Birzeit's founding of the Palestinian Institute of Archaeology in 1986.

Although Glock continued to apply the rigorous methods of his Albright background, he reversed the traditional chronological sequencing by working backward from the present to maintain the immediacy of the connection between the living and the material past. Thus he took his students back to Ti'inich, not to resume work on Iron and Bronze Age strata of the tell, but to perform a detailed ethnographic survey in the adjacent Palestinian village and work from there back to the late Ottoman era represented by recently abandoned village houses. His death in 1992 by gunshot in the yard of a student's family—a murder that remains unsolved—put a tragic end to this passionate project, but his legacy lives in his own achievements and in the ongoing work of his students and in other major work on the Palestinian cultural heritage, for example Palestinian textiles and embroidery.

Oslo Accords and After. The Oslo Accords of 1993/1995 included provisions for Palestinian administration of antiquities and an Israeli turnover of sites, artifacts, and records. Though the first produced the Palestinian Department of Antiquities and Cultural Heritage within the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's new Ministry of Tourism in 1994, the second was not fully achieved.

The Palestinian Department of Antiquities was given the mandate of developing a list of 50 major archaeological sites under its jurisdiction for archaeological management and site development planning. Under the able leadership of archaeologists Hamdan Taha as director general in Ramallah and Mu'in Sadeq as director of the Gaza office, the department has been able to muster international financial and intellectual support and in 2005 published an inventory of 20 Palestinian national heritage sites in cooperation with UNESCO (UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization). Strikingly, the inventory is described as "sites of potential universal value in Palestine" rather than as sites of only Palestinian heritage. The list includes sites such as Qumran, which are especially precious to the Israeli/Jewish cultural heritage.

The difficulty with turnover is illustrated by the status of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Although the Palestinians claim the right to the scrolls by virtue of their discovery within the West Bank, the Israelis have remodeled the Shrine of the Book to showcase them. A contentious atmosphere developed from the outset: The Israeli Antiquities Authority conducted Operation Scroll in 1993, a hasty scramble to discover any additional scroll materials before implementation of the Oslo Accords could occur. The Palestinians considered this plundering of archaeological areas under their jurisdiction, while Israelis argued it was retrieval of artifacts belonging to Israel by virtue of their heritage value.

Palestinian archaeology has also flourished in the private sector. Good archaeology programs, including field schools, are now available at major Palestinian universities and are training a new generation of Palestinian archaeologists who complete their graduate work in Western universities. A geography program at Birzeit, chaired by Professor Kamal Abdulfattah, has given graduates a familiarity with archaeological sites in their own landscapes, that is, the village environments of their childhoods. Immense efforts are also under way to record and preserve the traditional architecture of Palestinian town and country. RIWAQ, Centre for Architectural Conservation, in Ramallah, for example, produces publications and does restoration work. All of these activities constitute a Palestinian archaeology in service of preserving and developing Palestinian heritage and identity.

As is true in Israel, the urgency of archaeological work in Palestine is driven by the rapid destruction of the traditional landscape. The main causes are the domestic housing boom serving the rapid population growth among the indigenous Palestinians and the immigrating Israeli SETTLERS, which has cities like Ramallah and SETTLEMENTS like MA'ALE ADUMIM exploding across the landscape. Additionally, the massive destruction inflicted by Israel during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA has had devastating consequences for Palestinian archaeology. For example, some specific remains, such as the Byzantine ruins of St. Barbara at Aboud, were blown up in 2002 in individual acts of violence. The construction of the BARRIER (Al-Jidar in Arabic) around the West Bank, in addition, involves the systematic destruction of huge

acreages. Archaeologist Jamal Barghout, in a statistical survey using GIS analysis, estimated that 596 archaeological sites are located within 200 meters of the Barrier that presumably have been destroyed in the clearing of this 450-mile long strip of land.

Present and Future. As world archaeology became more theoretically disciplined, the archaeology of Palestine and Israel has conformed, albeit reluctantly. Although yet far from institutionalized, the situation is starting to change, as Israeli archaeologists such as Israel Finkelstein and historians such as Keith Whitelam (of the Copenhagen School) have used reinterpretations of archaeological and textual evidence to counter the traditional hegemonic stories. Increasingly archaeologists now recognize their field with broader terms like "Syro-Palestinian" in place of "biblical" archaeology. And ASOR changed the title of its popular journal, *Biblical Archaeologist,* to *Near Eastern Archaeology* in 1998 to reflect the broader foci of its articles, which now range from the Stone Age to late Arabic and Islamic cultures of the region, including MAMLUK and Ottoman Palestine.

Because the new interpretations challenge myths of the Israeli national epic, archaeology has lost popularity in the Israeli streets, though it flourishes in academia and continues to inspire tourism. In a sense, Palestinian archaeologists were fortunate to begin later and have been able to move directly into the international pool of archaeological academic theory. It is increasingly possible for Israeli and Palestinian archaeologists to come together on the level of theory. While Palestinians in the tradition of Glock deal with Bible-era layers seriously when they occur, Israeli archaeologists have also become serious about the Late Ottoman and Palestinian strata. Thus, an Israeli ceramist like Miriam Avissar and a Palestinian ceramist like Hamed Salem, both specialists in Ottoman pottery, can share and abet each other's research on this academic level.

Could archaeologists add their diverse Palestinian and Israeli voices to a common archaeological project? Sandra Scham and Adel Yahya recently led a series of workshops to discuss the possibilities for such an approach. They agreed that "how Israelis and Palestinians can deal with their intertwined and largely violent histories" can come "only through adopting a common narrative and understanding." Given that this still requires too huge a "leap of faith and imagination," they set a more realistic goal for their joint efforts: "to move toward a reflexive reconciliation, it is necessary to acknowledge the imperfections of our own narratives without fully rejecting them."

See also CHRISTIANITY

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—Bert de Vries

Al-Ard

Al-Ard (The Land) was an Arab nationalist political movement that emerged among Palestinian Israelis in the 1950s. It was a pan-Arab nationalist movement founded by young Israeli-Arab intellectuals who were inspired by the ideology of JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR of EGYPT. The movement eschewed traditional Arab politics and the COMMUNIST Party in favor of more authentically nationalist politics. It advocated a novel idea: to oppose the Jewish state by legitimate democratic means in general and via the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT in particular. The group gradually transformed itself from a movement to a political body, and later a party that ran for seats in the Knesset. The Knesset banned it in a law that was upheld by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court panel, litigating the petition filed by al-Ard following the decision to ban the movement from the Knesset, handed down a historic ruling: "No free regime will assist or recognize a movement that is seeking to undermine the very same regime." After the Supreme Court upheld the Knesset's action, al-Ard declined precipitously. This and similar court decisions have narrowed the venues for legitimate expressions of Palestinian identity or opportunities for redress of Arab grievances under the military administration. It was not until over a decade later that an Arab party emerged. Such measures continue to be implemented today against similarly nationalist Israeli-Arab groups.

See also LAND DAY; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Areas A, B, C

See INTERIM AGREEMENT

Arlozorov, Haim Victor (1899–1933)

Haim Arlozorov was a leading member of the Yishuv, especially in the HISTADRUT and LABOR parties. He was born in Romny, Ukraine, and moved at a young age with his family to Prussia (GERMANY), where he obtained elementary, secondary, and university education. He immigrated to Palestine in 1921, returned to Germany briefly to complete his academic studies, and settled permanently in Palestine in 1924. In Germany in 1918 he cofounded HAPOEL HATZAIR (the Young Worker), a group active in Palestine from 1905 to 1930. In 1920 he was among the founders of the Histadrut (a labor federation), and subsequently became one of its leaders. Later he became a prominent leader in MAPAI (Israel Workers' Party), which subsequently joined two small parties to became the Labor Party. Because of his activism and fervent devotion to the cause, Arlozorov was considered one of the most promising young members of the Zionist movement. In 1926 he was elected a member of the VA'AD LE'UMI (the National Council of the Jewish community in Eretz Yisrael) and elected to the Yishuv's delegation to the League of Nations. Toward the end of 1927 he traveled to the UNITED STATES as a member of CHAIM WEIZMANN's delegation to expand the JEWISH AGENCY.

In 1932, Yishuv leaders sent Arlozorov to Germany as the representative of the labor movement. There he negotiated with the Nazi authorities an agreement known as the HA'AVARA (Transfer), which enabled German Jews to transfer part of their assets to Palestine and to IMMIGRATE to Palestine. In 1935 the WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS officially approved the agreement, which established a major set of economic and political relations between Nazi Germany and the Zionist leadership in the Yishuv at a time when anti-Fascist forces were attempting to organize a boycott against Germany.

On his return, Arlozorov found the Zionist community rent by ideological controversies and violent clashes between Revisionists and the Labor movement. When he was assassinated on a Tel Aviv beach in June 1933, Labor leaders assumed that Revisionist extremists related to VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY had perpetrated the murder, and three members of the Revisionist party in Palestine were arrested: Tzvi Rosenblatt, Abraham Stavsky, and Abba Akhimeir. The first two were unknown outside Revisionist circles, but Stavsky was tried, convicted, and condemned to death for Arlozorov's murder. Stavsky appealed, however, and the conviction was overturned. Arlozorov's killer or killers have never been indicted, and the case remains officially unsolved. Nevertheless it stands as a symbol of the extreme hostility between the two main camps in Zionism during that period of the BRITISH MANDATE.

See also ZIONISM

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Armed Struggle, Palestinian

Palestinian Arabs since the early twentieth century have frequently engaged in various forms of armed resistance: first in opposition to British colonial occupation and a growing, privileged Zionist movement; and later in response to the formation of the state of Israel, the expulsion of some 750,000 Palestinians from their homeland, and the continuing Israeli OCCUPATION of Palestinian land. Particularly since the 1960s the Palestinian movement has advocated armed struggle, taking its inspiration from other armed national liberation struggles, such as those in Algeria and Vietnam. Compared to these movements, however, the Palestinian struggle has failed to achieve its goals, establishing neither a unified state in the whole of historic Palestine nor even a genuinely autonomous Palestinian "mini-state" in coexistence with Israel.

This failure has led even supporters of Palestinian self-determination to critically reexamine the history of Palestinian armed struggle, raising questions about its justification, its efficacy, and its relation to broader political strategies. In his monumental and authoritative study *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993,* Yezid Sayigh argues that "the armed struggle provided the political impulse and organizational dynamic in the evolution of Palestinian national identity and the formation of para-state institutions." But Sayigh also documents the weaknesses of Palestinian military strategy since the 1960s and concludes that the Palestinian movement "lacked the single-minded determination to take the practice of armed struggle to the elevated position it occupied in formal doctrine and to develop its organization in a manner commensurate with the task." It is debatable, however, whether greater determination could by itself have overcome the weaknesses in the military strategy. Indeed, Sayigh himself argues that while armed resistance was a legitimate part of the Palestinian struggle, military failures flowed from serious weaknesses in the political orientation and strategy of the Palestinian leadership, although how best to characterize these weaknesses remains a matter of controversy.

Before 1948: The Early Period of Struggle

Following the BALFOUR DECLARATION of 1917 and the start of the BRITISH MANDATE in Palestine after World War I, the influx of Zionist settlers into the region increased sharply, as did their land purchases. In 1918, there were 56,000 Jews and some 1 million Palestinians. Over the next seven years, well over 70,000 new Jewish immigrants arrived. In 1920, to cite one example, Zionists purchased 60,000 dunum (23 square miles, 60 square kilometers) of land in the Jezreel Valley from the Sursuk family, a Beirut ABSENTEE LANDLORD, and hundreds of peasant families were evicted from twenty-two villages in the valley. The IMMIGRATION/LAND threat was intensified by the policy of constructing a separate Jewish economy, which resulted in large-scale Palestinian unemployment.

As tensions grew, British administrators played Zionists and Arabs against each other, while favoring the former, including paying Jewish workers higher wages than Arabs. In early 1921, riots spontaneously broke out in JAFFA that left thirteen Jews dead, but for most of the decade the Palestinian response to colonial occupation and ZIONISM was dominated by the ARAB EXECUTIVE. Appointed by merchants and landowners at the Palestine Arab Congress in 1920, the Executive adopted the legal strategy of petitioning the British authorities. For their part, the British promoted the most politically conservative elements of Palestinian society to positions of leadership, who could be relied on to channel Palestinian discontent in an anti-Jewish direction. The most notable of these was the landowner and right-wing nationalist AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, who was appointed mufti (religious leader) of Jerusalem by the British in 1921, despite his losing the election for the position.

By the end of the decade, nearly 2,000 Palestinian farmers had been evicted from their land, and the British directed 90 percent of their economic assistance to Jewish settlers. In August 1929, following a provocative Zionist demonstration at the WESTERN WALL in JERUSALEM—a sacred site for both Jews and Muslims—new rioting broke out in which nearly 250 Jews and Arabs died. The riots—sometimes called the al-Buraq Rebellion or WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES—were brutally suppressed by the British army, but

they represented a militant shift in Palestinian opposition to ZIONISM and a rejection by many Palestinians of the Arab Executive's weak response to both the British occupation and continuing Zionist settlement.

Over the next few years, more radical currents emerged, including guerrilla cells in which middle-class intellectuals and peasants prepared for armed struggle against the British. The first of these, the Green Hand Gang, was formed in October 1929 under the leadership of Ahmed Tafish, who mounted an operation during the same month against the Jewish Quarter in SAFED, but it was poorly organized and was soon crushed by the British military. In general the British responded to Palestinian demonstrations with an iron fist. During a one-day strike in 1933, for example, British troops opened fire on a crowd of Palestinians in JAFFA, killing twenty-seven.

Meanwhile Zionist immigration continued to surge, and Zionist groups began to arm themselves and undertake aggressive actions against the Palestinians. In early 1935, Zionist parties smuggled a large quantity of arms from Belgium to the Jaffa port. In October 1935, after the weapon shipment was discovered, Palestinians responded with a general strike. By this time the global economic depression had reached Palestine. The Palestinian ECONOMY was hit hard. Businesses closed, unemployment surged, and more Palestinian farmers were evicted from their land—about 20,000 families by 1936. In these circumstances, the mood of militancy and rebellion intensified.

In November 1935, Syrian shaykh 'IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSAM and a small group of followers known as the Ikhwan al-Qassam (the Qassam Brotherhood) issued a call from the Galilee hills for armed revolt against British rule. Qassam had gained experience fighting FRANCE in SYRIA in the years after World War I, and his group professed Islamic ideals. The Ikhwan al-Qassam was better organized than the Green Hand, but only a week after their call was issued, Qassam was killed by a British patrol. Nevertheless, Qassamite guerrilla groups continued their armed raids on Zionist settlements.

As tensions continued to mount, with the British consistently favoring the Zionists, Palestinian workers in Jaffa launched a general strike against British rule in April 1936, which quickly spread to every other major city and received strong support from almost every sector of Palestinian society. In the absence of an alternative national organization, the Arab Executive—now re-formed as the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE—assumed leadership of the ARAB REVOLT, which it viewed as a way of pressuring the British to allow it a role in government rather than an all-out fight for independence. The British authorities responded with repressive measures, shooting demonstrators, arresting strike leaders, imposing harsh collective punishments, and dynamiting entire villages and sections of cities. But the repression failed to crush the strike, and hundreds joined guerrilla groups that hid in the mountains and carried out attacks on British targets. By June the British HIGH COMMISSIONER warned that the region was in a "state of incipient revolution." In July Britain declared martial law and sent troop reinforcements from home. Zionists gave the Mandate government their full support, organizing squads that attacked Palestinian villages under British direction and taking Palestinian jobs in many sectors.

As the strike continued, the members of the Arab Higher Committee grew increasingly nervous that, if not ended, it could lead to a full-scale revolution that would threaten their own privileged positions. By August as many as 5,000 guerrillas (including some from SYRIA and IRAQ) were carrying out regular attacks. At the same time, the British asked the client monarchs of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) and Iraq, Abdullah and Ghazi, respectively, to use their influence to end the strike. During an extended period of negotiations, the Higher Committee used its authority to wind the strike down, and it finally ended in October with the Palestinian demands—an end to Jewish immigration and land sales, and Palestinian independence with an Arab majority—unmet.

Following the strike's defeat, Britain's PEEL COMMISSION report proposed a split of the region into Jewish and Palestinian states and a population transfer, with the Palestinian area absorbed by Transjordan. Palestinians rejected this scheme, and later in 1937, guerrilla warfare resumed. The British arrested Palestinian leaders and deported many of the Higher Committee's members, further inflaming the situation. Rebellion spread around the country, and the British once again responded harshly. Zionist militias, working closely with the British, played a crucial role in finally crushing the rebellion. By the middle of 1938, several thousand Palestinian militants were dead, outgunned by the much better equipped British and Zionist forces. Thereafter Palestinian leaders were killed or exiled to the Seychelles. Without a coherent political

organization and with the Palestinian economy in ruins, the uprising petered out, and by 1939 the British had regained control.

Later that year, mindful of the need to win Arab support in the event of a world war, the British issued the MacDonald White Paper, which proposed a limit to Jewish immigration and possible Palestinian independence in ten years. This diplomatic gambit satisfied no one, however. Palestinians rejected the vague promises, and Zionists regarded them as a betrayal. With the outbreak of World War II, the British strengthened Zionist militias, while the Palestinians had been disarmed and were without effective political leadership.

By the end of the war, Britain's role in the Middle East was beginning to fade. In 1947 the recently formed UN issued a plan for partitioning Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, but the plan never materialized.

1948–1967

In April 1948, Zionist forces executed the Dalet Plan, a series of military attacks against the Arab population designed to expel as many as possible, to increase the area controlled by the proposed Jewish state, and to destroy the possibility of a Palestinian Arab state. A Palestinian militia of about 5,000, the Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddes (Sacred War, Vanguard of the Holy War), organized by Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, was poorly armed, hopelessly outnumbered, and completely ineffective in the face of Zionist attacks. Another small Arab army, the Jaysh al-Inqadh (Army of Salvation or Arab Liberation Army), created by volunteers from several Arab states and led by Fawzi al-Qawuqji, was about half Palestinian and was equally poorly armed and ineffective. Zionist terror attacks, such as the massacre of well over 100 people at the village of Dayr Yasin, were one factor, by creating mass panic, that gave rise to some Palestinians taking flight. The majority were driven from their homes by Zionist military forces, ultimately resulting in 750,000 dispossessed Palestinians, a disaster that came to be known as the Nakba (Catastrophe). Only after this ethnic cleansing had begun and British troops had withdrawn were five Arab state armies mobilized with combined forces of some 40,000 men (including the Arab Liberation Army troops), but this was largely an effort by the Arab states to mollify their own populations rather than to mount a serious military threat. The Arab states did nothing to reverse the expulsion of Palestinians, and by the end of the 1948 War the Zionists were in control of 78 percent of historic Palestine.

In the years immediately after the Nakba, Palestinians lacked coherent political formations that could group together a dispersed population under one leadership. Displaced, divided, and weakened, Palestinians faced tremendous obstacles in attempting to knit together organizations and forces that could speak for Palestinian interests. Instead some Palestinians found that they could join the armed forces of host countries in which they found themselves exiled. Refugees in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq joined the national militaries of those countries in search of employment and in the hopes that Arab rhetorical attacks on Israel would change into armed confrontations.

For instance, the armistice agreement in Egypt prevented the forward deployment of Egyptian troops in Egyptian-administered Gaza. Thus Cairo recruited Palestinians to police the border with Israel as the Palestine Border Police, later the Palestine Border Guards. However, Egyptian leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was keen to avoid any conflict with Israel, and he prohibited both political and armed activity from Gaza. This policy changed, however, following Israel's two massive raids against Egypt in 1954 and 1955, and the Lavon Affair in 1954, in which Israeli agents planted bombs in US facilities hoping the United States would think Egyptians responsible and reduce their relations with Cairo. In response, in 1955 Nasir permitted the Palestinians to create an armed group, the *fida'iyyun* (men of sacrifice), who began launching armed raids into Israel in April. In December, following a major Israeli operation that took over the al-Awja demilitarized zone, Egypt transformed the *fida'iyyun* into a formal military unit, the 141 Battalion, whose strength may have been as great as 1,000, and guerrilla activity rose sharply. Israel in turn used these guerrilla raids as one pretext for its invasion of Egypt in October 1956, and when Israel finally withdrew from Gaza in March 1967, some 1,200 Palestinians were dead. There is no doubt that the Palestinians wanted to fight Israel, but it is also clear that Nasir, as did all the Arab leaders, restrained or facilitated Palestinian armed activity when it suited Egypt's interests.

During the Israeli Occupation of Gaza, several hundred *fida'iyyun* and border guards fled to the West Bank, and this, together with the loss of

practically all the fighters in Gaza, left little armed resistance to the Israeli Occupation. Egypt also faced a political dilemma in its policy of arming Palestinians at the border: failure to arm them provoked demonstrations and domestic destabilization, while arming them increased the risk of Israeli reprisal. After the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 1957, Egypt pursued two tactics: the Palestine Border Guards brigades were dissolved and reconstituted as the Palestinian 107th Brigade, which was first moved to Cairo and then to the east side of the Suez Canal, well away from the border with Israel. The *fida'iyyun* were allowed to return to Gaza, and the 141 Battalion was transformed into a police unit, but the Egyptian state kept a tight rein on them and prohibited armed activities. Nasir also pursued a political line, proposing the establishment of a formal Palestinian entity, which became the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in 1964, while famously asserting that he had no plans for the liberation of Palestine.

Palestinians were also organized into formal sections of the Syrian army, such as the 68th Reconnaissance Battalion, composed of some 600 Palestinian commandos at its peak (though the officers remained Syrian). Ordered not to confront Israel by the Syrian government, the 68th Battalion was used by Damascus to carry out missions against LEBANON, Jordan, and Iraq instead. Competition between Nasir and Abdul Karim Qasim's BA'ATH Party in Iraq led Qasim to take advantage of Egyptian vacillation on the Palestine question by forming the Palestine Liberation Regiment (Fawj al-Tahrir al-Filastini) under Iraqi officers in 1959. The regiment was disbanded soon after its creation, however, when Qasim was overthrown in 1963.

Nasir responded to the initial formation of the regiment by sending the 20th Battalion of the Palestine Border Guards, now renamed the Palestinian Army, back to Gaza and approving the formation of the Popular Resistance, a militia force that recruited some 2,500 Palestinians. The collapse in 1961 of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the new balance of power among the Arab states pushed the Palestinian question to the rear. The experience inside the armed forces of Arab host countries exposed the limits of relying on Arab states to lead the fight against Israel. Palestinians had fought loyally in several units and had carried out several missions, but these were more often related to inter-Arab rivalries than to the cause of Palestinian liberation, with the result that the fortunes of Palestinian nationalism were tied to internal Arab struggles for power.

Arab governments' support for Palestinian liberation, moreover, turned out to be PROPAGANDA and purely rhetorical, as the fate of the various Palestinian military units in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt demonstrated. Palestinian activists concluded that they would need an autonomous political leadership and independent military resources to advance the struggle for liberation, and in this context new clandestine guerrilla organizations began to assert themselves.

There were two significant underground formations in the 1950s. The first was the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN), which in the 1960s would parent the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). (The PDFLP shortened its name to the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE—DFLP—in 1974.) The MAN coalesced in 1951 around a group of students at the American University in Beirut led by GEORGE HABASH and Hani al-Hindi. Habash and Hindi had first been members of both Kata'ib al-Fida' al-'Arabi (Battalions of Arab Sacrifice), which was committed to preventing Arab collusion with Israel and had been involved in the launching of several attacks on targets in Lebanon and Syria but was later disbanded, al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa (The Firmest Bond), an intellectual group at the American University. When the MAN was formed, it was committed to the liberation of Palestine but also believed that this would be impossible without freeing Arab countries from "Western imperialism." WADI' HADDAD, a leading figure in the MAN (and later military commander of the PFLP), is quoted as having said, "The road to Tel Aviv passes through Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, and Cairo." To help achieve the goal of liberating the Arab states from imperialism and colonialism, they formed the Committee for Resistance to Peace with Israel, which helped them recruit members to clandestine cells in the refugee camps. The MAN remained small through much of the 1950s, but with the success of Nasir's Free Officers Movement in Egypt in 1952, the MAN was able to grow and expand in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Jordan.

To achieve their objectives, the MAN began organizing but became involved in Arab politics,

mostly as arms of Egyptian and Syrian foreign policy. Their allegiance to Egypt, however, had seriously negative consequences, and when the Ba'ath took power in Syria (1961) and Iraq (1963), the MAN was effectively banned in those countries. Its growth in the early 1960s, largely fueled by enthusiasm for its support of Nasir, led to internal debates. Arab unity did not seem to lead organically to Palestinian liberation, even more so when Arab unity threatened to unravel at every turn. Also, allegiance to Egypt made confrontations with Israel difficult, as Egypt would not risk provoking Israel until it had decisive military superiority. The debates eventually led to the formation of a separate Palestinian arm of the MAN—the PFLP.

The second important clandestine formation was FATAH (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini), whose members were united by their common involvement with or support of the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD and their common experiences in Gaza. The enthusiasm of the Muslim Brotherhood in responding to Israeli raids led to their complete suppression by Nasir, which, combined with the defeat of Egypt in the 1956 War, led many of these Palestinians—including YASIR ARAFAT, KHALIL AL-WAZIR, and KAMAL 'UDWAN—to conclude that an independent Palestinian political organization was necessary. In 1958 Arafat and Wazir were joined by supporters in KUWAIT, where they penned two important documents—*Haykal al-Bina' al-Thawri* (Structure of Revolutionary Construction) and *Bayan al-Haraka* (The Movement's Manifesto)—and founded Fatah. Soon thereafter, they began publication of their journal *Nida' al-Hayat—Filastinuna* (The Call of Life—Our Palestine), whose circulation in the Arab world helped knit together a wide range of supporters. The simplicity of its slogans—relentless armed struggle against Israel, rejection of deals with Israel, distrust of Arab regimes, and Palestinian self-determination—attracted many. And the success of anticolonial revolutions in Africa and Southeast Asia made Fatah's call for armed struggle seem all the more urgent and effective. Most importantly, Fatah grew in direct relation to the failure of Arab regimes to provide meaningful solutions for Palestinian liberation. Its calls for "Palestine First" made it an attractive base for organizing armed struggle.

The establishment in 1964 of the Palestine Liberation Organization, initially a tool of Egypt in Arab politics, and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY (PLA), whose three battalions were under the control and direction of the Arab states, precipitated moves by Fatah to launch the armed struggle sooner than it had anticipated, especially since the leaders feared that Arab regimes were attempting to contain Palestinian national aspirations. *Filastinuna* remarked in July of 1964 that "the Palestinian people are more convinced today than ever that the armed Palestinian revolution is the only solution to regain its stolen homeland." But Fatah was hardly prepared for armed struggle at this point, and it lacked members in countries bordering Israel. Its most important base was Syria, where Arafat recruited veteran infiltrators and soldiers. They launched their attacks under the name AL-'ASIFA (The Storm) to avoid punitive measures against Fatah. The first effort was aborted when Jordanian border forces intercepted the guerrilla team. The second attempt, detonating an explosive in a water canal on 1 January 1965, was touted as a success (although Israel claimed it failed to go off) and would subsequently be celebrated as the beginning of the renewed Palestinian armed struggle. It would also lead to immediate conflict with the MAN, who saw these attacks as threats to Nasir's foreign policy and direct competition with its ability to recruit new members.

Although Fatah announced its guerrilla operations with great enthusiasm, its results were less tangible. Its capabilities for attacks were limited, and its poor organization left it vulnerable to repression by Arab police forces. But the popular enthusiasm for Fatah also brought it into conflict with states that could not allow escalation of tensions with Israel and that had promoted the PLO as a way to avoid armed conflict over Palestine. Additionally, it opened a rift with the MAN. Although Fatah believed that it could use guerrilla struggle to force the hand of reluctant Arab armies to engage with Israel, the MAN felt that an independent Palestinian military organization would simply provide cover for Arab reluctance to liberate Palestine. But after the MAN suffered setbacks in Jordan and Egypt, where members were rounded up and political changes altered its access to official power, it eventually moved toward the Fatah position. The MAN managed its first independent military operation in October 1966 from south Lebanon, leading to severe Israeli reprisal. Continued attacks launched from Jordan between December and June brought the MAN into direct

conflict with the Jordanian border forces. Fatah raids also escalated during this period from Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Both groups rode the rising tide of Palestinian support for the guerrilla struggle and by 1967 were boasting of the operations' successes, just when their hopes were dealt a devastating blow by Israel.

The Struggle, 1967–1972

Six days into the 1967 WAR, Israel summarily defeated the armed forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied large sections of the territories of each. The speed of Israel's victory and the utter failure of Arab armies to mount a serious challenge changed the entire dynamics of politics in the Middle East. First, it solidified Israel's importance to the US Cold War strategy in the region: finding an ally against growing SOVIET influence among Arab states, the United States increased arms sales to Israel and lifted its requirement that Israel sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Second, it changed the expectations of the Palestinian guerrillas vis-à-vis their Arab patrons. Nasir and King Husayn of Jordan came to the conclusion that "Israel is here to stay," and this proved to be a problem for Palestinian groups that had based their nationalist aspirations on the actions of Arab states. The pattern of conflict and negotiation over the next three years would solidify the centrality of the peace process over armed confrontation in Arab-Israeli relations. Palestinian guerrilla groups, in response, moved explicitly toward a Palestinian, as opposed to an Arab, nationalism and began to organize, at least initially, independently of Arab patronage. The new goal was the establishment of a Palestinian "revolutionary authority" in the West Bank and Gaza to continue operations against Israel. Even as Palestinian attitudes toward Arab states cooled, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq still initially relied on Palestinian guerrillas to deflect attention from their own rearmament plans and provided the guerrillas with arms and sanctuary.

Immediately after the 1967 War both Fatah and the MAN hoped to continue independent military operations against Israel and to launch efforts that they hoped would turn into a popular uprising for national liberation. Fatah made preparations for continuing its operations inside the newly Occupied Territories by stepping up training operations at its camp in Hama, Syria, from which it sent reinforcements to the West Bank. The MAN leadership moved cautiously along a path of military preparation, arguing that the Palestinians were not yet ready for conflict with Israel. Nasir reassured them privately that Egypt was preparing for a second round of war with Israel, so the MAN began to build up its base in Jordan to prepare for the coming conflict. In 1967 the MAN and Fatah began a series of discussions to coordinate military operations against Israel. The two organizations made agreements to delay the start of combat operations, but Fatah broke off talks and began its combat operations in August, timing them to start with the Khartoum Summit of the Arab heads of state. Fatah was also encouraged by its growing numbers of recruits, as well as by arms supplies it received from external sources, and began to organize its recruits into armed cells and roving guerrilla bands. Its hope was to launch combat operations and find large popular support on the model of events in 1936–1939, but its poor organization, lack of internal security, and the strength of Israeli retaliation made failure inevitable. Despite a spectacular bombing of an Israeli oil refinery at Eilat in January, by early 1968, Fatah's operations were in shambles.

The MAN, which had stayed out of Fatah's combat operations, now found its hand forced when Fatah announced its second round of combat operations. The organization had been losing recruits as its policy of slow preparation frustrated newer members, while Egypt was increasingly impressed by Fatah's efforts. In 1967 the MAN began discussions about a united front with the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF) and Abtal al-Awda (Heroes of Return). The new group announced its unity with a raid on the Ben Gurion International Airport, which, although a failure, inaugurated the PFLP. Israel stepped up its repression of MAN activists, and, by January 1968 the Israelis had captured large sections of the MAN membership. On balance, the hopes of launching a mass armed uprising against Israel were dashed by the end of 1967.

Armed struggle did, however, change the relationship of the various guerrilla groups with their host Arab states. Their successes allowed them both to carve out spaces for themselves inside these states (most successfully in Jordan where guerrillas found that Jordanian troops tolerated or cooperated with them) and to achieve political legitimacy for their efforts. But as the guerrilla forces grew in confidence and strength, the policy of Arab states toward them changed as well. In

1968, as the number of armed fighters from Fatah and the PFLP increased in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, Israel began launching attacks against Palestinian bases and struck the refugee camp of Karamah in Jordan. When the Jordanian authorities demanded Palestinian disarmament, there was an outcry among the Jordanian population, on which guerrillas were able to capitalize and build their forces. In the first three months of 1968, the guerrilla groups launched seventy-eight attacks against Israel.

In response Israel began a large search-and-destroy mission against guerrilla bases in and around Karamah. Fatah and the PLF/PLA prepared to fight against Israel alongside the Jordanian army, arguing that an act of steadfastness was necessary to raise Arab and Palestinian confidence. The PFLP, believing this an act of adventurism for which the guerrillas were unprepared, withdrew its members. When Israel attacked Karamah on 21 March, Fatah and the Jordanian First Infantry Division fought and inflicted several harsh blows on Israel, but Israel decidedly defeated the Arab fighters. When the fighting ended, the guerrillas paraded burned-out Israeli tanks and armor through the streets of Amman, and the reputation of the Palestinian guerrillas soared. Karamah took on mythological symbolism, viewed as demonstrating the Palestinian willingness to fight and challenge the seeming invincibility of Israel. As a consequence, the guerrilla movement, especially Fatah, gained new popularity among both the Arab masses and with certain Arab states (in particular Egypt). This led to rapidly expanding membership, including exponential growth within Jordan and combat bases near the Israeli border—a development the Jordanian authorities were powerless to stop. But as the guerrilla influence extended into the civilian population of Jordan, especially in the major cities, the Jordanian regime began to perceive it as a threat.

Parallel developments in Syria also expanded the network of Palestinian guerrillas there. In its attempt to offset the growing influence of Fatah, which Egypt favored, Syria's ruling Ba'ath Party launched its own group, the Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization, which merged with the Palestine Popular Liberation Front (PPLF) to form the Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization–Thunderbolt Forces, commonly known as SA'IQA. With official support, Sa'iqa grew rapidly, claiming over 1,000 members by 1969. Fatah tried to maintain good working relations with the Syrian government, but as its raids against Israel intensified, tensions between Syria and Fatah increased. In June 1969, Fatah operatives in Syria were warned not to provoke Israel, even inside the Occupied Territories, or risk being eliminated by the Syrian government.

In Lebanon the guerrilla movement grew as well, aided in part by a crisis in the Lebanese government, as well as by the declining economy, both of which allowed the guerrilla groups to expand their influence among the political left. Fatah was able to develop an extensive network in the refugee camps in southern Lebanon, and in April 1969, after the Lebanese authorities shut down a Fatah office in al-Khiyam, the Lebanese opposition parties announced a general strike in support of the guerrillas. A Lebanese crackdown against the protesters fueled resentment; in response, the ranks of the guerrilla organizations grew even more, and Fatah brought in reinforcements. As Egyptian and Syrian threats of military action against Israel increased, Israel's warnings to Lebanon to keep the guerrillas in check prompted the Lebanese authorities to attack the guerrilla bases inside the refugee camps. These attacks triggered nationwide protests and reprisals from neighboring Arab regimes that broke off relations with Lebanon until it accepted a cease-fire with the Palestinian guerrillas. In the Egyptian-mediated CAIRO AGREEMENT, the PLO agreed to maintain internal discipline of the Palestinians in Lebanon in exchange for the right to govern the refugee camps. The new freedom that the guerrillas acquired in Lebanon allowed them to recruit not only Palestinians but members of the Lebanese AMAL Shi'a population as well—a group that later brutally turned against them in the CAMPS' WAR.

Despite their growing numbers, the Palestinian guerrillas were still hardly successful against Israel. The number of raids and attacks increased dramatically from 1968 to 1970, but Israeli countermeasures proved effective as well. By 1969, Israeli prisons held some 2,800 guerrillas, and Israeli troops claimed some 1,828 guerrilla lives. There were also few territorial gains in the Occupied Territories for the guerrilla groups. These military difficulties as well as the large influx of recruits led to open debates inside the guerrilla movement about strategies for Palestinian liberation and to rampant inflation of the successes of rather small operations and skirmishes. There were also diffi-

culties in connecting the movement for liberation, which overwhelmingly existed outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories, with the Palestinians living inside those lands. And, as they faced these setbacks, some Palestinian guerrilla groups, most notably the PFLP, moved in the direction of attacks on civilian Israeli targets and international TERRORISM. On 23 July 1968 two members of the PFLP hijacked an El Al passenger flight, and between December 1968 and September 1969, the PFLP claimed credit for attacks on Israeli businesses and aircraft in Athens, Zurich, London, Brussels, and Bonn. Although some Palestinians agreed with such tactics, others were openly critical, such as the DFLP secretary-general NAYIF HAWATIMAH, who argued that such action "creates MEDIA sensation that replaces individual terrorism for mass action and so causes fundamental harm to the resistance movement."

Throughout the 1970s, Egypt had encouraged the guerrilla forces in Jordan to expand their operations and take advantage of the weakness of the Jordanian state. But Nasir's acceptance of the US-sponsored peace initiative and cease-fire in the summer of 1970 changed Cairo's decisionmaking. Subsequently the guerrilla forces engaged in open debates about whether the time was right to topple the Jordanian monarchy or if the balance of power had shifted, and the monarchy was prepared to destroy the guerrillas. The PFLP and the DFLP were convinced that confrontation with Jordan was necessary and began raising the slogan "All Power to the Resistance" in the streets, while Fatah was more hesitant about the prospects for victory. Talks among Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, and others were cut short when the PFLP hijacked three international airliners on 6 September and diverted them to airstrips in the Jordanian desert. Immediately, small-scale clashes erupted between the Jordanian army and the PFLP throughout Jordan. By mid-September Palestinian *fida'iyyun* had captured several strategic locations inside Jordan, including the oil refinery at Zarqa.

The guerrillas began a campaign of mass action against the monarchy, calling for civil disobedience and a general strike. In response, King Husayn named a military government in Jordan and gave wide powers to the armed forces to suppress the guerrillas. Although the Jordanian army blocked an Iraqi force from providing aid to the guerrillas, the Syrian government sent more than a hundred tanks marked as units of the PLA to assist the guerrillas, even though the refusal of the head of the Syrian air force, Hafez al-Asad, to provide the requisite air cover left the tanks vulnerable. Israel and the United States threatened action against the MOSCOW-backed Syrians, but in the absence of air cover Jordanian air strikes easily repelled the tank force. By 25 September the guerrillas were in defensive positions throughout Jordan, and with no reinforcements on the horizon from Arab regimes, they were forced to accept a cease-fire on 27 September. During ten days of fighting several thousand Palestinians were killed, and the events came to be known as BLACK SEPTEMBER.

The Jordanian civil war had several consequences for the armed struggle. First, many of the smaller commando groups disappeared entirely, their members either dispersed or absorbed into Fatah. Second, new power struggles emerged inside of the main Palestinian organizations over strategies and responsibilities for the setbacks. Third, the Jordanian regime became convinced of the need to expel the guerrillas. In the months after the civil war, Amman began a systematic campaign of emptying town after town of guerrilla fighters. The PFLP reacted by calling for a Palestinian national authority in Jordan and for the toppling of the monarchy. King Husayn responded by announcing that he had uncovered secret *fida'iyyun* plans to assassinate important Jordanian figures. The Jordanian army moved in and surrounded the *fida'iyyun* in the Ajlun-Jarash areas and arrested over 2,000. Certain leaders were able to escape to Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, but the armed struggle was essentially finished in Jordan.

This expulsion permanently altered the course of the Palestinian armed struggle, as substantially weakened Palestinian groups now had to negotiate with their host countries and accept their discipline, including no military attacks against Israel from their territories. The setbacks also fractured the main political organizations; the PFLP split and Fatah lost many of its members. In many ways, the movement was forced to confront the contradictory and competing logic of armed struggle that relied on Arab states; as long as Palestinians were tied to Arab host countries, they could only achieve limited military and political successes.

A New Era of Struggle, 1973–1982

In October 1973, Egypt began a major assault on the SINAI while Syrian troops crossed into the

Golan Heights—territories that Israel had occupied since the 1967 WAR. After fierce fighting, the United States pressured Israel into accepting a UN-sponsored cease-fire, which called for negotiations to settle disputed issues. Palestinian organizations had hoped that the battles would lead to a broader struggle against Zionism, but Egypt, Syria, and the Arab states that supported them had more limited aims.

In the months that followed, sharp debates broke out among the various Palestinian resistance organizations. There was unanimity in rejecting Jordan's claim to the West Bank and Gaza, and in supporting the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." But Fatah and the DFLP also wanted the PLO to support the creation of a Palestinian "national authority" on any territory liberated from Israeli Occupation. Critics of this strategy, including the PFLP, argued that the imperial powers would permit such an authority only if the PLO recognized Israel and abandoned its goal of a democratic, secular state in the whole of historic Palestine and only if it governed a weak, demilitarized state. In response, supporters of a national authority claimed that it would be a step toward liberating all of Palestine once established.

There was also disagreement about whether the PLO should attend the GENEVA CONFERENCE, where a settlement of the 1973 War was to be negotiated. The PFLP headed a "Rejection Front" opposed to the conference. Fatah's leaders responded that if the PFLP and others refused to attend a conference to which they had not yet been invited, it would make it easier for Jordan or other Arab states to claim to represent the Palestinians. Yasir Arafat wrote to HENRY KISSINGER, the US secretary of state, asking to attend the conference, but Kissinger refused. In June 1974, the twelfth meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL endorsed Fatah's position and issued a ten-point program that called for establishing a "fighting national authority" while reaffirming the goal of liberating all of historic Palestine. Despite the rhetoric, the PLO's willingness to accept a Palestinian "mini-state" in the West Bank and Gaza marked a significant retreat, which was not supported by most Palestinians living outside the Occupied Territories. Many also believed that the PLO was being maneuvered into a drawn-out diplomatic process that would ultimately lead nowhere and that would weaken the liberation movement.

At the Rabat Summit in October 1974, Arab leaders were presented with a manifesto supporting the PLO that was signed by 180 prominent Palestinians from the Occupied Territories. In response, the Arab leaders declared the PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The following month Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly, which voted overwhelmingly to support Palestinian self-determination and to grant the PLO observer status. Only the United States, Israel, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic voted against the resolution. The PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT, established in the Occupied Territories in 1973, organized ten days of strikes and demonstrations in the West Bank in support of the UN decision. The PLO had achieved the international recognition that it wanted, but in the process had tied itself even more closely to the Arab states, which placed their own interests above the goal of Palestinian liberation.

In 1975 armed conflict between the PLO and its enemies broke out again, this time in Lebanon, which had become the main *fida'iyyun* base after Jordan expelled the PLO. As in Jordan, Fatah's leaders advocated noninterference in Lebanon's domestic affairs, even though the presence of thousands of Palestinian resistance fighters inevitably had a radicalizing effect on Lebanese politics. In April the right-wing Phalangists killed twenty-six Palestinians in an attack on a bus. Fatah refused to respond, but the PFLP and DFLP retaliated in alliance with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a coalition of leftist groups that represented the country's lower classes. The attacks and counterattacks quickly escalated into full-scale war across the country, and by the end of the year, Beirut was devastated and divided. The LNM and the Palestinians controlled west Beirut, the rightists controlled the eastern part of the city, and each side controlled different parts of the rest of the country. In January 1976, rightist forces began attacking the Palestinian refugee camps that lay between east Beirut and the rightists' mountain bases.

Fatah, which had previously held back, now threw all its forces into the struggle, and within a few months the left had taken control of 80 percent of the country. In response, Israel began blockading Lebanese ports and increased its aid to the rightists, while the United States sent a small fleet of ships and 1,700 marines to patrol the Lebanese coast. But the leftist forces continued to advance.

In late May, just when victory seemed close, Syrian president Asad sent 40,000 troops into Lebanon, with approval from the US government. Although his stated goal was to be a peacekeeper, Asad's real goal was to prevent the development of a radical Lebanon, to control the Palestinian movement, and to prevent an Israeli intervention on behalf of its rightist Phalangist allies. When the Syrian troops encountered fierce resistance from the Palestinians and LNM forces, Syria began shelling Palestinian refugee camps and supporting rightist attacks on the camps. Fatah was also forced to join the fighting in defense of the camps. In August the Phalangists massacred over 2,000 Palestinian refugees after a long siege of the Tal al Za'tar camp. Eventually the other Arab states intervened politically to end the war. But Syrian troops continued to occupy much of the country, and although the PLO remained armed, it found itself confined to small pockets of territory.

The Lebanese civil war left the PLO weakened. The Arab states each cultivated their own factions within the organization, which they manipulated for their own purposes. Although Palestinian groups continued to launch guerrilla raids against Israel, the leadership had no clear long-term strategy to achieve its goals. Indeed, it was not clear what those goals were. As Sayigh notes, "The Palestinian community no longer knew whether total liberation was still a goal, and if so, whether it was to be achieved through protracted warfare or by stages in which peaceful and violent means would be used alternately. Furthermore, there was great ambivalence concerning the 'phasal' strategy. Were phasal objectives indeed transitional? Would they entail direct negotiations and recognition of Israel? Would they be achieved through international intervention, or did they require some supporting pressure from Palestinian military action?"

The PLO lacked the military strength to force Israel to relinquish control of the Occupied Territories, while diplomatic efforts led nowhere. By this time it was clear that US policy in the region was to exclude the Palestinians from any negotiated settlement. In September 1975, while civil war was raging in Lebanon, Washington persuaded Egypt and Israel to sign the Sinai Accords, which called for Israel to return part of the Sinai in exchange for a nonaggression pledge from Egypt. The United States handsomely rewarded both countries and privately assured Israel that it would not be pressured into negotiating with Syria or the PLO. Israel's separate peace deal with Egypt was finalized at CAMP DAVID in 1979. With Egypt neutralized and Arab unity permanently undermined, Israel was free to escalate its military attacks on the Palestinian movement.

In June 1982, with the full support of the US government, the Israelis launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, killing 20,000 people and laying siege to Beirut. According to the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz,* the strategic goal of the LEBANON WAR was "the physical annihilation of the PLO." It was also to fulfill Israel's objective of eliminating Palestinian nationalism in the Occupied Territories as a first step in its annexation. Palestinian forces held out in Beirut for two months, with no support from any Arab country. Between 10,000 and 12,000 PLO members were forced to evacuate by sea. The PLO relocated its headquarters to Tunis, while Palestinian fighters scattered to eight Arab countries. As soon as the PLO's armed units left, Israel allowed its right-wing Phalangist allies to enter the SABRA AND SHATILA refugee camps, where they proceeded to massacre over 3,000 Palestinian civilians.

The End of the Armed Struggle, 1983–1993

As a consequence of the Lebanon War, Palestinian guerrillas were sent to isolated camps, and the armed struggle of the previous two decades was, for the time being at least, effectively ended. Having been driven first from Jordan and then from Lebanon, the PLO found itself enormously weakened and more than ever under the control of the Arab states. This was emphasized in 1983 when a pro-Syrian faction of Fatah led by Abu Musa (SA'ID MUSA MURAGHA) split from the organization to form FATAH UPRISING. With Syrian support, including direct assistance from the Syrian army, Fatah Uprising eventually drove pro-Arafat forces out of Lebanon. The PFLP and DFLP, although sharing many of Abu Musa's criticisms of Fatah, were neutral in the conflict but moved their headquarters to Damascus shortly afterward, where they too became effectively pro-Syrian.

Some of the PLO's fighters did manage to return to Lebanon, but their main role was a purely defensive one of resisting attacks on the refugee camps by the Lebanese army (controlled by the country's right-wing Christian minority), the Israeli-backed Phalangist militias, and the Syrian-backed

Shi'a militia, Amal. In 1985, 200 Palestinian youths in Shatila fought off thousands of Amal militia members, and by 1986 Fatah had a significant presence only in the isolated Ain al-Hilweh camp near Sidon.

By the mid-1980s the Palestinian liberation struggle in general, and the PLO in particular, seemed a spent force. Even financial assistance from Arab states began to dry up, and at the November 1987 ARAB LEAGUE summit, the Palestinian question received only minor attention.

The situation turned around dramatically the following month with the spontaneous beginning of a new uprising, or INTIFADA, in the Occupied Territories. In the preceding months, Israel had increased its repression in Gaza in an attempt to end a series of protests. On 8 December an Israeli military vehicle killed four Gazan workers. This proved to be the tipping point, and their funerals turned into mass demonstrations. Protests rapidly spread throughout Gaza and to the West Bank, involving most of the Palestinian population. There were also important demonstrations by Palestinian Arabs living in Israel itself. Although the protesters in the territories were poorly equipped, often with no more than stones and Molotov cocktails, they set up barricades and fought running battles with Israeli troops. Nonviolent tactics in this revolt included local Palestinian administrators and police resigning their positions, people refusing to pay taxes, a sustained boycott of Israeli goods, and businesses shutting their doors in opposition to the Occupation. The Israeli government responded with violence—Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN told Israeli soldiers to "break the bones" of the demonstrators—but was unable to stop the movement. Ordinary Palestinians facing poverty and political repression had reached their breaking point, and there was a mood of defiance and self-confidence that the Israelis were unable to breach.

As demonstrations continued throughout 1988, trade unions and other community organizations were revitalized. Local organizing committees produced daily leaflets and directives to coordinate activity. Within a few months, leading members of Fatah in the Occupied Territories, who were in close contact with the PLO leadership in Tunis, formed a Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) composed of all the political factions. Israel responded with more violence, CURFEWS, collective punishments, and mass detentions. By the end of 1988, at least 30,000 Palestinians had been arrested and many others killed by Israeli troops. By July of the following year, the Palestinian death toll had reached 600, but the protests did not stop.

The Intifada was enormously successful in returning the Palestinian question to the top of the international political agenda, creating a new sense of unity among the Palestinians themselves, and exposing the colonial nature of Israel's Occupation. But over the longer run, the Intifada also revealed the structural limits of a movement based only on the Palestinian community. In particular, Palestinian workers were relatively marginal to the Israeli economy and could cause only temporary disruptions by going on strike. By the middle of 1989, the uprising had cost the Israeli economy $650 million in lost export earnings and added over $525 million to Israel's military budget, but with $3 billion in US aid coming into the country each year, Israel could absorb these costs.

The Intifada returned the PLO to the center of Arab politics. Members of Fatah and, to a lesser extent, the PFLP, DFLP, and Communist Party led the UNLU. Islamic groups such as the newly formed HAMAS (the Islamic Resistance Movement) and ISLAMIC JIHAD also participated in Intifada-related activities. Arafat took the opportunity to complete the transition that he had begun in 1974, and at the end of 1988 the PLO leadership unilaterally declared a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories, simultaneously accepting Israel's legitimacy and its right to exist. Western governments applauded the announcement, and the United States instituted low-level talks with officials in Tunis.

Washington's willingness to open negotiations with the PLO, however, primarily reflected its concern that the Intifada was becoming a destabilizing factor in the wider Middle East and thus a potential threat to the continued smooth flow of oil from the region. Within a few days of the uprising's start, there was a huge solidarity rally in Lebanon. Demonstrations in Jordan and Bahrain were prevented only by arresting Palestinian activists. Conversely, the Syrian government organized its own solidarity demonstration at the end of December, and in February the Algerian government did the same. Additionally, there were clashes between the authorities and supporters of the Intifada in Tunisia, Iraq, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and KUWAIT. The Arab governments gave

verbal and sometimes financial support to the uprising, but they were terrified that solidarity demonstrations would turn into mass rebellions against their own regimes. This is precisely what had already begun to happen in Egypt, where demonstrations led by students and workers denounced the Mubarak government's subservience to the West and turned into running battles with the police. Such developments also made the PLO leadership uncomfortable because of its close ties with the Arab regimes. Arafat even went to Kuwait to warn Palestinian activists there not to do anything that the monarchy might find threatening.

In October 1988 the unrest spread to Algeria, where privatization and austerity programs had led to rising prices and shortages of basic goods. There were strikes, demonstrations, and riots around the country in which the youth modeled itself on the Palestinian resistance in the Occupied Territories. Worried by these developments, and concerned that one or more of its regional allies could be vulnerable, the US government agreed to talks with the PLO, on the condition that it first recognize Israel and renounce "TERRORISM"—in other words, abandon the armed struggle.

The diplomatic process did not stop the Intifada, which continued throughout 1989 and into 1990. At this point, however, events in the Occupied Territories were eclipsed by the crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent US-led GULF WAR. The PLO, which for strategic reasons supported Iraq, paid a heavy price with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians workers expelled from the Gulf States, the loss of most of its financial support from the Arab states, and seemingly irreparable damage to its credibility and legitimacy. This was the background and context of the MADRID CONFERENCE convened by the United States shortly after the war, which in turn led to the secretly negotiated OSLO ACCORDS, signed in September 1993. In exchange for PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist and its abandonment of "terrorism," Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians and granted municipal powers to a newly constituted PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in Gaza and a handful of West Bank towns. The Israeli Occupation and SETTLEMENT of the territories continued, while the status of JERUSALEM and the situation of the Palestinian refugees were left to future negotiations. It was a humiliating agreement for the PLO. The Palestinian American intellectual EDWARD SAID commented at the time, "The PLO has transformed itself from a national liberation movement into a kind of small-town government, with the same handful of people in command."

Post-1993

Although the organized armed struggle against Israel was quieted by the hopes that Oslo might offer a real chance for an acceptable negotiated settlement, some organizations continued to advocate for and recruit members on the basis of continued armed struggle. Hamas, for instance, rejected the OSLO PROCESS and recruited heavily during the 1990s through both its political and social service programs. Its evolving political platform addressed all the concessions negotiated by Fatah during the 1993 Oslo Process with respect to Palestinian national rights: the right of return of Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state, and the unity of the Palestinian people.

In the mid-1990s, Hamas gained notoriety for its strategy of SUICIDE BOMBINGS against Israeli military and civilian targets. YAHYA AYYASH, "the engineer," provided the technical means for Hamas to carry out its strategy of using individual terrorists who could more easily infiltrate the Green Line (Israel's 1948 border) and get through the military CHECKPOINTS. Hamas's first suicide bombing took place on 4 April 1994, inside the Israeli city of Hadera, following the February 1994 HEBRON MASSACRE, when the American-Israeli settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN murdered twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE. Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD began discussions in the 1990s about limited cooperation on specific military acts and about their common rejection of the negotiations with Israel. Other organizations—primarily those of the secular left—failed to grow substantially because they vacillated on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the peace process. The dwindling numbers of the secular left also hindered its attempts at organizing effective armed or political struggle.

Partly in response to the growing popularity of the Islamic groups and partly because of growing conflict between secular nationalists and the Islamists, lower-ranking Fatah officials established their own military force—the TANZIM (The Organization)—inside the Occupied Territories in 1995. The formation of Tanzim reflected growing

discomfort with the PNA's trajectory; its increasing cooperation with Israel began to open a rift inside Fatah between the leadership's course of negotiations and the rank and file's opposition to compromise with Israel. The Tanzim's leadership was drawn primarily from the local Fatah leaders of the 1987 Intifada, and its members have a reputation of being courageous street fighters and defenders of Palestinians against the Israeli forces. Tanzim members fought alongside PNA police forces in the armed uprising of September 1996, after the Israeli government opened the HASMONEAN TUNNEL under the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF (the Noble Sanctuary to Muslims and the TEMPLE MOUNT to Jews) in the Old City of Jerusalem, ostensibly for tourism purposes.

The emergence of the Tanzim was also a response to the declining fortunes of the PLO and Fatah. A large part of Arafat's motivation in accepting the Oslo blueprint had been the crumbling PLO operation in Tunis, the lack of any meaningful political or economic resources from Arab countries, and growing dissatisfaction with the PLO among Palestinians. The peace process offered Arafat and the PLO the opportunity to reassert their relevance, legitimacy, and authority; to shore up the organization's infrastructure; and to take on a more central role in the Occupied Territories. Oslo transformed the PLO and Fatah into governing and policing bodies rather than umbrella organizations of the resistance to Occupation. The PNA, largely composed of members of OLD GUARD Fatah, became primarily a police force guaranteeing Israel's "security," and in the process assumed responsibility for rounding up Palestinians involved in armed struggle. This role, in particular, brought Fatah into open conflict with opposition groups, including members of its own ranks, and was significant in catalyzing the Tanzim.

On 29 September 2000, following the failure of talks between Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK and Arafat, LIKUD PARTY leader ARIEL SHARON made a provocative visit to the al-Haram ash-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam, with more than 1,000 armed Israeli police. The event set off waves of protests and demonstrations, soon dubbed the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, an uprising that reflected increasing Palestinian frustration and despair with the peace process, their plunge into economic disintegration, the massive expansion of the SETTLEMENT project, and Israel's increasingly severe RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT. The uprising was similar to the First Intifada in some ways—pitched street battles, large organized demonstrations, and harsh responses from the Israeli armed forces. But in other ways the Second Intifada differed from the First in that both Israeli and Palestinian forces had more substantial firepower; the political forces on both sides had shifted considerably as a consequence of the peace process; and Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line were far more active in the uprising. After Israeli forces killed many unarmed protesters in the Occupied Territories, Palestinians engaged in hundreds of battles against the Israeli forces.

Palestinians had clearly drawn inspiration from the armed resistance that drove Israel out of Lebanon in May 2000. The Lebanese HIZBULLAH movement led a guerrilla resistance to Israel and the mercenary South Lebanon Army (SLA) in the Israeli-occupied security zone inside Lebanese territory. In May, Barak ordered an Israeli withdrawal with the aim of handing over the region to the SLA. But Hizbullah-led resistance turned the withdrawal into a rout, and the SLA collapsed within days. Hizbullah's armed resistance showed that Israel could be beaten militarily, and when Israel and Hizbullah had another battle in July–August 2006, Israel lost.

In many ways, the outcome of the Second Intifada was similar to that of the First, as the balance of military power had not decisively shifted in favor of the Palestinians. As long as the military conflict remained contained to the Occupied Territories, Israel retained a superior position. It possessed a large arsenal of fighter planes and helicopter gunships, and it demonstrated its superiority repeatedly with deadly incursions into Palestinian towns such as Rafah, NABLUS, JENIN, and Ramallah, where Israeli forces held Yasir Arafat captive in his compound from December 2001 until his death in November 2004. The superior firepower of Israel was also demonstrated in the disproportionate casualty rates of Palestinians as compared with Israelis and the large number of Palestinian men detained in Israeli prisons. Although Palestinians were able to launch some effective raids on military outposts and Israeli settlements, the changing landscape of the Occupied Territories made fighting against the Israeli armed forces difficult. Palestinians did receive some support from neighboring Arab countries, but it paled in comparison to the prior

financial patronage, and countries like Jordan and Egypt faced internal crises in response to the Intifada that tied their hands. Still, the failures of the Intifada were the consequence of political missteps as much as military ones. Despite the growing protests in neighboring Arab states for Palestinian liberation and support for the armed struggle, the PLO and Fatah did not call for military support for the Palestinian cause. A confident movement of Egyptians and Jordanians against their states and allied with the Palestinians might have provided much-needed resources and solidarity and could have widened the offensive against Israel.

A split developed in Fatah, which widened even more with the death of Arafat, between the "old guard," represented by MAHMUD ABBAS, and a younger, more militant wing, represented by, among others, the imprisoned MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI. The success of Abbas over Barghuthi in the post-Arafat presidential elections signaled the victory of a wealthier, landed Palestinian elite, opposed to armed struggle with Israel and willing to reach territorial compromises far short of the original PLO and Fatah demands. Outside the PLO, the Islamists had gained much credibility for their willingness to confront Israel and their refusal to compromise on territorial concessions. As a consequence, Hamas won a decisive majority in the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL in early 2006 but soon incurred international isolation. In many ways, however, the victory of Hamas confirmed one of the central dynamics of the movement for Palestinian liberation: armed struggle was not ancillary or extraneous but a key determinant of the political fortune of Palestinian national aspiration.

The Intifada was still in progress in January 2009. B'Tselem statistics for deaths from 28 September 2000 to 31 November 2008 included 5,431 Palestinian fatalities and 580 Israeli fatalities. Hamas engaged in relentless, if ineffective, resistance with its Qassam rockets. But in the end its efforts only brought Israel's wrath on Gaza in the form of Israel's Operation Cast Lead from 27 November 2008 to 18 January 2009, in which 1,314 Palestinians and 14 Israelis were killed.

Conclusion

The failure of the Palestinian movement to achieve its main goals and the current impotent condition of that movement raise the question of whether the path of armed struggle was strategically wise. Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the US and Israeli governments have attempted to portray Palestinian armed struggle as morally unjustifiable terrorism. In response, a number of points can be made. First, the intransigence and brutality of the British colonial regime, Zionist settlers, and, finally, the state of Israel made it highly unlikely that any form of nonviolent resistance could have been effective. Following the pattern of many other third-world liberation movements, Palestinians turned to armed resistance after attempts at unarmed resistance (most notably the 1936 general strike) had been crushed. Second, the right to forcibly resist military Occupation and illegitimate authority is widely recognized. Palestinian resistance to British colonialism in the 1930s, and to Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967, is a relatively uncontroversial example of exercising this right. Finally, although armed struggle has failed to achieve a Palestinian state or the return of refugees, it has played a key role in achieving two more immediate goals. The persistence of the Palestinian struggle restored a sense of national identity to Palestinians and compelled the international community to recognize their plight.

Although the Palestinian armed struggle has often been compared to liberation struggles in such countries as Algeria and Vietnam, there are also important differences. In classic guerrilla warfare, the aim is not to defeat the enemy militarily but to raise the political costs (in terms of human and economic losses) to a level that the enemy is no longer willing to bear. But a variety of factors made this classic strategy unlikely to succeed in the case of Israel. First, as Sayigh points out, most Israelis, unlike French settlers in Algeria in the early 1960s, have no "mother country" to which they can return, making them more willing to accept a heavy burden of costs. Second, the large economic subsidy that Israel receives from the United States has made it much easier for Israel to bear the material costs of the conflict. Third, Palestinians are much more peripheral to the Israeli economy than, for example, blacks were to the economy of South Africa under apartheid, making it difficult to combine armed struggle with effective economic pressure through boycotts, strikes, and other forms of industrial action.

Fatah adopted the strategy of attempting to persuade or cajole the leaders of Arab countries to take up the Palestinian cause, either through military confrontation with Israel or, after 1973, through diplomatic pressure on Israel to agree to a Palestinian mini-state. In part because of this strategy and in part because it was being funded by Arab regimes, Fatah refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab states, even though many had large Palestinian populations and Palestinian activists were sometimes the victims of repression by Arab governments. Fatah stayed with this strategy in Jordan to an extent, but the organization became caught up in antiregime politics, and King Husayn felt as threatened by Fatah as it did by the PFLP. This led to the PLO's defeat in Jordan in 1970 and later, as a result of a similar situation, to its 1982 defeat in Lebanon. By 1988, the PLO under Fatah's leadership had eschewed the toppling of Arab governments and armed struggle; had accepted the partition of Palestine and the existence of Israel; and had embraced the idea of a Palestinian mini-state.

Fatah's strategy was criticized by both the PFLP and the DFLP in the late 1960s. The PFLP argued that the Palestinian struggle was part of an international fight against imperialism and that Palestinian liberation was linked to the overthrow of Arab regimes that were supported by the imperialist countries. Rejecting Fatah's nonintervention principle, the PFLP supported the struggle of Arab workers and peasants against their own governments. But the PFLP's tactics—in particular its reliance on airline hijackings to draw attention to Palestinian demands in the late 1960s and early 1970s—offered no concrete way to build a wider anti-imperialist movement in the Arab world. Furthermore, because it regarded some Arab regimes, such as Syria and Iraq, as anti-imperialist and progressive, it allied itself with them despite their policies of domestic repression and was soon being manipulated by such regimes for their own purposes. By the 1980s the PFLP had followed Fatah in accepting the idea of a Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories. The DFLP initially rejected the latter's distinction between reactionary and progressive Arab regimes and argued for an orientation to the Arab working class. Following the Palestinian defeat in Jordan, however, the DFLP moderated its views and came to accept much of Fatah's political program.

Disillusionment with this program and with the repression, corruption, and impotence of the Palestinian National Authority set up by the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS led to increased support for Hamas and other Islamic political groups. Armed attacks on Israeli targets by Hamas and Islamic Jihad have proved popular because of increasing Palestinian frustration with perceived Israeli intransigence, but they offer no more chance of defeating Israel than the use of similar tactics by secular groups—in fact, less so since guerrilla resistance has been replaced by individual acts of violence. Even before its election victory in early 2006, Hamas had in practice accepted most of Fatah's concessions—de facto recognition of Israel, the Palestinian mini-state framework, and suspension of armed attacks. Despite this, Israel, backed by the United States, sought to undermine the new government by withholding tax revenues that it collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, resulting in a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, open conflict between Hamas and Fatah, renewed attacks on Israel by Palestinian militants, and regular military incursions by Israel into Gaza (from which it had withdrawn in 2005), culminating in a full-scale Israeli invasion in December 2008.

The resulting crisis in the Palestinian struggle and the growing belief that a Palestinian mini-state can never be viable are leading to renewed debate about the strategy for Palestinian liberation. Some are once again linking the Palestinian struggle with a broader fight against imperialism, which would connect mass struggle against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US occupation of Iraq, and repressive Arab regimes with the aim of transforming the entire Middle East and establishing a democratic, secular state in the whole of historic Palestine. Armed actions might play a role in such a struggle, but they would be subordinated to the broader political strategy of a regional Intifada connecting the Palestinian cause to the fight for liberation across the Middle East and beyond. During both the 1987 Intifada and the 2000 AL-AQSA INTIFADA, mass demonstrations by Palestinians—including attacks on Israeli military targets and armed Israeli settlers—led to solidarity actions and antigovernment protests in many other Arab countries. Whether the revival of such movements in the future might become the basis for genuine Palestinian liberation remains, of course, to be seen.

See also ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, 2002 AND 2007; ARAB REVOLT; ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC; WAR, 1948

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—Philip Gasper and Snehal Shingavi

Armistice Agreements, 1949

In 1949 four armistice agreements were negotiated under UN auspices and signed at Rhodes, Greece, between Israel and its neighbors—EGYPT, JORDAN, LEBANON, and SYRIA. The accords, which excluded Palestinian participation, were designed to end the 1948 WAR and established the "Green Line" between Israel and the WEST BANK, then under Jordanian rule. The map illustrates the difference between the boundaries set by the UN Partition Resolution (181) in 1947 and those that emerged as a result of the 1948 War.

The armistice agreements were intended as temporary, to be replaced by permanent peace treaties; however, no peace treaties were signed until decades later.

The agreements left some 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine in Israeli hands. The remaining areas of Palestine—the Gaza Strip and West Bank—were occupied by Egypt and Jordan, respectively, until 1967. Except for the accord with Lebanon, the armistice agreements were clear that they were not creating permanent or de jure borders. The Egyptian-Israeli agreement stated that "the Armistice Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine question."

The Jordanian-Israeli agreement also stated that "no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either Party hereto in the peaceful settlement of the Palestine questions, the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations" (Art. II.2), and that "the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines or to claims of either Party relating thereto" (Art. VI.9).

Egypt

The main points of the agreement between Israel and Egypt, signed on 24 February, were the following:

- The armistice line was drawn along the international border (dating back to 1906) for the most part, except near the Mediterranean Sea where Egypt remained in control of a strip of land along the coast, which became known as the GAZA STRIP.
- The Egyptian forces besieged in the Faluja Pocket were allowed to return to Egypt with their weapons, and the area was handed over to Israel.
- A zone on both sides of the border near 'Uja al-Hafeer/Nitzana was demilitarized and became the seat of the bilateral armistice committee.


Lebanon

The main points of the Israeli agreement with Lebanon, signed on 23 March, were the following:

- The armistice line (the "Blue Line") was drawn along the international border.
- Unlike the agreements with the other states, there was no clause disclaiming this line as an international border, and it was thereafter treated as it had been previously, as a de jure international border.
- Israel withdrew its forces from thirteen villages in Lebanese territory, which it occupied during the war.

Jordan

The main points of the Israel-Jordan agreement, signed on 3 April, were the following:



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Map 2. UN Partition Plan and Rhodes Armistice

- Jordanian forces remained in most positions held by them in the West Bank, particularly East JERUSALEM, which included the Old City.
- Jordan withdrew its forces from their front posts overlooking the Plain of Sharon. In return, Israel agreed to allow Jordanian forces to control positions in the West Bank previously held by Iraqi forces.
- A special committee was formed to plan for the safe movement of traffic between Jerusalem and the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University, along the Latrun-Jerusalem Highway, free access to holy places, and other matters.

Syria

After the Israeli-Syrian agreement was signed on 20 July, Syria withdrew its forces from most of the territories it controlled west of the international border, which became demilitarized zones.

Others

Iraq, whose forces took an active part in the war (although it has no common border with Israel), withdrew from the region in March 1949. Because the front occupied by Iraqi forces was covered by the armistice between Israel and Jordan, there was no separate agreement with Iraq.

A Mixed Armistice Commission was formed to deal with each case of violation of an armistice line. After investigating complaints by either party, it made regular reports to the UN Security Council. In the years following the signing of the agreements, all of the parties were condemned many times for violations. Egypt, for example, kept a large military force in the demilitarized 'Uja al-Hafeer area. Israel, on its side, reinforced the Mount Scopus enclave (which was supposed to be demilitarized) with armed soldiers disguised as policemen. Israel also sent soldiers into Jordanian territory on numerous occasions to conduct massive retaliatory raids for incursions by Palestinian infiltrators. Additionally, Israel continuously penetrated the demilitarized zone along the Syrian border, and Syrian forces launched numerous artillery attacks against Israeli forces and settlements in the demilitarized zone adjacent to the Golan Heights.

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'Asfur, Hasan

Hasan 'Asfur was secretary to the Palestinian negotiating team that concluded the initial OSLO negotiations for Israel's withdrawal from the GAZA STRIP and West Bank. He was elected to the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC) as an independent from Khan Yunis. In August 1998 'Asfur became minister without portfolio of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) and then minister of nongovernmental organization (NGO) affairs, but in June 1999 he was forced out of the Cabinet. In the two months prior to the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT in 2000, 'Asfur participated in secret negotiations with ABU ALA'A and the Israelis Shlomo Ben-Ami and Gilad Sher in what was known as "the Swedish Channel," but he later became a bitter critic of the Palestinian negotiating strategy. He was a leading figure in the PALESTINE PEOPLE'S PARTY (Communist Party).

As minister of NGO affairs 'Asfur carried out YASIR ARAFAT's objective of making the NGOs subordinate to the will and the interests of Arafat and the PNA leadership. This undercut the democratic process and adversely affected the work of the PLC.

In March 2003 'Asfur joined with Gaza security chief MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, SAEB EREKAT, MUHAMMAD RASHID, and NABIL SHA'TH in what came to be called the "GANG OF FIVE." In effect, they assumed control of and ran the PNA from March to May 2002. They wanted a return to the OSLO format of direct negotiations with Israel, an end to the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, especially armed attacks, and a restructuring of the PNA's security apparatus into a single organization headed by Dahlan and supported by the US CIA but also by

the intelligence agencies of EGYPT, JORDAN, and SAUDI ARABIA. In May 2002 'Asfur was attacked and seriously wounded, requiring hospitalization, by suspected supporters of JIBRIL RAJUB.

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Ashkenazi

The term *Ashkenazi* refers to Jews whose origins lie in Europe, as compared to MIZRAHI, whose origins are in the Arab world, Africa, and elsewhere. Ashkenazi Jews formulated and implemented ZIONISM, as well as all the institutions of the Yishuv. In the state of Israel, the Ashkenazi and the Mizrahi have formed distinct cultural entities with differing socioeconomic status. The Ashkenazi continue to dominate all elite sectors of Israeli society, while the overwhelming number of the impoverished are Mizrahim or SEPHARDIM. Both the LABOR PARTY and the LIKUD remain predominantly though not exclusively Ashkenazi.

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Ashrawi, Hanan Mikha'il (1946–)

An educator, academic, and longtime Palestinian political activist, Hanan Ashrawi has been an articulate spokesperson for the Palestinian cause throughout Europe and America. Born in Nablus when the WEST BANK was under Jordanian OCCUPATION, Ashrawi moved frequently with her family during her childhood. From Nablus her family settled in TIBERIAS until 1948, and then settled in Ramallah, West Bank.

In 1967 Ashrawi received her B.A. and M.A. in literature from the Department of English at the American University of Beirut. After the 1967 WAR, Israel labeled all Palestinian residents who were not in the country "absentees" with no legal status or right to return home, making Ashrawi unable to return to Palestine. Thus she moved to the UNITED STATES and earned a Ph.D. in medieval and comparative literature from the University of Virginia.

When Dr. Ashrawi was able to return to her homeland in 1973, she established the Department of English at Birzeit University and served as chairperson of that department from 1973 to 1978 and again from 1981 to 1984. From 1986 to 1990, she served the university as dean of the faculty of arts, after which she remained a faculty member at Birzeit until 1995. During this time she authored several books, short stories, poems, and articles.

Ashrawi's political career began at American University, where she was actively involved in student politics. While studying in the United States she became active in the women's movement. During her time at Birzeit, she was in the heart of the Palestinian struggle for independence and frequently led her students in demonstrations. Ashrawi was arrested several times and more than once carried wounded students in her car through CHECKPOINTS, tear gas, and bullets to take them to the hospital. As the university experienced intermittent CLOSURES by the Israeli military, Ashrawi participated in the founding of the Birzeit University Legal Aid Committee/Human Rights Action project and held classes in her home or at a local hostel.

In 1988 Ashrawi was invited to appear on ABC's *Nightline* as part of a three-hour discussion between Palestinians and Israelis. Her fluent English and clarity of argument put her in demand with other broadcasters. She was successful in presenting the Palestinian cause in a sympathetic light, humanizing the Palestinians' plight, and giving them a voice that appealed to the world. In 1988 she joined the INTIFADA Political Committee, serving on its diplomatic committee until 1993. Additionally, from 1991 to 1993 she served as official spokesperson for the Palestinian delegation to the MADRID CONFERENCE and as a member of the leadership/guidance and executive committees of the delegation.

With the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS in 1993, Ashrawi founded the Preparatory Committee of the PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR CITIZENS' RIGHTS in Jerusalem and was a member until 1995. From 1996 through 1998 she served as minister of higher education and research in the

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY and became a member of the PALESTINE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

In 1998, however, Ashrawi resigned from the government in protest over corruption and against Arafat's handling of the peace talks. At the same time she founded MIFTAH—the PALESTINIAN INITIATIVE FOR THE PROMOTION OF GLOBAL DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRACY, whose goal is respect for human rights, democracy, and peace.

Ashrawi is a member of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo and of numerous international advisory boards, including the Council on Foreign Relations, the World Bank Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA), and the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD).

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Al-'Asifa

FATAH'S armed forces, al-'Asifa (The Storm), started out as a group of student activists from which Fatah and YASIR ARAFAT drew for their early military operations. In 1965 Arafat wanted to strengthen the morale of Fatah cadres and expand their influence while avoiding the wrath of Arab governments. His policy was that Fatah would endorse the ARMED STRUGGLE if al-'Asifa succeeded. If al-'Asifa failed, then al-'Asifa would take responsibility for the failure and not Fatah. The initial group consisted of only twenty-six fighters who were poorly armed. Even though al-'Asifa's early raids were utter failures, Arafat proceeded to make outsized claims of success. He predicted that money would begin to flow once they started to kill, no matter how small their actual effect. On this he was right. Still, Fatah did not take credit for the organization until al-'Asifa had carried out fifteen operations. By 1968 al-'Asifa had become known as the armed wing of Fatah and was subsumed under the Fatah General Command, headed by KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad) and Arafat. In March 1990 al-'Asifa was dissolved within Force 17, the "Presidential Guard" that was recruited from the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY.

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Assassination

See TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS

Association for Civil Rights in Israel

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) was founded in 1972 as a nonpolitical and independent body, with the goal of protecting human and civil rights in Israel and in the Occupied Territories under Israeli control. Today ACRI is one of Israel's leading human rights organizations. It works with policymakers, advancing legislation and encouraging them to change policy, and seeks legal precedents through the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT (www.acri.org.il/english-acri/engine/index.asp).

Association of Forty

The Association of Forty (Association for the Recognition of the Arab Unrecognized Villages in Israel) is a grassroots nongovernmental organization in Israel, committed to the promotion of social justice in the Palestinian sector of Israel and to gaining recognition for the UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES in this sector. The Association of Forty was formally established in 1988 in the unrecognized village of Ein-Hod by the local committee of the village, the inhabitants of other unrecognized villages, and Palestinian and Jewish volunteers from all over Israel. Among the association's goals are

to obtain official recognition for all the unrecognized villages and improve living conditions, to provide a legal structure through which the village inhabitants can pursue their rights, and to claim full rights and equality for the Arab citizens of Israel.

The association's Law Center provides legal advice to village residents about Israeli policies of demolishing houses and confiscating lands. Additionally the association attempts to strengthen the residents' resolve to remain in their villages by initiating projects within these villages, such as paving roads; improving existing roads; helping residents to connect their villages to networks of water, electricity, and telephones; establishing kindergartens and clinics for mother and child care; and obtaining educational noncurricular activities for schoolchildren. (www.assoc40.org/index_main.html).

See also ADALAH; ARAB ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Atara L' Yoshna

Founded in 1979, Atara L' Yoshna (the crown to its original form) is also known as the Society for the Renewal of Jewish Settlement throughout the Old City of JERUSALEM. Its main goal is to increase the Jewish presence in the Old City, especially near the TEMPLE MOUNT, the site of an ancient Jewish temple and now a complex of Muslim religious buildings known as AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, by purchasing property for Jewish SETTLEMENT in the Muslim and Christian quarters. As such it is involved with the THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT and also maintains a Study and Tourist Center near the WESTERN WALL.

Atara L' Yoshna is considered a settler "front organization," in that once a Palestinian property in Jerusalem's Old City has been identified by a settler group for takeover, Atara L' Yoshna assumes responsibility for the property's acquisition and restoration. Other, more recently established groups—for example, EVAN ROSH COMPANY and Mordot Moria—are engaged in similar work, but less is known about them, and Atara L' Yoshna remains the most important. Although the organization is registered as a nonprofit, it has been directly involved in taking over Palestinian homes, evicting the residents, and squatting until government recognition is forthcoming. It is also active in real estate deals for the settler groups in the Old City in close association with ATERET COHANIM, Yeshiva Torat Cohanim, and the Young Israel Movement.

Atara L' Yoshna's efforts to locate Palestinian property are assisted by the fact that most of the properties targeted by settler groups are under the trusteeship of the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY or the Israel Lands Administration. The cooperation between Atara L' Yoshna and these two government departments is quite close, to the extent that the Israel Lands Administration has given Atara L' Yoshna formal recognition for its work. In fact Atara L' Yoshna acts as an unofficial arm of the Lands Administration and also receives substantial financing from the Israeli government. Analysts investigating the group believe that by 1999 Atara L' Yoshna had received $1.8 million from various ministries in the government.

See also SETTLEMENTS, FINANCING OF; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Ateret Cohanim

Ateret Cohanim (Crown of the Priests, or Priestly Crown) is both a yeshiva (religious school) and an extremist settler association whose objective is to force out Palestinians from the Old City of JERUSALEM and Judaize the city. Mattityahu Hacohen founded the group in 1978, and Ateret Cohanim acquired its first Palestinian property in the Muslim Quarter that year.

The GUSH EMUNIM considers Ateret Cohanim a "special" yeshiva, and many of its sons study there. Students learn the ancient priestly texts in anticipation of the coming of the Hebrew Messiah and the rebuilding of the Second Temple on TEMPLE MOUNT (the Islamic holy site AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF).

In the mid-1980s Ateret Cohanim began to receive considerable government financial and logistical support from both the Ministry of Religion, which provided the group with $250,000, and the Housing Ministry, which gave it $40,000. At the same time, the state-owned JEWISH QUARTER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY transferred $1.7 million to Ateret Cohanim and several other Jerusalem settler groups. Since then, various ministries in the Israeli government have given Ateret Cohanim hundreds of thousands of dollars for its settlement and religious activities. Hacohen himself became a regular fixture in the halls of the Knesset, where he lobbied for Jewish settlement in the Old City and forged particularly close relationships with ARIEL SHARON and his chief aide, Rafi Eitan, who were in charge of the WEST BANK SETTLEMENT program at the time.

The state of Israel and Ateret Cohanim have cooperated in other ways. Both have worked together to identify "ABSENTEE PROPERTY" in the city, after which representatives of the Mordot Moria and EVAN ROSH companies, set up by the settlers, register the properties with the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY, which in turn "sells" it to Ateret Cohanim and other groups.

Additionally, during the 1980s Hacohen organized a group of American Jewish supporters who founded the JERUSALEM RECLAMATION PROJECT, an arm of Ateret Cohanim, to raise money for property acquisitions in the Muslim Quarter. Shortly thereafter evangelical Christian groups in the United States and Europe began financing the activities of Ateret Cohanim and similar groups. The evangelicals and the Jewish settlers have parallel interests. For the Christian fundamentalists, rebuilding the Jewish temple on Haram al-Sharif is a key element in the divine plan for the tribulation, the rapture, and the final triumphant return of Christ. For Jewish fundamentalists, rebuilding the temple will bring the Jewish Messiah. In 1982 Ateret Cohanim students began to tunnel under the Temple Mount in search of a chamber where King Solomon is believed to have hidden many of the gold vessels used in the First Temple. Palestinian guards at the DOME OF THE ROCK heard the digging, and, in the ensuing melee, Israeli police had the tunnel sealed. Yeshiva students have, on several occasions, thrown feces at Palestinians and have harassed and humiliated them in numerous other ways.

With some exceptions, both Jewish and Christian money from abroad is funneled to Ateret Cohanim through the Jerusalem Reclamation Project. For example, at one 1997 fund-raising dinner in New York, the Reclamation Project raised $375,000 for the work of Ateret Cohanim. Some wealthy Jewish individuals outside of Israel, such as Morton Freiman and Irving Moskowitz, finance Ateret Cohanim directly.

By 1987 Ateret Cohanim owned more than seventy buildings in the Muslim Quarter worth an estimated $10 million. The properties include their yeshiva, the building that houses Yeshiva Shuvu Banim, several dormitories, a museum, and about fifty apartment units. Ateret Cohanim officials estimated that the cost to purchase the rest of the buildings in the Muslim Quarter would be $100 million, with another $100 million needed for renovations.

Because both JORDAN and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION have made it a capital crime to sell property to Jews, Ateret Cohanim uses a variety of methods to "reclaim" Jerusalem property. Sometimes it uses Christian Arab middlemen to purchase property in the Muslim Quarter to disguise the fact that the buyers are Jews. Rabbi Shlomo Aviner stated publicly that "we will settle more and more of our Holy City, until all of it is ours." Because the settler groups will not be able to acquire all the houses in the city, the rabbi said they will make Palestinian residents' lives so bitter that the latter will eventually flee the city.

Ateret Cohanim activities in the 1990s and beyond have mainly centered on acquiring Palestinian land and houses for Jewish settlements in both the Christian and Muslim quarters of Jerusalem—both inside and outside the Old City. Its property-owning arm, ATARA L' YOSHNA, plays a significant role in all these activities. The 1990 takeover of St. John's Hospice in the Christian Quarter brought considerable attention to Ateret Cohanim, and with almost every property "reclaimed" by the group, there has been overt conflict. In the 1990s Ataret Cohanim was involved in evicting Palestinians from their homes in SILWAN, below the southern wall of the Old City, and it is also active in acquiring homes and

land in RAS AL-AMUD, where it has constructed a Jewish neighborhood (Ma'aleh Ha'Zeitim) in the midst of Palestinian residents. It is estimated that by 2006 Ateret Cohanim had acquired more than 1,100 properties in the Old City. (www.ateret.org.il).

See also AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF; JERUSALEM; KLUGMAN REPORT; SETTLEMENTS (B'TSELEM); SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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'Attallah, 'Attallah

'Attallah 'Attallah (Abu Za'im) was a dissident FATAH military leader. Born in HEBRON under the Jordanian OCCUPATION, he served in the Jordanian army and was based in Amman until 1968, when he was dismissed. In the spring of 1971, 'Attallah was recruited by FATAH and given command of Fatah forces in South LEBANON. In July 1971 YASIR ARAFAT charged 'Attallah with implementing the new policy of *tajyish* (turning guerrilla forces into a conventional army). However 'Attallah proved to be personally ambitious, first engaging in rivalry with Walid Nimr, which resulted in competing deployments of forces, then creating his own battalion, known as Shuhada' Aylul (Martyrs of September). In spite of these actions, in early 1972 Arafat appointed him as head of central operations in Lebanon and then as head of Fatah military intelligence.

In 1983 'Attallah was sacked from the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE for his support of the FATAH UPRISING. In 1986, Jordan's KING HUSAYN turned over the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) offices and funds in Jordan to Attallah and encouraged him to launch a "corrective movement" within Fatah. On 8 April 1986, with Jordanian support and the king's public call for "new leadership," Attallah convened a conference that "elected" him as caretaker chairman of the PLO. Attallah also played a key role in Jordan's attempts to win back the support of WEST BANK leaders. He was successful to an extent in the latter; nevertheless, by early 1987 the majority of his supporters had returned to the PLO. Jordan did not investigate an attempt to assassinate him that year.

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A Tur

A Tur is a Palestinian neighborhood within the municipal borders of JERUSALEM that has been a target of Jewish settlers, subjected to SETTLER VIOLENCE, and negatively affected by the BARRIER (separation wall). It is one victim of Israel's objective of completing the Judaization of all Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty. The experience of A Tur is similar to that of SILWAN, RAS AL-AMUD, 'Anata, ABU DIS, and other Palestinian areas of the city. A Tur has been the site of extensive HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, LAND confiscation, and a great deal of violence. In April 2003 a plot by Jewish settlers from Bat Ayin settlement to attack a Palestinian girls' school and adjacent Mukassad Hospital in A Tur was foiled by Israeli police officers. The settlers had planned to detonate explosives in the morning,

when students would be congregating in the schoolyard before class. Both this and a 5 March plot in the same year particularly frightened residents because of their intent to inflict TERROR on a mass scale by targeting a particularly vulnerable group of soft targets—in this case students.

See also JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Avnery, Uri (1923–)

Uri Avnery (originally Helmut Ostermann) is a leading peace activist, journalist and writer, former Knesset member, and founder of GUSH SHALOM. He was born in Beckum, Westphalia (GERMANY), and with his family immigrated to Palestine in 1933. Just before turning fifteen, Avnery joined the underground IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI and served for three years. He left the Irgun in protest against its anti-Arab and reactionary social attitudes and its TERRORIST methods. Later he explained his attitude in a booklet entitled *Terrorism, the Infantile Disease of the Hebrew Revolution* (1945).

Because of his once-wealthy family's extreme poverty in Palestine, Avnery left school at the age of fourteen and earned his living at many jobs until he turned to journalism as his profession in 1947. After some years of sporadic political activity, in 1946 Avnery founded the Eretz Yisrael Hatz'ira (Young Palestine Movement), also known as the Bama'avak (Struggle Group) after the name of its publication, which he edited. This group created an unprecedented uproar because of its contention that the Jewish community in Palestine constitutes a "new Hebrew nation" within the Jewish people and that this nation is part of Asia and the natural ally of the Arab nation. In September 1947 Avnery published a booklet entitled *War or Peace in the Semitic Region,* which called for a radically new approach to Israel's place in the region. He envisioned an alliance of the Hebrew and Arab national movements to liberate the common "Semitic Region" (a term coined by Avnery to avoid the colonialist term "Middle East") from imperialism and colonialism, and to create a Semitic community and common market as a part of the emerging third world.

During the 1948 WAR, Avnery joined the army (Giv'ati brigade) and later volunteered for "Samson's Foxes," a commando unit on the Egyptian front, which soon became legendary. During the last days of the fighting he was severely wounded, and after several months of convalescence was discharged in the summer of 1949 with the rank of squad leader. Throughout the war, Avnery reported on his experiences as a combat soldier who took part in nearly all the major battles on the JERUSALEM and southern fronts. These reports, which appeared in the *Ha'aretz* evening paper, were published after the war as a book, *Bisdoth Pleshet* (1948, In the Fields of the Philistines), which became an overnight best seller and is still generally recognized as the outstanding book of that war. Ten editions were published in quick succession and several more subsequently. (A new edition was published in April 1998.) However, Avnery's follow-up book, *The Other Side of the Coin,* which described the dark side of the war, including its atrocities and the expulsion of the Palestinians, was boycotted.

In 1949 the editor of *Ha'aretz* invited Avnery to join his staff as a writer of editorials; however, after one year Avnery quit, protesting that he was not allowed to express his opinions, especially concerning the mass expropriation of Palestinian LANDS by the government. Thus, in April 1950 he bought a moribund magazine and turned it into a unique Israeli institution: *Haolam Hazeh* was a combination of a mass-circulation weekly newsmagazine and a mouthpiece of aggressive political opposition to the establishment, with exposés of political and economic corruption and proposals for a radically different national policy.

Because of its untiring opposition to the official "consensus" on nearly all issues, for forty years *Haolam Hazeh* attracted an unusually large amount of both admiration and hatred. At the base of the controversy was Avnery's unflinching opposition to the nationalistic, militaristic, theo-

cratic "Jewish" state created by DAVID BEN-GURION, and Avnery's advocacy of a modern, liberal state belonging to all its citizens irrespective of ethnic, national, or religious roots. *Haolam Hazeh* fought for separation between state and religion, equality between Jews of European and oriental descent, adoption of a written constitution, and the rights of the Arab minority, women, and others. It was the first to uncover the facts of the LAVON AFFAIR (concerning an Israeli sabotage action against the UNITED STATES in EGYPT) as well as scores of corruption affairs. From the early 1950s, *Haolam Hazeh* resolutely advocated the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel and support for the Arab struggles for independence (in Egypt, Algeria, IRAQ, etc.).

Perhaps the most important battle won by Avnery was the gradual change in Israeli national consciousness from denying the existence of the Palestinian people to their general recognition, which made the OSLO ACCORDS possible. But his enemies were legion, and Avnery paid a high price for his principles. The chief of the secret service in the 1950s later testified that David Ben-Gurion and his political establishment considered Avnery and *Haolam Hazeh* as "Public Enemy Number 1." There were countless attacks on *Haolam Hazeh,* which were often violent. Its editorial offices and printing facilities were bombed several times and employees wounded. In 1953, after he criticized the QIBYA massacre, Avnery was ambushed and both his hands were broken. In 1972, the offices of *Haolam Hazeh* and its invaluable archives were completely destroyed by arson. In 1975 Avnery was the victim of an assassination attempt and sustained severe knife wounds. Throughout this time, all branches of the government and army maintained a total economic boycott against the paper.

In 1965 the government enacted a special press law aimed mainly against "that certain magazine" (as *Haolam Hazeh* was called by Ben-Gurion). This provided the final push for Avnery to enter politics. He created a new party based on the principles advocated by *Haolam Hazeh.* Initially the party was named after the magazine (New Force Movement), and it came into being on the eve of the 1965 elections. It surprised the establishment by winning a seat in the Knesset. In the 1969 elections it gained two seats. During his first eight years in the Knesset, even his enemies described Avnery as one of Israel's foremost parliamentarians.

On the fifth day of the 1967 WAR, Avnery addressed an open letter to Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL, calling upon him to make a dramatic gesture and offer the Palestinian people the opportunity to create an independent state of Palestine on the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, recently occupied by the Israeli army. This idea, which Avnery had advocated since 1948 and which he outlined in a detailed plan in 1957, became his central focus after 1967 and the subject of hundreds of his speeches and initiatives in the Knesset, where he was for years the lone voice for this solution.

To further this idea, in 1967 he wrote a book analyzing the conflict. It was published in 1968 (in English as *Israel without Zionists* and in Hebrew as *The Seventh Day War*) and translated into many languages. His proposal in 1970 for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION was attacked by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), but by 1974 the PLO's political line was beginning to change, and Avnery established contact with senior PLO officials. At the start, these contacts were secret, but Avnery reported on them to then prime minister YITZHAK RABIN. YASIR ARAFAT delegated SA'ID HAMAMI, the PLO representative in London, to conduct the meetings with Avnery. ABU NIDAL, who violently opposed any contacts with Israel, murdered Hamami in 1978. In the summer of 1975 Avnery established the ISRAELI COUNCIL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE, which officially opened in December, to take over the still-secret dialogue, which was by this time conducted for the PLO by ISAM SARTAWI (also later assassinated by Abu Nidal). The story of this dialogue forms the subject of Avnery's book *My Friend, the Enemy,* also translated into several languages.

The contacts assumed a new dimension during the 1982 LEBANON WAR, when Avnery crossed the lines at the height of the Battle of Beirut and publicly met with Yasir Arafat, with whom he would meet many times thereafter. Avnery created a sensation by this act, and several Israeli Cabinet ministers called for his indictment for high treason.

In 1977 Avnery's party joined with several other peace groups in forming a new party, SHELLI, which won two seats in the elections that year. Avnery returned to the Knesset in 1979, but gave up his seat in 1981 to make a place for an Arab colleague. He served as chairman of the party executive and upon its split became chairman of the newly formed Jewish-Arab PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR

PEACE, which won two seats in 1984. However, Avnery did not again run for the Knesset and in 1988 left party politics for good. Because of mounting financial difficulties, he had to give up *Haolam Hazeh*, having been its publisher and editor-in-chief since its inception. Soon thereafter the magazine folded.

At the end of 1992, when Rabin expelled 415 Palestinians, Avnery, together with a group of Jewish and Arab Israelis, put up a protest tent opposite the prime minister's office and stayed there for forty-five days and nights. In 1993 Avnery supported the Oslo Accords but soon became frustrated with many of the Israeli government's acts and omissions, which he believed were undermining any prospect for peace, and called for the creation of a strong extraparliamentary citizens' movement to push the government in a different direction. This led to the creation of GUSH SHALOM (the Peace Bloc), which has since become the leading voice in Israel calling for the creation of the state of Palestine in all the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Gush Shalom also demands the release of all Palestinian PRISONERS, the dismantling of all SETTLEMENTS, and the recognition of JERUSALEM as the joint capital of both states. Since its establishment, Gush Shalom has organized hundreds of demonstrations, mostly together with Palestinian activists, and numerous other political actions, including an ongoing boycott of the products of the settlements and the creation of the manifesto "Our Jerusalem," signed by 750 prominent Israelis and the Palestinian leadership. This manifesto, written by Avnery, calls for the recognition of Jerusalem as the joint capital of the two states: Israel and Palestine.

In May 1995, on the first day of his return to GAZA, Arafat publicly embraced Avnery, put him next to him on the tribune, and called him "my friend." The city of Osnabrueck awarded Avnery the Erich Maria Remarque Peace Price in 1995. At the awards ceremony, both the Israeli and Palestinian ambassadors were present. Since then, he has been awarded the Aachen Peace Prize (GERMANY), the Kreisky Prize for Human Rights (Austria), and the Lower Saxony State Prize (Germany) as outstanding publicist (awarded personally by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder).

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Avram Avinu Settlement

Avram Avinu was among the first Israeli settlements in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES after Israel conquered the areas in 1967. In the heart of Palestinian HEBRON, it has been a flashpoint of conflict since it was established. Hebron is the only WEST BANK city where Israeli settlements are located within Palestinian urban areas. In 2005, approximately 450 Jewish settlers lived in a cluster of buildings in downtown Hebron.

Avram Avinu has its origins in 1968, when a group of Israeli Jews, pretending to be tourists, celebrated Passover at the Park Hotel in downtown Hebron under the guidance of fundamentalist RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER, with plans to establish a permanent Jewish presence there. When Passover ended they refused to leave, calling themselves GUSH EMUNIM (Bloc of the Faithful). Only one descendant of the Jewish families living in Hebron in 1929 supported the establishment of this new fundamentalist settlement, which was distinct from the original Jewish presence in Hebron. Initially, Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN opposed the settlers' plan but eventually acquiesced, in part because of YIGAL ALLON'S persuasion. In an interview he gave in the later years of his life, Dayan commented that allowing Jewish settlers into downtown Hebron was "the greatest mistake of my career."

Inside the city, the settlers first focused on the Avram Avinu ruins. In 1976 Israel gave the settlers permission to erect a synagogue on the site, forcing the closure of the Palestinian wholesale market in the area. The new building also served—and still serves—as the central offices for the Hebron Jewish community, a nursery school, a kindergarten, and home to several Jewish families, including the Levingers. The Avram Avinu settlement was followed by several other settlements and Orthodox religious schools, including Beit Hadassa, Beit Castel, Beit Hasson, Beit Schneerson, Beit Fink, Beit Hashisha, Beit Romano, and Tel Rumeida—all in downtown Hebron.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON PROTOCOL, 1997; WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, 1929

Al-Awda: The Palestine Right to Return Coalition

Founded in 2002 and based in California, al-Awda, the Palestine Right to Return Coalition, is a broad-based, nonpartisan, charitable organization of grassroots activists. It is mainly committed to educating the public about the rights of Palestinian REFUGEES to return to their homes and lands and to receive full restitution for their confiscated and destroyed property in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, INTERNATIONAL LAW, and the numerous UN resolutions upholding such rights. (www.al-awda.org).

See also REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN

Ayalon, Ami (1945–)

Ami Ayalon is a former naval admiral, former head of Israel's SHIN BET, and cosponsor, together with Palestinian SARI NUSEIBEH, of the peace initiative The People's Voice or the People's Peace Initiative. He was born and raised in Kibbutz Ma'agan near Tiberias, joined the navy's elite commando unit Flotilla 13, and ascended through the ranks, eventually becoming chief of the Israeli navy from 1992 through 1996. He was formerly head of the Shin Bet, Israel's secret service, and distinguished himself in hundreds of secret missions, winning Israel's highest military honor, the Ribbon of Valor. In addition, he holds a B.A. in economics and political science from Bar-Ilan University and an M.A. in public administration from Harvard University. After the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN, Ayalon was asked to direct the Shin Bet internal security service, which played a key role in suppressing the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. Upon bringing his security career to a close in 2000, Ayalon and Nusseibeh formed The People's Voice, a grassroots lobby for Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. More than a quarter million Israelis and 160,000 Palestinians have signed on to the campaign.

A member of the Knesset since April 2006, Ayalon served as a member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense, Ethics, State Control, Labor, Welfare and Health, and Foreign Workers committees. In September 2007 Ami Ayalon was appointed Minister without Portfolio.

See also NUSEIBEH-AYALON AGREEMENT

Ayyash, Yahya (1966–1996)

Yahya Ayyash, a Palestinian, constructed bombs used in suicide attacks against Israelis. Born in the GAZA STRIP, he attended BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY, where he studied chemical engineering and was a member of HAMAS. Though his bombs used the most primitive kind of construction and design, his work earned him the nickname "The Engineer" (al-Muhandis). He started his bombing campaign in April 1994 after BARUCH GOLDSTEIN carried out the massacre of 30 Palestinians at prayer in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON at the end of February 1994. Israel's security force, SHIN BET, assassinated Ayyash on 6 January 1996 at a time of calm in the Occupied Territories; however, the results of the assassination were severe. On 26 February, Hamas launched a series of SUICIDE BOMBINGS in retaliation, beginning with dual early-morning suicide bombings of an Israeli bus and troops on the roadside. Other revenge attacks were the suicide bombing of an Israeli bus and the bombing of Dizengoff Center.

See also GOLDSTEIN, BARUCH; HAMAS; HEBRON MASSACRE; SUICIDE BOMBINGS; TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS

B

Ba'athism

Ba'athism is the ideology of the Ba'ath Party, formally the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party, which was founded in 1947 by two teachers from Damascus, Christian Michel 'Aflaq (1910–1989) and Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912–1980). Ba'athism does not have an exact analogue in English, but in general it means "resurrection" or "renaissance." It is constructed around three basic ideas: Arab socialism, pan-Arab nationalism, and secularism; that is, Ba'ath is a secular Arab nationalist political party conceived as a counter to Western colonialism and imperialism. The motto of the party is "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" *(wahda, hurriya, ishtirakiya)*. "Unity" refers to Arab unity, "freedom" emphasizes freedom from foreign control and interference, and "socialism" refers to what has been termed "Arab socialism" rather than to Marxism.

Ba'athism was influenced by nineteenth-century mainland European thinkers, notably conservative German philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte of the Konigsberg University Kantian school and center-left French "Positivists" such as Auguste Comte and Ernest Renan of the Collège de France in Paris. Ba'ath Party cofounders 'Aflaq and al-Bitar both studied at the Sorbonne in the early 1930s, at a time when center-left Positivism was still the dominant ideology among France's academic elite.

The "Kulturnation" concept of Johann Gottfried Herder and the Grimm Brothers had a certain intellectual impact as well. Kulturnation defines a nationality more by a common cultural tradition and popular folklore than by national, political, or religious boundaries, and was considered by some as being more suitable for the Arab countries. GERMANY was seen as an anticolonial power and friend of the Arab world; cultural and economic exchange and infrastructure projects such as the Baghdad Railway supported that impression.

The Ba'ath Party also had a significant number of Christian Arabs among its founding members. For them, most prominently 'Aflaq, a resolutely nationalist and secular political framework was a suitable way to evade faith-based minority status and to realize full acknowledgment as citizens.

After 1945, the traditional Arab Muslim elites failed to prevent the foundation of Israel and were not able to provide welfare and administrative standards comparable to the Western world. The secular and highly disciplined Ba'ath movement was seen as less corrupt and better organized. In multiethnic, multifaith, and highly divergent countries such as IRAQ and SYRIA, the Ba'ath concept allowed non-Muslims, as well as secular-minded Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, to work under one common roof.

The Ba'ath Party was created as a cell-based organization, with an emphasis on withstanding government repression and infiltration. Hierarchical lines of command ran from top to bottom, and members were forbidden to initiate contacts between groups on the same level of organization; all contacts had to pass through a higher command level. This made the party somewhat unwieldy, but helped prevent the formation of factions and cordoned off members from each other, making the party very difficult to infiltrate, as even members would not know the identity of many other Ba'athists. As the UNITED STATES and its allies discovered in Iraq in 2003, the cell structure has also made the party highly resilient as an armed resistance organization. A peculiarity stemming from its Arab unity ideology is the fact that it has always been intended to operate on a pan-Arab level, joined together by a supreme national command, which is to serve as a party leadership for branches throughout the Arab world.

From the early 1950s, the Ba'ath functioned as a pan-Arab party with branches in various Arab countries, but it was strongest in Syria and Iraq, coming to power in both in 1963. However, in 1966 the Syrian and Iraqi parties split into two rival organizations and remained hostile thereafter.

Both Ba'ath parties kept the same name and maintained parallel structures domestically and in the Arab world. In Syria, Ba'ath remains the ruling party under Bashar Assad, but after the 2003 US deposition of Iraqi president Saddam Husayn, Washington banned the Iraqi Ba'ath Party.

Michel 'Aflaq, the preeminent ideological father of the Ba'ath, was a philosophy student in Paris whose early interest was literary, and it is not clear how this shy and reserved young man formed the ideology that toppled regimes and established two models of oppressive government in the Middle East. The ideology of Ba'athism as it played out in Middle East politics became so ambiguous, ill-defined, and generalized that the Ba'ath Party has suffered from constant disunity and schisms. 'Aflaq never wrote a clear description of the Ba'ath ideology; all his ideas and principles were scattered throughout his many articles and published books, including his major classic, *Fi Sabil Al-Ba'th* (On the Way of Resurrection). He did, however, write strongly in favor of free speech, democracy, human rights, and aid for the poor, though these ideals were never put in place by the regimes that espoused his ideology.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights

The BADIL Center was established in BETHLEHEM in 1998 to provide alternative, critical, and progressive information and analysis in both English and Arabic on the issue of Palestinian REFUGEES and displaced persons. Through professional research and partnership-based community initiatives, it supports the development of a popular refugee lobby for the right of return. The center is a member of the Palestine Right to Return Coalition. (www.badil.org).

See also AL-AWDA; REFUGEES AND RIGHT OF RETURN

Baily Committee

The Baily Committee was formed in 1941 by BRITISH MANDATE officials to assess ways of bolstering the position of traditional Palestinian village leaders to counter the forces of Palestinian nationalism sweeping the country. It issued its findings in the Baily Committee Report on Village Administration. Little came of this initiative.

See also BRITISH MANDATE

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Baker, James Addison III (1930–)

James A. Baker was a successful businessman and a professional diplomat. He served as chief of staff in US president RONALD REAGAN's first administration, US secretary of the treasury from 1985 to 1988 in the second Reagan administration, and as secretary of state through the GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration (1989–1992). In the Bush administration Baker proposed a plan for Israeli-Palestinian dialogue (the BAKER PLAN), presided over the June 1990 termination of the low-level US–PLO DIALOGUE begun eighteen months earlier, oversaw the January 1991 GULF WAR (Operation Desert Storm), and crafted the October 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE.

Baker's principal aide on Arab-Palestinian-Israeli affairs was the pro-Israeli DENNIS ROSS (director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff), who recruited two other "old hands" in this area, AARON DAVID MILLER and Daniel Kurtzer—all three Jews with inclinations toward Israel's LABOR PARTY. Baker himself had no pro-Israel bias; if anything, he was rather cool toward Israel, and he actively disliked Israel's then prime minister, YITZHAK SHAMIR. Neither, however, did he have much interest in the Palestinians except to aver that the Palestinian issue had to be addressed.

He made no effort to capitalize on Washington's dialogue with the PLO, and he spent a full year promoting, "as the only game in town," Shamir's peace plan, a proposal so restrictive as to be unacceptable to any Palestinian. Indeed, as Daniel Pipes put it, "Baker spent months getting the Arab States to accept a peace process on Israeli terms."

Although Baker and Bush facilitated Soviet-Jewish and Ethiopian-Jewish IMMIGRATION to Israel, they deferred Israel's request for $10 million in loan guarantees to resettle the new immigrants until the Shamir administration fell and LABOR's YITZHAK RABIN was elected. The loan guarantees were granted in exchange for Rabin's promise to halt SETTLEMENT activity, a promise that he did not keep. Baker and Bush achieved a significant victory for Israel at the UNITED NATIONS—persuading it to rescind its 1975 "Zionism Is Racism" resolution (UN General Assembly Resolution 3379, 10 November 1975). James Baker's major Middle East initiative was organizing and convening the Madrid Conference.

See also BAKER PLAN; GEORGE H. W. BUSH; MADRID CONFERENCE; UNITED STATES–PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DIALOGUE

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Baker Plan

On 1 November 1989, US secretary of state JAMES BAKER formally submitted his five-point "Peace Plan," more accurately called an "election plan," to Israel and EGYPT, although they had reviewed drafts beforehand. It was based squarely on Israel's Four-Point Plan of May 1989 and was intentionally general. Baker intended it to be a framework under which Egypt would facilitate bringing Palestinian Arabs (but not the PLO) into a process of discussion about municipal elections in the Occupied Territories. The initiative contained five points or "understandings":

1. Israeli and Palestinian delegations would conduct talks in Cairo.
2. Egypt would consult with all parties—that is, Israelis, Palestinians, and the UNITED STATES.
3. Israeli participation would be contingent on its acceptance of the proposed Palestinian delegates.
4. Israel would come to the dialogue on the basis of its 14 May initiative, which stipulated that the Palestinians should be prepared to discuss local ELECTIONS and the negotiating process in accordance with Israel's initiative.
5. Palestinians could only raise issues that relate to elections and how to make the negotiating process succeed.

Israel agreed in principle to the Baker Plan in November but attached two reservations: that the PLO not be involved in the naming of Palestinian delegates and that the discussions be limited to preparations for the elections. Disagreement over the Israeli government's response to the Baker initiative caused the Israel National Unity government to fall in March 1990 in a vote of no confidence. Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR formed a new government in June 1990 and rejected the Baker Plan again, even after most of the Israeli demands had been accepted. Shamir's government took the view that the plan was too risky and that the United States was willing to sacrifice Israel and the Jewish people for its own interests. Frustrated by this process, Baker sarcastically provided Shamir with the White House telephone number, suggesting that Shamir call when he was "serious about peace."

See also MADRID CONFERENCE

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Balad Party

The Balad Party, formally Al-Tajamu' Al-Watani Al-Dimuqrati (National Democratic Alliance), was

established in 1996 by Dr. AZMI BISHARA as a primarily Arab political party in Israel. The party seeks to "transform Israel from a Jewish state into a democratic state, a state with equality for all of its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike, and to eliminate all state institutions and laws which discriminate against Arabs in Israel." It also supports the establishment of a Palestinian state in the WEST BANK, GAZA, and East JERUSALEM. In 2003 the Israeli parliament's nationalist-dominated election committee tried to ban the party from running in national elections, claiming it did not respect Israel's legally mandated status as a Jewish state and that its leader supported TERRORISM. This ban was applied to Azmi Bishara and another Arab member of the Knesset, AHMAD TIBI, who had formed an electoral alliance with the left-wing HADASH coalition, but in the end the ban was overturned by the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT.

See also AL-AWDA; AZMI BISHARA

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Balfour, Lord Arthur James (1848–1930)

Arthur James Balfour, first Earl of Balfour, is perhaps best known for authoring the 1917 BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home for Jews in Palestine. A British statesman, Balfour served as prime minister of the UK from July 1902 to December 1905. He remained leader of the Conservative Party until he was replaced in 1911, then returned to government in 1915 when he was offered the post of first lord of the admiralty in Britain's World War I coalition government. Prime Minister David Lloyd George appointed him foreign secretary in 1916.

Lord Balfour was a Christian Zionist, an ideology that supported Jewish return to Zion, as were Lord Lindsay, Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Palmerston, Disraeli, Lord Manchester, George Eliot, Holman Hunt, Sir Charles Warren, and Hall Caine, among others. Shaftesbury was probably responsible for the phrase "a land without a people for a people without a land," later to become the Zionist slogan.

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Balfour Declaration

The Balfour Declaration, issued on 2 November 1917, stated that the British government favorably viewed the creation in Palestine of "a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." It was written in the midst of World War I and presented by LORD ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, the British foreign secretary, in the name of the wartime Cabinet of Prime Minister David Lloyd George. This declaration now constitutes the principal legal justification for the founding of the state of Israel.

CHAIM WEIZMANN had first contacted Lord Balfour in 1906, hoping to convince the British government of the importance of Zionist objectives. Many Zionist leaders in Britain likewise argued for the necessity of establishing a Jewish homeland. In 1915 HERBERT SAMUEL, then a Cabinet minister, submitted a memorandum to the government suggesting that the establishment of a Jewish state controlled by Britain would expand British colonial interests. The memorandum was favorably received by a number of leaders, including Balfour and Lloyd George, while the lobbying activities of both Weizmann and Samuel influenced many politicians. But imperial interests were also involved in the decision to issue the declaration and essentially ally the British government with Zionists. The British government sought to secure the eastern flank of the Suez Canal by taking possession of Palestine and implanting there a cooperative "client population," which is how Balfour and George viewed the Jews. Finally, there was a religious component. Lloyd George was of a Christian fundamentalist orientation, and Balfour, though somewhat of a

rationalist, was nevertheless convinced of the validity of the Jewish claim to Palestine based on the Bible.

In a 1923 memorandum to the British Cabinet, Colonial Secretary Lord Cavendish described the Balfour Declaration as a "war measure" carried out at "a time of extreme peril to the cause of the Allies." Its object, according to Cavendish, was to "enlist the sympathies on the Allied side of influential Jews and Jewish organizations all over the world." This position incorporated the misconception that Zionists represented most of the world's Jews and that they had sufficient influence to help bring the US government into the war on the side of the English and to prevent the Russian government from abandoning the Allied cause.

The whole episode reflected the imperialist mindset of the time. A European government (Great Britain) had undertaken to promise a private organization (the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION) open access to the territory of a non-European government (the OTTOMAN EMPIRE). In this sense it differed from the more pragmatic and direct promise the British made around the same time to the Sharif of Mecca to support an independent Arab state throughout most of the Arab lands east of Suez, in exchange for military assistance against the Turks. It is not clear if the Zionist leaders came through with their side of the Balfour Declaration bargain, but the British facilitated their subsequent colonization of Palestine. The Arabs, on the other hand, fought against the Turks, only to be subsequently abandoned by the British, who restricted Arab independence to the Arabian Peninsula and converted the remaining Arab lands into appendages of the British and French Empires.

After the Allied victory, the British and the French, following US president WOODROW WILSON's lead, established the League of Nations. Because of President Wilson's anti-imperialism, articulated in his "Fourteen Points" (which promised self-determination to the peoples of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman Empires), FRANCE and England also masked the enlargement of their empires with the mandate system, through which the Europeans would supposedly "tutor" the non-Europeans in the art of self-government.

At the conference held at San Remo, Italy, on 24–25 April 1920, the British and the French divided the postwar mandates among the Allied powers as a form of spoils of war. The British gave themselves the mandate for Palestine, and later the League of Nations, essentially following the dictates of France and Britain, confirmed these awards. The British then arranged for the Balfour Declaration to be incorporated into the preamble of the BRITISH MANDATE for Palestine. In this fashion the Balfour Declaration, which was in essence a payment for wartime services perhaps rendered by the World Zionist Organization, changed into a "binding international legal obligation," or in the opinion of Colonel Ronald Storrs, Britain's governor in Jerusalem from 1917 to 1926, "a high and noble task placed on our shoulders by the voice of nations."

The Balfour Declaration promised a Jewish "national home" in Palestine, and many Zionists insist this meant all of Palestine, including Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950), which would place UN RESOLUTION 181 (29 November 1947), partitioning Palestine, at odds with the Balfour Declaration. For those who assert that the Balfour Declaration is the basis of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine, Resolution 181 is an illegal abrogation of Jewish legal rights and their title of sovereignty to the whole of Palestine. It is on this basis that many Zionists insist on Israel's legal right to keep all the lands it occupied in the 1967 WAR, objecting strenuously to the compromises they see in the OSLO ACCORDS.

See also BRITISH MANDATE; CHRISTIANITY; HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE; SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT; CHAIM WEIZMANN; ZIONISM

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—Lawrence Davidson

Ball, George W. (1909–1994)

George W. Ball, a lifelong Democrat, held many critically important political positions in the US government. Among other posts, he served as undersecretary of state and ambassador to the UN during the KENNEDY and JOHNSON administrations. After leaving government, Ball became a defender of the Palestinians and a critic of Israel.

Ball courageously took unpopular positions. An early and staunch supporter of fellow midwesterner Adlai Stevenson, Ball played a key role in Stevenson's (failed) 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. He is best known for his criticism of American policy toward Vietnam and for his counsel during the Cuban missile crisis of 1961–1962. Beginning in 1968, Ball became involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An early friend of Israel, Ball shifted his position and developed a more critical stance when he became convinced that Israel was pursuing a hard-line policy of aggression and violence against the Palestinians. He was particularly outraged by Israeli SETTLEMENT policy.

With the Israeli invasion of LEBANON in 1982 and the massacre by Phalangists (right-wing allies of the Israelis) of unarmed REFUGEES in the SABRA AND SHATILA camps, Ball wrote in defense of the Palestinians and in condemnation of Israeli policy. Two pieces are of special import in this regard: the 1977 *Foreign Affairs* article "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," and the book *Error and Betrayal in Lebanon* (1984), which condemns Israel, the LEBANON WAR, and US support for Israel in the war.

George Ball considered a Palestinian state inevitable and said so publicly and privately. In 1992, with the assistance of his son Douglas, he wrote *The Passionate Attachment,* a book that presented his detailed position concerning the Israelis and the Palestinians and documented the history of the relationship among the UNITED STATES, the Palestinians, and the Israelis.

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—James A. Bill

Al-Banna, Sabri Khalil (Abu Nidal) (1937–2002)

Abu Nidal, whose given name was Sabri Khalil al-Banna, was a dissident Palestinian leader, terrorist, and assassin. He was born to a wealthy family from JAFFA that was dispossessed in 1948 and settled in a refugee camp in GAZA. Later he moved to NABLUS, then under Jordanian rule, and worked as an electrician in JORDAN, where he joined the BA'ATH PARTY. For a time he worked in SAUDI ARABIA, was expelled, returned to Jordan, and joined FATAH in 1967. In 1969 Abu Nidal became the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) representative in Khartoum, Sudan, and in 1970 he was appointed PLO representative to IRAQ. In Baghdad, because of his opposition to PLO participation in political negotiations, he began consolidating around himself a group of loyal activists. With the assistance of the Iraqi intelligence services, Abu Nidal formed a terrorist group and began to act against Fatah officials. The PLO tried him in absentia for plotting the murder of YASIR ARAFAT and sentenced him to death. Abu Nidal then officially formed his own organization, the FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, and in the following decades assassinated numerous PLO leaders, almost always the most moderate, including SA'ID HAMAMI, Ali Yassin, Izz 'a-Din Qualaq, ISAM SARTAWI, Maim Khudr, and SALAH KHALAF. He also carried out countless attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets.

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Bantustans

Also referred to as cantons or enclaves, "Bantustans" are the small areas of Palestinian habitation in the WEST BANK. These small disconnected areas are the result of several factors, among them the crisscrossing of numerous Israeli SETTLEMENTS, settler bypass ROADS, military encampments, nature preserves, and the BARRIER (separation wall). Because these cantons are not contiguous, it is unlikely that a Palestinian state could be viable when (or if) the conflict ends.

By August 2006 the fragmentation of the West Bank and the ability of Palestinians to move from canton to canton within it were at their nadir. A combination of Israeli CHECKPOINTS, physical obstacles, and a PERMIT system had effectively cut the West Bank into three distinct areas—northern, southern, and central—in addition to East JERUSALEM. Within these areas further enclaves have been created, also bordered by checkpoints and roadblocks that increase the isolation of individual Palestinian communities. In addition, the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY had become an almost inaccessible enclave. Fewer and fewer Palestinians were able to obtain permits to visit "CLOSED MILITARY ZONES" —land to the west of the Barrier. The cantonization of the West Bank, combined with Israel's tight RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT of the Palestinians, is at the heart of the decline of the Palestinian economy—also at this time at its lowest point.

Northern West Bank

In August 2005, following the Israeli disengagement from GAZA and four small West Bank settlements, movement between the north and central West Bank deteriorated. The key Israeli checkpoint of Shave Shomeron closed, stopping Palestinian movement on the main route around NABLUS, the major city in the northern West Bank. In February 2006, Israel placed seven new road gates at the entrances to villages on Road 505. When the road gates were open they were the only possible entrance onto Road 505; in other words, the road running west of the Tappuah/Za'Atara checkpoint along Roads 505 and 5 to the Kafr Qassam checkpoint allowed Israel to completely seal and totally prevent all north-south movement. Between January and April 2006, the number of "flying checkpoints" (random checkpoints scattered throughout the northern districts) and the long delays they caused increased from 40 in mid-2005 to 160 in 2006.

Enclaves within the Northern Section. Since December 2005, residents of Jenin have been prohibited from passing through the Tappuah/Za'Atara junction south of Nablus, effectively sealing all residents within the northern West Bank and severing JENIN and Nablus from the central and southern West Bank and the Jordan Valley.

In March 2006, an east-west closure composed of the Kafriat Tunnel, Anabta, Shave Shaveron, Asira ash Shamaliya, and the al-Badhan road divided the northern West Bank into two parts: Jenin, Tubas, and Tulkarm to the north, and Nablus and Qalqilia to the south.

By the end of March 2006, Palestinians between the ages of fifteen and thirty-two years could not leave Nablus through the Huwwara and Beit Iba checkpoints, preventing their access to Jenin and Tulkarm. Public taxis and buses are also denied access through Huwwara checkpoint. Long delays are experienced by people who are permitted to cross the checkpoints.

Southern West Bank


Beginning in September 2000, Israel prohibited all Palestinian traffic from passing through Jerusalem when traveling from the southern West Bank to the north. Instead access has been via the long and winding road known as Wadi Nar (Road 398). The container checkpoint established at the top of the hill of the Wadi Nar Road effectively controls movement and separates the south from the central and northern areas of the West Bank. Since 2002, passage through the Container checkpoint has been allowed only for Palestinian public transport and private cars with valid permits. During periods of CLOSURE, Palestinians must cross on foot through the hills around the checkpoint to move north or south.

Enclave within Hebron City. The area occupied by Jewish settlers in the Old City of HEBRON (H-2) is surrounded by over 100 impediments to Palestinian movement. The combination of roadblocks, barriers, and military checkpoints isolates approximately sixty-three Palestinian families living in the same area as the settlers and restricts the movement of thousands of Palestinians residing and working




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Map 3. Territorial Fragmentation of the West Bank



Map 4. Northern West Bank, Territorial Fragmentation

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Map 5. Southern West Bank, Territorial Fragmentation

in the Old City and its immediate neighborhoods. In February 2006 the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) turned over the checkpoint of Givat Havot to the Jewish settlers, who have escalated the incidences of harassment of the twelve Palestinian families residing in that area, who must cross the checkpoint to access the rest of Hebron. The settlers have also prevented international organizations from using the crossing.

Enclave of South Hebron. Even before September 2000 the IDF had begun to seal off the HEBRON SOUTHERN DISTRICT through a combination of physical obstacles and movement restrictions imposed on Palestinian travel, which created clusters of iso-

lated Palestinian communities south of Road 317 and prevented access to HEALTH and EDUCATION facilities as well as to markets further north. In December 2005, Israel announced plans to build a concrete barrier one meter (more than three feet) high along the northern side of Roads 317 and 60 between the Jewish settlements of Karmel and Tene. When completed, the barrier will worsen the isolation of sheepherding communities in Imneizel, at-Tuwayni, and Masafer Yatta. Although Israel has said there are plans to ensure crossings through gates in the barrier, they are unlikely to maintain current levels of access for shepherds and landowners to grazing and cultivated areas on both sides of the road. Roads in the south are used almost exclusively by Jewish settlers and are increasingly difficult for Palestinians to access.

Central West Bank

The situation in the central West Bank, as in other areas, has been harsh, and as in other regions, it has grown increasingly difficult even though the INTIFADA has waned. In April 2006 the IDF imposed a new closure around Ramallah. The flying (randomly imposed) checkpoints at An Nabi Salih and Atara further restrict people from traveling to the northern West Bank. A series of flying checkpoints were deployed along bypass Road 60, delaying people traveling from the northern areas of the West Bank to Ramallah or further south to Jericho and Jerusalem.

East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem is isolated from and almost totally closed to nonresident Palestinians. Israel restricts movement from the West Bank to Jerusalem through a combination of the barrier surrounding the city and the complex system of checkpoints, gates, and permit requirements for West Bank residents. In January 2006, Israel further tightened access by limiting all West Bank Palestinian pedestrian and vehicle access into Jerusalem to four barrier crossings. Initially, there were twelve crossing points through which Palestinians could enter the city, but eight are now open only to residents of Israel and international travelers.

Jordan Valley. Since May 2005 access to and from the Jordan Valley has become increasingly difficult. In May of that year, Israel imposed a new policy requiring all Palestinians, regardless of family ties to valley residents or other links such as employment or landownership, to obtain a permit before crossing the Tayasir, al-Hamra, or Ma'ale Efraim checkpoints. Palestinians with a Jordan Valley address on their IDENTIFICATION CARD can move into and out of the northern Jordan Valley region without a permit.

Jericho Enclave. JERICHO is surrounded on three sides by an Israeli-built trench that prevents open access into or out of the city. There are two access roads to the city: one leading west toward Jerusalem and Ramallah, the other winding through the hills north of Jericho to Ramallah. Both roads are restricted by checkpoints: Jericho DCO (a permanent checkpoint) and An-Nwemeh, which can be crossed only between 5 A.M. and 8 P.M. Movement from other parts of the West Bank to Jericho has become increasingly difficult; for example, ambulances traveling either to or from Jericho or Ramallah are obliged to make prior arrangements with the IDF. On three occasions in April and May 2006, Israel completely denied all access into and out of Jericho.

See also BARRIER; BETHLEHEM; CHECKPOINTS; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA; JORDAN RIFT VALLEY; ROADBLOCKS; ROADS; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

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Barak, Ehud (1942–)

Ehud Barak, originally named Ehud Brog, is an Israeli military officer, politician, and prime minister (1999–2001). He was born on a KIBBUTZ founded by

his father, an immigrant from Lithuania. Barak received a B.S. in physics and mathematics from the Hebrew University and, in 1978, an M.S. in economic engineering systems from Stanford University in California.

Barak began his military career as an army corps private, but he was soon transferred to a secret unit then led by ARIEL SHARON, whom he later replaced as its head. During the 1967 WAR Barak served as a reconnaissance group commander, and from 1972 to 1973 he was the leader of a special forces unit that conducted commando raids, including the storming of an airliner hijacked by Palestinian guerrillas at Lod International Airport (now Ben-Gurion International Airport near Tel Aviv) in 1972. In 1973, disguised as a woman and carrying a purse packed with explosives, Barak led a raid on a Palestinian group allegedly responsible for killing Israeli athletes at the MUNICH OLYMPICS.

Barak was deputy commander of the Israeli forces during the 1982 LEBANON WAR, before which he argued for a surprise attack against SYRIA but was vetoed by the defense minister. In 1987 he was appointed deputy chief of staff, and the following year he organized the ASSASSINATION of KHALIL AL-WAZIR at his home in TUNIS. By 1993, after the OSLO ACCORDS were signed, Barak decided that if he wished to continue a professional career, he would have to leave the army and go into politics, which he did two years later, joining the LABOR PARTY as a protégé of then prime minister YITZHAK RABIN.

He served briefly as interior minister under Rabin and as foreign minister under Rabin's successor, SHIMON PERES. In 1996 Barak was elected to the Knesset, and in 1997, following the Labor Party's electoral defeat, he became leader of the party. In 1999 Barak moved the Labor Party to the right of center and created a coalition with several smaller parties. His goal was to increase Labor's focus on social and economic issues and on the need to restart peace talks. On 17 May 1999, Barak was elected prime minister with a record 56 percent of the votes. On 6 July 1999, he assumed office as both prime minister and minister of defense, making him not only the head executive officer of the Israeli government but also responsible for national security.

Barak claimed that his decisive electoral victory gave him a mandate for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and he resumed the negotiations with Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT that his predecessor BENJAMIN NETANYAHU had suspended. Barak also announced that Israel would resume implementation of the 1998 WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, but in fact he failed to carry out most of the redeployments stipulated by the memorandum and subsequent agreements.

Barak sought to play the Syrians against the Palestinians, and in December 1999, before meeting with the Palestinians, he held direct talks with Syrian foreign minister Farouk ash-Shara to discuss the Golan Heights. The meetings, as well as his strategy, led nowhere. However, in May 2000 Barak ordered the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern LEBANON, where they had been stationed since 1982.

In July 2000 Barak participated in the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, for which he had pressed, allegedly to resolve FINAL STATUS issues and conclude a firm peace between Israel and the PLO. The summit was a fiasco despite what is often called BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER, which was not in reality generous. Nevertheless, US president BILL CLINTON went to JERUSALEM and on Israeli television absolved Barak of all responsibility for the summit's failure. In September 2000 Barak endorsed LIKUD leader Ariel Sharon's visit to the sacred Muslim site, the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF (TEMPLE MOUNT), which sparked the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. In November Ehud Barak resigned as prime minister, the Knesset called for elections to be held on 6 February 2001, and Ariel Sharon became the next prime minister.

See also BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER

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Barak's Generous Offer

Of the leaders involved in the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (11–25 July 2000), Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK was by far its strongest advocate. It was

Barak who convinced US president BILL CLINTON of the urgency of a leaders' summit and of the possibility that it could produce a FINAL STATUS agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The summit convened, even though no prior understandings at the professional level had been reached between the two sides on most of the contentious issues dividing them, including JERUSALEM and its holy places, as well as the questions of REFUGEES, BORDERS, and SETTLEMENTS. In light of this situation, the Palestinian leadership expressed concern about holding such a decisive conference. The US government, however, decided to accede to Barak's request and convened the summit.

In the course of the Camp David Summit, Barak took the initiative and presented a far-reaching proposal for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On almost all final status issues, Barak's proposals represented significant compromises compared to offers made by previous Israeli leaders. From an Israeli perspective, Barak's offer looked exceedingly generous; however, it was far from meeting the Palestinians' minimal demands. Even more fatal to its chance of success was that Barak's offer was conditional on the Palestinians' agreement to end the conflict for all time. In other words, the Palestinians were expected to give up all additional claims vis-à-vis Israel in exchange for Israel's proposals, thus terminating the historic conflict.

Barak's offer and its limitations must be examined in the broader context of his perception of the OSLO PROCESS and the blueprint for a settlement that he strove to achieve during his brief tenure as Israeli prime minister. Before his election on 17 May 1999, Barak had been openly suspicious of the Oslo Process, pointing out, as Knesset member and cabinet minister, its disadvantages. One manifestation of his reservations about Oslo was Barak's abstention on the vote on the INTERIM AGREEMENT (28 September 1995). Before becoming prime minister, Barak had also voiced opposition to the principle of the Oslo blueprint, which he saw as transferring land to the Palestinians without securing a fair exchange for Israel.

After his victory in the elections, Barak was aware that implementation of the Interim Agreement was behind schedule and concluded that he had to enter into negotiations on a permanent agreement during his term. Israel and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) had agreed that the interim stage should be completed by 1999, and that both sides would meet their commitments, such as ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) troop redeployments, by that time. Yet after his election Barak decided not to adhere to the Oslo timetable. He chose to postpone the Israeli troop redeployments, to which Israel had committed itself in the series of agreements reached with the Palestinians after the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. These were outlined in a timetable of confidence-building measures, whose implementation was to be followed by final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Barak declined to implement these withdrawals, arguing that the PNA's record of acting on its commitments under the agreements was poor, specifically its obligation to prevent acts of TERRORISM against Israelis.

Instead of pursuing implementation of previous commitments made by Israel in the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM on 23 October 1998 (commitments that were now far behind schedule), Barak decided to bypass these agreements and enter directly into final status negotiations with the Palestinians. He believed that final-status talks would create a permanent agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, that all pending issues between the two sides would be resolved, and that an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be achieved. The final status negotiations planned by Barak were to be direct, with the UNITED STATES acting only as a guarantor of the agreement and in limited ways helping to reach its implementation.

Barak's Attitude toward the Palestinians

Immediately after his election as prime minister, Barak proclaimed four "nos" that would guide the Israeli side in the negotiations for a final status settlement:

1. No to returning to the 4 June 1967 lines
2. No to dismantling Jewish settlements
3. No to compromise over Jerusalem
4. No to any right of return by Palestinian refugees to Israel's sovereign territory

In talks with Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT on 11 July 1999, Barak also presented as a fait accompli his decision not to proceed with the redeployment phases outlined in the Wye Memorandum. Barak was determined to get the United States and the Palestinians to adopt his new fast-track approach and worked resolutely toward this end at the Sharm al-Shaykh Summit in early September 1999. Having

won EGYPTIAN, JORDANIAN, and US support, Barak succeeded in compelling the Palestinians to sign the SHARM AL-SHAYKH MEMORANDUM and thus to accept his new blueprint for negotiations on an Israeli-Palestinian final status agreement. As part of the memorandum, Israeli and PNA leaders committed themselves "to full and mutual implementation of the Interim Agreement and all other agreements concluded between them since September 1993."

In addition, however, the memorandum established deadlines for two new agreements intended to resolve all remaining disputed issues and to effect a final status settlement. One of these was a framework agreement, to be signed within five months, which would define the commitments of the parties at this stage while also detailing the issues to be resolved in a final status settlement. The other agreement, to be concluded within a year, would resolve all outstanding disputes between the two sides. This comprehensive agreement was to be considered "the implementation of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338." A potential "end of conflict" formula had been created.

Following Sharm al-Shaykh, Barak pressed ahead with his vision of reaching a final settlement with the Palestinians at a "make or break" summit, at which all issues would be put on the table and a final peace treaty signed. He tried to avoid substantive negotiations before this envisioned final summit, because he feared they would jeopardize his own political survival given his domestic political coalition problems, and because he worried that they would limit Israel's ability to maneuver in the "end-game" stage. One consequence of Barak's strategy was that he ignored the expectations and sensibilities of the Palestinians in the interim period, failing to meet commitments made to them by Israel at Wye and Sharm al-Shaykh (e.g., the handover of control of certain Jerusalem neighborhoods and the release of Palestinian security PRISONERS).

In talks held with YOSSI BEILIN on 2 October 1999, he told the Israeli justice minister that "even 50 percent of the West Bank looks like a state," and asserted that territorial contiguity for the Palestinians would be achieved by means of several bridges and tunnels. With regard to the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, Barak believed that the Palestinians would tolerate continued Israeli control over the area, including the retention of IDF camps and Israeli settlements there.

One dramatic illustration of Barak's disregard for Palestinian concerns was his sudden revival of negotiations with SYRIA in December 1999. Only a few months earlier, Barak had insisted on securing the reluctant Palestinians' agreement to the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. The agreements there should have prompted serious Israeli consideration of the details of a final status agreement with the Palestinians. However, Barak abruptly redirected his negotiators to concentrate on peace negotiations with Syria. Israeli-Syrian contacts culminated in the Shepherdstown Summit (3 January 2000), which ended in failure.

Barak Initiates Camp David

For the first half of 2000, the Barak government did not actively pursue negotiations with the Palestinians. At this stage Barak feared being compromised domestically by protracted interim negotiations. He believed that if news of his potential concessions were leaked to the Israeli public before the start of final status talks, he would have little room to maneuver at the summit itself.

Several factors led Barak to decide in the early summer of 2000 to initiate the summit. He perceived that the political situation was changing in both the United States and Israel. Clinton's term was nearing its end, and the campaign for the election of a new US president would be fully under way by the fall of 2000. In Israel Barak's government was facing increasingly severe difficulties with its coalition. Against this background, the prime minister believed that the successful conclusion, with US backing, of a final status agreement could save both himself and his party. The Israeli prime minister knew that the Palestinian leadership was reluctant to come to the summit because they felt that there was inadequate preparation on difficult unresolved issues—especially Jerusalem and the status of refugees. For Barak the summit was to be a crucial test of Arafat's true intentions; if Arafat rejected Israel's peace offer, Barak would consider this proof of the Palestinians' unwillingness to reach a real peace agreement. In this case, Barak believed, Israel would take its fate into its own hands, including unilateral moves to protect its citizens and preserve its national interests.

Barak reasoned that even if he failed to reach a final status agreement, he would appear to have defended Israel's interests and thus would improve his domestic position. Thus, Barak placed more emphasis on the idea of going to a summit, winning

US approval for his positions, and improving his standing in Israeli public opinion than on gaining acceptance of his blueprint from the Palestinians. In fact, Barak and the entire Israeli team that came to Camp David did not formulate in advance clear, concrete positions on many key issues. For instance, while Barak's team pressed for the annexation to Israel of Jewish settlement blocs beyond the 1967 "Green Line," it did not consider that these areas were also inhabited by tens of thousands of Palestinians. Because of inadequate preparation, the Israeli team also had not developed a solid position on Jerusalem.

Barak's Stands during Camp David

On 10 July 2000, a day before departing for Camp David, Barak once more emphasized that Israel would not return to the 4 June 1967 lines, that Israel would retain sovereignty over a united Jerusalem, that most of the Jewish SETTLERS in Judea and Samaria would remain in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty, and that Israel would not take any moral or legal responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem.

On the first day of the summit, Barak also told the Americans that Israel wanted to control a strip of land running parallel to the Jordan River, thus creating a buffer between the envisioned Palestinian state and Jordan. On two issues that had been considered taboo by previous Israeli governments, Barak endorsed new positions. He was willing to consider a large-scale Israeli withdrawal from the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, and he did not rule out Palestinian control over the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem, except for what he called the "HOLY BASIN": the Jewish TEMPLE MOUNT (AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF Muslim compound). In exchange, Barak wanted the Palestinians to commit to a permanent end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

From the beginning Barak's agenda dominated Camp David. The Americans yielded early on to Barak's demands regarding the opening stage of the negotiations. According to the account of DENNIS ROSS, the chief Middle East peace negotiator under Clinton, the United States had envisioned itself as an arbitrator "bounding the discussions and crystallizing them." The Americans wanted to set the terms on which the two sides negotiated and present solutions on the outstanding issues in the form of a draft agreement. Barak, however, succeeded in changing the role of the United States to that of a mediator who would eventually force the sides to accept a middle-of-the-road proposal. When the Americans attempted to frame the opening discussions at the summit, Barak persuaded Clinton to have the Israelis and Palestinians present their own starting positions instead. Later, when the Americans wanted to present the two sides with a draft agreement, Barak was insistent that both sides should present their own papers. When an arbitrator retreats from the role of controlling the bilateral negotiations of a summit, the stronger of the two sides becomes dominant. At Camp David, in response to Barak's pressure, the Americans receded from their role as brokers who set the terms of discussion, increasing Palestinian suspicions about the US role as an honest broker.

After his initial proposal, Barak prevented his negotiators from raising any new ideas and insisted on sticking to it, thus prohibiting his team from offering concessions. According to Ross, Barak's biggest fear was that he would offer major concessions and Arafat would "pocket" them without offering something in return. Because of the opposition he faced in Israel, Barak insisted that discussions between the sides would be off the record and that no protocols would be kept. During the negotiations themselves, the changing positions of the parties were also not documented, at Barak's request.

Barak allowed his negotiators, Gilead Sher and Shlomo Ben-Ami, more freedom only after pressure from Clinton. To Barak's dismay, the Israeli team made far-reaching offers on Jerusalem without obtaining what he viewed as vital concessions from Arafat. According to Ross, the Israelis showed the most flexible attitude yet regarding Jerusalem, offering to give the Palestinians East Jerusalem's northern Arab neighborhoods while keeping the rest of East Jerusalem for Israel and to institute a "special regime (in the Old City) in which there would be shared responsibilities in the Muslim and Christian quarters," which were to be worked out jointly. The Palestinians, however, downplayed the concessions and said that they could hardly agree to recognize the legitimacy of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem.

For Barak, this development was a turning point and caused him to accuse the American team of being biased against Israel and of not pressuring the Palestinians enough. In an emotional note to Clinton, Barak said that the Palestinians were refusing to negotiate in good faith and wanted to force Israel into a position that amounted to national sui-

cide. Barak was convinced that the United States would have to apply intense pressure on Arafat, even threats that he faced losing US support, if the Americans wanted Israel to continue negotiating. For the next few days, the negotiations were deadlocked.

On the eighth day of the summit, Barak, responding to American threats that the summit would have to be concluded and negotiations about Jerusalem deferred until later, finally agreed to give Clinton a series of concessions. However, the president would have to present them to the Palestinians as if the Americans were making the demands of Israel. Barak then made his final offer, which was presented to the Palestinians as a US proposal. The following are the main points of Barak's final plan:

- Israel would annex 9 percent of the West Bank and take another 1 percent of it in return for a swap of Israeli land in the Gaza Strip area.
- The Palestinians would control 85 percent of the border with Jordan.
- Israel was to be given control of the Jordan Valley for a maximum of twelve years.
- The Muslim and Christian quarters of the old city of Jerusalem would be under Palestinian sovereignty as well as almost all of the outer Arab neighborhoods. Meanwhile, the inner Arab neighborhoods would be under Palestinian civil jurisdiction, giving the Palestinians control over zoning, security, and law enforcement, but not formal sovereignty.

According to Ross, Barak also offered to give the Palestinians "custodianship" over the al-Haram ash-Sharif, but not sovereignty. On refugees, he pledged that a solution satisfactory to both sides would be agreed upon.

Barak's flexibility, however, had apparently reached its limits. On the tenth day, in response to Palestinian rejection of Israeli control over the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif, Barak insisted that he would not continue negotiating until Arafat agreed to the offer, which had been made to him via Clinton. Barak also explicitly reiterated that the Palestinians, in signing a final agreement, would commit to a permanent end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


In the meantime, Clinton had departed for three days to attend the G-8 summit in Okinawa. During Clinton's absence there was another turning point. When it became increasingly clear that the Palestinians would reject Barak's generous offer, Barak became adamant, while the Palestinians became more concerned about perceived failings of the proposal. They believed that Barak's proposals failed to grant a potential Palestinian state enough sovereignty, offered them a fragmented state, failed to make concessions on the refugee issue (in particular, an Israeli admission of responsibility), and failed to give them sovereignty over al-Haram ash-Sharif. From this point onward, Barak, according to different participants, quit participating actively in the summit, convinced that he had received nothing substantial from the Palestinians for his far-reaching offers. Barak sequestered himself, refused to meet with Arafat for direct talks, and practically demanded Palestinian acceptance of his offer if negotiations were to continue.

Barak felt convinced that all red lines had been crossed and went into damage control mode. He asserted that an agreement could not be reached and asked Clinton for a series of measures and gestures of support that would at least help him avoid defeat in the Israeli elections—since he had not achieved a settlement and he did not want to be perceived as having made extensive concessions. To shore up Barak's domestic support, Clinton concluded the talks by emphasizing the courage and vision the Israeli prime minister had shown, while blaming the Palestinians for the lack of progress.

Barak's Offer in the Israeli Post–Camp David Discourse


Barak's offer retained some relevance for several months after the failure of the Camp David Summit. Even after Camp David, Palestinians, Israelis, and Americans who had been involved in the negotiations continued holding meetings. However, two factors convinced most Israelis that Barak's offer was no longer relevant as a basis for future negotiations. One was the CLINTON PARAMETERS, which the president presented on 23 December 2000. With Clinton's blueprint, Barak's offer ceased being a point of reference for negotiations.

Another factor that terminated Barak's offer as a basis for future negotiations was its role in Israeli political discourse. Some Israelis considered the Palestinian refusal of Barak's offer proof that the Palestinians would never be satisfied with anything that Israel offered. Others in Israel depicted Camp David as being consistent with the



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Map 6. Projection of West Bank Permanent Status Map, Presented by Israel, Camp David, July 2000



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
Map 7. Projection of the Israeli Proposal for Jerusalem's Final Status, Camp David, July 2000

historical tendency of the Palestinian leadership to miss opportunities and to blunder in negotiations.

The Israeli narrative was strengthened by Clinton's public statements after the summit, in which he repeatedly held Arafat solely responsible for the failure to reach a historic agreement at Camp David. In the post–Camp David era, Barak's offer was thus transformed from a potential final-status agreement into proof that there was no Palestinian partner for peace. Barak himself implied that

Camp David had unmasked the true intentions of the Palestinians and exposed their hatred of Israel.

Barak's interpretation of Camp David thus played a key role in shaping a new Israeli post-Oslo narrative. According to this narrative, the Palestinians had never negotiated in good faith, because they did not genuinely recognize Israel's right to exist. The view that the Palestinians were not fit negotiating partners became pervasive after Camp David. As proof, the spokespeople of the Israeli political-security establishment tended to focus on Arafat's refusal of Barak's offer and the



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Map 8. The West Bank after Israel's Reoccupation, June 2002

subsequent outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which they saw as directed entirely by the PNA. Israeli chief of staff Moshe (Bugi) Ya'alon asserted in an interview on 25 August 2002 that Arafat regarded "Oslo as a Trojan horse that enabled the Palestinians to get into the country, and September 2000 as the moment of emerging from the horse's belly." The "no partner" trope—the belief that the Palestinians could never be a viable partner for negotiations—not only deepened during the second Intifada but also paved the way for Israel's unilateral policy toward the Palestinians. The map illustrates the political geography of the West Bank in the aftermath of Camp David and Israel's reoccupation in 2002.

See also CAMP DAVID SUMMIT; OSLO PROCESS

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—Yoram Meital

Al-Barghuthi, Marwan Hasib Husayn (1959–)

Marwan al-Barghuthi is the secretary-general of the FATAH Higher Committee in the WEST BANK and the most popular INTIFADA ELITE leader in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Born and raised in Kafr Kubr in the West Bank, he was among the founders of al-Shabiba (young men) and headed its faction at BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY in the early 1980s, where he also served as president of the student council. Al-Barghuthi received a B.A. in History and Political Science and an M.A. in International Relations from Birzeit.

Israel imprisoned al-Barghuthi for six years for his activism during the first INTIFADA, then deported him to JORDAN. In 1989 al-Barghuthi became a member of the FATAH-REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, coordinating relations between the inside (Occupied Territories) and outside (TUNIS and Amman). He was also an independent member of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CENTRAL COUNCIL. Returning to the West Bank in April 1994, al-Barghuthi soon established and headed the West Bank Fatah Higher Committee to develop CIVIL SOCIETY and revitalize Fatah as a viable political party. Unhappy with al-Barghuthi's moves, PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY president YASIR ARAFAT ensured that he was not on the Fatah-PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC) slate for the Palestinian elections. Nevertheless, he won the Ramallah seat as an independent. After initial competition over the civil versus military nature of Fatah in the West Bank, he became close to JIBRIL RAJUB and has good relations with Islamist groups. Al-Barghuthi was critical of the centralization of power under Arafat, and at the May 1997 PLC meeting, in the context of a budgetary misuse scandal, he submitted a motion of no confidence in Arafat. In 2000 Arafat attempted to remove him from leadership of the West Bank Fatah in favor of Husayn al-Shaykh, but the Fatah cadres refused to recognize al-Shaykh because of their loyalty to al-Barghuthi. A pragmatist, al-Barghuthi believes that a permanent solution to the Middle East conflict can be found only if the mediator is changed. According to him, the UNITED STATES is too close to Israel to be an honest broker.

Al-Barghuthi was one of the prominent leaders of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which erupted in September 2000, causing Israel to demand his DEPORTATION. On 4 August 2001, Israel attempted to ASSASSINATE him; but after the attempt failed, Tel Aviv arrested al-Barghuthi in Ramallah in April 2002, accusing him of having links to the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, a military offshoot of the Fatah movement that has claimed responsibility for numerous SUICIDE BOMBINGS. In June

2004, Marwan al-Barghuthi was convicted by a Tel Aviv court of five attacks carried out by the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and he was sentenced to five life terms plus forty years. Al-Barghuthi refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Israeli court and stated that he had no intention of appealing the verdict or asking the court for a reduced sentence.

In December 2004, despite strong pressure from Fatah officials, al-Barghuthi announced that he would stand, from prison, for election as an independent candidate for the Palestinian presidency. Polls demonstrated that he was the most popular choice among Palestinians to succeed Arafat. In the end, he did not run in the election, persuaded that he could not administer Palestinian affairs from prison or negotiate with Israel, and that his candidacy would so hurt that of PNA presidential candidate MAHMUD ABBAS as to lead to the victory of an Islamist candidate. The Islamists won a large victory in the elections for the Legislative Council.

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Al-Barghuthi, Mustafa Kamil Mustafa (1954–)

A physician and political activist, Mustafa al-Barghuthi is an advocate for the development of Palestinian CIVIL SOCIETY and grassroots democracy. Al-Barghuthi was born in Beit Rima, near Ramallah, on the WEST BANK. He studied medicine at the Russian University of Friendship of Peoples in the former SOVIET UNION. He later earned a master's degree in Business Administration and Management from Stanford University in California.

He is an international spokesman for the Palestinian sector of nongovernmental organizations and an organizer of the international solidarity presence in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Al-Barghuthi is the former leader of the PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPP) and secretary of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INITIATIVE (Mubadara) and was also a delegate to the MADRID CONFERENCE. He is responsible for the introduction of modern concepts and models of health care in Palestine. He has lectured widely at universities such as Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and Stanford, and at think tanks such as the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, Chatham House, the Brookings Institute, and the Sydney Institute. In 2001, he received the UAE Health Foundation Prize of the World Health Organization for his efforts in the Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS).

In 1979 al-Barghuthi organized and headed the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC), a nongovernmental organization that provides preventive and curative care to Palestinians living in West Bank rural villages and in the GAZA STRIP. The medical relief committees are organized and operate under the umbrella organization that al-Barghuthi organized and operated, the PMRS, establishing mobile clinics and health centers throughout the West Bank.

Ten years later, in 1989, al-Barghuthi was one of the founders of the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute (HDIP), a think tank that is an alliance of 90 organizations representing the Palestinian community. HDIP sees itself as the interface between policymakers and the Palestinian society. It advises Palestinian politicians and institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank, and various UN agencies such as UNICEF and UNDP. The institute also coordinates a large network of NGOs in the fields of health care and infrastructure conditions.

In October 2001, al-Barghuthi was one of the founders of Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian people (GIPP), which focuses on the protection of Palestinians during peaceful demonstrations by arranging the presence of international civilian observers.

Al-Barghuthi also works as an employee of the Oxford Research Group in the development of effective methods of nonviolent civil disobedience that he believes will translate into a positive change in the security situation.

In 2002, al-Barghuthi left the PPP and, together with physician HAYDAR 'ABD AL-SHAFI; Ibrahim Dakkak, a consultant in human rights for the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA); and the literary scholar EDWARD SAID, he founded the Palestinian Initiative (al-Mubadara Al Wataniyya Al Filistiniyya). The goal was a reformist, inclusive, and democratic alternative to the existing parties. The movement sees itself as a "third way" between FATAH, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and militant Islamic groups such as HAMAS.

Al-Barghuthi currently serves as the initiative's general secretary.

Al-Barghuthi has consistently criticized the PLO and the PNA for corruption and incompetence. He supports nonviolent resistance as the most effective means of overcoming Israeli OCCUPATION. He supports peace with Israel based on two states, with a Palestinian state in all the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 WAR, including a capital in Arab East Jerusalem and the right of return for the REFUGEES. He has indicated, however, that while recognition of a right of return is a must, this could be implemented in a way mutually acceptable to both sides.

In 1996, al-Barghuthi was injured while assisting victims of a violent clash between protestors and IDF soldiers in Ramallah. IDF soldiers fired near an area where medical personnel were working, and shrapnel entered his shoulder. On 3 January 2003, he was arrested following an international press conference in East Jerusalem, on charges of disturbing the peace and entering the city illegally. During his detention, al-Barghuthi was interrogated and suffered a broken knee, which, according to his account, was inflicted by blows from a rifle butt. He was released several days later.

In 2005, al-Barghuthi stood as a candidate in elections for president of the PNA subsequent to YASIR ARAFAT's death on 11 November 2004. The IDF arrested him during the election campaign and subsequently expelled him from East Jerusalem when he was planning to hold an election speech. He was also prevented from entering NABLUS and Gaza. Al-Barghuthi came in second in the elections, receiving slightly less than 20 percent of the vote.

In December 2005, the Independent Palestine list, a coalition of independents and NGO members, announced him as its top candidate in the legislative elections scheduled for January 2006. The list promised to fight corruption and nepotism, demanded the dismantlement of the BARRIER, which it termed the "apartheid wall," and pledged to provide "a truly democratic and independent 'third way' for the large majority of silent and unrepresented Palestinian voters, who favour neither the autocracy and corruption of the governing Fatah party, nor the fundamentalism of Hamas." Barghouti was newly elected to a seat on the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL in January 2006, along with one other member of the Independent Palestine list. The list won approximately 3 percent of the vote in the Council elections. He served as minister of information in the short-lived Palestinian Unity Government of March–June 2007.

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Bar Giora

Bar Giora (Watchmen) was a paramilitary organization that protected the Jewish SETTLEMENTS in Palestine during the early years of the twentieth century. The Bar Giora organization was founded in 1907 at the home of YITZHAK BEN-ZVI, who later became Israel's second president. In Neve Tzedek, near JAFFA, Bar Giora established the first commune of Jewish guards, who were stationed at Sejera. In a few settlements, young Jewish settlers organized small groups for guard duty on a voluntary basis, having learned the art of guarding and securing their settlements from the few professional military men in Palestine at that time. In 1909 the Bar Giora merged with HASHOMER.

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Barrier

The Barrier, composed of a series of electronic fences, deep trenches, wide patrol roads, and, in certain places, 9-meter-high concrete slabs, is variously called the "Separation Wall," "Annexation Barrier," "Security Fence," or "Apartheid Wall." According to Israel, it is a vital means of improving the security of its citizens. The Israeli government has also publicly contended that the Barrier is a temporary structure. But because a significant part of the Barrier has been built east of the Green Line, leveling hills, flattening valleys, and encircling whole villages and towns, Palestinians fear that its real goal is to determine the BORDER between Israel and any future Palestinian entity.

Historical Trajectory

The idea of creating a wall between Israel and its Arab neighbors can be traced back not only to the writings of Zionist leader Ze'ev (VLADIMIR) JABOTINSKY and his right-wing Revisionist camp but also to the ideologies of mainstream ZIONISM. As Avi Shlaim has observed, this vision has informed Zionism even before the establishment of Israel and the 1948 WAR; through the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Wars; the peace agreement with EGYPT; the LEBANON WAR; and all the way to the OSLO ACCORDS. Given the prominent place of the wall in Zionist ideology and practice, it is not surprising that, in the midst of the OSLO PROCESS, Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN decided to build a fence around the GAZA STRIP in 1993. Within a relatively short period, a patrol road and a series of fences 33 miles (54 kilometers) long closed the border between Gaza and Israel, leaving three passageways to connect the two regions. The Palestinians did not oppose the construction of this fence, because it was erected on the Green Line, the border determined by the 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT that differentiated Israel proper from the area it had occupied in the 1967 WAR.

Not long after the construction of the Gaza fence, Israeli military officials suggested creating a barrier to separate the WEST BANK from Israel. The fact that the idea was originally discussed during the Oslo Process and not during a period of overt conflict is telling. No less significant is that the original proponents of the Barrier were members of the LABOR PARTY and not politicians from the LIKUD, who initially opposed its construction because they feared that it would re-demarcate the Green Line. The discussions concerning the erection of a barrier did not, however, become active within Israel's ruling establishment until November 2000, about a month after the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. After public opinion within Israel demanded the creation of a barrier that would stop Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBERS, Prime Minister EHUD BARAK approved a plan to establish a barrier from the north to the center of the West Bank as a means of limiting unmonitored entry of Palestinians into Israel. Barak's government did not begin implementing the plan immediately, and in February 2001 the Labor Party lost the national elections to the Likud.

The new prime minister, ARIEL SHARON, initially opposed the construction of a physical barrier between Israel and the West Bank, but he quickly recognized that an overwhelming majority of Israeli citizens supported its erection. The Barrier had become a code word for security at a time when suicide bombers were exploding themselves on public buses and in shopping malls, killing dozens and injuring hundreds of Israeli citizens. In July 2001 the Israeli cabinet adopted a plan closely resembling the November 2000 Labor government's decision to erect a barrier that would allow Israel to monitor the entry of motor vehicles and to prevent the passage of people on foot in sections of the West Bank that were deemed high-risk areas.

Yet nine months later—a year and three months after Sharon had become prime minister—almost nothing had been done to execute the government's decision. Sharon's hesitancy to implement the plan reflected his and the Likud party's ambivalence about the Barrier, which stemmed primarily from their fear that it might undermine attempts to actualize the dream of a Greater Israel. Sharon and his political allies recognized that building a physical barrier would reintroduce the international border between Israel and the West Bank and undo in one action years of intense political labor to enlarge Israel, including the SETTLEMENT expansion and its related infrastructure (e.g., bypass ROADS, military bases, PERMITS, ROADBLOCKS, nature preserves, and CLOSED MILITARY ZONES). Nonetheless, they had to respond to public opinion. On 14 April 2002, in the midst of the massive military OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, during which Israel reoccupied all of the West Bank, the Israeli cabinet decided to establish a permanent barrier to "improve and reinforce the readiness and operational capability in coping with TERRORISM."


In the days after the decision, the Israeli military took control of Palestinian-owned LAND in several locations east (i.e., outside) of the Green Line and began to uproot Palestinian trees and level earth. Although the work was stopped a few weeks later, it resumed in August after the cabinet approved a permanent route for the first 72 miles (116 kilometers) of the Barrier. It became clear that the Sharon government had decided to construct parts of the Barrier deep inside the West Bank. More Palestinian land was confiscated to encircle Jewish settlement blocs from the east and, in this way, to incorporate them into Israel proper. In addition to separating Israelis from Palestinians, in many areas the barrier separated Palestinians from Palestinians.

The Barrier's Structure

The main component of the Barrier is an electronic fence that provides a warning signal when someone attempts to cross it. East of the electronic fence is a service road along which runs a barbed-wire fence. Further east is a trench or deep ditch, designed to prevent vehicles from crashing into the electronic fence. To the west of the fence is a trace road, intended to reveal the prints of anyone who crosses the electronic apparatus, a patrol road, and an armored vehicle road. A second barbed-wire fence is frequently constructed along this armored vehicle path. The average width of the Barrier complex is about 200 feet (60 meters). Because of topographic constraints, some areas have a narrower Barrier that does not include all of the elements supporting the electronic fence, while in other areas the Barrier's width reaches 325 feet (100 meters). This does not include a buffer zone averaging between 500 and 650 feet (150 and 200 meters) on the eastern side of the Barrier, where new Palestinian construction is prohibited. In a number of places, a "depth barrier," made up of a deep trench and a barbed-wire fence, has been constructed a few hundred yards or a few kilometers to the east of the regular Barrier. In built-up areas, where the apparatus supporting the electronic fence could not be erected, the Barrier is made up of a concrete wall 9 meters high, or approximately three stories. Altogether sixty-three gates have been built along the Barrier, of which twenty-five are accessible to Palestinians, who need special permits to pass from one side of the Barrier to the other.

The Barrier's Route

Since August 2002 the government has changed the Barrier's route a number of times following the intervention of ISRAEL'S SUPREME COURT of



The Barrier




The Barrier at Qalqilya

Justice. (See the section in this entry on "Legal Resistance.") The total length of the Barrier is expected to be 415 miles (670 kilometers)—a figure that includes sections around MA'ALE ADUMIM and the Ariel-Emmanuel settlements, which at the time of this writing are pending further interministerial examination. By the time it is complete, no less than $3.4 billion will have been spent, over 5 percent of Israel's annual budget.

The planned route extends in many places deep into Palestinian territory. The Ariel-Emmanuel finger, for instance, penetrates over 13 miles (22 kilometers) into the West Bank, which represents 42 percent of the region's width. The Ma'ale Adumim section will extend nearly 9 miles (14 kilometers) east across the narrowest section of the West Bank, thus cutting off all of the major arteries between the northern and southern parts of the West Bank and, in effect, blocking Palestinian movement between these two regions. Presently there are sixteen "internal enclaves" where Palestinian villages, towns, or cities are either surrounded totally or on three sides by the Barrier. Many human rights practitioners and political commentators believe that the Barrier's penetration east of Jewish SETTLEMENTS is a way to make future Israeli annexations easier. They claim that the Barrier's construction outside of the Green Line underscores that its major objective is to redraw the border between Israel and the West Bank. Because of its penetrations into the West Bank, the Barrier's planned route is over twice the length of the Green Line, which is 195 miles (315 kilometers) long.

Once the construction is completed, about 12 percent of Palestinian land will be located between the Barrier and the Green Line, not including large segments of land that will be confiscated if, as expected, a Barrier is erected in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. This 12 percent includes some of the most fertile parts of the West Bank and is currently home to about 30,500 Palestinians (excluding East JERUSALEM). An additional 244,000 Palestinians reside in the sixteen internal enclaves, which have one or two entrances through which the residents can pass to travel to other parts




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Map 9. The Barrier, February 2005


of the West Bank. In cities such as Tulkarm and Qalqilya, where the Barrier separates the metropolis from the neighboring villages, both urban and rural communities have suffered because the population's fragmentation and isolation have undercut social support networks and economic activity.

In East Jerusalem the Barrier, made up of concrete slates 30 feet (9 meters) tall, cuts through Palestinian neighborhoods. It disconnects about one-quarter of the estimated 230,000 Palestinians who hold Jerusalem residency cards from the city center, while the remaining three-quarters are cut



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Map 10. Barrier Wall Surrounding Qalqilya and Environs



Map 11. Barrier around Jerusalem

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off from the West Bank. After Qalqilya was surrounded by the Barrier, an estimated 4,000 residents (10 percent of the population) left the town, while the business center of ABU DIS in East Jerusalem has become a ghost town, as the existing separation wall cuts the district in half.

The Barrier's Effects

The economic ramifications of the Barrier for the Palestinians have been serious, inflicting further suffering on a society already plagued by extreme poverty. According to the UN, in 2005 the poverty rate, defined as those living on less than $2.10 a day, had climbed to 64 percent in the Occupied Territories. Although the dire economic situation is clearly a result of several factors, the UNITED NATIONS cited the Barrier as an important factor.

Many Palestinians see the Barrier as an effort to undermine their INFRASTRUCTURE so that entire communities will be unable to sustain themselves and will thus move to the Barrier's other side or leave the country altogether. On the other hand, Israel emphasizes that the number of attempts to launch suicide attacks from the West Bank into Israeli proper shrank during 2004 and 2005, after the Barrier was built. However, other factors may have been involved, including TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of Palestinians as well as changes in the political atmosphere inside the Occupied Territories, where support for suicide bombings has decreased.

Demographically, the Barrier will surround forty-eight Jewish settlements from the east, annexing the land they now occupy so that 188,000 of the West Bank's settlers will be incorporated into Israel's new BORDERS and thus legitimized. The wall being built in East Jerusalem is meant to reinforce the 1967 annexation of this part of the city and to legitimize further the 193,000 Jewish settlers living there. Thus, if the Barrier does become the new border, it will solve the problem of about 86 percent of Israel's illegal settlers. The remaining 14 percent, or 57,000 settlers, will have to be forcefully evacuated, as in ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA. It is unclear what Israel intends to do with the 30,500 Palestinians who are now living between the Barrier and the Green Line, but even if it does not evacuate them, it is likely that they will be unable to keep living in this area since in many respects the infrastructure is being drastically undermined.

Geographically and politically, the Barrier's objective is to enlarge Israel's internationally recognized territory by annexing West Bank land while creating small, isolated self-governing enclaves for the Palestinians. Aside from the sixteen small enclaves already mentioned, the Barrier's route cuts the Palestinian territory into at least two (north and south West Bank) and perhaps four larger enclaves (the north is divided into three parts: north of Ariel, south of Ariel, and JERICHO). Taking the Gaza Strip into account, it becomes clear that any future Palestinian state will be made up of three if not five main regions. Each of these regions will be closed off almost completely from the others, while Israel will continue to control all of the borders so that it will be able to implement a hermetic CLOSURE when necessary.

Grassroots Resistance

The Barrier has spurred ongoing NONVIOLENT resistance. Since Israel began erecting the Barrier, local Palestinian communities, joined by a small number of Israelis from the radical left and foreign activists, primarily members of the INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT, have confronted the military and bulldozers on a daily basis. Although this struggle has in many places been extremely persistent and has managed to draw the international community's attention to the Barrier's effects, it has not substantially changed the situation. There are several reasons for the ultimate failure of the grassroots movement, of which three are the most crucial:

1. The PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) left the role of leading the resistance to local leaders and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Consequently, the resistance has been fragmented so that only the villages and towns directly hurt by the Barrier engage in the struggle against it.
2. It is difficult for Palestinians in other areas to take part in the resistance because the CHECKPOINTS and roadblocks divide the West Bank into hundreds of small clusters and make travel from one area to the other extremely difficult, if not impossible.
3. Israel's response to the protesters has been harsh, thus deterring Palestinians from participating. So far over a dozen protesters have been killed by the Israeli military during nonviolent resistance against the wall, and thousands have been injured.

Legal Resistance

The local nonviolent resistance and the NGOs have caught the attention of the international community, and they have been largely responsible for mobilizing both the domestic and international legal struggle against the barrier.

On 9 July 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ, the UN's judicial arm) published its ruling regarding the Separation Barrier. While the judges noted that Israel has the right and indeed the duty to protect the lives of its citizens, they stated that any measures Israel adopts must conform to INTERNATIONAL LAW. The ICJ noted that "the wall, along the route chosen, and its associated regime, gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order." The court accordingly concluded the following:

- Because Israel is breaching international law, it must cease the construction of the Barrier in the Occupied Territories, including in and around East Jerusalem.
- Israel must dismantle the Barrier already built and repeal all legislative and regulatory acts relating to it.
- Israel must make reparations for all damage caused by the construction of the Barrier in the West Bank, including in and around East Jerusalem.
- The UN, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring an end to the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall.

The court's ruling is merely advisory, however, and the court has no enforcement mechanism. In response to the court's ruling, on 20 July 2004 the UN General Assembly called on Israel to fulfill its legal obligations. A majority, including the twenty-five countries comprising the EUROPEAN UNION, voted that Israel must comply with the court's ruling. In adopting a resolution by a vote of 150 to 6, the assembly also called on all UN member states "not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem," and "not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction."

Just a few days before the ICJ's ruling, the Israeli Supreme Court of Justice gave its verdict concerning eight separate land confiscation orders that Israel issued in preparation for building the Barrier in the northern West Bank Beit Sourik area. Dividing its discussion into two parts, the court accepted the government's claims that the sole purpose for constructing the Barrier was national security, not political, and security justifies the appropriation of plots of land in the West Bank. The court devoted most of its decision to the second issue, ruling that the military command failed to balance security and humanitarian considerations when determining the Barrier's route. Accordingly, the Supreme Court asked the state to change the Barrier's route, annulling six out of the eight confiscation orders (HC 2056/04).

Significant as the resistance has been, Israel has only made one minor change in the Barrier's route and has inexorably pursued its construction as part of its policy of unilateralism toward the Occupied Territories.

See also BANTUSTANS; PERMITS

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—Neve Gordon

Basel Program

The Basel Program was a statement of the objectives of the Zionist movement formulated at the First WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS, which was called by THEODOR HERZL. IT WAS held in August 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, and contained the following goals:

- The promotion by appropriate means of the SETTLEMENT in Greater Israel (Eretz-Israel) of Jewish farmers, artisans, and manufacturers
- The organization and uniting of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, both local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country
- The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and national consciousness
- Preparatory steps toward obtaining the consent of governments, where necessary, in order to reach the goals of ZIONISM

The Basel Program provided the guidelines for the work of the Zionist Organization (later, WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION) started at this congress until the establishment of the state of Israel.

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Basic Laws (Israel)

Israel's Basic Laws are legislative acts by the Knesset that exist as a consequence of the failure of Israel's Constituent Assembly and the first Knesset to formulate a constitution. In place of a constitution, Basic Laws serve as fundamental legal referents and supersede general Knesset legislation.

One of the most controversial of these is the Israel LANDS LAW, which is based on "the special relationship between the People of Israel and the Land of Israel and its redemption." The law ensures that "STATE LANDS," which constitute about 93 percent of the land in Israel, remain "national," that is, Jewish property. This means that Israel's non-Jewish citizens—the approximately 20 percent of Israelis who are Palestinian or Druze—may not rent, lease, purchase, or otherwise use this 93 percent of land.

Another controversial Basic Law is that covering JERUSALEM. This law establishes the status of Jerusalem (east and west) as the capital of Israel, secures its integrity and unity, and concentrates all governing institutions there. This means that fundamental Israeli legislation precludes the Palestinians from having East Jerusalem as the capital of any future state. (www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod.htm).

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Basilica of the Annunciation

See NAZARETH: BASILICA OF THE ANNUNCIATION

Bat Shalom

Bat Shalom (Women with a Vision for a Just Peace) was established in 1989 in JERUSALEM. It is a grassroots Israeli feminist organization of Jewish and Palestinian-Israeli women who work together to bring about a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, respect for human rights, and an equal voice for Jewish and Arab women within Israeli society. Bat Shalom has a sister organization, the JERUSALEM CENTER FOR WOMEN, in Ramallah/East Jerusalem in which Palestinian women from the Occupied Territories participate. (www.batshalom.org).

Bedouin in Israel

The Bedouin living in Israel are among the indigenous Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel after 1948 and are today a minority group of Israeli citizens. They are concentrated in two separate regions: the Negev in the south, which has the larger of the two groups, and the Galilee in the north. Traditionally they were organized into seminomadic tribes that derived their livelihood from livestock and seasonal agriculture. Since the fifth century CE (until 1948), the Negev desert was inhabited almost exclusively by Bedouin tribes. In the Galilee, which was populated with farming villages and several cities, the Bedouin were always a minority but were well integrated into the local agricultural and trade economies. Traditionally, the Negev and Galilee Bedouin originated from different regions and had little social or economic contact with each other, which remains much the same today.

In 2003 the Bedouin in Israel numbered over 210,000, of whom 140,000 live in the Negev desert. Approximately 50 percent of the Negev Bedouin live in government-planned towns, while the rest live in traditional villages that are not recognized by the government. The Galilee Bedouin number about 70,000, of whom about 30 percent also live in UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES. These two groups make up about 17 percent of the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel and are an overwhelmingly young community, among which over 65 percent are under the age of twenty.

Because of the processes of modernization, Bedouin life throughout the Middle East has undergone many changes. No Bedouin community, however, has been so dramatically affected as the Bedouin in Israel, who have also been directly and indirectly affected by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This impact is, in large part, the outcome of two ongoing components of the Zionist project: first, the transformation of Palestine from "a land without a people" into a Jewish state and second, the Judaization of the LAND.

A Land without a People

One of the main obstacles to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was that the overwhelming majority of the population was Palestinian Arab. However, during the course and aftermath of the establishment of Israel, the land was emptied of over 750,000 Palestinians, including about two-thirds of the Bedouin population, who fled or were expelled to the neighboring Arab countries or territories. Those who remained in Israel were never recognized by the authorities as Palestinians, even though all of them, including the Bedouin, had relatives in the Palestinian DIASPORA.

The second level of remaking Palestine as "a land without a people" was the division of the Palestinian minority in Israel into several smaller minorities based on religion and/or lifestyle. The authorities designated the Bedouin as a separate group and institutionalized this segmentation through administrative structures and conditions, such as allowing the Bedouin to volunteer for military service while denying this option to other parts of the Palestinian minority.

Judaization of the Land

The Judaization of the land in Palestine has its roots in pre-1948 Zionist SETTLEMENT methods, which attempted to create contiguous chains of segregated Jewish localities, particularly in areas with a Palestinian majority, such as the Galilee and the Negev. Jewish settlement in these regions continues to be a highly valued Zionist achievement. The Judaization of the land entailed its "de-Arabization," and this has been at the crux of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as experienced by the Bedouin in Israel.

Since the establishment of Israel, a number of mechanisms have been used to accomplish the double-pronged objective of de-Arabizing and Judaizing the land. First, a military administration that lasted until 1966 was established to govern the Palestinian minority in Israel. It was empowered to regulate Palestinians' places of residence and movements, which it used to prevent many from returning to and cultivating their lands. Of the nineteen Negev Bedouin tribes, twelve were removed from their lands, and whole populations were confined to a specially designated restricted area in the northeastern Negev, which represented only 10 percent of the territory they controlled before 1948. During this time the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW was enacted, which allowed for the confiscation of land whose owners were absent. Thus, the majority of Bedouin, whose absence was being imposed and enforced by the military administration, lost their lands.

Second, the Israeli government enacted a series of additional laws that facilitated the confiscation of land from the Palestinian minority in Israel, most of which was classified as "STATE LAND" and co-administered by quasi-governmental organizations such as the JEWISH AGENCY. As a result, the Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel are

currently prevented from purchasing, using, or leasing land in 93 percent of the country. The land loss has been most severe among the Bedouin, whom the Israeli authorities portrayed as wanderers, with no attachment to or ownership of the land, even though most Bedouin have permanent home bases and only seasonal migration. Before 1948 most Bedouin land was held according to traditional landownership systems, which were clearly demarcated and accompanied by contracts, either oral or documentary ones signed by neighboring tribes and communities. Because the Israeli authorities and courts refused to recognize the traditional ownership systems, the state claimed virtually all the Bedouin land. Unwilling to relinquish their land rights, the Bedouin have attempted to continue living on the land and to practice their traditional livelihood but have been able to do so only to a very limited extent. Their formal legal status as "illegal squatters" and "trespassers/invaders of State Land" has made their efforts particularly difficult. Furthermore, as members of the Palestinian minority, they continue to be viewed as a DEMOGRAPHIC and security threat to the Jewish state and denied full and equal citizenship rights.

Urbanization Program

An additional mechanism that the government instituted in the 1960s to consolidate Israel's control over the land and remove the Bedouin presence was the "urbanization program." This program involved the forced resettlement of the Bedouin population into towns on one-quarter-acre lots, making them dependent upon integration into the larger Israeli economy for their livelihoods. The government has claimed that their purpose was to provide the Bedouin with modern services—for example, running water, electricity, telephones, local schools, and HEALTH clinics—that the traditional villages did not provide. While the towns have the most basic services, they lack internal and external public transportation networks, active industrial and commercial centers, sewage systems, libraries, sports and cultural centers, and, in most cases, even banks and post offices—all of which are found in neighboring Jewish towns of comparable size. The official 2004 government document ranking local authorities in Israel according to a socioeconomic index places most of the Bedouin towns at the bottom of the list. Even in comparison to other Palestinian Arabs, Bedouins have the highest unemployment and school dropout rates and the lowest educational levels in the country. Their integration into Israeli society is marginal, and approximately 65 to 75 percent of the Bedouin population lives under the poverty line.

Bedouin who are able to do so have resisted resettlement in the towns, and thus over four decades after the initiation of the urban resettlement program, only half of the Bedouin live in the government-planned towns. The rest live in unrecognized villages and hamlets that lack services such as paved roads, public transportation, electricity, running water, garbage disposal, telephone service, and community health facilities. Because Israel doesn't recognize these towns, all forms of housing (except tents) are considered illegal and are subject to heavy fines and demolition proceedings. In 1976 the government established the Green Patrol as a paramilitary unit whose official purpose is to preserve nature, oversee state lands, and protect them from "squatters." However, its actions also include the tight control of herd sizes and grazing areas in the Negev, and the confiscation of flocks and destruction of Bedouin dwellings, crops, and trees found in violation of the restrictions.

The unrecognized villages lack their own representative authorities and have no official local council. Even those who do live in an area under a municipal authority, such as those villages within the jurisdiction of Jewish regional councils, do not receive services from these bodies or vote in their elections.

Government Plan

In light of the Bedouin's ongoing resistance to the urbanization program, in 2003 the government approved a five-year plan to bring "final closure" to the land conflict with the Negev Bedouin by establishing a number of new Bedouin towns. The plan, which was developed without the participation of the Bedouin, includes the following:

- The establishment of a new police unit and special forces to implement government policies toward the villagers living in unrecognized villages and to carry out house demolition orders
- The allocation of additional funds to the Green Patrol for more personnel, along with new powers to operate against the Bedouin
- The allocation of additional funds to the Ministry of Interior for enforcing planning and construction ordinances, which effectively means intensifying the policy of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS

- The allocation of additional funds to the courts and Ministry of Justice for special court sessions and the hiring of private lawyers to accelerate the processing of demolition orders

The government's plan has been rejected by representatives of the unrecognized villages and is being challenged through national and international legal channels.

See also PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES

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—Ismael Abu-Saad

Beged Ivri

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Begin, Benjamin "Benny" Ze'ev (1943–)

The son of the late prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN, Benny Begin is a soldier, scientist, and extreme right-wing politician. Born in JERUSALEM, he earned his B.S. and M.S. from the Hebrew University and his Ph.D. in geology from Colorado State University in the United States. From 1960 to 1963, Begin served in the Armored Corps and during 1975–1976 volunteered for a period of military service. He then worked at the Geological Survey of Israel and was co-coordinator of studies on the nuclear power plant site in Israel. Since 1989 he has served as the head of the Research Institute of the College of Judea and Samaria.

From 1988 until January 1997, Begin was a Knesset member from the LIKUD PARTY. In 1997 Begin left Likud, considering it far too soft on the issue of Greater Israel, and ran for prime minister under the banner of a reconstituted HERUT PARTY (originally founded by his father out of the IRGUN). The main issue in Begin's election campaign was his vehement opposition to the OSLO ACCORDS in general and specifically to the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, signed by Likud prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. According to Begin, "There is only one alternative today, because there are only two possibilities. Either we are dragged down the Wye River and give away more territory to these hoodlums, or we stand firm." He maintains that the HEBRON area is the heartland of the Jewish state and that Netanyahu's signing of the Wye accord was an abandonment of Likud's commitment to a Greater Israel.

Begin allied Herut with MOLEDET and TEKUMA, the most extremist parties on the Israeli political spectrum, becoming leader of the new bloc and its candidate for prime minister. One of his coalition partners, REHAVAM ZE'EVI, who openly advocated the TRANSFER of Palestinians from the "Land of Israel," became the number two person on the combined slate. One day before the elections, Begin withdrew from the race and has not returned to public life. Since leaving politics, he teaches science to Israeli high school students.

See also HERUT PARTY

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Begin, Menahem (1913–1992)

Menahem Begin was one of the most influential leaders in Israel from the mid-1940s, when he commanded the underground organization IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI, through his service as prime minister in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As the leader of a series of parties and coalitions representing Revisionist ZIONISM in the Knesset, Begin led the opposition to LABOR Zionism, which controlled the government of Israel from the founding of the state in 1948 until the 1977 elections, when the coalition led by Begin, the LIKUD, took power. In roughly five years as prime minister, Begin managed the peace process that first produced the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and later a peace treaty with EGYPT. In making peace with Egypt, Begin provided a major guarantee for Israel's security by removing a threat from the most important nation in the Arab world. At the same time, as a proponent of Greater Israel who was determined to keep the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and GAZA, Begin failed to implement the autonomy provisions regarding the Palestinians that were part of the Camp David Accords. In addition, his decision to send Israeli forces into the 1982 LEBANON WAR led to major casualties among all parties and a significant expansion of negative attitudes toward Israel.

Menahem Begin was born in Poland and lived his youth in a society in which virulent expressions of ANTI-SEMITISM were common. He became involved in Zionist activities at an early age, was educated as a lawyer, and served in BETAR, the youth organization of the Revisionist movement, eventually rising to command the Polish branch of the organization. Through his Zionist activities he came into contact with VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY, the most important leader of Revisionism, who recognized the danger for Jews in an increasingly anti-Semitic world. Jabotinsky favored the immediate creation of a Jewish state in Palestine and supported very strong military policies (what he called an "iron wall") to obtain such a state and to protect the Jewish community therein. Through Betar and other organizations, he also advocated training Jews to defend themselves. Begin was deeply influenced by Jabotinsky and for decades applied lessons from the man he labeled his "teacher."

In 1942 Begin immigrated to Palestine after fleeing Poland in September 1939. Initially he and his wife were able to make it as far as Soviet-occupied territory, where he was arrested by the secret police and eventually sent to prison. He would later write about this period in *White Nights,* which some consider a classic of prison literature. After being detained a little over a year, he was released and went to Palestine, where he immediately joined the anti-British underground and shortly thereafter became the commander of the Irgun, which he led from the fall of 1943 until the creation of the state of Israel. In fall 1944, in response to news of the HOLOCAUST and his belief that the British were not doing nearly enough to protect Jewish lives in Palestine, Begin launched what he called "the revolt" against British control of Palestine. During the four years of the revolt, which he later chronicled in his book of the same name, the Irgun carried out a number of military attacks on the British, the most famous of which was the bombing of the KING DAVID HOTEL, which served as British military headquarters. The Irgun also launched reprisal raids, including an assault on the Arab village DEIR YASSIN that left many dead, in response to what it saw as Palestinian violence against Jews. Although it was often labeled a TERRORIST organization, Begin saw the Irgun as a legitimate group that followed the laws of war and took careful steps to avoid harming innocent civilians. Although the exact influence of the Irgun on the British decision to leave Palestine is contested, it seems clear that the group increased pressure on the British and probably hastened their withdrawal. After the creation of Israel, Begin disbanded the Irgun and formed a political party based on his interpretation of Revisionism, the HERUT.

For almost twenty years Begin lived in a kind of political exile. Throughout this period, he led Herut but never came remotely close to gaining enough support to form a government. Through much of this time, Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION refused to even speak the name of Begin in the Knesset, viewing him as an extremist. Throughout, Begin maintained a consistent ideology based on a policy of strong reaction to any perceived threat, a claim of Israel's right to the LAND on both sides of the Jordan River (including both the West Bank and much of what is now the state of JORDAN), but also a strong commitment to liberal democratic principles, including the rule of law. He also continued to see Israel as threatened by a potential new Holocaust.

Although Begin's worldview did not change, the political world in Israel altered dramatically,

beginning with the 1967 WAR, which gave Israel control of the West Bank, and which Begin always referred to as Judea and Samaria. As a result of the war, Israelis could settle in Palestinian land that Begin and others considered the heart of ancient Israel. While a sense of national euphoria gripped the nation after 1967, the rise of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and the 1973 WAR shattered the mood of security, and many Israelis began to feel they were living in a threatening world. In this context, Begin's focus on the threat of a potential Holocaust and his emphasis on strong security policies as well as his absolute commitment to Eretz Yisrael (the Greater Land of Israel) resonated with an increasing number of Israelis. In 1977 he formed a coalition of parties that became the Likud and swept to an election victory. Although there were many factors in the election, not least the disaffection of the majority Arab MIZRAHI/SEPHARDIC segment of the population with ASHKENAZI (European Jews) domination and discrimination, nevertheless Begin's steadfast commitment to Israel's security and his dedication to maintaining sovereignty over all of Eretz Yisrael played a significant role in his victory.

His finest hour occurred when he agreed to full withdrawal from Sinai to achieve peace with Egypt. Shortly after becoming prime minister, Begin sent an Israeli intelligence official to Egypt to warn President Anwar Sadat of a possible Libyan plot against him. He also attempted to make contact with Sadat through third parties. In response, Sadat offered to go anywhere in the world, even JERUSALEM, to achieve peace. Begin then immediately invited Sadat to Jerusalem, and the peace process began. It proceeded in fits and starts until a September 1978 conference organized by the UNITED STATES at Camp David, where President JIMMY CARTER worked tirelessly to produce an agreement in which Egypt agreed to normalize relations with Israel, reject the use of war, and demilitarize the Sinai. Israel agreed to a complete withdrawal from the Sinai and granted the Palestinians limited autonomy, plus a five-year period of negotiations to determine the final status of the Occupied Territories. The ultimate result was a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in March 1979.

Although the treaty produced what has been labeled a "cold" peace between Egypt and Israel, it has endured the test of time without a breach, and by eliminating the risk of an attack by Egypt, it dramatically improved Israeli security and freedom of movement in the region. For example, Begin was able to launch the 1982 Lebanon War without concern about rear-guard opposition. Although he was steadfast in his commitment to the treaty with Egypt, even ordering the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) to forcibly remove Jewish settlers from the Sinai, he fulfilled none of his commitments to the Palestinians.

With regard to the Palestinians, Begin's commitment to retaining all of Eretz Israel (he did not view Sinai as part of Eretz Israel) precluded any possibility of a settlement. He felt a powerful biblical-mythic connection to the land and argued that the Israeli people drew strength from the return to their ancient homeland. For Menahem Begin, the Land of Israel and the People of Israel were an indivisible whole established by the covenant between God and Abraham, and no part could be sacrificed even for the sake of peace. At the same time, Begin was a committed liberal who believed in civil rights for all. Given these conflicting views, he offered the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories a "CIVIL ADMINISTRATION" and VILLAGE LEAGUES, but he was adamant that Israel would not withdraw from the West Bank, East Jerusalem, or Gaza. In what he continued to label as the "generation of Holocaust and revival," Begin always put what he perceived as the security needs of Israel first, and inevitably that put the legitimate needs of the Palestinians last. The result was that little or no progress was made on producing a just settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The final significant act of the Begin government was the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Begin's decision to initiate war was based on the desire to destroy Palestinian forces and institutions in LEBANON and to eliminate Palestinian nationalism in the Occupied Territories. Thus Begin ordered the IDF to attack what he considered terrorist bases and to advance forty kilometers into Lebanon. Begin's defense minister, ARIEL SHARON, ignored the forty-kilometer instruction and sent the IDF to the very outskirts of Beirut, where they became bogged down. In a series of statements, Begin compared YASIR ARAFAT to Hitler and justified Israeli military actions as needed to destroy the modern Nazis (the PLO). The results of the invasion were disastrous. Many Palestinians were massacred by a Lebanese militia in two refugee camps under the control of the IDF. Israeli forces suffered more than 600 deaths. Arafat and his fol-

lowers were forced to leave Lebanon, and the war caused some 20,000 Palestinian and Lebanese deaths. Begin had hoped to produce decades of peace and security for Israel through what he readily admitted was a "war of choice," but the result was instead a disaster for Israel, the Palestinians, and Lebanon.

Menahem Begin stepped down in the context of the SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRES at the end of the 1982 Lebanon War. Thereafter he lived a reclusive life and was not seen in public again.

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—Robert C. Rowland

Beilin, Yossi (1948–)

Yossi Beilin is a journalist, writer, former Knesset member, and one of Israel's leading "doves." He is the founder and head of the Social Democratic Party of Israel. Beilin held ministerial posts in the governments of YITZHAK RABIN, SHIMON PERES, and EHUD BARAK and is one of the most experienced left-wing Israeli politicians. He is best known for his involvement with the OSLO ACCORDS, the GENEVA ACCORD, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in general.

Beilin was born in Israel and began a career as a journalist before receiving his Ph.D. in political science from Tel Aviv University. By 1977 he was the LABOR PARTY spokesman, a position he held until 1984. From then until 1988, when he was elected to the Knesset, he held a variety of governmental posts. From 1992 to 1994 Beilin headed the Israeli delegation to the multilateral working groups that grew out of the MADRID CONFERENCE. Throughout this time Beilin had close ties to Shimon Peres, which allowed him in 1993 to secretly initiate the Israeli-Palestinian talks in Oslo, in spite of the mistrust of Prime Minister Rabin. Those secret contacts led to the Oslo Accords and to the beginning of the peace process. In addition Beilin was a negotiator at the TABA TALKS with the Palestinians in January 2001.

While out of government in 2001, Beilin initiated secret talks with former Palestinian information minister YASIR 'ABD RABBU, which lasted for two and a half years and resulted in the Geneva Accord. The initiative, supported by Swiss diplomats and officially launched in Geneva on 1 December 2003, offers an alternative peace plan with an agreement on FINAL STATUS issues in order to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

See also BEILIN-ABU MAZEN ACCORD; GENEVA ACCORD

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Beilin–Abu Mazen Accord

The Beilin–Abu Mazen Accord of 13 October 1995 set forth an outline for FINAL STATUS negotiations and was entitled "Framework for the Conclusion of a final status Agreement between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION." It was concluded immediately after the INTERIM AGREEMENT was signed, as a secret document created by MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen) and YOSSI BEILIN. With BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's election in

1996, the accord was locked away and did not resurface until September 2000 when, in the wake of the collapse of the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, *Newsweek* published the full text. It never played a role in talks between the two parties yet remains of historical significance in terms of the peace process.

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Beirut, Siege of 1982

See LEBANON WAR; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE

Beit Orot

Beit Orot is a yeshiva (religious school) and a settler organization at the forefront of the Judaization of East JERUSALEM. As a *hesder* yeshiva (one that combines religious study with military service), Beit Orot has a multipronged focus: educating its one hundred students in Torah study while they are serving in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, plus activism in the Jewish SETTLER MOVEMENT IN EAST JERUSALEM.

For all intents and purposes, the Beit Orot yeshiva is a settlement itself, because of its members' ideological profile. It was founded by Rabbi BENNY ELON in the early 1990s when he was minister of tourism. He made a point of transforming the location near the yeshiva into a national park on an overall area of 10 dunum (2.47 acres), known as Ein Tzurim, and the municipality has approved Building Plan No. 4904/A, which relates to public buildings and housing units, and gives Beit Orot the legal right to implement whatever development it wishes. Plans for development of Ein Tzurim were submitted by IRVING MOSKOWITZ, who also provided significant financing.

Successive governments have tried to implement the Judaization of East Jerusalem by integrating two forces that operate in tandem and feed off each other. One is the official, state organ that expropriates LAND and builds Jewish neighborhoods and enterprises, while the nonofficial organ is composed of settlers who perform what the state is unable to do for legal reasons. The settlers' *amutot* (nonprofit associations) are the long arm of government, moonlighting contractors for the government under each and every administration, LIKUD and LABOR. They flourished and developed with governmental backing and sponsorship, and are warmly embraced by every lawful authority, from the municipality to the police. A close, almost symbiotic relationship has formed between them and state representatives, to the extent that occasionally it is unclear who is leading whom, the state or the settlers.

Several settler associations operate in East Jerusalem: the most notable are Beit Orot and SHIMON HA'TZADIK plus ELAD, ATERET COHANIM, and ATARA L'YOSHNA. Their chief efforts are focused on the OLD CITY in the area of SILWAN, which they call Ir David (City of David), and neighborhoods surrounding the Old City. All of them collaborate in a framework known as the JERUSALEM FORUM, which links all organizations working to Judaize East Jerusalem, including the Messianic groups hoping to build the THIRD TEMPLE on the TEMPLE MOUNT.

Beit Orot is situated on Jerusalem's Mount of Olives and overlooks the TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. Its role in Judaizing Jerusalem is attested to on its website: "Establishing strategic Jewish assets in areas surrounding the Old City creates a Jewish DEMOGRAPHIC and geographic belt. This contiguous belt serves to both fortify the inner core of eastern Jerusalem as well as protect the Old City."

A new Beit Orot settlement/yeshiva is currently being built on land taken from the Armenian Orthodox Church by Ateret Cohanim in 1991 and will comprise a complex of buildings on 3,000 square meters (0.74 acre) of land.

Beit Orot also takes credit for a number of Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the East Jerusalem area, most notably Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim in RAS AL-AMUD, which was established in 1990, and the Shimon Ha'Tzadik colony in SHAYKH JARRAH, established in 1998. Beit Orot has also played a role in creating Jewish enclaves in A-TUR and ABU DIS, Ir David in Silwan, and Nof Zion on Jabel Mukhaber, with 395 new housing units, which are scheduled to open soon. This latest Jewish settlement is in the

heart of the area that every internationally recognized peace plan considers the future capital of a Palestinian state. (www.beitorot.org).

See also SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOUNT

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Beit Sahour Tax Revolt

See TAX REVOLT, BEIT SAHOUR

Ben-Eliezer, Benjamin (1936–)

Benjamin Ben-Eliezer was a career officer in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, a member of the Knesset, and minister in charge of settlement expansion in several governments. Born in IRAQ, he immigrated to Israel in 1949, speaks fluent Arabic, and is nicknamed "Fouad." He graduated from the Israeli army's Command and Staff College and the Israel National Defense College.

Ben-Eliezer was a commander in the 1967 WAR and the 1973 War; as first commanding officer in southern LEBANON in 1977, he served as army liaison with the Christian militias there. From 1978 to 1981 he was military governor of the WEST BANK and was government coordinator of activities in the Occupied Territories from 1983 to 1984. Considered a hawk on foreign policy and the Palestinian question, Ben-Eliezer was one of the main architects of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon as well as a strong proponent of OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD in 2002.

In 1984 Ben-Eliezer was elected to the Knesset on the YACHAD slate, headed by EZER WEIZMAN. (Yachad subsequently merged with the LABOR PARTY.) He is currently a member of the Labor-MEIMAD parliamentary group. From 1992 to 1996 as minister of construction and housing (the most important post for SETTLEMENT in the Occupied Territories) under YITZHAK RABIN's and SHIMON PERES's governments, Ben-Eliezer strongly promoted the expansion of Israeli settlements, especially around JERUSALEM. In 2000 Prime Minister EHUD BARAK again assigned Ben-Eliezer the construction and housing portfolio, through which he carried out Barak's expansionist settlement policy in Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Ben-Eliezer played an important role in actualizing Rabin's vision and settlement expansion in and around Jerusalem, aimed at putting the future of the city and its West Bank environs beyond the reach of diplomacy. During Barak's administration and through Ben-Eliezer's mandate as minister of housing and construction, colonization was much greater than under his LIKUD predecessor, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, especially in the Jerusalem area.

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Ben-Gurion, David (1886–1973)

David Ben-Gurion was the father of modern Israel, the foremost political and military leader of the Yishuv (the collection of pre-state Zionist institutions in Palestine), the first prime minister, and the most powerful leader in the new state of Israel from 1948 through 1963. In his early political life, Ben-Gurion was equally committed to socialism and ZIONISM, although after immigrating to Palestine in 1906, he gradually eschewed socialism for Zionism. In 1919 Ben-Gurion founded and led the political party AHDUT HA'AVODA. He eventually gravitated toward the right, and in 1930 he created and led the MAPAI party, the antecedent to the LABOR PARTY. Later Ben-Gurion was responsible for institutionalizing the premises and strategy of VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY's "Iron Wall."

Eventually Ben-Gurion's ideology reflected the pure ethnonationalism of Zionism, and his life was devoted to the single-minded pursuit of the goal of a Jewish state in Palestine—and he amassed the power to realize that objective. In the Yishuv, Ben-Gurion rose to positions of political prominence in the trade union movement—in 1920 and beyond serving as the secretary-general of the HISTADRUT (the general federation of labor in Palestine); in 1935 he was elected chairman of the JEWISH AGENCY Executive and held this post until the state of Israel was born in 1948.

The Formative Years

Originally named David-Josef Gruen, Ben-Gurion was born in Plonsk (Poland), then part of Russia and under the restrictive czarist policies that confined Jews to the Pale of Settlement (the term given to a region of Imperial Russia, along its western border, in which permanent residence of Jews was allowed and beyond which Jewish residence was generally prohibited; it extended from the demarcation line to the Russian border with Germany and Austria-Hungary). According to Ben-Gurion's biographer, Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion's strong Zionist identity and his personal sense of superiority, entitlement, and responsibility to Zionism were forged in his early years. Ben-Gurion came from a relatively privileged property-owning family. Both his father and grandfather worked as petition writers or mediators on behalf of Plonsk's Jewish residents, as a go-between for Jewish peasants in dealings with Russian and Polish officials. Although the *pokantny doradca* (corner advocates) were unlicensed and little respected, Ben-Gurion regarded them as lawyers. His father, moreover, separated himself from Plonsk's common Jews, dressed in a stylish, modern fashion, and was renowned as a host of card parties. He was above all, however, a passionate Zionist who cofounded the Plonsk Hibbat Zion Society, an early Zionist movement that advocated the Jews' return to ERETZ YISRAEL and the creation of an independent nation there.

So it was that Ben-Gurion was immersed in Zionist activity from birth. His father and his older brother aggressively collected funds from Plonsk's Jews, sending them to the Odessa Committee and on to Palestine to support the pioneers there. Ben-Gurion first heard of THEODOR HERZL, the founder of the Zionist movement, in 1896 and recalled his impression of Herzl as "a miraculous man . . . a messiah." Herzl believed that Ben-Gurion, for whom he became a model, was destined for greatness.

Ben-Gurion's education consisted of attendance at Plonsk's *heders* and a course in Russian. He studied the Torah informally and learned Hebrew. During his teenage post-*heder* years, together with two friends, he focused primarily on the founding of Ezra, a Zionist youth society. Their main goal was to teach Hebrew to their peers, and they edited their own Hebrew publication and were involved in the collection of money for the victims of the 1903 Kishinev pogroms. In 1903 Ben-Gurion and his Ezra companions aligned themselves with "Zion Zionists," in opposition to the proposal supported by some in the Zionist movement to establish the Jewish state in Uganda as an interim solution for Jewish colonization.

That same year Ben-Gurion moved to Warsaw to study for entrance to a Jewish engineering school. His engineering ambitions, however, were frustrated first by increased competition when the school opened its door to Gentiles and later by illness. The frustration continued even after he forged his birth certificate and "lowered his sights" to another institute. The revolution of 1905 led to the ultimate frustration of Ben-Gurion's aspirations. He returned to Plonsk with plans to sit for the August 1905 entrance exams; however, the martial law imposed in the wake of increased unrest shut down Warsaw's education system entirely.

Ben-Gurion then redirected his energies to politics and joined Ber Borochov's newly formed Socialist Zionist party, PO'ALE ZION. He assumed the outward appearance of a revolutionary intellectual and became an outspoken, somewhat alarmist orator and writer of handbills. He organized Ezra into a Po'ale Zion chapter and a self-defense unit. Around Plonsk Ben-Gurion carried a gun, traveled with a personal armed guard, and used petty intimidation tactics to extract "donations" for travel to small towns to attract membership and to organize Po'ale Zion chapters. Fairly quickly he concluded that he had exhausted his educational and political ambitions at home and that it was time to move to Palestine. He arrived in JAFFA on 7 September 1906.

Ben-Gurion in Palestine

In Jaffa Ben-Gurion was united with local Po'ale Zion members and set off for the pioneering agricultural settlement Petah Tikva. Within one month, however, he returned to Jaffa to pursue politics for the Palestine Po'ale Zion party's founding conference, where he was elected to the central and manifesto committees of the new party. Despite Ben-Gurion's initial favorable positioning in the party, at the subsequent Po'ale Zion meeting in May 1907, he was passed over in the selection of delegates for the WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS and was excluded from the secret planning for a Hebrew paramilitary force, BAR GIORA, and its offshoot, HASHOMER.

In 1909 Ben-Gurion moved to Zichron in Palestine to study French and Arabic, and at the next

party conference he was elected to the editorial board of the new party newspaper, Ha-Achdut. In June 1910 Ben-Gurion relocated to JERUSALEM, where he shared a room with his Ha-Achdut colleagues, YITZHAK BEN-ZVI and Jacob Zerubavel. At the time, Ben-Gurion believed that an alliance with the OTTOMAN Turks was the most efficacious way to create a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus in November 1911, he left for Salonika, Turkey, where he studied Turkish in preparation for legal studies. In June 1913, armed with a forged diploma, Ben-Gurion was admitted to Istanbul University.

Ben-Gurion maintained his pro-Turkish stance of Ottomanization until 1917, when Great Britain issued the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine. Thereafter he looked to the British to facilitate a Jewish state until 1939, when, increasingly disenchanted with London's policies, Ben-Gurion turned to the UNITED STATES. His belief in the need to have an "external power" supporting the Zionist project was consistent throughout his struggle.

In 1915, Istanbul deported Ben-Gurion to Egypt for his Zionist activities. From there he departed for the United States, where he focused his energy on mobilizing young American Jews to come to Palestine. He advocated the formation of He-Halutz, a pioneering self-defense movement that could replenish Palestine's then-dwindling HASHOMER, strengthen the Jewish right to the land, and defend the land alongside the Turks. Because his ideas were too controversial for the American Zionist leaders at this time, his success in recruitment was meager.

In 1918 Ben-Gurion enlisted in the British army for the defense of Palestine and while in England met with Zionist and Po'ale Zion leaders. In August he was stationed in Egypt, where he was able to reunite with many of his Zionist colleagues from Palestine. Ben-Gurion used leave time in November to participate in the Jaffa Po'ale Zion council. When his battalion moved into Palestine in December, Ben-Gurion went AWOL to do his political work. As punishment for going AWOL, he was demoted in rank.

In April 1920, Ben-Gurion began work on establishing the united party he envisioned: Ahdut Ha'avodah (United Labor). Ben-Gurion believed that the Jewish state had to be built by Jewish labor, which needed unity to become empowered through a tightly organized political structure. He also wanted a central role for Ahdut Ha'avodah in settlement activity. At Ahdut Ha'avodah's founding convention in February, Ben-Gurion was elected to the new party's executive committee and secretariat. In the first election for the Va'ad Leumi (National Council), the Yishuv's self-governing body, Ahdut Ha'avodah received a plurality of seats (70 out of 314), and Ben-Gurion received the most votes of any candidate in his party.

Ben-Gurion's commitment to unifying and empowering the Jewish labor force led to his creation of the Histadrut, which became the sole representative for organized labor in the Yishuv. Then Ben-Gurion worked to strengthen Ahdut Ha'avodah in order for his party to dominate the Histadrut. By 1921 Ben-Gurion decided that the Histadrut was the best instrument by which to establish a Zionist state. He moved himself and the Histadrut institutions to Jerusalem and conducted a census of its membership. Creating a census and directory ensured that only Histadrut members would benefit from the services of the federation's Labor Center and Sick Fund, which would in turn encourage workers to join the Histadrut. In the early days Ben-Gurion had to contend with the inadequate budget of the Histadrut Executive Committee (HEC), and he often clashed with the Histadrut's constituent organizations in struggles for authority. At the second Histadrut convention, however, the HEC was named the "central executive," and an amendment to the Histadrut's constitution gave it "the right of decision in all the Histadrut institutions," increasing Ben-Gurion's power.

In 1923 the Society of Workers was endorsed by the Histadrut and established as a stock company of Histadrut member-shareholders. Through the Society of Workers, the Histadrut became the major instrument for Zionist agricultural development and included among its subsidiaries some of Israel's largest employers. In the following years Ben-Gurion consolidated his authority in the HEC by campaigning to give executive power to its secretariat, of which he became de facto head. Abandoning socialism, which does not exclude workers based on race, religion, and ethnicity, Ben-Gurion now stood for the contradictory goals of "100 percent Jewish labor" and "100 percent organized labor."

By this time Ben-Gurion's vision of Zionism was increasingly pragmatic. He looked forward to the establishment of a Jewish state with an overwhelming Jewish majority, an exclusively Jewish governing body, and a near-total economic separation from Arabs. He once said of the Palestinians

that they are "easily befriended" and that "one might say they are like big children." More importantly, Ben-Gurion considered the Arabs' agricultural methods "outmoded and primitive . . . ruinous of the soil." The Arab "does not know how to derive the maximum benefit from his labor." From this analysis, Ben-Gurion stressed intrinsic Jewish superiority as a justification in itself for Jews claiming the LAND; he believed that Jews were a "cultured and energetic people." For Ben-Gurion the superiority of Jewish labor was also a justification for increased Jewish IMMIGRATION. He suggested that the Jews in Palestine should be able to "help the Arab workers and raise up the Arab masses from their degradation." Yet Ben-Gurion refined the principle of *avodah ivrit* (exclusive employment of Jews by Jews), and tens of thousands of Palestinian workers, who had already lost their lands to Jewish settlements, were fired from the Histadrut.

Ben-Gurion's vision of a segregated economy played out in several ways during the 1920s. In one situation, the Histadrut's railway union was temporarily opened to Arab workers, who were attracted by benefits such as the Sick Fund and the chance for a voice in the Histadrut itself. Zionists admitted the Palestinians with the idea that they would form separate Palestinian unions once they had sufficient numbers. When Palestinians came to outnumber Jews within the union, however, they and leftist Jews issued a call to "de-Zionize" the Histadrut, saying it should function as a BINATIONAL labor union. Ben-Gurion rejected this and proposed the formation of separate labor organizations. The Palestinians departed but their grievances were fueled.

In a second example and in the context of *avodah ivrit,* Ben-Gurion led action against Jewish citrus growers in Petah Tikvah for their employment of Arab labor. Negotiations reached a conclusion favorable to Ben-Gurion's position, with an agreement by the growers to hire the Jewish unemployed within a week. Ben-Gurion then advocated "organized violence" against the Arabs and against Jewish employers who hired Arab workers instead of Hebrew labor. Even as the unemployment situation in the Jewish settlements improved as part of an economic upturn, Ben-Gurion engaged in organizing an impromptu "force" of Jewish workers and laying the groundwork with Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir (the Histadrut's sports association) for the organization of trained squadrons.

By cutting off relief to the unemployed, he created conditions for new protests in the settlements. Real economic conditions played no role in Ben-Gurion's advocating a war on the growers; his actions were an attempt to empower the Histadrut and to emphasize the segregation of labor in Palestine. Under Ben-Gurion's direction, Jewish agricultural owners and industrialists forcefully removed Palestinians (and nonorganized Jewish workers) from jobs and installed Histadrut members in their place. By the late 1920s, growing unity between Ahdut Ha'avodah and Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir led to a merger in 1930 and the founding of Mapai (Israel Workers' Party), a broad-based labor party and the largest party in the Yishuv. Within a short time, Ben-Gurion became head of Mapai.

From 1930 onward, in the wake of the Arab general strike (the precursor to the ARAB REVOLT), Ben-Gurion portrayed himself as seeking Zionist-Arab understanding, but many believe this was merely a ploy to increase British support of Zionism and to create favorable conditions for immigration that could lead to the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine, something strongly opposed by the Palestinians. Nevertheless, he met with several Palestinian leaders, including the mufti AL-HAJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, MUSA AL-ALAMI, and AWNI 'ABD AL-HADI, and sought their consent to unlimited Jewish immigration and to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. None agreed.

During the first half of the 1930s, Ben-Gurion published three works in Hebrew: *The Labor Movement and Revisionism* (1933), *The Working Class and the Nation* (1933), and a collection of essays on labor Zionism, *Phases* (1935).

At the 1935 Zionist Congress, Ben-Gurion was elected chairman of the Jewish Agency. The Arab Revolt (1936–1939) was to erupt one year later, although the general strike remained in force; nevertheless Ben-Gurion abandoned even the pretense of an agreement with the Palestinians. He explicitly stated that sustained immigration was paramount to Zionism and that the support of the British was more valuable than the consent of the Arabs.

Ben-Gurion supported "in principle" the 1936 PEEL COMMISSION recommendations on partition and TRANSFER. Commenting on the "transfer" aspect, Ben-Gurion stated: "We have never wanted to dispossess the Arabs. But because Britain is giving them part of the country which had been promised to us, it is only fair that the Arabs in our state be transferred to the Arab portion." In another context, he

said: "The compulsory transfer of the Arabs from the valleys of the proposed Jewish state could give us something which we have never had, even when we stood on our own during the days of the First and Second Temples. . . . We are being given an opportunity which we never dared to dream of in our wildest imagination. This is more than a state, government and sovereignty—this is a national consolidation in a free homeland."

Although Ben-Gurion accepted partition, he did not view the borders of the Peel Commission plan as permanent. He saw no contradiction between founding the Jewish state in part of Palestine and planning to expand the BORDERS of this state to the whole "Land of Israel." On the territorial issue he pursued a gradualist strategy. The nature and extent of Ben-Gurion's territorial ambitions were revealed in a letter he sent to his son Amos on 5 October 1937. In it Ben-Gurion professed himself to be an enthusiastic advocate of a Jewish state, even if it involved the partition of Palestine, because he assumed that this state would be not the end but only the beginning. A state would enable the Jews to have unlimited immigration, to build a Jewish economy, and to organize a first-class army. "I am certain," he wrote, "we will be able to settle in all the other parts of the country, whether through agreement and mutual understanding with our Arab neighbors or in another way."

The Arab Revolt, which had begun in April 1936, marked a turning point in Ben-Gurion's attitude toward the Palestinians. For the first time he acknowledged openly the national character of the Arab opposition to Zionism. There is a great conflict, he told the Jewish Agency Executive on 19 May 1936: "We and they want the same thing: We both want Palestine. And that is the fundamental conflict."

Ben-Gurion insisted that it was important, especially at this time, to downplay to the outside world the extent of Palestinian opposition to the Zionist project: "In our political argument abroad we minimize Arab opposition to us. But let us not ignore the truth among ourselves. . . . Militarily, it is we who are on the defensive. . . . Politically, we are the aggressors and they defend themselves. . . . The country is theirs, because they inhabit it, whereas we want to come here and settle down, and in their view we want to take away from them their country." Yet he was already advocating the transfer of the Palestinian Arab population to other parts of the Arab world as a just solution to the problem. He stated clearly: "There was no danger of Arabs being landless; they could be transferred to Transjordan [JORDAN after 1950] and no injustice would have been done."

Israeli historian Avi Shlaim elaborates on the contradiction between Ben-Gurion's public and private postures: "Although publicly conciliatory toward the Palestinian Arabs, privately Ben-Gurion realized that Arab opposition was grounded in principle and that it amounted to an utter rejection of the entire Zionist enterprise. Thus, at a very early stage in his career, Ben-Gurion came to the conclusion that the conflict between Zionism and the Arabs was inescapable and that it presented a formidable challenge. Ben-Gurion's analysis and strategy was very similar to that of Ze'ev Jabotinsky in the article 'On the Iron Wall.' Despite common wisdom to the contrary, both men regarded the Arabs of Palestine as a national movement that by its very nature was bound to resist the encroachment of Zionism on its land. Both realized that these Arabs would not willingly make way for a Jewish state and that diplomacy was therefore incapable of resolving the conflict. Both believed that the Arabs would continue to fight for as long as they retained any hope of preventing the Jewish takeover of their country. And both concluded that only insuperable Jewish military strength would eventually make the Arabs despair of the struggle and come to terms with a Jewish state in Palestine. Ben-Gurion did not use the terminology of the iron wall, but his analysis and conclusion were virtually identical to Jabotinsky's."

After the May 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which greatly angered Zionists, Ben-Gurion devised one of his well-known "double formula" policies: Jews must fight with Great Britain in the world war as if no White Paper existed but must fight the White Paper as if there were no war.

After the Churchill government came to power in 1940 in Great Britain, Ben-Gurion was hopeful of raising a Jewish military force to fight alongside the British army in defense of Palestine. Although Churchill supported the proposal to create a Jewish force, other British politicians considered it a step toward creating a Jewish army that would establish Jewish independence and undermine the White Paper. Thus, they blocked and repeatedly delayed creation of a Jewish military force.

The Struggle for Independence

In September 1940, Ben-Gurion left for the United States to again recruit American Jews for a fighting force. "I do not rely any longer on assurances

and declarations. Our policy must be so directed that at the war's end we take Palestine." Because the British had put limits on Jewish immigration, in 1945 Ben-Gurion began to arm and mobilize Zionists in Palestine and encouraged acts of sabotage against the British by the JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, which consisted of the HAGANA underground organizations IRGUN and LEHI. He called upon the Jewish survivors in Europe to immigrate illegally to Palestine. The level of unrest in Palestine led London to seek an end to the BRITISH MANDATE, and the problem of Palestine's fate went before the UN in 1947.

The UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP) visited Palestine in the midst of increased tensions, intensified by British efforts to exert control and curb illegal immigration and by violent resistance from the Hagana, Irgun, and LEHI. The majority of the committee recommended a two-state partition plan, and on 29 November 1947 the UN General Assembly passed RESOLUTION 181 recommending the formation of both a Jewish Zionist state and a Palestinian Arab state. To gain support for the Jewish side of the conflict, Ben-Gurion misrepresented the conditions in Palestine. Testifying before UNSCOP, he claimed that Palestine had been empty before the Jews began to arrive. In answer to a UNSCOP committee member who disputed this claim, Ben-Gurion explained that all non-Jewish inhabitants whose ancestors dated back to ancient peoples mentioned in the Bible had died. Ben-Gurion specifically stated: "All of them and their descendants have died out. Yes, they disappeared."

At the beginning of the 1948 WAR, Ben-Gurion strengthened Zionist defenses, including the rallying of financial support, arms, and the consolidation of the factionalized Hagana. Ben-Gurion's name thereafter became synonymous with Israeli military might. The "Ben-Gurionist" or "activist" camp took the stance that if another party failed to meet their "obligations to Israel," whether it be the British in assisting Zionists or the Arabs in accepting them, they should be met with force. From November 1947 through December 1948, Ben-Gurion approved and oversaw the dispossession of 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians from their homes and land and the destruction of 418 villages. It was a ruthless, single-minded, and successful program to ensure that the new Jewish state had an overwhelming preponderance of Jews.

President of the New State

As prime minister and defense minister in Israel's first days of statehood, Ben-Gurion established the policy of "MASSIVE RETALIATION" against any Palestinian infiltrations into Israel and of offensive militarism that has continued until today. During the 1950s Israel carried out military reprisals on the Jordanian frontier against whole Arab communities for even minor Palestinian infiltrations and engaged in aggressive provocations to create incidents to justify additional actions. Then foreign minister MOSHE SHARETT, who favored a less aggressive approach, accused the Ben-Gurionists of "inventing dangers" and engaging in "provocation-and-revenge." Sharett attributed to Ben-Gurion the following statement: "It would be worthwhile to pay an Arab a million [British] pounds to start a war." Ben-Gurion deemed Sharett "a serious liability in the preservation of Israel's vital interests" and subsequently orchestrated his removal from office in order to pursue further military actions unopposed.

Ben-Gurion entered a short-lived semi-retirement in 1953, at which time Sharett became acting prime minister. During this period the Ben-Gurionist camp continued to consult him on military actions, circumventing or ignoring Sharett. Ben-Gurion returned to office as defense minister in 1955. Eleven days later Israel carried out the Gaza Raid, an act of aggression following a period of relative peace that led Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR to form the first organized group of *fida'iyyun*.

In 1956 Ben-Gurion joined with FRANCE and Britain, who were angered over Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal, in a war on Egypt. For Ben-Gurion this war had the goals of eliminating Nasir and expanding Israel's borders into the Sinai and GAZA STRIP. Ben-Gurion also envisioned, though did not implement, the creation of new borders for the surrounding states of SYRIA and LEBANON, including land gains for Israel, the creation of a Christian state from parts of Lebanon, and "pro-Western" conditions in an expanded SYRIA.

Ben-Gurion was determined to make Israel a major military power and did so by establishing ties with important Western powers; he secured arms from France (including NUCLEAR capability) and forged a relationship with GERMANY to ensure its economic support for Israel through financial reparations. By the late 1950s Ben-Gurion had built up an Israeli leadership loyal to his agenda of

militancy and helped advance his supporters, including MOSHE DAYAN, SHIMON PERES, and GOLDA MEIR, into key positions. Although Ben-Gurion resigned in 1963—succeeded by Levi Eshkol—this retirement too was short-lived. A year later he returned to reopen the LAVON AFFAIR and oppose Eshkol's plan to align Mapai with Ahdut Ha'avodah.

The 1965 Mapai Convention, however, approved the plan, which led Ben-Gurion and his adherents to present a separate slate in the upcoming elections. Ben-Gurion was subsequently expelled from the party that he had founded and, together with Dayan and Peres, formed a new party, RAFI (Israeli Workers). The Rafi party ultimately remerged with Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avodah in 1968 to become the Israeli Labor Party. During these years "Ben-Gurionist" militancy waned, while Eshkol focused more on socioeconomic issues and took a more cooperative approach toward the UN and the Arabs.

The 1967 War marked the end of Ben-Gurion's leadership role. Strikingly, he opposed the preemptive action against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and in the aftermath he held the unpopular opinion that some captured Arab territories (excluding Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) should be returned for the sake of peace. Ben-Gurion remained in the Knesset unaffiliated until 1970, when he resigned and retired from political life. He spent his final years in Sedeh Boker, his ranch in the Negev, reading and writing his memoirs.

See also HISTADRUT; INFILTRATION AND RETALIATION; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; WAR, 1948

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—Norton Mezvinsky

Benvenisti, Meron (1934–)

Meron Benvenisti is an Israeli writer, humanist, and iconoclast. Born in Jerusalem, a geographer and historian by training, he is passionately rooted in his homeland yet able to perceive the world through Palestinian as well as Jewish eyes. Benvenisti's major books include *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948* (2000), *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem* (1996), *Intimate Enemies: Jews and Arabs in a Shared Land* (1995), *Conflicts and Contradictions* (1987), and *Jerusalem: The Torn City* (1977).

From 1971 to 1978 Benvenisti was deputy mayor of JERUSALEM under TEDDY KOLLEK, responsible for administering Arab East Jerusalem. In 1982 Benvenisti established the West Bank Database Project, which collected, analyzed, and published previously unpublished data on the Israeli OCCUPATION of Palestine. Numerous books came out of the project, which afforded researchers invaluable raw data and analyses on the economic, social, and political situation in the Occupied Territories. Currently Benvenisti is a columnist for *Ha'aretz,* Israel's preeminent newspaper, where his contributions are known for their caustic comments on the government.

Ben-Yehudah, Eliezer (1858–1922)

Eliezer Ben-Yehudah was one of the first Zionists and is considered the father of modern Hebrew. Eliezer was born in Luzki, Lithuania, raised as an Orthodox Jew, and studied in a yeshiva until one of his rabbis, a secret *maskil* (enlightened Jew), caused him to change course and become a "free thinker" and a revolutionary. He joined the Haskalah (the Jewish enlightenment movement), although later he returned to Orthodox Judaism. When he was seventeen, Ben-Yehudah had an overwhelming revelation that was to decide his course in life: "the more the nationalist concept grew in me, the more I realized what a common language is to a nation." Thus he dedicated himself to the goal of *Yisrael be'artzo uvilshono* (the rebirth of the nation of Israel in its own land, speaking its own language).

Ben-Yehudah immigrated to Palestine in 1881 and began to implement his goals. He established two organizations: Tekhiyat Yisrael (The Rebirth of Israel) and Safa B'rura (Clear Tongue). It was largely in response to his 1879 article in *The Dawn* (a Hebrew periodical published in Vienna) that the first Zionist colonizers, the BILU GROUP, came to settle the land in Palestine.

Soon after his arrival in Palestine Ben-Yehudah accepted a teaching position at the Alliance School, the first school in Palestine where a few courses were taught in Hebrew (at his insistence). Ben-Yehudah wrote for *Hakhavatzelet* (The Lily), a Hebrew literary periodical, and launched *Hatzvi* (The Deer), a weekly publication that was the first Hebrew newspaper in Israel. For this paper Ben-Yehudah needed to coin new Hebrew words for nouns and verbs that did not exist in the days of the last Hebrew commonwealth.

Thus Ben-Yehudah founded and presided over Va'ad HaLashon, the forerunner of the Hebrew Language Academy, and worked eighteen hours a day on his *Complete Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Hebrew*. In 1910 he published the first of six volumes that were completed before his death in 1922. After his death his widow and son, Ehud, continued publishing his manuscripts, a task that was completed in 1959 (seventeen volumes). The dictionary lists all the words used in Hebrew literature from the earliest biblical writings to modern times.

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Ben-Zvi, Yitzhak (1884–1963)

Yitzhak Ben-Zvi was a Yishuv leader and the second president of the state of Israel, a symbolic honorific title. Born in Poltava (Ukraine), he immigrated to Palestine in 1907. Before immigrating Ben-Zvi was active in Jewish self-defense and played a leading role in PO'ALE ZION, a Zionist socialist organization. In Palestine Ben Zvi participated in the founding of the BAR GIORA, a paramilitary organization, and in 1909 he cofounded the HASHOMER (The Watchman) association, another paramilitary group. In 1910 Ben-Zvi coorganized the first Hebrew socialist periodical, *Ahdu* (Unity), in Palestine. With the outbreak of World War I, he was deported by the British, along with DAVID BEN-GURION. Both made their way to New York, where in 1915 they founded the He-Halutz movement in the UNITED STATES, establishing branches in many cities. In 1918 they returned to Palestine as soldiers of the JEWISH LEGION in the British Royal Fusiliers. In 1920 Ben-Zvi was elected to the secretariat of the HISTADRUT labor federation.

From 1920, the year the HAGANA was founded, Ben-Zvi was one of its most prominent figures. After the establishment of Israel, Ben-Zvi was elected as a MAPAI member to the first and second Knesset in 1949 and 1952. Upon the death of CHAIM WEIZMANN in 1952, Ben-Zvi was elected Israeli president and in 1957 was returned by the Knesset to that office for five more years. In 1962 he was elected president for a third term and died in office on 23 April 1963.

Ben-Zvi headed the Institute for the Study of Oriental Jewish Communities in the Middle East, which he founded in 1948, later named the Ben-Zvi Institute. His scholarly works were devoted mainly to research on communities and sects and to the geography of the land of Israel and its ancient populations, antiquities, and traditions.

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Bereaved Families Forum

See PARENTS' CIRCLE

Bernadotte, Count Folke (1895–1948)

Count Folke Bernadotte was a Swedish diplomat, a nephew of King Gustavus V, and a UN mediator who was assassinated in Palestine. He was active in the Swedish Red Cross and became its president in 1946. In the final months of World War II Bernadotte led a series of delegations to GERMANY that resulted in the rescue of 30,000 prisoners, including 10,000 Jews who were slated for death in the concentration camps. On 20 May 1948 the UN appointed him as its mediator in Palestine. His mandate rested on Resolution 186 of 14 May 1948, in which the General Assembly empowered Bernadotte to do the following:

- To use his good offices with the local authorities to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine
- To cooperate with the UN Truce Supervision Commission
- To invite, with a view to promoting the welfare of both the Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants, the assistance of specialized agencies of the UN and of the International Red Cross

The SOVIET UNION voted against the resolution, which originated from a British suggestion and was drafted by the UNITED STATES. The Arab states abstained. Significantly, the resolution gave the UN mediator no resources to enforce its directives.

Against seemingly insurmountable odds, Bernadotte succeeded in arranging a twenty-eight-day truce in the 1948 WAR between Israel and the Arab states, effective on 11 June. At the end of the truce, he presented a new partition plan that would give the Galilee to the Jews and the Negev to the Arabs, but both sides rejected his plan. On 8 July Egyptian forces resumed warfare. As the new round of fighting intensified, Bernadotte gave a vigorous speech to the UN calling for diplomacy, cease-fire, and refugee return. As a result, on 15 July the Security Council ordered a new truce in Palestine, which was to remain in force until a peaceful settlement was achieved. The new truce, which went into effect on 18 July and lasted until 15 October, was to be supervised by a UN mechanism set up by Bernadotte. In a short time, he succeeded in building a small truce supervision body with a Swedish colonel as its first appointed chief of staff. This was the beginning of the UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION.

Bernadotte worked to sustain the truce and find a peaceful solution, and he developed a second peace proposal that he presented on 16 October, which again was not accepted. In addition to these concerns, Bernadotte was intensely troubled, in fact "appalled," at the situation of the Palestinian REFUGEES, which he attempted to alleviate in several ways. In his 27 June peace proposal (and again in his second initiative in September), Bernadotte emphasized "the right of the residents of Palestine . . . to return to their homes without restriction and regain possession of their property." This became the foundation for UN RESOLUTION 194 of 11 December 1948, demanding that Palestinian refugees be permitted to return to their homes or to receive restitution for lost property. Bernadotte also initiated a humanitarian relief program for the Palestinian refugees. In July 1948 he established the UN Disaster Relief Project, which marked the beginning of what would become, on 1 May 1950, the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, still at work to this day.

In his time in Palestine, Bernadotte presented two plans for a comprehensive settlement. The first plan, dated 27 June 1948, suggested that Palestine—the area defined by the Mandate of 1922, thus including Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950)—would form a union comprising two "members": Jewish and Arab. All or part of the Negev would be included in Arab territory, while all or part of western Galilee would be Jewish territory. The city of JERUSALEM would be in Arab territory, and Emir Abdullah of Transjordan would rule Arab Palestine. As cited in UN RESOLUTION 181 (on partition), which was approved in 1947, Palestine would be divided between Israel and Transjordan, but the Jewish member state would have less territory than the UN resolution had allotted it. The 27 June plan was rejected by both sides.

In Bernadotte's second plan, presented on 16 September, he recommended that the whole of Galilee be part of Jewish territory; Arab Palestine was still to be merged with Transjordan; the Negev was to be given to the Arab state; and Jerusalem was to be placed under a permanent UN trusteeship. In response to Zionist objections to the first plan, Bernadotte made major changes, but the main winner was still Emir Abdullah, who would rule the Palestinian state called for in UN Resolution 181, including an enormously expanded Transjordan. Bernadotte's second plan had the support of Great Britain and the United States, which agreed that his plan would be presented to the UN. After its approval, the two great powers would ensure that the Arab and Israeli authorities accepted its recommendations.

On 17 September 1948, however, the day following announcement of the second plan, Folke Bernadotte was assassinated in the Israeli-controlled sector of Jerusalem. The murderers were never found, and no one was ever convicted of the assassination; however, it was commonly surmised that members of the LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL (LEHI), or the Stern Gang, carried out the assassination. It is now well established that the decision to kill Bernadotte was made by the Central Committee of the LEHI, which included YITZHAK SHAMIR, later prime minister of Israel.

After his death Bernadotte's second plan was also abandoned. The final blow came when US president HARRY TRUMAN, facing an uphill battle in the autumn 1948 presidential election campaign, repudiated Bernadotte's proposals in a pro-Israeli declaration on 28 October. After the United States withdrew its support, the British could not push the Bernadotte plan through the UN alone.

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Betar

Betar, Brit Yosef Trumpeldor, was a paramilitary movement, founded by VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY in 1923 in Riga, Latvia, as an offshoot of his Revisionist Zionist movement. Its major objectives were to recruit youth to the Revisionist worldview and to create a new generation of Jewish warriors. The movement quickly established a reputation as the premier activist Zionist youth organization, a position that it has maintained to this day. Betar members played vital roles in the fight against the BRITISH MANDATE and the creation of Israel. Its members wore and were often known as "brownshirts." During the Mandate a great many Betarim received military training in DIASPORA countries before settling in Palestine. For this purpose, Betar established a naval school in the Italian city of Civitavecchia. With the creation of the state of Israel, many of the school's graduates joined the Israeli navy and army and became high officers in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. Many of Israel's most prominent public figures were graduates of Betar, including former prime ministers MENAHEM BEGIN and YITZHAK SHAMIR and former defense minister Moshe Arens.

In 1929, Betar's forces fought from Plugat HaKotel, their residences in Jerusalem, against Palestinians who contested exclusive Jewish prayer in the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES. In 1938, when Jabotinsky formed ALIYA BET to counter the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER by illegally transporting Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe to Palestine, he delegated to Betar the responsibility for organizing the transports and guiding the immigrants to their ports of embarkation. Betar exists today in chapters around the world known as Zionist Youth Organizations. (www.betar.org).

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Bethlehem

Bethlehem is located in the Judean hills, about six miles south of JERUSALEM, in the WEST BANK. Evidence of a settlement is first mentioned in ancient Egyptian documents from the fourteenth century BCE, when Bethlehem was settled by Canaanite tribes who named the city Beit Lahama. Around 1200 BCE the Philistines had a garrison stationed in Bethlehem because of its strategic location. The city also is significant to both Jews and Muslims because it is the burial place of the matriarch Rachel, who was the wife of Jacob (the third biblical prophet), and the birthplace of King David, from whose lineage Jesus Christ was descended.

Following the Edict of Milan in 313 CE, in which the Emperor Constantine legalized Christianity, his mother Helena founded the Church of the Nativity over what was thought to be the birthplace of Christ. Christian communities began settling in Bethlehem, and the town became a center of pilgrimage. By 600 CE, Bethlehem was a flourishing town and the site of many churches and monasteries. The original church, destroyed by a SAMARITAN uprising in 529, was rebuilt by Emperor Justinian similar to its present form. After the Muslim conquest in the seventh century, Bethlehem escaped destruction as a result of Muslim caliph Umar's tolerance toward all "Peoples of the Book." However, some Christian sites in Bethlehem were damaged after Umar's death, but the Church of the Nativity was spared.

Under the Latin Kingdom established as a result of the First Crusade, the town was prosperous and remained a center of pilgrimage. When SALADIN's armies entered the city they did no damage and allowed the return of priests to the holy places. It was not until its conquest by the MAMLUK sultan Baybars that the city was destroyed. Despite the expulsion of most Christians, the Church of the Nativity continued to be maintained by the Franciscan and GREEK ORTHODOX communities. This arrangement continued after the OTTOMAN government took control of Palestine in 1516.


In the nineteenth century, Bethlehem was a small agricultural town supported by olive groves, figs, grain fields, and sheep. It was also the economic center of the Ta'amira BEDOUIN who lived south of the town. The prosperity of the area was reflected in a flourishing building industry. The quarrying of limestone employed a large number of people, and stonecutters and masons from Bethlehem were involved in the building boom in nearby Jerusalem. One of the largest sources of income throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the manufacture and sale of devotional souvenirs. Items made from olive wood, mother-of-pearl, and a type of limestone not only were popular among visiting pilgrims and tourists, but also found markets abroad in Europe, RUSSIA, and South America.

The population remained stable but decreased after World War I to about 6,000 because of emigration. By 1947 there was an increase to about 8,000, nearly all Christians. In 1948, as part of the West Bank, Bethlehem was occupied by JORDAN and became home to thousands of REFUGEES displaced by Israeli forces. Today its population is predominantly Muslim because of both Christian emigration and higher Muslim birthrates.

The Barrier's Effect

Bethlehem has been at the center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its residents have suffered, especially since the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000 and the completion in 2006 of the Separation BARRIER around Bethlehem and Beit Jala. The isolation of Bethlehem resulting from the nine-meter-high concrete wall has led to deepening poverty and to many Christians leaving the town. Bethlehem was historically considered a suburb of Jerusalem, but Israel's wall has separated the two cities, although it is barely five kilometers between the holy sites in Jerusalem's OLD CITY and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. In the past, tourists streamed between the two centers, and CHRISTIANS had solemn parades originating in Jerusalem and ending in Bethlehem, but the route is now blocked by the wall.

The Barrier's strangulation of Bethlehem has destroyed the tourism industry and the city's economic base. Some seventy-two of the city's eighty



Map 12. Barrier around Bethlehem

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largest businesses have been forced to close. Thousands of people in Bethlehem depend on tourism, including hotel owners and their employees, craftspeople, shopkeepers, taxi drivers, souvenir shops, restaurant owners and workers, tour guides, and many others. In better times Bethlehem drew more than 90,000 pilgrims a month, but that level of activity has ended. At Christmas 2006, when the Barrier had increased the difficulty of getting to Bethlehem, just slightly more than 2,500 foreign visitors traveled to Bethlehem.

The Barrier that stops tourists also cuts across Bethlehem's main trade artery. Anyone wanting to cross the wall must go through a sprawling modern building, known as a terminal (Gilo 300 Terminal)—very much like the ERETZ barricade that separates GAZA from Israel—that functions as an international border crossing. Terminal 300 was inaugurated by the Israeli authorities at the northern entrance of the Bethlehem Governorate on 15 November 2005, the first of ten such terminals that are being constructed along the Barrier.

Driving from Jerusalem to Bethlehem entails passing through several CHECKPOINTS, where Israeli officials check IDs, PERMITS, and passports. At the terminal there are two lanes entering from Jerusalem, one for the cars with Jewish passengers and the other for foreign tourist buses. Palestinian Jerusalemites can enter only as pedestrians and only if they have employment cards from one of the international organizations or medical institutions operating there. West Bank Palestinians who live outside the Bethlehem Governorate are prohibited from entering at all.

The land on which the Barrier was constructed, some 4,400 acres (18,000 dunum), was confiscated from Bethlehem residents and the governorate. In September 2002 the Israeli forces handed residents of the Bethlehem Governorate a military order that confiscated four acres (eighteen dunum) of land located in the vicinity of Rachel's Tomb and made provision for about 750 acres (3,000 dunum) of land belonging to the Bethlehem Governorate to be annexed to Jerusalem.



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The Barrier at Bethlehem

Rachel's Tomb

The area around Rachel's Tomb—a holy site for Jews and Muslims located just inside the Bethlehem Governorate—previously was home to restaurants and shops catering to Israelis, Palestinians, and foreign tourists. But the Israeli government surrounded Rachel's Tomb with a wall (different from the Barrier) that has only one access point, from its western side.

In the course of building the second wall, Israelis seized Palestinian land surrounding the tomb, which is now enclosed within ten to eleven-meter-high concrete partitions with four military watchtowers.

These fortifications have severed the main road, and the direct road from Jerusalem to HEBRON, which is blocked by the wall around Rachel's Tomb. Despite its significance in Islam, Palestinians are permanently prohibited from entering the tomb.

A Jewish SETTLEMENT is being built close to Rachel's Tomb, and in 2005 the ultra-Orthodox Kever Rahel Fund announced plans to build 400 Jewish-only apartments adjacent to the tomb. The residents of Bethlehem fear their town will become another Hebron. To facilitate the movement of religious Jews from all over the West Bank to the tomb, Israel has also constructed a bypass ROAD that runs parallel to the path of the Barrier at Bethlehem's northern entrance, from the Gilo 300 Terminal to Rachel's Tomb. On 3 February 2005 the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT rejected a petition presented by eighteen Palestinian families from Bethlehem and Beit Jala against construction of the bypass. A week after the court's ruling, Kever Rahel Fund founder and director Miriam Adani told the *Jerusalem Post* that the court's decision is the "first step towards the establishment of a Jewish community around the Rachel's Tomb compound." In August 2006, Israel officially severed the Rachel's Tomb area from the rest of Bethlehem.

Aida Refugee Camp

The Aida Refugee Camp abuts Bethlehem and contains Palestinian REFUGEES from the 1948 WAR. It is a small camp of 4,534, whose residents typically traveled to Bethlehem for most of their basic needs before the Barrier was built less than sixty-five feet (twenty meters) from the camp. In early 2004, before building the Barrier, Israel began a campaign of arresting young men from the camp—possibly an effort to preclude protests. Some have been released, but many others have not. Popular protests have resulted in injuries of camp residents and frequent Israeli raids with tear gas. From the perspective of the refugees, the wall has been built along the most devastating course possible. Not only is it right next to the camp, cutting it off from a neighboring olive orchard that was the only open space available to people of the camp, but the wall makes it difficult for residents to travel to adjacent neighborhoods within the governorate.

Before the Barrier, the power supply for Aida came from Jerusalem and its water from Bethlehem. Now both are sporadic and uncertain. The refugees essentially exist in the middle of nowhere, without access to Bethlehem, Jerusalem, or elsewhere. The Barrier has been built literally on the doorsteps of many camp homes, imprisoning families, with no way out in any direction.

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—Betsy Folkins

Bethlehem: Siege of the Church of the Nativity

In the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) held over 150 Palestinians hostage and under siege from 2 April to 10 May 2002 in BETHLEHEM's Church of the Nativity. This number included mostly unarmed civilians and some armed militants. During the siege the IDF denied food and medicine to the people inside, and Israeli army snipers killed 7 and wounded more than 40 people inside, mostly unarmed civilians. Four Israeli soldiers were wounded.

When the siege ended on 10 May, Israel deported to Cyprus 13 men who it said were among its most wanted militants and banished 26 others to GAZA. Not long after, EUROPEAN UNION negotiators arranged for 12 of the 13 men in Cyprus to be sent to several countries in Europe, including Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Belgium, and Italy.

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Bialik, Hayyim Nachman (1873–1934)

Nachman Bialik was a poet, translator, essayist, storyteller, and editor. Born in Radi, RUSSIA, he was one of the greatest Hebrew poets of all time and is considered Israel's national poet. Many Israeli intellectuals claim that Bialik's castigations against Jewish passivity in the face of ANTI-SEMITIC violence in Russia and Poland during the 1880s furthered the idea of founding Jewish self-defense groups in Russia, and eventually the HAGANA in Palestine. He immigrated to Palestine in 1924.

Bialik studied in Lithuania and Russia and was influenced by the Torah, the Talmud, and the Jewish enlightenment *(haskalah),* especially by the philosopher AHAD HA'AM. Although Bialik wrote in Yiddish, most of his important writings are in Hebrew. In many poems Bialik depicted the suffering of his people, but he also ridiculed the weakness and submissiveness of his fellow intellectuals.

In the early twentieth century, with Yehoshua Hana Rawnitsky, Bialik founded a Hebrew publishing house in Odessa, Moriah, that issued Hebrew classics and school literature. He translated various European works into Hebrew, such as Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar,* Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell,* Cervantes's *Don Quixote,* and Heinrich Heine's poems. In collaboration with Rawnitsky, Bialik published *Sefer*

Ha Aggadah (The Book of Legends), a three-volume edition of the folktales and proverbs scattered through the Talmud. *The Book of Legends* was immediately recognized as a masterwork and has been reprinted numerous times. Bialik also edited the poems of the medieval poet and philosopher Ibn Gabirol and began a modern commentary on the Mishna (the oral law).

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the communist authorities viewed Bialik's work in Hebrew culture with suspicion and closed Moriah. With the help of Maxim Gorky, Bialik received permission to emigrate. In 1921 he moved to GERMANY, where he established the Dvir publishing house. Three years later he moved to Palestine. During the last decade of his life, Bialik followed a number of cultural pursuits. He delivered the address that marked the opening of Hebrew University in JERUSALEM and was a member of its board of governors, visited the UNITED STATES on behalf of the Palestine Foundation Fund, toured in Poland, and founded weekly philosophical and literary discussions in Tel Aviv, which he called Oneg Shabbat (Enjoyment of the Sabbath). Bialik died in Vienna following surgery.

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Biltmore Program, 1942

The Biltmore Program was the first public declaration by the Zionist leadership of its objective of establishing a Jewish state over the whole of British Mandatory Palestine. At an extraordinary meeting of Zionists in the Biltmore Hotel in New York on 6–11 May 1942, a resolution was adopted urging "that Palestine be constituted as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world" after World War II. With this resolution, the Zionist movement for the first time openly staked a claim to Palestine in its entirety, and as a state rather than as a homeland.

Participants in the conference included CHAIM WEIZMANN, DAVID BEN-GURION as chairman of the JEWISH AGENCY Executive, and NAHUM GOLDMANN as a member of the Executive. Weizmann had hoped that this conference would reaffirm his position as head of the world Zionist movement, but just the opposite occurred because the "young guard"—Ben-Gurion and his associates—assumed control and steered the movement in a new direction.

Although the resolutions adopted at the Biltmore claimed to reaffirm the essential purpose of the BALFOUR DECLARATION, they went far beyond the intentions of the initial declaration. The British, in their most favorable policy declarations, had always stated that it was their intention to establish in Palestine a Jewish national home, not a "commonwealth," or an independent state. Beginning with the 1922 CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM, the British had emphasized that a Jewish national home would be formed *in* Palestine, that is, in a part of Palestine. The Biltmore resolutions now declared that the Zionists wanted "all" of Palestine as a Jewish "state."

The Biltmore Program was a crucial step in the development of the Zionist movement, which increasingly saw itself as opposed to rather than as a collaborator with Britain, and it determined that henceforth Ben-Gurion and the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE in Palestine, rather than Weizmann, would lead the Zionist movement and establish policy toward the British. The Biltmore Program was adopted before the full scale and horror of the Nazi campaign for the extermination of European Jewry became known. Zionist leaders assumed that at the end of the war there would be millions of Jewish refugees in Europe whose plight would strengthen the case for a large Jewish state in Palestine. Significantly, the Biltmore Program entirely ignored the rights of Palestinian Arabs and thus may be seen as a prelude to the TRANSFER that occurred in 1948.

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Bilu Group

The Bilu, or Beit Ya'akov Lekhu Ve-nelkha, Group (Let the House of Jacob Go) was a proto-Zionist group that was founded in 1882 in RUSSIA. Influenced by Marx as well as the Torah, the Bilu'im hoped to establish farming cooperatives in Palestine. The first group of Bilu'im was composed of fourteen former university students unfamiliar with farming. (Because Jews had been forbidden to own land in Russia, the country had almost no Jewish farmers.) Arriving in Palestine with enormous funds of goodwill and energy but with little money and experience, the Bilu'im found life very difficult. The group was given a tract on which to set up a farm in what became the settlement of Rishon le-Zion; however, within a few months, the Bilu'im faced starvation and most left. Eight members remained, and a few years later they were offered land in another location, G'dera, a town on the southern plain, where they struggled against difficult farming and living conditions. The G'dera outpost was eventually saved through the philanthropic efforts of BARON EDMUND DE ROTHSCHILD of FRANCE. Nevertheless, the dispirited and demoralized Bilu'im soon left the settlement—some to other parts of Palestine and others to Europe.

Although the Bilu movement failed completely, its vision of Jewish cooperative farms was later carried out successfully by the KIBBUTZ and MOSHAV movements, and the Bilu dream of Jews living and supporting themselves in their own homeland was regarded as one of the important principles of the Zionist movement.

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Binationalism

Binationalism is one of the possible solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although it has several potential forms, binationalism essentially involves a close and equitable union between two parties, whether as a single unitary state or in the form of a territorially or ethnically based federation. It was advocated in early-twentieth-century circles by some Zionists, including MARTIN BUBER, JUDAH MAGNES, and others, and is still advocated by some individuals and groups today. Binationalism assumes political equity between groups and also aims toward social and economic equality. It is often suggested as a solution for managing conflict in deeply divided societies. For example, both Jews and Palestinians would be allowed a "law of return" from their respective DIASPORA.

A binational political entity can be achieved through the gradual evolution of a confederate arrangement or directly from two separate states. The former development, a more likely scenario for Palestine and Israel, could take several forms:

- A unitary state with full civic equality for all residents, irrespective of their ethnicity—that is, a state for all its citizens. Containing mainly two peoples, this form does not meet the objectives of the two nations (Jews and Palestinians) and is unlikely to be achieved.
- Mini-cantons, including several for each group of Jews and Palestinians, with separate cantons for Israel's Arab minority and possibly mixed cantons within a federal structure, along the Swiss model. This is also unlikely.
- Two equal, autonomous, nonterritorial national frameworks for each of the two ethnic groups within a federal framework. This is possible but would be very difficult.
- Two autonomous separate units—three if a separate joint one is set up for JERUSALEM—within a federal state, similar to the Belgian model. Most advocates of binationalism believe this is an eventual possibility. The Belgian model is predicated on each substate having rights for all its residents. In this case, Jews would have equal rights in the Palestinian state and Palestinians would have equal rights in the Israeli state, thus minimizing the crucial importance of BORDERS. This form can evolve from a confederation and would aim for the protection of both peoples' rights—Jews and Palestinians—as well as safeguard social and economic equality.

See also PEACE

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Birzeit University

Birzeit University, located in the town of Birzeit near Ramallah, is the premier Palestinian university in the Occupied Territories. Its origins date to 1924, when Nabiha Nasir (1891–1951), a Christian Palestinian educator from Birzeit who received higher education in Sudan, started a school for girls in Birzeit at a time when schools were almost nonexistent in the area. By 1930 it had developed into a secondary school for both boys and girls, and by 1942 it was a two-year junior college. After the 1967 WAR, when the WEST BANK and GAZA fell under Israeli military OCCUPATION, the college saw a pressing need to develop into a university—especially to provide higher educational opportunities to students who were often barred from continuing their education abroad because of imposed military travel restrictions. In 1975, Birzeit became a full-fledged university, and by 1977 it offered its first master's program. Today the university offers numerous undergraduate and graduate programs through six branches: arts, commerce and economics, engineering, sciences, law and public administration, and graduate studies.

More than most Palestinian institutions, Birzeit has suffered from the Occupation. In its attempts to provide an EDUCATION to its students, it has been subject to arbitrary interference, intimidation, and obstruction. Israel has imposed forcible CLOSURES on the university fifteen times, including one that lasted for fifty-one months. Between 1979 and 1992, Birzeit was obliged to operate underground during 60 percent of the time. Fifteen Birzeit University students have been killed, and scores of students and professors have been detained without trial and DEPORTED.

Birzeit is the only Palestinian university located outside of "AREA A," and most students and staff live miles away, encountering enormous obstacles from the Israeli military simply to reach campus. Military CHECKPOINTS and impromptu ROADBLOCKS outside the campus and between Birzeit and the surrounding towns mean that commutes that should take twenty minutes can take up to five hours. Students and faculty are routinely subject to harassment on their way to and from the university, and sometimes arrested. Recently, construction of the BARRIER wall has cut off thousands of students, including many at Birzeit, from their places of education.

Birzeit's mission is to provide quality academic teaching, training, and research as well as community development programs "within the context of sustainable development, emphasizing social conscience and democratic values in a free civil Palestinian society." Students are required to do a minimum of 120 hours of volunteer community work to graduate. Birzeit's student body is more than 50 percent female; it hosts international students from a variety of countries; and its Student Council elections are typically considered bellwethers for political trends in the wider society.

Birzeit graduates often go abroad for doctoral degrees and fill leading positions in both the public and private sectors as well as in governmental institutions in the Occupied Territories and worldwide. (http://www.birzeit.edu).

See PALESTINIAN UNIVERSITIES UNDER SIEGE

Bishara, Azmi (1956–)

Azmi Bishara is a Palestinian citizen of Israel, a prominent academic, a politician and political activist, and a member of the Knesset. Born in NAZARETH to a Christian family, he received a Ph.D. in philosophy at Humboldt University in East GERMANY, WAS head of the Philosophy Department at BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY, and is a senior researcher at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem.

Bishara began his political activity in 1974, helping to establish the National Committee of Arab High-School Pupils (of which he also was chairman) and Arab campus organizations at HAIFA University and Hebrew University in JERUSALEM. He was also active on the Committee for the Protection of Lands, established in 1976, and is a critic of the Israeli OCCUPATION of the territories.

Bishara was a key founder of the political party that he represented in the Knesset (1996–2007), the National Democratic Alliance (BALAD). He defines

himself as a humanist, democrat, liberal, and neo-Nasirite (neo-pan-Arab nationalist) and advocates transforming Israel into a democratic state and granting cultural autonomy to the Arabs in Israel. He supports a bi-national solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.

Following two political speeches Bishara made, on 7 November 2001 the Knesset voted to lift his parliamentary immunity so that the attorney general could initiate criminal prosecution pursuant to the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (1948) and the Emergency Regulations (Foreign Travel, 1948). Bishara was charged with supporting the right to resist the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian territories and South Lebanon in speeches made at a public gathering in the Israeli Arab town of Umm al-Fahem on 5 June 2000 and at a memorial assembly in Syria on 10 June 2001. The removal of Bishara's immunity was an unprecedented event in the history of Israeli politics, being the first time that a Knesset member has been stripped of his immunity because of political statements made while performing his duties as a public representative. Bishara is also charged with organizing a series of visits by elderly Palestinian citizens from Israel to relatives in SYRIA whom they had not seen since 1948.

In April 2003 the Nazareth Magistrate Court dismissed the indictment against Bishara in connection with the visits to Syria, and in February 2006 the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT dismissed criminal charges against Bishara for his political speeches. However, Bishara is not free and still faces pending security-related indictments. A court-imposed gag order prohibits publication of suspicions against Bishara or details of the police investigations into the allegations.

On 22 April 2007 Bishara left Israel in the middle of the police investigation against him, submitting his resignation from the Knesset via the Israeli Embassy in EGYPT. The London-based *Ashark al-Awsat* newspaper claimed Balad chairman Bishara left Egypt shortly after submitting his resignation; however, his whereabouts are unknown according to Israel Radio. Bishara has said that "exile is not an option. Return is definite but the matter will take some time and arrangements. I want to set the rules of the game." He went on to say: "I have commitments now with other countries which I cannot make if I were there [Israel]. This is why I decided to end my responsibilities with my former post."

He said that if he stayed in Israel, legal proceedings could drag on for years and he would not be able to leave. "There's no point now to clinging to parliamentary status and immunity in this right-wing, fascist, racist orchestra," he added. "When return shall be exactly is linked to dear brothers in the Arab nation and inside [Israel and the Palestinian territories] with whom I must consult to see where is the best place at this point to participate," he said.

Bishara writes a regular column in *Al-Ahram* (Cairo) and is the author of two books: *The Arabs in Israel* (nonfiction) and *Checkpoints* (fiction).

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Bitterlemons.org

Bitterlemons.org—Palestinian-Israeli Crossfire—is a website that presents Israeli and Palestinian viewpoints on prominent issues of concern, focusing on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and on the peace process. Produced, edited, and partially written by Ghassan Khatib, a Palestinian, and Yossi Alpher, an Israeli, the website maintains complete organizational and institutional symmetry between its Palestinian and Israeli components. By contributing to mutual understanding through an open exchange of ideas, Bitterlemons.org aspires to affect the way Palestinians, Israelis, and others worldwide think about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It draws financial support from the

EUROPEAN UNION and additional philanthropic sources based outside the region. (http://www.bitterlemons.org).

Black September, 1970

Black September is the name given to the civil war in JORDAN in September 1970 that pitted the Jordanian army against the Palestinian *fida'iyyun* (Palestinian guerrilla fighters), who were defeated and subsequently expelled from Jordan. Some 3,000 Palestinians—civilians and fighters—were killed in the conflict.

After the 1967 WAR and the succession of Arab failures in conventional conflict against Israel, the Palestinians decided to adopt ARMED STRUGGLE tactics, which they believed would be a more effective method of defeating Israel. In February 1969 YASIR ARAFAT, leader of FATAH, became head of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). By early 1970 at least seven guerrilla organizations, including Fatah, were based in Jordan. One of the most important was the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), led by GEORGE HABASH. Although the PLO sought to integrate these various groups and announced from time to time that this process had occurred, they were never effectively united and often embarked on actions unilaterally.

Initially, Jordan's King Husayn sought accommodation with the *fida'iyyun* and provided training sites and assistance. In Jordan's internal politics, however, the main issue from 1967 to 1970 was the struggle between the government and the guerrilla organizations for political control of the country. Based mainly in the Palestinian refugee camps, the *fida'iyyun* developed virtually a state within a state, easily obtaining funds and arms from both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and often openly flouting Jordanian law.

As the guerrilla effort mounted, Israel retaliated quickly and with increasing effectiveness. In March 1968 an Israeli brigade attacked the Jordanian village of KARAMA in retaliation for a guerrilla incursion into Israel. Although Israel inflicted severe damage, in the process it suffered substantial losses. In reprisal, Israel launched heavy attacks in Jordan—on the towns of Irbid in June 1968 and as-Salt in August. Jordan became increasingly concerned about these breaches of its sovereignty, especially when, by late 1968, the main *fida'iyyun* activities in Jordan seemed to shift from fighting Israel to attempting to overthrow Husayn.

A major guerrilla-government confrontation occurred in November 1968 when Jordan sought to disarm the REFUGEE camps. Although a civil war was averted by a compromise that favored the Palestinians, the ongoing heavy Israeli reprisals that followed each guerrilla attack became a matter of grave concern to Husayn. His loyal BEDOUIN army attempted to suppress guerrilla activity, and sporadic outbursts of fighting between the *fida'iyyun* and the army occurred during the first half of 1970. In June 1970 an Arab mediation committee intervened to halt two weeks of serious fighting between the two sides. King Husayn, who became increasingly devoted to the promotion of peace in the region, made various peaceful attempts to reestablish his authority in Jordan, concluding a seven-point agreement with the PLO in November 1968.

Also in June, King Husayn designated Abd al Munim Rifai to head a "reconciliation" cabinet that included more opposition elements than had any previous government. Although the composition of the cabinet maintained a traditional balance between the East Bank and the WEST BANK, it included a majority of guerrilla sympathizers, particularly in the key portfolios of defense, foreign affairs, and interior. However, rather than reflecting a new domestic policy, the king's action indicated Husayn's hope that a nationalist cabinet would support peace negotiations generated by a proposed UN peace mission to be conducted by Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat appointed by UN secretary general U Thant as special representative to secure Middle East peace under the terms of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

On 9 June 1970, Rifai and Arafat signed another agreement conciliatory to the *fida'iyyun*. According to its provisions, the government allowed the commandos to move freely within Jordan, agreed to refrain from antiguerrilla action, and expressed its support for the *fida'iyyun* in the battle against Israel. In return, the commandos pledged to remove their bases from Amman, Jordan, and other major cities, to withdraw all armed personnel from the Jordanian capital, and to show respect for law and order. However, they did none of these, and small-scale clashes continued throughout the summer of 1970. By early September, the guerrilla groups controlled several strategic positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near

Az Zarqa. Meanwhile, the *fida'iyyun* were also calling for a general strike among the Jordanian population and were organizing a civil disobedience campaign. The situation became explosive when, as part of a guerrilla campaign to undermine the Jarring peace talks to which EGYPT, Israel, and Jordan had agreed, the PFLP launched an airplane hijacking campaign. Within the space of two hours on 6 September, the PFLP hijacked a TWA jet and a Swissair jet and made an unsuccessful attempt to seize control of an El Al plane. About two hours later, another PFLP group hijacked a Pan Am jet and forced the crew to fly to Beirut airport, where the airplane landed, almost out of fuel. By 12 September the PFLP had three airplanes, sans passengers and crew, on the tarmac at Dawson Field in Jordan. The planes were blown up.

King Husayn viewed the hijackings as a direct threat to his authority. In response, on 16 September he imposed martial law and named Brigadier Muhammad Daud to head a cabinet composed of army officers. At the same time, the king appointed Field Marshal Habis al Majali, a fiercely pro-royalist Bedouin, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and military governor of Jordan. Husayn gave Majali full powers to implement martial law regulations and to suppress the *fida'iyyun*. The new government immediately ordered the *fida'iyyun* to lay down their arms and to evacuate the cities. On the same day, Arafat became supreme commander of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY, the regular military force of the PLO.

During a bitterly fought ten-day civil war between the *fida'iyyun* and the Jordanian army, SYRIA sent some 200 tanks to aid the *fida'iyyun*, although it failed to provide the promised and necessary air cover, withheld intentionally by air force chief Hafez Asad. However, according to British archival sources, King Husayn was so distraught that he pleaded with both London and Washington to intercede and ask Israel to bomb the Syrian tank forces. London refused, but the United States passed the request to Israel.

To aid Husayn, if necessary, the US Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and Israel undertook "precautionary military deployments." (Though Israeli forces never entered Jordan or participated in the conflict, partisans of the idea that Israel is a STRATEGIC ASSET to US interests cite this mobilization as evidence of Israel's strategic utility.) On 17 September, IRAQ, rather than supporting the *fida'iyyun* as promised, began a rapid withdrawal of its 12,000-man force stationed near Az Zarqa. On 24 September, under attack from the Jordanian army and in response to outside pressures, the Syrian forces began to withdraw from Jordan, having lost more than half their armor in fighting with the Jordanians. Finding themselves alone and on the defensive throughout Jordan, the *fida'iyyun* agreed on 25 September to a cease-fire.

At the urging of the Arab heads of state, Husayn and Arafat signed the cease-fire accord in Cairo on 27 September. The agreement called for rapid withdrawal of the guerrilla forces from Jordanian cities and towns to positions "appropriate" for continuing the battle with Israel and for the release of prisoners by both sides. A supreme supervisory committee was to implement the provisions of the agreement. On 26 September Husayn appointed a new cabinet, although army officers continued to head the key defense and interior ministries.

On 13 October Husayn and Arafat signed a further agreement in Amman, under which the *fida'iyyun* were to recognize Jordanian sovereignty and the king's authority, to withdraw their armed forces from Jordanian towns and villages, and to refrain from carrying arms outside their refugee camps. In return, the government agreed to grant amnesty to the *fida'iyyun* for incidents that had occurred during the civil war.

The civil war caused great material destruction in Jordan, and the number of fighters killed on all sides was estimated to be as high as 3,500. In spite of the September and October agreements, fighting continued, particularly in Amman, Irbid, and Jarash, where guerrilla forces had their main bases. Husayn appointed Wasfi al-Tal as his new prime minister and minister of defense who would head a cabinet of fifteen civilian and two military members. The cabinet also included seven Palestinians. Known to be a staunch opponent of the guerrilla movement, al-Tal was directed by Husayn to comply with the cease-fire agreements. Furthermore, according to Husayn's written directive, the government's policy was to be based on "the restoration of confidence between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian resistance movement, cooperation with the Arab states, the strengthening of national unity, striking with an iron hand at all persons spreading destructive rumors, paying special attention to the armed forces and the freeing of the Arab lands occupied

by Israel in the war of June 1967." By then most of the *fida'iyyun* had fled to LEBANON, and soon thereafter the majority of the PLO's offices and organizations followed.

Those *fida'iyyun* that remained in Jordan were faced with a government adamantly opposed to them. In July 1971 al-Tal announced that the Cairo and Amman agreements, which had regulated relations between the *fida'iyyun* and the Jordanian governments, were no longer operative and that some 2,300–2,500 *fida'iyyun* would have to leave the country. The Jordanian sanctuary was no more. In November 1971 Prime Minister al-Tal was assassinated by Palestinians.

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Black September Organization

The Black September Organization (BSO) was a loosely knit TERRORIST group that existed from late 1970 to 1974 and that was named after the month in 1970, BLACK SEPTEMBER, when the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) was driven out of JORDAN. In the minds of its members, the BSO was an effort to restore the Palestinians' honor and guerrilla image after the debacle in Jordan. There was also an aspect of revenge against Jordanian officials responsible for the disaster, plus many of the BSO's operations were designed to bring the world's attention to the plight of the Palestinians. The BSO was also responsible for attacks against Israelis such as that at the MUNICH OLYMPICS in 1972.

Although not part of Fatah's chain of command, the BSO was linked to FATAH intelligence; indeed, SALAH KHALAF (Abu Iyad), the deputy chief and head of intelligence for the PLO and second most senior official in Fatah after YASIR ARAFAT, was the mastermind behind the movement. The operations carried out by the BSO represented a total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the *fida'iyyun*. Its members operated in airtight cells of four or more men and women, and each cell's members were kept ignorant of other cells. Instead of using a centralized command, leadership was exercised through intermediaries and "cut-outs." Many of the cells in Europe and around the world were composed of Palestinians and other Arabs who had lived in those countries as students, teachers, businessmen, and diplomats for many years. They operated on a need-to-know basis, which protected the organizers by ensuring that the apprehension or surveillance of one cell would not affect the others. The structure offered plausible deniability that the BSO was linked to the Fatah leadership, which was careful to distance itself from Black September operations.

Even after the passage of so many years, no evidence has been uncovered to suggest that PLO chairman Yasir Arafat was personally involved in the BSO or that he approved any of its operations. Although he was probably in a position to stop at least some of the operations, he chose not to step in. Nor was he averse to seeing the various members of Fatah and the PLO compete with one another over who conducted the more successful acts of terror: competition weakened them and made them more dependent on him. Still, given the chaos of the times and Arafat's own weakened position, his role cannot be definitively ascertained.

The BSO grew out of the despair, disillusionment, and disorganization of both PLO elites and cadres and the Palestinian masses in general after the defeat in and expulsion from Jordan. Within the PLO, and especially within Fatah, factionalism became the norm; Arafat had little to no control over either the political or military organizations. There were also significant external threats to the integrity of the Palestinian nationalist movement. On the one hand, a group of unaffiliated WEST BANK Palestinians called for the establishment of a state in the Occupied Territories while Israel organized municipal ELECTIONS in the West Bank, which the PLO feared would be used to constitute an alternative leadership. On the other hand, King

Husayn called for the establishment of a united Arab kingdom on both banks of the Jordan River while EGYPT called for the PLO to form a "government in exile," which the leadership viewed as a ploy to draw Palestinians into formal negotiations with Israel. Without a secure base of operations and in the midst of so many uncertainties, some PLO leaders from all factions came to feel that only through spectacular terrorist operations would the world take seriously the situation of the Palestinians.

The first operation carried out under the BSO name was the 28 November 1971 assassination of Jordanian prime minister Wasfi al-Tal. A former lieutenant of Khalaf's, 'ALI HASAN SALAMAH, took credit for the action. This was followed by the wounding of the Jordanian ambassador to England, Zayd al-Rifa', on 15 December 1971 and the 6 February 1972 bombing of a Dutch gas company and a German electronics company that Salama claimed were cooperating with Israel. In early 1972, PLO leaders learned of secret meetings between high Israeli and Jordanian officials, and fear of King Husayn's intentions to assume control of the West Bank was reignited. Guerrilla groups responded with renewed sabotage attacks in Jordan, mainly led by Salah Khalaf.

At the same time, YUSIF AL-MUHAMMAD NAJJAR (Abu Yusif), a Palestinian militant from the GAZA STRIP who commanded Fatah's military wing, directed the hijacking on 8 May 1972 of a Belgian aircraft, Sabena Flight 572, flying from Vienna to Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. None of the passengers or crew were injured or killed, but two of the hijackers were killed and two arrested. Fatah claimed responsibility for the operation because it occurred "on our own soil." On 30 May WADI' HADDAD (POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, PFLP), using three members of the Japanese Red Army, opened fire in the arrival hall of Ben Gurion Airport, killing thirty-one civilians and wounding fifty more. KAMAL 'UDWAN, a founding member of Fatah and a member of Fatah's Central Committee, issued a statement claiming that this was "an ordinary attack similar to any other attack conducted by a combat unit on a SETTLEMENT or military camp . . . in any part of Palestine." 'Udwan's remarks made it seem that the entire Fatah leadership was behind the operation, which it was not. These attacks, however, acted as a safety valve for Palestinian frustration, and the majority of Palestinians applauded them.

By this time Israel had begun retaliating. On 8 July 1972 PFLP spokesman GHASSAN KANAFANI and his niece were killed by a car bomb; on 19 July a letter bomb severely injured Anis Sayigh, director of the PLO research center; and on 25 July another letter bomb permanently disfigured BASSAM ABU SHARIF, at the time editor of *al-Hada* (the magazine of the PFLP). None of these men were in any way responsible for the terrorist operations.

In September 1972 the most horrific terrorist operation occurred during the Summer Olympics in Munich, GERMANY. On 3 September eight Fatah gunmen, apparently under the direction of Najjar and Khalaf, entered the Olympic village, where they killed two Israeli athletes and took another nine hostage. All nine hostages, five terrorists, and a German policeman died in a shootout at a nearby military base. The surviving Palestinians were captured.

Israel retaliated with extensive raids on SYRIA and LEBANON, killing 200 people (of whom 40 percent were civilians) by Israel's account or 300 people (of whom 75 percent were civilians) by Syria's account. From October to January 1973, Israeli intelligence bombed other Palestinian targets in Paris and Beirut; sent letter bombs to PLO officials in Algeria, Tripoli, and Cairo; and assassinated Fatah representatives in Rome (Wa'il Zu'aytir), Paris (Mahmud al-Hamshari), and Nicosia (Husayn Abu-al-Khayr). On 21 February Israeli commandos attacked guerrilla offices in Baddawi and Nahr al-Barid refugee camps in northern Lebanon, killing 40 Palestinians.

At this point, with much of Arafat's influence restored, the chairman moved to increase his authority over the security apparatuses, reorganize them, and place them in a direct chain of command under his exclusive control. The Palestinian-Israeli "shadow war" was not yet over, but the genie was gradually being forced back into the bottle. On 8 March 1973 a group calling itself BSO attacked the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, killing J. Curtis Moore, the US chargé d'affaires; Cleo Noel, the US ambassador; and Guy Eid, the Belgian chargé d'affaires. In retaliation, Israeli commandos slipped into Beirut on 10 April and assassinated al-Muhammad Najjar (and his wife), Kamal 'Udwan, and PLO spokesman KAMAL NASIR.

By 1979 at least one unit of MOSSAD (the Israeli intelligence agency), known as the "Wrath of God," had assassinated eight additional Palestinian figures it claimed were part of BSO, including Ali

Hassan Salameh, killed by a car bomb in Beirut on 22 January. Arafat's second in command and closest ally, KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), was assassinated by Israel in his house in Tunis on 16 April 1988, even though he had not taken part in Black September operations.

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Bloc of the Faithful

See GUSH EMUNIM

Bludan Conference, 1937

The Bludan Conference was a pan-Arab nationalist congress held on 8 September 1937 in Bludan, SYRIA, partly in response to the 7 July publication of the PEEL COMMISSION's report recommending partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Representatives of various Arab popular movements met in Bludan to discuss what they saw as the total elimination of Arab national rights in Palestine. They resolved as follows:

- Determination of Palestine as an inalienable part of the Arab homeland
- Rejection of the partition of Palestine and establishment of a Jewish state therein
- Demand for the abolition of the BRITISH MANDATE and the BALFOUR DECLARATION
- Suspension of Jewish IMMIGRATION to Palestine
- Solution of the Palestine problem through the establishment of an independent state

The delegates met again in Bludan in June 1946, this time as the ARAB LEAGUE, and approved a series of secret decisions. They also warned Britain and the UNITED STATES that ignoring Palestinian rights would affect their interests in the Arab world.

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Border Police

The Border Police (*Mishmar HaGvul*/Magav) are the combat branch of the Israeli Police. They were founded as the Frontier Corps, a *gendarmerie,* under the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) in 1949 and charged with the task of providing security in rural areas and along the BORDERS. In the course of the following years, they were gradually transferred to the command of the Israeli Police and became the Border Police. During these years, they secured new SETTLEMENTS and countered infiltration by Palestinians, especially from EGYPT and JORDAN.

During the 1956 Suez War, the Border Police were involved in the KAFR QASIM massacre. The resulting public outcry led to a landmark ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ruling on the obligation of soldiers to disobey manifestly illegal orders.

During the 1967 WAR, the Border Police fought alongside the IDF. Following the war, they were deployed in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP and charged with maintaining law and order as part of the military administration. Since then, a significant portion of the Border Police's activity has been in the Occupied Territories, especially during the years of the First INTIFADA. In uprisings and demonstrations during the OSLO years, the Border Police were used as the main element to control all demonstrations and protests. During the AL-AQSA INTIFADA the Border Police played a major role in security activity.

The Border Police have a reputation for unbridled brutality, and Palestinians fear them more than all other Israeli military and paramilitary forces. The Border Police have been prosecuted for beating, shooting, and killing without provocation. Their undercover units have been repeatedly accused by Israeli, Palestinian, and international human rights groups of extrajudicial killing of Palestinians whom Israel considers "wanted." Recently, Israel has used the Border Police as agents provocateurs embedded in demonstrations against Israel's BARRIER built in the West Bank; as provocateurs, the police throw stones at Israeli soldiers to justify violence against the demonstrators. Israel admits to the presence of undercover agents among demonstrators and even to the fact that they participate in stone-throwing, but it claims this follows rather than precedes stone-throwing by the demonstrators.

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Borders

The Israel-Palestine arena has experienced continuous territorial and boundary changes throughout the twentieth century, from the collapse of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE to the first partition of the region and the creation of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) in 1921 and the partition of Palestine in 1947–1949. As a result of Israel's War of Independence/Palestinian Nakba (1948 WAR), the borders of the state of Israel were one-quarter larger than those that had been proposed under the 1947 UN PARTITION PLAN (RESOLUTION 181). Boundary changes again occurred after the 1967 WAR, when Israel vastly expanded its territory, and after the 1979 Israel/Egypt peace agreement, when its territory shrank. Further contraction occurred after ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA IN 2005. The OSLO ACCORDS and the transfer of territory to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (1993–2000), as well as ongoing attempts to reach a final peace settlement that will create an independent Palestine, are likely to result in further territorial change.

Prior to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, Palestine did not constitute a distinct territorial or administrative entity possessing clearly defined boundaries. The first modern border in the region was the British demarcation of a line running from the Mediterranean Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. The northern border of the Mandate area resulted from negotiations with the FRENCH authorities who had assumed the Mandate for LEBANON and SYRIA. The eastern line was established by the British administration along the Jordan River and the Arava Valley, following the division of Palestine and the creation of the new state of Transjordan in 1921.

Following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent 1948 War, Israel entered into ARMISTICE negotiations with each of its new neighbors. The lines drawn up at the RHODES armistice talks reflected cease-fire lines, with minor land exchanges, and were demarcated and delimited as the temporary borders of Israel. It was expected that future political negotiations between Israel and its neighbors would eventually bring about the transformation of these lines into internationally agreed-upon juridical borders of sovereignty. The border lines between Israel and EGYPT in the south, Israel and Lebanon and Syria in the north, and Israel and Jordan to the west (with the exception of the Green Line separating Israel from the WEST BANK) were largely based on the demarcation of the BRITISH MANDATE Authority.

Until the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt at CAMP DAVID in 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982, Israel did not have a single internationally agreed-upon border. As a result of the peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1995), the borders with these two countries now constitute the international lines of control and sovereignty. The borders between Israel and Lebanon, Syria, and a future Palestinian state remain to be determined as part of future political negotiations. The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2002 essentially determined the official course of this border (with the exception of a tiny piece of land at the Shaba Farms), and the

future border with Syria will necessitate negotiations over the future of the Golan Heights, which was conquered by Israel in the 1967 WAR and annexed by Tel Aviv in December 1981.

Israeli-Palestinian Borders and Partition

Partition and division have been central to the territorial discourse since the 1930s and remain the core territorial questions to be resolved in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Given Palestine's relatively small area (less than 25,000 square kilometers [9,500 square miles] with a population of approximately 8 million), the territorial discourse takes on microgeographical proportions. The Green Line, the man-made boundary separating Israel from the West Bank, came into being as a result of the 1948 War. The line largely reflected the location of armed forces at the cessation of conflict, which, in turn, reflected the distribution of Jewish SETTLEMENTS established over the previous fifty years. The line emerged in negotiations at Rhodes during 1949 between Israeli and Jordanian representatives. The precise course of the line was determined at the implementation stage, but its general course took effect as a sealed line of separation between Israel and the newly created Jordanian-administered West Bank.

The Green Line was far from perfect. Because it cut through the heart of the Palestinian Arab population, some villages and townships were located within Israel, while their neighbors became part of the West Bank. Residents of the former became Israeli citizens, while the latter were Jordanian citizens or stateless. In some cases, villages were cut off from their agricultural lands; in particular, if a village was located in upland areas that became part of the West Bank, its fields could be on the Israeli Coastal Plain. Many Palestinians who found themselves on the West Bank side were cut off from their places of employment in coastal plain towns such as JAFFA, RAMLA, and LYDDA. The superimposition of this boundary thus had a profound effect on the nature of geographic, economic, and social relationships.

The Green Line functioned as a sealed and armed boundary of confrontation for only nineteen years. Although its barrier effects were removed in 1967, it has remained in place as an effective administrative boundary until the present, largely because Israel did not annex the Occupied Territories, retaining a clear distinction between the sovereign Israel and the administrative status of the West Bank, and also between their respective populations. Despite political statements to the contrary, the Green Line remained in situ, albeit under different functional conditions, and was strengthened whenever a CURFEW was imposed on the Occupied Territories to prevent Palestinians from crossing into Israel.

The Green Line and the Israeli settlements have had a major impact on the thinking of negotiators aimed at finding an acceptable territorial solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The default cartographic image carried around by most Israelis and Palestinians is of a region separated into an Israel and a West Bank, with the line of separation at the Green Line. Even in negotiations where territorial changes and exchanges are suggested, the Green Line continues to serve as the default line from which modifications must be determined. The fact that the West Bank was defined as a separate territory in the first OSLO ACCORD of 1993 and is often classified as a territory whose "jurisdiction is to be decided" on many international maps encourages a default acceptance of this line that determines the territorial and political contours of this region.

Borders and the Peace Process

The Oslo Accords of 1993 and 1995 effectively carved up the West Bank into exclaves of relative autonomy. Approximately 12 percent of the West Bank (Area A) and almost all the Gaza Strip were transferred to the Palestinians. Areas B and C were left under partial or full Israeli control, their future to be determined by negotiations in a final peace agreement. Palestinians accepted the second Oslo Accord in 1995 (the INTERIM AGREEMENT) because they perceived it as only the latest in an ongoing series of negotiations and its territorial outcome as no more than a transitory stage on the way to a final agreement that would provide them with control over a larger, more contiguous territory comprising most, if not all, of the West Bank.

Following the eruption of violence in 2000, including the use of SUICIDE BOMBERS inside Israel, the Israeli government decided to construct a new security border, known as the BARRIER, between Israel and the West Bank. Consisting of partly fortified barbed-wire fences, partly concrete wall, parallel deep trenches, a patrol road, a trace road, and service and armored vehicle roads, as well as electronic surveillance and military observation posts, it has brought about an almost total physical separation

between Israel and the residents of the Occupied Territories, who are no longer able to cross into Israel. In some areas the course of the Barrier has deviated from the Green Line as a means of retaining control over as many of the Israeli settlements as possible on the Israeli side of the Barrier. These deviations have been ruled illegal by both the International Court of Justice in the Hague and the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, but Israel argues that the construction of the Barrier has led to a significant reduction in incidents of violence.

At the same time, the construction of the Barrier has resulted in severe economic and spatial dislocation for many Palestinian inhabitants, especially those who reside on the Israeli side of the Barrier but on the Palestinian side of the Green Line and are denied automatic access to both Israel and the West Bank. Although the Israeli government argues that the Barrier has been constructed for security purposes alone, this Barrier has clear political implications, perceived by many as constituting the Israeli unilateral superimposition of a new political border that will dictate future negotiations between the two sides. As of October 2005, the Barrier was under completion in the southern section of the West Bank, effectively closing off the whole region from physical access to Israel except at a few closely guarded, and difficult-to-traverse, border crossings.

ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in August 2005 did not lead to any significant change in the route of the Israeli-Gaza border, although it did bring about the refortification and strengthening of the line as a means of preventing any form of illegal movement of people and goods across the boundary. The border separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt, known as the PHILADELPHI ROUTE, was transferred from Israeli administration to Egyptian control at the time of disengagement. Israel continues to control all other external Gaza borders, including the maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

Numerous proposals have aimed to demarcate a border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. These range from a return to the Green Line, to the establishment of a border along the course of the Barrier, and to other proposals that would necessitate either Israeli annexation of part of the region to maintain control over Israeli settlements or a territorial exchange that would annex an equal amount of land transferred from other parts of Israel to the Palestinian state. The latter proposals would require a bilateral agreement based on negotiations and could not be implemented unilaterally. Most of the areas suggested for possible land exchange include those regions in close proximity to the Green Line (inside Israel), which are inhabited by Palestinian-Arab citizens. For the most part, these residents reject any solution that would force them to become part of the Palestinian state. Other proposals have suggested the transfer of land adjacent to the Gaza Strip, which would enable the expansion of the Gaza land base so as to ease the intense pressure on this densely populated region while at the same time not necessitating any form of involuntary population TRANSFERS.

The establishment of Israeli settlements has played, and continues to play, a major role in the delimitation of boundaries between separate Israeli and Palestinian territories, regardless of whether or not they were established legally. This is as true of the settlements established during the first half of the twentieth century in British Mandate Palestine as it is of those established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip since 1967—all of which have influenced the ultimate location and demarcation of Israel's borders.

See also BARRIER

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—David Newman

Brandeis, Justice Louis Dembitz (1856–1941)

Louis Dembitz Brandeis was a singularly important US Zionist leader. Born into a liberal Jewish home in Louisville, Kentucky, he received his basic education in GERMANY and went on to take a law degree from Harvard University in 1877. From 1879 to 1916 Brandeis practiced law in Boston, where he specialized in promoting and defending labor rights and fighting against the monopolistic practices of big business. In 1912 he supported WOODROW WILSON's candidacy for president and became his friend and adviser. In 1916 Wilson appointed him as an associate justice of the Supreme Court, marking the first time a Jew sat on the Supreme Court. He served in that capacity until 1939, when he retired.

For the first half of his life Brandeis paid little attention to Jewish issues. He was of a wholly secular temperament, and his time was taken up fighting for liberal reform in the UNITED STATES. Around the turn of the century, he seems to have become more aware of the plight of East European Jewry, the pogroms in RUSSIA and elsewhere, and the resultant massive Jewish IMMIGRATION westward. His acquaintanceships with Jacob de Haas and AARON AARONSOHN, two active Zionists of that time, channeled his concern for persecuted Jews into support for the Zionist movement around the year 1912.

With the outbreak of World War I, the Provisional Executive Committee for Zionist Affairs was established in New York City, and Brandeis accepted the position as its head. Thus, in 1914, Brandeis became the leader of US Zionists. He saw ZIONISM on his own terms, which were not necessarily the same as those of its European founders and leaders. For Brandeis, Zionism was a Jewish nationalist version of American progressivism, which emphasized freedom, cooperation, and small-scale capitalism. The Jewish Palestine he envisioned was one of democratic decisionmaking and both private and public economic ventures.

Unfortunately, this American vision of Zionism clashed with the essentially socialist Jewish Palestine that was being created by the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO), led by CHAIM WEIZMANN and DAVID BEN-GURION. It should be noted that if the true socialist nature of Zionism in Palestine had become widely known in the United States of this era (a time of rising hostility to Soviet Russia and its evolving ideology), it would have been rejected by the public, both Jewish and Gentile. However, by painting a picture of Zionism as a movement representing US values, Brandeis initiated the powerful and enduring myth that the Zionists were building a society in the Middle East that represented US values and were therefore spreading civilization. In this effort he was fully supported by a misled and misleading American press.

Brandeis was a skilled and tireless administrator and was responsible for placing the US Zionist movement on a sound institutional footing. Its membership grew tenfold under his leadership to around 200,000 by 1917, and financial contributions to the cause soared. He also used his influence in Washington to establish a connection between Zionism and the US government, which has survived to this day. He used his friendship with Woodrow Wilson to encourage US support for the BALFOUR DECLARATION and the BRITISH MANDATE for Palestine. When ARTHUR BALFOUR visited the United States shortly after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, it was to Brandeis that he turned to garner US Zionist support for what was now an open alliance between the British government and the WZO.

As for the Palestinian Arabs, Brandeis initially urged his fellow Zionists to take a cooperative stand and integrate them into the modern economic infrastructure that the Zionists were erecting. The Zionists in Palestine, however, strove for a Jewish-only economy as far as possible. Brandeis could not sympathize with or put into a proper historical context the rising violence that came with Palestinian resistance to Zionist colonization, and so his position shifted until, by the late 1920s, he was advocating the TRANSFER of Palestinian Arabs into Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950).

Despite his important and very successful role as leader of the US Zionist movement at this time, Brandeis was forced to resign his position in 1921 because he objected to the WZO's growing reliance on the subsidization of Jewish colonization in Palestine, a strategy favored by the socialist-oriented European Zionists. In Brandeis's view, this approach threatened to erode individual initiative and self-sufficiency among Zionist settlers. Even in these early years, the US Zionists were a major source of funds subsidizing Jewish immigration into Palestine, and the WZO could not afford a major difference of opinion with its US branch. Thus, in an internal battle, Brandeis was forced out of his position and replaced by Louis Lipsky, a

man more willing to compromise with the European Zionist point of view. However, Brandeis remained an active member of the US Zionist movement for the rest of his life and repeatedly intervened on its behalf with influential members of the government.

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—Lawrence Davidson

Breaking the Silence

"Breaking the Silence" (Shovrim Shtika) was initially a photo and auditory exhibit held at the Tel Aviv Geographic Film School in June 2004, created mostly by unnamed soldiers who served in HEBRON. The exhibit eventually toured Israel and other Western countries. The photographs and recorded monologues illuminated the negative effects of OCCUPATION on Israel and its people but also demonstrated what Occupation means in terms of day-to-day violence and harassment for Palestinians.

Sixty of the ninety photos recorded aspects of the conflict between the Palestinians and the settlers, and thirty showed the soldiers at their daily routines. "One of the photographs showed soldiers 'drying out' young Palestinian men who were not suspected of any crime, but the soldiers threatened, beat, blindfolded and detained them. Another photo showed a hillside filled with Palestinian homes, where at night soldiers routinely shot barrages of bullets without targeting any particular suspects."

Over 6,000 visitors came to the exhibition from all over Israel, many of them soldiers, some of whom brought their families with them. It is the hope of the young soldiers who organized the exhibit that soldiers throughout the country will begin speaking out so "this madness can end." (www.refusingtokill.net/Israel/breakingthesilence.htm or www.shovrimshtika.org).

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British Mandate in Palestine (1922–1948)

The Palestine Mandate was approved by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922 and officially came into force on 29 September 1923. The Mandate had been assigned to Britain in 1920, when the members of the SAN REMO CONFERENCE (British prime minister David Lloyd George, French prime minister Alexandre Miller, Italian prime minister Francesco Nittie, and Japanese ambassador K. Matsui) redesigned the geopolitics of the Middle East by dividing the war-defeated OTTOMAN EMPIRE'S Arab provinces between FRANCE and Britain. Accordingly, the French were to gain control over SYRIA and LEBANON, while Britain's share consisted of IRAQ and Palestine.

By the time the Mandate terminated in 1948, the situation in Palestine was remarkably different than it was in 1917, when British general Allenby victoriously entered JERUSALEM with his army. Throughout the three decades that British administration took hold, the DEMOGRAPHIC map was redrawn and landownership shifted from Arabs to others. These major changes took place against a background of frequent civil unrest caused by conflicting claims of self-determination by the growing Zionist movement and the indigenous Palestinian-Arab majority. Toward the late 1940s, the Jewish populace swelled to nearly one-third of the total population and owned some 7 percent of the land, a considerable change from the beginning of the Mandate, when Jews constituted some

11–12 percent of the population and owned 2.5 percent of the land.

UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of 1947 symbolized the transfer of the Palestine "problem" from the hands of war-shattered Britain to the United Nations. The international organization recommended the partition of Palestine by calling for the establishment of a Jewish state on 56 percent of the land and an Arab state on the remaining territory, even though half the population of the proposed Jewish state was Arab and this half owned nearly 90 percent of the land. This situation made the eviction of the Palestinians a sine qua non of Zionist policy.

Structure of the Mandate

The British Mandate for Palestine was administered through the Colonial Office of the British government. The first high commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was appointed on 1 July 1920, more than three years before the League of Nations ratified the Mandate. Enjoying executive as well as legislative powers, the high commissioner administered Palestine through an advisory Executive Council and district commissioners who were exclusively British, although assisted by Palestinian and Jewish employees. The only elected bodies in this context were the municipalities and Jewish community organizations.

The foundations of British policy were laid down in the text of the Mandate and reflected London's perception of how it expected to deal with both the Jewish and indigenous Arab communities. Issues of self-determination, self-governing institutions, and immigration—integral to the interests of both communities—all found their way into the Mandate and illustrate Britain's attitudes at the beginning of its rule in Palestine.

Although British policy remains a matter of conjecture, it was surely influenced by Zionist pressure, Palestinian protests, occasional violent incidents, the global view of the Colonial Office and the British government, and structural changes in the international system that affected Britain and to which Britain also contributed.

One of the most important characteristics of the Mandate was its inclusion of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, by which the British government explicitly agreed to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. To understand the significance of incorporating the Balfour Declaration, itself a product of Zionist pressure on the British cabinet, one must consider it in relation to other British commitments made during World War I. In 1915–1916, London promised Arab nationalists (in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence) unity and independence in return for support against the Ottoman Empire. Later in 1916, Britain and France signed the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, which carved up the postwar Arab region between the two European colonial powers. Thus, the inclusion of the Balfour document in the Mandate negated these two prior commitments; more importantly, it clearly indicated the special privilege the Mandate accorded to the Zionist movement, revealingly referring to the indigenous Palestinians merely as the "non-Jewish communities," despite the fact that they constituted 90 percent of the population.

Moreover, although Palestine was classified as an "A" Mandate, or closest to independence, the Mandate failed to recognize the principles stipulated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, namely that Palestine, like Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, had reached a stage of development whereby its existence as a nation could be "provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as [the inhabitants] are able to stand alone."

An additional example of Britain's disregard for the political rights and national aspirations of the Palestinian community can be detected in Article 2 of the Mandate, which reads that "the Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."

Regarding self-determination and related institutions, although Article 4 provided for a "Jewish Agency" to be recognized "as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish-national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine," no comparable public body was provided for the Palestinian community.

Of major significance and greatly contributing to the development of the conflict in Palestine, Article 6 laid the groundwork for the immigration

policy adopted by the Mandate throughout the following decades by stating that "the Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land."

Pillars of British Rule in Palestine

During the first ten years of British rule, nearly as many laws were passed in Palestine as in the British Parliament. The policy of conflicting promises, undertaken by Britain during the war to facilitate its control of Palestine, continued throughout much of the Mandate period through British-enacted legislation. The essence of British policy consisted of reassuring the Zionists that London stood by its commitments while attempting to persuade the Palestinians that a "national home" for the Jews did not mean a Jewish state in Palestine. Britain hoped that the Palestinian opposition to Zionism would eventually wane and become reconciled to the Jewish national home concept. However, neither the Zionists nor the Palestinians were satisfied, but London showed its preferences in its interpretation and implementation of the Mandate articles relating to immigration and landownership.

One of the early actions of the Mandate authorities was to enact the first Immigration Ordinance on 26 August 1920, fixing a quota of 16,500 immigrant Jews for the first year. Even though only about 10,000 authorized Jewish immigrants landed in Palestine from September 1920 to April 1921, the Palestinians began to take this as an alarming indication of escalating Jewish settlement. Small quotas also predominated in 1922 and 1923, but the following year witnessed a larger figure of 12,856 immigrant Jews, growing to 33,801 in 1925—the largest number to do so legally until 1933. Hence, over the ensuing thirty years, the share of the Palestinian population dropped from 89 percent, according to the British census of 1922, to 72 percent in 1931 and to an estimated 69 percent in 1946. This meant that the proportion of Jews to the total population rose from 8 percent in 1918 to about 12 percent in 1922, to 17 percent in 1931, and to 31 percent in 1944. This increase in the size of the Jewish community occurred even though the birthrate among the Palestinians was about 50 percent higher than among Jews (3.2 and 2.2 percent, respectively). It was thus large-scale immigration that accounted for the rapid rise in the ratio of Jews to the total population.

British laws affecting land disposition, registration, and settlement complemented immigration laws in affirming the rising power of the Jewish community in Palestine. The Mandatory authorities retained the complex Ottoman land code but acknowledged its enmeshed chaos and devoted more attention to questions of landownership than the Ottomans had done, especially on technical matters such as surveying and settlement of claims to land rights. The major outcome of this approach was that the Ottoman prohibition on the registration or ownership of land by foreign subjects or institutions was immediately discarded. By this measure, the acquisition of land in Palestine by foreign Jews was legally facilitated. Prior to the onset of significant Jewish immigration, the scope of land owned by Jews in Palestine was negligible: only 22,530 dunum (5,500 acres), or 0.09 percent of the total land and 0.26 percent of the cultivable land, by 1882. By the end of the Mandate in 1948, 54 percent of Jewish-owned land belonged to the Jewish National Fund (JNF, or Keren Kayemeth), which was created together with the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod) by the World Zionist Organization for acquiring and holding land in a coordinated effort to build a Jewish homeland in Palestine by ensuring that whatever land was obtained was held in perpetuity for lease by the Jewish people only. Thus for the Palestinians, the issue was not only the amount of land owned by Jews but that as non-Jews they could never buy, lease, or use it. Moreover, the JNF required as a condition of sale that sellers remove any Palestinian tenant farmers who were working on the land. Hence Zionist land purchases meant the permanent alienation of the land from Palestinian usage, and Arab land acquired by Jews became extraterritorialized, thus multiplying the negative effects of Zionist landownership on Palestinians.

In addition to contributing to rising land prices, the set of five land ordinances enacted by the British to increase Zionists' ability to secure rights to and facilitate land purchases did little to change the situation that existed under the Ottomans, which favored the interests of landlords over those of the farmers. Thus throughout the Mandate period, there was a continuing, and increasingly greater, process of peasants' dispossession, which was a major factor in the unrest—

especially in the 1930s. The nature of the land ordinances, which instituted advantages to sellers, also helps to explain why large tracts of land were sold by some Palestinian landlords to Zionist brokers.

Some of the new laws gave Palestinian tenants—and even squatters—certain tenancy rights and protected them against eviction. If a landlord was burdened with taxes on land yielding almost no revenue as a result of the new laws, Jewish land brokers typically stepped in to buy the land. In one instance, over 40,000 acres, comprising eighteen villages, was sold, resulting in the eviction of 688 Arab agricultural families. By the end of the Mandate, some 70 percent of land purchased by the JNF and other Zionist bodies had been sold by large owners, the Mandate government, or corporate bodies.

Beginning in 1929, however, political factors led to a shift in British strategy toward the issue of land in Palestine. Palestinian violence that year prompted the British to conclude that rising Palestinian landlessness, as a consequence of Zionist land purchases, was a significant factor in Jewish-Arab tensions. Consequently, legislation was enacted in 1929 and 1933 to protect the rights of tenant farmers who might be evicted as a result of land sales, but this did not address the question of owner-cultivators rendered landless by selling their own land. Eventually, in 1940, the British curtailed Jewish purchases from Palestinian owners in certain regions altogether. A novel approach to the matter came in the aftermath of the widescale ARAB REVOLT of 1936–1939, which led Britain to propose partition for the first time.

The White Papers: Policy Statements of British Rule

Continuity and change in British rule in Palestine can be traced through the various WHITE PAPERS issued throughout the Mandate period. Such statements of policy came in the aftermath of periods of violence—in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936—when investigatory commissions were established by the British government to examine the causes of the disturbances.

The investigatory committees repeatedly pinpointed the unpremeditated nature of the outbreak of violence as well as the causes of the disturbances, which centered on Palestinian worries over rising Jewish immigration, increased land sales, and dispossession of the peasants; resentment about the unfulfilled promises of independence that had been given during World War I; and the concern that Zionists' real objective was a state that excluded the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The resulting recommendations of the commissions would soon be followed by a white paper announcing a new British policy. The Palestinians usually rejected the white paper's recommendations and adopted various methods of resistance. The Zionists also regularly disagreed with the finding and recommendations, but, having influential international contacts, they tended to opt for more intense diplomacy, especially in London.

The British government did not always implement white paper recommendations. At times London's inaction was a response to the pressures of communal violence in Palestine or to Zionist lobbying. On many occasions, however, regional circumstances also played a role. For example, the PALIN COMMISSION investigated the first instance of Palestinian discontent in April 1920, on the occasion of the local festival of AL-NABI MUSA (the prophet Moses), when a procession from outside the walls of Jerusalem through the Jaffa Gate resulted in the death and wounding of several people and required the intervention of the army to prevent further violence. The October 1921 Palin Report, however, was kept confidential because of the imminence of the SAN REMO CONFERENCE, which was the venue for rewarding the postwar mandates to the victorious powers, and Britain wanted to downplay local disturbances in Palestine.

Churchill Memorandum, 1922

On 3 June 1922 the British government issued the so-called CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM, which clarified its Palestine policy in light of the 1920 disturbances. The memorandum reaffirmed Britain's commitment to a Jewish national home in Palestine and stated that the Jewish presence in the country was based on "a right and not on sufferance." Although it stated that the Jews needed continued immigration to build their national home, it somewhat tempered Zionist ambitions by stating that "the absorption of Jewish immigrants would be limited to the 'economic capacity' of the country."

After Palestinian-Jewish violence in JAFFA involved nearly 100 deaths in May 1922, the HAYCRAFT COMMISSION of inquiry in October determined that the disturbances were a spontaneous result of frustrated national aspirations and Palestinian resentment toward Jewish immigration. While expressing certain restrictions, the

commission's report supported the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine, thus maintaining Britain's policy of dual obligations for the two communities of Palestine. Downplaying phrases such as "Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English," the memorandum stated that "His Majesty's Government regards any such expectation as impracticable and has no such aim in view." Its interpretation of the Balfour Declaration was that Palestine as a whole should not be converted into a Jewish national homeland but that such a home should be founded within Palestine. Nevertheless, facilitating the national home idea meant that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. Thus an order suspending Jewish immigration, issued by the high commissioner as a result of the al-Nabi Musa demonstrations, was revoked. However, from this point till 1936, immigration was to be regulated by a new principle, that of the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine.

The Palestinians rejected the Haycraft Commission's report because it upheld the Balfour Declaration and allowed further immigration, but their reaction was not violent. Instead, they refused to participate in elections for the high commissioner's proposed Legislative Council because they would have been at a disadvantage against the combined vote of the British and the Jews. In August 1922, in accordance with the Mandate articles calling for "development of self-governing institutions," Herbert Samuel had promoted creation of a Legislative Council composed of eight Muslims, two Christians, two Jews, and eleven British, reserving for himself the right to veto legislation.

Thereafter, Palestine was governed by the high commissioner assisted by an Advisory Council composed solely of British officials. The Palestinians had thus closed themselves off from direct channels of communication with the Colonial Office. Thereafter, the Palestinians consistently refused to cooperate with investigatory commissions sent by the British government.

The British also suggested the formation of an Arab Agency that would parallel the Jewish Agency established by the Mandate. However, unlike the Jewish Agency, its Arab counterpart was to be appointed by the high commissioner and would not be incorporated into the Mandate instrument. The Palestinians rejected this proposal because agreeing to an Arab Agency under such conditions would mean Palestinian acceptance of the equal standing of the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine, whereas their principal argument was that Palestine was to remain primarily Arab.

Between 1922 and 1929, Palestinian politics remained relatively quiescent, arguably because of lack of leadership. However, Palestinians' fears revived in 1928 when Jewish immigration took an upward turn. Moreover, the JNF was expanding its land purchases, and the World Zionist Organization, acting as an umbrella organization for the Jewish Agency, was gaining more power by including wealthy non-Zionists in the United States. Those developments paved the way for renewed unrest, leading Palestinians to overlook their political differences and convene a congress in July 1928 that elected the forty-eight-member Arab Executive, incorporating all the factions of the Palestinian community. The outbreak of rioting that commenced in August 1929 revealed the underlying anger and potential strength of the Palestinian national movement.

Passfield White Paper, 1930

The 1929 bloody outbreak, known as the Hebron Disturbances, began in Jerusalem and spread across the country, and its intensity caused the British to reexamine their policy in Palestine. The conflict began on 15 August 1929 when members of the Betar youth movement held a demonstration and raised a Zionist flag over the Western (Buraq) Wall. During the ensuing weeklong Arab-Jewish clashes, 133 Jews and 115 Arabs were killed and many more wounded.

The Shaw Commission of inquiry, created in March 1930, attributed the 1929 violence to Palestinian fear of Zionist takeover of the country. In October the British appointed the Hope-Simpson Commission, which concluded that the country was unable to absorb large numbers of Zionist immigrants. Both commissions generally determined that the Palestinian violence was unpremeditated and had stemmed from the community's anxiety over the adverse effects of Zionist immigration and land purchases. They recommended that British authorities limit both practices.

In response to those two investigatory commissions, the subsequent Passfield White Paper revived the idea of forming a Legislative Council for Palestine and recommended limiting Jewish immigration and land acquisitions by linking them with the absorptive capacity of Palestine's economy. Moreover, the Passfield White Paper stated

for the first time that Britain's obligations to the Jewish and Arab communities were "of equal weight."

If the findings of the Shaw Commission, the Hope-Simpson report, and the Passfield White Paper gave the Palestinians a glimmer of hope that British policy might be changing, such hopes were dashed by British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald's letter of "clarification" to CHAIM WEIZMANN, a prominent Zionist leader, in February 1931. The letter accorded Jewish institutions the right to hire only Jews, confined land leases to Jews, and stipulated that the criterion for immigration quotas was the economic absorptive capacity of the *Jewish* sector of the economy (as opposed to the economy of all Palestine). Denounced by the Palestinians as the "Black Letter," MacDonald's recommendations illuminated the degree of influence that Weizmann and his fellow Zionists wielded in official British circles.

The political and military radicalization of Palestinians increased in direct proportion to the rapidly mounting Jewish immigration and the increasingly developed Yishuv that occurred in the 1930s. Nonetheless, the Palestinian resistance still held to a moderate course, with some still pressing for a Legislative Council and for legislation to restrict land purchases. However, a temporary leadership vacuum developed when the ARAB EXECUTIVE dissolved after the demise of its president, MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI, in 1934.

MacDonald White Paper, 1939

The acceleration in Jewish immigration and growing economic disparities between the Jewish and Arab areas, coupled with the widespread and mounting distrust of the British administration, led to yet another violent showdown in 1933. The domestic scene was thus set for the forthcoming general strike, arguably the most significant resistance act in the history of the Mandate. Lasting for six months, the general strike of 1936 was precipitated by a chain of events between Jews and Arabs. Palestinian groups in Jaffa and NABLUS called for a strike, demanding that Britain suspend Jewish immigration and begin negotiations to form a national government. However, the British administration not only refused to suspend immigration but also announced new quotas. Jewish immigration laws enacted between 1933 and 1936 allowed for about 165,000 new Jewish arrivals in Palestine, raising the proportion of Jews in the population to around 30 percent.

At the same time, the newly formed ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, established in 1936 as the central political organ of the Arab community in Palestine, announced its leadership of the general strike. With the intervention of the Arab kings and emirs and their hollow promises, the strike tapered off in early October.

In 1936 the British responded to the unrest by forming the PEEL COMMISSION to investigate its causes. The commission stressed the Mandate's inability to provide a sufficient political solution for the two communities' contradictory national aspirations and recommended the revolutionary proposal of partitioning Palestine into two states—Jewish and Arab. The report reignited Palestinian anger at being denied statehood, and violence soon erupted again. Rather than crush the nationalist movement, British authorities arrested and deported most of the resistance leaders, which only galvanized the local people and intensified the violence across the country.

By the time it ended, the ARAB REVOLT had claimed the lives of nearly 3,000 Palestinians, and London sent out yet another fact-finding mission in 1938, the WOODHEAD COMMISSION. Woodhead's report signaled the abandonment of the Peel proposal for partition and declared that Britain would reassess the entire political situation at a round-table conference in London to be attended by Zionist delegates, Palestinians, and Arab delegates from EGYPT, Iraq, SAUDI ARABIA, Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950), and Yemen.

As a result of the turbulent events of 1936–1939, the British government, on 17 May 1939, issued the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which became British policy in Palestine for the duration of World War II. In London, the Colonial Office school of thought, which in 1937 had regarded partition as the most appropriate way out of the conundrum in Palestine, was superseded during the course of 1938 by the Foreign Office school of thought, which argued that Britain had already fulfilled its obligations to the Zionists under the Balfour Declaration. The white paper averred that the Jewish national home, as envisaged in the Balfour Declaration and in previous statements of British policy, had been established. Therefore, after the admission of a final quota of 75,000 more Jewish immigrants over a period of five years, Jewish immigration would stop. In par-

allel, during this five-year period, restrictions would be placed on additional land acquisition by the Jews, and self-governing institutions would eventually be set up in the country.

The MacDonald White Paper concluded that fundamental conflicting interests between the Jews and Arabs were the essential causes of the explosion of violence in Palestine. Although British officials knew that the white paper would be unacceptable to the Zionists because it limited Jewish immigration and land purchases, they reasoned that, because of the threat posed by the Nazis in Europe, the Jews would have no other choice but to acquiesce. The white paper was also an attempt to allay fervent Palestinian nationalist aspirations. However, these issues were not the only motivations for Britain's change of course. London was extremely concerned about the escalating tensions in Europe and was keen on securing the support of the Arab states and preventing them from allying with Italy and GERMANY. Additionally, Britain had other problems in the region and elsewhere: the termination of the British Mandate in Iraq, the national militancy of the Wafd Party in Egypt, the apparent success of a national strike in Syria, and more generally the challenge to Britain's dominant position in the region during the Abyssinian crisis, in addition to the threat posed by German Nazism.

The Jewish community in Palestine, by now too strong, too organized, and too well mobilized to be contained, denounced the British for withdrawing the promise of partition and statehood. Jewish activists viewed the Nazi threat as even more reason to have a Jewish state and responded to the white paper with TERRORIST attacks, clandestine military training, and massive propaganda efforts in Europe and the United States.

Contrary to the Zionists' absolute rejection, Palestinian reactions to the new policies articulated in the MacDonald White Paper were mixed. Politically and economically weakened, and lacking a strong visionary leadership (largely in exile because of British deportations), Palestinians were unable to take advantage of the possibilities inherent in the white paper. Some questioned the sincerity of the British government, but most were willing to support it. However, one faction flatly rejected it because it failed to fully meet the national aspirations of the Palestinians, and that became the official Palestinian policy.

By 1945 the United States under President HARRY TRUMAN was involved in the Palestine question. Truman called for the immediate admittance of 100,000 Jews to Palestine, but Britain was reluctant to consent. Finally Britain and the United States agreed to establish the ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY to review the issue of Jewish immigration. After a four-month investigation, the committee recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 displaced Jews and the creation of a BINATIONAL state in Palestine in which the interests of both communities would be carefully balanced and protected, as under the British Mandate, until a UN trusteeship could be implemented.

The Jewish Agency continued to orchestrate an intensified campaign of violence against the British and to promote and facilitate illegal immigration. Still, London made one more attempt to settle the Palestine problem by convening the LONDON CONFERENCE in 1946–1947. There the British put forward a proposal whereby a trusteeship over Palestine would continue for another five years with the declared objective of preparing the country as a whole for independence. In response, the Palestinians presented their own proposals for independence with guarantees for Jewish minority rights that were unacceptable to the British. The Jewish Agency rejected the British proposals outright and intensified its militancy.

The escalating hostilities between Arabs and Jews over the fate of Palestine, the attacks by Zionist militias against the British, and London's devastation in the aftermath of World War II paved the way for the termination of the Mandate. Although the British requested that the recently established United Nations determine the future of Palestine, the British government's hope was that the United Nations would be unable to arrive at a workable solution and would turn Palestine back to it as a UN trusteeship. A UN-appointed committee, the UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP), of representatives from various countries, went to Palestine to investigate the situation. Although committee members disagreed on the form that a political resolution should take, there was general agreement that the country would have to be divided to satisfy the needs and demands of both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. At the end of 1946, 1,269,000 Arabs and 608,000 Jews resided within the borders of Mandate Palestine. Jews had purchased 6 to 7 percent of the total land area of

Palestine, amounting to about 20 percent of the arable land.

On 29 November 1947, THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, in RESOLUTION 181, voted to partition Palestine into two states: one Jewish and the other Arab. The plan divided the country in such a way that each state would have a majority of its own population, although some Jewish settlements would fall within the proposed Palestinian state and many Palestinians would become part of the proposed Jewish state. The territory designated for the Jewish state would be slightly larger than the Palestinian state (56 percent and 44 percent, respectively), on the assumption that increasing numbers of Jews would immigrate there. According to the UN partition plan, the area of Jerusalem and BETHLEHEM was to become a permanent international trusteeship.

Days after the adoption of the UN plan, fighting began between Palestinian and Jewish residents of Palestine. The Zionist military forces, although numerically smaller than the Palestinian forces, were better organized, trained, and armed. By the spring of 1948, the Zionist forces had secured control over most of the territory allotted to the Jewish state in the UN plan.

On 15 May 1948 the British evacuated Palestine, Zionist leaders proclaimed the state of Israel, and the first Arab-Israeli war began.

Conclusion

The 1939 white paper marked the end of the British-Zionist alliance. At the same time, the defeat of the Arab Revolt and the exile of the Palestinian political leadership meant that the Palestinian Arabs were politically disorganized during the crucial decade in which the future of Palestine was decided. British rule in Palestine began with the vision of a victorious great power confident of its ability to manipulate what it perceived as local intercommunal skirmishes in a region that it believed would be quiescent under its colonial arrangements and control. The Mandate articles that legitimized British administration in Palestine enumerated numerous policies that enabled Britain to govern the country. One policy, however, dominated Britain's approach: the concept of dual obligation to the two communities seeking self-determination. The main tactics utilized by British policymakers to implement this approach involved enacting laws of immigration and landownership and submitting proposals for self-governing institutions.

During the first half of the Mandate, the British administration succeeded in downplaying the issue of a Jewish state while effectively allowing the Jewish community to grow, prosper, and establish an organized, institutionalized presence on the ground. Despite their myriad and varied modes of resistance, Palestinians found themselves in the unenviable situation of failing to persuade the British to grant them independence. Throughout the Mandate and in the aftermath of violent incidents, Britain sent numerous commissions of inquiry, and each succinctly pinpointed the causes of unrest in Palestinian opposition: exclusion and fear. Nevertheless, British policymakers did not always follow the recommendations of the white papers they issued.

The situation took a different path in the mid-1930s when the British administration was obliged to recognize that the Palestinians were a people with genuine national aspirations and perceived the necessity of restraining Jewish landownership and immigration. The 1939 MacDonald White Paper marked the end of the British-Zionist alliance. These insights were as much a product of regional conditions and international circumstances as they were of events on the ground in Palestine. Such were the circumstances that gave rise to the initiative to partition Palestine and Britain's bequeathal of that idea to the United Nations as it prepared to give up the Mandate.

On 18 February 1947 the British foreign secretary announced in the House of Commons that "the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, that the obligations undertaken to the two communities had been shown to be irreconcilable," and therefore that the government intended to give it up. After twenty-six years of administering Palestine, Britain withdrew from its mandatory responsibilities on 15 May 1948. On the same day the state of Israel was proclaimed, the first of six Arab-Israeli wars ignited. Decades later, land continues to be an integral component of the unresolved conflict, and Palestinians expelled during the 1948 War are into their fourth generation as refugees.

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—Shahira Samy

Brit Shalom

Brit Shalom, established by Jews in the Yishuv in the mid-1920s, proposed a solution to the Jewish-Palestinian conflict that was built on the principle

of parity—that two nationalities could coexist side by side in a BINATIONAL state. Its members shared a deep belief that, for both moral and practical reasons, a dominant people could not decide the terms of the dominated and that such an arrangement was unjust and would lead to enough friction to cause a war. Under Brit Shalom's solution, Jews would not have an independent, sovereign Jewish state, and Palestinians would have to concede their ambition for self-rule. Brit Shalom argued that, although there would inevitably be differences of opinion among Jews and Arabs, there would also be a great degree of cooperation. Issues such as economic development, social security, quality of life, trade, agriculture, industry, labor, and commerce would, in its opinion, draw Jews and Arabs together.

MARTIN BUBER became active in Brit Shalom from its outset in 1925. Buber rejected the idea of ZIONISM as just another national movement and wanted instead to see the creation of an exemplary society that would not be characterized by Jewish domination of the Arabs. He remained the most important intellectual influence throughout the existence of Brit Shalom.

One of Buber's disciples, JUDAH MAGNES, emerged as the leader and promoter of Brit Shalom. His activism on behalf of the organization's principles was legendary. Magnus was also deeply influenced by the Jewish philosopher AHAD HA'AM, one of the earliest critics of the policies of the political Zionist movement. The title of his essay, "*Lo zeh haderech*" (This Is Not the Way), became the touchstone of earnest criticism. Despite much opposition from the Zionist movement, Brit Shalom continued to propound its ideas throughout the 1920s and 1930s. In 1942 it founded a small political party, called the IHUD (Union Association of Palestine), and continued to lobby the international community for support and recognition of its ideas. However, the ideas espoused by Brit Shalom and Ihud were not well received in the Yishuv or the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, and insofar as they sought to replace the traditional Zionist aim of Jewish dominance and statehood with a unitary state for all citizens, they were simply dismissed out of hand.

Today Brit Shalom: Toward a Covenant of Peace in the Middle East is a contemporary Israeli peace alliance formed in 2001 that draws its inspiration and principles from its historic predecessor. It is mainly active in Israel and the UNITED STATES. (www.britshalom.org).

See also PEACE

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Brit Tzedek v'Shalom

Brit Tzedek v'Shalom (Jewish Alliance for Justice and Peace) is a national organization of US Jews committed to achieving a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is guided by the mitzvah, or obligation, to pursue peace and justice, an obligation that is rooted in both secular and religious Jewish traditions. Brit Tzedek v'Shalom believes that enduring peace and security can only be achieved through the establishment of an economically and politically viable Palestinian state, which would necessitate an end to Israel's OCCUPATION of land acquired during the 1967 WAR and in turn bring an end to Palestinian TERRORISM. (www.btvshalom.org).

B'Tselem

B'Tselem (in the image of), the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, is the foremost Israeli human rights organization that concerns itself, almost exclusively, with human rights abuses in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. It has published scores of reports, many comprehensive in scope, covering almost every kind of human rights violation, including TORTURE, fatal shootings by security forces, RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, expropriation of LAND and WATER, discrimination in planning and building in East JERUSALEM, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, and SETTLER VIOLENCE. These reports, available in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, are impeccably researched and documented, making B'Tselem the most important source for accurate information on human rights abuses. (www.btselem.org).

Buber, Martin (1878–1965)

The most important Jewish religious philosopher of the twentieth century, Martin Buber wrote widely

in the fields of art, education, sociology, philosophy, politics, religion, biblical interpretation, Judaism, and ZIONISM. His work *I and Thou* has been universally recognized as a classic. Buber was born in Vienna; studied there and in Leipzig, Berlin, and Zurich; and joined the Zionist movement in 1898. During the first years of Hitler's rule, Buber stayed in GERMANY, but by 1938 he felt he had to leave and immigrated to Palestine; from then on he lectured at the Hebrew University in JERUSALEM.

Buber became a Zionist because he believed that European ANTI-SEMITISM made it necessary for Jews to have their own homeland; however, he soon became disenchanted with THEODOR HERZL's brand of nationalistic political Zionism. Instead, he favored the form of Zionism developed by AHAD HA'AM, based on the fundamental moral and spiritual values of Judaism. For Buber, Zionism had to be no less than a Jewish path to bring about *tikkun olam* (redemption of the world through establishment of truth and justice) in all of the institutions and activities of the Jewish settlement in Palestine. In this way, he believed, Zionism could contribute to human civilization as a whole and avoid self-centered nationalism. Buber could not accept a Jewish state that did not provide justice and security for all of its inhabitants—Jews and non-Jews—and hoped for a deep and continuing solidarity of genuine interests between the two peoples. He wrote that the Arab question would be the moral litmus test of Zionism. In 1921 he proposed a federation of Middle Eastern states to link the Jewish community with its Arab neighbors.

In 1925, when Buber was still living in Germany, a number of his followers in Palestine started an organization called BRIT SHALOM. They based their political philosophy on Buber's writings and advocated a democratic BINATIONAL state in which Jews and Arabs would be completely equal. Once in Palestine, Buber was active in Brit Shalom, and he and his comrades, including Rabbi JUDAH MAGNES, worked with moderate Arabs to try to forge links between the two peoples. Although they tried to influence the direction of Zionism, their views were never taken seriously by the Zionist establishment.

Following the 1948 WAR, Buber told Israel's founder, DAVID BEN-GURION, that one of the most important priorities of the new state of Israel should be to solve the Palestinian REFUGEE problem, but Ben-Gurion refused to listen. Throughout the remainder of his life, Buber worked to defend the civil rights of the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, and he urged Jews and Arabs to engage in genuine dialogue. He continued to try to influence public policy in this arena until his death.

See also BINATIONALISM; IHUD; PEACE

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Al-Budayri Family

The al-Budayri family is a prominent JERUSALEM family whose authenticated origins date back to the seventeenth century. Composed of lawyers, newspaper publishers and editors, and very strong Palestinian nationalists, the family enjoyed wealth and social stature—evident from the official OTTOMAN titles they held, such as pasha and *naquib* (representative of the family).

Shaykh Mohammad ibn Budayri (1747–1805) was born in Jerusalem and was sent by his father to Cairo for his education in Islamic theology at al-Azhar Mosque. Upon attaining the highest order of education, he returned in 1778 to Jerusalem, where he taught Islamic theology and doctrines at AL-AQSA MOSQUE. The shaykh spent a large portion of his private wealth in acquiring books and rare manuscripts for his library. One of three remaining Palestinian family-owned libraries in Jerusalem today, the al-Budayri library contains 642 rare manuscripts and 2,200 books. The family is currently planning to open it to the public.

The following generations continued in the path of their fathers, especially in teaching Islam and the Arabic language. However, at the begin-

ning of the twentieth century, the trend in family education shifted to law, medicine, engineering, applied sciences, and social studies. Men and women were educated equally, and some of the first Palestinian lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, and engineers came from the Budayri family. In September 1919 the lawyer Muhammad Hasan al-Budayri opened the first newspaper in Palestine, *Suriyya al-Janubiyya,* published in Jerusalem. This paper was important in several respects: it appears to have been the most influential organ of opinion during its short lifetime; it was highly political and intensely nationalist; and its articles were vividly written. It attracted talented writers, in part, because it was affiliated with the Arab Nationalist Club (al-Nadi al-'Arabi) in Jerusalem.

In 1921 Muhammad Hasan al-Budayri's cousin Muhammad Kamil Budayri published a new newspaper called *al-Sabah,* which stated in its first issue that it was being published in Jerusalem, "the capital of Palestine." Minor though this might seem, it bespoke a subtle but important change in focus for many Palestinians, who now saw that Jerusalem, not Damascus, was the center of their political and social lives. The current generation of al-Budayris maintains the same high standard of education laid down by their founding fathers, and Jerusalem remains an essential part of their lives.

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Building Permits

To construct a home, enlarge an existing one, or build any type of structure (such as sheds, chicken coops, etc.) on one's LAND, Palestinians must obtain a PERMIT from the Israeli Occupation Authorities. Such permits, however, are almost never granted. Over the past four decades of OCCUPATION, Israel has employed in the WEST BANK a policy of planning, development, and building that severely restricts construction by Palestinians while allocating broad expanses of land to establish and expand Jewish SETTLEMENTS. In this way, Israel has created a situation in which thousands of Palestinians are unable to obtain permits to build on their land and are compelled to build without a permit to meet family needs for shelter.

The existing planning schemes, which date back fifty years and more, serve as the basis for approval, or far more often rejection, of applications for building permits. Land registration for Palestinians has been frozen for forty years, facilitating Israel's denial of permits on the grounds of failure to prove ownership of the land. The building authorities are administered by Israel and have no Palestinian representation. A Palestinian wanting to obtain a building permit to construct something on his land in AREA C (that part of the West Bank that remains under complete Israeli control according to the INTERIM AGREEMENT) must undergo a prolonged, complicated, and expensive procedure that generally results in denial of the application.

When Palestinians have built without a permit, Israel has adopted a policy of mass HOUSE DEMOLITIONS. In the ten years preceding 2003, the authorities demolished more than 2,200 residences, leaving more than 13,000 Palestinians homeless. This policy continued uninterrupted during the OSLO PROCESS. In this same period, at least 155 Israeli settlements, containing more than 170,000 (many put the number at 400,000) Jewish Israeli citizens, have been established in the West Bank. All these settlements are efficiently planned and constructed. But because thousands of houses within the settlements were built without permits, Israel has issued retroactive building permits, and it has never demolished any permitless Jewish structures.

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Bush, George H. W. (1924–)

The forty-first president of the UNITED STATES, George H. W. Bush, governed from 1989 to 1993. Much of his term was focused on Middle East issues, including the 1991 GULF WAR (the first war against IRAQ) and the MADRID CONFERENCE. Presi-

dent Bush and his secretary of state, JAMES BAKER, supported the long-standing US policy of an alliance with Israel and a refusal to recognize the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), including the termination in June 1990 of a low-level dialogue with the PLO begun in the REAGAN administration.

Opposition to the PLO

One aspect of the Bush administration's policy to discredit the PLO included strenuous efforts to block the Palestinian organization from membership in various international organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO); the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO); the International Labour Organization; the International Telecommunications Union; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as to prevent the PLO from signing the four Geneva Conventions. In this regard, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs John Bolton told the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1989: "Following an extensive lobbying campaign in Geneva, Washington, and virtually all foreign capitals, Secretary Baker made it clear in his 1 May statement that: (1) 'we oppose the PLO's efforts as a matter of principle,' and (2) the inevitable result of any enhancement of the PLO's status in an international organization would be the complete termination of United States funding for that organization."

The FAO, bowing to US pressure not to give the PLO full membership, was nevertheless desirous of granting the Palestinian organization some form of recognition. It thus passed a resolution that endorsed a PLO role in providing technical assistance to farmers in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Slightly over a month later, the United States announced that it was sharply cutting FAO's funding—from $61.4 million to $18 million.

Other efforts to delegitimize the PLO under the Bush administration included US government pressure on the Council on Foreign Relations to cancel PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE member YASIR 'ABD RABBU's invitation to speak before the council, the US State Department's warning that a speaking event at the UNITED NATIONS involving members of the PLO delegation would be considered improper "political activity" and could lead to the revocation of the delegation's visas, and repeated denials of requests from YASIR ARAFAT for visas to speak at the United Nations.

US diplomacy at the United Nations provided another venue for minimizing Palestinian interests and conversely supporting Israel. In Bush's first week in office, his UN delegate put strong pressure on Security Council members to withdraw a resolution that the United States deemed too critical of Israel's human rights violations in the Occupied Territories. Although fourteen Security Council members voted for the resolution, on 17 February 1989 the United States vetoed it. On 20 April 1989 the United States voted against a UN General Assembly resolution again condemning Israel's policies in the Occupied Territories, while stressing the need for an international conference. The vote was 129 to 2, with the United States and Israel being the sole opponents. On 31 August the United States abstained on a Security Council resolution that deplored Israel's DEPORTATION of Palestinians and called on Israel to respect the Geneva Conventions in the Occupied Territories. The US abstention was considered by many a great victory for the Palestinians, though clearly it did not deter subsequent Israeli deportations, which reached their peak in December 1992. On 6 October 1989 the United States and Israel cast the only two negative votes (140 to 2) against a General Assembly resolution condemning Israel's policies against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

On 16 February 1990 the United States abstained on a resolution passed by the UN Commission of Human Rights affirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories and calling on the Israeli government to cease settling Jewish immigrants in these areas. Subsequently, the Bush administration explained its abstention by stating that although it objected to new SETTLEMENTS in the Occupied Territories, "We have not determined that it is productive to address the legal issue. . . . We are concerned that the [resolution] . . . while upholding the principle of freedom of emigration, also refers to the Right of Return [for Palestinians]. . . . We also object . . . to the use of the phrase 'Palestinian and Arab territories.' . . . We do not accept the implied prejudgment of their status." On 16 May the United States voted against a WHO resolution condemning Israel for HEALTH CARE conditions in the Occupied Territories. The vote was 67 to 2, with the United States and Israel opposed. Additionally, the Bush team mounted a successful campaign in the United

Nations to repeal the 1975 General Assembly Resolution 3379 defining Zionism as a form of racism.

In May 1990, in the context of massive SOVIET JEWISH immigration to Israel (for which the Bush administration had marshaled significant diplomatic, economic, and logistical support) and extensive Israeli settlement building in the Occupied Territories, including in East JERUSALEM, to house these and other settlers, the Bush administration successfully pressured the Security Council to drop a resolution terming Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories and East Jerusalem illegal. In the same month, after escalating Israeli human rights violations in the Occupied Territories, US pressure in the Security Council killed a proposed resolution to send a UN observer force to the Palestinian territories and a compromise resolution that would have sent a special UN envoy to investigate the violence. On 31 May the United States vetoed a Security Council resolution to send a special commission of inquiry to the Occupied Territories.

Support of Israel

The first policy statement from the Bush administration on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict came on 10 February 1989 from Vice President Dan Quayle, who told a meeting of the ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE: "I am here to tell you that the Bush Administration shares your basic outlook. . . . The first principle of US Middle East policy remains strong and unwavering support for Israel's security. . . . America and Israel are linked by common strategic interests. The fact is that we have no more reliable friend than Israel. And the scope of our STRATEGIC COOPERATION is vast. . . . Our relationship with Israel has expanded into a 'true strategic alliance' . . . [and] I want to assure you that . . . the Bush-Quayle years will . . . continue to strengthen and deepen our strategic alliance with Israel."

In early March Secretary of State Baker broadly outlined what would become the administration's "two-tier" approach to the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This strategy involved separating negotiations on Israeli-Arab states issues from Israeli-Palestinian issues (excluding the PLO). The initial Bush-Baker diplomatic effort centered on a proposal put forth by Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR in April 1989 in response to an administration request for an Israeli initiative. In fact, the "Shamir Plan," which became the BAKER PLAN, constituted the parameters of the Bush administration's Middle East peace efforts throughout the entire four years of this administration—even after the Gulf War, which objectively altered a number of other significant factors in the region.

Prior to the Gulf War, the United States focused on the aspect of Shamir's plan that encouraged the Palestinians to participate in local elections, and after the war the United States emphasized the Israeli idea of bilateral negotiations and worked to promote talks between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and a delegation of non-PLO Palestinians from the WEST BANK and GAZA. However, even as the United States shifted its attention to bilateral agreements between Israel and the Arab states, the Shamir Plan for ELECTIONS (in the context of limited autonomy) remained the animating principle in US efforts to find some sort of settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

On 14 May 1989 the Israeli government released a follow-up proposal to its original election plan. The Palestinians responded by spurning Shamir's proposals and reiterating their own position on peace in a letter signed by West Bank leaders and made public in Jerusalem on 27 April 1989. The US response was articulated by Baker in an address to the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE on 22 May 1989: "President Bush believes, and I believe, that on these issues, there can be only one policy and that is continuity. American support for Israel is the foundation of our approach to the Middle East. . . . For the Palestinians, now is the time to speak with one voice for peace. Renounce the policy of phases in all languages, not just those addressed to the West. Practice constructive diplomacy, not attempts to distort international organizations, such as the World Health Organization. Amend the [PLO] Covenant. Translate the dialogue of violence in the INTIFADA into a dialogue of politics and diplomacy. Violence will not work. Reach out to Israelis and convince them of your peaceful intentions. You have the most to gain from doing so, and no one else can or will do it for you. Finally, understand that no one is going to 'deliver' Israel for you."

On 1 November 1989 the secretary of state formally submitted his peace plan, the "Baker Plan," which reflected Israel's dicta regarding "peace"—no negotiations with the PLO, no Palestinian state, no right of return for Palestinians, no discussion of Jerusalem, and the elections would be only to select individuals to participate in

negotiations on Palestinian autonomy. Yet, by the spring of 1990, Israel was refusing to implement its own election proposal—a stance that resulted in growing frustration and irritation on the part of President Bush toward Shamir.

By 1990 approximately 1.1 million Jews had left the SOVIET UNION, the vast majority settling in Israel. These huge numbers of IMMIGRANTS inextricably altered the nature of the Palestine-Israel conflict because the drive to house them in settlements led to the appropriation of more Palestinian LAND and WATER resources in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Also, new immigrants from the Soviet Union replaced many Palestinians from the territories who had worked in Israel. Israeli analyst Amiram Goldbloom wrote that the new settlements had enormous political significance in that "they are intended to prove to the Palestinians, and . . . to the Arab world, that the Israeli government thumbs its nose at the US efforts to advance peace in the region. . . . The government is now mobilized to torpedo any chance for peace."

At this point, sensing that its credibility as an impartial broker with the Arab states was increasingly coming into question, the Bush administration began to exert some pressure on Israel. On 1 March 1990 Secretary Baker issued a statement tying US approval of an Israeli request for $10 million in loan guarantees to help settle Soviet Jewish immigrants to a halt in Israeli settlement construction. At the same time, President Bush made several unprecedented statements to the effect that the settlements were a serious, even the main, obstacle to peace. This led to a hardening of the Shamir government's position and, consequently, increasing tensions in the US-Israeli relationship. Movement toward an Israeli-Palestinian accord came to a virtual halt, while at the same time Israel engaged in a program of massive new settlement construction.

On 13 June Shamir publicly blamed the United States for stirring up "Arab hostility" in the territories and at the same time laid down new, more restrictive conditions for peace talks, saying that Israel would not negotiate with any Palestinian who opposed limited autonomy for the Occupied Territories and that Palestinians from East Jerusalem could not have a role in the talks. Another Israeli official declared that Baker's formula for talks was "no longer relevant," and Israeli foreign minister DAVID LEVY averred that Baker's plan had "distorted" the Israeli peace initiative and called on the United States to "get back to basics" with Israel. Baker responded by expressing impatience with the peace process and suggested that if positive peace moves from the Middle East actors were not forthcoming, the United States might disengage. He then made his famous comment to Israel—"When you're serious about peace, call us"—and gave the White House telephone number.

Yet, in the very same week (on 20 June), the United States suspended the dialogue with the PLO, marking the end of eighteen fruitless months of talks. The Bush administration had indicated from the outset that it accorded little importance to the US-PLO DIALOGUE (Baker had stated early in the administration, "The existence of the dialogue should not lead anyone to misunderstand our overall policy or question our enduring support for the state of Israel"), but ending the talks was a severe blow to the Palestinians. The ostensible reason for the termination was the PLO's failure to condemn a 30 May attempted raid on Israel by the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF) and its subsequent refusal to submit to the US demand to expel ABU AL-ABBAS, PLF leader, from the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. More important was US capitulation to relentless domestic and Israeli pressure to discontinue the dialogue.

After the United States ended the dialogue, the PLO continued to seek ways to placate US objections and restart the talks, but the Bush administration ignored the Palestinian entreaties. PLO efforts were brought to a halt with the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of KUWAIT, followed by its 8 August annexation and Yasir Arafat's support of Iraq.

Gulf War

From August 1990 through January 1991, the Bush administration's interests in the Middle East were primarily directed at cobbling, then holding, together a coalition of Arab states in support of its objectives vis-à-vis Iraq. This necessitated maintaining a certain distance from Israel and satisfying some—mainly symbolic—Arab demands regarding the Palestinians. As a result, the United States further delayed approval of Israel's request for $10 million in loan guarantees. Shamir responded by publicly attacking two pillars of US policy—the sale of arms to the Arab states and efforts to arrange Israeli-Palestinian peace talks—and declared that it was necessary for the Jewish state to keep "the

land of Israel from the sea to the Jordan for the generations to come."

Still, the United States supported Israel's interests, successfully postponing meetings of the Security Council on 7 and 10 December that were scheduled to discuss an international conference for solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, the United States declined to veto Security Council Resolution 681 deploring Israel's deportation of four Palestinians. Following its passage, Israel ignored the resolution and declared that "the fate of this resolution will be like the fate of other resolutions which are now in the UN archives."

Peacemaking Efforts

Following the end of the Gulf War, during the spring and summer of 1991, the United States undertook an intensive venture to catalyze an Arab-Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Between March and July 1991, Secretary Baker made five trips to the Middle East. Yet, in spite of the flurry of American diplomacy, the 1989 Shamir Plan remained the basis of Baker's efforts.

Even the form of the US endeavor suggested that it would work against the Palestinians. Washington's pursuit of a two-track strategy of separating Israeli-Arab state and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations seriously weakened the Palestinian position. Unlike the comprehensive settlement that all relevant UN resolutions envisioned, the US plan was aimed at separate bilateral agreements, and the United States was far more committed to a just solution of the Israeli-Arab state conflict than it was to the Israeli-Palestinian one. Moreover, the United States demonstrated substantive opposition to Palestinian interests and rights, with the Bush administration repeatedly reiterating US opposition to an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as well as refusing to recognize the PLO or to include it in the negotiating process. The latter stance was manifested in the strong pressure exerted by Baker on West Bank and Gaza residents to find a group of non-PLO, non-Jerusalemite Palestinians to join a Jordanian delegation to negotiate with Israel about some form of autonomy for the Palestinians.

The Bush administration's objectives in advancing a peace strategy were narrowly conceived and focused more on process than substance. Bush sought to bring about an end to the ARAB LEAGUE economic boycott of Israel, to terminate the Palestinian INTIFADA, to get the various parties to the negotiating table, and to cement a stable pro-American status quo in the region. Washington openly admitted that it had "no plan" to resolve the differences between Israel and the Palestinians when a conference was convened.

Despite its favorable terms for Israel, the Jewish state initially rejected the US Baker Plan (relenting only in August). Israel insisted that the conference be simply a one-day ceremonial opening to direct talks between Israel and its Arab state neighbors. Israel also made it clear that it would not exchange territory for peace—negating UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 (the territories for peace formula)—and demanded a veto over the composition of a Palestinian delegation, which it now insisted, in addition to its previous stipulations (no PLO affiliates, no Jerusalemites), could contain no Palestinians living in the DIASPORA.

The MADRID CONFERENCE opened in Spain on 30 October 1991 with a group of non-PLO Palestinians (vetted by Israel) participating in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Each delegation gave an address, and the conference recessed indefinitely on 1 November. The first round of bilateral talks commenced for one day in Madrid on 3 November, and thereafter successive rounds were held in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. By November 1992 seven sessions of the peace conference had been held. In the meantime, Shamir had been replaced by the LABOR PARTY, and a new prime minister, YITZHAK RABIN (to whom President Bush immediately granted the loan guarantees), was in office. George Bush had been defeated by BILL CLINTON, who would assume office in January 1993, and the secret talks in Oslo that led to the OSLO ACCORDS were only a few months away.

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Bush, George W. (1946–)

George W. Bush, the forty-third US president, is the son of GEORGE H. W. BUSH, who was president from 1989 to 1993. Under the younger Bush's administration, which started in 2001, US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict took a qualitative shift to the right. Although previous administrations had never been particularly sympathetic to Palestinian concerns and had generally supported Israel's positions, most mainstream analysts placed the US position more or less in the center of the Israeli political spectrum. By contrast, the Bush administration firmly identified with the Israeli right, in particular with the LIKUD. Paradoxically, however, Bush was the first US president to call for an independent Palestinian state and the first to use the word *Palestine* in a public address.

During President Bush's first year in office, administration officials made a number of contradictory statements regarding Israeli policies. For example, Secretary of State COLIN POWELL criticized certain Israeli actions on several occasions only to have them soft-pedaled later by the White House. Both Republican and Democratic congressional leaders during this period tended to say that the administration was not being sufficiently anti-Palestinian.

The Bush administration's official position toward the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was largely based on leaving the two parties to work it out between themselves. Not surprisingly, given the asymmetry in power between the Palestinians and their Israeli occupiers, taking a hands-off approach toward bilateral negotiations resulted in little progress in the peace process and allowed Israel to further consolidate its OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, GAZA (until 2005), and the Golan Heights.

In 2001, the Bush administration—spearheaded by CIA director GEORGE TENET and retired marine commandant Anthony ZINNI—followed up on the MITCHELL Commission Report by pushing for a cease-fire agreement from the Palestinians at the same time that ARIEL SHARON'S government pledged to continue building more Jewish SETTLEMENTS. Indeed, the administration soon directed its attention almost exclusively to ending Palestinian violence and did not follow up on the Mitchell Report's call for a settlement freeze and other Israeli responsibilities. Bush and his advisers basically considered Palestinian TERRORISM the cause of the conflict and adopted the same rhetoric as Prime Minister Sharon (who assumed office less than a month after Bush) and his aides.

On several occasions during President Bush's tenure, the UNITED STATES utilized its veto power in the UN Security Council to block resolutions critical of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law, such as Israel's TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS against suspected militants and its attacks on civilian targets—including UN personnel and facilities—in the Occupied Territories.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States by Arab hijackers, the Bush administration moved even closer to the Likud worldview of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one dimension of the global threat of Islamist terrorism. Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulted not from "the absence of a political way forward" but from "terrorism . . . in its rawest form." Furthermore, he accused IRAQ, IRAN, and SYRIA of "using the Middle East conflict as an excuse for those terrorist organizations" operating in the region.

What became known as the Bush Doctrine, formalized in June 2002, moved US foreign policy away from its long-standing policy of deterrence, containment, and negotiation to emphasize unilateral action, military preemption, and full-spectrum dominance of the Middle East and other parts of the world against any potential adversary. Although

there was also a rhetorical shift supporting greater democracy and liberty in the Arab and Islamic world, US support for autocratic regimes in the region actually increased. The post-9/11 US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq quickly eclipsed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the major focus of US policy initiatives in the region.

One component of the Bush Doctrine was that those who harbor terrorists or have any other links to terrorists will be treated as terrorists themselves and thereby subjected to military action and excluded from any peace negotiations. In the case of Israel and Palestine, this doctrine led to full US support of Israel's massive offensives in 2002 against the Palestinians—Operation Journey of Colors, Operation Determined Path, Operation Defensive Shield, and others—during which the Israel Defense Forces reoccupied much of the West Bank, severely damaging major parts of the territory's civilian infrastructure, and at the same time destroying key segments of the Palestinian National Authority's security and governing institutions. The Bush administration also refused to engage in substantive negotiations with the Palestinians beyond issues dealing with Israeli security concerns.

This more hard-line policy under President Bush came in part as a result of his decision to give US Defense Department officials unprecedented clout in the formulation of US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which had previously been largely the purview of the State Department. One consequence was that the hard-line Pentagon officials who viewed the conflict strictly in security terms and tended to be sympathetic to Israel—for example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith—marginalized the pragmatic conservatives in the administration, such as Secretary of State Powell, who saw the conflict more in political terms. For example, before joining the administration, Feith, a prominent neoconservative intellectual, had contributed to a 1996 paper that advised then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to make "a clean break from the peace process." Similarly, Feith wrote a widely read 1997 article that called on Israel to reoccupy "the areas under Palestinian Authority control," even though "the price in blood would be high."

The Bush administration also ignored the Arab League's peace initiative, approved unanimously in its 2002 Beirut Summit, which would have provided security guarantees for Israel and establish full normal diplomatic relations in return for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories.

On 24 June 2002, in the midst of Israel's massive military offensive against the Palestinians, President Bush gave a major, televised speech setting forth the US position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the most important speech on the conflict in his eight years in office, Bush remained faithful to his tenets. He accepted the Israeli view that "terror" alone was fueling the conflict and defended all Israeli violence as self-defense. Bush demanded that the Palestinians "reform" themselves before any demands were made of Israel. He declared: "I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror. I call upon them to build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and liberty. If the Palestinian people actively pursue these goals, America and the world will actively support their efforts." This amounted to a demand that the Palestinians, under the conditions of military occupation, develop all the institutions of a fully independent, democratic state and a fully functioning democracy.

In addition, Bush chastised the Palestinians for having a weak legislature and an ineffective judicial system. But, if they complied with his goals, "the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and *certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement* in the Middle East" (emphasis added). While support for even interim independence and partial sovereignty was further than any previous administration had gone in recognizing Palestinian national rights, it still fell far short of international demands for a viable Palestinian state.

On the issue of violence, Bush made it clear that the Palestinians must renounce it categorically, while Israel was given a free hand to "continue to defend itself." Although Palestinians were required to stop "terror" immediately, Bush only called on Israel to withdraw its forces to the positions held prior to 28 September 2000 and to stop settlement construction in the Occupied Territories, "as we make progress." This was interpreted by Israel to mean that it could carry on with unilateral military operations and could accelerate the settlement enterprise until there was "progress."

Bush clearly viewed the Palestinians as being the direct cause of Israeli suffering: "I can understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people. You've lived too long with fear and funerals, having to avoid markets and public transportation, and forced to put armed guards in kindergarten classrooms. The Palestinian Authority has rejected your offer at hand and trafficked with terrorists. You have a right to a normal life; you have a right to security; and I deeply believe that you need a reformed, responsible Palestinian partner to achieve that security."

Although Bush didn't cite any direct Israeli culpability for the Palestinians' situation, he was sympathetic to their feelings. "I can understand the deep anger and despair of the Palestinian people. For decades you've been treated as pawns in the Middle East conflict. Your interests have been held hostage to a comprehensive peace agreement that never seems to come, as your lives get worse year by year." Bush declared further that after the Palestinians met his demands for a fully functioning democracy, "they [would] be able to reach agreement with Israel and EGYPT and JORDAN on security and other arrangements for independence." Later he affirmed that the "provisional" Palestinian state "could rise rapidly, as it comes to terms with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan on practical issues, such as security." Though this was the first time a US president had called for the creation of a Palestinian state, the conditions placed upon Palestinian independence, Bush's failure to call for an end to the Occupation, and his dismissal of Israeli responsibility for the Palestinian situation amounted to a US endorsement of Israeli policies.

In late 2002, under enormous pressure from the international community and desirous of solidifying support for the "coalition of the willing" in the Iraq War, the Bush administration cosponsored the "Performance-Based ROAD MAP to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" with the EUROPEAN UNION, RUSSIA, and the UNITED NATIONS. Reaching consensus among the four parties, which became known as "the QUARTET," was initially difficult because of the Bush administration's policies as stated in the June 2002 speech and his unwillingness to give much credence to INTERNATIONAL LAW and UN Security Council resolutions. Bush eventually reached agreement with the other three parties by the end of the year, only after he successfully pushed them to incorporate much of the Tenet Plan in the first phase of the Road Map. The Bush administration then insisted that this third and final version of the Road Map not be formally announced until after the January 2003 Israeli elections so as not to hurt Ariel Sharon's prospects for reelection. Bush greatly appreciated Sharon's strong support for US policy in the region, including the invasion of Iraq, in contrast to his principal challenger, the left-leaning and more independent-minded LABOR PARTY leader Amram Mitzna.

Unlike his father, who pursued a number of policy initiatives just prior to the 1992 Israeli elections (such as withholding a proposed $10 billion loan guarantee to help the more moderate Labor Party leader YITZHAK RABIN defeat the incumbent LIKUD prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR), President Bush, in the run-up to the 2003 Israeli elections, worked to help ensure a Likud victory. For example, just before Israelis went to the polls, Bush announced his support for a $12 billion loan guarantee to the Israeli government, along with substantial increases in military aid for Israeli Occupation forces.

During what should have been the first phase of the Road Map, the Bush administration failed to pressure Israel to live up to its obligations, and the plan eventually died. The Bush administration also largely ignored the draft peace agreement, the GENEVA ACCORD, signed by prominent former Israeli and Palestinian officials in Geneva in December 2003. Meanwhile, President Bush refused to meet with YASIR ARAFAT, who was president of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), or other leading Palestinian officials and refused to encourage Israel to resume the peace negotiations it had broken off in February 2001.

In April 2004, in a summit meeting with Sharon in Washington, President Bush effectively abandoned the "land for peace" formula, which had nominally been the basis of US policy toward the conflict during seven administrations since the June 1967 WAR, by endorsing Sharon's "unilateral disengagement" plan, later known as the "convergence" plan. Under this unilateral initiative, Israel would withdraw illegal settlements from the occupied GAZA STRIP but incorporate into Israel virtually all of the settlements in the occupied West Bank, leaving the Palestinians with a series of noncontiguous and economically unviable BANTUSTANS, each surrounded by Israeli territory with Israel controlling

the BORDERS, the SEAPORT, and the airspace, as well as having the right to conduct military operations inside Palestinian areas. According to Israeli press reports, Sharon brought four separate disengagement plans to Washington requiring various degrees of Israeli withdrawal. President Bush endorsed the one that allowed Israel to annex the largest amount of Palestinian territory. Declaring that Sharon was "a man of peace," Bush also pledged that "the United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan," an apparent reference to the Geneva Accord supported by the Palestinian leadership and leading Israeli moderates.

At the same time, the Bush administration openly acknowledged that it would not force Israel to withdraw from most of its WEST BANK settlements as required by the Fourth Geneva Convention and a series of UN Security Council resolutions, as well as its opposition to any negotiations for the Palestinian REFUGEES' right to return. That summer, the Bush administration denounced the landmark advisory ruling by the International Court of Justice that Israel's separation BARRIER within occupied Palestinian territory was a violation of international law and had to be dismantled.

Though more open to dialogue with MAHMUD ABBAS after his assumption of the PNA presidency following Arafat's death in November 2004, the Bush administration led international efforts to place tough sanctions and other restrictions on the PNA following the election of a HAMAS-led parliamentary majority in the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL fourteen months later. Ironically, it had been the Bush administration that had successfully weakened the Palestinian presidency by insisting that it add the position of prime minister, which was then assumed by Hamas activist ISMAIL HANIYEH. Subsequently, the Bush administration opposed the formation of a Fatah-Hamas coalition government negotiated by the Saudis in 2006 and actively pushed Fatah to stage a coup against Hamas. When a Hamas countercoup succeeded in consolidating the Islamist group's control of the Gaza Strip, the Bush administration led international sanctions against the besieged Palestinian territory, resulting in a humanitarian crisis. In the face of the international outcry regarding large-scale civilian casualties during Israel's three-week war on Gaza commenced in December 2008, Bush strongly came to the defense of the Israeli attack.

President Bush brought together Israeli, Palestinian, and other Arab leaders for a summit in Annapolis, Maryland, in December 2007 for what was ostensibly an effort to revive the Road Map. Instead, it apparently further doomed the Road Map by consolidating US control of the process at the expense of the other members of the Quartet. According to the text of the Annapolis agreement as put forward by the Bush administration, "implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the Road Map, *as judged by the United States*" [emphasis added], with Bush emphasizing that "The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitment of both sides of the road map." Despite making confident predictions of a final peace agreement by the end of this presidency, Bush did little to move the process forward during his final thirteen months in office.

A key component of the Bush administration's policy toward Israel was using Israel to advance perceived American objectives in the region, such as counterterrorism efforts, training US occupation forces in urban counterinsurgency warfare, and supporting pro-US Kurdish militias in northern Iraq. The US military also began working with its Israeli counterparts in drafting plans for a joint military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities and other Iranian targets, though Bush ended up blocking a proposed Israeli attack on Iran in 2008. In May 2006, however, during a Washington summit, President Bush pushed Israeli prime minister EHUD OLMERT to attack LEBANON and Syria. Although Israel rejected Bush administration pressure to go after Damascus, it did launch a devastating four-week air and ground assault on Lebanon in July, with the US government virtually alone in the international community supporting Israel's massive attacks against the country's civilian infrastructure and initially blocking UN efforts to impose a cease-fire.

The rightward tilt in US policy toward Israel and Palestine under President Bush can be attributed to a number of factors. One was the strong influence of neoconservative intellectuals on the administration, some of whom strongly identified with the Revisionist Zionist ideology that supports Israeli expansionism and opposes negotiations with Israel's Arab neighbors. Another factor was the 9/11 attacks, which led to the reliance on military responses to political problems, particularly those

that included Arab Islamic groups challenging US allies. A third was the failure of the Democratic Party to challenge Bush on Israeli-Palestinian issues, essentially giving his administration a free hand to pursue policies opposed by virtually the entire international community as well as, according to public opinion polls, the majority of the US public.

Perhaps the most important factor involved the emergence of a new major constituency within the Republican Party in support of US backing for a Greater Israel—an Israel fully sovereign in all of Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. Most previous Republican presidents had tended to be more moderate on Israeli-Palestinian issues than most of their Democratic counterparts, largely as a result of Republican ties to the oil industry with its links to the Arab world. However, recent years have seen the rise in influence of the CHRISTIAN Right, which has come to dominate key sectors of the Republican Party. Most of the leadership of this movement espouse a messianic theology centered on the belief that a hegemonic Israel is a necessary precursor to the second coming of Christ and—along with hot-button social issues like abortion and homosexuality—have made US support for Israel's rightist governments a major focus of their political agenda. Though Bush was less dependent on Jewish voters than any modern president, a number of his administration's key policy decisions in support of Israeli Occupation policies appear to have been influenced by vigorous lobbying campaigns by Christian conservatives.

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—Stephen Zunes

Bustan L'Shalom-Wadi Na'am

Bustan L'Shalom-Wadi Na'am (Builders without Borders) is a grassroots partnership of Jews and Israeli Arabs who are working to raise awareness of the plight of the indigenous BEDOUIN population in Israel by introducing sustainable, low-budget building techniques in the UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES. These are villages that Israel does not recognize and for which it does not provide social services or infrastructure assistance. Bustan works with villagers who have been denied access to public resources and raises awareness of systemic discrimination through programs that, for example, provide educational materials and technical support for the construction of medical clinics and other vital services in the Bedouin and other rural Israeli-Palestinian villages. In addition, it is hoped that this project will spawn interest in sustainable building across the

Negev, where 70,000 Bedouins are living in corrugated tin shanties in villages that are denied medical services, water, education, and electricity infrastructure. (http://builderswithoutborders.org/projects/project4.htm).

See also BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL; UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES

Bypass Roads

See ROAD SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK

C

Cairo I

See GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT I

Cairo II

See GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II

Cairo Agreement, 1969

See LEBANON

Cairo Declaration, 1985

In the Cairo Declaration, issued on 7 November 1985, PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT renounced TERRORISM and pledged that the PLO would henceforth not engage in acts of terror, and, if a faction or individual broke the pledge, it would be punished by the PLO. The Cairo Declaration was approved by the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, the Palestinian parliament in exile, on 19 November 1988 in Algeria.

In the declaration, Arafat further stated: "The Palestinian people has and continues to struggle to liberate its occupied land, to exercise its right to self-determination, and to establish a state as a necessary condition for achieving a just and lasting peace in the region in which all peoples would coexist, free from acts of terrorism or subjugation. . . . And, in the framework of pursuing a just and peaceful solution, and given the PLO's struggle by all legitimate means to regain the established national rights of the Palestinians as well as their political freedom, the PLO condemns all violations of human rights, especially the right to life and security without discrimination on the basis of creed, gender, or color. . . . The PLO reaffirms its declaration issued in 1974 which condemned all operations outside [Palestine] and all forms of terrorism. And it restates the adherence of all its groups and institutions to that declaration. Beginning today, the PLO will take all measures to deter violators. . . . In this context, the PLO stresses its insistence upon the right of the Palestinian people to resist the Israeli OCCUPATION of its land by all available means, with the goal of achieving withdrawal from its land. For the right to resist foreign occupation is a legitimate right, not abrogated by the UN Charter, which calls for disavowing the use of force or threatening to use it to settle conflicts, and which considers the resort to force a violation of its principles and goals. The right of the Palestinian people to resist the Occupation in the Occupied Territories has been stressed in numerous UN resolutions and in the rules of the Geneva Convention."

The context of the declaration resides in Palestinian politics in the post–LEBANON WAR era. At the seventeenth Palestine National Council (28 November 1984) in Amman, JORDAN, a very splintered PLO called for an independent Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan. In February 1985, Jordan's King Husayn and Arafat announced the Amman Agreement (HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT), which included a pledge by Arafat to cease terrorism. However, the September 1985 murder of three Israelis in Cyprus by Arafat's elite security guard, FORCE 17, and the 7 October hijacking of the cruise ship *ACHILLE LAURO* by ABU AL-ABBAS'S PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (in retaliation for the 1 October bombardment by Israel of PLO headquarters in Tunis that killed 68), weakened Arafat's position with King Husayn and rendered the Jordanian-PLO agreement void, and hindered his attempt to foster a dialogue with the UNITED STATES. Thus on 7 November he issued the Cairo Declaration, publicly renouncing terrorism.

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Cairo Declaration, 2005

The Cairo Declaration (17 March 2005) was an accord among thirteen Palestinian factions to end their feuding and come together as a unified movement in order to confront the Israeli OCCUPATION and in particular Israel's continuing offensives in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. It was concluded under the auspices of EGYPT and attended by the deputy foreign minister of SYRIA. The declaration called for the release of all Israeli-held PRISONERS, paved the way for HAMAS to become part of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and established rules and procedures for the 2006 parliament ELECTIONS. All groups agreed to extend the existing truce as long as Israel did not initiate aggression or alter the status quo; however, ARMED STRUGGLE was explicitly acknowledged as an option if Israel continued military actions.

Even as the Palestinian delegates were assembling in Cairo, the Israeli cabinet announced that the West Bank BARRIER would separate occupied East JERUSALEM from the WEST BANK by looping around the vast Jewish settlement bloc of MA'ALE ADUMIM. On 20 March Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz approved plans for the construction of 3,500 new houses for the bloc, cutting off another large slice of the small urban space that remained to Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The Cairo Declaration anticipated these moves: "Continued SETTLEMENT, construction of the wall and the Judaization of Jerusalem are issues liable to explode the calm," it warned. The truce among the Palestinian factions did not hold, Hamas and Fatah renewed fighting, and Israel undertook a major military offensive against the GAZA STRIP beginning in June 2006, OPERATION SUMMER RAINS, that lasted through November.

The 2005 Cairo Declaration is historically significant for several reasons beyond its ultimate failure. It marked the full integration of Hamas into the Palestinian political system, coming after ten years of conflict and negotiations between FATAH and Hamas, and by itself held the potential for a more unified national movement. Conversely, numerous issues at Cairo were unresolved and remained potentially problematic for the future. The upcoming elections would mark a major test of the two factions' ability to cooperate. But when Hamas overwhelmingly won the parliamentary elections for the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Fatah refused to accept the results and resorted to violence as a means of control.

Whereas Fatah is a veteran organization and has in fact been the ruling party of Palestinian nationalism for almost forty years, Hamas is a relatively young player. Hamas defined itself as a political movement only in the early months of the First INTIFADA at the beginning of 1988, when it published its ideological platform. It called this platform the Islamic Covenant, as a counterweight to the famous National Covenant of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Hamas was founded as an Islamic religious organization in opposition to the secular PLO. On its founding a Hamas member declared: "On the day that the PLO adopts Islam as a way of life, we shall be its soldiers."

Although Hamas leaders avoid claiming that Hamas is an alternative (to the PLO) leadership, they have behaved from the outset as if this were their objective. For example, during the First INTIFADA (1987–1991) they refused to take part in the Unified National Leadership, which consisted of all the other factions, and presented instead a different political agenda that was totally opposed to the decisions taken by the PLO in the summer of 1988, the main thrust of which was the acceptance of UN resolutions and de facto recognition of Israel's right to exist.

The refusal by Hamas to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, however, did not prevent it from engaging in a dialogue with the PLO. One of the first and most interesting meetings between Hamas and Fatah representatives was in January 1993 in Khartoum, Sudan, during the interim period of the diplomatic process, between the MADRID CONFERENCE (November 1991) and the OSLO AGREEMENT (September 1993). At this meeting Hamas expressed willingness to join the PLO under two major conditions. The first was that the PLO retract its recognition of UN RESOLUTION 242—or, in other words, change its policy of striving for a political settlement with Israel. The second was that Hamas would receive a representation of 40 percent in all PLO institutions. YASIR ARAFAT responded angrily, saying: "I didn't come to Sudan in order to sell you the PLO." The Hamas representative, Ibrahim Ghusha, replied: "We have expressed willingness to enter the PLO and not become an alternative to it."

The differences of opinion between Hamas and Fatah regarding Israel were, and to a certain extent have remained, differences of principle, at least until January 2006, when Hamas won an

overwhelming victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. Hamas has stood for the liberation of all Palestine, which according to its covenant is "the land of the Islamic *Waqf* for generations of Muslims until Judgment Day," a position that precludes ceding any part of Palestine. However, between 2007 and 2009, Hamas began to alter these absolutes and is gradually moving toward acceptance of a two-state solution. In contrast, Fatah officially supports the principle of a two-state solution, provided that the solution to the REFUGEE problem is based on their right of return, but it took Fatah some fifteen years to transform its position on the liberation of all of Palestine to the commitment to the two-state solution. Hamas declares that the sole operational method is jihad and armed struggle, whereas Fatah (and the PLO) have taken decisions opposed to violence and TERRORISM. Yet, initially, Fatah similarly believed that armed struggle was the only appropriate method of resistance.

There are significant social differences that exist between Fatah and Hamas. Whereas the initial breeding ground for some Fatah leaders was in the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (e.g., Yasir Arafat and SALAH KHALAF), others came from a secular-leftist atmosphere (e.g., GEORGE HABASH and WADI' HADDAD), and over the years secularism came to dominate in Fatah. In addition, Fatah was based outside historic Palestine, especially in Beirut and Tunis, which exposed it to multiple influences, while Hamas is a local organization that originated in the Gaza refugee camps and was fed by a traditional religious atmosphere inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Finally, Fatah leaders have an image among the Palestinian public of being hungry for authority and power, and tainted by personal corruption, whereas the public image of Hamas activists is of modesty and integrity.

Just as the first Hamas and Fatah dialogue ten years ago in Sudan failed, so did subsequent dialogues throughout the 1990s. One major dimension of the dispute between Hamas and Fatah (or specifically the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, PNA) was during the years 1996–2000, when the PNA security services arrested hundreds of Hamas operatives in the West Bank and Gaza and attempted to block the activities of the movement.

Tensions between Hamas and Fatah rose in 2005 after the 11 November 2004 death of longtime PLO leader Yasir Arafat and after Hamas won the 2006 PLC elections.

The period from March to December 2006 was marked by conflict. Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the Hamas government and the PNA initiated a campaign of assassinations and abductions against Hamas, leading to retaliatory operations by Hamas against Fatah. Tensions grew more acute between the two factions after they failed to reach an agreement to share governing power.

On 15 December 2006 fighting broke out in the West Bank after Palestinian security forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah, wounding at least 20 people. This came shortly after Hamas accused Fatah of attempting to assassinate ISMAIL HANIYEH, the Palestinian prime minister.

Intense fighting continued throughout December 2006 and January 2007 in the Gaza Strip. Several cease-fire attempts failed. SAUDI ARABIA sponsored a conference to bring about a permanent cease-fire and a national unity government, resulting in Fatah and Hamas signing the MECCA AGREEMENT on 8 February 2007. However, minor incidents continued through March and April 2007, and in mid-May 2007, clashes erupted once again in the streets of Gaza. In less than 20 days, more than 50 Palestinians were killed. Leaders of both parties tried to stop the fighting with dozens of truces, but none of them held for longer than a few days.

Beginning on 7 June 2007, what is referred to as the "Battle of Gaza" was transformed into a full-fledged military conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Gaza Strip. The fighting lasted about a week, and it resulted in Hamas remaining in control of the Gaza Strip after forcing out Fatah. As a result of the conflict, the territory controlled by the PNA is de facto divided into two entities: the Hamas-controlled government in the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank governed by the PNA.

The al-Aqsa Intifada, which erupted in September 2000, brought Hamas and Fatah together in countering the Israeli-Palestinian violence. The failure of the Oslo Process with Israel restored the option of violence to the Palestinian agenda, and Fatah activists returned to the methods of armed struggle and terrorist attacks, including the use of SUICIDE BOMBERS, which were previously employed solely by Hamas and other Islamic extremists. In other words, in the years between September 2000 and 2005, Fatah activists retreated to a large extent from their previous positions and adopted a stance similar to that of

Hamas. Furthermore, public support for Hamas had increased considerably, as had Palestinian public opinion in favor of violent attacks against Israel.

The renewal of contacts between Hamas and Fatah during the Intifada, as well as their intensification in 2003, occurred against a background of increasing Hamas prestige and power. In the Cairo dialogue in early 2002, Hamas representatives refused to agree to a joint document prepared by the Egyptians regarding a one-year suspension of armed activities. Abu Mazen (MAHMUD ABBAS), appointed by Arafat in the summer of 2003 as the first Palestinian prime minister, adamantly opposed Hamas activities and attempted to persuade Hamas leaders and others that the terrorist attacks and acts of violence—or, in his words, "the armed Intifada"—did not help the Palestinians but rather harmed their cause.

Abu Mazen's efforts to achieve rapprochement and an understanding with Hamas regarding the cessation of the terrorist attacks, combined with the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) policy of TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of Hamas leaders, produced a change in the Hamas position. Indeed, an understanding was reached in the summer of 2003 regarding a *hudna,* a temporary cease-fire, for which Hamas presented clear conditions, including the following: Israel would stop killing Palestinian citizens, halt its penetration of Palestinian territories, and release prisoners. Abu Mazen's *hudna*, achieved at the Cairo Conference in the summer of 2003, was short-lived, as was his government. The dialogue between the sides was renewed only after Arafat's death and Abu Mazen's election as president of the PNA. By this time the atmosphere between the factions had changed, and the Cairo Conference in March 2005 led to a cease-fire and agreement about a joint document.

What gave rise to the change in atmosphere at this conference? Several factors of varying degrees of importance may have contributed: Arafat's death in November 2004; Israel's assassination of three senior Hamas leaders—SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, Dr. ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI, and Ismail Abu Shenev; national and regional circumstances that included global aspects of Islamic terrorism; and the war in IRAQ. In addition, the events in LEBANON and SYRIA probably exerted a great deal of influence on the Hamas leadership, which was based in Damascus.

All these factors probably prompted Hamas to modify its positions, but it is important to note the additional influence of Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT plan from Gaza. As far as most Palestinians were concerned, and certainly from the Hamas viewpoint, the Sharon government drafted the disengagement plan solely because of the Palestinians' violent struggle. They regarded it as a tremendous Palestinian victory. All the opinion polls in the territories testified to this sentiment. The sense of victory and of Hamas strength allowed the heads of the movement in the territories and abroad to adopt more flexible positions, sensing an opening to assume control of the Palestinian national movement and perhaps the governing authority of the West Bank and Gaza. Meanwhile, support for Hamas was increasing, in part because of the disgust of the public in the territories with the corruption in Fatah and the PNA leadership. The internal disputes in Fatah between the older veterans of Tunis, who controlled the movement's central committee, and the younger veterans of Israeli jails from the al-Aqsa Intifada encouraged Hamas activists to believe that their goal lay within their grasp.

Consequently, the most important development achieved in 2005 in Cairo was not the cease-fire agreement but the preparation by Hamas to participate in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. Hamas (and the other opposition movements) had refused to participate in the elections held in 1996 because the elections were based on the OSLO ACCORD, which they rejected out of hand. Hamas had also refused to participate in the election for PNA president in which Abu Mazen was elected.

Hamas, as noted, overwhelmingly won the 26 January 2006 elections for the PLC, offering the first substantive defeat ever to Fatah. Fatah immediately began a sporadic armed campaign to dislodge Hamas and the conflict deteriorated from then on.

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CAMERA/Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

Camp David Accords, 1979

The Camp David Accords were the peace agreements forged during 5–17 September 1978 between Israel and EGYPT at the US presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. The negotiations had been catalyzed by Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in November 1977 when he made a dramatic pilgrimage to JERUSALEM, the first visit by an Arab leader to Israel. After subsequent negotiations between Cairo and Tel Aviv came to an impasse, US president JIMMY CARTER invited the two sides to Camp David, where for thirteen days he mediated between them. The official accords were signed on 26 March 1979 in Washington, D.C., by Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN and Egyptian president al-Sadat, with Carter as a witness.

The agreement consisted of two documents. The first was a general "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" that was based on a five-year transitional period of self-rule for Palestinians in the WEST BANK and GAZA. This framework was never implemented because it was not legally tied to the bilateral accord between Israel and Egypt; in addition, Begin was opposed to it and Carter ultimately agreed with him. Carter had pressured Begin to bring something demonstrating that the Palestinians were being considered, but Begin only agreed to a vague statement of principles and insisted that there be no legal tie between this document and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Sadat's failure to demand greater concessions from Israel in recognizing the Palestinians' right to self-determination contributed to his assassination in 1981.

The second document, the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel," was fulfilled. In it, Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula, captured from Egypt in the 1967 WAR. In exchange, Egypt recognized Israel as a sovereign nation-state and agreed to normalize relations with it—the first Arab country to do so. Further, although Israel had to withdraw both its troops and settlers from the Sinai and restore it to Egyptian control, Egypt had to guarantee Israel freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (e.g., the Straits of Tiran) and had to accept a restriction on the number of troops it could deploy in the Sinai Peninsula. The two countries exchanged ambassadors and continued to take steps to fulfill their treaty obligations until the final tract of land in the Sinai was returned to Egypt on 25 April 1982. Just over a month later, Israel undertook a war against the Palestinians in LEBANON, confident that Egypt would remain on the sidelines. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, though at times described as a "cold peace," has held firm for twenty-five years without a breach by either side.

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Camp David Summit, 2000

In the context of the OSLO PROCESS, the Camp David Summit was supposed to resolve FINAL STATUS issues, including BORDERS, JERUSALEM, settlement of the REFUGEE issue, and LAND and WATER access, paving the way for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians. The July 2000 summit involved Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK, PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY president YASIR ARAFAT, and US president BILL CLINTON plus their respective aides. The participants met at the US presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. The summit failed to reach an agreement, and the MEDIA blamed the failure entirely on Arafat and misrepresented Israel's position on key issues of the conflict, as BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER reveals.

President Clinton was partially responsible for the widespread misunderstandings. Immediately after the Camp David Summit, he broke his promise to Arafat that no side would be blamed if the negotiations failed and went on Israeli television declaring that although Barak made bold compromises, Arafat had missed yet another opportunity for peace. However, what Barak offered at Camp David would have meant the following for Palestine: no territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state, no control of its external borders, limited control of its own water resources, and no full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories as required by UN RESOLUTION 242 and INTERNATIONAL LAW. In addition, the Barak plan called for continued Israeli military control over large segments of the WEST BANK, including almost all of the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY; the right of Israeli forces to be deployed in the Palestinian state at short notice; and the continued presence of fortified Israeli SETTLEMENTS and Jewish-only ROADS. It would also have required nearly 4 million Palestinian refugees from 1948 to relinquish their rights in exchange for compensation to be paid not by Israel but by the international community.

Robert Malley, who was Clinton's special assistant for Arab-Israeli affairs, participated in the Camp David negotiations. In an article entitled "Fictions about the Failure at Camp David" published in the *New York Times* on 8 July 2001, Malley pointed out that Barak's offer was far from ideal and emphasized that Arafat had made far more concessions than anyone gave him credit for. Malley wrote: "Many have come to believe that the Palestinians' rejection of the Camp David ideas exposed an underlying rejection of Israel's right to exist. But consider the facts: The Palestinians were arguing for the creation of a Palestinian state based on the June 4, 1967, borders, and living alongside Israel. They accepted the notion of Israeli annexation of West Bank territory to accommodate settlement blocs. They accepted the principle of Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish neighborhoods of East Jerusalem—neighborhoods that were not part of Israel before the Six Day War in 1967. And, while they insisted on recognition of the refugees' right of return, they agreed that it should be implemented in a manner that protected Israel's DEMOGRAPHIC and security interests by limiting the number of returnees. No other Arab party that has negotiated with Israel—not Anwar al-Sadat's EGYPT, not King Husayn's JORDAN, let alone Hafez al-Assad's SYRIA—ever came close to even considering such compromises."

See also BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER; TABA TALKS, 2001

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Camps' War, 1985–1987

The Camps' War, or War of the Camps, was a series of clashes between the Palestinian REFUGEES in LEBANON and the Shi'ia Amal militia backed by SYRIA in the mid-1980s. After YASIR ARAFAT and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) withdrew from Beirut and Tripoli, the Palestinian refugee camps were extremely vulnerable. The Camps' War claimed more than 2,500 Palestinian lives. The camps themselves were devastated, and thousands of refugees fled the fighting to seek uncertain refuge in the coastal strip north of Sidon.

Background

In the wake of the creation of Israel in 1948, tens of thousands of Palestinians became refugees in southern Lebanon. Palestinians with skills and capital were allowed to reside in cities and live dignified lives; however, the majority, who could only offer their unskilled workforce to the Lebanese economy, were kept in squalid refugee camps, prohibited from working or attaining education in Lebanon, and suffered intense repression from the Maronite-dominated Lebanese government.

Following the establishment of the PLO in Lebanon, it created a series of social institutions—health care (the Red Crescent); employment (SAMED); welfare, arts, and culture organizations; and unions—to meet the needs of the Palestinians in the camps. The PLO extended these services, and protection from the government, to the impoverished, oppressed Shi'a population of southern Lebanon. Thus, for many years the Lebanese Shi'a were allies of the PLO. The PLO also formed militias in Lebanon who undertook guerrilla operations against Israel. Israel responded with massive retaliations wherein whole villages were laid waste and many were killed. The Shi'a eventually created their own political movements, Amal and later Hizbullah, and turned against the PLO.

By the time of Israel's LEBANON WAR in 1982, relations between Amal and the Palestinians had deteriorated significantly. As a result of this war, most of the PLO was driven out of Lebanon, but gradually, by the spring of 1985, PLO fighters had filtered back in, and Palestinian militias in the Sidon area were strong enough to repel attacks by the Lebanese Christian Phalange and South Lebanese Army (SLA) against the al-Miya wa-Miya and 'Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camps.

Such developments were viewed with concern by Syria and by the Phalange and its forces in Lebanon. Even more strongly opposed was the Shi'a party militia, Amal. Amal's hostility toward the Palestinians stemmed from prior Shi'a-PLO conflict and was reinforced by fears that a resurgent Palestinian presence would threaten the powerful political position that Amal had established for itself in post-1982 Lebanon.

Rex Brynen has provided an insightful analysis of the Camps' War. He relates that the first round of the conflict began on 19 May 1985, with an incident between Palestinians in the Sabra refugee camp in Beirut and Amal militiamen. Heavy fighting quickly erupted between the approximately one thousand armed Palestinians in the Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajne refugee camps and Amal's more than three thousand fighters, the latter supported by over a thousand soldiers of the (predominately Shi'a) Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese army and even some units of the (predominately Christian) Eighth Brigade stationed in East Beirut.

On 30 May, Sabra fell to its attackers. Amid Arab and SOVIET political pressures on Syria and the scheduling of an emergency meeting of ARAB LEAGUE foreign ministers to discuss the issue; Amal declared a unilateral cease-fire the next day. The fighting had claimed more than six hundred dead and two thousand wounded. A cease-fire agreement was signed by Amal and representatives of the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF) in Damascus on 17 June.

Despite the Damascus agreement, small-scale fighting continued for weeks. In Shatila, Palestinian defenders retained control of a small area around the camp's mosque, despite repeated efforts to dislodge them. Burj al-Barajne was not penetrated at all, but nevertheless remained under siege as Amal

prevented supplies from entering or its population from leaving.

Under the terms of the Damascus agreement, Amal and its Syrian sponsor were politically and militarily rebuffed. Amal was forced to retreat, having gained only the promise that the Palestinians would surrender nonexistent medium and heavy weapons and allow an ineffectual Lebanese police presence in the camps.

Yet the tensions that had sparked the Camps' War had not been resolved, and fighting erupted again. In Sidon, Palestinian reorganization attracted stern warnings from Amal. Clashes between Amal and Palestinians in the camps erupted in Beirut briefly in September, and again in late March 1986, then on 19 May 1986 a second major round of fighting began. Once again Amal was unable to penetrate the camps, despite a supply of T-54 tanks provided by Damascus. After the failure of more than a dozen cease-fires, the fighting finally died down with the deployment of Lebanese army units and Syrian military observers around the Beirut camps on 24 June 1986.

This set the stage for the third and most severe round of the Camps' War. It began with an incident on 29 September 1986 at the Rashidiyya refugee camp on the outskirts of Tyre in which Palestinians allegedly fired on an Amal patrol. Amal immediately surrounded the camp, demanding the surrender of all arms. The demand was refused. By late October, the fighting had spread to Sidon and Beirut. In an effort to relieve pressure on Rashidiyya, Palestinian forces in Sidon broke through Amal lines on 24 November and seized the strategic hilltop village of Maghdusha, overlooking the coastal highway south of the city. As Amal's military weaknesses became evident, Syrian Special Forces reportedly lent support in the battle for Shatila. At Sidon, Israel launched multiple airstrikes against Palestinian positions around the city.

As before, the clashes led to an emergency session of Arab League foreign ministers and diplomatic intervention to halt the fighting. Iranian mediation secured a partially effective ceasefire between Amal and the PNSF on 15 December 1986. Pro-Syrian groups withdrew from around Maghdusha, but remained elsewhere in a status quo ante.

Some of these positions were subsequently vacated to Hizbullah in January, and some supplies were allowed into the beleaguered camps. But for the most part the sieges continued, and new fighting soon erupted. In Beirut, the shelling of the camps was compounded by a blockade of food and medical supplies that resulted in sickness, starvation, and death for thousands of trapped residents.

Finally, on 21 February 1987 the first of seven thousand Syrian troops were deployed in West Beirut to maintain order. On 7 April, following an agreement with the PNSF, Amal lifted the siege as Syrian forces took up positions around the camps. That same month, negotiations between Amal and the PNSF began, eventually achieving a cease-fire in the south.

See also AMAL; LEBANON WAR

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Cantons

See BANTUSTANS

Al-Carmel

Al-Carmel was an influential Palestinian newspaper that was established in HAIFA in 1908 by Christian publisher Najib Nassar (1865–1947). The newspaper reflected the politicization of Palestinians at a very early period. Regarding the Paris Peace

Conference, an editorial in *al-Carmel* questioned: "Should we allow the Zionists to revive their nationalism at the expense of our nationalism? Have we agreed upon selling them our LAND piece by piece until they expel us from our land in groups and on an individual basis?" Another editorial called on the OTTOMAN authorities to "fulfill their obligation and not allow Jewish immigrants to remain in the country." *Al-Carmel* was a consistent voice in opposing Zionist land purchases and IMMIGRATION. Although other Palestinian newspapers followed, *al-Carmel* remains unique for its vision regarding the fate of Palestine.

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Carter, James (Jimmy) Earl, Jr. (1924–)

James "Jimmy" Carter was the thirty-ninth president of the UNITED STATES, serving from 1977 to 1981. Much of his foreign policy was focused on peacemaking in the Middle East. Although he was deeply committed emotionally and politically to Israel, he was the first president to directly address the Palestinian issue. There was however, much ambiguity in the president's approach to the Palestinians and in his foreign policy in general. Examples include the contradictory principles of "human rights" and the "Carter Doctrine" as well as Carter's transition from working closely with the SOVIET UNION, especially on the Middle East, to abandoning the policy of détente. The Carter Doctrine was expressed in his 23 January 1980 state of the union address, in which he declared, in response to Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. The ambiguity in Carter's policies was partly due to the fact that his two top foreign policy advisers—Secretary of State CYRUS VANCE and National Security Council Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski—held completely different worldviews.

Yet, as Kathleen Christson observed, Jimmy Carter changed the vocabulary of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the United States and to a great extent changed the frame of reference for the Palestinian issue. By broaching the notion of giving the Palestinians a homeland, by trying to deal with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), by recognizing the Palestinians as a critical factor in any peace settlement, and by attempting to involve them in the peace process, Carter overturned assumptions and misconceptions that had been in place for decades about the Palestinians' insignificance and in a real sense took US policy out of the old constricting framework around thinking on the Palestinian problem. Carter was a rarity among US presidents in dealing with the Arab-Israeli problem. More than any president before or since, he made an imaginative, good-faith effort to involve the Palestinians in negotiations throughout 1977, confronting Israel's objections, trying to face down opposition from within the United States, attempting different alternatives and new ideas when initial proposals were rejected, and persisting even when obstacles loomed.

He was ultimately defeated, however, by the persistence of a frame of reference that continued, despite his serious efforts to alter it, to center on Israel and Israel's concerns and to ignore or consciously discard the Palestinian perspective. Although he successfully negotiated an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, electoral politics ultimately undermined Carter's attempts to bring the Palestinians into the process of a peace settlement. No US president except Dwight Eisenhower has won an election while putting heavy pressure on Israel, and Carter, already in political trouble and losing popularity for a variety of other reasons, simply did not in the second half of his one-term presidency have the political capital to expend on a serious effort to oppose Israel's desire to keep the Palestinians out of peace talks. In the end, Carter's efforts to begin a serious peace process that would involve the Palestinians fell victim to an enduring frame of reference that held Israel's concerns to be paramount and the Palestinian perspective to be unimportant or even pernicious.

President Carter assumed office with several ideas that differed from those of his predecessors. He was committed to an active US policy to break the deadlock in the Arab-Israeli conflict, forthrightly addressed the need for a comprehensive

Arab-Israeli peace, and undertook specific steps to reconvene the GENEVA CONFERENCE, which was an attempt, based on UNSC Resolution 242, to bring Israel and the Arab states into negotiations to find a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Carter spoke of three main requirements for Middle East peace. First, peace should entail the normalization of relations—for example, exchange of ambassadors, trade, open borders, tourism, and regional economic cooperation. But he was sensitive to the Israeli position that there was an inherent unfairness in Israel having to give up territory in exchange for peace (even though the territory had belonged to Arab states). Second, Carter believed in the need for recognized BORDERS and arrangements for security that would go beyond borders. For this reason, the president was committed to meeting Israel's concerns about security by placing heavy emphasis on technical arrangements, such as measures to ensure that no state violated the peace. Carter was also prepared to bolster Israel's security up to and including a US-Israel defense pact as part of an overall settlement. Third, Carter took the lead in articulating a new position for the United States on the Palestinian question, calling for a homeland for the Palestinians. He was, however, vague and ambiguous about what this meant, and he never spoke of Palestinian self-determination or of an independent Palestinian state. Moreover, he felt that the homeland concept was tied to the Palestinian REFUGEE issue.

When Carter publicly articulated his thoughts on a Palestinian homeland on 17 March 1977, Israel and its domestic supporters immediately condemned the president. Consequently, he qualified his comments: "The exact definition of what that homeland might be, the degree of independence of the Palestinian entity, its relations with JORDAN, or perhaps SYRIA or others, the geographical boundaries of it, all have to be worked out by the parties involved." In other words, rather than supporting Palestinian self-determination, Carter subscribed to some form of "autonomy" for the Palestinians under one or another foreign domination. Still, Israel and its domestic friends were not mollified and barraged the president with visits, letters, and phone calls.

On 1 October 1977 President Carter and the Soviet premier issued a joint Soviet-US statement on the Middle East outlining a comprehensive settlement. The communiqué called for (1) Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab lands; (2) resolution of the Palestinian question, including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; (3) termination of the state of war between Israel and the Arabs with the establishment of normal, peaceful relations among the countries on the basis of mutual recognition, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; and (4) international guarantees (in which both the Soviet Union and the United States would participate) to ensure compliance with the terms of the settlement. The statement was also significant for what it did not say: it did not call for direct PLO participation in the talks at Geneva, it did not mention a Palestinian state, and Israel was not asked to return to its 1967 borders or to abandon East JERUSALEM.

Israel reacted vehemently and negatively, rejecting the Soviet-US statement "with both hands" because it was "the first step toward an imposed solution" and "indicated American willingness to have the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) participate in the Geneva Conference." Even Israel's LABOR PARTY fully supported the LIKUD, which was then in power, on this position. The Israelis were particularly upset because of the absence of any specific reference to UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338: "We hang on to those with all our strength because they say nothing about the Palestinians." (This rarely mentioned aspect of Resolution 242 explains why the PLO, despite intense US pressure, declined to accept the resolutions until 1988.) Opposition to the joint Soviet-US initiative was also intense from domestic Jewish groups. For example, the chairman of the CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS declared that the statement "on its face, represents an abandonment of America's historic commitment to the security and survival of Israel."

Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN dispatched Foreign Minister MOSHE DAYAN to the United States to inform the president personally of Israel's objections. The two men met in a New York hotel room on 4 October, and after a lengthy session Carter agreed to the series of proposals presented by Dayan, including a specific promise never to use military or economic sanctions to pressure Israel to make concessions on any issue. William Quandt, an adviser to Carter, wrote that Dayan had great leverage in these negotiations because the president approached Dayan from the perspective of seeking help on Carter's domestic problems

with American Jews. At the end of their session, Carter and Dayan issued a joint Israeli-US statement in which all of Israel's main interests and policies were incorporated. On 28 October 1977, the United States abstained from a vote in the General Assembly condemning Israel's drive to build Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the Occupied Territories; 131 countries voted in favor of the resolution.

After Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's pilgrimage to Israel in November 1977, President Carter became intensely engaged in the bilateral Israeli-Egyptian peace process, virtually to the exclusion of other aspects of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. From 5 September to 17 September 1978, Carter's involvement culminated with the president inviting Begin and al-Sadat to the presidential retreat at CAMP DAVID, where the three heads of state spent thirteen grueling days before agreeing to two accords. During these talks, Carter abandoned all his previously articulated principles on the Palestinians. Instead of one accord, he agreed with Begin to have two accords and to have no binding connection between them. The accord that was supposed to protect Palestinian national interests afforded nothing more than "limited autonomy" for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. After the talks Begin broke his explicit promises to Carter and presided over a massive expansion of the settlement project in the Occupied Territories. Instead of penalizing the Israeli president, Carter oversaw an enormous increase in aid to Israel from $1.7 billion in 1977 to $4.8 billion in 1979.

In March 1978, six months prior to the Camp David Summit but in the midst of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, Israel invaded LEBANON and established a "security zone" deep along the southern border. During the operation, President Carter sent Begin a message asking that Israel discontinue its advance, pull back its army behind the frontier, and permit a UN force to be posted in southern Lebanon. Additionally, the United States convened the Security Council and introduced Resolution 425, which was adopted. It called for a cease-fire in Lebanon, withdrawal of forces, and the establishment of the UN Interim Force. Begin responded by ordering the campaign expanded. Israel finally accepted Resolution 425 on 23 March but did not withdraw its troops until 13 June, after it had established a proxy army to control the south. Nevertheless, while Israeli troops remained in Lebanon, Carter gave Begin a warm welcome in Washington on 21 March and again on 1 May. On 31 May 1978, in a press conference, Carter stated that the United States had never been in favor of a Palestinian state, which it saw as a "destabilizing factor."

After leaving office, Carter remained involved in international affairs. In 1982 he became university distinguished professor at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, and founded, and actively guides, the Carter Center there, which addresses national and international issues of public policy. Carter has remained particularly interested in Middle East affairs, especially the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In March 2006 he gave a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in which he assessed the situation between Israel and the Palestinians. The following are some of his comments: "The three most basic premises [for peace] are quite clear and simple. First, Israel's right to exist and to live in peace must be recognized and accepted by Palestinians and all other neighbors. Second, the killing of innocent people by SUICIDE BOMBS or other acts of violence cannot be condoned. And third, Palestinians must live in peace and dignity, and permanent Israeli settlements on their land are a major obstacle to this goal. . . . The PLO accepted the ROAD MAP, and Israel also announced its acceptance, but with 14 caveats and prerequisites, some of which preclude final peace talks. . . . What, then, are the impediments to future progress? . . . in the last few years—the last five years—Israel's rejection of any substantive talks with Palestinian leaders. . . . With tension rising, the occupying forces have become increasingly oppressive in order to retain control over the Palestinians, who are deprived of basic human rights, militarily, politically and economically. This is obvious to anyone who visits Palestine."

Subsequently, the former president published *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid,* a book that is deeply critical of Israel and for which Carter was vilified by the MEDIA, pro-Israel groups, and the US Congress. Henry Siegman, former executive director of the AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, wrote, "Since the appearance of the book coincided with the recent Congressional elections, leaders of the Democratic Party went into near panic and fell over one another disassociating themselves from Carter's book, and his criticisms of certain Israeli policies. Indeed, the panic was so intense that so independent-minded a man as Howard Dean, chair of the party, who in the

past has had the courage to challenge the conventional wisdom of the party's establishment on a whole range of issues, joined the herd as well."

See also CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; MOSHE DAYAN; CYRUS VANCE

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Cattan, Henry (1906–1992)

Henry Cattan was a renowned international jurist, a prolific writer, and an advocate for the Palestinians. Born in JERUSALEM, he received a law degree from the University of Paris and a master of law degree from the University of London. During the BRITISH MANDATE, he practiced law in Palestine and taught at the Government Law School in Jerusalem from 1932 to 1942. Cattan served on the third ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (AHC), and in 1947 he represented the AHC before the UN General Assembly. The ARAB LEAGUE appointed Cattan to represent the Palestinian Arabs during discussions with COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, the UN mediator on Palestine. In 1948, the Israeli OCCUPATION of West Jerusalem forced him into exile, first to Damascus, later to Beirut, and finally to Paris. While in exile he authored several books, including *Jerusalem; The Garden of Joys: An Anthology of Oriental Anecdotes, Fables and Proverbs; Palestine, the Arabs and Israel;* and *The Palestine Question,* among others. He died in Paris.

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Cave of Machpelah

The Cave of Machpelah is considered by Jews to be the spiritual center of the ancient city of HEBRON. It is known by Muslims as al-Haram al-Ibrahimi, the Abraham Sanctuary, or AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE. According to Jewish tradition, its hidden twin caves are believed to be the burial place of three pairs of important biblical couples: Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, and Jacob and Leah (and thus is also called the Cave of the Double Caves [or tombs]). Because both Jews and Muslims consider Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as patriarchs of their respective religions, this site is revered equally by Jews and Muslims and has been a place of almost continuous conflict, especially since 1967.

The sanctuary Ma'arat Hamachpelah inside the cave is dedicated to Abraham, the most important of the patriarchs in both religions. The history of the Cave of Machpelah also has a special importance because the site is believed to be the first piece of land bought by Abraham in the Promised Land, as well as his burial place. In addition to believing in Abraham and his sons' connection to the site, Muslims believe it was visited by the Prophet Muhammad on his night flight from Mecca to JERUSALEM.

After the Islamic conquest in the seventh century, the site was under the control of the Islamic Waqf (religious trust). During the Crusades, when Christians had control of the site, it was made into a church, and the large structure over the cave today dates to that period. For seven centuries, access to the cave was restricted to Muslim worshipers only; Jewish pilgrims were allowed to pray at a special location outside the building. During the 1967 WAR, on the same day that Israeli troops entered Hebron, the chaplain of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) placed a Torah scroll inside the al-Ibrahimi Mosque. This initiative made it possible for Jews to hold prayers and religious services in various parts of the sanctuary, sometimes at the same time and place as Muslims. The move created great indignation among Muslims and their clergymen, who argued that the installation of a synagogue inside the sanctuary challenged the Muslim character of the site.

The al-Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of Machpelah and the surrounding city of Hebron have been continuous flashpoints of Jewish-Muslim conflict. Israel's 1967 capture of the site led to other provocations, including Jewish SETTLEMENT around the site, conflicts over where and when the two groups would pray that were consistently resolved to favor Jewish worship, the 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer by extremist settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, and others. Although the WYE RIVER Accords provided a temporary status agreement for the site and for Hebron itself, since the eruption of the 2000 AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the IDF has surrounded the site with soldiers and forbids Muslims from entering the area.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON MASSACRE; AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE

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Center for Architectural Conservation

See CENTRE FOR ARCHITECTURAL CONSERVATION

Center for Security Policy

The Center for Security Policy (CSP) is an American neoconservative think tank with close ties to Israel and to the right wing of the Republican Party. The CSP, together with other neoconservative pro-Israel think tanks, such as the WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, the JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, and the Project for a New American Century, has had a profound impact on US foreign policy during the ten years between 1997 and 2007, especially on the Middle East and the Israel-Palestine conflict. The CSP advocates a stronger US military and further development of nuclear and space weaponry; warmly supports Israel, especially the LIKUD; and advocates closer military and national security ties between the UNITED STATES and Israel. The CSP is highly critical of the UNITED NATIONS, nonproliferation treaties, peace organizations, and anything it deems to be an impediment to US global hegemony and Israel's interests.

The CSP accomplishes its goals by influencing national and international policy debates that bear upon the security of the United States and Israel. The center specializes in the rapid preparation and real-time dissemination of information, analyses, and policy recommendations via e-mail distribution, computerized fax, its website, published articles, and the electronic media. The principal audience for such materials is the US security policymaking community (the executive and legislative branches, the armed forces, and appropriate independent agencies), corresponding organizations in key foreign governments, the MEDIA (domestic and international), the global business and financial community, and interested individuals in the public at large. (www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org).

See also AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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Center of Life Policy

The Center of Life Policy, sometimes called the "Quiet Deportation," was one of many methods used by Israel to attain its DEMOGRAPHIC objective of reducing the number of Palestinians living in JERUSALEM. The policy was instituted by the Interior Ministry in 1995 in the context of the OSLO PROCESS, and deals with the residency status of East Jerusalem's Palestinian residents. According to B'Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, between December 1995 and December 2004, Israel revoked the residency rights of 3,606 Palestinians from East Jerusalem.

The Interior Ministry revoked the residency of those who had moved outside Jerusalem's municipal borders and of Palestinians who were unable to prove that they had lived in Jerusalem in the past. Thus, every Palestinian who lived outside Jerusalem for a number of years lost the right to live in the city. The Israeli authorities never announced this policy and never warned the Palestinians that by leaving Jerusalem they jeopardized their status and right to return. Under the new policy, the ministry requested proof, including numerous documents, that the individual's "center of life" was in Jerusalem. In explaining the policy change, the Interior Ministry said that permanent residency, unlike citizenship, is a matter of individual circumstances, and when these circumstances change, the PERMIT granting permanent residency expires.

Prior to 1995, the policies of the Israeli government and the Jerusalem municipality in a variety of spheres led thousands of Palestinians to leave the city, many to reside in Jerusalem's suburbs and others in the WEST BANK and JORDAN. Until this time, moving outside the city limits did not affect their status as permanent residents in Jerusalem, as long as they returned to Jerusalem to renew their exit permits at the Interior Ministry. Only a continued stay of more than seven years outside Jerusalem without having renewed the permits was liable to lead to revocation of residency status. Palestinians who moved to Jerusalem's suburbs or elsewhere in the West Bank did not require exit permits and could live there for years without having their status affected.

In March 2000, Minister of the Interior NATAN SHARANSKY submitted an affidavit to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT of Justice stating that the Center of Life Policy would cease. He indicated that the ministry would operate according to the pre–December 1995 policy and that residency would be returned to those whose status had been revoked, provided that they lived in Jerusalem for at least two years. The rate of revocation of permanent residency permits for Palestinians declined following Sharansky's announcement. In a clarification of the terms of the new policy before the Israeli High Court of Justice, Sharansky stated that Palestinian Jerusalemites living abroad would not lose their permanent residency if they visited Israel at least once every three years and maintained valid Israeli-issued travel documents. Palestinians who acquired foreign nationality or permanent residency status in other nations continued to lose their Jerusalem residency rights.

See also FAMILY REUNIFICATION; NATIONAL INSURANCE INSTITUTE

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Central Intelligence Agency

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a long history of involvement with both Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). This involvement deepened considerably with the 1998 WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM and then in June 2001, when CIA director GEORGE TENET proposed the Tenet Plan for an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire and security arrangements.

The agency's ties with the Israeli intelligence agency MOSSAD date as far back as 1951. In 1964 both agencies began monitoring the PLO and worked clandestinely to recruit Palestinian agents to spy for their respective causes. The first US contacts with the PLO began in late 1969, when the CIA spotted a promising potential recruit in the FATAH organization named 'ALI HASAN SALAMAH. A CIA case officer in Beirut, Robert Ames, made contact through a Lebanese intermediary, and a brief exchange of information followed. The White House approved the opening, as did then head of the PLO YASIR ARAFAT, who hoped to establish a channel to the Americans. Then, in November 1974, a secret understanding between Arafat's man Salamah and the CIA was reached in a meeting at the Waldorf-Astoria at the time of Arafat's visit to the UNITED NATIONS. The understanding amounted to a mutual nonaggression pact between the UNITED STATES and the PLO. During the 1975–1976 Lebanese Civil War, the liaison deepened when Arafat's operatives provided security for US diplomats in West Beirut. Senior US intelligence officials have stated that the Palestinian link helped save many dozens of US lives in the mid-1970s.

When Israel invaded LEBANON in 1982, Ames was instrumental in formulating the REAGAN PLAN, which called for autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the WEST BANK and GAZA in some sort of informal agreement with JORDAN. Although the Reagan Plan foundered, the United States brokered a deal that enabled the PLO to evacuate Lebanon in safety, away from Israeli fire. CIA contacts with the PLO were downgraded thereafter by the REAGAN administration and remained frozen during the GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration, but they were revived and expanded by the CLINTON administration shortly after the Israelis and Palestinians signed the OSLO ACCORDS in 1993.

In 1993, in a highly unusual mission, the CIA established an office in Tel Aviv to facilitate security cooperation between the United States and Israel. This role was expanded and formalized during peace negotiations in 1998 at the Wye Plantation in Maryland at the behest of US national security adviser Sandy Berger and DENNIS ROSS, the senior US negotiator in the Middle East. When Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU refused to cede more territory without a mechanism for ensuring a Palestinian crackdown on "TERRORISTS," CIA director George Tenet offered to have his agents monitor Arafat's security effort. Netanyahu bristled, but Arafat embraced the idea, knowing that the CIA had been a reliable partner with the PLO in the past and welcoming third-party involvement in the peace process.

The October 1998 Wye Memorandum, which required Israel to exchange territory for tougher action by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) to prevent attacks against Israel, outlined a central role for the CIA (without mentioning it by name) in monitoring both sides' compliance with the agreement. However, many considered this role as uncharted and potentially dangerous waters for the CIA.

In the subsequent two years, agents under the command of the Tel Aviv CIA station chief actively monitored Arafat's security efforts, oversaw Israeli and Palestinian troop deployments, verified reductions in the size of the Palestinian police force, kept track of Palestinian efforts to arrest suspected militants, and sought to ensure that alleged militants were not hired as Palestinian security officers. In addition, CIA officials stationed in Tel Aviv met regularly with Israeli and PNA representatives to resolve disputes, help manage border CHECKPOINTS, and review other security matters. Formal biweekly meetings were held to review steps taken by the PNA to eliminate HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD cells

and support structures. These tasks involved close CIA coordination with the Palestinian General Intelligence (Mukhabbarat al-Amma) and the Preventive Security Service, as well as with various Israeli intelligence departments (Mossad, SHIN BET, Aman).

In January 2001, in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the role of the CIA in assessing and mediating security matters between Israel and the PNA was considered by proponents as more integral than ever to any future for the peace process. The June Tenet Plan supposedly reaffirmed Israel's and the PNA's commitment to the security agreements forged at SHARM AL-SHAYKH in October 2000 and was embedded in the MITCHELL Report of April 2001; however, the plan was primarily a list of security measures each side should take to halt violence so that talks could proceed. In any case, it brought the CIA even deeper into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite the strong military, security, political, economic, and emotional ties between the United States and Israel, the CIA gained considerable trust on the Palestinian side because of the relatively close personal friendship between Tenet and Arafat and because of US efforts to strengthen PLO/PNA intelligence in key areas, such as infiltration of militant groups, clandestine communication, interrogation methods, computer technology, and intelligence processing. The CIA policy of "observing" the interrogations of suspected militants brought strong criticism from Palestinian human rights advocates, who argued that the agency was tacitly supporting the PNA's use of TORTURE, prolonged detention without trial, and other human rights abuses.

See also MOSSAD; 'ALI HASAN SALAMEH; SHIN BET

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Centre for Architectural Conservation

The Centre for Architectural Conservation (RIWAQ) is a nongovernmental, nonprofit Palestinian organization established in June 1991 in the WEST BANK. Its main objective is to protect the cultural, architectural, ARCHAEOLOGICAL, and natural heritage of Palestine, which is considered part of the PALESTINIAN IDENTITY. RIWAQ is particularly concerned with several issues: that contemporary Palestinian construction is losing its historic characteristics; the destruction of the ENVIRONMENT; the demolition of historic architecture because of the political conflict; and the transformation of the natural environment, including the cutting down of coniferous trees and soil erosion caused by the wearing away of rocky lands and stone walls. At the same time, traditional handicrafts and related professions are becoming extinct, as crafts workers fail to hand down their expertise and skills to the following generations. RIWAQ works in a variety of ways to try to rectify these concerns. (http://www.riwaq.org).

See also ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION

Chai Vekayam

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Checkpoints

Military checkpoints have long been used to control civil unrest in Palestine. The phenomenon mirrors broader changes in perceptions about the security role of the state in relation to individuals, changes brought on by colonialism, postcolonialism, and the post–Cold War era. Israel's use of the military checkpoint, however, is remarkable both in its connection to LAND confiscation policies and in its many other ramifications for Palestinians. Furthermore, the Israeli military checkpoint regime is now copied by other militaries in the post–September 11 world, especially by the US military in its occupation of IRAQ and Afghanistan.

The occurrence of the checkpoint in Palestine can be traced to the late 1800s and the strengthening of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE. BRITISH MANDATE encirclement practices, implemented most extensively after the 1936 general strike (ARAB REVOLT), were enforced using widespread troop deployment, CURFEWS, ROAD closures, demolition of structures that hindered military access to population centers, and the building of fences that disrupted supplies and communications. Similar methods were leveraged through the 1945 DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS intended to clamp down on Jewish rebels.

It was only after 1948, however, that movement restriction was closely connected to land confiscation. In 1950 the new Israeli government instituted military rule over Palestinian citizens of the state, including common martial law powers regulating freedom of speech, movement, and assembly. These regulations were based on earlier British edicts and allowed for the detention, search, or DEPORTATION of any individual suspected of activities "inimical to public safety." Fearing that the Palestinian Arab population might act as a fifth column in its midst, Israel dispatched the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES' Frontier Corps (the precursor to today's BORDER POLICE) to patrol border areas. But the regulations and troop deployment tightened the state's hold on Palestinian villages depopulated during and after the 1948 WAR and allowed for SETTLEMENT by new Jewish immigrants. Thus, approximately 1,500 residents of Palestinian villages inside the new Israeli border were removed from their homes and barred from returning. This change was facilitated by the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW of 1950, which meant that even "PRESENT ABSENTEES" could have their land confiscated by the state. Under this law, 40 percent of Arab land was confiscated from Palestinians still living inside the new Israeli borders. Areas where Palestinians lived were designated "CLOSED MILITARY ZONES," and residents were restricted from leaving without a military PERMIT. Jews living nearby, on the other hand, had no RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT. One of the most important means of controlling the movement of the Palestinian population—and therefore their access to and ownership of the land under the law—was the military checkpoint.

Israeli policy after its 1967 OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and the GAZA STRIP initially emphasized the economic integration of Palestinians newly under Israeli control. The military checkpoint was rarely employed, and Palestinians were allowed fairly free access through Israel and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The Border Police, now under the Israeli police instead of the military, were dispatched to maintain law and order under the military administration in the Occupied Territories. In 1972, Israel issued general exit orders that allowed Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to move in and out of Israel and Jerusalem except between the hours of 1 and 5 A.M. In June 1989, however, Israel began to restrict the general exit permits, a policy managed through checkpoints at the entrances to the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

In January 1991, during the first GULF WAR, Israel revoked the general exit permits of 1972, and every resident of the Occupied Territories was now required to carry a personal exit permit to enter Israel. After the 1993 signing of the OSLO ACCORDS, this permit policy was hardened. In addition, Israeli checkpoints that marked the outlines of Palestinian territory under the agreement were matched by PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) checkpoints on the other side. At this time, both Israeli and Palestinian checkpoints were rudimentary structures along roadways marked by a national flag, perhaps a small observation structure or a military vehicle blocking the road, and armed soldiers. Only periodically did PNA checkpoints actually monitor traffic; instead, they were symbolic markers of Palestine sovereignty. Israeli checkpoints, on the other hand,

determined the mobility of not only Palestinian civilians but also officials and police, who were required under the Oslo agreements to request Israeli permission to move from one PNA area to another.

The outbreak of hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis in September 2000 marked the gradual disappearance of PNA checkpoints (rendered useless in the face of Israeli incursions) and the intensification of the Israeli checkpoint regime. Early on, Israeli checkpoints were the natural targets of Palestinian demonstrations. Deploying sharpshooters, the Israeli army quickly moved its military forces to encircle areas that the Oslo agreements had designated as AREA A, under complete PNA control. As the conflict persisted, these military checkpoints became the "public face" of the Israeli Occupation: the arena where most Palestinians interacted with Israelis and Israeli authority. Although the government's security rationale in maintaining the checkpoints went largely unquestioned in Israeli society, MACHSOMWATCH (Checkpoint Watch), a group formed by Israeli women, stood at the checkpoints to monitor them and verify that the soldiers manning them behaved appropriately and professionally.

MachsomWatch performs a much needed service, as human rights organizations, including B'Tselem, have documented countless cases of beatings—sometimes severe, soldiers subjecting Palestinians to senselessly long delays in all temperatures, the random (and sometimes targeted) opening of fire on civilians, and other abuses. In addition, the checkpoints have prevented Palestinians from receiving proper HEALTH CARE: women in labor, dialysis patients, and critical cases have been held up by the military cordon, resulting in eighty-three documented deaths. Humiliating treatment is the norm at checkpoints. Over the years, these acts of physical abuse and humiliation have become an integral part of the daily life of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

Israeli checkpoints are currently found in many forms: permanent and partially manned checkpoints, temporary checkpoints, ROADBLOCKS (consisting of rows of 1-meter concrete blocks), metal gates, earth mounds, earth walls (a long series of earth mounds), trenches, and road barriers. From 2003 to 2006 the number of checkpoints and roadblocks hindering Palestinian movement in the West Bank at any given time ranged between 376 and 735. Developing in tandem with this grid of control was the system of Israeli-only and Palestinian-only roads running through the West Bank—access to each available only through checkpoints or gates.

Manned checkpoints usually require Palestinians to show the orange or green IDENTITY CARDS that designate them as Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories (versus Israeli settlers, who carry Israeli citizenship and blue identity cards). Some manned checkpoints do not check all passengers, but soldiers stationed there survey an individual's appearance to determine if he or she should be stopped. Travelers can be denied passage on the basis of their identity cards, their places of origin, their ages (frequently men aged sixteen to thirty-five, for example, are banned), the origin of their vehicles (some checkpoints are reserved for permitted, commercial, or noncommercial vehicles), or even the whim of the presiding soldier. Some manned checkpoints incorporate a search of the vehicle or accompanying luggage, using hand searches, metal detectors, x-ray scanners, or dogs. Major manned checkpoints are closed at night, although soldiers periodically slow traffic and even stop traffic altogether during the day. Drivers are then forced to seek out detours, which extend short journeys to long ones on remote back roads. Unmanned checkpoints, composed of physical barriers, prevent the travel of any vehicle and require passengers to traverse the area by foot.

The entire checkpoint regime divides the West Bank into five BANTUSTANS, with movement from one region to the other restricted in varying degrees. At the same time, Israel has developed a separate high-speed road system (commenced in the Oslo years) to connect Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories with their jobs and families in Israel. This dual system not only impedes Palestinians' movement to family, work, and recreation outside their home locales but also has a crippling effect on the economy. Palestinian exporters pay twice the transportation costs of their Israeli competitors and are unable to promise regular delivery. Prior to the INTIFADA, 22 percent of Palestinians worked in Israel. That number decreased to 9 percent by 2003, with Israel planning to completely eliminate Palestinian guest labor in Israel by the end of 2008 through the use of checkpoints. The World Bank named the "CLOSURE" implemented through the checkpoint regime as a "key factor" in the radical escalation of Palestinian poverty (by 2004, 47 percent of Palestinians were living below the poverty line).

Although Israeli policy at the beginning of the Intifada was primarily intended to isolate and control Palestinian population centers, as the hostilities progressed Israel again linked its security rationale to its claims on land. Between August 2005 and February 2006, checkpoints resulted in the de facto Israeli requisition of 7,884 dunum (1,950 acres) of West Bank land for the construction of a series of concrete walls, fences, guard towers, electronic monitors, and gates, including the BARRIER, to surround Palestinian population centers in the West Bank. These structures, Israel stated, would reduce the number of checkpoints, give greater protection to Israeli soldiers monitoring Palestinian movement, and ultimately prevent Palestinian access to prime Israeli interests, such as Jerusalem, border areas with JORDAN, WATER aquifers, and Israeli settlements. However, initial reports by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, established to monitor Palestinian and Israeli commitments, show that, in areas where the Barrier has been completed, the number of checkpoints has actually increased. In fact, rudimentary checkpoints at the start of the Intifada have been converted into major "crossings" between Israel and the Occupied Territories or between two regions of the West Bank.

In the Gaza Strip, one of the consequences of the August 2005 Israeli unilateral redeployment was the removal of checkpoints that had severed the strip into several areas. Still, the "super-checkpoints" (now operating more like border crossings) on Gaza's fenced borders prevent the movement of Palestinians and their goods in and out of the Gaza Strip. In the spring of 2006, citing security concerns, Israel closed Gaza's KARNI industrial crossing for several months, causing severe shortages in sugar, wheat, and gasoline and contributing to civil unrest within the Gaza Strip.

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—Charmaine Seitz

China

Though the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was apparently marginal to its international concerns, Beijing's official policy has meandered over time,

duplicating the twists and turns of Chinese foreign policy and domestic politics. Mao Zedong, the would-be leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the People's Republic of China (PRC), was aware of the Palestine problem even before he fully adopted communism. In a piece he published on 14 July 1919, entitled "So Much for National Self-Determination," he made the crucial link that was to govern the way China perceived this problem until his death in 1976: "The desire of the Jews to restore their nation in Palestine will not succeed because it is of no great concern to the Allied powers" (mainly FRANCE, the UNITED STATES, and Great Britain). Nevertheless, he later planned to include a chapter on "The Jewish National Liberation Movement" in a volume entitled *Collected Writings on the National Liberation Movement* (19 May 1926), although the chapter (and the book) was never written. There was no mention of a Palestinian "national liberation movement."

Chinese awareness of the Palestine problem emerged in the early 1940s, long before the CCP seized power in China. A number of commentators who later became prominent officials in the CCP were the first to discuss the Arab-Jewish imbroglio in Palestine. Motivated by international politics and their implications for the future of Chinese communism, these discussions and commentators attributed the primary causes of the Palestine problem not to endogenous Jewish-Arab hostility but to exogenous Western interference (later to be joined by the SOVIETS). Put differently, what was later to be known as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was seen as having been fabricated and exacerbated by the Western powers, especially England and France, to provide an excuse for their long-term presence in the Middle East. The CCP was concerned that GERMANY would exploit these rivalries and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to gain a foothold in the Middle East as a springboard to its advance toward East Asia and China, where it would join forces with Japan. This is why for many years the Chinese insisted on the withdrawal of foreign powers from the Middle East as a first step toward the resolution of the Palestine problem. These fundamental assumptions about global politics determined Chinese attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict until the early 1980s at least and, to an extent, to this very day.

China's stand on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has gone through a number of stages. In the first stage, until the mid-1950s, Beijing adopted a relatively balanced policy. While deploring the fact that a Palestinian state had not been established as stipulated by the 1947 UN RESOLUTION 181, the Chinese blamed not just Israel but also the Arabs. *Both* had occupied territories allotted by the UNITED NATIONS to Palestine. Beijing's cautiousness was related to Israel being the first, and at that time the only, government in the Middle East to recognize the PRC (on 9 January 1950, although full diplomatic relations were not established until 1992), as well as the Soviet role in the foundation of Israel. Perceiving Israel as a proto-socialist country just liberated from the yoke of British colonialism, the Chinese considered the Arab regimes as reactionary "running dogs" of Western imperialism. Still, while diplomatic explorations were taking place with Israel, though not with the Arabs, by the mid-1950s the second stage in China's stand on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict began to take shape.

Lasting until the mid-1960s, this stage opened with the preparations for the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. Because Beijing wanted to take part in the conference at the expense of Taipei, it had to bow to Arab-Palestinian pressure to exclude Israel. At the conference, held in April 1955, the PRC delegation, headed by Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, had to cope publicly for the first time with the Palestine problem as well as meet, for the first time, with Arab leaders. They included AHMAD SHUQAYRI, who in 1965 would become the first PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman. Zhou Enlai called for implementation of the relevant UN resolutions on Israel and reiterated China's official view that denounced foreign meddling for fomenting and prolonging the Palestine problem. His tone, however, was conciliatory. He insisted on a peaceful settlement of the conflict and avoided criticizing Israel. Yet the course had been charted, and China had to move closer to the Arab-Palestinian-Islamic position to expand its constituency and power base in the third world.

This policy paid off when China gained its first diplomatic foothold in the Middle East in 1956. As the prospects of establishing relations with Israel diminished, the Chinese began to manifest a greater interest in the Palestinians, though not yet at the expense of Israel. This attitude, however, changed dramatically by the mid-1960s, when the third stage began. This era was governed by domestic radicalization (leading to the Cultural

Revolution), international isolation (following the break with Moscow), and the establishment of the PLO. It is the convergence of these developments that paved the way for the Sino-Palestinian alliance. For Beijing, this alliance was still not motivated by any particular interest in the Palestine problem but rather by China's pursuit of Arab (and Islamic) support against the two superpowers. Unable to compete with the Soviet Union and the United States in diplomatic, economic, and military terms, the Chinese used the Palestine problem to win the goodwill of the Arab governments that had created the PLO. By the early 1970s, however, Beijing had become deeply committed to the FATAH-dominated PLO as the genuine representative of the Palestinian people. Other Palestinian organizations were largely overlooked not only for their radical Marxist-Leninist agenda but also, and mainly, for undermining Palestinian national unity.

As early as March 1965, China became the first non-Arab country to host a PLO delegation, led by Ahmad Shuqayri, as well as to establish a permanent quasi-diplomatic PLO mission in Beijing. After the PLO visit, China's MEDIA launched a massive propaganda campaign urging the Palestinians to wage a people's war against Israel. The possibility of a peaceful settlement, however, was subordinated to China's policy of (modestly) supplying the PLO with light weapons and ammunition accompanied by military and ideological training. In their nearly total identification with the PLO, the Chinese stopped short of challenging Israel's right to exist. Yet all these efforts aborted. Unable to offset the power wielded by the Soviet Union and the United States, China failed to win over the PLO, let alone the Arab governments, against its rivals. This was just one reason for Beijing to reconsider its stand on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the late 1960s. There were additional reasons.

To begin with, after the violent phase of the Cultural Revolution, China began to return to normal life and to reconstruct its domestic affairs and foreign policy. Equally important, while Moscow's military threat to China reached its peak in a series of armed clashes, Washington signaled its interest in reconciling with the PRC, in both words and deeds. These developments convinced other governments to resume or establish diplomatic relations with China, and in October 1971, China was admitted to the United Nations as a permanent member of the Security Council—at Taiwan's expense. As China's diplomatic network and international responsibilities expanded, Chinese support for national liberation movements, the Palestinian one included, dwindled. Since China had not been strictly interested in "national liberation" but rather in undermining the two superpowers, these movements now became superfluous.

The fourth stage in the Chinese attitude to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict began with China's emphasis that its relations with the Palestinians and with Israel had never been a zero-sum game. Although China appreciated Israel's vote for its admission into the United Nations and even more so Israel's role in checking "Soviet expansionism" in the Middle East in the early 1970s, the Chinese had no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. However, governed by other considerations, their sympathy for the Palestinians cooled considerably, not only because of the domestic and international changes but also because of Palestinian behavior. Beijing became visibly irritated by the Palestinians' inability to unite, by their growing association with Moscow despite China's opposition, and primarily by their use of TERRORISM, especially civilian aircraft hijacking. These practices undermined Mao's revolutionary principles and contradicted China's newly assumed responsibilities. To be sure, in the United Nations and elsewhere Beijing firmly and consistently called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from *all* OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and for a full restoration of Palestinian "rights." At the same time, however, Chinese verbal attacks against Israel became less frequent and less virulent. Mao no longer advocated ARMED STRUGGLE but, instead, advised the Palestinians to follow the lead of the moderate and pro-Western Arab governments. This explains China's (tacit) approval of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process and the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, which led to stage five in China's stand toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Consistent with its time-honored policy, Beijing's interest in these developments had more to do with the consolidation of the US position in the Middle East at the expense of the Soviet Union. Obsessed by its enmity toward Moscow, Beijing underestimated and misinterpreted the degree of Arab, and particularly Palestinian, opposition to the Israeli-Egyptian agreements. Indeed, by 1979 disagreements between the PRC and the Palestinians had reached unprecedented proportions. Palestinian officials accused the Chinese leadership of selling out the Palestinians by supporting the 1979

EGYPT-Israeli peace agreements while "shrouding its policy on our cause in obscurity and political obfuscation." The Palestinian irritation with China was fed by the emergence of post-Mao reform leaders who not only promoted international stability as beneficial to the PRC interests but also established full diplomatic relations with Washington (Israel's main supporter) and, worse, invaded revolutionary Vietnam, which had been unified only four years earlier. These developments, especially the latter, provoked the most furious Palestinian reactions up to that time. Palestinian leaders openly stated "that we stand on the side of Vietnam against the Chinese invasion" and accused post-Mao Beijing of apostasy, of collaboration with reactionary regimes in and outside the Middle East, and last but not least, of betraying the Palestinian revolution.

To intercept this onslaught, Beijing modified its stand on Palestinian demands. So far the Chinese had consistently, yet vaguely, called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the restoration of Palestinian national and legitimate rights. Never had the Chinese, either publicly or even privately, advocated the establishment of a Palestinian state (probably in view of China's own separatist challenges). Now, for the first time, a commentary issued on 20 April 1979 set the stage for a new act in the Sino-Palestinian drama. Its keynote lines read: "Only by persistence in unity and struggle can the Arab people recover the land usurped by the Israeli aggressors and assert the national rights of the Palestinian people, *including their right to set up their own state*" (emphasis added). By supporting an independent Palestine, the Chinese wanted not only to win back Palestinian goodwill but also to align themselves with many other governments all over the world who supported the Palestinian cause and, moreover, to refute rumors circulating at that time (which later turned out to be true) about secret Sino-Israeli relations. To underline the message, Chinese media intensified their condemnation of Israeli Zionist aggression against the Palestinians.

By that time, however, Beijing had already realized that Egypt's approach of recognizing and directly negotiating with Israel should be adopted to resolve the Palestine problem. Indeed, Beijing tried to convince the Palestinians that flexible, practical, and peaceful negotiations with Israel—rather than armed struggle—would lead to a "fair" and "just" settlement of the Palestine problem (namely, that would take into account Israel's concerns as well). Beijing's position was completely rejected by the Palestinians. Yet, while Sino-Palestinian relations reached a deadlock, the PRC was moving ahead, gradually modifying its foreign policy. Instead of thinking that foreign powers had fabricated the Palestinian problem, the Chinese leadership wondered if the problem had attracted foreign powers and that therefore a settlement of the conflict was the precondition for their withdrawal from the Middle East. Now less anxious about the Soviet Union, the Chinese believed, in a complete about-face, that the solution to the Palestine problem should not be left to the parties concerned but should become the responsibility of the great powers, the PRC included. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process should not be monopolized by the United States.

The PLO and Israel were to be copartners in the process, which should "take into consideration the legitimate rights and interests of the Jewish people and the existence of the Israeli entity." Such a statement not only reflected China's new pragmatism but also legitimized China's unofficial relations with Israel, which involved primarily, but not only, military affairs. These unprecedented exchanges and military sales infuriated the Palestinians. For example, the head of the PLO Beijing office, who left in 1983 at the end of his term, was not replaced until 1986. To appease the Palestinians, and despite its continued misgivings about them, on 20 November 1988 the PRC recognized the newly proclaimed (though virtual) state of Palestine. Having been the first non-Arab government to endorse the PLO in 1965, it now took Beijing five days and following thirty other governments to recognize Palestine. Yet it was not done at Israel's expense. In fact, recognizing Palestine legitimized China's establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. By then, the extent of unofficial Sino-Israeli relations and political exchanges could no longer be concealed. Moreover, Beijing, which had already called for an international conference to settle the Palestine conflict under the auspices of the UN Security Council, knew that it would not be allowed to take part in such meetings without having diplomatic relations with Israel.

This situation paved the way for the sixth, and final, stage in the Chinese stand on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the late 1980s, Beijing tried to justify its evolving relations with Israel as beneficial to the peace process and to the Palestinians. These messages were transmitted to PLO chairman

YASIR ARAFAT when he visited China in early October 1989, for the first time as "president of the State of Palestine." Using this opportunity, Prime Minister Li Peng put forward a five-point proposal to settle the Palestinian conflict. It (1) urged the two parties to solve the problems by political means, (2) without the use of force and (3) through a direct dialogue based on mutual recognition, (4) under the auspices of an international conference presided over by the United Nations, and (5) with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Li called on Israel to stop oppressing Palestinians in its Occupied Territories and to withdraw, but he also called for measures that would guarantee Israel's security. The die was cast.

It is conceivable that China had decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel by the late 1980s but was looking for the right timing. Two events led to the acceleration of this process. On 21 July 1990, SAUDI ARABIA became the last Arab government to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, ironically opening the door for Israel. Twelve days later, IRAQ president Saddam Husayn invaded KUWAIT and, paradoxically, facilitated Sino-Israeli diplomatic relations, for several reasons. First, Beijing realized there were other conflicts in the Middle East as serious as the Palestinian-Israeli one. Beijing also appreciated Israel's restraint in the face of the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on its civilian population, which prevented a regional deterioration that China did not want. Finally, Beijing was aware that with the end of the war, the peace process would top the international agenda, as a US reward for the Arab countries that supported the anti-Iraqi alliance.

To be sure, in late October 1991 an international peace conference was held in MADRID, but without the participation of China (which did not yet have official relations with Israel). The next meeting, the Multilateral Middle East Conference, was due to take place in Moscow on 28–29 January 1992. Interested in this meeting as the first step in its involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the PRC finally decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. The ceremonies took place on 24 January, just a few days before the Moscow meeting. Beijing disregarded its own preconditions, articulated consistently since the 1980s, that Israel completely withdraw from all Occupied Territories, including JERUSALEM, and fully restore Palestinian national rights, including an independent state. In retrospect, it is clear that the Moscow meeting was the key impetus for China to establish relations with Israel. Yet, since then, China has failed to take an active part in attempts to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, something its special envoy to the region has consistently avoided.

Rhetorically, Beijing has regularly commented on the progress in the peace process (or lack thereof) while criticizing Israel's operations in the Occupied Territories, occasionally in slanderous language. Furthermore, Chinese-made or -designed rockets and missiles have been fired against Israel by radical organizations such as Hizbullah (from LEBANON in July 2006) and HAMAS (from Gaza in late December 2008–January 2009), to Beijing's barely concealed embarrassment. At the same time, relations with Israel have been consolidated and expanded in all contexts. From a twenty-first-century perspective, China has always considered the Palestinian-Israeli conflict a sideshow and still does.

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—Yitzhak Shichor

Christianity

With their huge numbers and divisions, Christians do not share a consistent perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Christianity comprises more than 2 billion people worldwide, divided among three historical groups of church families: Roman Catholics (1 billion), Orthodox and Oriental Catholics (about 218 million), and Protestants, including Anglicans and independents (about 800 million). Orthodox and Oriental Catholics are divided among a number of national and historic churches, and Protestants are fractured into hundreds of small and large church bodies. Increasingly, there are deep ideological and theological divisions within and among these church bodies.

This entry discusses seven groupings of perspectives on the conflict:

- Christian Zionism, its history in Britain and in the UNITED STATES, and its contemporary politics
- Evangelical critics of Christian Zionism
- Mainline churches—pro-Israel views
- Mainline churches—critical views of Israel
- The VATICAN and its developing views
- Orthodox churches and Arab Christians, with particular attention to the Orthodox views of the Arab world and Palestinian Christians and to Palestinian Christian theologians and church leaders
- Palestinian Christians

Christian Zionism

Classical Christianity theoretically embraced an exclusivist universalism, but in practice it embraced various Christian-ruled empires and nations. In the first millennium CE, Christians believed that Israel as an elect nation had been superseded by the universal church, the "New Israel," or chosen people of God drawn from all nations. The "promised land" was the whole creation transformed into a redeemed and spiritualized "new heaven and earth." Palestine, however, was still venerated as the "Holy Land" of Jesus's life, death, and resurrection, and hence as a place of pilgrimage.

To the early Christians, the Jews were under divine reprobation for having failed to accept Jesus as their messiah and thus were condemned to wander the earth and be kept from political power and cultural dominance as an expression of God's wrath. Christianity also taught that, in order to be redeemed, Jews must convert to Christianity. This, it was believed, would happen "in the last days" when Elijah returned in preparation for the return of Christ, the Last Judgment, and transformation of the world into the millennial Kingdom of God. In this classical Christian view, there was no place for a nationalist restoration of the Jews to their ancient homeland.

This view, however, began to be modified in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, particularly among English Calvinists. Rejecting the allegorical for a literal, historical interpretation of the Bible, they saw the "promised land" as the actual land of Palestine and the Jews as historical descendants of the elect people of Hebrew scripture. At the same time, the breakup of western Christendom into rival nations created a new nationalism in which the English, French, and Spanish claimed to be the "new Israel," as nations rather than as an expression of a universal church. In particular, English Protestants created a parallelism between Jews as the original nation and themselves as the new chosen nation. The biblical traditions regarding the fulfillment of God's promises of redemption were reinterpreted in the light of these ideas. Nationalist Jewish hopes of redemption were no longer superseded by the universal hopes of Christianity; instead, Christians believed that Jewish fulfillment must come first, and then those of Christianity. This meant that the Jews must first be restored to their ancient land, reestablish their rule over it, and rebuild the Second Temple—a THIRD TEMPLE. Only then would Christ return and the final redemptive acts of history unfold—the resurrection of the dead, the Last Judgment, and the millennial reign of the saints on earth. Some Christian Zionists assumed the Jews would be

converted to Christianity before returning to Palestine, whereas others felt this would happen only with the return of Christ.

Belief in the restoration of the Jews to Palestine was common among British evangelicals in the seventeenth century, particularly during the English Civil War. One politician, Sir Henry Finch, called for the British government to help the Jews to return to Palestine. Such ideas faded in the eighteenth century but were revived in the early nineteenth century as Christian evangelicals sought to counteract enlightenment rationalism.

The major formulator of a Christian Zionist premillennial dispensationalist theology was John Nelson Darby (1800–1882), founder of the Plymouth Brethren. For Darby there were two separate covenants: one between God and Israel and the second between God and the Christian church. The first covenant was suspended while the church carried out the conversion of Gentiles. But in the last days of world history, the covenant of God with the Jews would resume its priority. The Jews then must return to Palestine, reassert their control of the whole of the promised land, and rebuild the Third Temple. In the final apocalyptic crisis, there would be a showdown with the evil powers of the world. Born-again Christians would be "raptured" into the heavens while the battle of Armageddon was being fought between the army of Christ and the army of Satan. Once these evil powers were defeated, true Christians, which according to scripture included 144,000 converted Jews, would descend from heaven and reign over a renovated earth. The return of the Jews to Palestine was the signal that these final events of world history were beginning to unfold.

Darby made six missionary journeys to the United States between 1840 and 1880 and promulgated these ideas among US evangelicals. The Scofield Reference Bible, the most popular Bible in the United States at the time, disseminated these views through its annotations, and evangelists such as Dwight Moody made these notions key to an understanding of the Bible. William Blackstone, author of the popular apocalyptic book *Jesus Is Coming* (1878), recruited 413 leading Americans to petition US president Benjamin Harrison (1889–1993) to support a restored Jewish state in Palestine. Such efforts were indignantly rejected by American Reform Jews as an effort to divert Jews fleeing Russian pogroms from immigrating to the United States.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Christian Zionism came to play an influential role in the imperial designs of Great Britain and then of the United States. In 1839 an evangelical social reformer, Lord Shaftsbury, called for the British government to aid the return of the Jews to Palestine. He also importuned Parliament to facilitate the founding of an Anglican bishopric of JERUSALEM, appointing a British Jewish convert, the Reverend Dr. Michael Solomon Alexander, as its first incumbent. Shaftsbury saw this as the means for spreading Christianity among the Jews in preparation for the return of Christ.

In the BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917), in which the British announced their support for "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people," and in the founding of the BRITISH MANDATE for Palestine (1922), British leaders such as LORD BALFOUR, High Commissioner for Palestine HERBERT SAMUEL, and Prime Minister Lloyd George mingled British imperialism with their Christian beliefs. These men saw British support for Zionist ambitions in Palestine as advantageous both to the consolidation of British global interests and to their belief in the first and second covenants. (In the first covenant, God promises Abraham a great nation in perpetuity for his tribe, the Israelites; Calvin believed that God gave the whole world to the Christians in the second covenant.)

In the United States, a widely disseminated Christian Zionist premillennialist dispensationalism became muted in the first half of the twentieth century as evangelicals retreated from political involvement in the face of a dominant liberalism and secularism. But the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 brought new faith that the prophesied events of the world's end were about to unfold, a faith confirmed by the greatly expanded power of Israel after the 1967 WAR. In reaction against the New Left of the 1960s, with its promotion of feminism, gay rights, and criticism of American militarism and imperialism, in the 1970s a newly politicized Christian Right movement began to see the possibilities of an alliance with NEOCONSERVATISM.

As liberal Christians became more critical of Israel, American Jewish establishment leaders began to explore an alliance with a newly empowered Christian Right. This alliance among the Christian Right, neoconservatives, and US and Israeli Jewish leaders blossomed during the REAGAN years.

In retreat during the presidencies of GEORGE H. W. BUSH and BILL CLINTON, it exploded into new dominance in US politics during the presidency of GEORGE W. BUSH. This shift also reflects the increased militancy of JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST settlers and the dominance of the conservative LIKUD Party over the LABOR Party in Israel.

This alliance among neoconservatives, such as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle; Christian premillennialists, such as the late Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and the late Ed McAteer; and Jewish establishment leaders with ties to pro-Israel lobbying groups, such as the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE and the MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE, represents a strange marriage of convenience. Beliefs that the United States must become a Christian nation and that the Jews in Israel are part of an apocalyptic scenario in which they will become part of a Christian millennium are hardly acceptable to Jews in the United States, Israel, or elsewhere.

What unites the three groups is a devotion to a hard-line politics of MILITARISM and expansionism in the state of Israel and to a vision of US economic and military world hegemony in which Israel plays a key supporting role. For the Christian Zionist premillennialists, Israel's return to the promised land means an exclusive right of modern Israeli Jews to the whole of Palestine, including the WEST BANK and GAZA and perhaps also parts of JORDAN, LEBANON, and SYRIA. Palestinians, including Palestinian Christians, are infidels who have no right to the land and should be expelled in favor of exclusive Jewish rule. Any proposal to turn over land to the Palestinians in return for peace is a betrayal of the exclusive divine gift of the LAND to the Jews.

Citing Genesis 12:3 ("I will bless those who bless you and curse those who curse you"), this group views the United States as a blessed world power because of its support for exclusive Jewish rights to all of the promised land. Christian Zionists also support the takeover of Jerusalem for exclusive Jewish residency and an eventual destruction of the Muslim sites on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in order to build a Jewish temple on the site. Falwell and others saw this expansion of Israeli power as a mere transition to Jewish conversion to Christianity and the destruction of all remaining Jews (who have not converted) in the battle of Armageddon. Yet this fact is ignored in light of the power and wealth such evangelicals mobilize for neoconservative politics in the United States and Israel.

Evangelical Critics of Christian Zionism

From the 1980s and particularly after 2000, with the consolidated alliance of the Christian Right, neoconservatives, and the pro-Israeli Right in US politics, there has emerged an increasing critique of Christian Zionism and its political effects. US and British evangelicals, often those previously schooled in these views, but who have come to repudiate them, have taken the lead in this critique. Among the leading evangelical critics of Christian Zionism and its politics are Donald Wagner, author of *Anxious for Armageddon* (1995) and *Dying in the Land of Promise* (2003); Gary M. Burge of Wheaton College, author of *Whose Land? Whose Promise?* (2003); and the Reverend Stephen Sizer, a British pastor and author of *Christian Zionism: Road Map to Armageddon* (2005).

These evangelical writers are responsible for making the history and theology of Christian Zionism better known among mainstream Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Christians, including Palestinians, to whom the theology is bizarre and alien. These writers have carefully detailed how this view arose, what its ideas are, and how it has become a political force today—all in the cause of discrediting it. While taking biblical authority seriously, they seek to propose a different theology based on a God who supports all nations and peoples equally. They denounce a view of a tribal war God as incompatible with the teaching of Jesus.

These evangelicals are sympathetic to the Palestinians, whom they see as having been unjustly deprived of their lands and homes, and they assume some kind of TWO-STATE SOLUTION that will allow both Israel and the Palestinians to forge a peaceful coexistence. Wagner, Burge, and others have developed alternative networks of evangelicals, such as Evangelicals for Middle East Understanding, and have been behind major international conferences critical of Christian Zionism, such as the one sponsored by the Palestinian Christian Liberation Theology Center, SABEEL, in Jerusalem in April 2004, "Challenging Christian Zionism: Theology, Politics and the Palestine-Israel Conflict." At such conferences Christian Zionism is called a "false ideology," a "heresy," and "idolatry."

Mainline Churches—Pro-Israel Views

In the aftermath of World War II and the horrific revelations of the Nazi death camps, many mainstream Christian bodies, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, sought to probe Christian responsibility for the atrocity and to reform Christian theology and pastoral practice to eliminate ANTI-SEMITISM. Some Christians felt the need to dispense with any idea that Christianity was superior to Judaism and to affirm the equal validity of both faiths as vehicles for a relationship to God. The extent to which anyone should continue to convert Jews to Christianity proved controversial for many Christians.

Already in 1942, theologians Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and William Albright formed the Christian Council on Palestine to help Jewish refugees migrate to Palestine from Europe. Their objectives were primarily humanitarian. Displaced Jews needed some place to settle and to be secure from anti-Semitic hostility. The fact that Palestine, rather than some other land (such as the United States), was seen as the place for such secure residency reflected an assumption that Jews had a unique relation to this land as their historic homeland. In the 1980s the development of Jewish-Christian dialogues suggested a deeper revision than just purging Christian theology of anti-Semitism. Jewish spokesmen at these dialogues generally insisted that Jews are not just a religious community but a nation and so need a Jewish nation-state, arguing that ANTI-ZIONISM is anti-Semitism. Thus many Christians involved in the dialogues felt they must accept the unique relationship of Judaism to the state of Israel.

Several Christian theologians emerged who supported this view, including the husband-and-wife couple Roy and Alice Eckhardt, Paul Littell, and Paul Van Buren. The Eckhardts claimed that all people have a right to security within a state of their own choice. To deny this for Jews would support the original Christian view that Jews are reprobate and should be a wandering, stateless people. Palestinian rights to a state were dealt with by claiming that Palestinians already have a state in Jordan and that Palestinian Israelis already have equal citizenship rights in Israel. Paul Littell took the view that God's gift to Jews of the promised land gave them a unique right to a Jewish state different from any other nation. Paul Van Buren attempted a more radical revision of Jewish-Christian relations, postulating that God's election of the Jews is the only covenant of God with an elect people, and it is eternal and unchangeable. The election of the Christian church is dependent on God's election of the Jews, for the purpose of extending that election to the conversion of the Gentiles. Jesus is not the Jewish messiah but simply the embodiment for the Gentiles of the covenant of God with Israel, which has a unique religious role. This means that Israel should not be secular as a nation but governed by the Torah. Christians have a responsibility to encourage Jews to be observant of the Torah, Van Buren believed, and also the responsibility to defend Israel against its enemies. Palestinians have no claims on Israel, he maintained, but should be taken care of by the Arab world, which should integrate the REFUGEES into their societies.

Although Van Buren's more radical revision has not caught on with mainstream Christians, there remains within the theology of Jewish-Christian dialogue a general assumption that God's gift of Palestine exclusively to the Jews means they have a right to a Jewish state and that Christians should be uncritical of this state, supporting it as a necessity for Jewish security against further outbreaks of anti-Semitism. Many Christian pastors and theologians, having spent many years trying to amend their worldviews through such dialogue, are reluctant to learn much about the Palestinian plight lest any attention to Palestinian grievances sour their relations with their Jewish colleagues. In effect, fear of being called anti-Semitic has caused many Western Christians either to be silent on Palestinian suffering or to mute any criticism of Israel.

An example of such pro-Israel Christian theology of dialogue was the address of Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, delivered by a proxy at the fifth Sabeel conference in April 2004. In this address, Williams said Israel, as the covenanted people with God, is called to be a paradigmatic people for all nations who exemplify what it means to be obedient to God and just toward one another. The state of Israel was described as the needed homeland for this people, "the sole place where the Jewish people have a guaranteed place." Rowan called on Israelis to better exemplify this calling by being more just to the people around them (i.e., the Arab states around Israel) as well as to the "stranger in their midst"—presumably Palestinians, who were not mentioned

by name in his speech (nor were Palestinian rights to a state mentioned). This address created great indignation at the conference among both Palestinian Christians and Western Christians with a more sympathetic view of Palestinian rights.

Mainline Churches—Critical Views of Israel

From the 1980s into the first decade of the twenty-first century, Christian denominational views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict evolved from a pro-Israel view based on Jewish election, God's gift of the promised land, need for refuge from anti-Semitism, and compensation for Christian guilt to one that sought to balance Israel's right to security with the rights of Palestinians to a state. These views became less biblical and theological and more based on a calculus of social justice: both Jews and Palestinians have historical roots and affinities with the land of Palestine, and both have suffered injustice. The new Christian view seeks to "balance" the claims of each and their civil and economic needs, as well as promote reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

These evolving perspectives among mainline Protestants are illustrated through the development of the statements of the World Council of Churches (WCC). Starting in 1948, the WCC and various Christian denominational bodies were involved in refugee work with Palestinians but were reluctant to propose political solutions, such as a Palestinian or a BINATIONAL state, in case they were prevented by the Israeli government from giving humanitarian aid in the camps.

These limitations began to shift after 1967 as Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, which the WCC increasingly saw as unjust. At the same time the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) emerged as the political representative of the Palestinians, and the Middle Eastern Council of Churches was created as a vehicle for Arab Christians to speak for themselves. Moreover, the politics of the WCC, influenced by liberation theology, leaned toward supporting the political rights of colonized and oppressed peoples in their struggles for liberation. In 1969 the student arm of the WCC, the World Student Christian Federation, recognized the PLO—becoming the first Christian international body to do so. That same year the WCC's body on interchurch aid, the Refugee and World Service, declared that the Palestinians had an equal right to a state along with the Jewish state of Israel. Because the great powers had failed to recognize Palestinian rights to self-determination along with the rights of Israel, "injustice has been done to the Palestinian Arabs by the great powers and this injustice should be redressed."

In 1974 the WCC made explicit its view that guarantees of the existence and secure borders of the state of Israel should be "balanced" with affirmations of the rights of Palestinians to self-determination. "What we desire is equal justice for both Palestinian people and Jewish people in the Middle East." The WCC's statements have become models for those of other world Protestant bodies such as the Lutheran World Federation and the Alliance of World Reformed Churches, as well as national denominational bodies.

Thus mainline Protestant churches have come to assume that the framework for a just peace is a two-state solution with a Palestinian sovereign state within the 1967 borders of Israel, with Jerusalem as the capital of both nations, the return of Palestinian refugees or compensation for loss or damage to their property, and the dismantling of the Jewish SETTLEMENTS. WCC and other mainstream Protestant groups have sharply increased their criticism of Israel's violations of Palestinian human rights and its continued promotion of settlements, CLOSURES, TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, the building of the BARRIER wall of separation, and other impediments to negotiating a just settlement. In 2004–2005, some denominations, such as the Presbyterians and United Church of Christ, also began to suggest that pressure in the form of economic boycotts might be exercised to force Israel to make a just settlement with the Palestinians.

The Vatican

The Second Vatican Council's (1962–1965) "Statement on the Relationship to Non-Christian Religion" declared that God's election of the Jews is the root onto which the Christian church has been grafted and that this covenant still holds. The council repudiated any collective guilt of the Jews for Jesus's death and condemned anti-Semitism. This statement laid the basis for a Catholic-Jewish dialogue that was institutionalized in 1970 with the Catholic-Jewish Liaison Committee. However, the Vatican has also insisted on separating religious Judaism from the political state of Israel, particularly pressing for equal access to the holy sites in Jerusalem for all three religious faiths.

The Vatican has also maintained major institutions that support Palestinian human rights. The

Pontifical Mission for Palestine, established in 1949, oversees a large number of schools and charitable works on a nonsectarian basis. In 1982 and again in 1988, the Vatican received YASIR ARAFAT as the representative of the Palestinian people. After the second meeting, the Vatican affirmed that the Palestinians and the Israelis "have an identical fundamental right to their own homeland in which they could live in liberty, dignity and security, in harmony with neighboring people." This same view of parallel rights was affirmed by the US Bishops' Conference in 1989, where it was stated that the Palestinian homeland should have "sovereign status recognized by Israel."

The Vatican delayed granting full diplomatic recognition to Israel on the grounds that the BORDERS for both states were not secure. After the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel in 1993, which appeared to grant such a secure homeland for the Palestinians, the Vatican signed a "fundamental agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel," focusing on religious freedom to be upheld by both Israel and the Palestinians. In 1994 this agreement was balanced by establishing official relations with the PLO. As hopes for a just peace have faded, the Vatican has joined with the WCC and the Lutheran World Federation to denounce Israeli violence and repression of Palestinians. In particular, the Palestinian delegate to the Holy See, Afif Safieh, has said that the pope's strong opposition to the US-led war against IRAQ "has saved the future of Christian-Muslim relations."

Orthodox Churches and Arab Christians

The Orthodox churches, many of them members of the WCC, have generally followed similar views to those of the WCC in upholding equal rights of Palestinians and Israel. Since Greek Orthodoxy is the historic majority church in Palestine and holds large properties there, it is particularly concerned about protecting these properties. At the same time, the Greek patriarch of Jerusalem has been faulted by other Palestinian Christians for allowing GREEK ORTHODOX properties to be sold to Israelis.

Other Orthodox leaders, such as Patriarch Alexy II of MOSCOW, have joined with other Christian bodies in denouncing the violence against both Jews and Palestinians in the Second INTIFADA. He describes the Holy Land as a place of many ethnic groups and all three religions: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. "One national or religious group cannot prevail in this sacred land. The Holy Land must become a hospitable home for everyone." The patriarch called for the world community (the Russian Federation, the United States, the UNITED NATIONS, and the EUROPEAN UNION) to become involved in stopping the bloodshed and restoring negotiations for peace.

The Orthodox Youth Movement played a major role in revitalizing Middle Eastern Christian churches and linking them with international bodies such as the WCC. Metropolitan George Khodr, one of the founders of this movement and its general secretary for many years, helped organize the 1967 statement by Middle Eastern theologians, "What Is Required of the Christian Faith Concerning the Palestine Problem?" In this statement, Christians are called to be witnesses to God's redeeming love for all human beings and so must reject any nationalism based on religious, ethnic, or cultural exclusivism.

Because separation of religion and state is a primary means for distinguishing religious and political allegiances and thus allowing for equal citizenship of people of all religions, the 1967 statement condemns both Israel as a Jewish state and Islamic states as Muslim states. ZIONISM and Muslim nationalism are seen as parallel distortions of monotheistic religions into religious states. Secular, pluralistic states are necessary so that Christians, Jews, and Muslims can live together as equal citizens. In their statement, the theologians call upon Jews in Israel to overcome racism and to affirm the universal vocation of Judaism. Palestinian refugees who have been thrown out of their homes should be integrated into Israeli society and reparations made for the damages. And the Middle Eastern Christian statement maintains that all inhabitants of Palestine should be considered full and equal citizens, thus following the lines of early PLO views that Palestine should become one secular pluralistic state for all its citizens.

Palestinian Christians

Like other Christians in the Arab world, Palestinian Christians have historically been a minority in Islamic societies. Unlike Western Christians, they have lived outside of Christian-ruled societies since the seventh century. In modern times that means they have been strong supporters of the secular pan-Arabism movements.

Generally well educated and urbanized, Palestinian Christians have benefited from the

many schools that Western churches, both Protestant and Catholic, have founded in the Holy Land, as well as from cultural ties to Europe and the United States. Many have been educated in the West. Afif Safieh, for example, came from a cultured and well-to-do Catholic family from West Jerusalem. He was educated at the French Collège des Frères in English, French, and Arabic and at the University of Louvain, Belgium.

In the context of the ongoing conflict, these cultural ties have facilitated emigration, scattering Palestinian Christians around the world. In Israel and Palestine, they have decreased today to less than 2 percent, raising fears that indigenous Christianity will disappear from the Holy Land.

Christians have been disproportionately represented among Palestinian intellectuals. The late EDWARD SAID, professor of literature at Columbia University in New York, was an outstanding example of such an exiled intellectual, noted for his sharp critique of Western "Orientalism" and his indefatigable defense of Palestinian human rights. But it is hard to trace particular Christian influences on the thought of such intellectuals, who tend to be predominately secular and even somewhat disgusted with the spectacle of Christian competition for resources and services in Jerusalem. Their pan-Arabism and support for a secular nationalism of equal citizenship follows the views of Arab Christians in general and may be related more to the position of Arab Christians as a minority group than to Christian tradition.

However, there has also emerged a significant sector of Palestinian Christian theologians and pastors who have defined a distinctively Palestinian contextual theology. Among these are Naim Ateek, Anglican priest and founder of the Sabeel Center for a Palestinian Ecumenical Christian Liberation theology; Mitri Raheb, pastor of Christmas Lutheran Church in BETHLEHEM; Munib Younan, bishop of Jerusalem of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Jordan; and Elias Chacour, Melkite priest and creator of the Prophet Elias schools in Ibillin, Israel.

These Palestinian Christians articulate a vision of inclusive universalism. God is seen as one who loves and seeks the well-being of all peoples. He speaks through all religions, although, in practice, these theologians are primarily concerned with the three Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. They denounce a God of exclusive nationalism, who chooses one people against others, as a tribal idol. Palestinian Christians are called to reject the temptation to hate Jews because of the injustices they have suffered and to steadily insist on the equal humanity of Jews and Palestinians, who must learn to respect and love one another as members of one extended family.

The Jerusalem Sabeel Center document, "Principles for a Just Peace in Palestine-Israel" (2004), articulates this Palestinian Christian vision for a just peace. Theologically, this vision is based on a universal God who loves all people equally and demands that justice be done between them as the basis for true peace. The wounds of both people should be acknowledged: the HOLOCAUST in the case of the Jews, and the Nakba, by which Palestinians have been displaced from their land and kept under harsh military rule.

The document supports a two-state solution with a sovereign, viable, and democratic state of Palestine on the whole of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The Jewish settlements in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES must become part of Palestine, and Palestinian REFUGEES must be guaranteed the right of return. "Our vision involves two sovereign states, Palestine and Israel, who will enter into a confederation or even a federation, possibly with neighboring countries and where Jerusalem becomes the federal capital," the Sabeel document states. "Indeed the ideal and best solution has always been to envisage ultimately a bi-national state in Palestine-Israel where people are free and equal, living under a constitutional democracy that protects and guarantees all their rights, responsibilities and duties without racism or discrimination: One state for two nations and three religions."

See also VATICAN; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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—Rosemary Radford Ruether

Christian Peacemaker Teams

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) grew out of a commitment by members of the Mennonite, Anabaptist, Quaker, and Church of the Brethren denominations to utilize their commitment to pacifism, nonviolent intervention and direct action, and justice in order to make a difference in real-world conflicts. It began its work in HEBRON in 1995 after an initial delegation visited the city and met with Palestinian mayor Mustapha Natshe, who provided a formal letter of invitation. Today CPT has a twelve-member full-time team plus reservists.

CPT's most significant work is its nonviolent interventions to protect Palestinians. Team members act as shields between Israeli soldiers with live ammunition and tanks and unarmed Palestinian demonstrators, between bulldozers and Palestinian orchards and homes about to be destroyed, and among Jewish SETTLERS who are harassing or harming Palestinians.

Because the scope of its operation is so small, CPT's effectiveness in protecting the Palestinians of Hebron is unclear. Moreover, CPT has been subject to hostility from the soldiers and settlers and has not been protected by the Israeli government, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE, or any other official institution from the attacks and depredations of the settlers. (www.cpt.org/hebron/hebron.php)

See also HEBRON; SETTLER VIOLENCE

Christopher, Warren Minor (1925–)

Warren Christopher is an American diplomat and lawyer. During BILL CLINTON's first term as president, Christopher served as the sixty-third secretary of state from January 1993 until January 1997. As the top US diplomat, Christopher led US diplomacy through the first four years of the Israeli-Palestinian

peace process. He logged more travel miles than any secretary of state before him, including eighteen trips to the Middle East.

The US government had no part in the secret negotiations that led to the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES that initiated the OSLO PROCESS until SHIMON PERES, Israel's foreign minister at the time, handed an advance text to Secretary Christopher. Christopher declined to present the agreement as a US document as Peres requested: "Secretaries of state are not supposed to lie," he said to the Israeli foreign minister. Instead he instructed Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) to draft a mutual recognition agreement between them. As conditions for this to occur, Israel insisted that the Palestinians first recognize the state of Israel and its right to exist, abstain from the use of TERRORISM, and accept UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, all of which they had already done. Israel further demanded that the PLO pledge to change the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER to remove language offensive to Israel. The final agreement was the Declaration of Principles.

In May 1996 the secretary of state told the WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY: "America's most critical role . . . is defending the Middle East peace process and peacemakers against the vicious attacks of their enemies. Terrorists and their supporters are now engaged in a systematic assault on Israel and the peace process. Their goal is clear: they seek to kill the very possibility of peace by destroying every Israeli's sense of personal security. . . .

"Chairman ARAFAT today clearly understands that he must give a 100 percent effort in the war on terror—and not just because his agreements with Israel require it. He is doing it because he knows that the bombs of HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD are trying to destroy Palestinian aspirations as much as they are Israeli lives. The United States will continue to insist that this increased Palestinian effort be sustained."

In January 1997, Secretary Warren Christopher tilted further toward Israel by attaching to the HEBRON PROTOCOL (an agreement in the Oslo Process) a letter to Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU recognizing Israel's "right" to determine from which areas it would "re-deploy." The word *withdraw* disappeared from the Oslo vernacular.

Although Christopher's diplomatic efforts were remarkably unsuccessful, he did legitimize the role of the Palestinians in the peace process: on 19 June 1995, Christopher said, "The United States will continue to support the peacemakers in this area—including the PALESTINIAN [NATIONAL] AUTHORITY"; however, this was said in the context of increasing support for Israel.

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Churchill Memorandum, 1922

The Churchill Memorandum (also known as the Churchill White Paper) of 1922 was the result of an inquiry commissioned by Winston Churchill into clashes between Arabs and Jews in 1921 and 1922 and came after a Palestinian delegation spent nearly a year in London lobbying for independence. The memorandum reaffirmed Britain's commitment to a Jewish national home in Palestine and stated that the Jewish presence in Palestine was based on "a right and not on sufferance." The statement defined the national home as "the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the existence of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride." The memorandum went on to say that, to accomplish this, "it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by IMMIGRATION."

However, the memorandum also tempered Zionist ambitions "to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine . . . His Majesty's government regards any such expectations as impractical and have no such aim in view." The memorandum also affirmed Britain's commitment to prevent "the disappearance or the subordination of the Arab population, language or culture in Palestine," and it promised that the Jewish community would not dominate or impose Jewish nationality on the indigenous Palestinians and that "the absorption of Jewish immigrants would be limited to the 'economic capacity' of the country."

The Zionists accepted the white paper because, even though it appeared to be a step back

from the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, it did not rule out the eventual establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In fact, when Churchill appeared before the PEEL COMMISSION in 1936, he affirmed that he had not implied such a prohibition. Conversely, Palestinian leaders rejected the memorandum because it upheld the Balfour Declaration and continued to allow Jewish IMMIGRATION.

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Church of the Annunciation

See NAZARETH: BASILICA OF THE ANNUNCIATION

Church of the Holy Sepulcher

The Church of the Holy Sepulcher (Church of the Resurrection/Anastasis) is a Christian church within the walled Old City of JERUSALEM. The church sits on the site venerated by most Christians as Golgotha, the Hill of Calvary, where the New Testament says that Jesus was crucified and buried (the sepulcher). An important destination for pilgrims since the fourth century, today it serves as the headquarters of the GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH patriarch of Jerusalem and is a center of conflict among Israelis, Palestinians, and the patriarchy, particularly over its LAND sales to Jews. Palestinian Christians from the WEST BANK and GAZA are unable to worship at the church because they are prohibited by Israel from entering Jerusalem.

See also GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH

Church of the Nativity, Siege of

See BETHLEHEM: SIEGE OF THE CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY

Cinema, Israeli

Although cinema cannot resolve conflicts, it can, under certain circumstances, shape a new sensibility toward political problems. The dramatic change that has taken place over the last fifty years in the cinematic representation of the Palestinians and the land of Israel/Palestine reflects the different attitudes Israelis have developed toward their neighbors, attitudes that do not always fit the dominant views.

From the very first days of Hebrew cinema in prestate Palestine, LAND has been a major issue, both symbolically and in its most concrete and tangible aspects. Thus the early Zionist propaganda films, made by Jewish filmmakers from Europe and intended mainly to raise funds in Europe and the UNITED STATES for the new Jewish SETTLEMENTS, depicted the settlers' efforts to adapt to rural life, emphasizing their determination to renew their link with the land of their biblical forefathers. These early films were inspired by the nineteenth-century romantic fantasy of a return to nature and revealed the new settlers' ambivalent approach to their Palestinian peasant neighbors. On the one hand, the *fellahin* (Palestinian peasant farmers) embodied the Zionists' own dreams about the fusion between humans and their land and therefore inspired the settlers' admiration and envy. On the other hand, the Palestinians' way of cultivating the soil, which held to premodern methods, as well as their superstitious beliefs about the land's fertility, proved in the settlers'

eyes their own incontestable superiority. In a recurrent narrative pattern, these films begin with the Palestinians' suspicious approach toward the newcomers and end with their recognition of the Jews' improved farming in prestate Palestine.

Both *Settlers* (Alexander Ford, 1933) and *Avoda* (Laborers) (Helmar Lerski, 1935) retrace the efforts of small groups of Jewish settlers to adapt to the dramatic changes in their lives. The films focus not only on the groups' internal need to coalesce but also on how they create a common understanding with the Palestinians. In Ford's *Settlers,* a relatively short fiction film imitating a documentary style, a group of Jewish settlers reach the promised land from the sea and look for ways to acclimate to this oriental space that differs so much from where they came. At first they encounter the positive image of the Palestinians—the famous oriental hospitality—as the latter offer them food and drink. But the more deeply rooted in the land the settlers become, the less the Arabs cooperate with them. The prevalent myth of the few against the many becomes stark and vivid as this alienated relationship reaches its peak through a technique of parallel editing and sequences juxtaposing the Jewish settlers, who after many efforts at digging wells finally find a WATER source, and the Palestinians, who, confronted with the same drought, stop praying to Allah and decide to attack the Jews. A close-up shows a sword pulled out then the camera backs up to emphasize the large number of attackers.

This scene's editing thus establishes the visual representation of one of the leading myths of the Zionist ethos: David (the Jews) against Goliath (the Arabs). What could have ended in a massacre is avoided thanks to the intervention of one of the Palestinian children, who reveals to the attackers' leader that the *shaykh* has closed the well, meaning that the Jews are not responsible for the drought. The ending depicts the Palestinian as "Other," as irrational in his beliefs (that is, only a war could bring rain) and thus unpredictable in his reactions. It also illustrates the way the first Jewish filmmakers in Palestine constructed the image of brave settlers by presenting the Palestinians in stark opposition as primitive and uncultured, thus reinforcing the superiority of the Western Jews over the oriental natives.

In a different approach from *Settlers,* Lerski's *Avoda* uses symbolism to reveal in a didactic way the transformation of an anonymous, passive Jewish settler, shown at first only by his footsteps in the sand, into an active participant when he joins a group of settlers and becomes part of the Zionist enterprise. The land of Palestine is presented from this newcomer's point of view as initially neutral but later as something he can dominate. *Avoda* graphically illustrates the roles ZIONISM attributed to the two sides: the Palestinians are shown in horizontal compositions that emphasize their passiveness compared to the settlers' determined attitude to alter the land and make it "bloom." *Avoda* also emphasizes the Palestinians' passivity in the way they relate to water. For example, before the settlers' arrival, the Palestinians considered drought as a divine punishment, but the Jewish newcomers refuse to accept the land's hardships and, after many efforts, finally discover the hidden resource. In this documentary, the representation of the Palestinian demonstrates the biased approach of the entire Zionist cinema of the time. At the beginning of the film, the Palestinian Arabs are presented as part of the background, but, as the narrative progresses, they gradually disappear even from the landscape, leaving the entire frame to the Zionist workers.

One of the first feature films made after the establishment of the state of Israel, *They Were Ten* (Baruch Dinar, 1960), returned more or less to this same premise and depicted the hardships encountered by a group of ten settlers in the first decade of the twentieth century. This film, representative of the Israeli national cinema genre, begins by retracing the naïve and mostly passive approach of the settlers to the land: when they ask the local inhabitants for water, they are expelled by a Palestinian mob. This incident leads to a radical change in their attitude: they use the well without permission. This scene, revolving around the crucial elements of land and water, functions as a turning point that describes the way the passive and effeminate DIASPORA Jew abandons his previous self and becomes the "New Jew," the forefather of the *zabar* (the Jew born in the land of Palestine). In fact, the Palestinian's opposition to the Jew's presence on his land and the latter's resistance to this hostility were to become the central themes of Israeli national cinema, not only in its revision of the past but also in its representation of the present.

In the late 1960s, however, Israeli national cinema abandoned these thematic issues in favor of more introspective narratives that still left no room for Palestinian representation. This short period (1967–1974), influenced by European

modernism, expressed for the first time the filmmakers' wish to diverge from the traditional representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and led to a reevaluation of the image of the "New Jew."

After the 1973 WAR, Israeli filmmakers began to question the basic assumptions of the Zionist narrative. One of the first films in this genre was *Hirbet Hizeh* (Ram Levy, 1976), adapted from a well-respected 1950s novel by S. Iz'har bearing the same name. The television adaptation caused a violent polemic, and its broadcast was censored. Set during the last days of Israel's independence war, *Hirbet Hizeh* tells the story of a small unit of Israeli soldiers whose mission is to conquer the Arab village of Hirbet Hizeh. At first, it seems that the place is deserted, but, as the soldiers penetrate further, they discover elders, women, and children. The film's plot reveals how this mission, which initially seems relatively simple—to put the villagers on a truck and expel them beyond the Israeli border—turns into a moral dilemma when one of the soldiers, Micha, speaks out about the moral significance of their operation and its consequence for each of them.

Hirbet Hizeh can be considered the trigger for a new thematic approach to the conflict and was followed by a series of political films, such as *Hamsin* (Daniel Waxman, 1980), which deals with the tense relationship between an Israeli landowner and his Palestinian worker, and *The Smile of the Lamb* (Shimon Dotan, 1987; based on a novel by DAVID GROSSMAN), which, set in an imaginary Palestinian village occupied by the Israeli army, tells the story of local resistance that ultimately leads to a tragic end. Both films depict the Israeli protagonists as morally corrupted by war, OCCUPATION, and domination of the Palestinian people, a situation that could lead only to a tragic end.

Most interesting is the case of *Once We Were Dreamers* (Uri Barabash, 1988), shot during the First INTIFADA. Set in the background of the first settlers' arrival in Palestine, *Once We Were Dreamers* seems to reinterpret Dinar's *They Were Ten*. As a small group of enthusiastic European Jews reach the desolate land of Palestine, they encounter a local Jew, Amnon, who introduces himself as a kind of middleman with the Arab population. But the group's leader refuses to accept him into the group, declaring: "Here you don't join, you get accepted." This answer reveals one of the unspoken "sins" of the first settlers, namely, their European arrogance and feeling of superiority toward Palestinian Arabs and later, oriental Jews.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to which the film relates by analogy, serves as the background of the plot. These ideologically motivated young men and women have to deal with the existence of the Others—either Jews or Arabs—in order to survive on the land. Whereas a superficial reading of the plot centers on Amnon's efforts to accompany the group in their confrontations with the local Palestinians, a more profound view hints at the high price the settlers have to pay to maintain, ideologically and in practice, the "difference" between Jews and Arabs and between Jews and Jews. In one of the most dramatic scenes, one of the group's women commits suicide, feeling that she cannot renounce her entire past. Her burial becomes the site of confrontation between traditional Jews, represented by Amnon, and modern secular ones. During the burial, an intercut shows the Palestinian women standing on a hill and watching the disintegration of the Jewish group, both by death and by discord. This burial scene echoes a similar one in *They Were Ten* in which a woman's death miraculously brings an end to the drought and thus contributes to the success of the settlers' mission. But in *Once We Were Dreamers,* the Jewish woman's death brings no miracle and marks only one more step in the ever-growing divisions inside the group, which leads to the death of the two mediators—Amnon and his friend, the son of the *shaykh*. This pessimistic end reveals the director's vision of the conflict as a whole. As in *Hirbet Hizeh,* the return to the past becomes a way to criticize the present and to illustrate the sources of its conflicts.

Another aspect of the 1980s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Israeli cinema is the interchangeability between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. Already represented in *Once We Were Dreamers,* this approach was to evolve and become dominant in the Israeli films of the late 1980s. In Dotan's *The Smile of the Lamb,* a Palestinian-Israeli actor, Makhram Huri, plays a high-ranking Israeli officer whose role is to implement the Occupation in a small village. The technique of Arabs and Jews taking on each other's roles reaches its peak in *Avanti Popolo* (Rafi Bukai, 1986), in which one of the two Egyptian soldiers lost in the desert on the seventh day of the 1967 WAR addresses the Israeli soldiers with Shakespeare's famous monologue by Shylock, the legendary Jewish moneylender: "I am a Jew! Hath not a Jew hands, organs,

dimensions, senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same Winter and Summer as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?" By creating the character of an Egyptian soldier who is an actor, director Bukai uses the interchangeability technique to maximize his political viewpoint: just because Jews have been persecuted for centuries in Diaspora, they cannot turn into persecutors and ignore the suffering of Others.

This technique of political oppositionality expressed in terms of interchangeability between Israelis and Palestinians can also be found in Haim Bouzaglo's first feature film, *Fictitious Marriage* (1989). Shot during the First Intifada, *Fictitious Marriage* presents the story of an Israeli high school teacher from JERUSALEM who, following his experience as a reserve soldier in GAZA during the Intifada, decides to leave his peaceful existence and ponder the mysteries of his Israeli identity. Pretending to be going to the UNITED STATES for a vacation, the hero arrives at Tel Aviv after intentionally losing his luggage at the airport. He rents a room in a small and empty hotel and borrows two fake identities: the first, of an Israeli living in the United States who has come to Israel to visit his aging mother, and the second, of a mute Palestinian worker from Gaza. Both identities afford him highly meaningful encounters. The Palestinian employee of the hotel explains to him that, as opposed to Israelis, he cannot leave his land, and the Palestinian workers show him the basic values that so many Israelis have lost in their race to modernization and capitalism. His visit to a Palestinian REFUGEE camp in the Gaza Strip becomes his journey's climax as he realizes the human face of "Israel's enemies"—hospitable and generous families with respect for their elders and for religion.

But this journey suddenly ends as his ingrained Israeli paranoia overcomes his newfound compassion. When he sees a tire left by his Palestinian friends in a children's playground, the mute Palestinian suddenly shouts in Hebrew: "Watch the bomb!" This cry of alarm reflects the anxiety and fear of the Other that characterized most Israelis at that point of the Intifada, but it also reveals his true identity. Our hero returns to his old self, his home, and family with a better understanding of his Palestinian neighbors. The director ends his film with a close-up of the hero's son opening presents, depicting the child sitting with his legs crossed in the same way the hero's former Palestinian friends sit. This image summarizes the entire understanding of the hero: the external masquerade hides the many similarities between "us" and "those people" who used to share the same behavior, the same culinary choices, and the same manners.

The interchangeability between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews is one of the interesting features of Israeli political cinema in the 1980s. However, it should be noted that the films' subtexts often reveal these efforts as vain because this understanding could only lead to a sense of siege. As Ella Shohat claims, the focalization remains an Israeli one, and therefore the role exchanges, achieved in various ways (either by the film's cast or by the hero's masquerade), fail to achieve the expected recognition of the similarities between the two peoples. As can be seen in *The Smile of the Lamb,* the Israeli protagonist projects his hopes and dreams on the Palestinians, who embody the Israeli longing to become part of the land and its history. Though the Palestinian remains the film's protagonist, his unique personal voice is not heard. The various analogies that the film draws between Israelis and Palestinians finally lead to a dead end and fail to reach any optimistic horizon.

Whereas Israeli filmmakers in the 1980s depicted the Palestinian Arab as a reflection of the first settlers' endeavor to work the land, the more recent politically engaged Israeli feature films, *Cup Final* (Eran Riklis, 1991) and *Look-Out* (Dina Zvi-Riklis, 1992), offer a more complex Palestinian representation. Set against the background of the LEBANON WAR (1982), *Cup Final* introduces a group of Palestinian exiles in South Lebanon who have taken an Israeli soldier as a prisoner. Much as in the 1980s political films, the director's view sympathizes with the Palestinian freedom fighters and the hardships they encounter, but it still maintains primary empathy for the fate of the Israeli reserve soldier. The film shows these guerrilla fighters' ambivalence toward their prisoner, some of them wishing to get rid of him before they confront the Israeli army, others trying to save his life by providing him food. This dual approach ends suddenly as the Israeli army approaches their refuge and the Israeli prisoner runs to his compatriots, abandoning his momentary Palestin-

ian companions to die. As in *The Smile of the Lamb, Cup Final*'s end expresses the impossibility of creating solid bonds between antagonistic sides.

Zvi-Riklis's feature film, *Look-Out,* offers another representation of the same issue. From his lookout post, an Israeli soldier in occupied Gaza observes the daily life of a Palestinian village. At first distanced, this naïve voyeur becomes emotionally involved in the family's daily life and aware of a private tragedy that derives from the Israeli Occupation. His remote position from the Palestinian people, iconographically expressed in the distance between the family and the guard tower and the background sound of a Hebrew radio soundtrack to which he listens as he stands at his lookout post, becomes a metaphor for the limited Israeli perspective in general and the cinematic Israeli gaze in particular, both of which fail to communicate an authentic image of the Palestinian Arabs.

In fact, both approaches mostly reveal the absence of a Palestinian voice in Israeli cinema. In the 1990s, this was counteracted by a growing number of Israeli documentary filmmakers who offered Palestinian men and women an opportunity to speak for themselves in films such as *Behind the Veil of Exile* (David Ben Shetrit, 1992), *The Women Next Door* (Michal Aviad, 1992), *Detained* (Anat Even and Ada Ushpiz, 2001), and *The Inner Tour* (Ra'anan Alexandrowitz, 2001). At the same time, the growing success of Palestinian filmmakers in Israel finally offered documentaries and feature films from the Other's true voice. Finally, Amos Gitai's *Kedma* (2002) offers a new approach to the conflict: a perspective that sees both sides as victims. Taking place a few days before the creation of the state of Israel, this feature film tells the story of a small group of illegal immigrants from Europe who have survived the concentration camps and arrive in Palestine, where they are given weapons and asked by the PALMAH (Jewish soldiers) to take arms against the Palestinians and the British soldiers. Without any military training and incapable of understanding the Israeli soldiers, they soon discover that their promised land belongs to many others. Thus, those who were victims of the European concentration camps have become victims of the war over the land of Palestine. Gitai uses quotations from Israeli and Palestinian canonic texts to find the victims' lost voices. *Kedma* returns to the point of departure of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emphasizing for the first time the other victims of the conflict—those who were driven into the war without knowing why.

Gitai's *Kedma* offers yet another perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adding to the ones provided by previous Israeli and Palestinian filmmakers, all of them trying in their own way, though not always successfully, to describe the human faces of those trying to resist the oppression of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

See also CINEMA, PALESTINIAN

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—Nurith Gertz and Yael Munk

Cinema, Palestinian

In its endeavor to invent, document, and consolidate Palestinian history, Palestinian cinema has traditionally focused on the momentous crisis experienced by Palestinian society in 1948 with the establishment of the Israeli state and the DEPORTATION of a substantial part of the Palestinian

people from their LAND. Some Palestinian films have created a historical sequence that leads from the past to the present and then to the future; others have frozen history either in a utopian, idyllic past or in experiences of exile and uprooting that severed the past but are revived as if they were part of the present. According to Freud, such stagnation characterizes posttraumatic situations in which the traumatic memory is reactivated again and again in the present.

Historical processes largely dictate to which direction the historical memory in Palestinian films inclines, whether freezing the past in the present or constructing a historical sequence. In its early days (the 1970s), Palestinian cinema operated under the patronage of Palestinian organizations and documented the events of the period: for example, bombardments of REFUGEE camps by the Israeli air force and the civil war between the Christians and Muslims in southern LEBANON. The films created during this time picture battles, air attacks, ruin, and the conflict's victims as narrated by combatants, civilian eyewitnesses, and political as well as military leaders. These films are a cinematic representation of the trauma of Palestinian history through a plot structure that, by documenting present occurrences, also revives in an abstract symbolic manner the story of the past, complete with olive trees, green pastures, and traditional hospitality. Thus, the tranquil life in the Lebanese refugee camps prior to the Israeli air force bombardments is linked through various techniques with the peaceful life in the homeland abandoned in 1948, and the violent events of the present are identified with the 1948 catastrophe.

In addition to constituting a structure typical of trauma, the pattern of reviving the past in the present also had another role—that of unifying the national experience. During this period Palestinian society was diverse and divided into various diasporas, classes, *hamayel* (pl. of *hamula,* clan), and generational and religious groups. The memory of the common past and shared place, along with the revival of that past in the present, contributed to a homogeneous national unity and created collective symbols to replace the diverse reality of Palestinian society.

Mustafa Abu Ali's film *Zionist Aggression* (1973), which deals with the destruction and loss of life that the Israeli air force bombardments caused in a refugee camp in Lebanon, illustrates that plot structure. The film opens with an extremely long shot of scenes of daily life in a Palestinian village. The tranquil scenes end abruptly with the appearance of the film's title and credits. While an Israeli strike plane patrols the sky, captions in several languages announce that "on April 8, 1972, Zionist combat planes launched an attack on Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon, northern Lebanon, and SYRIA." The visual serenity and soft Arabic music in the opening are interrupted and replaced by the sights and sounds of planes and bombardments, wails of Red Crescent ambulance sirens, and a close-up of the remains of a shell or missile stuck in the ground. These brief scenes, and the quick transitions from one scene to another with a camera movement that shows wrecked houses and bodies of children without pausing on a single one for long, serve to erase the individual stories, the faces, and the names. Instead they present a general story of destruction and ruin that brutally ended the rural tranquility. This amounts to a cohesive national narrative that reconstructs the 1948 catastrophe.

A shift occurred in Palestinian cinema in the 1980s, when the Palestinian struggle escalated and determined the agenda of Palestinian society. Filmmakers of that era attempted to narrate the Palestinian experience by depicting the actual land—real places—and the nature of life prior to 1948 rather than by reviving the past in the present. This change, which reflected the growing significance of the land as a symbol of Palestinian identity and nationality, was first seen in the films of Palestinian directors living in Israel and able to shoot within Israel, particularly in the works of Michel Khleifi. Although born and raised in NAZARETH, Khleifi lived most of his life in Belgium. His first film, *Fertile Memories* (1980), was considered innovative in terms not only of Palestinian films but also of Arab documentary films in general. The period of the lost past in *Fertile Memories* is preserved mainly in the character of Romiya Farah, one of the two main protagonists; in the landscape filmed around her house—the terraces, olive trees, and stone-built houses; in the Arab village tradition of food—baking bread in a *taboon* (outdoor brick oven) and preparing stuffed vegetables; and in her conservative lifestyle. The place where Romiya lives reverberates with the idyllic past before the loss. The film concludes with a freeze frame of Romiya sorting sheep fleece, which is as effective as freezing time—not the present but the pre-urbanized and

premodernized past. In general, however, the film is not about reviving the past but about weaving a historical sequence from the past to the present, and presenting life in the present environment. This life is a concrete, specific place where Romiya lives alongside other protagonists—men, women, and children, including the film's other protagonist, the writer Sahar Khalifa.

Other films by Khleifi include *Wedding in Galilee* (1987), *Tale of the Three Jewels* (1994), and *Canticle of the Stones* (1990), all of which continued to document the diversity of Palestinian life alongside the catastrophe that befell it in 1948.

In addition to Khleifi, other important directors, such as Rashid Masharawi, Ali Nassar, Elia Suleiman, and Hanni Abu Assad, established themselves during the 1980s. Some of their films attempt to tell the Palestinian story from a personal perspective: in this way, by telling the story of everyday life, they avoid the tendency to freeze the enchanted past in the present. In the following years, between the two INTIFADAS (1987 and 2000) in the Occupied Territories and the attempt at reconciliation with Israel through the OSLO ACCORDS, life in the refugee camps became more complex. On the one hand, the peace process aroused great hope; on the other hand, daily life was increasingly experienced as endless anguish, gradually unfolding as static, passive, and desperate. In Palestinian cinema that sense of being mired in the present gave rise to a revival and re-creation of the lost idyll of the pre-1948 period, and particularly of the trauma that destroyed it.

Tawfik Abu Wael's *Waiting for Salah A-Din* (2001) portrays this stasis in images of people waiting hours upon hours at ROADBLOCKS, slouching along on winding dirt roads to avoid Israeli army CHECKPOINTS, and waiting in line for a PERMIT from the Interior Ministry. Abu Wael's film intertwines five separate episodes of life in JERUSALEM that concentrate on the minor, ever-present grievances of everyday life. Everything in this film contributes to the sense of distress experienced by people who repeat the same meaningless actions over and over, including endless job hunts, HOUSES DEMOLISHED again and again, and the Sisyphean effort to keep open fruit stands while police officers confiscate the produce. Out of this barren existence, in which there are no events or occurrences, nowhere to go, and no goals, people try to find hope and a purpose. They find them in the distant past transposed to the present—in the figure of SALADIN, the historical hero who led the Islamic opposition to the Third Crusade.

Sometimes Palestinian cinema endeavors to shake off the experience of being trapped in the empty present by exploring the subjective, private memory. Subhi A-Zubeidi's film *My Private Map* (1998), for example, explores the distance between the present and the past. The film recounts two histories: that of the Jilazun refugee camp (where the director grew up) from its establishment until the present day, and the earlier history of life in Palestine and its people's expulsion. What is emphasized here is the *process* of remembering the past rather than the history itself. "I remember that twenty years ago the place was smaller and prettier. But I also remember that point in time when there was no such thing as a refugee camp at all." The film incorporates the enchanted past and the traumatic event that ended it into a succession of memories from the present to the past, thereby connecting the collective experience to the subjective, living, fluid, and flowing experience. The two tendencies—that of freezing time and of setting it into motion—are also apparent in the way space is filmed. Certain films still attempt to accomplish what Khleifi did in his films: to construct the whole Palestinian map—encompassing the house, the yard around it, the orchard, and the fields all the way to the horizon—while also fragmenting it into various separate areas and quarters. However, as the AL-AQSA INTIFADA escalated and Israeli OCCUPATION shrunk and reduced Palestinian land, filmmakers have found it difficult to construct a whole Palestinian map. They also find it difficult to deconstruct this already threatened space. They limit their filming, therefore, to obstructed areas or border zones, turning them into symbols of the lost unity. Such is the case, for example, of the olive tree in Liana Badar's *Zeitunat* (2002) and the traditional house unfolding in front of our eyes during a granddaughter's visit with her grandmother in Azza Al Khassan's *Place, or Out of Eden* (2000). In either case, discovering lost unity is related to finding lost time: either imagined lost time, when the Palestinian people lived on their land, or the time of the catastrophe that disrupted the connection to the land. The difference between Elia Suleiman's two feature films, *Chronicle of a Disappearance* (1996) and *Divine Intervention* (2002), best illustrates what transpired in Palestinian society and its cinema between the Oslo Accords and the outbreak of the Second Intifada, between

the "quiet before the storm," as Suleiman calls it, and the period of "total destruction and disintegration." In the early part of *Chronicle of a Disappearance,* the film focuses on Nazareth, on a local coffee shop, a souvenir shop, and the home of Suleiman's parents, where his father plays backgammon and his mother converses with her neighbors. From this place—this town and house—the movie sets out, roaming the country. It reaches the shore of ACRE, the northern part of the country on the Sea of Galilee, the road to JERICHO, and the Tel Aviv promenade. The second part of the film takes place in Jerusalem, where we see the American Colony Hotel, the director's house, and the AL-AQSA MOSQUE. These spaces, always shot through a car window, are congested and threatened, but it is possible to reside in them and lead a normal daily life, even if it is fraught with violence.

In contrast, in *Divine Intervention* we find almost no open spaces. All we see are brief takes: a small grove where Santa Claus escapes those trying to kill him; a private yard into which a neighbor throws his rubbish; another neighbor who repeatedly cleans the yard, piling the garbage up into a single heap; and a street with an abandoned bus stop, where no bus will ever arrive. The father's house is reduced mainly to the kitchen, and, instead of the Jerusalem sights, we see the A-Ram roadblock separating Jerusalem and Ramallah. Daily life has deteriorated into a static routine full of hate, rage, and ever-potential conflict.

Several films produced in the early years of the new millennium arguably mark a transition in Palestinian cinema, which tends to focus on the private sphere and family life. One of the most important of these films is Juliano Mer's *Arna's Children* (2004), which recounts the story of the children of the theater founded by Arna Mer Khamis, the director's mother, in the JENIN refugee camp. The film centers particularly on Yussef and three of his friends—Ashraf, Ala'a, and Nidal. At first glance, the film seems similar to many other Palestinian movies that focus on children's hardships and dreams and use them as an allegory for the suffering of the entire Palestinian people. However, Mer weaves in shocking flashbacks and flash-forwards, inserting the bleak future into the present and the hopeful past into the future, thus building a narrative of a personal rather than a national desperation. Unlike most other films, the future does not appear to spoil aspirations and dreams. Rather, the future is embedded in the heart of the present: the dead fighters and the living children, the camp in its prospering stage and the destroyed camp in the aftermath of the 2002 invasion, the lively theater and the forsaken theater. All of these, as well as the tanks patrolling the dark city before and after the destruction of Jenin, become a single picture, dissolving all hopes and dreams and yet disallowing the possibility of forgetting or relinquishing them.

This new direction can also be recognized in Tawfik Abu Wael's first feature film, *Atash* (Thirst) (2004). The movie is constructed as a disrupted sequence—image after image, extracted from a seemingly shapeless continuity of flowing time, in cycles from day to night, from night to misty morning, and again to the evening. The film has no dynamic plot or action, aside from the dominant theme of oppression and eventually rebellion—the son's rebellion against the tyrannical father who had compelled his family to live in isolation outside the village. The disrupted time finds its echo in the interrupted music and obstructed images: family members wander around the empty yard and among the rooms, observing other family members who are trapped in themselves. The images are seen through both the lens and the building's broken sections. All the features characterizing Palestinian cinema in recent years—distress, monotony, immovable time, and obstructed space—here become an existential state, the result of numerous unspecific reasons.

One might consider *Atash*, together with *Arna's Children* and Hanni Abu Assad's *Paradise Now* (the winner of the 2006 Golden Globe award), as testament to the Palestinian cinema's ability to transcend the boundaries of historical and geographical catastrophe caused by a seemingly endless Occupation and the continuation of one story and two protagonists: us and them. These three films use a broader cinematic language through which a new story and a new cinema can emerge.

The prolonged Occupation, life in exile, and the Palestinian national struggle did not erase Palestinian creativity, which began in the 1970s, changed direction in the 1980s, and continues to flow on and transform itself. Despite lack of internal support and funding, Palestinian directors have succeeded in creating films that illuminate a complex Palestinian society, and have been acclaimed in international festivals. The road paved by Michel Khleifi with *Fertile Memories* still serves

as a model for Palestinian cinema, even if the national and personal living conditions present obstacles for those traveling it.

See also CINEMA, ISRAELI

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Citizens' Rights Movement

The Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM or Ratz) was founded in 1973 by SHULAMIT ALONI, a former LABOR PARTY Knesset member. The CRM favored strengthening civil rights in Israel, particularly on issues involving the boundaries between the state and religion, and compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its main constituents were ASHKENAZI (Jews from Europe), the urban middle class, and the intelligentsia. In the 1973 elections, CRM won three seats and briefly joined the coalition government. In the 1977 and 1981 elections, it was part of the Labor alignment in which the LIKUD dominated, but in 1984 it broke off from Labor again. In 1984 it won three Knesset seats and in the 1988 elections another five mandates. In the 1992 elections CRM joined MAPAM and SHINUI to form MERETZ (Democratic Israel). The CRM received considerable support from the country's liberal community over the years, and prominent among its leaders were Knesset member Yossi Sarid (formerly of the Labor Party); Ran Cohen, a high-ranking reservist in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES; and Mordechai Bar-On and Dudy Zucker, leaders of the PEACE NOW movement.

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City of David Foundation

The City of David Foundation was created in 1986 by extremist Jews intent on transforming JERUSALEM into a completely Jewish city. It is the parent of *ELAD,* which has also been active since 1986 in taking over Palestinian homes, especially in SILWAN and RAS AL-AMUD. Members of both groups consider Silwan the biblical Ir-David (City of David) and are intent on restoring the area to its Jewish origins. (www.cityofdavid.org.il/hp_eng.asp).

See also SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

Civil Administration

In September 1981, in an effort to place a more genial face on military governance in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, Israel established the Civil Administration (CA) to govern the West Bank. Headed by Menachem Milson, the CA was actually a branch of the Military Administration and had several aims: to provide social services to the Palestinians and to thus shift their identity and loyalty away from the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and in general to implement Israel's concept of the "autonomy" contemplated in the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

The Civil Administration was responsible for providing HEALTH, EDUCATION, and other services as well as for granting PERMITS for work, travel, construction, drivers' licenses, and the myriad other things for which Israel required a permit. Although administered by the CA, the permits were conditional upon the approval of the General Security Service (GSS), or SHIN BET, which was not required to uphold CA decisions and did not adhere to any criteria in its decisionmaking. The GSS was overwhelmingly interested in recruiting

COLLABORATORS, and it frequently made the granting of a permit or service contingent on the applicant's agreement to work with it.

The GSS, including the Civil Administration, approached granting permits and services as favors and expressions of goodwill that could be revoked at any time. Major General (Res.) Shlomo Gazit, the first coordinator of government activities in the territories, described the basic premise behind this policy: "The policy that emerged was directed toward creating a situation in which the population would have something to lose, a situation in which the most effective sanction is the revocation of benefits." Gazit's principle was articulated earlier and more clearly by then defense minister MOSHE DAYAN on 10 November 1967 in a discussion that took place in the Ministry of Defense: "Let the individual know that he has something to lose. His home can be blown up, his bus license can be taken away, he can be deported from the region; or the contrary: he can exist with dignity, make money, exploit other Arabs, and travel in [his] bus."

The CA did not ease bureaucratic procedures for Palestinians. Even seemingly simple matters involved a lengthy and cumbersome application procedure. By 1987 the receipt of most permits was dependent on seven different authorities, including the police and the GSS. The granting of services based on agreement to collaborate increased significantly, and extortion was a common recruitment practice.

Immediately after taking office, Milson moved to organize "VILLAGE LEAGUES" among the rural population, seeking to establish a group of local "moderate" or anti-PLO Palestinian leaders who would accept Israel's rule of the Occupied Territories and mediate Israel's relationship with Palestinian residents. Milson approached MUSTAFA DUDIN to organize the leagues, which were extended throughout WEST BANK towns during the early 1980s.

Despite considerable effort and cost, most individuals in the West Bank considered the leagues as collaborationist. Even most of the village notables and rural intelligentsia refused to join an organization that had the declared aim of combating Palestinian nationalism. Palestinians continued to support the PLO and refused to accept the leagues, and the project eventually failed. The Civil Administration still officially exists, but, in terms of its original objectives, it cannot be said to have been successful.

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Civil Society, Israel

See CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT

Civil Society in the West Bank and Gaza

If civil society emerges in the shadow of a state, whether in cooperation or in opposition, it could be argued that Palestinian civil society in the WEST BANK and GAZA was born with the ink on the OSLO ACCORDS and the coming of the "proto-state" of the interim PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY to Palestinian soil in May 1994. Indeed, it is telling that the concept of civil society *(al mujtama' al madani)* only entered mainstream Palestinian public discourse in the interim period, when it quickly became a synonym for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). While reflecting globalized discourse, the new term also signaled an explicit notion of Palestinian "civil society," asserting a shared public sphere and making claims on an emerging Palestinian state.

If civil society is more widely conceived as society organized outside the state, the lengthy statelessness of Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza—despite various regimes of foreign rule—has generated its own forms of civil organization and association. When Israeli military OCCUPATION ruled directly, Palestinian society and its institutions developed within an overall imperative of survival and resistance. A broader historical argument has also been made that Western notions of civil society need to be expanded in the context of "Muslim societies," to include other categories of social organization (family, clan, notables, networks of religious scholars).

Although some categories have virtually disappeared in Palestinian society, others, particularly family and clan associations and networks, are constantly reconfigured and play important roles in the public sphere. With these caveats and a brief review of forms of association in other periods, the development of associational life and organization in the West Bank and Gaza after 1967, as well as their transformation in the period of Palestinian self-rule, provide insight into the dynamics shaping Palestinian civil society.

Pre-1948 Roots of Associational Life

New forms of Palestinian urban associations arose during the BRITISH MANDATE, which responded both to colonial and Zionist threats to Palestinian identity and community survival and to new forms of modernity and urban living, including the emergence of a middle class. Major Palestinian cities saw the formation of women's organizations, labor unions and professional societies, Muslim and Christian charitable societies, sports clubs, cultural and literary societies, and chambers of commerce, among others, that focused on charitable work, nationalist assertion, and specific union or cultural activities. Like other Palestinian organizations and movements, these organizations primarily served an urban elite, and the overwhelming majority of the population (70 percent) was rural and largely outside their purview. They have striven, in various ways, to overcome this dichotomy, most successfully in the mass-based organizations within the West Bank and Gaza and in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S (PLO's) bases in refugee camps outside Palestine.

Although many of these organizations were swept away with the dismemberment of Palestine in 1948 and the loss of its coastal cities, there are some remarkable continuities within the West Bank and Gaza today. The Arab Women's Union in NABLUS, established independently in 1921, for example, remains today an important local organization that runs a major hospital and engages in a host of charitable and developmental activities. Professional and commercial associations, active in the Jordanian period in the West Bank (the period of Egyptian administration in Gaza), and to a lesser extent labor union activity, are also marked by continuity, as are town and village associations formed by 1948 REFUGEES.

Civil Society under Israeli Occupation

Despite these links with the past, the sustained period of direct Israeli military Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza witnessed two new significant and related forms of civil society beginning in the early 1970s: mass socially based organizations (sometimes called grassroots movements), whose most striking feature was mobilization and participation in opposing Israeli Occupation; and nationalist institutions, including universities, municipalities, and a range of other institutions, that developed as a national infrastructure in the absence of a state. Both involved a confluence of civil and political society. The rise of the Palestine National Movement and the PLO after 1967 was a necessary (if not sufficient) prerequisite for opposing Occupation as an organized group. The PLO's swift failure in launching an ARMED STRUGGLE within the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (although more prolonged in Gaza), which led to a national front strategy with differing factions working together, also favored the development of nonmilitarized forms of civil organization to resist Israeli military occupation.

But the rise of the national movement is not the only explanation for the rise of opposition to Occupation: inside the Occupied Territories, new experiences, practices, and consciousness arose. The longevity of the Occupation, coupled with its ever-expanding program of Israeli SETTLEMENT, economic incorporation, and nonbenign neglect of the civic welfare of the Occupied population, is central to an understanding of the character and consequences of the mass organizations and nationalist institutions that developed in its shadow.

Voluntarism. One of the first to emerge was a voluntary work movement, founded in 1972 in the JERUSALEM-Ramallah area, with local committees forming in most West Bank towns in the next several years, although this movement was not as prominent in Gaza. Inspired by leftist and liberationist ideas circulating globally, the voluntary work movement eventually counted thousands of young people in activities ranging from reclaiming LAND and assisting in harvests to literacy campaigns, which served to mobilize and politicize a generation of Palestinian young men and women. Notions of a new civil society where all participated, including the young and the marginalized, in voluntary organizations were important themes that spread to other organizations.

Mass Organizations: Women, Students, Workers. Influenced by the experience and ethos of voluntary work, about fifty young women activists met in Ramallah in 1978 to form the first women's committees, distinguished from the older generation of women's charitable societies by a focus on women's political mobilization and by increasing participation of women from villages and camps. Initially concerned with improving working women's conditions and labor rights, they eventually added an important social dimension that would develop into explicit platforms for women's rights. Although inequalities within the family were not incorporated as programs, married and young women's increasing participation in committee activities, legitimized by a nationalist mandate, provided new models of women's autonomy and activism.

In a similar vein, student unions and youth movements incorporated youth from a wide variety of backgrounds (both male and female, but with leadership weighted strongly toward men) in a range of activities—from demonstrations against the Occupation and student rights inside Palestinian institutions to book exhibits and student forums, cultural troupes, and student counseling. Although these activities clearly mobilized youth, a second mobilization—often one of leadership—ironically occurred when thousands of young student activists were sentenced to Israeli prisons.

Factionalism. Labor unions differed from other organizations in that they drew on existing frameworks, although unions had very small memberships in 1967. With a steady increase in membership, although never able to engage more than a small proportion of the massive flow of laborers into Israel, labor unions took on the character of mass organizations in the late 1970s and 1980s. Then, like women and youth mass organizations, they became factionalized. With Palestinian political parties illegal, these mass organizations worked through clandestine links with the major factions in the PLO (as well as the Communist Party), all of which inevitably claimed a portion of the growing constituencies by forming separate organizations. These factions were extremely competitive ideologically and never coalesced into one national union.

Middle-Class Professionals' Volunteer Services. Although women, youth, and workers formed the core of grassroots movements, the 1980s saw the incorporation of different sectors of society within a wide range of organizational frameworks. Among the most important were HEALTH professionals who volunteered their services for the neglected population of the rural poor and an agricultural relief initiative founded by agronomists in 1982. Other professional associations, whether of writers, engineers, pharmacists, or university teachers and employees, also placed their group interests squarely within the framework of national resistance. Another important development at this time was the rise of several dedicated human rights organizations, prototypes of the professional NGOs that came to dominate in the Oslo years.

Intifada: Popular Committees and New Directions. Mass organizations formed the backbone of the popular rebellion known as the First INTIFADA, which began in December 1987 and led to the creation of one of the Intifada's most interesting civic associations: decentralized popular neighborhood committees that organized neighborhoods and informal schooling during school closures and assisted the population in supplying basic needs. The Israeli military quickly declared these committees illegal, at the same time targeting the mass organizations, particularly student movements and unions. Many student leaders, especially from universities, and a number of trade union activists were summarily DEPORTED. As the Intifada's course changed—with resistance commanded more and more by cells of young men—mass organizations also changed direction, and links to their respective political factions became more troubled, partly because of a lack of internal democracy. The growing economic and social needs of the population also motivated a shift in Palestinian organizations toward development, research, and service provision. Women's organizations, for example, began to concentrate more on expanding income-generating activities for women and childcare centers.

Transition to Self-Government

Although Palestinian civil organizations were able to expand their developmental activities into the early 1990s and the period of self-government beginning in 1994, they were largely unable to draw on their history and experience of mass mobilization and popular participation to confront the negative aspects of Palestinian rule or the continuing threats from Israeli control, including the Jewish settlements and Occupation. In the transition to Palestinian self-government, the spirit of the popular committees was largely left behind.

NGOs: From Grassroots to Civil Society. The relationship between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and civil organizations took place within a process of incomplete state formation, lack of Palestinian sovereignty, and continued Israeli control and expansion. An additional factor was the new trend of an international donor community infusing funds to stabilize the continually threatened peace process. Indeed, the major shift in civil society, from mass organizations oriented toward resistance to professional NGOs focused on development, was clearly visible before the PNA entered Gaza and JERICHO in May 1994. But the process was accelerated by increased attention and funding support from the international community in the early 1990s, particularly after the MADRID CONFERENCE. The triangulated relationship among the PNA, civil organizations, and donors continued to be a striking feature of the Oslo years.

The professionalization of Palestinian NGOs in this period was not solely driven by donor influence: their greater participation in global forums, new skills for societal needs, and the process of state formation, which involved projects of legal reform and developmental planning that were for the first time in Palestinian hands, encouraged this process of professionalization. Nonetheless, donor demands for long-range planning, short-term and clearly defined projects, and reporting and accountability, as well as a preference for certain areas of work, such as democracy, governance, and legal reform, led to the formation of an emerging Palestinian elite composed of NGO leaders. Over the years, these leaders garnered professional skills and relatively high salaries, traveled the conference circuit, participated in globalized discourses and agendas, and gained international contacts.

The transition from nationalist to professional work was always uneven and never complete. Leaders of the largest and most successful NGOs of the Oslo period had strong nationalist histories, and many activists searched for strategies that combined building Palestinian democracy and development with confronting Israel's continued control. Nonetheless, the NGOs themselves identified their obstacles as external political constraints imposed by both Israel and the PNA, a societal crisis of values, and a lack of voluntarism.

Relations with the Palestinian National Authority. At the beginning of the interim period, perhaps 1,000 NGOs (estimates in 1995 ranged from 800 to 1,200) were operating, and activists believed that society could push the PNA in a democratic direction or provide a democratic alternative to it. This optimism was not entirely unjustified: initial regulations announced by the PNA restricting freedom of assembly and the press foundered, and after incidents of abuse and TORTURE of prisoners in PNA jails were exposed by human rights organizations, conditions improved to some extent. A proposal by the PNA to require NGOs to receive permission from the PNA to receive foreign funds was countered by a network of Palestinian nongovernmental organizations (PNGOs), joined by the Union of Charitable Societies, that drafted its own NGO law. After a long battle, most of the NGO-produced law was passed by the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL in 1988 and signed into law by President YASIR ARAFAT in January 2000.

Advocacy and lobbying, as in the NGO law conflict, were the dominant approach for NGO activism. Even when clearly divisive issues arose, such as Arafat refusing to sign the constitutional Basic Law (until 2001) or the detention of NGO activists, civil organizations tended to lobby rather than sharply oppose the PNA. (Exceptions include the 1997 student protests over arbitrary arrests.) This was partly due to their own loss of constituencies and political linkages and also to structural constraints, including, paradoxically, a shrinking public sphere constrained, some analysts argue, by the dominance of Oslo-mandated security and police services. But the constraints on the NGOs also derived from the common bonds of national struggle, a political culture of kinship, and an incomplete (and endangered) national project. This practice of kinship also influenced PNA officials, who tended to use informal and nonpublic means to discipline unruly NGOs. One exception, significantly, was a controversy over funding that erupted in the wake of a May 1999 UN report on donor funding to the Palestinian human rights and legal sector, in which the Palestinian minister of justice launched a campaign marked by bitter invective over the allegedly excessive support for nongovernmental human rights organizations.

Some NGOs forged more intimate relations with the PNA, following the model that was familiar in the PLO, with its array of general unions and little distinction between political authority and society. The General Union of Palestinian Workers, many of whose officers were on the PNA payrolls, seemed to undermine rather than contribute to labor activism: two nationwide strikes

by teachers, in 1997 and 2000, were run by coordinating committees rather than the union, and workers in Gaza, faced with massive unemployment and impoverishment during the Second Intifada, formed independent workers' committees to press for their demands. Partial incorporation into the PNA through its payroll was also more evident in Gaza, particularly among professional associations. Moreover, the PNA sponsored a government-friendly NGO network to counter the weight of PNGO, which had documented PNA human rights abuses. On the other hand, an interesting model can be found in the *zakat* (Islamic alms) committees *(Awqaf)* that were integrated into the PNA in 1994 but nonetheless operated in a decentralized and independent fashion.

Conflict and cooptation were not the only models that shaped the relationships between the PNA and Palestinian society. Cooperation, particularly in health, education, agriculture, and developmental planning, flowed not only from common goals but also from interests, as the relevant ministries, struggling with limited budgets and capabilities, realized in practice that they needed the nongovernmental sector to augment or deliver services. Models of mixed government–civil society participation in policy and planning were also in evidence: a National Poverty Commission in this mode produced the first National Poverty Report in 1998, although the commission reverted to a governmental model in the succeeding years. Most strikingly, the Palestinian draft constitution drew on a wide-ranging committee of civil society leaders for advice and input. In many ways the interdependence of the PNA and NGOs, as well as their financing by the same donors, led to a guarded and reluctant partnership that undergirded much of the period.

New Issues, New Organizations. In the first year of Palestinian self-government (1995), at least twenty Palestinian NGOs were already engaged in new programs for democracy and governance. By 1996, major projects for legal reform—including the Basic Law—were on the table at research centers as well as at legal, human rights, women's, and labor organizations, among others. It was a ball that would keep rolling, oiled by donor interest to be sure, but also by a sense of urgency that the legal foundations for Palestinian democracy were in the process of being established. Although an uncertain legislative process, crippled both by the restrictions of the Oslo Accords and sharp conflicts with the executive, did not entirely meet these expectations, civil society activism influenced the Basic Law, the draft constitution, labor legislation (not yet signed into law), a draft criminal code, draft social insurance legislation, and other critical legal initiatives. On the contentious ground of family law, a major legal reform initiative from the women's movement, culminating in a Model Parliament in 1988, opened an important, if acrimonious, public debate with a number of analysts who concluded that NGO forms of organization were insufficient to the mission of societal change. In a less productive form, "NGOization" could be found in the plethora of democracy programs that focused on training and capacity-building workshops, which by their nature could not address the structural constraints impeding Palestinian democracy.

Despite shifts in donor support from nongovernmental to governmental health services during the late 1990s, it is striking that NGOs continued to provide a majority of primary health care throughout this period and over 90 percent of services to the disabled, as well as taking a major role in emergency services. In addition, NGOs are active in health education and awareness campaigns; health advocacy, particularly reproductive health; and health policy research. This form of service provision goes well beyond what is considered supplementary and places health NGOs in an unusual position to contribute toward a national health system, although such a development might raise problems of fragmentation and possibly undermine the developing state responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. The agricultural sector is quite similar, with one highly effective "mega-NGO" implementing more programs for agricultural relief and development than the responsible ministry.

Refugee and Islamist Associations. Two kinds of civil society organizations that rose to prominence in the interim period differ from other models. Spurred by the neglect of refugee issues in the interim accords and fear for refugee rights in FINAL STATUS agreements, refugee committees in camps in the West Bank and Gaza drew on their own constituencies to meet, protest, and network for refugee rights. Their activity also had a transnational dimension, coordinating with camp committees outside Palestine.

Islamist associations' civic, social, and developmental services (as well as their political activities) grew notably in this period, despite measures by the PNA to restrict them. Although also characterized by highly qualified staff, these associations

differ from their secular NGO counterparts in several ways, including funding sources (considerable local funding rather than Western funding), strong links to constituencies, and a strong spirit of voluntarism linked to ideological commitment. More arguably, Islamist associations may constitute a social movement whose informal social networks allow for mobilization.

With the outbreak of the Second Intifada and years of warlike conditions, insecurity, and receding hopes for justice, there has been a varying but growing realization among civil organizations that much that was discarded or undermined in the Oslo years—whether framed as popular mobilization or a social movement model—is needed to meet the threats of the present. NGO campaigns against the BARRIER (the Wall) are one example of a new direction. There is no way back to the neighborhood committees and mass organizations of the past, but civil society actors and organizations are seeking a way forward.

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—Penny Johnson

Civil War (Palestinian) in Lebanon, 1983

See CAMPS' WAR; LEBANON WAR

Clifford, Clark McAdams (1906–1998)

Clark Clifford was a corporate attorney and special White House counsel to President HARRY TRUMAN from 1946 to 1950. He worked closely with Truman on the Palestine question and was the chief architect

of the administration's pro-partition policy. Clifford represented the pro-Israeli stance adopted by the White House, contending, together with other pro-Zionists, that Israel could be an important STRATEGIC ASSET for the UNITED STATES in the Middle East because of its military strength, evident even at that time, and its predisposition toward the West. According to Clifford, the Arab nations, despite their oil reserves, should not be allowed to dictate the foreign policy of the United States. He also felt strongly that European Jews deserved a safe haven after the atrocities of the HOLOCAUST. Finally, he argued that a Jewish state would come into existence whether the United States supported it or not.

After the 1947 UN partition plan was passed, a number of the great powers that had voted for UN RESOLUTION 181 had second thoughts. Even Truman, under pressure from Secretary of State George Marshall, began to doubt the viability of partition, at least not without US troops, which the president was unwilling to commit. Great Britain and FRANCE too were putting pressure on Truman to back away from carrying out the plan. In this context, the president sent a memorandum to Marshall and Clifford asking each to present his position on the UN resolution. Truman called on Clifford first. "Mr. President, there must be a state of Israel," Clifford said. "The greatest proof that there has to be a state of Israel is the Bible." He proceeded to quote scripture after scripture to prove that the Jewish people had the right to a homeland in Palestine and that they would be returned to their homeland at the end of days. Without even listening to Marshall, Truman said, "I'm convinced. We'll carry on with the partition plan and an independent state." Marshall got up and said, "Mr. President, if you proceed with that position, in the next election I will vote against you," and left the room.

Clifford was also instrumental in securing US recognition for Israel within hours of its proclamation of independence, but his motivation for supporting Israel was not just for religious reasons. He was also concerned about Truman's ability to win the upcoming presidential election; he was convinced that securing the Jewish vote was Truman's only opportunity to prevail and that supporting Israel was the key to the Jewish vote.

Clifford went on to become the personal lawyer to President JOHN KENNEDY and secretary of defense for President LYNDON JOHNSON.

See also CHRISTIANITY; HARRY TRUMAN; WAR, 1948

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Clinton, William Jefferson (Bill) (1946–)

William "Bill" J. Clinton was the forty-second president of the UNITED STATES, serving two terms from 1993 to 2001. Before being elected president, he had

served for a dozen years as governor of Arkansas, yet he had a strong awareness of international issues. Clinton majored in international affairs at Georgetown University, where he studied under the late Palestinian-American intellectual HISHAM SHARABI, and was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford. Although Clinton focused primarily on domestic economic issues during his presidential campaign, he also challenged the incumbent Bush administration in regard to Israeli-Palestinian issues, criticizing President GEORGE H. W. BUSH and Secretary of State JAMES BAKER from the right for putting too much pressure on Israel to stop expanding its SETTLEMENTS and withdraw from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Among President Clinton's first appointments was that of MARTIN INDYK, from the right-wing WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, as assistant secretary of state for the Middle East; he later appointed Indyk US ambassador to Israel. Clinton's support for Israeli policies in the Occupied Territory appears to have been both a reflection of his strong political proclivity for currying favor with special interests that helped him get elected and a realization that as the first post–Cold War US president he could take a stronger pro-Israel position without risking pushing Arab states toward the SOVIET camp.

As president, Clinton became deeply enmeshed in diplomatic efforts regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the peace process and shifted US policy to an unprecedented degree to support expansionist elements in Israel. When he assumed office in January 1993, the post–MADRID Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track had stalled, in part because of the US insistence that representatives of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)—then effectively serving as the Palestinian government-in-exile—not participate in the talks. As a result, at the initiative of a Norwegian nongovernmental organization and later the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, officials in the Israeli government of YITZHAK RABIN began secret talks with the PLO in Oslo.

During that summer, unaware of the clandestine Israeli-PLO talks in NORWAY, President Clinton put forward what he referred to as a "compromise" proposal for Palestinian autonomy. Ironically, the Israeli negotiating proposal simultaneously developing in Oslo was more favorable to the Palestinians than the US plan. The talks in Norway resulted in the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, also known as the OSLO ACCORDS, which, while failing to recognize the Palestinians' right to statehood and imposing other limitations, did provide a framework in which substantive progress toward Israeli-Palestinian peace might result. President Clinton was a cosignatory of the agreement, which was initialed on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993 and in which the United States agreed to be guarantor of the agreement.

Peace talks resumed in Washington within the Oslo framework, but Israeli negotiators came under intense pressure from right-wing elements at home, which hurt their ability to make compromises. Over the next seven years, President Clinton presided over a series of Israeli-Palestinian agreements that led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the GAZA STRIP and small areas of the WEST BANK. With some of those areas coming under the administration of the FATAH-led PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, the agreements gave the Palestinians, for the first time, a degree of self-governance in their own country. Nevertheless, during this period, the Israeli government imposed a variety of harsh measures on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. It put severe RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT within and between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, dramatically expanded LAND expropriation for colonization by Jewish settlers, and repeatedly refused to make withdrawals from territory to which it had committed itself in US-brokered disengagement agreements.

Not only did President Clinton fail to sanction Israel for any of these policies, but in some cases he also helped facilitate the measures. For example, the 23 October 1998 WYE RIVER disengagement agreement was crafted to facilitate Israel's implementation of the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT and the 1997 HEBRON PROTOCOL, plus further Israeli redeployments. Despite the fact that Israel did not implement the commitments made at Wye, Clinton nevertheless agreed to supplemental economic assistance for Israel to build bypass ROADS and enhance security infrastructure for Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Moreover, Clinton maneuvered to evade restrictions on settlement construction set by his predecessor. As part of a $10 billion US loan guarantee to Israel signed five months prior to Clinton's assuming office, the estimated costs of settlement construction during the previous year were to be deducted from the $2 billion annual installment of the loan. Each year, however, Clinton increased US AID TO ISRAEL by

roughly the amount deducted according to the loan guarantee, effectively subsidizing the expanded settlement construction.

Even before the advent of Oslo, the Palestinians had renounced ARMED STRUGGLE and unilaterally recognized Israel's right to exist in 78 percent of Palestine. Their strongest remaining resource was a series of UN Security Council resolutions reaffirming principles of INTERNATIONAL LAW that applied to the conflict with Israel; however, the Clinton administration also opposed these, arguing that the UNITED NATIONS no longer had any relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that the UN resolutions had been superseded by the Oslo Accords, and that such "FINAL STATUS" issues as REFUGEES, settlements, BORDERS, sovereignty, and the status of JERUSALEM should be up to the two parties alone. Additionally, the Clinton administration cast a series of vetoes in the UN Security Council that criticized Israeli violations of the FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION and became the first US administration not to vote in favor of the annual confirmation of UN RESOLUTION 194, guaranteeing the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Moreover, in a policy statement designed to further undercut the Palestinians, President Clinton and top administrative officials began referring to the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights as "disputed territories" rather than "occupied territories." The phrase "disputed territories" implies that both sides have equal claim to the land and that the human rights provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention do not apply, nor do any other aspects of international law pertaining to war and belligerent OCCUPATION.

Clinton also became the first president to effectively recognize Israel's annexation of GREATER JERUSALEM; his administration stopped counting Israeli settlements in this area in the annual census of Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Territories and vetoed UN Security Council resolutions referring to East Jerusalem as part of the Occupied Territories.

Throughout the OSLO PROCESS, the Clinton administration coordinated the pace and agenda of the talks closely with Israel while largely ignoring Palestinian concerns. In a similar vein, the United States treated Israeli security as the primary focus of the negotiations rather than a more comprehensive approach that addressed Palestinians interests as well.

Camp David Summit

During the summer of 2000, the Clinton administration unsuccessfully presided over a summit conference that attempted to forge a final peace agreement between the two sides. The trilateral meeting was held at CAMP DAVID, Maryland, the site of the historic Israeli-Egyptian peace talks hosted by President JIMMY CARTER in 1978. Clinton's summit failed largely because neither side was ready for a final agreement and the US president was unable to pressure Palestinian president YASIR ARAFAT to accept Israel's terms. In the spring of that year, a series of missteps by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, and by Clinton as well, appears to have doomed the Camp David Summit. For example, Clinton relayed to Arafat that Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK would transfer three occupied Palestinian villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem to Palestinian control, which Arafat then announced to the Palestinian public. When Barak reneged on the promise, Clinton refused to push him to honor his pledge.

President Clinton's insistence to jump to final status negotiations without prior confidence-building measures, such as a freeze on new settlements or the fulfillment of previous pledges to withdraw from the settlements, led the Palestinians to question the sincerity of both Tel Aviv and Washington. Arafat and other Palestinian officials repeatedly warned both Israeli and US officials of the increasing resentment among ordinary Palestinians toward the dramatic growth of settlements and other Israeli policies. Furthermore, they argued that the previously agreed-upon withdrawals needed to take place before the more difficult final issues could be addressed. Clinton, however, insisted on moving directly to a summit on the final status questions, even though they had only begun to be addressed in earnest during the previous eight weeks of what had been a more than seven-year process.

Despite strong Palestinian objections, Clinton insisted that the two parties come to Maryland to try to hammer out a final agreement. Arafat pleaded that they needed more time, but Clinton pushed him, promising, "If it fails, I will not blame you." Yet, not only did Clinton put enormous pressure on Arafat to accept Israel's proposals, but he indeed did blame him for the collapse of the talks when the Palestinian leader rejected BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFERS on the grounds that they fell far

short of Israel's obligations under international law and making possible a viable Palestinian state. At the news conference at the close of the talks, Clinton declared that "Prime Minister Ehud Barak showed particular courage, vision, and an understanding of the historical importance of the moment" while insisting that it was Arafat who had been unwilling to compromise.

Hussein Agha and Robert Malley (respectively, special assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs and director of Near East and South Asian Affairs for the National Security Council), who participated in the Camp David Summit, later wrote that Israel stuck to a position clearly unacceptable to the Palestinians, knowing the United States would support it. Furthermore, they noted, there was a clear US bias favoring the Israeli negotiating position. President Clinton substantially departed from UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which the Palestinians had been promised would be the basis of the negotiations. Malley further charged that rather than judging the Israeli proposals on the terms of the resolutions, the United States instead rewarded Israel for its negotiating ploy of initially taking extreme positions as a tactical maneuver and then partially backing off from them. When Barak inched away from the hard line of his predecessors on some issues, Clinton gave these so-called concessions undue significance. After the talks, President Clinton declared on Israeli television that Barak "was more creative and more courageous" than Arafat, and then the White House leaked a series of accusations blaming the Palestinian leader for the breakdown of talks.

Clinton Framework

Despite these enormous obstacles, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators pressed on. In late December, after securing the approval of the Israeli government, President Clinton for the first time presented a US proposal for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace. While addressing some of the Palestinians' concerns over Barak's Camp David plan, it contained fundamental elements that reflected the Israeli stance at the summit. Most importantly, Clinton reiterated Israel's demand to incorporate unspecified parts of occupied East Jerusalem as well as large settlement blocs elsewhere in the West Bank. Although he reaffirmed the Palestinians' central demand for sovereignty, he did not detail the critical territorial dimensions of such a state or the powers a Palestinian state would be allowed to exercise. In essence, Clinton proposed total Israeli sovereignty over the annexed Palestinian lands in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in the West Bank, and he chose not to address Palestinian self-determination in areas such as WATER, borders, and airspace as well as safe passage routes.

Much like Barak's plan at Camp David, Clinton's proposal offered the Palestinians 95 percent of the West Bank but excluded Greater Jerusalem and the proposed Israeli security zones in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY and elsewhere. Clinton produced no maps to delineate his plan, which by itself raised suspicion among Palestinians. His plan divided the West Bank into three effectively separate BANTUSTANS connected and divided by Jewish-only and Arab-only roads. As many as 80,000 Palestinian villagers in the occupied West Bank would have found themselves annexed to Israel under this plan. Clinton's proposal also allowed for transfer of at least 6 percent of West Bank land outside of Jerusalem to Israel, when the settlements took up less than 2 percent of that land. In fact, large areas of unsettled land, particularly near Jerusalem and BETHLEHEM, were to be annexed to Israel.

Underlying the US plan was the Clinton administration's assumption that Israeli territorial contiguity required incorporation of recently established illegal settlement blocs but that Palestinian territorial contiguity was unnecessary even to the extent that centuries-old villages would not be part of the Palestinian state. Additionally, under Clinton's plan, Palestinian urban areas would be isolated from one another, eliminating any possible natural expansion, particularly around Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Jerusalem. In a spirit of flexibility and under heavy US pressure, the Palestinians had already given up their right under international law to Palestinian territory confiscated by Israel. However, the Palestinians insisted that there be a territorial swap for land inside Israel of equal size and value, which the Clinton plan rejected. Instead, the United States would have forced the Palestinians to give up valuable West Bank land for an area less than half its size in Israel's Negev Desert, which had been used in recent years as a major dumping area for toxic wastes. Under the Clinton plan, Palestinian East Jerusalem would be divided into a number of unconnected islands separated from each other and the rest of the Palestinian state, while the complicated arrangements for the Old

City and the sacred AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF site fell short of providing real Palestinian sovereignty. Clinton also insisted that Israel was under no moral or legal obligation to allow the return of Palestinian refugees expelled from what is now Israel in the 1948 WAR.

The US plan allowed Israel to maintain a continued military presence in the Jordan Valley, parts of southern extremes of the West Bank, and two military posts in more populated areas in the central part of the territory. The United States also insisted that the Palestinians accept emergency deployment rights for Israeli troops in the new Palestinian state. The Palestinians questioned why the Israelis needed both deployment rights and an ongoing military presence, particularly since the Palestinians had already agreed to the stationing of an international monitoring force. Also problematic for the Palestinians was the Clinton proposal's insistence on allowing a full three years for Israel to evacuate settlements and military forces from what would become part of an independent Palestine.

In early January the Palestinians formally rejected the Clinton proposals. Hopes that President Clinton would convene a new summit did not materialize, and the United States ended its active involvement when Clinton left office later that month. However, both the Israelis and Palestinians recognized that they were closer to an agreement than they had been at Camp David and resumed talks in TABA, Egypt, coming close to an accord prior to the talks' suspension with the election of ARIEL SHARON as Israeli prime minister in February.

Clinton and the Israeli-Syrian Track

In July 2004 President Clinton provided US auspices for the Israeli and Syrian governments to engage in peace talks for a resolution of their conflict, including Israel's ongoing Occupation of the Golan Heights (the southwestern corner of SYRIA, seized by Israeli forces in 1967). In brokering the talks, the Clinton administration made Israeli security concerns the primary focus of negotiations, going beyond the security guarantees required of Syria under UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, long acknowledged as the basis for negotiations. The Syrians found President Clinton unresponsive to their concerns regarding Israeli obligations to withdraw from the occupied Golan Heights under international law. Israel broke off talks in 1996 and then resumed them in 1999 with a greater willingness to compromise than when they were previously supported by the United States. The two sides came very close to agreement in January 2000 before the talks were suspended, but the death of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad later that year and the election of Ariel Sharon in Israel early the following year resulted in the end of that peace process.

President Clinton also defended Israel's ongoing Occupation of southern LEBANON and Israeli assaults against Lebanese Hizbullah guerrillas and civilian targets, vetoing UN Security Council resolutions condemning the violence as well as questioning the credibility of human rights groups and UN agencies that reported on the deaths at Qana. In 1996, Israel launched a mortar attack against a UN compound near the Lebanese village of Qana that was sheltering refugees from nearby villages, which had been under Israeli assault for several days; the attack killed more than 100 civilians. Although the United Nations, Amnesty International, and other investigators concluded that the bombardment was most likely intentional, the Clinton administration insisted that it was an accident, accusing Hizbullah of using civilians as cover for military activities. (Some reports have indicated that President Clinton's decision to veto UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reelection the following year was related to his refusal to suppress or tone down the UN's findings on the Israeli assault on Qana.)

By 1999, in response to public opinion polls showing that a sizable majority of Israelis wanted their forces out of Lebanon, Ambassador Indyk publicly encouraged Israel to keep its Occupation forces there indefinitely, a position openly defended by President Clinton despite long-standing UN Security Council resolutions that called for Israel's unconditional withdrawal.

See also CLINTON PARAMETERS

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—Stephen Zunes

Clinton Parameters (23 December 2000)

After the failure of the July 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT to achieve a peace agreement between Israeli and Palestinian delegations led, respectively, by Prime Minister EHUD BARAK and Palestinian president YASIR ARAFAT, negotiations continued between the two sides and gaps between the parties on various issues were narrowed, but there was no comprehensive agreement.

In a last-ditch effort, US president Bill Clinton offered the following "Parameters" on 23 December to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators at a meeting in the White House. President Clinton's parameters were not the terms of a final deal, but guidelines for final accelerated negotiations that he hoped could be concluded in the coming weeks. He said his terms would not be binding on his successor when he left office in January 2001.

Arafat, after a delay, accepted the Clinton parameters, but with questions and reservations. Barak accepted the parameters, but Israel's position was also equivocal. The parameters laid the foundation for the final negotiations that took place in January 2001 at TABA before the election of ARIEL SHARON in February 2001, which effectively ended the peace process. The text of the Clinton Parameters follows:

"Territory: Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90%'s, between 94–96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.

"The LAND annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1–3% in addition to territorial arrangement such as a permanent SAFE PASSAGE.

"The parties should also consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs. There are creative ways for doing this that should address Palestinian and Israeli needs and concerns.

"The parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:

- 80% of the settlers in blocks
- Contiguity
- Minimize annexed areas
- Minimize the number of Palestinians affected

"Security: The key to security lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides.

"My best judgment is that the Israeli withdrawal should be carried out over 36 months while international force is gradually introduced in the area. At the end of this period, a small Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the JORDAN VALLEY under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threats to Israel.

"On early warning situations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review after 10 years with any changes in status to be mutually agreed.

"Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you still have to develop a map of relevant areas and routes. But in defining what is an emergency, I propose the following definition: Imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel's national security of a military nature requires the activation of a national state of emergency.

"Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such determination.

"On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that the two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.

"I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a "demilitarized state" while the Palestinian side proposes "a state with limited arms." As a compromise, I suggest calling it a "non-militarized state." This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for BORDER security and deterrence purposes.

"JERUSALEM and REFUGEES: I have a sense that the remaining gaps have more to do with formulations than practical realities.

"Jerusalem: The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the OLD CITY as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.

"Regarding the Haram/TEMPLE MOUNT, I believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to the symbolic issues of sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.

"I know you have been discussing a number of formulations, and you can agree on any of these. I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish people. Regarding either one of these two formulations will be international monitoring to provide mutual confidence.

"1. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over [the WESTERN WALL and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part]. There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.

"2. Palestinian shared sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haram and behind the Wall as mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place.

"Refugees: I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level.

"I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 WAR and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem.

"An international commission should be established to implement all the aspects that flow from your agreement: compensation, resettlement, rehabilitation, etc.

"The U.S. is prepared to lead an international effort to help the refugees.

"The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning this principle.

"The Israeli side could simply not accept any reference to right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel's sovereign policies on admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.

"Any solution must address both needs.

"The solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach that both sides have accepted as the end of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict: the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.

"Under the TWO-STATE SOLUTION, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian state will be the focal point for Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.

"I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.

"In light of the above, I propose two alternatives:

1. Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Historic Palestine. Or,

2. Both sides recognize the right of the Palestinian refuges to return to their homeland.

"The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list five possible final homes for the refugees:

1. The state of Palestine

2. Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap

3. Rehabilitation in a host country

4. Resettlement in a third country

5. Admission to Israel

"In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the WEST BANK,

GAZA STRIP, and the areas acquired in the land swap would be a right to all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third world countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries.

"Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some of the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israel's sovereign decision.

"I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in LEBANON.

The parties would agree that this implements Resolution 194.

"I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all its claims. This could be implemented through a UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION that notes that Resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented through the release of Palestinian prisoners.

"I believe that this is an outline of a fair and lasting agreement.

"It gives the Palestinian people the ability to determine the future on their own land, a sovereign and viable state recognized by the international community, Al-Quds as its capital, sovereignty over the Haram, and new lives for the refugees.

"It gives the people of Israel a genuine end to the conflict, real security, the preservation of sacred religious ties, the incorporation of 80% of the settlers into Israel, and the largest Jewish Jerusalem in history recognized by all as its capital.

"This is the best I can do. Brief your leaders and tell me if they are prepared to come for discussions based on these ideas. If so, I would meet them next week separately. If not, I have taken this as far as I can.

"These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table, they also go with me when I leave the office."

Closed Military Zones

Closed military zones (CMZs) are areas in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES declared by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) as off-limits to unauthorized persons in the interest of security. The Israeli military imposes CMZs for a variety of reasons and in diverse circumstances, but the main purpose is at all times to restrict the movement of persons, primarily (though not always) Palestinians, from entering a specific area. These zones need not be of military significance; at times, Israeli officials abort peaceful demonstrations or restrict journalistic access to an area by temporarily designating a site—a building, a city, a region, a refugee camp, the entire Gaza Strip, even occasionally the whole West Bank—a closed military area. To enter a CMZ, one must obtain a PERMIT from the Israeli military.

According to Israeli law, the IDF can only declare an area a CMZ when (1) a concrete danger is posed (at a defined place and time) to human life; (2) no other means are available to reasonably deal with the situation in the specific time frame; or (3) access to the land is blocked for the minimal amount of time required to deal with the aforementioned situations. In practice, however, the IDF declares CMZs for numerous reasons that have nothing to do with danger to human life, and many such declarations have been in effect for decades. Legally, the only way the security forces can deny access to land under the rubric of a CMZ is through a valid military order signed by either a regiment commander or a regional commander. Only in extreme cases is it possible to order territorial closure verbally.

When Israel first occupied the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP in 1967, it established military control and governance of these areas by declaring them CMZs. This was soon transformed into a *general* CLOSURE that was essentially a mechanism for controlling the movement of the Palestinian population, but Israel's administrative and military framework allowed the CMZs to be later tightened for the imposition of *strict and absolute* closures. Israel used declarations of CMZs as a preliminary step in the designation of areas as STATE LAND, which allows Israel to confiscate the LAND from its Palestinian owners and use it for Jewish SETTLEMENT purposes.

From the outset of the OCCUPATION, Israel used CMZs to protect the settlements and their environs from Palestinian entry, and Palestinians have been required to obtain permits to work or otherwise enter these areas. The areas of Jewish settler jurisdiction in the West Bank extend far beyond the built-up settlement territories per se, yet the full extent of these jurisdictions has been defined as CMZs. Whereas Palestinians are forbidden to enter these areas without authorization, Israeli citizens, Jews from throughout the world, and tourists are all allowed to enter such areas without the need for special permits.

With the eruption of the First INTIFADA, the relatively lenient use of CMZs as RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT of Palestinians changed drastically, and Israel began extensively issuing orders for CMZs, imposing partial or total closures on the entire Occupied Territories. During the OSLO years, Israel declared huge areas in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY and in the HEBRON SOUTHERN DISTRICT CMZs in order to evict BEDOUIN shepherds and farmers from the lands they had lived on for decades. Additionally, Israel used CMZs to evict many Bedouin who resided in Area C (mainly in the eastern and southern parts of the West Bank) from Palestinian-owned areas that had been kept largely vacant of houses (through the denial of building permits) during the previous decade.

Many of the uses of CMZs involve collective punishment. For example, Israel has designated the area between the BARRIER (wall) and the Green Line a CMZ, thus strictly out of bounds to all Palestinians. As such, Palestinians are "not authorized" to farm their outlying lands, graze their sheep, or even in some places reach their villages. Moreover, Israeli plans call for this area to be permanently a CMZ.

Israel also uses CMZs to prevent Israeli and international human rights organizations, such as B'TSELEM, from examining alleged human rights violations. Israel also frequently obstructs solidarity meetings or protests in the West Bank and Gaza by declaring the whole region a CMZ. Israeli peace activists are denied permits to enter the zones; moreover, when they apply for a permit, they are "invited" to meetings with the SHIN BET, the Israeli internal security service, which "warns" them about their activities. For months during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the Gaza Strip was totally closed off to peace activists, including Knesset members; only Jewish settlers and soldiers could enter the region. Journalists have protested bitterly over their denial of access to news through the arbitrary imposition of CMZs. At one point in 2002 during the al-Aqsa Intifada, for example, Israel declared six autonomous West Bank Palestinian towns (Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah, Jenin, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya) CMZs to keep reporters out.

During the olive harvest season in the West Bank, Israel often declares the olive groves CMZs so that Palestinians cannot access the groves and harvest the crops. During its UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, Israel declared the Gaza Strip a CMZ to keep out settlers from the West Bank who intended to create problems for the IDF during the evacuation of Jewish settlers.

During 1949–1966 the Arab citizens of Israel were also subject to closed military zones. Israel imposed on this population a number of controlling measures, beginning in 1949, that amounted to martial law. A variety of "laws" and "legal" measures facilitated the transfer of Palestinian land to the Israeli state and/or its NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. One common legal expedient was the use of emergency regulations to declare land belonging to Arab citizens a closed military zone, followed by Israel's taking control of the land.

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Closure

Closure is the total prohibition on Palestinian residents of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES from entering Israel unless they have a special PERMIT. To comprehend the nature and meaning of closure, it is necessary to understand the evolution of Israel's policy regarding Palestinian right of access to Israel.

Following the 1967 WAR, Israel's military commanders in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP issued orders proclaiming these areas to be CLOSED MILITARY ZONES (CMZS). In 1972, Israel issued

general exit permits that allowed residents from the Occupied Territories to move freely, enter Israel and East JERUSALEM, and pass between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, they were not allowed to stay in Israel and East Jerusalem between 1 and 5 A.M.

In June 1989, during the First INTIFADA, Israel restricted the general exit permits for the first time. In the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed a magnetic-card system whereby only those with such a card were allowed to leave the Strip. The authorities did not issue magnetic cards to released PRISONERS, former ADMINISTRATIVE DETAINEES, or even Palestinians who had been detained and released without charges being filed against them. In the West Bank, green, rather than orange, IDENTITY CARDS were issued to Palestinians whom Israel prohibited from leaving the Occupied Territories.

In January 1991, during the GULF WAR, Israel changed its previous policy and required instead that every resident of the Occupied Territories have a personal exit permit to enter Israel. At first Israel issued many permits for relatively long periods, and, except for days on which a total closure on the Occupied Territories was imposed, most Palestinians could routinely enter Israel. However, Israel's permit policy gradually became stricter, and the number of residents of the Occupied Territories allowed to enter Israel and East Jerusalem steadily decreased.

The new policy divided the Occupied Territories into three areas—the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem—with passage between them requiring a permit from the Israeli authorities. Movement within the West Bank was also limited insofar as the main road between the southern and northern areas of the West Bank passes through Jerusalem, into which all entry was prohibited.

Revocation of the general exit permit in 1991 marked the beginning of the permanent closure policy, which reached its apex two years later. In March 1993, Israel imposed an overall closure on the Occupied Territories "until further notice." To enforce the closure, Israel set up CHECKPOINTS along the Green Line separating Israel and the West Bank, between the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and within the Occupied Territories. Approvals were granted sparingly and according to criteria unknown to Palestinians.

The OSLO ACCORDS and the geopolitical changes that followed had almost no effect on these restrictions, although the severity of the closure changed depending on the circumstances. For example, after Palestinian violence against Israelis, the authorities imposed a total closure during which no exit permits were granted except in exceptional cases. A total closure was also typically issued for the Occupied Territories during Israeli holidays. At times Israel also closed specific towns or villages in the West Bank.

With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel imposed a comprehensive closure on the Occupied Territories and almost completely prohibited Palestinians from entering Israel and from traveling between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Thereafter, for a short period, Israel allowed a limited number of workers from the Occupied Territories to return to work in Israel and enabled, with severe restrictions, a few Palestinians to enter Israel for medical treatment, trade, and other needs. For the overwhelming amount of time from 2000 to the present (2009), Israel has held a comprehensive closure on the Occupied Territories and refused to issue entry permits.

See also CURFEW; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT

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Coalition of Women for Peace

The Coalition of Women for Peace was founded in Israel in December 2000, six weeks after the AL-AQSA INTIFADA began, and has become one of the leading voices in Israel advocating a just and viable peace between Israel and Palestine. A mix of Jewish and Palestinian women (all citizens of Israel), the coalition brings together independent women and nine women's peace organizations, some newly formed, others promoting coexistence since Israel's founding. The principles of the coalition include the following:

- An end to the OCCUPATION
- Full involvement of women in negotiations for peace
- Establishment of the state of Palestine side by side with the state of Israel based on the 1967 borders
- Recognition of JERUSALEM as the shared capital of two states
- Demand that Israel accept its share of responsibility for the results of the 1948 WAR and cooperate in finding a just solution for the Palestinian REFUGEES
- Opposition to the MILITARISM that permeates Israeli society
- Equality, inclusion, and justice for PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL
- Equal rights for women and all residents of Israel
- Social and economic justice for Israel's citizens and integration in the region

In addition to supporting the work of its member organizations, the coalition carries out mass rallies, human rights campaigns, outreach, and advocacy activity, including rallies twice a year calling for an end to the Occupation. The coalition has provided emergency supplies to women and children in Palestinian refugee camps and school supplies to thousands of Palestinian children. In 2004, together with other Palestinian women, it completed the International Human Rights March of Women, which traveled for three weeks through Israel and Palestine and called for an end to the Occupation and the creation of a just peace between the two peoples. The coalition includes BAT SHALOM, THE FIFTH MOTHER, MACHSOMWATCH, MOVEMENT OF DEMOCRATIC WOMEN FOR ISRAEL (TANDI), NEW PROFILE, *NOGA* (A FEMINIST JOURNAL), Women for Coexistence (NELED), WOMEN IN BLACK, and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). (www.coalitionofwomen4peace.org).

Collaborators, Palestinian

In the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, a collaborator is a Palestinian who assists Israeli security forces by gathering information, trapping or identifying "wanted persons" for Israel, or selling land to Israeli organizations, among other things. Collaboration is one of the prime mechanisms used by Israel to fight Palestinian resistance to the OCCUPATION. Menahem Landau, head of the Arabic section of the SHIN BET (the Israeli internal security service), said in an interview with Israel's Channel One on 20 May 2001 that the role of collaborators was crucial to Israel. He said that, despite developments in electronic technology, collaborators remained the prime and most reliable source of intelligence gathering. "Without them we could never achieve anything in our war against TERRORISM," he commented. "We cannot, for one second, do without the services they provide us."

Collaborators have been a convenient way for Israel to obtain information in the Palestinian territories since 1967, and there has been no shortage. Israel follows an aggressive recruitment policy and has used poverty, cultural norms, entrapment (sometimes staged), and bribery (making the supply of essential services dependent on cooperation) to induce individuals to become collaborators. Israel looks for those in vulnerable positions and then exerts pressure on them, sometimes using blackmail and other threats to keep them cooperative. Most often, Israel pays a small sum: before the 2000 uprising, about $100 a month for a typical collaborator. Sexual entrapment is sometimes used, according to some Palestinians. Palestinian homosexuals are particularly vulnerable in a society that is intolerant of gay relationships. Israel also uses drug dealers and addicts.

The most common means of recruitment, however, is an Israeli offer to provide necessary services in exchange for collaboration. For example, to obtain a PERMIT to earn a livelihood, to acquire medical treatment, to travel, and so on, Palestinians are induced to collaborate with Israelis. In their 1990 book, *Every Spy a Prince*, Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv put it thus: "If a Palestinian wants a building license, the government will first review this with the local Shin Bet case officer. And an Arab merchant could not get the proper licenses without the consent of the Shin Bet. Almost every daily activity and every minute in the lives of Palestinians is subjected to supervision by the Shin Bet." Given the extensive control the Israeli authorities exercise over the Palestinian areas, it is not hard for the Israeli intelligence services to constantly find new ways to induce collaborators.

Israel's ability to recruit in exchange for services is related to the fact that, although the Military Government is responsible for providing services to the Palestinians, it has never fulfilled this duty. This insufficiency, combined with the great

dependence of Palestinians in the territories on the branches of the Military Government, has led to the emergence of an institution of lobbyists, collaborators, and individuals with close ties to the authorities who, for a price, act as go-betweens and obtain the services and permits needed by the local residents. B'TSELEM (Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) notes that, "since 1967, the security forces have recruited tens of thousands of Palestinians from the territories to serve as collaborators."

Another aspect of the collaborator issue relates to Palestinian culture and social structure, which is based on the *hamula*—the extended family or clan—and upheld by the ideology of honor versus shame. In this social system, Palestinians are accustomed to approaching intermediaries to obtain certain types of services. If the intermediary is successful in granting the request or obtaining the service, then some kind of reciprocity is expected. This system has made it easy for Israel to co-opt individuals, even family elders and *mukhtars* (village chiefs), because their social rank has depended to a great extent on their ability to dispense favors, and this power lies ultimately in the hands of the Israeli authorities. It is also the case that Palestinians engaging in behavior considered dishonorable in Palestinian society—for example, a woman seen in public with a man other than her husband or a very close relative, or a man taking drugs—might opt to collaborate rather than risk bringing shame to her or his family.

Collaborators receive preferential treatment from the authorities. To enable collaborators to protect themselves against attacks by other Palestinians, the authorities supply many of them with weapons, but collaborators frequently use those weapons illegally to threaten, wound, or kill other Palestinians for personal reasons. Israel does not punish collaborators who are implicated in criminal offenses such as forgery, fraud, murder, and other crimes.

Israel also uses collaborators as agents of the state to perform acts that the authorities may not want to engage in. For example, collaborators participate in the interrogation of Palestinian detainees and engage in the use of TORTURE.

When Israel redeployed from some Palestinian towns beginning in 1994 in the context of the OSLO PROCESS, it wanted to expand its operation for finding and maintaining collaborators so as to keep track of events outside its area of control. The Shin Bet set up a special unit to select likely collaborators from among the close circles of HAMAS activists and PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) officials. An indication of its success is evident, for example, in BETHLEHEM, where Shin Bet increased the number of offices for its collaborator network from two mobile homes in 2000 to seven in 2003. Each Palestinian village and refugee camp has about ten collaborator agents, and in the cities the number is far greater.

In the post-Oslo period, the supply of collaborators has increased because of Palestinian frustration over the failure of the peace process and the lack of a political solution on the horizon. This is compounded by the ECONOMIC situation: unemployment has risen to more than 60 percent and poverty is widespread. In this period, it has been primarily money that has turned Palestinians into informants, and it does not take very much. Collaborators who have confessed to PNA police often say they get as little as $50 for each meeting with a handler.

Israel not only overlooks its collaborators' criminal activity, but it also takes measures to protect them. When Palestinians attack suspected collaborators, as is quite common, the authorities make strenuous efforts to apprehend, try, and punish those involved. Palestinians who become collaborators, if discovered, are typically killed by other Palestinians. Frequently, the authorities resort to collective punishment for this killing, such as by demolishing or sealing suspects' houses. Some of those sought on suspicion of attacking collaborators have been declared "wanted individuals," a status usually given to individuals who have committed terrorist attacks against Israel.

See also ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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Combatants' Letter

In the Combatants' Letter, published in 2002 by fifty reserve combat officers and soldiers in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, the signers made public their refusal to fight in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The initiators of the letter, Captain David Zonshein and Lieutenant Yaniv Itzkovits, officers in an elite unit, had served for four years in compulsory service and another eight years as reserve soldiers, including long periods of active combat both in LEBANON and in the Occupied Territories. The letter reads: "We, reserve combat officers and soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces, who were raised upon the principles of ZIONISM, sacrifice and giving to the people of Israel and to the State of Israel, who have always served in the front lines, and who were the first to carry out any mission, light or heavy, in order to protect the State of Israel and strengthen it.

"We, combat officers and soldiers who have served the State of Israel for long weeks every year, in spite of the dear cost to our personal lives, have been on reserve duty all over the Occupied Territories, and were issued commands and directives that had nothing to do with the security of our country, and that had the sole purpose of perpetuating our control over the Palestinian people. We, whose eyes have seen the bloody toll this OCCUPATION exacts from both sides.

"We, who sensed how the commands issued to us in the Territories, destroy all the values we had absorbed while growing up in this country.

"We, who understand now that the price of Occupation is the loss of IDF's human character and the corruption of the entire Israeli society.

"We, who know that the Territories are not Israel, and that all SETTLEMENTS are bound to be evacuated in the end.

"We hereby declare that we shall not continue to fight this War of the Settlements.

"We shall not continue to fight beyond the 1967 borders in order to dominate, expel, starve and humiliate an entire people.

"We hereby declare that we shall continue serving in the Israel Defense Forces in any mission that serves Israel's defense.

"The missions of Occupation and oppression do not serve this purpose—and we shall take no part in them."

By mid-2005, 634 combatants from all units of the IDF and from all sectors of Israeli society had signed the letter and had joined the movement COURAGE TO REFUSE. The members of the movement, often called "refuseniks," continue to do their reserve duty wherever and whenever they are summoned but refuse to serve in the Occupied Territories. Many have been punished and imprisoned for refusing their orders to serve. (www.seruv.org.il/defaulteng.asp).

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; REFUSER SOLIDARITY NETWORK

Communists in Israel

In 1922, Jews and Palestinians formed the Palestine Communist Party, also called the ARAB-PALESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY. In the 1940s this party split in two: the mostly Jewish Communist Party of Israel (MAKI or Miflaga Komunistit Yisraelit), which was inclined to Zionist views and recognized the new state of Israel, and a mostly Arab group, the Palestine Communist Party, which did not recognize the new state.

In 1965 Maki split into two groups: a primarily Jewish party that retained the name Maki and a second group, the New Communist List (RAKAH), which was mostly, though not exclu-

sively, Israeli-Arab and considered itself the remnant of the Palestine Communist Party.

In 1973, Maki joined the noncommunist, pro-peace party MOKED (Focus), and in 1977, Maki, Moked, and several other small groups joined SHELLI (Peace for Israelis, Equality for Israelis). Meanwhile Rakah, in 1977, joined other ANTI-ZIONIST groups (Jewish and Arab) to form HADASH (Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, or DFPE), a left-wing group made up of the Communist Party of Israel and other small left-wing groups. In 1988 former LABOR PARTY Knesset member Abdul Wahab Daroushe founded the noncommunist ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY, which competed with Rakah and Hadash.

In 1989, Rakah changed its name to Maki, and it remains the leading force in Hadash. It is largely but not entirely Arab and remains anti-Zionist. In 1995 a new party emerged, according to its founders, because of the failure of Israel's "Communist Party," called ODA in Hebrew and DA'AM in Arabic. It is not a strictly Communist party but adheres to Marxist ideology. In 1999 another new group appeared, the Israeli Communist Forum, which sees itself as the true heir to the Israel Communist Party.

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Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

"Conquest of Labor"

See HISTADRUT

Conscientious Objectors

Conscientious objection to war and military service in Israel should be understood in the context of what has been termed "civil militarism," that is, the capacity of the Israeli state to mobilize the resources of groups and individuals to enhance its geopolitical capacity and make war or turn war into an interest of various groups in Israel. The conscientious objection movement challenged the main motifs of Israeli civil militarism while at the same time contributing to the emergence of civil society.

Though Israel has been involved in a state of protracted conflict and in a cycle of wars since its establishment in 1948, a massive peace movement emerged only in 1978. From 1948 to 1978, political space was closed to peace initiatives; the political elite displayed a unified opinion regarding the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and cultural norms precluded any deviations from militarism. The predominant element in this attitude was the view that because Israel was surrounded by nondemocratic, hostile states that wished to destroy it, only the establishment of democratic regimes in the surrounding Arab countries could bring about a peaceful solution. Therefore, to advance peace, Israel had to mobilize most of its resources to ensure its survival, and peace would be achieved only in an almost utopian future. Another assumption that loomed even larger was that the Arab-Israeli conflict could be resolved only by force and military might. The belligerent mood of most Arab states as well as the polarization of the international arena by the Cold War and the power contest between the UNITED STATES and the SOVIET UNION only strengthened these basic assumptions regarding issues of war and peace.

The 1967 WAR bore paradoxical results. On the one hand, Israel's military victory and the expansion of its boundaries brought about the glorification of the army and of all things military. On the other hand, the OCCUPATION of the GAZA STRIP, the WEST BANK, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights; the control and management of populations under military rule; and the establishment of Jewish SETTLEMENTS gave rise to small protest movements that conceived of the new OCCUPIED TERRITORIES as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations. During the 1970s two small groups of Israeli high school seniors published a letter addressed to the prime minister and minister of defense in which they declared their refusal to serve in the Occupied Territories. This was the first time in Israeli history that anyone had attempted to change the terms of the unwritten contract between the individual and the state. However, none of those initiatives gained momentum, and only two of the signatories were convicted for refusal.

The 1973 War shattered the illusion that territorial depth and expanded boundaries could guarantee the security of Israel. The war's devastating results (2,569 fallen soldiers) sowed the seeds for a reconsideration of the entire outlook regarding Israel's role in a peace process.

It was not until 1978, with the visit of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat to Israel and the expectations created by the prospects of peace with EGYPT, that the formula "territories for peace"—in which Israel returns Arab territory it conquered in war in exchange for peace and normal relations—began to take hold among wide sectors of the Jewish-Israeli population, especially those identified with the LABOR PARTY. Moreover, Labor's loss of hegemony—after thirty consecutive years in government—afforded these sectors a more autonomous outlook regarding alternative solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The relative opening of the political space and engagement of other elites who shared peace values were among the factors that enabled the spread of the formula "territories for peace" and the emergence of a mass peace movement, PEACE NOW. However, this did not change the patterns of political obligation; Israeli males continued their service in the military, and their opposition to Israel's war policies was frozen the moment they were called up for active duty.

This situation was to change in June 1982 when Israel invaded LEBANON. The LEBANON WAR represented a qualitative change in Israelis' attitudes toward political obligation and protest. The very sectors that gained their prestige and standing through their allegiance to the national missions and war policies—mainly secular, middle-class Israeli Jews of Western origin associated with the Labor movement—recognized for the first time that Lebanon was a war of choice. From the first week of the war, small demonstrations were staged, which, as the war expanded, turned into massive protests around the country. These rallies contradicted a tacit but firmly established consensus that as long as there is active warfare, the home front is in solidarity with the battle front and abstains from any critical stance that could undermine national solidarity. For the first time in the history of Israel, citizen soldiers questioned the right of the state to command its male citizens to kill and be killed under any circumstances, especially when the security of the state was not threatened. This questioning was translated into a movement of selective conscientious objectors. From 1982 to 1985, 160 reserve soldiers were convicted and sentenced by military courts to jail terms for refusing to serve in the war in Lebanon, and an unknown number of reserve soldiers reached informal agreements with their commanders to be either released from their reserve duty in Lebanon or granted the option to serve within the borders of Israel.

Conscientious objection during the Lebanon War signaled the emerging crisis of Israeli civil militarism. YESH G'VUL (There Is a Limit) mounted a frontal challenge to the war policies of the Israeli state, citing the invasion of a foreign country, the attempt to interfere in its internal affairs, the establishment of a government friendly to Israel, the length of the war, and its cost weighed against its gains. The war in Lebanon was perceived as a transgression of all the accepted conditions for waging a war—that is, only when there is an existential threat to the state and its people and only for defense and its targets, that is, other armies. The crystallization of the conscientious objector movement during the war in Lebanon contributed to a split between citizenship and military service and broke down the halo of sanctity surrounding war and warmaking, thus blazing the path for an active opposition to Israel's war policies.

In 1985, Israel partially redeployed its forces in Lebanon. Two years later, in 1987, the Palestinian uprising, or INTIFADA, broke out, initiating a new cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence and a new form of protest. The Intifada was a popular, grassroots uprising that included demonstrations, strikes, tax revolts, and other acts of civil disobedience that involved virtually the entire Palestinian population. Soldiers trained in combat faced mostly policing missions, such as enforcing CURFEWS, chasing demonstrators in alleys, doing home searches, and making arrests. These missions further undermined the morale and prestige of soldiering, and the fissures that had emerged during the Lebanon War between combat soldiering and constabulary activities deepened the crisis of Israeli civil militarism.

At that time, the effects of the conscientious objector movement could already be ascertained. From 1987 to 1993, 190 reserve soldiers were convicted and jailed for refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories. Moreover, a considerable number of soldiers made alternative arrangements, and refusal (declared and undeclared) turned into a viable option for opponents of Israel's military

policies. However, conscientious refusal did not expand beyond the ranks of the reserve army, nor was it granted covert or overt legitimacy by the left-wing political parties. To the contrary, their representatives as well as the main organization of the Israeli peace movement (Peace Now) not only kept a distance from the conscientious objector movement but were also among their most adamant critics.

The 1993 Oslo DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES brought about a partial demilitarization of Israel and, to a certain degree, a deescalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Oslo did not bring an end to the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories, the possibility of an agreement partially demobilized the organizations within the peace movement. Yet, although protest activity subsided during the "Oslo period," new radical peace initiatives were developed. Certain Israeli Jews perceived the militarization of the Israeli state and society, and especially "civil militarism," as requiring an alternative. The emergent movement NEW PROFILE (The Movement for the Civilization of Israeli Society) set a wide and ambitious agenda that sought to examine the relationship between militarism, inequality, and violent and discriminatory practices that hinder the development of democratic participation. Moreover, the movement maintained that the militaristic Israeli mindset prevented the achievement of real peace in the region. New Profile sought to achieve its goals through an array of projects, such as a rethinking of conscription, an open endorsement of citizens who refused to be inducted into military service, and various projects that demilitarized education and the curriculum. During the new cycle of violence sparked by the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, New Profile blazed the path for a new wave of draft refusers and a thorough questioning in Israeli society of civil militarism in Israel.

The collapse of the OSLO ACCORDS after the failure of the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (July 2000) and ARIEL SHARON's visit to the Muslim religious site AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in East JERUSALEM were among the factors that accelerated the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in October 2000, which immediately shattered the expectations of a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Prime Minister EHUD BARAK's faltering coalition fell apart in February 2001, and Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister. The new coalition, which included LIKUD and Labor representatives as well as religious and extreme rightist parties, was defined as a National Unity government. Like former governments of this type, it led to a political stalemate. The peace camp, already demobilized under the Barak coalition, was slow to react to the mounting cycle of violence. SUICIDE BOMBER attacks on Israeli urban centers, combined with the delegitimization of YASIR ARAFAT as a partner for peace, drained the disintegrated peace movement's energies and massive constituency. The Israeli military sought to escalate the conflict with the Palestinians and to define it as a full-fledged war from its very beginning. As violence increased, the Israeli army's actions against the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) and its institutions undermined the PNA's ability to restrain militant groups (the role assigned to them by the Oslo Accords), and a new wave of suicide bombings brought about a strong Israeli military reaction. However, contrary to what happened in the First Intifada, there were no Israeli groups protesting the ever-escalating cycle of violence. From February to March 2002, TERRORIST attacks on Israeli urban centers escalated, and the death toll swelled. The military buildup that had been in progress for years, including the preparations for yet another military operation against the Palestinians, was becoming apparent.

Amid the war preparations, mobilization of reserve units, and partial demobilization of peace organizations, a group of fifty combat officers published a letter, called the "COMBATANTS' LETTER," in which they stated their refusal to continue to fight what they termed "this war for the peace of the settlements." Behind the letter stood a new organization, COURAGE TO REFUSE. More than 600 combat soldiers and officers signed the Combatants' Letter, and approximately half the signatories were convicted and jailed for their refusal to serve in the Occupied Territories. The new organization of conscientious objectors called into question the relation between the ongoing Occupation of the Palestinian territories and the security of Israel. Moreover, Courage to Refuse portrayed the soldiers' missions in the Occupied Territories as destroying the core values of Israeli education and of the Israeli military as well. Taking pride in their role as combat soldiers and officers, the signatories to the letter claimed that the Occupation completely undermined and defiled the best qualities of the Israeli combat soldier and transformed him into a hooligan executing illegal and immoral orders.

There are both differences and similarities between conscientious objection in the 1980s and 1990s and that developing in the new millennium. In the first period, conscientious objection represented an attempt to redefine the unwritten contract between the individual and the state. While capitalizing on the discourses of Israeli civil militarism, this movement of conscientious objectors promoted the idea that military service and war participation are one way to contribute to society but not the only one. As such, it set the agenda to liberalize Israeli citizenship and to open it to groups and individuals who were marginalized by the close association between citizenship and military service. In the wake of the new millennium, the conscientious objector movement has expanded, and different organizations pursue different and sometimes contradictory agendas, each attempting to monopolize the movement. Some groups—such as Courage to Refuse—strongly adhere to the narratives of Israeli civil militarism and ZIONISM, whereas other organizations promote agendas that represent a sharp departure from those narratives. For these groups, conscientious refusal is partly a means to regain the lost cultural and political dominance of the ASHKENAZI middle and upper-middle classes. As such, conscientious objection is part of the identity struggles taking place in Israel.

For other groups, mainly for the emergent and expanding group of draft REFUSENIKS (SHMINISTIM and New Profile), conscientious objection is a way to demilitarize Israeli society. Instead of reinstituting militaristic values and identities, the new movement, composed mainly of high school students facing the draft, not only opposes the Occupation but also seeks alternatives to military service as different ways to contribute to their society.

Since the 1980s, conscientious objection in Israel has had an important role in the formation of civil society and in the promotion of a critical outlook toward the war and security politics. In its expansion from reserve soldiers to draftees to regular military service and from one organization to a variety of organizations that promote different visions of Israeli society and of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conscientious objection has gained legitimacy in Israel and reflects profound changes in the relations between individuals, social groups, and the state while also furthering these changes.

See also ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

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—Sara Helman

Convergence Plan

Devised by former Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON and first formally articulated by EHUD OLMERT, convergence is premised on the belief that because Israel has no partner with which to negotiate, it therefore must unilaterally determine its final BORDERS to ensure a Jewish majority.

Ehud Olmert, Sharon's successor, waged his election campaign for the prime ministership (won in March 2006) as a referendum on the Convergence Plan: settling the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians over control of LANDS under Israeli OCCUPATION by annexing to Israel the major WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS and settlement blocks (e.g., MA'ALE ADUMIM, Etzion, and Ariel). The 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, implemented under Sharon, was one aspect of the Convergence Plan. In its most expansive version, Olmert proposed that

Israel annex approximately 10 percent of the West Bank, including settlements and historic areas in East JERUSALEM, along a perimeter defined more or less by the separation BARRIER. Israel would expand settlements west of the Barrier and withdraw its settlers from the remaining areas—this includes seventy-two settlements with a current population of close to 60,000—while maintaining exclusive security control over these territories as well as over the border crossing points to JORDAN.

Although Olmert and the KADIMA PARTY he leads won the 2006 elections, they did so without a parliamentary majority large enough to be considered a mandate to fully implement the convergence project. From the outset, it appeared that Olmert would not have enough Knesset votes to proceed with his plan. Nevertheless, in May 2006 Olmert traveled to Washington to obtain the US seal of approval. US president GEORGE W. BUSH praised Olmert's "bold ideas . . . [that] could lead to a two-state solution if a pathway to progress on the ROAD MAP is not open in the period ahead."

After two wars in the summer of 2006—in Gaza and more importantly in LEBANON—Olmert's ability to maneuver was considerably reduced. Still, the convergence scheme enjoys strong support in Israel, and if not Olmert, undoubtedly another prime minister will implement it. Palestinians in general and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in particular have been and continue to be excluded from this process.

See also ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; EHUD OLMERT

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Councilists

See ARAB PARTY

Courage to Refuse

Courage to Refuse (Ometz Le'sarev) was founded following the publication of the COMBATANTS' LETTER in 2002 by the original letter signatories and serves as a support group for soldiers who refuse to serve in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. As of mid-2005, more than 280 members of Courage to Refuse had been court-martialed and jailed for periods of up to thirty-five days as a result of their refusal, and 629 had signed the letter. Over time, well-known public figures expressed their support of Courage to Refuse. Hundreds of university professors signed support petitions, and the word *seruv* (Hebrew for "refusal"), which a few years ago was synonymous with treason, has become an accepted part of the Israeli political discourse. According to a 2003 survey conducted by the Yaffee Center for Strategic Studies, over 25 percent of all Israelis sympathize with Courage to Refuse and acknowledge each citizen's civil right and moral duty to refuse to serve the OCCUPATION. Beyond refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories, the group's members take part in demonstrations, cultural events, and public education aimed at ending the Occupation and bringing peace to Israel. (www.seruv.org.il/English/default.asp).

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; PILOTS' LETTER; REFUSER SOLIDARITY NETWORK; SHMINISTIM

Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22 (1919)

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations created the mandates for four new Arab states: IRAQ, LEBANON, SYRIA, and Palestine. The covenant was approved by the Paris Peace Conference on 28 April 1919 and was incorporated in

the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed two months later. Article 22 applied to the Arab territories that were detached from OTTOMAN TURKEY at the end of World War I. In accordance with Article 22, these four states were subjected to "temporary mandates" designed "to assist them and to lead them to complete independence." Despite the affirmative words, in reality the mandates were extensions of French and British imperialism. Moreover, the Palestine mandate, into which Britain incorporated the BALFOUR DECLARATION promising a homeland for the Jews, negated the league's principle "that the well-being and development of their [the mandate's] inhabitants form a sacred trust of civilization."

A fifth territory located in the area lying east of the Jordan River was entrusted to Britain and attached to the Palestine mandate. This territory, Transjordan, had not been part of historic Palestine but had been administratively part of the province of Syria in Ottoman times, when it was called the district of Al Balqa'. When the question of delimiting the mandates arose, Britain insisted on the inclusion of Al Balqa' in its mandate over Palestine because it wished to reward Emir Abdullah, son of Sharif Husayn Ben Ali of Mecca, for his help during the war against the Ottomans. The new territory assumed the name Transjordan and Britain set it up as an emirate. It remained under a protective treaty relationship with Britain until 25 May 1946, when it was formally detached from the Palestine mandate and Emir Abdullah was recognized as king of Transjordan. In 1949 the new kingdom assumed the name of the Hashemite Kingdom of JORDAN.

See also BRITISH MANDATE; JORDAN

Crusades

A series of nine major (and many more minor) military campaigns between 1095 and 1291 were waged by Christians, usually sanctioned by the pope of Rome in the name of Christendom, with the goal of recapturing JERUSALEM and the sacred "Holy Land" from Muslim rule. In 1187 the Muslim general SALADIN retook Jerusalem without bloodshed, and the city remained in Muslim hands until 1228, when, during the Sixth Crusade, the invaders captured and held Jerusalem for ten years, after which it again reverted to and remained under Muslim control until 1967.

Cultural Zionism

See ZIONISM

Curfew

Curfew in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES—sometimes called lockdown or mass house arrest—is the most extreme RESTRICTION ON MOVEMENT imposed by the Israeli authorities. Ostensibly a security measure, it is a collective restriction imposed on a whole area—a neighborhood, town, city, refugee camp, or even the entire WEST BANK and/or the GAZA STRIP. A curfew can remain in force for several days, weeks, a month, or several months. During a curfew the residents of the affected area are confined to their homes twenty-four hours a day.

Israel does not announce a curfew in advance but uses Israeli jeeps, tanks, and armored personnel carriers to drive through Palestinian streets with loudspeakers notifying all to go home. This announcement is regularly accompanied by rapid machine-gun fire in the air and the exploding of tear gas canisters and stun grenades in the open markets to make sure people understand the message.

All businesses and stores close immediately, schools dismiss, government offices lock their doors, and medical services are, for all intents and purposes, inaccessible to the public. Families are dependent on what food supplies they have on hand, although during lengthy curfews the authorities usually lift the lockdown once a week for two to four hours so that people can stock up on necessities.

During the curfew, tanks, military jeeps, and snipers patrol the streets, making sure residents remain confined to their houses. Anyone seen outside their home—even on their front door steps—can be arrested or shot. There have been numerous instances of Palestinian civilians being killed for violating a curfew. For example, on 21 June 2002, four Palestinians, three of them children, were killed and twenty-four injured when Israeli soldiers opened fire on a market in Jenin at a time when Palestinian residents believed the curfew on the city had been lifted. B'TSELEM (Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) reported that "as of October 2002, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had killed nineteen Palestinians, twelve of them children under fifteen years old, for violating a curfew." Dozens more were wounded. None of these Palestinians, according to B'Tselem, had endangered soldiers' lives.

It is often difficult for residents of an area to determine when a curfew has been suspended because in many areas the Israeli military fails to publicly announce the lifting of restrictions. Residents are forced to rely on MEDIA reports and other informal sources of information to learn when and for how long the curfew will be relaxed. Frequently, a lift is announced and then canceled at the last minute, or the curfew is reimposed prior to the originally announced time.

B'Tselem has reported extensively on the many adverse effects of curfews: "Another grave practice employed by the IDF in enforcing curfew is the firing of tear gas. This practice caused the death of an infant and others were injured when they were hit by the tear-gas canister. Some Palestinians required medical treatment for inhalation of the gas . . . soldiers sought to punish Palestinians by intentionally firing tear-gas canisters into a house and car." Israel maintains that the enforcement of the curfews is a security issue.

As collective punishment, curfew has been used frequently during the First INTIFADA, for three months during the 1991 GULF WAR when the entire West Bank and Gaza were under curfew, and frequently during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. In addition to these "long curfews," the practice is used before, during, and after every Jewish holiday, which typically lasts eight or more days, and during which the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip are under curfew. When Jews kill Palestinians, Israel imposes curfews. For instance, in May 1990 when Ami Popper murdered seven Palestinian workers and wounded another ten in Rishon le-Zion, the entire Gaza Strip was put under curfew for eight days. When, in 1994, BARUCH GOLDSTEIN massacred twenty-nine Muslim worshipers in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE, all of HEBRON's Palestinian population was put under curfew for a month. Palestinians killing Israelis is another occasion for curfew. For instance, when unknown assailants stabbed to death Rabbi Shlomoh Ra'anan in his mobile home in the settlement outpost of Tel Rumeida in the southern part of HEBRON DISTRICT, Israel imposed a curfew on all 18,000 Palestinians living in H2 (Israeli-controlled Hebron) and imposed a hermetic closure on H1 (the Palestinian-controlled part of the city), where 150,000 people live.

During OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, a major Israeli offensive lasting three weeks during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the IDF imposed a curfew on most residents of the West Bank, and in some areas, to prevent Palestinian resistance, the curfew continued even after the operation finished. In the next incursion, OPERATION DETERMINED PATH, which lasted several months, the army reentered Palestinian cities in the West Bank and reinstated the curfew for all the cities except JERICHO and for many refugee camps, towns, and villages. In the initial weeks of the operation, almost 2 million Palestinians were under curfew. After two months, the IDF began to gradually lift the curfew from the towns and villages, but the major cities remained under curfew for many more months.

See also CLOSURE; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT

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Custodian of Absentee Property

The ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW that Israel enacted in 1950 defines categories of "absentee persons," which then permits the state of Israel to seize their property. By this law Israel acquired all the land, homes, movable properties, and other assets of the approximately 800,000 Palestinian REFUGEES of the 1948 WAR as well as those of many Palestinian citizens of Israel, such as the PRESENT ABSENTEES. The law stipulates that all the property of the absentees would be transferred to the Custodian of Absentee Property, with no possibility of appeal or compensation. (From there, by means of another law, the property was transferred to the state of Israel or the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND.) The law gives the custodian the "right" to seize, administer,

and control land owned by persons defined as "absentees." An absentee is someone who is not on his land on a specified verification date. Eventually all absentee property is turned over to a state institution for exclusive use by Jews.

Some relevant aspects of the authority of the Custodian as prescribed in law are as follows: "(1) All absentees' property is hereby vested in the Custodian . . . (a) every right an absentee had in any property shall pass automatically to the Custodian . . . and the status of the Custodian shall be the same as was that of the owner of the property. (b) The proceeds of vested property shall be dealt with like the vested property yielding the proceeds. (c) Vested property . . . (2) may be taken over by the Custodian wherever he may find it. . . (5) The fact that the identity of an absentee is unknown shall not prevent his property from being absentees' property . . . (6) (a) A person who has in his possession any absentees' property is bound to hand it over to the Custodian. (b) A person who has a debt to or any other obligation towards an absentee shall pay such debt or discharge such obligation to the Custodian. . . . (7) . . . (b) The Custodian may, himself or through others having his written consent, incur any expenses and make any investments necessary for the care, maintenance, repair or development of held property or for other similar purposes [for use by Jews]. (8) (a) The Custodian may carry on the management of a business on behalf of an absentee, whether or not he indicates that the business is managed by the Custodian, but he shall always have the right to sell or lease the whole or a part of the business, and—(1) if it is the business of an individual—to liquidate it; (2) if it is the business of a partnership all the partners of which are shareholders which are absentees, or of a cooperative society, in which all the members of which are absentees—to wind up the partnership, company or cooperative society by order . . . (7) in every case as if the Custodian had been appointed as a liquidator not replaceable by another liquidator."

Israeli historian Tom Segev has described in detail the work of the Custodian of Absentee Property in Israel in 1948–1949. This Custodian commissioned individual contractors with the following advice: "'Go from house to house, from shop to shop, from warehouse to warehouse, from plant to plant, from quarry to quarry, from field to field, from orchard to orchard, and also from bank to bank and safe to safe—to count, measure, evaluate, estimate, replace locks on doors and transfer all moveable property to well-guarded warehouses, while maintaining a correct inventory of the property and its location.'

"This inventory included approximately 45,000 homes and apartments, 7,000 shops and businesses, 500 workshops and industrial plants, and over 1,000 warehouses. Alongside this work, the Custodian wanted to ensure that over 800,000 acres of Palestinian land continued to be cultivated so that crops didn't go to waste and livestock did not die. All profits were to go to the government treasury, although many were taken for individual personal use and sale against orders of the government."

How much of Israel's territory consists of land consfiscated under the Absentee Property Law is uncertain but in an interview in 1980, the Custodian of Absentee Property estimated, "this could amount to up to 70 percent of the territory of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."

See also Absentee Property Law; Israeli Regime and the Question of Democracy; Palestinian Refugee Property Claims; War, 1948

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D

Da'am

Da'am/Organization for Democratic Action is a Palestinian-Jewish, secular Marxist party in Israel that broke away from Israel's COMMUNIST Party in 1995. It argues that the Palestinian question will be solved only within the context of a global solution to the crises caused by capitalism.

Dahlan, Muhammad Yusuf (1961–)

Muhammad Dahlan (Muhammad Yusuf Shakir Dahlan/Abu Fathi) was head of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's (PNA) Preventive Security Service (PSS) in GAZA from 1994 to 2000. He is a member of FATAH and was a leader of the First INTIFADA, during which he was deported, landing in TUNIS where he became the protégé of YASIR ARAFAT. Dahlan returned to Gaza with Arafat and his coterie in 1994, where he established a personal power base, growing out of his position in the PSS. Arafat's trust in Dahlan was reflected in the negotiating positions he appointed him to as PNA representative: at the US-sponsored WYE RIVER talks (1998), at CAMP DAVID (2000), and at TABA (2001). In the Occupied Territories, he became a principal representative of Fatah's "YOUNG GUARD" and a vocal critic of the older generation of Palestinian leaders who returned from exile with Yasir Arafat and remained entrenched at the head of Fatah institutions. During the years of the OSLO PROCESS (1994–2000), Dahlan enjoyed generally good relations with Israel and the UNITED STATES, including long-established cooperative links with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). In 2006–2007, Dahlan led the Fatah insurrection against HAMAS to weaken the resistance of the Islamist movement, which seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, and in 2008 he advised Israel ahead of OPERATION CAST LEAD, the twenty-two-day offensive in the Gaza Strip.

Born in the Khan Yunis refugee camp in the Gaza Strip to a REFUGEE family from Hammama, Palestine (now Nitzanim, Israel), Dahlan began his political activity as a teenager in Khan Yunis, where he recruited friends into organized groups for civic projects, such as road sweeping. As a student leader at the Islamic University of Gaza, where he earned a B.A. in business administration, he expanded the group to become a network of charitable organizations staffed by children and teens. Members delivered food and medicine door-to-door while advocating Palestinian nationalism and national unity. In 1981 the group formally became the Shabiba (Fatah Youth Movement), which was a driving force in the First Intifada.

When the Intifada broke out in 1987, Dahlan emerged as one of the uprising's young leaders in Gaza, but in 1988, Israel arrested and DEPORTED him to JORDAN. From there he went to Tunis, becoming very close to Yasir Arafat. He speaks fluent Hebrew, much of which he learned during eleven incarcerations in Israeli prisons before he was twenty-five. Dahlan was allowed to return to Gaza in July 1994 with Arafat, who put him in control of the Fatah movement in Gaza and made him head of the PSS for the Gaza Strip, one of the major security forces of the PNA. The control of these two large organizations made Dahlan one of the most powerful officials in the PNA.

As head of the newly formed PSS, Dahlan was responsible for building a police force from scratch. He received training and assistance from the CIA and created a police force of more than 20,000 men. Dahlan also developed a small empire in Gaza, informally called "Dahlanistan." He maintained order, sometimes ruthlessly, and Palestinian and international human rights organizations accused his PSS of serious abuses, including torture. He accumulated personal wealth from some of the PNA's monopolies—for example, oil and cement—and from the awarding of building contracts. Dahlan was the object of considerable criticism when he purchased the largest house in Gaza—the luxurious estate of former Gaza mayor HAJJ RASHAD AL-SHAWWA—for a reported $600,000. The fact that Dahlan's many years in Israeli jails insulated him to some extent from public criticism, and he was popular among younger Fatah members, who identified with him more easily than with

the senior Palestinian Tunisian leadership. Nevertheless, that he contributed to the PNA's reputation for corruption is undeniable.

As head of the Gazan PSS, Dahlan was responsible for restraining Palestinian militants, in particular Hamas, which rejected the OSLO ACCORDS between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel and which carried out attacks against Israel. At a January 1994 meeting in Rome with senior ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and SHIN BET officials, Dahlan is believed to have drawn up a plan to coordinate security measures for containing Hamas. Until 2001 he met regularly with Israeli and US defense and intelligence officials. Dahlan's close liaison with the CIA and Israeli security services earned him considerable suspicion among the Palestinians and often accusations of COLLABORATION. In 1995, following a spate of Hamas SUICIDE BOMBINGS, Dahlan cracked down hard on the militant Islamic organization's infrastructure. On orders from Arafat, he disarmed and jailed some 2,000 known Hamas members, shaved their beards, and tortured many. His police also raided and closed Islamic charities, schools, and mosques. Even Israel acknowledged that the PNA's actions against Hamas were effective. During the crackdown, Dahlan worked closely with the FBI and the CIA, and he developed a warm relationship with US CIA director GEORGE TENET, an appointee of President BILL CLINTON who stayed on under President GEORGE W. BUSH until July 2004.

Dahlan (and Arafat) were able to strike Hamas in 1996 because the PNA and the Oslo peace process with which it was identified still enjoyed the support of the majority of the Palestinian public. Within a year, however, a new Israeli (LIKUD) government was in place, and Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU and his aides effectively halted implementation of the Oslo Accords. As a result public confidence in the OSLO PROCESS began to slip among Palestinians, and the PNA's repression of militants for the benefit of an Israeli government that was not interested in ending the OCCUPATION became controversial among Palestinians. By the time the AL-AQSA INTIFADA erupted in September 2000, Palestinian anger at the failure of Oslo to bring them anything but increased hardship was intense and extremely widespread. In such an environment, Dahlan could do little to rein in militants.

In November 2000, Israel accused Dahlan of being a TERRORIST, and Prime Minister EHUD BARAK dispatched Israeli planes to strafe Dahlan's Gaza headquarters, after which opposition leader ARIEL SHARON declared that Dahlan "deserved to die" and should be "liquidated." Six months later, Dahlan's motorcade came under fire from the IDF, seriously wounding four of his bodyguards as he returned to Gaza from a negotiating session with Israeli officials. Dahlan, however, continued to be a player in Palestinian politics. In 2002, together with HASAN 'ASFUR, SAEB EREKAT, MUHAMMAD RASHID, and NABIL SHA'TH—the "GANG OF FIVE"—Dahlan took over leadership of the PNA from Arafat, running its affairs from March to May.

In 2003, after an intense struggle over the composition of the new Palestinian Cabinet, and under heavy pressure from the United States and Great Britain, Arafat agreed on 23 April that MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen), the minister of the interior, would bring Dahlan into the government as minister of state for security affairs. Within two weeks, Abbas had quietly authorized Dahlan to restructure the PNA's Interior Ministry, in preparation for cracking down on militant groups under the US-sponsored ROAD MAP to Middle East peace. This effectively gave Dahlan control of the ministry and about 20,000 of the PNA's security police, but without the official job title. From the start, the struggle between Arafat and Abbas over Abbas's appointment of Dahlan contributed to undermining Dahlan in Gaza by making him look like an Israeli and US security agent.

Additionally, Dahlan was in the difficult position of needing the cooperation of both Hamas and Israel's Likud government if he was to deliver on his security obligations under the Road Map. While Israel expected Dahlan to produce a complete cessation of attacks on Israelis, the Palestinian public and the Islamic organizations expected him to obtain an end to Israel's TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS and incursions into the West Bank and Gaza, lifting of Israeli CLOSURES so that Palestinians could work their fields, and release of the thousands of PRISONERS in Israeli jails—none of which Dahlan could deliver without the cooperation of Ariel Sharon, now prime minister, who declined to provide it.

In 2004 Dahlan put forward a plan to negotiate with Hamas and smaller militant groups to bring about a *hudna* (cease-fire) with Israel, which he achieved in July 2004. He proposed to detach up to 25,000 men from Fatah's TANZIM and AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, and remove them from

their WEST BANK power bases by turning them into a border police force, deployed along the BORDERS with Israel, Jordan, and the Golan Heights. In their place, the Palestinian cities would be policed by a newly created police force, made up of new recruits with no prior attachment to existing factions. Dahlan had apparently presented his intentions to the Bush administration at the Aqaba Summit of 4 June 2003 and won US approval. In practice, however, Abbas's government (already suffering repeated disagreements with Arafat and his supporters in the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE) was unable to elicit the necessary Israeli cooperation for Dahlan's proposals. The *hudna* collapsed in its second month, when Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD withdrew following the IDF's assassination of a senior leader from each of their respective movements.

In mid-July 2004 Dahlan was behind a wave of kidnappings and protests against his opponents in other factions that brought chaos to the Gaza Strip. Although Israeli and Western MEDIA tended to present the unrest as protest by "reformers" against a corrupt OLD GUARD, Palestinian commentators emphasized that this was rather a face-off between strong men in positions of power who used issues of reform and corruption to lend support to those who wished to challenge Arafat's entrenched leadership. And even though Dahlan and others were profiting from grassroots discontent, they had, in fact, used the same tools of patronage, cronyism, and brute force to rise to positions of prominence as had Arafat. When Abbas was elected president of the PNA in early 2005 after Arafat's death, he appointed Dahlan as minister for cabinet affairs. But PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL elections, held shortly thereafter, brought a Hamas government to power, and Dahlan's authority was diminished, although he was narrowly elected to the council as a representative for Khan Yunis in the legislative elections of 2006.

With the victory of Hamas, tensions between Hamas and Fatah escalated significantly. As the Palestinians slid toward civil war in the spring of 2006, Dahlan played a major role in fomenting unrest. And when, in June, Israel opened a campaign (which included the deaths of some 1,000 mostly Palestinian civilians from June to August) to bring down the elected Hamas government, Dahlan and his Fatah comrades did not attempt to protect their fellow Gazans, hoping, it appeared, that Hamas would fall and they could once again assume power. Unwilling to preside over a Palestinian civil war, Abbas tried another tactic. For weeks, King Abdullah of SAUDI ARABIA had been trying to persuade him to meet with leaders of Hamas in Mecca and formally establish a national unity government. On 6 February 2007, Abbas agreed to meet and took Dahlan with him. Two days later, on 8 February, the two major Palestinian factions—Fatah and Hamas—signed a historic conciliation agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, known as the MECCA AGREEMENT.

Subsequently, Hamas and Fatah formed a National Unity Government in which ISMAIL HANIYEH of Hamas would be prime minister while Fatah members would occupy several important posts. The Bush administration was strongly opposed to this government, because it included Hamas and offered the organization legitimacy, and immediately drew up plans to bring about its demise. The US State Department proffered a proposal known as "Plan B"; its objective, according to a State Department memo that has been authenticated by an official who knew of it at the time, was to "enable [Abbas] and his supporters to reach a defined endgame by the end of 2007. The endgame should produce a [PNA] government through democratic means that accepts QUARTET principles." This would remove Hamas from a leadership role in the government. Plan B also called for Abbas to "collapse the government" if Hamas refused to alter its hostile attitude toward Israel. From there, Abbas could call early elections or impose an emergency government. It is unclear whether, as PNA president, Abbas had the constitutional authority to dissolve an elected government led by a rival party.

Another plan to terminate the National Unity Government was revealed by *Vanity Fair* magazine, which obtained and published confidential documents, since corroborated by sources in the United States and Palestine, that exposed a covert initiative spearheaded by Dahlan, approved by Bush, and facilitated by Secretary of State CONDOLEEZZA RICE and Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams to provoke a Palestinian civil war. The plan was for Dahlan to lead, armed with new weapons supplied at US behest, which would give Fatah the muscle it needed to remove the democratically elected Hamas-led government from power. According to a State Department official who declined to have his name on the record, there were two "parallel programs": the overt one, which the

Bush administration took to Congress, "and a covert one, not only to buy arms but to pay the salaries of security personnel" to wage a campaign to remove Hamas. Congress never passed a measure expressly prohibiting the supply of aid to Fatah and Dahlan, but, according to a former CIA official, "it was close to the margins, but it probably wasn't illegal." Legal or not, arms shipments soon began to take place.

During the implementation of the secret plan, Dahlan "used my image, my power," to wage what he termed "very clever warfare" for many months. According to several alleged victims, the tactics in this warfare entailed widespread kidnapping and extensive torture of Hamas members. Dahlan denies the use of such tactics but admits "mistakes" were made.

On 1 February 2007, Dahlan took his warfare to a new level when Fatah forces under his control stormed the Islamic University of Gaza, a Hamas stronghold, and set several buildings on fire. Hamas retaliated the next day with a wave of attacks on police stations. The National Unity Government lasted only a few weeks. Instead of driving its Islamist enemies out of power, the US-backed Fatah fighters, led by Dahlan, inadvertently provoked Hamas to seize total control of Gaza by mid-June 2007. In March 2007, despite objections from Hamas, Abbas appointed Dahlan to lead a newly reestablished Palestinian National Security Council, intended to oversee all security services in the Palestinian territories. However, after the Hamas takeover of Gaza, Abbas issued a decree in July 2007 dissolving his security council.

Dahlan has been blamed by many in Fatah for the rapid collapse of its forces in Gaza in the face of a Hamas offensive of June 2007 that lasted less than a week. Dahlan and most of the other senior commanders of the Fatah-dominated PNA security forces were not in Gaza during the fighting, leading to charges that they had abandoned their men in the field. During the fighting, Dahlan's house on the coast of Gaza was seized by Hamas militants and subsequently demolished.

No man is more hated among Hamas members than Dahlan, who has been a favorite of US presidents and policymakers. Mahmoud Zahar, the former foreign minister for the Haniyeh government, who now leads Hamas's militant wing in Gaza, commented that "everyone here recognizes that Dahlan was trying with American help to undermine the results of the elections. He was the one planning a coup." President Bush has met Dahlan on at least three occasions. After talks at the White House in July 2003, Bush publicly praised Dahlan as "a good, solid leader." Many Israeli and US officials say that the US president described him privately as "our guy." Dahlan stated in *Vanity Fair:* "Yes, I was close to Bill Clinton, I met Clinton many times with Arafat." Indeed, according to the *New York Times*, Dahlan was trusted by some in Israel and the United States, and some saw him as a potential successor to Abbas as Palestinian president.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

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Dajani Family

The Dajani family is deeply rooted in the history of Palestine and especially in JERUSALEM. During the BRITISH MANDATE, leading members of the family played important roles in the Opposition Party (led by the NASHASHIBI FAMILY). Dajanis

helped form the Arab National Party in 1923 and were later associated with the NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY. The family is known primarily for its achievements in the professions of medicine, law, and journalism, as well as in politics and business.

Historically prominent Dajanis include Sufist shaykh Ahmed Dajani, who lived in Spain in the fifteenth century. He led pilgrims to Jerusalem, where he was recognized as a learned religious leader. As a reward for his services to the people of Jerusalem, the OTTOMAN EMPIRE appointed him as the custodian of Prophet David's Mausoleum.

Other important family members included Abdel Rahman Ahmad, who became the first mayor of Jerusalem in 1763; Shaykh Hussein Bin Salim (1788–1858), the grand mufti (judge) of HAIFA; Abdullah Shafik (1871–1927), a well-known judge in JAFFA; Aref Bakr Ahmad (1856–1930), the second Dajani to serve as mayor of Jerusalem and later, under the British Mandate, head of the MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION in Jerusalem; Shaykh Rawfiq Abdullah (1865–1951), mufti of Jaffa; Aref Pasha (1860–1930), also president of the Muslim-Christian Association during the mandate; and Mohammed Taher, elected in the late 1950s and early 1960s as a member of the Municipality of Jerusalem and the Arab Chamber of Commerce.

Several family members have been involved in the Jordanian government: Said Wafa, a district officer in the British Mandate government who also served in the Jordanian administration and from 1965 was a Cabinet minister several times; Nijm-ul-Din and Raja'i, ministers in the Jordanian government in the 1970s; Nijm-ul-Din, ambassador; Haj Ali Taher, minister of transportation in the Jordanian Cabinet in the mid-1960s; and Omar Sidqi, confidant and political advisor of King Abdullah of JORDAN.

Others in the family have been active in medicine or journalism: Fouad Ismail Bakr (1890–1940), a physician who built the first private hospital in Jaffa, known as the Dajani Hospital; Hasan Sidqi (1898–1938), a lawyer and journalist and one of the main leaders of the al-Dajani-Nashashibi opposition, leading to his assassination by the HUSAYNI faction; Mahmud Taher, a physician who established the Red Cross and Red Crescent Associations in Jerusalem in 1947; and Kamel Dajani, who was the first to issue a newspaper in Jaffa, *Al-Sabah* (The Morning), dealing with current political issues, and who was later a Jordanian government minister in the 1960s.

More recently Ahmed Sidqi (1936–2003) was a senior PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION official who served in several capacities: as a member of the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (1977–1985), a member of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, director of the PLO's PALESTINE RESEARCH CENTER, and cofounder of its organ *Shu'un Filastiniyya* (Palestine Affairs).

Dalet Plan/Plan Dalet

Plan Dalet, or Plan D, was a military strategy developed by the HAGANA, a Jewish military force in Mandatory Palestine considered illegal by the British, but regarded as a legitimate popular military force by the settler population. Plan D was conceived in phases: (1) Plan B, September 1945; (2) the May 1946 Plan, revised in December 1947 after the passage of the 1947 UN Partition plan (UN RESOLUTION 181); and (3) the Yehoshua Plan, 1948, finalized on 10 March 1948. Officially, the Zionist leadership described its purpose as defending the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, revisionist Israeli historians have argued that the true purpose of the final plan was to conquer as much of Palestine as possible in addition to what the UNITED NATIONS had allotted for the Jewish state and to force as many Palestinians as feasible to leave both the allotted and conquered areas. Although the military devised Plan D, the highest political echelons, including DAVID BEN-GURION, supported it.

The plan begins: "the objective of this plan . . . also aims at gaining control of the areas of Jewish SETTLEMENTS and concentration which are located outside the BORDERS [of the Hebrew state] against regular, semi-regular, and small forces operating from bases outside or inside the state." In Section 3b, Plan Dalet describes how defense forces were expected to deal with occupied "enemy" population centers by "destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously . . . [and by] mounting search and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search inside it, in the event of resistance, the armed force must be destroyed and the population expelled outside the borders of the state."

The Hagana officially began to implement Plan Dalet in April of 1948, although there had been numerous ethnic cleansing operations prior to that time, setting in motion the TRANSFER of Palestinians from their towns. On 9 April Jewish forces killed 254 Palestinians in the village of DEIR YASSIN. Within a month Palestinians were expelled from JAFFA, HAIFA, TIBERIAS, and SAFED. Israeli historian Ilan Pappe describes the directives of Plan Dalet: "The plan was executed because the soldiers in the battlefield were oriented by a general attitude from above and motivated by remarks made by the Yishuv's leaders on the need to 'clean' the country. These remarks were translated into acts of depopulation by enthusiastic commanders on the ground who knew that their actions would be justified in retrospect by the political leadership."

Israeli scholar Avi Shlaim provides an important insight: "The novelty and audacity of the plan lay in the orders to capture Arab villages and cities. . . . [Plan D's] objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians. By implementing Plan D in April and May [1948], the Hagana thus directly and decisively contributed to the birth of the Palestinian REFUGEE problem."

According to Pappe, "Plan D can be regarded in many respects as a master plan for [Palestinian] expulsion. Moreover, the Plan legitimized, *a priori,* some of the more horrendous atrocities committed by Jewish soldiers. . . . Plan D, with its specific orders of destruction and eviction [resulted in] the lower strata of the Palestinian society [being] driven out. . . . The massacre in *Deir Yassin* [also] played an important role in driving these groups out of Palestine in April and May 1948. . . . [It] had a psychological effect on the Arab community and acted as a catalyst to the exodus."

The success of Plan D within the overall context of the establishment of Israel resulted in the expulsion or flight of some 770,000 to 800,000 Palestinians, more than half the total population, and their transformation into refugees. Four hundred eighteen villages were destroyed (more than 50 percent of the total Arab property in Palestine), and vast amounts of agricultural land were burned, while large quantities of both movable and fixed property (houses, factories, livestock, jewelry, bank accounts, etc.) were confiscated. This huge displacement of the Palestinians gave Israel a sovereign Jewish state in 78 percent of historic Palestine, with only a small population of Arabs remaining.

See also PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROPERTY CLAIMS; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; WAR, 1948

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Darwish, Mahmud (1942–2008)

A Palestinian poet and political activist, Mahmud Darwish was arguably the most acclaimed poet in the Arab world. He was born in al-Birwah, a mixed Christian-Muslim village between HAIFA and ACRE in the Galilee. In 1948, after he was dispossessed by the Israelis and his village destroyed, he fled to LEBANON with his landowning Sunni Muslim family. The family returned to Haifa clandestinely after the census of Palestinians and thus had no proper identification papers. Darwish was a founder of AL-ARD (The Land), a left-wing noncommunist, Arab nationalist political party banned by Israel in 1963. He was also a member of RAKAH (the Communist Party) and editor of its newspaper, *al-Ittihad*. Several times between 1961 and 1969, Israel imprisoned Darwish or placed him under house arrest, often for traveling around the country without a PERMIT.

He left Israel in 1970 for the USSR and then settled in Cairo in 1971, where he worked for *al-Ahram,* the official Egyptian newspaper. In 1973 he joined the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and moved to Beirut, where he was an assistant to the director of the PLO Revolutionary Council, later becoming the director. During his time in Beirut, he edited *Shu'un Filastiniyya* (the party magazine) and *al-Karmil* (a literary review). After the LEBANON WAR in 1982, Darwish left with PLO forces to TUNIS; then, following disagreements within the PLO, he moved to Paris and then to Amman, JORDAN, and Ramallah in the WEST BANK. Even after the OSLO PROCESS, Israel forbade him from returning to Haifa. He drafted the Palestinian DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE in 1988, was president of the Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists from 1984 until his death, and was a member of the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE from 1987 to 1993. Darwish has often been criticized for what some have considered his excessive closeness to Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT. Many readers consider his poem "Madih al-Zill al-Ali" an homage to Arafat, although Darwish denies it.

Poetry is the preeminent mode of cultural expression in the Arab world, and Mahmud Darwish is the iconic poetic voice of the Palestinian people. His poetry is characterized by vivid and haunting metaphors that tell of the suffering, loss, and resistance of the Palestinian people. Although Darwish's preoccupation with Palestinian issues remained constant, his treatment of these concerns evolved considerably through the years. His second poetry collection, *Awraq al-Zaytun* (Olive Leaves), published in 1964, contains two of his most famous poems. In "Identity Card," he writes an imaginary response to an Israeli official's questions, defining himself as an Arab robbed of his land who does not hate but only reacts like an animal when cornered. In "On Resistance," Darwish presents the land, the peasants, and resistance as an unbreakable trinity. As with all his political poems, aesthetic considerations were subordinated to the political imperative of encouraging Palestinians to resist Israel's encroachment. His early love poems foreshadow the eventual transformation of the beloved female into the beloved homeland that is characteristic of Darwish's subsequent poetry. The transformation appears complete in *Ashiq Min Filastin* (A Lover from Palestine, 1966, 1970). This intimate love relationship between poet and land grows steadily more intense until it reaches an almost mystical union in Darwish's later poems.

While he lived in exile, Darwish's encounter with the reality of the Arab world proved disillusioning, and much of his poetry contains a gripping sense of nostalgia for Galilee, Haifa, Mount Carmel, and the coast of Palestine, scenes that reverberate through the poems of the early and mid-1970s. The poetry of this phase is replete with common images of daily life in the homeland,

such as the faces of family, friends, and the topography of the landscape. These poetic meditations are reflected in Darwish's collection *Uhibbuki aw la Uhibbuki* (I Love You, I Love You Not), published in 1972. Here the words, pictures, memory, and dreams of life before the Nakba (1948 catastrophe) join descriptions of wounds and death in exile as key concepts in Darwish's poetic language. In these poems the workings of dream and memory and the body of the beloved female blend imperceptibly with that of the homeland until they become virtually indistinguishable.

Although Darwish's poetry has a personal, almost confessional quality, it also frequently appeals to the prophetic tradition of the three great monotheistic religions, which imparts a universalistic dimension to these poems. Increasingly the cross, crucifixion, and especially wounds and sacrificial death become permanent motifs. Darwish also makes extensive use of the Hebrew prophets, notably Isaiah and Jeremiah, on whom he frequently calls to condemn Israel's acts of injustice against the Palestinians; for instance, *Uhibbuki aw la Uhibbuki* begins with seventeen psalms to Palestine. In tone and style, many of Darwish's lamentations echo those of the Old Testament, which Darwish, bilingual in Arabic and Hebrew, was able to read in the original.

Two important poems Darwish wrote after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon merit mention, both for their form and substance. Both "Qasidat Bayrut" (Ode to Beirut, 1982) and "Madih al-Zill al-Ali" (A Eulogy for the Tall Shadow, 1983) are narrative poems of substantial length. The subject of both is the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982. In each, Darwish abandons the subjective voice of the lyricist and, following the tradition of the classical Arab poets, uses the plural to praise the collective heroics of his people. Both poems employ a simpler, more direct, and clearer style than that of his earlier, more introspective poems. Of the two poems, "Madih al-Zill al-Ali" is significantly longer and is considered more accomplished artistically. It introduces into modern Arabic poetry the city (Beirut) and the sea (Mediterranean) as objects of sustained poetic interest and continues Darwish's cultivation of the prophetic voice, in this case using the voice of the prophet of Islam, Muhammad, to chastise the Arab regimes for abandoning the Palestinians and the Lebanese to the Israeli onslaught. Darwish's harshest invectives are reserved for the oil-rich Arab monarchies. Since writing these two narrative poems, Darwish's style has again become more intensely personal, although it is also allegorical. But in his most recent work, he avoids references to present-day occurrences—at least not in any discernible context.

Darwish received many awards for his poetry, including the Lotus Prize (Union of Afro-Asian Writers, 1969), the Lenin Prize (USSR, 1982), the Lannan Cultural Freedom Prize (United States, 2001), and the Erich Maria Remarque Peace Prize (Germany, 2003). Darwish was nominated as a Nobel laureate.

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Dayan, Moshe (1915–1981)

A prominent Israeli military and political leader, Moshe Dayan was the architect of Israel's military policy in three wars: the 1956 invasion of EGYPT; the 1967 WAR against Egypt, JORDAN, and SYRIA; and the 1973 War against Egypt and Syria. As foreign minister for Israeli prime minister MENAHEM

BEGIN, he was instrumental in fashioning the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS with Egypt.

Dayan was born in Deganya, an agricultural settlement in Palestine, the son of Shemuel Dayan (1891–1968), who was born in Zhashkov, Ukraine, and immigrated to Palestine in 1908. His mother, Devorah (1890–1956), came to Palestine from Russia in 1913. As a young man Dayan learned guerrilla warfare tactics and became the leader of special night patrols organized to fight Palestinian resistance groups during the BRITISH MANDATE. He helped organize the HAGANA, an illegal military force in British-occupied Palestine, which resulted in his arrest and imprisonment from 1939 to 1941. After his release Dayan served with British forces during World War II. While in combat in Syria, he lost his left eye, and the black patch he wore thereafter became a distinguishing trademark.

Moshe Dayan was known for his outspokenness. For instance, commenting on the transformation of Palestine into Israel, he remarked in an often-quoted 1969 speech before students at the Israeli Institute of Technology: "We came here to a country that was populated by Arabs, and we are building a Hebrew, Jewish state. . . . Instead of Arab villages, Jewish villages were established. You even do not know the name of the villages and I do not blame you, because those geography books no longer exist. Not only the books, but the villages no longer exist. . . . There is not a single SETTLEMENT that was not established in the place of a former Arab village."

Dayan played a major part in the development of Israel's civil militarism and was the epitome of the warrior-politician. He provided a clear example of discursive militarism in his famous eulogy for a KIBBUTZ member who was killed by infiltrators from the GAZA STRIP in April 1956. "It is our generation's fate," said Dayan, "it is our choice in life to be ready and armed, strong and unflinching, lest the sword slip from our grasp and our lives be cut off. . . . Let us not today fling accusation at the murderers. What cause have we to complain about their fierce hatred to us? For eight years now, they sit in their refugee camps in Gaza, and before their eyes we turn into our homestead the land and villages in which they and their forefathers have lived. We should demand his blood not from the [Palestinian] Arabs of Gaza but from ourselves. . . . Let us make our reckoning today. We are a generation of settlers, and without the steel helmet and gun barrel, we shall not be able to plant a tree or build a house. . . . Let us not be afraid to see the hatred that accompanies and consumes the lives of hundreds of thousands of Arabs who sit all around us and wait for the moment when their hands will be able to reach our blood."

In 1958 Dayan retired from the military and joined Israel's LABOR PARTY (MAPAI). The following year he was elected to the Knesset and was appointed minister of agriculture under Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION. He resigned in 1964 but joined Ben-Gurion in forming the new RAFI Party (Alliance of Israel's Workers) in 1965, from which he was reelected to the Knesset. During the crisis preceding the 1967 War, Dayan was appointed minister of defense.

After the war Dayan was the first top-level secular politician to use suggestive biblical metaphors in his rhetoric; for example, he stated: "we've returned to Shilo [believed to have been a sanctuary containing the Ark of the Covenant until it was taken by the Philistines]," and "we've returned to Anathot [the prophet Isaiah's birthplace] never to part from them again." In Israel Dayan was the adored victor in a glorious war and according to AMOS ELON, it was at Dayan's "urging that the war was retrospectively named after the Six Days of Creation. Right-wing and religious fundamentalists made the most of the victory and endowed the Six-Day War with a metaphysical, pseudo-messianic aura." After successfully conducting the war, Dayan pacified the WEST BANK and developed a long-term plan—the DAYAN PLAN—for establishing Israeli control over the area. He then served as the military administrator for the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

As Menahem Begin's foreign minister, Moshe Dayan personally advocated his expansive vision for Israel's future to the UNITED STATES, which provides crucial insight into the US-Israeli relationship. The Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* reported his efforts in an article headlined "The Fathers of Success: Israel Has Succeeded in Finding the Most Appropriate Line in Its Relations with Washington." According to *Ha'aretz*, and verified by others, the basis of the Dayan Plan, as presented to Washington was threefold:

1. Because Israel could do its own fighting, all it needed from the United States was armaments, not soldiers.

2. A militarily strong Israel, with the land acquired in the 1967 War, would make the Arabs despair of a military solution, thus preserving the peace and preventing the possibility of a confrontation in the Middle East between the United States and the Soviet Union.
3. A greater Israel could serve American interests in the Middle East—mainly the uninterrupted flow of oil—by protecting the conservative Arab regimes (the oil-rich kingdoms of the Persian Gulf) from the Arab radicals, such as Egypt and Syria. In the *Ha'aretz* piece Dayan was quoted as saying, "We explained that the Israeli army, with its real and not just relative power, presents a first line of defense for American interests in the Mediterranean area."

"To sum up," said Dayan, "what we did was to succeed in intertwining some of our interests with some American interests. . . . We suddenly realized that the State Department is not the place where 'the buck stops.' We realized that [Secretary of State WILLIAM] ROGERS can advance programs, but that it is possible to reject these and not bring the world to an end. Thanks in no small measure to [then ambassador] YITZHAK RABIN and his assistants, we suddenly discovered that we not only have contributors in the United States, but that we can exert strong and influential pressure and help to benefit individuals in elections. This time we succeeded in part in mobilizing our power (not officially, of course) to help [President RICHARD] NIXON in the election."

After convincing the United States of Israel's vision for the Middle East and after the Israeli-Egyptian treaties were concluded in 1979, Dayan resigned from Begin's government and formed a new party, TELEM, which won two seats in the 1981 election. Dayan died shortly thereafter.

During his life Dayan was also an avid amateur archaeologist, which led to some controversy because of his illegal private acquisition of historical artifacts, often with the help of his soldiers. Upon his death Dayan's extensive archaeological collection was sold to the state. Dayan also wrote five books: *Diary of the Sinai Campaign* (1966), *Mappah Hadasha-Yahasim Aherim* (New Map, Different Relations, 1969) on problems after the 1967 War, *Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life* (1976), *Living with the Bible* (1978), and *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (1981).

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; DAYAN PLAN; INFILTRATION AND RETALIATION; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT

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Dayan Plan

After Israel's sweeping victory in the 1967 WAR, two Israeli leaders—YIGAL ALLON and MOSHE DAYAN—put forth plans for the newly OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Within two weeks of the war's end, the two plans were conceptualized and ready for discussion by the Israeli Cabinet. The June 1967 Dayan Plan advocated settling Jews in densely populated Palestinian areas, while the ALLON PLAN called for establishing SETTLEMENTS as territorial buffers in strategic areas. Both plans were variations on the same goal of permanent Israeli control of major parts of the WEST BANK. As well as providing the guiding framework for the settlement movement in the years to come, Dayan and Allon both defined the limits of debate about the disposition of the West Bank and permanently foreclosed a range of other Israeli options. Although neither plan was ever officially adopted by an Israeli Cabinet, they have nevertheless provided the guiding principles for all Israeli governments as the settlement project inexorably moved forward.

Dayan's plan was based on the argument that Israel's minimum security requirements called for retention of some two-thirds of the Sinai, all of SYRIA's Golan Heights, and a permanent, Israeli-controlled protective barrier along the Jordan River. Dayan envisioned permanent Israeli rule over the West Bank, which he sought to accomplish by building five blocks of settlements from north to south and settling Jews in areas with large Arab populations. The Dayan Plan proposed a vague "functional autonomy" for the Palestinians (or, he posited, they could remain citizens of JORDAN) and "garrison settlements" for the Jews. AMOS ELON, an Israeli writer and intellectual, observes that, contrasted with Allon's proposal (the Allon Plan), Dayan's plan was more ambiguous but also far more ambitious. Indeed, Dayan personally encouraged a variety of right-wing and religious fundamentalist militants to establish settlements and so-called *heachsujot* (outposts) that multiplied over the years through formal and semi-informal arrangements with the government.

Soon after the 1967 War, according to Elon, prominent Palestinian civic and political leaders were interviewed by two senior Israeli intelligence officers, one of whom was David Kimche, who later served as deputy director of MOSSAD (the Israeli intelligence agency) and director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Kimche reported that most of the Palestinian leaders throughout the West Bank, including intellectuals, notables, mayors, and religious leaders, said they were ready to establish a demilitarized Palestinian state on the West Bank and that they would sign a separate peace with Israel. The PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION at the time was still a marginal group. Dayan shelved Kimche's report, which was never submitted to the Cabinet. Dayan's vision precluded even the discussion of a Palestinian state. Moreover, Dayan believed that as long as the "natives" were treated "decently," it would be possible to maintain the status quo in the West Bank and in Gaza for generations.

Jordan's King Husayn also made an early overture to Israel. He was ready to offer concessions to Israel along the narrow coastal plain and at the WESTERN WALL in the OLD CITY of JERUSALEM. Israel, however, had its own plans for Jerusalem. The municipal area of East Jerusalem was expanded by 24 square miles (64 square kilometers) of West Bank land that included 28 Palestinian villages together with their grazing and farming lands. The newly designated area of "East Jerusalem," together with what had been West Jerusalem, was declared Israel's unified capital for "all eternity." In addition to the GREATER JERUSALEM area, which Israel established on LAND confiscated from its Palestinian owners, Israel insisted on an expanded version of the Allon Plan, which was fully supported by Dayan. This called for the annexation of the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY from Lake Tiberias down to the Dead Sea, the heavily populated area between Jerusalem and HEBRON in the south, and the slopes of the western and northern mountain range of Samaria in the north. Husayn could not politically afford to accept such far-reaching concessions.

Dayan's approach was reflected in an interview he gave at the time to the editor of *Der Spiegel*. Asked how Israel hoped to achieve peace, he answered: "by standing firm as iron, wherever we are now standing, until the Arabs are ready to give in." As the settlement project expanded rapidly, Dayan provided new legitimizations for why Israel should keep the Occupied Territories. His most persistent tactic, according to Elon, was the argument that a treaty with the Arabs would be worthless because no Arab government was capable of guaranteeing the peace. Only by keeping the Arab land, Dayan repeated, could Israel count on "a generation of peace." The Dayan Plan, and the settlement movement it gave rise to, are summa-

rized in a comment by Michael Ben Yair, Israel's attorney general in YITZHAK RABIN's government, who wrote in *Ha'aretz*: "The Six-Day War was forced on us; but the war's Seventh day, which began on June 12, 1967—continues to this day and is the product of our choice. We enthusiastically chose to become a colonialist society, ignoring international treaties, expropriating lands, transferring settlers from Israel to the Occupied Territories, engaging in theft and finding justifications for all this."

See also GUSH EMUNIM; JERUSALEM; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; UNITED STATES

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(*See also* bibliographical listings under DAYAN, MOSHE.)

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Dayr Yasin

See DEIR YASSIN

Declaration of Independence, Israel

Israel's Declaration of Independence, proclaimed on 14 May 1948, has been analyzed many times by Israeli scholars, many of whom conclude that the document contains an overarching contradiction: the conflict between universalistic democracy and the tenets of a particularistic nationalism—that is, ZIONISM—or what is also called the "dual commitment" to Jewishness and democracy. Because Israel has no constitution, the Declaration of Independence, together with the BASIC LAWS promulgated in the following years, constitutes the foundation of Israel's social, legal, and political culture. Israeli scholar Ilan Peleg argues that the declaration's dual commitment has led Israel to adopt both "Jewish" and democratic policies, and that such policies have frequently been in conflict. For example, acting Jewishly, the state sponsored the IMMIGRATION of millions of Jews under the 1950 LAW OF RETURN while, undemocratically, it acquired Palestinian LANDS specifically to "Judaize" the country and denied the right of return to Palestinian Arabs who were disposed in 1947–1948 so that Israel could be a Jewish state. Additionally, according to Peleg, "All the problems in terms of the quality of Israel's democracy stem directly from the country's adherence to its 'Jewishness' enshrined in the Declaration of Independence."

See also ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Declaration of Independence, Palestinian

At its nineteenth session (held in Algiers on 14 November 1988), the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), the legislative body of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), adopted a formal Palestinian Declaration of Independence and a symbolic Declaration of Statehood in Exile. The declaration was released with a political communiqué intended to clarify specific PLO positions.

The declaration was and remains significant because it explicitly accepts the UN General Assembly's Partition Resolution 181(II) of 1947. For the first time, and in an historic compromise, the PLO formally accepted the two-state solution, thus acknowledging Israel's claim to 78 percent of historic Palestine and signaling the PLO's willingness to settle for a Palestinian state on the remaining 22 percent.

In the declaration, the PLO also stated its commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the policy and principles of non-alignment. The latter indicated that the state of Palestine was prepared to forswear any type of security treaty or other arrangement with the SOVIET UNION, along the lines of the ones then in existence between SYRIA and the Soviet Union, and was intended as a confidence-building measure for the benefit of Israel and the UNITED STATES.

Additionally the Declaration of Independence stated that, without prejudice to its natural right to defend the state of Palestine, the PLO rejects "the threat or use of force, violence and intimidation against its territorial integrity and political independence or those of any other state." The latter commitment was also explicitly intended to allay Israel's security concerns.

In a political communiqué attached to the declaration, the PNC indicated its willingness to accept UN supervision over Palestine on an interim basis until the OCCUPATION was terminated. The Palestinian concept of UN supervision was flexible; it could be implemented by means of a UN trusteeship of Palestine, or it could involve temporary UN supervision (or even temporary supervision by US troops). In whatever form, the concept was intended to reassure Israel.

The political communiqué called for the convocation of an international peace conference on the Middle East, based on UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 (1967) AND 338 (1973), which would guarantee the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, first and foremost their right to self-determination. In other words, the PLO explicitly accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 but requested an additional element. The PNC's acceptance of these resolutions represented a significant concession as well as a major policy change by the Palestinians. The PLO had traditionally rejected Resolutions 242 and 338 because they referred only to a "solution to the REFUGEE problem" and said nothing about the political rights of the Palestinians.

Further, in the political communiqué the PLO indicated its willingness to establish a voluntary confederation between the states of JORDAN and Palestine. Again, this was a concession to the United States and Israel, which had called repeatedly for such a union—in the 1978 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and the 1982 REAGAN PLAN, among others. The United States, however, did not consider the declaration sufficient to meet its demands for conducting a dialogue with the PLO and Israel dismissed it out of hand.

After the PNC issued the Declaration of Independence, Chairman YASIR ARAFAT vigorously pursued a peace offensive, most notably in his 14 December statement to the press in Geneva. In the political communiqué, the PLO had stated its

"rejection of TERRORISM in all its forms including state terrorism." In this regard, Arafat personally declared on 6 December 1988 that he renounced all forms of terrorism and was ready to start negotiations that would eventually lead to peace in the Middle East. At the press conference, Arafat accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 without directly coupling them with demands for Palestinian independence. He specifically stated that Israel has the right to exist in peace and security and declared, "we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism including individual, group, and state terrorism." With that statement, Arafat fulfilled all the conditions set by the United States for talks with the PLO and opened the door for the short-lived US-PLO dialogue that began on 14 December 1988. At that point President RONALD REAGAN authorized the start of a low-level diplomatic dialogue with the Palestinian organization, in spite of opposition by Israel.

See also US-PLO DIALOGUE

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Declaration of Principles

The Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed on 13 September 1993, was the first in a series of agreements between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in the OSLO PROCESS and the most important because it set the parameters for each of the accords that followed. It was signed by Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN and PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT, under the auspices of US president BILL CLINTON.

The DOP was essentially a blueprint for the conduct of future negotiations: "the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [is] . . . to establish a Palestinian Self-Government Authority . . . for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338" (i.e., "Land for Peace"). The authority would be established in GAZA and JERICHO first, to be followed at a later time in other unspecified populated areas in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Negotiations over permanent status issues would begin "not later than the beginning of the third year . . . and will cover remaining issues including: JERUSALEM, REFUGEES, SETTLEMENTS, security arrangements, BORDERS, relations and cooperation with other neighbors." The DOP constructed a two-stage process—an interim period and a FINAL STATUS stage, which meant that the PLO was forced to accept a five-year transition period, without prior agreement about the nature of a permanent settlement. Before Oslo the PLO had been steadfast in its opposition to an interim accord unless the principles of a final settlement were established in advance. Its acceptance here was a reflection of the weakness of the PLO at the time of the agreement.

According to the DOP, the domain of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), the interim administrative organization, would be functional,

not territorial; that is, the PNA could exercise authority over the Palestinian people on specified matters, but it had no sovereignty over LAND, WATER, resources, or BORDERS. The DOP provided for ELECTIONS "under agreed supervision and international observation" that would select a "Council"—the governing authority. The council could legislate on matters concerning "education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism . . . [and a] Palestinian police force, as agreed upon."

The policing role would be split between the Palestinians and Israel. The PNA was to "establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats as well as responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order." Moreover, "the withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council." From Israel's perspective, the PNA's purpose was to police the Palestinian population to ensure that no attacks were perpetrated against Israel or Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories. If the PNA failed to carry out this role to Israel's satisfaction, Israel had the right to resume its previous responsibility in this area.

The DOP stipulated that Israel would "withdraw" from the Gaza Strip and "redeploy" from the Jericho area (and later other areas). In this context, redeployment indicated that the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) would be moved from the center of a major Palestinian city (or cities) to another nearby area—just outside of and around the city or cities. As Rabin made clear in a speech before the Knesset, the IDF would remain in the territories—redeployed from the urban centers to less provocative locations—but at the ready whenever Israel determined there was a need for its intervention.

The DOP also established "joint liaison committees" composed equally of Palestinians and Israelis for every issue and eventuality, including issues not mentioned in the DOP. In these committees both sides were treated in principle as equal; yet, in the reality of Israeli-Palestinian politics, Israel was overwhelmingly stronger and had far more resources to employ—not least of which was direct US intervention to pressure the Palestinians to accede to Israel's wishes. Thus the Palestinians felt their interests were continuously sacrificed to Israel's demands.

Another controversial aspect of the DOP was its foundation on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, which were interpreted differently by the Palestinians and Israelis. When the PLO accepted these resolutions in 1988 as a basis for peacemaking, it did so based on the international consensus that Israel would withdraw from the WEST BANK, Gaza, and East Jerusalem to the June 1967 borders. Subsequent PLO diplomacy focused on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in these areas. Israel, however, argued that the resolutions required Israel to withdraw only from "some" but not all of the territories, and that Israel would never accede to a Palestinian state that possessed international sovereignty. The DOP does not clarify the two contradictory interpretations of the resolutions, and it puts the Palestinians in the position of having to bargain over how much and from which areas Israel would withdraw.

The DOP substituted the term "disputed areas" for "Occupied Territories," a term carried over from the documents used at the MADRID CONFERENCE. Substantively, this meant that there was no Israeli commitment to end the OCCUPATION, because there were only "disputed" areas over which the two parties could negotiate.

Another contentious point was the DOP stipulation that "negotiations" would determine the Palestinian elections for a legislative council as well as its structure and responsibilities. By vetoing anything with which it disagreed, Israel would thus control who would be eligible to vote in the elections, how many seats the council would have, and how it would function, as well as its areas of jurisdiction. The constitution for the self-governing authority was also to be negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians.

Finally, the DOP required that all matters related to "economic development" must be "negotiated" or decided in a liaison committee, including water resources, electricity, energy, transport, trade, and industry. Again, the disparities in power were of such magnitude that Israel would always be able to realize its interests. Thus the DOP constrains the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) from pursuing its own independent economic development and growth.

The PLO entered the Oslo Process at one of the lowest points in its history, in part because of its support for IRAQ in the GULF WAR. Conversely, Israel was at the apex of its political and military achievements and enjoyed a full strategic partnership

with the United States. In such circumstances the PLO was not able to influence even the most basic elements of the framework for peace in the DOP, and with every new agreement Israel was able to extract additional concessions. Moreover, when Israel failed to implement the agreements to which it committed itself, the Palestinians were powerless to compel it to do so. Conversely, when Israel determined that the PNA was not fulfilling its commitments—for example, each time an act of violence occurred—it undertook collective punishments.

The DOP grew out of the warm, personal relations that developed in Oslo between Abu Ala (AHMAD QUREI') and URI SAVIR. Savir was a highly skilled Israeli lawyer accustomed to dealing with the details of international agreements, while Abu Ala was a Palestinian economist with no legal background. The DOP was ambiguous enough to convince Abu Ala, Arafat, and Abu Mazen (MAHMUD ABBAS), the second president of the Palestinian National Authority, that it was the first step on a direct road to a sovereign independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Yet it contained all the legal safeguards necessary to protect Israel's interests and to prevent such a state from coming into being.

The other major aspect of the DOP that hurt the Palestinians was the separation of the interim period from the final status. While the Palestinians never seemed to understand the legal details of the final status provisions, the two-track framework permitted Israel to determine unilaterally the nature of the final outcome. Moreover, separating the two stages allowed Israel to prolong indefinitely the initiation of final status talks (in contrast to the three-five-year interim period stipulated in the DOP), in what some have termed a policy of "the permanence of temporary arrangements." In the interim period, Israel constructed new settlements, expanded existing ones, and built a new ROAD SYSTEM grid for use only by Jews throughout the West Bank.

Substantively, the DOP is not based on any aspect of INTERNATIONAL LAW or UN resolutions relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The DOP also does not mention any of the significant provisions in the body of international law that bear specifically on this conflict—for example, the Fourth Geneva Convention, the conventions relating to refugees and stateless persons, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Consequently, the DOP is not based on law, rights, or precedent but on a political agreement between two parties that are depicted as symmetrical, but which in fact have enormously unequal levels of power. Similarly, the failure to mention the Palestinian right to self-determination—a right specifically enshrined in numerous UN resolutions— forfeited the PLO's potential to make use of these international norms and laws in its negotiations with Israel.

An additional significant grievance for the Palestinians was that the DOP had no provision for an impartial mediator in the event that Israel failed to fulfill its obligations. Although the United States assumed the role of broker, with Israel's blessing, Washington's strong support of Israel resulted in its ignoring Israel's failure to comply with its obligations under the DOP. Instead the United States consistently blamed Arafat and the Palestinians for all the setbacks, delays, and other problems throughout the seven-year Oslo Process. Ultimately the Oslo Process was ended by Israel's "security concerns." Each time residents of the Occupied Territories carried out an act of violence toward Israelis, Israel claimed that the PNA had failed to meet its security obligations under Oslo and suspended negotiations, halted redeployments, imposed CURFEWS, and so on.

The Declaration of Principles thus contained major structural impediments to the Palestinians' realizing their objectives. At the same time, it provided institutional safeguards for Israel's interests. Such an imbalance could not lead to a just and fair peace.

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De-development

See ECONOMY: THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE PALESTINIANS

Defense Emergency Regulations

In 1945 the BRITISH MANDATE government enacted the Defense Emergency Regulations, initially used against the Palestinians and later against the Jews. After Britain's Mandate ended in May 1948, Israel then adopted these emergency regulations to implement an official state of emergency over its Palestinian citizens who remained within the BORDERS of the new Israeli state after the 1948 WAR. Thereafter the Knesset continuously renewed the state of emergency and approved the continued use of the emergency regulations. They served as the legal basis for the military rule over the Israeli Palestinians, which lasted until 1965. Following the 1967 WAR, Israel used them as one of several legal mechanisms to control Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

After cancellation of military rule in 1965, the Israeli Ministry of Justice established a committee of experts to examine the regulations and draw up proposals for their partial utilization, but the outbreak of the 1967 War brought the committee's work to a halt. At the beginning of its 1967 military OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, and East JERUSALEM, the Israeli government issued a military order applying the Defense Emergency Regulations in their entirety to the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES while at the same time "freezing" the legal situation then existing in those areas.

Over the years Israel has used these regulations extensively in the Occupied Territories to punish and deter. From the perspective of INTERNATIONAL LAW and civil rights, the most important of the regulations adopted by Israel are:

- *Regulation 84—Unlawful Associations.* This law empowers an Israeli government official or military commander to declare any body of persons or any organization to be an unlawful association. Any person who joins such an organization, attends its meetings, or is allegedly associated with it in any way may be subject to fine or imprisonment. Under this law Israel imprisoned tens of thousands of persons for alleged membership in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and later for alleged membership in HAMAS.
- *Censorship: Regulation 94—Newspaper Permits.* This law prohibits the publication of any newspaper without a prior PERMIT from the military authorities. In practice Israel extended it to the publication of books, volumes of poetry, and anything the military government thought that Palestinians should not read. In the early 1980s the military government issued a list of several thousand banned books that Palestinians were forbidden from reading.
- *Regulation 110—Police Supervision.* This regulation empowers the government/military to confine people to a limited area without trial or formal charges. This has been used by Israel for CLOSURES, town arrests, house arrests, CURFEWS, mass detentions, and other restrictions.
- *Regulation 111— Administrative Detention.* As the name suggests, this regulation provided the legitimization for ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, imprisonment without charge, or trial.

- *Regulation 112—Deportation.* Israel has used this regulation to deport people from their area of residence without trial or formal charges.
- *Regulation 119—Forfeiture and Demolition of Property, etc. House Demolitions or Sealing, Destructions of Crops.* Israel uses this regulation to legalize HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, the sealing of houses, the destruction of crops, the uprooting of fruit and OLIVE TREES, and the demolition of other property.
- *Regulation 124—Movements of Persons.* This regulation has been used by Israel to confine people to their homes for an undetermined length of time and has provided the "legal" basis for curfews.
- *Regulation 125—Area Closures.* This law has empowered the military to declare an area a "CLOSED MILITARY ZONE" in which no one is allowed in or out without a permit from the Israeli military. This regulation has also been used to exclude a landowner from his own LAND so that it could be judged as unoccupied and then expropriated under the Land Acquisition Law (1953).
- *Regulation 125—Closed Areas: Movements of Persons.* This regulation expands on Regulation 124 and is used to permit a military commander to declare any area or place to be a closed area for any purpose. This law is widely used for a variety of reasons.

See also ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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Degel HaTorah

Degel HaTorah (Torah Flag) is a mostly ASHKENAZI HAREDI political party with a small number of seats (two or three) in the Knesset. Rabbi Eliezer Menahem Mann Shach founded the party as a splinter from AGUDAT YISRAEL in 1988. Policy disputes among the Hasidic rabbis within Agudat Yisrael, which had been the only party for all Ashkenazi Haredi Jews in Israel, gave rise to the division. Degel HaTorah's fundamental interests are connected to religious matters, for example, forcing restaurants to close on the sabbath. Initially it was more likely to join a LABOR coalition, but it has grown increasingly hard-line—supporting the Jewish SETTLEMENTS and opposing compromise with the Palestinians. This transformation is mainly related to the increasing number of Haredi who live in WEST BANK settlements. Degel HaTorah was a member of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's and ARIEL SHARON's governing coalitions.

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Deir Yassin (Dayr Yasin)

Early in the morning of 9 April 1948, Jewish fighters from the IRGUN and the LEHI (the STERN GANG) attacked Deir Yassin, a small, Palestinian village located on a hilltop three miles west of the Old City of JERUSALEM. It was six weeks before the end of the BRITISH MANDATE and the declaration of the state of Israel. The village, which had a peaceful reputation, lay outside the area assigned by the UNITED NATIONS to the Jewish state. It was located on high ground in the corridor between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and with the knowledge of the mainstream Jewish defense force (the HAGANA), it was to be conquered and held.

The conquest was initiated by the two underground groups, the IRGUN and the LEHI (aka the Stern Gang), and in spite of being better armed,

they were at first unable to conquer the village. But after they elicited the help of a small band of PALMAH troops (the elite fighters of the Hagana), Deir Yassin soon fell. After the Palmah soldiers left, the massacre began. That evening, the leader of the Irgun told foreign correspondents in the neighboring Jewish SETTLEMENT of Givat Shaul that more than 200 Arabs had been killed and 40 had been taken prisoner. The guerrillas lost 4 of their own forces. They boasted of the "battle" but made no mention of the male Palestinians whom they had loaded onto trucks, paraded through the Jewish sections of Jerusalem, and then taken to a stone quarry between Givat Shaul and Deir Yassin, where they were shot to death. On 13 April *The New York Times* reported that 254 Arab men, women, and children had been killed at Deir Yassin; there was no mention of prisoners.

The official leaders of the Hagana denounced the dissidents of the Irgun and the Stern Gang, accusing them of massacre, robbery, looting, and barbarism. DAVID BEN-GURION sent an apology to KING ABDULLAH of JORDAN. Modern historians agree that the massacre at Deir Yassin marked the beginning of the depopulation of over 500 Arab villages and the exile of over 750,000 Palestinians. In spite of protests by MARTIN BUBER and other noted Jewish scholars, within a year the village was repopulated with Orthodox Jewish immigrants from Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Its cemetery was mostly bulldozed and its name was wiped off the map.

See also TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; WAR, 1948

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—Daniel A. McGowan

Deir Yassin Remembered

Deir Yassin Remembered is an organization dedicated to the remembrance of DEIR YASSIN, the small Palestinian village in which the IRGUN, an underground military group led by Menahem Begin), massacred more than 100 civilians in 1948. A group of Israelis, Palestinians, and Americans conceived the organization during the OSLO PROCESS, inspired by Simon Wiesenthal's observation that "hope lives when people remember" and by the fact that few memorials exist for the Palestinians who died in 1948. The organizers of Deir Yassin Remembered seek to acknowledge and memorialize the suffering of Palestinians, as the suffering of Jews is memorialized. Initially the main purpose of Deir Yassin Remembered was to build a memorial on the site where the village actually stood, but Israel refused to grant permission. Thus the organization developed a broader, more humanitarian objective: to work to eliminate prejudice against Palestinians and to promote the human side of this oppressed people. Deir Yassin Remembered has held numerous international conferences and built several memorials across the Western world. (www.deiryassin.org).

Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)

See UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Democracy

See ELECTIONS

Democracy and Workers' Rights Center

The Democracy and Workers' Rights Center was established in October 1993 by a group of Palestinian academics, lawyers, trade unionists, and political figures. The main office is in Ramallah, with a branch in GAZA. Its basic objectives are to contribute to the construction of a strong democratic and CIVIL SOCIETY in Palestine and to achieve peace and stability under the sovereignty of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, next to the state of Israel. It is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization without any political party affiliation. (www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=2815).

Democratic Alliance, 1983

The Democratic Alliance was one of three groups (the others were the NATIONAL ALLIANCE and FATAH UPRISING) that split from the PALESTINE

Liberation Organization (PLO) after the 1982 Lebanon War. It was composed of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Palestinian People's Party. After the split and despite intense Syrian pressure to do otherwise, the Democratic Alliance upheld Yasir Arafat's leadership of the PLO, strongly condemned the Fatah rebels' use of violence, and rejected all attempts at "containment" of the PLO or subjecting it to Arab—especially Jordanian—tutelage.

See also Aden-Algiers Accord; Lebanon War

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Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was at one time the third largest Palestinian organization. It was founded in 1969, in a split with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), by Nayif Hawatimah, who remains its head. Both Hawatmeh and George Habash were part of the Movement of Arab Nationalists, which after 1967 decided to decentralize and set up movements in individual Arab states, or *qutri* (countries-wide as opposed to pan-Arab-wide), to facilitate political changes in Arab states and to give impetus to the Palestinian resistance movement. Yasir Arafat exploited the feud between the PFLP and the DFLP and took the DFLP under his wing, using the disputes between the two groups for his own ends, often using the DFLP to float his political trial balloons.

The DFLP was the first Palestinian group to put into practice a version of Marxism-Leninism that adhered to armed struggle, unlike the Palestinian People's Party. It also advocated dialogue with progressive Jewish (and later Israeli forces), and Hawatmeh was one of the first Palestinian leaders from any faction to give an interview to an Israeli newspaper. The DFLP, however, never succeeded in attracting a mass following, although Hawatmeh appealed to many Arab intellectuals. Its ideology was politically and socially sophisticated, drawing on European Marxism that also gave it insight and flexibility in dealing with the Jewish question.

In the context of the Cold War the DFLP was a classic Marxist-Leninist organization but without a mass base. Few Palestinian cadres understood the complex ideology of the DFLP and fewer still were moved by its ideas, and the DFLP was notoriously weak in mobilizing mass support. The leadership, however, held to the party line. The DFLP never questioned the Soviet Union, and it followed Soviet policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict even when Moscow's line clashed with Arab public sentiments. The DFLP had some influence with South Yemen, and the Soviet Union relied on it to promote Soviet interests in the Middle East. In the 1970 Black September war in Jordan, the DFLP played a role beyond its size. Its slogan, "All power to the resistance," challenged the Jordanian regime and encouraged the Palestinians to overthrow it. Several Palestinian factions accused the DFLP of taking provocative and extremist stances, while others claimed the DFLP was engaged in left-wing adventurism.

In the mid-1970s Arafat used the DFLP to put forward the idea of the "phased program," which had as its end point a two-state solution and which attracted the attention of European leftists and progressive Israeli groups. The DFLP did not abandon its version of armed struggle but was made to seem by Fatah as capitulationist. When it aligned itself with Fatah after the 1974 Palestine National Council meeting in Cairo, which supported the phased program, the DFLP lost some of its Arab leftist appeal.

The DFLP played a role in the Lebanese civil war on the side of the leftist coalition, but the defeat of the Lebanese leftists at the hands of Ba'athist Syria signaled the decline of the DFLP. Support for the DFLP was further eroded by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism after the Iranian revolution, a trend that undermined the influence of Arab communists and socialists.

In 1991 the DFLP split, with a minority faction led by Yasir 'Abd Rabbu (who had become increasingly close to Yasir Arafat) favoring the Madrid negotiations that led initially to limited Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Inspired by the USSR's glasnost and the fall of the Berlin Wall, this group also favored a new political orientation, focused less on Marxism and armed struggle and more on the democratization of Palestinian society. It reconstituted itself as the

PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (FIDA), and 'Abd Rabbu was officially made an advisor of Arafat.

The influence of the DFLP suffered after the OSLO ACCORDS because it took an ambiguous position that reflected splits within its ranks. The DFLP under Hawatmeh, based in Syria, was able to retain its external branches, whereas the majority of the organization within Palestine, mainly on the West Bank, was taken over by FIDA. The influence of DFLP is now marginal in Palestinian politics.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Demography

Demography was a factor that ultimately determined the outcome of the South Africa conflict and shaped the nature of Northern Ireland's power-sharing arrangements. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has proved no different. Demography was, and remains, a key aspect of this conflict as well, and in recent years, demography has assumed ever-increasing importance, for Israelis in particular. The very prospect of Jews in Israel losing their shrinking majority led to ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT from the GAZA STRIP and parts of the north of the WEST BANK in August 2005. The demographic balance will continue to preoccupy Israel and dictate its behavior toward the Palestinians across and within the Green Line.

The Quest for a Jewish Majority

Though the Zionist movement was deliberately ambiguous for several decades (primarily for tactical purposes), its objective was from the outset to create a Jewish state. Such an entity required a definite Jewish majority. As the Zionist leader AHAD HA'AM noted after the publication of the BALFOUR DECLARATION, "We cannot demand Jewish coinage or a Jewish governor for towns with Arab majorities. We will be mocked if we present such demands." The need for a Jewish majority has been a point of common cause for the majority of Zionists representing differing persuasions. This view is embraced across the political spectrum, for example by both the rightist politician ARIEL SHARON and the leftist YOSSI BEILIN and their supporters. Beilin, for instance, notes, "The Zionist idea was about the Jewish state. If we give up on this idea, then there is no advantage of living in this country for many of us. There are much nicer countries than Israel in which we can be a minority as Jews."

Securing such demographic preponderance was to be a formidable task. When Jews first began arriving in Israel around 1800, there was only one Jew for every forty Arabs. By 1880, on the eve of the First ALIYA (the immigration of Jews to Palestine, 1882–1904), there were twenty-two Arabs for every Jew. That aliya added some 35,000 Jews. Though the Zionist movement harnessed historical claims to Palestine, the advent of popular sovereignty implied that a Jewish state required a Jewish majority. A failure to create a majority would mean that the exercise of self-determination would create a racial minority regime. It was, and remains, only a minority of Zionists that were prepared to accept a Jewish entity ruled by a minority of Jews.

Securing a Jewish entity implied the dispossession and displacement of the indigenous Arab population. Indigenous Palestinians were acutely aware of this imperative, hence their fierce opposition to Jewish IMMIGRATION under both Turkish and British rule. Much of the tension between the two communities in the period between the BRITISH MANDATE and the establishment of Israel revolved around Jewish efforts to change the demographic balance and Arab efforts to maintain the status quo.

Despite the Zionist movements' best endeavors, by 1915 there was a ratio of some six to seven Arabs for every Jew. The Second Aliya (1904–1914) saw the addition of 40,000 Jews. The

Third Aliya (1919–1923) brought an additional 35,000 Jews to Palestine. By 1931 the number of the Jews had only marginally increased to a one-to-five ratio, but by 1947 it had reached one-to-two. This change was attributable to the Fourth Aliya (1924–1928) and the Fifth Aliya (1929–1939). While the former wave of immigration added 67,000 Jews to the Yishuv's population, the latter witnessed the arrival of some 250,000 Jews. This drastic increase of Jews was the result of Adolf Hitler's rise to power. A third stream of immigrants before 1948 was the "illegal immigration" (Aliya Bet) prompted by the publication of the British MacDonald White Paper, which attempted to limit the number of immigrants but brought an additional 115,000 Jews to Palestine. In total more than 430,000 Jews arrived between 1924 and 1948. Nevertheless, it was ultimately conflict and displacement, rather than immigration, that eventually secured a Jewish majority.

Arab Flight and Jewish Absorption. The conflict between Jews and Palestinians from December 1947 to July 1949 produced a Palestinian exodus (al-Hijra al-Filasteeniya) of 711,000 Palestinians, mainly to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. This figure, which is provided by the UN Relief and Works Agency, is disputed by both Israelis and Palestinians. The former claim that the number of refugees was closer to half a million, while the latter suggest it was closer to one million.

The Nakba (disaster), as the exodus is referred to by Palestinians, fundamentally altered the demographic balance in favor of the Jews. At the end of the 1948 War, there were only 146,000 Arabs inside Israel's post-armistice borders. Palestinians claim that the exodus was the result of a deliberate Zionist strategy to exploit the cover of war to carry out ethnic cleansing by encouraging the flight of Palestinians. Transfer, Israeli historian Benny Morris writes, was "the solution to the seemingly insoluble Arab minority problem of the future Jewish state." After World War II, transfer was also supported by the British Labour Party. Some Israeli scholars argue that the widespread support for the transfer idea was for voluntary transfer or transfer agreed on with the neighboring Arab countries. They add that the refugee problem was "born of war, not by design." Others consider it to have been well planned and executed. The Transfer Committee and its activities lend some validity to this latter view.

Though there is no evidence of a formal plan for ethnic cleansing, except for the Dalet Plan, there was an implicit understanding that the immediate post–World War II demographic balance militated against a Jewish state. The Zionist leadership made it clear to the military that they wanted as "few Arabs as possible to remain in the Jewish State." Only days after the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the partition of Jewish and Arab states (UN Resolution 181), Israel's founder, David Ben-Gurion, noted, "there can be no stable and strong Jewish state so long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60 percent." There is evidence that the new Jewish state and its military structures deliberately prevented the return of these refugees. The "retroactive transfer" policy involved destroying their houses and villages. For demographic reasons Israel has been unwilling and unable to be flexible on the issue of the right of Palestinians to return to their homeland. Implementing the right of return could spell the end of the Jewish state.

Table 1 Demographic Ratios

Year	Arab Population	Jewish Population	Total Population	Ratio
1800	268,000	6,700		1:40
1880	525,000	22,400		1:220
1915	590,000	80,000–85,000		1:6–7
1922	660,641	84,000		1:7
1931	837,000	174,000		1:5
1947	1,310,000	630,000		1:2
. . .				
2000	4,900,000	4,800,000	9,700,000	1:1
2020 (projected)	8,800,000	6,400,000	15,200,000	1:1.4

Challenge of Maintaining the Jewish Majority. The Jewish majority in Israel has been bolstered and maintained by successive waves of immigration. Israel in fact doubled its population after independence (1948) as significant portions of Jewish communities relocated to Israel. After the absorption of the remnants of Europe's decimated Jews, followed by an influx of Jews from the Middle East and North Africa in the early 1950s, Israel enjoyed an 80-to-20 ratio of Jews to Arabs. That ratio was buttressed by additional inflows of Jews, the most significant of these in the 1990s, following the collapse of the SOVIET UNION. Between 1990 and 1998 over 790,000 immigrants arrived in Israel. In the absence of immigration, the 60,000 Jews living in Palestine in 1918 would have grown only to 250,000–260,000.

Israel's supply of potential immigrants is dwindling because of two factors. One is that most Jews today reside in developed countries, where they enjoy a quality of life higher than they could enjoy in Israel. More importantly, however, the number of DIASPORA Jews is rapidly declining due to low fertility rates and high assimilation rates. Indeed, there are today 13 million Jews worldwide, compared to 11 million in 1945 after the HOLOCAUST. It is only population growth in Israel that has compensated for the decline of Diaspora Jewry.

Despite a concerted pro-natalist policy by successive Israeli governments, the birthrate of Jewish Israelis was only nominally (25 percent) above the replacement rate and well below that for Palestinians. Indeed, Israeli pro-natalism proved to be an ill-considered strategy for maintaining a Jewish majority, as the country's Arab minority was the real beneficiary of incentives to promote larger families. Jewish fertility rates result in a natural growth rate of 1 percent, compared to over 3.5 percent (up to 4 percent) for Palestinians. If immigration is added, Israeli Jewish growth rates rise to 2 percent. Over time these differing fertility rates work against a Jewish majority.

According to sociologist Phillipe Fargues, high Palestinian birthrates are linked to nationalist considerations and to efforts to cope with the economic insecurity of life under OCCUPATION by having more contributors to household income. Palestinians came to view demography as their most potent weapon against Israel. In 1987 YASIR ARAFAT famously stated, "the Palestinian woman, who bears yet another Palestinian every ten months . . . is a biological bomb that threatens to blow up Israel." Maintaining larger families is made possible by the subsidization of rents through development assistance from the Gulf States and elsewhere, especially to refugees. Hence, Fargues suggests that peace and economic stability will make a significant contribution to reducing Palestinian fertility rates.

Demographic Parity and Disengagement

Israel's demographic balance was again fundamentally affected by the 1967 WAR. Whereas 1948 improved the ratio between Jews and Arabs, Israel's Occupation of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP in 1967 worsened Israel's demographic position because of the additional Palestinian regions under Israeli control. The effect was initially not apparent to most Israelis, partly because Israel had stated that the Occupation would be temporary. After almost four decades, the Occupation came to appear less transient.

In part the demographic factor caused the Zionist left to support a political accommodation, whereby Israel could off-load as many Palestinians as possible. At first an accommodation for off-loading was sought with JORDAN. When that proved impossible, Israel was forced to seek an accommodation with the Palestinians and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in the form of the 1993 OSLO PROCESS. It is indeed instructive that Israel was willing to leave the Gaza Strip and the major Palestinian cities early in the process. Through this disengagement Oslo allowed Israel to claim that 95 percent of the Palestinians did not live under Occupation. Oslo seemingly squared Israel's demographic circle.

The collapse of the peace process beginning in 2000, failure to reach a permanent status accord, and Israel's reoccupation of the Palestinian territories, however, prompted the return of the demographic question. As demographic parity in the Occupied Territories west of the River Jordan has approached, Israeli support for separation has increased. This demographic fear explains Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON's decision to disengage from the Gaza Strip (2005) and build a separation BARRIER. It is demographic fear that underpins Israeli support for separation and the Barrier. Though it has been justified as a security measure, the Barrier is widely viewed as an impediment to the Palestinian right of return. Israeli commentator Ari Shavit described the disengagement plan as "a national rescue plan." In a candid state-

ment to the Israeli public on the eve of the execution of the plan, Sharon, who had traditionally dismissed the demographic threat, said: "It is no secret that I, like many others, believed and hoped that we could forever hold on to Netzarim and Kfar Darom [Israeli settlements in Gaza]. However, the changing reality in this country, in this region, and in the world required reassessment and changing of positions. Gaza cannot be held forever. Over one million Palestinians live there and they double their numbers with every generation."

Although demography was once the primary preoccupation of liberal Zionist elites, it has been appropriated by the LIKUD and the secular right. This is captured in the statement of Michael Azoulai, a Likud Central Committee member, that "we must never forget that what General Winter was to Russia, General Time is to Arafat." Growing awareness and use of the demographic issue have fundamentally weakened the settlers' movement and those who support Israel's retention of the West Bank and Gaza. Recognizing this, a group of US and Israeli experts sought to dispute claims that parity is imminent. Palestinians, alert to Israeli fears, have hinted that they will abandon their support for a two-state solution if Israel does not end settlement expansion. In this context, the option of BINATIONALISM has returned to the discourse over the conflict and come to haunt the Zionist project.

After the Occupation. Many assume that demographic concerns will ultimately compel Israel to end the Occupation, but a full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied since June 1967 does not entirely eliminate the demographic issue and the binational option. Israel will need to come to terms with the existence of a significant Palestinian minority within its borders. Since 2001, Jews constitute only 73 percent of the population within the pre-1967 borders (including the Palestinians of East JERUSALEM). Demographers estimate that that proportion will fall to 69 percent by 2020. It is worth noting that a 1987 prediction by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics that Israel's Arabs would constitute just 21.5 percent of the population by 2000 was fulfilled only by the then-unanticipated arrival of over 700,000 Jews in the 1990s, suggesting that Israeli demographers underestimated Palestinian numbers at the time.

The internal demographic threat has also increasingly come to preoccupy Israeli elites. Russian immigrant politician AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN has been most candid in this regard: "I want to guarantee a Jewish and Zionist state. By current trends, there will not be such a country in twenty years' time, maximum." This concern is reflected in growing strategies to secure a Jewish democracy—that is, a Jewish majority. One indication of the salience of this issue is an amendment of the Citizenship and Entry Law, which would restrict the prospects and rights of Israeli Palestinians to secure citizenship for their spouses. Israeli officials state that almost 100,000 Palestinians exercised their right to return through marriage and FAMILY REUNIFICATION. The measure was originally introduced as a security precaution, on the basis that a number of Palestinians involved in terror had gained their citizenship in this manner. In reality it is motivated by demographic considerations. The preamble to the law states that one purpose is "to solve the demographic problem that stems from the fact that foreigners receive status in Israel as a result of being related to a citizen or resident of Israel, without themselves being eligible for citizenship status under the Law of Return."

There is also growing support in Israel for redrawing Israel's borders on the basis of demographic considerations. In effect, what is being proposed is the transfer of areas populated by significant Palestinian communities—for example, Umm al-Fahm and Taybeh—as part of a future Palestinian state. Such initiatives and growing Israeli concerns over demography will affect relations between Jews and Arabs inside of Israel. It also could pose a threat to ISRAELI DEMOCRACY. Reflecting on Israel's efforts to limit the number of West Bank Palestinians becoming Israeli citizens by marrying Israeli Arabs, columnist Orit Shachat noted, "A democratic state cannot exist if paranoid fears about the demographic threat lurk perpetually around the corner and are fanned now and then by demagogic politicians. Demographic fears lead to racist policies."

See also DEMOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN NATIONALS; DIASPORA; FAMILY REUNIFICATION; IMMIGRATION; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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—Anonymous Israeli scholar

Demography and Foreign Nationals

Beginning in 2006, Israel undertook a new undeclared policy toward foreign nationals, which in the main refers to Palestinians who have citizenship in Western countries, such as the UNITED STATES, Britain, and others. The policy denies foreign nationals entry to the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, even those seeking to enter for a short period of time, but especially those who live with Palestinian spouses and families, are Palestinian expatriate nationals, or are working in the Occupied Territories. Israel claims the restrictions are related to security concerns, but others believe the real reason is Israel's demographic concerns. Because Israel is intent on reducing the number of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, it has decided that it cannot permit additional non-Jewish individuals to settle there. Since 1967, Israel has used a variety of demographic manipulations to reduce the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories, causing some 100,000 people to lose their status as permanent residents. These are in addition to the 240,000 Palestinians who were born in the WEST BANK and GAZA and left the areas because of the 1967 WAR, and another 60,000 who were abroad when it broke out and not permitted to return.

Until 2006, Palestinians with Western citizenship were able to avoid this comprehensive policy. During the OSLO years foreign nationals were considered a desired population (investors, businessmen, academics, and professionals working in such organizations as the World Bank). Israel did not grant them permanent residency status but did permit them to live in the Occupied Territories and regularly renew their visas. This was also the case with Western spouses of Palestinian residents. However, from the start of 2006, Israel has denied their ability to renew their visas, and their entry or reentry has been blocked.

The situation has also affected professors, teachers, researchers, and students at universities and schools in the Occupied Territories. In May 2006, Birzeit University, in Birzeit Village in the West Bank, reported a 50 percent decline in employees with foreign passports and listed the recent policy of visa refusals as a significant factor. The US Consulate in Jerusalem has been notified of more than 100 cases of Palestinian Americans denied entry to the West Bank but says that the actual number of cases could be significantly higher. US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice raised the issue with Israeli officials during her visit to the region in October 2007 and later made public reference to it in a speech to a Palestinian-American group, promising to do everything in her power "to ensure that all American travelers receive fair and equal treatment."

See also DEMOGRAPHY; FAMILY REUNIFICATION

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Deportation

Deportation is a controversial tactic used by Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians. Israel says it issues deportation orders in order to prevent a potential security offense by the deportee, although its critics say that deportation is exercised largely for political rather than security considerations. No deportees have ever been charged with a criminal offense or tried and convicted. From the beginning of the OCCUPATION (in June 1967) to 1992, Israel deported 1,522 Palestinians, mainly to JORDAN and LEBANON. There were no deportations between 1992 and 2002, but the laws concerning deportation remained on the books. In 2002, Israel resumed the practice of deportation. All deportations are administrative rather than court-imposed.

From 1967 to 1985, deportees from the WEST BANK (almost no Gazans were expelled) were overwhelmingly professional individuals—of which 40 were women. They included professors, teachers, school principals, a university president, journalists, physicians, a mayor and other civic leaders, lawyers, a bank director, and the head of the Women's Society in JERUSALEM. All expressed public opposition to the Occupation, which, combined with their status as part of the educated elite, caused Israel to fear a mobilized political opposition.

It was not until the 1987–1991 INTIFADA that a second wave of deportations began. As the essentially nonviolent Intifada became prolonged, Israel responded by deporting Palestinian civilian activists involved in the uprising. These deportees included political leaders, activists, and the first individual in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES to formally promote nonviolent civil disobedience: Mubarak Awad. Within the first year, Israel deported 56 Palestinians, and the deportations peaked in December 1992, when Israel expelled a group of 415 Palestinian Islamists to Lebanon.

During the first two weeks of December 1992, Palestinian members of HAMAS killed six members of the Israeli security forces, and in response Israel arrested some 1,600 Palestinians. On 15 December, Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN announced that Israel intended to take severe action against Hamas. On the morning of 16 December, the Israeli government ordered deportation for "inciters, those inhabitants of the area who endanger human lives by their activities, or those who incite others to such actions." More than 400 Palestinians, most taken directly from prison facilities, were put on buses heading for Lebanon.

Israeli human rights organizations responded by filing petitions with the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. Justice Aharon Barak issued a temporary injunction stopping the deportations on 16 December. The next morning the court approved the government's plan, and officials proceeded with the mass deportation the same day (17 December). The

court, however, deferred a hearing on the legality of the procedure—meaning that the men were expelled before the court determined whether their deportation was legal. On 28 January it upheld the government's position that the deportations were legal, based on Israel's security needs. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF), however, did not contend that the deportees were responsible for or had participated in the attacks on IDF soldiers, which were the usual grounds for deportations. Moreover, the court upheld the government's argument that this was not collective punishment, although the deportation orders indicated that the deportees were linked to Hamas or the ISLAMIC JIHAD. "Due to their membership and activities in the area in the framework of the Hamas organization or the Islamic Jihad organization in a manner that severely harms the security in the area and the public order" was how the orders read.

Critics who contend that the deportations were collective punishment point to the fact that around 25 percent of the Palestinians expelled were found to have been included in error, and their deportation was cancelled. Also, the mass deportation orders were signed at night—some after the deportation was under way. And, unlike High Court hearings on deportations in the past, individual names of deportees were not provided. B'TSELEM (Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) concluded that this deportation of 415 Palestinians was illegal since both deportation and collective punishment are forbidden under Geneva Convention Four.

The deportees were transported to the northernmost point of Israel's "security zone" in Lebanon, but because the Lebanese army prevented them from continuing north and entering unoccupied Lebanon, they were left in a no-man's-land without shelter or other facilities for six months.

On 28 December the IDF announced that 10 of the deportees had been expelled by mistake and would be allowed to return. On 3 January 1993 the Israeli attorney general informed the High Court that 6 additional Palestinians had been deported in error and would be allowed to return. Later 5 more deportees were permitted to return for health reasons.

The international outcry that followed this mass expulsion, in addition to the prospects of peace opened by the OSLO ACCORDS, resulted in Israel's reluctance to use deportation as a political tactic after 1992, until it was renewed in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. In the summer of 2002, following a number of serious attacks in Israel and in the Occupied Territories during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israeli government, in the interest of "deterrence and punishment," decided to deport *relatives* of the Palestinian attackers to other places in the Occupied Territories. On 1 August 2002 the Central Command signed the first orders and by the end of 2004, Israel had deported 32 Palestinians from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip.

The first 2 individuals who received such orders were siblings of a man allegedly responsible for an attack on the central bus station in Tel Aviv, who had been killed by the IDF. Both individuals were represented by two Israeli human rights organizations, and they first filed an appeal with the Military Appeals Committee (which denied their appeal) and then petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court. The court ruled that the transfer of the siblings was lawful even though they were not considered security risks. The debate revolved around the deterrent effect that would supposedly prevent other attacks if the attackers knew their relatives would be deported.

See also FAMILY REUNIFICATION; HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA; HOUSE DEMOLITIONS; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM; ISRAELI SUPREME COURT; JERUSALEM; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; WAR, 1948

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—Bassem Eid

Development Authority

Shortly after the 1948 WAR the state of Israel passed a series of laws to validate its seizure of Palestinian property and to ensure that such property remained in the control of Jews in perpetuity. The 1950 ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW transferred ownership of Palestinian property to the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY. The Transfer of Property Law, also in 1950, was promulgated to create the Development Authority, a quasi-independent body empowered to sell, buy, lease, exchange, repair, build, develop, or cultivate Palestinian property provided that the beneficiary is a Jew or a Jewish entity. The Development Authority was conceived to ensure that the property it acquired, and continues to acquire, is disposed of in the interests of the state of Israel and the Jewish people. As such, it gives priority to the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND and the JEWISH AGENCY, which act exclusively in the interest of Jews and have quasi-governmental status as ISRAEL'S NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS within the framework of the Development Authority Law.

In 1953, to validate prior illegal expropriations, the Knesset passed the Land Acquisition Law (Validation of Acts and Compensation). This law permitted the minister of finance to vest ownership of previously and newly expropriated land in the Development Authority. Most of this land belonged to Palestinian citizens of Israel. The law also allowed for compensation to any (i.e., Palestinian) owner who applied. Compensation was based on the assessed value of the property as of 1 January 1950 in Israeli pounds of that date, plus 3 percent per annum thereafter, minus property maintenance costs. Because the vast majority of Palestinians were unaware of the law and many who were aware objected to it as a matter of principle, practically no Palestinians took the offer.

All of these laws remain in effect and are still used, especially in JERUSALEM, to acquire Palestinian property and transfer it to the Development Authority, which then sells it back to the groups that confiscated it in the first place—for example, ATERET COHANIM and other Jewish settlement groups.

See also CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; LAND; PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROPERTY CLAIMS; STATE LAND; WAR, 1948

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Dhimma/Dhimmis

Muslims have a special respect for People of the Book, Jews and Christians, because Islam accepts Moses (and all prophets of the Hebrew scriptures as well as Jesus) as prophets. Christian and Jewish minority populations in Muslim-dominated empires or states were therefore given a special status as protected persons. The *dhimma* (writ of protection) gave the *dhimmis* (Christians and Jews) certain rights denied other minorities and conquered peoples, but still made clear they were viewed as inferior to the Muslims in terms of taxation and military service.

Diaspora, Jewish, from the Perspective of the Diaspora

The numbers of Jews in the UNITED STATES, the length of their time in the area, and the level of their integration into the society have imparted to them both an organizational strength and a per-

sonal autonomy that set them apart from other Jewish diasporas. While making up less than 3 percent of the overall US population, American Jews nevertheless represent two-thirds of the entirety of Jewish diasporics throughout the world. Not only do the Jews in the United States still outnumber those of Israel, but with a population of 5.3 million, they are more than ten times as numerous as the second largest Jewish Diaspora, that of FRANCE.

Israel's reliance on American Jewish strength and vitality highlights a contradiction within classical ZIONISM: on the one hand, an ideological imperative that all Jews including American ones immigrate to the Jewish state; on the other, an acknowledgment that, without a strong Zionist Jewish constituency in the United States, Israel would not have flourished as it has. Nor would it have had enjoyed, vis-à-vis the Palestinian challenge, such long-standing, strong, and important support from Washington.

Jews have taken full advantage of their rights, freedoms, and prosperity as US citizens to advance their positions with respect to modern Israel and its perennial conflict with the Palestinians. Social integration and assimilation have also allowed countless individuals to opt out of taking any position on the Middle East conflict or even to relinquish their Jewish identity altogether. The result has been a schism between the American Jewish leadership and its constituency, on the one hand, and competing visions of Zionism and the preferred resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the other. Indeed, prior to the HOLOCAUST the official position of the American Reform Movement of Judaism and the American Council for Judaism was outright opposition to the very notion of an independent Jewish state. A unique period of consensus and solidarity prevailed from Israel's founding in 1948 until sometime after the 1973 WAR, peaking with the 1967 WAR. That consensus was based on the beliefs that Jews in the global Diaspora (though not necessarily those in the United States) needed the Jewish state as a refuge from persecution, that Israel was under constant military threat from hostile Arab neighbors, and that it was incumbent upon American Jews to support Israel with both direct financial aid and political remonstrances to the US government and its elected representatives. The latter strategy involved strengthening Zionist organizations and interest groups and voting for pro-Israel candidates in national elections.

Thus arose the myth of a "Jewish lobby" that, combining the alleged dominance of a "Jewish-controlled" MEDIA, Wall Street, and Congress (the latter through campaign contributions) in lockstep, forced the White House to do its Zionist bidding with respect to foreign policy in the Middle East. The AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC) became emblematic of this so-called Jewish power that maintained a hard-line US position against Palestinian sovereignty and in favor of virtually unconditional military and diplomatic support for Israel.

Despite some high-profile contests that pitted AIPAC against sitting presidents (most notably JIMMY CARTER, RONALD REAGAN, and GEORGE H. W. BUSH [over F-15 and AWACs sales to SAUDI ARABIA and loan guarantees covering Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK]), this highly effective interest group did not represent the views of the American Jewish Diaspora as a whole. In the years leading up to Israel's incursion into LEBANON in 1982, and especially as a result of it, other US-based organizations arose that directly challenged what they saw as Israel's increasing MILITARISM, specifically the Israeli OCCUPATION of the West Bank and GAZA. Breira (Alternative) was one of the first such movements that, in contrast to the mainstream Jewish leadership, advocated peace with the Palestinians through negotiation and concessions. Breira came to reflect the sentiments of liberal Jewish intellectuals such as Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, Irving Howe, and Arthur Waskow. Other left-wing (or "universalistic/prophetic") groups emerged that promoted Jewish-Palestinian coexistence and compromise between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. These included the New Jewish Agenda, Americans for Peace Now, Americans for a Progressive Israel, Jewish Peace Lobby, New Israel Fund, Abraham Fund, Interns for Peace, and American Friends of Neve Shalom. Rabbi Michael Lerner's San Francisco–based *Tikkun* provided the most public expression of such pro-peace sentiments, even including prayers for Palestinians in his magazine's High Holiday supplements.

Along with AIPAC, other right-wing Jewish organizations (including the more mainstream "ethnonational" ones such as the United Jewish Appeal and the Zionist Organization of America) initially mobilized not only against concessions to Palestinians but also against the dovish sentiments expressed by the left-wing Jewish groups. Opposing

the dismantlement of Jewish settlements, the return of territory captured in 1967, and the creation of a Palestinian state were groups such as Americans for a Safe Israel, American Friends of Likud, CAMERA, the HEBRON Fund, American Friends of ATERET COHANIM, Project Nishma, and Religious Zionists of America. As indicated by the latter's name, the Orthodox community (though only 10 percent of American Jewry) has become increasingly identified with this camp. So have ideologically neoconservative Jewish intellectuals such as Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol, whose viewpoints are given prominence in *Commentary* magazine. Though not representative of overall American Jewish opinion, Elliott Abrams, Richard Perle, and Paul Wolfowitz obtained high-ranking government positions that both reflected and reinforced the hard-line NEOCONSERVATIVE position, as shown in President GEORGE W. BUSH's refusal to deal with Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT.

Supposedly neutral groups, such as the AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, and CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF MAJOR JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, have been buffeted by these growing divisions between advocates and opponents of territorial compromise and Palestinian independence, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in particular tilting to the right. Upsurges in threats to Israel, such as the wave of SUICIDE BOMBINGS since 2000, have precluded restoring unanimity to American Jewish attitudes toward Palestine.

Many Jewish Americans generally feel free to support Israel and its government, just as other Jewish Americans feel free to condemn aspects of Israeli policy. Such disagreements have waxed as the war in Lebanon, the OSLO ACCORDS, the First INTIFADA, and the 2008–2009 Gaza war polarized the population in Israel itself. In short, despite a backdrop of organized Jewry's general success in promoting a pro-Israel US foreign policy, the self-confidence of Jews in the United States has paradoxically given rise to serious ideological and organizational rifts, particularly over how best to resolve Israel's conflict with the Palestinians.

Although no Jewish Diaspora outside of the United States is completely unified on the Palestinian question, the minority and often more marginal status of Jews in other countries militates against equivalent political strength and internal dissent, as well as a more centralized Jewish establishment, than that prevailing in the United States. In France, for example, the presence of a relatively large population originally from the Arab world puts French Jewry and Zionism on the defensive. A sense of besieged empathy with Israeli Jews reinforces hard-line positions on conflict resolution with Palestinians, particularly as reflected in the state-recognized Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France. In Great Britain, notwithstanding the controversial, liberal, and critical pronouncements of its chief rabbi Jonathan Sacks toward Israeli government policy, organized Jewry there exercises limited influence over foreign policy. In Australia cordial relations between Jewish leaders and their country's elected representatives (particularly Prime Minister John Howard [1996–2007]) have resulted in a somewhat more sympathetic foreign policy toward Israel.

Throughout Latin America, where *israelita* (Jew) is sometimes confused with *israeli* in local parlance, Jewish communities not only have little influence on their governments' Middle East positions but in some places they have also been targets of related violence and TERRORISM. The resurgence of ANTI-SEMITISM in the former SOVIET UNION also dampens Jewish expressions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Canadian Jewry, somewhat less fragmented than American Jewry, has put forth a more unified public stance supporting incumbent Israeli governments regarding the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. In South Africa, the Jewish community has weathered lingering divisions between a pro-Israeli establishment now embarrassed about (and making amends for) the Jewish state's ties with the former apartheid regime and leftist Jews who joined the black liberation movement.

Smaller Jewish diasporas beyond the United States—IRAN excepted—tend more toward equating ANTI-ZIONISM with anti-Semitism. More vulnerable and less influential than their North American counterparts, they tend to adopt more unified and less critical stances on Israel's handling of its conflict with the Palestinians.

See also AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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—William F. S. Miles

Diaspora, Jewish, from the Perspective of Israel

There are roughly 12 million Jews in the world and about 7 million in the Diaspora. From the perspective of the Israeli government and its NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS—the JEWISH AGENCY, the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, and the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, which are legally part of the Israeli government—every Jew in the Diaspora should be a committed Zionist actively involved with Israel. Because a great number are not, these institutions have undertaken numerous programs to reverse such issues as weak Jewish identities, assimilation, mixed marriages, and indifference toward Israel, and to instill a strong Zionist identity and worldview into every Jew.

Israel has two overarching objectives with regard to the Diaspora: IMMIGRATION and financial assistance for immigrant absorption. The issue of immigration is cardinal, because to maintain itself as a Jewish state, Israel must at least preserve, and would prefer to increase, the present balance of approximately 80 percent Jews to 20 percent Palestinians within the Green Line. In JERUSALEM, likewise, Israel wants to preserve or if possible increase the existing ratio of approximately 66.8 percent Jews to 33.2 percent Palestinians. In the WEST BANK, much of which Israel intends to absorb, some 2.4 million Palestinians outnumber the approximately 250,000–300,000 Israeli SETTLERS. Concerns about DEMOGRAPHY then drive the need for increasing numbers of Jewish immigrants, whose absorption or integration must be externally financed. To achieve these aims, several organizations are engaged in the work of creating strong Jewish and Zionist identities and commitments to Israel in Diaspora communities. Education, very broadly defined, is the key to these efforts.

The Jewish Agency has instituted the "Jerusalem program," the purposes of which are, among others: (1) fostering the unity of the Jewish people, their bond to Israel, and the importance of Jerusalem; (2) encouraging ALIYA (immigration) to Israel from all countries and the effective integration of all immigrants into Israeli society; (3) ensuring the future and the distinctiveness of the Jewish people by furthering Jewish, Hebrew, and Zionist education, fostering spiritual and cultural values and teaching Hebrew as the national language; and (4) settling the country as an expression of practical ZIONISM.

The World Zionist Organization (WZO) also has numerous principles, policies, and programs relating to the transformation of the Diaspora. It proposes that the money for immigrant absorption should come from three sources in the Diaspora: charitable contributions, investment in Israel, and tourism, with the goal that every Jew in the Diaspora should visit Israel every three years. With regard to strengthening Jewish identities, the WZO's major aims and goals are to (1) foster *hagshama* activities (Zionist activities that create "self-realization" as a Jew and Zionist) in the younger generation; (2) sponsor ideological Zionist education in Israel and the Diaspora; (3) encourage aliya; and (4) establish a popular movement for students of Hebrew.

The 34th WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS (WZC—the global meeting of the WZO) refined several of these objectives. To expand fluency in Hebrew throughout the Diaspora, "the [World] Zionist Congress instructs the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE to create a comprehensive program for the instruction of the Hebrew language at schools and in educational

institutions and universities, and in formal and informal education, and for the establishment of *ulpanim* (institutes or schools exclusively for intensive study of Hebrew) for the learning of the Hebrew language and Jewish tradition, identity and heritage, worldwide. . . . The Hebrew language must serve as a common platform for the Jewish people." To achieve these goals the WZC proposed several programs:

1. A "University of the Jewish People in Israel," to enable Jews from the Diaspora to study in Israel.
2. Improvement of the bar and bat mitzvah in Israel.
3. Joint summer camps for Israeli and Diaspora Jewish youth on a regular basis.
4. Encouragement of Jewish university students to pursue academic studies in universities in Israel.
5. A comprehensive network of Hebrew *ulpanim* in every active Diaspora Jewish community. The WZC stated: "the Zionist Movement considers the strengthening of Jewish education and activity among youth and students in the Diaspora a top priority that will guarantee the prevention of assimilation and the loss of members of our People."

The WZC further proposed "the development of formal and informal Jewish educational frameworks . . . [that] include the history of the Jewish people, the current situation of Jews worldwide, acquaintance with Israeli society, Jewish cultural works throughout the generations." Most important is the study of the Hebrew language. The informal frameworks would include youth movements, student organizations, the Dor Hemshech (future leadership) program, and community centers, which would "unite different generations under the same roof, from kindergarten and up to the old age."

In the Diaspora, the *hagshama* youth movements are the spearhead of the Zionist Movement. They are a basic component of building Zionist leadership among young people in the Jewish communities. One such youth group is the World Union of Jewish Students, whose objectives include:

1. Educational activity carried out by young people to create leadership and Zionist activity
2. Strengthening of Jewish identity and Zionist awareness in order to place Israel at the center of the Diaspora Jewish community

How effective these organizations and programs are is difficult to judge. If these global organizations working full-time to ensure immigration to Israel and to provide financial substance for absorption are successful, the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be irrevocably altered.

The activities of Israel and its national institutions frequently go beyond education when they become involved with specific Diaspora communities. In 2001 an official statement of the WZC called upon the Jews of the Diaspora to make aliya to Israel and to strengthen the Judaism and Zionism of their countries. As part of that effort the WZO instituted several campaigns, particularly targeting GERMANY, FRANCE, and the former SOVIET UNION.

In 1991, Germany began offering Jews from the former Soviet Union the right to settle in that country to help rebuild its own Jewish communities devastated by the country's Nazi past. Between 1991 and 2003 some 190,000 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union to Germany. In 2004, for the first time, twice as many Jews from the former Soviet Union—or 20,000 people—chose to move to Germany over Israel. In 2003 the Jewish Agency appointed a former ambassador to Germany, Benjamin Navon, to lobby the German government to restrict immigration. In December 2004 the German government complied, passing a law allowing only Jews under the age of forty-five and familiar with the German language to immigrate. The new German law drew praise from Zionist authorities. Michael Jankelowitz, a spokesman for the WZO, said that the new regulations should increase the number of Jews in Israel from the former Soviet Union.

The episode with Germany recalled the pro-Israel pressure on the UNITED STATES government in 1990 to cease admitting SOVIET JEWS, thus ensuring they would have to go to Israel, to which Washington eventually agreed. The United States was also a focus of the twenty-first-century WZC campaign, which enjoyed significant success. The WZO expected American Jewish immigration to Israel to approach a twenty-year high in 2004. In the first ten months of 2004, 2,240 Americans exercised their right to automatic Israeli citizenship, compared with 2,385 for the whole of 2003.

In France WZO agents mounted a campaign that emphasized the rising ANTI-SEMITISM there and encouraged French Jews to immigrate to Israel as the only place they could be safe. In 2004 Jewish emigration to Israel from France reached its highest level since 1972.

Focusing on South Africa in 2002, the Zionist General Council, which acts on behalf of the WZC between sessions, called for "the allocation of special resources for the aliya and absorption in Israel of South African Jews, who are leaving their country of current residence in large numbers, but are mostly preferring to emigrate to other Diaspora communities. . . . The Zionist Movement must not miss this opportunity to bring them to Israel."

The Diaspora, then, is an important source of immigration for demographic purposes, and, as at the outset of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more than 100 years ago, it remains the core (together with LAND) of that conflict.

See also DEMOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN NATIONALS; IMMIGRATION

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Diaspora, Palestinian

The concept of Diaspora leads us to consider the complex nature of relationships between the ethnic and religious communities in the Palestinian homeland, the similarities and differences in communities dispersed from the homeland, and the diverse ways in which they establish networks. The Diaspora, in other words, is a vast web with interconnections among both various peripheries and the center. Connectivity means not only the possible "return to the center" or the homeland, but also the continuous circulation and movement between different peripheries and the center. In the Palestinian Diaspora there is a global matrix of economic, social, and cultural networks established among individuals sharing the same Palestinian ethnicity. But possession of a Palestinian identity does not necessarily mean that a person would choose to return to Palestine (if permitted). There are multiple ways of being Palestinian and relating to Palestine. Most of the literature on expatriate Palestinians has focused on "Palestinian REFUGEES" and has considered other notions, such as "Diaspora," "forced and volunteer migrants," or "Palestinians abroad," as inadequately expressing the Palestinian experience or undermining the Palestinian cause. It has been assumed that the relationship between the expatriate communities and the Palestinian territories or historical Palestine is "natural" and "primordial." Yet, particularly since the beginning of the OSLO PROCESS in 1993, there are several impediments to relationships between the Palestinians abroad and the emerging Palestinian entity.

The Palestinian Diaspora today is composed of between four and five million people, settled for the most part in historic Palestine's neighboring countries but also in the Arab Gulf States, in North and South America, and in Europe. This Diaspora maintains ties with the present Palestinian territories (WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP plus the Palestinian community in Israel), but the connections are fragile and diverse, involving three main spheres: networks, ideology, and cyberspace.

The first sphere—networks—is based on the relations among members of kinship, social, and economic groups, especially on a domestic basis rather than on transnational levels, because the political geography in the region hinders mobility and limits the possibility of visits between exiles and family members remaining in Palestine. The literature on the Diaspora often presupposes mechanical ties between peripheries and a center, founded on transnational social and economic networks, ethnically organized economic activities (e.g., ethnic businesses), and a system of solidarity (financial help, grants, etc.). However, these connections are far from being obvious in the Palestinian case. Indeed, some networks have been completely sundered under the weight of the

structural constraints imposed by the Arab states—for example, difficulties in obtaining visas or economic systems that discourage regional travel and trade. Israeli policies have also impeded such mobility. Thus a person's decision to return to Palestine from the Diaspora would likely be affected by the quality and extent of his/her kinship network plus the practical limitations implemented by the various states.

The decision to return would be affected also by the intensity of an individual's ideology, which is constructed around the concept of the Nakba (literally disaster or catastrophe) and of the sacredness of the "right to return."

Finally, in the era of the Internet, Palestinian Diaspora communities are developing increasingly significant virtual relations. Indeed, the emergence of this medium has led to a new era in transnational imagined communities—the ability to be fully Palestinian without actually being in Palestine.

Another dimension of the Diaspora-Palestine relationship involves capital transfers from the Diaspora to the Palestinian territories. These take numerous forms, including investments, contributions, and remittances from earnings. Since 2005, remittances have been declining as workers have been prohibited from working in Israel, but investments and contributions continue to constitute an important element of connectivity. Although the Diaspora's contributions have not been regular, they increased significantly after the OSLO ACCORDS and the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Increased financial contributions during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA were crucial in helping families cope with the severe economic decline resulting from the SIEGE and the massive military destructions in the spring of 2002. These subsidies came mainly from the Gulf countries and the UNITED STATES.

To suggest an idea of the size of the Diaspora's contribution during a "normal" time, one study demonstrated that in 1996 the Palestinian Diaspora's contribution in investments and philanthropic activities together could be valued at $408 million (of which 74 percent was investments) and in 1997 $410 million (of which 76 percent was investments). These investments represent one of the main resources for the Palestinian economy. Indeed, compared to the total international assistance for the Palestinian territories, Palestinian investment from the Diaspora constituted 74 percent ($549 million) of this assistance in 1996, and 95 percent ($432 million) in 1997. Nevertheless, this level of investment is insufficient for a young entity ravaged by forty years of de-development and is substantially below the investment capability of business people in the Palestinian Diaspora.

During the Second INTIFADA and the War on Gaza (2008–2009), it is notable that some contributions have come from the lower-middle classes of Diaspora Palestinian communities. Contributions have been sent from JORDAN, LEBANON, and SYRIA. In this situation it is possible to distinguish two types of donations: individual contributions to specific families residing in the West Bank or Gaza (although it is impossible to accurately estimate these monies because the major part of such cash flows is not transferred through banks); and institutional contributions from Islamic associations, Christian charities and churches, or simply from pro-Palestinian solidarity groups/organizations (which are not necessarily managed by Palestinians in the Diaspora).

The WELFARE ASSOCIATION constitutes the most important financial institution of the Palestinians in the Diaspora, as much by its symbolic authority as by its financial strength. Composed of prominent Palestinian businesspeople and intellectuals, the association is a philanthropic and independent voluntary foundation established in 1983. It has earned its solid reputation as a serious organization by leading Palestinian development. From the start, it adopted the principle of self-sustainability. To guarantee financial durability, the association trustees set up an endowment fund, supervised by an investment committee and looked after by professional portfolio managers. The revenue is used to cover the association's recurring costs, which ensures that annual dues and donations are wholly appropriated to fund grants related to Welfare Association programs and projects in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Thus it is evident that there are multiple levels and types of connections between Palestinians in the Diaspora and those in the homeland. The different forms of connectivity, their varying strength or weakness, the nature of individuals' lives in the host country, and other factors all make it quite difficult to predict how many Palestinians would return to Palestine even should they have that option.

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—Sari Hanafi

Dimona

See NUCLEAR PROGRAM, ISRAEL

Disengagement from Gaza

See ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA

Disturbances, 1921

By 1920, Palestinians, peasants in particular, felt their survival was at stake. That year Zionists paid an ABSENTEE LANDLORD and tax-farmer family 300,000 pounds sterling for 240,000 dunums (59,000 acres)—a huge block of land, including twenty-two villages in the fertile Jezreel Valley of northern Palestine. Nine thousand people—comprising 688 peasant families—were driven off the land, and their fields were given to new Jewish immigrants. As Zionist IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases increased, the frustration and misery of the peasants as well as the urban poor led to protests.

In the spring of 1921, Palestinian anger turned into violence in the city of JAFFA. A clash between two Zionist groups at a parade spilled over into the Arab quarter. After Palestinians attacked a Jewish immigration center and killed thirteen Jews, fighting spread throughout the city and beyond. In all, forty-seven Jews and forty-eight Palestinians were killed in the disturbances. In an attempt to calm the atmosphere in Palestine following the upheaval, the British high commissioner for Palestine, Sir HERBERT SAMUEL, asked Whitehall to establish a commission of inquiry.

The HAYCRAFT COMMISSION of Inquiry was set up originally to investigate what were termed the "Jaffa riots," but its remit was widened. Its report was entitled "Palestine: Disturbances in May 1921." The report blamed the Arabs for the violence, but identified a series of grievances concerning the way their interests were apparently being subsumed to the interests of the Jewish immigrants, who then made up around 10 percent of the population and were increasing rapidly. Some measures to ease Arab dissatisfaction were taken, but Jewish colonies were helped to arm themselves and ultimately the report was ignored. Publishing it (unlike the PALIN Report of the previous year) was considered a propitiatory measure.

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Dome of the Rock

The Dome of the Rock (Qubbat As-Sakhrah) is both a sacred shrine and an important historical and political site for Muslims—and a place of continuous strife in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Dome of the Rock is one of the buildings on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the third holiest site in Islam, located in the OLD CITY of East JERUSALEM. At the macro level, Palestinians want to make East Jerusalem the capital of their proposed state, while Israel resists the emergence of a Palestinian state and considers all of Jerusalem, including the eastern sector, the eternal capital of Israel. At the quotidian level of the conflict, several Jewish fundamentalist groups want to level the Haram and all the buildings on it in order to rebuild the THIRD TEMPLE in its place.

Since 1967 some of these groups have attempted to blow up the Dome of the Rock, some have attacked it, and others pray there to demonstrate Jewish sovereignty. In 2005 one group, the Temple Mount Movement, petitioned the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT for permission to pray on the al-Haram ash-Sharif during the Tish'a Be'av Tzom holiday. The radical Third Temple groups have called for the destruction of the Dome and the entire Haram, and in 2005, Israeli police uncovered a plot to fire a missile at the Dome. The police arrested a handful of Jewish extremists on suspicion of plotting attacks against the Dome of the Rock, but none were charged or held.

The Dome of the Rock is sacred to Muslims for several reasons. One involves a passage in the Quran that links the Prophet Muhammad with Jerusalem and the al-Haram ash-Sharif. That passage, entitled "The Night Journey," relates that Muhammad was carried "from the sacred temple to the temple that is most remote, whose precinct we have blessed, that we might show him our signs." Muslims believe the two temples mentioned in this verse are in Mecca and Jerusalem. Further, according to Muslim belief, Muhammad's mystic night journey in the company of the archangel Gabriel stopped briefly at Mt. Sinai and then BETHLEHEM before finally alighting on the al-Haram ash-Sharif, where they encountered Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and other prophets whom Muhammad led in prayers. Gabriel then escorted Muhammad to the pinnacle of the Sakhrah (rock), where a ladder of golden light materialized. On this glittering shaft, Muhammad ascended through the seven heavens into the presence of Allah, from whom he received instructions for himself and his followers.

Islamic history is also deeply tied to the Dome. For a brief period between 680 and 692, Mecca was the capital of a rival (to the Umayyad's) caliphate that controlled most of Arabia and parts of IRAQ. Following the retreat of the Umayyad army from its siege of Mecca, the ninth caliph, Abd al-Malik, built the Dome of the Rock over the Sakhrah between 687 and 691, in part to discourage pilgrimages to Mecca. During this period the holy rock of Sakhrah was the primary sacred site of Islam.

Designed by Byzantine architects engaged by the caliph, the Dome of the Rock is considered the greatest monumental building in early Islamic history. It is sixty-five feet (twenty meters) high and thirty-three feet (ten meters) in diameter, and its supporting structure, made of lead, was originally covered in pure gold (the real gold was removed over the centuries and the Dome is now made of anodized aluminum). The Dome is encircled by sixteen arches, and its columns are made of rare marble and brilliant mosaics. It is not a mosque for public worship but rather a *mashhad,* a shrine for pilgrims. Adjacent to the Dome is the AL-AQSA MOSQUE, where Muslims make their prayers.

See also AL-AQSA MOSQUE; AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Dreyfus, Captain Alfred (1859–1935)

In 1894 in FRANCE, Captain Alfred Dreyfus was falsely charged with high treason and espionage in what came to be seen as an ANTI-SEMITIC smear known as the "Dreyfus Affair." His trial catalyzed journalist THEODOR HERZL's concept of ZIONISM and was subsequently used to support the belief that Jews could never be assimilated and thus Zionism was the only alternative.

In 1894, papers that were discovered in a wastebasket in the office of a German military attaché made it appear that a French military officer was providing secret information to the

GERMAN government. Dreyfus, an obscure captain in the French army, came under suspicion probably because he was a Jew but also because he had access to the type of information that had been given to the German agent. The army authorities declared that Dreyfus's handwriting was similar to that on the papers. Despite protestations of innocence, he was found guilty of treason in a secret military court-martial during which he was denied the right to examine the evidence against him. The army stripped him of his rank in a humiliating ceremony and shipped him off to life imprisonment on Devil's Island, a penal colony off the coast of South America. In 1899 the president of France pardoned Dreyfus, thereby making it possible for him to return to Paris, but he had to wait until 1906—twelve years after the case had begun—to be exonerated of the charges, after which he was restored to his former military rank.

At the time of Dreyfus's initial trial, Herzl was a journalist for an Austrian newspaper, assigned to report on the trial and its aftermath. Although Herzl's Jewish connections were then weak and tenuous, he nonetheless saw in the Dreyfus Affair a harsh reminder of the persistence of anti-Semitism. He concluded that Jews could never be fully integrated into their adopted countries and would always be considered outsiders. They could never feel safe from persecution and abuse, except in a land that they could claim as their own. Soon thereafter Herzl wrote his first major book, *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State), in which he outlined his program of political Zionism. Within a remarkably short time the Zionist movement became global and settlers were immigrating to Palestine; by 1948 the state of Israel came into existence.

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Drobles Plan

The Drobles Plan was produced in 1978 by the head of the JEWISH AGENCY's Division of Land and Settlement, Mattityahu Drobles. This plan (known as the Gush-Drobles Plan or Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria, 1979–1983) for the development of Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK contended that 100,000 Jews could be settled in the West Bank by 1986. The GUSH EMUNIM adopted the plan, and ARIEL SHARON, then a minister in the government of MENAHEM BEGIN, explicitly supported it. Both Sharon and Drobles believed that Jewish colonization could be an instrument of "DEMOGRAPHIC transformation," which would change the ethnic character of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The ultimate goal of the plan was Israeli annexation of the West Bank (and Gaza).

Excerpts from Drobles's Plan indicate its scope as well as its details: "(1) Settlement throughout the entire Land of Israel is for security and by right. A strip of settlements at strategic sites enhances both internal and external security alike as well as making concrete and realising our right to *Eretz-Israel*. (2) The disposition of the proposed settlements will be implemented according to a settlement policy of blocs of settlements in homogenous settlement areas which are mutually inter-related—this enabling, in time, the development of common services and means of production. . . . (3) The disposition of the settlements must be carried out not only around the settlements of the minorities [Palestinians], but also in between them. . . . (4) New settlements will be established only on STATE LAND. . . . (6) . . . We must also ensure, from the State and WZO [WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION] budgets, the required investments for realising and executing this task. . . . Altogether, then, after five years there will be added in Judea and Samaria—in the proposed settlements, the existing ones and those under construction—27,000 families, this necessitating an overall investment of IL [Israeli lira, historical currency] 54 billion." The Drobles Plan also provided for the creation of four new ROADS in the West Bank.

By August 1984 some 113 settlements were spread over the entire West Bank, including a half dozen sizable towns. Some 46,000 Jewish settlers lived in the area (excluding expanded East JERUSALEM), and housing and services were under construction to absorb 15,000 additional settlers each year.

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Dudin, Mustafa (ca. 1916–1995)

Mustafa Dudin was an anti-PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) activist from the WEST BANK who worked for the Israeli CIVIL ADMINISTRATION organizing VILLAGE LEAGUES. During the BRITISH MANDATE, Dudin worked for the British as an officer in the Mandatory Police. From 1948 to 1965 he was an official in the Egyptian administration that governed the GAZA STRIP and afterward served as a Jordanian parliamentarian, cabinet minister, and ambassador to KUWAIT. In 1975, after a dispute with JORDAN (over an offense committed by his brother), he returned to his West Bank village of Dura near HEBRON.

Dudin then worked for Menahem Milson, whom Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN had appointed as head of a new civil administration in the military government in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Milson asked Dudin to organize the rural population into village leagues, which, the Israelis hoped, would provide a counter to the PLO and lead to the acceptance of Israel's de facto annexation of the West Bank.

In August 1978 Dudin established the first village league, in Dura. Milson and Dudin promoted the leagues as a means to give the Palestinians some autonomy under local leaders, but most individuals in the West Bank considered the leagues as COLLABORATORS with Israel. Most traditional village notables and rural intelligentsia refused to join an organization that had the declared aim of combating Palestinian nationalism. Most Palestinians continued to support the PLO and refused to accept the leagues, leading to the failure of the project. In September 1983 Dudin resigned, and the project ended shortly thereafter.

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Dulles, John Foster (1888–1959)

John Foster Dulles was US secretary of state for six years (1953–1959) during the two-term presidency of DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, who took his own major foreign policy ideas and moral compass from Dulles. As secretary of state, Dulles was instrumental in forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Baghdad Pact. He was the first US secretary of state to make an extended tour of the Middle East, in 1953. On his return he advocated strict arms control throughout the region, the internationalization of JERUSALEM in accordance with the original UN partition resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181), and a solution for the Palestinian REFUGEES. Dulles was sharper in his criticisms of Israeli military policies than any secretary of state has been since. This did not mean, however, that

he was pro-Palestinian or even pro-Arab; both Arab oil and anticommunism were his major US concerns, and Dulles feared that if the Arab-Israeli conflict was not solved, the Soviets could make inroads in the Middle East.

Dulles considered the Palestinian issue to be solely about the refugees and argued that the solution would be found in the economic development of the region so the refugees would have a better life. Dulles was silent on the political rights of the Palestinians and the implementation of Resolution 181 (partition), which would have granted the Palestinians self-government. Instead he favored JORDAN's occupation of the WEST BANK, because he believed the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, despite King Abdullah's assassination in 1951, was a trustworthy pro-Western ally. Dulles had earlier played an important role in the establishment of the state of Israel. He was acting head of the US delegation to the 1948 Paris General Assembly session after George Marshall, head of the delegation, was called back to Washington. Dulles took charge and with the support of delegates Eleanor Roosevelt and Ben Cohen, persuaded the delegation to vote for the admission of Israel to the UNITED NATIONS.

Five months into his service as secretary of state, Dulles took a twenty-day trip through the Middle East in May 1953, visiting twelve nations and Jerusalem. After returning, on 1 June 1953 he gave a major foreign policy speech on national television and radio. He reported that he found Jerusalem "divided into armed camps split between Israel and the Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere there is heavy with hate. As I gazed on the Mount of Olives, I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all, the holy place of the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish faiths. That has been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations and that fact does not necessarily exclude some political status in Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan. But the world religious community has claims in Jerusalem which take precedence over the political claims of any particular state."

Dulles also described the "bitter fate" of the Palestinian refugees: "Closely huddled around Israel are most of the over 800,000 Arab refugees who fled from Palestine as the Israelis took over. They mostly exist in makeshift camps with few facilities for health, work or recreation. Within these camps, the inmates rot away spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper offers no solution, for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate. Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. Most, however, could more readily be integrated into the lives of the neighboring Arab countries. This, however, awaits irrigation projects, which will permit more soil to be cultivated. Throughout the area the cry is for WATER for irrigation."

Dulles continued: "The UNITED STATES should seek to allay the deep resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel. In the past, we had good relations with the Arab peoples. American educational institutions there had built up a feeling of goodwill and also American businessmen had won a good reputation in this area. There was mutual confidence to mutual advantage.

"Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of ZIONISM than of communism, and they fear the United States, lest we become the backer of expansionist Zionism. On the other hand, the Israelis fear that ultimately the Arabs may try to push them into the sea." Dulles admonished Israel to become "part of the Near East community and cease to look upon itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to this community."

On 25 July 1953, on Dulles's advice, President Eisenhower rejected "for the time being" Israel's request for a $75 million loan. The decision reflected his displeasure with Israel's creeping annexation of Jerusalem. The loan was eventually granted, but on 18 September 1953 Dulles announced a temporary suspension of aid to Israel for its violation of the UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION's request that Israel suspend work on its hydroelectric project on the Jordan River—the National Water Carrier.

This crisis grew out of Israel's secret plans to use the Palestinian village of Banat Ya'qub in the demilitarized zone near the Syrian border for a major water diversion project that would move the waters of the Jordan River to central Israel and south to the Negev. The United Nations, the United States, and the Palestinians who lived in that area were unaware of Israel's plans. Earlier the Eisenhower administration had offered to finance a US-sponsored regional water-usage plan (the Eric JOHNSTON PLAN), and Israel had promised to cooperate in that effort. But in reality Israel wanted complete control of the flow of water in the region, despite its com-

mitments to the United States. Consequently a dispute ensued between the two countries.

Israel believed that if it completed the water diversion project, the United Nations would back down because the work could not be easily undone. Israel moved ahead on the project and worked nonstop, twenty-four hours a day, using searchlights at night to hasten completion while trying to maintain total secrecy. Israel even omitted appropriations for the project from its published budget and did not mention it to the Americans working with them on other water projects; however, US intelligence soon detected the activity.

When Dulles realized that Israel had deliberately deceived the United States and had no intention of keeping its earlier promise to cooperate in the US-sponsored regional water-usage plan, he recommended that Eisenhower withhold $26 million under the Mutual Security Act and suspend economic aid until Israel agreed to cooperate with UN observers. Eisenhower agreed. Acting on another suggestion by Dulles, President Eisenhower directed the Treasury to prepare an executive order removing tax-deductible status from contributions by Jewish Americans to Zionist organizations such as the United Jewish Appeal. Eisenhower did not make these actions public because he did not want to humiliate Israel, but the Israelis interpreted his reticence as a sign of weakness and continued work on the project, convinced that the Americans would back down.

Israel's strategy might have worked had Israel not launched a bloody raid on the village of QIBYA on the night of 14 October 1953. In that attack, twenty-five-year-old ARIEL SHARON, and his 300 Israeli commandos known as UNIT 101, massacred fifty-three Palestinian civilians. The Eisenhower administration condemned the raid and, for the first time, publicly revealed that it had already suspended construction funds for Israel's water project. This resulted in a major domestic backlash against Eisenhower. Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization, publicly condemned the US government. An attaché at the Israeli Embassy attempted to divert attention from the water controversy by claiming, in a widely publicized speech, that the Qibya raid was in response to Jordanian aggression. Pro-Israeli US congress members and Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION accused Eisenhower and Dulles of ANTI-SEMITISM.

Fearing the financial consequences, Israeli representatives informed President Eisenhower on 19 October that work had ceased on the water diversion project and that Israel would cooperate with the Security Council's efforts to solve the Jordan River development problem. Within twenty-four hours, Dulles approved the restoration of aid to Israel. The Israelis interpreted Dulles's abrupt change of position as proof that they could manipulate the United States by applying adequate pressure. Ultimately Israel completed the water diversion project in a slightly altered manner.

On 26 August 1955 Secretary Dulles made a speech before the Council of Foreign Relations in New York in which he outlined terms for peace in the Middle East. He stated that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be resolved, but that Israel should not be expected to assume the full cost. He proposed that Congress approve an international loan to finance the resettlement or repatriation of Palestinian refugees in Arab states. The loan would also help develop irrigation projects to assist refugees in cultivating their land.

Dulles took a dim view of Israel's growing militarism, manifested in its policy of massive retaliation against neighboring Arab states, allegedly undertaken to stop Palestinian incursions but actually to force the Arab states to conclude peace agreements with Israel on its terms. The secretary of state feared that Israel's massive attacks on its Arab neighbors would heighten the Arab-Israeli conflict and provide the Soviet Union an entrée to the region. One of these attacks, the GAZA Raid in February 1955, resulted in EGYPT's purchase of weapons from the Soviet Union—the "Czech arms deal"—and provided MOSCOW its first opportunity for involvement in the Middle East. Dulles had repeatedly warned the Israelis that attacking their neighbors was no way to encourage peace. After the Gaza Raid Dulles told Israel, "Such raids dangerously heighten existing tensions. The very insecurity of which Israel complains is aggravated by such a policy."

On 29 October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On 1 November British and FRENCH forces, in a plan developed before the Israeli attack, also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the Suez Canal zone. Opposition from President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, and UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld, together with Soviet threats of intervention, put an immediate stop to British and French involvement, but Israeli troops remained in the Gulf of Aqaba and the GAZA STRIP in defiance

of a UN resolution. Eisenhower is said to have told Dulles, "Foster, you tell 'em, goddamn it, we're going to apply sanctions, we're going to the United Nations, we're going to do everything that there is to stop this thing." He later explained, "We just told the Israelis it was absolutely indefensible and that if they expect our support in the Middle East and in maintaining their position, they had better behave."

Nevertheless, Israel continued to occupy the Sinai and the Gulf of Aqaba. On 2 February 1957 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, but Ben-Gurion refused. Disturbed by Israel's intransigence, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter (drafted by Dulles) to Ben-Gurion, demanding Israel's withdrawal. Still, Ben-Gurion refused. Hammarskjöld was quietly pushing for sanctions at the United Nations—with the full support of the Eisenhower administration—against Israel if it continued to occupy Egyptian territory. In response, then Senate majority leader LYNDON JOHNSON published a letter to Dulles in the *New York Times*, urging the Eisenhower administration not to support UN sanctions against Israel. Johnson argued that the United States would follow an unfair double standard by punishing a small country such as Israel when large countries such as the Soviet Union openly defied UN resolutions without being punished. In addition, Johnson rallied Senate Democrats to oppose sanctions against Israel. He used partisan politics in an attempt to pressure Eisenhower and Dulles into retreating, but both stood their ground and delayed financial assistance. When Israel began to feel the financial effects in March 1957, Ben-Gurion finally agreed to withdraw troops from Egyptian territory.

When Eisenhower was campaigning for his second term in the White House in 1956, Dulles was called to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the hearings he was given a sharp reminder of the domestic political dimensions of the problem and was subjected to several hours of hard questioning, much of it from pro-Zionist Democrats such as Wayne Morse of Oregon and Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota. Dulles responded with the remark: "our difficulty . . . derives very largely from the fact that the Arabs believe that the United States, when it confronts problems which relate to Israel, is in the last analysis dominated by domestic political considerations."

A few days after the Senate hearings, which took place on 24 February 1956, Dulles was so irritated with the Zionist lobby that he took the extraordinary step of taking up the issue with ABBA EBAN, the Israeli ambassador to the United States. In a "bitter dressing down" of the ambassador, Dulles complained of "the political campaign being waged by the Israelis against the administration, the paid advertisements, the mass meetings, the resolutions, the demands of Zionist organizations, the veiled threats of domestic political reprisals."

In the end Dulles made no progress in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. He resigned his office on 15 April 1959, after being diagnosed with terminal cancer.

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Muhammad al-Dura was an 11-year-old Palestinian boy killed by Israeli gunfire near Netzarim junction in the GAZA STRIP on 30 September 2000

at the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. A resident of Breij Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip, Muhammad died of injuries sustained from five bullets to his body and head. His father took eight bullets but survived. A French television crew (France 2) filmed the boy clutching his father as his father tried to shield him from bullets. Broadcast around the world, this image became a rallying symbol of resistance and rage against Israel—a symbol of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

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E

E1 Plan

E1 is an Israeli government plan to connect distant WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, in particular MA'ALE ADUMIM, the largest Jewish settlement (population 32,000 in 2005), directly to East JERUSALEM. The E1 Plan involves confiscation of a swath of some 3,100 acres (12,590 dunum) of land between East Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim; the construction of 3,500 new housing units absorbing 15,000 additional Jewish settlers in new and existing colonies; plus the establishment of an industrial estate, police station, cemetery, park, and tourist and public areas. Expansion of the infrastructure is to include an elaborate system of roads, tunnels, and services.

The E1 Plan was conceived in 1997, a product of Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU'S grand strategy for the expansion of West Bank settlements and their linkage to East Jerusalem. In March 2005 ARIEL SHARON'S defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, gave governmental approval for implementation of the E1 Plan, but strong US pressure delayed its start.


Ha'aretz reported in February 2009 that "during the past two years Israel has invested close to NIS 200 million ($50 million) in preparing INFRASTRUCTURE for construction of housing units to create a contiguous block between Ma'aleh Adumim and East Jerusalem." The neighborhood of Mevaseret Adumim, slated to be built on Area E1, has so far not been begun because of continuing US opposition. However, in May 2008 construction of the Judea and Samaria police headquarters in E1 was completed. The building sits atop a hill where it moved from the Palestinian neighborhood of RAS AL-AMUD in East Jerusalem. Even though it is a relatively small complex (3.5 acres) inside a huge area, the police base opened a window for massive construction in the area.

In 2008 and 2009, there was dramatic infrastructure construction in the E1 area. A large system of ROADS, with an overpass, divided highways of up to three lanes wide, traffic circles, lighting, observation posts, and fences, has been completed. The extent of this construction is obviously meant to serve more than the several hundred employees traveling to the police headquarters every day. The construction of the police station, done with the required PERMITS, seems to have been a necessary initial stage for the "claiming" of Area E1 for eventual construction of residential neighborhoods there.

The completion of the E1 Plan will allow Israel greater control of the movement of Palestinians from one part of the West Bank to another while cutting off East Jerusalem from the rest of Palestinian territory. Because 40 percent of the Palestinian ECONOMY revolves around Jerusalem and its tourist-based income, E1 could isolate the economic center of any Palestinian entity and render any developing Palestinian state little more than a set of economically nonviable BANTUSTANS.

At the same time, E1 will block off East Jerusalem from the West Bank by encircling the city with settlements and the BARRIER wall, putting an end to territorial contiguity of East Jerusalem Palestinians with the rest of the Palestinian territories, and tipping the DEMOGRAPHIC balance of Jerusalem in favor of Israel by creating a decisive Jewish majority through the incorporation of the settlers from the Ma'ale Adumim settlement bloc (including Ma'ale Adumim, Mishor Adumim, Kfar Adumim, and Allon, plus the new colonies to be established within E1). The plan's implementation will expand the territorial and infrastructural foundations for the Israeli capital to double its size, while disrupting the only prospective Palestinian route of passage still available for relinking not only Arab East Jerusalem's currently scattered neighborhoods but also the discontinuous Palestinian territories of the northern and southern West Bank.

On the other hand, through E1, the contiguity of Israel's territory with major parts of the West Bank is solidified. E1 controls the main axis of socioeconomic development for Israelis outlined in Israel's METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM PLAN. The critical area of E1 runs along the trajectory of



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Map 13. Location of E1 Development Plan

Road 45, which originates in greater Tel Aviv and leads via Ben Gurion Airport—scheduled to be greatly expanded in conjunction with large industrial zones around the city of Modi'in—to GREATER JERUSALEM at the West Bank settlement of Givat Ze'ev. The road continues along the recently developed archaeological site next to the Prophet Samuel's tomb and passes the East Jerusalem settlement community of Ramot and the expanding industrial park of Har Hotzvim, to arrive at the projected Eastern Gate settlement site in East Jerusalem. From here it passes to Ma'ale Adumim and further to a newly projected settlement area at Tibek Kuteif on the heights above the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY.

The E1 scheme has significance beyond the territorial area that it encompasses by demonstrating the degree to which settlement expansion has

been seamlessly integrated into Israel's national planning framework. The E1 Plan additionally calls for linking, through the system of existing and new bypass roads, Ma'ale Adumim with Giv'at Ze'ev in the north and the Etzion Bloc in the south, as well as with Pisgat Omer, Neve Ya'acov, and French Hill, thus creating a large bloc of Jewish colonies.

According to a public statement by Defense Minister EHUD BARAK, "Ma'aleh Adumim is an inalienable part of Jerusalem and the State of Israel in any permanent settlement . . . E1 is a corridor that connects Ma'aleh Adumim to Mount Scopus and therefore it is important for it to remain part of the country." This has been the position of the Israeli LABOR PARTY since YITZHAK RABIN and also of the government of Barak in 1999.

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Early Empowerment

Early Empowerment, short for "Israel and the PLO Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities: Early Empowerment," was the fourth accord between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in the OSLO PROCESS and was signed on 29 August 1994. The agreement, hundreds of pages in length, was intended to facilitate the implementation of Israel's transfer of responsibility to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) for administration of aspects of civilian life in the GAZA STRIP and JERICHO. Building on previous accords, Early Empowerment further spelled out the limitations and restrictions as well as the obligations and responsibilities incumbent on the PNA when it assumed self-government in five areas, including EDUCATION and culture, HEALTH, social welfare, tourism, and direct taxation. The latter sphere was to be shared with Israel for "security" reasons. The OCCUPATION, together with all the military orders and laws that sustain it, remained in effect, especially in the WEST BANK. The Israeli CIVIL ADMINISTRATION was dissolved in Gaza but remained in place throughout the West Bank. The existence of two separate entities, Palestinians and settlers, with separate legal standards was preserved and legitimized in the Early Empowerment accord. Finally, consistent with the provisions in the 4 May 1994 GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II, Israel was explicitly exempted from legal responsibility for acts committed during its twenty-eight-year Occupation.

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East Jerusalem

See GREATER JERUSALEM; JERUSALEM; METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

East Jerusalem Settler Groups

See SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

Eastern Orthodox Church

See GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH

Eban, Aubrey (Abba) Solomon (1915–2002)

Aubrey "Abba" Eban was an Israeli scholar, diplomat, and politician. Born in Cape Town, South Africa, and educated in England, he immigrated to Palestine in 1942. Eban received degrees from Cambridge University in Middle Eastern languages and literature and served with the British army in World War II as a liaison officer between the Allies and the Jewish Yishuv. He remained in Palestine after the war.

In the years preceding Israel's independence, Eban was chief instructor (1944–1946) at the Middle Eastern Center for Arab Studies in JERUSALEM and worked at the JEWISH AGENCY before commencing his diplomatic career as representative to the 1947 UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE. From that position, Eban worked for approval of the UN General Assembly Resolution for the Partition of Palestine (UN RESOLUTION 181). Known for his superb oration, in 1948 he became Israel's UN representative, serving concurrently as ambassador to the UNITED STATES from 1950 until his election to the Knesset in 1959. A member of the LABOR PARTY, Eban held various cabinet positions before becoming foreign minister.

From 1966 to 1974, Eban served as Israel's foreign minister and strongly defended the country's position in the 1967 WAR. In 1967 he played an important role in inserting language into UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 (as well as UN RESOLUTION 338 in 1973) that allowed Israel to argue that the resolutions do not call for its withdrawal from all of the territories occupied in 1967.

In 1988, after three decades in the Knesset, Eban lost his seat due to internal splits in the Labor Party. He devoted the rest of his life to writing and teaching, including serving as a visiting academic at Princeton University and Columbia University. He also narrated television documentaries, including *Heritage: Civilization and the Jews* (PBS [Public Broadcasting Service], 1984), for which he was host; *Israel: A Nation Is Born* (1992); and *On the Brink of Peace* (PBS, 1997). His books include *My Country*; *Abba Eban: An Autobiography; Diplomacy for the Next Century;* and *Heritage: Civilization and the Jews*. In 2001 Eban received the Israel Prize, his country's highest honor, for his life's work.

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Economic Protocol

See GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II

Economy: The Effects of Occupation on the Palestinians

In 1967, when Israel occupied the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, it integrated Palestinian markets in these areas into its economy. At the time, the Israeli economy was approximately ten times the size of the Palestinian economy, its sectoral diversification was much greater, and the manufacturing sector's share of its GDP (gross domestic product) was more than four times larger than the Palestinians'. These differences in size and structure defined the relations between the two economies: on the one hand, a large, advanced, and rich economy, and, on the other, a small, underdeveloped, and poor economy. Both theoretical analyses and empirical studies suggest that the dynamics of such a relationship always generate two opposing forces—spread effects and backwash effects—that disproportionately affect the smaller economy and distort its development.

Such relations include an increased demand for the products of the small economy, possible diffusion of technology and knowledge from the large economy to the small one, as well as other spread effects resulting from the geographical proximity of the two economies. These effects typically lead to subcontracting, joint ventures, and coordination in tourism and other services. Unfavorable repercussions arise from the disappearance of many industries in the small economy, its confinement to producing labor-intensive and low-skilled goods, and the emigration of a sizable segment of its labor force to the neighboring economy as well as to other countries. These effects are known in the literature as backwash effects or polarization effects. They arise from the capability of efficient, large-scale industries in the advanced economy to outcompete inefficient, small-scale industries in the less advanced economy and to attract both labor and capital to the advanced economy and away from the poorer economy.

From the perspective of the small economy, therefore, the crucial question is the net balance between the two opposing dynamic impacts: to what extent do they help its own development and to what extent do they reinforce underdevelopment? Among the factors that determine the relative strength of these two forces is the degree of integration between the two sides, which can be easily illustrated by examining trade. A removal of tariff and other barriers to trade between the two countries would increase the exports of the small economy to its neighbor in a pattern of comparative advantage. This level of exports, however, will not be sustained if free trade between the two countries is accompanied by a common external tariff and if the tariff is substantial and fixed, as is likely when an advanced economy wants to protect its industries or when the poor economy does not have a substantial natural endowment or a niche advantage. Such protection would increase the price of intermediate and capital goods imported by the small economy and thus raise its cost of production in a way that would compromise its comparative advantage.

Further measures of integration between the two economies, such as allowing free movement of labor and capital, would significantly reduce the export of goods from the small to the large economy because the export of labor services would be substituted for the export of goods. In other words, free trade and free mobility would gradually wipe out comparative advantage from trade and confine it to absolute advantage, resulting in the small economy exporting low-skilled goods and importing high-skilled goods, thus locking in its poverty and underdevelopment. The small economy would be relegated to the status of a backward region in an otherwise advanced country, as is the case of the south in Italy and central Appalachia in the United States. Had the integration between the two countries been allowed to proceed at a slower pace and had the poor economy been able to exploit its own natural or human resources, free trade between the two sides without a common external tariff and free mobility of factors of production may have allowed producers in the small economy to expand production. This would have been the result of taking advantage of economies of scale and enhancing a comparative advantage favorable to development. In short, a slow pace of integration and sovereignty over resources and trade could improve the comparative advantage of the small economy by tapping the spread effects, whereas a hasty integration and usurpation of domestic resources would destroy the comparative advantage through the working of the polarization effects.

The pattern that evolved between the Israeli and Palestinian economies is characterized by the following:

- Israel possesses the majority of the modern sectors, operating under increasing returns of scale characteristic of manufacturing activities.
- By offering a wage premium to Palestinian workers in the traditional sector, such as in agriculture and crafts, Israel has assured itself an elastic supply of labor for its modern industries. This wage premium was a small one, given the low wages in Palestinian agriculture and the geographical proximity of the pools of migrating workers to their work in Israel.
- The influx of Palestinian labor into Israel at a fraction of the Israeli labor cost has reduced the wage premium in the Israeli modern sector, including technology and communication, and made it more profitable and sustainable.
- The shekels (Israeli currency) earned by Palestinian migrant workers in Israel are typically spent on the consumption of Israeli products, thus increasing demand for these products.
- Israel imposed on the Palestinian economy a common tariff regime that effectively wiped out

any comparative advantage that the Palestinians could have with Israel or with neighboring Arab markets.

- The geographical proximity between the two economies reduced transportation costs and time and contributed to the destruction of the traditional sector. The Occupied Territories lost even their absolute advantage in many agricultural products after the traditional sector was disrupted by the OCCUPATION and could not act as a buffer sector for local employment.

Economics of the Occupation

Immediately after Occupation in 1967, Israel imposed on the West Bank and Gaza Strip a customs union trade arrangement (that is, a free trade area with a common external tariff) that increased tariffs approximately fourfold. This drastic increase, along with the many nontariff barriers applied by Israel, resulted in Palestinians turning away from trade with neighboring Arab countries and the rest of the world and toward the Israeli market. It also raised the cost of capital and intermediary goods to Palestinian producers, which effectively wiped out their competitive edge in foreign markets. For instance, the cost of garment production in the West Bank is larger than that of JORDAN by a factor of 2.17, mainly because Palestinian producers pay double the price for their imported Turkish textiles compared to the superior-quality and cheaper East Asian materials imported by Jordanian producers. The Palestinians cannot import the Asian textiles because of the prohibitive tariff imposed by Israel to protect its own industry and trade with its strategic partners. Similarly, the cost of agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and shoes is lower in Jordan than in the Palestinian territories partly because of the differences in imported input prices.

Another reason for the high cost of Palestinian production in both agriculture and industry is the relatively high wage rate. It is estimated that wages of Palestinian workers are larger than those in Jordan by a factor of 2 to 3 in agriculture, a factor of 2 in the garment industry, and a factor of 2.3 in the shoe industry. These higher wages are the result of distortions in the labor and product markets created by Israel's hiring of Palestinian commuters to work by the day in Israel—a practice that started with the Occupation and steadily increased to account for almost a third of the Palestinian labor force in the early 1990s—plus the high cost of imports under the Israeli price and trade regimes. Higher wages in Israel have put pressure on employers in the Occupied Territories.

This trade arrangement has increased the cost of Palestinian production, causing Palestinian exporters to lose their comparative advantage in traditional neighboring markets, and facilitated their migration to Israeli markets. More importantly, economies of scale realized by the advanced Israeli manufacturers enabled them to undercut the small Palestinian firms producing for the domestic market, disrupting and replacing Palestinian artisan and small-industry production. A UNITED NATIONS study in the mid-1980s showed that 50 percent of Palestinian imports from Israel had been produced domestically prior to the Occupation.

While these adverse backwash effects were at work, other positive spread effects were introduced by the Occupation, including a limited number of new opportunities for employment in and trade with Israel and a minor transfer of technology. The rapidly rising income earned by Palestinians working in Israel contributed to increased demand and domestic economic activities. Palestinian agriculture benefited from a transfer of technology from the more advanced Israeli agriculture, and this contributed to increased exports of some agriculture products to Israel. The cumulative impact of this expansion in economic activities helped increase Palestinian income, savings, and investments, especially in residential construction.

Economic Policies and Practices

The higher cost of living in Israel and the external diseconomies produced by congestion in Israel suggest that backwash effects should ultimately outweigh the benefits of greater efficiency and economies of scale in Israel. However, the relation between the two economies has followed a different path. In the first decade, the Palestinian economy benefited from its relation with Israel; the Palestinian GDP per capita grew from 11 percent to 16 percent of that of Israel. But then the ratio declined continuously, and at the start of the limited self-rule in 1994 was almost at the level of a quarter century before. The reason for this reversal was the Zionist policies practiced by Israel since the start of Occupation, which increased in intensity and aggressiveness in the mid-1970s and circumvented the forces in the market, bolstering the effects of polarization and diminishing the

spread effects. These policies and practices include the following measures.

Restriction on the Use of Natural Resources

Since the start of the Occupation, the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have increasingly lost control over their LAND and their supply of WATER. It is widely believed that by the time Palestinian limited self-rule was established in 1994, Israel had confiscated 68 percent of the total land of the West Bank and 40 percent of the Gaza Strip, mainly for new Jewish SETTLEMENTS and CLOSED MILITARY ZONES. As of 2004, more than 85 percent of Palestinian water from the West Bank aquifers was taken by Israel, accounting for 25.3 percent of Israel's water needs. Palestinians are also denied their right to utilize water resources from the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers. West Bank farmers historically used the waters of the Jordan River to irrigate their fields, but this source has become polluted because Israel is diverting water flows from around Lake Tiberius into the lower Jordan. Moreover, Israeli diversion from Lake Tiberius into the National Water Carrier has reduced the flow considerably, leaving Palestinians downstream with little water and water of low quality.

In Gaza the coastal aquifer serves as its main water resource, but it is now suffering from severe saltwater intrusion. Other Gaza water sources, such as runoff from the HEBRON hills, have been diverted for Israeli purposes. Gaza, which housed only 50,000 people before 1948, is now one of the most densely populated regions in the world, with over 1.4 million inhabitants as of July 2007. This is the result of the high levels of forced IMMIGRATION following the 1948 and 1967 WARS and the high rate of natural population increase.

Most of the water used by Israel is for use within Israel and by Israeli settlers in the West Bank and, until 2005 when Israel withdrew, the Gaza Strip. With regard to total water consumption, Israel uses 1,959 cubic meters per year per capita compared to an average Palestinian use of 238 cubic meters per year per capita. By the end of 2008 the number of Jewish settlers had reached around 450,000 in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem).

These Israeli policies toward land, water, and settlements had a profoundly negative impact on all economic activities but particularly on agriculture. But most importantly, they facilitated the forced migration of labor whose ranks swelled from the proletarianization of Palestinian farmers, who lost their land and water, which in turn produced a sharp decline in irrigated land and steep increases in the price of land and water. The most important component of the Palestinian economy, the agricultural sector, employs about one-quarter of the labor force and contributes approximately one-third of the GDP and exports. In contrast, Israeli agriculture, an advanced capital-intensive sector, contributes no more than 2 percent to the GDP and less (1.7 percent) to exports. The loss of large stretches of agricultural land in the Occupied Territories after 1967 and limitations on water supply and product markets have led to a substantial decline in the production and importance of this sector. In 1967, Palestinian agricultural production, on balance, was almost identical to Israel's. Although tomatoes, cucumbers, and melons were roughly half of Israel's crop, plum and grape production was equal to Israel's, and Palestinian production of olives, dates, and almonds was higher. At that time, the West Bank exported 80 percent of the entire vegetable crop it produced and 45 percent of total fruit production. According to David Kahan, an Israeli scholar, "The agricultural sector was hit hard after Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thereafter the sector's contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Palestinian Occupied Territories declined. Between 1968/1970 and 1983/1985 the percentage of agricultural contribution to the overall GDP in the West Bank fell from 37.4/53.5 percent to 18.5/25.4 percent. The labor force employed in this sector has also declined. Between 1969 and 1985, the agricultural labor force as a percentage of the total labor force fell from 46 to 27.4 percent."

In 1965, before the Israeli Occupation, the actual cultivated area in Palestine was estimated at 600,000 acres (2,435 square kilometers). In 1980 the total area fell to 480,000 acres (1,951 km^2), in 1985 to 428,000 acres (1,735 km^2), and in 1989 to 421,000 acres (1,706 km^2), a reduction by 30 percent of the area cultivated in 1965. Israeli restrictions also have drastically limited the irrigation of Palestinian land so that today only 6 percent of the West Bank land cultivated by Palestinians is under irrigation, the same proportion as in 1967. By contrast, about 70 percent of the area cultivated by Jewish settlers in the West Bank is irrigated.

Marketing of farm products and their distribution to local and external markets are another major obstacle facing Palestinian farmers.

Throughout the Occupation years, selling Palestinian agricultural products within Israel has required special PERMITS issued by the Israeli authorities. Transporting products from north to south in the West Bank has become difficult as well, especially after Israel enforced a CLOSURE on East JERUSALEM that included the main road connecting northern and southern parts of the West Bank. Movement of agricultural products between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is also subject to Israeli control.

The GULF WAR in 1991 also severely affected Palestinian agriculture, because the bulk of exports were previously sent to Arab Gulf countries. Although Palestinian exports to the Gulf States before the war had accounted for approximately $25.4 million per year, Palestinian exports fell by 14 percent after the crisis.

Restrictions on Other Productive Sectors

In addition to the removal of land and water from Palestinian control, the Israeli authorities have followed a general practice aimed at changing the structure and performance of the Palestinian economy. In 1967 all economic activities were placed under the scrutiny of the Israeli military administration in the territories, and every economic undertaking requires its approval. Permits are required for all activities related to the acquisition of land, the construction of buildings, the transportation of goods, and export and import activities.

Palestinian firms have to pay a value added tax (VAT) on all their imports of raw materials through Israel. Long delays in receiving VAT refunds has caused some firms severe problems of cash flow and shortage of capital, resulting in an annual loss estimated to be 8 to 12 percent of the value of their finished products. Investment was further discouraged by the underdevelopment of effective financial sources in the Palestinian economy. This reflected the fact that all Arab banks were closed at the beginning of the Occupation and only reopened on a very small scale in the mid-1980s.

Another Israeli restriction is related to technological change and modernization. The Israeli authorities did not permit Palestinian firms to import machines and tools incorporating the latest technology, but instead Palestinians were compelled to buy secondhand machines from Israel.

It should also be noted that the customs union arrangement Israel imposed on the territories was, in effect, an asymmetric trade scheme that allowed Israel's own heavily subsidized products free entry into Palestinian markets but prevented the entry of Palestinian products into the Israeli market except on a selective and limited basis. This imbalance in trade relations, combined with complex administrative procedures aimed at limiting Palestinian exports to the rest of the world, has made Palestinian trade completely dependent on Israel. Not only do 90 percent of all Palestinian imports come from Israel, but Palestinians pay for these imports partly by exporting labor services to Israel and partly by exporting goods manufactured under subcontracting arrangement with Israeli firms.

Resource Transfer to Israel and the Neglect of the Public Sector

The forced integration of the Palestinian economy into that of Israel involved a transfer of resources from the former to the latter via three channels. First, Palestinians pay VAT and customs duties on products imported from Israel. It is estimated that half of the taxes paid by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories accrued to the Israeli treasury in this way. The second source is the income tax and social security contributions paid by Palestinians working in Israel. The third is the *seigniorage* revenue Israel received because its currency was made legal tender in the Occupied Territories. The total of these resource transfers is large and, according to some estimates, reaches in any given year from 15 percent to a quarter of the Palestinian GNP.

As a consequence of this transfer, public expenditures in the Occupied Territories (health, education, utilities, infrastructure, etc.) have been very low. Palestinians complain about the poor state of public infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the low level and poor quality of public services and utilities, which they view as far below those of neighboring countries. The poor condition of the basic infrastructure and public services causes market fragmentation, which in turn inhibits specialization and the realization of economies of scale that are essential for a small economy to be competitive.

The cumulative impact of the foregoing restrictions on resource use, business activities, and domestic and international trade has substantially weakened the traditional productive sectors of the Palestinian economy. As a consequence, a major structural transformation of the Palestinian economy has taken place. It has become an economy

characterized by a growing resource gap, a labor market imbalance, a great and unhealthy dependence on external sources of income and aid, an INFRASTRUCTURE gap, sectoral disarticulation, and a depressed and debilitated infrastructure.

Economics of Limited Self-Rule during the Interim Period

The gradual establishment of Palestinian limited self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after May 1994, the result of the implementation of the OSLO ACCORDS between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, resulted in a transfer of power over some economic affairs from the Israeli CIVIL ADMINISTRATION (CA) to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), including the removal of restrictions on business activities. In some geographical areas, Palestinian firms were no longer required to get permits and licenses previously required by the Israeli CA. However, some of the indirect restrictions remain, including indirect taxes and the tariffs on consumer durables from neighboring Arab countries.

Under limited self-rule, the customs union regime that was at the center of the economic relationship between Israel and the Occupied Territories changed in two directions. First, some elements were removed. In principle, Palestinian goods should have received the same tariff treatment in Israel that Israeli goods received in Palestine. Second, some elements of a free trade area regime were introduced, and the PNA was permitted to choose its own tariff rates on three lists of goods specified by Israel.

Monetary arrangements during the transitional period of 1994–2000 were an improvement over those of direct Occupation. Arab banks reopened, new ones were established, and banks were monitored by the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA), which has some of the functions of a central bank but not the right to issue national currency. The Israeli currency (the shekel) and the Jordanian currency (the dinar) remained as legal tender. While the absence of a national currency renders Palestinian monetary policy ineffective, the existence of a two-currency standard has the potential for increasing costs associated with fluctuations in exchange rates typical of a flexible exchange rate regime. Moreover, a dual currency tends to reduce the ability of commercial banks to perform their function of transforming debt maturities, because the currency is mismatched in mixed portfolios. This discourages banks from extending long-term loans, which are essential for investment and growth.

Under the limited self-rule, some of the resource transfers to Israel were eliminated. Nevertheless, Israel retains control over reimbursements to the PNA for 75 percent of the income tax collected from Palestinians working in Israel and 100 percent of the income tax collected from those working in Jewish settlements. According to agreements between Israel and the PLO, Israel was also to collect and transfer to the PNA all VAT on goods purchased in Israel by Palestinian firms, although in periods of conflict Israel has withheld and refused to transfer these funds. Palestinian imports from the rest of the world, which must pass through Israel, still generate customs duties received by Israel and are not transferred to the PNA. This happens because Palestinian wholesalers and firms use Israeli traders, who include the Palestinian imports as part of imports destined to Israel (rather than the West Bank and Gaza Strip). Accordingly, customs paid by Palestinians on these imports accrue to Israel and are not transferred to the PNA. Although there is no precise way of measuring the exact size of this forfeited revenue, studies at differing time periods have estimated it to be around one-third of total tax revenue and about 3 percent of the Palestinian GDP.

The most important feature of the limited self-rule is the continued absence of Palestinian sovereignty and the lack of control over natural resources. In the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), it was agreed that there would be no change in sovereignty over land, water, and settlements during the transitional period, but that these issues would be left to the FINAL STATUS negotiations. Consequently, the restrictions imposed on the Palestinian use of land and water remain intact. Furthermore, the conditions under which the limited self-rule has been implemented have caused geographic segmentation with harmful economic effects. According to a World Bank report, the new situation "split up the West Bank and Gaza into a number of largely separate economic units with little economic interrelationships among them, breaking up an already small domestic market into even smaller ones." Moreover, the awkward fractionalization of the limited self-rule areas has created a multidimensional uncertainty that is discouraging to both domestic and foreign investment. For example, a prospective investor can

obtain a license for starting a business from the PNA, but bringing outside capital, goods, and people for that investment needs the approval of the Israeli authorities; and he cannot be certain that if his factory is in NABLUS, for instance, he will be able to reach other parts of the West Bank due to CHECKPOINTS, ROADBLOCKS, and other impediments, let alone export to other countries.

During the interim period, Palestinians received their severest blow with the rapid construction of new Jewish settlements and the expansion of existing ones.

All of these activities increased in scope and intensity after 1997, especially in Palestinian lands surrounding the city of JERUSALEM. After six years of limited self-rule, the Palestinian economic outlook was as bleak as it was under direct Occupation. In fact, the general well-being of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as measured by all indices, seriously deteriorated after the establishment of the limited self-rule. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported that in the 1995–1996 period real average per capita expenditure was 15 percent below its value for the years 1992–1993. A growing gap between Israeli and Palestinian per capita income also reflected this deterioration in the standard of living.

Post-Intifada Crisis

A deep economic crisis pervades the West Bank and Gaza in the waning years of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which began late in 2000. The Intifada and Israel's responses have impoverished an entire generation of young Palestinians and have served to undermine the credibility of the PNA while increasing the popular appeal of militant factions—especially the Islamists. The economic recession is among the worst in modern history. Average personal income declined by more than a third after September 2000, and nearly half of Palestinians live below the poverty line. These losses exceed the scale of economic losses suffered by the UNITED STATES in the Great Depression or Argentina during its major financial collapse. Unemployment increased from 10 percent of the workforce to an average of 41 percent during 2002, and the number of poor rose from 20 percent to over 50 percent of the population. In Gaza, unemployment exceeded 46 percent of the workforce, and the poverty level rose to 68 percent. Private investment and trade fell dramatically through 2001 and 2002.

The main cause of this economic crisis has been closures—a multifaceted system of RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOVEMENT of Palestinian goods and people designed to protect Israelis in Israel proper and in the settlements. Closures typically take three basic forms: (1) internal restrictions within the West Bank and Gaza reinforced by CURFEWS, (2) restrictions on the BORDERS between Israel and the West Bank and between Israel and Gaza, and (3) restrictions at the international crossings between the West Bank and Jordan and between Gaza and EGYPT. Closures have affected the web of Palestinian economic transactions, raised the costs of transactions and doing business, and disrupted the predictability needed for orderly economic life and investment. They have reduced the already small Palestinian economy and shredded any possibility of reaping economies of scale or scope. Although the Palestinian economy stabilized in 2003, this reflected diminished levels of violence, fewer curfews, more predictable closures, and adaptation by Palestinian businesses to the contours of a cantonized West Bank economy. It also reflected the temporary fiscal stimulus from Israel's resumption of revenue transfers in late 2002 (Israel paid the PNA $294 million of a debt of over $441 million, although after the Palestinian elections in 2006 brought a HAMAS-led government to power, Israel again ceased all revenue transfers). Led by increased construction activity and informal transport and commerce, 97,000 new jobs were created in the West Bank and Gaza, and unemployment and poverty levels both fell by some four to five percentage points.

The economy, however, continued to operate at well below its previous performance, and under the closures it cannot generate the employment needed to absorb a rapidly expanding workforce or organize a sustained attack on unemployment. With the population growing at 5.2 percent in 2003 (and 5.5 percent in Gaza), 2003's GDP increase of 6 percent translated into per capita GDP (or domestic output) growth of about 1 percent. The quality of most new jobs created in 2003 was poor, with more than half classified as self-employed or unpaid family labor in commerce and agriculture—low-skilled jobs with limited potential, evidence of a growing "informalization" of the economy, and down-skilling the labor force and employment. Investment and trade remained depressed in 2003: private investment totaled at most US$600 million, roughly one-third of 1999 levels, while

exports actually decreased, contributing only 14 percent to GDP.

An easing of closures alone will not attract investors back to the Palestinian economy, nor will additional donor money solve the current economic problems. Donor disbursements of US$1 billion per annum are already high. Additional aid in today's economy would help alleviate day-to-day hardship but would have little lasting impact. As long as the economy is fragmented and unpredictable, investors will stay away and short-term gains will not be sustainable.

Economic Impact of the Barrier

In April 2002 the Israeli government approved the construction of a permanent BARRIER in the West Bank, with the stated aim of preventing Palestinians from carrying out attacks against Israelis. Upon completion, the Barrier, or the Wall, will be over 400 miles (652 kilometers) in length, 16 to 26 feet high, depending on the locale, and surrounded by a 200-feet (60-meter) exclusion area. The route does not consistently follow the Green Line (1967 border), but penetrates up to 13 miles (22 kilometers) into the Palestinian land, affecting about 375 square miles (973 square kilometers), or 17 percent of its area, and encompassing about 20 percent of the population of the West Bank.

About 13 percent of the cultivated area in the West Bank, 91 square miles (238 square kilometers) of land, will be isolated between the Green Line (1967 border) and the Barrier, resulting in additional restrictions on movement of the Palestinians, separating peasants from their lands and workers from jobs, and depriving thousands of the ability to earn a livelihood. By the fall of 2004, Israel had expropriated 6,900 acres (2,800 hectares) of Palestinian land for the construction of the Barrier.

In the northern West Bank, the confiscated land is among the richest and most productive agricultural land in the Occupied Territories, with some of the best water resources in the area. Combining all the negative impacts of the Barrier on Palestinian agriculture could lead, according to some estimates, to a reduction of at least 20 percent of the sector's productive capacity. The construction of the Barrier will have a negative impact on other economic sectors as well. Limitations on mobility of people and goods result in higher transaction costs for all economic activities. And because the Barrier increases uncertainty about the future, it dampens investment.

Economic Impact of the Israeli Disengagement Plan from Gaza

In June 2002, after the Israeli army reoccupied most of the West Bank, the Israeli government announced that "the state of Israel has reached the conclusion that there is currently no partner on the Palestinian side with whom progress can be made on a bilateral peace process." Guided by this political stance, the Israeli government began a process of unilateral actions independent of the Palestinians. In August 2005, Israel implemented its plan of UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA. The Israeli army redeployed from Gaza, and Jewish settlers vacated the settlements. In a prearranged agreement with Egypt, Israel turned over control of the PHILADELPHI ROUTE to Cairo, while retaining exclusive control of Gaza airspace and the Gaza coastline.

Theoretically, the Palestinians could benefit from this disengagement in two ways. First, the redeployment of the Israeli army will reduce the internal closures in Gaza and restore some mobility of people and goods. Second, Gazans could utilize the land previously taken by settlements, agricultural land, and military installations. The potential benefits of these two sources, however, are not significant, because Gaza remains an isolated enclave, surrounded by an electronic fence, and the restrictive trade arrangement imposed on Gaza will discourage investment.

The practical details of the disengagement plan are not yet clear, however. The Israeli government is planning to transform the Gaza Strip into a customs zone separate from the economic system in the other territories. This implies that Israel is planning to disengage the Gaza Strip from the economic regime established by the Paris Protocol/Annex IV of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. According to the protocol, Israel collects customs duties on goods destined for the West Bank and Gaza Strip and transfers them to the PNA, which comprises about two-thirds of all PNA revenue. The imposition of a new customs system on Gaza that is different from that of the West Bank will have far-reaching economic ramifications.

The Economics of the Labor Market

The working of the labor market best epitomizes the dynamic of the relationship between the Israeli and Palestinian economies. Since the beginning of the Occupation, opportunities for Palestinians to work in Israel have been the most important single

factor in the relation between the two economies. In just a few years after the beginning of the Occupation, the problem of unemployment in the Palestinian economy was almost completely eliminated by allowing Palestinians to work in Israel. The number of these workers increased steadily in the first decade of the Occupation and contributed to a very rapid increase in Palestinian money income. However, this steady injection of financial resources was not channeled into productive investment in the Palestinian economy due to various obstacles created by Israeli regulations that stifled investment under Occupation. The export of labor to Israel earned incomes that became a major source of financing imports from Israel. As we have seen in the foregoing, this dynamic had a deleterious effect on the possibility for economic development in the Occupied Territories. Moreover, beginning in 1993 (the year Oslo was initiated), when Israel began to drastically reduce the number of Palestinian workers it permitted to enter Israel—culminating in a total prohibition in 2000, which sent unemployment skyrocketing and resulted in widespread, massive poverty—Palestinian economic dependence on Israel was shown in all its horrific dimensions.

Estimates of economic losses from the resulting interruption to labor and trade flows vary, but most indicate huge losses, reaching in 1996 about 18.2 and 39.6 percent of GNP of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, respectively.

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—Atif Kubursi and Fadle Naqib

Education and the Role of Textbooks

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been fought on every conceivable level, and propaganda has been an instrument employed by both sides. During the years of the OSLO PROCESS, opponents of the peace talks mounted a major campaign charging that Palestinian textbooks were ANTI-SEMITIC, that they incited students to hatred and violence, and that they spoke of a Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine (thus denying Israel's existence). So successful was this campaign that, in the US MEDIA and other elite circles, the allegations were taken at face value and widely repeated. Since then, several serious studies have demonstrated the fallacies of the allegations. In order to obtain a complete picture of the role that Palestinian and Israeli textbooks play in peace education or the opposite, an Israeli educator and a Palestinian educator compared the two societies' textbooks.

Ruth Firer, director of Peace Education Projects at the Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Professor Sami Adwan of Bethlehem University carried out research on Palestinian and Israeli textbooks over a three-year period (2002–2005). Their central finding was that "the books used in each society reflect the perspective on the conflict in which they are both engaged and are also part of a wider societal mechanism to ensure that the conflict becomes part of the children's identities."

Firer and Adwan analyzed Palestinian history and civics textbooks for middle schools as well as the primary-level textbooks used in all types of Palestinian schools—public, private, and UNITED NATIONS Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. The Israeli sample included only the most commonly used texts among the numerous Israeli textbooks in history and civics as well as Israeli readers for the first six grades of primary school (for secular, religious, and ultra-Orthodox schools).

Palestinian Texts

In September 2000, for the first time in Palestinian history, twenty-nine new textbooks for grades one and six were introduced into schools. In addition, in September 2001, sixteen textbooks for grades two and seven were introduced. Until the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in 1994, no effort was made, including by Israel, after 1967 to modernize or change textbooks used by Palestinians. The PNA, however, set a priority of transforming the educational system, including writing completely new textbooks. The PNA Ministry of Education plans to introduce new texts for two grades at the beginning of each school year. In the meantime, Jordanian and Egyptian textbooks continue to be used in the remaining grades, as they have been since 1948, when those countries occupied the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, respectively. And although both countries have peace treaties with Israel, their texts continue to present negative stereotypes of Israelis.

Although the textbooks from JORDAN and Egypt ignored the Palestinians' own narrative, Firer and Adwan report that the new Palestinian textbooks reflect Palestinian life and reality, as well as the diversity within Palestinian society; they talk about Palestinian culture and tradition and focus on building Palestinian identity as part of the Arab world. Most important, Firer and Adwan found that the texts teach Palestinian students to respect human rights, justice, peace, equality, freedom, and tolerance in terms of both self and others. The books caution students to avoid extremism and stereotypes and encourage them to treat all people equally. The books also encourage students to respect other religions and to protect all religious places, not just their own.

The researchers further reported that Palestinian students are warned in the texts about the terrible results of wars and conflict—that they result in death and destruction—and are encouraged instead to resort to negotiation and peaceful forms of conflict resolution. The texts discuss the OSLO

ACCORDS as a step toward peace and to breaking the enmity and long period of conflict. Students learn about Gandhi and his form of civil disobedience as well as other peaceful forms of conflict resolution. The researchers state categorically: "We found no incitement for the use of violence at all."

Additionally, Firer and Adwan report that the new Palestinian textbooks define the future independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders as described in UN resolutions. The few maps that are included mainly show the PNA-governed areas of Gaza and the West Bank, although some show Israeli towns and cities. At the same time, students are taught to cooperate and develop good relationships with neighboring states. Arab East JERUSALEM is presented as part of the Occupied Territories and the future capital of Palestine.

The books, the researchers write, portray Jews throughout history in a positive manner and avoid negative stereotypes. However, according to the everyday experience of Palestinians, modern-day Israelis are presented as occupiers. The texts include examples of Israelis killing and imprisoning Palestinians, demolishing their homes, uprooting fruit trees, and confiscating their LANDS and building SETTLEMENTS on them. When describing how the 1948 Palestinian REFUGEES lived in camps, the texts talk about the right of return for the refugees.

Israeli Texts

The Israeli Ministry of Education publishes and recommends a list of texts from which teachers can choose, although others are available from the textbook market in Israel. The primary-level textbooks that were analyzed are used by three different audiences: secular, religious, and ultra-Orthodox. Firer and Adwan observe that those used in secular schools (which include more than 60 percent of the students in Hebrew-language primary schools) encourage patriotism, on the one hand, and individual and social human rights, on the other, including children's rights, freedom of expression, and the uniqueness of the individual. The books also provide exercises in self-criticism, analytical thinking, acknowledgment of emotions and skills for controlling them, as well as dialogue with others. Although Western values are the source of the human rights described in the secular textbooks, the values in the textbooks in religious schools are derived from the *Halacha* (Jewish religious laws and way of life).

The protagonists of the secular textbooks are children who learn to be themselves, to cope with family, friends, school, and their national identity. In contrast, in the religious textbooks, the children are part of a collective that is built on hierarchy and the roles defined by Judaism. Firer and Adwan report that Zionist ideology is the main pillar of the secular books. Accordingly, the sovereign state of Israel is presented as the only answer for the historical problem of anti-Semitism and as the only alternative for the Jewish nation. The secular textbooks also include stories about Arab children (Jordanian and Palestinian) who play or would like to play with their Israeli peers. Messages of peace with the neighboring countries and peoples are integrated explicitly and implicitly into the texts.

Further, the researchers observe, the textbooks used in the state religious primary schools are also Zionist, but in a different way. These texts enhance religious-national education, strongly emphasizing the collective values connected to the history of the Jews in "their land" and God's promises to the Jews that give them an absolute right to the land. The land of Eretz Yisrael described in the books includes the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. In addition, stories and poems about religious and national holidays are based on a perceived existential threat posed to Jews and Israelis by "others." These stories are about wars and loss and pain caused by the "others" through the generations. Many of the chapters describe "the good land," sometimes called "our birthplace" or "homeland," and include photos of places that are in the PNA-designated areas or are disputed by the two nations, such as East Jerusalem—presented as belonging to the Israeli state. Such religious textbooks are used in almost 20 percent of the Jewish state schools.

Firer and Adwan report that the primary-level textbooks for the ultra-Orthodox community are used by less than 20 percent of the autonomous schools (which are not supervised by the Israeli Ministry of Education) and ignore the state of Israel, Independence Day, and HOLOCAUST Commemoration Day. Instead, they heavily emphasize God's promise of the broader Eretz Yisrael to the Jews and include photos from all the places considered to be part of Jewish land. In both Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox textbooks, the "others" are the goyim (Gentiles), which includes Arabs of all nationalities as well as everyone else not Jewish.

Firer and Adwan observe that the Palestinians, as such, are not found in any of the three types of primary-level textbooks. In these readers, the Palestinian minority in Israel and the PNA Palestinians are referred to as Arabs. Texts that emphasize peace and tolerance for "others" were found only in the secular primary-level textbooks. Otherwise, tolerance and camaraderie are only encouraged within the defined kin (i.e., Jewish) collective.

In conclusion, Firer and Adwan state that, "while we argue of course, that school textbooks are an important element in peace education, the main 'textbook' is life outside schools and the oral presentations by teachers that reflect the public's general feelings. Currently, such oral and real-life instruction is far from conveying genuine peace education messages. Since the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not been resolved, modifying textbooks is problematic. As part of a true peace process, both Palestinians and Israelis have to revise their textbooks to clearly reflect the values of peace education."

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Egypt

Egypt's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has stemmed from its yearning for regional stability, which supported Egyptian national interests, and from its desire to maintain domestic stability in a country where much of the public identified with the Palestinian cause and suffering.

Egypt, along with the other Arab states, considered the UNITED NATIONS decision to partition Palestine (29 November 1947) a historical injustice against the Arabs in general and against the Palestinians in particular. Egypt joined the Arab effort to prevent the implementation of the partition resolution for a variety of reasons, including ideological and moral considerations, domestic public opinion, and national prestige—of which one factor was Cairo's desire to realize its hegemonic aspirations in the Arab world. As soon as Israel declared independence, Egypt deployed its regular army to fight against the nascent Jewish state; however, it did not fare well in battle, and by the end of 1948 the Egyptian army had suffered a total defeat. An ARMISTICE AGREEMENT was signed between the two states on 24 February 1949.

The failures at the Israeli front aggravated an internal crisis that Egypt had been experiencing for several years. The campaign in Palestine was widely criticized, socioeconomic tensions mounted, and internal instability grew steadily. On 23 July 1952, a coup by the Free Officers toppled King Farouk's regime and ushered in a new era in the history of modern Egypt. The new Egyptian leaders held deeply ingrained hostility toward Israel and the perception that its establishment was an injustice to the Palestinians and an imperialist conspiracy directed against all Arabs. As time went on, these tenets became permanent components of the overall political perceptions, both of the leadership and the Egyptian public at large. In terms of concrete objectives, however, the struggle against Israel was not a top priority of the new regime. Relations with Israel were mainly influenced by border incidents and by Egypt's blockage of Israeli ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal and the Straits of

Tiran (the passage from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba). Still, the new regime refrained from an escalation of the border situation and even carried out high-level secret contacts with Israel.

It is possible to discern a change in Egyptian domestic and foreign policies from 1955 to 1956. By that time, the main objective of the revolutionary regime was to secure full national freedom from Great Britain and pursue socioeconomic development. The international goodwill and financial contributions from Western nations in support of the construction of the Aswan High Dam project were reversed as Egypt acquired the image of a pivotal leader in the anti-imperialist struggle. Egypt's recognition of the People's Republic of CHINA, its intensifying contacts with MOSCOW, and JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR'S increasing prestige, especially after the role he played in the Bandung Conference (March 1955), only exacerbated Western anxiety. Yet it seems that it was the signing of the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal that most alarmed many Western states as well as Israel. In reaction to announcements by the UNITED STATES, Britain, and the World Bank that they would not provide financial aid for the High Dam project, 'Abd al-Nasir proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal (26 July 1956), ending British administrative control over the waterway.

Four months later, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) launched a full-scale military operation into the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula. As Britain and FRANCE landed troops in Port Said a few days later, it became obvious that the two countries had formed a secret attack plan with Israel. Militarily, Egypt's armed forces were unable to contain the three attacking armies. Only diplomatic pressure from the two superpowers, especially the United States, brought the war to an end. When the guns fell silent (7 November), the IDF had already completed the occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, while British and French forces held some areas along the Suez Canal. However, the agreement that terminated the war stipulated the complete withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli forces.

Despite its total military defeat, 'Abd al-Nasir's revolutionary regime had not only survived but actually become stronger. Most significantly, the Suez crisis launched what can be characterized as the decade of Nasirite domination. One of the implications of this crisis was that it caused Egypt's decisionmakers to solidify their perception of Israel as aggressive and expansionistic, to set themselves goals consonant with this perception, and to decide on the means to attain them. 'Abd al-Nasir and his regime disputed—on ideological, moral, political, national, economic, and historical grounds—the legitimacy of Israel's existence as a sovereign and independent state in the midst of the Arab Middle East. At times, 'Abd al-Nasir declared openly that Israel's existence was a threat to the Arabs and that its ultimate destiny was to disappear. Official spokesmen frequently referred to the need to return all of Palestine to the Palestinian people; that is, to liquidate the state of Israel as the home of the Jewish people and as the realization of ZIONISM. 'Abd al-Nasir sharply opposed other Arab quarters that proposed an accommodation with Israel, envisaged Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist in the partition boundaries, or contemplated signing a peace agreement. A salient example of this attitude was his out-of-hand rejection of Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba's appeal, in March 1965: "When it becomes clear that our forces are not capable of destroying the enemy and of throwing him into the sea it will be advisable to proceed phase after phase."

In January 1964, at the first Arab summit meeting held in Cairo, the Arab states approved the formation of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), an organization initiated and coordinated in the preceding years by Egypt, and its head, AHMAD SHUQAYRI, a Palestinian who was handpicked by 'Abd al-Nasir. Despite its fiery rhetoric against Israel, the PLO was intended by 'Abd al-Nasir to be an organization devoid of actual autonomy, which would serve to prevent other, underground groups from getting Egypt entangled in a war before it was prepared for military confrontation with Israel. Egypt failed, however, in its bid to control the Palestinian National Movement. Within five years of its creation, the compliant PLO was taken over by Palestinian guerrilla groups (mainly by YASIR ARAFAT'S FATAH) that had been engaged in ARMED STRUGGLE against Israel.

Crisis after the 1967 War

Following its defeat in the June 1967 WAR, Egypt lost the Sinai, its armed forces were in total disarray, the Egyptian economy was dealt a mortal blow by the loss of transit fees through the Suez Canal, and Cairo had to contend with the loss of the Sinai oil fields as well as the near-total cessation of tourism. Investments also declined steeply

while defense expenditures increased sharply. Moreover, a sense of insecurity spread throughout the population, as certain quarters of the public began to doubt the leadership's ability to extricate the country from the crisis. The war had turned into a test of 'Abd al-Nasir's personal, charismatic leadership and of that of his associates, as well as of the regime's legitimacy. 'Abd al-Nasir and his colleagues regarded the crisis as a threat to Egypt's most vital interests, and change became the watchword of the hour. After rather prolonged deliberations, the leadership concluded that the key to the changes needed at home and in foreign relations lay in Egypt's ability to stop Israel as an expansionist state that sought to dominate Arab territories from the Nile to the Euphrates.

On the other hand, Egypt began to perceive the conflict with Israel as having two dimensions. One was the traditional pan-Arab Nasirite view that there could be no settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict without first a just settlement for the Palestinians. The second view, which became predominant in Egyptian leadership circles as a consequence of the magnitude of the 1967 defeat, was that recovering lost Arab territories had to be Cairo's overwhelming priority. The Palestinian issue could wait. 'Abd al-Nasir had firmly moved to the second perspective.

The countless statements by Egyptian official personages that "what has been taken by force can only be recovered by force" led many to assume that despite the 1967 defeat, Cairo was clinging to the concept of a military option as the only strategy for dealing with the conflict with Israel. But, from an early point after the war, Egypt was thinking in terms of a twofold approach—both military and political means, which were viewed as complementary. Each was to be pursued as the means became available and as circumstances would allow. One of the most revealing statements 'Abd al-Nasir made was his address on 23 November 1967, a day after the passage of Resolution 242 in the UN Security Council, in which he stressed that the political and the military option must be pursued side by side—at least during that particular period. "Neither is preferable to the other," he said. And indeed the WAR OF ATTRITION dominated the Egyptian-Israeli front for the next three years.

After 'Abd al-Nasir died on 28 September 1970, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, pursued a gradual change in Egypt's overall strategic aims, first and foremost concerning the conflict with Israel. Sadat's point of departure, much like 'Abd al-Nasir's, was that the maintenance of the status quo was harmful to Egypt. The War of Attrition against Israel's occupation of the Sinai Peninsula was taking a heavy toll on Egypt. Sadat continued to uphold the combination of political and military action, however. He took pains to affirm his personal interest in promoting peace, and as early as February 1971 he stated: "We want peace, and I have already said several times that I am ready to go to the end of the world to prevent a single soldier of ours from being wounded."

When Sadat realized that his peace overtures had gained no consideration, he decided instead to go to war with the objective of ending the "no peace, no war" status quo. On 6 October 1973, Egypt and SYRIA launched a surprise attack on Israel's forces in Sinai and the Golan Heights. Egypt's strategic aims were to break the status quo, to regain the Egyptian territory Israel had occupied in 1967, to cause the United States to substantially change its policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to make the political solution more advantageous to Egypt. When the fighting ceased, Israel occupied even more territory of the two Arab states than it had when the war began. Nevertheless, from Sadat's perspective, because the Egyptians had taken Israel by surprise, had crossed the Suez Canal and occupied the Bar-Lev line, and had acquitted themselves well in the fighting, Egypt had regained its national honor and achieved important strategic gains. And, despite not recapturing Egyptian territory, Cairo had accomplished its strategic goals. After the 1973 War, both Cairo and Washington revised their attitudes toward each other, and Washington attributed increasing importance to Egypt's positions in the regional system.

The revised US policy had two principal aims: to ensure the flow of oil to the West and to weaken the Soviet hold in the Middle East. Diplomatic relations were restored (on 28 February 1974), and President RICHARD NIXON asked the US Senate to grant Egypt $250 million in economic aid. Such a policy was capable of producing pressure on Israel—at least up to a point. In view of Israel's dependence on the United States (and despite the closeness of the two countries), Cairo assumed that Washington could be made to pressure Jerusalem, provided the Arabs knew how to present their case to US administration and public opinion. In Sadat's view, any political settlement with Israel pursued by Egypt would have to be

preceded by an understanding between Cairo and Washington.

Cairo's claim that the October war had opened the road toward a peace settlement with Israel encountered a great deal of criticism in Egypt and beyond. On the Arab scene, Egypt's principal critics were Syria, IRAQ, Libya, and the PLO. Sadat answered his critics by emphasizing that Egypt was adhering to Arab decisions as laid down at the RABAT SUMMIT (28 December 1974). He argued that the only differences Egypt had with other Arab states was what constituted the best tactics to realize the common Arab strategic aims. Nevertheless, Egypt was careful to distinguish between all-Arab concerns, which required inter-Arab consultation, and issues subject only to its own sovereign consideration.

Settlement with Israel

The 1975 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3379, equating Zionism with racism, was received by many in Egypt as a confirmation of Israel's expansionist nature that went beyond Palestine. But regardless of Egyptians' negative image of Israel, calculations of national interest proved stronger, which dictated a search for a political settlement to be carried out with the help of the United States. Yet two issues continued to present a dilemma: the precise nature of the peace to be sought with Israel and the link between an Egyptian-Israeli accommodation and a similar settlement with Israel's other Arab neighbors. While frequently pledging, between 1973 and 1977, Egypt's readiness to reach a peace settlement with Israel, Sadat also dwelt on what he considered the objective constraints that made full peace impossible in the near future, including Israeli OCCUPATION of Arab territory and its intractability on the Palestinian issue, among others.

During the years 1974–1977, the search for a practical formula for linking the Egyptian-Israeli settlement with a wider Arab-Israeli accommodation became a major preoccupation for Egypt's foreign ministry. Egypt's policy on the Palestinian issue was based on the following premises:

- The Palestine problem was the core of the dispute with Israel, and no comprehensive settlement was possible without agreement on it.
- The Palestinians themselves were the only party authorized to choose their representatives, which meant that no solution was feasible without the participation of a legitimate Palestinian delegation—that is, the PLO.
- Egypt supported the Palestinians' right to self-determination and to a state of their own in the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP.

On 9 November 1977, Sadat made a speech in parliament that contained what has since become known as the Peace Initiative, in which he offered to address the Israelis in their own parliament. When it began to register that Sadat meant what he said, there was widespread surprise on the part of most Egyptian establishment figures, Arab leaders abroad, and the PLO leadership. Sadat's purpose was to move away from the political process that aimed solely at a comprehensive settlement by means of the GENEVA CONFERENCE; instead, he wanted to break down the "psychological barrier" that stood in the way of the political process.

On 19 November 1977, the aircraft of the president of the Arab Republic of Egypt landed at Ben Gurion Airport near Tel Aviv. The following day, Sadat addressed a festive session of Israel's Knesset, presenting his vision for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of which the Egyptian-Israeli dispute was only a part. It was a speech filled with hope for a better future between Israelis and Arabs, but it was also a clear statement about the present and the price of peace. Sadat presented for the first time what has become known as the formula of land for peace: complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 in exchange for peace with Egypt, JORDAN, SYRIA, and LEBANON, and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Peace, he said, guaranteed stability, prosperity, and security. In their speeches, Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN and opposition leader SHIMON PERES emphasized Israel's desire also for peace, security, and normalization with the Arabs, although both refrained from responding directly to Sadat's call for the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, Begin wisely delivered a message that enabled the parties to open political negotiations. "I propose," he declared, "that everything will be negotiable. . . . No side shall present prior conditions."

1978 Camp David Agreements

The negotiations between Israel and Egypt climaxed with the thirteen-day CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (5–17 September 1978), in which the US team,

headed by President JIMMY CARTER, was heavily involved. Camp David produced two documents with a weak linkage between them: (1) "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt" and (2) "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East." The latter was deliberately ambiguous on most crucial issues, including a formula for a Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A formal peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed on 26 March 1979. The Palestinian issue had little chance of being resolved, because the PLO rejected the Camp David blueprint, and Israel and the United States would not deal with the organization because it refused to recognize Israel and used terror tactics in the struggle against it.

The 1978 Camp David Accords signed by Sadat, Begin, and Carter were a watershed in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They shattered one of the most deep-set assumptions shared by Arabs and Israelis: that it was impossible to reach a political accommodation based on concessions by the two national communities. Camp David offered both a model for resolving the conflict with Israel and made clear the cost of attaining peace. According to this model, the onus is on the Arabs to follow the Egyptian path and recognize Israel's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, as well as to terminate the state of war with Israel and to accept security arrangements and normalization of relations that satisfy Israel's demands. Israel, for its part, is responsible for withdrawing from Arab territories occupied since 1967 and for fully implementing its agreements with the Palestinians. This historic compromise required the Arabs to abandon their old concepts of distrust of the Israelis and their struggle against the Jewish state. For Israel the historic compromise with the Arabs and especially the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state was, and still is, a heavy blow to the ideology of Eretz Yisrael (The Land of Israel), which claimed the whole land of Palestine for the Jewish people. Above all, the political significance of the Camp David Accords was the ability of the negotiators to translate UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 of November 1967 into consensual frameworks to facilitate future arrangements between Israel and the Arabs, including the Palestinians. It introduced a model for a transition from a "zero-sum game" or existential confrontation to a dispute over territory and over the terms of settlement.

The peace and the mutual interests between Egypt and Israel have stood the test of sharp challenges. The sides have remained faithful to their obligations in spite of President Sadat's assassination and the outbreak of Israeli-Arab violence, particularly during the LEBANON WAR, the two INTIFADAS, and the acts of terror that targeted mainly innocent Jewish and Arab civilians. Although these challenges placed great stress on the fragile relations between Egypt and Israel, they did not change their fundamental approach and commitment to the mutual agreements.

The effort to achieve further agreements between Israel and its Arab adversaries, first and foremost with the Palestinians, was made the top priority of Egypt's foreign policy. In this context, Egypt perceived the United States as a key player and expected Washington to oblige Israel to moderate its positions on refusing to recognize the PLO or the Palestinian problem as well as to restrain its use of force against the Arabs. Furthermore, Egypt's leadership believes that any serious stalemate in the peace process undermines the foundations of the two pillars of peace: certainty and stability, the lack of which would have negative ramifications not only for Israelis and Palestinians but also for Egypt's relations with the broader Arab world.

During the 1980s, Egypt's diplomacy invested great energies to help PLO leader Arafat consolidate his standing in the international arena and to create the necessary conditions for the participation of the PLO in the peace process, but Egypt's endeavors to convince Arafat to adopt more pragmatic attitudes placed Arafat on the horns of a dilemma. His attempts to tread the thin line between ideological commitments to recover all of Palestine and pragmatism exposed him (and the mainstream of the PLO) to severe criticism and even to a real danger of yet more splits within the organization. Through Arab, US, and international resolutions, Egypt tried to formulate a compromise between the PLO's demand for recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and Washington's terms for recognizing the PLO. The United States was ready to enter a dialogue with the PLO only if the organization acknowledged the *right* of Israel to exist, accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced TERRORISM.

Cairo's efforts with regard to the PLO, the strengthening of its ties with Jordan, and its support of IRAQ during the war with IRAN all

reinforced Egypt's local and global prestige as a constructive actor contributing to the stability of the Middle East. Gradually there emerged a new Arab consensus in favor of renewing relations with Egypt (severed by most Arab states in 1979). However, after the eruption of the 1987 Palestinian uprising and Israel's harsh response, public and official sympathy moved toward the Palestinians. Egyptian policymakers asserted that the INTIFADA had put the Palestinian problem back in the limelight, placing it at the top of regional and international priorities. In addition, Egypt noted the movement in some sectors of Israeli society toward more openness to dealing with the Palestinians and believed that it had serious implications for the peace process. Behind the scenes, Egypt was involved in most of the developments that led to the announcement of the Palestinian DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE on 15 November 1988. Moreover, when the United States announced that the language of the declaration did not meet its conditions for opening a dialogue with the PLO, Egypt worked hard to convince the Palestinians to commit themselves to Resolution 242 and the rejection of terror. Soon after that, Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly, where he spoke of "the right of all parties in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security." He went on: "I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism." The United States then entered into a dialogue with the PLO.

Nevertheless, the search for a framework for negotiations ended in a deadlock. Egypt believed that, despite the PLO's flexibility, Israel under the conservative administration of Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR had frustrated all chances for a real peace with the Palestinians. The United States had ended its dialogue with the PLO after eighteen months and was inactive in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the Intifada began to lose much of its original momentum. Among the Palestinians there was increasing opposition to Arafat's policy of compromise with nothing to show in return. With the outbreak of the GULF WAR, relations between Egypt and the PLO deteriorated sharply as the PLO supported Iraq in the conflict. In February 1990 a Palestinian unit attacked an Israeli tour bus on the Suez-Cairo highway, killing ten Israelis—the first operation of this kind in Egypt. Egypt was much embarrassed and President Hosni Mubarak urged Arafat to condemn the attack. Mubarak himself was under strong pressure from the PLO and eventually issued only a vague condemnation. Antagonism toward PLO solidarity with Iraqi president Saddam Husayn was expressed in Egypt's MEDIA, which in several instances implied that Arafat was no longer seen as a friend to Egypt. However, as a matter of principle, Cairo's officials endeavored to draw a line between mistaken PLO decisions, such as support for Iraq in the war, and Egypt's lasting commitment to the Palestinian cause. In the PLO, many accused Egypt of bringing undue pressure to bear on the PLO.

Diplomacy after the Gulf War

By the end of the Gulf War, the PLO found itself at a low ebb. Its pro-Iraqi policy had severely damaged its relations with the Gulf States, Egypt, and the United States. Against this background, both Mubarak and Arafat, each for his own reason, welcomed the US offer to restructure the peace process. The MADRID CONFERENCE (October 1991) convened with the participation of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation acting under a mandate from the PLO. After the conference, Egypt played a pivotal role in the bilateral and multilateral working groups, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty became a point of reference for all sides. Top Egyptian decisionmakers invested tremendous efforts to maintain the peace process momentum. Egypt's centrality in the Arab world as well as the fact that Cairo was the only Arab capital having diplomatic relations with all the antagonists made Egypt a focal point.

Cairo had the political awareness to quickly understand that the establishment of YITZHAK RABIN'S less conservative government (June 1992) offered an opportunity for pragmatic negotiations, while Rabin was ready to see Egypt play an active role in the peace process. Egypt's top leaders were among the few who knew about the secret back-channel Israeli-PLO talks in Oslo that led to the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (September 1993), which set the goal of establishing Palestinian self-government. Following the signing of the declaration in Washington, Egypt's role in the peace process reached its apex. Most of the talks between Israel and the PLO were held in Egypt, and Cairo provided the Palestinians the assurances of the Egyptian support they needed to engage in negotiations that had the potential to catalyze criticism from the Palestinian opposition and other Arab parties. After the assassination of Rabin and

mainly during BENJAMIN NETANYAHU'S government, Egypt was vocal in blaming Israel for the deterioration in the peace process with the Palestinians and called upon the two parties to implement their obligations according to the interim agreements they had signed.

When EHUD BARAK became Israeli prime minister, the United States and Israel sought Egyptian involvement in the peace process. Although President Mubarak had serious reservations about Barak's blueprint for achieving a permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, Egypt was not able to dissuade the ambitious prime minister. At the same time, Cairo warned that Barak's guiding principles contradicted central Palestinian positions and would most likely make it more difficult to reach an agreement.

Following the failure of the Camp David Summit (July 2000) and the eruption of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the Egyptians, along with the Jordanian government, played an important role in checking radical Arab states by steadfastly refusing to annul signed treaties with Israel and by criticizing Arab initiatives that held the potential for spreading the conflict. At the ARAB LEAGUE Summit (21–22 October 2000), Egypt and Jordan opposed calls to assist the Palestinians in armed struggle and to confront Israel. At the domestic level, Islamists and Arab nationalists demanded that Egypt abrogate its agreements with Israel, and in the Arab print and television media there were calls for Egyptian military intervention on behalf of the Palestinians. Mubarak dismissed these demands outright, declaring that he had no desire to satisfy the man on the Egyptian or Arab "street" and called on Arab leaders not to use provocative language. On the other hand, in response to the death of hundreds of Palestinians at the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Egypt recalled its ambassador from Israel on 21 November 2000 and downgraded the Egyptian representation in Tel Aviv. However, Egypt's policy toward Israel continued to focus on finding a solution to the escalating Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, which threatened its interest in preserving regional stability.

Following the Beirut Summit (28 March 2002), during which the Arab League adopted an Arab peace plan based on a SAUDI initiative, the Egyptians formulated their own plan for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict. As part of this plan, Egypt focused on two fronts: the United States and the Palestinians. On the one hand, they urged the administration of GEORGE W. BUSH to recognize Egypt as a credible partner in the struggle against Middle Eastern extremism and attempted to persuade the United States to make a public declaration of its support for a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians based on the TWO-STATE SOLUTION. The Egyptian program suggested granting early recognition to a Palestinian state in all the territory that the UN had recognized as Palestinian before settling all the final status complicated issues. This recognition, Mubarak argued, would restore Palestinian hope that a state was on the horizon and would be followed by negotiations and a final status agreement. However, the Egyptian peace initiative, like the resolutions of the Arab summit in Beirut, took a backseat to repeated US demands for regime and security reforms in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

On the other hand, the Egyptians also became intensively involved in Palestinian domestic affairs. Believing that he could achieve an overall cease-fire between all the Palestinian factions and Israel, Mubarak charged his minister of intelligence services with the task of mediating and coordinating among the different Palestinian factions.

Israeli Disengagement

Until spring 2004, Egypt's official position had been that the ROAD MAP was the only agreed-upon plan for resuming the political process between Israel and the Palestinians. However, Tel Aviv's decision to implement the ISRAELI UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT Plan reshuffled the cards, and the United States' and the QUARTET'S support for Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON'S decision created a new reality. Because Mubarak did not wish to strain US-Egyptian ties by opposing US support for Sharon's initiative to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, Cairo became actively involved in the process leading up to the disengagement. After accepting US agreement that the disengagement plan was not a substitute for the Road Map, the Egyptian government publicly expressed its support for Israel's planned withdrawal of settlements and armed forces from the Gaza Strip and a small area of the West Bank. At the same time, however, Egypt gave voice to its reservations about the unilateral nature of the disengagement and the potential for chaos in the Gaza Strip in the aftermath of an uncoordinated Israeli withdrawal.

Egypt's concerns led it to devise a plan under which Cairo would assume responsibility for security on the Egypt-Gaza border. Israel had long wanted Egypt to police the route (known as the PHILADELPHI ROUTE among Israelis and as the Salah al-Din Route among the Arabs) running along the border of the Gaza Strip and Egypt. Over the years this area had become a transit point for the smuggling of weapons and goods from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip. By withdrawing, Israel was poised to give up control of this politically sensitive area and wanted the Egyptians to fill the security vacuum. One factor that had prevented Egypt previously from deploying a robust force in the border area was its peace treaty with Israel, which limited the size and strength of Egyptian forces there. For the Egyptians, there were several disincentives for a larger Egyptian security presence adjacent to the Gaza Strip. First among them was the risk of Egyptian troops getting caught in potential crossfire between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Nevertheless, Mubarak seized on the Israeli request as a way of bolstering the Egyptian government's image as a valuable moderating and stabilizing factor in the Middle East and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Egyptians not only set about coordinating the securing of the Philadelphi Route but also became involved in training Palestinian security forces and in reasserting themselves as mediators among the different Palestinian factions. Egypt, in fact, initiated a dialogue between the Palestinian National Authority and the Palestinian opposition groups to facilitate a cease-fire with Israel, maintained law and order in Palestinian areas, and implemented regime reforms. Egypt's role has become even more crucial following HAMAS'S victory in the elections for the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (in January 2006) and following OPERATION CAST LEAD (January 2009)—a massive attack by Israel aimed at stopping the rocket fire from Gaza into Israeli territory, and dismantling Hamas's ability to govern the Gaza Strip.

See also JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR; PHILADELPHI ROUTE; RAFAH CROSSING

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—Yoram Meital

Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1890–1969)

Dwight D. Eisenhower was the thirty-fourth president of the UNITED STATES, serving two terms from 1953 to 1961. Like his secretary of state, JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Eisenhower is remembered for his firm policies toward Israel.

During his presidency, Eisenhower ended the Korean War; insisted that Israel, FRANCE, and Britain withdraw immediately after their coordinated invasion of EGYPT; invaded LEBANON to prevent Arab nationalists from taking power; and issued the "Eisenhower Doctrine," subtly aimed at Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. The president's overriding concerns were maintaining US access to Arab oil and impeding the spread of communism in the Middle East. Like Dulles, he believed that the best way to guarantee both interests was to solve the Arab states–Israeli conflict. Each time Israel undertook aggression against its neighbors, Eisenhower and Dulles feared that the United States would be seen as backing Israel—further alienating the Arab people and regimes, jeopardizing US access to oil, and affording the Soviet government opportunities to penetrate the region.

In this framework, the Eisenhower administration publicly condemned Israel's massive retaliation raids against neighboring Arab states, demanded its immediate withdrawal from the Suez Canal in 1956, and temporarily withheld aid and loans to bring about Israel's compliance. On the Palestinian question, the administration focused on REFUGEES and on ways to foster the economic development of the region to improve the refugees' lives. Eisenhower thought that some refugees could be repatriated but that most should be settled in the countries to which they had fled. Because he believed that Israel could not afford to pay all the compensation required, in 1955 Eisenhower backed a proposal that Israel be granted an international loan to help cover the costs of compensating the refugees. Dulles stated that the United States was willing to underwrite a loan to a "substantial extent" for this purpose. Neither Eisenhower nor

Dulles supported implementation of UN RESOLUTION 181, which partitioned Palestine into a Jewish and a Palestinian state. Indeed, both thought the British-installed monarchy in JORDAN was the appropriate governor of the WEST BANK.

The Suez War typifies the US response to Israeli aggression during the Eisenhower years. On 29 October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt and advanced toward the Suez Canal. On 1 November British and French forces also invaded Egypt and began occupation of the canal zone, but growing opposition from Eisenhower, Dulles, and UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld, plus Soviet threats of intervention, put an immediate stop to British and French action. Israel, however, refused to withdraw, maintaining troops in the Gulf of Aqaba and the GAZA STRIP despite a UN resolution. Eisenhower and Dulles were outraged over the whole affair and more so because of Israel's defiant stance after Paris and London withdrew. After three months of continuous US pressure, including the withholding of aid, Israel remained in occupation of Egypt. On 2 February 1957 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gaza Strip, but Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION still refused. Disappointed in Israel's intransigence, Eisenhower wrote a strong letter to Ben-Gurion demanding Israel's withdrawal. Once more, Ben-Gurion refused. Eisenhower, however, stood his ground and kept applying pressure on Israel by delaying financial assistance. When Israel began to feel the absence of US dollars, Ben-Gurion finally agreed in March 1957 to withdraw troops from Egypt and the Gaza Strip.

Despite the many efforts of Eisenhower and Dulles, at the end of the president's two terms, the Arab-Israeli conflict continued to grow in hostility, erupting in a series of conflicts, including the 1967 and 1973 Wars; Soviet involvement in the area grew; US domestic support for Israel became more organized and influential; and the Palestinians regrouped after their 1948 disaster and began to make themselves heard on the international scene by a variety of tactics.

See also JOHN FOSTER DULLES; JOHNSTON PLAN; WAR, 1967

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ELAD

ELAD (To the City of David) is an organization of right-wing JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISTS who are especially active in the "City of David" within the Palestinian community of SILWAN, a neighborhood of 3,000 Palestinians adjacent to the Old City of Jerusalem. Its fundamental objective is the "Judaization" of East Jerusalem.

ELAD has been operating in East Jerusalem since about 1987. By 1999, it had acquired 42 Palestinian homes in Silwan and had turned most of the homes into heavily defended compounds replete with armed guards. At least 50 Jewish families, comprising 250 people, have moved in. In addition to acquiring property for Jews, ELAD manages the national park in Silwan/City of David on behalf of the state. In recent years, the association has

invested many millions to finance controversial archaeological excavations in Silwan.

In 2005 ELAD had revenues totaling NIS 41 million ($10.5 million)—the last year it reported its figures to the registrar of associations. Of this sum, NIS 38 million ($9.8 million) came from donations; however, since 2005 ELAD has refused to disclose who its donors are or how much they have contributed. What is known is that they are mostly wealthy Jewish donors from the DIASPORA.

ELAD's short-term goal is to take over as many Palestinian homes in Silwan as possible and to turn them over to Jews so as to Judaize the area from the Dung Gate to the WESTERN WALL. Its ultimate objective is to reclaim all of East JERUSALEM for the Jews. ELAD's parent organization, the CITY OF DAVID FOUNDATION, is led by the somewhat shadowy Dan Berri.

Berri has said that Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU had openly encouraged ELAD to recruit more Jews to make Silwan their home. At the same time, Jewish settlers in Silwan established a bridgehead in RAS AL-AMUD, another Palestinian neighborhood (population 11,000), just east of Silwan. In addition to financing from Israeli government sources, funding for the settlers has been enhanced by private donations from a variety of sources. One notable and very public contributor is Florida millionaire IRVING MOSKOWITZ, who bought a four-acre plot in Ras al-Amud and undertook construction of 132 homes.

The ELAD settlers are armed and supported by private security forces and the Jerusalem police as protection against neighboring Palestinians. When seizing Palestinian homes, they typically operate in the middle of the night and ignore Palestinian deeds to their homes. After a seizure, ELAD turns the property over to the Israeli DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, which passes the title on to the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY, which certifies and returns it to the Development Authority, which then sells it to the original settler group.

The archaeological excavations in Silwan increasingly are becoming a point of contention. The heart of the "City of David" is an archaeological park that is being continuously extended into more corners of Silwan. After they were given the main excavation site in 1998, ELAD built new homes in the park, and they are continuously finding establishing new sites and claiming more land.

New excavations began in 2008 to unearth a drainage channel believed to be from the period of King Herod, damaging the foundations of numerous Palestinian homes. The dig was intended to run 600 meters (980 feet) underground to the walls of Jerusalem's Old City, but was halted by the courts after it emerged that the archaeologists were digging without licenses. Nonetheless, ELAD began work on other tunnels.

ELAD has not only poured money and manpower into the excavations but also subcontracted Israel's main archaeological body, the Antiquities Authority, to oversee the uncovering of what some think is the original location of Jerusalem. Yonathan Mizrachi, a former archaeologist for the Antiquities Authority, says of ELAD, "This is an important site, but ELAD has a very clear agenda, they want to use archaeology, even bogus archaeology, to provide cover for their political agenda of pushing Silwan's Palestinians out. In 2007, said Mizrachi, ELAD brought 350,000 tourists to the site "to convince people that this was once the home of King David, [if they are successful] then it will be easier for them to justify their takeover of Silwan and the removal of the Palestinian population." In any case, most of the ELAD sites supposedly under the control of the Antiquities Authority are in practice only nominally so with ELAD remaining the controlling force.

In the mid-1990s ELAD faced a legal battle over its damaging of ancient relics. In 1997 the Antiquities Authority cautioned against handing the park over to ELAD. And in 1998 archaeologists from Hebrew University in Jerusalem petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court over ELAD's mismanagement of the City of David site. However, as ELAD's control of Silwan has tightened and the City of David's popularity has grown, the voices of dissent have fallen quiet.

When it emerged in June 2008 that dozens of skeletons from the early Islamic period unearthed in Silwan close to the AL-AQSA MOSQUE had been discarded without inspection, no archaeologist would speak on the record, but the Antiquities Authority later admitted that it was "a serious mishap." According to a series of reports in the Israeli MEDIA, the government, state archaeologists, the Jerusalem municipality, and the police have all colluded with ELAD and another settler organization, ATERET COHANIM, in extending the settlers' control of Silwan.

See also ARCHAEOLOGY; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SILWAN

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Elections, Palestinian

Ottoman-Era Elections

Palestine's experience with formal elections began during the OTTOMAN period. *Tanzimat* reforms, promulgated through attempts to reassert the authority of the Ottoman central government in rural areas, culminated in legislation of 1864 and 1871 that provided for provincial (*vilayet*) and local (*sanjak* and *kaza*) councils with some elected members—in most cases, an equal number of Muslims and non-Muslims. These bodies essentially acted as consultants for administrative and judicial business. In villages and towns, *mukhtars* and councils of elders were elected to serve residents; each confessional religious community of more than twenty families was to have two *mukhtar*s. The process of electing council members, however, was more accurately a system of nomination, as senior officials initiated candidates' nomination for posts, despite later legal interventions to change this system.

Post-Enlightenment ideas about the rights of the individual were, however, expressed in nongovernmental bodies. A rising *effendiya*, the Palestinian-Ottoman white-collar middle class, shaped alliances based on common socioeconomic interests despite religious background; these ties were expressed, for example, among Freemason lodges in Palestine, which held elections to determine leadership and policy. Once the national conflict of Turkification became pronounced, these groups later split along confessional lines. Religious-national groups also used the elections process to organize their ranks.

Elections during the Mandate

By 1920, 20,000 Palestinian Jews had immigrated to Palestine and elections were held for a National Assembly, which was cited by British authorities as a reason to grant Jews some autonomy over their affairs in Palestine. These bodies were the nascent institutions of the future Israeli government. The authority granted Britain by the League of Nations to govern Palestine after World War I (BRITISH MANDATE) included the formation of a government to advise the British HIGH COMMISSIONER. The Palestine Order in Council of 1922 stipulated the election of a LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL of twenty-three members—eleven British officials and twelve citizens (eight Muslims, two Christians, two Jews). In the end, however, this scheme was stymied by the Arab leadership, which rejected sharing power with Jews, whose ever-increasing IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases foreshadowed the creation of a Jewish state. The Palestine Order in Council was amended on 4 May 1923 to establish a British-appointed council, but this too was boycotted. As a result, the British Mandate was Britain's only colonial governance that provided no arrangement for the gradual establishment of national self-rule. Municipal elections were first held in 1934 (one British white paper cites twenty-four elected municipal councils, thirty-eight elected local councils, and twenty-four popularly chosen village councils),

but by the late 1940s the British sought to stifle nationalist ferment by canceling municipal elections in the GAZA STRIP.

Elections after 1948

In 1948, with the creation of Israel, historic Palestine was divided into three subsystems: Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian. The new Jewish state held elections on 25 January 1949 for a parliament based on a proportional party system. All inhabitants of Israel eighteen years of age and older were allowed to vote. Of the elected representatives, 117 were Jews and 3 were Arabs. Some 150,000 Palestinians who remained in Israel after the war took Israeli citizenship. Today their numbers have grown to form nearly 20 percent of the total Israeli population, and their candidates run on several solely Arab slates as well as the lists of leftist Jewish parties. Israel's electoral system has alternated between joint and separate prime ministerial and parliamentary elections, the latter of which strengthens the powers of the prime minister in forming a government. The development of the various parties demonstrates how ethnic/confessional affiliation is tied to political life in Israel. As eastern Jewry on the margins pressured European immigrants at the core of the Zionist movement to share state resources, their cause was championed in the early 1990s by the SEPHARDIC ultra-Orthodox political party SHAS. Similarly, Russian immigrants, ASHKENAZI ultra-Orthodox, secular Ashkenazi Jews, and Arab citizens of Israel developed political platforms around their separate interests.

The WEST BANK and Gaza, controlled by JORDAN and EGYPT, respectively, from 1948 until 1967, were populated by a landed class as well as tens of thousands of new Palestinian REFUGEES. In the Gaza Strip, Egypt banned most political activity and refused to offer residents Egyptian citizenship, arguing that the refugees must be returned to their homes. In 1961 Egypt did allow the first and only elections for the Palestine Labor Union and then, in 1962, took steps to change the makeup of the five-year-old Gaza legislative council. Under the new system, half of the council's representatives were to be elected by members of the Palestine Labor Union and the other half appointed by Egyptian authorities.

Unlike Egypt, Jordan made citizens of some two-thirds of Palestinians in the West Bank and allowed West Bank residents to travel to the Jordanian east side of the Jordan River. But West Bankers' political and economic participation in Jordanian institutions was severely limited. For one, local elections that might have challenged the Jordanian regime were banned. In the elected branch of the bicameral Jordanian parliament, the West and East Banks received thirty seats each. Parliamentary elections were first held on 11 April 1950, and West Bankers were eligible to vote in the elections, even though the West Bank was not yet annexed to Jordan (that move was made later that year). April 1967 was the last general election incorporating the West Bank, and in fact, marked the freezing of parliamentary electoral politics in Jordan for more than two decades.

Gradually, Palestinians sought to reconstitute themselves in their own national institutions. The ARAB LEAGUE'S 1964 establishment of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) laid the ground for a government in exile—its leadership, army, and parliament slowly filled by the unions and political factions forming in universities and refugee camps. Even after YASIR ARAFAT'S faction FATAH began to dominate the PLO, making it somewhat less susceptible to inter-Arab intrigue, the PLO's leadership didn't want to be permanently integrated into Jordan and so was resistant to the electoral processes. The PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, the PLO parliament self-selected from members of the various Palestinian factions and important independent figures, was ostensibly the highest level of PLO leadership, voting on membership to other PLO bodies. However, PLO committees met more frequently than those of the PNC and were thus able to decide many crucial issues. In practice, the umbrella organizations of the PLO were largely controlled from the top down by Fatah, its dominant faction, and PLO chairman Arafat.

In 1974 an Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco, named the PLO the sole representative of the Palestinian people. However, this was a problem for Jordan, which was not ready to relinquish its claims to the West Bank but was also not interested in confronting the PLO. In November 1974, Jordan's king Husayn dissolved the elected House of Representatives, decreeing that elections for a new house would be held in March 1976. As that date neared, Husayn opted to avoid a risky decision on West Bank and Palestinian participation. In February the old House convened briefly with its West Bank members to approve the indefinite suspension of elections. Although Jordanian elections

ceased in 1967, the West Bank's parliamentary representatives continued in office until 1998, when Jordan signed a peace deal with Israel relinquishing all rights to the West Bank.

After Israel captured and occupied the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1967, its strategic view favored local autonomy for the Palestinians under continuing Israeli control. Coordinating with Israeli authorities, Gaza's elite commercial classes sought in 1971 to establish a municipal council headed and selected by citrus merchant RASHAD AL-SHAWWA. Under criticism for his moderate pro-Jordanian policies, Shawwa resigned one year later, and Israel assumed all civilian control of Gaza. Similarly, Israel's policies in the West Bank initially maintained the region's ties to Jordan, allowing free passage of people and goods across the Jordan River and leaving many Jordanian-appointed bureaucrats in their place. In 1972 and in 1976, Israel authorized municipal elections in the West Bank and liberalized Jordanian election rules in the 1976 election, allowing women and poorer men to vote, in a bid to develop local leaders that would counterbalance the PLO. Palestinians vigorously debated whether the vote should be boycotted. In the end, the elections proceeded normally, and PLO candidates won a landslide on a nationalist mandate, damaging Jordanian political influence in the West Bank and dashing Israeli hopes for an alternative leadership. Afterwards, Israel canceled all future municipal elections.

East JERUSALEM, which is part of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, is claimed by Israel as its eternal capital but designated by the UNITED NATIONS as a permanent international trusteeship under UN authority. In physical control of the city after 1967, Israel asked Palestinian residents to choose Jordanian or Israeli citizenship, at the same time that it automatically designated them as "permanent residents" of Jerusalem. This residency status granted them the right to vote or be elected in the city's new municipal council (Israel disbanded the Arab Jerusalem Municipality Council). But only rarely did residents participate in municipal elections, choosing instead a blanket rejection of Israel's authority in the city.

In lieu of a formal elections process during the years of Israeli OCCUPATION, PALESTINIAN UNIVERSITIES established in the late 1970s became laboratories for the political process. Student unions were modeled after political factions, and student council elections were viewed as a measure of political sentiment in the West Bank and Gaza. For the most part, Israeli officials allowed campaigning and polling to take place on campus grounds, even though all nationalist symbols, colors, and slogans were banned by the Occupation authorities. Much later, during the second Palestinian uprising, Arafat, then president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (the interim administrative organization), banned student council elections for several years, ostensibly due to public hardship but more plausibly to prevent possible gains in the universities by factions opposed to peace agreements with Israel.

After the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS and return of the Palestinian leadership to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, presidential and Legislative Council elections were held as stipulated by the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, the Israeli-Palestinian document that set a goal of establishing Palestinian self-government. Jerusalem residents were allowed to vote, but not to run in elections; otherwise the vote was open to all Palestinians over age eighteen. The internationally monitored 20 January 1996 presidential elections featured two candidates: Arafat and women's activist Samiha Khalil. The vote was not close, with Arafat winning 84 percent and Khalil 12 percent. Legislative elections resulted in a PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL dominated by Arafat's faction Fatah, which received forty-nine seats (independents affiliated with Fatah took fifteen seats, Islamists took four seats, other independents took seventeen seats, and another three small parties took one seat each). Six seats were reserved for the CHRISTIAN population, and one seat was kept aside for the Jewish SAMARITANS.

Elections were deemed fair, but critics noted that, one month before the elections, Arafat had delayed the registration of voters in Jerusalem, Khan Yunis, Gaza City, and HEBRON, allowing for the mass registration of Fatah supporters. Further, critics of the peace agreements—the Islamic resistance movement HAMAS and other opposition groups—boycotted the vote, although individual members ran in the elections as independents. Municipal elections were not held until much later. Although not written into the Oslo agreements, local offices were filled by the top levels of the PNA to mediate disputes and leverage power from above.

Over time, however, Fatah's rank and file began to clamor for a share in decisionmaking.

Agreement by Arafat to hold local and municipal elections in stages beginning in 2004 was a nod to these voices. The first round of voting was held in twenty-six local councils on 23 December 2004, with participation of 81 percent of the 144,000 Palestinians eligible to vote. Although the ISLAMIC JIHAD boycotted the elections, Hamas saw local council participation as a way of participating in politics without having to address the issue of recognizing Israel. The Palestinian Higher Commission of Local Elections reported that, in the 306 races, women defeated men in a record twenty-five of them, in addition to the twenty-one quota seats they were allotted to advance female participation. Fatah won a majority in twelve councils, Hamas nine, and independent candidates in another five councils. Pollsters noted the success of candidates from large families in the elections, highlighting the historic importance of extended family loyalties among Palestinians.

Elections were not held again until 2005, well after the Oslo Accords had declined in popularity and five years into the punishing AL-AQSA INTIFADA. A poll was scheduled for 20 January 2003 but then postponed, because Israeli military incursions into Palestinian towns made a vote practically impossible. The international community did little to press for elections, nor did Fatah, which feared losing its electoral majority. Indeed, municipal elections were showing that Hamas, responsible for the most punishing attacks on Israelis, had made great gains in public support. That changed when the UNITED STATES championed general presidential elections as part of its wider policies for democracy in the Middle East. The death of Arafat had further weakened Fatah, and the United States was hoping for a new mandate for his former prime minister, MAHMUD ABBAS. Eight candidates (two Fatah, four independents, one from the PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY, and one from the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE) entered the fray. When popular Fatah candidate MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI withdrew from the race at the last minute after negotiations, Abbas's victory was sealed, winning over 62 percent of votes cast. On 9 January 2005, 70 percent of registered voters cast ballots. In the final hours of election day, unregistered voters were allowed, in a highly contested decision, to cast ballots using only a valid ID. At the behest of Fatah, voting was also extended two hours past the official deadline, a move that caused the head of the elections commission to resign in protest.

That vote was followed by parliamentary elections, made possible by the March 2005 Cairo agreement where Palestinian factions agreed to stop attacks on Israelis for reciprocal Israeli calm, laying the groundwork for national political participation by Hamas. The lead-up to the 25 January 2006 parliamentary elections was marred by violence and disarray within Fatah. Primaries for 300,000 Fatah members to choose 132 candidates were only partially completed because of voting irregularities and internal violence. On the eve of the deadline for candidate registration, it appeared that Fatah might run two lists for each position. An eleventh-hour decision combined the slates, but it was too late to prevent dozens of Fatah candidates from running as independents. Later, Fatah would blame these independents for splitting the Fatah vote and bringing about the faction's stunning loss to Hamas in the 25 January election. Negotiations to draw Hamas into the elections process had produced a compromise electoral formula based on a combined bloc and proportional representation system. This new process, a Fatah vote divided among list candidates and independents, and Hamas's well-organized campaign, particularly among women, brought Hamas seventy-four seats to Fatah's forty-five seats in the PLC. With 75 percent of voters placing ballots on election day, Hamas won 44 percent of the popular vote and 56 percent of the seats, while Fatah won 42 percent of the popular vote and 34 percent of the 132 seats.

These results came as a surprise to most, as exit polling on the eve of the vote showed Fatah winning by a low margin. Pollsters blamed the discrepancy on the confusing balloting system and voters' reluctance to be candid with the pollsters. No significant voting irregularities were noted by election monitors. The POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE won three seats; al-Badeel, a coalition of leftist groups, won three seats; the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INITIATIVE (MUSTAFA AL-BARGHUTHI) won two seats; the Third Way (Salam Fayyad and HANAN ASHRAWI) won two seats; and independents (some supported by Hamas) won four seats. The election victory meant that Hamas would form the next Palestinian government. It also meant the de facto incorporation of Hamas into the Palestine National Council (council members are automatically included in the PLO parliament) despite Hamas's refusal to recognize the

organization. Prior to this election the PNC and virtually all Palestinian politics were dominated by Fatah; the shift was received with defiance by Fatah loyalists. Because most Western states listed Hamas as a TERRORIST entity, Israel refused to transfer PNA tax revenues and the international community stopped the flow of foreign aid bankrolling the official Palestinian budget. After a period of factional tension and violence, in June 2007, Hamas forces took control of Gaza, its authority to govern the PNA challenged by both the international community and Fatah. The physical separation of the West Bank and Gaza was thus rendered political, and two systems began to develop, both only selectively representing the electoral process.

See also individual ISRAELI and PALESTINIAN PARTIES

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—Charmaine Seitz

Elon, Amos (1926–2009)

Amos Elon is one of Israel's preeminent writers and essayists. Born in Vienna to Zionist parents who immigrated to Palestine in 1933, Elon served in the HAGANA, the illegal Jewish military force, during the BRITISH MANDATE. He studied at both Tel Aviv and Hebrew universities and in 1953 won a British Council scholarship to Peterhouse in Cambridge. He began his career as a correspondent for *Ha'aretz*, the leading Jerusalem newspaper, later becoming a member of its editorial board.

After the 1967 WAR, Elon became a critic of Israel's SETTLEMENT policy in the Occupied Territories, and he has produced a stream of essays in the *New York Review of Books* about the intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. His analyses and mood have become steadily gloomier, and in 2005 he wrote: "It [the conflict] may yet, I tremble at the thought, lead to results far more terrible than those we are now witnessing. . . . It was almost impossible to move 3,000 settlers out of Sinai under [MENAHEM] BEGIN. Now there are 400,000." Elon further observes that Israeli control over the Palestinian majority in the WEST BANK increasingly relies on brute force, and the morality of the Israeli army is increasingly compromised: "Soldiers loot nowadays," he said, "they looted banks in Ramallah."

Elon is one of the few Israeli writers to live abroad and spends most of his time in a house near Lucca, Italy, returning to Israel only for brief stays. He has written many acclaimed novels as well as works of nonfiction, including *Journey through a Haunted Land: The Two Germanies* (1967); *The Israelis: Founders and Sons* (1971); *between Enemies: A Compassionate Dialogue Between an Israeli and an Arab* (with Sana Hassan, 1974); *Herzl: A Biography* (1975); *Flight into Egypt* (1980); *Jerusalem: City of Mirrors* (1990); *Founder: Meyer Amschel Rothschild and His Time* (1996); *A Blood-dimmed Tide: Dispatches from the Middle East* (1997); and *The Pity of It All: A Portrait of Jews in Germany 1743–1933* (2003).

See also HEBREW LITERATURE

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Elon, Benyamin (1954–)

Benyamin "Benny" Elon is a rabbi, politician, member of the Knesset, chairman of the MOLEDET PARTY (which advocates "TRANSFER" of all Palestinians from Israel and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES establishing the "whole" land of Israel for Jews only), and sponsor of extremist settler groups in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in the Occupied Territories. Born in JERUSALEM, he studied at the flagship of religious ZIONISM, Yeshivat Mercaz HaRav*;* served as a chaplain in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES; and as rabbi of Kibbutz Shluchot from 1978 to 1982. As a JEWISH AGENCY emissary in the UNITED STATES from 1983 to 1985, Elon developed strong relations with the CHRISTIAN fundamentalist community, including politicians and prominent public figures. During his multiple visits to the United States each year, Elon lobbies the Christian groups for support and money for Israel's right-wing policies. When he returned from his first stint in the United States, Elon taught at the ATERET COHANIM Center in Jerusalem, a radical East Jerusalem settler group, and in 1990 founded Yeshivat BEIT OROT, serving as dean until 1996.

Elon has been a Knesset member since 1996, when he was elected on the Moledet ticket. Recently he has sought to unite Israel's right-wing parties under one larger faction—the NATIONAL UNION, which in 2006 comprised seven members of the Knesset. In October 2001, following the assassination of Tourism Minister REHAVAM ZE'EVI, Elon was appointed to that post.

Elon is part of the extremist radical right that advocates transfer of the Palestinians from the Occupied Territories and from inside Israel. He is committed to an Israel that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River—an outcome that he believes is both promised by God and made inevitable by realpolitik. Elon opposes the OSLO ACCORDS and the ROAD MAP: his favorite slogan is "Jordan is Palestine." He is among the most active forces in the Judaization of East Jerusalem through the acquisition of property, evicting Palestinians from their homes, building new Jewish colonies in Palestinian neighborhoods, and constructing *yeshivot (*religious schools).

Elon's party and his opinions are more extreme than the right-wing LIKUD PARTY. He believes that Muslims, including current citizens, should not be able to vote in Israel, and has predicted that Islam will be wiped out in a few years by a Christian crusade. In 2003 Elon developed and vigorously promoted a "peace" plan that includes the following planks:

- Declare the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY an enemy of Israel and dismantle the organization.
- Destroy the "terror infrastructure" by removing every terrorist, weapon, and bomb factory from Judea, Samaria, and GAZA.
- Nullify the Oslo Accords.
- Solve the REFUGEE problem by relocating displaced Arabs to Arab countries and dismantling refugee camps.
- Create two separate states for Jews and Palestinians on two sides of the Jordan River: the Jordanian/Palestinian state with Amman as its capital and the Jewish state with Jerusalem as its capital.
- Designate Arabs remaining in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as citizens of the Jordanian/Palestinian state. Arab Palestinians holding Israeli citizenship would be offered alternate citizenship in the Jordanian/Palestinian state.

Although Benny Elon and the Moledet Party are not overly powerful in Israel, the presence of his party and others with similar views in a Likud or KADIMA coalition by definition influences those parties' ability to make concessions to the Palestinians. Elon probably has more influence in the United States than in Israel. The evangelical Christian lobbies that agree with his views, including his claim that all of Palestine belongs to the Jews by biblical right, are some of GEORGE W. BUSH'S most active allies. Sympathy for Israel runs deep enough for Elon to be considered a welcome ally even among US lawmakers who do not support transfer but who believe the Road Map forces Israel to negotiate with TERRORISTS.

See also CHRISTIANITY; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Elon Moreh Settlement

Elon Moreh was one of the first permanent SETTLEMENTS established by the GUSH EMUNIM movement, a radical right-wing religious settler movement founded in 1974. It is particularly significant because its founding gave birth to the legal basis for future colonization in the WEST BANK.

Elon Moreh was created by a few hundred FUNDAMENTALIST settlers from KIRYAT ARBA settlement in HEBRON and their supporters, who in December 1975 took over an unused railway station in Sebastia (near Nablus) and refused to leave. Negotiations with the Israeli government, led by Defense Minister SHIMON PERES and Intelligence Advisor ARIEL SHARON, produced a compromise: the settlers could stay temporarily in an Israeli army camp located nearby.

When, in 1979, the government of Israel (under Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN) decided to formally expropriate LAND for the new settlement of Elon Moreh (whose settlers still remained at the Israeli army camp), it selected a site near the village of Rujeib. The settlers were given permission to build on privately owned Palestinian lands belonging to families from Rujeib. In keeping with past practice, Israel claimed that the expropriation was for military use. In response, PEACE NOW rallied thousands of Israelis at the site, opposing the seizure of land for what was an unambiguously civilian rather than military purpose, while the Elon Moreh settlers argued for the right of Jews to settle in all parts of the West Bank.

Palestinian owners of the expropriated lands appealed to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT to stop the seizure of their lands, and the High Court ruled that Elon Moreh had to be dismantled, arguing that privately owned land could not be expropriated to establish civilian settlements. The judges' decision implied, however, that they would have found otherwise if the land involved had not been privately owned.

The ruling turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for the Palestinians. Subsequent to the court's decision, the Israeli cabinet created policies to declare the vast majority of the West Bank "STATE LAND," abandoned property, or unregistered land, which, once classified as such, made the land available for Jewish civilian settlements. Then minister of agriculture Ariel Sharon and Israel Defense Forces chief of staff Rafael Eitan led the effort to implement this new policy, under which Israel could take for civilian settlement use any land in the West Bank that had been designated as state land under Jordanian rule or that Israel asserted was state land or land that was unregistered or uncultivated. Under these terms, most of the West Bank became fair game for settlement, particularly given that the West Bank had not had a complete land registry since OTTOMAN times. (One of the first things Israel did in 1968 was to stop the land registry process, and the burden of proof for landownership was, and remains, extremely difficult for Palestinians to meet.)

In the end, the landowners in Rujeib won their battle in court and got their land back. In January 1980 Elon Moreh moved to a site on Mount Kabir (as of 31 December 2004, there were 1,152 registered residents of Elon Moreh). The army camp where the Elon Moreh settlers had initially been allowed to stay (under the December 1975 compromise) eventually became the settlement of Kedumim (population 3,263, as of 31 December 2004).

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Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Areas

The Israeli Knesset approved the Emergency Articles for the Exploitation of Uncultivated Areas in 1949 (similar to a law promulgated by the first Jewish settlers in 1947), which allowed the Israeli agriculture minister to take over LAND that had been uncultivated for the previous three years. In many cases, Palestinian farms were declared CLOSED MILITARY ZONES for that time period, which meant Palestinians could not access their land, and then Israel annexed on the basis that the land was not cultivated. Any area could be closed by the authorities for "security" reasons and its Arab owners barred from the land, which would then be declared "abandoned" or "uncultivated." In effect, the articles provided a legal means for Israel to confiscate Palestinian LAND left by the REFUGEES and by the so-called PRESENT ABSENTEES.

This law is part of a series of laws promulgated by Israel soon after becoming an independent state to legally expropriate the lands and property of the approximately 800,000 Palestinians who had become refugees. Other important laws include the DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS, the ABANDONED AREAS ORDINANCE (1948), the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW (1950), and the Land Acquisition Law (1955).

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Emergency Defense Regulations

See DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS

Enclaves

See BANTUSTANS

The Engineer

See AYYASH, YAHYA

Entebbe, 1976

On 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139, with 246 passengers traveling from Ben Gurion Airport to Paris via Athens, was hijacked by Arabs who boarded during the Athens stopover. Armed with guns and grenades, the hijackers ordered the plane to divert to Benghazi, Libya, for refueling, then took off again and flew south to Entebbe, Uganda, where the plane landed on the morning of 28 June. The hijacking was a collaborative effort between Dr. WADI' HADDAD'S POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), a faction within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, and the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin.

The hijackers demanded the release of fifty-three Palestinian PRISONERS being held in Israel and elsewhere. Diplomatic efforts involving the FRENCH and the Israelis provided stalling time while the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) planned a rescue operation. The hijackers released some 150 passengers, leaving approximately 100 Israelis and Jews hostage. On 3 July a squadron of Israeli aircraft landed at Entebbe and met little resistance. During the rescue operation, eight hijackers and fifty-six Ugandan military personnel as well as three hostages and one Israeli commando were killed. After a plane loaded with the rescued hostages took off, the IDF destroyed Ugandan MIGs on the ground. The hijacking strengthened Israeli claims that the Palestinians were simply TERRORISTS.

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Environmental Degradation

Palestine is part of the historic Fertile Crescent, which is considered the cradle of human civilization and the origin of agriculture. Its unique location at the crossroads between Asia, Europe, and Africa has made Palestine an environmental melting pot for the flora and fauna of the three continents. Within a very small area, Palestine enjoys tremendous climatic variation. In a matter of thirty minutes' drive it is possible to travel from the rel-

atively humid highlands, receiving twenty-three inches of rain per year, to the JERUSALEM desert, and the Dead Sea nearly 400 meters (1,300 feet) below sea level and receiving less than two inches of rain per year.

Palestine was described by early visitors as a land flowing with milk and honey, but such a description cannot be applied today. Barren lands and deserts have replaced forests and green plains. The Jordan River, which had an annual water flow of 1,300 million cubic meters in 1953, is currently running with contaminated water at a flow of 100 million cubic meters. The Dead Sea, which represents the deepest continental depression on earth, is drying up at an alarming rate and separating into two seas; the water level will decline further if existing practices persist.

Human infringement on Palestine's native vegetative cover has occurred primarily in four ways: gathering of wood for fuel and lumber, overgrazing by domesticated sheep and goats, conversion of woodlands to arable land, and forest fires both planned and accidental. During OTTOMAN rule in Palestine, vast areas of natural forest were lost as large numbers of trees and shrubs were cut to provide fuel for the railways, which led to the loss or marginalization of large numbers of native flora. Gone also from the LAND are animals that were once plentiful—ostrich, cheetah, leopard, lion, Syrian bear, crocodiles, and several kinds of deer—casualties of human encroachment.

Although it is not surprising that world interest has focused far more on the conflicting historical and political claims to the land, what happens to the environment inevitably extends to all components of the natural web, including humanity. Environmental problems cannot be isolated from the surrounding economic, social, political, and military issues. The case of Palestine illustrates the often negative relationship between political conflict and environmental degradation. If one looks at a satellite image, the political boundaries of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) can be easily traced and two brown desert forms distinguished—in striking contrast to the green, irrigated fields of Israel. While the Israeli desert has bloomed, the once-verdant heights of Palestine have been denuded. Desertification and soil erosion are evident, particularly on the Eastern Slopes to the west of the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. This dry and barren landscape is the direct result of Israeli control over Palestinian surface and ground WATER resources.

The Palestinian environment has been the victim of Palestinian practices on the one hand and the actions of the Israeli OCCUPATION Authorities on the other. In the past decades, environmental problems such as land degradation, deterioration of biodiversity, depletion of water resources, deterioration of water quality, and air pollution have dramatically accelerated.

Land Degradation

As it stands now, the Occupied Palestinian Territories are significantly degraded, suffering from years of improper land use planning, overgrazing, deforestation, and environmentally unsound management of waste. Human activities, coupled with the impact of natural processes such as erosion and drought, have led to serious environmental problems in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP.

Improper land use planning. Lack of sovereignty over land and natural resources has denied the Palestinians their right to regulate land use and manage the utilization of their natural resources. Israeli planning schemes in the OPT have been geared toward political factors aimed at usurping as much land as possible to implement Israeli settlement expansion and toward changing the demographic character of the area. Consequently, there are two contradictory types of built-up areas in the OPT. The first consists of the Palestinian communities that are often constructed on nonfertile soil and comprise traditionally built houses with flat roofs used for harvesting rainwater and typically surrounded by backyard farms to meet household needs for agricultural products. The second type consists of the illegal Israeli SETTLEMENTS that overlie confiscated Palestinian agricultural lands on hilltops, particularly in the Jordan Valley, the western edges of the West Bank, and the Jerusalem area. As of 2008, around 200 Israeli settlements were scattered throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, accommodating more than 500,000 settlers. Other imposed Israeli structures include industrial zones, military bases, and ROADBLOCKS. The most recent Israeli intrusion erected in the West Bank is the Segregation Wall, or BARRIER, which has brought about major challenges to the conservation of ecosystems and landscapes.

In the West Bank, analysis of land use shows that the Israeli settlements, Israeli military bases,

and CLOSED MILITARY ZONES occupy approximately 73, 19, and 386 square miles (188, 48, and 999 square kilometers), respectively, while the Palestinian built-up areas occupy only 114 square miles (294 square kilometers), constituting 5 percent of the West Bank's total area (of 2,186 square miles, or 5,661 square kilometers). In the Gaza Strip, prior to ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT of 2005, Israel controlled an area of 53 square miles (138 square kilometers), which is 38 percent of the total area of Gaza (141 square miles, or 365 square kilometers). By the time the Israeli army completed the Gaza redeployment in August 2005, the area of its "security buffer zone" stood at 24 square miles (61 square kilometers); thus 17 percent of the Gaza Strip remained under the control of the Israeli army. On 28 June 2007, in another unilateral step, the Israeli army expanded the security buffer zone along Gaza's northern and eastern border to 1,640 yards (1.5 kilometers) in width. Accordingly, the newly defined security buffer zone occupies an area of 34 square miles (87 square kilometers), constituting 24 percent of the total area of Gaza.

Israeli colonizing activities, the division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C (based on the INTERIM AGREEMENT), and the construction of the Barrier wall have created geographical discontinuity especially within the West Bank, limiting the possibility of achieving comprehensive land use planning or implementation of environmentally sound waste management projects, thus leading to further land degradation.

Overgrazing and deforestation. During the prolonged years of Israeli Occupation, large areas in the West Bank have been transformed into deserts. Indicators of desertification appear clearly on the Eastern Slopes, which are characterized by steep slopes that have limited agricultural activity or animal grazing. The closure of 85 percent of the Eastern Slope zone by the Israeli authorities for military purposes has led to severe overgrazing in the remaining area accessible to the Palestinian herders. Overgrazing has resulted in the loss of the vegetation cover, soil erosion, and intensive desertification.

Israel converted large areas of planted and natural forests in the OTP into Israeli settlements and military bases—for example, Abu Ghnaim Mountain in the BETHLEHEM Governorate, where trees were cut down to construct the HAR HOMA settlement. Moreover, in the period from October 2000 until 2008, in the course of confiscating Palestinian land for the implementation of Israeli settlement construction, 432,036 trees including OLIVE TREES were uprooted in the West Bank, which is about 4.4 times greater than the number of trees uprooted in the period from 1993 until 2000. In the Gaza Strip, more than 1 million trees have been uprooted from Palestinian agricultural lands during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–2009).

Environmentally unsound management of waste. The lack of an efficient waste management system in the Occupied Territories has left huge piles of solid waste accumulating randomly in open areas and sewage streams flowing into wadis without any restriction. These pollution sources undermine the aesthetic value of the natural environment as well as exacerbate the land deterioration problem. During the Israeli Occupation, the waste management system has been neglected and left underdeveloped, with no separate system for the collection, treatment, and disposal of industrial and medical wastes generated from existing industrial facilities and health care centers.

In the West Bank, a high percentage of the collected domestic solid waste is dumped in open and uncontrolled dumping sites where open burning is the common practice, and the remaining uncollected waste is dumped and burned on roadsides and vacant lands. These dumping sites are not designed as sanitary landfills, thus allowing leachate to contaminate the soil, deteriorate the land, infiltrate into soil layers, and endanger the quality of groundwater in the aquifers. Currently, two sanitary landfills are operating in the West Bank, namely Zahret El-Fengan landfill, located in the JENIN Governorate in the northern part of the West Bank, and the JERICHO landfill, located in the Jordan Valley. In the Gaza Strip, the collected waste is disposed of in three sanitary landfills.

Sewage networks serve approximately 32 percent and 61 percent, respectively, of the West Bank and Gaza Strip population. The remaining population uses unlined cesspits and open channels for wastewater disposal. In the West Bank, the domestic wastewater collected by sewage networks is currently discharged raw, along with the collected untreated industrial wastewater, into open areas, mainly wadis. The only centralized wastewater treatment plant that is operating at a high efficiency rate is in Al Bireh in the Ramallah Governorate. The discharged wastewater is highly concentrated, in terms of the biological oxygen

demand and the total suspended solids, and it may contain heavy metals due to the release of the untreated industrial wastewater. The wastewater streams threaten the groundwater quality over the highly permeable recharge areas of the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip, part of the domestic wastewater collected by sewage networks is treated in three centralized wastewater treatment plants that are functioning only at moderately efficient rates. The partially treated and untreated wastewater is all discharged into open areas such as Wadi Gaza or into the Mediterranean Sea and sand dunes.

Furthermore, the management of waste has seriously deteriorated since the outbreak of the Second INTIFADA due to the CLOSURE imposed on the Palestinian localities and the concomitant geographical discontinuity. The closure makes it impossible to move waste from origin to waste dumping sites. Also, the construction of the Barrier has exacerbated the solid waste management problem. The existing dumping sites outside the Barrier have become inaccessible to the localities inside the Wall, causing the use of emergency disposal sites inside the localities and increasing the solid waste load to the existing dumping sites.

Another source of the waste is the Israeli settlements. In the West Bank, about 80 percent of the solid waste generated by the settlers is dumped in sites located within the West Bank. These include ABU DIS, Al Bireh, and Yatta (HEBRON, Southern Governorate) dumping sites, which are also used by Palestinians, and the Tovlan site, which was established in the Jericho Governorate to serve the settlers only. Most of the wastewater generated in the settlements flows untreated into nearby wadis and Palestinian agricultural lands. For instance, in the Salfit Governorate, the wastewater generated in Arial Settlement is discharged untreated into Wadi Al Matwi, which overlies the recharge area of the Western Groundwater Basin. Furthermore, Israeli industrial facilities located in the West Bank discharge industrial waste into the environment without prior treatment, because Israeli environmental law is not compulsory and is not followed in the OPT. The most harmful action to Palestinian land is the illegal Israeli transport of hazardous waste generated inside Israel to the Palestinian Territories.

Deterioration of Biodiversity

The location of the Occupied Palestinian Territory at the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Europe has allowed for a wide range of species to settle and evolve within its BORDERS. The diverse topographical features, climate, and soil distribution within such a small geographical area have provided many ecological niches for a rich biodiversity of flora and fauna. However, the absence of environmental protection has led to the deterioration of the biological resources. Urbanization, deforestation, pollution, overgrazing, land confiscation, and Israeli control over nature reserves during the Occupation have greatly reduced plant biomass and have endangered fauna species. Many of the species that appeared in historical records are now extinct or threatened.

The flora of Palestine includes 149 endemic species, of which 43 percent are found to be common, 27.5 percent rare, and 25.6 percent very rare. About 12 species of the endemic group are extremely rare, such as *Polygonum palaestinus, Trichodesma biossieri,* and *Verbascum fructiculosum.* Various species of mammals have been endangered by human activities, and seven mammalian species are extinct.

Moreover, defined segregation zones and the construction of the Segregation Wall in the West Bank have caused major challenges to the conservation of ecosystems and habitat linkages between protected areas. By fragmenting ecosystems and habitats in both Israel and the West Bank and by disturbing the natural ecological corridors, the Wall and segregation zones impede the movement of terrestrial fauna and cause deterioration of the vegetation cover by isolating over 10,000 acres (about 43 square kilometers) of forests and 130,000 acres (about 534 square kilometers) of nature reserves "protected areas" where Palestinians cannot have access even for management purposes.

Deterioration of Water Quality

Groundwater in most areas of the West Bank is generally considered to be of good quality. There are no serious indications of pollution in the deep aquifer; however, contamination of groundwater has appeared in the shallow aquifer and in some springs in the West Bank. Groundwater contamination is caused by agricultural practices, mainly the use of inorganic fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, and by the unsound management of domestic and industrial wastewater and solid waste.

Quality measurements of groundwater in the West Bank have shown that the nitrate level in

some wells (particularly in the Governorates of Nablus, Tulkarm, and Jericho) exceeds the World Health Organization's standard guideline value for drinking water. Nitrate contamination of groundwater is caused by fertilizers and raw sewage. Furthermore, microbiological contamination of springs is due to the infiltration of raw sewage from the unlined wastewater cesspits that are used in the rural areas of the West Bank. A microbiological examination conducted in July 2006 of water samples collected by the Palestinian Ministry of Health from Al Balad spring in Nahhalin village, located in the Bethlehem Governorate, showed the presence of coliform bacteria in the sample, indicating wastewater contamination and thus making the spring's waters unsuitable for drinking purposes.

Water quality of the Gaza coastal aquifer is considered poor. The main problem is the gradual increase in salinity and nitrate content, two indicators of organic pollution, as populations increase. Nitrate concentration reaches up to 400 milligrams per liter in the North Gaza Governorate and salinity is more than 1,500 milligrams per liter in the western area of Khan Yunis and southeastern part of Rafah Governorate. This deterioration in water quality is attributed to the overpumping of the aquifer due to increased demand from the growing population, which has lowered the groundwater table below sea level, leading to saltwater intrusion from the sea, as well as to the unregulated disposal of waste. Moreover, Israel's construction of dams on Wadi Gaza, in order to harvest the surface water running in the wadi and divert it into areas inside Israel, has also affected groundwater quality.

Air Pollution

Although air pollution is not recognized as a critical problem in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, it is believed that air quality is continuously deteriorating—hurt mainly by industrial activities, vehicle emissions, energy consumption, open burning of solid waste in the dumping sites, and transboundary air pollutants.

The major source of air pollution in the West Bank is vehicle emissions such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. These emissions have significantly increased since the segregation of the Palestinian localities, Israel's frequent closures, and destruction of the main Palestinian ROADS between localities and governorates. This has obliged Palestinians to use alternative routes, which are usually long unpaved roads requiring more traveling time and thus increased vehicle emissions.

Existing industrial activities that add to the air pollution problem are quarries and stone-cutting facilities, which emit huge amounts of particulate matter into the air. Charcoal processing releases considerable amounts of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds into the atmosphere. Metal factories, bakeries, and pottery industries produce large amounts of toxic gases, because they burn old tires and used motor oil as fuel.

Moreover, transboundary pollutants from Israel have significantly contributed to the deterioration of air quality in the West Bank. Western winds blow air pollution from the Tel Aviv urban area into the West Bank. Studies have shown that nitrogen oxides generated from the traffic in Tel Aviv are produced as ozone in Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and NABLUS.

See also INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; LAND; WATER

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—Jad Isaac and Abeer Safar

Erekat, Saeb Muhammad Salih (1955–)

Saeb Erekat is a Palestinian academic and politician. He was a member of the first PALESTINE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PNC) (representing JERICHO), and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. Erekat was head of the PLO's Negotiations Affairs Department and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY'S (PNA) minister of negotiations affairs, as well as minister of local government. He is a former professor of political science at An-Najah National University, NABLUS, and also served as the university's public relations director from 1982 to 1986.

Erekat was born and still lives in Jericho. He has a B.A. and an M.A. from San Francisco State University, both in International Relations, and a Ph.D. from the University of Bradford in Great Britain, where he studied conflict resolution at the Quaker-endowed Department of Peace Studies. In 1987 Erekat was arrested by Israeli authorities and accused of inciting sedition because of an article he wrote in which he argued that "Palestinians must learn to endure and reject and resist." At trial, he argued in his own defense that promoting NONVIOLENT resistance did not qualify as sedition. Nevertheless, an Israeli military court convicted him and he was under intermittent house arrest during the early years of the First INTIFADA.

In May 1988 Erekat was one of three Palestinians (with HAYDAR 'ABD 'AL-SHAFI and HANAN ASHRAWI) to participate in ABC *Nightline*'s town hall meeting from JERUSALEM. At the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE, where Erekat served as deputy advisor to 'Abd al-Shafi, he acquired the reputation of being a born politician and a competent negotiator. He was almost barred from Madrid for his insistence on wearing the *hutta* (kaffiyah), as a public show of loyalty to PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT. At WYE RIVER and CAMP DAVID, Erekat was the lead negotiator for the Palestinians.

When MAHMUD ABBAS was nominated to serve as prime minister of the Palestine Legislative Council in early 2003, Erekat was slated to be minister of negotiations in the new cabinet, but he soon resigned after he was excluded from the Palestinian delegation to the first ROAD MAP talks with Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON. This was interpreted as part of an internal Palestinian power struggle between Abbas and Arafat. Erekat was later reappointed to his post and participated in the 2007 Annapolis Conference, where he took over from AHMAD QUREI' during an impasse and helped hammer out a joint declaration.

Erekat is one of a very few senior PNA figures to escape charges of corruption. He is also one of the most pro-US members of the Palestinian leadership and remains convinced that there will be no solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without active and committed US intervention.

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Eretz Crossing

Eretz was the major crossing point for Palestinians between the GAZA STRIP and Israel and Gazans' only access to the WEST BANK and JERUSALEM before Israel restricted all Palestinian passage starting in 2000. Since the eruption of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, Israel has almost completely sealed Gaza. Although certain Palestinians could use the crossing, no one could enter or leave without special PERMITS and advanced Israeli approval. Generally, only diplomats and some Israeli-vetted journalists could obtain prior approval. The few Palestinians who in the past were able to obtain the required magnetic cards and permits needed to cross Eretz have been unable to do so since 2000. In May 2003, in the interest of "security," the Israeli authorities denied access through Gaza's crossing to everyone except those with diplomatic passports.

In January 2004, Israel closed the industrial zone near the Eretz crossing established as part of the OSLO ACCORDS in response to Gazans' firing QASSAM ROCKETS into Israel, cutting off hundreds of Palestinian day laborers from their source of employment. In 2005, during ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, it closed the crossing completely. Several months later, Israel opened it

for a short time to Palestinians with special permits, but closed it again in December 2005 and the crossing has remained closed since then.

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Eretz Yisrael l'Hashlema

See GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT

Eshkol, Levi (1895–1969)

Levi Eshkol (Levi Shkolnik) was a prominent LABOR PARTY leader and prime minister of Israel from 1963 to 1969. Born near Kiev, RUSSIA, he immigrated to Palestine in 1914. His family was wealthy and Hasidic, and Eshkol received a traditional Jewish education in Russia, where he joined a Zionist organization. In Palestine, he quickly became active in military, agricultural, and financial affairs; founded a workers' commune in Petah Tikvah; and became one of the founding members of Kibbutz Deganyah.

A member of the JEWISH LEGION from 1918 to 1920, Eshkol was elected to the defense committee of the HISTADRUT (labor federation) in 1921. In Vienna, he was arrested in 1922 on a mission to buy arms. After HAIM ARLOZOROV concluded the HA'AVARA agreement with the Nazis, Eshkol went to Berlin in 1934 to organize the transfer of German Jewish property. In the 1940s he played a key role in the development of the HAGANA, an illegal Jewish military force. During World War II, Eshkol headed the Hagana's finance department and became treasurer of the JEWISH AGENCY in 1949, heading its Land and Settlement Department. After serving as Israeli deputy minister of defense during the 1948 WAR, he was elected to the Knesset in 1951 and in 1952 became minister of finance. During his ministry, Israel's gross national product increased 10 percent annually and he was largely responsible for the development of the crucial National Water Carrier. In 1963 he succeeded DAVID BEN-GURION as prime minister of Israel.

As prime minister, Eshkol worked to improve Israel's foreign relations. During his term in office, West GERMANY established formal diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965 (although Bonn had been paying Israel reparations since 27 March 1953, constituting a major source of finance for the Jewish state), and relations with the UNITED STATES were greatly improved. His efforts to mend relations with the Soviet Union resulted in permission being granted to some SOVIET JEWS to immigrate to Israel, and cultural ties were established between the two countries.

In the weeks leading up to the 1967 WAR, Eshkol was forced by Israeli generals and senior politicians to form a "Government of National Unity" because they viewed him as "too soft," a government he was able to hold together for some time after the war. He believed that Israel should not return the Palestinian territories that it had conquered and occupied in 1967 until there was a solution to the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1968 Eshkol received a crucial commitment from the United States to supply Israel with sophisticated fighter planes. He died on 26 February 1969 while in office.

See also GERMANY; LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON

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Ethnic Cleansing

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See IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI

Europe

See policies of individual countries and places: China; European Union; France; Germany; Moscow; Scandinavian Countries; Turkey

European Union

European colonialism in the Middle East, World Wars I and II and the Holocaust, plus European involvement in the Cold War all affected the Middle East and were central external factors in the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a consequence, Europe has a historic responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Today, the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for the European Union (EU), and its political accountability is expressed primarily in the support of diplomatic processes and the defense of and respect for international law and human rights. As the strongest economic actor in the Mediterranean region, the EU also has an economic responsibility to Israel and the Palestinian territories. The EU has increasingly attempted to respond to these obligations, but its ability to take action is dependent on its internal evolution: the more the process of European integration proceeds, the more the EU, in principle, is capable of acting concretely in the complex and emotionally charged Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

EU's Growing Role in the Middle East

Despite frequent criticism of the EU as an "economic giant but political dwarf," the EU (and its predecessor, the European Community) has increased its role slowly but constantly as an international actor in the Middle East since the 1958 Treaties of Rome. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has often been the catalyst for the development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), by forcing the member states to find common policies even though, for historical reasons, the traditional positions of various countries on the conflict diverge quite strongly. Germany, for instance, has always defended Israel's interests, while France, since the 1967 War, has tended to support the Palestinians. Nevertheless, since the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1969, the Europeans have tried to harmonize their positions. In 1973 the Europeans' first common official declaration on the Middle East recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to a homeland within historic Palestine. The 1980 EU Venice Declaration, a major European initiative, called for an end to the Occupation in the Palestinian territories, and recognized the Palestinian right of self-determination and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative. However, these European initiatives regularly provoked negative reactions from Israel (and the United States), which rejected recognition of the PLO, ostensibly because it had not yet recognized Israel's right to exist.

The oil crisis of 1973 led to the creation of the Euro-Arab Dialogue between the EC and the twenty-one member states of the Arab League, an exchange denounced by Israel and the United States. Although the Arab states were mostly interested in a political dialogue and hoped the Europeans would counterbalance US foreign policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the EC was mainly interested in improving economic cooperation with the Arab states and staying as balanced as possible toward the conflict.

A major milestone in the European integration process, and thus for Europe's Middle Eastern policy, was the creation of the CFSP in 1993, replacing the EPC, and progressively enlarging the capabilities of the EU in matters of foreign policy. At the beginning of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in 1991, the EC/EU's role was little more than participating in the Multilateral Tracks (the central mediating role was played by the United States), while only eleven years later, the EU stood as an equal diplomatic partner with the United States, Russia, and the United Nations in the framework of the Quartet, the four entities that formed an association in Madrid in 2001.

After the 1993 Oslo Accords, European support for the Palestinians increased. The EU was among the first international actors to back the newly created Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and has been its major financial supporter for nonmilitary purposes since then. With the Berlin Declaration of 1999, the EU underlined the right of self-determination of the Palestinians, including the right to a Palestinian state as the best guarantee of Israel's security, and reaffirmed the readiness of the EU to recognize this future state. Finally, the 2002 Seville Declaration stated that only a negotiated solution of the conflict is acceptable.

After this long process of reaching consensus among different national positions among EU member states, the EU today advocates a two-state

SOLUTION consisting of an Israeli state, and an independent Palestinian state, living side by side within secure and recognized borders. More precisely, the EU recognizes the existence of the state of Israel and its need for security as well as the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. Its objectives are (1) an independent, democratic Palestinian state based on the 1967 BORDERS with minor adjustments agreed to by both parties, with JERUSALEM as the capital of both countries; and (2) an acceptable solution of the REFUGEE problem. These objectives are based on respect for the principles of UN RESOLUTIONS 242, 338, 1397, 1402, and 1515, and of the Madrid Conference of 1991.

Different Frameworks for EU's Policies

The EU's policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is carried out within different frameworks: the CFSP and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), the Barcelona Process (since 2008 named the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), direct aid to refugees, foreign economic policy, humanitarian aid, and international diplomacy. In the context of the CFSP/ESDP, the EU has issued numerous declarations and defined common positions on the Middle East conflict and has implemented numerous "Joint Actions" and missions, such as sending observers and assistance to the Palestinian ELECTIONS in 1996, 2004, and 2006; training the Palestinian police (by EUPOL COPPS since 2006); providing border assistance at the crossing point between Gaza and Egypt (by EU BAM RAFAH since 2005, but on "standby" since 2007); and appointing a special representative for the Middle East peace process, Miguel Moratinos, in 1996 (succeeded in 2003 by the Belgium diplomat Marc Otte). Since the creation of the position of the high representative of the CFSP in 1999, Javier Solana has been involved diplomatically in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and participated in the first Mitchell Commission. Solana is a Spanish physicist and highly respected international diplomat, former commander of the Balkans NATO mission operation, and from 1995 to 1999 secretary-general of NATO; in 2008 his role is more or less that of a European foreign minister.

The EU was intensively involved in drafting the ROAD MAP of April 2003, which proposed a final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict in three phases by 2005. On the basis of a seven-point plan from the former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, the Road Map was cooperatively developed by the European Commission, Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and European diplomats before being transmitted to then US secretary of state COLIN POWELL and being endorsed by the QUARTET. The Road Map remains a reference document for the EU, serving as a framework for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Beginning in 2007 and continuing thereafter, the EU supported the Annapolis process, in order to encourage Israel and the Palestinians to implement the Road Map obligations and to reach a peace agreement before the end of 2008. Despite some small progress in bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, SYRIA, and LEBANON, agreements were not achieved and the negotiations were suspended with Israel's 2008 offensive in Gaza. The EU also supports the ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE as a basis for regional peace.

Besides the CFSP/ESDP frame, the EU is indirectly engaged in the settlement of the conflict via the Barcelona Process, or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), now UfM, launched in 1995, when the EMP was conceived as a separate but complementary process to the Oslo peace process. Its objective was not to solve the Israel-Palestinian conflict but to improve the political climate in the Mediterranean region in general and, in turn, between the actors involved in the conflict. This was supposed to happen through regional cooperation and confidence-building measures, but the EMP has not been as successful as had been hoped. On the one hand, the EMP/UfM offers the only multilateral forum besides the United Nations where Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab countries involved in the conflict meet regularly and on an equal basis. When official peace talks were blocked or interrupted, an informal dialogue could be conducted within the Euro-Mediterranean context. Under the new roof of the Union for the Mediterranean, the Arab League will also participate in the planned summits and activities, which implies a "de facto" recognition of Israel by the member states of the Arab League. On the other hand, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at times paralyzed the development of the EMP/UfM, especially of its first phase, the Political and Security Partnership, which takes place on a multilateral level, making it more vulnerable vis-à-vis the distrust among the actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, the planned EU Charter for Peace and Stability was

never signed, the regional political dialogue was blocked, and several Euro-Mediterranean foreign minister conferences were boycotted by Syria and Lebanon as a response to Israeli policies in the Palestinian territories. In contrast to the stagnation of the first phase of the EMP, the second phase—the Economic and Financial Partnership—progressed more easily. In the framework of the EMP, the EU signed, among other things, bilateral association agreements with Israel, the Palestinians, and the neighboring countries of JORDAN, EGYPT, and Lebanon. Negotiations with Syria were concluded in 2004.

Bilateral Relations between the EU and Israel

The EU-Israel Association Agreement, signed in November 1995 and in force since June 2000, legally structures the bilateral relations between the EU and Israel and replaces an earlier 1975 Cooperation Agreement. The Association Agreement is primarily concerned with liberalizing commercial relations between the EU and Israel through free trade arrangements for industrial goods and concessionary arrangements for agricultural products, and increasing the prospects for trade liberalization in services and agricultural goods. But it also includes regular political dialogue at the ministerial and senior official levels, and increased contacts between the European Parliament and the Knesset as well as intensified cultural and scientific cooperation. An Action Plan with Israel, concluded in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy in December 2004, complements the Association Agreement. The objective of the Neighborhood Policy is, on the one hand, to harmonize the bilateral relations between the EU and its neighboring countries after the EU Enlargement round of May 2004 and to intensify political, security, economic, and cultural cooperation. On the other hand, the Action Plans allow involvement with the issues and problems specific to each country. The negotiation process with Israel has been longer and more complicated than with other countries because Israel initially refused to include any reference to the Road Map in the Action Plan, but it finally admitted that the Middle East conflict is a priority for cooperation. Most of all, the Action Plan allows Israel to progressively participate in more EU policies and programs than previously and to access more easily the EU's internal economic market. Israeli politicians and observers from different political camps debated the question of the full membership of Israel into the EU. But the EU is still occupied with managing the last enlargement rounds, and the Arab-Israeli conflict will have to be solved before Israel could ever be considered for full membership.

In 2008, however, the EU agreed on the "Advanced Status" for Israel, which means upgrading the bilateral relations (the only other country in the region with an advanced status is Morocco). Advanced Status was, however, suspended because of Israel's 2008/2009 offensive in Gaza.

The EU is Israel's major trading partner, and Israel is the EU's twenty-first largest export market. About 40 percent of Israeli imports come from the EU, while about 30 percent of Israeli exports are directed to the EU. Besides the economic cooperation, the scientific and technical relationship between the EU and Israel is extensive and has a long history. However, political relations between the EU and Israel have often been strained, especially in the past decade since the collapse of the Middle East peace process beginning in 1996. Israel criticizes the EU for supporting the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and is concerned about growing ANTI-SEMITISM in Europe, to the extent of urging Jewish residents in France to move to Israel, which ARIEL SHARON initiated in July 2004 and therewith provoked intense diplomatic tensions with the EU. At the same time, the EU and European civil societies criticize Israel for allowing Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the Palestinian territories, the IDF's destruction of EU-funded projects in the Palestinian territories during OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD in 2002, the TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of Palestinian militants, and the construction of the BARRIER (the wall separating Israel from the Palestinian territories) as violations of international law. The tensions culminated in November 2003 after a survey from the Statistical Office of the European Communities stated that 59 percent of EU citizens consider Israel to be the greatest danger for peace in the world. This provoked Israeli reproaches against the EU for failing to undertake enough efforts to combat anti-Semitism in Europe. Although Europeans recognize the right of Israel to protect its citizens from TERRORIST attacks, there are many and growing critical voices toward Israeli policies and military actions, especially since the beginning of the Second INTIFADA in September 2000, the Sec-

ond Lebanon War in 2006, and the military offensive in the Gaza Strip in 2008/2009. Fears are growing within European societies that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could spill onto European territory, especially France. But this does not change the fundamental and strong attachment of the EU and its civil societies to Israel as the only democratic state in the Middle East.

Bilateral Relations between the EU and PNA

The Interim Association Agreement on Trade and Cooperation, signed on 24 February 1997 and entered into force on 1 July 1997, constitutes the main legal document for the bilateral relations between the EU and PNA. The focus of the agreement is the liberalization of trade and a framework for a comprehensive political dialogue. In December 2004, the European Commission also concluded an "Action Plan" with the PNA, in the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. The implementation of the agreement has been difficult because of the Palestinian territories' strong economic, financial, and geographical dependence on Israel and Israel's restrictions on the Palestinian ECONOMY. This situation has worsened since the beginning of the Second Intifada in September 2000; among other measures, CLOSURES and CURFEWS imposed on the Palestinians have hindered a normalization of trade relations. The EU's objective is to improve the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians, to support political reforms and institution building, and to implement the principles of the Road Map. After the EU decided to assist the PNA with direct financial aid, the suspicion arose in 2002 that Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT and the PNA had misused European funds to finance "military and terrorist activities" and allegedly anti-Semitic Palestinian EDUCATION (e.g., textbooks). This suspicion provoked both a political debate within the EU on the necessary reforms of the PNA and an investigation by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). In response, the EU reformed and strengthened the conditionality attached to its financial assistance package and contributed to improving the Palestinian public finance management system. Although one of the EU's priorities is the reform of Palestinian institutions, it emphasizes that reforms must come from within. The EU also played a leading role in the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, created in 2002, which coordinates international donors' aid and monitors civil reforms. The EU is one of the oldest donors (since 1971 in the frame of UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA]) and today the most important donor for the Palestinians. Since the beginning of the Second Intifada, its assistance consists of a mix of emergency support, medium-term institution building measures, and support to the reform process. The EU also cochairs with NORWAY the meetings of the international donor mechanism, the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to the Palestinians, founded in 1993 after the OSLO ACCORDS.

From 1994 to 2002, the EU provided approximately 1 billion euros in grants and loans for development in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and a further 500 million in contributions to UNRWA. Besides this EU funding, the EU member states provided about 2.5 billion euros during the same time period. For the period 2000–2006, the EU provided approximately 1.8 billion euros for food aid and support to the PNA; refugees; the HEALTH CARE, education, and private sectors; municipalities; preparation for elections; institution building; judicial reform; and programs in support of the Middle East peace process such as the Partnership for Peace Program, focused on local and international CIVIL SOCIETY initiatives. In 2007 about 550 million euros and in 2008 approximately 486 million euros were provided. Large parts of these funds are channeled through the so-called PEGASE mechanism for direct assistance and the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. In recent years, European support has been instrumental in ensuring fair and free elections in the Palestinian territories. Thanks to European engagement, in cooperation with the international community, the PNA adopted and ratified the constitutional Basic Law in 2002 and passed legislation increasing the independence of its judiciary and the transparency of its public finances. However, European support for the Palestinians has become very controversial since the victory of HAMAS in the January 2006 parliamentary elections. On the one hand, the EU could not recognize a Hamas-led government as long as Hamas does not recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept the international engagements of the Palestinians in relation to former agreements. On the other hand, the EU continues to financially support the population living in the Gaza Strip, observes the destruction of EU-funded infrastructures by the IDF, and indirectly contributes to the growing frac-

tures between Fatah and Hamas by participating in the policy of isolating Hamas promulgated by the United States and Israel.

Contrasting Approaches of Europe and the United States

The EU and the United States have tried to harmonize their positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the framework of the Quartet. Even though both actors support peace between Israel and the Palestinians, their approaches often diverge, especially on the question of how to deal with the Palestinian side. One example was the GEORGE W. BUSH administration's isolation of Arafat, while the EU continued its dialogue with him. The international debate on unilateralism and multilateralism provoked by the 2003 War on IRAQ produced a clearer separation of Europe's Middle Eastern policy from the Bush administration's policy. The EU, however, knows that it needs to cooperate with the United States, because it is the only international actor capable of implementing a durable peace agreement. The United States has played a central role in important phases of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to a more modest role by the Europeans. European approaches focus on long-term policies such as "Land for Peace," the support of diplomatic initiatives, and financial support of the peace process.

Since the beginning of a European Middle Eastern policy in the 1970s, the EC and then the EU has sought to promote itself as a neutral actor—to respect the Israeli position as well as the Palestinian. Despite this balanced effort, Israel regularly accuses the EU of favoring the Palestinians, while the Palestinians criticize the EU for being too indulgent of Israel. Nevertheless, Europeans have the political will to increase the EU's role in the Middle East. However, the strength of the EU's Middle Eastern policy will most likely emerge in a postconflict situation.

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Evan Rosh Co.

Evan Rosh Co. is a shadowy company established by right-wing JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST settlers, which attempts to locate Palestinian homes, especially in East JERUSALEM, whose owners are believed to have fled the country in the 1967 WAR. The Israeli government has allowed representatives of Evan Rosh Co. (and its sister company Mordor Moria Co.) to easily register homes they have identified as absentee with the Israeli CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY. By law, the custodian is supposed to determine if the owners indeed fled the country and, if so, put the properties up for sale. In practice, the custodian takes the settlers' word and then returns the properties to the settlers.

See also DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; JEWISH QUARTER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; KLUGMAN

REPORT; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM;

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Expropriation of Palestinian Land and Water Resources

See LAND; WATER

Expulsion

See TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; WAR, 1948

Eyal

Eyal was an amorphous but extremist right-wing organization that in the period prior to YITZHAK RABIN'S assassination in 1995 issued daily warnings to the MEDIA that it would kill the prime minister if he proceeded with the OSLO PROCESS. The founder and head of Eyal, Avishai Raviv, worked for Israel's secret service, SHIN BET, and was involved with the establishment of the Zionist Fascist Youth organization. The SHAMGAR COMMISSION, which investigated Rabin's murder, reported that the Eyal organization had been set up by Israeli intelligence. Some in Israel contend that Raviv encouraged YIGAL AMIR, a member of Eyal, to assassinate Rabin.

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Fahd Plan, 1981

The Fahd Plan, proposed in 1981 by Saudi crown prince Fahd (who became King Fahd in 1982), was an eight-point initiative to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict that included the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Although the plan implicitly recognized Israel, Israel rejected it largely because of its call for a Palestinian state, but also because Israel preferred bilateral negotiations over multilateral ones. Arab capitals received it cautiously, but the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) accepted the plan. Among European countries the Fahd Plan was strongly supported, but the UNITED STATES rejected it, believing that its own peace proposal—the REAGAN PLAN, which designated JORDAN as the sovereign in the WEST BANK—would be more acceptable to Israel. (Israel rejected the Reagan Plan too.)

The Fahd peace initiative was largely a consequence of the 1975 rise to power in SAUDI ARABIA of pro-American Crown Prince Fahd, who believed that his initiative would find favor in Washington and lead to an improvement in US-Saudi relations, which became strained after the 1973 oil embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the subsequent rise in petroleum prices. The elements of the plan were familiar and loosely based on UN RESOLUTIONS 242 and 338: Israel was to withdraw from the territories captured in the 1967 WAR, including East JERUSALEM (though not the whole city), dismantle the Jewish SETTLEMENTS, recognize the PLO as the Palestinian representative, and establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. These actions would, in turn, secure guarantees of Arab state recognition of Israel, along with peace and stability for all states in the region, including Israel.

In 1982, at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference held in Fez, Morocco, the ARAB LEAGUE adopted an initiative similar to the Fahd Plan, which became known as the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE. It too was rejected by the United States and Israel.

See also ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC

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Family Reunification

International Legal Considerations. Based on the 10 December 1948 proclamation by the UN General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (especially Articles 12 and 16), protection of the right to family life from governmental interference was enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties. Such treaties include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 17 and 23), the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 10), and the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8). The right to family reunification has been applied to matters of IMMIGRATION by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. Domestic laws of almost all countries recognize the right of their citizens to be united with members of their immediate families, and most states extend such privileges to the alien resident's family members as well. In situations of armed conflict, the arbitrarily forced displacement of civilians is prohibited under international humanitarian law; the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I, Article 74) require that the parties facilitate the reunion of families dispersed as a result of armed conflict.

Israel's system of family reunification does not meet the standards set by INTERNATIONAL LAW and best practice. First, Israel's system of family reunification treats Palestinians as if they were foreigners requesting immigration. Arab Palestinians constituted the majority of the population of Palestine in 1948, were citizens under the laws of the BRITISH MANDATE in Palestine (1921–1948), and were forcibly displaced and denationalized, mainly during armed conflict, by the successor state, Israel. As such, international legal norms apply to their situation. Second, Israeli laws, policies and practices of family reunification discriminate on grounds of nationality. Jewish immigrants to Israel and after 1967 to the Occupied Territories, as well as their (Jewish or non-Jewish) relatives spanning three generations, have a guaranteed right to nationality as defined under the LAW OF RETURN (1950). No such right exists for Palestinians, and reunification of Palestinian families has been treated mainly as a matter of "national security" and DEMOGRAPHY.

The UN Human Rights Committee (2003); the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR, 1998 and 2003); and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD, 2003 and 2007) have all importuned Israel to adhere to these norms, to end discrimination against Palestinians, and to facilitate return, family reunification, and naturalization, but Israel has yet to do so. Finally, the separate system of citizenship, residency, and family reunification applicable to Palestinians has been characterized by a lack of transparency and by arbitrariness of procedure and decisions.

Palestinian Citizens in Israel since 1948

Approximately 1.2 million people, or 20 percent of the population, of the state of Israel today are Palestinians. They originate from the 150,000 Palestinians who remained in the territory of Palestine on which Israel established itself in the armed conflict of 1948. During the 1948 WAR, relatives and friends were displaced to the other side of the Israeli-Arab cease-fire lines and became REFUGEES. While Israel's Law of Return (1950) conveyed Israeli citizenship to the new state's Jewish population and to Jews worldwide upon immigration, a separate Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (CEIL) was passed in 1952 to control the official position of the country's Palestinian minority. The large majority of those who had become refugees were effectively denationalized under the terms of this law.

The CEIL (in conjunction with a later amendment) served initially to regulate the legal status of the country's existing Palestinian population—those who remained in Israel after 1948. This Palestinian minority became citizens through naturalization and a mechanism that granted permanent residence and citizenship in Israel to those defined as non-Jewish aliens. The CEIL, however, limited the scope of family reunification to spouses, parents, and minor children. Very few refugees from 1948, mainly some dependent elderly persons and minor children, succeeded in making their way back home under this law.

Israel's 1967 OCCUPATION of the Palestinian WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP resulted in the reunification of historic Palestine and gave rise to a reintegration of previously separated *hamula* (clans). This resulted in a growing number of marriages between Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinian residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) as well as between citizens and Palestinians living in other Arab states. The noncitizen spouses of Palestinian citizens of Israel were required to apply for family reunification and could become naturalized as citizens under the Naturalization Articles 5–8 of the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (1952).

Virtually all articles of the CEIL give power of discretion to the minister of interior. The minister's discretion is limited only by precedent-setting ISRAELI SUPREME COURT rulings based on the nondiscrimination clause in Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, the BASIC LAW on Human Dignity and Liberty (1992), and by the requirement, under the law, that decisions must be reasonable. However, the minister can issue decisions without explanation; the burden of proof that a decision is discriminatory or unreasonable lies with the applicant at the appeal level.

From 1952 until 1992, marriage in itself was not considered a sufficient reason for granting family reunification. Numerous applications by Palestinian noncitizens were rejected; rejections were usually followed by the DEPORTATION from Israel of the noncitizen spouse, including parents of minor children. The discretion and power held by the minister of interior gave rise to arbitrary decisions and corruption, with the result that family reunification was often denied in order to punish citizen spouses alleged to be a "security threat" by Israeli intelligence agencies.

According to Israeli Interior Ministry figures, between 1993 and 2002, some 22,000 family reunification requests were approved inside Israel. The collapse of the political negotiations with the PLO in 2000 and the start of the second Palestinian uprising in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES created the conditions for an unprecedented public campaign against the Palestinian minority within Israel. Israeli officials and MEDIA widely depicted Palestinian citizens as a threat to both state "security" and the Jewish character of Israel, and alleged that Palestinians who had obtained permanent residency via marriage and family reunification were involved in TERRORIST acts.

To counteract the supposed threat, a policy change came first in 2002 with a temporary ministerial decree freezing all applications for residency that involved Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, followed by an amendment to the 1952 CEIL. This amendment, temporarily enacted in July 2003 and approved by the Knesset in May 2005, prohibits the granting of family reunification to Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who are married to Israeli citizens or permanent residents with the exception of Palestinian women above the age of twenty-five and Palestinian men above the age of thirty-five, who may apply. It is estimated that the amendment will effectively limit the number of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who can receive permanent residency or citizenship in Israel to only some 200 to 250 annually.

Palestinians in the Occupied Territory since 1967

Since 1967, Israel has maintained exclusive control over Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, including the granting of status (resident/citizen) through family reunification. Neither the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP) between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) nor ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005 has resulted in the transfer of relevant powers to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA).

Access to family reunification is an important need in the Palestinian WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, where some 800,000 persons are (descendants of) Palestinian refugees since the 1967 Occupation, and displacement/out-migration continues to be as high as 2 percent yearly. The only means for nonresident spouses and children to obtain legal resident status is under regulations and policies set by Israel's military government in the Occupied Territories. During most of the forty-two years of Occupation, Israel has set these regulations and policies in a unilateral manner.

Between 1967 and 1990, Israel's military regulations considered the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories as "resident aliens" with no option for citizenship. Moreover, only those present and included in Israel's 1967 census in the Occupied Territories were considered residents. Individuals away at university, employed elsewhere, or even just visiting relatives outside the Occupied Territories were denied residency status even if they had lived there all their lives.

Descendants of residents were issued resident status if they were registered within the short time period required under military regulations. Children of a resident father and a nonresident mother could initially receive resident status. However, in 1987, Israel changed the law to require a resident mother. This change dramatically increased the number of unregistered children in the Occupied Territories, because most "mixed marriages" involved male Palestinian residents and female nonresidents. The status of resident alien did not convey a right to live in the Occupied Territories. Although resident aliens were generally permitted to leave—Israel's "open bridge policy" with JORDAN encouraged the departure of large numbers—but return to the Occupied Territories required a valid return visa, which is issued at the discretion of the Israeli authorities. Without such a visa, resident status in the Occupied Territories is revoked. It is estimated that some 100,000 Palestinian students and workers in Arab states without diplomatic relations with Israel failed to retain a valid return visa and were required to follow the family reunification process to return to their families in the Occupied Territories.

Marriage and separation due to armed conflict were not considered sufficient grounds for family reunification, and the military administration did not publish its criteria for establishing entitlement. Waiting periods for decisions could extend over years, and no effective appeal mechanisms were in place. As a result many Palestinians who had obtained temporary visitors' PERMITS to the Occupied Territories avoided applying for family reunification—which could be submitted only after their departure from the country—and stayed on without permission.

As part of its efforts to subdue the first Palestinian INTIFADA in 1989, Israel deported more

than 200 nonresident Palestinians from the West Bank for "staying illegally." Most were nonresident women married to residents and their unregistered children. These deportations triggered concerted legal action by Palestinian and Israeli human rights organizations and lawyers. In response, on 22 August 1993, Israel issued a new policy whereby foreign spouses of residents can apply for family reunification. In addition to humanitarian reasons and public interest, first-degree family relationships would henceforth be regarded as valid grounds for granting permanent residence. With an annual quota of 2,000 permits for permanent residence, spouses would be granted the largest number. Although not expressly stated, it was understood that this policy would also apply to minor children, although Israel fixed the age limit at sixteen years. In addition, applicants for family reunification had to remain abroad until the end of the application process. Special policies designed for spouses and minor children who had entered the Occupied Territories before 31 August 1993, including those who had been deported, were allowed six-month renewable visitors' permits and entitlements to permanent residency.

The period between 1991 and 2000 marks the only time Israel departed from its unilateralism and engaged in multilateral and bilateral arrangements regarding Palestinian family reunification. At the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE and in subsequent sessions of the Multilateral Refugee Working Group (RWG), Israel's family reunification policies came under international scrutiny. At the same time (between 1992 and 1996), local human rights organizations contributed to efforts by the parties in RWG, in particular the French Emissary on Family Reunification and the Jordanian-Palestinian team, to bring Israel's policy closer to the standards set by international law. However, no tangible results were achieved. Negotiations in the multilateral RWG broke down in 1995 and effectively ceased in 1996 when Arab delegations boycotted the meetings to protest the Israeli government's opening of the underground HASMONEAN TUNNEL in the area of the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the third holiest site in Islam.

By that time the PLO and Israel had signed the 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP). Interested in the establishment of a PNA with limited autonomy but with a major role in protecting Israel's security, public administration, and services; Israel agreed to two subsequent interim agreements: GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT I (1994) and the INTERIM AGREEMENT (1995), which had special relevance for Palestinian residency rights and family reunification. Both incorporated Israel's 1993 policy on family reunification guaranteeing the resident status of Palestinians lawfully present in the Occupied Territories and their children, and providing for the establishment of several special mechanisms to address urgent residency issues and needs. These included a Joint Committee to find redress for Palestinians whose resident status had been revoked by Israel in the past and a special mechanism for the repatriation of Palestinian personnel requested on behalf of the PNA. The Joint Committee, however, never became operational. Issues regarding repatriation of persons displaced in the 1967 WAR were to be resolved in a four-party Continuing Committee (PLO, EGYPT, Jordan, and Israel) established under the DOP and by the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel (1994). The Continuing Committee held several sessions between 1995 and 1997 but failed to achieve tangible results.

The major challenge for family reunification in this period was the complexity of Israeli-Palestinian regulations on civil affairs established under the interim agreements. Israel retained control over the entry of people into the Occupied Territories, family reunification, and the approval of Palestinian IDENTITY CARDS and travel documents, even in the PNA self-rule areas. All previously existing channels for direct legal redress with Israel's courts were replaced in 1994–1995 by a system of Israeli-Palestinian coordination: on the Palestinian side mainly through coordination offices among the PNA Ministry of Civil Affairs and other PNA ministries, which were mandated to operate as an intermediary between the Palestinian population and the Israeli authorities; on the Israeli side, the Israeli Regional District Coordination Offices (DCOs) took the place of the former regional headquarters of Israel's military government's civil affairs branches. Coordinating the Israeli-Palestinian transition took time and was accompanied by frequent disputes over the interpretation and application of the signed agreements.

The delay in implementing family reunification procedures resulted in a huge backlog of applications. By May 1997 the PNA Ministry of Civil Affairs in the West Bank, for example, had compiled some 10,000 requests, of which only

1,700 were considered by Israel. Applicants were forced to deal with Palestinian authorities that lacked power relative to Israel in deciding such matters. The bilateral bargaining over their cases at the regional DCOs violated standards of due process and transparency. Soon the whole mechanism of family reunification became a tool for the stronger party to exert political pressure on the weaker in the context of massive asymmetries of power between Israel and the Palestinians, and to punish both the PNA and its population.

Moreover, by this time the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian family reunification procedure set up under the OSLO PROCESS was already in essence defunct when all official coordination was halted in 2001 in response to the failed peace talks and renewed violence in the Occupied Territories. As of 2009, Israel has approved several thousand applications for family reunification as part of a goodwill gesture that aims to strengthen the FATAH-led PNA in the occupied West Bank. However, all regular procedures regarding family reunification and visitors' permits to the Occupied Territories remain suspended, and Israel follows a more restrictive visa policy also for persons holding a passport from a non-Arab country. Thousands of nonresident spouses and other close relatives of Palestinian residents in the Occupied West Bank are thus staying "illegally." With the movement of persons tightly controlled by Israel's military CHECKPOINTS and permit system, such illegal persons have little chance to find employment and essentially remain confined to their homes.

Since its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2005, Israel has retained control over the population registry (a huge database of information on persons living in Gaza) and the granting of legal resident status to Palestinians in this area. In line with the policy of boycotting the Hamas-led PNA in the Gaza Strip, no mechanism is in place for family reunification, nor has Israel approved any permits. In 2009, Israel had retained its status as occupying power of the Gaza Strip and continued to block the movement of persons and goods from and to the area in violation of its obligation to ensure access—at least humanitarian access.

Occupied Eastern Jerusalem: A Special Case

During the 1967 War, when Israel seized East JERUSALEM it constituted an area of some 6 square kilometers. Immediately after the war, Israel annexed some 70 square kilometers to the municipal boundaries of what was then West Jerusalem and imposed Israeli law there. These annexed territories included not only the part of Jerusalem that had been under Jordanian rule, but also an additional 64 square kilometers, most of which had belonged to twenty-eight Palestinian villages in the West Bank, and part of which belonged to the municipalities of BETHLEHEM and Beit Jala. Israel made every effort to exclude the residents of the land it confiscated.

In setting the BORDERS, Israel's objective was to strengthen Israeli sovereignty over the city by creating a decisive Jewish majority. Demographic considerations have been behind almost all of Israel's policies toward the Palestinians in the city. After the annexation, Israel conducted a census in these areas and granted permanent residency status to residents in the annexed areas present at the time the census was taken. Persons not present in the city for whatever reason forever lost their right to reside in Jerusalem. Permanent residents were permitted, if they wished and met certain conditions, to receive Israeli citizenship. These conditions included swearing allegiance to the state, proving that they were not citizens of any other country, and showing some knowledge of Hebrew. For political reasons, most of the residents did not request Israeli citizenship.

B'TSELEM comments on the situation of Palestinians in East Jerusalem: "Israel treats Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as immigrants who live in their homes at the beneficence of the authorities and not by right. The authorities maintain this policy although these Palestinians were born in Jerusalem, lived in the city, and have no other home. Treating these Palestinians as foreigners who entered Israel is astonishing, since it was Israel that entered East Jerusalem in 1967."

Based on a broad political consensus, all Israeli governments have striven for permanent control and sovereignty over eastern Jerusalem. Domestic Israeli law was extended over the expanded eastern Jerusalem, resulting in its legal and administrative separation from the rest of the Occupied Territories, which were under Israeli military rule. The 66,000 Palestinian Jerusalemites recorded by a census in the annexed area were classified as resident aliens—"permanent residents of Israel" under the CEIL. A special Inter-Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem was formed to design policies that would transform the

occupied Arab-Palestinian part of the city into an integral part of Israel's capital. This committee determined, among other things, that the Palestinian population in Jerusalem was to remain at a steady ratio of no more than 20 to 28 percent of the total in the city.

The CEIL has been applied to eastern Jerusalem with a twofold aim: to curb the growth of the Palestinian population in the city and to enforce the separation of Jerusalem's Palestinians from those living in the rest of the West Bank. Because family reunification became the only mechanism by which West Bank residents could obtain permission to live in the city, Israel would not permit, from 1967 until 1994, female Palestinian residents to submit family reunification applications for their nonresident husbands. From 1982 until the mid-1990s, Israel's Interior Ministry interpreted Article 12 of the law as precluding registration of children in Jerusalem by their resident Palestinian mothers. Jerusalem-born Palestinian children who were registered according to their father's status in the West Bank lost their natural right to legal status in the city. According to official Israeli sources, Jerusalem resident status was revoked from at least 5,000 Palestinians in the period 1968–1995 because they had failed to retain a valid reentry visa while staying abroad.

The period of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks (1991–2001) was characterized by a deterioration of Palestinian residency rights in Jerusalem. As Israel hoped to assert its claim for sovereignty over the entire city, unilateral Israeli activity intensified and policies were reshaped to strengthen this claim. Masses of Jewish settlers, for example, took over Palestinian homes and created Jewish enclaves in every Palestinian neighborhood.

A new permit system for entry into Israel was installed in 1991–1993 that, for the first time, restricted the physical access of West Bank Palestinians to Jerusalem. Stating that Jerusalem's status was slated for discussion in future FINAL STATUS TALKS, Israel did not apply the 1993 policy on family reunification, including its quota and criteria for eligibility, to Palestinian Jerusalemites. Occupied eastern Jerusalem also remained excluded from the interim agreements reached between Israel and the PLO. Unlike Palestinian residents of the rest of the Occupied Territories, whose right to reside in the territories was protected under the interim agreements, revocation of Palestinian residency rights in Jerusalem increased dramatically based on a 1995 reinterpretation of the 1952 CEIL and the 1974 Entry into Israel Regulations.

To claim Palestinian residency rights, the new policy required proof of a "center of life in Jerusalem" (that is, a person must have lived and worked in Jerusalem for the prior seven years) and papers documenting employment, study, and permanent domicile had to be submitted by Palestinian holders of Jerusalem identity cards in any interaction with the Interior Ministry. For the first time since 1967, failure to prove "center of life" resulted in the revocation of residency rights not only for Palestinians living abroad but also for those who had moved to the West Bank. Between 1995 and 1998, the Jerusalem resident status of some 2,000 Palestinians and their dependents was thus declared "expired," and affected families were left in a legal limbo. Palestinians responded by returning to the city in massive numbers. Israeli authorities decided the policy was counterproductive and subsequently scaled it down but never abolished it.

More recent official and unofficial proposals for dividing sovereignty over the city do not include the basic right to family unity of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Ideas raised at the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT between Israel and the PLO and by US president BILL CLINTON in 2000, as well as the so-called GENEVA ACCORD of 2003 treat Palestinians in Jerusalem as a population that can be separated and diminished by political compromise. In the absence of political compromise, thousands of Palestinians in Jerusalem are separated and displaced by Israel's illegal BARRIER wall, construction of which has largely been completed.

See also DEMOGRAPHY; DEMOGRAPHY AND FOREIGN NATIONALS; JERUSALEM

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—Ingrid Jaradat Gassner

Farsoun, Samih K. (1937–2005)

Samih Farsoun was a Palestinian intellectual, professor, and activist. Born in HAIFA, Palestine, he completed his secondary studies at Beirut's International College. He received a B.S. in Physics and Mathematics from Hamilton College in 1959 and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in sociology in 1971 from the University of Connecticut.

Farsoun spent most of his professional life at the American University in Washington, D.C., where he was a popular teacher, helped to found the Arab Studies Program, and shouldered numerous administrative responsibilities. Outside the university Farsoun made his mark as well. He was president of the Association of Arab-American University Graduates; a founding fellow of the Middle East Studies Association; and a founding member of both The Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development and its Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, as well as the Institute of Arab Studies. He was also a founder of MERIP (Middle East Report and Information Project) and an editor of its journal, *Merip Reports,* and a founder of the Trans-Arab Research Institute.

Farsoun played a leading role in establishing two universities in the Arab world: American University of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates, where he was the founding dean of the College of Arts and Sciences from 1997 to 1999, and American University of Kuwait in KUWAIT, where in 2004 he

was named founding dean of academic affairs and the College of Arts and Sciences.

Farsoun published six books and over seventy-five papers, book chapters, and articles about the sociology and politics of the Middle East, many of which have been translated into several languages. His *Palestine and the Palestinians* (1997), the most renowned of all his works, was a sociological history that focused on the political economy of the Palestinian people from the end of the nineteenth century until the present. His most recent book, *Culture and Customs of Palestine* (2004), was intended to introduce US high school students to the rich culture of the Palestinians.

—Naseer Aruri

Fatah

Fatah, or Fath (conquest or victory, the reverse acronym of Harakat al-Tahir al-Watani al-Filastini, a name used by early Muslim armies), is the largest Palestinian organization and the major political force within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Fatah was founded in the late 1950s (probably in 1959, although some accounts put the date as October 1957; in fact, the exact date is not certain). The first issue of its official publication, *Filastinuna* (Our Palestine), appeared in late 1959 and was widely and well received. Fatah filled a gap in Palestinian political culture at a time when many Palestinians yearned for a purely Palestinian national project and a Palestinian national agenda—as opposed to the pan-Arab nationalist movements of the time. Fatah's assertion of Palestinian nationalism was, at least initially, a polite protest against Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, who had monopolized the rhetoric about Palestine and any actions taken on behalf of the Palestinian cause in the Arab world.

Fatah was founded by Palestinian professionals who were residing in the Gulf States, many of them in KUWAIT, where YASIR ARAFAT and his comrades were located after their exile from Palestine in 1948. The early founders included SALAH KHALAF (Abu Iyad), KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), KHALID AL-HASAN (who did not join until 1959), YUSIF AL-MUHAMMAD NAJJAR (Abu Yusif), and KAMAL 'UDWAN. Arafat had been a student leader in Cairo after the Nakba (the 1948 Palestinian exodus) and later obtained a job as an engineer in Kuwait, where he and other colleagues, many of whom had known each other from their student days in EGYPT, organized the group. Some of the founders had modest military experience because of their participation in commando activities in GAZA sponsored by the Egyptian military going back to 1955. From its outset the movement bore the imprint of Arafat, who remained almost synonymous with Fatah even after his death.

The movement quickly founded branches in Egypt, LEBANON, JORDAN, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, Qatar, and the WEST BANK and GAZA. Membership requirements were not especially stringent, which in part explains the movement's inflation in size.

Ideology and Organization

Fatah never produced a clear ideology beyond the vague notion of liberating Palestine or Palestinian nationalism. In part this was due to Arafat's aversion to being pinned down politically, but the result was a hodge-podge of political thought, vague and changing purposes, and empty slogans—for example, "All Rifles against the Zionist Enemy." Fatah also waited until 1968 to formulate the "Principles and Goals of the Fath Movement," a document that is considered its constitution, which was ratified throughout subsequent years into the 1980s.

The political program of Fatah stressed three principles: (1) the liberation of Palestine (which at the time referred to the liberation of all of historic Palestine), (2) the pursuit of ARMED STRUGGLE as the method of liberation (a principle shared by all Palestinian political groups in the early years), and (3) independence from any regime—Arab or other. The last principle was quickly violated, however, as many of the founders of Fatah established close ties to different Arab regimes. But Arafat skillfully positioned the founders and their varying loyalties among different Arab regimes so that no one regime would have sole control.

The highest body of the organization is the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE; two-thirds of its members are elected by the General Congress. The second most powerful body is the FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, which comprises the commanders of forces, regions, and security services. Theoretically, the General Congress is the highest and most authoritative body of the movement and, according to the constitution, should convene once every four years; however, in practice neither has been fol-

lowed. The organization is also divided into various social sectors, including students, artists, writers, and women.

Fatah was represented in the first PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) in 1964, although not until 1968 (and officially 1969) did it come to dominate and shape the PLO. In 1969 Fatah officially headed the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, but other groups had seats on it as well. In that period Fatah, like other groups, opposed what were considered "defeatist solutions"—proposals for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict based on UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242—because the UN resolution does not mention self-determination or a Palestinian state. Indeed, Nasir's acceptance of the 1969 ROGERS PLAN opened a deep rift between the movement and the Egyptian regime, which led to the closure of the Palestinian radio station in Cairo.

The early period of Fatah (until 1968) was characterized by an extreme emphasis on secrecy; even pictures of the founders were not permitted to be publicized. Arafat was known to distribute leaflets and announcements of Fatah to Lebanese newspapers in Beirut, but the use of code names for members, such as "Abu X," was standard, although later many of the real names of the leaders were widely known, as were their faces.

Emergence of Armed Struggle

Operating underground, in the early years Fatah focused on organizing cells, military recruitment, and fund-raising, and it was successful in husbanding Palestinian resources scattered throughout the Arab world. Its moment of glory came in January 1965, when, under the name of AL-'ASIFA (a military offshoot of Fatah), Fatah claimed responsibility for a (foiled) attack on Israel's National Water Carrier. Arafat's personality was reflected in his announcement of the raid, which was both bombastic and bragging. This became characteristic of Fatah's claims of "armed struggle"—wild exaggerations and bold assertions not always based on reality. The date of the attack is celebrated by Fatah as the birth of the movement, and it is marked annually by Fatah supporters around the world.

This first operation began a new phase in the history of the movement, especially because it fulfilled a psychological need among the Palestinians: angry REFUGEES were disgusted with the exploitation of their cause by a variety of Arab regimes and wanted to take action themselves. Arafat quickly emerged as Fatah's leader and its official spokesperson, although he was not the autocratic leader that he later became, and new recruits flocked to the movement. Although Fatah's constitution provided for a collective leadership, eventually Arafat was able to outmaneuver and outsmart his rivals through a variety of means, some quite unsavory.

Fatah continued to grow, especially after the March 1968 AL-KARAMA conflict when the Jordanian army and a small band of Fatah guerrillas stood their ground in a battle with Israeli forces in the town in Jordan near the Israeli border. Although they were defeated, Arafat exploited their bravery for propaganda and recruitment purposes, and thousands of new members joined the movement. This came after the humiliating defeat of the Arab states by Israel in the 1967 WAR, when Palestinians and other Arabs were searching for an alternative model of liberation. In hindsight, however, some Fatah leaders, Abu Iyad and HANI AL-HASAN for example, realized that the influx of thousands of new recruits could open a security breach, allowing Israel and Arab regimes to place their operatives in key positions in the movement.

Jordanian Chapter

Karama also initiated the Fatah movement's Jordanian operation and simultaneously opened relations with several important states, including CHINA, Vietnam, and Algeria. These relations in turn inspired a new Arab version of guerrilla warfare—one that included political recognition and economic and military support to some extent. Later, Arafat expanded the movement's international ties and restored those with the Egyptian regime, which had been cool during Nasir's rule due to his monopoly of the rhetoric regarding the Palestinian cause in the Arab world, while he did nothing for the Palestinians, and his acceptance of the 1969 Rogers Plan based on UN Resolution 242, which ignored the Palestinian interests of self-determination and an independent Palestinian state. Later, Egypt had several things to offer the Palestinians, including introduction to the Soviets, and therefore relations warmed for a time. When Arafat was forced to leave Lebanon in 1982 (in the context of Israel's war in Lebanon), he went first to Egypt, where he was welcomed warmly by HOSNI MUBARAK.

Some members of the Fatah leadership established strong contacts with oil-rich Arab regimes,

especially Saudi Arabia, which provided significant financial resources to the movement. This financing (largely garnered through Hani Hasan and Khalid Hasan, who had an influential role within Fatah) led to a reduction in the revolutionary zeal of Fatah (at least among the political elite); served to empower Arafat, who used the money to buy support and punish rivals; and ultimately led to extensive corruption within the top echelons of the movement.

Within Jordan the Fatah movement, adhering to a long-standing policy, was not eager for a confrontation with the regime. Other groups within the PLO (mainly the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) pursued a policy of attempting to overthrow the monarchy, but Fatah counseled caution and accommodation. Nevertheless, the lack of discipline that characterized Fatah led to many excesses by PLO fighters, which together with rash actions by other groups (especially the PFLP) were used by the Jordanian regime to mobilize public opinion and its BEDOUIN army against the Palestinian military presence. The Jordanian regime was not acting independently however; its 1970–1971 suppression of the PLO (BLACK SEPTEMBER) reflected interests that stretched from Amman to Damascus, Cairo, Tel Aviv, and all the way to the UNITED STATES.

The Jordanian war against the PLO left a deep mark on the Palestinian national movement. Palestinian fighters fled Jordan in disbelief, resentment, and anger, although some left with the desire to engage in self-criticism over their behavior in Jordan. Shortly thereafter, ABU IYAD, with Arafat's blessing, founded the ultrasecretive BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION (BSO), which was intended to be a clandestine military arm of Fatah that would take revenge on the enemies of the Palestinians, especially the accomplices of the Jordanian regime in Black September. Although there were operational commanders, Abu Iyad was the ultimate authority; he designed, planned, and recruited the fighters for various missions. The BSO was founded at a time when Palestinians in the refugee camps were demanding action. Not only had Jordan expelled the PLO, but Israeli forces were consolidating their OCCUPATION of the West Bank and Gaza and regularly bombing the refugee camps in Lebanon. But the deadly results (not necessarily intended) of the 1973 attack on the US embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, began to increase the pressures on the movement to cease the activities of the BSO. Officially and publicly Fatah denied any link to BSO.

Lebanese Experience

After the Jordanian debacle, Fatah and the other Palestinian factions relocated to Lebanon. There the movement continued to grow, and Arafat built the infrastructure for statehood, although he did not seek to establish an alternative regime in Lebanon, as claimed by the leaders of the right-wing Lebanese militias. But Fatah was incoherent ideologically and fragmented organizationally into different sections or camps (called *dakakin,* or shops), and each had its own head and a different patron among the Arab regimes (or even outside the Arab world). FAROUQ AL-QADDUMI's faction of Fatah was close to the Syrian regime; the right-wing faction, led by Khalid Hasan, was close to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; 'ALI HASAN SALAMAH was close to the United States; and the Islamist faction, led by ABU JIHAD, was close to the Algerian regime, at least in the beginning. ABU NIDAL was linked to the IRAQI regime before he split from the PLO and formed his separate organization, known as FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

During the time in Lebanon, Arafat began to gradually introduce the idea of accepting a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict—the TWO-STATE SOLUTION, which was a departure from the Palestinian movement's original commitment to liberate Palestine, followed by the idea of a secular democratic state in Palestine. This transformation had its roots in the 1974 PNC meeting when Arafat first put the idea before his colleagues, having already begun raising it in Fatah's fora and councils, although the Fatah movement relied first on the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE to argue for and publicly theorize the concept of both Israeli and Palestinian states.

The Lebanese Civil War sapped the energy and resources of the PLO, but it also allowed for the creation of a massive infrastructure, both civilian and military. Hospitals, clinics, factories, farms, syndicates, newspapers, publishing houses, and military barracks and bases were all part of the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon. This required the continued influx of massive funding, and the oil-rich Arab Gulf regimes were willing to fund Fatah in return for political support from Arafat, the PLO's acceptance of the two-state solution, and the protection of those regimes from radical Palestinian factions.

Unlike other PLO organizations, Fatah genuinely tried to avoid being embroiled in the Lebanese Civil War, but certain factions within Fatah (NIMR SALIH, or Abu Saleh, and Abu Iyad, in particular) thought otherwise and armed certain groups in Lebanon to help bring about the defeat of the right-wing militias. To protect the right-wing militias from ultimate defeat, the Syrian army intervened in 1976. That chapter in Syrian-PLO relations marked a turning point; relations between Syrian president Hafez Al-Asad and Yasir Arafat soured and never recovered, because Syria, a traditional supporter of the PLO, entered Lebanon and defeated the PLO and its Lebanese allies. Syria felt this was necessary to avoid Israeli participation in the conflict, which it believed was inevitable if the PLO and its allies defeated the Lebanese rightists. The Syrian regime, however, later made an accommodation with others in the PLO.

Fatah's role continued to grow in Lebanon and elsewhere. Thanks to oil money, Arafat and his comrades turned Fatah into the largest and most influential Palestinian organization in the national movement. Despite infighting and factional struggles within Fatah, Arafat was able to rein in his rivals and to maintain full control of the organization.

Fatah after Lebanon

Fatah's role in Lebanon came to an end in 1982 after the Israeli invasion, when PLO fighters were forced to evacuate the country. The PLO and Fatah relocated to Tunisia, but the base was not the same, the money supply dwindled, and a 1983–1984 split within Fatah threatened the unity of the entire movement. In 1983, in protest against the mismanagement of Lebanon's defense during the Israeli invasion, some important political and military leaders within Fatah (primarily Abu Salih, Abu Khalid Al-'Amlah, and SA'ID MUSA MURAGHA, or Abu Musa) split from the movement and established their own organization, FATAH UPRISING. Their movement received direct Syrian support and declared war on Arafat's leadership. Syrian-sponsored Palestinian groups fought Arafat and his supporters in the refugee camps of Nahr al-Bared and Bedawi and in Tripoli. In 1985, Syria also triggered the CAMPS' WAR, which was intended to suppress Arafat's supporters in the Lebanon camps. The campaign ended in a stalemate, and the Syrian regime was never able to establish its own favorite Palestinian organizations as alternatives to Arafat within the PLO.

Fatah was dealt a severe blow in 1988 when Abu Jihad was assassinated by an Israeli team in Tunisia; and in 1991, Abu Iyad and Abu Al-Hawl were assassinated by agents of Abu Nidal, although there were accusations that they were working on behalf of Israeli intelligence. Moreover, the movement lost much of its financial support in 1990 when it sided with Iraqi president Saddam Husayn during the GULF WAR against Kuwait, alienating Gulf governments. For the rest of his life Arafat attempted to make amends with the Saudi government, but it never again trusted him. This was the context in which Arafat signed the OSLO ACCORDS and moved to Palestine, after which the nature of Fatah changed.

The old leaders were either killed, had died naturally, or stayed behind. Farouq al-Qaddumi (one of the few surviving leaders in Fatah and technically the most senior Fatah leader after the death of Arafat) did not support Oslo and remained in Tunisia. Arafat selected the new leaders of Fatah, some of whom had ties to other governments and had developed ambitions of their own. The new leaders of Fatah included MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen), who was one of the founding members of Fatah; MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI, a West Bank politician; and MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, a Gazan political activist from the First INTIFADA. The 11 November 2004 death of Arafat put the movement in the hands of this new leadership, and Fatah became a close ally of the United States, which favored the new Fatah leaders in the Palestinian ELECTIONS. However, the corruption, cronyism, and nepotism that had marred the history of Fatah produced stunning election results, bringing the Islamist HAMAS to power.

By 2008, Fatah was a fractured amalgam of coalitions and personal networks without a clear head or a transparent decisionmaking process. The Fatah General Congress—the supreme body within the movement empowered to select the two governing party organs, the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council—had not met since 1989. As a result, the most powerful elements of the formal party apparatus remained the preserve of those who, prior to the formation of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in 1994, directed the PLO from exile in Tunis. During the long tenure of Yasir Arafat as head of Fatah, chairman of the PLO, and president of the PNA, the party's various committees and councils, with no real authority, were reduced to instruments of

personal gain. Arafat again and again put off convening the Congress in the name of national unity, despite vociferous demands from the Fatah Higher Movement Committee, led by the veterans of the 1987–1991 Intifada, as well as other groups.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Fatah Central Committee

The Fatah Central Committee is the most powerful body within the institutional structure of FATAH. Despite this de facto status, since its founding toward the end of the 1950s, Fatah has stressed the collective nature, or "democratic centralism," of its leadership. Consistent with this principle, Article 63.d of the Organic Law stipulates that "all the members of the Central Committee (CC) are equal in rights, duties and responsibilities." Thus, while the CC has a secretary and two deputy secretaries "chosen from among its members" (Article 64), there is no legal provision for a president, though Article 63.e indicates that "the commander-in-chief presides over the Central Committee meetings and leads its sessions." Additionally, according to its statutes the Fatah Central Committee is no more than the executive instrument of the General Congress, which in principle is the supreme authority of the movement, made up of members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council (RC), regional congresses, military forces, mass organizations, and so on. Between sessions of the Congress, which counted 1,200 members when it was convened in 1998, the "supreme authority" is the 120-member RC.

Over time, however, the Fatah CC succeeded in monopolizing almost all the organization's powers—indeed, the General Congress, which is supposed to meet every four years, has not met since 1989. The CC has three categories of members. According to Article 63 of the statutes, eighteen members are directly elected by secret ballot by the General Congress while three others are named by these eighteen elected members by a two-thirds majority. The RC has the right to nominate an unspecified number of other members to represent the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Article 65 requires that candidates for Fatah CC have been members of the movement "for at least fifteen consecutive years and to have served as secretary of a regional committee or an equivalent function in the various departments and forces."

YASIR ARAFAT, often billed as the head of Fatah, legally had exactly the same status as all the other members of Fatah's Central Committee, which according to Article 67 of the Organic Law is "collectively in charge of all the movement's activities." In practice, however, in his capacity as commander of Fatah's armed forces AL-'ASIFA, Arafat could and did claim primacy among his

peers. Nonetheless, the title no longer has much meaning since al-'Asifa was dissolved in March 1990 within FORCE 17 (the Presidential Guard) recruited from the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY. Arafat indeed dominated the CC, but it is unlikely that MAHMUD ABBAS or any other Palestinian official will ever wield as much power.

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Fatah Hawks

Fatah Hawks is the name of two Palestinian militant groups, one a popular movement of Palestinian youth in the WEST BANK and GAZA in the 1980s, the other an unofficial group of FATAH fighters, loosely tied to the parent Palestinian organization that has carried out attacks against Israeli military personnel in the Gaza Strip during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA.

During the First INTIFADA that started in 1987, the Hawks were led by young Palestinians in the large cities of NABLUS, Tulkarm, Ramallah, and BETHLEHEM in the West Bank, and Gaza City and Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip. Most of their attacks were carried out using improvised weapons: stone-throwing, stabbing attacks, and occasionally the use of stolen firearms. The amount of weaponry they received from PLO sources outside of Israel was negligible, and most of their successes, such as they were, were in the use of stabbing attacks or roadside ambushes of Israeli soldiers in the occupied Palestinian territory.

In 1995 YASIR ARAFAT dissolved the Fatah Hawks, but they reemerged with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada by claiming joint responsibility with HAMAS for an attack on the RAFAH CROSSING, the Israeli military-controlled Egyptian border with Gaza, which resulted in five Israeli soldiers being killed and ten others wounded.

Following the death of Yasir Arafat on 11 November 2004, the Fatah Hawks suffered like many other Fatah-based militant groups from increasing Palestinian apathy as the corrupt and old-style Fatah lost public confidence in favor of Hamas.

The number of attacks has decreased. The Fatah Hawks' last activity was in 2005, when Fatah Hawk gunmen blockaded a Palestinian road and prevented PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) officials from passing in protest of not being included in the PNA security system.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES

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Fatah Revolutionary Council/Black June

The Fatah Revolutionary Council (Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyaho, or Fatah-RC) is a Palestinian organization better known as the Abu Nidal Organization, headed by SABRI AL-BANNA (Abu Nidal) and founded in 1974 as a consequence of Abu Nidal's split from FATAH and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). The organization was originally known as Black June, a reference to its disapproval of the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 on the side of the rightist Christians. When the organization was at its apogee, it had offices in SYRIA, Yemen, IRAN, Sudan, and LEBANON. It was one of the wealthiest Palestinian groups, with income from patron states, assassinations for hire, extortion, and its own network of businesses and front organizations. In its time

Fatah-RC was considered the most dangerous, active, and murderous Palestinian organization. From the beginning of the 1980s, it attacked Jewish, Israeli, Arab, and Western targets. It carried out terrorist operations all over the world, including throughout the Middle East, Asia, South America, and Europe. Its assassinations of Palestinian leaders whom it considered too moderate were legion.

Abu Nidal's break with Fatah and the PLO was the result of his opposition to their political direction (i.e., the TWO-STATE SOLUTION) and their advocacy of negotiations with Israel, promoted by PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT. IRAQ's support of and influence on the Fatah-RC led Abu Nidal to carry out terrorist operations that served Iraqi interests. Since its founding the organization has considered itself the real Fatah, accusing the leaders of the mainstream Fatah organization of betrayal. In response Arafat and Fatah tried and convicted Abu Nidal in absentia for treason.

The Fatah-RC has also been known as the Arab Revolutionary Council and has often claimed credit for its actions under the names of the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims (when taking responsibility for attacks on British targets), and Black September (when claiming credit for attacks on Jordanian targets).

At its peak Fatah-RC had about 400 members, plus a few dozen militiamen in the Palestinian REFUGEE camps in Lebanon. The organization claimed that the ARMED STRUGGLE against Israel was a sacred endeavor and the only way to liberate all of Palestine, and that because Fatah and its leaders had betrayed this struggle and the Palestine Charter, they had to be punished. It argued that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian TERRORISM was necessary to precipitate an all-embracing Arab revolution that alone could lead to the liberation of Palestine. Fatah-RC is believed to have carried out attacks in twenty countries, killing or injuring some 900 people.

During 1974–1980 the organization's headquarters were in Baghdad, and its activity was mainly directed by the Iraqis, who gave Abu Nidal substantial logistical assistance. This period was characterized by terrorist attacks mainly against Syrian and Fatah/PLO targets. At the beginning of the 1980s, disagreements between the Iraqis and Abu Nidal over Fatah-RC's independence and Iraq's interest in improving relations with the West during the war with Iran led Baghdad to expel Abu Nidal and his men. After Fatah-RC moved to Syria, the UNITED STATES pressured Syria to constrain the organization, and it moved its training and operational bases to the Sidon area in Lebanon. Still later the headquarters were moved to Libya and remained there.

The year 1987 marked a significant change from Fatah-RC's previously clandestine and secretive nature. The organization opened its ranks to new and young militants, formed a kind of militia, and even initiated social and political activity in the Palestinian refugee camps in South Lebanon. However, the new modus operandi and exposure to the refugees brought a serious split in the organization. By 1987 Abu Nidal had turned his terror tactics inward, against the Fatah-RC itself. After failing in his attempt to co-opt the refugees, he turned on them as well. In November 1989 two of the group's main leaders—Atef Abu Baker, a member of the Central Committee, and Abdel Rahman Issa, a member of the Political Bureau—defected, accusing Abu Nidal of murdering 150 militants because he feared internal subversion. Abu Nidal then made a brief attempt to reconcile with Fatah and Arafat but was rejected. These setbacks, plus the arrest of most of his militants in South America while they were pursuing Jewish targets there and the failure of several operations (e.g., the attack on the ship *City of Poros* in Greece), left Abu Nidal more isolated than ever. By the mid-1990s the Fatah-RC had ceased almost all terrorist operations and generally ceased to exist.

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Fatah Uprising, 1983

The Fatah Uprising, also referred to as the Fatah Dissidents or the Fatah Provisional Command, was a group of rebels who in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of LEBANON catalyzed a civil war within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). On 9 May 1983, FATAH colonel SA'ID MUSA MURAGHA (Abu Musa) claimed that YASIR ARAFAT's corruption and cronyism had prevented an effective Palestinian response during the LEBANON WAR and called upon all Fatah units in

Lebanon's Beka'a Valley to disregard future orders from the Fatah leadership. At first the Fatah Central Committee underestimated the disobedience, but when some 2,000 of the 10,000 guerrillas remaining in Lebanon joined the rebellion, it became apparent that the mutiny was gaining strength. The Central Committee attempted to undermine the rebellion by cutting funds and logistical support to the units involved; however, pro-Syrian factions of SA'IQA, the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY, and even Syrian army units backed Abu Musa's forces in what formally became the NATIONAL ALLIANCE. As such it had money, arms, and political support.

On 25 May the rebels seized Fatah supply depots in the Beka'a and on 28 May in Damascus. In late June, fighting erupted in the Beka'a between rebel units and forces loyal to Fatah and Arafat, with the rebels taking control of the town of Majdal Anjar and hence the Beirut-Damascus highway from Shtura to the frontier. Following the failure of Palestinian and Arab states' mediation efforts, loyal Fatah units were gradually forced out of their positions in the Beka'a northward to the Nahr al-Barid and Baddawi refugee camps near Tripoli, Lebanon. In late September Arafat himself returned to Tripoli to face his opponents. In October, fighting erupted around the two northern refugee camps. On 3 November the rebels (backed by Syrian and some Libyan forces) launched a major offensive against Arafat, capturing Nahr al-Barid on 6 November. After a brief lull in the fighting, a second rebel offensive captured Baddawi on 16 November. Loyalist forces retreated to Tripoli (Lebanon), where rebel forces bombarded their positions and threatened to storm the city.

The military pressures on Arafat were combined with Lebanese demands that he leave Tripoli. The only support for the beleaguered PLO leader came from a local Sunni fundamentalist leader, Sa'id Sha'ban, and his Islamic Unification Movement militia. Following a SAUDI ARABIAN–mediated cease-fire agreement on 25 November 1983 (barely a year after the PLO's Israeli-driven exodus from Beirut in 1982), Arafat and some 4,000 loyalists evacuated the city by sea to North Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia on Greek ships under the UNITED NATIONS flag with a naval escort provided by FRANCE. Because it was a breakaway element of Fatah, neither Abu Musa nor members of his group have attended any PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) meetings and thus remain conspicuously outside the PLO umbrella. The group is headquartered in Damascus, SYRIA, with operation sites in the Beka'a Valley. They receded from the forefront after the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS.

See also LEBANON WAR

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Fatherland Front

See HAZIT HAMOLEDETH

Faysal-Weizmann Agreement, 1919

See WEIZMANN-FAYSAL AGREEMENT

Fez Peace Initiative, 1982

The Fez Peace Initiative, which was based on the 1981 FAHD PLAN, was presented and ratified at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference of the ARAB LEAGUE, held in Fez, Morocco, in September 1982. Meeting shortly after Washington proposed the REAGAN PLAN, Arab leaders and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) debated the US plan, which did not include provisions for an independent Palestinian state but rather a federation with JORDAN, and then endorsed the Fez plan. The Fez Initiative declared that all states in the Middle East, including an independent Palestinian state, had a right to a peaceful existence. In that statement the plan implicitly recognized Israel and left to the UN Security Council the task of guaranteeing the security of states in the region. Based on UN RESOLUTIONS 181 and 242, the Fez plan called for Israeli withdrawal from the LANDS it had occupied in the 1967 WAR and recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Pro-Western king Hassan of Morocco,

who was host of the summit, predicted the "normalization of relations and diplomatic ties" between Arab states and Israel following implementation of the plan.

Initially, there was some optimism in Washington. Vice-President GEORGE H. W. BUSH said the Fez resolution meant implicit Arab recognition of Israel, and Secretary of State GEORGE SHULTZ thought the Fez summit could be a "genuine breakthrough" and added: "There might be an implied recognition of Israel. I hope that is so." This optimism lessened, however, after Israel expanded its incursion into LEBANON in mid-September 1982. Moreover, Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR rejected the plan, terming it "a renewed declaration of war on Israel . . . another plan for the liquidation of Israel in one stage or two." The Fez plan "has no weight, no value . . . and contains the same hate, the same war against peace, the same coldness" as all previous Arab plans, he said.

See also ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC

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FIDA

See PALESTINIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION

Field of Thorns Plan

Field of Thorns was the name given to the overall military strategy that Israel used against the Palestinians during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which began on 29 September 2000. By 15 October 2000 the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) had instituted an operations plan to topple YASIR ARAFAT and the interim PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Field of Thorns was prepared by the top officials in the Israeli security services during the 1990s, updated in early 2000, and openly discussed by Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK and senior government officials long before 29 September. Among other things, the Field of Thorns Plan stated: "Arafat, the person, is a severe threat to the security of the State [Israel] and the damage that will result from his disappearance is less than the damage caused by his existence."

The details of Field of Thorns were published in the framework of a report written by Anthony H. Cordesman, Middle East strategic expert at the influential Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, an institute with strong affiliations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. The tactics prepared in the Field of Thorns Plan and used by Israel during the Intifada and later included:

- Massive use of IDF troops at points of friction, that is, locations where Palestinians demonstrated or from which militants carried out attacks.
- Use of other units of the IDF to secure Jewish SETTLEMENTS, key ROADS, and terrain points.
- Use of helicopter gunships and snipers to provide mobility and suppressive fire.
- Use of extensive small arms, artillery, and tank fire to suppress sniping, stone-throwing, and demonstrations.
- Bombing, artillery, and helicopter strikes on high-value Palestinian targets, and punishing Palestinian elements for attacks.
- Search-and-seizure interventions and raids into Palestinian areas in GAZA and the WEST BANK to break up organized resistance and capture or kill key leaders.
- Selective destruction of high-value Palestinian facilities and clearing of strong points and fields of fire near Palestinian urban areas.
- Mobilization and deployment of armored and other land forces in the face of a massive Palestinian uprising.
- Use of armor and artillery to isolate major Palestinian population areas and to seal off Palestinian areas, including many parts of AREA A.
- A simultaneous economic blockade of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES with selective cutoffs of financial transactions, labor movements, and food/fuel shipments.
- Israeli control of WATER, power, communications, and road access to limit the size and length of Palestinian action.
- Regulation and control of MEDIA and a major information campaign to influence local and world opinion.
- Use of military forces trained in urban warfare to penetrate into cities if necessary, especially where there are Jewish enclaves such as HEBRON.

- Temporary withdrawals of Israeli SETTLERS from exposed and low-value isolated settlements such as Hebron.
- Arrest of PNA officials and imposition of a new military administration.
- Forced evacuations of Palestinians from "sensitive areas."

According to Cordesman, further escalation by Palestinians would be followed by TRANSFER of Palestinians from "sensitive areas," and the "arrest [of] Palestinian National Authority officials and imposition of a new military administration." Cordesman foresaw that the ensuing house-to-house battles would kill thousands of Palestinians, both armed and civilian. "The IDF must calculate in the framework of this operation," he wrote, "the death of hundreds of Israeli soldiers and with thousands more wounded on both sides." The only chance to avert this danger, his report avers, is if the PNA would suppress any violence ruthlessly and effectively, with no exaggerated amount of respect for human rights.

From the start of the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, the IDF planned for the possibility that it would reoccupy the territories that were yet to be transferred to PNA authority. In 1996 the IDF developed and tested Field of Thorns tactics through simulations and rehearsals. During the July 2000 negotiations at CAMP DAVID, the IDF changed its training plans from a policing security operation to a full-scale military mission in which all units were to receive special combat and anti-riot training. According to the simulations and rehearsals of the IDF, reoccupying Palestinian areas would take between a few days and twenty-four days, depending on the tactics Israel used. *Jane's Intelligence Review* wrote that from the Israeli point of view, "The military cost of reoccupation is directly proportionate to the degree the Israelis restrain their fire: the greater the restraint, the higher the IDF casualty list. Reoccupation could ultimately cost 200–2,000 Israeli military fatalities." In this scenario there was no estimate of Palestinian casualties.

B'TSELEM (Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) described Israeli military operations in the first two months of the al-Aqsa Intifada (between 29 September and 2 December 2000) that indicate the IDF implemented the Field of Thorns Plan. "Israeli security forces killed 204 Palestinian civilians and 24 Palestinian security forces, and wounded approximately 10,000 Palestinians. . . . Most of those killed or wounded in recent weeks were unarmed. These casualties were a direct result of Israel's policy on dispersing demonstrations by unarmed Palestinians. . . . Israel's policy is directed in large part against the Palestinian civilian population." Furthermore, B'Tselem stated: "IDF soldiers respond with tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, live ammunition, and tank and helicopter gunfire." Other tactics included "bulldozing homes, neighborhoods, fields of crops, fruit-bearing trees, imposition of a total CLOSURE on the Occupied Territories, closure on certain villages in the Occupied Territories, and in some instances also a CURFEW."

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; INTIFADAS; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION RAINBOW

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The Fifth Mother

The Fifth Mother is an Israeli peace organization that was founded in March 2002 by women from the FOUR MOTHERS MOVEMENT, which was instrumental in ending the Israeli occupation of LEBANON, along with other women who share the view that "War Is Not My Language." The Fifth Mother believes conflicts should be solved with words, not bullets, and uses the voices of women to provide an alternative to the militant language that characterizes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The movement calls for involving experts such as conflict resolution mediators to help solve impasses in negotiations between the two parties.

The Fifth Mother tries to affect public discourse and public opinion at many levels. They participate in public events to convey their views and create dialogue to counteract the widespread sense of desperation and loss of faith in a solution. Members engage in an ongoing effort to respond to militant and militaristic terminology in the MEDIA, promoting alternatives until they become an integral part of the discourse. They also build relationships with academic institutions that deal with conflict resolution and mediation, applying their expertise to the public debate. (http://coalitionofwomen.org/home/english/organizations/the_fifth_mother).

Final Status Talks

The 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), the first in a series of agreements between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in the OSLO PROCESS, envisioned that the last stage in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians would be the final status talks, when all of the most important issues in the conflict would be discussed and resolved. The official concept behind the two-stage peace process was that the experiences of peacemaking would build trust and confidence between Israelis and Palestinians, so the two parties could make the compromises necessary to resolve the weightiest matters by the time of final status talks. The remaining issues, according to the DOP, were "JERUSALEM, REFUGEES, SETTLEMENTS, security arrangements, BORDERS, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."

The DOP outlined a transitional period between the two stages that was not to exceed five years, with final status negotiations starting not later than the beginning of the third year (1996) of the interim period. However, final status talks did not begin until 6 May 1996 and were quickly adjourned, despite the fact that the DOP timetable called for them to be concluded by 4 May 1999. The ostensible reason was the election of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU as Israeli prime minister and the ascension to power of the LIKUD coalition, which opposed the Oslo peace process from the outset.

However, the separation of the peace process into two distinct phases—interim and final status—put the Palestinians at a serious disadvantage, because they had to negotiate without a clear idea concerning the future. In the end the separation permitted Israel to determine unilaterally the nature of the final outcome. In practice, separating the two stages allowed Israel to prolong indefinitely the start of final status talks in what some have termed a policy of "the permanence of temporary arrangements." In the intervening time Israel continued to build settlements, settler bypass ROADS, and military installations, while the DOP gave the Palestinians no means to prevent Israeli expansion throughout the WEST BANK and East JERUSALEM.

Israel's failure to begin final status discussions led YASIR ARAFAT, then president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, to threaten several times to declare unilaterally an independent Palestinian state on 4 May 1999 (the scheduled date for completion of final status negotiations). Israel's position was that a Palestinian state could only come into being as the result of negotiations and threatened to annex all the territories if Arafat acted unilaterally. The UNITED STATES also put enormous pressure on Arafat not to take such a

step. According to Israel and the United States, all final status issues could be resolved at a summit convened by President BILL CLINTON at CAMP DAVID in July 2000, even though most interim agreements, especially Israeli redeployments, remained unfulfilled. Negotiations at Camp David were unsuccessful and the peace process fell apart with the onset of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000 despite another initiative by Clinton in January 2001 known as the CLINTON PARAMETERS.

By 2002, however, Israel was taking major unilateral steps of its own. In addition to the expansion of settlements and road construction, in the summer of 2002, Israel began construction of the BARRIER or separation wall, and in August 2005 it unilaterally withdrew from Gaza. In 2006, Prime Minister EHUD OLMERT declared that Israel would unilaterally determine its final borders in the West Bank within four years and that the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY would be annexed. As of 2008 there have been no final status talks.

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First Arab Congress, 1913

The First Arab Congress, held in Paris in June 1913, was organized by the Committee of Reform (based in Beirut) and al-Fatat, an underground Arab nationalist organization. The congress demanded that the OTTOMAN EMPIRE provide for the autonomy of the Arab provinces ruled by the Turks, Arab participation in the Ottoman central government, and the recognition of Arabic as an official language of the empire along with Turkish. Palestinians supported these demands but criticized the congress for failing to note the threat posed to Palestinian Arabs by ZIONISM. Only a few months earlier, a large land sale to Zionists had prompted the Palestinian newspaper *Filastin* to write: "If this state of affairs continues . . . then the Zionists will gain mastery over our country, village by village, town by town; tomorrow the whole of JERUSALEM will be sold and then Palestine in its entirety." Although the congress did not deal with specific Palestinian issues, it nevertheless marked a turning point in the Arab nationalist struggle, which in its aftermath refined its goals for the independence of the Arab world in a sovereign, unified state.

See also HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE

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First Zionist Congress

See BASEL PROGRAM; WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESSES

Fishing, Gaza Strip

There are approximately 2,500 fishermen in the GAZA STRIP, plus an additional 1,200 Palestinians who have jobs related to fishing, such as the manufacturing and maintenance of boats, the preparation of ice blocks for fish storage, and fish skinning and selling. Thus, approximately 4,000 persons with an average of eight members per family, or 32,000 Palestinians, depend upon the fishing industry for their survival. The majority of these families live in the al-Shati refugee camp, in the Deir al-Balah region, and the al-Mawasi region along the Mediterranean.

Before the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, Palestinian fishermen were allowed to fish twenty miles from shore. In 1994, Israel reduced the area in which they could fish to twelve miles. Article 11 of the 1994 GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT gave Israel the right to determine which areas off the Gaza coast were open to fishing and how far out Palestinian fishermen could go. Two years later Israel reduced the fishing limit to six miles and since the begin-

ning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, fishermen have been arrested and sent to jail after having gone no farther than three miles.

Up to six miles offshore the waters have long been depleted, and sardines, tuna, and Sultan Ibrahim fish are found only much farther out in deeper water. Thus what Palestinians can catch in the restricted zone does not produce enough income for the fishermen to feed themselves or pay for fuel. In effect Israel's policies have caused the demise of the Gazan fishing industry and in the process have contributed to the impoverishment of thousands.

In addition to the foregoing measures, Israeli naval ships and personnel fire at Palestinian boats, chase and arrest fishermen, damage fishing equipment, block and sink Palestinian boats, and impose high fines on the fishermen for the slightest infraction.

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Flag, Palestinian

The Palestinian flag is the preeminent symbol of Palestinian nationalism. As such, in 1967 the flag was banned by Israel. A 1980 law forbade artwork of "political significance" and banned art composed of the flag's four colors. Israel went to extraordinary lengths to suppress the illegal flag, and everything that contained the forbidden colors—paintings (even of pastoral scenes), clothing, embroidery, anything—was confiscated and the persons responsible for producing or displaying such items were fined and arrested. Since the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS in 1993, the ban has been relaxed, although it is still occasionally enforced. Israel now is more concerned about the HAMAS Islamic flag, which it has prohibited.

The Palestinian flag is constituted of three equal horizontal stripes (black, white, and green from top to bottom) overlaid by a red isosceles triangle issuing from the hoist and reaching one-third of the way to the fly. Sharif Husayn of Mecca designed the current flag in June 1916 as the flag of the Arab Revolt against the OTTOMAN EMPIRE. In 1917, the Arab people raised it as the flag of the Arab Nationalist Movement. In 1947, the Arab BA'ATH Party interpreted the flag as a symbol of the liberation and unity of the Arab nation. The Palestinians readopted it at the Palestine Conference (ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT) in Gaza in 1948. Subsequently, the flag was recognized by the ARAB LEAGUE as the flag of the Palestinian people. In 1964, it was further endorsed by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION during the first meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL in JERUSALEM.

After 1967 and Israel's OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories of the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, and East JERUSALEM, succeeding military governors undertook systematic policies to eliminate all manifestations of Palestinian nationalism or national identity. This campaign involved every aspect of Palestinians' lives—education, journalism, literature and poetry, painting, folklore, and symbolic representations of Palestinian national identity.

In the whole sphere of cultural life, the Israeli authorities actively pursued a policy of stifling the concept of a Palestinian nation as a part of its general war against Palestinian self-determination. What they objected to was the idea of Palestine, and therefore any form of expression of the concept was forbidden. The campaign against the flag's colors became so extreme that if a man's shirt or the embroidery on a woman's dress contained the four colors, the person was fined and often detained.

After 1993, actions against the flag and against Palestinian nationalism in general significantly diminished because the Oslo Accords in effect denationalized Palestinian autonomy. The flag, its colors, or other previously potent symbols were no longer perceived as a threat. Instead,

Israel focused on any symbolic or actual opposition to the Oslo Process.

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Flapan, Simha (1911–1987)

Simha Flapan was the first of the Israeli NEW HISTORIANS, a body of scholars who subject traditional Israeli historiography to revisionist critiques. He is best known for his book *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities,* published in the year of his death. The book is considered crucial in demythologizing the story of the founding of the modern state of Israel. Flapan was national secretary of the MAPAM party and the director of its Arab Affairs Department. He was a founder and longtime editor of the leftist *New Outlook* magazine.

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Force 17

Force 17 was formed in the early 1970s as a personal security guard for YASIR ARAFAT and other leaders of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). It was initially based in Beirut at 17 Faqahani Street, which may account for its name. Another explanation is that the name refers to the seventeen Palestinians killed in the battle of AL-KARAMA in JORDAN in 1968.

During the early 1980s, Force 17 expanded its mandate to include attacks on Israelis. In 1985 it claimed responsibility for killing three Israelis in Cyprus, but according to the US Department of State, it has since not engaged in any operations outside Israel and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

When the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY was established in 1994, Force 17 officially ceased to exist and was merged into the Presidential Security Force (al-Amn al-Ri'asah) under the command of Faisal Abu Sharah. During that time it was responsible for protecting Arafat and other prominent Palestinians as well as important installations. Other functions include intelligence and counterterrorism, mainly against opposition activists and suspected COLLABORATORS with Israel.

According to the Israeli army, activists within Force 17 have carried out numerous anti-Israeli attacks since the start of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000. Israel alleged that a senior officer in Force 17, Masoud Ayad, was involved in mortar attacks against army positions and Israeli settlements and ASSASSINATED him in 2001 in GAZA. On 4 December 2001, Israel added Force 17, along with the Tanzim, to its list of TERRORIST entities.

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Ford, Gerald Rudolph (1913–2007)

Gerald R. Ford was thirty-eighth president of the UNITED STATES. He was appointed the vice president for President RICHARD NIXON after the resignation of Spiro Agnew, and assumed the presidency on 9 August 1974 after Nixon resigned in disgrace. Ford served until 1977, when he lost his bid for a second term. He began his political career when he was elected to Congress in 1948 for the first of thirteen terms in the House of Representatives. From 1965 to 1973 he was House minority leader.

As president, Ford retained Nixon's secretary of state, HENRY KISSINGER, who was at the time

engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" between EGYPT and Israel in an attempt to bring about a second disengagement of Israeli forces from the Sinai. This diplomacy took place in the aftermath of the 1973 War, when the United States was suffering the effects of an oil embargo and a subsequent dramatic increase in the price of oil. During the conflict the United States and the SOVIET UNION had come close to nuclear war, and the United States had provided a vast resupply of armaments to Israel. Washington was thus anxious to reduce tensions in the Middle East and was frustrated with Israel's intransigence in the US-conducted negotiations between the Jewish state and Egypt.

On 10 August, one day after taking office, President Ford publicly assured Israel that the United States would honor all its commitments. Desiring more reassurances, Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN visited Washington in early September 1974 to consult with the new president and senior administration officials. In March 1975, exasperated by Israel's unwillingness to make any progress in the Sinai negotiations, Ford delivered a speech calling for a "reassessment" of US policy toward Israel. The purpose behind this major presidential address was to spell out US fundamental national interests in the Middle East and to imply that those interests required Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. Additionally, on the advice of Kissinger, Ford conspicuously delayed the delivery of weapons to Israel, including promised F-15 fighter planes, and suspended negotiations for pending financial and military aid. On 21 March Ford sent Rabin a tough message, warning that the failure of Kissinger's mission would have far-reaching consequences for the region and for US-Israel relations.

Within White House circles a consensus for a peace plan was emerging, one similar to UN RESOLUTION 242 and the ROGERS PLAN, which required Israel to return to its pre-1967 borders in return for security guarantees. Nothing, however, came of the president's efforts, because Israeli leaders and domestic pro-Israel groups launched a campaign to defeat the plan. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee immediately drafted a letter, signed by seventy-six senators, that called for the president to support Israel and be receptive to its needs. Several other pro-Israel organizations, including the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, waged intense campaigns of their own, and within six weeks the president had to reassess his own initiative.

In June 1975 Rabin came to Washington a second time to hold talks with President Ford. Shortly thereafter Ford signed several pieces of legislation desired by Israel, including the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which tied US trade with the Soviet Union to freedom of emigration for SOVIET JEWS. Not only did Kissinger and Ford reinstate the military and economic assistance to Israel that they had placed on hold, but they increased both significantly. On 1 September 1975 President Ford announced that the United States would support Israel's stand that a comprehensive settlement with SYRIA must ensure Israel's security from any attack launched from the Golan Heights.

Also in September, several far-reaching political and strategic guarantees were incorporated into a secret American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding, which was initialed on 1 September 1975 as part of the second Sinai agreement. In accordance with this memorandum, the Ford administration would consult with Israel if Israel received a threat from "a world power" and supply oil to Israel "if the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is not available for purchase." The United States also agreed "to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, to continue to adhere to its present policy of nonrecognition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION as long as it does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338[,] and to consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva peace conference on this issue with the government of Israel." In view of these incentives, Israeli policymakers ultimately decided to set aside their reservations and signed the Sinai II accord, which called for a limited withdrawal from the Sinai.

In January 1976 the UN Security Council opened a debate on Israel's repressive and expansionist practices in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, but the United States vetoed a draft resolution and the discussion ended. Also in January Rabin made another visit to the United States, addressing a joint session of Congress and holding talks with the president. In March the United States again vetoed a Security Council resolution expressing concern about the Occupied Territories.

See also AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

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Four Mothers Movement

The Four Mothers was a successful grassroots movement that was highly influential in bringing about Israel's 2000 withdrawal from LEBANON. It is considered by many Israelis to be the most significant such movement in Israeli history. The movement was catalyzed in 1997 when two Israeli army helicopters collided on the way to Lebanon, killing 73 soldiers as they crashed in the front yard of the school that Rachel Ben Dor's children attended. At the time, Ms. Ben Dor's oldest son was a soldier in Lebanon, and several of his former classmates had died. Out of the trauma of the helicopter crash, a number of women living on the northern border with sons serving in Lebanon came together and drafted an open letter to Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU calling on him to withdraw immediately from Lebanon. Over the coming weeks, the women's letter evolved into the Four Mothers movement.

Rachel Ben Dor of Rosh Pina became the movement's founder and chairperson while two of her friends, Ronit Nahmias and Yaffa Arbel of Kibbutz Gadot, formed the core of the protest movement leadership. The three women had raised their sons together and together watched them go into the army to serve in Lebanon.

The women began with small street protests at traffic intersections; they wrote letters to lawmakers; and they organized debates at northern kibbutzim. After the first story about them appeared on national television, they received calls from all over the country. Working women all, they found themselves at the vanguard of a movement, without any organization, time, or money. They realized that what they were doing would require all of that, plus endurance.

On talk shows, the mothers were placed opposite generals who patted them on the shoulders and rolled their eyes when the women spoke. Eventually, however, the military understood that the women were shaping national opinion and began to attack their movement as bad for the morale of the soldiers and the country.

Over the course of the next two years, the movement grew from its original core group to a national organization with several hundred active members. The Four Mothers held protests, sponsored advertisements in newspapers, and perhaps most effectively, held vigils outside the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv each day after an IDF soldier was killed in Lebanon.

The persistence of the movement sparked a national reevaluation of the policy guiding Israel's continued presence in the Lebanese security zone. Public opinion polls quickly began to shift. By the time of the 1999 elections, a majority of Israelis supported unilateral withdrawal from the security zone. Understanding the shift in public sentiment, both leading candidates for prime minister in the May 1999 elections, EHUD BARAK (ONE ISRAEL) and Benjamin Netanyahu (LIKUD), made explicit promises to withdraw. Barak, who took office in July 1999, made it a commitment with a date: Israel would be out of Lebanon by 7 July 2000, he declared publicly.

The New York Times wrote on 3 June 2000, shortly after the Israeli army pulled its troops out of Lebanon, ending more than 20 years of war, "Today many Israelis celebrated with the Four Mothers. The women took a classic Israeli stereotype—the silent, suffering soldier's mother—stood it on its head and dared to challenge the military." The Four Mothers had successfully shaped Israeli public opinion into pulling the military out of the so-called security zone that Israel had occupied since 1978.

In the summer of 2006, Israel once again invaded Lebanon, and as earlier, a group of women emerged to protest. The movement was called Waking Up on Time, and while it was far more radical, it was explicitly based on the Four Mothers movement. This time, the 15 active members of the new organization stressed that "this will be a movement of everyone, women and men, young and old." The members initially hung about a hundred protest signs across the city of Kfar Saba against the fighting in Lebanon. The cities of Herzliya and Raanana were also targeted.

"This time we won't wait 18 years to demand that Israel leave Lebanon, but now, so as not to be drawn into an operation which will be impossible to escape from," the activists explained. The group hung signs at central junctions across the country. The signs bore a clear and personal message against Prime Minister EHUD OLMERT and Defense Minister Amir Peretz, in order to clarify that they had learned the lessons of the earlier movement and this time they spoke directly to the country's leaders. There were no more general and unfocused statements. One of the signs read: "Olmert: Missing Sharon So Entering Lebanon?" Another sign showed a picture of a Hizbullah member guarding caged IDF soldiers above the caption "With Amir Peretz—your children are in good hands."

Waking Up on Time, like its predecessor movement, had a major impact in mobilizing people to oppose the war.

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Fourth Geneva Convention

See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN AUTHORITY

France

France has traditionally maintained a strong interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it has had a unique relationship with both protagonists. Torn between conflicting interests, French diplomacy has long sought a balanced position, which was at the same time impaired by the country's specific ties with the Arab world. Two strong factors presently determine France's diplomatic commitment to finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: its desire to maintain influence in the Middle East and the conflict's growing domestic impact, which is raising serious concerns among French policymakers.

Attachment to the Holy Land

France's historical interest in Palestine is intrinsically linked to its Christian culture. As an ancient Catholic monarchy, France has an intense attachment to Christ's presence in the Holy Land. It was in Clermont-Ferrand, France, that Pope Urbain II called for the First Crusade in 1095, inviting both knights and citizens to travel to Palestine to defend Christian pilgrims' rights of access to the HOLY SITES. From the sixteenth century onward France continued to affirm its role as protector of the Christian minorities in the Levant. In 1799 a French expedition to EGYPT under Napoleon Bonaparte briefly went to Palestine, where it fought the Ottoman forces. This date marks the starting point of modern French intervention in the Near East.

As in most other nations of Europe, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed intense episodes of ANTI-SEMITISM in France. While working in Paris as a journalist for a liberal Viennese newspaper, THEODOR HERZL covered the 1894 DREYFUS trial and as a result wrote *Der Judenstaat,* proposing the creation of a Jewish state as the solution to growing anti-Semitism in Europe. Dreyfus was a Jewish army captain who was falsely convicted of trying to sell military secrets to the Germans.

After World War I the Arab territories of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE were divided between France and Great Britain. The mandate for Palestine was given to the British, to the great displeasure of significant sectors of French Catholic public opinion. SYRIA and LEBANON were entrusted to France.

Between the two world wars France became a land of immigrants, especially for Jewish refugees fleeing the pogroms of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet during GERMANY'S occupation of France (1940–1944), the French collaborationist (Vichy) government enacted its own anti-Jewish laws and cooperated with the Nazis in the extermination of its Jewish population. More than 75,000

Jews were sent from France to the concentration camps and slaughtered.

Immediately after the war, French public opinion became sensitive to the Zionist cause and strongly supported the right of HOLOCAUST survivors to have their own independent state. The traditional rivalry with the British also explains the French government's moral and logistical support for the Jewish IMMIGRANTS and their nascent political organizations in Palestine.

This was the beginning of the golden age of the Franco-Israeli relationship, which lasted for a little less than twenty years. France recognized the state of Israel in May 1949, one year after its proclamation of independence. Military cooperation between France and Israel began in the early 1950s and strengthened during the mid-1950s, mainly as a counterbalance to the emergence of pan-Arab nationalism, at the time jeopardizing France's position with its Arab colonies in the Maghreb. France was responsible for establishing the foundation of Israel's NUCLEAR PROGRAM, directly participating in the construction of the Dimona nuclear plant. This strategic friendship found its most overt expression in the 1956 tripartite Suez expedition, when French, British, and Israeli armies together invaded Egypt to block JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR'S nationalist ambitions.

Support for the Palestinian Cause

During the 1950s and 1960s, Arab-Israeli relations were characterized by an enduring state of war. After General Charles de Gaulle's return to power in 1958, France's position toward Israel began to change. France's great and widely respected leader was forced to reexamine all French alliances within the specific context of decolonization in the third world. Morocco and Tunisia obtained their independence from Paris in 1956, but France waged a costly war in Algeria until 1962. After this traumatic episode, de Gaulle reconsidered the significance of the Arab Nationalist Movement. Inspired by a realistic assessment of France's capacities as an intermediate power, he concluded that an entente with former Arab colonies was the best means of preserving French regional influence.

France's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli conflict reached a turning point with the 1967 WAR between Egypt, Syria, and JORDAN and Israel. During the tension preceding the war, President de Gaulle warned that he would not stand with any country that initiated a preemptive strike and announced an embargo on arms sales to all countries involved in the dispute. In a famous declaration, de Gaulle called the Jews "an elite people, sure of itself and dominating," a statement that became embedded in Israel's long historical memory. After Israel bombed the Beirut airport in January 1969 and destroyed thirteen civilian planes on the ground, allegedly in response to a Palestinian guerrilla infiltration, de Gaulle imposed a complete arms embargo on the Jewish state. Thereafter the political breakup was complete, and a quite different era began.

France's so-called Arab policy, a mix of cultural influence, economic aid, military entente, and political leniency for local regimes, began to develop early in the 1970s. France's concern for the fate of the Palestinian REFUGEES had been constant from the outset, yet French sympathy for Palestinian political objectives was not as forthcoming, especially when the Palestinians were engaged in ARMED STRUGGLE that at times degenerated into pure TERRORISM. Nevertheless, from the early 1970s France supported the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), probably based on a tactical evaluation that one strong European political actor was needed to help the Palestinians achieve a national solution and, given its regional interests, better Paris than another power. France therefore consistently championed PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT as someone who could moderate his own movement and move toward a peaceful solution. In 1974, French minister of foreign affairs Jean Sauvagnargues was the first member of a Western European government to meet officially with Arafat, and the PLO opened its first liaison office in Paris in 1975.

Support for the Palestinians' political rights thus progressively became part of the French diplomatic agenda. In 1982 President François Mitterrand was the first French leader to affirm in front of the Israeli Knesset his support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. In the same year, French troops participated in the multinational force that supervised the evacuation of the Palestinian *fida'iyyun* (guerrilla fighters) from Beirut, then under Israeli siege. One year later they guaranteed the protection of PLO officials fleeing Tripoli under Syrian fire. The French commitment to strengthen the Palestinian position reached its peak with the eruption of the First INTIFADA, in 1987. It was in Paris that Arafat declared in May 1989 that the PLO renounced the Palestinian Covenant and the destruction of Israel. Until his death in 2004, the Palestinian leader maintained

strong personal links with successive French presidents, including François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac. Arafat died in the Val-de-Grâce hospital in Paris, where Chirac had arranged his transfer from Ramallah, WEST BANK.

French diplomacy during the 1980s, considered by some as biased in favor of the Palestinians, reflected more an effort to maintain a position of equilibrium between Israel and the Palestinians. Mitterrand was the main artisan of this subtly balanced position, and his fluid relationship with the PLO did not impede him from trying to overcome France's diplomatic strain with Israel. Yet France's reputation in Israel as pro-Palestinian remained, and was reinforced through the period of the two Intifadas. In the memories of Middle Easterners a few symbolic episodes stand out: President Chirac, in 1996, striving to extricate himself from the vigilance of Israeli security guards during a visit to the Old City of JERUSALEM; and, in contrast, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin being pelted with stones by young Palestinian militants at BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY in early 2000, after he called the Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah a terrorist organization.

President Nicolas Sarkozy, elected in 2007, initially promoted himself as a greater friend of Israel than his predecessors, but he seems to be aligning himself with France's traditionally balanced approach, notably reviving the Arab track through reengaging Syria.

France's Contribution to a Peace Settlement

France's logistical and political support for the Palestinian cause makes sense when placed in a global context. Because Paris wants to maintain its regional role in the Middle East, it is sensitive to the regional consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The progressive extension of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities to Lebanon and the involvement of Syria, both former mandate colonies of the French, partially explains French insistence on participating as an autonomous player in any peace negotiation.

France's concept of a fair settlement is based on a calculated appraisal of the impact of the conflict on French interests in the region, combined with certain principles that in general guide the nation's foreign policy, in particular a preference for multilateralism and respect for INTERNATIONAL LAW. Thus France has long argued for an international conference involving all parties to the Israeli-Arab dispute under the auspices of the UNITED NATIONS and based on UN RESOLUTIONS 242 and 338. France supports the "land for peace" solution: a final settlement should ensure the viability of two states living side by side in peace and security.

In the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli context, as in many other international situations, France tends to calculate its contribution in proportion to the involvement of the UNITED STATES, which is considered the only influential external player. The latent Franco-US rivalry was explicit after the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (between Israel and Egypt), which the French interpreted as a first step toward a separate bilateral peace that would go against the principle of a comprehensive settlement.

Though playing no active role in the negotiations, France supported the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that followed. However, after Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN's assassination in November 1995, Chirac returned to more traditional and proactive French diplomacy in the region. After the election of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU (which brought the peace process to a halt) and the Israeli-Lebanese crisis of April 1996, France reactivated its privileged links with Syria and Lebanon and managed to assume a central role in securing a truce after Israel's OPERATION GRAPES OF WRATH on Lebanese territory.

France gradually reconciled itself to the primacy of US leadership and the prominence of the US-Israeli relationship in Washington's diplomacy. Successive French governments have gradually come to realize that assuming a complementary role is more realistic. Thus, the continuity of French discourse on the Middle East from one government to another is remarkable both prior to and since the appointment of Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine (1997–2002), who issued regular appeals for the US government to act as a catalyst and a neutral mediator in any peace negotiation.

Unable to exercise significant influence or play a meaningful role as an individual actor, France increasingly resorted to the European track as a possible means to strengthen its diplomatic position. France's activism in the making of a common EUROPEAN UNION (EU) position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was essential. The European VENICE DECLARATION, which in 1980 proclaimed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determi-

nation and called for recognition of the PLO as their legitimate representative, largely reflected French initiatives, as did the 1999 Berlin Declaration, which introduced the notion of a "viable Palestinian state." At the same time, France strongly advocated that the EU provide large amounts of financial assistance to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY and that it support developmental projects in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Despite the successes of French diplomacy within the EU, it has significant limitations as a forum for enhancing French national influence. The enlargement of the European Union, the difficulties in developing a common European diplomacy, and the growth of a camp of pro-Israeli supporters among the new members have demonstrated the limits of EU diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

French Public Opinion and the Conflict

Public opinion has increasingly become a major factor in French foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Traditionally the majority of the French public expressed solidarity with Israel, thus showing a degree of political independence vis-à-vis the government's official position. The French public decidedly rallied to the Palestinian cause only after the start of the First Intifada in 1987, largely because of MEDIA coverage of the uprising. Televised images of Israeli violence in the Occupied Territories gave rise to a new and different picture of Israel as an illegitimate occupying force and of the Palestinians as victims fighting for their liberation.

The 2000 AL-AQSA INTIFADA, with its TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of Palestinians, Israel's violent military offensives, and the staggering Palestinian civilian death toll, only reinforced the sympathy of the French for the Palestinian people. From the early 1970s the extreme left in France was committed to the Palestinian liberation movement both for ideological and tactical motives, while social democrats and the right were more hesitant in taking sides. Today opinion polls show that the French public favors a balanced solution that ensures peace and security for both sides.

Since 2006, French decisionmakers have regularly expressed concern about the gradual importation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into France itself, a development that directly affects the French Muslim and Jewish communities. The growing tension between the two communities illustrates the current difficulty of the French republic in maintaining its historic, egalitarian model of social cohesion. The French Jewish community (third in importance after the US and Israeli populations, with approximately 500,000 members) faces growing social pressure to distance itself from the positions of the Israeli government as well as confronting the growth of a new kind of anti-Semitism. The rise of anti-Semitic acts in France since 2000 is partly due to the indifference of the 5 million Muslim minority, mostly originating from North Africa, some of whom feel economically and politically marginalized and have become more sensitive to extremist pan-Islamic political messages.

In such a strained internal context it is becoming more difficult for French politicians to take open, balanced positions. ISRAEL'S UNILATRAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005 was perceived as an important opportunity to restore the Franco-Israeli relationship and ease tensions with the French Jewish community; however, French ambiguity regarding its colonial past and its present ambitions in the Arab world lingered and the dynamics of the relationships remained essentially the same. The 2009 Israeli operation in Gaza showed that the potential for social and political mobilization on both sides within France continued intact, suggesting that the government must take a more active part in the search for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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—Dorothée Schmid

Freedom of Movement

See RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT

Freij, Elias (1920–1998)

Elias Freij was the longtime and well-known Greek Orthodox mayor of BETHLEHEM. In the 1976 WEST BANK municipal elections, he was the only pro-Jordanian notable to be elected. All other winning candidates were aligned with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), although Freij eventually became an articulate spokesman against the OCCUPATION. During the BRITISH MANDATE Freij was employed in the Public Works Department of the Mandatory government and worked briefly in Cyprus. He was from an old and well-respected family, and after 1948 he ran the family's factory in Bethlehem, producing olive-wood handicrafts, mostly for tourists. In 1970 he became head of the Bethlehem Chamber of Commerce and in 1972 mayor of Bethlehem. Freij also headed Bethlehem University's board of trustees from 1973 on.

After the 1976 elections, Freij maintained public support for the PLO, but he also continued his cordial links with Israel and JORDAN, supporting a Palestinian entity in that country. He was the only mayor of a large city whom Israel did not dismiss in 1982 in response to the nationalist movement within the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, which was made up of prominent intellectuals and mayors. He remained mayor of Bethlehem until 1997. Freij was a member of the Palestinian delegation to the MADRID CONFERENCE and served as minister for tourism and antiquities under the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

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French Reports, 1931–1932

The French Reports were two evaluations of Palestinian agriculture and landlessness that Louis French, the director of development for the Mandatory Authority, wrote at the request of the British government. French submitted the first report in December 1931 and the second in April 1932. In both he demonstrated that Zionist IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases and settlement were causing Palestinian farmers to lose their land and advocated restrictions on Jewish immigration and land acquisition. At the time, however, most in London believed that increased agricultural productivity was the solution to the Palestinian problem. For different reasons, both Zionists and Palestinians rejected French's recommendations, and the British government never implemented them.

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Fundamentalism, Religious

See CHRISTIANITY; GUSH EMUNIM; HAMAS; ISLAMIC JIHAD MOVEMENT; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM

Futuwwa

Futuwwa (Youth and Chivalry) was a paramilitary Arab youth movement founded in 1935 by Jamal Tahir al-Husayni of the prominent AL-HUSAYNI FAMILY of Jerusalem. Some Futuwwa members fought as guerrillas in the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT, but Futuwwa fell apart when the Arab Revolt was crushed. The group was reorganized in 1946 and was headed by Kamal Urayqat, who was born in ABU DIS, served in the British Police (1926–1941), and participated in the Palestinian resistance movement under the leadership of ABD AL-QADIR AL-HUSAYNI. Not much reliable information is available about the group's activities in the 1948 WAR.

See also NAJJADA

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G

Gachelet

In 1995, the orthodox *garinim Torani'im* (religious nuclei), who had moved to towns throughout Israel to establish *kollel* (institutes for adult study of the Talmud) to counter secularism and spread orthodoxy, set up an umbrella organization called Gachelet (Garinim Chinuchi'im Leumi'im Torani'im B'Eretz Israel, or National Torah Religious Units in Israel).

Gachelet's function is to form a network of the *garinim* communities, work for the common purpose of all the communities, and unify efforts among the more than 25 outposts. It approaches government offices in search of grants, develops a unified budget, enlists new families, brings renowned rabbis to speak to the groups, and much more.

Today there are more than 500 young families connected to Gachelet, working mostly in development towns. One Orthodox elder explained the significance of Gachelet: "*Gachelet* is bringing about the most important revolution in Israeli life in our generation." Indeed, the most important characteristic of Gachelet is its reflection of the increasing influence of the Orthodox in Israeli society.

Gahal Party

The Gahal Party (Gush Herut-Liberalism, or Freedom-Liberal Bloc) was a right-wing political party created in 1965 by members of HERUT (founded by MENAHEM BEGIN) and the LIBERAL PARTY. During the 1967 WAR, Gahal joined the National Unity government, formed to bring together all Israeli political parties in support of the war. In 1973 it combined with other right-wing parties to form the LIKUD. In 1977 the Likud Party ascended to power as a rightist coalition dominated by the Herut/Gahal and has been an important force in Israeli politics ever since. Gahal's platform was consistent with VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY's Revisionist ideology, advocating an Israeli state on both sides of the Jordan River. After his retirement from the army EZER WEIZMAN joined the Gahal Party and led it until 1972.

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Galili, Israel Balashnikov (1911–1986)

Israel Galili was an Israeli political and military leader and the chief weapons designer for Israeli Military Industries. Born in Brailov, Ukraine, he immigrated to Palestine around 1926. Galili was a high commander in the PALMAH, the elite fighting force of the HAGANA, of which he was also head and later a high-ranking officer in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF). He designed the Galil assault rifle, one of the standard weapons used by the IDF. Galili was also a leader of the KIBBUTZ movement, a LABOR PARTY leader, and a member of Israeli governments during the 1960s and 1970s. The Institute for Settlement, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies—the Galili Institute—was named for Israel Galili.

See also GALILI PROTOCOLS

Galili Protocols

The Galili Protocols of 1973 were tenets for colonizing and settling the Palestinian territories captured in the 1967 WAR. At the end of the war, ISRAEL GALILI declared, "we must take steps leading to a long-range consolidation, lest we be considered a temporary, transient factor in the occupied areas." The protocols called for extensive additional rural and urban Jewish SETTLEMENTS and commercial and industrial development

in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, including the Golan Heights, the WEST BANK, GAZA, and the Sinai. In particular the protocols advocated expulsion of the indigenous BEDOUIN from the Sinai and destruction of their homes, mosques, and graveyards to clear the lands for all-Jewish kibbutzim, villages, and a city. The LABOR PARTY informally incorporated the Galili Protocols with the ALLON PLAN and the DAYAN PLAN, which together crystallized Labor's commitment to retain major portions of the Occupied Territories. Israel began to implement the Galili Protocols shortly after the 1973 War, and in 1975 expelled 10,000 farmers and Bedouin in northeastern Sinai in the process of constructing the Yamit settlement—an area of special focus in the Galili Proposals.

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Gamla

An ultra-right-wing Israeli group, Gamla was founded in 2002 by a group of former Israeli generals and settlers. It published a detailed plan, "The Logistics of Transfer," for the expulsion of Palestinians from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and for the TRANSFER of PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL from Israel proper. (www.gamla.org.il/english).

Gang of Five

The Gang of Five were the leaders of a putsch in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) and held power briefly in 2002, during the siege of YASIR ARAFAT's headquarters in Ramallah. From March to May, five individuals assumed control of and ran the PNA (the interim government): HASAN 'ASFUR, Gaza security chief MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, SAEB EREKAT, MUHAMMAD RASHID, and NABIL SHA'TH. All residents of GAZA, they represented a particular philosophy within the PNA that wanted a return to the OSLO format of direct negotiations with Israel, an end to the INTIFADA (especially armed attacks), and the restructuring of the PNA's security apparatus into a single organization headed by Dahlan and supported by the US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and the intelligence agencies of EGYPT, JORDAN, and SAUDI ARABIA. FATAH leaders and cadres in the WEST BANK were extremely displeased with the policies of the Gang of Five and favored continuing the Intifada, believing it was not the time for negotiations. When 'Asfur was severely beaten and seriously wounded on 13 May 2002, it was assumed that the attack was perpetrated by supporters of JIBRIL RAJUB, the PNA security chief for the West Bank, because 'Asfur had aligned himself with Dahlan. In late May 2002, Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat emerged briefly from his house arrest in the Muqata and put an abrupt halt to the putsch.

See also PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

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Gaza Coastal Waters

See FISHING, GAZA STRIP

Gaza-Jericho Agreement I (Cairo I)

Two Gaza-Jericho accords were signed during the OSLO PROCESS. The first was the "Gaza-Jericho First Agreement: Cairo I, 9 February 1994," and the second was the "GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT: CAIRO II, 4 May 1994," including as one of its five annexes the economic accord "Economic Protocol to Gaza-Jericho Agreement," Paris, 29 April 1994.

After the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and Israel agreed in 1993 on the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, which set up the framework for future talks on establishing an

interim Palestinian self-governing authority for Gaza and Jericho, the first set of negotiations culminated in what become known as the Gaza-Jericho First Agreement: Cairo I, signed on 9 February 1994. In what became a pattern for all future agreements between the parties, this accord was signed later than the period stipulated in the DOP (by five months in this case). The Israeli team that negotiated the agreement was composed of top ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) officers, led by Major-General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, head of military intelligence and the number two man in the IDF. The Palestinian delegation was led by NABIL SHA'TH, a former businessman and one of YASIR ARAFAT's senior political operatives.

Four months of intensive talks resulted in two partial agreements. One, which involved security and military issues, centered on the PLO's responsibilities for maintaining order among the Palestinians under its jurisdiction, protecting Israel's security, and establishing border control, both on the GAZA border with EGYPT and the JERICHO border with JORDAN. At the same time the IDF retained overall responsibility for security in those areas and maintained military encampments for that purpose. The second agreement was another statement of principles concerning the transfer of authority from Israel to the PNA. Together they further refined the limits on PNA governance and delineated the expectations of the PNA regarding Israel's security needs.

Cairo I, as the agreement is sometimes called because it was signed in that city, became a paradigm in terms of both substance and process for future Israeli governmental negotiations with the Palestinians. It was more a unilateral *diktat* than a negotiation. Moreover, in what became another precedent, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak intervened in the talks to strongly pressure the Palestinians to accede to Israeli demands.

The most important aspect of the Gaza-Jericho accord concerned the Jewish SETTLEMENTS. The DOP stated that the FINAL STATUS of the settlements would be negotiated later but said nothing about their status during the interim stages. In this agreement Israel imposed a clause that excluded the "zones of the settlements" from the Palestinian self-ruled areas. New settlement continued throughout the entire Oslo Process. The agreement provided for corridors in Gaza linking the Jewish settlements to Israel and for joint two-vehicle patrols along these corridors "led by the Israeli vehicle," while in Jericho (in the WEST BANK) similar patrols were to be led by the Palestinian vehicle. Palestinians gained access to two religious sites on the Jordan River outside Jericho proper and the right of safe passage to an area along the Dead Sea where Palestinian projects were slated. Israel retained control of all the border stations, including the appointment of a director-general with responsibility for the management and security of each border terminal and the right to veto the entry of any person into the Palestinian areas. The exact size of the district to be included in the Jericho region remained open for resolution in further negotiations, as did the scope and power of a new Palestinian police force and its working relationship with Israeli forces.

The DOP had set the terms of reference for future negotiations: The Cairo I agreement transformed ambiguity into fixed constraints on Palestinian self-rule. Israeli historian Avi Shlaim, who wrote that the OSLO ACCORDS were a "historical breakthrough," said of Gaza-Jericho I, "[It] tilted very heavily toward the Israeli position. The IDF had managed to impose its own conception of the interim period. . . . The outstanding feature of the agreement was thus to allow the IDF to maintain a military presence in and around the areas earmarked for Palestinian self-government." Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN was more explicit in an 11 May address to the Knesset: "The Palestinians will have a policing authority regarding civilian issues, subject to several constraints. . . . [It] allows blanket [IDF] protection of . . . the settlements in the Gaza Strip. . . . [There are] constraints on Palestinian building and other issues. . . . In other areas—such as religion, ARCHAEOLOGY, WATER, electricity, construction and planning, telecommunications, postal services, and population registration affairs—the transfer of power will be subject to certain constraints in order to secure essential Israeli interests. . . . [It] stipulates that a liaison committee . . . will be established to . . . decide on the principles concerning the entry of persons who left Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] in 1967. Take note we are not talking about REFUGEES from 1948 but about people displaced in 1967. . . . This clause stipulates that all decisions on this issue must be made unanimously by all the members of the [joint liaison] committee. In other words, without Israel's agreement, the committee will not be able to determine how

many people will be allowed in and in what stages."

See also GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II

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Gaza-Jericho Agreement II (Cairo II)

Israel considered the 9 February agreement partial and insufficiently precise in stipulating the autonomy limitations and security responsibilities of the Palestinian authority. Thus negotiations continued for another four months until a second "Gaza-Jericho Agreement (Cairo II)" was signed on 4 May 1994. On 29 April a separate accord, "Economic Protocol," was signed in Paris and appended to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement II as "Annex IV."

The second Gaza-Jericho Agreement contains hundreds of pages; dozens of annexes; and thousands of qualifications, reservations, and detailed exceptions to the notion of "limited self-rule." Taken together, these suggest a determined Israeli effort to impose controls on the Palestinians and obstacles to the possibility of their succeeding at self-rule. For example, the document stated that the Israeli OCCUPATION laws and Military Orders, which had controlled every aspect of the lives of the Palestinians since 1967, were to remain in force unless they were amended by mutual agreement (which meant that Israel held a veto). It was further agreed that Israel had the right to continue arresting, interrogating, and imprisoning any Palestinian, including those who came from the areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

Gaza-Jericho II, the "Self-Rule (al-Hukm al-Dhati) Accord," also called for, among other things:

- Immediate accelerated redeployment of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, to be completed within three weeks
- Appointment of a PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) to consist of twenty-four members to carry out legislative and executive powers, including the exercise of judicial functions
- Establishment by the PNA of a police force of 9,000 men to guarantee public order and internal security in the areas evacuated by the Israelis
- Measures taken by both sides to prevent all acts of TERRORISM, crime, and hostilities directed against each other, including the use of joint mobile patrols consisting of both Israelis and Palestinians, and legal measures that would be taken against offenders
- Promotion of mutual understanding and tolerance between Israel and the PNA (in their respective societies), abstention from incitement and hostile propaganda, and (within the parameters of freedom of expression) legal measures to prevent such incitement
- A temporary international presence in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area (owing to the HEBRON MASSACRE) to consist of 400 qualified personnel including observers, instructors, and other development experts from five or six of the donor countries

On the question of economic relations, Palestinians and Israelis negotiated for eight months in Paris to achieve an agreement. That accord—the Economic

Protocol to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement II—was signed on 29 April 1994 and incorporated into the 4 May agreement as Annex IV. The protocol covers all economic sectors and activities, including the PNA's economic relations with Israel and with other countries. In essence the agreement preserved the structure of economic domination that Israel established over the WEST BANK and GAZA beginning in 1967.

Palestinians are prohibited from having their own currency, without which they cannot make monetary policy or determine interest rates or currency value. Both Israel and the PNA have the right to levy personal or individual taxes. The agreement states that "the Palestinian Tax Administration will conduct its own direct tax policies. Israel will transfer to the Palestinian Authority 75 percent of the revenues from income tax collected from Palestinians employed in Israel. A value added tax (VAT) will be operated by the Palestinian Authority with rates around 15–16 percent." The PNA Tax Department issued a personal income tax regulation that became effective on 1 January 1995 and is applicable to Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza.

Trade relations remain bound by Israeli trade policy, and imports and exports are rigidly controlled. For example, the protocol specifies what goods the PNA may import (from places other than Israel) and in what quantity. The protocol also imposes complex restrictions on exports (both to Israel and other countries) and a de facto customs union with Israel, which would keep the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) economically integrated with Israel. With regard to labor, the protocol states that "both sides will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labor between them," with the proviso that each side has the "right" to "determine from time to time the extent and conditions of the labor movement in its area." In practice this is solely an Israeli prerogative, because the Palestinian labor force is dependent on employment in Israel. Additionally, Israel retains control over electricity, energy, transport, trade, and WATER. Israel collects VAT and customs duties on all goods destined for the WBGS, as well as continuing to collect taxes on the salaries of Palestinians working in Israel. Israel must remit these taxes to the PNA, although Israel is allowed to withhold from the PNA, at its discretion, moneys due the Palestinians. For example, after the AL-AQSA INTIFADA erupted in September 2000, Israel seized all taxes that by the agreement would have accrued to the PNA—a sum amounting to NIS (new Israeli shekels) 1.7 billion. The government then began preparing legislation to allow private Israeli citizens to sue the PNA for damages incurred during the course of the uprising, with compensation to be paid from the confiscated Palestinian funds.

The economic protocol gave the PNA control over human resources and investment decisions, but not over LAND and water. Overall the protocol reflects the historical reality of the continuing Occupation and the vast imbalance in power between the two sides.

Of the four documents concluded to this time Israeli analyst Meron Benvenisti wrote: "A perusal of hundreds of the Agreement's pages can leave no doubt about who is the winner and loser in this deal. By seeing through all the lofty phraseology, all deliberate disinformation, hundreds of pettifogging sections, sub-sections, appendices and protocols, one can clearly recognize that Israeli victory was absolute and Palestinian defeat abject."

Nevertheless, the majority of Palestinians believed a genuine peace process was under way and that within five years, the time frame stipulated in the DOP, they would have an independent state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East JERUSALEM. Given these high expectations, when the life situations of ordinary Palestinians began to deteriorate seriously and when the five-year deadline for a final settlement passed without any political achievements, Palestinian frustration was overwhelming—ultimately unraveling in the al-Aqsa Intifada.

See also ECONOMY; GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT I

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
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Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip epitomizes the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. The entity with the highest concentration of Palestinian REFUGEES and the birthplace of FATAH military activism, it is also the site of the first Israeli-Palestinian confrontation in 1956, the First INTIFADA in 1987, and the rise of HAMAS—the Islamic Resistance Movement. The Gaza Strip has also figured prominently in all Arab-Israeli peace initiatives and in four of the seven Arab-Israeli wars. It is the first Palestinian territory from which Israel withdrew troops as a result of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT plan, implemented in August 2005. Yet, like the rest of Palestine, Gaza is still far from being peaceful or viably independent.

The Gaza Strip as a political entity was created in the aftermath of the 1948 WAR and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli ARMISTICE AGREEMENT on 24 February 1949. It is a narrow area of land, 28 miles long and 7.8 miles wide at its southern end and 3.4 miles at its narrowest point (a total of approximately 140 square miles). Composed mainly of coastal plains and sand dunes with limited annual rainfall (6–10 inches, or 150–250 millimeters), Gaza is bordered by EGYPT in the south, the Mediterranean Sea on the west, and Israel on the north and east. The Gaza Strip constitutes less than 1 percent of the area of Palestine under the BRITISH MANDATE and less than 4 percent of the area designated by the UN Partition Plan in 1947 (UN RESOLUTION 181) for the proposed Arab state. Unlike either Gaza City (believed to have been established in 3200 BCE) or the WEST BANK, the Gaza Strip historically has not been part of any state. Although administered by Egypt from 1948 to 1967, it was not annexed by Egypt or by Israel, which occupied it after 1967. Gaza has been claimed by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) as part of a Palestinian state, which has been endorsed by the international community in its ROAD MAP in 2003, but such a state has yet to be established.

The defining element of the Gaza Strip is its refugee population. Within days of Israel's independence in 1948, the war in Palestine created some 750,000 or more refugees, of whom 150,000 to 200,000 were either expelled or fled their homes and found sanctuary in the Gaza Strip, thereby tripling its population almost overnight. These refugees came mainly from central Palestine and from the coastal areas of Ashdod and JAFFA. Although most 1948 Palestinian refugees went to



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Map 14. The Gaza Strip before Israel's Unilateral Withdrawal

the West Bank and beyond, the Gaza Strip ended up with the highest concentration of refugees among all receiving countries. Refugees and their descendants represent over 60 percent of the total population of the Gaza Strip today. As a result of their high population growth and the limited space of the territory, the Gaza Strip has become one of the mostly densely populated regions in the world, exceeding 9,739 persons per square mile, compared with 80 persons per square mile in Israel. In 2005 a total of 1.4 million Palestinians were living in the Gaza Strip among its 13 cities and towns and its eight refugee camps. In 2000, 45 percent of the refugees lived in the camps, down from 70 percent in 1967, with the rest residing mainly in Gaza City and the towns of Khan Yunis, Rafah, Jabaliya, and Deir el-Balah. The annual growth rate in the Gaza Strip has been approximately 3.9 percent, one of the highest in the world. Compared to the West Bank, the Gaza Strip is poorer, more limited in economic resources, and more militant politically. The historical evolution of the Gaza Strip since 1948 testifies to its resilience and its unresolved status.

Zionist Claims over the Gaza Strip

The Zionist claim to the Gaza Strip was part of its claim to historic Palestine. DAVID BEN-GURION, Israel's first prime minister, argued that Gaza was "an integral part not only of the historic Jewish past" but also inferred in the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Jews a homeland in Palestine. Historically, however, the Jewish presence in Gaza City and in the strip has been neither consistent nor dominant.

According to biblical tradition, the original inhabitants of the area around Gaza City were Avvites, but after David's conquest the land was allotted to the tribe of Judah. Archaeological records, however, indicate that the original inhabitants were the Canaanites, who possessed the area until the beginning of the twelfth century BCE, when it was occupied by the Philistines, possibly as an Egyptian garrison. Gaza City was historically an important commercial outpost, providing a link between Egypt and other ancient empires in the Middle East, as well as a way station for caravans traveling between Asia and Africa, starting from the fifteenth century BCE. Although Jews settled in Gaza in the Talmudic period (70–640 CE), the city was regarded as being outside the *halakhic* (Jewish religious law) boundaries of the holy land. Under Arab rule, Jewish and SAMARITAN communities flourished in Gaza but were eliminated with its destruction by the Crusaders around 1155 CE. Jews reappeared in the city in the fourteenth century and flourished during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but their community declined again during the nineteenth century.

The Zionist movement in Palestine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries sought to create a Jewish presence in Gaza as much as in the rest of Palestine. However, by 1944 the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND had bought only 4.5 percent of the land in the Gaza subdistrict (which was three times the size of the present Gaza Strip). Jews bought land in rural Gaza in Beit Hanun and Kefar Darom, but Kefar Darom was the only Jewish settlement created within the boundaries of what became the Gaza Strip. During the British Mandate (1922–1948), the Arab and the Jewish communities were segregated economically and politically. After 1929, British policy prohibited the use of STATE LAND in the Gaza District for purposes of Jewish SETTLEMENT. The last Jews in Gaza City left following the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES of 1929. The settlement of Kefar Darom was evacuated in the aftermath of the 1948 War when the Gaza Strip came under Egyptian control.

The 1948 War: The Refugee Question

The Gaza Strip was the site of the first Palestinian government established after the 1948 War, when in September 1948 the LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES announced the creation of the ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT under the leadership of the grand mufti of JERUSALEM, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI. This government was recognized by IRAQ, SYRIA, and LEBANON but collapsed by December 1948 as a result of internal weaknesses and inter-Arab struggles over who represented the Palestinians. King Abdullah of JORDAN, who annexed the West Bank in December 1948, was interested in taking control of the Gaza Strip as well, because it would provide him with access to the Mediterranean Sea. To that end he conducted secret negotiations with GOLDA MEIR and Ben-Gurion in 1949 and 1950. Egypt opposed these plans and took control of the strip after the collapse of the All Palestine Government. Unlike Jordan, though, Egypt did not claim or seek to assert sovereignty over Gaza.

The fate of the Gaza Strip since 1948 has been tied to the refugee question, which has been

at the core of the Israeli-Arab conflict following the 1948 War. The Arab countries, as well as the UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE, maintained that the refugees must be allowed to return to their homes and land before any negotiations over territorial settlement with Israel. On the other hand, Israel sought a territorial settlement first and planned to bar the refugees' return. Israel believed that achieving peace agreements with the Arab countries would resolve the refugee problem by absorbing them into the Arab states. In May 1949, after months of unsuccessful negotiations in Lausanne, Israel proposed the "Gaza Plan." It was Israel's first and only official plan to tackle the refugee problem up until the CAMP DAVID II negotiation in 2000. Under the Gaza Plan, Israel proposed to annex the Gaza Strip together with all of its refugees in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt, thereby freeing Egypt of the refugee problem. Israel, however, retreated from the plan almost as soon as it proposed it, in part because the LABOR government feared strong adverse reaction, particularly from its right wing, but more so because it had seriously underestimated the number of Arabs in Gaza at 100,000 to 150,000 when the number was nearer 280,000. While Israel retreated, Egypt also repudiated the proposal. Cairo could not afford the political cost of conceding yet more Arab territory to the new Jewish state. Thus, on both the Israeli and Egyptian sides the plan died. The UNITED STATES supported the Gaza Plan and the proposal that Egypt receive part of the Negev in exchange for giving up Gaza. But Egypt considered this unacceptable because it was based on a refugee-for-land formula and because it rejected Israel's hope that achieving peace agreements with the Arab countries would resolve the refugee problem by absorbing them into the Arab states.

Egyptian Legacy: 1948–1967

The Gaza Strip came under Egyptian military administration in February 1949, on the date of the signing of the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. Instead of annexing Gaza or giving its residents Egyptian citizenship, Egypt provided them with travel documents and governed them according to a fusion of Egyptian laws and pre-1948 laws put in place by British and OTTOMAN rulers. Egypt also did not attempt to resolve the refugee problem, which it left to the UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA), the organization created in the aftermath of the 1948 War to carry out relief and humanitarian operations for the refugees. UNRWA began its work in Gaza on 1 May 1950 and by 1952 established eight refugee camps for which it assumed total responsibility, while Egypt remained responsible for order and security.

Until 1956, Egypt's main concern was preventing any military confrontation with Israel. During this time Palestinian refugees from all the countries bordering Israel often attempted to return to their villages inside Israel, and throughout the early 1950s nearly 500 Palestinians were killed during such INFILTRATIONS. Most of these incursions were carried out by unarmed individuals seeking to reunite with relatives, harvest their crops, or retrieve property from their homes. The Palestinian resistance, or the *fida'iyyun* (Palestinian guerrilla fighters) based in Gaza, also occasionally launched strikes on Israeli military posts beyond the border and caused friction along the 1948 armistice line. But JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR kept a very tight rein on the Palestinians, and as Israeli historian Benny Morris notes in his *Israel's Border Wars,* there were remarkably few Israeli casualties during these years: on all Israel's borders, 66 individuals died in 1953 and 55 in 1954. All that changed, however, with Israel's Operation Black Arrow (commonly known as the Gaza Raid), initiated on 27 February and lasting through 1 March 1955, in which Israel launched a massive military raid on Egyptian military headquarters in Gaza, its bloodiest attack against Egypt since the 1948 War. The Gaza Raid resulted in the death of 38 Egyptian soldiers and precipitated a Middle East arms race in which Nasir, in response to Israel's aggression, signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia. This escalation of tension eventually led to the 1956 Sinai/Suez War. It also provoked Nasir to organize the Palestinian *fida'iyyun* and encourage them to engage in cross-border armed infiltrations against Israel.

In 1956, Israel invaded Egypt, pushing all the way to Sharm al-Shaykh, and in a previously coordinated arrangement Britain and France attacked Egypt in an effort to reclaim control of the Suez Canal, recently nationalized by Nasir. Israel occupied the Gaza Strip, plus the entire Sinai, which it retained from November 1956 until March 1957, despite UN resolutions and intense US pressure. This short occupation was the only direct political-military confrontation

between Israelis and Palestinians outside of Israel from 1949 until 1965, and as such it afforded important insight into Israel's strategy for institutionalizing its control over unannexed Palestinian territories. This five-month occupation was also key in developing Palestinian nationalism and shaping the ideas of major leaders in Fatah (the major Palestinian political party), many of whom had lived and studied in Gaza and Egypt, such as YASIR ARAFAT, SALAH KHALAF (Abu Iyad), and KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), among others. Most important, it made Palestinians aware of the limits of pan-Arab nationalism and of the need for an independent Palestinian national movement of liberation.

After the Suez War in 1956, Egyptian policy shifted toward supporting Palestinian nationalism and building Palestinian institutions. Nasir declared in 1962 that the Gaza Strip would be the "vanguard for the liberation of Palestine . . . [and] the nucleus of the awaited Arab Palestinian state." However, between 1957 and May 1967 the UN Emergency Force was stationed along the Egyptian side of the armistice line to patrol Gaza's borders with Israel, and during that time no Palestinian guerrilla attacks were carried out across the border. Egypt resumed its civil administration of the Strip after the war and permitted the formation of the Palestine National Union (PNU, al-Ittihad al-Qawmi al-Falastini) in Gaza. Egypt dissolved the PNU in 1965 and created the Gaza Legislative Council, which acted as a ruling council until 1967. Cairo also facilitated the creation of the PLO in 1964 through the League of Arab States, but more as a means of controlling Palestinian nationalist groups and preventing them from taking actions that could drag Egypt into another, unwanted, war with Israel than as supporting the goal of the groups to liberate Palestine. At the first meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL in Jerusalem that year, numerous delegates came from Gaza, and three of the fifteen-member PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE were Gazans.

Struggle for Self-Determination: 1967–1993

During the 1967 WAR, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip as well as the entire Sinai Peninsula. UN RESOLUTION 242 (22 November 1967) considered this seizure illegal and the UN called on Israel to return the land in exchange for peace with its neighbors. Israel, however, installed a military administration in the Gaza Strip (and in the West Bank) that controlled the Palestinian population, and created a civilian Jewish presence in the area as a means to foster a Jewish claim over the land and to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Although resistance to Israeli OCCUPATION was strong in the Gaza Strip, Israeli military repression was fierce. By 1972 ARIEL SHARON, commander of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES' (IDF) Southern Command, broke the resistance in a violent campaign that destroyed thousands of Palestinian homes and killed hundreds of people, and then attempted to remove the refugees from the camps and resettle them in newly constructed Gazan neighborhoods—in exchange for their relinquishing their refugee status. The program was only minimally successful, because few Palestinians were willing to abandon their status as refugees (thereby giving up all claims to their property in Israel) in exchange for better housing, even though most were living in makeshift shelters without electricity or running water. After the resettlement scheme foundered, Sharon enacted brutal measures to put the camps under full military control. He also completely sealed the Gaza Strip from the rest of the world by constructing a security barrier—a ten-foot-high barbed wire and chain-link fence surrounding most of the Gaza Strip that was regularly patrolled by Israeli soldiers. It had three points of entry: ERETZ, RAFAH, and Nahal Oz (expanded in 1995 to include KARNI CROSSING), which remain the only points of exit from or entry to Gaza today. With the 2005 unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Eretz and Karni remain under Israel's control, while the Rafah/PHILADELPHI ROUTE is under Egyptian rule.

Until 1995, Israel maintained direct military administration over the Gaza Strip. Between 1967 and 1995, Israel constructed seventeen settlements in the Strip, housing between 7,000 and 8,000 Jewish settlers, and it also controlled approximately 20 percent of the Gaza Strip's land for the colonies, together with its WATER and other resources, bypass ROADS, and military installations. Although Jewish settlers represented less than 0.5 percent of the total population living in Gaza, they were allotted 16 times more water per capita and 84 times more land per capita than the Palestinians.

Israel regulated the economic, political, and legal life of the 1.4 million Gazans through mil-

itary orders and the control of other legal institutions. Although Israel severed Gaza's economic relations with Egypt, it kept the Egyptian legal system and administration with regard to civilian affairs (EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, etc.). Gazans continued to need travel documents issued by Egypt as well as exit PERMITS from the Israeli military governor. Economically, the Gaza ECONOMY was integrated into that of Israel through a policy that allowed Palestinian workers to be employed in Israel, restricted Palestinian exports, and flooded Palestinian markets with Israeli goods, setting in motion a process of economic decline in Gaza.

Politically, Israel's position shifted from wanting to annex the Gaza Strip to using it as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations with the Arab countries and eventually with the Palestinians, and finally to disengaging from it unilaterally. According to the ALLON PLAN, discussed in the Israeli cabinet within weeks of the 1967 War, Israel would annex the Gaza Strip after resettling 350,000 of its refugees into northern Sinai and the West Bank. However, after failing to impose a refugee resettlement program on the Gaza Strip or to contain the area's DEMOGRAPHIC growth, and in the context of strong Palestinian political opposition to the Occupation, the Israeli government gave up on the idea of annexation by the early 1970s and proposed returning Gaza to Arab control. Between 1970 and 1993, Israel's official position supported what came to be known as the "JORDANIAN OPTION," namely the return of some West Bank Palestinian areas plus the Gaza Strip to Jordan. In 1971 the Israeli military commander in the strip appointed RASHAD AL-SHAWWA, who supported a united Arab kingdom with Jordan and the West Bank, as mayor of Gaza City. The Jordanian Option, however, was opposed by Gazans and the PLO, and by 1988 was abandoned by Jordan.

The Gaza Strip figured prominently in the peace negotiations that began between Egypt and Israel in 1977–1978. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East, signed by Israel and Egypt at Camp David in 1978, proposed a limited form of autonomy for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, although Israel would retain control of land, water, settlements, and BORDERS. It also promised a local Palestinian governing council similar to the one that existed in Gaza before 1967. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt suggested implementing the autonomy plan first in the Gaza Strip, because it was smaller and its borders, unlike those of the West Bank, were not in dispute. The Israeli government supported in principle this "Gaza First" approach, but failed to implement any of the related tenets of the Framework for Peace. Not until the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES did Tel Aviv actually commit to a "Gaza First" plan and then largely as a means of extricating itself from the demographic and other problems Gaza posed as well as an "exchange" for a strengthened and solidified Israeli hold over the West Bank. The 1978 autonomy plan, however, was rejected by the Gazans, including Mayor Shawwa, as well as by the PLO, which was popular in Gaza by that time. In 1982, Israel removed Shawwa from his post, and the Israeli CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, which remained under military command, reassumed control of the Gaza municipal council. In 1991, Israel allowed the establishment of a new Palestinian municipal council, headed by Fayez Abu Rahmeh, an attorney and Fatah activist.

The Gaza Strip's rejection of Israeli Occupation was clearly expressed with the eruption of the first Palestinian uprising on 9 December 1987, which was triggered when an Israeli vehicle hit and killed four Palestinians, including two children, and injured seven in the Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza. The First Intifada, as it is called, soon spread to the rest of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Although its beginning was spontaneous, it quickly transformed into an organized rebellion that relied on a campaign of civil and economic disobedience. Israel met this resistance with a violent response that led, between 9 December 1987 and 30 December 1990, to the deaths of 782 Palestinians (mainly civilians) killed by Israeli forces and settlers, the deaths of 65 Israelis (civilians and military) killed by Palestinians, and 130,787 Palestinians injured. Despite its heavy human toll, the First Intifada was important in changing the political landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Locally the Intifada gave rise to the Islamic resistance movement Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamia), which emerged out of the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD in Gaza. Hamas, which Israel initially supported in an attempt to undermine the PLO, was soon to compete with the PLO for dominance of the Palestinian political agenda. Regionally the Intifada brought an end to the Jordanian Option, as Jordan declared its disengagement from the West Bank on 31 July 1988, stating

that it did not represent or speak for the Palestinian people.

The Intifada also enabled the PLO, under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, to announce its historic compromise with Israel. On 15 November 1988 the PLO declared that it supported the creation of a Palestinian state on any part of liberated Palestine—meaning it accepted a state on the 22 percent of Palestine (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza) that was not Israel. In December 1988 the PLO announced its recognition of Israel, along with its acceptance of UN Resolution 242 and the two-state solution. The PLO's historic compromise opened the way for the UNITED STATES–PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DIALOGUE and for Palestinian (though not PLO) participation at the MADRID CONFERENCE, which opened on 21 October 1991. The Palestinian delegation, which was part of the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, was led by HAYDAR 'ABD AL-SHAFI, a prominent doctor who was the chairman of the first Gaza Legislative Council and a longtime political activist from Gaza.

Oslo Years: 1993–2000

The secret Oslo negotiations between Israel and the PLO in 1992–1993, which sidetracked the Madrid multilateral peace talks, initially revolved around the Gaza Strip. Israeli officials, including LABOR PARTY leaders YITZHAK RABIN and SHIMON PERES, were interested in resurrecting the "Gaza First" option, first proposed at the Camp David negotiations in 1978. They proposed Palestinian autonomy in Gaza under PLO rule as a first step toward a peaceful settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. The PLO accepted the idea of phased Palestinian self-rule, so long as it was not confined exclusively to Gaza, and proposed initial self-rule in the West Bank town of JERICHO as well. The OSLO ACCORDS, signed in September 1993 (Declaration of Principles), and GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT I in May 1994 provided for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and the establishment of an interim government, the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), in Gaza and Jericho. On 25 May 1994, IDF forces redeployed from Gaza City and Jericho. On 1 July 1994 Arafat returned to Gaza from his exile in TUNIS, his first entry into the Palestinian territories.

Yitzhak Rabin, however, decided that it was necessary to physically tighten the existing fence around Gaza to give Israel more control. He ordered the construction of a GAZA STRIP BARRIER, a continuous obstacle, 37.5 miles (60 kilometers) long with four crossing points—Eretz, Karni, Kisufim, and Sufa. Kisufim was used exclusively by Israeli civilians and army forces. Most of the fence was equipped with sensors, and bordering it on either side was an area of 300 meters that the IDF leveled and cleared of all foliage. The fence was continuously manned with troops sitting in watchtowers and utilizing other means of scouting and patrolling the terrain.

The Gaza Strip proved to be the test for Palestinian state building. The Oslo II, or INTERIM AGREEMENT, in September 1995 set out the terms for staged Israeli redeployment from the Palestinian territories and the scope of Palestinian jurisdiction. In January 1996, ELECTIONS were held for the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, the legislative branch of the PNA, and for the presidency of the PNA. These were boycotted by Hamas, which had already condemned the Madrid and Oslo negotiations. Hamas, however, accepted the return of the PLO from exile in Tunis and strove to avoid a civil war among the Palestinians, despite its disagreement with the Oslo framework. Under Arafat's leadership the PNA established a large state bureaucracy and security force filled with members of the PLO OLD GUARD, who returned from Tunis after being driven from Lebanon in 1982, as well as loyal Fatah members from the Occupied Territories. The PNA government and legislature, whose offices oscillated between Gaza and Ramallah (in the West Bank), sought to lay the foundation for an independent Palestinian state but without much success.

The terms of the Oslo Accords seriously constrained the scope of Palestinian jurisdiction and basically redefined rather than ended Israeli Occupation. While the Oslo Accords transferred to the PNA functional jurisdiction over civilian affairs, they strictly limited territorial jurisdiction. By the time FINAL STATUS TALKS took place at Camp David in July 2000, the PNA had functional jurisdiction over 93 percent of the Palestinian population, but territorial control over only 80 percent of the Gaza Strip and less than 22 percent of the land in the West Bank (Area A). Palestinian authority in Gaza was further constrained by Israel's continuous control of borders, land, and water resources, along with the expansion of its settlements. The entry and exit of Palestinian citizens, workers, goods, and government officials out of and into Gaza

remained under the control of the Israeli permit and CLOSURE policy. Between 1994 and 2000, Israel imposed over 493 days of closure on Gaza.

By 1997, one of the major challenges facing the PNA was the need to maintain its legitimacy in view of the growing opposition to the Oslo peace process, mainly led by Hamas, which had its most violent expression in SUICIDE BOMBINGS on civilians inside Israel. This strategy, initiated in April 1994 after Israeli settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN massacred twenty-nine Palestinians at prayer in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in the West Bank city of HEBRON in February 1994, intensified after the 1996 assassination of Hamas militant YAHYA AYYASH in Gaza. The PNA's response to Hamas's suicide attacks was to attack Hamas, imprisoning many of its members, closing down its offices and associations, and clamping down on its social activities and press. Opposition to the PNA also grew from within its own ranks, among the young cadres of Fatah, as well as from secular forces and the rest of the population who were opposed to Arafat's antidemocratic style of government, patronage, corruption, attempts to control the NGO community, and failure to hold elections scheduled for 1999. The AL-AQSA INTIFADA of 2000 was nearly as much a rebellion against the PNA's style of government as against Israel's policies during the Oslo years, which had deepened rather than ended Israeli Occupation.

2000–2005: The Road Map to Disengagement

The al-Aqsa Intifada, which erupted on 29 September 2000, ended the Oslo peace process. The second uprising proved to be far more militarized, violent, and devastating for the Palestinians than had the First Intifada. Both Hamas and Fatah's AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, the military wing of Fatah in the West Bank, led the resistance against Israel's Occupation through a series of armed strikes and suicide attacks inside Israel. This strategy led to a harsh Israeli military response that brought a heavy toll on Palestinian lives and INFRASTRUCTURE, particularly in the Gaza Strip. Between 28 September 2000 and 26 December 2008, a total of 4,837 Palestinians and 1,062 Israelis were killed. During heavy Israeli military escalations in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2006 the Gaza Strip suffered severe human and material losses. According to World Bank data, between 2000 and 2008 and on the eve of another major Israeli operation in Gaza, 75 percent of the population lived below the poverty level, the PNA's infrastructure and Hamas's institutions were destroyed, and per capita annual income had fallen from $1,231 to $942.

At the start of the Intifada, Israel cut the Gaza Strip into three parts, with the only road that connected the south to the north frequently shut by the Israeli military. In the spring of 2004, Israel's policy of TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS led to the liquidation of most Hamas leaders, including SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, the spiritual founder of the movement, and his successor, ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI.

Israel's political response to the al-Aqsa Intifada was its plan for unilateral disengagement from Gaza, which was officially announced in April 2004 and revised and approved by the Israeli cabinet in June 2004. This plan formalized the objective of successive Israeli governments, which was to disengage from the Gaza Strip while maintaining control over the major part of the West Bank. The plan called for the evacuation of all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip and the redeployment of the Israeli army outside the territory. It also promised Israeli withdrawal from four small settlements in the northern West Bank, but specified that "in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] some areas will remain part of the State of Israel." When US president GEORGE W. BUSH endorsed the disengagement plan, it gained some international acceptance, despite its violation of UN resolutions that called for a negotiated settlement and affirmed the illegality of acquiring land by force. The plan effectively sidetracked the April 2003 internationally backed Road Map to peace in the Middle East, which provided the clearest US-led international call for the idea of a viable Palestinian state as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Israel completed its disengagement from Gaza in August 2005, successfully evacuating all the Jewish settlers and destroying their seventeen settlements without major incident. Although Israel considers that its responsibility toward the Gaza Strip has ended as a result of the disengagement, virtually no other international organization agrees, and based on major tenets of INTERNATIONAL LAW an international consensus exists that given the degree of "effective control" Israel maintains over Gaza, the Occupation remains and Israel is responsible for the welfare of the population. Israel continues to control exit and entry points to the strip and to "maintain exclusive authority for

Gaza's air space, and . . . exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip" (Disengagement Plan, Article III.1). The plan also stipulates that the Strip be demilitarized and that the water, electrical, and other infrastructure that links Gaza to Israel be kept in place (Article VIII). It further stipulates that the Rafah border be monitored by a joint Israeli-Egyptian-Palestinian police force while all other borders and exit points remain under exclusive Israeli control. Israel's hegemony over the borders and Gaza's links to the West Bank and East Jerusalem effectively eliminates Palestinian jurisdiction as well as any Palestinian movement among these areas.

During the six weeks while Israel evacuated its settler population from the Gaza Strip, the Israeli military conducted 1,041 security raids in Palestinian areas, half of which were in Gaza, killing a total of 22 Palestinians.

Gaza in the Aftermath of the Unilateral Disengagement

Rather than leading to Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank as the PNA hoped, Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip and its continued domination of Palestinian resources (land, water, etc.) brought about deeper economic and political destruction. It continued Israel's brutal Occupation of the Palestinians and institutionalized the fragmentation of the Palestinian polity.

Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip on 15 August 2005 reinforced the power of Hamas in the Strip and contributed to its success in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. However, Hamas's electoral win led to international sanctions (because Hamas refused to officially recognize Israel's right to exist), which in turn deprived the PNA of the annual average of $55 million in customs and revenues clearance that Israel was required by the Interim Agreement to remit to the PNA and that constituted 70 percent of the PNA's budget. The PNA was also deprived of international aid, and Gaza was sealed from any trade with the outside world and with the West Bank (the Karni border crossing was closed 47 percent of its scheduled operating time in 2006, and completely closed after 2007). In June 2006, following a Hamas raid near the Kerem Shalom border crossing that resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers and the capture of IDF corporal Gilad Shalit, Israel launched Operation Summer Rains. This operation, which lasted until 26 November 2006, resulted in the death of 402 Palestinians and 6 Israelis. Palestinians in Gaza responded by continuing to launch Qassam rockets that reached as far as Ashkelon and Sderot. Between 2001 and 2008, some 15,000 Qassam rockets were fired from Gaza, killing some 18 Israeli civilians.

Together with the military Operation Summer Rains, Israel imposed a total blockade on the Gaza Strip that lasted beyond January 2009. This contributed to an implosion of Palestinian society and polity, as interclan fighting and clashes between Fatah and Hamas militias took to the street. In February 2007, Hamas and Fatah signed the Mecca Agreement, which led to the establishment of a Palestinian National Unity government as a means to resolve their conflict and entice the international community to lift the sanctions it had imposed on the Palestinians following the Hamas 2006 victory. The National Unity government failed, and in mid-June 2007, Hamas took control of Gaza, ousting Fatah militants from the Strip. Thereafter the Gaza Strip was split politically, economically, and territorially from the West Bank.

Israel tightened its siege of the strip after the Hamas takeover. In September 2007 it declared Gaza an "enemy entity" and intensified its air and ground raids. With all access to and from the outside world severed, in January 2008, Hamas militants blew holes in the border wall with Egypt, allowing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to go into Egypt to stock up on food, medicine, and other essential goods for a total of ten days, after which Egypt closed its borders. Israeli air strikes and Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli towns escalated in 2008 until a six-month truce agreement, brokered by Egypt, was accepted by Israel and Hamas on 19 June 2008. Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation reached disastrous proportions. In 2006, Israel had destroyed Gaza's main electricity station and most of its major roads, and ruined hundreds of acres of agricultural land. By 2008, 56 percent of the population was food insecure and the poverty level had reached 79.4 percent. People in Gaza continued to suffer from a lack of electricity, fuel, and spare parts, as well as food, medicine, and cash.

Hamas leaders signaled readiness to accept Israel's de facto existence, even if they did not explicitly recognize Israel's *right* to exist. In a series of interviews in April 2008, they called for a peace process with Israel based on Israeli

withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and an end of the blockade. Israel, however, declared its intention to "topple the Hamas regime in Gaza," as expressed by Foreign Minister TZIPI LIVNI in December 2008. On 4 November 2008, Israel violated the June 2008 truce and entered Gaza, killing six people and capturing six others. On 19 December 2008, subsequent to further clashes, Hamas called off the six-month truce. On 27 December 2008, Israel launched OPERATION CAST LEAD, which lasted until 18 January 2009. The stated purpose of the offensive was to end the firing of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israel. In the twenty-two days of Operation Cast Lead, the IDF reported 10 fatalities, all combatants, of whom 4 were killed by friendly fire, 1 inside Israel by a Qassam rocket, and 5 in combat with Palestinian forces. The Palestinian death toll reached a total of 1,417, of which 926 were civilians, including 313 children and 116 women. Noncombatant police officers constituted 255, and 236 combatants were killed, representing 16.7 percent of the total deaths. The number of civilian fatalities included 16 medics and 4 journalists. The number of wounded was approximately 5,500, of which two-thirds were civilians. Operation Cast Lead caused the destruction of 15–20 percent of the Gaza Strip's total infrastructure at an estimated cost of US$1.4 billion.

Hamas has not been defeated, but Gaza remains under siege and its population destitute. Talks among Hamas, Fatah, and other Palestinian factions resumed in Cairo in February 2009 in an attempt to achieve national Palestinian reconciliation.

The Gaza Strip's Economic Predicament

The economy of the Gaza Strip has been characterized by its internal weakness, its small size relative to that of the West Bank, its dependence on external sources of income, and its unsustainability. During the late nineteenth century and the British Mandate period, the economy, though largely based on subsistence agriculture, was already developing an export trade and market production, particularly of wheat and barley. During the period of Egyptian administration, services became the main source of economic activity, accounting for 55 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), followed by agriculture, which accounted for 34 percent of GDP. In 1966, gross national product (GNP) per capita in the Gaza Strip was half that of the West Bank and less than 1.6 percent that of Israel. Most of the labor force was employed in services (45 percent), followed by agriculture (35 percent), which was almost exclusively citrus production. UNRWA remains the main employer and provider for the refugees, who comprise 78 percent of Gaza's population.

The Occupation of the Gaza Strip in 1967 integrated this refugee-dominated and mainly agricultural economy into Israel's industrial and more developed economy, expropriating its resources and preventing it from competing with Israeli industries by means of trade and resource restrictions and barriers. According to Sara Roy, a leading expert on Gaza, from 1967 the Strip underwent a process of "de-development." The Israeli Occupation led to major structural changes in the Gaza economy, the central one being Palestinian dependence on the Israeli labor market. Between 1975 and 1993, 30 to 45 percent of the Gaza Strip's total labor force worked in Israel, thereby financing the Strip's trade deficit with Israel, which represented over 42 percent of Gaza's GNP. While employment in Israel was key to improving Palestinian standards of living and increasing demand in the domestic economy, Israeli restrictions on domestic investment and on Gazan access to land, water, and outside markets prevented the development of a vibrant, internally articulated Palestinian economy. Israel became the market for 70 percent of Gaza's (and the West Bank's) exports and the source of 90 percent of its imports. Although Gazan agriculture became more productive, it was skewed toward Israeli demand rather than toward domestic or international markets, and its share of the GDP dropped to less than 20 percent after 1990. The industrial sector was organized in small cottage industries such as sewing, increasingly geared toward subcontracting for large Israeli companies. Like those in the West Bank, Gazan industries were not allowed to compete with Israeli goods and represented less than 11 percent of GDP by 1991. Most Palestinian investment went into housing and construction (80 percent of total investment in the 1980s), which absorbed over 10 percent of the labor force and generated 18 percent of Gaza's GDP.

The OSLO PROCESS of 1994–2000 brought promises to "lay the groundwork for strengthening the economic base of the Palestinian [economy] and for exercising its right of economic decision making in accordance with its own development plans and priorities" (preamble to the Economic

Protocol, Interim or Oslo II Agreement). However, the Gazan economy further deteriorated, largely as a result of the failure of the Oslo Process to end Israeli Occupation and because of the myriad security and economic provisions in the Interim Agreement, Oslo II, that worked to Palestinian disadvantage. Israel remained in control of borders and security—and thereby of the movement of goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. It also restricted Palestinian workers' access to Israel, as it consolidated the permit and closure policies. The number of Gazans working in Israel fell from 43,000 in 1992 to fewer than 10,000 in 1996, or 8 percent of the labor force. Unemployment, meanwhile, soared from 15 to 32 percent between 1994 and 2000, decreasing whenever labor and goods access to Israel was restored. After 2000, unemployment rose to 38 percent. In 1998, those living in poverty, defined as those earning less than US$2.10 per day, constituted 46 percent of the population, compared with less than 16 percent in the West Bank.

The Oslo years led to the separation of the Gaza economy from Israel and its de facto separation from the economy of the West Bank. Structurally the Gaza economy became dependent on foreign aid, customs revenues from Israel, and public employment, in contrast to the pre-1993 era when it was dependent on labor export to Israel. The establishment of the PNA expanded the public sector and absorbed 26 to 32 percent of the labor force in the Gaza Strip, but it also created a system of patronage that proved detrimental to the efficient management of resources. At the same time, the sustainability of the public sector and the economy at large remained dependent on the generosity and vision of the donor community and custom revenues collected by Israel. These revenues represented 70 percent of the PNA's revenues and 20 percent of Palestinian GDP. Meanwhile, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the EUROPEAN UNION disbursed $3.5 billion to the Palestinian economy between 1995 and 2000. They have also become the main advisors, and supporters, of Palestinian finances and the economy at large. Nevertheless, they failed to make the Palestinian economy self-sufficient. Meanwhile, trade between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank dropped by 30 percent between 1994 and 1997, and trade with Israel dropped by 40 percent. By 2007 the Gaza economy was half the size of the West Bank's, and its GDP per capita was two-thirds that of the West Bank.

The al-Aqsa Intifada and disengagement plan confirmed the separation of the Gaza Strip from Israel and the West Bank and destroyed whatever remained of the Gaza economy. While formally committed to previously signed economic agreements, the disengagement plan suggests a severance of economic relations between Israel and the Gaza Strip. At the time of disengagement Israeli officials made it clear that they intended to terminate permits for Palestinians workers and their access to Israel by 2008, and to end customs arrangements with the Strip. While the disengagement plan promises the construction of an international SEAPORT and AIRPORT in Gaza, the movements of persons and freight will continue to be supervised by Israel. The international community promised to disburse $1.1 billion a year between 2004 and 2008 to help the Palestinian economy recover after the disengagement. However, by 2008 the Gaza economy had completely collapsed as a result of the sanctions and siege imposed on it since 2006.

According to the 2008 World Bank report, the manufacturing sector was 98 percent inactive, the banking sector had shut down, and the private sector had been destroyed. Bare economic survival became a function of "tunnel economics" (consisting of over 500 tunnels through which goods were smuggled from Egypt to the Strip), the economics of informal sector, and monopoly thugs unaccountable to law.

See also ECONOMY; INFILTRATION AND RETALIATION; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM; ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; KARNI CROSSING; OPERATION CAST LEAD; RAFAH CROSSING; WEST BANK

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—Leila Farsakh

Gaza Strip Barrier

Begun in 1994 and completed in 1996 in the context of the OSLO ACCORDS, a separation barrier around the Gaza Strip, home to 1.4 million Palestinians, was constructed at the order of Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN. Completely encircling Gaza, the barrier is made up of an electric fence with observation towers, sensors, and buffer zones on lands bordering Israel, and concrete and steel walls on lands bordering EGYPT. It is 37 miles (60 kilometers) long with three crossing points: the northern ERETZ into Israel, the southern RAFAH into Egypt, and the eastern KARNI used only for cargo.

Between December 2000 and June 2001 the part of the barrier separating the Gaza Strip from Israel was reconstructed, and a 1-kilometer buffer zone was added, as well as high-technology observation posts. Soldiers were also given new rules of engagement, which allow them to fire at anyone seen there at night. Along the Egyptian border with Rafah, Israel established a buffer zone 200 to 300 yards wide known as the PHILADELPHI ROUTE, or Philadelphi corridor. In order to construct this buffer zone, entire blocks of houses were demolished at the main entrance to Rafah's central throughway as well as in other neighborhoods. In 2005, Israel constructed a concrete wall over 26 feet (8 meters) high that was equipped with electronic sensors and underground concrete barriers to prevent tunneling, adding to the already existing steel wall running the length of the border with Egypt.

The three crossing points in the barrier are crucial to the population, who live in an area too small to be self-sufficient, at barely 3.4–7.8 miles (6–12 kilometers) wide and 25 miles (41 kilometers) long, with a total area of 140 square miles (360 square kilometers). In 2007 approximately 1.4 million Palestinians lived in the Strip, of whom almost 1 million were UN-registered REFUGEES. The Eretz crossing is the only pedestrian exit point from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Palestinians who have a PERMIT (some 5,000) to work in Israel or those with permits allowing them to receive medical treatment or to visit immediate family in prisons in Israel use this crossing, provided that it is open and that soldiers honor the permits. As a crossing for the transportation of cargo and goods between Israel and the Gaza Strip, Karni is vitally important to the Palestinian economy. Nevertheless, the Karni crossing is often closed by Israel.

On 17 June 2005, Israel announced plans to build a barrier that will extend out to the sea from its border with Gaza in order to deter Palestinian infiltrators from entering Gaza and then Israel. The *Jerusalem Post* reported that the first 150 meters of the sea barrier would consist of concrete pilings set into the seabed, while the remaining 800 meters would be a submerged, 1.8-meter-deep "floating fence." The *Post* further revealed that the barrier would stretch 950 meters into the Mediterranean from Israel's boundary with the northern Gaza Strip. The aim, according to Israel, is to stop Gaza

militants from launching attacks into Israel by sea, but it will be the death knell for the Gazan fishing industry.

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Gaza, Unilateral Withdrawal from

See Israel's Unilateral Disengagement from Gaza

General Strike

See Arab Revolt

Geneva Accord, 2003

The eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada and the January 2001 election of Ariel Sharon as Israel's prime minister ended any serious official negotiations for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unwilling to allow the escalating violence to destroy the chances for peace, Israeli and Palestinian delegations met in Geneva in October 2003. The Israeli delegation, which included Amram Mitzna, mayor of Haifa and leader of the Labor Party, and Labor Party leader Avraham Burg, was headed by Yossi Beilin, who is widely acknowledged as the most important political leader within the Israeli peace camp. The Palestinian delegation, which included prominent Palestinian academics and politicians, was headed by Yasir 'Abd Rabbu, a former minister in the Palestinian National Authority known to have been close to Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat.

The result of the talks was the Geneva Accord: Draft Permanent Status Agreement (GA), a highly detailed unofficial agreement that covers most aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and represents the almost universally acknowledged basis for a peace settlement in a two-state formula. Although the GA is unofficial, it was negotiated by high-level Israeli and Palestinian teams and is based upon and extends the 1993 Oslo Accords, the 1995 Beilin–Abu Mazen Accord, the unsuccessful but important 2000 Camp David negotiations that were followed by the December 2000 Clinton parameters, and the 2001 Israeli-Palestinian Taba Talks.

In embodying a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Geneva Accord recognized and acknowledged "the right of both the Jewish and Palestinian peoples to statehood . . . within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." Within this framework the main issues were resolved by mutual compromises, including territorial and security issues, the division of Jerusalem, and the status of Palestinian refugees. Other important issues, especially the disposition of water resources, were to be resolved later in special annexes to the accord.

At Geneva the Israeli delegation agreed to a more generous territorial compromise than Israel had previously. The accord required Israel to end its Occupation and withdraw from almost all of the territories conquered in the 1967 War, including all of Gaza and some 98 percent of the West Bank. Even with these concessions, however, Israel would still comprise about 77 percent of the land of Palestine as it existed under the British Mandate, leaving the Palestinians with only the remaining 23 percent. Approximately 2 percent of the West Bank, containing about 110,000 Jewish settlers within three of the largest Israeli settlements, would be transferred to Israeli sovereignty, while the remaining settlers scattered throughout the West Bank heartland (approximately 100,000) would be evacuated and settled in Israel. According to the accord, Palestinians would be compensated for this Israeli annexation through a land swap near the Gaza Strip in which they would receive some 2 percent of Israeli territory. Because this

land is agricultural, it could help the Gazan economy and widen the Palestinian corridor between Gaza and the West Bank.

To accommodate Israel's security concerns the Palestinian state would be demilitarized; no army or heavy weapons would be allowed, but only a police force sufficient to maintain internal law and order. All existing Palestinian militias would be disarmed, and Israeli border forces would be supplemented by an international peacekeeping force, composed mainly of US troops, which would control the BORDERS between Israel and the Palestinian state. The Palestinians agreed to allow Israel to continue high-altitude military flights over the West Bank and to maintain two early-warning radar stations in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY.

Jerusalem would be divided into East JERUSALEM and West Jerusalem, and each would become the internationally recognized capital of each state. The line of division would be based on the general principle of the Clinton Parameters: "What is Jewish is Israeli, what is Arab is Palestinian." Israel would be allowed to keep the Jewish neighborhoods it has established since 1967 within what was formerly Arab East Jerusalem and would hold sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the OLD CITY and the WESTERN WALL. Other sites regarded as holy by Jews, Muslims, and Christians would be under international supervision. The Palestinians would gain sovereignty over the remaining Arab areas of East Jerusalem as well as most of the Old City—in particular, over the Muslim holy places on what Israel calls the TEMPLE MOUNT and the Arabs the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF.

Aside from Jerusalem, the most contentious issue in all Israeli-Palestinian negotiations has been over the right of return for the Palestinian REFUGEES from the 1948 and 1967 WARS. The Geneva Accord also embodied the Clinton Parameters on this issue: at the discretion of the Israeli government, a few Palestinians might be able to return to what is now Israel, but there would be no overall right of return. Instead, the refugees would be offered generous economic compensation provided by the international community and given the choice between an unlimited right to return to the new Palestinian state and resettlement in another country that would accept them.

Several important issues were not resolved at Geneva, principally those concerning legal and economic relations between the two states and the disposition of the WATER resources near the 1967 borders. Some settlements slated for annexation by Israel were built over aquifers, making it imperative for the Palestinian state to be compensated for the loss of these crucial water sources. The Geneva agreement posits the building of internationally financed desalination plants, although this as well as other technical, security, and legal issues was left for resolution in separate negotiations that would later be incorporated into the accord in special annexes.

In sum, the Jerusalem and refugee issues that prevented a comprehensive settlement at the 2000 Camp David negotiations were potentially resolved in the Geneva Accord on the basis of a compromise: the Palestinians essentially accepted the Clinton proposals on the refugees, thus giving Israel a de facto veto over any return. In return, the Israelis conceded the division of Jerusalem and Palestinian sovereignty over the al-Haram ash-Sharif.

As the al-Aqsa Intifada escalated throughout 2003–2004, leaders on both sides backed away from the Geneva Accord. The Israeli government of ARIEL SHARON dismissed it out of hand, and even EHUD BARAK, who had appointed Yossi Beilin as the head of the Israeli delegation at Taba, denounced the agreement. As was typical, Arafat's response was noncommittal, even though some of his closest associates were members of the Palestinian team and he had encouraged the negotiations. However, the two most important Palestinian successors to Arafat, MAHMUD ABBAS and AHMAD QUREI', have long been strong supporters of a compromise two-state settlement. It is widely understood and accepted by most Israelis and Palestinians—political leaders, the general public, and specialists alike—that the Geneva Accord will be the framework for any political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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—Jerome Slater

Geneva Conference, 1973

The Geneva Conference was part of US secretary of state HENRY KISSINGER's diplomacy after the 1973 WAR. It was to be convened on 18 December 1973 with EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, and Israel as participants; with the UNITED STATES and the SOVIET UNION as cosponsors; and with the UNITED NATIONS as the official host. It seems certain that Kissinger knew the conference could not resolve the basic issues in dispute; moreover, he personally opposed both a comprehensive peace settlement and Soviet participation. But he believed that convening such a conference would give him time for behind-the-scenes personal diplomacy and that the psychological factor of bringing Arabs and Israelis together for diplomatic intercourse could set an important precedent. Egypt, however, was the only willing participant among the Middle East actors. Kissinger declined to meet Syria's prerequisites, and Jordan's initial enthusiasm for a Geneva Conference was significantly dampened as a result of the ALGIERS SUMMIT (which transferred responsibility for the Palestinians to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION [PLO]), although Jordan's wavering was overcome with relative ease.

Israel was strongly opposed to the Geneva Conference, and its disinclination to attend was far less easily resolved than Jordan's. It put forward a number of demands as prerequisites for its attendance at Geneva. One was for an explicit provision in the conference invitations stating that the original composition of the conference could be expanded only unanimously. This demand, to which Kissinger agreed, was intended to ensure that the PLO would be formally barred from Geneva and that its later participation at any reconvened conference would be subject to an Israeli veto. Israel was also given a private, written assurance that the United States would oppose, to the point of veto, any invitation to the PLO without Israel's consent. Kissinger's commitment prevented the United States from negotiating with the PLO until it met Israel's conditions. It was a substantial concession on the part of the United States considering that PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT had written to Kissinger on 10 October expressing the PLO's willingness to participate in postwar negotiations, given the intense feelings throughout the Arab world on this issue and the centrality of the Palestinian question to any final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel also demanded that the United Nations have no more than a ceremonial role, arguing that granting the auspices for a peace conference between Israel and the Arab states to an organization in which the Arabs had an automatic majority was unacceptable.

In response Kissinger manipulated the program to ensure that the United Nations would only convene the conference and not supervise it, and also arranged the conference so that the participants would form subgroups as rapidly as possible, ensuring that diplomacy would proceed in a bilateral fashion. Israel refused to sit in the same room with the Syrians unless they first met Israel's demand for a list of prisoners from the 1973 War being held in Syria and allowed the Red Cross to visit them, but Syria refused to come to Geneva, so Kissinger did not have to negotiate with Damascus regarding Israel's demands.

When Syria's president Hafez Assad declined the invitation to Geneva, he stated that he would not attend a formal peace conference without an initial disengagement agreement with Israel. He was extremely disturbed that there was to be an agreement concerning the Egyptian front before

there was one on the Syrian front. He saw this as a serious threat to the Egyptian-Syrian alliance and suspected, rightly, that Egyptian president Anwar Sadat had not informed him of all the arrangements he had concluded with Kissinger. Indeed, the secretary of state had played his role craftily in provoking ill-feeling between Syria and Egypt in the postwar period and by engaging in double-dealing and innuendoes.

The Geneva Conference convened on 21 December 1973 but was then recessed indefinitely. Nothing was accomplished at Geneva and subsequent attempts to reconvene the conference—for example, President JIMMY CARTER's 1977 effort—were unsuccessful, primarily because Israel objected to dealing with all the Arab states in a single forum, preferring instead bilateral negotiations.

See also GERALD FORD; RICHARD NIXON; UNITED STATES

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Germany

Federal Republic of Germany and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Within the first four days after YASIR ARAFAT, chairman of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), began in August 1994 to organize the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), two foreign states established diplomatic representations with the PNA—SWEDEN and Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany). Germany's swift action came because the OSLO PROCESS represented the first real opportunity for the German government to become involved in the Palestinian issue, not just verbally, as previously with political statements, but in a highly visible form—and at the same time in full agreement with Israel. Until then, "official Germany"—the government and the major political parties in the Bundestag (the federal parliament)—had treated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as merely one dimension of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict, with the Palestinian issue consisting of little more than the REFUGEE problem rather than a matter of Palestinian political rights. If there was a political dimension to the problem for Germany, it was the TERRORISM of some of the Palestinian political groups—such as the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION's attack on Israeli athletes during the 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS.

The prolonged exclusion of the Palestinian issue from official German policy was only one of the consequences of its policy options in the aftermath of the Nazi crimes. During the first decades after World War II, the Arab-Israeli conflict, with its attendant Palestinian dimension, was primarily an irritant in German endeavors to establish a working relationship with Jews—which at the time could only mean with Israel. On the German side, positive developments in these relations, accompanied by tensions and crises, were often expressed as a sense of guilt and obligation over the Nazi genocide of European Jews. This does not mean that the Arab-Israeli conflict went unrecognized in West Germany, but it was not perceived in German foreign policy or within German-Israeli relations as a factor in its own right. The conflict was viewed more as an obstacle to Germany's responsibilities toward Israel and an almost insurmountable dilemma for German foreign policy that sought to balance its relationship with Israel with German (commercial) interests in the Arab world. Only after—long after—the 1967 WAR did the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors and Israeli policy in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES become a factor in German-Israeli relations too.

Several factors account for Germany's limited involvement. Consecutive West German governments from the 1950s onward failed to develop a coherent and consistent Middle East policy, in spite of good and in some cases quite close bilateral relations with most states in the Middle East. In the early years Germany simply operated without a formal Middle East policy, but a policy of "even-handedness" was more clearly articulated by the social-liberal government of German chancellor Willy Brandt after 1969, and the government could expect that its policy would be accepted by all the factions in the administration's coalition without

major contradictions and conflicts. The situation improved somewhat when Germany initiated a two-pronged policy by adding to its bilateral relations with Israel an active involvement on the multilateral level. This came about through German participation in the European Community's European Political Cooperation (EPC), which placed a special emphasis on the Middle East. The EUROPEAN UNION's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) let the German government hide behind its partners when taking positions on the conflict; this was more acceptable to the Arab side but strained Germany's relations with Israel. Additionally, a more consistent policy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict emerged due to Germany's own forays into multilateralism and efforts to improve relations with Arab and other European countries after 1989.

German Reparations to Israel. After World War II, Germany faced many difficulties in creating a foreign policy. To be accepted again by the international community, the first postwar West German government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had to demonstrate that it represented a very different Germany. That meant, among other things, that Germany would have to make amends (at least on the material level) for the Nazi crimes against the Jews. This led to the 1952 Agreements on Restitution and Indemnification (the Luxembourg Treaty), which for Germans became the Reparations Agreement, or the Agreement of Making Good Again. Under its terms West Germany committed itself to pay Israel 3 billion German marks (DM) ($820 million in 1952 US dollars) over a period of twelve to fourteen years as "global recompense for the costs of the integration" of Jewish refugees from Europe. The agreement stipulated that two-thirds of the amount would be spent on German-made goods and services, and one-third would be paid in currency to British companies for oil shipments to Israel.

Today the overall sum of DM 3.45 billion seems somewhat small, but for postwar Germany it amounted to 15 percent of the total annual budget of the federal government, which was DM 23 billion (over $5 billion) in the year when the agreements were signed. The cost to Germany is one reason why the agreements were strongly opposed by some, including Adenauer's own cabinet minister of finance. For Israel, on the other hand, the financial aspects of the agreement were of huge significance in its early years, helping it to overcome enormous economic difficulties and setting it firmly on the road to economic modernization and development. In addition Israel received indirect economic support through large amounts of foreign exchange from Germany. Under the Federal Law of Restitution and Indemnification of 1953, the West German government paid billions of marks in reparations, mostly to individuals, out of which large portions went to Jewish recipients in Israel and to the Israeli government. By the year 2000, overall payments had reached more than DM 100 billion, one-third of which went as payments to individuals in Israel.

The ARAB LEAGUE, as well as individual Arab governments, attempted to change the Israel agreement, but they failed to influence either the negotiations or the later ratification procedure. The Arab states did not question Germany's moral obligation to pay reparations for injustices done to Jews, but they maintained that Israel was not the legal heir of individual Jewish victims and therefore could not put forward its own claims. Moreover, the Arab states maintained that because Israel rejected UNITED NATIONS resolutions demanding compensation for the Palestinian refugees, it had no right to compensation recognized by INTERNATIONAL LAW. In West Germany opponents of the reparations agreement argued that Israel was in a state of war with the Arab world and that as a neutral country, Germany should not support one of the belligerent parties. At the same time, opponents stressed Germany's own dire financial situation and its need to rebuild from the war's destruction.

The most serious Arab argument was that strengthening Israel's economy would increase its military potential and thus its ability to commit acts of aggression on its neighbors. Adenauer answered Arab objections by declaring that the agreement's provisions forbade Israel from using the monies to purchase arms or other war materials. This argument was particularly unconvincing, because all payments under the restitution agreement would increase Israel's available resources for military production or purchases of arms from abroad. Arab critics pointed out, moreover, that 60 percent of the goods on the "Schedule of Commodities" appended to the Israel agreement were classified as "strategic goods" and as such were on the German embargo lists for its trade with Eastern Europe. Indeed, Adenauer's policy of "moral recovery," which was to convince the world that he represented a new "other" Germany, had its own

pressing agenda. But it was not part of a policy that involved justice in a universal sense. The Germans involved in negotiating the reparation payments never considered the impact their support of Israel might have on the Palestinians, who, forced to flee their homes and fields, had to bear a large share of the cost for resettling the Jewish refugees.

Military Cooperation with Israel. During the 1950s and early 1960s, West Germany was preoccupied with economic growth, political integration in the West, and the problem of Germany's division into East and West (after the Soviet takeover in 1949). As a result the republic did not pursue a clearly formulated policy in areas outside the world of the big powers. This was even more the case when Germany was confronted—as it was in the Middle East—with a regional conflict that did not fit neatly into Cold War politics. For different reasons both parties to the conflict were important to Germany, but neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict and reasonably good relations with both sides—a policy successfully pursued by smaller European states and some nonaligned countries—proved at first difficult and finally impossible for Germany.

For one thing the Arab market appeared highly promising for German exports and direct investments, while some Arab states became increasingly vital suppliers of oil. Additionally, the growing number of independent Arab states that formed a significant bloc in international politics and at the United Nations—and could have been supporters of the German cause—were lost due to Germany's relations with Israel. Well aware of these factors, the Near East section of the German Foreign Office repeatedly urged the German government to avoid policies that could impair Germany's traditionally good relationship with the Arab world. Germany, however, while fulfilling its obligations to Israel under the restitution agreement, also undertook close economic cooperation and intensive secret diplomacy in the field of security and military cooperation with the Jewish state. Under intense pressure from the UNITED STATES, Germany established official diplomatic relations with Israel in 1965—something that would have been unthinkable back in 1952. However, Washington also cautioned Germany not to risk its good relationship with the Arabs, because the Suez War of 1956 had led to hostile relations between most major Western countries and the Arab states.

In the years after the Suez War and the disruption of US supplies, Israel had difficulties in acquiring arms from abroad in the quantities it desired. At the same time, Tel Aviv was looking for export markets for its own incipient arms production. Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION privately contacted Germany in this context, but news of his contact was leaked in December 1957 and provoked heated debates in the Knesset, followed by a government crisis. This in turn aroused Arab fears, which the German government could have allayed by stating that it would not deliver military equipment to Israel. Nevertheless, Franz-Josef Strauss, the German minister of defense, and SHIMON PERES, at that time an official in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, had already met in 1957 and continued to meet during the following years regarding military trade. Their meetings led to secret technical cooperation and the delivery on loan to Israel of small amounts of military equipment, excluding arms proper. Ben-Gurion's first meeting with Adenauer, on 14 March 1960 in New York, paved the way not only for a secret agreement on massive German economic aid but also for the delivery of major quantities of arms to Israel.

Keeping the arms deliveries secret proved increasingly difficult after the German government, at US instigation, made a second agreement in 1964 to deliver to Israel 200 American M-48 Patton tanks, 50 transport and reconnaissance airplanes, 15 helicopters, 6 speedboats, and 2 submarines. When the German press began to report these deliveries in the autumn of 1964, Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer's successor, sent an emissary to Cairo to appease Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. But Nasir was furious when he learned about the details and reacted by inviting East German party leader and state council president Walter Ulbricht on an official state visit. Because Nasir's invitation to Ulbricht was an unfriendly act toward West Germany, Erhard's government at first tried to persuade Nasir to revoke the invitation. When Nasir did not change his position, Erhard offered to stop the arms deliveries to Israel and eventually warned EGYPT that the consequences of diplomatically recognizing East Germany (the German Democratic Republic) could include economic sanctions and the end of diplomatic relations, as stated in the German Hallstein Doctrine. The doctrine (in effect from 1955 to 1969) stated that West Germany had the exclusive right to represent the entire German nation (East and West) and that West Germany would not maintain diplomatic relations with any state that

recognized East Germany in matters of foreign policy.

Although Nasir ignored these pressures and proceeded with the Ulbricht invitation, he did not diplomatically recognize the East German government. Nevertheless, Erhard felt rebuffed—particularly as he had stopped the arms deliveries without getting anything in return. On 7 March 1965 he therefore decided to discontinue economic aid to Egypt, to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and to put German policy in the Middle East on a new foundation. The government's press release announcing the new policies emphasized that the decision not to deliver arms to areas of conflict now or in the future was an important contribution to a well-formulated Middle East policy. Yet, important as it might have been, it came too late: West German policy for some time to come was a policy without Arab partners. When Germany and Israel announced the establishment of diplomatic relations on 13 May 1965, all Arab governments recalled their ambassadors to Germany, and ten out of the thirteen broke off diplomatic relations with Germany.

The German government—most of all Chancellor Erhard himself—proved blind to the implications of such a massive supply of arms to one side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In January 1967, almost two years after the arms deliveries had ended, former defense minister Strauss told a German journalist that he fully agreed with Adenauer on establishing relations with Israel. He said he had been convinced from the outset that military cooperation with the Jewish state was not only a duty of reparation but that support of Israel in the field where blood was involved was morally and politically of particular importance, since millions of Jews had been killed with German weapons.

The 1967 War and After. During the final weeks leading up to the 1967 WAR between Israel and SYRIA, JORDAN, and Egypt, Germans believed that Israel was facing a fight for its survival and that the survivors of the Nazi genocide might again be threatened with annihilation. The emotional identification with Israel, therefore, and the great relief when Israel easily won the war were all-embracing. Though the government maintained a carefully phrased policy of noninterference, the leaders of all four political parties represented in the Bundestag left little doubt that they held Nasir and the other Arab leaders responsible for the war and voiced clear sympathy for Israel.

The MEDIA, too, were fully on the side of Israel, some of them reporting very aggressively about Israel's "lightning war" and "lightning victory." The German public also came to the aid of Israel with unprecedented intensity. Millions of German marks were collected within days, thousands of Germans donated blood, and thousands volunteered for civil tasks in Israel. For the German government the situation after the war was not conducive to an active Mideast policy with the Arabs. Since 1969, when a grand coalition was formed between the Christian Democrats under Kurt Kiesinger as chancellor and the Social Democrats with Willy Brandt as foreign minister, a state of immobility had crept into politics and society. In relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, such immobility was starkly evident when Germany was silent about Israel's early actions in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, which evoked international criticism (even among European partners of Germany, many of whom had fully supported Israel during the weeks leading up to the war). On the other hand, it was difficult for Germany, which had no diplomatic presence in any Arab capital during the crisis, to improve its relationship with the Arab states after their triple no to peace and negotiations at their summit in Khartoum in August 1967. Moreover, major Arab states began to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states, and five of them, including Egypt, SYRIA, and IRAQ, established full diplomatic relations with East Germany in the spring of 1969, although five other Arab states had returned their ambassadors to the West German capital of Bonn.

While June 1967 and the following months probably saw the lowest point in German-Arab relations, the effects of the war slowly produced changes on two levels. Soon after the war, without taking a political position concerning Israel's policy, the German government considerably increased its aid to the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA). ISRAELI MILITARISM in 1967, followed by the OCCUPATION, made it more acceptable to show some concern for the Palestinians. During the first five years of UNRWA's existence Germany had made only one contribution, but during fiscal year 1955–1956 it began to make regular annual contributions to UNRWA's budget, starting with a modest DM 70,000 (US$16,000, 1956) per year. In 1958, Germany increased its contribution more than

tenfold, paid DM 1 million (over $250,000) annually from 1959 onward, and doubled this sum in 1965. In 1962 and 1963, Germany made an extra donation of DM 3 million (over $750,000) for vocational training.

Soon after the 1967 War Germany became a major supporter of UNRWA. While continuing to pay a fixed annual contribution to UNRWA's budget, the German government earmarked a special fund of an additional DM 50 million (over $12 million) to be used, at the rate of up to DM 10 million ($2.5 million) a year, for special projects for Palestinian refugees. Germany's overall contribution to UNRWA reached DM 4 million in 1968, then increased to sums between DM 11.5 million and 12 million (between $2.8 million and $3 million) during the following years. At first the special fund was used to build shelters, improve the INFRASTRUCTURE (ROADS, sanitation, and WATER supplies), and provide supplementary food and educational services in refugee camps in Jordan and Syria. Later the fund was used for specific projects—for example, the expansion of a vocational training center, the construction and operation of schools and health centers, and a university scholarship program in camps located in LEBANON, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Germany's involvement in the relief work for Palestinian refugees has continued ever since—in spite of severe budget cuts in recent years.

The aftermath of the 1967 War coincided in Germany with the emergence of a multiform, fragmented leftist movement at the universities in the larger cities—foremost in (West) Berlin. Particularly among communist and other radical groups and splinter parties, "solidarity with the just struggle of the Palestinian people" soon became one of their battle cries. By the early 1970s the PLO, or at least one or another of its member organizations—especially the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) and the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP)—were widely celebrated as part of the great liberation movements of the day. Their struggle for a democratic state of Palestine was presented as an integral part of the "fight against US imperialism," while many considered Israel to be the US spearhead in the Middle East. The identification was so strong and the cooperation so close that some members of the terrorist Red Army Faction even received military training in Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

While they claimed to be merely ANTI-ZIONIST, many German leftists revealed strong ANTI-SEMITIC tendencies in their leaflets and newspapers. Many leaders of this new German left compared Israeli politics in Palestine to Nazi politics, and some referred to Zionists as "the present-day Nazis," while Israeli politicians were accused of being aggressors and terrorists who were turning the Occupied Territories into "a single concentration camp" for Palestinians. In 1975 legitimacy for such positions came from an unexpected quarter when the UN General Assembly passed the widely quoted UN RESOLUTION 3379 (rescinded in 1991), stating that "ZIONISM is a form of racism and racial discrimination."

At the same time, anti-Semitic tendencies were strongly criticized, not least by members of the older generation of the left who were sympathetic to Israel—for example, the well-known writers Günter Grass and Heinrich Böll. However, quite a few younger intellectuals of the left, although critical of Israel's policy in the Occupied Territories, were even more critical of the younger emerging radical left. This was particularly pronounced during Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR, when elements of the radical left again accused Israel of fascist tendencies and compared Israeli behavior in Lebanon to Nazi politics in the Soviet-occupied territories of Eastern Europe.

Limits to Germany's New Policy of "Even-Handedness." When Willy Brandt formed a new coalition government of his Social Democratic Party with the Free Democratic Party in 1969, the international situation was finally conducive to a reformulation of German foreign policy. In his first government declaration, on 28 October, Brandt stated that his government would seek diplomatic relations in a spirit of "even-handedness" with all states in the Middle East. By referring to UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 of 22 November 1967 as a balanced basis for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Brandt connected his Middle East policy from the outset with the principles of his policy of détente in Europe: rejection of violence as a means in politics, the right to existence, recognition, the security of all states, and a permanent settlement of BORDERS on the basis of international guarantees. The fundamental principle of Resolution 242 is "land in exchange for peace," and the resolution is quite balanced with regard to Israel and the Arab states. But it says nothing about the Palestinians except a reference to the refugees.

The Arab states welcomed the change in German policy but, after their former experiences, hesitated to resume diplomatic relations before they saw how German-Israeli relations would develop. Most Arab governments, moreover, did not feel any urgency, because economic relations with and development aid from Germany had been good even without diplomatic relations during the preceding years. Brandt's government did not rush to reestablish diplomatic relations either, because its primary objective was improving relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states, including East Germany. It took more than five years until all Arab states had either resumed or for the first time established diplomatic relations with Germany.

While Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel concentrated on their *Ostpolitik*, the test case for a new policy in the Middle East came soon. When the six founding members of the European Community (EC) established the EPC in November 1969 to coordinate their policies on the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the second task for the EPC was monitoring the situation in the Middle East. The EPC established the framework for the EC's Middle East policy for the next twenty years, followed by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the European Union (EU) replaced the EC, so that "even-handedness," impartial treatment of both Israel and the Palestinians, became the guiding principle of their Middle East policy.

Even-handedness, however, had its problems. At their first meeting on the Middle East in May 1971, the six foreign ministers accepted a working paper proposed by FRANCE that went beyond UN Resolution 242—at least beyond Israel's reading of it—in three major areas. It implied an Israeli withdrawal from *all* Occupied Territories, referred to the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes, and suggested the internationalization of JERUSALEM. Although the Arab states welcomed the unpublished paper, Israel totally rejected it based on its opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem, which Tel Aviv considered its united, eternal capital; the return of the Occupied Territories to the Palestinians; and the return of the refugees. Harsh criticism was voiced in the German media, too, and Scheel had to go to Jerusalem to explain the paper to the Israeli government. While defending the working paper as such, Scheel pointed out several areas in which his government's position differed from the text. In the end Scheel managed to restore the Israeli government's trust in Germany's policy, but he deeply angered the French by his withdrawal from the common position.

The affair revealed a structural dilemma in the EC's Middle East policy: like Germany in its efforts to be more balanced within the EC, other European countries also started from an essentially pro-Israel position. The EPC, therefore, for a long time had to face quite opposite reactions from their Middle Eastern partners because any shift in the status quo tended to go too far for Israel and not far enough for the Arabs. Germany, moreover, had to face an additional dilemma: because of its historical responsibility for the genocide of the European Jews, close cooperation with Israel was mandatory but broken relations with the Arab states needed mending. Thus Germany was particularly susceptible to criticism and pressure in situations of intensified conflict, such as the 1973 OCTOBER WAR. When the German government declared its strict neutrality and stopped the US Armed Forces from loading war material stockpiled in Germany on Israeli ships, Bonn received harsh criticism from the Israeli government and press. Such neutrality, commented the daily *Ma'ariv*, would indirectly encourage genocide just to secure the uninterrupted delivery of oil.

Germany nevertheless supported the EPC resolution of 6 November 1973, which stated that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East must take into account "the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." A few days later, Israeli prime minister GOLDA MEIR asked Chancellor Brandt to persuade the other European countries to pursue a less "pro-Arab policy." Although Brandt assured her that the special character of German-Israeli relations would remain, his government did not dissociate itself from the EPC resolution. In the following years Germany actually managed to use the EPC framework as a foreign policy tool to maneuver among Arab demands, Israeli protests, and US misgivings. Together with other EC members, the governments of Brandt and (as of May 1974) Helmut Schmidt began gradually to take a more "pro-Arab" stance. The slowly changing position can be sensed in the shifting terminology of the EPC resolutions from "the Palestinians" to "the Palestinian people" who have "legitimate rights," a "national identity," and a "need for a homeland." No longer just a refugee problem, the Palestinian

issue moved into the very center of any resolution to the Middle East conflict.

Some crucial points were introduced as German initiatives, in particular, in the mid-1970s, the "right to self-determination." Berlin felt strongly about this, because Germany at that time demanded (with reference to East Germany) the right to self-determination for all Germans, and thus could not deny the same right to the Palestinian people. Other Europeans hesitated to accept this point, and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher eventually raised it on his own. At a press conference during an official visit to Egypt in September 1979, he outlined six principles for a Middle East peace settlement, the first being the right to self-determination. However, Genscher had misjudged how negatively Israel's foreign minister MOSHE DAYAN would react, and when Dayan visited Germany one week later, there were harsh words between the two politicians. Genscher eventually added that the implementation of Palestinian self-determination would need the agreement of all parties concerned. Since this meant that Israel could veto the exercise of any of the Palestinian rights enumerated in Genscher's principles, his initiative was effectively ended.

Nevertheless, in the VENICE DECLARATION of 13 June 1980 the EC finally demanded that the Palestinian people "exercise fully its right to self-determination" and that the PLO, which had not been mentioned in any previous resolution of the EPC, "will have to be associated with the negotiations." The Venice Declaration, the most carefully worded and comprehensive of all EPC declarations, was the foundation of European diplomacy during the next two decades (until it was superseded by the ROAD MAP). Yet this European peace initiative, which could have implemented at least some elements needed to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, never even got off the ground because of intense Israeli and US opposition.

The unfulfilled hopes accompanying the Venice Declaration as well as Genscher's aborted initiative were not the only illustrations of the difficulties facing a policy of even-handedness in a context of vast power asymmetries. Germany experienced several other confrontations with Israel. For example, in July 1979 Brandt and his Austrian counterpart, Bruno Kreisky, met with PLO chairman Arafat in their capacities as president and executive council member, respectively, of the Socialist International; the Israeli government and media were outraged and heaped disapprobation on the two. When Chancellor Helmut Schmidt negotiated a multimillion-dollar sale of the highly advanced German Leopard II tank to SAUDI ARABIA in April 1981, Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN issued vitriolic attacks on the German leader. In January 1984 Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed the Israeli Knesset and remarked that he had come to Israel not laden with guilt from the Nazi period because he had "the grace of the late birth" (that is, being born after the HOLOCAUST), and the comment raised angry responses. Incidents like these explain why Germany and other European countries attempted to make low-profile Middle East policy statements during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s.

Concurrent developments in the Middle East supported such an approach. The suspension of Egypt's membership in the Arab League after President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative and peace treaty with Israel isolated the strongest Arab player from the majority of Arab states. And the ongoing civil war in Lebanon continued to deepen tensions in the Arab world. Finally, when Iraqi president Saddam Husayn initiated the war with IRAN in September 1980, different Arab states supported opposing sides, so that cleavages in the region made a consistent Middle East policy even more difficult for the Europeans.

With the beginning of the INTIFADA in December 1987, the EC's Middle East policy began to regain some direction, with a number of EPC resolutions supporting the Palestinians in their legitimate demands without fully supporting their struggle for an independent state. In particular the twelve member states of the EC welcomed the acceptance by the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), in Algiers in November 1988, of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

East Germany and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The beginnings of East Germany's Middle East policy were in many ways linked to the relations between East and West Germany. Although East Germany always insisted on Israel's right to exist, official relations were never established. During the first few years after the founding of East Germany in 1949, its government denied Jewish and Israeli requests to pay reparations along the lines of West Germany's agreement with Israel. East

Germany justified its position by stating that it was founded by those Germans who had actively fought the Nazis or had suffered in concentration camps themselves; moreover, it was already paying high reparations to Russia and Poland.

Later, West Germany successfully isolated East Germany internationally with its Hallstein Doctrine, which Israel, with its close relations to the West Germany, had to accept. Not a single Arab state had established full diplomatic relations with East Germany, although Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had some low-level relations at the consular and trade levels. West Germany, on the other hand, had been hesitant to formalize its relations with Israel because some Arab states had turned the Hallstein Doctrine around and threatened that they would fully recognize East Germany if West Germany established diplomatic ties with Israel. When West Germany eventually did this in 1965, East Germany began to intensify its Middle East policy through full recognition of the Arab states, among the first being Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which came shortly after Chancellor Brandt declared his policy of even-handedness.

During the Suez War and several later occasions, East Germany declared its solidarity with the Arab states, which included references to the Palestinian problem, although, like West Germany's statements during the 1950s and early 1960s, only as a refugee problem. This changed earlier in East Germany than in West Germany. During Ulbricht's visit to Egypt, East Germany recognized "all rights of the Arab people of Palestine including its inalienable right to self-determination." During the following years, particularly after 1967, the tone of East Germany's declarations on the Arab-Israeli conflict became sharper and, to a remarkable extent, resembled the arguments of the radical left in West Germany. Several Arab states and in particular the PLO were seen as allies in the struggle against US imperialism, of which Israel was at the forefront. The close relations between West Germany and Israel mirrored the relationship between East Germany and the PLO, which pitted the two pairs on opposing sides of the Cold War.

During the second half of the 1960s, East Germany had already started direct contacts with Palestinians on the level of youth, student, labor, women's, and other organizations that were PLO-dependent. The East German leadership, however, hesitated for quite some time to establish official relations with the PLO or with individual member organizations, particularly FATAH, the PFLP, and the DFLP, because they were increasingly associated with terrorism. Even though a PLO delegation headed by Arafat had visited East Germany in 1971, it was not a state visit but a "private" invitation by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Relations with the Palestinians began to change in 1972, when Erich Honecker was elected general secretary of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). Following the Palestinian Black September attack on the Israeli Olympic team on 4 September 1972, East Germany deported a large number of Palestinian students and refused reentry to several hundred others who were returning from their vacations. The government condemned the Munich attack and made future cooperation with the PLO dependent on their promise not to allow similar actions. The PLO accepted this condition, and the responsibility for following it rested with Abu Iyad (SALAH KHALAF), the PLO head of security, who became a regular visitor to East Germany. During the following year, official relations between East Germany and the PLO were established. After several high-level discussions in Berlin, an SED delegation went to Lebanon in June, where the necessary agreements were finalized. On Arafat's next visit to East Berlin, where he was a guest at the World Festival of Youth and Students, the Agreement of Cooperation was signed on 2 August 1973. This agreement detailed several important points, the most significant for the PLO being official recognition by East Germany and permission to set up a representative office in Berlin (which opened in spring 1974). The most controversial point was East Germany's obligation to supply the PLO "goods of the noncivilian sector"—that is, military goods.

Military cooperation between East Germany and the PLO increased after 1976 at the request of the PLO, but it was eventually formalized in a June 1979 agreement between the East Germany Ministry of State Security (MfS) and the United Security of the Palestinian Revolution (USPR), formed by the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE to coordinate the various security services. The new accord included military training for the PLO Security Services, support of PLO security with operative technologies (including Western technology provided on a commercial basis by an East German firm with close connections to West German businessmen and politicians), and the deliv-

ery of arms, including Kalashnikov submachine guns, precision guns, hand grenades, mines, and other explosives. The USPR was a good partner for the MfS, because the relationship allowed the MfS to obtain information not only about Palestinian activities abroad—such as airplane hijackings, hostage situations, the liquidation of enemy persons, or the occupation of embassies—but also about Palestinian or other international terrorist connections in East Germany. These included the West German Organization of International Revolutionaries (RAF) of "Carlos" (Ramirez Sanchez)—groups whose leaders were using East Germany as a place of refuge (as were the heads of radical Palestinian splinter groups like ABU NIDAL and Mahmud Odeh/Abu Daoud).

The cooperation between the PLO and East Germany, particularly the MfS, intensified over the years with a constant revolving door of delegations on different functional levels. When Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat started peace negotiations with Israel, Palestinians feared this might lead to a separate peace and threaten their own situation. After Arafat visited Berlin in March 1978, East Germany upgraded the PLO office to the status of "permanent representation," followed by an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation. Moreover, East Germany established relations with Israeli communists and the PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. When the Israeli army defeated Arafat and the PLO leadership in Beirut in 1982 and drove them out of the country, PLO representation in Berlin was again upgraded to an embassy, with full diplomatic status. The split within Fatah after the disaster in Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO leadership and military forces to TUNIS affected the PLO's relationship with East Germany, as leading personalities from all warring factions had strong personal contacts in East Germany. After the PNC in Algiers declared Palestinian independence and proclaimed the state of Palestine in November 1988, the PLO Embassy in Berlin was officially renamed the "Embassy of Palestine." With that decision the Palestinian liberation movement reached in East Germany the highest point of international recognition possible.

Just one year later, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall between East and West Germany came down, and after 3 October 1990, East Germany no longer existed. The Palestinian Embassy in East Berlin was closed, and the relations between the new united German government and the Palestinians remained limited. A small PLO office within the building of the Delegation of the Arab League in Bonn, the interim German capital, headed by 'Abd-Allah Frangi, was tolerated.

The dramatic international changes that brought about the end of East Germany had parallels in the Middle East as well. Because of the GULF WAR, the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE, the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES in 1993, and the Oslo Process (including the creation of the PNA in Gaza and Jericho in 1994), the region underwent major transformations. When Germany established relations with the PNA, the PLO office in Bonn was finally recognized, and Frangi was accorded diplomatic status as plenipotentiary of the PNA in Bonn.

United Germany and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The process of unification had little direct impact on Germany's Middle East policy. For German politicians the major issue with the Middle East was the negative reaction of many Israelis to the prospect of a strong Germany emerging again—a fear shared by many people in France, Poland, and other European countries. This would explain why Germany, although it was no longer limited in its sovereignty by allied power prerogatives, still maintained a low profile in the Middle East, leaving action to fellow Europeans in their common EPC.

Ten years later, when the United States was building its "Coalition of the Willing" to bring down the Iraqi regime, Germany refused to join. While this was consistent with Germany's low-profile policy, it did not mean that Germany was unconcerned about Iraq: Germany participated in the air defense of TURKEY, sent ships to the eastern Mediterranean, after the war sent mine sweepers to the Gulf, and contributed at least US$12 billion to the United States' Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations—the second largest foreign contribution after Japan.

This low-profile policy did not change substantially when Klaus Kinkel took over from Hans-Dietrich Genscher as vice-chancellor and foreign minister in 1992, or later when the Europeans, after the Maastricht Treaties of 1993, increased their cooperation with the CFSP. A chance for Germany to show some independence in the Middle East came with the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 between the PLO

and Israel, which set the goal of establishing Palestinian self-government, and the resultant GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II in May 1994. Taking advantage of Israel's new relationship with the PLO and Germany's early and close cooperation with the PNA, Germany became the largest bilateral donor to the Palestinians, as well as donating multilaterally through EU projects. Moreover, it negotiated an agreement with Israel that the DM 140 million that Israel had received annually after the 1960 Adenauer–Ben-Gurion accord would slowly be phased out and transferred to infrastructure projects in the Palestinian territories and in Jordan. The mutual trust established with the PNA during the second half of the 1990s suddenly opened up the rare chance that Germany—or a German—might play an active role in the Middle East peace process. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer was in Israel when a Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBER blew himself up at the entrance to a Tel Aviv beachside disco on 2 June 2001, killing twenty-one young Israelis. Acting as a mediator, Fischer was able to convince Arafat to issue a clear public condemnation of the attack—addressed in Arabic to Arafat's own people and not just in English for foreign consumption. At the same time, Fischer dissuaded Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON from ordering the expected revenge air raids—at least for a time. During the following months, Fischer maintained close contact with both Sharon and Arafat and coordinated closely with other European nations to develop his own variant of a peace plan. Eventually Fischer's plan helped bring the Europeans into a QUARTET with the United States, Russia, and the United Nations, which together developed in 2003 the Road Map for a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Berlin was even mentioned as a possible neutral site for high-level talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Eventually Fischer's endeavors to impress moderation on both sides failed because of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA and Sharon's commitment to quell it at all costs, which resulted in an endless spiral of violence and counterviolence.

See also ARAB STATES; CHINA; EUROPEAN UNION; FRANCE; IRAN; MOSCOW; TURKEY

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—Friedemann Büttner

Gesher

The Gesher (Bridge) Party was set up by DAVID LEVY, a leader of the disaffected MIZRAHIM and SEPHARDIM communities, as a breakaway from the LIKUD PARTY during the thirteenth Knesset after he lost the Likud leadership elections to BENJAMIN NETANYAHU.

Levy refused to accept Netanyahu as the new Likud chairman, and in general the internal Likud politics at the time were stormy. Netanyahu's management tactics angered many Likud supporters, while his right-wing rhetoric gained the confidence of ARIEL SHARON, BENJAMIN BEGIN, and the hard-line party members. Levy knew that if he was cowed by his suave nemesis, Netanyahu, his supporters would either join Netanyahu's camp in order to oppose the new OSLO ACCORDS or go the opposite direction and back a more socialist candidate. He also knew that Netanyahu would not be willing to give him one of the top four ministries should the Likud return to power after his disastrous term as foreign minister.

Levy mistakenly believed he could draw a mass defection of parliament members from the Likud, and such a situation would lead senior party members on the Central Committee into a panic that would topple Netanyahu. What instead occurred was that only David Magen, a rather obscure Moroccan politician and former mayor of Kiryat Gat who served as minister of economics and planning in the last YITZHAK SHAMIR government, broke with the Likud. Though many of Gesher's members were derided by the press as lackeys of Levy, Magen would prove to be independent, and later would break with Levy to join the Center Party (then known as Israel in the Center) in 1998.

Gesher on its own never reached the potential Levy predicted for it, but it helped revitalize the Likud and bring in new members. The disaffected populist leader Levy faced the disadvantages of the constant press attention to the Oslo Accords, waves of terror attacks, rumors of negotiations surrounding the future of the Golan Heights, and the low priority that the MEDIA gave to economic and labor issues. Levy had to walk a fine line between opposing Netanyahu's hard-line rhetoric too harshly and not making enough noise (which would cause his own members to lose interest). The idea of joining the LABOR PARTY openly, even in coalition, was at that time still unacceptable to many Moroccans and other Mizrahim resentful of the old MAPAI that had preceded Labor.

By winter 1995, Levy was beginning to break under the stress of his first election campaign outside of the Likud. Netanyahu, similarly, needed as much street power as possible, even if Levy's was significantly reduced from the past. After the assassination of Rabin on 5 November 1995,

Netanyahu had attempted to moderate his image from the hard-line demagogue that many bereaved Israelis saw him as, into merely a skeptic who wanted to slow the pace of concessions to PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT. Levy's inclusion would bring him somewhat closer to that goal without forcing him to take a clear stand in favor of the Oslo Accords. The opposition leader was trying to bridge the gap by recruiting the hard-line TZOMET (Junction) party of General Rafael Eitan on the right, as well as the moderate right-wing general Yitzhak Mordechai in the center.

Throughout the spring, Netanyahu and Levy held negotiations, and in the end Levy agreed to establish Likud-Gesher-Tzomet, a joint three-party list for the May 1996 elections. The 1996 elections were a huge success for Netanyahu, but they brought little gain to Gesher or Levy in terms of personal power. The real number two leader in the Likud was now Mordechai, and the right-wing character of the government was clear from the start. Levy demanded leadership of the Foreign Ministry, which he received believing that through this post he could remain in control of the ministry. Instead he was again overshadowed by Netanyahu, who controlled almost every important foreign policy decision during his term.

On 6 January 1998 David Levy quit the coalition, along with former ambassador to France Yehuda Lancry and his brother and former Lod mayor Maxim. Gesher was once again independent, and Levy drifted closer to the policies of the Labor Party and opposition leader EHUD BARAK. The total lack of progress on the peace front had created cracks in his enemy Netanyahu's foundation. In early 1997 Minister of Science Benny Begin had broken from the Likud to reform HERUT, a group opposed to the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM of that year and the ceding of most of HEBRON to Palestinian Authority control, and brought with him fellow Likud members David Re'em and Michael Kleiner. Also, a year after Levy left the Likud, Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai left the Likud to form Israel in the Center, a group that hoped to compete with Gesher for moderate voters, and took with him David Magen and Dan Meridor from the Likud.

In 1999 a motion of no-confidence vote in the Knesset forced Netanyahu to call early elections for May. Levy had not yet been able to redevelop Gesher's street appeal and was faced with four choices:

1. Back Netanyahu: If the incumbent won, Levy would gain far more influence because of the defection of the party's right wing, and if he lost, then Levy would be a prime candidate in the postelection primary.
2. Join Ehud Barak: Other small parties were joining the Labor Party in what would eventually be called ONE ISRAEL. Levy was sure to get a good ministry in the event of a victory.
3. Join Mordechai: The former general is Iraqi, and therefore was guaranteed to draw Mizrahi votes away from the other larger parties, and his centrist platform was very similar to Levy's, yet he started off with far more support.
4. Run independently: Gesher would have to generate an administrative infrastructure it did not yet have, and would depend on Levy's excellent connections with local activists, many of whom would take votes from the Likud. A gain in Knesset seats would force the next prime minister to reckon with him.

Levy chose the second alternative, because preelection polls showed a deep slide in Netanyahu's support. The Likud had fallen from 32 seats to only 20 with the defections of Mordechai, Levy, Begin, and their supporters. Levy made the decision to merge Gesher into One Israel, and became a significant partner in the new coalition's leadership. This angered many former supporters, who viewed this move to One Israel as a betrayal of his Mizrahi followers and the Likud.

With the new system of direct election of the prime minister and a separate election of the Knesset, the number of parties elected to the body increased markedly in 1999 from eleven to fifteen, and the number would grow further as parties subdivided due to political tensions. The winning faction, One Israel, took only 26 seats, a record low for a governing party, though Barak won 56 percent of the direct vote for prime minister. Netanyahu's Likud was defeated as expected, winning only 19 seats and leading to his immediate resignation from the Knesset and public life.

Levy once again was chosen to be foreign minister, with his deputy being Nawaf Mazalha (One Israel), an Arab Israeli with less experience than he. However, Barak continued Netanyahu's

policy of firm control of the Foreign Ministry, leaving Levy as no more than a figurehead.

Gesher quit the coalition in April 2000, both in response to Barak's desperate attempts to move peace negotiations forward and in protest against the announced plan to withdraw Israeli military forces from LEBANON.

Levy was the first minister in Barak's government to resign when his demands were not met. He reformed Gesher along with Maxim Levy and rookie legislator Mordechai Mishani. Like Netanyahu, Barak failed to preserve the cooperation once enjoyed by his coalition; the leftist MERETZ PARTY departed at the end of June that year; the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP), SHAS, and YISRAEL B'ALIYA followed two weeks later. In addition Barak's popularity plummeted following the outbreak of the Second INTIFADA in September 2000. By November the prime minister had resigned in order to bring new elections that would take the form of a direct vote only for prime minister. This hurt Levy, because the format limited the choice in the end to a ballot between Barak and opposition leader Likud's Ariel Sharon.

The prime ministerial elections in February 2001 ended with a landslide victory for Sharon. But the new government offered Levy even fewer benefits than Barak's: because the Likud had only 19 seats, they were forced to form a coalition with One Israel, Shas, Yisrael b'Aliyah, ONE NATION, National Union–Yisrael Beiteinu, UNITED TORAH JUDAISM, and the NRP. Sharon was able to form a coalition without Levy, meaning that for only the second time since 1977, he was left without a ministry in a new government.

In February 2002 One Nation quit Sharon's government to protest his failed economic policies. Their leader, HISTADRUT Labor Federation chairman Amir Peretz, has many similarities to Levy, with one of the few differences being that he had broken from Labor and not the Likud. One month later the rightist National Union–Israel Beiteinu quit the coalition, claiming that Sharon's restraint policy was equivalent to appeasing the PLO.

This situation allowed Levy to enter the coalition in early April, though with almost no influence; he was named Minister Without Portfolio. Not long afterward Shas was fired from the government and was allowed back in, cementing Sharon's stability as prime minister at least until the end of the year. One Israel quit in November 2002 to force elections for January 2003.

Levy's position for the elections was precarious. He stood to gain nothing running with Gesher. With the abandonment of the direct election for prime minister, the Likud was gaining support while sectarian parties were falling apart. In the end, Levy merged Gesher back into the Likud.

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Al-Ghuri, Emile (1907–1984)

Emile al-Ghuri was a prominent journalist, author, and politician. Born in Jerusalem to a Greek Orthodox family, he later became a leading representative of that community. He obtained an M.A. in Political Science from the University of Cincinnati (Ohio) and published a bilingual weekly in Jerusalem called *Arab Federation* (*al-Wahda al-Arabiyyah*).

Al-Ghuri was a strong supporter of AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, the most important Palestinian leader during the BRITISH MANDATE, and played a significant role in Arab nationalist politics during that period. In 1933 al-Ghuri was elected to the ARAB EXECUTIVE and in 1935 became the secretary-general of the ARAB PALESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY. He was a frequent member of ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (AHC) delegations that were sent abroad to raise funds for the Palestinian cause.

The British arrested him for his political activities in 1941 and prohibited him from returning to Palestine until 1944. Even when al-Ghuri was allowed to return to Palestine, Britain banned him from any political activity (although in 1946–1947, he participated in the LONDON CONFERENCE). When World War II was imminent, al-Ghuri wrote that "unfortunately, the Arab countries rushed to declare their support for Britain . . . despite the fact that the latter did not show a single indication that proves its desire to solve the Palestinian problem justly." After 1948 he continued to serve on the AHC, held positions in the Jordanian government, and published several books on Arab nationalism.

He was active in the NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT of member countries that strove to avoid alliances with any great power, attending that movement's milestone 1955 Bandung Conference.

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Gil Party

A new party in the 2006 Israeli elections, the Gil Party (Gimla'ey Yisrael LaKnesset, Pensioners of Israel to the Knesset) is a pensioners' party that advocates the interests of Israelis of retirement age. Gil is headed by former MOSSAD operative Rafael Eitan, who was named as the spymaster of Jonathan Pollard, a US citizen convicted of spying for Israel. Little seems to be known of the party's positions on defense, security, or peace, because it campaigned solely on domestic issues. In the past, however, Eitan has been known for his hard-line rightist politics and support for Greater Israel in all the Occupied Territories. In the 2006 elections the Gil Party joined the KADIMA PARTY (newly created by ARIEL SHARON). The coalition succeeded in placing Eitan as minister of pensioners, while another Gil member, Kaakov Ben-Yeyzi, became minister of health.

Giv'at Ze'ev Settlement

Located just northwest of JERUSALEM and southwest of Ramallah, stretching across 6,248 acres, and with numerous additional satellite settlements making up the Giv'at Ze'ev bloc, Giv'at Ze'ev is one of the strategically most important settlements in Israel's design for the WEST BANK.

According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), at the end of 2007 the colony had a total population of 11,000. Giv'at Ze'ev has a diverse population: religious, secular, and HAREDI Jews. Most of the residents are former residents of Jerusalem who sought housing at cheaper prices than in Jerusalem, a ten-minute drive from the settlement.

In 2008 Nofei Yisrael Company began marketing 600 housing units to the ultra-orthodox Haredi population. A publication by the marketing company said: "The project is in a closed compound . . . to protect the interests of the Torah observant population," and includes "synagogues, ultra-orthodox elementary schools, ritual baths and schools for advanced Torah learning."

But the neighborhood Nofei Yisrael is constructing is some distance from Giv'at Ze'ev, on a 3.5-kilometer (2-mile) winding road from the end of the settlement (the distance as the crow flies is about 600 meters, or 650 yards). Construction of the neighborhood will enlarge Giv'at Ze'ev's area by hundreds of acres and complete the takeover of the western lands almost as far as the Beit Horon settlement and the BARRIER wall.

Giv'at Ze'ev, like MA'ALE ADUMIM, lies in the second of three circles that expand the boundaries of Jerusalem almost to the border with JORDAN, horizontally severing the West Bank into two separate entities. Giv'at Ze'ev is situated in the "GREATER JERUSALEM" circle and is slated in Israel's master SETTLEMENT plan to play an important role in the expansion of METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM (third circle). In 1996 the Israeli government approved a program for Giv'at Ze'ev that included 2,650 new housing units plus 20,000 new settlers. The housing has been constructed on land confiscated from the Palestinian villages of Betunia, Biddo, and Jeib. In March 1997, Israel confiscated an additional 50 acres from Jeib. Later in 1997 another Israeli confiscation took 200 more acres from Betunia and Jeib for the construction of 11,550 additional housing units. On 9 March 2008, Prime Minister EHUD OLMERT approved the construction of 750 new homes in Giv'at Ze'ev under the Agan Ha'ayalot project (an attempt to sell the apartments to a mixed population, secular and religious).

The Giv'at Ze'ev bloc is part of a wall of colonies surrounding the northwest side of East Jerusalem. The master plan for Jerusalem settlements envisages Giv'at Ze'ev connected with Modi'in Illit to its northwest (on the Green Line), with Modi'in Illit being directly linked due east to Beit El (just north of Ramallah) and Beit El being connected south to Ma'ale Adumim. This will complete the northern part of the third circle (Metropolitan Jerusalem), tying the northern settlements to East Jerusalem through Ma'ale Adumim with new bypass ROADS. In September 2004 it was revealed that the Mishab Company was offering a

grant of $8,700 to any buyer of an apartment in the settlement of Giv'at Ze'ev (on top of the grants and loans totaling $22,800 that the Israeli Housing Ministry allots to entitled buyers).

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Goldmann, Nahum (1895–1982)

Nahum Goldmann was an Israeli Zionist leader who became an outspoken critic of Israeli policies. Born in Lithuania, he grew up in GERMANY and was educated at German universities, where he studied philosophy and law. From an early age he became strongly allied with Zionist thought, and during World War I, while working at the Jewish division of the German Foreign Ministry, he unsuccessfully attempted to enlist the Kaiser's support for the Zionist idea. In the 1920s Goldmann was involved in publishing a Zionist periodical and also in launching a German Jewish encyclopedia. In all, twelve volumes of the encyclopedia—ten in German and two in Hebrew—were published before the Nazi rise to power halted the project. Goldmann retained the idea and was a key figure behind the English-language *Encyclopedia Judaica* in the 1960s.

During the BRITISH MANDATE Goldmann was involved in negotiations with the British to establish a Jewish state. He supported the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian states, arguing that sovereignty was more important than territory. In 1935, stripped of his German citizenship by the Nazis and forced to leave his adopted country, he settled first in Honduras and thereafter in New York, where he lived from 1940 to 1964. He continued to labor in the UNITED STATES for Zionist causes and for several years represented the JEWISH AGENCY in New York.

In addition to his Zionist work Goldmann championed other Jewish interests, including negotiating German reparations to Israel for the HOLOCAUST. He felt that a Jewish state would never answer all the needs of all Jews and that a strong DIASPORA was also needed. Goldmann believed that the future of world Jewry depended largely on a successful fight against assimilation and dedicated his effort to developing vibrant Jewish institutions in the Diaspora. In 1936 he helped organize the World Jewish Congress and was the first chairman of its executive board; he later served as its president for many years. He founded the Conference of Major Jewish Organizations (known as the Presidents' Conference) and was actively involved with other causes, such as SOVIET JEWS, Jewish education, and promoting Jewish culture.

In 1962 Goldmann became a citizen of Israel, but despite frequent visits he never became a permanent resident, instead dividing his time primarily between Switzerland and Israel. He was critical of what he considered Israel's excessive reliance on and adulation of its military prowess, and following the 1967 WAR he faulted Israel for not being more conciliatory toward the Arabs. Goldmann tried to encourage Israel to engage in negotiations with the neighboring Arab states, and argued that Israel's only chance of long-term survival was to accept the rights of the Palestinians. In 1970 he tried to initiate a dialogue with Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR but was stopped by the Israeli government. In 1974 Goldmann's attempts to contact PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION chairman YASIR ARAFAT were considered high treason in Israel, although he was never formally charged. He strongly opposed the 1982 Israeli invasion of LEBANON and argued that it would lead to ANTI-SEMITISM and ANTI-ZIONISM. Goldmann's vision was to make Israel the spiritual and moral center for all Jews, but as a neutral state, with international guarantees of its security, existence, and BORDERS, and perhaps even a permanent symbolic international presence.

Because of Goldmann's views about the centrality of the Diaspora and the need for Israel to make peace with the Arab states and the Palestinians, for the most part the Israeli establishment loathed him and he became persona non grata with Zionist leaders.

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Goldstein, Baruch Kappel (1956–1994)

Baruch Goldstein was a thirty-eight-year-old Jewish-American physician who was responsible for killing twenty-nine Muslim civilians and injuring approximately 100 in a 1994 mass shooting in HEBRON on the WEST BANK. Three months earlier Goldstein had spoken to a radio interviewer of taking the law into his own hands: "We are fed up and with God's help we will establish the state of Judea. . . . And then we will deal with the Palestinians ourselves."

Born in Brooklyn, New York, Goldstein was a "Kahanist" (a follower of MEIR KAHANE) and a member of the JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE. After immigrating to Israel, Goldstein served as a physician in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF), where he gained notoriety for refusing to treat non-Jews, even those serving in the IDF. When threatened with court-martial Goldstein declared: "I am not willing to treat any non-Jew. I recognize as legitimate only two [religious] authorities: Maimonides and Kahane." Following the end of his active duty he worked as a physician and lived in the KIRYAT ARBA SETTLEMENT of some 6,500 Jewish settlers, among the most extreme in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Dressed as an army officer, Goldstein killed the twenty-nine Palestinians during Friday prayers on 25 February 1994, in the Cave of the Patriarchs/AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE, a site in Hebron sacred to both Muslims and Jews. After being subdued with a fire extinguisher, Goldstein was beaten to death by survivors. At a eulogy reflecting the widespread sentiment of extremist settlers, Rabbi Dov Lior of Kiryat Arba stated: "Goldstein was full of love for fellow human beings. He dedicated himself to helping others. Goldstein could not continue to bear the humiliations and shame nowadays inflicted upon us; this was why he took action for no other reason than to sanctify the holy name of God."

Settlers from Kiryat Arba constructed an elaborate shrine in Goldstein's memory, to which thousands of settlers made pilgrimage in the ensuing years, although most Israelis were repulsed by the glorification of this mass murderer. In 1998 a bill was passed in the Israeli Knesset that forbade the erection of monuments to TERRORISTS, and in 2000 the shrine built around Goldstein's tomb was demolished. At the time, Israel also considered revising the inscription on his tombstone, but no revisions have been made as of 2008. The inscription reads: "Here lies the saint, Dr. Baruch Kappel Goldstein, blessed be the memory of the righteous and holy man, may the Lord avenge his blood, who devoted his soul to the Jews, Jewish religion and Jewish land. His hands are innocent and his heart is pure. He was killed as a martyr of God on the 14th of Adar, Purim, in the year 5754."

See also HEBRON MASSACRE

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Grassroots International Activism

Since the onset of the Second INTIFADA, in September 2000, there has been a marked increase in international grassroots activism attempting to

influence Israeli policies in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Calls from the US and Europe for people to travel to the Occupied Territories during this uprising brought widespread international attention to Israeli policies, Palestinian resistance to the OCCUPATION, and the role of the international community in potentially ending the Occupation. While many have heeded the call to challenge Israeli policies in person, international engagement has taken several forms. These movements have resembled past ones—for example, the anti-apartheid divestment movements targeting South Africa and the Central American solidarity movements of the 1980s—and yet they have also broken new ground in international solidarity. Although this engagement has taken many forms, currently three main areas of international peace work are trying to end the Occupation: divestment, boycotts, and international observers in the Occupied Territories.

Divestment

As in past social movements, university students have taken the lead in developing divestment as a response to Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories. The first efforts at divestment began in early 2001 at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Since then at least forty US campuses have begun campaigns to pressure their university administrations to withdraw endowment funds invested in Israel or to divest from US companies that produce and sell arms to Israel. The campus divestment movement gained momentum and focus in July 2005 when Palestinian CIVIL SOCIETY made a unified call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel until it complies with INTERNATIONAL LAW. This call was signed by over 170 Palestinian organizations and was made on the one-year anniversary of the International Court of Justice in The Hague's Advisory Opinion on the illegality of the Separation BARRIER in the WEST BANK. In addition, divestment campaigns have emerged within municipalities, faith communities, and religious denominations as well as in other organizations.

Municipalities. Several communities across the UNITED STATES have had grassroots movements for selective divestment, which targets corporations that benefit from Israel's Occupation. In 2004 in Somerville, Massachusetts, the Somerville Divestment Project (SDP) worked to bring a "socially responsible investment" resolution before the town's Board of Aldermen. This resolution highlighted Israeli human rights violations in the Occupied Territories and called for Somerville to divest from companies involved in the Occupation as well as from Israel Bonds. SDP recommended divestment from Caterpillar Inc., United Technologies, General Electric, Boeing, General Dynamics Corporation, Northrop Grumman Corporation, and Lockheed Martin.

The resolution was the result of an eighteen-month organizing effort by the SDP to educate residents about the Occupation. Members knocked on doors, stood outside mass transit stations, hosted film nights, and met individually with aldermen. Through this process, the SDP collected almost 1,200 signatures in support of the resolution, while supporters of Israel worked to counter the resolution. The process culminated on 8 November 2004 in a public board meeting to discuss the resolution. Despite initial support from several aldermen, in the end the resolution lost 9–1. According to MEDIA reports the majority of aldermen believed that it was inappropriate for Somerville to take a position on international issues, that Israel was being unfairly "singled out," and that the resolution was not "pro-human rights" but "anti-Israel." In response divestment supporters pointed out that Israel had already been "singled out," because Israel Bonds are the only foreign bonds Somerville owns. After the resolution was defeated, the board voted (8–3) to refuse to discuss four alternative resolutions regarding Israel/Palestine.

Presbyterian Church (USA). Of all current divestment efforts in the United States, those of several Protestant churches have received the most attention as they have debated taking organizational positions on selective divestment. The issue has been raised within the Presbyterian Church (USA), the United Church of Christ, the United Methodists, the World Council of Churches, and the Anglican Communion. Among these groups the Presbyterian Church (USA) has come closest to articulating a stance on divestment. At the church's General Assembly in July 2004, several measures opposing Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were approved, including a call for the Committee on Mission Responsibility Through Investment (MRTI) to begin gathering data to support a selective divestment of holdings in multinational corporations doing business in Israel/Palestine. This decision has been controversial

both within and outside the church, and the major pro-Israel Jewish organizations united to stop the Presbyterian divestment effort.

Despite the controversies, the Presbyterian Church began to clarify a process it refers to as "progressive engagement" on Israeli divestment. On 6 November 2004 the MRTI announced its socially responsible investing criteria that would determine their targets. The criteria focused on multinational corporations that:

- Provide products or services to or for use by the Israeli police or military to support and maintain the Occupation
- Provide products, services, or technology of particular strategic importance that maintain the Occupation
- Establish facilities or operations on occupied land
- Provide products or services, including financial, for the establishment, expansion, or maintenance of Israeli SETTLEMENTS
- Provide products and services, including financial, to Israeli or Palestinian organizations/groups that support or facilitate violent acts against innocent civilians
- Provide products or services, including financial, that support or facilitate the construction of the separation BARRIER

In the church's first step it planned to invite representatives of Caterpillar, Citigroup, ITT Industries, Motorola, and United Technologies to discuss the church's concerns and open a dialogue about the company's involvement in Israel and Palestine. If these dialogues failed to address the concerns of the MRTI, the church would consider shareholder resolutions for each company and, finally, if there were no positive results consistent with the church's General Assembly criteria, the MRTI would consider recommending divestment to the General Assembly.

While mainstream Jewish organizations in the United States have firmly opposed divestment and have actively worked against such efforts, several Jewish organizations support the Presbyterian Church and divestment as a strategy in challenging Israeli policy. The most notable of these are Jewish Voice for Peace, Jews Against the Occupation, and Not in My Name. Jews Against the Occupation has written a letter of support to the Presbyterian Church with the intention of deflecting charges of ANTI-SEMITISM. Not in My Name has supported both the Presbyterian Church and divestment as a strategy: "selective divestment from companies that profit from this destruction is not only appropriate, it is both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israeli." Jewish Voice for Peace has taken the most public stance, both by supporting the Presbyterian Church and by campaigning to end sales of Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers to Israel. As part of this program Voice for Peace introduced a shareholder resolution in 2005 requesting that Caterpillar review whether its equipment sales to the Israeli army violate the corporation's own Code of Worldwide Business Conduct.

Boycott

Since the AL-AQSA INTIFADA began, several types of boycotts have been proposed (similar to those against South African apartheid), including academic and cultural boycotts of Israeli institutions as well as economic boycotts, in particular of products produced at Israeli settlements.

Of all the boycott campaigns, a British one to boycott selected Israeli universities has received the most attention. On 22 April 2005 the British Association of University Teachers (AUT) decided to boycott Haifa University (for restricting the academic freedom of staff members critical of Israeli policies) and Bar Ilan University (which has a college in the West Bank settlement of Ariel). In addition the AUT voted to circulate among all its branches the Call for Boycott issued by the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel.

This decision proved to be controversial both within Great Britain and Israel. Haifa University threatened to sue the AUT for defamation, and British academics organized to repeal the AUT decision. Following much debate within the union and the British press, the boycott was overturned at an emergency AUT conference in May 2005.

International Witness

Of all the forms of global activism, the presence of international activists has had the greatest effect on bringing attention to the Palestinian cause. International activists and observers in the Occupied Territories have given accounts of day-to-day life under Occupation that were often absent in the international press, have revealed for audiences in the United States and Europe the existence of a nonviolent Palestinian movement, and by their

presence have shown solidarity with Palestinians and Israelis who resist Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories.

Since their beginning in 1995 the CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS have maintained a continual presence in the West Bank, where radical Jewish settlers have harassed the Palestinian population. Team volunteers are trained to observe and document the situation in HEBRON and the Southern Hebron Hills as well as to intervene nonviolently when they can prevent an escalation in violence.

Although the number of international observers and activists in Palestine increased after the beginning of the Second Intifada, Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals had joined together during the First Intifada to protest the Israeli Occupation. The Palestinian Centre for Rapprochement between People (PCR), based in Beit Sahour, was especially active in organizing these actions. The Second Intifada increased resistance to the Occupation, much of which was nonviolent and included internationals. The PCR helped start a series of nonviolent protests in December 2000, and, in the spring of 2001, the Palestinian Network for Non-Governmental Organizations helped form the Grassroots International Protection for the Palestinian People. This group worked with partner organizations in Italy, FRANCE, and Belgium to bring internationals to the Occupied Territories to witness the Israeli suppression of the Intifada, offer solidarity with the Palestinian people, and promote education in their home countries about life in the Occupied Territories. In the group's first year 2,700 internationals traveled to Palestine to help distribute food to areas isolated by CURFEWS and ROADBLOCKS and to accompany ambulances.

In 2001 the INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT (ISM) was founded in Ramallah, West Bank, by Palestinians and internationals. In its campaigns internationals witnessed Israeli Occupation policies and participated in nonviolent protests in August and December 2001. The ISM gained international notoriety during its third campaign in March 2002, which occurred immediately after Israel had reoccupied most West Bank cities. During the spring of 2002, hundreds of internationals responded to the ISM call and came to Palestine to accompany ambulances and medical personnel and to handle humanitarian needs that Palestinian organizations could not meet because of Israeli CLOSURE policies.

Despite the early successes in organizing international activists, the ISM has also dealt with severe challenges. Although it was originally thought that the international presence would be respected by the Israeli military and thus provide protection for Palestinian communities under attack, this proved not to be true. In March 2003 Rachel Corrie, an ISM participant from the United States, was killed protecting a house from being demolished in the RAFAH area of GAZA. A month later a British ISM participant, Thomas Hurndall, was shot in the head in Rafah (and died from his injuries in January 2004), and Brian Avery, another ISM activist from the United States, was shot in the face by the IDF in Jenin in the West Bank. Most recently, in March 2009, ISM activist Tristan Anderson was shot in the face with a tear gas canister by Israeli soldiers in the West Bank village of Ni'lin. The Israeli government's concerted effort to keep international activists out of the country has weakened the movement.

In addition to the ISM, several other international solidarity groups have emerged. In August 2002 the World Council of Churches founded the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel. Participants in the program record human rights violations, support acts of nonviolent resistance alongside local Christian and Muslim Palestinians and Israeli peace activists, and engage in public policy advocacy in their home countries through their respective churches. Over 230 members have worked with the program since its founding. Also founded in August 2002 was the International Women's Peace Service, an international team of women based in Haris, a village in the Salfit Governorate of the West Bank. Participants document human rights abuses, work with the media, and participate in Palestinian-led acts of nonviolent direct action.

See also NONVIOLENCE IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE

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—Adam Horowitz

Great Britain and the Palestine Mandate

See BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE

Greater Jerusalem

When Israel conquered the WEST BANK and the eastern half of JERUSALEM in the 1967 WAR, its first decision was to tighten its hold on Jerusalem and the surrounding area by transforming the city from a historic and religious symbol for the Jewish people into the heart of the modern Jewish state. Jerusalem has traditionally been an important ideological symbol for Jews around the world, but upon possessing the entire city, Israel wanted to expand it and ensure its status as the "eternal capital" of the state. It first unified east and west Jerusalem as one city under Israeli rule.

Israel then immediately began confiscating West Bank Palestinian LAND, covering an area of some 27 square miles (70 square kilometers), most of which had belonged to 28 Palestinian villages, including part of the municipalities of BETHLEHEM and Beit Jala, enlarging the eastern sector from the 2.5 square miles (6 square kilometers) it was under Jordanian governance. Following these annexations East Jerusalem tripled in size, and Jerusalem became the largest city in Israel.

The new BORDERS, set by a committee headed by General REHAVAM ZE'EVI, then assistant to the head of the Operations Branch of the Israel Defense Forces' General Staff, were approved by the Israeli government. In setting the borders the committee's main objective was to strengthen Israeli sovereignty over the city by creating a Jewish majority. Thus DEMOGRAPHIC considerations were decisive, and land development and planning considerations were secondary. In order to ensure a significant Jewish majority, Israel tried to avoid including within Jerusalem areas with large Palestinian populations. Thus several Palestinian villages were placed outside the city even though some of their lands were included within the city's new borders—for example, Beit Iksa and Beit Hanina in the north, and detached areas in the municipalities of Bethlehem and Beit Sahur in the south. Many Palestinian villages and neighborhoods were thus divided; one part remained in the West Bank, while the other part was annexed by Israel. The government then immediately began construction of a series of Jewish SETTLEMENTS to fill the city with Jews.

In the 1947 UN Partition Resolution (Resolution181) that divided Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, Jerusalem was specifically defined as *Corpus Separatum,* or "separate body," which was to belong to neither state; rather it was to be under a permanent international trusteeship with free access to all. In the 1948 WAR, Israel seized the western sector and Jordan took the eastern. Between 1948 and June 1967, Jerusalem was divided in two: West Jerusalem, which was Israel's capital, and East Jerusalem, a city under Jordanian rule.

Israel's declaration that a unified Jerusalem was Israel's eternal capital, whose indivisibility and sovereignty derive from its role as the sacred and historical capital of the Jews, is somewhat overstated. While Jews do certainly have a claim to their holy places in and around the OLD CITY, that historical core represents only 3 percent of the area of greater Jerusalem. The other 97 percent was never exclusively Jewish, nor until the frenzy of settlement activity after 1967 did it ever even have a Jewish majority. West Jerusalem, the 15 square miles (38 square kilometers) ruled by Israel as its capital from 1948 through 1967, on the other hand, was built only in the second half of the nineteenth century, and although West Jerusalem is today almost exclusively Jewish (the main exception being part of Beit Safafa village), before 1948 about 40 percent of it was owned by Palestinians who were dispossessed in 1948.

Today Greater Jerusalem, also referred to as "municipal Jerusalem" (distinct from "METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM," which contains another ring of settlements), comprises an area of some 170 square miles (440 square kilometers), of which less than a quarter is within pre-1967 Israel, and which contains eight large settlements that tightly ring what was once Palestinian Jerusalem (Pisgat Ze'ev, HAR HOMA, Gilo, East Talpiot, Ramot, Givat Hamatos, Neve Ya'acov, and Gilo), while another six settlements (Ramat Ashkol, Givat Hamiftar, Malst Defna, Atarst, Pisgat Omer, and

Rekhes Shufat) provide a solid Jewish presence throughout the entire Greater Jerusalem area. Israeli settlers in the East Jerusalem colonies numbered about 200,000 in 2009.


The following maps illustrate the transformation of Jerusalem during the past half century: (Map 15) the *Corpus Separatum* ("separate body"), an internationally administered zone that was an integral aspect of UN RESOLUTION 181 (partition); (Map 16) Jerusalem as it was partitioned after the 1948 WAR; (Map 17) Municipal Greater Jerusalem 1947–1997/2000; and (Map 18) the expansion of Greater Jerusalem into Metropolitan Jerusalem, which is ongoing.

In the first decades of the OCCUPATION the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem were designed to secure Israeli domination over the city, but as Israel's settlement presence grew and the need to extend its de facto control over larger areas of the West Bank became apparent after the OSLO ACCORDS, control over a strategic Jerusalem region took on greater urgency. In 1995 the Israeli




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Map 15. Jerusalem and the *Corpus Separatum* Proposed in UN Resolution 181, 1967



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Map 16. Partitioned Jerusalem, 1948–1967



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Map 17. Jerusalem Municipal Boundaries, 1947–2000

government adopted a master plan for a Metropolitan Jerusalem whose borders in an outer ring of settlements incorporated a full 40 percent of the West Bank. The area stretches from Beit Shemesh in the west through Kiryat Sefer to Ramallah; then extends southeast through MA'ALE ADUMIM almost to the Jordan River; there turning southwest to encompass Beit Sahur, BETHLEHEM, Efrat, and the Etzion Bloc; and then west again through Beitar Illit and Tsur Hadassah to Beit Shemesh. Within Metropolitan Jerusalem are found 75 percent of the West Bank settlers and the major centers of Israeli construction.

See also METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM PLAN; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

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Map 18. Arab East Jerusalem within "Greater" Jerusalem

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Greater Land of Israel Movement

The idea of the Greater Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael l'Hashlema), the full or complete land of Israel, developed within both secular and religious ZIONISM and has been used to legitimize Israeli expansionist territorial policies, programs, and practices. In his comprehensive book on the subject, political scientist Arie Naor claims that Greater Israel ideology was the most influential idea in Israeli history, based on the premise that the entire land of Israel, however defined, belongs exclusively to the Jewish people and that although members of other ethnic groups may hold individual rights to the land, they cannot have any collective rights. According to this ideology, no Israeli government, regardless of the majority it enjoys,

has the right to withdraw from any part of the land. This ideology was used to promote expansionist policies before the 1967 WAR, when Israeli BORDERS encompassed only a portion of the "whole" land. After the war had expanded Israeli borders to include all or most of what was defined as Greater Israel, the ideology was promoted to maintain the post-1967 borders, while expansion and colonization of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES focused on the Israelization or Judaization of the new territory with settlement and housing development.

The ideology has various rationales, among them religious belief in the divine promise of the land to the Jews as God's chosen people, historical memories of the national grandeur of David's kingdom, nationalist conceptions adopted from European nationalist movements, the unity of people and territory (blood and soil), the "practical" requirements of the Jewish people, a belief that it is required for Israel's security needs, and a deep distrust of Palestinian nationalism and Arab willingness to coexist peacefully with Israelis. Although currently this ideology is primarily connected to the Israeli religious right, for many years it was the trademark of the secular right, especially the HERUT political party and intellectuals connected to that camp. Factions in the Israeli left also toyed with the idea, though they rarely endorsed it wholeheartedly as a main ideological dictum.

Since 1967 there have been ongoing debates within Israel about the viability and practicality of the ideology. For some the fate of Palestinians was a sensitive and troublesome issue, while others argued that full acceptance of the ideology would transform the DEMOGRAPHIC composition of the Jewish state and encompass a great number of non-Jews hostile to Israel. The case against the Greater Israel ideology claimed that a larger territory entailed less Judaism, democracy, and human rights. Supporters countered with arguments that ranged from the benefits that would accrue to all the peoples of the region regardless of nationality or religion, through visions of future mass Jewish IMMIGRATION that would change the state's demographics, to a demand for the expulsion (TRANSFER) of all non-Jews from the land ruled by Israel, either through persuasion and incentives or by using the force of the state.

The concept that the national territory can be placed under exclusive Jewish rule is a novelty in Jewish history. While the sacredness of the land of Israel was widely accepted and rarely contested through the years of Jewish exile, the land's exact boundaries were never defined, and most Jews were more interested in the holy cities and sites than in the outer boundaries of the land. Furthermore, traditional messianic conceptions held that the Jewish return would result from an act of divine redemption, thereby undermining any discussion regarding the actual contours of the land.

Historically the land of Israel was never considered a precise geopolitical and administrative unit, and in early Zionist thought (around the turn of the twentieth century) the question of borders rarely arose. Initially Jewish SETTLEMENTS were established in the general landmass of Palestine and were in turn used to define areas demanded for Jewish rule, but without a debate over what were legitimate national borders. In the BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917), Great Britain promised the Jews a "homeland," although the borders were not defined. In the SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT of 1916, implemented after World War I, the former OTTOMAN areas were divided according to the imperial interests of Great Britain and FRANCE. Zionist organizations first formulated a specific territorial demand at the Versailles peace talks (1919) following World War I. When the British partitioned their portion in 1922 to create Trans-Jordan (which included the East Bank) for their protégé King Abdullah, Zionist leaders argued that the eastern and western parts of the land of Israel were an indivisible unity, and consequently the Zionist establishment did not accept the 1922 division. In practical terms, however, the mainstream Zionist leadership never made a cogent political demand to make Trans-Jordan part of the Jewish homeland or to enable Jewish settlement there.

The political debate over the territorial borders of the Zionist enterprise continued in the wake of various British partition plans and international committees whose programs were designed to decide the future boundaries and sovereignty of the land, but the political map stabilized when most of the Israeli LABOR movement accepted the existence of Trans-Jordan. However, the ideology's secular supporters, known as Revisionists, refused to accept that the East Bank was not Israel and adopted the Greater Land of Israel ideology.

Rationale of the Ideology

Supporters of the Greater Israel ideology often use medical metaphors of health and sickness to argue that a nation that forsakes parts of its land is pathologically ill. Zionism is defined as the return of the

Jewish people to their ancient homeland, which implies the transformation of the land into a home for the gathering of exiles. Because the number of Jews and the size of the land to be transformed were never fully or authoritatively declared, a definition of successful completion or of the appropriate time to terminate Zionist expansion remains open. The idea of Greater Israel reflects a fear that the Zionist enterprise will be stopped prematurely, before all Zionist goals are achieved. Supporters of the ideology claim that an untimely end to expansion would endanger the achievements of Zionism so far. Thus the ideology can be interpreted as a desire to continue the Zionist revolution, possibly indefinitely, despite attempts at compromise and the desire to realize other national goals and collective interests.

Claims by the ideology for exclusive Jewish rights on the entire land are numerous, overlapping, and at times contradictory. One claim is the divine biblical promise to the fathers of the nation—God's covenant with the Jews in which he promised them the land of Israel if they kept his commandments. These promises, however, usually referred to the Jewish people rather than to the size of its territory. On the other hand, certain divine promises mention borders, referring to natural obstacles such as the sea and the desert or other biblical political entities. Yet even the specifically mentioned geographical reference points cannot be identified beyond doubt in the contemporary era, because of the wide range of possibilities and interpretations.

A somewhat different rationale involves the historic boundaries of David's and Solomon's kingdoms as described in the Bible (that is, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Euphrates River). Proponents of this position view these as appropriate contours for the full Jewish return. This historical position allows for visions of a return to the glory of ancient times, especially since it is believed that the Messiah will be a descendant of King David. Although some contemporary ARCHAEOLOGISTS have doubts about the actual historical existence of a united ancient Jewish kingdom or the extent of its borders, the believers assume that these boundaries are more than political achievements and that their biblical description charges them with holiness.

In general the ideology of Greater Israel assumes that the boundaries of the land are predetermined and have an autonomous existence originating from the divine will, sacred texts, and ancient history. Thus the current Israeli democracy is not free to determine its national boundaries. Any decision to withdraw from parts of the sacred land may be legal but is inherently illegitimate, for it contradicts the divine covenant on which the Jewish state is based. Daniela Weiss, a leader of the GUSH EMUNIM, a radical settlers' group, took this idea to the extreme when she claimed that the only relevant plebiscite regarding the borders of Israel can be held among all the Jews that have *ever* lived in the land and *ever will* live in it in the future.

Parallel to the religious and historical arguments are practical concerns—namely the territorial needs of the contemporary Jewish people entering their homeland. The Greater Israel ideology sets its sights on the future, demanding that the modern state plan for the millions of Jews still to come, who need not only land to thrive and prosper but, in light of the tragic Jewish history, a secure existence as well. A small country, claim the advocates, will only survive precariously, constantly at the mercy of its neighbors and international superpowers.

A further argument of the Greater Israeli ideology involves a deep distrust of the Arabs, including Palestinians, or any other non-Jews. They are seen as having no legitimate claim on the land and, moreover, a deep desire to wipe out Jewish existence in the region. Therefore Greater Israel ideology is highly connected to deep-rooted images—images that are essentially Orientalist generalizations—of Arab and Muslim culture. The Arabs are considered as a unitary threat, regardless of divisions between Arab states, and supporters of Greater Israel compare the size of the land that Israel holds to the vaster lands that all Arabs and Muslims hold. In addition they claim that all Arabs under Israeli rule, whether citizens of Israel or noncitizens in the Occupied Territories, are potential or actual enemies without a distinct political entity, based on a dubious historical rationale that they are part of the larger Arab community. Accordingly decisions regarding the future of Israel should only be entrusted to Jews, while Palestinians, even when Israeli citizens, should be excluded from deciding the future of Israel.

The ideology of Greater Israel is deeply pessimistic about ever reaching a peaceful end to the Israeli-Arab (let alone the Israeli-Palestinian) conflict. Instead it suggests that the only way to reach

Middle East harmony is through Jewish perseverance, military superiority, and deterrence—an "Iron Wall" mentality, which would lead to a reluctant Arab acceptance of Israel's existence within its larger boundaries. Therefore supporters of the ideology consider a strong Israel within the widest possible borders a prerequisite for stability in the Middle East. Security issues, which are of great import in Israeli public discourse, are often brought up as practical reasons to negate possible territorial compromises. The Greater Israel ideologists claim that territory forsaken can be used against Israel and that Arabs will see Israeli withdrawal as a sign of weakness and thus become more aggressive and make further demands. When the ideological devotion to the Greater Israel ideal was less potent, security issues were used instead of religious or historical arguments to delay or thwart Israeli territorial compromise.

In the prestate years the development of Zionist settlements proceeded according to principles radically different from those of Greater Israel, even though the Zionist movement also attempted to maximize territorial gains and exclude Palestinians from the economic sector and political power. Early Zionists preferred to settle in locations that had little historical resonance, satisfied to exist generally on the "sacred land" of Israel. Thus, for example, the agricultural settlements of Degania and Nahalal, as well as the city of Tel Aviv, were esteemed for being new and innovative rather than for re-creating a predetermined historic map. The ideology of the hegemonic labor movement placed importance on actual laboring on the land, insisting that the plow would decide the future national borders. During the BRITISH MANDATE years and through the first two decades of the state, the Greater Israel ideology found itself in opposition to the established Zionist position—although it always enjoyed some support among important groups of the Labor movement.

Revisionists and Herut: Secular Holders of the Ideology

The main secular supporter of the Greater Israel idea was the Revisionist movement headed by VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY, later transformed into the Herut Party. In April 1925 the first conference of the Revisionists was convened in Paris and demanded the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth on all the land of Israel, which it defined as including Trans-Jordan (JORDAN after 1950) and the Syrian Desert. The Revisionist youth movement BETAR had as its symbol a map of the entire land, including both banks of the Jordan River and a fist holding a gun in the middle. The hymn of Betar, written by Jabotinsky and named "Left of the Jordan," proclaimed: "If my land is poor and small/it is mine from its head to its end/it lays from the sea to the wilderness/and the Jordan—the Jordan is in the middle/Two banks to the Jordan/this bank is mine—and so is that."

According to the Revisionists, the area they demanded was promised to the Jews for a homeland in a legally binding way based on religious history, and the Zionist leadership had the right to claim this territory from the nations of the world. Thus the Revisionists and their successors, the Herut and LIKUD Parties, did not attach as much importance or sanctity to other regions that were later to fall under Israeli rule; for example, they were willing to part with the Sinai Peninsula in order to secure a more internationally accepted Jewish rule on the WEST BANK. Until 1967 the Greater Israel ideology was marginalized, but the 1967 War revived the ideology and made the Herut Party the bearer of a legitimate political program regarding the future of the state's borders.

1967 and Its Aftermath

The 1967 War and the subsequent OCCUPATION were crucial historical events in the further development of the Greater Land of Israel ideology. The areas that fell under Israeli control as a consequence of the war were the Golan Heights, East JERUSALEM, the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), the GAZA STRIP, and the Sinai Peninsula. Of these places HEBRON, Shechem (NABLUS), and East Jerusalem had great symbolic significance and resonance in Jewish history. After 1967, although Israel's continuous control of these areas was based on various material and security interests, the Greater Israel ideology was the most important element in attempts to convince the Israeli public that the Occupation was legitimate. For the first time in the history of Israel as a sovereign state, the issue was not just a theoretical idea, a whim of marginal zealots, or an anachronistic slogan of an opposition party, but instead a concrete reality to be debated and possibly implemented. Furthermore, Israel now held territories that many considered as constituting the "wholeness" of the land. Although supporters of the Greater Israel ideology

never renounced Israeli claims to other regions that they believed should be part of the Jewish homeland (such as the eastern bank of the Jordan River or southern LEBANON), the post-1967 debate focused on the areas under actual Israeli control. Because the ideology has gained a concrete focus and more specific goals, it came to seem more viable.

Israel's initial policy following the war was to annex a portion of the territories—mainly East Jerusalem and its surroundings—and to keep the rest as bargaining chips for future peace negotiations. This policy clearly contradicted any version of Greater Israel ideology and lasted only briefly. Within a short time Jewish settlements began to spring up in the West Bank, following the concepts of the ALLON PLAN (named after YIGAL ALLON, then vice prime minister) and the DAYAN PLAN (named after MOSHE DAYAN, then defense minister). Both plans had at least a partial vision of Greater Israel, even if for strategic rather than messianic reasons. Moreover, while Labor governments, in power for another ten years, did not publicly sanction the settlement movement immediately, neither did they take measures to impede the settlement activities of GUSH EMUNIM and others, and very shortly these Labor governments were providing the settlers with material support, as in the construction of KIRYAT ARBA.

The actualization of the Greater Israel idea afforded room for variation. The Herut Party and Betar were still committed to both banks of the Jordan River and therefore were presumably less attached to other areas, such as the Golan Heights and Sinai. In contrast the religious groups (the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY and its offshoot, Gush Emunim) were committed to much wider borders, including all those under current Israeli rule, and opposed any negotiation attempts that would undermine Israeli rule or bring about a retreat to the prewar borders. The heady period after the war gave rise to new movements promoting Greater Israel. One such group, the Greater Israel Movement, was composed primarily of writers and intellectuals, including such well-known and respected individuals as Natan Alterman and Sh.Y. Agnon. The group included veteran Labor figures such as Moshe Tabenkin and Eliezer Livneh and mainstream writers Haim Guri, Haim Hazaz, Aharon Reuveni, Gershom Shofman, and Yehuda Burla. It also encompassed veteran Revisionists, including poet Uri Zvi Greenberg and writers Yisrael Eldad and Moshe Shamir. Rabbi M. Z. Nerya and Professor Harel Fish were also a part of the group.

This Greater Israel Movement announced its birth on 22 September 1967, with a proclamation that appeared in almost all of Israel's daily newspapers. Its opening statement began: "The IDF's victory in the Six Day War placed the people and the State within a new fateful era. The integral Land of Israel is now in the hands of the Jewish People and as we are forbidden to forfeit the State of Israel, we are also commanded to retain what it gave us, the Land of Israel. We must be loyal to our country's integrity, considering the nation's past and future alike, and no government in Israel is allowed to compromise this integrity. . . . We are committed to the wholeness of our land—toward the past of the Jewish people and its future together, and no government in Israel is entitled to give up this wholeness." Although most of the signatories to this proclamation were secular—whether from the right or left—the statement reflects a close approximation of the ideology of Gush Emunim and the National Religious Party. It is worth noting that, according to the proclamation, the entire land of Israel was now under Jewish rule.

Greater Israel and the Ascension of the Likud

The secular political supporters of the Greater Israel ideology were mainly descendants of the Revisionists organized in the Herut Party, who had been propagating the idea of Greater Israel for years. As a presence within Israeli politics, they had not been particularly effective until the 1977 elections brought Herut ideologue MENAHEM BEGIN to the prime ministership. The ascension of the right to power created a revolution in Israeli political life. The raison d'être of the Likud was the rapid acceleration of settlements in the Occupied Territories, creating many facts on the ground in an attempt to implement its version of the Greater Israel ideology.

Religious Versions of the Idea

Beside the secular nationalists, the main bearers of the ideology emerged among JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISTS in general and the Gush Emunim in particular. Religious Jews supplied both the ideological framework to hold together the Greater Israel concept and the committed manpower to implement the policy that derives from their ideology.

The center for religious thought on the subject is the MERCAZ HARAV KOOK YESHIVA in Jerusalem, headed by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook. Following the teaching and writings of his father, RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK HACOHEN KOOK, the first chief rabbi of the prestate period, the son defined the Zionist return to the land as the start of redemption. The 1967 War was seen by the yeshiva students at Mercaz as a divine and miraculous event that proved the truth of their rabbi's teachings and enabled them to implement the religious prohibition on the return of the newly Occupied Territories. For the disciples of Rabbi Kook, the entire land was promised and was therefore sacred, although specific places within the land, such as Hebron, Shechem/Nablus, and especially Jerusalem, hold special value due to their biblical history.

The religious Zionists made two important early contributions to Israeli settlements on the West Bank. The first occurred in September 1967, when a distinct group composed of the sons of the residents of Kfar Etzion (most of them orphans of fathers killed in the fighting of 1948) reestablished a religious KIBBUTZ on the same ground in the Judean Hills where their fathers lived and died. On Passover in 1968 a group of religious Jews headed by RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER arrived in Hebron (allegedly to stay for the holiday) but then refused to leave, after which the Israeli government permitted Levinger and his followers to remain. In 1971 the group moved to Kiryat Arba, a new settlement constructed for them by the government, overlooking Hebron. Levinger and his followers were proponents of the Greater Israel ideology, and Kiryat Arba became one of their main strongholds.

In March 1974 the younger generation of National Religious Party leaders, who constituted the party's new religious elite, created the Gush Emunim organization, which promoted a systematic Greater Israel ideology. This ideology, as represented in numerous religious and political texts, demanded Jewish settlement in all the land of Israel as part of the implementation of divine redemption. Because the land in its entirety belongs to the Jewish people, Gush Emunim argued that no land can rightly be given away to non-Jews, so that returning land to Palestinians or the Arab nations is inconceivable. From this perspective the connection of the Jewish people to the land is metahistorical, not tied to specific memories or historical events but determined by the eternal mystical bond between the chosen people and their home. Rabbi Levinger expressed this view in his demand to settle Jews in the marketplace of the Palestinian town of Qalqilya on the West Bank, a place assumed to be completely Palestinian, because he believed it was necessary for Jews to express their exclusive rights everywhere in the land of Israel.

For practical political reasons Gush Emunim prefers to focus on places that hold historical memories, especially those mentioned in the Bible. Thus, after Hebron, Gush Emunim's next settlement attempt was directed toward Shechem. This focus on historical/biblical sites won the movement popular support, but despite the movement's specific actions, its metahistorical worldview remained. Thus, when Gush Emunim attempted, unsuccessfully, to halt Israeli withdrawal from Sinai—a place that holds few Jewish references—their rationale was that it belonged to the sacred land of Israel as divinely promised in the Bible, although the Sinai is not specifically mentioned as part of the land of Israel.

The defiant Palestinian presence was the single greatest obstacle to the implementation of the Greater Israel ideology. The idea of transferring masses of Palestinians across national borders, while carried out in 1948 and on smaller scales on later occasions, was not adopted by Gush Emunim leaders. They preferred mass Jewish immigration to the Occupied Territories and selective eviction of radical Palestinian activists, coupled with giving Palestinians individual rights in the hope that they would leave in the face of the Judaization of the territories. More radical factions formed around the Gush Emunim movement, with some openly advocating mass transfer of Palestinians, including the expulsion of the Israeli-Arab citizens. RABBI MEIR KAHANE, head of the KACH movement and member of the Israeli Knesset, claimed in the 1980s that, given the possibility of a Palestinian majority, the contradiction between the concept of Israel as both a Jewish and a democratic state could not be resolved, and therefore both citizen and noncitizen Arabs should be evicted from Israel and the territories.

Changes and Setbacks

After the 1977 elections, when supporters of the Greater Israel ideology reached their greatest political power, Prime Minister Begin's first official

declaration was that there would be many ELON MOREHS, referring to the first Gush Emunim settlement in Samaria. Yet, although the Greater Israel ideology appeared to have become the foundation of Israel's policy, within a short time supporters of the ideology had to accept various compromises, which led to the rise of new radical groups (Kach, MOLEDET, and others). For Greater Israel proponents the 1979 CAMP DAVID agreement with EGYPT was a major crisis. Supporters of the ideology bitterly noted that although Israel surrendered its rights on the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptians insisted on the return of "every grain of sand" of the Sinai. For these members of the Greater Israel movement Egypt showed greater love for its land than did Israel. The debate over the peace proposal brought about the secession of the ultrarightist faction of the Likud Party and the establishment of a new radical Greater Israel party, TEHIYA. From then on, the main body of Likud leadership moved, if very slowly, away from the Greater Israel ideology. During the 1980s the number of settlements in the Occupied Territories greatly increased, in accordance with the Greater Israel ideology. However, even when the movement appeared to be most effective, as in altering the ethnic landscape of the West Bank, its public support became increasingly tenuous within Israel.

Significantly, the Greater Israel ideology developed as an inner-Israeli discourse that never considered the Palestinian and Arab positions. The growing resistance of the Palestinians, leading to the 1987 INTIFADA, rendered a blow to the aspiration to annex the Occupied Territories and keep them as an eternal part of Israeli. Although Israel continued to colonize and settle in the Occupied Territories, the discourse of Greater Israel was mostly abandoned by the governing elite.

Greater Israel and the Oslo Process

Despite YITZHAK RABIN's expansion of Jewish settlements after the OSLO ACCORDS, the Labor government's return to power was a further blow to Greater Israel ideology. With the Oslo Accords the Israeli government disavowed the intention of holding indefinitely all the territories occupied in 1967. In protest the opponents of the Oslo agreements and their political allies demonstrated against the agreements and reestablished the Greater Israel coalition. Their arguments, however, mostly abandoned the Greater Israel rhetoric and focused instead on the security issues raised by the agreements.

The Israeli right's return to power after Rabin's assassination and the 1996 elections did not change the basic situation. Although Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU was obliged to follow the Oslo Accords, he did so as sparingly as possible, refusing to implement numerous signed agreements and aggressively expanding GREATER JERUSALEM. He did, however, finally concede areas of Hebron to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. EHUD BARAK, who followed him as prime minister, received much criticism for his apparent willingness to concede much of the Occupied Territories to the Palestinians in a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The second Palestinian Intifada (AL-AQSA INTIFADA), starting in October 2000, brought new opportunities but also new constraints for the Greater Israel ideology. Its basic claim was always that the land was homogeneous, with no difference between either side of the Green Line. Although the SUICIDE BOMBINGS in Israeli cities seemed to enforce that view, the construction of the BARRIER wall was a major setback for the Greater Israel movement. It clearly implied that one part of the whole land should be physically protected from the other part and that security concerns should take precedence over religious/ideological dicta.

Similarly, Israel's plan for unilateral disengagement, which called for an Israeli evacuation from the Gaza Strip and the destruction of the Gush Katif settlement region, was devastating to Greater Israel proponents, all the more so because it was carried out by Ariel Sharon, previously a major proponent of Greater Israel ideology.

As of 2006 the ideology of Greater Israel is rarely mentioned in Israel and hardly considered in deliberations with the international community. Supporters of Greater Israel are still found in rightwing political parties and still form a sizable group that often must be considered in political decisions. Publicly, however, it is rare to find unqualified support for a political position that favors keeping the entire land of Israel, in whatever definition, under exclusive Israeli rule—apart from marginal messianic groups with limited followings. It has become clear to most Israelis that a Greater Israel solution would cause increasingly greater violence and undoubtedly entail mass ethnic cleansing of non-Jews. The radical Jewish messianic groups that support the idea try to legitimize the dehumanization of the Palestinians with religious, nationalistic, and security considera-

tions. Whether these attempts to keep the ideological torch burning will eventually rekindle the idea is a matter for the future.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; SETTLEMENTS

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—Michael Feige

Greek Orthodox Church

In Palestine the Greek Orthodox Church is the richest Christian church and the second largest landholder (after the state of Israel and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND), with major holdings in JERUSALEM, the WEST BANK, and the GAZA STRIP. It is also the largest Palestinian Christian community, with some 100,000 members. As such its patriarchy in Jerusalem has played a complicated role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In contrast to the Roman Catholic Church, whose pope makes policy and passes it down through the hierarchy, the Greek Orthodox Church is not centrally structured. Every Orthodox patriarch who has served in Jerusalem has essentially made his own policies. There is constant tension between the Greek patriarchs and local Palestinian Greek Orthodox bishops and priests over LAND sales to Israel, as well as tension among the patriarchs, Israel, JORDAN, and, more recently, the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA).

In 1974 Patriarch Hilarion Capucci was arrested and convicted by Israel of smuggling weapons to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, and in 2000 Patriarch Theodosios Hanna accused Israel of "ethnic cleansing" of Palestinians. Much more common than such extremes, however, are sales of Palestinian LAND by patriarchs to Israel, an action that enrages Palestinians.

Before the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionist pioneers bought land through middlemen or from ABSENTEE LANDLORDS and then established fortified communities, sometimes evicting long-term Palestinian tenants. Since Israeli forces captured East Jerusalem from Jordan in 1967, groups of Jewish investors and several right-wing settler organizations have continued this policy in and around East Jerusalem with the support of Israel, and Greek Orthodox patriarchs have been major land sellers. Since the BRITISH MANDATE the Greek Orthodox Church has sold or leased land to Jews. For example, the land for Jerusalem's prestigious Rehaviah suburb, the Knesset, and ARIEL SHARON's official residence was originally owned by the church. In the 1990s the Greek Orthodox Church sold a large piece of land on the outskirts of East

Jerusalem to Jewish investors who built the settlement of HAR HOMA on it, and since then there have been several smaller deals.

In 2001 Patriarch Irenaeus I was elected to the Jerusalem office, although initially Israel opposed him as too pro-Palestinian and refused to recognize him. Subsequently *Ma'ariv*, a respected Israeli newspaper, broke the story that Irenaeus had sold several church properties, including the landmark Imperial and Petra hotels along with numerous shops inside Jaffa Gate in the OLD CITY, to two groups of overseas Jewish investors. The paper described the sale as Jews seeking to "liberate the lands of Jerusalem." The patriarch quickly denied the allegations and blamed a Greek financial advisor, Nicholas Papadimas, for abusing his authority under a limited power of attorney. At the time Irenaeus was already fighting for his survival as patriarch after an Israeli court, acting on the government's initial belief that Irenaeus would support the Palestinian claim to East Jerusalem and before the news of his land sales was made public, ruled that he had been elected to the post with the help of a convicted drug trafficker.

After the story about the land deals was published the Jordanian government withdrew its recognition of the patriarch, and the PNA was prepared to follow. However, the PNA eventually decided to maintain its support of Irenaeus after the patriarch promised to cancel the property transactions. The transactions were not cancelled, however, and *Ha'aretz*, the Jerusalem daily, revealed in November 2005 that US businessman IRWIN MOSKOWITZ was the person who had bought the two hotels near the Jaffa Gate from the Greek Orthodox Church and that he had no intention of reselling them. On the other hand, the highest local Greek Orthodox ecclesiastic bodies, the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulcher and the Church Synod, both voted to depose Irenaeus, accusing him of being part of a conspiracy to "Judaize" the Old City. The synod demoted Irenaeus from archbishop to monk and elected Cornelius of Petra to act in his stead until a new patriarch would be officially installed.

Irenaeus, however, insisted he was still the patriarch. Legally church leaders cannot dismiss a patriarch; only the governments in the areas where his congregation lives—in this case, Israel, Jordan, and the PNA—have the power to do that by withdrawing their recognition of him. Only Jordan did so. After Israel learned of Irenaeus's land deals with Jewish investors in East Jerusalem, it maintained cordial relations with him until the end of his service in 2005. Such conflicts and political intrigues characterize the history of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Holy Land.

See also CHRISTIANITY

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Green Areas

Since 1967 the Israeli authorities have confiscated large areas of Palestinian land in Israeli-defined greater East JERUSALEM and categorized them as green areas. Ostensibly such spaces were established for environmental and recreational purposes, in which all construction is prohibited. Later, however, many of these areas were reclassified as "yellow areas" for exclusive Jewish building. The Israeli settlements of Neve Ya'cub, Pisgat Zeiv, MA'ALE ADUMIM, Gilo, the French Hill, Giva'at Shabira, and HAR HOMA are all built on land previously classified by the Israeli authorities as green areas.

In the early 1980s the Jerusalem municipal government began to prepare development plans

for all the Palestinian neighborhoods within and surrounding the Old City of East Jerusalem. The most conspicuous feature of these plans is the vast size—some 50 percent—of the area designated as green areas. The municipality used zoning restrictions to establish these green areas and thus removed the land from Palestinian use and created a reserve for Jewish housing.

Conversely, according to B'Tselem (Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), in the plans that were approved prior to the end of 1999, only some 1,250 acres (5,100 dunums, constituting 11 percent of the land in East Jerusalem) were available to the Palestinian population for construction. In 2006 the percentage of Jerusalem land accessible to Palestinians had shrunk to only 7 percent. The consequences of this policy are evident in Palestinian neighborhoods. For example, at the end of 2002 housing density in Arab neighborhoods was almost twice that of Jewish neighborhoods: 128 square feet (11.9 square meters) per person compared to 256 square feet (23.8 square meters) per person, respectively. This situation forced many Palestinians to build homes without first obtaining building PERMITS, which were consistently denied by the authorities. For the year 2006 the municipality budgeted US$600,000 for Palestinian HOUSE DEMOLITIONS in Jerusalem. From January to April 2006, 246 house demolition orders were sent to Jerusalemites living in the Sur Baher, Jabal Al Mukabber, SILWAN, and Shu'fat areas of Jerusalem. In the years 2003–2005 a total of 442 Palestinian homes were demolished in East Jerusalem, dispossessing some 2,108 persons.

If the municipality has declared an area as green, any Palestinian landowner wishing to build on the land must make a proposal for it to be rezoned. To make a rezoning proposal, one must employ an engineer to draw up plans in accordance with regulations. Not only are such proposals typically refused, they can also cost up to two or three times the cost of building the house. Once the municipality declares an area a green zone, existing houses may be demolished and new construction is illegal. Palestinians who live in the green areas have nowhere to go. If they build outside the city, they lose their residency rights, because the authorities claim Jerusalem is no longer their "CENTER OF LIFE," and if they build without a permit, their houses are demolished.

See also JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SHAYK JARRAH; SILWAN; ZONING LAWS AND REGULATIONS

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Green Patrol

The Green Patrol, an environmental paramilitary unit under the Israel Land Administration, has the mission of preventing BEDOUIN infiltration into national Israeli land and also keeps the Bedouin from grazing their animals, cultivating their farmlands, and establishing homes, roads, and educational facilities in traditional areas, among other things. In 1979 Agriculture Minister ARIEL SHARON declared the Negev south of the 50-degree latitude a protected nature reserve or "green area," rendering it almost completely out of bounds for Bedouin herders, who had traditionally grazed there. Initially the Agriculture Ministry established the Green Patrol for the purpose of implementing the 1950 Black Goat Law, which prohibited grazing on a large scale. The patrol later expanded its activities and removed 900 Bedouin settlements and cut their goat herds by more than one-third. Twice in 2003 the Israel Land Administration sent crop-dusting planes to spray Bedouin farmland with herbicide. Members of the Green Patrol are sometimes accompanied by a significant police presence on the ground.

See also BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL; UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES

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Grossman, David (1954–)

David Grossman is an Israeli journalist and writer who has published five novels, two nonfiction works, a play, and several children's books. As a journalist for a number of organizations, including Kol Israel (Israeli Radio), he has been hailed by some as Israel's best journalist. Grossman has won numerous awards for his writing, including the Prime Minister's Prize for Hebrew Literature, the Israeli Publisher's Prize for best novel, the Vallombrosa Prize, the Nelly Sachs prize, and the Premio Mondelo for *The Zigzag Kid*.

Grossman was born in JERUSALEM, the son of Yitzhak Grossman, who immigrated to Palestine from Austria, and Michaela, a Jerusalemite. He studied philosophy and theater at Hebrew University, graduating in 1979. Grossman first achieved international recognition with the publication of his book *The Yellow Wind* (1987), a nonfiction account of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since then he has continued to garner acclaim for works such as *The Smile of the Lamb*, which was inspired by the Israeli OCCUPATION, and *See Under: Love*, which examines the experiences of a child of HOLOCAUST survivors.

See also HEBREW LITERATURE

Gulf War, 1991

Following IRAQ's invasion of KUWAIT in August 1990, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chose not to join a coalition that immediately began to form against Iraqi president Saddam Husayn. The isolation of Iraq quickly widened to include a UN Security Council resolution (No. 664) condemning its action and calling for its "complete, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal" from Kuwait. Similar resolutions were hurriedly approved by the ARAB LEAGUE, while the UNITED STATES orchestrated an alliance to liberate Kuwait. The PLO's decision to align itself with Iraq resulted in wide-ranging setbacks—from economic deprivation to political marginalization—that affected many aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Following its liberation by the US and allied forces, Kuwait retaliated with a mass expulsion of the entire Palestinian community—some 450,000 persons, including many who had either been born in Kuwait or lived there for decades, so that individuals who had initially been REFUGEES from Palestine were now refugees from Kuwait. The majority went to JORDAN while others were scattered around the globe. At the same time, jobs that had previously been open to Palestinians in SAUDI ARABIA and elsewhere in the Gulf were now closed. All of these circumstances created economic difficulties for the Palestinians residing in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP and in the refugee camps elsewhere in the Middle East, who had become financially dependent on the remittances from Gulf workers. Moreover, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia abruptly ended their large annual financial contributions to YASIR ARAFAT for PLO institutions and individuals. The Palestinians also experienced serious political fallout that threatened their long-term goal of a viable, independent state. All the political capital the PLO had so painstakingly acquired since 1988 was squandered by its alignment with Iraq.

The most serious consequences of the PLO's decision was the organization's subsequent need for excessive accommodation to Israel after the PLO's legitimacy, credibility, and primacy as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" were questioned at a number of levels after the Gulf War. At the local (West Bank/Gaza Strip) level, where the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) had emerged during the First INTIFADA, the Palestinian masses were increasingly opposed to the secular policies of the PLO, which included recognition of Israel and a TWO-STATE SOLUTION. At the regional and international levels the PLO suddenly found itself more isolated than it had been since 1975.

The PLO took such a fateful course of action as a result of several factors. In the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, frustration had increased as the First Intifada entered its third year without ending the Israeli OCCUPATION. Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were also facing a rapid expansion of Jewish SETTLEMENT construction and the influx of a huge SOVIET JEWISH community. The newly formed LIKUD government was proving to be more hard-line than the previous LABOR-Likud coalition, and the threat of expulsion of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories was in the air after the far right MOLEDET Party, known for its open advocacy of

Palestinian TRANSFER, gained positions in the new Israeli government. And Palestinians became increasingly frustrated over what they perceived as continual PLO deference to the United States with nothing tangible to show for it.

In this context of despair and disappointment, Palestinians suddenly experienced a renewed sense of optimism about their plight when a February 1990 speech by Saddam Husayn marking the first anniversary of the Arab Cooperation Council was broadcast throughout the Occupied Territories. The Iraqi president condemned the West for its unwavering support of Israel and called upon all Arabs to unite in the struggle against the US superpower. Popular opinion in the West Bank and Gaza Strip now turned toward Iraq as the power in the region that could potentially liberate them from the Israeli military Occupation. At the same time, while other Arab states were significantly scaling back their financial contributions to the PLO, Iraq not only maintained but actually increased its assistance—aid that was materially experienced in the Occupied Territories and in the Palestinian DIASPORA.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, demonstrations in support of Saddam erupted throughout the Occupied Territories. One major force behind Palestinian public support for Saddam Husayn was that he proposed making any Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait conditional upon an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At this time Hamas was also calling on all Palestinians to take their struggle to Israeli soil and for Baghdad to strike at Tel Aviv if the West attacked Iraq. Arafat and his colleagues believed that if the PLO condemned the Iraqi invasion and Saddam's subsequent annexation of Kuwait, it risked being judged illegitimate by its constituency in the Occupied Territories—a constituency that had become increasingly important to the PLO as a consequence of the Intifada. The majority of the PLO leadership felt that it could not politically afford to ignore Palestinian grassroots support for Saddam or Saddam's political and financial support for the PLO and the Palestinian cause.

Yet its decision to align with Iraq and not join the US-led coalition against Baghdad stripped the PLO of its support in the Arab world and isolated it in the international community, leaving it extremely weakened and vulnerable. Throughout the preparations leading up to the MADRID CONFERENCE in the period after the war, the United States, following Israel's demands, set the terms and conditions for Palestinian participation, and the PLO was powerless to object. It had to accept that it would be formally excluded from the conference, that any Palestinian participation would be tied to a joint Jordanian delegation, that Israel would vet any Palestinian participants, and that no Palestinians from outside the Occupied Territories or from East JERUSALEM could participate. Despite these restrictions, Arafat concluded that to remain a factor in the Middle East, he had no choice but to participate in the conference.

At the start of the Madrid peace process, the Palestinian negotiators were optimistic because their voices and their concerns were being heard, and they hoped that the United States would be a fair and neutral partner in the peace process. Also the conference would mark the first time that all the parties to the dispute were seated at the negotiating table. The talks, however, failed to make any progress on substantive issues. The government of Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR rejected Palestinian proposals for self-rule, and Israel (and the United States) now began to refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed lands" rather than as "occupied territories." Both Hamas and the Damascus-based PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT openly opposed continued Palestinian participation in the Madrid talks, especially in light of Israel's increased settlement building, growing human rights violations, avoidance of the refugee issue, and the Palestinian ECONOMIC crisis. Yet despite its doubts, the PLO's Central Council decided that it had no choice but to continue engaging in the talks, although the leader of the Palestinian delegation, Gazan HAYDAR 'ABD AL-SHAFI, concluded differently and resigned.

During this period Arafat also approved secret back-channel negotiations that ultimately produced the joint Israel-PLO DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP) and the OSLO ACCORDS that followed. But the PLO was in no stronger a position vis-à-vis Israel in these negotiations than in the formal bilateral Madrid talks. The vast disparities of power that underlay the OSLO PROCESS set the PLO on a seven-year quest for a state that ended with Arafat's eighteen-month imprisonment until his death, an economic catastrophe for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, the harshest Occupation policies Palestinians had ever experienced, a new Intifada, and the end of all hope for a state.

The PLO's agreement to the extremely unfavorable terms of the Declaration of Principles,

which set the goal of establishing a Palestinian self-governing authority, can only be understood in terms of the organization's weakness as a result of siding with Saddam Husayn in a war in which every other state was on the opposite side. The Israeli-PLO relationship was always characterized by massive power differentials, but after the Gulf War the PLO's position was so weak that it had no leverage or bargaining power, which was one reason why Israel agreed to recognize and engage with the PLO. The DOP and the numerous agreements that followed were, in effect, dictated by Israel and acquiesced to by the PLO. Throughout the seven years of negotiations, the Israelis made demands and the Palestinians made concessions.

In the end the Oslo Process not only failed to lead to the fulfillment of Palestinian aspirations for self-determination and statehood, but also left unresolved the issue of the 1948 refugees' right of return as well as the final status of Jerusalem. At the same time, this period witnessed both an enormous increase in Jewish settlement and ROAD construction in the West Bank (thus reducing any prospect for a viable, territorially contiguous Palestinian state in the future) and an aggressive Judaization of East Jerusalem (foreclosing any possibility that the city could serve as the capital of any future Palestinian state).

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—JoAnn DiGeorgio-Lutz

Gush Emunim

The impact of Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) on Israeli society thirty years after its establishment in 1974 cannot be underestimated. While the movement as such ceased to exist in the 1980s, it gave birth to a large number of SETTLEMENTS and politi-

cal and ideological organizations, which continue to implement the basic ideology laid out by the movement's founders. This ideology focuses above all else on the philosophies of the Greater Land of Israel and JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM, spearheaded through its WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and GAZA settlement policy. The impact of Gush's policy and settlements has been clearly evident in attempts to draw the boundaries of a TWO-STATE SOLUTION to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the period since the OSLO ACCORDS in 1993 and 1995. At the same time, the political influence of its supporters as part of the governmental and institutional framework has been a major factor underlying Israeli governmental coalitions during the past twenty years.

History of the Movement

Gush Emunim was founded in 1974 as a movement seeking the permanent retention by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories and their ultimate incorporation into Israel. It has rejected any form of territorial withdrawal from these regions, viewing the Israel-SYRIA disengagement agreements on the Golan Heights, in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 War, as a dangerous precedent for further territorial withdrawals in the West Bank and Gaza. Gush Emunim's territorial philosophy is based on a religious ideology that believes the whole of the "Land of Israel," as described in biblical texts, was promised to the Jewish people by God. Once conquered (or, in their terms, "liberated") in the "miraculous" events of the 1967 WAR, this LAND cannot voluntarily be given over to any form of non-Jewish rule, even through the democratic decisions of an elected government. To achieve its objective, Gush Emunim sought to create a political movement that would ensure that no part of Israeli-controlled land would ever be relinquished. To that end it proposed the establishment of Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a practical means to establish permanent Israeli control of the land. Arguing that all settlement-colonization activity in pre-Israel Palestine had helped determine Israel's ultimate BORDERS, Gush believed that similar activities were necessary within the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the present era.

Gush Emunim established its first settlements in the West Bank, in Sebastia and Ophrah, against the wishes of the YITZHAK RABIN government of the time (1974–1977). After the election of Israel's first right-wing government in 1977, one of Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN's earliest actions was to visit the Camp Kedumim outpost and to declare that there would be many more ELON MOREHS (a reference to settlement OUTPOSTS not sanctioned by the Israeli government) during the life of his government.

Political Activity

Gush Emunim never became a formal movement with membership lists and official leadership roles. Movement activists, who identified with the basic Greater Land of Israel ideology, tended instead to become involved in a wide range of private, public, and quasi-governmental institutions, all aimed at furthering the cause of West Bank and Gaza settlements. Over time it adopted two modes of political behavior to achieve its objectives. On the one hand it maintained an informal street activist mode of protest via public demonstrations and similar actions whenever it felt that its ultimate objectives were threatened. At the same time the movement's leaders and their spin-off institutions worked within the government to advance their political aims. They assumed active roles in political parties, splinter factions, settlement movements, planning agencies, and local governmental and municipal positions, as well as getting support from specific government ministries and even from some LABOR and LIKUD administrations. This political involvement enabled Gush Emunim to use public sector resources to advance its settlement objectives and to disseminate the Greater Land of Israel ideology and messianic fundamentalism to future generations of adherents through a network of public sector and religious schools, as well as other educational institutions.

Gush Emunim and its ideological inheritors have always been major opponents of every peace process that proposed any territorial withdrawal that would lead to non-Jewish control or sovereignty over parts of the land of Israel. They have always been the most effective demonstrators against various peace initiatives, organizing large protests in the major cities, posting their slogans and billboards throughout the country at the most visible intersections and public places, and creating a lobby among right-wing politicians to prevent the implementation of any proposed peace accord. Compared to all other modes of protest in Israel during the past thirty years, the Gush Emunim settler movement has been the most vociferous and active, able to mobilize tens of thousands of supporters in public rallies whenever necessary. At the same time, its belief that its objectives are

religiously sanctioned has resulted in acts of violence and extremism, which have become associated with right-wing protests in Israel.

In the mid-1980s the discovery and arrest of members of an ultranationalist underground were the first indications of the extremes to which some members of the settler movement were prepared to go. Elected Palestinian mayors of West Bank cities were killed and maimed by bombs planted in their cars, while plans to plant bombs on Palestinian buses and to blow up the AL-AQSA MOSQUE were central to the activities of this underground. The murder of Emil Greenzweig at a PEACE NOW demonstration in 1983, the murder of 29 Muslim worshipers in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON by KIRYAT ARBA resident BARUCH GOLDSTEIN in 1994, and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in September 1995 were further indications of ultranationalist political extremism. In each case the movement was at pains to emphasize that these were exceptions rather than the rule and that the incidents of violence did not represent the overall settler movement, which was composed of law-abiding citizens opposed to any form of violence, particularly against the Jewish citizens of Israel.

The Gush Emunim ideology created additional protest movements, organizations, and NGOs. Most notable among these have been the WOMEN IN GREEN, ZO ARTZENU, BeTzedek movements, the GAMLA movement, and PROFESSORS FOR A STRONG ISRAEL, all of which strongly oppose any form of territorial compromise and have led the campaign against Israel's disengagement from any OCCUPIED TERRITORY. Many of these movements have adopted the most extreme statements and slogans of protest, distancing themselves from mainstream Israeli leadership. Many receive support and funding from supporters in North America and Western Europe.

The main political party associated with the Gush Emunim ideology was initially the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP, or Mafdal). Prior to 1967, Mafdal was seen as the party of compromise between secular and orthodox Israel and took part in almost all government coalitions. Following 1967, however, the party clearly turned to the right in terms of national politics, becoming the party that supported and promoted the retention of the Occupied Territories and the establishment of settlements throughout this region. Many Gush Emunim supporters transferred their political allegiances to other, more extreme, right-wing parties—such as the Ihud leumi (NATIONAL UNITY Party), led by BENYAMIN ELON, and YISRAEL BETEINU (Israel Is Our Home party), led by Avigdor Lieberman—and the more mainstream Likud party of government, and were partially responsible for the eventual demise of the NRP and its reincarnation into a small splinter faction known as Habayit Hayehudi (the Jewish Home) in the 2009 elections.

Another form of Gush Emunim political mobilization and institutionalization has been through local governments, which are responsible for educational and welfare services within their jurisdictions. Many Gush Emunim settler activists find employment within local government, while local mayors are elected from the resident settler population. In this way Gush Emunim is able to use public sector resources to consolidate and expand its existing settlement network.

A number of additional quasi-public bodies, set up with specific political objectives, provide additional indications of the sophisticated organizations that have formed around the Gush Emunim settler movement ideology. The YESHA COUNCIL is an umbrella organization representing all of the West Bank (and previously Gaza) municipalities and local government authorities. Its objective is to promote the settlements and to lobby on their behalf inside government, in political parties, and in government ministries. Similarly, the YESHA RABBIS Council, composed of some of the leading West Bank community rabbis, has over time become the supreme authority for many settlers in interpreting religious ideology and determining the form of opposition and political activity when government decisions support territorial withdrawal and settlement evacuation. The Yesha Council often consults with the leading Yesha Rabbis before it adopts a specific political position, and the latter played a leading role in the period before the Gaza disengagement.

Settlement Activity

Gush Emunim has always focused on the practical, concrete way to achieve its political objectives—the establishment of settlements throughout the Occupied Territories to ensure that the Palestinian territories taken in the 1967 War will never again be under non-Jewish rule. In its worldview, settling the territories will advance divine redemption, while relinquishing these ter-

ritories constitutes a setback in the redemption process.

Gush Emunim presents itself as the true preservers and interpreters of the Zionist movement as defined by RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK and his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda, who believed that the coming of the Messiah is imminent and that the Jews, with God's aid, will thereafter triumph over the non-Jews and rule them forever. The use of Arab-owned land for settlement by Jews, they argue, is part of this redemption process. Gush also looks to the early Zionist movement that brought land under control of the Jewish collective and eventually produced a sovereign state by incremental land purchases and settlements. The notion of *hitnachalut,* the term used in the Bible to describe Joshua's conquest of the land of Israel following the return from Egyptian exile, has come to define the West Bank and Gaza settlements and is perceived by Gush Emunim as a positive rather than negative term.

The Gush Emunim activities have resulted—directly and indirectly—in the settling of well over 250,000 residents in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This has taken place in a wide range of urban and suburban communities and townships, most of which have experienced growth due to relatively high rates of birth among the mostly religious inhabitants of these communities. Settlement growth has been accompanied by the development of social and physical infrastructure, schools, municipalities, and institutes of higher education, as well as the construction of ROADS, industrial parks, and commercial centers. In the ongoing Israeli discourse about the eventual borders between Israel and a future Palestinian state, settlements have played an important role. Israel's attempt to annex those parts of the West Bank where the major settlement blocs are located—especially those close to the Green Line—has shown the settlements' powerful impact in creating new geographical and political realities, which then become difficult, if not impossible, to reverse later if political conditions change. This has been demonstrated by the construction of the separation BARRIER, which has effectively annexed parts of the West Bank to Israel under the guise of security considerations. Equally, the evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip and the fact that many settlements are on the Palestinian side of the Barrier (which would indicate that they are candidates for future evacuation) show that geographical facts on the ground are powerful political assets, but ones that can be disposed of and removed if and when the political conditions are ripe.

Gaza Disengagement

Israel's *hitnatkut* (disengagement) from Gaza in 2005 caused a major crisis among the Gush Emunim settlers, at both the ideological and practical levels, because the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the forced evacuation of the settlements was the antithesis of what they perceived as the true path of contemporary ZIONISM: Jewish control of the Greater Land of Israel. In practice, the settler movement and their supporters used all available means to thwart the implementation of *hitnatkut*. This included attempts to overturn government decisions through civil protests, including demonstrations at which protesters wore orange clothes and ribbons to signify their opposition to the plan, violent actions such as the blocking of major roadways in the center of the country, and the establishment of small illegal outposts.

ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA also raised major questions about the long-term success of Gush Emunim ideology. Having set out to ensure future sovereignty over the entire Greater Land of Israel territory taken in the 1967 War, the settlers were forced to give up control over one part. The collapse of their dream started not with the Gaza disengagement but with the implementation of the Oslo Accords and the transfer of local control and autonomy in many areas to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Some settler leaders bitterly noted that they had not enlisted the support of most of the country's Jewish population because while they had "succeeded in settling the heart of the Land; they had failed to settle in the hearts of the people." In making this comparison, Gush drew on the term with which it is most associated, namely *lehitnachel* (settle or squat, or take root).

See also GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; SETTLEMENTS

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—David Newman

Gush Shalom

Gush Shalom (the Peace Bloc) is the core of the ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT. It was founded by URI AVNERY and others in 1993, in response to the repressive measures against the Palestinians introduced by the new LABOR PARTY government headed by YITZHAK RABIN. It struggled with the government to keep the OSLO PROCESS on track as soon as Israel began to deviate from the path of peace. An extraparliamentary organization, independent of any party or other political grouping, Gush Shalom is known for its unwavering stand for peace even in times of crisis, such as the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. Since its inception, Gush Shalom has played a leading role in determining the moral and political agenda of the peace forces in Israel as well as attempting to break the national (anti-Oslo) consensus.

The primary aim of Gush Shalom is to influence Israeli public opinion and lead Israel toward peace and reconciliation with the Palestinian people, based on the following principles:

- Putting an end to the OCCUPATION
- Accepting the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent and sovereign state of Palestine in all the territories occupied by Israel in 1967
- Reinstating the pre-1967 Green Line as the border between Israel and Palestine (with possible minor exchanges of territories agreed to between the parties)
- Opening the Green Line border for the free movement of people and goods, subject to mutual agreement
- Establishing JERUSALEM as the capital of the two states, with East Jerusalem (including the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF) serving as the capital of Palestine and West Jerusalem (including the WESTERN WALL) serving as the capital of Israel
- Recognizing in principle the right of return of the Palestinian REFUGEES, allowing each refugee to choose between compensation and repatriation to Palestine or Israel, and fixing by mutual agreement an annual quota for the number of refugees who will be able to return to Israel from the camps in LEBANON, JORDAN, and SYRIA without undermining Israel's foundations
- Safeguarding the security of both Israel and Palestine by mutual agreement and guarantees
- Striving for overall peace between Israel and all Arab countries and the creation of a regional union

(www.gush-shalom.org/english).

See also URI AVNERY; CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; REFUSENIKS; YESH G'VUL

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Ha'am, Ahad (1856–1927)

Ahad Ha'am, which means "One of the People," was the pen name of Asher Tzevi Ginzberg, a moral philosopher, prolific writer, Zionist thinker and leader, and the father of "cultural Zionism," a trend in Zionism that values Jewish culture and history and the Hebrew language to a greater extent than statehood, LAND, and other aspects of political Zionism. Born in Kiev, Russia, Ginzberg visited Palestine in 1891 and 1892 and immigrated in 1922. In addition to his traditional Hasidic upbringing, Ginzberg acquired a broad secular education in philosophy and literature and was fluent in five languages. As editor of the journal *Ha'shiloah* (1896–1902) he was influential in creating the Modern Hebrew literary style. But after Ginzberg developed a strong rationalist philosophy, he rejected first Hasidism, then religion itself. He believed the chief obligation of Jewish life was the fulfillment of the ethical demands of the Old Testament prophets and saw Palestine as the "spiritual center" for a cultural and spiritual revival of the Jewish people, which he considered a crucial precursor to a Jewish state.

Ginzberg joined the HOVEVEI ZION movement around 1884 but soon became a severe critic of its SETTLEMENT activities, preferring instead to work for a Jewish regeneration, for a Jewish cultural revival. He adopted his pen name in 1889 when he published his first and highly controversial essay on ZIONISM, "The Wrong Way," in which he criticized Jews who sought to settle in Palestine, advocating instead Jewish cultural education as the basis for building a strong people for later settlement. He founded the Bnai Moshe (Sons of Moses), a group that primarily concerned itself with the improvement of Hebrew education, the dissemination of HEBREW LITERATURE, and a cultural revival of the Jewish people. However, the group later founded Rehovoth, a settlement in Palestine, as well the Achiasaf Hebrew publishing company. Bnai Moshe was a short-lived effort.

Ginzberg's visits to Palestine convinced him that the Zionist movement would face an uphill struggle. In particular he warned of the difficulties associated with land purchase and cultivation, the problems with OTTOMAN authorities, and the inevitable conflict with the Arabs that would ensue if Jews established a homeland in Palestine. He criticized Zionism's founder THEODOR HERZL for "quasi-messianic schemes" and warned of the disillusionment that would follow Herzl's failure to secure great power support for Zionist land acquisition, IMMIGRATION, and statehood. Ginzberg did not believe in political Zionism and thought settlement of Palestine would not happen until nationalist sentiment and culture were promoted among Jews in the DIASPORA. He split from the Zionist movement after the FIRST ZIONIST CONGRESS of 1898.

Ginzberg played a role in obtaining the British BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917), which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine; however, he was one of the few in the Zionist movement who stressed the parallel obligations to the Arabs found in the declaration. Based on his concept of cultural Zionism, he attempted to limit the political aims of Zionism by emphasizing "consideration for the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs." This was a note rarely if ever struck by the spokesmen for mainstream Zionism.

Four years after the Balfour Declaration was promulgated, Ginzberg, writing as Ahad Ha'am, expressed his views in a preface to the Berlin edition of his book *At the Cross Ways*. He wrote that the historical right of the Jewish people to a national home in Palestine "does not invalidate the right of the rest of the land's inhabitants . . . [they have] a genuine right to the land due to generations of residence and work upon it." For the Palestinians, too, Ginzberg wrote, "this country is a national home and they have the right to develop their national potentialities to the utmost." He felt this "makes Palestine into a common possession of different peoples," which was why the British government "promised to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and not, as was proposed by the political Zionists, the reconstruction of Palestine as the National Home for the Jewish People."

In 1925 Ginzberg was the spiritual father of and an early participant in the creation of the Berit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), the first organization to call for BINATIONALISM in Palestine. He died in 1927 at the age of seventy-one.

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Ha'avara, 1933

The Ha'avara (transfer) agreement enabled German Jews to transfer part of their assets to Palestine and to immigrate there. It was concluded in 1933 between Nazi authorities and HAIM ARLOZOROV, a leading representative of the Yishuv, a LABOR Zionist, and a prominent HISTADRUT (Zionist labor federation) leader who traveled to GERMANY and initiated the idea. In 1935 the WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS and the JEWISH AGENCY officially approved the Ha'avara agreement, and it remained active, guaranteed by Hitler, until the outbreak of World War II. In 1933 Sam Cohen, a Jewish businessman from Palestine, also concluded a pact with the Nazi minister of economics that allowed German Jews to transfer their capital in the form of certain goods through Cohen's company, up to a limit of 3 million Reichmarks (about $857,000).

As a result of the Ha'avara agreement, two companies were established to carry out the transfers: the Ha'avara Company in Tel Aviv and a sister company, Paltreu, in Berlin. To start the process, the German Jewish emigrant paid his fee for emigration (the minimum sum was around a thousand pounds sterling) into the German account of the Ha'avara (at the Wassermann Bank in Berlin or at the Warburg Bank in Hamburg). With this money Jewish importers could purchase German goods for export to Palestine while paying the equivalent value in Palestinian pounds into the Ha'avara account at the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Palestine. When the German Jewish emigrant arrived in Palestine, he received from this account the equivalent value of the sum he had paid in Germany, after remitting rather high fees for emigration. In connection with this agreement, the Zionists established their own shipping company, which bought the German passenger ship *Hohenstein* and renamed it *Tel Aviv.*

The Ha'avara agreement benefited the economies of both Germany and the Yishuv. It assured the German economy of an export market at a time when world trade still suffered from the 1929 global economic depression and the series of US tariffs that followed. A 1937 memorandum from the German Reich Ministry of the Interior noted that the Ha'avara was good for Germany because German goods were being bought in Palestine and Jews were leaving Germany: "The emigration of Jews suits our overall objectives and the increasing German IMMIGRATION to Palestine has strengthened the Zionists against the British and the Arabs." Additionally, according to Francis R. Nicosia, "Germany became the number-one exporter of goods to Palestine by 1937 due to the Ha'avara agreement."

The Ha'avara agreement also improved the Zionist economy in Palestine. Some analysts suggest that as much as 8 million pounds sterling were transferred from Germany to Palestine. Moreover, only the wealthy German Jews could afford the required 1,000 pounds sterling to leave, so such individuals were more likely to have money that they could invest in the Yishuv economy. As a result of the Ha'avara agreement, approximately 50,000 German Jews immigrated to Palestine.

For the development of the Yishuv, the German immigrants themselves were the most important benefit of the Ha'avara. Many of the most important economic projects in the Yishuv were founded and directed by German immigrants, including the largest foundry and cement industry, owned by Karl Landau, the onetime director of the Berlin electricity and water company. Additionally, Arnold Barth of Berlin, Siegfried Sahlheine of Hamburg, and Herbert Forder of Braslav were prominent managers of the Bank Leumi, originally opened in JAFFA and eventually based in JERUSALEM. Fritz Naphtals of Berlin and George Josephthal of Nuremberg made a giant enterprise out of the insignificant Arbeiterbank. Some of the

most important Israeli firms were founded by German immigrants Yekutiel and Sam Federmann of Chemnitz; Yekutiel's entry in *Who's Who in Israel* (1962) describes him as the founder of the Dan Hotel chain; the Israeli partner of Isasbes, a construction materials company; the founder and partner of Yekutiel Federmann's Federal Oil Company group for investment in an Israeli oil-drilling program in 1975–1976; and president of numerous other companies.

The Ha'avara agreement thus served the Zionist aim of bringing Jewish settlers and development capital to Palestine, while simultaneously serving the German goal of freeing the country of its unwanted Jewish population.

This, however, was not the only instance of contacts between Zionists and the Nazis. LEHI, or the "Stern Group," proposed a variety of schemes to the Nazis in return for promises to fight against Britain in World War II. Not to be outdone, the IRGUN also offered Germany an alliance. Nothing came of either initiative.

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Habash, George (1925–2008)

George Habash is one of the historic leaders of the Palestinian national movement as it developed after 1948, the year of the Palestinian exodus from Israel (or *Nakba* [catastrophe], as it is called by Palestinians). Together with Hani al-Hindi, he was the founder of the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN, or Harakat al-Qaumiyyin al-'Arab), and in 1967 he established the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP, or al-Jabha al-Shabiya li-Tahrir Filastin), which he led as its general secretary until his resignation in 2000. He is admired by many for his consistent though radical positions in Palestinian politics, and his partisans call him "*al-hakim"* (the wise old man).

Habash was born in the Palestinian town of LYDDA, the son of a well-off Christian merchant. In 1944 his family sent Habash to the American University of Beirut to study medicine. The year 1948 proved to be the turning point for Habash, who was then in his second year of medical school. Instead of pursuing the career of a medical doctor, as envisioned by his family, he chose the life of a political activist—often underground, in and out of prison, hunted by his enemies and often only narrowly escaping death.

When the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors began, Habash hurried back to Lydda, where he helped in the local hospital and experienced firsthand Israel's organized expulsion of the populations of Lydda and RAMLA. After viewing the suffering, humiliation, and injustice, Habash returned to Beirut a different person. He became active in student politics in and around the originally cultural association al-Urwa al-Wuthqa (whose president he became), but he also searched for the possibility of more direct action. He found it in a small clandestine organization trying to fight those it considered responsible for the disaster that had struck Palestine and the Palestinians. The tiny but notorious underground group Kata'ib al-Fida' al 'Arabi (Phalanges of Arab Self-Sacrifice or Devotion) indiscriminately attacked Jewish and other targets in 1949–1950: the bloodiest attack was on a synagogue in Damascus where twelve people were killed. Although Habash was probably a marginal figure in the Kata'ib, at least concerning its TERRORIST attacks, he and his friends drew a major lesson from this early experience of activism: individual terror attacks cannot bring about a revolution, and small elite or student organizations cannot substitute for a mass movement. The American University students therefore decided to establish a clandestine but well-organized political group and turned to the refugee camps in Beirut and throughout LEBANON to mobilize and organize people.

In 1952 the results of this effort were visible with the publication of an underground journal, *al-Tha'r* (Revenge), which attempted to mobilize the masses. Behind the small paper, which was published in Lebanon from 1952 until 1958, was the organization Habash and his friends had finally succeeded in creating—the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN). The organization was first active in Lebanon but moved its activities and its headquarters to Amman, JORDAN, where the families of the founding leaders, Habash and his friend WADI' HADDAD, had moved as REFUGEES and where both newly graduated doctors wanted to start their work as physicians. Although Habash practiced medicine for a while, politics remained his main work and his passion. The goal of his new organization was the overthrow of the reactionary Arab regimes and the unification of the Arab states into one united state along the lines of nineteenth-century European national unification movements, especially that of Italy. This was to be followed by a united and well-prepared attack against the state of Israel, which they believed had occupied Palestine or, in an Arab nationalist reading, the heart of the Arab world.

The nationalist ideology of MAN was built mainly on the writings and teachings of Constantine Zurayk, a professor at the American University of Beirut and Habash's teacher and later mentor from the days of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa. But there were clear differences between Zurayk and the MAN leaders. Although Zurayk made an unambiguous and systematic distinction between Jews and Zionists and Judaism and ZIONISM, the young MAN leaders blamed and attacked all Jews. Zurayk called for the military defeat of the state of Israel by a united Arab army, on the basis that Israel was an illegal and therefore unacceptable creation in the heart of the future Arab state, but he also believed that the Arabs should emulate the Zionist movement's successful creation of Israel if they were to succeed in their goals of creating one Arab state. The young nationalists surrounding Habash, however, saw Israel as the cause for the Palestinian disaster and therefore as their prime object of revenge. MAN's first slogans expressed their philosophy succinctly: *wahda, taharrur, tha'r* (unity, liberation, revenge).

With a network of former friends and colleagues from the American University, Habash succeeded in establishing his newly founded organization throughout the Arab East—from Beirut to IRAQ and KUWAIT, and from SYRIA down to Yemen. Still, the organization remained what it had been at the start, an idealistic student organization demanding from its members total dedication to their political and organizational work. Although Habash possessed a charismatic personality and was loved and venerated by his friends and colleagues, he was unable to make a name for himself in Arab public life and politics. A small clandestine movement like MAN did not allow him to launch such a breakthrough, but he knew that without winning over Arab public opinion MAN's goals could never be attained.

Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR provided the solution to MAN and Habash's dilemma. After Nasir's first nationalist acts of defiance against the West in the mid-1950s, Habash wholeheartedly supported Nasir's new pan-Arab nationalism, or what came to be called "Nasirism." In Habash's view, Nasir would be the public figurehead while MAN would provide the intellectual and ideological foundation and the organizational infrastructure needed for an Arab revolution and Arab unity, which would climax with the liberation of Palestine. Although Nasir supported the young MAN activists and ideologues, he never accepted them as peers. He used them when it was convenient for him, but mainly Nasir followed the political course he deemed to be in EGYPT'S best interest. In the early 1960s Habash and the MAN leadership were compelled to confront reality. When the Egyptian-Syrian union broke apart, Arabs in general and Palestinians in particular were disillusioned with Nasir's Arab nationalism and his willingness or ability to liberate Palestine.

A number of young Palestinians began to follow their own course. Palestinian members of MAN in the refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan demanded a new and more activist political course. Although MAN's other ideologues insisted on loyalty to Nasir, Habash, who had always demonstrated a penchant for activism, recognized the challenge and reached a compromise. While MAN began to focus more on Palestine, most visibly through a new magazine, *Filastin* (Palestine), clandestine guerrilla groups were established to prepare for guerrilla warfare when Nasir would give the signal to begin fighting.

Through this course of action (or rather nonaction) from 1964 to 1967 until the 1967 WAR, Habash unwittingly played into the hands of rival

groups, above all the newly active FATAH movement under the leadership of YASIR ARAFAT. After Nasir's crushing defeat by Israel, Habash saw no alternative but to make a formal split with Nasir and embrace a new strategy. In effect Habash followed the path Arafat had forged with Fatah in 1964–1965 for unity of the Palestinian factions, although presented in a different ideological package. Habash could not abandon Arab nationalism, because it constituted one of his deepest convictions, yet he understood that a new dimension to the struggle was needed: more direct activism and a new ideological approach that addressed the concerns of the Palestinian masses. He decided that Marxism-Leninism, in a unique Palestinian interpretation, provided the way forward on both levels. The new focus was on the Arab and Palestinian masses but led by a Lenin-Mao-inspired revolutionary party, established by Habash in December 1967 as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which pushed MAN first into the background and soon into general oblivion.

After a brief period of fierce and often ugly ideological infighting, NAYIF HAWATIMAH, who among MAN's early founders had challenged Habash most strongly, broke with the PFLP to create his own group of "pure and real" revolutionaries—the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. While Hawatimah took most of the intellectuals (real and self-proclaimed) of the PFLP with him, Habash stayed with the old leaders and militants of the PFLP and MAN, respectively, and took with him the bulk of the popular base of the organization in Palestinian camps. The PFLP almost immediately embarked on a course of spectacular airplane hijackings intended to bring the Palestinian cause—and the PFLP—to international attention and to establish themselves as the true revolutionary force in the Arab region. Although the PFLP did highlight the Palestinian situation for the world political scene, they, and by association all Palestinians to some extent, were seen not as revolutionaries but as terrorists. On the other hand, the PFLP could not prevent the equally spectacular rise of Palestinian nationalism represented by Arafat's Fatah movement and its establishment of almost complete ideological and political hegemony over Palestinians inside and outside Palestine.

After the 1970–1971 BLACK SEPTEMBER war that King Husayn waged in Jordan against the Palestinian resistance movement, Habash, together with the remnants of the PFLP, was forced to leave Jordan and moved to Lebanon. In Lebanon the PFLP decided to stop any further hijackings because the leaders decided that the actions represented a deviation from the true path of revolution, which should be led by the masses. Meanwhile Arafat's Fatah was ascendant and once again challenging Habash and his PFLP. While the issue in the 1960s had been independent Palestinian ARMED STRUGGLE, now it was the acceptance of a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, which Arafat supported as early as 1972–1973. For Habash this meant the betrayal of all he believed in, and he responded with the creation of the PALESTINE REJECTION FRONT (Jabhat ar-Rafd).

At the same time, it appears that the series of disappointments—the 1967 War, the disillusionment with Abd al-Nasir, Black September, and Arafat's "betrayal," among others—exacted a physical price from Habash. He suffered his first stroke in 1972, and thereafter his ability to lead was severely limited. None of his competitors for leadership proved able to take control, and in the end the consensus was that Habash should remain leader of the PFLP. Yasir Arafat also recognized Habash's status, according him the respect of a historical leader and an honored elder statesman, who often accompanied Arafat on his diplomatic missions during the 1980s. For Arafat this was another successful co-optation of a potentially dangerous rival. For Habash it meant the recognition that although he and the PFLP had not been successful in gaining majority support for their ideology and political program, he was being recognized as one of the Palestinian leaders everybody held in high esteem. Also, it at least gave him a chance, however remote, to try to influence Arafat with the views of the PFLP.

Despite Habash's opposition, the PFLP did not stop Arafat's Fatah from pursuing the two-state option, and in November 1988 the PFLP and Habash could no longer resist its almost unanimous adoption in the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL in Algiers. However, Habash did not support Arafat on the OSLO ACCORDS, and under his leadership the PFLP vigorously objected to what it perceived as an abandonment of historic Palestinian political positions. But when Habash's deputy, Abu Ali Mustafa, decided to accept Arafat's course and return to the West Bank under the conditions imposed on him by the Oslo Accords and Israel, Habash resigned as general secretary of the PFLP. From his exile in Amman, where he had returned in 1990, Habash devoted his years in retirement to

writing his memoirs, establishing a research center, and working once again for an Arab nationalist revival.

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—Helga Baumgarten

Habibi, Emile (1922–1996)

Emile Habibi was a novelist, journalist, politician, and member of the Knesset. He is probably the most renowned Palestinian writer who lived inside Israel. Born in HAIFA, Palestine, to Protestant parents, Habibi was involved in the Palestinian resistance against the BRITISH MANDATE, yet he supported the 1947 UN Partition Plan (UN RESOLUTION 181, which called for the creation of both Jewish and Arab states in Palestine) and chose to remain in Haifa until his death. In 1940 he joined the ARAB-PALESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY, becoming the editor-in-chief of the party's official newspaper, *Ittihad.* After the fall of NAZARETH and Haifa in the 1948 WAR, Habibi joined the Israeli communist party MAKI and served in the Knesset on its list from 1951 to 1959. In 1960 he left Maki to found RAKAH with Tawfuk Toubi and served on its list in the Knesset from 1961 to 1972. He left Rakah in 1989 and devoted himself full-time to writing.

Habibi published his first short story collection, *The Sextet of the Six-Day War*, in 1968. In 1974 he wrote his first novel, *The Secret Life of Saeed the Ill-fated Pessoptimist,* depicting the life and fortunes of a PALESTINIAN CITIZEN OF ISRAEL. Published in 1974, it was an instant success and remains one of the greatest modern Arabic novels. It was translated into Hebrew and English and was well received far beyond the Arab world. In 1983 Habibi published a play, *Luka'Bin Luka',* and in 1985 a novella, *Ikhtiyyeh,* which received great critical acclaim because of its originality and the writer's successful use of humor in the portrayal of tragic situations. His last novel, *Saraya Bint al Ghoul/Saraya* (The Ogre's Daughter), was published in 1992. Habibi's novels are noteworthy for combining mythological and modern times, mixing tragedy with comedy, and using extensive sarcasm and satire. He was awarded two important prizes for his writing: in 1990 Habibi received the Al Quds Prize from the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, and two years later he received the Israel Prize. His acceptance of both reflected his belief in coexistence.

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Hadash: The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality

Hadash, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, is a left-wing political party that defines itself as a "Jewish-Arab Party," although most of its voters and leaders are Israeli-Arab citizens. It has three legislators in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset.

Hadash was formed during the term of the eighth Knesset when RAKAH joined with several nonparliamentary groups and other left-wing noncommunist groups. Within the Hadash movement, Rakah (which was renamed MAKI, a Hebrew acronym for Israeli Communist Party, in 1989) has retained its independent status.

In the 1996 elections the party ran a joint list with BALAD. Together they won five seats, but split during the Knesset term, with Hadash reduced to three seats. In the 2003 elections, Hadash ran on another joint list, this time with AHMAD TIBI's Ta'al. The list won three seats, but again split during the parliamentary session, leaving Hadash with two Knesset members.

The party supports evacuation of all Israeli SETTLEMENTS, a complete withdrawal by Israel from

all territories occupied as a result of the 1967 War, and the establishment of a Palestinian state in those territories. It also supports the right of return or compensation for Palestinian refugees. In addition to issues of peace and security, Hadash is known for being active on social and environmental issues.

Hadash defines itself as a non-Zionist party, originally in keeping with Marxist opposition to nationalism. It calls for recognition of Palestinian Arabs as a national minority within Israel.

In the 2006 elections, Hadash received three Knesset seats and in 2009 four seats. (www.hadash.org.il/).

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Hadawi, Sami (1904–2004)

An administrator, scholar, and writer, Sami Hadawi was regarded as the most important Arab authority on ownership of LAND in Palestine. He was born in West JERUSALEM and raised in his grandfather's house in the Jewish Quarter. During the BRITISH MANDATE he worked for the Land Registration Office, which was responsible for land taxation operations—a position that afforded Hadawi enormous information about land transactions during the Mandate. He is known for meticulous research and exact documentation of how Palestine was taken over by Israel in 1948, including the extent of Palestinian losses in land and other property. Hadawi made a major contribution toward documenting and compiling village land statistics prior to the partition of Palestine in 1948. He brought to the public's attention the last official British Mandate record of Palestinian population and landownership. Among his numerous books are *Village Statistics, 1945: A Classification of Land and Area Ownership in Palestine* (reprinted 1970); *Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A Comprehensive Study* (reprinted 2000); *Palestine Loss of Heritage* (1963); and *Bitter Harvest: Palestine between 1914–1979* (1979, reprinted 1991).

Hadawi was expelled from Palestine in 1948 and spent the rest of his life working for the Palestinian cause in various capacities, much of the time from Beirut. He served as the land specialist for the UN Palestinian Conciliation Commission in New York and as a member of numerous Arab and Palestinian diplomatic missions, and was director of the INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES in Beirut.

Haddad, Saad (1936–1984)

Around 1975, Israel sponsored the creation of a surrogate force in LEBANON, and Lebanese Christian major Saad Haddad was the first officer to defect from the Lebanese army to ally himself with Israel. His defection led to the formation of the pro-Israel Free Lebanon Army, based in a corridor, Israel's so-called security zone along Lebanon's southern border from the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which cleared out the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) strongholds as far north as the Litani River. On 18 April 1979 Haddad proclaimed the area controlled by his force Independent Free Lebanon. The following day, he was branded a traitor to the Lebanese government and officially dismissed from the Lebanese army. He remained a loyal Israeli ally, and several sources have suggested that Haddad was directly involved in the 1982 SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE. After the 1982 LEBANON WAR the Free Lebanon Army was renamed the SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA) and was under the leadership of Antoine Lahad following Haddad's death in 1984. It remained a proxy force for Israel in its war with the Palestinians until Israel's withdrawal in 2000.

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Haddad, Wadi' (1927–1978)

Wadi' Haddad (Abu Hani) was a founding member (with GEORGE HABASH) and leader of the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN) and of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). As head of the PFLP's Special Operations, he was the main strategist behind PFLP hijackings

of airplanes and other TERRORIST operations directed against Israel. Born in SAFED, Palestine, to a middle-class Greek Orthodox family, Haddad was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and forced to flee to Palestine, settling in Beirut.

A physician as well as a political activist, Haddad was a low-key supporter and friend of Habash when both attended medical school at the American University in Beirut. Although Habash was comfortable in leadership positions, Haddad always preferred to stay in the background. When they graduated from the university in 1952, Haddad and Habash moved to Amman, JORDAN, where they set up a health clinic to treat poor patients. The clinic brought them attention, which they used to recruit for the MAN and later for the PFLP. Habash too was a Greek Orthodox Christian, and one analyst speculates that both Habash and Haddad "were obliged to act as extremists in pursuit of better credentials as Arabs."

The PFLP hijackings began in 1968, and Habash has stated that they were the brainchild of Haddad, who believed that the PFLP should strike at the Zionist enemy wherever it was to be found. (His slogan and the slogan of his group was "Behind the enemy, everywhere.") In July 1968 Haddad and another PFLP operative from the Special Operations wing hijacked an El Al jet flying from Rome to Tel Aviv. Of this operation, Habash said: "Wadi' and I were trying to determine how world opinion could be awakened to the injustice that has been done to the Palestinian people. Wadi' came up with the hijacking idea. . . . We wanted to attract world attention through some action, and that was it." Yezid Sayigh, an expert on Palestinian politics and militarism, concurs and states that "the real purpose of international terrorism was to shock the international community out of its complacency regarding Palestinian suffering."

In the first hijacking, Haddad and the PFLP demanded only the release of PRISONERS in Israeli jails, but US support for Israel led to later attacks on Israeli territory, citizens, and property. The PFLP and its offshoots thought of themselves as representing Third World revolutions and anticolonialism, and they viewed the hijackings as a way to combat the image of Palestinian passivity portrayed in Israeli propaganda. Between December 1968 and September 1969 Haddad followed up the initial hijacking with attacks on Israeli aircraft and businesses in Athens, Zurich, London, the Hague, Brussels, and Bonn. His Special Operations group hijacked a TWA flight to Damascus, where they destroyed the plane. Haddad and some of his comrades argued that their targets were not actually civilian, but assets of Israel as a center of imperialism and capitalism. In September 1970 the PFLP hijacked Swissair, TWA, and BOAC airliners and attempted to take a fourth. They took the three aircraft to Jordan and destroyed them after the passengers were released. These actions gave rise to BLACK SEPTEMBER, during which the Jordanian military drove the entire PLO military apparatus from Jordan. The PFLP also seized a Pan Am plane, took it to Cairo, and blew it up on the ground. According to Haddad and the PFLP, their purpose was to break the cease-fire that had been arranged under US auspices (the ROGERS PLAN) among Jordan, EGYPT, and Israel; to undermine the Jordanian government; and to deal a blow to the "world nervous system." Destroying the plane in Cairo, as opposed to elsewhere, was intended to protest the US relationship with Egypt.

In 1971, however, the PFLP Central Committee decided to end hijackings completely, because they had become counterproductive. Haddad, who had been absent from the meeting, was enraged and defied the orders by mobilizing his Special Operations group to hijack a Lufthansa plane to Aden, Yemen. After a severe reprimand by Habash, Haddad worked independently as PFLP–International Operations. Nevertheless Haddad and Habash remained friends until Haddad's death seven years later. The official cause of death was cancer, although his family and many others believed and continue to believe that Haddad was poisoned. Israel had attempted to assassinate Haddad numerous times, including launching missiles into his Beirut apartment, although no conclusive evidence was ever found of Israeli involvement in his death.

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Al-Hadi, Awni 'Abd (1889–1970)

Awni 'Abd al-Hadi was a prominent Palestinian political and diplomatic leader during the BRITISH MANDATE. He was educated in Beirut, in Istanbul, and at the Law Faculty of the University of Paris. 'Abd al-Hadi was active in the Arab nationalist movement against the Turks before World War I as a founding member in 1911 of the al-Fatat nationalist society, as a member of the Decentralization Party, and as an organizer of the first Arab Congress in Paris in 1913. He served as private secretary to King Faysal of Saudi Arabia and later was an advisor to Emir Abdullah as well as to his father, Sharif Husayn, and he also represented the Hijazi delegation from eastern Arabia at the Versailles Peace Conference.

'Abd al-Hadi returned to Palestine in 1924, where he resumed the practice of law and became one of the chief spokespersons of Palestinian nationalism and the Arab nationalist movement. Besides his private law practice, he served as lawyer for the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL. For a period he advocated dialogue with the British and also provided legal services to Zionist LAND purchasing agencies. One of the largest sales in which he participated was the Wadi Hawarith land deal of 1929, in which Zionists acquired 30,000 dunums (nearly 7,500 acres) of land. Nevertheless he was elected to the ARAB EXECUTIVE (the Palestinian nationalist organization) three times—in 1922, 1923, and 1928. 'Abd al-Hadi was among the Palestinians attending the London Conference of 1930 and the ISLAMIC CONFERENCE in Jerusalem in 1931, and he presented the Palestinian viewpoint before the SHAW COMMISSION.

By 1932 'Abd al-Hadi began to adopt a more consistently militant position on the question of Palestine. Together with several former colleagues, he revived the ISTIQLAL (Independence) PARTY, which was plainly anti-British and ANTI-ZIONIST, and eventually became its general secretary. In 1936 'Abd al-Hadi was appointed secretary general of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (the successor to the Arab Executive) and assigned the job of coordinating the ARAB REVOLT of 1936–1939, the Palestinian general strike against the British Occupation and Zionist settlement of Palestine. For this the British deported him from Palestine in 1937, banning him from reentering the country until 1941.

In 1948 he was appointed minister for social affairs in the ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT located in Gaza, but he never served. Instead he held several posts in the Jordanian government from 1951 to 1955, and from 1955 to 1958 he was a member of the Jordanian Senate. He died in Cairo, where he had lived from 1964.

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Al-Hadi Family

The 'Abd al-Hadi family was a prominent multibranch Palestinian family of large landowners in the NABLUS/JENIN area of the WEST BANK. Under the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, BRITISH MANDATE, and Jordanian occupations, it was influential in central Palestine and held senior government positions. Highly respected family members include Hafez Pasha (1872–1916, a large landowner and tax collector during Ottoman reign); Ruhi (1885–1954, a member of the Ottoman diplomatic and consular corps); Awni (1889–1970, a lawyer and politician); al-Haj (circa 1862–1938, a man of literature, a landlord in Jenin, a district attorney in Beirut); Fu'ad (1900–1997, a lawyer and judge); Naim (b. 1912, an engineer and mayor); Issam (b. 1928, a union leader and political activist); and Mahdi (b. 1944, an academic and activist).

Hagana

Founded in June 1920, the Hagana was the main Jewish underground military organization in Palestine from 1920 to 1948. Leaders of the Jewish Yishuv believed they could not rely on BRITISH MANDATE authorities for protection from the Palestinians and thus needed to create an independent military force completely free of foreign authority.

During the first nine years of its existence, the Hagana was a loose organization of local groups in the large towns and in several of the Jewish SETTLEMENTS. By 1929, however, the Hagana became far larger and more organized, encompassing nearly all the youth and adults in the settlements as well as several thousand members from each of the cities. It created a comprehensive training program for its members, ran officers' training courses, and established central arms depots into which a continuous stream of light arms flowed from Europe, while it simultaneously laid the basis for the underground production of arms.

During 1936–1939 the Hagana developed into a sophisticated military organization. Although the British did not officially recognize it, the British Security Forces cooperated with Hagana by establishing civilian militia—Jewish Settlement Police and Jewish Auxiliary Police—*ghafirs*. In the summer of 1938, Special Night Squads were established to protect settlements from Palestinian guerrillas. During this time the Hagana supported illegal Jewish IMMIGRATION and organized demonstrations against the British for not going far enough in supporting Jewish LAND purchases and immigration.

With the outbreak of World War II, the Hagana faced a new situation. Although anti-British, its volunteer fighters were now mobilized by the British to form Jewish units to fight for the British. The Hagana also cooperated with British intelligence units and sent its personnel on various commando missions in the Middle East. Service with the British further strengthened the Hagana militarily, and by 1948 it was a formidable army—highly trained, disciplined, and well equipped. In the early 1940s the Yishuv instituted a systematic training program for all the Jewish youth of the country, which evolved into the Hagana's first mobilized regiment, the PALMAH, in 1941. After the war the Hagana began an open, organized struggle against British Mandatory rule and against Palestinian resistance in the framework of a unified JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (1945), consisting of the Hagana, IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI (ETZEL), and LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL (LEHI) underground military groups.

After the war, Hagana branches were also established at Jewish displaced-persons camps in Europe, and its members accompanied the illegal immigrant boats. In the spring of 1947, Israel's founder, DAVID BEN-GURION, took it upon himself to direct the general policy of the Hagana, especially in preparation for the impending 1948 WAR with the Palestinians. On 26 May 1948 the Provisional Government of Israel transformed the Hagana into the regular state army, called Zeva Hagana Le-Yisrael (the Israel Defense Forces).

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Haifa

Haifa is located on the Mediterranean coast at the base of Mount Carmel in Israel. A small port town dating from the fourteenth century BCE, it has existed in the shadow of its more powerful neighbors, ACRE and Caesarea. The Byzantines ruled there until the seventh century, when the city was conquered, first by the Persians and then by the Arabs. In 1100 it was taken over by the Crusaders, who made the city part of the principality of Galilee until the Muslim MAMLUKS conquered it in 1265. After the OTTOMAN conquest in 1516, Haifa began a revival and a renaissance. In 1761 the governor of Acre, Zahir al-Umar, completely rebuilt Haifa in a new location, destroying the Old City, and solidified it with a fortress-like wall. This event is considered the beginning of Haifa's modern era.

Shaykh al-Umar was a native of Galilee and began his career as a minor tax collector. Over a forty-five-year period (1730–1775) he emerged as the most powerful leader in Palestine. One key to his success was his ability to monopolize the trade in cotton, grain, and olive oil destined for Europe.

From the profits of this trade, the shaykh built a military force that allowed him to expand the territories under his control, withstand repeated attacks by the governors of Damascus, and construct lavish public and private buildings. The castle he built for himself remains standing—if in considerable disrepair—in Saffuiryya near Haifa.

Between 1830 and 1841 the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammad Ali, took Haifa from the Ottomans and their Arab governor. In the years following the Egyptian occupation Haifa grew in population and importance while Acre suffered further decline.

In the early nineteenth century, Haifa began to overtake Acre as a commercial center and became home to a growing number of foreign consulates. The rebuilding of the Carmelite monastery in the 1830s introduced Christian education and led to a growing Christian merchant community with well-established links to European commerce. Haifa became the fastest-growing trade center in Palestine. Building activity increased, and separate Muslim, Christian, and eventually Jewish quarters developed. In 1868 a colony of GERMAN Templars settled in Haifa and engaged in road building as well as agricultural and industrial improvement. At the same time, Haifa became an important site of worship and administration for the members of the Bahá'í faith, who have a significant holy site there, the Shrine of the Bab.

By mid-century over 150 steamships called at Haifa annually, and trade prospered with exports of cotton, sesame, and grains. The period after the 1880s saw increased IMMIGRATION of European Jews. A growing number of Zionist settlements in northern Palestine and new neighborhoods on the periphery of Haifa, subsidized by wealthy Zionist organizations, began to surround the Arab Muslim and Arab Christian residential areas and threatened the Palestinian commercial sector. Haifa's population continued to increase, especially with the construction of a new railway line—a spur of the Hijaz railway connecting Haifa with Damascus (completed in 1905), which attracted workers from villages and towns throughout Palestine to Haifa.

The construction of Haifa harbor between 1929 and 1933 and the building of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline in 1939 contributed to an increasing number of Palestinian laborers in the city. But the workers were inadequately housed and paid, which in turn produced violent strikes and demonstrations in 1929 and further strikes and rebellions in the 1930s. The 1936 general strike was a response to the vast discrepancies in wages between Jewish and Arab workers, the loss of more Palestinian LANDS to Zionist SETTLEMENTS, and continuous increases in the cost of living in Haifa. The beginning of the ARAB REVOLT was marked in Haifa by a walkout of porters from Haifa harbor. Palestinian work stoppages in most areas, however, only provided openings for Jewish workers, furthered Arab unemployment, and endangered the fragile Muslim-Christian solidarity. After the strike more radical rural elements, some influenced by the Muslim cleric 'IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSAM, assumed a leading role in Haifa and succeeded in pulling together Muslims and Christians against Zionists and the British. Haifa was the center of intense fighting throughout the rebellion (1936–1939), and much of the city's communications infrastructure was destroyed. When the Arab Revolt spread beyond Haifa throughout the Galilee, it prompted violent retaliation by radical Zionist groups, especially the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI.

By the end of the BRITISH MANDATE, Haifa had become an unbalanced mixture of a new, flourishing Jewish bourgeoisie that controlled the city's industry and a Palestinian community composed overwhelmingly of lower-class workers. After the UNITED NATIONS announced the partition of Palestine (UN RESOLUTION 181) in 1947 and placed Haifa in the Jewish sector, intense fighting broke out. At the time, Haifa was home to about 128,000 people, of whom 66,000 were Jews. On 21 April 1948 approximately 5,000 HAGANA military forces began an assault on the Palestinian sectors of Haifa, preceded by loudspeakers broadcasting messages intended to terrorize the Palestinian inhabitants into fleeing.

From the Jewish neighborhood Hadar HaCarmel, the militant underground organization LEHI joined the offensive and began shelling the Palestinian-Muslim neighborhood of Halisa. The 3,500–5,000 Arab irregulars and elements of the ARAB LIBERATION ARMY could not mount an effective defense. Furthermore, the 3,000 defenders of al-Tira, who tried to reinforce the city, were intercepted by the British. The next day the Arab National Committee of Haifa was prepared to ask for a truce via Hugh C. Stockwell, the British commander in Haifa. Stockwell agreed to meet with the Israelis, but the terms proposed by the Hagana—complete disarmament, surrender of

weapons, and a CURFEW—were not accepted by the Arab leadership.

The next day (23 April) the Arab leadership met with Stockwell to discuss organizing an evacuation. On the same day, Haifa fell to the Zionist forces, and most Muslims left the city and moved to Arab villages in the Galilee, from which they were later forced to flee, becoming REFUGEES in LEBANON and SYRIA. After only a few days, around 40,000 Palestinians had fled Haifa under the combined military pressure of the LEHI and Hagana. After the occupation of the city by Zionist forces and the further expulsion of the Arab population, barely 3,500 Palestinians remained in Haifa.

Today Haifa is one of five "mixed" cities in Israel, with a total population of around 270,000, of whom officially 24,100 (9 percent) are Palestinians (13,500 Christians and 10,600 Muslims).

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; WAR, 1948

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—Betsy Folkins

Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr. (1924–2010)

A US general and public official, Alexander Haig served as secretary of state under President RONALD REAGAN. He graduated from West Point, was military adviser to Secretary of State HENRY KISSINGER from 1969 to 1973, and became an influential member of the National Security Council staff. In 1981 he became President Reagan's secretary of state but resigned abruptly on 25 June 1982, reportedly because his policies and actions regarding Israel's 1982 invasion of LEBANON led to foreign policy disagreements with the president.

In the months before the invasion Israeli Defense Minister ARIEL SHARON had repeatedly told Haig that the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) armed presence in Lebanon was intolerable, that the security of Israel required that it be ended, and that he (Sharon) was going to do the job. Haig informed Sharon that the UNITED STATES understood Israel's problems and requirements and that the United States would find such an operation acceptable if it was carried out in response to a sufficiently bloody and brutal provocation. Sharon and Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN considered the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador to Great Britain by a non-PLO terrorist such a provocation and launched the invasion.

But Haig apparently had not told President Reagan or anyone else in the White House about his conversations with Sharon. When the Israeli invasion of Lebanon began, the White House's first reaction was to send Special Presidential Envoy Philip Habib to the Middle East to find an acceptable political solution and bring the war to a swift end. His attempts were unsuccessful.

Reagan's instructions to Philip Habib had been based on Reagan's and his immediate circle of advisors' view of the world. They believed the fighting must cease because of the potential for SOVIET UNION involvement on the Syrian side, which could lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviets. Reagan incorrectly believed that SYRIA's missiles in Lebanon were aimed at the heart of Israel, that the troubles in Lebanon were stirred up by the Soviets, and that the PLO was an instrument of the Soviets.

In any case Haig's view of what should happen in Lebanon was different from Habib's and Reagan's. Haig thought that a good outcome would see the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) smash the PLO's military capability, send its political leadership running, and in the process destroy any part of Hafez al-Asad's Syrian military that got in the way. This result would, Haig believed, seriously weaken Soviet influence in the Middle East. Haig believed that if the US ally Israel was seen easily defeating the Soviet client Syria, then more countries in the region would want to become US

allies. Few policymakers viewed the situation that simplistically.

To Haig the Israeli-Palestinian issue was of little concern. Although he strongly promoted STRATEGIC COOPERATION with Israel, his focus was on the perceived Soviet threat, and Haig was convinced that Israel was an effective regional surrogate in stemming Soviet inroads. Haig made some halfhearted efforts to encourage Israel to negotiate with EGYPT over Palestinian autonomy, as defined at Camp David. However, he was not concerned with the fate of the Palestinians but with solidifying a "consensus of strategic concern" in the Middle East, and he believed some form of Palestinian autonomy was important to solidify Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Even after Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menahem Begin decided in August 1981 to resume the autonomy talks that would eventually lead to the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, Haig did little to encourage them. He delayed a trip to the region until January 1982—supposedly to promote the talks—but that effort faded and the secretary of state waited until late May to pursue a serious effort to encourage a resumption of the talks.

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Hamami, Sa'id (1941–1978)

Sa'id Hamami was a PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) diplomat and an early peace activist who began clandestine meetings with Israeli peace activists in the 1970s. Hamami, who was born in JAFFA, was dispossessed with his family in the 1948 WAR, becoming a REFUGEE in Amman, JORDAN. After he received a B.A. in English Literature from Damascus University, he worked as a journalist and teacher. In 1967 Hamami joined FATAH and rose quickly to become a PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (the PLO parliament) member in February 1969. For a short time he was active in Fatah's military wing, AL-'ASIFA.

In 1972 PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT appointed Hamami as the first PLO delegate to the United Kingdom, although he served officially as head of the ARAB LEAGUE's Palestine Information Office. Hamami was highly critical of Palestinian international violence, such as plane hijackings, especially the operations by the TERRORIST group the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION. In 1973, with Arafat's backing, he began to call publicly for mutual Israeli-Palestinian recognition—in two articles that appeared in *The Times* of London on 16 November 1973 and 17 December 1973. While Israel dismissed Hamami's initiatives as camouflage for the PLO's "real" objective of destroying Israel, it seems clear that they were genuine "trial balloons," undertaken on behalf of the PLO leadership. Indeed, by this time Arafat had written twice to US secretary of state HENRY KISSINGER requesting that the PLO be included in the GENEVA CONFERENCE.

In 1974 Hamami met with Knesset member URI AVNERY, which was the first meeting between a Knesset member and a PLO leader. As a result of meetings with Avnery and other Israeli activists, Hamami came to advocate explicitly the TWO-STATE SOLUTION in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (which would be obtained through negotiations at Geneva) and criticized the PLO's continued rhetorical allegiance to the idea of a democratic state in Palestine. Hamami was assassinated on 4 January 1978 by the ABU NIDAL group, who opposed any political overtures to Israel.

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Hamas: The Movement of Islamic Resistance

Hamas, the Movement of the Islamic Resistance (Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah), was established in Gaza in December 1987 at the beginning

of the First INTIFADA. The founders are believed to include SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI, Salah Shehadeh, Muhammad Sham'ah, Isa al-Nashshar, Abdel Fattah Dukhan, and Ibrahim al-Yazuri, all of whom were members of the Political Bureau of the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD in the GAZA STRIP. In their historic meeting on 9 December 1987, they decided that recent events provided the right moment for the Palestinian Brothers to take a direct and active role in the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli OCCUPATION. Only days later, on 14 December, Hamas's first communiqué was distributed throughout the Gaza Strip and the WEST BANK: "The Intifada of our vigilant people in the Occupied Territories comes as a resounding rejection of the Occupation and its pressures, LAND confiscation and the planting of SETTLEMENTS and the policy of subjugation by the Zionists. It also comes to awaken the conscience of those among us who are grasping after a sick peace, after empty international conferences, after treasonous partial settlements like CAMP DAVID [1978]. The Intifada is here to convince them that Islam is the solution and the alternative."

Historical and Ideological Roots

Hamas's origins are found in the Muslim Brotherhood, which began in EGYPT in 1928 under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna. In addition to its Islamic tenets, a dominant element in its ideology is opposition to colonialism, which is the basis of the Egyptian Brothers' pro-Palestinian activities. Thus the Brothers supported the struggle of the Palestinians during the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT against British Mandatory rule in Palestine and against the accelerating Jewish IMMIGRATION. In 1945 a branch of the Brotherhood was established in Gaza and in 1946 another branch in JERUSALEM.

Despite their fervent ideology, only in the last years before the Intifada, beginning around 1984, did the Brothers take up direct political activities. They participated in demonstrations against the Israeli Occupation and began to prepare for engaging in ARMED STRUGGLE. Shaykh Yasin (who was arrested in 1983, sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment, but released in a 1985 prisoner exchange) played the central role in this change of direction. When the Palestinian Intifada started in December 1987, with all parts of Palestinian society actively participating in this uprising, Yasin led the Brothers in the creation of Hamas.

However, the unique conditions of Gaza and the Israeli Occupation led Hamas to develop an ideology and a political program of its own that was distinct from the principles, belief system, and political program of the Muslim Brothers. On the one hand, Hamas's charter, published in August 1988, is firmly rooted in the anticolonialist, ANTI-ZIONIST, anti-American, and anti-Soviet tradition of the Muslim Brothers in general. As a Palestinian organization operating under the Israeli Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hamas's situation was not unlike that of the Egyptian Brothers under Hassan al-Banna, who had fought against the British occupation of Egypt, Western colonialism, foreign domination, and exploitation on all levels. The Muslim Brothers in Egypt considered the current situation of Palestine a manifestation of "crusading Western imperialism," sometimes used interchangeably with "Jewish crusading imperialism" (*al-salibiyya al-yahudiyya*).

Hamas used this idea almost verbatim in its charter, and the Egyptian Brothers' analysis and criticism of imperialism and ZIONISM were also incorporated into the charter. Hamas differs, however, quite drastically from the Muslim Brotherhood in its uniform and vulgar ANTI-SEMITIC presentation of the role of Jews, Judaism, and Zionism in both history and the present. Especially when using the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* a nineteenth-century forgery purporting to demonstrate that Jews commit blood libel and other heinous crimes, as a historical reference, Hamas's discourse borders on racism, with stereotypes borrowed directly from nineteenth-century European anti-Semitism. Additionally, the charter superimposes on these European characterizations a flawed reading of the Prophet Muhammad's relationship with the Jewish community in the Arabian Peninsula.

Hamas characterizes the Palestinian resistance against Occupation as jihad—a struggle against a colonialist occupation in which the resistance fighter must be ready to sacrifice his life. Jihad is not presented as an absolute value but as an instrument in achieving Hamas's central goal: the liberation of Palestine, which the charter defines as the historic state within the Mandatory borders of 1947. Thus Hamas's goal is quite similar to those of its historic predecessors, GEORGE HABASH's MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS and YASIR ARAFAT's FATAH, which began with the objective of liberating the whole of Palestine, a goal both

abandoned as unrealistic. However, Hamas expects the new Palestine to become an Islamic state, which differs substantially from both the Arab Nationalists and Fatah, who envisioned a secular democratic state.

The 1988 charter is, above all, a political manifesto and ignores the philosophical-political arguments of the Egyptian Brothers. The founders of Hamas were primarily political-military activists who aimed for solidarity in Palestinian society as the necessary basis for a successful struggle against the Occupation. As part of that goal, Hamas asked Palestinians, as well as all Arabs and Muslims worldwide, to support Hamas through the payment of *zakat*, or charity, a special tax any pious Muslim is supposed to give to the poor.

The position Hamas takes toward women is a clear step backward in comparison to the ideas held by the Egyptian Brothers. While the Egyptian Brothers argued that Islam sees women as equal to men, Hamas focuses almost exclusively on the role of women within the family—in the private not the public realm. Women are supposed to give birth to children, to educate them as Muslims, and to support their husbands. It is thus not surprising that Hamas's leadership does not generally include women, notwithstanding the election of six female Hamas deputies in the Palestinian parliamentary elections of January 2006. Certain trends, however, suggest that Hamas's traditional view of women may be changing, perhaps as a reaction to the increasing outspokenness of Hamas women, especially within the field of education.

Struggle against the Israeli Occupation

In a clear departure from the first years of other historic Palestinian factions and despite the maximalist positions articulated in Hamas's charter, it has always been open to negotiations with Israel. As early as 1987 Yasin declared that Hamas was ready to negotiate with Israel, provided Israel was ready to recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination and the right of return of the Palestinian REFUGEES. And in 1989 he stated: "I do not want to destroy Israel. We want to negotiate with Israel. Our goal is to enable Palestinians to live in Palestine. Having achieved this would be the end of our problem." A number of Israeli political leaders, from YITZHAK RABIN to SHIMON PERES, did in fact meet with Hamas leaders, such as Dr. Mahmoud az-Zahar.

Although in principle ready for negotiations with Israel, Hamas nevertheless adamantly opposed the MADRID CONFERENCE—the US-sponsored dialogue among Arab states, Palestinians, and Israelis—and the subsequent negotiations in Washington. Despite the many attempts made to include Hamas in the negotiating teams, it insisted on its precondition: Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian land occupied in 1967. In the same manner, it opposed the OSLO ACCORDS from 1993 on and presented the same preconditions as in the Madrid process: an Israeli withdrawal and unequivocal commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Hamas is adamant on one point that differs substantially from its predecessors and competitors: the struggle against the Israeli Occupation is to be led inside Palestine, not in the Arab world, and not abroad. In another clear distinction from other Palestinian groups, Hamas never separated politics and the armed struggle. Additionally, while clearly committed to armed resistance, Hamas has never celebrated or idealized violence, and its ideology never claimed that only violence should or could bring about liberation.

Beginning in December 1987 Hamas, like Fatah and the other PLO organizations, participated in demonstrations and strikes against the Occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, organized by a series of leaflets. In addition to these activities, Hamas followed a rather low-key course of armed struggle against Israel with a limited number of military attacks. When Hamas embarked on a direct confrontation with the Israeli army in 1989 through kidnappings (followed by killings) of Israeli soldiers, it was outlawed and declared a TERRORIST organization. Yasin was rearrested, together with other Hamas activists and leaders, and was kept in Israeli prisons until 1997.

The major turning points in Hamas's armed resistance against the Israeli Occupation came following the 9 October 1990 killing of nineteen Palestinian stone-throwers by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF and more importantly the February 1994 killing of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON by a settler from KIRYAT ARBA. Subsequent to the killing of the stone-throwers, Hamas called for jihad "against the Zionist enemy everywhere, on all fronts and with every means." In response to the Hebron massacre, Hamas embarked on a course of revenge, no longer following a logical military

strategy, but attacking every possible target: soldiers, police, and, for the first time, Israeli civilians. From November 1990 until February 1991, thirteen Israelis were killed. During this period Israeli politicians and military officials were ordered to stop all lines of communication with Hamas, which had been kept open until then. The climax of this veritable war between Hamas and the Israeli Occupation came with the deportation of more than 400 Hamas leaders and activists into South Lebanon (Marj al-Zuhur) in 1992.

The major decisive change in the strategy of Hamas's armed struggle occurred after BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, an extremist Israeli settler, attacked Muslim worshipers inside the Haram al-Ibrahimi (al-Ibrahim) Mosque in Hebron, killing twenty-nine in February 1994. In a direct reaction to this crime, Hamas changed its well-established strategy of armed attacks against army positions and/or settlers in the Occupied Territories to armed attacks against civilians inside Israel, including SUICIDE BOMBINGS. First were two bomb attacks, one of them a suicide attack, in Afula and Hadera, with eight and five casualties, respectively. Hamas then resumed kidnapping Israeli soldiers, which led to the Israeli army's killing of Hamas activists and additional arrests of Hamas militants by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Fatah, which dominated the PNA, wanted to make peace with Israel and so tried to control those who threatened the PNA-Israeli-US relationship.

A new round of bombings started in fall 1994, killing twenty-two Israelis in a bus bombing in Tel Aviv. Suicide bombings in the summer of 1995, which claimed six victims in Ramat Gan and four in Jerusalem, cannot be clearly attributed to Hamas, although the UNITED STATES arrested a senior Hamas leader, Musa Abu Marzuq, after these bombings and detained him before deporting him to SYRIA. In 1995, negotiations with the PNA produced an agreement that Hamas would stop its suicide bombings. Hamas adhered to the agreement until the TARGETED ASSASSINATION by the Israeli security services of the alleged mastermind behind Hamas bombings, the "Engineer" YAHYA AYYASH, in January 1996. Hamas waited until the end of the Palestinian ELECTIONS before taking revenge with two attacks in February 1996, killing twenty-six civilians in Jerusalem and a number of soldiers at a hitchhiking post near Ashkelon.

A number of suicide attacks in March 1996 (when nineteen were killed in Jerusalem and another thirteen on Tel Aviv's Dizengoff Avenue) cannot be clearly attributed to anyone, because contradictory leaflets were issued by Hamas—one claiming and one denying responsibility. The same contradictions are found in the March and July bombings, respectively, in Tel Aviv (three dead and forty-eight wounded) and Jerusalem's Mahane Yehuda market (sixteen dead and 178 wounded), when Hamas political leader Rantisi denied any involvement at the same time that the AL-QASSAM BRIGADES, the military wing of Hamas, claimed responsibility. The last bombing was another suicide attack in Jerusalem's Ben Yehuda shopping street in September 1997, which left five dead and 181 wounded.

Several times Hamas offered Israel a cease-fire, the first after the Goldstein massacre and another in November 1994, after an encouraging statement on 24 October by YOSSI BEILIN, an Israeli liberal, who proposed that Israel should take up official talks with Hamas, provided Hamas was truly interested in reducing tensions. Rabin, however, rejected it out of hand. After the series of bombings in February 1996 in response to Israel's assassination of Yahya Ayyash, Hamas again called for a cease-fire and offered negotiations with Israel, but Israel again refused, convinced that a military resolution was in its best interest.

The rationale Hamas offered for these suicide attacks, apart from revenge, is that the bombings "exhaust and weaken Israel." Hamas's leaders argued that the overall negative consequences for Israel, including "impacts on the structure of Zionist society, on immigration from abroad, and on various other activities including tourism," would force Israel to capitulate. In that sense Hamas considered suicide bombings as part of the legitimate resistance of the Occupied Palestinians against the occupying Israelis and not as acts of terror. There are ample indications, however, that inside Hamas the suicide bombings were not as widely accepted as most terror specialists suggest. It appears that many Hamas activists and leaders, both inside and outside the Occupied Territories, considered these attacks controversial, in the least. The internal leadership in Gaza was apparently more hesitant to continue the attacks because of their negative repercussions on the Palestinian population at large and on Hamas, its leaders, and activists in particular. The external leadership in Damascus, however, seems to have considered this new strategy of civilian attacks as

successful and therefore advocated that they be continued.

The turning point came with Israel's attempt on 25 September 1997 to assassinate Khaled Mash'al in Amman. The Israeli government admitted that it had approved this assassination attempt in the course of its goal of "fighting terror without compromise." JORDAN's King Husayn was furious, because only days before he had communicated to Israel that Hamas might be ready to enter a dialogue and halt suicide attacks. Israel was forced to apologize to the Hashemite (Jordanian) monarchy, to supply the necessary antidote for the nerve toxin with which it had tried to kill Khaled Mash'al, and to release Shaykh Ahmed Yasin (Hamas's spiritual leader), which it did on 30 September.

When Yasin returned to Gaza on 6 October 1997, Hamas published a statement announcing that suicide bombings would be abandoned if there was a full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and the removal of all Jewish settlements. On 19 October 1997 Yasin announced a temporary halt to Hamas's attacks against Israel and the start of a cooling-off period, on the condition that Israel halt its punitive measures against the population in Gaza. Even though Israel did not agree to the conditions, there were no more Hamas attacks against civilians in Israel or, for that matter, in the Occupied Territories until March 2001, well into the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, when Hamas initiated a second period of suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. Hamas stated that it renewed the attacks because of the Israeli army's attacks on Palestinian demonstrators during the first few months of the Intifada, especially its use of snipers and targeted assassinations. By the end of December 2000, Israeli soldiers had killed almost 300 Palestinians, among them ninety-two children and youths. In the same period Palestinians had killed thirty-six Israelis, more than half of them soldiers, and, with the exception of four, all were attacked and killed inside the Occupied Territories. Given this background, Palestinian society was in full support of this renewed round of suicide attacks undertaken by Hamas, which produced an ever-increasing number of casualties, especially among the Israeli civilian population, including women and children.

Only in June 2003 did Hamas make a strategic decision to stop the suicide attacks in the first ceasefire announced by Hamas and all other Palestinian organizations. In contrast to other organizations, especially the ISLAMIC JIHAD (al-jihad al-Islami) and to a lesser degree the armed groups inside Fatah (Kataib shuhada al-Aqsa), Hamas embarked on a course to change its resistance strategy from armed struggle to the political arena and, above all, to stop suicide bombings.

Hamas Enters Politics

Throughout 2005 Hamas competed for seats on municipal councils and for mayoralties throughout the Occupied Territories. From election to election, Hamas became more confident of its campaign skills and increasingly made a good showing in the polls. In the last round in November 2005, Hamas won the elections in the major West Bank towns of NABLUS, JENIN, and al-Bireh and made a strong showing in the historically Christian-dominated city of Ramallah, where the first female (Christian) mayor was elected with the support of the Hamas deputies. In previous rounds Hamas took the city of BETHLEHEM, where a POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE mayor was elected with the backing of Hamas. In comparison Fatah scored mostly in small scattered villages around the West Bank but could not stop the Hamas victories in the major cities. The Gaza Strip showed similar results, with fiercely contested elections putting Hamas ahead of Fatah again and again.

Polls before the PNA parliamentary elections scheduled for 25 January 2006 showed Fatah in the lead, and most analysts predicted that the Palestinians would vote differently on the national level than on the municipal level. The election results proved them wrong. Based on the new election law (which gave Palestinian voters one party vote for a national list of candidates and determined the number of deputies in each electoral district), Hamas scored slightly better than Fatah on the party or national vote, but also swept most district votes. Fatah scored only a few direct victories in Jenin, JERICHO, and Rafah. The final result gave Hamas an overwhelming majority in the new parliament, with nearly 80 percent of the seats, demonstrating the people's impatience with the policies of Fatah.

Because Israel did not allow the newly elected Hamas deputies to travel from Gaza to Ramallah, two separate inaugural sessions were held on 18 February 2006, connected by video conferencing. In the 132-strong parliament, Hamas controlled seventy-four seats, compared to forty-five seats for Fatah, with four independents, all close to Hamas, plus nine deputies from four smaller parties. PNA

president MAHMUD ABBAS asked the leader of the Hamas majority, ISMAIL HANIYEH, to form a government. Israel, with strong US backing, refused to recognize the new Palestinian government, because it considers Hamas a terrorist organization, and refused to remit taxes to the Palestinians, as required in the Oslo Accords. The United States cut off the limited assistance it had been providing the PNA and persuaded the European governments, whose contributions had been the backbone of the Palestinian Authority, to cease financial aid. Within two months the PNA was bankrupt and its economy in shambles, and in June 2006, Israel arrested nine Palestinian cabinet ministers and twenty-one members of the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL—all affiliated with Hamas. This was followed by more arrests of Hamas officials, which paralyzed the government, and a full-scale Israeli invasion of Gaza that continued from the end of June into the fall.

Hamas and Fatah in the Aftermath of the Elections

Fatah had been the preeminent party in the PLO since its inception and the paramount faction in the PNA dominating every institution in both for forty-five years. The January 2006 electoral loss was akin to a tsunami to both the Fatah leadership and the rank and file, and some were prepared to do anything to reverse the results.

The situation, however, should not be construed as merely a power struggle between the two factions, though that is certainly a major factor. But in the murky political underworld in the Palestinian territories, there are internal power struggles within both Fatah and Hamas, the switching of loyalties based on political expediency, and powerful clan struggles revolving around extortion and business racketeering, as clan chieftains fight to retain their turf. The myriad of powerful clans in Gaza who under the previous PNA leadership became both powerful and rich as they cornered specific business and black markets swore allegiance to Fatah in return, and maintained that loyalty throughout the Hamas-Fatah conflict.

Moreover, as Moshe Ma'oz of the Hebrew University points out, "To the international supporters and the financial backers of Abbas, or Abu Mazen as he is better known, he is the good guy due to his moderation while Hamas are considered the bad guys because of being 'Islamic fundamentalists.' [Yet] to a large degree Hamas managed to establish law and order on the streets of Gaza and kidnappings ceased. They are regarded as clean politically, not corrupt like Fatah."

Additionally, relations between Hamas and Fatah had been quite hostile historically. For example, in 1996 the 20,000-man Preventative Security Force (PSF) in Gaza, under the control of strongman MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, ruthlessly suppressed Hamas and arrested 2,000 alleged Hamas militants after a series of suicide bombings against Israeli targets. From the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, Dahlan's security forces zealously victimized Hamas for its opposition to ongoing talks with Israel. In the following years, Fatah security services arrested hundreds of Hamas activists, torturing and mistreating them, while Dahlan provided Israel with intelligence on Hamas's activities and the location of Hamas militants. Egyptian journalist Abdelhalim Kandil told the Inter-Press News Agency, Cairo Office, that "the US and Israel worked closely with Dahlan, whose main task was the persecution of Hamas."

The defeated Fatah party initially maintained control of most of the Palestinian security apparatus and began immediately to strengthen it in order to defeat Hamas militarily. The US administration of GEORGE W. BUSH supported Fatah's objectives, funding, arming, and training, at a cost of $59 million, Abbas's Presidential Guard and Dahlan's Gaza-based security services. Throughout 2006 and 2007, the United States supplied money, guns, ammunition, and training to Palestinian Fatah activists and encouraged them to take on Hamas in the streets of Gaza and the West Bank. Washington also covertly persuaded Arab allies to supply more funding and training. A large number of Fatah activists were prepared and "graduated" from two West Bank camps, while Jordan and Egypt trained two Fatah battalions, one of which was deployed to Gaza in May. According to *Vanity Fair*, in 2006 the United States initiated a "covert initiative, approved by Bush and implemented by Secretary of State CONDOLEEZZA RICE and Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams, to provoke a Palestinian civil war." At an even more covert level, the United States cooperated with Israel to arm and train Fatah militants in preparation for a violent coup against the Hamas leadership in Gaza, a scheme known as the "Dayton Plan," which was reportedly managed by Dahlan and US lieutenant general Keith Dayton. Some have accused Dahlan of organizing and dispatching death squads into Gaza.

March 2006 to December 2006: Rise of Tensions

Two main issues contributed to an escalation of tensions between March and December 2006. Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the new government of Prime Minister Haniyeh, and the Fatah-PNA initiated a campaign of terror attacks, assassinations, and abductions against Hamas, which led Hamas to respond in kind. Tensions also mounted over the failure of Hamas and Fatah to reach a power-sharing agreement. Truces were signed and broken; agreements were concluded then violated; cease-fires were agreed upon then breached. Essentially Fatah did not want to share power with Hamas, nor did it want a cease-fire; it wanted to crush Hamas. On 17 February 2006, the Fatah movement of PNA president Mahmud Abbas refused an invitation by Prime Minister Haniyeh to join a government formed by Hamas. When, on 15 December 2006, Abbas called for a Palestinian general election, Hamas challenged the legality of holding an early election, maintaining Hamas's right to hold the full term of its democratically elected offices. Hamas viewed this as an attempted Fatah coup by Abbas, using undemocratic means to overthrow the results of a democratically elected government.

Skirmishes between Fatah and Hamas continued on a low level, but on an almost daily basis, from March to December 2006. December saw the first major battle between the two factions. On 15 December fighting broke out in the West Bank after Palestinian security forces fired on a Hamas rally in Ramallah that occurred shortly after Hamas accused Fatah of attempting to assassinate Ismail Haniyeh, the Palestinian prime minister. On 16 December at least thirty-two Hamas supporters in Ramallah were wounded by gunfire from Mahmud Abbas's and Dahlan's forces. On 20 December Hamas and Fatah reached a new truce; however, the following morning two Fatah members were killed during a gunfight with Hamas members. In a separate incident in Jabalya, seven Palestinians were wounded by Hamas members.

Second Round of Fighting: 30 December 2006–May 2007

Intense fighting continued throughout December and January 2007 in the Gaza Strip. Several cease-fire attempts failed, broken by continued battles. In February 2007 Palestinian rivals met in the Islamic holy city of Mecca, SAUDI ARABIA, and reached an accord ensuring a cease-fire and a national unity government—the MECCA AGREEMENT. However, the unity government collapsed almost as quickly as it was established, and minor incidents continued through March and April 2007. More than ninety people were killed in these first months. At least twenty people were wounded in the clashes.

In mid-May 2007, heavy clashes erupted once again in the streets of Gaza as Fatah moved to oust Hamas. In less than twenty days, more than fifty Palestinians were killed. Leaders of both parties tried to stop the fighting with dozens of truces, but none of them held for longer than a few days. By most accounts, Hamas performed better than Fatah in this round of fighting. Some attribute this to the discipline and better training of Hamas's fighters. However, Fatah's armed forces are greater in number and were trained, armed, and prepared for this operation by the United States, Egypt, and Jordan.

Battle of Gaza 2007: Hamas Reasserts Control

The final and most intense round of fighting took place between 7 and 15 June 2007 in the Gaza Strip. It resulted in Hamas remaining in control of the Gaza Strip after forcing out Fatah. It may also have signaled the downfall of Muhammad Dahlan. The PNA was now formally split, with Fatah controlling the West Bank and Hamas the Gaza Strip. The Red Cross estimated that at least 118 people were killed and over 550 wounded during the fighting in the week up to 15 June.

West Bank: Fatah Establishes a Separate Government

The attacks of Hamas gunmen against Fatah security forces in the Gaza Strip resulted in a reaction of Fatah gunmen against Hamas institutions in the West Bank. Although Hamas's numbers are greater in the Gaza Strip, Fatah forces are greater in the West Bank.

The West Bank had its first casualty on 15 June when the bullet-riddled body of a Hamas militant was found in Nablus, sparking the fear that Fatah would use its advantage in the West Bank for retaliation against its members' deaths in the Gaza Strip. On the same day, Hamas also declared that it was in full control of Gaza, a claim denied by Abbas, but reflecting reality on the ground.

On 16 June, a Fatah-linked militant group, the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, stormed the Hamas-controlled parliament based in Ramallah in

the West Bank. This act, including the ransacking of the Ministry of Education, was undoubtedly a response to Fatah's defeat in Gaza, but it did not bode well for future reconciliation between the two parties. On 20 June, Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar declared that if Fatah continued to try to uproot Hamas in the West Bank, it could lead to Fatah's downfall there as well. When asked, he would not deny that Hamas resistance against Fatah would take the form of attacks and suicide bombings similar to those Hamas has used against Israel in the past.

On 14 June, President Abbas announced the dissolution of the current government and the declaration of a state of emergency. Palestinian prime minister Haniyeh was dismissed, and Abbas began to rule Gaza and the West Bank by presidential decree. Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri responded by declaring that President Abbas's decision was "in practical terms . . . worthless," asserting that Haniyeh "remains the head of the government even if it was dissolved by the president." On 15 June, Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as prime minister and gave him the task of forming a new government—something he has yet to accomplish as of April 2009.

In consequence of the failure of Israel's surrogate, Muhammad Dahlan and his highly trained forces, to crush Hamas in Gaza, Tel Aviv decided to undertake the task itself. In this context, then, Israel, which on 19 September 2007 had declared Gaza an "enemy entity" and had imposed a total, punishing, eighteen-month siege on Gaza, unleashed Operation Cast Lead on 27 December 2008, lasting until 18 January 2009. In the twenty-two days of Operation Cast Lead, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR) put the Palestinian death toll during the offensive at a total of 1,417, of whom 926 were civilians, including 313 children and 116 women. Noncombatant police officers constituted 255, and 236 combatants were killed, representing 16.7 percent of the total deaths. The number of civilian fatalities included sixteen medics and four journalists. The number of wounded was approximately 5,500, of which two-thirds were civilians. The IDF reported ten fatalities, all combatants, of which four were killed by friendly fire, one inside Israel by a Qassam rocket, and five in combat with Palestinian forces. Three civilians were reportedly killed, but neither the place nor circumstances of their deaths were published. The IDF did not publish numbers of injured.

Yet despite the carnage that Israel inflicted on Gaza, when the onslaught was over, Hamas remained in power.

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—Helga Baumgarten

Al-Hamid, Hayil 'Abd (ca. 1935–1991)

Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid (Abu al-Hawl) was head of the FATAH security apparatuses from 1973 until his death. He was born in SAFED, Palestine, and, with his family, was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR, becoming a refugee in Yarmuk camp near Damascus, SYRIA. In the mid-1950s he joined the Arab Filastin student group, which competed in the League of Palestinian Students. After the Arab Filastin group merged with Fatah in 1963–1964, al-Hamid led Fatah groups in EGYPT, where he began to build relations with the governments of JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR and with Syria. In cooperation with HANI AL-HASAN he coordinated Palestinian activism from East GERMANY and was sent for military training in CHINA during the latter half of 1967. In 1969 he was again appointed Fatah's representative to Cairo.

In April 1973 'Abd al-Hamid became head of Fatah's security services, taking over from AL-YUSIF MUHAMMAD AL-NAJJAR, and became a member of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE. He was assassinated in January 1991, together with SALAH KHALAF, by the ABU NIDAL faction for siding with Arafat's two-state political strategy.

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HaMoked

HaMoked, the Center for the Defense of the Individual, is an Israeli human rights organization established in 1988 during the First INTIFADA, to help Palestinians who were injured as a result of President Rabin's policy to "break the bones" of demonstrators. HaMoked's main work is to assist Palestinians whose rights are violated by the Israeli authorities or as a result of Israeli policies. On behalf of Palestinians it petitions the Civil Authority, the Military Attorney General, the State Attorney General, or any of a variety of Israeli governmental offices. When necessary HaMoked files legal claims and submits petitions to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. HaMoked often collaborates with B'TSELEM, the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. (www.hamoked.org.il).

Haniyeh, Ismail (1963–)

In January 2006 Ismail Haniyeh, a senior political leader of HAMAS, became prime minister of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). He was born in al-Shati refugee camp in the GAZA STRIP. His parents, originally from Al-Majdal (now Ashkelon in southern Israel), were dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and became REFUGEES. In 1987 Haniyeh graduated from the Islamic University of Gaza with a degree in Arabic literature. In 1989 he was imprisoned for three years by Israeli authorities for participation in the First INTIFADA and membership in Hamas, and, following his release in 1992, he was deported to LEBANON. A year later he returned to Gaza and was appointed dean of the Islamic University.

After his return the Israeli army continuously targeted Haniyeh for alleged involvement in attacks against Israeli citizens. Following a SUICIDE BOMBING in JERUSALEM in 2003, the Israeli Air Force attempted to eliminate all Hamas leaders, and Haniyeh was slightly injured on his hand in an assassination attempt. His position within Hamas continued to strengthen during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA because of both his close relationship with SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN (Hamas's spiritual leader) and the assassinations of much of the Hamas leadership by Israel. In December 2005 Haniyeh was elected to head the Hamas slate, which on 25 January 2006 won the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS. After Haniyeh was asked by Palestinian president MAHMUD ABBAS to form a new government, he was elected by the Hamas delegates to serve as prime minister and was sworn in on 29 March 2006.

Haniyeh first attempted to form a coalition with the FATAH party, but when it declined he named a cabinet primarily of Hamas members and technocrats. When he outlined his administration's program, Haniyeh urged the UNITED STATES and the EUROPEAN UNION not to carry out their threats to cut funding to the PNA. He stressed that Palestinians were entitled to continue their struggle for independence, but at the same time he said clearly that he wanted to hold talks with international mediators about solving the conflict with Israel. "Our government will spare no effort to reach a just peace in the region, putting an end to the OCCUPATION and restoring our rights," he said.

Israel and the United States immediately imposed severe sanctions on the PNA because they deemed Hamas a TERRORIST group. The Europeans followed shortly, leaving the PNA bereft of resources with which to govern. Nevertheless, Haniyeh is considered a pragmatist in the ranks of Hamas who is more open to dialogue with Israel, although he has insisted that Israel would have to recognize Palestinian rights before talks could begin.

Despite the sanctions and incidences of successful border interdiction, Hamas leaders were able to smuggle enough money into the Palestinian territories to maintain basic health and educational services. The defeated Fatah party maintains control of most of the Palestinian security apparatus and the US administration of GEORGE W. BUSH funded and armed Abbas's Presidential Guard and Gaza-based Fatah warlord MUHAMMAD DAHLAN.

During 2006 and 2007, the United States supplied guns, ammunition, and training to Fatah activists to take on Hamas in the streets of Gaza and the WEST BANK. The US objective was to provoke a Palestinian civil war and topple the Haniyeh government.

The period from March to December 2006 was marked by tensions when Fatah commanders refused to take orders from the government while the PNA initiated a campaign of assassinations and abductions against Hamas, which led to Hamas beginning their own campaign. Tensions increased further between the two Palestinian factions after they failed to reach a deal to share government power. On 15 December 2006, Abbas called for a Palestinian general election. Hamas challenged the legality of holding an early election, maintaining their right to hold the full term of their democratically elected offices. Haniyeh characterized this as an attempted Fatah coup by Abbas, using undemocratic means to overthrow the results of a democratically elected government.

Intense fighting broke out after Palestinian security forces fired on a Hamas rally in the West Bank. Hamas accused Fatah of attempting to assassinate Prime Minister Haniyeh. Fighting continued through January 2007, though mostly in Gaza. In February 2007, the Palestinian rivals met in the Islamic holy city of Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and reached an accord ensuring a cease-fire—the MECCA AGREEMENT. A national unity government emerged, but just as quickly disintegrated.

Clashes erupted again in mid-May 2007 in the streets of Gaza. In less than twenty days, more than 50 Palestinians were killed. According to one Palestinian rights group, more than 600 Palestinians were killed in fighting from January 2006 to May 2007.

In just four days of fighting, Hamas took control of the entire Gaza Strip and forced Fatah out. Fatah then attacked Hamas institutions in the West Bank. President Abbas declared a state of emergency and dismissed Prime Minister Haniyeh, but he remained in power in Gaza as the two Palestinian territories split.

See also HAMAS

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Hankin, Joshua (1864–1945)

Joshua (Yehoshua) Hankin was an early Zionist LAND purchaser in Palestine. Born in the Ukraine, he immigrated to Palestine with his father in 1882, where they were among the founders of the town of Rishon LeZion. In 1887 Hankin and his father moved to Gedera, where they established relations with the local Arab landowners in order to facilitate major land purchases and expansion of the Jewish colonization movement.

Hankin made his first land purchase in 1890, buying the land on which the settlement of Rehovoth was established, and later bought land on which the JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION established settlements in the Galilee and in other parts of Palestine. In 1908 he went to work for the PALESTINE LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, which was established by the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION to purchase and cultivate land for the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND and for private individuals. Hankin negotiated the purchase of lands in the fertile Jezreel Valley as early as 1897, but the sale was delayed until 1909, when he finally succeeded in buying the land on which Merhavia, the first Jewish settlement in the valley, was established.

In 1915 Hankin was exiled by OTTOMAN authorities to Turkey, but he returned three years later. In 1920 he concluded another major purchase in the Jezreel Valley, which led to the founding of the Ein Harod, Tel Yosef, and Nahalal settlements. As a result of this important acquisition, Hankin became know as "Redeemer of the Valley," and Kfar Yehoshua in the Jezreel Valley is named for him.

In 1927 Hankin presented the Zionist leadership with a daring twenty-year plan for the acquisition of Palestinian lands, and he became the director of the Palestine Land Development Corporation in 1932. Hankin also sought to establish a town on the Mediterranean shore south of Caesarea, to be named Hephzibah. He planned to develop the area as a resort and build an elaborate European-style home for himself there. By the 1950s, however, the area became a housing project for immigrant families. During his lifetime Hankin arranged for the purchase of more than 600,000 dunums (almost 150,000 acres) of land.

See also ABSENTEE LANDLORDS; ARAB NATIONALISTS' LAND SALES TO THE ZIONISTS

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HaPoel HaMizrachi

HaPoel HaMizrachi (Spiritual Center Worker) was an Orthodox religious workers' movement founded in Palestine in 1922 by a left-wing faction of MIZRACHI. In 1956 it rejoined Mizrachi to form the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP), which was part of the religious Zionist movement that aimed to restore not only the Jewish nation in the "whole land of Israel" but also the Jewish religion, the Torah, and its commandments. Today the NRP and its offshoot, GUSH EMUNIM, are deeply committed to settling the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and to the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT.

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HaPoel HaTzair

HaPoel HaTzair (The Young Worker) was a labor Zionist political party founded in 1905 and led by A.D. Gordon (1856–1922), a Zionist ideologue and the spiritual force behind practical (political) ZIONISM. The party was active in Palestine from 1905 to 1930. HaPoel HaTzair's philosophy—Jewish labor as a Zionist value—embodied what became the major tenets of labor Zionism that dominated the Zionist movement and Israeli politics for many years.

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Al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man

Al-Haq (Fairness, Justice, Law, Truth) is the WEST BANK affiliate of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists. It is a Palestinian human rights organization, founded in Ramallah in 1979 by Palestinian lawyers concerned with the protection and promotion of the principles of human rights and the rule of law. Al-Haq is among the most respected and trusted human rights organizations in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (www.alhaq.org).

Al-Haram ash-Sharif

Al-Haram al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) is a Muslim shrine that is situated in the heart of the OLD CITY of JERUSALEM. Because part of it was also a Jewish holy site, it has been a major flashpoint in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Al-Haram ash-Sharif comprises nearly one-sixth of the walled Old City, enclosing over thirty-five acres of fountains, gardens, buildings, domes, and the tombs of revered Muslim individuals. At its southernmost end is AL-AQSA MOSQUE and, closer to the main entrance, the DOME OF THE ROCK. As the site of the Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey and as the first *qibla* (direction of prayer) for Islam, al-Haram ash-Sharif holds special significance for Muslims. The entire area, one of the three most important sites in Islam, is regarded by Muslims as a mosque and is thus sacred and inviolable. As a showcase for Islamic architecture and design from Umayyad to Ottoman times, al-Haram ash-Sharif continues to be an important religious and educational center for Muslims today.

Jews refer to the area (which sits atop the WESTERN WALL) as Har Ha-Bayit or TEMPLE MOUNT. Many believe it was the site of the Temple of Solomon, destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BCE, or the site of the Second Temple, destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE. Some Jews and fundamentalist Christians want to destroy the entire Haram and rebuild the THIRD TEMPLE there. Since 1967 there have been some 100 attempts by individuals and groups to assault al-Haram ash-Sharif for a variety of reasons, including to perform Jewish rituals, to destroy the Muslim buildings, to rebuild the Third Temple, or to upset the balance of power between Judaism and Islam and alter the status quo. Two groups in particular are dedicated to the destruction of Jerusalem's most sacred Islamic shrine: the militant Bloc of the Faithful (GUSH EMUNIM), led by rabbis, and the Temple Mount Reclamation Movement, whose objective is to build the Third Temple on the site. Militant fundamentalist Christians who want the Islamic shrine destroyed give support and financial aid to both Israeli groups, because, in their millennialist ideology, the second coming of Christ is dependent on the Jews rebuilding the Second Temple. The following is a brief chronology of provocative actions or direct attacks on al-Haram ash-Sharif.

August 1967. Shlomo Goren, the chief chaplain of the Armed Forces and later Israel's chief rabbi, led fifty armed men onto the shrine and declared "it is a holy commandment" for Jews to go to the Muslim grounds. That year there was much talk about Israel's restoration of its presence in the land of Israel. One Israeli publication reported that "many rabbis, including members of the Council of the Chief Rabbinate, support . . . Jewish sovereignty" over al-Haram ash-Sharif.

August 1969. A Christian fundamentalist from Australia set fire to al-Aqsa Mosque, destroying a priceless one-thousand-year-old wood and ivory *minbar* (pulpit) that had been sent from Aleppo, SYRIA, by the twelfth-century Muslim leader SALADIN.

December 1969. A group of militant Jews stormed their way onto al-Haram ash-Sharif in order "to conduct Hanukkah prayers."

July 1978. Gershon Salomon, leader of the Temple Mount Faithful, led militant Jews onto the Islamic holy grounds. When Palestinians demonstrated in protest, Israeli forces responded with tear gas.

August 1980. Three hundred heavily armed Gush Emunim extremists overcame Palestinian police and stormed the grounds of the Haram. They were eventually dispersed by Israeli troops.

September 1980. One month after their previous assault, armed Gush Emunim settlers again forced their way onto the Haram grounds. After scuffling with police, they were evicted.

April 1982. An Israeli soldier went on a shooting rampage in al-Aqsa Mosque, killing two Palestinians and wounding numerous others. A week of Palestinian demonstrations followed; the soldier was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment, but in November 1997 he was released.

October 1982. A member of MEIR KAHANE'S KACH movement was arrested for plotting to blow up the Dome of the Rock.

March 1983. Some forty-five armed men from Gush Emunim and Kach climbed the walls onto al-Haram ash-Sharif and attempted to overcome security guards and seize the site. They were found with large quantities of explosives, automatic rifles, and pistols. Twenty-nine people were eventually charged for the intrusion, but all were acquitted of the charges.

May 1983. After the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ruled that Jews could pray on al-Haram ash-Sharif, Gershon Salomon and other members of the Temple Mount Faithful entered the compound under police protection and held a service commemorating the reunification of Jerusalem.

January 1984. The Lifta Cell, led by RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER of Gush Emunim, attempted to blow up the Muslim holy sites on al-Haram ash-Sharif. The plan was thwarted only at the last minute, and police recovered almost 250 pounds of explosives, including dozens of Israeli army-issue hand grenades, boxes of dynamite, and about twelve mortar rounds. No suspects were arrested.

January 1986. A group of Israel Knesset members, including those who believe that the Jews have a right to pray on the Temple Mount, gathered on al-Haram ash-Sharif. Palestinians protested, but Israel suppressed the demonstrations. A week later someone hoisted the Israeli flag over the Haram.

October 1990. The Temple Mount Faithful marched on the Haram and unfurled a banner denouncing the Muslim presence. When they attempted to lay a foundation stone for the Third Temple, they were stopped by the police. In the ensuing riot twenty-two Palestinians were killed; no one was arrested.

September 1996. Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU opened the HASMONEAN TUNNEL—excavated in secret nighttime operations—which runs the length of the al-Aqsa Mosque. The controversial tunnel sparked intense fighting that claimed the lives of sixty Palestinians and fifty Israeli soldiers.

October 1998. Gershon Salomon and his followers mounted a ramp to the Haram, waving Israeli flags and blowing rams' horns. "The time has come to rebuild the Jewish Temple," said Salomon. To underscore his point, Salomon brought a forty-one-ton stone intended as the cornerstone for the Third Temple.

September 2000. Israeli Likud leader ARIEL SHARON, flanked by over 1,000 riot policemen, visited al-Haram ash-Sharif. It was intended to be a provocative statement of Israel's sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, but demonstrations broke out across the Occupied Territories, and the Second INTIFADA, known as the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, was under way.

April 2005. Israel's security service, SHIN BET, arrested nine far-right activists suspected of plotting to attack al-Haram ash-Sharif with missiles.

See also AL-AQSA MOSQUE; DOME OF THE ROCK; HASMONEAN TUNNEL; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Haredi

Haredi (one who trembles), also known as ultra-Orthodox Judaism, is the most theologically conservative form of Judaism. Haredi Jews consider their belief system and religious practices to extend in an unbroken chain back to Moses and the giving of the Torah on Mount Sinai. Historically the Haredi were ANTI-ZIONISTS because they believed that Jewish political independence could only be obtained through divine intervention with the coming of the Messiah. Once the state of Israel was created, however, the Haredi found it expedient to work with Zionists and also formed a political party, the AGUDAT YISRAEL. Today the Haredim are divided into two political parties. The first, UNITED TORAH JUDAISM, is an alliance of DEGEL HATORAH and Agudat Yisrael and is the party of the ASHKENAZI Haredim, who are of East European origin. The second is SHAS, the party of the MIZRAHI/SEPHARDI Haredim, who are of Middle Eastern and North African origin. In the 2006 elections the Haredi parties together won 18 of the 120 total Knesset seats. Shas won 12 seats, and United Torah Judaism 6 seats.

The Haredim constitute about 11 percent of the Israeli population and 13.4 percent of the Israeli Jews. They are, however, far more influential than their numbers might suggest, which is significant because on issues relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they share the worldview of the LIKUD PARTY, GUSH EMUNIM, and others from the right. Like the others, they are committed to a Greater Israel and to the retention and SETTLEMENT of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Traditionally the main interests of the Haredi parties were obtaining government subsidies for their yeshivas (schools), maintaining their exemption from military service, and expanding Halacha (Jewish) law over more aspects of Israeli society. Since around 2000, however, the single most important issue to the Haredi (aside from Halachic issues) has been Jewish settlements in the WEST BANK.

This issue had become important to the Haredi because they make up one-third of the population of the Occupied Territories, mainly drawn there because of the shortage of affordable housing within the Green Line, especially in JERUSALEM, where they have been traditionally concentrated. Because the high Haredi birthrate (8 to 12 children per family) had led to a great demand for housing, two settlements have become key contributors to the settler population's increase: Betar Illit, between the Etzion Bloc and Jerusalem, and Modi'in Illit (formerly called Kiryat Sefer) in the Modi'in area. The two settlements' combined population—each is estimated to have 22,000 residents—represents a quarter of the settler population in this area. If the Haredi town of Immanuel (population 2,700) is added, along with Tel Zion and Kokhav Yaakov's Haredi neighborhood (with 560 families, according to its own figures), the significance of the ultra-Orthodox in any Israeli program for retaining the West Bank is clearly crucial. Having established communities in the West Bank and having a vested interest in the Occupied Territories, the Haredi oppose any political arrangement with the Palestinians that would involve giving up LAND and settlements.

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Har Habait/Har HaBayit

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Har Homa Settlement

Har Homa is a major SETTLEMENT on the southeastern border of JERUSALEM, the development and construction of which was undertaken during the OSLO PROCESS. The area of the Har Homa settlement project comprises 2,056 dunum (about 500 acres) and completes the circle of Jewish settlements around East Jerusalem.

Har Homa, like all the Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, is illegal because it violates various provisions of INTERNATIONAL LAW that are binding on Israel. International humanitarian law prohibits the establishment of the settlements on Occupied territory. Breach of this prohibition leads to the infringement of numerous human rights of Palestinians that are set forth in international human rights law.

International humanitarian law relates to rules applying to states during times of war and OCCUPATION. The settlements in the Occupied Territories breach two primary instruments of international law: the Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and its attached Regulations of 1907 (hereafter the Hague Regulations), and the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to Civilian Persons in Time of War of 1949. Because the settlements have been constructed on land Israel has illegally occupied since 1967, they contravene the most basic tenets of the laws of war and occupation.

These principles are recognized by the UNITED NATIONS, the EUROPEAN UNION, and most every other country in the world. The US position, however, is ambiguous. On the one hand, it has quietly pressured Israel not to go forward with new settlement construction, particularly Har Homa, because of the ongoing peace process; on the other, the UNITED STATES has looked the other way during most of Israel's construction project, continuously providing it increasing financial assistance, and has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions condemning the settlement plans, including two different resolutions that called on Israel to stop construction at Har Homa. The United States was the only country of the fifteen members on the council to vote against the resolutions.

Shortly after concluding the HEBRON PROTOCOL on 17 January 1997 and five years into the peace process, Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU announced on 19 February 1997 the beginning of construction of another Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem on Jabel Abu Ghanem—Har Homa. The pronouncement was met with strong displeasure in Washington because it compromised the negotiating process; nevertheless, despite its objections to the project, on 21 March the United States vetoed a second UN Security Council resolution critical of Israel's settlement policy. On that same day a HAMAS activist placed a bomb in a Tel Aviv café, killing three women. The Israeli government suspended all further negotiations with the Palestinians except those concerned with security (until October 1998 when US president CLINTON convinced Israeli prime minister Netanyahu to return to the negotiating process at WYE RIVER).

The declaration also led to demonstrations throughout the Occupied Territories. On 1 March 1997 over 600 Palestinian and Israeli peace activists, as well as members of the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, protested the building of Har Homa. Similar demonstrations took place in the succeeding months as construction work proceeded. On 3 March Palestinians throughout the territories observed a general strike in protest of Har Homa. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES sent hundreds of soldiers into the West Bank to forestall additional demonstrations, and between 6 and 20 March Israeli troops killed eight Palestinians and wounded over 1,000. Two Israeli soldiers were killed.

In the early 1980s, Israel classified the Abu Ghanem mountain as a "GREEN AREA" (in principle meaning there was to be no construction in the area, Israeli or Palestinian). However, when the Israeli government completed its confiscation of the forested mountain, they reclassified it as a "building zone" for the construction of Har Homa.

Expropriation of the land commenced in July 1991 and was approved in December 1994 by Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN. Approximately 33 percent (694 dunum, 170 acres) of the Har Homa planning area was owned by Palestinian residents of the nearby West Bank village Beit Sahur (at the time part of Area A under the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's control) and the Jerusalem village of Um Tuba.

In addition to losing land, Palestinians lost both culturally and environmentally in the Har Homa project. The closeness of Abu Ghanem Mountain to the traditional Christian site of Shepherd's Fields

should have necessitated that the forested mountain be left intact so as to preserve the ENVIRONMENT and landscape of this biblical setting. The removal of the trees and their replacement with modern Western-style houses and industrial parks has substantially altered the ecosystem and character of the area adjacent to the Shepherd's Fields, and this is occurring at a time when Israel is restoring ancient archaeology in Jerusalem, at the expense of Palestinian homes and way of life, to reestablish their biblical past. A Byzantine monastery on the top of Abu Ghanem remained on the site under control of the Jewish settlers. It has become a showpiece, exploited for tourist revenue in the same fashion as the Byzantine church located in the middle of MA'ALE ADUMIM. The location of the settlement, now buttressed by the BARRIER wall, which physically isolates BETHLEHEM, plus loss of control of the monastery, deprives the Palestinians of Bethlehem of their main source of income—tourism.

Har Homa is, however, important to Israel, as the linchpin for the completion of a ring of large-scale housing colonies all along Jerusalem's southern, northern, and eastern perimeters. When these settlements are completed (with construction of Har Homa), Palestinian neighborhoods throughout East Jerusalem will be cut off from their WEST BANK hinterland by a circle of settlements housing more than 200,000 Israelis. This is part of Israel's program for realizing Jewish sovereignty over a united and Jewish Jerusalem in which there will be no possibility for sharing the city with Palestinians, who hope to have East Jerusalem as the capital of their state. Moreover, beyond its place in the unification of Jerusalem, Har Homa's significance resides in Israel's larger scheme for the city's connection with the West Bank settlement Ma'ale Adumim through the E1 PLAN, which will sever the occupied territory of the West Bank into two separate and unconnected halves.

Construction of Har Homa began within days after Prime Minister Netanyahu's 17 February announcement, but due to intense US pressure, work on the site ceased after INFRASTRUCTURE was laid in late 1997. In May 1999, construction was resumed at the controversial settlement and by the end of 2000, settlers began moving into the 110 units built with government tenders. Between the years 2003 and 2007, the Israeli Ministry of Housing in cooperation with the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem consigned six contractors to build an additional 2,536 new housing units in Har Homa.

A week before President GEORGE W. BUSH convened the 27 November 2007 Annapolis Conference, Israeli prime minister EHUD OLMERT announced that the minister of housing had issued a tender for the construction of 307 new homes at Har Homa. Prior to the announcement, according to Housing Ministry spokesman Kobi Bleich, the Knesset had approved an allocation of 50 million shekels ($13 million) in the national budget proposal for 500 new housing units in the West Bank, including 307 units in Har Homa.

The Annapolis Conference was based on the 2003 ROAD MAP peace plan, which required Israel to halt all settlement activity and the Palestinians to rein in militants. Israel's announcement on Har Homa appeared to US officials as a slap in the face. US secretary of state CONDOLEEZZA RICE demanded explanations from her Israeli counterpart, TZIPI LIVNI, about the construction plans for Har Homa. Administration spokespeople normally oppose any moves liable to damage Israeli-Palestinian FINAL STATUS negotiations, namely the settlements. But this time, Rice also expressed fear that the construction in Har Homa would disrupt the Annapolis process. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian president MAHMUD ABBAS claimed to be moving toward President Bush's goal of concluding the negotiations and establishing a Palestinian state within a year, although the talks were still on the "back burner."

In December 2007, Rafi Eitan, minister for Jerusalem affairs, told the BBC that Israel had never promised to stop building within Jerusalem and had a duty to house its citizens and, further, that the budget provided for 500 new homes in Har Homa. At the time there were some 2,500 families living in Har Homa, and there were plans for another 4,000.

By the end of 2008, there were approximately 4,000 families, twelve kindergartens, six day care centers, two public grammar schools, three medical clinics, and three shopping centers in Har Homa. There were three bus lines, including two that connect Har Homa to downtown Jerusalem and the central bus station, and another that connects the settlement to the Malha Mall, also known as the Jerusalem Mall (an indoor shopping center), and Ramot Alon (one of the largest settlements in Jerusalem, with about 40,000 residents). Har Homa is considered the newest bastion of religious

ZIONISM, with three religious youth groups, two synagogues, many informal daily prayer services, two religious schools, Talmudei Torah, nurseries, and an abundance of Torah classes. In addition, two yeshivot, Har HaMor (which carries on the legacy of RABBI AVRAHAM KOOK) and Mekor Chaim, plan to relocate from Jerusalem and Bet Shemesh, respectively, to Har Homa.

See also JERUSALEM; SETTLEMENTS (B'TSELEM); SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; UNITED STATES

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Al-Hasan, Bilal (1944–)

Bilal al-Hasan is a former political activist and, since the early 1970s when he eschewed politics, a prominent writer. Born in HAIFA, he was dispossessed with his family in the 1948 WAR and became a REFUGEE in Sidon, LEBANON. After the 1961 breakup of the United Arab Republic, al-Hasan became an activist in the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN) in Damascus and a member of the first command structure of the MAN's Palestine Action Committee (established in September 1964). Beginning in 1965, he was active on the editorial board of the MAN journal *al-Hurriyya* (Freedom), where he pressed for an early commencement of attacks on Israel and for independent Palestinian action. He joined the politburo of the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP) after it broke away from the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, and in 1969 was the DFLP's first representative to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(EC). However, he strongly objected to the DFLP's confrontational stance toward JORDAN in early 1970, and in 1971 he left both the DFLP politburo and the PLO-EC.

Al-Hasan became editor of the PLO journal *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, through which he became a well-known and respected journalist, and later was an editor at *al-Safir* in Lebanon. In March 1984, he created *Al Youm al Sabia,* an Arabic-language newspaper published in Paris, where he currently lives. During the years of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY he managed to place the so-called NATSHE DOCUMENT, critical of Arafat and senior Fatah leaders, in the most popular FATAH chat rooms, creating a major stir in Palestinian politics. He often writes for the London-based daily *Al-Hayat*, representing the position of the Palestinian left. Bilal al-Hasan is the younger brother of HANI and KHALID AL-HASAN, both founders of Fatah.

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Al-Hasan, Hani (1937–)

Hani al-Hasan (Abu Tariq or Abu-l'-Hasan) was one of the founders of FATAH and played a leading role in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). He was born in HAIFA, Palestine, and, with his once-wealthy family, was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR. He grew up as a REFUGEE in Sidon, LEBANON, and joined the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD in the early 1950s, later becoming involved in resistance politics when he led the General Union of Palestinian Students while studying construction engineering at the University of Darmstadt in West GERMANY. He joined Fatah in 1963 and soon became a leading figure in the movement. By 1967 he had become Fatah's senior figure in Europe and in 1974 was appointed chair of Fatah's political affairs department. He was also a member of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (the PLO parliament). Internationally, al-Hasan became Fatah's main contact with CHINA.

During the 1970s al-Hasan was a deputy in Fatah's intelligence service. From 1974 he was a personal political aide to PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT, becoming a member of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE in 1980 and the PLO's representative to Amman, JORDAN. In August 1990 al-Hasan was highly critical of Arafat's stand in the GULF WAR and was one of several senior Fatah figures who voiced criticism of the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, criticism that led to serious dissension within the movement. Although al-Hasan continued to oppose the Oslo Accords even after the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, he came to the GAZA STRIP in November 1995 and was subsequently chief political advisor to Arafat as well as head of the Palestine National Council's foreign relations committee. He is a brother of BILAL AL-HASAN, a prominent writer, and KHALID AL-HASAN, also a founder of Fatah.

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Al-Hasan, Khalid Muhammad (1928–1994)

Khalid al-Hasan (Abu Sa'id) was a founding member of FATAH, a leading official in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and senior advisor to PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT until 1991. In 1948 al-Hasan worked for the British military, who provided him protection in the Sinai for a year. He then joined his once-prosperous HAIFA family, who had been dispossessed and were then REFUGEES in Sidon, LEBANON. In 1950 al-Hasan moved to Damascus, SYRIA, where he worked as a tutor and became involved in Islamist politics, helping to found the Islamic Liberation Party, for which activity he was imprisoned. He moved around the Middle East and Africa for a period before settling in KUWAIT in 1952, where he became a prominent and exceedingly wealthy businessman and developer, and was one of the few Palestinians ever to receive Kuwaiti citizenship.

Within the PLO Khalid al-Hasan was known for his conservative politics. He was generally opposed to the use of military means against Israel and stressed collective leadership and democratic values. His most valuable contribution to the organization, particularly from the perspective of

finances, was to build and maintain Fatah's strong links with SAUDI ARABIA from 1969 on. In 1991 he broke with Arafat in opposition to the latter's siding with IRAQ and Saddam Husayn in the GULF WAR, but was nonetheless stripped of his Kuwaiti citizenship. Though a longtime advocate of a negotiated settlement with Israel, he was opposed to the OSLO ACCORDS, because he believed they constituted a violation of internationally recognized Palestinian national rights and could not serve as a basis for a just peace. After the signing at Oslo, al-Hasan moved to Morocco, where he died of cancer. He was brother of HANI AL-HASAN, also a founder of Fatah, and BILAL AL-HASAN, a prominent writer.

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Hashemite Genealogy from the Hejaz

Husayn Ibn Ali (1852–1931) was king of the Hejaz (western Arabia), sharif and emir of Mecca. The British conducted the HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE with him. He had five sons, two of whom played important roles in contemporary Arab politics.

1. *Abdullah Ibn Husayn al-Hashem* (1882–1951). The British appointed him emir of Transjordan in 1920, and he later became king of JORDAN.

King Husayn bin Talal bin Abdullah. The grandson of King Abdullah, he was king of Jordan from 1953 to 1999.

King Abdullah II bin Husayn. Son of King Husayn, he became king of Jordan in 1999.

2. *Faysal Ibn Husayn* (1885–1933). An Arab nationalist leader, he led the Arab Revolt against the OTTOMANS during World War I, based on his belief that the British had committed to his father in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence to give all of the Arab world back to the Arabs in exchange for their help in defeating the Ottomans. He was elected by a pan-Arab nationalist congress in 1920 as king of Greater SYRIA but did not take the throne because FRANCE held the mandate for Syria and threatened war if the British did not remove him. Instead the British made him king of IRAQ, a country also created by the British, where he ruled from 1921 until 1933. He was succeeded by his son *Ghazi Ibn Faysal* and grandson *Faysal Ibn Ghazi Ibn Faysal Al Hashim,* who ruled Iraq from 1939 until 1958, when a coup by Arab nationalists deposed him.

HaShomer

HaShomer (The Guardians) was an armed Jewish paramilitary organization, mounted on horseback, which operated throughout Palestine during the early years of Zionist colonization. Founded in 1909, it assumed responsibility for the security of Jewish settlements and grew out of smaller, irregular militias, such as the BAR GIORA organization and later the Jaffa Group and the Gideonites. These militias were also the forerunners of the HAGANA, a major Jewish military organization that became the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. HaShomer organized its operations in a three-tiered hierarchy: a small core of founders (veterans of Bar Giora), a larger circle of active guards, and members of HaShomer and Jewish laborers, who termed themselves a "labor legion," as reserves. HaShomer members often dressed as Arabs to avoid detection and were known to forcibly evict Palestinian peasants from lands they had cultivated for centuries, which had been sold by ABSENTEE LANDLORDS to Jewish agencies. After the founding of the Hagana, it ceased to operate in 1920.

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Hashomer Hatzair

Hashomer Hatzair (Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir, or the Young Guard) originated as a Zionist youth and scouting organization in Galicia (now in Poland) in 1913. In the 1920s it began sending members to settle in Palestine, where it quickly developed into a prominent left-wing voice within the growing Jewish community. Hashomer Hatzair members were strongly committed to the KIBBUTZ movement,

and by 1927 the organization had created its own network of kibbutzim. In 1936 Hashomer Hatzair created a political party, the Socialist League of Palestine, to unite its supporters and organize around its agenda.

By the 1930s Hashomer Hatzair had become increasingly Marxist in outlook, although it remained an integral part of the Zionist movement, committed to continuing Jewish IMMIGRATION and the economic and political development of the Jewish community in Palestine. It was the largest opposition bloc in the HISTADRUT (labor federation), winning some 20 percent of the vote in a 1942 election. Yet it diverged sharply from much of the rest of the Zionist movement due to its Marxist internationalism, which caused it to champion Jewish-Arab worker unity and a BINATIONAL future for Palestine. As early as the mid-1930s Hashomer Hatzair members participated in efforts to organize jointly both Jewish and Palestinian workers, for example in the HAIFA railways. When Arab workers went on strike, Hashomer Hatzair kibbutzim lent support and through meetings and newspaper articles called upon Jewish workers to unite with their Arab brothers to form joint Arab-Jewish trade unions and build political alliances between them.

To systematize and expand this work, in 1940 Hashomer Hatzair established an Arab affairs department and began agitating within the Zionist movement for a concrete policy of outreach to Palestinian communities. Jewish settlements were urged to establish health clinics and sports centers that could be used by nearby Arab villages, and Jewish activists were urged to fight national chauvinism and anti-Arab prejudice.

Hashomer Hatzair made a particular effort to seek out left-wing Arab political figures for discussions and to conduct political and trade union organizing. Leaflets and pamphlets were issued in Arabic, calling on Arab workers to reject ANTI-SEMITISM and to seek allies among progressive forces in the Jewish community. In 1942 Hashomer Hatzair joined the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and Cooperation. Its goal was an international federation of workers that "would lead the socialist revolution in Palestine when the time came." It supported the idea of a binational state, believing that Palestine was the common homeland of both Jews and Arabs, and worked for the creation of a binational regime, based on political parity that would allow for the unhampered development of both peoples, regardless of their numerical proportion. On the eve of the creation of the state of Israel, Hashomer Hatzair held to its own vision, and after Israel was established it joined with a number of other Zionist groups to form MAPAM, the United Workers' Party of Israel, and played a leading role in the development of the country's peace camp. Hashomer Hatzair was the only socialist Zionist party that admitted Arab members on an equal basis and that consistently supported full civil and political rights for Israel's Arab minority.

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Haskalah

Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment) was a movement for the dissemination of modern European culture among Jews. It began in Berlin around 1750 with the work of Moses Mendelssohn. Advocates of Haskalah believed that to achieve emancipation Jews had to accept the cultural values of the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment and liberal humanism. The *maskilim* (followers of Haskalah) employed a secularized Hebrew as their literary vehicle. Over time, with the publication of

journals, books, and newspapers, there emerged a group of highly secularized Jews, influenced by the prevailing social and political ideas of the Enlightenment yet still retaining their historical traditions through Hebrew. The sons and grandsons of the early *maskilim* became the first leaders of the Zionist movement.

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Hasmonean Tunnel

The Hasmonean tunnel is an archaeological site running under the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, a Muslim holy site in JERUSALEM, which was opened by Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU in September 1996, three years into the OSLO PROCESS. The opening was symbolic of Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.

The tunnel is an aqueduct that is believed to date back to the Hasmonean kings in the second century BCE, about 100 years before King Herod. It is a rock-cut channel of approximately 525 yards (480 meters) and runs in a north-south direction along and under one wall of the AL-AQSA MOSQUE. One gate emerges at the WESTERN WALL directly below the DOME OF THE ROCK, the other at a cistern located below Islamic Waqf property.

Netanyahu's action occurred during intense Palestinian frustration with the peace process, when the prime minister had made clear his opposition to Oslo and had refused to move negotiations forward. Moreover, while Palestinians perceived the tunnel as a threat to the physical stability of the al-Haram ash-Sharif, they also viewed it as another unilateral Israeli action to assert its sovereignty over all of Jerusalem and further preempt FINAL STATUS TALKS on the city.

Palestinian outrage erupted in protests that spread throughout the entire WEST BANK and GAZA. In three days Israeli soldiers killed eighty Palestinian civilian demonstrators and injured some 1,500. Watching the carnage, Palestinian policemen turned their guns on the soldiers, killing fifteen and wounding dozens. Security cooperation between Israel and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY appeared shattered, and the peace process seemed to be at an end. However, the tensions brought US diplomatic intervention with pressure on both sides to resume negotiations, which led to the HEBRON PROTOCOL in 1997. Nevertheless, the Hasmonean tunnel affair, combined with the HAR HOMA SETTLEMENT five months later, marked the beginning of the end of the Oslo Process.

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HaTenu'ah LeChinun HaMikdash

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Hawatimah, Nayif (1937–)

Nayif Hawatimah (Abu An-Nuf) is the founder and secretary-general of the Marxist DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP). He was active as a left-wing leader in the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN) and was a founding member of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), which he left to form the DFLP in 1969. Born in Salt, JORDAN, Hawatimah joined MAN at the age of sixteen and was appointed the overall leader of the organization after the overthrow of the Sulayman Nabulsi government in 1957 when he was only nineteen. After Jordanian military courts handed him several

death sentences for his attempts to overthrow the government, he fled to LEBANON, where he joined the leftist and Arab nationalist coalition in 1958. After the end of the first civil war in Lebanon, Hawatimah went to IRAQ, where he organized Arab nationalists, for which he was arrested and spent fourteen months in jail.

Hawatimah formed a leftist, Marxist-oriented faction within MAN and, in that capacity, clashed with GEORGE HABASH, who was associated with the rightist faction. In addition to their political differences, Hawatimah was always frustrated because Habash could move an audience, both inside the ranks of the movement and at mass rallies. Hawatimah viewed himself as an intellectual and did not respect those who used their oratorical skills to influence mass opinion. It was ironic that this man, with less formal education than Habash, a physician, and Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT, an engineer, had greater success in mobilizing intellectuals from Lebanon and Palestine.

When Hawatimah split from the PFLP in 1969, he initially used the name Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (eventually the DFLP), thus claiming that his movement, not Habash's organization, adhered to democratic principles. Hawatimah's understanding of democracy, however, stemmed from his appreciation of Lenin's "democratic centralism." Under pressure from Habash, he dropped the word "popular" from the name of the organization to avoid confusion. The DFLP succeeded in attracting intellectuals from around the Arab world, in large part because of Hawatimah's clarity and consistency of ideology. Hawatimah not only preached a Marxist-Leninist line, but also was one of the first Palestinian leaders to advocate for and engage in dialogue with progressive Jewish forces inside and outside Israel. The DFLP also used ARMED STRUGGLE, although it could not compete militarily with the much stronger FATAH and PFLP at the time.

In the BLACK SEPTEMBER war between Jordan and Palestinian fighters, the DFLP was often blamed by the Jordanian government and even by Fatah leaders for "provocative" actions and slogans. Hawatimah coined the slogan "All power to the Resistance," which was aimed at wresting control of Jordan from the Hashemite royal family. Hawatimah and the DFLP leadership relocated from Amman and Damascus to Beirut, where the group joined the Lebanese civil war. He was very close to the Lebanese Communist Party, but his closest ties were with the Communist Action Organization.

In the early 1970s Hawatimah established strong relations with Arafat and supported his political compromises: a TWO-STATE SOLUTION and no armed struggle outside of Palestine. Hawatimah was one of the first leaders to argue for an acceptance of the "phased solution"—a reference to the two-state solution. Hawatimah attracted some Western leftist and press interest but could not compete with Fatah or PFLP in attracting followers in the Palestinian REFUGEE camps because he was too intellectual, too cerebral, for popular appeal.

After the OSLO ACCORDS Hawatimah could not decide whether he supported or opposed Oslo. He decided to stay in Damascus and oppose Oslo, although he dispatched some DFLP leaders to Ramallah in the West Bank. Some of them split from his organization, including his deputy, YASIR 'ABD RABBU, who had been an Arafat confidant for years and was persuaded by Arafat to become the leader of the DFLP. In 1999 Hawatimah attracted strong criticism from his Palestinian and Arab peers when he shook hands with Israeli president EZER WEIZMAN at the funeral of Jordan's King Husayn in February 1999. In 2004 he was briefly active in a joint Palestinian-Israeli nongovernmental attempt to start a coalition of Palestinian groups supporting a two-state solution, and during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA he called for a cessation of hostilities. Hawatimah's influence in Palestinian politics is now minimal.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Haycraft Commission, 1921

The Haycraft Commission was appointed by the British to investigate the 1921 disturbances between Palestinian Arabs and Jews that began in JAFFA after a Zionist Labor Day march and then spread beyond the city. In all, forty-seven Jews and

forty-eight Palestinians were killed. To calm the atmosphere following the upheaval, Sir HERBERT SAMUEL created the investigatory commission of inquiry. Although the commission found the Palestinians responsible for the outbreak of violence, it claimed that the root cause of the trouble was Arab anxiety about British pro-Zionist commitments and Palestinian fear of the political and economic consequences of Zionist IMMIGRATION into Palestine. In particular, the Haycraft Commission noted, Palestinians were concerned about unemployment and the potential for Jewish domination of Palestine.

See also BRITISH MANDATE

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Hazit Hamoledeth

Hazit Hamoledeth (Fatherland Front) was either an offshoot of or an alternate name for LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL (fighters for the freedom of Israel, or LEHI), which took credit for the 17 September 1948 assassination of COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, the UN special mediator for Palestine. Because this was the only time the Fatherland Front appeared, most analysts believe that LEHI, at the time headed by YITZHAK SHAMIR, the eventual prime minister of Israel, was actually responsible for the slaying of Bernadotte.

Health Care

Health care and the health-care systems of Israel and Palestine are as much an aspect of the conflict as are LAND, WATER, or SETTLEMENTS. Moreover, issues of health are intertwined with numerous other aspects of the conflict, such as RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, CLOSURE, siege, the PERMIT system, and so on. Richard Horton, editor-in-chief of the eminent British medical journal *The Lancet,* observes that "the pursuit of health as a political objective and the creation of a strong health system for Palestinians could be one fruitful diplomatic path to reconciliation, peace, and justice." Moreover he argues, "The people of the Palestinian territory matter, most importantly, because their lives and communities are continuing to experience an OCCUPATION that has produced chronic de-development for nearly four million people over many decades, . . . because of the continued conflict with Israel, the failure of the peace process to make any substantial progress, and the internally catastrophic and violent divisions within Palestinian politics." Analysis of health care in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (OT) exposes several important Palestinian particularities, not least, occupation, coercion, violence, and insecurity.

Health and the Occupation (1967–1994)

Israel has one of the most sophisticated and highly technologized medical systems in the world. In the Occupied Territories, by contrast, the medical system is akin to that of a third-world country. During the 27 years of formal Occupation (1967–1994), Israel invested little in Palestinian health care or in any other INFRASTRUCTURE development, despite the fact that Palestinians paid heavy taxes to Israel, supposedly for social services, throughout that time. Under Israeli law, Palestinians were required to pay 55 percent on all income over 24,000 Israeli shekels (about $16,000 in 1988 currency). The highest tax bracket in Israel was not reached until the individual earned 45,000 shekels ($30,000), and then the tax assessment was only 48 percent. Another demonstration of this discrimination is governmental expenditure per capita on health care: in 1992, for example, Tel Aviv spent $500 per capita in Israel and on the settlers in the Occupied Territories, compared to per capita expenditure of $18–20 on Palestinians in the OT.

Health conditions in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP improved in a number of areas after 1967. Israel facilitated a comprehensive immunization program for Palestinian infants, provided training seminars in Israeli medical centers for Palestinian doctors, and certain medical facilities were expanded. Yet, although the infant mortality rate was reduced from approximately 100 per 1,000 to 38 per 1,000, it was still much higher than Israel's 9.9 per 1,000. Life expectancy rose in the territories by about 10 years, but the average Israeli lives 14 years longer than his Palestinian cousin.

Civil Administration (military government) hospitals provided 1,477 beds in 1992, roughly equal to the number of beds available 25 years earlier, although the population had more than doubled. The ratio of hospital beds was 1.1 per 1,000 in the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 6.1 per 1,000 in Israel.

Israel's unwillingness to develop the Palestinian health institutions is in violation of a number of international conventions. Most notable is the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), which stipulates that the adequacy of health-care services must be determined by the extent to which the real medical needs of a population are being met. Article 56 states that the occupying power "has the duty of ensuring and maintaining the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in occupied territories."

Health and the Oslo Accords

In 1994, under the Oslo Accords, Israel transferred responsibility for health in the OT to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). But the PNA inherited from Israel a health system that was decentralized, highly dependent on services provided by private nongovernmental organizations, and structurally incapable of meeting the health needs of the Palestinian population.

Moreover, despite the transfer to the PNA of responsibility for Palestinian health care, the PNA had but limited autonomy over disconnected areas in the West Bank and Gaza, and these areas remain, effectively, under Israel's control. Since November 2001, Israel's control has been explicit and absolute—even in Gaza after ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT in 2005. Therefore, these areas are still Occupied Territories, and Israel, according to INTERNATIONAL LAW, unequivocally remains responsible for health services therein.

The extensive Palestinian dependence on Israel for medical care was not addressed in any of the agreements of the OSLO PROCESS except briefly and inadequately in the INTERIM AGREEMENT. Some have argued that Palestinian negotiators should have taken into account the Palestinian dependence upon Israeli medical services and ensured the referral of patients who cannot be treated in Palestinian hospitals to Israeli medical institutions that can treat them, and that the negotiators should have laid the grounds for Israeli and Palestinian cooperation in the development of an independent Palestinian medical infrastructure. Power asymmetries and Israel's interests are not realistically considered in such an assertion.

In the October 1995 Interim Agreement, in the article dealing with health, it is stipulated that Palestinians will assume responsibility for the vaccination of the population, that Palestinians will also cover the cost of all treatment of Palestinian patients in Israeli medical institutions, and that Israel will ensure "SAFE PASSAGE" of patients in and out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The two sides concluded by agreeing that a joint committee should be established to facilitate coordination and cooperation on health and medical issues. Only three pages, out of the 400-page agreement, were dedicated to the health of the population; moreover, the infrastructure of the health system was not mentioned. Nothing came of the joint committee, and Israel refused to implement the safe passage.

The deficiencies in the system that the PNA inherited were reflected, in one instance, in June 1995, a year after the transfer of the health institutions to the PNA, when 15 children from Gaza were dying from heart defects. Physicians for Human Rights–Israel (PHR-I) wrote: "Surgery can save their lives, but nowhere in the Gaza Strip is there a single pediatric cardiologist capable of handling these cases; nor is there a scanner or catheterization room. The only echocardiology machine available is outdated to the extent that it has not been used in Israel for over 20 years. An operation that can save these children's lives costs $12,000 in Israel. The cost of a similar operation in Cairo is $3,000, but even this sum is too great for the Palestinian Ministry of Health to meet." How, the physicians asked, "did Gaza reach a state in which only five out of the 300 infants born annually with heart defects are operated on?"

In mid-February 1996, Amira Hass, *Ha'aretz* correspondent, reported that out of children under the age of five who were living in the Gaza Strip, an estimated 188,000 were in need of urgent treatment for malnutrition. She discussed a survey taken in 1995, which revealed that 41.6 percent of the families living in the Gaza Strip had to sell appliances to buy food, 53.8 percent took out loans to buy food, and only 5 percent of the population had savings accounts. In April 1996 Gideon Levy reported in *Ha'aretz* that during March and the first weeks of April, at least nine patients died due to closure, five of them children.

Severe lack of expertise and equipment extends to other medical fields, such as oncology and hematology, pediatric neurology and neurosurgery, metabolic diseases, and rehabilitation. Children or adults suffering from a disorder related to one of these specialties must be transferred to

hospitals outside of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to receive adequate medical care. The dilapidated condition of the pediatric institutions is an indication of the overall infrastructure of the Palestinian health institution, and underscores the life-or-death Palestinian dependency on Israeli medicine.

Israeli Obstacles to Palestinian Health (1994–2009)

In addition to eluding its responsibility to provide comprehensive health services to residents of the Occupied Territories, Israel has placed obstacles to the development of a Palestinian-run health-care system. The most significant barrier limiting Palestinians' ability to receive health services has been the restriction of movement *within* the West Bank and Gaza Strip, *between* the West Bank and Gaza, travel to other countries, and the prohibition on entering East Jerusalem or Israel.

All medical systems presuppose that patients, doctors, and emergency rescue teams have a guaranteed right of freedom of movement. As early as 1994, PHR-I proposed that "permission to enter Israel should be granted to patients on the basis of a recommendation by the Palestinian Ministry of Health, without need of a permit of any sort from the Israeli authorities, including the General Security Service." But Israel chose not to implement PHR-I's recommendation. PHR-I also wrote that "Israel should supply permits to allow the regular passage of West Bank and Gaza Strip residents who are members of the medical staff working in medical institutions in East Jerusalem." This proposal took into consideration that the largest and most modern Palestinian medical institutions are located in East Jerusalem, including Makassed, Augusta Victoria, and St. John's hospitals. Some 60 percent of the employees of these institutions (1,000 individuals including physicians), which provide medical attention for the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (when they are permitted to enter East Jerusalem), are not residents of the city and need entry permits in order to reach the hospital. No policy was ever established to ensure the free movement of medical personnel at all times, and it is still common for the operation of these hospitals to be hindered due to restriction of movement of the staff.

Due to the restrictions, it is almost impossible for physicians and staff to get to in-service training or students to the university, and many students are unable to either complete their studies or receive a higher quality of professional training. Every professional training, medical specialization, or travel for educational purposes is contingent on obtaining a permit. These permits are granted in such an arbitrary manner that intended travel is always in doubt. For example, hundreds of students in Gaza cannot travel to the West Bank or abroad to continue their education due to age-related travel restriction.

Closure was first imposed in the West Bank and Gaza in March 1993 and was repeatedly imposed during the Oslo years (1994–2000) for varying periods of time. During closures, no one, including chronically ill patients who regularly came to Israel for treatment or emergency patients who required catastrophic intervention, could leave the OT to enter Israel. Closures, however, were not the only Israeli practice that restricted Palestinians' freedom of movement and their ability to secure health care.

Throughout the Oslo period and even more harshly after 2000, the hundreds of physical obstructions and dozens of CHECKPOINTS resulted in very limited access to medical treatment, and sometimes none at all. The problem is especially grave among residents of villages and outlying areas who need to get to hospitals in the large cities. For example, persons living in villages around Jerusalem who need to get to hospitals in East Jerusalem for treatment require a permit in order to reach their destination. To obtain a permit, patients have to provide medical documents testifying to their illness, as well as confirmation that they have an appointment at the specific hospital and that it is the only facility where the needed treatment is available.

Cities within the Occupied Territories experience the same phenomena as East Jerusalem: Hospitals in Ramallah, NABLUS, and HEBRON cannot receive patients from nearby villages because of the impediments to movement and the permit regime. Since 1996 the way to the hospital is often blocked, so the sick and injured have to travel on long, winding, and worn roads. These alternate roads often lead to a checkpoint, where they are forced to wait and undergo lengthy interrogations and searches of their personal effects. In other cases, when checkpoints are closed at night and whole Palestinian communities are blocked from entering or leaving by vehicle, including by ambulance, access to medical treatment is prevented, and ill and wounded persons are unable to receive

emergency medical care at all. In 2007, there was an increase in the number of persons needing medical treatment who were delayed at checkpoints, and B'Tselem documented five cases in which ill or wounded persons died after being delayed at a checkpoint.

The need for a permit is especially problematic in emergency situations and for pregnant women, who need to get to the hospital in time to give birth. Even though the delivery date is uncertain, the permit given to women about to deliver is valid for only one or two days, as is the case for most sick persons. Therefore, women in their ninth month of pregnancy must go to the Occupation authorities every few days to renew the permit. In 2007, at least five women gave birth at a checkpoint, three of them at a checkpoint at the entrance to Jerusalem.

With the eruption of conflict in late September 2000, restrictions on movement worsened: closure was followed by a policy of internal separation and siege. According to B'Tselem, by November 2003, the IDF had set up 56 staffed checkpoints in the West Bank, as well as 607 physical ROADBLOCKS that prevent the passage of motor vehicles—457 dirt piles, 94 concrete blocks, and 56 trenches. In addition, Palestinians are forbidden to travel on most of the main roads in the West Bank.

Medical personnel also frequently experience difficulties in crossing checkpoints. The IDF does not have special procedures for ambulances to cross checkpoints, but have issued only a general procedure relating to Palestinians who seek to cross. The procedures do not provide a proper solution for the severe problems ambulances have in reaching hospitals; in addition, soldiers at times ignore the procedures. Ambulance medical teams are often detained and harassed by the security force personnel stationed at the checkpoints, and in some cases have been beaten. In a few extreme cases, Israeli soldiers damaged ambulances beyond repair, and in others they have seized ambulances for military purposes.

As a result of these difficulties, ambulances are able to reach the sick and wounded only 30 percent of the time they are called. The rest of the time, patients are forced to get to a physical roadblock or checkpoint by themselves. As a consequence, many Palestinians forgo calling ambulances. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the drastic drop in Palestinian women who give birth in a hospital. The rate of hospital births has dropped from 95 percent before the Intifada to less than 50 percent after.

The PNA and Health Care

The Palestinian Ministry of Health (PMH) was established after the Oslo Accords in 1994 and, as has been illustrated, inherited from the Israeli military government health services that had been severely neglected. Supported by massive funding from international donors, the ministry has since upgraded and expanded the health system infrastructure by institution building and human resource development. The number of hospitals, hospital beds, and primary health-care centers in the West Bank and Gaza increased, a public health laboratory was established, and a health information system and a planning unit were set up. Planning for the development of the health sector began during this period and entailed some coordination with the UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA), local nongovernmental organizations, and the private medical sector in developing policies and protocols.

By 2006, the number of hospital beds managed by the PMH had increased by 53 percent from 1994, with a similar increase in the number of available hospital beds in nongovernmental organizations and private sectors. In 2006 the PMH managed 57 percent of all hospital beds in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Also, the number of primary health-care facilities increased between 2000 and 2005, with 416 of 654 centers managed by the PMH. Similarly, the UNRWA facilities have increased in number, although not those of nongovernmental organizations.

Also by 2006, about 40,000 people were employed in different sectors of the health system, with 33 percent employed by the PMH. Health-related human resources in Palestinian institutions of higher learning also grew. Although a shortage of health personnel exists in many specialties (especially in family medicine, surgery, internal medicine, neurology, dermatology, psychiatry, pathology, anesthesiology, nephrology, nursing, and midwifery), there is an excess in others (such as dentistry, pharmacy, laboratory technology, and radiology technology), suggesting the need for rationalization of the educational programs of Palestinian institutions of higher learning.

All four main health service providers (the PMH, the UNRWA, nongovernmental organizations, and the private medical sector) contributed

to all areas of health care. However, because of various factors, including little health service development under the Israeli military Occupation between 1967 and 1994, and poor governance and mismanagement by the PNA, current services have been unable to provide adequately for people's needs, especially in tertiary health care. Therefore, the PMH continues to refer patients elsewhere (Israel, Egypt, and Jordan), leading to a substantial drain of health resources.

Yet, despite this progress in conventional indicators of health system functionality (e.g., number of patients who use services, number of hospital beds, number of primary health-care facilities), there is a serious underlying issue that is masked by the foregoing—the very poor quality of health care available in the Occupied Territories. Several types of health services fail to meet basic standards for training, equipment, and overall quality. For example, in all of the OT, no proper treatment is available for cancer—there are no radiation treatments, no treatments for eye tumors of all types, and no operations to remove cervical cancers. Pediatric hematology treatments are of such a poor standard that they can effectively be considered nonexistent; the same is the case for other oncology services. Additional fields that are unavailable include services in the field of cardiology and chest surgery. Pediatric heart operations and catheterization are not performed, nor are services available in the field of pacemakers and open heart surgery for children. In the field of transplants, no types of transplants are performed in the OT. There are no bone marrow transplants or isolation rooms suitable for such patients. In the field of orthopedics, there are no bone transplants or hip replacements. Procedures to rectify urological defects in children are among the other services that are lacking.

In March 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) released a report on health in the Occupied Territories indicating, among many other problems, the following: infant mortality rates have risen sharply; mental disorders are up by a third and little treatment is available; treatment for heart disease and cancer is largely unavailable; tuberculosis in the West Bank and Gaza rose by more than half between 1999 and 2003; between 10 and 30 percent of Palestinian children suffer a detriment to their cognitive development and physical health from malnutrition; the trend of stunted growth among children is increasing, reaching 30 percent in some areas, and the WHO is concerned about the long-term effects of chronic malnutrition; there is a low level of postnatal care; and despite the availability of child immunizations, children are not receiving them.

Over the eight years it effectively functioned, the PNA made a great effort to establish a system capable of functioning under frequent changes and a state of combat. At the same time, as Israel divided the Occupied Territories with checkpoints, walls, and barriers; imposed protracted closures on the main cities that provided secondary and tertiary health services; and obliged the PNA to duplicate vital services in numerous smaller medical centers, the quality of health care remained stagnant. Moreover, the deterioration in the economic condition of the population (from 1995 to 2000) led to a growing dependence on primary medical services, requiring extensive budgetary investments in this field, at the expense of the development of medical infrastructure and of secondary and tertiary services. Conversely, economic deprivation led to falling income from taxes, including the health tax and medical insurance—one of the important sources of funding for the health system and basic to any Western medical system.

According to Rita Giacaman, Rana Khatib, and associates, there are three fundamental factors undermining the quality of Palestinian health care. First, despite substantial funding and efforts made by the Palestinian Ministry of Health to build a Palestinian health system, the obstacles to planned development have proved too great. Restrictions placed by Israel since 1994 on the movement of Palestinian goods and labor across borders between the West Bank and Gaza, and within the West Bank, have had damaging effects not only on the economy and society, but also on the attempts of the PNA at system building. The physical separation and complicated system of permits required to go from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank resulted in the emergence of two PNA ministries of health, one in the Gaza Strip and the other in the West Bank. Since 2007, this separation has been further compounded by the political divide between FATAH and HAMAS.

Second, the absence of any control by the PNA over water, land, the ENVIRONMENT, and movement within the Occupied Palestinian territory has made a public health approach to health system development difficult, if not impossible. These issues have been exacerbated by the dysfunctional political and

institutional systems of the PNA; the damaging effects on ministries of using the Authority's resources for patronage to secure loyalty; marginalization of the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL; and corruption and cronyism, all of which led to a rapid increase in the number of health service employees of the PNA without improvement in the quality of health services. These factors have adversely affected an already fragile health service.

Third, the multiplicity of donors with different agendas and the dependence of the PNA on donor financial assistance have also caused program fragmentation. Most of the Occupied Palestinian territory health budget is financed by donor agencies. The PNA is estimated to have received $840.5 million in aid between 1994 and 2000. Donors have an influential role in determining the policy of the PNA. The American Rand Corporation has indicated that donors prefer to support infrastructure—mostly equipment and construction—over the operating expenses of the PNA health sector, which have increased as a result of expanded infrastructure and the introduction of modern equipment.

All these interacting factors have contributed to undermine the ability of Palestinians to build a health system from existing health services. In addition to the need for control over resources for health care, building an effective health system requires sovereignty, self-determination, authority, and control over land, water, the environment, and movement of people and goods, all of which are relevant for the protection and promotion of health. The international community has not appreciated the degree to which the PNA is "less than a state, yet expected to act like a state."

See also CLOSURE; ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION; INFRASTRUCTURE; LAND; PERMITS; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT; WATER RESOURCES AND ACCESS

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Hebrew Literature

The new Hebrew literature can be said to have begun as the cultural response of European Judaism to modernity. According to this view, starting from the late eighteenth century, European thinkers found in Jews an otherness that helped define the modern European self, as formulated by the famous question "What is enlightenment?" In this intellectual climate Jews and Judaism became a problem, a question, and the subject of numerous works designed to define the problem and prescribe a solution.

Jewish Enlightenment (HASKALAH) produced modern Hebrew letters as a form of cultural sovereignty whose writers often assumed a position typical of the modern Jewish polity. This is evident in the figure of the writer as "Hazofe Lebeit Yisrael" (Watchman unto the House of Israel), the Hebrew persona in Yizhak Erter's eponymous seminal satires published after 1824. The perspective of modern Hebrew letters, like that of ZIONISM, is quintessentially European and therefore concerned above all with issues of identity, subjectivity,

social reform, and the place of Jews in colonial Europe. It is therefore to be expected that the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, are viewed in modern Hebrew literature from a European and increasingly orientalist perspective. Turning his gaze to the old/new land, the Watchman of Israel is aware of the presence of Arabs but perceives them mainly through the perspective of European discourse—in a romanticized light, adorned with biblical nonmodernity, and rarely attributed with any national meaning.

This is the perspective of the First ALIYA, the first group of Zionist Jews that came to Palestine from Europe in order to create agricultural SETTLEMENTS on LAND bought by dedicated Jewish funds and to develop what can be described as colonial labor relations with the native Palestinian agricultural workforce. In 1895, AHAD HA'AM (1856–1927) wrote that the land was populated with Arabs and would not be taken without force, yet in the same passage dismissed the Arabs as lazy and incapable of caring for the future.

Among the writers of the period, Moshe Smilansky (1874–1953) stands out. In 1891 he came to Palestine from Russia and was among the founders of the settlement of Hadera and then moved to Rehovot, eventually taking part in many aspects of the development of Jewish settlements in Palestine, including founding and editing the agricultural journal *Bustenai* in 1929. While he was in Europe for the seventh WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS, Smilansky fell ill and, reportedly out of boredom, wrote his first story, "Latifa," about an "Arab subject," as he put it. Latifa is the daughter of a local dignitary who comes to work for the narrator, Hawaja Mussa, a pseudonym employed by Smilansky in writing these stories, later published under the title *Sons of Arabia*. Latifa has beautiful black eyes that bewitch the narrator, and she inquires about the conjugal habits of Jews and if it is true the Jews take only one wife, whom they do not beat. After Mussa confirms this, Latifa informs him that her father would give her to him in marriage if he became a Muslim. In reply he suggests she become Jewish, but she responds: "He will kill us both." Latifa then disappears and returns years later as a withered old woman who would like to meet Mussa's wife.

The story is revealing, showing that the earliest representations of the conflict in Hebrew literature already formulate a distance between Arab and Jew that oscillates between ethnic and colonial. Typically, it is a European male narrator who engages a native woman, although the Jewish narrative is only partially colonial. The distance between the two cannot be bridged because the proposed union can be achieved only if one of them relinquishes his/her ethnic/religious identity. It is a telling feature of the story that the narrator cannot contemplate becoming a Muslim for reasons that need no explication, while the reason Latifa cannot become Jewish is fear of her father's (violent) society.

Defining Wave of Immigration

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Zionism and Hebrew letters came closer together as Zionist writers increasingly chose Hebrew as their primary, if not exclusive, literary language. At this time the wave of immigrants known as the Second Aliya (1905–1919) started to arrive in Palestine, containing people destined to become the founders and leaders of the state, among them future prime ministers DAVID BEN-GURION and LEVI ESHKOL, and future Nobel Prize winner S. Y. Agnon, as well as Yosef Chayim Brenner. This wave of Zionist immigrants was dedicated to a contradictory set of ideals combining Jewish ethnic nationalism with socialism and the assumption of labor and defense duties, both until then held by the Arabs.

The stories written during and about the Second Aliya are the foundations of modern Israeli culture and politics. At this time a Hebrew literary community in Palestine also began taking shape, consolidated in 1908 by the arrival of Brenner (1881–1921). Like most of those arriving then, Brenner came from a traditional religious background, then lost his faith, taught himself European languages and literatures, and found in Zionism a Jewish resolution to the Jewish problem within modernity. In his years in Palestine, which included the travails of World War I, Brenner was almost a one-man literary republic—editing and publishing literary political journals (*Revivim, Achdut*) and books, and producing his own literary work. Among these, *Breakdown and Bereavement*, published in full format in 1919, towers as one of the most important works of the time.

Breakdown and Bereavement is the fictional diary of a young man gone mad. Yechezkel Hefez, the protagonist, is a Jewish youth who arrives in Palestine with the typical ideas of his generation, "to build [the land] and be built." but he fails and has a nervous breakdown. As in many of the literary

works of the time, the conflict with the Arabs is not explicitly discussed, yet Hefez's breakdown is expressed entirely in terms of the conflict. In his delusion he transfers Jews' relations with Gentiles in Eastern Europe to relations with the Arabs in the Middle East, and an innocent question about a missing boy becomes an accusation of ritual murder.

Brenner represents a formative generation of Zionist writers and activists who shared the view that the conflict does not exist or at the most is a result of the *effendis*—the landowners—instigating the Arab workers because they feared the Jews and the higher wages they offered the workers. This sometimes was accompanied by a utopian view based on a positive orientalism that perceived the Arab as a noble savage. In R. Binyamin's writing and in many others of the period, Zionism would develop the country for the benefit of both peoples, who shared the same origin, because the Arabs were seen as being descended from Jews who did not go into exile but changed their faith.

On 1 May 1921 a Jewish workers' procession clashed with an Arab one, and the violence spread quickly, lasting five days. Among the forty-two killed was Brenner. Only a few days before he was murdered he published a short piece, "From a Notebook," in which he recounts meeting a young Arab worker in an orchard. Before this Brenner had been contemplating that the land "all belonged to them, to the Arabs." The story exposes the ironies and contradictions of Brenner's generation, because it is clear that Brenner and the boy share no language, so any meeting is impossible. After his death Brenner was immediately canonized; R. Binyamin (Joshua Radler 1880–1957), a central figure of the time, eulogized him with the words "how perfect was your death Brennerke." The perfection lies in Brenner's consistent position on Jewish relations with the Arabs. In all his literary work he insisted on the brutal truth: Arabs don't look favorably on Jewish IMMIGRATION and never will. Brenner saw and wrote about an emerging Arab nationalism at a time when official Zionism talked of benefiting the simple *felah*—the peasant worker, who favors Jewish immigration because it brings work and increases wages. Brenner saw that economic conflict was inevitable and that there was an inherent contradiction in the Zionist endeavor to "conquer the labor for the defense"; in the end, it was all work taken from the hands of Arab peasants.

Especially for Brenner, and perhaps for most of the other writers of the time, such as S. Y. Agnon, Aharon Reuveni, and L. A. Ariely-Orloff, it was clear that the land, far from being empty, was full of Arabs. Orloff's seminal theater piece *Alla Karim* is in fact a tortuous account of Jewish masculinity faced by the noble savage in the form of the Palestinian. For these writers the main reason that conflict was inevitable was cultural. More than once Brenner wrote that even if those who claim an ancient brotherhood between Jew and Arab were right, that fraternity had no bearing on the present. In the present the Jews came from Europe seeking to create a modern Jewish entity of European stamp, and therefore a clash was not only inevitable but perhaps even desirable. In opposition to earlier romantic trends that sought to emulate the Arabs for their biblical customs rooted in the land, Brenner presented a clearly Jewish European position seeking to distance itself from the surroundings.

New Generation of Immigrants

Hebrew literature and culture in the 1920s and 1930s combined the basic ideas of the Second Aliya with varieties of futuristic modernism and socialism. The wave of immigrants known as the Third Aliya began arriving in 1919, propelled by the BALFOUR DECLARATION, the British conquest of Palestine, and the unprecedented pogroms against Jews that accompanied the end of World War I and the Russian civil war. This new generation of Jewish immigrants followed the ideas of its predecessor about the land and the need to settle it by merging socialism and nationalism, but did so with bigger numbers and with more success, thanks to aid by the British administration. In terms of literary genre, the 1920s and 1930s were dominated by poetry. In fact, the major Hebrew literary figures to emerge from this generation, such as Yitzchak Lamdan, Avraham Shlonsky, and Uri Zvi Greenberg, dominated the poetry scene until the late 1930s. In "Masada" (1927), his most celebrated work, Lamdan (1899–1954) elaborated the trauma of the pogroms and the radical solution of Zionism as a desperate last stand. Although the poem hardly refers to the suicidal defiance at Masada, it is nevertheless the symbolic base of the poem: the desperation of the enterprise grounded in the impossible balance of power between the handful of Jews and the vast Arab majority.

Avraham Shlonsky (1900–1973) arrived in Palestine from Russia in 1921, having already published some poetry. In the 1920s he became the main representative of a new generation of poets and a central speaker of "labor poetics," expressing the communal views and experiences of his peers, which celebrated the reconnection of Jewish workers with the land in terms that are taken from Nietzsche's description of the Dionysian. The symbolic conquest of the landscape is a central aspect of Shlonsky's poetry, achieved in a cycle of poems named "Gilboa," after the mountains overlooking the main communal settlement of the time in the Valley of Jezreel. In these poems as well as in others, the Arabs and the conflict seem almost absent. In this sense the new poets adhere to the Zionist norm of not explicitly writing about the conflict but using figurative language instead. In Shlonsky's writing this eventually takes shape as a battle of civilizations. In a cycle of poems, *Facing the Wasteland,* he writes of a grand symbolic battle between the lazy, chaotic, and inert (Arab) desert and industrious, modern, and constructive (Jewish) labor.

Though not unprecedented, the violence of the Western Wall uprising of 1929 took the Jews in Palestine by surprise. The wave of violence erupted in August and hit the non-Zionist communities of the holy cities the hardest, confirming in the eyes of many the primeval nature of the conflict. In HEBRON sixty-six Jews were murdered, and the millenary Jewish presence there and in places like GAZA was eradicated, creating the first ethnic cleansings of the conflict. These events were by far the most violent that had taken place in Palestine until then and presented Hebrew culture with a real challenge. Writers and politicians reacted; a few months later Ben-Gurion said that the real significance of the events had been to show the Arabs that the annihilation of the Jews was a politically feasible solution to the Jewish problem in Palestine.

Uri Zvi Greenberg (1896–1981) seems to best represent the reaction of Hebrew letters to the new situation presented in 1929. Greenberg, who fought on the Serbian front in World War I, began his career as a Yiddish modernist poet, gradually making a transition to Hebrew that became final with his arrival in Palestine in 1923. In Palestine he belonged to the workers' brigades, and he celebrated their ecstatic experience with a hitherto unparalleled Hebrew expressionism espousing modernistic existentialism with a Jewish nationalism that increasingly figured as the only possible solution to the conflict with the Arabs. Throughout the 1920s Greenberg gradually turned away from the labor movement in his political and poetic views, but a final break came only after the riots of 1929. To him they were no surprise, for he saw them as merely a continuation of the religious persecution of the Jews by Christianity and Islam. In reaction he wrote two small cycles of poems: *Defender's Girdle* (1929) and *Blood Son's Speech* (1930). In these poems and in the abundant journalistic prose he began to write at the time, he elaborates views that are remarkably close to those of VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY and the Zionist right wing with whom he now became openly affiliated. These views held that the clash between Jews and Arabs was inevitable for reasons more spiritual than material (economic). Thus the only course of action open to the Jews is to uphold a fierce Jewish nationalism backed by brute military force, creating an "iron wall" that won't come down until the Arabs accept the return of the land to Jews.

Hebrew Culture Coalesces

In the 1930s, Jewish settlement in Palestine underwent intensive development, as the hegemony of the Hebrew cultural community in Palestine became clear via immigration of the most important writers and the decline of the Hebrew centers in Eastern Europe, the UNITED STATES, and MOSCOW. The rise of Hitler to power in 1933 seemed to vindicate the Zionist analysis of the situation of the Jews, and Palestine became a prime destination, one of the few open to GERMAN Jewish emigrants. In literary terms this meant a continuation of the currents established in the 1920s.

Increasingly, poetry turned away from expressionist modernism toward a neosymbolism that culminated in the figure of Nathan Alterman (1910–1970). The young Alterman was a late addition to the group that, under the leadership of Shlonsky, broke away from the old literary establishment, creating a new journal for itself, *Turim*, which advocated the independence of art from political reality and a Zionist version of *art pour art* (art for art's sake). Alterman quickly became a central figure in the group and in 1938 amazed the public with the publication of *Stars Outside*, his incredibly ripe debut book of symbolist poetry, full of stunning imagery and use of biblical Hebrew. The significance of the collection can be seen in

how it epitomizes Zionist culture's preparation for war. An avowed Zionist, Alterman kept a neat separation between his journalistic poetry, which he published in a highly popular "Seventh Column" in the daily newspaper *Davar*, and his lyrical poetry, which makes little reference to the political reality of the time. Politically Alterman belonged to the LABOR PARTY and was an ardent supporter of Ben-Gurion, and though he railed against British policy limiting immigration to Palestine, he certainly understood the importance of the alliance with colonial power.

The main cultural significance of Alterman and the symbolist group is how their poetry supported the Zionist national project and especially the continuum of culture and art perceived as existing, just like the Jewish nation, beyond time. The main poetic persona in Alterman's poetry, as it developed in his second book, *Pauper's Joy* (1941), is in fact the living-dead male, a figure of the continuation of the Hebrew voice embodied, who speaks and abides with the living, beyond physical existence, in a space where memory, poetry, and life are one. Inhabiting this poetic space, the lyrical poetry of Alterman, as well as that of more marginal figures of the time such as Raphael Eliaz (1905–1974), is set in a world engaged in mortal primeval clashes that can only result in life or death.

At the time the beginnings of an alternative poetic view were evident in Avot Yeshurun's (1904–1992) work *On the Road's Wisdoms* (1942), in which the Arab village is identified as home through an imaginative fraternity with the Jewish town in Europe. Although Yeshurun's work had little resonance at the time, in the 1970s his views became popular.

In 1936 the ARAB REVOLT began and for three years there was violence in Palestine, with the British trying to subdue the revolt and the Arabs attacking the weaker links of the Jewish Yishuv, namely transportation and remote settlements. The revolt finally dissolved with the beginning of World War II, although among its many consequences was the creation of a legal Jewish guard force, which became part of the collective experience of the literary generation that came of age in the 1940s. This eagerly anticipated generation of writers came to be known as the "generation of the land"—those who were born and raised in Palestine, supposedly free from the Jewish neuroses of the DIASPORA. They were supposed to be the new Jews, a generation that grew up with the conflict and had an ideological commitment to the formation of Israel. The new generation matured during World War II and often served in various military and paramilitary organizations, such as the PALMAH (the crack troops of the Jewish HAGANA) or the Jewish Brigade, both formed by the British. Most of the writers of the time adhered to mainstream Zionism, working under the leadership of Ben-Gurion toward creation of a state that would, somewhat paradoxically, be Jewish but would also guarantee the rights of the Arabs. From that time on, the political right and left differed mainly over the question of how this would come about. The left opted to leave the inconsistencies of Zionism unclear, while the right, led by Vladimir Jabotinsky, spoke openly about the need for an "iron wall" as the only means to achieve a Jewish state against Arab hostility. A weaker faction on the left named Peace Alliance, which included the writers MARTIN BUBER, Moshe Smilansky, and Binyamin, opted for a BINATIONAL state.

Military Generation of Writers

Military service, especially in the Palmah and the 1948 WAR, was the formative experience of the generation of writers known in literary discourse as the Palmah generation. Many of these belonged to the workers' settlements that hosted the Palmah after the British dismantled the troops, and they formed the front line of battle. S. Yizhar (Yizhar Smilansky) is perhaps the most important writer of this generation, especially because he does not fully belong to the group. Born in 1916 (d. 2006) to an established agricultural family, he grew up speaking Arabic, because life with the Arab workers was a common characteristic of private farming in Palestine. He began publishing stories in 1938 and was immediately recognized for his rich and dense use of stream of consciousness. In the 1948 War between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Yizhar served as an intelligence officer, and afterward (in 1949) he published a book with three stories on the war, two of which describe the unpleasant fate of the Arabs in the war. In "Hirbet Hizaa" (literally, Hizaa Ruin), Yizhar tells the tale of the DEPORTATION of a whole Arab village as narrated by one of the soldiers. With the villagers gone, the village becomes a silent haunting sign of absence that will soon become a settlement for Jewish refugees, while its inhabitants are turned into REFUGEES. "The

Prisoner," set during the same phase in the war when the Israeli army was on the offensive, tells of the capture and interrogation of an Arab shepherd, who knows very little besides his sheep and the biblical pastoral surroundings from which he has been torn, perhaps never to return.

Yizhar was not unique in relating deep disaffection with the offensive turn that a defensive war had taken. Although perhaps Yizhar was the most acerbic, other notable writers, such as Dan Ben Amotz, URI AVNERY, and Netiva Ben Yehuda, shared his depiction of victory as trauma. The initial reaction to the war that completely changed the land and its population—Israel lost 1 percent of its population, or 6,000 men—is one of deep ambiguity toward and suspicion of what the future holds. In the years following the war of independence, Israel's population tripled, absorbing in a few years an immigrant population that was more than twice its original size. In the 1950s this led to ambivalent writing, in which the writers were torn between a spirit of nation building and a pressing need to express the traumatic nature of recent events affecting both Jews and Arabs. For example, while a member of parliament in the 1950s, Yizhar wrote a 1,200-page novel about a week-long battle called Ziklag, relating in dense prose the consciousness of the youths serving as soldiers. Although the battles are described in detail, the enemy is mostly referred to as the "blacks."

After the 1948 War and the HOLOCAUST, Israeli culture functioned in a ground zero environment that in literature took shape as a turn to introspection and away from the omnipresence of the conflict with the Arabs, who were slowly being recognized as the Palestinian people. When Alterman published his poetic epic about the foundation of Israel, *Ir Hayona* (almost untranslatable because the title can mean "the city of the dove" or "the city of deceit"), in 1957, he was scorned by the younger generation of poets and writers that emerged after the war, led by Nathan Zach (1936–). In the book Alterman praises the construction of the state, recognizing the problem of forging an Israeli identity out of the myriad strains of Judaism. War and nationalism are deemed child's play that a very old people is forced to engage in once again, after its utopian solo attempt to move beyond territorial nationalism had failed so miserably in the Holocaust. Although the younger generation's critique is one of a youthful turn from a collective spirit fully engaged in the public sphere to a more private space, it is nevertheless an evasion of the need—and assumed role of culture—to tackle significant political issues such as the conflict.

Indeed, after a short period of writing about the War of 1948, many writers seemed to turn in other directions. After both had written important works about the war, MOSHE SHAMIR (1921–2004) turned to biblical novels and Nathan Shacham (1925–) to novels dealing with KIBBUTZ life. In Shamir's case, one must especially note the early bestseller, *He Walked in the Fields*, that appeared a few months before the 1948 War and was later adapted as a play with great success. The book focuses on the life of Uri Kahana, born on the kibbutz and involved with Mika, a Holocaust survivor. Although Mika gets pregnant, Uri chooses the life of the Palmah over her. She plans to have an abortion, but, as she decides to keep the baby, she learns of Uri's sacrificial death in a training accident. Beyond the obvious national allegory, the causes of the struggle are significantly absent; the neighboring Arabs are not to be seen, or as Uri puts it: "There are things that are obvious and don't require discussion."

After the War

Uri's statement can be seen as a maxim of the first decade of Israeli literature, and yet this transition to a state culture remains an uneasy one, frequently interrupted by residues of Jewish moralism and Zionism's utopian past, which bluntly clash with the reality of the conflict. Apart from some very interesting exceptions such as *Mikre Haksil* (The Fools Case) by Aharon Megged (1920–), the 1956 war and the years that follow are characterized by an absence of a Palestinian voice in Hebrew letters. Yet the Israeli writers who gained center stage in the late 1950s and 1960s, such as AMOS OZ (1939–) and A. B. YEHOSHUA (1936–), were the first to return to the repressed figure of the silenced Palestinian Arab.

Yehoshua's story "Facing the Forests" (1963) is a well-known example of the generational dynamics in Zionism and the change in perspective on the conflict. The story describes an aging student who can't finish his schoolwork on the Crusades and leaves the city to become a watchman in the fast-growing pine forests imagined by Zionist founder THEODOR HERZL and planted by the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, frequently over the land of former Palestinian villages. The old forest

manager, a symbol of Israel's founding generation, entrusts the job to the forest guardian, who is aided by a mute Arab and his daughter. The student discovers the ruins of a village buried under the forest and, together with the Arab, burns the forest. The old manager is heartbroken, the Arab is blamed for the fire, and the balding eternal student drifts away aimlessly. The striking aspect of the story at the time was the rebellion expressed in the burning of the forest, exposing the coverup of the evergreen pine trees, so foreign to the landscape. In retrospect, what is even more striking is that the contact between the Jew and the mute Arab could function tacitly.

In Oz's popular early writings, especially *Where the Jackal Howls* (1965), Arabs are a menacing presence on the fragile boundaries of the kibbutz, already destabilized by this Arab presence and other pressures. These stories, which began to be published in the late 1950s, present another description of the conflicts between Arabs and Jews, which can be seen in the story "Geula" (Redemption). The story tells about a kibbutz whose fields are being invaded by nameless Arabs from the desert. As in Yehoshua's short story, the younger generation is at odds with the older one, but from the other direction. Facing growing theft and vandalism, the young generation wants to retaliate physically against the Arabs. The story reaches a climax as Geula, a female allegorical figure, meets an Arab shepherd in the grove, who she fantasizes tries to rape her, and the wrath of the kibbutz is unleashed on the Arabs. The paradoxes of this position are many; the self-image of settlers as advancing the boundaries of civilization on the frontier clashes with the violent reality of their conflict with the Arabs, conceived as a struggle with the chaotic powers of the desert in ways that by now are part of the stock images of the Zionist enterprise as a civilizing modernist enterprise. Oz attempts to be ironic, aware that a violent civilizing mission is hardly what it claims to be, yet the irony is obstructed by an underlying survivalist sense of justification.

After the 1967 War this view, along with the Israeli cultural scene, changed. Oz, Yizhak Ben Ner (1937–) (*The Man from There,* 1967), and others were quick to realize that the Occupation of the Palestinian territories allowed a perception of a modern Western Israeli self pitted against an oriental enemy. By winning the war and gaining control of a large Palestinian population, the conflict, as Oz saw it, threatened to undo the very change Zionism wanted to effect on the Jews in rendering them into a sovereign democratic nation. While eroding the delicate balance of liberal democracy with Jewish nationalism, the Occupation threatened to unleash the "capacity to self-destruct" latent in Judaism.

One of the most interesting formulations of the time can be found in *Seventh Day*, a book that was published in Israel a few months after the war and sold an unprecedented number of copies—distributed to every home in all the kibbutzim. The book, with interviews by Oz and others, is an edited compilation of conversations with soldiers in the kibbutzim after they returned from the war. In retrospect it is an amazing document, a report of group therapy undertaken after the war, yet from another point of view it can be seen as the last testament of the once hegemonic kibbutz movement. Taking credit for the victorious war, the declining movement metaphorically realizes that its role in the public sphere has ended. As such, the conversations can be seen as the cornerstone of left-wing politics in post-1967 Israel, with the war and the Occupation viewed as a disaster, constantly eroding the border that Zionism strove to establish between Israel and the Orient. It is here one can see that post-1967 left-wing politics are shaped not just by a longing for peace but also by a nostalgia for the Israel that once was: small, with Western values, and predominantly white (European).

Following the trajectory of Israeli history in these years, *In the Land of Israel* (1982) is a perceptive report of Oz's travels through the torn country of Israel after the Sabra and Shatila Massacres, when Israel was still engaged in the Lebanon War. The Sabra and Shatila Massacres in September 1982, after the Israeli occupation of west Beirut, though perpetrated by the Christian militias, took place while Israel controlled the perimeter of the refugee camps, not knowing or not wanting to know what was happening. The episode turned Israeli public opinion against the war, and Oz articulates this disaffection with the war as a comprehensive distancing of the current Israeli reality from the original Zionist vision. In what started as a series of articles for the Labor Party newspaper *Davar,* Oz engaged the country as a member of a kibbutz, part of a fallen elite, whose undoing began in the Six Day War. These views were to be the ruling paradigm of the Jewish peace movement and left-wing politics, culmi-

nating with a peace movement with a rather messianic name, PEACE NOW. Politically and culturally, this paradigm came to an abrupt end with the failure of the OSLO PROCESS and the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000.

Arab Jews on Literary Margin

That the so-called left-wing view of the conflict ignored MIZRAHI (Middle Eastern) Jews is hardly surprising. The arrival of a large mass of Jews from Arab countries had been presented in culture almost solely in terms of the Westernization and modernization of a backward part of the nation. Required to renounce their language and cultures, Mizrahi Jews were marginalized in literary discourse and in political and social life. MENAHEM BEGIN's rise to power in 1977 with his right-wing LIKUD PARTY is precisely the result of this disregard, which Begin addressed with a Jewish inclusiveness poised against a hostile Arab world. This move has crippled the political development of an alternative nonseparationist politics perhaps forever. It is only in the late 1990s with the development of Mizrahi radicalism that such a critique of Israeli culture became available and expressed itself in works by Sami Schalom Shitrit (1960–) or in Yossi Sucari's (1959–) enticing *Emilia and the Salt of the Land* (2002). These authors brought to the forefront of culture a Mizrahi voice that renounces Zionism and seeks a radical break with what is portrayed as an oppressive idea.

It can be stipulated that Zionism began with a move toward the East and yet never became part of that East, partly because the East never accepted Jewish nationalism and partly because Jewish nationalism never accepted the East. The terms are deliberately vague because their precise function in culture is such, denoting an oriental existentially threatening otherness. While keeping an eye on Zion, Hebrew letters kept certain parts of Zionism out of sight, particularly the literature of non-Western Jews, although such writers have been present in Hebrew letters starting with 1920s writers Yehuda Burla, Yizhak Shami, and Yacov Khurgin, all born and raised in Palestine and speaking Arabic as well as Hebrew. Though their inclusion in Hebrew letters is never doubted, they are marginal to the Israeli canon that is essentially about European Jewish (ASHKENAZI) male experience. In fact, Jews from Arab countries, who formed the majority of immigrants to the newborn state, remained almost as invisible in the culture as the non-Jewish Arabs. The harsh experience of Mizrahi immigration to Israel only began to surface in writing in the 1960s, notably with the unique voice of Egyptian-born master essayist Jacqueline Kahanof (1917–1979) and Shimon Ballas (1930–), a non-Zionist Jew from Baghdad who was the first to write artistically about the experience of immigration in *Hamabara* (The Transit Camp) in 1964. But it was not until after the 1973 War and its perception as a disaster that Mizrahi writing gained a presence and force. In 1974 Sami Michael (b. 1926), an immigrant from Baghdad and a communist, published *Equal and More Equal* (1974), a groundbreaking novel about a young man's immigration to Israel and his struggle to find a place in society. The story alternates between the narrator not understanding why he should fight against his Arab brethren in the 1967 War and the memory of his hardships in the transit camp where immigrants from Arab countries were first placed under precarious conditions. In spite of his rancor, when the moment comes, he saves his comrade's life, among others, through his knowledge of Arabic. Though the tone is neutral, the text discloses the brutal politics of class and race imposed on the Mizrahi Jews by an Ashkenazi-absorbing establishment. Another critical account of immigration, Yizhak Gormezanu Goren's (b. 1941) *Alexandrian Summer* (1978), which was later developed into a trilogy, recounts the protagonist's move from Alexandria to Israel, allowing a different view of Israeli society and an Arab past to emerge in which the Arab and the Jew are not enemies but rather part of a whole.

The turning point seems to have come after the 1967 War, which allowed for wider economic mobility and the rise of a relatively small but still significant Mizrahi middle class. This development was hastened by the shock of the 1973 War, which forced Israelis to reconsider if not reconfigure power and culture within Jewish society. Loyal to their role in Jewish modernity, Hebrew letters not only reflected these changes but also helped bring them about by an acute awareness of the fault lines of Israeli society. The political shift that put the Palestinians and their aspirations in the center of Israeli discourse was caused by many events, but these were made possible by a conceptual framework created foremost in Hebrew letters with its constant effort to expose the blind spot, to fulfill its ancient role of "Watchman unto the House of Israel." The participation of Arab writers in Israel also played an important role in

effecting change, whether in the form of EMILE HABIBI's (1922–1996) exceptional Arabic novel *The Pessoptimist* (1974) or Anton Shamas's (1950–) masterly Hebrew novel *Arabesques* (1986). The significance of these authors is how they incorporate the Palestinian pain of the Nakba—when Palestinians fled Israel during the 1948 War—into Hebrew discourse. The writing of Habibi and Shamas brought forth a voice almost unknown to Hebrew letters—the voice of the Arab from within. Although the participation of Arab writers in Hebrew culture is still marginal, as such it receives constant attention and has found new exponents in recent years, notably Said Kashua, whose bitter irony challenges the possibility of its very own voice, the Hebrew-Arab voice being as big a paradox as the attention it receives, which has little effect on power.

Effects of the Intifada

On the Hebrew side, the growing importance of the Palestinian identity and the transformation brought about by the Occupation form the main thrust of DAVID GROSSMAN's (b. 1954) early groundbreaking work, *The Smile of the Lamb* (1983), and the equally important journalistic account of his travels in the Palestinian territories, *The Yellow Wind* (1987), which predicted the advent of the INTIFADA. In these books as well as in his prolific journalistic writing, Grossman tries to elaborate a left-wing position that provides a nonparanoid response to Israeli anxieties about the Palestinian uprising. At the time, Grossman brought to Israeli letters his psychological insight into the Palestinian condition, which was perhaps the most acute available at the time, while he also reported profoundly on the brutalization caused by the Occupation. An ardent supporter of the Oslo Process, Grossman has since become almost more widely read outside Israel than inside.

In the 1990s many "posts"—POST-ZIONISM, postmodernism, and others—began to emerge between the cracks of the fragmented scene of Hebrew letters. The variety of voices and the abundance of autobiography, coming from all over the Jewish world, are striking. It seems culture has endowed the story of an individual life in the conflict with the significance of history. Although Hebrew letters no longer has a direct role in the developments of Jewish politics, writers struggle to function as the custodians of truth and memory, a role that has perhaps been suppressed by the pressing needs of conflict.

The truth that begins to emerge is by definition tentative, partial, and ambiguous, and at the same time a hardly noticed feminine voice becomes increasingly central to a rethinking of the public arena. Though women have always been a significant part of Hebrew letters, the centrality of the male military enterprise to state building confined the female voice to a personal, lyrical sphere. In this respect it is only since the 1980s that some of the most radical political writing began to be carried out by women, such as Daniella Carmi (*All the Time in the World to Pick Plums*, 1987) and Ilana Hamerman, a prolific and extremely judicious editor, translator, and author central to any discussion of Hebrew letters from the 1980s on. Together with other female writers such as Orly Castel Bloom and Ronit Matalon, they have challenged the norms of the reigning aesthetics in terms of both form and political content. Still to this very day it is the male authors who are prominent as political voices, and though the female voice is perhaps the dominant one in current letters, the arena itself has diminished in political importance.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a determining feature of Hebrew letters and is as much about Jews and being Jewish as it is about the enemy. As time progresses and the time before the Occupation fades from memory, both themes begin to merge. Such a moment of paradigm collapse is strangely present in Etgar Keret's (1967–) short story "Cocked and Locked" (1994), in which a soldier on guard in the Territories uses a bandage to dress his injured head like the *kufiya*-clad youth opposing him. Desperate from his immobility, he throws his weapon toward the youth, who hurries to pick it up only to "discover what I've discovered in this hellhole over the past month: the rifle is worth shit." The desire to become the enemy, to be like him, unburdened by the gun, the uniform, and the Occupation, is erotically telling as it harkens back to a lost history of moral certitude and a dream yet uncorrupted by reality.

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY

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—Uri Cohen

Hebron and Jewish Settlements

In the post-1967 phase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict no single area has been more of a flashpoint than Hebron. Some of the most intense bloodshed has taken place at a religious shrine sacred to both Muslims and Jews in this WEST BANK city. As the only city in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES to have Jewish settlements in the heart of the Palestinian population, nowhere in the Occupied Territories is SETTLER VIOLENCE more intense.

Hebron (Hevron in Hebrew, al-Khalil in Arabic) is one of the oldest cities in Palestine, believed to date back more than 6,000 years. Around 4000 BCE, Semitic tribes migrated from the Arabian Peninsula and built several villages and towns throughout the area of Palestine. Four such villages on the hills of Hebron were later amalgamated into a unified political and social system, and the city flourished after its unification. Archaeological excavations show human presence dating several millennia, but the identity of its original inhabitants remains in dispute. Hebron's holy site, the Cave of the Patriarchs (also "Abraham's Cave"), is revered equally by Jews and Muslims and is believed to be the burial place of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and their wives. Both religions honor these men as their first prophets. Herod the Great built the first structure over "Abraham's Cave," and the Byzantine emperor Justinian I turned it into a church in the sixth century CE, which was later destroyed by the Sassanid Persians. Muslims, believing that Abraham was the first Muslim and that the site was visited by their Prophet Muhammad on his night flight from Mecca to JERUSALEM, converted the building into a mosque in the seventh century and named it al-Ibrahimi.

Islamic rule in Hebron began in 638 and lasted until the Crusaders occupied it in 1099, which they called the City of Abraham. The name was changed back to Hebron in 1187 after the Muslim leader SALADIN defeated the Crusaders. Muslim MAMLUKS, a politically powerful Egyptian military class and political dynasty, controlled Hebron until 1516, when it fell under the rule of the Muslim OTTOMAN EMPIRE. From the beginning of the Islamic period the city has been predominantly Muslim, with small Christian and Jewish communities. In the twentieth century the Christian community dwindled to almost nothing, and the Jewish community was dispersed following an eruption of violence in 1929 (known as the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES), in which sixty-seven Jews were murdered. The Jewish community began to reestablish itself in Hebron following the 1967 WAR, during which Israel took control of the West Bank. In 2007, Hebron was home to approximately 160,000 Palestinian Muslims, 600 Jews, and three Christians. An additional 6,651 Jews reside in the adjacent KIRYAT ARBA SETTLEMENT.

Jewish Return to Hebron

The Jewish reentry into Hebron began in 1968 when RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER, a radical JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST, placed a newspaper advertise-

ment asking for "families or singles to resettle the ancient city of Hebron." A group of eighty settlers calling themselves the Bloc of the Faithful (GUSH EMUNIM) responded to the call. On Passover the group rented space in a Hebron hotel to celebrate the holiday and then announced that they would not leave. With YIGAL ALLON's (1918–1980) encouragement and Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN's approval, Gush Emunim was temporarily housed in an unused military barracks while a settlement was constructed for them on the outskirts of Hebron, in what became Kiryat Arba.

In 1976 the Israeli government granted Gush Emunim permission to construct a settlement near the AVRAM AVINU ruins in downtown Hebron, on the site of a structure destroyed in 1948. The Palestinian wholesale market in the area had to close to accommodate the new building, which also served—and still serves—as the central offices for the Hebron Jewish community. After finishing construction on Avram Avinu, Gush Emunim focused on nearby Beit Hadassa, built in 1880 as a hospital for the then Jewish community but later administered as a school by the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES (UNRWA) under the Jordanian government. After 1967 the building was administered by the Israeli CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY but still leased to UNRWA as a school. When this contract ended in the mid-1970s, the building was left empty until 1979, when a group of Jewish women, led by Moshe Levinger's wife Miriam, entered the building and, as eleven years earlier, refused to leave. After a short standoff with the Israeli government, the group was allowed to stay.

In May 1980, Palestinians killed six yeshiva students on their way home from the Cave of the Patriarchs. The Israeli government responded by officially recognizing the Beit Hadassa settlement, strengthening Jewish control in the face of Palestinian opposition. By that time the settlers occupied several buildings, including Avram Avinu, Beit Hadassa, Beit Castel, Beit Hasson, Beit Schneerson, and Beit Fink. An additional building, Beit Hashisha (House of Six, commemorating the six yeshiva students), was finished later. Situated between Beit Hadassa and Avram Avinu is yet another building, Beit Romano, constructed as a residence in 1879 by a Turkish Jew. Like Beit Hadassa, it was leased to UNRWA as a school. After the killing of the six students, however, this contract was terminated and the building was taken over by the settlers in 1981. It is currently a yeshiva, enrolling between 250 and 300 religious students.


The last settlement established in Hebron was Tel Rumeida in 1984. Situated on a hill overlooking the other settlements, it is believed to be the site where Abraham lived circa 1800 BCE. In 1984 a group of seven Jewish families placed portable caravans at the site. Following the killing of outspoken conservative leader Rabbi Shlomo Ranaan inside his caravan there in 1998, the Israeli government approved the building of permanent houses in Tel Rumeida.

These seven settlements sit in the heart of Palestinian Hebron, and since their arrival, there has been tension between the settlers and the Palestinians. Of all the settlers in the Occupied Territories, those in Hebron City and Kiryat Arba (and environs) are among the most ideologically extreme. The Gush Emunim are driven by messianism and literalism (especially with regard to Jewish "chosenness" and the belief in the territoriality of God's covenant) and by their sense of purpose—to "redeem" Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel) and restore it to its "rightful" owners—the Jewish people.

Settler Violence

The settlers use their ideology to justify their almost daily acts of harassment, humiliation, and intimidation against Palestinian residents of the city, including throwing stones, physical assaults, and damaging and destroying property. Their ideology permits them to use any tactics to achieve their objectives, including murder and expulsion of the Palestinians. Believing that they are God's chosen people, the settlers also think that God gave them this land for their exclusive use. The Israeli government has cooperated with the settlers and has imposed harsh measures on Palestinians in Hebron, including prolonged CURFEWS, CLOSURES, blockades, WATER shortages, LAND confiscation, large numbers of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and use of force by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF). The 1994 HEBRON MASSACRE by settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN of twenty-nine Palestinians in the al-Ibrahimi Mosque was not an isolated incident but one marker on a continuum of violence directed at Palestinians that began with the first settlers in Avram Avinu and Kiryat Arba and continues to this day.

The Israeli government has seldom punished the settlers for their crimes. On the rare occasions



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Map 19. Downtown Hebron Showing Jewish Settlements and Division between PNA-Controlled H-1 and Israeli-Controlled H-2

when an individual has been tried and convicted of an offense—usually murder—he has been given at most a sentence of only a few years' imprisonment and has invariably been pardoned and released long before completing the term. Rabbi Levinger, the spiritual as well as political and tactical leader of Gush Emunim, is one of the most active individuals in this group, yet only once has he been convicted of a crime. In 1990 he served ten weeks in prison for the killing of an unarmed Palestinian merchant and was hailed by his followers as a hero upon his release. He maintained that he only shot in the air to defend himself against stone throwers. In 1972 US-born fundamentalist RABBI MEIR KAHANE arrived in Hebron and leafleted the city, summoning the mayor, Muhammad Ali Ja'abari, to a public show trial for his alleged part in the 1929 massacre. Kahane even stormed the mayor's office, demanding his appearance at the trial. The public accounting never took place, but as Israeli analyst Ehud Sprinzak writes of Kahane: "His message was always the same. 'The Arabs do not belong here; they must leave.' In this spirit, Kahane initiated an organized operation to encourage the Arabs to emigrate."

By 1980 a group that originated in Kiryat Arba was carrying out violent acts throughout the West Bank, including several attempts to blow up the Muslim shrine AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in Jerusalem. They had also carried out assassination attempts against five West Bank mayors, who as prominent nationalist leaders have respect throughout the Occupied Territories. Three escaped without harm, while Nablus mayor BASSAM SHAKA'A lost both legs and a second mayor, Karim Khalaf of El Bireh/Ramallah, was permanently crippled. Those charged with the assassination attempts were released after serving two years of a ten-year sentence. Shortly thereafter Gush Emunim settlers exploded a fragmentation grenade in the Hebron market, which severely injured eleven Palestinian children. In March 1982 an Israeli soldier reported that thirty twelve- to thirteen-year-old Palestinian children were lined up facing a wall with their hands up for five hours in Hebron on a cold night. Afterwards the children were taken to an army camp where their parents were not allowed to see them or to bring them coats.

In October 1982, settlers planted a time bomb in the stands of Hebron's Husayn School football field. The explosion occurred minutes before the game was to begin and seriously injured several spectators. Another time bomb was discovered in the middle of the field. In 1983, three settlers entered the Muslim College of Hebron (later Islamic University), threw grenades, and opened fire on students, killing three and seriously wounding thirty-three more. The perpetrators were initially sentenced to life in prison but subsequently had their sentences reduced to fifteen years and were released after serving seven years. In 1984, settlers from Kiryat Arba wired explosives to the fuel tanks of five Palestinian buses, but the operation was foiled before the buses set off. After discussing several of these actions, American Jewish academic Ian Lustick wrote: "But these were only the most spectacular events in a wave of less serious vigilantism. . . . During that period [1980–84], the Israeli press reported more than 380 attacks against individuals in which 23 were killed, 191 injured and 38 abducted. Hundreds more attacks were directed at property—automobiles, homes, and shops. Forty-one attacks on Muslim . . . religious institutions were counted."

Eighteen months after the 1994 Goldstein massacre at al-Ibrahimi Mosque, the Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem undertook a detailed investigation of Palestinians living in Hebron. It found that Palestinians were victimized both by the IDF and by settlers. B'Tselem reported that security forces "used live ammunition excessively" against the demonstrators, performed often violent searches of Palestinians homes, killed twenty-seven Palestinians by gunfire, closed seven mosques for three to six months, imposed a total of fifty days of twenty-four-hour curfew, put up CHECKPOINTS within the city, closed and blocked ROADS, "severely" beat Palestinians, and ignored cases of settlers injuring Palestinians. "Whereas the Israeli authorities acted vigorously, often in flagrant violation of the human rights of Palestinians," B'Tselem stated, "in order to protect the settlers and to punish those who harmed them, those authorities failed to protect the lives, integrity and property of Hebron's Palestinian residents from repeated attacks by Jewish settlers in the city."

In 1997, Israel and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) signed the HEBRON PROTOCOL, which divided the city into two distinct sections: Israeli-controlled Jewish Hebron (H-2, with 400 Jews and 25,000 Palestinians and the Cave of the Patriarchs) and an area where the PNA had limited authority over the remaining Palestinian population (H-1).

Palestinian Situation Worsens

Beginning in 1999 the Palestinians' situation in Hebron and the surrounding areas worsened significantly. Settler violence became more widespread with the support of the authorities, and the IDF itself became more directly involved in the repression of Palestinians. In one incident in 1996, a settler fatally pistol-whipped an eleven-year-old child. The settler was arrested but at the trial the Israeli judge acquitted him, stating that the "child died on his own as a result of emotional pressure." After numerous appeals by the child's family and their Israeli lawyer, the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT termed the act a "light killing" and called for a new trial. At the second trial the settler was sentenced to six months of community service and a fine of a few thousand dollars.

In 2001 Human Rights Watch published a report documenting the various abuses by the settlers, while B'Tselem produced two additional major studies on the collaboration of the government with the vigilante settlers. B'Tselem reported that settlers destroyed grapevines, poisoned water supplies, burned grain storage, cut phone lines, and burned businesses of Palestinians. These incidents suggest that the peace process made the settlers more determined and aggressive and the Palestinians more vulnerable.

B'Tselem concluded: "It is clear that the majority of physical attacks are initiated by Israeli settlers and that the IDF has consistently failed in its obligations to protect Palestinians from attacks by Israeli settlers. In effect, settlers are using the protection provided by the IDF to attack Palestinian civilians."

In early July 2001, Israel established a new settlement near Kiryat Arba, and a few days later a Palestinian gunman shot and killed a man at its entrance. The Jerusalem daily *Ha'aretz* reported that in response, Kiryat Arba's "vigilante armies burned fields, ignited houses, uprooted trees, and vandalized anything in their path. . . . Completing this orgy of revenge without any interference [from the IDF], the settlers returned safely to their homes. No settler had been impeded; none was arrested. Soldiers stood by. . . . [Subsequently] the Palestinian residents of Hebron were put under curfew."

Settler and Government Plans for Hebron

The settlers' achievements in the early 1980s prompted more ambitious plans. In 1982 the Hebron Fund was created in New York to raise money to strengthen and expand the Jewish presence in Hebron and elsewhere in the Occupied Territories. In 1984, Hebron's settler establishment introduced a master plan that delineated their strategy to create a greatly expanded Jewish quarter in Hebron's downtown Old City. The master plan included two basic elements: increasing the size of the Jewish community inside the Old City and constructing a territorial link between the settlements in the Old City and Kiryat Arba. In 1990 the mayor of the Jewish enclave in Hebron, Rabbi Yechiel Leitner, stated at the Hebron Fund's national fund-raising dinner in the United States that "it is self-evident that the second largest city in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] can be Jewish." However, during the 1990s—the era of the OSLO PROCESS—political opinion tilted away from such ambitious plans. The 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between the PNA and Israel envisaged that the PNA would take control of Palestinian cities inside the Occupied Territories, including Hebron. This news alarmed the settlers in Hebron's Old City, who came to view Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN as a traitor.

Because he sympathized with their goal of making Hebron part of Israel, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's electoral victory as prime minister in 1996 gave the settlers renewed optimism, tempered somewhat, however, when the UNITED STATES pressured Netanyahu to resume the Oslo Process, including the planned redeployment from Hebron on the terms set out in the Interim Agreement. During this period ARIEL SHARON, then the minister of national infrastructure, provided Netanyahu with a set of proposals concerning Hebron. Like the settlers' master plan, Sharon's proposals called for the construction of a territorial link between Kiryat Arba and the Cave of the Patriarchs. His plan also envisioned the reduction of the Palestinian population inside Hebron's Old City as well as the construction of the BARRIER wall separating the Old City and its Jewish settlements from Palestinians in southern Hebron.

By the end of 2000 Sharon was prime minister, and the Oslo Process was in shambles. The outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA caused Israel to intensify its security measures in Hebron. New barriers, checkpoints, and ROADBLOCKS were erected throughout Hebron, effectively isolating neighborhoods within the city from each other and from the southern district of Hebron. The Israeli

army imposed extensive periods of curfew and carried out massive house demolitions along with other security measures against the uprising.

During this period the Hebron "settler promenade" of Worshiper's Way was initiated. Worshiper's Way is the road linking Kiryat Arba to the Jewish quarter of Hebron and to the Cave of Patriarchs. A long-cherished goal of Hebron's settler community, one supported by Sharon, was its transformation into a promenade that would attract tourists and become a national landmark. Yet even for the prime minister implementation of the promenade was a sensitive political issue, because it involved the expropriation and destruction of Palestinian property in Hebron, including sixty-four parcels of private land and at least fifteen houses. However, immediately following a November 2002 ambush of IDF soldiers by Palestinian militants in which nine soldiers and three Israeli civilians were killed, Sharon gave his approval to begin preparations for the promenade.

Shortly thereafter IDF central commander Moshe Kaplinsiki, a close aide to Sharon, issued military orders for the expropriation of Palestinian land and the demolition of Palestinian structures for "security reasons." Once the orders were formally issued, a legal battle ensued between the Israeli government and the Palestinian owners of the houses and land. Israeli human rights activists and lawyers represented the Palestinians before the Israeli Supreme Court, where they argued that the expropriations had nothing to do with security, as the government claimed, but rather were an attempt to establish territorial contiguity between Kiryat Arba and the Cave of the Patriarchs. As of this writing, the case remains in the court without a legal resolution, but the military nevertheless confiscated the designated Palestinian property, demolished homes and businesses, and by 2003 had begun construction of the 650-yard (600-meter) promenade.

During the first three years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the army imposed a curfew on the Palestinians in the city center of Hebron for more than 377 days total, including a consecutive period of 182 days, with only short breaks to obtain provisions. In addition the army created a contiguous strip of land in the city center along which the movement of Palestinian vehicles is forbidden. The middle of the strip contains many sections of road that the army forbids even Palestinian pedestrians to use. The strip blocks the main north-south traffic artery of the city, and therefore affects the entire city and its population. The extensive prohibitions have led to the closing of hundreds of shops, in addition to those that were closed under army order.

By 2007 these policies resulted in the economic collapse of the Palestinian center of Hebron and had driven many Palestinians out of the area. The findings of a survey conducted by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) demonstrated that at least 1,014 Palestinian housing units in the center of Hebron had been vacated by their occupants. This number represents 41.9 percent of the housing units in the relevant area. Sixty-five percent (659) of the empty apartments became vacant during the course of the Second Intifada. By 2007, 1,829 Palestinian commercial establishments were no longer open for business. This number represents 76.6 percent of all the commercial establishments in the surveyed area. Of the closed businesses, 62.4 percent (1,141) were closed during the Second Intifada. At least 440 of them closed pursuant to military orders.

According to ACRI, the main elements of Israel's separation policy are "the severe and extensive restrictions on Palestinian movement and the Israeli authorities' systematic failure to enforce law and order on violent settlers attacking Palestinians. The city's Palestinian residents also continue to suffer as a direct result of the actions of Israel's security forces."

In the summer of 2007, the Israeli army helped the Hebron settlers expand eastward to a hilltop home near the settlement of Kiryat Arba, a large step in their plan to connect the two areas. This new Jewish settlement is separated—by a wall, razor wire, and a worldview—from Hebron's Palestinian residents, who have watched as the settlement project swelled beyond the city center under the protection of Israel's military.

Hebron's Separation Walls

The Israeli military has prepared plans for a wall to divide the Palestinian-controlled side (H-1) of Hebron from the Israeli-controlled side (H-2). It is designed to separate the small number of Jewish settlers from some 162,000 Palestinian residents of the city by constructing a physical barrier through the center of Hebron. However, about 35,000 Palestinians live in the Israeli sector, which is also home to Palestinian Hebron's industrial zone and to the al-Ibrahimi Mosque. In the past this

industrial sector has contributed 40 percent of the total production of the Hebron District. In 2005, Israel imposed a closure on the industrial sector, and 5,000 workers lost their jobs. In addition to lost revenues (which were estimated at $63 million over a three-month period), due to the ripple effect unemployment skyrocketed to 70 percent in the district. In 2005 the IDF also placed seven iron gates across roads leading to the Old Suq in Hebron, which completed the encirclement of the market area, located within H-2, and resulted in shop owners losing their means of livelihood.

If the wall is completed, this area will probably be closed indefinitely to Palestinians from H-1. Moreover, access to the Old City and to the al-Ibrahimi Mosque would most probably be closed to Palestinians from H-1. Hebron's Land Defense Committee, an independent Israeli-Palestinian group, revealed in November 2003 that Israeli government officials had developed a plan to confiscate from Palestinians over 120,000 acres (half a million dunums)—some 48 percent of the total available space—for the Jewish sector in Hebron District.

As of 2006, both projects appeared to be on hold awaiting a decision from the Israeli Supreme Court, but by 2009 the route of the planned wall, while not yet walled, was completely barricaded so no Palestinian could pass.

Wall II

The Barrier wall is effectively separating Arab from Jew in rural areas along much of its 456-mile length, perhaps nowhere more so than in the Hebron Governate. In the Hebron District, Israel's Barrier will run from Kfar Ezion to the south of Hebron city near the Green Line up to el Daheriyya also in the south. From there it will run to the east to Susya, located east of Yatta. Most of the land that will be confiscated in this area is home to small Palestinian villages. This partially explains what has been taking place east of Yatta in the Hebron Southern District. According to the official signs placed by the Israeli engineers and soldiers, the wall's dimensions as of August 2005 were 3 miles (5 km) long and 100 yards (100 meters) wide.

By 2009, Palestinian Hebron was in shambles: a once thriving commercial metropolis, Hebron was a largely shuttered city where unemployment stood at 60 percent. The enforced division of Hebron had virtually emptied the city of the most important historic, religious, and commercial areas of Palestinians. International observers said the settlers regularly toss debris and dirty water into the Arab markets and yards. Settler violence had increased, and the IDF still afforded no protection to the Palestinian residents. Hemmed in and harassed, the Palestinians continued to flee.

The major new settlement point that was established on 19 March 2002 occupied a four-story house in the a-Ras neighborhood on a hilltop less than a mile's trip along streets secured by Israeli soldiers. Dozens of soldiers surrounded the home to protect its new residents. The settlers said they bought the home for $700,000, some of it donated by American supporters. But Israel's CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, the military government in the Occupied Territories, contended that the settlers did not arrange for the PERMITS Israelis need to buy and move into property in the West Bank.

While a military court considered their appeal, the settlers renovated the building and soldiers wandered the airy halls. The house overlooks the main roads leading from Kiryat Arba to the downtown settlements and the Tomb of the Patriarchs/al-Ibrahimi Mosque. The army used to set up a temporary checkpoint at the house on the Jewish Sabbath; after the settlers took over, they set up a more permanent rooftop position. Permit or not, the house will not be demolished; no Jewish house has ever been demolished for lacking a permit.

See also BARRIER; GUSH EMUNIM; HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA; HEBRON PROTOCOL; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Hebron District, Southern Area: Expulsion of Arabs

In the southern part of the Hebron Governate, in the southern WEST BANK in an area that Palestinians refer to as Masafer Yatta, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) have been systematically attempting to expel the Palestinians who reside there. This activity has been centered in the satellite villages of the town of Yatta: a-Tuba, al-

Mufaqara, a-Sfai, Magheir al-'Abid, al-Majaz, a-Tabban, al-Fakhit, al-Halaweh, al-Mirkez, Jinba, al-Kharuba, and a-Sarura. The area is home to about 1,000 Palestinians who live mostly in caves and maintain a traditional lifestyle, farming the LAND and grazing their sheep and goats. In the same area Israel has constructed four SETTLEMENTS plus five OUTPOSTS. There is strong evidence that this area of South Hebron—that is, the whole region south of Yatta, which is currently part of Area C (under complete Israeli control)—is one of the areas that Israel plans to annex in the future. Moreover, the state wants to incorporate the land without any Palestinians and appears determined to expel all the Palestinians residing in small villages within the region.

In the 1970s the IDF regional military commander declared large parts of this area a CLOSED MILITARY ZONE, and this injunction has been repeated since then. The official reasons given for the orders are "security needs," including using the area for IDF training grounds, although the IDF has never used this region for exercises. But these declarations provide Israel with a "legal" reason for expulsions of those living in the zone.

Cave Area and Its Residents


The southern Hebron hills in general and the closed area in particular are full of natural caves, which Palestinians use for homes and also as shelter for their sheep and goats. In addition to the natural caves, the ancestors of the current cave residents dug caves near wells and farmland. Each family has at least one cave that it uses as a residence for part of the year, although Jinba, a-Tuba, and al-Majaz villages also contain freestanding stone houses. Contrary to common perception, the cave residents are not BEDOUIN and do not migrate. Eighty-eight percent of the cave residents were born there, and, in fact, cave dwellers have been living in the southern Hebron hills at least since the 1830s. Residents support themselves primarily from farming and raising sheep and goats and from the production of milk and cheese. Most of the produce is for home consumption and for their flocks, with the surplus being sold in Yatta and other nearby towns.

Until 1947 the Palestinian farmers of Masafer Yatta cultivated swaths of land that extended all the way to Arad (located on the border of the Negev and Judean deserts, 25 kilometers [15.5 miles] west of the Dead Sea and 45 kilometers [28.0 miles] east of the city of Beersheba). Following the 1948 WAR they became Jordanian residents and were denied access to their land on the Israeli side of the border. After the 1967 WAR Israel occupied this region as well as the rest of the West Bank. When residents returned to their land, the OCCUPATION authorities began to expropriate the farmers' land for military bases, "drilling zones," nature reserves, and forests.

The area that the IDF declared a closed military zone, referred to as Firing Area 918, lies southeast of Yatta and consists of some 30,000 dunums (about 7,500 acres) and twelve Palestinian villages. A small number of the residents live there for a few months a year to farm the land and graze their flocks. In many cases this seasonal presence in the closed area reaches a total of six months a year. They farm out of sheer necessity until Israel confiscates their land, arrests them, or drives them off. Most of the residents living in the closed area also have a house in Yatta, which their children use during the school year and the family uses when in town. Yatta is situated about 7 to 10 miles (12 to 17 kilometers) from the villages in the closed area. Because of the distance, the lack of public transportation, and Israeli-imposed RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT to and from the closed area, children of residents who do not own homes in Yatta spend the school year with relatives from their extended family in the town or do not go to school at all.

The closed area has no physical INFRASTRUCTURE, including power, telephone, or WATER. There are no paved ROADS leading from the villages, and its harsh topography compels the residents to travel to and from the closed area by foot, on horse or donkey, or by tractor or off-road vehicle. A few families have a generator that is used primarily for lighting and heating. Residents have two options for obtaining water: rainwater gathered in cisterns in the villages and water purchased outside the closed area that is delivered by tanker and stored in the cisterns. A cubic meter of water purchased this way costs from $6 to $12 (25 to 50 shekels), whereas a cubic meter of water obtained from a running-water system costs from $0.75 to $1.25 (3 to 5 shekels).

No schools are available in the closed area, so residents must rely on the services provided by their parent town, Yatta, and other nearby villages.



Map 20. Southern Hebron District: Area of Expulsions

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Khirbet a-Tawaneh, which is situated just north of the closed area, has one elementary school that is used primarily by the children from nearby a-Tuba. The children go home on weekends and holidays, as well as for the summer. One-quarter of the children in the closed area do not attend school at all but help with the farmwork and the grazing.

The residents also rely on Yatta for medical services. A clinic is being built in nearby Khirbet a-Tawaneh that will provide basic medical services to residents of the closed area. However, it takes from thirty to forty-five minutes to get to Yatta from the closed area, depending on the location of the village and the means of transportation. As a result, residents requiring urgent medical care can find themselves in life-threatening situations. In addition, most of the childbirths take place in the caves under poor sanitary conditions, without licensed midwives and without appropriate medical equipment.

Israeli Settlements in Masafer Yatta

From the early 1980s the Israeli government began confiscating increasing amounts of land for settlements in the area, constructed to create territorial contiguity between border towns inside Israel and the area north of the Green Line. The settlements were erected on expropriated Palestinian-owned property, which the government declared STATE LAND. In the early 1980s, Israel built four settlements near the closed area, in which, by 2005, some 1,600 settlers lived: Carmel and Ma'on north of the closed area, and Susia and Mezadot Yehuda (also known as Beit Yatir) to the west. From 1996 to 2001 the settlers established four outposts near the settlements: Avigail, Hill 833, Mitzpeh Ya'ir (also called Magen David), and Nof Nesher (also called Lucifer Farm). A fifth outpost, Ma'on Farm, was established inside the closed area but evacuated in 2005. Other Israeli settlements in the Southern Hebron Governate include Eshkolot, Sinsaneh, Telem, Adora, Negohut, Otni'el, and Pene Hever.

According to B'Tselem, "All the settlements in the Masafer Yatta area are inhabited by extremist national-religious settlers. These settlers make religious claims to the land and assert themselves sole owners of the land. They assert that all non-Jews must be expelled from the land. They claim that all means are acceptable to achieve this goal. Many of the settlers of this area are linked to the KACH organization."

The Mount Hebron Regional Council intends to pave a new settler road parallel to the north-to-south Route 317. Such roads are typically closed to Palestinians. The road will link Mezadot Yehuda, Mitzpeh Ya'ir, Ma'on, and Carmel and will likely run the whole length of the closed area and through the cave residents' land. In addition, the Israeli MEDIA reported in 2005 that the council is planning to build forty new housing units in Mitzpeh Ya'ir near the closed area.

In the total Hebron Governorate there are twenty-three settlements whose built-up area is 3.7 square kilometers (1.4 square miles and about 0.4 percent of the total area of the Hebron Governorate). This number does not include the municipal area estimated at 39.9 square kilometers (15.4 square miles, 3.7 percent of the total area of Hebron District). These settlements are distributed along three nearly parallel lines. In addition to the existence of the settlement belt at the southern section of the governorate, there is the settlement of Kiryat Arba and its northern neighborhood, Kharsina (Ramat Mamre), which are the largest settlements in the governorate, with a total population of 7,000—the most extremist West Bank settlers. The total settler population in the Governorate of Hebron was approximately 15,000 in 2006.

Although the outposts in this region lack building PERMITS, an outline plan, or official approval for their establishment, government ministries have nevertheless provided financial support to the settlements. For example, the Interim Report on the Unauthorized Outposts indicates that the Housing Ministry transferred $320,000 (1.3 million shekels) to Mitzpeh Ya'ir and over $140,000 (570,000 shekels) to Avigail, which is situated near the western boundary of the closed area.

In FINAL STATUS TALKS between Israel and the Palestinians held in July 2000 at CAMP DAVID, Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK offered a proposal by which Israel would annex 13 percent of the West Bank, including Masafer Yatta, and would hold another 10 percent of the land for a period of at least ten years. The proposal came to nothing in the collapse of Camp David.

Expulsion Efforts

During the 1970s the IDF carried out a number of sporadic expulsions of Palestinians, sometimes on a small scale and on other occasions as much larger operations. During these evictions houses

were destroyed, and residents were ordered to leave their villages and were informed that they could not remain in the area. In 1984 the IDF implemented a more thorough expulsion in Khirbat al-Jinba, a small village composed of a few dozen houses and tents, which were totally destroyed. All of the residents were expelled.

The first attempt to carry out a massive expulsion took place in November 1999, during the Oslo Process, when the IDF, accompanied by CIVIL ADMINISTRATION officials, forcibly removed 750 Palestinians residing in twelve villages in the Yatta area. This action was taken because of demands by settlers from Ma'on, who had established a farm outpost and exerted pressure on the government to evict the Palestinians from nearby areas. The IDF soldiers, accompanied by bulldozers, expelled the cave residents; sealed their caves; ruined their tents, produce, and clothes; destroyed wells; and demolished temporary structures used to provide services to the residents. After hundreds of people, including children and infants, were prohibited from returning to the area, they were forced to pass the winter in nearby caves. During the spring of 2000 the cave residents petitioned the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT to halt their expulsion. After a public struggle in which various Israeli political organizations, writers, and public figures lent support to the cave residents, the court issued a temporary injunction, returning the residents to the area and enjoining the state from expelling them until the court reached a final decision in the matter. After this injunction the families returned to their land, although Israel made continuous efforts to complete the expulsion before a final decision is handed down. In the years since 2003 the army, too, has damaged their property. Furthermore, Israeli planning officials have refused to issue building permits that would provide the cave residents with housing and demolished new structures that the residents built in the villages.

From 3 to 5 July 2001, another expulsion occurred, which was far wider in scope than previous ones and affected communities throughout the region between Yatta and the Green Line and east of the Yatta-as Samou'a road. These expulsions involved a large military and civil administration presence. Caves that had been sealed in the past were now completely destroyed by bulldozers, which also blocked most of the water wells in the area, ruined crops and property, and killed livestock. Hundreds of people were dispossessed of their land. Among the people expelled were those whom the High Court—in the spring of 2000—had explicitly stated were not to be evicted. During this expulsion campaign the military prevented the Red Cross from providing the Palestinians with basic humanitarian assistance such as food, blankets, and tents.

During the months following the large-scale expulsions some of the residents managed to return to their land. To prevent any form of provisional residency the military prohibited the Palestinians from erecting tents, rebuilding the ruins, cultivating their land, or tending their herds. In addition the IDF blocked all attempts made by Israeli and international human rights organizations to provide food assistance and tents to the population; the military even destroyed the tents that had been donated by the Red Cross. Following wide-scale public protests and legal appeals, the state prosecutor announced that the government would avoid further exacerbating the residents' conditions and allow them to rebuild their homes.

Nevertheless, on the night of 16–17 September 2001 the military began another round of evictions that lasted several days. Targeting two locations near Susiya (Khirbat al-Nabi and Khirbat al-Tawaymin) that had not been included in previous campaigns, soldiers carried out nightly raids and destroyed buildings and structures sheltering livestock, as well as water wells. The residents reported that the military used physical violence against them, including blast grenades that were thrown at one of the family encampments. In all, 118 people were evicted during this wave. Subsequently the Palestinian residents filed an appeal to the Supreme Court requesting that Israel allow them to continue living on and cultivating their land. In the high court injunction Judge Ayala Procaccia prohibited the Israeli authorities from expelling the Palestinians from the region, but in spite of the court order a renegade group of IDF soldiers destroyed buildings, property, and wells belonging to the Palestinian Abu Kavash family near Al Samou'a.

On 26 September 2001, following the Supreme Court decision, the Khirbat Susia residents returned to their lands and were met by IDF soldiers who presented an order stating that the region was a closed military zone for a period of three months. This order was a direct violation of the high court decision and a promise made by the defense minister to stop the evictions. On 29 September, as a

consequence of intense media coverage and political pressure, the Defense Ministry announced that the residents were free to return to their land, and dozens of Palestinians did so.

Israel's policy of expelling the Palestinians from the al-Mufqara region of the Hebron District is being contested by an Israeli support group, TA'AYUSH, a coalition of organizations from Israel's peace camp that, in partnership with several Palestinian groups, attempts to halt the expulsions. Ta'ayush stated its case in 2002: "The Israeli government, military, civil administration, and Jewish settlers have been carrying out a premeditated and coordinated plan to make the South Hebron area 'Arab Free.' . . . The government pursues this plan while expropriating Palestinian land and issuing injunctions that confine the residents' right to remain in the region. These actions are carried out in order to exhaust the local Palestinian population and to run them off their land. In the last few months, the rate of evictions has increased and the attempt to ethnically cleanse the whole area is underway."

On 6 June 2007 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a petition brought by residents of the settlement of Susiya. The court agreed with the settlement (which also stole the name Susiya), which legally allows the eviction of the area's legal landowners. Because their land is considered "Area C," the Israeli state declared that the Palestinians are illegally squatting on the land they have lived on for centuries.

Settler Violence

Since the residents returned to the caves in March 2000, they have been subject to abuse by the settlers living nearby, in addition to the IDF harassment. According to B'Tselem, 88 percent of the residents have been victims of SETTLER VIOLENCE or have witnessed such violence toward a first-degree relative. No village has managed to escape settler abuse, although the frequency and nature of the abuse differs from village to village. Khirbet al-Fakhit, for example, suffered relatively little, apparently because it is situated far from the settlements and outposts near the closed area.

The abuse can be categorized by four broad patterns: (1) blocking roads and preventing access to fields (51 percent of the cases); (2) property damage, including destruction of crops and theft of sheep and goats (21 percent); (3) intimidation (17 percent); and (4) physical violence (11 percent). The attacks on property increased during the planting and harvesting seasons, which harms families in the closed area, because most earn their entire livelihood from farming and grazing.

For years Palestinian children who live in the closed area and study at the elementary school in Khirbet a-Tawaneh have been victims of attacks by settlers living in Ma'on. Because the settlers intimidated and beat the children when they tried to use the direct route to a-Tawaneh, the children used a longer and alternate route to get to school. In the beginning of the 2005 school year, members of the international voluntary organization CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS began to accompany children on their way to school using the direct route. In three instances Ma'on settlers beat the volunteers.

On 29 April 2004 a large contingent of Israeli police, army, Border Police, and Civil Administration officials came to the village of a-Tabban. A village elder reported to B'Tselem: "They destroyed our tents, the pens for our sheep and goats, and wells. When my children tried to remove mattresses and kitchen utensils from the tents, the soldiers beat them. They also tried to hit me. Tareq [commander of the forces] told them not to touch me because I am elderly and he ordered the soldiers to take me from the area and tie my hands. . . . In the past three years, Israeli aircraft have been spraying our fields and crops with chemicals completely destroying the crops. Tanks and jeeps also go onto our fields and destroy them. The army also destroyed six structures that we built from contributions by an organization from abroad, and which my family used."

See also HOUSE DEMOLITIONS; SASSON REPORT; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT

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Hebron Disturbances, 1929

See WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES

Hebron Massacre, 1994

On 25 February 1994, Dr. BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, a US-born physician-settler armed with a Galil assault rifle, entered AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE (Tomb of the Patriarchs) in HEBRON, walked past the Israeli troops stationed there to protect worshipers, and killed twenty-nine Muslims at prayer, wounding 125 others. Goldstein was killed after he was overcome by surviving worshipers.

Rioting immediately following the massacre led to the deaths of another twenty-six Palestinians and two Israelis. Israel responded by imposing a CURFEW on the 160,000 Palestinian residents of Hebron for thirty days. During the eighteen months following the end of the first curfew, twelve more twenty-four-hour curfews of varying length were imposed on Hebron Palestinians, totaling fifty days, plus forty night curfews. Hebron's Jewish settlers, however, were free to live normally.

Goldstein's act had profound affects on the OSLO PROCESS. For one, it highlighted the dangers posed by Israeli settlers to Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and spread terror among the Palestinians. The Israeli government expressed shock and outrage at the massacre, yet took no substantive measures to remove the settlers or to restrict their actions against the Palestinians. Many Israelis as well as Palestinians called for removing the 400-plus settlers in Hebron, and a majority of Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN's cabinet favored their removal, but Rabin vetoed it.

Although the major focus of the OSLO ACCORDS was on Israeli security, the Hebron massacre, which occurred within days of the signing of the first GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT (part of the Oslo Accords), demonstrated that Palestinians were vulnerable to Israeli security abuses and indifference to Palestinian safety. Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT initially demanded that Israel permit the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) to dispatch a Palestinian police force to Hebron and that Israel remove the settlers. Faced with unrelenting Israeli opposition to both demands, Arafat eventually dropped them but demanded that international observers be sta-

tioned in the volatile city. Rabin eventually permitted a group known as the TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON to come to Hebron in March 1994. Their mandate, however, was so restrictive that they were ineffective, and four months later (in August 1994) Rabin sent them home.

Another consequence of the massacre was a change in the HAMAS movement. Significantly, the first Palestinian suicide attack occurred two months after this massacre in retaliation for the murders. Until then, Hamas activists had concentrated their actions against Palestinian collaborators and Israeli military targets, with only one bombing directed against a civilian target in Israel. After the massacre, however, Hamas decided to engage in SUICIDE BOMBING of civilian targets, the first of which occurred on 4 April 1994. The suicide bombings in turn contributed significantly to the collapse of the peace process.

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Hebron Protocol, 1997

The Protocol Concerning Redeployment in HEBRON was signed by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), Israel, and the UNITED STATES on 15 January 1997, and divided Hebron city into two distinct sectors. Israel was accorded full control of sector H-2, which constituted 20 percent of the city, including its commercial center, the choicest real estate, the old Suq market area, and AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE and contained 600 settlers and some 35,000 Palestinians. By expanding and according formal recognition to an exclusive settler enclave under Israeli control within a Palestinian city, the protocol implicitly sanctioned this and other (heretofore considered illegal) settlements encroaching on Hebron and facilitated Jewish settlements in the centers of other Palestinian cities. According to the protocol, Israel would redeploy from the remaining 80 percent of the city (H-1), where 160,000 Palestinians would be permitted limited autonomy and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) would be responsible for security, although subject to Israeli restrictions and conditions. The protocol also required Israel to make three additional redeployments in other WEST BANK areas within eighteen months, provided the Palestinians met their "security responsibilities" of protecting the Israelis; and the protocol stipulated that "Israel alone will decide the[ir] timing and scope." The Knesset approved the protocol on 16 January by a vote of eighty-seven to seventeen, with the LABOR opposition voting with the LIKUD government.

The protocol required Israel to

- Remove the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) from 80 percent of Hebron within ten days of 15 January 1997.
- Begin the first phase of withdrawal from rural areas in the West Bank by 7 March 1997.
- Carry out the second phase of withdrawal eight months after the first stage.
- Complete the third phase before mid-1998. In this phase Israel would withdraw from the remaining parts of the West Bank, apart from "settlements and military locations."
- Begin negotiations with the PNA on the FINAL STATUS TALKS within two months of the Hebron Protocol and complete negotiations by 4 May 1999.

The protocol required Palestinians to

- Convene the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL and revoke the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER.
- Fight terror and prevent violence by all means.
- Strengthen security cooperation with both Israel and the United States.

- Prevent "incitement" and "hostile propaganda" among the Palestinian population.
- Combat systematically and effectively TERRORIST organizations and infrastructure, including the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists.
- Confiscate illegal firearms.

In addition the size of the Palestinian police force, the exercise of governmental activity, and the location of Palestinian governmental offices would follow what was specified in the INTERIM AGREEMENT, also called Oslo II.

After the first redeployment was completed—the only one that Israel implemented—Israel remained in exclusive control of 71 percent of the West Bank (Area C) and had security control over another 23 percent (Area B), while the PNA exercised control over only 6 percent (Area A). On 21 March 1997 a suicide bomber in a Tel Aviv café killed three Israelis and wounded forty-two, after which Prime Minister Netanyahu suspended further negotiations with the Palestinians and announced that there would be no further withdrawals because the PNA was not living up to its security responsibilities. (See Map 21.)

On 18 April 1997, Israel defied world opinion by beginning construction of the HAR HOMA SETTLEMENT on Jabal Abu Ghneim to complete a circle of Jewish SETTLEMENTS around occupied East JERUSALEM.


In the Interim Agreement, Israel had committed to redeploy from Hebron no later than six months after its signing, that is, in September 1996. Prime Minister SHIMON PERES, however, suspended the redeployment because of Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBINGS that came in retaliation for Israel's TARGETED ASSASSINATION of YAHYA AYYASH, a Hamas bomb maker. When Netanyahu became prime minister, he declared there would be no redeployments and canceled the Interim Agreement. Washington became concerned and convened talks in October 1996 in TABA, EGYPT, which focused on getting the peace process back on track. That meant redirecting attention to the Hebron redeployment. Facing a potential crisis with the United States if he refused to participate in negotiations, Netanyahu made a tactical decision to engage in the process without compromising his principles. President BILL CLINTON supported the Israeli position on Hebron but clarified specific US conditions, embodied in a Note for the Record and in a private letter from Secretary of State WARREN CHRISTOPHER to Netanyahu. Nevertheless, it required three additional months of negotiations until Israel agreed to sign the Hebron Protocol, which occurred at ERETZ CROSSING. It was the shortest agreement between the two parties but the one that contained the most explicit loss for the Palestinians—the 20 percent of Hebron city that would be under Israeli control, and the precedent that set.

Following the signing of the Hebron Protocol, the two sides also signed an agreement on the TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON on 21 January 1997, setting out the arrangements for up to 180 observers from the SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES, Italy, Switzerland, and TURKEY, with Norway responsible for the coordination, to monitor and report on conflicts in the city.

After implementation of the Hebron Protocol, Palestinians living in H-2 experienced a sharp deterioration in their living conditions, and, as a result, those families who could afford to do so moved to other neighborhoods. According to B'Tselem, the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, among the factors causing residents to leave the area were the following:

- Palestinians suffered almost daily physical violence and property damage by settlers in the city.
- The RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT in the city were among the harshest in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The IDF imposed a CURFEW on Palestinian residents of H-2, in response to violence by both Palestinians and settlers, and to enable settlers to hold public events.
- Some 2,000 to 2,500 shops and businesses were closed. Business life in the Casbah and Bab a-Zawiya areas, which had constituted the commercial center of the city, came to an almost complete standstill.
- Palestinian residents of H-2 also suffered from serious acts of violence by border policemen and IDF soldiers due to the tension of having the settlers within the city.

In the highly charged atmosphere of Netanyahu's November 1998 announcement that he would not implement the remainder of the Hebron Protocol and would reactivate the settlement policy, an undeclared Arab group carried out two suicide bombings in JERUSALEM. Israel and the United States immediately condemned



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Map 21. The Divided City of Hebron Following the Hebron Protocol, 1997

the PNA for its failure to fulfill its security obligations and demanded that it arrest every Islamist in the Occupied Territories. Washington then inserted the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY as coordinator between Israeli and Palestinian security services and produced an agreement on 17 December 1997, known as the "Israel and the Palestinian Authority Memorandum on Security Understanding." The accord was focused on Israel's security needs, held the PNA responsible for all acts of violence against Israelis, and stipulated that the PNA use all measures against its people to end violence and guarantee Israel's security.

During the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which began in September 2000, Israel retook control of Area H-1.

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Heroes of the Return

The Heroes of the Return (Abtal al-Awda) first appeared in 1966 as a small underground commando group in LEBANON associated with regional elements of the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN). In 1967 the Heroes of the Return merged with the Young Avengers, or Youth Revenge Group (Shebab Al-Tha'r), also a regional entity of MAN, and the two in turn merged with AHMAD JIBRIL's PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF, formed in 1961). Within months all amalgamated into the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), headed by GEORGE HABASH. In 1968 Jibril split with the PFLP and formed the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC) and took the Heroes of the Return and the Youth Revenge Group with him.

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Herut Party

Herut (Tenuat ha-Herut, National Jewish Movement) was the political party of the Revisionist Zionist movement in Israel. Founded in 1948 by MENAHEM BEGIN and other remnants of the militant Zionist group IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI, it was committed to the principles of VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY, founder of Revisionist ZIONISM. An extreme right-wing party, Herut believed that Israel should include the territory from the sea (Mediterranean) through both sides of the Jordan River (i.e., the state of JORDAN) and opposed any territorial compromises, especially the creation of a Palestinian state.

Begin led the party until 1983, when YITZHAK SHAMIR became its head. In 1965, Herut joined with the LIBERAL PARTY to form the GAHAL bloc, although it retained its own organization within the new party and dominated the new formation. In 1973, Gahal merged with other right-wing parties to form the LIKUD, but Herut maintained a dominant role in the new party and provided the main leaders of Likud. In 1988 the parties in the Likud coalition, including Herut, formally merged and Herut ended its independent existence.

In 1998 a new Herut party was created by dissenting members of the Likud, led by BENJAMIN

BEGIN, the son of Menahem Begin. The second incarnation of the Herut, or the National Jewish Movement, was in essence a continuation of the historic Herut. According to its founders, the need for reestablishing Herut arose when Israel's Likud government implemented the HEBRON PROTOCOL and agreed at WYE Plantation to cede parts of Judea and Samaria (the WEST BANK) to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Knesset members Benjamin Begin, Michael Kleiner, and David Re'em resigned from the Likud and reestablished Herut as a political vehicle for continuing the struggle for Greater Israel. Herut affirms, according to its literature, that "Eretz Israel was given in eternal trust to the Jewish people—past, present and future—and only they have the right to a sovereign state with JERUSALEM as its eternal capital. No Israeli government, therefore, can renounce any part of The Land, even in the name of peace." (www.herut.org.il/old/index-1.htm).

See also MOLEDET PARTY; TEKUMA

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Herzl, Theodor Binyamin Ze'ev (1860–1904)

Theodor Herzl, a Viennese journalist, was the father of modern political ZIONISM and founder of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION. He was born in Budapest and his Jewish family moved to Vienna in 1878; he grew up in a secular environment and was educated during the GERMAN Jewish Enlightenment. Herzl received a doctorate in law in 1884 and worked for a short while in the Vienna and Salzburg courts but left law within a year and devoted himself to writing, for which he had demonstrated ability from an early age.

In 1891 Herzl became Paris correspondent for the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse* (New Free Press), a liberal newspaper. In Paris he witnessed the effects of ANTI-SEMITISM as manifested in the court-martial of ALFRED DREYFUS, a French-Jewish army officer who, after an unjust conviction on espionage charges, was stripped of his rank and imprisoned in a humiliating public ceremony in January 1895 while a mob shouted, "Death to the Jews." Herzl became convinced that the only solution to the problems facing Jews was the mass exodus of Jews from their current places of residence to a home of their own. Originally he wrote that it did not matter where the Jews went and he was prepared to accept a home in Uganda, although he eventually settled on Palestine.

Herzl believed that anti-Semitism was a stable and immutable factor in human society that assimilation did not solve. In 1896, despite ridicule from Jewish leaders, he published *Der Judenstaat* (The Jewish State). In this work he argued that the Jews are one people and their plight could be resolved by the establishment of a Jewish state, with the consent of the great powers. He saw the Jewish question as a political issue to be dealt with in the international arena. In his novel *Altneuland* (Old New Land, 1902), Herzl envisioned a socialist Jewish utopian society that would arise in Israel by means of science and technology and be "a light unto the nations"— borrowing a phrase from the ancient prophets of Israel.

Although others had suggested solutions to anti-Semitism, Herzl was the first to call for immediate political action, but Jewish reaction to his plan was mixed. His ideas were met with enthusiasm by some of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe, although Jewish leaders were less ardent. Herzl appealed to wealthy Jews such as Baron Hirsch and BARON ROTHSCHILD to join the national Zionist movement but without success initially. For those who responded positively to his ideas, he called for an international conference. The result was the First Zionist Congress, held in Basel, Switzerland, on 29–31 August 1897, the first international gathering of Jews on a national and secular basis. The delegates adopted the BASEL PROGRAM, which became the basis of the political Zionist movement, and created the major institutions that were to lead the movement thereafter—most importantly, the World Zionist Organization (at the time, Zionist Organization), which served as the political arm of the Jewish people and helped establish the economic foundation for the proposed Jewish state.

Herzl was elected first president of the World Zionist Organization and chaired the first six WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESSES. In his remaining years he spent much of his time meeting with world leaders, both Jewish and non-Jewish, trying to enlist financial and political support for his

dream of a Jewish state. He died before his dream could become reality, but his influence extended far beyond his death.

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Herzog, Chaim (1918–1997)

Chaim Herzog was a military commander, diplomat, and president of Israel. Born in Belfast, Northern Ireland, he immigrated to Palestine with his family in 1935. Herzog received his early education in the Jewish Yishuv, then studied at Cambridge and London universities, where he earned a law degree.

During World War II Herzog served as a tank commander in Britain's elite Guard Armoured Division, later becoming a director of British intelligence in GERMANY. In this capacity he identified a captured soldier as Nazi leader Heinrich Himmler. After the war he served in the HAGANA, the underground military organization in Palestine. During the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Herzog was an officer in the battle for Latrun, a strategic hilltop overlooking the road to Jerusalem, and later headed military intelligence twice, in 1948–1950 and 1959–1962. He served as Israel's military attaché in Washington from 1950 to 1954, as commanding officer of the JERUSALEM district from 1954 to 1957, and as chief of the Southern Command from 1957 to 1959. In 1962, Herzog retired from the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and became the head of an industrial investment company.

During the 1967 WAR Herzog was a radio commentator best known for his military and political analyses. Likewise, during the 1973 War, Israelis relied on his commentaries on the war. In 1975 Herzog became Israel's ambassador to the UNITED NATIONS, where he was an aggressive advocate for Israel's interests, campaigning against the resolution that equated ZIONISM and racism (UN RESOLUTION 3379, 10 November 1975) and defending Israel's rescue of Jewish hostages in ENTEBBE, Uganda, in July 1976.

In 1981 Herzog was elected to the Knesset as a member of the LABOR PARTY. In 1983 he became Israel's president, a position to which he was reelected by the Knesset in 1988.

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Hibbat Tziyon

See HOVEVEI ZION

High Commissioner for Palestine

When Palestine was ruled by Great Britain from 1917 to 1948, initially as occupied enemy territory and later under a mandate from the League of Nations, a high commissioner was appointed to govern Palestine. The mandate was assigned to Britain at the SAN REMO CONFERENCE (1920) after World War I, which ratified the earlier division of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE's Arab provinces between FRANCE and Britain. France gained control over SYRIA and LEBANON, while Britain acquired IRAQ as well as Palestine. All these territories were designated Class A mandates, which meant that they would soon gain self-rule.

Palestine was placed under unique provisions because Britain had promised the Zionist movement in the BALFOUR DECLARATION (2 November 1917) that Jews could establish a national home in the territory.

Britain thus governed Palestine as a colony under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, with the region headed by the high commissioner for Palestine, who had unfettered executive and legislative powers, including censorship, DEPORTATION, detention without trial, demolition of the homes of suspects, and collective punishment. These powers were wielded against both the Palestinians and the Jews. Britain appointed the first high commissioner on 1 July 1920, before the mandate was ratified. The commissioner's advisory Executive Council and district commissioners were exclusively British, although they had Palestinian and Jewish assistants. Palestinians and Jews also worked in the administrative departments under British heads. The only elected bodies in Palestine were the municipalities and the organs of the Jewish community. Although some prominent Palestinians participated in an ADVISORY COUNCIL established by the high commissioner in the fall of 1920, they did so as individuals, not as representatives of the public. Moreover, they understood the council was temporary, to be superseded by constitutional representative organs.

Names and dates of appointments of high commissioners are Sir Herbert Samuel (1 July 1920), Lord Herbert Charles Onslow Plumer (14 August 1925), Sir John Chancellor (1 November 1928), Sir Arthur Wauchope (20 November 1931), Sir Harold MacMichael (3 March 1938), Viscount Gort (31 October 1944), and Sir Alan Gordan Cunningham (21 November 1945).

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High Court of Justice, Israel

See ISRAELI SUPREME COURT

High Follow-Up Committee and the Mada Manifesto

The High Follow-Up Committee was established in 1982, in the wake of "Land Day" in 1976 when six unarmed Palestinian citizens were shot dead by Israeli security forces during demonstrations against a wave of LAND confiscations by the state to advance its official goal of "Judaizing" the Galilee.

Since its inception the High Follow-Up Committee has been in the forefront of leadership of the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, including annually organizing and mobilizing the people for Land Day commemoration and Nakba remembrance.

In October 2000, Israeli police shot and killed thirteen Arab-Israeli individuals participating in a demonstration supporting Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES engaged in the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. Prime Minister EHUD BARAK appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the deaths. The Or Commission was headed by a senior judge, Theodore Or.

After the Or Commission completed its task, the government appointed a ministerial committee led by Minister of Justice Yosef Lapid to translate the recommendations of Justice Or and his colleagues into practical steps. Organizations representing Arab citizens of Israel, including the Arab Higher Follow-Up Committee, refused to appear before the Lapid Commission, saying that the creation of this second commission was only an attempt by the state to shirk its responsibility for the killings. Six months after the September 2005 publication of the Lapid Commission recommendations, it appeared to the vast majority of Israeli-Arabs that the recommendations of the Lapid Commission were merely dead words. In 2007, the Or Commission's spokesperson, Israel's attorney general Menachem Mazuz, declared that the investigations were being wound up. In most cases there was a lack of evidence, he claimed, and in the cases where there was evidence the policemen had acted in the belief that their lives were in danger. Shawki Khatib, chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee, told a demonstration of some 250,000 that Mazuz's decision proved that, as far as the Israeli authorities were concerned, "Arab blood is worthless."

In August 2007, the Israeli government made a decision to encourage national service among Arabs—both Christian and Muslim—with Israeli citizenship. The service is voluntary and is aimed at helping the Arab community. There was, however, strong opposition within the Arab community. Shaykh Abdullah Nimr Darwish, the founder of Israel's Islamic Movement, said, "Israeli Arabs will never agree to do national service for the State of Israel because it would call into question their loyalty to the Palestinian cause. Any type of national service, no matter what it is, would be perceived by the Palestinian people as military service."

The High Follow-Up Committee immediately became active and on 27 October mobilized hundreds of youth from different Arab villages to attend a national conference against civic service entitled "I Will Not Serve." The conference was overseen by the High Committee in conjunction with Baladna–Association for Arab Youth, the Youth Coalition against Civic Service, the Committee against Civic Service and all Forms of Enlistment, and the Welfare Association.

All of the foregoing, plus many other difficult circumstances, led the High Follow-Up Committee—a cautious and conservative body, mainly comprising the heads of Arab local authorities—which had never before dared to speak out, to commission a body of intellectuals in the community known as Mada, to produce a study on the future of Israel's Arab citizens. *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel* was issued under the auspices of the High Committee in December 2006. It is the first such sweeping demand by Israel's Arab mainstream, drafted by forty academics and activists, and it has been endorsed by an unprecedented range of Arab community leaders. The document presents, in addition to a clear bill of indictment against continuing discrimination by all Israeli governments, a radical reconceptualization of Palestinian collective rights and formulates bold demands in this area.

Included in the manifesto are calls for Israel to be reformed from a Jewish state that privileges its Jewish majority into "a state of all its citizens" and for sweeping changes to a national system of land control designed to exclude Palestinian citizens from influence. The manifesto declared that Israel's 1.4 million Arab citizens are an indigenous group with collective rights, not just individual rights. The document argues that Arabs are entitled to share power in a BINATIONAL state and block policies that discriminate against them and demands a partnership in governing the country to ensure that Arab citizens get equal treatment and more control over their communities.

The most contentious issue (for Israeli Jews) raised in the document is Israel's status as a Jewish state. The authors argue that Israel is not a democracy but an "ethnocracy" similar to TURKEY, Sri Lanka, and the Baltic states. Instead, says the manifesto, Israel must become a "consensual democracy" enabling Palestinian citizens "to be fully active in the decision-making process and guarantee our individual and collective civil, historic and national rights."

The demand for a state of all its citizens has wide backing among the Palestinian minority: a recent survey by the Mada Al-Carmel Centre revealed that 90 percent believed a Jewish state could not guarantee them equality, and 61 percent objected to Israel's self-definition.

As well as highlighting the various spheres of life in which Palestinian citizens are discriminated against, the manifesto makes several key demands that are certain to fall on stony Jewish ground.

The High Follow-Up Committee argues that the Palestinian minority must be given "institutional self-rule in the field of education, culture and religion." Israeli officials have always refused to countenance such forms of autonomy. Instead, the separate and grossly underfunded Arab education system is overseen by Jewish officials; the status of the Arabic language is at an all-time low; and the government regularly interferes in the appointment of Muslim and Christian clerics, as well as controlling the running of their places of worship and providing almost no budget for non-Jewish religious services.

The manifesto also demands that Israel "acknowledge responsibility for the Palestinian *Nakba*"—the catastrophic dispossession of the Palestinian people during Israel's establishment in 1948—and "consider paying compensation for its Palestinian citizens."

As many as one in four Palestinian citizens are internal refugees from the war, and referred to as "PRESENT ABSENTEES" by the Israeli authorities. They were stripped of their homes, possessions, and bank accounts inside Israel, even though they remained citizens. Most homes were either later destroyed by the army or reallocated to Jewish citizens.

An internal government memorandum leaked several years ago showed that most of the internal refugees' money, supposedly held in trust by a state official known as the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY, had disappeared and could no longer be traced.

Another controversial demand is for a radical overhaul of the system of land policy and planning in Israel, described in the manifesto as "the most sensitive issue" between Palestinian citizens and their state. Israel has nationalized 93 percent of the territory inside its vague borders, holding it in trust not for its citizens but for the Jewish people worldwide. The land can be leased, but usually only to Jews.

Israel's Palestinian citizens are restricted to about 3 percent of the land, although they do not control much of the area nominally in their possession. Gerrymandering of municipal boundaries means that Arab local authorities have been stripped of jurisdiction over half of their areas, which have been effectively handed over to Jewish regional councils.

The manifesto calls for an end to other discriminatory land practices: the exclusion of Palestinian citizens from planning committees; the refusal of such committees to issue house-building PERMITS to Palestinian citizens; the enforcement of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS only against Palestinian citizens; and the continuing harmful interference by international Zionist organizations, particularly the JEWISH AGENCY and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, in Israel's land and planning system.

The chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee, Shawki Khatib, said: "We've already seen the reality of which the Arab public says to the Jewish public, 'I want to live together, and I really mean it,' but the Jewish public has still not reached the same conclusion. This document is a preliminary spark. Its importance is not in its publishing, but in what happens after it."

Whatever else, the document is likely to further increase tensions between the Israeli government and the country's Palestinian minority and has been roundly condemned in the Hebrew MEDIA. An editorial in Israel's liberal *Ha'aretz* newspaper denounced the document as "undermining the Jewish character of the state" and argued that it was likely its publication would "actually weaken the standing of Arabs in Israel instead of strengthening it."

See also PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Hijackings

See ACHILLE LAURO; BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION; ENTEBBE; WADI' HADDAD; POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Histadrut

From its establishment in 1920 and into the 1990s, the Histadrut was one of the most powerful institutions in the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) and then in the state of Israel. (Histadrut is Hebrew for "organization" and is commonly used to refer to what was originally called the General Organization of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel, or Ha-Histadrut ha-Klalit shel ha-Ovdim Ha-Ivrim be-Eretz Yisrael.) The dense web of economic, social, cultural, and political institutions it controlled and the policies it implemented

not only helped shape Jewish society in Palestine but also affected the character and course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Histadrut was created as an instrument of labor ZIONISM, which emerged as a distinct tendency within the broader Zionist movement soon after the establishment of the Zionist Organization (later the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, WZO) in 1897. As opposed to both THEODOR HERZL's bourgeois-secular version of Zionism and the religious Zionist movement that emerged almost simultaneously, labor Zionists sought to synthesize the socialism popular among the oppressed Jewish masses in Eastern Europe (especially in Tsarist Russia) with Zionism's vision of solving Europe's "Jewish problem"—persistent or even worsening anti-Semitism—by creating a Jewish majority and a Jewish state in Palestine. Two rival labor-Zionist parties coalesced in Eastern Europe and then among Jewish immigrants to Palestine during the Second ALIYA (the 1903–1914 wave of Jewish IMMIGRATION to Palestine).

Though largely of lower-middle-class origin, the few thousand labor Zionists who in that period emigrated from Eastern Europe to what they regarded as their ancestral homeland were intent on transforming themselves into authentic workers through physical labor, especially in agriculture. This was in keeping with labor Zionism's doctrine of the "conquest of labor" (*kibbush ha-'avodah*), which asserted that in Palestine Jews could purge themselves, through manual labor, of the negative social characteristics with which they were associated in the DIASPORA and achieve both personal and national redemption. In so doing they would also create the nucleus of a Hebrew working class in Palestine, which would serve as the vanguard of the Zionist settlement and state-building enterprise. (Labor Zionists routinely used the term "Hebrew" instead of "Jew" to express their denigration and rejection of Diaspora Judaism, which they associated with statelessness and hence powerlessness, preferring to identify themselves with the ancient Hebrews, whom they saw as a sovereign people in their own homeland.)

However, these would-be workers quickly encountered obstacles unforeseen by the theoreticians of labor Zionism. Most Jewish farmers, especially the citrus plantation owners in the new Jewish agricultural settlements (*moshavot*) established from 1882 onward, preferred to employ cheaper (and less obstreperous) Palestinian workers, while the settlement and financial institutions of the Zionist Organization lacked the means to underwrite the large-scale settlement of these immigrants on farms of their own or secure them jobs elsewhere. As sociologist Gershon Shafir has shown, the inability of these immigrants to compete effectively in Palestine's labor market, dominated by masses of cheap Arab labor, and the resulting prospect that the Zionist project would founder because neither jobs nor resources for settlement (including both LAND and capital) were available to maintain them or attract others, led, through a process of trial and error, to the elaboration and adoption of both a new strategy and an ideology that justified it.

By World War I most labor Zionists had come to believe that the conquest of labor required not just individual and collective proletarianization but also a sustained campaign to prevent Jewish employers from employing Palestinian workers, thereby creating or preserving jobs for Jews. In the years that followed, the commitment to achieving Hebrew labor (*'avodah 'ivrit*)—exclusively Jewish employment in all Jewish sectors of Palestine's economy through exclusion of Arab workers, along with maximized Jewish employment in the government and non-Jewish private sectors—became a central component of labor-Zionist discourse and practice. At the same time, labor Zionists began to advocate a systematic effort to develop a separate, self-sufficient, and relatively high-wage Jewish economic sector in Palestine in which (ideally) only Jews would be employed, thereby creating the basis for an economically (and, eventually, politically) autonomous Yishuv. The leadership of the Zionist movement, initially indifferent or even hostile to labor Zionism, eventually endorsed and underwrote this strategy of economic separatism, through subsidies, land purchases, and political support, cementing what sociologist Michael Shalev has called a "practical alliance between a settlement movement without settlers and a workers' movement without work."

By the end of World War I, Britain had not only seized control of Palestine but endorsed the Zionist project, opening the way to large-scale Jewish immigration, settlement, and state building. To enhance labor Zionism's political and social weight within the Yishuv and the international Zionist movement, as well as its effectiveness in implementing its strategy, the two main labor-

Zionist parties—the avowedly social-democratic AHDUT HA'AVODAH (Unity of Labor), the successor of the prewar PO'ALE ZION (Workers of Zion), and the nonsocialist HAPOEL HATZAIR (The Young Worker)—agreed to create a new organization that could organize and mobilize all the Jewish workers in Palestine, regardless of party affiliation. The founding congress of the General Organization of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel took place in HAIFA in December 1920.

The founders of the Histadrut did not envision or structure it as a federation of autonomous trade unions, like the Trades Union Congress in Britain or the American Federation of Labor (or the later CIO and AFL-CIO). It was instead a highly centralized organization designed to further labor Zionism's goal of constructing in Palestine a politically, economically, and culturally separate Jewish society along social-democratic lines, which could eventually lead to a Jewish state. Early efforts by some Jewish trade unions to assert their autonomy were quickly crushed by the Histadrut leadership, and thereafter, notwithstanding sporadic upsurges from below, top-down control was exercised through a powerful, increasingly bureaucratized apparatus based in Tel Aviv (the Histadrut's headquarters there was later nicknamed "the Kremlin") as well as through a network of workers' councils in every Jewish city and town. The members of these councils and delegates to the Histadrut's congresses (which in turn elected its executive organs) were chosen not by trade unions but by the vote of all Histadrut members, under a system of proportional representation by party slates. This structure tended to give party apparatchiks (mainly from Ahdut Ha'avodah and then from MAPAI [Land of Israel Workers' Party], created in 1930 by the merger of that party with Hapo'el Hatza'ir) firm control of the Histadrut apparatus at the local as well as national level.

While the Histadrut leadership sometimes launched or supported (Jewish) workers' struggles for higher wages and better working conditions, on other occasions it sabotaged or crushed grassroots militancy when it was deemed to threaten the interests of Mapai, the Histadrut, or the Zionist cause. For the Histadrut leadership, trade unionism was always secondary in importance to the organization's "national" (i.e., Zionist) tasks, including immigration, settlement, education, and culture. The Histadrut played an especially crucial role in implementing labor Zionism's strategy of separate Jewish economic development in Palestine, using capital raised from its members' dues, the Zionist Organization, Jewish investors and donors, and later its own financial institutions to gradually build up a burgeoning network of industrial, agricultural, construction, housing, commercial, marketing, banking, insurance, and transport enterprises, largely controlled through its Hevrat 'Ovdim (Workers' Company) holding company. The Histadrut also played a central role in the sustained campaign to encourage Jews in Palestine to boycott local Arab and any imported produce and products to the greatest extent possible and instead to buy only local Jewish produce and goods, thereby supporting separate economic development. At the peak of the Histadrut's economic power in the 1970s, enterprises owned by or affiliated with it—including the new forms of collective and cooperative Jewish agricultural settlement (the KIBBUTZ and the *moshav*) developed in Palestine—accounted for as much as one-quarter of the Israeli economy. Beginning with some 5,000 members at its founding, the Histadrut also came to encompass over the decades an increasingly large proportion of Palestine's Jewish population (including the nonworking wives of its largely male membership) and to constitute a powerful (in some domains, virtually monopolistic) presence in the daily lives of most Israelis. In addition to its economic enterprises, it ran its own labor exchanges through which members could seek jobs; had affiliated organizations for women and youth; ran its own separate labor-oriented school system into the early 1950s; owned one of Israel's largest publishing houses; and offered members and their families a broad range of cultural, recreational, and social services, including Kupat Holim, the Histadrut's health-care organization, which at its peak (before the 1990s, when the state assumed greater control of the health-care system) served some three-quarters of Israel's population. Its members also played key roles in the Yishuv's main paramilitary organization, the HAGANA. At its high point in the mid-1980s, the Histadrut had some 1.6 million members—nearly half of Israel's Jewish population, more than one-third of its total population, and three-quarters of its wage earners.

The Histadrut's growing economic, social, and cultural influence made it central to the labor-Zionist movement's mobilization of the sociopolitical support it needed to achieve political and cultural hegemony in the Yishuv, Israel, and the

Zionist Organization—a position it then maintained for almost half a century. In 1921, Ahdut Ha'avodah leader DAVID BEN-GURION was elected secretary of the Histadrut; from that base he soon established himself as labor Zionism's preeminent leader in Palestine. By the early 1930s the growing electoral strength of Mapai (realized in large measure through its control of the Histadrut) enabled Ben-Gurion and his colleagues to secure key posts in the international Zionist movement. In 1935 Ben-Gurion became chairman of both the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE and the JEWISH AGENCY, the de facto political leadership of the Yishuv, and when Israel was established he became its first prime minister, succeeded in that office by various other leaders of Mapai and its successor, the LABOR PARTY, until the surprise victory of the Zionist right in the 1977 elections. Throughout that period the Histadrut remained the key institutional bulwark of the labor-Zionist camp and of the party-state that Mapai sought to construct in the Yishuv and then in Israel.

For its first four decades the Histadrut remained firmly committed to the goal of maximizing Hebrew labor. When either unemployment was high among Jewish workers or Mapai wanted to mobilize its mass base for political advantage (for example, in 1934, when it was engaged in a bitter struggle with its centrist and right-wing rivals), the Histadrut launched campaigns to compel Jewish employers (mainly citrus farmers and construction contractors) to replace their Palestinian workers with Jews, using picketing, harassment, intense political and moral pressure, and even violence. The Histadrut and the Zionist leadership also relentlessly lobbied the British authorities to increase the number of Jews working in government agencies and on government construction projects, arguing that the ratio of Jews employed should reflect the growing proportion of Jews in Palestine's population or (even better) the percentage of the government's tax revenues collected from Jews. During the 1936–1939 Palestinian ARAB REVOLT against British colonial rule and the Zionist project it protected and facilitated, labor-Zionist leaders were quick to argue that employing Jewish workers at critical sites like ports and railroads could help break the Arab general strike, a key component of the revolt. Unsurprisingly, the effort to achieve Hebrew labor evoked bitterness and outrage among Palestinian Arabs, especially those workers who felt that they lost or were denied jobs simply because they were not Jews.

Despite decades of sustained effort, however, the Histadrut's struggle to achieve Hebrew labor was never completely successful during the Mandate period. Jewish workers could never totally or permanently displace the much more plentiful (and less expensive) Arab workers in key sectors, such as agriculture, construction, the seaports, the Haifa oil refinery, and (during World War II) British military installations. It was only in 1947–1949, when most of the Palestinian inhabitants fled or were expelled from the territory that became Israel and massive numbers of Jews emigrated from Eastern Europe and then from Arab countries, that labor Zionism could achieve something approaching victory in its struggle for the conquest of labor.

From its inception and through the 1950s the Histadrut remained an exclusively Jewish organization. In the 1920s some marginal left-wing elements of labor Zionism (and the ANTI-ZIONIST Jewish communists, who were purged from the Histadrut in the mid-1920s) demanded that Arab workers be admitted or at least that the Histadrut commit itself to organizing Arab workers, especially in workplaces that employed both Arab and Jewish workers (e.g., the government-owned Palestine Railways). Ben-Gurion and his colleagues adamantly refused to allow Arabs to join the organization, because that would compromise its ability to fulfill its Zionist mission. Though the Histadrut eventually created a subsidiary organization for Arab workers (known in English as the Palestine Labor League [PLL]), the subsidiary never gained any significant membership or life of its own. The few Arab workers who joined did so mainly in the hope of securing jobs in Jewish-owned enterprises or of gaining access to HEALTH CARE and other services. Palestinian nationalists and trade unionists denounced the PLL as a Zionist front, and by the mid-1940s, when a vigorous Palestinian Arab trade union movement led in part by communists began to develop, the PLL was virtually defunct.

For a decade after 1948 the Histadrut, intent on protecting the jobs, wages, and superior status of its exclusively Jewish mass base, continued its attempts to bar PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL from employment in Jewish enterprises and refused to allow them to become members; instead, they were relegated to a resurrected PLL.

Only when the Israeli economy began to suffer from labor shortages in the late 1950s did the Histadrut move toward allowing "Israeli Arabs" (as they were officially designated) to join. Arabs were first allowed to vote in Histadrut elections in 1965, the term "Hebrew" was dropped from the organization's name, and Arabs would eventually come to constitute some 10 percent of the organization's membership. However, the Histadrut neither organized nor did anything concrete to help the large numbers of Palestinians from the WEST BANK and GAZA, occupied by Israel in 1967, who found jobs at low wages and with miserable conditions in Israeli agriculture, construction, and other sectors. Nor has it offered any real help to the foreign workers (usually undocumented and highly exploited) who largely replaced Palestinians at the bottom of the Israeli labor market after the First INTIFADA (1987–1993) and during the OSLO years (1993–2000).

The labor Zionist movement's loss of political and cultural hegemony in Israel from the late 1970s onward and the radical restructuring of Israel's economy along neoliberal lines beginning in the 1980s led to a sharp decline in the fortunes of the Histadrut. With state subsidies cut off, many of its enterprises were closed or sold off, and by the end of the 1990s it had lost nearly two-thirds of its membership (and hence most of its revenues), largely because once the state instituted a national health insurance system, Histadrut membership was no longer a requirement for access to the once nearly monopolistic Kupat Holim. Still closely linked with the Labor Party, itself in decline, the much-weakened Histadrut was, in the early years of the twenty-first century, struggling to hold on to its shrinking and beleaguered membership (now concentrated in the public sector) and to protect its wages and jobs. By then Israel had one of the most sharply skewed income distributions among the highly industrialized economies, in large part because of the poverty of many of its Palestinian citizens and the economic transformations that had disproportionately disadvantaged working-class Israeli Jews from Arab lands.

The labor Zionist strategy of ethnic exclusion and economic separatism, in whose implementation the Histadrut played a key role, clearly contributed a great deal to the establishment of a viable Jewish economy, society, and state in Palestine. At the same time, however, that strategy exacerbated antagonism and conflict between Arabs and Jews, with consequences that remain evident to the present day.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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—Zachary Lockman

Hizbullah (Party of God)

A Shi'ia Islamist group in LEBANON founded in 1982 to fight the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, Hizbullah (Party of God) has a military wing and a civilian arm, which runs hospitals, news services, and educational facilities; holds seats in the Lebanese parliament; and in 2005 held

several cabinet positions in the Lebanese government. In the summer of 2006 it fought a major war with Israel.

The Holocaust

The Holocaust (in Hebrew, HaShoah) is considered in the West the genocide of six million Jews under the German Nazi regime during World War II. A somewhat broader definition emerges when other groups also exterminated by the Nazis and their collaborators are considered. Indeed, millions of Gentiles were also victimized by efforts to exterminate "racially inferior" or "undesirable" groups. More than 330,000 to 500,000 Sinti and Roma (in Romani the genocide is called Porrajmos) were murdered in the Holocaust. More than 2 million non-Jewish Poles were exterminated, between 5.5 and 7 million Ukrainians (by Russia), between 100,000 and 700,000 Serbs, between 100,000 and 250,000 of the disabled, tens of thousands of homosexuals, between 2,500 and 5,000 Jehovah's Witnesses, plus untold numbers of Czechs, Greeks, Freemasons, and others. Taking all these other groups into account, the total death toll rises considerably; estimates generally place the total number of Holocaust victims at 9 to 12 million, though some estimates have ranged as high as 26 million.

The Holocaust has been ever present in the thinking of modern Israel, and the link between the birth of Israel and the genocide of 6 million Jews under the German Nazi regime during World War II remains indissoluble. The Holocaust suffuses every aspect of Israel's discourse, society, culture, politics, and militarism. As Israeli scholar Idith Zertal puts it: "Through a dialectical process of appropriation and exclusion, remembering and forgetting, Israeli society has defined itself in relation to the Holocaust. . . . It has been processed, coded, and put to use in Israel's public space."

One dimension of the connection between Israel and the Holocaust is the way the genocide of the Jews of Europe has been essentialized as proof of the Jews' uniqueness. Portraying the Holocaust as a uniquely Jewish experience deepens Jews' sense of themselves and others, the feeling of Jews as being essentially and eternally victims and conversely entitled to unlimited might and power and the right to use force at will. The Holocaust and the paradigm of power that grew out of it reinforce the perception of the Jews' inherent and permanent uniqueness among all nations in the world, which further legitimizes any actions taken by the state.

This reflects a process of social construction by the country's elites to serve the particular interests of ZIONISM. As Zertal notes, "There has not been a war in Israel, from 1948 till the present ongoing outburst of violence which began in October 2000 that has not been perceived, defined, and conceptualized in terms of the Holocaust. . . . Auschwitz—as the embodiment of the total, ultimate evil—was, and still is, summoned up for military and security issues . . . where Auschwitz is not a past event but a threatening present and a constant option . . . [by which] Israel rendered itself immune to criticism, and impervious to a rational dialogue with the world around her."

Zertal describes the 1961 trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem as "one of the most constitutive events in the annals of Israel." The trial "was a historic, continuous morality play . . . [that] created the teleological, indispensable connection between the agony and death of the Jewish DIASPORA and the establishment and the *right* to exist of the State of Israel, including its daily practices, especially the military ones. Thus, the trial gave new meaning to the fight against the Arab enemy." Perhaps as important, the trial served to boost the status of the Israeli army, as its might was viewed as indispensable to the security of the Jews—and to preventing a second Holocaust.

At the time of the Eichmann trial, MOSHE DAYAN, then Israeli minister of agriculture, spoke about the connection between the European tragedy and the land of Israel. "What is becoming clear at the Eichmann trial is the active passivity of the world in the face of the murder of the six million. There can be no doubt that only this country and only this people can protect the Jews again against a second Holocaust. And hence every inch of Israeli soil is intended for Jews only." Thereafter the Israeli government and public were prone to invoke the Holocaust when confronting threats—from the aggressive rhetoric of Arab leaders to stone-throwing Palestinians.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arabs were transformed into Nazis and the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict into another ever-present potential Holocaust. DAVID BEN-GURION, the first Israeli leader to use the term "Arab Nazis," did so as early as 1947, although not in public. In planning for

the Eichmann trial he made the first of many public declarations, telling a *New York Times* reporter that the "trial will help us ferret out other Nazis—for example, the connection between Nazis and some Arab rulers," and he went on to talk about EGYPT's JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. Thereafter, virtually every Israeli leader from Ben-Gurion through BENJAMIN NETANYAHU has repeated the Nazi-Arab association and described the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict in terms of the Holocaust.

The Holocaust has been variously appropriated, politicized, and mobilized by groups and individuals to promote various agendas. Indeed, the Holocaust became a dominant shadow in Israel at times of crisis such as war, military OCCUPATION, and relations with the world beyond Israel. Whoever controlled the interpretation of the legacy of the Holocaust wielded a formidable symbolic power against their enemies, whether Palestinians, Arab nations, or any critics of Israel's policies, With the end of World War II and the revelations of the results of Hitler's genocidal program, Zionist leaders argued that, had a Jewish state been established before the war, millions of Jews would have had a secure homeland.

The subject of the Holocaust gave rise to several serious debates in Israel. One of the first conflicts about the genocide was whether or not the Israeli government should accept reparations from West GERMANY. In 1951 Prime Minister Ben-Gurion asserted, "They [the Arabs] could slaughter us tomorrow in this country. . . . We don't want to relive the situation that you [Holocaust survivors] endured. We don't want the Arab Nazis to come and slaughter us." Money from Germany was judged necessary to strengthen the Israeli infrastructure, especially the military of the fledgling state. But MENAHEM BEGIN and the HERUT PARTY decried what they saw as Ben-Gurion's immoral pragmatism in dealing with the hated Germans. In the raucous debates that ensued, Begin articulated an elevated, purist view of the Holocaust that he believed ought to guide state policy, rather than a state policy that made the sacred memory of the Holocaust a factor to be used or ignored as expedience dictated.

In 1953, Israel institutionalized remembrance of the Holocaust by establishing an annual Holocaust and Ghetto Rebellion Memorial Day (Yom HaShoah), to appear on the Israeli calendar between Passover and Independence Day. Yad Vashem, the memorial to the Holocaust in JERUSALEM, opened to the public in 1957.

Israeli leaders from 1948 on drew on Nazi/Holocaust imagery, allusions, and analogies to vilify Israel's external enemies. However, the 1967 WAR changed all that. Because of the UN Partition Plan (UN RESOLUTION 181) and further conquests in the 1948 WAR, Israel before the 1967 War controlled over 78 percent of historic Palestine. After the June 1967 War, Israel instituted a military Occupation of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, thus seizing control over the remaining 22 percent of Palestinian land. Because of the bellicosity of threats coming from Arab leaders in the weeks before the war began, Israelis and many Jews worldwide were convinced of an imminent catastrophe—another Holocaust. Israeli commentators regularly equated Egypt's Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir with Hitler. There was also growing opposition from some Israeli elites to Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL's seeming vacillation in light of the Arab threats. Then out of power, Ben-Gurion zeroed in on the issue facing the Israelis: "A war of annihilation. None of us can forget the Holocaust that the Nazis inflicted on us. And if some Arab rulers declare day and night that Israel must be annihilated—this time referring not to the entire Jewish people in the world, but to the Jews living in their land—it is our duty not to take these statements lightly."

Jews around the world were galvanized to rally around what many perceived as a beleaguered Israel. Some even traveled there, including the then relatively unknown Jewish writer and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, who made the journey to Israel from the UNITED STATES and witnessed the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) at work, offering this impassioned report: "In the OLD CITY of Jerusalem, barely re-conquered, I saw hardened paratroopers pray and weep for the first time in their lives; I saw them, in the thick of battle, gripped by an ancient collective fervor, kiss the stones of the WESTERN WALL and commune in a silence as elusive as it was pure; I saw them, as in a dream, jump two thousand years into the past, renewing their bond with legend, memory and the mysterious tradition of Israel." Wiesel's rhapsodic testimony about the Israeli soldiers expressed the euphoria many Jews experienced.

Soon after the 1967 War, Israel began sending Jewish settlers to colonize parts of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. With religious sites now in Israel's possession, a movement of JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST ideological settlers (e.g., GUSH

EMUNIM and others) made its presence felt in Israeli political affairs. While the resolutely secular Ben-Gurion never hesitated in comparing Arabs to Nazis, Gush Emunim shared the same feelings but with a fundamentalist worldview. For example, in 1988 a settler writing in Gush Emunim's paper stated, "There is no difference between the PLO's attitude towards the State of Israel and that of other Arab countries, just as there is no difference between them—and the Final Solution scheme and the liquidation of the Jewish people as perpetrated by the brutal troops of Hitler and Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. There is, indeed, one difference between Hitler and Arafat: Hitler implemented his scheme, Arafat simply cannot implement his."

Despite the widespread fear and insecurity in Israel, the war's brevity (six days) and its results demonstrated that the Israeli military was the overwhelmingly preponderant force in the region. Israel's military prowess impressed the United States, and not long after, the US government came to regard Israel as a "STRATEGIC ASSET" in the Middle East. In the first decades following the 1967 War, one witnessed the beginnings of a Holocaust culture industry in the United States: innumerable books, histories, and testimonies on the tragedy; symposia and university courses; interfaith conferences; museums and memorials; and popular and documentary films on the Holocaust. During this time, Wiesel's career as witness to the Holocaust began to accelerate, as he became a public speaker, commentator, and professor of increasing renown at major universities (Yale, Boston University, etc.). Wiesel stood resolutely on the side of Israel by speaking as a survivor of Auschwitz in defense of the Jewish state, particularly after the October 1973 war. In 1978 President JIMMY CARTER authorized a President's Commission on Remembering the Holocaust.

The year 1977 witnessed the passing of power in Israel from the LABOR PARTY to the LIKUD with Menahem Begin becoming prime minister. Since the 1940s Begin had frequently alluded to the Holocaust in his skirmishes with opponents. In 1978 Begin, along with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for the peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel. But Begin's image as peacemaker was severely challenged by Israel's invasion of LEBANON in the summer of 1982, and by the IDF's failure to restrain its PHALANGIST allies on a rampage in the Palestinian refugee camps of SABRA AND SHATILA in September of that year, in which hundreds of Palestinian civilians were massacred.

In a meeting of his cabinet in early June, Begin attempted to justify his course of action: "You know what I did and what we all did to prevent war and bereavement, but it is our fate that in Eretz Israel there is no escape from fighting with dedication. Believe me, the alternative is Treblinka [the Nazi extermination camp], and we have decided that there will be no more Treblinkas." He likened Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT to Adolf Hitler and viewed the Israeli invasion as parallel to the Allied forces marching into Berlin in 1945 to finish off Hitler. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon had generated considerable international criticism, Begin claimed in the Knesset, "No one, anywhere in the world, can preach morality to our people."

Some Israeli Jews, however, were willing to preach morality to their own government. Writer AMOS OZ retorted to Begin a few weeks later: "There is not and cannot be balm for the open wound in our souls. Tens of thousands of Arab dead will not heal this wound. But, Mr. Begin, Adolf Hitler died 37 years ago. Sadly or not: it is a fact: Hitler is not hiding in Nabatiyeh, Sidon or Beirut. He is dead and burnt."

Contradictory voices were increasingly making themselves heard. Well-known Israeli philosopher YESHAYAHU LEIBOWITZ referred scathingly to "Judeo-Nazi" policies. Dr. Shlomo Shmelzman, a Holocaust survivor, explained in a statement to the press why he was on a hunger strike in protest of the Israeli war in Lebanon: "In my childhood I have suffered fear, hunger and humiliation when I passed from the Warsaw Ghetto, through labor camps, to Buchenwald. Today, as a citizen of Israel, I cannot accept the systematic destruction of cities, towns, and refugee camps. I cannot accept the technocratic cruelty of the bombing, destroying and killing of human beings. I hear too many familiar sounds today, sounds which are being amplified by the war. I hear 'dirty Arabs' and I remember 'dirty Jews.' I hear about 'CLOSED [MILITARY ZONES]' and I remember ghettos and camps. I hear 'two-legged beasts' and I remember '*Untermenschen* (subhumans).' I hear about tightening the SIEGE, clearing the area, pounding the city into submission and I remember suffering, destruction, death, blood and murder. . . . Too many things in Israel remind me of too many other things from my childhood."

Israeli novelist A. B. YEHOSHUA also drew parallels that countered Begin's rhetoric about the invasion. After the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, Yehoshua stated that "even if I could believe that IDF soldiers who stood at a distance of 100 meters from the camps did not know what happened, then this would be the same lack of knowledge of the Germans who stood outside Buchenwald and Treblinka and did not know what was happening! We too did not want to know."

Wiesel was disturbed by such intellectuals and politicians who, he said, "profaned the memory of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust by comparing Beirut with the Warsaw Ghetto . . . Israel's soldiers with the Nazis; the military operation in Lebanon with the genocide perpetrated by the Nazis—obscene comparisons, twisted analogies, vile and base and rooted in hate." Unlike Yehoshua and Shmelzman, Wiesel believed that, as a Jew loyal to Israel, his mission was not to criticize Israeli power or Begin's discourse of the Holocaust but to criticize those who were speaking truth to Israeli power.

Wiesel, and by association Holocaust remembrance, received prestigious recognition in 1986, when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. One year earlier he had been awarded the US Congressional Medal of Honor, further evidence of his increasing celebrity. Some Israelis offered spirited, at times raucous commentary on his awards, from criticism of Wiesel making personal gain from the Holocaust to his lack of a forthright criticism of Israel's policies toward the Palestinians. In his speech in Oslo, Wiesel referred to Israel's commitment to resolving its conflicts with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbors: "Israel will cooperate, I am sure of that. I trust Israel, for I have faith in the Jewish people. . . . Please understand my deep and total commitment to Israel: if you could remember what I remember, you *would* understand. Israel is the only nation in the world whose very existence is threatened."

In late 1987, Israelis were caught by surprise at the outbreak of a society-wide Palestinian effort to shake off the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which was known as the INTIFADA. Palestinians pursued largely nonviolent means—strikes, marches, and a TAX REVOLT—to challenge Israeli domination. Israeli leaders saw the uprising as another manifestation of an eternal anti-Jewish hatred that could only be countered with power and arms. In the Israeli press an exchange was reported between an Israeli physician, Marcus Levin, and his colleagues. Levin had been called up to duty and assigned the task of examining Palestinian PRISONERS both before and after Israeli soldiers interrogated them. Surprised at being asked to inspect the prisoners after interrogation, Levin was told that some Palestinian prisoners had broken bones. Levin subsequently told the commander of the camp, "My name is Marcus Levin and not Josef Mengele, and for reasons of conscience I refuse to serve in this place." One of Levin's medical partners sought to assuage his discomfort and told him, "Marcus, first you feel like Mengele, but after a few days you get used to it." The title of this account in an Israeli newspaper was "You Will Get Used to Being a Mengele."

Although Holocaust analogies and comparisons had long been used in Israel to defend Israeli actions, after the LEBANON WAR and increasingly during the Intifada, Holocaust references that criticized Israeli power began to circulate more widely. In 1991, Israeli writer Ari Shavit wrestled with images of the Holocaust in the contemporary scene: "Like a believer whose faith is cracking, I go over and over again in my heart the long list of arguments, the list of the differences. There are no crematoria here, I remind myself, and there was no conflict between people there. Germany, with its racist doctrine, was organized evil, its people were not in danger, and so on. But then I realized that the problem is not in the similarity—for no one can seriously think that there is a real similarity—but that there isn't enough lack of similarity. The problem is that the lack of similarity isn't strong enough to silence once and for all the evil echoes, the accusing images." During Israel's Lebanon invasion, when an Israeli officer was charged with unjustified violence toward Palestinians, he admitted that he had instructed his men to write numbers on the Palestinian prisoners' arms. With the famous 1993 handshake between Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN and Arafat, presided over by US president BILL CLINTON, many people expected progress in the peace process. But among right-wing Israelis the Holocaust was invoked and the prime minister equated with Hitler. A Likud press release asserted that "Rabin must not speak in the name of the Holocaust martyrs when he receives the [Nobel Peace] prize together with the heir of the Nazis." In an increasingly hysterical environment, Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish religious student in 1995.

In 1993 the Holocaust remembrance project that began with Carter was completed under Clinton: the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum opened to the public on the national mall in Washington, DC. Controversy ensued when, after the OSLO ACCORDS, the Clinton administration invited Arafat to the museum. Amid criticism that Arafat's record of TERRORISM would tarnish the reputation of the museum, officials denied him the security protection typically made available to other world leaders, so the Palestinian leader canceled the visit. A similar controversy had taken place in January 1995 when Polish leader Lech Walesa intended to invite other Nobel laureates to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz death camp. More clamor erupted, with one Holocaust survivor commenting, "Arafat will go to Auschwitz to learn from his teacher, Hitler, how to destroy us." Walesa decided not to invite the Nobel laureates.

In 2005 this perception of persecution and victimization was again expressed in Holocaust terms when several thousand Israeli settlers were ordered to depart the Gaza Strip by ARIEL SHARON's government. In protest, settlers donned Star of David patches, which Jews had been forced to wear under Nazi rule. Settlers, among them Holocaust survivors and their children, contended that withdrawal would lead to another Holocaust. Israeli rabbi and Holocaust survivor Israel Meir Lau rebuked the settlers, stating, "The deliberate murder of six million Jews is such a sacred and significant thing that it cannot be compared with absolutely anything else in the world."

Other Jews in Israel and the Diaspora, however, continued to criticize the Israeli military Occupation, based upon the experiences of Jews during the Holocaust. Amira Hass, an Israeli journalist who lived with Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank, recalled a formative story from her mother: "On a summer day in 1944, my mother was herded from a cattle car along with the rest of its human cargo, which had been transported from Belgrade to the concentration camp at Bergen-Belsen. She saw a group of German women, some on foot, some on bicycles, slow down as the strange procession went by and watch with indifferent curiosity on their faces. For me, those women became a loathsome symbol of watching from the sidelines, and at an early age I decided that my place was not with the bystanders. In the end, my desire to live in Gaza stemmed neither from adventurism nor from insanity, but from that dread of being a bystander, from my need to understand, down to the last detail, a world that is, to the best of my political and historical comprehension, a profoundly Israeli creation."

Like Amira Hass, Sara Roy is a daughter of Holocaust survivors and an authority on the Gaza Strip. In a reflection on what it has been like to grow up in the shadow of the Holocaust—one hundred members of her family and extended family were killed in Poland—Roy offered a view opposed to those of Begin and Ben-Gurion, Wiesel and Dayan, and Gush Emunim: "Memory in Judaism—like all memory—is dynamic, not static, embracing a multiplicity of voices and shunning the hegemony of one. But in the post-Holocaust world, Jewish memory has faltered—even failed—in one critical respect: it has excluded the reality of Palestinian suffering and Jewish culpability therein. As a people, we have been unable to link the creation of Israel with the displacement of the Palestinians. We have been unwilling to see, let alone remember, that finding our place meant the loss of theirs. Perhaps one reason for the ferocity of the conflict today is that Palestinians are insisting on their voice despite our continued and desperate efforts to subdue it. Within the Jewish community it has always been considered a form of heresy to compare Israeli actions or policies with those of the Nazis, and certainly one must be very careful in doing so. But what does it mean when Israeli soldiers paint identification numbers on Palestinian arms; when young Palestinian men and boys of a certain age are told through Israeli loudspeakers to gather in the town square; when Israeli soldiers openly admit to shooting Palestinian children for sport; when some of the Palestinian dead must be buried in mass graves while the bodies of others are left in city streets and camp alleyways because the army will not allow proper burial; when certain Israeli officials and Jewish intellectuals publicly call for the destruction of Palestinian villages in retaliation for SUICIDE BOMBINGS or for the TRANSFER of the Palestinian population out of the West Bank and Gaza; when 46 percent of the Israeli public favors such transfers and when transfer or expulsion becomes a legitimate part of popular discourse; when government officials speak of the 'cleansing of the refugee camps'; and when a leading Israeli intellectual calls for hermetic separation between Israelis and Palestinians in the form of a

Berlin Wall, caring not whether the Palestinians on the other side of the wall may starve to death as a result. What are we supposed to think when we hear this? What is my mother supposed to think?"

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—Mark Chmiel

Holst, Johan Juergen (1938–1994)

Johan Juergen Holst was the Norwegian foreign and defense minister who played a singularly important role in bringing about the OSLO ACCORDS. Norwegian secret diplomacy was the central factor in birthing the tentative peace agreement between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), initialed in Oslo on 20 August 1993, in which the PLO and Israel reached agreement on limited autonomy for Palestinians. The basis for much of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES was developed at meetings in Holst's and other Norwegians' homes.

Holst believed that the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE was the "front door" to peace in the Middle East, but that there needed to be a "back door," which Norway could provide by being an "honest broker" in negotiations. At a press conference shortly before the Oslo Accords were formally signed in Washington, Holst outlined the nature of Norwegian participation: a total of fourteen PLO-Israeli meetings were held in Norway under conditions of deepest secrecy, eleven of them in the four months preceding the initialing of the accord. "Our mission has been to mediate when the two sides felt the need for it." He said the negotiations were carried out in three phases: a preparatory one from January 1992 to January 1993, an "academic" study from January to March 1993, and direct negotiations from April to August.

According to Holst, Norway's role as secret mediator began with FAFO—the Norwegian Trade Union Centre for Social Science and Research, which had been studying the living conditions of Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES since 1988. This secured them contacts among both Israelis and the PLO, which in turn provided a key diplomatic opening. FAFO acted, for example, as an intermediary in the up to twenty telephone calls a day between the two sides.

The Norwegian working team consisted of two married couples: Holst and his wife Marianne Heiberg, who led the FAFO study group, and FAFO head TERJE ROED-LARSEN and his wife Mona Juul, who worked in Holst's secretariat. Holst was convinced that this "family atmosphere" broke down the barriers of suspicion and reserve and got the two sides on good terms. Because the political reality of the Oslo Accords necessitated extensive international aid to the Palestinians, Holst was also active in enlisting the help of the other SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES in procuring funds. The joint Nordic contribution to the Palestinians at the outset was approximately US$140 million.

See also SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

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Holst Fund

The Holst Fund was one of several channels of European financial assistance to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). It was established in December 1993 by the World Bank as a central, but temporary and short-term, repository for donations to help the interim government pay start-up expenses and short-term operating costs (as compared to development aid). The World Bank was responsible for overseeing the use of these funds on behalf of the contributing donors. In 1994 the Holst Fund disbursed approximately $51 million to the PNA and to the PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION.

The Holst Fund gradually began to expand its mandate beyond the PNA (and, after 1998, ceased paying for support of the PNA budget). In the first half of 1996, responding to skyrocketing unemployment in the Occupied Territories as a consequence of Israeli-imposed border CLOSURES and RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, the fund developed a rapid response mechanism in the form of the Employment Generation Program (EGP) to fund "make-work" schemes and small-scale micro projects. The Holst Fund contributed $23 million to the EGP that year.

After 1997 the EGP evolved from "make-work" schemes into a program of more sustainable community-based, high-labor-content micro projects, identified and implemented by local communities. Between 1997 and 2000 the Holst Fund received $269 million from 26 donors and distributed $220 million toward budget support and $40 million toward energy employment activities, including EGP and others. The fund ceased operations in March 2001.

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Holy Basin

The Holy Basin, the land in the OLD CITY and its immediate surroundings, where tens of thousands of Palestinians currently live, is the most extreme and volatile site of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli settlers and, officially or tacitly, the government are literally racing to create facts on the ground in Palestinian neighborhoods to foreclose any future settlement of JERUSALEM that would divide the city between a Jewish and a Palestinian state. The object is to totally Judaize this area, thus preventing Palestinians from having any future claim. As strife in Jerusalem, itself the center of the conflict, intensifies due to the struggles over LAND confiscation, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, home takeovers by settlers, as well as the separation BARRIER, activity in the Holy Basin is the most sensitive focal point of this complex reality.

The term "Holy Basin" should not be confused with the "Jerusalem Envelope," which is the

area that the Barrier will encompass around Jerusalem. The entire length of the Barrier will be approximately 770 kilometers (462 miles), and about 168 kilometers (101 miles) of these, or about 21 percent of the length, will be built in and around Jerusalem, enclosing a far larger area than that which constitutes the Holy Basin.

On 31 March 2009, on the eve of the swearing-in of a new ultra-right-wing government with BENJAMIN NETANYAHU (responsible for HAR HOMA and opening the HASMONEAN TUNNEL) as prime minister, the lead editorial in *Ha'aretz* reported that "right-wing elements in the new coalition and among the settlers are preparing to heighten Israeli control in East Jerusalem. . . . Settlers' associations that have gained purchase in the Holy Basin near the Old City are increasing their pressure on the political system. Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat, who was supported by these groups in his election campaign, was under pressure from them to demolish dozens of homes in the village of SILWAN to reduce the Palestinian population in the area. . . . It can be assumed that the ATERET COHANIM activists who were behind the establishment of the Jewish neighborhood in ABU DIS will lobby their loyalists in the government and the municipality to revive the project. . . . Netanyahu's declaration that his government will renew the negotiations with the Palestinians is at odds with unilateral measures in Jerusalem, whose status is one of the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian agenda."

On 1 May 2009 *Ha'aretz* revealed the existence of a secret Israeli government plan to thwart the division of Jerusalem. "The government and settler organizations are working to surround the Old City of Jerusalem with nine national parks, pathways and sites, drastically altering the status quo in the city. As part of the plan, Palestinian areas of the old city neighborhoods are being cleared and turned into lush gardens and parks, now already accessible to visitors who can walk along new footpaths and take in the majestic views, along with new signs and displays that point out significant points of Jewish history. The focus of the project is solely on Jewish heritage, despite the religious significance of the area to Muslims and Christians and the fact that Palestinians have lived in these neighborhoods for centuries; moreover, in the larger government plan, much of the presentation is being shaped by right-wing settler groups with a singularly Zionist approach, emphasizing ancient Jewish religion and history, even in mostly Palestinian neighborhoods.

Ha'aretz further revealed that Israel is clandestinely carrying out a $100 million, multiyear development plan in some of the most significant religious and national heritage sites just outside the walled Old City, the Holy Basin, as part of an effort to strengthen the status of Jerusalem as its capital. ARCHAEOLOGY, new Jewish SETTLEMENTS, parks, and recreational areas are all being developed in the service of Israel's retention of Jerusalem under its united and permanent sovereignty. In the process Palestinians are being dispossessed and excluded from having any claim to the city's eastern sector—an integral part of every peace plan thus far proposed. Based on the Geneva Conventions and numerous UNITED NATIONS resolutions such as Resolution 181 (Partition), Resolutions 242 and 338 (inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force), Israel's 1967 OCCUPATION and the June 1980 Knesset law making Jerusalem the capital of Israel are violations of INTERNATIONAL LAW.

The secret plan was assigned to the Jerusalem Development Authority (JDA). In a report presented to former prime minister EHUD OLMERT on 11 September 2008, the JDA described the purpose of the project as "to create a sequence of parks surrounding the Old City," all in the aspiration "to strengthen Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Israel."

The program, sponsored by the prime minister's office and the mayor of Jerusalem and largely outsourced to the private settler group ELAD, has been kept hush-hush to prevent any public debate. "It is a detailed, confidential government plan, the motivation is to create Israeli hegemony over the area around the Old City, inspired by extreme right-wing ideology."

The government development plan was first agreed upon in 2005 "to strengthen the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel," as it states in its opening line, and became operational in 2008, with the prime minister's office and the municipality jointly responsible. The *New York Times* reported that despite the expected objections of the Obama administration, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that it will push ahead with the project. Interior Minister Eli Yishai said in early May 2009 of the activity in the Holy Basin: "I intend to act on this issue with full strength. This is the land of our sovereignty.

Jewish settlement there is our right." Another official in the prime minister's office told the *Times*: "Jerusalem has been the eternal capital of the Jewish people for some 3,000 years and will remain the united capital of the State of Israel. Under Israeli sovereignty, for the first time in the history of Jerusalem, the different religious communities have enjoyed freedom of worship and the holy sites of all faiths have been protected."

Ha'aretz wrote: "This program integrates with statutory Program 11555, approved by the Jerusalem municipality in November 2007, designed to accelerate development [to six housing units per dunum, or some 24 units per acre] in one of the most important archaeological sites in Israel. The array of escalators, cable cars and tunnels included in the plan portend blatant signs of a biblical playground populated by settler organizations, which the organization says will be carried out by ousting Palestinian residents."

The plan provides a comprehensive view of how the government and settlers, working as one body, are creating a "biblical" territorial reign which connects Armon Hanatziv and Silwan in the south, Ras al-Amud and the Mount of Olives in the east, and Shayk Jarrah in the north, by connecting all of the land east of E-1. The map of ELAD's "Ancient Jerusalem" is, according to *Ha'aretz*, very similar to the map of the current Holy Basin project of the Old City.

Since 1967, Israeli governments have given clear priority to ideological settler organizations that work to strengthen their hold on the Holy Basin area. These settler organizations labor to increase the Jewish presence, usually through the establishment of fenced and guarded Jewish-only communities, in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem. Following the 1993 Declaration of Principles and especially after the 2000 Camp David Summit and the subsequent Clinton Parameters, there has been a marked increase in efforts to create facts on the ground in order to prevent the future possibility of geographically dividing the city.

Sites of Conflict in the Holy Basin


Mughrabi Gate: The Mughrabi Gate is situated near the southeast corner of the Old City, southwest of the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif. It was built by the Ottoman emperor Suleiman the Magnificent and is one of seven open gates (there are three sealed gates) facilitating access to and from the Old City. The gate is the closest gate to the Western Wall and is a main passage for vehicles.

On 14 February 2004, torrential rains led to collapse of the earthwork ramp that had connected the Western Wall compound to the Mughrabi Gate since 1967. The Israeli authorities wanted to restore entry to the Mughrabi Gate, and in 2006 the Jerusalem Municipality proposed a plan that would have radically altered the status quo in terms of access to the site. The plan envisions replacing the ramp with a massive bridge that would permit much larger numbers of people—Israelis, tourists, security forces—to access the gate and in turn provide direct entry to the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif from the Western Wall compound.

This plan generated heated debate, in part because of Palestinian/Muslim mistrust regarding Israeli intentions, and in part because the issue of construction of the ramp at the Mughrabi Gate is not purely archaeological. The real question concerns whether sovereignty over the Temple Mount and adjacent areas lies in the hands of Israel or the Islamic Waqf. The project was placed on temporary hold.

Of all the gates providing entry to the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif, the Mughrabi Gate is both unique and the most sensitive. The keys of the other gates remain in the hands of the Waqf, the Islamic administrative authority responsible for al-Haram ash-Sharif, which also controls access to the Temple Mount/al-Haram compound. However, since 1967 direct control over the Mughrabi Gate has remained with the Israeli authorities. It is via the Mughrabi Gate that the periodic and often tense and controversial visits by Jews to the Muslim sacred site take place, and it is also the primary route of admission to the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif for Israeli security forces when disturbances erupt.

In December 2007 following the Annapolis Summit, the Israeli government decided to renew excavations beneath the Mughrabi Gate, designed to allow construction of the new bridge on the site. On 17 January 2008 the Jewish District Committee approved a new revised and expanded plan for restoration of the Mughrabi Gate proposed by the Jerusalem Municipality. The plan includes enlarging the women's section of the Western Wall to include the space under the ramp, where there are archaeological remains from various periods. Both



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Map 22. The Holy Basin of the Old City, 2008

of these aspects of the plan have brought about massive public dissent among Palestinians and Israeli organizations such as Ir Amin: For an Equitable and Stable Jerusalem with an Agreed Political Future; Bimkon: Planners for Planning Rights; Jerusalem Inter-Cultural Center (JICC); The Open House: Jerusalem Open House (JOH); Sikkuy: The Association for the Advancement of Civic Equality in Israel; Yesh Din: Volunteers for Human Rights; ACRI: Association for Civil Rights in Israel, and others.

In July 2008 the Jerusalem Planning and Construction Committee, under pressure from these Israeli groups, agreed that archaeological remains from the later periods (including Mughrabi quarter remains) should be preserved, and that utilization of the space under the bridge for prayer should be prohibited. What happens in the future remains to be seen. But this perhaps explains the government's secrecy with regard to its master plan for Jerusalem discussed at the outset.

Herod's Gate: Herod's Gate is located on the northeastern perimeter of the Old City and was built in 1538–1540 by Suleiman the Magnificent's architects. The conflict here involves a pending project planned by the municipality, known as the "Herod's Gate project," or more prosaically, the "Town Planning Scheme (TPS) 9870," for a new settlement adjacent to Herod's Gate inside the Muslim Quarter of the Old City. The plan was approved by the Jerusalem Municipality in July 2005, but since then no further action has been taken to expedite its final approval by the government of Israel. The area in question is located at the northeastern tip of the Old City and consists of 3.8 dunums (1 acre), which is a relatively large open space in the context of the densely populated Old City. Currently, the area is used as a playground, but this is set to change. The Herod's Gate project consists of twenty-one housing units and a golden-domed synagogue that will loom over the city walls when completed. The outcome of this first governmental construction project in the Old City will be the creation of a new Jewish-only area. Though the scheme is currently dormant, it is likely to be implemented in the future.

Damascus Gate (underground "Solomon's Quarry"): This is the main north-facing gate of the Old City, built in 1542 by the Ottoman ruler Suleiman the Magnificent. Solomon's Quarry (also known as Zedekiah's Cave) is a 5-acre (20-dunum) underground limestone quarry that runs the length of five city blocks under the Muslim Quarter of the Old City, carved over a period of several thousand years. The entrance to Solomon's Quarry is just beneath the Old City wall, between the Damascus and Herod Gates, about 500 feet (150 meters) east of the former. In the mid-1990s the Israeli government contracted Ateret Cohanim, one of the largest settlement organizations in East Jerusalem, to "restore," with government funding, the 3,000-year-old quarry.

The quarry begins adjacent to Herod's Gate, and the underground excavated area stretches around 820 feet (250 meters) toward the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif. In the past, funding for the project has come, in part, from a fund held in the Ministry of Infrastructure intended for the rehabilitation of modern quarries that have become a blight on the landscape. The intentions of the government and the settlers are clear: to link the quarry with the Hasmonean Tunnel, creating a subterranean settler thoroughfare that will traverse the Old City, from the Damascus Gate in the north to the Mughrabi Gate in the south. Other proposals raised by the settlers include the opening of an underground theme park or opening the site for weddings and bar mitzvahs. This project is under way.

Hasmonean Tunnel: The Hasmonean Tunnel is an underground tunnel exposing the Western Wall in its full length. The tunnel is adjacent to the Western Wall and is located under buildings in the Old City. On 24 September 1996, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered that a new exit be cut from the Struthion Pool area to the Via Dolorosa. Palestinians believed that the real aim was to make the al-Haram ash-Sharif collapse; demonstrations erupted in which seventy Palestinians and sixteen IDF soldiers were killed.

Western Wall Tunnel and Ohel Yitzhak: Excavations have recently resumed inside the Western Wall Tunnel (which leads to the Hasmonean Tunnel) under the auspices of an archaeologist closely associated with the settlers. A mere 80 meters to the west, excavations (called "Ohel Yitzhak") are taking place under a settler house in the Muslim Quarter. There is basis for the conclusion that the intention is to link the house to the tunnel. Meanwhile, aboveground at Ohel Yitzhak construction of a new synagogue is proceeding.

Western Wall excavations and the Makhkame Complex: On the western perimeter of the Western Wall plaza, excavations are well under way in

preparation for the construction of a new police station. The old one, 100 meters away, is prime "settler" real estate: the Makhkame building overlooks both the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif and the Western Wall. Settlers have plans to turn the Makhkame into a synagogue.

Excavations at Isaacs's Tent: Since 2004, archaeological excavations in the Muslim Quarter in Jerusalem have been carried out underneath the structure known as "Isaac's Tent." The excavations are taking place without an excavation PERMIT and without permission from the archaeological council. They are being defined as "stabilizing excavations" despite the fact that they are not connected to any construction taking place on the building above.

The excavation site will constitute a tourist attraction, connecting the Western Wall tunnels with Isaac's Tent. As well, an educational center and an underground museum are planned for this site. The Western Wall Heritage Foundation, the body behind this initiative, is a governmental nonprofit organization responsible for the management of the Western Wall plaza and is closely tied to the settler community in East Jerusalem.

The excavation plan was not subjected to public scrutiny and was not approved by the statutory institutions of construction planning. Furthermore, the Palestinian residents of the Muslim Quarter, under whose houses the excavations are taking place, have not given their agreement to any kind of construction under their houses.

Jaffa Gate: The Jaffa Gate is a stone portal in the historic walls of the Old City, so named because it is the portal for Jaffa Road, which extends to the ancient port of JAFFA and the Mediterranean coastal plain. Inside the Jaffa Gate is a small square between the Christian and Armenian Quarters. The Christian Quarter is to the north, on the left, and the Armenian Quarter is to the south, on the right.

Controversy erupted in 2005 when settlers claimed to have purchased prized property—two hotels located just inside the Old City at Jaffa Gate, including the famed Imperial Hotel, which had become a symbol of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and coexistence. The Imperial Hotel was part of a large land deal leased for 198 years by the Patriarch of the GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH in Jerusalem, Irineos I, to Israeli developers. When news of the deal emerged, so did a conflict among Israel, the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), JORDAN, and the church over the legality of the transactions. The battle has raged since then. As of March 2009, displaced Palestinians were being housed in the hotel, rather than Jewish settlers. However, that could change when and if the court finally rules on the case.

Preservation of the Old City and Its Historic Basin: During 2005 the Israeli cabinet approved NIS 60 million (around $13.5 million) per year for seven years to fund the "preservation" of the Old City and its environs. This is in effect a slush fund for settler activities in the area.

Holy Basin/National Parks: Many of the authorities and sites in the national park area around the Old City have already been placed under the control of the settlers. By 2009, construction of several parks and walkways was completed and the remainder were ready to be implemented.

Silwan: The consolidation of the settlers' stranglehold over the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan was nearly complete by 2008. In particular, the ancient part of Silwan that the settlers call "Ir David" (believed to be the site of the ancient City of David) was expanded with new acquisitions and takeovers. The importance of Silwan is such that if the settler presence and hold in the area are permitted to continue and expand, it could destroy any future efforts to come to a solution for Jerusalem based on the generally accepted notion that "what is Arab will be Palestinian, and what is Jewish will be Israeli."

Silwan "Archaeological Sites": ELAD, one of the main settler organizations, continues to expand its activities and its hold in Silwan, with the group acting as a quasi-governmental body controlling tourism in the area and with full authority over archaeological activities. Entrance fees to the sites are paid to the settlers, who have recently begun offering tourists "Segway" tours of the area on which the tourists ride on individual mechanized scooters—a tour through what also happens to be home to tens of thousands of increasingly humiliated Palestinians. The settlers have recently begun subterranean excavations—unsanctioned and illegal—to expose what appears to be a Herodian-era road. Their goal is to establish an underground thoroughfare from the Pool of Shiloah to the containing walls of the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif. In 2005, excavations at the Pool of Shiloah were started under the sponsorship of the City of David National Park and a road was discovered

that connected the Shiloah pool in the City of David and on to the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif compound. It is this underground road that is now being reconstructed as a modern thoroughfare.

Silwan/al-Bustan Demolitions: In 1995 a municipal plan to demolish eighty-eight Palestinian-owned homes in the al-Bustan quarter of Silwan came to light. The goal of the plan was the "clearing" of the site for a settler-controlled national park in which the homes are located. Early exposure of the scheme led the Jerusalem Municipality to pull back and enter into a dialogue with the residents geared to leaving their homes intact. However, on 22 February 2009, the municipality served citizens of the al-Bustan neighborhood of Silwan notices to evacuate their houses voluntarily within seventy-two hours or else the authorities would evacuate them under the pretext of building without proper licensing documents. The process came after the municipality announced on 20 February a plan to relocate the more than 1,500 Palestinian citizens living in the eighty-eight houses of al-Bustan to alternative locations, one on a different hill in Silwan north of Jerusalem and the other in Beit Hanina north of Jerusalem.

A-Tur (Mount of Olives): A TUR is a Palestinian neighborhood on the Mount of Olives. In 2006, settlers made unprecedented inroads there. This new development is thus far limited in scope (with just two buildings partially taken over), so the impact to date is marginal. However, given the success of 2006, other settlers will likely be emboldened to establish themselves there. Israeli authorities evidence considerable tolerance of and even tacit support for such activities on the Mount. In March 2007 a number of violent incidents took place among Palestinian protestors, the settlers' private security guards, and the Israeli Border Patrol.

Shaykh Jarrah: In SHAYKH JARRAH, another threatened Palestinian neighborhood, plans are moving ahead for a new large settler complex at the Shepherd Hotel compound, financed by a company owned by US settler patron IRVING MOSKOWITZ. This scheme is to link the new settlement to the already existing settlement in Shaykh Jarrah (Shimon ha-Tzaddik). Moskowitz began to expedite efforts to start work on the complex in 2008, and on 26 March 2009 the licensing committee of the Jerusalem Municipality approved applications for building permits to allow for the construction of a new twenty-residential-unit settlement in Shepherd's Hotel.

The Mufti Grove: "The Mufti's Grove" is the historic name for a 30-dunum (7.5-acre), ancient olive grove located on a slope between the Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood and the Kidron Valley (Wadi al Joz) in East Jerusalem. The area is named after the grand mufti of Jerusalem during the BRITISH MANDATE, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, whose family owned the land.

In July and August 2007, a MEDIA investigation revealed an attempt by an East Jerusalem settlers' organization to seize government-held land. In the Mufti's Grove case, the Israel Lands Authority (ILA) had leased a private plot of land—of which it had no ownership—to Ateret Cohanim, a militant settlers' organization, for the agricultural cultivation of the area, even though the organization has no experience in such work. The transfer was officially justified under the mantle of "appropriation for public needs," a statute that had not been implemented for years. Aside from the harm caused to the landowners and the possibility of equal distribution of lands between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem, the Mufti's Grove incident is an example of the erosion in the upholding of Israeli law.

On 31 July 2007, the Arab Hotels Company submitted a petition against the ILA claiming that the association was working in collaboration with the Ateret Cohanim organization and conspired to seize the Mufti's Grove. The court has not ruled as of this writing.

Ras al-Amud: There are two settler projects in Palestinian Ras al-Amud. In 2006, substantial new construction occurred in the settlement of Ma'aleh Zeitim, located in the heart of the densely populated Palestinian neighborhood of Ras al-Amud. Ma'aleh Zeitim is set to more than double in size, with sixty-seven new units to be added to the existing fifty-two. The second project in Ras al-Amud is of even greater concern and is linked to the E1 settlement plan (connecting East Jerusalem to the WEST BANK settlement of MA'ALE ADUMIN). Under this scheme, a new Israeli police headquarters has been constructed in E1, completed in early 2009. The police have relocated to E1 from their present headquarters in the heart of Ras al-Amud. The vacated station is in the process of being handed over to the settlers to develop into a new major housing project in a key location—simultaneously expanding the settlers' hold on the area and consolidating their control over the main thoroughfare through the neighborhood.

Kidmat Tziyon/Abu Dis: Overlooking the Old City on the edge of Ras al-Amud/Abu Dis and hugging the Western Wall is a plan for the construction of a new settlement with 200 residential units. It was approved in the mid-1990s by the Jerusalem Municipality, but was officially put on hold. Nevertheless, several Jewish families have since moved into Palestinian homes in the area where the planned Kidmat Zion neighborhood is to be built. Two additional settlement houses adorn the northern and southern edges of the planned settlement. The northern house was built illegally by the settlers as the Barrier was going up—a fact that does not prevent the Border Patrol from guarding the house and its residents. Ninety percent of the lands within the Abu Dis area are defined as Area B territory, where the PNA maintains civil, but not military, jurisdiction. However, with Israel's permission the PNA constructed a new parliamentary building in Abu Dis, and several senior PNA leaders live there in their ancestral homes. Yet, settler and religious leaders are putting strong pressure on the government to lift the "hold" and go forward with the settlement.

Herodian Aqueduct: In a different era, a Herodian aqueduct brought water from the Artas pools, near BETHLEHEM, to the Second Temple in Jerusalem. This aqueduct, running under the Hill of Evil Counsel (on the southern ridge overlooking the Old City) is intact and accessible—if only one gets the keys. As is the case with so many other crucial archaeological sites in the area, those keys are now, literally, in the hands of the settlers.

Abu Tor Seminar Center: On the edges of the Palestinian neighborhood of Abu Tor, overlooking the Old City from the south, a building was designated as a center for the rehabilitation of Palestinian mentally disabled persons. At the last moment, it was turned over to the settlers, who use it as a seminar center, principally for addressing groups of Israeli army recruits and officers. The IDF has granted exclusivity to the settlers in terms of the messages and content delivered to its soldiers.

Nof Tziyon/Jabel Mukkaber: This project, for the construction of 400 homes for Jews on the southern ridge of Jabel Mukkaber, a Palestinian neighborhood overlooking the Old City, is in some ways an anomaly. The project is commercially (rather than ideologically) driven, and the target buyers appear to be mainly gullible DIASPORA Jews promised (and delivered) a stunning view of the Old City, but never informed that they will be living in "downtown" Palestinian Jabel Mukkaber. While not exactly fitting the mold, that tens of residential units are being built in an existing Palestinian neighborhood within the Holy Basin is not without significance.

Settlers' Private Security Guards: For more than fifteen years, the Israeli government has funded private security for the settlers. These guards not only guard the settlers' homes but escort individual settlers in their comings and goings. In the absence of any real public scrutiny, these guards have, on occasion, assumed some of the trappings of a private militia. Based on the findings of a governmental committee headed by retired general Uri Or, it was decided to remove this allocation from the 2007 budget and to restore exclusive responsibility for security to the Israeli police—a decision reversed by the cabinet in 2008. The public funding of private security guards for the settlers continues, reinforcing their status as the unofficial, albeit highly effective, "settlers' militia" in the Old City and the Holy Basin.

Sifting Sites: In an odd twist, the settlers have established two "sifting sites"—the first on the Mount of Olives, the second in Abu Tor. At the first site, settlers sift through waste material that is brought out of the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif, in pursuit of discarded Jewish artifacts (notably, the settlers displayed no similar sensitivities when they engaged in the illegal and unauthorized excavations in the Hasmonean Tunnel —no records were kept and the rubble removed from the site ended up unexamined in the dump). The second site is used for the examination of material extracted from the illegal excavations in Silwan.

See also JERUSALEM; JEWISH QUARTER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Holy Sites in Palestine

Since a Babylonian named Abraham left his birthplace in Ur and immigrated to the land of Canaan almost 4,000 years ago, this small piece of territory has become holy to the three great monotheistic religions of Judaism, CHRISTIANITY, and Islam. Each religion claims to be the rightful heir of the patriarch Abraham and the true followers of God. Jews claim primacy because they were the first to receive God's word. Christians worship Jesus as the Messiah and the Son of God, whose lineage they trace to the Hebrew King David, while Muslims revere all the prophets found in the Hebrew scriptures, beginning with Abraham, as well as Jesus, whom they consider a prophet (not the Son of God), and Muhammad, who is venerated as God's final prophet. Although these three religions believe in the same God and honor many of the same Hebrew prophets, their followers also compete, as modern-day Muslim and Christian Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, over the LAND, resources, and shrines to their prophets, as well as for their very existence in this same piece of land.

From the Christian CRUSADERS and Muslim OTTOMANS to the modern-day Zionists, successive conquerors have used their religious association with this land as justification for political control. The state of Israel has been especially active in politicizing holy sites in order to legitimize its political dominance. Many Jewish SETTLEMENTS, for example, have been established at holy sites in the WEST BANK, which the Israeli government uses to gain control over land and resources. Some JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISTS, including the settlers, are willing to risk their lives and the lives of Israeli soldiers to settle religiously significant areas.

Israel's comprehensive settlement program, however, has caused significant restrictions on Palestinians' access to holy sites. For example, the Christian and Muslim holy sites in East JERUSALEM cannot be visited by Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza without PERMITS issued by Israel, difficult or impossible to obtain. Even if they are issued, arbitrary denial of passage at CHECKPOINTS is common.

Among the most important holy sites in the holy land are the following.

Al-Haram ash-Sharif, or Temple Mount, Jerusalem. The Muslim complex called the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF (Noble Sanctuary) in Jerusalem's OLD CITY is one of the most intensely contested and politically charged spots in the world. The Haram contains the AL-AQSA MOSQUE and the DOME OF THE ROCK (one of the oldest and most spectacular Islamic buildings in the world), as well as numerous other structures significant to Muslims. Jews refer to the site as the TEMPLE MOUNT, where many believe the ancient Jewish temples were built, and many also believe that the WESTERN WALL of the Haram compound is the last remnant of the retaining wall of the Second Temple. The Western Wall is surrounded by a plaza that serves as a massive open-air synagogue. It is a site of worldwide Jewish pilgrimage as well as the focal point of prayers for religious Jews.

The entire site has the inherent potential to create both political and religious tensions. Two nations—the Israelis and the Palestinians—and two religions—Islam and Judaism—have deeply conflicting claims and narratives surrounding the site. Muslims revere it as a sacred spiritual and cultural center, as a triumph of Islamic art and architecture, and as the third holiest religious site in Islam. Some fundamentalist Christians and Jews believe that the Islamic sites must be destroyed so that the THIRD TEMPLE can be erected in their stead

in order to allow the Messiah to return (Christians) or to come (Jews). Israelis claim both East and West Jerusalem for their political capital while Palestinians claim East Jerusalem for theirs. The Haram is the anchor of identification with East Jerusalem and a potent symbol of nationhood.

When Israel captured the Old City in 1967, Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN ordered that the keys to the Haram be returned to the Muslim authorities, who thereafter nominally maintained their 750-year authority over the complex. Religious Jews focused on the Western Wall and its surrounding area, where some 100 Palestinian buildings, including homes and mosques, were destroyed to build a greatly enlarged prayer plaza. This arrangement has been relatively peaceful but highly unstable. Muslims fear efforts to erode their authority and resent Israel's control over access. There have been at least a half dozen attempts by fundamentalist Jews and Christians to destroy or desecrate the Islamic sites.

Jews from all over the world are given free access to worship at the Western Wall, but only a small percentage of the 4 million Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza are allowed to pray at the Muslim compound above it and none of the 1.66 billion from outside Israel. Non-Muslim tourists can enter the Haram at times when the Muslims are not at prayer, but cannot enter the mosques themselves without Waqf permission.

Church of the Holy Sepulcher, Jerusalem. The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem's Old City is believed to be built on Golgotha, the Hill of Calvary, which the New Testament identifies as the location of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Because Christians believe it also is the place where Jesus was buried (the sepulcher), it has been an important destination for Christian pilgrimage since the fourth century.

Several Christian sects, including Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Armenian Catholic and Orthodox, Apostolic, Syrian Orthodox, and Coptic Orthodox, compete for the administration and maintenance of the church and its grounds. Their infighting prompted Muslim leader Salah al-Din (SALADIN) in 1178 to appoint a Muslim family, the NUSEIBEH FAMILY, to be custodians of the key to the single door and to mediate disputes. An agreement now regulates times and places of worship for each sect. The church is open daily except during religious rituals and observations. Christians from the West Bank and Gaza, however, are subject to the usual, often insurmountable, Israeli-imposed restrictions on Palestinians visiting East Jerusalem and cannot, in most cases, visit the church. Occasionally on special holidays, extra permits are given to Palestinian Christians to enter Jerusalem and visit the church.

Rachel's Tomb and Bilal Mosque, Bethlehem. Rachel was the favored wife of Jacob and the mother of Joseph and Benjamin, two of the patriarchs of the twelve tribes of Israel. She is believed to be buried on the road leading from Jerusalem to BETHLEHEM, where she died giving birth to Benjamin. On her grave Jacob erected a pillar that became a pilgrimage site.

The current structure, which is believed to mark the spot where she died, dates to the Ottoman period and contains a revered mosque called Bilal bin Rabah, as well as Bethlehem's only Muslim cemetery. Since Israel captured the West Bank in 1967, Palestinians have been barred from the mosque, the grave, and the cemetery.

In the 1990s, Israel transformed the tomb into a heavily fortified military post and enclosed the area in concrete slab walls, guarded by soldiers and snipers. Israel's takeover of the site, located in a northern neighborhood of Bethlehem deep in Palestinian territory, has caused unrest and occasional violence. The military encampment also serves as a checkpoint that prevents many Christians from reaching their holy sites in Bethlehem, such as the CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY.

Church of the Nativity, Bethlehem. The centerpiece of Bethlehem, the birthplace of Jesus Christ, is the Church of the Nativity. The first church on this spot was dedicated in 339 CE by Helena, mother of the emperor Constantine. Most of what remains dates from renovations by the Crusaders (1099–1187). The church is controlled jointly by three Christian denominations: the Armenian Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Greek Orthodox Church.

The church is open daily, but there are many impediments to entering Bethlehem and reaching the church. Would-be visitors and pilgrims to the Church of the Nativity also must go through the checkpoint between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which the Israeli army has reduced to a tiny bottleneck and turned into something resembling an international border terminal.

In addition, Israeli CLOSURES in the Occupied Territories dramatically affect pilgrimage and

tourism in Bethlehem, and Palestinians living outside Bethlehem are prevented from entering the church by the usual RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT—checkpoints, ROADBLOCKS, and the prohibition on entering or passing through Jerusalem without a permit, the route for those living in the northern West Bank (Ramallah, Nablus, and so on). The church is open daily, but access for Palestinian Christians who wish to visit the site is difficult if not impossible, even for tourists. Thus, for example, Christians living in Ramallah cannot reach the church.

Cave of the Patriarchs (Jews) or al-Ibrahimi Mosque (Muslims), Hebron, West Bank. The Book of Genesis relates that the patriarch Abraham purchased a field near HEBRON 3,700 years ago as a burial place for his wife, Sarah. Jews believe that the biblical patriarchs and matriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Sarah, Rebecca, and Leah, are buried in the tombs located in a cave on the property, over which a massive shrine has been built.

Like the al-Haram ash-Sharif, this site is of major religious importance to both Muslims and Jews. Both groups venerate the same founding patriarchs that they believe are buried here. Although the Muslims have maintained it for centuries, Israeli Jews have increasingly come to dominate the shrine since 1967. It has become a major site of conflict between Palestinians and Jews. Jewish settlers have created fortified colonies around the shrine and have done their utmost, including theft, vandalism, and violence, to force Palestinians out of the area and prevent their worship at the mosque. The Israeli army rarely curbs the behavior of the settlers and often aids them in their attempts to take over more Hebron real estate.

Joseph's Tomb, Nablus, West Bank. According to the Bible, Joseph was the favored son of the patriarch Jacob but was taken to EGYPT from Canaan as a slave when his envious brothers sold him into slavery and tricked his father into believing he was dead. Later, in order to escape a famine, Jacob's entire family moved to Egypt, where their descendants remained until Moses led them back to Canaan generations later. Joseph died in Egypt, after decades of service to the pharaoh, but the Book of Joshua relates that Joseph's bones were brought by the Israelites out of Egypt, and buried at Shechem (NABLUS) in a tract of land that Jacob had bought for a hundred pieces of silver from the sons of Hamor, the father of Shechem. This shrine became the inheritance of Joseph's descendants.

Based on this account, right-wing Jewish settlers have claimed ownership of what they believe is the site of Joseph's Tomb in the heart of the West Bank. In the 1980s, Israel transformed the shrine into a fortified military base and a yeshiva (Jewish religious school). It maintained control over the area even after 1995, when Nablus was given over to nominal PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY control.

The presence of settlers and soldiers has caused tensions here too, which came to a head in October 2000 following ARIEL SHARON's explosive visit to al-Haram ash-Sharif. Violent clashes broke out around the tomb, and six Palestinians and one Israeli were killed. When the Israelis eventually retreated, Palestinians ransacked and destroyed the outpost and shrine. The next day, Israelis burned down a mosque in the Israeli city of Tiberius in protest.

The ruins of Joseph's Tomb are now located in a back alley of a poor residential area near a refugee camp in Nablus. The basic stonework mostly stands, but the grounds are overgrown and the tomb itself has been reduced to soot-blackened rubble. There is no restriction on access except for the Israeli law that makes it illegal for Israeli citizens to enter certain Palestinian-controlled areas and the general difficulty in getting around the West Bank due to the BARRIER, checkpoints, roadblocks, CURFEWS, and closures.

Jacob's Well, Nablus. A Greek Orthodox church has been built near the site of Joseph's Tomb, next to the Balata refugee camp in Nablus. It covers a well that tradition says was built by Jacob and where, according to the Gospel of John, Jesus met a SAMARITAN woman and revealed to her that he was the Messiah. In 1885 the Greek Orthodox Church acquired the site and began restoring it. In 1999 a new wave of restoration began, often hampered by the difficulty of acquiring Israeli building permits.

In November 1979 a priest and caretaker of the site, the Archimandrite Father Philoumenos, was murdered in the well chamber. Earlier that month, a radical rabbi settler and his followers came to the monastery and demanded that the crosses and icons be taken down, claiming the site belonged to the Jews. They shouted threats and blasphemies, but Philoumenos explained that the church had for many years been a sacred Orthodox place. A week later the extremists came back and tortured and killed the priest and desecrated the

church. No one was ever arrested or tried for the crimes.

Access to the church is open, but because Nablus is surrounded by Israeli checkpoints and under a state of continuous SIEGE by the Israeli military, the site is rarely visited by any but the most intrepid travelers and occasional tour groups.

See also ARCHAEOLOGY; AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF; HASMONEAN TUNNEL; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HOLY BASIN; NABLUS; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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—Pamela Olson

Holy War Army

The Holy War Army (Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas) was founded in 1933 but did not fight in the ARAB REVOLT and was relaunched at the end of 1947. These Palestinian irregular forces are said to have fought bravely but ineffectively against Israeli troops. Led by Hasan Salama and ABD AL-QADIR AL-HUSAYNI, they were loosely under the auspices of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE. In 1948 the Holy War Army was assisted, if poorly, by the 4,000-man volunteer ARAB LIBERATION ARMY, which was funded by the ARAB LEAGUE, trained at southern SYRIA bases, and led by the Syrian FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI.

See also WAR, 1948

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Homot Shalem Association

The Homot Shalem Association, together with the right-wing MOLEDET political party, is among the most vocal advocates of "TRANSFER"—removing Palestinians from Israel and the Occupied Territories. In East JERUSALEM the group mobilizes and organizes investors to purchase land in an effort to ensure Jewish control over the city. Homot Shalem is dedicated to populating East Jerusalem with Jews and Judaizing it so that Palestinians have no demographic claim to the area, thus precluding the possibility of a future partition of the city. A prime mover of the project is Knesset member BENYAMIN ELON of the NATIONAL UNION PARTY—Israel Beiteinu.

One Homot Shalem project implemented in 2001 was the assembling of a group of Jewish investors from Israel and abroad to purchase 18 dunums (4.5 acres) of land in the Palestinian neighborhood of SHAYKH JARRAH, inhabited by thousands of East Jerusalem Arabs, for $3 million. With the money, Homot Shalem's company, Nahalat Shimon Ltd., constructed a Jewish colony consisting of three buildings, each of which housed forty Jewish families in what the company termed "the first stage of the project." An additional forty apartments were built in another part of Shaykh Jarrah owned by Palestinians until 1976, when a cave and the adjoining field were purchased by Jews with funds raised abroad. The cave is allegedly the grave of Simeon the Just, a high priest during the time of the Second Temple, and Elon says he looks forward to a time when there will be no Palestinians living around the tomb of Simeon the Just and in Simeon's Heritage, the name he prefers to Shaykh Jarrah. "It was a Jewish neighborhood and it will be a Jewish neighborhood."

In April 2002, *Ha'aretz* reported that over the past few months, the Homot Shalem Association has secured Jewish rights to some one-third of the MUSRARA neighborhood in East Jerusalem by buying vacant lots and compounds currently inhabited by Palestinians.

See also SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

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HonestReporting.com

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US

The Hope

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Hope-Simpson Commission, 1930

In 1930 the SHAW COMMISSION, a British commission investigating the origins of the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, determined that the Palestinian violence had stemmed from the community's anxiety over the adverse effects of Zionist IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases. It recommended that British authorities limit both. Subsequently the British government appointed a second commission, headed by Sir John Hope-Simpson, to reexamine "the questions of immigration, land settlement, and development."

Hope-Simpson's report, issued in late 1930, focused primarily on the fact that there was insufficient land in Palestine to support continued Jewish immigration. According to the report, Arab farmers were suffering from severe economic difficulties. Approximately 30 percent of Palestinians were landless, which the report linked to Zionist land purchases. The report blamed the Jewish policy of hiring only Jews for the Arabs' deplorable economic circumstances. Because of these conditions, Hope-Simpson recommended the cessation of Jewish immigration until new agricultural methods were introduced in Palestine.

The Hope-Simpson Commission's findings led the British government to formulate a policy paper known as the PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER, which revived the idea of forming a LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL for Palestine and of limiting Jewish immigration and land purchase by linking them to the absorptive capacity of the country.

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Hospitallers

Known as the knights of the "Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem," the Hospitallers were originally CRUSADERS who devoted themselves to caring for pilgrims to the Holy Land. They established a hospital and hostel in 1080 CE near the Church of the Holy Sepulcher (St. Johns Hospice) that was taken over by radical Jewish settlers in 1990.

House Demolitions

The long-standing Israeli policy of demolishing Palestinian houses on both sides of the Green Line represents a central element in the conflict between the Israeli Jewish and Palestinian peoples. Israel offers a number of reasons for the demolitions, including that houses have been built without PERMITS and that homes demolished in military operations are merely "collateral damage." The policy did not originate with the OCCUPATION in 1967. Before 1948 the BRITISH MANDATE authorities demolished Palestinian homes as a form of deterrence against attacks, appreciating the fact that this was the most painful punishment for Arabs. It was Israel, however, that applied the house demolition policy widely and systematically, and house demolitions have stood at the center of Israel's approach to "the Arab problem" since the state's founding. Although exact figures are impossible to arrive at, the stages in Israel's demolition campaign are as follows:

- From 1948 into the mid-1960s, Israel systematically demolished 531 Palestinian villages and eleven urban neighborhoods inside of what became the state of Israel, which comprised two-thirds of the villages of Palestine. This was done after the residents had fled or were driven out to prevent the REFUGEES from returning, so that their LANDS could be turned over to Jewish immigrants.
- At the start of the Occupation in 1967, the policy of demolition was carried across the Green Line into the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and the GAZA STRIP. From 1967 to early 2009 (including the December 2008/January 2009 attack on Gaza), approximately 24,000 Palestinian houses were destroyed; many of these people had already lost their homes inside Israel in 1948 and after.
- Immediately following the 1967 WAR, at least 2,000 houses were demolished. Three villages (Yalu, Imwas, and Beit Nuba) were razed in the Latrun area (now transformed into Canada Park), while dozens of homes were destroyed in the Mughrabi Quarter of Jerusalem's OLD CITY to create a plaza for the WESTERN WALL.
- In 1971 ARIEL SHARON, then head of the Southern Command, demolished 2,000 houses in Gaza refugee camps to facilitate military control. (From the time he was elected prime minister in early 2001 until his stroke in January 2006, he oversaw the demolition of another 1,500 homes in Gaza.)
- During the First INTIFADA in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Israel destroyed at least 2,000 houses in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in the process of quelling the uprising.
- During the course of the OSLO PROCESS (1993–2000) almost 1,700 Palestinian houses in the Occupied Territories were demolished.
- Throughout the Second Intifada (2000–2009) some 4,000 to 5,000 Palestinian houses were destroyed in military operations. Hundreds of homes in JENIN, NABLUS, Ramallah, BETHLEHEM, HEBRON, and other cities of the West Bank were bulldozed, while in Gaza more than 2,500 homes were destroyed, many in the Rafah district. Tens of thousands of additional homes were left uninhabitable. Altogether, some 50,000 people were left homeless in this five-year period. Additionally, in the course of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, hundreds of shops, workshops, factories, and public buildings, including all the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY ministry offices in every West Bank city, were destroyed or damaged beyond repair. According to Amnesty International, more than 7,400 acres (3,000 hectares) of cultivated land—10 percent of the agricultural land of Gaza—was bulldozed during this time. Wells, WATER storage pools, and water pumps that provided water for drinking, irrigation, and other needs for thousands of people were also destroyed, along with tens of kilometers of irrigation networks.
- During the same period, about 900 Palestinian homes were demolished by the Civil Administration for lack of proper permits, and more than 628 Palestinian homes were demolished as collective punishment and deterrence, affecting families of people known or suspected of involvement in attacks on Israeli civilians.

According to B'TSELEM, the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, on average twelve innocent people lose their homes for every person punished for a security offense—and in half the cases the occupants had nothing whatsoever to do with the acts in question. The Israeli government says its actions are intended to deter potential TERRORISTS, but B'Tselem has noted that 79 percent of the suspected offenders were either dead or in prison at the time of the demolition. According to B'Tselem, 60 percent of the Palestinian homes demolished in the Occupied Territories during the Second Intifada were

destroyed as part of military "clearing operations," 25 percent as being "illegal" (not having proper permits), and 15 percent as collective punishment.

Throughout Israel proper in the "UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES" of Palestinians and BEDOUINS, as well as in the Palestinian neighborhoods of RAMLA, Lydda, and other Palestinian towns, houses continue to be demolished at an ever accelerating rate. Some 100,000 "internal refugees" or PRESENT ABSENTEES from 1948 and their families live in more than 100 unrecognized villages. These villages, located in the vicinity of their now-destroyed villages, have no legal standing and receive no services, and their residents have inadequate living conditions and face constant threats of demolition. Bedouin villages in the Negev, with some 60,000 to 70,000 residents, are threatened with demolition. Indeed, whereas Arabs comprise almost 20 percent of the population of Israel, they are confined by law and zoning policies to 3.5 percent of the land. In mid-2004 the Israeli government announced the formation of a demolition administration in the Ministry of Interior to oversee the demolition of the homes of Palestinian-Arab citizens—between 20,000 and 40,000 in number.

The process for demolishing Palestinian homes is based on an elaborate system of planning, laws, and administrative procedures to reach the goal of confining the 3.6 million Palestinians of the Occupied Territories, together with the million Palestinian citizens of Israel, to small enclaves on only about 8 percent of the country—rising to 15 percent if a truncated Palestinian mini-state is established.

When homes are demolished in military actions or as acts of deterrence and other forms of collective punishment, there is no process. On the other hand, demolitions for administrative reasons (such as lack of a permit) are carried out by the Civil Administration in the West Bank and Gaza, by either the Ministry of Interior or the Jerusalem municipality in East Jerusalem. Regardless, the overall process is similar. Master plans and zoning regulations limit the number of Palestinian buildings, based on planning requirements. For example, the entire West Bank has been designated agricultural land and STATE LAND, meaning that Palestinian buildings are not allowed, while most of the empty land owned by Palestinians in East Jerusalem has been zoned as "open GREEN AREAS." If Palestinians nevertheless build on land that belonged to them before the Israeli designations, Israel can demolish their illegal homes. (While Jews may in rare cases receive a demolition order for an illegal porch or shed, there has never been a Jewish house demolished in either Jerusalem or the Occupied Territories.) And the policy is explicit; as Colonel Shlomo Politus, legal advisor to the Civil Administration, stated flatly to the Israeli parliament on 13 July 2003: "There are no more construction permits for Palestinians."

Because Palestinians do not have home mail delivery (including in East Jerusalem), demolition orders are distributed haphazardly. Occasionally a building inspector may knock on the door and hand the order to anyone who answers, even small children. More frequently the order is stuck into the doorframe or even left under a stone near the house. Palestinians have frequently complained that they never received the order before the bulldozers arrived and thus were denied recourse to the courts. In Jerusalem a favored practice is to deliver an order at night by placing it somewhere near the targeted house, then arriving early in the morning to demolish it.

If they manage to reach the court in time, Palestinians may occasionally delay the order's execution (at considerable expense), although there is no record of an order being overturned. Once it is affirmed, the bulldozers may arrive at any time—the same day, that week, or even years later. (Because the government has issued so many demolition orders, it is unable to implement them all at once and orders are thus prioritized.) Though many families know their homes are targeted, actual demolitions are carried out seemingly at random. Randomization and its associated fear are part of the generalized policy of making life difficult for Palestinians so that they will voluntarily leave the territories. The wrecking crews, accompanied by soldiers, police, and Civil Administration officials, usually come in the early morning hours just after the men have left for work. The family is sometimes given a few minutes to remove their belongings before the bulldozers move in, but because family members and neighbors usually put up some kind of resistance—or at least protest—they are often removed forcibly from the house. Their possessions are then thrown out by the wrecking crews (often foreign guest workers).

In addition to the emotional suffering, demolitions constitute a serious financial blow, especially to the poor families who make up the vast

majority of demolition victims. About 70 percent of Palestinians living in both Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza live below the poverty line (US$2 per day). Israeli courts issue hefty fines when a demolition order is imposed, in the range of $10,000–$20,000, to be paid in monthly installments whether the house is demolished or not. In Jerusalem, families must also pay for the demolition of their own homes; at the end of the demolition they are presented with the wrecking company's bill, around $1,500. When the bulldozer finally begins its systematic work of demolition, the whole process may take between five minutes (for a small home of concrete blocks) and six hours (for a five-story apartment building). At times demolition is resisted, and people are beaten, jailed, and sometimes killed.

Although every country has planning regulations, zoning, and enforcement mechanisms, Israel is the only Western country—and Jerusalem the only city—that systematically denies permits to and demolishes houses of a particular ethnonational group. The Fourth Geneva Convention requires occupying powers (such as Israel) to protect the well-being of civilian populations under their control. Under the Hague Regulations of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, for example, Israel is enjoined as an occupying power to protect and ensure the needs of the Palestinian population.

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—Jeff Halper

House of Harrari

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Housing Restrictions for Palestinians

In the decades since the 1967 WAR, Israel's policy of planning, development, and building in the West Bank has severely restricted construction by Palestinians while allocating broad expanses of LAND to establish and expand Jewish housing in SETTLEMENTS. In this way Israel has created a situation in which thousands of Palestinians are unable

to obtain PERMITS to build on their land and are compelled to build without a permit, because they have no other way to provide shelter for their families.

At the outset of the OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and GAZA, Israel implemented planning regulations that serve as the basis for the approval—though more often the rejection—of applications for building permits. Since 1977, land registration has been frozen, making it difficult for Palestinians to prove ownership of their land. Israel administers the building authorities, which have no Palestinian representation. A Palestinian wanting to obtain a building permit to construct on his land in Area C (more than two-thirds of the West Bank, which remains under Israeli control as a consequence of the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION) must follow a prolonged, complicated, and expensive application procedure, which generally ends in denial of the application. In this situation, many Palestinians have no choice except to build without a permit to provide housing for themselves and their families.

Rather than change this situation, Israel has adopted a policy of mass HOUSE DEMOLITIONS. At the same time, at least 150 Israeli settlements containing more than 475,000 Jewish Israeli citizens have been established. These settlements benefit from an efficient system of planning and supervision of construction and comprehensive planning schemes for all the settlements. Despite this, thousands of houses have been built in the settlements without permits. Israel has refrained from demolishing these houses, instead issuing retroactive building permits for the houses constructed without permits.

The ongoing violation of the Palestinian people's housing rights and the ever expanding settlements in the West Bank are organically interconnected. Settlement creation and expansion require land. The usurpation of Palestinian land for the planning and building of Jewish settlements and housing, concurrent with the refusal to allow Palestinians to build on their own land, negates even the possibility that Palestinians will one day be able to plan and build for their future.

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Hovevei Zion

Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion), also known as Hibbat Zion, was the name taken by a loosely organized network of Jewish community circles that sprang up in the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Poland, and Romania in the early 1880s in response to the intensification of anti-Jewish government policies and increasingly destructive ANTI-SEMITIC riots. These were the beginning years of large-scale Jewish emigration out of Eastern Europe, most of it to the West. Leaders of the Hovevei Zion movement instead argued for migration to Palestine, where they hoped new Jewish colonies would both offer refuge from persecution and revive Jewish culture and identity, which they felt were threatened by the pressures to integrate into modern societies. By 1884, there were more than thirty-two Hovevei Zion societies spread across Eastern Europe, with approximately 14,000 dues-paying members working to raise money and promote immigration to Palestine. In Palestine they had established and helped to maintain six SETTLEMENTS: Petah Tikva, Rishon le-Zion, Rosh Pina, Zikhron Ya'akov, Yesud ha-Ma'ale, and Gadera.

Each settlement was begun by different groups and individuals under the Hovevei Zion umbrella. Gadera, for example, was established by a society named Bilu that was made up of high school and university students in Kharkov. With a name that was an acronym for the biblical phrase *Beit Ya'akov lakhu va nalkha* (Come, House of Jacob, let us go, Isaiah 2:5), Bilu was imbued with the secular populist ideas then prevalent at the university, including the ultimate takeover of Palestine and the establishment there of a modern Jewish state. An impatient idealistic youth movement, by 1890 it had grown to around 500 members in twenty-five groups. Ultimately, perhaps only 60 members actually reached Palestine, with 14 settling there permanently—half in Rishon le-Zion and the other 7 in Gadera.

Although Hovevei Zion is best known as a pioneer of the early Zionist settlements of Palestine, its ideological influence on the later European-wide general Zionist movement was also important. This was evident in a conference it organized in 1884 in Kattowice, Poland, which was intended to provide organizational coherence and a united purpose to the settlements, bringing together influential leaders from across Eastern Europe with different backgrounds and ideological bents. For example, the religious traditionalist Rabbi Samuel Mohilever from Bialystok, Poland, the honorary president of the conference, saw the settlements not only as physical refuges but also as practical applications of the traditional daily prayer for return to Zion, which had been abandoned by the integrationist Reform Judaism of the West. The presiding officer was LEON PINSKER, a modernist physician from Odessa, Russia, who argued in an 1882 pamphlet, "Auto-Emancipation," that only an independent Jewish state could save the Jews from persecution, and who repeated those ideas in his presidential address. Asher Ginzberg, a newcomer to Hovevei Zion, better known by his pen name, AHAD HA'AM, argued strongly at Kattowice that the Palestinian settlements should be built as spiritual and cultural centers of Hebrew language and culture. Without this primary focus on common language and culture, he insisted, the settlement movement (and by implication a Jewish state) would never survive. Others pushed for a focus on agricultural settlements with a "back to the land" theme.

The Kattowice Conference was a useful exchange of ideas. Particularly striking was its ability to hold together both religious traditionalists and secular nontraditionalists, although each member society of Hovevei Zion continued to pursue its own projects. In 1890 the Russian government granted legal status to Pinsker's Odessa group under the rubric Society for the Support of Jewish Farmers and Artisans in SYRIA and Palestine, but the license applied only to Odessa. Ahad Ha'am, through correspondence, built a network of Jewish intelligentsia throughout Europe, which supported his idea of Hebrew education. Calling themselves the Sons of Moses (Bnei Moshe), they worked to establish a national college in JAFFA, initially in cooperation with the ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE in Paris. The school opened in 1892, supported with Hovevei Zion funds from Odessa; by the late 1890s some 250 students were enrolled. In the end the establishment of a strong central executive to coordinate all of these activities came from Western Europe, in the form of the Zionist Organization, later the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO).

At the first WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS, convened in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897 and led by THEODOR HERZL, a caucus of the main Hovevei Zion groups attended and presented their views, which came to be known as "cultural" or "practical" Zionism. Cultural or practical Zionism stood in contrast to Herzl's secular nationalist "political Zionism," which believed that a Jewish state could currently be created in Palestine. For the cultural Zionists a Jewish state was at best a long-term hope. But Jews in Eastern Europe were under intense pressure of persecution and needed immediate relief. Herzl's political Zionist approach won the day, although the culturalist Ahad Ha'am and his followers continued their educational work, loosely cooperating with the WZO and providing a cultural voice to its political and diplomatic activities.

Only a few representatives from the religiously oriented Hovevei Zion societies were present at the 1897 conference, yet ultimately they would reinforce one of the salient features of modern ZIONISM: the concept of a Jewish state grounded in Judaic law and the Torah. Arguing that belief in the coming of the Messiah, Hibbat Zion, and Zionism were all part of a whole, they participated in World Zionist activities, where they presented their point of view. As proto-political parties emerged at the Zionist Congresses in the early twentieth century, these religious Zionists formed their own MIZRAHI faction (1902) under the leadership of Rabbi Yitzhak Reines. Mizrahi's founding manifesto called for a clear separation between political activities and "the spiritual sphere, which is the real animator of Zionism"; the name "Mizrahi" was formed from the words *merkaz ruhani* (spiritual center). Though Mizrahi leadership played down the earlier messianic theme, it never entirely disappeared. Mizrahi and its adjunct settlement organization Hapoel Mizrahi were strong forces in Yishuv activities during the BRITISH MANDATE period and coalesced into the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY in 1956. Its youth movement, Bnei Akiva, founded in 1929, is active today in Israel and throughout the DIASPORA.

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—Jon Mandaville

Husayn, Rashid (1936–1977)

Rashid Husayn, a Palestinian-Israeli teacher, poet, and activist, was a founding member of AL-ARD, an Arab nationalist political movement that emerged in the 1950s. Born in Musmus near HAIFA, Husayn was imprisoned numerous times by Israel for his activities with al-Ard, and in 1967 he left Haifa for the UNITED STATES, where he lived in poverty and eventually died in a fire. He is remembered for several major poems and for his style, which, like that of so many Palestinian poets, links the writer to his subject matter. This is perhaps best evidenced in the poem "To a Cloud," in which he abandons the attempt at maintaining aesthetic distance, instead becoming the land itself: "I, cloud of my life / am the hills of Galilee / I am the bosom of Haifa / And the forehead of JAFFA. . . . Waiting for you, my poetry turned to earth / Has become fields / Has turned into wheat / And trees. / I am all that remains of our earth, / I am all that remains of what you love, / So pour . . . pour with bounty, / Pour down the rain."

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Husayn-Arafat Agreement, 1985

In early 1985 King Husayn of JORDAN put a temporary end to fifteen years of secret negotiations with Israel and attempted to reach an agreement with YASIR ARAFAT and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), whose bases, infrastructure, and unity had been shattered by the 1982 Israeli-initiated LEBANON WAR. The king's objectives remained as they had been since the 1967 WAR: to regain control over the WEST BANK and East JERUSALEM and to establish a situation in which any Palestinian entity would be under a form of Jordanian rule instead of sovereign. The king believed that if Jordan was to achieve either peace or prosperity, he needed to tame Palestinian nationalism and assert Jordanian control over the territories. He encouraged the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) to meet in Amman, and on 22–29 November 1984 the seventeenth PNC convened and reaffirmed support for Arafat as PLO chairman and the PLO-Jordanian dialogue; however, the only attendees were some loyal FATAH members and the ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF). The majority of PLO factions boycotted the meeting.

At this time there were four distinct factional alliances in the Palestinian movement: (1) Arafat and his remaining Fatah supporters; (2) the Fatah rebels (known as Fatah-Intifada or FATAH UPRISING or Fatah–Provisional Command); (3) the NATIONAL ALLIANCE, which included SA'IQA, the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC), and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), who called for Arafat's removal as PLO leader; and (4) the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, which included the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP), the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), the PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCP), and the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF; Yakub faction). Although this latter group upheld Arafat's leadership, they were extremely critical of his policies.

On 22 December 1983 Arafat had met with Egyptian president HOSNI MUBARAK in Cairo. This move was designed to reward Egypt's support of

Arafat when he was under siege by the Fatah Uprising in Tripoli and to provide a counterweight to Syrian pressure, but it brought a storm of protest not only from the National Alliance but also from the Democratic Alliance. The meeting with EGYPT was condemned because Cairo remained isolated in the Arab world as a consequence of its separate bilateral peace treaty with Israel.

Seemingly heedless of the intense frustration among PLO cadres and the severe fractures in the PLO, in February 1984 Arafat reopened discussions with Jordan on a joint diplomatic approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which resulted in the Husayn-Arafat Agreement of 11 February 1985. Arafat's diplomacy caused further outrage in most sectors of the PLO, since King Husayn's desire to reassert Jordanian hegemony over the West Bank was well-known.

The Husayn-Arafat Agreement proposed a Middle East peace accord that called for the exchange of land for peace within the context of an international conference, but Palestinian autonomy would occur only in the context of Jordanian sovereignty. On 25 March 1985, former Palestine National Council speaker Khalid al-Fahum announced from Damascus the formation by the National Alliance, the PLF, and the PFLP of a PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF).

In its founding statement, the PNSF condemned the Amman accords and called for "action to topple the trend of deviation and relinquishment" within the PLO. Now legitimized by the presence of the PFLP, the opposition's challenge to Arafat's leadership seemed stronger than ever. Indeed, never in its existence had the PLO been so bitterly divided.

The king wanted assurances from Arafat that he would renounce violence and recognize the state of Israel, but such an assurance was never formally given and negotiations broke down. On 19 February 1986 King Husayn announced the end of the year-long effort to construct a joint strategy with the PLO.

King Husayn then resumed talks with Israel, and in April 1987 the monarch and SHIMON PERES, the Israeli foreign minister, agreed to a UN-sponsored conference that would include Palestinian representatives as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Despite American assent to the plan, Israel's premier, YITZHAK SHAMIR, refused to accept the agreement, wanting the conference to include only Jordanian delegates.

When the INTIFADA (the Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and in Gaza) erupted in December 1987, the entire situation for Jordan was altered. Any hopes of a Jordanian-Palestinian resolution to the Palestine problem were effectively quashed, and the king renounced all claims to the West Bank. He dissolved the Jordanian Parliament, half of whom were West Bank representatives, stopped paying salaries to over 20,000 West Bank civil servants, and resumed secret negotiations with Israel.

In November 1988 a reunified PNC declared the "State of Palestine" and agreed to recognize Israel. It also accepted UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, which until then it had firmly rejected. This momentous event signaled an enormous shift in Palestinian thinking toward a greater recognition of political reality.

See also CAMPS' WAR; JORDAN; LEBANON WAR

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Al-Husayni, Abd al-Qadir (1908–1948)

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni was a Palestinian resistance leader during the BRITISH MANDATE. Born in

JERUSALEM, he received a B.A. in Chemistry from the American University in Cairo in 1932. When he returned to Palestine he initially took a post in the settlement department of the British Mandate government, but eventually moved to the HEBRON area during the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT to lead the struggle against the British, during which he was a singularly important leader in the Jerusalem area. A member of the Palestine ARAB PARTY, he served as its secretary-general and became editor-in-chief of the party's paper, *Al-Liwa',* and other newspapers, including *Al-Jami'a Al-Islamiyya.* In response to his role in the Arab Revolt, the British deported him in 1938, and in 1939 he fled to IRAQ, where in 1941 he fought with the Iraqi army against the British in Baghdad (the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup). In 1946 al-Husayni moved to EGYPT, but secretly returned to Palestine to lead the HOLY WAR ARMY (Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas) in January 1948, and was killed fighting the PALMAH during hand-to-hand fighting for control of Qastal Hill on the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road. Abd al-Qadir established himself as a great and courageous leader in the Holy War Army against Zionist forces.

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Al-Husayni, al-Hajj Amin Mohammad (1895–1974)

Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni was a Palestinian-Arab nationalist and Muslim religious leader (mufti). As an al-Husayni he was a member of one of JERUSALEM's most prominent families. During the BRITISH MANDATE his most important positions were as mufti of Jerusalem, president of the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL, and head of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, through which he led the Palestinians in the struggle against the Zionists. Al-Husayni was born in Jerusalem in 1895 at a time when less than 7 percent of Palestine's population was Jewish. In 1913, at the age of eighteen, he made the pilgrimage to Mecca and thereafter was known by the honorific title of hajj. Al-Husayni studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo for a short period, then studied with Rashid Rida, the Muslim reformer and early proponent of Arab nationalism. Before World War I he attended the Military Academy in Istanbul, Turkey.

With the outbreak of World War I in 1914 al-Husayni joined the OTTOMAN Turkish army, received a commission as an artillery officer, and was assigned to the 47th Brigade, stationed in and around the predominately Greek Christian city of Smyrna. However, in November 1916, disillusioned with the Ottoman attitude toward Arab nationalism, al-Husayni left the army on a three-month disability leave and returned to Jerusalem, where he remained for the duration of the war. In 1916 he took part in the pan-Arab Revolt against the Ottomans, which struggled to establish a unified, independent Arab state, which they believed was promised by the British in the HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE.

In 1919 al-Husayni attended the Pan-Syrian Congress held in Damascus, where he supported Emir Faisal as king of SYRIA. That same year he joined the Arab secret society al-Nadi al-Arabi (The Arab Club) in Jerusalem, a literary and nationalist organization opposed to Zionist claims on Palestine, and wrote articles for the first new newspaper to be established in Palestine, *Suriyya al-Janubiyya* (Southern Syria). Beginning in September 1919, the paper was published in Jerusalem by the lawyer Muhammad Hasan al-Budayri and edited by 'Arif al-'Arif, both prominent members of al-Nadi al-Arabi.

Until late 1921 al-Husayni focused his efforts on pan-Arabism and creating Greater Syria, in which Palestine would be a southern province of one unified Arab state, with its capital in Damascus. Greater Syria was to include the territory now known as Syria, LEBANON, JORDAN, the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and Israel. The struggle for Greater Syria collapsed after Britain ceded control over present-day Syria and Lebanon to FRANCE in July

1920, in accord with the SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT. After the French army overthrew King Faysal and dissolved Greater Syria, al-Husayni turned from a Damascus-oriented pan-Arabism to an Arab-Palestinian nationalism centered on Jerusalem.

Al-Husayni viewed the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, as a betrayal of the Arabs by the British, and in 1920 he began his political activism on behalf of the Palestinians. He helped to organize ANTI-ZIONIST demonstrations in Jerusalem, and his initial speeches called for unity with Syria, as he had not yet given up hope of pan-Arab nationalism. Soon, however, he became a strong advocate of Palestinian nationalism, for which he became famous. An anti-Zionist demonstration in April 1920 turned violent, and in the ensuing riots five Jews and four Arabs were killed. The British sentenced several Jews and Arabs to prison terms for their parts in the riot, with al-Husayni being sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in absentia, because he had already fled Palestine. In 1921 the first British HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE, Sir HERBERT SAMUEL, pardoned al-Husayni and appointed him to succeed his brother as mufti of Jerusalem. Before his appointment al-Husayni had assured Samuel that he and his family would maintain tranquillity in Jerusalem and cooperate with the British, which he did until 1936.

In early 1922 the British high commissioner appointed al-Husayni president of the Supreme Muslim Council, which gave him control over Muslim Shari'a courts, schools, and mosques; an annual budget of about $220,000 (50,000 pounds sterling); and the Waqf (religious endowment) funds. He formed an international Muslim campaign to improve and restore the shrine known as the DOME OF THE ROCK on the Muslim holy site AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. The success of al-Husayni's fund-raising activities allowed the structure to be completely renovated.

Al-Husayni used these offices during the 1920s to extend his influence in religious and political affairs within and beyond Palestine. His rise to power coincided with the decline of the Palestine ARAB EXECUTIVE, which led the Palestinian national struggle from 1920 to 1934, and was based on the public perception that he had stood up to Zionists during the 1928–1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES and violent riots. In fact he neither organized nor led the riots, according to the British SHAW COMMISSION, which investigated the disturbances. Rather, he had publicly encouraged Muslims throughout Palestine not to resort to violence.

From 1929 to 1936 al-Husayni continued to cooperate with the British while at the same time attempting to change British pro-Zionist policy. He opposed militant activities against British rule and sent his secretary to London to propose a representative government.

For their part, the British proposed restrictions on Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchase in the 1930 PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER but withdrew the proposal because of Zionist pressure. Thus al-Husayni convened a General ISLAMIC CONFERENCE in December 1931 to galvanize Arab and Muslim opposition toward Zionists and to caution Britain that support for ZIONISM would jeopardize its interests in the Arab and Muslim world.

British policy, however, continued to support the Zionist cause, and al-Husayni increasingly found himself in the untenable position of working for the British and believing they would support Palestinian national rights, while consistently and forcefully articulating the Palestinian cause and opposing Zionism, and counseling the Palestinians not to use violence.

As Jewish immigration and land purchases continued to grow, so did Palestinian opposition to them. In April 1936, Palestinian groups throughout the country declared a general strike, and violence spread across Palestine. The public urged al-Husayni to assume the leadership of the ARAB REVOLT, which protested Jewish immigration and land purchases and demanded a national government. He reluctantly joined the executive organ known as the Arab High Committee, of which he became president. The committee proclaimed an official general strike; called for nonpayment of taxes and shutting down of municipal governments; and demanded an end to Jewish immigration, a ban on land sales to Jews, and national independence for the Palestinians. This immediately put al-Husayni on a collision course with the British. As the Arab Revolt continued, Jewish colonies, KIBBUTZIM, and quarters in towns became the targets for Arab sniping, bombing, and other violent activities.

In July 1937, British police were sent to arrest al-Husayni for his part in the Arab rebellion, but he was tipped off and escaped to al-Haram ash-Sharif, where the British thought it inadvisable to capture him. He rejected the 1937 PEEL COMMISSION Report, which recommended partition,

and in September the British removed him from the presidency of the Supreme Muslim Council and declared the Arab Higher Committee illegal. In October he fled to Lebanon, where he attempted to reconstitute the Arab Higher Committee and to direct events in Palestine—neither of which was very successful. It is thought that he acquiesced in the assassinations of collaborators. After Britain published the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which declared Britain's opposition to a Jewish state in Palestine, al-Husayni became even more bitter and uncompromising, rejecting (as did the Zionist leaders) the White Paper because it did not provide for an immediate Palestinian state, even though its terms were favorable to the Palestinians. Although he remained in Lebanon for two years, his deteriorating relationship with the French authorities led him to flee to IRAQ in October 1939. There he encouraged a pan-Arab revolt against British rule in 1941, which caused British prime minister Winston Churchill to approve his assassination, but the assassins failed.

Subsequently al-Husayni fled to Italy and GERMANY, where he conferred with Mussolini and Hitler. In exchange for German promises that the Arab nations would be liberated and given their independence after the war, he cooperated with the Nazis and assisted in anti-British and ANTI-SEMITIC propaganda campaigns as well as in recruitment of Muslims for the war effort. Fearing that Jewish immigration to Palestine would lead to the domination or dispossession of his people, al-Husayni appealed to Nazi officials not to allow Jews to leave Italy and Germany for Palestine. By doing so he endangered the lives of thousands of Jews, mostly children, who would not have been sent to concentration camps had the Nazis complied. Whatever his contributions to the cause of Palestinian nationalism, his career and his cause were tainted by his association with the Nazis. This involvement also limited his freedom of action during the critical period from 1946 to 1948.

In 1946 al-Husayni returned to the Arab world to continue his struggle against Zionists and his work for an Arab Palestine. But he utterly misjudged the balance of forces in Palestine and internationally. He rejected the November 1947 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181, which was a missed opportunity, because implementation of the partition resolution would have resulted in a TWO-STATE SOLUTION. On 1 October 1948 al-Husayni was elected president of the ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT, headquartered in the GAZA STRIP. But within a few days he was escorted back to Cairo by the Egyptians, and the All Palestine Government was annulled shortly after it was established. Thereafter, al-Husayni gradually lost political influence and became a religious Islamic leader, settling first in Cairo and then in Beirut, where he died.

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—Philip Mattar

Al-Husayni, Faysal (1940–2001)

Faysal al-Husayni, a prominent Palestinian political leader, was the son of ABD AL-QADIR AL-HUSAYNI, a Palestinian nationalist and fighter, and the grandnephew of AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI. His participation in the struggle for Palestine began in the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN) and involved guerrilla activity, but evolved to intellectual pursuits and political activism working for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION.

Upon finishing school in EGYPT in 1958, al-Husayni cofounded the General Union of Palestinian Students, which later became one of the central institutions of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). As a young man he was attracted to MAN but soon identified more with YASIR ARAFAT's FATAH movement. In 1963 he received commando training in Egypt, returned to JERUSALEM where he opened an office for the PLO,

and later (1966–1967) received military training in a PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY camp in SYRIA. In 1967 al-Husayni was back in Jerusalem under Arafat's leadership as the PLO's head of popular organizations in the WEST BANK. He also acted as a MAN military commander from August to October 1967, when he was arrested by Israel for arms possession and imprisoned for a year. After his release he worked as an X-ray technician in Jerusalem from 1969 to 1977, then went to Beirut to pursue graduate studies in history.

In 1979 Faysal al-Husayni founded the Jerusalem-based ARAB STUDIES SOCIETY and in 1982 became a member of the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL. By the mid-1980s al-Husayni was the senior representative of Fatah in the West Bank. He was held under house arrest by Israel for his political activities from 1982 to 1987 and repeatedly imprisoned from April 1987 through January 1989. These experiences helped transform al-Husayni's political outlook, leading him to recognize Israel as a permanent part of the landscape and to seek ways to achieve peaceful coexistence. In 1990 he led preparatory talks with US Secretary of State JAMES BAKER for the MADRID CONFERENCE, the US-sponsored dialogue among Arab states, Palestinians, and Israelis, and was part of the Palestinian steering committee from 1991 to 1993. Although Israel prevented him from taking a direct role in the talks for two years because of his association with Fatah, in 1993 he became head of the Palestinian delegation to Madrid. From April 1996 until his death in 2001, he served on the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, and Arafat appointed him a minister in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY as well as a member of the FINAL STATUS negotiating team. He spoke Hebrew fluently, often presenting the Palestinian viewpoint to Israeli audiences. Al-Husayni died of a heart attack while acting as the first PLO leader to visit KUWAIT after the GULF WAR.

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Al-Husayni, Jamal (1892–1982)

Jamal al-Husayni, a member of the prominent al-Husayni family of Jerusalem, played an important role in the Palestinian national struggle during the BRITISH MANDATE. He was secretary of the ARAB EXECUTIVE and secretary of the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL, and in 1936 became a member of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (AHC). Al-Husayni was a member of the Palestinian delegation to the 1930 LONDON CONFERENCE, which was held to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine situation, and in 1939 he was president of the delegation to the second London Conference.

Additionally he served on the AHC delegations to the ARAB LEAGUE and the UNITED NATIONS. After the British crackdown on Palestinian leaders in 1937, al-Husayni fled to LEBANON and from there to IRAQ and then IRAN, where the British arrested him and held him in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). During his time in exile, he attempted to revive the AHC but was unsuccessful, because by that time the British had outlawed all Palestinian political activity, and other former members had little interest in reviving it. In 1948, al-Husayni served for a period in the short-lived ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT. Eventually he settled in SAUDI ARABIA and was an advisor to King Sa'ud from 1953 to 1964.

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Al-Husayni, (Pasha) Musa Kazim (1850/1853–1934)

Musa Kazim al-Husayni was a prominent Palestinian politician. The son of a former mayor of JERUSALEM, Salim al-Husayni, he was appointed mayor by the British in 1918. However, BRITISH MANDATE officials removed him two years later, in 1920 during the AL-NABI MUSA DEMONSTRATIONS, because he gave a speech in support of SYRIAN independence under Faysal bin Husayn.

Musa Kazim was a prominent figure in the MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS opposed to ZIONISM, which began to emerge in 1918. He was elected head of the ARAB EXECUTIVE in 1920 and throughout the 1920s was the most important Palestinian nationalist leader, heading the opposi-

tion to the British-proposed LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL. Between 1921 and 1930 Musa Kazim led four delegations to London to argue the Palestinian cause before British officials. The delegations pressed for termination of the BALFOUR DECLARATION (which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine), suspension of Zionist IMMIGRATION, a halt to Jewish LAND purchases, and an independent, representative (without Zionists) Palestinian state, which would become part of a federation of Arab states. In October 1933, by which time his influence had significantly declined, Musa Kazim was severely beaten by British police during a demonstration in JAFFA protesting Zionist immigration. Twelve Palestinians and one policeman were killed. Al-Husayni died five months later of the injuries he sustained.

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Al-Husayni Family

Historically, the al-Husaynis, the AL-KHALIDI FAMILY, and the AL-NASHASHIBI FAMILY were the three most prominent families in JERUSALEM. Until 1856 the al-Husaynis largely dominated the three traditional power bases in the OTTOMAN EMPIRE: Mashyachat al Haram (the guardian of the Muslim holy site AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF), Niqabat al-Ashraf (head of the prophet's family), and the mufti, the Muslim legal scholar (as head of the committee for religious research and rulings). As a result of the Ottoman reform movement (Tanzimat) and the Ottoman sultan's effort to build a modern centralized state, the family had to conquer a new area, that of the Baladiya, the Jerusalem town council and the mayoralty, which were established in 1863. For most of the time until the outbreak of World War I, the Husaynis dominated this position as well as their other power bases. The mayoralty fortified the family's central role in local politics in Jerusalem from the 1860s through the BRITISH MANDATE period. Although the British in theory had the power to take that role from the Husaynis, they decided to leave the balance of power among the families intact.

The Husaynis' control over Jerusalem continued during the first decade of the twentieth century. The last mayor of Jerusalem before World War I was Husayn Salim al-Husayni, who inherited the mayoralty from his father in 1910. His stepbrothers, 'Abd al-Salih and Sa'id, held the posts in the years 1900 to 1906. Sa'id was also elected as a representative to the Ottoman parliament.

Additionally, in 1856 Mustafa al-Husayni, the grandfather of al-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, headed the Ifta (an educational institute founded to represent Islam) and remained its leader until 1893, when he was replaced by his son, Shaykh Taher. Kamil, Mustafa's son from his first wife, Mahbuba, replaced his father, Shaykh Taher, in 1908; Amin, Shaykh Taher's son from his second wife, Zainab, became the first grand mufti after the British occupation.

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Husayn-McMahon Correspondence

The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence was an exchange of ten letters in 1915–1916 between Sir Henry McMahon, British high commissioner in EGYPT, and Husayn ibn Ali, emir of the Hijaz (ruler of Western Arabia) and sharif of Mecca (keeper of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina). These letters concerned the future political status of the Arab lands of the Middle East and Great Britain's effort to mobilize the Arabs in armed revolt against the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, with which Britain was at war.

After the Ottomans were formally allied with GERMANY during World War I, Lord Herbert Kitchener, then British secretary for war, asked McMahon to seek an alliance with Sharif Husayn, who had established contact with groups of active Arab nationalists in SYRIA. Although British officials did not expect the Arabs to provide significant military assistance, they hoped that an alliance with an Arab Muslim leader belonging to a prominent family with long-standing Islamic credentials would deflect the Turkish call for holy war against its non-Muslim enemies.

The first letter, of 14 July 1915, in the exchange was sent by Husayn's son Abdullah and laid out

Husayn's opening conditions for joining Britain in the war against the Turks. The first condition was for Britain to "acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries," defined as all of the Arabian Peninsula except the British-controlled territory at Aden, along with the territory to the north of it bounded on the east by the border with Persia and on the west by the Mediterranean Sea, and extending north into what is now southern Turkey.

McMahon's second letter, dated 24 October 1915, is crucial. It states: "The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be exempted from the proposed delimitation. Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept that delimitation. As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to interests of her ally FRANCE, I am authorized to give you the following pledges on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows to your note: 'That subject to the modifications stated above, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and uphold the independence of the Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the Sharif of Mecca.'"

Disputes erupted soon after the war. Was Palestine included in the promise of Arab independence, as argued by Arab nationalists with the support of some British officials, or was it excluded, as afterwards claimed by the British government and propounded by Zionist leaders? Countless analysts have debated and interpreted and reinterpreted the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence over the issue of whether the British sponsorship of the Zionist program of colonization in Palestine (the 1917 BALFOUR DECLARATION) was compatible with agreements embodied in this exchange of letters. The disputes over the interpretation of the correspondence were, on the pro-Zionist side, related to the fact that the letter did not explicitly mention the Sanjak of JERUSALEM, which was the Ottoman administrative division that covered most of Palestine. On the other hand, the letter is clear about which areas are to be part of the Arab state and which are not.

McMahon's promises, which were made on instructions from the government in London, are seen by Arab nationalists as a pledge of immediate Arab unity and independence, which they believe was violated by the region's subsequent partition by the League of Nations into British and French MANDATES under the secret SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT of May 1916. Husayn did not comprehend how the Ottoman Sanjak of Jerusalem (central and southern Palestine) could possibly have been part of McMahon's exclusion. Because of the status of Jerusalem in Islamic tradition, Husayn would have vigorously insisted that it be part of the promise of Arab independence if he had thought McMahon was suggesting its exclusion.

Husayn and his side lacked practical leverage with Britain, so in the postwar settlement the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, not the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, were given priority. France took Syria, and Britain assumed direct rule in Palestine (as well as IRAQ and what became TransJORDAN). Not only in the Husayn-McMahon exchanges, but in all the contacts between British officials and Arab leaders, British officials had avoided fully exposing the true ambitions of London in the Middle East.

Aside from the question of alleged British duplicity, the prolonged argument over the inclusion or exclusion of Palestine in the promise of Arab independence has been regarded by some as relevant to the legitimacy of British sponsorship of the Jewish colonization of the country. The debate is part of a decades-long dispute over whether or not justification exists for the progressive alienation of Palestine Arabs from the LAND in whose history and geography they are deeply embedded.

See also HASHEMITE GENEALOGY FROM THE HEJAZ

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—Ray L. Cleveland

Husayn-Peres Agreement, 1987

The Husayn-Peres Agreement, also known as the London Agreement, was an accord reached between Israeli foreign minister SHIMON PERES and JORDAN's King Husayn in London in 1987. It encompassed both the process for and substance of a peace agreement among Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians—and potentially between Israel and the remaining Arab states. It failed because Israel's Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR vetoed it and US Secretary of State GEORGE SCHULTZ did not advocate it with the US government.

In 1987 a national unity government ruled Israel, with LIKUD PARTY Shamir as prime minister and LABOR PARTY Peres as foreign minister, producing a government rent with contradictions. At the international level none of the official diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the REAGAN PLAN, the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE) had produced any movement toward a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) had yet to clarify its position sufficiently on a number of issues (as required by the UNITED STATES) in order to be part of a peace process, and the king's efforts to draw the PLO into an alliance with Jordan had failed. Thus Peres and Husayn took it upon themselves to hold a secret summit and attempt to break the deadlock.

On 11 April they met in London and agreed on an agenda for proceeding, based on the following positions:

- An international conference should launch the process but should be a purely symbolic meeting without any power to impose solutions.
- After the initial conference, every subsequent session would require the prior consent of all the parties.
- All substantive negotiations would be conducted on a bilateral basis between Israel and individual Arab states.
- A joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team would be composed of non-PLO Palestinians and the PLO would be excluded from the conference.
- All issues concerning the Palestinians would be dealt with by Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian team.
- Participation in the conference would be dependent on a party's acceptance of UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 and their renunciation of violence and TERRORISM.
- The proposal was subject to the agreement of the United States, which would take the initiative in convening the conference.

Both Peres and the king believed that they had produced a practical, workable, and much-needed initiative, which moreover included all of Israel's demands made at the 1973 GENEVA CONFERENCE. Although Shamir had given Peres the go-ahead for the summit with King Husayn, he vetoed the agreement, backed by his Likud ministers. He even discouraged Schultz from coming to Israel to discuss it, although Schultz was not overly enthusiastic and did not push the initiative. Shamir was committed to holding on to the entire WEST BANK, which he considered an integral part of Greater Israel. King Husayn just as adamantly wanted the West Bank returned to his jurisdiction. He had no concern for the political and national rights of the Palestinians and

thus was willing to exclude the PLO from negotiations.

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Al-Hut, Shafiq (1932–)

Shafiq al-Hut was the head of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) Beirut office from 1966 to 1993 and sat on the PLO's EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (PLO-EC), where he was one of only two genuinely independent representatives. He was a member of the first PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL in 1964.

Born in JAFFA, al-Hut was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and became a REFUGEE in Beirut, where he obtained a B.A. in biology from the American University in Beirut, then worked as a teacher in KUWAIT, and returned to Beirut in 1958, where he emerged as a pro-NASIR journalist for Beirut newspapers. He was also the director of *Al-Hawadeth* weekly magazine from 1958 to 1964 and served as deputy secretary-general of the Arab Journalists Union from 1963 to 1967.

In 1963, before the PLO came into existence, al-Hut was a founding member and leading figure in a group of prominent intellectuals who created the Palestinian Liberation Front–Path of Return (PLA-PA), which circulated the bulletin *Tariq Al-Awda* (Path of Return), and in 1966 the PLA-PA allied itself with the Palestinian National Liberation Front. These small organizations, however, did not play significant roles in the Palestinian struggle. In 1965 al-Hut formed an alliance with AHMAD SHUQAYRI (the first chairman of the PLO), who appointed him PLO representative in Beirut that year, a position he held until 1993. He was appointed to the PLO Executive Committee in July 1966 and was active in encouraging the formation of Palestinian associations in LEBANON, which furthered the recruitment of activists.

In September 1968 al-Hut declined several high positions in the PLO, but remained affiliated with it, serving as PLO representative to the UN General Assembly on various occasions and remaining as the PLO ambassador to Lebanon, where he played a key role in managing the Palestinian position in the 1975–1976 Lebanese civil war. He narrowly avoided assassination on various occasions, especially by SA'IQA in January 1976. Although al-Hut was never a fighter or a military man, some speculate that Israel was behind several of the assassination attempts because of the clarity of his arguments for Palestinian interests.

Al-Hut was strongly opposed to the OSLO ACCORDS, believing they completely negated the basic principles of Palestinian nationalism—self-determination and sovereignty in an independent state in all of the territories Israel conquered in 1967. In response, he suspended his participation in the PLO-EC and removed himself from all positions in the PLO. He remains critical of the leadership's stance toward Palestinian refugees, especially those in Lebanon, and remains active in assisting dissident Palestinian factions based in Damascus.

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Al-Ibrahimi Mosque

The al-Ibrahimi Mosque (Tomb or Sanctuary of Abraham) is located in HEBRON, in the WEST BANK, over a site venerated by both Muslims and Jews (who call it the CAVE OF MACHPELAH) and, as such, is a place of continuous conflict between Palestinians and Israeli settlers. The prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) is believed to have come to Hebron around 2000–1900 BCE and to be buried in a cave under the present mosque with his wife, their sons, and their wives. In the first century BCE, King Herod built a Roman temple over Ibrahim's cave, which was converted into a Christian church during the Byzantine period. Believing that Abraham was the first Muslim and that the Prophet Muhammad had visited al-Haram al-Ibrahimi on his night flight from Mecca to JERUSALEM, Muslims converted the building into a mosque in 638 CE and named it al-Haram al-Ibrahimi. Thus Hebron became the fourth most sacred city of Islam after Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem.

The al-Ibrahimi Mosque was under Muslim control from the seventh century until 1967, when Israel conquered the West Bank and partitioned the mosque into a Jewish synagogue and a mosque. Thereafter Jewish services were held on the lower level, and Muslims prayed in an upper structure. As a consequence of the OSLO ACCORDS and increasing SETTLER VIOLENCE, the mosque has become virtually inaccessible to Muslims. A source of continuous Israeli-Palestinian tension since 1967, the 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in the mosque marked its nadir.

See also CAVE OF MACHPELAH; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON MASSACRE, 1994

Ichud Leumi

See NATIONAL UNION PARTY

Identity

See PALESTINIAN IDENTITY

Identity Cards

The Israeli Identity Card (Teudat Zehut) is a compulsory document for every individual over sixteen years of age, Jew or Arab, living in Israel or the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Children are generally registered on at least one of their parents' ID cards. It was prescribed in the Identity Card Carrying and Displaying Act of 1982. The card must be with the individual at all times and presented upon demand to a head of municipal or regional authority, a police officer, a member of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, or a member of the Border Patrol. Attached to the ID cards, people must carry any PERMITS they are issued, such as work permits or permits to enter JERUSALEM, for example.

The Identity Card includes the following personal details:

- Unique number, called Identity Number
- Full name
- Name of father
- Name of mother
- Date of birth (both civil and—for Jews—the Hebrew date)
- Place of birth
- Ethnicity (only in cards issued before 2005, but the Hebrew date of birth still differentiates Jews from non-Jews)
- Gender
- Place and date of issue (both Gregorian and Hebrew dates)
- Portrait photo (in color)

The document has an appendix where the following is listed:

- Current address
- Previous addresses
- Previous name(s)
- Citizenship (the bearer may be a permanent resident with a foreign citizenship)
- Name and Identity Number of spouse and children
- Electoral polling station stamp (the appendix used to be stamped at the polling station to help prevent ballot stuffing) (This regulation was abolished in 1992, so that the Israeli voter may now use an ID card without an appendix.)

There have been several fierce legal battles about identifying the ethnicity of the bearer of the Identity Card. As of 2005, the ethnicity has not been printed; a line of eight asterisks appears instead. Nevertheless, whether a citizen is Jewish or non-Jewish can in most cases be determined by checking whether the Hebrew date of birth appears in addition to the civil date. The Israeli state's population registry, which serves as the basis for the data on the Identity Cards, still indicates the ethnicity of each person, and this information is available upon request in certain circumstances determined by the registration law. It is always available when the requester names "security" as the reason for knowing.

The color of the plastic casing of the Identity Card of Israeli citizens and permanent residents is blue, with the Israeli coat of arms embossed on the outer cover. Non-Israeli residents of the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP (until 2005) were originally issued orange ID cards that were similar to the Israeli card (the differences being that the surname category came after the first name, father's name, and grandfather's name categories instead of at the top, and the ethnicity category was replaced with a religion category). The Identity Card has functioned as an important means of Israeli monitoring and control of the Palestinian population and is the prerequisite for acquiring any type of permit or document that a resident may need.

With regard to Palestinians, Israel began to change the Identity Card system following the outbreak of the First INTIFADA (December 1987). After a number of stabbings in which Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians in Israel, the Israel authorities took measures to restrict and supervise the entry of Palestinians into Israel and instituted nontransparent procedures based on unclear considerations. One change, instituted in 1988, involved changing West Bank ID cards to green while keeping them orange in Gaza. New Identity Cards were issued to Palestinian residents with a "security history" and whom Israel prohibited from leaving the Occupied Territories or from entering Israel. Furthermore, in 1989, the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION's employment offices ceased issuing work permits for Palestinians automatically, as it had done previously, and issued permits only to those who met undefined security criteria.

In June 1989, Israel began to require that every Palestinian worker entering Israel from the Gaza Strip (and later, in 2004, also workers from the West Bank) have a "magnetic identity card," in addition to the basic Identity Card, to obtain a work permit. These magnetic cards contained coded information that could be swiped when passing through the turnstiles at the Eretz checkpoint between Gaza and Israel (or later at CHECKPOINTS between Israel and the West Bank). The authorities did not issue magnetic cards to released PRISONERS, those formerly in ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, or even Palestinians who had been detained and released without charges being filed against them.

By 2005 the magnetic card was able to carry biometric identification, that is, it bears a picture of a person's face and hand from both sides, an image of the eye, and a fingerprint. In March 2005 some 2,000 residents of the West Bank had a magnetic card. By 2007, their number had reached 120,000. They are intended for use in conjunction with the separation BARRIER, where they are necessary at seven special access points along the Barrier and in the Ramallah area, and any Palestinian wishing to enter Israel must have one.

To obtain the card, Palestinians must go to the District Coordination Office, fill out forms, and pay a fee. Frequently, applicants are required to meet with a SHIN BET (GSS) agent to remove the "security prevention" notation on their file. The GSS agents use these meetings to pressure Palestinians to become COLLABORATORS. The decision on whether to grant a magnetic card is not transparent and is based on security considerations that the authorities fail to delineate. Applicants who are found to have a "security prevention" are rejected, as are every one of the some 650,000 Palestinians who since 1967 have been detained by Israel, were

once imprisoned or detained, including every Palestinian who was administratively detained, even if ultimately released from detention without being charged. This number constitutes approximately 20 percent of the total Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories. Considering the fact that the majority of those detained are male, the number of Palestinians detained forms approximately 40 percent of the total male Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories. Since these individuals cannot obtain a magnetic identification card, they cannot work or travel. A Palestinian without a magnetic identity card has almost no chance of obtaining a permit to enter Israel, but even those who have such a card must overcome additional hurdles before they can hope to receive a permit allowing such travel.

As of July 2006, there were 9,493 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. At least 765 of these prisoners are administrative detainees and have not been charged or tried. There are 311 prisoners aged eighteen or younger, and 126 of the prisoners are female. When these persons are released, they too will be unable to acquire a magnetic card.

Identity Cards and the PNA

After the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), residents were issued Palestinian ID cards, but each must be approved by Israel. They are identical to the Israeli Civil Administration cards save for the order of languages being switched, with Arabic coming before Hebrew, and the plastic casing being dark green with the PNA insignia embossed on the outer cover. The INTERIM AGREEMENT (September 1995) gave Israel control of the Palestinian population registry, and the Israeli government assigns the ID numbers for Palestinian ID cards, meaning it determines the number of Palestinians who can settle in the PNA territories. Changing addresses inside the territories was declared a PNA "right." But Israel, by virtue of its recording all the details in the ID cards, often prevented changes of address from Gaza to the West Bank, including cases of people who had long since moved to the West Bank as children, went to school there, and made families. Such Gazans have been living for years as "illegals" in the West Bank, under constant threat of expulsion to Gaza. Moreover, even after ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005, the Israeli government continues to control the Strip's population registry.

According to the Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs, there are over 50,000 Palestinians who have been waiting for up to eleven years for their ID cards to be approved by Israel. As a result, they cannot travel and are considered "illegal" in their own places of residence. Israel claims the PNA exceeded the quota allotted to it for FAMILY REUNIFICATION and ID issuance, and that the Palestinians themselves overstayed the visitor's permits that they were issued. Palestinians, however, consider obtaining residency their natural right, especially as many of those now without status were born in Gaza or the West Bank.

Jerusalem

In June 1967, Israel annexed some 70,000 dunums (17,500 acres, or 70 square kilometers) of land it occupied in the area in and around East Jerusalem, including twenty-eight Palestinian villages, and incorporated it into Israeli Jerusalem. Whereas the rest of the Palestinians in the West Bank were given West Bank Identity Cards, most residents of the annexed areas of Jerusalem were given Israeli Identity Cards and listed as "residents" of Jerusalem after they refused to accept Israeli citizenship following the OCCUPATION of East Jerusalem. This would have required them to take an oath of allegiance to the Israeli state and would have meant the de facto acceptance of the Occupation. However, a few thousand Palestinians who lived in the annexed areas were not recognized as residents of Jerusalem (in most cases because they were not at home when the census was taken, or because the census takers mistakenly thought they lived outside the annexed territory).

During the many years (1967–1988) in which free movement was allowed between the Occupied Territories and Israel, the lack of an Israeli Identity Card had almost no effect on these persons. However, since the CLOSURE policy (1990) has been in effect, they require an Identity Card and a permit (which they have little chance of obtaining) to stay in Jerusalem, including in their own house in the annexed territory. Lacking a permit, they are classified as "persons staying illegally." While these persons have not moved—in many instances, they and their families have been living in the same place for generations—the border has been moved, and now the Israeli authorities consider them trespassers. As a result, the Border Police from time to time—usually in the dead of night—go into Palestinian neighborhoods, drag

people from their beds, detain them for hours, interrogate them, arrest them, and let them return home only after they sign a document confirming that they live unlawfully in their homes and know that they are not allowed to sleep there without a permit to stay overnight in Jerusalem.

The confiscation of ID cards of Palestinian Jerusalemites has become as normal as LAND confiscation, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and SETTLEMENT construction. In order to qualify as a "permanent resident," a measure necessary only for Palestinian Jerusalemites and not for Israeli citizens, Palestinians

- Must obtain an Israeli reentry visa when they travel abroad, or they lose their right of return
- Lose their residency right in Jerusalem if they hold or apply for residency/citizenship elsewhere
- Must prove that their "center of life" is within the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem
- Who live abroad for more than seven years automatically lose their residency rights
- Can only register their children as Jerusalem residents if the father holds a valid Jerusalem ID card
- Must apply for family reunification if they marry someone from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or abroad in order to live legally with their spouses in Jerusalem. Most such applications are turned down.

Because of these policies, the ID cards of 6,500 Palestinian Jerusalemites have been revoked since 1967, a figure that does not include the dependents of those who had their ID cards revoked.

Unregistered Persons

As for the Palestinian Jerusalemites who live in the annexed areas of Jerusalem but are not recognized as residents, Israel refuses to issue ID cards to all unregistered Palestinians. These are persons whose parents did not register them at birth in the Palestinian population registry, usually due to ignorance or neglect of bureaucratic affairs, and consequently have no legal status. The major result of their lack of status is their inability to obtain an ID card, which is essential to accomplishing the most mundane acts in many walks of life.

Since the Occupation began in 1967, Israel has exercised almost total control over the Palestinian population registry and has sole power to determine who is a Palestinian resident. In this capacity, Israel could enable children whose parents did not register them—a tendency that is more prominent with regard to daughters—to obtain ID cards by applying the simple and relatively rapid solution known as "late registration." However, Israel refuses to authorize this procedure, and insists instead on channeling these cases to the long and exhausting family unification procedure, which was created to enable a nonresident of the West Bank or Gaza Strip (generally spouses of residents of the Occupied Territories) to live there. Not only does the demand to apply for family unification seem unreasonable with regard to people who have never lived apart from their families and have always resided in the West Bank, but the procedure cannot even be implemented because Israel has frozen handling of all family unification requests since 2000. Furthermore, even if the freeze is removed, and the quota applied prior to the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000) remains in effect, it would take dozens of years to arrange their status. B'TSELEM has taken the testimonies of Palestinians without legal status who began the family unification process when they were minors, who are now married with families, and have yet to receive a status.

Possession of an ID card is especially important in the Occupied Territories, where Israel runs a complex and cumbersome bureaucratic system. Due to the severe restrictions on movement that Israel imposes on Palestinians, many residents are required to show proof of identity on a daily basis, at the many checkpoints that are spread throughout the West Bank or at the ERETZ CROSSING on Gaza's border. Persons who cannot provide official proof of their identity are subjected to harassment, delays, and even denial of the right to pass through checkpoints. Those unregistered persons who insist on trying to live normally despite their lack of status are forced to deal with daily humiliation and harassment.

Another significant aspect of life without an ID card is the difficulty of unregistered persons in obtaining education. Children who do not have ID numbers come up against a variety of obstacles during their formal schooling. Those who manage to overcome bureaucracy and graduate high school—usually due to pressure by the family on key figures in the education system—are then often forced to give up any hope of higher education. Bureaucratic obstacles to registration combine with difficulty to get to the few universities and colleges

that are dispersed throughout the West Bank. Safa Fuqahaa, from the town of Tubas in the northern West Bank, told B'Tselem at the beginning of her fourth semester of nursing school, "the second [al-Aqsa] Intifada began and the Israeli army set up a lot of checkpoints on the way to NABLUS. I had to stop studying because I can't pass through checkpoints without an ID card. . . . I was one of the top students."

Unregistered persons suffer also from a particularly painful repercussion of their lack of status: many find it difficult to marry, as potential partners are deterred by the daily burden and constant restrictions that accompany life without status. Lena Fuqahaa from 'Ein al-Beida in JENIN District told B'Tselem she has almost given up hope of marrying and starting her own family: "A few men have proposed to me, but each time they changed their mind once my parents told them that I don't have an ID card."

The Barrier and New Special Identity Cards

The Barrier diverges from the "Green Line" by anywhere from 200 meters (600 feet) to as much as 20 kilometers (12 miles), with the result that many Israeli settlements in the West Bank remain on the Israeli side of the Barrier, and some Palestinian towns are nearly encircled by it. Considerable Palestinian agricultural land is on the Israeli side and is cut off from the towns. Palestinian concern about access to their property and lands has been intense—all the more so because Israel has declared the swath of land between the Green Line and the Barrier a "CLOSED MILITARY ZONE."

The IDF has decreed that the villagers need to have a special Identity Card, additional to the long-standing Identity Card they already have, because they live in an area that was declared a closed military area. Jews can go there or live there, but Palestinians cannot. Only those who live there are allowed to stay, provided they get this authorization from the Israeli authorities. A few have already been told that they are not allowed to stay there, because some of them were politically active years ago and were in Israeli jails, or for other, often not stated, reasons.

In order to obtain the new identification cards, residents must still prove "permanent residence" to the satisfaction of the authorities. The IDF claims that anyone who can demonstrate permanent residence will be automatically issued a new identification card. As of 2007, no definition of "permanent" was included in the order, and no criteria for judging permanency of residence are available. Unless explicitly addressed, this could lead to arbitrary implementation of the permit/identification card process in areas under PNA administration pursuant to the OSLO ACCORDS.

Palestinian farmers seeking access to their lands must cope with a complex bureaucracy and meet a number of conditions. First and foremost, with their new IDs in hand, they must prove ownership of their land. They also have to pressure the Civil Administration time and again to set times to allow them to enter. Also, the defense establishment subjects Palestinian access to the goodwill and caprice of the settlers. Against this background, many farmers give up and stop trying to gain access and to work their land.

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Ihud

Ihud (Unity) was founded in JERUSALEM in 1942 as a political movement to advance Palestinian-Jewish accord. Although it was part of the Zionist movement and thus committed to the right of the Jewish people to return to Palestine, the rest of its program diverged sharply from Zionist tradition, because Ihud also supported the right of independence for Palestinian Arabs. And, in opposition to the BILTMORE PROGRAM, the Zionist declaration in 1942 to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, Ihud proposed that these rights be exercised by the two communities jointly in a single BINATIONAL state of Arabs and Jews based on equality and full cooperation in social, economic, political, and cultural relations.

The leaders of Ihud believed that the Zionist movement had neglected the aspirations of the Palestinian community and saw this indifference not just as a political problem but as a deeply moral one as well. For Ihud the Jewish people's relationship to the Arabs while creating a new state in Palestine was the key political and moral concern, because Ihud saw the national rebirth of the Jewish people in Palestine primarily as a means to its cultural and spiritual rebirth. It contended that if Jews created their state by violence and subjugation of other peoples and if they failed in their political and moral obligations to their Arab neighbors, they were imperiling that spiritual rebirth and thus the very future of the Jewish people.

Ihud promoted the idea of a binational state in meetings with Jewish leaders and community activists in Palestine and in the UNITED STATES. It also made determined efforts to find and negotiate with Palestinian Arabs willing to talk about political compromises with the Jewish community. And it resolutely opposed the proposals of both the British government and later the UNITED NATIONS to divide Palestine into two separate states.

For Ihud the new Jewish immigrants had a particular responsibility to set an example for their Arab neighbors. Robert Weltsch, a good friend of Ihud leader MARTIN BUBER, wrote in 1925: "Palestine can only prosper if a relationship of mutual trust is established between the two peoples. Such a relationship can only be established if those who are the newcomers—and such we are—arrive with the honest and sincere determination to live together with the other people on the basis of mutual respect and full consideration of all their human and national rights."

Ihud was the culmination of years of dedicated effort by a number of Zionist leaders and intellectuals, many of whom had worked to create the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The most prominent of these were JUDAH L. MAGNES, the first president of the Hebrew University, and Buber, the eminent philosopher and social historian. In 1939 some of them came together with other political activists to found the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and Cooperation. The league was active for a number of years, organizing joint projects with progressive Arab leaders and seeking to build bridges between the two communities. In the end Ihud failed to prevent the partition of Palestine and the victory of political ZIONISM. Yet its example has kept alive a moral vision and the political ideal of a Palestine that transcends the limits of national enmity and conflict.

See also PEACE: "THE OTHER ZIONISM"

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Immigration

Two issues—immigration and LAND—lie at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since the 1897 Basel Congress, the Zionist movement has worked to bring Jews from around the world to Palestine, while from the beginning of the twentieth century, Palestinians have protested the waves of Jewish settlers that have transformed their lives and their land. Although the story of the Jewish population in Palestine is one of in-migration supplemented by modest natural increase, the story of the Arab population of Palestine is one of high natural increase offset by periodic expulsions.


In *To the Promised Land: A History of Zionist Thought,* David Goldberg notes that for Jewish immigration to Palestine, "the objective was not merely a national home for the Jews, as proffered by the BALFOUR DECLARATION, but through massive immigration to transform the DEMOGRAPHY of Palestine, so that the Jewish minority acquired equal status in the eyes of BRITISH MANDATE authorities and international opinion, and a plausible basis for demanding self-government. . . . This was the tacitly understood goal of Zionist policy during the mandate period. . . . The practical demands of creating an autonomous Jewish society in Palestine ready for eventual statehood took precedence over theoretical ruminations about coexistence with the Arab majority."

Throughout the Mandate, Palestinian protests, demonstrations, and violent revolts were said to be "anti-Jewish" when in fact they were "anti–Jewish immigration" and "anti–Jewish land purchases." The difference is real and material. For twenty years the Palestinian elite used political means to attempt to stem the tidal wave of immigrants without result, and consequently, what began as sporadic, localized outbursts in 1920, 1921, and 1929 became a sustained nationwide revolt in 1936.

Zionist arguments stress the continuity of a Jewish presence in the Holy Land; however, even the most militant proponents of this position acknowledge that, historically, the number of Jews living there was very small. Most Israeli sources accept the figure of the Turkish census of 1882, which indicated that only 24,000 Jews were in Palestine. Only later do Jewish sources begin to diverge. ARTHUR RUPPIN, official agent of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION in Palestine, for example, accepted the Turkish estimate of 60,000 Jews in Palestine in 1914 and acknowledged that these numbers dropped significantly during and after World War I. However, present-day Israeli demographers have revised this 1914 figure upward to 85,000.


According to Janet Abu-Lughod, whose research in the area of immigration is highly respected, after becoming the Mandatory power in Palestine, Britain took the first modern census in the country in 1922, which revealed that the Jewish population at that time numbered 83,790, or 11 percent of the total population of Palestine. Between the census of 1922 and that of 1931 (the latter was the last official census in the country), the Jewish population increased from 83,790 to 174,610, while the Arab population grew from 673,000 to 862,000. Thus in the nine-year period, the total population had increased by some 280,000 persons. Of this total, approximately 4,000 represented persons who had not been counted during the 1922 census, as well as another 10,000 added because of a 1923 boundary adjustment that included an Arab population resident in a district that had been Syrian. Thus there was a real increase of only 266,000 in the total population of Palestine in the nine-year period 1922–1931. The increase in the Jewish population during this period was approximately 91,000, which was attributable to 57,000 Jewish immigrants who entered the country on official visas, an estimated 9,000 persons (almost all Jewish) who were illegally present in the country and not counted when the first census was taken, and an additional 25,000 from natural growth.

Even if so high a Jewish rate of natural increase had been sustained during the next fifteen or so years, without immigration the Jewish population would not have reached 260,000. Although no census was taken again, making all numbers after 1931 relatively suspect, the British Office of Statistics of Palestine continued until 1947 to publish its "best estimates" of the population in Palestine. At that time the Statistical Office estimated the Jewish population at 589,341 (a footnote indicated that this figure had been revised upward, evidently due to "corrections" suggested by JEWISH AGENCY demographers). Thus, it is estimated that between the end of 1931 and early 1947, about 320,000 Jews arrived in Palestine—either as legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, or the offspring of such immigrants. Such immigration was sufficient to raise the Jewish proportion of the population to some 30.8 percent, while the Arab population



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Map 23. The First Zionist Colony in Palestine, 1878



Map 24. Zionist Colonies in Palestine at the Beginning of the British Mandate, 1920

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increased to about 1,320,000, almost exclusively through natural increase.

Even before the establishment of the state of Israel on 15 May 1948, it was clear that the demographic struggle for Palestine had become serious. Between 1932 and 1948 the Jewish population increased by approximately 470,000; of this growth, some 135,000 (29 percent) was due to natural increase while approximately 335,000 was due to an excess of immigrants over emigrants.

The Turkish census of 1914 indicated a resident Arab population in Palestine of about 630,000, a number that had increased only modestly to about 673,000 when the British took their census in 1922. This increase (only 7 percent over the eight-year interval, or less than 1 percent per year) is lower than the estimated natural increase rate for the time. It indicates that there may have been a net emigration, albeit temporary, but clearly no immigration. Nor was immigration a significant contributor to Arab growth during the nine-year period that elapsed before the British took their second census in 1931. The number of "non-Jews" in the country had by then increased to 861,815, of which some 10,000 had been added through a boundary change and perhaps 5,000 consisted of Europeans (British administrators and others). The real increase, then, was approximately 170,000, or about 25 percent over the nine-year period, yielding a compounded annual rate of some 2.5 percent. Most of this could be attributed to the rate of natural increase.

After 1931 the figures become more conjectural, but it is possible to reach some reasonable estimates by projecting forward from the last official figures in British sources. According to the last published *General Monthly Bulletin* on 31 March 1947, the total population of Palestine was 1,908,775; of these, 1,157,423 were Muslims, 146,162 were Christians (mostly Arab), and 15,849 were "others" (again, mostly Arab). Summing these, we reach the estimate of 1.32 million Arabs in Palestine as of 31 March 1947, and applying a reasonable rate of natural increase, close to 1.4 million at the time of the establishment of Israel and the Palestinian flight and expulsion.

In the years since 1948 the total number of Palestinians has more than tripled, and yet the number of Palestinians living in the territory of Palestine itself increased by only 43 percent. They represent the remnants of communities left behind after the 1948 WAR, despite Israel's successive efforts to expel them. The estimated number of Palestinians all over the world at the end of 2005 was 10.1 million, distributed as follows: 3.8 million (37.9 percent) in the Palestinian Territories (including 2.4 million in the West Bank and 1.4 million in the Gaza Strip), 1.1 million (11.2 percent) in Israel, 3.0 million (29.4 percent) in JORDAN, and 462,000 (4.6 percent) in SYRIA. Additionally there were 287,000 Palestinians in SAUDI ARABIA and 152,000 in other Gulf states. There were 58,000 in EGYPT, 113,000 in other Arab states, 216,000 in the Americas, and 275,000 in other countries. As of 2005 the total number of Palestinian refugees accounted for about 40 percent (or 4.2 million) of the total Palestinian population.

See also ALIYA; DEMOGRAPHY; DIASPORA, PALESTINIAN; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Industry (Palestinian)

See ECONOMY: THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE PALESTINIANS

Indyk, Martin S. (1951–)

Martin S. Indyk was a UNITED STATES official with enormous influence on US policymaking for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He was twice US ambassador to Israel (1995–1997 and 2000–2001), served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs in the BILL CLINTON administration (1997–2000), and was special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council (1993–1995). In the latter position Indyk worked from the White House and advised President Clinton directly. Thus he was one of the most strategically placed and powerful individuals in the world when it came to shaping US Middle East policy.

Indyk was born in England of Jewish parentage but was raised in Australia, where he received a B.A. in economics from the University of Sydney and a Ph.D. from the Australian National University. In 1979 he accepted a teaching position at Australia's Macquarie University but left in 1982 to settle in Washington, D.C., where he took a job with the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC), the official, registered pro-Israel lobby in the United States. Its power to ensure that Israel's interests prevail with Congress and the White House is legendary. Indyk assisted in establishing AIPAC's research department and became its deputy director of research.

In 1985 Indyk founded the WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (WINEP), a pro-Israel think tank less directly involved in politics than AIPAC, but closely associated with it, focusing instead on producing policy papers for the use of the executive and legislative branches of government. Indyk believed that all the existing think tanks concerned with the Middle East were "too pro-Arab and anti-Israel." WINEP's major goal has been to keep the US-Israeli relationship at the center of US Middle Eastern policy. Although he had applied for US citizenship several years earlier, he was naturalized only in January 1993 at the request of incoming president Clinton, immediately before his appointment to the National Security Council.

In 2005 Indyk became a senior fellow at the pro-Israel Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, funded by a grant from prominent Los Angeles businessman Haim Saban. Saban, with an estimated net worth of $2.8 billion, said, "he caught the political bug in the mid-1990s, when he felt that support for Israel was slipping in the United States."

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Infiltration (Palestinian) and Retaliation (Israeli)

Following the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, some 750,000 Palestinians were displaced or fled Israel. After the 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS between Israel and neighboring states, Palestinian REFUGEES sought to return to their homes, rescue their belongings, tend to their fields, harvest their crops, return to their villages, contact their relatives, or reclaim the property that Israel had expropriated. Occasionally a Palestinian sought revenge, but during the period 1949–1956, 90 percent or more of the infiltrations were motivated by social or economic concerns, according to Israeli historian Avi Shalim. During the same period, Israel shot and killed between 2,700 and 5,000 Palestinian infiltrators, the great majority of them unarmed.

Israel first responded to the infiltrations domestically, then began massive retaliatory military strikes against the countries from whose territory the infiltrators crossed the border—mainly EGYPT and JORDAN. To combat infiltration domestically Israel razed Palestinian villages; established new SETTLEMENTS along its borders; transferred Palestinian homes to new Jewish immigrants in strategic areas; established regular military patrols along its borders; laid ambushes; placed land mines; set booby traps; and instituted a "free fire," or fire-at-will, policy toward infiltrators. The first external attacks by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) were carried out in February 1951 against the WEST BANK Palestinian villages (then under Jordanian control) of Saffa, Falama, and Sharafat, in response to alleged infiltrations. The Arab governments themselves, especially Jordan, opposed the infiltrations and acted to stop them as best they could, but with little success. Israel's raids were aimed at civilians, constituted collective punishment of whole villages, and were carried out at night for maximum damage—material and human.

By mid-1953 the border situation had deteriorated significantly, and on the night of 14–15 October a major raid took place with serious consequences. Acting Israeli defense minister Pinhas Lavon directed a small commando division, UNIT 101 led by Major ARIEL SHARON, to attack the village of QIBYA under Jordanian control. Sharon and his men reduced the village to a pile of rubble, blew up forty-five houses, and killed sixty-nine civilians—two-thirds of them women and children. In the face of intense international pressure after Qibya, Israeli officially ceased focusing its offensives directly against civilians, adopting instead an aggressive counterforce strategy aimed at military targets in the neighboring Arab states, though without attempting to eliminate "collateral," or civilian, casualties.

Israeli raids continued unabated, including three major ones: First, on 10 October 1956, Israeli forces raided Qalqilya (a Palestinian town under Jordanian OCCUPATION). The attackers cut the telephone lines and mined roads. The initial attack was met with some resistance by the town's National Guard; however, Israeli troops returned following an intensive bombardment, in which fighter planes took part. They then entered the town firing randomly and blowing up houses over the heads of their occupants. The Palestinian dead included seventy to eighty-three persons, mostly civilians, including many women, children, and elderly people, and fifteen were severely injured.

The second major attack was Israel's 28 February 1955 raid on a police post in GAZA (under Egyptian control) in which forty Egyptian soldiers and two children were killed and every building destroyed. According to Israeli historian Benny Morris, from 1953 to 1956 the IDF strikes on its Arab neighbors were designed in part to emphasize Israel's military superiority and to provoke Arab states into war with Israel. The IDF's new chief of staff, MOSHE DAYAN, wanted war and hoped that "a given retaliatory strike would embarrass or provoke the Arab state . . . into . . . retaliating, giving Israel cause to escalate the shooting until war resulted—a war in which Israel could realize such major strategic objectives as the conquest of the West Bank or Sinai, or the destruction of the Egyptian Army." The Gaza raid was one such attack. Egypt had previously consistently discouraged Palestinian infiltration into Israel, but following this incident Egypt did begin to sponsor official *fida'iyyun* and commando raids on Israel, while still discouraging "private" Palestinian infiltration.

Confirming Morris's analysis, Israeli historian Ehud Ya'ari was given access to documents of the Egyptian military and civilian authorities in Gaza, captured by Israel during the 1956 and 1967 wars. The documents were published in 1975 in Hebrew as *Egypt and the Fedayeen, 1953–1956.* Ya'ari found that the Egyptian authorities had a

clear and consistent policy of curbing private incursions into Israel until the Gaza raid of February 1955 and that this policy was abruptly reversed as a direct consequence of this devastating raid.

The third major raid in this period was the 31 August 1955 Israeli attack on Khan Yunis under Egyptian control. Israeli troops conducted house-to-house searches for Palestinian *fida'iyyun* and weaponry. During this operation, 275 Palestinians were killed, with an additional 111 killed in Israeli raids on the Rafah refugee camp. Noam Chomsky writes that "Israel claimed that the killings were caused by 'refugee resistance,' a claim denied by refugees." He further notes that there were no Israeli casualties.

The major effect of these massive retaliations on Egypt was to lead Cairo to the "Czech arms deal," wherein it acquired heavy weapons and which ultimately resulted in the 1956 Sinai/Suez War.

See also KAFR QASIM; UNIT 101

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Infrastructure in the Occupied Territories

Israel has occupied the WEST BANK, the GAZA STRIP (until August 2005), and East JERUSALEM since 1967. As the OCCUPATION authority it has a legal responsibility to provide basic infrastructure—WATER, electricity, sanitation and wastewater treatment, ROADS, telecommunication, and HEALTH CARE—but it has not done so. As a result the Palestinian infrastructure, which was underdeveloped in 1967, progressively deteriorated during the Occupation, even though every Palestinian is required to pay taxes for municipal services to the Israeli government. When the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) took over these services in 1994, it was faced with the task of revitalizing every sector. Due in large part to the generosity of international donors, the PNA made limited progress in most spheres, though not nearly enough. With the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, almost all improvements were entirely destroyed.

The following illustrates the dilapidated and/or underdeveloped condition of all aspects of Palestinian infrastructure in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem; Israel's role in its dedevelopment during thirty-seven years of Occupation; the continuing dependence of the Palestinians on Israel, or conversely, Israel's continuing control over every aspect of Palestinian life; and the destruction Israel has wrought on the infrastructure, especially since 2000.

Energy

West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS). The West Bank and Gaza have different energy supply sources. Nearly all energy is provided by electricity and petroleum products, almost all of which have to be purchased from Israel. There is no storage capacity for petroleum products in the WBGS, thus fuel is transferred on a day-to-day basis and it all comes from Israel.

According to the Paris Agreement (INTERIM AGREEMENT), the Palestinians are allowed to sell fuel in the WBGS at a lower price than that in Israel, at a rate that does not exceed 15 percent of the excise tax on gasoline. Israel collects the taxes on the fuel for the Palestinians and is supposed to remit them to the PNA; however, since the start of the Intifada in 2000, Tel Aviv has refused to remit any revenue to the PNA. The total revenue from fuel excises in 2005 was equivalent to US $180 million. Total revenues from fuel excise duties and VAT on energy consumption amounted to about US $330 million in 2005, equivalent to one-third of total fiscal revenues for the PNA (but which they did not receive).

West Bank. The West Bank depends almost entirely on the Israeli Electricity Company (IEC) for electricity supply because it has no generation

capacity or transmission network. The electricity system in the West Bank consists of numerous isolated distribution systems to which power is supplied by four utilities: (1) the Jerusalem District Electricity Company (JDECO), (2) the Hebron Electric Power Co. (HEPCO), (3) the Southern Electric Co. (SELCO), and (4) the Northern Electricity Distribution Co. (NEDCO). The maximum capacity of electricity supply to the West Bank is about 550 megawatts, of which the IEC directly supplies 30 percent in bulk to 215 localities, and 70 percent indirectly through JDECO, which in turn supplies electricity to East Jerusalem and in bulk to 165 localities. In the West Bank, fuel is supplied by Israel to terminals in Nil'in (liquefied petroleum gas) and Deir Kadiz (other fuel types), from where it is distributed through the Palestinian Petroleum Commission (PPC). West Bank electricity consumption—as measured by purchases of bulk power from IEC—increased at an average annual rate of 6.4 percent between 1999 and 2005.

Gaza Strip. Israel failed to supply the Gaza Strip, except Gaza City, with electricity until 1978, more than ten years after the beginning of the Occupation. Thereafter it slowly expanded services to the towns and refugee camps throughout the Strip. Gaza receives electricity from the IEC and from a diesel-based power plant built by Palestinians in 2002 with an electricity-generating capacity of some 140 megawatts located inside Gaza. Gaza also receives a small proportion if its power supply, from 9 to 17 percent, from EGYPT. In Gaza, Tel Aviv supplies fuel to a terminal at Nahal Oz on the border with Israel.

Electricity is distributed in Gaza by the Gaza Electricity Distribution Company (GEDCO). The electrical lines for Gaza were initially installed by Israel and were later extended as Gaza's population increased. The different lines are not connected to each other, that is, there is no electrical grid that covers all of the Gaza Strip; there is a network connected to Egypt, a network connected to Gaza's power station in Nuseirat, and networks connected to the Israeli feeders. The different networks cannot be connected to compensate for the loss of one or more sources of electricity. GEDCO has no central control room to monitor and manage the flow of electricity. When it needs to redistribute electricity to share power cuts, engineers travel to a substation to manually pull a switch. The switches are designed to be operated once a year for maintenance, but since 2006 they have been used up to five times a day, resulting in serious damage and the electrocution of two engineers (both of whom recovered after lengthy hospital stays). According to GEDCO, at any one time 30 percent of Gaza's supply is affected by technical problems caused by the strain placed on the system and the lack of spare parts due to Israel's boycott.

In June 2006, following the capture of an Israeli combat soldier by Palestinian militants, Israeli aircraft bombed and destroyed the six transformers of Gaza's power plant. Since the bombing, eight new, smaller transformers have been installed, with a maximum output of 80 megawatts, but the power plant is operating far below capacity and is fully dependent on fuel supplies from Israel.

Following the destruction of the power plant's transformers, Israel increased for a time its direct supply of electricity to Gaza. Power from Israel reaches Gaza via ten feeder cables, which supply twelve megawatts each to different parts of the Strip. In late January 2007, one of the feeders from Israel was damaged. It was repaired on 6 February 2008, a year later.

By early 2007, however, Israel began reducing fuel and energy supplies to the Gaza Strip. Additionally, because of Israel's total blockade of the Strip, badly needed spare parts were unavailable. On 19 September 2007, Israel declared the coastal strip a "hostile entity" in response to HAMAS's 26 June takeover of the Gaza Strip and began further reductions in the amount of fuel it supplied to Gaza.

Israel said the measures are aimed at stopping Gaza militants from firing rockets into Israel. Others saw it differently. Human Rights Watch commented, "Israel's cuts of fuel and electricity to Gaza . . . amount to collective punishment of the civilian population, and violate Israel's obligations under the laws of war. . . . the cuts are seriously affecting civilians who have nothing to do with these armed groups, and that violates a fundamental principle of the laws of war."

Without power, Gaza's water authority, the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU), cannot pump and distribute water or process sewage. Power cuts also mean that hospitals have to suspend operations in order to ensure emergency services and increase the risk of health problems related to contaminated water and nonfunctioning sanitation and heating systems.

Recently hospitals and the CMWU have had to rely solely on emergency generators to maintain normal services. Between 18 January 2007 and 22 January 2008, when Israel suspended all fuel supplies, both services ran low on diesel and had to curtail their operations. Hospitals turned away patients, and in some cases relatives had to bring in food to feed patients.

Unable to treat sewage, the CMWU had no other choice but to release wastewater into the sea at a rate of 40 million liters per day. During the second half of January 2008, almost half of Gaza's population had no access to running water. The limited and diminishing supply of electricity to the Gaza Strip is placing ever increasing pressure on the delivery of basic services in health, education, water, and sanitation to a growing Palestinian population.

During and after OPERATION CAST LEAD (December 2008–January 2009), some three-quarters of Gaza's 1.5 million residents were without electricity. Areas that still had electricity were mostly limited to a few hours of power each day. As of May 2009, Israel was shipping only a fraction of the fuel needed to Gaza, and the ban on imports of spare parts and machinery continued while the Gaza power plant was not operating at nearly full capacity. This situation exacerbates an already precarious network for the provision of basic services and will lead, inevitably, to further decline in the standard of living for the residents of the Gaza Strip.

Solid Waste and Sewage

West Bank. In the West Bank several long-standing problems with waste disposal and sewage became acute during the al-Aqsa Intifada. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) frequently prevented garbage and wastewater trucks from reaching municipal garbage compounds. As a result garbage piled up, sometimes for weeks, and created health problems. Israeli CHECKPOINTS also disrupted normal solid waste transportation and diverted access from regular disposal sites. In addition the IDF prevented passage of maintenance equipment and spare parts. Transport difficulties have also been caused by ROADBLOCKS, CURFEWS, CLOSURES, and import restrictions. Jewish settlers blew up sewage pipes in several areas, and the expansion and development of Jewish SETTLEMENTS have dramatically increased the amount of generated waste, as well as destroying Palestinian buildings and infrastructure. In order to deal with the excess waste, some Palestinians have resorted to open burning. There are new emergency dump sites within urban areas, but these have significant negative ENVIRONMENTAL and health impacts.

Although approximately 50 percent of homes in the West Bank are linked to a public sewage network, the rest, including the majority of villages, rely on cesspits that require periodic emptying, usually every two to four weeks depending on size. Israel's closures, curfews, roadblocks, and checkpoints have impeded the proper disposal of this sewage, which has promoted the spread of a variety of diseases.

Adding to Palestinian problems with their waste infrastructure, in 2005, Israel began a new program to transfer garbage beyond the Green Line and dump it in the West Bank at the Kedumin quarry. The project was launched despite international treaties prohibiting an occupying state from making use of an occupied territory unless such use benefits the local population. In addition, Israeli pollution experts say such use of the Kedumin quarry—located in an old Palestinian quarry between the Kedumin settlement and NABLUS—will jeopardize the Mountain Aquifer, one of the largest freshwater sources in the West Bank. The dump operators deposit around 10,000 tons of garbage from the Dan and Sharon regions of Israel every month in this quarry.

Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip only eight communities out of twenty-three have access to piped sewage disposal networks, while overall 62 percent of the Gaza Strip households have access to sewage disposal systems of some type. Twenty-two communities, comprising 99 percent of the population, have access to garbage collection and disposal mechanisms, which are provided by local community councils and in refugee camps by the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA). However, the services in most communities are far from adequate to cope with the large amounts of solid waste generated by the population.

Following twenty-two consecutive days of Israeli military action on the Gaza Strip during Operation Cast Lead, sanitation and water services and facilities were on the brink of collapse. The sanitation and water sector was already in a dire state following Israel's eighteen-month blockade on Gaza, which had prevented the entry of material necessary for construction and repair of water and

sanitation facilities as well as the fuel and electricity necessary to operate essential services such as sewage pumping stations and water wells. Israel's aerial bombardment of the Gaza Strip beginning on 27 December 2008 and the ground invasion beginning on 3 January 2009 turned an already desperate humanitarian situation into a catastrophe.

Sewage overflowed into residential areas, posing an extreme threat to people's health and the environment. The main sewage line in Beit Hanoun was destroyed, and the main power generator at the Beit Lahia wastewater treatment plant was attacked. Due to the presence of Israeli troops in the Netzarim area, the Gaza wastewater treatment plant stopped operating and remains in danger of collapse. Wastewater from this plant flooded an area up to one kilometer from the plant. The wastewater level at the main Beit Lahia wastewater lagoon increased due to lack of electricity to operate it and could collapse, releasing millions of cubic meters of wastewater into surrounding areas and threatening lives and property. So far, appeals for materials to repair damaged infrastructure and coordination for technicians to access the area have been denied by the Israeli authorities.

During the war, Israel directly targeted the sanitation and water infrastructure. The CMWU reported that all basic water and sanitation infrastructure had been destroyed in areas that were subject to Israeli military attack. This included a direct hit on the Gaza City Waste Water Treatment Plant on 10 January.

Water

WBGS. Palestinians do not have adequate amounts of water for human consumption and much of the water they have for agricultural and industrial development is contaminated. Israel controls all the West Bank aquifers as well as the one that serves the Gaza Strip. It also regulates wells, requiring a permit to dig one, and requires Palestinians to pay three times as much as Israelis for water. Israel's restrictions on Palestinian water usage for human consumption and agricultural/industrial development, severe in the mid-1980s, became far more stringent in the ensuing years. In July 2000, B'Tselem reported that "the average Israeli consumes for domestic, urban, and industrial [and agricultural] use approximately 128 cubic meters a year, or 350 liters per person a day—five times more than the Palestinian per capita consumption." At an average of 70 liters per day, Palestinians thus consume less water than the World Health Organization and the US Agency for International Development recommend as the essential minimum of 100 liters per person per day.

West Bank. Only 45 percent of the available water supply in the West Bank is obtained from locally owned sources, mostly wells. Access to aquifers and riparian rights remains under Israeli control. During the al-Aqsa Intifada the lack of access to water resources became more acute. For example, many villages in the Jenin area suffered from serious water shortages, because the municipality was not able to import needed spare parts for the well pumps, and water tankers could not reach the villages because of the internal closure. Also, continual Israeli settler attacks on the water tankers prevented them from reaching their water supply source-taps, which are solely owned and controlled by the settlers, who in turn control the flow of water in the region, often cutting it off entirely. Some Palestinian villages, such as Dier Ibzi and Qabalan, suffered greatly from the cutoff of water supply by the settlers, who are protected by the IDF. Israeli settlers from Humesh also cut the water pipes that served seven surrounding Palestinian villages.

Additionally, many water tankers were unable to fill their tanks because of the high demand on exhausted water source-taps in areas under Palestinian control. As a result the price of tanked water increased from $2.5 to $7.5 per cubic meter, which meant that from 2000 to 2008, there was a 12 percent increase in the proportion of income spent per family on water. Another problem involves the shutting off of well pumps due to fuel scarcity. Israeli soldiers have often targeted the roof water tanks and solar heaters of Palestinian houses.

Gaza Strip. At the end of January 2009, in the wake of Operation Cast Lead, more than half a million residents of the Gaza Strip (a third of the population) had no access to clean water and 37 percent of water wells were not functioning. Some had been without water for over ten days. The CMWU, the water sector service provider in Gaza, announced that it was no longer able to maintain services in the water and wastewater sector due to concerns for staff safety and an acute shortage of spare parts, material, equipment, electricity, and fuel required to rehabilitate facilities and operate services.

Israeli military attacks damaged the water pipes that serve more than 30,000 residents in

Nuseirat refugee camp, who were still (as of April 2009) without a water supply, as well as more than 200,000 residents in Gaza City. Israeli helicopters bombarded the water well in the Mawasi area (refugee camp and surrounding towns) in Gaza, cutting off the water supply there. Destruction of El Edara well has left more than 25,000 people in Jabalya refugee camp without a water supply. Damage to an electrical transistor that operates a water well left more than 40,000 residents of southern Tal Al Hawa without water. There was destruction of water-filling points; long queues of people waited at the filling points, and water trucks were in desperate need to supply those without access to a water supply. Three staff members from the Palestinian Water Authority were killed during the course of Israel's military assault on Gaza, two working in the wastewater sector and one who was working at a water well at the time.

Health Care

WBGS. After eight years of Intifada the health-care infrastructure was near collapse. Israel's curfews, closures, and prohibitions on the importation of medicines and medical supplies, as well as the general RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, have created difficulties for medical personnel, who often are unable to reach their places of employment. Patient nonattendance at rural clinics has been reported at 35 to 40 percent in some areas. Checkpoints have denied civilians access to health care, a problem especially serious for the 70 percent of the Palestinian population that lives in rural areas without full-service health-care facilities. According to Médicins du Monde, Palestinian women in labor have often been delayed at checkpoints or refused permission to reach medical facilities, resulting in fifty-two women giving birth at checkpoints.

Another problem is acute blood shortages in hospitals because donors cannot reach them. Vaccination programs have been virtually halted, because the rural communities are difficult to reach and because Israeli restrictions on Palestinian imports have resulted in an insufficient supply of vaccines. Palestinian ambulances have been repeatedly denied access to the sick and wounded, and in many cases the injured were left to die. In other instances those requiring regular treatments (for example, for cancer chemotherapy or renal dialysis) suffered when they were prevented from leaving their villages to receive treatment.

The physical component of the health-care system experienced significant destruction as well. Between 29 September 2000 and 14 October 2003, 290 attacks by soldiers and settlers on hospitals and clinics resulted in damage. The IDF attacked 121 ambulances, with 36 damaged beyond repair, and Israeli soldiers killed 25 medical personnel, injured 425, and arrested 71 emergency personnel, alleging they were terrorists.

Further problems have been caused by the blockade on raw materials and other imports; for example, the Israeli Ministry of Defense banned imports of raw materials required by pharmaceutical companies. Additionally, health-care providers have faced great difficulties in the distribution of medical supplies to Palestinian towns and villages. In November 2003, Médicins du Monde reported that medical supplies had been held up at Tel Aviv customs since April of that year and were therefore unable to reach the West Bank. Imports of medical equipment are also typically denied by Israel.

Because Israeli import restrictions have closed the Palestinian pharmaceutical market to international competition, Palestinians must purchase material from Israel, which has made the prices paid by the Palestinian Ministry of Health (MOH) considerably more expensive than imports. The delay of drug deliveries from suppliers and the lack of contact between the MOH in Gaza and the MOH in the West Bank, due to movement restrictions, have also hurt drug procurement. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, MOH reported that its facilities were operating at about 30 percent of capacity.

A study published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in March 2009 found that the health-care system had deteriorated significantly. "Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have fragmented health services due to the restrictions imposed upon people by Israeli security forces, poor management, growing population, and nine years of violent conflict." WHO found that infant mortality rates have risen sharply, as well as mental health cases, and many Palestinians find it difficult to get treatment for heart disease or cancer. Tuberculosis in the West Bank and Gaza rose by more than half between 1999 and 2003, with mental disorders up by a third.

Between 10 percent and 30 percent of Palestinian children suffer a detriment to their cognitive development and physical health from malnutrition. The trend of stunted growth among children is increasing, and physicians are concerned

about the long-term effects of chronic malnutrition. There are pockets in northern Gaza where the level of stunted growth reaches 30 percent.

The WHO study said that movement restrictions affect every aspect of Palestinian life, and that this directly affects the health of Palestinians. For example, the increasing infant mortality rates and deaths of expectant mothers have not declined the way they have in other countries in the region, despite the potential availability of good care and the number of child immunizations. But restrictions on movement make access to pre- and postnatal care extremely difficult.

Gaza Strip. The Canadian Medical Association (CMA) reported on the consequences of Operation Cast Lead for the health-care situation. "When Israel began its 'Operation Cast Lead' . . . the Gaza health care system was already crippled by under-funding and a border blockade that prevented needed medical supplies and personnel from entering the region. The health care system soon buckled under the stress of rapidly rising casualties and infrastructure damage . . . some 34 health facilities were damaged or destroyed in the 22-day conflict." Additionally, among the facilities shelled during the military campaign was the al-Quds Hospital, Gaza's second largest, and the Israeli military severely hindered medical relief missions through missile attacks on or around health-care facilities, preventing medical personnel from safely getting to work and limiting the movement of ambulances. During Operation Cast Lead, an estimated sixteen medical personnel were killed on duty, and twenty-two were injured.

Israel bombed the headquarters of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in January 2009 killing three and destroying tons of food and forcing UNRWA to stop distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. Four United Nations aid workers were killed.

According to the CMA, "In terms of infrastructure, the needs are significant: Along with the damaged or destroyed health facilities, basic infrastructure has been ravaged. Medical workers are pushing for water, sanitation and electricity to be restored as quickly as possible before the lack of such basic necessities causes even more health problems."

One of the challenges facing Gaza in its attempt to repair and reconstruct its health infrastructure and other infrastructural problems is getting building supplies and other materials into Gaza. Israel has a long-standing ban on goods entering Gaza, including cement and other construction materials. Aid officials say this will have a serious impact on attempts to restore the health-care system, which needs to be rebuilt as quickly as possible. "Medical supplies can be replaced within one month," says Dr. Wael Qadan, director of health services for the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, which is affiliated with the Red Cross. "But the problem is infrastructure. The construction materials have not been allowed into Gaza and the impact of that is very dangerous."

After Operation Cast Lead, Israel prevented aid workers from entering Gaza even though they had donations and supplies in hand. All of these factors created what the head of operations in Gaza for the International Committee of the Red Cross, Pierre Kraehenbuhl, calls "a full-blown and major humanitarian crisis."

Education

WBGS. The educational system—government as well as UNRWA schools—has been crippled by Israel's curfews and closures. Neither students nor teachers have been able to reach their classrooms with any regularity. Schools have frequently been closed, and many schools were taken over by the IDF for use as detention centers. The consequences for students have been dire. Exam pass rates in Arabic and math have collapsed, and dropout rates have risen for the first time in a decade. Teachers are increasingly reporting signs of psychological trauma and disruptive behavior in students. Between 1997 and 2004, student-teacher ratios increased by 30 percent, with 80 students per class in government schools and 40 per class in UNRWA schools. As a result, test scores for Palestinian children are increasingly well below passing.

Telephone Service

WBGS. Outside of urban areas (and in many of them as well) the West Bank and Gaza did not have telephone service until 1989–1990, when the PNA developed a telephone network infrastructure. They established a fiber-optic cable outside Gaza to serve the city, but the system was inefficient; for example, a connection made between Palestinian locales within Gaza had to first go outside Gaza and then back into Gaza, because Israel financially and physically controlled all the connections. Both before and during the Oslo

PROCESS the Israeli military denied Palestinian institutions the right to lease lines. After the accords, Israel developed complicated rules that required a leased line application to go through various channels. As a result of the Interim Agreement in 1995 between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, the PNA was permitted to build an independent communication system, PALTEL (Palestinian Communications Co.), which increased the number of lines to over 311,206 as of December 2003. In December 2003, 36.2 percent of Palestinian households had a telephone line, but 60.4 percent still required a mobile phone.

Although wireless microwave technology provides some links between Palestinian cities, the West Bank has a hilly topography, so establishing transmission between cities requires the positioning of the microwave towers on high hilltops, a great number of which are occupied by the Israeli settlements. Also, the telephone network under the PNA is geographically fragmented, and most of the West Bank is not under Palestinian control. As of 2005, Israel still controlled the long-distance and international telephone network.

Internet

WBGS. In March 2000, Palestine became an official territory of the Internet. By 2002 there were thirteen Internet service providers, and 2.9 percent of Palestinian households had Internet access, although access was far greater at the institutional level, such as universities and businesses. The lack of widespread Internet access keeps Palestinians from networking not only on a national level but also at a regional and global level. The small percentage of Palestinians with Internet access must use dial-up connections to Israeli service providers or to Palestinian providers that are themselves connected to Israeli providers. Additionally, a shortage of networking and information technology skills as well as a lack of financial resources impedes the growth of the communications network.

Roads

WBGS. The road network provides a geographic linkage between various communities and centers. Yet this sector was completely ignored during the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The existing road network is based mainly on the roads built in the years before Israeli occupation in 1967; roads constructed, upgraded, or maintained since 1967 serve the Israeli settlements and military encampments. They were intended not to serve Palestinian towns and villages, but to bypass them. This resulted in an outdated and deteriorated Palestinian road network with major engineering deficiencies and traffic operational problems.

The inadequacy of the Palestinian road network, in conjunction with the myriad restrictions Israel has imposed on movement of goods and people, constitutes a major handicap for the Occupied Territories, which suffer from isolation and an inability to trade among West Bank communities, the Gaza Strip, or neighboring countries. The Palestinian road network is made up of 2,495 kilometers (1,500 miles) of roads, 2,200 kilometers (1,320 miles) in the West Bank and 295 kilometers (177 miles) in the Gaza Strip as well as an additional 1,300 kilometers (780 miles) known as "bypass" roads to Israeli settlements on which access is limited to Israelis. There are about 595 Palestinian towns and villages in WBGS (many are in sparsely settled areas) requiring the services of a transport network. Many have no access other than narrow dirt passageways. In 2003 about 50 percent of the Palestinian paved-road network was in poor condition, up from 40 percent in 1993 despite the investments made during those ten years.

When the PNA took over responsibility for some parts of the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, it moved quickly to upgrade and modernize the existing, decayed road infrastructure. Lacking financial resources equal to the challenge and with no national, public institutions to oversee the development of these services, the PNA adopted a dual strategy: an institutional reform to improve governance by creating better regulation, and financial mobilization from the private sector and from foreign donors. Progress, however, was sketchy, and when the al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in 2000, Israel's destruction of the main roads essentially reversed what limited improvements the PNA had made.

West Bank. During its forty years of Occupation, Israel invested little to nothing to repair or develop the Palestinian road system while at the same time spending millions of dollars to construct modern, wide, well-lit settler roads for Jewish use only. Palestinian roads, especially in rural areas, are in a very dilapidated condition; the majority are unpaved and the paved ones are in disrepair. There

is no lighting and few signs (except to direct Israelis to the settlements). At least 65 percent of the main roads that lead to eighteen Palestinian communities in the West Bank are closed or fully controlled by the Israeli army (forty-seven of seventy-two roads). In addition, approximately one-third of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, is inaccessible to Palestinians without a permit issued by the IDF, which is extremely difficult to obtain.

The road network in place when Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967 ran north-south down the region's hilly central spine. Lateral roads ran off this central artery. This transportation network reflected the requirements of the Palestinian community rather than those of an occupying army embarking upon creation of scores of Israeli settlements. In 1970, Israel began construction of roads running east-west, as part of an integrated security package that aimed at connecting Israel with the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY settlements and facilitating its military control of the valley.

Israel's policy on road development in the West Bank. Settlement expansion during the 1970s concentrated on establishing Jewish colonies in strategically and historically significant locales. The success of this program led in 1984 to the publication of Road Plan 50, the crystallization of Israel's intention to construct a dedicated network of roads to facilitate settlement expansion. In an unsuccessful objection to the plan before Israel's High Court, Palestinian attorney Raja Shehadeh argued that "the way the roads have been designed means that Palestinian towns and villages will be greatly restricted in their development, with many roads creating tight rings around their existing boundaries."

The Palestinian rebellion against Israeli rule that erupted in the First Intifada in 1987 focused, in one dimension, on attacking settler vehicles with stones. By 1990, Road Plan 50 had evolved into the "Intifada bypass" road plan. The uprising fortified the Israeli view of the necessity to create a transport network for a growing settler population separate and distinct from the one serving Palestinians. In 1990, 100 kilometers (60 miles) of new roads were paved in the West Bank alone to serve settlements including Beitar, Dolev, Hermesh, Karnei Shomron, Kedar, Otniel, Revava, Shani, and Talmon Bet. By 1992, the Ministry of Housing and Construction's Great Roads Plan—the new name given to Plan 50—outlined 400 kilometers (240 miles) of new West Bank roads, including bypasses around Halhul, HEBRON, Ramallah, and Nablus.

The Oslo Process dressed up the original bypass road plan in politically correct clothing, but changed neither the plan's dimensions nor its objectives. What did change was the public rationale. No longer were these bypass roads justified by Israel for their value to Palestinians. Indeed there were early suggestions that Palestinians would be prohibited from driving on them altogether. The bypass road plan became part of the Oslo "peace" package, intended to increase settlers' sense of security. This idea was now viewed positively by some Oslo supporters as confirmation of Israel's disengagement from parts of the West Bank. The BILL CLINTON administration considered these roads security-related expenditures and refused to deduct Israel's investments in them from its loan guarantees.

ARIEL SHARON's "Continuous Movement Plan" is meant to answer the strategic problem inherent in the territorial framework defined in the Oslo II agreement and exacerbated by the heightened security needs of many West Bank settlements resulting from the nine-year-old Second Palestinian Intifada—how to enable Palestinians to travel between the territorial islands formalized by Oslo—Areas A and B, comprising about 40 percent of the West Bank—on roads not used by settlers. Sharon described his objective as ensuring "transportation continuity" for Palestinians in these areas, where Israel favors a form of Palestinian self-rule and ersatz independence.

The extensive new Israeli network constructed during the 1990s failed to make settlements entirely independent of the historical network of West Bank roads. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, in order to maintain a normal, everyday life for settlers, Israel has restricted and sometimes prohibited Palestinian travel on many of these roads, a key feature of the "closure economy." In order to protect settlers, not only have Palestinians been separated from the new bypass road network; they have also been denied use of roads as old as Palestine itself.

Israel's solution to this untenable situation establishes yet another milestone along the long road of Occupation. Having constructed, at a cost of more than $2 billion, a bypass road network, which now includes major sections of the historical system, most notably large sections of Route 60, the Sharon government presented a plan for foreign donors to finance the rebuilding, construc-

tion, and establishment of underpasses, overpasses, junctions, and roads throughout the West Bank as alternatives to routes on which the IDF has forbidden Palestinian traffic and to others cut by the separation barrier.

Sharon's plan, adopted by EHUD OLMERT and BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, for a separate Palestinian network outlines fifty-two possible road projects and sixteen new crossroads and junctions, including bridges and underpasses spanning settler thoroughfares. Israel describes it as "a social-political stabilizer [that] creates an environment for support of the disengagement plan." The plan, in fact, reveals Israel's intention to remain in all West Bank settlements. Turning a tactical decision to deny Palestinians use of many West Bank roads into a permanent strategic objective is yet another element in Israel's ever-evolving strategy of creating facts on the ground.

Like the original Road Plan 50, today's Continuous Movement Plan is presented as beneficial to Palestinians. The Israeli plan—which Palestinians have had no role in preparing—is portrayed as an instrument of Palestinian economic revival made necessary because of the inadequacy of existing infrastructure. No mention is made that the existing infrastructure is inadequate principally because of Israel's draconian closure policy and the denial of Palestinian use of major segments of the road network improved for settlers.

Creation of separate road networks for Palestinians and settlers is yet another element of a long-term program aimed at the permanent physical division of the West Bank. It aims at subordinating Palestinian national and economic development to the maintenance of an expansive and unrestricted program of Israeli settlement in 60 percent of the West Bank and undermining the prospect of a territorially coherent state of Palestine.

There is no doubt that a continuous, unobstructed transport network is vital to Palestinian political and economic life. A rational plan would, for example, modernize the venerable Route 60 as the key to a regional road network. The ever-growing demands of the West Bank settlement enterprise, however, preclude this logical option. Instead Israel is demanding the creation of an inferior system at great expense.

A further issue concerns Israel's destruction of roads and its misuse of roads to control the movement of people and goods. Since the al-Aqsa Intifada, which began in September 2000, Israel has worked to regulate and restrict Palestinian movement in an attempt to disrupt the movement of militants and to punish the population at large. Aid workers estimate that, in this context, the IDF has cut off, dug up, or gated shut the roads leading to 80 percent of West Bank villages. The IDF says it has no figures on blocked roads. Israel exercises control over Palestinian roads through roadblocks and checkpoints. There are approximately 630 permanent roadblocks and manned and unmanned checkpoints across the West Bank. In addition, the IDF erects approximately sixty to eighty "flying" or temporary checkpoints across the West Bank each week. Permits to pass checkpoints are extremely difficult to obtain. Due to the movement restrictions imposed by Israel's separation Barrier and other policies that have led to the fragmentation of the West Bank, transportation costs have increased by up to six to seven times.

Gaza Strip. The Gaza Strip has a small, poorly developed road network of approximately 300 kilometers (180 miles). It had a single standard-gauge railway line running the entire length of the Strip from north to south along its center; however, it is abandoned, in disrepair, and cannot be used. One reasonably good road runs the entire north-south length of the Strip, but the many feeder roads are often unpaved or in serious disrepair. Few roads inside any of the refugee camps or towns are paved.

There is not a lot of data on roads in Gaza, but the following comment on Gaza City is illustrative because it is the most modern, developed sector of the Gaza Strip: "Gaza City attracts heavy traffic volumes as well as different types of transportation—from lories to donkey-carts. Gaza City is also facing a great challenge in dealing with an aging infrastructure. For pavements in particular, many streets were built 20 or 30 years ago and they are near the end of their economic life."

In Israel's six-month 2006 war on Gaza (OPERATION SUMMER RAINS) the Strip's infrastructure was one of the first and primary targets of the IDF. In that campaign Israel bombarded seven Palestinian bridges linking Gaza City with the central Gaza Strip, and destroyed much of the major road system in the Strip. Israel claimed it was limiting the mobility of "terrorists," but the civilian population was the major victim. One road that was damaged was that approaching Gaza's Netzarim junction, at the northern end of Gaza's arterial road, Salah al-Din Street. The three-kilometer-long (1.8-mile) road connecting the junction to the Israeli

border was "swept" by the IDF, demolishing OLIVE TREES, a brick factory, three greenhouses, and almost everything else that fell within forty meters of the road. Operation Cast Lead destroyed more roads and made the situation in Gaza even worse.

East Jerusalem

Since East Jerusalem was annexed in 1967, the government of Israel's primary goal in Jerusalem has been to create a demographic and geographic situation that will thwart any future attempt to challenge Israeli sovereignty over the city. To achieve this goal, the government has been taking various actions to increase the number of Jews and reduce the number of Palestinians living in the city.

At the end of 2005, the population of Jerusalem stood at 723,700: 482,500 Jews (67 percent) and 241,200 Palestinians (33 percent). About 58 percent of the residents live on Palestinian land that was annexed in 1967 (45 percent of whom are Jews and 55 percent Palestinians). With the Palestinians having a higher growth rate than the Jews, Israel has had to plan very carefully to achieve its goal of demographic superiority.

One significant policy concerns the municipal budget. Less than 10 percent of the municipality's development budget is allocated for Palestinian neighborhoods, although the population there represents a third of the city's residents. The lack of investment has left infrastructure in East Jerusalem in a deteriorated state.

East Jerusalem residents are required to pay taxes like all city residents. However, they do not receive the same services. As Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, former Jerusalem municipal officials, explain, the Jerusalem municipality has continuously failed to invest significantly in infrastructure and services (such as roads, sidewalks, and water and sewage systems) in Jerusalem's Palestinian neighborhoods. Since the annexation of Jerusalem, the municipality has built almost no new schools, public buildings, or medical clinics for Palestinians. The lion's share of investment has been dedicated to the city's Jewish areas.

Indicators of the discrepancies in infrastructure between Jews and Palestinians in Jerusalem include:

- Entire Palestinian neighborhoods are not connected to a sewage system and do not have paved roads or sidewalks.
- Almost 90 percent of the sewage pipes, roads, and sidewalks are found in West Jerusalem.
- West Jerusalem has 1,000 public parks; East Jerusalem has 45.
- West Jerusalem has 34 swimming pools; East Jerusalem has 3.
- West Jerusalem has 26 libraries; East Jerusalem has 2.
- West Jerusalem has 531 sports facilities; East Jerusalem has 33.
- West Jerusalem has direct mail delivery to every home; East Jerusalemites must rent mailboxes if they are to receive mail.

In addition, Israel has discriminated against East Jerusalem Palestinians by:

- Physically isolating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, in part by building the separation Barrier
- Discriminating in land expropriation, planning, and building, and the demolition of houses
- Revoking residency and social benefits of Palestinians who stay abroad for at least seven years, or who are unable to prove that their "center of life" is in Jerusalem
- Allowing messianic settlers to displace Palestinians and construct Jewish enclaves in every Palestinian neighborhood

Israel's policies gravely infringe the rights of residents of East Jerusalem and flagrantly breach international law.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; EDUCATION; ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION; HEALTH CARE; INTIFADAS: FIRST AND SECOND COMPARED; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT; ROAD SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK; WATER RESOURCES AND ACCESS

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Institute for Jerusalem Studies

The Institute for Jerusalem Studies is a branch of the INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES. Established in 1995, it initially operated in Ramallah, WEST BANK, and then moved to JERUSALEM in 2000. Because of Israeli RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, its offices returned to Ramallah three years later. The institute's main objective is to commission and publish research on FINAL STATUS issues, with a particular focus on Jerusalem and REFUGEES. In addition it is active in setting up networks with both local and international research communities around common areas of interest and in computerizing data on Palestine. (www.jerusalemquarterly.org).

Institute for Palestine Studies

The Institute for Palestine Studies is the only institution in the world exclusively devoted to documentation and analysis of, and research and publication on, Palestinian affairs and the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Established in Beirut in 1963, it was incorporated there as a private, independent, nonprofit institute unaffiliated with any political organization or government. The institute also has offices in Washington, Paris, and London, and an affiliate, The INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM STUDIES, in Ramallah, WEST BANK. It publishes four quarterly scholarly journals in English, French, and Arabic, which are independently edited and published from Washington, Paris, Jerusalem, and Beirut, respectively: *Journal of Palestine Studies* (English), *Revue d'études palestiniennes* (French), *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyah* (Arabic), and *Jerusalem Quarterly File* (English). (www.palestine-studies.org/final/en/index.html).

Inter-Arab Politics

See ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS

Interim Agreement

The Interim Agreement, sometimes called Oslo II or the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, was signed on 28 September 1995 in Washington by Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). It detailed the mechanisms for and the limitations of the extension of Palestinian self-rule to portions of the West Bank. The agreement's main feature was the division of the West Bank into areas in which there were varying degrees of Israeli and Palestinian responsibility. It also contained provisions for ELECTIONS for a PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (which were held in January 1996), to which Israel would transfer authority in sectors specified in previous agreements: EDUCATION and culture, HEALTH CARE, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism, and a "Palestinian police force as agreed upon." The police and security organs of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), the interim government, were required to coordinate jointly with the security apparatus in Israel, although "security" was defined mainly according to Israeli needs, and the Israeli military government was explicitly recognized as the ultimate source of authority in all the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The Interim Agreement also specifically committed Israel to release West Bank and Gazan (though not East JERUSALEM) Palestinian PRISONERS and detainees who had committed offenses before 13 September 1993. It further provided for construction of "safe passages" for Palestinians between Gaza and the West Bank. Oslo II was the fourth accord in the OSLO PROCESS, and, as with other Oslo agreements, it contained hundreds of pages that defined the limits of Palestinian autonomy in ways initially imposed by YITZHAK RABIN in the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.

The most important element of the Interim Agreement was the division of the West Bank into three areas of jurisdiction. Area A, under the jurisdiction of the PNA, would consist of some 3 percent of the West Bank, including Ramallah, JENIN, NABLUS, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, and BETHLEHEM, although notably not HEBRON (the largest Palestinian city), whose jurisdiction would be decided at a later date. Area B, controlled jointly by Israel and the PNA, included a network of some 400 Palestinian villages and adjoining rural lands that comprised approximately 27 percent of the West Bank. Area C, containing almost 70 percent of the West Bank, would be under exclusive Israeli control and would include the Jewish SETTLEMENTS and their bypass ROADS, military encampments, and Israeli-designated STATE LAND, plus hundreds of Palestinian villages and their farmland.

Oslo II also specified that Israeli troops were to redeploy from the Palestinian-controlled



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Map 25. Oslo II, Interim Agreement, 1995

territory—Area A—in three phases, starting in October 1996 and ending by October 1997. On completing the third phase, Israel was to have withdrawn from all of the West Bank with the exception of Israeli settlements and Israeli military bases—in total some 88 percent of the West Bank. However, the territory from which Israel was to withdraw was not clearly specified in Oslo II. The Interim Agreement did not, however, commit Israel and the PLO to a FINAL STATUS agreement by October 1999, as prescribed in the Declaration of Principles.

Although Israel was to redeploy from Area A, Palestinians could not move from one part of Area A to another without passing through Area B, which involved crossing a series of CHECKPOINTS, ROADBLOCKS, and other obstacles. Entrances to and exits from Gaza were also under Israeli control. The agreement thus created a series of isolated Palestinian BANTUSTANS as well as completely severing the West Bank from Gaza.

This state of affairs, combined with a unilateral Israeli prohibition on West Bank and Gazan Palestinians from entering Jerusalem, created a schizophrenic situation. For instance, life in downtown Ramallah appeared perfectly normal. The redeployment of ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) gave residents a new sense of freedom, and social life blossomed. Cafés, restaurants, coffee shops, galleries, businesses, research centers, and so on opened and flourished. Yet, a Ramallah resident with family in Bethlehem could not visit them (and vice versa) because the road between the two cities passes through Jerusalem. a Ramallah (or Bethlehem or any other West Bank) residents with a serious illness could not obtain medical attention at one of the major Palestinian hospitals in Jerusalem because they were prohibited from entering the city (as were all Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza). Ramallah residents who were students or professors at BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY (a few kilometers outside the city but in Area B) frequently found they could not reach the campus because of an IDF roadblock. A Muslim from anywhere in the Occupied Territories could not pray at AL-AQSA MOSQUE; a Christian could not worship at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. A Ramallah Christian could not even attend the CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY in Bethlehem. Palestinians from the West Bank could not enter Gaza, or the reverse, and so on across all the Occupied Territories.

On 4 November 1995, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated, and a new Israeli government led by SHIMON PERES took over. Shortly thereafter the IDF began its redeployments in Area A, first from Jenin (13 November 1995), followed by Tulkarem (10 December 1995), Nablus and other villages in the Tulkarm area (11 December 1995), Qalqilya (17 December 1995), Bethlehem (21 December 1995), and finally Ramallah (28 December 1995). However, other parts of the agreement were not fulfilled; prisoners were not released and Israel did not carry out further withdrawals. Final status talks never seriously commenced, and in less than a year (May 1996) BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, who opposed the Oslo

Process altogether, became prime minister and ceased to carry out any further provisions.

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International Christian Embassy

The International Christian Embassy (ICE), located in JERUSALEM, is the main institutional vehicle through which Christian Zionists support Israel. It was established in 1980 to provide Christian support for the JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST and right-wing nationalist Greater Israel agenda. ICE says that 1,400 Christians from forty countries opened the embassy in Jerusalem as "an act of solidarity with the Jewish people's 3,000-year-old connection to their holy city." The ICE believes that it is God's will that Jews be returned to their "rightful land" and rebuild the Third Temple, after which the second coming of Christ will occur. (www.icej.org).

See also CHRISTIANITY; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

International Law and UN Authority

From the earliest period of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, decades before Israel existed, the world Zionist movement focused on political strategies while the Palestinians rested their claims mainly on legal rights. Of course Zionists also put forward historical and religious arguments that came to enjoy the conditional backing of the British government. This backing acquired a certain formal status after the 1917 BALFOUR DECLARATION, named after the British foreign secretary LORD ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR, endorsed Zionist efforts to establish a Jewish "national home" within the territory of historic Palestine. Yet two aspects were fundamental to the legal situation of the Israel-Palestine conflict: first, the highly questionable colonial authority of the British government to constrict and interfere with the Palestinian right of self-determination; and second, the historical developments that constantly changed de facto situations in Israel's favor and the effect of these changes on the negotiation of the adversary claims of the two peoples.

After World War I, Palestine became a separate entity with the breakup of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, although it was not granted political independence as a separate sovereign state. Instead, by Article 22 of the COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, the peoples inhabiting the former Ottoman imperial territories were deemed "not able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and needed to be "temporarily" administered by a so-called advanced state entrusted with the job of promoting "the well-being and development of such peoples" as "a sacred trust of civilization." By agreement with the League of Nations, Britain became in 1922 the Mandatory power responsible for the administration of Palestine and incorporated the text of the Balfour Declaration into its formal Mandate, thus initially demonstrating international support for the Zionist project.

It was clear from the outset, sparking controversy even in Britain, that acknowledging Jewish national rights in Palestine would violate Palestinian rights of self-determination and produce future difficulties as Zionist settlers occupied land already inhabited. British motivations in proceeding down this path seem to have been dictated by broader colonial policies and a characteristic paternalistic mindset: the pragmatic assumption that

Jewish settlers would dominate Palestinian inhabitants and thereby weaken indigenous pressures on British administrative control. Such an approach was consistent with the British tendency to implement a strategy of "divide and conquer" in its colonies—a policy that invariably produced dangerously divided contested states upon political independence (as in Ireland, India, Cyprus, and Malaya). San Remo deemed Palestine a Class A mandate, the type considered most evolved toward statehood—a political community whose "existence as an independent state can be provisionally recognized."

When the BRITISH MANDATE was established the region contained about 85,000 Jews (most not Zionists) and some 673,000 Palestinians, whose interests were explicitly subordinated from the outset in a manner that jeopardized the fundamental right of Palestinian self-determination. Aside from the legally problematic Balfour Declaration, the small proportion of Jews in Palestine at the start of the Mandate made the Jews appear to be a religious and ethnic minority rather than a rival claimant for shaping political independence and territorial sovereignty. In this regard the Palestinian narrative needs to be comprehended within the wider story of the struggle against colonialism, complicated in this case by the Zionist project, which at the time must have seemed to most observers an entirely extraneous movement pursuing a harmless pipe dream—the establishment of a Jewish state rendered viable by waves of Jewish settlers. After World War I, colonial policies were not repudiated by international law or rejected by world political opinion, nor was the right of self-determination yet legally vindicated or politically supported. The winners in World War I considered the Mandate system for the Ottoman territories as a middle ground between outright independence and continued colonial rule, giving the colonial actors extensive administrative rights for the present while holding out an indeterminate promise of future independence.

Without tracing the tortuous history of Palestine during the Mandatory years or discussing the dynamics of Jewish SETTLEMENT and Palestinian opposition, it is important to acknowledge the decisive impact of the HOLOCAUST on the interplay of Zionist and Palestinian interests. The Nazi persecution of European Jews from 1933 onward, culminating in massive genocide, convinced Jews around the world of the need for a Jewish homeland, gave rise to a far more credible claim for a Jewish right of self-determination in Palestine, and increased support for a Jewish state from liberal public opinion in Europe and North America. In effect the Holocaust transformed ZIONISM from a utopian fantasy into a formidable political project. This was acknowledged in the international community when the British decided to quit Palestine abruptly and terminate their Mandatory role without resolving the clash of nationalisms, handing over responsibility to the UNITED NATIONS General Assembly in 1947.

The UN then formally endorsed a UNITED STATES–backed plan to partition Palestine into two states and to establish an international trusteeship over JERUSALEM to be administered by the United Nations (UN RESOLUTION 181(II), 27 November 1947, also known as the Partition Resolution). Significantly the Partition Resolution included two additional integral elements that might have made all the difference if this outcome had been accepted by both sides: an economic union between the two entities and unimpeded rights of transit to and from both proposed states, "subject to security considerations." Boundaries separating the two proposed states were specified with some precision, and the characteristics of the special status of Jerusalem were set forth. Taking account of the existing circumstances, the UN effort was a reasonable attempt to define a sustainable future for the two peoples, although given Palestinian expectations at the time, it was hardly surprising that they and their Arab neighbors considered the UN plan a colonialist ploy that unacceptably intruded upon their lands.

The JEWISH AGENCY, representing the Jewish community in Palestine, initially accepted the proposal, but the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, representing Palestinian interests, rejected it and urged reconsideration by the United Nations. Later decisions by the World Court on issues of self-determination and decolonization, although not directly considering the issue, have generally relied on legal reasoning that is consistent with the essential Arab claim that the problems of European Jewry were being addressed at the expense of the legal rights of the Palestinian people. Reputable scholarship has also established that the Zionist leadership accepted the Partition Resolution only provisionally, viewing it as a stepping-stone to a far more extensive Israeli state.

The 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors resulted in the flight and coerced

departure of some 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians from the territory of the state of Israel, which, as the war's victor, expanded territory to one-quarter more than its allotment in the partition plan, thereby occupying 78 percent of historic Palestine and leaving Jerusalem divided between Israeli governance of the western sector, with the eastern half (the WEST BANK and East Jerusalem) administered by JORDAN. Significantly, Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE on 14 May 1948 expressed the commitment both to be "open for Jewish IMMIGRATION and for the ingathering of the exiles" and to "ensure complete equality of social and political rights for all inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex." The fundamental tension between these two undertakings has been one crucial source of the ongoing conflict between the Palestinian-Arab citizens and the Jewish citizens of Israel.

Although the legality of the state of Israel was questionable at the time of its establishment due to the unilateral curtailment of Palestinian rights of self-determination, the issue became effectively moot in the ensuing years because Israel received diplomatic recognition from leading states and in 1949 was admitted to membership in the United Nations. The General Assembly Resolution 273 of 11 May 1949, which admitted Israel to membership, called on Israel to repatriate the Palestinians who were either expelled or fled in fear in 1948. Israel has never admitted any responsibility for the Palestinian REFUGEES who left in 1948 and over the years has consistently refused to acknowledge any right of return of these refugees. It has also consistently resisted pressures from the United Nations and elsewhere to address under international law the claims of Palestinian refugees. Yet the Palestinian refugee issue is of fundamental importance in assessing the claims of both peoples. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194(III), adopted on 11 December 1948, attempted to foster a settlement between Israel and the Arab states based on a framework of principles and goals, the basis of which was the repatriation or compensation of the refugees: "*Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property, which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." Although the United Nations was given the responsibility to implement this proposed solution, it has never been able to do more than reiterate again and again this obligation of Israel.

Significant by itself, Resolution 194 also reflects the general approach of international law to refugees, which is premised upon rights of repatriation and of compensation for damages wrongfully sustained. Over the years some Palestinian refugees have managed to assimilate in neighboring Arab countries, but several million Palestinians still live in impoverished and insecure conditions in refugee camps located in GAZA, LEBANON, SYRIA, the West Bank, and Jordan. The numbers are difficult to calculate, but there are at least four million Palestinian refugees resulting from the 1948 War and the 1967 WAR, as well as one million dispersed outside of historic Palestine and more than one million living in Gaza and West Bank refugee camps. These numbers give some sense of the magnitude of the refugee problem, although it is thought that only a small percentage of the several million DIASPORA Palestinians would wish to exercise their right of return. At the international level the refugee issue remains seemingly irresolvable despite the UN's continued affirmation of Resolution 194. Israel's persistent refusal to acknowledge any obligation for the Palestinian refugees remains a major stumbling block to achieving a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israeli public opinion is overwhelmingly convinced that honoring a Palestinian right of return would be fatal to Israel's identity as a Jewish state and would thereby be the end of the Zionist project. Yet, as long as this ethnonationalism predominates among Israelis, the possibility of real peace will remain unattainable even if one assumes resolution of a variety of other obstacles.

Issues after the 1967 War

Israel initiated the 1967 War in complex circumstances arising from a crisis generated by neighboring Arab states, especially EGYPT, which asked for the removal of UN peacekeeping forces from the Sinai, closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and adopted a belligerent tone toward Israel as articulated by its fiery leader, Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. The apparent Arab mobilization for war, combined with menacing troop deployments on Israel's BORDERS, led Tel Aviv to launch a major preemptive military attack

to weaken Arab military capabilities decisively at the very beginning of hostilities, including the destruction of the Egyptian air force on the ground. Israel took the occasion to occupy the West Bank, all of Jerusalem, Gaza, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and Syria's Golan Heights, thereby greatly increasing its military control over the entirety of historic Palestine and much territory beyond.

The UN Security Council did not condemn Israel for waging war, implicitly accepting Israel's rationale for a preemptive attack even though it stretched the UN charter's concept of self-defense in Article 51, which requires a prior armed attack to qualify a response as self-defense. The Arab provocation was implicitly treated as being sufficiently credible to justify action that might be described as anticipatory self-defense. From the outset, however, the United Nations did object to Israeli moves to convert its defensive claims to wage war into postwar plans to extend the scope of its territorial sovereignty. In UN Resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, the General Assembly called Israel's moves to annex Jerusalem "invalid" and insisted that "Israel . . . rescind all measures already taken" and "desist . . . from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem." In the resolution the UN secretary-general was requested to report "on [its] implementation . . . not later than one week from its adoption." Israel's response was based disingenuously on its assertion that only the Jewish state could protect the HOLY SITES of Jerusalem on a nondiscriminatory basis and provide for the harmonious administration of the city. The claim, however, was inconsistent with Israel's efforts to TRANSFER a large number of Jews to the Arab parts of the city as well as to establish sizable Jewish settlements in parts of Jerusalem previously considered Palestinian, conduct that was in direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention regulating the behavior of an occupying power. A subsequent General Assembly resolution, UN Resolution 2254 of 14 July 1967, deplored Israel's failure to abide by 2253, repeated its call for compliance, and again requested a report on implementation from the secretary-general.

The key action taken by the United Nations was the unanimously supported UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, adopted on 22 November 1967. The main elements of Resolution 242 are the following propositions: "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" (the 1967 War) and "a just settlement of the refugee problem." On Israel's behalf the resolution also called on all Arab states to terminate the state of belligerency and to show respect for and acknowledge "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." Israel was also supported by the call for "guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the region," which went against Egypt's attempts to close the Gulf of Aqaba. This resolution, although sensitive to legitimate Israeli state interests, did not lead Israel at any point to contemplate a full withdrawal, Instead it led to a pattern of activity that seemed decisively at odds with the intention of 242, especially the creation of numerous Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Israel's annexation of Jerusalem, even though the resolution was nominally embraced by all parties, including the United States and Israel. The Security Council challenged Israel's annexation of Jerusalem in a series of resolutions, including 252 (1968), 267 (1969), and 298 (1971). Resolution 298 objected to all steps taken by Israel "to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriations of LAND and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section," calling them "totally invalid."

After the 1973 War, UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 called on the parties (Egypt, Syria, and Israel) "to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts" and to embark upon negotiations "aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." A 1973 declaration by the EUROPEAN UNION reaffirmed the applicability of Security Council Resolution 242 as providing the necessary basis for "a just and durable peace." The EU Declaration suggested four points as essential to this process: "(1) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. (2) The need for Israel to end the territorial OCCUPATION which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967. (3) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries. (4) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The declaration also supported reinforcing this framework with "international guarantees" by establishing "peacekeeping forces" and "demilitarized zones" and stated that the issuance of these guarantees is "of primary importance" in fostering the termination of the conflict in conformity with Resolution 242. This emphasis on building confidence addresses Israel's concerns about its alleged vulnerability, but Israel rejected in totality the EU Declaration. Until 1973 the Palestinians called for the abolition of Israel as a Jewish state, most authoritatively in the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER of July 1968 adopted by the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Article 9 of the Charter asserted that "ARMED STRUGGLE is the way to liberate Palestine," which is identified as the exclusive "homeland of the Arab Palestinian people." Article 29 asserted that "the Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland," and Article 19 stated that "the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the State of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people . . . and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right of self-determination."

The aims of the Palestinian people were subsequently altered, most significantly at the 1988 meeting of the Palestine National Council, which effectively acknowledged the state of Israel as legally existing within its pre-1967 borders. However, because of Israel's failure to withdraw and the re-radicalization of Palestinian political life in 2006 under the auspices of HAMAS, these earlier Palestinian concessions to the existence of Israel have been partially withdrawn or at least rendered temporarily ambiguous. Because the PLO remains the legal representative of the Palestinian people and has not altered its 1988 approach to Israel, the rise of Hamas is unlikely to overshadow the earlier acceptance of an Israeli state. Besides, even Hamas has indicated a pragmatic willingness to drop its maximalist goals if Israel will comply with 242 and withdraw completely from Palestinian territory occupied in 1967. In an important recognition of the significance of the 1988 PNC resolutions, UN General Assembly Resolution 43/177 of 15 December 1988, acknowledged the 1988 Palestinian proclamation of a Palestinian state as consistent with the earlier Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into two states. On 9 September 1993, Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN and PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT recognized one another in an exchange of letters, and a few days later, on 13 September, the two leaders signed the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES on Interim Self-Governing Arrangements for the Palestinian Territories, which set a five-year goal of establishing Palestinian self-government.

Israeli Occupation of Palestinian Territories

Since the 1967 War many issues of international law have arisen in connection with Israel's Occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza. The most fundamental of these involves a controversy over whether the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War (1949) is applicable to Israel's Occupation. Especially in Articles 47–48, the treaty specifies in considerable detail the obligations of an occupying power to protect the civilian population, although the occupier is entitled to impose some restrictions "strictly necessary" for its security. Both Israel and the neighboring Arab states are parties to this Geneva Convention. According to Article 1 the parties "undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances." Nevertheless, Israel has refused to acknowledge that its Occupation policy is so constrained. It has insisted that according to Article 2, the Fourth Geneva Convention applies only to territory held lawfully by one of the parties and that between 1948 and 1967 neither Jordan nor Egypt possessed such a legal title when they administered the West Bank and Gaza. The government of Israel, supported by the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, declared it would apply, only of its own free will and without legal obligation, those provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that it deemed "humanitarian" in character. It is generally understood that this *ex gratia* commitment by the Israeli government applies only to Article 3, which sets forth an obligation for humane treatment for all those who are not taking "an active part in hostilities" and to this end prohibits the following practices: "(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted

court affording all judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Even on this limited basis Israeli judicial proceedings have officially acknowledged that Israeli detention practices have violated in various ways prohibitions on "cruel and inhumane treatment and torture," as well as extrajudicial executions.

Moreover, Israel's refusal to acknowledge its role as an occupying power and hence its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention has resulted in its further self-exemption from any obligation, even voluntary, to respect the provisions that define the overall rights and duties of an occupying power. This Israeli view of the legal applicability of the humanitarian law of war (i.e., the Geneva legal framework) to the Occupation was unanimously rejected by the international community, including the International Court of Justice in its 2004 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Israeli Security Wall (the BARRIER). The ruling followed the 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1322, adopted by a vote of 14–0 with the United States abstaining, which called "upon Israel to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and its responsibilities" under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

A central issue of international law during the entire duration of the Occupation has been the Israeli policy of establishing settlements on the West Bank and Gaza (the latter dismantled in 2005), as well as in East Jerusalem. Since 1967 both the number of settlements and especially the number of settlers have steadily increased. Present estimates indicate that there are 121 settlements in the West Bank with 285,500 settlers, plus some 150 outposts, and 12 major settlements in Jerusalem with 193,700 settlers. The establishment of these settlements on occupied territory is clearly prohibited by Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "the Occupying Power shall not deport or TRANSFER parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." The Israeli Supreme Court has rejected Palestinian objections to the settlements, contending that Article 49 is not a "humanitarian" provision of the convention and thus not relevant. This argument is rejected by the overwhelming majority of international law specialists, who consider the convention fully applicable to the Israeli Occupation and reject the more informal Israeli claim that the settlers have established their settlements by their own volition rather than by any official policy. In fact the Israeli government has continuously helped settlers expropriate Palestinian land, subsidized and defended the settlements, and promoted settlement establishment and expansion as matters of official policy.

On the basis of international law the removal of all or most of the settlements and settlers is crucial to any effort to shape negotiations for a Palestinian state or to end this 100-plus-year conflict. Notably the settlement population almost doubled during the OSLO PROCESS, suggesting an Israeli unwillingness even during these negotiations to address Palestinian objections, rooted in international law, to its Occupation policies. This Israeli settlement expansion increased Palestinian suspicions that Oslo was a delaying tactic and that Israel never intended to allow the creation of a Palestinian state in the territory occupied since 1967.

The issue of seizing Palestinian land for Israeli settlements raises several separate and important issues. Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land declares that land occupied as a result of belligerency should not be confiscated. Although Israel is not a party to this convention, so many states consider it obligatory that it has achieved the status of customary international law, which the Israeli Supreme Court has acknowledged as binding on Israel. In the 1979 ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT case the Israeli Supreme Court held "that private West Bank and Gaza Strip land could not be confiscated in the absence of a security justification." After the Elon Moreh ruling the Israeli government bypassed this restriction by declaring huge tracts of Palestinian land STATE LAND, then seizing it for "security" reasons and building settlements on it. The Israeli Supreme Court raised no objection to this practice. Professor John Quigley, a respected expert on these matters, points out that "the [Israeli] government [following *Elon Moreh*] began confiscation of nominally state-owned land. . . . Much of the land of the West Bank was under a tenure system that was in a technical sense state ownership, though individual [Palestinian] families had occupied the land for generations and, so long as they paid taxes on it, were considered its owners."

Another violation of Geneva Convention Article 49 is Israel's use of DEPORTATION as a policy against Palestinians. According to B'Tselem, the respected Israeli Center for Human Rights,

between 1967 and 1992, Israel deported 1,522 individuals. Following a ten-year hiatus, in 2002, Israel deported 13 individuals, and between 2003 and 2005, in a new twist on the policy, Israel deported 32 persons from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank and vice versa. No one who has been deported has even been charged with a crime, much less convicted. All these individuals were expelled for political reasons. Once more Israel's Supreme Court gave a legal justification to a practice—deportation—deemed illegal by the international community. Israel's Supreme Court decided in 1987 that Article 49 only prohibits "mass deportations for purposes of forced labor or extermination, and therefore, does not prohibit deportations of individuals or small groups, done for punitive purposes." The United States and the European Community, as well as the UN Security Council, have protested the deportations. UN Security Council Resolution 607 of 5 January 1988 interpreted Article 49 as legally prohibiting any expulsion of residents of an occupied territory.

Israeli Occupation policies have produced other serious violations of Palestinian civil rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Among the most condemned has been the Israeli practice of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, used both as retribution for building a house without a PERMIT (Israel has rarely issued permits) and as a punishment imposed on families of suspected terrorists. Israeli scholar and activist Jeff Halper, who has thoroughly studied this issue, estimates that between 1967 and 2005, Israel demolished 12,000 houses, and these demolition practices continue through the present. Israel has also imposed harsh CURFEWS and CLOSURES on Palestinian communities or even, at times, the entire OCCUPIED TERRITORIES as punishment for an act of an individual. These curfews and closures constitute collective punishment that is clearly prohibited by Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states: "No protected person [that is, Palestinian civilian] may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of TERRORISM are prohibited. . . . Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited." Other serious violations of Article 32 are associated with the practice of ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION in which thousands of Palestinians have often been held for long periods without charges.

Palestinian Right of Resistance

A contested issue in international law is whether there is a right of resistance to a prolonged belligerent occupation that specifically violates the basic guidelines of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and more generally international humanitarian law. This question has a special importance if the occupier's violations curtail or nullify a people's ability to exercise the right of self-determination as conferred in common Article 1 of the two international human rights covenants that are authoritative under international law. In the Palestinian situation these legal guidelines suggest that the Palestinian people enjoy some right of resistance that validates at least nonviolent defense of their fundamental rights, and more likely, armed resistance in accordance with limits imposed by international humanitarian law.

Since the Occupation commenced, there have been various forms of sporadic resistance by Palestinians of various political persuasions. But a collective, essentially nonviolent, and spontaneous resistance, the INTIFADA, occurred with unexpected suddenness in December 1987. In Cheryl Rubenberg's words, "virtually all Palestinians participated in Intifada-related activities—mass demonstrations, labor and merchant strikes, civil disobedience (e.g., refusal to pay taxes), confrontations with military authorities, blocking roads with burning tires, and—in what became the symbol of the uprising—throwing stones at armed soldiers." The Israeli government responded with an "IRON FIST" POLICY enunciated by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in which ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES were instructed to beat resisters or break their bones at the scenes of confrontation. The iron fist was officially intended to intimidate the Palestinians by making them fear the consequences of taking part in even nonviolent resistance. Israel's use of excessive force was condemned in Security Council Resolution 605 of 22 December 1987. The UN Human Rights Commission regarded the Intifada's forms of resistance as a lawful exercise of the "right of the Palestinian people to regain their rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with relevant United Nations resolutions." On this basis the commission concluded that "the uprising of the Palestinian people against the Israeli Occupation since 8 December 1987 is a form of legitimate resistance."

The broader legal issues raised by Palestinian resistance involved the limits imposed by international law on the use of force in armed conflict, especially the prohibition on attacks that deliberately target civilians. The AL-AQSA INTIFADA, also called the Second Intifada, was triggered by the deliberately provocative visit of ARIEL SHARON and several hundred armed guards to the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT, a holy site in Jerusalem for both Jews and Arabs, on 30 September 2000. When Sharon, who was then running for prime minister, visited al-Haram, Israeli snipers shot unarmed Palestinian demonstrators, killing several. Sharon's visit occurred in the context of intense Palestinian anger, frustration, and despair at the failure of the peace process. The renewed expressions of Palestinian resistance targeted not only Israel but also the leadership of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY for its corruption, cronyism, repression, and especially the concessions made at the 2000 CAMP DAVID meetings. Unlike the First Intifada, this second instance of collective resistance was far more violent on both sides from the outset. Because the OSLO ACCORDS gave Palestinian police the duty to guarantee Israel's security, they had a variety of light weapons that were used against Israeli soldiers in some of the early demonstrations. Israeli forces reacted with sophisticated weaponry, as well as a variety of tactics deemed inconsistent with international humanitarian law, such as TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of terrorist suspects, collective punishments of Palestinian communities by way of extended closures and curfews, destruction of Palestinian property without compensation, violence against children, and interference with movement of medicines and medical relief vehicles. In response to Israel's use of force in the Second Intifada, the UN Security Council, by a vote of 14 to 0 with the United States abstaining, adopted Resolution 1322, which "called upon Israel to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities" under the Fourth Geneva Convention. A "special rapporteur" appointed by the UN Human Rights Commission to assess allegations that Israel had violated human rights in the Palestinian Territories concluded that Israel used excessive force against Palestinian demonstrations and political activities associated with the Second Intifada.

The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel and the Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court to stop the practice of targeted assassinations; however, on 11 December 2005 the court upheld the legality of assassinations. "The State determined that preventative strikes upon terrorists in the *area* which cause their deaths are a necessary means from the military standpoint. These strikes at times cause harm and even death to innocent civilians. These preventative strikes, with all the military importance they entail, must be made within the framework of the law. . . . In this case, the law was determined by customary international law [UNSC Res. 1322 and the Geneva Convention] regarding conflicts of international character."

Suicide Bombings

After the 1994 massacre of twenty-nine men at prayer in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON by settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, various Palestinian groups, including Hamas, ISLAMIC JIHAD, and the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, have relied on the tactic of SUICIDE BOMBING to inflict harm on Israeli civilian society, killing hundreds and maiming thousands. This tactic did not originate with the Palestinians but has been used in numerous modern conflicts, especially by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. In their setting, Palestinians have defended it as a necessary tactic, given the asymmetries of power between the two sides. SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, the subsequently assassinated Hamas leader, expressed the standard justification: "Once we have warplanes and missiles, then we can think of changing our means of legitimate self-defense. But right now, we can only tackle fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves."

International law uniformly condemns targeting civilians by suicide bombings. As constituting the international crime of terrorism, suicide bombings are punished by all legal systems, even though the major world powers have been unable to agree on the definition of terrorism. Every government is entitled to take lawful measures to prevent suicide bombing, although such responses may not be feasible, as the bomber is usually dead and his/her accomplices may be unknown or merely suspected. In retaliation Israel has relied on targeted assassinations, the destruction of the home of the family of a suicide bomber, the imposition of a collective punishment on a whole community or region where a suicide bomber resided, and the indiscriminate use of weaponry such as missiles or helicopter gunships to attack targets

allegedly linked to suicide bombing. These are considered unlawful measures in international law.

Peace Process

In the aftermath of the 1991 GULF WAR and the widespread sympathy for the Palestinian cause that grew out of the First Intifada, the United States took the initiative in encouraging some sort of Israel-Palestine negotiating process. The first formal phase was the MADRID CONFERENCE in October 1991, which was dominated by the United States and embodied all Israel's diplomatic priorities. Israel insisted that the PLO be excluded, that only non-PLO Palestinians from the West Bank or Gaza, but not Jerusalem or the Diaspora, could participate, and only then as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating presence. The United States acquiesced and further accepted Israel's interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242—that it had fulfilled its commitment by withdrawing from the Sinai—which substantially weakened the resolution as the foundation for a resolution of the conflict. After a divisive debate, the PLO under Yasir Arafat's leadership agreed to the conditions set by Israel despite their unfavorable basis. None of the Palestinians' concerns were satisfied at Madrid or in the bilateral and multilateral talks that followed. But simultaneously, in a highly secret and lengthy undertaking, senior Israeli and Palestinian officials met in Oslo, Norway, and hammered out a plan for a peace process. This became the Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed on 13 September 1993 on the White House lawn, and marked the start of what became known as the Oslo Process. The DOP has several notable features: there was no reference to a Palestinian right of self-determination or to the eventual establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state; the Interim Self-Government Arrangements called for a transition period of five years during which Israeli military forces in Palestine were to be redeployed rather than withdrawn; and issues such as borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and WATER were left for resolution in final status negotiations.

During the Oslo years many Palestinians and Israelis expressed hopes for the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders and a real reconciliation of the parties. As well, the Declaration of Principles affirmed "that the negotiation on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973)." As time went on, however, Israel's carefully chosen diplomatic language, its expansion of settlements, and the construction of an extensive network of settlement roads as well as the Security Barrier indicated that implementing 242 and 338 did not involve dismantling the main settlement blocs, nor did it mean more than partial withdrawal. It certainly did not suggest that Israel would give up control of a unified Jerusalem or concede a right of return to Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian expectation of a state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, which could be formed only if Israel adhered to the real meaning of 242, was no longer viable. The entire framework of the peace process reflected the gross power disparities between the parties, a reality magnified by the unconditional partisanship manifested by the United States on Israel's behalf, a posture masked behind its spurious claim that it was serving as an "honest broker" in the conflict. The weakness of the Palestinian position was never more dramatically evident than by their acquiescence to the Oslo Process.

Just as significantly, Palestinian weakness was underscored by their failure to insist on a negotiating process that respected their rights under international law. Aside from their political resolve to maintain their struggle, international law is the strongest Palestinian weapon. On every crucial issue between the parties—from the occupied land and borders to the status of Jerusalem, the rights of refugees, the settlements, and access to water—international law is clearly on the side of the Palestinians, especially considering that in 1988 the Palestinians renounced their earlier claims to the whole of the Palestine Mandate and thereby conceded the legitimacy of the state of Israel as encompassing 78 percent of historic Palestine. It is equally an expression of Israel's strength that it could frame negotiations in such a way as to marginalize, if not altogether eliminate, consideration of Palestinian rights and issues under international law. It should be remembered in this regard that international law incorporates well-established notions of fairness and common sense in its operative norms on the issues separating the two parties. The effective exclusion of international law made it clear that the bargaining process would be based on *power* not *rights,* and that the outcome would not correspond with the wider international understanding of justice. There was no pressure on Israel to stop all actions inconsistent with its obligations under international law, and the Palestinians were

told that their grievances would be addressed later in the FINAL STATUS TALKS and that any present Palestinian insistence on their rights under international law would disrupt the peace process. Their acceptance of pre-1967 Israel, without challenges to its legitimacy or borders, was an enormous Palestinian concession that, if reciprocated by Israel, could have produced a mutually beneficial peace agreement, but this was not to be.

There are two ways of conceiving of a just outcome that is sensitive to the historical evolution of the relations among the two peoples: first, conflict resolution in accordance with international law, allowing minor adjustments as agreed by the parties; and second, two truly equal, sovereign independent states established on either side of the pre-1967 borders, with international guarantees, international border supervision, an internationalized Jerusalem, and full and equal transborder mobility. These two views converge to a considerable extent, but the second approach allows for more negotiating flexibility. It permits, for instance, the Palestinians to allay Israeli anxieties on the refugee issue in a manner that would not be feasible if the process of reconciliation depended on a strict implementation of Palestinian rights under international law.

World Court and Israel's Security Wall

Israel began construction of its Security Wall in June 2002, mainly situated on the Palestinian side of the 1967 Green Line, which will have an estimated length of more than 430 miles (700 kilometers) when and if completed. It cuts Palestinian villages off from the Palestinian Territories and effectively incorporates occupied Palestinian land into Israel, including over 90 percent of the settlement population and all of the large West Bank settlement blocs. On 8 December 2003 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-10/14, requesting the International Court of Justice (World Court) to issue an advisory opinion on the legality and legal consequences of the wall as being constructed on occupied Palestinian territory. This approach was a reaction to a US veto of an earlier draft Security Council resolution condemning the wall as illegal and the lack of any mention of the wall in the ROAD MAP, which had been approved by the Security Council as a resumption of the peace process initiated at Oslo.

The World Court issued its advisory opinion on 9 July 2004, first addressing objections by Israel and the United States to the court's jurisdiction in the case, and then concluding, by a vote of 14–1, that the wall as constructed on Palestinian territory was illegal and should be dismantled, with reparations paid to the Palestinians harmed by the construction. The lone dissenting vote was cast by the US judge, Thomas Buergenthal, who contended that the majority had not sufficiently considered Israel's security justifications for constructing the wall on Palestinian territory, but otherwise endorsed almost all of the legal reasoning of the World Court advisory opinion, including the affirmation that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to Israel's Occupation. Judge Buergenthal observed that the construction of the wall on Palestinian territory had raised serious legal issues, including an impairment of the Palestinian right to self-determination.

On 20 July 2004 the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted Resolution ES-10/15 (by a vote of 150–6, with ten abstentions), which endorsed the conclusions of the advisory opinion and called upon Israel to dismantle the wall, and otherwise comply. The government of Israel, supported by the United States, rejected the World Court's legal conclusions and, as expected, voted against the General Assembly resolution. In separate legal proceedings within Israel the Israeli Supreme Court, although accepting Israel's basic security rationale for constructing the wall on Palestinian territory, did issue several specific legal rulings requiring Israel to dismantle segments of the wall that imposed unacceptable levels of harm on the Palestinian inhabitants residing in particular areas. The Israeli Supreme Court's approach was to weigh the humanitarian argument against the security rationale in each specific locale and to require relocation of the wall closer to the Green Line in cases of disproportionate harm to the Palestinians. Israel implemented the Supreme Court's decision, requiring changes in the direction of the wall applying to an area of some twenty miles (thirty kilometers) in length, while thereby reinforcing the overall legality of the wall and allowing Israel to purport a show of respect for the rule of law as well as to claim the independence of its judiciary.

John Dugard, the special rapporteur on the Palestinian Territories appointed by the UN Human Rights Commission, summarized the widely held international views on the wall in a report issued on 19 March 2004, as well as in a statement made to the Third Committee of the General Assembly on 28 October 2004. Professor Dugard emphasized

that three sets of adverse consequences for the Palestinian people follow from the wall:

(1) "It consolidates and encourages illegal Israeli settlements by including most settlements in the 'closed zone'—the area between the Wall and the Green Line." This prediction was borne out by statistics on the growth of settlements. In 2003, for instance, the settler population increased by a total of 5.3 percent as compared to a population growth in Israel itself of 1.3 percent. In addition the Israeli government issued 2,167 permits to Israeli settlers to build apartments in Palestine. The report argued that this has caused "increased SETTLER VIOLENCE against Palestinians" and it held Israel responsible for this violence.
(2) "The Wall has led to the seizure of substantial amounts of land previously considered part of Palestine, owned and used by Palestinians. . . . Regions of Tulkarm and Qalqilya have already seen the seizure of the best agricultural land and its water resources."
(3) "The Wall impedes Palestinian freedom of movement, making it particularly difficult for those Palestinians with lands partially located on the Israeli side to have access without obtaining PERMITS, which are often either unavailable or exceedingly difficult to obtain, especially by young Palestinians who allegedly pose security threats."

An overwhelming majority of Israelis believe that the wall has reduced the incidence of suicide bombings, and this belief is reinforced by a decline in incidents. However, a wall on Israeli territory would probably make an equal or greater contribution to Israeli security behind the Green Line and would almost certainly have been treated as consistent with international law, although raising moral and political objections of the sort occasioned during the Cold War by the Berlin Wall.

See also BARRIER; DEPORTATION; HOUSE DEMOLITIONS; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE OCCUPATION; SASSON REPORT; SETTLEMENTS; UNITED NATIONS

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—Richard Falk

International Solidarity Movement

The International Solidarity Movement (ISM) is a nongovernmental organization focused on protesting certain Israeli activities in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. It was founded in 2001 by Ghassan Andoni, a Palestinian; Neta Golan, an Israeli; Huwaida Arraf, a Palestinian American; and George N. Rishmawi, a Palestinian. Adam Shapiro, a Jewish American, joined the movement shortly after its founding and is also often considered one of the founders.

The organization calls on civilians from around the world to participate in acts of nonviolent protest against the Israeli military's actions in the WEST BANK and, prior to Israel's withdrawal in August 2005, the GAZA STRIP. The group has attracted criticism as well as praise for its peaceful methods.

Past ISM campaigns have employed the following tactics:

- Acting to deter military operations.
- Accompanying Palestinians to minimize harassment by Israeli settlers or soldiers, ensuring that queues at Israeli CHECKPOINTS are processed efficiently, and providing witnesses and intermediaries during annual olive harvests, which are often disrupted by settlers and police.
- Removing ROADBLOCKS. These large, unmanned mounds of earth and concrete are placed on roads throughout the West Bank and at the entrances of Palestinian villages by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), thereby preventing traffic in or out.
- Attempting to block military vehicles such as tanks and bulldozers, especially in the destruction of homes.
- Violating Israeli CURFEW orders enforced on Palestinian areas in order to monitor Israeli military actions, deliver food and medicine to Palestinian homes, or escort medical personnel to their work.
- Interfering with the construction of the West Bank BARRIER and placing politically motivated graffiti on the Barrier.
- Entering areas designated as "CLOSED MILITARY ZONES" by the Israeli military. (This is not so much a "strategy" as a prerequisite for conducting activities like those above in areas designated as "closed military zones" by the IDF.)
- Attempting to lift the Israeli blockade of Gaza with the "Free Gaza" initiative to send boats to Gaza in August 2008.
- Confronting Israeli soldiers.

The activities of the ISM are carried out in dangerous conditions and have often been met with harsh response by the IDF.

- On 2 April 2002, Australian ISM volunteer Kate Edwards sustained severe internal injuries from rounds fired by Israeli forces during a protest in Beit Jala. The incident was captured on film and appears in the documentary by Palestinian filmmaker Leila Sansour, *Jeremy Hardy vs. the Israeli Army*.
- On 22 November 2002, Caoimhe Butterly, an Irish ISM volunteer, was shot and injured by the IDF in Jenin.
- On 16 March 2003, American ISM volunteer Rachel Corrie was killed while trying to block an IDF armored bulldozer during a house demolition.
- On 5 April 2003, British ISM volunteer Brian Avery was shot in the face by machine gun from an IDF armored personnel carrier while he was outside in the street escorting Palestinian medical personnel.
- On 11 April 2003, British ISM volunteer Thomas Hurndall was left clinically brain-dead after he was shot in the head by an IDF soldier. Initially the soldier claimed the shooting occurred during an armed firefight between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian militants, but later admitted firing a shot near him as a deterrent, which had accidentally hit him. Hurndall died on 13 January 2004.

In 2004, the ISM was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by Svend Robinson, a Canadian parliamentarian. In 2006 the American Friends Committee (Quakers) nominated Ghassan Andoni for the Nobel Peace Prize together with Israeli Jeff Halper, founder of the ISRAELI COMMITTEE AGAINST HOUSE DEMOLITIONS. (http://palsolidarity.org/).

Intifada Elite

The Intifada Elite, or the "young guard" as they are often called, arose in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s as a cadre who considered the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) their legitimate representative but who wanted to determine political resistance activities in the WEST BANK and GAZA for themselves. Veterans of Palestinian universities and Israeli prisons, they built Palestinian institutions of CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA with an eye toward mobilizing society against the OCCUPATION. They were the leaders of the First INTIFADA (1987–1993) and considered themselves future leaders of the Palestinian nationalist movement. However, when PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT and his Tunisian cadres (the "OLD GUARD") came to Gaza from TUNIS (Tunisia) in 1994, the Old Guard dominated the political and security institutions and sidelined the local leaders. As a result there has been an ongoing struggle, especially within the FATAH party, over who would lead the Palestinian movement during both the OSLO PROCESS and the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. The struggle remains unresolved, but both the Old Guard (personified by MAHMUD ABBAS, the elected president of the Palestinian National Authority after Arafat's death) as well as the Intifada Elite were dealt a severe setback in the January 2006 PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS that brought an overwhelming majority of HAMAS members to the Legislative Council. Subsequently in 2007, Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza and the Intifada Elite were severely humiliated.

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Intifadas: First and Second Compared

In the spring of 2005, in the midst of the Second Intifada, a prominent Palestinian political figure proclaimed in Ramallah that Palestinians should

be proud that, in the last four decades of Israeli military OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, hardly a day had passed without some form of resistance against that Occupation. However, two periods of concentrated resistance have transformed Palestinian society and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the First Intifada, which began in December 1987, and the Second, or AL-AQSA, INTIFADA, which began in September 2000.

The word *intifada* means "shaking off" or "throwing off," and in both Intifadas the prime target was the Israeli military Occupation. Yet in their practices, the Israeli responses they precipitated, their effects on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict globally, and their local political consequences, the two Intifadas differ significantly. The first Palestinian Intifada was primarily a popular, nonviolent uprising, manifest in civil disobedience and some forms of Palestinian self-rule despite direct Israeli Occupation. It recentered the struggle inside historic Palestine, garnered new international support for the Palestinian cause, and brought Israel and the UNITED STATES into negotiations with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). The Second Intifada was highly militarized and more limited among the population because of Israeli counterinsurgency tactics and the presence of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Occurring concurrently with the ill-defined but far-reaching US "War on Terror," this Intifada produced no significant political gains for the Palestinians but instead gave Israel a pretext for intensifying its control over the Occupied Territories.

First Intifada: Roots and Organizational Structures

On 8 December 1987 four Palestinian workers in Gaza died after being hit by an Israeli vehicle. It was not the first time that traffic violence seemed to have a political dimension. Confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers and settlers in Gaza—including those involving cars—had been on the rise throughout 1987; however, this incident sparked widespread protests in Gaza that quickly spread to the West Bank. Palestinians inside Israel also held demonstrations. The protests only intensified a week later as ARIEL SHARON, then the Israeli minister of industry and trade, moved into an apartment in the Muslim Quarter of JERUSALEM's OLD CITY, a residence established by the extremist Israeli settler movement in Jerusalem. It soon became clear that this new movement had the energy and will to sustain itself longer than any previous uprising. Moreover, unlike previous strikes and protests, which had been organized around specific goals such as easing conditions for political PRISONERS, the aim of this new uprising was broad—an end to the Occupation.

The Intifada received support from a social institutional structure that had been developing throughout the 1980s, almost as though in preparation for the uprising. Popular committees and service organizations had been building the capacity to serve Palestinian society, especially in times of crisis. The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees epitomized the role CIVIL SOCIETY played in the First Intifada. Founded by Dr. MUSTAFA AL-BARGHUTHI in 1979, the union was a grassroots medical organization that sought to supplement the weak HEALTH CARE infrastructure that existed under the Occupation. In 1982 the organization saw 2,000 patients with its mobile clinics, in 1987 it saw 50,000, and in the first five months of the uprising the clinics served 28,000 people. In addition, women's organizations, agricultural committees, and trade unions all mobilized to support the uprising.

The First Intifada also benefited from strong and unified local political leadership, especially in its early years. Before and during the Intifada, the PLO was based in TUNIS, Tunisia, and suffered from organizational problems like splintering. Unlike that in the DIASPORA, the PLO leadership in the Occupied Territories—where members were under constant threat of arrest or DEPORTATION—had resisted such factional splits. Despite its illegal status the PLO had representatives in every town and, indeed, in nearly every family. Local leaders coordinated to form the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which consisted of members from the four major parties of the PLO: the mainstream FATAH and three leftist parties—the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP), and the Communist Party. In some places the Islamist groups, especially ISLAMIC JIHAD, also participated in the UNLU, but both Islamic Jihad and HAMAS tended to act as rivals to the UNLU. Within the UNLU each party had similar weight, in contrast to Fatah's clear dominance in the Diaspora; this resulting plurality of voices also invigorated the uprising.

Struggle for an independent authority under Occupation. The First Intifada can be understood as a struggle for Palestinian de facto authority on the ground. The Israeli Occupation ruled by force, controlling every aspect of Palestinian life (for example, schools and other key institutions), co-opting a few key Palestinian leaders, establishing a network of COLLABORATORS, restricting the distribution of work and travel PERMITS, and using shootings, arrests, and CURFEWS to maintain order. During the Intifada the UNLU and other nationalist organizations aimed to establish an independent structure of authority that achieved legitimacy by popular assent. The UNLU asked people for demonstrations of allegiance, such as closing shops in the afternoon during strikes, even though Israeli soldiers punished those who participated. On certain days the UNLU asked Palestinians to have no contact with Israelis, and Palestinians refrained from going to their jobs inside Israel or applying for permits. Palestinians also refused to pay taxes to Israeli authorities. Generally Palestinians endeavored to implement the directives of the leadership, and PLO activists were on the ground to encourage—and sometimes enforce—compliance.

The Intifada was also a precarious assertion of self-sufficiency. Palestinians declined to buy the Israeli goods that flooded their market, and storeowners stopped stocking Israeli products. People planted Intifada gardens so they could enjoy fresh produce during extended curfews. Palestinian organizations were established to offer many of the services usually provided by a state, including health care, alternative schools, and MEDIA—albeit underground media.

With a few exceptions Israel maintained widely effective control over the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Palestinian defenses were barrels filled with concrete and burning tires, while the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) employed guns, jeeps, and tanks. On a few occasions towns were "re-occupied" by hundreds of soldiers. Generally, though, Israel had the power to determine whether or not schools would be open or permits would be granted. Nevertheless, an essential victory of the Intifada was that, despite Israeli control of events on the ground, their control over political meaning and legitimacy was far less secure. When Israel closed schools, for example, Palestinians held smaller sessions in homes and used the opportunity to provide popular EDUCATION on Palestinian history and society of the sort not allowed in the Israeli-controlled schools. When schools were open, youth took the opportunity to gather and stage protests.

Practices of resistance and suppression. The most famous image of the First Intifada is that of a child throwing stones. In these popular protests youths—both boys and girls—threw stones at Israeli soldiers in jeeps or tanks in their neighborhoods, towns, and cities. The figure of the child throwing stones encouraged its own poetics and crushing Israeli counterrevolutionary tactics. Palestinian poets such as MAHMUD DARWISH and Nizar Qabbani wrote paeans to the "children of stones." Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani's poem "Children Bearing Stones" begins with a verse that praises the new generation and disparages his own: *"With stones in their hands,/they defy the world/and come to us like good tidings./They burst with anger and love, and they fall/while we remain a herd of polar bears:/a body armored against weather."*

As the image of the young Palestinian stone thrower confronting the heavily armed Israeli soldier circulated around the world, it helped to transform the United States and European view of Palestinians and their situation under Occupation.

If slender arms were some of the primary instruments of the First Intifada, they were also some of its primary targets. A month and a half after the Intifada began, Israeli defense minister YITZHAK RABIN stated, "The first priority of the security forces is to prevent violent demonstrations with force, power and blows. . . . We will make it clear who is running the territories." He went on to announce an Israeli policy of beating Palestinian protesters with clubs, fists, and rifle butts to break bones. Although the policy met with widespread global criticism, some in Israel defended it as a nonlethal method to quell the protests, noting that those with a broken arm would be debilitated for at least a month and a half. This aggressive stance resulted, according to the Swedish branch of Save the Children, in "23,600 to 29,900 children requir[ing] medical treatment for their beating injuries in the first two years of the Intifada, one-third of whom were children under the age of ten years old." Curfews, rubber bullets, tear gas, and arrests were other important Israeli counterinsurgency tactics. According to the Israeli human rights organization B'TSELEM, from the beginning of the Intifada in December 1987

through the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS on 13 September 1993, which some consider the end of the First Intifada, 1,070 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces, including 237 children under the age of seventeen, and 54 Palestinians were killed by Israeli civilians. During the same period Palestinians killed 47 Israeli civilians and 43 Israeli security force personnel.

The Intifada had a distinct geography. Protests were strongest in Gaza and within the West Bank in outlying cities such as NABLUS, HEBRON, JENIN, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm, rather than in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and BETHLEHEM. Refugee camps were also centers of resistance, as they were to be in the Second Intifada.

Social dimensions of popular uprising. The First Intifada thrived in part because of the wide participation of people from different parts of society, especially women. Symbolically, mothers, wives, and sisters were the steadfast supporters of men on the front lines, but they were also essential to the practical workings of the Intifada. Women and girls participated alongside men and boys in throwing stones at military positions and often intervened to protect youths from beatings or arrests. Women and girls also acted as guards and lookouts and brought food to wanted men.

Just as important was the women's leadership of the many social activities that gave the Intifada its breadth. When government schools were closed, women provided political and academic education, and they helped institute income-generating and survival strategies such as the Intifada "victory gardens." Because women played such an important role in an uprising that was held in high esteem, women also began to claim extended freedom of movement and association that had formerly been lacking in parts of Palestinian society.

On the other hand, in Gaza the Intifada also strengthened conservative elements in Palestinian society. Before the Intifada, women's dress in Gaza, as elsewhere in Palestinian society, was varied and reflected class, geographic, religious, and generational identities. However, during the Intifada a newly energized Islamic movement encouraged all Muslim women to wear the *hijab*, or head scarf. Islamic activists wrote graffiti telling women to cover their heads, and children shouted and threw stones at women who refused to do so. After some time (many women said far too long), the UNLU denounced such attacks on women, arguing that these disputes only strengthened Israel. According to UNLU Communiqué 43 in Gaza, as cited by Reema Hammami, "We should value highly the role women have played in our society during these times in achieving our national goals and confronting the Occupation, and they should not be punished without cause. The phenomenon of harassing women contradicts the traditions and norms of our society as well as our accepted attitudes about women. At the same time, it denigrates the patriotism and humanity of each female citizen." The UNLU's statement swiftly changed norms on the street.

The Intifada upset other social hierarchies and values in Palestinian society as well. Upon their release the many young men who had served time in Israeli prisons received the kind of respect usually accorded only to their seniors. They were called upon to resolve internal conflicts and were considered leaders of their communities. This new status often came at a distinct cost, though. The beatings by Israeli soldiers and the detentions, which came to be rites of passage for young men, disrupted other normal aspects of growing up, including freedom of movement.

Underground media. During the First Intifada, Israel used both force and legal measures against Palestinian media. All of the major Palestinian daily newspapers repeatedly lost their licenses to distribute their papers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, sometimes for more than a month at a time. The Palestine Press Service, the main news agency in the Occupied Territories, was closed from March 1988 until at least March 1990. During the first full year of the Intifada (1988) at least forty-four Palestinian journalists were detained for two days or longer, and several were held under ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION for six months without charge. Other journalists were put under house arrest.

To bypass the intense Israeli censorship Palestinians found other means of communicating with the public, all dangerous, and many under the cover of night. Rumor, communiqués, and graffiti became the prime means of communication during the Intifada. The clandestine UNLU leadership issued *bayans,* or bulletins, distributed by teenagers and young men and women at night or at the mosque during Friday prayers, under risk of arrest or being shot. These communiqués included practical information such as the schedule of strike days, political assertions, and explications of internal social issues.

Graffiti was a more succinct medium for political speech. As with the communiqués, teenagers did the writing, with the leadership often deciding what to write. Graffiti was also posted at night, in dangerous conditions, because the army was constantly on patrol in many areas. Sometimes the army painted over the graffiti only hours later. As Julie Peteet writes, graffiti consisted of slogans and tags for political groups. Some were simple political formulations, like "1948 + 1967 = Palestine," a clear phrase that soldiers might also understand, meaning that the legitimate state of Palestine consists of the LAND occupied in 1948 (i.e., Israel) and some of the land occupied in 1967 (i.e., the West Bank, Gaza Strip). Others were admonitions to fellow Palestinians: "Don't paint over graffiti voluntarily. First Warning!" Still others were meant to memorialize those killed during resistance or to encourage resistance and fortitude: "Prison is for relaxation, deportation is for tourism, throwing stones is exercise—UNLU." Most of the graffiti was written in Arabic, but occasionally English was also used.

Roots of the next uprising. During the First Intifada the struggle for international political recognition of Palestinian nationality, political rights, and the PLO continued in parallel with struggles for Palestinian autonomy on the streets of the Occupied Territories. The Intifada transformed the dominant global image of Palestinians from plane-hijacking terrorists to children using stones to resist one of the world's most powerful armies in the streets and alleyways of their own cities, villages, and refugee camps. The First Intifada surely contributed to the nearly universal recognition of Palestinians as a national group whose representative was the PLO. The negotiations that started with the MADRID CONFERENCE of 1991 and led to the Oslo Accords of 1993 marked a Palestinian victory with regard to US and Israeli willingness to deal directly with the PLO.

The results of the Oslo Accords themselves were considerably more mixed. Among different Palestinian geographic constituencies, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza seemed to have benefited most from the agreements, which appeared to put them on the path to statehood. The fates of the REFUGEES in LEBANON, SYRIA, and JORDAN and the status of Jerusalem were more tenuous, as the right of return to Israel and the future of Jerusalem were considered FINAL STATUS issues to be determined at the end of the process. During the OSLO PROCESS of 1993–2000 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza developed educational, media, and private enterprises, albeit to a limited extent. However, the Israeli policies that prohibit residents of the Occupied Territories from entering Israel without a special permit (CLOSURE) kept many Palestinians from working inside Israel and caused an overall decline in the Palestinian ECONOMY. According to Sara Roy, when the Second Intifada began, less than 4 percent of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories had permission to enter Jerusalem. Despite considerable amounts of foreign assistance, by the year 2000, per capita income levels in the West Bank and Gaza were about 10 percent below what they had been before the Oslo agreements, according to Salem Ajluni, professor in the Department of Economics at Siena College of Loudonville, New York.

Meanwhile, despite the plethora of meetings that constituted the peace process, Palestinians could see scant political progress, while Israel expanded settlements substantially. Excluding the settlements in Jerusalem, from 1993 to 2000 the settler population of the West Bank increased from 110,000 to 195,000. Such settlement expansion necessarily led to extensive land expropriation. At the same time, there were repeated delays in negotiations over such critical issues as the boundaries of a Palestinian state, the status of Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees' right to return.

Moreover, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was not living up to Palestinian hopes. Dominated by Fatah, it was both corrupt and repressive toward its opponents, most notably Hamas. Although many outside analysts thought the Palestinians were on a path to statehood—with a president, the right to issue passports, and agreements that promised to address long-term issues—Palestinians inside the Occupied Territories could discern only too clearly that Israel continued to control BORDERS, movement, and resources. In the months before the Second Intifada broke out, there was talk that a new uprising would be against the PNA rather than Israel. However, when Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT refused to accept what Palestinians saw as a weak final status agreement at the US-hosted CAMP DAVID SUMMIT in the summer of 2000, Arafat's support rose slightly, according to polls by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.

Second Intifada: A New Uprising

As in the First Intifada, an Israeli act set off the second Palestinian uprising. On 28 September 2000, Israeli right-wing opposition party leader Ariel Sharon visited AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the site of the AL-AQSA MOSQUE, one of Islam's most holy sites. His visit was seen as an act of deliberate provocation, especially because he brought with him a thousand Israeli police in riot gear. A military helicopter hovered above the scene as Palestinians tried to break through the lines of police forces, and conflict ensued between Palestinians and Israeli security forces. The next day Palestinians once again found police reinforcements at al-Haram ash-Sharif, and upon leaving the al-Aqsa Mosque after Friday noon prayers, they began protesting the police presence. The Israeli response was quick and strong. That day seven Palestinians were shot and killed and more than 200 injured by Israeli rubber bullets and live ammunition. When protests spread to Gaza, other places in the West Bank, and among Palestinians inside Israel, a new Intifada had begun.

Both Palestinians and outside observers called this uprising the al-Aqsa Intifada. Because the conflict had started at the important holy site, many Western analysts assumed that it had an essentially religious and Islamist character. Yet, the Islamic character of the Second Intifada cannot be presumed. By the beginning of the new century, Palestinian society, like much of the rest of the Middle East, was more religiously motivated than it had been fifteen years before. However, at the same time, many Palestinians warned that transforming the conflict into a religious one would be deleterious to the Palestinians' cause. For Palestinians the Second Intifada, like the first, was fundamentally focused on ending Israeli Occupation.

Yet Palestinians found that struggle more difficult this time. Before the First Intifada, Palestinian civil society had flourished, despite direct colonial rule and nebulous political leadership. In the years leading up to the Second Intifada the PNA, through its harsh restrictions on NGOs, opponents, and others, had diminished the space for Palestinian civil society. At the same time, as an administrative body, the PNA took over the role that the Israeli Occupation held during the First Intifada, limiting the scope and forms of resistance during the Second Intifada. Along with Israel's excessive use of force during the first months of the uprising, the PNA's role shaped the character of the uprising as one that actively included only a narrow segment of society. More fundamental than this, though, is that the PNA led, albeit indirectly, to the armed nature of the Second Intifada.

Shift in Palestinian tactics and Israeli responses. During the first several months of the Second Intifada, the uprising resembled its predecessor in several basic ways. It consisted primarily of unarmed demonstrators confronting Israeli soldiers and tanks at Israeli checkpoints with stones and occasionally Molotov cocktails. Their actions were met with Israeli use of considerable force but not with the full-blown military operations that would come later. In October 2000 alone, as Michele Esposito writes, the IDF estimated that it "fired between 850,000 and 1.3 million 5.56-bullets."

Even in this early period, however, the differences between the two uprisings were clear. During the Oslo period, Israeli troops were not stationed within PNA-administered areas (Area A), which included most cities of the West Bank and Gaza. As a result, unlike during the First Intifada, when protests against Israeli Occupation were geographically widespread, during the Second Intifada, clashes with Israeli troops were concentrated on the town borders, on settlement ROADS, and at the Israeli-controlled religious sites of Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem. Also in the al-Aqsa Intifada's early months, analysts have argued, Israel exploited the presence of 40,000 armed Palestinian police and security forces to justify Israel's use of more extensive military force, even though the PNA forces were not at first extensively involved in the uprising. This resulted in a high death toll for this early period of the Intifada. By mid-February 2001 more than 350 Palestinians had been killed by Israeli soldiers and civilians, and nearly fifty Israelis were killed by Palestinians. Thus, even before the militarization of the Intifada, casualties were much higher than in the First Intifada.

As the Intifada continued, its most visible components were various types of armed resistance. Both because Palestinians viewed settlements as the paramount obstacle to a Palestinian state in the areas occupied in 1967 and because settlers had themselves carried out acts of aggression against Palestinians, Palestinian militants primarily targeted settlements and bypass roads that served settlements. In the first four years of the Intifada, 190 Israeli settlers were killed, according to the *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Palestinian

militants also attacked Israeli military positions, including CHECKPOINTS: 295 members of the IDF and other Israeli security forces were killed in the first four years of the Intifada.

Yet the form of Palestinian resistance that received the most Western press coverage was undoubtedly the SUICIDE BOMBINGS, a relatively new instrument of Palestinian resistance that was first used after the Oslo Accords were signed. During the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, fifty-four suicide bombings took place, killing at least 349 Israelis, among them both civilians and security forces. The bulk of these attacks were carried out by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, a splinter group from the Fatah party—with Hamas the most deadly and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades the least. The leftist PFLP group carried out a handful of bombings as well.

The frequency of suicide bombings increased when Ariel Sharon, an intensely hated figure in Palestinian society because of his role in the SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE (in which hundreds of Palestinians were killed in Beirut refugee camps), became the Israeli prime minister on 7 March 2001. Sharon quickly intensified EHUD BARAK's strategy to crush the Intifada. As Michelle Esposito explains, "while Barak had intermittently shelled residential areas, demolished buildings, razed Palestinian agricultural lands, and deployed tanks, helicopter gunships, and missiles against demonstrators, alongside the TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, Sharon's resort to such measures became routine."

By the summer, Sharon put in place new policies to crush the Intifada, including curfews and large-scale closures and invasions of Palestinian cities. In the spring of 2002, Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities intensified, resulting in long periods of curfew in cities already strangled by checkpoints; massive detentions of boys and men, usually from the ages of sixteen to forty-five; and the deployment of one of the world's most powerful armies against lightly armed militants and a civilian population. Israeli use of F-16 fighter planes, Apache helicopters, and missiles in both assassination attempts and attacks in the middle of cities shocked even those Palestinians who had endured decades of military Occupation. By the end of 2002 the PNA security infrastructure was essentially destroyed, while Israel was consolidating control of territory through the construction of the separation BARRIER within the West Bank, undertaken with the stated goal of preventing bombers from entering Israel.

Around the same time, Palestinian leaders were rethinking strategies for resistance. Facing increasing international pressure and devastating Israeli military campaigns that reoccupied Palestinian cities, Palestinian prime minister MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen) called for a halt to the militarization of the Intifada, stating: "We should not expect the Intifada to bear more than it can take. We must ask where we are heading. . . . Whose blood will be cascading? Our children's blood, the blood of your children. . . . Every Jewish person in Israel now is with Sharon because they all believe that he protects them. I want to deprive him from this pretext." Though Palestinians often viewed Abbas as a minion of the United States, by this time in the Intifada many Palestinian analysts concurred that a less militarized popular Intifada would serve Palestinian interests better.

The Palestinian losses from only the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada speak to the differences between the First and Second Intifadas. According to the Palestinian human rights organization Health Development Information Project (HDIP), 3,334 Palestinians, including 621 children, were killed during this period of the Second Intifada. Israeli forces used snipers, helicopter gunfire, or missiles to assassinate 273 Palestinians, according to the *Journal of Palestine Studies.* Assassinations were controversial because they constituted extrajudicial killings of militants who instead might have been arrested and sent to trial, and because so many bystanders—at least 233—died in assassinations or assassination attempts. According to the IDF, 989 Israelis were killed during this time period. The Israeli human rights organization B'Tselem estimated that 3,700 houses were demolished either as punishment to the families of suspected militants, for security reasons, or because of lack of a permit. According to B'Tselem, 7,366 Palestinians were in detention at the four-year anniversary, a number that included 760 held in administrative detention without charge and 386 minors.

Civil society. Popular involvement in the Second Intifada was precluded both by a lack of the kinds of civil organizations that coordinated and sustained the First Intifada and by its militarization. These organizations, such as the popular and neighborhood committees, were crushed by Israeli counterinsurgency tactics at the end of the First

Intifada and never fully recovered. Popular organizations were viewed with suspicion and suppressed by the PNA, as it reined in opposition. Moreover, the "state formation" processes of the Oslo period encouraged the growth of professional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) funded by Western governments and foundations rather than popular organizations. Thus popular organizations faced many obstacles to direct participation in the uprising. According to Johnson and Kuttab, this time was characterized by a system of "'authoritarian populism,' which denies specific constituencies and publics in favor of 'the people.' The people or 'the street' give—or potentially withhold—vital legitimacy to the government, but have weak or absent roles in political interpretation, opinion formation, or, most importantly, decision making."

Women in particular were disempowered by this political formation. In the First Intifada, popular participation and the need for widespread support gave women a significant role in the uprising. During the Oslo period the professionalization of civil society led to significant gains on issues such as domestic violence and women's health, but it also caused a loss of power for much of the women's movement. Moreover, during the Intifada itself the nature of resistance changed, and fewer women participated fully in the armed uprising (although a few did become suicide bombers). Indeed, not only most women but also all those unwilling or unable to carry arms were left at the periphery of the Second Intifada, except as victims of the Israeli siege and violence.

Leadership and authority. Although the First Intifada was mostly directed from inside by the UNLU, it did receive support from the PLO leadership in Tunis, especially from KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad, 1935–1988), who was assassinated at close range in his home in the presence of his wife and son by an Israeli commando team under the command of Ehud Barak on 16 April 1988. Despite its presence within the Occupied Territories, the PLO made little immediate impact on the Second Intifada. Throughout much of the al-Aqsa Intifada the role of the official Palestinian leadership was murky; at times PNA president and PLO chairman Arafat encouraged resistance—the level of popular support for the uprising made it impossible for him to withhold approval—yet sometimes he attempted to limit its extent. After all, he had to uphold the position he had assumed since the beginning of the Oslo Accords: that of a leader supported by the West and tolerated by Israel precisely because he could maintain order. In the first four months of the Intifada, Arafat addressed his people only once.

To the extent that the PNA leadership used the Intifada strategically, they attempted to bring Israel back to the negotiating table—essentially to establish a Palestinian state before more land was lost to settlements or before they lost leadership positions and the potential to capitalize on Palestinian statehood. Meanwhile, many leaders of the Second Intifada, both in Fatah's oppositional elements and in Hamas, had come of age in the First Intifada and wanted to move beyond the Oslo agreements. In the coming years even some figures inside the PNA would talk about dissolving it and refortifying the PLO, but that did not come to pass.

These internal fractures and the lack of clear goals limited Palestinian success in the Second Intifada. Although new political and military groups coalesced, there was never unity among these groups, nor was there always coordination between the political and military branches of the same organization. The absence of a central leadership that could narrate the conflict from a Palestinian perspective for influential audiences abroad was another key shortcoming of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

Economics of uprising. Both Intifadas had the goal of affecting the Israeli economy, but the economic strategies that had, at the very least, promoted cohesion among Palestinians during the First Intifada were more difficult to implement during the Second. While refusal to participate in the Israeli economy was an important tactic of the First Intifada, it was harder to separate the Palestinian and Israeli economies in the 2000s. Rather than Palestinians refusing to work inside Israel on special strike days, as in the First Intifada, Israel prevented Palestinians from working both inside Israel and within the West Bank on a massive scale every day by fortifying and vastly complicating the Israeli system of checkpoints and closures.

While Israel estimated that it sustained $12.5 billion in total economic losses for the first four years of Intifada (mostly from the tourist sector), the Palestinian economy suffered tremendously from Israeli military attacks, which destroyed much of the Palestinian infrastructure and the governmental and NGO capacity that had been developed in the 1990s. Through April 2002 alone the World Bank estimated that $650 million in damage had been done to the Palestinian

infrastructure, including agricultural land, public buildings, private homes, and roads. According to World Bank statistics as analyzed by Ajluni, the Palestinian per capita gross national income decreased by 40 percent from 1999 to 2002.

In addition to its invasions, Israeli closures drastically constrained the Palestinian economy. In January 2004 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs counted 763 barriers to movement in the West Bank, including 59 checkpoints, 10 partial checkpoints, 479 earth mounds, 75 trenches, 100 roadblocks, and 40 road gates. In a World Bank report entitled "Four Years—Intifada, Closures, and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment," the third of its kind focusing on the issue of closure during the Intifada, the impact of Israel's closure policy is summarized: "After almost four years of the conflict, average Palestinian incomes have declined by more than one-third, and one-quarter of the workforce is unemployed. Nearly one-half of all Palestinians live below the poverty line. More than 600,000 people (16% of the population) cannot afford even the basic necessities for subsistence. The precipitator of this economic crisis has been 'closure,' a multi-faceted system of restrictions on the movement of Palestinian people and goods, which the Government of Israel argues is essential to protect Israelis in Israel and in the settlements." When construction of the separation Barrier began in 2002, many of these closure policies solidified further, more permanently cutting off Palestinians from agricultural land and severing villages from the metropolitan areas with which they had always been connected.

Role of the media. As in the First Intifada, media played a key role in spreading information within the Occupied Territories and communicating the Palestinians' message abroad. During the Oslo period, Palestinian broadcast media had developed an extensive local radio and television network. However, the decline in advertising funds during the al-Aqsa Intifada presented tremendous financial challenges to what had been largely commercial ventures. Stations that had played music now provided urgent news updates, both from the streets just below the studios and from regions of the Occupied Territories made inaccessible by closure, and also broadcast practical information about checkpoints so residents could take alternate routes. When Israeli invasions reached their most critical stages, call-in radio shows helped listeners respond to emergencies.

Another major media development that shaped the Second Intifada was the presence of Arab satellite media stations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia. These networks produced high-quality news programs not subject to the censorship that existed during the First Intifada. With the spread of satellite television, Al-Jazeera became the top news source for Palestinians. For many months Palestinians essentially had their own news at the national or even local level, because these satellite media stations covered the Intifada in extensive detail and at great length.

At the same time, Israeli attacks directly affected Palestinian journalists and media institutions. Many private and PNA radio and television stations were destroyed during the Israeli invasions of 2002. The Israeli Government Press Office also began denying Palestinian journalists press cards, even if they had held them for years previously. Because they were not able to pass through checkpoints, they had limited ability to cover events in the Occupied Territories. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, Israeli soldiers shot and killed seven journalists between 2000 and 2006, including five Palestinians, one Italian, and one British.

In comparison to Western media coverage of the First Intifada, coverage of the Second Intifada was less sympathetic to the Palestinians. In the First Intifada, Palestinians successfully portrayed themselves as a people struggling against the violent oppression of a much more powerful party. During the Second Intifada, Western media debates often focused, to the exclusion of nearly all else, on the suicide bombings against Israeli civilians, and Palestinians were grouped with other Muslim terrorists who were attacking Western democracies during the international "War on Terror." The word *occupation* was excised from the media's lexicon—especially in the United States. In human rights circles Israel was criticized for its 2002 invasion of Jenin, its massive military campaigns throughout the West Bank and Gaza, and its construction of the Barrier. But as long as Palestinians were carrying out suicide bombings, Western sympathies remained with Israel.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES; JERUSALEM; MEDIA; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION RAINBOW; OSLO ACCORDS; OSLO PROCESS; PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; SUICIDE BOMBINGS

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—Amahl Bishara

Ir Amim: For an Equitable and Stable Jerusalem with an Agreed Political Future

Ir Amim ("City of Nations" or "City of Peoples") is an Israeli nonprofit, nonpartisan organization founded in order to actively engage in those issues impacting Israeli-Palestinian relations in JERUSALEM and the political future of the city. Ir Amim seeks to render Jerusalem a more viable and equitable city, while generating and promoting a more politically sustainable future.

Bearing in mind the symbolic and actual status of Jerusalem as a city of two peoples and three religions, as well as the city's pivotal role in reaching a political agreement, Ir Amim aspires to a stable Jerusalem, equitably shared by Palestinians and Israelis, a city that ensures the dignity and welfare of all its residents and that safeguards their holy places, as well as their historical and cultural heritages.

Ir Amim offers its knowledge and expertise concerning the political, economic, and social conditions in Jerusalem to a range of organizations and individuals, including governmental and municipal authorities who deal with the management of the city, and parties who examine the sustainability of possible political arrangements.

The organization has ongoing working relations with the Palestinian community in Jerusalem, as well as with key players in the international community active in Jerusalem issues.

Ir Amim operates a range of complementary activities, including:

- Monitoring and exposing critical developments in Jerusalem, and informing/alerting target audiences in Israel and in the world
- Legal advocacy aimed at halting or mitigating unilateral actions that harm the fabric of life in Jerusalem and create obstacles to reaching an agreed-upon future for the city and the region
- Policy advocacy with decision makers, both local and international
- Public outreach and media work aimed at raising awareness of developments in the city and understanding of their local and global significance, including study tours of East Jerusalem, professional seminars, and public events
- Strengthening, and working with, civil society organizations in East Jerusalem to advance a more equitable Jerusalem

(http://www.ir-amim.org.il/eng/).

Iran

Speaking in October 2005 at a program called "A World without ZIONISM," Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that the Jewish state must "vanish from the page of time" in order

for a Palestinian state to be established. This type of bellicose anti-Israel statement, reminiscent of earlier speeches by the late Ayatollah Khomeini, had rarely been voiced by top Iranian officials since the 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah's regime. Fearful of mounting international outrage, and alarmed by additional hate-filled speeches by Ahmadinejad, the Iranian government backed off from the president's statement but reaffirmed Iran's continued commitment to a "just" resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Ahmadinejad controversy, as this affair might be called, clearly represents a radical shift in Iranian views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Until 1979, Iran was less interested in the internal dynamics of the conflict than in cultivating relations with the Jewish state in various fields. In what an Israeli scholar retrospectively called a "wondrous love affair," Iranian-Israeli relations were founded on a combination of strategic, economic, and ideological interests, many of them inimical both to the "progressive" Arab states and to the Palestinians in their benefits to Israel. The collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979 destroyed Iran's longtime alignment with Israel. Afterwards the Iranian state emerged as one of Israel's most outspoken rivals, periodically calling for the extinction of the "regime occupying JERUSALEM" and providing logistical, financial, and moral support to the Shiite-Lebanese HIZBULLAH and to various Palestinian movements and groups, most notably HAMAS.

From the time of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the history of Iran's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been fraught with many contradictions and tensions and has been heavily influenced by official state ideologies, making it hard to tell myth from reality. Because portions of this history have either been silenced or amplified, depending on the circumstances and on regime changes, the actual extent of Iranian involvement in the conflict remains unclear. This explains why the history of Iran's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been shaped by perceptions no less than by factual sociopolitical processes.

From 1948 to 1979

From a Palestinian perspective the Israeli-Iranian connection as it evolved after 1948 was nothing short of shameful. In 1949, Israel received the tacit agreement of the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), to use Iran as a transit point for the illegal IMMIGRATION of Iraqi Jews, in effect helping to tip the DEMOGRAPHIC balance in Palestine in Jewish favor. Equally detrimental to the Palestinians was the Shah's entanglement in Cold War rivalries, from the mid-1940s through the end of his rule, which drew him into a close strategic alliance with the state of Israel. The Shah sought UNITED STATES protection from his domestic opposition (mainly the Shi'ite clergy and the Tudeh Communist Party) as well as from the radical Arab states (especially Nasirite EGYPT). He hoped that an Iranian connection with the new state of Israel would help achieve that goal. For this reason, among others, the Shah agreed to join Israel in the "alliance of the periphery," originally conceived by Israel's founder DAVID BEN-GURION and his close advisors after the 1956 Suez War. Their basic idea was to forge alliances with the non-Arab states of the Middle East "periphery" (such as Iran, TURKEY, and even Ethiopia) in order to weaken the immediate circle of hostile (and pro-Soviet, pro-Palestinian) Arab states.

Iran and Israel drew closer together in the late 1950s, when the Shah sought the assistance of the MOSSAD (the Israeli intelligence agency) in building and administrating the SAVAK, the Shah's notorious secret police. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Shah undertook the responsibility for ensuring peace and stability in the Persian Gulf region, in accordance with the precepts of the Nixon Doctrine, formulated by US president RICHARD NIXON. As a result Iran became a crucial export market for Israeli arms, spending about US $500 million per year. These aspects of the Israeli-Iranian connection fueled Iranian popular hostility to Israel in the years leading to the 1979 revolution and afterwards.

Yet the Israeli-Iranian alliance under the Shah's regime was not limited to military, security, and intelligence matters. When the Shah embarked on his ambitious modernization programs (titled the "White Revolution") in the 1960s, he became increasingly dependent on Israeli expertise in the fields of technology, transportation, construction, and agriculture. Thus the initial security and intelligence alliances between the two countries expanded into sprawling business and financial initiatives that produced large profits for Israeli companies and entrepreneurs. To illustrate, Israeli trade with Iran, which was estimated at US $33 million in 1973–1974, sharply increased to

US $250 million on the eve of the revolution in 1977–1978. Iran reciprocated by publicly selling oil to the Israelis, thereby standing out as one of the very few oil-producing countries willing to defy the Arab oil boycott.

The Shah's increasing ties with Israel always risked provoking domestic and external opposition forces. To survive these threats the Shah issued statements with a pro-Palestinian disposition. He was also able to claim that along with Egypt, IRAQ, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, and Yemen, he had voted against the 1947 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181, which called for a partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, and that he even endorsed the notion of "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." To overcome his internal opposition, the Shah had to conduct his relations with Israel secretly, consistently resisting an open relationship with the Jewish state. This explains why he refrained from granting Israel more than de facto recognition and why Israeli-Iranian relations under the Shah regime came to be known as a "discreet entente" and were likened to "true love that exists between two people outside of wedlock."

Israel's 1967 WAR with Egypt, JORDAN, and SYRIA once again showed the Shah to be a master at calculated ambivalence. In practice the spectacular Israeli victory enhanced Tehran's special relationship with Israel, for it neutralized the threat of Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR's Arab radicalism while also demonstrating that SOVIET power in the region rested on flimsy grounds. In his public pronouncements, however, the Shah prudently denounced the Israeli OCCUPATION of Arab territories and called for Israeli withdrawal from these territories.

A shift in the Shah's policy toward the Middle East conflict occurred after the 1973 OCTOBER WAR. Although the Shah was determined to continue his basic ties with Israel, several developments triggered by the war induced him to take a more evenhanded position toward the Arab states. Because the war created a favorable environment for security and stability in the Middle East by putting Egypt in a better position to make peace with Israel and by producing a coalition of relatively moderate forces within the Arab world, the Shah could afford to show greater sensitivity to the Palestinians' plight. He therefore sharpened his criticism of the enduring Israeli Occupation, voiced strong opposition to the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, and upheld the RABAT SUMMIT declaration of 1974, which designated the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) as "the sole and legitimate" representative of the Palestinian people.

Because the Iran-Israel relationship was founded, among other things, on the conviction that the PLO belonged to the radical Arab forces in the Middle East, the significance of the Shah's overtures to the Palestinians after 1973 cannot be overstated. From the Palestinian standpoint, however, these overtures were too little, too late. They still remembered that the Shah had joined forces with Israel in 1970 to help the Hashemite King Husayn of Jordan save his throne by crushing the BLACK SEPTEMBER Palestinian uprising. In other words, the Shah could no longer hide his alignment with Israel and the Arab "reactionary" states merely by issuing pro-Palestinian declarations. By 1973, too, Palestinian guerrilla groups in Lebanon were already providing valuable political and military training to various Iranian dissidents who would topple the "Peacock Throne" in the 1979 revolution.

1979 and After

The collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy produced an abrupt severing of Iran's ties with Israel, in part because of Israel's close identification with the Shah's regime and his repressive policies. Another reason was revolutionary Iran's Islamist commitment to worldwide anticolonial struggles, for which the Palestinian struggle soon emerged as a primary emblem. Quite intentionally, the decision to break relations with Israel was announced on the same day that YASIR ARAFAT arrived in Tehran as the first foreign leader to visit Iran after the revolution. Arafat was received like a head of state and was handed the keys to the building formerly belonging to the Israeli diplomatic delegation in Tehran. It was reported that his meeting with Khomeini was so emotional "that Arafat, to his eternal credit, managed to extract a public smile from the Ayatollah—a historic breakthrough that has not been repeated since." Yet, soon after the establishment of an Islamic Republic, PLO-Iranian relations cooled substantially owing to ideological differences between the *Islamist* Iranian revolutionaries and the *secularist* PLO, as well as Arafat's open embrace of Saddam Hussein during the IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

Officially the Islamic Republic of Iran does not recognize Israel as a legitimate state. Government declarations and publications often depict

Israel as imperialism's "illegitimate child," which was "implanted" in the Middle East to advance the foreign powers' "hegemonic designs." Occasionally Iranian political leaders also praised the goal of Palestinian radical groups to eradicate Israel and replace it with a "reconstructed" Arab and Islamic Palestine. However, behind the rhetoric is a different story. As details revealed by the Iran-Contra scandal in the mid-1980s illustrate, the Khomeini regime, which came to power in 1979, was willing to do business with Israel in ways reminiscent of the Shah's regime. At the outset of the Iran-Iraq War (1980) the Iranian military—already weakened and demoralized by successive revolutionary purges—suffered serious losses in combat with the well-equipped and well-organized Iraqi forces. Faced with a likelihood of military defeat, the Khomeini regime turned to Israel—its avowed enemy—to purchase arms and spare parts on a large scale. According to reliable estimates, Iranian arms deals with Israel after 1979 exceeded the US$3 billion mark, thus proving to be more lucrative for Israel than its pre-1979 sales to the Shah. This, however, did not prevent the Khomeini regime from parroting such slogans as "Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine."

Iranian views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not been devoid of nuances and contradictions as well. The first era of the Islamic Revolution (1979–1989) produced some intense anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian rhetoric, but it subsided considerably during the second term of Hashemi Rafsanjani's presidency in the 1990s and even more so during the era of reform spearheaded by President Muhammad Khatami (1997–2005). While not recognizing the legitimacy of Israel, Iranian officials stated that Iran was not opposed to Israel and the Palestinians working out a "mutually satisfactory" resolution to their conflict. Looking with trepidation at the US invasion of neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq and, hence, also at the likelihood of the "regime change" policy spilling over into Iran, in 2003 the Khatami government offered the GEORGE W. BUSH administration what was later described as a "grand bargain": in it, Iran offered to open its nuclear program to inspections, to halt its support for Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD in the Palestinian territories, to help disarm Hizbullah in Lebanon, and, last but not least, to move toward some sort of recognition of Israel. Significantly, the Bush government, which was at the time still deluded by the hubris caused by its initial military successes in Iraq, never bothered to reply.

Hard-line president Ahmadinejad, who was sworn into office in August 2005, reverted to the "principles" of the revolution's earlier years. His declarations that the Jewish state must "vanish from the page of history," or at least "be moved to Europe," and that the HOLOCAUST was a myth sparked a barrage of international criticism. Explanations of Ahmadinejad's anti-Israeli outlook varied from crude ANTI-SEMITISM, excessive zeal and political inexperience to a deliberate effort at self-aggrandizement. There is also speculation that the president's hate-filled speeches against Israel emanate from Shi'ite apocalyptic beliefs about the End of Time. It is difficult to say how much high-level support Ahmadinejad enjoys inside Iran for his outspoken views. Nevertheless, the controversy surrounding Ahmadinejad's alleged rigged victory at the 2009 presidential elections seems to suggest that his bases of support within the regime remain strong.

Whatever the case may be, Iranian reformists and conservatives seem to share many ideas about the nature and prospects of the OSLO and post-Oslo process. Indeed, Iranians of different political persuasions would agree that the peace process since the 1990s cannot produce a genuine peace, mainly because it fails to address the substantive issues of injustice—such as the rights of Palestinian REFUGEES from 1948, the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, and the continued presence and expansion of Israeli SETTLEMENTS on occupied Palestinian territories. These reservations were evidenced in the wake of the ARAB LEAGUE Peace Plan of 2002, which was endorsed by the Arab states *and* by Iran.

Although official statements may help in deciphering Iranian views on Israeli Jews and Palestinians, they leave unanswered the thorny question of the actual extent of Iranian involvement in this conflict. A major charge against Iran by Israel and the United States in recent years is that it has provided planning, training, arming, and funding for some of the Palestinian terrorist attacks inside Israel and the Occupied Territories as well as for Hizbullah. According to these charges, the "collusion" between Iran and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) was greatly enhanced through the mediation of Iran's Lebanese-Shi'a "proxy," the Hizbullah, in the wake of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. This thesis seemed to be credible when in January 2002 the Israeli navy intercepted the *Karine-A*, a freighter carrying fifty tons of Iranian

weapons to the PNA. The official Israeli version of the *Karine-A* affair was received with great skepticism by the Western and Arab MEDIA, but it was sufficient to convince the Bush administration to include Iran (together with Iraq and North Korea) in an "Axis of Evil."

There is little doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran has provided financial, military, and moral support to such Palestinian groups as Hamas and Islamic Jihad and that it has used Hizbullah to gain a strategic foothold along Israel's northern border. Surely, it would be terribly foolish to discount Hamas's prime minister ISMAIL HANIYEH's own account of Iran as the Palestinians' "strategic depth." The question of Iran's involvement in the conflict is thus one of proportion. Indeed, it is plausible to argue that Iran's actual involvement in the conflict has been more limited in size and scope than Israel (or the United States) would have us believe. This discursive amplification of the Iranian menace may be traced to the Israeli post-9/11 strategy of imagining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an integral part of the "War on TERRORISM." By casting an ominous Iranian shadow over Palestinian realities and placing them within the matrix of the global war on terror, Israel has hoped to gain international consent for—and divert attention away from—its continued Occupation of Palestinian territories.

Few Iranians would disagree with the pro-Palestinian policy of the Iranian government since 1979. In recent years, however, support for the Palestinians has been driven less by ideological fervor than by a discourse on social justice. Indeed, there is clearly a growing consensus among politically aware Iranians that their interests reside not in the annihilation of Israel but in a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Clearly, too, there has been a decreasing interest among other Iranians in issues of the conflict. Although Iran is unlikely to disengage from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict anytime soon, it is fairly plausible to argue that present-day Iran contains multiple perspectives on the conflict, some of which do not support the notion of replacing Israel with Palestine by force. It is also patently clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran has more important concerns than to invest all of its energies and resources in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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—Haggai Ram

Iran-Iraq War

Initiated by IRAQ in September 1980, the Iran-Iraq War lasted until August 1988. There were multiple sources of the conflict, including Shi'a IRAN's attempts to export radical Shi'ism to Iraqi Shi'ites, arming and training them to attempt an overthrow of the BA'ATHIST government. Other factors in the initiation of hostilities were Iraq's claim of sovereign rights in three islands in the Persian Gulf (Abu Musa, Greater Tumb, and Lesser Tumb) heretofore under Iranian sovereignty, a dispute over sovereign rights to the Shatt al-Arab waterway, both countries arming and encouraging Kurdish separatists in the other country, and Iraq's fomenting of separatism in Iran's provinces of Baluchistan and Khuzestan.

Iraqi president Saddam Husayn was secretly encouraged by US president JIMMY CARTER because Iran held fifty-two US embassy staff hostages and the UNITED STATES supplied weapons to Iraq throughout the war. However, during the RONALD REAGAN administration (1981–1989) the United States also sold weapons to Iran through Israel (with the profits used to fund the Nicaraguan Contras in their attempts to overthrow the leftist government). The war basically ended in a stalemate but with massive material and human losses on both sides; however, Iran is generally considered the loser.

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Iraq

In general, Jews in the Muslim world, including Iraq, had a more stable and less uncertain existence than their coreligionists in Europe. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Aleppo and Damascus (SYRIA), Muslim-Jewish partnerships and joint business ventures were ordinary, and interreligious membership in occupational guilds was commonplace. According to the late Hanna Batatu, a professor of history at Georgetown University, in 1877, Jews were 25.7 percent of the population in Baghdad; in 1908, they were 35 percent (53,000 persons); and in 1947, with 77,400 persons, Jews constituted 15 percent of Baghdad's total population. In 1936 thirty-five of the thirty-nine *sarrafs* (bankers or money-lenders) of Baghdad were Jews, and in 1938–1939, Jews comprised over 43 percent of the members of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce and seven of its twenty-five "first-class" members.

The Jews of Iraq (apart from those in Kurdistan) were profoundly Arabized; not only did they speak Arabic but they also partook of the cultural heritage shared by those around them. (Hebrew was only used in the liturgy.) Iraqi Jews belonged to all social classes, from the poor (the majority) to the very rich; from sophisticated professionals to illiterates and beggars; and, along another spectrum, from the deeply pious and learned to secular agnostics and leftists—indeed, Jews featured prominently in the ranks of the Iraqi Communist Party. Until the middle of the twentieth century, Iraqi Jews were profoundly integrated into Iraqi society at all levels, most prominently as pioneers in journalism and in Arabic fiction and especially as artists, musicians, and singers. In addition they were fairly homogeneous, apart from a few SEPHARDIC Jews who had settled in Iraq after the expulsions from Spain and a handful of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who had arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

When ZIONISM emerged in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, it had little appeal to most Middle East Jews. There were some exceptions, particularly in Morocco and Yemen, where some members of the Jewish communities had traditionally been attracted to a mystical form of Zionism, and among Jews who had emigrated more recently from Eastern Europe to various parts of the Arab world. Contributing to the lack of interest in Zionism among Middle Eastern Jews was the influence of the ALLIANCE ISRAÉLITE UNIVERSELLE, which was decidedly pro-assimilation. A philanthropic association founded in Paris in 1860, the alliance established a network of schools from Casablanca to Tehran (in Baghdad, its first school for boys was founded in 1865 and its first for girls in 1893). Although not explicitly anti-Zionist, the Alliance regarded Zionism as at best something of a distraction from its own mission, which was to educate Middle Eastern Jews in modern European, particularly French, culture.

Immediately after World War I both Iraqi Muslims and Iraqi Jews were almost equally indifferent toward Palestine.

In addition the notion of a common world view shared by most Middle Eastern townspeople, regardless of sectarian affiliation, generally held good until the ARAB REVOLT of 1936–1939 against the BRITISH MANDATE and Zionist settlement of Palestine. News of the political demonstration and British reprisals at the WESTERN WALL in JERUSALEM in 1928 and 1929 attracted the attention of political activists in Baghdad, but it was not until the 1936 Palestinian general strike against the British that the conflict in Palestine began to be noticed more generally by both Iraqis and the rest of the population in the region, and its broader implications for Middle Eastern Jewry began to be more widely perceived by both Jews and non-Jews.

In *The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq, 1928–1948*, Michael Eppel notes that the Palestinian conflict was a favorite means for arousing anti-British sentiment in Iraq by opposition politicians for much of the 1930s and 1940s. (Iraq, too, was under a British mandate.) Pan-Arab propaganda circulated widely in Iraq in those decades, and in 1935 a pan-Arab club, al-Muthanna,' was established in Baghdad, which acted as the headquarters for the Committee for the Defense of Palestine, founded after the outbreak of the general strike. The committee attempted to stir up anti-Jewish as well as anti-British feeling in newspapers and through mass meetings and demonstrations. Britain's staunchest political ally in Iraq, Nuri al Sa'id (1888–1958), who served fourteen terms as prime minister both during the Mandate and during the British-imposed monarchy, went to Palestine offering to mediate between the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE and the JEWISH AGENCY, arguing that Jewish IMMIGRATION would need to be halted or drastically reduced. These and other efforts failed and the strike ended in October, but over the next three years Iraq was probably the principal supplier of arms to the Palestinians, who also recruited volunteers from Iraq (in small numbers) willing to fight against the Zionists.

By this time their contacts in Arab nationalist circles made British diplomats in Baghdad increasingly aware of the damage that Britain's role in the Palestinian-Zionist conflict was causing to Anglo-Iraqi relations. How much sympathy the Iraqi public had for the Palestinian cause is a matter of much speculation, but influential members of the Baghdad embassy gradually came to believe the committee's statements that the question of Palestine was the major stumbling block preventing Arab-British cooperation in the Middle East. However, an October 1936 coup in Iraq brought to power a government that was much less concerned with Arab nationalism and far more inclined toward the notion of "Iraq for the Iraqis." The government even received a semi-official delegation from the Jewish Agency in February 1937, although nationalist pressure obliged it to reject the partition plan proposed by Lord Peel (of the PEEL COMMISSION) in July 1937, which would have divided Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.

For much of the period between 1937 and the events leading up to the creation of Israel in 1948, pan-Arab nationalism was a dominant ideology in Iraqi government circles, although, given that Shi'a and Kurds greatly outnumbered Sunnis, the extent of popular commitment to pan-Arabism or to the Palestine cause is very much open to question. In general, Iraqi governments between the late 1930s and the end of World War II employed much rhetoric about the Palestinian cause, but their support consisted mainly of small quantities of arms and calls for the cessation of Jewish immigration. After 1936 there were sporadic attacks on individual Jews and Jewish clubs in Baghdad, which were widely deplored. In October 1939, a few months after the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, the mufti of Jerusalem arrived in Iraq from his exile in LEBANON after being deported by the British.

Generally regarded as the beginning of the end of the Jewish presence in Iraq after some 3,000 years, the Farhud, a major outbreak of anti-Jewish violence, took place from 29 May to 1 June 1941 after British forces put down a serious revolt against Britain and its local Iraqi allies. The crisis started when the Iraqi government that came to power in April 1941 announced that without British concessions on Palestine it would reject Britain's demands that Iraq immediately sever its relations with Italy and that British troops would not be allowed to cross Iraqi territory in the fight for North Africa. In May 1941 the British army attacked Iraq and within some four weeks defeated its army and proceeded to march on Baghdad. In the meantime, order broke down in Baghdad and approximately 150 to 180 Jews were killed—an extraordinary and uncharacteristic outburst of violence that was as much anti-British as anti-Jewish.

In addition many Muslims were killed while attempting to protect their Jewish neighbors, a fact that speaks to the state of intercommunal relations at that time. After an inquiry in July there were numerous arrests, and three men were executed for their participation in the violence.

Jewish Exodus of the Early 1950s

The British occupation of Iraq allowed Zionist emissaries to work fairly freely in Iraq, although their first efforts were unsuccessful. Between 1939 and 1945, according to the Jewish Agency (which might have been inclined to inflate rather than reduce the figures), slightly over 1,500 Jews left Iraq for Palestine (a further 65 left between 1946 and 1948). The Farhud was seen by most Jews as well as non-Jews in Iraq as an aberration rather than as a symptom of some deeper malaise. Especially in the last year of World War II and in the years immediately after it, the nationalist movement became more inclusive and less pan-Arab. An Anti-Zionist League, which consisted mostly but not entirely of Jews, was established in 1946 by the Iraqi Communist Party and produced a newspaper, *al-'Usba*, which sold 6,000 copies a day. In the 1980s one prominent member of the Iraqi community commented, "If Israel had not been established nothing would have happened to the Iraqi Jews. They could have stayed as any other religious minority."

In 1948 the events in Palestine changed everything in Iraq. Tensions gradually rose after 1945 as a result of high levels of inflation, poor harvests, and unemployment, creating an opposition that was increasingly restive, organized, and more hostile toward the local status quo. Two events then acted as catalysts to an already unstable situation. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 181, which called for a partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, greatly inflamed public opinion throughout the Arab world. At a meeting of the ARAB LEAGUE in December the Iraqi prime minister called for military intervention in Palestine, although this was widely understood as promising Iraqi assistance to Jordanian king Abdullah's plan to annex the parts of Palestine assigned to the Palestinian Arabs. Also in 1948 the government of Iraq attempted to conclude a revision of Iraq's treaty with Britain, which led to extensive rioting and considerable loss of life, and ultimately to the nonratification of the new treaty. Rumors were spread that the disturbances were the work of "Communists and Zionists."

In response to these and other pressures the government formally joined the Arab-Israeli 1948 WAR, dispatching 3,000 troops that entered Transjordan on 15 May 1948 and came under the command of King Abdullah. The Iraqi forces played a purely defensive role and kept well away from the areas of Palestine assigned to the Jewish state. In fact the Iraqi performance in the Palestinian theater, like that of other Arab states, was utterly dismal, and as time went on (especially after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958), the failure of Iraq in 1948 became part of the litany of complaints of the "revolutionary" nationalist officers.

As a result of the Arab defeat and Palestinian dispossession, the situation of Iraqi Jews became increasingly precarious. They became targets of suspicion as a potential fifth column, a situation that served to distract attention from the government's own inadequacies. This degenerated to discriminatory legislation that barred Jews from public service, and life was made increasingly difficult for them. In September 1948 the prominent Jewish businessman Shafiq Adas was tried on trumped-up charges and subsequently executed. Although there were widespread protests from non-Jewish Iraqis, the Iraqi Jewish community could not overlook the event and consequently became increasingly fearful and more susceptible to the arguments of Zionist emissaries. At the same time, Jewish newspapers in Britain and the UNITED STATES circulated inaccurate reports that atrocities were routinely being committed against Iraqi Jews.

Over the next few years a combination of Iraqi government measures and Zionist agitation made the position of Iraqi Jews untenable. First, various denaturalization laws were passed. (These may be related to the British government's consideration of a number of impractical TRANSFER schemes, in which Palestinian REFUGEES would move to Iraq in exchange for equal numbers of Iraqi Jews emigrating to Israel.) In 1951 another law froze the assets of Iraqi Jews who wished to leave, although substantial amounts of capital were still being transferred out of the country to Israel. It is worth mentioning that Israel was desperate to find new immigrants, since the supply of potential settlers from Europe, the United States, and the British Commonwealth seemed to be drying up. However, the majority of Jews leaving other Arab countries in the late 1940s and early 1950s preferred to emigrate to FRANCE (99 percent of Algerian Jews, 60 percent of Tunisian Jews) or to the Americas rather than to Israel.

In late 1950 and early 1951 a number of bombs exploded in cafés, synagogues, businesses, and other venues owned or frequented by Jews in Baghdad, and the incidents were accompanied by leaflets urging the Jews to return to their "natural homeland." Some speculated that the incidents were the work of Zionist agents provocateurs, as Wilbur Eveland, a CIA official in Baghdad at the time, concluded. Nevertheless, these incidents profoundly shook the confidence of the community, and by the middle of 1951 some 105,000 Iraqi Jews had left Iraq for Israel. Six years later (in 1957) the Iraqi census recorded a Jewish population of only 4,906.

Internal Crises and Black September 1970

After the departure of the Jews, Israel and the Palestine question tended to receive considerably less attention in Iraq until the fall of the unpopular and repressive monarchy in July 1958. Led by 'Abd al-Karim Qasim (president 1958–1963), the coup was heralded as the beginning of a new era, marked the definite overthrow of British tutelage, and enabled the revolutionary government to strike out in several new directions. Qasim's rule also coincided with the beginnings of a major increase in Iraqi oil revenues, which continued with the price explosion of the early 1970s. Qasim himself was more of an "Iraqist" than an Arab nationalist, and although the achievements of his contemporary, JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, were undoubtedly admired in Iraq, there was no organized Nasirite movement there. Under Qasim and his nationalist and (from 1968) BA'ATHIST successors, Iraq tilted toward the SOVIET UNION, which remained its principal ally and arms supplier until it drew closer to the United States in the 1980s.

Iraq was too preoccupied by its own internal crises to engage with revolutionary Palestinian groups, such as the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) (which originally derived most of its material support from Algeria and Syria). Iraq did not even take part in the 1967 WAR, although some 17,000 Iraqi troops arrived in JORDAN after the fighting had ceased. But after the Ba'athist party seizure of power in 1968, the Iraqi government quickly aligned itself with those Arab states and factions of the PLO that rejected attempts to find a peaceful solution and in particular UN RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the course of 1969, several show trials were held in Baghdad, in the first of which fourteen people, including nine Jews, were hanged in public for allegedly spying for Israel. In 1969 the Ba'ath also founded its own small Palestinian faction, the ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF), and began to fund GEORGE HABASH and the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) until 1990. On the other hand, Iraq's relations with FATAH, the mainstream Palestinian organization headed by YASIR ARAFAT, were often strained.

In the late summer of 1970, there was a heated exchange between EGYPT and Iraq, during which Iraq committed itself to "the goal of liberating the whole of Palestine [by means of] ARMED STRUGGLE," while after 1971, Egypt was looking for a negotiated settlement. In August 1970, Iraqi-Syrian animosity led to the dissolution of the "Eastern Command," the two-year-old alliance among Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, which left the Salah al-Din forces (the Iraqi contingent) as the only sizable unit of regular troops in the region. Earlier in 1970 various Palestinian guerrilla organizations had clashed more or less seriously with the Jordanian army, largely because Jordan's King Husayn was unwilling to allow the guerrillas to operate freely in and from Jordan and was increasingly concerned about the challenge they posed to his authority. When the Jordanian army began an all-out attack on the Palestinian guerrillas early in September, Iraq took the side of the Palestinians and pledged its support. However, not only did Iraqi troops play no part in the fighting, but their inaction substantially facilitated the victory of the Jordanian army over the Palestinians in the 1970 BLACK SEPTEMBER conflict.

Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

During the early 1970s the Iraqi Ba'ath came to acquire a reputation as a maverick in Middle Eastern politics, based partly on its adoption of a consistently hard-line rhetoric against Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, its close relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries between 1969 and 1973, and its militant declarations on Arab socialism and unity. Although there was a wide gulf between rhetoric and reality, the regime's more extreme declarations convinced both its more moderate neighbors and much of the rest of the world that Iraq intended to pursue genuinely revolutionary policies. As a result Iraq found itself either feared or loathed by most states

in the region. In October 1974, for example, Iraq and Libya supported the formation of a PALESTINE REJECTION FRONT, consisting of the PFLP, the PFLP–GENERAL COMMAND, the ALF, and the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT, all of which supported the liberation of all of Palestine, opposed a two-state solution, and had thus broken with the mainstream PLO and in particular Fatah, which was willing to engage in negotiations with Israel.

In some ways the Ba'athist adoption of the extremist Palestinian line was both necessary and inevitable. It had inherited a degree of militancy from its predecessors and it also had to differentiate itself from another Ba'athist regime in Syria with which, apart from a brief reconciliation in 1979, it was in almost continuous conflict. In this situation the Iraqi Ba'athists were more or less forced to try to outdo the Syrians in appearing more truly Arab and more truly nationalist—or perhaps more truly Ba'athist. In fact, Iraq was isolated in the Arab world, as shown by its refusal to participate in the post–1973 War oil embargo and its failure to send representatives to the Arab summit in Algiers in November 1973. Championing the most extremist Palestinian groups was then part of the larger canvas.

After Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 and the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS a year later, Iraq became a leading member of the anti-Egypt coalition. Early in 1978 the Iraq-backed ALF assassinated SA'ID HAMAMI, the PLO representative in London, and Iraq broke off relations with Fatah and declared that the PLO should only receive funds from a source that had been approved by the anti-Egypt coalition. Iraq also backed the extreme anti-PLO Palestinian faction led by ABU NIDAL, whose men assassinated Israeli diplomats and moderate Palestinians in foreign capitals. In March 1979 the much-heralded rift between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world (which Iraq saw itself as leading) was formalized at a conference in Baghdad. Behind the extravagant verbiage, however, the sanctions were modest and mainly symbolic, amounting largely to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and the transfer of the League's headquarters from Cairo to TUNIS.

During the 1980s, Iraq was largely preoccupied with its war against IRAN, which increased its dependence on the West and the West's conservative Arab allies, including Jordan and Egypt. Meanwhile, in order to prevent Iraq from developing nuclear weapons, the Israeli air force destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor in June 1981; although there was widespread international condemnation, much of the world was happy to see an end to Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The exigencies of the war with Iran prevented Iraq from taking any hostile action against Israel. For the benefit of his Arab audiences, Iraqi president Saddam Husayn attempted to link Iran and Zionism against the forces of the "noble Iraqi army" and to portray the war with Iran as "an international Zionist conspiracy aimed not only at Iraq but at the entire region."

In the end Iraq's need for weapons and the US desire to ensure Iran's defeat led to increasingly warm US-Iraqi relations, which led to, at Washington's insistence, a considerable reduction of Iraq's belligerent rhetoric on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On 27 October 1984, Iraq resumed full diplomatic relations with the United States (which had been broken off in October 1967), although this was largely a formality because links between the two countries had been close for a number of years. A few days later, in an interview with the Lebanese daily *al-Nahar*, Iraq foreign minister Tariq 'Aziz declared that his country would support "any just, honorable and lasting settlement between the Arab states and Israel," and went on to say that "Iraq does not consider itself to be a direct party to the conflict because Israel is not occupying any part of Iraqi soil." Given Iraq's previous record of failing to match its actions to its vigorous denunciations, such pronouncements were perhaps less remarkable than they may have seemed.

After the end of the war with Iran the political geography of the Middle East continued to change dramatically. In November 1988, a year after the outbreak of the INTIFADA in the Occupied Territories, the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (the PLO parliament) declared its willingness to negotiate with Israel on the basis of UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. The Israeli government under YITZHAK SHAMIR showed no interest, however, and there was no real support in Washington either, despite some encouragement from JAMES BAKER, the US secretary of state. Because the PLO received no immediate benefits from its various concessions, there was widespread resentment at its evident inability to deliver.

Increasingly, following the precipitous decline in oil prices beginning in 1985, the PLO could no longer rely on its traditional financiers—

the Gulf States (and their Palestinian populations). Imprudently, as events were to prove, Arafat turned to Baghdad for financing, where Husayn was making increasingly strident verbal attacks on Israel. Several of Arafat's colleagues, especially SALAH KHALAF, were intensely suspicious of the Iraqi regime, which had since the 1970s sheltered Abu Nidal. In addition they feared the opprobrium of being associated with Husayn, whose viciousness and brutality were well-known. At the end of June 1990, two incidents perpetrated by the Palestine Liberation Front (one of which was the *ACHILLE LAURO* hijacking) led President GEORGE H. W. BUSH to suspend what had been a rather halfhearted UNITED STATES–PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DIALOGUE. Some six weeks later the forces of Saddam Husayn, by now the principal financier of the PLO, invaded KUWAIT.

The PLO now faced a dilemma, because condemning the invasion could mean the loss of Iraqi financial and political support and could hurt the 300,000 Palestinians living in Iraq. Furthermore, its efforts to improve relations with the United States (and thus eventually with Israel) had come to nothing, and its rival party, HAMAS, was gaining support daily in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Arafat put himself forward as a mediator between Iraq and Kuwait, but he was brushed aside by the Saudis. His support for Saddam Husayn and Iraq in the GULF WAR won him tremendous support among Palestinians but made the PLO a pariah in much of the Arab world. Kuwait, after all, had supported the Palestinians more or less consistently since the 1950s, and its prosperous Palestinian community had also been a major source of PLO support. Given the PLO's traditional policy of nonalignment, it seems that Arafat could have avoided supporting Iraq. Furthermore, given the possibility that Husayn would threaten SAUDI ARABIA as well as occupy Kuwait, it was inconceivable that the United States would stand idly by.

In many ways it is surprising that the Palestinian leadership survived the Gulf War crisis virtually intact, and, in an important sense, the 1991 peace talks at the MADRID CONFERENCE meant that the dialogue with Washington was resumed, although officially without the PLO. Almost equally incredibly, and in spite of his launching Scud missiles against Israel, Saddam Husayn also survived. For the time being, however, the straitened circumstances within which the Iraqi regime was obliged to operate meant that it could no longer make any impact on Israeli or Palestinian affairs between its defeat in 1991 and its overthrow in 2003.

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—Peter Sluglett

Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi

The Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi (National Military Organization, or Etzel, or Irgun) was a militant Zionist group that operated from 1931 to 1948 in BRITISH MANDATE Palestine. The British authori-

ties classified Etzel as a TERRORIST organization, although others considered it a liberation movement. Its political association with Revisionist ZIONISM, its leadership by MENAHEM BEGIN, and Begin's transformation of the Irgun into the HERUT PARTY make it a predecessor to modern Israel's right-wing LIKUD PARTY coalition.

Etzel was founded in 1931 by Avraham Tehomi after he had assumed leadership over the district of JERUSALEM and after a political/ideological split within the HAGANA, the Jewish underground military organization, which Tehomi and his associates considered too restrained in its relations with the Arabs and the British. Throughout its history Etzel advocated a more aggressive and offensive use of force than did the Hagana against both the Palestinians and the British. In 1936 Tehomi and VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY, the founder of Revisionist Zionism, signed an agreement in Paris under which Tehomi was officially commander of the Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi and president of the NEW ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (Jabotinsky's political movement). Etzel's ideology was based on Jabotinsky's premises that every Jew had the right to enter Palestine, that only force would deter the Arabs, and that only Jewish arms would ensure the Jewish state.

From 1931 to 1937, Etzel was a small, renegade group that undertook random attacks against Palestinian targets. However, during the years of the ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939) against the British Occupation and Zionist SETTLEMENTS, Etzel became more organized and better armed and intensified its assaults, especially against the Palestinians. Following the killing of five Jews at kibbutz Kiryat Anavim on 9 November 1937, Etzel launched a series of attacks that lasted until the beginning of World War II, in which more than 250 Palestinian civilians were killed—a ratio of 50 Arabs killed for each Jew.

The first phase ended when the original group broke up in April 1937. About half the members, including Tehomi, returned to the Hagana, while the rest reasserted the independent existence of Etzel. In the following period the most serious attacks against Palestinians coincided roughly with Etzel's campaign to facilitate illegal IMMIGRATION of European Jews in defiance of British limitations on immigration. After the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER declared Britain's opposition to Palestine becoming a Jewish state, Etzel concentrated its attacks on the British, whose restrictions on immigration it vehemently opposed and vowed to ignore.

Etzel declared a truce, from 1940 to 1943, suspended operations against the British, and supported Allied efforts against the Nazis by enlisting its members in British forces, including the Jewish Brigade. However, a small group within Etzel, led by AVRAHAM STERN, continued to fight the British and formed an independent group, the LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL (Stern Group or LEHI). In 1941, Etzel leader David Raziel volunteered for a dangerous mission in IRAQ to assassinate AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, but was killed by a German bomber before the operation could be finished.

In February 1944, under the new leadership of Menahem Begin, Etzel resumed hostilities against the British by attacks against prominent symbols of the British administration, including blowing up the British military, police, and civil headquarters in the KING DAVID HOTEL in Jerusalem and attacking the British prison in ACRE. Although these operations were largely successful, several Etzel operatives were captured, convicted, and hanged, but they refused to accept the jurisdiction of the British courts and consequently refused to defend themselves. Eventually British authorities arrested many of its members, including Shlomo Ben Yosef, who was hanged for shooting at an Arab bus. The Etzel leadership responded to the executions by hanging two British sergeants, which effectively brought the executions by the British to an end.

Following the assassination of British diplomat LORD MOYNE on 6 November 1944 by Stern Group members Eliyahu Bet-Zuri and Eliyahu Hakim under the leadership of YITZHAK SHAMIR, the Yishuv and the JEWISH AGENCY initiated a "hunting season" on both Etzel and LEHI, resulting in the arrest of some 1,000 members of both organizations. The British deported 251 to camps in Africa, although many others were released and continued their activities against the British and the Palestinians.

From about October 1945 until July 1946, Etzel was part of an alliance with the Hagana and the LEHI called the JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, which was organized to fight British restrictions on Jewish immigration. This alliance ended after the bombing of the King David Hotel. From July 1946 until June 1948, Etzel fought informally with Hagana forces against the British and the Palestinians, in particular engaging in campaigns to drive Palestinians from the country. Etzel's participation in alleged war crimes at DEIR YASIN on 9 April

1948, where some 100 unarmed Palestinian men, women, and children were killed, has been widely discussed and documented. However, their largest single operation was a successful assault on JAFFA (an Arab city in northern Palestine) during April and May 1948, in which Etzel forced some 70,000 Palestinian residents to flee. In 1948, Etzel was formally dissolved and its members integrated into the newly formed Israel Defense Forces. This integration coincided with Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION's sinking of the *Altalena*, a ship full of fighters that Etzel had recruited and arms it had acquired in Europe. After its dissolution as a commando group Etzel became a political party, the Herut, led by Begin.

See also WAR, 1948

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"Iron Fist" Policy

The First INTIFADA was grounded in civil disobedience and resistance, including mass demonstrations, tax revolts, boycotts of Israeli goods, planting "victory gardens" to become self-sufficient in food production, throwing stones, commercial strikes, burning tires, and setting petrol bombs. The Israeli government, however, chose to meet the uprising with brutal force.

Shortly after the eruption of the Intifada in December 1987, the *New York Times* reported on Israeli defense minister YITZHAK RABIN's announcement of new aspects to his "iron fist" policy (first articulated in August 1985, signaling the Israeli government's intention to increase repressive policies in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES), including a policy of "broken bones" that involved "troops [being] sent into homes to break the hands of Arab youth so they could not throw stones" and "might, power and beatings" to suppress the Palestinian uprising.

The *New York Times* printed a letter from several prominent American Jewish leaders, including Irving Howe, Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, Henry Rosovsky, and Michael Walzer condemning Rabin's policy. It read in part: "We read with shame reports of house-to-house beatings of hundreds of people, leading to broken bones and hospitalization of the aged and children. . . . Let our fellow American Jews speak up in friendly but firm voices, and tell Israeli leaders that we disagree profoundly with the 'iron fist' policy."

Rabin defended Israel's use of force, saying, "We will fight with all our power against any element that tries by violence to upset our full control over Judea, Samaria [WEST BANK] and the GAZA STRIP. . . . The supreme responsibility of our government is to fight the violence in the territories and to use all the means at our disposal to do that. We will do that, and we will succeed." Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR later said, "our task now is to re-create the barrier of fear between Palestinians and the Israeli military and once again put the fear of death into the Arabs of the areas so as to deter them from attacking us anymore."

The iron fist policy in the First Intifada included a shoot-to-kill order against unarmed Palestinian demonstrators (including children), mass detentions without trial, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, DEPORTATIONS, beatings, as well as the systematic policy of crushing the hand and arm bones of young Palestinian men and boys who threw stones at Israeli soldiers and tanks. Amnesty International's annual report for 1987, published one month after the uprising began, criticized Israel's methods: "In December at least twenty-three Palestinian demonstrators in the West Bank and Gaza were shot and killed by soldiers. . . . There were also severe and indiscriminate beatings of demonstrators and hundreds were summarily tried and imprisoned. There was an increase in reports of ill-treatment and torture of detainees by members of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCE and the General Security Service [SHIN BET]. Political activists, including prisoners of conscience, continued to be administratively detained or restricted to towns or villages or imprisoned in violation of their right to freedom of expression."

See also INTIFADAS

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Iron Wall

See Arab State Peace Overtures, 1949–Present

Islamic Conference, 1931

On 7 December 1931 the Pan-Islamic Congress met in Jerusalem, attended by representatives from twenty-two Islamic countries and prominent personalities from throughout the Arab world. The conference was hosted by the Jerusalem mufti al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who opened it with a passionate speech on the importance of Palestine, the al-Haram ash-Sharif, and the al-Aqsa Mosque to the Islamic world. The conference condemned Zionism, British policy in Palestine, and Jewish immigration and land purchases at the expense of the Palestinians. Additionally, it started an Islamic league in Jerusalem, agreed to boycott all Jewish products, established an agricultural company in Palestine to save Muslim lands, and promoted the idea of reviving Jerusalem's role as an educational center, issuing a call to establish a university carrying the name of "al-Aqsa." The British saw to it that none of these objectives were realized.

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Islamic Fundamentalism

See Hamas; Islamic Jihad Movement

Islamic Jihad Movement

The Islamic Jihad Movement (*harakat al-jihad al-islami*) was established in 1980 in Gaza as a splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood society. Islamic Jihad encourages the forceful seizure of government power as the main instrument in the "re-Islamization"—increase in Islamic consciousness and practice—of state and society. The movement shares this perspective with another Palestinian Islamist group, the Islamic Liberation Party, *hisbul-tahrir al-islami*, founded in 1952 by the Palestinian teacher and judge Sheikh Taqiuddeen al-Nabhani. (Nabhani died in 1979, leaving behind branches of his party throughout the Middle East and elsewhere.)

Along with both the Islamic Liberation Party and the better-known Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), founded in Gaza in 1987 by the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad has as its ultimate goal an Islamic state based on two pillars. The first pillar is *shari'a* (Islamic law), and the second is the Islamization of the people through a variety of means, from giving classes in mosques, universities, and homes to demanding the application of *shari'a* through various institutions. The first leader of Islamic Jihad, Dr. Fathi al-Sheqaqi, was assassinated (allegedly by Israel) in Malta on 26 October 1995. His successor is Abdallah Shalah, who resides in Damascus, Syria.

Islamic Jihad developed in response to both the secular nationalism represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the particular Islamic trend represented by the Muslim Brothers, which Jihad saw as passive and

ineffective, especially in the struggle against Israel. Islamic Jihad's vigorous challenge against the Brothers' inaction arose from within the ranks of the Brotherhood itself. The radicalization that led to the birth of Islamic Jihad was made possible in part by the revolution in electronic MEDIA, by means of which a younger generation throughout the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES gained access to the worldwide Islamic revival. Palestinians were fully aware of the militancy of the various Islamic groups that confronted the Sadat regime in EGYPT in the 1970s and eventually assassinated him in 1981. They were aware of the brutal suppression of the Islamic movement in Syria, culminating in the destruction of the city of Hama in 1982. They followed with keen interest the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in IRAN in 1979, the dramatic activities of HIZBULLAH (from the early 1980s to the present) in southern LEBANON, and the victory of the *mujahedeen* in Afghanistan in 1992.

The Islamic Jihad Movement believes that an understanding of Arab history is important to guide its vision. In the eyes of Islamic Jihad, Palestine has come to its present condition because of the role of non-Islamic Arab leaders. Members of Islamic Jihad believe that the Arab nationalist movement was "a[n] illegitimate son of the Western assault [imperialism, colonialism] against the Islamic nation" and that the Zionist movement began "as an authentic part of the attack." They believe that the Arab defeats were the result of a catastrophe in modern Arab thought: "The disaster in our ideas came before the disaster in our land . . . and was the prelude, and the long term cause for the disaster in the land." The Zionist presence in Palestine is seen as an "embodiment of the modern Western challenge and evidence that this challenge still exists." For Islamic Jihad, the natural reaction to the challenge lies in the trend toward Islamization, which it sees as playing a vital role in restoring the psychological balance of both the Islamic community and the educated individual Muslim. In this view, the Islamic solution—an Islamic state led by a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad—will be the ultimate, divinely guided solution to the ongoing ideological and political struggle. ARMED STRUGGLE, or *jihad*, is the means to achieve the liberation of Palestine, a necessary step if the Islamic nation is to rise and regain its place in history.

This perspective appeared in sharp contrast to the quietism and inner piety preached by the traditional leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood. As one young leader of Islamic Jihad put it, "Contrary to the Brothers, our priority is not indoctrinating the masses, but direct action"—by which he meant resisting the Israeli OCCUPATION in Palestine. The difference in outlook resulted in the split in the Brotherhood and the birth of Islamic Jihad. The movement believes that its role is to fill the vacuum left by both the Palestinian nationalists who have abandoned Islam and the Muslim Brothers, who have failed to take the lead in the struggle against Israel.

Islamic Jihad thus differs from Hamas in significant ways. Rather than calling for overthrow of the government by force, Hamas advocates the gradual Islamization of the masses through *da'wa* (proselytizing), until the people themselves call for an Islamic government. Hamas, then, is more a mass-based, grassroots movement that works from the bottom up. In contrast, Islamic Jihad can be understood as an "elitist" top-down group. It targets the elites, the most educated sectors of society; thus Islamic Jihad is also far smaller and has far fewer supporters or activists than Hamas and lacks Hamas's wide social network and mass appeal, which makes sense, since Islamic Jihad's strategy is not one of proselytization but of "direct action" (described below). Finally, the Islamic Jihad Movement differs from Hamas and other Islamic organizations in its internal organization. Inspired by the guerrilla warfare groups of Latin America, the movement avoids the hierarchical structure of the Muslim Brothers, instead building a network of small separate cells of five or six members that work independent of a central command. Islamic Jihad members are known for their organization, strict discipline, and absolute secrecy, especially with regard to armed activities. The majority of Jihad followers, who are recruited in mosques and university campuses and through social activities, come from modest social origins and live in poor neighborhoods and refugee camps, mainly in the Gaza Strip. There are, however, active branches in East JERUSALEM and in other cities and towns throughout the WEST BANK.

Like most other Islamic movements, Islamic Jihad takes its principles from Islamic *shari'a* and considers the liberation of Palestine its central task. However, in the case of Islamic Jihad, this orientation took the form of a campaign of violent attacks on Israeli settlers and army personnel in the mid-1980s. Its members eschewed attacks on Israeli

civilians until an Israeli Jewish settler massacred twenty-nine Palestinians at the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON in 1994. Thereafter Islamic Jihad created the Jerusalem Brigades, which first undertook SUICIDE BOMBINGS and other militant operations against Israeli civilians. Ironically, just as the PLO abandoned armed struggle, it was taken up by the Islamic forces. Islamic Jihad conducted a series of dramatic suicide bombings against the Israeli Occupation, which undoubtedly gave the Islamic movement as a whole a credibility it had hitherto lacked. With these actions, a framework was created for those who wanted violent confrontation with the enemy. Significantly, although the stated motivation for these actions was Islamic, the nature of the operations was the same as those that had been carried out by nationalist groups in the not-so-distant past. Islamist thinkers close to Hamas carried this observation further and asserted the existence of intimate ties between FATAH and Islamic Jihad—a relationship that is seen as a combination of radical nationalism (Fatah) and religious radicalism. Accordingly, Islamic Jihad resurrected the historical figure of SHAYKH 'IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSAM, a religious guerrilla assassinated by the British in 1935, to symbolize the integration of Islam and nationalism, giving his name to the local mosque in Gaza over which the Islamic Jihad had earlier clashed with the Brothers. (Of note, when Hamas established its own military wing in 1992, it named its military organization the IZZ-AL-DIN AL-QASSAM BRIGADES.)

The Muslim Brotherhood originally reacted to Islamic Jihad as an alien organization, accusing it of obstructing the Islamic movement and of aligning with the secularists against the Brothers. Later, however, many sources, including some now inside Hamas itself, agreed that Islamic Jihad's daring military operations, in particular those of 1986 and 1987, pulled the rug out from under the relatively inactive Brothers. For example, on 15 October 1986, a cell of Islamic Jihad attacked a crowd of Israeli soldiers celebrating their graduation in front of the WESTERN WALL in Jerusalem, with the result that a tenth of the soldiers were injured or killed. In May 1987, in another daring act, a group of six Jihad prisoners managed to free themselves from the most heavily guarded Israeli prison in Gaza. The PRISONERS opened fire on the Israeli soldiers, killing four of them. Some attribute the beginning of the 1987 INTIFADA to this incident.

Although Islamic Jihad rejects any form of recognition of Israel and opposes all proposed political settlements, it does not consider itself an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Nor does it oppose the PLO's role in bringing all Palestinian factions under its umbrella. However, it does object to what it calls the "ideological confusion" of the PLO and its factions, which it blames for "abandoning Islam as the nation's belief." It regards the PLO's goal of establishing a secular democratic state in Palestine (later changed to the TWO-STATE SOLUTION) as incompatible with the historical Islamic view of a state ruled according to Islamic law. Accordingly, Islamic Jihad refused to join any Palestinian ELECTION organized under the banner of the OSLO ACCORDS of 1993 and declined to participate in the first PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL election of 1996, the presidential election of 2005, or the legislative election of 2006. The movement also refused to participate in a government led by Hamas, which won the 2006 legislative elections. Since it did not recognize the elections as legitimate, Jihad also does not recognize the Hamas government in Gaza as legitimate, but unlike Fatah, Jihad does not fight against it.

On the other hand, Islamic Jihad has avoided clashes with other Palestinian organizations, whether Islamic or secular, believing that Palestine—all of Palestine—is and should be the common element unifying all political forces working for its liberation. It believes that any ideological or political disagreement with another political group should be solved solely through dialogue and that violence should be directed only against the enemies of the nation. In spite of this principled stand, when Fatah undertook a witch hunt against Hamas members and supporters in the West Bank after the takeover of power in Gaza by the Hamas-led government, among the Islamist militants arrested were many members of Islamic Jihad.

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—Islah Jad

Islamic Resistance Movement

See HAMAS

Israel Defense Forces

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) (Tsva HaHagana LeYisrael) are Israel's military forces, comprising the Israeli army, air force, and sea corps.

The IDF was founded on 26 May 1948 after the establishment of the state of Israel "to protect the inhabitants of Israel and to combat all forms of TERRORISM which threaten the daily life." The IDF succeeded the HAGANA (in particular, its operational branch, the PALMAH) as the permanent army of the Jewish state. It was also joined by former elements of the Jewish Brigade that had fought under the British flag during World War II.

After the establishment of the IDF the two Jewish underground organizations, the ETZEL and LEHI, joined with the IDF in a loose confederation, but were allowed to operate independently of the IDF in some sectors until the end of the 1948 WAR. After the war these two organizations were disbanded and their members integrated into the IDF. The modern IDF came into existence during the period from 1949 to 1956 by experience gained through border conflicts involving Palestinian INFILTRATION and massive Israeli reprisal raids on neighboring Arab states from where the infiltrators presumably had come. The 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR was its first state-to-state war since 1948. From 1956 to 1966 the IDF engaged in numerous massive retaliations in response to organized Palestinian guerrilla raids. It used this time to purchase new equipment and to become a formidable professional fighting force. Also during this period Israel developed its nuclear capability with the assistance of FRANCE. By 1967, after these developments the IDF increasingly emerged as one of the most powerful and modern military forces in the world, recognized by many as "the Modern Sparta."

Regular Service

National military service is mandated by law for Jewish and Druze men and Jewish women over the age of eighteen, although exceptions can be made on religious, physical, or psychological grounds. Men serve three years, and women serve two. Women may volunteer for combat duty, in which case they also serve three years. However, in 2007 the IDF produced statistics showing that nearly 28 percent of Jewish males avoided conscription.

Druze and Circassians as well as Jews are subject to mandatory conscription. In proportion to their numbers the Druze achieve much higher levels in the Israeli army than other groups of soldiers. Nevertheless, some Druze still charge that discrimination continues, such as exclusion from the air force. Israel maintains that the official low security classification for all Druze, formerly an

obstacle to advancement in the military, has been abolished for some time.

There is a long-standing government policy of encouraging BEDOUIN to volunteer and offering them various inducements. Given the extreme poverty among the Bedouin, a military career offers one of the few means of social advancement available. But Bedouin complain that they do not receive the package of benefits that other conscripts do, and as a result few volunteer.

PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL are prohibited from serving in the IDF. This can be seen as a form of institutionalized discrimination, because Palestinian citizens are thus denied the plethora of advantages that accrue from military service, including housing subsidies and tuition assistance, among many others. Reservists (all men are required to serve one month each year in the IDF until they are forty-three or forty-five) receive special grants amounting to NIS (new Israeli shekels) 4,000 per year, reductions in Transportation Ministry licenses, scholarships and tuition assistance, housing loans on preferential terms, and priority in civil service appointments.

Border Guard Service

Some IDF soldiers serve their mandatory military service in the Mishmar HaGvul (Magav), the Israel Border Police—a section of the Israel Police. Once these soldiers complete their IDF combat training, they undergo additional counterterrorism and border guard training. They are then assigned to any one of the Israeli Border Police units around the country and in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, where they are often more feared than regular IDF soldiers.

General Staff

All branches of the IDF are subordinate to a single General Staff. The chief of the General Staff (Ramailcal) is the only serving officer with the rank of lieutenant general (Ray Aluf'). The chief of the General Staff reports directly to the defense minister and indirectly to the prime minister of Israel and the cabinet. Chiefs of staff are formally appointed by the cabinet, based on the defense minister's recommendation, for three years, but the government can vote to extend their service to four or even five years.

IDF Weapons

The IDF possesses state-of-the-art weapons and computer systems. Some are US-made (with some equipment being modified for IDF use), such as the M4A1 assault rifle, the F-15 Eagle, the F-16 Fighting Falcon jet fighters, and the AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters. Israel also has developed its own independent armaments industry, which has developed weapons and vehicles such as the Merkava battle tank series, the Kfir fighter aircraft, and various small arms such as the Galil and Tavor assault rifles and the Uzi submachine gun.

The IDF also has several large internal research and development departments, and it purchases many technologies produced by companies in the Israeli security industry, such as IAI, IMI, Elbit, El-Op. Rafael, Soltam, and dozens of smaller firms. Many of these weapons and command-and-control systems have been battle tested in Israel's numerous military engagements, resulting in mutually beneficial relationships, with the IDF getting tailor-made solutions and the industry gaining experience and reputation. Israel also exports weapons to a variety of countries.

Wars

The IDF has fought numerous wars—conventional, guerrilla, and the war of OCCUPATION, since its inception, losing none: (1) 1948 War; (2) 1948–1967 infiltration and massive retaliation; (3) 1956 invasion of EGYPT—SINAI/SUEZ WAR; (4) 1967 WAR against Egypt, JORDAN, and SYRIA; (5) 1967–1970 WAR OF ATTRITION with Egypt; (6) post-1967 Occupation; (7) 1967–1982 raids and massive retaliation in LEBANON; (8) 1971–1973 Palestinian-Israeli "Shadow War"; (9) 1973 War between Israel and Egypt and Syria; (10) 1978 Israel's first invasion of Lebanon; (11) 1982 Israel's war in Lebanon (LEBANON WAR); (12) 1983–2000 Israeli and HIZBULLAH conflict in Lebanon (indirectly against Syria); (13) 1987–1993 INTIFADA; (14) 2000–2009 AL-AQSA INTIFADA; (15) 2006 invasion of GAZA (OPERATION RAINBOW); (16) 2006 war against Hizbullah in Lebanon; (17) 2008–2009 war in Gaza (OPERATION CAST LEAD).

The Occupied Territories

The IDF alone controls the Occupied Territories. As a result it has numerous permanent military bases in the WEST BANK (and did in Gaza until ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT of 2005). Legal proceedings in the territories take place entirely in the ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM, and Military Orders (MOs) constitute the laws of the land.

The IDF has become embroiled in a number of controversies over its human rights record and has been increasingly accused by such organizations as B'TSELEM, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch of violating the laws of war in the Occupied Territories. Its supporters dismiss such accusations as biased, stating that they do not take into account the reality of the threats on the ground faced by the IDF.

Counterterrorism Tactics

Because of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the tactics of the IDF have been adapted for low-intensity warfare, primarily against Palestinian militants operating from within densely populated civilian territory.

Targeted Assassinations

The IDF employs a strategy of "focused foiling," or TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, of suspected Palestinian terrorists, asserting that the killing of suspected criminals and terrorists prevents potential acts of violence and TERRORISM, such as SUICIDE BOMBINGS. The legitimacy of these assassinations is a major cause of debate in the international community, with many questioning their legality.

House Demolitions

The IDF has historically used a strategy of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS for a variety of reasons; for example, a house may be demolished if it is built without a PERMIT or as punishment for criminal activity of one family member. Recently the IDF has been demolishing the houses of family members of suicide bombers, originally claiming that this was a very effective means of preventing such attacks. Critics, including human rights organizations, contend that this effectiveness of prevention does not legitimize excessive force.

Both Palestinian and international organizations maintain that the use of bulldozers for demolishing civilian structures is illegal. In one well-known incident, INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT activist Rachel Corrie was killed when she tried to obstruct a Caterpillar D9 armored bulldozer in Rafah.

The IDF has also been accused of engaging in numerous other violations of the laws of war. These include violation of the right to life, torture and ill treatment of Palestinians, arbitrary detention, denial of FAMILY REUNIFICATION, expulsion/DEPORTATION, withholding WATER, use of collective punishment, RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, use of Palestinians as human shields, denial of access to HEALTH CARE, the PERMIT regime, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, and tolerance of SETTLER VIOLENCE.

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Israeli Arabs

See PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions

The Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions is a nonviolent, direct-action Israeli peace organization established in the early 1990s and based in JERUSALEM. It was originally focused on opposing and resisting Israel's demolition of Palestinian houses in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. As its activists gained direct knowledge of other problems related to the OCCUPATION, it expanded its activities to protests against Israeli practices of LAND expropriation, SETTLEMENT expansion, bypass ROAD construction, CLOSURE, the separation BARRIER, and the destruction of fruit and OLIVE TREES, among others. Composed of members of many Israeli peace and human rights organizations, it coordinates closely with local Palestinian organizations in its work in the Occupied Territories. (www.icahd.org/eng).

Israeli Council on Israeli-Palestinian Peace

The Israeli Council on Israeli-Palestinian Peace was formed in late 1975 by a group of prominent Israeli Zionists as a private initiative responding to signs of moderation in the Palestinian national movement that the Israeli government ignored. Among its founders were the late Major General MATTIYAHU PELED (a member of the General Staff of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES in 1967), the journalist URI AVNERY, and the late economist Dr. Ya'akov Arnon, a former head of the Dutch Zionist Federation and director-general of the Israeli Finance Ministry. The council is based in JERUSALEM and is known for its English-language newsletter, *The Other Israel.* Its members met with PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION officials long before it was acceptable or legal to do so, and it has consistently supported a TWO-STATE SOLUTION. (http://otherisrael.home.igc.org/ICIPP.html).

Israeli Democracy

See ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY

Israeli Militarism

Almost from the outset, fears, suspicion, and even violence were part of the Israeli-Palestinian encounter. If not with the first surge of Jewish IMMIGRATION to Palestine in the late nineteenth century, surely with the so-called Second and Third ALIYAS (waves of Jewish immigration to Palestine), at the beginning of the twentieth century. These relations gradually translated, within the Yishuv (the prestate Jewish community in Palestine), and later on within the Israeli state, into social, political, and military modes of action that express an Israeli tendency to solve political problems in Israeli-Arab-Palestinian relations by military means. Militarism also presents the way these modes of thought and action have been legitimized by various actors and mechanisms over the years, increasing the probability of war, and reducing the chances for peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

Prestate Period

Before World War I, Palestine was populated mainly by Arabs living in small villages and some cities. Among them, a minority of religious Jews lived mainly in four cities, which were considered sacred to Jews since biblical time. During the war, Palestine was conquered by the British, who were sympathetic to the Jews' national aspirations for several reasons: the peculiarities of Jewish history; the fact that they were victims of persecution, racism, and ANTI-SEMITISM; their contribution to the British war effort; British national interests in the Middle East; and the fact that the Jews were regarded as "Europeans," more civilized and modern than the "natives." Additionally, many British officials were Christians with strong affiliation to the Bible, and their religious beliefs inclined them to support a return of the Jews to Palestine. As a consequence, Britain's BALFOUR DECLARATION (1917) provided legal status to the Zionist ideal of a "national home" for the "Jewish People" in Palestine, their "ancestral land." Many leaders of the Zionist movement, which had emerged in Europe, in the second half of the nineteenth century, sought initially to reach their national aspirations through a gradual process of international diplomacy (e.g., THEODOR HERZL, CHAIM WEIZMANN). A minority within the movement believed that a Jewish homeland could only be established by force of arms. Those who practically immigrated to Palestine came mainly from Russia and Poland early in the twentieth century, held socialist principles, and

later become the "founding fathers" of Israel. For most, their socialism (universal principles) became transformed into pristine ZIONISM (exclusive and particularistic principles—e.g., the KIBBUTZ, the HISTADRUT). These men and women tried to realize the national goals, not through diplomacy but through the practical methods of immigration, settlements, and cultivation of the land.

The indigenous Arabs soon began to oppose this movement and a conflict ensued between the newcomers and the locals. Until the second half of the 1930s, there is no clear evidence that mainstream leaders within the Zionist movement considered military power as the means for implementing their vision. The main military organizations that they formed (e.g., BAR GIORA, 1907; HASHOMER, 1909; HAGANA, 1920) were mainly responsible for defensive aims. The only exception was the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI, which was influenced by VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY, who left the Zionist movement because of its moderation. However, the ARAB REVOLT of 1936–1939, which started with a general strike against the British occupation and Zionist colonization of Palestine and later evolved into an armed insurgency, shattered many illusions among the Zionists, and changed the perception of the conflict dramatically.

The Palestinians, who were the majority and had lived on this land for generations, could not accept either Jewish dominance or the idea of partition, which was proposed by the BRITISH MANDATE PEEL COMMISSION (1936–1937). For a time, in the face of Palestinian guerrilla warfare against both the British and the Jews, the leadership of the Jewish community clung to a policy of *havlaga* (restraint), and the British forces quelled the revolt. However, as violence continued, the policy of restraint did not have much support within the Zionist movement, and a new military orientation soon evolved, creating new military organizations with new military offensive methods. Among them were not only the right-wing, highly motivated, and force-oriented underground groups such as Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi and LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL, which also fought the British, along with the unofficial but mainstream LABOR PARTY military organization, the Hagana, and its elite unit, the PALMAH (which was formed in May 1941). These groups were composed of the young generation of native-born Israelis, who came to age in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Among them were many later Israeli leaders, such as MOSHE DAYAN, YIGAL ALLON, and YITZHAK RABIN. For this generation, whose members made a career through the military, using force against the Arabs became a way of life.

With the end of World War II, the UN partition plan was formally rejected by the Arabs, who were still the majority in Palestine and owned close to 90 percent of the land. The Jews, as well, could not practically accept the problematic plan but they preferred to declare their approval. As such, the two sides fought the bitter and bloody 1948 WAR. Despite the fact that all the surrounding Arab states joined the war (including IRAQ), the highly organized, unified, and militarily stronger Israelis turned the Arab threat into a war of conquest, with the result that most of Palestine's Arab population was expelled or fled, and a Jewish state, larger than the one envisioned in the UN partition plan, was born. In the first few years of statehood, Israel faced the problem of Palestinian INFILTRATION—dispossessed Palestinian REFUGEES who crossed the BORDERS from where they were sheltering into Israel. Most of them simply sought to return to their homes, rescue their belongings, tend to their fields, harvest their crops, contact their relatives, or reclaim the property that Israel had expropriated. Occasionally a Palestinian sought revenge; others were sent by the Egyptian or Jordanian security forces and operated as spies and as murder squads. The Israelis, for their part, regarded the infiltrations as a serious threat that could disrupt the new state's ethnonational character and destroy its sovereignty. As a result, the state army and police shot and killed thousands of Palestinian infiltrators, the great majority of them unarmed, and completely blocked the borders.

Eight years after its independence, with the Israeli-Arab conflict unsettled and numerous violent activities along the borders, Israel colluded with Great Britain and FRANCE in an invasion of EGYPT, capturing the entire Sinai Peninsula and reaching the Suez Canal. This SINAI/SUEZ WAR was perhaps the culmination of the new perception that emerged within the Yishuv/Israel's young generation, during the period 1936–1956, according to which the use of military force was the most appropriate, most efficient, and indeed the only feasible way to solve the problem of the Arab and Palestinian resistance to a Jewish state. This perspective, which was new in the context of Jewish history and tradition, can be defined as "militarism"—a belief in the use of force as a

means to solve political problems on the national level. It was then incorporated into Israeli social norms, practices, and institutions, characterizing society and politics at large.

Israel as a Nation-in-Arms

During this early period, Israeli militarism was not characterized by a love of force for the sake of force, even though some of the army units (like UNIT 101) were merciless in the way they treated the Arabs in their frequent border crossings. The myth of the new Jew, the warrior who takes his destiny in his hands, was still restricted to concepts such as nation-building, modernization (and the army as an important agent of modernization), and a definition of reality in terms of "no-choice" (despite the fact that every social reality is always open to various choices) in regard to the relations with the surrounding Arab states and the penetrating Palestinians. In any case, the IDF (ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES) was exalted and presented as the embodiment of the nation and all that is good in it. The new immigrants, who formed the majority in the new state and knew nothing about armies, wars, and modern nationalism, were deeply socialized along this line. The practices and institutions that were responsible for developing a positive attitude toward army and war, and that encouraged sacrifice for the new nation, operated not only through the formal and nonformal educational system (e.g., youth organizations) but also through the mandatory active military service for both men and women, and the required service in the reserves for males. The result was that Israel, in this period, became a nation-in-arms.

The nation-in-arms paradigm derived from such countries as eighteenth-century revolutionary and early nineteenth-century republican France, Prussia, and then GERMANY in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Japan from the Meiji Restoration until World War II, all of which supported the total engagement of men and resources for war purposes. These nations-in-arms engaged in a massive mobilization of the whole young population for war, while simultaneously attempting to constitute or reconstitute the society into a nation. One defining characteristic was the existence of an army-nation (*armée nation* in France), created by conscription and a compulsory reserve-service system. The army, which was formed of the mass of the citizens and not an elite group of professional soldiers, was represented as the embodiment of the collective national will, an integrated society, and all that is good in the nation—for example, *la France réelle* (the real France). In addition, in any nation-in-arms a close collaboration exists between the professional military elite and the political leadership, based on a shared appreciation of the army's formidable political influence. The most important characteristic of the nation-in-arms, however, is that the boundaries between "civil" and "military" are rendered indistinct in various spheres. Thus preparation for war, and indeed war itself, become a universal project involving men and women (sometimes even children) and both young and old, who were also indirectly involved in the war effort. Finally, in a nation-in-arms, the national military symbolically and ostensibly places itself above "internal" politics, certainly above party politics and domestic disputes, and presents itself as the guardian of the national values and interests.

Israel in the 1950s–1970s was a late version of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century model. The state's political configuration attained its zenith in the aftermath of the 1967 WAR. Israel's victory in the war, along with its OCCUPATION of territories in JORDAN, Egypt, and SYRIA, ushered in the pinnacle of the nation-in-arms. The view of reality that was adopted fused sets of ideas in three basic areas:

1. Military, the need to keep the territories for strategic reasons, based on the professional assessments of the army experts concerning the importance of territorial depth to Israel.
2. Political, the neorealist idea according to which the new territories were a bargaining chip for peace.
3. Social-cultural, a worldview that fused JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST and Greater Israel, ethnonational ideologies, with the feeling of many Israelis that with the territorial conquest they extricated themselves from a long siege. Such feelings inverted the Occupation, presenting it as liberation of Israel's ancestral land.

In those days many Israelis believed redemption was at hand, and talk of a biblical "war of commandment" became popular. After all, how else could one explain the swift and quick victory over three Arab states? Only a few questioned either Israel's ability to control the Arab territories and rule another people or its moral right to do so.

In the "six years of Empire," as one journalist termed the period from the 1967 War to the 1973 War, Israel attempted to translate its military victory and its conviction of superiority into domination of the Palestinian territories as well as the Egyptian and Syrian territories. In fact, Israel refused to accept the claim that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, claiming that it was no-man's-land beforehand. Thus, SETTLEMENTS, military bases, parks and nature resorts, ROADS, and industrial zones were built in the territories, quite often using cheap Arab labor to increase the profits of Israeli entrepreneurs. Certain issues within the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES were more controversial than others: among them, the status of the Jewish settlements, the annexation of JERUSALEM and the Golan Heights, and the attitude toward and treatment of the Palestinians who lived there. Until 1993 the Palestinians were subject to Israeli military administration. They did not receive the same political rights and freedoms or protections under Israeli law as the settlers who lived in the same area. However, as Neve Gordon claimed, until the 1990s, the Palestinians under Occupation enjoyed a certain amount of support and help given by the Israeli military administration. Moreover, many of them were allowed to cross the "Green Line" and to work in Israel itself.

Within Israel, the 1967 war-hero generals became objects of sweeping admiration and emulation. Perhaps the most striking manifestation of this was the pattern of recently retired senior IDF officers turning to politics, a process that came to be known as "parachuting." Indeed, many Israeli prime ministers and cabinet ministers from that period forward had a significant military career: Yitzhak Rabin, Haim Bar-Lev, ARIEL SHARON, Rafael Eitan, Amnon Lipkin-Shachak, Itzhak Mordechai, EHUD BARAK, Matan Vilnai, Amram Mitzna, and Shaul Mofaz, to name a few. This phenomenon did not hinder Israel's procedural democracy. However, when parachuting into the political arena, the Israeli generals usually brought their militaristic worldview into politics, proving the proverb "once a soldier, always a soldier."

Militarism and Praetorianism

In fact, parachuting into politics was just one means through which the generals influenced their country's politics. Strikingly, even in the 1950s, IDF officers, particularly Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan, could pressure the politicians to adopt belligerent solutions to political problems. With the help of Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION Dayan neutralized MOSHE SHARETT, the "civilian," moderate foreign minister, and turned the army into an influential political actor. On issues involving war or peace and "security," to a very great extent the IDF's opinion, at least informally, was highly influential. In 1967, to cite a concrete example, the government was pressured by the generals to start a war, in reaction to provocations by the Egyptian ruler JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. During the event, which was known as the "revolt of the generals" (though it was far from a revolt), members of the General Staff put enormous pressure on Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL to launch the 1967 War. The generals also campaigned for Dayan's appointment as minister of defense and for the formation of a "national unity" government composed of both the Right and the Left. Hence the generals expressed the concept, typical of nations-in-arms, that the army is the unifier, that a common destiny, values, and interests made Israel one nation in which internal differences, should they arise, must be minimized for the sake of the nation-state that is engaged in war. Moreover, the assumption was that a separation of the army from politics was a luxury Israel could ill afford. The result of the war, the capture of so much territory, supposedly affirmed that conception together with the idea that force was the right way to solve the relations with the Arab world.

Militarism can sometimes flourish despite an army's formal subordination to the political level even in states that are considered democratic, often as a quid pro quo for that formal subordination. On this, the Israeli case is at odds with most conventional views in the scholarly literature, which tend to see militarism and praetorianism as similar phenomena, implying both the army's takeover of government and the simultaneous dissemination of its worldview throughout society. In contrast, the Israeli situation suggests the possibility of an inverse relation between militarism and praetorianism. In such a case the generals have no qualms about promoting a spirit of militarism in society, a phenomenon that can be termed "cultural militarism." Militarism may also include the generals' attempt to influence political leaders to adopt an army's jingoist perspective in making decisions concerning war or peace, a phenomenon that can be termed "militaristic politics." Thus, under cul-

tural militarism and militaristic politics, the generals can accomplish their aims without the need for direct and coercive intervention in politics. Indeed for many years, the Israeli high brass successfully influenced the public to adopt their version of Israel's security needs, especially because they did not coerce it but "suggested" and sometimes "subtly implanted" it, because no other institutionalized ideology, or even alternative opinion, to the military one existed, and because the generals succeeded in creating a widely accepted image as reliable, responsible, supposedly apolitical, and indispensable advisors. As long as cultural militarism and militaristic politics prevailed, the army generals did not need to disrupt democratic procedures, because the army enjoyed a central role in society, and the generals had status and prestige, no less than a preeminent influence in the decision-making process. It was what the Israeli scholar Yoram Peri termed "democracy in uniform." All this, however, was about to change.

Gradual Decline of the Nation-in-Arms

With the 1982 LEBANON WAR, hegemonic militarism began to weaken. Indeed, already in the 1973 OCTOBER WAR, the difficulties Israel was facing also raised some doubts concerning the way the army functioned militarily, and the manner in which it succeeded in preserving its relative autonomy vis-à-vis the government. These doubts, however, did not immediately delegitimize the value of the nation-in-arms and the centrality of the army-nation. On the contrary, the conclusion from the Yom Kippur War was that Israel's unpreparedness required increases in state security and defense, and that citizens had to internalize the military's norms more deeply.

In the Lebanon War, the public reaction was different. For the first time, Israel's war was defined as a "war of choice," and the dishonesty of the government concerning the war's objectives was severely criticized. Israel's share of responsibility for the massacre of Muslim civilians in SABRA AND SHATILA by Lebanese Christian forces, raised considerable concern within the Israeli public as well, and led to increasing demonstrations against the war and those who were responsible for its course. A few years later, in 1987, when the First INTIFADA erupted, it became clear that not only had the long period of relative quiet in the territories come to an end but also that the Israeli symbiosis of army, society, and politics was no longer impregnable.

First Intifada

On 8 December 1987, after four Palestinians were killed by an Israeli car in a traffic accident, rioting broke out in the territories. Soon the Intifada was in full force as a protest against Israel's repression, which included mass detentions, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and DEPORTATIONS. The Intifada was characterized by mass protests, tax revolts, strikes, tire burnings, and Palestinian teenagers confronting Israeli soldiers with rocks and occasionally Molotov cocktails. In contrast, the IDF used the latest weaponry and military technologies against the demonstrators. The high-ranking army officers were influenced by Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin's militant stance toward the Palestinians, notably an exhortation to the army to "break the bones" of demonstrators. The number of Palestinian fatalities was reduced only after Israel introduced special riot-control methods and Rabin was succeeded by Moshe Arens, who assumed the Defense Ministry in 1990. By the early 1990s the Intifada seemed to have lost direction. The Palestinians were frustrated and many displayed a willingness to negotiate an overall settlement with Israel. In Israel, the Palestinian distress was widely felt and it became clear to many that the army-nation does not perform well as a police force and that its diverse social composition and political differences create special complexities when it confronts civilians who are fighting for their freedom.

During the First Intifada, trials of Israeli soldiers charged with brutality, unnecessary killings, violations of Palestinian civil rights, and other infractions were widely publicized and added to public anger and disappointment concerning the army and polity. Even the soldiers were divided over the question of whether the Occupation was desirable or defensible, and whether the brutal suppression of the uprising was justified. In a dynamic typical of armies based on extensive reserve duty, the disputes in the army affected Israeli society as much as differences in the society influenced the army. In this regard, the Intifada heightened the differences within Israeli society that had begun to appear in the 1982 Lebanon War. The new questioning and dissent exposed the weakening of statist hegemony, and showed that Israeli society was sundered by contradictions, disputes, and disagreements, especially on the issues of peace and war, and was no longer completely mobilized for war as in the past.

One indication of the dissent was the criticism directed at IDF's senior level for military training

accidents. Irate parents of dead soldiers organized and went to court against the IDF, demanding investigations of such incidents by an external neutral body, without any military intervention in the process. Such demands were regarded in Israel as an almost revolutionary step. Another sign of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the army was the unprecedented refusal of soldiers, particularly reservists, to take part in military action in either the Occupied Territories or southern Lebanon. Although such refusals were relatively few, they challenged the long-standing Israeli axiom that military service is performed at any price, is an unconditional civic virtue, and is an informal confirmation of citizenship.

Another phenomenon that indicated the decline of the nation-in-arms militarism was the emergence of a variety of social peace movements that protested for peace and against Occupation. Movements such as Parents Against Silence, which emerged in 1982 and urged parents to break their silence against the war; WOMEN IN BLACK, who demonstrated against the Occupation weekly at major cities' intersections; YESH G'VUL (There Is a Limit); and Ad Kan (Up to Now) were the among the most prominent groups. Similar to the CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, these organizations represented a different Israel, one that eschewed militarism and the nation-in-arms and chose a different perspective toward life and death.

Changes and Transitions

A number of factors, both internal and external, converged in the late 1980s to bring about change within Israel. External factors included the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, after which the Middle East was no longer an arena of superpower rivalry. This factor, plus the pressure that came from the UNITED STATES after the First GULF WAR (1990–1991), brought Israel to the MADRID CONFERENCE. Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR did everything he could to thwart the conference; however, many in Israel began to understand that world politics had changed in the era of globalization, that an opportunity for peace was possible, and that it should be seized because it might not return.

Another factor that contributed to the decline in the nation-in-arms was the profound worldwide economic changes that affected Israel as well. In 1985, Israel signed a major trade agreement with the US, and limitations on government resources led Israel to withdraw most of its armed forces from Lebanon, except for a strip some few miles deep into South Lebanon. To lower the spiraling inflation rate (which then stood at 450 percent a year), the government implemented an austerity program. It privatized the economy, reduced its welfare policy, and created a neoliberal system. The massive immigration of close to one million SOVIET JEWS in the early 1990s—which was another reflection of globalization and the Cold War's end—brought human capital of great economic worth, contributed to neoliberalism in Israel, and generated rapid economic growth.

In the late 1980s, Israel also experienced a serious party-parliamentary crisis caused by a paralyzing electoral stalemate between the two major parties, the greater bargaining power of the small parties, and the failure of "governments of national unity" to resolve political problems. Eventually general disgust with party politics was expressed in public protest, which began in early 1990s. Numerous organizations and associations sprang from local grassroots politics, such as the neoliberal and secular Constitution for Israel; Adam, Teva Va'Din (Man, Nature and Law), which was an environmental movement; and even B'TSELEM, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Under the influence of these movements and numerous other new associations and groups, many Israelis began to adopt a lifestyle that was more individualistic, universal, and in fact Western. Even if most of these associations did not comprehensively and directly challenge the old militaristic system, they focused attention on individual freedoms and rights, which were not compatible with the collectivistic and nationalist past. Moreover, they contributed to a new perception of politics, which was translated into what Foucault would call "micro-power," in which the public is more involved in politics at the grassroots and less responsive to government demands. Local politics also took on greater importance then, as many Israelis seemed to have grown weary of the "big" questions—the all-embracing ideologies and their demanding collectivistic and militaristic statism—and preferred to place themselves into a more narrow framework, so that the individual, his/her desires, preferences, identities, and way of life became a major feature of Israeli politics.

The Israeli army itself contributed to the decline of the nation-in-arms. Particularly during

Ehud Barak's tenure as chief of staff, in the first half of the 1990s, the IDF was subjected to what some have called "role extraction," in which Barak's goal was to produce a "small, smart army." The reforms, which were the result of budget cuts, included the elimination of various social projects such as youth camps, in which the army had been traditionally involved and through which it maintained its connection with the society. Such organizational changes within the army contributed to the reconfiguration of the relations among army, society, and politics on a new basis, which was meant—among other things—to avoid cleavages on a political basis within the army itself.

Civil Society and the Militaristic-Religious Society

With the Yitzhak Rabin–Shimon Peres government at the beginning of the 1990s, and the Oslo Accords, it became clear that Israeli society was divided not only along class, ethnic, and religious divisions but along a new division as well. The new dichotomy emerged in the face of two contradictory organizing principles that first coalesced, then confronted each other with harsh animosity: one was civil and antimilitaristic, the other militaristic and usually religious. This split appeared in 1993 and after, when, for the first time in Israel's history, a prime minister expressed willingness, in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to give up territory in exchange for peace with the Palestinians. Yet this decision, which reflected political realism if not a civil, universal, and democratic approach, was opposed by a large sector within society, mainly the settlers and their supporters. This sector accused the prime minister of treason and let it be known that the supreme value was the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael), for which they would fight by all possible means.

The divisions inside Israel resembled certain trends that appeared in many places throughout the globe. On the one hand, the Israeli peace movement had its counterpart in the emergence of globalization, particularly in the role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in civil society. This new (pre-9/11) universal and democratic mode linked even questions concerning peace and war with the natural rights of humanity while urging political compromises and reconciliations. On the other hand, a counterreaction emerged, grounded in religious fundamentalism, "traditional values," and an atavistic ethnonationalism, that regarded globalization as a menace to tradition and religion. Reflecting the latter in Israel, Jewish fundamentalism and the Greater Land of Israel movements fought against the Oslo Accords and insisted that relations with the Palestinians would not be solved by diplomacy or compromise but by force.

The conflict between the two sectors within Israeli society has been extremely pronounced. The sectors differed profoundly over mega-issues such as peace and war, which in turn led to conflicts over and questions of identity, in particular "what Israeliness is and who the Israelis are." One example of the difference between the two sectors was their orientation toward military service. During the collectivistic nation-in-arms era, it was not possible to avoid military service because it was considered a custom and a duty. Military service signified belonging, identity, and partnership in the Jewish-Israeli community. Those few who declined to serve were effectively kept invisible and mute, and were perceived as marginal to society. In the neoliberal Israel, two different approaches have emerged regarding military service. In army slang the two types were differentiated as "shirkers" and "fanatics" (the Hebrew term for the latter is *mur'alim*, literally meaning individuals who are "poisoned" with the desire for gung-ho combat and prepare for it accordingly). Each category had its own cultural heroes. Brigadier General Effie Fein, for example, who was bearded and wore a knitted *kippa* (head-covering) that signified allegiance to national-religious Zionism, projected the tough, bearish exterior of a combat officer or a field soldier who is willing and ready to die for the country. Upon his retirement Fein became a political figure, fighting fervently for Greater Israel. On the other hand, a well-known photograph showed Aviv Geffen, a highly successful Israeli pop singer, in the nude with the inscription on his body "It is good to die for ourselves"—a parody of the famous assertion made by an Israeli national hero eighty years before that "it is good to die for our country."

Another indication of the rift between the two sectors was seen in rituals of mourning and bereavement over the death of soldiers. In the era of the nation-in-arms the state portrayed the death of each individual soldier as serving the goals of commonality. One newspaper put it succinctly: "They overcame their grief, like symbolic monu-

ments of a mother's strength—that is, of a nation's strength. . . . The convoy of the corps of bereaved mothers . . . is the proudest and most wonderful of all flags, the state's most solid security belt." Surely the most effective recruiting mechanism of the nation-in-arms is the incorporation of bereavement and commemoration to elicit the population's identification with military power and war. However, the meaning of such symbols has faded over the years, and the more individualistic modern era has brought additional perspectives. Death, even on the battlefield but certainly in terrorist attacks or training accidents, began to acquire a new meaning for many Israelis, because these deaths could not be explained as a necessary part of the process of nation-building or nation-strengthening.

Commemoration of the dead became an issue of controversy as well: should the tradition of inscribing a standard state text on the gravestones of fallen soldiers be continued, or could the family decide on a personal message? In the modern nation-state (especially a nation-in-arms), as George Mosse noted, state rites for the fallen were part of the unifying ritualistic ethos, meant to emphasize symbolically every citizen's participation in the state and its wars. In the Israel of the 1990s, though, many parents no longer felt comfortable with the uniform text on their sons' gravestones and insisted on a more personal note, such as citing the names of the deceased's siblings. Military cemeteries have also undergone some changes, including "private" additions to graves in the form of different symbols, special landscaping, vases, stone pathways, modest signs, photographs, poems, and so forth. Some families whose sons fell in the Lebanon War fought for nearly ten years to change the gravestone inscriptions that described it as the "Peace for Galilee War."

Bereavement in the 1990s assumed a political character through comments made by parents who lost sons. A striking case in point was Manuella Dviri, who became a preeminent representative of the peace-oriented civil society. The conclusion she drew from her son's death was blatantly political: "My duty toward this child, who dwells within me," she said, "is to say the truth always and not to be silent. Not to allow people to forget that we must get out of Lebanon, that we must make peace with the Palestinians." A different attitude toward bereavement also sprang up in the militaristic-religious society. "If there is no longer any point in dying for one's country," said a settler who lost his son, "and if life is a supreme value, what exactly is supposed to happen when the enemy's final assault comes? . . . Will we be trampled here beneath the boots of a foreign occupier? The dead sacrifice their lives above all to ensure one of the most basic needs of people as such—nationalism. . . . A human creature needs national belonging. . . . His nation exists eternally. . . . It constitutes a considerable part of the things that are worth dying for."

The two contrasting orientations have been translated into collective action to effect political change. For the peace groups, the turning point was the First Intifada, by which time they were no longer willing to accept a "minimal" notion of democracy in which only the state's political and military elites decided security issues that affected everybody, without taking into consideration the public voice. On the other end of the political continuum stood the particularist settlers, who claimed the right to conquer and occupy Palestinian land by any means, including coercive ones. They too were energized, first by the First Intifada, then by the 1993 Oslo Accords, which both delegitimized their presence in the territories. Moreover, the settlers too, like their counterpart, could not accept the idea that the government alone will decide on these issues. Many of the settlers even denounced the army and state leaders, whom they perceived as pursuing a path of undue compromise and moderation. From many of the settlers' perspective, God's land is indivisible and belongs to Israel only, and no democratic or authoritarian procedure can change that.

The peace supporters criticized the settlers for their nondemocratic, religious beliefs. The settlers excoriated the civil society for its antimilitaristic beliefs. REHAVAM ZE'EVI (Gandhi), an extreme right-wing politician, expressed this sentiment well by explaining: "The reasons [that fewer Israelis desire military service] must be sought in the crisis of Zionist self-fulfillment. In the post-Zionism of the Israeli left, in their blind belief in peace, in the move away from the Torah of Israel and the Jewish tradition . . . and in education for materialism instead of education for values."

Statements like these, which exposed the neomilitarism that emerged within some sectors in Israel, were translated into policies designed to increase the involvement and influence of the settlers and their supporters not only in politics but in

the army as well. Thus, although the settlers continued to criticize the IDF, they also made a concerted effort to join it and influence it from within. This effort began during the First Intifada and was pursued with greater intensity thereafter. Contrary to Israeli tradition in which the religious were exempted from military service to devote themselves fully to religious studies, many religious youths became, during the 1990s, combat soldiers, volunteers for elite units, and graduates of officers' courses. Some even made the army their career, responding to their rabbis who encouraged them to excel in the IDF.

The military proficiency displayed by the settlers and their supporters, and their strong motivation to do military service, which was based on theological ideas, were not always well received by other Israelis, who viewed them as another sign of the growing split in the country and as an attempt by the settlers to influence reality through the military. These feelings became evident with the political assassination that turned the Israeli scene into a nightmare.

Assassination of Rabin

The possibility of a "war of brothers"—the Hebrew term for "civil war"—in the light of the OSLO PROCESS, became part of the regular Israeli discourse. As one settler explained, "The fear of a civil war . . . Please do not make light of this . . . One does not have to be excessively perceptive and sensitive to be aware of the abysmal hate that exists, unfortunately . . . Among too many people, the word 'settler,' for example, arouses rejection, repulsion, even abhorrence." Such sentiments became commonplace and accompanied by the claim that the Israeli "left" had allied itself with the Arabs. As a settler from the Gaza Strip noted, "The deeper the dialogue between the [Israeli] left and the Arabs became in the first seven years after the signing of the Oslo accords, the more the Palestinian stand in the conflict was accepted almost completely. At the same time, the estrangement of the Israeli left from its brethren on the right intensified. The struggle thus became an intra-Jewish one over the Jewish-Israeli identity, a trans-national struggle in which one segment of the nation made the historic common enemy privy to decisions about their shared destiny."

The militaristic-religious society was further aided in its struggle against the peace process by the SUICIDE BOMBINGS throughout Israel. HAMAS, which rejected the Oslo Accords, was mainly responsible for the bombings, but as they continued and more civilians were killed, the Israeli public became more inclined to the militaristic-religion interpretation, according to which the bombings proved that "the Arabs" (as a generalized category) do not want to make peace with Israel. As a result, following the terrorist attacks, for the first time since the Oslo Accords, the majority in Israel preferred the option of increasing Israel's military might to holding peace talks.

Even in the face of the deepening internal rift, Rabin and Peres believed that a government elected by a majority of the nation, most of whom also supported the peace process, was enough to forge ahead. In the meantime, probably at the height of the public protest against the government and the prime minister, there was a rabbinical decision to place a curse on Rabin, involving the invocation of terms taken from traditions thousands of years old—"*din rodef*" and "*din moser*," Talmudic injunctions to kill a Jew who imperils the life or property of another Jew—and "*pulsa de nura*," a kabbalistic curse of death.

Such terms, which were totally unfamiliar to the vast majority of the Israeli public, became now part of a new discourse. In August 1995, after the negotiations with the Palestinians on self-government gathered momentum, a movement called "ZO ARTZENU" (This Is Our Land) declared a civil revolt. In this period, attempts were already being made to attack Rabin physically. The most unruly demonstration, however, took place on 5 October 1995, when the Knesset was about to vote on the Oslo II or INTERIM AGREEMENT, which included the transfer of some territories to the Palestinians (albeit not any of the settlements). Tens of thousands of demonstrators flocked to Zion Square in the center of Jerusalem, blew on shofars (rams' horns), screamed "Death to Rabin," burned his portrait, and distributed a photomontage showing the prime minister in an S.S. uniform. Looking down on the rabid crowd from the balcony was the opposition leadership: Ariel Sharon, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, and many others. Netanyahu's speech whipped the crowd into a frenzy with his allegation that the government was illegitimate because it relied on the votes of Israeli-Arabs who supported the PLO.

Suddenly, in a sovereign, law-abiding state, in a society that perceived itself as civil and democratic, certain circles began to ask questions such as "Does Rabin deserve death according

to *halakha* [Jewish religious law]?" Then, on 4 November 1995, Rabin was assassinated by a young, religious, Israeli-born Jew, who was influenced by the steady stream of rabbinic and political messages declaring the "illegitimacy" of those who "hand over territories." "When I shot Rabin," said the murderer two months later, "I felt as if I shot a terrorist."

The religious public in Israel rejected the collective accusation that was hurled at it. Many among them deplored the assassination, perhaps as lip service, or out of fear of the consequences for the settlement project, if not for the entire religious society. There were also those who rejected political killing on moral grounds. Some in the religious public expressed contrition and called for a "housecleaning." However, these voices were soon silenced. And if at first it seemed that the pall of mourning that blanketed Israel—combined with an international show of support for Rabin's way, seen in the participation of world leaders in his funeral—would advance the peace process, the reverse ensued.

Though the majority of the public deplored the assassin and rejected what he stood for, the militaristic-religious worldview continued to be antiglobal, antidemocratic, neonational, particularistic, ethnocentric, and militaristic. Moreover, under attack from the "left," they quickly reciprocated, turning from accused to accuser, from a public that had produced the assassin to one that developed a persecution complex and accused those from whose society the victim had come, blaming them for inciting the settlers who brought on the assassination.

The assassination was the climactic event in the struggle against the Oslo Process, demonstrating in no uncertain terms that no one who opposed the idea of "Greater Israel," not even the prime minister himself, was immune. However, a civil war did not occur. It was actually Shimon Peres—who on the night of the assassination was appointed to succeed the slain prime minister—who decided, in his brief term of office, that relations with the settlers and their supporters would be based on emphasizing not the differences between the sides but what they had in common. Peres declared solemnly that Rabin's assassination would not bring the peace process to an end. However, instead of invoking the assassination to ensure the continuation of the process, he opted for a politics of compromise. He signed another agreement with the Palestinians but refused to act on requests to dismantle the *hesder* yeshivas (one of which the assassin had attended in the past), which were based on army-religious arrangements. Even the state commission of inquiry, appointed to investigate the assassination, had no mandate to examine the extensive incitement that led up to the murder. It seemed that the Peres government wanted only to deal with criminal and procedural questions, and to diminish any possible discourse on the cultural and social aspects of the event. Perhaps Peres thought that this approach would win him the support of religious circles in the looming elections. In the event, his decision bore consequences that turned sharply from his expectations and in fact contradicted them. It enabled the settlers to claim, directly or indirectly, that although political assassination as such was unacceptable, in this case Rabin was to blame for his own murder: his scorn for the settlers had dragged him into the Oslo adventure and he had effectively split the nation. Thus, perhaps without intending to, Peres contributed to the coalescence of an institutional structure that encouraged "internal unity" over possible peace. This "unity" was construed to mean that the settlers could act almost as they pleased without the state taking vigorous action against them, whether because they were Jews or because of their strong public support.

During Peres's short term as prime minister, the horrific terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hamas, which again claimed the lives of dozens of Israelis in the big cities, were interpreted in Israel as proof that the Palestinian people did not want peace. This interpretation of the bombings enhanced a dichotomous ethnonational perspective of "us" versus "them" and practically minimized the internal rift. Israeli politicians tend to attach critical significance to acts of TERRORISM during election campaigns. The great fear of the LABOR PARTY's election-campaign strategy in 1996 was of terrorist attacks and their impact on the electorate. After the first terrorist attack during the campaign, on 25 February, three months ahead of the election, peace was discarded as a campaign message. Instead of playing up the simple fact that terrorism demonstrated powerfully the urgent need for peace, Peres's strategists and PR people tried to cast him as "Mr. Security," packaging him as a product for the public to buy. With Peres having a huge lead over Netanyahu in the polls in the wake

of the Rabin assassination, Labor's campaign also was based on the attempt to portray Peres as the prime minister of all the people, statesman-like and judicious. When the election approached, even the Rabin assassination was played down—not only by the LIKUD, which feared an electoral backlash, but also, astonishingly, by Labor, which was concerned that harping on the subject would be perceived as "splitting the nation."

Peres's strategy of making peace among the Israelis at the expense of a peace with the Palestinians did not help, and Benjamin Netanyahu, the Likud representative, was elected prime minister. The Israelis seemed simply to take fright at the "price of peace." Indeed, even though Netanyahu had promised in his campaign not to discard the agreements with the Palestinians, once elected he showed himself in no hurry to implement the agreements that he voted against as a parliament member in 1993. On 15 January 1997 Netanyahu surprised his supporters when, under intense US pressure, he signed the HEBRON agreement, under which the IDF withdrew most of its forces from most of the city. That he did so only because he feared losing the support of the US administration did not help him to gain the support of moderate Israelis.

Moderate Israelis were still active in the late 1990s. For example, throughout the period of the Oslo Process, IDF units were stationed in an Israeli self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon. But several Israeli groups worked tirelessly in demanding the army's removal from Lebanon, among them a number of mothers of soldiers who constituted a new organization, "FOUR MOTHERS." The movement engaged in symbolic activity, distributed material, held marches and demonstrations, and formed a political lobby with the aim of bringing about Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and the termination of the state of war between the two countries. This was an expression par excellence of a civil society and a manifestation of the "feminine voice," which had long been prominent in Israeli peace and protest movements, the more so as the women of Four Mothers also had to rebuff allegations that they knew nothing about security and that in wartime they would stay behind.

Yet again, civil society and the militaristic-religious society found themselves in a frontal clash. Netanyahu, who lost the trust of the settlers, was defeated in the May 1999 election after three years in office by the leader of the Labor Party, Ehud Barak. Barak brought about the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon despite the general's objection. However, as a former chief of staff, Barak could not detach himself from the militaristic mindset, and indeed the expectations that Barak would be the one to bring peace to Israel were soon to be dashed. At the 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, Barak tried to convince Arafat to accept the Israeli terms of an agreement. His suggestions were presented as "generous," not only to most Israelis but to the US administration as well. Arafat, however, did not accept them, and the negotiations collapsed. The one who tried to exploit the vacuum that was subsequently created was the opposition leader Ariel Sharon, a militarist of the old school who was soon to rule Israel.

Al-Aqsa Intifada

Sharon's visit to the TEMPLE MOUNT, a part of the Muslim holy site AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in Jerusalem, on 28 September 2000, triggered Palestinian protest across the Occupied Territories in what came to be known as the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. His visit was regarded as an indication of Israel's intention to maintain sovereignty over all of Jerusalem and as a threat to the integrity of the mosques. The IDF was very quick in responding to the challenge. In the first six days of the Second Intifada, sixty-one Palestinians were killed and 2,657 were injured while no Israelis were killed. The character of Israeli retaliatory actions against the Palestinian population was influenced by the beliefs of the militaristic-religious society, which wanted to prove that the Oslo peace process was false and that drastic military actions provided the only solution to the Palestinian uprising.

The Israeli army used harsh methods of suppression such as CURFEWS—long-term lockdowns of civilian areas, sometimes for months, which generally allowed residents less than two hours per day to get food. Although such tactics were condemned internationally, Israel insisted they were vital to prevent terrorist attacks. Another method of collective punishment was the demolition of homes of suicide bombers. Both because each home generally housed a considerable number of Palestinians and because a large number of homes were destroyed, the tactic created controversy within Israel between the civil and the militaristic society. Additionally the army employed CHECKPOINTS that resulted in severe RESTRICTIONS ON

MOVEMENT of the Palestinians. Israel maintained that the checkpoints were essential for military purposes, although many Palestinian, international, and Israeli human rights organizations claimed that they served as a means of humiliation and cruelty against the civilian population. Mass detentions were also common. At any given time about 6,000 Palestinian prisoners were held in Israeli jails, about half of them under ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION without an indictment. Perhaps the most effective but controversial military tactic of the IDF was the policy of "targeted killing," the term used for the TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of militants suspected of perpetrating attacks against Israel. The tactic was controversial because it sentenced suspects to death without a trial, and it put at risk many Palestinians who happened to be near the suspects at the time of the attack.

Israel's harsh suppression of the al-Aqsa Intifada turned it into a war of a new kind. It demonstrated the extent to which the army and soldiering continued to constitute a central value in Israel, and indicated that with the failure of both the Oslo Accords and later the Camp David talks, the Israeli militaristic-religious society gained major influence on political questions of peace and war. The majority of the Israeli public accepted Barak's claim that Arafat was to blame for the failure of the talks. The consequence of that was thus clear to everybody: the Palestinians have to pay. The discourse on Arafat's fault was so strong in Israel and the fact that it was the Palestinians who started the violence after the failure of the talks—almost completely silenced Israeli civil society in the first two years of the uprising, and the army under Barak felt free to handle the war as it liked.

However, the differences between the two sectors of society did not disappear. There was a new movement of combat soldiers and reserve officers who claimed that the repressive operations in the territories were illegal and refused to take part in them, and Jewish-Arab partnerships and peace movements were organized as well, linking the local civil society to global human rights movements. In response to reports of atrocities and harsh military methods used by the Israeli army in the territories, public debate began again in late 2002 and continued, producing a new peace discourse alongside the war discourse. Most Israelis, however, did not accept the moderate way, and the Intifada continued.

International intervention appeared in the form of President GEORGE W. BUSH'S ROAD MAP. The formal goal of the plan was to put an end to the Occupation and bring about the establishment of two states with secure borders. As always, the Americans believed that such a conflict could be solved rationally. The Bush administration wanted to remove Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat as it accepted the Israeli claim that the chairman of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY was a terrorist and an obstacle to peace. The result was the appointment of MAHMUD ABBAS as prime minister with executive powers. The Palestinians expressed their readiness for an agreement. The Israeli government also approved the Road Map toward the end of May 2003, though with some fourteen "reservations" that in essence gutted the plan. They included the demand that the "terrorist organizations," including Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD, would give up their weapons and dismantle. These comments were compatible with Bush's "Global War on Terror," but they reduced the chances of the Road Map's success to zero. Sharon knew that this formula would guarantee Israel's supremacy and effectively block an agreement, and that without the "terror" option the Palestinians' bargaining power was very limited, while the disagreements among them were so overriding that they would never be able to reach a settlement with Israel.

In a statement to the Knesset, Sharon deplored the Occupation and declared that it was time to end the conflict. His words astounded everyone, including his party and the members of the government coalition. This was not the platform he was elected on, they said. The militaristic-religious society expected Sharon, who was "flesh of their flesh," to stall the implementation of the Road Map and not make declarations about the evils of the Occupation. Sharon, however, felt confident in his way, which, in fact, was a "third way," neither the way of the militaristic-religious society nor that of the civil society. However, the "third way," institutionalized in his new KADIMA PARTY, did not bring peace to the Middle East. It was more an attempt to make internal peace in Israel and external peace with the Americans, but not with the Palestinians. Moreover, in the same breath that Sharon deplored the Occupation, he said that the settlement project would continue.

Nevertheless, some agreements were made, such as that reached by Sharon and Abbas at

Sharm al-Shaykh in February 2005, just after the death of Arafat. The SHARM AL-SHAYKH DECLARATION indicated the Israeli-Palestinian war was over. The war, however, was never over, even when Israel evacuated the settlements from the Gaza Strip and withdrew from the area in August 2005. At that time, the al-Aqsa Intifada had been under way for more than five full years. It had claimed 1,064 Israeli victims and 7,462 wounded. The casualties on the Palestinian side were vastly higher: 3,729 Palestinians were killed and nearly 25,000 wounded, and the violence, mainly around the Gaza Strip, continued.

Second Lebanon War and Gaza War

On 4 January 2006, Sharon suffered a stroke and sank into a coma. The new coalition government continued Sharon's "third way" and the Kadima Party. Some observers even anticipated a strategic change under a government headed by two "civilians," EHUD OLMERT as prime minister and Amir Peretz as defense minister. However, this government also did not succeed in releasing Israel from its dependence on its army and the army's ideas about the way to solve the country's problems. Thus, in response to provocations made by Hassan Nasrallah, the HIZBULLAH leader, the IDF's leadership persuaded the "civilian" government to go to war on 12 July 2006 and was cheered on by the public. Israel penetrated Lebanon but, as always, it was the Lebanese civilians who paid the price. The army, in what became habitual in those years, developed military tactics that deliberately used civilians as a bargaining card, and the Israeli chief of staff, Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, who was formerly commander of the air force, believed that the "Kosovo doctrine" could be successfully applied to Lebanon. This strategy, which took its name from the NATO bombing campaign of the former Yugoslavia in 1999, called for Israel to take advantage of its technological superiority and its unchallenged aerial superiority and decide the war swiftly by "remote control" with massive bombing raids and "surgical strikes," which kill civilians as well.

Surprisingly, in the course of the thirty-three-day conflict, Israel was unable to subdue the Hizbullah fighters, who numbered no more than a few thousand. Moreover, the Israeli "home front" became a war front, as the population was unprotected and suffered tremendously from the Hizbullah rockets. The war was a clear Israeli failure. The tide of criticism that was unleashed in Israel after the war targeted the army's inefficiency and the political leadership's inexperience. One of the major lessons Israel drew from the fiasco of the Second Lebanon War was that the IDF must prepare better for the next war. It was also clear that the era of "civilian" defense ministers had ended with the brief tenure of Amir Peretz, who finally resigned in June 2007, and that future holders of the post would come from the heart of the security establishment. Thus, Peretz was succeeded by a former chief of staff, Ehud Barak. Other lessons, of a technical-military nature, were also learned. But there was one issue that was hardly referred to: the fact that the government had allowed the army an almost totally free hand in the war. Again the influence of the army within the military-political nexus in Israel became clear. In the meantime, Israel again turned its attention to the Palestinians.

The Gaza Strip, which was under the full control of Hamas since 14 June 2007, continued to be a source of rocket fire into Israel, and Israel did not stop its military operations there. In fact, the entire Strip was under a tight boycott, electricity and fuel supplies were minimal, and Gaza was completely cut off from the West Bank. Among other things, it seemed that the Palestinians in Gaza paid the price of supporting Hamas and denying the more moderate way of the FATAH-dominated Palestinian National Authority, which still controlled the West Bank. The cycle of QASSAM ROCKET attacks, followed by IDF raids, targeted assassinations, air raids, and attempts to strike at rocket-launching squads, continued as well. Even when Israel and Hamas were engaged in a cease-fire, silence did not occur. On 17 June 2008 an Egyptian-sponsored six-month truce was agreed upon by Israel and Hamas, set to last until 19 December 2008. On 4 November 2008 the Israeli army broke the truce when it sent an assault team backed by air cover into Gaza and killed seven militants. Subsequently Hamas announced the termination of the cease-fire and ratcheted up its rocket attacks. On 27 December 2008, Israel unleashed its massive air, sea, and ground campaign—"OPERATION CAST LEAD"—on Gaza, in a war that lasted twenty-two days, until 18 January 2009. On 19 September 2007, Israel had accorded a new status to Gaza when its Security Cabinet declared it a "hostile territory"—a characterization that was shortly afterward approved by the United States. Although the legal implications that Israel intended to attach to this

status remain unclear, the political purpose of this declaration was immediately made known—the further reduction of the supply of fuel and electricity to Gaza.

The Gaza War again demonstrated the influence of the new militarism that prevailed in Israel, which included damage to INFRASTRUCTURE and harm to civilians. The war started with a massive surprise air strike that killed about 270 people and wounded 750 the first day. Most of them were Hamas members; however, among the objectives specifically targeted was a festive ceremony marking the completion of a training course for seventy police cadets. They were not combatants and were not even necessarily supporters of Hamas, but young men looking for gainful work in an area rife with unemployment. Their killing would probably not meet the test of international legal judgment. Indeed, in Israel itself there were deep differences of opinion about the legality of the attack on the ceremony. But IDF officers could not resist the temptation. Hamas, though taken by surprise by the air strike and its scale, continued to fire rockets at Israel and also showed that it had succeeded in vastly increasing their range. Now it was the southern half of Israel that took to the shelters. After a few days of mutual shelling and punishing air and artillery attacks by Israel, the IDF launched a ground operation, this time not delaying as it had done in Lebanon in 2006. In Gaza, the Israeli officers were determined to resuscitate the IDF's prestige, which had been battered in the Second Lebanon War. IDF troops advanced into the outlying neighborhoods of the city, demolishing houses and gunning down Palestinians, both Hamas fighters and noncombatant civilians. Even though Israeli public opinion overwhelmingly supported the war, the recurring questions surfaced again, and as in the past, neither the political nor the military leadership had clear answers: Did the operation have defined goals? Would the attacks on Palestinian civilians produce any concrete results?

The MEDIA was kept out of Gaza, but devastating reports emerged especially from Al-Jazeera, and have been broadcast across the globe. When the scale of the destruction and the number of civilian casualties—including a large proportion of children—began to become apparent, particularly in Europe and the Arab world, international initiatives for a cease-fire followed almost immediately. Though pleased at the blow sustained by Hamas, Israelis could not entirely ignore the hundreds of civilian dead and the thousands of wounded. Many in Israel sought to justify the ferocity of the operation by noting that Hamas had effectively established a small armed state in the Gaza Strip. But the "state" was hemmed in from all sides by the long Israeli-Egyptian siege, and its population of 1.4 million was deprived of basic commodities, including food, medicine, fuel, electricity, and other basic essentials for life. As the days wore on with no appreciable change in the situation and it became increasingly clear that the international pressure would eventuate in a cease-fire, the soldiers were urged by their commanders to "keep up the pressure." Their rationale, invoked so often by the IDF in the past, and most recently in the Second Lebanon War, was based on the rhetoric that such pressure "will help the government reach the best arrangement possible." Some again looked for a "victory photo" to satisfy the IDF and perhaps also the political leadership, which waged an election campaign throughout the operation and did not want to be considered "soft" on Hamas. In any war, even if the army is careful, in a new war civilians are being killed constantly. As for the declarations of many Israeli leaders, such as Foreign Minister, TZIPORA LIVNI that "Hamas does not represent any legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people," and that the conflict will be resolved when Israel finds a "legitimate partner" to talk to, this was little more than an updated version of the "third way" that was first adopted by Sharon, according to which you do not make peace with your enemy you just please the vast majority of Israelis and your allies, in this case the Bush administration and its demand for Israeli moderation.

Thus, the Gaza War was over, but few basic "truths" concerning the Israeli attitude in the new millennium remained unchanged: First, most Israelis accepted the militaristic-religious definition according to which the reason for the Palestinian war against Israel is not the Occupation but their unwillingness to recognize Israel's right to exist. Second, with the decline of hegemonic statism and the nation-in-arms arrangements, a new version of militarism evolved in Israel. It is no longer the all-embracing statist militarism, which included "everybody," and it is no longer a "no-choice" militarism that was based on the argument of the small Israel that has to protect itself against its surroundings. It is now the militarism of a sector that gained influence and even predominance in Israel, a militarism that is based on an ultra-ethnonational per-

spective, a new religious-nationalism, fundamentalism, dehumanization, and even racism. It is a militarism that wants to preserve Greater Israel even at the price of constant war. It is a militarism of a sector that does not form the majority in Israel but that various circumstances, including mistakes that were committed by the Palestinians, have brought to the fore. To conclude, the vast shadow of Israel's new militarism, which flourishes in the global era, can definitely be regarded as one reason for the impossibility of peace in Middle East.

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; INTIFADAS; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT

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—Uri Ben-Eliezer

Israeli Military Court System in the Occupied Territories

The Israeli military court system in the WEST BANK and GAZA is the criminal justice component of the military administration that was established in 1967, when Israel occupied these regions after the 1967 WAR. This court system is different and separate from the system used to court-martial Israeli soldiers and is also distinct from the legal system for Israelis, including those who live in the Jewish SETTLEMENTS. Although the nature of Israel's OCCUPATION of the West Bank and Gaza was somewhat altered by the OSLO ACCORDS and the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in 1994, the military courts have continued to function and likely will do so as long as the Occupation of any part of these regions endures.

The military courts are used to prosecute Palestinians arrested by the Israeli military and charged with security violations and other offenses, including a wide array of nonviolent activities. Under the Israeli Occupation, punishable activities encompass anything the Israeli authorities deem menacing to Israel's security or disruptive of order. Even Palestinians' normal

activities, including EDUCATION, marriage, work, HEALTH CARE, and movement, have been regulated by military and emergency laws that impose criminal sanctions for breaches and violations.

The military court system has been a subject of ongoing controversy. Some of its inherent problems include blurring and contradictions between the military and legal dimensions of Israeli control over foreign civilians, the use of soldiers in a policing capacity, and the complex and unpredictable nature of the laws enforced through the courts. Moreover, military law and practice have no presumption of innocence; the three-pronged practice of arrest, interrogation, and prosecution is premised on the presumption of guilt. This is evident in the fact that any soldier can arrest any Palestinian for the slightest suspicion or cause, and, once arrested, individuals can be held incommunicado for prolonged periods. The presumption of guilt is further confirmed by widespread judicial refusal to release detainees on bail, impediments to and prolonged denials of lawyer-client meetings, and a pattern of judicial concession to prosecutors' requests for extension of detention. Controversies and criticisms of the military court system extend to disputed interpretations about the applicability of international humanitarian and human rights laws to Israeli rule in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, compounded by the combined effects of the enduring conflict, Palestinian statelessness, and Israeli aspirations to retain permanent control over all or part of the territories.

How the System Works

Three bodies of legislation are enforced through the military courts: original Israeli military legislation, the 1945 British Defense (Emergency) Regulations, and local criminal laws (Jordanian in the West Bank and Egyptian in Gaza). Israeli Military Orders (MOs) constitute the main body of law regulating the operation of the military courts. They also designate specific offenses, including the following:

- Violations of security (sabotage or attacks on military installations, possession or carrying of firearms, attacks on ROADS, spying)
- Criminal offenses with security implications (forms of political/national speech and association, failure to prevent or report planned attacks, distribution of literature or organization of activities that disrupt order)
- Offenses relating to the operation of the military courts (escaping from custody, committing perjury, disobeying a summons to appear in court)
- Criminal offenses not related to security (failure to pay taxes, bribery, or trade violations, to cite a few)

By the early 1990s the Israeli military had promulgated over 1,300 MOs for the West Bank and over 1,000 for Gaza. The criminal provisions of the British Defense Regulations outlaw membership in an "illegal organization" (which Israel interprets as including Palestinian nationalist and Islamist organizations and factions), aiding and abetting members of illegal organizations, and threats to public order and safety. Since 1967 hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been arrested by the Israeli military. Not all Palestinians who are arrested are prosecuted in the military court system; some are released, while others undergo ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION without charges. Of those who are charged, approximately 90 to 95 percent are convicted.

The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) do not maintain records of the total number of people who have been prosecuted in the military courts. But according to a widely acknowledged rule of thumb, approximately 50 percent of Palestinians who are arrested are released or administratively detained without charges, and the other 50 percent are charged with crimes and prosecuted. Approximately 813,000 Palestinians were arrested between 1967 and 1993. During the First Intifada (1987–1993) at least 20,000 to 25,000 were arrested every year, the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world at that time. In 1994 and 1995, the start of the Oslo Accords, arrest rates declined to approximately 6,000 per year. Between 1996 and September 2000 the annual average varied from 1,200 to 3,600. Between 29 September 2000 (the start of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA) and September 2002 approximately 15,000 were arrested. The total estimated number of prosecutions since 1967 is over half a million.

Main Participants

The military court system has five main categories of participants: judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, translators, and defendants. All judges, prosecutors, and translators are Israeli citizens and soldiers. All of the judges are Jewish Israelis, as are most of the prosecutors, although a few of the latter are Israeli Druze (an ethnoreligious sect), as

are most of the translators. Defense lawyers, all civilians, include Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, Jewish Israeli citizens, and PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL (i.e., Arab Israelis). The defendants are Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories.

The administration of the military court system is under the direct authority of the military advocate general, appointed by the minister of defense. For the judiciary the administrative hierarchy is (1) military advocate general, (2) president of the military court of appeals (established in 1989), (3) presidents of military courts, and (4) other judges. In principle judges are obliged to act impartially and to ensure the fair enforcement of the law. In practice some judges regard their role as complementary to that of the prosecutors and tend to emphasize the need for close coordination of military and legal measures to maintain Israeli security, order, and control, whereas others strive to maintain a degree of judicial impartiality toward prosecution evidence.

The prosecution is administratively distinct from the judiciary, although judges and prosecutors (and translators) are members of the same IDF unit. The administrative hierarchy for the prosecution is (1) military advocate general, (2) legal advisor (West Bank and Gaza), (3) head prosecutor (West Bank and Gaza), (4) head prosecutors of military courts, and (5) other prosecutors. The prosecutors' primary concern is the conviction of the accused. They have less latitude and discretion than prosecutors in civilian courts because their work is overseen and directed by their superiors in the military hierarchy, and their mandate (including penalties for charges and sentencing guidelines) is defined by directives coming from the military establishment.

Translators are required in this court system because many Palestinians from the Occupied Territories cannot speak Hebrew and many Jewish Israelis cannot speak Arabic. Translators use their bilingual Arabic-Hebrew skills during court proceedings to enable judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to understand one another and to communicate their points. Translators also assist, when necessary, in out-of-court discussions (e.g., negotiating plea bargains).

The Israeli and Palestinian defense lawyers who practice in the military court system in the West Bank and Gaza provide a variety of legal and extralegal services. They represent people who have been arrested and defend the rights of the accused throughout the legal process. Lawyers also visit clients in prison and many encourage or console PRISONERS as they endure the travails of prosecution and incarceration, and serve as their link to family members. Lawyers who are members of the Israel Bar Association (i.e., Israeli citizens) have the prerogative to submit petitions to the Israel HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (HCJ) in order to challenge military administrative measures, including the treatment of clients at the hands of soldiers or interrogators, or other matters that relate to arrest, interrogation, and pretrial detention. However, the HCJ does not entertain petitions concerning the functioning or decisions of the military courts.

All Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza are potential defendants, because all are subject to the jurisdiction of the military court system. A defendant's participation in the military court system may include arrest, interrogation, prosecution, and imprisonment and/or fining. There is no legal requirement that a Palestinian's arrest be preceded by a detention order or that a person be informed of the reason for arrest when taken into custody. Although there is a provision for *habeas corpus* (challenging the lawfulness of an arrest and the necessity of detention), in practice this is treated as a request for release on bail, and bail is almost never granted. In most cases people are detained throughout the proceedings until their cases are concluded.

Confessions as Primary Evidence

In the vast majority of military court convictions, the primary (or sometimes only) evidence against the accused is a confession (first- and/or third-party) extracted during interrogations. The IDF and the police conduct some interrogations, but the main agency responsible for interrogation is the General Security Service (GSS, also known by its Hebrew acronyms SHIN BET and Shabak). Interrogations feed the legal process by procuring confessions that are then turned over to police and prosecutors. Over 97 percent of all cases in which charges are brought are concluded through a plea bargain rather than a trial. Plea bargain agreements must be accepted and confirmed by judges in court, and judges have the authority to reject or alter a negotiated deal.

There are three categories of military courts, distinguished by their number of judges (one or

three) and their maximum sentencing power. Until July 1991 the maximum sentence that could be issued by a one-judge court was five years in prison, but this was raised to a maximum of ten years. Three-judge courts are empowered to pass sentences up to the maximum of life in prison or the death penalty. Although several death sentences have been handed down by military courts, all were subsequently commuted to life sentences. The military court of appeals, established in 1989, is composed of a three-judge panel, although there is a provision for a five-judge panel. No decision of a military court (including the court of appeals) has status as a legally binding precedent. Consequently there is a great deal of disparity in the sentences issued for similar charges.

Until 1994 the military courts were located in the Palestinian towns of Ramallah, HEBRON, NABLUS, JENIN, Tulkarem, and Gaza; the courts in Jenin and Tulkarem were set up during the First Intifada. After the Israeli military redeployment negotiated under the Oslo Accords, the military courts were relocated to West Bank military bases at Beit El and Adoreim and the Gaza base at Erez. There are also military courts attached to prisons and detention centers to handle hearings for extensions of detention and appeals against administrative detention.

History

The Israeli military court system was established on the third day of the 1967 War as one of the first official acts of the military administration. Its timing suggests a high degree of Israeli preparedness for Occupation. The most extensive prewar planning occurred under the direction of MEIR SHAMGAR, who served as the military advocate general from 1961 to 1968. In the mid-1960s Shamgar developed skeletal exercises in military government problems for his unit and prepared a comprehensive *Manual for the Military Advocate in Military Government*, which included a large set of precedents from military government proclamations and orders, as well as detailed legal and organizational instructions and guidelines.

Before the 1967 War, Shamgar also conceived the principles of a legal doctrine for Israeli control of occupied territory and rule over Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza. This doctrine incorporates a number of interrelated components and premises. First, Shamgar reasoned that Israeli control of these areas would *not* constitute a "foreign occupation," because they were part of the historic Jewish homeland (Eretz Yisrael) and because the displaced rulers, JORDAN and EGYPT, were themselves occupiers who had seized control during the 1948 WAR. In his interpretation of international humanitarian law, territory is occupied in war only if it was clearly part of the sovereign domain of the defeated and expelled state. According to Shamgar's formulation Israel was not occupying but rather administrating these disputed areas, whose legal status was sui generis.

The original proclamation establishing a military court system in June 1967 declared that the military courts would be run in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention (the most important international humanitarian law pertaining to the occupation of conquered territories and their civilian population), and soldiers were instructed to abide by this convention in any instance where there was a contradiction between it and original military legislation. However, the second element of Shamgar's legal doctrine, which builds on the first, holds that the Fourth Geneva Convention, promulgated in the aftermath of World War II, is not applicable to Israeli rule on a de jure basis. If it were, Shamgar reasoned, this would constitute an acknowledgment of Israel's own status as an occupier. The Fourth Geneva Convention delineates the rights and duties of "High Contracting Parties" (i.e., signatory states) vis-à-vis territories and populations of other high contracting parties. Because Jordan and Egypt were not sovereigns in the West Bank and Gaza, according to Shamgar's reasoning, they did not have the status as high contracting parties in these areas. And although Israel is a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions, this would have no bearing on territories that are not occupied.

A third component of Shamgar's doctrine was that Israel would abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention on a de facto basis and would respect its "humanitarian provisions." However, Israeli officials have never specified which provisions of the convention they do—or do not—regard as humanitarian, whereas the International Committee of the Red Cross, the official guardian of the Geneva Conventions, regards them as humanitarian in their entirety and rejects any attempts to interpret this legislation selectively.

A fourth component of Shamgar's doctrine holds that the Fourth Geneva Convention could not be binding on Israel, even if there were no dis-

pute over the status of the West Bank and Gaza, because at least part of the convention constitutes "conventional" rather than "customary" INTERNATIONAL LAW. Therefore, the convention would not supersede "local" laws unless the Israeli Knesset enacted it as domestic legislation or until the state recognized that it has acquired status as customary international law. However, the international community overwhelmingly regards the Geneva Conventions as customary international law.

Shamgar's doctrine essentially interpreted Palestinian statelessness as rightlessness and provided the Israeli state with carte blanche for control of legal proceedings in the West Bank and Gaza. By interpreting the Fourth Geneva Convention as pertaining exclusively to the rights and duties of sovereign states, Shamgar asserted that the Palestinian people could not be the rightful sovereigns of the West Bank and Gaza, because nothing in international law prescribes the recognition of sovereignty to a "non-state" or demands the creation of a heretofore nonexistent state in territories seized in war. This doctrine also provided the legal basis for the establishment of civilian (Jewish Israeli) settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Mentioning a de facto commitment to undefined "humanitarian provisions" was a means of acknowledging that Palestinians have some rights as individuals, but not as a national entity. Shamgar's doctrine and his interpretations of international law on which it was based became the foundation of official Israeli policy and were reinforced by the HCJ.

Military Courts Established in 1967

Following Israel's 1967 conquest of the West Bank and Gaza with their 1.5 million Palestinian inhabitants (a population that now numbers over 3.6 million), one-third of the population living under Israeli rule was Palestinian Arab. The Israeli military court system was accorded concurrent jurisdiction with local (Palestinian) courts in the West Bank and Gaza and was empowered to try Palestinian residents of the territories for crimes committed outside the territories (personal jurisdiction), in the territories (territorial jurisdiction), or anywhere that might have an impact on the security situation in the territories (extraterritorial jurisdiction). To ensure that Israeli citizens in the West Bank and Gaza would not be subject to the military and emergency laws or the jurisdiction of the military courts, on 2 July 1967 the Knesset enacted a law giving domestic Israeli courts concurrent jurisdiction with courts in the territories for Israeli settlers.

From the outset, Israel also used the draconian British Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 to govern and punish Palestinians. Although the Defense Regulations were used against Arab citizens of Israel for decades, the first challenges to their legality were mounted in the Israeli Supreme Court on behalf of petitioners from the West Bank and Gaza after 1967. One challenge contested the state's right to use these laws because the British had revoked the Defense Regulations on 12 May 1948, several days before the BRITISH MANDATE ended, and thus they were no longer in effect when Israel declared independence on 15 May 1948. The official Israeli response was that the regulations had remained in force because the British did not publish the revocation order in the *Palestine Gazette*, thus terming their cancellation a "hidden law," a position upheld and confirmed by the HCJ in 1979.

A second challenge contested the legality of the regulations on the grounds that many of their provisions were outlawed by developments in international law since World War II. Israel's official position held that it was required by the Fourth Geneva Convention to maintain the regulations in the West Bank and Gaza as part of the "local laws" in force at the time of the conquest, implying that the Jordanian and Egyptian governments also rejected the validity of the British revocation, even though the regulations were never used in either region between 1948 and 1967. Thus, the Israeli government used the Fourth Geneva Convention to justify the maintenance of the regulations, while disregarding the convention's prohibition of their anachronistic and illegal provisions.

In the early years of the Occupation, manifestations of Palestinian resistance were limited for the most part to armed attacks by *fida'iyyun* (fighters), including both those residing in the Occupied Territories and others who crossed the borders from surrounding Arab states. Some captured *fida'iyyun* were tried and convicted in the new military courts. But at that early stage the court system was functioning in a rather limited capacity, because the Israeli authorities mainly used administrative detention and DEPORTATION to punish and deter ARMED STRUGGLE. In 1970–1971 the Israeli military undertook a "pacification" campaign to quell the resistance in Gaza. The imposed quiescence provided

the authorities with the latitude to institute more legalistic means of control, including expanding the military court system.

Interrogation was increasingly aimed at producing confessions to be used for conviction. Israeli and Palestinian defense lawyers working in the military court system began reporting claims by their clients of beatings, electric shock, death threats, position abuse, cold showers, sexual abuse, and denial of access to toilets. The official response condemned reports of such torture and ill-treatment during Israeli interrogations as anti-Israel lies and smears and asserted that such claims were based on pernicious fabrications by Palestinians and other "enemies of the state." Consequently, many international observers were skeptical or reluctant to label Israel a torturing state.

In 1977 the *Sunday Times* (London) published a detailed inquiry into "Arab allegations and official Israeli denials of the use of torture." The *Times* reported that "torture of Arab prisoners is so widespread and systematic that it cannot be dismissed as 'rogue cops' exceeding orders. It appears to be sanctioned as deliberate policy." The Israeli government, through its embassy in London, ridiculed the findings and conclusions of the article as "fantastic horror stories" in a response on 3 July 1977. Nevertheless, Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN ordered a curtailment of violent interrogation tactics. As a result allegations of torture declined for the next several years. To compensate, beginning around 1979 the GSS developed a new technique to gather information and extract confessions: the procurement and use of Palestinian COLLABORATORS (*'asafir*, literally "birds") in prisons.

In the late 1970s intensified LAND confiscations and Jewish settlement activity, combined with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, led to an escalation of Palestinian protests and resistance, which in turn led to an escalating number of arrests and interrogations. By the early 1980s the hiatus on torture had ended. An important legal development relating to interrogation was instituted in 1981: henceforth, a person could be convicted on the basis of a third-party confession, whereas previously a conviction required either a first-party confession or material evidence. This change institutionalized the admissibility of hearsay in the military court system. It also benefited the GSS agents, because each conviction that resulted from such interrogations was recorded as a credit in an agent's personnel file.

International Attention to Court System

From the beginning of the Occupation through the end of the 1970s, very little scholarly or political attention was directed to the operations of the Israeli military court system or the legality of the means used to govern Palestinians. The first efforts to redress this lacuna and forge a legal critique of Israeli military rule were undertaken by a few military court lawyers. The process began in 1979 with the creation of Law in the Service of Man (LSM, later renamed AL-HAQ), the first Palestinian human rights organization and a West Bank affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ).

In 1980 two of LSM/al-Haq's founders, Raja SHEHADEH and Jonathan Kuttab, published *The West Bank and the Rule of Law*. This book described changes in the West Bank legal system since the onset of Occupation and was the first effort to compile a comprehensive account of Israel's uses of emergency laws and military orders. A rejoinder to Shehadeh and Kuttab's book was published in 1981 under the title *The Rule of Law in the Territories Administered by Israel.* Although not an official publication, it was authored by Israeli government lawyers and thus quickly acquired status as one of the most important public articulations of the government's legal basis for its policies. These publications spurred a mounting body of scholarship and reporting about the military court system and more thorough and sophisticated critiques of Israel's violations of international law in the Occupied Territories, as well as more detailed elaborations of the legal framework for official policies and rejoinders to critical assessments.

By the mid-1980s more human rights organizations were established in the Occupied Territories and in Israel. In this period international organizations were becoming increasingly attentive to the situation in the Occupied Territories because of escalating tensions in the region, including Israel's invasion of LEBANON in 1982, the evacuation of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) leadership to Tunisia, and the massacre of hundreds of civilians by the Lebanese PHALANGE in the SABRA AND SHATILA refugee camps outside Beirut. In 1985 the Israeli military administration imposed a harsh "IRON FIST" POLICY in the West

Bank and Gaza to crush and punish resistance to the Occupation and any demonstrations of support for other Palestinian communities.

Amnesty International (AI), the most prominent international human rights organization at that time, focused on political prisoners, fair trials, and an end to torture and executions. In its work in Israel, AI refused to accept Israel's argument that membership in the PLO automatically constituted the advocacy or use of violence and was therefore a punishable offense. However, in comparison to its coverage of the situation in apartheid South Africa, AI was more cautious in its support for Palestinian prisoners and more circumspect in its criticisms of Israel. For example, AI did not use the word "torture" in reports on Israel until 1990.

In 1987 two scandals involving the GSS—the summary execution of captured Palestinian prisoners (who had hijacked a bus) and a charge by a Circassian Israeli soldier that he had been tortured to elicit the confession that had been used to prosecute him (for treason)—prompted the government to appoint an official commission of inquiry, headed by MOSHE LANDAU, a retired justice of the Israeli Supreme Court. Among its findings the LANDAU COMMISSION report confirmed that GSS agents had used violent interrogation methods routinely on Palestinian detainees since at least 1971 and that they had routinely lied about such practices when confessions were challenged in court on the grounds that they had been coerced. Although the Landau Commission was harsh in its criticism of GSS perjury, it adopted the GSS's own position that coercive interrogation tactics are necessary in the struggle against "hostile terrorist activity." The Landau Commission accepted the broad definition of TERRORISM used by the GSS, which encompasses not only acts or threats of violence but virtually all activities related to Palestinian nationalism.

The Landau Commission argued that Israeli penal law could be interpreted to give interrogators license to use "moderate amounts of physical pressure" as well as various forms of psychological intimidation as part of the fight against terrorism. The legality of such pressure, the commission reasoned, could be justified under the "necessity defense," which permits people to use violence in "self-defense," thereby mitigating criminal liability on the grounds that they are acting to prevent grievous harm. The specific interrogation methods that the Landau Commission recommended were contained in a classified appendix to the report. The Israeli government adopted the Landau Commission's recommendation to authorize "moderate physical pressure," making Israel the first state in the world to "legalize" and publicly sanction interrogation methods that constitute torture according to international law.

The Landau Commission report's publication (30 October 1987) and its endorsement by the Israeli Cabinet (November 8) coincided with the outbreak of the First Intifada (uprising) on 9 December 1987. Between 1988 and July 1993 some 100,000 Palestinians were arrested by Israeli forces, and 83,321 were prosecuted. This massive increase in arrests, interrogations, prosecutions, and imprisonment focused unprecedented attention on the military court system. Extensive MEDIA coverage of the popular resistance and the military's responses increased international awareness of the Occupation and demands for information; every local human rights organization in Israel/Palestine and many international organizations issued reports on some aspect(s) of the military court system.

Arrest and Interrogation

Arrest and interrogation are two complementary and coordinated means for any state to investigate individuals suspected of crimes. In the West Bank and Gaza, every Israeli soldier has the authority to arrest any Palestinian if he or she suspects that the person has committed, planned, or conspired to commit an offense. These arrests and interrogations of Palestinians are often violent, which is deliberate and calibrated to induce and exacerbate suffering. A second type, "initiated" arrests, generally is ordered by the GSS and carried out by the military, often in the middle of the night. Upon arrest detainees are turned over to the GSS for interrogation. "Roundups," a third type of arrest, sometimes involve mass arrests at demonstrations or public events, or in the course of military operations. In roundups GSS agents do a brief check on each person, keeping people they want to interrogate and turning over those suspected of minor offenses to the IDF or Israeli police for interrogation.

A detained Palestinian from the West Bank or Gaza can be held in custody for up to eighteen days without charges before being brought before a judge. This breaks down as follows: ninety-six hours of detention on the order of any soldier and

two seven-day extensions of detention on the order of police officers, usually at the request of the GSS. Following the initial eighteen days, detention can be extended by order of a judge. Extension-of-detention hearings usually take place in prisons, although sometimes extension hearings are held in regular military courts. Typically prosecutors request an extension of detention when the interrogation has not been completed (i.e., the person has not confessed) or when the authorities have not had time to act on the confession (e.g., arresting people implicated in the detainee's statement). A judge can grant an extension of detention without charges for up to six months. In 1992 a new policy was issued that reduced the maximum time allowed before an extension hearing from eighteen to eight days for minors and people suspected of simple crimes. But there was no institutionalized oversight of this shortened detention, and its implementation was irregular.

Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are authorized to meet with detainees on the fourteenth day of detention to review who is in custody and their conditions and treatment. But by the terms of the agreement between the Israeli government and the ICRC, the latter's representatives are barred from relaying information about detainees' conditions or whereabouts to others, including lawyers and family members. Although, in principle, detained Palestinians have the right to meet with a lawyer, lawyer-client meetings tend to be prohibited as long as the person is undergoing interrogation. Provisions in military legislation can prohibit detainees from any access to lawyers for up to ninety days. Interrogators have the authority to prevent a lawyer-client meeting for up to thirty days (two fifteen-day periods, the second on the order of someone of higher rank than the person who ordered the first period). Following that, a military judge can issue another thirty-day order barring the meeting, and a third thirty-day order can be issued by the president or acting president of a military court. In April 2002, during major offensive operations in the West Bank, the IDF issued MO 1500, reaffirming the policy that allowed eighteen days of incommunicado detention. This order instituted a blanket prohibition of lawyers' right to meet with clients for the first eighteen days. In response to a petition submitted to the HCJ, the order was amended in July 2002. Under MO 1505, prisoners could be held incommunicado for twelve days, but lawyers would have to petition the courts on a case-by-case basis to meet with their clients after that period.

The age of "criminal responsibility" in the Occupied Territories is twelve. Children younger than twelve can be arrested but not interrogated. Palestinians twelve and older are classified legally as "minors"; those aged twelve to thirteen are "juveniles" and those aged fourteen to sixteen are "youths." The maximum sentence is six months for juveniles and one year for youths who are convicted of minor security violations, such as demonstrating, writing graffiti, throwing stones (if no injury resulted), and building or manning barricades. However, maximum sentence restrictions do not apply for juveniles convicted of more serious security violations, including murder and attempted murder, attacks and weapons possession, and membership in an illegal organization. During the First Intifada throwing stones was made into a felony offense and classified as an assault with weapons; Palestinians sixteen and younger have received sentences of up to four years in prison for throwing stones.

Interrogation Techniques

Approximately 85 percent of arrestees are interrogated. In 1993 the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme published findings of a study based on a sample of 477 Palestinian ex-prisoners who had spent between six months and ten years in prison. Of this total, 91.7 percent had spent five years or less in prison, meaning that they were convicted of minor crimes. The findings documented the incidence of specific interrogation methods as percentages of the sample: beatings (95.8 percent), verbal humiliation (94.8 percent), exposure to extreme cold (92.9 percent), prolonged standing (91.6 percent), threats against personal safety (90.6 percent), solitary confinement (86 percent), intense noise (81.6 percent), food deprivation (77.4 percent), exposure to extreme heat (76.7 percent), sleep deprivation (71.5 percent), forced witnessing of torture of other detainees (70.2 percent), pressure applied on the neck (68.1 percent), pressure applied on the testicles (66 percent), witnessing torture of family members (28.1 percent), threats of torture or rape of female family members (27.9 percent), tear gas (13.4 percent), pushing instruments into the penis or rectum (11.1 percent), and electric shock (5.9 percent). Other studies and investigations of

interrogation tactics have generated similar findings.

Although far fewer Palestinian women and girls have been arrested than men and boys, the number is nevertheless in the thousands. Palestinian females who are arrested are subjected to many of the same interrogation methods as males. They are also subjected to special methods that exploit their gender, such as sexual harassment and abuse, and techniques and threats that manipulate notions of "female honor" and women's feelings for their family members, especially their children.

After the publication of the Landau Commission report in 1987, lawyers mounted a protracted campaign of litigation in the HCJ to challenge the legality of interrogation tactics used on Palestinians. In 1990 a group of Israeli lawyers and human rights activists formed the PUBLIC COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE IN ISRAEL (PCATI) to spearhead a campaign to end the use of torture. This litigation, along with the hundreds of petitions by lawyers representing Palestinian prisoners, forced the state to admit or acknowledge that its permissible methods included the routine use of threats and insults, sleep deprivation, hooding and blindfolding, position abuse, physical violence (including "shaking," which produces a whiplash effect and leaves no physical marks), solitary confinement (including in refrigerated or overheated closet-like cells), and subjection to excessively filthy conditions.

In 1993 the Israeli government reported that the GSS had modified its interrogation procedures, although these changes remained classified. The HCJ granted relief in certain cases, but its general pattern of decisions and delays served to preserve the secrecy of GSS interrogation practices and, in effect, to support the state's refusal to adhere to international law in its treatment of Palestinian detainees. This litigation also revealed information about GSS interrogations. For example, the state confirmed three interrelated types of treatment for detainees: active interrogation, "waiting," and "rest." Waiting entailed physical discomfort (often extreme) and sleep deprivation to prepare (i.e., "soften up") the detainee for the interrogation. Most detainees were held in waiting twenty-four hours a day for five-and-a-half-day intervals, the only interruptions being active interrogation and three daily five-minute breaks when the detainee is placed in a toilet in order to relieve himself and at the same time is given his meal. Detainees are placed in the "rest" position during the Sabbath, when the GSS interrogators go home, at which time they are unhooded and unshackled in cells where they can sleep.

In January 1998 the HCJ combined a number of petitions pertaining to interrogation tactics and convened a panel of nine justices to consider the matter. On 6 September 1999 the court rendered a decision in *PCATI v. State of Israel* (HCJ 5100/94) that prohibited GSS agents from routinely using physical "pressure," although the decision neither called these tactics "torture" nor completely excluded their continued use under exceptional circumstances. After the ruling some methods all but disappeared (e.g., violent shaking, covering a detainee's head with a thick cloth sack, and exposure to extremely loud and constant music). But other methods remain common practice, including sleep deprivation, position abuse and painful shackling, exposure to extremes in temperature, and intense pressure applied to various body parts.

In addition to the use of various physical and psychological "pressure" tactics, interrogators routinely have used Palestinian collaborators in prison (*'asafir*) to elicit confessions. The two main tactics in the *'asafir* repertoire, deception and violence, are often used in sequence, and anything prisoners say to *'asafir* is treated as evidence. Some *'asafir* are special agents planted in prisons, but many are prisoners themselves who were recruited while undergoing interrogation or serving a sentence. Although the First Intifada caused a near-total collapse of the Palestinian collaborator network, a reorganization of the military and security apparatus compensated for this collapse by recruiting a new network of informants within prisons and using strategies of entrapment, such as promises of shorter sentences, vital services (e.g., medical treatment), or better prison conditions.

Legal Process

Once the interrogation is finished, the prosecutor prepares the charge sheet if there is a confession and/or other forms of evidence to charge the detainee, and the legal process begins. If a confession is the main evidence, the prosecutor needs an additional scintilla (that is, a minimum of evidence upon which to validate a charge, *dvar ma* in Hebrew). In the military court system the scintilla could be the protocol of the extension-of-detention hearing; if a detainee failed to tell the presiding judge that he is "innocent," the prosecutor could

use this as an admission of guilt. Given that detainees often are not represented by counsel at extension-of-detention hearings, many are unaware that declaring their innocence is an option. Corroborating evidence can also include the testimony of an arresting soldier, information that a particular event for which the defendant is being charged actually occurred, or secret evidence.

In the domestic Israeli criminal justice system a confession must pass certain logical tests to ensure that it was not invented by the accused, such as a scintilla that the accused had the opportunity to commit the crime or that the confession does not contradict other evidence. However, in the military court system the scintilla does not have to corroborate the confession or even to implicate the accused directly. All it has to show is a *possible* connection between the accused and the crime. Even when a defendant subsequently rescinds a confession on the grounds that it was coerced or when other exculpatory information becomes available, the military court has the option to retain—and prefer—the confession over other evidence.

In principle a defense lawyer can challenge a confession that a client claims was coerced by calling for a *zuta* (voir dire; often called a "mini-trial" or a "trial-within-a-trial"). This entails a hearing in camera, in which a judge hears testimony from the defendant, the interrogators, and any others who have relevant information (e.g., police, prison guards, and doctors). But for such a challenge to succeed the judge would have to consider the testimony of the defendant more credible than that of the interrogators. In the history of the military court system, there are almost no instances in which a judge threw out a confession as a result of a *zuta*, and most defense lawyers are disinclined to attempt using this procedure because the client can face greater punishment as reprisal for "wasting the court's time."

Secret evidence is always the basis for extrajudicial incarceration (i.e., administrative detention). Within the military court system prosecutors can use secret evidence as a basis for charges, much of which comes from Palestinian collaborators. The collaborator network forms an integral part of the state's resources to gather incriminating information that can be used to detain, charge, and prosecute suspects. To ensure a continuing source of information and to protect Palestinians who collaborate from reprisals by other Palestinians, it is crucial to maintain a high level of secrecy. Israeli officials and spokespeople for the military have justified the use of secret evidence as necessary in light of the security situation in the Occupied Territories, where fighting crime and maintaining order are treated as tantamount to counterinsurgency. Secret evidence is unavailable to either the defense lawyer or the defendant, which means that the defense is afforded no opportunity to know its contents or contest its veracity. Under such circumstances a defense lawyer's only option is to request that the judge evaluate the merits of the secret evidence. Thus, the judge becomes the de facto representative of the defendant, since the lawyer is barred from playing such a role.

The overwhelming majority of the legal work in the military court system involves plea bargaining. Defense lawyers and prosecutors negotiate over the charges and the merits of evidence in a case to come to an agreement on the sentence. For the defense the incentive to plea bargain is a negative one: a defeat at trial is considered the most likely outcome, with the consequence of a higher sentence. For the prosecution the incentive is a positive one: an assured conviction of the accused saves the time, effort, and resources that a trial would entail. In many criminal court systems plea bargaining is the routine and predominant way to resolve most cases. Proponents laud its expediency, while detractors deride the "presumption of guilt." In the military court system the official Israeli position holds that plea bargaining is a just and efficient resolution to cases in which the defendant has already confessed to the crime(s) and/or there is corroborating evidence that would ensure a conviction at trial.

The prevalence of plea bargaining in this system derives, in large part, from the many advantages that prosecutors enjoy. These include administrative and legal provisions that allow detainees to be held incommunicado for prolonged periods and impede lawyer-client meetings, the prevalent and routine use of coercive interrogation tactics to obtain confessions, the weight given to confessions as evidence and difficulties in challenging them in court, the use of secret evidence that is unavailable to defense lawyers or defendants, and a general tendency by judges to accept prosecution evidence and prefer it to exculpatory evidence or contradictory testimony from defendants and defense witnesses.

Lawyers for Palestinians

In the first years of the Occupation, very few Palestinian lawyers from the Occupied Territories took up military court work. In 1967 the estimated number of lawyers in the West Bank ranged from 50 to 150, and the entire legal profession in the region went on strike to protest the Occupation. Capitalizing on ties with Jordan, lawyers were incorporated into the Jordanian Lawyers' Union (JLU), which provided financial compensation for the lawyers' loss of income during the strike. Although all the lawyers initially joined the strike, ten lawyers from Ramallah decided to break the strike in 1971, and some started working in the military courts. They were condemned as traitors by the JLU and disbarred. Gradually other lawyers joined them, leading to a split in the legal profession in the West Bank between "working" and "striking" lawyers. By 1986 there were approximately 500 lawyers in the West Bank, of whom 280 were receiving compensation from Jordan (i.e., still striking).

In the Gaza Strip there were only eight to ten lawyers in 1967, four of whom began working in the military courts in response to requests from family members of people who had been arrested. Until 1971, when the Israel crushed armed resistance in Gaza, the lawyers were escorted to and from the courts in Israeli military vehicles. In 1976 eighteen Gaza lawyers formed the Gaza Bar Association, which became the corporate affiliation for all lawyers in the region. The Israeli authorities refused to register the organization, claiming it was a front for the PLO.

In January 1980, working West Bank lawyers established the Arab Lawyers' Committee (ALC). In 1984 the ALC applied for a license to function as an independent bar association, which the Israeli authorities refused on two grounds. First, the ALC's inclusion of East JERUSALEM residents contradicted Israeli efforts to enforce a separation between East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank (Israel unilaterally annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, and Palestinians were given the status of noncitizen residents of Israel). The second reason was "security considerations," namely suspicion that the ALC would espouse Palestinian nationalist ideology and serve as a front for the PLO. By early 1987 the total number of Palestinian lawyers working regularly in the military court system was estimated to be between 80 and 100.

In 1968 FELICIA LANGER became the first Jewish Israeli lawyer to defend Palestinians in the military courts. The visibility she commanded through her outreach to the media attracted a new generation of leftist Jews and Arab Israelis, who followed her into the military courts. Langer mentored the first generation of Israeli lawyers who decided to work in the military court system, including LEA TSEMEL, who became Langer's *estagiere* (apprentice). Langer and Tsemel mentored younger Arab and Jewish Israelis who decided to work in the military courts. However, by the early 1980s the difficulty of the work, the scanty material rewards it provided, and the inability to contribute to substantive political change discouraged or deterred younger Israeli lawyers from pursuing this work. Between 1967 and 1987 the number of Israeli citizens (Jews and Arabs) who practiced in the military courts was small and proportionally decreased as the number of Palestinian lawyers grew. By the mid-1980s approximately twenty to thirty Israeli lawyers worked regularly in the military courts. But until the First Intifada, they handled 60 to 70 percent of all cases from the West Bank and a lower but still substantial portion of cases from Gaza.

When the First Intifada erupted in December 1987, there was a massive deluge of arrests and prosecutions, producing increased sentences for minor crimes, longer delays in lawyers' ability to gain access to detainees, and heightened security measures in the courts and prisons. Contesting the deteriorating conditions became a rallying cause for defense lawyers, and ad hoc collaborations among Israeli and Palestinian lawyers strengthened. The escalating demand for legal services drew some 200 additional Palestinian lawyers into the military court system, many with little or no prior experience. To demonstrate collective solidarity with the Intifada, local Palestinian courts were boycotted, and Palestinian civil litigation declined to demonstrate collective solidarity with the Intifada. Criminal litigation was subsumed within the military court system (which has concurrent jurisdiction with Palestinian courts), and by April 1988 most Palestinian police had resigned.

Before the Intifada many of those arrested and prosecuted were well-trained activists organized along the factional lines of the PLO, and some Palestinian and Israeli lawyers had standing arrangements to represent people from particular factions. After 1987 the arrest of vast numbers of people who were only nominally aligned (if at all)

with factions and had no political training or previous experience with the military court system strained lawyer-client relations. By the end of the 1980s, Islamist activists affiliated with HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, who were waging increasingly violent attacks on both Israeli and Palestinian targets, were being arrested in increasing numbers. Because Islamist militancy gained prominence only during the Intifada, there were virtually no prestanding arrangements for legal representation. Lawyers stepped in to meet the Islamist demand for their services, but secular/sectarian political differences, coupled with disagreement over the use of violence that Islamists championed, created new tensions in lawyer-client relations.

During the First Intifada, work conditions in the military courts so seriously eroded that lawyers frequently went on strike to focus attention on violations of the lawyers' own rights as legal professionals as well as those of their clients. The reasons for lawyers' strikes included lack of notification of arrest, difficulty obtaining information about where prisoners were being held or even deliberate misinformation by prison authorities about prisoners' whereabouts, difficulty gaining access to people in custody, mistreatment of detainees and official failure to investigate lawyers' allegations of torture, lack of privacy for lawyer-client meetings at detention centers, long delays in scheduling court dates and cumbersome procedures, mistreatment of lawyers, lack of notification about extension-of-detention hearings, denial of bail, arbitrary sentencing by judges, and judicial refusal to consider the testimony of defense witnesses. However, the strikes often were called off in response to public pressure to continue providing legal services for those being arrested.

The one bright spot sustaining and encouraging defense lawyers was human rights activism and organizations during the First Intifada. Because they could provide information and explanations about the unrest and escalating violence, local human rights organizations were propelled into the international limelight. This provided lawyers with more and better ways to convey information about their work through press conferences and meetings with representatives of international organizations and foreign governments. The more prominent military court lawyers were in heavy demand as expert informants.

Oslo Accords

The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, which started in 1991 and led to the Oslo Accords and an interim government by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), also affected the military court system. When the PNA was established in 1994, many Israeli and Palestinian lawyers saw it as an opportunity or reason to quit military court work, because they believed the negotiations would resolve the conflict. Others quit out of frustration with the flawed nature of the negotiations. Although human rights violations did not diminish during the interim period, the concern they commanded dissipated.

In 1994 the military court system was reduced as part of Israel's military redeployment from Palestinian towns, although Palestinians continued to be arrested and prosecuted. Throughout the 1990s the military court system arguably contributed to Palestinians' frustrations and a growing popular opposition to the Oslo Accords, because people were still being arrested and prosecuted for Intifada crimes—activities that allegedly took place before the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (in 1993) as part of the Oslo Accords. The sentences imposed by the court system during the interim were generally higher than those during the Intifada. For example, whereas a person previously might have been sentenced to a ten-month prison term for "membership in an illegal organization," by 1997 the same charge could bring a sentence of three to four years. The most common charge prosecuted in the military courts during the interim was a violation of the PERMIT system that controlled the movements of Palestinians. With the Israeli use of temporary CLOSURES of the West Bank and Gaza and the dramatic economic decline in PNA areas, permitless Palestinians tried to get to Israel to work or move from one Palestinian area to another (e.g., to study or seek medical treatment), and they were often arrested and subjected to higher penalties than in the past.

During the interim period and its changed political arrangements, the main task of the military court system was to enforce the enclosure and "separation" of Palestinians. The Israeli government told its own citizens these were a compensation for the territorial compromises that were being negotiated. Prosecuting people accused of violence against Israelis was not only a means of exacting retribution, but also an assertion of Israeli

jurisdictional control over the Occupied Territories. The PNA was deemed to be failing in its responsibility to police the separation between Israel and the Occupied Territories and prevent Palestinian attacks, which diminished its jurisdictional autonomy. Harsher punishments for all types of crimes cannot be explained simply by the goal of deterrence. Rather, the punishments themselves served a political function by strengthening Israel's hand in the troubled negotiations over the Oslo Accords. Palestinian prisoners were bargaining chips, and the bigger the sentence, the bigger the chip. Releasing prisoners before their sentences were over was a concession that Israel could make to the Palestinians in lieu of other types of concessions.

The strong networks that Israeli and Palestinian lawyers had built during the 1980s broke down during the Oslo period and were exceedingly difficult to rebuild when the Second Intifada started in 2000. The only lawyers who were able or willing to continue working in the military courts during the interim were a small number of leftist Jews, Arab Israelis who decided to remain in Jerusalem, East Jerusalem residents, and the few Palestinians in other parts of the Occupied Territories who were able to attain the necessary permits to access the military courts.

Second Intifada

The second, al-Aqsa Intifada, which began on 29 September 2000, has been the most intensely destructive and deadly period in Israel/Palestine since 1967. According to the Palestine Human Rights Monitoring Group, 2,780 Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza were killed by Israelis between 29 September 2000 and 31 March 2004. Of this total, 167 were TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS and 73 were bystanders killed during assassinations. In the same period 962 Israeli citizens were killed by Palestinians. Although the Israeli military court system continued to function during this period, to some extent it was marginalized because extrajudicial executions (i.e., assassinations) in some ways replaced prosecutions as means of punishment and deterrence for SUICIDE BOMBINGS by Palestinian militants. However, by July 2002, following massive Israeli assaults on West Bank towns and the start of construction of the BARRIER wall surrounding Palestinian areas, the ratio of arrests to assassinations became between ten-to-one and fifteen-to-one. The violence and vastly heightened security measures of the Second Intifada severely impacted lawyers' abilities to do their work and impeded professional and political collaborations. Palestinian lawyers could appear in courts only when they were near areas where they lived, assuming they could get the necessary permits to enter the military compounds. Accessing prisons became exceedingly difficult for everyone, as did face-to-face meetings between lawyers and the families of clients; most contacts were made by phone and fax.

ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005 has again modified but not significantly transformed the practices and function of the military court system. Palestinians, including those from Gaza, continue to be subject to the courts' jurisdiction, and the practices of arrest, interrogation, prosecution, and imprisonment follow earlier patterns.

See also ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION; DEPORTATION; ISRAELI SUPREME COURT; OCCUPATION; PERMITS

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—Lisa Hajjar

Israeli National Institutions

When the Zionist movement was formalized at the first ZIONIST CONGRESS in 1897, the congress created a series of settler-colonial organizations to fulfill political-Zionist objectives of IMMIGRATION, LAND purchase, and "reclamation" in Palestine so the "Jewish people" could create a national home and, subsequently, a national state there. The most important of these new Zionist settler-colonial institutions were the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO), the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL (JA), and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF). Together they birthed, built, and administered the institutions of the settler-colonial Yishuv, which, in turn, gave rise to the state of Israel as an apartheid state.

After the unilateral declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the ethnic cleansing by the Israeli army of the territories that came under its control in the 1948 WAR, questions arose concerning the relationship between the state and said political-Zionist institutions. Some thought that, once the state was established, all the Zionist institutions should be dismantled and their functions and material holdings—primarily land—should be transferred to the relevant government ministries. By and large, however, this option was rejected by the mainstream LABOR Zionist Party leadership that had dominated both prestate Yishuv politics and that of the first three decades of Israel. Israeli officials quickly realized that regularizing the status of and incorporating the WZO, the JA, and the JNF—referred to as "national institutions"—into the state's legal framework could help portray the state as democratic (or, as its publicists like to argue, "the only democracy in the Middle East"). At the same time, they supported the policy of apartheid "Judaization" of the ethnically cleansed territories through these institutions and created a two-tier legal system that marginalized and discriminated against the remaining disinherited indigenous Palestinian-Arab minority.

Because a legal basis was needed to establish the status and functions of the prestate organizations, their relationship with the state was formalized through a number of laws that incorporated these institutions into the state. This integration ensured the dominance of "Jews" over "non-Jews" in all municipal, social, economic, territorial, and political spheres. Most of the laws that strategically underpin Israel's institutionalized exclusionary system predicated on a "Jew" versus "non-Jew" basis were enacted by the Knesset in the first decade of statehood. They included (1) the LAW OF RETURN, 1950; (2) ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW, 1950; (3) DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Law, 1950; (4) the World Zionist Organization–Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 1952; (5) the Keren Kayemeth Leisrael (Jewish National Fund) Law, 1953; (6) Land Acquisition (Validations of Acts and Compensation) Law, 1953; (7) Covenant Between the Government of Israel and the Zionist Executive, also known as the Executive of the Jewish Agency for the Land of Israel, 1954; (8) Prescription Law, 1958; (9) Basic Law: Israel Lands, 1960; (10) Israel Lands Law, 1960; (11) ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION Law, 1960; (12) Covenant Between the Government of Israel and the Jewish National Fund, 1961; and (13) in the wake of the 1967 WAR, Agricultural Settlements (Restrictions on Use of Agricultural Land and Water) Law, 1967.

Israel evaded enacting petty blatantly segregationist laws, such as those of apartheid South Africa that had separate benches and parks for "Whites" versus "Blacks" and so on. Yet Israel

achieved similar discrimination, which goes to the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, through control of land and subsoil (primarily WATER) and through the regulation of the activities of the WZO, the JA, and the JNF in the first instance, as well as of other groups. Through law, the state gave the tasks of maintaining "Jewish" dominance and Palestinian exclusion/subordination to the "national institutions," which are committed exclusively to the interests of "Jews only." Thus, the state has claimed to absolve itself of any institutional discrimination because the "national institutions," that is, the political Zionist institutions of the WZO, the JA, and the JNF in the first instance, implement the fundamental apartheid segregation on its behalf.

The key distinction between "Jew" and "non-Jew" is first made explicit in the constitutions and articles of association of the WZO, the JA, and the JNF. For example, the JA's constitution stipulates: "Land is to be acquired as Jewish property and . . . the title of the lands acquired is to be taken in the name of the JNF to the end that the same shall be held the inalienable property of the Jewish people. The Agency shall promote agricultural colonization based on Jewish labor, and in all works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency, it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labor shall be employed (Article 3 [d] & [e])."

Similarly, the JNF's 1954 memorandum of association states that the primary object of the organization is "to purchase, acquire on lease or in exchange, etc. . . . in the prescribed region (which expression shall in this Memorandum mean the State of Israel in any area within the jurisdiction of the Government of Israel) or any part thereof, for the purpose of settling Jews on such lands and properties (Article 3 [a])." Until 1948 it could have perhaps been justifiably argued that the WZO, the JA, the JNF, and the various other bodies of the Zionist movement were institutional expressions of legally voluntary organizations of primarily parochial interests. That situation, however, was radically altered after the state of Israel was established, because the exclusivist constitutional stipulations (for Jews only) of the WZO, the JA, and the JNF were incorporated into the body of the laws of the state of Israel, thereby establishing the state of Israel as an apartheid state. The strategic legislation above that embedded the "national institutions" into the machinery of the state underpins its core apartheid, with one result being that 93 percent of the territory of the state of Israel within the 1949 armistice lines (the "Green Line") is reserved in law for exclusive use by "Jews" only. In South Africa, at the height of its apartheid regime, 87 percent of the territory of the republic was reserved in law for the exclusive use of "Whites" only.

See also ISRAELI DEMOCRACY; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL; JEWISH NATIONAL FUND

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—Uri Davis

Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information

Founded in JERUSALEM in 1988 by a group of Israeli intellectuals, the Israeli-Palestinian Center for Research and Information is now the only joint Palestinian-Israeli public policy think tank in the world. It is concerned with issues such as the nature of a FINAL STATUS agreement, the placement of BORDERS, and the future of Jerusalem. (www.ipcri.org).

Israeli Peace Movement

Not until 1978 did Israel experience its first mass peace movement. Between 1948 and the end of the 1970s, with the exception of a small minority among the religious communities and a marginal non-Zionist left, the Jewish population of Israel shared the same basic ideology and the same political consensus that can be summarized in twelve points:

1. Historic Palestine is the homeland of the Jewish people.
2. ZIONISM is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people and the tool for its return to its homeland.
3. After 2,000 years the Jewish people are returning to their homeland with the objective of colonizing it and establishing a Jewish state.
4. Jewish IMMIGRATION (ALIYA) is a top priority for Zionism and for the state of Israel.
5. The 1948 WAR was a war of national liberation in which the Jewish community defended itself from overwhelming Arab aggression.
6. Although the goal of the Arabs is to destroy Israel, the state of Israel has always aspired to peace with its neighbors.
7. All the wars between Israel and the Arab states were imposed on Israel by an Arab world that desires the extermination of Israel.
8. Israel is and must stay a Jewish state, the home for all the Jews throughout the world and for Jews only.
9. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East.
10. Israel is and wishes to be in the advanced position of the West and the free world against the barbarian East; that is, it wishes to be Westernized and part of Western civilization.
11. National unity against the enemy is a duty, and political and ideological debates must be limited by this necessary unity.
12. The government is the expression of the state, which is the expression of the Jewish people, and all Jewish people owe it unconditional obedience.

From Israel's statehood to the 1979 peace agreement with EGYPT, the great majority of the Jewish population of Israel was united around this set of beliefs, so that any political or ideological debates in Israeli society during these three decades were grounded in overall agreement on these twelve points. Even the right-wing opposition remained profoundly loyal to the twelve beliefs and avoided any kind of subversion of the existing political regime, despite its deep disagreement with what they saw as "socialist" and antireligious ideology. Until the late 1970s only the ANTI-ZIONIST far left and the non-Zionist left—MATZPEN and the COMMUNIST Party—challenged these basic principles. Their influence, however, was marginal among the Jewish population of Israel, which ostracized and sometimes repressed them—socially and politically, although later their political opinions gained attention and interest.

Although the Israeli Communist Party considered the 1948 War a war of national liberation and accepted the legitimacy of the Jewish state, it opposed both the domestic policies of successive governments—for example, institutionalized discrimination against the non-Jewish population—and the hostility of Israeli-Arab state relations. Thus the Israeli Communist Party did not share the values and principles on which the state was based and put itself outside the national consensus. On the other hand, the far-left Matzpen stood on a radical anti-Zionist platform that denounced the Zionist enterprise as colonial and called for revolutionary change in the Israeli regime and for an alliance with the Palestinian national movement. After 1967 this anti-Zionist left concentrated on systematically denouncing the OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories, and therefore became even more isolated in Israeli society. The years 1967–1973 marked the peak of national unity and consensus; even longtime opponents of the LABOR PARTY regime, who before 1967 had been on the margins of the Zionist consensus—for example, journalist URI AVNERY and writers Amos Keinan and Dan Ben Amotz—temporarily supported this atmosphere of national unity.

Beginning of the End of the National Consensus

The 1973 Egyptian-Syrian offensive came as a total surprise for the government. Both the army and public opinion had been lulled by a sense of unlimited power generated by Israel's 1967 victory. In 1973, however, Israel experienced its most severe military defeat, and only due to exceptionally massive US aid did the Israeli army succeed in reversing the situation on the battlefield. As a result the Labor leadership that would be in power for almost half a century—from the early days of the prestate Yishuv through the founding of the state until 1977—lost significant credibility. Before the war's end a massive and spontaneous movement emerged demanding the resignation of Israel's political and military leadership. Three years later Labor power ended, and the right wing for the first time controlled the government. Yet, ultimately, it was not the Zionist left but the far right that broke with MENAHEM BEGIN's government when he signed the 1979 peace agreement with Egypt that required Israel to withdraw from the whole Sinai Peninsula and dismantle the Jewish SETTLEMENTS established there.

The initiative of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in fact triggered the first mass peace movement in Israel: PEACE NOW. Although there were protest movements against the Occupation and repression in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES during the second half of the 1970s, these were composed essentially of several thousand Palestinian Israelis and non-Zionist Jews. Peace Now, on the other hand, was a Zionist movement that represented the Labor center of the Israeli population and was started by a group of reserve officers who defined themselves as patriots and Zionists. During the two years following the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT between Begin and Sadat, dozens of mass demonstrations mobilized more than 150,000 Israeli Jews who gave Begin the support necessary to fight his own political camp and withdraw from Sinai.

At the beginning of the 1980s, Israeli society was highly polarized between right and left. Led by the settlers' movement GUSH EMUNIM, the right organized mass demonstrations against the withdrawal from Sinai and initiated a new settlement drive throughout the Occupied Territories. Represented by Peace Now, the left not only supported the peace treaty with Egypt but also gradually challenged the Occupation of the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP. Although the Israeli movement against the Occupation is often labeled a peace movement, this definition can be misleading, because most Israeli activists were not antimilitarists or pacifists in the classic sense of the term. The reserve officers who started Peace Now still insisted on total loyalty to the army, and even today Peace Now strongly opposes YESH G'VUL, the movement of the reserve soldiers and officers who refuse to serve in the Occupied Territories. In Israel, being a "pacifist" does not necessarily mean ideological opposition to war but rather opposition to a specific conflict and particular forms of engagement.

Ultimately it was the 1982 LEBANON WAR that split Israeli society and transformed the peace movement into a genuine political opposition that challenged parts of the historic consensus. For the first time an Israeli prime minister described the war as a "choice" made by Israel and not as a result of Arab aggression. For the first time also, the objectives of a war were hidden from the Israeli population (and even from the majority of the government). Although the government spoke about installing a "security zone" of twenty-five miles (forty kilometers) in South Lebanon to protect the Galilee, Israeli soldiers found themselves on the way to Beirut to install the PHALANGE (historic allies of Israel in LEBANON) as head of the Lebanese state, to crush the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and to expel the Palestinians from Lebanon. When Israelis discovered the deception, demonstrations against the war, initially organized by the radical wing of the peace movement (united into the Committee Against the War in Lebanon), grew from several thousand to more than 100,000 within a few weeks.

During the Lebanon War the Israeli peace movement developed a modus operandi that remained until the OSLO PROCESS. Radical groups began the mobilization against the war, which prompted a reluctant Peace Now, pressured by its grassroots, to organize mass demonstrations. A small organization in Tel Aviv, the Committee in Solidarity with BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY, held a demonstration attended by some 3,000 persons and then transformed itself, that very day, into the Committee Against the War in Lebanon. Three weeks later, with the Israeli army in the suburbs of Beirut, the committee organized a demonstration that attracted more than 15,000 individuals, including many reserve soldiers coming directly from the battlefield. Until then Peace Now had refused to

oppose this war publicly ("as long as our soldiers are fighting, we have to support them"), but the mass demonstration spurred it to call for its own mobilization: a week later, more than 100,000 people protested "the widening of the war beyond its original goals" as well as against "the break in the national consensus."

Impact of Protest Groups

Unlike more radical organizations (e.g., the Committee Against the War in Lebanon and especially the newly established Yesh G'vul), which advocated a confrontation with the government based on an ethical opposition to Israel's policy of war and Occupation, Peace Now attempted to capitalize on the growing mass opposition to the Lebanon War, while refraining from sundering the traditional national consensus. For this reason Peace Now uncompromisingly rejected Yesh G'vul. However, the borders between Peace Now and the more radical organizations were not impermeable, which allowed the radical groups to affect Peace Now decisionmaking and to radicalize its political demands. A clear example of this influence was Peace Now's position concerning the Occupation. At first Peace Now refused to take any stand on this central topic, which at the end of the 1970s the Israeli public viewed as a benign or "enlightened Occupation" with limited (Palestinian) resistance. As such, Peace Now saw no urgency in trying to find a solution. The more radical organizations, in particular the Committee in Solidarity with Birzeit University, led campaigns against repressive tactics and settlement activities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and for an end to the Occupation. This approach differed greatly from Peace Now's position, which was based on the national consensus and pragmatism: that the Occupation corrupted the soldiers or put at risk the "Jewish-Democratic character of Israel."

While the more radical groups developed a real solidarity with the victims of the Occupation and their struggle, Peace Now did its best to escape such a tendency. The First INTIFADA (1987–1991) gave tremendous impetus to all the protest movements that had focused on the Occupation, as well as producing a variety of new initiatives. In addition to the Birzeit Solidarity Committee (renamed Dai La-Kibbush, or Enough with Occupation) and Yesh G'vul, which attracted a new wave of reserve soldiers who refused to participate in the repression of the Intifada, new movements were formed. WOMEN IN BLACK is the best known, but there were many others—more "specialized" organizations such as the Israeli Committee Against Torture, Israeli and Palestinian Physicians for Human Rights, and RABBIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. When united, these organizations could mobilize up to 10,000 demonstrators. The growing impact of this anticolonialist left radicalized the political positions of Peace Now, which finally called for ending the Occupation and for recognizing the PLO. Through Peace Now initiatives from 1988 to 1990, the demonstrations grew from several thousand to tens of thousands of participants, during which Peace Now increasingly advocated a political platform similar to the platforms of the radical groups: withdrawing totally from the Occupied Territories, dismantling the settlements, and negotiating with the PLO. By 1992, for the first time, the main demands of the Palestinian national movement were finally endorsed by a significant part of Israeli society that succeeded in bringing to power a leftist government (Labor-MERETZ) that articulated the main demands of the Israeli peace movement.

In September 1993, the Oslo DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP) between the PLO and Israel, which set the goal of establishing Palestinian self-government, brought euphoria to the Israeli peace movement, because it believed that its program and aspirations were about to be realized. In this euphoria, however, the two components of the peace movement did not draw the same conclusions. For Peace Now the struggle against the Occupation and for an Israeli-Palestinian peace stopped the day YITZHAK RABIN agreed to shake the hand of YASIR ARAFAT. After achieving what it considered a victory, Peace Now believed it was the government's role to lead the process. The leftist activists, on the other hand, saw that the Occupation did not end with the signing of the DOP and believed that the OSLO ACCORDS' potential would be realized only by mobilizations and permanent pressure on the government, especially because Israel was implementing a CLOSURE of the Occupied Territories and dramatically increasing settlement activities in the territories that it was supposedly preparing to give back to the Palestinians. Vigilance, mobilization, and solidarity were the focuses of the radical peace organizations, which adopted the slogan "With the government when it is determined to go forwards toward

peace; against the government when it is reinforcing the Occupation!"

Peace—and the compromises necessary for an honest implementation of the DOP—produced a political battle throughout Israeli society, among the ruling elites, within the government itself (including inside the Labor Party), and even—as his biographers have pointed out—in Rabin himself. The main issues of contention were whether to allow a Palestinian state, how much of the Occupied Territories to include, and how to hold on to the settlements. Vigilance, therefore, was needed to prevent the peace process from disintegrating completely. Uri Avnery understood this when, together with a few dozen activists (mostly non-Zionists) and some disappointed Peace Now people, he decided to establish GUSH SHALOM (Peace Bloc) to continue the struggle against Occupation. He saw, as did others, that when the left assumed power, Peace Now became comatose, a condition from which it has never recovered. During the crucial years of the Oslo Process, together with the women's organizations BAT SHALOM and Women in Black, Gush Shalom maintained a permanent mobilization against the ongoing Occupation.

Human rights organizations such as B'TSELEM (the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories), HAMOKED (Center for the Defense of the Individual), and others also played a role in this period. Though not directly committed to mobilization against the Occupation, they helped document the reality of the Occupation and Israel's systematic violations of human rights and INTERNATIONAL LAW by producing and disseminating major reports on conditions there. These human rights organizations are usually ideologically closer to Peace Now than to the radical left, yet their commitment to human rights caused them to align with the more radical wing of the peace movement in an increasingly systematic denunciation of Occupation, even when the Occupation was disappearing from the lexicon of most peace activists.

Gulf between Palestinian and Israeli Activists

The peace process era (1993–2000) was characterized by a central paradox; although reconciliation between the two peoples was on the official agenda, Palestinians and mainstream Israeli peace activists grew further apart in their respective perceptions of reality and in their respective aspirations. Two years after the signing of the DOP, Palestinians were increasingly disappointed in the actions of the Israeli government and skeptical about its intentions. But Peace Now ignored the realities of Occupation, the government's retreat from real peace, the increased strength of the right, as well as the calls for aid from the Palestinian leaders and activists with whom it had cooperated in the past and who could not understand why the Israeli peace movement did not protest and sometimes even supported a government that violated signed agreements. Gradually the relative trust and partial cooperation that had developed throughout the 1980s were replaced first by indifference (from the Israeli side) and then by disappointment and ultimately a sense of betrayal (from the Palestinian side). For many Israelis peace was equated with security and could only come from negotiations by the Israeli leadership according to the principle that "the smarter is the winner." If Israel felt "secure," then there was peace, regardless of what was happening on the Palestinian side. For the Palestinians, the Occupation not only continued but grew worse, and the Israelis systematically violated both the letter and the spirit of the negotiated Oslo Accords by their campaign of settlement expansion, the denial of PERMITS to work in Israel (previously given in large numbers) that sent the Palestinian ECONOMY into free fall, and new and increasingly stringent RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, among others. When, more than ever, they needed the Israeli peace movement to pressure its own government to negotiate and implement agreements, the Palestinians discovered that their previous allies were busy with their own national reconciliation and the rebuilding of the traditional national consensus to avoid a potential confrontation with the right.

When in 1995 the failing peace process led to a renewal of Palestinian acts of resistance, including TERRORIST actions, the Israeli peace camp was taken by surprise. It couldn't understand why the Palestinians were using violence when supposedly the peace process had put Palestinian statehood on track. It couldn't understand the impact of Israeli insincerity and the pent-up discouragement of the Palestinians. The Israeli peace movement did not clearly comprehend the real differences between protesting for peace in the "Jewish democratic" state and suffering in Gaza for thirty years in conditions of "de-development" (as Sara Roy has described them). Most peace

activists believed that Palestinians would not interfere in Israeli affairs and vice versa, except in the area of "security." Few in Peace Now challenged this concept or warned against the dangers a deadlock in the peace process could bring. However, some groups and individuals did warn that Israeli policies of repression could lead to revolt; among them were Women in Black, Bat Shalom, and Gush Shalom in the political organizations; Tanya Reinhardt, Baruch Kimmerling, Oren Yiftachel, and Ran Hacohen in the academy; intellectuals such as MERON BENVENISTI, AZMI BISHARA, and Yitzhak Laor; and Gideon Levy, B. Michael, and Amira Hass in the MEDIA. But these few were isolated, while the majority in the peace movement acted as if peace were already a reality. Although Israeli military operations might briefly dampen the euphoria of the peace activists, they remained convinced that the peace process would continue and that the Palestinians would have a state of their own.

The US-sponsored July 2000 Camp David peace talks were a terrible blow to these pro-peace Israelis, who until then were the majority of the population. When Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK returned from the Camp David Summit to announce the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the peace camp was already totally demobilized and mystified that peace had not yet been realized. In Israel, PLO chairman Arafat's rejection of BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFERS was presented by Barak (and President BILL CLINTON) as not only a lack of moderation by Arafat but also evidence of his real but hidden intention—the destruction of Israel. Israeli public opinion returned to its old position—that the Jews are not accepted and will never be accepted by their neighbors and will have to fight for their survival forever. Although the Palestinians were the main victims, the peace movement also suffered from this dramatic change. As early as July 2000, long before the second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA began, prominent intellectuals on the left and liberal journalists started a campaign of "reassessing" political reality. Writers such as A. B. YEHOSHUA and AMOS OZ stated that the Palestinian demand for the right of return of the REFUGEES (from the 1948 War) was evidence of their bad faith and their aspiration to destroy Israel; journalist Ari Shavit warned the Israeli public to stop dreaming about peace and normality and to remember that the fate of the Jewish people is a permanent war for its own survival. The NEW HISTORIAN Benny Morris wrote that one has to understand the "oriental mentality" that is the root of the Palestinian rejection of Israel's existence.

Within two months of the Camp David failure the Israeli peace movement disintegrated, not only as a political organization able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of demonstrators but even in political and ethical discourse. Most of its leaders joined the consensus that the conflict with the Palestinians was about survival, and many became—in the media, the universities, and, in general, Israeli public opinion—the loudest advocates of the "we have no partners" argument. From August to November 2000, Israel witnessed a generalized mea culpa from the leaders of the former peace movement, and the most common media headline was "The left lost its way." After renewed confrontations between the Palestinians and the Israeli army and the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, and especially with the new wave of SUICIDE BOMBINGS by Palestinians, the left fully endorsed ARIEL SHARON's war against the Palestinian people.

Not all Israeli peace activists gave up the belief that peace with the Palestinians was possible. With the renewal of Palestinian resistance to Israeli Occupation at the end of September 2000, the radical organizations of the peace movement—Women in Black, Yesh G'vul, and Gush Shalom—as well as the Palestinian population of Israel mobilized to denounce the repression in the Occupied Territories as well as the Occupation itself as the cause of the dramatic deterioration of the situation. In the media, critical voices were heard, including some from the political establishment, such as former minister SHULAMIT ALONI, who accused Barak and later Sharon of pushing Israel toward a total war against the entire Muslim world. Akiva Eldar, senior journalist at the Jerusalem daily *Ha'aretz,* reported in autumn 2000 the truth about Barak's "generous offer"—that Israel had reneged on all promises—while Amira Hass and Gideon Levy also tried to inform public opinion about the harsh repression in the Occupied Territories.

During the years, 2000 to 2005, the peace movement in Israel became synonymous with the movement against the Occupation and was limited to Israel's more radical wing. As in many other

countries in the world, Israel has had a generational vacuum of some twenty years between the 1982 Lebanon War and the al-Aqsa Intifada, during which an entire generation of Israelis avoided political activism. Throughout the First Intifada and during the Oslo era, most of the activists were the ones who had been in their twenties during the invasion of Lebanon. The average age of Gush Shalom activists is fifty, and the Women in Black are mostly in their forties. With the Second Intifada a new generation of Israelis is starting to lead the movement against Occupation. Most members of the Anarchists Against the Wall, an activist organization established in 2003 that organizes daily nonviolent confrontations with the army at the BARRIER or separation wall, are teenagers. TA'AYUSH, a movement of Jews and Arabs established in October 2000 as an answer to the repression of the Palestinians, is now active in organizing solidarity convoys to besieged Palestinian villages. A new organization, COURAGE TO REFUSE, consists of soldiers who refuse to serve in the Occupied Territories and was politicized by the wave of repression in the Occupied Territories that began in 2000. MACHSOMWATCH emerged to monitor the behavior of soldiers at the checkpoints. And COALITION OF WOMEN FOR PEACE, ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION CENTER, ISRAELI COMMITTEE AGAINST HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and others are part of a new generation of activists, who often have no political experience or ideology but are motivated by strong feelings against injustice.

Another characteristic of the new anti-Occupation movement is its rejection of realpolitik, in particular its often aggressive and militaristic manifestations. Thus, although one finds in their statements general calls for peace, many more contain firm denunciations of the Occupation. A third characteristic of this new resistance movement is that it considers its struggle in the framework of solidarity and cooperation with Palestinian resistance. Though most of their actions are obviously oriented toward Israeli public opinion, establishing links with Palestinian organizations is a priority—to show to both communities that there is a partner for peace and coexistence. When Israeli politics is focused on building a Barrier aimed to enclose the Palestinians as well as to separate Israel and Palestine, this drive toward cooperation indicates not only the rejection of the Barrier but also the belief in the possibility of coexistence and a partnership based on mutual respect and equality.

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; MEDIA, ISRAELI

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—Michel Warschawski

Israeli Political Parties and Settlements

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has come to dominate domestic party politics in Israel and is the key issue for an overwhelming majority of the Israeli voters. The main actors in successive Israeli coalition governments' treatment of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the political parties. Their internal dynamics and decisionmaking have influenced one main element of the conflict—the establishment of Jewish SETTLEMENTS. While there are numerous other aspects to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this entry focuses on the relationship between the Israeli political parties and the establishment of settlements in the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, excluding East JERUSALEM.

Israel is a multiparty parliamentary democracy, with an electoral system providing proportional representation. Given the nature of this

system, no single party ever commands a parliamentary majority, so a coalition among several parties is a practical necessity for governing. The Israeli political system has gone through two very different periods. The first encompassed the almost three decades from the first elections in 1949 until the 1977 elections but includes the prestate period (pre-1948) as well. This period was one of MAPAI (the predecessor of the current LABOR PARTY) and later Labor dominance. Although Mapai never won an absolute majority, it outdistanced all of its rivals and headed the coalition governments it formed. The second period stretched from 1977, when Labor lost for the first time, until 2006. This period saw competitive elections between two main parties (Labor and LIKUD), both short of a majority and both surrounded by potential coalition partners of relatively equal size—thereby creating two main camps, or blocs, of parties.

The different coalitions and the dynamics within each of these two periods profoundly influenced the policymaking of the respective governments. The decisions made concerning issues such as settlements must be assessed in light of the particular situation of each coalition government from 1967 until Labor's fall from power a decade later. After 1977 when either the right or the left or both held power, the decisions vis-à-vis the conflict became quite different. Before the 1967 WAR Israeli party, coalition, and electoral politics were not dominated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, after the war and the capture of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which Israel placed under military administration, Israel's political parties focused their electoral competition predominantly on security issues and in particular the fate of the territories. The left took a more dovish position on issues such as land for peace (Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories in exchange for peace with Arab countries and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and settlement building, while the right took a more hawkish stand, and both placed less emphasis on their socioeconomic differences. Their different perspectives on Palestinian issues, in turn, defined each party's potential for forming coalitions with other parties.

The religious parties in Israel, which for the first sixty-some years won between 10 percent and 15 percent of the seats in the Knesset, also experienced a dramatic shift in their position in Israeli politics. During the first period, the religious parties focused on domestic religious issues and occupied the middle of the party map. The cooperation between the main Orthodox party, the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP), and Mapai became known as the "historical partnership." After Israel's capture of biblically significant territories in 1967, however, the NRP began to adopt more nationalistic stands, gradually shifting toward the right. When the Likud won power in 1977 this transformation intensified, and the NRP eventually became part of the rightist bloc. The ultra-Orthodox parties, on the other hand, increased their bargaining power in coalitions by working with both Likud and Labor, yet clearly preferred the right and should thus be seen as belonging to it.

Israel's population has always included a minority of Palestinian citizens, who have the right to vote and have been represented in the Knesset since the first elections. The Israeli-Arab parties have changed over time, originally functioning as client parties affiliated with Mapai/Labor, but that role declined and then disappeared as the nationalist parties became more successful. During the same time the joint Arab-Jewish COMMUNIST Party gradually became a predominantly Arab party, first in terms of its electorate and later in terms of its representation. The number of parliamentary seats won by newer Israeli-Arab parties has increased over time, both as the Arab minority's percentage of the population has grown and as more Arab voters shifted away from Jewish/Zionist parties. Largely because of their non- and ANTI-ZIONIST positions and their clear support of the Palestinian struggle for national liberation, the Arab parties represent the extreme left in Israeli politics.

Israeli politics in the last several decades thus developed four main blocs of parties: two on the left—the dovish Zionist parties headed by Labor and the Arab parties, and two on the right—the hawkish parties led by Likud and the religious parties. Many parties aspired to capture the strategic middle, but few have proved successful until KADIMA in the 2006 elections.

Israeli Coalition Government

The different coalitions and dynamics within each of these two periods had a profound influence on the policymaking of the respective governments.

Table 2 Number of Settlements and Settlers, 1967–2006

Years	Coalition	Settlements Established[a] (Total)	Total Settlers[a]
1967–1969[b]	Grand[c]	5	NA
1969–1973	Grand (1969–1970)	7 (12)	NA
	Left dominant (1970–1973)	10 (22)	1,500
1974–1977	Left dominant	9 (31)	7,900
1977–1981	Right dominant	38 (69)	21,500
1981–1984	Right dominant	44 (113)	36,800
1984–1988	Grand	12 (125)	66,300
1988–1992	Grand (1988–1990)	6 (131)	81,600
	Right dominant (1990–1992)	1 (132)	104,800
1992–1996	Left dominant	1 (133)	148,300
1996–1999	Right dominant	3 (136)	180,300
1999–2001	Left dominant	– (136)	196,700
2001–2003	Grand	– (136)	226,300
2003–2006	Right Dominant (2003–2004)	– (136)	237,700
	Grand (2005–2006)	– (116)[d]	255,600

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics; Eldar and Zertal 2004.
Notes: a. Total number of settlements and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for each coalition government.
b. The previous elections were in 1965, but the first coalition to build a settlement could do so only after the 1967 War.
c. Grand coalitions mean that both major parties were included, along with other smaller parties.
d. Reduced number of total settlements reflects withdrawal from Gaza Strip in August 2005.


The best way to assess the political parties' policies regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is to look at the number of Jewish settlements established by the successive governing coalitions and at the number of settlers. These two measures, rather than party platforms or coalition agreements, provide the most credible indicators of how the political parties in Israel addressed and shaped the most contentious aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—or failed to do so.

The table showing the number of settlements and settlers from 1967 to 2006 makes the following four points:

1. More than 20 percent of the settlements (31 of 136) were established by coalition governments dominated by the left in the first decade after the 1967 War.
2. Most of the settlements—over 60 percent (82 of 136)—were established after the Likud first came to power in 1977 during the two coalition governments it dominated in the subsequent seven years.
3. Since 1984 there has been a dramatic slowdown in the number of settlements established, and since 1992 the building of new settlements has been all but frozen.
4. The number of settlers has grown constantly, without any connection to the number of settlements. For example, between 1984 and 2004 only twenty-three settlements were created (17 percent of the total number of settlements), but the number of settlers grew sixfold. In 2005, when Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip and thus the number of settlements actually declined, the number of settlers still increased.

The first point shows that left-dominated coalition governments—headed by Mapai/Labor—established settlements immediately after the 1967 War. Although the Labor Party currently opposes the establishment of any new settlements, the party has shifted its position on this issue quite substantially in the last few decades. Immediately after the 1967 War, Labor was divided between a more hawkish faction, led by Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan, and more dovish elements. Both Allon and Dayan wanted to maintain control over certain parts of the territories for security reasons and sought to establish settlements that would help the territories serve as a buffer zone. The presence of Gahal (Likud's predecessor) in the coalition helped lead to support for establishing the first settlements.

The 1973 elections kept the left in power, but as the head of a narrow coalition with the pro-settlement NRP. Moreover, the initial collapse of Israel's lines of defense in the 1973 War convinced many that the territories were vital for Israel's survival. The hawkish elements within the dominant



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics; Eldar and Zertal 2004

Figure 1. Number of Settlements and Settlers, 1967–2007

Labor Party helped stimulate the first group of settlements, even though their overall number was quite small. Only in 1975 was the first political settlement established (that is, a settlement not in accordance with the security parameters of the ALLON PLAN).

The second point indicates that when Likud first assumed power in 1977, it sought to implement its ideology of a Greater Israel by building settlements. After the peace treaty with EGYPT in 1979, which included a complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the dismantling of all settlements there, Likud wanted to make sure that land for peace would not become a precedent. Moreover, after the early collapse of its coalition partner, the Democratic Movement for Change, no forces within the coalition—or the subsequent one in 1981—strongly opposed the policy of settlement building. During these two coalition governments the number of settlements more than tripled and the number of settlers more than quadrupled.

The third point indicates a reversal in settlement policy by the Israeli coalition governments, a result of two developments. First, the Labor Party had shifted to a more dovish stand by the mid-1980s and opposed the establishment of new settlements. Second, the 1984 election results were a stalemate, forcing the two main parties to govern together in a grand coalition that included mutual veto powers. Thus Labor was able to extract concessions from Likud that dramatically curtailed the establishment of new settlements.

The subsequent 1988 election produced another close result, which forced the main parties to govern together and to continue the previous understanding concerning settlements. Meanwhile, the long-term consequences of the First INTIFADA, which erupted in 1987, began to change many Israelis' attitudes about settlements and the viability of the territories as security buffer zones. After two years the grand coalition collapsed, leaving Likud in power and Labor in the opposition. This time international pressure, in the form of economic penalties levied by the GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration, restrained Likud from building further settlements, although the number of settlers practically tripled during this eight-year period (1984–1992).

In 1992, Labor returned to power, formed a coalition that was decisively dovish, and within a year embarked on the OSLO PROCESS with the

Palestinians. From this point on, the establishment of new settlements—even after the return of Likud to power in 1996—basically ceased, although the number of settlers increased by 50 percent.

The increase in the number of settlers, in an almost linear fashion during the entire post-1967 period, is the most intriguing question. Did the settler movement (GUSH EMUNIM) and, since the 1980s, the YESHA COUNCIL (Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) successfully circumvent the political parties' changed positions on settlements by increasing the number of settlers? Or did the political parties themselves decide to curtail the building of new settlements for domestic and international reasons and instead to push ahead with the expansion of the existing settlements?

Settler Movement and the Political Parties in Israel

There is little doubt that the establishment of settlements and their expansion are connected to the influence of the settlers' leadership and their supporters on the political parties, even though the settlers were never a substantial electoral force. Despite their ever-increasing numbers, in 1977 they were less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the electorate, and circa 2005 they reached only 2 percent—a negligible electoral constituency. Moreover, the settlers were never a significant part of the electorate, even for those parties on the right who championed the settler cause. The data until the late 1990s show the settlers amounted to no more than 10 percent of the electorate for any of the smaller right-wing parties and no more than 3 percent of the Likud voters.

In the Knesset the settlers had a greater representation than their actual electoral strength. At the height of the settlers' influence, the number of Knesset members who were settlers reached 7 percent. Although this is more than three times their electoral size, it is still far from being a parliamentary contingent that could significantly influence the parties' agendas. In fact the settlers' power and influence are not based on electoral or party variables but rather on a combination of ideological and organizational factors. Their organizational infrastructure, coupled with ideological unity, produced a cohesive and easily mobilized constituency. Furthermore the settlement movement did not have a coherent and significant opposition; indeed, during its early years it received support not only from elements on the right but also from some on the left. But it was right-wing politicians and parties who saw it as a powerful ally during election campaigns and often during the parties' internal candidate selection procedures. The increasing inability or reluctance of the political system and the government to confront the settlers allowed them to advance their policy—even when it acted against declared government policies.

The settlers also enjoyed generous subsidies from the state, and their people held senior posts in the administration. Often they mobilized state resources to protest government policies and even to build illegal OUTPOSTS, contrary to the declared policy of the state. In short the settler lobby, in spite of its electoral weakness and small number of representatives in the Knesset, could advance its agenda because the movement had a dedicated and expanding base of followers that were mobilized around a single cause, access to many elements in the government, and a weakened opposition at a time when the party system was coalescing into two equally sized camps. The settler lobby was a force that could successfully manipulate either a policy vacuum or an inactive government, not to mention a favorable government.

However, as soon as significant segments of both the public and the party system began to perceive the settlements in somewhat negative terms—from either the increased expense of maintaining the settlements, international pressure, or a belief that the OCCUPATION led to the First Intifada in the late 1980s—the settler lobby was forced to switch tactics. Rather than adding new settlements, they expanded existing settlements, which could be presented to both domestic and foreign audiences as "natural" growth and hence almost a humanitarian necessity. The very high birthrate of the religious settlers, along with the expanding outer neighborhoods adjacent to Israel's main population centers, let much of the growth take place without adding new settlements.

This arrangement, which created a favorable climate for the settler movement, continued for almost two decades. However, once a combination of domestic political shifts, international pressure, and the nonsettler majority in Israel coalesced against the settlements, the lobby's influence proved to be either evanescent or largely mythical.

Israel's erection of the BARRIER security fence, which leaves a large majority of the settlements on the outside of the Barrier, was unsuccessfully opposed by the settlers. And in 2005, ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT from all of the settlements in the Gaza Strip and four additional settlements in the northern part of the West Bank—which many settlers saw as a symbolic battle over the settlements in general—was implemented more easily, quickly, and quietly than many in Israel expected.

Role of the "Pivotal Party"

In Israel's party system, the "pivotal party" is the party with no majority to its right or its left after an election. This means that this party is essential for building a majority coalition government. In a multiparty system the pivotal party is usually close to the center and can be crucial in allowing, or opposing, the implementation of a specific policy. Throughout the history of Israel's party system, the pivotal parties—or the pivotal elements within those parties—have never been strongly opposed to the establishment of settlements. During the decade between 1967 and 1977, when governing coalitions were dominated by the left, Mapai held the pivotal position. However, it was the right wing of Mapai that made the party the pivot of the party system. This part, which included hawks such as Dayan, Allon, SHIMON PERES, and YITZHAK RABIN, supported the establishment of settlements in accordance with Israel's security needs. Between 1977 and 1984, when governing coalitions were dominated by the right, the religious parties held the pivotal position. The orthodox NRP, the largest of the religious parties, was in favor of settlements, while the ultra-Orthodox parties were not opposed to them. Likud's pro-settlement policy, along with the acquiescence or support of the pivotal religious parties, allowed the major thrust of settlement building to take place. Afterward, during the period between 1984 and 1992, the two major parties formed a grand coalition in which each was granted veto power over major decisions. Labor was able to use its veto to slow down the building of settlements substantially during this period.

In the 1992 elections Labor regained the pivotal position, but once again the hawks within Labor (who would subsequently split to form the Third Way party) comprised the pivot, and they opposed the more dovish positions expressed by the party as a whole at that time. From 1996 to 2003, when the two main parties lost many seats, a combination of parties in the middle of the party system—religious, immigrant, center, and so forth—held the pivot, but none of them actively opposed the expansion of settlements and some even actively supported it. In 2003–2005, Likud was the pivotal party; until ARIEL SHARON convinced a majority of the party to support disengagement from Gaza, the party in control supported settlements. In 2006–2009, Kadima captured the pivot, and although identified with the disengagement from Gaza, and hence the removal of settlements, Kadima had numerous legislators who were sympathetic to the settlers and their cause—exemplified by the inability to remove even the illegal outposts, despite promising repeatedly to do so. The combination of a united, mobilized, and expanding settler lobby on the one hand, and a party system with a pivotal position always controlled by those either passive toward or overtly supportive of the settler lobby on the other hand, created a situation that the settlers were able to exploit.

Twice in Israel's history the pivot has swung against the settlers, with the result that settlements were forcibly removed. Both times the dominant Likud Party divided and a portion joined with the left, resulting in both a majority in the Knesset and a shift in the pivot of the party system. The first time was the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS between Israel and Egypt, and the second was the disengagement from Gaza.

Another source of strength for the settler lobby is the diffusion of power in Israeli politics in general and in the Israeli party system in particular. Israeli politics has gone through a process of "de-alignment," in which the political parties have over time lost their exclusive role as agenda-setters and policymakers to competing organizations, including interest groups, the MEDIA, and business interests, among others. In this aspect, Israel is no different from most advanced Western democracies. Almost concurrently the Israeli party system has gone through a process of realignment, in which Mapai's domination during the first three decades was replaced by two-bloc competition in the subsequent decades, then by the growth of smaller sectoral parties at the expense of the major ones, and more recently by a very fluid party system. In short, Israeli democ-

racy and the Israeli party system have become more pluralist, which allows smaller organizations, particularly if they are united, mobilized, and expanding, to gain a foothold. The settler lobby benefited from a polity in which no single party (or nonparty actor) could veto its agenda and from the increasing opportunities produced by maneuvering between the multiple power centers emerging in Israel.

The process of de-alignment, unlike that of realignment, shifted power away from the parties in general, rather than away from certain parties and toward others. As the political parties lost some power to competing organizations, and as their grand coalitions immobilized the government, the settler lobby was able not only to become an important actor in Israeli politics but also to use successfully its relative strength vis-à-vis the other emerging actors. Also, most of these new actors were not strongly opposed to the settlers, and those that were (such as PEACE NOW) were not powerful enough to constrain successfully the influence of the settler lobby. By then the party system lacked the power to oppose the shift from building new settlements to expanding the existing ones, and the viable alternative actors in Israeli politics generally did not see settlement expansion as a major concern of their limited agendas.

Two final points illustrate the relative strength of the settler lobby in a party system where the pivotal party does not oppose them and in a democracy undergoing a process of power diffusion. First, the settlers and their political allies were willing to topple coalitions dominated by the right if they did not support the settlers, even if this would bring the left to power. No competing organization on the left was willing to take such an extreme position, so this stance helped foster an environment of acquiescence to the policies of the settler movement in order to avoid dire political consequences—particularly since the majority in the Knesset, including the pivotal party, did not oppose the settlements. Second, the policies espoused by the settlers were unilateral in nature, while those advanced by the peace camp were dependent on the Palestinians' willingness to reach and to implement agreements. When international pressure came to bear on Israel in the mid- to late 1980s, the shift from settlement building to settler expansion was also unilateral and became possible because of developments in both the party system and the political system.

See also GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT; GUSH EMUNIM; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; ISRAELI SUPREME COURT; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; SETTLEMENTS

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—Reuven Y. Hazan and Gideon Rahat

Israeli Regime and the Question of Democracy

The Israeli regime has actively facilitated an ethnic (and religious) project of Judaization. This political and historical setting, and the associated Jewish colonization of the contested LAND, present structural problems to the implementation of many democratic principles. The lack of genuine democratization has had powerful consequences for Jewish-Palestinian relations both in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and within Israel Proper (the recognized Israeli sovereign area, within the 1949 Green Line). A recent process of liberalization is yet to make a significant impact on the attainment of full democratic rights by Palestinians, other non-Jews and women.

Since 1967 Israel has been deeply involved in its colonial rule in the Occupied Territories. Nearly half a million Jews have settled in the territories, while the state has imposed military rule over the local Palestinians. Jewish colonialism has eroded the level of democracy within Israel, by exacerbating the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, deepening racism toward PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, and reinforcing the impact of MILITARISM on Israeli society. Jewish colonialism has also sharpened the Orthodox-secular conflict within Jewish society over such divisive issues as the future of the biblical lands in the WEST BANK and JERUSALEM, the fate of the Jewish SETTLEMENTS (inhabited by large numbers of Orthodox Jews), women's rights, and the Jewishness of Israel. The colonization of the West Bank has also imposed considerable costs on the Israeli public, thereby shifting resources away from social welfare and causing long-lasting economic and political inequalities—especially among Israel's ethnic minorities.

Democracy

Democracy is a form of rule established "by the people, for the people." Modern democratic regimes developed after generations of political struggle that broadened the boundaries of citizenship and political participation to previously excluded sectors, such as women, slaves, immigrants, and the poor. There is not one, absolute definition of democracy, which is a regime that can never fully attain its lofty goals. However, most political thinkers agree on a few key principles—aimed at promoting the two fundamental democratic values of equality and liberty. These include the following:

- Equal citizenship for all the state's permanent residents
- Universal and free ELECTIONS at regular intervals or according to a regular process
- Protection of the rights of all citizens, especially minorities, from "tyranny of the majority"
- A range of civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, religion, movement, political organization, and demonstration

In most democratic states these principles are established by a stable constitution and are overseen by an accountable government, an elected legislature, and an independent judiciary.

A debate exists whether democracy should be limited to the protection of individual personal liberties or can be extended to the facilitation of collective and substantive (social) rights. Most scholars

agree that a reasonable balance needs to be maintained between the rights and responsibilities of individuals, on the one hand, and those of collectivities (minorities, workers or women), on the other. Advanced democracy, most agree, should also include substantive rights such as housing, HEALTH CARE, and EDUCATION. Because no state fulfills its principles completely and thus no state is a perfect democracy, it is preferable to measure the democratic state of affairs by assessing key issues such as civil equality, minority and gender rights, theocratic impositions, and legal inequalities. By placing these on a continuum extending between the poles of advanced democracy and authoritarianism, regimes can be characterized as "more" or "less" democratic in the various fields of governance.

Despite inevitable deviations in certain spheres, most Western states fit into the "advanced democratic" classification. The situation in Israel is more problematic, for there are structural deviations on almost all of the democratic principles listed, which raise questions about its common classification as a democracy. Accordingly, recent critical scholarship has challenged Israel's classification as a democracy and has instead proposed such categories as "ethnocracy," "colonial state," "ethnic state," "ethnic democracy," or "deeply flawed democracy."

The democratic achievements of Israel are significant. Defining itself as "Jewish and democratic," Israel holds relatively open elections at regular intervals, which have led to multiple changes of government (though Palestinians residing in the Occupied Territories are not enfranchised). There is almost full freedom of political organization, relatively high levels of freedom of expression, an open MEDIA, and numerous civil rights anchored in laws, regulations, and conventions. The judiciary is relatively independent and exercises judicial review of legislative and executive authorities. The state also ensures basic protection of its citizens and extends (basic) economic assistance to needy population sectors.

The Role of Judaization

However, structural barriers to full democratic rule exist. The central one is the colonial process of Judaization (and the associated process of de-Arabization), which has been a central pillar of ZIONISM since its inception and continues through this day. This process tries to deepen and broaden Jewish control over state institutions, territory, economy, and public sphere. In the early years of Zionism there were compelling (if controversial) reasons for promoting Jewish domination, namely to secure the survival of a small Jewish community in a state of war with local and neighboring Arabs and to facilitate the absorption of Jewish refugees and immigrants after the HOLOCAUST. Today circumstances are different, so that the ongoing Judaization project seriously impedes the consolidation of a democratic regime. Judaization is based on the concept that Israel "belongs" to world Jewry with a mission of concentrating Jews in Israel. Because the Jewish state was created in a territory that had a Palestinian-Arab majority, the goal could have been achieved only by the creation of an immigrant-colonial Judaizing society, and by jealously guarding the outcome of the 1948 WAR, which saw the ethnic cleansing of large parts of historic Palestine, the erasure of hundreds of Palestinian villages and towns, and the creation of the REFUGEE problem and the denial of their right of return.

A central problem to democracy therefore derives from the definition of the polity as "Jewish." Given the geopolitical and ideological circumstances, a Jewish state must continue the Judaization project, which undermines two major principles of modern democracy: civil equality and minority protection. The definition of the state has produced legal and institutional discrimination against the state's Palestinian-Arab minority, which is enshrined in a series of laws. First among these is the LAW OF RETURN, which grants any Jew in the world a permanent right of IMMIGRATION to Israel. At the same time immigration of Arabs to Israel—including those (refugees) born in the country before 1948—has been largely prohibited. A range of other discriminatory legislation exists, including two notable examples in Israel's BASIC LAWS: Israel's Lands and the structure of the Knesset. Both ensure Jewish control over the territory and government while curtailing political representation to citizens opposing the Jewish nature of the state. Several additional discriminatory laws include those regulating the state's military and security apparatus, public education, national broadcasting, and state religious services.

In addition Israel has used several discriminatory executive practices, such as applying the British DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS (used almost entirely against Arabs, most recently to pre-

vent FAMILY REUNIFICATION with Palestinians from the Occupied Territories), preferential mortgage and child allowances to (predominantly Jewish) ex-soldiers, budget allocations skewed in favor of Jewish localities and projects, and severe constraints on Palestinian land control and housing mobility. Judaization is the reason scholars have described the Israeli regime as "ethnocratic." In such a regime a dominant ethnonational group uses the state apparatus to expand its influence and control while maintaining a democratic facade. In Israel the dominance of one ethnonational group is buttressed by a hegemonic regime structure, which reinforces the state's Jewish character through immigration, land policy, development and flow of capital, constitutional settings, public culture, and the role of the armed forces.

Israel's land and planning systems have constituted a central pillar of its ethnocratic regime. The state expropriated, nationalized, and transferred the vast majority of previously owned or held Palestinian lands, and then made it subject to exclusive Jewish control by incorporating the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (a body representing world Jewry) as an equal partner in the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION. At the same time laws and regulations have prevented the sale or lease of STATE LAND, in most areas, to non-Jews. Although Israel established more than 700 Jewish communities, no Arab communities were established except for twenty-two small towns built for the coerced urbanization of the BEDOUIN.

Judaization also explains the official role played in Israel by international Jewish organizations such as the JEWISH AGENCY and the Jewish National Fund. These organizations, which have a semiofficial role in Israel, function solely for the benefit of Jews as determined by several laws, including the 1952 WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION–Jewish Agency (Status) Law between Israel and these two global Zionist organizations. These arrangements allow "discrimination by proxy" on behalf of the state and accelerate Judaization, mainly by aiding Jewish immigration, allocating land to Jews alone, establishing hundreds of Jewish communities, promoting afforestation, and protecting Judaized "open spaces" from Arab settlement.

Undemocratic practices are also prominent in housing and development rights. Because of the legal and institutional involvement of the Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund and the total Jewish domination of the land and planning systems, Arab citizens are effectively prevented from residing in over 80 percent of Israel's territory. In those same areas DIASPORA Jews can purchase or lease land even if they are not citizens of the state. In its Qa'adan decision of 2000 the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ruled that the allocation of state lands to Jews alone, in certain circumstances, is illegal. However, later institutional readjustment by the Land Authority has enabled Jewish communities to continue to exclude Arabs, and the landmark Qa'adan decision has to date had little impact on Israel's ethnic geography.

Other, less conspicuous, policies facilitate the unequal distribution of public resources between Jews and Arabs. Among these are the classification of Jewish localities as "frontier regions" (which results in beneficial budget allocations), the methods of funding local authorities, the exclusion of Arabs from various employment fields (such as Israel's Electric Company and high-tech industries connected to the armed forces) for security reasons, and wide disparities in the funding of Arab and Jewish schools and community facilities. Several studies suggest, however, that these gaps in public allocations are narrowing.

In addition, the state's security forces and pervasive militarism constitute a central pillar of the regime. These are totally identified with Jewish society (except for the participation of Druze and a few Bedouin), thereby causing pervasive inequalities in access to the centers of power and legitimacy. While Jewish secular women are drafted for a short military service, the security services are totally male dominated, causing further marginalization of women in Israel. Finally, ultra-Orthodox Jews are exempt from military service, and are hence also excluded from the important centers of power associated with state security, its apparatus, and surrounding institutions and culture.

Ethnonational Sphere

As noted, a modern democracy is synonymous with a state and thus must be territorial—that is, limited to a well-bounded space. All who live in this space—the *demos* (the people)—have equal civil rights and are subject to the same laws. Thus the basis for sovereignty and self-determination is territorial. Accordingly France belongs to the French (those who live in France), Italy to the Italians, and Great Britain to the British. This structure ensures that only the body politic of all

citizens in a given territory—who are ruled by the government of that territory—have the right to participate in the political process. But in Israel the principles of sovereignty and self-determination are ethnic, not territorial. The state belongs to all the Jews in the world, not necessarily to its own inhabitants, among them the Arabs, whose lives are affected daily by the regime. A manifestation of this is the "nationality" category in the Israeli registration of citizens, which lists various ethno-religious groups (Jewish, Arab, Druze, non-Jewish Russian, etc.) and thus prevents through institutional means the creation of a Palestinian nationality.

Was the "Jewish and democratic" concept—so dominant in Israeli political and legal thinking—doomed to failure from its very inception? The answer to this is not unequivocal, despite the structural problems outlined above. Many believe it would be more democratic to transform Israel into a secular (multicultural, binational, but not Jewish) state. But if we return to the definition of democracy as a complex set of rules and institutions, even within the structure of "Jewish and democratic," there is room for much democratic improvement. Just as Finland is defined as a Lutheran democratic state and Italy is both Catholic and democratic, so too Israel can be Jewish but at the same time more democratic. But a clear difference exists between a "Jewish" and a "Judaizing" state. Israel cannot aspire to become a democracy while continuing its colonial strategies both within and beyond the Green Line. It cannot democratize while maintaining and deepening disproportionate Jewish control over DEMOGRAPHY, land, resources, and institutions of Israel/Palestine, because those produce a clearly undemocratic category of second- and third-class citizenship for Palestinians in Israel proper and in the West Bank, respectively.

For genuine democracy Israel must therefore put an end to the OCCUPATION, and change its discriminatory laws and practices, by treating all the citizens of the state as equals. The state can still form the main organ of Jewish self-determination while maintaining civil equality and protecting the collective rights of the Arab national minority—that is, its identity, representation, property, resources, and autonomy.

The Religious Sphere

A basic democratic principle that is absent in Israel is religious freedom (including freedom *from* religion). Although well-established democracies do not coerce religious affiliation, in Israel such affiliation is inscribed at birth. The law specifies fourteen religious communities based on the Ottoman *millets* (communities of minorities). Unless there is civil legislation on personal matters, citizens are subject to the rule of their religious communities in matters such as marriage, divorce, custody, and burial. This practice causes widespread violation of civil rights, especially among women and the some 300,000 immigrants who belong socially and ethnically to the Jewish majority but are denied religious recognition of their Jewish affiliation.

Officially, intermarriage between Jewish-Israeli citizens and citizens belonging to other religions is prohibited by Israeli law (although the state accepts intermarriages registered elsewhere). Also prohibited are marriages conducted by non-Orthodox Jewish authorities such as those from the Reform and Conservative movements, which are not recognized in Israel. Recent years have witnessed an erosion of this religious monopoly over personal matters, in part from the growing popularity of offshore civil marriages (recognized by Israel) and the establishment of a Civil Court of Family Affairs. However, the religious establishment still has considerable power over the personal matters of the vast majority of citizens.

In addition to its influence over marital issues, the religious establishment was instrumental in establishing a series of laws and practices that impinge on basic liberties. First, it uses exclusively Orthodox criteria to determine who is a Jew. In Israel this is not just a religious issue but a legal-civil one that determines if a person is entitled to full citizenship. Orthodox laws and regulations impose Sabbath observance on public companies, prevent the Sabbath opening of private businesses, enforce Jewish dietary laws (Kashrut) in public institutions, prohibit the import of nonkosher meat, and provide funding for nondemocratic Orthodox education.

How can one explain the success of a religious establishment in imposing undemocratic measures on the lives of the vast majority of non-Orthodox citizens? Most secular Jews accept the undemocratic characteristics of religious control because they believe the religious establishment strengthens the Jewish character of the state vis-à-vis the Arab-Palestinian challenge. The influence of the religious establishment is seen in concrete legal structures (such as rabbinical control

over Jewish identity and hence the identity of immigrants) and in Jewish control of public spaces and state culture. For these religious groups, then, democratization would neutralize their political powers, though not necessarily their cultural or faith-based influence. The examples of Finland and Britain demonstrate that stable democracies can thrive even in states with "national churches" (Lutheran and Anglican, accordingly). A key factor is ensuring that religious institutions lack coercive political or institutional power. In addition, the existence of a state-supported church does not impinge on the religious freedom or freedom *from* religion of Finnish and British citizens. This model could provide a realistic option for democratization of the governmental apparatus in Israel.

Liberalization

Since the early 1990s a number of important human rights were secured by new Basic Laws that have semiconstitutional status. The new rights include human dignity, liberty, property, and freedom of employment. (Such laws do not apply in the Occupied Territories, however.) There has also been much discussion regarding the drafting of a constitution, and the Knesset published several proposals during the 2006–2009 period, aiming to produce a draft in the near future. In addition the economy and capital markets have been significantly deregulated, and key assets of the state, including large tracts of land and key infrastructures, have been gradually privatized. Liberalization has also been evident in the increased activity of civil society organizations and in the growing freedoms enjoyed by Arab citizens, in terms of both political organization and access to some domains in Israeli society, particularly culture, sports, and media. However, this freedom is largely confined to individual mobility or to civil society activities that do not challenge the Jewish nature of the state, typically in fields such as the environment, welfare provision, and women's rights.

But this process is partial and incomplete. First, most of the changes promote liberalization rather than democratization, although there are links between the two. In other words, the individual has more rights and liberties, but the ethnoreligious definition of the state remains unchanged. Second, many of these changes have been produced by economic forces that have privatized public resources in the name of the free market, not by a drive for civic equality. In addition the liberalization of the economy, especially the privatization of public assets and services, has significantly widened socioeconomic gaps and increased poverty, thus weakening an important foundation of substantive democracy—the equitable distribution of public resources.

Finally, since the second Lebanon War, and more intensely since the election of a right-wing Likud-led government in 2009, a plethora of new legislation and policies have been launched by the new government, with the aim of marginalizing and weakening the state's Palestinian citizens. These have demonstrated again the deeply ethnocratic nature of the Israeli regime and its substantial distance from genuine democracy.

See also Abandoned Areas Ordinance; Absentee Property Law; Bedouin in Israel; Custodian of Absentee Property; Development Authority; Israeli Militarism; Israel Lands Administration; Jewish Agency for Israel; Jewish National Fund; Palestinian Citizens of Israel; Present Absentees

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—Oren Yiftachel

Israeli Supreme Court and the Occupation

The WEST BANK and GAZA were conquered by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) during the 1967 armed conflict among Israel, EGYPT, and JORDAN. As territories captured by a hostile party during an international armed conflict, these territories became subject to a regime of belligerent OCCUPATION. Hence the main international instruments dealing with such a regime, the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 1907 (Hague Regulations), and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949 (Geneva Convention IV), were applicable. Recognizing this, the first military order promulgated when the IDF entered the areas provided that the military courts established there would observe the provisions of Geneva Convention IV, and that in case of a conflict between the Convention and military orders, the Convention would prevail.

Soon after military operations ended in June 1967, some in Israel began questioning whether the West Bank and Gaza should indeed be regarded as occupied territory. They argued that neither area was part of the sovereign territory of the two belligerents in the 1967 conflict (Jordan and Egypt), so their status was unclear. The provision in the military order referring to Geneva Convention IV was revoked, and the government of Israel adopted the political position that the West Bank and Gaza were "disputed territories." It challenged de jure application of Geneva Convention IV, but declared that the Israel Defense Forces would respect its humanitarian provisions. Government spokesmen never clarified what distinguished humanitarian provisions from others in the Convention.

The government's approach was rejected by most experts in INTERNATIONAL LAW, foreign governments, and international organizations. On a number of occasions the UNITED NATIONS Security Council has declared that Geneva Convention IV applies to the West Bank and Gaza. In its advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of Construction of a Wall (2004) the International Court of Justice also affirmed that the Convention applies to the West Bank.

Soon after Israel's Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian residents of these territories submitted petitions to the Supreme Court of Israel challenging the legality of actions of the Israeli military authorities. Although there was no precedent for judicial review by a national court over actions of the state's military forces in occupied territories, Israeli authorities did not question the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the petitions. At first the Court accepted the government's acquiescence as sufficient basis for its jurisdiction, but later it ruled that its statutory jurisdiction as a high court of justice to issue writs against all authorities in Israel "exercising public functions under law" covers review of IDF actions, wherever they are performed.

Alongside the issue of jurisdiction, petitions by Palestinian residents could potentially have met two other procedural obstacles. First, Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza are not Israeli nationals and given the ongoing conflict they could be regarded as enemy aliens who may not challenge the actions of Israel's authorities before its own courts. This argument, which was recently raised to avoid judicial review of actions by another occupying power, never came before the Supreme Court of Israel. Second, the political nature of some Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza arguably made them nonjusticiable (i.e., unsuitable for resolution in a court of law), either as "acts of state" or under a "political-questions doctrine." In a few cases the Israeli authorities did indeed try to avoid judicial review by claiming that the specific issue before the Court was nonjusticiable. The Court was not receptive to the argument. It has consistently held that acts which have allegedly harmed the rights of specific individuals are always justiciable.

Having established its jurisdiction to entertain petitions relating to the West Bank and Gaza, the Court had to decide whether to resort to international law relating to belligerent occupation in assessing the legality of acts performed there by Israeli authorities. In the first cases to reach the Court, government counsel asked it to refrain from ruling on the status in international law of the West

Bank and Gaza. They declared that the military authorities were convinced that they had complied with norms of belligerent occupation and were thus prepared for the Court to assess their actions according to these norms, even if they were not formally binding. Initially the Court went along with this approach. However, later it ruled that the West Bank and Gaza are indeed subject to a regime of belligerent occupation. The one exception relates to East JERUSALEM, which was annexed by Israel in 1967 pursuant to a statute enacted by the Knesset. The Supreme Court regards itself as bound to apply this statute, even if it is incompatible with Israel's international obligations.

In enforcing international norms relating to belligerent occupation, the Supreme Court's approach was shaped by the role of international law in Israel's domestic legal system. Following the British approach, courts in Israel enforce customary international law unless it is incompatible with a statute passed by the Knesset, Israel's parliament. On the other hand, because the power to make binding treaties on behalf of the state is in the hands of the executive branch of government, the courts do not enforce international treaties unless they have been incorporated in domestic law by parliamentary legislation. They will, however, interpret legislation so as to avoid incompatibility with Israel's international obligations.

Applying that approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the Hague Regulations reflect customary law, while not all provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are reflective of such law. Provisions that do not reflect customary law will not be enforced, since even though the Geneva Convention was ratified, it was not incorporated by Knesset legislation. The distinction between customary and conventional international law allowed the Court to avoid confronting the government's contention that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not formally applicable. After violence erupted in September 2000, the Court gradually modified its approach and used the standards of the Fourth Geneva Convention to assess the legality of government action, without formally ruling that the Convention applies.

Respecting Local Law

The primary duties of an occupying power are contained in Regulation 43 of the Hague Regulations. According to this provision, the occupying power "shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and civil life, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." The meaning of this provision was the focus of a number of Supreme Court decisions delivered during the first two decades of the Occupation.

Regulation 43 deals with two issues: the duty to restore and ensure public order, and the duty to respect the laws in force when the Occupation began. Although these were originally regarded as two separate issues, the Supreme Court forged a strong connection between them, holding that the occupying power's duty to respect the local laws is subject to its obligation to restore and ensure public order. When changes in the local law are required for reasons of public order and civil life, they cannot be "absolutely prevented."

The Court has given a wide interpretation to the term "public order and civil life" (an interpretation of the original French "*l'ordre et la vie publique*"). It has ruled that any measures whose motive is to benefit the local population may be regarded as promoting public order and civil life, even if this is not their sole, or even dominant, motive, and if they also further Israeli interests, including those of the Israeli settler population. Thus, for example, in 1982 the Court upheld the imposition of a new tax, value-added tax (VAT), in the Occupied Territories, when the same tax had been instituted in Israel. Given the free flow of services and goods at the time, this was clearly in the economic interests of Israel. However, in upholding the tax the Court held that if VAT had not been imposed, restrictions would have been required on the free flow of goods and services between Israel and the Occupied Territories and that these restrictions would not have been beneficial for the local population (i.e., the Palestinians).

Under the Court's jurisprudence, the actions of military commanders in the Occupied Territories must be guided by one or both of two considerations: security and the good of the local population. As both of these considerations have been broadly defined, the Court has rarely interfered with decisions or actions of the military. This has been especially noticeable in the field of lawmaking. While in theory the prevailing law when the Occupation began remains in force, even before the OSLO ACCORDS and the changes in law and administration effected under those accords and subsequent agreements, there had been wide-scale changes in many fields of law.

Israeli Settlements in Occupied Territories

One of the most contentious policies of successive Israeli governments since 1967 has been establishment of Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the West Bank and in Gaza. In the view of most experts in international law, foreign governments, United Nations bodies, and the International Court of Justice, in establishing these settlements Israel violated Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits an occupying power from transferring part of its own civilian population into the occupied territory. It would also seem that taking private or public LAND for such settlements is incompatible with the obligations of an occupying power under international law.

The settlement issue has reached the Supreme Court several times. In the initial cases the Court held that Article 49 is not reflective of customary international law. It therefore refused to rule whether this provision applies to any settlement of civilians of the occupying power in occupied territory, or only, as some Israeli lawyers have claimed, to forcible transfers of civilians. Instead of ruling on the legality of settlements under international law, the Court's decisions focused on the legality of taking the land on which settlements were established. In the *Beth El* case (1978) the Court ruled that settlements established in strategic positions could fulfill a security function and that Palestinians' private land requisitioned for military purposes could therefore be used for such settlements. Soon after this decision, in the famous ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT (1979), the Court held that it was unlawful to requisition private land for a settlement if the primary motivation for the settlement was political rather than military, and the settlement was intended to be permanent. In this particular case the Court ordered the authorities to disband the settlement and return the requisitioned land to its Palestinian owners.

In response to the *Elon Moreh* ruling, Israeli authorities adopted a policy of declaring uncultivated land in the Occupied Territories public or STATE LAND and establishing settlements on such land. The Supreme Court has avoided ruling on the legality of this practice. In one case it held that the petitioners had no property rights to the land and thus lacked legal standing to challenge its use; in another it held that a petition challenging the whole settlement policy on various grounds, including use of public land, was too general to be justiciable.

The *Elon Moreh* precedent, which declared that establishing settlements with intention that they should be permanent is unlawful, became highly relevant when the government decided to remove Israeli settlers and settlements from Gaza in the framework of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT plan (2005). Settlers challenged the legality of the decision and the constitutionality of the Knesset statute enacted to implement it. Their main argument was that the government was violating their fundamental rights by forcing them to leave the homes in which they had lived for many years. In reply, government lawyers argued that the settlements were established in occupied territory and were thus by their very nature temporary. They could therefore be removed as part of a political agreement or political decision to withdraw from the territories. The Court accepted the argument, dismissed the settlers' petition, and upheld both the constitutionality of the Knesset statute and the legality of the government decision to force settlers to leave Gaza. In doing so, it stated that "according to the legal outlook of all successive Israeli governments, as it was presented to the Supreme Court—an outlook that has always been accepted by the Supreme Court—the [West Bank and Gaza] are held by the State of Israel by way of belligerent occupation."

The legality of settlements on the West Bank returned to the Court in cases dealing with the separation BARRIER that was constructed there. The International Court of Justice opined that as the settlements were established in violation of international law, routing the Barrier to protect them was unlawful. The Supreme Court refused to accept this argument. Rather it held that whether the settlements were established lawfully or not is irrelevant in examining the lawfulness of the Barrier's route, because even if the settlements are unlawful, their residents are civilians who are entitled to protection against security threats. The Court did not examine whether, under international law, removing the settlers, rather than including the settlements on the western side of the Barrier, would have been the appropriate measure to protect them.

Security Measures

During the Occupation, the Israeli authorities have employed various security measures against the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza. These have included DEPORTATIONS, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. There

have been numerous challenges to such measures before the Supreme Court.

The first cases relating to deportation of Palestinians to Jordan or LEBANON reached the Court in the 1970s. The main legal argument rested on Article 49, paragraph 1, of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits deportations of protected persons from occupied territory, regardless of their motive. The Court held that a total ban on deportations is not part of customary law and that, in any event, paragraph 1 does not apply to deportations of individuals on security grounds. Despite strong criticism of this interpretation, the Court refused to reverse its stand in later cases. In 1992, 415 members of HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, who the security services maintained were involved in attacks against Israelis, were deported without a hearing, which was required by law and by the Court's previous jurisprudence. The Court refused to grant an injunction to stop the deportations, although it later ruled that the authorities were bound to allow the deportees a hearing after their deportation.

Deportation orders against Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza were halted after the Oslo Accords. However, when terrorist attacks by SUICIDE BOMBERS increased before and during the Second INTIFADA, the authorities proposed to deport West Bank family members of the bombers to Gaza. After the attorney general of Israel ruled out measures against persons who were not personally involved in the activities of bombers, the IDF authorities issued deportation orders against three persons who had allegedly been involved in the terrorist activities of family members. When the orders were challenged in court, the authorities maintained that rather than deportation, the orders involved "assigned residence" within the occupied territory, which is allowed under Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention when necessary for imperative reasons of security. The Court rejected the legal argument that the West Bank and Gaza should be regarded as two separate occupied territories, relying, inter alia, on a clause in the Oslo agreements between Israel and the PLO that the parties "view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which shall be preserved during the interim agreement." Ordering a West Bank resident to live in Gaza was therefore to be regarded as "assigned residence within occupied territory" rather than deportation. The Court emphasized that since this measure could be used only when necessary for imperative reasons of security, there had to be a strong connection between the activities of the suicide bomber and the person subject to "assigned residence." In two of the cases the Court found such a connection, but in the third case it held that the connection was not strong enough, and the "assigned residence" order was therefore revoked.

Punitive house demolitions are based on a provision in the BRITISH MANDATE DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS that were promulgated in the whole of Palestine in 1945. Regulation 119 grants the military commander power to order forfeiture and demolition of any house if an inhabitant of the house participated in a crime involving use of violence. The Supreme Court ruled that the Defense Regulations were still valid in the Occupied Territories when Israel entered in 1967 and were therefore part of the prevailing law. It has heard hundreds of cases challenging punitive house demolitions. In all cases the Court issues a temporary injunction to stop use of the measure pending its decision, but it has rejected substantive arguments that would prohibit all punitive demolitions. The Court rejected the argument that punitive demolitions are a form of collective punishment, because the main victims are family members of the alleged perpetrator, and it refrained from considering other arguments that such demolitions are incompatible with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. On the other hand the Court subjected the practice of demolitions to some constraints. First, it ruled that the measure may not be employed unless the inhabitants have been afforded a hearing and allowed time to petition the Court. This has proved a significant constraint, because in many cases once the matter reaches the Court the authorities either withdraw the order or agree to less harsh measures (such as sealing rooms in the house). Second, the Court has held that house demolitions are subject to the "proportionality rule." In the context of demolitions, the Court has interpreted this rule to imply that a house may not be demolished if persons other than the nuclear family of the perpetrator live there.

The Court has never addressed the argument that house demolitions are not an effective deterrent against terror, stating that this was a decision for the security authorities. In 2005 the authorities suspended use of the measure, after a task force

established by the military opined that the measure was on the "borderline of legitimacy" and that its use caused resentment among Palestinians that probably outweighed its deterrent effect. However, after a terrorist attack on a religious seminary in Jerusalem, they reverted to use of the measure. The Court refused to interfere in that decision.

Administrative detention was widely used by the authorities during various periods of the Occupation, especially during the First Intifada, when hundreds of Palestinians were held in detention camps for long periods of time. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the problematical nature of detaining persons who have not been charged with a criminal offense (let alone convicted) and has stressed that such detention may not be used as an alternative to the criminal system. Administrative detention can be justified on security grounds only when less severe preventive measures are unavailable. All detention orders are reviewed by military judges, and consequently the Court has seldom been prepared to examine whether these stringent conditions have been met. Its approach has been to stress procedural aspects of the review process but to refrain from intervening on the merits. There have, however, been exceptional cases in which the Court has ordered revocation of a specific detention order.

From the above cases one can draw a general picture of the Court's approach to security measures. The Court has refused to prohibit various measures entirely, even in light of weighty arguments that such measures are incompatible with standards of international humanitarian law. It has, however, sought to constrain the use of such measures by laying down procedural demands, reviewing the use of the measures in concrete cases, stressing that the measures may be employed only when demanded for security reasons, and interfering in rare cases that do not meet these requirements. The Court's willingness to grant temporary injunctions to allow judicial consideration of each concrete case has led in practice to a large number of cases being resolved out of court.

Interrogation Practices

During the first twenty years of the Occupation, serious allegations were raised regarding use of force during interrogations of Palestinians suspected of involvement in violence against military or civilian targets. These allegations were strenuously denied by the IDF authorities. However, when in 1987 it was discovered that an Israeli army officer had been convicted of serious security offenses on the basis of a confession extracted by use of force, the government established a commission of inquiry to look into the interrogation practices and to make recommendations.

The Commission of Inquiry, headed by the former president of the Supreme Court, MOSHE LANDAU, found that force had indeed been used in interrogations in the past and that members of the security services had perjured themselves in court by denying its use. Although highly critical of this policy, the commission accepted that in fighting organized and ideological violence, it was not possible to restrict interrogators to normal police practices and that when it was essential to elicit information from detainees to frustrate terrorist attacks, use of moderate physical pressure could be justified. The commission opined that an interrogator who used such force could be protected from criminal liability under the defense of necessity. Following the commission's report, use of various forms of pressure in the interrogation of Palestinians, including sleep deprivation, tying interrogatees in uncomfortable positions, hooding, and shaking detainees, was institutionalized. The authorities argued that the measures employed did not amount to torture.

A large number of petitions were submitted to the Supreme Court challenging the interrogation practices, some by individual detainees and others by human rights NGOs. The interrogation methods were also criticized by international human rights bodies, including the UN Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights Committee. The Supreme Court dragged its feet in ruling on the petitions. Eventually, in September 1999 the Court handed down a major decision in which it ruled that the security authorities were not legally empowered to use any of the described methods of interrogation or any other physical force, and that they were bound to conduct investigations according to accepted police methods of interrogation. It added, however, that while the necessity defense in criminal law could not provide the executive with the legal power to depart from regular interrogation techniques, the authorities could refrain from prosecuting officials who departed from these techniques in cases of necessity.

The Court based its judgment on Israeli domestic law rather than on standards of international law. It even intimated that the Knesset had

the power to change the law but stressed that any such change would have to meet the strict requirements of one of Israel's BASIC LAWS, Human Dignity and Liberty. It is unlikely that any law that would have permitted use of force in interrogations would have met these requirements and the Knesset didn't change the law. However, following the judgment the attorney general issued guidelines in which he stated that he would consider not prosecuting officials who have "used means of interrogation needed immediately in order to gain essential information for the purpose of preventing a concrete danger of severe harm to state security, human life, liberty or bodily integrity," provided the methods used were reasonable and did not amount to torture. The Court has not interfered in this policy.

Military Operations

Until violence broke out in September 2000 in the Occupied Territories, the Supreme Court had not had to deal with combat situations. The First Intifada, which began in December 1987, was essentially a popular uprising in which the use of force by the Palestinian population was limited and did not involve wide-scale use of firearms. The response of the IDF was to be judged on standards of law enforcement in what may have been considered an emergency-type situation. It certainly did not amount to hostilities or active armed conflict.

Soon after the start of the Second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the Israeli authorities claimed that the situation was one of "armed conflict short of war." In support of this position they cited the large number of incidents involving use of firearms by Palestinians and the fact that there were organized armed groups behind the incidents. After a series of serious TERRORIST attacks and suicide bombings by Palestinians inside Israel in March 2002, in which over 100 civilians were killed, the IDF embarked on a campaign termed OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, in the course of which there was heavy fighting between armed Palestinians and the IDF in JENIN, NABLUS, and other parts of the West Bank. At various times Israeli forces also entered areas of Gaza that were under Palestinian control, and this too involved heavy fighting.

While fighting was going on, petitions were submitted to the Supreme Court to enjoin certain actions of the Israeli military or to force them to comply with requirements of international humanitarian law. Although it is unprecedented for national courts to interfere in military operations in real time, the Supreme Court was not prepared to dismiss such petitions as nonjusticiable. In many cases, rather than ruling on the merits of the case, it served as a mediator between the military authorities and the petitioners—Palestinians affected by the fighting or human rights NGOs. Thus, in a case relating to the siege of the CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY in 2002, the Court held special sessions during the siege to determine the plight of civilians who were apparently being held hostage in the church by Palestinian fighters who had taken refuge there. Only after being satisfied that civilians were allowed to leave to get food and water did the Court dismiss the petition. In a case related to a battle in the Rafah area in May 2004, the Court mediated between the lawyers of Palestinian civilians trapped in the fighting and the IDF officer in charge of humanitarian matters. By the time the Court wrote its judgment, most of the major issues had been resolved. In other cases the Court stressed that its role during ongoing hostilities is limited. At times the most it can do is to demand explanations from the authorities, who are required to show that their operations are being conducted in conformity with international humanitarian law. This pattern repeated itself during Israel's military campaign in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. While the Court refused to accept that a petition relating to humanitarian concerns during the hostilities was nonjusticiable, rather than ruling on the merits the Court demanded an explanation from the authorities for their actions, stressed the norms of international humanitarian law that apply, and pressured the authorities to mitigate burning problems.

In the case of house demolitions during military operations, the Court has been highly reluctant to interfere when the authorities have argued that the demolitions are necessary in order to safeguard the lives of soldiers. It has, however, stressed that the decision to demolish houses must be seriously considered and that, where possible, persons in the house should be afforded a hearing before the house is demolished.

One of the controversial actions of the Israeli military authorities has been "TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS" of persons suspected of involvement in planning and executing terrorist attacks on Israelis. In November 2006 the Supreme Court handed down a judgment that examines the legality of the practice under international humanitarian law. The

Court held that active members of organized Palestinian armed groups are civilians who may be targeted only for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities. However, the Court adopted a wide interpretation, both of the term "direct participation" and the time frame in which persons will be regarded as taking such part. It held that active members of armed groups will be regarded as taking a direct part in hostilities even while resting between attacks. On the other hand, the Court circumscribed the authority to target such persons with a number of conditions. There must be well-based evidence of the participation of the targeted person in hostilities; nobody may be targeted if he could be arrested, investigated, and tried; after every targeted killing there must be a thorough investigation to see that the above conditions were met; and, finally, in every attack the expected collateral damages must meet the demands of proportionality.

Despite the Court's general reluctance to interfere in policies of the military or the government, there have been important exceptions. In one major case the Court ruled that the use by the IDF of Palestinian residents of the West Bank to warn neighbors who are about to be arrested is incompatible with international humanitarian law. In another case the Court overruled a statute enacted by the Knesset that denied compensation to persons harmed by Israeli forces during the Intifada.

Separation Barrier

Following a series of terrorist attacks in Israel by Palestinian residents of the West Bank, in 2002 the government of Israel decided to construct a barrier that would make the entry of West Bank residents to Israel more difficult. The Barrier's original route ran mainly through the West Bank and included a number of Israeli settlements on the west (Israeli) side of the Barrier. During its construction private land was requisitioned, and in many cases OLIVE TREE groves, WATER wells, and other Palestinian property were severely damaged. The Barrier's route cut off many Palestinians from their agricultural land and from access to educational, HEALTH CARE, and other services.

Palestinian landowners turned to the Supreme Court to challenge the Barrier's legality. Initially the Court was unreceptive to these petitions, relying on the argument that the Barrier was needed for security reasons. However, in June 2004, ten days before the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion on the legality of the separation Barrier, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the *Beit Sourik* case, in which it took a radically different approach. Construction of a twenty-five-mile (forty-kilometer) portion of the Barrier northwest of Jerusalem caused extensive damage to Palestinians in the area, which included taking large parcels of land, uprooting thousands of olive trees, and separating villagers from their agricultural lands. The Court accepted the government's argument that the Barrier itself as well as the route of the section under consideration was motivated by security concerns. However, it held that the harm caused by the route chosen in the particular section was disproportionate to its security advantages. In reaching this conclusion, the Court was guided by an opinion submitted by a group of retired army officers, who argued that the route chosen by the authorities was not optimal from a security perspective. The Court revoked the orders requisitioning land for this part of the Barrier and ordered the authorities to find an alternative route.

The *Beit Sourik* judgment related to one portion of the separation Barrier, but it laid down principles that were relevant in assessing the legality of other portions. The Court accepted that building the Barrier on the east side of the Green Line is legal if the route chosen is justified on security grounds and the damage caused is not disproportionate to its security advantages. In another judgment, delivered after the International Court's Advisory Opinion, the Court again held that the route of the Barrier section under review was dictated by legitimate security considerations. However, it ruled that the route did not meet the demands of proportionality, because the authorities had not shown that it had the least harmful effects on Palestinian residents of villages entrapped in an enclave around an Israeli settlement, Alphei Menashe. The Court therefore ordered the authorities to find an alternative route that would have less impact on the Palestinian villagers but would still provide security to persons in Israel and surrounding Israeli settlements. However, the few cases in which the Court has interfered in the Barrier's route are the exception. In most of the cases the Court has refused to interfere in the route chosen, even when the damage to Palestinian civilians has been significant.

Gaza and the Disengagement

Following withdrawal of Israeli settlements and forces from Gaza, the 2006 Palestinian ELECTIONS and the establishment of a Hamas government in the area, Israel's cabinet passed a decision placing sanctions on Gaza, which included cuts in fuel and electricity supply and RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT for leaving and entering the territory. The one limitation was that a "humanitarian crisis" should be avoided. The Court considered a number of petitions challenging this policy. It refused to interfere in restrictions on the right of persons to leave Gaza so as to study in the West Bank or abroad. When human rights NGOs attacked the decision to restrict supply of fuel and electricity, the Court ruled that since Israel no longer had effective control over Gaza, it was not bound by the full range of obligations imposed on an occupying power. Without clearly defining Israel's status vis-à-vis Gaza, the Court held that in light of the hostilities between Israel and Hamas and Israel's control over the entry points to Gaza, it retained certain duties under international humanitarian law. These were restricted to allowing the minimum flow of fuel and electricity needed to sustain the essential humanitarian needs of the population. The Court accepted the authorities' view that the amounts of fuel and electricity that were being supplied met these needs. In subsequent cases the Court has not been prepared to interfere in government policy relating to entry of supplies into Gaza, provided the authorities assure them that the "essential humanitarian needs" of the Palestinian population there are being met.

General Assessment of Court's Function

In the Court's review of the authorities' actions in the Occupied Territories one detects two conflicting trends. On the one hand, the Court has no doubt fulfilled a legitimizing function. This is most apparent in the Court's interpretation of provisions in the Fourth Geneva Convention; its refusal to interfere in the use of highly questionable security measures, such as punitive house demolitions and deportations; its reluctance to question the lawfulness of Israeli settlements; and its acceptance of the notion of "essential humanitarian needs" as the criterion for restrictions on supplies to Gaza. On the other hand, the mere existence of the Court's power of review, and its demand that the authorities provide legal grounds for their actions, have mitigated arbitrariness by the IDF and allowed for some measure of accountability.

Judicial review in real time over actions of the military in the Occupied Territories set a precedent for domestic courts. In recent years the Supreme Court has gone even further in reviewing the legality of ongoing military actions during active hostilities. Although the Court has been reluctant to interfere in operational decisions, it has forced the authorities to relate to the demands of international humanitarian law and has often helped to negotiate local agreements that mitigate the harsh conditions of armed conflict. The Court has seldom overruled the authorities in the Occupied Territories. However, many cases are settled in the Court's shadow, either after a petition has been submitted or when legal action is threatened.

In summary, judicial review by the Supreme Court of Israel over actions of the military in the Occupied Territories has not served to guarantee the rule of law there. Existence of such review has, however, provided for some restraint on the military.

See also ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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—David Kretzmer

Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement

The Treaty of Peace between the state of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of JORDAN was signed on 26 October 1994. It made Jordan the second Arab country (after EGYPT) to normalize relations with Israel and was closely linked to the OSLO PROCESS initiated in September 1993. The basis for the treaty's implementation was the signing and ratification of fifteen bilateral agreements in economic, scientific, and cultural spheres.

In addition to normalizing relations between the two countries, the treaty resolved territorial disputes, and provided for more substantial economic connections that would reach into the wider Middle East region. According to the treaty both countries would refrain from acts of belligerency, ensure that no threats of violence to the other would originate within their territory, prevent TERRORISM, and act together to achieve security and cooperation in the Middle East by replacing military preparedness with confidence-building measures, such as trade.

Other provisions include specifying allocations from existing WATER resources, freedom of passage for nationals of both countries, efforts to alleviate the Palestinian REFUGEE problem, and cooperation in the development of the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. The treaty contained little in the way of LAND transfers, but one is worth mentioning: Israeli land in the area on the northern Jordanian/Israeli border, known in Israel as Naharayim and in Jordan as Baqura, came under official Jordanian sovereignty. Israeli landowners, however, along with their employees and guests, are permitted freedom of movement in the area, with no customs or immigration restrictions of any kind. In an unusual move, the treaty declares that, although the land is under Jordanian sovereignty, the Israeli police department has jurisdiction over incidents "solely involving the [Israeli] landowners, their invitees or employees." Furthermore, Jordanian law does not apply to activities in which only Israelis are involved. Land purchases by non-Israelis, however, can only be made with Jordanian approval.

The Jordan-Israel peace treaty formalized private talks between the countries that had been occurring for many years. The 1991 GULF WAR and, most importantly, the Oslo Process finally made it acceptable for an Arab government to be in peace negotiations with Israel. Another contributing factor was the UNITED STATES, which wrote off over $700 million of Jordan's debt to Washington and supplied Jordan with modern military hardware—for example, F-16 aircraft—in exchange for Jordan's cooperation in making peace.

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Israel Lands Administration

The Israel Lands Administration (ILA) was created in the 1960 Israel Lands Law to manage the land in Israel that is in the "public domain." These lands either are property of the state, belong to the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF), or belong to the Israel DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (DA). This land comprises some 4,820,000 acres (19,508 square kilometers), or 93 percent of all the land within the Green Line. The ILA is a government agency that closely collaborates with the JEWISH AGENCY (JA), an organization that promotes Jewish IMMIGRATION to Israel and develops residential areas on both public land and land owned by the JNF; the JA as a matter of policy does not lease land to non-Jews, and the JNF's charter prohibits it from selling or leasing land to non-Jews.

The ILA ensures that the ownership of Israeli lands ("lands" in this law means land, houses,

buildings, and anything permanently fixed to land)—whether the lands of the state of Israel, the DA, or the JNF—will not be "transferred" by sale or lease or in any other manner to non-Jews, namely, non-Jewish PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL. As such, some 18–20 percent of the total population is excluded from purchasing, renting, subletting, or in any other way using 93 percent of the land in Israel.

The ILA has several specific functions, including guaranteeing that the national lands are used in accordance with Israeli laws; regulating, managing, registering, actively protecting, and supervising STATE LAND; making state land available for public (Jewish) use; planning, developing, and managing state land reserves; initiating and planning development programs (including relocation of existing occupants, i.e., Arabs); and authorizing contracts and agreements with other parties.

Four Israeli laws form the "legal" basis of its land policy:

- Basic Law establishing the Israel Lands Administration (1960)
- Israel Lands Law (1960)
- Israel Lands Administration (1960)
- Covenant between the State of Israel, the World Zionist Organization (WZO), and the Jewish National Fund (1962)

The Israel Lands Council sets policy for the ILA. It is chaired by Israel's vice prime minister and the minister of industry, trade, labor, and communications. The council has twenty-two members; twelve represent government ministries and ten represent the JNF. The director general of the ILA is appointed by the government. The JNF appoints half, less one, of the members of the council, while the government appoints the other half, plus one. The director of the ILA is directly subordinate to the minister of agriculture.

Background

Despite tremendous efforts over more than fifty years, Jewish institutions were able to purchase only 6–8 percent of the land of Palestine by 1948. Thus soon after its DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE the state of Israel undertook an intensive process of "land nationalization." This process was intended to systematically transfer Palestinian lands to the possession and use of the new Jewish community, with the purpose of redesigning the geographical space and maintaining a DEMOGRAPHIC balance between the group of some 150,000 Palestinian inhabitants who remained after 1948 and the group of some 660,000 Jews.

On 2 December 1948, the Israeli government declared the enactment of the Emergency Regulations on Property of Absentees, generally referred to as the Absentee Property Act. Accordingly, the government established the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY, a division within the Finance Ministry, to take charge of the recently created REFUGEES' property. These regulations reclassified most abandoned Arab property as absentee and, in effect, prevented the return of any of their Palestinian owners.

In the nationalization process Israel gained control of over 7,482,000 dunums (approximately 1,850,000 acres) of Palestinian-owned property. As regards immovable property, in 1949, Israel reported—in a partial count—that 73,000 dwellings and 7,800 premises, such as warehouses, workshops, shops, and offices plus bank accounts and movable property (e.g., jewelry, furniture), were under the control of the Custodian of Absentee Property.

In March 1950 the Knesset officially approved the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW, which also stipulated the creation of the Development Authority (Transfer of Property Law 5710-1950), and was put into effect on 9 August 1950. Generally speaking, the new law legalized the de facto situation that grew out of the wartime abuses that gave rise to the abandoned Palestinian property. While the task of the Custodian of Absentee Property was intended above all to administer and to preserve the absentee property for future Jewish use, the DA was authorized to take measures to distribute that property to Jews and to sell land to the government, to the JNF, and to other public agencies.

The Israel Lands Administration at Work

When on 19 July 1960 the ILA was formalized in a BASIC LAW, it officially provided that the ILA would manage the lands of Israel, which are divided among three bodies as follows: the state of Israel, which owns about 14.5 million dunums (approximately 3.6 million acres); the DA, which owns about 2.5 million dunum (approximately 618,000 acres); and the JNF, which owns about 2.6 million dunums (approximately 640,000 acres or 13 percent).

The Lands Administration Law also specified the exceptions to it, including the activities of

the Development Authority. The law established, among other things, that all the lands and properties belonging to the Palestinian refugees were transferred to the state of Israel as the sole owner, regardless of their use or who was using them, and that apart from exceptional cases, they could not be sold, leased, or transferred to others (i.e., non-Jews).

After its official establishment the ILA, armed with an arsenal of documents "legalizing" the confiscation of refugee property and the lands of Israel's Palestinian citizens, continued the expropriation process and the leasing of these properties, whether to the de facto Jewish occupiers or to new immigrants, including for the establishment of new Jewish settlements and neighborhoods.

Until the early 1960s, the JNF managed its own landholdings. However, in 1962 it signed a covenant with the state of Israel whereby it agreed to place JNF landholdings, without transferring title, under the administration of the ILA and its governing body, the Israel Lands Council. The ILA was allowed to lease its land to Jews only, in keeping with the JNF's mission to purchase and develop land for Jewish settlement.

The specificity of this landownership, with 93 percent in the hands of the state or parastate Zionist organizations, has significant consequences: the vast majority of Jewish Israelis live on land that cannot change hands without the formal consent of the ILA. The "nationalization" of virtually all the land has to do, then, not with a socialist vision but with a Zionist one. The point is to affirm the right of the Jewish people as such to the land of Eretz Yisrael. Conversely, Palestinian citizens of Israel, some 18–20 percent of the population, are prohibited from buying, leasing, renting, or living on this land.

From 1948 to 1977, Israel confiscated the major part of Arab land in the Galilee and in the Arab-populated northern and southern "triangles" in the center of the country as well as in the Negev. One result has been the proletarianization of this population (especially in the Galilee), the majority of whom were originally farmers. While the Arab villages have preserved their rural appearance, most of their inhabitants travel to the cities to work.

In the Negev the ILA has seized hundreds of thousands of dunums—the exact number is not clear—and has repeatedly expelled the BEDOUIN. The Bedouin, who are Palestinian Arabs, are still suffering from measures taken in the early years of Israel's statehood on the pretext of sorting out the ownership of about 700,000 dunums (approximately 175,000 acres). Not only has their land been confiscated but they are refused PERMITS to build homes, even provisional ones, and, if they proceed without permits, they are made to demolish their "illegal" dwellings and assessed heavy fines. Now half the 80,000 Negev Bedouin have been forcibly regrouped into seven reserves or townships.

The ILA has used a variety of coercive mechanisms to facilitate the transition of Negev Bedouin from rural to urban life, to discourage subsistence herding and encourage the indigenous Bedouin population to concentrate in the government-built townships. For instance, the state does not provide electricity, running WATER, telephone, access ROADS, sanitation services, schools, or HEALTH CARE clinics in the traditional Bedouin villages, many of which are "UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES." The situation of the "unrecognized villages" is perhaps the worst of all Israeli-Arab communities. There are several such unrecognized villages in the Galilee, but most are in the Negev, where some forty-six unrecognized villages do not appear on any Israeli map and face the same total lack of services as do the Bedouin in traditional villages. The Bedouin have faced myriad problems in conjunction with the confiscation of agricultural and herding lands and the subsequent loss of means of self-subsistence. Life in the ILA "urban townships" is rife with the social breakdown resulting from near-total joblessness, crime, and drug use. In 2006 the JNF signed a forty-nine-year lease agreement with the state of Israel that gives it control over 30,000 hectares (74,132 acres) of Negev land for development of forests. More recently the JNF has undertaken a $600 million project entitled "Blueprint Negev," which aims to attract and build infrastructure for 250,000 new Jewish settlers.

While, as noted, Palestinian citizens of Israel account for 18–20 percent of its population, they own a mere 3 percent of the land that has typically been passed down from parents and grandparents. Nevertheless, they face restrictions on its use. Much of the land that Palestinians own has purposefully been designated by the ILA for "agricultural purposes" only. Unable to purchase or lease land elsewhere, Palestinians have often built on these lands, only to have their "illegal" homes destroyed. Moreover, while the state of Israel confiscated most lands owned or held by its Palestinian citizens (as well as

the refugee lands), and the ILA allotted many of these lands to the Jewish settlements, there was no such allotment of lands to the Arab towns and villages. Since the establishment of the state, not even one Arab town has been established (apart from the imposed townships/reserves created for the Arab Bedouins in the Negev), which contrasts sharply with Israel's destruction of more than 500 Palestinian villages in the lead-up to, and after, the 1948 WAR and despite the fact that its Palestinian population has increased almost tenfold (from 150,000 to some 1.3 million, and more if one includes the Palestinian residents of occupied East JERUSALEM). The government allocates vast areas for Jewish settlement only, often at the expense of Arab communities. The ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL (ACRI), among others, contends that this practice violates Israel's democratic principles and restricts Arab citizens from living on the state's land. Moreover, land for new Jewish townships is regularly expropriated from the private and public holdings of neighboring Palestinian towns, resulting in disproportionately large amounts of land reserved for the use of Jewish townships and citizens.

As a result of the above, combined with the fact that the state has allocated very few resources to Palestinian towns, the Arab towns and villages in Israel suffer from severe problems of housing shortages, high density, dilapidated INFRASTRUCTURE, overcrowded schools and high dropout rates, lack of public areas, and lack of land reserves for construction and environmental and industrial development, resulting in high unemployment. The problem is even more critical in the unrecognized villages. In order to solve these problems, there is need for a significant allotment of lands owned by the state and/or the ILA to the Palestinian communities. If, however, the process of "privatization" continues and accelerates, there will be no land available for the state to apportion even if at some point the government chooses to pursue democratization.

Privatization—New Wine in Old Bottles

Since the late 1980s, the Israeli government has been steadily transferring key state assets, including land, and services into private hands. There has been an ongoing debate over "privatization" of land, although such privatization has been based on the premise of preventing land from passing into non-Jewish hands. But far-reaching changes have begun to take place in the structure of land possession, especially in the agricultural settlements. These changes began while the influx of Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union was at its peak. The absorption of over one million SOVIET JEWS over the decade of the 1980s caused an increasing housing shortage and a lack of available lands for construction. At the same time, Jewish farmers in the KIBBUTZIM and MOSHAVIM were suffering from a serious economic situation. The changes in land possession and classification took place relatively rapidly, without primary legislation in the Knesset, but rather through the decisions of the Israel Lands Administration Council.

The main decisions in the privatization process were taken while ARIEL SHARON was both minister of infrastructure and chairman of the ILA Council. According to these decisions, holders of agricultural lands in the Kibbutzim and Moshavim were given the option to "change the purpose" of their land (i.e., from agricultural to housing developments or commercial undertakings) and to receive a significant cut of the land with the new purpose. The implication in terms of benefits exceeds many times more the compensation the Jewish farmers would have been entitled to according to the situation preceding these decisions.

In his first year as minister of national infrastructure (1997), Ariel Sharon commissioned a study for reform of the landholding system. Though the debate was fractious, everyone agreed on the need to prevent "foreigners" from buying land, whether it was private or not. Headed by Boaz Ronen, the commission defined a foreigner as anyone who is not a citizen of the state of Israel and who does not have the right to become one under the LAW OF RETURN. Under the proposal, Jewish citizens of another country could acquire land in Israel before they even move there and establish Israeli citizenship, but Palestinian refugees, whose land was expropriated and transferred to Jews, were excluded.

The Ronen Committee published its recommendations in 1997 with suggestions relating to the privatization of the state's lands and improving the functions of the ILA. The committee only dealt with lands held by Jewish farmers and deferred in most cases to previous decisions of the ILA Council. The Jewish agriculture lobby, which has a great influence on political life in Israel, with the unprecedented support of representatives of Zionist parties from both the left and right wings (LABOR, MERETZ, SHAS, MAFDAL, and LIKUD), rose

against the recommendations of the Ronen Committee, not because they did not do well by the Jewish farmers, but because the use of the term "citizens" implied the right of Israeli-Arabs to participate. The recommendations were tabled in the summer of 1997.

Following the disappointment with the Ronen Committee's recommendations, an intensive legislative process began, initiated by the agriculture lobby and interested real estate entrepreneurs. Through this process emerged the Farmers Land and Rights Bill for anchoring farmer rights to the land. This bill was intended to transfer the effective possession of the lands from the state to the hands of the Jewish farmers in the Kibbutzim and Moshavim. Clause 2 of the bill provided that holders of agricultural land would have a perpetual lease right for 196 years divided into periods of 49 years each. In addition, the bill set a generous compensation mechanism for farmers whose land undergoes a process of "change of purpose" and release for construction. This bill passed the first phase of legislation in the Knesset in 1998.

In opposition to the legislation, several petitions were submitted to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT or High Court of Justice by the Oriental Democratic Spectrum (ODS), ACRI, and the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel. They demanded the cancellation of the ILA's decisions with regard to the "change of purpose" of agricultural land, compensation, and other benefits given to agricultural landholders at the time of the change of purpose. These petitions requested that the status quo, which existed prior to the decisions of the ILA in relation to land privatization and the change of their purpose, be maintained. The petitions of ACRI and the ODS emphasized the importance of the "civil equality" principle in dividing state lands and actually referred to the Arab minority in the state as another deprived group, similar to the Jewish residents of development towns, which can also benefit from the implementation of the equality principle when dividing state lands. The petitions were either denied a hearing or ruled against, although the government tabled the bill in 1999.

The process of land privatization and the bestowing of ownership rights to the land only to residents of the Kibbutzim, Moshavim, or companies of agricultural cultivation, are clearly harmful to Palestinian rights. These lands, consisting of many millions of acres, will be removed from the land reserves of the state and transferred to private hands in a way that will not enable their future allotment to Arab towns and villages.

Nevertheless, the JNF and several government ministries have found privatization to be a useful tool in engaging in controversial activities. For the purpose of purchasing land in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (OT), the JNF uses Himnuta, a private company in which the JNF owns 99 percent of the shares. Since 1967, tens of thousands of acres of land have been purchased by the JNF in areas of strategic importance in the WEST BANK. Himnuta buys properties inside the OT, often using money from the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION and government ministries. The majority of its purchases lie just outside the Green Line, areas key to negotiations with the Palestinians. Even if these lands are eventually returned to Palestinian control, Himnuta stands to gain, as evidenced by the generous compensation packages given to the settlers in Gaza after Israel's 2005 withdrawal. It is not only the JNF that uses Himnuta's services. Government ministries have done so frequently. In 1990, for example, the Housing Ministry transferred NIS 3.6 million ($1 million) to Himnuta to buy the St. John's Hospice building in the Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem's OLD CITY. The transaction was made through the Jerusalem settler organization ATERET COHANIM.

The Qa'adam Case: A Legal Challenge to the ILA

On 2 April 2000, after five years of judicial dithering, nondecisions, petitions, and counter-petitions, the Israeli Supreme Court reached a decision in *Qa'adam v. the Israel Lands Administration.* The court ruled in a landmark decision (though in a ruling that was limited to the facts of that case) that Palestinian citizens of Israel could no longer be discriminated against in the provision of state lands.

The case involved a married couple of Israeli citizens, Adel and Eeman Qa'adam, inhabitants of the run-down, overcrowded Arab town of Baka'h-el-Garbiya, who wanted to buy a house in the new middle-class suburb of Katzir, which lies just north of Tel Aviv—itself an act of demographic engineering, an attempt to change the Arab-Jewish balance in the area. But because the Qa'adams were Arab Israelis, the Katzir Building Association and Katzir Municipal Council informed them, quite openly and with no vague excuses, that Katzir was to be a Jewish-only town.

In itself, there was nothing new in the rejection—such policies had been implemented in Israel since its creation—but the Qa'adams appear to be the first Palestinians to sue the state. Israeli Arabs like the Qa'adams pay taxes, vote in Israeli elections, and speak Hebrew.

ACRI, acting on behalf of the couple, asked the Supreme Court to rule on the discriminatory practice. The state defended the Jewish-only policy. In effect, the Supreme Court was asked to choose between ZIONISM and democracy. Supreme Court president Aaron Barak, normally assertive and even aggressive in his judicial rulings, was reluctant to rule on this case, and pleaded with the sides to reach a compromise out of court.

On paper the Qa'adams won with the Supreme Court's 2000 decision. In practice, however, they, and many other Arabs, are still waiting for Israel to uphold their basic human rights. The court's verdict had little effect on the discriminatory policies of the ILA or the Katzir Municipal Council. Eight years later the Qa'adams still lived in Baka'h-el-Garbiya, prohibited from building a house in Katzir. Similar examples of Israeli Arabs who have attempted to lease or rent apartments or homes have been stymied by community selection committees. The selection committees have the right to refuse admission by applicants to any area. Typically the rejections are couched in the language of preserving homogeneity utilizing a "legal" stipulation allowing these bodies to prevent those "ill-suited to the community" from moving in.

A New Proposal: The Land Swap

In May 2004, EHUD OLMERT, then minister of industry, trade, and labor, established the Gadish Committee to investigate reform in the ILA. The committee's principal recommendations "included the transfer of urban residential land ownership rights to private owners of apartments and buildings, and the streamlining of the process surrounding land-ownership rights." In this context, on 15 June 2005 the JNF and the ILA agreed to a massive land swap involving an exchange of 70,000 state-held, urban, developed dunums (17,000 acres), which contain some 750,000 apartments and properties, for undeveloped periphery lands. The swap was intended to allow the government to privatize urban properties in the country's central region while enabling the JNF to develop more of the land in the Galilee and the Negev. By exchanging already built-up municipal properties, ostensibly worth more because of their urban location, for "undeveloped" lands in the Galilee and the Negev, the JNF is hoping to increase the Jewish population there through the building of new settlements.

In January 2005, Israel's attorney general, Menahem Mazuz, ruled in response to a Supreme Court petition that lease restrictions violated Israeli antidiscrimination laws. Nevertheless, in early June 2005, the government accepted the Gadish Committee's recommendations without signing a formal agreement.

In June 2005, ADALAH sent a letter to Israel's Prime Minister Sharon and Attorney General Mazuz, calling on them to reject the Gadish Committee's recommendations on land exchange. Adalah argued that such a transfer would violate the rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel and exacerbate the discrimination they face in accessing lands. Adalah further contended that the discriminatory division of land between Jewish and Arab local authorities, which creates severe housing and residential shortages, also prevents Arab communities from developing and thereby contributes to the poor socioeconomic status of Arab towns and villages.

ACRI also condemned the land-swap process because "it does not truly provide non-Jews with equal access to land. The ILA, as a public body, must function for the benefit of all its citizens." The case languished in the courts until July 2005, when the ILA cancelled the land-swap process.

Shortly thereafter, the JNF issued a tender for residential land plots in the Givat Hamakosh neighborhood of Carmiel (in the Galilee). This was in accordance with the terms of the JNF's agreement with the state and its functionary the ILA, and it effectively excluded non-Jews from bidding. In response, ACRI and the Arab Center for Alternative Planning submitted a petition to the Haifa Administrative Court against the ILA, the JNF, the Carmiel Municipality, and Arim, the Enterprise for Urban Development, claiming that the tender was discriminatory. In the petition, ACRI argued that the tender was illegal because a public body (the ILA) manages JNF land and the restrictive terms of the tender were therefore tantamount to state discrimination.

On 7 September 2005, the court declared that the ILA must allow Palestinian citizens to participate in the tender or suspend or cancel it. The JNF elected to cancel the tender. In response, ACRI

submitted a petition to the Israeli High Court demanding that the state force the JNF to cease its discriminatory policy altogether. ACRI requested an interim order freezing all JNF tenders in the country. The JNF opposed the petition, stating that its most basic and historic policy was to develop lands for the Jewish people. Both the JNF and ILA chose to suspend all new tenders in the Galilee until the High Court ruled. The case sparked intense national and international debate about the JNF's role in Israel.

In January 2006, in response to the petitions submitted by ACRI and other organizations, Attorney General Mazuz declared in a nonbinding decision that the ILA is forbidden to discriminate against citizens on the basis of national affiliation in the administration and marketing of land. However, he added that the ILA could continue its previous land-swap policy with the JNF. In April 2007, the JNF published new tenders in Givat Hamakosh for Jews only. Again, ACRI appealed to the State Attorney's Office, and the JNF cancelled the tender rather than allow non-Jews to participate in the bidding. In May 2007, the State Attorney's Office wrote that the ILA cannot discriminate based on "national belonging" in administering JNF lands.

The Knesset Intervenes

In opposition to the court's ruling, on 18 July 2007 the Knesset passed legislation that would legalize the JNF practice of refusing to lease land to Arab citizens and allow it to lease lands to Jews only. The bill called for a new provision to the 1960 Israel Lands Administration Law. "Despite whatever is stated in any law, leasing of Jewish National Fund's lands for the purpose of the settlement of Jews on these lands will not be seen as improper discrimination." Further, "For the purpose of every law, the association documents of the Jewish National Fund will be interpreted according to the judgment of the Jewish National Fund's founders and from a nationalist-Zionist standpoint."

The bill, entitled the "Jewish National Fund Law," passed its preliminary reading in the Knesset plenum by a large majority—sixty-five in favor to sixteen against. While JNF lands constitute only 13 percent, it could involve, for example, the establishment of a university only for Jews, or a hospital, or a cultural center. The law has the support of Benjamin Netanyahu, Ami Ayalon, Michael Eitan, Reuven Rivlin, and Shalom Simhon, but must go through several readings before becoming law.

The legislation triggered campaigns for and against it, both in Israel and abroad. In the rendering of some Israeli analysts it does not matter. Said one member of the Knesset, "The Qa'adam ruling was exceptional in setting red lines, allowing a broad range for change, establishing norms and preventing the debasement of the rule book, [but] it turns out that the Supreme Court is not omnipotent. In an instant, a racist Knesset can overturn its rulings."

In the fall of 2007 the High Court heard a petition from Adalah seeking cancellation of a provision in the original Lands Law whereby ILA policy (supporting the JNF's policy) as well as Article 27 of the "Regulations of the Obligations of Tenders," in which the ILA would compensate the JNF with an equivalent amount of land in any transaction, thus ensuring the total amount of land owned by Jewish Israelis remains the same. Given that the JNF law would effectively remove the privatization and sale of vast land tracts from the purview of the Supreme Court, the impact of this legislation on future land rights battles and ethnic relations, while not immediate, could have a seriously negative impact on Israeli Arabs.

Jaffa and the ILA: A Case Study

Jaffa is one place to begin to understand how the ILA works and the nature of the discriminatory land laws. In 2009 the Bemuna Company completed construction of "housing for the religious public" in places attractive to Jewish families, including from the hills of the Galilee in northern Israel to Jerusalem ridgetops overlooking the Old City. Bemuna also built sixty apartments in the middle of a somewhat run-down neighborhood (Ajami) of mostly Palestinian residents in Jaffa, a seemingly anomalous site compared to its other more appealing places. There are no plans to market the apartments to the Palestinians. "We are a homogenous group. We do not want to live together with Arabs in the same building," lawyer David Zeira said during an Israeli Knesset hearing on the project. Rather, he said, Bemuna hopes to bolster the Jewish presence and "improve the population" in Ajami, the center of Jaffa's Arab community. In Jaffa, as elsewhere, the ILA and JNF's marketing policy highlights the state's systemic discrimination against Israel's Arab citizens, specifically in housing and land distribution.

The ILA and West Bank Settlements

Since 1967, each Israeli government has invested significant resources in establishing and expanding the SETTLEMENTS in the Occupied Territories. Israel has used a complex legal and bureaucratic mechanism to take control of more than 50 percent of the land in the West Bank, a process in which the ILA has played a major role. Land seized was used mainly to establish settlements and to create reserves of land for the future expansion of the settlements.

All Israeli administrations have implemented a consistent and systematic policy intended to encourage Jewish citizens to migrate to the West Bank. One of the tools used to this end is to grant financial benefits and incentives to citizens—both directly and through the Jewish local authorities. The purpose of this support is to raise the standard of living of these citizens and to encourage migration to the West Bank. Most of the settlements in the West Bank are defined as national priority areas. Accordingly, the settlers and other Israeli citizens working or investing in the settlements are entitled to significant financial benefits. These benefits are provided by six government ministries.

The ILA provides discounts of from 49 percent to 69 percent from the value of the land in the payment of lease fees for residential construction, and a discount of 69 percent on leasehold fees for industrial and tourism purposes. The ILA also issues tenders for housing in the West Bank and Jerusalem. The other five ministries provide additional financial incentives and benefits to the settlements.

Jerusalem

Since the mid-1990s, the ILA has been deeply involved with settler groups in acquiring Palestinian property and transferring it to Jews in Jerusalem. One case will illustrate. The ILA is working together with Ateret Cohanim, a religious, ultranationalist organization, whose main objective is "Judaizing" Jerusalem. Ateret Cohanim promotes settlement of Jews in and around the Old City and takes over Palestinian assets in the HOLY BASIN.

The project on which they collaborated involves the effort to wrest from Palestinian landowners' control 30 dunums (7.5 acres) of land in East Jerusalem and to transfer it to the ILA without a tender. According to Israeli and Jordanian documents, in the early 1960s the land was purchased by the Arab Hotels Company of East Jerusalem. After the area was annexed to Israel following the 1967 WAR, the Finance Ministry stated its intention to expropriate the land "for public purposes," but this was never carried out, and the Palestinian owners continued to cultivate it. Several times over the years an Israeli court confirmed that the Arab company is indeed the owner of the property.

In 2000 the Palestinian owners submitted to the planning authorities a request to build a hotel, a conference center, and a cultural center on the land. Architect Moshe Margalit, who drew up the plan, related that at the time the district planning commission confirmed that the Arab Hotels Company has ownership rights to the land. The Interior Ministry confirmed to *Ha'aretz* that the company has been allowed to continue the planning, as it has been proved that it "has an interest in the land." From the summaries of meetings concerning the property at the Interior Ministry, it emerged that representatives of the ILA were present.

Margalit related that the Palestinian landowners' plan was presented "to the most senior people at the Jerusalem Municipality" and received their blessing. The petition also states that the mayor of Jerusalem at the time, Ehud Olmert, and his deputy, Yehuda Pollack, the chairman of the Local Planning and Building Committee, supported it. However, at some point, said Margalit, it seemed that Ateret Cohanim also submitted a plan for this parcel of land. Some two years before (circa 1998), the ILA had granted permission to IRVING MOSKOWITZ, an American Jewish millionaire who supports Ateret Cohanim, to plan a Jewish neighborhood on the plot. A person close to Ateret Cohanim stated that the group aims to build 250 housing units there and pressured ministers in former prime minister Ariel Sharon's first government to approve it.

In June 2000, immediately after the plan by Moskowitz and Ateret Cohanim was revealed, the Arab landowners' attorneys applied to Jerusalem's Local Planning and Building Committee with a request to dismiss the Moskowitz and Ateret Cohanim scheme. The committee told the attorneys that the plan had been "shelved."

In March 2007, however, at the request of the ILA, the state formally expropriated the land under the rubric of "acquisition for public needs." The Arab Hotels Company immediately petitioned the High Court, asking for the expropria-

tion to be prohibited. The ILA's response says that the state owns about 20 percent of the land under the Absentee Property Law; however, the Palestinian landowners' lawyers insist that the law does not apply to the property because it was purchased before Israeli rule began in East Jerusalem in 1967. Attorney Danny Kramer, the representative of the official guardian of absentee property, supports the ILA position and is a signatory to the petition, which states that Arab Hotels has no connection to the land and that the ILA has been leasing it to Ateret Cohanim "for some years now." As of this writing the matter remains in the courts.

Israel's successful colonization of Palestine owed much to the brutality of the expulsions in 1948, followed by the creation of a complex web of legislation "legalizing" the seizure of Palestinian land and its transfer to Jews in which the Israel Lands Administration stands at the epicenter.

See also BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL; HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA; HOLY BASIN; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION DEMOCRACY; ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; LAND; SETTLEMENT; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; WAR, 1948

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Israel's Search for Water, 1950–1965

See UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Israel's Unilateral Disengagement from Gaza

During August and September 2005, Israel carried out a unilateral withdrawal from the GAZA STRIP (and from four small isolated OUTPOSTS in the

northern WEST BANK). Some 8,000 Jewish settlers who had lived in twenty-one SETTLEMENTS under constant guard by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES left Gaza during that period, and numerous military bases and encampments were moved.

Of the 1.5 million Palestinian inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, most are REFUGEES (or descendants of refugees) from the 1948 WAR. When some 750,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out of JAFFA, HAIFA, JERUSALEM, and elsewhere, a large portion of the dispossessed settled in refugee camps in Gaza. The former homes of the refugees, especially those from the urban areas, were given to immigrant Jews. After 1967, Jewish settlers illegally moved into newly constructed modern homes in settlements in the Gaza Strip, where the refugees continue to reside in shanties in dilapidated camps. When Israel decided to withdraw, the settlers were handsomely compensated: forty-one families from what Israel considered "legal" settlements received advances of around NIS 600,000 ($160,000) as well as $500 or so as a monthly housing allowance for up to two years. Yet the Gazan refugees were not permitted to move into the houses in the former settlements in Gaza; some settlers destroyed their own homes to prevent Palestinians from having them, and whatever was left was reduced to rubble by the Israeli army.

Israel's decision to leave Gaza without a negotiated agreement with the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) was portrayed as a major step toward peace; however, while Israel had several reasons for withdrawing from Gaza, none of them involved peace with the Palestinians. Gaza does not hold any significant Jewish historical places, nor does it have valuable resources as does the West Bank. Israel wanted to extricate itself from the morass and expense of protecting the Gazan settlers from Palestinians (it has been reported that one settlement alone, Netzarim, required the protection of an entire battalion of Israeli troops), and it wanted to avoid the DEMOGRAPHIC effects of retaining Gaza, with its overwhelming ratio of Palestinians to Israelis. In terms of human and capital resource commitment, Gaza had become a liability.

The most important reason, however, for the withdrawal was Israel's desire to consolidate its control over the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This was explained by Dov Weisglass, one of the initiators of the disengagement plan and senior advisor to Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON: "The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process and when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the BORDERS, and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with . . . a [US] presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress. . . . what I effectively agreed to with the Americans was that [the majority of the West Bank] settlements would not be dealt with at all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the Palestinians turn into Finns. That is the significance of what we did."

Sharon and Weisglass received US president GEORGE W. BUSH's blessing for the disengagement plan during a visit to Washington on 13–14 April 2004, even though the unilateral redeployment contradicted the QUARTET's ROAD MAP of April 2003, which proposed a final and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in three phases by 2005, and to which the UNITED STATES was supposedly committed. In December 2004 Sharon stated: "The understandings between the US president and me protect Israel's most essential interests, first and foremost, not demanding a return to the . . . borders [before the 1967 WAR]; allowing Israel to permanently keep large settlement blocs which have high Israeli populations; and the total refusal of allowing Palestinian refugees to return to Israel." As the withdrawal from Gaza began, Israel's minister of defense, Shaul Mofaz, announced that Israel intended to hold on to the core of the settlements in the West Bank—about half the territory.

Withdrawal from Gaza allows Israel to concentrate on fulfilling the ALLON PLAN of 1967, the original scheme for disposing of the West Bank by annexing most of the LAND and WATER, securing Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, and handing back what remains to JORDAN or Palestinian self-rule in small, isolated, disarticulated areas. This scheme, developed during the tenure of Sharon, was officially announced by his successor, EHUD OLMERT, as the "Convergence Plan" and was carried forward by Olmert's successor, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU. Concerning the connection for Israel between withdrawing from Gaza and tightening its control in the West Bank, Israeli analyst Peretz Kidron wrote, "as for 'abandoning' Gaza . . . Sharon is drawing in his exposed Gaza flanks the

better to reinforce Israel's hold on the main prize—the West Bank, the historical Jewish heartland of biblical times and an area of far greater strategic and economic value than the Gaza Strip. When Sharon speaks of a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, he intends to grant the Palestinians nothing more than the bare minimum of territory, on which they can achieve no viable sovereignty—particularly when their state will be a subdivided BANTUSTAN entirely surrounded by Israeli territory and under almost total Israeli economic and military domination."

The unilateral nature of the withdrawal, excluding any PNA involvement or negotiations, was a slap in the face to the Palestinians as well as a strong signal that the bilateral peace process was at an end. President MAHMUD ABBAS said that the PNA was kept "in the dark" about Israel's plans. As such it was unable to prepare or coordinate a PNA role in the postwithdrawal era of Gaza.

Under the disengagement, Israel continues to control Gaza's borders (with the partial exception of the RAFAH CROSSING), the entire coastline and seawaters, and its airspace, as well as its telecommunications, water, electricity, and sewage networks. Gaza continues to use Israeli currency, and Tel Aviv maintains complete authority over the Population Registry, by which it continues to determine who is a "Palestinian resident" and who is a "foreigner," which among other things impedes FAMILY REUNIFICATION. Additionally, through its control of the border crossings, Israel continues to regulate the movement of people and goods between the Gaza Strip and the outside world, including the West Bank, even when transit is not across Israeli territory. An Israeli military order classifies the entire West Bank as a "CLOSED MILITARY ZONE," and a PERMIT issued by the military is required for entry and exit. Because a high fence with Israeli control towers encircles the Gaza Strip, it remains sealed off from the rest of the world, and Israeli forces remain stationed along the length of the borders. According to the terms of the unilateral plan devised by Sharon, Israel retains the right to conduct military operations inside Gaza to search for "terrorists." In September 2007, Israel declared Gaza an "enemy entity."

The three crossing points designated primarily for the movement of goods—Karni, Sufa, and Kerem Shalom—remained under Israel's sole control. In 2006, Israel closed the KARNI CROSSING, the major point of transit for goods, to all movement for a total of 175 days and partially for a further 169 days, resulting in severe shortages in Gaza, including essential medicines and foodstuffs, which have been aggravated by restrictions on the entry of humanitarian supplies and workers. From mid-June 2007 through all of 2008, Israel imposed a total blockade on Gaza, sealing all its crossing points and prohibiting any movement of goods and persons into or out of Gaza.

The Rafah Crossing between Gaza and EGYPT is primarily the means of access for people, but it has a terminal for the passage of goods. However, according to the 15 November 2005 "Agreed Documents by Israel and Palestinians on Movement" and its annex, "Access from and to Gaza and Agreement on Movement and Access and Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing," signed by Israel and the PNA, the Rafah Crossing is limited to "exports." Further, if a truck leaves Gaza for Egypt via Rafah, it is prohibited from returning to Gaza. The PNA's independent ability to export goods via the Rafah Crossing is further limited by the fact that most of Gaza's exports are intended for Israel or are shipped abroad via Israeli ports. It is necessary to note here that in the OSLO ACCORDS, Gaza was to have a seaport. The Gaza seaport was mentioned in the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1993) and detailed in the INTERIM AGREEMENT (1995); however, it was never built. Israel's "security concerns" were a major factor in this failure, but had it been constructed, Gaza might have had an independent outlet to the world that, in turn, could have mitigated some of its problems, although Israel could have closed a port or damaged it beyond use as it did the Gaza airport.

According to the November 2005 agreement between Israel and the PNA, the PNA may permit entry into the Strip via Rafah only to "Palestinian residents," namely individuals who are registered in the Palestinian Population Registry and hold Palestinian identity cards. Also, the PNA must prevent the entry of Palestinian residents if Israel opposes them for security reasons. To ensure the PNA's compliance with the agreement, European observers are posted at the Rafah Crossing. "Foreign" residents, except those in a few categories, are only allowed to enter the Gaza Strip via the Kerem Shalom and Eretz crossings, which are under Israel's unilateral authority.

Tel Aviv also continues to control most elements of the taxation system of the Gaza Strip: according to the Interim Agreement, Israel is responsible for setting the VAT and customs rates

on goods intended for consumption in the Gaza Strip (and the West Bank), collecting these taxes for the PNA and remitting them to the PNA. In June 2007 it ceased all remittances to Gaza—a collective punishment that contributed significantly to Gaza's humanitarian crisis. Israel's hegemony over all these elements clearly constitutes OCCUPATION as defined by INTERNATIONAL LAW.

One test of occupation in international law is the concept of "effective control," which exists if the military forces of the adversary could "at any time they desired assume physical control of any part of the country." By stating that "Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip," Israel demonstrated its intention to maintain effective control. Furthermore, Israel's provision for a military presence along the border for an indeterminate length of time ensured that military control of the entire Gaza Strip would be maintained.

Principle Six of Israel's unilateral disengagement plan states that "completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians within the Gaza Strip." This principle has created a great deal of opposition within the human rights and international law communities. B'TSELEM, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, for example, argues that according to the parameters of the disengagement, "Israel's claim of an 'end of the Occupation' is questionable. . . . So long as these methods of control [security, utilities, airspace, seacoast, etc.] remain in Israeli hands," B'Tselem concludes, Israel has responsibility for the Gazan population's welfare.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), a US-based organization, argues more emphatically that Israel is responsible for the population of Gaza. "Whether the Israeli army is inside Gaza or redeployed around its periphery and restricting entrance and exit, it remains in control." While Israel works to reconfigure its Occupation of the territory, it will remain an occupying power with obligations for the welfare of the civilian population, the HRW maintains. According to John Dugard, then UN special rapporteur on human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, "the withdrawal of Jewish settlers from Gaza will result in the decolonization of Palestinian territory but will not result in the end of Occupation."

Israel, then, is legally responsible for the welfare of the people of Gaza; however, it has not fulfilled any of its duties to the Gazan population—not even humanitarian ones; moreover, it has relentlessly and brutally punished Gaza from the time of its departure through June 2009. After the disengagement, Israel immediately introduced a new tactic against the Gazan people—deafening sonic booms over the entire strip. Flyovers by air force jets created dozens of sonic booms by breaking the sound barrier at low altitude and sending shock waves across the region, often at night. Human rights agencies and the UNITED NATIONS urged Israel to stop, because the sonic booms are considered a form of severe collective punishment that can cause nosebleeds, widespread fear, and heart problems, and induce miscarriages and traumatize children with symptoms such as anxiety attacks, bedwetting, muscle spasms, temporary loss of hearing, and breathing difficulties. Palestinian human rights agencies petitioned the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT to end the sonic booms, but in January 2006 the court refused to stop them.

In the years that followed Israel's redeployment, the Gaza Strip also endured multiple short military incursions; shellings; attacks on INFRASTRUCTURE; TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS; aerial surveillance and bombardments; sporadic border closures; fishing restrictions; and the bombardment of Gaza's only power generator, followed by a cutoff of fuel, spare parts, and other items. From 28 June to 26 November 2006, Israel undertook a six-month large-scale military invasion of Gaza, OPERATION SUMMER RAINS, ostensibly because Hamas captured an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, stationed on Gaza's border. (Shalit remained in HAMAS custody as of June 2009.) This was followed by another major military campaign—Operation Autumn Clouds from 1 to 8 November 2006. After Hamas seized power in June 2007, Israel imposed the eighteen-month punitive boycott during which no goods or persons could enter or leave the Strip. From 27 December 2008 to 8 January 2009, Tel Aviv carried out a massive air, land, and sea attack, OPERATION CAST LEAD, which killed 1,415 Palestinians, justified because of the firing of QASSAM ROCKETS into southern Israel by Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD.

During its forty-year Occupation, Israel did nothing to encourage economic growth in Gaza,

and international and Palestinian efforts during the Oslo years (1994–2000) to improve the economy were frequently frustrated by the difficulty of getting goods and services in and out of Gaza as well as by other Israeli-imposed impediments. As a result, unemployment rates of around 50 percent have been the norm. Further, over 60 percent of the population of Gaza lives below the poverty line. In the postwithdrawal situation, Gazans have been unable to engage in commerce with Israel and the West Bank, making a resuscitation of their economy all the more difficult. Indeed, in the first four years after Israel's unilateral withdrawal, Gaza experienced the almost total destruction of its infrastructure, a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions: clean water was unavailable; power was only sporadic (residents typically received it for two hours daily if at all); sewage overflowed the streets and was dumped into the sea; hunger prevailed; and unemployment and extreme poverty were at their worst ever. In the same period Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem accelerated, and throughout the Occupied Territories the quality of life for Palestinians deteriorated significantly.

See also GAZA STRIP; HEALTH CARE; INFRASTRUCTURE; KARNI CROSSING; EHUD OLMERT; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; RAFAH CROSSING; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT; SETTLEMENTS; ARIEL SHARON; UNITED STATES

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–Saree Makdisi

Israel-Syria Water Disputes, 1950–1965

See SYRIA; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Istiqlal Party

The reconstitution of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party in 1932 marked the first Palestinian pan-Arab political party. AWNI 'ABDAL-HADI was elected as its first president. The party was established by activists from an earlier pan-Arab party of the same name; the new party's main objective was to end the BRITISH MANDATE as the first step to establishing a Palestinian state in the pan-Arab context. Several decades later, when al-Istiqlal Party was the only mass-based pan-Arabist party in Palestine, al-Istiqlal began to mobilize Palestinians around an ANTI-ZIONIST and anti-imperialist program. However, it was opposed by factions of the JERUSALEM parties of the AL-HUSAYNI and NASHASHIBI families, because al-Istiqlal had criticized clan-based parties and because al-Hadi belonged to a family of large landowners in the JENIN (NABLUS) area.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, there was conflict between Palestinian nationalists and various types of pan-Arabists, but the latter became increasingly marginalized. By 1937 only the Istiqlal Party promoted political absorption into a greater Arab nation as its main agenda.

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Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades constitute the armed, underground wing of the HAMAS party. Based mainly in the GAZA STRIP, the brigades have carried out both military and terror attacks against Israel, including SUICIDE BOMBINGS. The name commemorates SHAYKH 'IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSAM, the father of modern Arab resistance, who was killed by the British in 1935. The brigades were created in 1992 under the direction of YAHYA AYYASH, and thus members sometimes refer to themselves as "Students of Ayyash," "Students of the Engineer," or "Yahya Ayyash Units" to commemorate Ayyash, who was assassinated by Israel in 1996. The primary objective of the group is to build a coherent military organization to fulfill the goals of Hamas, which at the time was primarily interested in blocking the OSLO ACCORDS negotiations. The brigades operate on a decentralized model of independent cells, and even high-ranking members are often unaware of the activities of other cells.

Between 1994 and 2000 the al-Qassam Brigades carried out a number of attacks against both Israeli soldiers and civilians; however, with the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the group became a central target of Israel, which assassinated many of its militants and leaders. The brigades regrouped during 2003–2004 and recommenced operations.

See also HAMAS

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J

Jabotinsky, Vladimir (Ze′ev) Yevgenievich (1880–1940)

Writer, orator, political organizer and leader, thinker, and rebel Vladimir Jabotinsky (commonly known as Ze'ev) remains a controversial figure whose early death has allowed his legacy to be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways. Most significantly, Jabotinsky has been understood as the inspiration for what became the right-wing Zionist movement in Israel and the hero of MENAHEM BEGIN, among others. Jabotinsky, however, lived only briefly in Palestine despite dedicating his life to the creation of a Jewish state there, and his life and legacy are as intimately tied to Europe (East and West) of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as to the Middle East. As with THEODOR HERZL, Jabotinsky's conceptualization of ZIONISM was rooted in his particular experience as a cosmopolitan Jewish intellectual witnessing the power of European nationalisms as well as the ANTI-SEMITISM that created heightened awareness of Jewish vulnerability. Jabotinsky remained throughout his life a gifted writer as well as translator who utilized his knowledge of languages in the service of a central paradox. He was popularly known as the leader of a militantly nationalist movement that was dedicated to Jewish statehood in Palestine. Yet Jabotinsky remained an individualist whose life embodied immersion in an international environment.

Jabotinsky was born in Odessa, Russia, to a Jewish bourgeois family. He was educated in Russian-language schools that were typical of his class and milieu. Odessa, known as a city of mixed population and later as the home of the Hebrew Renaissance, was for Jabotinsky the cosmopolitan origin of a search for recognition as a writer and for experience beyond the bounds of his home. He left Odessa in 1897 for Switzerland, where he began a career as a journalist reporting from Europe to Russia under the pen name of Altalena. It is only beginning in 1902 that there is evidence in his writings and commentary of a gradual identification with the movement for Jewish statehood. Jabotinsky's participation in the Sixth WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS in Bern that year signaled a decisive shift toward activist political engagement, although he continued his work as a journalist; his writings, political and literary, remain important sources for the evolution of his thought.

Among the first of Jabotinsky's Zionist initiatives was the call for the formation of a JEWISH LEGION to participate in the First World War. He argued for such an armed presence because he believed that the war would lead to the dismemberment of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE and he hoped that Zionist service in a national brigade allied with British forces would strengthen postwar Zionist claims. The Jewish Legion came into existence in 1917 and Jabotinsky, who served as an officer, arrived in Palestine at a time when the British commitment to a Jewish national homeland (in the BALFOUR DECLARATION) was being translated into what became the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine. Initially Jabotinsky worked with the ZIONIST COMMISSION sent to Palestine to examine conditions, and he simultaneously argued the need for a Jewish military force able to defend the Zionist project in conjunction with British control. Although no formal army emerged at this time, Jabotinsky was later instrumental in organizing such a military—the HAGANA. In 1920, he was arrested for his role in the Palestinian-Jewish (AL-NABI MUSA) clashes in JERUSALEM.

When the British commuted his sentence (and those of others arrested with him) Jabotinsky left Palestine and returned to Europe, where he became a member of the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE. By 1923, however, he was in open disagreement with the official Zionist policy of cooperating with the British, "cooperation" he then saw as subjugation to British policies that he deemed insufficiently committed to Zionism. Thus, he resigned.

Beginning in 1925, Jabotinsky's followers, dedicated to revising official Zionist policies, were organized in the WORLD UNION OF ZIONIST REVISIONISTS. He laid down two principles that formed

the core of Revisionist Zionist ideology and its political program. The first was the territorial integrity of Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel, which Jabotinsky perceived as indivisible over both banks of the River Jordan, including the original borders of the Palestine Mandate. The second was the immediate declaration of the Jewish right to political sovereignty over the whole of this area. Central to the ideology of the Revisionists was the call for immediate large-scale Jewish migration to Palestine and continuing pressure on the government of Great Britain to interpret its commitment to the Zionist movement as one of enabling Jewish majority and statehood.

Linked to the Revisionist movement was a paramilitary youth group that had originated in Lithuania in 1923, called Betar. Betar developed organizations throughout Europe and had a branch in Palestine as well. In subsequent years, Betar became a significant vehicle for recruiting youth into the Revisionist movement, inculcating Jabotinsky's beliefs in the concept of *hadar* (literally defined as beauty or glory but elaborated by Jabotinsky as critical to the training of youth), described by Yaacov Shavit as "an idealized code of behavior."

Jabotinsky held a distinctly different view of the Palestinian Arabs than did the more mainstream Zionists. Jabotinsky's perspective is contained in two highly important articles he published in 1923 in the Russian Zionist journal *Raysvet* under the heading "The Iron Wall." They provided the essence of Revisionist theory on the Palestinian Arab question.

The first article was entitled "On the Iron Wall: We and the Arabs." It begins on a personal note in which Jabotinsky described his emotional attitude toward the Arabs as one of "polite indifference." But he went on to reject as totally unacceptable any thought of removing the Arabs from Palestine. The real question, he said, switching to a philosophical mode, was whether one could always achieve peaceful aims by peaceful means. The answer to this question, he insisted, depended without a doubt on the attitude of the Arabs toward Zionism, not on Zionism's attitude toward them.

Jabotinsky's analysis of the Palestinians' attitude led him to state categorically, "There can be no voluntary agreement between ourselves and the Palestine Arabs. Not now, nor in the prospective future." As most moderate Zionists came to discover, there was not the slightest chance of gaining the agreement of the Palestinian Arabs to turn Palestine into a country with a Jewish majority. Jabotinsky strongly rejected those Zionists who portrayed the Palestinian Arabs either as fools who could be easily deceived by a watered-down version of Zionist objectives or as a tribe of mercenaries ready to give up their right to a country in exchange for economic advantage. "Every native population," he wrote, "resists colonists as long as it has the slightest hope of being able to rid itself of the danger of being colonized. That is what the Arabs in Palestine are doing, and what they will persist in doing as long as there remains a solitary spark of hope that they will be able to prevent the transformation of 'Palestine' into the 'Land of Israel.'"

After explaining the logic of Palestinian hostility to Zionism as he saw it, Jabotinsky turned to the policy implications. "So that all those who regard such an agreement as a condition *sine qua non* for Zionism can now say 'no' and withdraw from Zionism. Zionist colonization must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population. Which means that it can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population—behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach."

On the need for an iron wall of force, he claimed there was agreement among all Zionists. The only slight difference was that "the militarists" wanted an iron wall constructed with Jewish bayonets, whereas "the vegetarians" wanted it built with British bayonets. Constant repetition of Zionist willingness to negotiate with the Arabs was not only hypocritical but harmful, Jabotinsky argued, and he regarded it as his sacred duty to expose this hypocrisy.

Toward the end of the article, Jabotinsky went to some length to dispel any impression his analysis might have given that he despaired of the prospect of reaching an agreement with the Arabs of Palestine: "this does not mean that there cannot be agreement with the Palestine Arabs. What is impossible is a voluntary agreement. As long as the Arabs feel that there is the least hope of getting rid of us, they will refuse to give up . . . because they are not a rabble but a living people. And when a living people yields in matters of such vital character it is only when there is no longer any hope, . . . because they can make no breach in the iron wall. Not till then will they drop their extremist leaders

whose watchword is 'Never!' And the leadership will pass to the moderate groups, who will approach us with a proposal that we should both agree to mutual concessions. Then we may expect them to discuss honestly practical questions, such as a guarantee against Arab displacement, or equal rights for Arab citizens or Arab national integrity."

Jabotinsky did not spell out in this article what precisely he meant by "national integrity," but other pronouncements suggest that what he had in mind was political "autonomy" for the Palestinians within a Jewish state. What does emerge from the article is that he recognized that the Palestinian Arabs formed a distinct national entity and that he accordingly considered them entitled to some national rights, albeit limited ones, and not merely to individual rights.

Shortly thereafter Jabotinsky wrote a second piece entitled "The Ethics of the Iron Wall," in which he further elaborated his views on the moral basis of Zionism despite Palestinian Arab opposition. In the realm of ideas Jabotinsky's contribution was highly significant. In the realm of politics, his impact was much greater than is commonly realized. It was not only Revisionist Zionists who were influenced by his ideas, but the Zionist movement as a whole.

Before 1948 and after, the Labor movement implemented these ideas even as they decried them. The Zionist movement was never monolithic but rather contained a collection of rival political parties, the largest being the LABOR PARTY, which was inspired by socialist ideas. Jabotinsky believed in capitalism, though not without some accommodations for the poor, and rejected socialism. Another fundamental difference between Labor Zionism and Revisionist Zionism related to the use of force. Labor Zionists were reluctant to admit that military force would be necessary if the Zionist movement was to achieve its objectives. Jabotinsky faced up to this fact realistically. He went further in suggesting a reversal of the Zionist order of priorities. Labor Zionists wanted to proceed toward statehood by IMMIGRATION and SETTLEMENT and initially accorded a lower priority to the buildup of military capability, though DAVID BEN-GURION relatively quickly came to appreciate the importance of military force. Jabotinsky never wavered in the conviction, or in its public advocacy, that Jewish military power was the key factor in the struggle for a state. Labor Zionists in general gradually came around to his point of view. Thus in historical perspective the gap was not as great as it appeared in the heat of political competition.

In the early 1930s several developments contributed to what was to become a bitter division between the dominant Labor Zionist movement and that of Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism. The first, as noted, was the role of force. In 1931, activists in the Hagana, dissatisfied with what they perceived as its restrained stance with regard to the use of military power, joined Betar members in Palestine to form the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI, which became a militant underground organization. Jabotinsky supported the Irgun and in 1937 officially became its supreme commander. Yet he never exercised complete control over the organization, even though it remained linked to the Revisionist Party, which was under his leadership, and its actions were associated with his ideology. Nevertheless, Jabotinsky's involvement with the Irgun was a point of contention with the Labor leaders. In addition, the success of fascism in Europe, including Nazi accession to power in GERMANY, generated significant differences. While Jabotinsky called for a boycott of Germany, the official Zionist leadership chose to negotiate an agreement known as HA'AVARA (Transfer) with the German government. On these and other issues, Zionist parties were hardening their own identities, often in competition with one another. Similarly, competition became fiercer for certificates allowing immigration to Palestine, especially after the Revisionists charged Labor with using their institutional position in the Yishuv to deny those in need for partisan reasons. During this time, the Revisionist Party also undertook the beginning of a project to enable illegal Jewish immigration in the face of British limitations.

The relationship between Ben-Gurion, in the early thirties the leader of Labor Zionism, and Jabotinsky was one of deep enmity, particularly on Ben-Gurion's side. Nevertheless, in 1934 he and Jabotinsky made personal efforts to arrive at a rapprochement and in an agreement called for efforts to end the conflict within Zionism as well as to resolve differences with regard to employment of workers and immigration certificates. Opposition from the left of the Labor movement led to the efforts' failure and in 1935 the Revisionist Party left the World Zionist Movement to form the New Zionist Organization. As spokesperson for his movement, Jabotinsky gave testimony to the PEEL

COMMISSION investigating the ARAB REVOLT in Palestine in 1937; in that testimony he argued forcefully for the ethical basis of Jewish claims to statehood. Speaking from his position of being in Europe during the growing prewar crisis, Jabotinsky's point of view remained that of a nationalist separated from the Jewish community, which by now had taken institutional shape in Palestine. The tensions involved were evident not only in his dealings with the Labor leadership but equally in his relations with representatives of the Irgun in the late thirties, when differences were resolved only with difficulty and never entirely.

A recent biography of Jabotinsky, *Lone Wolf*, written by a political sympathizer, Shmuel Katz, conveys a striking image of singularity and power. It is suggestive of the fact that its subject combined enormous influence over others, as charismatic orator and political leader, with a personal, interior life known only partially to those closest to him. Jabotinsky, whose political activism was publicly evident, combined frequent changes of residence and travel with the protectiveness of a continuing intellectual and creative literary life. He was well-known for his extraordinary gift in mastering a multiplicity of languages (in addition to his native Russian, he was fluent in Hebrew, Yiddish, English, French, Italian, and German, with a working knowledge of others). The love of language was evident as well in Jabotinsky's prodigious literary output, which went well beyond his journalism and political writings to include novels, stories, and poetry as well as numerous translations (including that of a large portion of Dante's *Inferno* into Hebrew). In both realms, political and literary, language remained a passion. Jabotinsky was actively involved in the development of Modern Hebrew both in his own writings and in his campaign to ensure the teaching of Hebrew to Jewish youth in the DIASPORA.

Another biographer, Joseph Schechtman, illuminates the ways in which the political work of the Revisionists was reinforced by the strong personal relationships that the inner circle had with their leader. Perhaps linked to the complexity of these relationships and reflective of his individualism was the fact that Jabotinsky's creativity in organizing political movements was often accompanied by internal rifts, which in turn reinforced his solitude. Despite such differences, it is clear that he awakened deep loyalty among his followers, who felt inspired not just by his ideas, but by his personal impact.

Although Jabotinsky had returned to Palestine for one year in 1928, his return visa was invalidated by the British in 1930 and he lived out the rest of his life in Paris, London, and eventually New York. Jabotinsky arrived in New York in February 1940 hoping to gain support for his project of creating a Jewish army to participate in the war. His life ended abruptly with a heart attack during a visit to a Betar camp in upstate New York. He was initially buried on Long Island; however, he had requested in his will that his remains be transported to Palestine when a Jewish government made the request. This wish remained unfulfilled while David Ben-Gurion was in office, but in 1964 when LEVI ESHKOL was prime minister, Jabotinsky's body was reinterred on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem.

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—Ylana Miller

Jabra, Jabra Ibrahim (1919–1994)

Jabra I. Jabra was a distinguished Palestinian novelist, poet, and critic and the first Palestinian writer to achieve fame outside Palestine. Born in BETHLEHEM, he moved to IRAQ after the 1948 WAR and lived there the rest of his life. Two of Jabra's most famous novels, *Hunters in a Narrow Street* (1960) and *The Ship* (1970), take a historical perspective of JERUSALEM during the pre-1948 period. As a

Palestinian Christian, Jabra draws heavily on Christian pastoral traditions in his representation of Jerusalem and its surrounding countryside, where the "good Palestinian shepherd" is born in Bethlehem and grows up in Jerusalem. According to literary critics, Jabra's protagonists can be seen as Palestinian figures who, like Jesus Christ or other martyrs, are destined to redeem Jerusalem and hence their country.

Although Jabra published seven novels, his fictional fame was not recognized until the publication of *The Ship* and *Looking for Waleed Masoad.* Also well-known is his autobiography *Princesses' Street: Baghdad Memories,* which continues the personal story that Jabra began with *The First Well: A Bethlehem Boyhood.* In addition to being one of the Middle East's leading novelists and poets, he was a painter and translator (notably, of James George Frazer's 1890 *Golden Bough* and William Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*).

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Jaffa

Jaffa, or Yaffa*,* was an ancient port city and major commercial center located on the central coast of Palestine. Its natural harbor on the Mediterranean Sea has been in use since the Bronze Age, and its strategic position exposed it to a series of conquests from the fifteenth century BCE. King David and King Solomon conquered Jaffa; however, it also has significance for Christians. The New Testament records that in Jaffa, Saint Peter resurrected the widow Tabitha, whose tomb remains a site of popular pilgrimage. In 636 CE, Arab armies took Jaffa from the Byzantine Empire, and in 1099 it fell to the Crusaders, after which it served as the gateway to the Latin kingdom of JERUSALEM. Jaffa was the site of a series of major battles between Muslim leader SALADIN and England's King Richard the Lionhearted, who fought over control of the city for almost a year until Richard surrendered in September 1192, at which time the city was in ruins. In 1268, Jaffa was conquered by the Egyptian-Muslim MAMLUKS, who in the fourteenth century destroyed the city again, fearful of new Crusades. Jaffa did not begin to revive until the start of OTTOMAN rule in 1517, when the city gradually became an import-export center and a hub of the soap-making industry. In the early 1800s, Jaffa was reconstructed by its Ottoman governor, and further reforms were initiated during the short reign of Ibrahim Pasha.

After 1840, and especially after the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal, maritime trade was enhanced by the arrival of steamships and by a new road between Jaffa and Jerusalem. Increased trade and tourism promoted Jaffa's international status and brought European merchants, missionaries, foreign consuls, and Zionist settlers hoping to establish agricultural colonies. Immigration to the city from other areas of Palestine increased, and after the 1880s a surge of Jewish immigrants began to expand the population in Jaffa and the surrounding areas. By the end of the nineteenth century, oranges were Jaffa's leading export. However, many of the groves owned by Palestinians were sold to Jews by ABSENTEE LANDLORDS. At the turn of the century there was an increase in industry, including the establishment of metal plants and factories, many owned by Zionist immigrants or funded by wealthy Zionist organizations.

By the beginning of the twentieth century the population of Jaffa had swelled. Rabbi AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK moved to Palestine and took up the position of chief rabbi of Jaffa. Until the establishment of Tel Aviv in 1909, Jaffa had the most advanced commercial, banking, fishing, and agriculture industries in Palestine as well as many factories producing a variety of goods. When the British took control of Palestine, there was an increase in Zionist IMMIGRATION and ownership of LAND and commercial enterprises that caused Muslim and Christian Arabs, who were predominant in Jaffa, to rise up in rebellion. By 1921, Britain had placed the city under martial law. Arab organizations

such as the MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS were active, and two prominent Arabic newspapers in Jaffa articulated ANTI-ZIONIST feeling. The uprisings of the ARAB REVOLT in the 1930s pitted Palestinian protesters in Jaffa against the British military. The Royal Air Force destroyed much of the old city in 1936 as punishment for its continued support of the general strike. Although the strike paralyzed the port, Jaffa remained the primary export center for the citrus industry in spite of the growth of HAIFA, also a seaport, and the newly built port at Tel Aviv. In 1945, Palestinians planted 146,316 dunums (36,000 acres) of citrus, while Jews planted 66,403 dunums (16,400 acres).

Although the 1947 UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE recommended that Jaffa become part of the planned Jewish state, the UN General Assembly Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181) designated Jaffa as an enclave in the Arab state due to its large Palestinian majority. Palestinians rejected Resolution 181 and the day after the adoption of the resolution, on 29 November 1947, large spontaneous demonstrations erupted in Jaffa, during which several Jewish establishments were looted. In December 1947, Zionist forces attacked Palestinian residents of Jaffa and the nearby village of Salame. The militant Zionist group IRGUN launched major assaults against Palestinian positions in Jaffa, often targeting the civilian population. In response, in February 1948, Jewish workers were slain by Arabs in a factory after being disarmed by the British, and Jaffa became a battleground between Arabs and Jews.

On 13 March 1948, Zionist forces first used Davidka mortars against Jaffa, and the bombardment caused many Palestinians, especially from the middle and upper classes, to flee the city. The Palestinian flight may also have been accelerated by the news of the 9 April 1948 massacre in the Arab village of DEIR YASSIN, where Zionist militias murdered over one hundred men, women, and children. But the brutal capture of Jaffa also prompted many residents to leave. According to Shmuel Toledano, a Jewish intelligence officer, although other factors played a part, "the Irgun had been shelling Jaffa for three weeks before the HAGANA [the underground military organization] entered, making the Arabs very much afraid." On 10 May 1948 the Irgun began a full-scale assault on the city, causing the mass flight of the remaining inhabitants. At one point British forces, attempting to prevent the expulsion of Jaffa's Palestinians, engaged the Irgun in battle. Initially the Irgun retreated but Hagana fighters came to its assistance, and the British withdrew. On 13 May, Jaffa formally surrendered to Jewish forces, shortly before Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. To commemorate the fall of Jaffa, Israel planted the Conquest Garden in the center of the city. Before the 13 May 1948 surrender, the Arab population of Jaffa had decreased from 75,000 to 55,000. On the day of surrender less than three weeks later, only about 3,500 Palestinians, the poorest of the city dwellers, remained, and they formed the basis of the modern Palestinian population of Jaffa. Those who fled have never been allowed to return to their homes and are now scattered throughout the world, many living in refugee camps.

Immediately after the conquest, Irgun forces indulged in widespread looting. Jon Kimche, former editor of the *Jewish Observer* and *Middle East Review*, the official organ of the Zionist Federation of Britain, reported: "for the first time in the still undeclared war, a Jewish force commenced to loot in wholesale fashion." At first, the young Irgunists pillaged only dresses, blouses, and ornaments for their girlfriends. But, according to Kimche, "soon everything that was movable was carried from Jaffa, including furniture, carpets, pictures, crockery and pottery, jewelry and cutlery." Historian Michael Palumbo also wrote about the pillaging: "Not content with looting, the Irgun fighters smashed or destroyed everything which they could not carry off, including pianos, lamps and window-panes. [Israel's founder DAVID] BEN-GURION afterwards admitted that Jews of all classes poured into Jaffa from Tel Aviv to participate in what he called 'a shameful and distressing spectacle.'"

Shortly after Jaffa fell, Israel blew up and bulldozed most of Jaffa's Arab sector—some 75 percent of the city—leaving only the al-Ajami neighborhood of the Old City and a small part of al-Manshiya. Most, if not all, of Jaffa's *suqs* (markets) were obliterated. The small group of Palestinians who managed to stay in Jaffa was literally imprisoned in a part of the al-Ajami neighborhood, surrounded by a barbed-wire fence with sentries at the neighborhood's entrances and exits. Shortly thereafter Jewish immigrants from Bulgaria, Morocco, Romania, and other countries were settled in Jaffa, causing severe housing problems. One solution was housing the immigrants in the al-Ajami neighborhood. As a result the fence came down, and the old Palestinian family mansions

were subdivided into smaller flats. Jewish and Palestinian families lived next door to each other, usually sharing the same kitchen and bathroom. Because the neighbors were all poor with shared problems, friendships were created, and many Ajami residents remember Jewish-Palestinian relations from this period as good; they shared family feasts and provided help and support in times of need. In the 1960s and 1970s, modern homes were constructed in Jaffa's destroyed neighborhoods, and many of the Jewish families moved to those newer flats, while others moved to nearby Bat Yam, Holon, and Rishon LeZion. Al-Ajami slowly turned into a slum, populated almost exclusively by Palestinians (or "Israeli Arabs"). Today Jaffa's old Palestinian neighborhoods are being renovated and inhabited mostly by artists and are frequented by tourists.

See also WAR, 1948

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—Betsy Folkins

Jenin, 2002

The Battle of Jenin took place from 3 April to 11 April 2002 in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY–administered refugee camp of Jenin in the WEST BANK. It occurred in the context of OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD as part of the Second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA and was an intense military confrontation. The battle was fought between the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and several Palestinian factions. It gave rise to a number of myths, especially concerning the number of Palestinians killed, a number that was widely exaggerated. Nevertheless, the destruction wrought on Jenin by the IDF was severe.

On the eve of Israel's April military incursion, the Jenin refugee camp, established in 1953, was home to roughly 13,055 registered REFUGEES, of whom approximately 47 percent are either under 15 or over 65 years of age. It is the second most populous refugee camp in the West Bank, with a very high density, covering an area of only approximately 373 dunums (92 acres). The Jenin refugee camp came under full Palestinian (PNA) civil and security control in 1995 with the INTERIM AGREEMENT. It abuts the town of Jenin, overlooks both the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY to the east and the Marj Ibn Amer (Jezreel Valley) to the north, is near the Green Line, and is in close proximity to several Israeli SETTLEMENTS. The Jenin camp is administered by the UNITED NATIONS Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

In the early hours of 3 April 2002, the IDF entered the city of Jenin and the refugee camp adjacent to it, declared them CLOSED MILITARY ZONES, prevented all access, and imposed a round-the-clock CURFEW. According to both Palestinian and Israeli observers, the Jenin camp had, by April 2002, some 200 armed men from the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, Tanzim, ISLAMIC JIHAD, and

HAMAS operating from the camp. The government of Israel has charged that from October 2000 to April 2002, 28 SUICIDE BOMBINGS were planned and launched from the Jenin camp.

The Israeli government and the IDF have stated that their soldiers were unprepared for the level of resistance they encountered in the Jenin camp, noting that it was "probably the most bitter and harsh" that they had faced. The IDF soldiers who took part in the operation were, for the most part, reservists who had been mobilized only on or after 17 March. Many were called up only after the Passover bombing on 27 March in Netanya.

In the account of the operation by the Israeli government, the IDF first surrounded and established control of access into and out of the Jenin camp, allowing its inhabitants to depart voluntarily. Using loudspeakers, the IDF urged civilians in Arabic to evacuate the camp. Some reports, including interviews with IDF soldiers, suggest that those warnings were not adequate and were ignored by many residents. Many of the inhabitants of the Jenin camp fled the camp before or at the beginning of the IDF incursion. Estimates vary on how many civilians remained in the camp throughout the fighting, but there may have been as many as 4,000.

According to Israeli sources, in their incursion into the camp the IDF relied primarily on infantry rather than airpower and artillery in an effort to minimize civilian casualties, but other accounts of the battle suggest that as many as sixty tanks may have been used, even in the first days. Interviews with witnesses conducted by human rights organizations suggest that tanks, helicopters, and ground troops using small arms predominated in the first two days, after which armored bulldozers were used to demolish houses and other structures so as to widen alleys in the camp.

As described by the Israeli government, "a heavy battle took place in Jenin, during which IDF soldiers were forced to fight among booby-trapped houses and bomb fields throughout the camp, which were prepared in advance as a booby-trapped battlefield." The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) acknowledges that "a number of Palestinian fighters resisted the Israeli military assault and were armed only with rifles and . . . crude explosives." An IDF spokesman offered a slightly different portrayal of the resistance, stating that the soldiers had faced "more than a thousand live explosive charges and some more sophisticated ones . . . hundreds of hand grenades . . . [and] hundreds of gunmen." Human rights reports support the assertions that some buildings had been booby-trapped by the Palestinian combatants.

That the IDF encountered heavy Palestinian resistance is not in question. Nor is the fact that Palestinian militants in the camp, as elsewhere, adopted methods that constitute breaches of INTERNATIONAL LAW that have been and continue to be condemned by the United Nations. Clarity and certainty remain elusive, however, on the policy and facts of the IDF response to that resistance. The Israeli government maintains that the IDF "clearly took all possible measures not to hurt civilian life" but were confronted with "armed TERRORISTS who purposely concealed themselves among the civilian population." However, several human rights groups and Palestinian eyewitnesses assert that IDF soldiers did not take all possible measures to avoid hurting civilians, and even used some as human shields.

As the IDF penetrated the camp, the Palestinian militants reportedly moved further into its center. The heaviest fighting reportedly occurred between 5 and 9 April, resulting in the largest death tolls on both sides. There are reports that during this period the IDF increased missile strikes from helicopters and the use of bulldozers—including their use to demolish homes and allegedly bury beneath them those who refused to surrender—and engaged in "indiscriminate" firing. In this period, the IDF lost 14 soldiers, 13 in a single engagement on 9 April. The IDF incurred no further fatalities in Jenin after 9 April.

By the end of May 2002, 52 Palestinian deaths were confirmed by the hospital in Jenin, and the IDF also placed the death toll at approximately 52. A senior Palestinian Authority official alleged in mid-April that some 500 were killed, a figure that has not been substantiated in light of the evidence that has emerged, but which many Palestinians continue to cite.

It is impossible to determine with precision how many civilians were among the Palestinian dead. The Israeli government estimated that during the invasion there were "only dozens killed in Jenin . . . and the vast majority of them bore arms and fired upon [IDF] forces." Israeli officials informed UN personnel that they believed that, of the 52 dead, 38 were armed men and 14 were civilians. The PNA has acknowledged that com-

batants were among the dead, and has named some of them, but has placed no precise estimates on the breakdown. Human rights organizations put the civilian toll higher. Human Rights Watch documented 22 civilians among the 52 dead, while Physicians for Human Rights noted that "children under the age of 15 years, women and men over the age of 50 years accounted for nearly 38 percent of all reported fatalities." The final death toll was confirmed at 52 to 56 Palestinians—anywhere between 5 and 26 of whom were estimated to have been civilians—while 23 IDF soldiers were killed. Approximately 150 buildings were destroyed, and many others were rendered structurally unsound. Four hundred fifty families were rendered homeless. The cost of the destruction of property is estimated at approximately $27 million.

In the second part of the operation, the IDF appeared to have shifted tactics from house-to-house searches and destruction of the homes of known militants to wider bombardment with tanks and missiles. The IDF also used armored bulldozers supported by tanks to demolish portions of the camp. The Israeli government maintains that "IDF forces only destroyed structures after calling a number of times for inhabitants to leave buildings, and from which the shooting did not cease." Witness testimonies and human rights investigations allege that the destruction was both disproportionate and indiscriminate, some houses coming under attack from the bulldozers before their inhabitants had the opportunity to evacuate. The PNA maintains that the IDF "had complete and detailed knowledge of what was happening in the camp through the use of drones and cameras attached to balloons . . . [and that] none of the atrocities committed were unintentional."

Human rights and humanitarian organizations have also questioned whether this change in tactics was proportionate to the military objective and in accordance with humanitarian and human rights law. The PNA account of the battle alleges the use of "helicopter gun-ships to fire TOW missiles against such a densely populated area . . . anti-aircraft guns, able to fire 3,000 rounds a minute . . . scores of tanks and armored vehicles equipped with machine guns . . . [and] bulldozers to raze homes and to burrow wide lanes." Other sources point to an extensive use of armored bulldozers and helicopter gunships on 9 and 10 April, possibly even after the fighting had begun to subside. Much of the physical damage was done during this period, particularly in the central Hawashin district of the camp, which was effectively leveled. Many civilian dwellings were completely destroyed and many more were severely damaged. Several UNRWA facilities in the camp, including its HEALTH CARE center and sanitation office, were badly damaged.

Within two days after 9 April, the IDF brought the camp under control and defeated the remaining armed elements. On 11 April, the last Palestinian militants in the Jenin camp surrendered to the IDF, having requested mediation by B'TSELEM, an Israeli human rights organization that operates in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, to ensure that no harm would come to them. According to PNA sources, those surrendering included wanted Islamic Jihad and FATAH leaders, as well as three wounded and a 13-year-old boy.

As the IDF incursion into Jenin wound down, a range of humanitarian problems arose or worsened for the estimated 4,000 Palestinian civilians remaining in the camp. Primary among these was the prolonged delay in obtaining medical attention for the wounded and sick within the camp. Ambulances and medical personnel were prevented by the IDF from reaching the wounded within the camp, despite repeated requests to the IDF to facilitate access for ambulances and humanitarian delegates, including those of the United Nations. From 11 to 15 April, the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies petitioned the IDF and negotiated for access to the camp, to no avail. At IDF headquarters on 12 April, UN officials were told that UN humanitarian staff would be given access to the affected population. However, such access did not materialize on the ground, and several more days of negotiations with senior IDF officials and personnel of the Israeli Ministry of Defense did not produce the necessary access despite assurances to the contrary. On 18 April, senior UN officials criticized Israel for its handling of humanitarian access in the aftermath of the battle and, in particular, its refusal to facilitate full and safe access to the affected populations in violation of its obligations under international humanitarian law.

The UNRWA mounted a large operation to deliver food and medical supplies to needy refugees who had fled the camp and to Jenin hospital but was not allowed to enter the camp. The humanitarian crisis was exacerbated by the fact that, on the first day of the offensive, electricity in

both the city and the camp was cut by the IDF. Electric power was not restored until 21 April.

Many of the reports of human rights groups contain accounts of wounded civilians waiting days to reach medical assistance and being refused medical treatment by IDF soldiers. In some cases, people died as a result of these delays. In addition to those wounded in the fighting, there were civilian inhabitants of the camp and the city who endured medication shortages and delays in medical treatment for preexisting conditions. For example, it was reported on 4 April that there were 28 kidney patients in Jenin who could not reach the hospital for dialysis treatment.

The functioning of Jenin Hospital, just outside the camp, appears to have been severely undermined by IDF actions, despite IDF statements that "nothing was done to the hospital." The hospital's supplies of power, WATER, oxygen, and blood were significantly limited by the fighting and consequent cuts in services. On 4 April, the IDF ordered the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) to stop its operations and sealed off the hospital. Hospital staff contend that shells and gunfire severely damaged equipment on the top floor and that at least two patients died because of damage to the oxygen supplies. None of the Palestinians within the hospital were permitted to leave until 15 April.

It appears that, in addition to the denial of aid, the IDF in some instances targeted medical personnel. Before the Jenin incursion on 4 March, the head of the PRCS Emergency Medical Service in Jenin was killed by a shell fired from an Israeli tank while he was traveling in a clearly marked ambulance. On 7 March, a staff member of UNRWA was killed when several bullets were fired by Israeli soldiers at a UNRWA ambulance in which he was riding near Tulkaram in the West Bank. On 3 April, a uniformed Palestinian nurse was reportedly shot by IDF soldiers within Jenin camp, and on 8 April an UNRWA ambulance was fired upon as it tried to reach a wounded man in Jenin.

The Israeli government repeatedly charged that medical vehicles were used to transport terrorists and that medical premises were used to provide shelter. This, according to Israel, necessitated the severe restrictions on humanitarian access. Furthermore, in the specific case of Jenin camp, IDF spokesmen attributed denials of access to the clearance of booby traps after the fighting had subsided. The IDF spokesman also maintained that the "Palestinians actually refused our offers to assist them with humanitarian aid" and that "everyone who needed help, got help." There is, however, a consensus among humanitarian personnel who were present on the ground that the delays endangered the lives of many wounded and ill within. UN and other humanitarian personnel offered to comply fully with IDF security checks on entering and leaving the camp, but were not able to enter the camp on this basis. Furthermore, UN staff reported that the IDF had granted some escorted Israeli journalists access to the camp on 14 April, before humanitarian personnel were allowed in. UN personnel requested similar escorted access to assess the humanitarian condition of people in the camp, but were unsuccessful, despite assurances from senior IDF officials that such access would be possible.

On 15 April, 12 days after the start of the military operation, the IDF granted humanitarian agencies access to the Jenin refugee camp. The PRCS and the International Committee of the Red Cross were permitted to enter the camp under military escort but reported that their movement was strictly confined to certain areas and further constrained by the presence of large quantities of unexploded ordnance, including booby traps. After evacuating only seven bodies, they aborted their efforts. A UN team with two water trucks and other supplies was forbidden from unloading and was also forced to withdraw. Supplies were not distributed to the camp inhabitants until the following day, 16 April. Acute food and water shortages were evident, and humanitarian personnel began calls for specialized search-and-rescue efforts to extract the wounded and the dead from the rubble.

Once the IDF granted full access to the camp on 15 April, unexploded ordnance impeded the safe operations of humanitarian personnel. Non-UN humanitarian agencies reported that large amounts of unexploded ordnance, explosives laid by Palestinian combatants as well as IDF ordnance, slowed their work. Negotiations carried out by UN and other international agencies with the IDF to allow appropriate equipment and personnel into the camp to remove the unexploded ordnance continued for several weeks, during which time at least two Palestinians were accidentally killed in explosions.

There was a battle in Jenin. It was real urban warfare, as a modern, well-equipped army met an

armed and prepared group of guerrilla fighters intimately familiar with the local terrain. For both sides, Jenin has been added to the memories that invest the conflict in the Middle East with such bitterness. Because Jenin has become so potent a symbol, a new battle erupted over what precisely happened there and what its wider significance will be.

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Jericho

The ancient city of Jericho, thought to be the oldest and lowest city on earth (at 830 feet below sea level), is situated in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY about seven miles (eleven kilometers) west of the Dead Sea and twenty miles (thirty-two kilometers) east of JERUSALEM. Extensive excavations place the earliest settlement at about 8000 BCE. Layers of human habitation on the site reveal evidence of hunting-and-gathering groups, followed by an urban culture with defensive walls and indications of more complex social organization, including agriculture and craft production between 7000 and 6000 BCE.

The site was continuously inhabited by various peoples and destroyed and rebuilt many times. The Egyptians occupied it from the fifteenth to thirteenth centuries BCE, followed by the Israelites in the twelfth to sixth centuries BCE. Under the Romans the city moved further west, and in the time of Herod, aqueducts were built. Jericho was destroyed during the Jewish wars in 66 CE, rebuilt by the emperor Hadrian, and under the Byzantines moved about one mile east of its present location. Beginning in the early fourth century, there was a Christian presence in the area, and in 325 CE, Jericho became the center of a bishopric. In the sixth century the emperor Justinian built a church there and constructed a road connecting the city to Petra (now in JORDAN) on a main caravan route. The city began to attract a large number of pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem, and several monasteries were established. After the caravan route was diverted, the city fell into decay. In the seventh century, Jericho was captured by Arab armies, and in 724 the Umayyad Caliph Hisham built a grand winter palace nearby. By the ninth century, Jericho was a district capital, whose importance was enhanced by the production of sugarcane and indigo. In 1099 the city was captured by the Crusaders and served as an encampment before it was recaptured by the Muslim leader SALADIN in 1187.

For several centuries Jericho was no more than a small village. Because it lay on the pilgrimage route from Damascus to Medina and Mecca, for security reasons the OTTOMANS maintained garrisons to protect tourists and hajj pilgrims. In 1840, Jericho was razed by the departing troops of Ibrahim Pasha, son of the Egyptian conqueror Mohammed Ali, and in 1871 destroyed again by fire. During World War I, in 1918, British general Allenby captured the city from Ottoman troops, securing the eastern front. The main bridge over the southernmost crossing of the Jordan River, the Ghoraniyya Bridge, was destroyed during the war and replaced in 1935 by the Allenby Bridge. According to Muslim belief, a few miles to the southwest of Jericho lies the tomb of Nabi Musa (the prophet Moses), which has been the site of an annual pilgrimage and festival since the end of the Crusades. In the 1920s and 1930s it was the scene of demonstrations against Zionist IMMIGRATION, which were always quelled by the British army.

Not until the arrival of the British after World War I did Jericho begin to revive and become a winter resort for wealthy Jerusalem Palestinian families. The increases in fruit production, mainly from orange and banana groves, led to population growth, and by the 1940s Jericho had some 3,000 inhabitants. Jordanian forces occupied Jericho in 1948 as part of the WEST BANK, and it soon became the site of three teeming refugee camps after the 1948 WAR, housing REFUGEES from the coastal areas of Palestine. In the 1967 WAR Israel captured the city. When the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) was established in 1994, Jericho was the first West Bank city to come under autonomous Palestinian rule.

Jericho became prominent during the period of PNA governance for the establishment of a casino there. Situated left of the Dead Sea–Jericho highway and across the road from the squalid Aqbat Jabar refugee camp, the Oasis Casino opened in October 1998, claiming to be the largest in the Middle East. An opulent construction project, the $50 million Oasis development was intended by the cash-strapped PNA to be a source of revenue and to draw further private investment. Recurrent Israeli CLOSURES had left the West Bank economy suffering, taking a particularly heavy toll on earnings from tourism. Controversies surrounded the casino from the outset—for example, who owned it, who invested in it, how the PNA spent the earnings, the presence of gambling and alcohol in a predominantly Muslim society, the prohibition on Palestinians (unless they held foreign passports) entering the casino (though Palestinians constituted 435 of 2,000-plus staff), and other issues. Israelis came to the casino in large numbers, and for a time the casino seemed hugely successful. On peak days up to 3,000 gamblers packed its two large rooms and VIP lounge, staking their bets on baccarat, blackjack, roulette, and craps. However, in October 2000, shortly after violence broke out, the casino closed, and Israel barred its citizens from traveling to the area. In February 2005, the casino was reopened, but there were no gamblers. Following years of violence and depression, Palestinian businessmen hope Israelis will quickly return to Jericho and jump-start tourism there, but Israel has not yet allowed its citizens to return.

By 2006, Jericho was a Palestinian island in a sea of Israeli SETTLEMENTS—three large settlements and several smaller OUTPOSTS. The small town is surrounded by a trench and sealed off by Israeli troops. At the CHECKPOINT at the entrance to the town near the defunct Oasis Casino, two Israeli soldiers control all movement into and out of town.

See also JORDAN RIFT VALLEY; AL-NABI MUSA DEMONSTRATIONS PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

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—Betsy Folkins

Jerusalem

Jerusalem is at the physical and symbolic core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, representing both the political and religious aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians and the ebb and flow of relations between them. Because both communities claim that the city is their spiritual center and political capital, there will be no resolution to the conflict unless there is a mutually acceptable agreement on sharing Jerusalem and its holy sites. Because Israel has been reluctant to relinquish significant parts of the city to the Palestinians and the Palestinians have refused to accept Israeli claims to certain parts of the city, resolution of this component of the conflict has been especially intractable. At the same time, Israel's military control over the city since 1967 has been marked by political limits on its authority and sovereignty through the presence of strong religious institutions and historical practices and has not removed either the Palestinian presence or Palestinian resistance to the Israeli OCCUPATION. This in turn has provided space for a continued and realistic Palestinian claim to the city.

History of Change

The history of Jerusalem is characterized by the constant succession of changing rulers and dynasties, the dominance of different religions at various times—though almost always in a multidenominational context and relative tolerance—and continuous construction, destruction, and reconstruction. The earliest archaeological evidence for human settlement in Jerusalem can be traced to around 1800 BCE, known as the Jebusite period. Remnants include some city walls, foundations of houses, water-supply installations, and some tombs and caves. Following its conquest by the Israelite tribes under King David in 1003 BCE, the city acquired political importance as being midway between the two tribal areas of Judah and Benjamin and became the capital of a united kingdom. Further expansion continued under David's successor, Solomon, when the first Jewish Temple was built and its fortifications were enlarged. During this period, Jerusalem also became a commercial center with major trading routes from the Mediterranean coast to the Arabian interior passing through the city.

The Babylonian invasion of 587 BCE ended the longest period of unbroken Israelite rule in the city; ruling members of the Israelite population were executed, and the remainder deported to Babylonia. The Babylonians, in turn, were conquered in 539 BCE by the Persians, who allowed the Jewish exiles to return but prevented the Israelites or Hebrews, as they were then called, from establishing independent political control over the city. During the subsequent Hellenic period (332 BCE to 168 BCE) there was a renewed flowering of Jewish ritual and law in Jerusalem, but this was crushed under Antiochus Epiphanies, who destroyed the city and made Torah observance punishable by death. However, a succession of revolts against the Seleucid Greeks reestablished Jewish control over the city under the Maccabeans in 141 BCE.

The Roman period, which succeeded the Hellenistic and Maccabean, lasted from 63 BCE until the Muslim invasion in 638 CE. In the first half of this period, the empire was ruled from Rome, and its citizens worshiped pagan gods, although the Jews (as they were now called) enjoyed an initial period of religious autonomy in Jerusalem. Jewish attempts to gain political independence from Rome, however, were crushed, culminating in the destruction of the Second Temple in 69–70 CE. During this period the first Christian community was also established, and the city saw the beginnings of the Christian pilgrimage trade. The second half of the Roman period was characterized by a growing movement away from paganism and the acceptance of CHRISTIANITY throughout the empire, as well as its division into two parts. In the eastern half, Byzantium was ruled from Constantinople. One of the most significant events of the period was the conversion of Emperor Constantine to Christianity. In 336 CE, Helena, Constantine's mother, visited Jerusalem, identified the supposed site of the crucifixion of Jesus, and commissioned the construction of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, which became the holiest place in Christianity. As a result, Christian pilgrimages to the city became central to the economic and cultural life of Jerusalem, while churches, infirmaries, hospices, and hostels were built on an extensive scale.

Rule by Islam. The next major epoch in Jerusalem's history was its conquest by the adherents of Islam, a new religion born in Arabia. The arrival in Jerusalem in 638 CE of Caliph 'Umar ibn Khattab, the second successor to the Prophet Muhammad and the Islamic caliph, opened an era of Muslim rule in the city that, excluding an interruption during the period of the Crusades, lasted for over 1,300 years until the Israeli conquest in 1967. Throughout its history Jerusalem has been of little military significance in terms of strategic location or vital resources, and its succeeding conquests were mainly for religious purposes. In Islam, Jerusalem was the first *qibla*, the direction to face during the prayers that Muslims are obliged to carry out five times a day; it was also the destination of Muhammad's mystical "night journey" and the site where it is believed he ascended briefly to heaven, both events being recorded in the Quran. Early Islam was renowned for its inclusiveness, and the caliph 'Umar made an agreement with the city's Christian population that in exchange for the payment of a poll tax, their property, churches, and personal safety would be assured. Jews were allowed to return to Jerusalem for pilgrimage purposes only, but over time more and more began to settle in the city. Between 685 and 709 CE the DOME OF THE ROCK and the AL-AQSA MOSQUE were built, possibly on the site of the Jewish Temple, in an enclosure that became known as the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam after Mecca and Medina.

Subsequent Muslim rulers elevated the status of Jerusalem. The Umayyads, for example, drew pilgrims away from Mecca, where their political rivals held sway, and enhanced their own political position by emphasizing the holiness of Jerusalem. Up until the eleventh century the praises of Jerusalem, collectively known as the *fada'il al-quds,* were sung, and it became known as the *bayt al-maqdis*, or the House of Holiness, from which the Arabic name for the city, al-Quds, is derived. The rise of the Abbasids in 750 CE and the subsequent transfer of the seat of the caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad led to a relative decline in the importance of Jerusalem. However, the fortunes of Jerusalem as a religious city in general did not suffer, because Christians and Jews were allowed additional freedoms. The caliph Harun al-Rashid, for example, opened diplomatic relations with Charlemagne that led to the construction of many new buildings in Jerusalem in order to cater to Christian pilgrims. Similarly, during the Muslim Fatimid dynasty, as Cairo became more important to Islam, the number of Muslim pilgrims to Jerusalem decreased, and Christians and Jews became involved in the government and administration of the city—so much so that, in approximately 985 CE, the celebrated Muslim geographer al-Muqaddasi observed that the Christian holy days marked the rhythm of the year for the Muslim population as well.

Increasing Christian pilgrimage continued to have a considerable impact on the city and to cause disaffection among the Muslims. For example, in 1065 CE nearly 12,000 pilgrims, a number that exceeded the native inhabitants of the city, arrived on a mass pilgrimage. By the late tenth century and throughout the eleventh century, the Muslim domination of Jerusalem weakened, and by 1099 CE, Crusader armies had laid siege to its gates and entered the city—a period that was inaugurated by the mass slaughter and expulsion of its existing Muslim and Jewish inhabitants.

Period of construction. The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem lasted for approximately 100 years and saw a massive program of construction. The remains of some sixty-one churches have been found dating from this era. With Jerusalem's capture by Salah al-Din (SALADIN, the commander of the caliph's armies) in 1187 CE, this era, known as the Muslim Ayyubid period, was marked by an enormous investment in the construction of houses, markets, public baths, and pilgrim hostels. Large *waqf*s (Muslim religious endowments) brought income into the city and provided funds for refurbishing the al-Haram ash-Sharif. For the greater part of the thirteenth century, Jerusalem lacked any strategic or military value for the Ayyubid leaders, who were beset by their internecine struggles. However, Jerusalem's importance as an Islamic sacred place returned under the next dynasty, that of the Muslim MAMLUKS, who ruled from approximately 1250 to 1517. The Mamluks used the city as a home for exiled and retired princes and dignitaries, and gave large and wealthy endowments. As a result, Mamluk monumental building attained a level of rare architectural magnificence, which in the twentieth century contributed to Jerusalem being listed as a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. A bureaucracy was set up to introduce some coherence into all the endowments that were being made, and this became the basis of the continuity of Muslim presence in the

city to this day. An increase in Muslim pilgrimages to Jerusalem contributed to its economy. The sanctity of Jerusalem to Islam was reinforced through writings of poets and religious scholars; at least thirty *fada'il* (cardinal virtues) can be traced to this period. In addition, the small Jewish community in the city, as well as the Christians, attained what was known as *dhimmi* status under the Mamluks, meaning they were recognized and protected as religious minorities, and they were allowed to own property and set up business enterprises.

The Mamluks were followed by the Muslim OTTOMANS, whose rule in Jerusalem was the longest virtually unbroken dynasty, lasting until the twentieth century. Originally Turks from Central Asia, the Ottomans occupied Jerusalem in 1517 CE, with Sultan Selim receiving the keys to the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque. The Ottomans were responsible for the construction of the city walls standing today. In 1551 the largest *waqf* in Palestine, the Khasski Sultan Waqf, was set up to raise money for charity and other purposes. Much of Ottoman economic life in Jerusalem was based on religion. Revenue from the pilgrim industry, and endowments and bequests to the Islamic, Christian, and Jewish communities, sustained a city that was some distance from ports and the trade routes of the coastal plain and lacked natural resources or a manufacturing base.

During the Ottoman period significant developments laid the foundations for Jerusalem as a modern city. First was the reassertion of a Christian and European presence in the city. From the signing of the first "capitulation" treaty in 1535 CE with FRANCE to the arrival of British general Allenby at Jaffa Gate in 1917, European involvement and interference in the affairs of Jerusalem began to advance slowly but significantly. The capitulation treaties gave different European countries various powers over the administration of Christian holy places, which they exercised either through the churches under their tutelage or through their consuls. By the late nineteenth century the French and British consuls had considerable influence over political developments in Jerusalem.

Second was the intervention of the state in the regulation of religious life. Violent, bloody clashes between different denominations periodically erupted during the Ottoman era and were severe enough that the sultan in Istanbul was obliged to intervene. These interventions eventually produced an edict issued by Sultan Uthman III in 1757 CE that codified the conduct of ritual and the maintenance of the holy places, which became known as the "Status Quo."

During the nineteenth century, Jerusalem developed as a major administrative center in the region. Following a brief interlude of Egyptian rule from 1830 to 1840, minority religious groups and foreigners were allowed relatively greater freedom by the Ottomans. When they regained power in Jerusalem, the Ottomans made it the administrative capital of the province of Jerusalem. This was both a recognition of the city's religious and political importance and an attempt to exert closer control over its affairs by making the city directly accountable to the Ottoman central government in Istanbul. However, despite this reform, Ottoman state power weakened, creating greater opportunities for European intervention. Britain, for example, took on the protection of Jews in the city as a means of furthering its influence.

Modern Developments

By the beginning of World War I, Jerusalem had become the largest city in Palestine. The transfer of political and military power to the British in 1917 hastened its transformation into a more European city, in terms of both physical appearance and demographic composition and culture. In addition, for the first time a political territory approximately congruent with the geographical area known as Palestine was established; not since the Crusader period had Jerusalem been the administrative and political capital of an integrated region.

Nevertheless, during the BRITISH MANDATE the dominant Palestinian Muslim community and the major Jerusalemite families were cut off politically from the Islamic hinterland. To some extent this loss was balanced by the establishment of a SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL in 1921, which had jurisdictional powers over Muslim religious (Shari'a) courts and control over the vast array of Islamic *waqf*s. The geographical and political separation of Palestine from the larger Arabic-Islamic world allowed for a much more unified and centralized administrative system of the Muslim community, which enhanced the power and influence of the elite Jerusalem landowning families that dominated these structures. The loss of Muslim dominance over Jerusalem in general political

terms was partially offset by a greater direct involvement in the administration at a local level. This, along with the growth in the Christian institutional presence and the exponential growth in the Jewish population by the end of the British Mandate, explains to some extent the hostilities in 1948 that tore Jerusalem in half.

The tripling of the Jewish population in Jerusalem between 1922 and 1946, from 34,000 to 99,000, which in 1946 was just less than half the total population of the city, was a direct consequence of British support for ZIONISM and the establishment of a Jewish "homeland." Disputes over access to holy sites and the balance of political representation in the Municipal Council became the main flashpoints in the relations between Zionist Jews and Palestinian Muslims and Christians, whose influence with the British administration was gradually eclipsed by Jewish demographic preponderance. The resulting communal tensions led the British in 1947 to turn the issue of Palestine over to the UNITED NATIONS, which proposed in UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181 the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, with Jerusalem under a permanent UN trusteeship—namely, the creation of an international zone, or *corpus separatum*, around Jerusalem that would be administered by the United Nations for a ten-year period, after which there would be a referendum to determine its future. The Palestinians did not accept Resolution 181 because it gave more than half of Palestine to the Jews, and therefore rejected the internationalization proposals for Jerusalem. Following the withdrawal of British forces in 1948 and the inter-communal fighting that accompanied it, the city was severed into two parts: an eastern Jordanian-held (East Jerusalem) sector and a western Israeli-held sector (West Jerusalem).

Over the nineteen years from 1948 to 1967, when Jordan occupied East Jerusalem, its population remained surprisingly static, despite the thousands of REFUGEES absorbed from the western part of the city and a high birthrate. The reason for the stasis was the large number of Palestinians who emigrated to the Gulf States and elsewhere, in search of work, security, and a stable future. In addition, the Jordanian government was unwilling to see a Palestinian Jerusalem develop at the expense of the Jordanian capital in Amman and relocated its administrative offices to Amman. The city fell back onto its traditional economic base of pilgrimage, which in the postwar era took the form of tourism. Deprived of access to the ports and agricultural wealth of the coastal plain and prevented from developing as the political center of Palestinian nationalism, East Jerusalem declined.

In contrast, Israeli West Jerusalem was made the capital of the new state. To overcome its geographic disadvantages (the loss of its hinterland and access to the Arabian interior), the government invested heavily in the city in order to attract IMMIGRATION and promote employment. Most government offices and national institutions, such as the Knesset, a new university, and the Great Synagogue, were built there. Israel had captured the main WATER supply to Jerusalem, and power was transmitted from sources on the coastal plain. As a result of these activities, the population of West Jerusalem doubled to 200,000 Israeli Jews from 1948 to 1967. However, Jerusalem's economy was dependent upon government and public sector employment. With no access to the holy sites, it had little attraction for tourists, and its frontier-like status deterred private investment for industrial enterprises.

The concluding phase of this historical background is the Israeli capture of East Jerusalem during the 1967 WAR with the army's entry into the OLD CITY and the placing of an Israeli flag on the roof of the Dome of the Rock—emblematic images of the latest period.

New Regime: Jerusalem after 1967. On 11 June 1967, the Israeli government annexed East Jerusalem to the Israeli state. On 27 June 1967, Israel approved an amendment to the Law and Administration Ordinance as follows: "The jurisdiction and administration of the State shall extend to any area in the Land of Israel designated by the government by order." A second amendment to the Municipalities Ordinance Law allowed the prime minister to enlarge by proclamation the area of the municipality by inclusion of an area designated by order. Concurrently, an Israeli ministerial committee was formed in 1967, and its first decision was to declare an acceptable demographic ratio of 76 percent Jews to 24 percent Palestinians in the city.


Israel also immediately redefined the borders of East Jerusalem. Under Jordanian rule the city had covered 6.5 square kilometers (2.3 square miles); Israel expanded it to 64 square kilometers (24.7 square miles), or some 64,000 dunums (16,000 acres). The newly designated area of "East

Jerusalem" contained twenty-eight Palestinian villages together with their grazing and farming lands. According to Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, Israel had "purposely" drawn the new city borders "to include the maximum territory possible, with the minimum possible Palestinian population." They described it thus: "The government simply issued orders to expropriate [land that was owned by Palestinians] . . . taking advantage of a legal system in Israel that gives [Arab] owners little recourse against the authorities taking away private property. . . . In January 1968, Israel carried out its first major expropriation . . . some 3,345 dunum (826 acres) were taken from . . . Arab landowners to build the Jewish [SETTLEMENT] of Ramot Eshkol; 486 dunum (120 acres) were expropriated for [a second settlement]. Four months later another 900 dunum (220 acres). . . . But Israel's land grab in 1968 was nothing compared with the one that occurred at the end of August 1970, when eight separate expropriation orders were carried out, covering 10,000 dunum (2,470 acres) of land."

By 1970, at the end of the first three years of Occupation, Israel had expropriated more than 16,000 dunums (3,950 acres) of Palestinian land to construct East Jerusalem. Following the land confiscations from 1967 to 1970 there was a ten-year hiatus, until 1980 when Israel seized 4,400 dunums (1,090 acres) from Palestinian landholders. The next confiscation was in April 1991, with the seizure of 1,850 dunums (457 acres) of Jabal Abu Ghanem. Today, Palestinians inhabit small areas in East Jerusalem, constituting only 7,000 dunums (1,730 acres), or 10 percent of the land. Conversely, by the year 2000, Israel had transferred approximately 180,000 Jewish settlers to East Jerusalem in twelve major settlements. No new Palestinian neighborhoods have been established since 1967.

In addition to confiscating LAND, constructing settlements and increasing the number of Jews in the newly expanded borders of Jerusalem, and concomitantly greatly reducing the spatial area in which Palestinians are allowed access, Israel has employed a variety of policies to encourage Palestinians to leave the city, including withholding of municipal services, coercive unilateral measures such as HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and restrictive demographic and planning policies designed to ensure an Israeli Jewish majority on both sides of the city. In addition, the Israeli government has enacted policies designed to obscure the reality of Israeli military and political dominance over the city so Jerusalem is perceived as a peaceful city under benevolent and just Israeli rule. Questions of citizenship, electoral participation, and the application of Israeli laws have all been applied with qualification and tacit anomalies to smooth the impact of Israeli rule. Palestinians in East Jerusalem have residency, not citizenship, of Israel; they are permitted to vote in ELECTIONS for the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL but not for the Knesset. Not all Israeli laws have been extended to East Jerusalem, particularly in the banking, religious, and commercial sectors. Indeed the very borders of the city themselves have been obscured by ad hoc administrative measures. The Armistice Line that once divided the city has ceased to be prominent as new Israeli settlements straddle both sides and the provision of municipal services to them has further obscured the relevance of the extended Israeli municipal borders. More recently, the ring of settlements outside the new municipal borders of Jerusalem and in the WEST BANK have created the concept of a GREATER JERUSALEM and a METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM. By blurring the distinction of what is Israel and what is the West Bank and by blurring the concept and practice of Israeli sovereignty in this way, incremental change can be introduced without provoking overwhelming resistance. Nevertheless, these Israeli actions were forcibly imposed; its Occupation of the eastern section of the city has still not been accepted by the Palestinians, by the international community, or by Israel's Arab neighbors. Over the years of Occupation, successive Israeli governments may have consolidated and extended their military control over both parts of the city, but they have not succeeded in putting to rest the final status of Jerusalem.

Politics of demography. The issue of DEMOGRAPHY has been central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from its inception, and demographic changes in Jerusalem are a reflection of this broader struggle. While Jerusalem is predominantly an Arab city, the Jewish population increased during the last century of the Ottoman period, although precise figures are difficult to establish. Nevertheless the political implications of Jerusalem having a sizable Jewish minority are important. Palestinian Arabs were, at the early stage of the Zionist colonization venture, the overwhelming majority in the areas that became



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Map 26. East Jerusalem Closures

Palestine. However, in the city of Jerusalem itself, which became the administrative capital of Mandatory Palestine, Jews were beginning to make their presence felt in both spatial and political terms. At the same time, the increase in the Jewish population in the city did not lead to a corresponding increase in Jewish landownership. Palestinian Arabs continued to own most of the land in and around Jerusalem.

The main Jewish areas of residence were also in the western parts of the city. Neighborhoods erected along communal lines expanded, and infilling linked them to each other and to the central business district along the Jaffa Road running westward from the Old City. The Old City saw a relative decline in the Jewish population as living opportunities increased outside its walls. While the total population of the Old City increased from 22,000 in 1922 to approximately 34,000 in 1944, the Jewish population there dropped from 5,600 in 1922 to approximately 3,000 in the 1940s. By 1947 only 2 percent of the Jewish population of the city was in the Old City. They were replaced by Palestinian Arab traders and their families from the HEBRON area, confirming the essentially Arab and Islamic nature of the Old City.

Often overlooked is the rise in the population of Palestinian Christians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By 1948 nearly half of the Christian Arab population of Jerusalem lived in the western half of the city. Wealthy and educated Christian Arab families resided in the southwest sector of Jerusalem, just outside the Old City, in places such as Upper and Lower Baqa'a, Katamon, Talbiyye, and an area known as the German Colony. In fact, during the British Mandate period, the Christian community attained the highest number of inhabitants ever recorded for Christian residents in the Old City, that is, 31,300, 17,528 of whom were Palestinian Arab Christians. The 13,772 remainder were mostly European Christian diplomats, educators, missionaries, and churchmen. These wealthy suburbs of Jerusalem fell to the Israelis in 1948, and their Palestinian residents were dispossessed.

During the period between 1948 and 1967 the Jewish population of Israeli-held West Jerusalem fluctuated. Immediately after the 1948 WAR it fell to about 58,000 inhabitants, but through heavy government investment and directed immigration policies it rose quickly, so that on the eve of the 1967 War it had nearly quadrupled to approximately 193,000. We should note that virtually the entire Palestinian Arab population of the areas that became West Jerusalem fled or were evicted. Thus, some 28,000 Palestinians were made refugees. In Jordanian-held East Jerusalem there was an initial corresponding rise in population from approximately 45,000 to 70,000 inhabitants as a result of the war. However, as noted, this number remained relatively static.

Since 1967, Jerusalem has seen a further dramatic rise in population. (See Table 3.) To attain control over East Jerusalem and the annexed areas of the West Bank and to prevent any possibility of these areas becoming part of a Jordanian or Palestinian state, the government had to increase the Israeli Jewish population substantially and place them in the eastern, Palestinian-inhabited part of the city. The Israeli government sought to consolidate its hold over the eastern section of the city by encouraging the settlement of Israeli Jews there. The growth of these settlements and the political and legal issues surrounding them are well documented and need not be repeated here. From the early 1990s onward, there have been more Israeli Jews than Palestinians living in the eastern part of the city.

Two objectives were achieved by these policies. First, as the Israeli Jewish settlements spread and became more established, Palestinian areas, particularly in and around the Old City, became enclaves within a modern Israeli city, which in turn hampered their mobility, restricted areas for Palestinian residential and institutional development, and undermined the original Arab and Islamic culture of the city. Second, the Palestinian enclaves themselves became increasingly cut off from the West Bank hinterland, affecting their economic development and reducing their role in Palestinian society. By the year 2000, Israel had transferred approximately 180,000 Jewish settlers to East Jerusalem in eleven major settlements. In 2007 the total population of Jerusalem was estimated at 743,000, with approximately 505,000 Jews, 223,000 Muslims, and 14,900 Christians.

The effects of these settlement policies are exacerbated by two supplementary policies. The first is the CLOSURE of Jerusalem to West Bank and GAZA STRIP Palestinians. Imposed in 1992, the closure is enforced by ROADBLOCKS and CHECKPOINTS that ring the city, and Palestinians without a Jerusalem residency PERMIT have to obtain special

Table 3 Residents of Jerusalem According to Population Groups in Selected Years, 1967–2002

	Number of Residents (thousands)			Percentage	
Year	Palestinians	Israelis	Total	Palestinians	Israelis
1967	68.6	197.7	266.3	25.8	74.2
1970	76.2	215.5	291.7	26.1	73.9
1975	96.1	259.4	355.5	27.0	73.0
1980	114.8	292.3	407.1	28.2	71.8
1985	130.0	327.7	457.7	28.4	71.6
1990	146.3	378.2	524.5	27.9	72.1
1995	174.4	417.0	591.4	29.5	70.5
1998	200.1	433.6	633.7	31.6	68.4
2002	221.9	458.6	680.5	32.6	67.4

permission to enter. This has dramatically contributed to the separation between East Jerusalem and the West Bank described above, disrupting economic, cultural, religious, and political activities in East Jerusalem and the Old City. The second policy is the withdrawal of residency permits and the confiscation of a Jerusalem IDENTITY CARD from those Palestinians who cannot prove that Jerusalem is their "center of life." Many Palestinian Jerusalemites had moved out of the city in order to seek better housing conditions, as the prospect of receiving a building permit in East Jerusalem is virtually impossible. At the same time they retained their residency permit and the ownership or tenancy of their property in East Jerusalem or the Old City. The main reason for this is that as Jerusalem residents they are entitled to Israeli NATIONAL INSURANCE INSTITUTE (NII) benefits such as child allowances.

However, in 1996, the new Israeli government, led by Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, in conjunction with the more anti-Palestinian mayor of Jerusalem, EHUD OLMERT, began a policy of withdrawing residency permits from individuals who had moved outside the municipal borders, compounding an already complex problem of FAMILY REUNIFICATION. By September 1999, 2,812 residency permits had been withdrawn. However, the policy appeared to backfire. The major effect was to induce those wishing to keep their NII benefits and access to schools and hospitals in East Jerusalem to seek housing in East Jerusalem. The result was that tens of thousands of families relocated back into Palestinian areas where they were able. This development is confirmed by population figures of the Old City where there is still Palestinian dominance. (See Table 4.)

This migratory drive back to East Jerusalem was accelerated with the construction of the Separation BARRIER or Wall. Many Palestinian families sought to find accommodation on the west side of the wall to ensure access to services and employment. Precise figures are unavailable, but in 2006 an Israeli think tank, the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, produced figures that showed that the hitherto Israeli goal of maintaining an overall population ratio for the city of 70 percent Israeli Jews to 30 percent Palestinian Arabs had been breached. And, indeed, their projections showed that if current trends continued, there would be parity between the two ethnic groups by 2035, in which case the Israeli policy of engineering Jewish demographic dominance in the city would have failed.

Table 4 Population of the Old City by Religious Group, 31 December 2003

Religious Group/ Quarter	Jews	Muslims	Christians	Unclassified	Total
Christian Quarter	143	1,242	3,888	3	5,276
Armenian Quarter	748	504	1,205	4	2,461
Jewish Quarter	1,811	560	12	4	2,387
Muslim Quarter	431	23,461	1,354	2	25,248
Total	3,133	25,767	6,459	13	35,372

Note: All population figures come from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics as of 31 December 2003.

Religious Communities

As emphasized above, Jerusalem's main importance lies not in its economic wealth or strategic military significance, but in the centrality of the city to the three monotheistic religions. Over time, it became to different religions the city of the greatest concentration of their holy places. The definition of the term "Holy Place" is of great importance to the history and politics of Jerusalem. Over the centuries, a Holy Place in Jerusalem has accrued a special status. In addition to its role in ritual and worship, it is also exempt from civil legislation and issues such as taxation and HEALTH CARE and safety regulations. As such, the Ottomans, British, Jordanians, and Israelis have all been obliged to recognize limits on their jurisdiction and administrative authority in dealing with them. Thus the designation of a particular site as a Holy Place is of some legal, political, and economic significance.

Historically, the term "Holy Places" did not encompass all the holy sites in the city belonging to the three religions. Initially, it was used by scholars and jurists to refer strictly to the Christian Holy Places listed in a number of Ottoman edicts, in particular the *firmans* of 1757 and 1852, which laid down a series of ritualistic arrangements known as the Status Quo. The sites mentioned in this context are the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and its dependencies (Old City), the Convent of Dayr al-Sultan (Old City), the Sanctuary of the Ascension (Mount of Olives), the Tomb of the Virgin Mary (near Gethsemane), the Church of the Nativity (BETHLEHEM), the Milk Grotto (Bethlehem), and Shepherd's Field (near Bethlehem).

This definition of "Holy Place" continued until the British Mandate period, during which the authorities extended the list to include the Western or (Wailing) Wall (Jewish, Old City), Rachel's Tomb (Jewish and Muslim, between Jerusalem and Bethlehem), and the Cenacle on Mount Zion (Jewish and Christian, historically administered by a Muslim family). Of note is that this British list introduced non-Christian sites into the collective term "Holy Places." Following UN Resolution 181, a greatly expanded list of Holy Places also came into use. The UN list compiled by the UN CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE in 1949 added the following sites to the ones already listed. *Muslim*: Dome of the Rock (Old City), al-Aqsa Mosque (Old City), Mosque of the Ascension, and the Tomb of David. *Christian*: Church of St. Anne (Old City), Church of St. James (Old City), Church of St. Mark (Old City), House of Caiaphas, and the Pool of Bethesda. *Jewish*: Tomb of Absalom, Synagogues (some in the Old City, e.g., Hurva synagogue), Bath of Rabbi Ishmael, Pool of Siloam, Cemetery of Mount of Olives, and the Tomb of Zachariah.

This extended UN list of Holy Places is significant in that it is the last list on which there is some international consensus and therefore has the support of INTERNATIONAL LAW. But it must be observed that there are much greater numbers of Christian and Jewish holy sites on the list compared to the relatively few Islamic ones. This is a reflection of the dominance of the UN at that time by Christian powers and supporters of Zionism.

Israeli policies toward the Holy Places and the religious communities in Jerusalem were designed on one level to reassure the international community that Israel would safeguard the existing rights of the communities, access to the Holy Places, and thus preclude any need for external intervention. At the same time, however, Israel's policies also developed in directions that extended the control of the Israeli state in the city, extended the influence of the Jewish religious hierarchy, and curtailed the independence of the non-Jewish communities.

During the early months of the Israeli Occupation, Israeli government policy toward the Muslim and Christian communities and their respective hierarchies revealed this contradiction. Immediately following the Israeli entry into the Old City, the whole Moughrabi quarter close to the Western Wall, including its two mosques, was demolished. In addition, an Israeli police station was installed on the al-Haram ash-Sharif. Neither of these unilateral steps was a continuation of previous arrangements, nor did it receive the consent of the Muslim leadership. These acts also set a precedent for further alteration of the religious Status Quo.

Muslim community. In the first few weeks following the Occupation, the Israeli Ministry of Defense was placed in charge of dealings with the Muslim religious establishment and Muslim HOLY SITES. It was faced with the practicalities of disentangling those parts of the bureaucracy that dealt with the West Bank from those that dealt primarily with Jerusalem and the adjacent areas that were now incorporated into the new Israeli municipal boundaries. Following passage of Israeli legislation

(Law and Administration Ordinance, Amendment No. 11, and Municipalities Ordinance, Amendment No. 6), which incorporated East Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank into Israel, the government transferred responsibility to the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

The Religious Ministry, controlled by members of the Orthodox Jewish NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, embarked upon the aggressive application of Israeli law to these areas. It meant, for example, that the *qadis* of East Jerusalem would not be allowed to adjudicate on Shari'a matters unless they renounced their Jordanian citizenship and swore allegiance to the state of Israel. In addition, if they accepted these conditions, they would have to accept the amendments to Shari'a law enacted by the Knesset and adopted by the Israeli *qadis*. Furthermore, all the holy sites that were *waqf,* that is, the vast majority of them, would be covered by the Israeli ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW of 1950 and be placed under the jurisdiction of the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY. Finally, the ministry would also have the right to censor the Friday sermon delivered in all Old City mosques, including the revered al-Aqsa Mosque. However, as these conditions were not acceptable to the Muslim leadership in Jerusalem, a campaign of resistance was initiated that threatened to destabilize the introduction of Israeli military government in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Therefore, in January 1968 responsibility for Muslim affairs was transferred back to the Ministry of Defense. The result of this move was that the administrative framework established by the Jordanian government remained in operation, provided a relatively advanced degree of autonomy, and has formed the basis of Muslim religious administration in Jerusalem until the present.

Christian communities. For the plethora of Christian communities, accommodation to the Israeli Occupation was not quite so contentious. During the period of the city's partition (1948–1967), Israel officially recognized over twelve different Christian denominations inside Israel. These communities were given freedom to appoint their own clergy, to retain independent administration over church property (save for a number of long-running disputes), to run their own schools, and to have matters of personal status dealt with by their own religious courts. Prior to 1967, the Armistice Lines of 1949 separated ecclesiastical superiors based in Jerusalem from their subordinates, congregations, institutions, and communal assets. They had been able, however, to coordinate activities with their coreligionists in Israel by frequent visits across the lines. Therefore, in 1967 the removal of the frontier through the middle of the city made their life much easier. On the other hand, Christian communities were concerned that the Israeli Occupation of Jerusalem would alter the Status Quo arrangements at their expense. Despite repeated lobbying by church leaders of the Israeli government, the Christian communities in Jerusalem were unable to secure an unequivocal commitment to maintain the Status Quo arrangements and not to intervene in favor of one or another of the Christian denominations or the internal affairs of the denominations. This provided the Israeli government with an important instrument for leverage over the Christian communities and meant that their relations with the Israeli state were continually subject to pressures and piecemeal agreements.

The Jewish community. The Jewish community also experienced considerable change brought about by the Israeli Occupation of the Old City. During most of the period under review the Ministry of Religious Affairs had been a virtual fiefdom of the National Religious Party, a hawkish, largely ASHKENAZI party of Jewish Orthodoxy. In the 1980s and 1990s the ministry came under the influence of GUSH EMUNIM, the militant settler movement. One of the most important changes at this time was the enlargement and reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter in an attempt to slow the rate of growth of Palestinians in the other quarters of the Old City. The ministry has been able to secure considerable autonomy over its activities around the Western Wall area, including the long-term project of tunneling along and beneath the wall to the north under Palestinian residences, which has caused some of them to collapse. This has brought the ministry into conflict not only with the Palestinian residents but also with the Israeli Department of Antiquities. In addition, disagreements over the best use to make of the razed Moughrabi quarter have led to the paralysis of plans for its development as a Jewish Holy Place, with the result that it remains an open plaza with only security and toilet facilities installed. Most contentious has been the tunneling along the Western Wall and the edge of the al-Haram ash-Sharif. When the HASMONEAN TUNNEL was opened to the public in 1996 with an entry in the heart of the Muslim Quarter, it pro-

voked a riot and major violence between Palestinian and Israeli security forces and temporarily derailed the OSLO PROCESS. Continuing support by the ministry and other agencies in the Israeli government for militant Israeli SETTLER GROUPS and their colonizing activities in the vicinity of the Haram have led to Palestinian suspicions that there is covert government support for an Israeli takeover of the al-Haram ash-Sharif.

Infrastructure and Physical Changes

Relative to other important cities in the region, such as Cairo, Damascus, and Istanbul, Jerusalem is a small compact city based around the Old City. Its physical shape did not change dramatically until the second quarter of the twentieth century.

In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent built the walls that still enclose the Old City today, and it was not until the end of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth that any notable construction took place outside the Old City walls. This recent change was undertaken to accommodate the influx of new Jewish immigrants and the establishment of Jerusalem as an administrative center for the British Mandatory government. These factors were further emphasized in 1948, when West Jerusalem became the political capital of the new state of Israel and government offices and other national administrations were established there. In addition, the new Israeli government sought to broaden the economic base of the western part of the city to consolidate its hold on what was essentially, prior to 1967, a frontier town. It created educational and medical institutions and industrial zones on the urban peripheries that served to stimulate the urban spread of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, trade and commerce were discouraged by its proximity to a hostile border, and its major industry, tourism, was stymied by the lack of access to the important religious sites in the Old City.

The period of Jordanian government rule in the eastern part of the city (1948–1967) also left a distinctive imprint upon urban development in Jerusalem. As a result of the Armistice Agreements with Israel, only 11 percent of the former municipal area of Jerusalem came into Jordanian hands. While the Jordanians secured control over the prime religious sites in the Old City, Palestinian Arab inhabitants of the city lost access to the main commercial area along Jaffa Road, to their affluent suburbs with good-quality housing in the western part of the city, and to many of the key services they were used to receiving. The impact of these factors was heightened by poor economic opportunities in Jordan. At the same time, however, the eastern part had an important advantage over the western part. East Jerusalem's tourist economy and its ancillary services benefited from the presence of the key Holy Places in the Old City. Indeed, the perceived threat to the Muslim shrines of the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque as a result of the conflict with Israel increased Muslim pilgrimage to East Jerusalem.

Zoning and housing. Since 1967, in addition to its visible and constant military presence and its aggressive settlement construction, the main instrument by which the Israeli government has secured its control over East Jerusalem has been through the imposition of ZONING LAWS AND REGULATIONS. Through highly restrictive and discriminatory zoning policies, Israel has ensured that Palestinian areas of residence are tightly constricted, while areas where there has been no building have been given special designations that have served as a reserve for the expansion of settlements for the exclusive use of Israeli Jews.

Zoning laws have primarily applied to the Palestinian neighborhoods in the HOLY BASIN, the areas of East Jerusalem outside the Old City—for example, SILWAN, RAS AL-AMUD, SHAYK JARRAH, and ABU DIS, among others. Although Israel has expanded the Jewish Quarter in the Old City at the expense of the Muslim Quarter, there is no overall zoning plan. Settler groups, however, have been acquiring properties in the Muslim and Christian quarters methodically and with alacrity. On the other hand, Palestinians wishing to build a house, enlarge an existing one, or open a shop in the Old City must obtain a permit from the municipal authority on an individual basis. These requests have been typically denied.

A Regional Planning Board was established to review and evaluate all development projects. According to Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, "The board was the guardian of the limitation system . . . [and] was famous for blocking development projects in Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem." For example, Israeli planners zoned vast tracks of land as "GREEN AREAS," making them "off-limits to development." Ostensibly these areas were intended to protect the environment and enhance the beauty of the city through open views of the landscape. In reality, however, green areas

have served as a means of containment and demarcation as well as land reserves for future Jewish settlement. For example, Jabal Abu Ghanem was originally zoned "green" to prevent the neighboring Palestinian villages of Sur Baher and Um Tuba from expanding. Later it was "rezoned" for construction of the HAR HOMA SETTLEMENT. Other areas were left "unzoned," but here, too, Palestinian housing and development were prohibited.

Housing restrictions. Another zoning restriction placed on Palestinians (but not on Israeli Jews) is that building—residential or commercial—is permitted only in areas that are already built up; it is prohibited in vacant areas. Buildings may be no more than two stories high. There is a strict limitation on the number of dwellings that can be built in any given area as well as on the height and size. Thus, for example, while a Jewish Jerusalemite owning a plot of 50 square meters (538 square feet) can build an eight-story building of 200 square meters (2,152 square feet), a Palestinian Jerusalemite owning the same-size plot can only build a two-story building of 50 square meters (538 square feet). Additionally, as B'Tselem documented, "The Israeli authorities prepared town plans which, instead of developing Palestinian neighborhoods, prevent such development. Over a third of East Jerusalem lacks town-planning schemes, making construction impossible. . . . In fact, Palestinian building is allowed in only 7 percent of East Jerusalem." Thus the municipality rejects most building permits either because of "zoning plans" or because the land is claimed by Israel as "absentee property." Moreover, projects that are submitted to the relevant authorities for approval experience inordinate delays—often as long as ten years—before receiving an answer.

Permits. Permits are an important means by which Israel limits the development of Palestinian neighborhoods and prevents the construction of homes. Between 1967 and 1999, only 15 percent of all new housing units in Jerusalem were built for Palestinians in East Jerusalem (i.e., 21,490 housing units for Palestinians as compared to 122,376 housing units for Jews).

In consequence, considering the Palestinian growth rate since 1967, there is an acute housing shortage and extreme residential overcrowding among East Jerusalem Palestinians. In 1996 in East Jerusalem as a whole, there were 43,000 homes in Jewish neighborhoods (all built on expropriated Palestinian land), compared to 28,000 homes in Palestinian neighborhoods. The housing density of the Palestinian community in Jerusalem is 2.1 persons per room, twice as high as that of Jewish residents of the city. Some 40 percent of the houses are severely substandard, and about half of all residents rent their homes. (The population density in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City is 487 persons per hectare [or 197 persons per acre: one hectare = 2.47 acres] compared to the Jewish Quarter, where it is 183 persons per hectare, or 74 persons per acre.)

Zoning and housing policies plus the permit system, coupled with the demographic policies outlined earlier, illustrate several means by which the Israeli government has sought to curtail any Palestinian growth in the city. These measures have been backed up by the extensive use of house demolitions and land confiscations to prevent unregistered Palestinian construction.

Discrimination in municipal services. The desire to have a Jewish majority in East Jerusalem and to encourage Palestinian emigration is also reflected in the highly discriminatory disbursement of resources for municipal services to the Jewish and Palestinian sectors of the city. Palestinian residents of Jerusalem pay the same amount of taxes—in some cases they pay more—as do Jewish residents. The weighty *arnona* (occupancy) tax is especially burdensome, but it is paid into the National Insurance Institute and is intended to provide benefits and services. Yet Palestinians receive a very small proportion of services relative to what they pay in taxes. For instance, there has been virtually no municipal or government funding allocated to Palestinian neighborhoods. After forty years of Occupation, entire Palestinian neighborhoods are not hooked up to sewage systems, do not have paved roads or sidewalks, and do not have regular electricity—indeed, lengthy blackouts are typical. Phone service is sporadic. Houses are grossly overcrowded and severely substandard. The poverty rate is high, at an estimated 45 to 60 percent of the population. Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, all former Jerusalem municipal employees, write: "There are Arab neighborhoods where human waste literally pours out into the streets. Some Arab neighborhoods do not have trash pick-up and debris piles up in abandoned lots. The streets in many Arab neighborhoods have not even been given names by the local authorities [making mail delivery, among other things, impossible]. . . . Those that have been named still

do not have signs. . . . Some East Jerusalem neighborhoods still do not have proper water lines."

The following set of comparisons demonstrates that Jerusalem is not a "united" city. In fact, Jerusalem is distinctly divided between a modernized Jewish sector and a backward Palestinian sector. In 1998, according to the (Israeli) *Jerusalem Statistical Yearbook*, there were 433,600 Jews in all of Jerusalem (east and west) and 200,100 Palestinians. (Israel does not disaggregate east from west because it considers the city "unified.") This is a ratio of 68.4 percent Jewish to 31.6 percent Palestinian—not quite the desired ideal, but close. There are virtually no Palestinians in West Jerusalem, although there are some 200,000 Israeli settlers in East Jerusalem. Put differently, services for "Jerusalem Jews" include Jews in both the eastern settlements and western sectors, whose combined total makes up 68.4 percent of the total population. East Jerusalem Palestinians constitute 31.6 percent. Palestinians pay 31 percent of the taxes, but receive only 2–12 percent of the services of the municipal budget. On a per capita basis, the city spends six times more on each Jewish resident than it does on each Palestinian resident. The paucity of services, benefits, and basic municipal obligations is a stark illustration of one aspect of Israel's efforts to induce Palestinians to leave the city.

The monopoly on and discriminatory practices related to service provision have resulted in some unintended consequences. For example, the gradual and incremental interference by the Israeli government meant that the independent Palestinian Jerusalem Electric Company slowly lost its customer base and was consigned to being a contractor of the Israel Electric Company. Fierce resistance by Palestinians at interference of their EDUCATION system led to the Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian curriculum taught in municipality schools in East Jerusalem. Similarly, an independent Palestinian health sector has emerged and expanded in East Jerusalem with the assistance of religious groups and NGO support, despite attempts to bring it in line with Israeli regulations. Finally, the complexity of service provision in the Jerusalem area can be seen in the way the Israeli municipality came into dispute with the Israeli military government of the West Bank over the operations of the Jerusalem Water Undertaking (Ramallah District), the JWU. Due to the enlargement of the municipal borders, the northern suburbs of Jerusalem along the road to Ramallah were supplied by the JWU. Both the JWU and its Palestinian customers inside the enlarged municipality insisted that their agreements should stand. They were supported by the military government, which did not wish to see the JWU being forced to cease operations in the Ramallah area simply because of the loss of its main customers to the south. The municipality of Jerusalem was obliged to back down and negotiated an agreement with the JWU in which it would continue to supply water to existing and new Palestinian customers and be able to purchase water from the Israeli water agency, Mekorot, via the municipality. New Israeli settlements such as Neve Ya'acov would be the responsibility of the municipality. Thus, there are a number of functional borders based on service provision that are not congruent with the political borders of the municipality.

From these examples it is possible to understand that on some levels, Israel has failed to incorporate East Jerusalem into the Israeli state despite its declarations to the contrary. In spite of nearly forty years of Occupation, Jerusalem is still not like the other mixed Jewish-Palestinian cities of Israel, such as Acre, RAMLA, and LYDDA. Indeed, adding to the difficulties of incorporating a hostile population have been ideological factors intrinsic to the Zionist project. There is a great reluctance to expend effort and resources on non-Jewish population groups. One result of this abdication of responsibility is that other actors—political parties, Islamic and church groups, community groups, nongovernmental organizations, and so on—have stepped into the vacuum and provided institutional alternatives to the Israeli state and municipal structures. To this extent there is a fundamental contradiction in Israeli approaches to the city: the intention to secure control of the city is undermined by the ideological preference for Jewish exclusiveness.

Barrier Wall

A more recent development that seriously affects Palestinian Jerusalem is Israel's construction of a separation Barrier through the suburbs of the city. In effect, the wall is a repartitioning (of the original 1948 partition) of the city, but the line has been moved further east to ensure that significant amounts of territory acquired in 1967 remain under Israeli military control, pending a FINAL STATUS agreement with the Palestinians or, more

likely, to preempt the possibility that these areas will even be open for negotiation—Israel's long-standing "facts on the ground" policy.

Comprising over twenty kilometers (twelve miles) of concrete walls with heights varying between four and nine meters (thirteen and thirty feet) and another fifty-seven kilometers (thirty-five miles) of fencing, the Barrier will separate 80,000 Jerusalemites on the West Bank side of the Barrier from families, schools, hospitals, religious sites, and commercial networks, among other things. In the education sphere alone, the wall, not yet complete, has cut off some 18,000 pupils and 800 teachers from their schools. One report concluded that 17 percent of those who have moved from their residences in occupied East Jerusalem did so because of the effects of the wall. Similarly, the wall cuts off 90 percent of households on the eastern side from health services in Jerusalem's center. In the four years since the beginning of the Barrier's construction in 2002, 20 percent of households have been divided, which is expected to increase the internal displacement of Palestinians. Already 64 percent of Palestinians in East Jerusalem may be obliged to change their place of residence. According to John Dugard, UN special rapporteur on human rights in the Palestinian territories, the Barrier results in the "forced displacement of Palestinians," which sustains "Israel's policy of population TRANSFER."

The Barrier cuts through the middle of many Palestinian neighborhoods, separates neighborhoods from each other, and isolates the central Jerusalem suburbs from the West Bank and Palestinian hinterland. The government's plan calls for the separation Barrier to surround East Jerusalem and detach it from the rest of the West Bank. B'Tselem outlines the relevant decisions and approvals to begin construction that were made in three principal stages:

1. In June 2002, as part of the decision in principle to build the whole separation Barrier, the government approved Stage A, which included two sections north and south of Jerusalem. The northern section extends for some 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) from the Ofer army base on the west to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the east. The southern section, also about 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) in length, runs from the Tunnels Road on the west to Beit Sahur (south of Har Homa) on the east. The two sections were completed in July 2003.
2. In September 2003, the Political-Security Cabinet approved the Barrier's route in the other areas around Jerusalem, except for the section near the MA'ALE ADUMIM SETTLEMENT. These approvals were made in the framework of construction of Stages 3 and 4 of the entire Barrier. The approval related to three subsections. One section is 17 kilometers (10.6 miles) long, extending from the eastern edge of Beit Sahur on the south to the eastern edge of al-'Eizariya on the north. The other section covers a distance of 14 kilometers (8.7 miles), from the southern edge of 'Anata to the Qalandiya checkpoint on the north. The third section is also 14 kilometers (8.7 miles) and surrounds five villages northwest of Jerusalem (Bir-Nabala, al-Judeireh, al-Jib, Beit Hanina al-Balad, and Nebi Samuel), which are situated near the city's municipal border. Most of the Barrier in these sections will be a wall. The progress in building these sections varies: some parts have been completed while in others work has not begun.
3. In February 2005, the Israeli government approved an entirely new route for the Barrier following the High Court of Justice's decision in June 2004 that voided a section of the Barrier on the grounds that it disproportionately harmed Palestinians in the area. However, in the Jerusalem area the route largely remained as it was, except for an addition of 40 kilometers (24.8 miles) that will surround the Ma'ale Adumim Settlement and settlements near it (Kfar Adumim, Anatot, Nofei Prat, and Qedar). The government did not, however, approve commencement of work on this section and conditioned confirmation on "further legal approval."

The dominant principle in setting the route of the Barrier in the Jerusalem area is to run the route along the city's municipal border; however, there are two sections in which the Barrier does not run along the municipal border. One is in the Kufr 'Abeq neighborhood. The other is in the area of the Shu'afat refugee camp. These are separated from the rest of the city by the Barrier, even though they lie within the city's jurisdictional area.

Palestinian towns and villages (Ramallah and Bethlehem, for example) are situated not far from Jerusalem's border. These communities are home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who have ties with Jerusalem. These ties with Jerusalem are

especially close for residents of communities situated east of the city: a-Ram, Dahiyat al-Barid, Hizma, 'Anata, al-'Eizariya, Abu Dis, Sawahreh a-Sharqiya, and a-Sheikh Sa'ad (hereafter "the suburbs"). The suburbs, with a population in excess of 100,000, are contiguous with the built-up area of neighborhoods inside Jerusalem. Until recently, the city's border had an inconsequential effect on the daily lives of the residents on both sides of the border. Residents of the suburbs who carry Palestinian identity cards officially need permits to enter East Jerusalem, but many routinely enter without a permit. Running the Barrier along the municipal border completely ignores the fabric of life that has evolved over the years, and threatens to destroy it altogether. B'Tselem elaborates:

- In light of the housing shortage in East Jerusalem, over the years tens of thousands of residents of East Jerusalem have moved to the suburbs. They still hold Jerusalem identity cards and receive many services in the city.
- Thousands of children living in the suburbs study in schools in East Jerusalem, and many children living in Jerusalem study in schools outside the city. Similar reciprocal relations, albeit on a lesser scale, occur in higher education.
- The suburbs do not have a single hospital. Most of the residents use hospitals and clinics in East Jerusalem. Women from the suburbs almost always give birth in Jerusalem hospitals because they would have to cross a staffed checkpoint (the "container" checkpoint and the Qalandiya checkpoint, respectively) to get to hospitals in Bethlehem and Ramallah, which may entail long delays.
- A large proportion of the workforce in the suburbs is employed in Jerusalem, East and West. Shops, businesses, and factories in the suburbs rely on customers coming from Jerusalem. Many businesses have closed since construction on the Barrier began.
- Residents of East Jerusalem have close family and social relations with residents of the West Bank and with residents of the nearby communities in particular.

Israel contends that gates in the barriers will enable residents to cross from one side to the other and to maintain the existing fabric of life. However, experience regarding the operation of the gates in the northern West Bank section of the Barrier raises grave doubts about the ability of the gates to provide a workable solution: crossing through the gate requires a permit, and many persons wanting to cross are listed as "prevented" for varied reasons; most of the gates are open only a few hours a day, far less than is needed to meet the residents' needs; residents must often wait a long time at the gates, sometimes because the gates do not open on time, and sometimes because of long lines.

Israeli officials state at every occasion that two considerations were instrumental in choosing the route: maintaining security and obstructing Palestinian life as little as possible. However, using the municipal border as the primary basis for determining the route is inconsistent with these two considerations. On the one hand, the route leaves more than 200,000 Palestinians, who identify with the struggle of their people, on the "Israeli" side of the barrier; on the other hand, the route separates Palestinians and curtails the existing fabric of life on both sides of the Barrier.

The decision to run the Barrier along the municipal border and the weak arguments given to explain that decision lead to the conclusion that the primary consideration was political, that is, the unwillingness of the government to pay the political price for choosing a route that will contradict the myth, that unified Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel. In light of the way of life that has been created in large parts of the city since East Jerusalem was annexed by Israel in 1967, any security solution based on the unilateral construction of a physical barrier, including a barrier that runs along the Green Line, will severely violate Palestinian human rights.

Jerusalem and the International Community

Despite the long-running dispute among Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians over the future of Jerusalem, the international community and the decisions of the UN have been remarkably clear and consistent about the city. As discussed above, UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (UNGA 181) proposed the establishment of a *corpus separatum* for Jerusalem for a ten-year period under UN administration, after which there would be a referendum. This proposal for internationalization remained the basis for the international community's efforts until 1967, with various permutations suggested to break the diplomatic logjam. However, it was never implemented.

Following the Israeli Occupation of East Jerusalem and its incorporation of adjacent parts of the West Bank into an enlarged Israeli municipality, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 237, condemning Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. Further Israeli steps to incorporate East Jerusalem provoked additional UN resolutions. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the 1949 armistice lines, and this has formed the basis of all peace overtures. Together these resolutions comprise a powerful corpus of binding international law denying legitimacy to Israeli acquisitions in the city.

Additional international condemnation took place in 1980 when Israeli passed a new law entitled "BASIC LAW: Jerusalem," which asserted that "complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel," and it is "the seat of the President of the state, the Knesset, the Government and the [ISRAELI] SUPREME COURT." The law was seen by the international community as a further attempt to prevent and forestall previous UN resolutions on Jerusalem. Indeed, the Israeli member of Knesset who introduced the bill, Geula Cohen, affirmed: "This Bill is designed to ensure that there will never be any compromise over the sovereignty of Jerusalem." The UN Security Council passed a strongly worded resolution condemning the Israeli action and urged those remaining countries that had diplomatic representation in Jerusalem to remove their embassies. As a result, several more countries moved their embassies from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv. Finally, in 2004, an Advisory Opinion by the International Court of Justice on the separation wall firmly asserted the illegitimacy of the Occupation and the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination. In doing so it emphasized the illegality of Israeli actions in East Jerusalem. Thus the international community, through its actions in the UN bodies and through bilateral diplomatic measures, has made completely clear the inadmissibility of the acquisition of East Jerusalem by force. However, the lack of political will by key players to enforce these positions has meant that Israel can continue to act with relative impunity. A brief overview of the key players—the UNITED STATES, the EU, and the Arab states—will give an indication of the dynamics at play.

The official policy of the United States since the 1947 Partition Resolution has been that Jerusalem should remain a unified city but with its final status to be determined by negotiations. However, over the specific question of the construction of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem after 1967, successive US administrations have either vetoed or abstained from UN General Assembly or Security Council resolutions that demanded an Israeli cessation. For Palestinians, this lack of effective action is evidence that the United States is only paying lip service to its publicly stated policy of pursuing negotiations while in reality it is content to leave Israel in control over both sides of the city. By refraining from public criticism or effective action on Jerusalem, the United States is able to maintain cordial relations with an essential ally in the region, Israel, while simultaneously placating the influential pro-Israel lobbies in Washington. At the same time that it continues to withhold recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, the United States asserts that Israeli unilateral actions do not affect the US commitment to a negotiated future for Jerusalem. In this way the United States is also able to maintain its relations with the majority of the Arab and/or Islamic states. The United States also refrains from exerting pressure on Israel with regard to the separation Barrier.

European Community (EC), and later EUROPEAN UNION (EU), policy toward the Jerusalem issue has been marked by a lack of coordination among the member states and by a lack of "follow-up" after various positions have been articulated. In part this has been in deference to the US monopoly over Palestinian-Israeli mediation, but it has also been a result of the discrepancy between EC/EU policy as such and the policy of its individual member states. This latter point has allowed member states to take heed of domestic constraints in pursuit of their own foreign policy, but at the same time espouse more principled and universalistic policies at the EU level without fear of domestic political reaction. This lack of consistency should not obscure the fact that in the main, EC/EU policy, based firmly on adherence to international legal norms, has been broadly sympathetic to Palestinian and Arab perspectives on Jerusalem. UN Security Council Resolution 242 is the basis of EU policy on Jerusalem, and hence the EC/EU has never accepted the 1980 Israeli Basic Law on Jerusalem; moreover, EC/EU member states have their embassies in Tel Aviv.

In the early 1990s, the EU established an office in East Jerusalem to coordinate its funding

policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and appointed a special envoy to the Middle East peace process, both of which have ensured that the EU plays an active role in discussions concerning the city's future. A report by the heads of mission in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, compiled in 2005 but never approved, gives an indication of the thinking of some of the EU member states. The report concluded that Israeli policies are decreasing the chances of reaching an agreement on Jerusalem and furthermore clearly intend to make the annexation of East Jerusalem permanent. In addition, the EU has accepted the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the separation Barrier and has made representations to Israel to that effect.

The Arab and Islamic world has never held a united or consistent position on the question of Jerusalem. Immediately after 1948, despite the opposition of the Jordanian regime, there was broad support for internationalization of the city. In the post-1967 period an Arab consensus emerged regarding Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem, but abandoned support for internationalization in favor of supporting Palestinians having their capital in East Jerusalem.

The fragile consensus that emerged after 1967 was shattered when in 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat shocked the Arab world by flying to Jerusalem and formally addressing the Israeli nation from the Knesset rostrum. Indeed the peace treaty signed by Israel, EGYPT, and the United States in 1978 failed to resolve the issue of Jerusalem and simultaneously destroyed Arab unity on the subject for almost a decade. A further important milestone in the Arab world in regard to Jerusalem occurred in 1988, when King Husayn announced that Jordan was severing its political and administrative ties with the West Bank and East Jerusalem and only retaining an enduring link to the Holy Places through its funding of the *waqf* system and the Shari'a courts.

Despite the lack of success in advancing Arab and Islamic positions on Jerusalem in the political sphere, Jerusalem has continued to play an important role in intra-Arab and intra-Islamic deliberations. In the wake of the 1973 War and the subsequent quadrupling of oil prices, a greater pan-Islamic consciousness of the role of Jerusalem in Islamic culture and Arab history led to the release of large sums of money for Palestinian institutions and groups in Jerusalem. The Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), backed principally by SAUDI ARABIA, established the al-Quds Committee, which was devoted to restoration of Islamic buildings in the Old City and the preservation of Islamic culture. Other funds were made available through the ARAB LEAGUE, the Islamic Bank, and their subsidiary bodies and provide an important counterbalance to Israeli attempts to determine the future of the city. The Arab League and the ICO continue to affirm East Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state.

Jerusalem and the Peace Process

Jerusalem continues to play a central role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it is impossible to envisage a stable agreement between Israelis and Palestinians without an agreement over Jerusalem, whether it be a phased agreement or under international supervision. An additional complicating factor is that due to the city's long history, its sacredness to three major religions, and the interests that many states have in it, the question of its future is not one that can be decided only by the main protagonists. Other important regional and international players are also concerned about the details of any agreement.

Prior to the launching of the peace process through the OSLO ACCORDS in 1993, there were a number of informal (Track II) discussions between Israelis and Palestinians. An important example was the agreement between the Israeli justice minister YOSSI BEILIN and the PLO general secretary MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen), known as the BEILIN–ABU MAZEN ACCORD. The plan proposed a framework for a Joint Higher Municipal Council with an Israeli and Palestinian submunicipality and a special regime for the Old City. This agreement marked an important opening in the possibility of a negotiated solution on the basis of the Israeli government conceding control over significant parts of the city. The plan was never officially published but was widely seen as an important step toward later Israeli and US proposals.

The DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), signed in September 1993 between the PLO and Israel, the first and most fundamental document in the Oslo Accords, hedged on the issue of Jerusalem, leaving it for final status talks. Moreover, there are contradictory views regarding the legal basis of a settlement over Jerusalem. On the one hand, the Oslo Accords are based upon UN Resolution 242, which states that Israel should

withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, which includes East Jerusalem. Israel, however, does not accept that Resolution 242 requires it to withdraw from *all* the territories occupied in 1967 and changed the terms of reference in the DOP from "occupied territories" to "disputed territories." On the other hand, the permanent status issues identified by the accords refer to "Jerusalem," and not simply "East Jerusalem," implying that Palestinian claims to West Jerusalem were also to be part of the discussions. Partly due to this confusion, serious dialogue on the future of the city did not commence in 1996, as required in the DOP, but has been continually deferred.

The next important milestone in the peace process was the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT in 2000. The Israeli proposals comprised two main elements: they would relinquish control over the northern Palestinian-dominated suburbs of the city to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY and devolve administration in the central areas of East Jerusalem to Palestinian bodies. In exchange, Israel would retain sovereignty and security control over all East Jerusalem, including the Old City. From the Israeli perspective, this was seen as a generous offer. However, for the Palestinians what was being offered was simply a de jure recognition of their de facto dominant position in those areas. From their perspective, when Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, the neglect of the Palestinian residential areas by both the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem and the central government led to the virtual absence of basic services, INFRASTRUCTURE development, and welfare programs in Palestinian areas; and Palestinian and foreign charitable associations, religious organizations, the PLO, and the Jordanian government attempted to fill the vacuum left by the Israeli state. In these areas, the only elements of the Israeli state that are visible is the restrictive planning and zoning laws and the security forces. The Israeli proposals were therefore not much more than what the Palestinians already had, and certainly not enough for them to surrender their claims to sovereignty over the central parts of the city. Not surprisingly, in view of these diametrically opposed views of the situation, the Camp David talks failed.

In 2001, talks were held at the Egyptian resort of Taba, although no formal agreement was achieved. However, unlike at Camp David, a record of the meetings indicates a number of important developments: both sides agreed that Jerusalem would be the capital of two states; Palestinians were willing to discuss Israeli sovereignty over Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and to accept Israeli sovereignty over parts of the Old City; and Israel accepted Palestinian sovereignty over Palestinian suburbs up to the Green Line. There was no final agreement on the Holy Places, only agreement to continue discussions on the concept of a "Holy Basin" to encompass religious sites and special arrangements regarding the al-Haram ash-Sharif/TEMPLE MOUNT. These were important steps toward the implementation of UN Resolution 242, yet Taba also recognized that 242 (simple withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines) could not be the sole framework of a long-term agreement that met the interests of both sides simultaneously.

Following the collapse of the formal peace process in the wake of the second Palestinian INTIFADA in 2000, a new round of ad hoc and uncoordinated Track II discussions took place. Among the most significant were those known as the Geneva Initiative, the interim plan of which was launched in December 2003. Although having no official status, these talks made further progress on a number of key issues and a possible trajectory for future official negotiations. As at Taba, they also proposed two capitals for two states, with two municipalities responsible for their respective areas. There would be a coordination committee appointed by the municipalities to oversee the economic development of the city as a whole. As opposed to a Holy Basin discussed in Taba, there would be a special regime for the Old City with Israeli sovereignty over the cemetery on the Mount of Olives and the Western (Wailing) Wall. Palestinian sovereignty over the al-Haram ash-Sharif would be phased in according to an agreed timetable. A key instrument in the Geneva Initiative is that of third-party intervention and monitoring. On the central issue of the areas of respective sovereignty, the initiative is not clear, as it references a map that has not been published.

At the time of this writing (July 2009), no significant discussions for a negotiated settlement are in the offing. Indeed, on one level prospects for a negotiated solution appear to be receding with an Israeli policy of ongoing unilateral action, such as the completion of the separation Barrier, which will act as a border around the eastern part of the city. No legitimate Palestinian leadership will accept this outcome as a permanent solution

for Jerusalem. In this context, no realistic solution is in sight. However, it is also possible to take a longer view and recognize that there have been significant shifts over the past fifteen years. Taken together, the various Track II discussions, the Oslo Accords, the Camp David Summit, and the TABA TALKS reveal a gradual movement away from the maximalist positions of both sides prior to the peace process and toward positions based upon UN Resolution 242. We can see this in the form of proposals for an Israeli withdrawal and Palestinian sovereignty over large areas of East Jerusalem, and a tacit parallel acquiescence on the part of Palestinians to the new realities in Jerusalem. The fact that this movement is limited and incremental cannot disguise the fact that for the Israelis, the issue of Jerusalem has shifted from being non-negotiable in the 1980s (pre-Oslo), to negotiable at some deferred stage in the 1990s (Oslo), to negotiable in detail, including land exchanges, in the twenty-first century (post–Camp David and Taba). The current alteration of the landscape and physical use of the city by the separation wall and the unilateralist policies of recent Israeli administrations (i.e., ARIEL SHARON, LIKUD/KADIMA, March 2001–January 2006; Ehud Olmert, Kadima, 2006–2009; and Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud, March 2009), who maintain that a united Jerusalem is the indivisible and permanent capital of Israel, do not, for the time being, alter this trend. There is still sufficient ground for hope that this city of three faiths and of international concern is one that can be politically shared and revived as a city of peace and religious inspiration.

See also E1 PLAN; FAMILY REUNIFICATION; GREATER JERUSALEM; HOLY BASIN; KLUGMAN REPORT; METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM PLAN; IRVING MOSKOWITZ; OLD CITY; SETTLEMENTS (B'TSELEM); SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; TEMPLE MOUNT; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT; WESTERN WALL

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—Michael Dumper

Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights

The Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER) is a Palestinian nongovernmental human rights organization. Established in 1997 by lawyers and members of the Palestinian community of JERUSALEM, the center uses the Israeli legal system to provide legal assistance and representation to Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and provides extensive information about news and issues concerning Jerusalem. JCSER assists Palestinian Jerusalemites in finding ways to take

the initiative to proactively fight discrimination and improve conditions of daily life in the short term without conferring political legitimacy on Israel's illegal annexation of East Jerusalem. (www.jcser.org).

Jerusalem Center for Women

The Jerusalem Center for Women was established in March 1994 as a Palestinian nongovernmental women's organization located in East JERUSALEM. Founded simultaneously with the Israeli women's center BAT SHALOM, located in West Jerusalem, the two groups carry out joint Palestinian-Israeli programs through a coordinating body known as the Jerusalem Link. This joint initiative marks the first time that Palestinian and Israeli organizations have worked so closely for the advancement of women's and human rights, as well as toward resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (www.j-c-w.org).

Jerusalem Forum: The Amuta for Settling Jerusalem

The Jerusalem Forum, or The Amuta for Settling Jerusalem, is an *amuta* (Hebrew—nonprofit organization) that unites and provides a framework through which all the settler organizations working to Judaize the OLD CITY and the HOLY BASIN in East JERUSALEM—including ELAD, ATERET COHANIM, ATARA L'YOSHNA, BEIT OROT, and SHIMON HA'TZADIK, plus the Messianic groups hoping to build the THIRD TEMPLE on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF—can concentrate and organize their efforts. The idea behind unification in the Jerusalem Forum is to focus the activity of all the settler *amuta* and coordinate efforts in matters of common interest. The defining ideology of the *amuta* is "redemption of LAND in Jerusalem," with emphasis given to land near the WESTERN WALL of the TEMPLE MOUNT. Many activists in the settlement movement are also activists in Temple Mount organizations.

See also HOLY BASIN; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Jerusalem Forum/ Jerusalemites

The Jerusalem Forum, also known as Jerusalemites, is an Amman-based nongovernmental organization whose Internet site tells the story of the Palestinian people in the hope of building a database of documented, credible information for posterity. It intends to become interactive with the world, pass on the Palestinian message to a worldwide audience (scholars and general-interest readers alike), and expose them to Palestinian culture, life, and history.

A significant portion of Jerusalem Forum content centers on the Holy City of JERUSALEM. This is because, for Palestinians, Jerusalem is the embodiment and symbol of Palestine. Jerusalemites puts forward challenging topics written by various members and friends of the Jerusalem Forum, as well as speaking up for the Palestinians living under Israeli OCCUPATION and testifying about Palestinian existence (historically and in the present).

Jerusalemites believe that it will be possible to clear the air, to come to a mutual Israeli-Palestinian understanding, and to speak on equal ground only when the truth becomes known and is acknowledged by all parties. (http://www.jerusalemites.org/index.htm).

Jerusalem Is Ours

Jerusalem Is Ours (Yerushalayim Shelanu) is an organization of mainly secular Jews founded in 1997 that works closely with ATERET COHANIM (a yeshiva settler group) to "ensure a united Jerusalem under Israel." Its focus is on acquiring Palestinian properties and encouraging Palestinians to leave JERUSALEM, which it envisions as completely Jewish. Jerusalem Is Ours receives support from Christian Zionist groups in the UNITED STATES.

See also JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Jerusalem Media and Communication Center

The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center was established in 1988 by a group of Palestinian journalists and researchers to provide information on events in the WEST BANK (including East JERUSALEM) and the GAZA STRIP. As the first Palestinian group to engage in professional public opinion polling, the center is best known for its high-quality survey research and public opinion polls, which reflect Palestinian views in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES about the peace process, Palestinian leaders, the economy, and other social and political issues. It has offices in Jerusalem and Gaza that provide services to journalists, researchers, international agencies, and other individuals and organizations interested in obtaining information on the Palestinian territories. (www.jmcc.org).

See also POLLS AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION

Jerusalem Prayer Team

The Jerusalem Prayer Team (JPT) is a Christian Zionist organization that opposes Israel giving up LAND in exchange for peace. The mission of the JPT is "to guard, defend and protect the Jewish people and the ERETZ YISRAEL until Israel is secure, and until the redeemer comes to Zion." The group's members are Christian fundamentalists, overwhelmingly from the UNITED STATES. It is nondenominational and does not receive support from Israel. Among the more than 300 Christian leaders who the Prayer Team states are part of the movement are Dr. Tim LaHaye, Mrs. Anne Graham Lotz, Mr. Pat Boone, Mr. Bill McCartney, Ms. Kay Arthur, Pastor John Hagee, the Rev. Tommy Tenney, Evangelist Mike Evans, Dr. A. R. Bernard, and Dr. Jay Sekulow. Not listed officially, Pat Robertson and the late Jerry Falwell are said to have been active on the Prayer Team's board.

The Prayer Team—which claims two million members—states that it has invested millions of dollars in Israel since the organization was founded in the mid-1990s, supporting hospitals, schools, and other public works projects. By circulating petitions, making use of television, and other means, it vigorously fought against the implementation of the ROAD MAP proposed during US president GEORGE W. BUSH's administration. The Jerusalem Prayer Team is also committed to rebuilding the THIRD TEMPLE and works closely with the myriad Jewish groups involved in that effort, providing essential funding and other material support. In 2005 the group began a new project, "Adopt-a-Settler," conceived after leaders met with Israeli tourism minister BENYAMIN ELON. The program aims to raise money through donations, which will be directly given to settlers. (www.jerusalemprayerteam.org).

See also CHRISTIANITY; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Jerusalem Quarterly File

The *Jerusalem Quarterly File* is a scholarly journal first published in 1998 by the INSTITUTE FOR JERUSALEM STUDIES, an affiliate of the INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES. Published in JERUSALEM, the English-language publication provides articles on Jerusalem's history and on the dynamics and trends currently shaping the city. (www.jerusalemquarterly.org).

Jerusalem Reclamation Project

The Jerusalem Reclamation Project is the English name for ATERET COHANIM, a militant settlement group in East JERUSALEM.

See also ATERET COHANIM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Jerusalem Temple Foundation

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Jewish Agency for Israel

The Jewish Agency for Israel is a Zionist organization originally established in 1923 to represent the Jewish community in Palestine during the BRITISH MANDATE. The Palestine Mandate called upon Britain to "secure establishment of the Jewish National Home" with "an appropriate Jewish agency" to be set up for advice and cooperation. In 1929 the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO), which was specifically recognized as the appropriate vehicle, formally designated the Jewish Agency to fulfill the Mandate stipulation.

During the Mandatory period the Jewish Agency organized itself and soon emerged as the quasi-government of the Yishuv, serving the administrative needs of the Jewish community. In 1920 the Jewish Agency established the HAGANA, the military organization of the Yishuv, in cooperation with the Va'ad Le'umi (the supreme institution of the organized Jewish community in Palestine, which was founded in 1920).

In October 1945, under the leadership of the Jewish Agency, the Hagana signed an agreement with the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI and LEHI to establish the United Resistance Movement, which primarily carried out joint operations against the British, although some were directed against the Palestinians. The Jewish Agency officially dissolved the United Resistance Movement after the bombing on 22 July 1946 of the KING DAVID HOTEL; however, beginning in 1946 the Jewish Agency instructed the Hagana to defend all Jewish settlements and neighborhoods, set up the elite PALMAH commando units, and took on the task of procuring weapons, ammunition, and other matériel.

After the UN vote to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states on 29 November 1947 (UN RESOLUTION 181), the Jewish Agency and the Va'ad Le'umi set up a National Council and a National Administration that became the state of Israel's provisional legislature and government with the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE in May 1948. DAVID BEN-GURION, chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, became the first prime minister. With the establishment of the state, the Jewish Agency relinquished many of its functions to the new government but retained responsibility for Jewish IMMIGRATION, land purchases, Jewish settlements, youth work, and relations with the DIASPORA.

In 1952 the WZO, as the proprietor of the Jewish Agency, and the government of Israel signed a covenant, or "Status Law," which was followed by Knesset legislation that established the basis for the relationship among the WZO, the Jewish Agency, and the state of Israel. Under the terms of this covenant, the Jewish Agency was recognized as the third element in the constellation of ISRAEL'S NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS but was subordinate to the government of the state. This quasi-governmental status allowed the Jewish Agency to fulfill specific nongovernmental functions, even though at the same time it was an arm of the state. During Israel's early years, the Jewish Agency provided important services in the area of Jewish immigration, absorption, and settlement. In the first two decades it established a wide variety of companies to develop the country's cultural and economic INFRASTRUCTURE, including El Al (the national airline), Mekorot (the water supply company), land development companies, agricultural companies, real estate management companies, Binyanei HaOoma (the national theatre and convention center), museums, and others.

The Jewish Agency's real significance, however, resides in its status as one of Israel's "national institutions" (together with the WZO and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND [JNF]). For example, under the terms of the 1952 Status Law the government entrusted the Jewish Agency with the planning and funding of new settlements (towns, villages, urban areas, etc.). It is also responsible for funding the development projects necessary to create new settlements, including building access roads, financing public buildings, and connecting settlements to the national electricity and water grid. The Jewish Agency, though in general secular, follows the biblical injunction of "redeeming the land," a concept

appropriated by political ZIONISM and transformed into nationalist terms. The state, instead of God, would return the people from exile and restore the relationship between the "Jewish People" and the "Land of Israel." This mandate to develop the country for the Jewish people is carried out by the WZO, the Jewish Agency, and the JNF (Keren Kayemeth le-Yisrael), the third element in the troika of Jewish national institutions that work to keep Israel permanently in Jewish hands through its land-leasing policy. (Until quite recently when "privatization" began to be implemented, even Jews did not "own" land in Israel; they leased it for forty-nine or ninety-nine years, at which time it reverts to the Jewish Agency or the state of Israel. Through the laws and institutions concerned with land, the land is guaranteed for Jewish use in perpetuity.) When the state assumed control of the majority of national land in 1960 (in the form of the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION), it agreed to continue to abide by the Jewish Agency and the JNF's mandate for those lands.

Ninety-three percent of all Israel's land (within the Green Line) is "national" land—that is, for exclusive use by Jews. It is developed, leased, and administered by the Jewish Agency for Israel's national constituency, the Jewish people. The meaning of this Jewish exclusivity for PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, who make up 18–20 percent of the total population, is that they are completely excluded from access to 93 percent of the land of Israel. They cannot lease, sublet, buy, or in any other way make use of the land or anything affixed to the land (for example, they cannot build apartments, homes, educational or economic facilities, or develop new agricultural area). Since 1948 no new Arab settlements, towns, villages, or infrastructure have been established in the Arab areas. Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel are disqualified by virtue of their ethnicity from establishing and developing a town or village or even expanding one that they already own, while the Israeli state has continually confiscated Palestinian land.

The Jewish Agency also facilitates the provision of government services exclusively to the Jewish population. The government, serving a "citizen" constituency, can at any time give the Jewish Agency authority to deliver services to its "national" constituency. In this way, services can be legally withheld from non-Jewish citizens. For example, Ian Lustick relates in his *Arabs in the Jewish State* how a program providing special incentives for large families was administered by the Jewish Agency, instead of by the government, to ensure that only Jews would be motivated to have more children. The rationale was DEMOGRAPHIC in that it is the interest of Israel to increase the Jewish, but not the Arab, population.

See also ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; JEWISH NATIONAL FUND; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Jewish Colonial Trust

The Jewish Colonial Trust (JCT), the first Zionist bank, was founded at the Second WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS and incorporated in London in 1899. Intended to be the financial instrument of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, the purpose of the JCT was to procure capital and credit to obtain a charter for Palestine from the OTTOMAN government. It quickly became clear, however, that the amount of capital raised by the JCT was far from sufficient for this goal; the total was only £395,000 ($1,925,000) of the £8 million ($39 million) needed.

The JCT's main activities in Palestine were carried out by the Anglo-Palestine Bank, which was formed in 1902 as a subsidiary to JCT. With seed capital of £40,000 ($195,000), it opened its first branch in JAFFA in 1903 and quickly made a name for itself as a reliable, trustworthy institution—one that did not consider business transactions and profitability its only goals. In its early years the bank conducted transactions in support of the Zionist enterprise: LAND purchases, imports, obtaining of concessions, and so on. Branches were opened in JERUSALEM, Beirut (then the region's main commercial center), HEBRON, SAFED, HAIFA, TIBERIAS, and GAZA.

The Anglo-Palestine Bank established a network of credit unions in the *moshavot* (loosely organized KIBBUTZ) and gave farmers long-term loans. It also helped with the construction of the first sixty houses in Tel Aviv. When the Zionist enterprise faced severe difficulties during World War I, the bank managed to keep its funds intact, transferring them to safe locations. The Ottoman government, considering the bank an enemy institution because it was registered in Britain, ordered its branches shut and its cash confiscated. While the liquidation of the bank's branches proceeded slowly, business continued surreptitiously. After the war the bank's operations expanded, and branches were established in Palestine. In 1932 the main office of the Anglo-Palestine Bank was moved from Jaffa to Jerusalem. In 1934 the JCT terminated its banking activity and became a holding company for Anglo-Palestine Bank shares only.

During World War II the Anglo-Palestine Bank was able to use its large reserves to finance the developing industries in Palestine that supplied provisions to the British army. When the state of Israel was established, the bank was given the concession to issue new banknotes and to become the government's banker and financial agent. In 1950 the bank's registration was transferred from Britain to Israel, and it was renamed Bank Leumi Le-Israel (National Bank of Israel). When the Bank of Israel was founded as Israel's central bank (1954), Bank Leumi became a commercial bank.

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Jewish Colonization Association

The Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) was founded by Baron de Hirsch (Moritz von Hirsch auf Gereuth), a German-Jewish businessman, in 1891 to facilitate the IMMIGRATION and settlement of poor and oppressed Jews from Eastern Europe to agricultural colonies in North and South America. The organization was also committed to establishing and maintaining educational and training institutions, model farms, loan banks, industries, factories, and any other institutions or associations that would assist the settlement of Jews in the New World.

The first settlements were in Argentina, followed by others in Canada, Brazil, the UNITED STATES, and later Cyprus, Galicia, and elsewhere. In 1896 the JCA began taking an interest in Palestine, and in 1924 a sister organization, the PALESTINE JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION (PJCA), was created by some of Hirsch's associates. BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD used the JCA as a mechanism to support early Jewish colonization in Palestine, and when he was ill in 1899, he turned over the administration and support of his Palestine settlements to the JCA, giving it 15 million francs ($30 million). By 1986 the JCA had participated with the Israeli government and the JEWISH AGENCY in the establishment and consolidation of eighty-seven settlements. The work of the JCA continues to this day, supporting the far-flung communities established decades ago.

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Jewish Defense League

The Jewish Defense League (JDL) was established in the UNITED STATES in 1968 for the declared purpose of protecting Jews by whatever means necessary. The founder, national chairman, and leader of the JDL was MEIR KAHANE, a thirty-eight-year-old ordained rabbi from Brooklyn, New York, who was assassinated in 1990 in New York by an Arab extremist. Rabbi Kahane believed that American Jews were living in a fiercely hostile society and faced many of the same dangers as the Jews in Nazi GERMANY, which led to the creation of the JDL as an extremist and violent organization. Kahane also believed that the major Jewish organizations in the United States had failed to protect America's Jews from ANTI-SEMITISM, which he saw as "exploding" all over the country. "If I have succeeded in instilling fear in you," Rabbi Kahane often said in the closing statement of his standard speech, "I consider this evening a success."

The JDL describes itself as "the most controversial, yet the most effective, of all Jewish organizations." The group has been responsible for publicizing such issues as SOVIET JEWS, Nazi war criminals, anti-Semitism/Jew-hatred, and Jewish self-defense. The JDL's motto, "Never Again," has been used to fuel the group's actions.

Kahane consistently preached an extremist form of Jewish nationalism that included racism and violence, and the JDL engaged in violent activities from its founding through the 1990s, when its activism tapered off somewhat in the United States. In 1994 the JDL defended the massacre of twenty-nine Palestinians at prayer in HEBRON by DR. BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, an American Israeli physician and JDL activist.

In both the United States and Israel the majority of Jews and Jewish organizations condemned and rejected the JDL. In 1973 it established a political party (KACH) in Israel and repeatedly ran for the Knesset but did not win a seat until 1984. After Kahane's assassination in 1990, Kach split into two groups—Kach and KAHANE CHAI—the first led by Baruch Marzel from Hebron, and the second by Meir Kahane's son, BINYAMIN ZE'EV KAHANE, from the settlement of Kfar Tapuach. In 1994 the Israeli government outlawed both organizations, although they continue to have followers among a radical group of settlers in the WEST BANK. The Southern Poverty Law Center, a US anti-hate group, has added the JDL to its list of watched groups. Similarly, the Jewish ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE has a website that chronicles every act of violence perpetrated by the JDL.

In the United States in 2005, the Jewish Defense League was chaired by the prominent Chicago Jewish activist Ian Sigel, East Coast Director Robert Turk, and West Coast Director Jim Nutting. Since 2000, the JDL has been showing a rapid increase in chapters and membership worldwide.

On 12 December 2001, Irv Rubin, international chairman of the JDL since 1985, and Earl Krugel, a member of the organization, were charged with conspiracy to commit acts of TERRORISM. The two were accused of planning attacks on Arab-American congressman Darrell Issa's office and on the King Fahd Mosque in Culver City, California. Rubin proclaimed his innocence, but, after awaiting trial for eleven months, he committed suicide on the morning of his first scheduled trial hearing. On 4 February 2003 Krugel pled guilty to conspiracy and weapons charges stemming from the terrorist plot and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. However, Judge Ronald Lew subsequently ruled that Krugel "broke conditions" of his deal and ordered him to face trial on further charges. If convicted, he faces a sentence of up to fifty-five years. (www.jdl.org).

See also KACH; MEIR KAHANE; KAHANE CHAI

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Jewish Fundamentalism

Based on conservative interpretations of religious dictums and precepts, Jewish fundamentalism is a radical and uncompromising element in Israeli politics and society. It steadfastly opposes any attempts by Israel to withdraw from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES or to accept Palestinian collective rights. Consisting of various groups and factions, Jewish fundamentalism can be seen not only as part of a general trend in Israeli society toward spirituality and religious revival but also as a part of a wider global change in the role and characteristics of faith. Like US Protestant fundamentalism and radical Islamist groups, Jewish fundamentalism relies on its ancient holy texts for values and precepts and is critical of the moral changes of the modern and postmodern ages. Like other fundamentalist activists, Jewish fundamentalists attempt to reconstruct a moral society based on their interpretation of religious truths. And similar to their monotheistic cousins, they are highly politicized, with their main interests relating to ensuring Israel's perpetual control over the Occupied Territories and bringing about a mass migration of Jews to ancient biblical sites, such as JERUSALEM, HEBRON, and NABLUS.

Historical Background, Pre-Israel State

Jewish history has many fundamentalist and messianic movements, which have grown out of the same structure of power and myth that constituted political authority in ancient Israel. Several central biblical motifs are crucial in the fundamentalist worldview, the most important the belief that the Jews are God's chosen and holy people, and are destined to play the central role in a divinely orchestrated redemptive drama. From the time of the early prophets (in the eighth century BCE) to the destruction of the last vestiges of Jewish political autonomy in Persia and Palestine in the first century CE, beliefs in and struggles to achieve God's redemption of his people formed the ideological core of Jewish political life.

This central belief led to numerous attempts to activate the messianic era. The Maccabees (Hasmoneans), who defeated the Syrian-Greek (Seleucid) empire in 165 BCE, declared themselves motivated by faith in the God of Israel and his commandments. Although the Maccabees were not descendants of the House of David and therefore did not declare their own kingdom as messianic, they claimed they were preparing the way for the Messiah and would deliver the kingdom to him when he appeared. In Roman-ruled Judea during the first century CE, the Zealots advocated immediate rebellion against Rome on behalf of a reconstituted Davidic kingdom that would herald the advent of the redemption, and they ruthlessly persecuted other Jews who held more moderate views. In spite of the political issues the Zealots raised, they preached in apocalyptic terms, including the redemption and the Messiah.

Two major revolts against Rome erupted within the space of seventy-five years in Judea—the Great Revolt (66–73 CE) and the Bar Kochba Rebellion (132–135 CE). Each was based on fundamentalist appeals about God's direct commandments to his people regarding Jewish independence in the land of Israel and the integrity of the Temple cult. The first revolt resulted in the destruction of Jerusalem and the Second Temple. The second was led by Simon Bar Kochba, who was declared the Messiah by the leading rabbi of the period, Akiva, who also announced that the redemption had begun. The Bar Kochba Rebellion ended in the deaths of more than a half million Jews, the mass enslavement of survivors, and the elimination of a Jewish majority in Judea.

Subsequently the rabbis adopted an intense and near-unanimous opposition to all apocalyptic, messianic, and redemptionist themes. However, it proved impossible in the context of exilic Judaism to purge the religion of all expectations of the "dawn of redemption." Jewish mysticism, which remained a potent influence, was heavily involved with speculation about the end of the world and revered those charismatic individuals who attempted to hasten redemption through direct communion with God. From 1665 to 1667 a wave of messianic enthusiasm swept over world Jewry. Responding to reports of the Messiah's appearance in Palestine in the person of Shabbatai Zevi, accompanied by "his prophet" Nathan of Gaza, the majority of Jews in virtually all major centers of the Jewish world were persuaded of his legitimacy for a time. Yet whether mystical or Orthodox, all

forms of worship were inextricably linked to contemplation of redemption, which assumed the eventual end of Jewish exile and the rebuilding of the Temple in the land of Israel. The return to Zion was, in fact, the cornerstone of the Jewish messianic ideal.

Ideology and Theology in Contemporary Israel

In light of Jewish history and religious beliefs, it should not be surprising that a movement of messianic fundamentalism has emerged in Israel. Such fundamentalism existed from the early years of the state and before. Contemporary Jewish fundamentalism in Israel relies to a large extent on the writings of RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK HACOHEN KOOK (1865–1935), as interpreted by his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda HaCohen Kook (1891–1982), and taught in the MERCAZ HARAV KOOK YESHIVA in Jerusalem. The students of this yeshiva and their disciples have generated leaders and activists and have provided a theological justification for political action.

Rabbi Kook the elder was the first ASHKENAZI (of European descent) chief rabbi during the BRITISH MANDATE years and founded the still-functioning institution of the chief rabbinate. Although he grew up in ultra-Orthodox circles and never renounced that camp, he became an important spiritual leader of the national religious camp and had good relations with many secular intellectuals. He died before the establishment of the state of Israel, and at the time of his death his teaching had fallen into partial oblivion and his yeshiva had become marginal among the religious institutions of Jerusalem.

One of Rabbi Kook's precepts was that the redemption had already arrived. He believed that ZIONISM was visible proof that God had decided to return the people of Israel to their land. The disciples of Mercaz HaRav added to his ideas by incorporating the 1967 WAR and the 1973 War into the divine historical scheme, interpreting them as stages in the process leading to full national and cosmic redemption. A second principle found in Rabbi Kook's writings is the sacredness of the entire land of Israel, whose BORDERS should be determined through *halakhic* (Jewish religious law) deliberation, rather than historical contingency or diplomatic negotiation. The redemption of the people is inextricably connected to the redemption of the land, with the final goal being the gathering of the entire people of Israel into Greater Israel, living according to precepts of the Torah.

Although Jewish fundamentalist theology holds that the three components of land, people, and Torah are inseparable, the more politicized believers have declared that the struggle over the land takes precedence. Political scientist Ian Lustick has defined and enumerated seven deeply held beliefs that underpin the thinking and behavior of Jewish fundamentalists:

1. *The abnormality of the Jewish people*. This tenet of Jewish eternal uniqueness derives from the covenant God made with the Jews at Mount Sinai—for fundamentalists it is a real historical event with eternal and inescapable consequences for the entire world. The implication of chosenness is that the transcendental imperatives to which Jews must respond effectively nullify the moral laws that bind the behavior of normal nations, and Jews are not required to abide by codes of "justice and righteousness" that bind other peoples. Chosenness equals abnormality.
2. *The meaning of Arab opposition to Israel.* From the fundamentalist view, the conflicts Israel encounters with its neighbors are not normal but involve Israel's eternal battle to overcome the forces of evil. The wars with the Arab states and the conflict with the Palestinians are simply the most recent and most crucial episode in the struggle against absolute evil. Jewish fundamentalists' assumptions about the world make it essentially impossible for them to see Jews and Palestinians in comparable terms. Nor can fundamentalists acknowledge any real tie between the Palestinians, or any human group other than the Jewish people, and the land of Israel. Fundamentalists believe that the Jews are authorized by the living God and creator of the universe as a legitimate, eternal people with unalienable rights to the entire land of Israel. The Palestinians have absolutely no legitimate claim to nationhood or to any part of the country.

   The image of the Palestinians as doomed in their opposition to Jewish rule in the land of Israel corresponds to a yet more fundamental categorization of them. Fundamentalist rabbis and ideologues regularly refer to the local Arabs as "Canaanites" or "Ishmaelites." They weigh the implications of the terms Joshua offered the Canaanites before his conquest of the land, or the circumstances under which Abraham expelled Ishmael, for the determination of policy in current circumstances. Thus

Rav Tzvi Yehuda cited Maimonides to the effect that the Canaanites had three choices—to flee, to accept Jewish rule, or to fight. Moreover, "humane treatment" of Palestinians is appropriate "only for those Arabs ready to accept the sovereignty of the People of Israel." From this general principle comes a duty to make merciless war against Arabs in the land of Israel who reject Jewish sovereignty, which translates into specific requirements such as the rule to deport the families of Arab juveniles who throw stones at the passing automobiles of Jewish settlers.

3. *Israel's international isolation as proof of Jewish chosenness.* Jewish fundamentalists hold a deep-seated belief that almost the only distinction worth making among human groups is that between Jews and Gentiles. Thus, fundamentalists interpret what they consider the extremely irrational opprobrium heaped on Israel by the world community as yet more evidence of the Jewish people's special, divine destiny—"a theological sign of election." Considering this belief, the state of Israel, by attracting "outrage and persecution," merely continues the traditional role of the Jew in world history—that of a "barometer for registering the moral state of the nations."

   The concept of an ontologically based opposition between Jews and Gentiles is so central to fundamentalist thinking that a GUSH EMUNIM ideologue could write: "All the nations of the world well know that the goal of the Arabs is to destroy the people of Israel, God forbid, and nonetheless they take their side. All except the UNITED STATES of America, who stands by the side of Israel; truly this is a miracle from heaven."
4. *The impossibility of arriving at a negotiated peace.* According to fundamentalist thinking, the scale and pervasiveness of Gentile hostility to Israel reflect the underlying spiritual tension that God introduced into the world via his covenant with the Jews and cannot be assuaged through negotiation or compromise. All efforts, no matter how structured or under whose auspices, are bound to fail. This is so because the conflict is not a "normal" one; territorial and political problems are but superficial aspects of the metaphysical struggle being waged. Real peace (*shalom-emet)* will come only when Israel possesses the whole land and the Messiah then comes to rule over the reunited people of Israel. For this reason the fundamentalists vehemently opposed the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty accomplished in the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA IN 2005.
5. *The cardinal importance of the land of Israel.* Jewish fundamentalists are wont to proclaim "the Land of Israel, for the People of Israel, according to the Torah of Israel." The primacy of the land relates to motivation. The Jews' return to Israel must be based on their love of the land of Zion rather than an attempt to find refuge from persecution. In the covenant between God and the Jewish people, the land is holy because God dwells in it and chooses the Jews to dwell with him. Nonfundamentalist Orthodox Jews often criticize what they consider the fundamentalists' tendency toward "idolatry" in their focus on Eretz Yisrael (GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL) as the supreme value in Jewish life. But for all Jewish fundamentalists, an attachment to the entire land of Israel is at the core of their worldview. They believe that while other people may feel an attachment to their homeland, *only* the Jews in fact have a divinely ordained relationship to their land. The entire land of Israel is the promised land to be "conquered, possessed, and settled," and Jews must rely on this promise despite Arab and other Gentile opposition to the land's habitation and rule by Jews. One implication of this belief is that political debates over territorial questions are absurd from the fundamentalist perspective. In this context it is also inappropriate and even dangerous to justify the need to maintain Jewish rule of this or that piece of the land because of security, economic, or DEMOGRAPHIC necessities, because the right to the whole land is not based on such essentially changeable and conditional considerations.
6. *Current history as the unfolding of the redemption process.* A key element in Jewish fundamentalism, as in many fundamentalist movements, is its adherents' belief that they possess special and direct access to transcendental truth, to the future course of events, and to an understanding of what the future requires. For Jewish fundamentalists history is God's means of communication with his people. Political trends and events contain messages that pro-

vide instructions, reprimands, and rewards. Political and historical analysis, properly undertaken, is equivalent to the interpretation of God's will. Together with interpretations of religious texts, this analysis guides the continuing struggle toward redemption.

7. *The faith and ideological dedication of the Jews as decisive factors.* Although they believe that God has the dominant role in shaping human history, Jewish fundamentalists are not fatalists. Their call for sustained political mobilization is based on their view of the Jewish people as God's chosen assistants in the process of *tikkun olam* (repair of the world), which will culminate in complete redemption and establishment of the messianic kingdom. Accordingly, a key belief of the fundamentalists is that the success of efforts to accomplish the political objectives necessary for redemption will be determined by the vision of Jewish leaders, their sensitivity to the imperatives of the hour, and, especially, the single-minded faith and spiritual discipline of the Jewish people as a whole. Virtually all political contacts are therefore construed as tests of the vision, courage, and will of the Jewish people and its leadership.

Emergence of Jewish Fundamentalist Groups

Gush Emunim is not the only fundamentalist group in Israel, but largely because of its actions in the SETTLEMENT movement, it has garnered significant attention. Like other fundamentalist movements, it evolved as a response to crisis both in the wider world (modernity, secularism) and in the national group to which it belongs. Ironically, the crisis addressed by Jewish fundamentalist ideology and the Jewish fundamentalist movement originated with the success of secular Zionism and the establishment of the Jewish state. The drama of national salvation was, to the disappointment and surprise of observant Jews, performed by nonobservers. Between the secular pioneers on the one hand and the ultra-Orthodox on the other, young religious Zionists felt marginalized and second best. They were neither the vanguard of the nation nor the exemplars of religious commitment. Their frustration was fueled by their conviction, based on the teachings and influence of the two Rabbis Kook, that the Zionist project was divinely orchestrated. In the view of the national religious adherents, secular Zionists had ignored the divine basis of the Zionist imperative, while the ultra-Orthodox erred in not seeing the Zionist enterprise as part of the process of divine redemption. The 1967 War, in which Israel triumphed over its Arab neighbors, and the subsequent crisis of the 1973 War gave the fundamentalists the opportunity to correct what they saw as the blindness of other groups in Israeli society.

In his research on the origins of the Gush Emunim, sociologist Gideon Aran focused on the group of young religious Zionists who comprised the GACHELET. In the early years of the state, the group arrived at the Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva, where its members encountered the younger Rabbi Kook. Developing the writings of his father, Kook presented them with an ideology that placed the victorious Zionist project within a religious framework and assigned his followers a privileged position with respect to other groups. This combination of an enthusiastic young group, the message of the yeshiva, and the historical opportunity provided by the two wars helps to explain why the movement emerged in its current form.

Political scientist Ehud Sprinzak points out that in many respects Gush Emunim is not as revolutionary as it may seem, especially not from the perspective of the National Religious camp. In their ideology and religious practice there is little difference between the Gush Emunim believers and the rest of the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP) from which they emerged. Although they founded new settlements in the Occupied Territories, the religious communities within Israel serve as the bases from which the groups leave on their missions and provide logistic aid and moral support. Gush Emunim can be viewed as the tip of the iceberg for the rest of the National Religious camp and the Jewish fundamentalists.

Gush Emunim initially constituted an ideological group within the NRP, but in the wake of the trauma of the 1973 War, ideological differences emerged and the Gush split. The Gush Emunim people—mostly yeshiva graduates, rabbis, and teachers—immediately launched a vigorous information campaign to explain their position. Through *kaffeeklatsches*, meetings in schools and yeshivot, and so on, they carried their campaign to all parts of the country. At the same time they began organizing people to live in the settlements they planned to set up in the WEST BANK. Gush Emunim did not require formal membership, which meant that people could participate in particular activities without any obligation to

support Gush's other activities or broad platform. The absence of formal membership, however, makes it impossible to confirm or refute Gush Emunim's claims regarding the size of its following.

History of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel

Some three weeks before the outbreak of the 1967 War, on the eve of Israeli's Independence Day, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook delivered a sermon in which, according to his disciples, he stated: "Nineteen years ago, on the very night that the decision of the UNITED NATIONS to create the state of Israel was handed down, as the entire people rejoiced, I was unable to join in their happiness. I sat alone—quiet and depressed. In those very first hours I was not able to accept what had been done, that terrible news, that indeed 'my land they have divided' had occurred! Yes, where is our Hebron—have we forgotten it?! And where is our Schechem [Nablus] and our JERICHO, where—will we forget them?! And all of Trans-Jordan—it is all ours, every single clod of earth, each little bit, every part of the land is part of the land of God—is it in our power to surrender even one millimeter of it?!" Later, the words and the timing of their utterance were taken by the fundamentalists as a sign of the coming of the Messiah.

The 1967 Six Day War, in which Israel gained the Sinai Peninsula, the GAZA STRIP, the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights, can be seen as the watershed event that brought Jewish fundamentalism to the fore of Israeli politics. For the fundamentalists the war was a cataclysmic event that opened up the territories for settlement and allowed movement activists to create a public atmosphere that would enable the emergence of a religious-messianic movement. Immediately after the war the idea of Greater Israel was affirmed by a group of mostly secular public figures, including some of Israel's best-known authors and poets, but within the first year after the war, the National Religious camp took the first steps to settle the area of Judea (the West Bank). The "Children of Kfar Etzion" returned to rebuild their village, and a group headed by RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER went to settle in Hebron in the West Bank. Meanwhile, other Jewish settlements that were mainly secular were established with governmental assistance, especially along the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, in the Yamit region in Sinai, and on the Golan Heights, so that strategic areas would remain under Israeli rule after any peace agreements. In the early 1970s the Elon Moreh *gari'in* was organized to settle in the vicinity of Nablus, and the Gush Emunim movement was formally established in 1974, holding its first meeting in Kfar Etzion.

The history of the fundamentalist movement can be roughly divided into six periods, with some overlap. In the formative phase during the LABOR-led government of YITZHAK RABIN (1974–1977), Gush Emunim pursued three types of activity: it protested Israel's interim agreements with EGYPT and SYRIA; it staged demonstrations in the West Bank to underscore the Jewish attachment to Judea and Samaria, part of Eretz Yisrael; and it carried out settlement operations in the Occupied Territories.

Gush Emunim's protest activity began with active support of a hunger strike that leaders of the Greater Israel Movement started on Independence Day in May 1974 outside the prime minister's residence in Jerusalem. There were repeated protests against US secretary of state HENRY KISSINGER, who was shuttling to and from Israel as a peacemaker after the Yom Kippur War. Participation in these demonstrations, which continued sporadically until the fall of 1975, ranged from the scores of people blocking traffic in Jerusalem, thereby obstructing official motorcades, to the thousands who filled Jerusalem's Zion Square and clashed with the police. This activity peaked in October 1974, when a mass rally was held in Tel Aviv's Malkhei Yisrael Square to urge recognition of Judea and Samaria as inseparable parts of the national territory. After the Interim Agreement with Egypt and the end of Kissinger's visits, smaller protest demonstrations opposite the Knesset building or the prime minister's office reminded policymakers that the Gush had not abandoned this avenue of activity.

Additionally, the first phase witnessed strong efforts by the Elon Moreh *gari'in* to establish new settlements. After their eighth attempt the *gari'in* received permission to settle, forming the ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT and that of Kdumim, and another part of the group formed the settlement of Ofra.

The second period began with the change of government in 1977. Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN began his term of office with the declaration "there will be many Elon-Morehs." The Israeli government, however, proceeded to conduct peace talks with Egypt and curtailed the establishment of more settlements in response to international pressure. But Gush Emunim succeeded in privately establishing more settlements and began a process

of institutionalization, setting up a coordinating agency (Amana) in 1977 and in 1980 the YESHA COUNCIL, a body representing the heads of religious councils in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Some of the former leadership figures found formal roles within newly formed local governments, and local leaders began to assume leadership roles in the movement.

The third period began with the struggle against the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, a major blow to imagined future prospects of the West Bank settlements. Subsequently, in 1985 a plan was uncovered to blow up the mosques on the TEMPLE MOUNT by the Jewish Underground (TERROR AGAINST TERROR), a group of settlers that had targeted Palestinians. When its leaders and activists were found to be important members of Gush Emunim, there were heated internal debates and the movement's standing with the Israeli public was jeopardized. Gush Emunim ceased to exist as an organization and was replaced by various settler organizations, some ad hoc and some permanent, but most were fundamentalist in nature. Throughout the period, however, the settlement project gained in power and political influence.

The fourth period began in December 1987 with the first Palestinian INTIFADA, whose most violent events were directed against isolated settlements on the West Bank's hilltops. The settlers retaliated, and numerous violent encounters took place between them and their Palestinian neighbors. While the settlements continued to increase in population, they found themselves under constant physical attack and had to change tactics in order to maintain their momentum.

A fifth period started with the OSLO ACCORDS. Certain areas in the Occupied Territories were handed over to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, and weapons-bearing Palestinian policemen patrolled in close proximity to the settlers, who feared that the new government would evacuate them.

The final period began with the second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000. Although the hallmark of that Intifada is the murderous SUICIDE BOMBINGS in Israeli cities, over 95 percent of the terrorist attacks took place in the Occupied Territories, targeting settlers and the soldiers guarding them. Consequently, settlement growth slowed somewhat, and some secular and less ideological settlements were partially abandoned. An emerging phenomenon is the dramatic appearance of the young second-generation settlers, nicknamed "the youth of the hills," who attempt to settle in OUTPOSTS (*ma'ahazim*) on virgin areas in the territories.

In the wake of the second Intifada the fundamentalist settlers have suffered two major setbacks. To prevent terrorist infiltration into Israeli cities a BARRIER was built, roughly along the pre-1967 borders, although partially within the West Bank. This leaves some of the settlers behind a physical barrier, alongside their hostile Palestinian neighbors, and strongly hints that many of the ideological settlements will not remain in place. Second, in 2005 the Israeli government, headed by ARIEL SHARON, implemented a plan of unilateral disengagement from Gaza, evacuating all Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip as well as four settlements in the northern West Bank.

Attitudes toward the Palestinians

Fundamentalist Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories regard the Palestinians as both a theological challenge and a practical problem. Given their ideology—that they are prepared to engage in an eternal struggle with the Arabs to realize their worldview—it is difficult to imagine that the fundamentalists would compromise with Palestinians or even engage in negotiations that acknowledge collective Palestinian rights to the land. In fact, SETTLER VIOLENCE against the Palestinians, extensively documented by B'TSELEM and other human rights groups, has been a continuous phenomenon from the beginning of the settlement project. Moreover, the fundamentalists have had the open or tacit assistance of Israeli governmental ministries, including all of Israel's law enforcement authorities—the military, the police, the state prosecutor, and the judicial system. As detailed by the KARP COMMISSION, the SHAMGAR COMMISSION, and numerous detailed reports from B'Tselem, the government has had an undeclared policy of absolution, compromise, and mitigation for Israeli citizens who violate the law vis-à-vis Palestinians. Thus the fundamentalists have not only been able to control much of the LAND and WATER resources of the settlement areas, but have also engaged with impunity in egregious acts of intimidation, harassment, and worse against Palestinians.

For the fundamentalists the solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict resides in Israel's annexation of the Occupied (in their terms "liberated") Territories. The Palestinian population would be given residential rights rather than citizenship, and those

who oppose Israeli rule would be evicted. From the fundamentalists' perspective, the Intifadas represent not group feelings of rage or a surge of nationalistic sentiments but rather the work of isolated provocateurs who should be removed from the territories.

Over the years the relations between Palestinians and fundamentalists have been characterized by increasing violence, which seems to be related to the emergence of a new generation of settler-fundamentalists. When Gush Emunim and other fundamentalist groups started out, conflict with the Palestinians was still limited, but for the younger generation the violence has been a real experience and continuous part of life, resulting in intense hostility toward the Palestinians. Also, the younger generation is less attached to the elaborate teaching of Rabbi Kook and Mercaz HaRav and is much more willing to demonstrate their hostility to the Palestinians as well as to express blatantly racist attitudes.

These second-generation fundamentalist settlers have made a strong attempt to assert themselves in the public sphere. For example, the settler youth have formed a group that opposes the Yesha Council, the more established leadership of the fundamentalist settler community. Although many young settlers follow the lead of their parents and attempt to establish new settlements or neighborhoods adjacent to already established settlements, others prefer to act individually and create illegal outposts on hilltops. The rapid growth of outposts is in part connected to new spiritual influences on the young settlers. They incorporate trends taken from Kabbalism and other contemporary examples.

Radicalization of Jewish Fundamentalism

Although Jewish fundamentalism is itself a radicalization of Israeli politics, religion, and positions regarding the Palestinians, the fundamentalist camp has undergone a radical transformation through the years. Alongside the main camp, splinter groups have emerged and have expressed greater urgency, more extremism, increased willingness to engage in direct conflict with Israeli authorities and the public, and far deeper racist attitudes toward the Palestinians than Gush Emunim did. Where Gush Emunim worked for a gradual evolution of Israeli society, new fundamentalist sectors have pushed toward a faster revolution.

The first and most important group to emerge as radical-right opposition to Gush Emunim was the KACH movement, created in the early 1970s and headed by RABBI MEIR KAHANE. The leader of the US-based JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE, he made his reputation in the radical and highly contested struggle to get MOSCOW to allow Jewish emigration. Arriving in Israeli in 1971, he resided in KIRYAT ARBA, which became the stronghold of his new movement. Kahane proposed to implement the religious law (*halakah*) in Israel immediately. Unlike Gush Emunim, which indirectly pressured the Palestinians to leave with unfavorable policies, his trademark was to demand the forced eviction of Palestinians, including Israeli citizens, from the land of Israel. In the Knesset he promoted a law stating that only Jews can be Israeli citizens.

After Kahane was assassinated in New York in 1990, his son, BINYAMIN ZE'EV KAHANE, formed a competing group called KAHANE CHAI (Kahane Lives). Both Kahane Chai and Kach were disqualified from the 1992 Knesset election on the basis of racism, and after BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, a Kach activist, committed the mass murder of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in Hebron, both were declared illegal. Kahane's son was himself killed with his wife by Palestinians near the settlement of Ofra in 2000.

Another radical fundamentalist group that emerged in the 1980s was the Jewish Underground (or Terror Against Terror). The group emerged from Kiryat-Arba, Ofra, and religious settlements in the Golan Heights, and over a period of five years organized various acts of violence against Palestinians. Among these were the booby-trapping of cars of Palestinian mayors and the random shooting spree at the Islamic College of Hebron, but their most radical act was the attempt to blow up the mosques on AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF/Temple Mount. This plan was foiled, and the group was captured in 1986 while attempting to blow up buses containing Palestinian workers. The group's members were brought to trial and received long terms in jail; however, after public protests and demonstrations by their communities, they were released after serving less than five years of their sentence.

Fundamentalist groups are currently dispersed in various settlements in the West Bank. A nucleus of radicals remain in Kiryat Arba and several other settlements that are known for radicalism—Yitzhar and Tapuah in Samaria and Bat Ain in the Etzion Bloc. In the OLD CITY of Jerusalem a variety of groups, including the Temple Institute,

the TEMPLE MOUNT Faithful, and ATARA L' YOSHNA, are involved in plans to build the THIRD TEMPLE on what is now al-Haram ash-Sharif.

New and more radical fundamentalist groups constantly emerge while older groups, such as Gush Emunim, develop new reservations and responses with regard to their goals and situation. Starting with the evacuation from the Yamit settlement in the Sinai after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the fundamentalists have experienced setbacks, which they consider the state's betrayal of its own sacred trust. The Oslo Accords were another crisis, in which Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a fundamentalist student, and so were further agreements with the Palestinian National Authority as well as Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza and evacuation of settlements. These government acts raised basic questions for the fundamentalists: Is the state really sacred? Is the Israeli army sacred after evacuating settlers from their homes? Will the Israeli public eventually see the light, or should more radical measures be taken? By the end of 2008 the conflict between the more radical religious Zionists and the state could lead to further radicalism, including a greater propensity toward violence on the part of the growing fundamentalist movement, especially in the settler community.

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—Michael Feige

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

See American Jewish Organizations; Media, US; US Aid to Israel

Jewish Legion

The Jewish Legion was a military formation of Jewish volunteers in World War I who fought in the British army to liberate Palestine from Turkish rule. When Britain waged war against the Ottoman Turks, Zionists around the world saw it as an opportunity to promote British sympathy for a Jewish national homeland.

In December 1914, revisionist leaders Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky and Joseph Trumpeldor first raised the idea of the formation of a Jewish unit, and by the end of March 1915, 500 Jewish volunteers, originally from Egypt (who had been deported by the Turks), had started training. Before the war ended, five battalions of Jewish volunteers were established for the British army: the 38th through 42nd (Service) Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers. Together they were known as the Jewish Legion.

The British initially opposed the participation of Jewish volunteers on the Palestinian front and ordered Zionist volunteers to serve as a detachment for mule transport in another sector of the Turkish front. Trumpeldor formed the 650-strong Zion Mule Corps, of whom 562 were sent to Gallipoli, where he led his troops with great distinction. Jabotinsky served as an officer and advocated a Jewish Legion on the Palestinian front. In August 1917, Britain announced the formation of a Jewish regiment designated as the 38th Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers.

In April 1918 the 38th was joined by the 39th Battalion, made up almost entirely of Jewish residents of the United States and Canada. In June 1918 the volunteers of the 38th Battalion fought for the liberation of Eretz Yisrael (Palestine) from Turkish rule some twenty miles north of Jerusalem. In the fighting in the Jordan Rift Valley, more than twenty legionnaires were killed, wounded, or captured, and the rest came down with malaria, which caused thirty deaths. In its next mission, crossing the Jordan River, Jabotinsky led the effort, for which he was later decorated.

Ninety-two Turkish Jews who had been captured in earlier fighting were also permitted to enlist and became the 40th Battalion. In late 1919 the Jewish Legion was reduced to one battalion, titled First Judeans, which was awarded a distinctive cap-badge inscribed with a menorah and the Hebrew word *Kadima* (forward). Immediately after the end of World War I in November 1918, almost all the members of the Jewish regiments were discharged. Some of them returned to their respective countries, while others settled in Palestine, hoping to realize their Zionist aspirations, and later used their military training to fight the Palestinians and the British.

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Jewish Lobby

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Jewish National Fund

The Jewish National Fund (JNF, or Keren Kayemeth L'Yisrael) is one of the major ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. It was proposed at the First World ZIONIST CONGRESS in 1897 by Hermann Shapira (1840–1898), a Lithuanian-born scientist and mathematician, as an institution that would purchase LAND in Palestine that could neither be sold nor mortgaged, thus remaining in perpetuity the property of the Jewish people. Land owned by the JNF would be leased only to Jews, initially for forty-nine-year periods (later ninety-nine years). The proposal was adopted at the Fifth World Zionist Congress in 1901, together with two fund-raising tools: blue collection boxes for Jewish homes and the JNF stamp. In 1905 the JNF purchased its first tract of land in Palestine. It was registered in Britain under the British Companies Act, established its headquarters in Cologne (moved to The Hague at the outbreak of World War I), and opened an office in JAFFA in 1908 (moving to JERUSALEM in 1922).

The JNF's engagement in reclaiming the "Land of Israel" for the Jewish people has involved a range of land infrastructure development projects, including reservoir construction (it built 180 dams and reservoirs), river rehabilitation, afforestation (it planted over 240 million trees in Israel), construction of hundreds of miles of roads, development of new towns, and establishment of more than 1,000 parks. However, its most important, and controversial, role has been in the acquisition of land for the exclusive use of Jews.

After its establishment, the JNF immediately began making small land purchases, and by 1920 was able to acquire large tracts, mainly in the Jezreel Valley. Continual land purchases followed, some in urban areas but primarily in agricultural areas. The JNF played a central role in establishing the first modern Jewish city, Tel Aviv, as a suburb of the well-established and ancient Arab city of Jaffa. By 1932 the JNF had acquired 75,000 acres and, by 1938, 125,000 acres. At the time of the UN Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181) in November 1947, the JNF had acquired a total of 936,000 dunums (approximately 232,000 acres); however, this constituted only 3.55 percent of the total land of Palestine. Moreover, together with all other Jewish holdings, the Zionists owned merely 7 percent of Palestine. Nevertheless, the Partition Resolution gave the Zionists 5,500 square miles for a Jewish state (consigning the indigenous majority of Palestinians to a 4,500-square-mile allotment).

As early as the beginning of February 1948, two months prior to the commencement of the takeover of Arab villages, DAVID BEN-GURION told JNF leaders: "The war will give us the land. Concepts of 'ours' and 'not ours' are peace-time concepts only, and they lose their meaning during war." In a similar vein, Ben-Gurion asked YOSEF WEITZ (1890–1970), director of the JNF Lands Department/Development Division and head of the TRANSFER COMMITTEE, whether the JNF was ready to buy "from him" land at £25 a dunum, to which Weitz replied that they would buy if the land was Arab-owned and if they received the deed of property and possession. Of course, Ben-Gurion could not provide such deeds. On 13 May 1948, just before the state of Israel was declared, Ben-Gurion offered to "sell" a massive 2 million dunums of land to the JNF for £0.5 per dunum. He was, in fact, trying to sell land his forces did not yet occupy to raise money for arms.

As the Israeli conquest of Palestine proceeded and its inhabitants were expelled or fled the hostilities, more Palestinian land became available to the JNF. On 19 August 1948 the JNF formally asked to lease 193,500 dunums (47,000 acres) of "abandoned" land from the Ministry of Agriculture. In November 1948, it leased 154,000 dunum (38,000 acres) for one year from the Ministry of Agriculture. The JNF then sublet the land to new Jewish settlements. Weitz continued to press for expanded JNF control over refugee property. He wanted legal JNF ownership of the land, not merely leases. He was anxious to open up the lands for Jewish immigrants and expressed his impatience shortly after the JNF acquired its first refugee land from the state in 1949: "Of the entire area of the State of Israel only about 300,000–400,000 dunums [74,000–99,000 acres] . . . are state domain which the Israeli government took over from the mandatory regime. The JNF and private Jewish owners possess under

two million dunums [494,000 acres]. Almost all the rest belongs at law to Arab owners, many of whom have left the country. The fate of these Arabs will be settled when the terms of the peace treaties between Israel and her Arab neighbors are finally drawn up. The JNF, however, cannot wait until then to obtain the land it requires for its pressing needs [settlement of new immigrants]. It is, therefore, acquiring part of the land abandoned by the Arab owners, through the government of Israel, the sovereign authority in Israel."

Following passage of UN RESOLUTION 194 of 11 December 1948, which endorsed the refugees' right of return, and in the context of Israel's completion of the Occupation of the most fertile and most populated areas of Palestine, the JNF was seen by the government as the mechanism by which land that was previously owned by Arabs could be "legally" purchased by Jews from the state. Accordingly, the government began to sell absentee lands left behind by their Arab owners to the JNF. Ben-Gurion told Weitz and Ezra Danin (1903–1985, also of the Transfer Committee) on 18 December 1948 that "the JNF would buy land only from the State. There was no need to buy land from Arabs." Ben-Gurion perhaps entertained the hope that the Palestinians would sell their land; however, there is no evidence to support that. The refugees assumed that they would return to their homes and land after the hostilities concluded.

On 27 January 1949, one month after Ben-Gurion told Weitz not to buy land directly from Palestinians, the government and the JNF concluded a major deal by which the JNF would "purchase" 1 million dunums (247,000 acres) of refugee land for $44 million (£11 million Israeli), although the actual price, payable in installments, would be determined by a joint state-JNF committee and would vary according to location and type of land. In addition, the JNF agreed to pay an additional $29 million (£7,250,000 Israeli) to the state and the JEWISH AGENCY to assist in settling immigrants on the land. The JNF insisted that the land be legally transferred to it within one year of signing the contract in order to ensure the JNF right of ownership.

Of this massive real estate transaction, the largest such transaction ever carried out in Israel, Meron Benvenisti commented, "the uprooted Palestinians including tens of thousands of 'PRESENT ABSENTEE' citizens, did not get a single agora for their land that was given to the JNF, while the government of Israel was compensated in their stead in a deal that was illegal even according to the heads of the JNF." This was followed later by additional sales of some 250,000 dunums (62,000 acres). Indeed, after independence, it was the confiscated land of the refugees and the "present absentees"—seized by the Israeli state government—that the JNF purchased from the government.

In 1954 more than a third of Israel's population lived on property that had belonged to Arab refugees or to "present absentees" (some 30,000 Palestinian Arabs with Israeli citizenship whose property was confiscated because they had fled to other places in Israel during the war). Though Arabs account for some 18–20 percent of Israel's population, they own only 3 percent of the land. The real problem posed by the JNF is that in acting as caretaker of the land for the Jewish people only in a period of protracted national conflict, it was bound, whatever the intention, to be discriminatory. However, it seems that most Jews did not ask the question: from whom was the land "redeemed"? The JNF published a survey in 2005 showing that over 70 percent of the Israeli-Jewish public opposed allocating JNF land to non-Jews (over 80 percent preferred that Israel be defined as the state of the Jewish people and not the state of all its citizens).

In 1960 the JNF and the Israeli government negotiated a covenant that provided for the establishment of two separate bodies. The first was a government land authority headed by the minister of agriculture—the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION (ILA)—that would manage all state and JNF lands (by then about 13 percent of the total) and follow a unified policy that ensured perpetual ownership of the land and its use by Jews only. The second was a land DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, which was to be in charge of land reclamation, afforestation, and certain other forms of land development. This agreement was based on the BASIC LAW: Israel Lands (19 July 1960). By 2006, about half of the total JNF land had once belonged to Palestinian refugees, having been seized without compensation.

According to the Israel Lands Law the JNF appoints 49 percent of the council members (the government appoints 51 percent) of the ILA, which controls 93 percent of the land in Israel and grants leases rather than selling land. Much of this land is "STATE LAND" that was either acquired from Palestinians dispossessed during the 1948 WAR or confiscated from Palestinian citizens of Israel.

Following the 1967 WAR and Israel's OCCUPATION of the Golan Heights, the WEST BANK, the

GAZA STRIP, the Sinai, and East JERUSALEM, the JNF undertook unprecedented land reclamations in coordination with the Jewish Agency in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. It acquired massive amounts of land, which were designated "state land" and therefore reserved for Jewish use only, as well as the major WATER resources in the occupied areas.

Of the JNF's role in the Occupied Territories, Israeli writer and editor Dan Leon reported the following: "The JNF claims that it does not operate over the 'green line' [the 1967 border] but the JNF subsidiary Himnuta, as an instrument for the implementation of JNF policies, makes no such claim. Himnuta was established by the JNF in 1938 and registered in Ramallah in 1971. Its original function in the 1930s was mainly to circumvent legal restrictions on land dealings, so there is a degree of continuity in its current endeavors. As a private rather than a public company it enjoys the advantage that its activities are not properly supervised. Hence it can avoid most public exposure.

"When the public eye is turned upon Himnuta, it appears, for example, under the headline 'Ring suspected of trading in stolen Palestinian land' in *Ha'aretz.* We read that Haim Cohen, the former director of Himnuta, and four others, were suspected of 'purchasing stolen Palestinian lands in exchange for bribes . . . police suspect that the ring was responsible for at least five deals in which West Bank lands were stolen from their Palestinian owners and sold to Himnuta for a total of more than NIS 20 million. Nineteen lawyers were said to be involved in the fraud. The stolen lands are located near HEBRON, Gush Etzion, JERICHO, [MA'ALE] ADUMIM and Givat Ze'ev. All these areas are located in the occupied West Bank, or in formerly Palestinian-owned Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem, settled since 1967.' Apart from the criminal aspects, the major issue is the involvement of the JNF with its 'Jews-only' policies in the Occupied Territories."

Leon continues, "It is also known that in 1972 the JNF paid half the cost of a highway through the West Bank linking Jerusalem with the upper JORDAN [RIFT] VALLEY. JNF Director Shimon Ben Shemesh said on *Israel Radio* on 23 September 97 that during the past year the JNF had purchased lands in the territories for the sum of over US$66 million, including lands in the Nebi Samuel area, huge tracts in the area between Ramallah and Latrun. Another report spoke of JNF land deals in the northern part of the Jordan Valley, southeast of NABLUS, near KIRYAT ARBA, south of Ramallah, east of Kafr Qasim, and in Gush Etzion.

"The JNF itself sometimes inadvertently lets the cat out of the bag in connection with the Occupied Territories. For instance in a reference in the official 2003 JNF website we read that the 1967 Six Day War 'started a fresh page in the history of Israel and the JNF was enlisted to develop new areas for settlement.' In addition to areas within the green line, one of the areas developed for settlement was none other than Rafah [in the Gaza Strip, then occupied by Israel]. In general, since, as we have noted, such activities in the territories are not publicized and do not appear in JNF reports, the random examples quoted here, which somehow manage to escape the secrecy, may well be only the tip of the iceberg. At any rate, all this is summed up in the statement by Amiram Barkat in *Ha'aretz* of 28 February 2005 that 'Himnuta has made extensive purchases in the territories, where the JNF does not operate.'"

Other controversial JNF programs are its efforts to build up Jewish communities in the most densely populated Palestinian areas—the Galilee and the Negev. All Israeli Palestinians have suffered from ZIONISM's discriminatory policies but perhaps none more than the Negev BEDOUIN. According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 110,000 Bedouin live in the Negev (plus 50,000 in the Galilee and 10,000 in the central region of Israel). Prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, there were an estimated 65,000–90,000 Bedouin living in the Negev. Like other Palestinian Arabs, their land and water resources have been taken by the state. Today roughly half of Israel's Bedouin population lives in seven government-built townships/reserves, where they were essentially forcibly relocated after losing their grazing lands and means of livelihood. The other half of the Negev Bedouin population continues to live in forty-five "UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES," some of which predate the existence of Israel. These villages do not appear on any commercial maps and are denied basic services like water, electricity, schools, access roads, clinics, or sewage systems. It is forbidden by the Israeli authorities for the residents of these villages to build permanent structures, though many do, risking fines and home demolition.

Nevertheless, in 2006 the JNF signed a forty-nine-year lease agreement with the state of Israel that gives it control over 30,000 hectares (74,132 acres) of Negev land for development of

forests. More recently the JNF has undertaken a $600 million project entitled "Blueprint Negev," which aims to attract and build infrastructure for 250,000 new Jewish settlers. There is no recognition on the JNF website of the existence or rights of the Palestinians in these unrecognized villages. (http://www.jnf.org).

See also BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL; ISRAEL'S NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL; LAND; WAR, 1948; WATER

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Jewish People Policy Planning Institute

The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute was established in JERUSALEM in late 2002 by the JEWISH AGENCY, which was concerned about the "Jewish demographic emergency"—the higher birthrate among Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES than among Jewish Israelis. The DEMOGRAPHIC concerns also included the decline in IMMIGRATION to Israel, increasing assimilation of Jews in their countries of origin, increasing intermarriage, increasingly secular identities among Jews, and similar trends. Although based in Jerusalem, the institute operates worldwide. Former US ambassador DENNIS ROSS, who played a major negotiating role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict especially during the Oslo years (1994–2000), heads the organization as chairman of the board of directors. The institute functions as

a subsidiary of the Jewish Agency, which owns 50 percent of its shares. (www.jpppi.org.il).

See also DEMOGRAPHY; DIASPORA, JEWISH, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ISRAEL

Jewish Quarter Development Company

The Jewish Quarter Development Company (JQDC) is a state-owned firm that owns most of the property in the Jewish Quarter of the OLD CITY and funnels government money to settler groups active in acquiring Palestinian properties in and around other sectors of JERUSALEM—especially in Palestinian neighborhoods. For example, in 1987 the redevelopment company transferred NIS 4.215 million ($1.7 million) to four major Jerusalem settler groups—ATERET COHANIM, ATARA L'YOSHNA, Magaleh Orot, and ELAD. The money came from a Housing Ministry fund totaling some NIS 7.2 million ($3 million) that is earmarked for acquiring Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem.

In 2002, the Jewish Quarter Development Company decided to rebuild the Hurva synagogue and entrusted Israeli architect Nahum Meltzer with producing a nearly exact replica of it. The synagogue dates back to the year 1701, when a group of newly arrived Polish Hasidic Jews led by Rabbi Yehuda ha-Hasid began constructing a new house of worship for their small congregation. Two decades later, the building was still unfinished when the congregation ran out of money and was expelled from the city by local Arab creditors, who proceeded to tear down the incomplete structure. The ruined remnants of the building stood, untouched, for a century, giving the synagogue its name—Hurva, Hebrew for "ruin." Then, in a project that began in 1836, disciples of the Vilna Gaon rebuilt the synagogue. For the next eighty years, the domed, neo-Byzantine synagogue dominated the skyline of the Jewish Quarter. But its architectural reign came to an end in 1948, when the Jordanian army destroyed the Hurva during the 1948 WAR. However, with Israel's victory over JORDAN in the 1967 WAR, the Hurva's remnants once again fell into Israeli hands.

Gavriel Rosenfeld, associate professor of history at Fairfield University, has noted that the decision to rebuild the Hurva reflects a variety of motives. One is the desire of the JQDC to complete its forty-year project of renovating the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. From 1967 through the 1980s, the pace of redevelopment in the long-neglected district was slow. But the construction of apartments, shops, and restaurants (and a corresponding rise in real estate values and tourism) in recent years has enhanced the quarter's status to the point where the Hurva's ruins appeared anomalous.

Political motives have also played a role. Ever since the late 1960s, the proponents of reconstructing the Hurva have seen the project as a way of increasing the comparatively small Jewish architectural presence in the Old City and symbolically asserting sovereignty over the city more broadly. The rebuilt synagogue is slated to tower over the DOME OF THE ROCK.

The project has adherents and detractors within Israel. Some say that rebuilding the Hurva will obscure traces of eternal Jewish victimization. As long as the Hurva stood as a hulking ruin, it served the same kind of function as sites such as Masada and Yad Vashem—which, by highlighting the tragedies of the Jewish past, helped to confirm the Israeli state as the chief guarantor of the Jewish people's future.

At the same time, however, it seems the Hurva's existence as a ruin conflicted with the state of Israel's Zionist master narrative: the idea that ultimately, heroic achievement triumphs over helplessness. In fact, in the end it may be the project's ability to confirm the national desire to control its own destiny that best explains its appeal. It might be questioned, though, how its transformation into an icon of redemption from one of victimization will be read within the context of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. Skeptical observers will likely argue that the Hurva's restoration may impede peace by functioning as an aggressive symbol of Israel's commitment to maintaining a permanently united Jerusalem.

The Jewish Quarter Development Company reports the following on the progress of the synagogue: "[In 2007] the frame of the Hurva was completed when the cement dome of the structure was poured. As of November 2008 the Jerusalem stone covering of the frame is almost done. Next the JQDC needs to reach an agreement on the planning for the interior of the building . . . at least 2 years to go until the synagogue is anywhere near completion."

See also JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

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Jewish Resistance Movement

With the end of World War II in 1945, the JEWISH AGENCY organized the Jewish Resistance Movement (JRM), which was composed of the military organizations HAGANA, PALMAH, ETZEL, and LEHI, to fight Great Britain in the hope of forcing it out of Palestine.

The JRM's first operation occurred in October 1945, when a Palmah unit attacked the Atlit internment camp and freed 208 illegal Jewish immigrants whom the British had arrested. In November 1945 the JRM launched a major attack on railroads all over Palestine and sank several British coastal patrol launches. In the following months the movement carried out attacks on British police posts, coast guard stations, radar installations, and airfields. In June 1946 it blew up the bridges linking Palestine with neighboring states.

The British authorities reacted on 29 June 1946 (Black Saturday) by arresting the members of the Jewish Agency Executive and undertook a large-scale operation against the Hagana, including the arrest of 3,000 of its members. In searches of the offices of the Jewish Agency, the HISTADRUT (the labor federation), and twenty-seven SETTLEMENTS, British officials discovered a large arms cache at Kibbutz Yagur. The British detained "important" prisoners and women at the Latrun camp and more than 2,000 other militants were held in camps at Rafah.

In response to the British operation the Jewish Agency ordered a halt to armed attacks against the British, but ETZEL and LEHI refused to comply. In July 1946, ETZEL blew up the central government offices at the KING DAVID HOTEL in Jerusalem, killing eighty people, including government officials and civilians, Britons, Jews, and Arabs. After this operation, condemned explicitly by the Jewish Agency and the Hagana, the JRM ceased to exist, although the resistance continued.

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Jewish Underground, 1980s

See TERROR AGAINST TERROR

Jibril, Ahmad (1938–)

Ahmad Jibril, a Palestinian guerrilla leader, was the founder and head of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE—GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC). He was from Yazur, a town near JAFFA, and with his family was dispossessed during the 1948 WAR, fleeing Palestine and settling in SYRIA. After Jibril graduated from Britain's royal military academy in Sandhurst, he became a Syrian army cadet and then an officer, rising to the rank of captain in the Syrian army. However, he was expelled from the army for opposing the 1958 union between Syria and EGYPT.

In 1966 Jibril established the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT and until the 1967 WAR carried out a number of military operations against Israel under its banner. In December 1967 he joined the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

(PFLP) and held operational leadership while its founder, GEORGE HABASH, was imprisoned. However, he disagreed with the PFLP's Marxist turn, and only a year later left the PFLP and formed the PFLP-GC. The PFLP-GC undertook numerous ruthless military operations, and Jibril argued consistently that Israel must be continually subjected to the type of force (airplane hijackings and similar violent attacks) used by some factions within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION in the 1970s and 1980s.

The PFLP-GC never had a large mass following, especially not in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and by the 1990s the group was engaged in very few guerrilla actions. Jibril, however, was among the group of Palestinian "rejectionists" who disagreed with Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT's decision to pursue peace negotiations with Israel and a two-state solution. His eldest son, Muhammad Jihad Jibril, was killed on 20 May 2002 in Beirut, Lebanon, by a car bomb attack that Ahmad Jibril blamed on Israel.

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Jiryis, Sabri (1938–)

Sabri Jiryis is a Palestinian lawyer, scholar, and activist. Born in Fassuta in the Galilee, he obtained a law degree from the Hebrew University in JERUSALEM and practiced law in Israel. He became a leading figure in the AL-ARD movement—a pan-Arabist, noncommunist vehicle for Palestinian political activism—and beginning in 1958 helped to edit its newspaper, *al-Ard*. Israel considered the movement subversive and outlawed it in 1964, although by that time, Jiryis had been placed under house and town arrest several times. In 1966, he published in Hebrew his highly acclaimed *Arabs in Israel*, still read today.

During the 1967 WAR, Israel arrested Jiryis, and when he was released, he joined the FATAH party and assumed responsibility for its operations in northern Israel. When Jiryis was arrested again in 1970, his French publishers intervened and facilitated his release after three months. At that point he left Israel for LEBANON and became active in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). In 1973 Jiryis began to work for the Palestine Research Center in Beirut, serving as head of its Israel section, and by 1978 he was the center's director-general, a position he held even after the 1982 LEBANON WAR, when the center moved to Cyprus.

In 1976–1977 Jiryis, together with the Fatah leader ISAM SARTAWI, was involved in a series of contacts with Israeli leftists associated with the ISRAELI COUNCIL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE. In 1976 both the American Friends Service Committee and the US Jewish peace group Breira invited Jiryis to come to the UNITED STATES and address their constituencies. The US government, however, denied him a visa.

After the OSLO ACCORDS, Israeli authorities gave permission for the Palestine Research Center's archives to be moved back to Palestine, and in 1995 Sabri Jiryis and his files came home. The files went to Arafat's new government, the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY in the GAZA STRIP, but Jiryis himself, though a supporter of the PLO-Israel peace accord, returned to his village in the Galilee, and Israel quietly restored his citizenship. He now appears as a commentator on Israeli television, appealing for a confederation of Israel, Palestine, and JORDAN. He has warned that Israel's peacemaking with neighboring Arab states will not end the dilemma of PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL. "The only real solution to our problem is for the Zionist component of Israel's identity to become less important. . . . Otherwise, Israel's Arabs will remain second-class citizens, non-Jews in a country that defines its essence as a Jewish state."

See also ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Johnson, Lyndon Baines (1908–1973)

Lyndon Johnson was the thirty-sixth president of the UNITED STATES, serving from 1963 to 1969. He assumed the presidency after the 22 November 1963 assassination of President JOHN F. KENNEDY. After serving six terms in the House of Representatives beginning in 1937, Johnson was elected to the Senate in 1948. In 1953 he became the youngest minority leader in Senate history. In the 1960 presidential campaign, Johnson ran on Kennedy's ticket and was elected vice president.

Johnson was the first openly pro-Israel president, strongly advocating the "STRATEGIC ASSET" idea, sending Israel large amounts of sophisticated military technology; greatly increasing economic aid; supporting its preemptive attack against EGYPT, JORDAN, and SYRIA in the 1967 WAR; backing it at the United Nations; and covering up its attack on the *LIBERTY,* a US military ship. Despite the 1964 emergence of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and several years of Palestinian commando activities, Johnson ignored the Palestinians during his tenure, even the REFUGEE issue, which preceding presidents had addressed. The one issue on which Johnson could have demonstrated some concern for the Palestinians, the Joseph Johnson Plan, he shelved. He deeply opposed Arab nationalism and NASIRISM, attempted to stop MOSCOW from selling weapons to the Arab states, and supported only those Arab states—especially Jordan and Lebanon—deemed friendly to the United States.

During his many years in the House and Senate Johnson had been a strong supporter of Israel, and he came to the presidency imbued with sentimental admiration for the state. Additionally, he was surrounded in office and in his private life by individuals who had intense commitments to Israel, including National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg, Special Counsel Harry McPherson, speechwriter John Roche, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow, his brother Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, and presidential aide Ben Wattenberg. In his private life one of Johnson's closest informal advisers was Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, a warm friend of Israel. Two of Johnson's closest outside advisers were Abraham Feinberg and Arthur B. Krim, both strong supporters of Israel. Johnson routinely consulted Feinberg, who was president of the American Bank and Trust Company of New York and a vocal supporter of increased aid to Israel, on Middle East policy. At various times Feinberg owned the Coca-Cola franchise in Israel and was a part owner of the Jerusalem Hilton Hotel. When his bank fell into trouble in the 1970s and two of its officers were convicted of misappropriating funds, the Israeli bank Leumi, in a generous act of reverse aid, purchased the American Bank and Trust Company. Krim, whose attachment to Israel was intense, was president of United Artists Corporation of Hollywood, a New York attorney, and a major Democratic fund-raiser. He served as chairman of the Democratic National Party Finance Committee and chairman of the President's Club of New York, the most important source of Johnson's campaign funds.

The US policy of providing Israel with the most advanced weapons in the US arsenal began with a decision by Johnson on 9 October 1968 that was incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act of that year. In the largest single arms deal with Israel to that point, the United States sent Israel fifty Phantom jets plus 100 Skyhawk jet attack aircraft and other equipment, at a cost of $285 million. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke explained the importance of the sale in a discussion with Israeli ambassador to the United States YITZHAK RABIN: "We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving Israel more directly in the security of the United States."

The Johnson administration also moved closer to Israel on the issue of JERUSALEM. Although the United States continued to withhold recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, it ceased putting pressure on other countries that wished to establish their diplomatic missions there. During the Johnson years, aid to Israel

climbed steadily. In 1964 total economic and military aid was $37 million, in 1965 $61.7 million, in 1966 $126.8 million, in 1967 $31.1 million, and in 1968 $76.9 million. In the 1967 War there were numerous, though unproven, allegations that the US Air Force flew aerial reconnaissance for Israel. On the other hand, the US was conducting reconnaissance of Israel from the *Liberty* in international waters off the Sinai coast when Israel torpedoed the ship and then strafed it, killing thirty-four and wounding 171 others. The Johnson administration decided to cover up the fact that the perpetrator was Israel and that the attack was intentional.

Johnson's pro-Israel policies became institutionalized in US politics, and every administration since has provided more assets to the Jewish state.

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Johnson Plan

See JOHN F. KENNEDY

Johnston Plan (1956)


During the early 1950s, Middle Eastern states competed bitterly over the scarce WATER resources of the region. As the issue became increasingly contentious, fear grew in the West that if left unresolved, the struggle for water held the potential for another Arab-Israeli war. Thus the US government moved toward deeper involvement with the issue. On 16 October 1953 President DWIGHT EISENHOWER appointed Eric Johnston as a special ambassador to mediate a comprehensive plan for the regional development of the Jordan River system, which runs along the borders of Israel, the WEST BANK, JORDAN, and SYRIA, with tributaries in LEBANON. Based on the philosophy of the Marshall Plan in Europe, it sought to reduce the conflict potential of the region by promoting cooperation and economic stability. In particular, it sought to resolve the Palestinian REFUGEE situation by making more land arable and thus available for settlement and development within the Arab states.

There had been many plans for water-sharing in the post-1948 period, though none had been successful. But Johnston considered them bargaining stages in the negotiations over the sharing of the Jordan River system. The main bargaining issues pertained to (1) the water quotas for the riparian states, (2) the use of Lake Tiberias as a storage facility, (3) the use of Jordan waters for out-of-basin areas, (4) the use of the Litani River as part of the system, and (5) the nature of international supervision and guarantees. Allocation of water quotas was by far the most difficult issue, and the disparity between the opening demands was considerable.

The base plan for Johnston's mission was a study sponsored by the UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA) and prepared by Charles T. Main, under the supervision of the US Tennessee Valley Authority, with the backing of the US State Department.

The plan featured:

- A dam on the Hasbani River (Lebanon) to provide power and irrigate the Galilee area
- Dams on the Dan and Baniyas rivers (Golan Heights) to irrigate Galilee
- Drainage of the Huleh swamps



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Map 27. The Johnston Plan

- A dam at Maqarin (Jordan) with 175 million cubic meters of storage capacity that would be used for power generation
- A dam at Addassiyah to divert water to Lake Tiberias and into the east Ghor area (Jordan)
- A small dam at the outlet of Lake Tiberias to increase the lake's storage capacity
- Gravity-flow canals down the east and west sides of the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY to irrigate the area between the Yarmouk River and the Dead Sea
- Control works and canals to utilize perennial flows from the *wadis* (riverbeds)

The Main Plan favored primary in-basin use of the Jordan waters and ruled out integration of the Litani. Provisional quotas gave Israel 394 million cubic meters, Jordan 774 million cubic meters, and Syria 45 million cubic meters.

Israel countered with its own seven-year plan, whose main features included the integration of the Litani, the use of Lake Tiberias as the main storage facility, and out-of-basin use of the Jordan waters and the Mediterranean–Dead Sea canal. Since water flow was based on the combined Jordan-Litani output of 2,500 million cubic meters, Israel sought an initial quota of 810 million cubic meters. Israel's proposals were elaborated from an earlier plan prepared for it by Josep Cotton in 1954. The combined annual Litani-Jordan water resources were estimated at 2,345.7 million cubic meters. Israel was to receive 1,290 million cubic meters per year. The Arab share of 1,055.7 million cubic meters per year was to be divided by allocating 575 million cubic meters to Jordan, 450.7 million cubic meters to Lebanon, and 30 million cubic meters to Syria.

The Arabs responded to the main "base plan" with the Arab Plan of 1954, which reaffirmed the principles from other earlier plans for exclusive in-basin use of the water, rejected storage in Lake Tiberias, and rejected integration of the Litani. Because 77 percent of the water of the Jordan water system originated in the Arab countries, it objected to the quota allocations proposed in the Main Plan. According to the Arab proposal, Israel was to get 200 million cubic meters per year, Jordan 861 million cubic meters, and Syria 132 million cubic meters. The Arab Plan recognized Lebanon as a riparian of the Jordan River system and allocated it 35 million cubic meters per year.

As negotiations progressed, disagreements were gradually reduced. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and downgraded its quota demand to 550 million cubic meters per year, and the Arabs dropped their objection to out-of-basin use of water however, they rejected use of Lake Tiberias as a reservoir for Yarmouk water. An alternative Arab proposal to treat Lake Tiberias (without diversion of the Yarmouk) as a regional storage center to benefit all riparians was rejected by Israel. Significantly, the Arabs demanded and Israel refused international supervision over withdrawals of water.

After extremely hard bargaining the so-called Gardiner Formula was adopted as the final version of the "Unified (Johnston) Plan." Compared to the Main Plan figures, the Johnston Plan quotas are significantly different only with regard to Syria and Lebanon. Jordan's share was slightly scaled down, and Israel was to receive the variable residue after other quotas had been met; most estimates place this average residue at 400 million cubic meters per year.

The Unified Plan stipulated that supervision would be exercised by a three-member Neutral Engineering Board. The board's mandate included the supervision of water withdrawal, record keeping, and preserving the spirit and letter of the agreement.

The Unified Plan was accepted by the technical committees from both Israel and the ARAB LEAGUE; however, the Israeli cabinet discussed the plan in July 1955 without taking a vote—a decision that constituted a de facto refusal. The Arab Experts Committee approved the plan in September 1955 and referred it for final approval to the Arab League Council. The council decided on 11 October 1955 not to ratify the plan. According to most observers, including Johnston himself, the Arab nonadoption of the plan was not total rejection; while they failed to approve it politically, they were determined to adhere to the technical details. The issue of impartial monitoring was not resolved, which made for problems in the future—most importantly Israel's National Water Carrier project.

After in effect rejecting the Johnston Plan, in 1953, Israel launched a massive diversion project on a nine-mile channel midway between the Huleh Marshes and Lake Tiberias in the central Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The plan was to divert enough water to help irrigate the coastal Sharon Plain and eventually the Negev desert. Syria claimed that would dry up 12,000 acres of Syrian land. The UNTSO chief of staff, Major General Vagn Bennike of Denmark, noted that the project was denying water to two Palestinian water mills and thus to several villages, was drying up Palestinian

farmland, and was of substantial military benefit to Israel against Syria. For a time, the United States cut off aid to Israel because of the project. The Israeli response was to increase work, albeit under extremely secret conditions. UN Security Council Resolution 100 (S/3122 27 October 1953) asked Israel to stop work pending an investigation. Israel finally desisted—temporarily.

In late 1956, Israel quietly resumed work on its National Water Carrier but avoided the DMZs, and thereby US objections. It diverted water directly from Lake Tiberias, sending it to irrigate the northern section of the Negev desert. It did this without consulting Syria and Jordan, riparian states with the right of consultation on usage of joint waters.

The precedent was set, and the Arab states felt free to develop their own schemes. In August 1956, Jordan began work, without consulting Israel, on the East Ghor canal to siphon water from the Yarmouk River before it joined the Jordan. There was a major difference between the Israeli National Water Carrier and the Jordanian plan: the Jordanian plan returned the water within the Jordan River complex while the Israeli plan removed the water to the Negev, thus depriving Syria and Jordan of their share.

On 17 January 1964, Arab leaders gathered in Cairo for their first summit and in their final communiqué called the National Water Carrier an "aggressive plan to divert the course of the River Jordan, thereby grievously endangering the riparian rights of the Arabs." The Arabs, however, had no significant military force, and the Israelis completed the project on 28 May 1964.

In retaliation for Israeli projects, the Arabs vowed to draw water from the Baniyas in Syria and send the water east through Syria and Jordan to south of Lake Tiberias. They began digging in February 1964, but the Israelis then destroyed their bulldozers with artillery fire. In the summer of 1966, Syria tried to resume work. On 14 July Israeli planes bombed the equipment and the engineering works, permanently destroying the Syrian project.

Near the end of 1964, Israel laid claim to the River Dan, the largest of the headwater rivers of the Jordan; a reservoir; and all the springs in the area. Syria claimed several of the springs and part of the reservoir and pointed out that the road Israel had built to patrol the area intruded on Syrian territory. From then on the region devolved in ever-accelerating acts of violence, culminating in Israel launching a preemptive war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in June 1967. Water, of course, was not the only issue in the 1967 War.

See also John F. Kennedy; United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; Water

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Joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration, 2001

The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration was the result of a meeting in early July 2001 in which Israeli and Palestinian intellectuals, under the leadership of Palestinian YASIR 'ABD RABBU and Israeli YOSSI BEILIN, drafted a statement made public on 25 July 2001 that said "No to Bloodshed, No to Occupation. Yes to Negotiations, Yes to Peace." The declaration, the first joint Israeli-Palestinian document after the start of the 2000 AL-AQSA INTIFADA, addressed many core issues of a future peace agreement and called for specific measures aimed at ending the violence and resuming negotiations.

The document declared: "In spite of everything we still believe in the humanity of the other side, that we have a partner for peace and that a negotiated solution to the conflict between our peoples is possible. . . . The way forward lies in international legitimacy and the implementation of UNSCR [UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION] 242 AND 338 leading to a TWO-STATE SOLUTION based on the 1967 borders, Israel and Palestine living side-by-side with their respective capitals in JERUSALEM. Solutions can be found to all outstanding issues that should be fair and just to both sides and should not undermine the sovereignty of the Palestinian and Israeli states as determined by their respective citizens, and embodying the aspirations to statehood of both peoples, Jewish and Palestinian. This solution should build on the progress made between November 1999 and January 2001."

Initial signatories to the declaration included about thirty intellectuals and prominent political activists from each side. Among the Israeli signatories were Haim (Jumes) Oron, DAVID GROSSMAN, Galia Golan, Avishai Margalit, AMOS OZ, and A. B. YEHOSHUA. Among the Palestinians were HANAN ASHRAWI, SARI NUSEIBEH, Gabi Baramki, Salim Tamari, Mahdi Abdul-Hadi, and Sama'an Khoury.

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For a transcript of the document see *Le Monde diplomatique*. www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/procheorient/peacedeclaration.

Jordan

The Kingdom of Jordan has long had an intimate relationship with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even before either of today's states of Jordan or Israel existed. Jordan's approach to the conflict and its participation in the search for a resolution to the Palestinian question have always been grounded in Jordan's self-interests: maintaining the HASHEMITE monarchy, ensuring the regime's ability to preserve domestic security and promote economic development and modernization, and navigating the shoals of inter-Arab politics on Jordan's terms. Although a peace treaty signed with Israel in 1994 has ostensibly put Jordan on the periphery of the conflict, the country remains deeply affected by and a central player in the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian politics.

After World War I, Transjordan was part of the BRITISH MANDATE of Palestine given by the League of Nations. In 1921 the British gave semi-autonomous control of Transjordan to the Hashemite family, in the person of the emir Abdullah Ibn Husayn al-Hashem. Early that year Abdullah, the second son of the grand Sharif of Mecca, Husayn Ibn Ali, first established a presence in Amman while en route to SYRIA, where he intended to lead an army to expel French forces from Damascus, reinstate his younger brother Faysal as king of Syria, and secure the kingdom of IRAQ for himself. Britain, however, opposed his plans and instead offered to recognize Abdullah's rule in Transjordan if Abdullah accepted the British mandate over Transjordan. Abdullah consented on the condition that any national home created for the Jews in accordance with Britain's BALFOUR DECLARATION would not include Transjordan. The British tacitly agreed and in 1923 recognized Transjordan as an autonomous emirate under Abdullah's authority, thereby beginning its separation from the Palestine mandate. In return for a secure throne, Abdullah remained financially and militarily dependent upon the British to protect his reign from external and internal challenges. However, his ambitions to rule larger parts of the Arab world, in particular Damascus, did not diminish. The British, for their part, continually debated Abdullah's usefulness to them. On the one hand, he checked ANTI-ZIONIST and anti-French activities and served as a bulwark against Wahhabi expansionism led by Ibn Saud. On the other hand, the British viewed Abdullah as a potentially divisive figure in the region, especially because he

increasingly challenged the leadership of AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, the British-installed grand mufti of Jerusalem. For the British, Transjordan's place in Zionist ambitions also remained ambiguous. Britain's agreement with Abdullah clearly excluded the possibility of Jewish settlement in Transjordan, though some in Britain held out hope that this condition could be reversed.

During the British Mandate, Zionists in Palestine sought to engage Abdullah under the belief that Transjordan was an integral part of Palestine and therefore potentially part of any Jewish national home. Although early attempts to foster economic cooperation between Transjordan and Jewish firms amounted to little, British efforts to limit Jewish IMMIGRATION to Palestine in the aftermath of the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES intensified Zionist interest in gaining land rights inside Transjordan. The JEWISH AGENCY targeted large landowners in the country, hoping that they would pressure the Transjordanian government to permit land acquisitions. When their efforts were repeatedly rebuffed, Zionists turned their attention toward enticing Abdullah himself to intercede on their behalf with the British. In the 1930s, reports that Abdullah had granted the Jewish Agency an option to buy land in Ghawr al-Kibd produced great distrust of the emir within the Arab world. Nonetheless, by that time, Zionists and Abdullah shared important interests: both chafed under British authority, both sought changes in the regional status quo, and both increasingly came into conflict with Amin al-Husayni.

For Abdullah, a combination of pragmatism and ambition motivated his contacts with Zionists. On the one hand, he felt that Jewish interests in the region, as expressed in the Balfour Declaration, could not be denied entirely. Some of Abdullah's initiatives toward Jewish leaders, such as his efforts to convince them to limit immigration to Palestine voluntarily, were motivated by his desire to make himself an indispensable mediator between Britain and Palestine. Though this goal was often undermined by the suspicions that his negotiations aroused among both the Palestinians and the British, his contacts with Zionists also kept alive Abdullah's larger territorial leadership quest—one that amounted to ruling an expansive Arab kingdom. He counseled the Jews that they would have difficulty reaching any satisfactory accord with Palestine Arabs, so it would be to their advantage to strike a deal with him that would allow Jews to live freely in an Arab state under his rule.

Abdullah's Ambitions Thwarted

The idea of a "Semitic kingdom" encompassing both Palestine and Transjordan, in which Jews and Arabs could live as relative equals under Abdullah as hereditary monarch, was never acceptable to Zionists and was resented by many in the Arab world, who regarded Abdullah as usurping the prerogatives of the Palestinian leaders. Similarly, many in Britain harbored serious misgivings about merging the Arab part of Palestine with Transjordan, as called for in Britain's 1937 PEEL COMMISSION report, because this support for Abdullah would antagonize other Arab states and undermine support for the entire concept of partition—dividing the mandate area into Arab and Jewish areas. As momentum for partition waned, Britain's 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER proposed as an alternative to partition a unified state in Palestine for Arabs and Jews, with limited Jewish immigration. Abdullah again offered his support and promised not to pursue independence for Transjordan during the war years as a concession to the British. But Abdullah did not give up his dreams of territorial expansion, hoping in vain that the British would reward his loyalty by making him ruler of greater SYRIA. However, Britain's priority at the time was to find common cause with Arab nationalism, which was at odds with Abdullah's aspirations in Syria. At the same time, Abdullah maintained contact with the Jewish Agency, hoping to get Zionist support for his goals in Syria, but without success. Instead, as articulated in the 1942 BILTMORE PROGRAM, Zionists chose to pursue a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine.

The end of World War II brought a new intensity to Transjordan's involvement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though Britain had dashed Abdullah's hopes vis-à-vis Syria, it felt compelled to reward his loyalty. Thus, in spite of objections from Zionists, Transjordan in 1946 was granted independence, which, combined with Britain's imminent divestiture of the Palestinian mandate (after the November 1947 Partition Resolution—UN RESOLUTION 181), led the Jewish Agency back to Abdullah. In secret meetings held in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, representatives of each party agreed to the partition, and Abdullah was expected to deploy the Arab Legion to ensure that the Arab portions of Palestine were peacefully absorbed

into Transjordan. Both considered this an efficacious way to avoid what neither Abdullah nor the Zionists wanted to see: al-Amin al-Husayni in control of an independent Palestinian state in Palestine. The extent and ultimate meaning of these arrangements and the core of Abdullah's long-standing contacts with Zionists still remain a topic of intense scholarly debate. For political purposes, Abdullah continued to disparage the idea of partition publicly. Although disagreement with partition was only beginning to coalesce inside Transjordan itself, there was significant opposition within surrounding Arab communities, where Arab leaders suspected that Abdullah was using the UN plan with British help to further his own territorial ambitions at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs. Moreover, although Britain no longer opposed the idea that Transjordan would absorb the Arab areas of Palestine, London expected the Arab Legion not to engage Jewish forces in the process.

According to historian Philip Robins, the aftermath of the 1948 massacre at DEIR YASSIN, where Zionist militias murdered some 250 Palestinians (more recent research puts the figure at a little over 100), and the waves of Palestinians entering Transjordan seeking its help led Abdullah to seize the initiative. He appealed to the ARAB LEAGUE (composed of Arab states) to allow him to take charge of the military operations in Palestine. At the same time, he continued to push Zionists for a federation. In a secret meeting between Jordan and Zionist leaders in late 1947, GOLDA MEIR, acting head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, firmly rejected the federation proposal and placed in doubt the entire postmandate set of understandings. Moreover, each Arab country announced it would fight in Palestine using its own command structure and take responsibility for administering whatever territory it controlled. Abdullah would be only a nominal supreme commander of the Arab effort. With Abdullah's hope of peacefully assuming control of partitioned Palestinian territory now in serious question, his agreements with London that ensured the continued existence of Transjordan were imperiled.

Role in the 1948 War

Transjordan's role in the 1948 WAR initially centered on JERUSALEM. Upon peacefully occupying several parts of the WEST BANK, the Arab Legion engaged Israeli forces in Jerusalem after the Israelis entered the city, which the Partition Resolution designated to remain independent of either Arab or Jewish control. Arab Legion forces managed to take control of significant pieces of territory in and around Jerusalem before a truce with Israel was declared. However, the fighting was costly to Transjordan, both in men and finances, and Palestinian REFUGEES were entering Jordan in growing numbers. Moreover, a proposal by UN mediator COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE to allow Transjordan to annex Arab Palestine and form a union between Transjordan and Israel was rejected by both Israel and the Arab League. While Abdullah pursued diplomacy in the Arab world to extend the truce and prevent renewed hostilities with Israel, members of his armed forces pushed to reengage and fight for the liberation of Palestine. The failure of the UNITED NATIONS to broker a cease-fire ensured that the Arab Legion was drawn into further fighting, but it relinquished control of RAMLA and LYDDA—two major Palestinian cities—at the start of the second round of fighting in July 1948. This resulted in widespread criticism that implied the Arab Legion and Abdullah were working against the interests of the Palestinian Arabs and in concert with the Israelis, who had immediately assumed control of the cities.

The loss of Lydda and Ramla was damaging for Transjordan for additional reasons. The Arab Legion had been commanded by British general John Bagot Glubb, who had ordered Transjordanian forces to abandon Lydda and Ramla without a fight, and as soon as they were in Israeli hands, British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin called for a renewed truce. Thus, throughout the Arab world Transjordan and the Arab Legion were blamed for the failure to save Palestine. The stream of Palestinian refugees to Transjordan continued unabated, and in their wake came domestic unrest. The creation of an ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT in Gaza in September 1948, led by al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and under the apparent influence of the Egyptian government, further constrained Abdullah. Tensions between EGYPT and Transjordan mounted, and when fighting erupted again in October 1948 and Israeli forces pushed Egypt from positions it held in southern Palestine, Cairo claimed that its forces were defeated because Transjordan had abandoned nearby positions of support.

Meanwhile, during the months of fighting, contacts between Transjordan and Israel had persisted, first in London during summer 1948 and

later in Jerusalem, with Israel searching for acceptable terms to forge reconciliation. In a secret meeting in December, Abdullah defined his position: Arab Palestine and Transjordan should be united, Lydda and Ramla should be returned to Jordanian control, and the Arab sector of Jerusalem should remain with the Arabs while the Jews would stay in the Jewish half. In addition, the status of the Palestinian refugees and of JAFFA, the Galilee, and the Negev would be open to negotiation. Abdullah's proposal came with a warning to the Israelis: "unacceptable results" would "bring trouble from our political enemies on the Arab side worse than you can imagine." Through the early months of 1949 and even after Egypt reached an ARMISTICE AGREEMENT with Israel, both public and secret talks between Abdullah and the Israelis continued without much progress. The conflict between Egypt and Transjordan and Israel's success at wresting the Negev from Cairo undermined a great deal of Abdullah's leverage. By the end of the talks in March 1949, Israel had used a combination of military threats, acquisition of more territory around Tulkarm and JENIN, and diplomatic maneuvers to undermine Transjordan's claims with Britain and the UNITED STATES, which then withdrew support from Abdullah's position. Announcement of the armistice terms at Rhodes in April sparked rioting in the West Bank, as Palestinians charged that Abdullah cared more about obtaining an agreement with Israel than about protecting Arab territorial claims. Meanwhile, the Americans and British accused Abdullah's negotiators of sloppiness and incompetence and blamed them for Transjordan's unfavorable outcome.

Even though Britain had permitted the Arab Legion to enter Arab Palestine to secure it for Transjordan and had consented to a union between Transjordan and Palestine, the Arab Legion paid a high price to control far less territory than Abdullah had imagined, and his state lacked the diplomatic recognition already extended to Israel by the world's new great powers: the United States and the USSR. West Bank Palestinians under Transjordan's control regarded King Abdullah as despotic and untrustworthy. Jordan itself contained some 100,000 Palestinian refugees, with over 400,000 more refugees residing in the West Bank. In the preliminary stages of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, accusations of self-interest and betrayal cast a shadow over Transjordan's conduct, which persisted for some time.

Control of the West Bank

Once Transjordan had obtained the West Bank, its main tasks were to exercise effective sovereignty and establish legitimacy with its populations. That meant creating a dynamic in which the Palestinian population of the territories would come to welcome rule from Amman rather than regard it as an undesired inevitability. To confront these challenges, Abdullah responded with both stylistic and substantive initiatives. The name of the country was changed to Jordan, implying that both West and East banks belonged to one sovereign state. Jordan offered Palestinians citizenship in Jordan, appointed Palestinian ministers to its royal cabinet, and relaxed customs and trade restrictions to foster economic integration between the two banks. Abdullah granted economic favors to notable West Bank families who, he hoped, would tacitly support the Hashemite agenda of integrating the two banks on the monarchy's terms. Though state coffers were depleted, the government also provided aid to the refugees, but the money dispensed paled in comparison with the needs. Politically, too, Abdullah undertook maneuvers. In the 1950 elections he took steps to unify the East and West banks by dividing parliamentary seats equally between the two regions and making investments in the populations of both banks. Nonetheless, although the West Bank had twice the population of the East Bank, the representation of the East Bankers outweighed that of the West, thereby institutionalizing East Bank dominance over Palestinians, which would come to define Jordan's political and economic systems. In the end, Abdullah's efforts to begin the "Jordanization" of the West Bank failed almost as soon as they began.

Many West Bank Palestinians accepted the union offered by Amman because they had few viable alternatives coming out of the 1948–1949 period. But assenting to Jordanian rule did not imply an allegiance to the Jordanian state. Although Palestinians under Abdullah's rule were typically better educated than native East Bankers, many found it difficult to fit into the government-subsidized economic system Jordan was fostering. Taking on another million people not only tripled Jordan's population, but also altered the nature of the territory Abdullah sought to remake. There were now two Palestinians for every Jordanian citizen of the state. Because its needs were so much greater than its resources, Jordan's economic prospects were gloomy. The range of political

debate, particularly with regard to the monarchy versus Palestinian nationalism, had also widened markedly and ensured a continuing undercurrent of discontent between Palestinians and Jordanians. The discord bred by Abdullah's efforts to "Jordanize" the Palestinians played out dramatically in 1952, when a lone gunman assassinated Abdullah after prayers at the AL-AQSA MOSQUE in Jerusalem.

Throughout the 1950s the state was strained by the conflict's legacy. Squalid refugee camps run by the UNITED NATIONS Relief and Works Agency produced a sense of frustration and betrayal among many Palestinians after the war. Other Palestinians sought power in the new Jordanian state, thereby challenging the emerging dominance of the East Bankers and creating structural tensions. As political challenges emerged in the late 1950s to the successor of the hereditary monarchy, King Husayn used the threat to the stability of Jordan as a justification for marginalizing Palestinian political power and creating a system of political rule that rewarded loyalty to the throne. Experiments with political pluralism inside Jordan came to an abrupt end.

Emergence of the PLO

Jordan's evolving relationships with the Arab world during the 1950s were shaped by the country's place in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Of particular note was the ongoing tension with Egypt, in which hostilities deepened when Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR attempted to undermine Husayn's stature in Jordan in order to pursue Egyptian socialism and pan-Arab nationalism. By the mid-1960s the Palestinian issue again dominated Jordanian politics, both domestically and regionally. Like his grandfather Abdullah, King Husayn pursued secret meetings with the Israelis to reach some understanding that would stabilize Jordan's place in the region, but his initial bids bore little fruit. More profoundly, however, Egypt's move in the Arab League summit of 1964 to create the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) had an immense and immediate impact on Jordan. The new PLO leader, AHMAD SHUQAYRI, demanded that the PLO have the right to tax Palestinians in Jordan, to form a liberation army, and to disperse troops to border villages in Jordan. Husayn rejected all of these demands as steps that could undermine Jordan's border security with Israel and encroach on the sovereignty of the Jordanian state. Moreover, the creation of the PLO, along with the expanding profile of armed guerrilla groups such as FATAH and the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), signaled a growing Palestinian nationalism, which state leaders in the Arab world sought to control and harness for their own purposes. All of these changes undermined Jordanian efforts to unify the East and West banks. At the same time, resurgent Palestinian nationalism helped spawn a renewal of Jordanian nationalism that had been born some forty years before.

Though Husayn found ways to temporarily paper over differences with Shuqayri and the PLO, by mid-1966 tensions again spilled into the open, prompting the PLO and Syria to threaten to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy as a precursor to liberating Palestine. Once Nasir joined in the rhetoric directed at undermining Husayn's regime, Jordan began to press its claims to speak authoritatively for the political interests of Palestinians in the region. When Israel attacked the West Bank village of as-Sammu in November 1966 and killed many Jordanian troops and civilians in the process, the weak Jordanian military response called into question the state's commitment to protect and promote the Palestinian cause. Ensuing riots in the West Bank that called for Husayn to abdicate in favor of a PLO government shifted his perspective on the conflict significantly. He was now convinced that Israel was an expansionist power in the region that sought his political demise in order to claim the West Bank for itself. Because clandestine political discussions with Israel had done little to safeguard Husayn's position, he chose to move Jordan closer to Egypt, signing a joint defense agreement with Cairo in May 1967 and reconciling with the PLO leadership. This, in turn, fueled Israeli fears of Arab encirclement and helped set in motion the dynamics for the 1967 WAR.

By virtually all measures the 1967 War was devastating for Jordan. Territorially, Israel occupied the West Bank, unified Jerusalem, and sent some 300,000 more refugees into Jordan. Economically, the war did great damage, stripping the country of valuable agricultural land and industrial and tourism resources. The war left Jordan politically and economically vulnerable and compelled Husayn again to pursue policies designed to secure the Jordanian state. The military dominance displayed by Israel convinced Husayn that the Arabs could not defeat Israel militarily and that a

renewed secret dialogue to stabilize Jordan's relationship with Tel Aviv was vital. Jordan publicly signaled its acceptance of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which enshrined the principle of peace in exchange for occupied territory.

The renewed vigor of the Palestinian resistance after the 1967 War posed more challenges for Jordan and Husayn. Increasingly larger segments of the Palestinian community inside and outside the West Bank came to believe that relying on the Arab states to fulfill Palestinian aspirations was unwise and unrealistic, and the reconstituted PLO, now controlled by YASIR ARAFAT and Fatah, gave added voice to these sentiments. Such ideas found wide support among Palestinians in Jordan, causing Jordan to monitor Palestinian affairs closely, and mutual suspicion between Husayn and the PLO leadership grew. Tensions rose in 1968 with the confrontation at Karameh, where Jordanian forces joined Palestinian guerrillas in facing an Israeli incursion. Israel successfully crushed the Palestinian guerrillas, but the combined Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas inflicted enough casualties on the Israelis to make it a painful victory. For the Palestinians Karameh became an important turning point in their struggle with Israel. In its aftermath recruits increasingly gravitated toward the PLO, whose supporters in Amman and elsewhere in Jordan openly defied Jordanian authority. For their part many Jordanians resented that Palestinian versions of the Karameh battle played down Jordanian participation, while Palestinian defiance gradually escalated to open disdain of Jordan. Nonetheless, the political impact of Karameh domestically and throughout the Arab world made it more difficult for Husayn to confront the Palestinian resistance movement openly. As he continued to pursue secret contacts with the Israelis to explore possibilities of accommodation, tensions further escalated.

Escalation of Tensions with Palestinians

By late 1968, signs were emerging that open confrontation was imminent. Although the PLO pledged to avoid actions that could undermine Jordanian sovereignty, clashes between Israeli troops and Palestinian commandos based in Jordan undercut that promise. In addition, although most in the PLO had no intention of taking control of Jordan, confrontations between Jordanian troops and Palestinian guerrillas were becoming more numerous, and some within the Jordanian armed forces were pressing Husayn for a comprehensive crackdown. Simultaneously, the initial development of Palestinian institutions was beginning to create the elements of a state within Jordan. Although Husayn and the Fatah-Arafat-led PLO sought to prevent open confrontation, other resistance groups, most notably the PFLP, increasingly regarded Husayn's pursuit of accommodation with Israel as grounds for challenging the Hashemite monarchy. Throughout the middle of 1970, PFLP forces repeatedly challenged Husayn's rule, culminating in the hijacking of four Western-owned airliners, three of which were blown up on Jordanian runways after the passengers were allowed to leave. Husayn's response, known as BLACK SEPTEMBER, drew all Palestinian military and civilian groups into a series of battles that lasted nine days and completely crushed all resistance groups in the country. Only a hastily arranged summit in Cairo stemmed the bloodshed; ultimately the fighting killed some 20,000 Palestinians and approximately 1,000 Jordanians. Although several Arab regimes condemned Husayn's military campaign against the Palestinian resistance, Jordan was not censured in the next Arab League summit, and little effort was made to constrain Jordan's continued crackdown against the PLO presence in the country. Despite their public rhetoric, all the Arab governments, including that of al-Nasir, tacitly approved the crackdown, viewing radical Palestinian nationalism as a threat to regional stability. The effects of Black September, however, left many West Bank Palestinians deeply embittered over Jordan's conduct and its subsequent expulsion of all remnants of the Palestinian resistance to LEBANON.

After Black September, PLO forces were gradually evacuated from Jordan, leaving Irbid in March 1971 and Amman the following month. The last Palestinian units were defeated around Jerash and the Ajlun hills in July. The encounter had left deep wounds in both communities, as evidenced by the assassination of Jordanian prime minister Wasfi al-Tal in November 1971. It was now essential for Jordan to reestablish a stable relationship between the Palestinian and Jordanian populations inside the country. Within the Palestinian community in Jordan, refugees from the 1948–1949 fighting were more committed to remaining in Jordan than were refugees from the 1967 War, who regarded Jordan as a temporary and hostile refuge. Among Jordanians, too, some elements believed

that Palestinians from both the West and East banks should return to a liberated Palestine, leaving Jordan for the Jordanians, while others advocated that the two banks be reunified and regarded the PLO as leading the Palestinians in pursuit of a contrary agenda. King Husayn clearly fell into this latter camp, and his desire to restore authority over the West Bank put him at odds not only with most of the recent wave of Palestinian refugees but with many Jordanian nationalists as well. Politically Husayn's Jordan remained relatively isolated in the region after Black September, as Arab popular opinion clearly sympathized with the Palestinians, even though Arab governing elites supported the king's moves.

Husayn's attempts to bridge these gaps emerged in the plans for a United Arab Kingdom that he began to articulate in 1972. According to this plan, the East and West banks would be reunified, but each would be granted autonomous status as provinces under the king's more flexible leadership. In taking such a step, Husayn attempted to accommodate the Palestinians' growing national consciousness by providing autonomous federal structures. However, the plan failed to consider the growing strength of the PLO and the Palestinian nationalism it represented. Nor did it adequately address the Israelis, who under the ALLON PLAN were offering Husayn a truncated part of the West Bank to lure Jordan into peace talks. As a result Husayn's moves were largely ignored. In addition, Syria and Egypt excluded Husayn from their plan to wage war against Israel in 1973. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, in particular, suspected that Husayn's periodic secret diplomacy with Israel might warn Tel Aviv of the plan to attack. Once the fighting was under way, Damascus and Cairo pressured Jordan to join the war, but Jordan remained largely removed from the events.

After the 1973 War the "battle over representation" was in full swing, as the Arab states debated who constituted the legitimate voice of Palestinian interests in any postwar negotiations. There had long been questions about Jordan's capacity to speak on behalf of the Palestinians in the region, especially after the creation of the PLO in 1964, and these doubts had grown substantially after Black September. Protecting his role as spokesman for the majority of Jordan's Palestinian population remained a key priority for Husayn, who argued that although the PLO had the duty to speak for Palestinians in Lebanon and other Arab states, Jordan represented Palestinian interests in Jordan and the West Bank. The result of the 1973 Algiers summit of Arab leaders, who took up this question, was ambiguous. Although a resolution stated that the PLO was the sole representative voice of the Palestinians, several Arab leaders appeared reluctant to accept publicly that the decision included all Palestinians, in light of Husayn's stance.

By the 1974 Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco, Jordan had no choice but to relent. Although Husayn made an impassioned plea that Israel's refusal to engage the PLO diplomatically gave Jordan the better chance of retrieving the West Bank, Arab leaders sided with Arafat's claim that PLO representation of the Palestinians would compel Israel and the United States to confront the conflict directly or risk diplomatic isolation. The defeat was all but complete for Husayn, whose only tangible victory was a statement implying that Jordan still spoke for the Palestinians on the East Bank. Although the prevailing regional dynamic was moving toward separate Palestinian and Jordanian states, Husayn continued to hope that reunification of the West and East banks under Jordanian sovereignty was possible.

Realignment after Camp David

US diplomacy initiated by the JIMMY CARTER administration severely complicated such calculations, particularly given Sadat's willingness to engage the Israelis at the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, an initiative rejected by most in the Arab world. Suddenly Jordan became the object of attention for all sides. For Sadat and the United States, King Husayn's participation would broaden the process and undermine efforts to isolate Egypt in the Arab world. For the Arab states implacably opposed to Sadat's gambit, keeping Husayn in the fold was necessary to maintain a united opposition to the peace process. The primary Arab opponents—Iraq, Syria, SAUDI ARABIA, and the PLO—offered Jordan a range of political and economic inducements to stay on the sidelines, including economic aid and authority to distribute money in the West Bank, thereby underscoring that it shared a place with the PLO in representing Palestinian interests. As it became clear to Husayn that the US-led process would not result in the international conference that Jordan sought, and after the United States failed to offer Jordan sufficient assurances of the final outcome of the talks with Israel, Husayn joined Arab

leaders in the 1978 Baghdad summit that began the isolation of Egypt. Jordan's decision to forgo participation in the Camp David process had wide-ranging implications for the state. Most notably, it was drawn closer to Iraq politically and economically, and Baghdad became a major source of aid. During this period, Husayn continued to hope for a reunification of the West and East banks, but for the time being he would rely upon Arab diplomatic moves to pursue his goal.

The early 1980s brought a great deal of Arab diplomatic activity devoted to the conflict with Israel, much of it in response to continued US intervention (both military and political) in the region. After Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR, the United States advanced a proposal (the REAGAN PLAN) that declared its opposition to both an independent Palestinian state and permanent Israeli control of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and instead proposed to give the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip political autonomy in association with Jordan. Jordan responded favorably to the US initiative and sought to ensure that a moderate PLO leadership emerged from the siege of Beirut to pursue the US offer. Although Jordan's first attempt at engaging the PLO under Arafat in 1982 foundered, shifting regional developments and Jordan's decision to reconvene its parliament (with 50 percent of its delegates drawn from the West Bank) created new opportunities for a Jordan-PLO dialogue to reemerge. On 11 February 1985 Arafat and Husayn signed a joint agreement proposing the confederation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan and resolution of the Palestinian issue in accordance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338 at an international conference, in which the PLO and Jordan would be represented by a joint delegation.

Within a year, however, Husayn's coordination with the PLO came to an end—this time permanently. Ostensibly the breakdown centered on the PLO's failure to accept explicitly the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 242, because the United States refused to commit to an independent Palestinian state. Yet the talks were ultimately ended by Jordan's failure to obtain all the necessary commitments to ensure the country's complex interests regarding the Palestinian issue. In particular, changes in the internal politics of the PLO made constituencies in the West Bank and Gaza more important in Palestinian politics, and this shift was drawing Jordan and the PLO closer. But the inability to channel these changes into a clear dynamic left Husayn exposed politically and willing to restore back-channel negotiations with Israeli leader SHIMON PERES. The result, in spring 1987, was the LONDON AGREEMENT, in which Israel and Jordan sought to realize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" through a comprehensive settlement to be negotiated at an international conference that would include a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This attempt was scuttled by both internal Israeli politics and Jordan's inability to obtain the assurances it needed to go forward. Soon all of this diplomacy was overtaken by the spontaneous rebellion of young Palestinians to the Israeli OCCUPATION of the West Bank and Gaza.

The scope and intensity of the First INTIFADA, which erupted in December 1987, shook the region noticeably and compelled further recalculations of the situation. For Jordan the recalculation was fundamental: renunciation of the Hashemite monarchy's claims to the West Bank. To some within the Jordanian regime, the move was vital in order to pursue political and economic reform in Jordan proper. Others speculated that the PLO would eventually fail to meet its responsibilities and Palestinians would again look to Jordan for help and leadership. Regardless of the analyses, the consequences were clear: the PLO now had proprietary rights over the West Bank, thereby providing the Palestinians de facto sovereignty over the territory.

Opportunities from the Gulf War

The aftermath of Iraq's August 1990 invasion of KUWAIT started another series of developments that further redefined Jordan's role in Israeli-Palestinian affairs. The invasion and subsequent war to evict Iraq from Kuwait caused severe economic problems when 350,000 Jordanian expatriate workers, mostly Palestinian, were driven back to Jordan. The loss of their remittance revenues hurt financially, and the burdens of accommodating their return grew quickly. Jordan was trapped by the war—its economic dependence on oil from and trade with Iraq made it impossible for it to turn on Baghdad, but its reluctance to do so alienated Amman from the United States and aroused suspicions within Israel. Yet the end of the war to evict Iraq from Kuwait created opportunities for Jordan to mend fences with Israel and Washington, with the start of the process to pursue Israeli-Arab political settlement at the MADRID CONFERENCE.

Although the conference's plans called for Jordan and Palestinians unaffiliated with the PLO to negotiate jointly with Israel, the delegation soon split into two separate sets of bilateral negotiations, coupled with multilateral talks. Although the Israeli-Palestinian talks stalled, negotiations between Jordan and Israel focused on developing bilateral terms of peace that had long been under discussion. When it was announced that a framework for peace had been negotiated secretly between Israel and the PLO in Oslo, a surprised and agitated Jordan moved quickly and quietly to solidify its own accord with Israel. Husayn concluded that the move was politically safe because it came after the PLO initiative, and he was determined not to be left exposed by any Israel-PLO treaty.

The terms of the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement, signed in October 1994, ended the state of war between the two states, established a full and formal peace with discernable borders (though the borders with the West Bank were not formalized), acknowledged Jordan's role regarding the Muslim shrines in Jerusalem, and outlined the future expectations of relations over a host of bilateral issues, including WATER sharing, tourism, trade, agriculture, and information exchanges. None of the treaty's clauses stipulated any coordination with the Palestinians, and only marginal concern was shown for their interests. The stated expectation of King Husayn was that peace would attract investment and revenue to Jordan, which had long been blocked by its conflict with Israel. The treaty did help ease economic difficulties resulting from the Iraq war, primarily by rehabilitating Jordan's relations with the United States, which directed significant aid and debt relief toward Jordan over the coming years. In combination with Oslo's creation of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) government, the Israel-Jordan treaty also ended, in the monarchy's view, any Israeli claims that Jordan was Palestine and therefore the rightful place for Palestinians currently in the Occupied Territories. Internationally, King Husayn was given credit for the accord, thereby linking opposition to it with opposition to the monarchy inside Jordan, effectively heading off domestic protest within the country.

Given the speedy and largely secretive dynamic behind the Israeli-Jordanian accord, however, the treaty became controversial in many political quarters of Jordan, where some derisively called it "the King's peace." Along with the gradual but perceptible narrowing of political reform in Jordan (which Husayn used to gain approval for the treaty from a largely sympathetic parliament engineered through changes to Jordan's electoral law in 1993), Jordan's peace with Israel became the target of latent and occasionally explicit opposition in the kingdom. The "anti-normalization" movement, which at first included leftist and Islamic opponents of the government as well as many of Jordan's professional associations, believed the king had wrongly abandoned Arab coordination of peace efforts in response to US and Israeli pressure. They argued that Husayn had shunted the responsibility for the Palestinian refugee issue to future undefined multilateral talks, failed to reclaim all of Jordan's lost land and water rights, and used domestic opposition to the treaty as justification for further curbing the political rights of Jordanian citizens. Sympathy for this movement's view was relatively contained until the economic expectations of peace failed to materialize. Frustration grew significantly in 1996 when Israeli attacks against the PNA and HIZBULLAH positions in Lebanon became more frequent and Israeli political pressure on Arafat increased. The prevailing fear in Jordan was that peace treaties were not enough to stem the dynamics of confrontation. This fear seemed justified after a Jordanian soldier killed seven Israeli schoolgirls and Israel botched the assassination of a HAMAS official in the streets of Amman. Even for the many Jordanians who sympathized with the Israeli victims of the soldier's shooting spree, King Husayn's offer of personal condolences to the individual Israeli families contrasted unfavorably with the lack of official concern historically shown for Arab victims. Conversely, the regime's relatively mild public response to the attempted assassination of a Palestinian leader on the streets of Amman underscored its failure to understand the public's outrage over Israel's actions on Jordanian territory.

Although King Husayn intervened from his sickbed in 1998 to help the United States forge a limited agreement between Israel and the PNA at WYE RIVER, Jordan gradually became less directly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process after its own accord was completed. In reality, since 1994 both Jordan and the Palestinians finally possessed their own territorial entities, however contested they remained. For Jordan the

central challenge is to create a working relationship with the PNA while addressing the outstanding issues that remain central to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including BORDERS with the West Bank, the status of refugees, Jerusalem, and water rights.

With the transition from Husayn to his son Abdullah II, Jordan increasingly focused on pursuing internal economic development while offering rhetorical support for the Palestinians. The end of day-to-day worries about the West Bank gave Abdullah II a chance to modernize Jordan in order to solidify the monarchy, which after 2000 was once again threatened by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The AL-AQSA INTIFADA produced fear among the citizens of the kingdom that Jordan might once again be the destination for hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees if Israel decided to assert its sovereignty over part or all of the territory. Although Jordan has long sought to secure its own national interest through a combination of engagement with and detachment from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the intertwining of this issue with Jordan's own national existence ensures that its quest remains elusive.

See also ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; GULF WAR; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC; WAR, 1948

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—John C. Creed

Jordanian Option

The "Jordanian option" is an idea for settling the Palestine question—that is, the stateless and homeless condition of the Palestinian population—by associating the Palestinians with JORDAN. Both Israel and Jordan, albeit for different reasons, have had an interest in such a solution. The idea was originally raised in Britain's PEEL COMMISSION Report of 1936 and later by COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, the UN mediator on Palestine in 1948. In his report to the UN General Assembly of 16 September 1948 (A/648), Bernadotte suggested the possibility of merging the territory of Palestine earmarked for an Arab state (the WEST BANK), in accordance with the UN Partition Resolution (UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181), with Transjordan (Jordan after 1950) in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Before 1948, Zionist leaders and Emir Abdullah, who controlled Jordan, had met on several occasions to discuss dividing between them the area to be allotted to the Palestinian state. In 1948 Abdullah actualized the merger of Jordanian and Palestinian territories when he annexed the West Bank to Jordan. This action, however, was unacceptable to the Palestinians.

Since the 1930s, Jordan has considered the West Bank an integral part of the HASHEMITE kingdom, and from 1948 through 1967 the monarchy appeared to have achieved its objective. However, Jordan's situation changed radically after the 1967 WAR, when Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the GAZA STRIP, the West Bank, eastern JERUSALEM, and the Golan Heights, even though King Husayn, Abdullah's successor, made persistent attempts to regain control. To counter Israeli efforts to annex the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES by the creation of Jewish SETTLEMENTS, the king proposed, on 15 March 1972, the unification of the West Bank and the East Bank of the Jordan River in a "United Arab Kingdom." The proposal was rejected by both the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and Israel. On 22 June 1977, Jordan again revived the proposal and suggested a federation between an autonomous West Bank of Palestine and the East Bank state of Jordan. The proposal was again rejected by the PLO and by Israel.

When, in 1982, President RONALD REAGAN proposed a peace plan that included Palestinian autonomy in association with Jordan, King Husayn seized the occasion to offer to the Palestinians a confederation between the West Bank and Jordan. This assumed the future establishment of a Palestinian state and was meant as a compromise between the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE and the REAGAN PLAN. The PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL discussed King Husayn's proposal at Algiers in February 1983 and approved a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation in principle, but only on condition that each member of the federation was established as an independent state.

At the urging of King Husayn, Jordan reached an agreement with the PLO on 11 February 1985

for a joint initiative to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian federation as part of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. Husayn took advantage of the weakness of the PLO after the devastating 1982 LEBANON WAR and a tripartite split in the organization, as well as a civil war among Palestinians in LEBANON and an AMAL militia onslaught against the refugee camps in Lebanon. The Husayn-Arafat agreement included the following principles:

- Total withdrawal by Israel from the territories it occupied in 1967
- Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, to be exercised within the context of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine
- Solution of the Palestine REFUGEE problem in accordance with the UN resolutions
- Solution of the question of Palestine in all its aspects
- Negotiations to be conducted by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation under the auspices of an international conference, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council

The joint peace initiative, however, encountered a number of difficulties. The UNITED STATES and Israel opposed holding negotiations with PLO representatives in the context of an international conference. In addition, the United States and Israel claimed the right to approve the Palestinian members of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Moreover, Jordan and the PLO disagreed over the use of Security Council Resolution 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, as the guideline for the negotiations. King Husayn was ready to accept 242, but the PLO rejected it because it does not guarantee the national rights of the people of Palestine. The joint initiative was abrogated in 1986.

In 1988, after the end of the Jordan-PLO agreement and the outbreak of the First INTIFADA, Jordan formally disengaged from the West Bank but still did not give up its hope of recovering the coveted area. King Husayn had the following interests in the Occupied Territories: (1) the monarchy considered the West Bank an integral part of the Hashemite kingdom and sought to restore its sovereignty there; (2) control over the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem was a critical objective for Amman both for religious and tourist reasons—it provided Jordan with a major part of its GNP; and (3) King Husayn feared that a Palestinian state in the West Bank could lead to irredentist claims on the East Bank and to the politicization of the Palestinian citizens in Jordan, who constitute more than half the population. All these factors mandated an active policy of Jordanian engagement.

Between 1967 and 1993 some Israeli leaders, mainly from the LABOR PARTY, considered the possibility of a "compromise" with Jordan over the West Bank. They saw such a compromise as a way of managing the DEMOGRAPHIC problem that resulted from the OCCUPATION—that is, the growing Arab population relative to the Jewish one. Israel would achieve several objectives in such an initiative; it could divest itself of a large number of Palestinians, retain certain strategic areas of the West Bank, obtain Arab ratification of its conquests, and end the Palestine question. When the LIKUD PARTY came to power in 1977, the Jordanian option was shelved. But it reemerged in 1987 in the HUSAYN-PERES AGREEMENT. Indeed, throughout this period Labor leaders and King Husayn retained a strong interest in the possibility of some sort of agreement, despite the 1974 ARAB LEAGUE decision at the RABAT SUMMIT designating the Palestine Liberation Organization as the claimant for the future of the territories.

The 1987 Husayn-Peres Agreement, negotiated between the king and Foreign Minister SHIMON PERES, appeared auspicious for Jordan, but the proposal was rejected by Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR. That same year the outbreak of the Intifada and the subsequent upsurge in Palestinian nationalism lessened King Husayn's interest in acquiring the radicalized population, and the following year he disengaged. Still, in the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE, Israel required a joint Jordanian-Palestinian negotiating team in hopes that Jordan could speak for the Palestinians, and thus kept open an option for an agreement with Jordan over the West Bank.

The Jordanian option has been distorted by some extremist Israeli factions, including former prime minister ARIEL SHARON, who use the slogan "Jordan is Palestine" to mean that all the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories should undergo TRANSFER to Jordan and their land (the West Bank) should become part of Israel.

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Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement, 1985

See HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT


Jordan Rift Valley

The Jordan Rift Valley technically refers to the area at the bottom of the mountain ridge (the valley) abutting the western side of the Jordan River, which runs from the north to the south, connecting the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. However, common references to the Jordan Valley typically include a much broader strip of land—an area bordered on the north and south by the Green Line, to the east by the Jordanian border, and to the west by Route 80 (consisting of Routes 458, 508, and 578) and known as the Allon Road. The area includes the Jordan Valley itself, as well as the coastline area of the Dead Sea, and the mountain ridge's eastern slopes. In the following analysis, then, the term "Jordan Valley" refers to this larger area.

Settlement of this area began almost immediately after the 1967 WAR, led by Minister of Labor YIGAL ALLON. In July 1967, Allon unveiled to Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL his plan to consolidate Israel's hold on what he believed to be crucial areas of the WEST BANK. The ALLON PLAN called for Israel to retain the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the mountain ridge running through the West Bank in order to protect against an Arab attack from the east. The plan also called for establishing Israeli settlements in these areas as a way of defining the land that would eventually be annexed to Israel. While the Allon Plan was never formally adopted by any Israeli government, it nonetheless became the framework for the LABOR PARTY policy vis-à-vis the West Bank. In 1968, Eshkol declared, "The Jordan River is the State of Israel's security border." In the next ten years twenty-one SETTLEMENTS were established in the Jordan Valley and along the eastern slopes of the West Bank's central mountain ridge, all under the leadership of Labor governments. The settlement boom in the Jordan Valley cooled somewhat after 1977 when the LIKUD PARTY came to power, largely due to a shift in Israeli government policy to permit settlement in areas of the West Bank previously considered off-limits.

According to PEACE NOW, whose research on and analysis of settlements in the Occupied Territories are considered the most reliable, as of 2008 there were twenty-seven settlements in this area, with a combined total population of 9,358 people. There are also nine "illegal" OUTPOSTS in the area. Three of them, together with the settlements of Yitav and Na'omi, are located in such a manner as to surround JERICHO from the north and east, and to prevent Jericho from expanding to connect with the neighboring village of Auja. These outposts are attractive sites for ideological settlers who see the area as an important and strategic location that should be kept under Israeli control. Four of the outposts are at the edge of the central ridge (three near the settlements of Kochav Hashahar and one near Mitzpe Yericho). One, Mitzpe Jericho North East, is located along the strategically important road connecting JERUSALEM and the Jordan Valley.

In addition, a series of outposts have been established in recent years east of the (non–Jordan



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Map 28. Jordan Valley, Eastern West Bank, ~~2005~~

Valley) settlements of Shilo, Itamar, and ELON MOREH. The apparent purpose of these outposts is to connect isolated mountain ridge settlements to the Jordan Valley. Some settlers and their supporters hope that Israel not only will retain the Jordan Valley, but will extend "fingers" into the West Bank heartland to incorporate these veteran ideological settlements as well. As Israeli map expert Shaul Arieli wrote for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in August 2004: "Their [the settlers'] assumption is that the lightly populated Jordan Valley, which constitutes Israel's 'eastern security region' in the 'essential interests map' approved by the Israeli government during Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU'S first term [1996–1999], can remain under Israeli control for the foreseeable future. . . . For example, seventeen outposts are located between Ariel and Mevo Shiloh approaching the Allon Road, six outposts are designed to connect Itamar eastward to the hill range, and fourteen outposts connect Ofra and Beit El to northern Jerusalem."

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, as of mid-year 2005 the Palestinian population in the Jordan Valley was around 53,000 (this includes all the villages in the Jericho governorate, as well as a handful of villages from the governorates of Tubas and Nablus, but not Nablus itself). The population is broken down as follows (numbers are rounded): Jericho/Auja area (including Aqabat Jabr refugee camp): 35,000; Jiftlik area: 6,700; North Jordan Valley: 3,150; Nablus/Tubas area (i.e., the eastern slopes of the mountain ridge): 7,700. In addition, the area is home to an unknown number of BEDOUIN (probably a few thousand) who maintain a seminomadic lifestyle.

RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT and access for Palestinians into and within the Jordan Valley are especially severe. Beginning in 2001, Israel set up seven permanent CHECKPOINTS west of the Jordan Valley and north of the Dead Sea, including four around the Jericho enclave. In 2005 the army placed much harsher restrictions on Palestinians wanting to cross these checkpoints. In response to an inquiry by B'TSELEM, an ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) spokesperson said that only Palestinians whose IDENTITY CARDS indicate that they live in one of the villages in the Jordan Valley are allowed to cross the checkpoints. Other residents of the West Bank are permitted to cross only if they have a special PERMIT issued by the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. In reality, only in "humanitarian cases" can Palestinians cross without a permit. Travel from Jericho north to other parts of the valley, including travel by residents of Jericho, is also forbidden except by permit. "Palestinians caught in the Jordan Valley without a permit," the IDF spokesperson said, "are handed over to the police."

On 12 January 2006, Israeli leaders officially announced the isolation of the Jordan Valley from the rest of the West Bank, dropping the status of the Jordan Valley from FINAL STATUS TALKS. In addition to the foregoing, Israeli policies in the Jordan Valley from 2001 to 2008 included the following:

- Imposing strict military procedures on areas inhabited by Palestinians, such as placing watchtowers at the entrances of Jordan Valley villages and along Road 90, setting up twenty-four-hour military routes, breaking into villages and houses, and imposing regular and continuous CURFEWS
- Preventing landowners whose IDs do not show a Jordan Valley residential address from reaching their lands, resulting in loss of sources of income and making it easier for Israel to confiscate their LAND under Israel's ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW
- Preventing Palestinian farmers from selling their produce to Israeli traders at Bardala-Bisan checkpoint 5 kilometers (3 miles) away, forcing them to travel 50 kilometers (30 miles) to get to Al-Jalameh, increasing the cost and leading to far more damage and spoilage of agricultural goods
- Preventing traders from 1948 land from entering Palestinian villages or farms based on the excuses of "security, creating problems with regard to quality, price and payments"
- Closing thousands of dunums of pastures and surrounding some with trenches and designating others as CLOSED MILITARY ZONES
- Forcing Palestinians to deal with the Israeli Civil Administration for their daily affairs
- Restricting access to and from Jericho by placing seven checkpoints manned by Israeli soldiers around the city; surrounding Jericho with a trench 30 kilometers (8.5 miles) long, 2 meters deep, and 2 to 5 meters wide; closing all entrances and exits to Jericho with permanent ROADBLOCKS and controlling movement through two permanent checkpoints; and preventing Palestinian vehicles and tourist guides from moving out of Jericho toward the Dead Sea

Following major protests, the situation was somewhat improved as of 2009. Palestinians who do not live in the Jordan Valley are generally, though not automatically, permitted to enter, but the IDF still bars entry of the cars of any Palestinians who do not live in the area. So any Palestinian not a Jordan Valley resident who wants to come to the area must enter via special taxis that are permitted by the IDF to pass through the checkpoints. The exception is the city of Jericho itself, where access into the city is normally open, but via only one road. However, Palestinians cannot leave Jericho to travel into the rest of the Jordan Valley.

Since early 2001 the IDF has barred all Palestinian access to the Dead Sea. A checkpoint south of Jericho (or north of the Dead Sea) prevents any Palestinian vehicle from entering the region. According to B'Tselem, testimonies of soldiers who served at this checkpoint reveal that the checkpoint was established in response to pressure from Israeli settlers in the area who are trying to develop resort sites along the shore of the Dead Sea. These settlers fear that Israelis will be reluctant to come to their resorts due to the presence of Palestinians in the area. The Dead Sea has traditionally been a popular site for Palestinian visitors and vacationers from throughout the West Bank, especially since the early 1990s, when Tel Aviv began to bar Palestinian entry into Israel, thus closing off access to the Mediterranean to Palestinians in the West Bank. Now, some Israelis have concluded that in order to permit the settlers to develop resorts in the area, the entire Dead Sea has been made inaccessible to Palestinians. On 10 June 2008 the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) filed a petition (HCJ 5148/08) against the checkpoint with the Israeli High Court of Justice, but it remains without adjudication.

On 28 June 2009, the Israeli Land Registry Office at Ma'ale Adumim Settlement published twelve public notices in the local Palestinian *al-Quds* newspaper for the registration of 139,000 dunums (34,000 acres) located along the northern and western shores of the Dead Sea to the property of the Custodian of State Land of Israel. The public notices requested that any individual or entity affected by the registration process be entitled to "file an objection" to the Beit El District coordination office within forty-five days. The Land Registry will not deal with any objection, as it considers the state of Israel the rightful heir and owner of all the public lands of the state in addition to most land in the West Bank.

Peace Now asserts that Israel is planning to declare ownership of the West Bank's Dead Sea shore as "state property," in order to acquire more Palestinian land. "Israeli authorities have announced that they intend to declare as state land some 138,600 dunum (34,650 acres) that has emerged along the Dead Sea in the occupied West Bank," said Hagit Ofran of Peace Now.

The land, part of which has emerged as a result of Dead Sea shrinkage, is located along the shore of the Dead Sea in the West Bank. According to Peace Now the amount of land involved may go beyond the shoreline that has surfaced as a consequence of an estimated one-meter (yard) drop in the water level per year. "It would appear that the primary purpose of registering this area as 'state land' is to prevent Palestinian use of the land or any Palestinian assertion of ownership over it," Ofran added.

In the West Bank, the designation of "state land"—land to be held in trust by the occupying power and to be used for the benefit of the indigenous population—has long been abused as a form of de facto expropriation. Israel occupied the West Bank during the 1967 War, and it has so far "declared or registered huge areas of the West Bank as 'state land' and virtually all of which has been given over for the exclusive use and exclusive benefit of Israeli settlers and the Israeli military."

Almost all of the land in the Jordan Valley, other than actual built-up areas of the Palestinian population, has been placed under the jurisdiction of the settlement regional councils in the area ('Arvot Hayarden and Megillot). This means that land not defined as belonging to a specific settlement is still under the control of the settlements' regional councils (and off-limits to Palestinians), and in some cases is actively farmed by settlers. Almost all of the settlements, despite having tiny populations, have huge footprints on the land, with extensive agricultural areas (large fields, greenhouses, etc).

Israel's policy of demolishing Palestinian homes has been especially focused on the Jordan Valley. Looking only at the first quarter of 2008 (the first regular report period following the November 2007 Annapolis Conference and the relaunching of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted in a May 2008 report that

"eighty-six percent of the demolitions in Area C due to lack of permit in the first quarter of 2008 (107) were in Jordan Valley locales." Within the Jordan Valley, certain areas have been the particular focus of HOUSE DEMOLITION efforts. The OCHA report notes, for example, that on 11 March 2008 twelve structures in the northern Jordan Valley village of Al Hadidiya were demolished by Israel. OCHA observes that the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT rejected a petition from the villagers against the demolition orders on the grounds that the affected buildings were located in an area defined as agricultural in the Mandatory Regional Outline Plans, and the buildings posed a security threat to the Ro'i settlement. The plight of the village of Al 'Aqaba has drawn a great deal of attention—in part because of a campaign by local and international activists. OCHA reports that "the village of Al 'Aqaba lies at the edge of the Jordan Valley and comprises 3,500 dunums [865 acres] of land. It is entirely situated in Area C, between two military bases . . . 35 of the 45 structures in the village have received demolition orders due to lack of permit."

According to Peace Now, "The restrictions on movement and access in the Jordan Valley, combined with the restrictive land use policies, have resulted in a situation where the Israeli public, to the extent that it is aware of the Jordan Valley, does not really view it in the same light as the rest of the West Bank. Israelis driving through the area—and historically, the main Jordan Valley road, Route 90, was and to some extent remains the primary route used by Israelis to travel from southern Israel or Jerusalem to reach the Galilee—do not see many Palestinians using the highway or living along it. What they see are other Israeli vehicles and the IDF, and alongside the route, desert or Israeli agricultural development. By keeping the area free of Palestinian traffic, Israelis and tourists who use this route can feel they are traveling a road that is no different than any road inside Israel.

"More broadly speaking, many Israelis still believe that the Jordan Valley must remain eternally part of Israel—the vital security buffer between Israel and Arab lands to the east. According to this perspective, the Palestinian population of the area—which is sparse and spread out over a huge area—is at best an inconvenience to be minimized, and at worst a liability that must be overcome. Israeli policies in the area, historically and through the present day, would appear to seek to minimize the number of Palestinians in the area, while maximizing Israeli control over the land and Israeli control over the transportation routes."

During the 1999–2001 final status negotiations, initial Israeli proposals placed the Jordan Valley under various levels of Israeli control, with part of it annexed to Israel and other parts left under Israeli control via long-term lease arrangements, with the understanding that such areas would eventually come under full Palestinian sovereignty. These proposals were rejected by the Palestinians, who view the Jordan Valley as the only land reserve that could be used by a future Palestinian state to absorb large population increases expected from natural growth and refugee absorption. Additionally, Palestinians view control over their own BORDERS as an important attribute of sovereignty.

At some point during the final status negotiations some participants claimed that Israel gave up its demand for control over the Jordan Valley. For example, US special Middle East coordinator DENNIS ROSS pointed to oral Israeli proposals made at the end of the July 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT. Others, like Israeli negotiator Shlomo Ben-Ami, point to the CLINTON PARAMETERS, presented by President BILL CLINTON on 23 December 2000 and accepted by Israel, which called for Israeli annexation of 4–6 percent of the West Bank, an amount inconsistent with Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley. Given, however, the strategic importance Tel Aviv has accorded the Jordan Valley since 1967, it seems unlikely that Israel would ever give it up.

The Jordan Valley has come into play more recently with regard to Israel's West Bank security BARRIER (fence/wall). In March 2003, during a cabinet ministers' tour of the route of the separation Barrier, Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON (2001–2006) declared that he intended to build an eastern separation fence. This new section of the fence would span some 300 kilometers (185 miles), running from the Green Line in the north, along the Jordan Valley and the Allon Road, and ending in the southern Hebron hills (and keeping the Jordan Valley outside the territory to be bounded within the separation fence). The original map with the route of the Barrier issued by the Israeli Ministry of Defense in October 2003 appeared to include the first stage of this plan, depicting a barrier running close to the Green Line along the northern end of the West Bank, and also including

a section jutting out from the main barrier running south along the central mountain ridge. Faced with international and internal opposition, Israel dropped the plans for an eastern barrier.

In mid-July 2008, Israeli defense minister EHUD BARAK approved a plan to turn a long-disused military outpost in the Jordan Valley originally established in the 1980s, called Maskiyot, into a new permanent civilian settlement. If the decision is implemented, this transformation of Maskiyot will represent the first new settlement in the Jordan Valley since the mid-1980s and would conflict with the government of Israel's long-standing and much-repeated commitment not to establish any new settlements.

Supporters of the plan have argued that this is not the establishment of a new settlement, but the expansion of an existing one. This logic is inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of Israel's commitment not to establish new settlements. With respect to the former, a military outpost is not the same as a civilian settlement, and the transformation of a disused military outpost into a permanent civilian settlement represents the transformation of an arguably temporary, limited-use, limited-needs site into something entirely new, with new legal, security, financial, infrastructure, and political implications. With respect to the latter, the Israeli commitment not to establish new settlements was made as a sign of good faith and support for a peace process that was predicated on the understanding that further expansion of settlements undermined the chances of achieving a two-state solution. To seek to exploit a dubious technicality in order to circumvent this unambiguous commitment would have troubling implications.

Maskiyot is what is known as a NAHAL outpost (Pioneering Fighting Youth), a term that dates back to pre-1948 Jewish militia terminology and has been adopted by the IDF. Among their other activities, Nahal units are responsible for creating military outposts in the West Bank. In 1982 the army established Maskiyot. In 2002, the IDF left Maskiyot, and a pre-army religious education program, with a few dozen students in temporary residence, moved in. Then, in September 2005, the Israeli press reported that settlers evacuated from the GAZA STRIP settlement of Shirat Hayam (as part of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA) were planning to move to the site. At that time, it was reported that approximately twenty families were planning to move to Maskiyot sometime after October 2005, and that some twenty prefabricated structures, removed from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, would be moved to the Maskiyot to accommodate them in the short term. In the longer term the families reportedly expected to receive permanent housing and land for agricultural use.

Subsequently, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered that the planning process for the site commence (checking the status of the land and preparing a master plan for the settlement, intended to accommodate up to 100 families). On 12 May 2005, the official "municipal borders" of the settlement were announced in an order issued by the commander of the IDF's Central Command, the official sovereign in the Occupied Territories. A master plan for 100 housing units was prepared and approved by the planning authority, awaiting only the approval of the minister of defense to validate the plan.

During the last week of 2006 it was made public that Defense Minister Amir Peretz had approved the plan and that the construction of thirty homes to accommodate new civilian settlers in Maskiyot was set to start. This decision was widely recognized, both within Israel and by the international community, as tantamount to a decision to establish a new settlement. After strong criticism from within Israel and from abroad, including pointed criticism from US secretary of state CONDOLEEZZA RICE, in mid-January 2007 Peretz froze the approval, taking construction at Maskiyot off the table. A few months later, a group of some eight families from the evacuated Gaza settlement of Shirat Hayam moved into trailer homes in Maskiyot, apparently deciding that they would not wait for approval to build at the site.

Maskiyot then fell off the world's radar screen for more than a year, until 23 July 2008, when an announcement was published in an Israeli newspaper by the High Council for Planning in the Civil Administration informing the public of the approval of Plan Number 303 for the construction of residential units in Maskiyot.

Numerous articles in the Israeli press about Maskiyot, however, noted that the plan (as of 2009) has not been formally approved, as required to begin construction. In theory, it might still be possible for the Israeli government to freeze the plan. For example, in some cases, after the final approval of a plan for construction in West Bank settlements, the minister of defense must approve

the beginning of the development before the bulldozers can start to work. There are no indications that Prime Minister Netanyahu intends to pursue such a course. Indeed, the apparent perspective of the Defense Ministry is clearly summed up by one Israeli Defense Ministry official who stated, "Maskiyot is a settlement that exists and has been on the map. . . . The place is bubbling with life. There is no intention to relent on the decision."

The Maskiyot plan is extremely important in terms of the scope of settlement in the Jordan Valley. As the head of the Jordan Valley regional council (the settlement governance body in the area), Dubi Tal, recently told Israel Radio, "Twenty units in the Jordan Valley is significant, as there are only 1,000 [housing units for Israelis] in the entire Jordan Valley." It is even more significant in light of the fact that in almost all other Jordan Valley settlements, the population is either stagnant or shrinking. In political terms it is also extremely significant. The future of the Jordan Valley is one of the most important territorial questions that must be addressed in order to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unilateral actions that seek to cement Israel's hold on the area undermine the chances of achieving any peace agreement, including one in which Israel could retain some control over the area through a bilateral arrangement with the Palestinians.

The character of the proposed Maskiyot settlers makes this plan even more problematic. Currently, the settler population of the Jordan Valley is generally nonideological and the vast majority would likely cooperate with, if not support, a future peace agreement that required them to relocate. A new settlement in this area, populated by some of the most hardline ideological settlers (a category into which virtually all of the former Gaza Strip settlers fall), would significantly change the political coloration of the Jordan Valley, greatly complicate future negotiations over the area, and open the door for an influx of additional ideological settlers to the area. Indeed, some observers have suggested that this is one of the goals, if not the major goal, of the plan.

See also Allon Plan; Bedouin in Israel; House Demolitions; Settlements

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Judea

The word *Judea* is derived from the Hebrew word for the mountainous southern part of Palestine, an area now divided among Israel, JORDAN, and the WEST BANK. Judea is mainly used in modern times by Jewish religious fundamentalists and secular ultranationalists in a conscious attempt to reassociate the region with its biblical past.

See also SAMARIA

June War

See WAR, 1967, CONSEQUENCES FOR ISRAELI; WAR, 1967, CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PALESTINIANS

K

Kach

Kach (Only Thus) was a far-right political party in Israel founded by RABBI MEIR KAHANE in the early 1970s. Kach advocated two central principles: the forced TRANSFER of all Palestinians from Greater Israel, including Israeli Arab citizens; and the establishment of a Jewish theocracy in ERETZ YISRAEL (the biblical land of Israel). Kach believed that biblical Israel should be reestablished in its entirety and that any Arabs who occupy those lands should be evicted to make room for Jews.

Kahane expressed opposition to Western-style democracy for Israel, arguing that it was incompatible with authentic Judaism. He advocated the consistent application of Orthodox Jewish laws and standards to the whole of society, even if that meant undermining liberal democratic institutions. Kahane said that "secular government is the enemy" and opposed a secular Jewish state. Supporters of such a state were, for Kahane, a major obstacle to the coming of the Messiah—an obstacle that could not be tolerated passively. It was an important principle of Kahane and his followers that "miracles don't just happen, they are made." Kach believed that its efforts would help change the course of world history, even if violence was required, and members of Kach were involved in countless acts of TERRORISM against Palestinians.

Only three years after Kahane's arrival in Israel, Kach candidates ran for seats in the Knesset in 1973 but failed to attract the minimum number of votes. Attempts in 1977 and 1981 also failed, but the party finally gained a Knesset seat in 1984 with Kahane as its only representative. This caused significant alarm among the Israeli public, and in 1985, the "BASIC LAW: The Knesset" was amended with the provision that a candidate's slate could not participate in elections if it (1) negated the existence of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, (2) negated the democratic character of the state, or (3) incited racism. This effectively ended Kach's existence as a political party, although it remained highly influential as a movement with certain segments of the settler population.

Following Kahane's assassination in 1990, the movement split into two groups with similar ideologies and somewhat overlapping memberships: Kach, led by Baruch Marzel; and KAHANE CHAI, led by Meir's son, BINYAMIN ZE'EV KAHANE. Both groups were outlawed in 1994 following statements in support of the massacre of Arabs in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE by BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, a Kach member. Marzel ran for the Knesset in 2003 on the HERUT PARTY list but failed to win a seat.

A reinvented Kach continues to organize protests against the Israeli government, harasses and threatens Palestinians and Israeli government officials, and has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife, who were murdered by Palestinians on 31 December 2000. Since the start of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, Kach is suspected of involvement in a number of attacks against Palestinian civilians, although the government appears not to interfere with these activities. Kach sympathizers were vocal and active against the Israeli government during the August 2005 ISRAELI UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA.

"The New Kach Movement" is another offshoot of the original group, active during 2001–2003 and headed by a charismatic young student, Efraim Hershkovits. In August 2005 he was arrested after attending the funeral of Eden Natan-Zada, an ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES soldier who on 4 August 2005 murdered four Israeli-Palestinians and wounded twenty-two others on a bus in the northern Israeli town of Shfar'am, after which he was beaten to death by bystanders. (www.kahane.org.il).

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Kadima Party

The Kadima (Forward) Party was formed by Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON on 21 November 2005 as a splinter from the LIKUD PARTY, largely as a consequence of the opposition from within the Likud to the ISRAELI UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in August 2005. At least half of the members of Likud rejected Sharon's withdrawal, which ended Israel's thirty-eight-year presence in Gaza. After Sharon suffered a massive stroke on 5 January 2006 that ended his political life, the leadership of Kadima passed to EHUD OLMERT. In the March 2006 election, Kadima won twenty-nine seats in the new Knesset, and Olmert became prime minister. Several Likud ministers and Knesset members joined Kadima, as did Knesset members from the LABOR PARTY and members of other parties. In the 2009 elections Kadima won twenty-eight seats in the 120-seat Israeli Knesset, the most seats of any single party. The Likud Party, led by BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, came in second with only one less seat than Kadima, twenty-seven. Kadima leader Tzipi Livni was unable to form a coalition, thus Netanyahu became prime minister and formed the government.

Kadima's "Main Foundations of the Peace Process" include the following:

- A FINAL STATUS agreement leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state must mark the cessation of all Palestinian claims toward Israel, including that no Palestinian REFUGEES be allowed entry into Israel.
- A future Palestinian state must be free of terror and exist as a peaceful neighbor to the state of Israel. In order to prevent it from becoming a staging ground for attacks against Israel, it must be demilitarized. Therefore, the Palestinians must totally renounce terror and dismantle all TERRORIST infrastructure prior to the establishment of such a state.
- Determination of Israel's future BORDERS will be part of a final status agreement.
- Israel will retain areas that are crucial for its security.
- Israel will retain Jewish holy places that are of central religious and symbolic national importance, in particular a unified JERUSALEM as the capital of Israel.
- Israel will retain the large Jewish SETTLEMENT blocs.

(http://kadimasharon.co.il/15-en/Kadima.aspx).

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Kafr Qasim

On 29 October 1956, the Israel Border Police (MAGAV) massacred forty-eight Palestinian civilians in the Israeli Palestinian village of Kafr Qasim. At the time, Israel had stationed soldiers along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier in preparation for its invasion of EGYPT. Several battalions of the Israeli BORDER POLICE under the command of ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) brigade commander Colonel Issachar Shadmi were ordered to prepare the defense of a section officially known as the Central District of Galilee and colloquially as the "Little Triangle." It contained seven villages close to the border in which about 40,000 PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL lived and was regularly patrolled by soldiers to prevent INFILTRATION of Palestinians into Israel.

During the period from 1949 to 1966, Arab citizens were under an Israeli military regime and were treated as a hostile, enemy population. The

seven villages were under a nightly 10:00 P.M. CURFEW, but on the morning of the massacre, Shadmi changed the curfew to 5:00 P.M. He then gathered all the border patrol battalion commanders under his command and ordered them to "shoot on sight" any villagers violating the curfew. One of the men, Major Shmuel Malinki, asked Shadmi how to react to those villagers who were unaware of the curfew.

Malinki later testified as follows: "[Shadmi said] anyone who left his house would be shot. It would be best if on the first night there were 'a few like that' and on the following nights they would be more careful. I asked: in the light of that, I can understand that a guerilla is to be killed but what about the fate of the Arab civilians? And they may come back to the village in the evening from the valley, from settlements or from the fields, and won't know about the curfew in the village—I suppose I am to have sentries at the approaches to the village? To this Col. [Shadmi] replied in crystal clear words, 'I don't want sentimentality and I don't want arrests, there will be no arrests.'" Malinki issued a similar order to the reserve forces attached to his battalion shortly before the curfew was enforced: "No inhabitant shall be allowed to leave his home during the curfew. Anyone leaving his home shall be shot; there shall be no arrests."

At 4:30 P.M., the *mukhtar* (village elder) of Kafr Qasim was informed of the new time, and he asked what would happen to the 400 villagers working outside the village in the fields who were not aware of the earlier curfew. An officer assured him that they would be taken care of. Most villagers returned immediately, but others, working fields too far away to get the news, did not. Between 5:00 and 6:30 P.M., in nine separate shooting incidents, the platoon led by Lieutenant Gabriel Dahan killed nineteen men, six women, ten teenage boys (age 14–17), six girls (age 12–15), and seven young boys (age 8–13). Palestinians from Jaljuliya, a nearby village, were brought in to dig a mass grave.

News of the massacre leaked out almost immediately, despite a MEDIA blackout imposed by Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION. To limit publicity, a military cordon was maintained around the village for months, preventing journalists from approaching and talking to survivors. It took two months of lobbying by communist Knesset member Tawfik Tubi and members of the press before the government lifted the blackout, though the cordon remained. Meanwhile, the government started to conduct an internal inquiry.

Following public protests, eleven Border Police officers and soldiers involved in the massacre were charged with murder. On 16 October 1958, eight of them were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms. Malinki received seventeen years and Dahan fifteen years. The fact that other local commanders had chosen to disobey Shadmi's order was cited by the court as one of the reasons for denying Dahan's claim that he had no choice. The court placed great emphasis on the fundamental responsibility of Shadmi, though he was not a defendant. Shadmi was subsequently charged as well, but his separate court hearing (29 February 1959) found him innocent of murder and only guilty of extending the curfew without authority. His symbolic punishment, a fine of one *grush* (a small coin), became a standard metaphor in Israeli political debate.

All the men convicted in the affair had their sentences drastically reduced in the next few years: In April 1959 the court of appeal reduced Malinki's sentence to fourteen years and Dahan's to ten. The Israeli chief of staff further reduced them to ten and eight years, respectively, and then the Israeli president reduced them to five years each. Finally, the Committee for the Release of Prisoners ordered the remission of one-third of the prison sentences, resulting in all the convicted persons associated with the massacre being out of prison by November 1959. Soon after his release, Malinki was promoted and put in charge of security at the top secret DIMONA nuclear reactor. In 1960 Dahan was placed in charge of Arab affairs by Israeli officials in the Palestinian town of RAMLA.

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Kahan Commission Report, 1983

The Kahan Commission Report, released on 8 February 1983, is the Israeli Commission of Inquiry's report on the massacre in the Palestinian REFUGEE camps of SABRA AND SHATILA in Beirut, LEBANON, on 16–18 September 1982. The commission was chaired by ISRAELI SUPREME COURT president Yitzhak Kahan, and its other two members were Supreme Court judge Aharon Barak and Major-General Yona Erfat. The commission was to make recommendations for action on Israelis involved in the massacre through an investigation of "[a]ll the facts and factors connected with the atrocity carried out by a unit of the Lebanese Forces against the civilian population in the Shatila and Sabra camps."

The commission's main conclusions were the following:

- The massacre at Sabra and Shatila was carried out by a unit of the PHALANGE, a Lebanese Christian political party, acting on its own, although its entry was known to Israel.
- No Israeli was directly responsible for the events that occurred in the camps.
- Israel had indirect responsibility for the massacre, because the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) held the area of the refugee camps.
- Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN was found responsible for not exercising greater involvement and awareness in the matter of introducing the Phalangists into the camps.
- Defense Minister ARIEL SHARON was found responsible for ignoring the danger of bloodshed and revenge when he approved the entry of the Phalangists into the camps as well as not taking appropriate measures to prevent bloodshed.
- Foreign Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR erred by not taking action after being alerted by Minister of Communications Mordechai Zippori.
- Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan did not give the appropriate orders to prevent the massacre.

The commission recommended that Sharon resign, that the director of military intelligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy be relieved of his post, and that other senior officers be removed.

Israeli critics of the commission pointed to its limited scope, and some argued that the recommendations amounted to a whitewash. Most analysts believe that the commission's conclusions constituted the minimum that could be deduced from the evidence and that the facts warranted a finding of more than just indirect responsibility. For example, General Rafael Eitan ordered the Phalangist militia into the camps, while Phalangist commanders met with General Amir Drori, commander of Israeli troops in Lebanon, and General Amos Yaron, commander for West Beirut, to "coordinate the militia's entry into the camps and arrange communications." The Israeli army gave the Phalange logistical support during the massacre, and they received orders, salaries, and training directly from Israel. Sharon and the Israeli army knew that the Phalange leaders planned to expel most of the Palestinians from Lebanon, and the Phalangists were at all times under IDF orders. The Kahan Report revealed that "only one element of Israeli Defense Forces will command all forces in the area," which means, according to the Israeli head of intelligence, "that all forces in the area, including the Phalangists, will be under IDF command and will act according to its instructions."

See also LEBANON WAR; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE

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Kahane, Binyamin Ze'ev (1966–2000)

Binyamin Ze'ev Kahane was the son of activist RABBI MEIR KAHANE. Born in New York, he immigrated to Israel with his family in 1971. He was an Orthodox Jewish scholar and rabbi who studied at the MERCAZ HARAV KOOK YESHIVA and cofounded the JERUSALEM-based Yeshivat Ha Ra'yon Ha Yehudi (the Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea) with his father in 1987.

He was most well-known, however, for his leadership of KAHANE CHAI, a far-right-wing extremist settler party that grew out of Meir Kahane's KACH party after Meir's assassination in 1990. Binyamin Kahane and Kahane Chai advocated the replacement of democracy in Israel with a Jewish theocracy, the forced expulsion of the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, as well as all the Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and the annexation of the WEST BANK to "force the hand of God" and bring about the Messianic age. In 1994, following their statements in support of BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, who perpetrated the mass murder of twenty-nine Palestinians at prayer in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE, both Kahane Chai and an offshoot of the original Kach were declared TERRORIST organizations and outlawed by the Israeli government. Binyamin Kahane and his wife Talia were murdered on 31 December 2000 by Palestinian assassins near the SETTLEMENT of Ofrah as they were driving home. They left behind six children.

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Kahane, Rabbi Meir David (1932–1990)

Meir Kahane was an American Orthodox rabbi, author, violent activist, founder of the JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE (JDL) in the UNITED STATES and the right-wing KACH party in Israel, and a member of the Israeli Knesset. Born in Brooklyn, New York, to a family that adhered to Orthodox Judaism—his father was a rabbi—Kahane received rabbinical ordination from the Mir Yeshiva in Brooklyn. He was fully conversant with the Talmud and Tanakh and worked as a pulpit rabbi and teacher in the 1960s. Subsequently, he earned a degree in international law from New York University.

As a teenager, Kahane became an admirer of VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY, the militant revisionist Zionist leader, who was a frequent guest in his parents' home, and he joined Jabotinsky's paramilitary movement, BETAR. He personally led protests against British minister for labor Ernest Bevin, who was visiting New York in the 1940s, for which Kahane received his first arrest. Later he organized public demonstrations in the United States against the SOVIET UNION's policy of refus-

ing to permit Jewish IMMIGRATION to Israel and was a central activist in the Free SOVIET JEWRY movement, for which he was widely credited with the release and subsequent immigration of Russian Jews to Israel.

During the 1960s, the FBI recruited Kahane by alleging that the Black Panthers and other black nationalists were ANTI-SEMITIC, and Kahane worked undercover in COINTELPRO. In 1968, Kahane founded the Jewish Defense League in response to a perceived mass wave of anti-Semitism in the United States, including supposed threats of violence against Jews by the Black Panthers and members of the black power movement. Also during the 1960s, Kahane was an editor of the largest Anglo-Jewish weekly, Brooklyn's *The Jewish Press*, and was a regular correspondent until his death for the paper, which served as one of his most important propaganda organs.

At the same time, Kahane became entangled with Mafia boss Joseph Colombo Jr., who paid a $25,000 bond after Kahane and a dozen other JDL members were arrested on 12 May 1971 by federal agents for conspiracy to manufacture explosives. The following day, Kahane publicly announced an alliance with the Colombo family. Israeli journalist Yair Kotler wrote that "Kahane received substantial aid from the New York Mafia." Not only did Colombo provide bail money and attorneys for countless JDL activists in trouble with the law, but the JDL received weapons and "tons of money" from Colombo. "Colombo thought he got respect from being seen with a famous rabbi, even though at the time most Jews didn't respect Kahane." When, in late 1971, Colombo was shot dead by the Gallo family, Kahane was at his side.

Late in 1971 Kahane was convicted in a New York federal court for conspiracy to manufacture explosives and received five years' probation. That same year he immigrated to Israel and soon established the Kach party. The following year, 1972, he was arrested in Israel for attempting to smuggle explosives to Europe to blow up the Libyan Embassy in Brussels. Kahane's lawyer argued that he had acted out of patriotism, and Kahane received a two-year suspended sentence. In 1980 he stood unsuccessfully for election to the Knesset, after which he was sentenced to six months in prison for plotting to attack the AL-AQSA MOSQUE in JERUSALEM. In 1984 Kahane stood again for election to the Knesset and was successful, serving for one term. He was arrested more than two dozen times in Israel for a wide range of offenses but served little time in prison. Kahane's main legislative proposals involved revoking Israeli citizenship from non-Jews and banning Jewish-Gentile marriages or sexual relations.

A six-month investigation of Kahane's political activities in the United States in 1989 revealed that the rabbi's support was far broader than the radical, ultranationalist fringes of New York's Jewish community. Kahane's organizations set up several charitable tax-exempt foundations in the United States that were used to funnel hundreds of thousands of dollars to his movement in Israel. Kahane boasted that after his election to the Knesset, donations had increased "especially from Jewish millionaires." Even after moving to Israel, Kahane swept across the United States four or five times a year in search of funds to support his political goals. His largest bastions of support were in New York, south Florida, the Baltimore–Washington, DC, area, and Los Angeles. Despite the wealthy businessmen who supported him, Kahane's backbone was the Orthodox Jewish community. One of Kahane's successes was to attract major financial support from the Aleppo (Syrian) Jewish community of Flatbush, New York, perhaps one of the wealthiest Jewish communities in the world. Initially Syrian Jewish leaders had barred Kahane from even speaking in neighborhood synagogues. But opposition to him slackened with his growth in popularity in the Israeli polls. Nevertheless, some donors were so worried about being tied to Kahane that they passed money to him through a sympathetic New York yeshiva rather than make out checks or give cash directly to his organizations.

Several individuals from Kahane's core group were the prime suspects in the October 1985 pipe-bomb murder of Alex Odeh, an official of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in Santa Ana, California; the August 1985 house-bomb slaying of Tscherim Soobzokov of Paterson, New Jersey, an alleged Nazi war criminal; the September 1985 bomb explosion at the Brentwood, Long Island, home of Elmars Sprogis, another alleged Nazi, in which a twenty-three-year-old musician who had been passing by lost his leg; and the August 1985 attempted bombing of an ADC office in Boston in which two police officers were severely wounded when the bomb blew up in their hands. Although Kahane's JDL initially took credit, in anonymous calls to the MEDIA, for

these bombings, JDL officials later denied responsibility but applauded the attacks on Odeh, Soobzokov, and Sprogis.

On 5 November 1990 Meir Kahane was assassinated in New York by Egyptian Islamist El Sayyid Nosair. His son Binyamin then founded and led KAHANE CHAI, which means "Kahane Lives." (www.kahane.org).

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Kahane Chai

Kahane Chai (Kahane Lives) is an extremist, violent religious-nationalist Jewish group that was formed in and mostly operates in Israel and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, although it has carried out operations outside that area. It is an offshoot of the original KACH party, which was formed by *Rabbi* MEIR KAHANE, whose assassination in 1990 propelled his son BINYAMIN KAHANE to start Kahane Chai. Kahane Chai and Kach have a shared core leadership and are referred to interchangeably in the Hebrew MEDIA.

In 1993 Kahane Chai claimed responsibility for an explosion near the French Embassy in Tel Aviv to protest PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION leader YASIR ARAFAT's visit to FRANCE. In 1994 the group publicly supported Kach member BARUCH GOLDSTEIN's massacre of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer and was thereafter banned from politics in Israel. In 1995, Kahane Chai claimed responsibility for an assassination attempt on the Iranian chargé d'affaires at the Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires. From 2002 through 2004, the group refrained from major TERRORIST activity, because it was attempting to convince the Israeli government to lift its ban on the group. In 2005, however, Kahane Chai increased its level of activity in protest of Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON's plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip and leveled serious threats against politicians who supported the withdrawal. Kahane Chai remains active in Israeli society, as its leaders openly recruit new members and membership appears to be growing significantly, and as it holds public demonstrations in which its speakers excoriate the government and its policies.

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Kanafani, Ghassan Fayiz (1936–1972)

Ghassan Kanafani was a Palestinian journalist, writer, intellectual, and revolutionary. He edited *al-Hadaf* (The Target), the weekly publication of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), and published some twenty novels and collections of short stories.

Kanafani was born in ACRE but was dispossessed and fled with his family in the 1948 WAR, staying briefly in LEBANON before settling in Damascus, SYRIA, as REFUGEES. After finishing his secondary education in 1952, Kanafani received a teaching certificate from the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA). He then studied Arabic literature at the University of Damascus but was expelled in 1955 as a result of his involvement in the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN), to which he had been recruited by GEORGE HABASH. In 1955, Kanafani left Syria for a teaching position in KUWAIT, and the following year he became editor of the MAN newspaper *al-Ra'i* (Opinion) until Habash persuaded him to move to Beirut, Lebanon, and join the staff of MAN's official mouthpiece, *al-Hurriyya* (Freedom), in 1960. He also edited the leftist, pan-Arabist paper *al-Muharrir* (The Liberator) and its weekly supplement, *Filastin* (Palestine). During these years, as Kanafani's political sensibilities became more acute, he began to take an interest in Marxism and joined the PFLP, becoming its chief spokesperson and the editor-in-chief of its weekly *al-Hadaf*. He wrote the founding documents of the PFLP, introducing a new communist political and revolutionary philosophy to the Palestinian milieu.

During the early 1960s, Kanafani also began to take his writing more seriously and published the first of numerous short stories. His first novel, *Men in the Sun,* appeared in 1963 and was adapted into a film, *al-Makhduun,* by the Egyptian director Tawfiq Salim. The movie was banned in some Arab countries for its criticism of Arab regimes. Kanafani's ambitious and experimental second novel, *All That's Left to You* (1966), is considered one of the earliest and most successful modernist experiments in Arabic fiction. He used multiple narrators, of which two, the clock and the desert, were inanimate.

Kanafani's life and career as a writer were closely connected to the situation of the Palestinians, and his main themes are uprootedness, exile, and national struggle. He often used the desert and its heat as a symbol for the plight of the Palestinian people. Kanafani's intense involvement in Palestinian affairs gave him a unique vantage point. Another novel, published in 1969, *Umm Sa'd* (Mother of Sa'd), reflects the situation of the Palestinians following the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 and the rise of the Palestinian resistance movement.

On 9 July 1972, at the age of thirty-six, Kanafani was assassinated, along with a young niece, by a bomb planted in his car by the Israeli MOSSAD. Several weeks earlier, the PFLP had claimed responsibility for an attack by three Japanese Red Army gunmen at Lod (Ben Gurion) Airport that left twenty-six dead, and Kanafani was presumably targeted for revenge.

Shortly after his death his only historical study, *The 1936–1939 Revolution in Palestine*, was published. It examined the popular rebellion that began the month he was born. He was posthumously awarded the Lotus Prize for Literature by the Conference of Afro-Asian Writers and left fragments of three novels that were published posthumously. Besides his novels, Kanafani published four collections of short stories, literary criticism, plays, and historical expositions.

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Karama

Karama, a town in JORDAN, was the site of a 21 March 1968 battle between Palestinian guerrillas, mainly from FATAH, together with the Jordanian army, and the Israeli army. In an effort to suppress guerrilla forces, approximately 15,000 armed Israelis entered Jordan with two armor and infantry brigades and three paratroop, tank, and engineer battalions, backed by five artillery battalions. On the other side were approximately 330 to 350 Palestinian guerrillas with sketchy armament, a handful of antitank mines, seven antitank rocket launchers, and two 82-millimeter mortars. Jordan contributed its First Infantry Division with attached tank and artillery battalions.

Initially, Israeli paratroopers unexpectedly came under fire from Palestinian gunmen hiding in caves outside the town, while the main Israeli force faced heavy fire from Jordanian units nearby. The Palestinian fighters forced the Israelis to take Karama street by street—fighting that resulted in unforeseen Israeli casualties. However, by noon, Israel had full control of Karama and systematically destroyed the town, completing its withdrawal by 5:30 P.M.

Israel lost 28 men, with another 90 wounded, plus four tanks, five other vehicles, and an aircraft. The Jordanian army, which did most of the actual fighting against Israel, lost 61 men, with 108 wounded and 12 taken prisoner; in addition, 13 tanks were destroyed, 20 seriously damaged, and 39 other vehicles were disabled. The Palestinian guerrillas suffered the highest cost: 120 were killed, 100 were wounded, and some 40 to 66 were taken prisoner by Israel.

Nevertheless, Karama immediately became a byword for valor in Palestinian symbolism and mythology. Less than a year after the combined Arab armies were overwhelmed by the Israelis in the 1967 WAR, the Palestinian fighters had inflicted painful losses on a superior enemy. Karama was seen not as a victory in battle but as survival against overwhelming odds. Despite the limited guerrilla role in the battle, it became a pivotal event in the emergence of a new Palestinian political identity and placed the Palestinians back on the political map. After the battle, there was a burst of enthusiasm for the Palestinian revolutionaries: recruitment skyrocketed, the semidormant PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION was revived and YASIR ARAFAT was named chairman, and the organization's charter was rewritten to declare that "ARMED STRUGGLE is the only way to liberate Palestine." The myth about Karama grew, for the most part spontaneously, because it met critical psychological needs among the demoralized Palestinians. Although Jordan and Israel provided alternative descriptions of the same events, the battle remains today a significant element in Palestinian historiography.

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Al-Karmel Journal

Al-Karmel is a pioneering Arabic-language literary journal, published quarterly in Israel, and founded in 1981 by Palestinian poet and intellectual MAHMUD DARWISH, who served as editor until his death in 2008.

The journal emphasizes poetry, though not to the exclusion of literary contributions. Darwish was impressed by the Arab poets Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati, Al-Mutanabbi, and the Mahjar poets (emigrant poets such as Kahlil Gibran), as well as the modern Arab poets such as Badr Shakir al-Sayyab. But he was also influenced by such Western poets as Arthur Rimbaud (French), García Lorca (Spain), Pablo Neruda (Chile), William Butler Yeats (Ireland), Derek Walcott (West Indies), Wislawa Szymborska (Poland), and Allen Ginsberg (United States); he also admired the Hebrew poet Yehuda Amichai. These diverse styles and themes, including Arab, Western, and modern influences, are reflected in the pages of *Al-Karmel*. (www.alkarmel.org)

See also MAHMUD DARWISH; PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Al-Karmi, 'Abd-al-Karim (1907–1980)

'Abd-al-Karim Al-Karmi (Abu Salma) was a leading Palestinian poet. He was born in HAIFA, where he studied law and worked until April 1948, when the Israelis occupied the city. He then moved to Akka, but shortly he left Akka for Damascus as a REFUGEE from the 1948 WAR. Abu Salma kept the keys to his house and office in Haifa until he died, hoping to return.

Abu Salma was above all a poet, and he belonged to the generation of poets who wrote the classical *qasidah,* a form of poem from pre-Islamic times often consisting of an *atlal* (a remembrance sparked by the remains of a campsite) and a *rahil* (journey). He loved poetry and used it as a vehicle to write about his attachment to and yearning for Palestine. Abu Salma was a close friend of IBRAHIM TUQAN; their friendship was built on their love of poetry and Palestine. In 1978 he was awarded *The Lotas International Prize for Literature* by the Association of Asian and African Writers. He was also given the title The Olive of Palestine (a reference to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION).

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Karni Crossing

Karni Crossing is one of the border passages, indeed the most important, along the Israeli–GAZA STRIP barrier, a 60-kilometer (36-mile) separation barrier first constructed under the leadership of Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN in 1994 after the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1993). Completed in 1996, it entirely encircles the Gaza Strip and is made up of wire fencing with posts, sensors, and buffer zones on Gazan lands bordering Israel, and concrete and steel walls on lands bordering EGYPT. There are four additional border-crossing points along the barrier: ERETZ, Nahal Oz, Sufa, and Kerem Shalom. The Karni Crossing is managed by and under the control of the Israeli Airports Authority (IAA) backed by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF).

Karni is a cargo terminal located in the eastern end of the Gaza Strip and was intended to allow Palestinian merchants to freely export and import goods. It was constructed for "back-to-back" transfer use, in which merchandise and produce for the Israeli market or for export overseas are removed from a Palestinian truck and placed in an Israeli truck, or vice versa for incoming goods. Additionally, a single-lane conveyor belt runs next to the Karni Crossing, intended to transport grain and animal feed into Gaza.

In the 29 April 1994 "Economic Protocol," which was appended to the "GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT (CAIRO II)" signed on 4 May 1994 as "Annex IV," it states that "the security fence erected by Israel around the Gaza Strip shall remain in place and that the line demarcated by the fence, as shown on the map, shall be authoritative." Additionally, according to the Economic Protocol, Gaza's foreign trade is permitted almost solely with Israel or via Israeli ports. Karni is critical for the Palestinian ECONOMY because it is the only conduit for Palestinian exports and is the main gateway for goods entering Gaza. However, Israel's repeated CLOSURE of Karni has caused hardships for ordinary Palestinians, who have experienced intense shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and other basic necessities, as well as for farmers, manufacturers, and merchants who have been unable either to import or export goods.

Subsequent to the August 2005 ISRAELI UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, including all its SETTLEMENTS and its military posts, Israel continued to control, among other things, Gazan airspace, its territorial waters, and all the crossing points (with the partial exception of RAFAH CROSSING on the Egyptian border). Though the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) had no part in the unilateral withdrawal, in November 2005, Israel signed an accord with the PNA, the

"Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access" (AMA), under which it committed to enable the regular and continuous movement of goods through the crossing and to adhere to clear goals regarding the scope of activity at the crossing. Israel agreed that the number of export trucks to be processed through Karni would reach 150 per day by the end of 2005 and that it would rise to 400 per day by the end of 2006.

In fact, just the opposite occurred: Karni was completely closed on 15 January 2006 for 100 days, which, according to *Ha'aretz* (Israel's preeminent newspaper), resulted in a critical humanitarian situation in Gaza. For example, because no flour was able to enter, there was no bread, and bakeries and mills closed, increasing the already high (60 percent) unemployment level. From September 2006 until June 2007, Karni was mostly open, but with significant restrictions on traffic and goods, and with numerous short-term closures in response to Palestinian actions. On 13 June 2007, Israel closed Karni completely, this time for eighteen months until January 2009, when it was partially reopened. Complicating matters is the fact that Israel does not allow Egyptian trucks to enter Gaza, and if Palestinian trucks leave for Egypt, they are not allowed to return. Moreover, movement of goods through Karni, when it is open, is conducted at a pace far too slow to allow for effective foreign trade.

According to the World Bank, "Karni represents a serious physical barrier to Palestinian trade, embodying a design that introduces unnecessary delays, inflicts damage on goods and severely limits the movement of cargo." The World Bank deems essential for a functioning Palestinian economy the passage of a minimum of 150 trucks per day, while during the years 2000–2006 an average of only 43 trucks a day managed to pass through Karni. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) alone needs 100 trucks a day at Karni with just its bulk grain flour. Additionally, the amount of cargo allowed through the terminal varies from day to day, making it extremely unreliable. The World Bank also charges that Karni "acts as a significant non-tariff barrier to trade, as a result of controls and processes, which (a) makes it difficult for Palestinian exporters and importers to avoid using Israeli middlemen and traders, (b) discriminates against goods entering from the West Bank and exiting Gaza, and (c) obliges Palestinian importers and producers to pay Israeli truckers to sit idle for long periods at the crossing." The movement of cargo through Karni is also impeded by a number of technical issues related to Israel's security demands, but the World Bank states that even if these problems are fixed, there will be no real improvement unless the entire system at Karni is changed.

There is a permanent traffic overload at Karni crossing; however, the crossing does not function at full capacity. For one thing, working hours at Karni are limited. According to the IAA website, the crossing operates between 7:00 and 5:00 Monday through Thursday, and between 7:00 and 1:00 on Fridays. The crossing is closed on Saturdays and on Jewish and Muslim holidays. Other sources, including the UN and the World Bank, report that in practice the crossing operates for an average of only six to seven hours a day. In the past, the authorities justified these limited working hours by claiming that operating the crossing when it is dark entails a security risk. According to B'Tselem, "this claim is completely unfounded. In the past the crossing was kept open from time to time, on some occasions until midnight, in order to facilitate the export of farm produce or for other reasons, clearly indicating that it is feasible to operate the crossing more hours of the day." Moreover, Israeli officials have acknowledged that the limited operating hours stem from financial rather than security concerns. According to state officials, the IAA refuses to bear the costs that an additional work shift at Karni would entail, and government departments have failed to agree which of them is to provide the required funding. It was only after this matter was published and publicly criticized that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert instructed, at a government meeting held in February 2007, that operating hours at Karni on weekdays would be extended until 11:00 p.m. The prime minister also instructed the Ministry of Finance to provide the IAA with the funding necessary to implement this decision. The decision was meant to come into force as of 15 April 2007, but it was not implemented as of July 2009.

Even during the limited hours of the day in which it is open, Karni Crossing does not function at full capacity. Representatives of the IAA place the blame for this on the Palestinian authorities, arguing that "there is a regular shortage of equipment and personnel on the Palestinian side, due to unpaid wages and internal problems, which often cause the terminal to be closed early or not to be

opened at all." It seems that budget problems and organizational failures on the Palestinian side do indeed hamper the functioning of the crossing. This notwithstanding, the crossing would be less inefficient if these problems were not compounded by a shortage of personnel on the Israeli side of the crossing resulting from budgetary problems and organizational failures on the part of the Israeli authorities.

B'Tselem comments, "Had Israel fulfilled its obligations and allocated the sums required in order to extend the scope of activities at Karni, much of the devastation which has beset the economy of Gaza might very well have been prevented and the people of Gaza would thus have been spared much suffering."

The goods that pass through Karni, particularly those being exported from Gaza, are examined in stringent and lengthy procedures, and in many cases goods are damaged as a result of the examination process. There are potential security threats at Karni and thus a need for security measures; however, the examination procedures at the crossing are extremely cumbersome and could be made significantly more efficient without compromising security.

The principal system for moving goods through Karni is, as noted, the "back-to-back" method. This is required because Israel does not permit Israeli trucks to enter the Gaza Strip or Palestinian trucks to enter Israel. Consequently, Israeli trucks stop at the Israeli side of the crossing, where they are unloaded, and the goods are placed in special storage areas ("checking compartments") for examination. After the goods are checked, they are loaded on Palestinian trucks and taken to their destination. The procedure is the same in the opposite direction. When the goods are transported in a shipping container, they must be unloaded from the container to the checking compartments and then returned to the container after the check is completed. The goods are passed through a scanning device such as is common at airports. After the container is taken to its destination and unloaded, it is brought back to Karni, checked, and returned to its owner on the other side of the crossing.

This bulky procedure slows the movement of goods at the crossing to a crawl, resulting in long delays and uncertainty as to when goods can be delivered. Also, during the unloading and reloading of the containers, goods—especially agricultural goods—are liable to be damaged, causing a loss of value. Moreover, due to structural deficiencies at the crossing, goods of different types are treated in proximity and without adequate separation, so that agricultural products and consumer goods may be contaminated and ruined as a result of coming into contact with "dirty" products.

Technologies available today make it possible to conduct much quicker and far more efficient security checks. By using suitable scanners it is possible to carry out a thorough examination of the contents of an entire container along with the trucks on which they are being conveyed. According to the World Bank, a great deal of time and money would be saved if such technology were to be used at Karni, since it would render the "back-to-back" method superfluous. Even if one accepts Israel's position that security threats mandate an absolute prohibition on the movement of trucks from one side of the border to the other, existing technologies make it unreasonable to demand that goods be unpacked from containers for examination: a scanner could be used to carry out a thorough check of the contents. Such devices are in use in many locations around the world, including Israel's Ashdod Port. Scanners of this type are in fact already in place at Karni Crossing. The first of them was purchased in October 2004 with funds provided by the PNA, and more scanner equipment and supporting infrastructure were purchased for Karni by the US Agency for International Development. However, due to dubious managerial or political considerations, this equipment is only used to scan empty containers.

Representatives of the IAA claim that more sophisticated scanners able to scan entire containers will be put into use upon the completion of construction work being conducted at the crossing. Similar claims made in the past were never put into practice. The delay in upgrading the crossing is due to the fact that the IAA refuses to fund such upgrading from its existing resources. The Israeli government itself has been unwilling to allocate the required funds, even though Israel controls the crossing and is responsible for the damage (though it has never paid compensation) that has been inflicted on Palestinians as a result of the convoluted and superfluous security checks it has imposed.

The problems created by the cumbersome security checks at the crossing are compounded by the fact that Gaza imports and exports are checked

more than once before they reach their final destination. For example, goods from Europe intended for Gaza are checked first at Ashdod Port and again at Karni. Goods produced in NABLUS in the West Bank that are intended for Gaza are liable to be checked three times: when leaving Nablus, at the checkpoint into Israel, and at Karni. Israel claims that the duplication is needed to detect weapons that are placed in the container after the first check. This problem, too, could be solved by modern technology, such as with hermetic sealing of the checked containers. The use of such technologies would eliminate the need for duplicate checks and shorten the time needed to get the goods to the customer.

The decision as to what types of goods will be permitted to go through the crossing at a given time is coordinated between the Israeli and Palestinian authorities on an ad hoc basis in a nontransparent process, though more often than not Israel dictates what goods may or may not pass. B'Tselem's research indicates that actors involved in the Palestinian side of the decisionmaking process are prone to give preference to goods of certain types in return for payment or other privileges provided by merchants and manufacturers.

Other acts of corruption involve exploitation of the scheduling system operated by the IAA. Under this system, the unloading of goods for transport through Karni must be arranged in advance via a telephone ordering center. The ordering center allocates places within the schedule based on various categories of merchandise. Because the limited number of trucks allowed to unload at Karni on each day is far from sufficient to meet demand, there is a great deal of pressure on the ordering center. The telephone lines at the center are constantly busy, and callers are forced to wait on hold for extended periods and to call again and again until one of the operators is available. Even when one reaches an operator, it is only possible to schedule an unloading date a few weeks in advance. Business owners who need to deliver goods urgently are thus compelled to accept offers by profiteering Israeli carriers who schedule unloading dates in advance and then offer to transport goods on the dates allotted to them in return for hefty sums, sometimes as much as ten times higher than the typical cost of transportation.

Testimonies collected by B'Tselem further indicate that certain carriers are given preferential treatment in the allocation of unloading dates in return for bribes. These carriers then charge exorbitant prices to deliver goods on the dates allotted to them.

All of these issues have had a disastrous effect on the Gazan economy and on the well-being of the Palestinian residents of Gaza. Despite the November 2005 "Agreement on Movement and Access" that was supposed to regularize and improve trade through Karni, data for each of the following years demonstrate that Israel did not fulfill its commitments. According to a report published by the World Bank in association with Paltrade (Palestine Trade Center, with offices in Ramallah and Gaza City), during 2006 the Karni Crossing operated fully (allowing the passage of both exports and imports) on 171 of the 313 available working days (54.6 percent). The crossing was completely closed for 86 days. On 12 of these days the crossing was closed for holidays, whereas on the remaining 74 days it was closed by the Israeli authorities for unspecified security reasons. On an additional 55 days the crossing was open for imports only, and on one day the crossing was open for exports only. The average number of monthly working hours at the crossing in 2006 was 122.5 of the 331 working hours possible (37 percent). According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the number of truckloads exported from Gaza in 2006 was, on average, only 12 per day, just 8 percent of the 150 trucks-per-day quota established for the beginning of the year and a mere 3 percent of the 400 trucks-per-day target set for the end of the year.

Ninety-five percent of Gazan industry is based on enterprises that rely on the importation of raw materials. Eighty percent of these enterprises need machines and replacement parts, which are imported, to operate. During 2006, due to the lack or absence of raw materials entering Gaza, 80 percent of the enterprises were forced to close down operations. The remaining enterprises operated at 60 percent capacity. During the same year more than 1,300 shipping containers of imported products intended for Gaza were prohibited by Tel Aviv from entering and were thus stuck in Israel, forcing importers to pay storage costs and late fees and bear the heavy loss of expensive perishable goods. In the construction sector, building stopped or was delayed because of the lack of raw materials. The total economic losses during the first month of 2006 alone were estimated at $20.6 million. In this period, 3,190 businesses

closed temporarily and 65,800 workers, who support 450,000 dependents, lost their jobs. As each day of siege passed, more business shut down and more Gazans found themselves without a means of livelihood.

United Nations data show that as of March 2007, Karni Crossing was still operating only during half of its scheduled working hours, the scope of import remained low, and export was being conducted at a rate of approximately forty trucks per day, just 10 percent of the quota that, according to the AMA, should have already been reached by the end of 2006.

B'Tselem analyzed the situation at Karni in terms of Israel's security needs and had the following to say: "The cessation of trade flows due to closures enforced by the Israeli authorities for security reasons has inflicted a great deal of harm on the population of the Gaza Strip.

"[During the period from January 2006 through June 2007] various Palestinian factions have repeatedly attempted, and on some occasions have succeeded, to smuggle arms and suicide attackers into Israel via Karni crossing. The crossing itself was the target of a number of attacks by Palestinians which resulted in injuries and deaths at the crossing. The Israeli authorities, who are obligated to defend Israeli civilians, have a right and indeed a duty to thwart such threats. However, even when they do so, they are not at liberty to ignore the rights and needs of the Palestinian civilians over whom they wield effective control. Israel must endeavor not to inflict damage on this population beyond the minimum necessary to achieve legitimate security objectives. The frequent and prolonged closures enforced at Karni crossing failed to meet this requirement.

"An equitable balance between Israel's security needs and the needs of the people of Gaza would require that the movement of goods between Gaza and Israel not be prevented except where and when necessary in order to neutralize a security threat. In practice, however, since the outbreak of the second intifada, Karni crossing has repeatedly been closed for extended periods even in the absence of a concrete security threat. Moreover, when the crossing was closed no effort was made to provide for a reasonable alternative which might allow for trade to continue. Such an alternative could have been created, for example, by permitting the movement of goods via one of the other border crossings between Israel and Gaza, or by allowing for the establishment of a sea port, if only of a temporary and restricted nature.

"Since it would have been possible to thwart security threats directed at Karni by more restricted means focused on the time and place of the threat, it appears that the comprehensive closures enforced on Gaza for extended periods were in fact not legitimate security measures, but rather a form of collective punishment or a means of applying pressure on the people of Gaza. This impression is reinforced in view of the tight economic blockade which Israel placed on Gaza after the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit on 26 June 2006, which has caused a steep deterioration in Gaza's already weak economy." (Shalit is an Israeli soldier who was kidnapped by Palestinian militants in a cross-border raid from the Gaza Strip and has been held hostage by HAMAS since.)

In June 2007, Hamas carried out a successful coup against FATAH in Gaza. During fighting between Fatah and Hamas militants, some of the equipment at Karni was destroyed, including damage to the container loading platforms. In response to the coup, Israel closed Karni completely on 12 June 2007 for the next eighteen months. The total boycott resulted in a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions as even essential medicine and food were prohibited.

On 27 December 2008, Israel unleashed OPERATION CAST LEAD, a massive land, sea, and air assault against Gaza that lasted until 18 January 2009. By January 2010, a year after Operation Cast Lead, Karni was still not fully open, and the residents of Gaza continued to suffer. Israel's sweeping ban continued on the import of construction materials, spare parts for public infrastructure, and industrial inputs into Gaza, along with restrictions on the entry of cash, which prevented the implementation of almost all planned early recovery activities.

See also GAZA STRIP; INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; OPERATION CAST LEAD

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Karp Commission, 1981

In April 1981, a commission headed by Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp was established in the Israeli Ministry of Justice "to ensure, as far as possible, that suspicions about offenses committed by Israelis [settlers] in the Judea and Samaria Region [WEST BANK] against Arab residents of that region be investigated speedily, substantively and efficiently." The Karp Commission examined some seventy incidents of SETTLER VIOLENCE that had been reported, including killings, armed threats, trespassing, assault, property damage, and disturbances of public order.

The commission's conclusions criticized the violence by Jewish settlers against Palestinians living under Israeli OCCUPATION and stated that Israeli troops and Jewish settlers were engaged in a massive miscarriage of justice against Palestinians. The Karp Report further declared that the Israeli administration of justice in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES was in need of "a radical reform of the basic concept of the rule of law in its broadest and most profound sense."

The report found that Jewish settlers were regularly protected by the army and seldom arrested for offenses ranging from shootings to massive destruction of property against Palestinians. It found that settlers considered themselves above the law and refused to cooperate with Israeli police investigating Palestinian complaints: "Israeli [civilian] residents of the territories are given to understand that they are soldiers to all intents and purposes. . . . Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria, explicitly relying on this assurance, refuse to cooperate with the police or provide information; they reject any contact with the police, basing themselves on 'high-level policy' and declaring that they are under no obligation to cooperate in this matter." The report cited the radical settlers living in KIRYAT ARBA and the adjoining Palestinian city of HEBRON as being of particular threat to Palestinians and stated that the settlers' refusal to cooperate with civilian police was "tantamount to civil rebellion."

The Karp Commission's conclusions were considered so critical of Israel's Occupation policies that the government, which had commissioned the inquiry, kept them secret for twenty months, until 9 February 1984, and then only released a highly censored version (the full report has never been released). Government officials condemned the report, charging that it was unfair and misleading, and no policies were undertaken to remedy the situation. Still, on the basis of the censored report, the *Jerusalem Post* editorialized: "The Karp Report bears out the initial suspicion that a systematic miscarriage of justice is being perpetrated in the West Bank. Jewish settlers wishing to assert their rights to the area take the law into their own hands and refuse . . . to cooperate in police investigations. . . . The police, deferring to the army, fail to stand on their own rights and the army tends to look benignly on those it views as its soldiers. The result . . . is that files are closed without anyone being booked."

The Karp Commission's conclusions were validated a decade later, in the aftermath of the 1994 massacre of Arabs in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE by a Jewish settler, when Israeli police and troops told the special SHAMGAR COMMISSION that there were different laws for Jews and Palestinians. The chief inspector of the border police stationed in Hebron testified that troops had standing orders never to shoot at Jewish settlers even if the settlers were shooting at Palestinians, stating, "Even if I had been there I would not have been able to do a thing because there were special instructions regarding this. The open-fire orders were that if a settler in Hebron fires purposefully, under no circumstances should he be shot at." Also, in 1994, B'TSELEM, the Israeli human rights group, published a major report on settler violence in which it declared nothing had changed since the Karp Commission's report.

See also HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; SASSON REPORT; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Kennedy, John F. (1917–1963)

John F. Kennedy was the thirty-fifth president of the UNITED STATES, governing from 20 January 1961 through 22 November 1963, when he was assassinated. His political career started as a Democratic congressman from the Boston area and advanced to the Senate in 1953. Kennedy came to the presidency with an energetic and ambitious program. He was sympathetic to third world nations in general, and in the Middle East he worked to improve relations with EGYPT and other states; considered ways to resolve the Palestinian REFUGEE issue, although he never viewed the Palestine question as one of national rights; and forged a close and intimate relationship with Israel, selling it Hawk missiles and turning a shaded eye to its nuclear proliferation.

Almost immediately on assuming office, Kennedy undertook an initiative to address the Palestinian refugee issue, based on UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194, which called for repatriation or compensation for the refugees. He encouraged the UN CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE (UNCCP) to reenergize and appoint a special representative to discuss the refugee issue with Israel and the Arab states involved and come up with a plan. Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was selected to head the commission and held talks with the heads of state in the Middle East in September 1961 and May 1962. Although he acted independently, he consulted with and reported to US Department of State officials on a regular basis. Johnson also worked closely with UNCCP land expert Frank Jarvis, who, along with UNCCP principal secretary John P. Gaillard and UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY official Sherwood G. Moe, studied several methods for estimating the value of land, movable property, and so forth for purposes of compensating the refugees.

The four men met in March 1962 to discuss the specifics of a plan. After numerous ideas were presented a proposal emerged containing five main points: (1) Each Palestinian would be given an opportunity, free from all external pressures, to express whether he preferred repatriation or resettlement; (2) Israel's legitimate security interests would be safeguarded by allowing it, subject to UN review, to reject individual Palestinians as a security risk; (3) both repatriation and resettlement would be handled in a gradual, step-by-step process and would be undertaken simultaneously; (4) a special fund, to which Israel would be expected to make a substantial contribution, would be set up to pay compensation for Palestinian properties expropriated by Israel as well as to provide financial help to assist the resettled Palestinians to become self-supporting; and (5) the United States would play a vital role in supervising all aspects and stages of the program.

In total, the plan to pay compensation based on the value of land, movable property, interest, and so forth totaled some 400 million Palestinian pounds, or US $1.125 billion. Word of the various general figures being discussed began to leak out almost immediately, and some people with connections to the UN began talking of US $1.5 billion in compensation while other figures cited at that time were between two and seven times as large. But like the estimate of refugee property values itself, the overall compensation plan never was made public and has lain hidden in the UNCCP archives for four decades.

More important, the "Johnson Plan," or "Palestine Refugee Initiative" as it was also called, was rejected in November 1962 by the Israeli Knesset, which opposed any significant repatriation of refugees to Israel, while the Arab states remained unwilling to deal with Israel and thus were cool to a comprehensive resettlement.

At the same time, Kennedy began secret negotiations with Israel over arms sales. In May 1961, Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION, in a private meeting with Kennedy in New York, requested Hawk missiles. Although the president failed to make the sale formally conditional, Kennedy had expected that in return for the sale of Hawk antiaircraft missiles, Israel would react favorably to the Johnson Plan, especially with the United States underwriting the attendant financial costs. As it turned out, Israel received the Hawk missiles in the fall of 1962 and at the same time again rejected the Johnson Plan. In December, under intense Israeli and US pro-Israel pressure, Kennedy abandoned the plan altogether.

At the 1961 meeting between Kennedy and Ben-Gurion, according to Israeli professor Zaki Shalom, "The issue of Israel's nuclear activity naturally headed the president's agenda." The tone of their conversation was relaxed, according to Shalom, following the Kennedy administration's decision "to avoid an open dispute [with Israel] over the [nuclear] Project." The new president told Ben-Gurion that he wanted more inspections, but it was phrased as a "request" rather than a demand. The reason for the soft approach was apparently the Kennedy administration's assessment "that Israelis, especially David Ben-Gurion, perceived the 'Dimona [NUCLEAR] Project' as a matter of supreme national importance and that Israel considered any concessions on that question unthinkable." Under such circumstances, Kennedy apparently thought it pointless to pressure the Israeli government, and Ben-Gurion seems to have thought it politic to permit US limited inspections.

But Israel controlled the inspections very tightly. Through rouse and deception, inspectors never saw the most sensitive and serious activities at Dimona. The first tour, after much Israeli stalling, occurred on 18 May 1961 when two scientists from the US Atomic Energy Commission

spent the day being shown around Dimona, saw no plutonium-separation plant, and gave the reactor something close to a clean bill of health. Not until sixteen months later were two other commission scientists taken on another tour around Dimona—this time for just forty minutes. Kennedy was most displeased.

In 1963 the president finally attempted something of a showdown. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told the Israelis that Kennedy now wanted semiannual, unhindered visits of Dimona by US experts. The president insisted on two inspections per year to see how fast the Dimona reactor was burning through fuel—a telltale sign of a weapons program, but Ben-Gurion defiantly offered one supervised visit per year. That spring, Kennedy sent Ben-Gurion two letters warning that US-Israel relations would be "seriously jeopardized" without real inspections. When Ben-Gurion resigned over an unrelated domestic political scandal, Kennedy repeated the warning to the new prime minister, LEVI ESHKOL, whose policy was to mollify Washington without abandoning the secret program of nuclear weapons production. He agreed to regular US visits, hinting that the six-month schedule would not be a problem, and promised to return plutonium produced at Dimona to FRANCE. Meanwhile, as the Federation of American Scientists later reported, Eshkol ordered the installation of false control-room panels and bricked over passages leading to Dimona's innards so that inspectors were completely deceived.

By mid-1963, buoyed by the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Kennedy intended to take a firmer approach toward the Israeli nuclear program, although he died before taking any action and, given his successor LYNDON B. JOHNSON's highly sympathetic view toward the Jewish state, little else was ever raised about the issue.

Kennedy's positive rhetoric vis-à-vis Israel went significantly beyond anything said by previous presidents. For example, he told a gathering of Jewish leaders: "This nation, from the time of President WOODROW WILSON, has established and continued a tradition of friendship with Israel. . . . In the prophetic spirit of ZIONISM, all free men today look to a better world and in the experience of Zionism we know that it takes courage and perseverance and dedication to achieve it. . . . Israel was not created in order to disappear—Israel will endure and flourish. It is the child of hope and home of the brave. It can neither be broken by adversity nor demoralized by success. It carries the shield of democracy and it honors the sword of freedom." When Foreign Minister GOLDA MEIR visited the United States in December 1962, Kennedy told her that the United States has a "special relationship" with Israel "really comparable only to that which [the US] has with Britain over a wide-range of world affairs." The president also told Meir at this meeting that the Johnson Plan was dead.

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Khalaf, Salah (1933–1991)

Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) was the second-in-command, after YASIR ARAFAT, of the FATAH movement and was in charge of intelligence and counterintelligence in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Khalaf was born in JAFFA but was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and fled with his middle-class family to GAZA, where he received his diploma from a UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA) school and then went to EGYPT for university studies. In Cairo, Khalaf met Arafat, and the two established the team that would later lead to Fatah and the PLO, as well as the Palestinian resistance movement in general.

In Egypt, Arafat, Khalaf, and others formed the General Union of Palestinian Students, and in 1956 Khalaf succeeded Arafat as president. In 1957, he earned a degree in philosophy and returned to Gaza to pursue a career in teaching, but in 1959 he joined Arafat in KUWAIT, where, with Arafat and KHALIL AL-WAZIR, the seeds for the Fatah organization were planted. Later Khalaf, together with the core Fatah members, moved to SYRIA, which at the time was hospitable to the Palestinian movement. There he emerged as one of the architects of the PLO policy toward Arab governments and helped the PLO establish ties with Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, who had initially been suspicious of Fatah's intentions.

Khalaf was a private man who remained out of the spotlight; he lacked the mass appeal of other leaders, but within the Fatah movement he was second only to Arafat. Khalaf participated in the "JORDAN experience" of the development of PLO institutions there, and, like the rest of the PLO leaders, had to relocate to LEBANON in its aftermath. That and the later massacres of BLACK SEPTEMBER, 1970, in which some 2,500 Palestinians were killed in the conflict with Jordan, left their mark on him. He is credited (or blamed) for the creation of the secretive BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION within Fatah that claimed responsibility for numerous attacks. Israeli intelligence would mistakenly credit the braggart young PLO leader ABU 'ALI HASAN SALAMAH, but it was Abu Iyad who was the real leader. In the Lebanon sojourn of the PLO experience, Khalaf remained in the shadows and cultivated a wide intelligence network that proved highly useful for the PLO in its planning and activities. He maintained a wide network of agents and spies for his secret apparatus and was quite eager to cultivate ties on college campuses and in schools. His department (of intelligence and counterintelligence) was also active in recruiting Arab students in Europe, the UNITED STATES, and around the world. For his operations, he required constant financial support and often clashed with the mercurial Arafat, who controlled the flow of money.

First in Fatah and then in the PLO, Arafat demonstrated his trust of Khalaf, and the relationship between the two men was strong enough that Khalaf was viewed as the person who could disagree with Arafat over major issues of policymaking. Yet politically the two were often at odds. Khalaf was a firm believer in the efficacy of ARMED STRUGGLE and opposed the US-led peace process and Arafat's secret negotiations with US emissaries going on at the time. He also did not support Arafat's cautious approach in the Lebanese civil war and wanted more vocal and active support for the leftist coalition. Instead, Arafat maintained ties with the right-wing militias through secret emissaries. In 1991 Khalaf clashed with Arafat over Arafat's decision to support IRAQ president Saddam Husayn, because Khalaf didn't trust Husayn, who had pursued a long war and campaign of terror against Palestinian activists when they disagreed with the Iraqi regime. So strongly did Khalaf feel about this issue that, in a rare move, he made his position public.

In the meetings of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE, Khalaf often clashed with Arafat and not infrequently headed the faction that opposed the chairman. But they both needed one another, and Arafat could not promote policies in Fatah unless

he had the support of Khalaf. In January 1991, Khalaf was assassinated in TUNIS by an ABU NIDAL operative.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Khalid, Layla (1944–)

Layla Khalid was politically active in the Palestinian resistance movement and is most remembered for her part in two airline hijackings. She was born in HAIFA, was dispossessed with her family in the 1948 WAR, and became (with her family) a refugee in LEBANON. After completing her secondary education, Khalid entered the American University of Beirut and, in 1962, joined the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN). She left Beirut for a year to teach in KUWAIT and during her stay joined the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) in 1968. When Khalid left Kuwait, she moved to Amman, JORDAN, where she attended paramilitary training courses. On 29 August 1969, she participated in the hijacking of a Trans World Airlines plane en route to Damascus, SYRIA. On 6 September 1970, she participated in an unsuccessful hijacking of an El Al plane, for which she was sentenced to prison in London. After she was released, several weeks later, Khalid became a member of the PFLP's Central Committee. Later she married, had a family, and wrote an autobiography entitled *My People Shall Live*. When YASIR ARAFAT convened the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL in Gaza in 1998, Khalid attended.

Al-Khalidi Family

The Khalidi family is one of JERUSALEM's oldest and most prestigious Palestinian families. Known especially for their scholarship and for being a part of the city's fiber and history, the Khalidis have lived in Jerusalem since 1187 and have left their mark on the city in many ways, notably by bequeathing to it a library of untold value.

The Khalidi Library is one of the most significant sites in Jerusalem and is housed in a thirteenth-century Mamluk building that recalls the city's medieval grandeur. The family's collections were officially organized into a library in 1900 under the terms of a private family trust, or *Waqf thurri,* established by Hajj Raghib al-Khalidi, a Palestinian judge. Although the architectural features of the library summarize much of Jerusalem's history, it is its intellectual composition that comprises the real treasure as an indigenous collection built by Palestinians. The library contains some 1,200 precious manuscripts: 18 in Persian, 36 in Turkish, and the rest in Arabic, and a catalogue released in January 2007 that was prepared by Dr. Lawrence I. Conrad. Not yet catalogued are well over 5,000 printed volumes and countless documents and letters. The collection is distinguished by its medieval manuscripts and the fact that it spans a broad spectrum of subjects with religious law at its center. Other fields include medicine, history, geography, astronomy, Quranic exegesis, rhetoric, logic, philosophy, and poetry. In all, its holdings reveal the concerns and interests of educated Palestinians during the Mamluk and OTTOMAN periods and shed light on the intellectual heritage of Palestinians in Jerusalem from medieval times to the present.

The Mamluk structure that houses the collection is known by its abbreviated Arabic name, al-Khalidiyyah (the Khalidi Library), and it is the *turbah* (burial site) of Amir Husam al-Din Barkah Khan, a thirteenth-century military chieftain, and his two sons, Husam al-Din and Badr al-Din. The Khalidis undertook numerous phases of construction and restoration that are mainly Ottoman in character. In 1876, they constructed a family mosque on part of the site, which is presently the library's reading room. The Khalidi family has traditionally preserved the core of the collection. This was true of Sun 'Allah al-Khalidi, who held the position of chief secretary to the Religious Court of Jerusalem for forty years and died in 1726. He secured the various family collections, which were then consolidated in the late nineteenth century. But it was Khadijah al-Khalidi, great-grandmother of the family's present-day senior member Walid, who endowed with her own money the *Waqf* that her son Raghib established and who persuaded other family members to contribute to it and its future.

During the Mamluk period, at least three members of the Khalidi family served as *qadi al*

qudat (chief justice). For most of the Ottoman period as well, Khalidi scholars served in the judiciary, and in the decades preceding World War I they also served as administrators, diplomats, and members of parliament. Shortly after the turn of the century, Ruhi Khalidi (1864–1913) served as a member of parliament for Jerusalem and as consul-general in Bordeaux, FRANCE. He lectured at the Sorbonne and wrote a book on Victor Hugo, recently reprinted with an introduction that identifies it as the first work in Arabic on comparative literature.

In the twentieth century, Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi (1896–1951) was a prominent Palestinian educator who served in the BRITISH MANDATE government's education department; was principal of the Teacher's College, which he renamed The Arab College in Jerusalem; was appointed deputy-director of education in 1941; and was the author and translator of many books on education and psychology. He is best known for the role he played in developing the Palestinian Arab educational curriculum, focusing on nationalism and Arabism.

Samih al-Khalidi's wife was a Lebanese feminist, writer, translator, and educator. Anbarah Salam al-Khalidi (1897–1986) translated Homer's *Odyssey* and Virgil's *Aeneid* into Arabic for the first time. She was also the first woman in Greater SYRIA to unveil her face, in 1927. In October 1929, Anbarah attended the first nationalist meeting for women at a general conference held in Jerusalem and organized a demonstration to protest the increasing Jewish IMMIGRATION.

The family tradition of scholarship in the context of Palestine continues today. The family's senior living member, Harvard University professor Walid Khalidi, son of Ahmad Samih al-Khalidi, was born in Jerusalem in 1925 and educated at Oxford and the University of London. He is cofounder of both the Royal Scientific Society in Amman, JORDAN, and of the INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, of which he has been general secretary since 1963. His most recent book is the 700-page volume *All That Remains,* which painstakingly documents the disappearance of 416 Palestinian villages during the 1948 WAR. Walid's younger cousin Rashid, born in 1950, holds the EDWARD SAID Professor of Arab Studies chair at Columbia University, where he is the director of the Middle East Institute, and it is he who is presently directing the work on the private papers of the Khalidi Library.

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Kibbutz

A kibbutz (plural is kibbutzim) is an Israeli collective community. Initially, the kibbutzim combined socialism and ZIONISM into a communal movement that lasted for several generations (circa 1910–1970) as relatively utopian communities. Today, however, they are scarcely different from the capitalist enterprises and regular towns to which the kibbutzim were originally supposed to be alternatives. Though the kibbutz movement never accounted for more than 7 percent of the Israeli population, it has given Israel a disproportionate share of its military leaders, intellectuals, and politicians.

In 1909 the first viable kibbutz, called Degania, was established at the southern end of the Sea of Galilee near the Arab village Umm Juni. By the end of the 1920s, there were twelve kibbutzim with a combined population of 805 persons. Most kibbutzim were founded on land that had been cultivated by Palestinians. For example, the land on which Degania was established had previously been occupied by Palestinian tenant farmers, who were evicted when the land was purchased from ABSENTEE LANDLORDS by a Zionist SETTLEMENT agency. Because the founders of the kibbutz movement wanted to redeem the Jewish nation through work, they refused to hire non-Jews to do hard tasks. This exclusivity in agricultural and industrial hiring was a major issue of contention with the Palestinians, who felt discriminated against at a time when they were losing their LANDS to Jewish purchasers and Jewish IMMIGRATION was overwhelming the country.

In the 1930s, the role of the kibbutzim in the pre-state Jewish Yishuv began to increasingly involve military activities equal to or greater than their economic endeavors of farming and industry. Kibbutzim played a role in defining the BORDERS of the Jewish state-to-be: by the late 1930s, when it appeared that Palestine would be partitioned between Arabs and Jews, kibbutzim were planted in remote parts of the BRITISH MANDATE to make it more likely that the land would be incorporated into Israel rather than a Palestinian state. Many of these kibbutzim were founded, literally, in the middle of the night. In 1946, in one day a dozen new "Tower and Stockade" kibbutzim, as they were called, were hurriedly established in the northern part of the Negev to give Israel a better claim to this arid but strategically important region. By 1948 there were over 100 kibbutzim.

One kibbutz, Maagan Michael, manufactured the bullets for the Sten guns that helped win the 1948 WAR. Maagan Michael's clandestine ammunition factory was later separated from the kibbutz and grew into TAAS (Israel Military Industries). In the war kibbutzniks were considered to have fought especially bravely, emerging from the conflict with enhanced prestige in the nascent state of Israel. For example, members of Degania, using homemade gasoline bombs, were instrumental in stopping the Syrian tank advance into the Galilee.

After the war, kibbutzim continued to play an outsized role in Israel's defense apparatus. In the 1950s and 1960s many kibbutzim were established by an ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES group called NAHAL on the precarious and porous borders of the state. In the 1967 WAR, Israel lost 800 soldiers, fully 200 of them from kibbutzim. The prestige that kibbutzniks enjoyed in Israel in the 1960s was reflected in the Knesset, where they made up 15 percent of Israel's parliament while comprising only 4 percent of the Israeli population. There are currently approximately 250 kibbutzim.

By the 1970s, the kibbutzim were hiring large numbers of Palestinians from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES as cheap laborers, and 38 percent of kibbutz employees were kibbutz members. With the OSLO ACCORDS, Israel began prohibiting Palestinians from entering Israel; thus temporary workers from Thailand and elsewhere have now replaced Palestinians as the non-Jewish physical work element at kibbutzim.

In his history of Palestine under the British Mandate, *One Palestine, Complete*, Israeli historian Tom Segev wrote of the kibbutz movement: "The *kibbutz* was an original social creation, yet always a marginal phenomenon. By the end of the 1930s no more than 4,000 people, children included, lived on some thirty *kibbutzim*, and they amounted to a mere 2.5 percent of Palestine's Jewish population. The most important service the *kibbutzim* provided to the Jewish national struggle was military, not economic or social. They were guardians of Zionist land, and their patterns of settlement would to a great extent determine the country's borders."

See also HISTADRUT; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION

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King Abdullah (1882–1951)

See ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; JORDAN

King-Crane Commission, 1919

The King-Crane Commission was a US commission of inquiry sent to the Middle East to ascertain the attitudes and views of the Arab people on the proposed British and French MANDATES for the region. On 20 March 1919, US president WOODROW WILSON proposed that an Inter-Allied Commission visit SYRIA and Palestine "to elucidate the state of opinion" and to report its findings to the Paris Peace Conference. The French refused to appoint representatives, and, although the British named theirs, London later withdrew. As a result, only the two US members, Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane, proceeded with their staff, arriving at JAFFA, Palestine, on 10 June, and submitted a report late in the summer. In the end, neither the European powers nor the UNITED STATES, both focusing energy on the new League of Nations, gave the King-Crane inquiry serious consideration. Politics, not principle, triumphed in

Paris. Nevertheless, the report remains of considerable historical significance and here a small segment of it is printed that bears on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Fundamentally, King and Crane recommended "serious modification of the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited IMMIGRATION of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State." The commissioners noted that they began their study of ZIONISM with "minds predisposed in its favor," but that the actual facts in Palestine had led them to make the recommendation they did. The commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the Zionist program by the ZIONIST COMMISSION to Palestine, heard testimony in conferences concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims, and personally saw something of what had been accomplished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists and had warm appreciation for the devotion of many of the colonists and for their success in overcoming great natural obstacles.

They also noted their awareness of the promises given by the British in the BALFOUR DECLARATION. But, they averred, if the strict terms of the Balfour Declaration were adhered to, "the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified." A "national home for the Jewish people," they declared, "is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State." Such a Jewish state, they argued, could only be accomplished with the gravest harm to the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. In the commission's conference with Jewish representatives, the Zionists repeatedly indicated that they expected a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine.

King and Crane reiterated that the Zionists and others must remember that the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire Zionist program, and that to subject a people so opposed to unlimited Jewish immigration and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the LAND would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights, though it kept within the forms of law.

They also dismissed as absurd the claim by the Zionists that they have a "right" to Palestine, based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago.

King and Crane further addressed the fact that CHRISTIANITY and Islam both have religious attachments to Palestine and that it is doubtful "whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole." They further argued that Jewish control over all the holy sites in Jerusalem and the remainder of Palestine "would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as 'the Holy Land.'"

Thus, expressing a genuine sense of sympathy for the Jewish project, the commissioners felt bound to recommend that "only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up."

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King David Hotel, 1946

The King David Hotel in JERUSALEM was the base for the British secretariat, the military command, and a branch of the Criminal Investigation Division (police) during the BRITISH MANDATE. On 22 July 1946, members of the IRGUN, a militant Zionist group intent on driving Britain out of Palestine, exploded a bomb at the hotel. Ninety-one people were killed, most of them civilians: twenty-eight Britons, forty-one Arabs, seventeen Jews, and five others. Approximately forty-five people were injured.

The attack was initially ordered by DAVID BEN-GURION, who was in the UNITED STATES, but he later changed his mind and ordered the bombing cancelled. But MENAHEM BEGIN, the head of Irgun, went ahead anyway. Both Ben-Gurion and Begin would later become Israeli prime ministers.

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King Husayn

See ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; JORDAN

Kiryat Arba Settlement

Kiryat Arba is one of the oldest Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK, abutting the city of HEBRON. It is also home to the most ideologically extremist elements in the settlement movement, including GUSH EMUNIM and KACH. It was started on 4 April 1968, when RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER, his wife Miriam, and a small group who called themselves Gush Emunim rented rooms in the Park Hotel in downtown Hebron for Passover, then refused to leave, announcing that they had come to reestablish Hebron's Jewish community. Initially, the government was uncertain how to react, but with the support of Deputy Prime Minister YIGAL ALLON and MOSHE DAYAN, former defense minister and at the time administrator of the Occupied Territories, the government approved a permanent settlement for the group. The settlers were moved from the Park Hotel to a special area in the Military Administration Building in Hebron, where they lived while the government built permanent homes for them in Kiryat Arba. By 1972, the settlement was flourishing and had 105 housing units.

Today, Kiryat Arba is a self-sufficient community with prenursery though postsecondary educational institutions, medical facilities, shopping centers, a bank, and a post office. It encompasses 2,543 dunums (635 acres), which does not include the area of Kiryat Arba that blocks the developmental capacity of Hebron in the east. The population of Kiryat Arba in 2005 was approximately 6,500 (including the settlers in the center of Hebron), with an additional 2,700 Israelis living in a number of smaller satellite settlements. In the heart of Hebron, more than 600 settlers live in six enclaves. The Palestinian population of Hebron, in contrast, is approximately 160,000.

Residents of Kiryat Arba and the surrounding settlements have perpetrated continuous violence against the Palestinians living in the area. BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, who murdered twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE, was from Kiryat Arba, and his settlement neighbors erected a monument to him declaring him a righteous man of God.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; HEBRON; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Kiryat Shmona

On 11 April 1974, a team of three members of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND penetrated the

Israeli bordertown of Kiryat Shmona from LEBANON. Although they had apparently been instructed to take hostages, they instead entered an apartment building and killed all eighteen residents, including nine children. The TERRORISTS then barricaded themselves in one of the apartments and were eventually killed in an exchange of fire with Israeli forces. Subsequently, the prevention of such attacks was cited by the Israeli government for the 1978 invasion of Lebanon in OPERATION LITANI.

Kissinger, Henry Alfred (1923–)

Henry Kissinger was the fifty-sixth US secretary of state, serving from 1973 to 1977, and assistant to the president for National Security Affairs (NSA) from 1969 until 1975. His tenure spanned the terms of both Presidents RICHARD NIXON and GERALD FORD. In 1973, together with Le Duc Tho, Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize for ending the Vietnam War. After leaving government service, he founded Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm of which he is chairman. Born in GERMANY, Kissinger came to the UNITED STATES in 1938 and was naturalized in 1943. He received all his higher education from Harvard University and was a faculty member there from 1954 until 1971. Kissinger wrote numerous books and articles on US foreign policy, international affairs, and diplomatic history, for which he has received prestigious awards.

Kissinger's entry into Middle East politics came early in his tenure as National Security Council adviser when he worked to undermine the efforts of Secretary of State WILLIAM P. ROGERS. Kissinger's worldview centered on the bipolar Soviet-American competition, in which every regional problem was seen as an aspect of the conflict between the two world powers. Rogers, on the other hand, was attuned to the indigenous nature of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict, believed that a solution to the problem could be found, worried about the decline in influence of the United States with the Arab states, and was concerned about the trends toward radicalization and polarization in those countries as well as emerging Palestinian militancy.

President Nixon authorized Rogers to pursue two sets of parallel talks—one between Moscow and the United States and the second among FRANCE, Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Kissinger did everything he could, successfully, to ensure that no initiatives came out of these talks, because he thought any peace plan would be an appeasement of the Soviets. Frustrated, Rogers put forward his own initiative on 9 December 1969—the ROGERS PLAN. Instead of supporting it, however, Kissinger worked to torpedo it—primarily by backing Israel's rejection of the proposal and at the same time facilitating an increase in sophisticated weapons and aid to the Jewish state.

As a consequence of their experience in Vietnam, Kissinger and Nixon developed the idea of "regional surrogates," known as the Nixon Doctrine, and they designated IRAN and Israel as the Middle Eastern surrogates for US intervention in the region. This was the beginning of the concept of Israel as a "STRATEGIC ASSET," which became the dominant perception in US political culture and provides the backdrop to the massive armament and aid the US annually provides Israel. When the Palestinian-Jordanian civil war erupted in September 1970 (BLACK SEPTEMBER), Kissinger was certain that the Soviets were behind it, although all Western intelligence agencies had evidence that Moscow had tried to defuse the crisis. Moreover, Kissinger asked Israel to mobilize and come to Jordan's defense if JORDAN was unable to manage the conflict. Amman effectively handled the crisis on its own, but Israel's readiness to act cemented for Washington the state's role as a surrogate power.

In the first months of the Nixon administration, senior officials such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird believed it was important that Washington try to check Israeli nuclear progress for the sake of stability in the Middle East. In April 1969, NSA adviser Kissinger issued National Security Study Memorandum 40, requesting the national security bureaucracy to develop options for dealing with the Israeli nuclear program. A Senior Review Group, chaired by Kissinger, proposed initiating a probe with Israeli ambassador YITZHAK RABIN designed to achieve its policy objectives of reducing Israel's NUCLEAR PROGRAM. Nixon approved the group's proposal for action but, on Kissinger's advice, declined to use deliveries of advanced F-4 Phantom jets as leverage for the investigation. This decision was fateful for the entire exercise, convincing Israel that it could pursue its nuclear program without facing a reduction in US arms sales.

On 29 July 1969 Ambassador Rabin was summoned by Acting Secretary of State Elliott Richardson and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard as the first step in the probe. The two officials pressed Rabin on three issues: (1) the meaning of Israel's "non-introduction" pledge, claiming that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East; (2) pursuit of Israel's signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); (3) Israel's intentions on the nuclear missile issue. Rabin provided no replies and subsequently proposed to leave the whole issue for a meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister GOLDA MEIR scheduled for late September. On the eve of Meir's visit, the State Department prepared a background paper for the president, concluding that "Israel might very well now have a nuclear bomb" and certainly "had the technical ability and material resources to produce weapons grade uranium for a number of weapons." No written record of the meeting between Nixon and Meir on 26 September is available, but it was a key event in the emergence of the 1969 US-Israeli nuclear understanding. Subsequent documents suggest that Meir pledged to maintain nuclear restraint—no testing, no public declaration, no visibility—and, after the meeting, Nixon, at Kissinger's importuning, decided to "stand down" on pressure on Israel.

On 7 October 1969 Ambassador Rabin formally provided his belated answers to the US questions: Israel would not become a nuclear power, would decide on the NPT after Israel's election in November, and would not deploy strategic missiles until 1972. On 23 February 1970 Rabin informed Kissinger that, in light of President Nixon's conversation with Meir in September 1969, Israel "has no intention to sign the NPT." Subsequently, the White House decided to end the secret annual US inspections of the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona begun under President JOHN KENNEDY. Lower-level officials were not told of the decision and, as late as May 1970, were under the impression that the visits could be revived. By 1975, in keeping with the secret understanding with Israel, Kissinger's State Department refused to tell Congress that it was certain that Israel had the bomb, even though US intelligence was convinced that it did.

In 1972, under Kissinger's direction, the United States employed its veto in the UN Security Council for only the second time—to protect Israel's new policy to combat "TERRORISTS." The draft resolution had condemned Israel's heavy air attacks against LEBANON and SYRIA, which killed between 200 and 500 Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians, mostly civilians. In 1975–1976, Washington used the veto four more times while Kissinger was secretary of state. Kissinger's precedent was important: the United States used its veto thirty-two times between 1972 and 1997 to shield Israel from critical draft resolutions. Most of the vetoes protected Israel from censure for violating a broad range of INTERNATIONAL LAWS.

Some months before the outbreak of the 1973 War between Israel and EGYPT and Syria, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) initiated contact with Washington through US ambassador to Iran Richard Helms. Most of the documents on the contacts are still classified in the Nixon papers, because they were conducted through CIA channels. According to Kissinger's account, however, PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT sent a message on 10 October expressing interest in talks. Arafat predicted defeat for Egypt and Syria in the war but opined that they had achieved enough "face" to enter into negotiations with Israel. On 23 October, Arafat sent another message suggesting a meeting on 26 October. Kissinger turned this down but, wanting some "maneuvering room" during the crisis of the 1973 War, arranged for an early November meeting between deputy director of central intelligence Vernon Walters and an Arafat representative. In the meantime, Peter Rodman, a member of Kissinger's staff, prepared a position paper, at Kissinger's direction, that suggested a narrow basis for communication. Although making some noises about the importance of the Palestinian issue in regional negotiations and expressing gratitude that the PLO had taken a "responsible position" during the war, the United States would take no position on Palestinian political claims: Washington had "no proposals" on the "future political role of the Palestinians." And there was a warning: the United States "does not betray its friends," namely Israel. Hostile moves against King Husayn's Jordan were out of the question and by implication, threats to Israel, another US friend, would not be tolerated. For Kissinger, until the Palestinians were ready for a compromise with Israel, substantive discussions were impossible. However, although Kissinger would later comply with an Israeli demand that Washington not recognize or negotiate with the

PLO, he would not close the door to lower-level, informal contacts.

Throughout the 1973 War and its aftermath it was Kissinger, by then both National Security Council adviser and secretary of state, who alone made US policy, mainly due to Nixon's immobility as a result of Watergate. The degree of support that Kissinger provided Israel—diplomatic, economic, and military resupply—was unprecedented. By 13 October, seven days after the outbreak of hostilities, a massive military airlift of equipment was under way, paid for by a congressional grant of $2.2 billion. The resupply was so huge that it triggered the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to institute an oil embargo against the United States in opposition to US support for Israel and led to a series of hikes in the price of oil. In the war's aftermath Kissinger tried to shatter the alliance between Syria and Egypt. He undertook a trip to Moscow to rewrite UN Resolution 242 into Resolution 338, to ensure that there would be no "comprehensive" settlement after the war, and during his time in the Soviet capital Kissinger ignored instructions from President Nixon to arrange a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East with the Soviets. On returning to Israel, the secretary gave the go-ahead to Israel to break the cease-fire with Egypt and Syria, which provoked the Soviets to the point that a nuclear confrontation became a distinct possibility.

Kissinger convened a summit conference in Geneva with Israel and the Arab states on 21 December 1973, then recessed it indefinitely, ensuring that Israel would not have to make any concessions to the Arabs and Palestinians. Moreover, as compensation for Israel's brief attendance at the GENEVA CONFERENCE, Kissinger made numerous concessions to Israeli demands that affected US foreign policy for decades. Most important was Kissinger's promise that the PLO would be barred from Geneva and that the United States would never negotiate with the PLO until it first recognized Israel's *right* to exist. Between 22 October 1973 and 1 September 1975, Kissinger visited Israel thirty-one times, in what came to be called "shuttle diplomacy," to secure a second cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt. Finally, on 1 September 1975, Israel agreed to sign the Sinai II accord but only after Kissinger made a series of extraordinary concessions to the Jewish state. Through all these policies, Kissinger tied the United States and Israel in an impregnable union.

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Klugman Report, 1993

The Klugman Report, issued on 13 September 1993, uncovered evidence that tens of millions of dollars had been given illegally to JERUSALEM-focused SETTLER GROUPS by Israeli government ministries, especially Housing and Justice. It demonstrated that false documents supplied by

Palestinian COLLABORATORS and Jewish front organizations had been used to classify Palestinian houses as "ABSENTEE PROPERTY," that the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION (ILA) and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF) had allotted this property to the settlers without offering it up for tender, and that public funds had been used to finance the settlers' legal expenses. In short the ILA, the JNF, and government ministries had all aided settler groups with the objective of ousting Palestinians and taking over their property to Judaize Jerusalem.

The investigation was spurred by a strong rebuke from Washington to Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN concerning settlers who had taken over another dwelling in the Muslim Quarter of the OLD CITY in Jerusalem. After its publication, Rabin gave the Klugman Report to State Comptroller Miriam Ben Porat for further scrutiny. Because this was a highly political case, she did not recommend legal action. On 14 June 1998, Ir Shalem, a nonprofit Israeli organization affiliated with PEACE NOW, stated in a press release: "The State Comptroller approached Rabin [in 1995] and suggested ending the investigation because of the damage it would cause Israel's good name. Unbeknown to the other ministers, Rabin and the State Comptroller [had earlier] decided to halt the investigation."

In November 1997 Ir Shalem and other groups, plus several Knesset members, demanded that the investigation be continued. In May 1998 Ben Porat notified Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU that the inquiry would begin again within a month unless he ordered otherwise. On 4 June 1998 she announced: "I have received an order from the Prime Minister. . . . In accordance with this message, I have informed my office to stop the investigation." Ir Shalem petitioned the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, but as of 2006 the court had not rendered a decision. None of the recommendations of the Klugman Report were ever implemented.

Nevertheless, the Klugman Commission's findings are significant. According to the report, increased settler activity in East Jerusalem was focused on the neighborhood of SILWAN, near Herod's Gate in the Old City, and the adjoining Muslim Quarter. Klugman found that, in addition to secretly transferring funds, the government colluded with the settler groups in locating properties vulnerable for takeover. In 1982, under the direction of ARIEL SHARON, then agriculture minister, the government set up a special committee to locate Arab properties in the city for purchase or acquisition by the state under the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW. Often the settler groups themselves undertook to find properties. The government took the settlers' word that the owners had left the country and transferred the properties to the settler groups without conducting their own investigation, as required by law. While supposedly "selling" the properties to the settler groups, the government was in fact giving them the money to make the purchases. Such illegal transfers were stepped up in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Sharon became the minister of housing. In July 1991 he established a special committee to acquire properties and transfer them to the settlement groups through the ILA.

Some of the funds transferred to the ATERET COHANIM, a settlement group, went to finance the purchase of the sublease on St. John's Hospice in the Old City's Christian Quarter. Klugman discovered that the Housing Ministry had secretly paid Himnuta (a subsidiary of the JNF) a sum of NIS 3.6 million (around $800,000) for transfer to SBC, a front company for the JNF, to help it buy the sublease. The GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH petitioned the Supreme Court and seemingly prevailed. However, by exploiting a loophole in the court's ruling that allowed security personnel to stay, pending further litigation, the settlers continue to occupy the building.

In April 1990 the LIKUD Cabinet allocated NIS 7.5 million (around $1.65 million) for purchasing properties in East Jerusalem, and as part of the initiative, in December 1991, the ELAD group spearheaded a move into Silwan under the slogan "No Judenrein [free of Jews] in Jerusalem." In 1992, the LABOR PARTY came to power, and, though Yitzhak Rabin did not accelerate the settlement drive in the Old City, he did nothing to undo changes already introduced under the Likud. Rabin, in fact, shared the broad Israeli consensus regarding the permanence of Jewish rule over East Jerusalem and the need to Judaize it. He stated repeatedly that "united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty will remain our capital forever. For us it is the heart and soul of the Jewish people." As Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed observe, "the new [Rabin] government took virtually no steps to put an end to the wrongdoing and to discipline or prosecute those involved. . . . None of the recommendations of the [Klugman] committee were implemented."

See also ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; JERUSALEM; JEWISH NATIONAL FUND; SASSON REPORT; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM.

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Knesset

Israel's parliament, located in JERUSALEM, is the legislative branch of the government. Members are elected on the basis of proportional representation by parties. There are 120 seats, so a party must win 61 seats to govern alone. However, no party has ever garnered enough votes to rule by itself, and thus the majority party in an election must cobble together a coalition to govern.

See also ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES AND SETTLEMENTS

Koenig Memorandum, 1976

The Koenig Memorandum was a set of Israeli proposals issued in 1976 for dealing with the "Arab problem." Labeled "top secret," it was written by Israel Koenig, a Polish-born member of Israel's highly conservative NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY and, since 1967, the Interior Ministry's top officer for Galilee. It was sent to Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN on 1 March 1976 and was leaked to the press in September 1976. The report was written in the context of a growing resistance movement among PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, triggered by the government's plans to expropriate 5,500 acres of Palestinian-owned LAND. The villages of Arraba, Sakhnin, Deir Hanna, and other smaller communities in the Galilee were particularly affected. Thousands of indigenous Palestinians were preparing for a general strike on 30 March 1976, and Israeli authorities were increasingly concerned about the strike and the restiveness of the Palestinians in general.

Koenig's recommendations were aimed at repressing the growing Palestinian movement, plus suggesting long-term solutions. Some of the policy recommendations included reducing the "DEMOGRAPHIC threat" (i.e., countering Palestinian population growth), destroying independent Palestinian leadership (e.g., through DEPORTATIONS or repeated ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTIONS), disrupting Palestinian strength in the economy, redirecting Palestinian education to reduce the numbers of educated Palestinians capable of assuming leadership roles in a nationalist movement, and harsher use of the law under a system of "punishment and reward" to decrease Palestinian participation in nationalist political activities.

Koenig further suggested: "Expand and deepen Jewish settlement in areas where the contiguity of Arab population is prominent and where they number considerably more than the Jewish population; examine the possibility of diluting existing Arab population concentrations. Special attention must be paid to the border areas in the country's northwest and to the NAZARETH region. . . . At the same time, a strong and solid Jewish leadership should be fostered in Upper NAZARETH and in ACRE capable of facing the expected crucial developments." Subsequent to this report, Israel undertook an intensive effort to develop an exclusively Jewish Upper Nazareth (NAZARETH ILLIT) that overlooks Palestinian Nazareth.

These recommendations were implemented through the policies of the Misgav Regional Council and the recommendations of the Markovitz Commission, which placed the agricultural land and natural resources of the northern region exclusively in the hands of Jewish settlers and directly intervened through urban planning to stop the growth of Palestinian villages and to demolish some of the existing ones.

The Koenig Memorandum also discussed the "danger" of a Palestinian labor force capable of exacting a cost on the Israeli economy through strikes and other methods. Koenig called for strategic reductions in Arab labor and economic strength in key areas because, "by [Arabs] having significant control over various spheres of the economy there is the possibility of striking or of noncooperation and thus causing serious damage to the economy and the state, and especially political damage by emphasizing their strength as a factor in the country's economy. . . . The number of Arab employees [in any firm] should not exceed 20 percent. . . . [It is necessary to] reach a settlement with central marketing factors of various consumer goods that would neutralize and encumber Arab agents, particularly in the northern areas, in order to avoid dependence of the Jewish population on those agents, especially in times of emergency."

At the same time, the report recommended the deliberate creation of a parallel Palestinian opposition leadership aimed at undercutting effective resistance to Israel and providing an "escape valve" for the repression. Specifically, Koenig recommended denying RAKAH (Communist Party of Israel) its "priority" in carrying out a national struggle for Palestinian equality in Israel and in representing Israeli Arabs and advocated providing a safety valve for communities still "sitting on the fence," by establishing a "sister Labor Party." "The establishment," Koenig declared, "has to prepare itself to maintain covert presence and control in that [sister] party." Additionally, the memorandum said that the Palestinian citizens of Israel were "a cancer in the Jewish body that had to be curbed and contained" and argued for a policy of "terror, ASSASSINATION, intimidation, land confiscation, and the cutting of all social services to rid the Galilee of its Arab population."

The Koenig Memorandum led to a wave of Israeli confiscations of Palestinian land and the establishment of Jewish settlements known as *mitzpim* (lookouts) in the Galilee. The net effect of these policies resulted in increasing general strikes and protests by Israeli Arabs. On 30 March 1976, Palestinians held widespread demonstrations, called "LAND DAY," throughout the Galilee to protest Israel's seizures of land. The police responded with violence, killing six unarmed Palestinian youths, wounding another 100 activists, and arresting over 300 people. The protests and the authorities' response highlighted the Israeli government's strategy of *yehud ha-galil* (Judaizing the Galilee), which was a clandestine program until 1976, when it was openly adopted as a slogan of the Israeli Housing Ministry.

See also PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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Kollek, Teddy (Theodor) (1911–2007)

Teddy Kollek was an Israeli civil servant and longtime mayor of JERUSALEM from 1965 to 1993. Born in Vienna, he was active in the HeHalutz

pioneering movement and immigrated to Palestine in 1934. During World War II, he served abroad in many capacities, one of which involved meeting with high-ranking Nazi Adolf Eichmann and arranging for the transfer of 3,000 Jewish youth to England. From 1940 to 1947, Kollek worked with the JEWISH AGENCY in Europe, maintaining close contact with the Jewish underground movement in Palestine, including both the militant Zionist groups IRGUN and LEHI, and he was active in the Beriha (Flight; an underground operation conducted from 1944 to 1949 to move Jews from Europe to Israel, largely through means of illegal IMMIGRATION). He also represented the HAGANA in Washington and, despite the US arms embargo on Palestine, helped to amass essential ammunition for the Jewish underground military organization. Kollek served as minister to Washington early in the 1950s but, at the request of DAVID BEN-GURION, returned to Israel in 1952 to head the prime minister's office, where he remained until 1964. He was founder and director of the Israel Museum, the national museum complex, which he felt was essential to Jerusalem's political prestige as a capital city. In 1965, Kollek was elected mayor of Jerusalem and served in that office for the next twenty-eight years.

As mayor, Kollek did more to Judaize Jerusalem than any other single individual. His policy toward the city had four interrelated objectives: (1) to rapidly expand the Jewish population in the extended Greater East Jerusalem, (2) to hinder the growth of the Palestinian population, (3) to induce Palestinian residents to move out of the city into the WEST BANK, and (4) to surround East Jerusalem with a barrier of Jewish SETTLEMENTS separating it from the Palestinian population of the West Bank.

To realize these ends, Kollek used ZONING LAWS AND REGULATIONS aimed against Palestinians; strict limits on construction of new Palestinian housing; denial of basic municipal services to Palestinian areas (i.e., WATER, sanitation, electricity, trash collection, ROAD pavement and maintenance, parks and sports facilities, and adequate schools); subsidization of housing for Jewish families in East Jerusalem; expropriation of Palestinian land (23,378 dunums—about 5,800 acres—over twenty-five years) for construction of eleven Jewish settlements that closed a "ring" around Arab Jerusalem; and the construction of housing units in the West Bank to lure Palestinian residents out of the city. Of his DEMOGRAPHIC policy, Kollek once said: "Like all of us here, it seems to me, I am worried about the balance of forces and about the Arab growth within Jerusalem and around Jerusalem."

B'TSELEM writes in this regard, "Official documents of the Jerusalem Municipality and statements made by [Kollek and] the Israeli policymakers demonstrate that the urban development has been dictated chiefly by national-political considerations intended to achieve one central goal: to create a demographic and geographic reality that would preempt any future attempt to challenge Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem."

By 1996 some 157,000 Jews had moved into East Jerusalem, almost matching the 171,000 Palestinians then living there. This demographic change is particularly notable given the far higher birthrate of the Palestinian population, yet the overall population balance in the whole city remained about the same as in 1967: approximately 71 percent Jewish and 29 percent Palestinian.

Israelis generally, and certainly Mayor Kollek, understood the political importance of presenting their policies in a humane and gentle light, and Kollek was a master at persuading visitors to Jerusalem and the international public as a whole that his administration was acting with enlightenment and compassion toward the Palestinians of the city. He understood the risks Israel ran by not doing more to improve the Palestinian standard of living and repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to obtain more resources for East Jerusalem by promoting the international Jerusalem Fund and appealing to a succession of Israeli prime ministers from GOLDA MEIR to YITZHAK RABIN. At the same time, he failed to allocate a proportional share of his regular budget to the Palestinian neighborhoods. In 1990 and on the mayor's behalf, Foreign Ministry director general Reuven Merhav conducted a historical analysis of the city budget, which illustrated that Palestinians had been allocated 2 to 12 percent of the budgets of the various municipal departments, although they comprised 28 percent of the population of Jerusalem. Kollek shelved the report and, when queried about services for the Palestinian residents of the city, declared: "I am seeing to the Jewish majority . . . the majority in Jerusalem. That is why we are here, to see to that."

Kollek's mismanagement of Jerusalem during his twenty-eight years as mayor is reflected in this comment of Amir Cheshin, Bill Hutman, and Avi Melamed, three former officials who worked closely with him: "Do not believe the propaganda the rosy picture Israel tries to show the world of

life in Jerusalem since the 1967 reunification. Israel has treated the Palestinians of Jerusalem terribly. As a matter of policy, it has forced many of them from their homes and stripped them of their land, all the while lying to them and deceiving them and the world about its honorable intentions. And what makes all this so much more inexcusable is that there was no reason for it. Governing Jerusalem properly would not have jeopardized Israel's claim to the city. Indeed, it likely would have eased the growing conflict over Jerusalem's future. That massive error in judgment, we believe, is the tragedy of Israel's rule in East Jerusalem since 1967." In his final and unsuccessful campaign for reelection in 1993, Kollek was eighty-two years old and wanted to retire, but Yitzhak Rabin urged him to run in order to save the Jerusalem portfolio for the LABOR PARTY.

See also FAMILY REUNIFICATION; GREATER JERUSALEM; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM.

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Kook, Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak HaCohen (1865–1935)

Rabbi Avraham Kook is considered by many to have been the spiritual father of ZIONISM. He is indisputably the father of "Religious Zionism," an ideology combining Zionism and Judaism, which views the Zionist project within a religious framework. The first ASHKENAZI chief rabbi of Palestine, Kook was highly influential in bringing Orthodox Jews to the secular Zionist movement. The outbreak of World War I caught him in Europe, and he was forced to remain in London and Switzerland for the remainder of the war. While there, he was involved in the activities that led to the British

BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine.

Born in Latvia, Rabbi Kook immigrated to Palestine in 1904, where he initially served as chief rabbi of JAFFA. In 1921 the British appointed him to the office of the chief rabbinate of Palestine, which he believed was the first step toward the reconstitution of the Sanhedrin, the highest judicial and ecclesiastical council of the ancient Jewish nation. Rabbi Kook believed that the return of the Jews to ERETZ YISRAEL (the biblical land) was the beginning of the divine redemption and thus participated in a range of Zionist activities aimed at those ends. Unlike other members of the Orthodoxy who shunned the Zionist movement because of its secular and materialist nature, Kook embraced all Jews, arguing that secular Jews have a distinct role in the divine plan. Most Orthodox Jews, especially in the early days of Zionism, believed that THEODOR HERZL, the father of political Zionism, and his comrades were heretics and that the Jews would return to Zion only when God wanted them to. Kook's important contribution to this argument was to see in Herzl not a heretic working against God but a man unknowingly guided by God. It was God, Kook argued, who placed Zionism in the hearts of the disbelieving.

In the Yishuv and, after 1948, in Israel, Rabbi Kook played an important role in the infusion of religion into politics. Within a short time after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, Kook founded the Degel Yerushalayim (Banner of Jerusalem) organization, which aimed to introduce the rules of Halakha (Jewish law) and religion into the Jewish renaissance in Palestine. In March 1924 he made his first visit to the UNITED STATES to attend a Zionist conference held in New York. After the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, Rabbi Kook became highly critical of the British for not being supportive enough of the Jews.

In 1924 Kook established a yeshiva in JERUSALEM (later known as MERCAZ HARAV and headed by his son), which has since produced many of the most messianic WEST BANK settlers—for example, MOSHE LEVINGER, David Sampson, Moshe Feiglin, Benzi Lieberman, and the GUSH EMUNIM movement. Graduates of Kook's yeshiva tend to be active in the education of youth in the Bnei Akiva Yeshivot and in the religious Zionist movement. When Rabbi Kook died, his son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, continued to run the yeshiva and to strongly support the SETTLEMENT movement.

Rabbi Kook's legacy is found in the religious Zionist movement and in JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST circles that flourish today. Most religious Zionists are right-wing politically and belong to the Mafdal (NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY), LIKUD, and NATIONAL UNION. Many of the religious Zionists are settlers in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and, prior to 2005, the Gaza Strip.

See also GUSH EMUNIM; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM

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Kuwait

The relationship between the state of Kuwait and the Palestinian people is a tortuous tale of two emerging nations. With the intertwining of regional strategies for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for several decades their political, economic, and communal lives were compatible and mutually reinforcing. However, relations were strained in the 1980s and were ruptured entirely after the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990–1991. It was more than a decade before the two sides formally reconciled and reestablished a cool friendship that is a faint echo of times past.

In the period from the late 1940s to the mid-1980s, both societies were transformed. From a peripheral city-state languishing under a British protectorate, Kuwait became a sophisticated independent modern nation-state, a transformation funded by mounting infusions of oil export revenues and accompanied by a blossoming sense of native Kuwaiti national identity. In contrast,

Palestine was the most developed of the British-mandated states in the Middle East but when the state of Israel was created in 1948, Palestinian society was fragmented, impoverished, and dispersed. The Palestinians who fled Israel began to rebuild their society and national identity in the DIASPORA, especially in the rapidly growing oil-exporting economies such as Kuwait, where their professional abilities and industriousness were needed and appreciated. As Shafeeq Ghabra, president of the American University of Kuwait, sums it up: "In Kuwait, Palestinians provided . . . labor, skills, and know-how and had a decisive impact on the country's development process. In return, they found in Kuwait protection, employment, mobility, and the opportunity to re-knit their social fabric."

Regional Strategies and Politics

A small, vulnerable state after independence in 1961, Kuwait set its sights on winning recognition and respect in the region and the world at large. Through its political and economic activities, Kuwait exerted a moderating influence on both its radical and conservative neighbors and actively worked to mediate regional conflicts. The Kuwaiti government used part of its surplus oil revenues to promote integrated economic development in the Arab world. Using low-interest loans from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), Kuwait invested in other developing Arab economies and used direct aid from current government revenues to award gifts to the new republican regimes in EGYPT, IRAQ, and Algeria; to the emerging Palestinian nationalist movement; and to the UNITED NATIONS Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). It also provided reconstruction aid to the "confrontation states" of JORDAN, Egypt, and SYRIA after the 1967 WAR and 1973 War, and financial backing to Iraq for the war with IRAN in the 1980s.

Meanwhile, the Palestinians began to regroup through reconstituted, broadly defined family units, village and town self-help organizations, and associations for charitable purposes and promotion of common interests. By the early 1960s, these associations grew into the building blocks for national political organizations and a new Palestinian national consciousness. YASIR ARAFAT, then an engineer working in Kuwait, was part of an emerging and influential group of young professional Palestinians (including SALAH KHALAF, KHALIL AL-WAZIR, KHALID AL-HASAN, YUSIF AL-MUHAMMAD NAJJAR, and KAMAL 'UDWAN) who at the end of the 1950s founded FATAH, the first major guerrilla organization. In 1968, Fatah joined the Egyptian-sponsored, ARAB LEAGUE–created PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and in 1969 assumed the leadership role in the PLO. Fatah, with its political headquarters in Kuwait, remained the PLO's main faction. By 1969, Kuwait had become a key nexus for an international network of popular Palestinian organizations providing essential services to refugee populations across the region and material support for the liberation movement.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, Kuwait was vocal in its commitment to Arab solidarity and the Palestinian cause. It aimed to neutralize the radicalism of its immediate neighbors, whom it feared much more than distant Israel, and to respond to pressures from its own internal Arab nationalist and other opposition movements. Although Kuwait's rulers maintained close relations with moderate Palestinian leaders such as Arafat, they pledged to promote justice for Palestinians in a homeland of their own and to aid them in resettling there. Among Arab countries, Kuwait was the most tolerant of the Palestinian liberation movement and supportive of the reconstruction of its society in exile, but only if it reinforced rather than threatened its monarchy. On one hand, though the Arab countries as a group did not recognize the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people until 1974, Kuwait had already allowed popular Palestinian organizations and Fatah to flourish in its territory for over a decade. On the other hand, the government systematically curbed Palestinian militancy—from deporting the organizers of oil workers' strikes in the 1950s to prohibiting the presence of the radical PLO factions until the onset in 1987 of the INTIFADA (uprising in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES). The monarchy forbade Palestinian interference in its internal affairs and the mounting of military activity from its territory. In the 1970s, the Palestinians' role in the civil wars in Jordan and then in LEBANON led the Kuwaiti government to increase its control over their growing militancy.

With regard to international relations, Kuwait's support for the Palestinians was similarly mixed. It spoke on the Palestinians' behalf in international forums—for example, at the United Nations in 1974 and 1988 to argue the case for a state of their own, and tried unsuccessfully to

lobby the Jimmy CARTER administration about the issue in the late 1970s. Kuwait offered symbolic military gestures to the Palestinians during the wars of 1967 and 1973; led the oil boycott of the UNITED STATES in 1973; and tried to mediate the conflict between Jordan and the Palestinian guerrillas in 1970, suspending aid to Jordan from 1970 to 1973 after mediation efforts failed. The Kuwaiti government refused more than once to accept the credentials of US diplomats who had previously served in Israel. In contrast, Kuwait did not intervene when the MARONITES and the Syrian army defeated the PLO in the battle of Tel Za'tar in Lebanon in 1976. Again, in 1982, no Arab country, including Kuwait, intervened when the Israeli army overcame fierce Palestinian resistance and drove the guerrillas out of Lebanon. However, when a chastened PLO reemerged as a unified national organization in 1987, the government donated land in Kuwait City for an embassy of the Palestine-to-be and taxed all public employees a day's pay during an approved general strike as a communal donation to the Intifada.

Of Arab donors, Kuwait was the most generous in terms of financial, material, and educational aid to the Palestinians, both inside the Occupied Territories and in the Diaspora. The Kuwaiti government itself gave a total of almost $892 million to the PLO over the 1964–1989 period, amounting to about 3 percent of its total aid to all recipients and not including Kuwait's contributions to other Palestinian organizations or causes. In addition, from the late 1940s through the late 1980s, a private Kuwaiti People's Committee actively raised funds for refugee relief and education projects, including the work of UNRWA and to support the Intifada.

Kuwait considered Jordan a deserving recipient of development loans from the KFAED because it was a "confrontation state," a haven for large numbers of Palestinians from both the 1948 WAR and 1967 War, and the only host country that offered citizenship to the majority of its REFUGEE population. Jordan had inherited a relatively efficient British civil service, also staffed by Palestinians and similar to Kuwait's, that worked well with KFAED. Kuwait's loans to Jordan over the 1962–1975 period amounted to about $50 million for INFRASTRUCTURE and economic projects, such as JORDAN RIFT VALLEY irrigation, electricity, and the phosphate industry. The relationship with Jordan also served Kuwait's moderating political agenda, and KFAED allowed its investment projects there to continue uninterrupted from 1970 to 1973, even as direct aid was suspended.

Population, Labor Force, and Migration

From 1946 to 1990, the population of Kuwait increased by a factor of more than twenty—from about 90,000 to 2,130,000. Although the native Kuwaiti population maintained a high rate of natural increase, augmented by the settling of tribal nomads, growth came disproportionately from expatriates, whose share of the total population passed the 50 percent level around 1960 and rose to a peak of 73.5 percent in 1990. This growth was due to the seemingly bottomless demand for imported labor in the rapidly expanding economy. In 1963, for example, the state had just four Kuwaiti physicians and no qualified Kuwaiti nurses or health inspectors. In the early decades, when there were not enough qualified Kuwaiti workers to meet this demand, Kuwait drew labor from Arab countries where the educational system was already modern—Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine—to fill its second-level positions in the professional civil service and private sector. In 1963, foreigners accounted for almost 100 percent of professionals, 95 percent of teachers (almost half of them female), and 80 percent of oil workers. As a 1965 World Bank report put it, "Without these foreign officials and employees, the business of government simply could not be done" and the economy would grind to a halt.

In the later decades, the demand for imported labor continued to grow as Kuwaiti citizens were given special economic privileges, such as guaranteed employment in the public sector and subsidies for the relatively risk-free establishment of private business. Despite a public policy of Kuwaitization, Kuwaitis constituted just 8 percent of an industrial workforce of 43,000 persons in 1976 and only 6 percent, instead of the desired 25 percent, of employees in joint stock companies. By the late 1970s it was clear to Kuwaiti analysts that economic development would have taken twice as long without foreign labor.

As employers continued to import readily available skilled workers from poorer countries with low-cost surplus labor, the proportion of nonnationals in the workforce stabilized at about 82 percent through the 1980s. In 1988, a typical foreign employee worked 30 percent more hours than a Kuwaiti for less than half the pay. Stratified by job

type, the non-nationals formed socially homogeneous, endogamous communities by national origin. Until the mid-1980s, Arabs were better integrated and more privileged in the labor market than were other foreign workers. Palestinians and Jordanians were concentrated in the technical, production, transport, and professional occupations, while 65 percent of teachers were Egyptian or Palestinian. Agricultural work was done by Iranians living in primitive conditions, construction jobs were filled by Korean contract labor living in segregated work camps, and the lower ranks of a burgeoning service sector were filled by South Asians.

Palestinian Migration to Kuwait. Palestinians formed the oldest, largest, and most settled expatriate community in Kuwait. In the peak year, 1990, between 450,000 and 510,000 persons of Palestinian origin and/or Jordanian citizenship were estimated to reside in Kuwait—about one-fourth of the total population. Like other expatriates, single Palestinian males and females had first come to Kuwait to work, but soon came to settle as families. The proportion of females in the foreign population rose from one-fifth in 1957 to over two-fifths in 1975, as non-Kuwaiti females had a higher labor force participation rate than Kuwaiti females and as Palestinian families arrived after each war, in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1970, 1973, 1976, and 1982. By 1990, Palestinians were only 13 percent of the foreign labor force but accounted for more than one-third of the total expatriate population, and more than two-thirds of all expatriate families.

The British had encouraged their Gulf protectorates, especially Kuwait, to offer refuge to Palestinians after the establishment of Israel, thus helping to relieve the pressure to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict after the end of the BRITISH MANDATE. The British advised Kuwait to allow Palestinians to immigrate freely for work purposes but not to reside there permanently. They helped Kuwait to fashion legal restrictions on the various émigré populations, including Palestinians, through the use of visas, security checks, "no objection" certificates, and the *kafalah* system for control of work PERMITS, including the requirement that employers repatriate workers whose contracts were terminated. Such controls would keep the various expatriate groups from banding together in common economic or political cause and, especially in the turbulent 1980s, keep them separate from discontented domestic groups like the Shiia.

In the early decades there were three rounds of Palestinian migration to Kuwait. The first migrants in the 1940s were the relatively young and freshly educated intelligentsia, who took up posts as civil servants, teachers, doctors, engineers, accountants, military officers, businessmen, and academics. The second round began in the early 1950s, as less educated camp-dwellers, mainly displaced peasants with little experience in urban wage labor, responded to the need for unskilled labor in Kuwait. Lacking proper travel documents and work permits, they made the long and perilous journey to Kuwait by way of "the underground railroad" through Syria and Iraq. Most entered Kuwait illegally but were helped by veterans of the earlier round in finding work and eventually getting permission to stay. At the end of the 1950s, the Kuwaiti government ended visa requirements for Arab workers, and another round of Palestinians entered legally. As family members joined them, the relative permanency of the Palestinian community generated a growing demand for locally produced goods and services that served to stabilize and stimulate Kuwait's domestic economy.

Kuwaitis had long held a special respect for Palestinians, especially in the field of education. As early as 1936, a delegation of Palestinian educators was invited to mount a mission to Kuwait to help set up the first public schools. In 1937 two Palestinian female teachers came to teach at a girls' school established by a group of progressive merchants, and each year more teachers of both genders arrived. After the Palestinians fled Israel in 1948, the Kuwaiti government saw it as a national duty to appoint Palestinian teachers and administrators to fill the growing number of posts in what became a free and mandatory system of education. As of 1964, Palestinians constituted 50 percent of the total teaching profession in Kuwait, although this proportion gradually decreased to 25 percent in 1977–1978 as Kuwaiti teachers began to graduate from training colleges—a shift that also suited the growing Kuwaiti sense of patriotic pride in its own national heritage.

As compared to Palestinians who became refugees in adjacent countries, those who moved voluntarily to distant Kuwait came in response to economic opportunity. In the early decades, the Kuwaitis treated them with respect as professionals and workers. Although unique in its own social and political heritage, Kuwait had been a backwater in

the Arab world, so Palestinians, and to a lesser degree other Arabs, were able to transform Kuwaiti culture and politics. By 1975, Palestinians were found in all sectors of the economy and played a key role in important industries such as oil. The civil service employed 21,000 Palestinians and the remainder were in professional and skilled occupations. Palestinians comprised more than one-third of accountants, physicians, and pharmacists, and more than one-fourth of engineers and nurses. Until Kuwaitization took hold in the 1980s, as new graduates left Kuwait University, Palestinians found mobility in the Kuwaiti economic structure, and Kuwait became the Palestinians' "commercial capital." More than half were in private business, usually with the requisite Kuwaiti partners, and some of these firms grew large and operated on an international scale—for example, Consolidated Contractors Company.

Palestinian Community and Nation Building

The first Palestinians to find employment in Kuwait and other countries in the Gulf region were from an educated and professional middle-class background, not from the traditional Palestinian landed elite or pre-1948 political class. Pride in their educational and professional accomplishments, and the extensive regionwide network they built, helped them blossom into the leadership of a nationalist movement that reflected a critical transformation in Palestinian society and a new political conception of Palestine, to which they yearned to return.

In Kuwait, Palestinian communal life recreated and transformed the imagined traditional society of the homeland. As Ghabra put it, Palestinians "from all parts of Palestine, from all social classes, from different religious backgrounds, and from all major families, villages, and towns" were mixed together in this growing community where "even the dialects, feuds, poetry, and dances survived." Working relationships, communal school experience, friendships, and even marriages crossed class and local lines as Palestinian national identity trumped the more old-fashioned identities based on clans or families. The necessity of pooling resources for emergencies or education or big events like marriages led to the reinvention of extended family funds and of village and town associations drawing on resources locally and from abroad. These organizations created cultural centers, where folklore and Palestinian tradition were reconstructed, and sponsored children's visits to grandparents in the WEST BANK, for example, to instill in them the idea of the homeland. The links grew into networks that broadened the extended family and overlapped with each other, enhancing nationalist consciousness among members living in different countries. In valuing hard work, education, and communal solidarity, including support for the families left behind, and in practicing endogamy, the Palestinians came to resemble Jewish and Armenian communities in the Diaspora.

More than any other Arab country, Kuwait allowed the Palestinian community to pursue nation building through community projects, fundraising, and political organizing. When the Kuwaiti public school system did not have the capacity to absorb the large number of children from Palestinian refugee families after the 1967 War, the PLO was allowed to run its own schools in Kuwaiti public school buildings after hours, with one-third of the cost covered by the government. Palestinians openly selected delegates to the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (the parliament of the PLO) and freely solicited private contributions for the Palestinian Red Crescent and the PALESTINE NATIONAL FUND. The Kuwaiti government even enabled the Palestine National Fund to raise funds routinely through a two-tiered income tax on Palestinians employed in the public sector—5 percent on higher incomes and 3 percent on lower incomes—for a total of $122.5 million over twenty-five years.

It was in Kuwait that the Palestinian popular organizations for women, workers, students, teachers, and HEALTH CARE—each with its own dynamic but affiliated with the PLO—were the longest-lived and best organized. Furthermore, the Kuwaiti counterparts of these organizations provided support at critical junctures both inside and outside Kuwait. As Brand put it, the Palestinians in Kuwait became "one of the most cohesive and active communities in the Diaspora." The political and social functions provided by these organizations in Kuwait, and across the Arab world, were strong enough that they could not be crushed even as the liberation movement confronted major setbacks in Jordan, Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories.

Social Conditions of Palestinians in Kuwait. Migration policy toward the Palestinians and other foreign communities evolved in the context of Kuwaiti nationalist politics and the growing disparity in power and privilege between Kuwaiti citizens

and "the other" in their midst. As early as 1959, laws were passed that made naturalization of resident workers rare, effectively only for Palestinians and limited to those who had "rendered exceptional service" or lived in the country for at least ten years. As of 1975, only 374 Palestinians had been granted Kuwaiti citizenship. Their growing cohesion and distinctive identity, as well as discrimination against them as refugees, discouraged the assimilation of Palestinians by their host societies. This communal insularity was most extreme in Kuwait, where a virtual caste system had been under construction since the advent of oil wealth. Like the Kuwaitis themselves, the various expatriate communities were stratified by longevity of residence and the nature of their contributions to building the modern Kuwaiti economy, with Palestinians at the top, followed by Iraqis, Egyptians and other Arabs, and last, non-Arab unskilled labor. There was little social mobility or intermarriage between the Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, or among the expatriate groups, and the economic and social conditions of the expatriates were kept distinctly inferior to those of citizens.

Palestinians were especially sensitive to economic discrimination, because, unlike other expatriates, they had no home country to return to. They had to accept the appointment or promotion to higher positions of less qualified Kuwaiti university graduates with no experience. They could not start private companies without a Kuwaiti majority partner and could not own land or other immovable property. Their salaries were lower than those of their Kuwaiti counterparts and, other than health care, they had less access to social services. They were frequently reminded of their lower status not only by these forms of institutional discrimination but also by the prejudice and hostility that grew up among Kuwaiti colleagues and landlords in the 1980s.

Except for those few with high salaries and professional or business status, Palestinians were crowded into substandard housing for which they paid high rents to Kuwaiti landlords. They had a higher density—2.6 persons per room—and a larger household size—at 6.4 persons per household—than any other foreign community in Kuwait. They were concentrated in their own ghettos of Hawally, Nuqrah, and Farwaniyyah, with limited public services and segregated from the neighborhoods built for low-income citizens (mostly newly settled tribal people) and neighborhoods in which low-priced land and low-interest mortgages were reserved for high-income Kuwaitis.

Palestinians were allowed to attend the free public schools during some periods, but government policy shifted every few years regarding how many Palestinian children could do so. This was a source of great anxiety to Palestinians, given the value they placed on EDUCATION as their sole movable capital. After the influx of families following the 1967 War, Palestinians could still attend high school without restriction, but the government reduced the quota for non-Kuwaiti students in the primary schools from 25 percent to 10 percent. The PLO and teachers' union organized community schools, for which the women's union raised funds privately, but these could not accommodate all the children. Although the government let Palestinians use Kuwaiti public schools for a second shift, government policy on Palestinian school attendance was to shift twice again. Seeing rising Palestinian militancy following the wars in Jordan and Lebanon, the Kuwait government closed down the PLO programs after the 1975–1976 school year and reintegrated Palestinian children into the regular public schools. In the early 1980s, the policy changed again to limit the enrollment of foreigners in the public schools to those whose parents had been in Kuwait since 1963. Although the government then agreed to pay half of private school tuition for the excluded children, the affected Palestinian children were mainly from families who had come after 1967 and were among the poorest in the community. Again, the women's union had to undertake major fund-raising drives to educate these children.

At the tertiary level, Kuwait University maintained a quota of 10 percent for non-Kuwaiti applicants, but there were many more Palestinian students qualified to attend than could be admitted. Families and cooperative associations pooled their resources to send them to universities elsewhere in the Arab world or to Islamic or socialist countries, usually on scholarship, or even to the United States or Europe. However, this entailed the risk that Palestinian students who left to study abroad would not be allowed back into Kuwait if they tried to return as adults without a work permit.

Despite these restrictions, Palestinians were grateful for the haven Kuwait had provided and remained the most docile and law-abiding of expatriate communities in Kuwait. They even offered to prove their loyalty by defending the country

when, in the 1980s, the IRAN-IRAQ WAR threatened Kuwait from without and a rebellion from Kuwait's downtrodden and disenfranchised Shi'a minority threatened from within. To many Palestinians, especially those under thirty years of age who had been born in Kuwait, "Palestine" was a distant abstraction that served only to label their identity. They considered Kuwait their home and longed for the right to permanent residence, if not full citizenship, as the troubled 1980s wore on.

Emerging Contradictions

By the mid-1980s, both the economic and the political environment in Kuwait had changed significantly. The massive infrastructure projects that had made the skilled labor of Arabic speakers so crucial in the 1970s were now completed, and the economic crises of 1982–1983 and 1985–1986 caused by falling oil prices led many Kuwaitis to reason that they could no longer afford the more expensive foreign labor and that costly social services should be reserved for citizens alone. When Finance and Planning Minister Abd-el-Latif al-Hamad advocated a plan to make "Kuwait more socially balanced" by charging fees for services to all who could afford them, reducing the disparities between citizens and noncitizens, and loosening naturalization law—a plan not unlike what had been proposed by the World Bank twenty years earlier—the uproar among Kuwaitis forced his resignation.

Instead, the government tightened its political surveillance of the expatriate communities, especially Arabs, and, in November 1982, deported 25,000 persons as illegal aliens. In 1984, stricter rules for work permits in the private sector were imposed by all the Gulf countries in common, requiring renewal every two years, without which expatriate workers could not be reemployed in or move to the private sector without first leaving the country and applying for a new permit from abroad. Those caught without permits were summarily deported. Because Arab workers expected better economic treatment and were politically vocal, employers shifted to importing a higher proportion of labor from South and East Asia. Whereas Arabs had accounted for over 80 percent of the foreign population in 1975, this proportion gradually declined to 61 percent in 1990.

The diverse contributions of Palestinians that had been welcomed warmly in the 1960s were appreciated less in the 1970s, and very little by the mid-1980s, as Kuwaiti nationalism and Kuwaitization came into full bloom. The emerging Kuwaiti educated middle class was anxious to overcome its dependence on foreigners and to take over positions of responsibility. Many Kuwaitis came to view Palestinians as just another segment of the temporary migrant labor force and were less inclined than ever to assimilate them into Kuwaiti society proper. As Al-Moosa put it, "Because of their large numbers and their strategic location in the government, the professions, and business, Palestinians gradually became suspect as Kuwaitis strove to come to terms with and address their continuing position as a minority in their own country."

For their part, Palestinians felt increasingly unappreciated and constrained. The strictures on their economic role were tightened, for example, by the 1985 law that required government contractors to hire Kuwaitis for at least 15 percent of their managerial positions and 30 percent of their lower-level positions. Frustrated and fearful, Palestinians began to send as much of their income as possible abroad, to invest in their children's university education, and to purchase property and set up savings accounts in Jordan, Europe, and North America. In the mid-1980s, Palestinians comprised about 15 percent of the foreign labor force but were transferring out of Kuwait between one-third and one-half of total foreign remittances, inadvertently worsening Kuwait's economic recessions in 1982–1983 and 1986 by reducing demand for domestically produced output.

Several violent events in the mid-1980s frightened Kuwaitis, including Islamist militants bombing seaside resorts and mounting an assassination attempt on the emir, whose regime feared that these domestic threats were tied to the ambitions of the new Islamic republic in Iran. After the PLO's expulsion from Lebanon, the radical Palestinian factions became more active and militant in many Arab countries, blaming the defeat of the PLO on Fatah's domination of the organization. In Kuwait, Fatah assisted the government in monitoring and controlling the militants, but it was difficult to prevent their influence from spreading to Kuwaiti youth, and Fatah stood aside as the government deported several dozen Palestinian militants for political activities threatening to the regime.

Thus long before Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Kuwaiti policy had clearly turned against importing Arab labor and allowing immigration

and permanent residence of foreign families. The proportion of Arabs in the labor force and of females and dependents in the non-national population declined, and the sense of common purpose among Arabs in Kuwait eroded. On the domestic side, Kuwait had yet to find a way to resolve the contradiction between its deep structural need for employable labor and its national ambition to be independent of the migrant workers, especially Palestinians, who provided that labor. On the international side, Kuwait and other Gulf countries began to realign their political orientation away from the Arab region and toward an alliance with the United States. By the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Kuwait was purchasing large quantities of US-made arms, such as aircraft, tanks, missiles, and bombs.

Crisis of 1990–1991 and Its Aftermath

At the time of the Iraqi invasion in 1990, more than 73 percent of the total population of 2.1 million was non-Kuwaiti, and the vast majority viewed the occupation as a personal and social disaster. Few had sympathy for the occupiers, whose brutality and destruction they witnessed firsthand. Many, Palestinians in particular, joined the anti-Iraq resistance and, at the behest of the Kuwaiti government-in-exile, kept essential services in operation for people living under the occupation. However, whatever goodwill Kuwaiti Palestinians earned in the resistance was soon swamped by the political miscalculations of the PLO and the king of Jordan. From his perch atop the exiled PLO in Tunis, Arafat endorsed the Iraqi occupation, and many Palestinians in the Occupied Territories demonstrated their support in the streets, believing that Iraqi president Saddam Husayn would make good on his promise to become the new SALADIN and liberate them from Israeli domination. At the same time, Jordan, a country as economically dependent on Iraq as it was on Kuwait, professed neutrality regarding the occupation.

Many Kuwaitis felt betrayed and, after liberation in March 1991, the Kuwaiti government let loose severe reprisals in political, financial, and, most importantly, communal relations. It severed both its political relations with and financial backing for the PLO, as did SAUDI ARABIA and other Arab states. Furthermore, by June 1992, Kuwait cut all aid to Jordan and other countries that had failed to join the US-led coalition against Iraq. It redirected its financial resources away from regional aid and investment into domestic reconstruction and armaments, now formally aligning with the United States as its chief trading partner and military guarantor. Kuwait abandoned the decades-old Arab boycott of firms that did business with Israel, due to "considerations of national interest," and imported from Israel what it deemed essential to its reconstruction program.

In 1991 the restored Kuwait government took its revenge on the expatriate communities. In the name of rooting out collaborators, police, military, and vigilante forces used arbitrary detention, torture, murder, and deportation to punish "suspect" foreigners, after mock military trials in some cases and no trials in most cases. The groups targeted for this collective punishment were mainly noncitizen Arabs who had remained behind when most Kuwaitis fled, notably Palestinians, Iraqis, and the *bidun* (longtime undocumented residents of Kuwait), despite clear evidence that many had served with honor in the anti-Iraq resistance.

Mass expulsions soon followed. As of September 1991 more than 1,500 workers were deported, often with their wives and children and most often across the border into Iraq, with no food, water, or shelter. The rationale for expulsion was extended to those who had left Kuwait and returned during the occupation, no matter what their legal status, and even to those who committed serious traffic offenses. All residence permits were ordered to expire at the end of October 1991, and those without permits were then deported. In addition, the government terminated the employment contracts, without pay, of all foreign workers and *bidun* retroactively to 2 August 1990, the start of the occupation. It decreed that the *bidun* and the 180,000 Palestinians still outside Kuwait, mostly families who had fled the fighting, would not be allowed to return, and directed landlords to confiscate the contents of their homes.

About 300,000 persons carrying Jordanian passports were forced to move from Kuwait to Jordan in 1991, adding about 10 percent to Jordan's existing population. Almost all were of Palestinian parentage, but most had never been to Jordan or Palestine. Jordan's economic growth and well-being had been tied to those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq for several decades but had suffered along with them during the economic recessions of the 1980s due to depressed oil prices and the disruptions of the Iran-Iraq War. At first, the already stagnant Jordanian economy reeled from the influx of refugees and from the loss of trade with and aid from those countries, and unemployed Kuwaiti Palestinians were forced to spend down the

savings they had previously accumulated in Jordan. Kuwait then agreed to allow their remaining bank account balances to be transferred to Jordan and to indemnify most deported Palestinians who had been employed in the civil service. As Palestinians used these resources to invest in Jordan, the economy and employment began to improve.

At the turn of the century, Kuwaiti-Palestinian relations were still in disarray. Angered by the failure of Arafat and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) to apologize for its backing of Iraq in 1990, the Kuwait national assembly voted in 2001 to back the emir's decision not to restore diplomatic contact with the PLO. Despite this, many ordinary Kuwaitis still sympathized with the plight of Palestinians under Israeli OCCUPATION and raised private funds to send in truckloads of supplies during the Israeli incursions into JENIN and other Palestinian cities in the spring of 2002. Only 9,000 Palestinians remained in Kuwait, but some Kuwaitis openly acknowledged the role of Palestinian resisters to Iraqi occupation and conceded that Palestinian labor had been difficult to replace. Ironically, Kuwaitis expressed rising concern about the impact of non-Arabic speakers with different cultural backgrounds on their societal cohesion and their children's identity as Arabs.

If the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were resolved, reconciliation between Kuwait and the Palestinians could be matched by Kuwait's recognition of Israel. As chair of the PLO following Arafat's death and as a candidate for president of the PNA, MAHMUD ABBAS traveled to Kuwait in December 2004 with a large Palestinian delegation, and formally apologized for the PLO's gross error of 1990. The Kuwaiti prime minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, welcomed him with a declaration that "no apology was expected" and agreed to a resumption of financial assistance, in the amount of $25 million, for "support of the Middle East peace process." At the same time, Kuwait, like other Gulf countries, had come to view Israel in a less negative light. In 2005, Kuwaiti MEDIA and politicians openly debated the reversal of a long-held policy of not recognizing the Jewish state by rewarding Israel's withdrawal from Gaza with some form of diplomatic acknowledgment.

See also DIASPORA, PALESTINIAN

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—Karen Pfeifer

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Labor, Palestinian

See ECONOMY: THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE PALESTINIANS

Labor Party

The Labor Party (Ha'Avoda or Mifleget ha-Avoda ha-Yisraelit) was established in 1968, when the MAPAI party joined with AHDUT HA'AVODAH and RAFI to form the "Labor Alignment." Labor is the dominant left-of-center or, more precisely, center party in Israel. Until MENAHEM BEGIN's victory in 1977, every Israeli prime minister came from Labor. Since 1977, Labor leaders YITZHAK RABIN, SHIMON PERES, and EHUD BARAK have served as prime ministers. Other distinguished leaders of the party include DAVID BEN-GURION, MOSHE SHARETT, LEVI ESHKOL, GOLDA MEIR, MOSHE DAYAN, and AUBREY EBAN.

The core of the Labor Alignment, Mapai, was established in the early 1930s as the right-wing faction of the Zionist-socialist Russian party PO'ALE ZION and was the dominant political party in the pre-state and early post-state years. During the 1930s, Labor leader (and future prime minister) Ben-Gurion rose to power in Mapai and led it for almost two decades before he retired. Under Ben-Gurion's stewardship Mapai became the leading political party, while the party allowed Ben-Gurion to attain personal power and stature. The Labor movement founded the HISTADRUT (labor federation) that dominated the pre-state Yishuv economy (and Israel's until the 1990s) and INFRASTRUCTURE. It was also responsible for founding the paramilitary HASHOMER and the military HAGANA, the two major armed groups that functioned during the BRITISH MANDATE. After Israel's founding, Mapai engaged in additional institution building—establishing the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, constructing Jewish SETTLEMENTS, and settling more than 1 million Jewish immigrants. From 1948 until the 1968 merger that produced the Labor Alignment, Mapai led every coalition and owned the premiership. (Recently the small party MEIMAD has joined with the Labor Party.)

Because it originated in the Socialist Workers Party, Mapai initially adhered to the Zionist-socialist ideology promulgated by Nahum Syrkin and Ber Borochov, political theorists and founders of Labor ZIONISM. During Ben-Gurion's leadership, however, Mapai focused mainly on the Zionist agenda, ignoring most of the socialist. Nevertheless, the Labor Party continued the socialist economic orientation until its adoption of neo-liberalism in the 1990s, and it exercised power through the Labor-controlled Histadrut, which owned the majority of economic enterprises. In Israel, however, economic policies depend much more on initiatives by the civil service than on political ideologies and have seldom been core issues in Israeli politics. For example, during the 1990s, Labor and LIKUD's economic policies were almost indistinguishable.

Another significant element of Labor's ideology is security, which has come to mean the dominance of military values throughout civil society, or ISRAELI MILITARISM. In the first two decades of statehood, Labor was more hawkish on security and defense issues than it is today. During Labor's years in office, Israel initiated the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR and the 1967 WAR, and fought the 1973 War, in addition to the less well-known wars of INFILTRATION AND RETALIATION: the WAR OF ATTRITION with EGYPT, the international war with Palestinian terrorists, and, after 1967, an almost continuous low-intensity war with LEBANON.

From the earliest days of the Zionist enterprise and during the first thirty years after the establishment of the state, the Labor movement represented the mainstream of Israeli public life. That hold has weakened over the past twenty-five years, and to reverse that trend the party has blurred its identity, looking more and more conservative like the Likud, in its hawkish stance on keeping the settlements, for example. Historically Labor was the party of the ASHKENAZI (Jews of European

origin) elite who founded and dominated the country. Its fall from power in 1977 was directly related to the majority MIZRAHI (Middle Eastern and African Jewish) community finding its voice and voting for the opposition, which happened to be the Likud (also overwhelmingly led by Ashkenazi). Today Labor remains predominantly Ashkenazi.

Under the leadership of Peres and Rabin, the Labor Party concluded the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP) in 1993, which set the stage for the subsequent OSLO ACCORDS. However, Labor's subsequent minimalist interpretation of the agreements, as well as its decision to accelerate settlement building in and colonization of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, led to the demise of the accords and ultimately produced the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. Rather than committing itself to Oslo and trying to convince Israelis of the value of peaceful coexistence and equality, the Labor-MERETZ coalition based its strategy solely on security, separation from the Palestinians, and the continuity of Israel's supremacy. The Labor-Meretz leadership links the conflict, both politically and rhetorically, to Palestinian "TERRORISM."

In May 1997 (prior to the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT and the collapse of the OSLO PROCESS and three years before the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada), the Labor Party's platform concerning FINAL STATUS TALKS with the Palestinians contained the following planks, which still apply:

- *Oslo Accords.* "The negotiations will be based on the Oslo Accords with guarantees for the State of Israel to exist in peace and security within defensible BORDERS, and with precise definitions of the elements for the normalization of relations between Israel and its neighbors."
- *JERUSALEM*. "United Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty: The Palestinian residents of the city will enjoy municipal rights in the quarters in which they reside, and special arrangements will be established for the sites sacred to Christianity and Islam."
- *Self-determination for the Palestinians.* "The Labor Party recognizes the Palestinians' right to self-determination and does not rule out in this connection the establishment of a Palestinian state with limited sovereignty."
- *Security*. "The Jordan River will be Israel's eastern security border, and there will be no other army stationed to the west of it."
- *BORDERS and settlements.* "Israel extends its sovereignty over areas that are major Jewish settlement blocs."
- *Right of return*. "Israel does not recognize the right of return of Palestinians to areas under Israeli sovereignty. Israel will *negotiate* with the Palestinians on allowing the return to areas under Palestinian control."

In 2001, Labor agreed to participate in a national unity government with the Likud (under ARIEL SHARON), SHAS, Israel-BaAliya, and UNITED TORAH JUDAISM. In 2003, Labor quit the government but in 2005 joined another national unity government with the Likud.

See also ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES AND SETTLEMENTS; OSLO PROCESS

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Lake Tiberias

WATER from Lake Tiberias (also known as Lake Kinneret or Sea of Galilee) and the Jordan River that feeds it has been a constant source of conflict among Israel, JORDAN, and SYRIA, as well as a key and continuing issue in the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israel's 1950s National Water Carrier project (completed in 1964) to irrigate the Negev desert region transports water from the lake to the population centers in southern Israel and provides most of the country's water for agriculture, commerce, and personal consumption. However, Israel's massive use of this resource has deprived Jordan and Syria of desperately needed water for their countries.

See also JOHNSTON PLAN; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

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Land

Land and WATER are at the heart of the conflict that began more than a century ago between Palestinians and Israelis. Both issues are nationalistic and ideological symbols that also have real material value, which further complicates the underlying dynamics of the conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict over land is unique and differs from normal disputes between nations. Before Israel became a state, Palestine was a geographic area that had passed from one conqueror to another. The indigenous people, whether Christians, Jews, or Muslims, lived together in relative harmony. The conflict began when DIASPORA Jewish-ZIONISTS planned the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine that excluded the Muslim and Christian populations. Acquisition of land and Jewish IMMIGRATION were major tools for achieving the Zionist objective of a Jewish homeland.

In 1516, Palestine became a province of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, and continued so for almost 400 years until its defeat in World War I. When the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the British became the new rulers of Palestine, receiving a mandate over the land—defined to include an area of 27,000 square kilometers (10,400 square miles) in 1922—from the League of Nations. After the British assumed power, there was a mass immigration of Jews to Palestine and a sustained effort on their part to acquire as much land as possible. With the support of the JEWISH AGENCY, the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, and the BRITISH MANDATE authorities, the Jewish population of Palestine increased from 83,794 in 1922 (11 percent of the total population) to nearly 553,600 in 1944 (33 percent of the total population).

In 1947 the UNITED NATIONS General Assembly proposed in UN RESOLUTION 181 a partition plan that would divide Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state. The plan declared JERUSALEM to be a *corpus separatum*—a separate body under an international administration. The area of Jerusalem was defined as 186 square kilometers (72 square miles) and included BETHLEHEM, Beit Sahour, and Beit Jala in the south; Shu'fat in the north; beyond ABU DIS to the east; and beyond Ein Karim to the west. Palestinians rejected the partition plan, in part because they believed that Jews were not entitled to the 56 percent allotted by the United Nations when at that time they owned only 7 percent of the land. At the same time, Zionist leaders submitted a map to the United Nations delineating Israel's BORDER, as stipulated in the partition plan. This map is still the only legal and internationally recognized boundary of Israel. However, in 1948, war erupted between Israel and the Arabs, and at its end Israel controlled 78 percent of Mandate Palestine, while more than 750,000 Palestinians had been expelled or fled and had become REFUGEES. Additionally 418 villages were depopulated or demolished. After the war, JORDAN and EGYPT administered the 22 percent of Mandate Palestine that remained outside of Israel's control. Jordan administered the WEST BANK (5,885 square kilometers, or 2,200 square miles), including East Jerusalem, and Egypt administered the GAZA STRIP (362 square kilometers, or 140 square miles).

After the 1967 WAR between Israel and the Arabs, Israel occupied SYRIA's Golan Heights, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula as well as the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank from the Jordan. On 22 November 1967 the United Nations passed Security Council Resolution 242, which called for the withdrawal

of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict and for a just settlement of the refugee problem. In the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt through a phased withdrawal that continued until 1982, but Israel retains control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Following the 1967 War, Israel began almost immediately to implement a series of geopolitical actions in the occupied Palestinian territory designed to reinforce the Jewish presence there, including annexing East Jerusalem, confiscating Palestinian lands, and constructing SETTLEMENTS and bypass ROADS. To expand the borders of Jerusalem, Israel confiscated lands from twenty-eight villages near the Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem districts. Accordingly, East Jerusalem borders illegally stretched from 6.5 to 71 square kilometers (2.5 to 27 square miles). To minimize the Palestinian population of the city, the illegal borders of the expanded Jerusalem municipality were drawn to include as much land as possible and as few Palestinians as was feasible. Since then, Jerusalem has undergone intense colonization meant to further dilute the Palestinian population of the city and at the same time separate the city from the rest of the West Bank.

Settlements are both the ends for which the Israeli OCCUPATION exists and the means by which ultimate control is achieved. Most settlements are built in strategically important areas. In the Gaza Strip, for example, they were established predominantly along the coast, securing Israeli control of the seacoast and its waters. Settlements were also constructed near the Egyptian border to secure the border and at two junctions farther north in the Strip, which facilitated Israel's plan to divide Gaza into three isolated areas and tightened Israel's control over the population. In the Jerusalem area of the West Bank the settlements established Jewish DEMOGRAPHIC supremacy, while those along the West Bank's western edges are situated to make a return to the 1967 borders practically impossible. Additionally, the settlements are positioned to control the West Bank's water resources. In the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, where a massive road network has been constructed to serve the settlers, the locations of settlements are determined by both Israel's security needs and its agricultural requirements.

The development of settlements has been planned to establish the formation of blocs; that is, they grow outward and toward each other in ways that separate Palestinian populated areas. Analysis of satellite images by Peace Now as of August 2009 shows that the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) had 121 settlements with an official population of 290,000 and jurisdiction over 130,000 acres (526 square kilometers), or 9.3 percent of the West Bank. In addition there were 99 "unauthorized" outposts with an estimated population of 4,000. In East Jerusalem there are 12 major settlements with a population of 194,000 as well as settlement outposts in all Palestinian neighborhoods in the Holy Basin. Prior to August 2005 there had been 16 settlements in Gaza.

Bypass roads in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES are designed to link Jewish settlements with each other and to Israel proper while circumventing Palestinian localities and ensuring that the settlers can avoid contact with the indigenous population. The Israeli military has complete control of these roads, which stretch for more than 734 kilometers (450 miles) inside the West Bank, and forbids Palestinians from using most of them.

Like settlements, military camps are scattered throughout the Occupied Territories but are concentrated in particularly strategic areas. Most are in the Jordan Valley, which Israel considers essential as an eastern security zone, but military camps are also located near Palestinian population centers. In the past many military camps established by the Israeli army were transformed to civilian settlements, although this practice has declined in recent years, because Israel no longer justifies settlement building as a military necessity. In the West Bank, there are military sites of varying size that cover an area of 48.3 square kilometers (18.5 square miles).

The 1987 Palestinian INTIFADA gave voice to the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli Occupation and led to the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE. The guiding principles of the negotiations that followed were land for peace and the implementation of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. Madrid in turn led to the OSLO PROCESS. The 13 September 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP) between the PLO and Israel (and the subsequent OSLO ACCORDS) set up an interim period of five years during which the Israeli military would withdraw from Palestinian territory and negotiations would also take place over unresolved issues, including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, settlements, borders, and water—all cornerstones of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was also agreed that during the interim period neither party would initiate any action that might alter the geographical sta-

tus and thus jeopardize the outcome of FINAL STATUS TALKS.

A series of subsequent interim agreements were signed to implement the DOP. On 4 May 1994 the Israeli government withdrew from JERICHO and most of Gaza, where the newly formed PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) assumed quasi-governmental responsibilities. On 28 September 1995, Israel redeployed its forces from some additional areas of the West Bank, and the territory was further divided into AREAS A, B, and C, which designated varying levels of control. Area A, which included 70 percent of the Gaza Strip and 3 percent of the West Bank, falls under virtually complete PNA control. Area B included 24 percent of the West Bank and in this area the PNA assumed administrative control over the people; however, Israel continued to have overriding security control, including over the land. Area C encompassed more than 70 percent of the West Bank and in it Israel retained full control over land, security, and people—including the Palestinians living in these areas, natural resources, and so on. In January 1997, Israel and the PLO signed the HEBRON PROTOCOL, which placed 85 percent of the West Bank city (classified as H1) under PNA control, while 15 percent of the city (designated as H2) remained under Israeli control—an area that includes approximately 20,000 Palestinians and 400 Jewish settlers.

After a one-and-a-half-year freeze, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations recommenced, and the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM was signed in 1998, in which Area A increased to 10.1 percent and Area B decreased to 18.9 percent. Further redeployments were stalled until September 1999, when a new memorandum was signed at SHARM AL-SHAYKH, in which the distribution of land changed slightly, so that Areas A, B, and C in May 2000 were, respectively, 18.2 percent, 21.8 percent, and 60 percent.

The Oslo Accords were initially well received by Palestinians, but during the process of negotiation the Palestinians found themselves the weak party in a situation of overwhelming power disparities and had to submit to Israel's wishes. Moreover, Israel continued confiscating Palestinian land and expanding Jewish settlements. By 1996 many Palestinians seriously doubted Israel's commitment to a just settlement. At the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, convened in July 2000 by US president BILL CLINTON, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators for the first time discussed a framework for a final agreement. The Palestinian negotiators were offered 77 percent of the West Bank in noncontiguous segments for their future state, of which 15 percent would be leased to Israel for twenty-five years, while Israel would annex the remaining 23 percent. For several reasons, the Palestinians viewed the offer with considerable skepticism. The proposed Palestinian state would be surrounded by Israeli-controlled territories and would have no international boundaries, effectively eliminating its viability and sovereignty, and the bulk of Jerusalem would remain under Israeli control, with the exception of a few peripheral Palestinian neighborhoods. Worse, it was presented to them as a "take it or leave it" proposal. Beyond land, other final status issues were not dealt with satisfactorily at Camp David either. Palestinian frustration was overwhelming.

Then, on 28 September 2000, ARIEL SHARON made his provocative visit to the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, and the Palestinian territories once more erupted in defiance of Israel's continued Occupation. In December 2000, President Clinton put forward his parameters for a final status agreement and called for resumption of negotiations. In an attempt to rescue the peace process, the late president YASIR ARAFAT launched an initiative to resume negotiations. In January 2001, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Taba in an attempt to reach an agreement. But the Israeli elections were close at hand, and the TABA TALKS were suspended by the Israeli side despite near-agreement by both sides.

Following the onset of the Second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000, Israel increased its colonization of the Occupied Territories, destroying Palestinian agriculture, confiscating land, building settlements, and effectively enclosing Palestinians in small BANTUSTANS of land surrounded by military CHECKPOINTS. In April 2002, Israel reoccupied the West Bank, invaded the PNA-controlled areas, and destroyed and besieged cities and villages in response to the Intifada.

Citing security concerns, the Israeli government began building what they claimed was a security fence in the West Bank in June 2002. On the ground, the Palestinians identified the Israeli construction as the "Separation BARRIER" since it extends Israeli territorial authority over large expanses of Palestinian land in the West Bank. It cuts through the West Bank, running from north to

south, encompassing the most fertile Palestinian agricultural lands, isolating Palestinian communities, undermining the territorial contiguity between the Palestinian villages and cities, appropriating natural resources (including groundwater aquifers), and enclosing most of the Israeli settlement blocs on the Israeli side. The Barrier would eventually create internal enclaves on the eastern and western flanks of the West Bank. When complete, the Separation Wall will isolate 576 square kilometers (222 square miles) of Palestinian land in the West Bank (approximately 10 percent of the total area), which runs for 679 kilometers (421 miles) between the Barrier and the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice Line). However, since the time that Israel sanctioned the construction of the Barrier in 2002, several adjustments were made to comply with the settlements' interests. Accordingly, the length of the wall varied, and so did the segregated area isolated behind it, which the Israeli army identified as a "seam zone" area. In April 2007 the length of the Wall came to 770 kilometers (478 miles) across the West Bank and the isolated area behind it came to 733 square kilometers (283 square miles), approximately 13 percent of the West Bank total area.

On 11 September 2008, the Israeli human rights organization B'TSELEM published a report on Israel's blocking of Palestinian access to land around settlements lying east of the Separation Barrier. The report reveals that state authorities and settlers have de facto annexed rings of land amounting to tens of thousands of dunums (4 dunums = 1 acre) to these settlements.

Control of these lands is seized by a variety of means, but two methods stand out: (1) settlers, and sometimes members of Israel's security forces, violently attack and harass Palestinians who venture near settlements; and (2) fences and other physical and electronic devices are placed around the lands, blocking Palestinian access. In many cases, the authorities turn a blind eye to unlicensed closure of lands, systemically avoiding their duty to enforce the law on criminal settlers.

The total amount of lands thus attached to settlements can only be roughly estimated, as most of the takeovers were not documented or officially sanctioned in orders. In recent years, however, Israel has begun to formalize the closing of lands by issuing military orders in the framework of the "Special Security Area" (SSA) plan. As part of this plan, Israel has fenced off twelve settlements east of the Separation Barrier, unofficially annexing 4,558 dunums (1,125 acres), thus increasing the overall area of these settlements by a factor of 2.4. Half of the closed-off lands are privately owned by Palestinians.

The closing of lands around settlements primarily harms Palestinian farmers, who face almost impassable bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to access their lands. As a result, many are forced to stop cultivating their land.

Israeli officials seek to justify the closings by citing the security need for a warning space around the settlements, to help protect settlers. However, B'Tselem's research has demonstrated that the authorities permit settlers to access these purported "warning areas." B'Tselem has documented settlers living on, and tending to, closed-off Palestinian lands. This contradicts the security logic cited by the army and defies the closure orders issued by the military commander.

Along the eastern terrains of the West Bank, Israel also maintains control over what is known as the Eastern Segregation Zone with several checkpoints and roadblocks that deter Palestinian movement to and from the Jordan Valley. The Eastern Zone covers an area exceeding 1,555 square kilometers (600 square miles, 27 percent of the West Bank) across a 200-kilometer (124-mile) stretch including the Jordan Valley and southward along the western shores of the Dead Sea.

Between the Western and Eastern Segregation zones, Israel stands to retain control of at least 40 percent of the West Bank. Fifty-five Palestinian communities, including more than 90,000 people, will be isolated in the western zone, and forty-two Palestinian communities, including more than 43,000 people, will be isolated in the eastern zone.

On 15 August 2005, Israel began its UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, which included the evacuation of all the settlements in Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank. The withdrawal process from the Gaza Strip was completed on 12 September 2005, to leave 83 percent of the Gaza Strip entirely under Palestinian control except for 17 percent (61 square kilometers or 24 square miles), which is a security buffer zone area along the northern and eastern borders of Gaza that remains under the control of the Israeli army along with its control over the airspace and the waterfront of the Gaza Strip. On 28 June 2007, the Israeli army decided to widen the security buffer zone. Accordingly, 24 percent (87 square kilome-

ters, or 34 square miles) of the total area of Gaza falls under effective control of the Israeli army.

Many Israeli officials, including former prime minister Ariel Sharon, have stated that the objective of the Gaza disengagement was to reinforce Israel's control over the settlements in the West Bank, especially the settlement blocs that Israel wants to retain permanently. Most political analysts believe that the disengagement plan was a diversion strategy to free Israel from the pressures resulting from local, regional, and international initiatives. For example, the QUARTET'S ROAD MAP stipulated that by 2005 a viable Palestinian state will be established next to Israel. Israel's unilateral actions and the absence of an honest broker to the peace process make this vision unrealistic.

See also ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; LAND LAWS, ISRAEL; OUTPOSTS; SETTLEMENTS; STATE LAND

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—Jad Isaac

Landau, Moshe (1912–)

Moshe Landau is a well-known Israeli jurist. He was the fifth president of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. In 1960 he was the chairman of the special tribunal that presided over the trial of the high-ranking Nazi Adolf Eichmann. In 1973–1974, as a member of the Agranat Commission, Landau investigated the intelligence failures relating to the 1973 War, and in 1987 he served as chairman of the government commission that bears his name, the LANDAU COMMISSION, which reviewed and rewrote the rules for SHIN BET (the Israeli internal security service) interrogations—rules that legalized the use of torture under certain conditions.

Born in Danzig, GERMANY, Landau studied law in London in the early 1930s. A few years after he immigrated to Palestine in 1940, he was appointed as a magistrate in BRITISH MANDATE Palestine. In 1948 he became a district judge in HAIFA and in 1953 was appointed an Israeli Supreme Court justice. From 1976 to 1980 he served as deputy president of the Supreme Court and from 1980 to 1982 as Supreme Court president. In 1965, as chairman of the Central Election Commission, Landau disqualified the Palestinian AL-ARD party slate from running for the Knesset, arguing that a Palestinian party undermined the state's integrity. In 1969 he was the first judge to nullify a piece of Knesset legislation. A year later he objected to the court's interference in the "Who is a Jew?" matter (the effort by the Orthodox rabbinate to declare conversions to Judaism performed by Reform and Conservative rabbis illegitimate), and in the 1980 ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT ruling he prohibited the expropriation of Palestinian LAND for the purpose of building Jewish SETTLEMENTS. In many cases that involved Jewish petitioners, Landau defended freedom of expression and the public's right to know, but in 1979 he upheld the state censorship of a pro-Palestinian film.

Throughout his forty-two years as judge and in the first eighteen years that passed since he retired, Landau kept silent about his political views. In 2000, however, he gave his first interview ever to a journalist for *Ha'aretz* (the preeminent Israeli daily) because of his "fear for the state's survival" and his belief that "the existence of the Jewish state is in danger." Landau said: "The biggest danger that I see is Islam. We have fine, naive people who see Muslim officials as some kind of partners in dialogue. . . . But if we do not agree to that [a Jewish canton in an Islamic state], they will not tolerate us. They will work against us using violent means of terror. . . . But I say that it's actually some of those [Jews] who believe in a 'peace of the brave' who are the real cowards. . . . I'm opposed to concessions on the TEMPLE MOUNT and in JERUSALEM'S OLD CITY. . . .To me ZIONISM is the longing for Zion. And what is Zion if not the Temple Mount, the Mount of Olives, the Old City? I'm not a religious man. I'm secular. But I cannot deny the importance of the Temple Mount that stands at the center of the Jewish faith."

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Landau Commission, 1987

In 1987, after a series of scandals involving the torture of Palestinian suspects in detention, the Landau Commission of Inquiry, headed by ISRAELI SUPREME COURT justice MOSHE LANDAU, was convened to investigate the interrogation methods of SHIN BET, Israel's internal security service. The Landau Commission's November 1987 report approved the use of "moderate physical pressure" in interrogations, but that approval was based on the restriction that such "pressure" should have "clear boundaries," which were detailed in an annex to the report that remains secret. However,

according to the Israeli human rights group B'TSELEM, the guidelines include permission for severe shaking, shackling detainees in painful positions for prolonged periods, sleep and sensory deprivation, exposure to temperature extremes, and psychological pressures. The Landau Commission also set up a ministerial review committee to evaluate the guidelines periodically and called for the state comptroller to assume responsibility for investigating complaints of abuse.

The Convention Against Torture that Israel ratified in 1991 defines the practice as the "infliction of pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, for the purpose of obtaining information or confession by a person acting in an official capacity." Numerous Israeli and international human rights organizations maintain that "moderate physical pressure," as recommended by the Landau Commission, constitutes torture as defined in the Convention and other international legal covenants. Torture is further considered a "grave breach" of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which, according to INTERNATIONAL LAW, applies to Israel's military OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP (until 2005).

An audit of Shin Bet practices by the state comptroller covering the 1988–1992 period found extensive "deviations" from the Landau recommendations and Shin Bet regulations. The comptroller concluded that these violations were committed by "veteran interrogators" on a serious and systematic basis. According to B'Tselem, between 1992 and 1999, the abuse of prisoners became more severe and widespread. On 6 September 1999, in a case entitled "Supreme Court Judgment Concerning the Legality of the GSS [Shin Bet] Interrogation Methods," the Israeli Supreme Court determined that these methods were illegal and thus overturned the Landau Commission's decisions.

See also ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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Land Day

Land Day (Youm al-Ard in Arabic) is an annual commemoration held on 30 March when Palestinians remember the Israeli confiscation of the LAND of three Arab villages, an ensuing peaceful strike, and the deaths of six protesters in 1976.

On 20 February 1976 the Israeli government, then headed by Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN, expropriated 30,000 dunums (7,400 acres) of land from the Dir Hana, Sakhnin, and Arabee villages in the Galilee in northern Israel. The land seizures were part of a larger Israeli government plan to Judaize the Galilee and the Negev regions. The KOENIG MEMORANDUM, a 1976 government-commissioned study about ways to encourage the emigration of PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, largely provided the rationale for the confiscations. In October 1975 the official monthly publication of the Israel Agriculture Ministry included the following statement: "The main problem of the Galilee is the minority position of the Jewish population with respect to the majority non-Jewish population. . . . [T]here is a need to change the present situation in the demographic field." The new plan expropriated more than 20,000 dunums (4,900 acres) in the Galilee from Palestinian Arabs and more than a million and a half dunums (370,000 acres) in the Negev from Palestinian-Arab BEDOUIN.

The Arab National Committee for the Defense of the Lands (ANCDL) and RAKAH (the Communist Party in Israel) decided to call a general strike in NAZARETH and the surrounding area on 30 March 1976 to protest the government's plan. *Ha'aretz,* Israel's preeminent newspaper, reported on 21 March that "police reinforcements will be sent to Nazareth in order to respond to any action that will take place in the city." The Workers Council of HAIFA—the local council of the HISTADRUT (Zionist trade union federation) in the city—decided that if the Arab building workers struck, the Histadrut would not back them against their employers. On 19 March 1976 the ANCDL, together with the National Committee of the Arab Local Municipal Councils, appealed to the Israeli press and the Zionist left to prevent the army from entering the Arab villages. "We believe that the real interest of the state of Israel with all its citizens, Jews and Arabs, is totally opposed to the current policy of the government of expropriating and evicting Palestinian citizens from their lands. The land that still remains in Arabs' ownership is not enough to meet the basic needs for survival."

On 27 March 1976, Rabin met Police Minister Shlomo Hillel, together with representatives of the SHIN BET (the Israeli internal security service), and decided that the army, the police, and the border guard would suppress the strike by any and all means. On the evening before the strike, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and the police moved into the Galilee with tanks and heavy artillery. They first entered the village of Arabee, where they burned properties, attacked protesters with tear gas, and wounded and arrested many people. The IDF then moved on to the town of Sakhnin and the village of Dir Hana.

On the morning of the strike in Nazareth, the IDF beat people on the streets and went to the house of the mayor, Tawfik Ziad, where they beat his mother, his wife, and his nine-year-old daughter and threatened to kill him. In solidarity with Palestinians in Israel, residents of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES decided to strike. In JERUSALEM the police beat leftist Jewish students demonstrating in front of the prime minister's residence, and in Tel Aviv the Communist Party held a small protest rally against the invasion of Arab villages.

The Communist Party was the main force in organizing the strike. Six Palestinian Arabs, citizens of Israel, were killed by the IDF, 96 were injured, and around 300 arrested.

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Land Laws, Israel

Israel is the only democratic, advanced-economy country where the state or quasi-state agencies own the vast majority of the land area. An estimated 93 percent of the country's total landmass (excluding the territories occupied after the 1967 WAR) is owned by the state or by ISRAEL'S NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS—a situation enshrined in the BASIC LAW: "Israel Lands," passed on 25 July 1960.

Beginning in 1947, Israel passed a series of land laws that had the objective of "legalizing" or legitimizing Israel's usurpation of Palestinian land, homes, groves, orchards, livestock, bank accounts, jewelry, and other property. These laws also facilitated the transfer of this massive amount of property to Jewish IMMIGRANTS for Jewish-only use in perpetuity.

The 1960 Basic Law: "Israel Lands" codified and elevated all the previous land laws into one concise legal decree. According to the law, "the basis of the law is the special relationship between the People of Israel and the Land of Israel and its redemption." The law ensures that STATE LANDS remain Jewish national property in perpetuity. As defined in the Basic Law, "Israel lands" are owned by the following three bodies: the state of Israel, the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF), and the DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Israel Lands Law stipulates that "the ownership of Israel lands . . . shall not be transferred either by sale or in any other manner."

The Land Laws grew out of a dispute between Israel's government and the JNF, one of the Jewish national institutions, which purchases land in Palestine to remain in perpetuity the property of the Jewish people. During and after the 1948 WAR the Israeli government intended to acquire title to all of the JNF land in the name of the state. The JNF, however, maintained that such land should belong to the Jewish people, not to the state, because the latter, given different political and demographic conditions, could not adequately guarantee lasting Jewish ownership.

Until 1960 the JNF managed its own landholdings, and the quarrel between Israel and the JNF over ownership of the "Land of Israel" was only settled in the Israel Land Laws through a significant compromise. In the settlement the JNF agreed to place its landholdings, without transferring title, under the supervision of the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION and its governing body, the Israel Lands Council. The JNF, which owns about 13 percent of the total of Israel lands, appoints half (less one) of the members of the council, while the government appoints the other half (plus one). The JNF was allowed, however, to increase its pre–BRITISH MANDATE holdings by purchasing a certain amount of land seized by the state in the 1948 War as part of the compromise.

The state of Israel agreed in the settlement to incorporate into the land laws the JNF condition that the Israel Lands Administration would hold the land in perpetuity for use only by the Jewish people. The law stipulates that land in Israel can only be leased or sold to Jews, whether to those living in Israel or residing abroad. This means that Israel's non-Jewish Palestinian citizens are prohibited from buying or leasing land in Israel.

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"Land Without People for a People Without Land"

"A land without people for a people without land" was the principal Zionist slogan in the early 1900s. It sought to convey the idea that Palestine was a land empty of people that the Zionists would settle and develop. An enormously effective propaganda tool, the slogan became embedded in the collective psyche of both Jews and non-Jews. ISRAEL ZANGWILL is often credited with creating the slogan, but various sources name other individuals as its author. What is important, however, is that the slogan was effective in galvanizing support for ZIONISM despite its historical fallaciousness.

Langer, Felicia (1930–)

Felicia Langer is an Israeli lawyer and human rights activist who has defended Palestinians throughout her career. Born in Poland, she fled her native country for the SOVIET UNION at the start of World War II but returned to Poland after the war and married a HOLOCAUST survivor. Although not a ZIONIST, she and her husband immigrated to Israel in 1950 because Langer wanted to be near her mother, who had settled there. Langer and her husband soon joined the Israeli Communist Party. In the early 1960s Langer became a lawyer, and after the 1967 OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories she resigned her job in a Tel Aviv law firm and established a private practice in JERUSALEM to assist Palestinian political PRISONERS. Thereafter she dedicated her life to defending individual Palestinians and supporting the Palestinian cause.

Although she only infrequently won cases in her twenty-three-year career, she counts her successful defense in 1979 of NABLUS mayor BASSAM SHAKA'A as the high point. Shaka'a had been a PLO supporter and outspoken critic of the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and was subsequently accused of inciting TERRORISM with his public statements and issued an expulsion order. Shortly after this expulsion order was overturned in the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT with Langer's assistance, an Israeli terrorist group planted a bomb in his car, leaving him a double amputee.

For her work Langer suffered hardship and ostracism from her fellow Israelis and lived under the permanent threat of violence. During the First INTIFADA Langer wrote that the ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM broke down completely, with hundreds of Palestinian prisoners herded into daily sentencing sessions that lacked even minimal decorum. Langer said: "I was supposed to represent clients I had never met before so I could not prepare myself to defend them. It came to the point where I was no longer physically able to walk into a courtroom and address the judge as 'your honor,' I felt I just couldn't say the words anymore. As a gesture of protest I closed my Jerusalem law office and left the country."

In 1990 she left Israel in self-imposed exile, settling in Tübingen, GERMANY, where she lectures

at the university. Also in 1990 she was honored with the Right Livelihood Award (known as the Alternative Nobel Peace Price) "for the exemplary courage of her struggle for the basic rights of the Palestinian people." In 1991 Langer was awarded the Bruno Kreisky Award for Outstanding Achievements in the Area of Human Rights. In 2005 Langer was awarded the Erich Mühsam Prize for her continuing struggle for the human rights of Palestinian people. In July 2009, German president Horst Kohler awarded her the Federal Cross of Merit. For many years Langer was vice president of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights. A prolific writer, she is the author of a number of books documenting Israeli human rights violations, including *With My Own Eyes* (1975), *These Are My Brothers* (1979), *An Age of Stone* (1987), *Fury and Hope* (1993) (autobiographical), *Appearance and Truth in Palestine* (1999); *Miecius Report: Youth between the Ghetto and Theresienstadt* (1999), *Quo Vadis Israel? The New Intifada of the Palestinians* (2001).

Langer's major books in German include *Zorn und Hoffnung* (Fury and Hope); *Brücke der Träume* (Bridge of Dreams); *Wo Hass keine Grenzen Kennt* (Where Hatred Is Boundless); *Lasst uns wie Menschen leben* (Let Us Live as Human Beings); *Miecius später Bericht* (Mieciu's Late Story); *Brandherd Nahost* (Troublespot Mideast); and *Die Frau, die niemals schweigt* (The Woman, Who Is Never Silent).

Langer has also undertaken numerous speaking tours in Europe and the UNITED STATES.

Lausanne Conference, 1949

The Lausanne Conference, the first peace conference on Palestine and Israel, was convened on 27 April 1949 in Switzerland under the auspices of the UN PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION (PCC). The PCC had been created the previous year to "achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding" between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The future of the Palestinians was decided at Lausanne.

In attendance were the UNITED STATES, FRANCE, TURKEY, EGYPT, SYRIA, LEBANON, JORDAN, and Israel. The Palestinians did not have their own independent delegate, although a Palestinian adviser, AHMAD SHUQAYRI, was attached to the Syrian delegation. The most immediate problem faced by the PCC was the situation of the Palestinian REFUGEES from the 1948 WAR. The organizers believed that unless their long-term plight was alleviated, they would be an unrelenting source of instability as well as a humanitarian disgrace. There was, however, no discussion at the conference of the political rights of the Palestinians, nor of the state that UN RESOLUTION 181 had mandated for them. Everyone involved appeared to accept Jordan's occupation and Egypt's administration of the areas. Israel was unwilling to make any concessions on the refugees and preferred the ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS to peace treaties that would require territorial concessions and the repatriation of some number of refugees. Although the Arab states were adamant about the refugee issue, several Arab leaders were prepared to compromise. For example, Syria's ruler Husni Zaim proposed that he and Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION meet personally to discuss a possible peace treaty, although Ben-Gurion rejected the offer. However, Israel for the first time accepted the principle of repatriation and the internationalization of JERUSALEM, but "did so as a mere exercise in public relations aimed at strengthening Israel's international image" and winning admission to the UNITED NATIONS. Walter Eytan, head of the Israeli delegation, stated, "My main purpose was to begin to undermine the protocol of 12 May which we had signed only under the duress of our struggle for admission to the UN. Refusal to sign would . . . have immediately been reported to the Secretary-General and the various governments." Israel was admitted to the UN, but once a member, it failed to implement the refugee repatriation and internationalization of Jerusalem under which it was approved.

The US State Department delineated its policy for Lausanne on 19 January in top-secret instructions from Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to US delegate Mark F. Ethridge just before he departed for Switzerland. The United States believed the boundaries of the new state of Israel should be those defined by the 1947 UN Resolution 181 and that "Israel is not entitled" to retain its conquests from the 1948 War beyond those BORDERS, Lovett said. He added that, "if Israel desires additions to its territory Israel should make territorial concessions elsewhere." Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN and Ben-Gurion claimed that the Jewish state could not survive within those borders (now known as the pre-1967 lines).

Lovett told Ethridge that the status of Jerusalem should remain as called for in UN Resolution 181,

receiving "special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control." The US position on the Palestinian refugees, according to Lovett, followed UN RESOLUTION 194—that of repatriation or compensation. And Lovett indicated that the United States "favors incorporation of a greater part of Arab Palestine into Transjordan [Jordan after 1950]. The remainder might be divided among other Arab states as seems desirable."

As early as 28 March 1949, Ethridge reported to the State Department that "failure of the Jews to [settle the refugee problem] has prejudiced the whole cause of peaceful settlement in this part of the world." On 11 April he wrote a personal letter to President HARRY TRUMAN: "The Jews . . . still feel too strongly that their security lies in military might instead of in good relations with their neighbors. The Arabs have made what the Commission [PCC] considers very great concessions; the Jews have made none so far."

At the end of May Truman sent a message to Israel stating that the United States was "seriously disturbed by the attitude of Israel with respect to a territorial settlement in Palestine and to the question of Palestinian refugees. The US government is gravely concerned lest Israel now endanger the possibility of arriving at a solution of the Palestine problem in such a way as to contribute to the establishment of sound and friendly relations between Israel and its neighbors. . . . The government of Israel should entertain no doubt whatever that the US government relies upon it to take responsible and positive action concerning Palestine refugees and that, far from supporting excessive Israeli claims to further territory within Palestine, the US government believes that it is necessary for Israel to offer territorial compensation for territory which it expects to acquire beyond the boundaries of the UN partition plan." If Israel continued to ignore the advice of the United Nations and the United States, the president wrote, "the US government will regretfully be forced to the conclusion that a revision of its attitude toward Israel has become unavoidable."

Despite this firm warning, US diplomats in the region reported that Israel continued to display a "voracious territorial appetite," "expansionist ambitions," and "take it or leave it attitude," with threats of force if it did not get what it wanted. By July the American consul in Jerusalem reported that "the favorable opportunity for settlement" generated at the 26 February Israel-Egypt armistice agreement "has now passed" because of Israel's "harsh terms."

When the Lausanne peace talks ended in failure with no agreement on 15 September 1949, Ethridge placed the blame on Israel: "If there is to be any assessment of blame for stalemate at Lausanne, Israel must accept primary responsibility. Her attitude toward the refugees is morally reprehensible and politically short-sighted. Her position as conqueror demanding more does not make for peace. It makes for more trouble. There was never a time in the life of the commission when a generous and far-sighted attitude on the part of the Jews would not have unlocked peace." It should be noted that, in spite of Truman's stern letter to Israel, the US president undertook no actions with serious repercussions or any measures that Israel could interpret as sanctions.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS; WAR, 1948

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Lavon Affair

The Lavon Affair was a scandal resulting from a failed Israeli covert operation in EGYPT known as Operation Susannah, in which Israeli military

intelligence planted bombs in Egyptian-, US-, and British-owned targets in Egypt in the summer of 1954. Apparently it was hoped that Britain, and especially the UNITED STATES, would believe that the Egyptian government was responsible, and their relations with Egypt would become strained. In particular Israel wanted to halt Western support for Egyptian control of the Suez Canal. The Lavon Affair was named after the Israeli defense minister Pinhas Lavon, who was forced to resign after the incident became known to Israel's governing elite. Israel admitted responsibility only in 2005, when Israeli president Moshe Katsav honored the nine surviving Egyptian Jewish agents who were involved, presenting each with a certificate of appreciation for their efforts on behalf of the state.

Operation Susannah

According to Israeli historian Shabtai Teveth, who wrote one of the more detailed accounts of the Lavon Affair, the assignment was "to undermine Western confidence in the existing [Egyptian] regime by generating public insecurity and actions to bring about arrests, demonstrations, and acts of revenge, while totally concealing the Israeli factor. The team was accordingly urged to avoid detection."

Israeli operatives in Egypt had been recruited several years before, when an Israeli intelligence officer arrived in Cairo, working undercover as a British citizen of Gibraltar. He recruited several Egyptian Jews who had previously been active in illegal emigration activities and trained them for covert operations.

Egyptian authorities arrested one of the spies when his bomb ignited accidently, and incriminating evidence was found in his apartment, including the names of accomplices to the operation. As a result several suspects were arrested, including Egyptian Jews and undercover Israelis.

One member of the group managed to escape, another died in prison, and a third committed suicide. The trial of the others began on 11 December 1954 and lasted until 27 January 1955; two of the accused were condemned to execution by hanging, two were acquitted, and the rest received lengthy prison terms.

Political Aftermath

In meetings with Prime Minister MOSHE SHARETT, Secretary of Defense Pinhas Lavon denied any knowledge of the operation. When the chief of intelligence contradicted Lavon, Sharett commissioned a board of inquiry consisting of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT and the first chief of staff of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. They were unable to find conclusive evidence that Lavon had authorized the operation. Lavon tried to place the blame on SHIMON PERES, the secretary general of the Defense Ministry, accusing him of insubordination and criminal negligence. Sharett resolved the dilemma by siding with Peres, who along with MOSHE DAYAN testified against Lavon, after which Lavon resigned. Former prime minister David Ben-Gurion succeeded Lavon as minister of defense. A short time later Sharett, who did not know about the operation in advance and had strongly denied Israel's involvement, resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Ben-Gurion.

In 1956 an inquiry found that the perjury indeed had been committed, and that Lavon had not authorized the operation. Sharett and Levi Eshkol tried to issue a statement that would placate both Lavon and his opponents. Ben-Gurion refused to accept the compromise and viewed it as a divisive play within the MAPAI party. After another investigative committee sided with the Cohen inquiry, Ben-Gurion resigned from his post as defense minister. This led to the expulsion of Lavon from the HISTADRUT labor union and an early call for new elections that changed the political structure in Israel.

In April 1960 another inquiry found that Lavon had no knowledge of the affair. It should be noted that the specifics of Operation Susannah were not public at the time of the political upheaval.

Legacy

Operation Susannah and the Lavon Affair were disastrous for Israel in several ways. The most important was that Israel lost significant standing and credibility with the United Kingdom and the United States and created a rift that would take years to repair—exactly the opposite of its intentions.

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Law of Return, 1950

Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE of 14 May 1948 embodied the right of return: "The State of Israel will be open for Jewish IMMIGRATION and for the ingathering of the exiles." On 5 July 1950, this right was codified into a BASIC LAW, which was amended, in 1970, to grant the right to immigrate to Israel to non-Jews who are either children or grandchildren of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, or the spouse of a child or grandchild of a Jew. The amendment was intended to accept Jewish families, mainly from the former SOVIET UNION, where mixed marriages were abundant and where individuals and family members not considered Jews under the traditional definition nevertheless wanted to immigrate to Israel.

The Law of Return has been the subject of much controversy, because it is an exclusive Jewish right and excludes Palestinian REFUGEES who wish to return home to their native land. In theory, the Israeli law does not categorically exclude non-Jews from immigrating to Israel. Any person who wishes to settle in Israel may do so, at least hypothetically. In practice, Israel has prevented Palestinians from returning to their homeland. Non-Jews who are permitted to return must meet the requirements set forth in the Law of Entry to Israel (1952) and the Law of Citizenship (1952), regarding naturalization.

See also DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ISRAEL; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN

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League of Arab States (Arab League)

As ZIONISM gained a foothold in the postcolonial Middle East, the newly sovereign Arab states founded the League of Arab States in 1945 to protect and further their territorial, economic, and political well-being. The earliest members included EGYPT, IRAQ, LEBANON, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950), and Yemen. Later membership included Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros (1993), Djibouti (1977), KUWAIT (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern Yemen (1967), Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and the United Arab Emirates (1971).

Although sometimes criticized for its "apparent political irrelevance and futility," the role of the Arab League has been significant though not always visible in Middle East politics, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since its founding the League has faced daunting obstacles in the ideological schisms among its members and in protecting the welfare of the stateless Palestinians. However, despite considerable flaws in fulfilling its purpose of "strengthening of the relations between the member-states, the coordination of their policies in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty," the League has played a notable role in communicating Arab interests vis-à-vis Israel, despite the power disparity between the two sides.

Perhaps the Arab League's most effective undertaking has been its economic boycott of Israel. Adopted after the 1948 War, the boycott is an effort to isolate Israel economically in support of the Palestinians. It was conceived to prevent Arab states, and to discourage non-Arab ones, from providing support to Israel and adding to Israel's economic and military strength.

The boycott specifically focuses on three areas: products and services that originate in Israel (referred to as the primary boycott and still enforced in a few Arab states), companies in non-Arab countries that do business with Israel (the secondary boycott), and companies that do business with firms that shipped or flew to Israeli ports (the tertiary boycott). At one point the boycott was observed by the entire Arab League, but today only Lebanon and Syria adhere to it stringently.

Although it cannot be estimated to what extent the boycott has hurt Israel's economy, it is likely less than the Arabs intended. Moreover, the Arab countries have suffered economically from the boycott as well. In its report on the cost of conflict in the Middle East, Strategic Foresight Group estimates that Arab states have lost the opportunity to export $10 billion worth of goods to Israel between 2000 and 2010.

Because of the boycott, certain products and brands that were ubiquitous elsewhere in the world, such as Pepsi, McDonald's, and most Japanese cars, were not to be found in Israel until the boycott began waning in the late 1980s. A similar situation existed in the Arab world, which boycotted the products of companies that were selling in Israel, as is the case with Coca-Cola.

Despite the boycott, Israeli goods often do make it to Arab markets in boycott countries.

Typically, the Israeli goods are sent to a second country and then reshipped to the Arab state. Cyprus is the most significant transshipment point. In 2001, Cyprus imported $164 million in Israeli goods, but only exported $27.5 million to Israel. It is probable that the bulk of that enormous Israeli trade surplus ended up in the Arab world.

Although the Arab League repeatedly affirmed that Palestine is a part of the Arab motherland, its concerted efforts to foil British and Zionist colonization ultimately failed. In 1948, under the auspices of the Arab League, seven states sought (but failed) to stop what they perceived as the consolidation of a settler-colony that endangered not only their security but also the heart of their collective identity in Palestine.

After Israel's defeat of Arab forces and the subsequent *Nakba* (Catastrophe), in which over 750,000 Palestinians fled or were forced from their cities and villages, the League became a symbol of the disappointing results of pan-Arabism in a region of states with competing interests. Often this ideology served a rhetorical purpose but produced little concrete action. Meaningful cooperation among Arab states became increasingly illusory, as the League endured numerous setbacks in political and economic development. In almost all respects the League of Arab States lagged behind similar regional organizations throughout the world. Nevertheless, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the Arab League did serve a constructive function under the leadership of Egypt's JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. But the relationship between the League and the Palestinians was never simple, especially regarding Palestinian aspirations for statehood. To further the perception that Egypt championed the Palestinian cause, in 1964, under the auspices of the League, Nasir engineered the creation of an entity for the liberation of Palestine—the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)—and was reluctantly joined by Jordan's King Husayn. By forming and recognizing the PLO as an independent representative agent, the Arab League facilitated the eventual international recognition of the Palestinians as a people with their own leadership. Under the PLO the Palestinians gained a place among the Arab nations, even though they did not become full members of the League until 1988.

After their crushing defeat by Israel in the 1967 WAR, the Arab states did not have much to offer the Palestinians, aside from inclusion in the League. League members found themselves in a precarious position when Egypt, the strongest Arab state and a key founder of the League, commenced peace talks with Israel that culminated in the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and the 1979 peace treaty. As a result, the League expelled Egypt, although the country regained membership in 1987.

During the uncertain post-9/11 climate the peace processes of the 1990s eventually produced the ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE OF 2002. In it the Arab League insisted on "full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967; implementation of [UN] SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338"; and "Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state with East JERUSALEM as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel." But except for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005, the status quo remains, and Arab peace offers continue to be rejected.

See also ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, 2002 AND 2007; ARAB STATE PEACE OVERTURES, 1949–PRESENT; ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC

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—Khalil M. Marrarr

League of Nations

See COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Lebanon

The early twentieth century witnessed the simultaneous growth of two political projects in the East Mediterranean–Arab region. The first, championed

by the Christian Maronite Church, aimed at establishing a state of Lebanon under MARONITE domination. This goal was promoted by a group of Maronite elite, both clerical and lay, that introduced and spread new political doctrines based on Lebanese nationalism; the "special nature" of Lebanon; the philosophy of confessionalism (the system of a multisectarian society in which religious sects act as political subjects, and political structures, institutions, and practices reflect the weight of religious groups in society); and the idea of Lebanese territorial autonomy. This Maronite elite carried out its project under the protection of and in alliance with FRANCE. The political doctrines of the project developed in the preceding century as a consequence of several factors, including the Maronite Church's replacement of a feudal class and its assumption of community leadership, the socioeconomic disturbances of the time, civil strife between Druze and Maronites, and the *Mutasarrifiyya* system (1861–1914).

The second political project, promoted by the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, aimed at establishing a dominant Jewish presence in Palestine. The BASEL PROGRAM of August 1897 inspired ZIONISM's efforts to colonize Palestine. After many failed attempts to find an international benefactor, the Zionist movement finally secured the support of Great Britain, which was expressed in the BALFOUR DECLARATION of 2 November 1917. Eventually both the Maronite and the Zionist projects succeeded. A Maronite-dominated State of Greater Lebanon was proclaimed on 1 September 1920 as a French dependency, followed by a Lebanese Republic on 23 March 1926. During the BRITISH MANDATE a major portion of Palestine was gradually transformed into the Jewish state of Israel, formally declared on 15 May 1948.

Early Encounters with Zionism

The new Lebanon was a historical novelty. France occupied the country during World War I, and subsequently a mandate from the League of Nations legitimized its rule over Mount Lebanon and SYRIA. French authorities, however, were soon frustrated by the hostility of Syria's population and its pan-Arab nationalism, which produced insistent calls for Arab unity and independence. Because France did not intend to accommodate the Arab nationalists, it decided to appease the Maronite minority, in the belief that the Maronites would be loyal allies and support French interests in the region. Thus Paris first revived and enlarged the recently abolished *Mutasarrifiyya* ("Little Lebanon") enclave. On 2 August 1920, France incorporated into Mount Lebanon all the administrative regions of the Beqa'a Valley that had formerly been part of the Vilayat of Damascus. On 31 August 1921, France further enlarged the new entity; it integrated into it major parts of the former Vilayats of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, and the hinterland of the latter two.

What the new entity gained in territory, however, it lost in social harmony and stability, because two permanent elements were introduced into its political life. The first element was the sharp increase in the number of Muslims. Unlike Mount Lebanon, which had a dominant Christian (primarily Maronite) population, the republic of Lebanon had at best only a slight Christian majority. This demographic change upset the former balance of power and expectations. Although the French authorities gave the Maronite elite political power in the new entity, the arrangement was tenuous and in time would certainly prove nonviable. Therefore, France and the Maronite elite sought to advance the prospects for Lebanon by securing the acquiescence of its Muslim and other Christian populations to their novel status by promoting the confessional traditions of nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon. Because confessionalism divided society into multiple competing groups, it allowed French officials to pursue an almost unchallenged policy of divide and rule. Paris calculated that the new system would weaken Arab nationalist solidarity and lessen the possibility of a common front hostile to foreign rule. It also assured the French that their most favored client, the Maronites, had a privileged position in the state. In the late 1930s and 1940s the confessional system was somewhat altered to co-opt the Muslim elite by offering them a more favorable share of political power.

The second element of the new system created in Lebanon was an immense and almost unbridgeable ideological chasm. Because each party's interests were defined by ideology, sectarian disagreements were inflamed and made more intransigent and intense. The ideological split, which has plagued the national life of Lebanon for the past century, is that of pan-Arab nationalism versus Lebanese nationalism. Advocates of the former ideology emphasize the country's Arab identity, wish to integrate the country with the Arab world's politics and social life, and want to reduce its dependence on and alliance with foreign

powers. Proponents of Lebanese nationalism prefer to emphasize the country's supposedly non-Arab distinctiveness and safeguard its Western orientation and alliances. These two differing political orientations not only affected domestic politics but, even more, affected the attitude of Lebanese political actors toward external issues and to relations with outsiders—not coincidentally, Israel and Palestine.


During the British occupation of Palestine and the French occupation of Lebanon, a limited, interrupted, and not particularly fruitful relationship developed between the Zionist movement and some Lebanese elements, primarily Maronite. The Zionist leadership in Palestine realized early on that their plans for the colonization of Palestine were adamantly opposed by the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian Arabs (Christian as well as Muslim) and by the people of the surrounding countries. Zionist leaders believed that alliances with other ethnic and religious minorities in the region were their best course to gain acceptance and support, and they viewed the Maronites of Lebanon as among the most likely candidates for an alliance. The JEWISH AGENCY and its political department in Palestine developed, promoted, and defended this minority alliance theory.

In fact a close examination of the record, including Israeli archives, indicates that the policy of minority alliances essentially failed in the case of Lebanon for several reasons. First, on the Lebanese side, relations between the two minority movements remained limited to a few members of the Maronite elite. Zionism's Lebanese interlocutors consisted of a subset of the Maronite elite, who were a minority of the Maronites. In turn the Maronites were a minority in Lebanon. Given the limited number of their contacts in Lebanon, the Zionist objective of winning over the Lebanese populace, or even the Maronite community, to their cause or gaining meaningful support from them was doomed from the outset. Second, the Maronite figures willing to deal with Zionists did so from narrow sectarian or private material interests rather than sympathy with or support for Zionism. When the Maronites' relations with Lebanese Muslims improved or when financial inducements were withheld, support for Zionism evaporated. Third, those Maronites willing to engage with Zionists were aware of their society's intense, widespread opposition to Zionism and feared the public outcry that would ensue if their activities became known. Therefore they insisted that their contacts and discussions with Zionist circles remain secret at all times. Despite the efforts and resources expended, Zionists failed to elicit any practical support from their Maronite contacts. Finally, Lebanese leaders were aware that plans for a future Jewish state invariably called for the agricultural LAND and WATER resources of South Lebanon to be annexed to Palestine. Any desires to collaborate with Zionists were, of necessity, tempered by the fear of Zionist encroachment on Lebanese territory. Collusion with Zionists came to be seen as high treason and a betrayal of the cause of Lebanon, condemning in the process the minority alliance theory.

In the late 1930s and early 1940s, attitudes of both Sunni Muslims and Maronite Christians changed, and a greater measure of mutual acceptance and cooperation developed. When Sunnis began receiving a fair share of government and economic spoils, demands for union with neighboring Arab states became less important than the apportionment of political offices and the distribution of wealth among the sects. Similarly, Maronite leaders adopted a more pragmatic outlook on the West (especially France), a more moderate view of Lebanese-Arab relations, and closer identification with and more support for Arab efforts in the conflict with Zionism. The changes in attitude between Lebanon's two major sects made Lebanese political life less doctrinaire. In the process they allowed the various groups to collaborate to end French rule and establish institutional arrangements for power sharing in an independent Lebanon. The new republic soon joined the LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, and when the 1948 WAR erupted between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Lebanon was firmly in the Arab camp and the Zionist project in Lebanon totally collapsed.

Independent Lebanon: Relations with Israel and the Palestinians

After 1948 the official policy of successive Lebanese governments toward Israel and the Palestinian issue has traditionally been determined by two interrelated considerations: (1) Israeli threats to Lebanon's national security, territory, and natural resources; and (2) the presence of a large Palestinian REFUGEE community in the country. To counter the former, Lebanon joined the various collective security arrangements set up by the Arab countries, and its foreign policy emphasized



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Map 29. Political Map of Lebanon

the need for joint Arab action regarding Palestine. Lebanon was also the first Arab country to raise the Palestinian issue in its economic and political relations with other nations. In 1949, for instance, it refused to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with the UNITED STATES because Washington had taken a hostile position toward Arab rights in Palestine. On the issue of the Palestinian refugees, Lebanon's policy has been to defend the Palestinians' "right of return" to their former lands and to consider the solution to the refugee problem an urgent humanitarian and political issue. Without such a solution, Lebanon has maintained, all efforts at settling the Arab-Israeli conflict are certain

to fail. Officially, Lebanese governments have, without exception, adhered to this position and rejected Israeli calls for settling Palestinian refugees in their host countries.

The foremost threat Israel poses to Lebanon can be seen as a threat to its fundamental principle, religious coexistence. Lebanon, the most religiously pluralistic society in the whole Middle East, has been the most sensitive to the dangers inherent in the existence of a Jewish/Zionist state in Palestine. Because it called for the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state, Zionism challenged the principle of religious coexistence, which is essential for maintaining stability and social harmony in the multireligious Lebanese society. One of the earliest and most penetrating analyses of the dangers Israel poses to Lebanon and the Arab world was made by the eminent Lebanese diplomat and philosopher Charles Malek, minister plenipotentiary to the United States and permanent delegate to the UNITED NATIONS. In a 15 August 1949 confidential report to the Foreign Ministry, entitled "On the Present Situation," Malek argued that the Palestinian *Nakba* (Catastrophe), or the loss of Palestine to the Arabs, mirrored an ongoing Arab Nakba, and that unless fundamental reforms were undertaken, Israel would dominate the Arab world within half a century. He further pointed out that Lebanon, an integral part of the Arab world, had to take a leading role in this reform movement because its raison d'être is respect for freedom of the mind, spirit, and expression. Similarly Bishara Al-Khuri, a Christian Maronite and the first president of the independent Lebanese republic, was the first Arab head of state to publicly denounce Zionism as "an exploitative idea for political control that has no connection whatsoever with religion." He expressed his government's fear of Zionist intrusions into South Lebanon and warned that Israel was about to incite interreligious conflict and promote the establishment of religious "mini-states" in surrounding countries. Such schemes, he wrote, would have disastrous effects on the Christians of Lebanon and the conditions of peace in the region.

The fears of these two prominent public figures that Israel would meddle in Lebanon's domestic affairs and foment civil strife proved prophetic. The *Personal Diary* of MOSHE SHARETT, Israel's first foreign minister, released in 1979, outlines a 1954 plan by DAVID BEN-GURION, Israel's first prime minister, to dismember Lebanon, establish a restricted and dependent Christian state in the image of Israel, and annex the territory south of the Litani River to Israel. This task was a principal objective, if not "the central duty," of Israel's foreign policy, he emphasized. Viewing Lebanon as the weakest link in the Arab chain, Ben-Gurion planned to break the chain by setting Lebanese Muslims and Christians against each other. Agents provocateurs and financial means—"no amount of dollars should be spared"—would be used to accomplish this design. Former Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN, a supporter of the scheme, envisioned hiring a puppet Maronite Lebanese officer who would invite the Israeli army to invade the country under the pretext of saving the Lebanese Christians. Sharett's protests that the majority of Lebanese Maronites were satisfied with the power-sharing arrangements in the country and were loath to collaborate with Israel were not heeded, but Lebanon was spared what could have been a tragic fate when Israeli plans were suspended to prepare for a war with EGYPT. Elements of the Ben-Gurion plan, however, with its traditional underlying Zionist conception of Israeli interests and objectives in Lebanon, were put in effect during two major episodes of Israeli involvement in Lebanon: the civil war (1975–1990) and the Israeli invasion (1982), including the occupation of the southern parts of the country (1978–2000).

The Palestinians

The history of Lebanon's relationship with the Palestinian community and Israel's role in this relationship can be viewed in four successive and distinct phases: submission, standoff, confrontation, and subordination.

Submission Phase: 1948–1969. The founding of the state of Israel in Palestine in 1948 created additional concerns for Lebanon other than the threat of Israeli territorial expansion and meddling in Lebanon's internal affairs. Large numbers of Palestinians sought refuge in Lebanon in 1947–1948; the number was estimated by the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA) at 127,600. Lebanon was a natural choice for many refugees because of their ancient social and commercial relations with its inhabitants. Others came because Lebanon was the closest country to their homes and villages. In time their numbers increased as other Palestinians sought refuge in Lebanon in 1967 and in 1970–1971.

The 1948 refugees included some professionals, entrepreneurs, capitalists, and skilled laborers who relocated to urban centers and made significant contributions to Lebanon's impressive economic development in the 1950s and 1960s. However, most refugees were peasants, many of whom were first assembled in deserted French and British army barracks and were later reassembled near the main coastal cities and a few locations in the interior in refugee camps. Originally there were sixteen camps: seven in Beirut (Tal al-Za'tar, Dikwane, and Jisr al-Pasha; Dhbaye in East Beirut and its environs; and Burj al-Barajne, Shatila, and Mar Ilyas in West Beirut); two in Sidon and its environs ('Ayn al-Hilwa and Al-Miya wa Miya); three in Tyre (Al-Bass, Al-Burj al-Shamali, and al-Rashidiya); one in the southern city of Nabatiya; two in Tripoli (Nahr al-Barid and Badawi); and one in Ba'albek (al-Jaleel). Today twelve camps remain, with four totally destroyed in the civil war (only Dhbaye remains in the environs of East Beirut) or by Israeli shelling (Nabatiya). About half of the Palestinians in Lebanon reside in the coastal cities, while the rest are distributed among the various refugee camps.

In this phase (roughly the first two decades after their arrival in Lebanon), Palestinians were subject to constant surveillance and harsh police methods. In addition their attempts at organization, either political or social, were severely repressed. The lack of any legitimate organizational avenues for communal self-expression and identification led the politically conscious youth among the Palestinians to join the pan-Arab political parties, primarily the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS and the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party/BA'ATH. Because these parties were not officially recognized, their Palestinian members learned to organize and function underground. Their activities took the form of mass demonstrations and public rallies on significant national occasions. During this time the Lebanese secret service, the Deuxième Bureau, remained in control of the Palestinian camps.

Official Lebanese policy toward the Palestinians was motivated by security considerations as well as by internal issues. The pro-Western government believed the politicization of the camps and their revolutionary potential threatened its security, and its policies toward the Palestinians frequently used arbitrary and harsh measures, including arrests. Official state policy also imposed many restrictions on Palestinians, which were motivated by a desire to maintain the sectarian balance and by intercommunal suspicions. Palestinians were treated as foreigners and not allowed to work without PERMITS, which were difficult to obtain and valid only for a specific job at a specified place. Permits also had to be renewed yearly, and a worker who left his job had to have his permit reissued. Not surprisingly, only 2,362 Palestinians had work permits in 1969. Because of these difficulties, the majority of working Palestinians violated the law. Furthermore, they had to accept low wages and did not qualify for any work benefits. Palestinian freedom of movement was severely restricted. According to UNRWA and government regulations, families moving from one camp to another lost their UNRWA rations and other services, including the right to an EDUCATION. The regulations also gave the government the authority to transfer any Palestinian from one camp to another "for reasons of security."

The use of repressive policies continued until 1958 and the election of General Fu'ad Shihab to the presidency. Arab nationalist sentiment was at a high point in the country. The 1958 civil war had forced the government to make minor concessions and undertake some reforms. There was also a shift in attitude toward the Palestinians. Some practices were liberalized and the policy of outright collective discrimination was replaced by more selective measures. Political activism, however, was still not tolerated. Significantly, the first FATAH victim to be killed outside Palestine died in Lebanon at the hands of the Lebanese secret service.

In the mid-1960s a new consciousness began to emerge among the Palestinians. Arab heads of state, during their first summit conference in 1964, called for the establishment of an organization that would represent Palestinian interests. That decision produced the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), which, once established, encouraged the formation of independent Palestinian labor unions and professional associations. In the same period, many of the *fida'iyyun*, or commando organizations, were also founded, and a score of Palestinian organizations were formed, including the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Fatah) in the late 1950s and HEROES OF THE RETURN in November 1966. Meanwhile, both the Movement of Arab Nationalists and the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party formed a special wing for their Palestinian members within their party structures.

After the 1967 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Palestinian activism took a definite shape. Israel's defeat of the Arab armies and the consequent loss of faith in existing regimes and leadership created a vacuum filled by popular Palestinian activism. The Palestinian resistance movement became the rallying point for the Arab masses, the symbol of their defiance of the status quo, and an expression of their rejection of defeat. With its dominant Palestinian element, JORDAN became their major base of operation, while Lebanon was a supporting front. Between June 1967 and April 1969 the resistance worked on two fronts to establish itself in Lebanon. First, it had to infiltrate and organize the refugee camps in spite of the government's tight security arrangements. The living conditions in the camps and the long-standing subjugation of their inhabitants made them receptive to the emerging movement. Second, the resistance had to establish a military presence in South Lebanon to secure itself against both Israeli attacks and the opposition of the Lebanese army. There were serious clashes between the army and units of the resistance, which were either attempting to infiltrate Israel or were returning from missions inside Israeli territory. Frequent Israeli raids into Lebanon worsened the relationship between the army and the resistance. The Lebanese army, which was ill-equipped, could not face the far superior numbers and weapons of the Israelis and feared that under the pretext of retaliatory action for Palestinian attacks, Israel might invade and occupy South Lebanon. Army discontent reached new heights.

After a Palestinian attack on an El Al Israeli airliner in Athens, Israel raided the Beirut International Airport on 27 December 1968 and destroyed thirteen Lebanese civilian airliners on the ground; the Lebanese government felt helpless in the face of Israeli threats and decided to confront the resistance. In 1969 there were several serious clashes between the army and the resistance, but the Lebanese army was unable to achieve any decisive victories. In August and September the refugee camps revolted against the Lebanese government and expelled the security forces stationed there. The resistance then assumed control of the camps. These clashes polarized Lebanese public opinion and led to the longest government crisis in Lebanese history. For almost eight months the country remained without a cabinet. Facing increasing domestic and Arab pressure, the Lebanese government accepted Egyptian mediation. The day after Lebanese and Palestinian delegations met in Cairo, on 2 November 1969, the secret Cairo Agreement was reached, which listed the principles that would govern relations between the two sides. One month later a new Lebanese cabinet was formed.

Standoff Phase: 1969–1973. The Cairo Agreement consists of two parts. The first part defines the relationship between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinian community in Lebanon (and its resistance organizations). It outlines four principles: (1) the right of work, residence, and freedom of movement for Palestinians in Lebanon; (2) the founding of local Palestinian committees in refugee camps, which would cooperate with local authorities to safeguard the interests of the inhabitants; (3) an armed Palestinian military police in the camps to ensure discipline and to regulate the carrying of arms; and (4) the right of Palestinians in Lebanon to join the ARMED STRUGGLE of the Palestinian revolution.

The second part of the agreement covers the various military aspects of the relationship between the two sides. Three of the fifteen clauses are of special significance. In the first, Lebanon agreed to facilitate the passage of Palestinian commandos through its territory and to allow them to establish observation posts on the border with Israel. The seventh clause called for resistance representatives to be stationed in Lebanese army headquarters to deal with any emergencies that arose in the camps. Finally, in the fourteenth clause the two delegations affirmed that the Palestinian armed struggle was as much in the interest of Lebanon as it was integral to the Palestinian revolution and the Arabs as a whole.

The Cairo Agreement began a new phase in Lebanese-Palestinian relations, although the Lebanese political leadership accepted the changing realities only after a long period of political and social crisis made them recognize the amount of support for the Palestinians among the Lebanese people. But the complete dominance of the Lebanese authorities over the Palestinian community in Lebanon was over. Because the Palestinians had been radicalized and had acquired military strength, they were better equipped to resist government attempts to suppress them. Undoubtedly, the proliferation within Lebanese society of sentiments and organizations opposed to the status quo and the natural solidarity of many Lebanese with

the Palestinian cause were the necessary conditions for this transition. Although the agreement produced a relatively peaceful relationship for the next three years, it was not final. In retrospect, it gave the government the time it needed to make its second attempt to confront the resistance.

The period from November 1969 to April 1973 witnessed several dramatic developments. The first was a product of the fierce clashes between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance in September 1970 (BLACK SEPTEMBER) and in February, June, and July 1971. The defeat of the Palestinian resistance and its expulsion from Jordan made Lebanon its only place of refuge. Beginning in the second half of 1971, the number of armed resistance members in Lebanon increased significantly. The second major development was an increase in the tempo and ferocity of Israeli attacks on Lebanon in response to Palestinian incursions across the border. Israel's actions took several forms: shelling of southern Lebanese villages, search-and-destroy missions, the invasion and occupation of different border areas with large forces for varying lengths of time, aerial raids on Lebanese civilian targets and Palestinian refugee camps, naval bombardment of coastal refugee camps, and commando assaults into the country's interior. The Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory between November 1969 and April 1973 resulted in considerable destruction in Lebanon and indicated Israel's commitment to the obliteration of the Palestinian resistance.

Conflict between Lebanese government forces and the resistance broke out after three prominent Palestinian leaders were assassinated during an Israeli raid in Beirut on 10 April 1973. Intense fighting between the army and the resistance in different parts of the country erupted on 2 May and continued unabated until 9 May. Like the June 1969 clashes, those of May 1973 seem to have ended under the influence of three factors: (1) the inability of the Lebanese government to resolve the conflict militarily; (2) rising pressures from other Arab countries, especially Syria; and (3) the threat of civil war. The events of May 1973, like those of June 1969, transformed Lebanese-Palestinian relations. The new phase is best described as one of confrontation.

Confrontation Phase: 1973–1982. The end of open violence did not lead to the cessation of hostilities. Both sides were not satisfied. Lebanon's president and the army had failed to contain the resistance and its activities, and they were unable to revoke the Cairo Agreement. Events also seemed to corroborate the worst fears of the resistance—namely, that the Lebanese government would continue to seek its liquidation and would not willingly abide by common agreements. In addition, the resistance thought the government was part of a larger, internationally inspired scheme aimed at its destruction.

The period following May 1973 witnessed a hardening of positions. The resistance became more heavily dependent on its bases in Lebanon, Israeli raids intensified, and Lebanese public outrage increased. Armed militias of the PHALANGE and National Liberal parties became large, massively equipped private armies that added a new source of tension. The widespread distribution of weapons among civilians increased the possibility that accidental clashes would escalate into large-scale engagements. The system of checks and balances found in Lebanon's institutional infrastructure did not exist at the popular level, and mass violence can paralyze state institutions. The result was a Lebanese society unable to stop violence without outside assistance or intervention. This, on a small scale, was the lesson of the civil war of 1958, and Lebanon unfortunately experienced a repetition of this drama on a much larger scale after April 1975.

The civil war was triggered by two incidents in 1975. The first, a purely Lebanese affair, was the assassination in late February of Ma'ruf Sa'd, a popular Muslim leader from Sidon and a former member of parliament. This incident produced a nationwide controversy over the composition and impartiality of the army and led to a national debate over socioeconomic issues, which threatened the stability of Lebanon's political life that had traditionally divided the Lebanese along sectarian lines.

The second incident took place on 13 April 1975, when militiamen, reputedly belonging to the Phalangist party, ambushed a bus in the Beirut district of 'Ayn al-Rumaneh and murdered its twenty-six Palestinian occupants. The incident produced a series of fierce clashes between Phalangists and the resistance and led to a cabinet crisis. A prolonged confrontation between the two sides would naturally assume a sectarian coloring because the Phalangist party was exclusively Christian and portrayed itself as the champion of Christian interests. These two incidents reflected a growing trend

within Lebanon: conflicts arising out of the armed presence of the Palestinians were superimposed on socioeconomic and political conflicts between Lebanon's religious sects, which created mutually reinforcing fractures in Lebanese society. Lebanese political movements split between two coalitions: the progressive Lebanese National Movement and the conservative Lebanese Front. Each side, fearing destruction at the hands of the other, forged external alliances to support its political and military programs.

The confrontation phase went through five stages. The first stage lasted from the serious breakdown in public order after Prime Minister Rashid al-Solh resigned on 15 May 1975 to the reformist presidential message of 14 February 1976, commonly referred to as the "Constitutional Document." In this stage the combatants were mainly Lebanese groups. Domestic issues dominated political discourse, clashes were primarily confined to Beirut and its environs, and fighting involved mutual shelling across stationary boundaries. At this stage, the Palestinian resistance was only partially involved, fluctuating between behind-the-scenes backing of nationalist forces and restrained, limited assaults. Its objectives were limited: to guarantee its continued presence in the country; to ensure that its allies, the forces of the Lebanese National Movement, were not defeated; and to prevent the "Arabization" or "internationalization" of the conflict and thus loss of Palestinian control.

The second stage of this phase extended from mid-February to late May 1976, when differences between the two sides assumed a more ideological tone and thus became more difficult to resolve. There was less willingness to compromise and a greater faith in military solutions. Also the Palestinian resistance, which had been a sporadic participant, now became crucially involved. Two significant developments brought about this change. The first was the escalation of fighting by Christian militia groups during the month of January, their increasingly frequent attacks on Palestinian camps, and the entrance of the Lebanese army into the battle against the forces of the National Movement and the resistance. Since this came after the Sinai II Agreement between Israel and Egypt, most Palestinian leaders felt that their fate had become inextricably linked to that of the Lebanese National Movement. Therefore they decided to throw their full weight into fighting. The second was the intensification of international intervention. Other states, both Arab and non-Arab, became more heavily committed to supplying their proxies with materials to carry on a war that none could pursue independently.

This second stage produced the total disintegration of Lebanese state institutions; the civil service, police, and the army ceased to function. The unsuccessful coup d'état of 11 March 1976 fragmented the army into several warring bands. The reintegration of Lebanon was further hindered by the forced internal migration of Muslim minorities from Christian-dominated sectors and vice versa. These migrations, in turn, contributed to a de facto partition of the country.

The third stage began on 31 May 1976, when regular units of the Syrian army entered Lebanon on the side of the right-wing coalition of Christian parties, reversing decades of support for the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinians. The Lebanese Front and its military wing, the Lebanese Forces, were losing; Syria stepped in to save them so Israel would have no pretext for invasion. This direct and large-scale Syrian participation in the war radically altered the objectives of both sides. For the National Movement and the resistance, the presence of Syrian troops frustrated their military and political objectives and led to serious divisions in and defections from their ranks. The open conflict between the Syrians and the Palestinians had a devastating effect on the resistance, which had long considered relations with Syria of paramount importance. In contrast, the Syrian intervention was a blessing to the conservative Christian parties, which expanded their objectives and demanded total disarmament of the resistance. They called also for the expulsion of Palestinian fighters, and some even went so far as to announce their intent to relocate most of the Palestinian population to other Arab countries. After their capture of Jisr al-Pasha, Nab'a, and Tal al-Za'tar, all former strongholds of the National Movement and the resistance, the militancy of the Christian parties became more pronounced.

The fourth stage began with the transfer of presidential authority to Elias Sarkis on 23 September 1976 and primarily featured the large-scale involvement of Syria and Israel. Since these two regional powers chose for different reasons not to engage each other directly, their confrontation took place indirectly in Lebanon. Syria attempted to check the inroads Israel made in Lebanon

principally by frustrating the ambitions of the Lebanese Front and resuming its support for the Palestinian resistance, while Israel confronted the Syrians by backing the SAAD HADDAD enclave in the southern region and by trying to build an alliance with the militant leadership of the military branch of the Lebanese Front.

Israel developed a three-pronged policy to deal with Lebanon's civil war. In addition to targeting Palestinian refugee camps and military installations, the first prong was to wage continuous attacks on Lebanese civilians and their economic infrastructure to create a rift between the two communities. Israel wanted Lebanese nationals to blame the Palestinians for their losses and turn against them. The policy achieved significant though not total success. The second prong in Israel's policy was to exercise authority over South Lebanon, the area bordering Israel. In July 1976 the defense minister announced Israel's intention to end all non-Lebanese (that is, mostly Palestinian) military presence in the region and establish a pro-Israeli Lebanese militia. The SOUTH LEBANON ARMY under Major Saad Haddad, a dissident Lebanese army officer, was formed by Israel at the end of 1976, and in March 1978 the Israeli army occupied the region.

The third prong was to supply the Lebanese Forces with weaponry, military training, military advisers, intelligence information, funds, and diplomatic support. This stream of aid began several years before the start of the civil war but escalated after March 1976, when official contacts between Israel and some of the civilian and military leaders of the Lebanese Front were established. By May 1977, Israeli military assistance to the Lebanese Front militias reached as high as $150 million. This amount proved only a trickle as the war progressed and intensified and Israel's involvement expanded. In retrospect, the involvement of Israel was a prime contributor to the longevity of the civil war and its high toll in human lives and material destruction.

As the theater for this many-sided battle, Lebanon became increasingly involved in the larger Middle East conflict, from which it was unable to disengage. The willingness of the different Lebanese political parties and groups to seek external assistance was responsible in some measure for the impasse that ensued in this stage of the war.

The fifth and final stage in the confrontation phase began when an Israeli army of some 100,000 soldiers invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982. The Israeli command's primary objective was the surrender or destruction of the armed Palestinian organizations and their leadership. In addition, it hoped to destroy the aspirations of the Palestinians for an independent homeland, seal the fate of the WEST BANK and GAZA, end Syria's presence in Lebanon and undermine the regime of Hafez al-Asad, secure a military balance of power in the Middle East that would favor Israel for the next thirty years, and establish a sectarian Maronite state in Lebanon allied to Israel and isolated from its regional Arab environment. To achieve these goals it became necessary to occupy Beirut, the center of Lebanon's political, economic, and cultural life and of the Palestinian presence.

The reelection of Israel's LIKUD PARTY under the leadership of MENAHEM BEGIN in 1981 and the appointment of the hawkish ARIEL SHARON as minister of defense produced a new and more radical Israeli approach to Lebanon and the Palestinian issue. Lebanon was viewed as part of an Israeli grand design that encompassed the whole Middle East. In a lecture Sharon gave at the Center for Strategic Studies in the University of Tel Aviv in December 1981, he said the sphere of Israel's strategic and security interests covers all the Arab countries of the Middle East and the Mediterranean and Red Sea areas.

Although the conflict has been considered the fifth Arab-Israeli war, it differed notably from previous engagements (i.e., those of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973). First, it was the only time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict that Israel invaded a neighboring Arab country, occupied its capital, and proceeded to reconstitute its internal policies to serve Israel's interests. Second, for the first time since World War II a major capital city (Beirut) and several other cities and towns in the same country were subjected to systematic attack by highly advanced weapon systems, without regard to human life or property and in full view of the world. Sixty thousand artillery shells and countless bombs were used to bombard Beirut. By the end of August 1982, the invasion had left 19,000 dead, 31,000 wounded, 100,000 homeless, and some 300,000 displaced; property losses were valued at $12 billion. At the time, UNRWA reported that the level of destruction in the 'Ayn Al-Hilwa refugee camp in Sidon reached 100 percent, and in the al-Rashidiya, al-Bas, and Burj al-Shamali refugee camps in Tyre it was 70, 50, and 35 percent, respectively.

Third, for the first time in the Arab-Israeli conflict irregular forces or people's militias accepted the task of confronting an invading army. (The involvement of the Lebanese army was weak and relatively insignificant.) Despite the vast imbalance between the two sides, the military engagement lasted longer than any previous Arab-Israeli military encounter, and Israel failed to destroy the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance. Less than four months after its invasion, Israel began a series of withdrawals that led to its retreat to its pre–6 June 1982 positions in South Lebanon. Fourth, the invasion exposed the Arab countries' almost total political and military paralysis, individually and collectively. Finally, the bombardment and occupation of Beirut and the massacre of some 3,000 Palestinian civilians at the SABRA AND SHATILA refugee camps exposed the moral bankruptcy of the Israeli government and caused deep fissions within Israeli society itself. Although the massacre was committed by Lebanese collaborators, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES escorted them to the scene and provided them with cover as they executed their heinous crime. The international outcry that followed and the decision to send a multinational force to protect the refugee camps preempted any scheme to dispel the Palestinian community. It also forced the Israelis to retreat to their self-declared security zone in South Lebanon.

Three lessons relating to Israeli-Lebanese relations and the Palestinian issue can be learned from the invasion. First, there are limits to the use of military power to achieve political ends. The Israeli military, though more powerful than its opponents, found itself in a quagmire from which it was not easy to disengage and its credibility was undermined. The minority alliance Israel built within the country blinded it to two Lebanese realities: (1) to install a sectarian minority in power and isolate the country from its Arab environment, Israel would need to maintain a large force in Lebanon permanently, which was inconceivable; and (2) Israeli leaders underestimated the attachment of the Lebanese to their country and their shared experiences. Instead, the invasion made the vast majority of Lebanese more hostile toward Israel and led to the rise of Shi'ite resistance to the Israeli OCCUPATION. Second, Israel will be hard-pressed to ever again enter into a similar venture in Lebanon. Ben-Gurion's design to restructure Lebanon was in all likelihood buried in the wake of the invasion. The third lesson is that Israel has been blind to the strength of Palestinian national sentiments and the resiliency of Palestinian society. Although the command and fighters of the PLO had to relocate outside Lebanon, the invasion failed to destroy Palestinian nationalism, as the Israeli war plan envisioned. Instead, six years later Palestinian opposition to the Occupation produced the INTIFADA, and Palestinians gained the sympathy and support of the international community.

Subordinate Phase: 1982–Present. Israeli forces began their withdrawal from Beirut on 26 September 1982. Together with its Lebanese allies, Israel lost any influence it had on Lebanese national politics. On 23 February 1984, President Amin Gemayel, followed on 5 March by the Council of Ministers, abrogated the proposed peace agreement of 17 May 1983 that Israel, with the aid of the US government, had attempted to impose on the Lebanese government. The agreement would have taken Lebanon out of its Arab environment and placed it in an Israeli sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Syria assumed a largely uncontested position of dominance over Lebanese affairs. For the Palestinians, the most dangerous fallout from the invasion was the "war of the camps." It began with the splintering in 1983 of Fatah, the Palestinians' largest resistance organization, and the outbreak of infighting for the control of the refugee camps between Syrian-backed rebels known as the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT and the mainstream factions of the PLO, known as the Command for Palestinian National Action. After the Salvation Front wrested control of the camps in the Tripoli area and the interior from the PLO factions, the battles moved to Beirut and the south. They were spearheaded by the forces of the Shi'ite organization AMAL, an ally of Syria. Elements from the Shi'ite organization HIZBULLAH and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party supported PLO loyalists. It is estimated that 47,000 people were displaced in this conflagration.

On 22 October 1989, the Lebanese parliament adopted the Document of National Understanding, better known as the Ta'if Accord, which became the basis for an enduring peace settlement. The accord established a revised political system, shifting some power away from the office of the president to the Council of Ministers, providing for the disarmament and dissolution of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and setting up a special relationship with Syria and a framework for eventual Syrian withdrawal. Gradually, the institutions of the state

revived and a measure of stability reappeared. The settlement called on the state to "extend its authority over the whole territory of Lebanon." The armed forces were to be unified, trained, and equipped to confront Israeli aggression. In regard to Israel, the accord entrusted the state with liberating Lebanon from Israeli occupation, ensuring the implementation of UN Resolution 425, which required Israel to fully withdraw from Lebanon, and adhering to boundaries of the 23 March 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT with Israel. In other words, Lebanon undertook not to sign the separate bilateral peace agreement imposed during the 1982 Israeli invasion.

PLO-affiliated organizations accepted the provision of the Ta'if Accord affecting them, and most Palestinian fighters surrendered all of their heavy weaponry to the army and were reassembled within the refugee camps. This marked the onset of a new era in Lebanese-Palestinian relations and the Palestinian experience in Lebanon.

Charting a Course for Lebanon

Lebanon will always feel the effects of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, given the size of the Palestinian refugee community it hosts and the susceptibility of Lebanese society to foreign interference. Estimates of the total number of Palestinians in the country today vary significantly. The Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz*, on 21 July 1995, placed their numbers at 480,643. However, UNRWA reported the number of registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in 1999 at 370,144, with another 42,000 refugees unregistered. At present, they form the largest single concentration of Palestinians outside historic Palestine and the HASHEMITE Kingdom of JORDAN.

With the exception of a small enclave in the Shab'a farms, Lebanon has liberated its territory from Israel. On 24 May 2000 the Lebanese resistance, in particular Hizbullah, at great sacrifice, forced an unconditional and hurried Israeli retreat from the 10 percent of Lebanon it had occupied directly or through proxies for almost a quarter of a century. Since then, Lebanese policy has been to resist any attempts at bilateral arrangements with Israel. Public figures and the public at large almost universally accept the dictum pronounced by former president Sarkis: "Contrary to what some Israelis imagine, Lebanon will not be the second Arab country to sign an agreement with Israel. It will be the last." Nevertheless, Lebanon may well assume in the future a diplomatic role in the pursuit of an Arab-Israeli settlement. It is noteworthy that the Arab summit that issued the ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, also known as the Beirut Declaration, on 28 March 2002 was held in Beirut, and that Lebanon was a member of the committee that drafted the declaration. The Arab world proposed a complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since the war of June 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, a just solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, followed by peace agreements and the normalization of relations with Israel. This remains the only comprehensive peace initiative approved by all Arab states.

Lebanon's laws and policies regulating the civil and social rights of the Palestinian refugee community were archaic. The administration of Lebanese president Ilyas Hrawi, formed after the Ta'if Accord, was aware of the need for change and judiciously refrained from sending the armed forces into the refugee camps, thereby removing what used to be a major source of friction. It also engaged Palestinian delegations on a number of occasions in discussions over such matters as reconstruction and improvement of living conditions in the camps, the regulation of all armed Palestinian presence in the country, and full civil rights except for citizenship and public service employment for Palestinian residents. Consideration of these issues was suspended when direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations began with the OSLO ACCORDS, because Lebanese authorities assumed that any final settlement would cover the future status of the Palestinians of Lebanon. Meanwhile, they adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The challenge was and is to grant the refugee community the civil and social rights that would allow them a normal and humane existence until they are able to exercise their right of return.

A new phase in Lebanese-Israeli relations emerged in the aftermath of Israel's 2000 withdrawal from its enclave in southern Lebanon. It was molded by two major developments. The first relates to the rise in the United States of the administration of GEORGE W. BUSH, which adopted the agenda of the neoconservatives and began to act, especially after 11 September 2001, as the self-appointed custodian of the Middle East. Throughout his two terms in office, the Bush administration was deeply involved in reshaping the region in its own image economically, culturally, politically, and militarily and was seen as pursuing "a nearly

predatory intervention" in every country in the region. The second was the rise to national prominence of Hizbullah, which evolved from a small underground organization resisting Israeli occupation of the Shi'ites' ancestral homeland in southern Lebanon, historically known as Jabal 'Amel, to a mass-based popular movement with a well-equipped, trained, and disciplined military arm and allied with Syria and Iran, the principal opponents of US and Israeli policies in the region.

In this new phase, Hizbullah assumed the former role that the Palestinian organizations had played in defying Israel and resisting its encroachments. Israel's attention turned to Lebanon once more, and preparations were made to destroy Hizbullah at the opportune time. The occasion presented itself in 2006 following a cross-border raid carried out by Hizbullah fighters in which three Israeli soldiers were killed and two captured. Immediately thereafter, Israel subjected Lebanon for thirty-four days to one of the most unrelenting and intense aerial bombardments ever mounted on a civilian society. The war Israel waged on Lebanon, most probably with the US administration's advance knowledge and approval, caused catastrophic destruction: approximately one quarter of the population was displaced; the infrastructure, transportation, and communication systems were severely damaged; and vital points such as airports, ports, water and sewage treatment plants, electrical facilities, wheat silos, and fuel depots were destroyed. The attack did not spare hospitals, schools, commercial enterprises, offices, shops, and food stores. Moreover, there was systematic destruction by air, sea, and land of complete city blocks and scores of villages that culminated in the saturation bombing of southern Lebanese villages in the last days of the war with four million cluster bombs that continue to kill and maim Lebanese villagers.

For several weeks, the US administration, hoping that Israel would be able to achieve its war goals, defended Israel's actions and prevented the UN Security Council from passing a resolution demanding a cessation of hostilities. When it became obvious that Israel was failing, the United States had no choice but to allow the Security Council to call for an end to the fighting. In time, a multinational force made up primarily of European soldiers was dispatched to South Lebanon under the UN flag to separate the combatants and garrison the area.

The war failed to destroy or disarm Hizbullah, but it led to the erosion of Israel's deterrent capability and contributed to the further radicalization of the Arab public. Together with resident Palestinians, Hizbullah now forms the nexus between Lebanon and Palestine. Israel wants this nexus exorcised and Hizbullah destroyed, even if Lebanon is seriously impaired in the process, thus Lebanon will likely continue to be an Israeli target in the future. Lebanese hope that the US administration of Barack Obama will show balance, adopt measured policies, and bring about a just and lasting settlement to the core issue in the region, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such an accomplishment would contribute to real and durable peace in Lebanon.

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—Hani A. Faris

Lebanon War, 1982

The Israeli invasions of LEBANON had a profound and lasting effect on the Palestinians and their cause. The first invasion took place in 1978 and was short-lived, but it laid the groundwork for the subsequent 1982 invasion. From the early 1970s the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) had been mounting attacks on Israel's northern SETTLEMENTS from the south of Lebanon. Although in military terms and in loss of Jewish lives these were never more than an irritant for Israel, Tel Aviv wanted to end them altogether. Thus, it undertook the 1978 invasion of Lebanon, sending the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) to the Litani River. After a few months Israel withdrew only partially and only after a UN Interim Force in Lebanon was sent to take control of the area. This first invasion, though milder than the one to follow, produced damaging changes that would affect Palestinian (and Lebanese) life thereafter. Israel continued to attack Palestinian positions and Lebanese villages in the period up to 1982. In one such attack in 1981, some 500 to 600 Palestinians and Lebanese were killed: in Beirut, 300 in one night.

The 1982 invasion had unforeseen consequences, both direct and indirect, whose effects remain to this day. Israel had more than one purpose in attacking Lebanon. First, it had long sought an opportunity to transform Lebanon into a client state. Israel envisioned defeating the foes of the Christian MARONITES and installing a Maronite government that would conclude a formal peace treaty with Israel. The PHALANGE, Israel's key ally in Lebanon, was a small but extremist Maronite group that had been trained and armed by Israel for decades. As Christians they believed they were not part of the Arab world, but like the Jews were a minority in the region.

Israel's second and more important purpose in invading Lebanon in 1982 was to destroy the PLO and its power base in that country, where it had firmly established itself in Beirut and the south since its 1970 expulsion from JORDAN (and before). Israel wanted to defeat the PLO militarily, not just to remove it as a cross-border irritant, but Tel Aviv also believed that destroying the PLO's institutional infrastructure—both civilian and military—would allow it to quash all manifestations of Palestinian nationalism, especially in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, where Israel was deeply concerned about the PLO's role in Palestinian nationalism. Israel wanted to annex the WEST BANK and needed a docile and quiescent Palestinian population that would not resist. To bring about such submission, it created the VILLAGE LEAGUES, local quisling leaders, but Israel considered the PLO's destruction a critical aspect of this project. The PLO had scored many diplomatic triumphs since its chairman YASIR ARAFAT's historic address to the UN General Assembly in 1974. The Palestinian cause had gained international legitimacy and had become a crucial part of any peace settlement. For these reasons too, Israel was keen to crush the PLO and put a stop to the whole process before it developed any further.

The 1982 Invasion

In the months before Israel's invasion, Arafat was acutely aware of its imminence and endeavored to avert the attack by halting his fighters' provocations against Israel, so that Israel would not have a pretext for an attack. Indeed, for the full year preceding the invasion, the PLO abided by a truce with Israel that the UNITED STATES had brokered in 1981. With the invasion Israel broke the truce, which it justified as retaliation for an assassination attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London, carried out by a discredited Palestinian faction headed by ABU NIDAL.

The Lebanon offensive, code-named "OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE," began in June 1982 with ground troops invading the south of Lebanon and the aerial bombardment of West Beirut, where the PLO had its offices, hospitals, and other social services. In a matter of days, Israeli forces seized a third of Lebanon's territory, reaching Beirut and besieging its western half. On its way Israel destroyed the entire battery of SYRIA's SAM missiles in the Beqa'a Valley and shot down eighty Syrian MIGs. When it bombed the Palestinian refugee camps in the south and scattered the REFUGEES, the IDF advised them to "go to Syria, and don't come back." Lasting nearly four months, the invasion claimed the lives of some 20,000 people, mostly

Lebanese citizens and Palestinian refugees who had fled Israel during the 1948 WAR and later conflicts.

All accounts indicate that PLO fighters resisted fiercely in the southern camps of Tyre and Sidon. In Beirut, Israeli forces were unwilling to engage in combat along the narrow streets and were unable to penetrate the Palestinian-held areas in the west of the city. Instead, the Israeli army encircled them, bombarding ceaselessly from land, sea, and air with cluster, phosphorus, and other bombs. The siege of West Beirut, which lasted for two and a half months, resulted in enormous hardship for its population, which was denied food, electricity, and basic services. For the first time world reaction toward Israel became hostile, and its massive human rights abuses were condemned. Arafat negotiated desperately with Israel via US intermediaries, hoping to be allowed to stay in Beirut, but the Israelis refused his overtures and demanded that the PLO depart and leave behind no presence in the camps or elsewhere. Arafat capitulated, deciding that the price Israel was exacting from the city's civilian population was too great. In addition, the new American president, RONALD REAGAN, was very pro-Israeli, and the Arab states had done almost nothing to support the PLO. In August, under the supervision of a multinational force, the Palestinian leadership and 11,500 of its fighters left Lebanon and dispersed to a number of different Arab countries, including Syria, Yemen, Tunisia, Sudan, and Algeria.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon marked the end of one of the most important phases of the Palestinian struggle to regain their lost homeland. In destroying the Palestinian base and infrastructure in Lebanon, Israel delivered a nearly fatal blow to the Palestinian cause. The results of this war worked to Israel's advantage in the short term, but Palestinian nationalism returned five years later—in the INTIFADA that erupted in the Occupied Territories. In the long run Israel achieved none of its objectives and suffered several unintended consequences, including Lebanon's refusal to sign a peace treaty with Israel, the growth of Palestinian nationalism that eventually produced the First Intifada, and an acceptance of Arafat and the PLO by the international community, especially the Europeans. For the Palestinians the consequences were grave and manifold. The refugee camps were left defenseless, the Palestinian leadership was in disarray and in exile, the peace process and its subsequent history were altered irrevocably, and even the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA was affected.

Sabra and Shatila Massacre

The most immediate effect of the PLO's expulsion was felt in the refugee camps. According to the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA), Israel's offensive had destroyed them either in whole or in part, and the ones that were partially destroyed lost the services on which they had relied. While the PLO was based in Lebanon, the camps benefited from the organization's range of social and welfare services and, most importantly, the protection of its armed men. But when Arafat and his guerrillas left in August 1982, followed by the multinational force that had overseen the evacuation, the refugees were left defenseless. Aware of this, the PLO had sought and been given assurances by the United States that no Israeli troops would enter West Beirut after their departure. However, Bashir Gemayel, a Maronite pro-Israel leader who along with his Phalangist supporters had a fierce hatred for the Palestinians, became Lebanon's new president soon afterward. When Gemayel was assassinated on 14 September 1982, the Phalangists were determined to avenge his killing and made the refugees their target. Claiming that it had to "keep the peace," Israel invaded West Beirut. On 15 September, under the command of Defense Minister ARIEL SHARON, the IDF permitted Phalangist militias to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, ostensibly to prevent an escalation of violence. In reality, the plan was to destroy the camps and disperse the refugees to Jordan, in line with Sharon's long-held aim.

As the killing proceeded, Israel assisted the operation by lighting up the camps at night with flares and blocking the exits to fleeing refugees. The Phalangists killed and raped the inhabitants and demolished their homes and belongings. They killed patients in the camp hospital and also babies and pregnant women. After forty-eight hours of destruction, which left bodies scattered all over the camps, the Israeli army used bulldozers to push the corpses into mass graves. In those two days, 3,000 persons lost their lives, including Christians, Lebanese, and even several Jewish spouses of some refugees. Defenseless, the Palestinians in the other camps in Lebanon became easy targets for further assaults by Israeli, Phalangist, and other forces. There is little doubt that the SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE was only one part, though the

most tragic, of an emerging pattern of intimidation against Palestinians in Lebanon.

For the Lebanese forces, postwar Lebanon provided a golden opportunity to settle old political scores and to generate through terror an exodus that would rid Lebanon of its Palestinian problem once and for all. Even before the Beirut evacuation the issue had been raised in discussions between Israeli leaders and Gemayel. Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN had spoken of the need for population "TRANSFER" as early as June 10, and had later issued directives to prevent the reconstruction of devastated refugee camps in Sidon and Tyre. Before the war was over, Lebanese militias had attacked Palestinian camps around Israeli-controlled Sidon, ordering their populations to leave at once.

Similar violence and threats continued through the latter half of 1982 and into the next year. In the south, mass arrests of Palestinians by the IDF were accompanied by a spate of disappearances and murders conducted by local Phalangists and militiamen of SAAD HADDAD, a cashiered Lebanese military official who became Israel's proxy. In Beirut the government of Amin Gemayel, Bashir's brother, ordered the full reassertion of Lebanese law over the Palestinians, which included bulldozing "illegal" structures in the refugee camps and rounding up hundreds of Palestinians without official documentation. Palestinians who were abroad with Lebanese refugee travel documents were refused renewals unless they pledged not to return to Lebanon. In Beirut the Lebanese government announced that only those Palestinians who had sought refuge in 1948 would be allowed to remain.

PLO's Internal Disintegration

As a direct consequence of the Lebanon War, the PLO had been rendered acutely vulnerable both to regional pressures and to its own centrifugal tendencies. At a meeting of the FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL in Aden, Yemen, in January 1983, Colonel SA'ID MUSA MURAGHA (Abu Musa), supported by prominent Fatah leftists NIMR SALIH and Samih Abu Kuwayk of the Fatah Central Committee, presented a memorandum strongly critical of the political direction of the movement. Among other issues, the men were most concerned about the continued dispersal of PLO forces and the failure to reconstitute them in the Beqa'a and the north of Lebanon. This suggested that the Fatah leadership was preparing to withdraw all Palestinian forces from Lebanon. Four months later, when Abu Musa began his insurrection against Fatah, it still appeared that Arafat was prepared to accept a total withdrawal from Lebanon. On 9 May 1983 Abu Musa ordered all Fatah units in the Beqa'a Valley to disregard future orders from the Fatah leadership. The Fatah Central Committee at first ignored the disobedience, but as it became apparent that the mutiny was gaining strength, it cut funds and logistical support to rebellious units. The rebels then seized Fatah supply depots in the Beqa'a on 25 May and in Damascus on 28 May. In late June, fighting erupted between Fatah loyalist and Fatah rebel units in the Beqa'a.

A wide spectrum of grievances motivated the actions of the dissidents. Many were fundamentally dissatisfied with the evolution of Fatah and PLO policy since the mid-1970s, with its gradual shift away from the goal of liberating all Palestine through ARMED STRUGGLE and toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories, as well as with the PLO's increasing emphasis on diplomatic means to achieve that goal. There were a variety of specific complaints regarding corruption and incompetence within Fatah itself and dissatisfaction with the removal of Nimr Salih from his positions on the Fatah Central Committee and the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL earlier that year. Most immediately, however, the rebellion was sparked by Arafat's appointment of seventy-nine new military officers, including Colonel Ghazi 'Atallah (Abu Hajim) as commander of Palestinian forces in the Beqa'a and Colonel al-Hajj Isma'il in the north. In June 1982 both men had fled their respective posts in the southern Beqa'a and Sidon at the start of the Israeli invasion. Abu Musa and other professional military men were outraged at the appointment of these deserters, which Arafat made primarily to ensure that officers personally loyal to him dominated the military command structure.

In addition to the military dissidents, there were political divisions in the PLO after the 1982 war. In January 1983 the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP), the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC), the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT (PPSF), and SA'IQA met in Libya, where they issued a joint statement that condemned the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE and the REAGAN PLAN, criticized the PLO-Jordanian joint initiative, and called for closer relations with Syria.

These internal challenges to the PLO leadership coincided with deteriorating relations with Damascus and an intensification of Syrian pressure on the PLO. There were numerous points of disagreement—from Arafat's perspective, the most unforgivable was Syria's encouragement of and support for the opposition within Fatah. When Abu Musa's rebellion erupted, Syria and Libya first tacitly, then openly, supported the rebels. When the Fatah leadership condemned this, Arafat himself was unceremoniously deported from his diplomatic center in Damascus to Tunis on 24 June. Pro-Syrian units of Sa'iqa, the PFLP-GC, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY (PLA), and even Syrian army units backed Abu Musa's forces.

Palestinian and Arab mediation efforts failed miserably, and in Lebanon, Abu Musa gradually forced loyal Fatah units out of their positions in the Beqa'a Valley northward to the Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi refugee camps near Tripoli, Lebanon. In late September 1983 Arafat himself returned to Tripoli to face his opponents, and in October fighting erupted around the two refugee camps. On 3 November the rebels launched a major offensive against Arafat, capturing Nahr al-Bared on 6 November. After a brief lull in the fighting, a second offensive captured Beddawi on 16 November. Loyalist forces retreated to Tripoli, but the rebel forces bombarded their positions and threatened to storm the city. As a result of these defeats, Arafat agreed to a Saudi-mediated cease-fire agreement with Syria and the rebels on 25 November. Under its terms Arafat would evacuate Tripoli, although the withdrawal did not take place until 20 December. Some 4,000 Arafat loyalists left Tripoli by sea to North Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia in Greek ships under the UN flag and with a naval escort provided by FRANCE.

With this second Palestinian departure from Lebanon, the PLO had essentially split into three competing factions. The Fatah rebels (known as Fatah-Intifada, or Fatah-Uprising, or Fatah–Provisional Command), together with Sa'iqa, PFLP-GC, PPSF, and other opponents of Fatah, grouped themselves into the so-called NATIONAL ALLIANCE and called for Arafat's removal as PLO leader. However, because their use of violence had provoked a civil war, these groups eventually lost whatever credibility they once had and became increasingly dependent on Damascus. Moreover the bulk of Fatah, especially outside Lebanon, remained loyal to the PLO leader, and Fatah's historic central leadership group remained united. The ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF) supported Arafat too (largely because of Syria's support for the opposition), as did its Iraqi sponsor, SAUDI ARABIA, and other important Arab states.

Meanwhile the PFLP, DFLP, and PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY found themselves in a difficult position. These groups (particularly the PFLP), which remained headquartered in Damascus, agreed with many of the opposition's organizational and political criticisms. Yet they were fundamentally committed to the independence of Palestinian decisionmaking and to the institutional framework of the PLO. Despite often intense Syrian pressure to do otherwise, the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE upheld Arafat's leadership of the PLO and strongly condemned the rebels' use of violence, rejecting all attempts at "containment of the PLO or subjecting it to Arab tutelage."

Still, the split in the PLO grew even wider as a result of the diplomatic offensive launched by Arafat after the Tripoli evacuation. On 22 December Arafat met with Egyptian president HOSNI MUBARAK in Cairo, a move designed to reward Egypt's support of Arafat in Tripoli and to create a counterweight to Syrian pressure, but the meeting produced a storm of protest not only by the National Alliance but also by the Democratic Alliance and even some within Fatah. Because of its separate bilateral peace treaty with Israel, EGYPT remained isolated in the Arab world. Seemingly heedless of the severe fractures inside the PLO, in February 1984 Arafat reopened discussions with Jordan on a joint diplomatic approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, resulting in the HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT. This diplomatic maneuver, too, outraged many sectors of the PLO, because King Husayn's desire to reassert Jordanian hegemony over the West Bank was well-known. A subsequent meeting of the Palestine National Council (the Palestinian parliament-in-exile) was marred by discord over these issues. Moreover, on 25 March 1985 former council speaker Khalid al-Fahum announced from Damascus the formation by the National Alliance, PLF, and PFLP of a PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (PNSF). In its founding statement the PNSF condemned Arafat's accord with Jordan and called for "action to topple the trend of deviation and relinquishment" within the PLO. Because the presence of the PFLP in the PNSF seemed to legitimize it, the opposition's challenge to Arafat's leadership seemed stronger than ever.

War of the Camps

Meanwhile, regional conflict and the divisions within the Palestinian movement were reflected in Lebanon after Arafat's withdrawal from Tripoli, and such tensions would be fought out primarily in the Palestinian camps. Even before the PLO split, Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut had seen the gradual reestablishment of a Palestinian armed presence. But this process accelerated as competing Palestinian organizations hurried to bolster their presence and win support from the local Palestinian community. By the end of 1984 numerous Lebanese sources reported a substantial resurgence of the Palestinian political and military presence in the capital. In the following year Israel's withdrawal from Sidon (February) and Tyre (March–April) produced a similar reemergence of Palestinian guerrilla groups in local camps there. Indeed, by the spring of 1985, Palestinian militias in the Sidon area were strong enough to repel attacks by the Phalange and South Lebanese Army (SLA) against the Miya wa Miya and 'Ayn al-Hilwa refugee camps.

Such developments were viewed with concern both by Syria and by the Phalange and its forces in Lebanon. Even more strongly opposed was the Syrian-sponsored Shi'ite party/militia, AMAL, whose hostility toward the Palestinians stemmed from the Shi'ite-PLO conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s and was reinforced by fears that a resurgent Palestinian presence would threaten the powerful political position that Amal had established in post-1982 Lebanon.

The first round of the "CAMPS' WAR" began on 19 May 1985, with an incident between Palestinians in the Sabra camp in Beirut and Amal militiamen. Heavy fighting quickly erupted between the approximately 1,000 armed Palestinians in the Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajne refugee camps and the more than 3,000 fighters of Amal, the latter supported by over 1,000 soldiers of the (predominately Shi'ite) Sixth Brigade of the Lebanese army and even some units of the (predominately Christian) Eighth Brigade stationed in East Beirut. On 30 May, Sabra fell to its Amal attackers. Amid Arab and MOSCOW political pressures on Syria to restore stability in the region, an emergency meeting of ARAB LEAGUE foreign ministers was scheduled to discuss the issue on 8 June. However, Amal declared a unilateral cease-fire the next day and signed an agreement with representatives of the PNSF in Damascus on 17 June. Under the terms of the Damascus Agreement, Amal and its Syrian sponsor were politically and militarily rebuffed. Amal was forced to retreat, having gained only the promise that the Palestinians would surrender nonexistent medium and heavy weapons and allow an ineffectual Lebanese police presence in the camps. The agreement's rhetorical endorsement of the PNSF notwithstanding, Fatah's foothold in Lebanon remained intact.

Yet the tensions that had sparked the Camps' War had not been resolved, and they would soon be manifest elsewhere. Indeed, from 1985 to 1987 the Camps' War claimed more than 2,500 lives. The camps themselves were devastated, and thousands of refugees fled the fighting to seek uncertain refuge in the coastal strip north of Sidon.

PLO in Exile after 1982

With its fighters scattered in various Arab countries, far from their original Palestinian community in Lebanon, and its leadership likewise divided, the PLO faced severe difficulties in adjusting to exile. Arafat, having been expelled from Damascus in 1983, moved his base to Tunis and set about rebuilding his shredded organization. The task he faced was enormous, for the organization that he and his colleagues had built against many obstacles and the revolution that had been its driving force were now devastated. It would be necessary to find a new direction and to forge different alliances. The first of these was forced on the PLO by the Reagan peace plan, which emerged soon after the PLO's eviction from Lebanon. This proposed the creation of a Palestinian "self-government" in the Occupied Territories in association with Jordan. Since the battle of BLACK SEPTEMBER in 1970 between Palestinian guerrillas and the Jordanian army, the PLO's relationship with Jordan had been tense. But Arafat, accepting the new realities, agreed in 1983 to set up a Palestinian-Jordanian committee and to attempt to reconcile the differences between the two sides.

This move displeased Syria, and Arafat tried to mollify its president, Hafez Asad, but without success. By 1985 a new alliance between Jordan and the PLO was forged to oppose the leftist PLO factions, mainly the PFLP, although the alliance was short-lived. Jordan demanded concessions from the Palestinians that were unacceptable to Arafat, who saw them as depriving his movement of its hard-won autonomy and requiring him to reverse many of its gains. The agreement lasted

only one year before it was abrogated in 1986 amid charges that the PLO was being uncooperative. The main Fatah offices in Amman were closed by Jordan, and Arafat's second-in-command, KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), was expelled from Jordan. The Jordanians then went on to strengthen ties with Israel in order to create a "condominium" between them over the West Bank. At the 1987 Arab summit in Amman, Jordan's king snubbed Arafat publicly. This loss of the Jordan base was another severe blow to the PLO, especially because Abu Jihad had been organizing military cells in the camps there. Arafat was thrown back onto his diplomatic skills, reviewing his alliances with the Arab states and juggling his options against the demands they made on his movement.

After 1982 his style of leadership and strategic thinking began to change. The executive organs of the PLO and those of Fatah had previously worked on a model of consensus. With the crisis of 1982, the expulsion of the PLO, and the chaos left behind, the necessary continuity and direction had to be provided by Arafat himself, who was in supreme command of Fatah after the splits in Fatah ended in marginalizing its opponents. With Arafat's increased power, PLO decisionmaking became more centralized and based on coalitions and alliances rather than consensus. Though much reduced, the Fatah civilian support network in Lebanon channeled all decisions through Arafat, who even managed to return some of his men to Lebanon, where they worked to reestablish the movement in the camps. Social and medical services were revived and funds were provided for rebuilding destroyed houses in the camps. After Amal finally ended its conflict with Fatah and agreed to a real peace, Arafat shifted his attention to developing the struggle in the Occupied Territories. The PLO base had been shattered in Lebanon, but would reestablish itself in the West Bank and GAZA.

Effect of War on the Occupied Territories

By 1982 the West Bank and Gaza had been under Israeli OCCUPATION for fifteen years, and agriculture and industry were in decline because LAND, WATER, and other resources had been lost to Israelis. Unemployment was running at 33 percent, and 40 percent of the workforce was employed in Israel. To oust the PLO from the Occupied Territories, Israel had appointed a number of docile local leaders, the "village leagues," to replace the nationalist leaders whom the people had chosen in ELECTIONS. With the decline in the PLO's fortunes, there was a resurgence of nationalism in the territories, which Israel was eager to quash. Destroying Palestinian nationalism was, after all, a raison d'être for the 1982 War. Tel Aviv thus deported elected mayors and harshly suppressed any manifestation of nationalist political activity. Nevertheless, Palestinian nationalism was now firmly centered in the Occupied Territories. In addition, after the failure of the 1985 Jordanian-PLO agreement, King Husayn renounced Jordanian control of the West Bank altogether in 1988, thus providing an important opening for the PLO. These various factors created a sense of self-reliance among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and an increasing activism, which resulted in the First Intifada (uprising) in 1987. At the same time, the appearance of new homegrown Islamist movements, HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, was further evidence of a new vibrancy in the Occupied Territories.

Local resistance organizations in the West Bank and Gaza had never been completely independent of the PLO, but they had exercised considerable autonomy. After the eruption of the 1987 Intifada, however, they gradually became more closely integrated with the PLO, which had itself gained strength from the Intifada. After the PLO's expulsion from Lebanon, the leadership decided to intensify its activities in the Occupied Territories, working to build a mass movement in the West Bank and Gaza. PLO offices in Amman ran a variety of social services, which enabled the settlement of 2,000 refugees from Lebanon. The following year, Abu Jihad, who had been officially put in charge of the PLO's Jordan project, moved to Amman. Until his expulsion in 1986, he managed to build a well-organized youth movement in the Occupied Territories, with social and political mobilization committees. A number of ad hoc relief branches were also established to support basic services such as agriculture and HEALTH. Predictably, the youth cadres were dominated by Fatah, and by the start of the First Intifada they had attained a membership of some 40,000.

Largely because of this movement, the territories were able to sustain for several years a campaign of large-scale, NONVIOLENT resistance against the Occupation with strikes, sit-ins, tax revolts, and so forth—numbering over twenty

actions a month by 1985. When the Intifada broke out two years later, the youth organizations already set in place by Abu Jihad were able to maintain it for the next five years, effectively enough for Israel to ASSASSINATE Abu Jihad in 1989. But by then, irreversible political changes in the Occupied Territories and the evolution of a strong resistance movement had produced a local leadership. These new leaders—including such figures as HANAN ASHRAWI, FAYSAL AL-HUSAYNI, and HAYDAR 'ABD 'AL-SHAFI, who would become prominent during and following the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE—had their own view of people's needs and priorities. MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI, a Fatah activist and youth leader in the Intifada, acquired such popularity on the Palestinian streets that he was soon seen as a natural successor to Arafat. Aware of this, the Israelis put him in prison, where he has been ever since.

From their exile in Tunis, Arafat and the PLO did not welcome the takeover of power by a new leadership in the Occupied Territories. But, in fact, these developments were not out of line with Arafat's overall thinking at this stage. The disaster in Lebanon and the PLO's subsequent isolation in exile had convinced him that the Palestinian struggle thenceforth would have to be centered on Palestinian soil. Resistance to Israel from outside the territories was of little further value, and enlisting the aid of the international community to put pressure on the Jewish state would not be sufficient. The Lebanon War had been a catastrophe and had almost destroyed the PLO, but it also marked the end of a phase in the history of the Palestinian struggle and repositioned it inside Palestine. At the same time and despite its setbacks, throughout the 1980s the PLO remained the only real Palestinian interlocutor in the peace process. Even when Israel attempted to render it irrelevant at the Madrid peace conference by insisting on dealing only with West Bank and Gaza representatives, everyone knew that the latter maintained constant contact with the PLO leadership and acted only in coordination with it.

1988 Declaration of Independence

In November 1988 the Palestine National Council declared the "State of Palestine," meant to include Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem—the pre-1967 territories—and agreed to recognize Israel. The DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE also accepted UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Until then the Palestine National Council had firmly rejected the two UN resolutions, and this momentous event signaled that Palestinian thinking was moving toward a greater recognition of political reality. But it was also a response to regional and international events. A decade of subsidies to the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War and falling oil revenues in the 1980s caused the Gulf States to cut back their assistance to the PLO. In the same period the Syria-Iraq feud split Arab ranks, while the bread riots of 1984–1989 in six Arab states further distracted attention from peace politics. Civil wars were raging in Sudan and Somalia, and Iraq was trying to contain Kurdish dissidents in the north. All these factors made the Palestine issue less prominent in the Arab world, at least until the start of the Intifada in December 1987. Meanwhile, the USSR's internal situation was changing, and the United States showed little interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The PLO was consequently forced to reconsider its position.

Arafat thus concluded that in light of the regional power imbalance and the primacy of US support in furthering the peace process, and hence the Palestinian cause, the only alternative was to recognize Israel and renounce "TERRORISM" (though not the armed struggle). A Palestinian state on only a part of the homeland, rather than its total liberation, was not a new idea in Palestinian circles, but its bold adoption by the PLO was a significant move. Arafat set about laying the groundwork for this new thinking by persuading his PLO colleagues to accept it and conducting inter-Arab diplomacy to enlist backing for it. By 1988 Arafat had accrued considerable power. His already strong autocratic tendencies had been reinforced by the siege mentality that afflicted the PLO leadership during its years of exile, further aggravated by the Syrian hostility that undermined it. The organization became dysfunctional, accused from within of being arrogant, intolerant of criticism, and distrustful, and as a result became even more marginal and ineffective. Arafat reasoned that the Declaration of Independence would put the PLO back into the center of events and force the world powers, especially the United States, to deal with it once again.

Although Israel disregarded this declaration, as well as the PLO's recognition of the Jewish

state (which Israel claimed to want), this in no way reduces the significance of the change in PLO thinking, almost certainly a result of Israel's own actions in Lebanon. Nor can one doubt that the course the PLO adopted in 1988 led inexorably and for the same reasons to the subsequent 1993 OSLO ACCORDS. Although new factors helped propel the PLO toward this agreement, the organization's fundamental change in direction as a result of the depredations it faced after 1982 was ultimately responsible. Despite the 1988 recognition of Israel and the short-lived UNITED STATES–PALESTINE LIBERSTION ORGANIZATION DIALOGUE that rewarded it, the PLO remained largely ostracized by the Arab world. In 1990, fighting in the refugee camps in Lebanon between Fatah and the dissident Abu Nidal faction led to the Lebanese army's intervention. The fighters were disarmed, and over the next year Fatah's organizational and military base in the camps became more fragmented.

The PLO's support of IRAQ president Saddam Husayn during and after the invasion of KUWAIT and the GULF WAR in 1990 dealt the next, nearly fatal, blow to the organization. Several factors influenced Arafat's decision. Iraq was a major PLO funder and the organization could not afford a loss of revenue; in addition, the Iraqi army could have posed a threat to the 400,000 Palestinians in occupied Kuwait if Arafat had voiced any criticism. Nevertheless, after Iraq's defeat the PLO's support of Iraq produced a drastic withdrawal of funding by the Gulf States. Egypt also withdrew its support, and the entire Kuwaiti Palestinian community of over 400,000 was expelled. The expulsion had serious consequences for the population in the Occupied Territories, which relied on remittances from Palestinian workers in Kuwait and other Gulf states. The PLO's financial hardships had negative effects on the Palestinians in Lebanon and reduced funding for its foreign missions as well.

In consequence, the organization was formally excluded from the 1991 Madrid international peace conference (although, as noted, it still participated behind the scenes with US knowledge). The delegation from the Occupied Territories did well at the talks and seemed to be favored by the US, developments that alarmed Arafat, who saw himself and the PLO under threat once again. At this time he began to consider opening a direct channel to the Israelis, thus bypassing the negotiation process started at Madrid and defying all efforts to marginalize the PLO leadership. At the end of 1992, secret talks were initiated through NORWEGIAN mediators between PLO leaders close to Arafat and Israeli government representatives. Elections in Israel had brought in a new LABOR administration under YITZHAK RABIN, who agreed to participate in the OSLO PROCESS in May 1993. The Oslo Accords, enjoining mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO, were signed in September of that year, and in 1994 the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT enabled Arafat and the PLO leadership to return to the Palestinian territories. This move finally fulfilled Arafat's aim, elaborated after the defeat of 1982, of relocating the struggle to Palestinian soil.

Effect on the Diaspora

The Palestinian Diaspora communities, which constitute six million people, or 60 percent of the total Palestinian population, consist of a core of four million UNRWA-registered refugees and a number of nonrefugee groups dispersed in various Arab and other countries. So long as the PLO was a Diaspora organization that operated from outside the homeland, and notwithstanding its banishment to Tunis, most Diaspora Palestinians were little affected. Whatever the PLO's shortcomings, they identified with it as an exile organization and a symbolic substitute for the homeland. The First Intifada modified this view somewhat and focused attention of the Palestinians on "the inside"—in the Occupied Territories. But with the Oslo Accords and the incorporation of the leadership inside Palestine, the PLO's pivotal role for the Diaspora suddenly came to an end. The accords were primarily concerned with the situation post-1967, which by definition excluded the Diaspora. The refugee issue was to be discussed but was deferred to the FINAL STATUS TALKS, which have never taken place. To maintain a public continuity, after 1994 Arafat assumed the twin roles of PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY president and PLO chairman, yet in reality the PLO effectively ceased to function from that time. Its offices and departments gradually lost funds and authority, and the political center of gravity shifted irrevocably to the newly established Palestinian National Authority in the territories. When Arafat died in 2004, he took with him the last vestiges of the previous connection of the inside with the outside.

These changes had a devastating effect on the Diaspora Palestinians. The four million refugees living in UN-supported camps ended up without effective representation. Their vulnerability provoked after Oslo a spate of Western and Israeli-inspired

plans for their future. By the late 1990s, proposals promoting the refugees' patriation in their host countries, their compensation, or assisted emigration to Western states began to appear. These proposals had one thing in common: they canceled the refugees' right of return to their original homes, now in Israel. The Diaspora Palestinians fiercely resisted this assault on their legal right of return. With the demise of the PLO under Arafat's very weak successors, the Diaspora remains leaderless and in a state of limbo. After 1995 a number of Diaspora initiatives were launched by the United States and Lebanon in an effort to re-create the PLO or some other unifying body for Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories. None has so far been successful, although an international group lobbying for the right of return is still active. Meanwhile the political process in the Occupied Territories became more localized and preoccupied with internal struggles against Occupation, and since the election of a Hamas government in 2006, between Fatah and Hamas. The Diaspora role is confined to financial and logistical support. Inevitable as this is, it must ultimately widen the gulf between the various Palestinian communities, already geographically divided, and aggravate the process of social and political fragmentation that threatens to destroy the Palestinian national cause.

See also INTIFADA: FIRST AND SECOND COMPARED; LEBANON; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION; PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

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—Ghada Karmi

Legislative Council (British Mandate)

In August 1922 the British HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE, Sir HERBERT SAMUEL, proposed the creation of a Legislative Council that would include twenty-three members: eleven British officials and twelve elected members, of whom ten would be Palestinian (eight Muslims and two Christians) and two Jews. The council would be one governing arm of the British-proposed constitution that would include the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine. The powers of the Legislative Council, however, would be circumscribed; for example, it would have no say over Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases.

Palestinian leaders rejected the proposal, because the Palestinian members would be outnumbered by the combined vote of the Jewish representatives and the British members on the council. Additionally, the high commissioner could veto legislation, and the sensitive subject of immigration would be considered instead by a special advisory commission composed of representatives from the three religious communities—Muslim, Christian, and Jewish—who would propose policies to the high commissioner, who would not be obliged to follow its advice. Therefore all Palestinian political groups except the Zionist-funded National Muslim Societies boycotted the 1923 council elections. Rather than form a clearly unrepresentative legislative council, the high commissioner canceled the elections, and the Legislative Council never came into being.

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LEHI

See LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL

Leibowitz, Yeshayahu (1903–1994)

Yeshayahu Leibowitz was a leading Israeli moral philosopher, scholar, scientist, and writer. Born in Riga, Latvia, he studied chemistry and philosophy at the University of Berlin and continued with studies of biochemistry and medicine at the University of Basel (Switzerland), where he received an M.D. in 1934. In 1935 Leibowitz immigrated to Palestine and joined the faculty of Hebrew University. Apart from his numerous scientific articles and essays, he published a wide range of books on philosophy, Jewish thought, the teaching of Maimonides, and politics, and he was also editor of several volumes of the *Encyclopedia Hebraica*, a Hebrew-language encyclopedia. An Orthodox Jew, Leibowitz is known primarily for his religious writings and for his critique of modern Israeli values and national policies.

Leibowitz's publicly expressed views on Judaism and Israel aroused a great deal of debate and antagonism in religious and secular circles. His notion of Judaism focused primarily on the importance of *Halakha* (Jewish religious law). He held that the obligation to observe the commandments was an end in itself and that religion was thus not a means to a greater personal or social good. Although he initially stressed nationalism's religious importance, when the state of Israel formally excluded Halakic norms at its establishment, Leibowitz argued fiercely for the separation of religion from the state. As a Zionist he insisted that the state was not an ideal with an intrinsic significance but was there to serve its citizens. He believed that ZIONISM "is not an ideology, but a complex of activities undertaken to restore independence to the Jewish nation in its own land."

Leibowitz was uncompromising in his political views. Although he had been active in various political groups, he disapproved of the system of party rule and the plethora of Israeli political parties, including the religious parties, believing that "only God can govern." He labored publicly against government corruption and against the worldwide proliferation of nuclear weapons. Following the 1967 WAR he staunchly objected to retaining any Arab territory, arguing that OCCUPATION morally destroys the conqueror, and he supported CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS who opposed serving in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and in LEBANON. In 1993 he was selected to receive the Israel Prize but declined to accept it when Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN refused to participate in the award ceremony because of Leibowitz's past criticism of him.

Leibowitz coined the term "Judeo-Nazis" to describe the mentality behind the 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Muslim worshipers in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON. He also supported the REFUSENIKS (soldiers who refuse to serve in the Occupied Territories), 200 of whom have been jailed, and Leibowitz is credited with giving the movement its momentum. As a philosopher Leibowitz was one of three prominent members of the Israeli academic community who protested when Israel unilaterally annexed JERUSALEM in 1980. Despite his Orthodoxy he ridiculed the cult of the Wailing Wall as pagan stone-worship. He charged that Jewish treatment of the Palestinians was turning Israel into a police state and warned that the continued occupation of GAZA and the WEST BANK would eventually spell the end of Israel and bring catastrophe to the Jewish people as a whole.

After his retirement from Hebrew University in 1970, Leibowitz continued to teach philosophy and the history of science until his death.

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Levinger, Rabbi Moshe (1941–)

For nearly forty years Moshe Levinger has been the driving force behind the Jewish SETTLEMENT movement in the WEST BANK. Born in JERUSALEM, he is a graduate of Bnei Akiva, the yeshiva founded by Rabbi Moshe Zvi, and a pupil of RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK. While at the yeshiva Levinger was part of an elite group of young men called Gahelet, which contained many of the future leaders of the GUSH EMUNIM fundamentalist movement. Levinger himself was appointed ultimate leader of Gush Emunim in 1987. In 1964, after it failed to exert influence within the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, Gahelet gravitated toward Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, son of Rabbi Kook, who emphasized the importance of Jewish settlement in the LAND of Israel. In April 1968 Levinger led a group of eighty Jews who rented a hotel in the West Bank city of HEBRON to celebrate Passover. After the holiday the group remained and under his leadership declared their intention to stay in the city permanently. By September the Israeli government began construction of KIRYAT ARBA, one of the first Jewish settlements in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, for Levinger and his followers; they also received support and weapons from an organization calling itself the "Whole Land of Israel Movement" that later evolved into the Gush Emunim.

His political and religious ideology is consonant with JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM, which believes that the whole land of Israel (ERETZ YISRAEL, which includes all the Occupied Territories plus the HASHEMITE Kingdom of JORDAN) is Jewish due to the ancient and eternal covenant between God and the Jews. In 1987, together with MENAHEM BEGIN, Levinger was voted by twenty-two leading Israelis in the Hebrew weekly *Hadashot* as the most influential person of his generation on Israeli society. Boaz Epplebaum, an adviser to Foreign Minister SHIMON PERES, said of Levinger: "Prime Ministers have come and gone but Levinger is still riding high. All of us have adapted ourselves to his dimensions and his scale."

In 1988 Levinger was driving through a Palestinian village when his car was hit by stones. According to witnesses, he parked his car and walked toward the demonstrators while firing his pistol indiscriminately, killing one man and injuring another. The Israeli army commander who witnessed the shooting said that "after the rabbi fired his weapon, he walked down the road screaming, 'You're dogs,' at Palestinian vendors, kicking over vegetable crates and flower containers." Levinger was sentenced to prison for the murder, but before entering prison he was honored for his actions in battling the Palestinians and settling the West Bank. The celebration was attended by numerous well-wishers, including Israeli general Yitzhak Mordecai, military commander of the West Bank, and Israel's president, CHAIM HERZOG. After serving two and a half months of his five-month sentence, Levinger was released from prison—his short sentence and early release reflecting the influence on the secular judicial system of settler rabbis, who teach that the spilling of non-Jewish blood is a lesser offense than the spilling of Jewish blood. In a religious ruling on the attack published in *Ha'aretz* on 13 May 1989, Rabbi Moshe Zvi Neriya stated that every Jew has the duty "to shoot [Arabs] left and right without thinking and without hesitating."

In the 1980s Levinger encouraged the Jewish underground (TERROR AGAINST TERROR [TNT]) to attack and kill Arabs, and in an operation in June 1980, settlers used car bombs to badly wound the elected mayors of NABLUS and Ramallah in the West Bank. In July 1983 Levinger's son-in-law and other members of TNT burst into the courtyard of the Islamic College in Hebron during a noon lunch break, tossed a grenade, and sprayed machine-gun fire, killing three Palestinian students and injuring thirty-three. "Whoever did this," declared Levinger, "has sanctified God's name in public." Although he has been convicted seven times for attacking Palestinians and was implicated in hundreds of violent incidents, Levinger was jailed only once; some of his foot soldiers were charged but few were convicted. The Israeli authorities ignored the SETTLER VIOLENCE and intervened only when the underground settlers' group TNT tried to blow up the DOME OF THE ROCK in Jerusalem.

Levinger considers his religious ties to the biblical Judea and Samaria (West Bank) stronger than his loyalty to the state of Israel, although in 1993 he unsuccessfully ran for a seat in the Israeli parliament. He opposed Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN's peace policies and castigated him harshly. In Levinger's ideology Palestinians are "foreign residents" and "will be allowed to stay in Israel if they follow our laws and don't demand privileges." He does not believe, however, that the Palestinians will accept such an arrangement and therefore advocates their TRANSFER to other states.

In 2001 Levinger, who lives in a Jewish settlement in downtown Hebron with his US-born wife and eleven children, told US reporter Ellen

Cantarow: "Our idea is very simple. The difference between one part of *Eretz Yisrael* and the other is an odd idea. The Jewish spirit, throughout all generations, was that there was a place called *Eretz Yisrael*. Not two parts, *Eretz Yisrael*, the other Palestinian autonomy."

See also GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT; GUSH EMUNIM; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Levy, David (1937–)

An Israeli politician, a leader of Israel's SEPHARDIC and MIZRAHI (Spanish, Arab, or African) Jews, and a holder of numerous high government offices, David Levy is the first Mizrahi to have achieved such accomplishments. Born in Rabat, Morocco, he immigrated to Israel in 1957 and soon thereafter became a leader of the poor, uneducated Moroccan working class of Beit Shean, a city in the northern district of Israel. After serving one term as mayor of Beit Shean, he entered national politics and became a union activist. Running as part of an opposition faction of the LIKUD PARTY, he campaigned for membership in the HISTADRUT (labor federation) executive body, which was then completely dominated by ASHKENAZI (European Jews) who were MAPAI (LABOR PARTY) loyalists. Until 1973, Likud had been an alliance of middle-class, Ashkenazi, and right-wing parties that had never had an active role in governing Israel. Levy distinguished himself in the Likud as the first of many young working-class party members from a Mizrahi background. Levy's rise in the party coincided with and expressed the surging power of the new social rebellion of the Mizrahi.

In 1977 Levy campaigned for MENAHEM BEGIN, whose election overturned Labor's thirty-year dominance of Israeli politics. Levy's presence in the Likud and his campaign for Begin resulted in hundreds of thousands of Mizrahis going to the polls and voting for Begin (and Likud). From 1977 until 1981 Levy was minister of "immigrant absorption" in the first two Begin governments. During this period the major political issues were the campaign to liberate SOVIET JEWS and the controversy over the *Beta Israel* (Ethiopian tribes). Levy was not active in the Ethiopian issue, and the Soviet Jewish problem continued to drag on with few results. Levy gained a more important role in Begin's government in January 1979 when he became minister of housing and construction, a post he held until 1992. In line with Begin's policies, he provided enormous support to the settler movement and helped create a major construction boom in the WEST BANK, which created new jobs for workers. Additionally, for most of his thirteen years as housing minister Levy was able to make housing for poor and lower-middle-class Israelis inside the Green Line more affordable.

During these years Levy gained a huge following. While Likud leader YITZHAK SHAMIR was often aloof and ineffective at forging coalitions, Levy was able to enter doors closed to the aging prime minister. He helped Likud court the SHAS Party into the Shamir government. Levy also was the symbolic leader of the young Mizrahi Likud activists; in the Likud Central Committee he

commanded a huge portion of the members and was considered a likely candidate to succeed Shamir. In 1987, however, Levy encountered a young diplomat named BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, then the Israeli ambassador to the UNITED NATIONS. According to Netanyahu in *The Way to Power*, during their meeting in a New York hotel Levy attempted to bring Netanyahu into his camp in preparation for the 1988 Knesset elections. Netanyahu turned down Levy's proposal and instead became a nominal ally of Defense Minister Moshe Arens. This created a fierce enmity between the two, one that would lead eventually to the decline of Levy's influence in the Likud.

One issue that hurt Levy's career was his continuous shifts in position regarding the peace process and the Likud's libertarian economic policies. During the Shamir administrations Likud policies on the ECONOMY and the SETTLEMENTS also drove many Mizrahi to vote for other parties, decreasing Levy's mass base. Finally, Levy was unable to stop the public perception that he had changed from the symbol of Mizrahi vibrancy into a corrupt clan chief. As the Mizrahi drifted away from the Likud, Levy's rivals in the Likud tried to minimize his influence. However, in 1990 Shamir faced a major crisis when the Labor and Shas parties brought down his governing coalition because he refused to consider any peace initiatives with the Palestinians. He thus formed a narrow right-wing coalition in which he was forced to give Levy the Foreign Ministry.

Although Levy believed that the new post would boost his chances of gaining the Likud chairmanship, it was a disaster. Levy, who speaks Hebrew, French, and Moroccan Arabic, was at a loss during important discussions with US diplomats, especially Secretary of State JAMES BAKER. His frequent slips of the tongue embarrassed many of his coalition colleagues, and he was lampooned by the Israeli MEDIA and public. Making Levy's situation worse was Shamir's appointment of Netanyahu as his deputy, who shined and was seen as Shamir's right-hand man at the MADRID CONFERENCE of 1991. Subsequently Netanyahu became party chairman.

As the 1992 elections neared, Levy vowed to crush Netanyahu and used all of his influence in the Likud Central Committee to undermine his rival. Nevertheless, Netanyahu won the vote of the political spectrum within Likud and earned the second slot on the Likud list after Shamir, while Levy placed eighth. When both Shamir and the Likud were defeated in the elections, Levy was optimistic because the Likud chairmanship was open and he believed he was the obvious person to assume the position. After new leadership was chosen, not only was Levy defeated but the party also managed to make him the scapegoat for years of Likud corruption, briberies, indulgences, and other malfeasances. The media accepted the party line and Levy was nationally humiliated. Appalled that members of his own party had turned on him, he refused to accept Netanyahu as the new Likud chairman and established his own political party—GESHER (Bridge). Levy believed he could draw a mass defection from Likud parliamentarians, which would lead senior party members in the Central Committee to replace Netanyahu. Not only did party members stay loyal to Netanyahu, but Gesher on its own never reached the potential Levy predicted it would, while Netanyahu's campaign to overthrow Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN helped revitalize the Likud and bring in new members.

By winter 1996 Levy was under the enormous stress of his first election campaign outside of the Likud, while Netanyahu also needed as many voters as possible. After the 4 November 1995 murder of Rabin, Netanyahu tried to moderate his image, portraying himself not as a hard-line demagogue but rather as a thoughtful skeptic who wanted to slow the pace of negotiations with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. He concluded that Levy's inclusion would bring him closer to that goal. Throughout the spring, Netanyahu and Levy negotiated, and in the end Levy agreed to participate in a Likud-Gesher-TZOMET coalition for the May 1996 elections. Though a massive success for Netanyahu, the ELECTIONS gave Levy very little power within the coalition. He demanded and received the Foreign Ministry, but instead of controlling the ministry he was again overshadowed by Netanyahu, who personally handled every important foreign policy decision during his term.

On 6 January 1998 Levy quit the coalition, and an independent Gesher began to drift closer to the policies of the Labor Party. In 1999 a no-confidence vote in the Knesset forced Netanyahu to call early elections. Levy had not yet redeveloped Gesher's mass appeal and was faced with the dilemma of whether to split with Likud in favor of Labor. He chose to join EHUD BARAK and the Labor Party and merged Gesher into ONE ISRAEL, becoming a partner in the new coalition's leadership. In Barak's government Levy once again was chosen as foreign

minister, but Barak, like Netanyahu, dominated foreign policy without consulting Levy. For the third time Levy was a passive partner as foreign minister and he quit the coalition in April 2000.

By November 2000, however, Barak had resigned in order to call new elections, and in the Likud a February vote gave ARIEL SHARON a landslide victory. Sharon formed a coalition without Levy, so that for only the second time since 1977 he was left without a ministry in a new government. However, in early April Sharon's coalition began to disintegrate and Levy was invited to become a part of it. He was named minister without portfolio, a position with almost no influence. When Sharon was forced in November 2002 to call for new elections in January 2003, Levy's position was precarious. He merged Gesher back into the Likud and backed Sharon in his primary campaign against Netanyahu. Still, Sharon's overwhelming victory in January 2003 did not provide Levy the influence he had so long sought, as he was not awarded a ministry in the new government. Although the merger left most of Levy's Gesher supporters intact, his future in the Likud is not expected to be prosperous. The right wing has recruited a far greater number of new members, and the Likud has split into a new party, KADIMA. In recent years Levy has returned to Likud.

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Liberal Party (Israel)

Israel's Liberal Party (Miflaga Liberalit), which formed in May 1961, became the second major component in the LIKUD PARTY bloc in 1988 and a stable coalition partner in Likud politics. The Liberal Party's right-wing, nationalist origins lie in the Organization of General Zionists (Zionim Klaliim), established in 1922 in Palestine. In 1961 the party merged with the Progressive Party to become the Liberal Party (Miflaga Liberalit). In 1965 the Liberal Party split, with the conservatives continuing as the Liberal Party, which joined HERUT to form GAHAL (eventually becoming Likud), and the liberal faction forming the Independent Liberal Party (Mifleget Liberalim Atzmaiim).

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Liberal Party (Palestinian)

The Liberal Party (Hizb al-Ahrar*)* was a Palestinian nationalist party founded in JAFFA and the GAZA STRIP circa 1930 by Shaykh As'ad Shuqeiri (1860–1946), Hassan Sidqi al-Dajani (?–1938), and others as an alternative to the bitter rivalry between the Jerusalemite AL-HUSAYNI and NASHASHIBI families. Its support tended to come from businessmen and professionals outside of JERUSALEM who had little or no linkage to either of the two families. It participated in the ARAB CONGRESSES, and within the context of Palestinian politics during the BRITISH MANDATE the Liberal Party worked to establish unity among the various factions.

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Liberty (USS *Liberty*)

On 8 June 1967, Israeli fighter planes attacked a US Naval signals intelligence ship, the USS *Liberty,* during the 1967 WAR. In what is considered a major event in the US-Israeli relationship, Israeli planes and torpedo boats repeatedly bombed and strafed the USS *Liberty* in international waters—some 12.5 nautical miles (23 kilometers) off the coast of

the Sinai Peninsula. The attack killed thirty-four US servicemen, wounded at least 173, and severely damaged the ship. Israel apologized and said the attack was an accident, and later paid humanitarian reparations.

New evidence and recent statements by *Liberty* officials make clear that Tel Aviv knew it was hitting a US ship, although the question of why it did so still remains unanswered. Some speculate that Israel felt that the United States was monitoring Israel's moves on SYRIA. Although Washington accepted Israel's claim that the attack was an error, many outside the government, especially survivors on the ship, believe the attack was deliberate and premeditated. For instance, CIA director Richard Helms wrote that "the board of inquiry (concluded) that the Israelis knew exactly what they were doing in attacking the *Liberty*." For almost three decades the crewmen of the *Liberty* have campaigned to have the attack further investigated. Indeed, they claim not only that the attack was intentional, but also that President LYNDON JOHNSON recalled the Sixth Fleet rescue flights to avoid a clash between the United States and Israel.

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Libya

See ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS

Lieberman, Avigdor (1958–)

Avigdor Lieberman (born Evet Lieberman) is an Israeli politician and member of the Knesset. After the 2009 Israeli elections, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, the new prime minister from the LIKUD, tapped Lieberman to serve as minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister of Israel. Lieberman was born in Kishinev in the SOVIET UNION and immigrated to Israel in 1978. He is the founder and leader of the ultra-right-wing YISRAEL BEITENU party, whose electoral base is mainly immigrants from the former Soviet Union. He lives in the WEST BANK SETTLEMENT of Nokdim.

Lieberman established Yisrael Beitenu in 1997 to create a platform for Russian immigrants who support a harder line than YISRAEL B'ALIYA (another party composed mainly of SOVIET JEWS) in negotiations with the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Much of his motivation came from what he considered the excessive concessions made by Netanyahu, in whose first government (1996–1999) Lieberman was director general of the Likud. Lieberman considered the 1997 WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, which included the division of the West Bank city of HEBRON, to be a complete negation of fundamental Zionist principles, and he resigned from the Likud. Lieberman first entered the Knesset in 1999 and has since served as minister of National Infrastructure, minister of transportation, minister of strategic affairs, deputy prime minister, and foreign affairs minister. Lieberman strongly opposed the 2003 ROAD MAP at the time of its adoption and left EHUD OLMERT's government due to his opposition to the 2007 Annapolis Conference.

Lieberman has been a polarizing figure within Israeli politics. For instance, following a series of TERRORIST attacks on Israelis perpetrated by Palestinian militants during a three-day period in March 2002, Lieberman proposed issuing an ultimatum to the PNA to halt all terror activity or face wide-ranging attacks. He said, "If it were up to me I would notify the Palestinian Authority that tomorrow at ten in the morning we would bomb all their places of business in Ramallah, for example."

In July 2003, reacting to a commitment made by Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON that amnesty could be given to approximately 350 Palestinian PRISONERS, including members of HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, Lieberman rejected a chance to participate in the related committee and said: "It would be better to drown these prisoners in the Dead Sea if possible, since that's the lowest point in the world," and continued, according to Galei Tzahal of Israel Army Radio, by stating his willingness, as minister of transport, to supply buses to take the prisoners there.

The "Lieberman Plan," proposed in late May 2004, states that the populations and territories of Israeli Jews and Arabs, including Israeli-Arabs, would be "separated." According to the plan, also known as the "Populated-Area Exchange Plan," Israeli Arab towns adjacent to PNA areas would be transferred to Palestinian authority and only those Arab Israelis who migrated from the area to within Israel's new borders and pledged loyalty to Israel would be allowed to remain Israeli citizens. Prime Minister Sharon condemned Lieberman's statements, saying: "We regard Israeli-Arabs as part of the State of Israel." On 4 June 2004, as the disputes over the upcoming Gaza disengagement plan grew more intense, Sharon dismissed Lieberman from the cabinet because of his intense vocal opposition.

In November 2006, Lieberman called for those Arab members of the Knesset who met with Hamas to be tried for treason. In his words, "World War II ended with the Nuremberg trials. The heads of the Nazi regime, along with their collaborators, were executed. I hope this will be the fate of the collaborators in the Knesset." In remarks in the Knesset in March 2008, shortly after a 6 March attack on Jerusalem's MERCAZ HARAV KOOK YESHIVA, Lieberman stated that "yesterday's attack cannot be disconnected from the Arab MKs incitement, which we hear daily in the Knesset." He further stated, directed at those Arab members of the Knesset that Lieberman claimed uttered anti-Israel incitement, that "a new administration will be established and then we will take care of you."

In January 2009, during the Israeli assault on Gaza, Lieberman argued that Israel "must continue to fight Hamas just like the UNITED STATES did with the Japanese in World War II. Then, too, the occupation of the country was unnecessary." This threat has been interpreted by some MEDIA commentators as an allusion to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and as advocacy for a nuclear strike on Gaza. On the eve of the 2009 elections, *Ha'aretz* reported that in 1979 Lieberman was involved with the KACH party of RABBI MEIR KAHANE shortly after his immigration to Israel.

Lieberman believes that PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL must sign a loyalty oath or lose their right to vote, and he has worked tirelessly to formalize this perspective into law. Similarly, he has pursued as law the prosecution and imprisonment of anyone who celebrates Israel's independence day as *Nakba* (Catastrophe), as the Palestinians perceive it. As of 2009 both laws have passed the first reading in the Knesset.

Lieberman's contempt is not solely reserved for Israeli-Arabs or Palestinians under OCCUPATION. In 1998, news reports stated that Lieberman suggested the bombing of the Aswan Dam in retaliation for Egyptian support for YASIR ARAFAT. In 2001, reports stated that he told a group of ambassadors from the former Soviet Union that if Egypt and Israel were ever to face off militarily again, Israel could bomb the Aswan Dam.

Since the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which followed Egyptian president Anwar Sadat's historic visit to Israel, multiple Israeli heads of state have visited EGYPT on numerous occasions. However, Sadat's successor, HOSNI MUBARAK, has visited Israel only once and has never participated in talks on Israeli soil. In 2008, while on the Knesset speaker's podium during its memorial for REHAVAM ZE'EVI, Lieberman raised the issue and said, "Mubarak never agreed to come here as president. He wants to talk to us? Let him come here. He doesn't want to talk to us? He can go to hell."

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President SHIMON PERES immediately apologized to the Egyptians, and after Netanyahu began his term as prime minister in March 2009, government aides met with Egyptian officials and told them that Lieberman's comments should not be a reason for tension between the two countries. News reports had previously been issued claiming that Egypt would not work with the Netanyahu administration unless Lieberman personally apologized. The Netanyahu administration labeled them "inaccurate and out of all proportion." Mubarak invited Netanyahu to meet with him personally on the issue, without Lieberman. Unofficial channels for discussion are also reportedly being considered.

With regard to the peace process Lieberman has said, "The peace process is based on three false basic assumptions: that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the main cause of instability in the Middle East, that the conflict is territorial and not ideological, and that the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 BORDERS will end the conflict." In an attempt to distract President Barack Obama from his effort to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, Lieberman and Prime Minister Netanyahu plan to broaden the PR campaign overseen by the Foreign Ministry regarding IRAN. Part of the new campaign focuses on Tehran's abuse of human rights and sponsorship of TERRORISM and also aims to appeal to those, such as the gay and lesbian

communities, less concerned with Iran's nuclear aspirations and more fearful of its human rights abuses and mistreatment of minorities.

Lieberman has been under investigation since 2006 related to alleged corruption. In 2004, Lieberman's twenty-one-year-old daughter, Michal, set up a consulting firm, which received 11 million shekels (approximately $2.8 million) from anonymous overseas sources. Lieberman, according to the police, received more than a 2.1-million-shekels (approximately $540,000) salary from the company for two years of employment. Moreover, according to an investigation by *Ha'aretz*, he allegedly received additional severance pay—amounting to hundreds of thousands of shekels—in 2006 and 2007, while he was minister of strategic affairs and deputy prime minister. Such financial transactions are illegal according to Israeli law. In August 2009 the Israeli Police "recommended that the state prosecution indict Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman on charges of bribery, fraud, money laundering, witness harassment and obstruction of justice." However, Attorney General Menachem Mazuz must approve the recommendation before Lieberman is formally charged and, because Lieberman brings fifteen seats to Netanyahu's fragile coalition, the decision to indict or not will be a political one.

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Likud Party

The Likud (Consolidation) Party is a right-wing political party that supports free market capitalism and neoliberalism as well as annexation and settlement of the entire land of Israel, including the whole of JERUSALEM. Historically it has been the second-largest party in Israel, behind the LABOR PARTY. The Likud's roots are in VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY's Revisionist ZIONISM, which formed the HERUT Party that was the main opposition to the Labor Zionist MAPAI party. The Likud was formed in 1973 when La'am (made up of the Free Center, State List, and the Movement for Greater Israel) and GAHAL (Gush Herut Liberalim) joined together in preparation for elections that year. The Likud worked as a coalition of its factions led by MENAHEM BEGIN's Herut until 1988, when the factions formally dissolved and Likud became a unitary political party.

Likud has promoted hawkish policies toward the Palestinians, opposing Palestinian nationalism and statehood, and supporting and encouraging the Jewish SETTLEMENT movement in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Under Likud prime minister ARIEL SHARON the separation BARRIER between Israel and the Occupied Territories was constructed. Two years into the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2002, Israel's Likud-led government militarily reoccupied Palestinian towns and refugee camps throughout the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, although in 2005 Sharon carried out a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Thereafter Likud split, and Sharon and his supporters formed KADIMA, which has proclaimed that Israel will unilaterally determine its final BORDERS, including annexing the major settlement blocks and the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. What

remained of the Likud after the split opposes any Palestinian state or entity in the West Bank.

Begin, who in 1977 became the first Likud prime minister elected, was a former leader of the militant underground IRGUN and built the settlement program in the Occupied Territories at a feverish pace. He also concluded Israel's first peace treaty with an Arab state, EGYPT. The second Likud prime minister, YITZHAK SHAMIR, was a former commando leader in the underground Lehi and carried on the settlement project with even greater fervor. Benjamin Netanyahu, elected in May 1996, was the only Likud leader who was not a military man and is best known for stalling the OSLO PROCESS. Sharon, the fourth Likud prime minister, was a militarist who as defense minister led the country during the 1982 LEBANON WAR. Most of his life he was an advocate of and activist for Greater Israel, but in his last year in office (2005) he decided to forgo settlement in Gaza for greater control over the West Bank.

The social composition of the Likud has been diverse. The old-guard Likud leadership consisted of ASHKENAZIM (European Jews) with Revisionist backgrounds, while the rank-and-file has been composed mostly of the MIZRAHIM (Spanish, Arab, or African Jews). Many immigrants from the former Soviet Union also found their way to the Likud. The majority of SOVIET JEWS gravitated to the right either in the NATIONAL UNION PARTY or NATAN SHARANSKY'S YISRAEL B'ALIYA, and most followed Sharansky when his party merged with Likud. About 5,000 Israeli Druze (a religious sect that broke from Shi'a Islam circa 1017 CE, unique in its incorporation of Gnostic, neo-Platonic, and other philosophies), are Likud members—a somewhat higher ratio than the Israeli Jewish population—and two Druze hold Likud seats in the Knesset. Although the Druze are generally unsympathetic to Revisionist Zionism or the settler movement, they support the Likud's populist, pro-military, and Israeli nationalist positions.

Ideologically the Likud encompasses a spectrum from center right to far right. At the far right of the nationalism spectrum is Rabbi Moshe Feiglin's Manhigut Yehudit (Jewish Leadership) faction, which controls approximately 5 percent of the Likud central committee. Members of this faction strongly support the settler movement and the concept of Greater Israel, including TRANSFER of the Palestinians to other states as well as construction of the THIRD TEMPLE on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. The majority of the Likud right wing—many from the old guard who came up through Herut, BETAR, or other Revisionist organizations—sympathize with the settler movement and Greater Israel, and oppose Palestinian statehood and withdrawal from any part of the Occupied Territories. But they are not completely monolithic—some are willing to consider limited territorial concessions in return for a proven defensive benefit, although nearly all opposed ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA in 2005. Most oppose Feiglin's proposals for the denaturalization of the Palestinian citizens of Israel and for the immediate redemption of the TEMPLE MOUNT.

Further toward the center are what might be called the pragmatic hawks, who were led by Sharon until he broke with Likud in 2005. This loosely united faction believes, either for strategic or demographic reasons, that Israel should withdraw from some, albeit limited, parts of the Occupied Territories. The extent and timetable of such a withdrawal are a matter of debate within the faction, as is the issue of whether it should be unilateral or coordinated with the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Most of this faction rejects Palestinian statehood in principle, although its members disagree about the nature and extent of autonomy that Israel should allow the Palestinians and how much of the West Bank and Gaza should be given up.

The last group along the security spectrum is the so-called leftists. The furthest left of these, such as Israeli president Moshe Katsav and Sderot mayor Eli Moyal, could probably fit into the Labor Party's ideological mainstream. Katsav has repeatedly spoken against permanent OCCUPATION and urged a return to the negotiating table. The members of this faction arrived at their beliefs in various ways. Some, like Katsav or Moyal, are Mizrahim who were shut out of Labor or entered politics through local Likud networks. The strength of this faction is difficult to estimate; its representation in the Central Committee is probably no stronger than Manhigut Yehudit's (if that), but many of its members are prominent in public life and have influence within the party.

See also ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES AND SETTLEMENTS; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Livni, Tzipora (Tzipi) Malka (1958–)

Tzipora Tzipi Malka Livni is an Israeli politician who, since September 2008, has been leader of the KADIMA Party, the largest party in the Knesset. She was acting prime minister from September 2008 to February 2009. Raised as an ardent revisionist-nationalist (both her parents were prominent former IRGUN members), Livni served as a lieutenant in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. Thereafter she served in the elite MOSSAD unit, based in Paris, responsible for Operation Wrath of God (also known as Bayonet), which sought out and assassinated leaders of the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION in Europe. In Israel she has earned a reputation as honest, clean, and consistent in sticking to her principles. Prior to her political career, Livni graduated from the Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law and was a practicing commercial lawyer for ten years.

Livni entered politics in 1996, when she tried to win a spot on LIKUD's list to the Knesset. She was not elected to the Knesset but was appointed director general of the Government Companies Authority in BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's first government (June 1996–July 1999) and oversaw the privatization of a number of companies. In 1999 she won a seat in the Knesset and, after the Likud assumed power in 2001, Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON appointed Livni minister of regional cooperation. This position was followed by appointments as minister of agriculture and rural development, minister of immigrant absorption, and minister of housing and construction. She received the Abirat Ha-Shilton (Quality of Governance) award for 2004. On 1 October 2005, she was appointed minister of justice after several months acting in that position on an interim basis.

Livni was a key supporter of Sharon's plan for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA and was a leader of the "left-wing" faction of the Likud Party. Her political approach depends on compromise, and this has enabled her to score important successes. For example, Livni was instrumental in getting Netanyahu to support the disengagement process and ensuring ratification of it in the Knesset. Livni was active in promoting the 2007 Annapolis peace talks and the opening of indirect peace negotiations with SYRIA.

However, the Likud Party split over the disengagement plan, and Livni, along with EHUD OLMERT and others, joined the new Kadima Party, founded by Ariel Sharon on 20 November 2005. When Sharon was incapacitated by a stroke, Olmert became acting prime minister, and Tzipi Livni became the number two leader in Kadima and in the Israeli government.

On 4 May 2006 Livni became deputy prime minister and retained the position of foreign minister, while resigning her post as minister of justice. Alone among leading government members, Livni escaped virtually unscathed from the massive wave of public criticism that followed the 2006 war in LEBANON against HIZBULLAH. She had led the quest for a diplomatic solution, through UN

Security Council Resolution 1701. Critics of the resolution, which has allowed the rearming of Hizbullah, have blamed Livni.

Livni became the first Israeli cabinet minister to explicitly differentiate Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israeli military targets from terrorist attacks against civilians. In an interview on the US television news show *Nightline* in March 2006, Livni stated, "Somebody who is fighting against Israeli soldiers is an enemy and we will fight back, but I believe that this is not under the definition of TERRORISM, if the target is a soldier." On the other hand, Livni, as acting prime minister, presided over the massive air and land invasion of Gaza—OPERATION CAST LEAD—during which hundreds of civilians were killed.

Though Livni has been sharply criticized by the Israeli right for promoting negotiations and compromise, her tenure as foreign minister includes aggressive and repeated denunciations of terror, as well as a clear and repeated emphasis on the legitimacy of Israel and of Zionist ideology, and frank assertion of Jewish national rights. She is the first foreign minister in many years to strongly emphasize these issues.

On 2 May 2007 Livni called for Olmert's resignation in the wake of the publication of the Winograd Commission's interim report concerning Israel's poor performance in the war in Lebanon and new allegations of Olmert's corruption. Olmert did not then resign, but in the Kadima leadership election held on 17 September 2008, Olmert decided not to stand for reelection as party leader and stated he would resign as prime minister following the election. Livni and Shaul Mofaz emerged as the main rivals for the leadership; Livni won the leadership election by a margin of just 431 votes (1 percent). When Olmert resigned as prime minister on 21 September 2008 after Israeli police had recommended on 6 September that criminal charges be brought against him, Livni became acting prime minister.

In February 2009 Israel held elections for the Knesset. Livni, acting prime minister and head of the Kadima Party, campaigned against Netanyahu of the Likud to lead the new government. While election results gave Kadima the most seats in the Knesset (twenty-eight), parties to the right in Israel's political spectrum gained enough seats that a coalition government under Kadima leadership proved unattainable. After Livni's efforts failed, Israeli president SHIMON PERES asked Netanyahu (whose party received one less seat than Kadima in the elections—twenty-seven) to form a government, marking the first time in Israel's history that the party with the most seats was unable to form a government.

See also EHUD OLMERT; OPERATION CAST LEAD

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Lobby, Pro-Israel

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Lohamei Herut Yisrael

Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI, Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or Stern Group) was a militant underground organization that operated in Palestine from 1940 to 1948 during the BRITISH MANDATE. At first it was composed chiefly of a group headed by AVRAHAM "YAIR" STERN, which had broken off from the Etzel (IRGUN) group in 1940. The split was caused by disagreement on three main issues: (1) LEHI demanded that the military struggle against the British be continued, irrespective of the war against Nazi GERMANY; (2) it opposed Jewish enlistment in the British army, which VLADIMIR ZE'EV JABOTINSKY (the father of Revisionist ZIONISM) supported; and (3) it was willing to collaborate with anyone, including the Nazis, if they supported the struggle against the British in Palestine. LEHI also demanded unrestricted IMMIGRATION of Jews, as every other Jewish group did at this time. But LEHI rejected the authority of the pre-state Yishuv's elected institutions and the worldwide Zionist movement and sometimes clashed bitterly with the HAGANA, the main underground military organization at the time.

LEHI's goals were maximalist: conquest and liberation of a "Hebrew kingdom from the Euphrates to the Nile," all-out war against the British Empire, and complete withdrawal of Britain from Palestine. In contrast to these broad goals, LEHI's strength was limited; it never had more than a few hundred fighters, and its weapons stores were relatively meager. The disparity between its aspirations and its real power dictated LEHI's method of fighting—bold, extremist actions intended both to obtain funding and weapons and to demonstrate that it was possible to strike successfully at the enemy, Great Britain.

As a result of its actions LEHI initially found itself isolated in the pre-state Yishuv, while British authorities quickly focused their efforts against the group. In 1942 British police shot and killed Stern under disputed circumstances. Several of the group's members were arrested, and the organization went into temporary eclipse. The remaining fighters continued to wage Stern's war, and a new command structure was established—a triumvirate composed of Israel Eldad, Natan Yellin-Mor, and YITZHAK SHAMIR (later prime minister of Israel). TERRORISM continued to be the group's modus operandi, for they believed that a series of painful attacks would force the British to reevaluate the wisdom and price of remaining in Palestine. Ideologically the "new" LEHI was guided by spiritual and philosophical leaders such as Uri Zvi Greenberg and Israel Eldad, while the "old" LEHI was primarily guided by the writings of Abba Achimier, a columnist who embraced national socialism and was a major influence within the Revisionist movement.

The new LEHI adopted a nonsocialist, anti-imperialist platform that viewed the continued British rule of Palestine as a violation of the Mandate's provision and its restrictions on Jewish immigration an intolerable breach of INTERNATIONAL LAW. Unlike the Hagana and IRGUN, which fought against both the British and Palestinians, until 1948, LEHI attacked British targets almost exclusively. LEHI prisoners captured by the British generally refused to present a defense when tried in British courts and instead read statements declaring that the court, because it represented an occupying force, had no jurisdiction over them and was illegal. For the same reason, LEHI prisoners refused to plead for amnesty, even when this would clearly spare them from the death penalty. In one case two LEHI men killed themselves in prison to prevent the British from hanging them.

In 1940 and 1941, LEHI proposed intervening in World War II on the side of Nazi Germany to attain its help in expelling Britain from Mandate Palestine. Late in 1940, LEHI representative Naftali Lubenchik was sent to Beirut, LEBANON, where he met the German official Werner Otto von Hentig and delivered a letter from Lehi offering to "actively take part in the war on Germany's side" in return for German support for "the establishment of the historic Jewish state on a national and totalitarian basis, bound by a treaty with the German Reich." Von Hentig forwarded the letter to the German embassy in Ankara, TURKEY, but there is no record of any official response. LEHI tried to establish contact with the Germans again in December 1941, also apparently without success. Ironically, mainstream Labor Zionist efforts were far more productive in this regard, as evidenced in the 1933 HA'AVARA Agreement.

Apart from a small number of high-profile operations, LEHI mostly conducted small-scale attacks on British soldiers, police officers, and, on occasion, Jewish "collaborators." Another operation (in 1947) involved sending letter bombs to British politicians. Others included sabotaging infrastructure, such as bridges, railroads, and oil refineries. LEHI financed its operations from private donations, extortion, and bank robberies. On 6 November 1944 in Cairo, two LEHI members assassinated Lord Moyne, a British government representative it blamed for the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER immigration policy, which declared Britain's opposition to Palestine becoming a Jewish state. This act rocked the British government and outraged Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Two assassins, Eliyahu Bet-Tzuri and Eliyahu Hakim, were caught, tried by a military tribunal, and hanged on 23 March 1945.

When the JEWISH AGENCY organized the JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT against the British in November 1945, LEHI joined it along with the Hagana and Etzel. As part of the movement, LEHI carried out several operations, the largest of which was the bombing of the HAIFA railroad workshops in June 1946, in which eleven LEHI members were killed by British soldiers and twenty-two were arrested. The Jewish Resistance Movement broke up following Etzel's bombing of the KING DAVID HOTEL in Jerusalem on 22 July 1946, but LEHI continued with its campaign.

In 1947, LEHI decided to concentrate its activities in JERUSALEM to prevent implementation

of the UN Partition Plan (UN RESOLUTION 181) and the internationalization of the city. In April 1948, LEHI, together with the Irgun, massacred more than 100 Palestinians in the village of DEIR YASSIN. By that time LEHI considered the Palestinians as much or more the enemy than the British.

When the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) was established on 31 May 1948, LEHI was disbanded, and its members enlisted in the IDF. Only in Jerusalem did LEHI remain an independent organization, arguing that at the time of Israel's proclamation of independence the city's fate had not yet been determined. On 17 September 1948, LEHI assassinated the UN mediator COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, who had been sent to broker a settlement in the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. Although arrested, most of the five suspects involved were released immediately and all were granted general amnesty by Israel on 14 February 1949.

In 1980, Israel instituted the LEHI ribbon—red, black, grey, pale blue, and white—which is awarded to those former members of the LEHI underground who wish to carry it.

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London Agreement, 1987

See HUSAYN-PERES AGREEMENT

London Conference, 1946–1947

In July 1946, Britain released the MORRISON-GRADY PLAN, which proposed a unitary federal trusteeship in Palestine. Zionists rejected it categorically, while the Palestinians were skeptical and had numerous reservations, such as who would control Jewish IMMIGRATION. To clarify the plan to both sides, Britain decided to hold a second LONDON CONFERENCE, called for September 1946, although neither Jews nor Arabs participated. Palestinians refused to attend unless AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI was allowed to participate, and Zionists so strenuously opposed the concept of a unitary state that they were unwilling even to discuss it. The British tried again in February 1947, proposing an independent Palestinian state with a Jewish minority after a five-year transitional period under British trusteeship. Both the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE and the JEWISH AGENCY rejected the plan.

Three weeks later Britain announced that it would turn the fate of Palestine over to the UNITED NATIONS.

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London/St. James Conference, 1939

The London/St. James Conference of February–March 1939 was organized by the British under the leadership of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to create an agreement between Arabs and Zionists over the future of Palestine. The British government announced that it would decide and implement its own policy if the conference did not produce an agreement.

The British government invited representatives of the Palestinians (excluding those allegedly responsible for violence, in particular AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI), Jews, and the Arab states. All the prominent Palestinian political leaders, Christian and Muslim, were represented, including JAMAL AL-HUSAYNI, AWNI 'ABD AL-HADI, MUSA AL-ALAMI, GEORGE ANTONIUS, Husayn AL-KHALIDI, Ya'qoub Farraj, Ya'cob al-Ghussein, Alfred Roch, Fu'ad Saba, and representatives of the NASHASHIBI FAMILY. Leaders from several Arab states were invited, including those from EGYPT, IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA, and Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950). On the Jewish

side, both Zionist and non-Zionist groups within the JEWISH AGENCY attended, organized under the leadership of CHAIM WEIZMANN.

Because the Arabs refused to grant formal recognition to the Jewish Agency, the conference turned into parallel but separate Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Jewish conferences. In addition the Arabs requested that the British government make public the 1914–1915 HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE, in which Britain promised its support for creating a unified, independent Arab state in all the Arab provinces if the Arabs revolted against the OTTOMAN Turks. Although the British created a committee to "examine" the letters, in which the Arabs were supposed to participate, nothing came of this.

The Arabs were determined to secure the right of the Palestinians to their independence, which they believed had been pledged by the British twenty-five years earlier in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence and for which the Palestinians had risen up in arms. Meanwhile, the Jews were determined to create a Jewish state, based on the BRITISH MANDATE'S incorporation of the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine—a home considered particularly vital at a time of Nazi persecution of Jewry in Europe. Although meetings among all three sides took place toward the end of the London Conference, British proposals for an agreement were first rejected by the Jewish side, and then (after revisions partially met the Jewish objections) by both sides.

The conference ended inconclusively and shortly thereafter the British issued the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which declared Britain's opposition to Palestine becoming a Jewish state.

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Lydda

Lydda is an ancient city situated on the coastal plain about ten miles southeast of JAFFA. During the 1948 WAR Lydda was the site of an Israeli attack that left scores dead and thousands expelled. Lydda was first mentioned in 1465 BCE in Pharaoh Thutmose III's list of Canaanite cities. It was occupied by the SAMARITANS in the fourth century BCE and then came under the administration of Judea during Roman rule. From about the fifth century BCE until the third century CE, Lydda had a Jewish presence. In 200 CE the Romans established the city of Diospolis there, a prominent market center supporting the textile, dyeing, pottery, and cattle industries. The city was also thought to be the site of the martyrdom in 303 and the burial place of St. George, the patron saint of England and of the Crusaders, and was renamed Georgiopolis during the Byzantine and Crusader periods.

The city was captured in 636 by the Muslim general 'Amir ibn al-'As and served as the headquarters of the province of Filistin (Palestine) until 715, when RAMLA assumed that role. The Crusaders occupied the city in 1099 and built the church of St. George, which now belongs to the GREEK ORTHODOX community and has been restored several times. In 1191, Lydda was reconquered by the Muslim leader SALADIN. Along with the nearby city of Ramla, Lydda retained its importance as a crossroads of the two major routes through Palestine linking EGYPT and SYRIA and connecting the coastal plain with JERUSALEM. Later, under the MAMLUKS, the city was the seat of an administrative district, and in 1273, Sultan Baybars built the Bridge of Lod with its carved lions, which survives today on the northbound road.

Under OTTOMAN rule European interest and influence in Palestine increased, and Lydda's location between the port of Jaffa and Jerusalem encouraged economic growth and population increase, supported by the citrus industry, the proliferation of olive plantations, and the production of soap. Lydda was connected to Jerusalem and Jaffa by a commercial road in the late 1860s and by the first railway line in 1892. Given Lydda's fertile agricultural land on the coastal plain and its strategic location, trade was also a key dimension of the city's economy. In addition to its shops, Lydda was home to a weekly market that drew thousands of people from neighboring villages. The town was also a center for traditional manufacturing.

In 1936, under the BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948), authorities constructed Palestine's only international airport just north of Lydda (later renamed Lod by Israel). In the first half of the twentieth century, Lydda's population growth

reflected the town's mounting importance: an urban area of some 7,000 in 1912, it grew to 11,250 in 1931 and 18,250 in 1946.

Like that of Ramla, the fate of Lydda and its inhabitants during the 1948 War mirrored the wider Palestinian experience. Lydda was allocated to the proposed Arab state of Palestine under UN RESOLUTION 181 of 29 November 1947. It was defended from an Israeli attack by Palestinian forces, irregular volunteers from JORDAN, and initially by units of the Jordanian Arab Legion. But John Glubb, the British general commanding the legion, refused to divert legion units from the important position of Latrun to reinforce Palestinian forces in Lydda. In May 1948 the Jewish fighting force PALMAH occupied Lydda and Ramla, and in July 1948 the area was the site of one of the darkest episodes of the war. Scores of civilians were killed in the assault, twenty-eight villages destroyed, and at least 40,000 people were evicted from their homes in and around Lydda and Ramla after an order issued personally by Israel's founder DAVID BEN-GURION and signed by the field commander in the area, the future prime minister YITZHAK RABIN (who would later express some regret about this episode in his memoirs). In Lydda some 19,900 Palestinians were expelled, mainly to camps in LEBANON, while only 1,052 were allowed to stay. Israel changed the name of the city to Lod, and a number of Jewish families moved into the vacated houses.

See also WAR, 1948

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—Betsy Folkins

M

Ma'ale Adumim Settlement


Ma'ale Adumim is the largest (population 33,000) and most strategically located Jewish SETTLEMENT in Israel's plan to annex a contiguous territorial area in the WEST BANK to JERUSALEM and incorporate it into the Jewish state. It is geopolitically important because (when all the plans for its expansion are complete) it will form a metropolis extending from Jerusalem in the west to JERICHO in the east, thus severing the West Bank at its center into two disarticulated areas—the north and the south. So important is this colony that, in 1991, the Military Authority for the West Bank in conjunction with the Knesset altered its status from a "settlement" to an "Israeli town," thus designating it sovereign Israeli territory.

In the 1998 Umbrella Municipality Plan (UMP), designed to expand East Jerusalem by integrating the surrounding Jewish settlements, Israel designated Ma'ale Adumim as "the 'metropolitan hub' of Jerusalem." The blueprint for its growth includes programs to construct 4,478 new housing units to support an increase in its population to 45,000 within a few years and a further increase to 60,000 residents by the year 2010. In addition the UMP specifically forecasts that after the confiscation of more Palestinian LAND and the construction of new suburbs, Ma'ale Adumim will connect GIV'AT ZE'EV (north of Jerusalem), Gush Etzion (south of Jerusalem), and the Jerusalem corridor through a contiguous link of settlements with East Jerusalem. The southern territorial stretch includes areas south of and isolating BETHLEHEM, Beit Jala, and Beit Sahour. The northern area reaches almost to the border of Ramallah, resulting in the surrounding and segregation of dozens of Palestinian villages.

The entire area—some 35,000 dunums (8,600 acres) on which Ma'ale Adumim sits—was confiscated in 1975 from Palestinians who owned the land and had been farming or grazing it for centuries. In a commonly used policy, Israel declared the area STATE LAND before turning it over to the settlers. Subsequent confiscations increased the area of the settlement to 43,500 dunums (10,700 acres) in the early 1990s. The villages that lost the most land in this expropriation were ABU DIS, al-Izariyyeh, al-Issawiyyeh, A TUR, and 'Anata. The agricultural land of the villages and the grazing land confiscated from the BEDOUIN tribes extended from the border of Jerusalem on the west to a'Khan al-Ahmad at the approach to the Dead Sea on the east. For the Bedouin as well as for the villagers, loss of their land meant the loss of their way of life and major transformations in their social life. Today, the area available to these Arab villages with a population of approximately 40,000 is some 4,600 dunums (1,100 acres), while the area of Ma'ale Adumim is 11.5 times greater. (See Map 30.)

Ma'ale Adumim's residents enjoy a high standard of living, modern INFRASTRUCTURE, GREEN AREAS, advanced educational and cultural institutions, and numerous other services, benefits, and institutions designed to attract families to the settlement. Residents receive large tax exemptions and government-subsidized mortgage terms (as do residents of all settlements). The settlement has hotels and other tourist facilities, and an ongoing advertising campaign is designed to attract Christian pilgrims visiting Jerusalem and Bethlehem who seek inexpensive accommodations. The settlement/town is also well endowed with an industrial park that spreads across 7,500 dunums (1,800 acres), in "an area that is among the largest industrial parks in Israel."

By August 2005, Israel had completed a plan (E1 PLAN) for confiscating and settling an area known as E1 between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Adumim. Colonizing E1 would be the final phase in tying Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem. The first stage was approval by the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION's Planning Council in the West Bank to relocate the headquarters of the Judea and Samaria police district from the East Jerusalem Palestinian neighborhood of RAS AL-AMUD to the E1 area. This had the effect of freeing land for increased Jewish settlement in



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Map 30. The Ma'ale Adumim Settlement Bloc Expanding into Municipal Greater Jerusalem through the E1 Plan and the Road System

Ras al-Amud and sealing the area between Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem. This extra building required confiscating more land around Ma'ale Adumim to expand the settlement and to construct ROADS and the BARRIER separating the West Bank from Israel. In January 2009, the new police station was completed, and police and administrators moved in. Residential settlements were soon to follow.

Financial and material assistance for implementing the UMP came from the Housing and Construction Ministries. Former prime minister ARIEL SHARON (2001–2006) announced several times in the spring and summer of 2005 that he intended Ma'ale Adumim to be part of Israel and wanted the territory between Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem to be unbroken. In February the Israeli Cabinet approved the inclusion of area E1 within the route of the West Bank Barrier. At the same time, the Planning Council in the West Bank approved the plan to develop the area and build 3,500 housing units in two neighborhoods.

See also E1 PLAN; GIV'AT ZE'EV SETTLEMENT; METRO-POLITAN JERUSALEM PLAN; SETTLEMENTS

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Ma'alot, 1974

Ma'alot is a town in northern Israel where on 15 May 1974 three members of the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP), a leftist Palestinian faction, commandeered a schoolhouse and took a group of eleventh grade students hostage. They demanded an exchange of Palestinian PRISONERS in Israeli jails for the freedom of the Jewish children. Instead of negotiating, Israel sent a unit of the elite Golani brigade to storm the building, killing the terrorists and twenty-one children. On their way to the schoolhouse the night before, the DFLP infiltrators had murdered five Israelis, bringing the total number of Israeli victims to twenty-six.

Ma'arat HaMachpelah

See CAVE OF MACHPELAH

MacDonald "Black Letter," 1931

The MacDonald "Black Letter" was a letter from British prime minister Ramsay MacDonald to CHAIM WEIZMANN, president of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, dated 13 February 1931. It was issued after Zionists mounted an intense campaign against the findings of the PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER, issued following an investigation of the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES in Palestine. In the paper Lord Passfield, the British colonial secretary, recommended limiting Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchase in Palestine. Although Passfield's recommendations, published in March 1930, largely reflected those of the HOPE-SIMPSON and SHAW COMMISSIONS, they outraged Zionists, and Passfield and his paper came under enormous criticism and pressure. Bowing to the pressure, MacDonald sent Weizmann a public letter and promised what amounted to an abrogation of the Passfield White Paper. The MacDonald Letter, which was issued as an official interpretation of the White Paper, reiterated the BRITISH MANDATE's obligation to "facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land," and suggested that STATE LANDS be made available to both Jews and Arabs. Zionists regarded the let-

ter as a restoration of the status quo ante, while Arabs, who had been satisfied with the limitations of the Passfield White Paper, called the MacDonald Letter "a black frame for the white paper." The letter played an important role in the eruption of the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT.

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MacDonald White Paper, 1939

The MacDonald White Paper proposed a unitary government of Arabs and Jews, which significantly altered BRITISH MANDATE policy in Palestine. Issued by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, the British White Paper of 17 May 1939 limited Jewish IMMIGRATION to 75,000 for five years, subject to the country's "economic absorptive capacity," and after this initial five-year period further immigration would be determined by the Palestinian-Jewish government. The White Paper also restricted LAND acquisition by Jews and repealed the PEEL COMMISSION's recommendations (for the partition of Palestine with transfer of land and population exchanges) and reflected the failure of the LONDON/ST. JAMES CONFERENCE.

When the White Paper was passed in the House of Commons by a 268-to-179 vote, London had essentially given up on the Mandate and the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, and with the MacDonald proclamation, the British believed that their obligations to ZIONISTS were now fulfilled. Further, the paper stated that "His Majesty's Government now declares unequivocally that it is not part of their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State." Zionists vehemently rejected the new policy, but so did the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE and Palestinian leader AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, who, after more than twenty years of British support for the Zionist movement, were skeptical that London would suddenly support the Palestinians.

Zionists appealed to the League of Nations Mandate Commission, which declared the White Paper illegal. Nonetheless, the British continued to enforce its provisions, although at this stage in the conflict they had little practical effect; because previous British policies had ensured that the Jewish pre-state Yishuv was institutionally—politically, economically, and militarily—well developed, the new White Paper was unenforceable. Owing to British policies that had encouraged Zionists, in September 1939, the head of the JEWISH AGENCY, DAVID BEN-GURION, declared: "We will fight the white paper as if there is no war [World War II], and fight the war as if there is no white paper." On 15 May 1948 the government of the new state of Israel issued an injunction officially abolishing the White Paper.

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MachsomWatch

MachsomWatch (Women for Human Rights) was founded in January 2001 by three Israeli women to monitor the behavior of soldiers at CHECKPOINTS throughout the WEST BANK. It was created in response to repeated reports of human rights abuses against Palestinians crossing army and border police checkpoints. The goals of the group, which is open exclusively to women and includes some 400 activists, are threefold: (1) to be physically present at checkpoints to monitor the behavior of soldiers and police, (2) to ensure that the human and civil rights of Palestinians are protected, and (3) to record and report the group's observations to the widest possible audience, from the decisionmaking level to that of the general public. (www.machsomwatch.org).

See also COALITION OF WOMEN FOR PEACE

Mada Manifesto

See HIGH FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE AND THE MADA MANIFESTO

Madrid Conference, 1991

The Madrid Conference, convened on 30 October 1991, was formally cosponsored by the UNITED

STATES and MOSCOW, and was promoted as a major initiative in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Participants included Israel, SYRIA, LEBANON, and JORDAN, which presented a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Following the 1991 GULF WAR, US president GEORGE H. W. BUSH and his secretary of state, JAMES BAKER, wanted to balance US military action in the Gulf region with a demonstration of the United States' commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The conference, which lasted for three days, was hosted by the government of Spain, then separated into bilateral and multilateral tracks.

The bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors began immediately on 3 November 1991 and were followed by forums in Moscow and Europe in 1992–1993 and over a dozen formal rounds in Washington, DC, from 9 December 1991 to 24 January 1994. The initial discussions had the goal of achieving peace treaties between the Arab states and Israel, while the talks with the Palestinians were based on a two-stage formula in which interim self-government arrangements would be negotiated first, to be followed by permanent status negotiations.

The multilateral negotiations, which opened in Moscow on 28 January 1992, were held in five separate forums and continued until November 1993 in various European capitals. Each set of talks focused on a major issue—WATER, ENVIRONMENT, arms control, REFUGEES, and economic development. Israel, however, refused to take part in the refugee and economic meetings, and Syria and Lebanon declined to participate in the multilateral meetings so long as there was no concrete progress on the bilateral level.

Context of Madrid

The impetus for the Madrid Conference came with the defeat of IRAQ in 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when officials in Washington believed an Arab-Israeli political settlement based on US interests was possible. Although Secretary Baker was the architect of the Madrid Conference, much of the groundwork had been laid by Baker's predecessors, and, in a sense, the Madrid framework represented a synthesis of previous US diplomatic initiatives. The pillars of Madrid, such as the two-stage approach, the Palestinian self-rule concept, and transitional arrangements, were derived from the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS negotiated during President JIMMY CARTER's administration in 1978. The Jordanian dimension of a Palestinian-Israeli settlement was grounded in the 1982 REAGAN PLAN. Other aspects, especially those designed to attract the Palestinians, were largely inherited from the 1988 Shultz Plan, which itself incorporated important features of Camp David and the Reagan Plan.

Two additional characteristics were common to these initiatives. First, they were all occasioned by structural changes in either the regional or the global environment. For example the de-Nasirization of EGYPT and the subsequent collapse of Soviet influence with Cairo in 1972 led to the policies of Anwar Sadat, which created a strategic opening for US diplomatic action, the outcome of which was Camp David. Second, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon had so weakened the Palestinian national movement that President RONALD REAGAN was able to effectively remove Palestinian national rights from the agenda. Because Reagan had just intensified the Cold War with the Soviet Union and embarked on a global campaign against revolutionary nationalism, he welcomed the opportunity to rearrange the strategic landscape of the Middle East. His plan, however, was thwarted by a junior ally with strategic designs of its own: Israel promptly and categorically rejected the Reagan Plan a few hours after it was announced and thus ensured its failure. Tel Aviv objected to the plan's denial of Israeli sovereignty in the WEST BANK and GAZA in favor of Jordanian control. The plan was thus shelved, but US Secretary of State GEORGE SHULTZ resurrected elements of it six years later, though deferring the issue of sovereignty for FINAL STATUS TALKS, but the 1988 Shultz Plan failed when Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR declined to engage in negotiations. The following year Secretary Baker began to revive it.

A further important common element of the four US plans is that the interests of the people in the region were always overshadowed by the strategic needs of the United States. This created a corresponding disparity between the pursuit of comprehensive peace and the search for regional security. The Arab parties to the conflict rarely shared Washington's belief that particular circumstances were propitious for establishing peaceful relations or its view of the Soviets as a potential threat but rather considered Israel the threat. Despite major flaws in the US proposals, most of the Arab parties chose to negotiate so as not to displease Washington, while Israel continued to reject

all initiatives that might undermine its objective of permanent control over the West Bank.

After the Gulf War the Arab states were more divided than at any time since the establishment of the ARAB LEAGUE in 1945. With Arab solidarity against Israel sundered, an important source of pressure for Israeli concessions was weakened. Moreover, the poorer Arab countries were heavily indebted to the West and many of the richer Arab states relied on Western countries for military protection, which translated into a loss of relative Arab leverage. The Gulf War also effectively removed the question of Palestine from the top of the Arab agenda. After the war the Palestinians were isolated, politically weakened, and faced serious economic problems. Not only was the Palestinian leadership, based in TUNIS, ostracized for its pro-Iraq political stance, but it was deprived of solid and unified Arab backing in negotiations; it was isolated from its constituencies in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, the Gulf region, Syria, and Lebanon and faced with economic, ideological, leadership, and governance crises. Moreover, because the internal (Occupied Territories) Palestinian leadership was rapidly growing in importance (a trend markedly evident during the First INTIFADA), the United States and Israel exploited this to render the external leadership in Tunis even less important. The Bush administration thus viewed the PLO and the Palestinians as the weakest link in its quest for a peace settlement and regional stability. All these developments enabled the Bush administration to obtain Arab and Palestinian acquiescence to its framework for negotiations, even though it was tilted heavily against the Arabs and Palestinians.

Several other factors led to the US investing so much political capital in the Madrid Conference. On the one hand, Secretary Baker felt that he had lost an opportunity for peace after he embraced a plan presented by Shamir in 1989, calling it "the only game in town," only to have Shamir repudiate his own proposal within months. Two years later, in 1991, however, Baker had a second window of opportunity resulting from both the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq. These regional and global changes gave the United States an opportunity to pursue a Middle East settlement unencumbered by conflicting Soviet interests or a powerful Iraq's strong support for the PLO and the Palestinians. Thus the way was open for George Bush and James Baker to define and shape a new world order in the Middle East, in which the United States would be the sole major power and could maximize its own national interests. Given that regional stability was the foundation for all other US objectives in the region, Washington believed it was necessary to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, if the United States was to assume the leadership of the new global system, it needed to demonstrate that it could not only crush detractors but also broker viable peace agreements in situations of prolonged impasse. In a sense then, the Madrid Conference was a litmus test of US leadership in the new global order.

Preliminaries to Madrid

During the Gulf War, Iraq had launched several Scud missiles onto Israeli territory, and these attacks, combined with the Intifada (whose civil disobedience was viewed as a major security threat), consolidated the hard-line forces in Israel. The war thus allowed Israel to impose its diplomatic framework on negotiations in which it participated. Israel insisted on two parallel negotiating tracks at the Madrid Conference for the Palestinian issues and on replacing an international conference called for in UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 with a regional conference hosted by the United States, and the now powerless Soviet Union, although both these conditions were congruent with US policy, as was ensuring that the UNITED NATIONS had no substantive role.

Secretary Baker engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy to persuade Israel, the Arab states, and Palestinians to attend the Madrid Conference. From March to September 1991 he made eight trips to the Middle East. Israel, under the administration of Prime Minster Yitzhak Shamir, opposed the conference from the outset, made no concessions (except to attend), and greeted each visit by Baker with the creation of a new SETTLEMENT. The Arab states, however, made numerous concessions (for example, agreeing not to have a separate Palestinian delegation) that were incorporated into a letter of invitation signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 October 1991.

Israel demanded that individuals affiliated with the PLO, residents of JERUSALEM, and Palestinians from the DIASPORA be excluded from the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, leaving only non-PLO persons from the West Bank and

Gaza whom Israel insisted on vetting. However, several notable Palestinian participants, including SAEB EREKAT, HANAN ASHRAWI, and HAYDAR 'ABD AL-SHAFI, who were part of the joint negotiating team with Jordanians, were in constant communication with the PLO leadership in Tunis.

These Israeli demands were reflected in Baker's preconference diplomacy, which involved unequal treatment of the Palestinians and their fundamental interests. Several actions illustrate this point:

- Baker's acquiescence in Israel's exclusion of any delegates from the PLO, the Diaspora, or Jerusalem seriously undermined the Palestinians' ability to press credibly for their rights. The exclusion of the PLO from the Madrid Conference signaled the intention to ignore discussions of Palestinian national rights, including the right to self-determination in a sovereign state and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. By excluding Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Israel's claim to Jerusalem was reinforced.
- Discussion of the fundamental issue of Israel's OCCUPATION of Palestinian territories was placed beyond the parameters of debate through the numerous encumbrances built into the conference, including its structure, participants (including the mandatory joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation), the limits on speech, and the frequency of meetings.
- The two-track approach also ensured that solving the Palestine question would not be the central issue in negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Issues of arms control, water resources, economic development, regional security, and the environment, which made up the agenda of the multilateral talks, sidestepped the basis of the conflict.
- The transitional period represented another substantive issue packaged as procedural. An unrepresentative segment of the 5.5 million Palestinians, carefully chosen to satisfy Israeli requirements and meticulously screened for their willingness to operate within defined constraints, would, after an interim period of limited autonomy, sit across the table from an Israeli team free of any constraints to negotiate the final status of the Occupied Territories.

Not surprisingly the Madrid process stalled after eleven rounds of talks in Washington, Rome, and Moscow, as Israel clung tenaciously to the policy of building settlements, thus precluding any kind of territorial solution. For the Palestin-ians, all fundamental issues involving BORDERS, refugees, Jerusalem, and the Occupation had to be deferred. Self-government, the sole concern of the Madrid negotiations in the immediate term, was seen by the Palestinians as the necessary step toward independence, while Israel had ruled out independence and considered self-government a mechanism to ratify the Occupation under a new and different label.

See also JAMES BAKER; GEORGE H. W. BUSH

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—Naseer Aruri

Mafdal

See NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY

Magnes, Judah Leon (1877–1948)

Judah Magnes was a rabbi and philosopher who served as chancellor, then president, of the Hebrew University in JERUSALEM. Born in the UNITED STATES, he showed a commitment to ZIONISM early when as chairman of the Jewish Self-Defense Association in 1903, he collected funds and weapons to send to Jews in RUSSIA and then to Zionists in Palestine. In 1906 he founded the AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE, and in 1909 he

helped found the Kehilla (the organized Jewish community of New York), which provided a thorough Jewish education, and remained active in it until he left for Palestine in 1922. Magnes was also involved in the early stages of the founding of the AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS but eventually resigned because he believed the organization wasn't sufficiently focused on its primary goal of mobilizing support for Zionist settlement in Palestine.

As the United States edged toward war in 1917, Magnes was an articulate and ardent spokesman for pacifism, a position that cost him the respect of many previous Jewish supporters and later led to his virtual ostracism in the Zionist movement. By 1925 Magnes began to believe that Zionism could lead to a war with the Palestinians, which he opposed, and proposed instead a BINATIONAL state. In Palestine he helped found BRIT SHALOM to foster his position and attempted to persuade the British authorities and the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE to adopt his vision of a state in which Israelis and Palestinians would live together. At the meeting of the JEWISH AGENCY in 1937, Magnes, representing the non-Zionists in attendance, introduced a resolution calling for the establishment of a committee of Zionists and non-Zionists to negotiate with the League of Nations, Great Britain, and the United States to study methods for creating a binational state in Palestine. Magnes, who had many contacts with the local Palestinians, insisted that the Palestinians would cooperate in such a project. However, he was repudiated and chastised allegedly because his relationships with the Palestinians had been unauthorized, and the motion was defeated.

In response to the 1942 BILTMORE PROGRAM, which stated the Zionist leadership's objective of establishing a Jewish state over the whole of Mandatory Palestine, Magnes formed IHUD, a quasi-political party/organization to improve Arab-Jewish understanding. Appearing as the representative of Ihud before the ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY and the UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE, Magnes argued for a binational state in a united Palestine that would be based on political parity for Jews and Palestinians, with a transitional period of trusteeship for Palestine under the UNITED NATIONS. When the Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181), which proposed dividing Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, was adopted in November 1947, Magnes was not deterred. The ensuing outbreak of hostilities, the escalation of fighting, and Jewish setbacks in the early months of the 1948 WAR led him to renew his efforts for an immediate truce and postponement of the UN partition decision.

When the United Nations advocated a temporary trusteeship of Palestine in March 1948, Magnes drew the attention of Warren Austin, the US representative at the United Nations, to the Ihud platform and was invited to the United States to help obtain a truce in Palestine. In response, on 26 April 1948 the Senate of the Hebrew University issued a statement disassociating the institution and its faculties from Magnes's political activities. After the establishment of Israel, Magnes advocated the inclusion of Israel in a confederation of Middle Eastern states, but he died later that year and his ideas never received serious attention by Diaspora Zionists or in Israel.

In 1962 the Judah L. Magnes Museum was founded in Berkeley, California. The third largest Jewish museum in North America, it has a permanent collection of more than 12,000 objects of Jewish ceremonial, folk, and fine art, including paintings, sculpture, prints, and drawings by contemporary and traditional artists.

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Maimonides (Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon [Rambam]) (1137–1204)

One of the greatest Torah scholars, Maimonides was a rabbi, physician, and philosopher. Born in Spain, he fled persecution to Morocco and finally settled in EGYPT. In *Mishneh Torah*, Maimonides composed a code of Jewish law with the widest possible scope and depth. The work gathers all the binding laws from the Talmud and incorporates the positions of the Geonim (post-Talmudic early medieval scholars, mainly from Mesopotamia). Through the *Guide for the Perplexed*, his most famous work, and the philosophical introductions to sections of his commentaries on the *Mishna*, Maimonides exerted an important influence on the scholastic philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas.

Al-Majlisiyyun (Councilists)

See ARAB PARTY

Maki

The Communist Party of Israel, Maki (Miflaga Komunistit Yisraelit), was formed in 1948 within the BORDERS of the new state of Israel from the remnants of the PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. Although not Zionist, the party recognized Israel but denied the link between the state and the Jewish DIASPORA and asserted the right of Palestinians to form a state, in accordance with UN RESOLUTION 181. Maki had four seats in the first Knesset and elected three to six seats to each subsequent Knesset until 1965.

The party was part of the world communist movement and supported the SOVIET UNION. After the Prague Trials of 1953 the pro-Soviet Labor Zionist party MAPAM broke with the Soviet Union, and a number of Mapam members who still felt allegiance to the Soviet Union joined Maki. In 1965, Maki split between a largely Jewish group that recognized Israel's right to exist and a largely Israeli Palestinian group that was increasingly ANTI-ZIONIST and adopted the name RAKAH, or the New Communist List. The new Maki dwindled, winning only a single seat in the Knesset in 1965 and 1969, and was unable to attract any significant number of Jewish voters, despite having supported the 1967 WAR as legitimate self-defense by Israel. In 1973, Maki joined the pro-peace party MOKED and won a single seat. In 1977, Maki joined others on the Jewish left to form the SHELLI camp, which lost both its seats in 1981, and in 1984 merged into RATZ.

Meanwhile, Rakah remained a presence in the Knesset and was increasingly seen as an Arab party, though it was led until the late 1980s by Meir Vilner, who was Jewish. In 1977 the party formed an electoral coalition with other anti-Zionists to form HADASH. In 1989, Rakah officially changed its name to Maki and remains the leading force in Hadash, which regularly wins three to six seats in Knesset elections.

See also COMMUNISTS IN ISRAEL

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Mamluks

The Mamluks originated as a Turkish slave-soldier caste who converted to Islam and served the Muslim caliphs and the Ayyubid sultans from the ninth to thirteenth centuries. Because they were warriors, their status was considerably above that of ordinary slaves, who were not allowed to carry weapons or perform certain tasks. They played a major role in defeating the Crusaders. In Egypt Mamluks were considered to be the "true lords," with social status above freeborn Egyptians. They seized power and ruled Egypt in the Mamluk Dynasty from 1250 to 1517, remaining powerful until 1811. They governed Palestine and other parts of the Middle East and left an important legacy of architecture, art, and culture, especially in JERUSALEM.

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Mandate

Following World War I, the League of Nations (precursor to the UNITED NATIONS) established a system of "mandates." In theory, the system had the benevolent intention of preparing the natives of various regions for self-government. In practice, the granting of mandates represented the extension of imperialism or the granting of spoils to the victorious allied governments. The basis of the mandate system was Article 22 of the League's Covenant, which gave broad authority regarding preparation for self-rule to the mandatory powers, mainly Britain (for IRAQ, Transjordan, and Palestine) and FRANCE (for SYRIA and LEBANON).

See also COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Mandela Institute for Palestinian Prisoners

The Mandela Institute, an advocacy organization that focuses exclusively on Palestinian political PRISONERS, was established in 1990 in Ramallah in

the WEST BANK by Palestinians from the legal and medical professions as well as the clergy. The need for such an institution became apparent during the First INTIFADA (1987–1990), when Israel detained at least 8,500 Palestinian protesters for more than three days. The organization has three major areas of operation. The first, the Legal and Medical Aid Intervention Program, is known as the "Prisons visits project" and is considered the backbone of the Mandela programs. It organizes visits by lawyers and doctors to Israeli detention facilities to determine if they adhere to internationally recognized standards. The second is the Human Rights Training Department, established in 1994 following the onset of the OSLO PROCESS, which offers human rights training for Palestinian law enforcement officials. The third is the Legal Advice Department, which provides legal guidance for families of Palestinian prisoners. (www.mandela-palestine.org).

Mapai

Mapai (Mifleget Po'alei Eretz Yisrael, or Israel Workers' Party) was the forerunner of the Israeli LABOR PARTY. Its head, DAVID BEN-GURION, was a leading figure of the pre-state Jewish Yishuv and of the state of Israel for its first seventeen years. The influence of Mapai and Ben-Gurion in the realization of the Zionist project cannot be overstated.

The party was founded in 1930 by the merger of the HAPOEL HATZAIR, founded by A. D. Gordon, and the original AHDUT HA'AVODAH (founded in 1919 from the right, more moderate, wing of the Marxist Zionist socialist Russian party PO'ALE ZION led by David Ben-Gurion). In the early 1920s the Labor Zionist movement had founded the HISTADRUT union, which dominated the Hebrew settlement economy and infrastructure, later making Mapai the dominant political faction in Zionist politics. It was also responsible for the founding of HASHOMER and HAGANA, the first two armed Jewish groups who secured the people and property of the new and emerging Jewish communities. By the early 1930s, David Ben-Gurion had taken over the party and had become de facto leader of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine).

Mapai's founding convention defined the aims of the new party, the most important of which was the "rebirth of the People of Israel in the Land of Israel as a free working nation." To achieve this objective the party sought a complete identification with the Histadrut—the economic and political policies of communal KIBBUTZIM and Jewish workers performing all labor in Palestine to reclaim the land/country. Many of Mapai's organizational and cultural activities were carried out within the framework of the Histadrut. Mapai's ideology has been described as "constructivist-Zionist-socialism." Mapai's leaders believed that the primary purpose of the party was to recruit Jews from the DIASPORA to immigrate to Israel and to develop new Jewish colonies in Palestine. From its inception Mapai was the dominant party in the Yishuv, and after 1948 in Israel it was the dominant faction in the Labor Party.

After Israel achieved independence, Mapai refined its platform and proclaimed a number of objectives, although it had additional goals that were never publicly stated. Its objectives included the following: to bring the greatest possible number of Jews to Israel; to settle undeveloped areas; to develop a pluralist economy with public and private sectors; to strengthen the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES; to prevent the return of the Palestinian REFUGEES from the 1948 WAR; to absorb refugee property for use by Jewish immigrants through state and quasi-state institutions (e.g., the JEWISH AGENCY); to acquire NUCLEAR weapons; to develop a foreign policy focused on forming alliances with the Afro-Asian bloc and with world powers—at the time especially with FRANCE and the UNITED STATES; and to seek reparations from GERMANY.

Mapai remained the largest party in the state of Israel until 1967, when shortly before the 1967 WAR it merged with AHDUT HA'AVODA and RAFI to form the Israeli Labor Party. Every government from the first through 1977 was formed by Mapai/Labor.

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Mapam

Mapam (Mifleget ha-Po'alim ha-Me'uhedet, or United Workers' Party) was established as a Marxist-Zionist party in 1948 with the merger of HASHOMER HATZAIR (the Young Guard) and AHDUT HA'AVODA-PO'ALEI ZION (Unity of Labor Workers of Zion). Active in Israeli politics until the 1990s, Mapam was the political party of the left-wing KIBBUTZ movement and, until the mid-1950s, was the second largest political party in Israel after MAPAI.

Mapam's ideology valued ZIONISM over socialism, holding, for example, that the right and duty of Jews to settle in Israel are universal. When Great Britain put quotas on IMMIGRATION, Mapam encouraged Jewish immigration and also sought to establish the conditions for a socialist state—a Jewish socialist state, not a universal socialist country. Although it sought Jewish-Arab reconciliation, it stressed that the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict lay solely in the failure of the Arab leaders to recognize Israel.

Mapam was initially oriented toward the SOVIET UNION with a pro-Stalinist policy until the 1953 Prague Trials shook the party's faith in the USSR. The show trials, in which mostly Jewish leaders of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia were purged and Mapam's envoy in Prague, Mordechai Oren, was falsely implicated as part of a Zionist conspiracy, led Mapam to move away from its pro-Soviet position and to a more social democratic ideology. As a result, a number of Mapam leaders left the party and joined MAKI. At the same time, Mapam suffered a right-wing split with Ahdut Ha'avoda-Po'alei Zion's departure.

Subsequently Mapam remained in principle committed to socialist Zionism, but internally the party was divided over a number of issues, especially whether to accept Palestinians into the party and whether to support or oppose Israel's policy of massive retaliation in response to Palestinian INFILTRATION. Mapam was unified, however, against Israel's 1956 invasion of EGYPT, and it spearheaded the campaign to end the military administration of Israel's Arab citizens and to secure equal membership rights for Palestinian workers in the HISTADRUT labor federation.

Mapam considered the 1967 WAR a war of self-defense for the survival of Israel. In its aftermath, the party put forth a peace plan that called for returning all the Occupied Territories with minor border adjustments. It supported a two-state solution so long as the Arab state was demilitarized. Mapam also called for a united, Jewish JERUSALEM as the capital of Israel.

In 1969, Mapam joined with its former rival Mapai in an electoral alliance with the Labor Alignment, with Mapam as a junior partner. This alliance caused criticism within Mapam, with some arguing that the party was excessively subservient to Labor's status-quo-oriented policies, particularly on the issue of the future of the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP. In 1984, Mapam left the Alignment in protest over SHIMON PERES's decision to form a National Unity government with the LIKUD PARTY. In 1992, Mapam joined with RATZ and SHINUI to form the MERETZ electoral coalition, representing the Israeli peace camp. In 1996, Mapam formally merged with Ratz and ceased to exist as a separate party. (In 2004 Meretz changed its name to Yahad.)

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Maronites

Maronites are members of one of the Lebanese or Syriac Eastern Catholic Churches (though they have always remained in communion with the Bishop of Rome), with a heritage reaching back to Maron the Syriac Monk of the early fifth century. Enshrined by FRANCE in the nineteenth century as the political elite in LEBANON, they retained that status (and that of the predominant economic elite) despite ever-shrinking numbers compared to the other ethnic sects and ethnoreligious groups (e.g., Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, and other Christians). Even now, as a small minority they play a major role in Lebanon's politics and economics. For much of the period since Israel's independence they, or factions within the Maronites, have been allied with Israel. Maronites do not consider themselves "Arab," therefore they and Israel have looked on the Arabs as a common enemy.

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Massive Retaliation

See INFILTRATION (PALESTINIAN) AND RETALIATION (ISRAELI)

Matzpen

Matzpen (The Compass), the Israeli Socialist Organization, was founded in 1962 when a small group of Jewish former members of the Israeli Communist Party teamed up with older dissident communists, including some Israeli-Palestinians. The result was Matzpen—an organization that presented, for the first time in Israel's history, a radical critique of ZIONISM and Arab nationalism. It called for the democratization and "de-Zionization" of Israel and its integration into the Arab Middle East. Matzpen produced a monthly journal that reflected these ideas and worked openly with Palestinian groups and individuals. In time the group developed ties with leftist movements throughout the world, especially with Arab activists in Europe and North America.

Most of Matzpen's members were Israeli-born, coming from the deep core of Israeli society; nevertheless their fight against Zionism and against the OCCUPATION of Palestinian territories as well as their contacts with Palestinian and European left-wing activists led to threats, slander, and political and social isolation. Some well-known members included LEA TSEMEL, Moshe Machover, MICHEL WARSCHAWSKI, Akiva Orr, Moshe Mehuver, and Haim Hanegbi. Although Matzpen never had a large membership, it was an unwavering ANTI-ZIONIST force in Israeli society and took consistently progressive positions on critical issues in Israel. At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, it was considered a genuine threat to the Israeli political and social consensus. Today, however, many of the issues first raised by Matzpen form the core of progressive politics in Israel.

In the early 1960s, Matzpen declared that the heart of the conflict in the Middle East was the Palestinian problem. Official Israel denied this, asserting that the source of the conflict lay in the burning desire of the Arab world to destroy Israel. Today few, at least outside Israel, would disagree with Matzpen's analysis, evidenced by the fact that at the outset of the OSLO PROCESS most of the Arab world made overtures to Israel. In September 1967, three months after the conquest of the territories, Matzpen published a leaflet that asserted that "occupation brings TERRORISM and counter-terrorism in its wake." On the question of the Palestinian REFUGEES, Matzpen supported UN RESOLUTION 194 and believed that either payment of compensation or allowing the refugees to return was the only way to solve the refugee question. Matzpen also condemned the authorities' repressive measures in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

A group of Matzpen and fellow Palestinian activists founded the ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION CENTER to provide the Palestinian and Israeli communities with information about each other. The main aim of the center, however, was to work for a common strategic vision that would mobi-

lize Palestinians and Israelis to resolve the Palestinian situation.

See also ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE; MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCES

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McGovern, George Stanley (1922–)

George McGovern served as a Democratic senator from South Dakota from 1963 to 1981. Previously he had served for four years in the US House of Representatives and as director of the Food for Peace program under President JOHN F. KENNEDY. A prominent opponent of the Vietnam War, he became the 1972 Democratic Party nominee for president, losing to incumbent president RICHARD NIXON. McGovern also unsuccessfully sought the Democratic presidential nomination in 1968 and 1984. In 1997, President BILL CLINTON named him the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and World Food Program, a position in which he served in Rome for the next four years.

Like most liberal Democrats of his generation, as an elected official McGovern took a strongly pro-Israel stance during most of his career. His strict Methodist upbringing had emphasized the special role of Jews in the promised land, and as a highly decorated bomber pilot in World War II, he had witnessed the horror of the HOLOCAUST and subsequently developed a respect for Israel's democratic institutions. Although McGovern was considered the most liberal major party presidential nominee in US history, the 1972 Democratic Party platform was the strongest up to that time in promoting US support for Israel.

McGovern's perspectives began to change in 1978 when, as the newly appointed chair of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he took his first major trip to that region. Exposed for the first time to the plight of the Palestinians and to related perspectives in the Arab world, he began to shift from his previously uncritical support of Israel.

Following his 1980 defeat for reelection to a fourth term in the Senate, McGovern became a part-time lecturer at a number of prominent universities and continued to speak on political affairs, particularly food and agricultural policy, as well as on US policy toward the Middle East. Although underscoring his support for Israel's right to exist in peace and security, he became an increasingly outspoken opponent of the Israeli OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories and of US support for Israeli policies that he considered illegal, unjust, and ultimately detrimental to Israel's long-term security. During his brief campaign for the 1984 presidential nomination, he distinguished himself from most of his rivals in calling for conditioning aid to Israel, if necessary to advance the peace process. From 1991 to 1997 he served as president of the Middle East Policy Council, a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C., that is dedicated to improving US-Arab relations and promoting public awareness of Middle East policy issues. In his position he traveled frequently to the Middle East, where he developed cordial working relationships with YASIR ARAFAT and other Palestinian leaders both in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and in exile, as well as with leaders in Israel and the Arab states. McGovern used his connections within the Democratic Party and on Capitol Hill to work for a more even-handed US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, becoming a prominent US proponent of a sustainable peace between Israel and Palestine.

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—Stephen Zunes

Mecca Agreement and the Palestinian Unity Government

On 8 February 2007 the two major Palestinian factions—FATAH and HAMAS—signed a historic conciliation agreement in Mecca, SAUDI ARABIA, under the sponsorship of Saudi king Abdullah Ben

Abdul Aziz. The Saudis pledged $1 billion for economic projects, aid, and rebuilding schemes for the GAZA STRIP and WEST BANK if the two Palestinian camps maintained their agreement. On 28 March 2007 the Saudis convened an ARAB LEAGUE Summit in Riyadh to secure ratification by all Arab states of the principles of the Mecca Agreement.

Two major issues provided the impetus for Saudi mediation. One was the long-standing conflict between Hamas and Fatah, which had escalated significantly when the January 2006 ELECTIONS gave Hamas 76 of 132 parliamentary seats in the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC) and thus the right to form the next PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) Cabinet under Fatah president MAHMUD ABBAS. Although international monitors had carefully observed the elections and proclaimed them fair, Fatah refused to accept its loss, and its militias—some armed, financed, and trained by the UNITED STATES—challenged Hamas's authority at every turn. By the end of 2006 and with increasing intensity in early 2007, the two sides were engaged in a bloody civil war played out primarily in the Gaza Strip. Previous efforts to forge a unity government had failed, and relations worsened between the rivals when Abbas threatened in December to hold new parliamentary elections in the absence of an agreement, making an end to the conflict imperative.

A second reason for conciliation was to attempt to break the financial embargo that Israel, the United States, and the international community imposed on the PNA after Hamas won the 2006 elections. The US Treasury Department had blocked all funds from reaching the PNA, and banks around the globe abided by the US prohibition, because they feared being viewed as dealing with "terrorists" and thus cut off from the US banking system. Some European countries developed systems of indirect aid or humanitarian donations that bypassed the PNA and went to specific Palestinian institutions, but this system was highly fragmented and inefficient. In May 2006 the US House of Representatives voted 361–37 to stop giving aid to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that provided assistance in the Palestinian territories, thus curtailing European indirect aid and other NGO assistance.

At the same time, in response to the Hamas victory, Israel (based on the 1994 Paris ECONOMIC PROTOCOL) withheld the transfer of Palestinian tax and custom revenues that amounted to some $60 million a month. Foreign bank accounts and financial transactions by the PNA were also frozen, while frequent Israeli blockades of border crossings between EGYPT, JORDAN, and Israel caused Palestinian trade to collapse. For example, although Israel agreed to allow 400 trucks daily to export goods out of Gaza through the KARNI CROSSING, by December 2006 only seventeen trucks per day had been permitted to pass. By March 2006, 60 percent of the population was living on less than $2 a day, and some 34 percent were "food insecure"—that is, they did not have enough food to meet their basic needs. In addition, 165,000 PNA employees had not received their salaries, causing suffering for their families (about 800,000 people). Without international funding, the Hamas-led government was unable to provide basic services to Palestinians. By April 2006 the official unemployment rate was above 40 percent, and by the end of the year the situation had deteriorated precipitously. Ending the international economic blockade was thus a necessity for the survival of the PNA and the Palestinian people.

The goal of the Mecca Agreement then was to end the deadly factional fighting between Fatah and Hamas and to create an appearance of neutrality for the Palestinian government to help end the international economic sanctions on the PNA. The key issues in the agreement included:

- "A ban on the shedding of Palestinian blood including the adoption of all necessary measures to prevent this;
- Reaffirmation of the importance of national unity as a basis for national steadfastness, confronting the OCCUPATION and achieving the legitimate national goals of the Palestinian people;
- Adopting the language of dialogue as the sole basis for solving political disagreements in the Palestinian arena. . . .
- Reaching a final agreement on forming a Palestinian national unity government according to a detailed agreement approved by both sides, and which would be based on taking the appropriate constitutional measures to form this government.
- [Moving] forth in activating and reforming the PLO [PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION]. . . .
- [Reinforcing] the principle of political partnership on the basis of enacted laws in the PNA and on the basis of political pluralism according to an agreement ratified by both parties."

In this context President Abbas sent a letter to PNA prime minister ISMAIL HANIYEH, commissioning him to form the next Palestinian government within the period stipulated in the Basic Law. Abbas also urged Haniyeh "as premier of the next government to abide by the interests of the Palestinian people; to protect their rights and preserve and develop their achievements; and to work towards achieving their national goals as ratified by the resolutions of the PNC, the Basic Law, the national conciliation document, and the resolutions of Arab summits. Accordingly, I call on you to respect legitimate Arab and international resolutions and agreements signed by the PLO."

On 15 March, Abbas and Haniyeh announced the formation of a national unity government as well as a detailed political program. On 17 March, the PLC ratified the new Cabinet by a vote of 83 to 3 of the 132-member parliament. (At the time, 41 Palestinian parliamentarians were detained in Israeli prisons, 37 of them Hamas members, and another 4 were not present for the vote.) The new government consisted of twenty-five ministries. In a complicated formula, Hamas controlled the most seats (twelve), then Fatah (six), while the remaining seven went to independents and members of four smaller parties in the parliament. The new ministers were sworn in subsequent to the PNC vote at the office of President Abbas and held their first meeting only days later.

Israel immediately announced that it would not deal with the new Palestinian government or any of its members except Abbas, because the government as a whole did not explicitly meet Tel Aviv's three criteria for recognition of a Palestinian government: recognizing the *right* of Israel to exist, forswearing violence, and accepting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The United States also immediately rejected the unity government.

Palestinians from all over the world, especially in Gaza, were optimistic that the Mecca Agreement would end the fighting and lead to a resumption of international aid. Although the agreement led to a cease-fire between the competing factions, by 15 May 2007 the coalition government of Fatah and Hamas began to break down, as massive fighting erupted in the Gaza Strip in a dispute over which faction controlled security apparatuses. In a gunfight between Hamas and Fatah forces in Gaza, ten people were wounded, and Hamas ultimately drove Fatah from Gaza. By June the two parties were operating parallel governments—Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank. Hamas's swift military conquest of the Strip badly fractured the Palestinian territories and left the Palestinians with their worst situation in recent memory.

See also HAMAS; ISMAIL HANIYEH; PRISONER'S DOCUMENT

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Media, Israeli

A critical overview of the intricate relationship between the Israeli media and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must start early in the twentieth century, long before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, with the Zionist press that was already active in Palestine at the time and its attitude toward what was then called "the Arab problem." Many institutions of the Israeli press and much of its ideological makeup were already established long before independence.

The Hebrew-language press played a crucial role in the development of ZIONISM in its early years. Many founders of Zionism and leaders of the Jewish community in Palestine were themselves professional journalists and essayists, and they all saw the press as an indispensable tool for political action. Not unlike the media of other national liberation movements (such as the Palestinian media under Israeli OCCUPATION), the Zionist press saw itself as an integral part of the struggle for independence. During the BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948), authorities attempted by force and by law to prevent the emergence of a free press in Palestine to avoid activist opposition to the Mandate, and British opposition further contributed to a close alliance between the Zionist political and military elite and the intelligentsia of the Hebrew-language media. Much of the acquiescence that characterizes the present relationship between the Israeli media and the establishment emerges from this early alliance.

Moreover, a very clear ideological pattern was apparent in those years, in which the different Hebrew-language papers provided the platform for endless, often fierce ideological debates, but only rarely, if ever, did they deviate from what was considered a legitimate version of Zionism. Most papers belonged to political parties, and even those that did not (e.g., *Ha'aretz*) were identified with some version of Zionism. This combination of a genuine sense of freedom to print whatever was fit to print and a deep belief that anything that transgressed the confines of Zionist discourse, or later the confines of the dominant Israeli consensus,

was not worthy of publication, has determined much of the ideological makeup of the Israeli media up to the present.

Most importantly, the founders of the Zionist papers thought of their own role in the common struggle in terms of the construction of collective and individual identity. Together with other cultural elites, they saw themselves as educators. The Zionist movement set itself the goal of producing a new type of individual—not traditional Jews but Zionist Jews—Israelis who speak Hebrew as their native language, take their destinies into their own hands, participate in a collective effort of historical dimensions, and, most importantly, defend themselves against their enemies. The task of the newspapers, then, was tremendous. They provided their readers with different partisan versions of this new identity, through a new vocabulary, a new set of concepts and goals, a new sense of national belonging, and, most crucially, a new common enemy (the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular)—all classic tactics in the construction of new nations and national identities. Profoundly important for the future, the dominant feature of this new identity was the belief in self-defense—a concept that still determines the way the Israeli media covers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Zionist press, then, worked to construct and maintain the new imagined community of Israeli Jews, and it eventually produced a certain type of public, which the Israeli media then kept targeting, reinforcing, and developing.

Legal Background

Much of the legal climate within which the Israeli media came to operate after independence was established by the British during the Mandate. Following the Palestinian riots of 1929, a royal commission was sent to Palestine to investigate the events. The commission determined that the Palestinian newspapers played a major role in inciting the riots and consequently recommended regulations that would increase British supervision of the papers and impose constraints on their conduct. Correspondence from the time suggests that Mandate officials consulted with senior Zionist leaders, including Dr. CHAIM WEIZMANN, about these recommendations and received their approval. In 1933 the Press Ordinance was enacted, in which the licensing and publication of newspapers de-pended on the goodwill of the British authorities. In 1945 the British enacted a new set of ordinances regarding newspaper licensing: the DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS. This time the Mandatory power wanted to constrain both the Palestinian and the Zionist press, for the latter was openly encouraging an underground military campaign against the British. The new regulations decreed that all printed material published in Palestine required prior approval of the censor. The Zionist papers struggled against these constraints and at times risked publishing a report without the British censor's approval. A committee of the Zionist papers' chief editors, which was already established in 1942 as the Reaction Committee, closely coordinated with the Zionist political leadership to combat what they considered constraints imposed on the press by a foreign enemy.

When Israel declared its independence, it adopted the Press Ordinance and the Defense Regulations as the legal basis for the relationship between the press and the state, which the editors accepted. The Reaction Committee, now simply called the Editors' Committee, quickly declared that it had turned from "a war council fighting against a foreign government to an editor's committee which cooperates with the Jewish government and aids its establishment." A few months later, however, when the government attempted to use military censorship to suppress political opposition by temporarily shutting down two Zionist papers, the committee asked to negotiate an agreement with the government and the military. In the agreement, signed in 1949 and updated several times, the government agreed that censorship would apply only to reports dealing with issues of security (and not political views) and the censor would not close a newspaper or apply other sanctions before the matter was taken to an arbitration tribunal of three, which would include a member of the Editors' Committee, a representative of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) chief of staff, and a member of the public. The editors, in return, gave up their right to defend themselves in court against arbitrary governmental decisions, and agreed to have all security-related reports censored in advance by the IDF. In other words, the editors surrendered their right to seek judicial review in determining the line between security-related and political censorship, in effect allowing the government to suppress information in ways that went beyond the narrow limits of military censorship. Moreover, although the editors obtained immunity from arbitrary closures, in return they gave their

tacit support to the closure of other papers, especially the Arab ones, that were not invited to join the Editors' Committee. Thus the agreement maintained the Mandatory regulations (to this day) and created a sharp distinction between the Zionist media and all others. Israel is the only Western democracy in which a military censor screens everything that is printed or aired.

The agreement also established a relationship between the members of the Editors' Committee and the government, whereby the editors routinely received secret or sensitive information in return for their commitment not to publish it. The editors, in other words, agreed to replace the original Mandatory form of explicit censorship with a very radical form of voluntary self-censorship. Today, following the privatization of the media and other institutional changes, the Editors' Committee is no longer active, while the censor's authority was eventually challenged in court and was narrowed considerably. Although explicit military censorship has lessened (at least with respect to the Hebrew-language media; Palestinian papers both in the territories and within the 1967 borders, are still routinely censored and punished on the basis of the Mandatory law), the media has strengthened self-censorship, while contributing to the general belief among Jewish journalists that their work environment is free of government pressure. Self-censorship remains one of the most crucial determinants of the media's coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, strongly shaping the conduct of both the military correspondents and the editors.

Privatization

The history of the Israeli press from 1948 to the present is sometimes represented as a gradual passage from a system tightly controlled by the political and military establishments to an independent system of commercial media, whose conduct is determined by considerations of marketing, profit-making, and ratings. Consequently, it is claimed that the Israeli media now covers the news in a way that is relatively free of political pressure.

At a certain descriptive level, this is undoubtedly a reasonable account. The party press system that had developed in the Mandate period was already fading away in the late 1960s and eventually disappeared in the mid-1990s. Today Israel has only three major Hebrew-language papers—*Yediot Ahronot, Ma'ariv,* and *Ha'aretz*—all of which are privately owned. Until the mid-1960s the Israeli radio Kol Israel (Voice of Israel) was tightly controlled, but in 1965 it was granted the legal status of an independent public authority and was released from overt supervision by the prime minister's office. The Military Radio, established in 1950, has gradually turned through the years into a genuinely interesting and at times experimental radio station. In the 1990s, moreover, dozens of privately owned local radio stations began broadcasting all over the country, turning Kol Israel into one among many. Israeli television, which started broadcasting on one channel after the 1967 WAR (with a stated major goal of creating a "bridge between Israel and the Arab population" of the newly OCCUPIED TERRITORIES), now competes with two privately owned channels, an almost fully spread system of cable TV, a commercial system of satellite television, and dozens of international channels. News on the Internet provides an additional source of information in this rich and diversified system.

The implications of this change for the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, are a different story altogether. The coverage of the conflict—in sharp contrast to the coverage of other topics—has changed very little over the years. A set of working habits, which emerged during the Mandate period and were consolidated in the first twenty or thirty years of independence, is still applied almost indiscriminately, though often without the ideological zeal that characterized the media earlier. Explicit ideology has been internalized to such an extent that most senior reporters and editors are genuinely convinced that they provide the public with reasonably neutral coverage that simply respects the constraints of journalistic common sense. Because of market constraints on their work—the need to "sell newspapers"—they feel certain that, unlike their predecessors from the party press and the government-owned broadcasting authority, they do not let ideology get in their way and merely produce the coverage that the public wants to buy. However, both the public and the media professionals, as an integral part of that public, are themselves the product of explicit ideological education. Consequently, producing the coverage that the public wants to buy means in effect perpetuating the same basic messages. Moreover, the decline of explicit ideology has given rise to the common notion that coverage of the conflict by small media outlets that are still

active at the margins is "ideologically biased" but that the general consensus at the center of the political map, and its reflection in the major media, are nonpolitical. Paradoxically then, in the past when the party press wore its ideological convictions on its sleeve it may have been easier for the public as well as for the journalists themselves to detect the inherent bias in the coverage. In the seemingly ideology-free environment of today, this is much more difficult. And the bias is still there.

This bias is based on the overarching notion that Israel, state and society, does not have an interest of its own in the conflict apart from self-defense and that it is constantly dragged back into it by Arab violence in general and Palestinian violence in particular. The implications of this notion in terms of media coverage are manifold, but here a historical observation is pertinent. Whether or not the Jewish community in Palestine was ever seriously under threat of annihilation (and different historians have different views about this), it seems beyond doubt that the sense of existential anxiety reflected by the Zionist papers of the time (especially following the Arab riots of 1929) was a sincere and genuine reflection of a sentiment shared by the public and its leaders alike. It was not all propaganda. But the fantasy of self-defense, which was born together with Zionism, within the context of ANTI-SEMITIC persecution in Europe, consequently became an obsession that took over the state and the entire society. What became a deeply distorted perception of reality once Israel grew into the regional superpower that it is was developed and consolidated in a very different context.

From the IDF Viewpoint

This is, then, the narrative that emerges out of the obsession with self-defense: "We (the Israelis) are a peace-loving people. All we wish for is a context in which Jews can lead a normal life. However, the world has continually proven that this is only possible in a Jewish nation-state that defends itself and does not entrust its security to other nations. Unfortunately, Israel is still under existential threat. Some of us feel that we should reach some kind of compromise with the Arab world; others feel this will never be possible. Everybody agrees, however, that at the moment peace is not an option. We have to remain strong and patiently await a better future." This narrative is the single most important factor in the way the Israeli media covers the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To begin with, then, the Israeli media considers the entire conflict from the viewpoint of those professionally and personally responsible for self-defense—the commanders of the IDF. This view is based on a deep-seated trust, developed through years of close cooperation with and belief in the integrity of the military experts, and accepts that those with access to top-secret intelligence are the ones who know best. Military correspondents and analysts, in the papers and on television, enjoy the same privileges today that they always had to shape the narration and interpretation of events—from the daily activities of the IDF in the territories to the prospects of a peaceful agreement with the Palestinians.

The perspective of the military establishment overwhelmingly dominates all the other possible perspectives that might influence the coverage of the conflict—not only the Palestinian and international perspectives, but also, and crucially, the different perspectives within the Israeli establishment itself and Israel at large. This is true for the political opposition, academia, the foreign office, and even the settlers (during the disengagement from Gaza, for example). Most importantly, at certain times when the military seemed to have a more combative perspective than the government itself, the media went along with the military and provided the public with coverage that eventually pressured the government to adopt the military's point of view. For example, in the "waiting period" before the 1967 War, moderate prime minister LEVI ESHKOL was forced to nominate MOSHE DAYAN, former chief of staff, as minister of defense and eventually to launch the war.

However, the dominance of the military perspective does not necessarily imply that the media's attitude toward the conflict has remained static over the years. In fact the media have moved from the denial of the very existence of a Palestinian people to an acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state. The dominance of the military perspective implies, most importantly, that the media has always based changes of perspective on the attitudes of the military establishment. For example, during the OSLO PROCESS (1993–2000), the optimism expressed by the media directly reflected the attitude of the military establishment then headed by Prime Minister and Defense Minister YITZHAK RABIN, a former IDF chief of staff

who described the process as a calculated risk meant to attain security. A few years later, following the failed CAMP DAVID SUMMIT of 2000, Prime Minister EHUD BARAK, another former IDF chief of staff, declared there was "no partner on the other side" for a peaceful solution and rallied the support of the IDF's intelligence wing to support his conclusion. The media completely accepted this contention. Six years later, even after it became clear this did not reflect the assessments of the professional ranks within the intelligence wing—nor of SHIN BET—it is still quite difficult to find Jewish Israelis who seriously doubt that Barak's contention was factually right.

Also, even though news coverage is and has been dominated by the military perspective, other perspectives are mentioned. However, they are presented as views or opinions, as opposed to the factual assertions of the military: critics of Israel "claim," while the IDF "reveals." Alternative perspectives are thus rarely found in the media's factual descriptions that make up the news. *Ha'aretz,* for example (by all accounts the most progressive newspaper in Israel), routinely publishes reports by its correspondent in the Occupied Territories, Amira Hass (who is, incidentally, the only Israeli reporter who actually lives in the territories). But when Hass's reports contradict those of the paper's military correspondent, *Ha'aretz* usually publishes the two stories separately: the IDF's version appears on the front page as news, whereas Hass's story is relegated to the back pages and framed there as part of the background. The paper thus sends its readers a double message: it is important to hear what the Palestinians have to say, but as far as the facts are concerned, we trust the IDF. Other Israeli newspapers do not even include the Palestinian perspective.

This is not a deliberate attempt to keep the Palestinian perspective away from Israeli consciousness. A worldview based on self-defense views the Palestinians and anything that sounds like a pro-Palestinian perspective as a threat. As a result only Palestinian actions or declarations that are violent, combative, or threatening get published and are regularly highlighted. Palestinian extremists, such as the leaders of HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, have a much better chance of getting a headline in an Israeli paper than any of the leaders of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, which becomes a topic for coverage only when it is implicated in TERRORISM (according to the IDF). The Israeli public regularly reads detailed information about the capture of terrorists, the discovery of weapons and explosives, and the annihilation of various leaders of the Islamic organizations. Because the general Palestinian population, on the other hand, is not perceived as a direct threat, its plight under the OCCUPATION is rarely covered. (Amira Hass's reports and those of her colleague at *Ha'aretz*, Gideon Levy, are significant exceptions.) This is not as much an attempt to cover up the reality of the Occupation as it is a reflection of a general perspective. As some polls clearly indicate, Jewish Israelis know very little about the Palestinians, and what they know, or think they know, implies nothing but danger.

The media consistently presents Israel as a passive party to the conflict, one that only attempts to defend itself against Palestinian violence. Consequently violent actions by Palestinians attest to their evil intentions, while Israeli acts of violence, on the other hand, are always provoked by Palestinian violence and are thus justified as acts of self-defense. The IDF may accidentally harm Palestinian civilians in its fight against Palestinian terrorism, but whenever this happens (or more accurately, whenever the IDF admits to such events), the incident is presented as a mistake.

Most importantly, the Occupation itself is rarely acknowledged as one of the causes of the conflict: Palestinian violence is not the result of the Occupation; rather, the Occupation is a result of Palestinian violence. The national consensus is that, at the moment, security considerations dictate continuing the Occupation, and any future withdrawal could only be justified by security-based arguments. Such was the argument that convinced the majority of Jewish Israelis to support ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005. From this foundational conviction emerges a deep and bitter sense of siege, not just in the physical sense but also, and sometimes primarily, in the mental and symbolic sense: not only does Israel have to defend itself against unjustified violence, the whole world thinks of it as the aggressor. The injury of Palestinian violence is complemented by the insult of blame.

During the Second INTIFADA, the common perception among Israelis was that this was primarily a fight over world opinion, that the war would be won or lost on the screens of global television. The images of the Occupation and the suffering of the Palestinians thus came to be

considered by Israelis as the Palestinians' strongest (propaganda) weapon, yet another direct threat to Israel's existence. In fact, this was how the events on the ground were covered by the media. When a child, MUHAMMAD AL-DURA in Gaza, died on the second day of the Intifada, it was perceived chiefly as a Palestinian victory: the child was either killed by the Palestinians themselves or by an IDF mistake, but the Palestinians managed to use his death to blame Israel. The coverage of both this event and the entire Intifada was thus dictated by the urgent need to fend off guilt and to prove that the Palestinians were the guilty party in the conflict. Paradoxically, when the Intifada deteriorated into a full-fledged war of attrition and the IDF reoccupied the WEST BANK, this perspective did not necessarily imply unconditional support for the government. Some of the media sharply criticized the government for letting itself be "dragged" into the war by the Palestinians. A government manipulated by the Palestinians is a passive government, and everything it does—from the construction of the BARRIER to the assault on the JENIN refugee camp—is nothing but a desperate and not very successful attempt to defend Israel against Palestinian terrorism. The other interpretive option, that the reoccupation of the West Bank was a conscious attempt to destroy the Palestinian National Authority and turn the clock back to the pre-Oslo days, was severely marginalized.

To what extent does such media coverage influence how Jewish Israelis think and feel about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? To what extent does it manufacture consent with the government and its actions? Debates between media critics and media professionals about these complex issues regularly fail to reach a consensus: most media critics maintain that the coverage heavily influences the public, while media professionals insist that they only reflect what the public already thinks and feels. Media critics also complain that the media coordinates its work with the establishment, while media professionals maintain that they work independently. Unfortunately, both sides are right: the coverage is constructed independently but serves the interests of the establishment, and the media influences society, but by reflection—by maintaining, strengthening, and updating the society's self-perception as the main victim in the conflict.

See also ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; POST-ZIONISM

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—Daniel Dor

Media, Palestinian

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Palestinian press has played an important role in the formation of PALESTINIAN IDENTITY and political organizing. At the same time, it has fairly consistently faced pressure from various ruling authorities. Under Ottoman rule (1900–1916) early in the twentieth century, the press helped to constitute a community with a shared body of knowledge and a sense of common grievance. During the last years of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, the press was a forum for developing Arab ideas about ZIONISM, both in Palestine where debates were particularly intense and in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut, where readers often had a direct interest in events in Palestine. During this formative period in Palestinian nationalism, the press helped to unify local, national, and regional identities.

Of ten newspapers surveyed by historian Rashid Khalidi from 1908 to 1914, nine were clearly ANTI-ZIONIST. Even those that published pro-Zionist articles often led to an entrenchment of Arab

and Palestinian nationalisms, because many readers could see for themselves that Zionism threatened their hopes for independence and a state. Although newspapers generally reflected elite perspectives on nationalism and often did not embrace the more radical politics of the peasant *fellaheen*, Khalidi writes, "by 1914, most editors and writers in the papers examined were fully aware that the seemingly innocuous activities of the Zionist movement were directed at the ultimate establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, with its necessary concomitant dispossession of the Arab population." During the BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948), Palestinian papers continued to both reflect and shape public opinion in opposition to Zionism.

Throughout this period the press periodically struggled with the authorities as well. Although Ottoman officials had recognized freedom of the press in theory, they restricted it through licensing practices and criminal liability for violators of press laws. In the first decade of the British Mandate, the press generally flourished, but in 1929, as political strife intensified, the Mandatory authorities enacted new laws to curb "incitement," and officials censored papers and occasionally suspended their publication. Under Jordanian rule (1948–1967), officials continued to restrict the press through licensing laws, prior censorship, and closures of papers.

Nationalist Movement and Israeli Occupation

After 1967 the Palestinian media developed alongside the Palestinian nationalist movement and was an important part of its strategy. As the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) tried to constitute itself as a state in the making, it instituted broadcasts of the Voice of Palestine radio from a number of Arab countries. In the 1970s the PLO began implementing intensive media projects in the Occupied Territories. An important factor for the Palestinian media inside Israel's borders and in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES was that the geography of Palestine allowed its residents to receive many different radio and television broadcasts from Israel, LEBANON, SYRIA, IRAQ, JORDAN, EGYPT, and even IRAN. At the same time, the local print media provided concrete information about local events and supported communication with PLO leaders outside the Occupied Territories.

Nevertheless, the Israeli OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories, like previous occupations, produced serious government censorship of the local press. From 1948 through 1966, the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL were under a military occupation, and to restrict the Palestinian (and at times Israeli) press, Israel employed British Mandate laws, in particular the 1945 DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS and the Press Ordinance of 1933. These laws entailed strict rules regarding licensing of the press and allowed the censor, a military official, to forbid the publishing of anything that "in his opinion, would be, or be likely to be or become, prejudicial to the defense of [the state] or to the public safety or to public order." At the same time, in the early years of the state, the Israeli press worked out agreements with the military that included a certain degree of self-censorship that, in turn, precluded direct military censorship in many circumstances. In contrast, these laws seriously restricted the Palestinian media from presenting opposition views or even more mundane content, such as obituaries.

After Israel's Occupation and annexation of East JERUSALEM in 1967, Palestinian newspapers located there gained some of the rights accorded to Israeli newspapers. However, each night managing editors of Palestinian newspapers in Jerusalem had to send their proof sheets to the Israeli censor, who would mark each item as either approved, rejected, or approved with alterations. A clear hierarchy of restrictions determined whether papers could publish critical material. Least likely to be censored was the non-Arabic (Hebrew, Russian, French, English) press inside Israel; then the Arabic-language Israeli Communist Party paper, which could not be distributed in the Occupied Territories; the English-language Palestinian weeklies, also not distributed in the Occupied Territories; other Palestinian and Israeli papers not allowed in the Occupied Territories; and, finally (with the most restrictions), the Palestinian press in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP.

Meanwhile, freedom of the press in the nonannexed parts of the West Bank and Gaza was further restricted. Israeli restrictions on the Palestinian press were based not only on the Emergency Regulations of 1945 but also on military orders issued after 1967, which gave military commanders "any power of government legislation, appointive or administrative." Military regulations prohibited the publication or distribution of newspapers or anything with political significance without a license or PERMIT. Journalists could be placed

under ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION without legal charges, prevented from traveling outside a particular town, given other travel restrictions (e.g., individual editors or journalists were not allowed to go to Jerusalem), or even deported.

Press restrictions were based on the government position that Palestinians did not have the same rights to a free press as Israelis. When university professor SAEB EREKAT was convicted of incitement for writing "Palestinians must learn how to endure and reject and resist [all forms of occupation] until we regain our freedom" in a university newsletter published in English and circulated abroad in April 1987, the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT's decision stated that "[in an] area under military control due to Occupation from war, within which there does not exist either a democratic regime or a democratic procedure of rule, no political institutions nor general elections, there obviously cannot be a derivation of the right of freedom of expression."

Although Israeli censorship could have been more far-reaching, permitting some free speech arguably benefited Israel on several levels. First, because newspapers in Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem fell under the same legal framework as Israeli media, treating these papers totally differently would have called into question Israeli democracy. Second, allowing some Palestinian media to exist gave Israel the opportunity to gather information and to set the limits of published discourse.

Palestinian Press during the Oslo Period

After the OSLO ACCORDS were signed in 1993, the Palestinian press in the West Bank and Gaza underwent major transformations. The DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES stated that the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) had "the right to build and operate separate and independent communication systems and INFRASTRUCTURES including telecommunications networks, a television network and a radio network." The PNA established the Voice of Palestine radio station and Palestine TV in July and November 1994, respectively. However, the PNA soon began to exercise its own forms of control. In 1995 the new Palestinian Press Law replaced Israeli military regulations and presented strong statements about the importance of freedom of expression, yet the law was dangerously vague and allowed for serious limitations on free speech. For example, the law "strictly prohibits" the publication of "articles that may cause harm to national unity or incite acts of crime or plant seeds of hatred, dissension, and disunion, or stir up trouble and sectarianism among the members of society."

In restricting the press the PNA was constantly balancing internal and external pressures. After the pro-Jordanian paper *Al-Nahar* criticized the Oslo Accords, on 28 July 1994 the new Palestinian Ministry of Information ordered its closure. The other major daily paper, *Al-Quds*, was more cautious and did not report on the closure. To avoid PNA criticism the major daily newspapers sometimes appointed people close to the PNA to high management positions. The PNA also severely restricted the Islamist media, because it represented the PNA's main political competition and was also a target of Israeli and Western criticism. Journalists who criticized or opposed the PNA were often arrested, and their publications or stations could be closed for a limited period or permanently. Thus the three major daily newspapers at that time, *Al-Ayyam*, *Al-Quds*, and *Al-Hayat Al-Jadida,* all promoted the FATAH-controlled PNA as the dominant national force. Perhaps because of fear of PNA reprisals that led to self-censorship or because of loyalty to Palestinian nationalism, these newspapers overlooked internal issues, including social movements, human rights issues, and regime corruption and malfeasance.

In the 1990s, technological as well as political developments changed the mediascape, as a great proliferation of nonofficial media provided diverse perspectives and strengthened both local and regional interests. First, Arab satellite television provided high-quality news with an unprecedented level of criticism of Arab governments. Starting in 1996, Al Jazeera satellite television broadcast from the Gulf state of Qatar; it presented well-produced news that was freer of state control or censorship than any previous Arab national media. Because Al Jazeera focused much of its coverage on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and had reporters on the ground in Israel and the Occupied Territories, it became an important news source for increasing numbers of Palestinian families with access to satellite television.

Second, there was a proliferation of local television and radio stations, especially in the West Bank. Although many were started as small businesses rather than political projects and their production values were not consistently high, they voiced alternative political views on important

issues, especially US policy in the region and internal Palestinian issues. Some stations tried to promote positive social change. For example, *Al-Quds* educational TV broadcast a joint Israeli-Palestinian version of *Sesame Street*, and the channel also broadcast live coverage of a PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL session that addressed corruption in the PNA, which the PNA's Palestine Broadcast Company tried to jam and for which a journalist was later imprisoned for a week. Independent media also faced restrictions from Israeli officials, who sometimes took down transmitters they considered to be illegally located outside of PNA territory.

Third, Islamist publications began to circulate more widely and more freely. In its early years the militant Islamist and Palestinian organization HAMAS had spread its message primarily through clandestine leaflets and preaching in the mosques. However, the establishment of the PNA allowed Hamas to use mass media, even though the Islamist media faced some repression by the PNA. Although Hamas's media sometimes addressed religious issues, their main focus was political, and they included secular discourses about human rights and political pluralism. One important Hamas weekly based in Gaza, *Al-Risalah*, confronted the PNA on diverse issues—at times asserting that the peace process had stagnated badly, that ARMED STRUGGLE was a legitimate way to resist the Occupation, and that the PNA needed to improve its handling of internal issues, such as teachers' salaries and human rights concerns.

Second Intifada

During the Second INTIFADA (starting in 2000) the level of Israeli violence against Palestinian journalists drastically escalated. Israel intensified its system of CHECKPOINTS and other forms of CLOSURE to severely restrict all Palestinian movement within the West Bank and Gaza, and almost no one from the West Bank or Gaza could enter Jerusalem or Israel. Some Palestinian journalists carried official Israeli press credentials that let them work around such restrictions, but early in 2002, Israel refused to renew these press passes, arguing that Palestinian journalists presented a security threat to Israel. Even after legal challenges from international news organizations, few journalists could get their passes back.

Israel targeted both official and independent Palestinian media. In 2000 it bombed the radio transmitter for the Voice of Palestine, accusing the station of inciting the violence that killed two Israeli reservists in Ramallah in the West Bank. In the winter of 2001–2002, Israel confiscated equipment and then blew up the building that housed administrative and broadcast facilities for the Voice of Palestine and Palestine TV. In 2002, Israeli soldiers also removed the hard drives of some private stations' computers, occupied their offices, and destroyed their equipment. Israeli authorities contended that these incidents were either attacks on locations containing Palestinian snipers or unfortunate acts of vandalism by individual soldiers, but Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab suggested, "Israel targeted every symbol of Palestinian independence. The media is a part of that."

Moreover, Israeli forces killed seven journalists between 2001 and 2004: one British, one Italian, and five Palestinian. After the Israeli military invaded Palestinian cities in 2002, the Committee to Protect Journalists, a human rights and free press group based in New York City, named the West Bank as one of the most dangerous places to be a journalist for three years running.

Even in this critical situation, the PNA continued to repress the local media, particularly during the first years of the Intifada. Arrests, detentions, and abuse of local journalists critical of the PNA continued, and journalists complained of barriers to publishing material critical of the PNA. Meanwhile, the PNA attempted to maintain its influence by closing Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD media after a series of bombings inside Israel in 2001, apparently in response to US and Israeli pressure to control extremists. Also, in 2001 the PNA temporarily closed a local television station in BETHLEHEM after it aired a militant group's statement of responsibility that implicated the PNA in the group's attack during a truce with Israel. By 2003 and 2004 the PNA had lost a great deal of institutional power, and journalists reported receiving fewer critical phone calls from officials.

During the Intifada, local media played an important role in creating and disseminating vital information, even though many faced severe economic and physical problems with the collapse of the Palestinian ECONOMY and Israel's destruction of media infrastructure. Some, such as NABLUS's Radio Tariq al-Mahabbeh, changed from music and educational programming to live coverage of

demonstrations and call-in programs, especially during CURFEWS, when radio provided an important social and logistical support for information such as when curfews might be lifted, for how long, what shops would be open, etc. Such local media covered Israeli attacks so thoroughly that people used it to track the safety of relatives and friends. Local media relied on networks of friends and listeners to report what they could see of Israeli army movements and expanded these networks to help provide international media with reports and experienced journalists as the demand for coverage grew. Thus, when Israel destroyed the official PNA media, local stations were able to continue broadcasting and, along with Al Jazeera, broadcast local emergency and safety information while areas were under siege or curfew.

Since the 2006 ELECTIONS, which led to the division of the Occupied Territories into a Fatah-controlled West Bank and Hamas-controlled Gaza, press freedoms have declined significantly, affecting both Arab satellite media and Palestinian media institutions. Fatah officials have repeatedly ordered the closure of Al-Jazeera, while Al-Arabiya has been threatened, following accusations that it favored Fatah. Hamas gunmen have stormed Fatah-controlled media outlets, and Fatah forces have attacked pro-Hamas media, each seizing equipment.

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—Amahl Bishara

Media, US

Unlike either the Israeli or Palestinian media, the US media does not have to concern itself with developing nationalism, shaping a national identity, or creating a "common enemy" to mold national unity. There is however, an elite consensus on major political issues that defines the limits of "respectable discourse"—limits that if transgressed by an individual or an institution result in sanctions such as ostracism, loss of access, loss of position, boycotts, smear campaigns, withdrawal of advertising, and more. The media both shares the elite consensus and is constrained by its norms and parameters. Ostensibly the US media is free, professional, objective, and unbiased, yet, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the prevailing consensus ensures that it is none of these.

Mainstream media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the UNITED STATES is characterized by an absence of context and historical background as well as structural distortions that reinforce false perceptions of the conflict, all of which produce a highly Israel-centric perspective. Media coverage of the conflict passes through several filters—US political and corporate elites, Israeli public relations and watchdog organizations, the private owners of media organizations, publishers, and senior editors—before it reaches the public. These filters ensure that the realities on the ground are distorted through the omission of crucial information, the manner in which a story is framed, the choice of words, and one-sided perspectives. British journalist Robert Fisk commented on a related dimension of media and power and reached a similar conclusion: "Journalists in America like being very close to power. They [cozy] up to people in the administration, the politicians. There is a very unhealthy osmotic, incestuous relationship between journalists and power. . . . I think also there is no doubt that the pro-Israeli lobby in America has a very powerful voice. They are able to attack editors and reporters in print and by going to the editors and saying, 'Look, this is ANTI-SEMITIC.' It's a great phrase used over and over again—any critic of Israel is accused of being anti-Semitic. It's disgraceful, a slanderous, disgusting lie directed at innocent people, and it has to be stood up to. But in America, I fear that because journalists don't want to get into controversies . . . they don't want to be accused of being anti-Semitic, they fall into the habit of writing in such a way that they don't offend anybody. So, for exam-

ple, you find that 'OCCUPIED TERRITORIES' is referred to as 'disputed territories,' 'settlements' are referred to as 'neighborhoods,' and slowly but surely, the language is drained of its meaning, and the crisis that actually occurs is de-contextualized; for example, if you can't call the occupied territories 'occupied,' how can you explain why Palestinians would wish to resist an OCCUPATION?"

For example, on 3 September 2001 a news network did not want its journalists to refer to the Israeli settlement Gilo as a "settlement," so in the network's news clips the journalist reporting from Gilo used the officially approved word "neighborhood," which removed any perception of colonization, settlement, or illegality from the report's context. In another example, when President BILL CLINTON designated the Occupied Territories "disputed territories," he radically altered the dynamics of the conflict, and the media followed his lead, referring afterward to the "disputed territories." For these reasons, among others, the US public is often not aware of the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Even the Israeli Occupation of the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and (since 2005 indirectly) GAZA STRIP remains hidden in the news media. For reasons ranging from intimidation to a lack of thorough investigation, US journalists have adopted practices that serve Israel's interests and ensure public support for them. Statistical studies, specific incidents, and a variety of wide-ranging and revealing accounts demonstrate the US media's attitude toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Every time a SUICIDE BOMBING strikes Israel, mass coverage of the tragedy begins instantly, while the mainstream US media mostly overlooks the TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS and deaths by air strikes of Palestinians, which occur far more frequently. Analyses of US media have revealed that the media reports Israeli deaths significantly more than Palestinian deaths, even though far greater numbers of Palestinians have been killed. In another example, a CNN.com headline about a 25 August 2005 incident read "Israel: Five Militants Shot in Raid." The article, which relied on Israeli sources, claimed the armed militants, who exchanged fire with the Israeli army, were suspected of being involved with a suicide bombing. However, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* (Israel's paper of record) covered the same event and quoted Palestinian sources that said three of the five young men were between the ages of fourteen and seventeen and had no known links to militant organizations; in addition, Palestinian reporters cited witnesses claiming that all five Palestinians were unarmed, including the two militants killed. A later investigation by *Ha'aretz* and the Israeli human rights group B'TSELEM confirmed that three of the five Palestinians killed in the assault were under the age of eighteen and did not have any links to known terrorist organizations, while the other two were low-ranking militants who were not armed at the time. CNN never altered its original story.

Influence from the US Government, Corporations, and the Israel Lobby

One of the explanations for the US media's adoption of Israeli frames of reference in reporting on the conflict is related to Israel's relationship with Washington. Since the 1967 WAR the US government has had a major interest in supporting Israel, considering it a STRATEGIC ASSET to US power in the Middle East and beyond. Moreover, since 9/11 that alliance has become stronger because of the fight against a perceived global Islamic threat. US governing elites consider Israel such a useful surrogate that Washington willingly supports whatever policies Israel inflicts on the Palestinians. Moreover, because the United States has no vital national interest in the Palestinians, their issues are usually ignored in Washington. This attitude of the governing elite is transferred to other elite sectors, including the media, and so emerges an elite consensus that sets the boundaries of permissible discussion.

In addition to sharing government perspectives, the media is under direct corporate control—in fact, the media itself is part of the corporate world—which decides what is fit to print or air based on the ever-present parameters of respectable discourse and backed by threats of boycotts, advertising withdrawals, and so on. In this regard it is notable that US mainstream media outlets have failed to report on the connection among US aid, US weapons trade, and the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (That is, the United States sells weapons and arms to Israel; Israel in turn uses them against the Palestinians and sells weapons and arms to third world countries, both illegal by its contracts with the United States, and thus gains revenue and friends in the context of UN voting.) Because the corporate, media, and government sectors are integrated into a locus of power and share the same

interests, objectives, and very often the same people (through the revolving door and interlocking directorates), it becomes more obvious why the media would not report outside the elite consensus. In this mutually reinforcing network, the media follows the consensus of the government and the corporate world and in turn influences public opinion to support government policies, in this case the promotion of Israel and the devaluation of the Palestinians.

In addition to the media's inherent constraints, AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS use many strategies to ensure favorable news coverage for the political interests and ideology they represent. A number of partisan, well-financed groups are known for organizing telephone and letter-writing campaigns, personal visits, advertising boycotts, and other negative tactics against media outlets if they feel a story presents Israel unfavorably. Such groups can exert considerable pressure, alleging that a story—or coverage in general—is "anti-Israel" or even "anti-Semitic." The threat of such action makes the media very cautious. Boycotts have been organized by pro-Israel groups against National Public Radio, the *Los Angeles Times*, and other media outlets.

Israel has always made enormous efforts at influencing American public opinion, and the media is the key to its success. Today the Israeli government employs such high-powered public relations firms as Howard J. Rubenstein Associates; Morris, Carrick & Guma; and many others to promote its version of events. There are as well numerous think tanks actively disseminating information beneficial to Israel, such as the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), the Middle East Forum, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. And there are myriad organizations who operate collectively and loosely under the rubric of the "Israeli lobby," for example the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC), CAMERA, HONESTREPORTING.COM, and others that have an enormous influence on the media.

In addition many media owners, publishers, and executives demonstrate strong affection for Israel, sit on the boards of pro-Israel and media organizations, and consistently donate to Israeli causes. In fact, researchers have identified many individuals with potential bias in key positions in the media. For example, Mortimer Zuckerman, at various times the owner of *U.S. News & World Report, The Atlantic*, and the *New York Daily News*, is passionately pro-Israel and is known for imposing his views on news content. Media magnate Walter Annenberg, who endowed two journalism schools, was a generous benefactor of Israel. Newspaper publisher Conrad Black, who at one time controlled 60 percent of the newspapers in Canada and hundreds in the United States, England, Australia, and Israel, is passionately pro-Israel. Haim Saban, the founder of Fox Family Network, is increasingly buying media outlets in Europe and elsewhere and has stated that "I'm a one-issue guy and my issue is Israel."

Similarly, many leading journalists and talk show hosts identify closely with Israel. There are, as Edward Herman notes, a preponderance of media figures who are openly biased in favor of Israel, including Mortimer Zuckerman, Ted Koppel, Wolf Blitzer, George Will, Dan Abrams (general manager of MSNBC), Katie Couric, Barbara Epstein (cofounder and coeditor of the *New York Review of Books*), Jeff Greenfield, Dennis Ross, Thomas Friedman, Seymour Hersh, Geraldo Rivera, Daniel Schorr, Arthur Sulzberger, Larry King, Mike Wallace, Barbara Walters, and many others. *New Yorker* staff writer and Middle East commentator Jeffrey Goldberg is an American who immigrated to Israel, took Israeli citizenship, and served in the Israeli military. A *Time* magazine bureau chief, he became an Israeli citizen while he was stationed in Israel, where he was assigned to provide objective reporting. This can be contrasted with very few commentators sympathetic to the Palestinian viewpoint.

Another factor producing Israel-centric coverage is that most US correspondents tend to live in Israel, rather than the Occupied Territories. For example Martin Fletcher, one of ABC's major journalists in the region, is a Jewish resident of Israel, and his wife and children hold Israeli citizenship. Another resident of Israel is National Public Radio's (NPR's) longtime Israel correspondent Linda Gradstein, who has reported from Israel since 1990 and has lived in Israel even longer. In 1986–1988 she attended Machon Pardes, a religious institute in Israel known for building strong ties to Israel among its students, and her husband is a former IDF soldier.

The lack of journalists with firsthand life experience reporting from the Palestinian territories may account for some of the massive imbalance in news coverage. Few mainstream US journalists have ever lived for any substantial amount of time

with the Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank. Of note here is Israeli journalist Amira Hass, who writes for *Ha'aretz*, Israel's "newspaper of record," and has lived for decades in the West Bank and Gaza—and her articles reflect that immersion.

While the media outlets call for transparency and openness in government, they are rarely open and transparent themselves. It is difficult to identify journalistic conflicts of interest and bias when the decisionmakers in these institutions are hidden from the public. For example, the Associated Press has great power as a disseminator of foreign news, yet it does not reveal who is on its international desk, who determines what will be disseminated and where, or how its bureau structure operates. Moreover, its employees are prohibited from speaking to the public. Because the Associated Press is a cooperative owned by the multitude of organizations carrying its feeds, theoretically it is subject to oversight by these contracting organizations, yet there is no indication of such oversight.

Media Studies

In 2001 several media watchdog organizations undertook statistical studies of daily news coverage of deaths during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the second Palestinian uprising. In every case these analyses revealed that the media reported Israeli deaths in significantly greater numbers than Palestinian deaths, even though far more Palestinians were killed. In addition, it was found that this distortion was even more pronounced in reporting on children's and civilian deaths, with Israeli deaths covered at rates seven to thirty times greater than Palestinian deaths.

It is unclear what role statistical patterns play in the distortion. For example, do Israeli deaths occur in spurts, while Palestinians die more frequently but in smaller numbers, making the instances less newsworthy? Analysis of the data on deaths, however, does not seem to indicate that this is a major factor. In some cases small numbers of deaths on the Israeli side resulted in headlines, while large numbers on the Palestinian side did not.

National and Regional Mainstream Media

ABC, CBS, and NBC. In the first year of the Second Intifada (2000), over three times more Palestinians were killed than Israelis and almost five times more Palestinian children (see Fig. 2). Yet, a study of television reporting in 2000 revealed that two of the three major network prime-time television news programs reported on more Israeli deaths than Palestinian deaths, and all three programs reported Israeli deaths at rates considerably higher than Palestinian deaths (see Fig. 3).




Figure 2 Number of Deaths during the First Year of the Intifada (29 Sept. 2000–28 Sept. 2001)

In the study, conducted by the nonprofit organization If Americans Knew, researchers tabulated all ongoing reports of deaths for both populations and then compared the number of reports with the actual number of people killed. Because follow-up news reports mentioning earlier deaths were also counted, theoretically media reporting could exceed 100 percent of a population's deaths. Surprisingly, this was found to occur quite often in reporting on Israeli deaths, although never in reporting on Palestinian deaths.

In the year ending September 2001, 28 Israeli children and 131 Palestinian children were killed, yet the networks carried more reports on Israeli children's deaths than on Palestinian children's deaths. ABC broadcast fifty-six reports on Israeli children's deaths (through repetition) and nineteen on Palestinian children's deaths; CBS reported on 37 Israeli children's deaths and 27 Palestinian children's deaths; and NBC reported on 45 Israeli children's deaths and 17 Palestinian children's deaths. In other words, the study found that the networks had covered Israeli children's deaths at rates 6.4 to 13.8 times greater than Palestinian children's deaths.

Figure 4, which examines the number of deaths reported for each population's children compared with the number that actually occurred, demonstrates the media's skewed daily reporting on deaths among Israelis and Palestinians.

A 2004 follow-up study of the networks' coverage revealed similar patterns (see Fig. 5). The US media consistently portrayed 2004 as a period of "reduced violence," although it was so only for Israelis; Palestinian deaths increased by 50 percent. For children, the disparity was even greater. While Israeli children's deaths decreased considerably, the killing of Palestinian children increased: 8 Israeli children and 179 Palestinian children were killed during 2004. With all deaths considered, Palestinian rates were 3.8 to 4.4 times greater than Israeli death rates, but in the case of children's deaths, rates were 9.0 to 12.8 times greater.

New York Times. Often referred to as the US "newspaper of record," the *Times* provided daily coverage of deaths among Israelis and Palestinians and also revealed significant distortions, with Israeli deaths reported at rates up to seven times greater than Palestinian deaths. In the first year of the 2000 Intifada, headlines and lead paragraphs in the *Times* covered Israeli deaths at a rate 2.8 times greater than Palestinian deaths, and Israeli children's deaths at a rate 6.8 times greater. Once again Palestinian deaths were often omitted, while Israeli deaths were frequently repeated. Figure 6 summarizes some of these data.




Figure 3 Percentage of Deaths Reported by ABC, CBS, and NBC Evening News, First Year of Intifada (29 Sept. 2000–28 Sept. 2001)




Figure 4 Children's Deaths Reported: Repititions and Omissions on ABC, CBS, and NBC Evening News, First Year of Intifada (29 Sept. 2000–28 Sept. 2001)




Figure 5 Percentage of Deaths Reported ABC, CBS, and NBC Evening News, 2004




Figure 6 Deaths Reported in Headline or First Paragraph during the First Year of the Intifada, *New York Times* Foreign Desk (29 Sept. 2000—28 Sept. 2001)

In 2004 this disparity became even greater, with the *Times* covering Israeli deaths at a rate 3.6 times greater and covering Israeli children's deaths at a rate 7.3 times greater—even though in 2004, Palestinian children were being killed at a rate 22 times greater than Israeli children. It is relevant to examine the media's daily reporting chronologically. When this is done, the curve for reported deaths among both populations generally follows the Israeli death rate, even though Palestinian deaths were considerably higher from the very beginning of the uprising.

National Public Radio. Considered by many a more serious and reliable news source than the commercial networks, NPR is generally considered a liberal or progressive outlet, and pro-Israel groups have repeatedly claimed that NPR's coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is "pro-Palestinian." Yet Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting conducted a six-month study of NPR's coverage of deaths among both populations that showed a similar pro-Israel distortion. The study, which examined NPR's coverage during the first six months of 2001, found that there was an 81 percent likelihood that an Israeli death would be reported on NPR, but only a 34 percent likelihood that a Palestinian death would be. In the case of children's deaths, the distortion was still greater. NPR reported on Israeli children's deaths at a rate 4.5 times greater than Palestinian children's deaths. (The study, unlike the If Americans Knew studies, did not include follow-up reports for either population.)

Researcher Seth Ackerman's study of NPR, titled "The Illusion of Balance," found that, although NPR reported on approximately equal numbers of Israeli and Palestinian deaths, it didn't tell its listeners that the network was reporting on almost all the deaths among the Israelis, while reporting on only a small fraction of the deaths among the Palestinians.

The study also found that NPR had an odd pattern of reporting on military versus civilian deaths. Although Israeli civilians were more likely to have their deaths reported on NPR (84 percent were covered) than members of the Israeli security forces (69 percent), Palestinian security personnel were far more likely to have their deaths reported (72 percent) than civilians (22 percent).

CNN. A three-month study by Palestine Media Watch of CNN's evening news coverage of deaths among both populations also found that Israeli deaths were covered at consistently higher rates than Palestinian deaths. This study, like that of NPR, counted only initial reports of deaths and did not include follow-up reports in its analysis. It was found that CNN had reported on 74 percent of Israeli deaths and 18 percent of Palestinian

deaths. This disparity, once again, grew wider for coverage of children's deaths; CNN reported on 83 percent of Israeli versus 22 percent of Palestinian children's deaths.

The study found that CNN, like NPR, particularly underreported Palestinian civilian deaths. Although Palestinian civilians accounted for 40 percent of the total deaths during the time period monitored, only 7 percent of CNN's coverage of deaths caused by the conflict focused on Palestinian civilians.

Regional News Media. The pattern of magnifying Israeli and minimizing Palestinian deaths was repeatedly found among local newspapers as well. In fact the disparities between the two populations were often greater. For example, If Americans Knew conducted a six-month study of *San Francisco Chronicle* headline and lead paragraph coverage of children's deaths, which revealed that the *Chronicle* had reported prominently on Israeli children's deaths at a rate 30 times greater than Palestinian children's deaths.

Similarly, a six-month study of the *San Jose Mercury News* showed that its front-page headlines had reported Israeli deaths at a rate almost 20 times greater than Palestinian deaths. A study of Portland's *Oregonian* newspaper headline coverage of the conflict revealed that the paper had reported on Israeli children's deaths at a rate 44 times greater than Palestinian children's deaths.

Associated Press. The Associated Press (AP), the oldest and largest wire service in the world, serves 1,700 US daily, weekly, non-English, and college newspapers and 5,000 radio and television outlets. It provides twenty-four-hour news feeds daily and is the chief source of news on Israel and Palestine for many Americans.

Analyses have shown that its coverage also emphasized Israeli deaths. A six-month study conducted at Stanford University in 2003 found that AP headlines had reported Israeli deaths at twice the rate they reported Palestinian deaths. A one-year study by If Americans Only Knew of AP headline and lead paragraph coverage in 2004 had similar findings. AP had reported Israeli deaths at a rate twice that of Palestinians and had covered Israeli minors' deaths at a rate 7.5 times greater than for similar Palestinian deaths.

One cause of this distortion may be AP's system of reporting from Israel. AP has two offices in Israel (in West Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv) and two offices in the Palestinian territories (in Ramallah in the West Bank and Gaza City). Although the bureaus in Israel are staffed largely by Jewish and Israeli journalists, those in the West Bank and in Gaza are staffed largely by Palestinian journalists. Although such a system appears well balanced, the Israeli bureau is the "control bureau" to which all reports are sent, where its staff then chooses which reports to send out on the news wire, edits these news stories, and sometimes writes the stories themselves, occasionally attaching a Palestinian journalist's name and a Palestinian dateline to the story.

Some reports from the Palestinian journalists never reach the public, although it is difficult to know how often this occurs, but several examples show how this works. On 17 October 2004, Israeli armored vehicles invaded the Balata Palestinian refugee camp on the outskirts of NABLUS. Although there was no physical resistance from the Palestinians, US and British eyewitnesses reported that an Israeli soldier stuck his rifle out a porthole in his vehicle, aimed at a boy nearby, and pulled the trigger. A steel bullet coated with rubber ripped into the boy's abdomen and penetrated his bladder while an AP cameraman recorded the incident. However, the recording was never broadcast and was later erased. AP's Corporate Communications Office would not comment on the reasons for not showing the recording, saying it was "an internal matter."

Although hundreds, possibly thousands, of Palestinian youngsters have been shot by Israeli soldiers, many of them killed, only once has a recording of such an incident aired prominently on US television—and this was recorded by a French news organization. But American pro-Israel groups produced such an outcry about this incident that the Israeli military later staged a reenactment of it that purported to absolve its soldiers of culpability. While European journalists were appropriately skeptical of this investigation, which was directed by a former ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) sniper, a number of US media figures appeared receptive. A few weeks after AP erased the recording of the soldier shooting a boy, another Palestinian boy was shot and killed in the same region. In this case the twelve-year-old boy was throwing stones at an Israeli patrol 300 meters (325 yards) away when a soldier shot him in the throat. Although the story was phoned in to Jerusalem by the Ramallah bureau chief, the Jerusalem bureau didn't forward the news story, although it did include one sentence on it in a news report about Israel. Such single-sentence reports of Palestinian deaths in stories on other

topics are characteristic of AP news. A twenty-eight-paragraph news report on the dismantling of a Palestinian security unit, published on 27 November 2004, is typical. Paragraph twenty-seven states: "Also Saturday, a four-year-old girl was in serious condition after being shot in the mouth by Israeli soldiers as she stood in front of her home, witnesses and medical officials said."

Alternative/Progressive Media and Professional Journals

Even the alternative and progressive press, often known for investigative reporting of topics ignored by the conventional media, follows the mainstream media in omissions of Palestinians in coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Project Censored, a Progressive media watchdog organization, is a case in point. Founded in 1976 to highlight and give awards to investigative reports ignored by the mainstream press, Project Censored compiled an annual top ten list—eventually a top twenty-five list—of the most important investigative reports that were minimally covered in the mainstream media. Yet for its first twenty years Project Censored ignored powerful exposés of Israeli treatment of Palestinians that were produced by publications such as *The Link* and *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. In these first two decades Project Censored reported on only one story connected to Israel—its support of oppression in Central America. The first story about Israel's treatment of Palestinians that made the Project Censored list was in 2004. After a story about US tax money going to Colombia was highlighted in the previous volume—the number three top story that year—Project Censored decided to cover US tax money to Israel as well. Although this is a vastly larger amount that has been dispensed far longer, the story was ranked at number twenty-four. Because news reports on Project Censored's annual list only name the top ten stories, this low rating meant that this story was basically unmentioned. However, the inclusion of this story seemed to indicate that Project Censored's omission of Palestine was ending. Its volume in 2005 included a chapter on Palestine and in 2006 a report on Palestinian child prisoners (number twenty-three), and it has increasingly included the Palestinian situation in its activities and events.

Similarly, several progressive and left-wing journalists known for exposing the powerful have consistently ignored Palestinian oppression. Some, in fact, are openly anti-Arab. An example is star investigative journalist Greg Palast, author of *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*. Palast has called Al Jazeera "Terror News Network" and Palestinians "self-described child-killers," betraying a level of ethnic bias usually not associated with progressive writers.

Pacifica Radio, particularly its premier station in Berkeley, has long been known for its alternative journalism. Yet it has censored programs on Israel-Palestine, dating back to at least 1969. In his essay "Censored," which was originally published in *The Link*, longtime journalist Colin Edwards described a number of instances when KPFA managers such as Elsa Knight Thompson and Larry Lee, who identified themselves as Zionists, worked to prevent the broadcast of negative information about Israel. For example, he describes one exchange with Program Director Thompson: "in trying to explain the difficult position that my work had put the station in with some of its wealthiest supporters, she said they were threatening not only to withhold their annual contributions and cut the station out of their wills but also to organize a boycott of the station by all its subscribers." This situation, however, began to change with the Second Intifada (2000). KPFA's popular program *Flashpoints,* with Dennis Bernstein, covered Israeli-Palestinian issues consistently, and other programs that discussed such issues were also added.

Professional media journals such as the *Columbia Journalism Review* and the *American Journalism Review* have approached the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cautiously and appear to apply a different standard to this topic. For example, in May 2005, *CJR* ran an article that described how the *New York Times* failed to cover the Nazi HOLOCAUST against Jews during World War II, while refusing to run an article on—or even mention—studies detailing current failure of the *New York Times* to cover the ongoing killing of Palestinian children.

Reporting by Omission

The immense omission of stories about Palestinians indicates a far larger and deeper pattern, which has been detailed thoroughly by a number of media analysts, including Palestine Media Watch director Ahmed Bouzid, Middle East commentator Jeffrey Blankfort, Electronic Intifada founder Ali Abunimah, and Dutch journalist Joris Luyendijk, whose book *Almost Human* provides an analysis of media coverage of the conflict. British researchers

Greg Philo and Mike Berry of the Glasgow University Media Group illustrated quantitatively that historical and geographical context is consistently omitted from news stories about Palestinians. Their surveys found that most people did not know the history of this conflict, and, as they indicated in their book *Bad News from Israel*, it is not unusual to find people who believe that Palestinians are occupying Israel.

Three major elements elucidated by Marda Dunsky, a professor of global studies, are missing from reporting on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: (1) the details of Palestinian daily life under Occupation for the last thirty-five years—for example, CHECKPOINT violence and humiliation, CLOSURES, DEPORTATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, the PERMIT system, CURFEWS, and much more; (2) any explicit acknowledgment that a body of INTERNATIONAL LAW and consensus is relevant to competing Israeli and Palestinian rights and claims; and (3) any acknowledgment that the two parties to the conflict are not equal and that there is an enormous disparity or asymmetry of power between them—the Occupier and the Occupied.

Sonia Nettnin elaborates with regard to international law: "PR-media strategies explain why the news continues to emphasize the violence directed against Israelis. However, the media reports do not include international law in their coverage, with regard to human rights, the rights of Palestinian REFUGEES, and the obligations of occupying forces. The Geneva Conventions and several UN Security Council Resolutions are solid sources for reference. If news reports included the historical fact that Israeli settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem exist on illegally confiscated Palestinian LAND [and that settlement in occupied territory by the occupier is illegal], that fact alone might cause Americans to raise questions. . . . Moreover, people might even begin to reassess the root causes of the conflict. When news consumers have thorough, accurate information, the conflict between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians can reflect different meanings or interpretations, absent from the current patterns of news coverage."

It is also a significant fact that the US media does not cover the Israeli peace movement. When 2,000 Israeli and Palestinian women from the organization WOMEN IN BLACK marched in the streets of Jerusalem, the US media did not cover it. Whenever a major peace group such as GUSH SHALOM has a demonstration with tens of thousands participating, it is not found in US news coverage. And Palestinian nonviolent resistance is either not covered or misrepresented as violence.

Indeed, entire areas of information are largely omitted from news reporting. In particular, the Israeli press and Israeli and international human rights organizations frequently describe Israeli torture of Palestinian PRISONERS, but such stories are rarely found in the US media. In January 2004 the US media reported prominently on a prisoner swap in which an Israeli businessman imprisoned in LEBANON was traded for three Lebanese resistance leaders and a few hundred Palestinians (who had been scheduled for release within a few months anyway). Although earlier news stories had reported that the Israeli had been tortured in Lebanon, upon his release the man stated that he had been treated well by his captors. On the other hand, one Lebanese leader, released two days before, testified for ten hours in an Israeli court describing gruesome sexual abuse by Israeli prison guards, and his claims were validated by a member of the International Red Cross. Nothing was mentioned in the US media, although accounts of Israel's use of torture had been reported in the foreign and Hebrew press for years.

In particular the *Washington Post*'s failure to cover the prisoner abuse was striking, given its extensive coverage of the prisoner swap. When a *Post* foreign editor was asked why the paper had not reported this incident, the editor replied that they were looking into it further and would probably cover it in the future. Although allegations of the torture of an Israeli—proven false—had been printed, reports of torture by Israelis needed to meet a higher standard of proof. To date this projected coverage has still not come.

In June 2002 the *Foreign Service Journal* published an exposé describing Israel's torture of US citizens. Yet virtually no US news outlet covered this thoroughly documented report. Moreover, even the *Foreign Service Journal* did not include this story on its website. Luyendijk observes: "Global reporting on the Middle East is thus in the hands of a very small number of (mostly American) editors who rely on a handful of international news agencies and set the tone for the entire Western media. It goes without saying that their selection of what's news and what's not is not objective or even representative."

Finally, two international human rights organizations released findings that 374 Palestinian

teenagers imprisoned by Israel were being mistreated. A short AP story on the report was published in the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* and sent out on the Worldstream wire to Britain, Europe, Africa, India, and Asia, but not to US newspapers.

Israeli obstruction of the activities of journalists has similarly been largely ignored in US news coverage. In 2002 the Committee to Protect Journalists named the West Bank as the most dangerous place to be a journalist, stating, "Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON's government has used extraordinary force to keep journalists from covering its recent military incursion." Yet even when the journalists attacked were Americans, the media barely covered the stories. Journalist Robert Fisk described how CNN's Cairo bureau chief Ben Wedeman was shot in a gun battle in Gaza. Having visited the spot where Wedeman was hit in the back, Fisk realized that the bullet must have been fired by Israeli soldiers, yet the CNN report only said that "most of the bullets" fired came from the Israelis. In response to a question about the coverage, a company spokesman in London said CNN did not want to suggest who was to blame "at this time." The US AP news agency later reported that Wedeman had been "caught up in crossfire."

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—Alison Weir

Meimad

The Meimad (Dimensions—Movement of the Religious Center) Party was established in 1988 as a religious ZIONIST alternative to the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (NRP). Meimad supporters were discouraged by the NRP's increasingly right-wing positions on the peace process and security issues. Meimad maintains that peace between Israelis and Arabs is possible and that Israel can negotiate land for peace because of the Hebrew concept of *pikuach nefesh*, which states that saving a soul is more important than LAND. In 1999 Meimad joined EHUD BARAK'S ONE ISRAEL PARTY.

Meimad first elected a representative to the Knesset in 1999—Rabbi Yehuda Gilad, a Torah

scholar who accepts the view that the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES are part of a divinely ordained Greater Israel. But he also is committed to the concept that two peoples cannot exclusively control one land and therefore there must be territorial compromise, and he believes that the need for peace must supersede theological assertions. In practical terms this means, according to Meimad, that Israel and the Palestinians must compromise to some degree and that Israel must give up about 90 percent of the Occupied Territories, only maintaining control over SETTLEMENTS that could be contiguously integrated into the Jewish state. It also calls for explicit Palestinian recognition of Israel. (http://english.meimad.org.il).

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Meir, Golda (1898–1978)

Golda Meir (born Mabovitch) was a senior official in the HISTADRUT labor federation, the JEWISH AGENCY, and the MAPAI labor party, and the prime minister of Israel from 1969 to 1974. Known as the "Iron Lady" of Israeli politics, Meir was born in Kiev, Ukraine, and in 1906 her family immigrated to the UNITED STATES, where they settled in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In high school she joined the Zionist group PO'ALE ZION and immigrated to Palestine in 1921 with her husband, Morris Myerson, and settled in KIBBUTZ Merhavya.

In 1924 Meir moved to Tel Aviv and became an official of the Histadrut, as well as serving in a managerial post with the union's construction corporation, Solel Boneh. From 1932 to 1934 she worked as an emissary in the United States, serving as secretary of the HeHalutz Zionist Women's Organization. Subsequently she became secretary of the Histadrut's Action Committee and later of its policy section.

When the pre-state BRITISH MANDATE authorities imprisoned most of the Jewish community's senior leadership in 1946, she replaced MOSHE SHARETT as head of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, the chief Jewish liaison with the British. Elected to the Executive of the Jewish Agency, she was active in fund-raising in the United States to help cover the costs of the 1948 WAR and became one of Israel's most effective spokespersons. In 1948 DAVID BEN-GURION appointed Meir a member of the provisional Israeli government. A few days before Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, Ben-Gurion sent her to persuade Emir Abdullah of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) not to attack Israel. The emir sought to take only the area allotted to the Palestinians in UN RESOLUTION 181 and annex it to Transjordan.

In June 1948 Meir was appointed Israel's ambassador to the SOVIET UNION. Elected to the Knesset as a Mapai member in 1949, she served as minister of labor and national insurance until 1956, when she became foreign minister, a post she held until January 1966. As foreign minister Meir was the architect of Israel's attempt to create bridges to the emerging independent countries of Africa via an assistance program based on practical Israeli experience in nation building. She also endeavored to improve relations with the United States and successfully created bilateral relations with several Latin American countries.

From 1966 to 1968 Meir served as secretary general of Mapai and then as the first secretary general of the newly formed LABOR PARTY. When Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL died suddenly in early 1969, the seventy-one-year-old Meir assumed the post of premier at a time when Israel was brimming with confidence after defeating three Arab states in the 1967 WAR and capturing vast amounts of territory. She also inherited Eshkol's second National Unity government, although it broke up over a disagreement about a cease-fire with EGYPT in the WAR OF ATTRITION (1967–1970). Meir opposed a cease-fire and aggressively pursued the war. She continued in office with a coalition of the Alignment (Labor and MAPAM), the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, and the Independent Liberals.

The major event of her administration was the 1973 War, which broke out on 6 October 1973 when Egypt and SYRIA coordinated attacks in the Sinai and Golan Heights to retake territories seized by Israel in 1967. After the fighting, the Agranat Inquiry Commission found that the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES and the government had erred

seriously in their assessment of Arab intentions. Although Meir and the Labor Party won the 31 December 1973 elections, Meir resigned in 1974 in favor of YITZHAK RABIN. She died four years later.

Meir made a number of statements that reveal her attitude toward the Palestinian issue:

- "There were no such thing as Palestinians. When was there an independent Palestinian people with a Palestinian state? It was either southern Syria before the First World War, and then it was a Palestine including Jordan. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist." (*The Sunday Times* [New York], 15 June 1969)
- "How can we return the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES? There is nobody to return them to." (Various news reports, 8 March 1969)
- "Any one who speaks in favor of bringing the Arab REFUGEES back must also say how he expects to take the responsibility for it, if he is interested in the state of Israel. It is better that things are stated clearly and plainly: we shall not let this happen." (*Washington Post*, 16 June 1969)
- "This country exists as the fulfillment of a promise made by God Himself. It would be ridiculous to ask it to account for its legitimacy." (*Le Monde,* 15 October 1971)

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Mercaz HaRav Kook Yeshiva

Mercaz HaRav (The Rav Center), also known as Yeshivat Mercaz HaRav, is a *Hardal* yeshiva (for strictly Orthodox Jews who support the ideology of religious Zionism). Located in JERUSALEM, it is considered the flagship of national-religious yeshivas (Talmudic/rabbinic colleges) and has trained the settler movement's leading rabbis as well as many yeshiva heads, city rabbis, and teachers in religious colleges and high schools. The school was central in shaping the evolution of religious ZIONISM. It is not a *Hesder* yeshiva; its students do not do regular military service, although some students do a much-shortened stint in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) when they are well into their twenties. The yeshiva was founded in 1924 by Rabbi AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK.

Today Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva is the focal point of a young generation drawn to the nationalist-religious vision of HaRav Kook. This movement encompasses thousands of pupils and students in high school yeshivot and *yeshivot hesder* (a yeshiva program that combines advanced Talmudic studies with military service in the IDF), pupils and students in the *ulpanoth* (intensive Judaic studies for girls) and *michlaloth* (girls' Torah high schools and colleges), and members from all walks of the *Hityashvuth* (SETTLEMENT) movement.

The yeshiva has never been an "ivory tower" of religious or academic isolationism. The students and graduates of the Yeshiva have established a vast network of seminars in Judaism as well as institutions for *Ba'alei Teshuva (*Jews who have returned to the fold of Orthodox Judaism, translated idiomatically as "one who has done repentance"), whose programs are open to the general public throughout the country, throughout the year. Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook's son, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook (1891–1982), took up the position of Rosh Yeshiva (the title given to the dean of a Talmudic academy) several years after the death of his father. When Zvi Yehuda died, Rabbi Avraham Shapira took the position and led the institution until his death in 2007. His son, Rabbi Yaakov Shapira, was his successor. Today, the Yeshiva has about 500 students, including 200 students in the Yeshiva's *kollel* (postgraduate division).

Notable alumni include a number of Knesset members, community leaders, and settler rabbis.

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Meretz Party

The Meretz (Vitality) Party was a left-leaning, secular Zionist party created by SHULAMIT ALONI, Yossi Sarid, and others in 1992 from three existing political parties—left-wing MAPAM, center-socialist RATZ, and centrist SHINUI—and led by Sarid. Although its positions on Palestinians were often ambiguous, in general Meretz favored a Palestinian state but was committed to a unified JERUSALEM under Israeli sovereignty. In 1992 Meretz won twelve seats in the Knesset and joined the LABOR PARTY coalition of YITZHAK RABIN, together with the MIZRAHI Orthodox SHAS Party—a decision that contributed greatly to its eventual disintegration. Previously, in the 1996 ELECTIONS, Meretz garnered nine seats; in 1999, ten; and in 2003 it received only six seats and ceased to exist, joining SHAHAR to form YACHAD.

Meretz's decline can be traced to when, at its peak during the Rabin years, politically it should have been focused on the peace process—the number of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories grew by 49 percent, from 101,000 to 150,000 in this period. Instead Meretz immersed itself in a secular crusade against Shas's religiosity (demanding control of the education portfolio among other issues). Additionally, when the Rabin government DEPORTED 415 Palestinians in December 1992, Meretz cabinet member Aloni voted for this collective punishment.

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Meretz-Yahad Party

See YACHAD

Meshal, Khalid (1956–)

Khalid Meshal, the top HAMAS political official, was the target of a failed Israeli ASSASSINATION attempt on 25 September 1997 on the streets of Amman, JORDAN. Born into a middle-class Palestinian family in the village of Slowan near Ramallah in the WEST BANK, after the Israeli OCCUPATION in 1967, Meshal moved with his family to KUWAIT, where his father was the *imam* of a local mosque. In his teens he joined the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD and led the Islamic Palestinian student movement in Kuwait University, where he graduated with a B.A. in physics. Unlike present-day Kuwait, in the 1970s the country seethed with Arab nationalism and pro-Palestine sentiments and activities. Until he left Kuwait for Jordan after the first GULF WAR in 1991, Meshal worked as a physics teacher. In Amman he joined the politburo of Hamas, an organization he had helped found when he was thirty-one, and was elected its head in 1996.

The assassination attempt on Meshal occurred in September 1997 when BENJAMIN NETANYAHU was Israeli prime minister. Although an Israeli commission of inquiry found that Netanyahu had no involvement with the operation, it is likely that the prime minister was deeply involved and made all the major decisions. Two days before the assassination attempt, Israel received a message from Hamas offering a ten-year cease-fire in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and an end to Jewish SETTLEMENTS. Netanyahu claims he only got this important message after the botched assassination.

Meshal's increased popularity following the 1997 attempt on his life proved embarrassing for the Jordanian authorities, who were increasingly friendly with Israel, and he was forced to leave Amman, along with other Hamas leaders. After Meshal left Jordan he relocated in Qatar, where he resumed his activities until he finally moved to SYRIA, and Damascus has been his base of operations most of the time since then.

Following Israel's assassination of SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN and his successor Dr. ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI in 2004, Meshal became the top leader in Hamas. Initially a hard-line rejectionist, in recent years he has moderated his position considerably.

On 17 March 2005, at a conference in Cairo attended by thirteen Palestinian factions as well as by the deputy Syrian foreign minister, the Cairo

Declaration was issued, which integrated Hamas into the Palestinian political system and marked the movement's clear ascent. Since then the Egyptian media has adopted a particular interest in Meshal, who was the first Hamas leader given the opportunity to appear on both state-run and private Egyptian television channels—with all the incumbent associations of status and official approval.

On 13 February 2006, Meshal declared that Hamas would end the ARMED STRUGGLE against Israel if Israel withdrew to its pre-1967 borders and recognized Palestinian rights such as the right of return. He reaffirmed this stance in a 5 March 2008 interview with Al-Jazeera, citing Hamas's signing of the 2005 Cairo Declaration and the National Reconciliation Document, and denied any rejectionist stance. Meshal met with former US president JIMMY CARTER on 21 April 2008 and reached an agreement that Hamas would respect the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas seized by Israel in the 1967 WAR, provided that such a state is ratified by the Palestinian people in a referendum. Hamas later announced it would offer Israel a ten-year *hudna* (truce) if it returned to its 1967 borders and recognized the "right of return" of all Palestinian refugees. Israel did not respond to the offer.

See also HAMAS; MOSSAD

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
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Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan, 1995

In 1995 an Israeli interministerial committee finalized a new large-scale development plan for some 40 percent of the WEST BANK and an equal percentage of its Palestinian residents. The Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan significantly enlarged the scale of previous Israeli planning efforts for the JERUSALEM region (see Map 31).

The plan was promulgated by the government of YITZHAK RABIN after the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), which established a framework for ending the OCCUPATION of the West Bank and GAZA, including Jerusalem. The Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan, however, supports little territorial compromise with Palestinians and even less negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians concerning its implementation. This plan appears to compromise any prospects for Palestinian socioeconomic progress in the core area of Jerusalem, because it essentially severs the West Bank in half from JERICHO to Jerusalem with SETTLEMENTS, ROADS, and INFRASTRUCTURE—all of which precludes a territorially contiguous Palestinian state.

The Metropolitan Jerusalem Plan represents a logical extension of earlier plans, which used East Jerusalem as a fulcrum to tie together far-flung settlements and extend Israeli sovereignty over ever greater areas of the West Bank. The outer circle of metropolitan Jerusalem includes a group of large, widely dispersed, yet strategically positioned settlements located across the territory of the West Bank. Bypass roads connect the set-



Map 31. Expanded Metropolitan Jerusalem, 2006

tlements to Israel proper through the settlement of Tsur Hadassah and on to the town of Bet Shemesh (which is within the Green Line between Israel and the West Bank). As of 2006, Tel Aviv had not determined definitively which settlements would be included in the Metropolitan Plan, but the following seem certain to be part of the arrangement: Kiryat Sefer (northwest of Jerusalem along the Green Line and near the centrally located settlement of Modi'in with 34,500 residents), Beit El (north of Jerusalem on the northern outskirts of Ramallah, with 3,570), MA'ALE ADUMIM (due east of Jerusalem, close to the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY extending almost to Jericho, 33,000), Efrata (southwest of Ma'ale Adumim, 8,606), Betar Illit (west of Efrata, 29,000), and the entire Etzion Bloc (with some 40,000 settlers). The future of the Palestinian towns of BETHLEHEM, Beit Sahur, and Beit Jala, now ringed by the settlements of HAR HOMA, Gilo, Betar Illit, the Etzion Bloc, and Efrata, is highly precarious.

In conceiving and implementing this master plan Israel has several goals, including to place as much West Bank territory as possible under Israeli sovereignty, to connect the settlements of metropolitan Jerusalem with each other through bypass roads and numerous smaller settlements, and to link them to East Jerusalem and to Israel proper. As a result Israeli citizens will populate sovereign Israeli settlements throughout the West Bank, all interconnected through infrastructure and military installations and subject only to the authority of the Israeli government. It will fragment Palestinian territory into isolated, disarticulated BANTUSTANS, which, in reality, is not all that different from the status quo.

See also GREATER JERUSALEM; JERUSALEM

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Middle East and North African Economic Conferences

During the OSLO PROCESS (1993–2000) and the improvement in Israeli-Arab state relations after the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1993) between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, US president BILL CLINTON believed that the environment favored regional economic integration and helped convene the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summit. Indeed, such economic cooperation had been the animating vision behind Israeli prime minister SHIMON PERES'S efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The MENA project was undertaken to a considerable extent in response to Israel's interest in attaining formal peace treaties with the Arab states and, more importantly, expanding its markets across the Arab world, which was considered a means to ensure regional stability.

The first MENA Economic Summit, held in Casablanca from 30 October to 1 November 1994, was cochaired by the UNITED STATES and RUSSIAN FEDERATION presidents with representatives from sixty-four countries, including Israel, for which it was both a major diplomatic and an economic breakthrough. The declaration signed by all sixty-four countries in Casablanca underscored the importance of solid economic growth and measurable improvement of the lives and security of peoples in the region and stressed the need to reinforce the achievements made in the OSLO ACCORDS. Participants emphasized the importance of increased cooperation between governments and business communities and started measures to lift the ARAB LEAGUE

embargo against Israel. The participants also decided to create a Middle East and North Africa Development Bank and a Regional Chamber of Commerce.

The second MENA Summit, again chaired by the US and Russian presidents and supported and endorsed by the EUROPEAN UNION, Canada, and Japan, took place in Amman, JORDAN, from 29 to 31 October 1995 and occurred in the same positive atmosphere as the first. To supplement the institutions proposed in Casablanca it was decided to set up a permanent regional economic organization—a secretariat.

The third MENA SUMMIT took place in Cairo from 12 to 15 November 1996, chaired again by the US and Russian presidents. Because Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU had essentially frozen the Oslo Process, it was downgraded from a "summit" to a "conference," and Israel was no longer the focal point of the event. The declaration adopted at the end of the conference underlined the principle that regional economic cooperation could take place only if there was a just peace for the Palestinians. Despite the concern by the Arab states about the freezing of the peace process, the United States announced that the Middle East and North Africa Development Bank would become operational by the end of 1997.

The fourth MENA SUMMIT took place in Doha (Qatar) from 16 to 18 November 1997. Despite extensive US pressure, many Arab countries did not attend. Arab participants included Djibouti, Jordan, KUWAIT, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Tunisia, and Yemen. However, the conference was boycotted by Algeria, Bahrain, EGYPT, LEBANON, Morocco, the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, and the United Arab Emirates, all of whom had linked their participation in MENA to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. (IRAQ, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan had not been invited.) No progress was made on implementing the Development Bank or on promoting direct economic and trade cooperation between Israel and the Arab states.

Since November 1997 no MENA summits have taken place, and the fate of the secretariat, the Development Bank, and the entire initiative remains unclear. From an economic point of view the conferences successfully encouraged some joint ventures and projects, but their political objectives have been unrealized.

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Middle East Forum

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

Middle East Media Research Institute

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

Militarism, Israel

See ISRAELI MILITARISM

Militarism and Armed Struggle, Palestinian

See ARMED STRUGGLE

Military Courts

See ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Milkart Protocols, 1973

The Milkart Protocols, an agreement negotiated between LEBANON and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) banning the presence of Palestinian guerrillas in certain areas and prohibit-

ing their use of medium and heavy weaponry in Lebanon, were signed on 17 May 1973. The Protocols were negotiated after the PLO had moved its base from JORDAN to Lebanon following BLACK SEPTEMBER (Jordan's war with Palestinian guerrillas, in which some 2,500 Palestinians were killed). PLO strikes on Israel across the Lebanese border had provoked massive Israeli reprisals against towns and villages in southern Lebanon, enraging the Lebanese. After MOSSAD agents penetrated Beirut and assassinated three senior PLO leaders, resulting in two weeks of intense fighting between the PLO and the Lebanese army and three broken cease-fires, diplomatic intervention was necessitated.

The Protocols were essentially based on the 1969 CAIRO AGREEMENT, in which the PLO agreed to maintain internal discipline among the Palestinians in Lebanon in exchange for the right to govern the REFUGEE camps. The Protocols precisely spelled out the boundaries for guerrilla forays, and enjoined the guerrillas to self-restraint. They included the following stipulations:

- Self-defense would be entrusted to a local militia drawn from residents, equipped with individual light arms only.
- A Lebanese Internal Security Forces post would be established near each refugee camp.
- In the border area with Israel the guerrillas were prohibited from deploying in the western sector, near villages, or in close proximity to the Israeli frontier.
- Military operations against Israel were to be frozen by virtue of earlier decisions of the Arab Defense Council, and Lebanon would not be used to launch external operations.
- Military training would occur only at agreed-upon locations outside the camps, and all non-Arab guerrillas were to leave Lebanon.

In addition the PLO reaffirmed that its official headquarters was in Damascus, SYRIA, and agreed not to establish a radio station or to "entangle" Lebanon in its informational activities.

In accordance with their agreement, and following additional meetings at the Kuwaiti and Egyptian embassies later that month, the PLO and Lebanese army established a Higher Coordinating Committee to oversee implementation of the Milkart Protocols. After fighting that had left more than a hundred dead and twice as many wounded, a semblance of calm returned to Beirut. The tensions that had sparked the abortive confrontation, however, remained rife and erupted again later. Moreover, in the end the Milkart Protocols may have made the situation worse by prompting certain Lebanese factions, particularly among the CHRISTIAN sects, to create their own militias, eventually leading to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990).

See also LEBANON

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Miller, Aaron David (1950–)

Aaron David Miller worked at the US Department of State for two decades as an adviser to six secretaries of state, in which capacity he helped formulate UNITED STATES policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Palestinian-Israel peace process. During the Clinton administration he served as the senior adviser for Arab-Israeli negotiations throughout the OSLO PROCESS and was one of the most influential decisionmakers in Washington.

Miller received his Ph.D. in US diplomatic and Middle East history from the University of Michigan in 1977. During 1982 and 1983 he was a fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and a resident scholar at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies. In 1984 he served a temporary tour at the US Embassy in Amman, JORDAN. In 1998 Miller was appointed by President BILL CLINTON to serve on the US HOLOCAUST Memorial Council. He has written three books on the Middle East and has lectured widely

at universities and Middle East symposia across the country. In January 2003 Miller became president of Seeds of Peace, a program focused on bringing Arab and Israeli teenagers together.

Washington's role in the failed Oslo Process and in particular at CAMP DAVID has been much criticized. Miller, together with MARTIN INDYK and DENNIS ROSS, made and implemented US policy, but to this point Miller is the only former player critical of US diplomacy in that period. In May 2005, in an op-ed article in the *Washington Post*, Miller wrote: "For far too long, many American officials involved in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, myself included, have acted as Israel's attorney, catering and coordinating with the Israelis at the expense of successful peace negotiations. . . .

"In fact, the Arabs may well understand something we have forgotten. When we have used our diplomacy wisely and functioned as advocates and lawyers for both sides, we have succeeded. . . . Unfortunately, too often we lose sight of the need to be advocates for both Arabs and Israelis. The most recent example of this was the Clinton administration's effort in 1999–2000 to broker final deals between Israel, SYRIA and the Palestinians.

"With the best of motives and intentions, we listened to and followed Israel's lead without critically examining what that would mean for our own interests, for those on the Arab side and for the overall success of the negotiations. The 'no surprises' policy, under which we had to run everything by Israel first, stripped our policy of the independence and flexibility required for serious peacemaking. If we couldn't put proposals on the table without checking with the Israelis first and refused to push back when they said no, how effective could our mediation be? Far too often, particularly when it came to Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, our departure point was not what was needed to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides but what would pass with only one—Israel. . . .

"We should have resisted [Israeli prime minister EHUD] BARAK's pressure to go for a make-or-break summit and then blame the Palestinians when it failed. What we ended up doing was advocating Israel's positions before, during and after the summit. . . . And one lesson is that there should be no inherent contradiction between our special relationship with Israel and our capacity to be an effective broker in Arab-Israeli negotiations. We can still be Israel's close friend and work with Israelis and Palestinians to ensure that the needs of both sides are met."

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Mitchell, George John (1933–)

Former US senator George Mitchell was named by President Barack Obama in 2009 as special envoy for Arab-Israeli affairs. In 2000, he headed a fact-finding commission that investigated the causes of the recent outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence and made recommendations to lessen tensions and resume the peace process. Previously, Mitchell had been a prominent Maine attorney, Democratic Party activist, and US district judge before being appointed to the US Senate in 1980 following President JIMMY CARTER's selection of Maine senator Edmund Muskie to be his secretary of state, which left the Maine seat empty. Mitchell was subsequently elected to two full terms, quickly rising in the ranks to serve as majority leader from 1989 to 1995. He was raised in a blue-collar family in Waterville, Maine, and his mother was a textile worker who had emigrated from LEBANON as a young woman.

Although he was one of the most prominent Arab Americans in politics, Mitchell rarely openly embraced his Arab heritage. As a senator he accepted large amounts of campaign contributions from right-wing political action committees that supported Israeli policies and was a strong proponent of unconditional military and economic aid to the rightist Israeli government of YITZHAK SHAMIR. Mitchell criticized Secretary of State

JAMES BAKER for characterizing the Jewish SETTLEMENTS ringing eastern JERUSALEM on lands seized by Israeli forces in the 1967 WAR as part of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Mitchell effectively argued that the UNITED STATES should recognize Israel's unilateral annexation of a part of the WEST BANK, in contravention of INTERNATIONAL LAW and a series of UN Security Council resolutions.

Following his retirement from the Senate in 1995, Mitchell led the commission that oversaw the Northern Ireland peace process and played an important role as a mediator in negotiations between Catholic and Protestant leaders that produced the Good Friday Accords of 1998. In an analysis with potential relevance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mitchell argued that the peace process succeeded in Northern Ireland because of the recognition that all interested parties had to be at the table and could not be excluded because they engaged in TERRORISM; that while insisting upon an end to the violence, it was not necessary to demand full disarmament; and that, while insisting upon peaceful means, one cannot ask a people to give up on their dreams.

Mitchell subsequently served on a number of corporate boards and bipartisan commissions, and in academic positions.

In the fall of 2000 the UN General Assembly created a commission charged with investigating the causes of and possible solutions to the outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence in what came to be known as the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. As a means of countering the UN commission, which was expected to stress Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law, President BILL CLINTON appointed a US-led team to put forward its own report. After a US-convened security conference in SHARM AL-SHAYKH (EGYPT), Clinton announced the formation of a fact-finding committee to be led by Mitchell. Other members of the commission included former US senator Warren Rudman, also a strong supporter of Israel's earlier right-wing governments, as well as a former president of TURKEY, Suleyman Demirel, a strong ally of Israel. The three outnumbered the more moderate commission members—NORWAY foreign minister Thorbjorn Jagland and EUROPEAN UNION representative Javier Solana.

The United States determined that the Sharm al-Shaykh Fact-Finding Committee, better known as the Mitchell Commission, would operate primarily out of Washington and that its investigations in Israel and the Occupied Territories would be strictly limited. The commission's report, released at the end of April 2001, held neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians solely responsible for the breakdown of the peace process or for the ongoing violence. Instead the report called for a cease-fire, in particular for the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) to "make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable and that the PNA will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators." It urged Israel to "ensure that the [ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES] adopt and enforce policies and procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators with a view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities."

The report noted that the violence was not solely a result of then–opposition leader ARIEL SHARON's provocative visit to an Islamic holy site in occupied East JERUSALEM the previous autumn, nor was it part of a Palestinian plan to launch a violent struggle. The uprising, it stated, was rooted in Palestinian frustration over the failure of the peace process to return Palestinian LAND seized for settlements and was fueled by unnecessarily violent responses by both sides early in the fighting. Yet when the report failed to call for an international force to separate the sides, it underscored the commission's unwillingness to support decisive steps necessary to curb further bloodshed. Although the Mitchell Commission Report did not call for Israel to withdraw from its illegal settlements, as required under UN Security Council Resolutions 446, 452, 465, and 471, it did call for a "freeze on all settlement activity including the 'natural growth' of existing settlements," emphasizing that "a cessation of Palestinian-Israeli violence will be particularly hard to sustain unless the Government of Israel freezes all settlement activity."

To minimize civilian casualties on both sides, the report called on the PNA to prevent gunmen from firing at Israeli military and civilian areas from Palestinian populated areas. It also called on Israel to lift its CLOSURES of Palestinian population centers, transfer all the tax revenues it owed to the PNA, and permit Palestinians formerly employed in Israel to return to their work. The Mitchell Commission Report also emphasized that Israeli security forces and settlers needed to "refrain from the destruction of homes and ROADS, as well as trees and other agricultural property in Palestinian

areas," and that the PNA should "renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism."

Although formally accepting the Mitchell Commission Report, the succeeding administration of GEORGE W. BUSH, as well as Congress, stressed the need for a cease-fire from the Palestinian side, effectively ignoring the report's insistence on a settlement freeze and other Israeli responsibilities.

On 22 January 2009, President Obama announced Mitchell's selection as special envoy for Arab-Israeli affairs at a public forum at the State Department. Choosing the relatively moderate former Senate majority leader over more hawkish candidates for the post gave hope among some analysts that Mitchell's appointment could signal that the incoming administration would pursue a more evenhanded approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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—Stephen Zunes

Mixed Armistice Commissions

The 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, a set of truces between Israel and its neighbors (EGYPT, JORDAN, LEBANON, and SYRIA), ended the 1948 WAR and established the armistice lines with demilitarized zones (DMZs) between Israel and each Arab state. The Mixed Armistice Commissions (under the responsibility of the UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION) were established to monitor each state's respect for the border, investigate complaints by the parties, and make regular reports to the UN Security Council.

After the signing of the armistices, the commissions condemned, at one time or another, all of the parties, except Jordan, for breaches of the truce. Egypt was sanctioned for keeping large military forces in the demilitarized 'Uja al-Hafeer area. Syria was faulted for launching artillery attacks against Israeli forces and Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the demilitarized zone adjacent to the Golan Heights. However, the Mixed Armistice Commissions condemned Israel for its actions more frequently than any Arab state, as did the UNITED NATIONS, where complaints against Israel often ended up.

The Commissions complained that Israel had reinforced the demilitarized Mount Scopus enclave in JERUSALEM with armed soldiers disguised as policemen; sent military forces into Jordanian territory several times to retaliate for INFILTRATIONS by Palestinians, with considerable loss of life and destruction of property; frequently shelled areas in Egypt—especially the GAZA STRIP—typically with significant material and human loss; and diverted WATER from Syrian and Jordanian sources.

In an interview that created a stir in Israel after its belated publication, Defense Minister MOSHE DAYAN explained the nature of the provocations: "I know how at least 80 percent of all of the incidents there [in the DMZs] started. In my opinion, more than 80 percent, but let's speak about 80 percent. It would go like this: we would send a tractor to plow in the demilitarized area and we would know ahead of time that the Syrians would start shooting. If they did not start shooting, we would inform the tractor to progress farther, until the Syrians, in the end, would get nervous and would shoot. And then we would use guns, and later, even the air force, and that is how it went. We thought that we could change the lines of the cease-fire accords by military actions that were less than a war. That is, to seize some territory and hold it until the enemy despairs and gives it to us."

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Mizrachi

Mizrachi (Merkaz Ruchani or Religious Center) are religious or Orthodox Jews who support ZIONISM. Mizrachi is also the name of the religious Zionist organization founded in 1902 in Vilna, Lithuania, at a world conference of Religious Zionists. It operates a youth movement, Bnei Akiva, that was founded in 1929.

Mizrachi believe that the Torah should be at the center of Zionism and see Jewish nationalism as a means to achieve religious objectives. The Mizrachi party was the first official Religious Zionist party. RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK was the driving figure in the Religious Zionist Movement. Mizrachi had a separate trade union wing, founded in 1921, called HaPoel HaMizrachi, which represented religious Jews in the HISTADRUT labor federation and tried to attract religious LABOR Zionists.

In 1956, Mizrachi, HaPoel HaMizrachi, and other Religious Zionists formed the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (Mafdal) to advance the rights of religious Jews in Israel. The origins of post-1967 JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM, GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT, and the GUSH EMUNIM reside in Mizrachi.

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Mizrahi

Mizrahi Jews, sometimes referred to as Oriental Jews or Arab Jews, comprise both a distinct ethnic and socioeconomic sector in Israel. Ethnically, Mizrahim are Jews of Middle Eastern origin whose ancestors never left the Middle East and North Africa. Until the mass Russian immigration of the 1990s, Mizrahi Jews comprised as much as 70 percent of the population of Israel. Now, they are about half.

Mizrahim are distinct from ASHKENAZI Jews, whose roots lie in Europe and North America, and from SEPHARDIM, who originated in Sepharad (Spain and Portugal) and who were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in 1492 or left during the Spanish Inquisition. After the expulsion many Sephardim fled to Middle Eastern and North African countries, where they merged with the Mizrahim and are indistinguishable today.

Because most Mizrahi Jews emigrated from their countries of birth just before or shortly after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, they played virtually no role in the Zionist movement, in the development of the pre-state Yishuv, or in the multitude of military and political organizations that created the state. When the Mizrahim arrived, the Ashkenazi dominated all public and private institutions, including absorption centers where new migrants went for housing and employment. The Mizrahim did not speak modern Hebrew and had no personal connections to facilitate finding a desirable location within the country, a good house, or a well-paying job. As a result they came as second-class citizens, were treated as second-class citizens, and largely remain so to this day.

When the Mizrahim first arrived in Israel, they were moved into rudimentary and hastily erected tent cities and later to "development towns," which had a primitive infrastructure but were in the process of being developed, on Israel's farthest borders. Discrimination followed them at every turn—substandard housing, inferior educational opportunities, exclusion from professional employment in any sector, and high blue-collar unemployment. Today Mizrahim constitute a distinct majority in Israel's urban slums and among its poor in general.

Despite their origins the Mizrahim have a reputation for hard-line anti-Arab politics that stems from a variety of factors. Many Mizrahim feel pressured to deny their own Arabic heritage to show their loyalty to a state founded and defined by Ashkenazi Jews, who view Arabs as inferior. Because their culture and appearance forced them into the seam between the two nations, the Mizrahim had to prove their Jewishness and Israeli identity by adopting Ashkenazi nationalist views and symbols. AZMI BISHARA, an Arab-Israeli and Knesset member, described the situation thus: "The Ashkenazi has a clear stance as to the relationship with Palestinians: You are there, we are

here. . . . but the Mizrahi resembles the Palestinian in looks, customs, dialect . . . it forces him to distinguish himself from the Arab . . . if the criterion for equality is nationalism, then they must prove their nationalism."

Self-identity is another key issue in understanding Mizrahi anti-Palestinian attitudes. Self-hatred, derived from the attitudes of the Ashkenazim, became hate for the Arabs, who reflect the same culture (and physical attributes) that the Mizrahim are trying to disavow. Several studies have demonstrated a direct correlation between the cultural oppression of Mizrahi youth at school and their lack of tolerance for Palestinians.

The Ashkenazi elite also contributed to Mizrahim hostility toward the Palestinians by "divide and rule" policies. On the one hand, settling the Mizrahi in the development towns—in the front line of confrontation between Israel and the Arabs—taught them to hate and distrust the Palestinian REFUGEES who sought to return to their homes and LANDS lost in the 1948 WAR. At the same time, their location made them the most physically vulnerable of Israel's citizens. When Palestinian INFILTRATION into Israel was an issue in the early 1950s, the state expected the Mizrahim to prevent the infiltrators' passage, even with their bodies.

After the 1967 WAR the government's massive colonization of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES has led many Mizrahim to move there, not for ideological reasons, but because there they can receive the services and benefits unavailable within Israel. This gives them a vested interest in continued Israeli OCCUPATION of the territories, as well as hostility to the Palestinians who want a state there. For many low-income Mizrahi Israelis with relatives in the SETTLEMENTS, support for the Israeli right wing and the Occupation becomes one of the few ways to ensure that their families' basic needs are met.

The Mizrahim suffered from decades of discrimination and mistreatment by LABOR PARTY governments, and after the 1977 rise of the LIKUD they have become strongly inclined to align with rightist, even extreme, right-wing parties. These encourage them to despise Arabs even more and teach them that the whole land of Israel belongs by right exclusively to Jews. Moreover, many Mizrahim believe that peace efforts led by Labor and liberal movements are for Ashkenazi elites who care more about Palestinians than about poor and unemployed Israelis.

See also ASHKENAZI; SEPHARDI

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Moked

Moked (Focus) Party, a leftist group, was established in 1972 as a parliamentary group in the Eighth Knesset. Composed of the Israel COMMUNIST Party and the Blue-Red Movement, it advocated a full withdrawal from the Palestinian territories conquered in 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state, a reduction in Israel's dependence on the UNITED STATES, and a focus on internal economic and social issues. In the course of the Eighth Knesset, Moked changed its name to "Moked—for Peace and Socialist Change." In the Ninth Knesset the Israel Communist Party joined HADASH, and Moked joined the left camp of SHELLI.

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Moledet Party

The Moledet (Homeland) Party is a right-wing Israeli political party that supports the TRANSFER of Palestinians as an integral part of a comprehensive peace plan between Jews and Arabs living in Israel. Moledet was established by REHAVAM ZE'EVI, a retired Israeli general. After Ze'evi was murdered on 17 October 2001 in JERUSALEM by the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, the party was chaired by Knesset member BENYAMIN "BENNY" ELON.

Since its inception Moledet has been actively involved in Jewish SETTLEMENT and OUTPOST construction and in creating a high standard of living for the settlers. Because it believes that JORDAN should be the Palestinian homeland, Moledet opposes any Palestinian state in what it considers Eretz Yisrael. Moledet is also active in strengthening the Jewish presence in East Jerusalem.

Limor Lavnat, the Israeli education minister, ordered schools nationwide to observe the anniversary of Ze'evi's death—a decision that was considered by many to legitimize Moledet's principles. (www.moledet.org.il/english).

See also HERUT PARTY/NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY; TEKUMA

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Moreshet Avot

Moreshet Avot (Heritage of the Fathers) is an ultra-orthodox, far right political party that opposes any compromise with the Palestinians. Its leader, Rabbi Joseph Ba-Gad, served in the Knesset from 1992 to 1996. Ba-Gad is described as a colorful and flamboyant figure. The day before the January 2003 elections, he withdrew his party from the campaign. The party has been characterized by a continuing pattern of election-list discrepancies and platform shifts.

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The Morrison-Grady Plan was the result of a second Anglo-American effort to find a solution to the Palestine problem. (The first was the ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, 1945–1946.) Issued in early July 1946, the formal plan called for a unitary federal trusteeship in Palestine, a concept developed by Herbert Morrison, deputy prime minister of Britain, and Ambassador Henry Grady of the UNITED STATES.

The Morrison-Grady Plan proposed a Jewish province consisting of some 17 percent of the country and a Palestinian province containing some 40 percent, while JERUSALEM and the southern Negev (Naqab) desert would remain under British control. Additionally, Britain would maintain power over the entire trusteeship, even though each province would exercise self-rule. The plan also called for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees but declared that further IMMIGRATION would be subject to the country's economic absorptive capacity.

Both Arab and Zionist leaders flatly rejected the plan. Zionists wanted a sovereign state with far more territory and unlimited immigration in perpetuity, while the Arabs objected to the arrival of 100,000 Jews and also wanted an independent state, not continued British control. On 22 July 1946, shortly after the Morrison-Grady Plan was issued, the militant Zionist group IRGUN bombed the KING DAVID HOTEL in Jerusalem, which was the British political and military headquarters in Palestine, killing ninety-one British, Jewish, and Arab employees. Nothing further came of the plan, and Great Britain turned the "Palestine problem" over to the UNITED NATIONS.

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Moscow

In relations with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and Israel, Moscow (the Soviet Union/Russia) has shifted back and forth between favoring one and the other Middle Eastern player, depending on its larger diplomatic interests in the Middle East and in the world as a whole. Initially it recognized and supported Israel from 1947 to 1949, but during most of the post–World War II Soviet period until the emergence of Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, Moscow tended to back the Arabs (including the PLO by the late 1960s) in its conflict with Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Moscow's ties with Israel were generally far stronger than with the Palestinians, although by 2009, Russian-Israeli relations had cooled.

The Soviet Period

During the initial rise to power in Russia in 1917, the communist leadership under Lenin was strongly ANTI-ZIONIST, because it believed the Zionist movement's call for a Jewish state in Palestine diverted the attention of Jewish workers from world revolution. Because Britain, a major enemy of the Soviet Union during most of the interwar period, was fostering the growth of the Zionist community in Palestine (through the BALFOUR DECLARATION and the BRITISH MANDATE over Palestine), Moscow's antipathy to ZIONISM was reinforced. It was therefore surprising when the Soviet Union not only supported the UN partition of Palestine (UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181) into a Jewish and an Arab state in 1947, but also gave Israel both diplomatic support and military aid (via Czechoslovakia) when the Arab states invaded Israel on 15 May 1948, an action Moscow severely condemned. Soviet support for Israel at that time was based on Moscow's perception that Israel was fighting against a pro-British bloc of Arab states that would, along with Britain, be weakened if Israel won.

In the latter part of the Stalin era (1950–1952), however, Soviet-Israeli relations deteriorated, in part because of increased ANTI-SEMITISM in the Soviet Union and in part because Israel backed the US (rather than Soviet) position during the Korean War. Although Moscow severed diplomatic relations with Israel in 1952, its relations with the Arab world or with the Palestinians did not improve until after Stalin's death in 1953. Although Stalin's successor, Georgi Malenkov, restored relations with Israel in 1953 as part of the post-Stalin "thaw" in Soviet foreign policy, there was a distinct tilt toward the Arabs, if not yet to the

Palestinians, when Nikita Khrushchev rose to power in 1955. Moscow strongly condemned Israel, along with Britain and FRANCE, for the tripartite invasion of EGYPT in 1956. Following the 1964 ouster of Khrushchev, there was a pronounced tilt toward the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict by Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev, culminating in the complete severance of diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1967 WAR, although the Arab world criticized Moscow for not giving aid to the Arabs during that conflict.

Following the 1967 War and the sharp rise in the PLO's importance in the Arab world, Moscow paid increasing attention to that organization, while the new PLO head, YASIR ARAFAT, visited Moscow as part of an Egyptian delegation in 1968. The real change in Moscow's relations with the PLO came after the 1973 War for two reasons. First, in 1974 the Arabs themselves recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which gave the Palestinian organization increased legitimacy. Second, Egypt, Moscow's primary ally in the Arab world and the recipient of lavish Soviet economic and military aid and considerable diplomatic support, had begun to defect to the side of the UNITED STATES in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, in addition to cultivating SYRIA and IRAQ, the Soviet Union strengthened its ties with the PLO, allowing it to open an office in Moscow in the summer of 1974. Following the successful Israeli-Egyptian negotiations at CAMP DAVID in September 1978, Brezhnev explicitly supported the right of the Palestinians to create their own state.

However, there were problems in the Soviet-Palestinian relationship during the Brezhnev era (1964–1982). While the Soviets criticized the TERRORIST actions of the PLO, the Palestinians were deeply disappointed that Moscow did not provide more help in 1976 during the PLO's war against Syria in LEBANON or during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The PLO and the Arab world also criticized Moscow for allowing tens of thousands of SOVIET JEWS to immigrate to Israel. Still, on balance the Brezhnev era can be seen as a positive one for Soviet-Palestinian relations, but this cannot be said about the next major Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985 and remained in office until the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev radically changed Soviet policy toward both the Arab-Israeli conflict and the United States. Gorbachev planned to revitalize the moribund Soviet economy, and he realized, particularly after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986 and the sharp drop in oil prices in the same year, that an end to the Cold War was necessary for the Soviet economy to develop. This required, among other things, pulling Russian troops out of Afghanistan, sharply cutting the size of Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe, and changing Soviet behavior in the third world. One change was the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, first at the consular level in 1987–1988, followed by full diplomatic relations in 1991. Gorbachev also permitted hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel in 1988–1991, which not only helped Israel in its DEMOGRAPHIC competition with the Palestinians but also greatly augmented Israel's scientific and military power, because many emigrating Soviet Jews had worked in the USSR military-industrial complex. Perhaps equally important was Gorbachev's admonition to both Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad and Arafat that their conflicts with Israel had to be settled politically and not by war—a signal to both Arab leaders that the time had come to negotiate with Israel and a not-so-subtle indication that they could not expect Soviet aid in a war against Israel.

Post-Soviet Russian Policy

The first four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union were a honeymoon period in the Russian-Israeli relationship. Cultural relations and trade boomed, Russian Jews continued to immigrate freely to Israel, and Moscow and Israel even cooperated on jointly producing military equipment for sale to third world countries. Moscow also warmly endorsed the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES between Israel and the PLO, which set the goal of establishing Palestinian self-government, and the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PLO on self-rule in the WEST BANK, but Russia was so involved in its own economic problems that it effectively ceded leadership in Israeli-Arab and especially Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking to the United States. Under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Moscow took an "even-handed" position on Israeli-Arab clashes. By 1996, however, the situation changed as Russia developed a more independent foreign policy under its new foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, and became more critical of Israel and more supportive of the Palestinians. For example,

during the fighting in southern Lebanon in the spring of 1996, Primakov and Israeli prime minister SHIMON PERES openly clashed over Soviet support for the PLO. In addition, the Russian decision to build a nuclear reactor for IRAN further cooled relations with Israel, and Moscow was also critical of the policies of PERES's successor, BENJAMIN NETAN-YAHU, who expanded Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK.

However, by 1998, Russia's economic crisis effectively limited its freedom of action in the world, including in the Middle East. This situation continued until Yeltsin resigned as Russia's president and was succeeded in January 2000 by Vladimir Putin, who had two major goals for Russia. The first was to rebuild the country economically so it could again be a great power, and the second was to prevent the United States from dominating the world unilaterally. The latter goal, which Moscow pursued more vigorously after a brief period of cooperation with the United States after 9/11, involved a more active role for Russia in the Arab world and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 2002, Russia became part of the diplomatic QUARTET (with the United States, the United Nations, and the EUROPEAN UNION [EU]) seeking to bring about an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement.

Russia's new position involved a clear tilt to the Arab side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which became more evident after Israel reoccupied West Bank cities following a series of Palestinian terrorist attacks in 2002. A secondary goal of Russia's pro-Arab sympathy was to weaken Arab support for the rebellion in Russia's Chechen Republic. Although favoring the Arabs, Putin still sought to maintain ties with Israel, periodically uttering soothing remarks about how much he valued the bilateral Russian-Israeli relationship and the role of Russian émigrés in Israel. Nonetheless, on issues of substance, such as the Russian construction of a nuclear reactor for Israel's arch-enemy Iran, Israel's construction of its BARRIER, and Arafat's role in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, Russia and Israel had opposing positions.

However, Putin had a valid point about the continuing strength of the bilateral Israeli-Russian relationship. Trade rose above $1 billion a year; cultural relations continued to develop; the two countries cooperated on military sales, including an AWACs airborne command plane to India; and 50,000 Russian tourists visited Israel in 2004. Nonetheless, these areas of bilateral cooperation were increasingly overshadowed by diplomatic conflicts. Although Russia conditionally supported Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON's plan for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, it did so only as a step toward a full peace agreement. The increased coolness first became evident following Sharon's visit to Moscow in September 2003. Although Putin promised to incorporate Israeli concerns into a UN Security Council resolution codifying the Quartet's Middle East "ROAD MAP," Moscow introduced the resolution without including Israel's reservations. By 2002, Israel had refused to talk to PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) chairman Arafat, blaming him for the numerous terrorist attacks against Israel since the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000, a position supported by Israel's chief ally, the United States. In contrast Putin asserted that Arafat was still relevant to the political process. On Israel's Barrier, Russia voted with the majority of EU states on 22 October 2003 (and again on 20 July 2004) to support a (nonbinding) UN General Assembly resolution condemning Israel for building its security fence and called on Israel to comply with the majority decision of the International Court of Justice and tear it down.

By September 2004, however, a series of terrorist attacks that culminated in the seizure of a Russian school in Beslan, Chechnya, may have prompted Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to accept an Israeli offer to cooperate in the area of counterterrorism. Still, any Israeli hopes that the security cooperation agreement would lead Russia to adopt a more pro-Israeli stand in the conflict with the Palestinians quickly faded. On 5 October 2004, just one month after the Israeli-Russian agreement, Moscow supported a UN Security Council resolution (vetoed by the United States) to condemn Israel for its military incursion into Gaza, which was designed to eliminate HAMAS fighters before the vote in the Israeli Knesset on Sharon's disengagement plan.

Initially, it appeared as if the death of Arafat in November 2004 would lead to an improvement in Russian-Israeli relations, because both Israel and Russia saw Arafat's successor, MAHMUD ABBAS, as a serious partner for peace. But, perhaps as a reaction to the Beslan school disaster and to anti-Russian developments in Ukraine, Putin sought to reassert Moscow's role as a major world power. Thus Russia finally completed an agreement to provide Iran with nuclear fuel and then protected

Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from EU and US criticism, despite Tehran's repeated violations of IAEA regulations and its call to "wipe Israel off the face of the earth." Putin also agreed to provide surface-to-air missiles to Syria, another major enemy of Israel. Given these acts, Russian-Israeli relations remained cool despite Putin's April 2005 visit to Israel. Meanwhile Russian-Palestinian relations were friendly but limited. Although Putin offered arms to Abbas during his April 2005 visit to the PNA, Moscow could do little to help the Palestinians achieve statehood. The United States remained the dominant factor in the diplomatic Quartet working to create a TWO-STATE SOLUTION to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and as Moscow's relations with Israel cooled, it could not seriously challenge US leadership in the peace process.

Moscow's policy continued in this direction for the rest of the decade. As part of his anti-US policy, Putin recognized Hamas following the Islamist organization's victory in the January 2006 PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS—in the face of US attempts to isolate Hamas until it recognized Israel, renounced terrorism, and accepted previous Palestinian agreements with Israel. Putin justified this policy by asserting that engagement with Hamas would get the organization to make peace with Israel, although by the fall of 2009, he had not been successful. In addition, Moscow was caught off guard when Hamas seized power in Gaza in June 2007, and as the gap between Hamas and Fatah widened, Moscow sought, also without success, to bridge the divisions between the two Palestinian organizations.

In the case of Russian-Israeli relations, Moscow's bifurcated policy continued. On the one hand, it continued to provide military aid to Israel's enemies, Syria and Iran, while protecting Iran from serious UN Security Council sanctions because of its nuclear enrichment program. On the other hand, bilateral relations between Russia and Israel continued to improve. Trade rose to an annual rate of $3 billion, cultural relations continued to flourish as Russia established a cultural center in Tel Aviv, and Israel even agreed to sell Russia unmanned drones after Russia's poor performance in the Russia-Georgia war of August 2008.

In sum, Russia has been following a rather schizophrenic policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. It cultivates good bilateral ties with Israel, while also supporting Israel's enemies: Hamas, Syria, and Iran. How long it will be able to continue such a policy remains to be seen.

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—Robert O. Freedman

Moshav

The moshav is a type of Israeli settlement, in particular a type of cooperative agricultural community of individual farms, built on land belonging to the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND or to the state. The moshavim are similar to kibbutzim with an emphasis on community labor, but contrary to the collective kibbutzim, farms in a moshav tend to be individually owned but of fixed and equal size. Workers produce crops and goods on their properties through individual and/or pooled labor and resources, and use the profit and foodstuffs to provide for themselves. Support of the community is done through a special tax that is equal for all households of the community, thus creating a system in which good farmers are better off than bad ones, unlike in the communal kibbutzim, where (at least theoretically) all members enjoy the same living standard. Many moshavim still exist today.

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Moskowitz, Irving (1927–)

Irving Moskowitz, a US doctor and bingo tycoon, is one of the largest individual donors to Israel, and his money has been donated explicitly for securing East JERUSALEM for Jews. Moskowitz sees himself as part of a divine mission to protect Israel's survival, which he believes depends on Jewish control of Jerusalem. "After 2,000 years of sacrifice for the dream of returning to Jerusalem, we cannot allow it to be taken away," he told the *Los Angeles Times.*

Moskowitz is a Florida physician who runs a bingo empire in Los Angeles County and has made an additional fortune in real estate speculation. With his vast earnings, he underwrites the Jewish settler groups that are transforming the Palestinian neighborhoods of RAS AL-AMOUD, SILWAN, Herod's Gate, SHAYK JARRAH, and others into Jewish communities. Using both his own money and funds from his US tax-exempt Irving I. Moskowitz Foundation, Moskowitz has supported the settler groups as well as a variety of projects and foundations, including American Friends of ATERET COHANIM (an ultranationalist Orthodox religious group that opened a militant yeshiva in the heart of the Muslim Quarter of the OLD CITY in Jerusalem), Old City Charities (a group that supports Jewish settlers in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City), and the Hebron Fund (which supports settlers in the Old City of HEBRON).

Moskowitz has also supported the JERUSALEM RECLAMATION PROJECT and the One Israel Fund, both New York foundations that have funded the purchase of some fifty Palestinian homes near Ateret Cohanim's yeshiva. Located close to the AL-AQSA MOSQUE, the third holiest site in Islam, the yeshiva states that its mission is to prepare for the replacement of the mosque by a reconstructed Jewish THIRD TEMPLE atop the biblical TEMPLE MOUNT (al-HARAM ASH-SHARIF). The head of the Jerusalem Reclamation Project, Joseph Frager, said this about Jerusalem: "There is nothing to talk about. It belongs to the Jews. Period. End of story."

To Judaize Jerusalem, Moskowitz has funded another yeshiva on Mount Scopus and purchased an estimated $20 million in LAND and property in Arab East Jerusalem, along with a large house on the Mount of Olives and St. John's Hospice next to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. The Hebrew press has reported that Moskowitz has given various Jerusalem settler groups between $70 million and $80 million out of his personal funds.

In November 2005, *Ha'aretz*, Israel's newspaper of record, revealed that Moskowitz was behind a plan to build ninety housing units with a synagogue, a nine-dunum (2.5 acres) private garden, and kindergarten in an expanded Shimon Hatzadik area within the Palestinian neighborhood of Shayk Jarrah and around the Shepherd's Hotel, bought by Moskowitz in 1985. He is also responsible for constructing a new Jewish neighborhood in the Old City, and he has bought land around the Palestinian neighborhood of ABU DIS for another Jewish neighborhood known as Kidmat Tziyon. Reportedly Moskowitz also bought two hotels near the Jaffa Gate from the GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH. Moskowitz also financially supported and lobbied for the controversial restoration and opening in September 1996 of the HASMONEAN TUNNEL, which runs under the Muslim holy site of al-Haram ash-Sharif. So provocative was this event that demonstrations erupted throughout the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in response, and some seventy Palestinians and fifteen Israeli soldiers were killed.

About 1,600 Jewish settlers live in East Jerusalem, and all of them support a Jewish Jerusalem, not a city shared with the Palestinians. They are hostile to the peace process, and some have Messianic aspirations regarding the Temple Mount. There have been almost constant conflicts between the settlers and the local Palestinian population—because the settlers take over Palestinian homes and because they establish their colonies in the heart of Arab neighborhoods. One of the most contentious sites is Moskowitz's Ma'aleh HaZeitim (Olive Heights), consisting of 132 residential units, a synagogue, *Mikveh* (ritual bath), and attractive public spaces within the Palestinian neighborhood of Ras al-Amud in East Jerusalem. Ma'aleh HaZeitim was intended to obstruct the BEILIN–ABU MAZEN ACCORD of 1995, which would allow Palestinians to travel from Abu Dis and Azzariyeh to al-Haram ash-Sharif and all the way to the JERICHO road without passing through Jewish communities. Such a corridor would have given Palestinians direct access to Muslim and Christian holy sites in the Old City of Jerusalem without crossing sovereign Israeli territory. But Ma'aleh HaZeitim connects the settlements of Ir David (City of David, in the Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan) with Har HaZeitim (Mount of Olives) and Har HaTzofim (Mount Scopus), thus providing a continuously expanding, contiguous Jewish presence between the Old City and Abu

Dis/Azzariyeh. Moskowitz is a personal friend of former Jerusalem mayor and former prime minister EHUD OLMERT and was close to former prime minister ARIEL SHARON; consequently Ma'aleh HaZeitim won extraordinary construction rights from both the Housing Ministry and the city.

In July 2004 the government ruled that the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW applied in East Jerusalem; however, in 2005 the Israeli attorney general handed down a decision that effectively annulled the ruling. The state had already informed Palestinians who sought access to their land in Jerusalem that they were considered absentees and therefore the land no longer belonged to them. Moreover, Moskowitz's son-in-law, Arieh King, the head of the MOLEDET PARTY branch at the Hebrew University and Moskowitz's right-hand man in Jerusalem, dismissed the attorney general's decision because high-ranking officials in the LIKUD opposed it, believing that it would not be taken seriously. "After all, the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY will not abide by what Mazuz [the Attorney General] says," King stated. "He does what the minister says. With all respect, this is a ministerial decision. They can decide whatever they want. I know from the treasury and from [NATAN] SHARANSKY's ministry that from their point of view, nothing has changed and he [Mazuz] doesn't decide for them. I understood from them, from their people, that to apply the law [of absentee property] and to enforce the law in East Jerusalem is legal and therefore there is no reason not to implement it."

In 2004 Moskowitz cooperated with Ateret Cohanim to build several dozen apartment units for Jews in Kidmat Tziyon in Abu Dis. Under Israel's previous LABOR government, there had been considerable progress in talks with the Palestinians to turn Abu Dis into the future Palestinian capital. A Jewish presence there will clearly thwart that option.

Moskowitz does not limit himself to settlement building but is also deeply involved in Israeli politics. He helped Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU financially, stating: "Yes, not much, and in the framework of the law, from my private funds." In 1995 he launched a movement called The Third Way, headed by Public Security Minister Avigdor Kahalani, who negotiated for Moskowitz the opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel. The Third Way subsequently became a political party that joined the Likud's ruling coalition in 1996–1999. Its platform supports the Jewish people's right to the land of Israel, Israel's right to retain territories captured in a defensive war, Israel as the national home of the Jewish people and as a democratic Jewish state committed to the protection of human rights, Israeli Jewish settlement as the basis for Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, the permanence of these settlements, Israel's right to defend its existence, and Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem. In 1996 Moskowitz gave $100,000 to the Likud Party's campaign, which (given Israel's electoral laws) probably came from his private funds.

Danny Seidemann, a Jerusalem lawyer who has opposed the settlers in court, contends that "the settlement movement in East Jerusalem would not have anything approaching its current achievement without the active assistance of Moskowitz. Even though his activities are limited geographically and in terms of members, they are qualitatively of a highly inflammatory potential."

See also KLUGMAN REPORT; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Mossad

The Mossad (Ha-Mossad le-Modi'in ule-Tafkidim Meyuhadim, Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks) is an Israeli intelligence agency responsible for intelligence collection and covert action, including paramilitary activities such as assassinations and counterterrorism. One of the world's most well-known intelligence agencies, it is often compared to the US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and Britain's MI6 and is known for its efficiency and ruthlessness. However, it has also been involved in several humiliating debacles, and the Mossad's liberal use of kidnappings and assassinations has led some outside of Israel to consider its actions thuggish, although in Israel it is highly respected. The Mossad's mandate is to carry out operations outside of Israel, mainly focusing on the Arab states and Arab organizations throughout the world, but in recent years it has also been active in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

Formed in December 1949 as the Central Institute for Coordination by Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION, it was reorganized in March 1951 and made a part of the Prime Minister's Office that reported directly to the prime minister. The Mossad is headquartered in Tel Aviv and has eight departments with a staff estimated at approximately 1,200. In its operations, the Mossad has had a variety of objectives. For example, in the early 1950s the Mossad recruited agents to bomb US buildings in Cairo, Egypt, hoping to disrupt relations between the UNITED STATES and JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR'S EGYPT (the LAVON AFFAIR). In 1984 the Mossad detonated bombs outside the US embassy in Riyadh, SAUDI ARABIA's capital city, and claimed credit in the name of an unknown radical Saudi resistance group, in an effort, similar to that in Egypt, to weaken US-Saudi relations by attempting to show the United States that the Saudi regime was fragile and about to fall. Other objectives include a variety of operations to enhance Israel's security.

Some of the Mossad's better-known operations—successful and unsuccessful—have included the following:

- Locating and kidnapping Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann
- Planning and negotiating the IMMIGRATION of Ethiopian Jews to Israel, which was being blocked by the Ethiopian government
- Assassinating individuals Israel considered responsible for the massacre at the 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS
- Killing a Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, Norway, whom the Mossad apparently mistook for 'ALI HASAN SALAMAH, a PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) intelligence chief suspected of masterminding the killing of eleven Israeli athletes in Munich (in January 1996, Israel paid undisclosed damages to the man's family but refused to admit responsibility for the killing)
- Kidnapping MORDECHAI VANUNU in Italy after he passed detailed secret information concerning Israel's NUCLEAR PROGRAM to the *London Times*
- Providing highly sensitive information about IRAQ's Osiraq nuclear reactor, which Israel then destroyed in an air strike in 1981
- Providing intelligence for Israeli military operations in far-flung places, for instance, for Operation ENTEBBE
- Assassinating PLO-FATAH leader ABU JIHAD in Tunis in 1988
- Assassinating Gerald Bull, a ballistic missile scientist who was reportedly under contract to the Iraqi military to design and build a "super gun"
- Stealing passports from individuals in other countries for use in other covert operations
- Assassinating the head of the Palestinian militant group ISLAMIC JIHAD, Fathi al-Shikai, in Malta in October 1995

One of the Mossad's notable operations was its 1997 attempt to assassinate KHALID MESHAL, a

Palestinian HAMAS leader, on the streets of Amman, JORDAN. On 19 September members of the Israeli hit squad arrived in Amman; two from New York were registered as Canadian tourists and four others came from Europe, three with Canadian passports and the fourth on a French passport. The four from Europe posed as businessmen and had forged Egyptian passports to be left behind in the event of an accident—to point a finger away from Israel. The two assassins, who used the aliases Shawn Kendall and Barry Beads and pretended to be tourists, accosted Meshal on 25 September as he entered his office in Amman, and placed a pressure-gas injector against his neck that released a toxin that immediately penetrated the skin. As the assassins fled, one of Meshal's two bodyguards, Mohammad Abu Saif, sprinted after them and, with the help of a Jordanian security guard, caught the two triggermen and delivered them to the police. By then Meshal was in the hospital in critical condition.

When the other members of the Mossad hit team realized what had happened, they took refuge in the Israeli Embassy in Amman. At the same time, Jordanian police officers became suspicious when the two assassins in custody refused assistance from the Canadian Embassy. After several hours of intense interrogation, the two men broke down and admitted their real identity. Soon the Israeli government began negotiations with Jordan in an attempt to control the damage to their interests. King Husayn warned that if Meshal died, Jordan would try the assassins and have them publicly hanged for murder, an act that Israel could avoid by providing the antidote for the toxin. But the Israelis refused even to name the toxin, while insisting on the release of their agents. Husayn then asked US president BILL CLINTON to intervene, and the president pressured Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to name the poison. When the Jordanians applied the antidote, Meshal's life was saved.

As quid pro quo the Jordanian government allowed the Mossad backup team to leave for Israel. By then, news of the assassination attempt had reached the media, and events moved rapidly. The king was ready to break off diplomatic relations with Israel in retaliation for Netanyahu's failure to follow former prime minister YITZHAK RABIN's promise that the Mossad would not operate on Jordanian soil. To forestall that rupture, Netanyahu and some cabinet members traveled to Amman for secret negotiations with the king's brother, Crown Prince Hassan. Netanyahu suggested that if he released the spiritual leader of Hamas, SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, the king would be seen as the man who negotiated his release. That offer started the negotiations, and Netanyahu at first believed that he had secured the release of his two jailed agents. The Jordanians, however, insisted on getting more.

Meanwhile, the news that the Mossad hit squad had used Canadian passports irritated the Canadian government. After it was revealed that Canadian passports had been used in Mossad operations in Cyprus in the mid-1980s and one in Lillehammer in the 1970s, the Israeli government promised Canada not to use them again. This time Canada recalled its ambassador to Israel "for consultation" and contemplated other measures. After Yasin was released and returned to GAZA, and Israel released twenty Hamas members accused of TERRORISM and promised fifty more releases, the Jordanians returned the Mossad assassins, and the story, which the Israeli media called "the Jordanian affair," came to an end.

After the Meshal fiasco, Israel was reluctant to carry out assassinations on the home territory of allied and neighboring states. Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON, however, reversed the policy in 2003 to take a more aggressive approach against terrorism, a policy change revealed by former Mossad agents in interviews with United Press International (UPI) and later confirmed by US intelligence officials. (Officially Israel has refused to confirm or deny the new policy.) One Mossad official told UPI the policy shift was prompted by "a huge budget" increase for the agency as part of "a tougher stance in fighting global jihad (or holy war)." Another said the policy raised the potential for killings in countries with close ties to Israel, including the United States, Britain, and Australia.

Since the First INTIFADA (1987–1993) the Mossad has been active in the Occupied Territories, operating as part of a network of Israeli army intelligence, air force intelligence, and SHIN BET (the internal security service). These agencies cooperate, provide each other information, and sometimes carry out joint operations. At the time Israeli leaders wanted to weaken Palestinian nationalism—specifically the PLO—and the Mossad helped to create Hamas, believing the Islamic organization would be a religious counter to political nationalism. During the Second, or AL-AQSA, INTIFADA

(starting in 2000), TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS against Palestinians became routine, many carried out by a small group of Mossad operatives who masquerade as Palestinians to infiltrate neighborhoods and fulfill their missions. The Mossad (as well as Shin Bet) has proved adept at finding COLLABORATORS by using deception, bribery, threatened family shame/dishonor, and other questionable tactics.

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Movement for the Preparation of the Temple

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Movement of Arab Nationalists

The Movement of Arab Nationalists (Harakat Al-Qawmiyyin Al-'Arab, MAN) emerged in the late 1940s and early 1950s on the campus of the American University of Beirut (LEBANON) in reaction to the creation of Israel and the loss of Palestine. The movement is associated with GEORGE HABASH, who was a medical student in Beirut at the time, and his comrade, the Syrian revolutionary Hani al-Hindi. Habash, Hindi, and a group of young Arab nationalists were influenced by the philosophy of Qustantin Zurayq, a prominent Syrian intellectual and educator who attempted to infuse Arab political thought with the secular, modern ideas of European rationalism. MAN's ideology, which owed much to Zurayq's thinking, was revolutionary and pan-Arabist. It was committed to socialism and secularism, and it emphasized the formation of a nationally conscious intellectual elite that would be the vanguard of a revolution of Arab consciousness, which would lead to Arab unity and social progress. Its Arab nationalist approach produced an uncompromising hostility to Western imperialism in general and to Israel in particular.

In the early 1950s the movement was loosely organized around the leadership of Habash and Hindi. After attaining his medical degree Habash, together with medical graduate WADI' HADDAD, became active in the Palestinian REFUGEE camps in JORDAN. The two set up clinics that provided free care, but they also recruited refugees to join MAN, a practice later used by various Palestinian organizations after the Arab defeat in the 1967 WAR. In the late 1950s, MAN closely aligned itself with the regime of Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, an alliance it did not break even after Egypt's defeat in 1967. MAN was one of the first true pan-Arab organizations, disregarding the boundaries between individual Arab states and including Arabs throughout the region participating in its political activities, which sometimes included conspiracies in various Arab countries. In 1967, Habash transformed MAN into the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, which reflected most of its ideals and principles.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Movement of Democratic Women for Israel

The Movement of Democratic Women for Israel (TANDI) is an alliance of two organizations: Women's Awakening, founded in 1948 as an Arab women's organization in Israel, and the Progressive Democratic Organization of Jewish Women. Both had the same goals and mission and believed that their alliance would increase their chances of success. As a result TANDI was created in the early 1970s, and the following goals were ratified and signed by some 5,000 women in 1973: a just peace in the region and the world with coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis; equal rights for women in all areas of life—society, politics, and the workplace; and protection of children's rights, assuring them a peaceful and secure future. TANDI supports an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel as a way to resolve the conflict in the region and achieve a just peace. It is concerned about the national rights of Arabs in Israel and works for their complete equality. (www.hri.ca/organizations/viewOrg.asp?ID=4086).

Moyne, Lord (Walter Edward Guinness) (1880–1944)

First Lord Moyne (Walter Edward Guinness, 1st Baron Moyne), was a British politician and minister residing in the Middle East, who was assassinated in Cairo in 1944 by members of the Jewish underground Stern Gang/LEHI. Although the Stern Gang had targeted BRITISH MANDATE personnel since its inception in 1940, Lord Moyne, an ally and close personal friend of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was the first high-profile British official murdered by the group. He may have been targeted because he was known to be an ANTI-ZIONIST in British politics, was stationed in Cairo (a short distance from Palestine), and was one of the highest-ranking British colonial officials in the region.

The assassination on 6 November 1944 did not change British policy, but it significantly cooled Churchill's approval of ZIONISM. In the end the action hurt LEHI very little. The Conservatives fell from power in Britain that year, and in Palestine, resistance increased against the British, with LEHI joining MENAHEM BEGIN's Etzel/IRGUN and the HAGANA of DAVID BEN-GURION in the JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. The actual assassins, Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet Zuri, were caught and hanged by the British in 1945.

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Al-Mu'arada

See NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY

Al-Mubadara

See PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INITIATIVE

Mubarak, Muhammad Hosni Said (1928–)

Muhammad Hosni Said Mubarak, commonly known as Hosni Mubarak, was a career military leader in the Egyptian air force before he became the president of EGYPT on 14 October 1981, following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He trained at the Egyptian Military Academy and at the Soviet Pilot Training School in Frunze (currently Bishkek) in Soviet Kyrgyzstan. In 1981 he became party chairman of the National Democratic Party.

In 1989 Mubarak brought Egypt back into the ARAB LEAGUE, ending ten years of exclusion following Sadat's peace treaty with Israel, and relocated the League's headquarters to its original setting in Cairo. Domestically, he has pursued severe policies against militant Islamists and the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD and has resisted grassroots efforts to democratize Egypt. Internationally,

Mubarak has pursued close relations with the UNITED STATES and Israel throughout his presidency. Before the 1991 GULF WAR, Mubarak supported the UNITED NATIONS sanctions against IRAQ after its occupation of KUWAIT; Egypt participated in the war with 38,500 troops and was part of the postwar efforts to stabilize the Gulf region.

Since 1979 the United States has provided Egypt with $1.3 billion a year in military aid, and an average of $815 million a year in economic assistance. All told, Egypt has received over $50 billion in US aid since 1975. Additionally, each year USAID gives $200 million to the Egyptian government in cash handouts, conditional upon economic reforms in problem areas such as deregulation, privatization, and free trade.

In 1993 Mubarak's government advised the Palestinians during talks in Norway, which led to the OSLO ACCORDS of the same year. Thereafter and through the present, Mubarak has been deeply involved in attempts to bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

See also EGYPT

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Munich Olympics, 1972

During the Munich Olympics of 1972 a faction of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) called the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION (BSO) took hostage nine Israeli Jewish athletes, who were later killed in a firefight, as were five of the kidnappers and one German policeman.

On the morning of 5 September 1972, with six days left in the Summer Olympic Games, five Palestinians wearing track sweat suits climbed the six-foot-six-inch fence surrounding the Olympic Village in Munich, GERMANY. These five were met by three more men who are presumed to have obtained credentials to enter the village. The Palestinians knocked on the door of Israeli wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg, who immediately realized something was wrong and shouted a warning to his comrades. He and weightlifter Joseph Romano attempted to block the door while other Israelis escaped, but Weinberg and Romano were killed by the terrorists. After the Palestinians captured nine Israelis to hold as hostages, they demanded that Israel release over 200 Palestinian prisoners and that they be given safe passage out of Germany.

After hours of tense and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations with German police, the Palestinians agreed to be taken by helicopter to the NATO air base at Fürstenfeldbruck, where an airplane would fly them and their hostages to Cairo, EGYPT. But when the helicopters carrying the hostages and kidnappers landed, German police attempted to ambush the Palestinians and a bloody firefight ensued. One helicopter was blown up by a terrorist grenade, and the remaining hostages in the second helicopter were shot to death. All nine Israeli hostages and one German policeman were killed. Five of the kidnappers were killed and three were captured. There remains debate over whether some hostages were accidentally killed by shots from the German police.

A little over a month later, on 29 October, a German Lufthansa jet was hijacked by Palestinians, who demanded that the Munich killers be released. The Germans agreed, and the three terrorists were released.

Within days of the massacre Israeli prime minister GOLDA MEIR and the Israeli Defense Committee made a secret decision authorizing the Israeli intelligence agency MOSSAD to kill Black September and POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) operatives, although there is little or no evidence that the PFLP was involved in the Munich massacre. Indeed, Israeli analyst URI AVNERY states that "the Palestinians who were killed in revenge for Munich, had nothing to do with the affair. The Mossad was looking for easy targets and chose PLO diplomats posted to European capitals and who were quite unprotected." In revenge missions that became known as Operation Wrath of God (Mitzvah Elohim), the Mossad established a special hit team, aided by the

agency's stations in Europe, to locate and eliminate targeted operatives. According to Israeli historian Benny Morris, the Mossad compiled its target list using information from former PLO personnel and friendly European intelligence services, placing at the top Wael 'Aadel Zwaiter, a suspected member of Black September and the official PLO representative in Italy, who was shot and killed on 16 October by Mossad forces. However, ABU IYAD, the PLO's deputy chief and chief of intelligence who was a prime mover in Black September, later wrote that Zwaiter was not connected to Black September and had "fiercely opposed . . . all forms of TERRORISM." Zwaiter's death was followed by letter bombs sent to PLO representatives in Algeria and Libya, to Palestinians in Bonn and Copenhagen, and to a Red Cross representative in Stockholm, although none were fatal. On 8 December 1972 the PLO's representative in Paris, Mohammad Ham-shiri, was killed by a radio-detonated bomb under his desk. Over the next three months four PLO, PFLP, and PFLP–General Command operatives were killed in Cyprus, Greece, and Paris.

On 9 April 1973, Israel launched Operation Springtime of Youth, a joint Mossad–Israel Defense Forces operation in Beirut, Lebanon. The targets were YUSIF AL-MUHAMMAD NAJJAR (Abu Yusif), head of Fatah's intelligence arm; KAMAL 'UDWAN, head of the PLO's Western Sector, which oversaw PLO action inside Israel; and KAMAL NASIR, the PLO spokesman—none of whom can be linked to Munich. Two detachments of commandos blew up the PFLP's headquarters in Beirut and a Fatah explosives plant. On 28 June 1973 the Algerian-born alleged director of operations for Black September in Europe, Mohammad Boudia, was killed by a car bomb in Paris. In Norway on 21 July 1973, in the so-called Lillehammer affair, a team of Mossad agents killed Ahmed Bouchikhi, a Moroccan man unrelated to the Munich attack, after an informant mistakenly identified Bouchikhi as 'ALI HASAN SALAMAH, a Black September operative. On 22 January 1979 the Mossad found and killed Salamah in Beirut using a remote-controlled car bomb.

British author Simon Reeve writes that the Israeli revenge operations continued for more than twenty years. He details the assassination in Paris in 1992 of the PLO's head of intelligence and says that an Israeli general stated there was a link back to Munich. Reeve also writes that while Israeli officials have stated that Operation Wrath of God was intended to extract vengeance for the families of the athletes killed in Munich, "few [Israeli] relatives wanted such a violent reckoning with the Palestinians." Reeve writes that the families were instead desperate to know the truth of the events surrounding the Munich massacre, and he proceeds to outline what he sees as a lengthy cover-up by German authorities.

The mastermind of the massacre remains at large. In his autobiography (written in 1999), Mohammed Oudeh (Abu Daoud) admitted his role. He claims that the commandos never intended to harm the athletes and blamed their deaths on the German police and Meir's stubborn refusal to negotiate the prisoners' release.

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Municipal Jerusalem

See GREATER JERUSALEM

Municipal Services in Jerusalem

See JERUSALEM

Muragha, Sa'id Musa (Abu Musa) (1927–)

Abu Musa was the military chief of the FATAH dissidents in LEBANON in 1983. Born in JERUSALEM, he was trained at the British military academy Sandhurst and served in the Jordanian army, in which he fought the ZIONISTS in 1948. By 1970, he had turned against JORDAN, fighting with the Palestinians in the 1970 BLACK SEPTEMBER conflict that pitted the Palestinian *fida'iyyun* against the Jordanian army. His military ability was again evident in the civil war in Lebanon (1975–1990), where he fought with the Palestinians, and especially during the 1982 Israeli siege of West Beirut, when he orchestrated the city's defense. At the war's end, YASIR ARAFAT rewarded his courage by appointing him deputy chief of military operations and head of the Yarmuk brigade. Shortly thereafter he catalyzed the mutiny within Fatah.

His leadership of the dissidents came as a surprise to most, for he was thought to be apolitical and had previously demonstrated exemplary loyalty to the Fatah leadership. He was, however, deeply critical of the leadership's stance after the LEBANON WAR, especially when PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION chairman Yasir Arafat appointed his loyalists, known for their corruption and cowardice, over more capable officers. Musa began open criticism in May 1983, which led to a fracture of Fatah's forces and to open fighting in October 1983 in what is known as the FATAH UPRISING or Palestinian civil war.

See also LEBANON WAR, 1982

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Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood (The Society of the Muslim Brothers, al-Jama'at al-ikhwan al-muslimin, al-Ikhwan) is an Islamist organization that encourages the building of character in Muslim individuals. The first Muslim Brotherhood was founded in EGYPT in 1928, and since then, Muslim Brotherhoods have been established in all Middle Eastern countries as well as in other countries. The first Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine was formed in JERUSALEM in 1946, with groups springing up the same year in JAFFA, LYDDA, HAIFA, NABLUS, and Tulkarm. The Egyptian Brothers fought alongside the Arab armies during the 1948 WAR with Israel and demonstrated a degree of courage and valor lacking in most of the Arab forces. For this reason many Palestinian Muslims joined the movement after the war.

Founded by Hassan al-Banna, the Egyptian Brotherhood quickly became a large charitable and educational organization as well as a major political opposition group, campaigning against political and social injustice and against British imperial rule, as well as articulating a conception of Islam that attempted to restore the broken links between tradition and modernity. By the end of the 1940s the Egyptian Brothers were believed to have had as many as a million members. The Muslim Brothers believe in grassroots work rather than following Islamic edicts, and in teaching people about Islam, with the hope that an Islamic state would arise, rather than imposing such a state. With a few exceptions, the Brotherhood's leaders and members have demonstrated a commitment to a nonviolent, reformist approach to Islamism. (For this reason, militant Islamic groups such as ISLAMIC JIHAD, HAMAS, and others, although their roots may be in the Brotherhood, represent distinct offshoots.)

Despite the Muslim Brothers' stated commitment to nonviolence, they are illegal in almost every Arab country as opposition parties. In Egypt the movement has been tolerated to varying degrees since 1954, but is still periodically subjected to mass arrests that include torture. Nevertheless, the Brotherhood remains Egypt's most popular opposition group and continues to call for a more open and democratic political system. In the early 1980s the Brotherhood was brutally repressed in SYRIA by the Hafez al-Assad regime.

The main objectives of the Brotherhood include building the Muslim individual (emphasizing the development of a strong body, good manners, cultured thought, economic productivity, strong faith, correct worship, efficient use of time, aid to others, organization, and self-struggling character) and also the Muslim family, society, state, and Khalifa (caliph).

See also HAMAS; ISLAMIC JIHAD MOVEMENT

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Muslim-Christian Associations

Muslim-Christian Associations (MCAs) were active in Palestine during the BRITISH MANDATE years as nationalist organizations opposed to ZIONISM. Their activities emphasized a growing Palestinian nationalism that transcended their members' religious ties. The first society was formed in JAFFA in 1918, followed shortly by one in JERUSALEM—both fueled by the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine.

The years 1917–1920 saw the emergence of Muslim-Christian Associations in all the leading towns of Palestine, with the purpose of placing pressure first on the Paris Peace Conference and then on the British government to abrogate the Balfour Declaration. Like the Arab nationalists, the members of the MCAs initially demanded a united SYRIA, but after Britain imposed the Mandate, they supported Palestinian nationalism rather than pan-Arabism.

At the Third Palestinian Congress, in December 1920, the MCA became the main organizational framework for the Palestinian Arab national movement. From the start, the MCA intended to establish itself as a body representing the Palestinian Arab population and as an organization taking a public stand on the country's future. The appointment of two Christian vice presidents—Ya'qub Farraj (a GREEK ORTHODOX from Jerusalem) and Tawfiq Abdallah (of ACRE)—alongside the Muslim president of the ARAB EXECUTIVE Council (MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI) demonstrates the leading role Arab Christians played during the years of the Mandate.

Like Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs were involved in many aspects of the national struggle, including active resistance, forming parties and political organizations, assuming the responsibilities of leadership, producing manuscripts, contributing to education and national guidance, and financing the national movement. A long-established Christian organization, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and a Greek Orthodox youth group (both of which admitted Muslims) were also important political instruments for mobilizing the public behind the Palestinian nationalist leadership.

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Musrara

The JERUSALEM neighborhood of Musrara, on the boundary between the eastern and western sectors of the city (between the Damascus Gate and Hanevi'im Street) is one of several areas of Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the fate of the city. Musrara was originally developed by Palestinian Arabs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Wealthy Arabs built the earliest homes there during this era. Later in the twentieth century, Jews built homes there too, and Musrara became a mixed (Jewish/Arab) community. As a consequence of the 1948 WAR the Palestinian residents fled or were expelled, and Musrara was divided as Jerusalem was divided into Jordanian East Jerusalem and Israeli West Jerusalem.

Beginning in the 1950s, Israel settled immigrant MIZRAHI/Oriental Jews from North Africa in west Musrara, but due to its peripheral status at the border with the then-Jordanian side of Jerusalem, Israel ignored the neighborhood in terms of housing, education, employment opportunities, and so on. Insofar as the authorities paid any attention to Musrara, it was related to issues of security. At the beginning of the 1967 WAR, west Musrara housed 650 Mizrahi immigrant families, most of whom were economically impoverished. When East Jerusalem was conquered and annexed after that war, Palestinian/Jordanian east Musrara was reunited with the Jewish/Israeli sector of Musrara.

In the 1970s the disenchanted Jewish youth of Musrara established the Israeli "Black Panther Movement," fashioned after the African-American group in the UNITED STATES with the same name. The young leaders demanded from the establishment equal services and opportunities for the Jews of Sephardi/Oriental background. The social and economic divide between Eastern European ASHKENAZI Jews and those of Spanish-Arab descent still lingers within Israel, but the Black Panthers helped to bring those issues to the fore. Musrara became a "Project Renewal" neighborhood for the Los Angeles Jewish Federation and along with support from the government, money was invested to build better schools, playgrounds, and community areas for the Jewish residents.

By 1990, Jewish Musrara had undergone a process of renewal. Artists, young families, and Israelis wanting to return to the city began renovating the old houses and building new modern apartments. Five minutes' walking distance to the OLD CITY and the center of downtown Jerusalem, Musrara is close to family-owned markets, coffee shops, and restaurants, and prides itself on being a charming historic neighborhood.

During the same period, the Palestinian sector of Musrara grew increasingly impoverished, marginalized, and isolated, while "renovating the old houses" involved their takeover by organized settler organizations whose goal is the Judaization of all Jerusalem. Moreover, Palestinians in Musrara had become the object of personal attacks.

In 1999 the Zionist settler group Mishbi Tzion occupied a Palestinian house in the Palestinian Musrara neighborhood, endeavoring to create continuity between Musrara and other Jewish neighborhoods in the vicinity. The ISRAELI SUPREME COURT ruled against the Palestinian family living there who claimed ownership, opining that they did not have rights to the property. The court ordered that the house be expropriated from the Palestinians. After the ruling, Israeli police prepared for another takeover by a Jewish family of another Palestinian-owned property in Arab Musrara. The settlers are backed by the organization NATIONAL UNION–YISRAEL BEITENU, run by member of the Knesset BEN YAMIN ELON.

In 2002, *Ha'aretz* reported that over the past few months, the HOMOT SHALEM ASSOCIATION, backed by Knesset member Elon, had secured Jewish rights to approximately one-third of Palestinian Musrara. In addition to the residences noted above, a number of vacant lots alongside the purchased structures had been bought, and the association has plans to build on them in the future. It also reported that Elon plans to hold a ceremony at the site to mark its population by Jews.

Elon told *Ha'aretz* that the association's activities were just another small step toward "returning Zion to Jerusalem." He added that soon a second area in the neighborhood would also be populated by Jews. He refused to elaborate, but *Ha'aretz* discovered that Elon and his supported organization had managed to secure ownership rights to ten compounds and courtyards out of the thirty in the Palestinian Musrara neighborhood, which cover some 18 dunums (4.5 acres). Some of the properties are now privately owned by Jews, while others are being held by the custodian-general.

Palestinians currently reside in almost all the apartments, but the association says it intends to conduct talks with the tenants and convince them to vacate their homes by consent. However, settler harassment against Palestinian residents of Musrara, in an attempt to drive them out, is well documented and includes verbal and physical abuse as well as the use of explosives on multiple occasions, which for the most part has been ignored by the municipal and police authorities.

See also HOLY BASIN; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SETTLER VIOLENCE; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Mutasarrifiyya (Little Lebanon)

The Mutasarrifiyya was an autonomous area of Mount Lebanon from 1861 through the end of World War I (1918) that was established by the FRENCH with OTTOMAN approval for the benefit of the Christian MARONITE and Druze communities. Governed by an executive administrative council, it was a weak entity and required constant military protection. It was not able to sustain itself economically, which led, in turn, to political instability. To minimize tensions between Sunni and Shi'a sects, the frontiers of the Mutasarrifiyya excluded Sunni cities such as Beirut and Tripoli, which rejected the idea of local autonomy under the control of the European powers, especially because the region was under Maronite dominance. The Mutasarrifiyya lasted until the establishment of Greater Lebanon in the French Mandate of 1920.

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Muwatin

Muwatin (Citizen, the Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy) was established in January 1992 in Ramallah, WEST BANK, to promote the study and development of democracy in Palestine and the region. Founded by a group of scholars and academics, its aim is to foster the process of democratic transformation in Palestinian society in particular and in Arab society in general. Muwatin's objectives include initiating a wide-ranging critical debate on democratic issues and options and providing a public forum for debate on the need for the democratic transformation of Palestinian political and civil life; building a strong research community in Palestine that will produce original studies, including policy-oriented research, to influence policy formulation; and rebuilding the links between Palestinian and Arab intellectuals. (www.muwatin.org).

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Al-Nabi Musa Demonstrations, 1920

The April 1920 al-Nabi Musa demonstrations in JERUSALEM were one of several Palestinian protests that year against Zionist IMMIGRATION and colonization. In the Muslim religious festival of al-Nabi Musa (Prophet Moses), worshipers traditionally walked in a procession from Jerusalem to Moses' burial site near JERICHO, but this time it degenerated into violence between Muslims and Jews. On 8 March, Faysal bin Husayn had been proclaimed king of SYRIA (and Palestine), and during the al-Nabi Musa holiday, Muslim leader AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI added to the local conflict by raising a portrait of Faysal and shouting "Here is our king." The crowd replied with "Allah save the king" and ran through the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem, leaving five Jews and four Palestinians dead.

In response the British punished several Palestinian leaders, most notably removing the mayor of Jerusalem, MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI, whom they had appointed in March 1918. According to the British, a speech by Musa Kazim, in which he supported the government of Faysal in Damascus, was treason. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni was reprimanded, too, but he was able to persuade the British of his loyalty to them and was subsequently appointed by the British to several high positions.

Britain then established the PALIN COMMISSION to investigate the origins of the al-Nabi Musa violence. The commission concluded that the conflict grew out of Palestinian nationalist frustration and the Palestinians' belief that the British would not keep what the Arabs saw as promises made in World War I (the HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE) for an independent and united Arab world. Additionally, the Palin Commission noted the Palestinians' fear of Zionist objectives in Palestine and criticized the "arrogance" of the Zionist leaders.

Other Palestinian demonstrations in 1920 included a February protest at the first official public reading in Palestine of the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine; March demonstrations supporting the proclamation of independence by the second ARAB CONGRESS meeting in Damascus; and a November protest on the third anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. In May 1921, worker demonstrations took place in JAFFA and neighboring areas.

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Nablus

Nablus is a major WEST BANK city 63 kilometers (39 miles) north of JERUSALEM with a population of over 134,000 in 2008. According to the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel, it is controlled by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. The ancient part of the city, which dates back some 4,000 years, is located in the eastern sector of the modern city, in a site known as Tal Balatah. Nablus, the location of Joseph's Tomb and Jacob's Well, is a site of religious significance to the three major Abrahamic faiths—Jews refer to it as the biblical Shechem—and it is also a site of intense political and military struggle in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Within the city limits are three major refugee camps, which were built for the Palestinian REFUGEES from the 1948 WAR—Ein Beit el Ma, Balata, and Askar Al Quadim, plus the smaller Askar Al Jadid—with a total population of more than 34,000 inhabitants.

The Nablus area has been an important target of the settlement movement, and in 2009 there were fourteen Jewish SETTLEMENTS there, including Itamar, Yizhar, ELON MOREH, Har Bracha, and twenty-six OUTPOSTS. SETTLER VIOLENCE here is second only to that in the HEBRON area. The

settlements are connected to each other by a series of bypass ROADS, used almost exclusively by the settlers, which stretch around the city.

History

Between the Middle Bronze Age and the late Hellenic period, Nablus was a prosperous commercial center because of its position along vital trade routes through the region. It produced grapes, olives, wheat, livestock, and pottery. Archaeological evidence indicates that the city was razed and reconstructed up to twenty-two times. The present city of Nablus was founded in 72 CE by the Romans. In the fifth and sixth centuries CE the emperor Zeno built a church—Maria Theotokos—on the summit of one of Nablus's mountains. The city was called Neapolis (Naples) by the Byzantines. In 636 the Arabs conquered the city and renamed it Nablus, and in 1099 the Crusaders conquered it and built several churches. After the Muslim leader SALADIN retook the city in 1187, Nablus became a mixed town of Muslims, Christians, and Jews, and it also became the center of the SAMARITAN community, as it is today. During OTTOMAN rule Nablus was the first capital of one of four districts in the Syria-Palestine province.

The historic Old City is filled with important cultural and religious sites from these various eras. In addition to the sacred places mentioned above, there is an Ayyubid mausoleum, Ottoman-era structures including two major marketplaces, Turkish bath houses, olive-oil soap factories, and over two thousand historic houses and palaces. Visible Roman ruins lie outside the Old City, and a Roman-era aqueduct system runs under the city, part of which had recently been preserved by the Nablus municipality and is open to visitors. There are also several monuments within the Old City dating back to the Byzantine era and the Crusader period. There are eighteen Islamic monuments and eleven mosques in the Old City alone, nine of which were established in the fifteenth century. Nablus contains a Greek Orthodox church dedicated to Saint Justin the Martyr, built in 1898, and an ancient Samaritan synagogue, which is still in use.

From the sixteenth century, cotton was the primary commodity in Nablus's trade with Europe, mainly with FRANCE. When the cotton trade began to decline in the mid-nineteenth century, other products, including olive oil and soap, overtook cotton as primary commodities. Powerful merchant families controlled the rural-urban network through capital investment, moneylending contracts, and a reconfiguration of the traditional patron-client relationship between peasants and the old ruling families. Soap-making prospered into the twentieth century, despite the growing prominence of the industry in coastal cities, the imposition of tariffs by EGYPT, and stiff competition from a new Jewish-owned soap and oil factory in HAIFA.

In 1927 an earthquake damaged many of the city's buildings, which were subsequently rebuilt. After World War I, Palestine became a BRITISH MANDATE, and Nablus was an active center of resistance against the British. After the 1948 War the city came under Jordanian occupation and was later captured by Israel in the 1967 WAR.

Nablus, traditionally a politicized city, was a center of opposition to the oppressive policies of the Ottoman government after the 1908 Young Turk revolution, was in the forefront of the early twentieth-century pan-Arab movement, took a leadership role in the general strike and ARAB REVOLT during the 1930s, and was a center of anti-British resistance during the Mandate. This tradition has continued through both the First and especially the Second (al-Aqsa) Intifadas.

Nablus and the al-Aqsa Intifada

Nablus experienced intense violence between the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and Palestinian militant groups during the Second Intifada. It is home to units of the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES (a FATAH splinter group), the IZZ-AL-DIN AL-QASSAM BRIGADE (HAMAS's military wing), the Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades (a small faction from the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE), and ISLAMIC JIHAD. Israel believes that some SUICIDE BOMBERS have come from here and repeatedly cites security concerns as the main factor behind its continuous punishment of Nablus. Indeed, in the years 2000–2008, Nablus was one of the most relentlessly targeted areas, experiencing the highest number of casualties, the most severe physical damage, and the most intense RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT in the West Bank. According to Gideon Levy writing in *Ha'aretz* in 2008, "a thousand residents of Nablus were killed in the Second Intifada."

In 2006 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

produced a summary of aspects of the Intifada as they affected Nablus from 2000 to 2005:

- At least eight large-scale Israeli military incursions
- 522 fatalities (militants and civilians)
- 3,108 injured (mostly civilians)
- 894 houses and buildings destroyed (including "punitive" home demolitions)
- 8,161 houses and buildings severely damaged
- 149 cultural and religious sites destroyed (mostly in the historic Old City)
- 2,000 cultural and religious sites severely damaged (mostly in the historic Old City)
- CURFEW for a total of 240 days—the longest curfew (April to November 2002) lasted 151 days, lifted only every few days for a total of 65 hours
- 53 closure obstacles (earth mounds, concrete blocks, CHECKPOINTS, road gates, and trenches), isolating Nablus from the outside world
- Numerous CLOSURES restricting all movement into and out of the city
- The BARRIER, making access to Israeli markets for Nablus goods more difficult
- Seven permanent checkpoints that required PERMITS to pass

The ratio of Israeli power to Palestinian power in 2000–2005 (throughout the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES) was at least 100:1 in Israel's favor, in terms of raw conventional military strength, without taking into account Israel's nonconventional military capabilities.

OCHA concluded: "The extensive duration and sweeping nature of the restrictions caused extensive, profound harm and affected fundamental aspects of the fabric of life in [Nablus]: many of the residents lost their jobs and the ability to support their families; pupils and students were not able to complete their studies and exams; residents of nearby villages were unable to receive regular medical care or other basic services; many persons found themselves separated from their families living outside the besieged area, and so forth and so on."

On 25 February 2007 the IDF once again launched a major offensive in Nablus named Operation Hot Winter. According to the IDF the operation was intended "to undermine the terrorist infrastructure" in Nablus, which they dubbed the "Palestinian terror capital." Senior Central Command sources said the operation could last "indefinitely." In addition to the usual arrests, home demolitions, and so forth, during this operation the IDF raided municipal buildings, charities, and health clinics hunting "wanted" men.

Five months later, beginning on 7 July 2007 and lasting nine days, the IDF initiated a new campaign in Nablus, raiding several popular organizations and imposing long-term closures on alleged Hamas-affiliated organizations. Among the institutions locked down were the Municipality Council, the city shopping mall, schools, six charities, orphanages, health centers, media organizations, and six mosques. In all of these locations the premises were ransacked and computers, documents, and money were confiscated. Beyond the material assaults, the IDF imposed an arbitrary closure for two or three years on individual organizations, marking the beginning of a harsh campaign against charities and other organizations. Most owners of the destroyed places issued press releases refuting the Israeli accusations of their being Hamas-affiliated, even pointing out that many had been founded years prior to the creation of the Hamas movement.

The city's mall, a modern five-story complex composed of some 50 privately owned shops and offices, was closed by Israel, which asserted that the shops and companies located there funded the Hamas movement and "encouraged TERRORISM." The IDF posted closure notices on the windows of shops, stating, "anyone found in this center will be considered as working on behalf of Hamas and puts himself and his properties in danger." This arbitrary order was slated to come into effect on 15 August, giving no more than a month to the storeowners to remove their businesses and find other locations. Significantly, the IDF further stated that "ownership of the Mall would be transferred to the Israeli authorities as of 18 August." By besieging the mall, issuing arbitrary laws, and transferring ownership to Israel, Israel was also attempting to weaken Palestinian control of the city.

On 23 September 2007, IDF forces initiated another operation targeting the "terror infrastructure" in the Ein Beit el Ma refugee camp in Nablus. Israeli troops remained inside Nablus for three months, during which there were more than 70 days of full 24-hour curfews.

By the end of 2008, according to the World Bank, the Nablus economy was suffering from a precarious lack of investment, largely because of Israeli restrictions on movement and despite

increased international aid. Palestinian per capita gross domestic product in 2007 was 40 percent lower than its peak in 1999, the report said. Investment "dropped to precariously low levels," with public investment having virtually ceased over the previous two years and private investment remaining stagnant after dropping 15 percent between 2005 and 2006.

The World Bank also noted the deleterious effect on agriculture writing that "the increasing number of walls, ROADBLOCKS, and checkpoints has made it increasingly difficult for farmers to access their lands and markets." The restrictions have raised the cost of transporting goods and importing agricultural supplies, while "produce destined for external markets frequently spoils as it is detained at checkpoints." Meanwhile, industrial development is hampered by limited access to LAND and WATER, as well as the difficulty in obtaining permits to build. The World Bank also pointed out the ENVIRONMENTAL impact of the restrictions on access, including creeping desertification caused by overgrazing in the limited area accessible to Palestinian herders. It added that the "lack of suitable site access for solid waste disposal causes the use of 'wildcat' disposal sites close [to] or inside the cities and villages, a practice that carries serious environmental and health dangers."

The years 2007–2008 saw an upsurge in settler violence in Nablus and the villages surrounding it. OCHA reported that within the first 10 months of 2008, it recorded 290 settler-related incidents targeting Palestinians and their property in the West Bank (up from 182 attacks in 2007 for all 12 months), 21 percent of which were in the Nablus area, including the burning of some 3,000 olive trees. The Nablus correspondent for the Palestinian News Network reported that, "using stones and bullets, the settlers hit residents as they were picking olives in their fields. Instead of stopping them, the occupying forces helped the settlers assault citizens and farmers."

The settlers for the most part hold either an ultranationalist or religious FUNDAMENTALIST ideology, both of which lead them to believe that the entire West Bank, which they call Judea and Samaria, is part of ERETZ YISRAEL (the whole land of Israel), which belongs to Jews according to God's covenant.

The following story, reported by Isabel Kershner in the *New York Times,* offers a fitting conclusion to an entry on Nablus. In the middle of one night she observed waves of "ardent Jewish settlers, religious women from central Israel, black-clad followers of Hasidic courts and groups of teenage boys and girls, almost a thousand of them in all, . . . crammed into a dozen buses and escorted by the Israeli military. The Jewish pilgrims slid quietly along deserted streets throughout the early hours . . . while the residents of Nablus slept. . . . The destination was the holy place known as Joseph's Tomb . . . in the heart of a residential district."

Kershner reported that "the first group arrived around midnight. Rushing through the darkness into the tomb, they crowded around the rough mound of the grave and started reciting Psalms by the glow of their cell phones, not waiting for the portable generator to power up a crude fluorescent light. They were praying to be infused with some of the righteousness of Joseph, as well as to be able to return [to Nablus]."

"To them," she wrote, "this is not Nablus, one of the largest Palestinian cities . . . but the site of the ancient biblical city of Shechem. The tomb, they believe, sits on the parcel of ground that Jacob bought for a hundred pieces of silver, according to Joshua 24:32, an inheritance of the children of Joseph, meaning that its ownership is not in doubt. Here, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is boiled down to its very essence of competing territorial, national and religious claims. The renewed focus on what the Jewish devotees call the pull or power of Joseph appears to reflect a wider trend: a move by the settler movement at large away from tired security arguments and a return to its fundamental raison d'être—the religious conviction that this land is the Jews' historical birthright and is not up for grabs.

"The local settlers say they are now working on establishing a routine. Since the beginning of the year . . . the newly elected mayor of the Samaria Council, which represents settlers in the northern West Bank, has made the resumption of regular visits a priority, coordinating with the army to organize entries at least once a month. 'Our hold on Joseph's Tomb strengthens our hold on the whole country,' said an employee of the council and a former administrator of the yeshiva at the tomb. Now their goal is to make the visits weekly, then to re-establish the kind of permanent presence that existed before 2000 so that the pilgrims will no longer have to come . . . 'like thieves in the night.'"

This illustration of the religious dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, supported by the Israeli military, demonstrates how difficult the conflict will be to resolve.

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—Betsy Folkins

Nahal

Nahal (Noar Halutzi Lohem, Fighting Pioneer Youth) is a unique Jewish military cadre that requires its members to perform both military service in a combat unit and civilian service in a newly founded KIBBUTZ, MOSHAV, or other SETTLEMENT. The goal of Nahal, established by DAVID BEN-GURION during the 1948 WAR out of the underground PALMAH, is to support both the military and colonization. Its function was to maintain *Gar'inim*—groups of youths united for founding new settlements or joining existing ones—with the objective of providing its soldiers with extensive military capability as well as the basic tools for life on a new settlement.

Since its establishment Nahal has helped found at least 108 new settlements and has assisted in the development of many more. Nahal settlements, established to secure Israel's BORDERS, play an important role in stopping Palestinian INFILTRATION. In the LEBANON WAR (1982), Nahal troops had a key role, fighting in all sectors of Lebanon, while Nahal paratroopers entered West Beirut. Inside Israel, Nahal soldiers performed more security-related duties than any other unit at the time.

In the early 1990s a special forces Nahal battalion was created to conduct operations in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. In the AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000) these troops were counterterrorist forces, raiding homes and hideouts and carrying out the most offensive operations of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES.

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Najjada

The Najjada (Helpers) was a nonpartisan Palestinian youth movement formed by Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari in October 1945. It was similar to, although less political than, the FUTUWWA movement backed by the AL-HUSAYNI FAMILY of

JERUSALEM. Both the Najjada and the Futuwwa organizations were modeled on Rover Scouting (similar to US Boy Scouts) and were strongly nationalist and ANTI-ZIONIST. Although they are frequently portrayed as paramilitary formations, there is little evidence to substantiate such assertions or to estimate their strength. When hostilities broke out in 1947 and the Palestinians improvised local militias for defending their towns and villages, groups such as Najjada and Futuwwa may have joined these "national guards," but their role seems to have been limited.

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Najjar, Yusif al-Muhammad (1929–1973)

Yusif al-Muhammad Najjar (Abu Yusif) was a founder and leader of the Palestinian FATAH party who became involved in the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION and led numerous terrorist operations against Israel.

Najjar and his family were dispossessed from Yibna (al-Majdal) in the 1948 WAR and settled in the Rafah refugee camp in the GAZA STRIP, where he grew up. As a youth he joined the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD but soon became active in Palestinian politics. While a student activist in Gaza, Abu Yusif was a leader in the General Union of Palestinian Students. In early 1954 he was arrested by EGYPT for participating in demonstrations calling for a Palestinian army. In March 1955 the Egyptians arrested and imprisoned him for two years for protesting Egypt's plan to resettle Palestinian REFUGEES in the northern Sinai.

After leaving prison Najjar moved to KUWAIT, where he taught school for a while, and then was active in setting up organizations similar to Fatah in SAUDI ARABIA and Qatar. In addition to being a founding member of Fatah, he was a member of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE from its creation until his death. In 1971 he led Fatah's new security apparatus and was the first military commander of Fatah. Najjar also coordinated the operations of AL-'ASIFA, a Palestinian military organization founded by YASIR ARAFAT in 1958. In July 1968 he was named to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE and served as its chairman, coordinating Palestinian affairs in LEBANON and brokering relations with Lebanese governments after the CAIRO AGREEMENT (1969).

Abu Yusif was an operational head of the terrorist group Black September Organization from 1970 to 1972. On 10 April 1973 he was assassinated in Beirut, together with his wife, Kamal Adwan, and KAMAL NASIR, by an Israeli commando unit with the help of Lebanese collaborators.

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Al-Nashashibi, Fahri (1899–1941)

Fahri al-Nashashibi was a Palestinian politician who worked for the British during the 1920s and was deeply involved in the competition between two of Jerusalem's main families, the NASHASHIBIS and the AL-HUSAYNIS. Although he initially joined in the 1936 ARAB REVOLT, by 1937 he supported Great Britain's partition plan, and during World War II Nashashibi helped recruit Palestinians into the British army. A member of the Palestinian Arab National Party and the NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY, he was hated by supporters of the al-Husaynis and accused of collaborating with ZIONISTS. In 1941 al-Nashashibi was assassinated in Baghdad.

Al-Nashashibi, Ragib (1883–1951)

Ragib al-Nashashibi, a Palestinian politician, was the first governor of the WEST BANK. He began working as an engineer for the OTTOMAN government in the JERUSALEM District, later represented the district in the Ottoman parliament, and served in the Ottoman military during World War I. In 1929 the British authorities appointed al-Nashashibi mayor of Jerusalem after they dismissed MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI, and he remained in that post until 1934, when he lost the election. Throughout the BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948), as a senior

Palestinian politician al-Nashashibi represented the al-Mu'aridun (NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY) faction and was perpetually in political competition with the Councilists (Palestine ARAB PARTY, Husayni faction). He was a founder of the Literary Society and the Palestinian Arab National Party. In 1934 he formed the NATIONAL DEFENSE PARTY and as its leader served on the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE from 1936 to 1937. In 1937 he fled to EGYPT to avoid the growing conflict with the Husaynis.

Al-Nashashibi was committed to negotiations with Zionists and believed that the Palestinians should achieve the best possible settlement with the British through flexible negotiations. Thus he attended the LONDON CONFERENCE and accepted the recommendation of the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, in which the British proposed one unitary government of Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Al-Nashashibi was also a longtime ally of Emir Abdullah of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) and supported Abdullah's ambitions for control in Palestine. After its annexation by Jordan in 1950, he served as the first governor of the West Bank and also as Jordanian minister of agriculture and transportation, and from 1951 he was given authority over the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the Muslim religious site in Jerusalem.

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Nashashibi Family

The history of the Nashashibi family in JERUSALEM began in 1469 CE when Nasir al-Din Mohammad al-Nashashibi, a former general in the MAMLUK army and treasurer in the Mamluk palace in Alexandria, was appointed "Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques"—the AL-AQSA MOSQUE in Jerusalem and the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON—by the Mamluk sultan Qatbay. He retired after serving nineteen years as guardian and remained in Jerusalem, where his descendants have lived ever since.

During the Mamluk (1250–1517) and OTTOMAN (1299–1923) periods, the Nashashibis were landlords and merchants who amassed a considerable fortune and significant influence in Jerusalem and throughout Palestine. During the Ottoman period Rashid al-Nashashibi was a member of parliament in Istanbul, TURKEY, and represented Jerusalem. During the BRITISH MANDATE the Nashashibis held important public and administrative posts. After the establishment of Israel, Ragib al-Nashashibi was the mayor of Jerusalem for several years, and in 1951 King Abdullah of JORDAN appointed him Guardian of the Two Holy Mosques and Custodian of Holy Places. The family was the force that controlled the anti-British, anti-Zionist AL-MU'ARADA PARTY (National Defense Party).

While Jordan occupied the WEST BANK from 1948 through 1967, the Nashashibis held many important posts in Jordan's government and business community, and two members of the family served on the PLO's PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL: Nabila Ibrahim, the first female physician in the family, and Mohammad Zuhdi, minister of finance in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Today some members of the family live in Jordan as businessmen and professionals, while others work in the Gulf States; a few family members have jobs in Europe and the UNITED STATES as researchers, engineers, physicians, and businessmen. The majority, however, still reside in Jerusalem, where they own properties in the old and new parts of the city.

Al-Nasir, Jamal 'Abd (1918–1970) and Nasirism

Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was the leader of EGYPT from 1954 until his death in 1970. Considered one of the most important modern Arab politicians, he is especially well-known for his Arab nationalist and anti-imperialist philosophy. The pan-Arabist ideology named after him, Nasirism, won a large Arab following in the 1950s and 1960s and was particularly attractive to several strands of Palestinian nationalism. Nasir's Egypt and Israel fought two major wars (1956 and 1967) and several smaller conflicts (Gaza Raid, WAR OF ATTRITION, etc.).

After World War II Nasir was an instructor at the Military Academy in Cairo, where, during the next several years, he organized a group of other reform-minded officers called the Free Officers and recruited new members for the organization. On 23 July 1952 the Free Officers seized control of the government, and Nasir became prime minister in February 1954. Although he was soon forced to resign, he became president and head of state in October 1954. Nasir, who governed for fifteen years, is remembered for his September 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia (negotiated after the

UNITED STATES turned down his request for arms in the aftermath of Israel's Gaza Raid) and for his organization of and leadership in the NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT of third world nations that attempted to form their own coalition instead of aligning with the United States or the SOVIET UNION. The independence of the Egyptian leader caused the United States and other Western countries, in July 1956, to retract their financial support for construction of the Aswan High Dam—a crucial component of Nasir's plans for Egyptian development. On 26 July, in a plan to raise money for the dam and to remind the West that Egypt would not be humiliated, Nasir announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This move produced outrage in the West, especially in the United States, and a major, coordinated military assault by Israel, Britain, and FRANCE (the Suez War), but for the Arab masses Nasir became a hero for not capitulating to Western hegemony and imperialism.

Soon Nasir became the most popular leader throughout the Arab world, and his ideology of non-alignment, Arab unity and independence, Arab socialism, and anti-imperialism, as well as the liberation of Palestine, became known as Nasirism. The Suez War enabled Nasir to merge the issues of Arab unity and the Palestine question into one, presenting the liberation of Palestine as the principal goal of this movement. He took the lead in establishing the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in 1964 and sought to mobilize the Arab world's resources to battle Israel and the countries that supported it. Nasir's pan-Arabism reached the WEST BANK, where Palestinians became among its most fervent exponents, drawn to its emphasis on national liberation that put the Palestinian situation in a broader historical context.

In the early 1960s there were signs that the claims of Nasirism went beyond its power. At the end of the 1967 WAR, Israel had gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the WEST BANK, eastern JERUSALEM, and the Golan Heights. The war demonstrated the limitations of Egyptian and Arab power, and Nasir announced his resignation, but widespread protests in Egypt and other Arab countries convinced him to remain. Because both of his own stature and Egypt's respected position, he was the indispensable broker between the Palestinians and their adversaries. In 1969, Egyptian intervention produced an agreement between the Lebanese government and the PLO, which set the limits for the organization to operate in southern LEBANON. In 1970 Nasir mediated between the JORDANIAN army and Palestinian guerrilla groups that were threatening to take over the country and made peace between them.

Immediately after this negotiation 'Abd al-Nasir died suddenly, and in the words of one Arab intellectual, "the extraordinary scenes at his funeral, with millions weeping in the streets, certainly meant something; at least for the moment, it was difficult to imagine Egypt or the Arab world without him. His death was the end of an era of hope for an Arab world united and made new."

The legacy of 'Abd al-Nasir is complex. He freed Egypt from European domination and reformed its economy through major agrarian reform projects and greater government involvement in other sectors of the economy. Yet his socialist economic policies were less than successful, largely because of elite-driven capital flight as well as economic stagnation. He sought to lead the Arab world in the Non-Aligned Movement and against Israel and Western imperialism. But though he gained the love of the Arab masses, he failed to unify the Arab leaders. In one instance he negotiated a union between Syria and Egypt, then so humiliated Syrian leaders that they withdrew from the union. He founded the PLO allegedly to give Palestinians independence in Arab and other politics, but his real objective was to control the Palestinian movement. Nasir's miscalculations that dragged Egypt into the 1967 WAR were a disaster for the country.

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Nasir, Kamal Butros (1925–1973)

Kamal Nasir was a Christian Palestinian poet and PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) leader. Born in GAZA, he was educated at the American University of Beirut and worked as a teacher while studying law in JERUSALEM. After 1948 Nasir worked as a journalist, publishing the *al-Ba'ath* newspaper from Ramallah, and establishing *al-Jil al-Jadid*, a literary periodical. In the 1956 Jordanian elections he was elected to the parliament from the Ramallah district on the BA'ATH slate, although JORDAN expelled Nasir from parliament during a period of martial law. In 1967, Israel expelled him from the WEST BANK for participation in the NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE and other resistance activities. In 1969 in Beirut he became editor of the PLO newspaper *Filastin al-Thawra* and a member of the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. He was assassinated in an Israeli raid led by EHUD BARAK in Beirut in April 1973.

In 1961 Nasir published a collection of poetry, *Jirah Tughanni*, and other collections were published posthumously. Some of his better-known poems deal with the British betrayal of their promises to the Arabs, for example, "British Injustice," "The Jewish Flood," and "Palestine the Proud." In his poem "Cry of the Tents" ("Sarkhat al-Khiyam"), he wrote about the sadness of the Palestinian REFUGEES, who wish, at the end of Ramadan, that people could keep fasting so the refugees would not be alone in their hunger.

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Nasirism

See JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR

Nassar, Najib (1865–1947)

Najib Nassar founded and edited *al-Karmil*, the first Palestinian ANTI-ZIONIST weekly newspaper in Arabic, which appeared in HAIFA in 1909. *Al-Karmil* repeatedly warned against LAND sales to Jews and called attention to Zionist colonial activities in Palestine. Near the end of 1910 Nassar created an association in Haifa to prevent the implementation of the Zionist program and to persuade the OTTOMAN government to prohibit land sales to Jews. In 1911 he published the first book in Arabic on ZIONISM, *Zionism: Its History, Objective and Importance*, in which he described Zionism as a racist movement that planned to displace the Palestinians in the Holy Land.

In 1912 Nassar called for a Palestinian congress as a way to counter the Eleventh WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS and to resist the Zionist invasion of Palestine. At the congress, held in August 1913, Palestinian leaders called upon the Ottomans to stop selling land through an open auction and instead to sell to the mostly Palestinian farmers who cultivated it, allowing them to finance the cost of the land through easy payments. Nassar's personal politics favored the Ottoman decentralization program for Palestine, which gave more independence and autonomy to the provinces, and throughout his life he maintained loyalty both to the Ottomans and to Palestinian patriotism.

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Nasser, Gamal Abdel

See JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR

National Alliance, 1983

The National Alliance, along with ABU MUSA's FATAH UPRISING and the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, was one of three groups that split from the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) after the 1982 LEBANON WAR. The alliance was composed of

SA'IQA, the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE—GENERAL COMMAND, and the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT.

Initially the National Alliance's (and Fatah Uprising's) criticisms of Arafat and PLO policy generated significant support among many segments of the Palestinian movement and population. But the popular backing quickly evaporated when the National Alliance aligned itself with SYRIA, resorted to force, and provoked a civil war in LEBANON. The split began to heal in July 1984 when FATAH and the Democratic Alliance reached an accord known as the ADEN-ALGIERS ACCORD and joined together within the PLO. However, the split widened again in March 1985 when former PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) speaker Khalid al-Fahum announced from Damascus the formation of the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT with factions from the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT and the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). Nevertheless, by 1987 the PLO was reunited with the return to the fold of the PFLP and the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE at the eighteenth meeting of the PNC, and the National Alliance disintegrated.

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National Bloc Party

The National Bloc Party was formed in NABLUS in July 1935 by Abdul al-Latif Saleh, a lawyer and former official of the OTTOMAN Senate. Its declared objectives were to work for the independence of Palestine and the preservation of its Arab character, to unify all the political efforts of the Palestinian Arabs, and to disseminate information for this purpose. The influence of this party was small and very local.

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National Defense Party

The National Defense Party was founded in 1934 by RAGIB AL-NASHASHIBI, a Palestinian politician who, after 1948, was the first governor of the WEST BANK, and was linked to Transjordan (Jordan after 1950). The party's members came mainly from the Nashashibis and their allied clans, known as the Mu'aridun. More disposed to a compromise with Zionists than the AL-HUSAYNIS and their ARAB PARTY, the party's objective was an independent Palestine with Arab supremacy. It acknowledged no international obligations that could prejudice Arab independence or permit the introduction of foreign influence. There were at the time a number of smaller parties—AL-ISTIQLAL (headed by Awni Abdul Hadi and Ahmad al Balqi); the REFORM PARTY (formed by the AL-KHALIDI clan and other intellectuals); and the NATIONAL BLOC PARTY (formed by Abdul al-Latif Salah), among others, which generally were established by public activists on a family and local basis. In addition there was the NATIONAL LIBERATION LEAGUE, an organization founded by the Communist Party.

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National Democratic Alliance

See BALAD PARTY

National Guidance Committee

Established in 1978 in East JERUSALEM, the National Guidance Committee (NGC) was one of the first major expressions of post-1967 indigenous Palestinian nationalism. It was founded by a group of WEST BANK leaders to coordinate popular opposition to the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and their limited autonomy plan for Palestinians. Though initially formed to oppose Camp David, later the NGC actively opposed the VILLAGE LEAGUES and openly supported the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO).

The NGC eschewed the traditional family/clan, pro-Jordanian politics that had characterized West Bank politics since the OCCUPATION. Its twenty-three members were on the whole highly educated and urbane, but uncompromising in their support of full Palestinian statehood. As the NGC steadily gained stature in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, it became influential enough to challenge the PLO on West Bank affairs, although it always did so in ways that did not undermine the PLO's legitimacy.

The Guidance Committee worked through a network of local organizations, associations, and other bodies, allowing it to quickly convey ideas and resolutions to the entire West Bank populace. It effectively called for street demonstrations, mayoral resignations, and other acts of civil disobedience in response to Israel's harsh measures against the Palestinians. Israel permitted four NGC public rallies between 1 October and 7 November 1979 but outlawed any further rallies.

On 2 May 1980, Israel summarily expelled from the West Bank two prominent members of the Guidance Committee: Mayors Muhammad Milhim of Halhoul and Fahd Kawasme of HEBRON. One month later, on 3 June, NABLUS mayor BASSAM SHAKA'A and Ramallah mayor Karim Khalaf, both members of the NGC, were maimed for life in separate, almost simultaneous car bombs planted by Israeli settlers; they came to be known as the "martyr mayors." Two years later, in May 1982, Israel outlawed the committee altogether.

See also PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT

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National Institutions

See ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

National Insurance Institute

Israel's National Insurance Institute (NII, Ha'Mosad Le'Bitu'akh Leumi) administers the Israeli social security system, including HEALTH CARE, unemployment insurance, and child care, among others. Although it provides generous benefits to Jewish citizens, the NII's policies toward Palestinian-Arab citizens, Palestinian residents of JERUSALEM, and Palestinian guest workers are more restrictive. B'TSELEM, the Israeli human rights group, states that the NII policy for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem "has become an instrument of government policy to reduce the Arab population of the city."

Current regulations of the NII law provide national insurance benefits only to residents of Israel living in Israel and to citizens of Israel living in either Israel or the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. This policy excludes Palestinians in Jerusalem, Palestinian workers in Israel, and all Palestinians in the WEST BANK and GAZA. Palestinian Jerusalemites, who have the status of "permanent residents" of Israel, lose their rights if they move outside Israel's Jerusalem BORDERS and cannot regain benefits until two years after they move back. A new Israeli policy is likely to cause major problems for the new generation of Jerusalemites

now applying for IDENTITY CARDS and access to the NII because the policy now declares that permanent residency can only be passed on from their parents if the applicants meet certain "conditions of residency" and of "CENTER OF LIFE."

The Ministry of Interior, which issues identity and National Insurance cards, legitimizes residency and grants social benefits through a sophisticated information-sharing system across government agencies that verifies the addresses of and other required information on residents. When Palestinian residents claim benefits, the NII sends investigators to ensure that the claimants are bona fide Jerusalem residents (not just identity card holders), but no such investigations are made for Jewish residents. Completing the residency check can take years and delay the receipt of benefits and, in the case of childbirth, the receipt of a birth certificate and identity card number, all of which jeopardizes continued residency in the city. For this reason many Jerusalem identity card holders (estimated to be as many as 30,000 households) who have been forced to live outside the Israeli-drawn borders of the city (often because housing is unaffordable or unavailable) continue to pay into the NII system (often through automatic deduction by their Jerusalem-based employer), but they do not claim benefits from the NII because the claim would launch an Israeli address check. Households that live outside of Jerusalem but have family-owned property in the city often give the Jerusalem address as their primary home, hoping to qualify for the benefits they have paid for.

For example, a physician who holds a Jerusalem identity card and earns 6,000 Israeli new shekels (NIS) ($1,500) monthly has NIS 900 ($230) deducted for National Insurance by the Jerusalem hospital where he works. Although he is entitled to benefits, he cannot claim the monthly child allowances for his two children, which would amount to NIS 312 ($80), because he moved to Ramallah and fears that an investigation will result in the withdrawal of his identity card.

The amount of money lost in unclaimed benefits is substantial for Palestinians in the following categories:

- If the resident made regular payments to the NII and then moved outside of the city borders, no benefits can be claimed. This especially affects the elderly on pensions who move in with family members and thus forfeit their pensions. Many residents do not report their change of address and continue to collect benefits until the NII finds out and terminates the benefits.
- Palestinians pay the same National Insurance rate as citizens but cannot collect all the benefits available to Jewish citizens, in particular severance payments. Being ineligible for the draft, they cannot receive compensation for military reserve duty, although this benefit has been "hidden" recently as a separate fund. And the maternity allowance is given only to dues-paying mothers who work, which excludes most Palestinian women.
- If Jerusalem residents have always lived in the West Bank and work in Jerusalem, the full rate of National Insurance is still deducted automatically from their salaries by their employers, even though they cannot claim benefits.
- Some Jerusalem residents pay voluntarily into the NII, although they live in the West Bank, to preserve their Jerusalem identity cards, although it is not proven to have any effect.

Before 1995, Israeli health insurance was voluntary for households and the only valued service they accepted and received from Israeli institutions, but choice was eliminated in 1995 when health insurance became a mandatory part of the NII package. Effectively this meant that Jerusalem identity card holders, wherever they lived, could not benefit from private Israeli health insurance plans without paying into the National Insurance fund. Because this could require considerable retroactive payments for past years, many households living outside the Jerusalem borders had their insurance lapse; others moved back to Jerusalem.

Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work in Israel are paid through the employment service of the Ministry of Labor, which disburses wages and benefits collected from employers. The ministry deducts a 1 percent union fee plus the guest workers' contributions to the NII. Despite these deductions, Palestinian workers do not have access to unemployment insurance, general disability payments, low-income supplements, child allotments, or maternity leave.

PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL are discriminated against by both the National Insurance Institute and the state budget, which includes stark disparities in resource allocation. According to B'Tselem, with respect to Palestinian citizens,

"Despite Israeli citizenship, the situation of Palestinian Arab citizens is precarious. The Israeli Government does not provide its Arab citizens, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the population, with the same quality of education, housing, employment, and social services as it does Jews. In addition, government spending is proportionally far lower in predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish areas."

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National Liberation League

The National Liberation League (NLL) was one of the first Palestinian communist organizations. It was formed in a split with the ARAB-PALESTINE COMMUNIST PARTY, which was created in the 1920s by Jewish and Arab communists. As the Yishuv developed and the imminence of an independent Jewish state in Palestine became a reality, tensions between Palestinian and Jewish members of the party grew until 1943, when it splintered and the Palestinians formed the National Liberation League. The NLL was the only Arab Palestinian party that urged the acceptance of the Partition

Resolution (UN Resolution 181), which called for the creation of both Palestinian and Jewish states in Palestine.

After 1948, communists from the West Bank formed the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), which created the Palestine National Front in 1973. Those in Gaza formed the Communist Party of Gaza. In 1982 the JCP split from the Palestine National Front. West Bank and Gaza communists united to become the Palestinian Communist Party, which changed its name in 1991 to the Palestinian People's Party while the JCP remained in Jordan.

The Palestine Communist Party was not admitted to the Palestine Liberation Organization until 1987, it never had a military wing, and it did not engage in armed resistance, focusing instead on political and diplomatic struggle. During the First Intifada the party was part of the Unified National Command, the umbrella organization that subsumed all Palestinian political factions except Hamas, and it supported the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords. Its main base of support has been in the Occupied Territories, having little following among the Palestinian Diaspora.

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National Religious Party

The National Religious Party (NRP, Mafdal Datit Le'umit), often referred to as Mafdal, is an Israeli political party representing the Ashkenazi religious Zionist movement. It is an Orthodox faction within the Zionist movement that combines a belief in the importance of a Jewish state in the land of Israel with a religious way of life. It is contrasted with secular Zionism on the one hand and non-Zionist Haredi Orthodox movements on the other. The founder and main ideologist of religious Zionism was Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook (1865–1935), who urged young religious Jews to settle in Israel and called upon the secular Zionists to pay more attention to Judaism.

NRP was founded in 1956 by Yosef Burg and Haim Moshe Shapira out of the merger of HaPoel HaMizrahi (The Workers Religious Center) and Ha-Mizrahi (The Religious Center). Throughout NRP's existence it has attempted to preserve the relevance of Judaism on issues such as Israeli personal status laws, education, culture, and municipal issues, such as prohibitions on the selling of non-Kosher food and on transportation and public activities on the Sabbath. NRP has a youth movement, Bnei Akiva.

Until 1992, NRP was a coalition partner in all the governments of Israel and was often the pivotal party in coalition disputes. It was considered a centrist party until the 1967 War, which spawned messianic trends among Israel's religious Jews, and it subsequently moved to the political right. Today the NRP is a strictly right-wing party, fiercely opposed to the Oslo Accords and to US president George W. Bush's Road Map for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it considers "Oslo in disguise." The NRP's views on the conflict can be summarized as follows:

- The only state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea should be the state of Israel. No independent national Arab entity (i.e., Palestine) will exist within these borders.
- No part of Israel will be given over to a foreign government or authority.
- Palestinian Arabs can be given self-governing autonomy in certain geographic areas if they are subject to Israel's authority in matters of security and foreign affairs. However, no settlements should be dismantled, and settlement expansion should be continued.

NRP reacted to the al-Aqsa Intifada by demanding a harsh military response to "root out terror infrastructure" in the Occupied Territories, the dissolution of the Palestinian National Authority, and the deportation of Palestine Liberation Organization leaders back to Tunis.

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National Union Party

The National Union Party (Ha'ihud Ha'Leumi or Ichud Leumi) is an extreme right-wing Israeli political party formed in 1999 by REHAVAM ZE'EVI (founder of the MOLEDET or Homeland Party in 1988) in a merger with two other small parties: (1) HERUT (the National Movement, founded in 1998 by BENJAMIN BEGIN, Michael Kleiner, and David Re'em) and (2) TEKUMA (Rebirth or Resurrection, founded in 1998 by Hanan Porat and Zvi Hendel, today led by Hendel). After Ze'evi was assassinated in 2001, AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN brought the party he led, YISRAEL BEITENU (Israel Our Home), into the coalition and became head of the National Union Party (and Rabbi BENYAMIN ELON became head of Moledet). In 2003, Herut left the National Union, and in 2005, Yisrael Beitenu left. However, the National Union was then bolstered by the addition of Ahi (the Renewed Religious National Zionist Party, formed by dissidents from the National Religious Party [NRP]), led by Effi Eitam, who were opposed to the Gaza withdrawal. The 2005 departure of Yisrael Beitenu was a blow to the National Union, but at the same time the National Religious Party decided to form a joint list with National Union called National Union–NRP. In 2008, in anticipation of the 2009 election, the National Union and NRP formally unified into a single party, called the Jewish Home. the Jewish Home was to be a single party, rather than a list of separate parties, and reflected a religious Zionist orientation. It was headed by Daniel Hershkovitz.

As the elections approached, member of the Knesset Aryeh Eldad left to form his own list, Hatikva, while Knesset members Effi Eitam and Yitzhak Levy (formerly Ahi) reestablished Ahi, which later merged into the LIKUD. When Jewish Home announced its candidate list for the elections, five of the top six slots went to ex-NRP members, with only member of the Knesset Uri Ariel, formerly of Tekuma, in the top six.

The remaining ex-Moledet members broke off, reestablished their party, and allied with Eldad's Hatikva, reviving the "National Union" name. Benny Elon declared that he would not seek reelection, and US immigrant Uri Bank took his place on the Jewish Home list. The split within Jewish Home grew, and polls indicated Hatikva could win three seats. Eretz Yisrael Shelanu then joined the National Union, with member Michael Ben-Ari given fourth spot on the alliance's list. While these issues were being negotiated, Uri Ariel also left Jewish Home and rejoined the National Union list, leaving Jewish Home as little more than a renamed NRP.

In the 2009 elections the National Union was an alliance of four parties: Moledet, Hatikva, Eretz Yisrael Shelanu, and Tekuma, winning three Knesset seats and joining the coalition government of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU.

The National Union has a sister organization, the American Friends of Israel's National Union, that raises money for it and disseminates its ideas throughout the UNITED STATES.

The National Union and the various parties associated with it at one time or another share an ideological perspective reflected in the National Union's platform. The mergers and departures are an indication of individual power struggles rather than differences of principle on major issues. Thus a presentation of National Union's platform provides insight into the thinking of all the parties discussed in the foregoing. The National Union rejects all current Oslo-based peace efforts, which it sees as dangerous to Israel and rejects the notion of a Palestinian state; instead it advocates cantons of self-rule for the Arabs in the WEST BANK whose leadership would be local and not imported. It believes that population TRANSFER (of Palestinians from the West Bank and East Jerusalem) is a "precondition for peace negotiations with any Arab country." As the capital of the Jewish people, the Land of Israel, and the state of Israel, Jerusalem "must not be divided again, its status changed, or serve as the capital of any other country." The party also hopes, though this is not explicit in its platform, that one day the East Bank (present-day JORDAN) will be incorporated into Israel, because it considers the East Bank part of the biblical Eretz Yisrael. Its platform further states that the funds transferred to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY by the Israeli government "will henceforth be used for reparations for the damage Israel has suffered during the period of terror [AL-AQSA INTIFADA]." The party's platform supports the SETTLEMENT of all the "Land of Israel," condemns ISRAELI'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, and advocates the use of more military power in the war on terror and harsher measures against Palestinian TERRORISM. Seeking to limit the participation of Israeli-Palestinians in the political process, the platform declares: "The State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people. A party will not be allowed to stand for election to the Knesset if its

platform does not affirm that the State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people. The Israeli government must clearly mandate that every citizen of Israel will swear loyalty to the flag of Israel, to its national anthem, the *Tikvah* and to the laws of the state. Citizenship will be revoked from those implicated in terror acts and those who identify with terrorist organizations. Any movement which takes upon itself a purpose detrimental to the Jewish state and its principles, such as the Islamic Movement, will be outlawed." The National Union also wants to create the means to initiate population transfer of all non-Jewish Israeli citizens.

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National Unity Government (Palestinian, 2007)

See MECCA AGREEMENT AND THE PALESTINIAN UNITY GOVERNMENT

National Water Carrier

See JOHN F DULLES; DWIGHT EISENHOWER; JOHNSTON PLAN; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Natshe Document, 2004

The 2004 Natshe Document was produced by Rafiq Natshe (Abu Shakar), a former speaker of the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) ambassador in SAUDI ARABIA for many years, and a highly respected figure in the Palestinian community. The document, which accused PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT of deception, fraud, and treason, exposed extensive corruption by Arafat and his supporters. In an unusual charge, Natshe accused Arafat of practicing "TERRORISM." According to the document, Arafat personally directed the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES, telling them what to attack and when. "With one hand," Natshe charged, "he funds the al-Aqsa Brigades and with the other he sells them out."

The head of the Natshe family, the leading clan of HEBRON, Natshe exposed corruption at the highest levels in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). One among many cases was the Egyptian Cement affair, in which a construction firm owned by PNA prime minister AHMAD QUREI' supplied Israel cement from Egypt for constructing new settlements. According to Natshe, Arafat consistently obstructed all efforts to scrutinize PNA finances and audit its accounts, which were under his exclusive control. Natshe accused Arafat and the FATAH party leadership of pocketing huge financial contributions from Saudi Arabia that were intended to benefit the Palestinian people.

Despite Natshe's influence, he had difficulty finding a publisher for the forty-page document. According to Natshe, Arafat's followers frightened journalists and TV stations around the Arab world to prevent them from fully exposing the extensive corruption in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP. Finally BILAL AL-HASAN, who lives in Paris and is the brother of HANI AL-HASAN, one of Arafat's closest advisers, managed to place the Natshe document in the most popular Fatah Internet chat rooms.

Natshe's aggravation peaked in 2002, when he decided that the widespread corruption meant he could no longer support Arafat or the PNA. Adding to his frustrations, Arafat's gunmen attempted to assassinate Nabil Amer, another PNC legislator and a fellow Hebronite from the largest Hebron clan. Like Natshe, Amer had been an outspoken critic of Arafat and his followers. Amer survived the attack but was severely wounded, and Natshe and Amer prepared to retaliate. On 27 July 2004 the Coordinating Committee of Hebron's Palestinian Organizations put Arafat on notice that he would suffer repercussions from harming a Hebronite. In local terms, the Palestinians of Hebron had declared a blood feud against Arafat.

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Natzerat Illit and Nazareth

Natzerat Illit (Jewish Upper Nazareth) was built in the 1950s after DAVID BEN-GURION, outraged by the presence of so many Arabs in the Galilee,

appointed the director general of the Ministry of Defense, SHIMON PERES, to "Judaize" the Galilee using emergency regulations that allowed the army to confiscate LAND from Palestinians. Natzerat Illit opened in 1957, and senior army officers were billeted there. Upper Nazareth was built entirely on land confiscated from PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL in Nazareth and the surrounding villages of Ein Mahel and Reineh. Natzerat Illit has a population of some 50,000 (up from the original 300 settlers) in an area of 40,000 dunums (9,884 acres), compared to Nazareth, the largest Palestinian city in Israel, with a population of some 70,000 living in area of 15,000 dunums (3,706 acres) that is not allowed to expand by a single square meter. Upper Nazareth is a strategically placed "development town" literally overlooking and surrounding Palestinian Nazareth. By its physical presence and through municipal underfunding, Natzerat Illit has prevented Nazareth from expanding to accommodate the natural growth of its population.

Until recently, few Palestinians were able to move to Natzerat Illit as a means of coping with Nazareth's housing shortage because Israeli housing authorities and banks did their utmost over the years to limit the Palestinian inflow to Natzerat Illit, chiefly by selective approval of government-backed mortgages and highly selective rental of publicly owned properties. According to Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, officially, no Palestinians live in the "Jewish" city of Natzerat Illit. In fact, in 2009, according to the Arab Association for Human Rights, of the 50,000 inhabitants of the city, 20 percent (10,000) are Palestinians. Most of them bought houses from RUSSIAN FEDERATION immigrants who wanted to move to Tel Aviv. Most had to pay exorbitant prices, some as much as $1 million for a house, three times the market value. There are no Palestinian schools or kindergartens, so the roads between Nazareth and Upper Nazareth are overcrowded in rush hour.

The "nonexistent" 20 percent are represented on the city council by two Palestinian councilors, who are in an unlikely coalition with the ultra-right-wing party of AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN. Because the Christian mayor, Ramiz Jaraisy, needed their support in order to defeat the LABOR PARTY, they demanded, and received, a promise that an Arab school would be built in Natzerat Illit. The mayor is nonetheless committed to the "Judaization" of his city, and Lieberman has declared that stopping the IMMIGRATION of Arabs into Natzerat "is a national priority."

There is systematic discrimination by the government between Nazareth and Natzerat Illit. While Natzerat Illit's economy is healthy, since 2000, Nazareth has experienced an economic recession that includes crises in textiles and construction that have dealt crushing blows to the Arab villages around Nazareth and, in turn, to the city. Nazareth faces high unemployment, an outdated and insufficiently funded educational system, and a growing number of families living beneath the poverty line. Aggravating these problems, Nazareth suffers from inadequate INFRASTRUCTURE and a weak medical care system, among many other inequities. The annual budget of the chief scientist in the Ministry of Industry and Trade is NIS 1.8 billion ($477 million). The Arab sector gets none of that. In Nazareth, the cost of a square meter of commercial space is the same as in the heart of Tel Aviv. There are no master plans for zoning and housing and no industrial area, inhibiting development, job creation, and the ability to raise sums from municipal taxes. On the other hand, Jewish Natzerat Illit has large industrial areas and thriving factories and businesses. One additional dimension of the discrimination became evident during the July 2006 war between Israel and HIZBULLAH when missiles fell on northern Israel. Nazaret Illit had bomb shelters and warning sirens for its citizens while Nazareth's citizens had neither. On 19 July a rocket fired by Hizbullah killed three people in Nazareth, including two children, all Muslim.

Given the number of Palestinians who have moved into Natzerat Illit, the government has undertaken a renewed campaign to entice Jews to move there. The present attempt is motivated by the failure of the previous policies to make the Galilee in general, and Nazareth in particular, Jewish. People and economies move in mysterious ways: well-off Palestinians began buying houses in the citadel that was built to evict them. Pappé relates that Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU regards this as a grave threat to Israel's national security. Local politicians are even more blunt. "If we lose the Jewish majority in the Galilee, this is the end of the Jewish state," Motti Dotan, a member of the Labor Party, said recently. "I would like to imagine a Galilee without Arabs: no thefts, no crimes . . . we will have normal life." The racist mood in Israel absolves the government from any inhibitions that may have restricted its actions in the past.

Now ecologists, industrialists, and academics have been drafted to find ways to increase the Jewish population. The JEWISH NATIONAL FUND is behind the initiative, along with the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel. The aim of diminishing the Palestinian presence in the Galilee is also fully endorsed by the prestigious union of Israeli wine producers, which has adopted a plan prepared by leading academics from the Israel Institute of Technology. Published in 2003, the plan calls for the Jewish "takeover" of the Galilee. "It is either them or us," it begins. "The land problems in the Galilee proved that any territory not taken by Zionist elements is going to be coveted by non-Zionists."

The gist of what they propose is to seize strategically important land by force and hold on to it until Jews settle on it. The director general of AMPA, an electrical manufacturer, recently said that his company now not only makes refrigerators but is also actively supporting the "Judaization of the Galilee" by building new communities in the area for AMPA's veterans. "We are not ashamed to say that our plans have a Zionist element."

The Palestinian village of Ayn Mahil, east of Nazareth and adjacent to Natzerat Illit, is now accessible only by one road, one that goes through a Jewish religious neighborhood in Natzerat Illit. As a result, on the Day of Atonement the people of Ayn Mahil cannot leave or enter their village. They will soon be encircled by a new town called Shacharit (which means "dawn" in Hebrew but which is also the name of the first Jewish prayer of the day). Ten thousand ultra-Orthodox Jews will be settled there, and the hope is that they will rectify the "unfavorable" demographic balance, as well as cut Ayn Mahil off from the greater Nazareth area. The village's ancient olive groves have been uprooted in preparation for the building work. A new road network will ensure that other villages are separated from each other and from Nazareth.

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Nazareth

Nazareth, one of the most important biblical Christian cities, was the only Arab town left intact after the 1948 WAR and today is the largest Palestinian town in Israel. Most Nazarenes today are Israeli Arabs, about 35 to 40 percent of whom are Christians and the remainder Muslims. Nazareth is situated in the ridges of the Nazareth Mountains about nineteen miles (thirty-one kilometers) from the Sea of Galilee and about five miles (nine kilometers) west from Mount Tabor in Galilee. In 2005 it had a population of about 65,000.

The BASILICA OF THE ANNUNCIATION and numerous other Christian shrines are located in Nazareth. Although the city is not mentioned in the Hebrew Bible, Josephus, or the Talmud, some scholars argue that it became an exclusively Jewish town after the Bar Kokhba revolt in the second century and remained so until the fourth century, when the emperor Constantine had a church built over the Cave of the Annunciation. Other scholars find any early Jewish connection to Nazareth highly doubtful.

In the seventh century CE the Byzantine emperor Heraclius conquered Nazareth and expelled the small Jewish community then living there. In 638 CE, Muslim armies conquered the area, but Christian communities continued to thrive under tolerant Muslim rule. In 722, Yazid II, an Ummayad caliph who ruled from 720 to 724, ordered the destruction of images in churches because of the Islamic prohibition on depicting human forms. The Crusaders entered Nazareth in 1102, found it in ruins, and rebuilt the Church of the Annunciation and other churches. In 1187 the city was taken by the Muslim leader SALADIN, and

the Christian population fled or was destroyed. In 1201 a treaty between the Roman Catholic Church and al-'Adil, Saladin's brother, allowed Christian pilgrimages to the holy sites to resume. In 1263 the MAMLUK armies under Baybars destroyed the city and drove out all the Christians.

Once Palestine came under OTTOMAN rule in 1517, Nazareth was part of the province of Acre. In 1620 the Franciscans returned to the holy sites under a benevolent local Muslim ruler, and Christians began to move back and purchase property, but their status continued to be subject to the whims of local despots. In the late eighteenth century they experienced ill treatment from the forces of Ahmad Pasha (al-Jazzar), who was governor of the Acre district and known as "the Butcher" for his indiscriminate brutality. Nevertheless he successfully defended Akka against Napoleon (who spent a night in Nazareth).

In the nineteenth century, Nazareth participated in the *Nahda* (awakening or renaissance) movement, a cultural and intellectual flourishing in the Arab world. The city was especially known for its schools, and many people, including prominent writers from the Levant, came to Nazareth for education. Among the schools the Russian seminary became particularly famous, and many European missions in Nazareth had their own schools and taught in their respective languages. During the nineteenth century, Nazareth also became the main commercial center in the Galilee region, taking advantage of caravans passing through to the coast. A thriving weekly market offered livestock, fabrics, and agricultural products, and Nazareth was a center for the production of agricultural implements. With a growing population that approached 7,000 by the end of the nineteenth century, Nazareth continued to function as a regional commercial center, before being overtaken by the growing coastal cities of HAIFA and JAFFA in the twentieth century.

Under the BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948) Nazareth was an important administrative center as well as a place where opposition to ZIONISM flourished, and after World War I there were growing protests against the influx of Zionist settlers. Nazareth sent a delegation to the First Palestine Congress in 1919 and established a branch of the MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION in 1922. Less active than other towns during the ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939), Nazareth was chosen as the site for protests against the inclusion of the Galilee in the Jewish state proposed by the British PEEL COMMISSION. The protests led to the assassination of Lewis Andrews, the British acting district commissioner of the Galilee.

In 1948 the Arabs of Nazareth had expected that the city, then overflowing with REFUGEES from Haifa, TIBERIAS, and the surrounding villages, would be placed under international protection with the status of a holy city. (Nazareth was part of the proposed Arab state under UN RESOLUTION 181, the partition plan.) Instead the city became a target of the largest Zionist offensive in northern Palestine, Operation Dekel, carried out during the first and second truces in the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Poorly defended, Nazareth surrendered after only light fighting to Israeli forces on 16 July 1948, and the ARAB LIBERATION ARMY forces under the command of FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI retreated to the mountains in the north. According to some sources, Nazareth was spared the brutal treatment of other areas in the Galilee because of its Christian population and the international status of its religious institutions.

Expulsion and occupation throughout the Galilee were the goal of Israel's political and military leaders, and the military command was prepared to carry out this order in Nazareth. However, the military commander, who was one of the signers of the truce, defied the order, and was removed from command. Thereafter, a senior general was prepared to move ahead with the evacuation, but DAVID BEN-GURION, aware of the threat of international condemnation if the city's Christian population was harmed, retracted the order. Thus, unlike with other Palestinian cities and towns, there was no mass evacuation of Nazareth, although many "undesirables" were expelled, and the city, with its thousands of REFUGEES who had fled from nearby villages, was under the strict military control of the Israeli state until 1965.

After the war and the *Nakba* (the Palestinian exodus from Israel), Nazareth became a hub for what remained of the Arab intelligentsia and was the base for the AL-ARD movement, an Arab nationalist political movement that emerged in the 1950s. Arab nationalism was a strong current in the city, and the intellectual elite included both GREEK ORTHODOX Christians and Muslims—for example, EMILE HABIBI, TAWFIQ ZAYYAD, and many others. The Communist Party in Nazareth gave voice to the grievances of Nazareth and of Palestinians in general, a trend that culminated

when Zayyad was elected mayor of Nazareth in 1973, a position he retained until his death in 1994. For Nazarenes and for many others, Zayyad became the symbol of Palestinian *sumud* (steadfastness) inside Israel.

See also NAZARETH: BASILICA OF THE ANNUNCIATION; NATZERAT ILLIT AND NAZARETH

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—Betsy Folkins

Nazareth: Basilica of the Annunciation

NAZARETH contains one of Christianity's holiest sites, the Basilica of the Annunciation, where CHRISTIANS believe the Angel Gabriel informed Mary that she would carry the son of God. In the years leading up to the 2000 millennium celebration, Israel catalyzed a conflict between Christians and Muslims when the Tourism Ministry decided to earmark extra funds for Nazareth so it could construct a plaza on land in front of the basilica to cater to the millions of tourists and pilgrims expected for Christmas 2000. Israel's Muslim community protested that the area for the proposed plaza was an undisputed parcel of land that since before 1948 belonged to the *waqf* (an Islamic religious trust) and has been recognized since the Middle Ages as the location of the tomb of Shihab al-Din (a nephew of twelfth-century Muslim leader SALADIN). But after Israel declared its plan to extend the plaza in front of the basilica, the Muslims claimed that the entire area, including the plaza, was part of the same *waqf* property and set up a tent at the site, demanding that a mosque be built on it.

The actions taken by Israel seriously damaged relations between Muslims and Christians, divided the people of Nazareth in their struggle against the institutionalized discrimination between NAZARETH and NATZERAT ILLIT, and aggravated relations with church leaders and mosque *imams* throughout the Holy Land. When the Christians and Muslims were unable to resolve the dispute, Israel appointed two official bodies to rule on the matter. The first was a ministerial committee set up under the BENJAMIN NETANYAHU government, but when the LABOR government of EHUD BARAK took office in July 1999, Shlomo Ben-Ami became the minister of public security and sought a compromise between the *waqf* and the municipality. The second ruling institution was the Nazareth District Court, which claims ownership of the 1,860 square meters (20,000 square feet) of land earmarked for the plaza.

On 1 October 1999, Ben-Ami presented a compromise that affirmed the municipality's right to authorize the building of a plaza, on the condition that 700 square meters (7,500 square feet) would be set aside for the construction of a small mosque. By way of compensation, the *waqf* would be given 10 dunums (2.5 acres) of land elsewhere in Nazareth that could be used for "cultural and educational facilities." Although the Muslims welcomed the decision, the main Christian churches in Israel and Palestine were furious. In a rare show of Christian unity, and within hours of the announcement of the Ben-Ami decision, the Greek Orthodox, Latin, and Armenian churches made public a letter they had sent privately to Barak on 11 September. Together with the VATICAN's representative in the Holy Land, the patriarchs warned that they would close down all the Christian holy sites in Jerusalem during the Christmas period if the Muslims' tent was not removed from the area of the basilica.

In 1999 the Nazareth District Court then ruled that, aside from the 135 square meters (1,400 square feet) that holds the tomb of Shihab al-Din, the plot next to the Basilica of the Annunciation is STATE LAND over which the *waqf* has no claim. The ruling was met with quiet satisfaction by the churches but with fury by the Muslims. On 8 October over a thousand Muslims turned out for noon

prayers at the "tent mosque" adjacent to the church. During a peaceful rally they heard speeches from *imams* and members of the Knesset belonging to the Muslim-backed UNITED ARAB LIST denouncing the district court ruling, warning the pope to "stay out of Nazareth's internal affairs," and generally applauding the Ben-Ami compromise. The rally passed peacefully.

At the time relations between the Israeli government and the Muslims were tense because some Nazarene Islamists were involved in a series of car bombings in HAIFA and TIBERIAS aimed at Israelis. The offenders were a minority on the fringes of Arab and Muslim society and were known in Nazareth as longtime troublemakers. But on Easter 1999 Islamic militants attacked Christians leaving Holy Saturday services in Nazareth. Three days of inter-religious group violence followed, with vandalism, looting, and beatings by both sides. Through it all the Israeli police simply stood aside. Only when church leaders threatened to close all the churches in the country in protest did police intervene to curb the violence.

A third compromise emerged later that spring. Although Netanyahu was out of office, the inter-ministerial committee appointed by his government decided that the Muslims could erect a shrine, though not a mosque, on one quarter (500 square meters or about 5,300 square feet) of the disputed plot. The remainder of the ground would be used for a public square, as proposed by the Nazareth 2000 Committee. Nazarene Christians accepted the compromise, but the Muslims did not. Then, in October 1999 an Israeli district court upheld the Nazareth municipal court, ruled that the disputed land did not belong to the *waqf* and also declared that it was state land.

Subsequently the government of Ehud Barak announced another compromise. It would permit the construction of a mosque (not just a shrine) on a larger site, but the site would take only 450 square meters (4,800 square feet) from the proposed square and 250 square meters (2,700 square feet) purchased from neighboring private property—plus the Israeli government would pay for the mosque's construction. The Muslims ended their protest and accepted the Barak compromise. On 23 November they laid the cornerstone for the mosque on what was to have been the plaza in front of the basilica.

The most apparent reason for each government's differing decisions was the desire of each for electoral support. Both the Labor and LIKUD parties consistently campaign in Arab cities such as Nazareth (where, in 2000, Muslims were 70 percent of the population) and just as consistently make promises to the Palestinian people in exchange for votes—promises that are seldom kept. In May 1999, just before ELECTIONS for prime minister, the ministerial campaigns of both major parties sought the votes of the Muslims in Nazareth. Likud and the Netanyahu government had offered the Muslims several compromise solutions, and the Commission of Inquiry that Netanyahu established would have allowed them to build a mosque. Ehud Barak and the Labor party negotiated far-reaching demands between with the United Arab List, supported by most Muslims, which would allow the Muslims of Israel to be recognized as a separate community and also, by implication, for a solution of the Shihab a-Din controversy to the Muslims' liking.

The issue of the Nazareth mosque afforded Israel for the first time an opportunity to divide the historically united population of Israel's largest Palestinian city. Patriarch of Jerusalem Michael Sabah termed the government ruling an "Israeli policy of divide and rule" aimed at splitting Arab Muslims from Christians, and many Muslims seemed to understand this point. The protesters' demands for a mosque were opposed, for example, by the PNA president YASIR ARAFAT and the Islamic Supreme Council in JERUSALEM. Moreover, on the eve of the mosque cornerstone laying, the government of SAUDI ARABIA offered to pay for the construction of a substitute mosque elsewhere in Nazareth.

Nevertheless, the Israeli government stood by its decision and construction of the mosque proceeded. On 25 March 2000, however, Pope John Paul II said mass at the Basilica of the Annunciation, and, under stiff pressure from the Vatican and a united front of Christian factions in the Holy Land, the Israeli government, on 4 March 2002, reversed earlier decisions and declared that the mosque would not go forward. The government based its decision on the recommendation of a special ministerial committee led by Minister of Construction and Housing NATAN SHARANSKY, who suggested to the Nazareth *waqf* alternative locations for construction of the proposed mosque. The government offered the *waqf* seven possible locations, all available for immediate building, and promised to restore Shahib al-Din's grave without

altering the status of the site. In addition, the government called for implementation of the Nazareth municipality's original plan to turn the disputed square alongside the church into an open plaza for tourists.

In July 2003 the six-year conflict came to an ephemeral end when Israel dispatched bulldozers and jackhammers to tear down the foundation of the mosque, leaving the Muslim population seething with anger and the likelihood of intercommunal violence tangible. A public square was constructed at the site, although the official opening has been delayed for fear of reigniting tensions. The temporary walls surrounding the square were torn down by protesters in 2006 after a fanatic Jew, Haim Habibi, carried out an attack on the Basilica of the Annunciation while worshipers were gathered in prayer for the coming Easter holidays.

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NELED (Women for Coexistence)

NELED was founded in 1989 in Israel to bring together Palestinian and Jewish citizens of Israel. In this spirit the group initiates solidarity visits to and activities within the Palestinian territories. It networks with institutions in the Palestinian city of Tulkarm, such as the orphanage and the Institute for Children with Mental Disability. On holidays NELED collects donations and brings the children gifts. (http://coalitionofwomen.org/home/english/organizations/neled).

Neoconservatives, US

Neoconservative ideology is characterized by an emphasis on militarism, on the need to continuously expand and increase US military strength, and to utilize military means in offensive as well as defensive situations. Under the GEORGE W. BUSH administration, neoconservatives (or neocons) dominated US foreign policy making, and nowhere was their influence more pronounced than in the Middle East generally and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular.

Neocons tend to believe that the UNITED STATES should overthrow regimes deemed hostile to its interests and that preemption is the best assurance of security. They advocate the spread of democracy (even in cases where elections produce anti-US regimes), by war if necessary. However, the neoconservative concern with installing democracy by force is limited to a few states and nonstate actors in the Middle East and Islamic

countries, particularly potential opponents of Israel. Neocons admire Israel's militarism and bold military actions—for example, preemptive strikes and TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS. They respect the Israeli government's willingness to use military means without regard for constraints and consider Israel to be the most important strategic ally of the US and a democratic country threatened by various forms of TERRORISM: ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, Palestinian nationalism, and IRAN's nuclear. From this worldview, any threat to Israel is also a direct threat to the United States, because both are democratic, free, peace-loving, and civilized countries as well as allies. Neoconservative identification with the state of Israel increased after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, which for the neoconservatives highlighted the parallels between the United States and Israel as democratic states under the threat of Islamic terrorism. Additionally, neocons have an emotional attachment to Israel not often evident in international relations. A significant proportion of neoconservatives are Jewish, but the group's non-Jewish adherents are just as devoted to Israel.

Neoconservatives perceive the world as dichotomous: countries are either allies or enemies, while nations are considered either good or evil. Neocons speak in stark terms, labeling enemies as like "Hitler" or "Stalin," "Nazis," or "communists." In this context Israel is good and the Palestinians are essentially terrorists, whom Israel must suppress. The neocons believe the Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES should have limited local autonomy but only after Israel has ensured that they can pose no military threat. They believe that Israel alone has the right to decide the fate of the Occupied Territories and consider Israel's sovereignty legitimate over all of JERUSALEM, including Palestinian East Jerusalem.

During the first eight years of the twenty-first century, the neoconservatives held many positions of power in the US government and dominated many think tanks and opinion-making and policy-planning forums. Notable neoconservatives include the former vice president Dick Cheney, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, chief Middle East adviser at the White House's National Security Council Elliot Abrams, special assistant to the president Peter W. Rodman, assistant secretary of defense Zalmay Khalilzad, special assistant to the president John R. Bolton (later Bush's ambassador to the United Nations), deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and many unelected experts that make foreign policy.

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Netanyahu, Benjamin (1949–)

Benjamin Netanyahu, an Israeli politician and diplomat who was prime minister from 1996 to 1999 and began a new term in 2009, is the first prime minister born after the creation of the state. A member of the conservative LIKUD PARTY, the self-assured Netanyahu, called "BiBi" in Israel, is known for his intelligent use of the ISRAELI MEDIA and public relations acumen.

He is the grandson of a Lithuanian rabbi who immigrated to Palestine in 1920 and the son of Benzion Netanyahu, a theorist of Revisionist ZIONISM and secretary to ZE'EV JABOTINSKY, the founder of Revisionist Zionism. Netanyahu grew up in Cheltenham, Pennsylvania, where his father was a history professor and where he graduated from high school. From 1967 to 1972 he was an officer in an elite Israeli commando unit and later studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, receiving bachelor's and master's degrees in science. After studying architecture and business administration, he worked for the Boston Consulting Group until 1978, when he returned to Israel.

He immediately became active in politics, served as Israel's UN representative from 1984 to 1988, and was first elected to the Knesset in 1988. Netanyahu served as deputy foreign minister from 1988 to 1991 and deputy prime minister from 1991 to 1992; he was also part of the Israeli delegation to the MADRID CONFERENCE in 1991. Netanyahu is regarded as a hawk and is politically close to YITZHAK SHAMIR, in whose cabinet he served. In March 1993 he became leader of the Likud and was largely responsible for engineering its return to political power after its 1992 electoral defeat. After Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN was assassinated in 1995 by a right-wing religious Zionist, Netanyahu was criticized for previously cultivating extremist Jewish sentiment against Rabin.

In May 1996 Netanyahu was narrowly elected prime minister on a platform that focused almost exclusively on a tough stance on TERRORISM. His tenure as prime minister was marked by difficult talks with the Palestinians in the OSLO PROCESS, which occurred mostly because of US pressure. In the end he made some tactical concessions to placate Washington and to give the appearance of respecting the commitments made by previous governments. However, Netanyahu remained committed to the Greater Israel ideology (that the entire land of Israel belongs exclusively to the Jewish people) and publicly declared that JERUSALEM is one unified city under permanent Israeli sovereignty. He refused to negotiate the status of Jerusalem—even though such negotiations were stipulated in the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION [PLO] and Israel). While prime minister, Netanyahu made several highly provocative gestures that greatly disillusioned the Palestinians—for example, constructing the HAR HOMA SETTLEMENT to complete the ring of Jewish colonies around East Jerusalem and opening the HASMONEAN TUNNEL under the Muslim religious site AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. He rejects the creation of a Palestinian state, which he sees as a "Trojan horse" designed to annihilate Israel. Netanyahu is committed to permanent Israeli control of the biblical Judea and Samaria (the WEST BANK), which he describes as a "protective wall" against Israel's Arab neighbors, and is determined to construct many more Israeli settlements in this area. He opposes the OSLO ACCORDS, which "proves to the PLO that terrorism really pays," and said that "the continuation of the application of the Oslo Agreements girds Israel with terrorist bases." He will at most tolerate a limited form of local Palestinian autonomy over some civil matters, as defined in the INTERIM AGREEMENT (between Israel and the PLO) on the West Bank and GAZA STRIP.

Corruption scandals in Netanyahu's cabinet and strong reactions to his personality contributed to his May 1999 loss to ONE ISRAEL (LABOR PARTY) leader EHUD BARAK. However, after ARIEL SHARON was elected prime minister, Netanyahu served as foreign minister from 2002 to 2003 and as finance minister from 2003 to 2005.

On 9 August 2005 Netanyahu resigned from ARIEL SHARON's government in protest over ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA. When Sharon created the KADIMA PARTY, Netanyahu decided to remain with the Likud, running for prime minister in the 2006 elections. The Likud, however, came in a distant third. After leaving Sharon's government, Netanyahu established himself as Israel's strongest advocate for the missile defense plans of the GEORGE W. BUSH administration. Netanyahu's political career has been financed by the most conservative wing of the pro-Israeli lobby in the UNITED STATES.

In March 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu was again elected prime minister of Israel and put together the most far right coalition ever to have governed the state. Unexpectedly, Labor joined the

coalition at the last hour. The following parties comprise Netanyahu's governing coalition:

- Likud, 27 seats: Rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state; insists on completing the separation BARRIER and maintaining Israeli control over most of the Occupied West Bank, including East JERUSALEM, the main settlement blocs, the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, and the Judean Desert—relegating Palestinians to a series of disconnected Bantustans.
- YISRAEL BEITENU, 15 seats: Headed by the controversial AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN, who has advocated the forced expulsion of Israel's Palestinian citizens, the party is primarily driven by a desire to cleanse Israel of as many non-Jews as possible. Main supporters come from recent immigrant populations from the former SOVIET UNION.
- Labor, 13 seats: Its platform closely resembles that of Kadima with regard to the peace process. The platform mentions the need for a return to the ROAD MAP for peace, yet supports unilateral action that would allow Israel to retain control of the Palestinian land on which its major settlement blocs sit.
- SHAS, 11 seats: The Knesset's largest religious-Zionist party, guided by the controversial Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, whose inflammatory remarks about Arabs have outraged liberal sectors of Israel; opposes any negotiations over the status of East Jerusalem, usually takes a hard line on the Palestinian issue.
- UNITED TORAH JUDAISM, 5 seats: A religious-Zionist bloc, it supports the application of Jewish religious law to all spheres of Israeli society. Its policies and ideology are heavily influenced by a council of religious scholars. It has consistently expressed its unwillingness to support any moves by the Israeli government to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority over the status of Jerusalem, insisting that East Jerusalem remain under Israeli control.
- The Jewish Home, 3 seats: A religious-Zionist party that emerged from the split of the NATIONAL UNION–NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, it rejects the return of any of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, opposes the creation of a Palestinian state, and promotes active Jewish settlement of all the Occupied Territories.

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Neturei Karta

Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City in Aramaic) is a group of HAREDI (ultra-Orthodox) Jews who not only reject all forms of ZIONISM but also actively oppose the state of Israel and advocate the Palestinian cause. Numbering some 5,000, they are mainly concentrated in the JERUSALEM neighborhoods of Batei Ungarin and Meah Shearim, with smaller groups in London, New York City, and upstate New York. Most members of Neturei Karta are descended from Hungarian Jews who settled in Jerusalem's Old City in the early nineteenth century. Adherents of Neturei Karta stress that the classical rabbinic literature states that Jews were first sent into exile from the Land of Israel for their sins, that they must wait for God (through the Messiah) to end Jewish exile, and that all human attempts to do so are sinful. Neturei Karta thus views Zionism as a presumptuous affront against God.

From the beginning of the Zionist movement, Neturei Karta was theologically and ideologically allied with AGUDAT YISRAEL in their vocal opposition to and resentment of the predominantly secular new Jewish immigrants to Palestine. After 1948 and the establishment of Israel, however, Agudat Yisrael changed its position and has been a participant in most governments since that time, leaving Neturei Karta isolated from its Orthodox allies; as a result its opposition to Israel and Zionism became more intense. Neturei Karta does have allies, mainly among the large and affluent Hasidic group Satmar, as well as other Hasidic groups, some in Israel and others in the DIASPORA.

With their help Neturei Karta in Israel was able to avoid paying taxes to a state it did not recognize and, conversely, avoid obtaining any benefits from Israel by reorganizing the *halakha* distribution of funds that had characterized earlier generations. Thus it became a self-contained community within Israel with few formal ties to the surrounding political infrastructure.

After the 1967 WAR some elements in Neturei Karta became so opposed to Israel and Zionism that they became involved in Palestinian politics. For example, Rabbi Moshe Hirsch, Neturei Karta's self-proclaimed "foreign minister," served in PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION chairman YASIR ARAFAT's cabinet and saw a striking similarity between the views of Neturei Karta and those of the FATAH party: both seek to distinguish Judaism from Zionism and both favor a secular and nonsectarian government in Palestine. Hirsch has also sought REFUGEE status at the UNITED NATIONS for Neturei Karta, arguing that there is no difference between a people that was "pushed out of its land and one like ourselves whose land is being wrenched from under it by the Zionists." When Arafat was imprisoned in his Ramallah office during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, and especially after he fell ill, Moshe Hirsch brought him food and water. The Neturei Karta has been consistently active in support of the Palestinian cause, although the group is rarely mentioned or discussed in the US MEDIA.

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Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam

Neve Shalom/Wahat al-Salam (Oasis of Peace) was founded by the Dominican monk Bruno Hussar (1911–1996) to create a place where the people of Israel would live together despite national and religious differences, and a place to conduct educational work for peace. In the early 1970s, Jews and Palestinian Arabs who were Israeli citizens jointly established a village and began to engage in educational work for peace, equality, and understanding between the two peoples. Neve Shalom is situated equidistant from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv–Jaffa on land originally leased from the adjacent Latrun Monastery. By 2004 some fifty families had come to live in the village, with an equal number of Jews and Arabs. Eventually the village will include about 140 homes. Neve Shalom includes bilingual, binational schooling; The School for Peace; and Doumia-Sakinah (the Pluralistic Spiritual Centre in memory of Bruno Hussar). (www.nswas.com).

New Historians

History is not written in stone, nor does it remain unchanged by time. Among the changes that inevitably force a reexamination of historical interpretations are new scholarly techniques, the availability of new data, the growth and development of an open intellectual environment, the end of intellectual isolation, and a collective crisis of confidence that requires revisiting the past. Such a reexamination can be traumatic, particularly when it confronts established national myths sometimes used to legitimize the existence and essential nature of a state. The battle of the new historians and scholars with the guardians of a nation's official history can generate accusations of national betrayal and counteraccusations of moral stupor.

In the mid-1980s such a struggle developed in the Israeli academic establishment, and the ensuing debate arose largely from the perpetual national emergency under which citizens of Israel live and the concomitant questions this situation provoked among scholars, especially those who were not part of the generation involved in the establishment of the state. The research efforts of the young academics gave rise to more than revisionist historiography; they demythologized national legends as well as the foundational elements of an ideological history. The debate also involves serious questions about the previously uncontested connection between the new state of Israel and the entire sweep of Jewish history. The research of the new scholars produced a new history that rivaled the official state ideology and its idealized version of events surrounding the birth of modern Israel. What resulted was a potential paradigm shift away from ethnohistory and the national Zionist ideology toward a more pluralistic and humane narrative.

The term "new history" was coined by Benny Morris, whose 1988 article in the American

journal *Tikkun* attempted to distinguish the new scholarship from "revisionism" as it applied to the 1948 WAR. Morris described revisionism as an assault on a well-defined, credible, and documented body of historical writing. But in his opinion Israel's established history did not qualify as the product of formal historical scholarship, because it was simply the construction of state officials, public figures, and civilian and military bureaucratic analysts. The Israeli academe, aware of the phenomenon of "postmodernism," applied the term "POST-ZIONISM" to the new writers, because they generally approached Israeli history and politics with a critical analysis of ZIONISM. Recent critical writing is produced not only by historians but also by sociologists, literary figures, journalists, and political activists. Some are non-Zionists, although others remain decidedly Zionist, but most saw a need to move away from politicized history and from the glorification of war and military heroes that had shaped the nation's history since 1948.

National Historiography

Though he was not alone, Ben Zion Dinur is credited with the development of a national history based on the collective historical memory of the Jewish people—the Zionist meganarrative. He arrived in Palestine in 1921 after receiving his higher education at universities in Switzerland, GERMANY, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION. A historian by profession, Dinur became minister of culture and education during Israel's formative years and was also a member of the first Israeli Knesset in 1949. He taught Jewish history at Hebrew University and was an important leader of MAPAI (the Israel Workers' Party) from the 1930s onward. Dinur was responsible for founding the Yad Vashem Holocaust Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, authored the State Education Law of 1953, and served as president of the World Congress of Jewish Studies.

Dinur contributed significantly to the development of the official national narrative by his shaping of the writing of Jewish Israeli history to create a sense of common identity, a shared past, and a common future—the eternal "oneness" of the whole Jewish people from the earliest times through the present. To him history was intended to teach, empower, and create an emotional identification with the state. Israeli scholar Idith Zertal writes that Dinur "knew all about the role that knowledge of the past played in shaping the present, and to no less a degree about the shaping of the past for needs of the present—and, thus, about the historian's role in creating and imparting a national narrative." In Dinur's view the HOLOCAUST eliminated any choice of assimilation for Jews and justified the Zionist premise that a Jewish state was an absolute necessity. Indeed, he made the crucial, exclusive link between Holocaust memory (a collective memory of death and trauma created, produced, processed, and coded for use in Israel's public space) and the state of Israel, and between the Holocaust and Jerusalem. Dinur and others sharing his views found a way to use the horror of mass annihilation to rationalize Zionism and to support Israeli statehood. His ideas continue to dominate official Israeli textbooks.

Traditional Israeli-Jewish history as developed by Dinur and others promotes a Zionist meganarrative with unique slogans, signs, cues, linguistic typifications, and biblical symbolism to mold the Israeli-Jewish identity. The fundamental aspects of traditional Israeli-Jewish history, as developed by Dinur and others, include the idea that all Jews from all time and all space are one, that their oneness reflects their biblical "chosenness," and that they possess a universal existence outside history, which is their essence and their eternal victimhood. From these tenets, Zionists coined specific terms with biblical connotations to reinforce the oneness narrative—ALIYA (ascent), to describe the Zionist IMMIGRATION project; ERETZ YISRAEL, to imply the historical continuity of the Jewish presence in Palestine; and redemption from exile, to emphasize the reunion of the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, as well as to provide the rationale for expropriating Palestinian LAND and the dispossession of the Palestinian people. Even the Holocaust—with its six million Jewish lives lost—was used to support the meganarrative of Zionism. By not acknowledging the millions of others who also died at the hands of the Nazis, the term reinforced the eternal victimhood of Jews, while its combination with other symbols—"Holocaust and rebirth" and "destruction and redemption"—provided support for the new ideology. "Negation of exile," the definition of Jewish identity in relation to Zionism and Israel and not the wider JEWISH DIASPORA, provides a further example.

These precepts were institutionalized in Israel's universities because standard sociological

paradigms were not applied to actual historical experience. For instance, the universities instituted academic programs such as Jewish and Eretz Yisrael studies as special cases beyond the norms of modern sociology and historiography, cultivated in total isolation from the rest of the world, and in a manner consonant with nationalist disciplines that do not submit to international academic standards. Such programs deeply inculcated the tenets of the Zionist meganarrative, and, along with such leading Hebrew-language journals as *Cathedra* and *Ha-Tziyonut*, as well as *Studies in Zionism,* consider history a tool for public and civic education and for rationalizing continued political struggle against the Palestinian enemy.

DAVID BEN-GURION, head of the pre-state Jewish Yishuv and first prime minister of Israel, was committed to the institutionalization of a Judeo-centric idealized state history, which led to the 1953 Law of Education. The law had its roots in the 1903 Association of Hebrew Teachers, the 1913 establishment of Hebrew as the medium of instruction, and the 1918 decision by Zionist leaders to monitor the educational system of the Yishuv. The objective of each act, especially the 1953 law, was the creation of Zionist education that would help develop the new national Jew. Other movements, such as the more secular HASKALAH, received scant recognition. Official history and official education both served the state and its Zionist ideology.

Emergence of the New History

Post-Zionist scholarship was led by the historians Morris, Ilan Pappé, and Avi Shalim, who rewrote the history of the 1948 WAR and revised the official Israeli narrative on such topics as the Palestinian REFUGEES, JORDAN's relations with Israel, and Britain's unofficial support for Zionist objectives. Important early sociologists included Baruch Kimmerling, Gershon Shafir, and Michael Shalev. Ella Shohat and Tom Segev made significant contributions, as did Simha Flapan, whose groundbreaking work questioned all of Israel's myths and national history.

According to Pappé, new history and post-Zionist scholarship emerged from the convergence of several factors. One of these was the 1973 WAR, which gave rise to a severe crisis of self-confidence because of the initial defeats suffered by the Israeli military early in the war. This, in turn, produced an inward reexamination of the country's past. An additional cause, also related to the war, was the failure of the Israeli LABOR government to deal effectively with this unexpected challenge, which, in turn, dampened the ideological zeal of some sectors of the population. Later, the 1982 LEBANON WAR, with its lack of clear objectives and the mass peace movement that it produced, also contributed. Finally, the outbreak of the First INTIFADA produced a new awareness of the Palestinians and opened a period in which questions about the origin of the Palestinian "problem" could be explored. The Intifada also created an opportunity for Israeli-Palestinian intellectual exchanges that gave the Israelis a version of events that differed from the insular perspective of their own national history and led some to question the utopian and heroic aspects of the Israeli national narrative. Additionally, Israel began to experience multicultural and multiethnic pressures from within by those not included in the traditional European-ASHKENAZI history. More importantly, in the late 1970s, national archival material was declassified at the end of a thirty-year period, not only in Israel but also in Britain and the UNITED STATES. Young Israeli scholars, most born after 1948, began to study this new material, and their initial work was published mainly in Britain, where an intellectually open climate proved responsive to their endeavors.

It is notable that the challenge to traditional national history developed within academic institutions that were outside the reach of citadels of Zionist hegemony such as Hebrew University in Jerusalem. For instance, the newly established sociology department at Haifa University during the early 1970s produced the first works that undermined the foundations of Zionist historiography by applying theories of domination to the historical experience of the Yishuv. The works of Baruch Kimmerling and Yonathan Shapiro later built on the findings of these earlier sociologists. During the early 1980s, Uriel Tal at Tel Aviv University criticized the concept of Jewish history from within the history department. Although he is not counted among the new historians per se, he is credited with interjecting a healthy note of skepticism into the hegemonic and exclusivist field.

The fundamental understandings that emerged from the corpus of the new historians involve deessentializing the Jewish experience, equalizing the value of the Diaspora with that of

Israel, and humanizing and validating Palestinian experience and narrative. With regard to the Diaspora, the scholarship of the new historians revealed the distortion in the dominant Ashkenazi depiction of Israel as Western and white and its concomitant negation of the culture and history of the MIZRAHIM, SEPHARDIM, Ethiopian, Chinese, and other Jewish communities—a paradigm traditionally reinforced by the twin fields of Jewish and Eretz Yisrael studies. The new historians have also been rigorous in deconstructing the many myths surrounding the Yishuv, Mapai, the Euro-centrism of the Ashkenazim, and, in particular, Ben-Gurion. Tom Segev's work has been particularly important in this regard. For example, whereas traditional scholarship insisted on applying the term "colonization" to the process of Jewish SETTLEMENT in Palestine, the new scholars insisted on the term "colonialism." While the old school saw "colonization" as a progressive feat that led to the creation of a better world for all concerned, the new scholars regarded the Zionist settling of Palestine as a violent victory of the strong over the weak.

The new historians' impact on the traditional Zionist scholarly establishment has been far-reaching. Individuals such as Uri Ram demanded not only that the Jewish-Arab struggle be acknowledged as central to understanding the nation's history but also that the impact of Zionism on Palestine and the Palestinians be understood. Ram argued for an explanation of the injustice heaped upon Palestinians as a result of Zionist domination of Palestine as well as for situating Israel's recent history in the context of Middle Eastern events. Similarly, Kimmerling felt that the Arab-Israeli conflict must be understood as the main issue that shaped Israel's recent history. For him, the traditional paradigm that posited Israel as an integral aspect of "exceptional" Jewish history required replacement with a view of Israel as an "immigrant-settler" society within history. This, he believed, would lead to a deeper understanding not only of the indigenous Palestinian Arabs but also of non-European Jewish immigrants.

The new historians view the Palestine problem as standing on its own and stress that it must be separated from the Holocaust and victimhood as the overarching explanation for ISRAELI MILITARISM and wars. Many of the new historians have questioned the obligatory visit to the Holocaust Memorial, whenever foreign dignitaries visit Israel, as so much propaganda to justify the continuous effort to link that atrocity with the creation of the state. Through their research, the new scholars have undermined the logic of the juxtaposition of such concepts as Holocaust and rebirth, and destruction and redemption, which, they argue, serves to ascribe divine intervention and exceptionalism to events surrounding the creation of Israel. Rather than the traditional view that portrays the Zionist victory in 1948 as preordained, Pappé and others stress the strength of Israeli troops. The new scholars also question the policies of the Yishuv (and later Israel) toward Holocaust survivors. The use of the Holocaust to emphasize Israel's position as a perpetual victim in a region dominated by its enemies is viewed as a deliberate reinforcement of Israeli nationalism. For example, Israel's leaders have always identified Palestinian leaders such as YASIR ARAFAT with Nazism.

The new historians and scholars illuminate the actual role of the Labor movement during and after the formative years of the state as the agency that led to the creation of a Zionist state under the leadership of an exclusively Ashkenazi elite. Their work has been largely directed at revealing the reality of the Labor Party's victims, who were mainly but not exclusively Palestinians.

Individuals and Contributions from the New Historians

The new historians and scholars have devoted intense documentary study to the flight of the Palestinian refugees before and during the 1948 War. Even though official historical texts gave no space or credence to the national narratives of the Palestinians, some Israeli voices preceding the new historians expressed grave doubts concerning the official version of this event—that the Palestinians fled not because of anything the Zionists did but because the Arab leaders called on them to leave. Leftist Israelis have long echoed assertions by Arab historians (e.g., Walid Khalidi, who documented the destruction of 418 Palestinian villages within the 1949 armistice lines and the expulsion of the Arab population in 1948). Scholars such as Uri Davis revealed the idea of population TRANSFER within the Zionist elite as early as the 1917 BALFOUR DECLARATION and during the BRITISH MANDATE. In the 1980s URI AV-NERY's *Israel without Zionism: A Plan for Peace in the Middle East*, though flawed in some respects, nevertheless detailed Israel's forced expulsions of the

Palestinians, massacres, destruction of villages, and so on. Avnery may be considered a transitional figure, straddling both the Zionist phase of Israel's history and its years of skepticism and disillusionment.

Simha Flapan, who in 1987 published a major contribution, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities,* benefited from the declassification of documents in the Israeli State Archives and the publication of Ben-Gurion's war diaries. Unlike Benny Morris, who released his findings about the Palestine refugee problem around the same time, Flapan did not limit himself to this issue. Instead, he undertook a broader investigation of some of Israel's founding myths, including Arab responsibility for starting the 1948 War, the Arab military threat to the new state, and, most importantly, Arab resistance to Israeli peace overtures. Although Flapan did not belong to the new historians generationally (he was born in 1911), his contribution to the debate was no less remarkable because he lived and grew up during the formative years of the Israeli state. He also stands out for his utilization of Arab scholarship, such as works by Khalidi, who described attacks by the HAGANA and IRGUN, the main Zionist paramilitary forces, as the reason behind the flight of HAIFA's Arabs in April 1948. Flapan produced a history of massacres, destruction of the Palestinian ECONOMY, and mass looting by Israeli fighting units, all of which he described as a "scorched earth policy" against the Palestinians. He made two pivotal revelations relating to 1948—PLAN DALET and the work of Aryeh Yitzhaki, the historian of the Hagana (the Jewish underground military organization), who affirmed after the 1948 DEIR YASSIN massacre of more than 100 men, women, and children by Zionist militias that other Zionist military and paramilitary groups had committed many other massacres.

Flapan wrote that, although the Hagana did not participate in such massacres, it did engage in massive destruction of property designed to force the civilian Palestinian population to leave. He also cited the diaries of YOSEF WEITZ, the director of the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND's Colonization Department, who wrote that Israel destroyed many Palestinian villages in preparation for Jewish settlement and discussed the forced expulsion of more than 60,000 Palestinians from LYDDA and RAMLA in July 1948, citing the determined policy of the Yishuv to empty the land of its Palestinian inhabitants. Morris's 1987 groundbreaking history, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947–1949*, shed further light on Plan Dalet (Tochnit Dalet), revealing that the plan was a strategic and ideological rationalization for Israeli army commanders to expel Palestinians in 1948. Regarding Lydda and Ramla, the Hagana and its elite unit the PALMAH, commanded by YIGAL ALLON, were engaged in the military activities, and the commander of this operation was YITZHAK RABIN, the future prime minister, who wrote the order authorizing the expulsion of Lydda's Arabs irrespective of age. Similar orders were given to the Yiftah and the Kiryati Brigades to expel the population of nearby Ramla. Other accounts based on Rabin's memoirs corroborate this information. Morris described Ben-Gurion's famous hand gesture indicating "expel them" when asked twice by Allon what to do with the civilian population of the two towns.

In *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956* (1993) and *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* (1994), Morris provided additional details about massacres committed by Israeli troops. One, Operation Hiram, succeeded in driving out a large number of the Arab inhabitants from the Galilee villages. He also uncovered a series of atrocities committed in the course of these expulsions, such as rapes and murders intended to intimidate the civilian population into fleeing their land, and identified the three main military groups that carried out the operation: the Golani, the Seventh, and Carmeli Brigades. In *1948 and After,* Morris documented that the remaining Arab population of the town of al-Majdal, numbering 2,700 (from an original population of 10,000 and now renamed Ashkelon), was pushed across the GAZA STRIP border in 1950. Morris's analysis also attributed the refugee flight to the normal state of confusion in a war, the failure of Arab governments and military leaders to reverse this development, and the Palestinian elite who fled in advance of the arrival of the Jewish troops.

Pappé made the *Nakba,* the 1948 Palestinian exodus, the central issue of his research and delved more deeply and broadly into the founding of Israel than any other new historian. Relying on newly declassified official documents in his research for the 1994 book *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951*, he was able to reveal that Israel was not on the verge of annihilation in 1948, as many Zionists maintained, and that the Arab side was fragmented and incapable of

extending meaningful military support to the Palestinian fighting units. He concluded that official Arab armies that joined the war following Israel's declaration of statehood were woefully lacking in their operational abilities. Pappé strongly emphasized the tacit understanding and secret cooperation between the Israelis and the HASHEMITE Kingdom of Jordan as the main argument illustrating Israeli might versus combined Arab state weakness. The nature and extent of Zionist-Jordanian relations were evidenced both in Pappé's 1988 *Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1951* and in Avi Shlaim's 1988 seminal work *Collusion across the Jordan.* Another text demonstrating this point is Uri Bar-Joseph's 1984 *The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948.* Pappé went further than other historians in challenging the Zionist narrative that Israel was threatened on all sides, but all the chroniclers of this new historiography argue that by neutralizing the strongest Arab army, the Jordanian Arab Legion, Israel had no basis for asserting its weakness.

Although crucially important, historical works alone were insufficient by themselves to transform the Zionist-national paradigm, but, combined with the contributions of the "new sociologists" such as Baruch Kimmerling, they are gradually undermining state ideology. Kimmerling elucidated the experience of the Yishuv as another variation on the international system of colonization. In his 1993 *Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics*, he demonstrated that Israeli historiography employed certain strategies to promote the triumph of Zionism over other Jewish experiences and over its territorial enemies—Palestinians and the Arabs. Kimmerling pointed to the use of specific terms with religious connotation such as aliya and Eretz Yisrael that implied a historical continuity of the Jewish presence in Palestine that defied historical reality.

Countering the New Historians

The new historians and scholars did not escape rebuttals from the traditional historians and Zionist guardians of the state's official historiography. A blistering attack was mounted in 1994 by the Israeli author Aharon Megged in the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*. He protested the new scholarship's delegitimizing of Israel and Zionism and complained about the attempt to create a new collective memory of the 1948 War. He accused the new scholars of ignoring the sacrifices of those who fought in that war, particularly the Palmah generation, of which Megged was a member. The Palmah, who enjoyed a stellar reputation for living by a high moral code known as the "purity of arms" even in the midst of fierce combat, was shown by the new historians to have committed wartime atrocities against the civilian Palestinian population. Megged's strong critique can be viewed in part as a reaction of deep anger at this assault on one of the cherished myths of Israel's wartime conduct. Another attack on the new historians was mounted by Efraim Karsh in his 2000 book *Fabricating Israeli History: The "New Historians."* Karsh criticized the major themes of the new scholarship, particularly the significance of Israel's relations with Jordan during and before the war years. He averred that Shlaim's revelation of the existence of secret contacts between Israel and the Hashemite Dynasty and his assertion that British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin concurred with that alliance were nothing new. Karsh also accused Morris of simplifying the story of the refugees' flight, insisting that it was a "complex" phenomenon, and he absolves the Yishuv of any blame in encouraging the expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948, insisting that this aspect of war should be seen in the context of the British PEEL COMMISSION (1937), which explored the possibility of population exchanges. But Karsh's case against the new historians rests mostly on the acceptance of Ben-Gurion's words rather than his actions. Other attacks have been mounted by traditional historians and members of the Labor movement, such as Shabatai Teveth, Anita Shapira, Shlomo Aharonson, Itamar Rabinovich, and Yoav Gelber. Popular writers such as Hanoch Bar-Tov and David Bar-Ilan also joined in the attack.

In 2004 Morris, one of the leading new historians, revised much of his previous historical analysis. He wrote an article asserting that Israel had no choice but to engage in policies of expulsion and removal of the Arab civilian population in 1948 because it was engaged in a deadly struggle for survival. Had the Arab population remained in areas designated for the new Israeli state, he claimed, there would have been no Israel at all. Adopting a philosophical tone, he claimed that the movement of history does not hinge on the degree of suffering caused by superior forces. In his view, if the Palestinians had remained within Israel, they would have become a fifth column within the

Jewish state, and he argued that Arab aggression left Israel with no choice but to retaliate in full force. Morris also implied that Israel's activities were hardly unprecedented in world history.

Morris's revised stand was symptomatic of the retrenchment of the Israeli old guard following attempts to suppress the release of additional damning evidence related to the 1948 War. One such attempt, which made headlines in Israel, was the decision of Haifa University to reject an academic thesis that exposed details of the massacre in the Arab village of Tantura during the 1948 War. The student who authored this, Teddy Katz, was also denied the opportunity to attain a higher academic degree.

See also JORDAN; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; POST-ZIONISM; PROPAGANDA, ARABIC; WAR, 1948

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—Ghada Hashem Talhami

New Israel Fund

The New Israel Fund is a philanthropic partnership of Israelis, North Americans, and Europeans. Since it was founded in 1979, the fund has granted over $130 million to more than 700 organizations in Israel dedicated to safeguarding civil and human rights, bridging social and economic gaps, and fostering tolerance and religious pluralism. The fund's goal is to enable institutions to stand on their own and to invest in new organizations. The New Israel Fund is today the leading financial backer of social change in Israel. (www.nif.org).

New Profile

New Profile is a group of Israeli feminist women and men opposed to ISRAELI MILITARISM, in particular the militarization of Israeli society. It opposes the use of the military to enforce Israeli sovereignty beyond the Green Line, which separates Israel from the WEST BANK, and the use of the army, police, and security forces in "the ongoing oppression and discrimination of the Palestinians including demolishing their homes, denying them building and development rights, using violence to disperse their demonstrations and worse." The group regards Israeli conscription law as discriminatory and nondemocratic, and works to change it. Today, it argues, Israel is capable of a determined peace politics. New Profile maintains that the state of war in Israel is sustained by decisions made by its politicians (not by external forces), to which the citizen is passively subject.

In September 2008, Israeli authorities began a campaign to criminalize New Profile with the attorney general's announcement of an investigation of the movement. The campaign accelerated, and on 26 April 2009, shortly after BENJAMIN NETANYAHU was reelected prime minister, Israeli police "raided" the homes of seven activists in different parts of Israel and summoned them for interrogation. The police demanded that they turn over the computers located in their homes, seizing the computers of partners and children of the detainees. The police were particularly interested in the website of New Profile, which has links to other sites on the Internet concerned with conscientious objection and civil disobedience. At the conclusion of the interrogations the activists were released on bail under "limiting conditions," and all were told that during the next thirty days they were forbidden to contact other members of the movement. The computers of family members were returned after the activists were released.

A statement released by New Profile declared: "These recent acts confirm what we have been contending for many years: the militarism of society in Israel harms the sacred principles of democracy, freedom of expression and freedom of political association. One who believed that until now criminal files were conjured up 'only' for Arab citizens of Israel saw this morning that none of us can be certain that s/he can freely express an opinion concerning the failures of society and rule in Israel. . . . The attempted criminalization of New Profile amounts to no less than a state war on youth." More and more young Jewish Israelis are unable or unwilling to accept military service, and they have found their own way to avoid it. Israel's campaign against its youth is being fought within the broader context of increasing repression of political dissent. Activists were detained by the hundreds for protesting Israel's recent attack against Gaza, most of them PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, and some of them remain in detention. Nonviolent protesters are regularly targeted by lethal fire. Eighteen Palestinians have been killed while protesting the separation BARRIER.

Ha'aretz reported that officials initiated the New Profile investigation "because of increasing concern at the defense establishment of a growing trend of draft evasion. In July 2007 Defense Minister EHUD BARAK and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi declared publicly that they would fight the trend." Incitement to draft evasion is a criminal offense in Israel punishable by five years' imprisonment. www.newprofile.org/english/.

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI MILITARISM

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New Zionist Organization

The New Zionist Organization (NZO) was an independent, worldwide body established in 1935 in Warsaw when the UNION OF ZIONIST-REVISIONISTS seceded from the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO) and took a far more radical line. NZO reflected VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY's program that called for the creation of a Jewish state made up of both sides of the Jordan River, the IMMIGRATION of all Jews to Palestine who wanted to come irrespective of British quotas, the liquidation of the DIASPORA, and opposition to the partition of Palestine in 1937 and in 1947. In 1946 the NZO was dismantled as an independent organization and rejoined the WZO because the latter promulgated the BILTMORE PROGRAM, which sought to establish a Jewish state over the whole of Palestine.

See also VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) YEVGENIEVITCH JABOTINSKY

Nili

Nili (Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker) was a secret Jewish and pro-British espionage organization that operated in Turkish-controlled Palestine, primarily during the period 1917–1919. Under Ottoman rule young men who lived in the *moshavot* (collective farms) around the settlement of Zikhron Ya'akov formed an organization in Palestine called the Gideonites. During World War I this organization served as the basis for Nili, which engaged in active espionage for Great Britain under the leadership of the agronomist AARON AARONSOHN and his sister SARA AARONSOHN.

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Nixon, Richard Milhous (1913–1994)

Richard Nixon was the thirty-seventh president of the UNITED STATES, serving from 1969 to 1974. He was the only US president to resign from office, a resignation that came in the face of imminent impeachment related to the Watergate scandal and other offenses. He received a law degree from Duke University and during World War II served as a reserve officer in the navy. In 1946 Nixon was elected to the House of Representatives after accusing his opponent of collaborating with communist-controlled labor unions. He made a name for himself serving on the House Un-American Activities Committee, which sought to uncover communists in US society, and led the fight to destroy Alger Hiss. In 1950 Nixon was elected to the Senate after again accusing his opponent of being a communist, or a "fellow traveler." From 1953 to 1961 Nixon was vice president under DWIGHT EISENHOWER. His preoccupation with communism followed him to the White House and affected his decisionmaking on every foreign issue, including the Middle East.

Nixon came to the presidency well informed about most Middle East issues, free of debts to pro-Israel domestic constituencies, and not overly partisan toward Israel. He was prepared to be evenhanded in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but by the time he departed office, Nixon had become extremely pro-Israel. After the 1967 WAR, Nixon visited Israel and commented that Israelis had an attitude of "overconfidence" and "total intransigence," which Nixon thought could lead to hatred among their Arab neighbors and possibly another war. Before assuming the presidency, his only reference to the Palestinians was as "guerrillas," and Palestine was not on his agenda. Shortly before taking office Nixon sent a special envoy, William Scranton, to the Middle East to assess the situation, and Scranton reported back that the United States needed to be more neutral to secure its national interests in the region. Nixon publicly supported Scranton's recommendations.

Soon after becoming president, Nixon dispatched his secretary of state, WILLIAM ROGERS, to the Middle East to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but differences of opinion between Nixon and Rogers, on the one hand, and National Security Council Advisor HENRY KISSINGER, on the other, ultimately caused Rogers's efforts to fail. The first major disagreement involved whether to engage the Arab states and promote negotiations between Israel and the Arabs or to do nothing. (Israel preferred the latter since the status quo allowed it time to confiscate LAND and build SETTLEMENTS.) Rogers wanted to engage and

attempted numerous initiatives—each undermined by Kissinger. Although Nixon initially agreed with Rogers, he quickly distanced himself from his secretary of state, and, by November 1971, all of Rogers's efforts to transform the status quo had been sabotaged by Kissinger and Nixon.

The second issue involved the role of the Middle East in the Cold War. Although Nixon generally saw regional conflicts in the context of a global struggle against communism, for a time his view of the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed to be an exception to this global perspective. Nixon's early inclination was to hold Israel accountable for the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict rather than viewing communism as responsible. But very soon the president, prompted by Kissinger, came to view the Middle East as part of the Cold War and saw MOSCOW as the cause of all the region's ills—a perspective that, among other things, precluded any multilateral peace efforts and prevented Nixon from developing an understanding of the Palestine question. Rogers, on the other hand, clearly perceived the indigenous nature of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict and consistently attempted to mediate on those terms.

The 1970 BLACK SEPTEMBER crisis in JORDAN, which pitted the Jordanian army against the Palestinian guerrillas, solidified Nixon's Cold War thinking; he portrayed what was clearly a local conflict as part of a global confrontation in which the United States, with Israel's help, thwarted the Soviet Union and its Syrian proxy. The most important outcome of this affair, however, was Nixon's determination that Israel, although it had taken no action other than mobilization, would henceforth be a STRATEGIC ASSET to US interests regionally and globally; thereafter, economic and military aid to Israel escalated rapidly. According to Donald Neff, an author and journalist who is an expert on Israel and the Palestinians, in fiscal year 1970 all aid to Israel totaled $93.6 million, but the following year it rose to $634.6 million, and by 1974 reached $2.6 billion.

By the summer of 1973 Nixon was deeply involved in the Watergate affair, and most day-to-day foreign policy affairs were handled by Kissinger. In April 1973, SAUDI ARABIA's oil minister, Shaykh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, came to Washington to warn Kissinger that a failure to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict could lead the Arabs to use the oil weapon. Kissinger dismissed the minister out of hand. When EGYPT and SYRIA attacked Israel in the 1973 War, Nixon was completely preoccupied and Kissinger managed the weapons resupply, the shuttle diplomacy, and the reaction to the oil boycott. Nixon's one intervention came toward the end of the conflict when he drafted a set of instructions for Kissinger to follow when he went to Moscow to meet with the Soviets. Nixon wrote: "The Israelis and the Arabs will never be able to approach this subject by themselves in a rational manner. That is why Nixon and Brezhnev, looking at the problem more dispassionately, must step in, determine the proper course of action to a just settlement, and then bring the necessary pressure on our respective friends for a settlement which will at last bring peace to this troubled area." Kissinger informed Nixon that he could not and would not transmit this message, and Nixon's impotence was such that Kissinger prevailed.

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Noga

Noga, both a magazine and an organization, was started in 1980 when a group of Jewish women from a variety of professional backgrounds created Israel's first feminist magazine. Its mandate is to be "by women, about women, for women." As a magazine *Noga* is known for its consistently high standards, and as an organization it is part of the women's peace movement. It has taken a strong stand on the link between feminism, antimilitarism, and a just settlement with the Palestinians. (http://coalitionofwomen.org/home/english/organizations/noga).

See also COALITION OF WOMEN FOR PEACE

Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is an international organization of states considering themselves not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc, namely the UNITED STATES or the SOVIET UNION. The movement was formed and initiated by three leaders: India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; former president of EGYPT JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR; and Yugoslav president Josip Broz Tito. It was founded in April 1955 at the Bandung Conference, a conference of Asian and African states hosted by Indonesian president Kusno Sukarno. The attending nations declared their desire to avoid involvement in the Cold War and adopted a "declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation." Six years after Bandung, an initiative by Yugoslav president Tito led to the first official Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which was held in September 1961 in Belgrade.

The purpose of the organization, as stated in the "Havana Declaration of 1979," is to ensure "the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries" in their "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics." It represents nearly two-thirds of UN members and comprises 55 percent of the world population, particularly countries considered to be developing, or part of the third world. In 2007 it had 118 members, although changes in global politics after the fall of the Soviet Union have led to a reduction in its influence.

Nonviolence in Israel/Palestine

Though violent confrontation has characterized much of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nonviolent struggle has also had a long history. Recent years have seen ongoing nonviolent demonstrations against such Israeli actions as seizures of Palestinian LAND, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and the construction route of the BARRIER separation wall. Historically, nonviolent action played a major role in the Arab general strike of 1936 (the precursor to the ARAB REVOLT), which lasted for six months. Although the large demonstrations (up to 400,000 during the LEBANON WAR) held by the Israeli group Shalom Achshav (PEACE NOW) have been perhaps the most MEDIA-visible nonviolent action in Israel/Palestine, Israelis and Palestinians have conducted nonviolent activities—strikes, marches, boycotts, petitions, and so forth—for decades before Peace Now emerged in the late 1970s. Other nonviolent resistance activities in recent years have included the regular monitoring of WEST BANK Israeli CHECKPOINTS by the Israeli women's group MACHSOMWATCH, the weekly vigil by WOMEN IN BLACK, and the countless manifestations of *sumud* (steadfastness) by Palestinian farmers and shepherds, such as those in the villages of Yanoun and Tuwani, who maintain their lives despite the constant threat (and occurrence) of SETTLER VIOLENCE.

One prominent strand of Israeli nonviolent resistance is found in the refusal movement. Starting in 1970 and subsequently in 1987 and 2001, groups of high school seniors (called SHMINISTIM) signed and delivered letters to the prime minister declaring their refusal to serve in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES (West Bank and GAZA STRIP). Hundreds of Israelis are currently signed on to the Shministim letter, and at any one time a handful face or serve jail sentences as a consequence. Reserve officers in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES have also sent a series of letters to the government expressing their concern about military actions in the West Bank and Gaza. The 1973 Officer's Letter to MENAHEM BEGIN, signed by 350 reserve officers, asked that Israeli troops be withdrawn to pre–1967 WAR borders. In 1982, YESH G'VUL (There Is a Limit) was formed from a group of reserve soldiers who refused to serve in LEBANON and articulated the right of a soldier to disobey orders that violate the individual's conscience. In January 2002, COURAGE TO REFUSE was formed after the drafting of the COMBATANTS' LETTER, stating that its members refused to fight beyond the 1967 borders. In 2003 a group of pilots and members of an elite commando unit also wrote letters voicing concern that the OCCUPATION was immoral, violating Palestinian civilians' rights and corrupting the moral fabric of Israel.

In the Palestinian context nonviolence is often explicitly referred to as "nonviolent resistance" or "nonviolent struggle" to emphasize its active (as opposed to passive) nature and to highlight that nonviolence is an important alternative to ARMED STRUGGLE against the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The First INTIFADA, which began in December 1987, was almost entirely nonviolent. Organizing committees orchestrated daily strikes, led boycotts of Israeli

goods, and encouraged the planting of "victory gardens" to promote self-sufficiency. In June 1988, Israel arrested and deported one of the leaders of the Palestinian nonviolent movement, Mubarak Awad, head of the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence, because his nonviolent activism threatened the Occupation. During this period, the village of Bay Sahur carried out a TAX REVOLT, for which it was heavily punished by Israeli Occupation authorities.

A number of Palestinian NGOs use nonviolence training, radio programming, community mediation, and youth work to promote nonviolence and traditional means of conflict resolution (*sulh*); among them are the Wi'am PALESTINIAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION CENTER, Holy Land Trust, Palestinian Center for Rapprochement, Middle East Nonviolence and Democracy, and Palestinian Center for Democracy and Conflict Resolution. Several Palestinian villages have engaged in nonviolent activism through weekly marches and publicity campaigns against land annexation and by appealing to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT and the International Court of Justice regarding the route of Israel's Barrier. Some villages have trained virtually the entire village population in nonviolent methods. In April 2005, Panorama Center and Holy Land Trust organized a conference that drew 120 Palestinians from all districts in the West Bank to discuss nonviolent strategies for resistance and to develop mechanisms for communicating and sharing accumulated experience. The conference built on a two-year process of regional nonviolence strategy meetings and training sessions. In December 2005 an International Nonviolence Conference was held in BETHLEHEM, and in February 2006 another was held in Bil'in, with a special focus on the joint Israeli-Palestinian nonviolent struggle against the Barrier.

Joint Israeli-Palestinian nonviolent efforts include the numerous dialogues that occurred (largely abroad) when contact with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION was forbidden by the Israeli government. However, direct partnerships have also occurred in Israel and the Occupied Territories. For example, in the 1980s, Israelis created the Committee for Solidarity with BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY (in the West Bank), the Committee against Settlements in HEBRON, and the Committee for Confronting the IRON FIST. The ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION CENTER was founded in 1984 as a joint organization for raising awareness about current events in the West Bank and Gaza by circulating updates, writing reports, and holding events. Although it has been attacked at various periods by the government, it continues today with offices in Jerusalem and Beit Sahur in the West Bank near Bethlehem. TA'AYUSH (Partnership in Life), founded after the outbreak of the AL-AQSA (Second) INTIFADA in 2000, is composed of both Palestinian (Arab) and Jewish Israelis working together to fight racism, injustice, and the walls dividing Palestinian and Israeli society. Originally focused on actions inside Israel, Ta'ayush increasingly formed partnerships with Palestinian groups in the West Bank after the Israeli re-invasion in March–April 2002. Groups like Ta'ayush, in partnership with other Israeli groups such as the COALITION OF WOMEN FOR PEACE, GUSH SHALOM, the ISRAELI COMMITTEE AGAINST HOUSE DEMOLITIONS (ICAHD), and RABBIS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, mount campaigns during each olive harvest to help pick the trees of those Palestinians who cannot access their lands for a variety of reasons. Some Israelis have regularly participated in the weekly nonviolent demonstrations against the separation Barrier to express solidarity with Palestinians, in the hope of reducing the Israeli military's use of live ammunition against Palestinian demonstrators; other Israelis have accompanied Palestinians to their fields for planting, plowing, or grazing their sheep in areas prone to settler violence. Members of ICAHD and Rabbis for Human Rights have been particularly involved in protesting the Israeli policy of administrative house demolitions and have even chained themselves to houses in front of bulldozers.

In addition, nongovernment groups overseas have brought hundreds of volunteers into the Occupied Territories to engage in nonviolent intervention against Israeli repression and other violence; these groups include the INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT, CHRISTIAN PEACEMAKER TEAMS, the Ecumenical Accompaniment Program in Palestine and Israel, and Operation Dove. Such international efforts to support nonviolence and to accompany nonviolent Palestinian activists have deterred worse violence and have raised awareness of the nature of the Occupation among North Americans and Europeans, though it has also led to the deaths of several international volunteers at the hands of Israeli Occupation forces.

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; TAX REVOLT

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—Maia Carter Hallward and Stephen Zunes

Nordau, Max Simon (1849–1923)

Max Nordau (born Simon Maximilian Südfeld) was a Zionist leader, physician, author, and social critic. Together with THEODOR HERZL he was a cofounder of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION and president and vice president of several ZIONIST CONGRESSES.

Born in Hungary of SEPHARDI origin, Nordau was the son of an Orthodox rabbi and poet. Although given a solid grounding in Jewish tradition, he drifted away from the Jewish community and worked as a journalist for small newspapers in Budapest before moving to Berlin in 1873 and changing his name. He soon moved to Paris to work as a correspondent for *Die Neue Freie Presse*, and he spent most of his life in Paris. In 1880 he

began to study medicine and later opened a practice, although it was in the literary field that he was to make a name for himself. Married to a Protestant Christian woman and, despite his Hungarian background, strongly attracted to GERMANY's culture, Nordau was an example of a fully assimilated and acculturated European Jew.

Nordau was considered a controversial writer for his attacks on contemporary European art and social and political behavior. As a social critic he wrote a number of books, including *The Conventional Lies of Our Civilization* (1883), *Degeneration* (1892), and *Paradoxes* (1896). Although not his most popular or successful work while alive, the book most often remembered and cited today is *Degeneration*. *Conventional Lies* was an attack on irrationality, egotism, and nihilism, which he perceived as the evils of his time. By 1898 his works had been translated into some eighteen languages.

Nordau's conversion to ZIONISM, like Herzl's, was based on FRANCE's DREYFUS Affair (1894), after which the increase of ANTI-SEMITISM in Europe sensitized him to his duties toward the Jewish people. When Herzl met with him, it took little persuasion to convince Nordau that a Jewish state was a worthy idea. The two soon became partners in the Zionist movement, playing a central role in defining the BASEL PROGRAM (1897), which stated the objectives of the movement. At the First Zionist Congress, Nordau gave the opening speech on the condition of the Jewish people, which subsequently became a tradition at later World Zionist Congresses. At the Sixth Zionist Congress, Nordau defended Herzl's Uganda plan, in which the Jewish state would be created in Uganda, arguing that it offered a temporary solution to the Jewish people's sufferings, and coined the term *nachtasyl* (night shelter) to describe it. Following Herzl's death Nordau was offered the position of president of the World Zionist Organization but declined, preferring instead to serve as adviser; he opposed the growing trend toward practical Zionism, remaining faithful to Herzl's political program.

Eventually Nordau distanced himself from the Zionist movement, although not from the idea. He last attended a Zionist Congress in 1911, and, although a resident in Spain during World War I, he tried to maintain contact with the movement. At the end of the war, CHAIM WEIZMANN attempted to bring him back into the organization, but Nordau rejected the overtures, believing that the movement was a shadow of what Herzl had intended it to be. In 1920 he suggested a plan to evacuate half a million Jews from Europe to Palestine, but no one took the idea seriously at that time. By then he had returned to Paris, where he died after a long illness.

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Norway

See JOHAN JUERGEN HOLST; TERJE ROED-LARSEN; SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Nuclear Program, Israel

It has been widely believed that Israel possesses the largest and most sophisticated arsenal outside of the five declared nuclear powers, although Israel had never officially admitted possessing nuclear weapons. In a press conference in JORDAN in 1998, former prime minister SHIMON PERES hinted at possession when he said: "Israel built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima but an Oslo." In December 2006, Prime Minister EHUD OLMERT also hinted at Israel's nuclear capability. Speaking to a GERMAN television network he said, "Can you say that this is the same level, when they [IRAN] are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as America, FRANCE, Israel and RUSSIA?" Indeed, there is abundant information that the capability exists. The center of Israel's weapons program is the Negev Nuclear Research Center, usually identified simply as "Dimona" from the name of the nearby desert town. All production and fabrication of special nuclear materials (plutonium, lithium-6 deuteride, and enriched and unenriched uranium) occur at Dimona, although the design and assembly of nuclear weapons take place elsewhere.

Israel has been involved with nuclear technology from the founding of the country in 1948. Many talented scientists immigrated to Palestine from Europe during the 1930s and 1940s, particularly the German scientist Ernst David Bergmann, who was later the director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission and the founder of Israel's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. By 1949 the Weizmann Institute of Science was actively supporting nuclear research, with Bergmann heading its chemistry division. In 1949 Francis Perrin, a French nuclear physicist and atomic energy commissioner who was Bergmann's personal friend, visited the Weizmann Institute, after which Israeli scientists were invited to the newly established French nuclear research facility at Saclay, and a joint research effort was subsequently established.

The development of nuclear science and technology in France and Israel remained closely linked from the early 1950s through the early 1960s; for example, Israeli scientists were involved in the construction of the G-1 plutonium production reactor and UP1 reprocessing plant at Marcoule, France. The two countries had close relations in other areas as well. France was Israel's principal conventional arms supplier, and as instability spread in France's colonies in North Africa, Israel provided valuable intelligence obtained from MIZRAHI Jews in those countries. In October 1956, Israel and France collaborated (along with Britain) in planning and staging the Suez-Sinai war against EGYPT.

Six weeks before the war, Israel approached France for assistance in building a nuclear reactor. Shimon Peres, a key aide to Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION and director general of the Ministry of Defense, and Bergmann met with members of France's Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), and an initial understanding to provide a reactor was apparently reached during September. On 7 November 1956 a secret meeting between French and Israeli officials produced the understanding that France would assist Israel in developing nuclear capability. Several months of negotiation produced an agreement on the form French assistance would take—an 18-megawatt (MW, thermal) reactor of the EL-3 type along with plutonium separation technology. The reactor was later officially upgraded to 24 MW, but the actual specifications issued to engineers provided for core cooling ducts sufficient for up to three times this power level, along with a plutonium extraction plant of similar capacity.

Hundreds of French engineers and technicians secretly built the reactor at Dimona underground. In early 1958, ground was broken for the EL-102 reactor (as it was known in France). In 1959 the necessary twenty tons of heavy water were supplied by Great Britain (although it was originally believed to have come from NORWAY). In 1960, France, then under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle, reconsidered the deal and decided to suspend the project, although negotiations kept the issue open. An agreement reached before the year's end allowed the reactor to proceed if Israel promised not to make weapons or to announce the project to the world.

Israel used a variety of subterfuges to explain away the activity at Dimona, calling it a "manganese plant" among other things. Before the end of 1958, US intelligence became aware of the project from pictures taken from U-2 spy planes and identified the site as a probable reactor complex. On 2 December 1960 the US State Department issued a determination that Israel had a secret nuclear installation, and on 16 December this became public knowledge when it appeared in the *New York Times.* On 21 December Ben-Gurion responded to the disclosure by saying that Israel was building a 24 MW reactor "for peaceful purposes." In public the United States accepted Israel's claims at face value but privately exerted pressure, especially during the KENNEDY administration. Although Israel did allow a cursory inspection by physicists Eugene Wigner and I. I. Rabi, Ben-Gurion consistently refused to allow international inspections. The final resolution was a commitment from Israel to use the facility for peaceful purposes and an agreement to admit a US inspection team once a year. During these inspections, which began in 1962 and continued until 1969, Israel showed the US engineers the aboveground area of the buildings, but not, however, the many underground levels. The aboveground areas had simulated control rooms, and while the inspectors were present Israel kept access to the underground areas bricked up.

In 1962 the Dimona reactor went critical, and there is little doubt then that sometime in the late 1960s, Israel became the sixth nation in the world to manufacture nuclear weapons. It is believed that the first extraction of plutonium occurred in 1965 and that enough plutonium was on hand for one weapon during the 1967 WAR, although whether a prototype weapon actually existed is unknown. US journalist

Seymour Hersh relates that Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN approved starting weapons production in early 1968, when the plutonium separation plant presumably went into full operation. After this, Israel produced three to five bombs a year. In 1971, Israel began purchasing krytrons—ultra-high-speed electronic switching tubes.

Beginning in 1967, considerable nuclear cooperation developed between Israel and South Africa, which continued through the late 1970s and 1980s. During this period South Africa was Israel's primary supplier of uranium for Dimona. The 22 September 1979 nuclear explosion in the south Indian Ocean is widely believed to have been a joint South African–Israeli test.

Hersh also relates extensive (and highly successful) efforts by Israel to obtain targeting data from US intelligence. Tel Aviv obtained much satellite imaging data of the Soviet Union through the American spy Jonathan Pollard, which appears to indicate that Israel intended to use its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent, political lever, or retaliatory capability against the Soviet Union itself.

See also JOHN F. KENNEDY; MORDECHAI VANUNU

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Nuseibeh, Sari Anwar (1949–)

Sari Nuseibeh is a prominent academic, president of al-Quds University in JERUSALEM, political analyst, diplomat, and a member of the prominent Nuseibeh family. Born in Jerusalem, he graduated from Oxford University with degrees in politics, philosophy, and economics in 1971 and from Harvard University in 1978 with a Ph.D. in Islamic philosophy. From 1978 to 1990 he was a professor of philosophy at BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY (in the WEST BANK) and also taught classes in Islamic philosophy to Jewish students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

In June 1987 Nuseibeh made what was then a highly controversial suggestion: that the Palestinians should recognize Israel and that Israel should annex the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, reunify the country, and give full citizenship to the Palestinians in a single BINATIONAL state. A month later Nuseibeh was approached privately by the LIKUD PARTY's Moshe Amirav with a proposal to open a dialogue between the Likud and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in the West Bank. Nuseibeh and FAYSAL AL-HUSAYNI thus became the first prominent Palestinians to meet with the Israeli right wing. On 21 September 1987 Nuseibeh was badly beaten on leaving Birzeit University, presumably by elements of the Palestinian FATAH party angered by his talking with the Likud. (Husayni was jailed by Israel for attending the meeting, and Amirav was expelled from the Likud.)

During the First INTIFADA (1987–1993), Nuseibeh helped to author the "inside" Palestinians' declaration of independence and to establish some of the political and technical committees necessary for that struggle. He claimed that his objective was to strengthen Fatah in the Occupied Territories, but many were skeptical of his commitment to the PLO, and, as such, he was widely accused of wanting personal power.

In May 1989, Israel named Nuseibeh an unindicted co-conspirator in the trial of four Palestinian activists facing an Israeli military court. Israel alleged he was a member of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising and that he was instrumental in channeling funds from the PLO in exile to the Occupied Territories. Nuseibeh denied the accusation and no charges were brought. The following month, Israel closed his Holy Land Press Service, which was providing news of the Intifada to foreign correspondents and diplomats, alleging

that it funneled money to the Intifada—a charge Nuseibeh denied. At the same time, Nuseibeh's English-language weekly was banned.

After Scud missiles were fired at Tel Aviv during the GULF WAR, Nuseibeh was arrested and placed under ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION on 29 January 1991, effectively accused of being an IRAQ agent. British and US officials challenged his arrest, and Amnesty International adopted Nuseibeh as a prisoner of conscience. He was released without charge after ninety days in an Israeli prison.

Unable to participate in the Palestinian delegation to the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE, because Israel prohibited Palestinian residents of Jerusalem from taking part, Nuseibeh worked behind the scenes with the joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. In 1991 he also coauthored *No Trumpets, No Drums* with US scholar Mark Heller, which called for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. About the same time, he founded the Palestinian Consultancy Group (Maqdes) in Ramallah in the West Bank, which he still directs.

In 2001 YASIR ARAFAT appointed Nuseibeh the PNA representative in Jerusalem after the death of Faysal Husayni. However, an article he published on 24 September 2001, recommending that Palestinians give up the right of return, appeared in numerous Israeli and Palestinian newspapers and generated enormous anger among Palestinians. In January 2002 Nuseibeh criticized the militarization of the Intifada and called for the renunciation of SUICIDE BOMBINGS and the establishment of Palestine as a demilitarized state. Israel again arrested him briefly, on 17 December 2001, for planning a reception for foreign diplomats at the Imperial Hotel in Jerusalem. Top Likud officials justified the arrest on the grounds that the reception threatened Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem. On 10 July 2002, Israel closed and sealed Nuseibeh's offices at al-Quds University, where he had been president since 1995, on the grounds that they represented PLO activity in Jerusalem.

Reflecting the Palestinian public's outrage at Nuseibeh, on 19 December 2002 Arafat relieved him of the PLO portfolio for Jerusalem. In June 2003 Nuseibeh and former Israeli SHIN BET chief AMI AYALON colaunched The People's Voice, a civil initiative to mobilize grassroots support for a two-state solution.

See also NUSEIBEH-AYALON AGREEMENT

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Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement, 2002

The Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement is a peace plan signed on 27 July 2002 by Palestinian SARI NUSEIBEH and Israeli AMI AYALON. The six-point plan, also known as the People's Voice petition, set out what the authors considered the essential components of a final peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. Nuseibeh is the president of al-Quds University and was formerly the PNA official responsible for JERUSALEM affairs. Ayalon was an admiral in the Israeli navy and director of the SHIN BET, the Israeli internal security service. Neither man considered himself a professional politician, but both acted as concerned private citizens. After drafting the document, Nuseibeh and Ayalon sought to build grassroots support for their plan. As of September 2005, Mifkad.org reported that 254,280 Israelis and 161,000 Palestinians had signed the petition.

The plan is short, with only six paragraph-long points introduced by a brief preamble, and begins by stating that "the Palestinian people and the Jewish people each recognize the other's historic rights with respect to the same land." It is based on a TWO-STATE SOLUTION formula where "both sides will declare that Palestine is the only state of the Palestinian people and Israel is the only state of the Jewish people." The permanent BORDERS would be based on the Green Line established by UN RESOLUTIONS 242, 338, and 181. Any border modifications "will be based on an equal territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides including security, territorial contiguity and DEMOGRAPHIC considerations." The plan also calls for a physical link between the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP and for the removal of all settlers from the territory of the Palestinian state. Jerusalem would become an open city and the capital of both states. In the plan, "Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty." Regarding the HOLY SITES, the state of Palestine would guard the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF "for the benefit of Muslims," while Israel would be the guardian of the

WESTERN WALL "for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy sites will be maintained." The agreement recognizes the right of return of REFUGEES but with the important caveat that "Palestinian refugees will return only to the state of Palestine; Jews will return only to the state of Israel." In addition, returnees would receive compensation from an internationally supported fund. The Palestinian state would be demilitarized, with its security and independence guaranteed by the international community. Finally, with the "full implementation of these principles all claims on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end."

In 2003 Nuseibeh and Ayalon traveled to Europe and the UNITED STATES to promote their agreement and argued that their proposal was different from and superior to the October 2003 GENEVA ACCORD. Although both plans are private two-state initiatives that have many similarities, they differ on several points, especially on the issue of refugees. The Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement rules out a return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, while the Geneva Accord vaguely allows for the possibility. However, the Geneva Accord avoids the term "right of return," which is present in the Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement. Moreover, although the Geneva Accord is a virtual peace plan with the proposed text of a full final-status agreement, the People's Voice petition only sets out basic principles of agreement.

In putting forth the agreement, the authors sought to "restore hope" after the AL-AQSA INTIFADA deepened violence between Palestinians and Israelis in spring 2002. They also intended to restart the official peace process by building support for the principles of peace from the ground up. Although Ayalon and Nuseibeh jointly promoted the plan together overseas, in Israel and Palestine each ran separate campaigns to attract signatures for the petition. Ayalon's organization is Hamifkad Haleumi (National Register), while Nuseibeh's is al-Hamla al-Sha'abiyya lil-Salam wa-al-Dimoqratiyya (HASHD, or the People's Campaign for Peace and Democracy). Moreover, the two campaigns raised their funds separately.

The initiative has been criticized within both the Israeli and Palestinian publics. Israeli critics dismissed the petition as rewarding the Palestinians' violence during the Intifada and questioned whether Nuseibeh could speak for the majority of Palestinians. Many Palestinian critics concurred on the latter point, arguing that Nuseibeh had breached the national consensus on the right of return of Palestinian refugees as expressed in UN RESOLUTION 194. Other Palestinian critics noted that the plan would allow Israel to keep expropriated land in Arab East Jerusalem.

The People's Voice petition garnered support from US deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, who believed it backed the GEORGE W. BUSH administration's Middle East ROAD MAP. Ayalon responded that, although the Road Map provided the path, the Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement was the objective. Some Israeli peace activists supported the agreement by stressing the shared objectives and complementary methods of the Geneva Accord and the Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement.

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—Russell E. Lucas

Nuseibeh Family

The Nuseibehs are one of the oldest families of JERUSALEM, traditionally a large landowning Arab clan, although their influence in Jerusalem public affairs had declined by the twentieth century. In 638 CE an agreement between the Muslim caliph Omar and the GREEK ORTHODOX patriarch put the keys to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in the hands of the Nuseibeh family for safekeeping. After the CRUSADERS arrived in 1099 CE, the family fled to NABLUS, but when the Muslim leader SALADIN reconquered Jerusalem in the thirteenth century, the family returned to Jerusalem. Saladin gave the church keys to two families—the Nuseibehs and the Joudehs. (Christian sects, often squabbling over stewardship of churches in the Holy Land, generally trusted Muslims with the keys—a custom that continues today.)

Two prominent twentieth-century members of the Nuseibeh family are Anwar and Hazem Nuseibeh. Anwar (1913–1986), a lawyer, politician, and supporter of the AL-HUSAYNI political faction, became secretary of the Jerusalem

National Committee in 1934. In 1946 he was appointed to the reconstituted ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE and was secretary-general in the ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT. After 1949 Anwar served in several ministerial and diplomatic positions for the Jordanian government. He is the father of Sari. Hazem (1922–) was a politician who, after receiving degrees from the American University in Beirut and Princeton University, served in numerous positions in the Jordanian government.

O

Occupation

In June 1967, during a war that lasted six days, Israel conquered the Egyptian territory of the Sinai Peninsula; the GAZA STRIP, which had been under Egyptian administration since the end of the 1948 WAR; the part of the WEST BANK east of the ARMISTICE line of 1949 (the Green Line), which JORDAN had annexed and administered since 1949; and a portion of the Syrian Heights above and north of the Sea of Galilee. A few weeks after the end of the 1967 WAR, Israel undertook its first endeavors to build Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Israel's Occupation of the Egyptian territory lasted fifteen years, until 1982, when, following a peace treaty with EGYPT signed in March 1979, Israel completed its withdrawal to the 1967 BORDER by evacuating and destroying all the settlements built in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel's rule in the rest of the Occupied Territories continues and today is the longest existing modern military occupation in the world. Two significant facts distinguish this Occupation from occupation of Palestinian territories by Jewish forces during the 1948 war: most of the territories occupied in 1967 have never been annexed and Israeli rule there is recognized by the entire international community as an occupation; only a small fraction of the Palestinian population living in these territories was forced to leave and become REFUGEES.

Occupied Palestinian Territories

When Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, 1,256,000 Palestinians lived in these areas, some 235,000 of whom fled or were expelled to Jordan immediately after the war, only 45,000 of whom were allowed to return. Forty-two years later, the majority of the 3.5 million Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories were born under Occupation. During these years, without annexing the West Bank or Gaza or ever denying legally or officially the temporary status of the Occupation (except for the JERUSALEM area), Israel has radically transformed the occupied regions, their landscape, INFRASTRUCTURE, and DEMOGRAPHY in a way that seems to many irreversible. The ambiguous, indeterminate status of the West Bank and Gaza has become one of the main characteristics of Israel's form of governance and has allowed much of its colonization and oppressive practices, which were embedded from the beginning in an ambiguous legal system.

Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza have no political rights and are constantly exposed to violent threats and the direct use of force from the Israeli military. Although in rare cases compensation for confiscated property has been offered and even received, most often property is confiscated or destroyed without compensation. Soldiers' injuries to and killings of Palestinian noncombatants or of armed people who were not engaged in combat with Israeli armed forces are investigated by the army itself, but very few cases have led to legal charges, and of these only a handful have ended in indictment and even fewer in punishment. The situation is worse when it comes to SETTLER VIOLENCE against Palestinian civilians, which is rarely investigated. In other words, those who injure or kill Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are usually immune. And yet the use of force by the military, the police, and the special services (SHIN BET) against Palestinian bodies and property almost always enjoys the appearance of legality, at least in Israeli eyes.

The Legal Case. Even before the war was over, Israel declared martial law, according to a set of orders planned in advance to ensure the army's preparedness for occupying the Palestinian territories. The military commander was authorized to enact primary legislation, and other commanders were authorized to enact secondary legislation; some of these prerogatives were transferred in 1981 to the head of the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. The system of military regulations and decrees subordinated the Jordanian legal system, which was in place at the time of Israel's Occupation and which remains in force as long as it does not contradict Israeli military legislation. Both systems, however,

may be suspended or annulled at any moment by special EMERGENCY DEFENSE REGULATIONS issued by military commanders, according to BRITISH MANDATE law embedded in both Israeli and Jordanian law. Emergency decrees have been used for executing DEPORTATIONS, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, detention without trial (ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION), and seizure of LAND for so-called military purposes or as STATE LAND. The intensity and frequency of the use of these measures have varied during the four decades of Occupation, but the power to use them has never been questioned, and it is one of the main characteristics of the Israeli ruling apparatus.

No Israeli government has ever ratified the Geneva Convention or recognized the Palestinian territories as occupied in the legal sense of the term, but government jurists and the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT have always insisted that the relevant articles in the Geneva Convention and the Hague regulations are and should be respected in practice. Israeli actions that clearly contradict articles from these documents of INTERNATIONAL LAW (e.g., deportations, the establishment of civilian Jewish settlements) were legitimized through the Israeli courts' interpretations. Since 1968, the Supreme Court has agreed to consider Palestinian appeals that challenge the legality of decisions and actions taken by the military or civil administration, and the number of appeals grew steadily despite the official opposition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), which well understood the collaborative effect of this procedure. Most appeals were rejected (almost 99 percent), usually for the all-pervasive security reasons and "military necessity," which soon included the establishment of civilian settlements. The few exceptions in which governmental malpractice was admitted hardly forced the government to change its practice and have never affected its policies. However, both sides have gained something out of this legal practice. On the one hand, Palestinian access to the court has contributed to the legitimacy of the Occupation among Israelis (and some internationals), and, on the other hand, it has given Palestinians occasions to speak out and force Israel to listen to their complaints, in whatever limited form the legal discourse could allow.

In the first two decades of the Occupation, Israeli military force and emergency decrees were used mainly to suppress resistance—both military and political. Palestinian political leaders and activists were detained or deported without trial; labor unions and other civic associations were banned, and armed people and those suspected of relations with armed groups were detained without trial or arrested and sentenced in military courts. At the same time, the ruling apparatuses—both military and civilian—administered the daily lives of the governed population and took some minimal care of its basic needs. Israel allowed movement of people and goods to and from Jordan and Egypt, fostered the integration of Palestinian workers into the Israeli labor market, and exported its own products to the Palestinian market. The Palestinian ECONOMY soon became integrated into and dependent upon the Israeli economy. The introduction of cheap Palestinian labor (which was not protected by Israel's social laws) had a triple effect: it forced thousands of Palestinians to abandon agricultural work in cultivated land, restructured the socioeconomic stratification of Israeli society, and contributed to rapid growth of Israel's economy (but also delayed industrialization in areas such as construction work). The hierarchical, exploitative labor market created the main place, which lasted well into the 1990s, for encounters between Israelis and Palestinians.

The Use of Settlements. After the 1967 War, many Zionist Jews across the Israeli political map considered the West Bank and Gaza as part of the historical "Land of Israel" (Greater Israel) and demanded to resume Jewish colonization there. Although some objected to the idea, the main argument between Zionist doves and hawks was about the location of the new settlements. A few new Jewish settlements were built immediately after the war, primarily in areas where Jews lived before 1948 (HEBRON and Gush Etzion), as well as in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, where colonization was conceived as part of a military strategy against neighboring Arab states. Clashes between young Jewish religious-nationalist settlers and the LABOR government then in power ended again and again in compromises that allowed for the construction of temporary housing. The Labor governments that ruled till 1977 were unable to make a clear and firm decision on the territories in general and on the issue of settlements in particular, but many of their members supported the settlers and helped them in various ways, both material and political. However, in the first decade after the war, the colonizing effort was still hesitant, scattered, and negligible—except for Jerusalem and its surround-

ings, where intensive construction of new Jewish settlements started immediately after the war.

Using administrative decrees, Israel almost tripled the municipal area of Jerusalem, where borders were changed several times to include more Jewish colonies. Israeli law was applied to the region by a special fiat enacted in 1968 (reaffirmed in 1981 by another special act to prevent the option of any withdrawal of Israel from Jerusalem). Palestinians living in the Jerusalem region who wanted Israeli citizenship had to ask for it, although few did, and most who asked were denied. In the 1990s, Palestinian inhabitants of GREATER JERUSALEM who left for periods of more than seven years (and often even less) lost their PERMITS to return to their homes. The "quiet transfer," as this administrative deportation or prohibition on FAMILY REUNIFICATION was called by the human rights group B'TSELEM, forced thousands of Palestinians out of the Jerusalem area and often out of Palestine. The Jerusalem area as a whole was gradually cut off from the rest of the West Bank by a series of ROADBLOCKS, CHECKPOINTS, and a permit system that separates Jerusalemites from other West Bank Palestinians. This has affected access to and functioning of many Palestinian institutions located in Jerusalem, including hospitals, schools, institutes of research and higher learning, and various organs of CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

The colonial project gained new impetus when the right-wing LIKUD PARTY came to power in 1977. Dozens of new settlements were built across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Land was first seized and confiscated for security reasons, but after a 1979 Supreme Court challenge to the seizure of private land near NABLUS, Israel changed its tactics. Relying on an OTTOMAN law embedded in the Jordanian system, uncultivated land was declared "State Land" and was allocated for the construction of new Jewish colonies. By 1983, Israel had seized about 25 percent of the entire Occupied Territories and declared it state land, making way for further colonization.

The result of this continual process is that today Palestinians can use freely (i.e., build on and cultivate) less than 40 percent of the land in the West Bank. But the seizure of land was not always accompanied by actual colonization. After 1977, the pace, direction, and form of the settlement project were mainly determined by the strength of international—mainly US—pressure and the weight given to such pressure by the acting government. In the late 1980s, colonization entered a new phase with the construction of large settlement towns close to but east of the Green Line, together with a system of new ROADS leading to and connecting these towns and the granting of generous subsidies to those willing to move eastward into the new settlements. New segments of the Israeli population hitherto uninterested in the colonial project were attracted to the new settlements for material reasons. As Israel's state-centralized economy underwent the first stages in the process of privatization, the result was a restructuring of the Israeli welfare system along geographic lines: those who moved to the Occupied Territories enjoyed—and are still enjoying today—reduced taxes plus governmental subsidies in housing, EDUCATION, transportation, and culture, while the universal welfare system on the west side of the Green Line (Israel proper), which was structured according to socioeconomic criteria, has been gradually dismantled.

After ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in August 2005, there were 125 Jewish settlements, both legal and illegal, in the Occupied Territories, in which 450,000 Jews live (some 200,000 of these in the Jerusalem area). These settlements are connected to each other through a network of wide roads and linked to Israeli territory through a series of highways. As Israelis, all settlers are subject to Israeli law, regardless of the territorial status of their places of residency. But, somewhat like the Palestinian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories, they are both inside and outside the law. On the one hand, as far as their relations to Palestinians and their property are concerned, their subjection to the law is mostly theoretical, and when offenses are committed, the law is hardly ever enforced. On the other hand, when settlers challenged the Sharon government's decision to evacuate the settlements in the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria in the West Bank (as part of Israel's unilateral disengagement plan in 2005), the Israeli Supreme Court rejected their appeal and reasserted the temporary status of the settlements and the precarious status of the settlers as bearers of property rights in the Occupied Territories.

Most Palestinians resisted the Israeli Occupation from its beginning, using both political and armed means. The first signs of resistance were met with very harsh measures of repression by the Israeli forces, and both the resistance and its suppression were often ignored by the Israeli public or

silenced by the Israeli authorities. As a result, until the First INTIFADA, the resistance appeared, to Israeli eyes at least, as scattered, relatively isolated, and easy to repress. Many political leaders were deported or forced to COLLABORATE with the Israeli regime. With the Intifada, which erupted in December 1987, resistance became popular and widespread, and a new local leadership vigorously asserted itself. The emergence of new cadres of activists committed to the national struggle among the occupied population pushed the PLO leadership, then in exile in TUNIS, not only to intensify its struggle against Israel (which had been halted after the expulsion of that leadership from LEBANON in 1982) but also to take a more realist position—give up the dream of reconquering the whole of Palestine and recognize the existence of Israel in the 1948 borders. The Intifada yielded wide international interest and put the Occupation on the agenda of many international players. Numerous activists from international human rights organizations, journalists, and diplomats were drawn to the region. Many Israelis, too, became aware of the moral, political, and economic costs of the Occupation to Israeli society, and opposition to the government's policies mounted, although its political fruits came about only after the Labor Party returned to power in 1993.

Oslo Accords. In the new political environment created by the 1991 GULF WAR, a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian people (represented by the PLO) that would include the end of the Occupation seemed a feasible political goal. Secret talks between the two parties held after YITZHAK RABIN was elected as prime minister in 1992 yielded the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), the first of the OSLO ACCORDS. The Accords promised a gradual progress toward ending the Occupation without defining the terms of the final agreement, the status of the Palestinian entity, or the BORDERS between it and Israel. The Accords divided the Occupied Territories into three zones of control. Israeli control over the Palestinian cities was transferred to a PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) established and controlled by the PLO, whose leadership returned to Palestine after decades of exile. The Accords allowed the construction, with the help of Western states, of Palestinian state apparatuses, including a nonhierarchical structure of several distinct armed bodies, all of which were under the command of President YASIR ARAFAT. This security apparatus was committed, in principle at least, to collaborate with Israeli forces in suppressing Palestinian armed resistance. Negotiations toward a final implementation of later phases of the Accords and the final solution that should have followed them were conducted while Israel was still holding direct control over 60 percent of the area (Area C) and about 20 percent of the Palestinian population. The OSLO PROCESS soon came under sharp attack by opponents on both sides.

The mechanisms of cooperation and negotiation established in the Oslo Accords functioned only for a short while. The March 1994 massacre of dozens of Palestinians at prayer by a Jewish settler in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in Hebron and the oppressive measures Israel took against Palestinians in the aftermath to prevent retaliation, together with the growing opposition to the political process by the Palestinian religious parties HAMAS and ISLAMIC JIHAD, yielded a wave of TERRORIST attacks against Israelis—the SUICIDE BOMBINGS. Most Israelis ignored their government's responsibility for this new wave of terror and supported its violent response. The new repressive measures taken to "uproot terrorism and abolish its infrastructure" resulted in the gradual dismantling of the various mechanisms of political negotiation and administrative cooperation set in place in the various Oslo agreements. Colonization, which was supposed to come to a halt with the Oslo Accords, took two new forms, both of which have been legally dubious and often violent: the enlargement of existing settlements to accommodate the settlers' "natural growth" and the construction of so-called illegal OUTPOSTS and their de facto legitimization and development. More and more settlements are now served by a system of bypass roads that allow rapid movement of settlers and soldiers and are more or less closed to Palestinians, who are not allowed to cross them or come too close to their margins. Palestinians are also not allowed to enter the settlements (whose municipal areas extend far beyond the built-up environment) without a special permit. Colonization has thus squeezed the Palestinians into smaller and increasingly fragmented space, damaged (often irreversibly) the Palestinian landscape and ENVIRONMENT, expropriated private property and WATER resources, and systematically separated the lives of Palestinians and Israeli colonizers, while efforts to reconstruct Palestinian infrastructure have been postponed indefinitely or undermined completely.

During the Oslo years (1994–2000), this process was still partial and its costs to the Palestinian side were justified or tolerated because of the promise and prospect of a political agreement through which most or all of the settlements would be evacuated and Palestinians would regain their land and independence, as described in UN RESOLUTION 242. Growing Palestinian frustration intensified by the collapse of the Oslo Process, and ignited by ARIEL SHARON's provocative visit to AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in late September 2000, yielded scattered Palestinian attacks across the Occupied Territories that were met by excessive use of force by the Israeli authorities. This was the beginning of the Second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which has lasted more than nine years and was—on both sides—much more deadly than the first one, and much more devastating for the Palestinian economy and society. During that period the colonizing process became more blatant, consistent, orchestrated, and intensified. Israel reconquered parts of the areas under Palestinian control, and the already fragmented Palestinian space has been turned into a cluster of isolated territorial cells in which Palestinians are separated not only from Israelis but also from each other. Since 2000, and especially in response to the terrorist attacks of the Second Intifada, separation has become increasingly popular among Israelis, both as a strategy of control and as an ideological principle and a discursive trope. Two major strategic policies were shaped and executed in this context: the construction of the separation wall, or BARRIER, between Israel and the Occupied Territories, which runs east of the Green Line across Palestinian villages and fields, as well as Israel's unilateral "disengagement" from Gaza (August 2005), in which Israel evacuated its settlements and army bases from the Strip while keeping it as a closed area and maintaining full control over all crossings leading into and out of that area.

The EHUD OLMERT government, which was elected in March 2006, adopted disengagement as its declared policy and envisioned evacuation of more remote settlements, completing the Barrier and turning it into a border, and consolidating and annexing the major settlement blocs while still containing and controlling the entire Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip as well as in the West Bank. None of these goals were achieved. Instead, the Olmert government conducted a failed war against the Hizbullah in Lebanon (in response to an ambush in which three soldiers were killed) and launched a brutal attack against the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip, the worst of its kind so far within the Occupied Territories. The attack on Gaza in January 2009 (OPERATION CAST LEAD), which left 1,400 Palestinian dead and more than 15,000 houses damaged or ruined, was conducted in response to firing of homemade rockets on Israeli towns and villages. Israel reacted as if Gaza were an independent enemy state and not —since the Hamas government was elected in June 2006 — a besieged territory or, better, a huge prison, which no one can enter or leave without Israeli permission, and in which the population is supported by humanitarian aid but purposefully kept as close as possible to the "threshold of humanitarian catastrophe."

The imprisonment of Gaza and the fragmentation of the West Bank are both driven by the same logic of separation. The rationale of this kind of separation is not colonial and it often works against the settlements, whose existence and location only constrain, enable, and accelerate the spatial fragmentations; the rationale is rather security, which has become the main concern for Israelis since the 1990s. The common Israeli wisdom is that, because Palestinians are not partners for peace, Israeli security will be gained by spatial separation alone, and this by itself suffices to justify the devastating effects separation has had on Palestinian lives. Thus, the legal separation that has been in place since the beginning of the Occupation is now accompanied by a system of geographical separation. At present, separation has become a strategy of containment and control whose modality has changed and expanded in response to perceived threats, including remote control (from the air and the sea in Gaza), armed intervention and direct control through military raids aimed at targeted individuals, and the strict control of movement between and within Palestinian enclaves. As a result of this change, the colonizing project that was first developed into and structured as an apartheid-like system of governance has become entrapped within it.

New Kind of Governance. However, the Israeli regime of Occupation cannot be simply equated with the Apartheid regime of South Africa. Since 2000, it has become increasingly clear that Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories has become a form of governance or type of power in its own right with a history, an evolving and changing structure,

and a logic of its own. The outlines of this unique governance appeared even before the Declaration of Principles, notably during the 1991 Gulf War, when the first total, long-term CLOSURE of the Occupied Territories was imposed, lasting almost six weeks. Types of closure have been differentiated according to their duration, the size of the area they cover, and their relative permeability. Spatial isolation and a strict regime prohibiting Palestinian movement have become the hallmarks of this new form of governance. Both have become more nuanced, more sophisticated, and more devastating for the Palestinian population. This sophisticated spatial regime has been closely associated with two other dimensions of Israeli governance: a regime of "temporariness"—an elaborate network of suspensions (indirect violence in which bodies are affected by the real or imagined presence of forces that may but do not actually exercise violence) that extends from the very minute details of local control, oppression, and resistance to the most general stakes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and a peculiar economy of violence—a flexible equilibrium between "spectacular," or direct, violence, and "suspended," or indirect, violence. Thus one may describe the Israeli Occupation as a form of power structured along three axes: *space, time,* and *force.*

Space. Israel has established in the territories a very detailed and sophisticated regime for controlling Palestinians' movement that relies on a thoroughly fragmented space, a strict but ever-changing system of classification of the Palestinian inhabitants, and a whole bureaucracy of permits granted and denied according to changing criteria. Permits, which are needed to pass checkpoints, go abroad, or spend time in Israel, are granted for purposes of work, study, medical care, family visits, and other humanitarian reasons. The territories have been demarcated and controlled as a cluster of cells; the movement of Palestinians and their goods into and out of each cell is strictly controlled. Cells may be as large as the Jordan Valley or as small as a single village or a single house, sometimes even one story or one room. Movement is controlled between Palestinian cells, between Palestinian and Jewish cells (settlements and army barracks), and between the cellular space of the territories and the relatively open space west of the Green Line. Palestinians have no access to many of the Israeli cells, including the settlements and a wide strip of land along the Jordan Valley, and many of the cells can only be accessed with special permits. The disengagement in Gaza has not changed this basic cellular pattern. The four main cells of the Gaza Strip were first merged into one and soon after were divided into two again: an uninhabitable area, from which Palestinians fire rockets into Israel and which Israel shells quite indiscriminately from the ground; and an inhabitable area, which Israel bombs selectively from the air, targeting specific individuals with "smart" missiles that all too often hit innocent bystanders and suspects alike.

The construction of the 450-mile-long Barrier has not changed the cellular regime, but it has clearly affected the size of the cells, the location of the gates, and the frequency of their dislocation as well as their status (closed, selectively open, or mostly open). With the construction of permanent terminals in place of some of the quasi-temporary and provisory checkpoints, in which the bureaucracy of permits has been rationalized, the cellular system now has a façade of a border on its western side. This cellular regime has turned uncertainty into a structural component of everyday life and made extremely costly any attempt to maintain relations of any kind—familial, social, economic, academic, bureaucratic, or political—between different cells.

According to numerous reports by humanitarian experts, this cellular confinement is the single most important reason for the collapse and continuing deterioration of the Palestinian economy and for bringing the territories to the verge of humanitarian catastrophe. Israeli military experts say that it is also the single most effective deterrent of terrorist activity. Although both statements may be true, Israel has created conditions for a chronic disaster in the Occupied Territories, which has been avoided only through aid from humanitarian organizations, Western governments, and UN agencies, who all collaborate with Israel in an effort not to cross the dangerous threshold; they all share with Israel the burden of feeding the population, which "the Occupation" has deprived of its basic means of production and exchange. A "disaster to come" sets the horizon of the humanitarian enterprise; in the meantime, it is precisely this enterprise that stands between present impoverishment and a full-fledged disaster.

Time. The suspension of humanitarian catastrophe reflects the deep-rooted reluctance, which structures Israeli governance in the Occupied

Territories, to accept a final solution. Israel has always abstained from attempts to impose its own solution to the conflict through the use of force alone—in the form of another round of total war, massive deportation (TRANSFER), or full annexation (except for the Jerusalem region, where nationalist temptations proved too strong to resist). Calls for a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders, whether through agreement or unilaterally, have also been consistently rejected. Until 1993, negotiations with the recognized representatives of the Palestinian people, the PLO, were also rejected or postponed until certain conditions would be met by the organization. When negotiations began, they yielded an intermediate agreement—the Oslo Accords—whose structure consisted of a series of postponements of final status negotiations. Then and for a long time, the suspension of negotiations toward establishing the proper conditions for starting negotiations on the final agreement became a routine response by Israel to Palestinian terrorist attacks and gave Palestinian militants the power to dictate the pace and fate of the political negotiation. This seeming reluctance to make truly irreversible decisions is apparently in line with the common understanding of the Occupation, in which temporariness is one of the main strategies of the ruling power. What is effectively temporary is not the Occupation as a general framework of power relations—in fact, after more than four decades nothing seems more permanent than this framework—but everything that belongs to it: laws and regulations, rules and commands, political agreements and local arrangements, the presence of soldiers, the locations of their garrisons and the meaning of their orders, even the outlines of settlements and access to roads and routes one uses daily, the map itself, and above all what is permitted and what is forbidden, including the validity of written permits, sometimes even the permit to stay in one's own house.

Temporariness is created by the suspension of rules and permits' validity, and by the occupier's authority to suspend everything, which constantly hovers over the entire sphere of activity. An elaborate network of suspensions exists from the very minute details of local control to the most general stakes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the Second Intifada and at least two years after its repression, the uncertainty that pervaded everyday life ruined the Palestinian life-world. Expectations, planning, and long-term projects were constantly and repeatedly jeopardized. Birthday parties and school calendars, meetings in offices and private dates, let alone timetables for production and exchange of any kind, were all suspended in their turn as a result of the temporary nature of every mechanism of social coordination. One never knew for how long even the most familiar rule would last—how long a closure would be in effect, for example. Life has been rearranged not only in smaller and inflexible spatial units, but also in smaller and very flexible temporal sequences, in a way that forced the shrinking of the entire world of everyday practice.

Since the end of 2006, Israel has slightly released its grip over the West Bank and allowed some of the Palestinian enclaves to enjoy relative calm. In this climate, the coordinated Israeli-American effort to isolate the elected Hamas government that has ruled the Gaza Strip since June 2006 brought massive European and American support to the PNA and made possible economic and cultural prosperity, especially in Ramallah and its surroundings. In the summer of 2009, in Ramallah, suspension means the suspension of any effort—using words or blood, diplomacy or violence—to end the Occupation.

Suspension is not simply a symmetrical structure of double exclusions that cancel each other out (neither annexation nor withdrawal, neither catastrophe nor development), but rather a power, an asymmetrical strategy. The space between annexation and transfer, wholesale disaster and a political agreement, is not a neutral one. This is the space in which the Israeli colonizing project has taken place, and this is the interregnum that has made possible its more or less continuous advance. From the first settlements onward, temporariness has been both a means and an almost inevitable stage in their construction. It has also reflected the internal political debate in Israel—the split between hawkish and dovish parties. The Israeli government itself has structured this debate, giving it its impetus and ideological function, transforming the landscape and its demographic constitution without making any clear and irreversible political decision. It is for these reasons that Israel started, in 2005, replacing its colonial expansionism with separatist strategies and discourse.

Force. The retreat of the rule of law and the complete blurring of distinctions between law and command, or between a constituted rule and an ad hoc order, are the links that hold together the outer

and inner aspects of the system of suspensions. This blurring of distinctions is also a way of detaching the legal apparatus from the actual military apparatus of domination and control. On the one hand, executions by air and ground raids (the so-called TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS), house demolitions, detentions, and many other forms of exerting brute force on bodies, property, and land are conducted with only a semblance of a legal process; on the other hand, legal decisions are ignored or implemented in a very slow and distorted way. In fact, acting without three main apparatuses of state power—law, discipline, and ideology—the Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories can rely on the use of force alone.

Israel uses two kinds of force. "Suspended violence" is the force deployed across the Palestinian space whose presence is visible or merely hinted at by walls, gates, roadblocks, and road signs—it acts without touching; it directs and enforces without tearing bodies apart. It is clear to anyone involved that this violence may explode at any moment and become "spectacular violence," appearing anywhere, at any moment, on the ground, from the air, and in Gaza from the sea as well. Usually soldiers at the checkpoints do not shoot. Missiles are fired from unseen helicopters, and tanks storm one neighborhood but kill people in another where they have not yet been noticed. Gradually, the deployment and use of military forces have been deterritorialized and disconnected from the specific places where resistance occurs; violence may erupt anywhere at any time. From the military point of view, Palestinians are a mass of moving bodies channeled through a system of checkpoints alongside a series of individual suspects who must be traced and located, followed, and stopped by arrest or "targeted elimination."

This logic of action requires better coordination and integration between the forces exercising suspended violence and those exercising spectacular violence, reducing the presence of the former to signs and traces, and increasing the rapidity and precision with which the latter acts. Indeed, since the 2002 large-scale military operation in the West Bank and Gaza (e.g., OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD), Israel has significantly improved this interplay between spectacular and suspended violence, and the swift transition from the absence of the acting forces to their immediate presence, while simultaneously minimizing their operational costs. Because this strategy contradicts the logic of territorial expansionism, for which presence is of utmost importance, it has become necessary to reduce the areas of friction between Jewish settlers and Palestinian inhabitants. In the Gaza Strip this has led to the evacuation and destruction of all Jewish settlements, and similar acts may take place in the West Bank as well. So far, however, in the absence of further evacuation in the West Bank, the mechanisms of separation of movement (on the roads and at the checkpoints) have been radically enforced.

In these circumstances, the occupied is constantly exposed to violence, always at risk of being physically stroked, always forsaken and abandoned. Palestinians are neither citizen nor even subjects of the Israeli sovereign but "noncitizens" whose political existence is reduced to the status of an object of power, its target. At the same time, the occupied is also an *object* of power, that which stands in opposition to it, an *obstacle* in its way. From power's point of view, the occupied is an addressee of symbolic action only because he is conceived, first and foremost, as an address for a possible violent action. His very presence, let alone his attempt to speak back to power, is conceived as a form of resistance. He is not punished because he transgresses the law; he is usually oppressed, detained, sent back, expelled, injured, or shot dead because he is present where he is not supposed to be, arriving at the wrong time at the wrong place.

Occupied Syrian Territory

On the eve of the 1967 War, about 130,000 Syrian citizens lived in the Syrian Heights (called Golan Heights by Israel). During and immediately after the war, they were expelled and their villages were systematically destroyed, often without prior notification. Only five villages in the northern part of the region, four of which are inhabited mainly by Syrian Druze, remained intact. Soon thereafter, Israel annexed the territory and applied its own law in the region by a special decree enacted in 1981, forcing Israeli citizenship on the inhabitants of the Druze villages. By 2005, Israel had constructed thirty-two settlements in the region, housing about 18,000 colonists. During the October 1973 WAR, led by Egypt and SYRIA in an attempt to retake the territories seized by Israel in 1967, Syria reoccupied some parts of its territory. However, it was soon forced to withdraw and yielded even more territory to Israel, which later, accord-

ing to the armistice of 1974, was handed back to Syria together with the capital of the region of Quneitra, occupied in 1967. Since then, development of Israeli settlements has continued uninterrupted. The possibility of giving back the Syrian Occupied Territories in the context of a peace treaty with Syria is raised from time to time; negotiations toward this end last took place during the EHUD BARAK government (1999–2001). The occasional political speculation and diplomatic effort aside, Israel has continued its administration of the Syrian Occupied Territories as an integral part of Israel, and the Syrian Heights are a favorite vacation and resort area among Israeli tourists.

See also BANTUSTANS; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER VIOLENCE; MEIR SHAMGAR

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—Adi Ophir and Ariella Azoulay

Occupied Territories

In 1967, Israel conquered the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and the GAZA STRIP, among other Arab territories, in an armed conflict. The laws of war apply equally to all armed conflicts. Israel's OCCUPATION of these Palestinian territories falls under the INTERNATIONAL LAW of belligerent occupation, as distinguished from nonbelligerent occupation that follows an armistice. Israel may not claim these territories as its own because conquest is prohibited by international law, a principle that was considered so important that it was enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UNITED NATIONS Charter. Israel therefore has no sovereign rights over the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, nor are they "disputed" territories, as has been the coinage since President BILL CLINTON introduced the term. Moreover, with the exception of Israel, the entire international community considers these areas occupied and therefore subject to the laws of occupation.

The laws of occupation provide rules regulating the relationship between an occupying power and the population of the occupied territory (including REFUGEES and stateless persons), comprising a vast array of norms. Because of evolving circumstances it is necessary to examine the status of each of the three Palestinian areas under the laws of occupation as of 2009.

East Jerusalem

Despite Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and its assertion that unified Jerusalem constitutes its eternal capital, East Jerusalem is occupied territory. Therefore, it is subject, as is the rest of the West Bank, to the provisions of international humanitarian law that relate to occupied territory, which include the prohibition on unilateral annexation, the transfer of its citizens, and the alteration of the territory.

Palestinians in Jerusalem hold the status of "permanent residents" of the state of Israel, which differs substantially from citizenship. The primary right granted to permanent residents is that of being able to live and work in Israel without the necessity of special PERMITS. Permanent residents are also entitled to social benefits provided by the NATIONAL INSURANCE INSTITUTE and to HEALTH CARE insurance. They have the right to vote in local elections, but not in elections for the Knesset. Unlike citizenship, permanent residency is only passed on to the rightholder's children whereby the holder meets certain conditions set by the government. A permanent resident with a nonresident spouse must submit, on behalf of the spouse, a request for FAMILY REUNIFICATION. Such requests are more often than not denied. If a Palestinian Jerusalemite leaves the city for any period of time, he or she is not automatically guaranteed the right to return. Only citizens are granted the right to return to Israel at any time.

West Bank

Palestinians who reside in the occupied West Bank have the status of "resident alien," with no possibility of citizenship and no political rights, although they too have lived there for generations. The status of resident alien does not even convey the right to live in the Occupied Territories, and Palestinians there are subject to DEPORTATION, TRANSFER, and other harsh measures (HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, etc.) that are not applied to Jewish settlers living there. The West Bank settlements, like those in Jerusalem, violate explicit provisions of international humanitarian law; moreover the existence of the settlements leads to the violation of the rights of the Palestinians as enshrined in international human rights law.

Gaza Strip

Some analysts consider the occupation of the Gaza Strip as having ended when Israel withdrew its troops and settlers from the territory in 2005. This, however, is incorrect. Under international law, the test for determining if an occupation exists is *effective control* by a hostile army, not formal declarations or organizational implementation. Israel continues to maintain absolute jurisdiction over all Gaza's BORDERS (with the partial exception of the RAFAH CROSSING), its entire coastline and seawaters, and its airspace. Additionally, Israel retains control over Gaza's telecommunications, WATER resources, and electricity and sewage networks. Gaza continues to use Israeli currency, and Tel Aviv sustains complete authority over the Popula-

tion Registry, by which it continues to determine who is a "Palestinian resident" and who is a "foreigner." These comprise effective control and therefore occupation.

See also FAMILY REUNIFICATION; GAZA STRIP; INTERNATIONAL LAW; ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; JERUSALEM; OCCUPATION; SETTLEMENTS; STATE LAND; WEST BANK

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October War, 1973

On 6 October 1973, SYRIA and EGYPT launched a surprise attack on their territories that Israel had occupied in the 1967 WAR—the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. Their objective, besides regaining their lost land, was to force Israel to negotiate and to draw the UNITED STATES into a negotiating process. The war lasted until 26 October, when an initial Arab advantage was reversed and Israeli troops neared Cairo and Damascus. A massive US airlift of armaments, a near-nuclear confrontation between the United States and the SOVIET UNION, and an oil embargo of the United States were aspects of this crisis.

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Old City

The Old City of Jerusalem, the epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is an 879-dunum (217-acre) area within the modern city of JERUSALEM. Until the 1860s this small area constituted the entire city of Jerusalem. The Old City is home to several sites of key religious importance: the TEMPLE MOUNT and the WESTERN WALL for Jews, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Via Dolorosa for Christians, and the DOME OF THE ROCK and AL-AQSA MOSQUE on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF for Muslims.

Historically many nations occupied this city, beginning with Jebusites, followed by King David and the Israelites, the Babylonians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Muslims, the Crusaders, the Ottomans, the Jordanians, and the Israelis.

The current walls of the Old City were built in 1538 by the Muslim sultan of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE,

Suleiman the Magnificent. The walls stretch for approximately 4.5 kilometers (2.8 miles) and rise to a height of 5–15 meters (16–49 feet), with a thickness of 3 meters (10 feet). Altogether, the Old City walls contain forty-three surveillance towers and eleven gates, seven of which are presently open. Suleiman also built the gates, which have been known by a variety of names over historical periods and by different community groups. The English names for the seven open gates are New Gate, Damascus Gate, Herod's Gate, Lion's Gate, Dung Gate, Zion Gate, and Jaffa Gate.

Traditionally, the Old City has been roughly divided into four quarters: the Muslim Quarter (the largest section), the Christian Quarter (the second largest), the Jewish Quarter (the third largest), and the Armenian Quarter (the smallest), although these ethnoreligious designations were introduced only in the nineteenth century, and until then most quarters had mixed populations. The quarters form a rectangular grid, and the dividing lines are the street that runs from Damascus Gate to the Zion Gate—which divides the city into east and west—and the street leading from the Jaffa Gate to Lion's Gate—which bifurcates the city north and south. Entering through the Jaffa Gate and traveling to David Street places the Christian Quarter on the left. On the right, continuing down David Street, is the Armenian Quarter. To the left of Jews Street is the Muslim Quarter and, to the right, is the Jewish Quarter.


Some 32,500 people live in the four quarters of the Old City. Approximately 69 percent are Muslim, 12 percent Jewish, and 17 percent Christian of various denominations. Population density in the Old City is practically the highest in Israel, with 36 people per dunum (145 people per acre). But if only the residential area is counted, and public spaces—religious spaces, schools, markets, shops, and other open areas—are discounted, density rises to some 70 people per dunum (283 persons per acre). The Muslim Quarter is overwhelmingly impoverished; many in the Christian Quarter are also in poverty and with serious problems of drugs and crime. The Armenian Quarter is mainly middle-class, and the Jewish Quarter is prosperous. The average population of households and the average size of housing units vary among the quarters. The average Muslim household has 5.3 people, and the average size of an apartment is 40 square meters (430 square feet); the average Jewish household has 4 people living in an average of 75 square meters (807 square feet); the average Christian household has 3.7 people living in 42 square meters (452 square feet); and in the Armenian Quarter an average of 3.5 people live in 54 square meters (581 square feet).

Even today the distribution of the ethnic groups does not exactly match the quarters. The number of Muslims in the Christian Quarter has doubled since 1967, reaching some 1,000. The number of Jews in the Jewish Quarter grew only by 22 people between 1983 and 1995, reaching 2,900. But the number of Jews—Jewish settlers—living in the Muslim, Christian, and Armenian Quarters grew by 400 during the same period, reaching 500 in the Muslim Quarter, 300 in the Christian Quarter, and approximately 100 in the Armenian Quarter. Altogether, by 2005 some 3,800 Jews lived in the Old City (in all quarters). Christians and Muslims are prohibited from living in the Jewish Quarter.

The number of holy places in the Old City has proliferated enormously: in 1949 a list of 30 holy sites was given to the UN. Fifty years later, in 2000, a team of three—a Jewish Israeli, an Armenian Christian, and a Muslim Palestinian—prepared a list with more than 326 holy sites. These sanctified places are squeezed amid the population and are typically sites of conflict.

In 1948 the Jewish population of about 2,000 was besieged, forced to leave en masse, and the Jewish Quarter was sacked, with the ancient synagogues being destroyed. During the Jordanian occupation (1948–1967), the Old City was largely ignored and thus deteriorated significantly, but following the 1967 War, Israel invested millions of dollars in reconstruction and renovation of the Jewish Quarter (though not the other three). By 2004 the renovation and reconstruction of this section resulted in some population growth, and many educational, commercial, and religious institutions moved there.

The Armenian Quarter is distinct from the Christian Quarter, even though the Armenian people are Christian. Despite the small size and population of this quarter, the Armenians and their Patriarchate remain staunchly independent and form a vigorous presence in the Old City. After the 1967 War, the Israeli government provided compensation to the Armenians for use in repairing any churches or holy sites damaged in the fighting, regardless of who caused the damage, although it did not do so in the Muslim or Christian quarter.



Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), Washington, DC, © Jan de Jong cartographer, reprinted with permission.

Map 32. The Old City of Jerusalem

Today some 500 Armenians live in the Old City (another 2,500 live in Jerusalem outside the Old City). Some are temporary residents studying at the seminary or working as church functionaries. The Patriarchate owns the land in this quarter as well as valuable property in West Jerusalem and elsewhere.

In 1980, Jordan proposed that the Old City be inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage Site List, and it was added to the list in 1981.

See also CHRISTIANITY; HOLY BASIN; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

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Old Guard

The "old guard," sometimes referred to as the "Oslo elite," refers to the senior echelons of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) who were in exile with PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT and returned with him to the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in 1994. They dominated virtually all the senior political, bureaucratic, and security positions within the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), causing resentment and tension on the part of the indigenous WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP leadership. The old guard included Arafat, MAHMUD ABBAS, AHMAD QUREI', HANI AL-HASAN, and others of that generation. They tended to be both autocratic and corrupt.

A much younger generation of Palestinian leaders argues that the old guard failed to deliver an end to OCCUPATION, something it promised when the OSLO PROCESS was initiated in 1993, and that it also failed to provide good and clean government and strong institutions for the Palestinian people. As a result, there has come to be a split in the Palestinian movement, more specifically within the FATAH party, that has grown into a chasm since the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000. The YOUNG GUARD is determined to find a new way to end the Occupation, and to some extent they view ARMED STRUGGLE as the most effective means. Their model is derived from HIZBULLAH in South LEBANON. They want to force Israel to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank and cease its domination and brutalization of Gaza, and they are determined to displace the old guard of the national movement and take over.

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Olive Tree Uprooting

The uprooting of Palestinian trees and orchards, an aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has been an Israeli practice throughout the OCCUPATION. Israel uproots trees and agricultural products for a variety of reasons, including to clear LAND for Jewish SETTLEMENTS, military encampments and firing ranges, settler ROADS and INFRASTRUCTURE; punitive purposes; and, more recently, the Separation BARRIER. While the uprooting of citrus, stone fruit, date, banana, grape, and other fruit trees, plus vegetables and grains, is economically and socially distressing, the destruction of centuries-old olive trees is particularly devastating and has had deleterious effects on Palestinian society—from agriculture to identity. In Palestine, the *Olea europaea* is prized for its historical presence, its beauty, and its symbolism. The traditional landscape of Palestine dating beyond memory is inscribed in the psyches of Palestinians with olive trees, and their loss is nearly comparable to the loss of human life. In addition to their cultural and psychological significance, olive trees are a traditional mainstay of the Palestinian ECONOMY, with many families dependent on olives for their livelihood. Numerous products are extracted from the olive tree, including olives, olive oil, olive wood, and olive-based soap. Olive oil is the second major export item in Palestine, and olive production contributes about 38.2 percent to the productive income of all fruit trees. Forty-five percent of Palestinian agricultural land (228,560 acres/914,235 dunums) is planted with olive trees.

Table 5 Number of Trees Uprooted in the West Bank, 1993–2006 (olive trees comprise approximately 25 percent of the total number)

Year	Uprooted Trees
1993	500
1994	4,521
1995	2,500
1996	1,050
1997	25,435
1998	30,210
1999	17,033
2000[a]	18,274
2001[a]	123,915
2002[a]	45,548
2003[a]	249,378
2004[a]	83,956
2005[a]	60,759
Jan.–March 2006[a]	6,388

[a]Years of the Second Intifada.

There are an estimated 9 million olive trees in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, which have the potential to produce around 43,000 metric tons of oil. Picking the olives, which are harvested from the middle of October to the beginning of November, is a highly labor-intensive process requiring thousands of workers and almost a month of daily work. Consequently, more than half of the Palestinian population participates in the olive harvest, with extended families and their children spending weeks in the fields. After the harvest is completed, the farmers send the fresh olives to the press, which must be done quickly or the quality of oil is reduced. Once the oil is pressed and packaged, farmers need access to markets to sell their goods.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, however, has radically altered the tradition. Palestinian farmers working in their fields have been faced with SETTLER VIOLENCE, including crop theft, tree uprooting, orchard burning, harassment, and physical, sometimes fatal, attacks. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) rarely intervene to protect the farmers and often impose arbitrary prohibitions keeping Palestinians from going to their land. On 22 October 2002, for example, the Israeli press reported that the army prohibited Palestinian farmers from harvesting their olive crops in the WEST BANK, claiming that it could not protect the olive pickers from attacks by Israeli settlers. In the 2004 peak olive-harvest season, many farmers were prevented from accessing their olive groves by settler violence and the IDF. Israeli RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, such as CURFEWS, CLOSURES, ROADBLOCKS, CHECKPOINTS, and the Barrier, hinder Palestinian access to fields, processing, and markets, impeding farmers from completing the olive cycle.

The 703-kilometer (436-mile) Barrier presents a major obstacle to farmers in harvesting their olives. It is estimated that 85,000 dunums (21,000 acres) of olive trees, approximately 1 million trees, are or will be inaccessible or have access restricted behind the Barrier once the route is completed. Moreover, the Barrier has accelerated the olive trees' destruction, as land is cleared for it. The International Court of Justice opined in 2004 that Israel is obligated to make reparation for any damage caused to Palestinian farmers and where possible to "return the land, orchards, olive groves and other immovable property seized from any natural or legal person for purposes of construction of the wall." Israel has not accepted the judgment.

Since the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000), tree uprootings have occurred more frequently and have targeted whole villages. Groves of centuries-old olive trees have been bulldozed and destroyed across the West Bank. The settlers and the IDF have also set trees ablaze. On 23 October 2002, the *Washington Post* reported that settlers set fire to hundreds of olive trees and additionally sawed to the ground about 100 other trees in Mazras Sharqiya in the West Bank. Olive groves along most of the bypass road networks have been declared security zones, preventing farmers from tending their crops. In many areas, groves within 200 meters (219 yards) of the roads have been bulldozed, allegedly to prevent them from being used as cover by Palestinian militants. Israel has also set up blockades of commercial movement between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and Israel and vice versa, which impede the processing and marketing of the olives. Since the Palestinian "SAFE PASSAGE," AIRPORT, and SEAPORT mandated in the OSLO ACCORDS did not materialize, restrictions on movement of Palestinian persons and goods are extreme, and the exportation of olive oil is often impossible.

See also OUTPOSTS; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Olmert, Ehud (1945–)

Ehud Olmert is a professional politician, lawyer, former mayor of JERUSALEM, and elected prime minister of Israel from 2006 to 2008. He was born in Binyamina to parents who immigrated to Palestine in the early 1930s, where his father, Mordechai, was one of the founders of BETAR and the IRGUN, both militant Zionist groups. Both parents were members of the HERUT Party, and Ehud joined Betar in his youth. He holds degrees in psychology, philosophy, and law from the Hebrew University and had a successful law practice in Jerusalem before entering the Knesset in 1973.

Starting at the age of twenty-eight, Olmert was reelected from the LIKUD PARTY seven consecutive times through 1998, served on various committees, and held several ministerial portfolios. In November 1993, he was elected mayor of Jerusalem and served for two terms through 2003, at which time Olmert was reelected to the Sixteenth Knesset. On 7 August 2005, he was appointed acting finance minister of Israel, replacing BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, who had resigned in protest against the planned Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Although Olmert had originally opposed withdrawing from any land captured by Israel in the 1967 WAR and had voted against the 1977 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and the OSLO ACCORDS, he was a strong supporter of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA because it gave Israel the opportunity to solidify its control over Jerusalem and the WEST BANK. Following ARIEL SHARON's decision to leave the Likud Party in November 2005, Olmert joined Sharon and several other former Likud ministers to form a new party, KADIMA.

After Sharon's stroke on 5 January 2006, Olmert was appointed acting prime minister to

keep the government effectively running in Sharon's absence, and he remained in the position until the Israeli elections, which took place on 28 March 2006. Following election to the Seventeenth Knesset as head of the Kadima Party, Olmert became prime minister of the thirty-first government of Israel. In the 2009 elections he surrendered the prime ministership to Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu.

Legacy as Mayor of Jerusalem

Olmert has always had hard-line views regarding the Palestinians, perspectives that were especially evident while he was mayor of Jerusalem. As mayor, Olmert left an important legacy in a series of infrastructure and building projects that were designed to ensure that East Jerusalem could not be easily detached from Israel and serve as a capital for a future Palestinian state. The projects included the expansion of SETTLEMENTS in and around Jerusalem and the building of ROADS, bypasses, and tunnels to tie everything to Israel.

Ehud Olmert's term as mayor saw the industrialization of Jerusalem and the development of its light rail system. But it was also characterized by sharpening divisions between Jews and Arabs in the city, both socially and physically, as well as by a marked increase in the politicization of the city. Olmert was very involved in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's moves to increasingly "Judaize" all of Jerusalem. He was instrumental, for instance, in pushing forward such projects as the opening of the HASMONEAN TUNNEL in 1996, which sparked days of intense rioting. He was also a strong supporter of the construction of HAR HOMA, a settlement in East Jerusalem that continues to be a major disruption for Jerusalem's Palestinians and a serious obstacle to a peace agreement.

Despite the fact that 33 percent of the population of Jerusalem during Olmert's term was Palestinian, Olmert and his religious-nationalist followers were strong believers in what they called "a united, undivided Jerusalem under eternal Israeli sovereignty." When Washington protested a plan to build 13,000 new homes in Jerusalem and its West Bank settlement suburbs, Olmert had a quick, uncompromising response: "I never thought they [Americans] were the ones to decide the fate of Jerusalem. The city's future," he added, "won't be determined by the [US] State Department, but by what is done here. I don't lose equilibrium when I hear there is an American position on Jerusalem. It only proves we have to do more." Olmert used social policies and institutions to discriminate against Jerusalem Palestinians and demolition orders of Palestinian homes as means to "Judaize" the city. Nearly 300 Palestinian houses were demolished in Jerusalem between 1987 and 2000.

Olmert believed, as did his predecessor Teddy Kollek, in the value of determining Jerusalem's future through the creation of settlements—"facts on the ground"—to preempt Palestinian demands to make Jerusalem the capital of their presumptive state. He described the LABOR government's Oslo agreement with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION as a "dark cloud over the city." Olmert, together with all of his coalition partners on the municipal council, opposed the OSLO PROCESS.

Olmert based his seven-year term on the premise that he would "administer Jerusalem according to the understanding that we are speaking of a city under Israeli rule and sovereignty," and he acknowledged that the focus of his efforts was to continue the campaign of large-scale housing development that had already created an Israeli majority in East Jerusalem.

Olmert's Prime Ministership

Within a few months of assuming office as prime minister in 2006, Olmert undertook several major initiatives. In early April he unveiled his "CONVERGENCE PLAN," on 28 June he launched a six-month major military campaign in Gaza; on 12 July he went to war with HIZBULLAH in LEBANON; and by September he was so politically weakened that his ability to remain in office was widely called into question.

Convergence Plan. Olmert's Convergence Plan—which would unilaterally annex most of the West Bank without reference to, or negotiations with, the Palestinians—was his major policy objective. In an interview he gave to the *Wall Street Journal* on 12 April 2006, Olmert stated that his "goal . . . is to establish permanent, internationally recognized BORDERS that will ensure Israel retains its Jewish majority for decades to come." He planned to do this "without Palestinian input." The prime minister said that he planned to pull out of some areas of the West Bank, evacuate some 70,000 settlers (possibly with the offer to relocate them "to the large settlement blocs Israel plans to retain"), and annex "large chunks of disputed Palestinian Territory," which would negate the possibility of a Palestinian

state. Some 450,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank (including 200,000 in GREATER JERUSALEM), and evacuating 70,000 would still leave 380,000, plus those who are relocated. Olmert ruled out sharing political control of Jerusalem and its holy sites with the Palestinians, although Palestinians claim the eastern sector of the city as their future capital and say that this fact must be reflected in any peace treaty. "Dividing Jerusalem will not bring peace, only more fighting," said Olmert, who placed the cost of his plan at $10 billion.

Olmert's Convergence Plan was intended to establish final borders between Israel and JORDAN, already partially visible in the form of the BARRIER wall that separates Israel from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. He stated that the development of the E1 PLAN, a development plan that would connect distant West Bank settlements directly to East Jerusalem, would go ahead, despite the declared disapproval of the US State Department. This would link the strategic settlement of MA'ALE ADUMIM to Metropolitan Greater Jerusalem, severing the West Bank horizontally. The Convergence Plan represents basic long-term calculations: Israel intends to withdrawal unilaterally from minor areas in order to keep geopolitically strategic ones, especially Jerusalem and major West Bank settlement blocs. The intention is to undermine any feasibility of a potential Palestinian state while simultaneously controlling DEMOGRAPHICS for a decisive Jewish majority.

War in Gaza. On 28 June 2006 Olmert launched an invasion of the Gaza Strip—OPERATION SUMMER RAINS—in retaliation for the HAMAS kidnapping of an Israeli soldier and the killing of two others. The action continued unabated, and on 1 November Olmert renamed it "Autumn Clouds." By mid-November, the operation had killed 342 and wounded 1,186 Palestinians—overwhelmingly civilians—while life in the Gaza Strip spiraled further into the abyss. On 11 November, just before Olmert was scheduled to arrive in Washington, the UNITED STATES exercised its veto in the UN Security Council, killing a resolution that condemned Israel's excessive use of force in Gaza. The kidnapped soldier remained with the Hamas militants.

War in Lebanon. On 12 July 2006, in retaliation for the capture by Hizbullah of two soldiers, Olmert launched an all-out war in Lebanon against the Shi'a Islamist group. The United States fully backed Israel in this military offensive, including a major weapons resupply, and successfully delayed a UN cease-fire call until 11 August, when the Security Council passed Resolution 1701, to give Israel more time to achieve its objectives. Although Israel formally agreed to the resolution on 14 August, it continued to carry out operations until 8 September. The civilians killed in this war included 1,187 to 3,600 Lebanese (depending on the source) and 44 Israelis; military casualties included 119 Israelis and 46 Lebanese. As a consequence of the fighting, 900,000 Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis were displaced, and Lebanon was laid in ruins. Meanwhile, Israel failed to rescue the two abducted soldiers. Both the military and political elites in Israel were openly criticized over the conduct of this war, and the political leadership, especially Olmert, was greatly weakened. Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz had followed, rather than led, the military, which had made the decisions during the war. In an attempt to control the political damage, Olmert established a commission of inquiry into the war known as the Winograd Commission, after its chairman, Justice Eliyahu Winograd. An interim report was presented to Prime Minister Olmert and Defense Minister EHUD BARAK in April 2007. A final report was published on 30 January 2008. The report concluded that the conduct of Olmert and Barak was "reasonable."

In the aftermath of the wars, the political trends in Israel were mixed. On the one hand, the Convergence Plan was shelved, at least temporarily, but, on the other, the settlement movement in the West Bank, which only a few months earlier appeared to be a divided, waning political force, experienced a revival. Olmert stepped up construction in the large settlement blocs, including areas that the GEORGE W. BUSH administration had warned Israel against developing, and the West Bank settlement population grew rapidly. The settlers' change of fortune was a direct result of the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon (both areas Israel had occupied and abandoned only recently—Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005). Some Israelis drew lessons from the war that helped vindicate the settlers, whose large financial claim on the national treasury and strident opposition to an independent state for the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank had angered many outside the Greater Israel and JEWISH FUNDAMENTALIST circles. Effie Eitam of the NATIONAL UNION PARTY said, "The settlements are Israel's anchor in these

places. . . . Israel is about to review its entire defense doctrine and most Israelis understand it is time to rethink the whole paradigm of giving up land for things less certain."

In mid-September 2006, Peretz ordered the military to raze forty-seven illegal buildings in some West Bank settlement OUTPOSTS, which PEACE NOW said contained thousands of illegal structures. The order, which by the end of 2009 had yet to be carried out, also called for the demolition of thirty-nine buildings that Israel claimed the Palestinians constructed illegally, and this part of the order was implemented. At the same time, Olmert advertised for bids to construct 854 new housing units in West Bank settlements, although such construction is prohibited by the US-backed ROAD MAP, which Olmert says he supports. In addition to the new housing, Olmert went ahead with the development of the E1 Plan, and a large Israeli police headquarters was completed.

Ehud Olmert resigned as prime minister on 21 September 2008 after Israeli police had recommended that criminal charges be brought against him for fraud, corruption, breach of public trust, money laundering, and fraudulent receipt of goods. Olmert's trial commenced on 25 September 2009.

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One Israel Party

Just before the 1999 ELECTIONS, EHUD BARAK became the leader of the LABOR PARTY and its candidate for prime minister, whereupon he created a joint slate of the Labor Party, DAVID LEVY's GESHER, and the religious Zionist MEIMAD, calling it the One Israel Party. Barak was motivated by the desire to make the Labor Party appear more centrist and to reduce its secularist and elitist reputation among MIZRAHI voters. One Israel focused on social and economic issues and took an ambiguous position regarding the Palestinians. Barak's reputation as a "nonpolitician" helped him to overcome and replace LIKUD's charismatic candidate BENJAMIN NETANYAHU and win the prime ministership. However, Barak's participation in the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT with YASIR ARAFAT in the summer of 2000 led to Gesher pulling out of the alliance on 4 August, bringing an end to One Israel. Labor and Meimad continued as a joint faction, Labor-Meimad.

After the party's collapse, Barak was investigated following allegations that One Israel had broken the party funding law by allowing money from abroad to be directed into campaign funds through nonprofit groups in order to get around spending limits. State comptroller Eliezer Goldberg had already fined the party 13 million shekels ($3.4 million) for breaking fund-raising laws. It later became known as the "Barak Organization Affair."

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One Nation Party

In March 1999 former HISTADRUT (labor federation) chairman and Knesset member Amir Peretz (together with Rafik Haj Yahia and Adisu Massala) split from the LABOR PARTY and established One Nation (Am Echad) to fight for Israel's working class. One Nation won two seats in the 1999 elections; in 2002 it won three seats; in 2004 One Nation merged back into Labor (and Peretz became defense minister in EHUD OLMERT's Likud government). Later it joined Kadima.

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Open Spaces

See GREEN AREAS

Operation Big Pines, 1982

Although Israel's invasion of LEBANON in 1982 was publicly named "Peace for Galilee," the operational plan for the campaign was called "Big Pines." The objectives of the LEBANON WAR, as detailed in Big Pines, included destroying the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S (PLO) military capability and driving it out of Lebanon. The war was part of a campaign in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES to weaken Palestinian nationalism and transform the Palestinians into a depoliticized quiescent population that would accept the limited local autonomy of the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, allowing Israel to continue expanding SETTLEMENTS and INFRASTRUCTURE for a permanent presence. Big Pines also envisioned a confrontation with SYRIA in Beirut and in the Beqa'a Valley with the objective of eliminating Syrian influence in Lebanon and installing the MARONITE PHALANGE party in power as a friendly government with whom Israel could conclude a formal peace treaty.

After Defense Minister ARIEL SHARON, Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan, and Major General Amir Drori visited Beirut, met with the Phalange, and made their plans, the operation commenced on 5 June 1982 with a bombing campaign that lasted sixty-seven days, followed by a three-pronged ground assault. It is estimated that around 17,825 Palestinians and Lebanese, mostly civilians, were killed during the war. Hospitals were hit, the Palestinian refugee

camps were leveled, and West Beirut was all but destroyed in a massive bombardment. Approximately 376 Israeli soldiers were killed.

Syria's influence in Lebanon, however, was not eliminated, although in the first week of the war the Israeli air force destroyed all nineteen Syrian SAM missile sites in the Beqa'a, brought down sixty-one MIGs (ninety before the war ended), and destroyed five helicopters. Much, although not all, of the PLO was forced to leave Lebanon, but shortly thereafter the Palestinian organization enjoyed some of its most successful international diplomacy. In the Occupied Territories, Palestinian nationalism was not erased but was heightened, and in only a few years Israel had to face the First INTIFADA. The Phalange did not cooperate with Israel in the war's aftermath, as Tel Aviv had expected; there was no peace treaty; Israel's handpicked presidential candidate was assassinated; and Israel had to face a new enemy in Lebanon—HIZBULLAH, which fought for eighteen years to end Israel's occupation of their country.

See also LEBANON WAR

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Operation Cast Lead, 2008–2009

Operation Cast Lead was an Israeli assault on Gaza that began on 27 December 2008 and lasted until a unilateral Israeli withdrawal on 18 January 2009. It came after eighteen months of total SIEGE on the GAZA STRIP, which severely limited food, medicine, fuel, and other goods from entering Gaza as well as not allowing Palestinians to leave, creating a near–humanitarian catastrophe. The stated purpose of the offensive was to end the firing of QASSAM ROCKETS from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Throughout the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which began on 29 September 2000, HAMAS had fired thousands of these homemade rockets into Israel, killing twenty-three Israelis.

Background to the Assault on Gaza

With the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel blockaded Gaza and closed the Gaza international airport and seaport. The economic effects were immense, on the order of some US$5.3 billion, and were worsened after the Israeli creation of a so-called buffer zone in September 2001 that sealed all entry and exit points in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES for "security" reasons. After 9 October 2001, movement of people and goods across the Green Line and between Gaza and Israel was halted, and a complete internal CLOSURE was effected on 14 November 2001.

For seven years the Gaza Strip was subjected to continuous blockades, including an eighteen-month total blockade, severely restricting electricity and fuel supplies, as well as the movement of people and goods in and out of the region, including crucial humanitarian aid. From 2000 through 2006, as a consequence of the Gaza conflict and Israel's ensuing military operations in the Strip, it is estimated that there was a loss of $43 million in Gazan agricultural productivity due to the destruction of land, trees, vegetables, and greenhouses. The ongoing blockade had a devastating impact on an area where some 85 percent of the population is dependent on food aid from outside Gaza. It also significantly increased the levels of poverty and unemployment in Gaza, the consequences of which affect children more than adults because of their vulnerability to malnutrition and disease.

During that period, Israel carried out a series of military campaigns in Gaza, including OPERATION RAINBOW, 14–26 May 2004; Operation Days of Penitence, 28 September–15 October 2004; OPERATION SUMMER RAINS, 25 June–26 November 2006; and Operation Autumn Clouds, 1–8 November 2006, among others named and unnamed.

On 1 September 2005, Israel withdrew its settlements and military installations from Gaza as part of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA policy. In January 2006, Hamas won, by a

large majority, seats in the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, a victory that FATAH (and Israel and the UNITED STATES) was unwilling to accept. Infused with US weapons, aid, and military trainers, Fatah fought to keep control of Gaza. In June 2007, Israel (with US support) carried out an abortive and desperate attempt to overthrow Hamas by arming and backing a Fatah putsch. The purpose was to install in power PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) president MAHMUD ABBAS. Hamas resisted, often with violent brutality, and expelled Abbas and the Fatah leadership from Gaza to the WEST BANK.

After the failure of the June 2007 coup, Israel further tightened the blockade on Gaza, while Egypt and Israel sealed their border crossings with Gaza on the grounds that Fatah had fled and was no longer providing security. Like Israel, the United States officially reaffirmed its categorization of Hamas as a terrorist group and refused to have any dealings with it. Cairo, fearing a spillover of Hamas-style militancy into EGYPT, was somewhat more willing to act as a mediator.

On 19 September 2007, Israel accorded a new status to Gaza when its Security Cabinet declared it a "hostile territory"—a characterization that was shortly afterward approved by the United States. Although the legal implications that Israel intended to attach to this status remain unclear, one political purpose of this declaration was immediately made known, manifest in further reductions of fuel and electricity to Gaza.

Israel began planning for the military assault of Operation Cast Lead in March 2008, according to *Ha'aretz*, Israel's preeminent newspaper. On 4 November, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) deliberately broke a six-month truce with Hamas, which had gone into effect on 17 June 2008 and had been honored by Hamas, when it carried out an attack in the Gaza Strip that killed six Hamas members. Israeli officials claimed that it had uncovered a plot in Gaza to attack Israel, but skeptics claim that the real reason was to provoke Hamas to respond so it could "justify" its planned offensive. The day after the raid, Israel severely tightened its siege of the Gaza territory. Imports were reduced to 16 trucks a day, down from 123 daily the previous month (and 475 in May 2007). Hamas responded to the 4 November provocation in the manner Israel expected: it fired more Qassam rockets and Grad missiles into Israel. Although Hamas offered to extend the truce if Israel would lift the blockade, Israel refused, and Operation Cast Lead was unleashed.

The Operation

The Israeli operation began with an intense bombardment of the Gaza Strip, targeting Hamas bases, police training camps, police headquarters, and offices. Civilian INFRASTRUCTURE, including mosques, houses, medical facilities, and schools, was also attacked. The aerial assault was supplemented by a ground invasion that began on 3 January 2009, but the air force remained in action throughout. Over the three-week period of the operation, it was estimated that a million and a half tons of explosives were dropped on the Gaza Strip. Gaza is 25 miles by 5 miles in area and home to 1.5 million people, making it the most densely crowded area in the world and obscuring the distinction between civilians and militants.

In the twenty-two days of Operation Cast Lead, the Palestinian death toll as determined by B'Tselem was 1,387, of whom 773 were civilian noncombatants, including 320 minors and 109 women, plus sixteen medics and four journalists. The Palestinian Center for Human Rights reported that some 5,300 Palestinians were injured (many seriously), of whom 1,606 were children. The B'Tselem figures were widely corroborated by international human rights organizations, but the IDF disputed them, claiming a total of 1,166 Palestinian fatalities, of whom 709 were combatants and 295 were noncombatants. The IDF did not publish figures on injuries. B'Tselem reported that Palestinians killed nine Israelis during the operation: three civilians, one member of the security forces inside Israel by a Qassam rocket, and five members of the IDF in Gaza. Another four soldiers were killed by friendly fire.

Palestinians in Gaza had the following weapons: (1) small arms and light weapons, including assorted handguns, antitank weapons, hand grenades, grenade launchers, long rifles, and Dragunov sniper rifles; (2) missiles and mortars, including the homemade Qassam missile with a range of 9.9 to 25 miles and the Al-Banaa antitank missile with a range of 500 meters; and (3) improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some of which were used as antipersonnel bombs and others which were planted on the sides of roads or underground.

Palestinian tactics included booby-trapping houses and buildings and constructing an extensive system of tunnels in preparation for combat. A

Hamas fighter reported that the group had prepared a tunnel network in Gaza City that would allow Hamas to engage the IDF in urban warfare. Some houses were booby-trapped with mannequins, explosives, and adjacent tunnels used for ambush. Militants attempted to blend in with the civilian population and sometimes stored weapons in mosques.

Israel, on the other side, had undertaken long-term planning and detailed intelligence-gathering, largely relying on COLLABORATORS. Although Israel had been planning for the war for six months, operational security and a well-planned deception campaign took Hamas by surprise when the operation finally got under way.

Operation Cast Lead began with devastating air strikes. The Israel Air Force (IAF) hammered targets in the Gaza Strip with jets and helicopters. Prime targets were the Rafah tunnels under the Egyptian border, through which Hamas smuggled from Egypt food, medicine, all the basic things that were unavailable due to the siege, as well as small arms. The IAF used sophisticated weapons, including earth-penetrating bombs, to destroy the tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. Among those weapons was a new laser-guided, hard-target-penetrating bomb reportedly capable of penetrating 2 meters (6.5 feet) of reinforced concrete. High-precision weapons were also deployed throughout the battle to destroy bunkers and weapon depots.

Following a week of bombing, the ground campaign opened with three infantry brigade task forces simultaneously entering the Gaza Strip from several directions. The infantry brigades approached their objectives from unexpected directions, avoiding previously used routes in which Hamas had created booby-trapped bunkers and tunnels. An armored brigade, fielding the latest Merkava Mk4 main battle tank, raced unopposed to block access from Rafah and Khan Yunis to Gaza City, cutting supply lines to Hamas from the south.

Cast Lead was the first IDF operation in which unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or drones), helicopters, and fighter jets were allocated to ground forces directly without IAF central command authorizing sorties. Air-support controller teams operated alongside brigade commanders at the front, passing along whatever surveillance data from UAVs and other assets they needed.

Each brigade combat team was assigned a UAV squadron for close support, with ground-control operators at forward headquarters calling in air strikes from standby attack helicopters and identifying targets to fighter aircraft cruising over the combat zone. A high degree of situational awareness was achieved by maintaining at least a dozen UAVs in flight over Gaza at all times. These aircraft detected Hamas ambushes and rocket launch sites and directed aircraft, tanks, and artillery to the targets. The use of sophisticated electronic intelligence-gathering that pinpointed explosive caches and booby-traps provided troops with real-time intelligence. Intelligence sources say that during the operation, F-15 and F-16 aircraft could identify and fire air-to-ground missiles within thirty seconds of data transmission to take out fleeing targets. There was much more cooperation between ground and air forces than the IDF has employed in the past.

The Israeli navy also attacked Hamas coastal targets and boats. Vessels were equipped with electro-optically guided missiles with a range of five miles that were employed on gunboats and were able to make precision hits from the boats, even in rolling seas.

Other newly employed technology was utilized by the combat engineering unit. Soldiers facing booby-trapped houses and ambushes set by Hamas in order to kidnap Israeli personnel were aided by miniature robots and wall-breaching munitions that allowed entry from holes blown through walls instead of doorways. Additional successful tactics included night maneuvers with sophisticated night-vision equipment and the wide use of canine units. The dogs were very effective in uncovering hidden militants and explosives, although the casualty rate among the dogs was quite high.

Another innovation was the use of electronic warfare. The IDF was able to jam all radio, television, and cell phone communications as well as call thousands of Palestinian homes to warn of an impending incursion. There was an important psychological impact to these electronic tactics as well.

Apart from conventional bombs and high explosives, many scientists believe that Israel used unconventional weapons in Operation Cast Lead, including the following:

- White phosphorus shells, which burn in contact with oxygen and cause deep burns when they touch human skin, sometimes reaching to the bone. The weapon is not illegal itself and can be

used to provide a smokescreen on the battlefield or as an incendiary weapon against a military target. However, its use is regulated by customary INTERNATIONAL LAW, and it must be employed in a way that distinguishes between combatants and civilians, and never used to target civilians.

- Dense inert material explosives (DIMEs), which expel a blade of charged tungsten dust that burns and destroys everything within a 4-meter radius (12–13 feet). The heavy metal tungsten used in the weapon acts as microshrapnel. It is lethal at close range (about 13 feet) but loses momentum quickly due to air resistance, coming to a halt within approximately forty times the diameter of the charge. This increases the probability of killing people within a few meters of the explosion while reducing the probability of causing death and injuries or damage farther away. Evidence of their use in Gaza is in the number of people who had limbs severed, as with a blade, but did not bleed.
- Flechettes, metal darts that are 4 centimeters (1.6 inches) long and are sharply pointed at the front, with four fins at the rear. Between 5,000 and 8,000 are packed into 120mm shells, which are generally fired from tanks. The shells explode in the air and scatter the flechettes in a conical pattern over an area about 300 meters (984 feet) wide and 100 meters (328 feet) long. They are designed to penetrate dense vegetation and should never be used in built-up civilian areas.
- Cluster bombs, which are air-dropped or ground-launched munitions that eject smaller submunitions: a cluster of bomblets. During attacks the weapons are prone to indiscriminate effects, especially in populated areas. Unexploded bomblets can kill or maim civilians long after the fighting has ended. Children often pick them up thinking they are shiny toys; adults tend not to see them but step on them. Unexploded submunitions are very costly to locate and remove.

Israel dropped cluster bombs along the Rafah border to make it difficult to rebuild the tunnels it had destroyed by bombing. Destroying the underground tunnels between Gaza and Egypt was one of Israel's primary objectives in the campaign, and well over half of the tunnels were destroyed. The tunnels came to be important as a means of countering Israel's blockade and have been the main transit method for food, medicine, fuel, and weapons into Gaza.

Consequences of Operation Cast Lead

Subsequent to the operation, Amnesty International (AI) sent a fact-finding delegation to Gaza and issued a major report in March 2009. The AI team described how rescue workers were unable to remove the dead during the hostilities. While the fighting was in progress the IDF prevented any access to the areas where the army was dug in. "In the Zaitoun neighborhood of Gaza City, rescue workers were pulling out the bodies of members of the Sammuni family from the rubble of their home. They had been killed in Israeli strikes two weeks earlier and Israeli soldiers had subsequently bulldozed the house on top of them." AI continued: "The Israeli army did not allow rescue workers to reach the area, despite repeated requests, and the bodies were in a state of decomposition. The smell was unbearable." The team learned that more than 100 decaying bodies had been pulled out from under rubble in various parts of Gaza.

AI also reported that 14,000 homes, 219 factories, and 240 schools had been destroyed. Another 17,000 homes were badly damaged, as were many schools and factories. "We found more and more destroyed and damaged homes, mosques, schools and government buildings, some completely flattened, by bombs dropped by F-16 fighter jets, others rendered uninhabitable by the artillery and missile strikes. . . . There were also whole neighborhoods reduced to rubble in areas where the Israeli ground forces were present."

Israel's military said buildings were only destroyed because of military "operational needs." The IDF stated that it had operated in accordance with international law during the conflict.

However, the use of mines to destroy homes, which AI found extensive evidence of, contradicts this claim. Another organization, Israel's BREAKING THE SILENCE, corroborated AI's claims, stating that its findings from the Gaza war suggested that many demolitions had been carried out when there was no immediate threat. "Israeli troops had to leave their vehicles to plant the mines, indicating that they faced no danger and that there was no military or operational justification." Yehuda Shaul from Breaking the Silence stated, "From the testimonies that we've gathered, lots of demolitions—buildings demolished either by bulldozers

or explosives—were done after an area was under Israeli control."

The AI team found evidence that Israeli soldiers had taken over dozens of homes and used them as military positions. "The soldiers had not only smashed holes in the outer walls to fire from, but also vandalized the furniture and everything else in the houses. The destruction was, in our view, and according to our findings, wanton destruction—it could not be justified on military grounds." In the houses AI reported seeing "discarded Israeli army supplies, including sleeping bags, medical kits, empty boxes of munitions and spent cartridges, incontrovertible evidence of the soldiers' occupation of the houses." In every one of the homes the team visited, "rooms had been ransacked, with furniture overturned and/or smashed. Clothing, documents and other personal items belonging to the families who lived there had been strewn over the floor and soiled, and in one case urinated on."

The AI team also described how power lines had been torn down and water mains ripped up. "Gaza's infrastructure is now in dire condition. Prolonged blackouts are the norm, tens of thousands of people have no access to clean WATER, and sewage is now flowing in the open from the broken conduits."

Among the more extraordinary events of this war were the published testimonies of a group of squad leaders who had fought in Gaza, told to their chief, Danny Zamir, and published in *Ha'aretz* and *Ma'ariv*. The soldiers were enrolled in the Yitzhak Rabin Oranim Academic College, a military preparatory school in the northern town of Tivon. Zamir is the academy's director, and he invited combat soldiers and officers who graduated from the program for a lengthy discussion of their experiences in Gaza. They spoke openly, but most preferred not to use their real names.

In the months following Operation Cast Lead, international human rights groups accused Israel of excessive force, wanton killing, and war crimes. The Israeli military and Minister of Defense EHUD BARAK repeatedly responded that the IDF followed the highest ethical standards, was the most moral army in the world, and took great care to avoid civilian casualties. The soldiers' testimonies, however, suggest something quite different. One soldier gave an account of a sniper killing a woman and her two children who walked too close to a designated no-go area by mistake, and another told of a sharpshooter who killed an elderly woman who came within 100 meters (320 feet) of a commandeered house. Others described commandeering Palestinian homes, throwing all of the contents out the windows, and leaving the premises with graffiti and in disarray.

Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak responded to the soldiers' statements by repeating Israel's description of its forces as the "most moral" in the world; the military said its military advocate-general had ordered an investigation into the alleged incidents; and the highest echelons of the military and government undertook a widespread public relations campaign, including in the United States, to discredit Danny Zamir and the soldiers who spoke out. The official inquiry was opened on 19 March and closed on 30 March, concluding that the soldiers' testimonies were based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible.

Ha'aretz correspondent Amos Harel, writing in late March, revealed additional evidence in support of the soldiers' assertions. "Until the soldiers' testimonies were published, the IDF Spokesman's Office had been highly successful in promoting its version of events. The international media may not have bought it, but the army managed to sell the Israeli public an almost impossible package: We were victorious in Gaza, we suffered minimal casualties, and we also came out of there smelling like roses." But, Harel continued, "There is a discrepancy between the official military response, of denial and horrified disapproval, the testimonies of the Rabin pre-military preparatory course graduates, and the response to those reports by key senior officers, unwilling to be identified."

On 15 July 2009 the organization Breaking the Silence announced the release of a booklet that includes fifty-four testimonials by soldiers (none of the same men from Yitzhak Rabin Oranim Academic College who testified earlier) who participated in the Gaza operation. The testimonies expose significant gaps between the official positions of the Israeli military and events on the ground. According to Breaking the Silence, "The testimonies prove that the immoral way the war was carried out was due to the systems in place and not the individual soldier. What was proven is that through the IDF the exception becomes the norm, and this requires a deep and reflective discussion. This is an urgent call to Israel's society and leadership to take a sober look at the foolishness of our policies."

Conclusion

The weapons and tactics Israel used in its twenty-two-day offensive in Gaza devastated an essentially defenseless civilian population. The one-sidedness of the encounter was so stark, as illustrated by the vast disparities in the quality and quantity of weapons used and the relative casualties on both sides—1,387 Palestinian fatalities, nine Israeli deaths—that this can hardly even be considered a war.

The Israelis and their allies talk of "retaliation" and "the right of Israel to defend itself." Critics described the attacks as a "massacre" or relied on the language of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Richard Falk, United Nations special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, argued that the Gaza attack dramatized a shift away from states fighting states to state struggles against armed resistance movements, and with it a related shift from the language of "war" to that of "criminality." "In one important respect," he posited, perceptions and discourse have been skewed by the focus on whether Israel's use of force was "disproportionate." Falk stated: "This way of describing Israeli recourse to force ignores the foundational issue: were the attacks in any legal sense 'defensive' in character in the first place? An inquiry into the surrounding circumstances shows an absence of any kind of defensive necessity: a temporary cease-fire between Israel and Hamas that had been in effect since 19 July 2008 had succeeded in reducing cross-border violence virtually to zero; Hamas consistently offered to extend the cease-fire, even to a longer period of ten years; the breakdown of the cease-fire is not primarily the result of Hamas rocket fire, but came about mainly as a result of an Israeli air attack on 4 November that killed six Hamas fighters in Gaza. . . . In other words, there were no grounds for claiming the right of self-defense as Israel was not the object of a Hamas attack, and diplomatic alternatives to force existed and seemed credible, and their good-faith reliance was legally obligatory. On this basis the focus of legal debate should not be upon whether Israeli force was disproportionate. Of course it was. The focus should be on whether the Israeli attacks were a prohibited, non-defensive use of force under the UN charter, amounting to an act of aggression, and as such constituting a crime against peace."

See also Al-Aqsa Intifada; Field of Thorns Plan; Operation Defensive Shield; Operation Determined Path; Operation Journey of Colors; Operation Rainbow; Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds

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Operation Defensive Shield, 2002

Operation Defensive Shield was Israel's second major military offensive (following OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS) against the Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. Starting on 29 March 2002, Defensive Shield was the largest military operation in the WEST BANK since the 1967 WAR and had as its objective Israel's reoccupation of the West Bank. The operation supposedly was retaliation for a 27 March 2002 HAMAS SUICIDE BOMBING that killed thirty people at the Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel. Within twenty-four hours of that incident, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) called up 20,000 reserve soldiers.

The stated goals of the operation, according to Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON, were to "enter cities and villages which have become havens for TERRORISTS; to catch and arrest terrorists and primarily, their dispatchers and those who finance and support them; to confiscate weapons intended to be used against Israeli citizens; to expose and destroy terrorist facilities and explosives, laboratories, weapons production factories and secret installations. The orders are clear: target and paralyze anyone who takes up weapons and tries to oppose our troops, resists them or endangers them."

The offensive began with an attack on PLO president YASIR ARAFAT's headquarters in Ramallah. The IDF then entered BETHLEHEM, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya on 1 April, followed by JENIN and NABLUS on the nights of 3 and 4 April, and declared these

areas CLOSED MILITARY ZONES, thus barring access to or from the outside world. In most areas, the IDF cut WATER and electricity and imposed strict CURFEWS on residents within the towns. Tanks, armored personnel carriers, and soldiers were positioned in the Jenin refugee camp and Nablus's old city, where the IDF carried out operations. Missiles from Apache helicopters bombed houses.

Amnesty International reported that "after the first day those killed or wounded in Jenin and Nablus were left without burial or medical treatment." It also reported that tanks traveling through narrow streets sliced off the outer walls of houses and that the IDF demolished, by explosives or army bulldozers, a large residential area of the Jenin camp.

Israeli analyst URI AVNERY further described some of the destruction the IDF inflicted on Palestinian institutions. In the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, and other Palestinian government offices, the archives and computers were destroyed.

In "the Ministry of Education . . . the safe [was] blown open, the papers strewn around, the drawers emptied, the telephones crushed. Some of it was just plain vandalism. But the money in the safe was stolen, the furniture upturned, the papers dispersed. All the hard disks were taken from the computers, all the important files taken away. Only empty shells remained. All the important contents of the [education] ministry were taken: the lists of pupils, examination results, lists of teachers, the whole logistics of the Palestinian school system," he said. Similarly, "The Ministry of Health suffered the same fate. The hard disks that contained all the information, state of diseases, medical tests, lists of doctors and nurses, the logistics of the hospitals was taken. A similar fate happened to virtually all the Palestinian government offices. Gone is the information pertaining to LAND registration and housing, taxes and government expenditure, car tests and drivers' licenses, everything necessary for administering a modern society."

Furthermore, "this was true for the CIVIL SOCIETY as well and even more so for the security system. The headquarters of the security services were destroyed, files burned, computers crushed, the information concerning armed underground organizations and all other details pertaining to the war against terrorism were obliterated."

For the three weeks of operations, strict curfews were placed on the Palestinian cities, while a SIEGE on Palestinians holed up in the Bethlehem CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY left Bethlehem residents under curfew for five weeks. Operation Defensive Shield officially ended on 10 May 2002, and, shortly afterward, OPERATION DETERMINED PATH was launched.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; FIELD OF THORNS; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION RAINBOW; OPERATIONS SUMMER RAINS AND AUTUMN CLOUDS

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Operation Determined Path, 2002

Operation Determined Path constituted the third major Israeli military offensive during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, following OPERATION JOURNEY OF

COLORS and OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD. On 22 June 2002, Israel threatened to launch a "crushing offensive" and impose an indefinite reoccupation of Palestinian areas that it had left in 1995 under the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT unless SUICIDE BOMBINGS and shootings against Israelis stopped. Officially, it was an attempt to stamp out TERRORISM, but the nature and extent of IDF actions, especially its imposition of suffering on civilians, suggest that other motivations were at work. The Israeli army reentered Palestinian cities throughout the WEST BANK and reinstated the CURFEWS on all the cities (except JERICHO) and on many towns, villages, and refugee camps.

The first city to be reoccupied was Ramallah, when some eighty Israeli tanks swept into the city in a predawn raid, encircling the headquarters of Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT, which had been wrecked in Operation Defensive Shield, and barricaded him behind a front gate blocked with rubble. Almost 2 million Palestinians were affected by the curfew, which remained for the several-month duration of the operation and became its defining aspect. An F-16 strike on 23 July assassinated HAMAS leader Salah Shehadeh and killed fifteen additional Palestinian civilians in the Gaza City neighborhood of al-Daraj, an indication that Israel intended to prolong its military presence and tighten its curfews inside towns—measures that Israel said were necessary to prevent Hamas from following through on its loudly broadcast pledges of revenge for the killings in Gaza City.

The military's operations during Determined Path were similar to those implemented during Operation Defensive Shield. On 23 July, Amnesty International issued an interim report on the situation in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Among its findings were that most Palestinian towns and many villages in the West Bank were under curfew for up to twenty-four hours a day for a month, forcing Palestinians to live under virtual house arrest. In NABLUS the twenty-four-hour curfew was lifted once a week for up to six hours. In Tulkarm, the curfew imposed on 20 June was reportedly lifted only eight times, for up to four hours a day. "Even where the curfew has been officially eased it confines inhabitants of towns under curfew to their homes from sunset to sunrise." In addition, Amnesty International found that more than 3 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were living under CLOSURES. "Nearly every road to a town or village is cut by barriers manned by soldiers or closed by blocks of concrete, piles of earth, and trenches. A journey of 40 kilometers (25 miles) can take several hours. Palestinians are barred from many primary roads, and special passes, often unobtainable, are needed for Palestinians to travel from one area to the other." These RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT for the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories "affected the ability of Palestinians to access work, EDUCATION, and HEALTH CARE, as well as their ability to conduct business, travel, and maintain family contacts. The impact on the Palestinian ECONOMY has been severe. The reoccupation took place at the same time as the final school exams, leaving teachers, students and supervisors unable to reach schools." Amnesty International also reported that Israeli soldiers sometimes shot at anyone in the street during curfew and shot people even when curfews were lifted. In Jenin three children were killed by fire from Israeli tanks during a temporary lifting of curfew. Also in Jenin, on 11 July 2002, Israeli soldiers on a tank shot two Palestinian journalists wearing jackets clearly marked "Press"; one journalist died from his wounds.

Additionally, more than 600 Palestinians were held under ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, mostly in tents in military detention centers. Several hundred other Palestinians, many of them arbitrarily detained over the previous three months, were also held in pretrial detention in centers in Israel and the Occupied Territories. During this time, the IDF continued to destroy or damage Palestinian homes and property "without absolute military necessity," Amnesty stated. Operation Determined Path ended at the end of September with 165 Palestinians killed and no Israeli deaths.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; FIELD OF THORNS; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION RAINBOW; OPERATIONS SUMMER RAINS AND AUTUMN CLOUDS

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Operation Grapes of Wrath, 1996

In August 1996, in an attempt to end the shelling of northern Israel by HIZBULLAH from southern LEBANON, Israel undertook a sixteen-day military blitz against Lebanon, conducting more than 1,100 bombing raids and extensive shelling. Israel's bombing of a UN installation at Qana resulted in the deaths of 118 Lebanese civilians who had sought shelter in the facility. The offensive displaced some 500,000 Lebanese civilians in their own country; 170 Lebanese were killed, not counting the Qana deaths; 350 civilians were wounded; and 62 Israeli citizens were injured in Israel during the operation.

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Operation Journey of Colors, 2002

Journey of Colors was the first major offensive operation that Israel undertook after the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. The operation began on 18 February and lasted until 15 March 2002, and it was followed by OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD and OPERATION DETERMINED PATH. Journey of Colors' stated strategic objective was to force the Palestinians to accept an unconditional cease-fire or cause the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) to implode as a result of overwhelming military-political pressures that would leave it in shambles. The operation's tactical objective was to totally incapacitate the various Palestinian militant organizations' ability for sustained action by eliminating their leaderships (via TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS), disarming them, destroying their facilities, and arresting their cadres en masse. Israeli military commentators stated that the offensive was the "largest-scale Israeli military campaign since the 1982 invasion of Lebanon."

The operation involved Israel's reoccupation of most WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP cities that Israel had left under the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT, as well as refugee camps and some towns. The occupied cities included NABLUS, JENIN, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, BETHLEHEM, Beit Jala, Ramallah/el-Bireh, and Rafah City in Gaza. The occupied refugee camps included Balata in the Nablus area; Am'ari in the Ramallah area; Dheishe and A'aydah (Aida) in the Bethlehem area; Far'a and Jenin in the Jenin area; Nur al-Shams and Tulkarm in the Tulkarm district; and Jabalya, al Burejj, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Dayr al Balah in Gaza. All of the cities and refugee camps are in Area A, which was supposedly under PNA autonomous control, according to the Interim Agreement signed on 26 September 1995 between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel.

In each locale the massive ground invasions involved hundreds of troops and 160 to 180 tanks and armed personnel carriers that roamed the streets, shelling and shooting at schools, stores and shops, hospitals, UN installations, and PNA security facilities, as well as any person who appeared. The troops and tanks were accompanied by air cover provided by helicopter gunships and F-16 fighter planes that bombed, strafed, and sent missiles for targeted assassinations. Once a locale was under Israeli control, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) placed the entire population under CURFEW, cut electricity, and in many places cut WATER mains and telephone lines. Every male in the cities or camps between the ages of fourteen and forty-five was told to "surrender," so soldiers could check their papers against a "wanted" list. Thousands of men were detained at gunpoint, blindfolded, handcuffed, and held from twelve hours to six days, depending on the locale. By 12 March, more than 2,500 men had been arrested, although relatively few were charged—by 14 March, the number was approximately 250.

Once all the men in a particular area were under detention, the IDF conducted house-to-house searches, causing damage in the process. Carnage was also caused by aerial bombing of houses from tank movements and shelling, as well as shelling from other types of weapons. In the refugee camps of the northern West Bank, damage was extensive. In Jenin, with a population of 14,000 living in 2,500 buildings, 550 residences were seriously damaged (rendering them unsafe for habitation), 3 were completely demolished, and 6 were partially demolished, while nine schools and two medical clinics were severely damaged. In other places, hospitals and other medical facilities, INFRASTRUCTURE, stores, and colleges and universities sustained severe damage, but in no other area was the destruction of homes as extensive as in the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, with a population of 89,000. As of the

end of December 2001, fifteen months into the Intifada, Israel had completely demolished 368 houses and partially demolished (making them unsuitable for living) 520 houses. Some 900 families, or 6,200 persons, were made REFUGEES for a second time. On 10 January 2002, Israeli tanks and bulldozers razed 73 additional houses in Rafah, making some 800 persons homeless.

Medical facilities and personnel were also direct targets of Operation Journey of Colors. B'TSELEM, the Israeli human rights organization, published a report in March covering the period 28 February through 13 March 2002, documenting the IDF's assault on medical personnel and facilities: "IDF gunfire killed five Palestinian medical personnel who were on duty, wounded several members of ambulance medical teams and damaged ambulances. . . . IDF soldiers have fired at ambulances and prevented medical treatment to the sick and wounded, even leaving some of them in the field where they bled to death. Also the hospitals have been unable to function because of the damage to the electricity, water and telephone infrastructure and the blocking of access to some of them. As a result the hospitals are unable to receive the wounded and sick, or obtain food and medicines."

Bethlehem and the nearby Dheishe refugee camp were hit especially hard during this operation, and in one instance tanks shelled the CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY. The church compound also houses a hospital and an orphanage, which had to be evacuated under a barrage of bullets and artillery fire. Bethlehem University suffered severe damage when, on the night of 8–9 March, the IDF fired four TOW antitank missiles at buildings on the campus.

By the end of the second week of Journey of Colors, Israel had killed 170 Palestinians and wounded more than 1,000, and 36 Israelis were killed. Among the dead were 12 children and teenagers, 3 members of medical teams, 1 foreign journalist, and 11 members of the PNA security forces. *Ha'aretz*, Israel's newspaper of record, editorialized about the operation: "The IDF caused deliberate suffering and humiliation to the broader Palestinian population. . . . The government of Israel, through the IDF, sought to use humiliation as a means of pressure or punishment."

In spite of the death and destruction, it did not appear that Israel achieved its main objectives in this operation. Tactically, while it discovered some arms caches and a few weapons factories, the Palestinian militias did not appear to be incapacitated, and attacks on Israel were stronger and more deadly than before the operation.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; FIELD OF THORNS; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION RAINBOW; OPERATIONS SUMMER RAINS AND AUTUMN CLOUDS

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Operation Litani, 1978

Initiated on 14 March 1978, Operation Litani was Israel's first invasion of LEBANON to suppress PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) operations there. ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF), numbering 25,000, combed the whole of southern Lebanon, occupying the entire area south of the Litani River except Tyre. The offensive's stated goals were to push Palestinian militant groups, particularly the PLO, away from the border with Israel and to bolster Israel's ally—at the time the SOUTH LEBANON ARMY (SLA). The IDF first captured a belt of land approximately ten kilometers (six miles) deep but later expanded it north to the Litani River. The Lebanese government estimated that 285,000 refugees were created as a result of the operation and that approximately 2,000 Lebanese and Palestinians were killed, almost all civilians. Several Israeli soldiers were court-martialed after a number of Lebanese peasants were strangled and prisoners were executed. Twenty Israelis were killed in the operation, and fifty Shi'a Muslims were massacred in Khiyam by Christian militiamen allied with Israel. The PLO retreated north of the Litani River but continued to fire and infiltrate across the border with Israel.

In response to the invasion, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 and Resolution 426 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to enforce this mandate and restore peace and sovereignty. On 23 March 1978, UNIFIL forces arrived in Lebanon, setting up headquarters in Naqoura. Israeli forces withdrew in the spring of 1979, turning over positions inside Lebanon along the border to the South Lebanon Army under the leadership of Major SAAD HADDAD. With Israeli aid, the SLA continually harassed UNIFIL. On 19 April 1978 the SLA shelled UNIFIL headquarters, killing eight UN peacekeepers. Palestinian cross-border infiltrations did not cease.

In 1982, Israel returned to Lebanon in a major war and for eighteen years thereafter remained in occupation of South Lebanon. Not until 2000 did it withdraw its forces, but in 2006 it invaded again to destroy a new enemy, HIZBULLAH.

See also ISRAELI MILITARISM; LEBANON

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Operation Peace for Galilee

See OPERATION BIG PINES

Operation Rainbow, 2004

On 14 May 2004, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) initiated a military operation in the Rafah refugee camp in the southern GAZA STRIP. Israel's stated purpose was to prevent the smuggling of arms and matériel by Palestinians through tunnels, allegedly dug under houses, to or from EGYPT. The operation began shortly after Palestinian militants killed eight soldiers in Gaza, raising the suspicion that the motive was at least partly retaliation for their deaths. Israeli officials described the incursion as the largest military operation since OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD in the spring of 2002.

During the twelve-day offensive, the IDF killed fifty-eight Palestinians, including forty-one either "wanted" by Israel or deemed militants and at least eight minors. Seven Israeli soldiers were killed in the operation, which found three tunnels. Early in the operation, in its search for the tunnels, the army demolished 116 houses along the PHILADELPHI ROUTE that separates the Gaza Strip and Egypt and 183 houses in Rafah, severely dam-

aging dozens more, plus causing extensive damage to the INFRASTRUCTURE, including electricity, WATER, and sewage systems. With explosive charges and the use of armored bulldozers, the IDF also damaged the surface of many kilometers of ROADS in Rafah, allegedly to expose and detonate explosives planted under the roads and clear the way for armored fighting vehicles and troops. The consequence for Palestinians was that no vehicles were able to drive along the roads, and, in some locations, passage on foot was also difficult.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; FIELD OF THORNS; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATIONS SUMMER RAINS AND AUTUMN CLOUDS

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Operations Summer Rains and Autumn Clouds, 2006

Operation Summer Rains and Operation Autumn Clouds were Israeli offensives in the GAZA STRIP in 2006. They occurred in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA and ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA (completed 12 September 2005). In addition, HAMAS's victory in the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL elections in January 2006 led Israel to impose a blockade on the Gaza Strip, resulting in an increase in the number of QASSAM ROCKETS that Hamas fired into Israel and increasing Israeli TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS against Hamas officials.

The first operation, Summer Rains, was triggered by a 25 June 2006 Hamas raid near the Kerem Shalom border crossing of the Gaza Strip that resulted in the death of two Israeli soldiers and the capture of Gilad Shalit, an ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) corporal. The Israeli operation began on 28 June and lasted until 26 November 2006, when a cease-fire was signed and Israel withdrew its troops. Israel's stated objective for the operation was to free Corporal Shalit (who remains in captivity as of the end of 2009), avenge the death of the two soldiers, and stop the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israeli territory.

At the outset of the war, on 28 June 2006, Israel bombed the Gaza power plant and three bridges in the Strip. The destruction of the 140-megawatt generator, the only one in the Gaza Strip, threatened to create a humanitarian disaster because the plant supplies electricity to two-thirds of Gaza's 1.5 million residents and operates the pumps that provide WATER.

The day following the bombardment of the power plant, 29 June 2006, Israel arrested 100 Hamas members, including sixty-four government officials. Among them were PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) cabinet ministers and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Eight Hamas government members (five of whom lived in Ramallah) and up to twenty Legislative Council representatives were detained in the operation. At least a third of the Hamas cabinet were detained and held by Israel.

The IDF stated that the arrested Hamas ministers "are not bargaining chips for the return of the soldier [Cpl. Shalit captured by Hamas]—it was simply an operation against a TERRORIST organization." Israeli minister of national infrastructure Benjamin Ben-Eliezer hinted that ISMAIL HANIYEH, the Hamas prime minister of the PNA, was not immune from being arrested or attacked. The Israeli army and government officials said the arrested Hamas officials would be questioned and indicted. "Their arrests were not arbitrary," SHIN BET director Yuval Diskin stated. "Those arrested will be put to trial, and they will be able to defend themselves in accordance with a legal system which is internationally recognized." Israeli deputy prime minister SHIMON PERES repeated the statement and added that those arrested would be prosecuted for the criminal offenses of failing to prevent acts of terror and membership in a terrorist organization (which carry a maximum sentence

of twenty years) and tried by military judges before an open military tribunal.

The five-month conflict resulted in the deaths of 402 Palestinians, including approximately 277 militants of various factions, mostly Hamas, six Palestinian policemen, and two presidential guards, plus 117 civilians. Additionally, some 1,500 Palestinians were injured. Five Israeli soldiers were killed, including the two in the initial Hamas cross-border attack, and one in a friendly fire incident. Six Israeli civilians were killed, and some thirty-eight wounded. Israel imposed a total blockade on the Gaza Strip for the duration of the operation and continued it thereafter.

Operation Autumn Clouds began on 1 November 2006, before the cease-fire was signed, and lasted until 8 November. It was a short but intense campaign, mainly in and around Beit Hanoun, the stated purpose of which was to "cleanse" Gaza of "terrorists" and capture central caches of weaponry, in particular destroying the Qassam rocket infrastructure, including production, transporting, and firing cells.

During the eight-day offensive, 57 Palestinians and one IDF soldier were killed. Among the Palestinian dead were eighteen members of a single family, the extended al-Athamna clan, mostly women, children, and old men. Some 260 other Palestinians were wounded. Israeli prime minister EHUD OLMERT said a "technical failure" was to blame for the strike on the al-Athamna family. The IDF interrogated thousands and incarcerated hundreds. On 8 November 2006 the IDF announced the end of Operation Autumn Clouds, but fighting continued until the 26 November truce.

Commenting on Autumn Clouds, the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* wrote, "The IDF wreaked havoc and terror in Beit Hanun and left behind hundreds of wounded, as well as destroyed houses, uprooted orchards and a water system that was brought to a standstill. Yet, the declared aim of the operation was not achieved and the firing of Qassam rockets into Israel continued. . . . No military operation which is of reasonable proportions can bring the Qassam fire to a complete halt. Instead, operations of this kind merely increase hatred and thirst for revenge among the entire Palestinian population, which is the true victim of such operations."

The failure of both operations, despite five months of intensive combat, resides in the fact that Israel's objectives were not so much to stop the Qassam rockets, though it would have certainly wished to do so, but Tel Aviv's larger goal was to break the will of the Palestinians to resist the OCCUPATION and to make life so miserable for the them in Gaza that they would turn against and oust the Hamas government, replacing them with the compliant leadership of FATAH's MAHMUD ABBAS (president of the PNA).

After the two Israeli operations, Fatah attempted to control Hamas in Gaza, leading to continuous factional fighting until in mid-June 2007, Hamas defeated Fatah and drove it from Gaza—despite the fact that Fatah was receiving aid, arms, and training from the UNITED STATES. Israel's response to the Hamas coup was to tighten the blockade to a stranglehold—virtually no persons or goods of any kind were allowed to enter or leave Gaza, resulting in a severe humanitarian crisis. The total siege lasted eighteen months.

On 19 September 2007, Israel declared Gaza an "enemy entity." On 11 December 2007, on the eve of a new round of peace talks, Israeli troops in some thirty tanks and armored vehicles mounted an incursion in southern Gaza, near the Sufa crossing and close to the town of Khan Yunis, killing at least six Palestinian militants. The IDF destroyed a petrol station and a second building where militants had gathered. Approximately sixty Palestinians were detained. Two Israeli soldiers were lightly injured.

The Israeli military said the operation was a routine tactic against militants, but Palestinian officials accused Israel of trying to disrupt the upcoming peace talks. Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were due to meet the following day at the KING DAVID HOTEL in JERUSALEM to start a new process of talks in the wake of the Annapolis Middle East Conference on 27 November 2007, at the United States Naval Academy in Maryland. The US-sponsored conference marked the first time a TWO-STATE SOLUTION was articulated as the mutually agreed-upon outline for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian officials had already complained about an Israeli decision the previous week to issue tenders for more than 300 houses in the East Jerusalem settlement of HAR HOMA, and its declaration that Tel Aviv does not regard the ROAD MAP as applying to Jerusalem. US secretary of state CONDOLEEZZA RICE said of the Israeli announcement on Har Homa: "This is a time that we should be building confidence and

this is not something that builds confidence." The December incursion sealed the fate of further peace talks.

In January 2008, Hamas militants, frustrated over the tightened Israeli closure of Gaza, blew holes in the RAFAH CROSSING on the border with EGYPT, allowing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to stream into Egypt unchecked for ten days and stock up on food and other goods made scarce by the blockade.

On 17 February 2008 the IDF captured approximately eighty Gazans and took them to Israel for questioning following a ground incursion in the Gaza Strip that killed four Palestinians, including three militants. One Israeli soldier was severely injured. Palestinian HEALTH CARE officials claimed an additional twenty Palestinian civilians were wounded in the attack.

New hostilities began on 27 February 2008 when Palestinian militants fired more than forty Qassam rockets into southern Israel and the Israeli army fired three missiles at the Palestinian Interior Ministry in Gaza, destroying the building. On 28 February 2008, Israeli forces killed eleven Palestinians in a series of air strikes. At least ten civilians were killed, including four boys playing football on a waste ground. Militants launched a Qassam rocket in retaliation that injured one Israeli civilian.

On 29 February 2008, Israel launched a new offensive in Gaza named "Operation Hot Winter" that lasted until 3 March 2008. At least 112 Palestinians, including sixty civilians, and three Israeli soldiers were killed. Some 250 Palestinians, including fifty-four militants and 196 civilians, and twenty-five Israeli soldiers were injured. Israeli air strikes and Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli towns escalated. The humanitarian situation reached disaster proportions.

The Palestinian president, Mahmud Abbas, accused Israel of "international terrorism," saying this most recent assault on Gaza constitutes "more than a HOLOCAUST." On 3 March Abbas suspended all contact with Israel as the Israeli government sent warplanes to hit more targets and vowed to continue its offensive. The EUROPEAN UNION condemned what it called "disproportionate use of force" by the Israeli military. The EU also demanded an immediate end to Palestinian militant rocket attacks on Israel and urged Israel to halt activities that endanger civilians, saying they were "in violation of INTERNATIONAL LAW." UNITED NATIONS secretary-general Ban Ki-moon issued a condemnation of what he termed Israel's "excessive and disproportionate" response, and called on Israel "to cease such attacks," while denouncing the ongoing rocket attacks on Sderot and Ashkelon. The UN Human Rights Council expressed "shock at the bombardment of civilian homes in Gaza." The IDF operation exacerbated the precarious humanitarian situation emanating from the near-total blockade on Gaza. There was a lack of electricity, fuel, and spare parts, leading to an inability to upgrade networks. Food, medicine, water, and cash money were in short supply.

In April 2008, through the offices of former US president JIMMY CARTER, Hamas delivered a letter from captured Israeli soldier Corporal Shalit to his family, signaling a reaffirmation of Palestinian interest in reaching a cease-fire. It was suggested by Gaza activists that Israel could release women and child PRISONERS it is holding as a reciprocal goodwill gesture. Israel declined. Also in April, Hamas leaders gave interviews and made statements articulating their goals: a peace process with Israel based on Israeli withdrawal to the BORDERS of 1967, a dismantling of all the WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS, removal of all soldiers from Gaza and the West Bank, repudiation of Israel's "illegal annexation of Jerusalem," release of all Palestinian prisoners, and an end to Israel's blockade of "our international borders, our coastline and our airspace permanently." While Hamas has never said explicitly that it will recognize Israel's "right to exist," statements by Hamas leaders Mahmoud Zahar and KHALID MESHAL signaled that it was ready to accept the fact that Israel does exist. Political analysts have pointed out that Zahar and Meshal's statements generally match the final-status arrangement that most observers see as reasonable and inevitable. Israel did not respond to the Hamas overtures, but the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz*, in an editorial, called for negotiating with Hamas leaders, saying "the only way to ensure the safety of the people living near the Gaza border is through a political effort to reach a cease-fire agreement."

On 28 April 2008, Israel again began ground and air operations in Gaza. In less than a week the IDF's offensive killed more than 100 Palestinians including twenty-three militants and seventy-seven civilians. Palestinians fired 150 rockets at Israel during the week, which killed three Israelis, including two soldiers and a civilian. On 19 June

2008, Israel and Hamas agreed to an Egyptian-brokered six-month truce to last until 19 December.

For most of the cease-fire relative quiet prevailed and life returned to near normal for the Israeli residents of Sderot and environs, though not for Gazans who remained under blockade. Israel, however, broke the cease-fire with Hamas on 4 November 2008, entering Gaza, killing six people, and capturing six others. Israeli officials claimed that the offensive was in response to specific intelligence, so they had not technically broken the cease-fire. Nevertheless, this Israeli breach sparked a new round of dangerous, if controlled, violence.

On 14 November Hamas retaliated by firing a barrage of rockets into southern Israel, resulting in eighteen mild injuries. On 19 December 2008, subsequent to further clashes, Hamas called off the six-month truce altogether.

Shortly after the 4 November 2008 incursion, Israel tightened the blockade and hermetically sealed all the crossings into the Gaza Strip, which meant even less access to fuel, major blackouts, and no access to humanitarian aid, including food and medicine. On 12 November fourteen journalists were barred from entering Gaza via the ERETZ CROSSING CHECKPOINT. Israel banned the United Nations from bringing food into Gaza and from importing educational materials for blind students.

On 27 December 2008, Israel unleashed the twenty-two-day massive military OPERATION CAST LEAD, during which 1,387 Palestinians and nine Israelis were killed.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; FIELD OF THORNS; FINAL-STATUS TALKS; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS; OPERATION RAINBOW

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Oriental Jews

See MIZRAHI

Orient House

Orient House is a JERUSALEM mansion that has belonged to the prominent AL-HUSAYNI FAMILY since it was built in 1897 by MUSA AL-HUSAYNI. Historically, the building was the site of many diplomatic functions, including two notable ones: an 1898 reception held in honor of the German emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm, when he visited Jerusalem; and, in 1936–1937, a haven for Emperor Haile Selassie and Empress Minan of Abyssinia and their court when the Italians invaded Ethiopia and forced them into exile.

In contemporary times, with its large library and many conference and reception rooms, Orient House has served as the national gathering place for Palestinians in Occupied East Jerusalem and was the political headquarters for the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION in the city. In 1988, after several attempts to close off the services provided by the Orient House, Israel broke into the building and closed down the establishment for "security reasons."

On 26 October 1992, Israel permitted Orient House to reopen, and it played a vital role in the initiation of the OSLO PROCESS (1993–2000). During this period, the Orient House regained its diplomatic status in Jerusalem and once again became the official Palestinian political address in Jerusalem. Yet despite the peace process, the Israeli government continued to undermine the initiatives of the Orient House as part of its efforts to physically isolate Jerusalem from the WEST BANK and deny the Palestinians political rights in the city. For example, it placed enormous pressure on all foreign governments not to meet with Palestinian officials in East Jerusalem, especially not at Orient House.

On 10 August 2001, Israeli authorities again occupied and closed the Orient House. The Israeli army and police confiscated all the computer equipment, files, data, and confidential information regarding issues in Jerusalem, which were intended for use in negotiations with the Israeli government. This was one of many Israeli "statements" declaring that Jerusalem would remain unified and Jewish.

See also FAYSAL AL-HUSAYNI; JERUSALEM; OSLO PROCESS

Oslo Accords: Documents

The following is a list of the documents that make up the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. (See OSLO PROCESS for description and analysis of the agreements.)

1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993.
   See DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES; OSLO PROCESS
2. Israel-PLO Partial Agreements on Implementation of Declaration of Principles, Cairo, 9 February 1994.
   See GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT I; OSLO PROCESS
3. Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Cairo, 4 May 1994, with five annexes, including Annex I, Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Security Arrangements; Annex II, Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs; Annex III, Protocol Concerning Legal Matters; Annex IV, Protocol on Economic Relations; and Annex V, Protocol Concerning Confidence Building Measures. Also known as the Cairo Agreement.
   See ECONOMIC PROTOCOL; GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II; OSLO PROCESS
4. Israel-PLO Protocol on Economic Relations, Paris, 29 April 1994, which is Annex IV to the 4 May 1944 Gaza-Jericho Accord.
   See ECONOMY, PALESTINIAN; GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II; OSLO PROCESS
5. Israel and the PLO, Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, Eretz Checkpoint, Gaza, 29 August 1994.
   See EARLY EMPOWERMENT; OSLO PROCESS
6. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington, 28 September 1995.
   See INTERIM AGREEMENT; OSLO PROCESS
7. Sharm al-Shaykh Declaration, Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, 13 March 1996. (This was a US-sponsored summit on terrorism in the wake of several suicide bombings in Israel.)
   See OSLO PROCESS; SHARM AL-SHAYKH DECLARATION; SUICIDE BOMBINGS; TERRORISM
8. Israel and the PLO Joint Communiqué on the Permanent Status Negotiations, Taba, Egypt, 5–6 May 1996. (In the first session of permanent status negotiations, little progress was made on substance but there was agreement that the negotiations on final status between them would be conducted on the basis of Article V of the Declaration of Principles.)
   See OSLO PROCESS
9. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, Protocol Concerning the Redeployment

in Hebron (Agreed Version), Eretz Crossing, Gaza, 15 January 1997.
See HEBRON PROTOCOL; OSLO PROCESS

10. Israel and the Palestinian Authority Memorandum on Security Understanding, 17 December 1997. (In December 1997 the United States drafted a memorandum of understanding on principles to govern Palestinian National Authority [PNA] performance on security and counterterrorism, which was incorporated into the Wye Memorandum, signed by Israel and the PNA on 23 October 1998. The memorandum, a result of nine days of high-level US-sponsored negotiations, included Israeli and PNA commitments to "take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime, and hostilities." PNA implementation of the security aspects of the memorandum was to be supervised by US Central Intelligence Agency officials.
See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; OSLO PROCESS; TERRORISM; UNITED STATES; WILLIAM CLINTON
11. Wye River Memorandum, Washington, D.C., 23 October 1998.
See OSLO PROCESS; WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM
12. Israel and the PLO, Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum on Implementation of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, 4 September 1999 (also known as Wye II).
See OSLO PROCESS; SHARM AL-SHAYKH MEMORANDUM
13. Camp David Summit, July 2000.
See BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER; CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, 2000; OSLO PROCESS
14. The Clinton Parameters, 23 December 2000
See WILLIAM CLINTON
15. Taba Summit, 27 January 2001.
See OSLO PROCESS; TABA

Oslo II

See INTERIM AGREEMENT

Oslo Process

The announcement of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement signed in Oslo, Norway, toward the end of August 1993 was received all over the world as a historic moment, the beginning of a new era in the Middle East. And, indeed, for the first time after decades of confrontation and conflict, both parties had recognized "their mutual legitimate and political rights" and committed themselves "to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity . . . [and] to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation."

For the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the two sides agreed to meet and formulate agreements that would end the conflict. The DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), the first step in what became known as the OSLO ACCORDS, was followed by thirteen more agreements over an eight-year period that ended in 2001 with the TABA TALKS. Yet, although Oslo was connected to real political events and deep social changes that made it possible, in the end the Oslo Accords failed to lead to a lasting peace. Was its failure inevitable? Was the DOP a genuine opening for peace, or was it no more than a maneuver by Israel to neutralize the Palestinian movement's quest for freedom and independence? An attempt to answer these questions must situate Oslo (as the talks came to be abbreviated) in the global context in which it was born and analyze the motivations that brought both the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership to sign the DOP in September 1993.

From the First Intifada to the Madrid Conference

After twenty years of OCCUPATION, in December 1987 the Palestinian population in the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP revolted against Israeli rule. During the previous two decades, Palestinians had engaged in many actions of resistance—civilian as well as military, and local as well as regional. Israeli Occupation forces, however, had been able to keep this resistance under control and at a relatively small cost—both for Israel and for the Palestinian population. These were the years of the "benign Occupation," as some Israelis described it.

The core of the Palestinian resistance prior to 1987 was the ARMED STRUGGLE, which was organized and often launched from the Palestinian refugee camps in the neighboring Arab countries, but which was ineffectual in challenging the Israeli Occupation. In the eyes of the Israeli political class as well as in public opinion generally, the future of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES would eventually be decided by negotiations with JORDAN. Although Israel would not agree to a Palestinian state, it might return a part of the West Bank to Jordan, which had occupied it from 1948 through 1967. In fact, until

1987, no one in Israel—except a very small anti-Occupation minority—seriously foresaw a qualitative change in this "provisory Occupation." Israel referred to the military rule of the Occupied Territories as a CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, as it unsuccessfully sought local leaders—that is, COLLABORATORS—who would help Israel to control the Palestinian population. In a short time this approach, with its VILLAGE LEAGUES and civil administrators, collapsed in the face of huge mass nationalist demonstrations and successful general strikes against the Occupation: this general upsurge eventually took the name of INTIFADA in 1987. As Palestinian strikes, demonstrations, and protests increased, the relatively small number of Israeli military units serving in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank had to be replaced by huge numbers of soldiers, especially reserve units that were obliged to confront, more and more brutally, daily acts of mass resistance.

Thus for many Israelis, the Occupation became a problem that required a solution, yet Israeli society was deeply divided about the remedy—ranging from mass expulsion of Palestinians (TRANSFER), advocated by the far right, to total withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, supported by the far left. The mainstream ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT rapidly evolved toward the belief that the Occupation must be ended as soon as possible and through peace negotiations with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), which only a few years earlier it considered a terrorist organization. Gradually, important segments of Israeli public opinion accepted the inevitability of negotiations with the PLO, with the aim of ending the Occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the creation of a Palestinian state in these territories. But the government and the majority in the Israeli parliament continued to hold a rejectionist position.

While the Intifada was still alive, IRAQ invaded KUWAIT, and the GULF WAR began (1991). For the GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration, the war against Iraq was waged not only to force Iraq president Saddam Husayn to withdraw from Kuwait but also to establish the groundwork for a "new Middle East," one more directly under US control. After the collapse of the SOVIET UNION, most of the Arab states were ready to accept US hegemony in the Middle East, which they demonstrated through various forms of participation in the war. The importance of this new alliance had implications for US-Israel relations, as was illustrated in the strong veto imposed by the Bush administration on any Israeli involvement in the war, even after Israel was attacked by Iraqi Scud missiles. Moreover, part of the new US-Arab partnership and the new Middle East project was the promise of a settlement of the Palestinian question.

Immediately after the war on Iraq, the US administration called for a multilateral peace conference to be held in Madrid, Spain, where Israel, led at that time by one of its most rejectionist prime ministers, YITZHAK SHAMIR, was forced to take part. Israel objected to any Palestinian presence but finally agreed that Palestinian leaders from the Occupied Territories (but not from the PLO, JERUSALEM, or the DIASPORA) could be integrated into a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Although the PLO was formally excluded from the MADRID CONFERENCE (30 October 1991), the US administration was obliged to accept that the Palestinian delegation would coordinate all its decisions with the PLO leadership in TUNIS.

Despite Israeli attempts to neutralize the Palestinian presence at the Madrid Conference and to minimize its importance, the Palestinian delegation not only had the same status as the other delegations, including displaying the forbidden Palestinian FLAG and the right to its own opening speech, but, in fact, became the focus of the conference. These achievements were in part the result of tough negotiations directed from PLO headquarters in Tunisia, but also from the political and intellectual skills of the Palestinian delegates, advisers, and observers, including HAYDAR 'ABD 'AL-SHAFI, HANAN ASHRAWI, and SAEB EREKAT, among others. FAYSAL AL-HUSAYNI headed an "advisory delegation" that acted as a liaison between the PLO and the Palestinian delegation.

The Madrid Conference was basically a formal opening of thematic multilateral negotiations that were subsequently held in other places in the world. MOSCOW held five separate forums, on WATER resources, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, arms control, REFUGEES, and economic development. Other participating cities were Brussels and Rome (regional economic cooperation); the Hague and Tokyo (environment); Washington, Vienna, and Geneva (water resources); Washington and Moscow (arms control); and Ottawa and Oslo (refugees). Washington, D.C., was chosen as the city where the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations would be conducted. These negotiations lasted for two years without any result on the many topics that were on the agenda. Shamir put Yossi Ben

Aharon, former general director of Shamir's office and an ultra-rightist, at the head of the delegation to make sure that no compromise would be formulated that could lead to a freeze of Jewish SETTLEMENT activity or to a change in the direct rule and control by Israel of the Occupied Territories. At the same time, the Palestinian delegation put the issue of settlements and the necessity of freezing all settlement activity at the core of their demands. The negotiations were interrupted several times for long periods, during which Shamir was defeated in the elections and YITZHAK RABIN was elected prime minister. For Rabin the first priority was a political agreement with SYRIA, not the Palestinians, and the UNITED STATES tended to agree with him. But Rabin's relative indifference to an agreement with the Palestinians was not shared by important segments of the Israeli elite, especially in the LABOR PARTY. In particular, SHIMON PERES, number two in the Labor Party, was convinced that normalization with neighboring Arab countries was a strategic interest for Israel but that it could only materialize if a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was achieved.

Declaration of Principles

A series of unofficial meetings between left-leaning senior officials in the Labor Party and senior Palestinian officials, both from within and outside the Occupied Territories, convinced Peres that any attempt to reach a political agreement without the PLO was doomed to failure: the entire Palestinian society in the Occupied Territories, as well as in the Diaspora, considered the PLO as its only legitimate representative and leader. Peres's viewpoint led to the opening of the informal, secret talks conducted in Oslo in 1993, under the auspices of the Norwegian government, between Peres's representatives and PLO officials. The talks represented a major turning point in Israel's perspective toward the Palestinians, because they ended Israel's rejection of the PLO, recognized the legitimacy of the Palestinian national liberation movement, and opened negotiations with senior PLO officials.

PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT's position had became extremely difficult following his public support for Iraq in the Gulf crisis, for which he was punished by the withdrawal of financial support from SAUDI ARABIA and several Gulf countries. Thus, recognition of the PLO by Israel was a priority for which he was ready to pay with substantial concessions, which was well understood by "Peres's boys" (a name given by the Israeli MEDIA to Peres's assistants and followers), in particular, YOSSI BEILIN, who was the driving force behind the Oslo negotiations. It was Beilin who convinced Israelis that recognition of the PLO would make possible what the Israeli leadership considered the necessary Palestinian compromises for reaching a settlement. In May 1993, the secret talks began, and less than five months later they were concluded by a Declaration of Principles to be ratified by the Israeli government and the PLO central leadership. The Israeli negotiators were Foreign Ministry general director Uri Savir and two Israeli academics, Ron Pundak and Yair Hirshfeld, while the Palestinian side was led by AHMAD QUREI' (Abu 'Ala). On 13 September 1993, at the White House, Rabin and Arafat publicly ratified the DOP.

A very short document (seventeen articles, each three to nine lines), the DOP marked the "mutual recognition" of the state of Israel and the PLO and set a timetable to negotiate a final solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It provided a framework for gradual Palestinian self-government (which Israel later renamed "autonomy") for residents of the West Bank and Gaza, based on a gradual redeployment of Israeli forces from these areas, starting with Gaza and JERICHO. The major issues of the conflict—sovereignty, BORDERS, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, and the issue of the Palestinian refugees—were to be negotiated as "early as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the transitional period," that is, May 1996.

Instead of an agreement on the issue of Palestinian refugees from the 1967 WAR, the DOP "invited" the governments of EGYPT and Jordan to set up, with Israel and the Palestinians, a committee that would decide on the methods for admitting the "persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder" (Article XII). A solution to the status of refugees from 1948 was deferred until FINAL STATUS TALKS.

Immediately after signing the DOP, the two parties were supposed to begin negotiations on the Israeli redeployment parallel to the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) for self-government of the West Bank and Gaza and on the ECONOMY aspects of the new situation. The PNA, or "elected Council for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip," was

to last "for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on [UN] SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338," which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Palestinian territories.

The Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP) was a framework for the future relations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It was not a peace treaty between the two parties; rather, it established a negotiating process without a defined outcome. Negotiations were to take place over a five-year interim period during which Israel was to withdraw from "Gaza and Jericho first," and then from unspecified parts of the West Bank. Interim self-government was to be granted by Israel in phases. In exchange, the PLO recognized Israel's "*right* to exist" and pledged to cooperate in suppressing TERRORISM. The Palestinian Authority was to establish a strong police force to protect Israel's security while Israel would continue to hold responsibility for defending against external threats.

The DOP provided for the creation of a Palestinian Authority with limited powers and a limited geographical area in which to exercise such powers. All of the major issues of the conflict—Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security, and borders—were deferred for "final status" talks. The DOP was not grounded in any aspect of INTERNATIONAL LAW or human rights, nor was it based on any UN resolutions, such as UN RESOLUTIONS 181 (on partition) or 194 (on compensation and repatriation of refugees). It acknowledged Resolutions 242 and 338 (the end of the 1967 WAR), but Israel has maintained since its withdrawal from Sinai and peace with Egypt that it has met all obligations under Resolution 242 and will make no further concessions in terms of giving up land. The United States was the de facto arbitrator of any disputes that might emerge.

Together with the DOP, the two parties signed "Letters of Mutual Recognition"—the Israeli government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism.

The announcement of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was widely understood as the beginning of the end of a century-old conflict. And, for a majority of both peoples, the joy was visible and real, though on the Palestinian side the lack of a clear Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza was obvious and worrisome. In the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, the Palestinian flag appeared everywhere; in Tel Aviv, people were dancing in the streets, though to a lesser extent in Ramallah and in Gaza, and at several CHECKPOINTS there were even scenes of fraternization between the two sides, usually at the initiative of young Palestinians.

The Israeli joy was easily understandable. In exchange for recognition by the Israeli government, the Palestinian leadership announced a unilateral cease-fire. Through a letter from Arafat, on behalf of the PLO, to Rabin, Arafat "renounced the use of terrorism and other acts of violence" and announced again "that those articles of the PLO Covenant that denied Israel's right to exist are now inoperative and no longer valid." Although not part of the Oslo agreement, the letter was a precondition imposed on the PLO chairman by the Israeli prime minister as a prerequisite for Tel Aviv's ratification of the DOP. The Palestinian leadership, however, was so happy about its recognition by Israel and so sure that the end of the Israeli Occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank was almost achieved that it did not give much thought to Rabin's new demand, which was the first step in a unilateral reshaping of the whole Oslo agreement.

Opposition to the DOP in both societies came from the extreme ideological sides. On the one hand, the Palestinian left (mainly the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE and DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE) and HAMAS, but also the refugee communities inside the Occupied Territories as well as abroad, denounced the lack of commitment by Israel to an independent Palestinian state and the likely abrogation of the refugees' right of return. On the other hand, the Israeli right, in particular the settlers, considered the Oslo Accords as selling out the God-given right of the Jewish people to historic Palestine as well as surrendering to terrorism. However, the massive international support for the bilateral agreement and the conviction that an irreversible process was in motion marginalized these opposition groups for nearly half a year.

Cairo Agreement and the Withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho

Shortly after the signing of the DOP, negotiations began between Israeli and PLO representatives on implementation of the INTERIM AGREEMENT, in par-

ticular the withdrawal of the Israeli army and administration from Gaza and Jericho. The talks took place in Cairo, and the agreement is officially known as "Israel-PLO Partial Agreements on Implementation of Declaration of Principles, Cairo 9 February 1994." Sometimes referred to as "GAZA-JERICHO [AGREEMENT] I," it was succeeded by the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II.

Unlike the DOP, which was negotiated and drafted by politicians who had an overall objective of normalization with the Arab world and therefore, necessarily, with the Palestinians, the Cairo agreement was negotiated by senior ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) officers who, like Rabin himself, were far from convinced that peaceful coexistence between Israel and the Palestinians was possible. They thus reduced the DOP to a kind of security arrangement wherein the PLO's main function was guaranteeing Israel's security in the Occupied Territories but in a context in which the IDF would maintain overall responsibility for that security. As Rabin explained in the Knesset before signing the DOP in Washington, the only difference the DOP would make is that now the Palestinians would be the ones keeping law and order in Gaza and Jericho without the limitations "of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT and B'TSELEM," the human rights organization.

Gaza-Jericho Agreement II, which was signed on 4 May 1994, was a portent in terms of both substance and process of the way the Israeli government intended to negotiate the implementation of the Oslo Accords. It was more a unilateral *diktat* than an agreement, and the few objections the Palestinians tried to make to the Israeli demands were met with brutal pressure by Egyptian president HOSNI MUBARAK on Arafat. Even on the day of the signing, when Israel presented Arafat with a series of maps to sign, the nature of which Arafat had serious disagreements about, Mubarak intervened to insist that the Palestinian leader sign whether or not he agreed.

In the DOP, it was agreed that the final status of the Jewish settlements would be negotiated later, but nothing was said about their status during the interim. In the Cairo Agreement, however, Israel imposed a clause that stated that the "zones of the settlements" would be excluded from the Palestinian self-ruled areas. As a result, almost immediately the pace of new settlement construction accelerated rapidly and set a precedent for unparalleled settlement expansion throughout the Oslo years. While it is difficult to know if Rabin, under pressure from the settlers' movement, felt forced to make a compromise, what is certain is that the Cairo accord established a pattern and made the Cairo model a guideline in the following years, reducing quantitatively and qualitatively the reality or possibility of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. First, the Cairo agreement determined the scope and the modalities of the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, excluding the areas of Jewish settlement—in particular, the Katif bloc, which constituted more than a quarter of the Gaza Strip—and reducing the withdrawal, in the Jericho District, to the city of Jericho and the village of Ujja, far less than what was initially envisioned in the DOP. Moreover, under pressure from the settlers and in order to allow Israelis to cross the Palestinian area, the main street of Jericho and the road between Jericho and Ujja were put under "joint" Israeli-Palestinian control, rather than complete Palestinian control as promised in the DOP. The Jericho "joint patrol" would later serve as a negative precedent for other Palestinian self-administered cities, because it assumed full freedom of movement for Israelis everywhere in the Occupied Territories, while the Palestinians were denied this right not only on Israeli territory but also in the Occupied Territories themselves.

At the time of Israel's redeployment from Gaza and Jericho, the high expectations that followed the DOP had already begun to disappear. Palestinians were deeply disappointed in the negotiating procedures, which became more a series of *diktats* than bona fide negotiations. They were dismayed at Israel's lack of good faith, its unilateral decisions, and above all its rapid reversion to colonist behavior, not only toward the Occupied population but also toward the negotiations. For example, immediately after Rabin signed the DOP, with its specific timetable for future negotiations, he announced that "there are no holy dates" and postponed negotiations for the Cairo agreement. Later, Israel postponed the date of the elections for the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL as it carried out the first stage of the redeployment. At the same time, Rabin attempted to reassure the Israeli opposition by falsely claiming that the DOP provided Israel a number of guarantees, for example, that the Palestinian refugees would not return to Israel and that the only commitment made by Israel was "to discuss the issue in a joint committee."

On 29 April 1994 a protocol on economic relations was signed in Paris and, from August to December 1994, three additional agreements were reached concerning the transfer of civil powers (EDUCATION, welfare, HEALTH CARE, tourism, and taxation) to the PNA. In the meantime, PLO chairman Arafat was permitted to return to Palestine in July 1994, together with tens of thousands of PLO officials and soldiers with their families, and this gave a new impetus and sense of permanency to the process.

On 28 September 1995 the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed in Washington, D.C., which marked the conclusion of the first stage in negotiations between Israel and the PLO. Its main objective, as required in the DOP, was to enlarge the area of Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and was to be followed by further redeployments of the Israeli army, leading to a full redeployment with the exception of "strategic locations." The agreement was based on the division of the West Bank into three zones: Area A—the cities, with the exception of HEBRON, where the PNA had administrative autonomy and security control; Area B—most of the villages and their immediate surroundings, where the Palestinians had administrative authority but both Israelis and Palestinians had responsibility for security (although in reality it remained an Israeli-only function); and Area C (the remaining West Bank, about 70 percent)—where the Israeli military and civil administration would keep full control. This meant in practical terms that Israel had full control over 70 percent of the West Bank (Area C), while the PNA exercised limited autonomy over only 3 percent (Area A). In consequence, Israeli public opinion saw Area C as Israeli or, in the best case, an area in dispute and not Occupied Palestinian territory.

In January 1996, just after the beginning of the implementation of the Interim Agreement and the redeployment of the Israeli army from the Palestinian cities, general ELECTIONS were held in the Occupied Territories (20 January 1996) in which the Palestinian Legislative Council was constituted, and Arafat, by a large majority, was elected PNA president. In the meantime, however, Rabin had become the target of an enormous campaign by right-wing political leaders and ideologists, who portrayed him as a traitor for signing the Oslo Accords and for agreeing to return at least part of the Occupied Territories to the Palestinians, and he was condemned to death by fanatic settler rabbis for "selling out the Land of God." Throughout 1995, the right wing monopolized the streets in more and more violent demonstrations while the peace camp relied on the government to do what it had promised in the DOP. On 5 November 1995, YIGAL AMIR, a far-right religious activist, shot Rabin to death at the end of a mass rally in Tel Aviv that was supposed to be the beginning of a campaign to counter the right under the slogan "for peace, against violence."

The murder of the Israeli prime minister sent shock waves throughout Israeli society, and even the right-wing parties entered into a phase of disarray, realizing that their systematic incitement against Rabin was partly responsible for his murder. The situation initially seemed to shut out the right and to implement what everyone called "Rabin's testament"—peace with the Palestinian people based on the withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. However, the choice of Shimon Peres, who replaced Rabin, turned out very differently. Peres called for "national reconciliation" with the right wing and decided to slow down the peace process. All the agreements between Israel and the PLO were suspended, and new commitments were made to the settlers, including strengthening of the CLOSURE of the Occupied Territories and establishing more settlements. As a result, the anger of the Palestinian population grew dramatically, and a new wave of terrorist operations hit the cities of Israel, which resulted in the right-wing parties immediately regaining their strength and support and consequently winning the 1996 elections.

The new prime minister, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, considered the Oslo Process treason and did everything he could to put an end to the negotiations with the PLO. He had to take into consideration, however, the fact that the United States expected the peace process to move forward and that to maintain a modicum of stability in the Occupied Territories the Palestinian leadership needed to retain some legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Under pressure from Washington, Netanyahu was finally obliged to sign the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM (October 1998), bringing about a partial Israeli redeployment from the city of Hebron as well as a commitment for additional enlargements of Area B. Yet despite signing the agreement, Netanyahu never implemented most of its provisions.

Camp David Accords

In 1999, EHUD BARAK was elected prime minister, and many in Israel as well as abroad believed that, with Labor back in power, the peace process would get a new start. To give Barak the time needed to implement the many unfulfilled Israeli commitments concerning the interim period, Arafat agreed to postpone the start of final-status negotiations. Few people remembered that Barak had publicly opposed the Oslo Process from its outset, and most were not prepared to believe that he would do everything he could to make it fail. For an entire year, Barak refused to deal with the suspended issues of the transitional period and did not even convene the preparatory committees that were to draft position papers on the issues slated for final-status negotiations. Pressured by President BILL CLINTON to move forward, but unwilling to implement the long series of Israeli commitments linked to the interim period, Barak announced in June 1999 that he wanted to jump directly to the final-status talks and intended to reach "the end of the conflict" in a few weeks. Clinton was surprised, while Arafat was stunned and worried, because such issues as the refugees, Jerusalem, and the final borders had to be resolved in a few weeks when no preparatory work had been done and many Israeli commitments were still unfulfilled. Arafat asked, in vain, to postpone the summit planned for mid-July at CAMP DAVID and instead to immediately get the working groups to undertake necessary preliminary planning for such a summit. However, Clinton acquiesced to Barak, and the Palestinians had no choice but to go along.

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations met during the period 11 to 24 July and were hosted by Clinton in his residence at Camp David. For well over a year, Barak's report of the summit, which was publicly backed by Clinton, provided the only information available about what happened during those thirteen days. Barak claimed he had made extremely generous offers to Arafat, including giving 94 percent of the Occupied Territories to the PNA, but that Arafat rejected the offer because he was never truly interested in a fair compromise and secretly continued to strive for Israel's destruction. A few journalists, including *Ha'aretz* political editor Akiva Eldar, immediately rejected Barak's claims, and some even argued that they were a cynical, well-planned slander campaign intended to put an end to a process that Barak had never endorsed. But they were in effect silenced by Clinton and Barak, as were the Palestinians, who said Barak had made no concrete offers. Two years later, Clinton's chief adviser at Camp David, Robert Malley, provided a different version than Barak. In short, Malley said that Barak's offers were not genuine peace offers, the Palestinian rejection was not a rejection, and that the Palestinian delegation requested to continue the negotiations after they were better prepared.

With the collapse at Camp David, a concerted international campaign was initiated to delegitimize not only Arafat but the Palestinian people as a whole. For example, in the Israeli peace camp and among its main intellectuals—for example, the writers AMOS OZ and A. B. YEHOSHUA—there was an outpouring of claims that for the past ten years they had been naïve and fooled by the Palestinian rhetoric about peace. At the same time, the Israeli army put in place scenarios of "retaliation" and prepared for the reconquest of the territories, including the limited spaces of power gained by the Palestinians throughout the Oslo Process. It was the provocation by Barak, who allowed the head of the opposition, ARIEL SHARON, to visit the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the Muslim holy site in Jerusalem, on 28 September 2000 that ignited a fire in the Occupied Territories in the form of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA and allowed the government and the IDF to begin the process of reconquest of the achievements of Oslo.

The diplomatic efforts, however, did not stop immediately. Clinton, who was at the end of his presidency, wanted to reach a historic agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Negotiations were reconvened in Washington in December 2000, and an agreement was reached in Taba, Egypt, between the two delegations around what became known as the "CLINTON PARAMETERS":

- Israel will withdraw from all the Occupied Territories.
- Palestinians will accept an exchange of territories that will allow the Israelis to keep the settlement blocs where 85 percent of the settlers live on 2.5 percent of the land in the West Bank, including in Jerusalem.
- The WESTERN WALL and the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem will be annexed by Israel, and the rest of East Jerusalem will be under Palestinian sovereignty.
- Israel will recognize the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, but the actual return will

be negotiated according to the DEMOGRAPHICS of Israel's need for an overwhelming Jewish majority in Israel.

Barak rejected the Taba agreement, claiming that he could not accept such compromises at the end of his mandate and knowing that, in a few weeks, Sharon would undoubtedly be elected the new prime minister. Elected by a large majority and released from any pressures from the moribund Israeli peace movement, Sharon was ready to start the reconquest of the Palestinian territories and the destruction of the PNA.

Evaluation of Oslo

When the DOP was made public, Palestinians as well as Israeli peace activists were divided on the evaluation of this historic move. On the one side, there were those—and they were the majority—who believed that this process would lead, almost inexorably and independent of the political actors, to the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and that it would bring an end to the century-old Jewish-Arab conflict. On another side were those who saw it as an Israeli maneuver aimed at destroying the Palestinian national liberation movement and pushing it to capitulate to an Israeli *diktat* on limits of PNA governance that was not in the interest or objectives of the Palestinians. In the middle were those who thought that the DOP was indeed a bad agreement imposed on the Palestinians by unfavorable power relations, but that it nevertheless could bring about a better situation for the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories, and that it could change the perceptions and behaviors of both sides in a way that could bring about, in the longer term, a real peace.

Today, the Oslo Accords are viewed as a failure, in terms of ending the conflict. However, the DOP seems to have been a good deal for the Israeli government and a bad one for the Palestinians. Looking at the situation on the ground, the PLO is weaker than ever before and the PNA has lost most of its control not only over civil institutions but also over the Palestinian population. In the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas, the militant Islamist organization, won a landslide victory, pushing FATAH and other PLO factions to the margins of Palestinian political life. Israeli control of the West Bank is stronger than ever, and the number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories has doubled since 1990.

The main questions, however, remain: Was it unavoidable? Was it a planned maneuver by Israel to weaken the PLO, to strengthen Israeli control in the Occupied Territories, and to give a strong push to the settlement enterprise? Was the Palestinian leadership an accomplice in selling out the rights of its own people? The last question, at least, can be easily answered: Arafat's rejection of Barak's offers and the subsequent major crisis of the al-Aqsa Intifada prove beyond any doubt that the Palestinian leader was not part of any secret agreement with the Israelis. When he signed the DOP, Arafat's goal was to end Israeli occupation, establishing an independent state on 22 percent of historical Palestine, and negotiate a solution for the refugees based on an Israeli recognition of their right to return to their country. Was Arafat intentionally fooled by the Israelis and made to believe that he would get what he was expecting, while at the same time they intended to do the exact opposite? In other words, while for the Palestinians the Oslo Process was a deadly trap in which they were led by their blind leadership, from an Israeli point of view it was definitely a successful move.

There were two currents of thought in Israel about the Oslo Accords, according to Palestinian scholar Camille Mansour. The first was "based on the true spirit of the agreement and good faith, which implied not only the freezing of settlement activities but its de-legitimization, that security should be understood in its broad political context, [and] that the political, financial and psychological dividends of the peace process will be shared by both sides." The second was based on a military balance of power that pushed Israel to sign the DOP only because Occupation was, since the Intifada, too expensive, and therefore "it was necessary to give to the Palestinians control over Palestinian daily life in the urban centers of West Bank and Gaza, while keeping the main ROAD axes and the rest of the space—especially in and around Jerusalem—to strengthen and enlarge the settlement project.

The two options existed simultaneously and were the object of a political struggle among the Israeli leadership. The "Peres boys" represented the first option, and they convinced the Palestinians to accept the deal, despite its lack of clear commitments concerning the future and its lack of guarantees, because they themselves thought that the final outcome would be the end of the Israeli Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza and the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. Rabin

embodied the second reading and gave responsibility for the negotiations on the implementation of the DOP to senior army officers, who subcontracted to the PLO leadership the job of law and order in the Palestinian populated areas. When Rabin changed course, apparently toward the beginning of 1995, and rejoined the Beilin perspective—that Israel needed to move bona fide forward on the peace process—it was already too late. The dominant interpretation of the Oslo Process and the arguments used to justify the DOP among the Israeli public had already become the military ones. The days of reconciliation and true Israeli-Palestinian peace were over, and the Oslo Process entered a dead end that led to a new circle of violence and, finally, the recolonization of the Occupied Territories by Barak and Sharon.

See also BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER; WILLIAM CLINTON; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; OSLO ACCORDS

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—Michael Warschawski

The Other Israel

The Other Israel is the English-language publication of the ISRAELI COUNCIL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE. The quarterly newsletter, first published in 1983, aims to provide extensive coverage of the diverse struggles waged by the Israeli peace movement at large and reports on a variety of peacemaking activities, most of which find little or no mention in the world media. It also contains commentaries on events in Israel and the Middle East from a perspective that reconciles the interests of Israelis and Palestinians. *The Other Israel* is available at libraries in Israel, in the Occupied Territories, and in universities throughout the world. (http://otherisrael.home .igc.org).

See also MEDIA, ISRAELI; MEDIA, PALESTINIAN; MEDIA, US

Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire ruled the Middle East from 1299 to 1 November 1922 CE. It was a Turkish imperial monarchy, not an Arab empire, but the state religion was Islam. At the height of its power (sixteenth to seventeenth centuries), it spanned three continents, controlling much of southeastern Europe and North Africa as well as the Middle East. The empire was at the center of interactions between the Eastern and Western worlds for six centuries, and it was Western penetration of the empire, starting with economic penetration and gradually involving military occupation, that resulted in the ascendancy of the West and the dependency of the East. Its capital, Istanbul (previously known as Constantinople), was for centuries the jewel of the East.

In 1516 the Ottoman Turks conquered Palestine, and the country was incorporated in the dominions of the empire. Local governors were appointed from Istanbul, to which annual revenues were sent.

Later, in order to boost its tax base, the Ottomans undertook land reform and passed the Land Law of 1858, which required Arabs in Palestine, like its citizens elsewhere, to register their lands for the first time. Since many *fellahin* (peasants) wished to avoid paying taxes to the ailing regime or to be conscripted into its army, and furthermore were unable to write, many local *mukhtars* collectively registered village lands under their own name. The *mukhtars* were eventually able to claim ownership and to sell the local peasants' lands to the new Jewish immigrants, as they themselves relocated permanently to SYRIA or LEBANON.

In 1867, foreigners received the right to own land throughout the empire, which was a much-needed revenue source for the Ottoman administration but became a disaster for the indigenous peasants. At the outset, the Ottoman Porte (foreign ministry) actively encouraged European immigrants to buy LAND for cultivation and development. This was the context in which Jewish communities from Russia and Central Europe, fleeing from pogroms and systematic social oppression, were initially able to settle in Palestine. Many Arab estates were sold to Jewish settlers after 1880, but by the 1890s the Ottomans had begun to understand what Zionism was actually about and had moved in various ways to try to prevent foreign Jews from entering Palestine, settling there, and buying up land. The Ottomans passed a variety of new laws, gave directives to local officials, and made policy statements to the effect of limiting land sales to European Jews in Palestine. These were often not enforced or were unsuccessful, as ways were found to circumvent the new restrictions: for example, some Jews declared themselves pilgrims, not settlers, to evade entry restrictions and then just stayed on; bribes were paid to extend visas; European governments and consuls used their influence to enable their Jewish subjects to stay and buy land; and Ottoman Jews (who were initially not subject to any restrictions) bought land on behalf of foreign Jews and the Zionist land-purchasing agencies. By 1920, ABSENTEE LANDLORDS who had made large profits by selling off small plots or becoming brokers for others had become immensely wealthy.

By 1900, 5,000 Jewish agricultural settlers had settled in nineteen colonies. The general increase in foreign trade and settlement throughout the Palestine region led to rises in land prices and to waves of speculation that lasted until the end of the BRITISH MANDATE in 1948.

When, in the context of World War I, the Ottomans joined the Germans and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the British explicitly promised the Arab leadership (in the HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE) that if the Arabs would support the Allies against the Ottomans, at the war's end Britain would facilitate the unity and independence of the Arab world. The Arabs rose up against the Ottomans; however, when the war ended, the great powers carved up the Arab world into separate mandates and gave Zionists special rights in Palestine.

After Israel's OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP in 1967, Tel Aviv resurrected, when it suited its purpose, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 to confiscate Palestinian property.

See also IMMIGRATION

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Outposts

Outposts are, in reality, new settlements. According to Israel's PEACE NOW, at the end of 2008 there were approximately 100 new settlement-outposts in the WEST BANK housing several thousand extremist settlers. In the 2005 SASSON REPORT, the author found 150 outposts (and believed there were more), and in August 2009 a delegation composed of JIMMY CARTER, Desmond Tutu, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, MARY ROBINSON, and Ela Bhatt found 200 outposts. Whatever the reason for the discrepancy (i.e., new or existing), it is not Tel Aviv's dismantling of outposts; at most it has dismantled three or four, and new ones have been continually established.

The ROAD MAP requires Israel to dismantle outposts established after ARIEL SHARON's March 2001 election as prime minister and to freeze construction in older outposts (and settlements). Yet Israel has done neither. The UNITED STATES has declared that the outposts are a threat to the territorial integrity of a future Palestinian state. Yet Israel claims that it has secured US agreement to keep some of the outposts intact, something the US does not deny.

Peace Now comments: "According to the Ministry of Defense, 26 outposts meet the criteria stipulated in the Roadmap and therefore must be evacuated. However, according to the data collected by Peace Now, there are in fact at least 44 inhabited outposts that meet the criteria, in addition to a handful of uninhabited outposts. Aerial photos showing that the outposts did not exist before March 2001, but did exist after, can be found on Peace Now's website."

At the 27 November 2007 Annapolis Conference at the US Naval Academy in Maryland, Israeli prime minister EHUD OLMERT pledged to freeze settlement construction and remove some existing outposts and settlements. In November 2008, he announced that the government would cut off funding for illegal outposts—thereby admitting that it had continued to fund them up to that point.

No outposts have been evacuated since the Annapolis Conference. According to Peace Now, "Worse yet, since Annapolis there has been further investment, development, and construction in a number of outposts that Israel is required to remove under the Roadmap (i.e., outposts established after March 2001). This includes: (1) New, permanent structures are being built in the outposts of Kida, Hill 725 and Gilad Farm; (2) New caravans have been added in 11 outposts (Givat Assaf, Mevo'ot Jericho, Mitzpe Yitzhar, Yair Farm, Migron, Neve Daniel North, Nofe Nehemia, Susiya North West, Asa'el, Kida, Ramat Gilad).

"In addition, since Annapolis there has been construction and development in outposts established before March 2001. While some might argue that this construction is not relevant to Israel's Roadmap obligations (since, as explained earlier, under the Roadmap Israel is only required to remove outposts that were established after March 2001), they would be wrong: such construction conflicts with another Israeli obligation under Phase I of the Roadmap, under which Israel 'freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of outposts and settlements).' Further, in 2008 alone at least 261 new structures were built in or set up in outposts, including 227 caravans and 34 permanent structures. This represented a 250 percent increase compared to 2007, when approximately 98 structures were built in outposts (including approximately 82 caravans and 16 permanent structures).

"It should be noted that on 17 March 2008 Prime Minister Olmert declared that two illegal outposts had been evacuated. He was referring, first, to 'Ofra East'—which consisted of a single, damaged, vacant travel trailer placed near the settlement of Ofra, with another small trailer that was recently added next to it. This 'outpost'—which was never counted by Peace Now as a real outpost, was indeed 'evacuated,' with the two empty trailers removed from the site. The second outpost he was referring to, 'Yatir South West,' is a different story. This outpost consists of 4 caravans (travel trailers) located adjacent to the settlement of Metzadot Yehuda. Notwithstanding Olmert's declaration, the reality on the ground is that these caravans were never removed—a fact confirmed by Peace Now's Settlement Watch Team, which visited the site on March 28, 2008 and found the four caravans still in place."

Just like the official settlements, these outposts were established to realize two objectives: to create a continuity of Israeli presence by taking over as much LAND as possible and to create barriers among the various Palestinian population centers, leaving them as isolated CANTONS. This project precludes the possibility of creating a Palestinian state that can be viable, contiguous, independent, and self-sufficient. As the outposts steadily spring up and become permanent commu-

nities, taking up ever wider swaths of the West Bank that Palestinians envision as the heartland of their future state, the prospects for any comprehensive and peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict correspondingly decrease.

Typically, small groups of settlers—often young men (the "hilltop youth")—undertake the initiative to establish an outpost, assuming, correctly, that once they are in place the government will provide the necessary support. Indeed, the settlers do not act alone in the establishment of outposts; rather they have the massive assistance of government officials and ministries who are operating against Israeli law, but who are committed to establishing and expanding a web of settlements in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. This activity, which involves creating new outposts under the guise of constructing new neighborhoods in existing settlements, educational institutions, natural growth, acclimatization farms, and dummy antennas, reached its peak during two separate periods: the first was 1997 to 1999, when BENJAMIN NETANYAHU was prime minister, and the second was 2001–2002, when ARIEL SHARON held that position.


Despite the fact that this phenomenon significantly changed the map of the West Bank, it did not receive much public attention until about 2004; however, the Israeli MEDIA and the US government were able to bring sufficient pressure to bear that Prime Minister Sharon was forced to appoint Attorney Talia Sasson to examine the scope of the phenomenon and the involvement of various government officials in the effort. The Sasson Report found that while Israel does not officially recognize these communities, they are illegal, as noted, even by Israeli laws or international mandates that prohibit expansion of established settlements outside an occupier's borders. Nevertheless, government ministers, bureaucrats, and others have fueled the expansion of outposts by providing funds, granting PERMITS (or looking the other way when settlers build without permits) for construction, electricity, phone lines, security, and so on. For example, from 2000 to 2003, Israel's Housing Ministry funneled nearly US$6.5 million to the illegal outposts, with more than half going to outposts that Israel had pledged to the US government to remove. During the same period the Housing Ministry approved seventy-seven contracts for construction projects in thirty-three West Bank areas—eighteen of them for unauthorized outposts—with funding of about US$4 million. Sasson wrote that "the process of outpost expansion is profoundly under way."

Peace Now reports that at the end of 2008, there were 100 outposts, plus a large number of additional points controlled by the settlers but without a permanent settler presence. During 2008, no new "real" outposts (sites with an even moderately well-established settler presence and inhabited on a regular basis) were established and no "real" outposts were evacuated. Instead, many "dummy" outposts—uninhabited sites where settlers placed a container or vehicle, but no real structures—were established, and some of these were "evacuated." Peace Now further comments that these "were often part of a cat-and-mouse game settlers played with the Israeli army—wherein the settlers create the new 'outpost' and the army comes in and removes it, only to see the settlers reestablish it or move it to another site nearby."

Existing outposts were expanded significantly during 2008. At least 261 new structures were built in or set up in outposts in that year alone, including 227 caravans and 34 permanent structures. This represented a 250 percent increase compared to 2007, when approximately 98 structures were built in outposts (including approximately 82 caravans and 16 permanent structures). Peace Now also discovered that the government is directly funding some of the outposts: "Figures that show the State is funding illegal outposts: . . . at least 16 outposts are enjoying the settlement department support."

All outposts wish to become de facto settlements in their own right. Each outpost collects its own taxes and has its own secretariat, absorption committees, and the like. Many outposts grow within a few years into full-scale settlements with hundreds of residents. For example, the six-year-old outpost of Bruchin (near the western edge of the northern West Bank) is populated mainly by a core group of students from the Peduel Yeshiva, and in July 2002 comprehensive land work began for permanent settlement west of the outpost. Bruchin is well developed with uniform houses, brick sidewalks, and street lamps, and in a few years it grew to forty-five trailers and fifty-six permanent structures housing some twenty-seven families. Yet because it is considered illegal, Bruchin cannot be found in any conventional Israeli atlas.

Another example of a new illegal outpost is Migron, a settlement of about forty-five religious families on a ridge next to the Palestinian city of Ramallah. Migron has parks, children's playgrounds, a daycare center, and a synagogue, all paid for by the government. Migron is supposedly linked to the biblical site where King Saul



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Map 33. Israeli Settlement "Outposts"

based himself during his fight against the Philistines, and thus attracts primarily religious settlers. Yehudit Genud, a resident of Migron, told a reporter: "This place is holy to the Jewish people and we have a duty to be here. The whole land of Israel belongs to us and we should not be afraid to live wherever we want to. The Arabs must accept that." Further, Ms. Genud said, "We are connected to the water grid, we have phone lines from the national company Bezeq, we have been

hooked up by the electricity company and have street lighting. We also have a kindergarten paid for by the state and a group of soldiers stationed here to protect us. How can we be 'illegal'?"

In November 2008, SHIN BET chief Yuval Diskin said that hundreds of people are regularly involved in extremist violence in the West Bank, and, if necessary, they could recruit another few thousand people for a violent confrontation. In the early months of 2008, Shin Bet discerned a gradual rise in right-wing settler violence. Even though settlers still see no great likelihood of settlements being evacuated in the near future, the fact that senior government officials, such as outgoing prime minister Ehud Olmert, KADIMA leader TZIPI LIVNI, and LABOR leader and Defense Minister EHUD BARAK, all speak about the need for such an evacuation increases the settlers' sense of being under pressure. In the words of Amos Harel in March 2005 in *Ha'aretz,* "The distance from hitting and kicking soldiers and policemen to a political assassination is shorter than it seems."

In 2009, *Ha'aretz* wrote, "An infrastructure of Jewish terror is being created in the West Bank. Through a policy they have dubbed 'Price Tag,' the settlers have the declared aim of attacking innocent Palestinians in response to any perceived threat to a settlement or outpost, verbal or physical. This is merely the anecdotal and the blunt, extreme end of this infrastructure. Through intimidation and systematic violations of the law, the supreme goal of the settlers who exercise this policy is to seize more and more land. This, in turn, causes harm to the livelihood, property and welfare of tens of thousands of Palestinians."

The weakness of the IDF in dealing with the violence is pronounced. The reserve soldiers at Yad Yair, for example, like the regular soldiers at Yitzhar outpost, were unable to stop the settler outbursts and made do with standing aside. Since the dismantlement of Amona outpost in 2006, the army has changed its approach and prefers to send in the police and the border police to clash with the rioters. But the police are not always available, and the message that comes down to the officers (even if it is not always intentional) is that it is best not to tangle with Jews, whether an extreme right-wing activist at Yitzhar, an anarchist at Na'alin, or a religious fundamentalist at Migron.

The settlers, in fact, are unrestrained and have made shocking declarations and accusations at the various authorities. Moreover, it can be assumed that what has been, will be: the attacks and the violence around Yitzhar, for example, have been going on intermittently for more than twenty years. The outposts are a constant source of front-line friction between the settlers and the Palestinians. Occasionally, the IDF has attempted to allow Palestinians to reach their lands near the outposts, but the residents of the outposts use threats and violence to keep the Palestinians away. And the IDF does not protect them. When the Palestinians use violence, as was the case with the stabbing of a boy in Yitzhar, the laws of the jungle take over. The residents of the outposts are convinced that only if their Arab neighbors exist in a constant state of fear will quiet prevail and their families be able to live in relative security.

See also SASSON REPORT; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Oz, Amos (1939–2009)

Amos Oz was one of Israel's foremost writers. Born in JERUSALEM, at the age of fifteen he went to live on a KIBBUTZ, after which he studied philosophy and literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and was a visiting fellow at Oxford University. Oz was author-in-residence at the Hebrew University and writer-in-residence at Colorado College in the UNITED STATES. An author of prose for children and adults as well as an essayist, he was widely translated and is internationally acclaimed. Oz was honored with the Prix Femina and the honorific title of Officer of Arts and Letters from FRANCE and the Frankfurt Peace Prize. He lived in the southern town of Arad and taught literature at Ben Gurion University of the Negev.

Oz rooted his writing in the tempestuous history of his homeland. A common thread runs through his writing, both fiction and nonfiction: examining human nature, recognizing its frailty, but glorying in its variety. Some of his better-known works are *A Tale of Love and Darkness* (2005); *Israel, Palestine and Peace: Essays* (1995); *In the Land of Israel* (1993); *To Know a Woman* (1992); and *Elsewhere, Perhaps* (1985). Oz consistently argued for an end to ambivalence with regard to the Palestinians, for dialogue, for a channeling of passions toward faith in the future, and for peace. He wrote with an economy of words yet managed to present panoramic perspectives of the people of Israel, their political tribulations, and the biblical landscape. *Newsweek* once wrote of Oz: "Eloquent, humane, even religious in the deepest sense, Oz emerges as a kind of Zionist Orwell: a complex man obsessed with simple decency and determined above all to tell the truth, regardless of whom it offends."

See also HEBREW LITERATURE

Oz Veshalom-Netivot Shalom

Oz Veshalom-Netivot Shalom, based in JERUSALEM, was founded in 1975 to present an alternative, peaceful expression of religious ZIONISM. It is committed to promoting the ideals of tolerance, pluralism, and justice, which have long been central to Jewish tradition and law. As the only religious Zionist peace organization of its kind, it counters fundamentalist and extremist political arguments that place the value of the LAND of Israel ahead of human life. The organization seeks to effect a fundamental change within the national religious community and throughout Israeli society by demonstrating support for the peace process on the basis of political reality and justice; enhancing Jewish unity and pluralism among Israel's religious and secular publics; practicing coexistence and support for equality for Israel's Arab minority; and advocating political rights for Palestinians, including the establishment of a Palestinian state. (www.netivot-shalom.org.il).

P

Pale of Settlement (1791–1917)

Pale of Settlement was a western border region of imperial RUSSIA in which Jews were permanently allowed to live, extending from the *pale*, or demarcation line, to near the border with central Europe. More than 90 percent of Russian Jews were forced to live in the Pale, and the population grew from 1.6 million in 1820 to 5.6 million in 1910. Although comprising only 20 percent of the territory of European Russia, the Pale corresponded to the historical borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and included much of present-day Lithuania, Belarus, Poland, Moldova, Ukraine, and parts of western Russia. Only a few categories of Jews were allowed to live outside the Pale.

Life in the *shtetls* (villages) of the Pale of Settlement was hard and stricken by poverty. To meet the needs of the population, a sophisticated system of volunteer Jewish social welfare organizations developed, following the time-honored Jewish tradition of *tzedakah*. Various organizations supplied clothes to poor students, provided kosher food to Jewish soldiers conscripted into the czar's army, dispensed free medical treatment for the poor, offered dowries and household gifts to destitute brides, and arranged for technical education for orphans. According to historian Martin Gilbert's *Atlas of Jewish History*, no province in the Pale had less than 14 percent of the population on communal social welfare, and Lithuanian and Ukrainian Jews supported as much as 22 percent of their poor populations.

The concentration of Jews in the Pale made them an easy target for pogroms and massive (and often government-sponsored) anti-Jewish riots. These, along with the repressive May Laws, anti-Jewish regulations enacted in 1882 by Czar Alexander III, often devastated whole communities. Though pogroms were staged throughout the existence of the Pale, particularly devastating attacks occurred in 1881–1883 and 1903–1906, targeting hundreds of communities, killing thousands of Jews, and causing tens of thousands of rubles in property damage.

A positive outgrowth of the concentration of Jews in a circumscribed area was the development of the modern yeshiva system. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, each town supported its advanced students, who were taught in the local synagogues by the rabbinical head of the community. Each student would eat his meals in a different home each day, a system known as *essen teg* (eating days). A Jewish quota for education was set by the Russian government: since 1886, the percentage of Jewish students could be no more than 10 percent within the Pale, 5 percent outside the Pale, and 3 percent in the capitals (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev). The quotas in the capitals were slightly increased in 1908 and 1915.

During World War I, the Pale lost part of its Jewish population when large numbers of Jews fled into the Russian interior to escape the invading GERMAN army. On 20 March 1917, the Pale was abolished by the provisional Russian government. A large portion of the Pale, together with its Jewish population, became part of Poland. The Bolshevik Revolution and the wars of 1918–1920 also resulted in many pogroms and military excesses—over 1,236 of them in the Ukraine alone, during which, conservatively, 31,000 Jews were killed.

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Palestine Central Council

The Palestine Central Council (PCC) was established in 1970 as a consultative body to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, especially in periods between meetings

of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC). Its membership is composed of sixty individuals. In 1991, at the twenty-ninth PNC, the PCC became a legislative as well as consultative body. Members are elected from among members of the PNC, and the PCC meets regularly every six months. When the PNC is not in session, the PCC assumes the role of the PNC.

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Palestine Conciliation Commission

See UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute

The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) was founded in JERUSALEM in 1994 as an independent, nonprofit think tank to contribute to the policymaking process of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY by conducting economic and social policy research. Based in Ramallah in the WEST BANK, MAS produces and publishes high-quality research relevant to economic and social development in Palestine. (www.mas.org.ps).

Palestine Executive Committee

See PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Palestine Jewish Colonization Association

The Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (PICA) was established in 1924 and played a major role in supporting the Yishuv in Palestine until its disbandment in 1957. It was originally founded as the JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION (ICA) by Baron Maurice de Hirsh in 1891 to help Jews from Russia and Romania to settle in Argentina. The baron died in 1896, and thereafter the ICA began to assist the Palestinian colonies. In 1899 BARON EDMOND JAMES DE ROTHSCHILD transferred title to his colonies in Palestine plus fifteen million francs (around $3 million at the time) to the ICA, which was reorganized as the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association in 1924. After the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES in 1929, PICA helped to rehabilitate agricultural colonies that had been damaged. Rothschild's will instructed the PICA to transfer most of its land in Israel to the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND.

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Palestine Land Development Corporation

The Palestine Land Development Corporation (PLDC) was the second land redemption agency (after the JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION) founded by Zionists. It was established in 1908 by the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO) and headed by Otto Warburg and ARTHUR RUPPIN, whose mandate was to purchase LAND for the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF), which held the land in perpetuity for the Jewish people. Shortly thereafter, JOSHUA HANKIN joined the PLDC and later became a key figure in land reclamation in Palestine.

In the early years of the PLDC, the WZO focused on placing Jewish IMMIGRANTS in agricultural SETTLEMENTS, but few immigrants had agricultural training. Thus the PLDC initiated a series of training facilities, known as "National Farms," on JNF land. While alumni of this training leased land in other JNF-sponsored localities, most importantly, the farms served as incubators for the philosophies and practices of various kinds of rural settlement. Thus, by the time the BRITISH MANDATE came into effect (1920), the land-redemption model had been consolidated as institutional, as distinct from entrepreneurial (although its leading figures thought entrepreneurially), and increasingly rural rather than

urban. Nearly all of the settlers were lessees, not owners, of their land.

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Palestine Liberation Army

The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was founded at the first meeting of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (together with all the major institutions of the PLO) in May 1964 in JERUSALEM under the chairmanship of AHMAD SHUQAYRI. The ARAB LEAGUE had decided to create a regular military force (as opposed to guerrillas) recruited from Palestinian REFUGEES in SYRIA, IRAQ, and EGYPT, who performed their military service in separate Palestinian battalions in the armies of those states. Although the PLA was the official military wing of the PLO, in reality it was under the effective military command of the countries in which it was stationed. Initially there were three battalions of Palestinians: 'Ayn Jalut in Egypt; Qadisiyya in Iraq, though it moved to JORDAN and came under Amman's control after 1967; and Hittin in Syria.

The PLA reached a maximum strength of 12,000 men deployed in eight brigades around 1978 and eventually came to be concentrated in LEBANON under the control of the PLO. However, the PLA was largely destroyed as a fighting force during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon; its fighters were dispersed throughout the Arab world, and the leadership settled in TUNIS. Some PLA members later became part of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

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Palestine Liberation Front

The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF, Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya) was formed by MUHAMMAD ABBAS ZEIDAN (Abu al-Abbas) and Tal'at Ya'qub in April 1977 after a split with the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP–GC). The split came about because of the PFLP–GC's support for SYRIA's attacks on the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in LEBANON in 1976 and occurred in the context of bitter inter-Arab rivalries. FATAH, the strongest faction within the PLO, at the time was feuding with Syria and helped in the formation of the PLF, whose leadership accepted the patronage of the IRAQ regime. The PLF and al-Abbas both were supportive of and supported by Fatah. Although the PLF was always a small group, with no supporters in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, it was quite militant and pursued a strategy of ARMED STRUGGLE, mainly by attacks on Israel across the Lebanese border.

In the early 1980s, the PLF split into three small organizations, with a centrist, pro-Damascus faction under Ya'qub challenging the pro-Iraqi faction under al-Abbas and 'Ali Ishaq, who in turn effected a rapprochement with the mainstream Fatah in 1983 in the context of the post–LEBANON WAR Palestinian civil war. Al-Abbas and 'Ali Ishaq even took part in the Amman (JORDAN) PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL of November 1984, where, for the first time, the PLF was allotted a seat on the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. The third and minor faction was under the leadership of 'Abd al-Fattah Ghanim, who was militantly pro-Syrian and later reconciled with Ya'qub's faction when the latter left the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE to join Ghanim in creating the Palestine National Liberation Front (PNLF). This group declined significantly with the death of Ya'qub in November 1988 and because of the PLO's reunification at the same time. After Ya'qub's death, al-Abbas became leader of a reunited PLF and was elected to the Executive Committee, at which time the PLF became, in effect, a satellite of Fatah, though never completely relinquishing its Iraqi connections.

When, in October 1985, the PLF hijacked the cruise ship *ACHILLE LAURO* and then attempted a seaborne raid near Tel Aviv in May 1990, al-Abbas brought intense international criticism on the PLO. In 1991, to defuse the criticism, PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT replaced al-Abbas with 'Ali Ishaq on the Executive Committee. But 'Ali Ishaq's opposition to the MADRID CONFERENCE and the OSLO ACCORDS led him to resign his Executive Committee seat. After the Oslo agreement, al-Abbas's PLF faction accepted the PLO's policy of curtailing guerrilla activity against Israel. The organization is currently based mainly in Lebanon and Tunisia, where it has several hundred members.

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Palestine Liberation Organization

In 1964, at the first Arab Summit, held in Cairo, Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR engineered the creation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as an "independent" institution through which Palestinians could struggle for their rights. The PLO, however, was neither independent nor capable of struggle—not even politically. As a creation of EGYPT, it was controlled by Egypt and functioned mainly as an instrument of Egyptian diplomacy in Arab politics. Its establishment was specifically undertaken to relieve the Arab states of responsibility for Palestine and to control the Palestinians so that they would not drag the Arab countries into an unwanted war with Israel. In May 1964, the PLO was formally founded in JERUSALEM at an assembly of 422 Palestinians from ten Arab countries. There they drafted the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER, a Declaration of Independence, and the General Principles of a Fundamental (Basic) Law, a constitution outlining the basic political structure of the PLO. The PLO was permitted to have a military wing (the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY), but it consisted of three Palestinian contingents under the control of Arab countries, had no independence, and was not involved in guerrilla or other military activities. AHMAD SHUQAYRI became the organization's first leader. He resigned in December 1967 and was replaced by Yahya Hammouda, who served until February 1969, when YASIR ARAFAT was elected chairman.

In the years immediately following *Nakba*, when some 800,000 Palestinians fled the 1948 WAR between Israel and the Arab states, dispossessed Palestinian REFUGEES were mostly preoccupied with the basics of existence in the refugee camps, located in various Arab states. Conditions in the camps were deplorable: water, electricity, and sewerage were nonexistent. For at least fifteen years, there was no organized political activity among the refugees; indeed, Palestinians thought it was only a matter of time before they could return to their homes and land in Palestine. At the same time, middle- and upper-class Palestinians who left in 1948 and who had the means to settle in urban areas migrated to Beirut, LEBANON; Cairo, Egypt; Amman, JORDAN; KUWAIT; and elsewhere. They played pivotal roles in the development of numerous Arab countries and made educating their children their first priority. Universities, especially in Lebanon and Egypt, introduced Palestinians to Arab nationalist ideas, movements, and parties and became fertile ground for the development of Palestinian nationalist thought and organization. By the mid-1960s, Palestinians who were exposed to these trends began to organize, to recruit supporters from the masses, and to coalesce in several groups of *fida'iyyun* (freedom fighters or self-sacrificers) committed to the liberation of Palestine. The various factions recruited from the masses and solidified their organizations, and then joined the PLO as an umbrella that eventually subsumed eight independent groups. So, for example, supporters of one faction continued to give their first loyalty to that group but were also part of the PLO. Arafat, to implement policy, always had to bargain and negotiate with the various factions because each could leave the PLO at any time (and often did), lessening the political power of the PLO.

Shortly after the creation of the PLO, Palestinian resistance groups exploded onto the Middle East scene. FATAH (the Palestine National Liberation Movement), the organization with the widest support, had its origins in GAZA among a group of university student activists studying in Egypt. They included the major leaders of the PLO throughout the 1970s and 1980s and a few into the 1990s: SALAH KHALAF (Abu Iyad), KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), FAROUQ AL-QADDUMI (Abu Lutuf), KHALID AL-HASAN (Abu Said), his brother HANI AL-HASAN, and Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar). The POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), the second strongest group, had its roots in the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS, which had a strong organizational base at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon. PFLP leaders and ideologues who came from this university setting included, among others, GEORGE HABASH, WADI' HADDAD, Muhsin Ibrahim, and NAYIF HAWATIMAH. Hawatimah later split from the PFLP and formed

the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP), the third most populous organization. Though operating independently, these groups collectively constituted the Palestine Nationalist Movement. They were underground, secretive, populist, activist, and radical, in contrast to the PLO, which was aboveground, was elitist, toed the line of the Arab states (in particular, Egypt), and was legitimized by the status quo ARAB LEAGUE. In 1969, the *fida'iyyun* took over the PLO and transformed it into an independent, revolutionary organization; eight distinct guerrilla organizations came together under its unifying umbrella, Fatah, the PFLP and the DFLP being the largest. The smaller factions included the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF), the Abu Abbas faction, minor, left-wing; the ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF), a minor faction aligned with the Iraqi Ba'ath Party; SA'IQA, a Syrian-backed Ba'athist faction; the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT (PPSF), the Samir Ghawsha left-wing faction; and the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF), another minor faction. The PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPP), founded in 1982 as the Palestinian Communist Party, only joined the PLO in 1987. It was communist, was opposed to ARMED STRUGGLE, supported a two-state solution, and its followers came primarily from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. It was led first by Bashir Barghouti, then MUSTAFA AL-BARGHUTHI.

Without any independent territorial base and with Palestinians geographically fragmented, it would have been unlikely for one party to dominate resistance activities. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the resistance constituency was socioeconomically diverse and included the destitute camp population, middle- and upper-class teachers, bureaucrats, educated professionals, and wealthy businessmen working in Jordan, the Gulf States, and elsewhere, plus Christians (Habash and Hawatimah, for example) and Muslims. The class and religious variations, as well as the divergent life experiences of the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA, were reflected in ideological differences and disagreements regarding the appropriate strategy and tactics for Palestinian resistance. The main disagreement was between an Arab nationalist and a Palestinian nationalist orientation, including what should be the appropriate relationship between the *fida'iyyun* and the Arab states. Arafat and Fatah believed that the focus of the resistance should be exclusively on Palestine and that, given the absence of an independent territorial base and the necessity of organizing in and operating from the Arab states, the Palestinian movement needed to maintain good relations with the Arab regimes. Habash and the PFLP believed, on the other hand, that Palestinian objectives could only be realized through the existence of progressive, pan-Arab nationalist leaders, necessitating the overthrow of the current Arab regimes. It was this PFLP worldview that led to BLACK SEPTEMBER after the organization unsuccessfully attempted to oust King Husayn. Thereafter, while maintaining a rhetorical commitment to revolution throughout the Arab world, the PFLP adhered to Fatah's policy of attempting to maintain good relations with existing regimes.

Yet, despite the ideological differences, occasional feuds, and the temporary withdrawal of one or another group from the fold, the eight resistance organizations worked together under the PLO umbrella and remained committed to the principles of consensus and unity until 1993. That year Arafat broke their consensus when he signed the OSLO ACCORDS with Israel, which did not reflect the political principle of commitment to an independent, sovereign state in the pre-1967 boundaries, which had constituted PLO policy for twenty years.

PLO Structure

Each of the PLO's eight parties had its own internal organizational structure and political apparatus in which issues of theory, practice, and so forth were discussed and debated, and where the political program of each group was formalized. These political organs were separate from each organization's guerrilla contingent, although it was not uncommon for individuals to function in both capacities. In addition, the PLO had its own political apparatus, which superseded the structures of the individual groups. The PLO's political institutions were established in 1964 at its founding meeting, remained viable after the 1969 resistance takeover, and continued functioning as originally intended until 1991. They included the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), the PALESTINE CENTRAL COUNCIL (created in 1970), and the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. The PNC was a parliamentary body that was confirmed by the PLO constitution as the PLO's supreme policymaking authority, although in practice it usually set broad policy guidelines of sufficient ambiguity to allow the Executive Committee flexibility in their implementation. The policy guidelines were typi-

cally shaped by the PLO leadership and presented to the PNC for discussion and ratification. According to the constitution, PNC members were to be elected by the Palestinian people, though in practice this was never possible because the Arab states did not allow that level of Palestinian organization. Instead, participation was normally the result of negotiations among the leaders of the various resistance groups prior to each PNC session and reflected the relative strength of each faction. Between May 1964 and September 1991, the PNC held twenty regular sessions and one extraordinary session, with 100 to 450 delegates in attendance.

In addition to establishing the framework of PLO policy, the PNC was charged with electing the Executive Committee, although, in actuality, the PNC essentially ratified a list of committee members presented to it after lengthy behind-the-scenes negotiations among resistance group leaders. Consisting of twelve to fifteen members, the Executive Committee was the de facto ruling and decisionmaking body of the PLO, and its composition also reflected the relative strength of the resistance organizations. The Executive Committee also elected the PLO chairman, who, from 1969 until his death in 2004, was Yasir Arafat. The Central Council was an intermediary body consisting of twenty-one to fifty-five members elected by and from the PNC and headed by the PLO chairman. It functioned both as an advisory body to the EC and, in situations requiring an immediate decision when it was impractical to convene the PNC, as a decisionmaking forum.

By 1973–1974 Fatah was by far the most powerful and best organized of all the resistance organizations. It had many thousand more men in its armed forces than the other groups; it controlled most of the mass, civilian organizations; and it dominated all three PLO political institutions. Even with all these caveats, however, the politics of the PLO was remarkably democratic. Arafat could not command obedience but had to persuade and win support. Bargaining and negotiation, give-and-take, and compromise—not fiat—were the norm. The PLO could not have remained organizationally intact, exercised regional and international influence, or maintained its status as the "legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" if the theories, opinions, and policies of each group had not been allowed to play out in a democratic manner. The emphasis on unity and consensus added to the PLO's legitimacy and mass support, which in turn contributed to the institutionalization of the PLO as the organizational embodiment of Palestinian nationalism. Subsequently, this institutional legitimacy precluded any other group from unilaterally claiming to represent Palestinian interests or pursuing an independent policy. The failure to establish legitimacy by those groups (e.g., Abu Nidal's organization and the Fatah "dissidents" in 1983) that did split from the organization serves to illustrate this point.

Changing Objectives

During the same period—1969–1991—while the PLO maintained this structural continuity (the leadership of Fatah and the persistence of the political institutions), it radically transformed itself from a national liberation movement to a conservative nationalist organization. In the early period, Fatah leaders were deeply influenced by the revolutions in Algeria and Cuba, the Vietnamese resistance to the UNITED STATES, and Arab nationalism. Thus they espoused objectives similar to those of other twentieth-century, anticolonialist liberation movements, proclaiming their intention of freeing their homeland from foreign oppression and colonialism and of using armed struggle as the means to that end.

Between 1 January 1965 (when Fatah launched its first guerrilla operation) and September 1970 (when King Husayn drove the *fida'iyyun* from Jordan in Black September), the various resistance groups carried out hundreds of guerrilla operations against Israel. The majority of these were little more than pinpricks that caused relatively few Israeli injuries or deaths. Yet, insofar as they breached Israeli sovereignty, they were an embarrassment to the government, and Israel responded with massive retaliatory strikes on the territory of the Arab states from which the guerrillas operated. The guerrilla operations, regardless of their effectiveness, gave momentum to the Palestinian Nationalist Movement and brought many new recruits to the various groups.

Egypt and Syria both prohibited guerrilla raids from their territories, although, until September 1970, Jordan allowed the *fida'iyyun* to operate from bases on its soil. King Husayn's tolerance stemmed from a variety of factors, though primarily from his shaky domestic legitimacy combined with his large population of Palestinian refugees. After Black September, however, Jordan joined Syria and Egypt in prohibiting such operations. The only remaining

"front" for guerrilla incursions was Lebanon, to which the guerrillas fled after being driven out of Jordan and where they significantly enlarged an already considerable Palestinian population. Additionally, the period prior to 1970–1971 witnessed major terrorist operations—mainly carried out by the PFLP—such as airline hijackings, the MUNICH OLYMPICS kidnappings, and others.

A late 1967 meeting of Fatah's Central Committee marked the beginning of the retreat from "liberating" Palestine and the opening of a debate on a democratic secular state program. This innovative concept was based on Western democracies, which meant in practice a state wherein Jews, Muslims, and Christians would live together with equal access to human, civil, and political rights. Fatah's first public statement on the democratic position was made on 1 January 1968, and it was formally adopted in the political program of the third Fatah General Congress in October 1968. At the fifth PNC session in February 1969, the establishment of a secular democratic state in Palestine became official PLO policy. Israel's response to this proposal was that it was one more means toward the destruction of Israel. Both Israel and the United States vehemently denounced it, and little more was heard of it as the PLO moved on to the TWO-STATE SOLUTION of a separate Israel and Palestine.

After the dismissive response to its proposal for a democratic secular state, the PLO again altered its goals. At the close of the twelfth PNC in June 1974, the PLO issued its political communiqué that called for the establishment of "a Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian areas liberated from Israeli control." This was the first formulation of the idea of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel. A further point in the PNC program stated that the PLO would use "every means" to achieve its ends, implying a retreat from armed struggle. In fact, since 1970, the number of guerrilla operations had drastically declined, both because the PLO was confined to Lebanon and because it had become painfully aware of the futility of such operations in achieving its goals. In another notable event from this period, Arafat wrote to US secretary of state HENRY KISSINGER during the OCTOBER WAR of 1973, declaring the PLO's willingness to take part in a postwar political settlement. Kissinger declined to reply to the letter, and the Palestine issue was firmly excluded from postwar diplomacy. Additionally, in the aftermath of the 1973 war, Kissinger provided Israel with a memorandum of understanding that pledged, among other things, never to negotiate with or recognize the PLO as long as it did not formally recognize Israel's *right* to exist. In 1976, Kissinger engineered a US veto of a UNITED NATIONS Security Council resolution (supported by the PLO and all the Arab confrontation states) that called for a two-state settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite Israeli and US abjuration, the PLO achieved considerable international legitimacy. In October 1974 an Arab Summit conference, meeting in Rabat, Morocco, proclaimed the PLO "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians." The following month, Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly, where the PLO was accorded the status of an "observer-member." At the thirteenth PNC in March 1977, the two-state idea was further refined and clearly articulated as policy, and the PLO formally declared its willingness to participate in negotiations for a political settlement. Official PLO policy, then, from 1977 through 1993 (explicitly detailed in 1988 PNC resolutions), was centered on the objective of securing an independent Palestinian state in the WEST BANK, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. It also disclaimed the armed struggle and sought to engage in a diplomatic process that would achieve its goals.

By 1978 PLO guerrilla activity had declined even further, and, in March of that year, in the aftermath of Israel's first invasion of Lebanon, Arafat agreed to cooperate with a United Nations peacekeeping force (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL) in South Lebanon. In so doing, the PLO chairman was, by implication, endorsing Security Council Resolution 425, which created UNIFIL's mandate and specifically mentioned Israel, thus inferring PLO recognition. In the words of one analyst, this commitment "marked a turning-point in the history of the Palestinian resistance movement. . . . It constituted the first open acceptance by the leader of the PLO of a cease-fire agreement with Israel, and Arafat's decision to co-operate with UNIFIL was subsequently endorsed by all the official PLO bodies." Again, in July 1981, the PLO accepted a cease-fire agreement, this one mediated by US envoy Philip Habib, which it scrupulously honored for eleven months (in spite of repeated Israeli provocations) until Israel again invaded Lebanon in June 1982 (LEBANON WAR).

In 1979 Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky and West German leader Willy Brandt both met with Arafat and issued statements of unqualified support for the PLO's inclusion in the peace process. During the ensuing months, Arafat met with most of the top officials from the European countries, and several conferred diplomatic recognition on the PLO. In June 1980 the European Council issued what came to be known as the VENICE DECLARATION; this declaration distanced itself from UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict and referred to the Palestine question only as a "refugee problem." The European declaration called for the Palestinians "to exercise fully [their] right to self-determination" and also recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

Effects of the Lebanon War

The 1982 war dealt the Palestinians a devastating blow. In an intense three-month air, land, and sea campaign, Israel destroyed all the refugee camps in southern Lebanon to end guerrilla operations originating in the camps. It decimated the PLO's entire civilian infrastructure, including the clinics and hospitals of the Red Crescent, the factories of SAMED, the research center and archives, trade union offices, schools and kindergartens, cultural centers, and the PLO's political headquarters. Israel killed some 20,000 individuals, drove the PLO militias from Lebanon, and presided over the massacres in the SABRA AND SHATILA refugee camps. In the aftermath, a mini civil war (the FATAH UPRISING) erupted in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and 1983 saw a split in the PLO.

In this, the darkest hour of the resistance, Arafat convened the seventeenth PNC, in Amman, in November 1984. With the exception of Fatah, most of the other resistance organizations chose not to attend. In February 1985 Arafat signed an accord with King Husayn in which the concept of an independent Palestinian state was reduced to the notion of a "homeland" and self-government to a "confederation" with Jordan. The agreement also contained the idea of a joint Jordanian-PLO negotiating team, which, in effect, compromised the status of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In 1985 Arafat made a formal pronouncement in Egypt known as the CAIRO DECLARATION, in which he stated the PLO's condemnation of "all [guerrilla] operations outside [Palestine] and all forms of TERRORISM." The resolutions of the Amman PNC and the HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT were strongly opposed by the majority of Palestinians and never acquired popular legitimacy. In February 1986, they were abrogated.

In April 1987, when the eighteenth session of the PNC convened, the various resistance groups were reunited. The PLO restated the objective of national self-determination in an independent state in part of Palestine. The emphasis on diplomacy was also reiterated, with the PLO calling for an international conference under the auspices of the UN Security Council as the means to facilitate a solution to the question of Palestine. During this session, the Executive Committee declared the Jordanian-PLO agreement (the Husayn-Arafat Agreement) "null and void." Thereafter, Arafat sought by all diplomatic means to make the PLO a full partner in a political settlement.

In March 1988, four months into the First INTIFADA, Arafat again publicly called for an international peace conference to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with full, independent PLO participation. He declared that the PLO accepted "all UN resolutions on Palestine," including 242 and 338; referred to a 1984 PNC resolution calling for "land in exchange for peace"; and concluded with the statement "With whom am I going to make peace at an international conference? With my enemies, with the Israeli government." In June 1988, at an Arab Summit conference, BASSAM ABU SHARIF, one of Arafat's closest advisers, issued a statement that emphasized the common suffering of Israelis and Palestinians and their mutual desire for peace and security. In September 1988 Arafat addressed, by invitation, the socialist members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, FRANCE, where he once more stressed the PLO's commitment to negotiations, peace, and justice; to UN Resolutions 242 and 338; to the UN Charter and all its resolutions; and to a two-state solution. He also repeated his denunciation of TERRORISM.

The momentous nineteenth PNC, in November 1988, concretized the PLO's historic compromise, unconditionally defining its territorial objective as an independent state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem—comprising 22 percent of historic Palestine—and committing itself solely to peaceful means of struggle. On 13 December 1988 the UN General Assembly convened in a special session in Geneva specifically to hear an address by Arafat

after the US government denied him permission to come to New York. In his speech, Arafat reviewed the history of the Palestine issue, discussed the concessions made by the PLO over the years, and unequivocally reaffirmed its commitment to diplomacy and a two-state solution. The following day he gave a press conference in which he spoke of peace as salvation for both Israelis and Palestinians, renounced all forms of terrorism, called for an international peace conference, reiterated the PLO's commitment to Resolutions 242 and 338, and recognized Israel's *right* to exist.

In response to these cumulative efforts by the Palestinians, on 14 December 1988, the United States reluctantly opened a low-level, short-lived dialogue with the PLO. The talks were conducted through Washington's ambassador to Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau, and involved no high-level US or PLO personnel. Substantively, the dialogue primarily involved US pressure on the PLO to stop the Intifada (in the Occupied Territories) and to relinquish its claim to being the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. There were no discussions about a territorial solution for the Palestinians or any other major issue of concern to them. In June 1990, Washington terminated the UNITED STATES-PLO DIALOGUE, eighteen months after its start, ostensibly because the PLO failed to condemn a 30 May aborted raid on Israel by the PLF, following the *ACHILLE LAURO* affair (1985) by the same group. The PLF is a small faction, backed by IRAQ and headed by ABU AL-ABBAS. Because the PLO refused to submit to the US demand that it expel al-Abbas from its Executive Committee, the United States charged that the PLO was again engaging in terrorism.

Fatah's fifth General Congress was held in August 1989. Mourning Israel's assassination of Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) in TUNIS four months earlier, it nevertheless reiterated its support for the resolutions taken by the nineteenth PNC and pledged adherence to the principles of international legitimacy. It denounced all forms of terrorism and stressed the need to continue to work for a just and lasting peace. In February 1990 Arafat wrote a letter to the International Conference of World Jewish Leaders, which was meeting in Jerusalem, and made a forceful declaration for peace: "We remain deeply convinced that the only real security guarantee for Israel lies in a peaceful settlement based on the termination of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories . . . and the acceptance of the two-state principle that the Palestinian people have already accepted. . . . The option we have chosen is peace. . . . [The PLO] has made all the commitments it can make in favor of a settlement. It has laid the foundations of a comprehensive peace based on international legitimacy and a balance of the interests of all the parties to the conflict. In return, we have received from the Israeli government no positive response and no commitment to the peace process."

In May 1990, following another US visa denial to Chairman Arafat, the UN Security Council convened a special session in Geneva to enable him to address the council, which was attended by all members except the United States. Additionally, because the PLO subsequently refused to submit to the US demand that it expel al-Abbas from its Executive Committee, the United States ended the talks.

Israel continuously used propaganda as a weapon to discredit PLO peace initiatives. For example, the commitment in the organization's original charter to regain all of Palestine was held up as "proof" that the PLO remained committed to the destruction of Israel, even though the objectives laid out in the charter were superseded by PNC resolutions. Although the charter remained an important and potent symbol to Palestinians, Arafat was anxious to convince Israelis and Americans of Palestinian sincerity and finally bowed to pressure to renounce the charter. In a May 1989 interview with the French media, when asked about the issue, Arafat responded, "*C'est caduc*," meaning, roughly, it is null and void.

Relationship with Arab States

The fact that the Palestinian resistance was not based on its own soil was inherently disadvantageous and left it dependent on Arab "host" states. Thus the PLO was severely restricted by the environment in which it had to function—that is, the nature of the Arab state system. As noted earlier, in considerable measure the structural characteristics of the PLO derived from the circumstance of Palestinian dispersion and displacement. After 1948 the majority of Palestinians were scattered in various countries throughout the Middle East and came under the rule of the Arab regimes and, in turn, the Arab state system. Rhetorically the Arab states supported the Palestinians, but in practice they often worked to undermine the PLO because they feared a confrontation with Israel.

When Fatah became the dominant force in the PLO, it concluded that to strengthen the organization's legitimacy, independence, and influence, the PLO needed to maintain the support of all Palestinian constituencies. At the same time, Fatah did not want to alienate the Arab governments—especially Syria—and it feared that if those resistance groups promoted by Arab states (notably Syrian-sponsored Saiqa and the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front [ALF]) were excluded from the PLO, the regimes might act against the organization. Thus the structure of the PLO as an "umbrella" for all the Palestinian and Arab-sponsored groups was established and institutionalized. On the other hand, the politics of unity and consensus constrained the PLO's strategy and tactics to the lowest common denominator that was acceptable to *all* the factions—Palestinian and Arab-sponsored—and ultimately allowed the Arab regimes to strongly influence Palestinian politics.

This anomalous situation, of lacking an independent base, also made the movement susceptible to Arab state interference, and Arab regimes, seeking to maximize their own state interests, acted in every possible way to dominate the movement's politics. For instance, they created and supported groups such as Saiqa and the ALF that functioned to serve the Arab states rather than Palestinian interests. They also attempted to co-opt genuine Palestinian groups. Moreover, they engaged in overt repression of the PLO (e.g., Jordan in 1970, Syria in 1976, Syria's sponsorship of the Fatah dissidents in 1983 and of Amal in the "Camps' War" in 1985–1987). The willingness of these regimes to use force against the Palestinians provides clear evidence of the extent of the PLO's subordination to the Arab states. The problematic relationship between the Arab states and the PLO is also evident in the refusal, after 1970, of any Arab regime to permit guerrilla activity from its territory. (Lebanon was the exception, but that was only because it was so continuously wracked by civil insurrection that it was too weak to act against the resistance.) Thus, while the PLO maintained its independence from any one Arab government in the post-1969 period, it was, in essence, dependent for its very existence on the grace of the Arab regimes. This situation was a major determining factor in the transformation of fundamental PLO goals and methods.

In the aftermath of 'Abd al-Nasir's defeat in the 1967 War with Israel (and the defeat as well of Jordan and Syria), these regimes were adamant about prohibiting guerrilla activity from their territories for fear of another Israeli attack. Additionally, after the June conflict, the locus of power in the Arab world shifted toward the conservative states—led by Saudi Arabia—that had strong ties with the United States. After the 1973 War, the dominance of the conservative order was fully established, and that order involved the recognition, at least de facto, of Israel's permanence in the region. Even Syria, which regularly presented itself as a "radical" state, was prepared to conclude an accord with Israel—as testified to by the 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. After the Arab regimes acquiesced in Israel's existence (though without formal peace treaties), they exerted strong pressure on the PLO to do likewise. To a considerable extent they did so out of fear that an "unchecked" PLO might enmesh the Arab states in an undesired war with Israel. But, in addition, the Arab state system mandated the PLO's abandonment of the democratic secular state concept, because such an idea directly threatened the Arab regimes, whose political authority did not rest on the consent of the governed. Moreover, the "lesson" of the Jordanian repression against the Palestinians in September 1970, implemented by King Husayn but sanctioned by Nasir and the entire Arab state order, was that the Arab regimes were prepared to annihilate the Palestinian resistance if it transgressed the parameters set by the Arab states.

It is also true that the PLO's success in establishing institutional legitimacy derived from the October 1974 Arab Summit decision at Rabat that granted the PLO the status of "sole legitimate representative" of Palestinians. At the same time, the Arab regimes advocated recognition for the PLO at the United Nations, which resulted in Arafat being invited to address the General Assembly in November 1974. But the willingness of the Arab states to confer the Rabat mantle and to lobby the General Assembly came only after the twelfth PNC in June 1974, when the PLO altered its objectives and brought them into line with what was acceptable to the Arab regimes—a Palestinian state *alongside* Israel and the declared willingness to engage in diplomacy.

Equally significant is that the transformation in PLO objectives and the organization's accommodation to the policies prescribed by the Arab regimes were facilitated through Fatah's leadership. The party had a solid alliance with Syrian-sponsored Sa'iqa and the Marxist DFLP (which owed its

existence to Fatah's support for its split from the PFLP). Fatah's control of the PLO's political apparatus—the Executive Committee, the Central Council, and the PNC—facilitated its shaping of PLO policies that accorded with Fatah's objectives. In the final analysis, the wealthy, conservative Arab states "rewarded" Fatah leaders for their promotion of "acceptable" policies—accepting a two-state solution, abandoning armed struggle—by making large financial contributions to the PLO through Fatah. This allowed Fatah to increase its control over the mass organizations, recruit more supporters, and develop the civilian institutions in Lebanon, which Fatah dominated and which, in turn, contributed to Fatah's organizational power.

Israel's Unique Challenges to the PLO

As important as the Arab states' pressure in altering and determining fundamental PLO objectives were factors uniquely related to Israel. These included the ideology Israel espoused as a "national liberation movement," the successful linking of political ZIONISM with the legacy of the HOLOCAUST and historic ANTI-SEMITISM, and the linkage of biblical images and symbols with concepts of "restoration" and "return." Indeed, the PLO was not struggling against an ordinary colonial-settler, imperialist regime. Moreover, Israel has been clear and consistent on its policy toward the Palestinians, which can be categorized as absolute rejectionism, expressed in three "no's": no recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination, no Palestinian state, and no negotiations with the PLO (though under the Oslo Accords, Israel agreed to negotiate, that is, to engage in *process*, without altering its substantive opposition to a Palestinian state).

In 1969, Israeli LABOR prime minister GOLDA MEIR denied the existence of the Palestinian people, stating: "It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist." In 1975 Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN explained why Israel would never negotiate "with any Palestinian element . . . [stating that to do so would provide] the basis for the possibility of creating a third state between Israel and Jordan," which Israel would never accept. In 1982 Rabin spoke in support of MENAHEM BEGIN's LIKUD government, again declaring that the PLO could never be a partner to any negotiations, "because the willingness to speak with the PLO is the willingness to speak about the establishment of a Palestinian state, which must be opposed."

Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PLO must be viewed in light of the Jewish state's desire to expand into all the territory it considers Eretz Yisrael, the biblical land of Israel. This plan includes Israel's retention of East Jerusalem, the West Bank since 1967, and Gaza (until 2006); the ever-expanding construction of SETTLEMENTS, INFRASTRUCTURE, and military bases therein (including the enormous financial investment involved); and its dependence on Palestinian WATER resources. Additionally, Zionist intellectuals and Israeli leaders have been clear and unequivocal about this objective. For example, Israel's first prime minister, DAVID BEN-GURION, said he "regarded the creation of a Jewish state in part of Palestine as a stage in the longer process toward a Jewish state in all of Palestine."

In addition, the Zionist movement/Israel was able to forge alliances with Western powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-1967 period, Israel enjoyed the full moral, diplomatic, social, economic, cultural, and military support of the United States, the most powerful state in the international system. Israel became so intertwined with US foreign policy and political culture that Washington buttressed and advanced every aspect of the Jewish state's policy toward the Palestinians. As a result, Israel succeeded in transferring to the United States its hostility toward and rejection of the PLO and its claims.

The European powers, especially during the decade of the 1980s, were far more sympathetic to the PLO. Yet, regardless of their intentions and efforts to advance the Palestinian cause, European states exist, de facto, in a subordinate position to the United States—a situation that places significant limitations on their freedom to maneuver on the international scene. This is nowhere more apparent than in the Middle East, where US oil interests and the special US-Israeli relationship render the Europeans mere bystanders. Indeed, since the 1956 Sinai/Suez crisis, the United States has been the sole external power in the region—challenged only occasionally, and then tepidly, by the Soviet Union and deferred to by London, Bonn, and Paris. Moreover, the Soviet position regarding the Palestinians has been ambiguous at best. As a supposedly "revolutionary" state with a mission to support revolutionary movements elsewhere, its policy toward the PLO has seemed

enigmatic. The Soviet Union was the first state to afford de jure recognition to Israel in 1948. Thereafter, convinced that Israel was as socialist as it proclaimed, Moscow pursued it with offers of arms sales. However, Soviet policy changed after the 1956 Sinai/Suez War, when it sought allies among the Arab states; following the 1967 War, Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Israel. Nevertheless, it remained committed to Israel's continued existence as a Jewish state. Thus, when the PLO proposed "liberation" or a secular democracy, it confronted Soviet opposition. The PLO's desire to secure Soviet diplomatic support, arms, and aid was one factor that nudged the PLO toward the two-state proposal. Once it adopted that policy, Moscow rewarded it with all three.

The PLO's Precipitous Decline

While 1988 marked a high point for the PLO, 1990 was a nadir. The Intifada was losing much of its original dynamism and momentum. Israeli repression left West Bank and Gazan Palestinians debilitated, economically enfeebled, and without any political gains to show for their years of struggle. Additionally, Israel initiated a new, more intense settlement drive in the Occupied Territories, while inside the Green Line it expanded its population with several million immigrant SOVIET JEWS. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War left the PLO without the diplomatic support of a great power. In the Arab world, the PLO was totally isolated from Syria, owing to a longstanding feud between Syrian president Hafez al-Assad and Arafat; its relations with Jordan and Egypt were cool; and its Saudi and Gulf state friends were diminishing their economic aid. Only Iraq appeared to be an ally, but Baghdad's support proved to be the PLO's undoing.

Iraq's 2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait shifted world attention from the Israeli-Palestinian front to the oil-rich Persian Gulf, leaving the Palestinians even more isolated and vulnerable. When the West, led by the United States, began to prepare for an attack—claiming that the international community could not tolerate an invasion and illegal occupation of one country by another—the Palestinian masses throughout the Diaspora reacted with scorn and outrage at what they saw as US hypocrisy. As the war drew closer, that sentiment was transformed into overt Palestinian support for Iraq, although the initial outpouring of Palestinian sentiment became far more nuanced, complex, and diverse. Arafat, responding to his mass constituency and to the fact that Iraq was the only Arab state providing the PLO with significant financial assistance and strong public support, initially backed Baghdad. The damage to the PLO's image in regional and world public opinion was almost irreversible. Arafat could have ameliorated the harm created in the public perception, but he made the situation worse with vague, ambiguous, and contradictory pronouncements about Iraq. He avoided a public and forthright condemnation of Iraq's actions and refrained from a public call for Iraq to unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait. As a result, the PLO's already shaky fortunes plummeted, and it was politically discredited. European support substantially diminished, and the organization was completely isolated in the Arab world, which was more united behind the United States than it ever had been. Thereafter no Arab state was willing to challenge the United States on issues relating to the Palestinians—even had one been inclined to do so. Moreover, the US-Israeli alliance was firmer than ever. The PLO also experienced financial disaster as its traditional Arab donors cut off aid while remittances from Palestinian workers in the Gulf ceased, because the workers were expelled.

During the spring and summer of 1991, the United States, sensing the need to polish its image among the Arab people (and in turn shore up the pro-US Arab regimes), undertook an intensive venture to catalyze an Arab-Palestinian-Israeli peace process. In mid-July, the United States presented the terms of reference for the MADRID CONFERENCE. In effect, the conference would (1) be chaired by the United States, along with a weak Soviet Union, and not by the United Nations, which would act as an observer, along with the EUROPEAN UNION; (2) be largely symbolic, without any binding power and with indeterminate follow-up meetings; (3) use the relevant UN resolutions—mainly 242 and 338—as a "basis for talks" rather than being binding—that is, "land for peace" was no longer the basis for agreements; and (4) set the stage for separate bilateral talks between Israel and individual Arab states.

In addition, the PLO was prohibited from participating. Israel insisted that the only Palestinian participation could be as a junior member of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian team; Palestinian participants could come from the West Bank and Gaza but not from East Jerusalem and not from the Diaspora; they could have no obvious affiliation with the PLO; and Israel demanded an ultimate veto

over each individual who would take part. Additionally, the Palestinians were required to negotiate in two separate stages—the first to reach an interim self-government arrangement in the Occupied Territories and the second to reach a final settlement that would begin only in the third year of the interim period. There were no references to Palestinian self-determination or statehood.

These were highly unfavorable terms for the PLO; indeed, they were, in every respect, at odds with fundamental PLO policies. Yet, in its diminished condition, there was little the PLO could do to influence or alter the US proposal. The issue for the PLO basically boiled down to one of two choices: permit Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to participate, accept the terms as stipulated, and hope that the conference would constitute a first step to more favorable conditions or boycott the conference entirely. The gut feeling of most PLO officials was to boycott, yet the precariousness of the organization's situation made that a risky choice. It could have meant that the Palestinians might be out of the "game" ever after. At the twentieth PNC, convened in Algiers in September 1991, under Arafat's intense pressure a majority was persuaded that it was in the best long-term interests of the Palestinian people to participate in the conference. At Algiers, Arafat negated the principles of unity and consensus on which the PLO had successfully functioned since 1969.

On 30 October 1991, President GEORGE H. W. BUSH opened the first session of the Madrid Conference. Subsequently, there were ten rounds of talks through July 1993, plus innumerable multilateral and bilateral talks on specialized issues such as water and refugees. Yet, despite nearly two years of dialogue, the Palestinians made no progress on any of their objectives. Despair at this lack of headway became disbelieving shock when, in late August, Israel and the PLO announced that they had reached agreement on a "set of principles" to resolve the 100-year conflict between the two peoples. On 13 September 1993, Chairman Arafat and Prime Minister Rabin formally signed the document entitled the "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" (also known as the Oslo Accords) in Washington, D.C. The DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES was secretly negotiated in Oslo with Arafat's approval, not participation, and it took place during the last four months of the Madrid talks. The initiative originated with a quasi-governmental organization based in Norway, which persuaded SHIMON PERES and Arafat to send advisors to Oslo to try to craft some agreement.

To many, it was the weakness of the PLO that led Arafat to participate in the OSLO PROCESS. He had nothing left to lose; thus the symbols of power that Oslo conferred—Israel's recognition of the PLO and of Arafat, and his return to Palestine, talks with the Israelis, and mantle of peacemaker, for example—were apparently seductive to the aging leader. Conversely, by practically trading the PLO for the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), he may have hoped that he could extract concessions from Israel that would realize Palestinian rights, including statehood. Moreover, after 1994, when Arafat and the PNA were seated in Gaza, the PNA de facto superseded the PLO. The PLO continues to exist somewhere among a potentiality, a theoretical referent, and a symbol of Palestinian nationalist aspirations. In the post–AL-AQSA INTIFADA era there are individuals from inside the Occupied Territories (the so-called YOUNG GUARD) and individuals in the Diaspora who are attempting to resurrect the PLO, but a democratized, transparent, noncorrupt PLO.

See also CHINA; EUROPEAN UNION; FRANCE; GERMANY; MOSCOW; WAR, 1967; individual Palestinian factions

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—Khalil Barhoum

Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee

The Executive Committee (EC) of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) is, in practice, the "government in exile" of the yet-to-be state of Palestine. It typically has seventeen to nineteen members who are elected by the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC). Although the PNC is officially the legislative body of the PLO, most actual political power and policy decisions are exercised by the Executive Committee. The EC has full operational authority over all PLO organizations and budgets and directs the activities of the PLO in accordance with the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER and the BASIC LAW. Its members have ministerial positions in the various PLO departments, including foreign affairs, higher EDUCATION, the military, the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, national relations (with Arab states), popular organizations, information and culture, administration, social affairs, economics, planning, health, and finance.

The signing of the OSLO ACCORDS led to a political crisis within the PLO, precipitating the resignation of several members of the EC and marginalizing the committee, as power shifted to those inside the Occupied Territories and away from PLO leadership groups in JORDAN, LEBANON, and TUNISIA. Nevertheless, in juridical terms, the EC is still the de facto sole organ of governance for the Palestinian people, which is why several officials (YASIR ARAFAT, ABU MAZEN, YASIR 'ABD RABBU, etc.) held double responsibilities—to the EC and to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY.

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Palestine Liberation Organization Information Office (US)

The PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) first opened a registered (with the Department of Justice) information office in Washington, D.C., in 1978. Under pressure from the Israeli lobby, in 1987 Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act, which mandated the downgrading of the PLO office. The law also required that the US president sign a waiver every six months to allow the office to remain open. In 1989 the US government closed the Palestine Information Office as a result of additional pro-Israel lobbying; however, it reopened in 1990 as the Palestine Affairs Center. In 1994 it became the PLO Mission to the United States, although its status continued to require presidential renewal on a semiannual basis. GEORGE W. BUSH temporarily downgraded, and then reinstated, the mission. In what appeared to be a final decision, in a July 2006 memorandum prepared for US secretary of state CONDOLEEZZA RICE,

President Bush declared that he was imposing a "downgrade in status of the PLO Office in the United States [for] non-compliance by the PLO and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY with certain commitments." The first PLO representative in Washington was Dr. Hatem I. Husayni, who later became the first president of al-Quds University in JERUSALEM. He was followed by Hasan Abdul Rahman, and, in 2005, the highly respected diplomat AFIF SAFIYYA was appointed to head the mission. Safiah resigned in 2008 and was replaced by Dr. Nabil Abuznaid.

In 1997 the PLO Mission faced an unsuccessful challenge from Representative John Saxton, who attempted to pass legislation suspending all US contacts with the PLO for three months, including closing the Washington office. In 1999 Senator Jesse Helms attempted to have the PLO Mission closed, but he too failed. After the victory of HAMAS in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, the United States froze all the US-based PNA assets, substantially limiting the mission's activities, especially in lobbying and advocacy. Moreover, after the departure in January 2007 of Edward Abington, former lobbyist for PNA president MAHMUD ABBAS, the PLO Mission in Washington, D.C., is considered more of a symbolic presence than a full diplomatic mission. However, the mission remains open and functions at many levels. The PLO has diplomatic missions in almost all other countries. They function as embassies and consulates, and in no other country have they been treated as in the United States.

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Palestine Liberation Organization National Council

The PLO National Council (PNC) is the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) legislative body and the parliament-in-exile of the Palestinian people. As the most representative body in the PLO, the PNC, at least theoretically, is the preeminent decisionmaking institution. The PNC elects the PALESTINE CENTRAL COUNCIL, which assumes leadership of the PLO between PNC biennial sessions. The PNC also elects a presidential office composed of the chairman, two vice-chairmen, and a secretary. The PNC formulates policies, issues guidelines to the Executive Committee, nominates its members, and passes resolutions by a simple majority with a two-thirds quorum. It represents all sectors of the Palestinian community: political factions/resistance groups, trade unions, professional organizations, and independents have seats in the PNC according to the relative strength (number) of each. Membership varies from session to session due to a variety of factors, especially local conditions, such as travel restriction, prevailing in the countries where Palestinians live. Eighty-four seats are always set aside for representatives from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, but as of this writing, Israel has never permitted any Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to travel to attend PNC sessions (except for the 1996 and 1998 meetings in Gaza).

The first PNC, composed of 422 representatives, met in JERUSALEM in May 1964 and adopted the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER, established the PLO as the political expression of the Palestinian people, and elected AHMAD SHUQAYRI as the first chairman of the PLO Executive Committee. At the conference were representatives from Palestinian communities in JORDAN, the WEST BANK, the GAZA STRIP, SYRIA, LEBANON, KUWAIT, IRAQ, EGYPT, Qatar, Libya, and Algeria. Subsequent sessions were held in Cairo, Egypt; Gaza; Damascus, Syria; Algiers; and Amman, Jordan. At the February 1969 meeting in Cairo, YASIR ARAFAT was appointed chairman of the Executive Committee, hence leader of the PLO.

In the November 1988 meeting in Algiers, the PNC unilaterally declared the independence of the Arab state of Palestine as a state beside Israel (i.e., the TWO-STATE SOLUTION). After the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS, the PNC met in Gaza in April 1996 and voted 504–54 to void parts of the charter that denied Israel's right to exist. In December 1998, the PNC met in Gaza at the insistence of Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, who called it a condition of the continuation of the peace process. In the presence of US president BILL CLINTON, the PNC reaffirmed the annulment of the parts of the charter that denied Israel's right to exist.

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Palestine Monitor

The *Palestine Monitor* is an information clearinghouse that was created in September 2000 at the outbreak of the Second INTIFADA by the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO) to provide a Palestinian perspective to the media—especially the foreign media covering the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. Individuals involved with the PNGO sought to rectify what they considered an absence of the Palestinian narrative in television and print reporting. The *Palestine Monitor* was the PNGO's answer to this problem, with an emphasis on quality of information and analysis in an accessible and user-friendly presentation, especially for foreign audiences. Based in Ramallah, it is available on the Internet, where information and analyses are continually updated about the latest developments in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. In addition, it has several publications, including *In Focus*, *Reports*, *Newsletter*, and *Daily Press Briefing*. (www.palestinemonitor.org).

See also MEDIA, ISRAELI; MEDIA, PALESTINIAN; AND MEDIA, US

Palestine National Charter

The Palestine National Charter (al-Mithaq al-Qawmi al-Filastini, or the Palestine Covenant) was adopted on 28 May 1964 when the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) was first established in JERUSALEM. It was promulgated along with another document, variously known as the Basic Constitution, Basic Law, or Fundamental Law of the PLO. While the charter addresses the aims of the PLO, the Fundamental Law is concerned with the structure and procedures of the organization.

Although unacceptable to Israel and the UNITED STATES because of its call for the destruction of Israel, the Palestine National Charter served as the foundation of the Palestinian struggle for an independent Palestinian state for thirty-some years. It reflected the hopes and aspirations of a people who had been dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and found themselves, sixteen years later, no better off and with no prospects. The initial charter was an uncompromising document that sought to restore Palestine to Arab rule and refused to accept Israel's "right to exist." It emphasized several points: the total liberation of Palestine, the principle of self-determination, and a definition of "who" was a Palestinian. The means of liberating Palestine were not explicit, although the charter implied that "Arab unity" would accomplish the goal.

Four years later, in 1968, the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC, the PLO parliament) amended the charter to reflect the dominant view of the guerrilla groups in the PLO and placed emphasis on popularly based ARMED STRUGGLE. The amended charter rejected ZIONISM and the partition of Palestine, termed Judaism "a religion . . . not an independent nationality" (Article 20), and called for "the total liberation of Palestine" (Article 21). The charter upheld Arab unity but emphasized that, just as the PLO would "not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state" (Article 27), it would also "reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship and subordination by Arab governments" (Article 28). The PNC further determined that the charter could only be amended by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of the PNC at a special session.

Israel's objections to the charter included the description of the establishment of the state of Israel as "entirely illegal" (Article 19), the definition of Palestine "with its original [BRITISH MANDATE] BORDERS as the indivisible homeland of the Arab Palestinian people" (Articles 1 and 2), the call to eliminate Zionism in Palestine and the world (Article 15), and the demands throughout to "liberate" Palestine.

Beginning in 1974, the PLO moved toward the acceptance of a TWO-STATE SOLUTION and during the 1980s escalated its diplomacy and advocacy through numerous means to attempt to convince Israel of its desire for peace in an independent state alongside Israel on the 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine that remained. Nevertheless, no matter

what concessions the PLO made or how far it went in extending its hand in peace, Israel always pointed to the charter, accused the Palestinians of hypocrisy, and demanded that it be amended extensively or negated entirely. In August 1993, Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN insisted on changes to the charter as part of the OSLO ACCORDS. Complying, PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT, in a 9 September 1993 letter of mutual recognition, committed in writing to "submit to the Palestine National Council for formal approval" the changes to the charter; in particular, the letter stated that "those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist and the provisions of the Covenant that are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid." On 24 April 1996, the PNC met in Gaza and adopted the changes proposed by Arafat by a vote of 504–54.

In May 1996 the LABOR government under SHIMON PERES accepted these changes as fulfilling the Palestinian commitments, but Peres's successor, BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the charter amendments and demanded greater clarity and precision. Arafat again complied, this time in the context of the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM. In January 1998, Arafat wrote letters to President BILL CLINTON and British prime minister Tony Blair explicitly listing the articles of the charter nullified by the PNC's 1996 vote: the call for Palestinian unity in armed struggle; denial of the legitimacy of the establishment of Israel; denial of the existence of a Jewish people with a historical or religious connection to Palestine; and anti-Israel labels, including Zionism as "racist," "imperialist," "fanatic," "fascist," and "aggressive."

Although this was seen as progress in some quarters, most Israeli officials remained unconvinced that the charter had been amended, while Palestinians began to feel that they were being humiliated and opposed further concessions. In an attempt to allay Israeli concerns, Clinton suggested adding a special provision to the Wye River Memorandum containing clarifications and elaborations. Again complying, Arafat drafted a new version of the amendments in a letter on 22 January 1998 to Clinton, who pronounced the letter "acceptable" and publicly thanked Arafat. Following President Clinton, Netanyahu, most LIKUD PARTY officials, and several ministers made positive, public, official statements formally declaring that they agreed that the objectionable clauses of the charter had been abrogated. Unofficially, however, these same officials continued to reject the PLO's changes to the charter as "meaningless."

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Palestine National Council

See PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION NATIONAL COUNCIL

Palestine National Front

The Palestine National Front (PNF) was a WEST BANK coalition of Palestinian leftist-nationalists and Communists, including the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), which was active from 1973 to 1976. While decisions made by the tenth (1972) and eleventh (1973) PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCILS placed a new emphasis on political organization within the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, there can be little doubt that the decision to form the PNF came from within the territories.

Early in 1972, representatives from the JCP, Palestinian Communists, and Palestinian nationalists from GAZA and the West Bank met in East JERUSALEM and agreed on the need to establish the PNF to oppose OCCUPATION. The JCP members drafted a platform and distributed copies to progressive activists, and in the summer PNF representatives traveled to Amman, JORDAN; Damascus, SYRIA; and Beirut, LEBANON, for consultations with various Palestinian organizations in search of support and acknowledgment. On 15 August 1973, the PNF published its program throughout the territories, and in November the PNF's Central Committee met for the first time.

Throughout the early 1970s, Israel had tolerated the Communists' existence in the Occupied Territories and had allowed them some level of political activity, perhaps because the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) refused to admit the Palestine Communist Party because it rejected ARMED STRUGGLE and recognized Israel's right to exist. Also, since the Communists recognized Israel's right to exist (they had supported UN RESOLUTION 181) and favored political rather than military struggle, they were initially considered less of a threat in Israel's eyes. Additionally, RAKAH, the Israeli Communist Party, had a large Arab contingency, which Israel may not have wanted to alienate. The tolerance was short-lived, however, and in the late fall of 1973, Israel deported eight members of the PNF for their activism in the nationalist struggle.

The PNF was instrumental in nationalist politics and institution building in the Occupied Territories, which made the territories independent of services provided by Israel or Jordan and was an attempt to build independent representative institutions for the conduct of day-to-day political and administrative life. Municipal administration, labor, and EDUCATION were national as well as local issues, and it was in these areas that the PNF was most effective. In late 1974 the PNF resumed its activities, now in coordination with the PLO leadership in Beirut, mobilizing people through 1976 on a mass scale, largely because of the organizational framework established by the JCP and the rising prestige of the PLO. Like its predecessor organization, the NATIONAL LIBERATION LEAGUE, the JCP reached its supporters principally through high school and college student associations.

The PNF made a significant contribution to the PLO's acceptance of diplomacy and the TWO-STATE SOLUTION. The PNF was strongly anti-Jordanian and opposed all PLO-Jordan agreements and alignments, but it supported the GENEVA CONFERENCE and advocated for PLO admission. It supported UN RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in exchange for peace, and an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. In 1974 and 1975, under the direction of the PNF, there was a sharp increase in acts of civil disobedience as well as a few violent incidents in the West Bank. In response, Israel launched a campaign to eliminate the PNF, with DEPORTATION of two prominent leaders, after which the tendency for militant activity was sharply diminished, while the majority within the PNF that favored institution-building activities was strengthened.

It can be argued that the crowning achievement of the PNF was the victory of nationalist candidates in the 1976 ELECTIONS for West Bank municipal councils in a contest between the PLO and Communists on one side and pro-Jordanian politicians on the other. Israel had worked hard to ensure that pro-Jordanian candidates were elected, and its reversal of fortune was a stunning defeat. By one estimate, about 40 percent of the newly elected councilors and about 33 percent of the new mayors were politically nationalistic and/or leftist radical. In particular, the larger West Bank cities, comprising NABLUS, HEBRON, Ramallah, and Tulkarm, reflected Communist and nationalist successes. In BETHLEHEM, the pro-Jordanian mayor ELIAS FREIJ was reelected, but the second-highest number of votes went to Communist George Hazbun. During the following year, several of the mayors mutually cooperated in leadership that openly supported the PLO, including BASSAM SHAKA'A from Nablus, Fahd Qawasmah from Hebron, Karim Khalaf of Ramallah, Hilmi Hanun of Tulkarm, and Ibrahim al-Tawil of Al-Birah.

To punish the nationalists, Israel decreased its contribution to West Bank annual municipal budgets from 30 percent in 1973–1974, to 18.5 percent in 1975–1976, to 17 percent in 1977–1987, and to about 7 percent in 1979–1980. In response, in the spring of 1977, West Bank mayors began traveling to the Gulf States to solicit donations, grants, and loans for their cities. In March, the money began to arrive from Palestinians living in SAUDI ARABIA, who financed the purchase of electrical generators for the city of Nablus. Thereafter, funds and products flowed to all the municipalities. Again, in punishment for their nationalism, Israel forbade the mayors from taking any additional fund-raising trips. Within a short time, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT and political

activities were severely curtailed, the independence of the West Bank nationalist leadership began to erode, and the strength of the leftist-nationalist coalition was greatly diminished.

Despite the fact that, by 1976, the dissolution of the PNF was well under way, the period of 1974 to 1976 could be regarded within the Palestinian national movement as a high point of resistance in the territories and of the role of the PNF as central. By the following year, the organization had disappeared entirely. In 1979, activists unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate it, but by then both the harshly repressive policies of the LIKUD government and the ascendancy of the right in Palestinian politics contributed to the failure. Still, as the PNF disintegrated, a new nationalist group emerged in the West Bank—the NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE, which was formed to coordinate opposition to the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS—and less than a decade later the First INTIFADA erupted.

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Palestine National Fund

The Palestine National Fund (PNF) was set up in 1964 at the first meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, the legislative body of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), with the purpose of raising money to finance the PLO, in particular the operations of its PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. In time, the PNF funded, as well, the PLO's social institutions (the Red Crescent, the Research Center, SAMED, and others). Officially, it was named the National Palestinian Fund and was to have a board of directors whose members were to be elected by the Palestine National Council.

According to the Basic Law (constitution) of the PLO, the PNF's sources of funding were to be fixed taxes levied on the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA and collected in accordance with special laws; financial assistance offered by the Arab governments and people; a "liberation stamp" to be issued by the Arab states and used in postal and other transactions; donations on national occasions; loans and assistance given by Arab or other friendly nations; and "Support Palestine Committees," which were to be established in Arab and other friendly countries to collect donations and to support the PLO. In reality, the most important sources of funding for the PNF have been contributions from wealthy Arab states, donations from wealthy Palestinians, a "liberation tax" levied on Palestinians working in other Arab countries, and profits from PNF investments.

The PNF was first headed by Palestinian banker 'Abd al-Majid Shoman. Subsequently it was headed by Hanna Nasir, the deported president of BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY, and later by Jawad Ghusayn.

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Palestine National Liberation Movement

See FATAH

Palestine National Salvation Front

The Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF) emerged on 25 March 1985 as an umbrella organization for factions within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) that opposed YASIR ARAFAT's policies in the post–LEBANON WAR (June 1982) period, especially the alliance with JORDAN and his visit to EGYPT. The post-1982 crisis in the Palestinian political order vented itself in a series of divisions, including the FATAH UPRISING, the NATIONAL

ALLIANCE, the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, and finally the PNSF. The POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) joined the PNSF, which led to the breakup of the Democratic Alliance that had included the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP) and the PFLP. Based in Damascus, SYRIA, the PNSF was supported by Damascus and headed by Khalid al-Fahum, the pro-Syrian speaker of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), the PLO's legislative body.

The PNSF rejected the 1985 HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT, which gave up Palestinian independence for a union with Jordan, and the holding of the seventeenth PNC meeting in the Jordanian capital. In its founding statement, the PNSF condemned the accord and called for "action to topple the trend of deviation and relinquishment" within the PLO. In spite of these events, however, the major PLO factions, including the PFLP, continued to recognize the legitimacy of the PNC and the general framework of Palestinian political organization, even while boycotting the PLO. This situation persisted for two years until the PNC's reunification convention in April 1987, when all the dissenting factions returned to the framework of the PNC and PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, which foreshadowed the outbreak of the First INTIFADA in December 1987.

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Palestine Popular Struggle Front

The Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF, Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi, sometimes Popular Struggle Front) is a small faction that was founded in 1968 by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya and Fayiz Hamdan. The PPSF's most prominent attack, possibly the only one of significance, was the 1970 hijacking of an Olympic Airways jet to Cairo. With the Red Cross mediating, the group successfully negotiated the release of a number of imprisoned Palestinian militants, including PPSF member Mildos Dergarabedian and Mansour Marad, who later became a member of the Jordanian parliament.

Until the events of September 1970 (BLACK SEPTEMBER), the PPSF was based in JORDAN and then in LEBANON until the Israeli invasion of 1982, after which the group relocated to Damascus, SYRIA. Today its members, which number fewer than 300, are based mostly in Syria and Lebanon, and the PPSF has almost zero presence in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. In Palestinian politics, the PPSF has generally followed the FATAH/PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION position and supported the OSLO ACCORDS.

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Palestine Rejection Front

The Palestine Rejection Front (Front of the Palestinian Forces Rejecting Solutions of Surrender) was a minority current, but nonetheless significant, in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Established in 1974 in Baghdad and active until 1977, the front was supported by IRAQ and initially included four Palestinian groups: the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), the ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF), the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP–GC), and the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT (PPSF). Later the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF) joined the Rejection Front.

The emergence of the front grew out of the PLO's adoption at the twelfth PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) in 1974 of the "Ten Point Program," which authorized the PLO to establish an independent national authority for the Palestinian people on any part of Palestinian territory that could be liberated. This was the genesis of the TWO-STATE SOLUTION. Groups who joined the front adamantly rejected PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT's and FATAH's efforts to alter the PLO's objectives from the liberation of all of Palestine to the acceptance of a two-state solution and to transform its tactics from ARMED STRUGGLE to diplomacy—both of which it considered a betrayal of the national cause. The PFLP and other rejectionist groups froze their mem-

bership in the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE and announced they would never accept the "surrenderist solutions" adopted by Arafat.

Israel's defeat of SYRIA and EGYPT in the 1973 October War had made a strong impact on the mainstream PLO leadership, which came to believe that Palestinian objectives could only be realized through diplomacy. Therefore, Fatah began to develop a strategy aimed at obtaining recognition of the PLO by the Arab states and the international community as a preliminary stage to the PLO's participation in international negotiations. The decisions of Arafat and Fatah brought a number of successes to the PLO, and the PLO's new program was accepted by virtually the entire international community, with the exception of the United States and Israel.

Meanwhile, Rejection Front organizations used cross-border attacks (from LEBANON into Israel) to demonstrate their militancy and to derail the PLO's diplomatic moves. Fatah and the DFLP were pressured to use similar attacks to advertise their continued commitment to armed struggle. In 1977, however, the Palestine Rejection Front began to rethink its positions, and in 1978, member groups rejoined the PLO. By 1980, the front ceased to exist as an independent organization.

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Palestine Research Center

The Palestine Research Center, established in Beirut in 1965 and one of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) most important social institutions, serves as a repository of Palestine's historical, political, social, and cultural heritage. During the 1982 LEBANON WAR, Israel confiscated the entire archive, and, after the war, only a single office associated with the center (headed by longtime PLO representative to Lebanon SHAFIQ AL-HUT) remained in Beirut. On 3 February 1993, the facility that had housed the archive was devastated by a car bomb, and thereafter it was closed by the Lebanese army. In December 1983, Israel returned the major collection to the Palestinians, and it was subsequently reconstituted in Cyprus. When the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) was established in GAZA pursuant to the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, one of PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT's first priorities was moving the entire collection from Cyprus to Gaza, which he was successful in achieving.

The Research Center comprises some 25,000 volumes in Arabic, Hebrew, English, and French, in addition to microfilms, manuscripts, and documents. The collection is divided into three general areas: documentation, research, and information. The center has its own printing press and publishes books, pamphlets, and a scholarly journal—*Shu'un Filastiniyya* (Palestinian Affairs). Since its inception, the center has published some 400 books and pamphlets and translates many of its publications into foreign languages, including English, French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, and Japanese.

Palestine Right to Return Coalition

See AL-AWDA

Palestine Royal Commission

See PEEL COMMISSION

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs

The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) is an educational organization that was founded in JERUSALEM (with a second institution in Ramallah, WEST BANK) in March 1987 by Dr. Mahdi Abd al-Hadi and several other Palestinian academics and intellectuals. A financially independent nonprofit institution, PASSIA seeks to present the Palestinian question in its national, Arab, and international contexts through academic research, dialogue, and publications. Through its international and intra-Palestinian symposia and workshops, PASSIA provides a forum for free expression and analysis of a plurality of Palestinian perspectives and methodology and strives to develop and clarify its own and others' understanding of international relations as they affect the Palestinian struggle for justice and peace. (www.passia.org).

Palestinian Armed Struggle

See ARMED STRUGGLE, PALESTINIAN

Palestinian Center for Human Rights

The Palestinian Center for Human Rights is an independent legal body based in Gaza City that is dedicated to protecting human rights, promoting the rule of law, and upholding democratic principles in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Established in 1995 by a group of Palestinian lawyers and human rights activists, under the directorship of Raji Sourani, the center documents and investigates human rights violations, provides legal aid and counseling to both individuals and groups, and prepares research articles relevant to issues such as the human rights situation and the rule of law in the Occupied Territories. The group holds special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UNITED NATIONS and is an affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva), the Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme (Paris), the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (Copenhagen), and the International Legal Assistance Consortium (Stockholm). In 1996 it was a recipient of the French Republic Award for Human Rights. (www.pchrgaza.org).

Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-Violence

The Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-Violence was founded by Dr. Mubarak Awad to promote nonviolent action as an effective means for citizen diplomacy and the resolution of conflict as well as to offer an alternative to violence. In 1988 Awad was deported by Israel, who considered his nonviolence a threat to its security, and the center was closed. In the context of the OSLO PROCESS of the early 1990s, Israel allowed the center to reopen. It remains grounded in Awad's Gandhian philosophy and practice. Based in East JERUSALEM, it is an affiliate of Nonviolence International. One of its projects, "Islam and Peace," or "Non-Violence in Islam," aims to critically examine the intellectual, cultural, and spiritual resources for peace and nonviolent change that would lead to democratization in Palestine and other Islamic societies.

See also NONVIOLENCE IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE

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Palestinian Cinema

See CINEMA, PALESTINIAN

Palestinian Citizens of Israel

The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel are those individuals and their descendants who remained on the land of Palestine that became Israel in 1948; this excludes those Palestinians living in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. At once Israeli citizens and Palestinian, they constitute one dimension in the

complex Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Israel they are a distinct and unequal minority, essentially excluded from national decisionmaking and unable to materially alter their situation. Their situation derives from the fact that Israel is constructed as a Jewish state—for Jews and by Jews—and non-Jews do not share equally in the resources (power, privilege, economic, social, or cultural) of the state. Israeli Arabs, as they are referred to by Israel, make up 17 to 20 percent of the country's total population, depending on the balance of Jewish in- and out-migration. They also constitute approximately 11 percent of the total, global Palestinian population but have tended to be overlooked by the dominant trends in the Palestinian national movement, including that of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). At the same time, Israel's Palestinian citizens have overwhelmingly poured their political energy into struggles for equality within Israel rather than into Palestinian nationalist struggles. Almost universally, these Palestinians believe there should be a Palestinian state in the WEST BANK, GAZA, and East JERUSALEM, but most also say that given the proposal of two states (Israeli and Palestinian) living side by side in peace, they would prefer to live in Israel and continue to struggle for their full rights there.

In 2009, Israel's total population, according to figures released by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), stood at 7,411,000. Some 5,593,000 of the population (75.5 percent) are Jewish Israelis; 1,498,000 (20.2 percent) are Israeli Arabs; and the remaining 320,000 (4.3 percent) are immigrants and their offspring who are not registered as Jews by the Interior Ministry, including some 200,000 foreign workers. This demographic distribution has profound implications for Israeli policymakers; a fundamental government objective is preventing an Arab majority in any given area because Israel deems such a DEMOGRAPHY a "security" threat to the Jewish state. Approximately 92 percent of the Palestinian population live in urban or village communities, and 8 percent live in the UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES.

Palestinian annual population growth averages 3 percent but with slight regional differences. The Palestinian gender distribution is 51 percent male and 49 percent female. The Palestinian community is young: those 25 and younger constitute 59.1 percent of the overall population, and the average age is 19.7 years.

The Palestinian community is also poor. In 2006, 56 percent of Israeli Arabs lived below the poverty line, compared to 16 percent of Israeli Jews. Also, the average level of poverty among Palestinian children is twice that of their poor Jewish counterparts, and poverty among Israeli Palestinians has increased by 50 percent since the early 1990s. In 2003, the average annual income for Israeli Arab families was NIS 99,000 ($22,200), while the average annual income for Israeli Jewish families was NIS 138,000 ($30,900), and the average annual income for non-Orthodox Jewish families was NIS 145,000 ($32,500). In 2009 life expectancy for Israeli Jews significantly exceeded that of Israeli Arabs. Jewish women live an average of 82.5 years and Jewish men live 78.8 years. For Israeli Arabs that number falls by 4.0 years for men and 3.8 years for women.

Israel as an Ethnocracy

Democracies typically have laws and norms that ensure freedom and equality under the law for all citizens as well as institutional arrangements designed to ensure that minorities' rights are protected. Rather than being a democracy, by this definition, Israel is instead an "ethnocracy." The concepts guiding ethnocratic regimes are control of active minority ethnic or racial groups by the state apparatuses, allocation of resources and power on the bases of ethnicity (and religion) instead of citizenship, and gradual ethnicization of the politics that emerge according to ethnic strata. For example, Israel's IMMIGRATION policy, which was legalized in the LAW OF RETURN, is only for Jews, while Palestinians are excluded from this right. Its policies concerning LAND distribution, namely Israel's confiscation of Palestinian land, are also enshrined in law. And there is an enormous discrepancy between Israel's allocation of resources for the development of Jewish cities and villages and the small sums provided to non-Jewish municipalities. In all areas—the Knesset, courts, media, and others—the Hebrew/Jewish culture holds central status.

Israel allows its Palestinian citizens to practice basic rights such as voting and standing for election and, since 1966, has allowed them to freely express their views as well as practice freedom of movement and assembly. On the other hand, the state ensures the supremacy of Jews in all areas, including national legislation and decisionmaking. Israel is a state that identifies with a

singular nationalist/ethnic/religious group—Jews. The state's resources—land, symbols, or finances—are distributed on an ethnic basis and are overwhelmingly allocated for the benefit of Jews.

The political activity undertaken by Palestinians in Israel to express their needs and demands is diverse but limited in its capacity to bring about meaningful change in their living conditions, status, and situation. As a Jewish state, Israel's fundamental obligation is to advance the interests of Jews. Thus the very character of the state is an impediment to real change in the situation of Arabs within the state. The situation of Palestinian citizens began to deteriorate in 2000, plummeting in 2008–2009. In 2008, Palestinian intellectual Ali Abunimah wrote, "Israeli society is in the grip of a wave of unchecked racism and incitement that seriously threatens Israel's Palestinian Community."

On 1 October 2000, Israeli police used live ammunition against unarmed civilians demonstrating their solidarity with Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Thirteen Palestinians, of whom twelve were Israeli citizens, were shot dead. More than one thousand Arab Israelis were arrested in the first few months of the Intifada. Israel's Arab citizens were denounced as the "enemy within" and as a fifth column, and Arab Knesset members were portrayed as arch-traitors. Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon described Israeli Arabs as a "cancerous manifestation."

An official commission, headed by Judge Theodor Or, was appointed to look into the events that came to mark the deterioration in Arab-Jewish relations inside the country. In 2003, the Or Commission confirmed that the police used "excessive" and unjustifiable force, reported that the police viewed the country's Arab citizens as "enemies," and documented a pattern of "prejudice and neglect" toward them by Israel's establishment. While the Or Commission recommended a number of measures to redress the sharp disparities between Jews and Arabs in the country, families of the victims regarded the report as a whitewash. The commission failed to examine the forensic evidence in each of the killings, and none of the killers, or any responsible official, was ever brought to justice. By 2007, according to Elie Rekhess of the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, "There remained 'yawning' gaps between Jews and Arabs in Israel and the bottom line is that the conclusions and recommendations of the 2003 Or Commission remain conspicuously unimplemented." Since then, twenty-seven Israeli Arab citizens have been killed by the police. There has been only one conviction with a token fifteen-month sentence handed out for the shooting of Mahmoud Ghanaim in the head at point-blank range.

The October 2000 event and the lack of response to the Or Commission's findings are the backdrop to the later period of confrontation. Amid the increasingly precarious situation of Palestinian citizens of Israel, prominent and broadly representative leaders of that community published in 2007 a series of documents setting out visions for Israel as a state of all its citizens with equality for all.

It is possible to analyze the basic character of the state on three levels: ideological-declarative, structural, and policy implementation.

1. *Ideological-declarative*. Israel's goals, symbols, and policies are premised on its being a Jewish state, and Palestinian Arabs—even citizens—do not have equal status in this state. An amendment to the Basic Laws of the Knesset in 1985 prohibits election slates that do not expressly recognize the state of Israel as the state of the Jewish people. Legally and formally, this situation leaves Palestinian citizens in Israel without any formal entity defined as their state.

The Israeli national anthem, "Hatikva" (The Hope), written by a Galician Jew and set to music in Palestine in the early 1880s, is about the undying hope of the Jewish people to someday return to independence in their homeland. Israel's flag includes two blue stripes on a white background with a Shield (Star) of David in the center, inspired by the *tallit* (the prayer shawl with blue stripes worn by Jews during prayer). The Star of David is a common Jewish symbol of biblical times. The Israeli emblem consists of a menorah with an olive branch on either side, a potent symbol in Jewish history found in every synagogue. In comparison with Jews, for whom the symbols, values, and institutions of the state embody their Jewishness and reinforce their traditions and identity, Palestinian citizens are estranged and unable to identify with them because they are rooted exclusively in the religious and ethnic heritage of another group.

The symbolic or ideological sphere continues to grow more difficult for Palestinians. Writing in *Ha'aretz* in August 2009, Ron Gerlitz, executive director of Sikkuy: The Association for the

Advancement of Civic Equality in Israel, discussed some of the new difficulties: "Material discrimination against Israel's Arab citizens is pervasive and well documented. It manifests itself in almost every sphere of life: welfare and development budgets, funding for education, land allocation and more. Recently, though, we have been witness to a growing and disturbing trend: the attempt to deprive Arabs of certain intangible, or symbolic, rights.

"Take the way the state relates to Arabic, which together with Hebrew is an official language [English is not] that at a minimum means all government offices must publish all official documents in both Arabic and Hebrew. Signs on Israel's highways are trilingual—in Hebrew, Arabic and English. And yet, anyone who travels those roads will encounter an almost totally Jewish public space, even in areas with a predominantly Arab population. For example, at many major intersections, though the signs may be in three languages, they designate the routes to Jewish communities while ignoring the Arab ones. To add insult to injury, the minister of transportation now plans to replace the Arabic names of destinations, with the Arabic transliterations of their Hebrew names.

"Both of these practices seem to reflect a more general trend, whose clear message seems to be that intangible assets—such as names of cities, streets and mountains; the linguistic and cultural character of public spaces; and the historical narrative children learn at school—all belong to Jewish Israelis alone."

Gerlitz further observed that in practice Arabic is treated as inferior, and the obligations inherent upon the state from its official status are routinely neglected. The text of the website of the Interior Ministry, for example—perhaps the most critical ministry in terms of its oversight of domestic concerns, including those related to citizenship, construction, and local government—is in Hebrew only, with a small English translation of its main title. There is no Arabic. This is also true for the sites of most other ministries. "And when one travels on Israel Railways, the conductor informs passengers of approaching stations in Hebrew, and sometimes English but never in Arabic. This happens even when the next station is in the BEDOUIN city of Rahat in the Negev."

Israel also has hundreds of publicly funded museums and cultural institutions celebrating Jewish and Zionist history and culture. Their brochures and other explanatory texts are available only in Hebrew and, at times, English. But more significant is that there are no such publicly funded institutions commemorating Palestinian history or culture from a Palestinian perspective. The result is that Palestinian history is absent not only from school textbooks, but also from the general cultural-historical sphere: it becomes an unknown—not only to Israel's Jews, but even to Arab citizens, unless they learn it at home.

Gerlitz concludes: "Such exclusion from the Israeli symbolic realm and discourse generates a sense of disorientation and alienation among the Arab public—a feeling of being a stranger in one's own land. . . . Implicit in the rhetoric that justifies this exclusion 'campaign' is the sense that there is a need to strengthen Israel as a state inclusive of all Jews, but totally exclusive of Arab citizens, who 'should thank us for letting them stay here.' This feeling may be fueled by fears that sharing the intangible symbolic spheres is potentially dangerous to the State of Israel. Exactly the opposite is true. The continued exclusion of Arabs is a most dangerous process, because it conveys a clear message to Palestinian citizen, one that says, 'You are not authentic members of this state.' Dissemination of such a message to a large national minority is a recipe for alienation and escalation of domestic conflict. And demanding new and outward expressions of 'loyalty' to the state at the same time can only exacerbate such feelings."

2. *Structural.* Arabs in Israel find themselves excluded from Israeli institutions, which are considered to be the purview of Jewish citizens. Palestinians are kept at a distance from key centers of political decisionmaking, are not conscripted into the armed forces (which involves broader exclusions), and are not hired for senior positions. Such political exclusion also includes the systematic underfunding and discriminatory structuring of Arab education, the discrimination in the institutions of the mass media, and the existence of lesser civil institutions serving Arabs only.

3. *Policy implementation*. This level includes various kinds of discrimination relating to laws, the distribution of state financial resources, and the allocation of territory. Legal discrimination involves the state's basic goals as they are expressed by its leaders and by the Jewish majority. For example, the Law of Return and the Law of Citizenship are intended to preserve and augment the Jewish majority of the state and reduce the number of non-Jews, including specifically Pales-

tinians. This is also obvious in the special legal status of non-Israeli Jewish institutions and Amendment 7A to the Basic Law of the Knesset, 1985. In addition, there is a whole series of legal arrangements that discriminate against Arabs and give preference to Jews. In the realm of resource distribution, research has verified in comparisons of various indicators that the gaps between allocation to Jewish and Arab communities arise mainly from outright discrimination and remain substantial.

At the level of policy implementation, too, Palestinian citizens of Israel have found themselves increasingly threatened. In 2003 the Knesset passed the Citizenship Law, which prevents Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who marry an Israeli Arab from moving to Israel with their spouses. In May 2009, cabinet ministers voted to introduce a pair of bills to parliament, the first of which would institute a loyalty oath as a requirement for citizenship. The second would outlaw public expressions of grief over the Palestinian displacement in 1948—known as the *Nakba*, or catastrophe—on Israel's Independence Day holiday. The proposal to ban *Nakba* observances suggests a three-year jail term for public expressions of "mourning" on Israeli Independence Day. Additionally, draft legislation was prepared for a loyalty oath requiring all citizens to declare "loyalty to the State of Israel as a state that is Jewish, Zionist, and democratic, to its symbols and values," and to promise to fulfill national service requirements before receiving identity cards.

The proposals have since been watered down somewhat, and it is highly unlikely they would pass the required three readings in the Knesset. But their effect has already been internalized. Moreover, Education Minister Gideon Saar plans to drop the word "*Nakba*" from Arab textbooks, while introducing classes on Jewish heritage and Zionism in Arab schools. Future budgets for schools will be linked to the percentage of students going on to perform military service. This would adversely affect Arab schools. As it is, Jewish schools currently receive nine times more funding per child than Arab schools. AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN, foreign minister and deputy prime minister in the government of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU (elected March 2009), announced that training for the diplomatic service would only be open to those who had completed military service. (In 2009 only 15 of the Foreign Ministry's 980 employees were Arab, a pattern reflected across the civil service sector.) The housing minister, Ariel Atias, demanded segregation between Jews and Arabs and launched a drive to "Judaicize" the Galilee where most Arabs live, to prevent any land swap in a peace deal with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Meanwhile, Interior Minister Eli Yishai approved a wave of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS in Arab towns.

Government ministers have made provocative verbal attacks on Arab Knesset members, suggesting that they would be legitimate subjects for TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS. Lieberman said, "Our central problem is not the Palestinians, but AHMAD TIBI [an Arab member of the Knesset] and his ilk—they are more dangerous than HAMAS or the [ISLAMIC] JIHAD combined."

Other statements have been aimed at delegitimizing, intimidating, and threatening with expulsion Palestinian citizens of Israel for exercising their democratic rights. In early March, thousands of Palestinian citizens staged a peaceful rally attended by several Arab members of the Knesset to protest Israel's military attacks in the Gaza Strip. In the Knesset, former cabinet minister Effie Eitam accused the Arab legislators of "treason" for participating in the rally, adding, "We have to drive you out, as well as everyone else who took part" in the demonstration. Days later, Lieberman repeated the ethnic-cleansing threat in the Knesset, telling Arab members, "You are temporary here," and "One day we will take care of you."

Israeli extremists appear to be getting the message. Representatives of three Arab parties have reported that their Knesset members have been receiving death threats in the mail daily. A spokesman for one Knesset member said, "We have always received threats but they have recently escalated to the point where we are growing truly concerned."

This atmosphere gave rise to two cases of ethnic-based rioting. The first, on 10 March 2008, occurred a week after a Palestinian opened fire in the MERCAZ HARAV KOOK YESHIVA in JERUSALEM, killing eight students, apparently in revenge for Israel's killing of dozens of civilians in Gaza. Hundreds of Israeli Jews converged on the Palestinian neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber in occupied East Jerusalem where the gunman's family lived. In what *Ha'aretz* termed an "organized, synchronized pogrom" the mob threw stones at Palestinian homes, smashing windows and destroying water tanks; damaged cars; and shouted "Death to the Arabs," while police made little effort to stop

them. *Ha'aretz* further observed that such an attack "could never take place in a Jewish neighborhood," and noted that while "Israel and the Jewish world raise a huge cry over every suspicion of an attack on Jews because of their ethnicity, it is intolerable that residents of the capital [sic] are attacked solely because of their nationality."

One of the most blatant examples of public incitement in the days before the attack on Jabel al Mukaber was a circular widely distributed and posted around Jerusalem and in West Bank settlements. Signed by a long list of rabbis, it called for acts of revenge on Palestinians in retribution for the Mercaz HaRav shooting: "Each and everyone is required to imagine what the enemy is plotting to do to us and match it measure for measure." Among the signatories was Rabbi Ya'acov Yosef, son of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the former Sephardic chief rabbi of Israel and spiritual leader of Shas, a party in the coalition governments of both Ehud Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu. The younger Yosef is himself a former Knesset member representing Shas. Another signatory, Rabbi Uzi Sharbav, was one of a group of extremists who murdered three Palestinian students at a school in the West Bank city of Hebron and set off bombs that maimed the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah in the early 1980s. Sharbav served a short prison sentence for the murders but was pardoned and freed with other extremists by Israel's president in 1990.

Although the mob action had been planned and advertised days in advance, the Israeli police did nothing to prepare for it. "The district police didn't need to be surprised," said the former Jerusalem district police commander Mickey Levy. "There was no need to collect intelligence, it was right there in their hand. Appropriate preparation was called for in order to prevent the violent demonstration." In Abunimah's concluding words, "This event indicates that Israel's official institutions have failed to learn any lessons from the Or Commission report but also serves as a warning sign of worse to come, against a backdrop of highly tolerated public incitement and widespread racist attitudes towards Arabs."

The second incitement, on 24 March 2009, was a march on the Israeli-Palestinian town of Umm al-Fahm, organized by some of the most extremist individuals in Israel, including Baruch Marzel, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and member of the Knesset Michael Ben Ari (National Union), all former members of the late Meir Kahane's Kach party, which was outlawed in 1994 and is considered a terrorist organization. Ben-Gvir declared on his way to the march, "Our statement is loyalty to the state of Israel. There are a bunch of law-breakers in Umm al-Fahm that think they will win with violence. The state of Israel is the state of the Jewish people [i.e., there is no place for Arabs in it]—we are here to tell our truth and not to provoke." About one hundred activists waving Israeli flags, backed by 2,500 police in riot gear to protect them, marched through the outskirts of the town. Israeli-Arab residents of Umm al-Fahm, who considered the marchers racist, had called a general strike, but said they would use peaceful methods to prevent the activists from entering the town. "Racism is not freedom of expression, it's a criminal act and the law should punish it," Israeli member of the Knesset Jamal Zahalka told the APF news agency.

Residents of Umm al-Fahm held a counter-demonstration, and police responded with stun grenades, water cannons, and tear gas, and had undercover officers among the crowd who arrested thirteen for throwing stones. Twenty-seven people were injured, including fifteen policemen. Umm al-Fahm is the town in which thirteen Palestinians demonstrating in support of the Palestinians under Occupation were shot to death on 1 October 2000. It is a nationalist town, but it is a curious kind of nationalism. The residents of Umm al-Fahm have repeatedly asserted their desire to remain part of Israel while they support the right of West Bank and Gazan Palestinians to have an independent state. Their main desire is that Israel become "a state of all its citizens" rather than an exclusionary Jewish state. Leonard Fein, writing in the Jewish newspaper *The Forward*, commented that the march itself was not so important, but it was about something, "something big and growing—to wit, the unresolved dilemma of the place of some 20 percent of Israel's people."

With respect to the distribution of land, there is long-standing discrimination in national and regional development plans. The vast majority of land that belonged to Palestinian citizens was confiscated between 1948 and the present. Various means have been employed to divest the Arabs of their land, most of which became State Land, which is centrally administered by national and regional planning commissions. On these commissions, the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Housing and Construction, the Jewish Agency

FOR ISRAEL, and the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND have permanent representation. The latter two, together with the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, are constituted by Jewish communities abroad and are meant to serve the interests of the Jewish people globally at the same time that they enjoy quasi-governmental status as NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS of the state. This necessarily involves ignoring Arabs as potential beneficiaries of State Land. In practice, Israeli planning policy is designed to serve Jews, and Palestinians by default are entitled to little or nothing. Ninety-three percent of the land in Israel cannot be rented, leased, bought, or otherwise used by Arab citizens. Planning policy thus becomes a tool for control of the Arabs; it requires massive investment in the establishment of Jewish towns with land reserves for future development (for example, the creation and development of NATZERAT ILLIT, the strategically placed Jewish town surrounding Palestinian NAZARETH) and contributes to the Judaization of Galilee.

Palestinians' Internal Crisis

The Palestinians in Israel are facing a deep internal crisis that permeates their social, political, economic, and cultural life as well as their collective identity. The crisis is manifest on two levels that are intertwined: the daily practical and the general strategic. The daily practical predicament is expressed in the population increase and physical expansion of the community, which are not matched by increased inclusion in Israel's power structure, by an innovative (Arab) political leadership, or by appropriate economic development of the Arab sector. On the general strategic level the predicament is expressed in an identity crisis, haphazard social and cultural change, fallout from the paradoxes of democratization, and the community's lack of vision about its collective future. Some of these crises might have been less acute if the community had had a more normal political, cultural, and social existence. Others are clearly internal.

The nature of the crisis affecting Palestinians in Israel can be examined through basic situation indicators: increased poverty and economic hardship, the development of a partial Israeli-Palestinian identity, the failure to adapt to modern times, weak democratization together with a deep cultural crisis, and a failure of Palestinian leadership.

Increased poverty. In 2006, Palestinians constituted 20 percent of the total Israeli population. This increase has resulted in the expansion of Arab towns, some into cities. In 2006, there were eight Arab towns with a population of more than 25,000, including Nazareth with 64,300, plus another seven towns with populations ranging from 17,200 to 24,400, reflecting a striking increase in the Palestinian urban centers. The growth in the Arab population and of Arab villages was not coupled with economic development, because appropriate industries and industrial zones are lacking in the Palestinian towns, which are situated at the lowest level of the social and economic indicators of cities and villages in Israel. State planning policies put industry and development in Jewish towns and zones. This lack of industry and jobs contributes to poverty among the Palestinians. Government policies controlling access to land and housing PERMITS also contribute to a situation of housing shortages—a problem that is growing rapidly.

Partial identity. The complex situation of the Arab citizens of Israel is also related to the fact that they are partially Israelis and partially Palestinians at the same time, meaning that they have dual and incomplete identities. This is the crux of the collective identity crisis for the Palestinian citizens in Israel. Palestinians are Israeli citizens according to official status but can't identify with a culture that ignores Palestinian history, culture, and society. For example, Israeli student textbooks present the *Nakba*, the 1948 Palestinian exodus, as Israel's War of Liberation and Independence. Moreover, after 1948, through RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT and travel, Israel prohibited its Palestinian citizens from interacting with the Arab world or participating in the Palestinian national movement—both of which were natural identity affiliations. The PLO, in any case, tended to ignore the Palestinian-Israeli community, even after the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS, and to exclude it from participation in the movement. The Arab states, likewise, even those that have formal relations with Israel, completely ignore Israel's Palestinians. Finally, Palestinian identity is complicated by the ongoing conflict between Israel and external Palestinians.

Adapting to modernity. The *hamula* (extended family) continues to serve as the basis of the social fabric for the Palestinians in Israel. The status of the individual within the *hamula* is subordinate to the patriarchal social, cultural, and ideological norms of the clan, hindering any possibility for individuation and self-development. The status of Arab women, in particular, highlights the oppressive situation of the Arab individual. Women live

within a repressive social structure that permits them almost no possibility for self-fulfillment. Palestinian women, then, are a minority within a minority. Compared to the status of Jewish women in Israeli society, Arab women are extremely deprived. The enduring importance of the *hamula* raises questions about the ability of the Arabs in Israel to adapt to modernity and social democratic behaviors.

Lack of democratic values. The failure of Palestinian Arabs to fully internalize democratic norms is related to the conflict between the private and public spheres. The internal distortions arising from demographic stress, economic and social changes coupled with the discriminatory experience of the Arabs in Israel, and the symbolic participation of Arabs at the national level (in the Knesset, for example) while being simultaneously excluded from the decisionmaking process have combined to produce an incomplete adaptation to democratic values and have given rise to certain ideological trends among the Palestinian minority. These discrepancies indicate the real difficulty Palestinian Israelis have had in embracing democracy and transforming it into an integral part of their life. The Arabs find it difficult to move effortlessly between two different "worlds"—one democratic yet discriminatory, the other traditional and undemocratic.

Cultural crisis. Following the 1948 WAR, the Israeli Palestinians found themselves in compulsory seclusion from Palestinian culture and the Arab world. The war resulted in immense destruction to Palestinian civil centers and removed the middle class and cultural elite that had the potential to continue strengthening Palestinian culture. As a result, over time and mainly in the middle class that began to emerge in the late 1980s, various forms of Western culture have been adopted—music, makeup, fashion (for men and women), movies, and consumption in general—though often as a thin veneer over traditional values and culture. The intrusion of Western culture has made the Palestinian community as a whole highly schizophrenic and exacerbated the identity crisis. Moreover, because the dominant Jewish-Israeli culture is Western, Palestinians question whether adopting Western ways will bring them more respect and less discrimination.

Leadership crisis. The leaders produced by the Israeli-Palestinian community have been essentially ineffectual. Regardless of political ideology or party, the Arab leaders have failed at three crucial tasks. No one has formulated a collective vision for the Arab community in Israel. Although the Israeli Communist Party incorporated the slogan "national minority," it never provided the criteria for defining the status of Palestinians as a minority. Palestinian leaders never developed a strategy and tactics for effecting change, and no leader or party has effectively mobilized the Palestinian community. At one time, the Communist Party was able to mobilize the community, followed by the Islamic movement, but neither has had staying power and neither was able to mobilize the whole community.

Palestinians were deprived of a strong leadership largely because of the military rule under which they existed from 1948 to 1966. Once that military regime was removed, by 1974 a collective leadership, represented by the Local Authorities Chiefs Committee, was established. That was followed in 1982 by the HIGH FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE (HFC). Both led the struggle of the Israeli Arabs from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, which culminated in the 1987 "Equality Day" and the "Peace Day" the same year. These two strike days highlighted the two points around which the Palestinian struggle was conducted in Israel: peace and equality. Since that time, a slow process of deterioration has taken place in the HFC. The 1980s marked the emergence of political plurality among the Palestinians in Israel, which was reflected in the emergence and institutionalization of the Islamic movement, the progressive movement, the ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY, and several local organizations. Although some thought this trend would strengthen and boost the status of the Israeli Arab leadership, plurality weakened it, and the HFC fragmented, with the result that Palestinian leaders had no place for dispute resolution. At the same time, the participation of Arabs in the Knesset elections nourished the misconception among the Palestinians and other sectors in Israel that the Arabs in Israel now had their own collective leadership. It is true that the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Jabha) behaved as a collective leadership in 1970s and formulated a collective vision for the community, yet since that time the Arabs in Israel have lacked leadership. Although most of the young leadership that emerged in the 1990s was more educated and better understood the system and how to maneuver in it, it suffered from disarray and lacked the ability to build a joint leadership forum. When elections

for the Sixteenth Knesset were held in 2003, three Arab parties managed to enter the Knesset while six left it. This generation of leaders tended to encourage personality cults and did not develop strong, direct relations with the public; thus they lacked the ability to mobilize the community.

New leaders are emerging, and older ones are becoming more outspoken. In early 2007 the High Follow-Up Committee published a study it had commissioned on the place of Palestinians in Israeli society. *The Mada Manifesto,* or *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel,* set out a vision for Israel as a state of all its citizens with equality for all. It was followed by three additional documents along a similar vein: (1) *The Democratic Constitution* (published by ADALAH: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), (2) *An Equal Constitution for All? On a Constitution and Collective Rights for Arab Citizens in Israel* (published by Mossawa Center: The Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel), and (3) *The Haifa Declaration* (published by the Mada Institute).

The response of the Israeli body politic was overwhelmingly to view these initiatives as an unwelcome threat to the "Jewish character" of the state. They were denounced in the media, the Knesset, and throughout society. Israel's SHIN BET secret police went so far as to warn that it would "disrupt the activities of any groups that seek to change the Jewish or democratic character of Israel, even if they use democratic means."

To observe, then, that Israel's Palestinian citizens are in a crisis—politically, socially, economically, and culturally—is not hyperbole, but reality.

See also HIGH FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE AND THE MADA MANIFESTO; ISRAELI REGIME AND THE QUESTION OF DEMOCRACY; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; KOENIG MEMORANDUM; LAND DAY; NATZERAT ILLIT AND NAZARETH; STATE LAND; UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES.

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—As'ad Ghanem and Mtanes Shihadeh

Palestinian Communist Party/PCP

See PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center

The Palestinian Conflict Resolution Center (Wi'am, Cordial Relationships) is a grassroots organization located in BETHLEHEM and established in 1995. Known as Wi'am, the center helps to resolve disputes within the Palestinian community by complementing the traditional Arab form of mediation (*sulha*) with Western models of conflict resolution. Given the nature and length of the OCCUPATION, the weakness of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, and the lack of legitimacy of traditional village leaders (*mukhtars*) owing to their appointment by Israel, there has been no clear means of resolving disputes, while the need for local conflict resolution is high. Believing that individuals who learn how to manage conflict at the local level without violence will contribute to a nonviolent resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Wi'am works in different areas at the grassroots level in the greater Bethlehem area. (http://www.alaslah.org/).

See also NONVIOLENCE IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE

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Palestinian Democratic Union

The Palestinian Democratic Union (FIDA, al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati al-Filastini) is a reformist movement within the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) that arose from a 1990–1991 split within the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP). YASIR 'ABD RABBU formed the breakaway faction because he opposed involvement in Jordanian politics and supported the

MADRID and OSLO PROCESSES. Initially, 'Abd Rabbu's group continued to call itself the DFLP, but, in 1993, it took the name Palestinian Democratic Union. Its primary constituency is among middle-class, urban, WEST BANK residents, although it has plans to organize in the Palestinian refugee camps in JORDAN, SYRIA, LEBANON, and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. FIDA has twenty-one members in the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC), the PLO's exile parliament. It gained a seat on the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE in 1992, and in the 1996 elections won a seat on the Palestinian Legislative Council from the Ramallah district.

FIDA describes itself as "a national, socialist, and democratic movement that is progressive and secular and seeks to include a range of groups—organizations, parties, unions"—within its coalition "to further the ends of national liberation and social justice." 'Abd Rabbu said that FIDA would work to exert pressure on the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY to solve the economic and social problems that exist in the Occupied Territories and would fight corruption in the PNA, including the illegal spending of public money. (www.fida.ps/english/tadamon/tadamon.html; www.fida.ps/english/english.html).

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Palestinian Diaspora

See DIASPORA, PALESTINIAN

Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction

The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) was established to solicit financial assistance from European donors (and in accordance with European government conditions), which would then be disbursed as aid to Palestinian developmental and humanitarian projects. AHMAD QUREI' (Abu Ala), of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) Palestine Martyrs Works Society (SAMED), the economic arm of the PLO, created the institution in 1993 specifically to receive funds from donors for development projects in the Occupied Territories under the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). It was designed to uphold Western standards of transparency and accountability and to be the official address for foreign aid to the PNA. In 1993, PECDAR's mandate was endorsed by the General Meeting of Donors that was held in Washington under the chairmanship of the US secretary of state and the World Bank. Most of its projects are done by local contractors, while technical assistance work is conducted by international firms and consultants. PECDAR's existence was a central condition for the PNA to receive the $2.5 billion in aid that was pledged over five years by the donor nations.

Shortly after the establishment of the PNA in 1994, YASIR ARAFAT assumed control of PECDAR, displacing Ahmad Qurei'. Arafat took great personal interest in the affairs of PECDAR, and, as one former PNA official noted, "no amount, no matter how small, [left] the PECDAR funds without the president's signature." PECDAR is said to have raised a total of some $2.1 billion from European donors and the UNITED STATES. There have been allegations from some sources—primarily US conservatives—that Arafat looted PECDAR of hundreds of millions of dollars. Several European committees have examined the allegations and to date have found no irregularities. However, that there was financial corruption within the PNA is incontrovertible.

From the outset of the PNA's creation there was tension and competition for funding from PECDAR between the Finance Ministry, headed by MUHAMMAD RASHID, and the Ministry of Planning, headed by NABIL SHA'TH. The competition between the ministries led to confusion among the donor nations about which agency was responsible for receipt of aid. As a result, in 1995 the PNA and the World Bank agreed to bypass PECDAR and transfer aid directly to the PNA via its economic ministries, primarily the Ministry of Finance.

In 1999 the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EUROPEAN UNION's financing institution, contributed 10 million euros (around $10 million) to support small-scale INFRASTRUCTURE in Palestine, including support for the Community Development Project for upgrading projects in GAZA and the WEST BANK, such as ROADS,

WATER schemes, and community buildings. The funds from the EIB were made available to the PNA, through the Ministry of Finance, under the 1997–1999 "Euro-Med Partnership" mandate. The investment was implemented by the Ministry of Local Government in conjunction with PECDAR, the main agency still responsible for managing international donor aid, particularly for infrastructure projects.

In 2005 Dr. Mohammad Shtayyeh was the president of PECDAR.

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Palestinian Elections

See ELECTIONS, PALESTINIAN

Palestinian Flag

Before the OSLO ACCORDS, the Palestinian flag was taken very seriously by the Israelis, and any display of it was strictly forbidden. Individuals caught attempting to place a flag on a rooftop or a pole were arrested and imprisoned. Moreover, the colors of the flag were prohibited. Paintings that contained the four banned colors could be confiscated and the painter fined or arrested; if the painting was found in an art gallery, the gallery was closed indefinitely.

As a part of its general war against Palestinian self-determination, Israel actively pursued a policy of stifling the concept of a Palestinian nation or Palestinian nationalism, and therefore any form of expression of the concept was forbidden. The war against the flag's colors became so extreme that if a man's shirt or the embroidery on a woman's dress contained the four colors, the person was fined and often detained.

The Palestinian flag is constituted of three equal horizontal stripes (black, white, and green from top to bottom) overlaid by a red isosceles triangle issuing from the hoist and reaching one-third of the way to the fly. Sharif Husayn of Mecca designed the current flag in June 1916 as the flag of the Arab revolt against the OTTOMAN EMPIRE. In 1917 the Arab people raised it as the flag of the Arab national movement. In 1947 the Arab Ba'ath Party interpreted the flag as a symbol

of the liberation and unity of the Arab nation. In 1948 the Palestinians adopted it at the Palestine Conference of the ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT in GAZA. Subsequently, the flag was recognized by the ARAB LEAGUE as the flag of the Palestinian people. In 1964 it was further endorsed by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION during the first meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL in JERUSALEM.

After 1967 and Israel's OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories of the WEST BANK, Gaza Strip, and East JERUSALEM, succeeding military governors undertook systematic policies to eliminate all manifestations of Palestinian nationalism or national identity. This campaign involved every aspect of Palestinians' lives—EDUCATION, journalism, literature and PALESTINIAN POETRY, painting, folklore, and symbolic representations of Palestinian national identity.

After 1993, the war against the flag and Palestinian nationalism in general virtually ceased because the Oslo Accords in effect "denationalized" Palestinian nationalism. The flag, its colors, and other previously potent symbols were no longer perceived as a threat. Instead, Israel focused on any symbolic or actual opposition to the OSLO PROCESS.

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Palestinian Foreign Nationals

See DEMOGRAPHY

Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group

The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group was founded in December 1996 in response to the deteriorating state of democracy and human rights under the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). The organization was established by a diverse group of Palestinian leaders, including Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) members, newspaper editors, journalists, a union leader, veteran human rights activists, and religious leaders. Its mandate is to document human rights violations committed against Palestinians in the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, and East JERUSALEM, regardless of who is responsible. In practice, however, the group has dedicated most of its work to monitoring human rights violations committed by the PNA. The monitoring group believes that, in spite of the ongoing Israeli OCCUPATION and the need to denounce Israeli human rights abuses, similar scrutiny of the PNA is essential to the process of state building, to ensure that the future Palestinian state will be truly democratic. In the long run, it argues, the protection of human rights can only strengthen the PNA. (www.phrmg.org).

Palestinian Identity

Zionists claim that Palestinian identity only emerged in response to the process of Zionist colonization of Palestine. Yet, in 1919, a monograph entitled *Reconstruction of Palestine* and published by the Palestine Anti-Zionism Society in New York City illustrated that a strong Palestinian identity was already in place in the early part of the twentieth century. As revealed by different authors, including the distinguished historian Philip Hitti, this identity was deeply rooted, nationalist, secular, and Arab in nature, yet threatened by the process of Zionist settlement. This document demonstrates quite clearly that the fundamental issues facing Palestinians have changed little since 1919. The voices of the writers in the manuscript clearly reflect a native population that is threatened by Zionist colonial settlers coming from Europe and bringing with them superior technology, money, and the backing of a great power, Britain.

There is an overarching Palestinian identity that is grounded in the history of ancestors who once inhabited the LAND known as Palestine, whose BORDERS were delineated by the BRITISH MANDATE. In spite of the variety of peoples who migrated to Palestine since 2000 BCE, a Palestinian character emerged—Arab in language and literature. It involves a way of life, a unique attachment to the land, and defined social and cultural forms.

Palestinian identity is also grounded in the experience of the *Nakba*, during which more than two-thirds of the Palestinian population were driven from their homes in a historic act of ethnic cleansing carried out by the newly estab-

lished state of Israel in 1948. The collective trauma of this experience is deeply etched in Palestinian consciousness, as is the experience of dispersion and exile. In the immediate aftermath of the *Nakba*, Palestinians focused almost exclusively on recovering their lost land and their patrimony. The REFUGEES carried with them the keys to their houses and the titles to their land. In the early period, from 1948 through the 1960s, poets such as MAHMUD DARWISH expressed this deep attachment in poetry and songs that became popular with Palestinians wherever they were. The refugees in JORDAN, LEBANON, SYRIA, and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES—by far the largest percentage of the entire Palestinian population—have maintained over the decades since 1948 a deep attachment to their homes and land that has nourished a sense of identity as Palestinians who differed substantially from the populations in the host countries. This deep sense of identity has remained strong in spite of significant events that have had a major impact on these populations: the 1970 civil war in Jordan (BLACK SEPTEMBER); the 1975–1976 civil war in Lebanon, culminating in the forced departure of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) following Israel's 1982 invasion (LEBANON WAR); and the harsh and discriminatory treatment the Palestinians received from authorities in the Arab countries.

Those who stayed behind were subjected first to Jordanian and Egyptian occupation in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, respectively, until 1967, when they came under Israeli military control. The impact of the years of Israeli OCCUPATION served to strengthen the sense of Palestinian identity as a form of resistance against the Occupation. Similarly, the Palestinians who remained in Israel, even after years of living within the Israeli system as second-class citizens, to a large measure still define themselves first as Palestinians and then as Israeli citizens. In the 1960s, a new symbol of resistance began to emerge with the *fida'iyyun,* who were willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Palestine. This was followed by the symbol of *sumud,* or steadfastness, meaning refusing to depart in the face of Zionist attempts to engage in forcible population TRANSFER from the Occupied Territories. More recently, the symbol of *shahid* (martyr) has begun to emerge.

At the same time, there are also multiple Palestinian identities that have grown out of different experiences, such as refugee/nonrefugee, rural/urban, kin/nonkin, Muslim/politicized Islamist/Christian, male/female, class, and foreigner/nonforeigner. In the particular cultural, economic, and social systems in which Palestinians live and have lived—Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the Occupied Territories, and other PALESTINIAN DIASPORA locations—multidimensional perspectives or social forces define the individuals within a given social space. Thus the experiences of Palestinians in, for example, Tunis are likely to be different from those in Lebanon.

Palestinian refugees who have lived in a refugee camp most of their lives have given rise to a "refugee identity." Being a son or daughter of refugee camp parents also marks a person's identity. In the beginning, refugees were badly treated by other Palestinians, who blamed them for leaving their homes and land to the Jews. Over the years, a clear distinction emerged between camp dwellers and city residents, and problems came to the surface in a variety of ways. This remains the case today in cities such as NABLUS and Ramallah, with their neighboring camps. The unhappy experience of refugees within the Occupied Territories was mirrored by and increased in the Arab states, where many Palestinians took refuge.

An additional and more recent Palestinian identity distinction emerged between those who returned to the Occupied Territories after the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS (known as the "returnees" or "Tunisians") and the local population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who had lived and suffered under the Israeli Occupation. The returnees, mostly active members of the PLO, arrived with romantic and idyllic visions of a Palestine they had left behind years before and were shocked to find a population that had changed drastically over the years. Moreover, as they brought with them values and behaviors they had learned from their host populations, the local Palestinians looked at them as *ajanib* (foreigners, nonkin). Julianne Hammer and Helena Schultz have examined issues related to the Palestinian Diaspora as well as the problems encountered by those who returned after the Oslo Accords. Hammer distinguishes between returnees (*aideen*) and *Amrikan* (those who returned from North America to invest and settle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip after the Oslo Accords). She suggests that for the *aideen*, Palestine is *al-Watan,* the national homeland (a political entity), whereas for the *Amrikan*, it

is *balad,* a cultural homeland. She also notes that the process of return has strengthened Palestinian identity, replacing idyllic images with more nuanced ones that appreciate the complexity of the place and the changes that have occurred.

Over time, Palestine had become a vibrant symbol for many Palestinians living in the Diaspora. Perhaps because of distance, fragmentation, and the problems of access, the majority of Palestinians came to believe in Palestine as a "cause" and knew little about the reality on the ground. "Palestine" had become an abstract notion or an idea that one fought for and was willing to die for. Upon their return, many of the exiles were shocked to discover a Palestinian society that had been emasculated and psychologically mutilated as a result of the oppressive conditions it experienced during the many years of Israeli Occupation after 1967.

Prior to the 1993 Oslo Accords, a consensus galvanized the Palestinian communities scattered throughout the world. There was a general agreement, regardless of political leanings, that one must support the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, that the Palestinian right to self-determination is a basic right, and that the Palestinians are entitled to establish their independent and sovereign state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East JERUSALEM as the capital of this state. The PLO was the representative of the Palestinian national movement, a secular, relatively progressive movement whose initial objective was to liberate Palestine from Israeli control and establish a Palestinian state in its place, a goal that was radically transformed by 1988 to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Following the Oslo Accords, however, and with the creation of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), the center of gravity of the Palestinian national movement shifted from the Diaspora, specifically from the refugees, to the Occupied Territories—the "inside." The Palestine "cause" began to narrow and fragment into ever smaller parcels: Israeli withdrawal from some areas, security control, WATER problems, refugees, Jerusalem, borders, SETTLEMENTS, and so on. Gone was the old consensus that helped mobilize large segments of Palestinian society.

The Oslo Process did not culminate in the promised Palestinian state. More land was confiscated and more illegal Jewish settlements were established by successive Israeli governments. This has brought about conditions that make it almost impossible to establish a viable Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories. Increasingly, there is a significant shift in the discourse about the nature of a possible settlement of the conflict from a two-state to a one-state formula. What is in place at the moment is one state where Jews enjoy basic rights and Palestinians live in an apartheid-like system. The old nationalist discourse is beginning to give way to a new kind of discourse that emphasizes equal rights for all citizens in a democratic state in the historic land of Palestine. Increasingly, as Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews begin to launch initiatives in this direction, an important shift in their identity as potential citizens in a secular and democratic entity will also begin to emerge.

See also PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; PALESTINIAN POETRY; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; TUNIS: THE TUNISIAN INTERLUDE; ZIONISM

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—Fouad Moughrabi

Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights

The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights (PICCR) is a PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) human rights institution, although it exists and operates independently of the PNA. Its mandate is to ensure respect for citizens' rights in Palestine through respect for the rule of law by all official Palestinian bodies. PICCR was established in September 1993 by YASIR ARAFAT, in his capacity as president of the state of the PNA and chairman of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

PICCR establishes its own legislation, finances, policy, and operation, although its policy and program were created by a Board of Commissioners consisting of Palestinian individuals, both in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA, known for their commitment to human rights. European and other international institutions, plus some external private donations, provide all of PICCR's funding. To guarantee its independence from the PNA, PICCR board members who belong to the PNA have their membership suspended for the duration of their government posts; PICCR's commissioner-general and director-general are elected by and accountable only to the PICCR board; and PICCR staff members are directly and exclusively responsible to PICCR, not to the PNA. (www.piccr.org).

Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy

The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, or MIFTAH, is a nongovernmental, nonpartisan, JERUSALEM-based institution dedicated to fostering democracy and good governance within Palestinian society through promoting public accountability, transparency, and the free flow of information and ideas. MIFTAH was established in December 1998 with HANAN ASHRAWI as its secretary-general and with the goal of serving as a Palestinian platform for global dialogue and cooperation guided by the principles of democracy, human rights, gender equity, and participatory governance. To this end, MIFTAH generates and presents policy proposals and disseminates reliable information. MIFTAH is a founding member of the National Coalition for Transparency and Accountability, established in February 2000, which is working on a national plan aimed at combating corruption and administrative and financial mismanagement across all sectors of the PNA. (www.miftah.org).

Palestinian Legislative Council

See PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

Palestinian Media

See MEDIA, PALESTINIAN

Palestinian National Authority

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA, As-Sulta al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya) was established through the series of Israeli-Palestinian agreements, known collectively as the OSLO ACCORDS, that were signed by Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Although the first agreement, the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES of 13 September 1993, created the framework for future negotiations, the structure of the PNA was formalized in the Cairo Agreements (GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENTS I AND II) of 4 May 1994 (allowing PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT to end his exile and enter the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES) and the 29 August 1994 Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, as well as in the INTERIM AGREEMENT of 28 September 1995.

The purpose of the PNA was to transfer administration of Palestinian-populated areas of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP from Israel, ostensibly to prepare Palestinians for some form of limited sovereignty after a five-year transitional period that was to end with the completion of FINAL STATUS TALKS. According to its mandate, the PNA would function as a quasi-governmental administration

that would manage, in part, the political, economic, social, and—especially important from Israel's perspective—security situation in the Occupied Territories during the transitional period. The PNA, however, had no jurisdiction over the LAND or its resources, while its jurisdiction over Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories was challenged structurally by Israel's routine military operations in the West Bank and Gaza and, more broadly, by the SETTLEMENT enterprise that intensified during the Oslo years.

The terms of the Oslo agreements encouraged such a dynamic. In the Interim Agreement that divided the West Bank into three areas, the PNA was to have control over both security-related and civilian issues in Palestinian urban areas, excluding HEBRON (referred to as Area A, constituting about 3 percent of the West Bank), and civilian control over Palestinian village populations, while Israel retained all security functions (Area B, some 27 percent). The remainder (Area C, over 70 percent), including Israeli settlements, the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, military encampments, and bypass ROADS, remained under exclusive Israeli control. This was part of a larger division of powers between Israel and the PNA in which Israel maintained control over foreign affairs, BORDERS, and most economic issues, while the PNA was given authority over most civil matters, such as providing EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE, and social services.

History and Structure of the PNA

From a political perspective, the roots of the PNA can be said to lie most immediately in the November 1988 decision by the PLO to formally and publicly recognize Israel and endorse a TWO-STATE SOLUTION (Israel and Palestine) to the conflict, in the PLO's position in the GULF WAR, in the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE, and in the failure of its "Washington Track." This failure occurred at the same time that Israel had succeeded in largely crushing the First INTIFADA and when the PLO was operating from a position of international weakness. The foundation for the PNA's creation can further be said to reside in the "implosion of FATAH," the challenge of the Islamic party HAMAS, the wholehearted support of Israel by successive US administrations, and the lack of any positive options for Palestinians other than signing on to a process that they had very little power to shape.

Former Israeli prime minister SHIMON PERES described how Israel saw the PNA and the OSLO PROCESS when he explained before the Knesset on 23 October 1995, "The edifice we are building is based on a change in relations, not in location." That is, Israel was not going to leave the Occupied Territories (especially the West Bank). The primary change it hoped to achieve was to establish a set of Palestinian institutions that would create vested interests and would tie the OLD GUARD PLO leaders, the Oslo elite, to the Oslo Process while preserving Israel's presence and power in the territories. Additionally, from Tel Aviv's viewpoint, the overriding purpose of the PNA was to guarantee Israel's security in the context of the Palestinian struggle for a state and against OCCUPATION. In retrospect, the PNA, as well as the Oslo Process, failed. In attempting to explicate that failure, we begin with an examination of the institutional structure of the PNA.

The executive: President Arafat. When Yasir Arafat returned to Gaza and JERICHO in May and July 1994, he was welcomed with enthusiasm by a majority of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Arafat had been not only the leader of the PLO since 1969 but, more importantly, the personification of Palestinian nationalism, the symbol of Palestinian identity, and the embodiment of Palestinian aspirations. He alone, among the PLO leaders, enjoyed a special status among Palestinians throughout the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA and (perhaps somewhat less so) in the Occupied Territories, even with the many that supported different political factions. Within a relatively short time, however, Arafat became the object of Palestinian frustration, disappointment, and eventually anger.

After Arafat returned to the Occupied Territories from TUNIS and was elected president of the PNA, his governance became increasingly undemocratic, as he marshaled power unilaterally in his person and used an easily corruptible patronage system to ensure the loyalty of the various people and forces under his command. As one analyst wrote concerning Arafat's concentration of power: "He exercises more than sixty functions, which include not only those of a chief executive and chief of state, but also extend to many mundane chores. The fact that those functions include several chairmanships of newly established boards and no less than twelve new committees of the transitional authority . . . [suggests] that the national project is in trouble." This observation was made in 1995, and the centralization of power in Arafat's hands grew significantly every year thereafter.

Arafat established and controlled six separate "security" services (eventually mushrooming to eleven) that initially comprised between 35,000 and 40,000 individuals. The Oslo agreements mandated the creation of "a strong Palestinian police force" to provide unconditional security for Israel. In the 1995 Interim Agreement, the PNA was obliged "to act systematically against all expressions [including verbal] of [Palestinian] violence and terror," to "arrest and prosecute [Palestinian] individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror," and to "cooperate in the exchange of information as well as coordinate policies and activities" with the Israeli security services.

Arafat, however, took this mandate as license to create multiple security forces all directly under his control, which not only acted to protect Israel but also interfered in every aspect of Palestinian institutional and individual life. The institutions were highly repressive, monitoring public speech and written publications, and punishing anyone critical of the PNA or Arafat. The original six were (1) the General Intelligence Service, the "official" PNA intelligence agency that coordinated with Israel's SHIN BET (internal security service); (2) the Preventive Security Service (PSS), a second intelligence service that monitored Palestinians for any expression of opposition to Arafat or the Oslo Process and oversaw Palestinian PRISONERS, including interrogations; (3) the Presidential Guard/FORCE 17, whose specific task was to protect Arafat; (4) the Special Security Force/Military Intelligence, headed by Musa Arafat, which gathered intelligence on and scrutinized the PNA's other security services and, like the PSS, collected information on opposition organizations and individuals, inspected the press, and led internal investigations; (5) the Palestinian Police Force, which kept general order; and (6) a special "Chairman's Guard" under Force 17, which also shielded Arafat. In addition, there was a Civil Defense Force, a Maritime Police, an Airborne Force, an Air Police, and the General Security Administration. In effect, Arafat created a *mukhabarat* (internal state security apparatus) state wherein the intelligence services usurped individual civil liberties and freedoms and severely compromised—to the point of rendering impotent—the civilian judiciary, interfering with the jurisdiction of the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL (PLC), particularly with implementation of the few laws it passed. All of this activity, which directly undermined the rule of law, was undertaken on behalf of the executive's interests, in particular Arafat.

When Arafat returned to the Occupied Territories, he brought with him several thousand PLO cadres from Tunis (plus their families), and these men largely filled the security services. They were mainly men who had left Beirut with Arafat during the LEBANON WAR in 1982 and who regrouped with him in Tunis, running the political affairs of the PLO from there. Their style of governance was centralized, secretive, partisan, elitist, and disdainful of pluralism and democracy, and they exercised their control over the Palestinian people ruthlessly, imprisoning journalists and closing television stations. Arafat's closest advisers and "inner circle"—the only individuals who had access to him—were known as the "Tunisians."

The local Palestinian population was incensed, because many highly educated and experienced individuals in all areas, from political leadership to professional expertise, were passed over by Arafat in favor of the leadership that came with him from Tunisia. His choice of outsiders and their governing style were foreign to the political culture of the Occupied Territories, where Palestinians had developed a strong commitment to political democracy and CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. The friction undermined Arafat's and the PNA's legitimacy. On the other hand, democracy was institutionalized enough that, shortly after Arafat's death in January 2005, the PNA held presidential elections and MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen) won a clear majority. A year later, in January 2006, the PNA held elections for the PLC, and Hamas won an overwhelming majority, attesting both to the viability of the democratic process and to the people's dissatisfaction with Arafat's party, Fatah.

The legislative branch. The legislative branch of the PNA—the Palestinian Legislative Council—was originally composed of 88 members, first elected in January 1996. In 2006 the number of members was increased to 132, and a new electoral system was established that combined a majority arrangement based on district voting and a proportional representation system similar to Israel's. Hamas participated in the 2006 election, unlike the first, which it boycotted, and won some 80 percent of the seats. It was unable to govern, however, because Israel and the UNITED STATES considered it a TERRORIST organization because of its participation in the ARMED STRUGGLE, which included SUICIDE BOMB-

INGS, and because it refused to recognize Israel's *right* to exist. Israel, the United States, and the EUROPEAN UNION cut funding, making the PNA unable even to pay government salaries, much less provide services. In the summer of 2006, Israel arrested and imprisoned most of the PNA cabinet and many of the legislators who were Hamas members.

The PLC was intended to function independently of the executive and to act as a check on its power. After the first election in 1996, Arafat's party, Fatah, controlled seventy-one of the eighty-eight seats, and Abu Ala (AHMAD QUREI'), Arafat's chief negotiator at Oslo, was elected speaker. Still, the majority of the council members came from the West Bank and Gaza and were not returnees from Tunis, and the potential existed for the parliament to function as envisioned.

The most important initial task facing the PLC was the writing of a constitution for the PNA. Various nongovernmental groups in Palestinian society had consulted over a period of two years about the nature and content of a constitution, coordinating their discussions with the PLO's National Council Legal Committee and the PNA's Ministry of Justice. After two years, they presented the PLC with a draft proposal for the Basic Law for the National Authority in the Transition Period. The PLC debated the proposal and made several minor changes, and in 1997 the Basic Law passed the required three readings (three separate votes). However, to actually become law, it required ratification by President Arafat. Fearing it would curtail some of his power, he refused to sign it until April 2002, and then only under extreme pressure from many quarters.

But with Arafat's 1997 refusal the PNA was left without a constitution and the Palestinian people without the means to ensure democratic processes to protect citizens' rights, to enforce the rule of law, or to secure constitutional accountability. Moreover, by refusing to sign the Basic Law, Arafat sent the PLC a clear message that he would veto any legislation passed by the council that did not accord with his wishes. As a precedent, this rendered the legislative branch impotent from the outset.

Another issue that reflected legislative weakness was that of the local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). From their inception, these grassroots groups had been distinguished by their independence, which was intolerable to Arafat, who was determined to control them. His attempts to extinguish their autonomy, in turn, made the NGOs vociferous detractors of the PNA's authoritarian rule. Soon the PNA and Arafat were waging a concerted campaign of criticism, harassment, and vilification of the NGOs. Finally, the atmosphere became so ugly that the Legislative Council attempted to pass a law that would regulate relations between the NGOs and the executive. The law, which was generally acceptable to the NGO community, defined the relationship between the PNA and NGOs, made the NGOs accountable for their practices and finances to both the government and the public (ironic in that no such requirement existed for PNA accountability and transparency), and required all NGOs to register with the Ministry of Justice. The bill passed the requisite three readings in the PLC—the final in December 1998—and was forwarded to Arafat for his signature, but he declined to sign it. After several months, Arafat returned it to the PLC with an amendment requiring the NGOs to register instead with the Ministry of the Interior, placing them directly under the PNA's security and intelligence apparatus. Moreover, they would have to obtain a license from Interior Ministry, which would be predicated on an investigation and approval by the security services. Initially, the PLC refused to accept the amendment, but several months later it capitulated to Arafat's wishes. The NGOs, however, refused to register under the Ministry of the Interior, and relations between the NGO community and the PNA continued to deteriorate. Thereafter, the NGOs and especially their prominent heads were subject to ceaseless harassment and occasionally violence.

In general, the Legislative Council was unable to develop and implement an independent legislative or policymaking agenda of its own. When it did challenge PNA corruption or some other sensitive issue, Arafat by various means was able to thwart the PLC.

The judiciary. The absence of a legal system enshrined in a constitution had a highly negative impact on the independence, immunity, and integrity of the Palestinian judiciary. The fundamental problem involved the ways by which Arafat and the PNA Executive compromised the judiciary. Arafat personally transferred and dismissed judges for no professional reason but that they in some way displeased him or proved insufficiently loyal. At the same time, he appointed judges who were often unqualified, on the basis of personal and political fidelity or to further his own political support.

The PNA relied heavily on clan politics to govern. For example, to obtain a government job one had to be from a large *hamula* (extended family) or belong to Fatah. Handing out "carrots"—for example, a judgeship—to particular clans to garner support may have served Arafat's personal interests, but it led to serious inter-*hamayel* rivalry and contributed to increasing fragmentation in Palestinian society. In the Gaza Strip, in particular, there was a significant increase in interclan violence beginning in 1998, a phenomenon that had been dormant, at least on a wider community level, for over two decades.

More delegitimizing of the judiciary than clan politics was the increasing reliance on clan or "tribal" law—traditional, nonformal mechanisms for settling disputes, which are particularly deleterious to women. Reliance on tribal law began to intensify during the First Intifada and continued to strengthen thereafter. Thus, although it did not arise specifically under the PNA, the PNA's practice of undermining the legitimate independent judiciary did nothing to impede people's reliance on this system but, in fact, encouraged it. A second area of judicial interference involved Arafat's and the PNA's failure to execute court decisions. If Arafat did not like a judicial decision, he simply ignored or reversed it. In general, Arafat and the PNA did not treat judicial decisions seriously. Arafat often disregarded a law to protect a crony or political ally or, conversely, bypassed entirely the judicial process to punish someone who had criticized him publicly or in some other way offended him. A third problematic area involved Arafat's establishment, by a presidential decree on 7 February 1995, of a State Security Court—a military court—with jurisdiction over "security offenses," which included opposition to Arafat and the PNA, or affiliation with Hamas. The operations of this court, which began in April 1995, were accountable to no one but Arafat. Arrests were arbitrary, and trials were held in secret and typically conducted in the middle of the night. Members of the security forces served as judges, and there was no right of appeal. Torture was routine, sometimes resulting in deaths during detention, and death sentences were summary.

Arafat also interfered with the attorney general (AG). Although the executive appoints the AG, who is subject to approval by the PLC, there are no legal or legislative guarantees preventing the executive from dismissing the AG at will. The AG office is officially part of the executive, but because its mandate is to ensure the rule of law, the AG's work actually falls within the responsibility of the judiciary. From 1995 to 1998, Arafat appointed, and then dismissed, two individuals—the first allegedly resigned because of corruption, and the second officially resigned but did so, he stated, because "of the difficulties created by pressure and interference" from Arafat. Eighteen months passed before Arafat appointed a third attorney general, in June 1999. On taking office the new AG warned that his tenure would meet the "same fate of [my] predecessors, if the Executive leadership refuses to come to terms with the supremacy of the law." He was no more successful than the AGs before him in enforcing the rule of law and eventually resigned. There were multiple additional problems with the judiciary, which were the basis for the extensive human rights violations under the PNA.

Most important, the nature of the PNA allowed the executive, embodied by Arafat, and sometimes with the help of the Israeli and US security/intelligence services, to manipulate the political process to maintain its hold on Palestinian society. This dynamic also served Israel's interests by emasculating independent institutions and grassroots initiatives that could have challenged the policies of the PNA, and by extension Israel, and would likely have led to political challenges to the Oslo Accords before the eruption of violence in September 2000 (the AL-AQSA INTIFADA).

Forces Contributing to the PNA's Failure

The PNA's lack of success is related to several external as well as internal factors, some previously discussed. Several main issues undermined the ability of the PNA to function as a representative and effective government.

The Oslo Accords and the power asymmetry between Israel and the PNA. Beginning with the Declaration of Principles, the Oslo Accords were a reflection of the enormous power differential between Israel and the PLO. As such, they favored Israel's interests while minimizing or negating Palestinian interests. These terms were and largely remain unacceptable to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (and particularly to the REFUGEES), which meant that, for the Oslo Process to succeed, the PNA had to suppress all opposition, even peaceful dissent, effectively depoliticizing Palestinian society. This authoritarianism, which kept Palestinians silent or punished if they did

speak out, combined with the PNA's failure to deliver on its political, economic, or social promises, contributed to the downward spiral of the PNA's legitimacy and credibility.

Nevertheless, Palestinians searched for ways to express their political grievances. Without recourse to political means, the opponents of Oslo gathered around Hamas and smaller parties such as the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, which were prepared to use violence. Hamas, in particular, used suicide bombings against Israelis, and, in turn, Israel made the elimination of Hamas the primary task of the PNA. This responsibility led the PNA to take greater measures of repression against its own people, especially Hamas, and led it into a tight security alliance with the US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and Shin Bet, making the PNA appear as a collaborator. Meanwhile, Hamas earned popular support for its lack of corruption; its provision of crucial social services, particularly in health and education; and its willingness to fight the "enemy," Israel.

Land, water, and settlements. Land, WATER, and other resources are at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the Declaration of Principles, the PLO failed to secure a clear commitment from Israel that it would cease confiscating Palestinian land and water. From the beginning of the Oslo Process, Israel accelerated its confiscation of Palestinian land and water, which directly and negatively affected thousands of Palestinians who lost their resources and pessimistically affected all Palestinians who had believed that Oslo was going to retrieve these assets. The PNA had neither the ability nor the power to stop the continuing confiscations, while the dissonance between what Arafat was telling his people—that he was stopping land confiscation and settlement, and that a state was in the making—and what they observed became a chasm. In the end, Palestinians lost faith in the process and in their leadership. Indeed, during the seven years of Oslo, the PNA never gained control of more than 18 percent of Palestinian land and was unable to gain control over any Palestinian water resources, while Israel continued to expropriate water for its own use.

While unable to affect Israel's usurpation of Palestinian land and water, the PNA was also impotent to stop the relentless expansion of Jewish settlements into the Occupied Territories undertaken by Israel during the Oslo Process, a phenomenon that greatly enraged the Palestinian public. The settlement expansion directly contravened the spirit of Oslo, and anti-Oslo sentiment spread uncontrollably through Palestinian society. That Arafat and the PNA continued to express support for Oslo and continued to engage with Israel produced such indignation among the public that the PNA eventually lost all legitimacy.

Violence and security. From Israel's perspective and reflected in the Oslo Accords themselves, the raison d'être of the PNA was to guarantee Israel's security. Israel blamed most acts of violence that occurred in the Occupied Territories during the Oslo Process on the PNA's lack of commitment to the accords, which gave Israel the "right" to suspend or renege on its commitments (e.g., by not carrying out withdrawal from areas to which it had committed itself in signed accords) and to impose various types of punishment on the Palestinians, which ranged from tightening the CLOSURE of Israel to residents of the Occupied Territories to carrying out TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS. Israel's continuing land confiscations, ongoing settlement growth, statements asserting sovereignty over all of JERUSALEM, refusal to allow any return of refugees, and failure to live up to its commitments made in a variety of agreements resulted in Palestinian violence that the PNA simply could not control. Additionally, the massacre of twenty-nine Muslims in al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron by settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN in February 1994 directly led to the first Hamas suicide bombing the following April at the Afula bus station, which resulted in nine deaths. Subsequently, Israel's targeted assassinations of Hamas leaders resulted predictably in more suicide bombings, for each of which Israel held the PNA and Arafat responsible.

In turn, the United States and Israel intensely pressured Arafat to fulfill his security obligations and suppress the violence, which led to crackdowns by the PNA. For their part, Palestinians criticized these crackdowns as heavy-handed tactics and an abuse of human rights.

What is more, the PNA was unable to prevent continued Israeli violence by settlers, the IDF, and the Border Police against Palestinians and their property or to protect its people. The continuing cycles of Israeli and Palestinian violence during the Oslo years had structural causes as well, including the downward economic spiral and the descent into unemployment and poverty by the majority of the Palestinian population, as well as the regime of PERMITS, closure, CHECKPOINTS, and other measures of Israeli control that made life unbearable for the Palestinians.

Corruption in the PNA. The PNA was rife with corruption, and, although Arafat was never personally accused of self-aggrandizement, he used or allowed the use of the financial resources intended for the development of the Occupied Territories to ensure the loyalty of his highest officials as well as to guarantee the support of the masses. The system of corruption was complex and involved four interconnected issues. The first resided in the 1994 Paris ECONOMIC PROTOCOL, in which the Palestinians agreed to a customs union with Israel and to Israel's collection of import, VAT (value-added), excise, and income taxes. The second originated in the relationships that were developed between Israelis and Palestinians during the process of negotiations beginning with Oslo and continuing thereafter. The third related to Arafat's vast enlargement of the bureaucracy to nearly 100,000 (civilian and security/police), which guaranteed him a loyal following because their livelihood was tied to their fidelity to him. The fourth was a manifestation of the absence of the rule of law and the power and lawlessness of the security services.

The Paris Protocol. As a consequence of the customs and taxation policies specified in the protocol, Israel collected and remitted a variety of taxes due the PNA. For example, if televisions were imported into the West Bank via the HAIFA port, the Israeli importer paid an import tax on them to the Israeli government, which, in turn, gave it to the PNA. Similarly, VAT garnered on goods purchased from Israel and excise taxes on fuel, alcohol, tobacco, and so forth were accumulated by Israel and given to the PNA. The income and health taxes Israel extracted from the salaries of Palestinian workers in Israel were likewise turned over to the PNA. This arrangement led to multifaceted opportunities for corruption. For example, Arafat had numerous secret bank accounts in various cities around the globe. One that he maintained at the Hahashmonaim branch of Bank Leumi in Tel Aviv, known in the Occupied Territories as "*al-sondouk al-thani*" (the second account), became public knowledge and caused him considerable embarrassment. The only two people who had access to this account were Arafat and his close personal adviser MUHAMMAD RASHID. From 1994 to January 1997, at the request of Arafat via an intermediary, Israel transferred NIS 500 million ($125 million) into this account from the various taxes it collected for the PNA. During 1997 alone, it is believed that Israel transferred NIS 1.5 billion ($400 million) into the secret fund in Tel Aviv. In contrast, Israel transferred NIS 264 million ($66 million) directly to the PNA between 1994 and January 1997.

The taxes that were put into this secret account were intended for the treasury of the PNA and were to be used to develop INFRASTRUCTURE and to fuel economic growth in the West Bank and Gaza. But Arafat used them for three main purposes. First, he used them to fund his overblown bureaucratic payroll, and he hid this money from foreign donor countries and organizations that made large contributions to the PNA, insisting that their moneys be used to initiate self-sustaining economic projects to develop the Palestine ECONOMY, *not* for salaries of PNA employees. Second, and also related to Arafat's need to maintain his power base, the secret account was used to pay for a series of activities that ensured mass loyalty, including martyr allowances to widows and orphans and social services in the Lebanese refugee camps. The third, and by far the largest share of the account, was a "fallback" fund for Arafat and his family as well as his senior aides, in the event of a coup or some other political misfortune. Given such a cushion, they would be able to safely leave the country and establish themselves comfortably in exile.

Of course, should Israel choose to—and it did on more than one occasion, including a complete cessation of transfers after September 2000 upon the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada—it could deny Arafat access to this account.

PNA monopolies. Simultaneous with the establishment of the PNA, its top officials, with the blessing of Arafat, assumed control over the essential sectors of the economy through monopolies that would provide them with personal wealth. There are believed to have been approximately twenty-seven monopolies held by PNA officials, including steel, wheat, meat, wood, paint, building materials, feed for sheep and cattle, cement, flour, fuel, gravel, cigarettes, cars, computers, televisions and VCRs, and electrical appliances.

In general, the pattern was that a PNA official contracted with an Israeli firm or individual to purchase large quantities of a product at a given price, sold the product on the Palestinian market at a greatly inflated price, and pocketed the profit for his personal benefit. If Palestinian wholesalers had access to an alternate source for the same product

at a lower price, the PNA security services often employed strong-arm tactics to "persuade" the wholesaler to purchase only the product sold by the official monopoly. At the same time, companies that attempted to sell products in competition with the official monopoly were often pressured by the security services to cease.

In addition, many officials created monopolies for their children, wives, and other relatives. An example of such nepotism involves PNA president Mahmud Abbas's son, Yasser Abbas, who shared the monopoly on consumer entertainment. In addition, Palestinians wishing to open a business had to offer PNA officials bribes to obtain permits, which varied from onetime payments to monthly percentages of the businesses' profits. The bribes, or "fees," went to the senior official of whatever agency issued the permit or to the security services. Furthermore, senior security officials and members of the PNA frequently demanded from businesspeople regular financial payments for "protection."

Muhammad Rashid held one of the largest monopolies in the territories. His company, the Palestinian Company for Commercial Services (PCCS), had several subsidiaries and controlled a number of markets. One was cement, and all Palestinian contractors were required by the PNA to buy Nesher (an Israeli firm) cement from PCCS. Trucks carrying cement from other manufacturing companies were stopped by the security services and sent home—usually after the drivers were beaten. In 1996 Nesher sold the PNA/Rashid more than a million tons of cement for between $50 million and $60 million, which was resold to Palestinian contractors at significant markup. Later, it was decreed by the PNA that Palestinians could purchase cheaper cement (than Nesher's) from Jordan. Palestinians welcomed the pronouncement, but in practice Israeli officials on the bridge checkpoint from Jordan subjected the Jordanian trucks to extensive searches and the drivers to humiliating harassment so that very little Jordanian cement actually arrived in the Occupied Territories.

In 2004 a Palestinian parliamentary committee found that Ahmad Qurei' was assisting in the building of the Israeli BARRIER in the Occupied Territories. Qurei's family company, Al-Quds Cement, ships cement to Israel from EGYPT. That cement, the committee found, was specifically used for building the wall.

When a monopoly ran into a problem, Arafat fixed it. For example, the PNA minister who had the monopoly on flour in the West Bank improperly stored 5,000 tons of Romanian (via Israel) flour, which spoiled. An Israeli associate contacted through Arafat's office came to his rescue and sent a convoy of trucks to the official's NABLUS storehouse, loaded the flour, and transported it to Israel, where it was repackaged in fresh sacks so it appeared unspoiled. The PNA official then had the spoiled flour returned to the territories and put on the local market. Eventually, when the public discovered that their newly purchased flour was spoiled, the episode became known throughout the Occupied Territories, resulting in outrage over the economic collusion between Israel and the PNA, and the PNA's disregard for the welfare of its people.

PNA officials earned hundreds of thousands of dollars per year from their monopolies, and this revenue effectively constituted a transfer of income from poorer economic groups to the new political class, which used the profits for personal gain or to buy political loyalty. Because the PLC was weak and the rule of law nonexistent, there were no laws protecting a company from demands of paybacks, protection, or other forms of extortion; no requirements for competition in tenders; no organized system for enforcing or collecting debts; and no way of documenting joint entrepreneurial initiatives.

Israeli involvement in the monopoly system was wide-ranging. Without exculpating the PNA officials, Israeli analyst Gershon Baskin wrote in March 2001 that "Israeli officials facilitated and encouraged what must be called 'the ripping off of the Palestinian people' through shady deals and schemes conducted in broad daylight by tens of former Israeli security officials with agents of the Palestine Authority including Palestinian intelligence officers, policemen, and 'advisors' working on behalf of themselves and on behalf of Arafat directly."

Israeli and Palestinian economies during the Oslo era. A final factor that contributed to the failure of Oslo involved economics. One of the real purposes underlying the Oslo initiative was, from Israel's perspective, to bring about a certain amount of stability to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a means of facilitating Israel's economic integration into the Middle East region—a strategic goal that would transform the Middle East and

Israel's place in it. In his 1993 book *The New Middle East*—published the same year as the Oslo Accords—Shimon Peres laid out a far-reaching plan for the region, based on integration and economic cooperation, that would be followed by increasing political understanding and agreements until regional stability and development were achieved. Peres's vision, at least for a time, helped convince most Israelis, the international community, and significant elements in the Arab world. But the failure of the Oslo Process as a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict meant the end of Israel's regional integration objective. During the process, two economic tracts pursued between Israel and the Palestinians were also failures. These included the effort to "integrate" the Palestinian and Israeli economies (already totally integrated but in a structural relationship of dependency) and the Paris Economic Protocol.

Integration. At the same time the Madrid process began (1991), planning for a "new" Palestinian economy commenced. Israeli liberals such as Yossi Beilin and Yair Hirschfeld set up an Economic Co-operation Foundation, which produced economic surveys with Palestinian researchers to better assess the potential for developing links with the Occupied Territories, based on the idea of moving "from dependence to interdependence." Soon after the start of Oslo, however, it became clear that four dynamics would make it very hard for the PNA to shape the development of the Palestinian economy toward the interests of Palestinians rather than Israelis. First was the continuation of the Occupation, with all the restrictions, prohibitions, permits, closures, and so forth that had kept the Palestinian economy subordinate to Israel since 1967. Second was the nature of the economic agreements and development plans themselves, which were skewed to Israel's interests. Third was the mismanagement of the economy by the PNA, and fourth (and related to the third) was the endemic corruption in the PNA and larger Palestinian and Israeli societies.

In terms of the privatization efforts associated with Oslo, the PNA was directly involved in these programs, which were sponsored—and, in some senses, imposed—by the international community. One component of these measures was the Palestine Securities Exchange, which was established in 1995 with the Palestine Development and Investment Company as a major institution to attract private investment from abroad. Yet while private investment was deemed important, at the same time, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), "The fundamental task of the PNA was the provision of basic public services to improve living conditions and to enhance the economy's human capital." Moreover, the PNA needed to create an environment conducive to economic growth. This required embarking on an ambitious public investment program to meet the economy's significant infrastructure needs, pursuing sound macroeconomic policies, and developing institutions in support of a market economy that would encourage private investment and foster growth. The PNA did not fulfill these requirements.

The attempt to impose a neoliberal program in the Palestinian economy became intimately tied to the corruption in the PNA. When Arafat first arrived in Gaza, he promised to turn it into a "new Singapore," but he was stymied by the PNA's regime of nepotism, monopolies tied to senior officials, and even extortion. Further, one of the signature effects of the Oslo Process was that the expatriate Palestinian bourgeoisie increasingly squeezed out and even displaced local entrepreneurs, creating a new elite and private sector.

The Paris Protocol. The Paris Protocol (Gaza-Jericho Agreement II) was promoted as bringing prosperity to the Palestinian economy, correcting the flaws of previous arrangements, and maintaining free movement of goods and labor between the two economies within the framework of a customs union. The import taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the PNA were to provide the PNA with a grace period in which an independent fiscal system would be established. Employment of Palestinian workers in Israel would continue, while the PNA would create a badly needed public sector. Although the protocol appeared on the surface as an agreement between two equal partners, in reality it reflected almost entirely the objectives of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian economy. For example, Palestinians could not develop new industries that would compete with existing Israeli industries. This left little room for any sort of industrial development aside from small-scale industries, usually agricultural in nature. Similarly, in terms of the import sector, Palestinians faced multiple restrictions on what goods and materials they could import from any country other than Israel. This left Palestinians a captive market in which they could import only goods that Israel deemed "amenable to Palestinian development"—goods that were peripheral to Israel's economy and did not threaten existing

Israeli industries. It was precisely because of terms such as these that, as the IMF admitted in a later report, the protocol led not to sustained development or a "sound economic base" for the territories, but rather to "economic growth [that] has been sluggish, to per capita income [that] has declined," and ultimately to the intensification of economic inequalities between the two parties.

Growing out of the protocol was the formation of Palestinian "industrial estates," marketed "as a template for the Occupied Territories' integration into global markets." The industrial estates negatively shaped Oslo's political economy by combining flawed economic theory with a system in which Israeli middlemen, the Israeli military, and Palestinian Oslo-elites worked together to enrich themselves, and in turn weakened the PNA. The industrial parks produced textiles and similar products through Israeli middlemen and mainly for the Palestinian market. The Palestinian economy remained largely unable to access the global economy except when Israel occasionally permitted it. For example, the only Palestinian cell phone company (Jawwal) is linked to an Israeli company, Orange, and its network.

Given the nature of the Oslo Accords and the policies Israel implemented during the seven years of the peace process, it seems fair to conclude that Israel never intended to permit the establishment of a viable, independent, sovereign Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories. In this context, the PNA was crippled from the start, prevented by the terms of the Oslo Accords from protecting or advancing the interests of the Palestinians it was charged with serving. Given the massive power asymmetries between Israel and the PNA, and despite the myriad flaws in the PNA, it does not appear that anything the PNA could have done would have allowed it to realize its goal of Palestinian statehood. On the other hand, the election of Hamas in 2006 and the effective splitting off of Hamas-controlled Gaza from the Fatah-controlled West Bank marked the realization of an over two-decade-long Israeli goal of splitting and, through it, weakening the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, this was, according to many analysts, a primary reason why Israel tolerated and even encouraged the emergence of political Islam, and ultimately Hamas, in the Occupied Territories when the phenomenon first appeared in the early 1980s.

The continued inability as of late 2009 of Hamas and Fatah to unite in a common policy either of pursuing the peace process or resisting Occupation points to the success of this policy by Israel, and of the difficulties Palestinians will have in forging a common structure and program for moving toward independence in the foreseeable future.

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—Mark LeVine

Palestinian National Initiative, 2002

The Palestinian National Initiative (PNI, al-Mubadara) was a peace proposal conceived by a group of well-respected Palestinian activists and intellectuals and presented to the public on 17 June 2002. The PNI, for the first time, articulated an authentic Palestinian position on the peace process. Three key individuals, each known for his commitment to the Palestinian struggle, spearheaded the initiative: the late Dr. HAYDAR 'ABD 'AL-SHAFI, a physician and nationalist leader from Gaza, head of the Red Crescent Society for the GAZA STRIP, and commissioner-general of the PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR CITIZENS' RIGHTS; Ibrahim Dakkak, a veteran political analyst and commentator from East JERUSALEM who played a significant role during earlier stages of Palestinian resistance; and Dr. MUSTAFA AL-BARGHUTHI, a physician, longtime president of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees and founder of the Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute and International Protection for the Palestinian People program.

Although the PNI's long-term objectives were to bring an end to the Israeli OCCUPATION of East Jerusalem, the WEST BANK, and the Gaza Strip and to create a sovereign Palestinian state, the immediate goals included the formation of a national emergency leadership and the restructuring of governmental institutions to replace those of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), which was perceived as corrupt and hampered by bureaucratic mechanisms. The initiative also called for free, democratic, and internationally monitored elections that reached "all institutions and political posts in the Palestinian Territories including the Presidency, the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) and local councils."

Once formulated, the PNI garnered the support of leading Palestinian intellectuals, including the late scholars EDWARD SAID and HISHAM SHARABI, and galvanized the support of many Palestinians, both in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA, who agreed with the initiative's key premise that a political alternative was needed. Like any consequential political event, the PNI must be situated and analyzed within the political and historical context from which it emerged. The early months of 2002 witnessed an Israeli reinvasion of the population centers in the West Bank in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in a show of force unprecedented since the 1967 WAR. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed, and thousands more were wounded in the towns and refugee camps. The PNA was incapable of challenging the Israeli invasion, although its military vulnerability did not come as a surprise to most Palestinians. What many found disquieting was the PNA's total failure to

mold and present an alternative strategy at such a crucial time. PNA officials, including President YASIR ARAFAT, confined themselves to repeated condemnations of TERRORISM in an attempt to highlight the PNA's commitment to the "peace process," but offered little in terms of a national contingency plan with the aim of unifying Palestinian ranks.

Additionally, the PNI was a response to the excessive militarization of the al-Aqsa Intifada, which started in 2000. The SUICIDE BOMBINGS directed at Israelis alienated traditionally pro-Palestinian voices worldwide and supplied Israel with the rationalization for its deadly military campaigns—aimed at destroying the "terrorist infrastructure." Moreover, the Intifada's violence had sidelined methods of popular, nonviolent resistance and civil disobedience that had united Palestinians from all walks of life in past revolts, especially during the First INTIFADA. Edward Said was one of several who established a correlation between the PNI and the PNA leadership vacuum and the directionless and dangerous resistance tactics. "One of the main elements in the creation of *al-Mubadara* is precisely the issue of leadership of the Intifada and [its] militarization," he told *Al-Ahram Weekly*.

Indeed, the primary force behind the PNI was a protest against the PNA's corrupt, undemocratic leadership, which was sustained almost entirely through a process of tribal-like political affiliations, nepotism, and marginalization of the opposition. This was also why the PNI gathered the support of many Palestinians; in the ELECTIONS for PNA president held in January 2005, Mustafa al-Barghuthi managed to garner 20 percent of the Palestinian vote. For a young movement that relied little on the system of political patronage, the numbers equaled a victory and perhaps represented the actual establishment of the PNI as a considerable yet unique indigenous force in Palestinian political life. The fact that al-Barghuthi was not the only candidate offering himself as an alternative to the political reign of the PNA and still managed to garner a substantial showing at the ballot box, second only to MAHMUD ABBAS, indicates the appeal of the PNI's program and political line. On the other hand, the PNI has yet to capture the imagination and the support of the poorer segments of Palestinian society, the dwellers in REFUGEE camps and villages scattered across the West Bank and Gaza. Al-Mubadara is still seen by some as an elitist, urban movement with no serious weight among the Palestinian masses, whose allegiances remain divided between FATAH and the Islamic movements, particularly HAMAS.

See also OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD

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—Ramzy Baroud

Palestinian National Unity Government, 2007

See MECCA AGREEMENT AND THE PALESTINIAN UNITY GOVERNMENT

Palestinian People's Party

The Palestinian People's Party (PPP, Hizb Ash-Sha'ab) is an extension of the communist movement in Palestine that was formed in the early 1920s. The origins of the PPP go back to 1921, when Eastern Europeans, Marxist Jews, and Palestinians established the Palestine Communist Party, which split along ethnic lines in 1943, with the Palestinian communists forming the NATIONAL LIBERATION LEAGUE (Usbat al-Taharrur al-Watani). In 1947, the league called for the acceptance of the Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181) issued by the UN General Assembly, stipulating the establishment of a state for the Palestinian people adjacent to a Jewish state in Palestine. After 1947, Palestinian communists working through the Jordanian Communist Party and the Palestinian Communist Party in the GAZA STRIP defended the right of the Palestinian people to regain their LAND and to exercise their right to self-determi-

nation, including the right of return for Palestinian REFUGEES, in accordance with UN RESOLUTION 194.

In the aftermath of the 1967 WAR, the Palestinian communists were the only party calling for a political solution on the basis of implementing UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for peace and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They stressed guarantees for Israeli security if it withdrew from all territories occupied in 1967, resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, and the right of the Arab Palestinian people to self-determination. Accepting Resolution 242 was not a popular position at the time because it said nothing about Palestinian political or national rights, merely making note of the need to solve the refugee problem. Moreover, as guerrilla groups burgeoned in the 1960s and ARMED STRUGGLE was the mantra of the Palestinian movement, the Palestinian communists eschewed the use of violence or armed struggle, committing themselves instead to diplomacy and negotiation.

After the 1973 War, the Palestinian Communists supported UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 (a restatement of Resolution 242) and the GENEVA CONFERENCE. They played an important role in reinforcing recognition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, even though the PLO did not permit the group to become a member until 1987. They called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and, in this connection, formed the PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT in the WEST BANK and the UNITED NATIONAL FRONT in the Gaza Strip, both important indigenous nationalist movements in the Occupied Territories. Later, the Palestinian communists were among the founders of the NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE, which agitated against acceptance of the concept of "autonomy" for the Palestinians in the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

In 1982, the Palestinian communists held their first conference and established the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) in the West Bank, Gaza, and the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA. Their political program demanded the end of OCCUPATION, the securing of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees.

From 1986 to 1987 the PCP participated in efforts to reunify the PLO; consequently, in 1987 the PCP was designated as a full member of the PLO, becoming the first exclusively "political" party to be accepted in the PLO, all other factions having both political and paramilitary groups. During the INTIFADA that erupted in 1987 in the Occupied Territories, the PCP contributed to the formation of the popular committees (voluntary organizations that responded to the material needs of the Palestinian population) and participated in the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada command that planned and orchestrated Intifada activities. Although the party's platform during the Intifada was somewhat at odds with that of other parties in that it already recognized Israel, nevertheless it played a major role throughout the Intifada in organizing the various forms of grassroots and popular nonviolent resistance against the Occupation.

In late 1991 the PCP held its second conference and changed the name of the party to the Palestinian People's Party to avoid the communist designation, although it maintained its basic political positions. After the GULF WAR in 1991, the PPP approved the formula for the MADRID CONFERENCE and, in September 1993, gave its support to the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES and the OSLO ACCORDS, the agreements between Israel and the PLO.

The PPP initially refrained from joining the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), but succeeding developments in mid-1996 led it to respond positively to calls by President YASIR ARAFAT to participate. However, on 15 August 1998 the politburo of the PPP announced, following reports of corruption and the collective resignation of some members of the PLC, that it did not consider itself a representative or participant in that government and therefore could not assume any responsibility in its performance.

Although indigenous to the West Bank and Gaza and despite more than eighty years of organizing and activism, the PPP garnered only 2 percent of the public's support in a 2005 public opinion survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Research and Cultural Dialogue. Much of Palestine is a conservative and Muslim society, and communism is anathema to both. On the other hand, many Palestinians belong to leftist factions—the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, FIDA, and others—that are not consonant with Islam. The party's acceptance

of the Partition Resolution, recognition of Israel, and eschewing of armed struggle were the likely reasons it was set apart from other factions.

In the current phase, the PPP calls for a comprehensive review of the entire Oslo Process and the PNA's performance. (www.palpeople.org).

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Palestinian Poetry

Palestine is richly meditated in the poetry of its most well-known, and less well-known, writers. This poetry provides a profound testament to the endurance of Palestine and to the eternal durability of poetry as a synthetic medium of expression and a concise reservoir of evocative communication harboring meaning, signification, resonance, and music. From before the time of the Prophet Muhammad, poetry has been an iconic part of Arab culture, and the intensely opulent Arabic language has been its vehicle. It is the ultimate expression of individual emotion, but for Palestinians, particularly after the creation of the Zionist state in 1948, poetry serves as a collective expression of people's loss, memory, exile, unsettled identity, resistance, and struggle.

Palestinian poetry of the twentieth century is frequently characterized by a heightened sense of irony and the exploration of existential themes. References to resistance, OCCUPATION, exile, loss, and love and longing for homeland are prominently depicted. A common theme that runs through nearly all Palestinian poetry is that of a strong affection for, and longing for, a lost, beloved homeland. It is a common loss, everybody's loss; hence resistance poetry belongs to everybody, to the whole Palestinian community. Reproducing and spreading this poetry requires no permission, because, like the land, classified as *Musha'a* ("property held in common"), it is a product that belongs to the people. Another theme that pervades Palestinian poetry is that of exile. In "Who Am I, without Exile?" by MAHMUD DARWISH (1941–2008), exile is interrogated existentially, but the Palestinian experience foregrounds and molds it. We are therefore locked into close intimate reading of exile as a collective and personal destiny.

From "Letter from Exile" by Mahmud Darwish

I am now grown—over twenty/The burden of life I shoulder like men

I work in a tavern, as a dishwasher/And coffee maker

You should see me mom/I am well/I have a loaf of bread

And some vegetables/I heard on the radio: messages

of the Exiles/They all concurred, without dissent:

"We are quite well"/No one has said: "I am distressed."

Or "it is wretched here."/How's my father?

Does he still pray?/Does he love children, The land and olives?

As he always did? And how are my brothers?/Did they graduate?

Are they teachers now?/Like my father used to say.

Growing out of the condition of exile is the problematic of identity, and this too is a recurrent theme in the poetry of almost all the Palestinian poets. Many of the greatest poets have by birth or force found themselves in exile, living among other cultures; thus their sense of their identity runs deep into the lines of their poetry. Even for those who remained in Palestine after it became Israel, the sense of internal exile is profound, and their identities are even more disjointed by the dichotomous situation of being "Israeli Arabs." For all Palestinians, then, identity is ambiguous, obscure, indefinite, and unsettled. Palestine, the site of that struggle for a collective national self, is rendered with yearning and tenderness in many poems: Palestine is no ordinary place: "The mother of beginnings, the mother of ends," as Darwish put it. Thus, it is the extraordinariness of Palestine—its fertile and beautiful landscape, its people's infusion with history, its culture—preserved in the words of the best poets and thinkers, that makes their poems great and striking. Each of the poets has a story, memory, and vision of and about Palestine to tell. It is through the

prism of historic Palestine that the poems mushroom into different trajectories, where love, yearning, hope, memory, resistance, injustice, and death are sites of contextual reflection.

Palestinian poetry of the period 1920–1945 is considered to contain the origins of "resistance poetry," in which poets focused on the struggle against the Zionists and the British occupying forces. Poets Abu Salma (the pseudonym for 'ABD-AL-KARIM AL-KARMI, 1907–1980), IBRAHIM TUQAN (1905–1941), and Abd al-Rahim Mahmud (1913–1948) were among the foremost spokesmen of this period. Ibrahim Tuqan conveys a sense of urgency about saving his homeland. Tuqan could very well have written the following words as a form of resistance poetry to the Palestinians struggling today—praising them for their courage and loyalty to the cause of freeing their Palestinian homeland.

From "Lest We Lose" by Ibrahim Tuqan

You're the ones loyal to the cause/You're the ones who carry its burden

You're the ones who act without speech/God bless your strong arms!

A declaration from you equals an army/with all its military might

Your gatherings restore/the glory lost since Umayyad conquests/But we still have bits of country left in our hands/so rest awhile, lest we lose what remains.

The period from about 1945 through 1956 was a time of sorrow, despair, and stasis, and it preceded the emergence of any resistance groups. Poetry of the period reflected these feelings. Typical is this poem by Abu Salma.

From "We Shall Return" by Abu Salma

We'll return some day while generations listen/to the echoes of our feet.

We'll return with raging storms,/holy lightning and fire,/winged hope and songs,

soaring eagles,/the dawn smiling on the deserts. Some morning we'll return riding the crest of the tide,/our bloodied banners fluttering/above the glitter of spears.

Nevertheless, after the 1948 *Nakba* and especially after the 1967 Occupation, poetry was gradually transformed into a vehicle for political activism. From among those Palestinians who became Arab citizens of Israel and after the passage of the Citizenship Law of 1952, a school of resistance poetry was born that included poets such as FADWA TUQAN (1917–2003, who lived in NABLUS), RASHID HUSAYN (1936–1977, who lived in a village near HAIFA until fleeing into exile in 1967), Taha Muhammad Ali (1931–, who lives in NAZARETH), Samih al-Qasim (1939–, from the town of RAMLA in the Upper Galilee), and TAWFIQ ZAYYAD (1929–1994, who was mayor of Nablus). These poets lived in Israel; most were members of the Communist Party and, as such, had a degree of freedom of expression within the contours of Israeli political parties, although all were subject to harassment, arrest, and imprisonment for their work. Khalid Sulaiman writes of Palestinian poetry in this era, "The loss of Palestine formed the tragic reality which determined the climate within which Arabic poetry has developed since the late forties. The Palestine experience has radiated a new poetic tone, a new symbolism, a new *angst* which forms a subterranean level of modern poetry."

By 1967, as the armed resistance to Israel grew, the voices of the poets expanded. Traditional styles, rhythm, forms, and themes were transformed, and a new poetics emerged. That post-1948 mood of despair and stasis was transformed with the emergence of the resistance fighter, the *Fida'i*, which soon became as important a figure in poetry as the REFUGEE had been after 1948.

As Aida Hasan wrote, "New themes emerged and became predominant in these years, driven by a successive round of defeats, leading ultimately to poetry reflecting the rise of resistance." The words of the poets became, if not weapons, at least powerful tools, for as writer and critic JABRA IBRAHIM JABRA (1919–1994, lived in exile in IRAQ) wrote (quoted in *The Object of Memory*), while poetry might be condemned as too weak a toy against guns, "in actual fact it was often as good as dynamite. It gave point to a whole nation's suffering and wrath. It crystallized political positions in telling lines, which, memorized by old and young, stiffened popular resistance and provided rallying slogans." New expressions appeared: terms such as *jurh* (wound), *khayma* (tent), *manfa* (exile), *sumud* (steadfastness), and *awdah* (return) became symbols for the Palestinian tragedy itself.

Indeed, from 1970 through the present, poetry has poured forth from Palestinians living in

Israel, from those in exile throughout the Arab world and beyond, and from those living under Occupation in the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, and East JERUSALEM. Hasan further notes that the important duality of roles for Palestinian poets is apparent in these and other works. "Darwish, Abu Salma, Tuqan [Zayyad, Husayn, Taha Muhammad Ali, Kamal Butros Nasir (1925–1973)], and other Palestinian poets are more than just poets. They and their experiences are part of a tragic Palestinian history, and they have recorded it for us to experience, understand, and remember. They write not because they want to, but because they have to; not merely for themselves, but for their people. They are poets, but consciously or not, they are spokespeople as well." For a Palestinian—whether in exile or in the homeland—the experience of misery, loss, sorrow, and yearning for justice is the same. And while it may not be the job of poets to speak our collective experiences and feelings, Palestinian poets have done just that.

The following is illustrative of later resistance poets.

"Against" by Rashid Husayn (translated by As'ad AbuKhalil)

Against the revolutionaries of my/country injuring a spike

Against a child—any child—carrying/a grenade

Against my sister studying the muscles/of a rifle

Against whatever you want . . . , but

what does even a prophet or a prophetess to do

when their eyes drink the horses/of killers

Against a child becoming a hero/at ten

Against the heart of the tree bearing/mines

Against the bushes of my orchard/becoming gallows

Against the basin of flowers in/my land becoming gallows

Against whatever you want . . . but/after the burning of my country,

my comrades, and my youth

Other samples are from individuals whose poetry is so known and beloved among Palestinians that they have become the poetic voice of the Palestinian people. They are, as Salma Jayyusi states in her anthology, "household names" in the Arab world. They have provided Arab readers with a "potent verbal weapon" against their tragic history. Zayyad represents the continuing Palestinian struggle for justice—a strong, solid, determined spirit defying the injustices, aggression, and suffering that typify the Palestinian collective experience. This well-known poem by Zayyad is typical of his work: its central message is steadfastness (*sumud*) in the face of Zionist aggression.

"On the Trunk of an Olive Tree" by Tawfiq Zayyad

I shall carve my story and the chapters of my tragedy, I shall carve my sighs

On my grove and on the tombs of my dead;/I shall carve the number of each deed

Of our usurped land/The location of my village and its boundaries.

The demolished houses of its peoples, My uprooted trees

And to remember it all,/I shall continue to carve/All the chapters of my tragedy,

And all the stages of the disaster,/From the beginning/To end,

On the olive tree/In the courtyard/Of the house.

In "We Shall Remain" Zayyad expresses even more intensely *sumud* and the determination that the *Nakba* of 1948 will not be repeated.

"We Shall Remain" by Tawfiq Zayyad (translated by Naseer Aruri)

It is a thousand times easier/For you/To pass an elephant

Through a needle's eye/To catch fried fish in the Milky Way

To plough the sea/To teach the alligator how to speak

. . .

Here upon your chest/We shall remain

Like broken glass/And cactus/In your throat

A fiery whirlwind in your eyes . . ./Here, we shall remain

A wall on your chest/We starve; go naked; sing songs;

And fill the streets with demonstrations/And the jails with pride

We breed rebellions/One after one/Like twenty impossible, we shall remain

In Lydda, Ramleh, and the Galilee/Here we shall remain

You can drink the sea/We squeeze the rock/To quench our thirst

And if we starve/We eat the dirt/And never depart

Or grudge our blood./Here, we have a past/A present

And a future

Of those who remained after 1948 and the transformation of Palestine into Israel, Samih al-Qasim has written quite profoundly about *sumud*. He and Mahmud Darwish, who left to various parts of the Arab world and finally died after a massive heart attack, often debated *sumud* (al-Qasim) versus *raheel* migration/expulsion (Darwish). Under the title of "Enemy of the Sun," which also became the title of a book translated by Naseer Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb (Drum and Spear, 1970), al-Qasim wrote the following.

From "Enemy of the Sun" by Samih al-Qasim

I may if you wish, lose my livelihood/I may sell my shirt and bed

I may work as a stone cutter, a street sweeper, a porter.

I may clean your stores/or rummage your garbage/In pursuit of nourishment.

I may lay down hungry/Oh enemy of the sun,/But/I shall not compromise

And to the last pulse of my veins/I shall resist.

You may confiscate the last strip of my land/Feed my youth to prison cells

You may plunder my heritage./You may burn my books, my poems

Or feed my flesh to the dogs./You may spread a web of terror

On the roots of my village. O enemy of the sun, But

I shall not compromise/And to the last pulse in my veins

I shall resist/You may put out the light in my eyes

You may deprive me of my mother's kisses.

You may curse my father, my people./You may distort my history.

You may deprive my children of a smile/And of life's necessities.

You may fool your friend with a borrowed face.

You may build walls of hatred around me/You may glue my eyes to humiliation

O enemy of the sun/The celebrations fill the air.

The decorations are raised at the port/A glow in the heart and in the horizon

A sail is seen challenging the wind and the depth/It is Ulysses returning home

From the sea of trouncing/BUT, it is the return of the sun, O my exiled ones

And for her sake and his/I swear/I shall not compromise

And to the last pulse in my veins/I shall resist,

Resist—and RESIST.

Collective punishment by the Israeli occupier captured the attention of West Bank poets such as Fadwa Tuqan of Nablus. Here is a monologue between Fadwa and her cousin, Hamza, who languishes in prison while the Israelis prepare to demolish his old father's home as a punishment for Hamza.

From "Hamza" by Fadwa Tuqan

That his father was 65 has fallen on deaf ears/And the governor has issued his orders:

"Demolish the house and torture the son."/Having issued his orders he rose up

Reciting slogans of love, security, and order./The soldiers encircled the home

Wriggled like the serpent, and The knocks commandingly heightened

Enjoining the inhabitants to depart/Quite generously—in an hour or so.

And Hamza opened the windows/On looking at the soldiers and the sun

He exclaimed:/"Oh Palestine be assured/The house, the children, and myself

Will be sacrificed for your deliverance./We live and die for your sake."

The echo of Hamza's howl/Sent shivers through the nerves of town

While the house stood silent—and somber/Not an hour yet, the house went up and down. The rubble of the rooms which housed the dreams/And the warmth which was

And the years of childhood/The memories of building

The struggle and determination/Tears and happy laughter

Yesterday, I saw Hamza in the street/Stepping forward with steadfastness and conviction/And uphill brow

Tuqan's sense of injustice and outrage was matched by that of Nizar Tawfiq Qabbani (1923–1998), who was one of the most revered contemporary poets in the Arab world; not Palestinian, he probably felt Palestinian given his passionate identification with the Palestinian cause. Qabbani was a Syrian poet whose early poetry focused on love, eroticism, and affection, but he was transformed by the 1967 Arab defeat, which deeply influenced his poetry and provoked his lament for Palestine and the Arab cause. The defeat marked a qualitative shift in Qabbani's work—from erotic love poems to poems with overt political themes of rejection and resistance. For instance, his poem "Marginal Notes on the Book of Defeat" is a stinging self-criticism of Arab inferiority. He attributed the overwhelming defeat in six days to endemic problems and entrenched traditions that retarded society and crippled its capacity to advance and resist. Additionally his "Reflections on the Nakba" is a piece of social history containing a sophisticated, if subversive, analysis of the ills of Arab society.

From "Marginal Notes on the Book of Defeat" by Nizar Qabbani

My friends, I mourn for the language of the past/and the old books

This discourse punctured like battered shoes/This verse of profanity, slander, aspersion, I mourn—I mourn

Bitter to our mouth is poetry/Bitter to our eyes is beauty

The night—the curtains—the seats/Oh my sad Homeland

You have changed me over night/From a poet of love and longing

to one who writes with a knife/the summation of our case

is reduced to one sentence/we adopted the facade of civilization

while our spirit remained antiquated/It aches me to hear the news in the morning

and to hear the dogs bark/Our skin is senseless/our souls suffer from bankruptcy

Our days revolve around chess, drowsiness, visitation./Are we truly the best nation? Our oil which floods the desert/could have become a burning spear

If I am granted amnesty/If I can meet with the Sultan/I would say

your fierce dogs have torn my suit . . ./They interrogate my wife and compile a list of my friends

my master my sultan, you were defeated twice./If I am granted amnesty against the soldiers/I would say to the Sultan/you lost twice because you were unenlightened

about human rights/We want an angry generation/to aim towards the horizon

to search the roots of history/and penetrate the annals of thought

We are vanquished, insipid like a watermelon's rind/Do not study our news

Do not track our footsteps/Do not accept our thought/Oh children

you are the spring rain, the blossom of hope/You are the generation which will conquer defeat.

Yet Qabbani's poetry is also infused with a sense of optimism matching that of the Palestinian poets who lived under Occupation and vowed to resist it and succeed. An illustration of this theme appears in the following.

From "Jerusalem" by Nizar Qabbani

I wept until my tears became dry/I prayed until the candles flickered

I knelt until the floor creaked/I asked for Mohammed and Christ

Oh Jerusalem, the fragrance of prophets/The shortest path between earth and sky Oh Jerusalem, citadel of laws/A beautiful child with fingers charred

And downcast eyes/You are the shady oasis, route of the prophets

Your streets are melancholy/Your markets are mourning

You, the young maiden dressed in black/Who will ring the bells in the Nativity? On Sunday morning? Who will bring toys to the children?

On Christmas eve?/Oh Jerusalem, city of sorrow

A big tear is wandering in your eye/Who will halt the aggression

On you, o pearl of religions?/Who will wash your bloody walls?

Who will safeguard the Bible?/Who will rescue the Quran?

Who will save Christ?/Who will save man?

O Jerusalem my town/O Jerusalem my love

Tomorrow the lemon tree will blossom/And the olive trees will rejoice

Your eyes will dance/The migrant pigeons will return

To your sacred roofs/And your children will play again

Fathers and sons will meet/On your rosy hills

My town/The town of peace and olive trees

Mahmud Darwish is the best known of the Palestinian poetic lights. He is called the Olive Tree of Palestine as a symbol of rootedness and undying dedication and identification with the Palestinian cause in his poetry. Raymond Deane describes him as "the national poet of a non-existent nation, the love poet whose beloved is both a woman and a country, [who] saw metaphor as the essence both of poetry and of his everyday life. Such a vision dissolves secure perceptions of self, form, language and 'things-in-themselves.'"

Darwish began his poetic career in the 1960s and rose to fame in the 1970s, when he became noted for his metaphorical explanations of the Palestinian reality. The suffering he writes of is his own, but he knows that he is writing for his people, and thus he is recognized as one of the greatest Arab poets writing today. Mahmud Darwish became the main exponent of the literature of resistance in the sixties, and was, like many fellow poets, often imprisoned by Israeli authorities. He earned international acclaim for his poetry on the Palestine experience, etching the details of human moments rather than ideology, but constantly imbued with a drive for his people's dignity.

When his poem "A Lover from Palestine" was going to be published, he presented it to the Israeli censor, who crossed out the word "Palestine" and replaced it with "Eretz Israel." The insistence on his identity later prompted him to compose what is probably the most internationally celebrated Palestinian poem, "Bitaqat Hawiyya" (Identity Card), in which the poet, in the voice of a worker, addresses just such a bureaucrat. Here is Mahmud Darwish on the loss of al-Barwah, his childhood village.

From "Write Down! I Am an Arab" by Mahmud Darwish

I wasn't able to memorise the words and protect the place

from being transferred to a strange name fenced in

with eucalyptus trees. While the posters told us:

"You were never here."

The following small excerpt is from a poem called "Poem of the Land," which refers to the Day of the Land, a day that is marked annually by Palestinians on 30 March. It is a dedication to the demonstrators and the protesters who were shot and killed by the Israeli army in 1976.

From "Poem of the Land" by Mahmud Darwish

A small evening/A neglected village/Two sleeping eyes/Thirty years/Five wars

I witness that time hides for me/an ear of wheat

The singer sings/Of fire and strangers/Evening was evening

The singer was singing/And they question him/Why do you sing?

He answers them as they seize him/because I sing.

And they have searched him:/In his breast only his heart

In his heart only his people/In his voice only his sorrow

For the young, contemporary Palestinian poets, sorrows and worries notwithstanding, sentiments of hope and defiance serve as antidotes to suffering and pain. Ultimately, the Palestinian

struggle for a counternarrative is one that spawns interrelated disparate realms to achieve liberation and emancipation, and a historical grounding that makes the freedom of Palestine special. Here are the defiant words of Nizar Wattad (1980–, born in the United States to exiled Palestinian parents).

From "Poets for Palestine" by Nizar Wattad

Put it down for posterity's sake, free P [Palestine]
from the West Bank to the West Coast we start
to connect and get close, professin' our best hope
—despite the stress blessed 'cause it is something in our chest that love.

Another young poet, Sammer Abu Hawwash (1972–, born in Beirut to a family of Palestinian refugees), conveys his solitude and detachment from the outside world as follows.

From "A Cold Day" by Sammer Abu Hawwash

A cold day/I didn't think at all
to turn on the heat/wear a third sweater
or stand by the window/and wait for the rain
because it won't fall today/it will fall tomorrow
and I won't ask ever/how old I've become
at this hour/it is sometimes sufficient to sit
and think/it is a cold day

There are numerous other contemporary Palestinian poets who may be yet less well-known than those discussed above, including Sharif S. Elmusa, Saud el-Asadi, Izzidin al-Manasrah, Ahmad Dahbour, Anas al-Ayla, Mohammad H. Ghanaiem, Salman Masalha, Khaled Abdallah, Walid Khazendar, Youssef Abd al-Aziz, Ghazi al-Theeba, Khairi Mansour, Mourid al-Barghouti, and Ghassan Zaqtan, to name a few. The tradition of Palestinian poetry lives on.

See also Individual Palestinian poets: Mahmud Darwish; Rashid Husayn; 'Abd-al-Karim al-Karmi; Kamal Butros Nasir; Fadwa Tuqan; Ibrahim Tuqan; Tawfiq Zayyad. Other major literary and artistic figures with entries herein include Naji al-Azami Al-Ali, political cartoonist; Emile Habibi, novelist; Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, novelist and poet; Ghassan Kanafani, journalist and writer; Isma'il Abdul-Qader Shammut, artist

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—Naseer Aruri

Palestinian Refugee Property Claims

The Zionist movement has been able to create and defend a Jewish state successfully because it has gained and maintained control over increasingly larger amounts of LAND in Palestine/Israel, to the detriment of the Palestinian Arab population that formerly controlled much of the land. Although Zionist organizations like the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF) gradually purchased land in Palestine from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, Jews owned only 6.59 percent of the total surface area of Palestine on the eve of the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 (although this amount represented about 20 percent of Palestine's cultivable land). This situation changed dramatically as a result of Israel's victory in the war, when it confiscated a huge amount of land abandoned by Palestinian REFUGEES.

During the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, approximately 750,000 Palestinians fled their homes or were expelled across the cease-fire lines by Jewish forces—approximately one-half of the entire Arab population. Israel completely destroyed more than 400 Palestinian villages. Compounding the refugees' staggering political and demographic loss was their abandonment of a huge amount of movable and immovable property (land). For Israel, the abandoned property was a major boon to its devastated postwar economy. Even as the war was still raging, Jewish forces and civilians began occupying some of the homes abandoned by the refugees and tilling some of their fields. The new Israeli government quickly

enacted legislation to sequester the property and provide a "legal" regime for controlling it. On 20 June 1948, it froze all refugee bank accounts. The following day, it enacted the Abandoned Property Ordinance and, on 24 June, the ABANDONED AREAS ORDINANCE. On 15 July a Custodian of Abandoned Property was established, which later gave way to a CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY after promulgation of the Emergency Regulations (Absentees' Property) of 2 December 1948.

This law allowed the state to sequester the property of persons defined as "absentees." Movable property could be sold, although the custodian could only lease land, not sell it. The definition of an absentee was much wider than the conventional definition of a refugee. Any citizen of an Arab state was declared an absentee, as was any person who, after 29 November 1947 (the date the UN partition plan for Palestine, UN RESOLUTION 181, was adopted), traveled to an Arab state for any reason. Individuals who were in any part of Palestine not under Jewish control—which was much of the country—were declared absentees. Persons who were in any location other than their "habitual residence" were declared absentees, even if they were in areas under Israeli control. The ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW, enacted by the Israeli Knesset on 14 March 1950, was the most significant law to affect Palestinian property. It granted the Custodian of Absentee Property the ability not just to lease sequestered property but also to sell it to a "DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY," a governmental body later created by the Development Authority (Transfer of Property) Law of 31 July 1950. The custodian thereafter sold the bulk of the refugee land to the Development Authority, and title to the land was transferred officially on 1 October 1953. Together, these two laws were the first major steps by which Israel sought to sever the refugees' legal title to their abandoned property and confiscate it permanently.

Even before that sale occurred, the Israeli government agreed to sell most of the abandoned Palestinian property to the Jewish National Fund (JNF), the premier Zionist land-purchasing company. The two sides signed agreements on 27 January 1949 and 4 October 1950 in which the state agreed to sell a large amount of mostly rural land to the JNF. The JNF's charter forbade it from ever selling any of its land; it could only lease it, and then only to Jews. The JNF then worked with another Zionist organization, the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, to build settlements on this land to house new Jewish IMMIGRANTS. While some abandoned Palestinian housing was utilized for the newcomers, most dwellings in abandoned villages were destroyed, leaving only vacant land. Over 300 new settlements were built by the end of 1953. By 1954, one-third of Israel's Jewish population lived on confiscated refugee land, although much rural refugee land today remains uninhabited.

The United Nations General Assembly expressed its concern over the refugees and their property by adopting UN RESOLUTION 194 (III) on 11 December 1948. In addition to establishing the UN CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE (UNCCP), paragraph 11 of the resolution stated that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practical date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of INTERNATIONAL LAW or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible."

The UNCCP began functioning in January 1949 and immediately tried to engineer peace treaties between Israel and several Arab states. It also undertook the more specific task of implementing Resolution 194's call for property compensation. Within two years, the UNCCP had failed in its mandate to effect peace treaties and then pursued in vain its mission to work on behalf of refugee compensation until its functional demise in 1966 (the commission technically still exists). Starting in 1952, the UNCCP also supervised the restitution of £3,595,160 sterling ($14,488,495 in 1947 dollars) in refugee bank accounts that had been blocked by Israel.

However, its major efforts were in assessing the scope and value of the refugees' losses. From 1953 until 1964, the UNCCP worked on the largest project it ever undertook: identifying Arab land in Israel and assigning it a value. Because UNCCP staff did not know which land belonged to refugees, it decided to identify every parcel of Arab-owned land in Palestine as of 14 May 1948, the date on which Israel declared independence. It then determined the value of each parcel as of 29 November 1947, the date marking the UN General Assembly's vote to partition Palestine and the effective start of the war. On 13 May 1964, the UNCCP published the amount of land in Israel that it had identified: 5,258,091 dunums (approxi-

mately 1,314,523 acres), of which most was refugee land. It estimated that an additional 1,811,000 dunums of land (approximately 452,750 acres) had been owned by Arabs, although it could not document this. The UNCCP estimated the value of all this land to be £235,660,250 in 1947 Palestinian pounds ($949,710,808 in 1947 dollars), although it never published this information.

The refugee property issue has defied solution because it is intertwined with the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, especially the Palestinian refugee problem. From the beginning, Israel stated its willingness to compensate the refugees for their property but refused to allow either large-scale refugee return or property restitution. For this reason, and because Resolution 194 refers to compensation being paid to nonreturning refugees, most Palestinian refugees have refused to contemplate compensation, because this would mean abandoning their right of return. Israel also raised counterclaims that it said would affect its eventual compensation payments to Palestinians. The most significant of these claims arose in 1951, when Israel linked Palestinian compensation with compensation for lands taken from Jews who emigrated from several Arab states starting in 1948. Because the property claims were connected with other difficult issues, no progress was made during the long decades of conflict. Although the OSLO ACCORDS of September 1993 set in motion an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the two sides deferred dealing with the refugee problem in all its aspects until the so-called FINAL STATUS TALKS. With the subsequent breakdown of peace negotiations in 2000, Palestinian refugee property claims remain unresolved.

See also JOHN F. KENNEDY; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN

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—Michael R. Fischbach

Palestinian Society, Pre-1948

The modern history of Palestine begins around 1800 and ends in 1948, with Israel's establishment as a state and the *Nakba*—the exodus of some 750,000 Palestinians. It is divided into two main historical periods: the first covers the nineteenth century and World War I, and the second, which is the subject of this essay, begins after World War I with the establishment of the BRITISH MANDATE of Palestine under the auspices of the League of Nations. The transforming forces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which had severe consequences for Palestinian society, may be summarized in one phrase: European interventionism. European intervention in Palestine encouraged the process of European settlement in the country, transformed its economy, created new social classes, and rearranged power relations among existing social groups, including the recent Jewish IMMIGRANT settlers. This process of intervention started slowly in the early nineteenth century but intensified and accelerated in its second half. European interventionism propelled Palestine from a largely subsistence and semifeudal, tribute-paying mode of existence into a market economy and, finally, before its destruction, into an underdeveloped capitalist-dependent economy. Most significantly, it created the conditions for the destruction of Palestine and the dispossession of its people in 1948.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the traditional economy of Palestine was eroding under a regime of clan-based, local notables subject to Ottoman suzerainty. The old order gave way to a new one consisting of commercial agriculture, a monetized economy, and the beginnings of an indigenous

market linked by trade to the region and to Europe under more centralized Ottoman control. In the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century prior to World War I, however, this new order was itself restructured and reoriented toward dependent peripheral market capitalism as a result of both European intervention and the active participation of native landed and comprador classes. This transformation was similar to that of the surrounding Arab region except in one major respect: the arrival in the country of European colonial settlers and immigrants, principally Jewish, which eventually led to the dispossession of Palestine's native people.

During the British Mandate, two structural processes—rapid settler colonialism and colonial capitalist transformation—combined to subjugate the Palestinian people and destroy Palestinian society. Although the emergent Palestinian bourgeoisie participated in a minor way in the latter process, it was the European Jewish settlers who were the principal agents of the dual processes.

The British Mandate, 1920–1948

After the breakup of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, Palestine was unique among the mandates created by the League of Nations in that the Mandatory power encouraged European Jewish immigrants to settle in the country (in accordance with the BALFOUR DECLARATION). Otherwise the British treated Palestine as an ordinary colony, with typical trade, finance, currency, administrative, and defense policies. Like other colonies, Palestine was supposed to pay the costs of its own internal and external security and, in this instance, to guarantee the safety of Jewish colonial settlers against the native Palestinians.

Palestine was a poor country lacking in resources and in investment and growth potential. Britain's main interest in Palestine was strategic, despite the Balfour Declaration's religious and cultural justifications. The country was the key buffer state in the British imperial defense of India, EGYPT, and the Suez Canal (the shortest sea route to India); part of the air routes to India and IRAQ; and the principal terminus of the oil pipelines from the Iraqi oil fields (of the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company, or IPC). However, British and Zionist ideology saw the potential for the economic growth of Palestine in the "yeast" of Jewish immigrants with superior education, technological know-how, and capital that would produce an economic "cake" that could be shared with the poor and backward Palestinian Arabs.

The number of Jewish settlers in Palestine increased in sporadic waves between 1919 and 1931. The December 1931 British census of the country showed that, of the 1.04 million people, 84 percent were Arab and 16 percent Jewish. By 1936, the Jewish population was estimated at 370,000, or 28 percent of the total, a dramatic increase from the 1931 census. Eighty-five percent of the Jewish population remained centered in three major urban centers and their surrounding areas: JAFFA–Tel Aviv, JERUSALEM, and HAIFA. In response, the Arab population became alarmed at the rapid rate at which the DEMOGRAPHY of their country was being altered, without their consent and against their will, thus contributing one factor to the 1936 ARAB REVOLT.

Land acquisition. By the mid-nineteenth century, except for certain swampy areas, Palestine was densely populated and intensively cultivated. Moreover, the land tenure and ownership system was complex and encumbered by varied forms of private and public usufruct rights, despite nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms and liberalization. Available LAND was expensive and became more so with the rising demand of a population growing as a result of both natural increase and in-migration. With the establishment of the British Mandate, Zionist hopes that STATE LAND—perceived as vast and potentially accessible—would serve as a basis for land acquisition turned out to be largely unrealistic. Nevertheless, by 1947, approximately 195,000 dunums (48,000 acres) of State Land were granted or leased to Jewish settlers by the British Mandate authorities.

The Zionist policy of land acquisition had a political logic: the Zionists looked for quantity and quality, location and contiguity. Accordingly, they tended to purchase land in large, contiguous areas of the inland and coastal plains. These acquisitions were made not by private individuals but by political agencies of the Zionist movement, such as the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF), the Keren Hayesod (or the Palestine Foundation Fund, established in 1920), the PALESTINE LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PLDC), the PALESTINE JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION (PJCA), and the JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION. Around 70 percent of all Palestinian land that Zionists acquired was purchased by the PLDC on behalf of the JNF. Collectively owned land was purchased in the name of

the Jewish people and reserved for exclusive Jewish use. The formal establishment of the Palestine Mandate under Britain, and to the north the LEBANON Mandate under FRANCE, created a strong impetus for the sale of vast estates by mainly Lebanese and Syrian Arab ABSENTEE LANDLORDS to Zionist organizations, which were well endowed with hard capital. Between 1920 and 1927, 82 percent of all land acquired by such groups was purchased from absentee landlords.

It is possible to discern three periods of intensive land acquisition by Jews and Zionist organizations in Palestine: 1923–1927, an average annual 61,400 dunums (15,000 acres) of land purchased; 1932–1935, 59,500 dunums (14,500 acres) purchased; and 1942–1947, 61,200 dunums (15,000 acres) purchased. Whereas in 1922, Jews owned 751,192 dunums (185,000 acres), representing 3 percent of the land of Palestine, the total area purchased by Jews by 1947 was 1.73 million dunums (427,000 acres), representing only 7 percent of the total surface area of Palestine but including nearly 24 percent of all the arable land. At no time did the percentage of Jews living on farms exceed 19.3 percent. The withdrawal of so much arable land from access or use by Palestinian peasants led not only to their landlessness and proletarianization but also to economic hardship. Thus Palestinian peasant discontent, political activism, and hostility to and violence against the Zionists and the British authorities were highest after periods of high transfer of land, accounting for the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, and the 1948 WAR. These periods also coincide with heavy waves of Jewish migration into Palestine, particularly in the five years before the Arab Revolt of 1936.

A separate Jewish economy. The British policy of economic development in Palestine and, specifically, of granting Jewish settlers monopolistic concessions and industrial protectionism, facilitated the building of an exclusive Jewish economy that Zionists called the "conquest of land and of labor." Britain also facilitated Jewish land acquisition (except when Palestinian political or violent action caused a reconsideration of policies) and provided for Jewish enterprises through a protectionist policy and preferential tariffs that included the importation of raw materials produced in Palestine by Palestinians.

Besides land for Jewish colonies in Athlit, Caesarea, Kabbara, and Beisan, the British Mandate granted three main national monopolistic concessions to Jewish entrepreneurs in 1920–1930: the Rutenberg, the Dead Sea salt, and the Athlit Salt Company. Although Palestinians opposed the Rutenberg concession, viewing it as economically privileging Jews, the British government ignored these objections and allowed the Jaffa Electric Company and the Palestine Electric Corporation to form, with a majority of Jewish capital, in 1921 and 1923. These companies helped electrify a new settlement, Tel Aviv, providing a service crucial to its rapid rise from a suburb of Jaffa to a modern, European-style Jewish city. In 1930, after a long controversy in the British Parliament, the Palestine Potash Company, a Zionist industrial venture, was granted to a team headed by Moses Novomeysky, a Russian Zionist. One final major concession—in addition to several smaller ones—was the Athlit Salt Company, a Jewish enterprise licensed to produce salt, which showed special favoritism to the Zionist Jews. The artificially high price placed on salt hurt the Palestinian Arabs in all walks of life, because salt was not just a basic daily food necessity but also a crucial element in the manufacture of soap and leather goods, long-established industries of Palestine.

Even before the Mandate, Jewish enterprises introduced steam, electric, and internal combustion power into production as oil presses, flour mills, and power motors in soap manufacturing. In addition, Jewish and German settlers came to dominate the building industry. Also prior to the Mandate, the Jewish settlers had laid the foundation for an industrial sector that was more capital-intensive and efficient than the Palestinian one. This transplanted, well-organized Jewish industrial sector experienced a new and significant advance during the Mandate. Although British authorities did not materially support industrialization in their colonies, they encouraged private development of Jewish industry in Palestine. In the mid-1920s, industrialization took off after an urban boom following the wave of migration of middle-class Polish Jews, who were sophisticated in industry and business and who settled in cities rather than rural agricultural settlements.

During World War II, the Jewish industrial base became stronger, as the British encouraged it to supply the needs (including military hardware) of Allied forces and of the domestic market. By 1939, the *Survey of Palestine* indicated that although Jews comprised only 31 percent of the

total population, Jewish capital investment in industry was 88 percent of total industrial investment, 90 percent of installed horsepower, and 89 percent of total net industrial output, while Jewish workers represented 79 percent of all industrial workers in Palestine. In short, by 1929, British and Zionist policy had brought forth a Jewish industrial sector that had little connection to the Palestinian Arab economy or population.

Most directly deleterious to Palestinian industry and agriculture was the exemption of duties on the importation of olive oil and sesame seeds to benefit the Jewish-owned Shemen Palestine Oil Industry. At the same time, import duties on cement were constantly raised to protect the Jewish-owned Nesher Cement Company. Similarly, Mandate import duties on a whole host of items (salt, jelly, jam, cakes, chocolate, etc.) were also specifically raised to protect Jewish manufacturers.

Jewish labor. As in the development of an exclusive Jewish economy, institutions, and land base, the British colonial government of Palestine contributed to the exclusive creation, protection, and unemployment relief of Jewish labor. The British did not, however, extend this policy to the Palestinian Arab labor force. Further, the British facilitated the creation of a two-tier wage structure for Palestinian Arabs and Jews in both the private and public sectors. These discriminatory labor policies handicapped Palestinian labor in wage levels and working conditions, contributing to Palestinian unemployment, indebtedness, and severe discontent. These factors were important determinants of the sociopolitical upheavals of the Palestinians in 1929, 1936–1939, and 1947–1948.

British colonial economic development policy in Palestine had three basic tenets. The first was a conservative fiscal policy (common to other colonies) by which the colonized people had to pay internal and external security and public expenditures, no matter how narrow their revenue base. The second was a development theory that postulated that Jewish inputs in the undeveloped, resource-poor Palestine would lead to a structural rise of the whole economy. This idea was predicated on the potential importation of vast Jewish capital and skilled Jewish capitalists into the country. However, because Zionist organizations encouraged Jewish employers to hire more expensive Jewish workers over the much cheaper Palestinian Arab workers, the growth of all sectors of the Palestinian economy was hurt. According to the third tenet, Britain regulated Jewish migration into Palestine in accordance with the "absorptive capacity" of the country. Early in the Mandate period, this concept was redefined to mean the absorptive capacity of the Jewish economy only.

The principal means through which the Zionists succeeded in building a separate and privileged Jewish labor force was the HISTADRUT (the General Federation of Jewish Labor), established in 1920. Unlike any other union, it owned a construction cooperative (called Solel Boneh), consumer and marketing cooperatives, a bank (Bank Hapoelim), and credit, insurance, and publishing institutions. The great majority of Jewish workers belonged to the Histadrut, and it became one of the largest employers after the establishment of Israel. In contrast to the poorly organized Palestinian workers, organized Jewish labor exerted strong pressure on the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE and the British government in Palestine. As a result, the Histadrut was able through the Zionist Executive to gain many concessions from the Mandate government.

Separate social and political institutions. Like other practices of the Zionists, the social service institutions exclusively served Jews. The most important of these was Hadassah Medical Organization, which established a number of hospitals, with clinics, laboratories, and pharmacies, in most of the Palestine cities with heavy Jewish populations (e.g., Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Tabariyya, and SAFED). Hadassah also established the nurses' training school, the Straus Health Center for All Races and Creeds, infant welfare stations, school hygiene, school lunch programs, and playgrounds, and it developed public health programs for reducing trachoma and malaria among Jews. As a consequence of these raised health standards, the death rate among Jews was less than half that among the majority of the Palestinians.

One of the most important efforts in creating a new Jewish-Zionist national identity was the educational system. In the Mandate agreement, the Zionists won from the British and the League of Nations the recognition of Hebrew as an official language, along with Arabic and English, although at the time Jews represented no more than about 10 percent of the population in Palestine. They also acquired British consent and financial support for a separate and exclusive private Jewish school system. Zionist authorities, furthermore, gained autonomy over the curriculum, which was imbued with Zionist-inspired Jewish nationalism.

At the same time, British authorities denied such freedom—and financial support—to the Palestinian Arabs, who were again greatly disadvantaged relative to the settler-immigrant Jews. Mandate government figures indicate that, in 1944, only 32.5 percent of Palestinian Arab children five to fourteen years old were enrolled in schools; the figure was 97 percent for Jewish children in the same age group. The private and governmental Palestinian school system helped reduce illiteracy substantially yet failed to provide the technical or higher education that the Jewish community provided. Secondary education for urban Palestinians was limited, and, unless they attended a teachers' college in Jerusalem, Palestinians had to leave the country to go to a university. Palestine's educational system for the two communities under the Mandate was separate and unequal in terms of quality, financing, levels, and delivery, especially in the rural areas. To suppress the rising Palestinian consciousness, British authorities denied the Palestinians the right to teach nationalism. Nationalist sentiment and activity nonetheless surged in the schools, which became the loci of political mobilization during the Mandate, as they were later for Palestinians in exile and during OCCUPATION in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP.

Moreover, the British authorized the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, in addition to acting as a quasi-government for the Jewish community, to establish various social, economic, and political agencies, institutions, and organizations, including military and intelligence units. Together these organizations were the nucleus of an emerging autonomous Jewish political authority within the British Mandate government. The Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, had no such centralized political agency, nor did their political leaders have the capacity to mobilize the population effectively on a national level. Although the British made several proposals for the formation of a parallel Arab agency, Palestinian Arab leaders rejected the notion because it would have placed the Arab and Jewish agencies on an equal political and moral level at a time when the indigenous people and their leaders were in a highly unequal situation vis-à-vis the Zionists. At the time, they were not prepared to accept the Zionist settler-colonial project and were demanding independence from British rule.

Economic Transformation of the Mandate

As the Jewish settlers created in Palestine a Westernized enclave society with a European standard of living and a demand for European goods and services, these socioeconomic developments vastly escalated the pace of change and reoriented the structure of the Palestinian economy and society. To begin with, the population increased rapidly. As two British censuses (in 1922 and 1931) and subsequent governmental estimates suggest, Palestine's population more than doubled between 1922 and 1946, from 750,000 to 1.8 million. The rate of increase of the migrant Jewish population was higher than the natural increment among Palestinians, and therefore the Jewish ratio to the total population grew larger: from roughly 11 percent to 31 percent in twenty-four years. While the Palestinian population doubled in size, the Jewish population nearly tripled. Nevertheless, the Palestinian population was still greater by a ratio of two to one.

The population shifted toward urban centers, although the distribution between Jews and Palestinians was uneven. The Palestinian population was still largely rural in the mid-1930s and less so in the 1940s, with roughly 25–35 percent urban; the opposite held for the Jewish population, with roughly 75 percent urban in the same period. Although Palestinians outnumbered Jews two to one, both labor forces were roughly the same size as a result of the age distribution (50 percent of Palestinians were below the age of fifteen), low Palestinian female participation in wage labor, and the fact that most Jewish migrant-settlers were of the productive age (fifteen to twenty-nine years old). Furthermore, well over 90 percent of the Jews were literate, in contrast to 30 percent of the Palestinians, and the two-tier wage system instituted by the British provided Jewish workers with a wage rate up to three times higher than for the Palestinians. Accordingly, the per capita income for Jews was also nearly three times as high as that for Palestinians: £P44 (around $175 in 1935) compared to £P17 (around $68).

The first economic phase, 1920–1939. The structure and dynamics of Palestine's economy during the Mandate went through two distinct phases. The first extended from the beginning of the Mandate until 1939, and the second, a wartime economy, lasted until 1945, its consequences reaching into 1948. In both periods the Jewish and Palestinian communities developed differently, but during the war the Palestinian economy, which remained overwhelmingly agrarian, experienced much greater rates of change and transformation. In the plains, large tracts of land were devoted to

irrigated, export-oriented citrus fruits, while in the hill country, cereal, olives, and olive oil were produced for self-consumption, the local market, and, if there was a surplus, for export. The whole Palestinian economy, however, turned more capitalistic as land was lost to Jewish purchases, as agricultural stagnation created surplus labor and high unemployment in the countryside, and as more Palestinians entered the wage labor market and rural-to-town migration gained momentum.

Substantial growth in Palestinian manufacturing also occurred during the first phase. The number of industrial enterprises rose from 1,240 in 1913 to 3,505 in 1927, and about 6,000 in 1936. Industrial workers also grew in number (from 17,955 in 1927 to 48,000 in 1939), although industrial enterprises remained largely small handicraft workshops. Most factories employed fewer than 100 workers, and only a fraction ran on motor power. The 1939 government census of industry found 13,678 Jewish workers engaged in industry, in contrast to only 4,117 Palestinian Arab workers. Nevertheless, the number of Palestinian wage laborers increased steadily throughout the 1930s as opportunities in public works and private enterprises, including some Jewish ventures, increased (e.g., in citrus groves, the Nesher Cement Company, and the Palestine Potash Company). However, much of Palestinian wage labor remained seasonal and itinerant, and a reserve army of labor grew in size and destitution by the end of the 1930s, contributing to the violent explosion of the 1936 Arab Revolt.

The consequences of the first two decades of the British Mandate's economic growth and development varied widely between the two communities. While economic growth strengthened and consolidated the Jewish immigrant-settler community and its political leadership, the uneven, differential, and rapid capitalist economic change polarized the Palestinian people; dispossessed and substantially impaired the well-being of increasing numbers of peasants; fragmented, displaced, and proletarianized much of the Palestinian population; and fractionalized Palestinian social and political leadership.

The second economic phase, 1939–1945. During World War II, Palestine became a strategic outpost for the British in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean region: the fortified base of large land, air, and naval military forces; the terminus of oil pipelines from Iraq; and the location of a key oil refinery. The British devised an economic plan—through the Middle East Supply Center (in Cairo), the War Supplies Board, and the Directorate of War Production—to mobilize local and regional agricultural and industrial production for both military and civilian needs to reduce dependence on external (European and US) sources of supply. This successful strategy resulted in rapid economic development of nearly all sectors of Palestine's economy, though the Jewish share was larger than the Palestinian.

In a short period of five years, Palestine underwent a profound structural transformation. There was a phenomenal increase in industrial capacity, output, and types of products supplied to the military, Palestine's internal market, and the region. By 1946, the number of industrial enterprises rose to well above 6,000, the majority Jewish-owned and only several hundred owned by Palestinians. Most remarkable was the production of military and other sophisticated hardware (antitank mines, steel containers, hydraulic jacks, and bodies for military vehicles), especially in the peak years of the Allied North African Campaign against German general Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. Also during this period the Jewish-owned diamond-cutting and-polishing industry (thirty factories employing 3,000 workers) expanded.

Because of increased mechanization, production on small farms and large estates owned by Palestinians increased sharply and was accompanied by the decline, from 180,000 in 1939 to 100,000 in 1944, of rural male laborers who derived a livelihood from agriculture. Delayed British efforts to introduce modern production techniques, however, meant that these techniques were not broadly adopted. Without a comprehensive road network, production in Palestinian Arab agriculture remained largely traditional, especially on the smaller and more remote farms.

As a consequence of the demand for labor, average industrial wage earnings rose by 200 percent for Palestinians and 258 percent for Jews, and those for unskilled construction workers advanced by 405 percent and 329 percent, respectively. Despite the rise in their wages, the unskilled Palestinian workers remained disadvantaged in comparison to Jewish laborers, lacking benefits and facing lower wages. Socioeconomic differentiation and polarization in the population swelled the ranks of both the middle class and landless peasantry and also the urban middle class and the city poor. Nearly one-third of Palestine's Arab peasantry was

landless by the end of the war, and urban misery increased tremendously.

With the rapid formation of the Palestinian wage-earning labor force in the 1940s, working-class organizations sprang up throughout the urban centers. Established in 1925, the Palestine Arab Workers Society (PAWS) grew rapidly during the war: from 2,000 members in 1939 to over 9,000 members in 1943 and 15,000 in 1945. Unions were especially active in the coastal industrial cities of Haifa and Jaffa and in Jerusalem. Another major union, the Federation of Arab Trade Unions (FATU), emerged in 1942 in a split with PAWS, whose political orientation was social democratic, whereas FATU was communist-influenced. FATU, whose membership may have reached 4,500, concentrated on organizing skilled workers and affiliated worker associations in such large establishments as the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company, Shell Oil, Consolidated Refineries, the Haifa Harbor, the Royal Depot at Haifa Bay, and the Haifa Public Works Department. While originally owned and managed by the workers, both PAWS and FATU became increasingly politicized by the end of the war.

Palestinian wage labor by the end of the Mandate had scored impressive gains, as witnessed by its growth, activism, and independence. There is no doubt that it had succeeded, despite the absence of progressive labor laws, in forging a relatively strong class consciousness and a working-class culture. Whereas early in the war the British encouraged unionization as part of their labor recruitment policy, by the end of the war the authorities were hostile to the increasingly politicized movement. But neither the labor movement nor the political organizations were sufficiently strong to enable them, along with the more traditional leadership and parties, to succeed in the national political struggle against dispossession in the postwar era.

Palestinian Struggle against Dispossession

The process of Jewish empowerment and the commensurate inverse process of Palestinian disenfranchisement, both highly politicized under British auspices, developed through three stages that coincided roughly with the three decades of British colonial rule. The period from 1920 to 1929 culminated in serious rioting, political conflict and violence, and critical British government investigative and policy reports: the SHAW COMMISSION report, the HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION report, and the PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER. The period from 1930 to 1939 witnessed a general Palestinian revolt between 1936 and the 1939 Arab Revolt and forced the British government to issue the 1937 PEEL COMMISSION Report and the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER. The period from 1940 to 1948, a time of dramatic economic transformation and political conflict, saw the establishment of the UN partition plan in 1947 (UN RESOLUTION 181), an internal Jewish-Palestinian war, the destruction of Palestine, and the rise of Israel as a Jewish state.

The 1920–1929 decade. In Palestine, mass Jewish immigration commenced in accordance with the British policy of establishing a Jewish national home. Palestinians perceived the arrival of 10,000 Jewish immigrants from December 1920 to April 1921 as a harbinger. A riot started in Jaffa and spread to rural areas, fueled by wild rumors of Jews killing Arabs. Several Palestinians were killed by British soldiers defending Jewish settlements. In the aftermath, the British appointed the HAYCRAFT COMMISSION to investigate the situation and found that the Palestinian Arabs were intensely agitated over political and economic issues, especially Jewish immigration into Palestine.

While peasants and the urban poor rioted and used violence against Jewish settlers (but not yet against the British authorities), the Palestinian people in the towns and villages organized themselves into MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS, Arab literary clubs, the Higher Islamic Council, and other groups in a national effort to resist Zionist designs. The elite launched a movement to unite their political efforts to influence British policy. In December 1920, a Palestine Arab Congress, representing, it claimed, "all classes and creeds of the Arab people of Palestine," was held in Haifa and elected a twenty-four-member leadership called the Palestine ARAB EXECUTIVE, which joined the leaders of the two competing notable families of Jerusalem who had national stature—the AL-HUSAYNIS and the NASHASHIBIS. The political platform of the congress included condemnation of the Balfour Declaration, the idea of a Jewish national home and the British Mandate's support of it, and the principle of mass Jewish immigration into Palestine; instead, it voiced support for the establishment of a national government in Palestine. Diplomatic pressure by the Palestine Arab delegation of the Arab Executive that lobbied in London

and Geneva (at the League of Nations) led the British colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, to clarify the Balfour Declaration. In 1922, the CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM reasserted British pro-Zionist policy but proposed to allow Jewish immigration only in accordance with the economic "absorptive capacity" of the country and to establish a legislative council made up of Palestinians, Jews, and British.

In October 1923 the British offered to create an ARAB AGENCY analogous to the Jewish Agency, but the Palestinian leadership turned down the proposal because they believed that an analogy was unfair, given demographic and historical conditions. Further, the Jewish Agency was elected by the whole Jewish community, whereas the proposed Arab Agency would be appointed by the British authorities. When the Palestinian leadership sought an elected parliament for self-rule, the British blocked it, leaving the Palestine Arab Executive merely a mouthpiece, unlike the powerful Jewish Agency. The executive was not even officially recognized by the British Mandate government and had no official advisory or consultative status. Instead, the Palestine Arab Congress, which met regularly, remained the principal Palestinian representative despite deep fissures in the nationalist ranks, until it was replaced by the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE in 1936. The demands of the congresses (the fifth in 1923 and the sixth in 1924) presented to the British authorities evolved as the economic and financial policies of Histadrut and the exclusion of Palestinian labor came to the fore. An early harbinger, the question of land—the critical issue of the 1929 violent political upheaval—was considered by the 1922 congress, which demanded protection for small peasants against Jewish expropriation, an indication of the fast-deteriorating economic conditions of Palestine's peasantry.

The Mandatory government legitimized and recognized the religious leadership of AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI. However, to counter his influence and his control of the Palestine Arab Executive, the Nashashibis attempted to form an opposing power base. RAGIB AL-NASHASHIBI formed national Muslim societies and the National Party (1923) and encouraged the creation of peasant parties (1924). These latter moves were supported by the Zionists as an effort to split Palestinian ranks along social class lines. These political developments both reflected and fueled the bitter rivalry between the two nationalist factions, which in turn kept the Palestinians from achieving their larger political goals.

The peasant parties or groups were the vanguard of the violent struggle against the Zionists in the 1920s and the British authorities in the 1930s. The leaders of the peasantry, perhaps more than the elite politicians, demanded immediate social and economic protection against the peasants' worsening situation. The platforms of the rural political groups were noteworthy for their attention to economic matters. They called on the government to adopt specific policies: reduce taxes; extend the maturity of debts; provide long-term loans; build roads, schools, and the educational system; and encourage agricultural cooperation.

During the 1920s a sudden downturn in the economy caused a sharp decline in the well-being of all Palestinians, especially the peasantry. Palestinian concern was reflected in the agenda for the seventh Palestine Arab Congress, held in 1928, which reunified the Palestinian nationalist factions. Its resolutions stressed the economic dilemma and called for tax reform, social welfare for the workers, and increased public expenditure in education. Although violence against the Zionists had largely subsided by 1921, a combination of factors created a highly charged political situation. As was often the case, a minor religious incident in 1929 at the WESTERN WALL of the ancient Jewish Temple triggered a crisis over rights to the wall and an explosion of violence known as the Western Wall Disturbances.

The British government response was predictable. It set up the Shaw Commission to study the causes of the disturbances; sent another, the Hope-Simpson Commission, to conduct a thorough study of the socioeconomic conditions in the country; and issued a policy statement, the Passfield White Paper, in 1930. The Shaw Commission concluded that the basic cause of the disturbances was the Palestinian people's feeling "of disappointment of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future." Hope-Simpson concluded his report with a number of specific and general policy proposals. For immediate relief, he recommended an end to imprisonment for debt; taxation exemption for any peasant making less than £P30 (around $120) per annum; credit and education for the peasantry; and, for the longer term, extensive agricultural development programs. He also urged regulation of land transfer and tight restrictions on immigration. Although he said that Palestinian Arab unemployment was not

directly linked to Jewish immigration, he stated that the policy of the British government in regard to immigration must be determined by unemployment in Palestine overall, not just in the Jewish community. He wrote that "it is wrong that a Jew from Poland, Lithuania or the Yemen, should be admitted to fill an existing vacancy, while in Palestine there are already workmen capable of filling that vacancy, who are unable to find employment."

The recommendations of the Hope-Simpson and Shaw commissions were largely reflected in the 1930 Passfield White Paper, which also stated that it was time to develop self-rule institutions in Palestine, although the LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL it proposed was styled after that in the 1922 Churchill Memorandum. Lord Passfield and his white paper came under vigorous attack by the Zionists and pro-Zionists in Britain and Palestine. This political pressure overwhelmed the minority government of Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, who, in effect, repudiated and reversed the policy changes of the Passfield White Paper in a letter to CHAIM WEIZMANN, dubbed by the Palestinians the "black letter." This policy reversal kept in place the social, economic, and institutional processes that the British authorities had determined to be the causes of the disturbances in Palestine.

The 1930s and the Great Revolt. Through moderate political-diplomatic tactics, including petitions, testimonies, delegations, public meetings, congresses, and discussions with the Mandate government, elite Palestinian leaders achieved little. The MACDONALD "BLACK LETTER" added proof of the ineffectiveness of moderate politics. A new tone of militancy imbued newspaper articles, reports, and public speeches that challenged the traditional leadership and its unsuccessful methods, and there emerged a new generation of leaders. An all-out revolt was in the making.

The root causes of the revolt remained unchanged: the Palestinians' antipathy toward pro-Zionist British policies and their inability to advance toward self-rule. Exacerbating the situation for the peasantry was a land tax introduced by the British authorities in 1928, based on the value of the higher crop prices of the boom years of 1924–1927. These crippling tax rates and a sharp drop in income may have led some peasants and landlords to sell their land. Palestinian land brokers, usurers, and middlemen were especially active in land sales to the Jewish organizations, despite being pilloried and on occasion threatened with physical harm. The difficult economic situation led the British government to remit the taxes of the poorest peasants, as recommended by Hope-Simpson. More alarming for the Palestinians in this economic context was the sudden and spectacular rise of Jewish immigration into the country in the first half of the 1930s. In spite of governmental decisions to regulate and reduce the number of Jewish immigrants into the country in accordance with the vague concept of "absorptive capacity," tens of thousands of Jews poured into Palestine when the rise of Nazism in GERMANY pushed them out of central Europe.

These contextual factors coincided with the death in 1934 of the head of the Palestine Arab Executive, the subsequent demise of the organization, and the emergence of more militant groups, especially the ISTIQLAL (Independence) Party. These new groups tended to be pan-Arabist and highly critical of the moderate Palestinian leadership and its diplomatic methods. They included such articulate and modern men as AWNI 'ABD AL-HADI, Akram Zu'ayter, Izzat Darwaza, and AHMAD SHUQAYRI (who became the first chairman of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION in 1964). These leaders advocated strong active opposition to the Zionists and, significantly, to the British and Mandate governments and called for the dismantlement of the Mandate and its replacement by a parliamentary Palestinian Arab government. Such views captured the imagination and support of a frustrated and combative public. By 1936, a number of Palestinian political parties reflecting varied socioeconomic and ideological interests had formed, including the Youth Congress, the National Defense Party (dominated by the Nashashibis), the Palestine ARAB PARTY (dominated by al-Hajj Amin and the Husaynis), the REFORM PARTY, and the NATIONAL BLOC PARTY. A Palestine Communist Party, which had existed since the early 1920s but had little direct influence, called for an independent Palestine for both Palestinian Arabs and Jews free from British imperialism.

The activism that produced the new political groupings found a stronger and more militant echo in an underground religious organization led by SHAYKH 'IZZ-AL-DIN AL-QASSAM. Like the Istiqlal, pan-Arabists, and nationalists, he became convinced that the diplomatic and political tactics of the elite leadership not only were ineffective in securing Palestinian rights but also had brought the

country to the edge of disaster. Al-Qassam and his followers took up arms in the countryside as the renewed urban violence and Jewish counterviolence intensified. In November 1935, he and his band of guerrillas were ambushed and killed by British troops. His martyrdom, self-sacrifice, and commitment to the national cause offered the Palestinian people a more honorable and popular model of struggle than that of the elite leadership. A large number of youths throughout Palestine formed guerrilla bands, called themselves Ikhwan al-Qassam (Brothers of al-Qassam), and launched an ARMED STRUGGLE against both the Jewish settlers and the British authorities.

Organizations of the emergent Palestinian civil society (unions, chambers of commerce, the All-Palestine Conference of Arab Students, etc.) and traditional BEDOUIN and clan leaders supported a general strike. To lead the strike, the elite leadership quickly reorganized into the Arab Higher Committee, made up of representatives of the new parties under the chairmanship of the mufti, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who although appointed by and beholden to the British authorities, had no alternative but to join the militants. Representing all political factions and social sectors of Palestinian society, the committee announced its goals to be the complete cessation of Jewish immigration, the prohibition of land transfer to Jews, and the establishment of a national government responsible to a representative council.

The strike lasted six months, and before it ended, civil disobedience had turned into armed insurrection, the beginning of the Arab Revolt. In the countryside the revolt was to a considerable extent spontaneously organized, autonomous, and anchored in peasant norms. There was wide variation in the recruitment, organization, leadership, and command structures. For example, recruitment ranged from voluntary enrollment, selection by *hamula*, or family, and selection by village elders to compulsion. Despite coercion in recruitment or in material contributions, such methods did not alienate the villagers. Most peasant families enthusiastically contributed men, money, food, shelter, and matériel. The whole family collected money to purchase the soldier's rifle and decided which young men would fight and which would stay at home.

In the course of the revolt, the rebels gained control of much of the countryside and were then faced with administering it. They developed systems of taxation, supply, and armaments. Rebel courts, created to adjudicate village civil conflicts and criminal cases, replaced traditional institutions, such as elders, and the British courts as well. Some rebel leaders codified new regulations in written form and appointed *qadis* (judges) and other officials. Both the strike and the armed insurrection were thus a direct challenge to British authority. In an early attempt to end the unrest, the British appointed a new commission to investigate Palestinian grievances. The Peel Commission report lucidly stated that the causes of this revolt were the same as those that had triggered the "disturbances" of 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933: "the desire of the Arabs for national independence" and "their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home." Its recommendations were therefore to end the Mandate and to partition Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and a British zone in and around Jerusalem.

This proposal outraged the Palestinians, who viewed it as a means to dismember their homeland. The revolt intensified and reached its climax in the summer of 1938. Major Palestinian cities, including Jerusalem, joined the rebellion. With rumors that the war was easing in Europe (because of the 1938 British appeasement pact with Germany), the British launched an all-out campaign to crush the revolt. But they could not defeat the estimated 2,000 Palestinian rebels until 1939, when the Palestinians became exhausted. With its political leaders in exile, its military commands contained and segmented, the revolt dwindled. The British government issued a white paper that, for the first time during the Mandate, reversed its previous policy and responded to Palestinian concerns. The 1939 MacDonald White Paper capped Jewish immigration at 75,000 over five years, restricted land transfers to limited areas, and proposed to make Palestine independent within ten years if Arab-Jewish relations improved. The rebels rejected the white paper, as did the Arab Higher Committee and the Zionist Jewish leadership. Despite its rejection by both sides, the British implemented the new policy unilaterally. Although it gained important concessions from a British government faced with a new world war, the revolt failed to achieve its principal goal of immediate Palestinian independence.

1940–1948: Palestinian political and military collapse. The war in Europe, the HOLOCAUST, the increased Jewish immigration (legal and illegal) to Palestine, sympathy for European Jewry, the

rising international influence of the Zionist movement (especially in the UNITED STATES), the weakening of the British Empire, the emergence of the UNITED NATIONS, the dramatic structural transformation within Palestine, and the defeat of the Palestinian revolt all combined to overwhelm Palestine and the Palestinians during the 1940s.

The harsh British suppression of the Palestinian revolt and the reconquest of the country by 1939 decimated Palestinian political and military institutions. Palestinian parties and political activity were made illegal by the British, Palestinian leaders were either in detention camps or exile, political activists and fighters in the thousands were in prison or concentration camps, and the community was largely disarmed. Palestinian society was economically devastated, politically and militarily defeated, and psychologically crushed. The collective will to struggle had been broken. The forceful spirit that animated political activism and revolt in the 1930s did not return in strong enough force in the 1940s to allow meaningful resistance to the Zionist campaign of 1947–1948 that resulted in the Palestinian *Nakba*.

In contrast, the Jewish community in the 1940s grew economically strong, tightly organized politically, and militarily mobilized. With the aid of British training, the HAGANA, the military forces controlled by the Jewish Agency, and other militia grew in numbers, skill levels, and sophistication during the 1936–1939 Palestinian revolt. In addition, underground extremist and terrorist Jewish groups, such as the IRGUN and the LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL (LEHI, or the Stern Gang, as the British called it), also proliferated. Jewish military power was further augmented by the experience and technical skill acquired by the 37,000 volunteers in the Jewish Brigade and other units that served in the British army during World War II.

International Zionist organizations, along with the Jewish Agency, mounted a vigorous diplomatic campaign to undermine the provisions of the Passfield White Paper. Frustrated with Britain, whose regional political calculations in the context of World War II necessitated placating Arab public opinion and the Arab states, the Zionists turned for support to the United States, the emerging world power. In 1942, at a Zionist conference at the Biltmore Hotel in New York, the Zionist program was announced. In opposition to the white paper, it demanded open immigration into Palestine and settlement of unoccupied land in the country; for the first time, it publicly declared the Zionist intention to establish a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine. Since 1917, Zionist policy goals had evolved from a Jewish national home to a state in part of Palestine (the 1937 Peel partition proposal) to a state in the whole of Palestine. Shortly after the Biltmore convention, a number of US senators and members of Congress signed a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt supporting Jewish rights to Palestine. And in January 1944, in less than two years, the US Congress passed a joint resolution endorsing the BILTMORE PROGRAM.

The Palestine quandary after World War II led the British and US governments in 1946 to form an investigative commission jointly headed by a British and a US representative. The ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY (also called the Morrison-Grady Commission) recommended the conversion of the Palestine Mandate into a trusteeship divided into two autonomous Jewish and Arab provinces, while Jerusalem and the Naqab Desert would remain under British control. Although the Zionists, the US government, and the Palestinians rejected the plan, the British accepted it and resisted US and Zionist pressure to open the gates of Palestine to another 100,000 Jewish immigrants before the trusteeship proposal was considered in a London roundtable conference planned for September 1946. Perhaps because of this, the Jewish forces of the Hagana and the Irgun launched a terror campaign and revolt against the British in Palestine.

United Nations partition plan and descent into war. After diplomatic machinations in which the Palestinians and the Arab states were at a distinct disadvantage, on 29 November 1947 the UN General Assembly approved Resolution 181 on the future of Palestine, partitioning it into an Arab and a Jewish state. At a time when the Jewish population of Palestine was around 31 percent of the total, the size of the proposed Jewish state was roughly 55 percent of historic Palestine and included a sizable Palestinian minority of 45 percent. The proposed Palestinian Arab state, in contrast, was awarded 45 percent of the land of Palestine and a negligible Jewish minority. Jerusalem and BETHLEHEM were supposed to be separate bodies under international auspices.

By the end of May 1948, the British pulled out their forces as planned and left Palestine in disarray. The disorderly withdrawal added confusion to the rapidly developing internal war between the Jewish forces and the Palestinians. The self-contained, well-organized, and highly institution-

alized Jewish community was well positioned to assume the functions of government. Throughout the Mandate they had built parallel autonomous institutions of governance and control with the support of the British authorities. When the British abandoned the Arab areas, they left to the unprepared municipal and village authorities the immense responsibility of providing security, policing, defense, electric power, water and sanitation, medical care, education, and other services.

With Arab public concern for their compatriots in Palestine, the nominally independent Arab states began discussing how best to assist the beleaguered Palestinians. The machinations of one Arab leader, the ambitious Abdullah Ibn al-Husayn, ruler of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950), worked to undermine the interests of the Palestinians. After World War II, he had set his sights on reuniting and ruling greater SYRIA (which had been under the control of Vichy FRANCE) with the backing of the British. In return, he supported British policy (especially the Peel Commission's recommendation of partition) on Palestine and secretly colluded across the Jordan River with the Zionist leadership for the partition of Palestine. As a participant in ARAB LEAGUE deliberations and decisions on the Palestine question, the Transjordanian government of King Abdullah was able to undercut both Palestinian and Arab efforts to save the country.

Since 1942, the Zionists had planned and organized a Jewish army, not just defensive guards—one of the two key decisions of the Biltmore Program—while the Palestinians were being disarmed by the British authorities. Jewish forces numbered roughly 15,000 in early 1948 but swelled to over 60,000 by May 1948. The majority of them were part of Hagana (with World War II experience), and the rest belonged to the TERRORIST groups, the Irgun and the Stern Gang. For the 1947–1948 hostilities, they recruited a large number of professional military volunteers from all over the world.

The Palestinian leader, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, waited to form a volunteer force, al-Jihad al-Muqaddes (the Holy Struggle), until December 1947, after the United Nations partition decision and after hostilities began. By March the irregular force, under two commanders, numbered around 1,600. The Arab League organized and financially supported a volunteer Arab force, Jaysh al-Inqadh (Arab Rescue Army), under the command of FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI. With a promised 10,000 rifles, 3,830 Arab men, including 500–1,000 Palestinians, were organized into eight battalions that operated in north-central Palestine. Palestinian and Arab fighters were outnumbered, outarmed, and outclassed (in training, technical knowledge, experience, firepower, and mobility) by the armed Jewish regulars and their allied international volunteers. The Palestinians were unprepared politically and militarily to defend the integrity and unity of their country.

The intercommunal Jewish-Palestinian fighting unleashed after the United Nations partition decision was both offensive and defensive. By March 1948, it appeared that the Palestinians and their volunteer Arab supporters had the upper hand, but this was a false impression, as the Zionists had yet to implement their offensive plan. In April 1948, the Hagana launched major operations throughout Palestine, dismembering the country, destroying over 400 of its villages, and expelling much of its people. As hundreds of thousands of REFUGEES poured into safer areas of Palestine and into neighboring Arab countries, the Arab League could no longer simply engage in talks. Arab states mobilized their regular armies for battle, but the numbers, equipment, and firepower of those armies were less than half of what the Arab League's own Military Technical Committee had recommended. Equally important was the collusion of King Abdullah with the Zionists: he ordered his British-commanded Arab Legion to secure only the part of Palestine allotted to the Arab state, which he had planned, with the agreement of the Zionists, to annex to Transjordan.

Arab state intervention arrived too late and was too little to save Palestine. By 1 January 1949, the transformation of Palestine was complete. Some 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians were stateless refugees, their villages razed, their social life disrupted, and their lands and property now in Jewish hands. Palestinians came under Jordanian rule, Egyptian administration, or Israeli military rule, though with "citizenship" in the Jewish state, while others were flung across the Arab world—peasants in refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria; the educated middle class to the Gulf and SAUDI ARABIA, where they built these new states; and still others around the world.

See also ARAB CONGRESSES; BRITISH MANDATE IN PALESTINE; WAR, 1948; Zionism

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—*Samih Farsoun* (edited by *Naseer Aruri* after Dr. Farsoun's death)

Palestinian Universities Under Siege

Most Palestinian institutions of higher education were developed after the Israeli OCCUPATION in 1967. Eleven Palestinian universities, five university-colleges, and twenty-six community colleges operate in the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, serving a population of 3.5 million. Bethlehem University, a Roman Catholic institution partially funded by the VATICAN, opened its doors in 1973. In 1975, Birzeit College (located in the town of Birzeit north of Ramallah) became BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY after adding third- and fourth-year college-level programs. An-Najah College in NABLUS likewise became an-Najah National University in 1977. The Islamic University of Gaza (also known as IUG, IU Gaza, or the University of Gaza) is an independent Palestinian university established in 1978. HEBRON University was established in 1980. Al-Azhar University in Gaza City began operations in 1992. Al-Quds University, whose founders had yearned to establish a university in JERUSALEM since the early days of Jordanian rule, finally realized their goal in 1995. Also in 1995, the Arab-American University, the only private university in the West Bank, was founded right outside the town of Zababdeh, with the purpose of providing courses according to the US system of education. According to the 2002 census, 3,474 teaching faculty were serving 83,408 students at all Palestinian higher education institutions.

By 2003, nearly three years into the AL-AQSA INTIFADA and as a result of Israel's military response to the Palestinian uprising (CURFEWS, CLOSURES, CHECKPOINTS, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, forced entries, and destruction of public buildings—including the two ministries of education), Palestinian institutions of higher education suffered serious human losses (24 teachers, 194 students, and 7 employees killed and 1,245 students injured) plus severe material losses (estimated at $4.85 million). As a result of income compression, nearly 20 percent of the student body in Palestinian higher education is no longer able to pay its fees. In addition, physical access to higher education institutions by students and faculty has become extremely difficult as a result of long curfews and other drastic RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT. In an attempt to overcome Israeli-imposed restrictions, many university faculty began to communicate with their students via the Internet, and some universities have tried to find alternate venues for holding classes and seminars, sometimes even in neighboring cities. The problem with these alternatives is that not every student has access to e-mail, and many students are scattered in villages far from urban centers; moreover, travel between areas is prohibited.

The financial crisis facing higher education presents a much more difficult challenge. A 2003 World Bank report states that "Palestinian institutions face the worst financial crisis over the last thirty odd years and their continued operation

without emergency assistance is in serious doubt." Some institutions will be forced to reduce course offerings, increase class size, and rely on part-time or unqualified instructors. Unfortunately, resulting from the multiple hardships during the years of the OSLO PROCESS, an exodus of qualified faculty was already under way even before the Intifada. The crisis has exacerbated this phenomenon, as capable teachers look for better-paying opportunities in the various nongovernmental organizations working in the country or leave the country altogether.

Some universities have set up new degree programs and graduate programs that have higher tuition rates. Others have begun to relax admission requirements as a way of increasing revenue with larger attendance. Library holdings are declining, and journal subscriptions are not being renewed, mainly because of a lack of funding and the unreliability of postal delivery. All of these factors will eventually lead to a further decline in the quality of education.

In general, the Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education has tried to deal with this crisis in three ways: tuition and fees increased sharply as a percentage of the overall budget (now at 70 percent); a student revolving-loan fund was initiated to enable needy students to obtain low-interest loans to cover tuition; and a voucher system was also created, although not yet implemented, whereby universities receive public funding by cashing in student vouchers. The ministry created an autonomous, semiofficial commission responsible for the accreditation and licensing of new programs and institutions. This commission reviews existing criteria, develops new criteria for accreditation, and produces procedures for an ongoing assessment of all programs that grant academic degrees. All this is based on a two-tier methodology of self-evaluation and external review.

Other possible developments, including the pursuit of administrative efficiencies, the modernizing of management systems, and the establishment of joint and combined operations, are being delayed because of the financial environment. These measures relate mostly to the financial crisis and are aimed not only at trying to make do in abnormal conditions but also, in the long run, at paving the way for future reforms. It is not clear whether they will be enough to enable the universities to withstand the cumulative effects of a protracted war situation and an endemic financial crisis.

See also EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF TEXTBOOKS; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD

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—Fouad Moughrabi

Palin Commission, 1920

The Palin Commission was created by the British Foreign Office in May 1920 to investigate the causes of the previous month's violence in Palestine—the AL-NABI MUSA DEMONSTRATIONS. In April, five Jews and four Palestinians died during protests against Zionist IMMIGRATION, after which British authorities cracked down on Palestinian nationalist leaders and established the commission of inquiry headed by Major-General P. C. Palin.

The commission's report, issued on 1 July 1920, stated that Palestinians were frustrated because the promise of independence and unity for the Arab world, made by the British to the Arabs at the beginning of World War I in the HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE, had not been kept and was, in fact, being negated by British support for the Zionist program. Additionally, the commission noted the Palestinians' fear of the political and economic consequences of ZIONISM and criticized the "arrogance" of the Zionists. The report was never made public.

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Palmah

The Palmah (Pelugot Mahatz, or Crushing Battalions) was the elite fighting force of the HAGANA, the clandestine military wing of the Yishuv (pre-state Israel) in Palestine during the BRITISH MANDATE from 1920 to 1948. Established on 15 May 1941, the Palmah had grown to three fighting divisions and auxiliary aerial, naval, and intelligence units by the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

The Palmah was originally created by the British military, in cooperation with the Hagana, to help the British protect Palestine from a threatened invasion from Nazi GERMANY. It was also intended to assist British forces with the planned invasion of SYRIA and LEBANON, then held by pro-German Vichy FRANCE forces. Even though British experts trained and equipped the Palmah, after the British victory at El-Alamein in 1942, London ordered the dismantling of the Palmah. Instead, the Palmah went underground and proceeded to fight the British and the Palestinians.

After World War II, the Palmah grew, thanks to a unique arrangement with the KIBBUTZ movement. Initially, the organization was not only underground but also without funds, because British financing had stopped. Yitzhak Tabenkin, head of the kibbutzim union, suggested that the Palmah could be financially self-sufficient by letting the warriors work in the kibbutzim. Each kibbutz would host a Palmah platoon and supply them with food, housing, and resources. In return, the platoon would safeguard the kibbutz and carry out agricultural and other work. Accepted in August 1942, the plan worked well for both the Palmah and the Zionist settlers; it also educated the soldiers in Zionist values. Subsequently, the Palmah forged an agreement with Zionist youth movements, requiring that each person from the age of eighteen to twenty undergo military training. This was the basis of the NAHAL military cadre.

In 1945 and 1946, Palmah units were active in attacking British infrastructure, such as bridges, railways, radar stations, and police stations, in an attempt to drive the British out of Palestine to make room for the establishment of their state. Such activities declined markedly, however, after "Black Sabbath" (29 June 1946), when British forces carried out mass arrests of Palmah and Hagana leaders. Palmah units also played a major part in the 1948 War. In particular, the town of SAFED was attacked and conquered by the Palmah on 9 May 1948. The town's Arab population of 10,000 was dispossessed on 10 May. The remainder of eastern Galilee was conquered by Palmah units between 2 May and 25 May, after which the villages in that area were depopulated.

Notable Israeli leaders whose origins reside in the Palmah include, among others, MOSHE DAYAN, Yitzhak Sadeh, YIGAL ALLON, YITZHAK RABIN, Chaim Bar-Lev, Mordechai Gur, MATTITYAHU PELED, Yair Tsaban, SHULAMIT ALONI, REHAVAM ZE'EVI, and Rafael Eitan.

See also WAR, 1948

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Parents' Circle: The Association of Bereaved Families in the Middle East

The Bereaved Families' Forum ("Bereaved Parents' Circle") was founded in 1995 by Israeli businessman Yitzhak Frankenthal, whose son was killed by Palestinians while serving in the Israeli army. Members are Palestinians and Israelis who have lost loved ones in the conflict. They have held numerous dialogues and taken joint action for peace, and continue to do so, even in the midst of the turmoil now gripping Israel and Palestine. The families share the experience of having lost a son or daughter to the conflict, and bereaved families, victims from both sides, pursue a joint reconciliation even though the conflict is still active. The group consists of several hundred bereaved families, half Palestinian and half Israeli. The Families' Forum has played a crucial role since its inception in spearheading a reconciliation process based on nonviolence between Israelis and Palestinians.

The objectives of the Parents' Circle include (1) to prevent further bereavement, in the absence of peace; (2) to influence the public and the policymakers to prefer the way of peace to the way of war; (3) to educate for peace and reconciliation; (4) to promote the cessation of acts of hostility and to achieve a political agreement between Israel and the Palestinians; (5) to prevent the use of bereavement as a means of expanding enmity between the two peoples; and (6) to uphold mutual support among the members. The organization strives "to offer a breakthrough in people's frame of mind, to allow a change of perception, a chance to reconsider one's views and attitudes towards the conflict and the other side. [Its] activities are a unique phenomenon, in that they continue during all political circumstances and in spite of all tensions and violence in our region. [Its] members initiate and lead projects throughout the Israeli and Palestinian communities."

The Parents' Circle produced a film, *Counterpoint*, which has been shown throughout Israel, the WEST BANK, the UNITED STATES, and Western Europe. http://www.theparentscircle.com/about.asp.

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Partition Resolution

See UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181

Passfield White Paper, 1930

In the aftermath of the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES between Palestinians and Jews, the BRITISH MANDATE government established a series of fact-finding commissions to investigate the situation and determine the causes of the violence. The first, the 1929 HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION, had pointed to the likelihood that the economy and DEMOGRAPHY of Palestine would be further destabilized by Zionist IMMIGRATION and settlement. Its recommendations, echoed by those of the 1930 SHAW COMMISSION, urged the British government to expediently reassess its immigration policy that allowed Jewish immigration to Palestine with little restriction, and to address the "meaning of the passages in the Mandate which purported to safeguard the interests of the non-Jewish communities." The third commission, headed by Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), issued its report in October 1930, and its findings and recommendations were in line with those of the previous two commissions.

The Passfield White Paper asserted that "equal weight shall at all times be given to the obligations laid down with regard to the two sections of the population [Arabs and Jews] and to reconcile those two obligations where, inevitably, conflicting interests are involved." It did not suggest an end to Jewish immigration but emphasized the condition of the Mandate that safeguarded the rights of the indigenous population, the Palestinians, and stressed that these were of equal importance to creating a Jewish homeland. By inference, it raised the question of whether immigration and safeguarding Palestinian rights were contradictory. Referring to the Hope-Simpson Report, the Passfield paper stated that no more LAND reserves were available for cultivation and that the temporary suspension of immigration (undertaken the previous April) was justified and should continue.

The Passfield White Paper reiterated the cultural nature of a Jewish national home, as defined in the CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM of 1922 and in the BALFOUR DECLARATION itself, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, and it proposed the creation of a LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL modeled on the lines of one suggested in 1922 that had failed. The report further stated: "His Majesty's Government feel[s] it necessary to emphasize, in the strongest manner possible, that . . . a double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other."

In another section, the White Paper implicitly criticized the Zionist leaders: "His Majesty's Government has reason to think that one of the reasons for the sustained tension and agitation on both sides has been the creation by misguided advisers of the false hope that efforts to intimidate and to bring

pressure to bear upon His Majesty's Government would eventually result in forcing them into a policy which weighted the balances in favor of the one or the other party." Substantively, it also stated "that in estimating the absorptive capacity of Palestine at any time account should be taken of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment in determining the rate at which immigration should be permitted." This became known as the "twin and equal purpose policy."

Zionists were outraged by Passfield's paper and began to exert intense pressure on London. CHAIM WEIZMANN, leader of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION, played a particularly active role, immediately contacting leading officials in the British government. In his memoirs, Weizmann described the White Paper "as rendering and intending to render, our work in Palestine impossible. There was nothing left for me but to resign my position as President of the JEWISH AGENCY." Fortuitously for the Zionists, there was a change of government in Great Britain, and with it came a new prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, who was more sympathetic toward the Zionist project. MacDonald was immediately subjected to a great deal of pressure from Zionist interests, including Weizmann. In February 1931, he wrote the so-called MACDONALD "BLACK LETTER" to Weizmann, in which he rescinded the Passfield Commission's recommendations, going so far as to praise "the constructive work done by the Jewish people in Palestine [and their] . . . beneficial effects on the development and well-being of the country as a whole."

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Peace

Knowing that "peace" is a subjective concept, we solicited three essays, from an Israeli, a Palestinian, and an American, on scenarios for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the first, entitled "Current Options for Resolving the Conflict," US sociologist Gordon Fellman argues for the two-state option. Palestinian analyst and doctoral student in philosophy and ethics at Tel Aviv University Omar Barghouti contributes the second essay, entitled "Peace and Justice," which offers a perspective on the solution to the conflict through a "one-state" concept. Israeli scholars Arie Nadler and Nurit Schnabel provide the third article, entitled "Settlement, Resolution, and Reconciliation," in which they set out the processes of reconciliation necessary for any lasting solution. These three are followed by "The Other Zionism: Reconciliation Attempts between Arabs and Jews in Palestine Prior to 1948," a discussion of efforts undertaken by individuals and organizations, collectively often referred to as "the Other Zionism," which considered some form of binationalism as the only just solution for Arabs and Jews in Palestine. —Editor

Peace: "Current Options for Resolving the Conflict"

In one way or another, Israelis and Palestinians have been locked in combat for more than a century. The encounter, though, can no longer be understood entirely as a death struggle with Israelis and Palestinians at each other's throats. Nevertheless the "Israeli-Palestinian conflict" is understood as such by much of the world and majorities in both nations.

That designation is no longer accurate. The confrontation has morphed from one in which two communities are pitted against each other, each trying to make sure the other does not exercise national self-determination, into a different one, between two sides: Israelis and Palestinians who favor the end of violence and want to share the land between two independent nation-states, referred to here as "accommodationists," and Israelis and Palestinians who want to keep the fighting going until one side has lost everything and the other side is left with all of "Israel" or "Palestine" as entirely its own country, designated here as "rejectionists." It is the rejectionists who insist on continuing the violence that has characterized the relationship for nearly a century, and the accommodationists who seek to end it. Or to put it another way, one is committed to war, the other to peace.

It is not hard to script the vision of the war parties. On the Israeli side, there have been endless ASSASSINATIONS of leaders of the Palestinian war

party, endless bombings of refugee camps, endless destruction of Palestinian homes and fields, endless taking of LAND for further Jewish SETTLEMENTS and settlement expansion, endless fears that any kind of acceptance of Palestinian nationalism will compromise Israeli nationalism and national security, and endless terror that Israel might one day dissolve in the cauldron of the raging hatred of Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, there have been endless expressions of rage, frustration, and humiliation; endless INTIFADAS marked by escalating violence; endless SUICIDE BOMBINGS; and endless despair that, come what may, Israel will never allow and accept a separate Palestinian nation-state alongside it. One would be a fool not to imagine this scenario continuing to play out as the tormented relationship between two aspiring nationalisms.

Yet it is not the only imaginable state of affairs. Several others have appeared over the years, with varying degrees of support for each. On the far right in Israel, there is hope of expelling all the Palestinians from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and even from Israel itself. The euphemistic term used is "TRANSFER," but how the two million or so Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, with or without the addition of another million-plus who are Israeli citizens, would actually be forced out of Israel and the OT is never specified. Nor is there an actual idea of where they would go or how they would get there or why they would give up their nationalist dream. There was an idea in vogue for several years among some Israelis and American Jews that "JORDAN is Palestine," bolstered by the fact that Palestinians comprise a sizable group in Jordan and that Jordan was once part of what was historic Palestine, but the idea of transferring Palestinians to Jordan never got off the ground anywhere in the world except among its limited fervent advocates.

The idea of expulsion seems to be a nationalist/racist/xenophobic expression of both the extreme Jewish renewal in ZIONISM and genuine fear of annihilation at the hands of Palestinians and other Arabs. In some very deep way, people proposing transfer seem to be creating—whether consciously or not—a defense against a potential second HOLOCAUST. (Indeed, much of the Jewish response to the conflict might be seen as part of a desperate effort to come to terms with the Holocaust by seeking a situation where Jews are in power rather than powerless, as they were in Europe during the Nazi period, and where there are no Arab leaders calling for the extinction of all Jews.) On the far right among Palestinians is the same idea—mass ejection of Jews and leaving the land as Palestine once and for all—related to the history of conquest and degradation following Israeli independence in 1948 and the 1967 WAR.

In the rejectionist scenario, then, the conflict persists until, following massive carnage and ever-intensifying hatred, one side has, in conventional terms, won, and the other has, in conventional terms, lost. As the outcome of this possibility, there would be Israel but no Palestine or Palestine but no Israel. In either case, large numbers of the other community would have been killed and/or expelled, or some form of enforced BINATIONALISM would be imposed, which could take different forms. As a political majority, the victorious power could deprive the minority of any number of political and civil rights and/or could dominate the society and all its institutions. Under this scenario, an Israeli or Palestinian state might be religiously based or secular. In either case, dominance and forced submission are conceivable as the base of binationalism.

Another form of binationalism is what has been called for years a "democratic secular" binationalism, meaning that Jews and Palestinians would participate equally in the ELECTIONS, government, and institutions. Israelis fear this possibility, because once Palestinians outnumber Jews in the binational state, by voting strength they would take over the government and possibly much else. The entire point of Zionism historically has been that persecution of Jews will end only when Jews enjoy sovereignty in their own society, and that means a state with a Jewish majority. Another binational solution might be some sort of political arrangement, such as LEBANON knew for decades, with a presidency in the hands of one community and the prime ministership in the other. Cabinet portfolios could be allocated according to a formula that would see rotation of such positions between the two communities. However, the goodwill, patience, and risk-taking that would be required for effectively enacting this setup in Israel are, without question, absent on both sides.

Although binationalism makes a certain logical sense, it seems to have no viable political support in either community, beyond a fringe of intellectuals who find the idea of a binational secular democratic state attractive for various reasons. On the other

hand, neither community shows substantial support for continuing the status quo or for complete expulsion of the other party. Another possibility is continuing Israeli OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and JERUSALEM (not, since 2005, the GAZA STRIP) with some sort of limited cultural and political autonomy for Palestinians. Although this vision is attractive to some Jews, as it would reduce the fears of an independent state of Palestine becoming strong enough to threaten Israel, the limited autonomy idea has no support among Palestinians.

The only option that seems to have substantial support among both populations and a realistic possibility is the TWO-STATE SOLUTION, which is the focal point of accommodationist thought. Two-state proponents reject the binary thinking of the rejectionists, who insist it has to be all ours or all theirs, and thereby reject the demonization of the other party that is essential to rejectionist thinking in any situation. Rejectionism means full demonization of the "enemy"—seeing the "other" as somehow purely evil not only in intention but in its very nature. Anti-Semites who see Jews as irredeemably malevolent are in this respect remarkably similar to Jews who see Palestinians as incurably evil. Complementarily, rejectionists see their own side of the conflict as heroic, entirely in the right, and pure, noble, and idealistic in the best sense.

The two-state solution is a goal and a vision that assume the real possibility of peace between two nation-states even though one of them is at an earlier stage of economic development than the other. Today, organizations in the nongovernmental and private nonprofit sector in Israel are working out details of how to guarantee security for both sides: how to share the most precious and scarce resource in the Middle East—WATER; how to develop healthy economic interdependence between Israel and Palestine; how to continue to use Palestinian labor in Israel but to treat laborers more fairly than has been the case so far; and how both communities can work together to address shared environmental concerns, peace education, issues of security, and more. Despite such work that moves ahead, there is as yet no clear-cut blueprint for the two-state solution, and thorny issues persist.

Perhaps the greatest is the so-called right of return. Israel is founded on the prerogative of all Jews in the world to migrate to Israel easily and freely. In the wake of the Holocaust, this made perfect sense, but that right turned out to be predicated on the fleeing of and expulsion of large numbers of Palestinians from what became Israel in the 1948 WAR. Many of them, who have been rootless and homeless for half a century or more, insist on the right to return to live in what were their homes in what was Palestine before 1948. Although there are various proposals to allow limited return for reasons of FAMILY REUNIFICATION, Israel fears that it could be overwhelmed by Palestinians returning if no quotas were established. Two-state proponents have yet to resolve this issue to everyone's satisfaction. Lingering behind the claim to return is the alternative claim of compensation and its attendant issues: who would be eligible, how much would be offered, how claims would be processed, and so forth.

The gigantic issue of security is also nowhere near resolution. It is widely understood that Israel would not tolerate a fully armed Palestine that could join in concert with Arab neighbors to threaten and attack Israel. Most Palestinians seem to accept that reality, yet how much of an armed force, what kind of police force, and what sorts of arms and so forth that Palestine might claim continue to be sore and open issues. Another thorny issue is the status of Jerusalem. Is this religious city to remain the "eternal, undivided capital of the Jewish people," as the current Israeli government insists? Or might it be divided according to the already existing lines of where Jews and Palestinians live? Other possibilities are for joint governance by a Palestinian-Jewish council or division into cantons or boroughs, some of which are Jewish and some Palestinian.

Once these issues are resolved, if they ever are, other crucial ones remain. One is reconciliation. Over thirty countries have established truth and reconciliation commissions to help facilitate peace between parties long in contention and scarred by acts of hideous and sustained brutality. Reconciliation processes are meant to acknowledge deep wounds and scars and bring to light massacres, rapes, and other atrocities in order for the perpetrators to confess their deeds and seek forgiveness. This process is conducive to clearing the air so that formerly contending adversaries can proceed in healthy ways. There are no examples yet of such a process between parties that began under one authority administratively but evolved into two states in the conflict's resolution. And there have been, as yet, few calls for a truth and reconciliation commission to bring Palestinians and Israelis to face each other in the hurts, grievances, and grief clearly attributable to actions by the other side. Real peace would demand some such process.

One Israeli thinker, Yehoshafat Harkabi, suggests that Palestinians and Israelis have an opportunity to devise a unique conclusion to their history of wars and hatred. Many members of each community, even after a political two-state solution, will most likely continue to relate emotionally to all of the Land of Israel or Palestine. For example, Rivka, a Jewish woman living in Israel, might visit HEBRON in Palestine and see where her grandparents once lived and feel a deep connection with the graves of the Jewish patriarchs and matriarchs in Hebron. Correspondingly, Muhammad, a refugee living in a camp in Gaza, might visit JAFFA in Israel and see where his grandparents once had an orchard and visit the site of a mosque that was important to them. In each case, Rivka and Muhammad would live in Israel or Palestine politically but relate emotionally to parts of what they consider their inheritance, which is now located in the country of the other people. Harkabi speculates that each party will have to grieve for what it has given up and believes to belong rightfully to it. He thus adds the idea of a collective grieving process—yet to be designed, if at all—to that of truth and reconciliation.

It is useful to distinguish between violence that is *proactive* or *offensive* and violence that is *reactive* or *defensive*. All aggrieved violent parties claim they are acting defensively. Whether an action is defensive or offensive depends, in other words, on one's point of view. In 1948, several Arab states attacked the newly founded Israel, which Israelis experienced as offensive violence, and Israel defined its reaction as defensive. Arabs viewed their war upon Israel as a defensive struggle against a population that was invading Palestine with plans of displacing Palestinians from their homes and land. To this day, neither side seems able to see itself as offensive in its actions at any stage of the conflict. From the late nineteenth century on, Jewish entry into Palestine was a Jewish initiative meant to counter the resurgence of ANTI-SEMITISM in Europe in the late nineteenth century and the Holocaust of the twentieth century. From the Jewish point of view, IMMIGRATION to Palestine/Israel was a defensive reaction against continuing persecution and victimization of Jews in virtually every country in Europe for more than a thousand years. What is then a defensive move in the Jewish experience was in the Palestinian experience an offensive move. The Palestinians were not involved in persecuting Jews in Europe and hence viewed immigration as an invasion of their land and a threat to their culture and rights. Yet Palestinian violence against Jews was, not unreasonably, experienced by most Jews as an act of aggression on their national project.

Part of the problem is that Jews and Palestinians, like Croats and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, and other parties in conflict, tend to see themselves as victims and miss the sociopolitical truth that any party can be *both* victim and victimizer. If peace is possible between the two peoples, one condition will have to be each party recognizing and taking responsibility for its own part in continuing the violence. This approach is as much social psychological as political, or rather a combination of the two. It demands that each party face and cope with its own real behavior as well as that of the other. If peace comes to Israelis and Palestinians, it will more likely be according to the two-state solution than any other, but that is not guaranteed. And if peace does come about, whether in a two-state form or something else, issues of hurt, resentment, hatred, grievance, and fear will have to be dealt with for the peace to be solid and trustworthy.

—Gordon Fellman

Peace: "Peace and Justice"

What do we imply when we speak of peace? At the most general level, peace represents two conditions. The first and most common, especially in real politics, is the absence of or freedom from war or conflict. This assumes a variety of forms and is typically characterized by the victor imposing the terms of peace. An example is the peace of Versailles, in which the victors humiliated and dismembered GERMANY, thus contributing to the inexorable rise of National Socialism/Nazism. There is the peace of a victory so overwhelming and total that the majority of the vanquished population is exterminated and the remainder can only submit without hope of altering their status. The European conquest of the indigenous Indians in America was such a peace. Excluding the situation of mass genocide, virtually all examples of imposed peace result in efforts by the defeated, weaker party to alter their oppressive situation. In asymmetric power relationships, the powerful have historically sought to maintain the status quo, while the vanquished have struggled for a more equitable change, whether evolutionary or revolutionary.

Thus peace has had diametrically opposing connotations to either side and is inherently unstable.

The post–World War II conception of peace, formulated by the war's victors led by the UNITED STATES, was informed by the "scourge of war" and the desire to achieve international stability, recognized and respected interstate borders, and intrastate tranquility. Yet the very leaders who imposed the peace had themselves employed horrific violence to achieve their political ends: Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki. What is an acceptable price to achieve the absence of violent conflict? Who decides? These post–World War II questions were among the most important that prompted the establishment of the UNITED NATIONS as an international, objective guardian of world peace, above everything else.

The second condition of peace, markedly different from the first, involves peace based on justice. In contrast to an imposed peace, such a formation is typically stable and lasting, largely because neither side has been humiliated, dehumanized, or subjected to inequality. The starting point for a just peace is a belief in the fundamental human dignity and equality of all persons and their right to share equally the resources, benefits, and responsibilities of their society.

Voltaire wrote, "The sentiment of justice is so natural, and so universally acquired by all mankind, that it seems to be independent of all law, all party, all religion." Martin Luther King Jr. commented, "Justice denied anywhere diminishes justice everywhere." Samuel Johnson averred that "an injustice anywhere is an injustice everywhere." Perhaps most pertinent to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Corazon Aquino argued, "Reconciliation should be accompanied by justice, otherwise it will not last. While we all hope for peace, it shouldn't be a peace at any cost but peace based on principle, on justice." The Israeli-Palestinian colonial conflict has been the object of so many "peace plans" it would be impossible to catalog them all. But each of these multiple projects has had one thing in common: it has sought to impose a settlement based on the existing vast power asymmetries that leave one side—the Palestinians—humiliated, excluded, and unequal. Because these projects have been unjust, they have failed. In a relationship involving colonial oppression, a just peace entails, first and foremost, ending the central aspects of this oppression. Advocating peace without justice is tantamount to institutionalizing injustice and therefore perpetuating the oppressive status quo.

Although the founding charter of the United Nations did not explicitly disavow the realpolitik definition of peace, it conceptualized world peace as a function of several factors that transcend the mere absence of war, as essential as that factor may be. Two categories of conditions conducive to a just peace appear in the charter's preamble: the first comprises respect for fundamental human rights, the dignity and worth of every person, and the equality of rights among all humans; and the second includes justice and obligations under INTERNATIONAL LAW. Peace in accordance with UN principles must be understood in light of the totality of these conditions, primary among which is the fulfillment of the basic requirements of justice.

In the context of national liberation struggles against settler colonialism—as was the case in Algeria and South Africa and is the case with the Palestinian struggle against Israel—*absolute* justice, as in comprehensively reversing historical wrongs committed against the indigenous people, is realistically and morally unattainable. Even if it were achievable, pursuing absolute justice may lead to the commission of fresh injustices against the settler community, which would call into question the ethicality of the process. The more reasonable and ethical approach is therefore to seek *relative* justice, which entails redressing the fundamental rights of the indigenous people while avoiding the infliction of any unnecessary or unjust suffering on the settler community. In Algeria, that meant the wholesale flight of the settler-colonist community to its country of origin, FRANCE; and in South Africa, relative justice was achieved through ending racial privilege in the laws and practices of the state and giving all the citizens an equal right to vote and to run for office, among other economic and social measures.

In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the path to justice and peace must take into account the particularities of the conflict, its origins, and its international context. At its core, Israel's oppression of Palestinians encompasses three major dimensions: (1) denial of REFUGEE rights, including their right to return to their homes of origin, in accordance with UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194; (2) military OCCUPATION of the GAZA STRIP (until 2005, after which there has been "effective" Occupation) and the WEST BANK (including East JERUSALEM), as well as the colonization of the latter; and (3) institutionalized and legalized racial discrimination against PALESTIN-

IAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL. A just peace would have to ethically and practically address all three components as a minimal requirement of relative justice.

At best, a negotiated TWO-STATE SOLUTION, based on UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242—which emphasized the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and the need to achieve "a just and lasting peace," calling for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict—can only address the second of the three dimensions of oppression, bringing partial justice to a mere one-third, or less, of the people of Palestine (i.e., those who live in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), many of whom are also refugees), ignoring the majority who are refugees living in exile. From another angle, if morality and justice are put aside, is the two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict still possible? Have decades of Israeli "facts on the ground" created an irreversible reality that cannot allow for dividing historic Palestine into two sovereign, contiguous, and viable states?

Two-State Solution

Although still a small minority, a growing number of observers are no longer convinced that the two-state solution can be achieved or can even bring about a lasting—let alone just—peace. Especially after the eruption of the second Palestinian INTIFADA in September 2000, these doubts were given credence due to several compelling factors. First, Israel's almost complete hegemony over the 1967 OPT—as manifested in the immense growth of its colonial SETTLEMENTS, settlers-only ROADS, and massive colonial Wall (BARRIER), as well as in its control over Palestinian resources—has gradually but fundamentally eroded the principal foundations upon which an independent Palestinian state was intended to be established.

Second, Israel's division of the OPT into disconnected zones, coupled with its military SIEGE of Palestinian population centers, has essentially turned these areas into BANTUSTANS, or holes in the proverbial Swiss cheese.

Third, Israel demonstrated during the OSLO PROCESS that it is unwilling to genuinely accept a full withdrawal from the 1967 OPT (including East Jerusalem), or to accede to the establishment of a truly independent, sovereign Palestinian state. The OSLO ACCORDS and the ensuing systematic co-optation of a visionless and mostly corrupt Palestinian leadership provided a rare opportunity for Israel to gain recognition from the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY of its claimed right to exist as a Jewish state. But Israel failed to resist the temptation to carry on additional colonial and exclusionary designs.

Fourth, the Palestinian political leadership dismally failed to transform the wide international support for the two-state solution into concerted pressure on Israel to accept it, which resulted in the substantial squandering of the international community's long-standing support for the Palestinian people. Through a combination of blurred vision, miscalculated tactics, lack of ability and stamina, vested personal interests, and a politics of submission, Palestinian leaders have failed to bring the Palestinians any closer to their aspired and internationally recognized national rights, particularly their right to self-determination.

Fifth, Israel's substantial influence on US foreign policy in the region has further distanced the possibility of any consequential pressure on Israel to implement UN resolutions and comply with international law.

Sixth, the entrenchment of the institutionalized racial discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel has further confirmed the irreconcilability of having a Jewish and democratic state within the 1948 areas, a combination that is viewed as an oxymoron by many. A two-state solution would therefore not bring justice to this approximately 1.3-million-strong component of the Palestinian people.

Seventh, the incompatibility between a negotiated two-state settlement and the right of Palestinian refugees to return—due to Israel's insistence on maintaining Jewish supremacy and DEMOGRAPHY domination—has meant that any settlement reached along the lines of two states will essentially undermine the legal and moral rights of the Palestinian refugees, which are at the core of the entire conflict. This means that such a solution can never endure.

One-State Solution

During the last three decades, the slogan "Two States for Two Peoples" was widely viewed as both realistic and politically wise. Now, given all the evident problems, some reconsideration is due. Those proposing a one-state solution as an alternative, though, must face up to a crucial question: if Israel has so systematically and relentlessly crushed the foundations of a mini Palestinian state within the

Occupied Palestinian Territory, why should anyone expect it to accept a democratic state over the entire area of British Mandate Palestine, an entity that would by definition negate the very concept of a Jewish state? It may be argued, in response, that Israel's acceptance is not a necessary condition for the implementation of a one-state democracy; after all, South African apartheid was abolished by compulsion, not persuasion. Specifically, it took a sustained internal campaign of resistance and a persistent international campaign of boycott, divestment, and sanctions—spearheaded by the African National Congress—to reach this end. Similarly, Palestinians, conscientious Israelis, and international supporters of a just peace can mobilize an international civil struggle aimed at negating the Zionist colonial character of the state and the attainment of equal rights in the framework of a unitary, democratic state.

There are many thorny issues that ought to be scrutinized when raising the slogan of a "Democratic State in Historic Palestine." For the most part, these revolve around how, even whether, such a concept can deal with the repatriation of Palestinian refugees; the development of a "national Israeli identity" and the corresponding acquired rights; the fate of Jewish colonies in the West Bank; the centrality of Jerusalem to the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish faiths; the ethnic and cultural character of Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews; reconciling the new progressive and egalitarian identity of such a state with its surrounding Arab context; and the requirements for a "new Arabism" that can tolerate such a model of diversity and democracy.

Ethical De-dichotomization

Regardless what shape or form a just and peaceful solution ultimately takes, for coexistence to succeed a process of de-dichotomization of the two conflicting identities must be judiciously considered. To do so, it is necessary to examine whether the existing dichotomy between Palestinians and Israelis is a cause or an effect of the oppression in question. It could be argued that ingrained differences exist in a conflict due to an exclusive sense of subjectivity or as embodiments of established conflicts and injustices. Each of these two views will influence the foundations of any conceptual process of de-dichotomization, which is a necessary condition for a just reconciliation.

If the dichotomy is regarded strictly as a *cause* of the conflict, efforts are focused on challenging the prevailing or established forms for defining identity, and, therefore, these efforts explore intergroup commonalities, or attributes, that are shared across the subjective border lines. Precedence, in this case, is given to conceptual change. All the joint, "apolitical" Palestinian-Israeli projects since the Oslo Accords belong to this category, aiming to bridge a perceived psychological and/or cultural gap separating the two entities. If, on the other hand, the separation is viewed exclusively as a *result* of the conflict, the struggle to change the concrete reality on the ground—the actual experiences of the subjects involved in the conflict—is given priority, with the hope that it would effect a corresponding flux in intragroup awareness, hence promoting the prospects for intergroup compromise.

These arguments and the questions raised themselves tend to dichotomize reality and conceptualization, presenting them as mutually exclusive. A different approach is to examine the dialectical interaction between the two, which makes each of them cause *and* effect simultaneously. What varies is the degree of relevance of each in a given time-space context. From this viewpoint, there is a need to explore a process of de-dichotomization that takes into account the epistemological as well as the ontological dimensions of the conflict between the two identities, Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews. However, there are ethical implications that should not be ignored even in such an approach.

If de-dichotomization takes place in perception alone, then it may be accused of complicity since, for all intents and purposes, it advocates a change in the "consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them," to borrow from Simone de Beauvoir. The inherently contradictory identities of the oppressor and oppressed cannot find a moral middle ground. So long as the relation of oppression obtains, only coercion, submission, and injustice are possible outcomes.

If, on the other hand, de-dichotomization is sought only in action aimed at fighting the oppressive relation, without a corresponding change in perception, it may lead to revenge. If Palestinians decide to pursue the path of revenge, far from ending the relationship of oppression, they would, in this case, be interchanging roles with their current oppressors while maintaining a relationship of oppression. So long as the oppressed can only see the "other" as devoid of all attributes except being

oppressor, they cannot possibly challenge the dichotomy of oppressor-oppressed; they can only reverse it. Challenging the dichotomy would require exploring the human commonalities, which must be viewed in a specific context of time and space, rather than as absolute, eternal, or transcendental factors; otherwise, they may turn into a tool of imposing conformity, or forced identification, a more subtle form of oppression.

Ethical de-dichotomization ought to be envisioned, as Brazilian educator Paulo Freire argues, in both reflection and action—in conceptualizing the relations between Palestinians and Israelis in the process of undoing the injustice and in the situation after the causes and manifestations of oppression have been overcome. Like any other people on earth, the Palestinians cannot be expected to accept injustice as fate. The entire relationship of oppression and inequality that has so far prevailed is morally intolerable and practically unsustainable. Zionist Israel, as an exclusivist and colonial state, has no hope of ever being forgiven or accepted as a normal or legitimate state by its victims, the Palestinians. Reconciliation and oppression cannot coexist. A secular, democratic state that can offer the most ethical and therefore enduring path to a just peace must first and foremost allow and facilitate the return of and compensation for all the Palestinian refugees, as the only moral restitution acceptable for the injustice they have endured for decades. Such a process, however, must uphold at all times the moral imperative of avoiding the infliction of any unnecessary or unjust suffering on the Jewish community in Palestine. A just peace would also grant full, equal, and unequivocal citizenship rights to all its citizens, Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, including the refugees. Moreover, it would be required to recognize, legitimize, and even nourish the cultural, religious, and ethnic character and traditions of each respective community. Coexistence should not imply uniformity or even conformity in these vital domains.

Advocating such a vision for a just peace poses a moral challenge to Israel's colonial existence, not an existential threat to Israeli Jews per se. Through dismantling the colonial character of the state and ending racial/ethnic oppression, a secular, democratic state will allow the Jews in Palestine to finally enjoy normalcy as equal humans and equal citizens of a secular democratic state—a truly promising land and a genuine hope for peaceful coexistence.

See also OCCUPATION; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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—Omar Barghouti

Peace: "Settlement, Resolution, and Reconciliation"

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict began in the late nineteenth century, spans the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and remains the central reality of the Middle East. Despite the fact that the conflict's 100-plus-year history is dotted with periods of high hopes for peace (the 1993–2000 OSLO ACCORDS), its conclusion remains elusive. This entry provides a social-psychological analysis of conditions and processes that might facilitate the transition from a reality of a protracted conflict to one of peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians. This is presented against the background of three approaches to ending international conflicts: conflict settlement, conflict resolution, and reconciliation. Each of these approaches encapsulates different assumptions about the antecedents of international conflict, the forces that maintain it, and the road that needs to be taken

to end it. The argument made here is that failures to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are at least partly due to the relative lack of attention to processes of reconciliation.

Conflict Settlement

The conflict settlement approach has dominated much of the discourse on conflict in the social sciences (economics, sociology, social psychology, and political science) and is situated within a real-conflict (realpolitik) view of discord. Applied to the international arena, it suggests that conflicts between nations emerge because the parties covet the same limited resource (e.g., LAND), and each is motivated to maximize its own gain. Conflict is said to persist as long as its costs are lower than the alternative costs associated with giving up on demands for maximal self-gain. This economic-rational view of conflict emphasizes the parties' constant vigilance of what is to be gained by continuing the conflict vs. the alternative costs that are associated with reaching a settlement. According to this view, the king's road to end an international conflict is to negotiate a formula for the division of the disputed resources. Achieving such a formula is possible because the contested resources are concrete and divisible (land, WATER, or other natural resources). The negotiations can consist of distributive bargaining, which is dominated by a win-lose perspective and focuses on the parties' opposite positions, or integrative bargaining, which focuses on the underlying concerns of both parties and is said to be dominated by a win-win perspective.

Most of the efforts over the past 100 years to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been couched within the conflict settlement approach. From the days of the PEEL COMMISSION in 1936 to the days of the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT in July 2000, plans were devised on how to divide the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean between Israelis and Palestinians. There were always those on both sides who rejected any settlement and kept claiming, "this is all ours." But, in recent years, a growing number of Palestinians and Israelis recognize the necessity of concluding the distributive bargaining with a TWO-STATE SOLUTION along the 1967 BORDERS. If this is so, one may wonder, why are Israelis and Palestinians still fighting? One answer to this query by those who have been close to the peace process is that the prevailing distrust between the parties is the major stumbling block on the road to peaceful coexistence. After a century of violence and mutual infliction of pain, each party doubts the other party's promises for a violence-free future that will be based on equality and independence. Thus, the problem is not the parties' inability to find a formula to settle their conflicting claims but their lack of trust in the other side's intention to commit to such a formula. The conflict resolution approach aims to deal with this problem of distrust by attempting to change the nature of the relationships between the adversaries.

Conflict Resolution

Efforts at conflict resolution are guided by the idea that repeated positive interactions between the adversaries will lead to the buildup of more trust between them. This idea is consistent with the basic rationale of the contact hypothesis within social psychology. Theory and research in this tradition identified four conditions that are needed in order for such interactions to yield more trustworthy relations and less animosity: (1) prolonged positive interaction (2) between equal parties (3) that cooperate to achieve a common goal (4) within a supportive social context. Further, after the work of conflict resolution has restored a degree of working trust between the adversaries, they will be more prepared to settle the conflict by reaching an agreement on the concrete issues that separate them.

There are numerous examples for conflict resolution within the Israeli-Palestinian context. Herbert Kelman's seminal work with groups of Israelis and Palestinians and the theoretical insights that resulted from it are a prime example of how this approach has been used to increase trust and improve relations between Israelis and Palestinians. There are many other examples of programs of conflict resolution, conducted within and outside the Middle East. A major example of the conflict resolution approach as a tool of diplomacy is the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, part of the Oslo agreements signed in 1993. An important element in the Oslo Accords was the idea that Israelis and Palestinians had to change the nature of their relations before they could tackle and settle the concrete issues that separated them. To this end, both sides agreed to postpone negotiations on issues such as land, REFUGEES, and the status of JERUSALEM. Consistent with the logic of the conflict resolution approach, the interim between the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the FINAL STATUS TALKS was intended to allow the parties to learn to trust each other and be more pre-

pared to settle the conflict. The joint activities between Israelis and Palestinians during the interim period of trust building (1993–2000) had three of the previously mentioned four determinants of constructive inter-group contact. The parties were involved in numerous cooperative projects designed to achieve common goals (e.g., economic prosperity for the region) in a context of active international support. However, the fourth determinant of "equal status" contact was missing. Although some control was handed over to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), in general throughout this period Israel remained the occupying force that controlled the daily lives of Palestinians. It has been suggested by many that this unequal relationship may have been a prime reason why the seven years of the Oslo conflict resolution efforts resulted in the resumption of hostilities rather than settlement of the conflict.

Just a couple of months before the OSLO PROCESS evaporated into the smoke of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, Israelis and Palestinians met at Camp David (July 2000) under the auspices of US president BILL CLINTON to try to conclude a final status agreement. After seven years of trust building, some thought that enough trust had been established to settle the conflict, yet no agreement emerged. In the language of the present analysis, neither the gradual approach of trust building and conflict resolution (the Oslo Process) nor the efforts toward settlement with one swoop (the peace conference at Camp David) seems to have worked. One reason for this may be that the parties had never taken the road of reconciliation to end the conflict.

Socio-Emotional Reconciliation

Socio-emotional reconciliation is a "healing" process that reflects the internal identity changes that each of the parties involved in the conflict undergoes. In this process, each party strengthens the core elements of its own identity while accommodating the other, and conflict-related *emotional barriers* are removed. The Needs-Based Model suggests that the weaker group's unfulfilled need for restoration of its sense of power and the stronger group's unfulfilled need for social acceptance and restoration of its moral image constitute such emotional barriers that the path to reconciliation is blocked. The model's hypothesis that fulfilling these needs should facilitate reconciliation received support in the context of various intergroup conflicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A common way in which the fulfillment of these needs for the stronger and the weaker parties may be achieved is the use of what was labeled by Tavuchis the Apology-Forgiveness cycle. By apologizing and taking responsibility for past wrongdoings the stronger party acknowledges a debt to its adversary. Only the recipient of this apology (i.e., the weaker party), by expressing forgiveness for and acceptance of the stronger party, can annul this debt and remove the threat of the stronger party's labeling as the guilty perpetrator. The control over these psychological resources that are desired by the stronger party is an empowering experience for the weaker party. Mutual interaction that grants power to the weaker party by the stronger party and acceptance to the stronger party by the weaker party lowers the motivation for revenge by the weaker party and for belittling the consequences of one's actions by the stronger party, which results in greater readiness to reconcile and end the conflict.

If it is so simple, why is it so difficult? Why have Israelis and Palestinians not taken this road of socio-emotional reconciliation through a reciprocal fulfillment of their needs for acceptance and power, respectively? The first reason is the deep distrust that exists between the two parties. The initiation of socio-emotional reconciliation requires that the stronger side acknowledge responsibility for past wrongdoings. Yet, when lack of trust dominates, such a unilateral admission of responsibility is risky. It can be misused by the adversary as a pretext for claiming moral superiority and making more demands. This risk is diminished when the stronger party *trusts* the weaker party to reciprocate its responsibility-taking with expressions of acceptance and empathy. Because trust is a rare commodity in Israeli-Palestinian relations this does not happen. Consider the example of the Camp David 2000 meeting in which the Israeli delegation refused to accept responsibility for Palestinians' suffering. No one knows if Camp David 2000 would have ended differently if the Israelis trusted the Palestinians to reciprocate responsibility for infliction of suffering with a message of social acceptance toward the Israelis. The logic of the Needs-Based Model suggests that it would have ended more positively had this been the case. Yet, the wide gulf of distrust that exists between the parties prevents the exchange of the psychological commodities that each party desires: empowerment for the Palestinians who covet the acknowledgment of their sufferings and loss of land, and social

acceptance for the Israelis who covet empathy and understanding of their perspective.

The second reason that prevents the process of socio-emotional reconciliation from occurring between Palestinians and Israelis is their competition over the role of the "real victim" of the other's wrongdoings. In most protracted conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even if there is power asymmetry (i.e., one party possesses more power than the other), both parties view themselves as the "real victim" of the other's malevolence. Because of this, each side believes that it is the other's responsibility to initiate the process of socio-emotional reconciliation by admitting to past wrongdoings. Yet, such an admission replaces the morally advantageous identity of a victim with the moral inferiority associated with the identity of a perpetrator. Therefore, neither Palestinians nor Israelis are ready to initiate such a process. Each expects the other side to take the initiative by acknowledging past wrongdoings and intransigence.

This analysis suggests that in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict socio-emotional reconciliation needs to be carefully planned in advance in order to overcome the obstacles of distrust and competitive victimhood. An agreement needs to ascertain that the process of socio-emotional reconciliation is reciprocal and simultaneous. Both parties need to structure this interaction in a way that minimizes perceived risks. The party that accepts responsibility for past wrongdoings must trust that its adversary will reciprocate with an expression of understanding, empathy, and acceptance. The party that expresses empathy and acceptance, in turn, must trust that its adversary will not use this expression as legitimization that allows unjust practices to continue. Part of the social contract that underlies such a process needs to ascertain both parties' agreement that each is a victim *and* a perpetrator of violence and intransigence and that neither occupies a monopoly over the moral high ground that is in the "real victim's" territory. We are not naïve enough to suggest that such a planned and agreed-upon process will miraculously transform a reality of more than a century of intractable conflict into a paradise of social harmony. The realistic, tangible issues that separate the parties need to be negotiated and settled. But an approach that does not lose sight of the importance of the different psychological needs of the parties will pave a smoother road for getting there.

The simmering hostility and sporadic outbreak of violence between Israelis and Palestinians tell us that neither the conflict settlement nor the conflict resolution approach is the "philosopher's stone" to transform this conflict into peaceful coexistence. The approach of socio-emotional reconciliation has been missing from past efforts to bring peace to the region. If successful, it can supplement the approaches of conflict resolution and conflict settlement and boost the overall effectiveness of efforts to achieve a lasting peace in this region.

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—Arie Nadler and Nurit Schnabel

Peace: "The Other Zionism: Reconciliation Attempts between Arabs and Jews in Palestine Prior to 1948"

The main currents of ZIONISM have focused on maximum Jewish IMMIGRATION and utmost LAND acquisition as well as on the establishment and maintenance of a Jewish state, while ignoring the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine as a nation of people with rights and aspirations. But there was another Zionism—one that considered Palestinians equal to Jews and that attempted to find a political solution that would accommodate the basic human rights and desires of both peoples. These "Other Zionists," who were active in Palestine from the 1920s through 1948, were motivated by deep ethical precepts and viewed Palestine not as an empty land but as one that contained another and kindred people. They were an isolated handful then and are an almost unknown one now, when the pendulum of contemporary power in Zionist/Israeli politics has swung to the right to the ultra-nationalists, who are willing to use military power to expand Jewish land and repress the Palestinians.

In their time, however, the spokespersons for the Other Zionism were not obscure and peripheral figures but among the most highly respected personages in the history of early Zionism. They were among the greatest of the thinkers and pioneers who prepared the way for the establishment of Israel. One of them, AHAD HA'AM (1856–1927), was the foremost philosopher to take part in the rebirth of Hebrew as a living language. A Jewish immigrant from Russia, he had played a significant role in obtaining the British BALFOUR DECLARATION in 1917 to establish in Palestine "a national home for the Jewish people." Yet, Ha'am was also one of the few in the Zionist movement who stressed the parallel obligation expressed in the declaration "that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." Ha'am called himself a "cultural Zionist," concerned with spreading the Hebrew language and culture, as opposed to a nationalist Zionist, focused on establishing and sustaining the state of Israel. He wanted the political aims of Zionism delayed by "consideration for the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs."

Four years after the Balfour Declaration was promulgated, Ahad Ha'am expanded his views on this in a preface to the Berlin edition of his book *At the Cross Ways*. He wrote that the historical right of the Jewish people to a national home in Palestine "does not invalidate the right of the rest of the land's inhabitants." He recognized that they have "a genuine right to the land due to generations of residence and work upon it." For them, "too," Ahad Ha'am went on, "this country is a national home and they have the right to develop their national potentialities to the uttermost." This right, he explained, was why the BRITISH MANDATE government "promised to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people and not, as was interpreted by the political Zionists, the reconstruction of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish People." Ahad Ha'am argued that the purpose of the Balfour Declaration was twofold: (1) to establish a Jewish national home there and (2) also not to deny "any right to deprive the present inhabitants of their rights" and any intention "of making the Jewish people the sole ruler of the country."

After Ahad Ha'am died in 1927, his disciple, JUDAH L. MAGNES (1877–1948), followed in his footsteps. Magnes was a San Francisco–born rabbi who immigrated to Palestine in 1922, established the Hebrew University in JERUSALEM, and served as its first president until his death in 1948. He made a lifelong effort to bring Arabs and Jews together and to work for a binational state in which the national rights and aspirations of both peoples would be safeguarded by fundamental constitutional guarantees. In such a state, the constitution would recognize two nations within one state, with

full rights to cultural autonomy and fostered by two official languages—Arabic and Hebrew. In his address at the opening of the Hebrew University for its 1929–1930 academic year, Magnes put forward the principles of BINATIONALISM: "One of the greatest cultural duties of the Jewish people is the attempt to enter the Promised Land, not by means of conquest as Joshua, but through peaceful and cultural means, through hard work, sacrifices, love and with a decision not to do anything which cannot be justified before the world conscience."

Another of the Other Zionists was A. D. Gordon (1856–1922), whose writings reflected much the same spirit as those of Magnes. Gordon, who died the same year Magnes immigrated to Palestine, was a Zionist who left his family in Russia in 1904 to live in Palestine. He believed that the Jews could reestablish a nation in Palestine only if they began to build it, literally, with their own hands. Though he was already forty-eight years of age when he emigrated and a writer and philosopher not accustomed to physical labor, he set out to live as he believed. He worked as a manual laborer in the vineyards and orange groves of Petah Tikvah and Rishon le-Zion—two of the oldest Jewish farming settlements in Palestine—and, after 1912, in various villages in Galilee, suffering all the tribulations of the pioneers: malaria, unemployment, hunger, and insecurity.

A secular mystic, nationalist, and universalist, Gordon wrote of the Jews: "We were the first to proclaim that man is created in the image of God. We must go further and say: the nation must be created in the image of God. Not because we are better than others, but because we have borne upon our shoulders and suffered all which calls for this. It is by paying the price of torments the like of which the world has never known that we have won the right to be the first in this work of creation." In Gordon's opinion, the crucial test of the Jews would be their position toward the Arabs. "Our attitude toward them," he wrote, "must be one of humanity, of moral courage which remains on the highest plane, even if the behavior of the other side is not all that is desired. Indeed," he concluded, "their hostility is all the more reason for our humanity." In Gordon's view, "each and every nation must see itself as a unit responsible for the fate of humanity and for the attainment of universal justice." From this it followed that "the relationship between the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine was important because if the Jews were to recreate their nation as a just nation this could not be done on the basis of injustice." The Jews, in his view, had a right to return "to Palestine and become once again a part of it, but the Arabs were part of it too."

For Gordon, as with Ahad Ha'am, the Arab problem was central. He recognized that the Arabs were "a living nation, though not a free one" (he was writing in 1919), and that, whether Zionists liked it or not, they would be "partners with us in the political and social life" of the country. He saw Arab-Jewish relations as "a great moment," because "here we have the first lesson and the first practical exercise in the life of brotherhood between nations." The test of Jewish humanity was in the Jewish attitude toward the Arabs. Nor did Gordon see this relationship purely in terms of ideals. He translated it into terms of the land question, fearing for the coming dispossession of the Arab peasant. In 1922, when drafting statutes for the guidance of Zionist labor settlements, he included a provision (ignored by the people implementing them): "Wherever settlements are founded, a specific share of the land must be assigned to the Arabs from the outset. The distribution of sites should be equitable so that not only the welfare of the Jewish settler but equally that of the resident Arabs will be safeguarded. The settlement has the moral obligation to assist the Arabs in any way it can. This is the only proper and fruitful way to establish good neighborly relations with the Arabs."

A similar message came from a very different sector of European Jewry, from the German-Jewish philosopher MARTIN BUBER (1878–1965), who also was influenced by Ahad Ha'am. He became a Zionist as early as 1898, but for him Zionism was to be different from all other nationalisms. It was to be *Der Heilige Weg* (The Holy Way), also the title of a book he published in 1919 in his native GERMANY. In it, Buber espoused a "Hebrew humanism." He, too, saw relations with the Arabs as crucial and emphasized in his writings "that Zionism should address itself to the needs of the Arabs." As early as 1921, Buber set forth the germ of the idea of a binational state in a proposal to the WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS that year. He wanted the congress to officially proclaim "its desire to live in peace and brotherhood with the Arab people and to develop the common homeland into a republic in which both peoples will have the possibility of free development." They declined. In Palestine, where he immigrated

in 1938, Buber made the quest for Arab-Jewish friendship one of his main concerns. Even after the outbreak of the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Buber "called for a harnessing of nationalistic impulses and a solution based on compromise between the two peoples." He was a close friend of Magnes and taught at the Hebrew University until his death in 1965.

One of the earliest figures in the Other Zionism was Moshe Smilansky (1874–1953). The son of a tenant farmer near Kiev in Russia, he immigrated to Palestine in 1890 and was active as a farmer, writer, and Zionist. A binationalist also, Smilansky opposed the movement to restrict employment in Jewish colonies and fields to Jewish labor only. He had the distinction of being the first modern Hebrew writer to write about the Arabs among whom he settled. Under the pen name Hawaja Mussa, he published amiable short stories about Arab life before World War I. These stories, "the first of their kind in Jewish literature," introduced "to the Jewish reader a new world—exotic, colorful, throbbing with its own rich humanity."

A similar figure, out of that same pioneering generation, was the agronomist Hayim Kalwariski-Margolis (1868–1947). His was the only Jewish home in which one encountered Arab intellectuals. By 1945, he had already spent fifty years in Palestine devoted to Jewish resettlement and Arab-Jewish friendship. Many of the earliest and most famous pre–World War I Jewish settlements in Galilee owe much to Kalwariski-Margolis for their foundation and survival. To protect these colonies, Kalwariski-Margolis helped to organize the HASHOMER, the Jewish armed watchmen's organization, from which the HAGANA ultimately developed. And, in his search for better relations with Arab neighbors, he persuaded BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD to establish a Hebrew-Arab school, the first of its kind, for the children of the Arab village of Ja'uni near the Jewish village of Rosh Pina in Galilee.

Kalwariski-Margolis played a part in a series of attempts to establish amicable relations between the rising forces of Arab and Jewish nationalism. As early as 1913, he arranged meetings in Damascus, SYRIA, and Beirut, LEBANON, between the famous Zionist leader NAHUM SOKOLOW and Arab nationalists. After World War I, Syrian king Faysal I, who had led the Arab revolt against the Turks, paid Kalwariski-Margolis an unusual tribute. Kalwariski-Margolis was invited by the newly crowned king to Damascus and the presidium of the All-Syrian Congress "to suggest proposals for the regulation of Jewish-Arab relations in Palestine." In 1922, Kalwariski-Margolis participated in Arab-Jewish negotiations in Cairo, which were discontinued after the British government opposed them. In those years, he was not acting merely as an unauthorized Zionist heretic but was one of the three Jewish members of the Arab-Jewish Advisory Council set up for Palestine by the first British High Commissioner, Sir HERBERT SAMUEL. Kalwariski-Margolis also served on the executive of the Va'ad Le'umi, or National Council, which was the unofficial governing body of the Palestinian Jewish community between the two world wars. From 1923 to 1927, he directed the Office of Arab Affairs of the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE. In 1929, after the Arab uprising that year, he was appointed head of the combined office set up by the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL and the Va'ad Le'umi to deal with Arab-Jewish tensions.

Kalwariski-Margolis did not, however, limit his activities to these official Zionist bodies. He was a leading figure in a series of maverick organizations, established in the 1920s through 1940s, that advocated a binational state to bring about Arab-Jewish reconciliation. Though they were all politically marginal movements with little impact on majority opinion, they attracted many of the best minds and most illustrious intellectuals of the Jewish community. The earliest was the Berit Shalom (Covenant of Peace), formed in 1925 by leading pioneers and intellectuals such as ARTHUR RUPPIN, Hans Kohn, Gershom Scholem—then the leading authority on Jewish mysticism—and Kalwariski-Margolis. This was the first organization to call for the establishment of a binational state in Palestine, and it was bitterly attacked by most of the Zionist parties, especially by the right-wing Zionist Revisionists, as "defeatist." Yet these men were not utopian idealists but believed that the Palestinians were justified in fearing a Zionism that spoke in terms of a Jewish majority and a Jewish state. They believed that both nations were in Palestine by right and if the Jews wished to live there in peace and security, they had to acknowledge and live by this reality.

Berit Shalom lasted until the early 1930s and was succeeded by three similar organizations: Kedma Mizraha (Forward to the East), established in the 1930s; the League of Arab-Jewish Rapprochement in 1939; and the last and most important binationalist group, IHUD (Unity), which referred to Arab-Jewish unity, in 1942. Kalwariski-

Margolis played a leading role in all these organizations. Ihud was organized four months before the 1942 BILTMORE Conference by a group of Zionist dissidents, among them Magnes and another American Jew, Henrietta Szold, with the stated purpose of establishing friendly contact with the Arabs and working for a binational solution. Magnes testified for Ihud in 1947 before the UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE in favor of a binational state. After the UNITED NATIONS voted for the partition of Palestine between an Arab and a Jewish state in UN RESOLUTION 181, with economic and other links between them, Magnes pressed for the establishment of a Semitic Confederation, including Israel, as a means of preventing the war he saw would result from partition, but was unsuccessful. With the 1948 War and the establishment of a Jewish state, the binational movement came to an end, but not the Other Zionism, which continued to struggle for justice for the Arabs in Israel and later in the Occupied Territories and for Arab-Jewish reconciliation.

These Jewish binationalist groups, as their Zionist adversaries have pointed out, rarely if ever attracted Arab support, although one of the groups, the League of Arab-Jewish Rapprochement, achieved a breakthrough in 1946. It came in HAIFA, where Jews and Palestinians rotated the municipal offices between them: when the mayor was an Arab, the vice mayor was a Jew, and vice versa. There, in 1946, a leading Arab intellectual declared himself for a binational Palestine. This maverick, Fauzi Darwish al-Husayn, was a member of the most influential Arab clan in Palestine, the AL-HUSAYNIS, and a cousin of the mufti of Jerusalem, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, a bitter opponent of Zionism, who took the Axis side in World War II. But at a public meeting in Haifa in 1946, Darwish al-Husayn called for an Arab-Jewish agreement under the auspices of the United Nations, for a "bi-national independent Palestine," which would, in turn, link itself by "an alliance with the Arab neighboring countries."

Al-Husayn amplified his views in a talk before an Arab-Jewish gathering in the home of Kalwariski-Margolis a few days later. He said he had taken part in the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES as a follower of his cousin, the mufti, but had begun to realize "that this road has no purpose. Experience has proven," al-Husayn went on, "that the official policy of both sides brings only damage and suffering to both." He said that in Palestine "the Jews and Arabs once lived in friendship and cooperation" and added that "there are Jews and Arabs from the older generation who nursed from the same mother. The imperialist policy plays with us both, with the Arabs and the Jews, and there is no other way except unity and working hand in hand."

Al-Husayni stressed that the moderates must organize. "A club must be set up immediately in Jerusalem to acquire friends, to begin producing a written organ, to visit other cities for propaganda and making ties." In response, an Arab organization was formed, called the Falastin al-Jedida (the New Palestine), and, on 11 November 1946, five of its leading members signed an agreement with the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. The two sides agreed to "full cooperation between the two national movements in all fields on the basis of political equality between the two nations in Palestine as a means to obtaining the independence of the country . . . and the joining of the shared and independent Palestine in an alliance with the neighboring countries in the future." They even reached agreement on the thorniest problem of all—Jewish immigration, which was to be regulated "according to the absorptive capacity of the country." But this potentially promising beginning—at least from the perspective of the Other Zionists—was brought to an end twelve days later when al-Husayn was murdered by unknown Arab nationalists.

The tradition of the Other Israel is carried on today by Israeli intellectuals, activists, and organizations, and though, like their predecessors, they are marginalized in Israeli society and politics as well as being disunited, their efforts are significant. Although they are not all binationalists, they believe in the basic humanity of the Palestinians and in their right to share and participate equally in all fundamental civil, human, and political rights. These individuals include writer Meron Benvenisti; historians Avi Shlaim, Tom Segev, and Ilan Pappé; academics Uri Ram, Tanya Reinhart, Jeff Halper, the late Baruch Kimmerling, Neve Gordon, and Ze'ev Sternhell; moral philosopher Adi Ophir; journalists Amira Hass and Gideon Levy; activist intellectual Michel Warschawski; lawyers Tamar Peleg, Lea Tsemel, and self-exiled Felicia Langer; the military officers who have refused duty in the Occupied Territories; activists such as Uri Avnery and

Gila Svirsky; the members of B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; and Israeli organizations such as WOMEN IN BLACK, Anarchists Against the Wall, TA'AYUSH, YESH G'VUL, and COURAGE TO REFUSE.

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Peace Bloc

See GUSH SHALOM

Peace Movement

See ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT

Peace Now

Peace Now is the largest extra-parliamentary movement in Israel, the country's oldest peace movement, and the only peace group to have a broad public base. It describes itself as "Israeli pacifists for Palestinian self-determination within the 1967 borders." The movement was founded in 1978 during the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks. At a moment when these talks appeared to be collapsing, a group of 348 reserve officers and soldiers from Israeli army combat units published an open letter to the prime minister of Israel calling upon the government to make sure this opportunity for peace was not lost. Tens of thousands of Israelis sent in support for the letter, and the movement was born.

The basic principles of the movement from the outset were the right of Israel to live within secure BORDERS and the right of their neighbors to do the same, including the right of Palestinians to self-determination. In time the movement became convinced that the only viable solution to the conflict was the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories adjacent to Israel, which were occupied as a result of the 1967 WAR. In 1988, upon PLO acceptance of UN RESOLUTION 242 and the principle of the TWO-STATE SOLUTION, Peace Now led a massive demonstration of 100,000 persons calling on the government to negotiate with the PLO. Fully supporting the breakthrough represented by the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, Peace Now supported all steps promising to promote a resolution to the conflict until the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. The most important continuous project of Peace Now is its "Settlement Watch," which carefully monitors the building of settlements, including housing tenders, expropriation of lands, budget allocations, new outposts, and all else related to settlement expansion. It publishes detailed reports with statistics and analysis available on its website. http://www.peacenow.org.il.

See also ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT

Peel Commission, 1937

The Peel Commission, also known as the Palestine Royal Commission, was a British Royal Commission sent to Palestine in the wake of the 1936 ARAB REVOLT. Despite the recommendations of prior British fact-finding commissions to limit Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases, including the 1929 HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION, the 1930 SHAW COMMISSION, and the 1930 PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER, Jewish immigration nevertheless continued to increase, land purchases escalated, and the Jewish community in Palestine successfully created statelike institutions (hospitals, universities, a military, agricultural communes, and a quasi-government in the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL). Thus, by 1936, Palestinian frustration, resentment, and anger had reached the boiling point. Moreover, the British had been duplicitous in their dealings with the Palestinians, and few any longer believed they would achieve their right to self-determination under the BRITISH MANDATE.

The situation in Palestine had been tense for several years before the Arab Revolt erupted. In October 1933, nationwide strikes and demonstrations against ZIONISM and British targets were met with force, leaving at least twelve Palestinians dead and fueling outrage at Britain's strong-arm tactics. By 1936, seven years after the Hope-Simpson Commission, the Jewish population had risen by



Map 34. Peel Commission Partition Plan, 1937

more than 150 percent, an additional sixty-two Jewish settlements had been created, and nearly 1.5 million dunums (370,000 acres) of Palestinian land was the property of the Zionists. In mid-April 1936, a series of Arab-Jewish clashes in the JAFFA area provided the revolt's trigger, as Palestinian national committees sprang up across the country in support of a call for a general strike issued by the Palestinian leadership, the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE. The British banned the Arab Committee soon after, but, despite the arrest of its leaders and the nationwide imposition of CURFEWS, the uprising surged, and from April until October 1936 the Arab Revolt swept Mandate Palestine. The extent of the revolt and its support throughout the region worried the British, who requisitioned additional troops in September to suppress the uprising. Regional Arab leaders, fearing domestic instability and under pressure from their British benefactor, eventually provided the necessary mediation to bring about a lull in the uprising, while Britain dispatched the Peel Commission to investigate.

Arriving in November 1936, the Peel Commission, headed by Lord Peel, set out to assess the feasibility and future of the Mandate. Published in July 1937, the Peel Commission's report concluded that "the Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System." The proposed treaty envisioned a partition of Palestine, with JERUSALEM and BETHLEHEM retained under a separate British Mandate that would extend to the port at Jaffa. The part allotted the Palestinians was to be united with Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950), and on the land that was to go to the Jewish state, the Palestinians would be compelled to leave and the Jews would be required to pay a subsidy for the Palestinians' loss. With its twin premises of partition and population TRANSFER, the Peel Plan became the point of reference for most future schemes to solve the Palestine question.

The Palestinians flatly rejected the notion of a Zionist state on nearly 33 percent of Palestine and the dispossession of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, which the plan would entail. The Zionist leadership accepted in principle but rejected in detail the Peel partition plan; it was encouraged by the legitimization the plan granted its program but was not content with the amount of land offered. VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY's Revisionist Zionist movement rejected the idea outright and by September 1937 had commenced a violent campaign against the Palestinians and the British, marking the resumption of violence and the resurgence of the Arab Revolt.

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Peled, General Mattityahu (1923–1995)

Mattityahu (Matti) Peled was an Israeli army major general, member of the Knesset, professor of Arabic literature, and founder of the ISRAELI COUNCIL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE (ICIPP). Born in Palestine of parents who had immigrated from Eastern Europe, he started his political life as a "Canaanite," a group that sought cultural as well as political integration with the Arab world. However, Peled soon dropped out of the organization, and the group itself—with its ideal of creating "the New Hebrew Nation"—remained a marginal phenomenon.

Peled joined the PALMAH, the elite fighting force, in 1946, while still a pupil at a prestigious JERUSALEM high school. The same year, he went to London to study law, but his studies were cut short by the outbreak of the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He returned to Palestine; fought—with distinction—with the HAGANA, the underground military organization; and stayed on

in the army through 1969. During Israel's 1956–1957 campaign against EGYPT, Peled was appointed governor of the GAZA STRIP. Prior to the 1967 WAR, Peled was among the generals who strongly pressured Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL to undertake a preemptive strike against EGYPT, JORDAN, and SYRIA. Immediately following the war, however, he raised the idea of a bold peace initiative directed at the Palestinians, including the possibility of creating a Palestinian state, but found no support among his fellow generals or from then chief of staff YITZHAK RABIN.

When Peled left the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES in 1969, it was to pursue an academic career in Arab literature, and he served as chair of Tel Aviv University's Arab Language and Literature Department from 1974 to 1978. He entered politics in 1973, spent a short period on the left of the LABOR PARTY, and formed a brief partnership with SHULAMIT ALONI, a left-wing politician and Knesset member. During this time, possibilities developed for political dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, and Peled soon became part of this clandestine endeavor. As the chief coordinator of the ICIPP (established in 1975), he had a key role in formalizing the dialogue within the framework of the ICIPP. Although the talks began as a series of secret meetings between PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) representative SA'ID HAMAMI and Israeli peace activist and writer URI AVNERY, they quickly expanded to involve more Israelis and Palestinians (continuing from 1976 through 1993), though all such meetings were illegal according to Israeli law.

Peled was one of the earliest advocates of a land-for-peace agreement with the Palestinians (i.e., Israeli withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for peace with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and LEBANON and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the WEST BANK and Gaza Strip). In Paris in 1973, he met with Dr. ISAM SARTAWI, sent by PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT, and these two men—each a significant figure in his own camp, each a patriot convinced that he was acting in the true interest of his people—recognized each other as coequals and discovered that they could talk about the common problems of their peoples. It was the beginning of true friendship. Later, in 1976, Peled met with Arafat in Paris, and, in 1983, a second meeting took place. Peled briefed Prime Minister Rabin on his talks with the PLO leaders, which often contained direct messages for the Israeli leader, but while Rabin heard him out, he never consented to send a message in return. "That would be negotiating with the PLO, and I will never do that." Both Sartawi (1983) and Hamami (1978) were assassinated by Palestinian extremists, and, while Peled did not suffer such a fate, he was subjected to death threats and public accusations of treason.

Peled returned to politics in 1977, founding the short-lived SHELLI (Peace & Equality for Israel) Party, whose platform focused on advocating peace negotiations with the Palestinians. Virtually the entire membership of the ICIPP joined the new party, but, although all members of Shelli were doves within the Israeli general political spectrum, there were considerable differences and many difficulties over political strategy and tactics. Peled remained a member of the Shelli executive for the whole of the party's six years of existence, though he never held public office on its behalf. He was implacable in his opposition to Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and in particular to the bombing of Beirut, which he considered a war crime, and said so in public. Peled supported the reserve soldiers who refused to take part in the LEBANON WAR, who were organized by the newly founded YESH G'VUL movement, some 200 of whom served terms in military prisons. Because of his illustrious military past, Peled's support for the "refusers" drew much public attention. However, some of his fellow members in the Shelli party regarded reserve service in Lebanon as the correct course, and Peled precipitated a split in the party.

In 1984, Peled was elected to the Knesset, on behalf of the newly formed PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE (PLP), which advocated an independent Palestinian state. Peled and Avnery were the Jewish founders of the PLP, together with their Arab partners Muhammad Mi'ari, a veteran political activist and human rights lawyer specializing in LAND confiscation cases, and the Reverand Riah Abu El-Assal, vicar of the Anglican Church in NAZARETH (later Anglican bishop of Jerusalem). The Israeli government and right-wing parties made several attempts to outlaw the PLP for its advocacy of a Palestinian state and prevent it from running in elections, which was the fate of earlier parties in which Mi'ari was involved, such as AL-ARD in 1965. However, the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT overturned these attempts. Thus, in the general elections that year, Mi'ari and Peled were elected to the Knesset. Peled's parliamentary term coincided with the outbreak of the First INTIFADA, and he soon

gained a reputation as one of the most serious and industrious of Israel's parliamentarians.

Peled dedicated his last years to advancing a dialogue of mutual recognition and respect between Israelis and Palestinians and to research of Arabic literature. He was the first Israeli professor of Arabic literature who introduced studies of Palestinian literature into the academic curriculum. Peled published numerous political articles in ISRAELI MEDIA and international media and translated several pieces of Arabic literature into Hebrew. For what turned out to be his last work of translation, *The Sages of Darkness* by the Syrian-Kurdish writer Salim Barakat, Peled won the Translators' Association Prize in the early 1990s.

In 1993 Peled participated in the formation of GUSH SHALOM, the Israeli Peace Bloc, a grassroots peace movement in whose ranks Peled alternately expressed a sharp criticism of his old friend Rabin for severe human rights violations in the Occupied Territories; commended him for his dramatic rapprochement with the PLO and the handshake with Arafat on the White House lawn; and finally expressed great concern at the slow pace of the peace process and the continuing OCCUPATION, oppression, and SETTLEMENT activity.

Ill with liver cancer by 1994, Peled continued to write political commentary. His last essay, penned a few weeks before his death and published in *The Other Israel*, was entitled "Requiem to Oslo." It expressed immense disappointment with the OSLO PROCESS and predicted the explosion that was to break out with the Second Intifada in 2000.

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The People's Voice

See NUSEIBEH-AYALON AGREEMENT, 2002

Peres, Shimon (1923–)

Shimon Peres is an Israeli politician who served as the prime minister of Israel from 1984 to 1986 and again from 1995 to 1996 and served twice as the head of the LABOR PARTY. On 13 June 2007 he was elected president of Israel, a largely symbolic position, for a seven-year term beginning in July. The eighty-three-year-old Peres was the ninth president of Israel. Peres was foreign affairs minister of Israel from 2001 to 2002 and became vice premier in a coalition under ARIEL SHARON at the start of 2005. In 1994, Peres won the Nobel Peace Prize, together with former prime minister YITZHAK RABIN and PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT, for their efforts toward peace, which culminated in the OSLO ACCORDS. Peres is one of Israel's most durable politicians and is currently the longest-serving member of the Knesset.

Peres was born in Wieniawa, Poland (now Vishniev in Belarus), and immigrated to Palestine with his parents in 1934. He was educated at the agricultural school of Ben Shemen. In 1947 he was conscripted into the HAGANA, the Jewish underground military organization, and was given responsibility for personnel and arms purchases. In 1952 he was appointed deputy director-general of the Ministry of Defense, and in 1953 he became its director-general, through which he was involved in procuring weapons for Israel, acquiring from FRANCE the advanced Dassault Mirage III jet fighter and a nuclear reactor.

In 1959 Peres was elected to the Knesset as a member of MAPAI, the Israel Workers' Party. From 1959 to 1965 he served as deputy defense minister until he was implicated, with Defense Minister MOSHE DAYAN, in the failed Israeli covert operation that became known as the LAVON AFFAIR. Peres and Dayan left Mapai with DAVID BEN-GURION, Israel's founder and first prime minister, to form a new party, RAFI, which reconciled with Mapai in 1968 (without Ben-Gurion), resulting in the formation of the Labor Alignment.

In 1969 Peres was appointed minister of absorption, responsible for IMMIGRATION and settlement in Israel, and in 1970 he became the minister of transportation and communications. In 1974, after a period as information minister, he was appointed

minister of defense in the Rabin government. Peres had been Rabin's chief rival for the post of prime minister after GOLDA MEIR resigned in 1974, and he continued to challenge Rabin for the leadership of the party. While again narrowly defeated in 1977, he succeeded Rabin as Labor leader when Rabin resigned after his wife Leah was found to have maintained bank accounts abroad in violation of then-existing Israeli currency regulations.

Subsequently, Peres led the Labor Party to its first ever electoral defeat in 1977, which was repeated in 1981. However, it won more seats than any other party in 1984, and Peres became prime minister at the head of a national unity government composed of Labor, LIKUD, and several minor parties. After leaving the premiership in 1986, he became foreign minister the same year and finance minister in 1988. For a time, Peres hoped that King Husayn of JORDAN could be Israel's Arab negotiating partner rather than Arafat. He met secretly with Husayn in London in 1987 and reached an agreement with him (HUSAYN-PERES AGREEMENT), but this was rejected by Israel's prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR. Shortly afterward, the First INTIFADA erupted in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and whatever plausibility King Husayn had as a potential Israeli partner in resolving the fate of the West Bank evaporated. Subsequently, Peres gradually moved closer to support for talks with the PLO, although he avoided making an outright commitment to this policy until 1993.

Peres and the Labor Party finally left the government in 1990 after making a failed bid to form a narrow government based on a coalition of Labor, small leftist groupings, and HAREDI parties. In the National Unity government (1988–1990), Peres served as vice premier and minister of finance. From 1990 to 1992, he led the opposition in the Knesset. In early 1992, branded as a hopeless loser, Peres was defeated by Rabin in the first primary elections in the history of the Labor Party. However, Peres remained active in politics, serving as Rabin's foreign minister from 1992 and briefly succeeding him after his assassination in 1995. In the first direct elections for prime minister in Israel's history, in 1996, Peres was defeated by Likud leader BENJAMIN NETANYAHU. In 1997, he did not seek reelection as Labor Party leader and was replaced by EHUD BARAK, who rebuffed Peres's attempt to secure the position of party president and, upon forming a government in 1999, appointed Peres to the minor post of minister for regional development.

However, after the defeat of Barak by Ariel Sharon in the 2001 election, Peres made yet another comeback. He led Labor into a national unity government with Sharon's Likud Party and secured the post of foreign minister. The formal leadership of the party passed to Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and later to HAIFA mayor General Amram Mitzna. On 13 June 2007 Peres was elected president of the State of Israel by the Knesset. Peres was much criticized on the left for remaining in his position as foreign minister in a government that was not seen as advancing the peace process, despite his own declared liberal stance. He left office only when Labor resigned in advance of the 2003 elections. Subsequent to Labor's crushing defeat under Mitzna, Peres again emerged as interim leader. He led the party in a coalition with Sharon once more, at the end of 2004, when the latter's support of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA presented a diplomatic program Labor could support.

As a protégé of Ben-Gurion and Dayan and an early supporter of the WEST BANK settlers during the 1970s, Peres was at one time considered something of a hawk. However, after becoming the leader of his party, his stance evolved, and since the 1990s, he has been seen as a leftist and a strong supporter of the notion of peace through economic cooperation. During the 1970s and early 1980s, he was opposed to talks with the PLO, but he later distanced himself from the Jewish settlers and spoke of the need for "territorial compromise" over the West Bank and GAZA STRIP.

Peres was perhaps more closely associated with the Oslo Accords than any other Israeli politician (Rabin included), with the possible exception of his own protégé, YOSSI BEILIN. He has remained a supporter of the Oslo Accords and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY since its inception in 1993, despite the AL-AQSA INTIFADA of September 2000. However, Peres also supported Sharon's military policy of using the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES offensively against the Palestinians. Whatever Peres's image internationally, within Israel he tends to be viewed by friends and foes as a ruthless and opportunistic wheeler-dealer.

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Permits

Of all the elements in Israel's control of the Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, none is more all-encompassing or more effective than the permit system. Permits regulate Palestinian employment, access to medical care, attainability of EDUCATION, where they can worship, and their ability to travel—abroad, between the GAZA STRIP and the WEST BANK, and within the West Bank, as well as to JERUSALEM. The permit system adversely affects the entire Palestinian ECONOMY by regulating Palestinians' ability to build or enlarge a home, determining what goods they can export or import, developing their municipalities, tending their fields, digging or repairing a well, and living in their village of origin. It even determines the ability of families to live together as married couples with their children. So comprehensive is this "matrix of control," as Israeli academic Jeff Halper has termed it, that the permit system allows Israel to control 2.3 million people in the West Bank (and until 2005, 1.5 million Gazans). The principal question underlying this system is why any human being should need a permit to travel to see a doctor, visit relatives in the next town, attend university, move from his or her place of residence to another, or perform any other routine modern human activity.

History and Mechanics of the Permit System

From 1967 to 1991, restrictions on the movement of Palestinians were relatively light. However, with the beginning of the First INTIFADA in 1987, Israel increasingly restricted Palestinians' freedom of movement by implementing a permit system, and in 1988, Israel began preventing Palestinians from traveling between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With the start of the GULF WAR in 1991, the Israeli military implemented further restrictions in the permit system. Every Palestinian was required to obtain an individual permit, in contrast to the general permits that had previously applied to the population as a whole. In the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed a magnetic-card system whereby only those with such a card were allowed to leave the Strip. In the West Bank, green, rather than orange, IDENTITY CARDS were issued to Palestinians whom Israel prohibited from leaving the Occupied Territories.

In 1993, Israel imposed an overall CLOSURE on the Occupied Territories "until further notice," and to enforce the closure, Israeli military CHECKPOINTS were established along the 1949 armistice line (Green Line) between the West Bank and Israel, between the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and between cities within the West Bank. Permits to move among the three areas were granted sparingly and according to criteria unknown to Palestinians. One had to receive a special permit to enter East Jerusalem and very few were granted. The OSLO ACCORDS and the geopolitical changes that followed had almost no effect on these restrictions, which, together with other factors, seriously eroded Palestinian confidence in the peace process. From the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, the Israeli military increasingly restricted Palestinians from moving freely. From 2002 through the time of this writing (summer 2009), almost no permits have been issued or renewed, closure policies have substantially tightened, and the entry of Palestinian workers into Israel has dramatically decreased. The perfection of the permit system over the years led Amira Hass to comment that Israel "is fragmenting not only Palestinian territory, but the Palestinian population into categories which are characterized by their accessibility to the privilege of freedom of movement."

Revocation of the general exit permit in 1991 marked the beginning of the permanent CLOSURE policy, which reached its apex in 1993. Subsequently, total closures became a regular Israeli policy instrument, and with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada Israel imposed a comprehensive closure on the Occupied Territories. The severity of the closures changed depending on circumstances. For example, after Palestinian violence against Israelis, the authorities imposed a total closure, during which no exit permits were granted (except in very exceptional cases). A total closure is also always imposed on the Occupied Territories during Israeli holidays. At times, Israel also imposed an internal closure on specific towns or villages in the West Bank, often after some act of Palestinian resistance or protest. In 2002 the Israeli army began tightening its grip on movement of

Palestinians in cities and towns within the West Bank by insisting that they obtain new freedom-of-movement permits from the regional administration to travel from one city to another. One result of this new internal permit system and accompanying measures has been to divide the West Bank into eight population regions, effectively isolating each from the others, with traffic and movement control exercised by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. The eight regions are JENIN, NABLUS, Tul Karm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, JERICHO, BETHLEHEM, and HEBRON. East Jerusalem, once the economic heart of the West Bank, annexed by Israel and cut off from the rest of the West Bank, can be added as a ninth sealed-off enclave. In the Gaza Strip, which was split in two, the 200,000 residents of Rafah were required to obtain permits to move to the northern part of the Strip including Gaza City.

Traditionally, there had been regular traffic between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with Israel, which was due to the extensive family ties between residents of the occupied areas and Palestinian citizens and residents of Israel. In 2001 it became illegal for Israeli citizens to travel to Area A (areas under full Palestinian control) in the West Bank or to enter the areas of Gaza controlled by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, affecting the ability of Palestinian-Israeli citizens to unite with their families. By the end of the year, the ability of Israelis to obtain permits to enter Gaza fell by 98 percent, thus Tel Aviv made it almost impossible for couples, one of whom was Israeli and the other a resident of Gaza, to live together under one roof, and consequently for their children to live with both parents. Israel generally suspends the permits of Israeli Arabs to enter Gaza following Palestinian attacks or during extensive military operations. The vast majority of those holding such permits, which are suspended in a wholesale manner with no notice of the decision or how long it will be in effect, are women with Israeli citizenship or residency who are married to Gazans. During such periods, women who left Gaza for a brief visit in Israel are unable to return to their homes, husbands, and children. In January 2002, Israel decided to shorten the period of the entry permits for divided families—from three months to one month. Thus women who wished to obey the law had to travel to the ERETZ CROSSING between Israel and Gaza twelve times a year to renew their permits. Owing to harsh conditions and poverty, many women failed to reach Eretz to renew their permits on time. When they later tried to get new permits, their applications were rejected on the grounds that they had "stayed illegally in the territory of the Palestinian National Authority."

The institution that controls the permits and thus every aspect of Palestinian existence is a massive bureaucratic edifice known as the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, or the District Coordination and Liaison Administration Offices. Its Subcommittee for Supervision of the Supreme Planning Council specializes in providing or withholding permits and issuing demolition orders for Palestinian houses and stop-work orders for construction projects, decisions that are ultimately made by the General Security Services (GSS, Shabak, SHIN BET). Decisions by the GSS are confidential and often arbitrary. The Shin Bet frequently attempts to recruit COLLABORATORS as the basis for granting a permit. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, mostly men, are blacklisted by the GSS for alleged political activity against the Occupation and cannot get a magnetic card, which is a necessary, though not solely sufficient, condition to get a permit of any kind. Those who are rejected often make appeals to a court or hire a lawyer, which ironically often brings about a positive decision, thus exposing the arbitrariness of their previous rejections. The authority to issue permits is exclusively in Israeli hands. Applicants wait for hours on end, are treated like cattle, and are humiliated by Israeli soldiers. A permit is issued—or, more often, not issued—by a confidential, unaccounted-for decision by the GSS. If issued, a permit can be valid for a few days or for a month, or just for a single day from sunrise to sunset, and all permits have to be renewed regularly.

When Israel institutes a new permit regulation or tightens its closure policy, residents do not receive any formal notification, discovering the change only when they show up at checkpoints and are ordered by soldiers to go to a civil administration building and bring a new or revised permit that will allow them to leave or enter whatever city or town they are facing.

Permits for Building, Work, Driving, and Goods

Since the beginning of the Occupation, Israel has employed in the West Bank a policy of planning, development, and building that severely restricts construction by Palestinians. All construction requires a permit from the Israeli authorities, which grants very few. Obtaining a building permit is a

prolonged, complicated, and expensive procedure, which generally results in denial of the application. In this situation and with no other option, many Palestinians who need to provide housing for their families build without a permit. In response, Israel has adopted a policy of mass HOUSE DEMOLITIONS of Palestinian homes—ostensibly because they are illegal. During the 1990s, the authorities demolished more than 3,000 residences, leaving more than 18,000 Palestinians homeless.

To obtain a permit to work in Israel, Palestinians have to pass certain conditions established for "security reasons." However, Israel also places quotas on the number of permits it issues to those who pass the security checks. These quotas are set by the political echelon, for economic reasons of supply and demand unrelated to security. Throughout the years of the Oslo Accords (1993–2000), the number of workers who were able to obtain work permits declined precipitously, resulting in a severe economic crisis in the Occupied Territories by 1997.

Individual drivers, as well as taxi, truck, and other drivers, must have permits to get from one area to another (these are different from driver's licenses, which are also required). Many areas have only one entrance or exit that can be crossed only after receiving the proper freedom-of-movement permit. Israeli authorities claim that the permits were intended to ease the lives of Palestinians because they would reduce the need for closures and SIEGES. As of 2008, however, there has been no reduction in closures and sieges.

Under the system implemented in 2002, goods require a permit to enter or leave the Occupied Territories or to be transported within the territories, and Israel strictly regulates what can be imported (e.g., in Gaza, cooking gas, industrial diesel fuel, cement, and 20 percent of UNRWA's humanitarian supplies, among most other goods, are prohibited) or exported (e.g., in both the West Bank and Gaza, textiles and agricultural products, among other items, cannot be exported). Even when goods are permitted they can only be moved through a "back-to-back system" in which a truck goes to a certain location where goods are unloaded to another waiting truck, which then carries the merchandise further. Both truck drivers must have valid permits as well. The list of prohibited goods is so extensive and the permits so few, both the agricultural and commercial sectors have been devastated. The new system contributed significantly to the increased economic disintegration Palestinians experienced.

Intifada and the Barrier

In September 2000, with the eruption of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel initiated a policy of refusing most requests for permits for everything—including work, travel, or movement within the territories.

In 2002, Israel began construction of a BARRIER wall, most of which lies outside the Green Line in West Bank territory, to separate Palestinians and Israelis. The Barrier leaves some entire Palestinian villages on the Israeli side of the wall, but more often it severs villages from their farmland, with the agricultural land on the Israeli side and the village in the West Bank. In October 2003, Israel implemented a permit system in the enclaves it created between the Barrier and the Green Line. Palestinians living in these village enclaves must have a permit to cross a gate in the wall to reach and work their land, but obtaining such a permit is difficult. B'Tselem, the Israeli Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, reported that during the first six months of the enclave permit regime, the Civil Administration rejected some 25 percent of the permit requests in the Tulkarm-Qalqilya area alone.

The Israeli military has ordered thousands of Palestinians living near the steel and concrete Barrier in the West Bank to obtain special permits to live in their homes. Any Palestinian who lives in the area is defined by a new category of "long-term resident," and everyone over the age of twelve is required to obtain a permit to live in his or her own home and travel beyond his or her village. The order immediately affected about 12,000 Palestinians in fifteen villages squeezed between the Green Line and Barrier, and within months another 40,000 or more were in a similar position once construction of the fence was completed around the north of Jerusalem. The number has grown exponentially since.

In an arc around much of Jayyous, a village in the West Bank near Qalqilya, the Barrier caused 70 percent of the villagers' farmland—and all their irrigated land—to end up on the western (Israeli) side. There are gates for Jayyous's farmers to access their land, but Israel has made the ability to do so steadily more difficult. On 2 October 2002, the Israeli West Bank military commander declared the area between the Green Line and Barrier—Jayyous's farmlands—a CLOSED MILITARY ZONE. The Israelis call this area the "seam zone," and the rules require that no Palestinian can enter the seam zone without a permit issued by Israel. Although permits have since been given to children, old men

and women, and Jayyousians who currently live outside the country, no permits were given to any of the farmers who had participated in Jayyous's campaign of nonviolent protests against the Barrier in the preceding year or to anyone who had a family member seized by Israel's security forces. Only 30 percent of the farmers who needed them were able to obtain permits, and they were issued for only two months. Many farmers went to the Occupation authorities to try to obtain permits to work their land, and some hired Israeli lawyers to help. The answers were always the same: "Permit denied," with no explanation given. It should be noted that the permits that were issued contained seven numbered items, the most salient of which is number 6: "This permit does not prove your ownership of the land, or if you have a house there, this permit does not prove you are the owner of the house." This naturally caused great anxiety. Additionally, many shepherds cannot graze their sheep because they cannot obtain a permit to access their land.

When the villagers' permits expired in January 2003, even fewer farmers were given new ones, and Israel delivered a set of new rules for permits. Farmers must now provide pictures for the magnetic permits and declare that they will not rent their lands and that they own the land directly and work it themselves. (It is a common practice for the farmers to rent land and hire additional workers.) If their names do not match those on the title deeds, they have to prove in Israeli court that it is their land, and the mayor's office must certify they own the land and work on it and how much land they have. After all these conditions are fulfilled, Israel then requires that all back taxes on the land be paid. The Jayyousians stopped paying their taxes in 1995, when the village came under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority, which did not compel the farmers to pay. Now they are required to come up with nine years of back taxes, which few farmers can afford.

The permit system is a policy in the name of security that forces many people to leave their own land and their own homes if they want to conduct a decent life. But it is not only the robbery of land, the demolished houses, the inability to engage in commerce, and the RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT; the permit system has also appropriated Palestinian time. Amira Hass writes in this regard, "Palestinians' time has been robbed in the last thirteen years, because they have to wait for a permit and they don't get it, then they have to wait again. Then they waste time waiting at the checkpoint, then they waste time in submitting another request for a permit, then they waste time trying to go through all kinds of small, dangerous bypass ROADS. And time is a means of production. Time is so precious for one's development, internal development, community development, and this has been taken by the permit system. Consider that time is even more precious than land. It is possible that land will be given back, but lost time will never be returned." During the OCCUPATION Israel has used time, space, and force as major controlling mechanisms to sustain hegemony over the Palestinian population.

See also OCCUPATION; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT I and II

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Phalange

Phalange is the political party and the militia (Al Kataeeb) of the Maronite Christian Gemayel clan/family in LEBANON. Founded in 1936 by Pierre Gemayel, it remains the Gemayels' most important instrument to obtain and hold power in Lebanon. The Phalange has a historic relationship of quiet diplomacy with Israel dating to the days of DAVID BEN-GURION, Israel's founder and first prime minister. When, in 1975, civil war broke out in Lebanon, the leaders of the Christians—specifically the Gemayel and Chamoun families—asked Israel for military aid. The government of Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN responded positively, and, via the MOSSAD, the Israeli intelligence agency, Israel began to provide weapons to the Phalange. Israel's strategy in the 1982 LEBANON WAR was deeply dependent on the cooperation of the Gemayel clan, but Tel Aviv felt it failed to deliver. In the aftermath of the war it refused to agree to a peace treaty with Israel and pursued a more independent policy in the following years. The Phalange was directly responsible for the SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE.

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Philadelphi Route

The Philadelphi Route is a narrow swath of land variously 50 to 100 meters (164 to 328 feet) wide that runs the length of the southern GAZA STRIP–Egyptian border between Palestinian Rafah and Egyptian Rafah. In the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace treaty, control was given exclusively to Israel. Under the OSLO ACCORDS, Israel retained sole control of the route in cooperation with EGYPT. After ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005, Israel handed over nominal control of the Philadelphi Route to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in conjunction with the EUROPEAN UNION Border Assistance Mission Rafah, but Israel maintained ultimate control through its technology and military at the nearby Israeli town of Keren Shalom. Simultaneously, Tel Aviv secured Egypt's agreement to accept primary responsibility for providing security along the route. In March 2005 Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Egyptian president HOSNI MUBARAK reached a preliminary agreement for Egypt to provide security along the Philadelphi Route, including an Egyptian offer to deploy national guard personnel along its border. Mubarak insisted, however, that he would act only after Israel removed its troops from the buffer zone. Still, Israel was not entirely satisfied, delaying arrival at the final agreement until it received guarantees from Egypt that Cairo would not provide the PNA with weapons or ammunition. In August 2005, the two countries reached a new and final agreement.

The Israeli-Egyptian agreement is called "Agreed Arrangement in the Matter of Deployment of a Task Force of the Border Guards along the Length of Border in the Rafah Region." Egypt was to deploy 750 border police to control the area from the Mediterranean coast all the way to the Negev border and Keren Shalom. To avoid conflicts with the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, the Egyptian forces are not permitted to bring tanks or antitank weapons, or to construct permanent military infrastructure. Its soldiers may only carry light arms and rocket-propelled grenade launchers and use police-style personnel carriers. Egypt is also permitted to

construct "unfortified" observation posts. Israel began its withdrawal in mid-August 2005, completing the operation on 12 September, and the Egyptians deployed border police in September.

Tel Aviv considers the area of vital security interest: Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON declared after Egypt assumed control that Israel's policy would be to "continue to maintain military presence along the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. This presence is an essential security requirement. The physical widening of the route where the military activity will take place may be necessary in certain areas." One purpose of the Philadelphi Route was to prevent the movement of illegal materials (including weapons, ammunition, and illegal drugs) and militants between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Palestinians, in cooperation with some Egyptians, have built tunnels under the Philadelphi Route to move food, medicine, fuel, as well as some illegal materials. Most of the tunnels are based in both sides of Rafah. From the outset of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) began operating against the tunnels, repeatedly bombing them, destroying hundreds of Palestinian houses in Rafah (which it claimed housed one end of a tunnel), and establishing a fortification system that includes a steel anti-sniper wall and armored outposts.

By April 2004, IDF forces discovered and destroyed more than ninety tunnels. Alleging that Palestinians were smuggling arms through tunnels along the Philadelphi Route, Israel undertook an offensive in these areas in May 2004 known as OPERATION RAINBOW. The campaign's efforts were focused in the Rafah Refugee Camp, especially on neighborhoods close to the Route. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the IDF used the tunnels as a pretext to create a depopulated "buffer zone" along the Gaza-Egypt border, resulting in the destruction of 1,600 homes and the razing of at least 700 dunums (175 acres) of agricultural land by September 2004. In a report on HOUSE DEMOLITIONS in Rafah, HRW argues that the IDF should have been able to detect and neutralize tunnels at the point where they cross underneath the border using technologies proven at the Korean demilitarized zone and the US-Mexico border.

In June 2006, Israel opened a new military campaign in Gaza—OPERATION SUMMER RAINS—to free an abducted soldier and stop Qassam rocket fire. The invasion began with Israeli fighter planes carrying out air strikes on Gazan bridges, its power plant, and other INFRASTRUCTURE, followed by ground troops moving into the area east of Rafah. By the end of August the carnage continued unabated, while SHIN BET chief Yuval Diskin told government ministers that the Philadelphi Route had been breached and that recently several tons of explosives and hundreds of weapons had entered Gaza via the route. Diskin further claimed that $1.5 million had been smuggled in through Rafah by the HAMAS Agriculture Ministry and that "terror experts" had also entered. The Shin Bet chief recommended reviewing all agreements on the passages, which he claimed "are ineffective in actuality under Egyptian monitoring." In November Egypt deployed 5,000 additional troops to attempt to halt the smuggling that Israel alleged continued unabated, while several members of the Israeli cabinet argued for Israel to reoccupy the Philadelphi Route.

Following the Hamas coup in Gaza in June 2007, Israel declared that because the PNA was gone, there was no one to observe the Route. The EU Monitors left, the RAFAH CROSSING was closed, but the tunnels along the Philadelphi Route continued to function. They became even more important than before for transporting food, medicine, flour, and so on in the context of Israel's total blockade around the Gaza Strip.

On 23 January 2008, Palestinian militants destroyed several parts of the wall dividing Gaza and Egypt in the town of Rafah and as many as 1.5 million Gazans flooded across the Philadelphi Route into Egypt, in search of food and supplies. Egyptian president Mubarak ordered his troops to allow the Palestinians in due to the humanitarian crisis, but to verify that they did not bring weapons back. The border remained open for five days, and Egypt estimated that Gazans spent some $250 million in Egypt's northern Sinai town of al-Arish alone buying medicines, food, clothing, flour, cooking oil, cigarettes, biscuits, cheese, small generators, sheep, soap, Coca-Cola, gasoline, appliances, and other basics of existence that Israel's boycott had kept out of Gaza.

On 12 January 2009, during OPERATION CAST LEAD, Reuters, citing anonymous Western diplomats, reported that the Israeli military was considering retaking the Philadelphi Route area in order to prevent Hamas from rearming.

See also RAFAH CROSSING

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Physicians for Human Rights–Israel

Physicians for Human Rights–Israel (PHR-Israel) was established in 1988 as a nonpartisan and nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting and protecting the right to HEALTH CARE. A motivating factor for its founding was the worsening situation in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES with the outbreak of the First INTIFADA and the heightened need at that time for protection of human rights. It initially focused on issues of health in the Occupied Territories and the medical aspect of Israel's human rights violations, such as the participation of doctors in the practice of torture. Over the next few years, PHR-Israel widened the scope of its activities to a variety of other fields and the protection of groups suffering from systematic denial of their right to health, such as migrant workers. Additionally, concern for the rights of PRISONERS and detainees, both Israeli and Palestinian, was the basis for a project on health and on conditions for people in custody and provision of health care services for them.

In recent years PHR-Israel has further widened the scope of activities to deal with other marginalized groups, such as the BEDOUIN and the residents of the UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES (by Israel), as well as those who are socioeconomically deprived. It supplies individual and direct medical treatment to residents in the Occupied Territories through its Mobile Clinic and to prisoners and detainees through its volunteer physicians. Much of its effort is concentrated on bringing about changes in Israeli policy and ending systematic abuses of the right to health. PHR-Israel often utilizes legal means, such as appeals to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, and engages in advocacy to raise public awareness. Throughout the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, PHR-Israel continued its cooperation with Palestinian medical and human rights organizations and provision of health services. (www .phr.org.il/phr).

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Pilots' Letter

The "Pilots' Letter," published on 24 September 2003 during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, was signed by twenty-seven Israeli reserve pilots and former pilots already exempt from reserve duty. In it they declared that they would refuse to fly missions that would endanger civilians in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP. The declaration was aimed at Israel's policy of TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of activists of HAMAS, the ISLAMIC JIHAD, and the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES.

The impetus for most of the pilots was the bombing in 2002 of the home of Hamas leader Salah Shehade, which killed him and fourteen members of his family, mostly children. All agreed that the attack sowed the doubts that resulted a year later in their letter.

The signatories included Brigadier General (res.) Yiftah Spector and Yonatan Shapira, a former officer in a Black Hawk helicopter squadron who had flown hundreds of missions over the Occupied Territories in his eleven years in the Israeli air force.

In their letter the pilots stated: "We oppose obeying illegal and immoral orders to attack, such as those carried out by the State of Israel in the Occupied Territories." They continued by explaining their reason: "These orders are illegal and immoral, and the result of an ongoing OCCUPATION that has had a corrupting effect on all of Israeli society." The signatories clarified that they did not reject military service in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES: "We will continue to serve in the Israel Defense Force and the Israeli Air Force [IAF] in any assignment in defense of the State of Israel."

In response, the Israeli chief of staff announced that the pilots would be grounded and would no longer be allowed to train cadets in the country's flight school. The letter inspired hundreds of IAF pilots to sign a petition denouncing the letter and the pilots' refusal to serve. Because of the harsh response and the negative social pressure, several of the pilots who were original signatories removed their names. Other signatories stood by the letter, and subsequently more pilots signed it. The letter is considered part of the wider "REFUSENIKS" phenomenon that began during the 1982 LEBANON WAR and has been growing significantly since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada. (www.jfjfp.org/BackgroundW/refusenik_pilots.htm or www.seruv.org.il/english/combatants_letter.asp).

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; COURAGE TO REFUSE

Pinsker, Leon (1821–1891)

Leon Pinsker (Yehuda Leib) was an early Zionist whose book *Autoemancipation*, published in 1882 as an analysis of the roots of ANTI-SEMITISM and a call for the establishment of a Jewish home, was highly influential in the Zionist movement. Born in Poland, he studied law at Odessa University in Ukraine, then redirected his interest and studied medicine at the University of MOSCOW. In 1849 he opened a practice in Odessa.

Pinsker was one of the founders of a Russian-language weekly that encouraged Jews to speak Russian, and was later a contributor to a weekly that urged Jews to assimilate. He viewed the HASKALAH, the movement for the dissemination of modern European culture among Jews, in a strongly positive light. Yet, after the pogroms against Jews in Odessa in 1871 and in southern Russia in 1881, Pinsker made a complete about-face. He came to agree with the HOVEVEI ZION movement in Russia that Jews needed a homeland of their own, preferably, but not necessarily, in Palestine. He eventually became chairman of the Hovevei Zion and remained in charge of the organization until he died.

In 1882 Pinsker toured Western European capitals, including Vienna, Berlin, Paris, and London, to sound out Jewish leaders on the idea of funneling Russian Jewish emigration to a Jewish homeland, but the leaders favored emigration to the UNITED STATES. A few agreed with Pinsker that the Jewish question had to receive international recognition, but interest in Palestine was negligible. He returned to Odessa discouraged and began to investigate other possibilities, such as settling Jews in Argentina. Just before his death, Pinsker wrote an article (never published) stating that he feared Palestine or Zion would never be more than the spiritual center of the Jewish people. In his final days, Pinsker expressed a willingness to leave the final decision on the location of a homeland to a national congress, anticipating that the world-

wide process of national awakening would benefit the Jewish people.

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Plan Dalet

See DALET PLAN

Po'ale Zion

Po'ale Zion (Workers of Zion) was a movement of Marxist, Zionist, and Jewish workers' circles, founded in various Russian cities around the turn of the century, that became the core of the Labor Zionist movement. In 1906 a formal Po'ale Zion Party was established in Poltava, Ukraine, under the leadership of Ber Borochov, and other groups soon formed elsewhere in Europe. The key feature of the party's ideology was acceptance of the Marxist view of history combined with nationalism (which Marx would have considered a contradiction). Po'ale Zion sought to combine political ZIONISM with the class interests of the Jewish proletariat, although not the interests of the Palestinian Arab proletariat.

In 1906 a party branch was formed in Palestine, mainly by the Russian immigrants of the second ALIYA. Initially, the Palestine group was primarily concerned with class struggle and the formation of trade unions. Soon, however, Po'ale Zion took up the ideology of the "conquest of labor" (*Kibbush Ha'avodah*) and *Avoda Ivrit* (Hebrew labor), which held that Jewish workers should do all tasks in society, from most menial to most advanced. Po'ale Zion set up employment offices, kitchens, and health services for members, which later became central institutions in the prestate Yishuv, and founded the HASHOMER paramilitary organization that guarded settlements.

In 1920, Po'ale Zion split into left and right factions, although the leftist wing was not significant in the politics of the Yishuv. The right wing was non-Marxist, favoring a more moderate socialist program, and essentially became a social-democratic party led by Israel founder DAVID BEN-GURION and YITZHAK BEN-ZVI, the latter a close friend of Borochov. Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi controlled and directed the party, eventually merging it with other movements to form larger constituencies. They quickly eschewed class issues in favor of political activity to realize the Zionist project.

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Political Parties

See individual parties

Political Zionism

See ZIONISM

Polls and Palestinian Public Opinion

Reliable public opinion polling is usually only found in well-developed Western democracies; however, Palestinians have made several notable efforts in this regard. The first attempts at a systematic survey of Palestinian public opinion in the occupied WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP began in 1993. The JERUSALEM MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION CENTER (JMCC), located in East JERUSALEM, released its first survey in February 1993, which dealt mainly with attitudes toward the peace process. The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), headquartered in NABLUS, now in Ramallah, in the West Bank, released its first comprehensive survey in September 1993 on perceptions of the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT. More recently, Al-Najah and BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY entered the fray and began to produce their own public opinion polls. One should avoid making conclusions based solely on these surveys because of the severe RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT within the Occupied Territories as well as questionable

methodological practices that characterize most of these surveys.

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—Fouad Moughrabi

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

See DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, al-jabha al-sha'biya li'tahrir Filastin) was founded in December 1967 by three groups: the HEROES OF THE RETURN (Abtal al-Auda), the YOUTH REVENGE GROUP (shebab al-tha'r), and the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (jabhat al-tahrir Filastin). This new Palestinian guerrilla group was established as a response to the sweeping Israeli military victory in the 1967 WAR and its OCCUPATION of the remaining historic Palestinian lands—the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and GAZA STRIP. The PFLP's main objective was to liberate Palestine from "the river to the sea"—all of BRITISH MANDATE Palestine—both the territory of the state of Israel as created in 1948 and the newly occupied areas.

Historical Roots

The PFLP's "mother" organization was the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN, or harakat al-qaumiyin al-'Arab), which had been established in the early 1950s as a response to the 1948 WAR and the Palestinian Disaster (*an-nakba,* the expulsion and flight of Palestinians from their homeland, which was transformed into the state of Israel). MAN was created by Palestinian and Arab students at the American University of Beirut and led by a young Palestinian medical student, GEORGE HABASH, a refugee from LYDDA, and his Syrian comrade, Hani al-Hindi. As an intellectual and political avant-garde, they had hoped to lead the Arab people to victory over the newly established state of Israel, which in their perception was an illegal and unacceptable creation of colonialism. In the second half of the 1950s, MAN aligned itself closely with Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, whom it considered the Arab leader capable of leading the Arab nation to victory over Israel.

By the first half of the 1960s, MAN's attempt to dominate the Arab and Palestinian political and ideological scene ran into problems. For a while MAN had religiously followed the political course of Nasir, avoiding direct confrontation with Israel and leaving all decisions in Nasir's hands. In the mid-1960s, however, MAN came under intense pressure from its members and from Palestinians in general to begin preparations for guerrilla action and a war of national liberation. Still, the leadership of the movement did not want to put Nasir under pressure. Therefore, and in order to prepare guerrilla attacks against Israel, MAN established the Heroes of the Return and the Youth of Revenge as front organizations, trying to avoid direct entanglement. This new course had been provoked by young Palestinians living in various Arab states, first and foremost YASIR ARAFAT's FATAH, who had begun to organize for independent guerrilla struggle against Israel and who hoped to provoke the Arab states, especially EGYPT, into a war against the Israeli occupier. The Arab defeat in the 1967 WAR finally broke the spell and set MAN free from its almost blind allegiance to Nasir. The establishment of the PFLP was their organizational, political, and ideological response to the defeat of their erstwhile hero, Egyptian president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.

Infighting in the PFLP: 1967–1969

The young PFLP, which established its headquarters in JORDAN, based its ideology on the founding documents written by the Palestinian poet and intellectual GHASSAN KANAFANI, but had to deal with continuous ideological infighting and fierce personal struggles for leadership and domination, both of which it inherited from MAN. These struggles tended to center on Habash and his younger competitor, NAYIF HAWATIMAH, who espoused different ideological directions for the PFLP. In early 1968, SYRIA imprisoned Habash, and Hawatimah dominated the PFLP during its first National Congress in August, which passed the so-called August Program. But, by February 1969, Hawatimah decided to split from the PFLP and establish the

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (its name changed in 1974 to the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, or DFLP). Yasir Arafat's Fatah, by then the dominant Palestinian political force, supported Hawatimah in his breakaway and protected the new organization against the revenge of the PFLP, which lost many of its best-trained activists in the conflict with Hawatimah. Despite the 1969 split, competition, at times violent, continued between the PFLP and Fatah on the one hand and the PFLP and the DFLP on the other. Habash and other former MAN leaders, who had dominated the political scene of the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA in the 1950s and early 1960s, had to watch from the sidelines as Arafat's Fatah, in a matter of two years, mobilized the Palestinian masses in numbers they could only dream of.

These ideological-programmatic differences turned the two wings of the PFLP into deadly enemies, while neutral observers had difficulty even grasping what the differences were. Both criticized Fatah from the left, both wanted to pursue a revolutionary course, and both fiercely attacked the Arab regimes for their "reactionary" politics. Yet, the competition between the PFLP and the DFLP continued and seemed particularly senseless, because both fought for the same goals: revolutionizing Palestinian and Arab society and leading the masses to a long-term people's war, first against reactionary Arab political leaders and then against the Israeli enemy.

The third group that joined the two MAN front organizations, the Palestine Liberation Front, had been established as an independent organization in Syria in the early 1960s by a seasoned military man, AHMAD JIBRIL. Following in the footsteps of the Algerian National Front, Jibril sought to prepare the Palestinian people for a war of liberation. But the former members of Jibril's Palestine Liberation Front were not interested in the ideological infighting of the PFLP leaders and activists, and in October 1968 they and Jibril left the PFLP to establish the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP–GC), which from then on focused almost exclusively on ARMED STRUGGLE against Israel. Some of the most spectacular Palestinian military operations against Israel were led by Jibril, such as the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in LEBANON, which led to a major prisoners' exchange in 1985, and the hang-glider attack on an Israeli army camp in 1987, which contributed to the outbreak of the First INTIFADA.

The Arab defeat in the 1967 War challenged the MAN leaders and activists to take up independent Palestinian armed struggle against Israel, thereby following their former rival Fatah, whom they had fiercely criticized for what they considered an adventurous course of guerrilla war. In July 1968 the PFLP hijacked an Israeli airplane on its way from Rome to Tel Aviv, forcing it to land in Algiers, and succeeded in getting Israel to release sixteen Palestinian prisoners from Israeli detention. This first hijacking by a Palestinian organization was followed by a series of plane hijackings all over the world by the PFLP, which hoped to establish itself in this way as the leading revolutionary force in the Arab region and in Palestinian politics. The climax came in the multiple hijackings of 6 September 1970, when several PFLP commandos landed their hijacked planes on an airstrip in the desert outside Amman, Jordan, evacuated all the passengers, and then exploded one plane after another. This proved to be the last straw for the Jordanian monarch, igniting King Husayn's war against the Palestinian guerrilla movement in Jordan—the bloody "BLACK SEPTEMBER."

For the Hashemite monarchy, this was a war for control of the state and preservation of the throne, since the Palestinian left, led by the DFLP, had begun to talk about taking over power in Jordan, while the PFLP had challenged the sovereignty of the state with its hijackings. Undoubtedly, the left had vastly overestimated its capabilities and at the same time had underestimated the readiness of the monarchy to use all the force at its disposal to defeat the challenge that was posed. The number of victims of Black September amounted to thousands of dead, especially among the civilian Palestinian population in Amman.

Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon: 1971–1982

By 1971 the PFLP, like all other Palestinian resistance organizations, had left Jordan and moved to Lebanon. As a result of its self-criticism for the disaster in Jordan, during its 1972 conference the PFLP decided to stop all hijackings, or "external operations," as they were called in its jargon. This led to a split—or so it was announced publicly—between two former comrades in arms and cofounders of MAN—Habash, the head of the

PFLP, and WADI' HADDAD, responsible for external operations. Haddad allegedly left the PFLP and continued on his own in cooperation with the Iraqi government but also in close collaboration with an array of extremist leftist groups from all over the world. However, after his death he was openly welcomed back by the Front and is celebrated as one of its heroes on the official PFLP website.

The PFLP's ultranationalist positions, insisting on the liberation of all of Palestine and its implementation through revolutionary means alone, led it to view the Fatah-led PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) with deep distrust. Under the direction of Arafat, the PLO had been moving toward accepting a TWO-STATE SOLUTION implicitly recognizing Israel since 1972–1973. At this crucial turning point in the history of Palestinian nationalism, the first real political split occurred in the ranks of the Palestinian left. Hawatimah's DFLP not only aligned itself with Arafat's PLO/Fatah, but actually claimed that the idea for a two-state solution was its original proposal, which Arafat and Fatah only later adopted as their own political program.

The PFLP's adamant opposition to the two-state solution led to a split both within the left and within the PLO. In October 1974, the minority opposition, made up of the PFLP, the PFLP–GC, the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front, and the PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT, convened in Baghdad, IRAQ, and established the PALESTINE REJECTION FRONT (jabhat al-rafd). Only Egypt's decision, under Anwar Sadat, to start peace negotiations with Israel that led to the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS overcame the internal Palestinian split and led to a joint Arab-Palestinian front against Egypt. The PFLP rejoined the ranks of the PLO and took up its seat inside the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

The second half of the 1970s was dominated by the split between Egypt and the other Arab states over Camp David, as well as by the civil war in Lebanon. The PLO participated as the partner of the Lebanese left, fighting against the Christian-dominated Lebanese right and supported in the early stages by Syria. The PFLP entered the fighting and played a role commensurate with its size until Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR. Despite a fierce fight against the invading Israeli army, the Palestinians had to accept defeat, and the resistance movement, led by Arafat, was forced to leave Lebanon for its next refuge in TUNIS, while the PFLP found a new sanctuary in Syria.

The war of 1982 led directly to a challenge to Arafat's leadership and fierce internal fighting, including an armed rebellion within Fatah for control of the main Palestinian Resistance Movement. The PFLP attempted to stay neutral, but this proved extremely difficult because Damascus supported and even encouraged the Fatah rebels. Thus the PFLP first joined the DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, a coalition of the DFLP, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the PALESTINIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY; then, in a more serious opposition move, it participated in the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, a Syrian-backed, Damascus-based umbrella group that rejected the 1985 HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT and the holding of the seventeenth meeting of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (the PLO legislative body) in the Jordanian capital. The alliance called for "action to topple the trend of deviation and relinquishment" within the PLO. In the end, Arafat prevailed over his challengers, most of whom fell into oblivion, with many of them rejoining Fatah years later.

From the War of 1982 to the Intifada

The 1980s were dominated by international political and diplomatic efforts to bring both the Palestinian resistance and the Arab states as a whole closer to official recognition of Israel and adoption of a two-state solution. While Arafat expended enormous energy to bring Fatah and the PLO to accept this strategy, the PFLP went to equally great lengths to resist it and to prevent its acceptance. The first great grassroots rebellion, the INTIFADA by the Palestinian population under OCCUPATION in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, began in December 1987 and very quickly brought the Palestinian Resistance Movement to the threshold of accepting the two-state solution. In Algiers, the Palestine National Council proclaimed on 15 November 1988, only one year into the Intifada, a PALESTINIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, unanimously supported by all political forces, including the PFLP. Only Israel refused to accept the historic offer of negotiations toward a two-state solution made by the entire Palestinian national movement.

As the Intifada continued, the PFLP inside the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES played, for the first time in its history, a major role, overshadowing its leadership in exile in Damascus. In 1990 Habash was allowed to return to Jordan; though motivated by

the desire to be closer to Palestine, he was also trying to escape the not-always-welcome tutelage of Damascus. The PFLP leadership inside the Occupied Territories was part and parcel of the broad-based United National Leadership of the Intifada composed of all the factions, and its cadres played an important role in organizing the uprising.

Israel managed to restore control, and by 1991 the repercussions of Iraqi president Saddam Husayn's invasion of KUWAIT and the ensuing GULF WAR helped it to finally crush the Intifada.

From Madrid to Oslo and After

After the Gulf War in 1991, the UNITED STATES called for a major peace initiative—the MADRID CONFERENCE—with the participation of Arab states but excluding the PLO and, above all, Arafat. Instead, Palestinians were represented as a junior partner in the Jordanian delegation. Arafat, however, managed to slip in through the back door by signing with Israel the first of the OSLO ACCORDS, the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, in September 1993. The PFLP immediately protested and denounced this as a "sellout."

Nevertheless, the OSLO PROCESS went forward, and a large part of the Palestinian Resistance Movement was allowed to return to the Occupied Territories. However, Habash refused to accept the Oslo agreements and renounce the use of violence, which were the conditions set by the Israeli government for his return, and he remained in exile in Jordan, making it clear that his condition for returning would be the return of Palestinian REFUGEES. In 2000, with his health having deteriorated during the previous years (a first stroke in 1972, another one in 1980, and finally a major operation in FRANCE in 1992), Habash announced his resignation from his position as head of the PFLP. In his place, the PFLP elected Abu Ali Mustafa (MUSTAFA AL-ZABRI), who had been Habash's deputy since 1972. In contrast to Habash, Mustafa had returned to the Occupied Territories in 1999. For the first time in its history, the PFLP leadership and also the bulk of the organization were inside Palestine.

The breakdown of the Oslo Process led to the start of the Second or AL-AQSA INTIFADA at the end of September 2000. Fighting between the Israeli army and the Palestinians turned extremely violent, with the notorious SUICIDE BOMBINGS (or martyrdom operations) undertaken mostly against civilians inside Israel. Although the PFLP participated in the Intifada and in armed struggle against the Occupation, it did not take part in the suicide bombings. Nevertheless, the Israeli army targeted Mustafa early in the Intifada, and he was the victim of a TARGETED ASSASSINATION in August 2001. The PFLP responded in kind in October 2001, assassinating REHAVAM ZE'EVI, then Israeli minister of tourism, in a daring operation in the middle of Jerusalem. Ze'evi was one of the most extreme and openly racist Israeli rightists, who had just announced his resignation (in protest against ARIEL SHARON's policy, which he considered not extremist enough).

The PFLP elected as the new secretary general Ahmad Sa'dat, who was arrested only months later by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) for his alleged role in the assassination of Ze'evi and held in Arafat's presidential compound in Ramallah. In May 2002, an international agreement was reached to jail Sa'dat, together with the four PFLP activists who had been sentenced by the PNA for the assassination of Ze'evi in a prison in JERICHO. After the second Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006 and the success of HAMAS, the Israeli army moved in and captured Sa'dat and the other arrested PFLP activists, putting them on trial in Israel.

The PFLP, meanwhile, participated in the elections held in the Occupied Territories between December 2004 and January 2006 and was successful in the municipal elections in BETHLEHEM, Ramallah, and Birzeit, where it won elections either directly or in a coalition with independent candidates. In the parliamentary elections in January 2006, under the "List of the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa," the PFLP slate ran a distant third after the two major parties, Hamas and Fatah, with approximately 3 percent of all votes, sending three deputies to the Palestinian Legislative Council. From jail, Ahmad Sa'dat led the slate, just as his Fatah counterpart MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI headed the Fatah slate from his prison cell.

The PFLP today is considered one of the historical organizations inside the Palestinian national movement and within the PLO. With the taking over of the PLO by Fatah in 1969, the PFLP became essentially the opposition or, at times, the junior partner of Fatah. Under the new political constellation in the Occupied Territories established by the Hamas victory in the parliamentary elections of 2006, the PFLP aligned itself in a loose coalition with Hamas against Fatah, while

jealously guarding its ideological and political independence. Thus the PFLP declined at the last minute to join the Hamas government in Gaza as a junior partner, although it had to give up four ministries reserved for it. Against this PFLP history, it is an ironic twist that the reason given for this rejection was the PFLP's insistence on the 1988 Palestinian Declaration of Independence, which clearly implied the acceptance of a two-state solution and the recognition of Israel.

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—Helga Baumgarten

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP–GC) was a left-wing militant Palestinian nationalist organization. The group was founded by AHMAD JIBRIL, a former captain in the Syrian army, in April 1968 as a splinter group from the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). The PFLP–GC was disenchanted with the ideological disputes within the PFLP and declared that its focus would be on military operations, not philosophy. It supported ARMED STRUGGLE against the Israeli OCCUPATION and is known for cross-border attacks into Israel using unusual means such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Its primary focus was on guerrilla operations from southern LEBANON and small-scale attacks in Israel, although it has not carried out any operations since 1993.

At its inception, the central leadership of the PFLP–GC was composed mostly of former Syrian army officers, and its largely pro-Syrian stance resulted in an April 1977 split of a pro-Iraqi faction within the organization. In June 1974, the PFLP–GC joined the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), but its membership was suspended ten years later due to the PFLP–GC's support for factions opposing PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT and the FATAH party. In 1984 the PFLP–GC joined the PFLP in the PALESTINE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, opposing what they saw as the PLO's move toward an accommodation with Israel. Although the PFLP eventually returned to the PLO, the PFLP–GC did not. In fact, the PFLP–GC always opposed Arafat and any political settlement with Israel. It never participated in the peace process and, because of Arafat's leadership in moving the PLO in that direction from 1974 onward, became strongly anti-PLO. Numbering about 300 cadres, the PFLP–GC remained close to SYRIA, and its base of operations remained in Syria and LEBANON.

In May 2002, Jibril's son, Jihad, was killed by a car bomb thought to have been planted by Israel.

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Popular Liberation War Pioneers

See SA'IQA

Popular Struggle Front

See PALESTINE POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT

Population

See DEMOGRAPHY

Post-Zionism

The term *post-Zionism* was first used as early as 1989, spurring a fruitful debate among scholars on the relation of ZIONISM to the Palestinian conflict and to the discrimination against Arab Jews, as well as the relation between theory and political action. Post-Zionist scholars examine the collapse of the traditional foundations of Zionist ideology, as formulated by the founding fathers and mainstream scholars, and aspire to produce an effective critique of the status quo. What is distinctive about post-Zionism is the attention to aspects of the past that, until recently, were mostly ignored by scholars. Post-Zionism, then, is a rereading of history in the context of critical questions about the Zionist tradition. Most of the material for this radical questioning is found in the tradition itself but is examined with new perspectives and interpretations.

Critical scholars from the social sciences and humanities, most notably Uri Ram, Oren Yiftachel, Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Adi Ophir, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris, the late Baruch Kimmerling, Gershon Shafir, Shlomo Swirski, and Azmi Bishara, were grouped under the term *new—new historians, new sociologists,* and so on. The accuracy of this labeling, however, is of some dispute. For example, there are questions about whether Swirski and Bishara are post-Zionists or new sociologists. Moreover, some of the scholars disagree with the definition, while others, such as Shlaim, use it to distinguish themselves from mainstream scholars. There is also a contribution from non-Zionists, such as Sami Michael, and from anti-Zionists, such as Daniel Boyarin. Their voices offer different perspectives on the Zionist image of itself and its past, especially regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the 1980s, British and Israeli archives were first opened to the public and offered previously classified material to scholars for research and analysis. Thus historians such as Morris, Shlaim, Pappé, and author Tom Segev reexamined the hallmarks of Zionist history in light of newly available documents. Sociologists influenced by postmodern critics also used the newly available data in their own discipline. Unlike the mainstream historians or sociologists, who produced manuscripts from well-established governmental archives, the new historians and sociologists worked according to the Foucaultian method of genealogy: using the uncontested facts and reinterpreting them from various perspectives and disciplines.

The ultimate aim is to appropriate Zionist materials in such a way as to avoid being dominated by them, but to utilize them critically. The work of Raz-Krakotzkin provides a vivid illustration of that methodology by linking contemporary Israelis' deepest fear of the Palestinians to the study of Jewish history. "Can a Jewish collective live in Israel basing its life on the recognition of rights of the Palestinians and taking responsibility for their fate?" This rhetorical question provides the conclusion to one of Raz-Krakotzkin's articles, thus tying Jewishness and Israeliness to the conflict with the Palestinians. In doing so he subverts the traditional dichotomy between Zionism and the negation of DIASPORA constructed in traditional historiography.

Post-Zionism has led to a crisis in the whole notion of the history and periods of Zionism. In her article "The Legend of Sarah: Gender Memory and National Identities," Billie Melman demonstrated how historiography could change in three historical phases of Israel's nation-building project, each serving different national purposes. Melman's account examined different interpretations of the life and death of SARA AARONSOHN (1890–1917), who committed suicide after being captured by OTTOMAN officials who suspected her of membership in NILI, a pro-British Jewish underground group. Melman found that Aaronsohn was presented in one biography as a heroine who preferred to sacrifice her life rather than give up her comrades' names. In a second account, she was depicted as one of the first female pioneers who paved the way for the establishment of the state of Israel. A third biography presented Aaronsohn as an unfulfilled woman, a childless divorcee who, missing the opportunity to have a family of her own, committed suicide.

The rise of theory, particularly that inspired by the late EDWARD SAID, Ella Shohat, and the French philosophers/theorists Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, imported Orientalism and postmodernism into the academy. Following these theorists, post-Zionists emphasize antifoundational and antiholistic approaches as well as deconstructing the eternal, metaphysical "truths" or "realities" and the grand narratives of Zionism that pretend to provide totalizing explanations. Critical scholars of the post-Zionism genre distinguish their writings from mainstream research that considers itself "high Zionism," the traditional history that sees Zionism as flawless. Post-Zionism spurred skepticism and, like Kimmerling, undertook a critical evaluation of the nation-building Zionist myths, while others, such as Shlaim, used a similar approach to deconstruct the Zionist founding fathers' management of the conflict with the Palestinian people and to present the realities.

The conflict, post-Zionists are convinced, is maintained by language, images, and other cultural phenomena that are as central, if not more central, to conflict management as economic, political, or militaristic processes. Kimmerling, for example, brought into the Israeli sociological discourse the *Nakba* (catastrophe, or the Palestinian exodus from Israel during the 1948 WAR). In doing so, he linked the establishment of the state for the Jews with the Palestinians' devastation. Gabi Piterberg's critique of the historiography of the grand Zionist narrative shows how the Arabs were presented as the "other" in school curricula to enhance the construction of Zionist self-identity. Another example is the Arab Jews, who were introduced in Israeli culture as inept and thus unfit to enjoy an equal share in the society. Their "backwardness" was depicted as a threat to the Zionist project. These examples illustrate how images and language demonized the Arabs and the Arab Jews, building up walls that separate Israelis and Palestinians and legitimizing discrimination against those who were associated with Arabness.

One enters a post-Zionist world once one is convinced that the production of images and information (not only the production of material goods) of Israel and of conflict management determines who holds power. The "linguistic turn" in post-Zionist studies explains the centrality of the critique of Jewishness and nationalism to all current versions of an oppositional politics. But the critics of post-Zionism accuse it of having no model of conflict resolution beyond intellectual disputes, and the theorists have paid little explicit attention outside the academic world to the issues raised by Palestinians. Given this position toward politics, relations between Palestinians and post-Zionists have been wary. The prominent figures who lead post-Zionist scholarship remain outside politics and limit themselves to semi-academic conferences, publicist expressions, or, at most, participation in NGOs. Since "grand policy" is the object of their criticism, they refrain from immersing themselves in institutionally established politics or in executive positions. The promise of conflict resolution, however, is concealed within post-Zionism, which regards it as the only context in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be seen. Individuals and groups participate in a multitude of localities, and the lessons, beliefs, and practices of the way to the conflict resolution become the heart of the study for post-Zionists and the compos for the resolution.

Pulling Zionism from the hands of the mainstream academic scholars and delivering it to the hands of critical postmodern scholars gave rise to the exploration of the complex relations between Zionism and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The traditional analysis of Zionism in terms of victimization, as represented in school curricula, for example, yielded to an examination of the conflict determinants in texts and to the ideological impact those texts had on both Palestinian and Israeli Jews. Politically, the analysis showed that the emphasis on victimization was misleading because the political materials regarding the conflict (language, images) come from basic Zionist perceptions that demonize Arabs and, even more radically, because the state and its citizens are constituted by that Zionism. The exploration of the conflict determinants in the text and the ideological impact the text has on its audience is in a sense also synthetic because the purity of the alienated forecloses access to the energies and disputes that are lived while also severing any connection to an audience beyond the Zionist elites. Thus, the post-Zionists argue, the belief that Israel can enjoy autonomy from the contemporary conditions of the conflict while maintaining the OCCUPATION in the territories and the oppression of the Palestinians is both misleading and synthetic. Mainstream Zionist texts do not address the Palestinian Other. Though post-Zionism is often identified with the

political left wing in Israel, Zionism has also been contested from the right and from the Orthodox religious. Religious Zionist leadership is challenged by a radical younger generation who oppose any position that favors resolution with the Palestinians. This position is best represented by the "Hill Youth" (*No'ar Hagva'ot*) and by SHAS, the ultra-Orthodox party representing religious people of Arab-Jewish origin who reclaim Zionism and proclaim that they are the true Zionists.

Against the traditional Zionist history and Jewish nationalism, post-Zionism inspired study groups and produced works and journals such as *Theory and Criticism* by the Van Leer Institute, an ivory tower at the service of well-established scholars, both Zionist and post-Zionist. These works insisted that practices, linguistic usage, media work, EDUCATION, and techniques were all crucial sites of oppression and of maintenance of the Zionist elites. The disruptive narrative techniques in post-Zionist works stress the significance of ignoring the old distinction between high univocal hegemonic history and the low polyvocal history of the subordinated groups, such as Arab Jews, Palestinian Israelis, the ultra-Orthodox, and women. Post-Zionist study aspires to use the power of heterogeneous voices and images, but it fails to open the door to mixed genres that threaten to breach the decorum because all the post-Zionist scholars except Swirski are active within the well-established Israeli, US, and English academia and obediently follow the conventions of academic behavior.

The hegemonic academic establishment, represented by distinguished scholars such as Moshe Lissak, Shlomo Deshen, Eliezer Ben Raphael, Anita Shapira, and Joseph Gorni, dismiss post-Zionism as a distortion of history. Post-Zionists explore the hidden issues in the Zionist grand narrative regarding the Palestinian *Nakba*, the discriminatory relations of the ASHKENAZI (European Jews) toward the MIZRAHI (Arab Jews), and the close ties between political power and academia in Israel, which nourishes the traditional Zionist narrative. In turn, establishment scholars criticize the post-Zionists for their alleged lack of seriousness and "addiction" to casting Zionism in a negative light. Boyarin's portrayal of THEODOR HERZL, for example, as a homophobic sexist who simply wanted to join the colonialist club of his day is perceived by the establishment as anti-Zionist contempt for the founding fathers.

The multiple critiques of the Zionist narratives are problematic in new ways. On the one hand, they have generally reverted to a discourse on the extent to which Israeli society has changed and the fact that contemporary studies consider the multiplicity of Jewish religious, national, and cultural styles and practices. There is also a multiplicity of "language games" and ceaseless experimentation in all these games. However, no rules are followed except one—"To speak is to fight," to use Jean-François Lyotard's words—and the playing and speaking are part of a general agonistics. The notions of *Nakba* or Mizrahim are displayed with initial ostensive meaning or set up next to their antonym, such as "the war of independence" or the Ashkenazim, thus contributing to both plurality and subversion of the unified canonical study.

Many Palestinians scholars, such as Bishara, have been impatient with the abstruse arguments surrounding the epistemological foundations of post-Zionism and have concentrated instead on more historically informed studies of the political conditions and biases of particular knowledge claims. Such work ultimately derives from the late Edward Said, as does appropriation of Said's account of Western scholars' hostility to and fascination with the "other" in postcolonial literature. A complete immersion in the conflict allows many ways to judge it and is thus doomed to the intellectuals' accommodation to it. After all, post-Zionists offer no collective agreement on means to solve the conflict. What remains is the ethics of lessening the suffering of the victims. The close proximity between the conflict and its theorization as reflected in the new historians' works and the other "new" scholars, according to Shafir, generates motion in search of a resolution. But a vision of conflict resolution cannot be formulated as long as the univocal hegemonic Zionist view of the conflict prevails and post-Zionists continue to refrain from taking active political roles. Moreover, a theory that is capable of representing the complex realities and components in which multiple political entities exist is lacking. The global-local ties and the powers that exploit the vast majority on both sides are not fully comprehended. The debate focuses on whether post-Zionism actually disrupts Zionism by advocating a varied, heterogeneous different view against the unifying, identity-obsessed practices of the massive state and its bureaucracies in contemporary Israel. I suggest, then, that the new historians'

contribution to the public debate has been minor, albeit significant.

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—Henriette Dahan Kalev

Poverty, Palestinian

See ECONOMY: THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE PALESTINIANS

Powell, Colin Luther (1937–)

Colin Luther Powell was a UNITED STATES army general, government official, and, from 2001 to 2005, the sixty-fifth secretary of state, under President GEORGE W. BUSH. He was the first African American and the youngest person to chair the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989–1993) and the first African American to head the Department of State. From 1983 to 1986, Powell was military assistant to the secretary of defense, and in 1986 he served as commander of the V Corps in Western Europe. The next year he was named assistant to the president for national security affairs. He had an important role in planning the US invasion of Panama in late 1989, and, prior to the 1991 Persian GULF WAR, he played a crucial role in planning and coordinating the victory of US and allied forces.

When Powell became secretary of state, he advocated the so-called Powell Doctrine—that US military power be used in overwhelming strength only to achieve well-defined strategic national interests. He also promoted a "uniquely American internationalism" and showed a particular interest in African affairs. As he was secretary of state in an administration composed overwhelmingly of NEOCONSERVATIVES, his influence on foreign policy was not significant enough to institutionalize his ideas as policy. Powell lacked the authority to have a decisive say in the appointment of reputable diplomats or the latitude to develop a coherent foreign policy. On issues concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Powell played a secondary role and made no substantive contribution to resolving the conflict. It is difficult to know if there were ever serious, substantive disagreements between Powell and Bush, since he kept such matters to himself, or if he was in essential agreement with Bush's strongly pro-Israel policy.

On the one occasion in June 2002 when Powell publicly expressed an opinion that differed from the president's, he was roundly chastised. In an interview with the BBC, the secretary commented that President Bush favored creating a "temporary" state for the Palestinians ahead of a full-fledged state. Such a formula, he averred, would "allow the Palestinians to achieve their hopes and dreams and secure the confidence of the international community." He cautioned, though, that a temporary state needed to rely on "democratic power, transparency without corruption and effective security agencies." The White House immediately and sharply distanced itself from Powell. Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer dismissed Powell's comments, declaring that he "receives information and advice from foreign leaders who have different thoughts about what they would like the president to say. And so the secretary from time to time will reflect on the advice that he gets and do so publicly, which is his prerogative, of course."

A second incident occurred in August 2002, just days before Powell was about to convene a meeting with several high-ranking Palestinian officials in Washington. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a public forum of Pentagon employees that Israel won the 1967 WAR and acquired the territories legitimately, and he also made several derogatory comments about the Palestinian leadership. The Powell meeting was called off, which was viewed by Rumsfeld and Bush as something of an end run around the president's policies.

In November 2001 Powell gave his first major address on the Middle East: "To begin with, Palestinians must accept that, if there is to be real peace, Israelis must be able to live their lives free from terror as well as war. The Palestinian leadership must make a 100 percent effort to end violence and to end terror. There must be real results, not just words and declarations. Terrorists must be stopped before they act. The Palestinian leadership must arrest, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of terrorist acts. The Palestinians must live up to the agreements they have made to do so. They must be held to account when they do not.

"Whatever the sources of Palestinian frustration and anger under OCCUPATION, the INTIFADA is now mired in the quicksand of self-defeating violence and terror directed against Israel. Palestinians need to understand that however legitimate their claims, they cannot be heard, let alone be addressed, through violence. And as President Bush has made clear, no national aspiration, no remembered wrong can ever justify the deliberate murder of the innocent. Terror and violence must stop and stop now."

In the first twenty months of the Bush-Powell administration, Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON visited Washington seven times, while Palestinian leader YASIR ARAFAT was never invited to the White House. Israeli and US leaders established an intimate relationship, and Bush intensified STRATEGIC COOPERATION, provided new and more sophisticated weapons to Israel, was receptive to Sharon's diplomatic offensives, and provided a green light for Israel's 2002 massive military campaigns (OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, OPERATION DETERMINED PATH, OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS) against the Palestinians and for construction of the BARRIER wall.

In April 2002, after the siege of JENIN, the international outcry about the Israeli attack against the civilian population forced the United States to react, but it did so in a manner that made it clear that Washington was not going to interfere with Israel's military offensive. The president dispatched Powell to Israel, but instead of proceeding directly and immediately to JERUSALEM, Powell took a circuitous route through various Arab capitals. Once in Jerusalem, Powell did not demand a cessation of hostilities, and his very cordial public relations with Sharon signaled no opprobrium.

At Bush's direction, Powell effectively sabotaged the UNITED NATIONS commission charged with investigating the deaths in Jenin. First, the State Department attempted to stack the commission in such a way that would be favorable to Israel—for example, by appointing military experts and some dubious diplomats. Finally, it vetoed the commission altogether. Moreover, the Bush-Powell team aided Israel in trying to stop the International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearings investigating international complaints about the Barrier as a violation of basic INTERNATIONAL LAW. Powell sought to pressure many countries to submit advance objections to the ICJ hearing on the specious grounds that this would "politicize" the issues surrounding the construction of the Barrier. He also helped to delay, at Israel's request, the issuance of the State Department's human rights report until after the ICJ hearings because Israel feared the report could contain criticism of the Barrier. His efforts proved successful, as it was released a week after the ICJ hearings, more than a month after it was originally scheduled for publication. Finally, the United States attempted to delay the ICJ's rulings on the matter until it would be useless—that is, months after the Barrier had been completed. Powell was personally active in all these efforts, lobbying hard in foreign capitals and from Washington.

Under Powell's tenure, the United States initiated the "ROAD MAP," but the comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was quickly downgraded and eventually disappeared from the US policy agenda. In May 2004 Powell met with QUARTET officials, Kofi Annan, and Javier Solana, supposedly to revive the Road Map, but Powell's statements at the meeting suggested this was simply pro forma. The secretary revealed details of US policy at this meeting, including that Israel and the United States would from now on negotiate with JORDAN and EGYPT as partners in imposing the new plan and controlling Palestinian interests and affairs, thus supplanting Palestinian representation. He resigned on 15 November 2004 without giving specific reasons. The *Washington Post* reported that he had previously told the president that he would stay under two conditions: greater engagement with IRAN and a harder line with Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.

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Present Absentees

Present absentees are Palestinians whose property was confiscated under Israel's ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW (1950) but were present (within the borders of the new Israeli state) in the first population census and were thus registered as citizens of the state, according to the Israeli Nationality Law (1952). "Present absentee" is thus the contradictory appellation given to the more than 200,000 PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL (out of a total of 1,498,200 Israeli Arabs) whose property and homes were taken by the state, making them REFUGEES within their own country. Most were

forced to leave their villages under military orders during the 1948 WAR; they locked their doors, took their keys and land deeds, and planned to return as soon as the fighting ended (as did all the refugees). Following the war and under the pretense of security needs, the state evicted others to break up areas of Palestinian concentration. They are "present" because they have never left the country, remaining through the 1948 War and the years following. They are "absentees," according to Israeli laws passed to gain LAND for the state, because in 1948 they left their original villages, regardless of the reason. As present absentees, they are prevented from regaining their property, homes, and land. In 2005, Israel had thirty-six laws and regulations that limited the right of Palestinian citizens of Israel to use the lands they once owned.

Professor Don Peretz provided human meaning to one dimension of the concept of present absentees: "Any Arab of NAZARETH who might have visited the OLD CITY of JERUSALEM or BETHLEHEM on Christmas 1948 automatically became an 'absentee' under the law. Nearly all the Arab refugees in Israel as well as the 30,000 inhabitants of the little Triangle, which became part of the state under the armistice with JORDAN, were classified as absentees. Arabs, who during the battle of ACRE, fled from their homes to the old city of Acre, lost their property. . . . All of the new city of Acre was turned over to the recent (Jewish) immigrants despite the fact that many of its Arab 'absentee' home owners were living a few yards away." Palestinian villagers often left their homes with the understanding, promulgated by the military, that after the war they could reclaim their property and return to their homes. Most of the internal refugees or present absentees come from the more than 400 Palestinian villages destroyed during the 1948 War. This massive destruction was not simply a by-product of war but part of a conscious effort to secure certain areas of land for the state and prevent return of the refugees. Instead, the government destroyed most of the villages and later turned the land over to the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL or the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND to build Jewish settlements. In urban areas, the reclamation of land for Jewish residents was even more blatant. In HAIFA, JAFFA, and Jerusalem, where over 100,000 Palestinians resided before 1948, tens of thousands of families fled to safer areas during the war. Using the Absentee Property Regulations of 1950, the state seized their homes and resettled Israeli Jews in them.

Land evictions of the Israeli-Arab population did not end with the cessation of fighting in 1948. Through the 1970s and even today, Israel continues to evacuate villagers and take their lands for Jewish settlements in any area deemed "too densely settled" with Palestinians. These actions uphold the policy position promulgated in the Interior Ministry's KOENIG MEMORANDUM on Handling the Arabs of Israel, 1976. Israel's current National Master Plan, TAMA 35, makes similar statements with less incendiary wording. The current plan upholds the policy of "equalizing" population in the Galilee, one of the areas with significant Palestinian population concentration, by bringing in more Jewish settlers.

Israel has also continued to destroy villages located in "sensitive areas." For example, when Israel moved to take de facto control of demilitarized zones along the cease-fire lines with SYRIA and EGYPT, it decided to clear the area of all villages. From 1949 to 1956, Israel carried out expulsion campaigns, destroying ten villages and forcing the inhabitants to move to other villages in northern Israel. Many refugees fled to Syria, but a fifth of the villagers—numbering more than 4,000 people—are now internally displaced citizens of Israel, living in the area of Acre.

By imposing martial law from 1948 to 1966 on parts of the country with high concentrations of Palestinians, the state prevented Arab citizens from pressing their claims for their property. During those nearly two decades, Arab citizens of Israel were governed by the DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS of the BRITISH MANDATE. For what Israel deemed security reasons, these regulations prevented the present absentees from entering their own land without prior permission. For nearly twenty years, present absentees were not allowed to visit the homes they had owned and had no ability to press for a legal claim to their property.

The plight of internal refugees has had far-reaching effects throughout the Palestinian-Israeli population. The populations of remaining Arab towns skyrocketed overnight, causing serious urban planning problems. Given the limitations on land available to Arab municipalities for growth, these towns have become overcrowded, with no room for public parks and other public amenities. Additionally, inequitable distribution of state funds to Arab locales has meant that Arab towns have not had the money to deal with the INFRASTRUCTURE needs caused by their sudden growth.

The influx of refugees brought thousands of people with no possessions and few savings, keeping tax revenues low while straining the cities' social services. With no access to their land, their traditional source of income, internal refugees increased unemployment problems already significant in Arab locales.

See also BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES

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Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard, formerly FORCE 17 (Al-Amn al-Ri'asa), is an elite force that was the personal guard of YASIR ARAFAT during his years as chairman of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Since MAHMUD ABBAS was elected president of the PNA, he has been supported by the Presidential Guard, although its strength is estimated now at about 2,500, down from Arafat's 3,000. The INTERIM AGREEMENT signed between Israel and the PLO specifically authorized a presidential guard. The guard, which wears military-style uniforms and is equipped with

light weapons and armored cars, is considered the best trained and most sophisticated of the various Palestinian security forces.

When the Presidential Guard was originally established, by ʻALI HASAN SALAMAH, in the early 1970s as Force 17, its purpose was to provide security for PLO officials and to protect Arafat, VIPs, and official institutions, and it was rarely involved in military operations against Israel. Two exceptions were the 1985 killing of three Israelis in Cyprus and the July 1987 assassination in London of political cartoonist NAJI AL-ALI, who had incensed Arafat with his acerbic lampooning. But aside from these two operations, Force 17 has played a nonviolent, behind-the-scenes role. Even during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, the guard chose not to take part in the violence, although its offices have been systematically targeted by Israeli bombing raids. On 19 October 2000, an explosion destroyed the Presidential Guard's headquarters in BETHLEHEM; although the perpetrators have yet to be identified, many in the organization believe that the Islamic militant organization HAMAS was behind the episode. On 20 April 2001, the Presidential Guard's temporary headquarters in Ramallah was also destroyed. Despite these attacks, the organization remains a highly respected intelligence-gathering and protective organization in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

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Principles of Peace

Principles of Peace was a document issued on 1 January 1977 as a result of negotiations between PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION member MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen) and Israeli general MATTITYAHU PELED. It was based on a TWO-STATE SOLUTION with Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders.

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Prisoners and Prison Conditions

The experience of Palestinian prisoners inside Israeli prisons and detention facilities is an integral part of the continuum of arrest, interrogation, and sentencing under Israeli military law. The prison experience is characterized by extremely harsh detention conditions and enforced isolation from families and communities. Prisoners are almost continuously engaged in a collective struggle against these conditions and play a central role in the broader Palestinian national movement.

The number, location, and characteristics of Israeli detention facilities have varied considerably since 1967 and are largely dependent on the political situation. From 1967 to 1987, Israel maintained an extensive network of detention facilities inside Israel as well as throughout the major towns of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP. Soon after the beginning of the First INTIFADA (1987–1993), Israel opened a number of new detention centers to cope with the large influx of prisoners.

At the end of the Intifada and following the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in 1994, prisons in Palestinian towns in the West Bank and Gaza were closed. By mid-2005, there were twenty-four Israeli detention facilities holding Palestinian political prisoners: fourteen prisons and military camps, five detention and holding centers, and five interrogation centers. Nineteen of these facilities were outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the remainder were located inside military camps or Israeli SETTLEMENTS throughout the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Some facilities are administered by the Israeli military, and others are administered by the Israeli Prisons Services under the authority of the Ministry of Public Security.

Most administrative detainees and prisoners who have been sentenced in an Israeli military court are held in prisons or military camps inside Israel, whereas detainees awaiting trial or interrogation are usually held in facilities in the Occupied Territories. The transfer of prisoners outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip is in violation of Article

47 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states, "Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in the occupied country, and if convicted they shall serve their sentences therein." Israel maintains that the convention does not apply to the Occupied Territories because they are not "occupied," but rather "disputed."

In addition to these twenty-four facilities, a secret prison known as Facility 1391 exists and is renowned for particularly severe methods of torture. The exact location of this prison is unknown, and lawyers and the International Committee of the Red Cross are denied access. A Lebanese prisoner, Mustafa Dirani, spent eight years in Facility 1391 before being released from Israeli detention in 2004 and is suing the Israeli state for two cases of sexual abuse while under interrogation there.

As of August 2006, 9,273 Palestinian prisoners were being held in Israeli prisons or detention camps. Of these, 351 were under the age of eighteen, 75 were women, and 42 were over the age of fifty. Of the total number, 433 remain in prison despite the INTERIM AGREEMENT of 1995 in the OSLO ACCORDS calling for their release. The prisoners include nearly half of the elected Palestinian Legislative Council and many other prominent Palestinian political leaders. Of the 9,273 prisoners held in Israeli prisons in 2006, only an estimated 1,800 had actually been put on trial and convicted of an offense. As of mid-2009, Israel's prisons and detention centers held close to 11,000 Palestinian prisoners.

The vast majority of Palestinian prisoners are political prisoners who have been arrested for an alleged security violation of Israeli military law. As the human rights organization B'TSELEM has pointed out, under military law in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel defines security "in an extremely broad manner such that non-violent speech and political activity are considered dangerous." Trials take place before a military court, which, according to Amnesty International and other human rights organizations, does not meet international standards for fair trials. Moreover, in 2006, Israel held in prison an estimated 800 Palestinians who had not been charged with any offense; they were held under ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, a practice that violates INTERNATIONAL LAW. Administrative detention orders may last for up to six months, and Palestinians are imprisoned, without charge or trial, during this period. Israel routinely renews the detention orders and may do so without limitation, thereby holding Palestinians without charge or trial indefinitely.

Israel also practices mass arrest, as, for example, from February to March 2002 during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, when it rounded up approximately 8,500 Palestinians and held them without charge. In many areas of the Occupied Territories, all Palestinian males from the ages of fifteen to forty-five were rounded up and detained or imprisoned. Palestinians were blindfolded, handcuffed, and forced to squat, sit, or kneel for prolonged periods of time. Mass arrests and detentions of this type have been condemned by Amnesty International as a breach of human rights.

Conditions inside Detention Facilities

Detention conditions fluctuate depending upon the political circumstances, worsening considerably during times of heightened political mobilization in the Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, since 1967, certain themes are consistent. Palestinian political prisoners are held in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions; given food of poor quality, quantity, and nutrition; denied adequate medical treatment and access to EDUCATION and books, magazines, and other materials; lack adequate clothing; are prevented from regular contact with families and lawyers; and are subject to frequent beatings, isolation, and other punishment. In facilities where Israeli prisoners are held alongside Palestinian prisoners, there is a significant disparity in conditions and rights between the two sets of prisoners. Likewise, Palestinians charged with criminal offenses are held in better conditions than Palestinians arrested and charged with security offenses.

During the 1970s a series of reports from Amnesty International (1972), the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights (1973), the *Christian Science Monitor* (1977), the Swiss League for Human Rights (1977), and the American National Lawyers Guild (1978) detailed the harsh conditions inside Israeli prisons. This period saw a large increase in arrests and administrative detention orders coinciding with the establishment of the pro-PLO PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT resistance group in 1973. Prisons became a key site of struggle and repression, particularly toward the end of the decade. A major concern at the time was severe overcrowding. The 1977 report by the Swiss League for Human Rights cited the situation in the Ramallah (West Bank) Prison, where approximately 200 detainees were held in a facility designed for no more than 40. In HEBRON Prison,

prisoners each had an average of one square meter of cell space. In Beersheba Prison in the Negev Desert, 80 to 95 prisoners were crowded into cells that measured no more than 120 square meters (1,290 square feet). While Israeli prisoners in Beersheba were provided with beds, Palestinians were forced to sleep on the floor. Overcrowding and the generally poor conditions led to widespread respiratory problems, skin diseases, and rheumatic disorders. Prisoners frequently complained that they were given only basic pain relievers, such as aspirin, regardless of their ailments.

Some of the worst conditions at the time were found in Ashkelon Prison in southern Israel. A 1977 report by the Middle East and Research Information Project cites Israeli attorney LEA TSEMEL, who detailed the grievances and demands of the prisoners during a prisoner hunger strike in Ashkelon in 1976–1977. According to Tsemel, prisoners were forced to sleep twenty to thirty to a room in dark, damp cells without beds or mattresses. They were required to eat, sleep, defecate, and play inside the cells where they were locked for twenty-three hours a day. The cells were unlit during the daytime, and at night the lights were switched off at 9:30 P.M. Prisoners were not provided with clothes apart from two sets received following their entry into the prison, and underwear could only be brought by families once a year. Prisoners and their lawyers noted the stench of the cells and the lack of fresh air with no windows to the outside. All prisoners suffered from rheumatic pains, and most had ulcers. Prisoners claimed that the physician would see around fifty prisoners in fifteen minutes, and serious medical problems, many resulting from interrogation, went untreated.

During the Intifadas

During the First Intifada, imprisonment rates skyrocketed to an estimated 20,000–25,000 per year, forcing Israel to open a number of new prisons and detention centers to cope with the increased numbers. Among the most notorious was the Ketziot Military Detention Center, opened on 18 March 1988, which held thousands of Palestinians and was known for its harsh conditions. Palestinians called this facility Ansar III after the open-air tent prison used to hold Lebanese and Palestinian detainees during the Israeli occupation of LEBANON, but it was also described by detainees as the "camp of the slow death." Located in the Negev Desert 68 kilometers (42 miles) south of Beersheba, Ansar III experienced very hot temperatures during the daytime and freezing temperatures at night. The Palestinian human rights organization AL-HAQ had fieldworkers detained in Ansar III and documented conditions in which prisoners were kept in tents infested with insects, scorpions, and rodents; water supplies were inadequate; and prisoners were permitted to shower only once each week. Individual and collective punishment of prisoners included cutting off water supplies, depriving detainees of food, and solitary confinement during which detainees would be bound in contorted positions for long periods of time.

Another detention center opened specifically for the First Intifada was the Dhahriya detention center, located south of Hebron and under the authority of the Israeli military. For the first six months of the Intifada in particular, Dhahriya suffered from severe overcrowding; in some cases, 170 detainees were held in an area as small as 100 square meters (1,080 square feet). To cope with the increased numbers, prisoners were forced by the military authority to build additional cells, which remained small and windowless. They were kept in their cells for twenty-four hours a day except when engaged in forced labor or moved outside for punishment. Prisoners were provided with buckets in their cells to use as toilets, as there was no water source in the room, and they were permitted to bathe only once every ten days. Severe and arbitrary beatings were common. Conditions in all prisons during the First Intifada deteriorated as the number of arrests increased and prison guards employed more violent means to suppress prisoner unrest. It became common practice for guards to spray tear gas into the small cells or, in the case of open-air tent prisons such as Ansar III and Megiddo, to fire at prisoners. On 16 August 1988, two prisoners were shot dead during a protest at Ansar III, and others were injured by gunshot in January 1989. A detainee was shot dead in February 1989 at Megiddo prison.

With the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994, the rate of arrests dropped. Israel closed Ansar III (in 1995) as well as prisons in the major Palestinian towns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although thousands of prisoners were released, political arrests continued, and the number of prisoners fluctuated

between 3,000 and 4,000 from 1993 to 1998. Moreover, administrative detention continued to be widely used against left-wing and Islamic organizations. A characteristic of this period was a large increase in the length of administrative detention orders and their frequent renewal. Of particular concern was the lack of family visits. Prisoners were generally detained outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and it was difficult for family members to obtain PERMITS due to the new movement restrictions put in place following the Oslo Accords.

The beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, on 29 September 2000, once again witnessed a large increase in the number of prisoners. Ansar III was reopened in 2002, following the wave of mass detentions that began in March–April of that year. Military camps in the West Bank were expanded to cope with new detainees, and many of the detention facilities suffered from overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. Palestinian minors held in Hasharon reported in March 2003 that seventy-two prisoners were being held in a section with the capacity for only forty-eight prisoners, so new prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor. In Megiddo, Ofer, and Ansar III, prisoners were held in tents filled with dust, insects, and rodents. During the cold, rainy winter months, lack of protection from the elements was a particularly severe problem. Tents were leaky, and prison authorities did not provide adequate bedding or warm blankets. Beds usually consisted of a wooden shipping pallet covered by a thin sponge.

Attacks by prison guards, repeated and invasive body searches, and raids of cells were a frequent occurrence. During these attacks, personal possessions were often confiscated or damaged. In Ramle Prison in 2001, Palestinian women prisoners were subjected to months of particularly severe beatings as well as punishment through isolation. In June 2001, twenty prison guards used tear gas and heavy batons to attack female prisoners during a hunger strike over lack of access to medical treatment. A fourteen-year-old female prisoner was badly beaten with her arms tied behind her back and punched in the stomach repeatedly until she coughed up blood. In September 2001, six female prisoners were beaten when they refused to stand up during roll call in a protest over poor conditions and were kept in overnight isolation with each of their limbs tied to the bed. In March 2002, thirteen female prisoners were forcibly stripped and searched while handcuffed and then left in an area where male wardens were present.

Ablution facilities are often lacking or unsanitary. A 2003 report by Defence for Children International–Palestine Section on the conditions in the reopened Ansar III noted that the toilet consisted of a small channel dug into the ground, and one shower was available for approximately sixty prisoners. There was little hot water even in the winter months, and one bar of soap was provided for every ten detainees. Another issue facing Palestinians in detention is lack of medical treatment. The Palestinian Prisoners Society estimated in 2004 that 700 Palestinians in detention were suffering from severe medical problems for which Israel refused to provide treatment, and at least 110 Palestinians had died in Israeli prisons since 1967 due to torture or medical negligence. Israel has denied the use of torture. Israeli medical professionals have been complicit in the practice of torture and mistreatment. Prisoners consistently complain that the sole medical treatment offered for all maladies is basic pain relievers. In a series of interviews with sixty ex-prisoners from the BETHLEHEM area in 1994, 90 percent of those interviewed claimed that the prison administration used the denial of medical treatment as a way of pressuring detainees to become COLLABORATORS. So common was this belief that detainees were reluctant to seek medical treatment for fear of being suspected a collaborator, according to former prisoners.

A clear aim of imprisonment is isolation from family and community. From 2000 to 2004, it was almost impossible for families to visit prisoners due to the denial of permits to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2005, after a limited number of visits resumed in coordination with the International Committee of the Red Cross, family members complained of humiliating and invasive checks prior to entering the prison. In addition, prisoners are forbidden from communicating with their families by phone, although letters are permitted.

Prisoner Resistance

Prison resistance is etched into Palestinian culture. Thousands of poems, songs, and stories are devoted to life behind bars. During the First Intifada, underground cassettes of songs written by prisoners circulated throughout the Occupied Territories. A major theme of this resistance culture is the commemoration of hunger strikes and

other actions used to protest conditions inside the prisons.

During the period 1976–1980, a series of prolonged hunger strikes in protest of prison conditions took place in Israeli prisons. On 11 December 1976, 450 Palestinian prisoners in Gaza launched a hunger strike that rapidly spread to other prisons in Beersheba, Ashkelon, and Ramle, as well as to all prisons in the West Bank. The largest of these strikes, in Ashkelon Prison, continued until late January 1977 for a total of forty-five days and was then renewed on 26 February 1977 when the prisoners' demands were not met. High school students and prisoners' families organized demonstrations in support of the strike throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian students in Israeli universities launched solidarity strikes. Another major hunger strike began in Nafha Prison on 12 July 1980 and lasted for forty-two days. According to testimonies received by a United Nations Special Committee, Nafha Prison was built in early 1980 to hold prison leaders, isolate them from other prisoners, and disrupt political organization within the prisons. Attorney FELICIA LANGER told the committee that the prison was designed to break the prisoners both mentally and physically. During the Nafha strike, prisoners raised the slogan "yes to the pain of starvation, no to the pain of submission." Two prisoners—Ali Jaafari and Rasem Halaweh—died while being force-fed in a prison hospital during the strike.

Smaller hunger strikes and other protests occur frequently. Often these take place in a single prison or among a specific group of prisoners. In October 1995, thirty Palestinian women prisoners in Telmond Prison barricaded themselves in two cells and threatened to set themselves on fire if the guards forced their way in. The women were protesting Israel's refusal to release five of the women prisoners according to an agreement under the Oslo Accords. In response, all of the women refused to be set free, and they remained in prison until they were all released in February 1997.

Palestinians have widely referred to prisons as universities, a place to study political theory and the practical tasks of movement building. Political factions, particularly during the First Intifada, promoted a strict regime of early rising, study circles, and organized political discussions inside the prisons. In defiance of prison regulations, prisoners undertake one-day hunger strikes and other actions to commemorate events of national significance. Prison authorities attempt to undermine collective organization by frequently transferring prisoner leaders among different prisons or placing them in solitary confinement. The administration also refuses to negotiate with collectively elected leaderships inside prisons, instead pursuing individual negotiations with each prisoner. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, prison services were increasingly commercialized by allowing prisoners to purchase their own food and other items if they had the financial means. In this manner, Israel has attempted to weaken bonds of solidarity among prisoners.

Outside the prisons, networks of family committees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip organize for the release of their relatives. Family committees hold regular demonstrations outside the International Committee of the Red Cross, PNA offices, and in other central locations to maintain the high profile of the prisoner issue. The PNA's Ministry of Detainee Affairs and several nongovernmental organizations monitor the situation of prisoners, provide legal support, and coordinate with families. The prisoner struggle is commemorated each year on 17 April, Palestinian Political Prisoners Day, and prisoners remain central to the broader Palestinian national movement. At sensitive junctures in political negotiations with Israel, prisoners have drafted joint communiqués placing demands on their counterparts outside the prison. Every Palestinian political faction has made it clear that no political settlement is possible without the release of all political prisoners.

See also ADDAMEER: PRISONERS SUPPORT AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION; ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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—Adam Hanieh

Prisoners' Document

On 25 May 2006, highly respected Palestinian leaders representing five major Palestinian political parties announced that they had reached agreement on a proposal for national unity. Officially entitled the National Reconciliation Document, it was produced by PRISONERS in the Israeli Hadarim prison, including MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI of FATAH, Shaykh Abdel Khaliq al-Natshe of HAMAS, Shaykh Bassam al-Saadi of ISLAMIC JIHAD, Abdel Rahim Malouh of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, and Mustafa Badarneh of the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE.

The National Reconciliation Document was inspired by a dire need for Palestinian unity. Divisions, which had been encouraged and exploited by Israel, had weakened the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). In particular,

the conflict between Hamas and Fatah factions portended an all-out civil war. Israel's reoccupation of the WEST BANK in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA further damaged internal Palestinian relations. The Prisoners' Document was also drawn in the context of international sanctions imposed on the PNA after Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council ELECTIONS in January 2006, which were followed by the devastating economic crisis. By June 2006, the Hamas-led government had been unable to pay its state employees for over three months. Unemployment was over 40 percent, and the number of people living below the poverty line was approximately 70 percent. With increasing demonstrations and strikes against the Palestinian government, internal and external pressures gave rise to the Prisoners' Document.

The document is composed of eighteen points, which are here summarized. The Palestinian people at home and in the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA seek and struggle to:

1. Liberate their lands, secure the right of return for REFUGEES evicted from their homes in the 1948 WAR, and establish an independent Palestinian state with JERUSALEM as its capital on all the territories occupied by Israel in 1967.
2. Accelerate efforts to achieve what was agreed in Cairo in March 2005: developing and reactivating the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and forming a new PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL to represent the Palestinian people.
3. Exercise the right to resist the OCCUPATION in the lands occupied by Israel since 1967, together with political and diplomatic work.
4. Unify the Palestinian discourse on the basis of national goals and the resolutions and peace plans of the ARAB LEAGUE.
5. Protect and support the PNA as the nucleus of the future Palestinian state.
6. Establish a national unity government that includes all political factions and that implements a program to improve the Palestinian situation at all levels.
7. Affirm that the administration of peace negotiations with Israel is within the jurisdiction of the PLO and the presidency of the PNA and ensure that negotiations will be conducted to achieve the national goals of the Palestinians.
8. Liberate all Palestinian prisoners and detainees held by Israel.
9. Double efforts to support and care for the Palestinian refugees and form a popular body to defend their rights, particularly the right of return and compensation as stipulated by UN RESOLUTION 194.
10. Form a united resistance front that will be called the Palestinian Resistance Front to lead the struggle against Occupation.
11. Adhere to the principles of democracy and free and fair elections.
12. Condemn and reject the Israeli and US siege on the Palestinian people following the Hamas electoral victory in 2006 and call on fellow Arab peoples to support the PNA and the PLO.
13. Promote Palestinian unity and rally behind the PNA, the president, the PLO, and government.
14. Condemn the use of weapons in all internal disputes.
15. Find the means to improve the participation of the Palestinian people in the GAZA STRIP in achieving freedom and independence.
16. Reform and modernize the Palestinian security forces in all its branches so that they are able to defend the homeland and enforce law and order.
17. Call on the Palestinian Legislative Council to pass laws that regulate the security forces and ban the exercise of political and partisan action by its personnel.
18. Expand the role of international solidarity committees and peace-loving groups that support Palestinians' struggle against Israeli Occupation, Jewish SETTLEMENTS, and the BARRIER that severs part of the West Bank.

In short, the document seeks to affirm the basic political rights of the Palestinians and to create a national consensus around pursuing them. Written in the spirit of a united front alliance, the document is based on agreement over common aims and objectives without forgoing the legitimate right of political and ideological contestation. Clause 14 states that internal disagreements do not conflict with unity so long as they are resolved peacefully, politically, and legally. This is an obvious attempt to avert civil war and to prohibit other internal violence, as well as to affirm the value of dialogue, discussion, and contestation (including demonstrations) in the resolution of conflicts and political differences within the alliance. The document is fundamentally democratic, affirming democratic elections and

accountability as the best means of conducting Palestinian politics.

The document clearly allows PNA president MAHMUD ABBAS (of the Fatah party) to pursue a negotiated, diplomatic course with Israel and implicitly approves of the Arab League Peace Initiative of 2002; it also stipulates that any major end-of-conflict agreement is subject to PLO approval (which would by then include Hamas and Islamic Jihad) and popular ratification. The Prisoners' Document also suggests that any future fateful referendum would be open to both Occupied and Diaspora Palestinians, reflecting the fact that popular Palestinian sovereignty is the ultimate arbiter of national goals and programs. The prisoners also call for the end of the Israeli Occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, thus abiding by INTERNATIONAL LAW and UN resolutions over Palestine, effectively endorsing a TWO-STATE SOLUTION. It also calls for the continuation of resistance against the Occupation, along with negotiation and diplomacy, until withdrawal is secured. Clause 3 involves a broad conception of resistance that is military as well as popular and focused on the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and it implicitly prohibits SUICIDE BOMBINGS against civilians in Israel as a legitimate form of violence.

In sum, then, the Prisoners' Document strongly affirms all Palestinian rights and calls for a unity government to withstand the pressures of political and economic SIEGE and international boycotts. It affirms democracy and democratic representation as the only means of resolving internal conflicts and of moving forward as a nation. The prisoners also recommend that Hamas and Islamic Jihad join the PLO as permanent members, making the PLO again the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The day the document was released, 25 May 2006, PNA president Abbas gave Hamas an ultimatum: a ten-day deadline to agree to the proposals in the document or face a national referendum on the document in forty days. The referendum was intended as a vote on the Hamas government and its policy of refusing to recognize Israel, which had led the West to impose the crippling sanctions on the PNA.

Initially, Hamas leaders dismissed Abbas's calls for a referendum as "illegal" and vowed to boycott it, but they later agreed to negotiate with Fatah on the document's contents. However, the talks ultimately broke down, and Abbas announced that the referendum would go ahead, despite appeals by Arab leaders and representatives of the Palestinian prisoners to delay the announcement. He extended the deadline for three additional days, and an agreement on the clauses of the Prisoners' Document was reached on 27 June 2006. However, Hamas did not agree to a referendum.

A poll released in early June showed that 77 percent of Palestinians supported the Prisoners' Document, and a full 83 percent supported the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders—one of the primary tenets of the document. Ironically, Islamic Jihad, which continued to engage militarily with Israel (Hamas had maintained a unilateral cease-fire for seventeen months), approved the document with some reservations, as well as the plan to put it to a referendum.

All the political maneuvering over the Prisoners' Document took place simultaneously with a massive Israeli military operation (OPERATION SUMMER RAINS) that began on 28 June 2006 and lasted well into the fall. The invasion of Gaza was triggered by a Hamas commando operation on 25 June that left two Israeli soldiers dead and a third, Gilad Shalit, kidnapped. Hamas claimed that the attack was carried out in response to the death of the Ralia family, killed by an Israeli bomb on a north Gaza beach a few weeks before. The Hamas operation and the Israeli invasion were the culmination of increasingly hostile relations in the aftermath of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in the summer of 2005. Hamas militants regularly fired QASSAM ROCKETS into Israel from Gaza, while Israel continually tightened the siege on Gaza, preventing the opening of border crossings and other restrictions. Shalit's kidnapping also revealed serious internal tensions within Hamas that involved a power struggle between more militant factions in Gaza and Damascus on the one hand and the political leadership within the PNA on the other. Prime minister and Hamas member ISMAIL HANIYEH had agreed to accept the Prisoners' Document, with PNA president and Fatah leader Abbas calling for a two-state solution, thus giving implicit recognition of Israel's existence by Hamas's governing wing. This was apparently too much for the militants to swallow and may have led to the decision to kidnap the soldier and force the struggle with Haniyeh's wing into the open.

On 29 June Israel arrested sixty-four Hamas officials, including PNA cabinet ministers and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. In addition, eight Hamas government members (five

of whom lived in Ramallah in the West Bank) and up to twenty Legislative Council representatives were detained. In the aftermath of the military operation in Gaza, the Prisoners' Document and the referendum were left hanging. Because Tel Aviv had made it clear from the outset that the document was unacceptable to Israel, possibly the massiveness of Israel's invasion was intended to abort the possibility of a national unity government.

See also MECCA AGREEMENT AND THE PALESTINIAN UNITY GOVERNMENT; EHUD OLMERT

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Professors for a Strong Israel

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

Progressive List for Peace

The Progressive List for Peace (PLP, or Progressive National Movement) was an Israeli political party active from 1984 to 1992 that was formed from an alliance of both Arab and Jewish left-wing pro-peace parties. Its platform advocated recognition of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and the GAZA STRIP. The PLP insisted that Israel and the PLO must recognize each other mutually and simultaneously if a lasting peace was to be achieved in the region and that Israel's Palestinian citizens must receive fully equal treatment. The party was unique on the political scene in that Arabs and Jews enjoyed equal representation.

In 1984 two candidates from the PLP slate were elected to the Knesset: Muhammad Mi'ari and MATTITYAHU PELED. Only Mi'ari was reelected in 1988, reducing the party's representation to one, and it failed to gain any seats in the 1992 elections. Though short-lived, the party was controversial enough that, in 1985, the Knesset approved an amendment to the BASIC LAW directed at the PLP's philosophy. Added to Section 7(a), "Prevention of Participation of Candidates List," this provision stated: "A candidates' list shall not participate in elections to the Knesset if its objective or actions, expressly or by implication include one of the following . . . negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people." In turn, the Israeli Central Elections Committee used this amendment as a justification for banning the PLP from participating in the 1988 elections. The PLP appealed to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, which overruled the Elections Committee decision and permitted the PLP to run in the election. However, the high court did not overturn Section 7(a) but merely held that the PLP policies did not fall under it.

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Pro-Israel Lobby

See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS

Propaganda, Arab

One of the major myths about the Middle East conflict is that the Arab states have been relentlessly engaged in a serious effort to destroy

Israel since its inception in 1948 and that they have supported their Palestinian brothers to the fullest extent. According to this myth, Israel was "invaded" by five Arab armies directly upon its independence with the intent of driving the nascent state "into the sea," and, although the Arabs were roundly defeated, Israel has remained surrounded by hostile Arab regimes that have launched war after war to destroy it and eradicate the Jewish state. The reason for this implacable animosity was never fully linked to the injustice inflicted on the Palestinians initially by the Zionist organizations, then by Israel, but to an inherent Arab rejection of a Jewish state in Palestine. This myth is deeply rooted in Zionist-Israeli discourse, widely projected in Israel's foreign policy, and remains a powerful component of the militarized ideology that informs Israel's state and society.

The official rhetoric of the Arab states contributed significantly to the perpetuation of the myth. The questions are: why Arab leaders spoke in such bellicose terms when they had neither the ability nor the willingness to fight Israel, why the Arab regimes never actually supported the Palestinians (except with inadequate money and superabundant rhetoric), and how the Arab states' own domestic survival and national interests, not the Palestine conflict, animated their policies. The aspect of the myth concerning the "mighty power and huge numbers" of the Arab armies that fought Israel in the 1948 WAR has been disproved by a number of archive-based studies by Israeli scholars and others.

Dichotomy between Rhetoric and Reality

The rhetorical aspects of official Arab discourse, which promise all-out support for the Palestinians, have been repeated so often and in so many contexts that it is easy to present a picture of unified, hostile aggression—especially if that serves one's purpose. One of the most common assertions made by Arab leaders has been that the question of Palestine and the plight of the Palestinians are the primary interest of Arab state and pan-Arab agendas. Another frequent contention by Arab regimes has been that internal power struggles, including military coups in one or another country, have been caused, partly if not entirely, by the issue of Palestine. Also common has been the assertion that the Palestine question is not exclusively Palestinian but rather of pan-Arab interest, necessitating the involvement of all Arab states in an arena of "Arab national security." In other words, assisting the Palestinians was not just a question of dealing with Palestine but also involved the fundamental national interests of each Arab state. A further rhetorical claim by Arab leaders has been that the "liberation of Palestine" (a term diluted after the 1967 WAR to "removing the Israeli OCCUPATION") overwhelmingly preoccupies the states surrounding Israel, compelling them to shelve all other pressing issues—domestic and international—that are vital to their survival. Finally, there has been the myth that the Arab states must commit themselves to continuous financial assistance to the Palestinians. Yet, if any of these rhetorical statements are tested against historical facts (with the exception of the one that links the concerns of individual Arab states with their own national security), it is easy to demonstrate the emptiness of that rhetoric and to expose the huge gap between what, at one time, may have been the wishes of some Arab regimes and realpolitik.

More often than not, Palestinian interests have been at odds with the declared or tacit Arab objective of ending the conflict with Israel. In 1947 some Arab states, primarily JORDAN, encouraged the Palestinian leaders to accept the UNITED NATIONS plan to partition Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state (UN RESOLUTION 181), against vehement Palestinian opposition. In 1965, Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba called upon the Palestinians to recognize Israel and accept the UN plan (one that had already been refused by Israel, announcement of the rejection having been suppressed in the hope of leaving to the Palestinians the responsibility for its demise). In 1970 the Jordanian army attacked Palestinian guerrilla forces in Jordan and forced them to flee to LEBANON after Palestinian guerrilla operations from Jordan brought Israeli reprisals and Jordanian-Israeli border friction that neither side wanted. From 1976 to 1982, PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) factions in Lebanon were implicated in the bloody civil war there, which ended in Syrian suppression. In 1982, Israel forced the Palestinians to leave Lebanon for TUNIS, after which Syrian forces in Lebanon fought mercilessly against the remaining Palestinians, backing AMAL in the "CAMPS' WAR" and bombarding the refugee camps for weeks.

Although official Arab rhetoric against Israel soared to new heights during Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon (LEBANON WAR), it was no more

than an effort to contain the anger of the Arab masses and shore up regime legitimacy. Not one Arab state came to the assistance of the Palestinians, who were under continuous siege for three months. In fact, that same year Arab leaders convened in Fez, Morocco, and proffered the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE, which recognized, collectively, publicly, and for the first time, the *right* of Israel to exist. Successive developments on the ground emphasized the great gulf between what Arab leaders said and what they did regarding Palestine and the Palestinians.

In the aftermath of HAMAS's victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council ELECTIONS in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in January 2006, the UNITED STATES and Israel led an international campaign to isolate the new Hamas-led government. The campaign succeeded by imposing three conditions on the Hamas government: recognizing Israel, acknowledging previous agreements with Israel, and denouncing violence; without meeting them, all financial and diplomatic links with the government (and people) would cease. Hamas refused the conditions and immediately the Palestinian people faced the brunt of drastic cutting of Western financial aid. Similar to their inaction in 1982, the Arab states, by and large, caved in to the US- and Israeli-led policies to isolate the Palestinians. Had there been a collective Arab state position that was clearly supportive of the Palestinians, acknowledging their right to choose their leaders in free and fair elections, the isolationist policy would have failed.

More to the point, if more scandalously, the Arab states again remained on the sidelines during the massive Israeli war against the Gaza Strip in late 2008 and early 2009. Over three weeks of sustained land, air, and sea bombardment of the defenseless Palestinians, after which Israel was accused of committing war crimes, the Arab regimes for a second time did nothing. In fact, there is some emerging evidence pointing to Egyptian and Jordanian preapproval of the Israeli war. The leaders in these two countries, together with a long list of other Arab governments, saw in that war an opportunity to end Hamas's control over the Gaza Strip and deflect the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in their own countries.

Even in the era of "peace," after the 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE and the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel, Arab diplomatic and financial support to the Palestinians was far less than the Arab leaders promised and what outside observers believed was flowing into PLO coffers. The Arab states frequently failed to honor commitments made at Arab summits, in terms of both financial assistance and diplomacy, in the sense that they publicly maintained that peace with Israel should be pursued only in a collective manner and not bilaterally. In fact, the framework of the Madrid Conference was based on bilateral negotiations with Israel, reached individually with SYRIA, Jordan, and the Palestinians. In any case, parallel, multitrack negotiations at the conference, which included the Gulf States and other Arab countries, proved to be a futile exercise. After the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in 1994, the PNA annual budget came largely from European and other non-Arab sources rather than from the Arab states.

In their relationships with foreign powers, particularly with the United States, the most influential external player in the Middle East, the Arab states rarely used their leverage for, or exercised any pressure on behalf of, the Palestinians. Studies of the foreign policies of individual Arab states, especially the major ones such as EGYPT, Syria, IRAQ, the rich Gulf States, and particularly SAUDI ARABIA, reveal that bilateral relationships with influential Western or non-Western powers were always forged according to the specific national interest of the individual state. So pronounced has this phenomenon been that numerous American and European officials have openly expressed their surprise and puzzlement at the absence of a Palestinian dimension in Arab state foreign policies and in bilateral meetings with Western leaders. To a great extent, this explains the massive increase of US political, military, and financial support to Israel over the years, because Washington did not have to be concerned about Arab states' opposition. The onetime use of an oil embargo against the West by OPEC in the aftermath of the 1973 War is the exception that only affirms the rule. Yet even the oil embargo was undertaken to support Syrian and Egyptian interests, not Palestinian, and to punish the United States for its massive resupply of weapons to Israel.

It is misleading, however, to conclude that the Palestine question was only a marginal issue for the Arabs—though it is important to distinguish between popular mass sentiment and that of regime elites. The Palestine question in Arab public opinion is deeply rooted, intensely felt, and has

persisted over time—often despite Arab ruling elites but never because of them. In the 1990s, when Israel and the Arab states were busy establishing "regional economic integration," the depth of mass popular sentiment was evident in the pressure that was brought to bear on Arab governments not to proceed with "normalization" with Israel. Ultimately, Arab states as far from the center of the conflict as Mauritania, Tunisia, Morocco in the west and Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates in the east were forced by their own people to terminate the process.

Reasons for the Dichotomy

The evident dichotomy between Arab rhetoric and Arab inaction on Palestine evokes three questions: the causes of this dichotomy, its development over the years, and its consequences for the parties involved: the Palestinians, the Arab states, and Israel.

Causes. This dichotomy originally resulted from a host of pressing issues that were facing the newly founded Arab states that gained independence from colonial powers around the same time as the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. These new states were confronted with endless challenges, including the consolidation of their political legitimacy, the formulation of distinct national identities, the defense of their newly demarcated boundaries, and the problems inherent in constructing a functioning government and economy. These Arab states also had to contend with overwhelming feelings of resentment and anger on the part of their populations that they had betrayed the promise of pan-Arab nationalism and were little more than creations of the colonial powers whose aim was the dismemberment of Arab territory and control, via surrogates, of their people and resources. Such sentiment on the part of the masses obviously complicated the legitimacy crisis.

Primarily because of this legitimacy crisis, combined with the need to create national identities and to put distance between themselves and their former colonial masters, regime elites seized on the plight of the Palestinians as a means of demonstrating to their own people that they remained part of the pan-Arab movement, were committed to the pan-Arab cause, and were dedicated to rectifying the injustice committed against the Palestinians. The rhetoric about Palestine served several practical ends for the new Arab leaders. Primarily, it provided credibility to the new leaders and states as bearers of the "liberation torch." By adopting a strong rhetorical discourse against Israel, ruling elites sought to vent popular feelings of humiliation and loss of honor after the Arab defeat of 1948 and the creation of Israel. The highly inflammatory rhetoric against Israel was taken literally by Israel, because it suited Israel's interests to do so and justified its military endeavors. For the Arab states, it became the cornerstone of a strategy that was intended to absorb popular anger, garner national and regime legitimacy, and buy time so that these elites could consolidate their position and control domestically. So they offered grand slogans and promises about Palestine as a verbal replacement for their political and military failures and continuing inaction.

This rhetorical emphasis on the "liberation of Palestine" and "restoring Arab national honor" led the Arab states into a thorny trap. On the one hand, they had to circumvent their own people's high expectation of fighting the newly established Jewish state, an expectation nurtured by the states' own rhetoric but which was far beyond the states' capabilities to undertake. On the other hand, such continuing hostile pronouncements provided Israel with an excuse to massively develop its military resources—human and material, aided by FRANCE, BRITAIN, and the United States—until, within a few years, it possessed an offensive military capable of defeating all the Arab states combined, thus creating a whole new balance of power and dynamic in the region and presenting the Arab governments with a host of new challenges. After 1956, these challenges boiled down to guns and butter and seriously complicated the internal development plans of the new states, creating an even more complex legitimacy problem for regime elites.

Historical development. "I am the prime minister of Egypt, not of Palestine" was the answer of Egyptian prime minister Muhammad Mahmud in 1936 to a question about Egypt's reaction to the Palestinian ARAB REVOLT against the BRITISH MANDATE and the rise of the Zionist movement. Shocking and perhaps dismaying as it was to Palestinians and many Arabs, including Egyptians, the answer was at least honest and reflected starkly and realistically Egypt's nonaction policy toward helping the Palestinians in their resistance efforts.

At that time in Egypt there was neither internal popular pressure for the Palestinian issue nor yet the pan-Arab aspirations that would accompany the military coup of Egyptian leader JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR in 1952.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, however, the nature of Arab discourse measured against Arab action on the Palestine issue gravely changed. The interplay of factors noted above brought the rhetoric on Palestine to the forefront. Although Arab states were reluctant to concretely help the Palestinians, because of internal weakness and fragility, including limited military capabilities and/or external pressures, many Arab prime ministers, presidents, kings, and revolutionary commanders rhetorically embraced the question of Palestine and even spoke in the name of Palestinians. Some of them fought battles "in defense of Palestine"; some even fought against the Palestinians themselves, who were perceived as too immature to take their fate into their own hands. In the late 1940s, Jordan's king Abdullah Ibn al-Husayn and Syrian leader Husni al-Za'im, for example, espoused strong rhetoric about Palestine and the Palestinians in public while dealing with the Zionist movement and later with Israel in secret.

With Nasir's assumption of power in Egypt, the rhetoric about the Palestine question reached unprecedented heights. Advocating pan-Arab nationalism, Nasir stressed "liberating Palestine and defeating the Zionist entity." His popularity in the 1950s, especially after his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in 1956, the Czech arms deal, and the Sinai/Suez War, alarmed other Arab states. By the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the Syrians, Iraqis, Saudis, Jordanians, and later the Libyans were competing over the torch of the "Palestine question" as part of a larger game of intense regional power rivalry that had come to be called the "Arab cold war."

Whereas Nasir's Egypt considered the Palestine question an Arab issue and assumed the leadership over its affairs, King Husayn's Jordan considered the Palestine issue a national concern because Jordan was the controlling power in the West Bank before the 1967 War and because Husayn had ambitions of regaining the land and incorporating it into Jordan. In addition, successive military ruling elites in Syria and Iraq expressed a desire to adopt the Palestine question locally and regionally. A conference of the Syrian BA'ATH Party in 1966, for instance, declared that "the Palestinian issue is at our core domestic, regional and international politics." In the late 1960s and 1970s, King Faisal's Saudi Arabia considered the question of Palestine an Islamic issue that should not be left to Egyptian leftists or Syrian or Iraqi Ba'athists. All these players claiming to speak in the name of and for the Palestinians severely exacerbated the gulf between Arab rhetoric and practice.

When the Palestinians decided to take their destiny into their own hands, in the mid-1960s and onward, by establishing first the FATAH movement and then dominating the PLO, the latter had to struggle with the Arab states for years to obtain the formal legitimacy of representing the Palestinians. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Palestinians fought against Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian military forces at the same time as those states were publicly trumpeting the Palestine issue. The "Arab cold war," with its Palestinian dimension, developed even further after the Iranian revolution in 1978, followed in 1981 by the IRAN-IRAQ WAR, which lasted until 1988. Syria supported Iran against Iraq, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt backed Iraq. During the years of that war, the rhetoric of the Palestine question was exercised as much as ever, yet in practice, the cause of Palestine was further marginalized. When, in 1982, the PLO was besieged by the Israeli army in Beirut for almost three months during the Lebanon War, the Arabs did nothing, and the Palestinians had to face their fate alone.

In later stages, when the First INTIFADA erupted in late 1987, real Arab help was nonexistent, while the rhetoric continued unabated. Jordan and Egypt even worried about the possible demonstration effect of the uprising among their own people. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of KUWAIT dealt the harshest blow to the Palestine cause and further weakened the remaining collective Arab solidarity with the Palestinians. The PLO was perceived by Kuwait and other Gulf countries as having sided with Iraq leader Saddam Husayn and was made to pay a dear price for that after the war. All aid from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia was terminated, and Kuwait expelled its entire Palestinian population—some 400,000 people. Weakened by the sudden ending of the minimal financial and diplomatic support from the Gulf States and isolated in the Arab world and elsewhere, the Palestinians agreed to take part in the 1991 Madrid Conference on

highly unfavorable terms. Following that, the 1993 Oslo Accords, decidedly disadvantageous to the Palestinians, reflected the stark imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, while the Arab states were entirely absent from the process, failing to provide anything to improve the asymmetry.

In retrospect, it is evident that Arab states used the Palestinian issue to distract attention from a number of domestic concerns; for example, the pretext that "the country is at war against Israel" seemed to co-opt a number of ills. The most obvious of these was the Arab governments' intractable refusal to permit any popular political participation. Multiparty systems, democracy, and/or any form of political openness were consistently rebuffed, in many cases overtly attacked, allegedly because they were neither timely nor appropriate during the "struggle." "No voice overrides the voice of the battle" was the predominant official motto in many Arab capitals, which lasted for decades. It meant that all efforts had to be directed at the struggle against Israel, including subordination of democratization, press freedom, and economic development. In reality, the emptiness of this motto stood in sharp contradiction to its wording. In Jordan, for example, the democratic process of the 1950s with successive parliamentary elections was aborted because of the Arab defeat in the 1967 War.

In Arab countries that have no direct borders with Israel, such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and the Maghreb countries, the regional climate was poisoned by the conflict, and its rhetoric helped relegate the issue of political openness and democratization to the back burner. Almost every Arab country espoused some Palestinian element in its national discourse to appease public opinion on the one hand and to claim some influence in Palestinian affairs on the other. For example, Morocco headed an ineffective suborganization, the Al-Quds Committee, formed in 1975 by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, an umbrella of fifty-seven Muslim countries, with the vague aim of defending JERUSALEM and promoting the Palestinian issue. From the 1960s to the mid-1980s, Algeria adopted a supportive revolutionary discourse toward the Palestinians and nurtured a strong relationship with the PLO, including offering Palestinian factions military training camps. But its distance from Palestinian land made the Algerian aid hardly practical. TUNIS's offer to host the PLO after its forced departure from Lebanon in 1982 gave the country a degree of regional leverage and international prestige stemming from its role as mediator between the Palestinians and the outside world. Libya helped radical Palestinian factions fight the mainstream Fatah movement, although it eventually ended up doing more damage than good for the Palestinians. In the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, Libyan authorities forced thousands of Palestinian families to leave the country because they theoretically had a country of their own by then.

Consequences of the dichotomy. Over the decades, the increasing gap between the action taken on the ground to help the Palestinians and the high pitch of rhetoric was devastating for the Palestinians and caused them great political and financial losses. Israeli politicians have ironically benefited from official Arab rhetoric, particularly in light of the absence of accompanying actual support on the ground. No great effort has been required for the Israeli propaganda machine to accumulate piles of official Arab statements calling for the immediate liberation of Palestine and the elimination of Israel, as well as Arab declarations that the Arab states are preparing their armies for the final and decisive battle against Israel and the Zionist movement. As Arab rhetoric has fed into Israeli rhetoric and propaganda, both have succeeded in exacerbating Western fears about the fate of the Jewish state and thus generated more external military, financial, and diplomatic support for Israel.

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—Khaled Hroub

Public Committee Against Torture in Israel

The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI) is an independent human rights organization founded in 1990 and based in JERUSALEM. In September 1999, in response to a PCATI petition, nine justices of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT prohibited the use of torture during interrogation. PCATI monitors the implementation of this ruling in detention centers and continues to oppose the use of torture in interrogation in Israel and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. In pursuing its objective, PCATI focuses on an information campaign aimed at raising public awareness of the subject and also uses legal means, including support of relevant legislation, provision of legal counsel, and advice and assistance to attorneys representing victims of torture. (www.stoptorture.org.il/eng).

Public Opinion

See POLLS AND PALESTINIAN PUBLIC OPINION

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Al-Qaddumi, Farouq (1931–)

Farouq Al-Qaddumi (Abu Lutf) is, at least on paper, the most senior member of the FATAH movement and one of the last remaining Fatah founders. He headed the Political Department (foreign ministry) of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and served as the movement's foreign minister from 1973 onward. Born in Qalqilya in the northern WEST BANK, his family later relocated to HAIFA but was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and fled to NABLUS. When Qaddumi, like many other Palestinians, could not find work in the Arab east, he moved to SAUDI ARABIA in the early 1950s, where he worked for the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). He moved to EGYPT in 1954, where he earned degrees in sociology and economics from Cairo University in 1958. In the early 1960s, he joined Fatah and was one of the few hard-core BA'ATHIST ideologues in its leadership. In 1965, he moved to KUWAIT (where many Palestinian Fatah leaders relocated) and worked for the Kuwaiti government, but he was expelled in 1966. He relocated to JORDAN and then to SYRIA.

Qaddumi joined the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE in 1969 and led the Department of Popular Organizations, before heading the Political Department. He developed extensive contacts with the Arab states through the 1970s, although he was closest to Syria and IRAQ. Indeed, Qaddumi maintained excellent relations with the Syrian regime and often served as PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT's emissary to Damascus after Arafat and Syrian president Hafaz al-Asad had a serious falling-out. Qaddumi distanced himself from Arafat's inner circle and succeeded in insulating himself from the corruption that surrounded Arafat's lieutenants. Instead, he immersed himself in his work at the Political Department and in serving as de facto foreign minister for the PLO, although he often bitterly complained that Arafat's secret diplomacy undermined his position. He was considered a hard-liner in the movement and opposed Arafat's double-dealing and pragmatic diplomacy, particularly with Arab states. After the 1982 LEBANON WAR Qaddumi relocated to TUNIS with Arafat and other PLO leaders. In 1983 the pro-Syrian Palestinian dissidents who split from Fatah to form the FATAH UPRISING asked Qaddumi to join their ranks and head the movement. He apparently considered the idea but decided to stay at Arafat's side on the condition that Arafat would not tie himself to any Arab states. He then became secretary general of the Fatah Central Committee.

Qaddumi rejected the OSLO ACCORDS and refused to sign the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. He never become a minister in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) or even entered PNA areas, but he continued to serve as PLO foreign minister. He was considered by many members of the Fatah Central Committee, who also rejected the Oslo Accords, as a potential successor or replacement of Arafat, but that was not to be.

He was not involved with the secret negotiations that led to the Oslo Accords and criticized Arafat and his policies publicly, yet he remained in the movement, feeling obligated to stay because the Political Department's vast budget was funded by Arafat. After the death of Arafat, Qaddumi, as the most senior member of the Fatah movement, constitutionally succeeded him as Fatah chairman; however, a Fatah General Conference was not held until August 2009, and MAHMUD ABBAS, with Arab and Israeli/US support, was chosen to head Fatah. Despite Qaddumi's sense of injustice, the rise of HAMAS, the militant Islamic group, in 2006 brought him closer to Abbas, who needed him to revive Fatah and the PLO in the face of Hamas's electoral success.

When Abbas finally planned to convene a meeting of Fatah's policymaking council, he insisted on holding it in occupied BETHLEHEM, which enabled Israel's security forces to completely control who could attend and who could not. Qaddumi was excluded, and the historic leadership of Fatah was split down the middle. Qaddumi called the decision illegitimate, unilateral, and negating the founding idea of Fatah back

in the 1950s, which was to demand the "return" to their original homes and farms of all those Palestinians who had been expelled by the Jewish/Israeli forces in 1948, or who left during the intensity of that fighting, and have never been allowed to return home.

The split between Qaddumi and Abbas goes back to before Oslo. Abbas had been the main architect within Fatah and the PLO of the whole Oslo approach. His idea, as he said in interviews in the late 1980s, was to show the Israelis so much friendship, and give them so many assurances of concern for their safety, that they "could not avoid" meeting the Palestinians' demand for an independent mini-state alongside Israel. At that time Qaddumi was the person on the PLO's ruling Executive Committee charged with running PLO foreign policy. When Abbas pursued the discussions in Norway that led to the Oslo Accords, he was going behind Qaddumi's back. But he had the backing of the powerful, yet always very manipulative, PLO/Fatah head, Yasir Arafat.

On 12 July 2009 (a month before Fatah's conference), Farouq al-Qaddumi, still the secretary general of Fatah's Central Committee, held a press conference in Amman, Jordan, in which he disclosed information impugning the legitimacy of the current Palestinian leadership. Holding up three typeset pages in Arabic, Qaddumi claimed he had the minutes of a secret meeting among Abu Mazen, MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, former Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON, former Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz, and a US delegation led by William Burns, then a State Department envoy. The meeting was presumably held in the run-up to the 4 June 2003 Aqaba Summit, where the Israeli and Palestinian sides declared their commitment to the QUARTET-sponsored ROAD MAP.

The document essentially alleges that Mahmud Abbas and Dahlan were privy to Israeli intentions to assassinate Arafat through poisoning. The need to get rid of Arafat and other Palestinian resistance figures is described as a means to facilitate an internal putsch within the PNA and Fatah so that a new class of leaders, led by Abbas and Dahlan, could take control. The assertions played across the Palestinian and Arab worlds like bombshells. Qaddumi's allegations carry weight because he is one of the last remaining, heavy-hitting Palestinian figures from the era when the PLO was established and one of a handful of surviving founders of Fatah. Nevertheless, numerous critics challenged the veracity of the document as well as Qaddumi's motivation because he had not publicly challenged Mahmud Abbas prior to this incident.

Qaddumi's exclusion from the Fatah conference was compounded by his expulsion from the leadership of Fatah at the conference.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Al-Qassam, Shaykh 'Izz al-Din (1882–1935)

Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam was a Muslim preacher, religious teacher, and social reformer who played a key role in the 1936 ARAB REVOLT in Palestine by mobilizing the peasants and laborers. Born in Jaballah near Latakia, SYRIA, he was educated at al-Azhar University and was associated with the conservative Sunni Salafi movement. He was a key figure in the 1921 Syrian revolt against FRANCE, which sentenced him to death, but he escaped and fled to HAIFA, Palestine, then under the BRITISH MANDATE. In Haifa he became imam of a *masjid* (mosque) and formed strong ties with the oppressed and downtrodden in the city. He was critical of the moderate approach toward the British taken by the mufti of JERUSALEM, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, and the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL.

He was a prominent member of the Young Men's Muslim Association, and in 1929 he was appointed to a role in the Shari'a court in Haifa,

which allowed him to tour the northern villages, whose inhabitants he encouraged to set up agricultural cooperatives. He was also keen to give young women political and religious education, setting up the women's group Rafiqat al-Qassam (the Comrades of Qassam). For the first time, women began to receive training in the use of weapons. As with his other work, al-Qassam focused his political activities on mobilizing the lower classes with whom he lived, setting up a night school for casual laborers, and recruiting followers from among the peasants throughout the Galilee and migrants in Haifa shantytowns to form an underground organization. When the mufti rejected his plans to divert funding for mosque repairs toward the purchase of weaponry, Qassam found support in the Arab nationalist ISTIQLAL movement. By 1935, al-Qassam had managed to enlist a substantial group of men well trained in military actions. His organization was known as the Black Hand, and his message was simple and found resonance among peasants: there must be unity, strict piety, struggle, and sacrifice to make a liberation movement to fight the British and the Zionists. Al-Qassam's success resided in his emulation of early Islamic heroes and in his transformation of traditional religious values into revolutionary practice. He fused the growing Palestinian nationalist sentiments with religion- and class-conscious components in an anti-colonial movement. Al-Qassam is considered by many historians as the spark that ignited the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 against the British Mandate and the Zionist movement. His death by British soldiers led directly to the outbreak of the revolt, an act of fidelity to his call for revolt to claim Palestinians' rights in their LAND, which differed from the accommodating path of the elite *a'yan* (notables). In the 1980s the Islamist movement revived al-Qassam's heroic image as their symbol for resistance and sacrifice. HAMAS, the militant Islamic organization, named its military division AL-QASSAM BRIGADES and its QASSAM ROCKETS after al-Qassam.

See also ARAB REVOLT; ARMED STRUGGLE; ZIONISM

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Al-Qassam Brigades

Al-Qassam Brigades, or 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is the armed branch of the Islamic resistance movement HAMAS. Officially established on 14 December 1987, the al-Qassam Brigades have taken credit for many of the SUICIDE BOMBINGS in Israel since 1994.

See also HAMAS

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Qassam Rockets

The Qassam rocket is a relatively primitive steel rocket filled with explosives that was developed by the Palestinian armed group HAMAS and named after the armed wing of Hamas, the AL-QASSAM BRIGADES. Three models have been used, but all three lack a guidance system. Human Rights Watch said that Qassam rockets are by their very nature problematic weapons because they cannot be directed at military targets with any degree of precision. "They are primitive, short-range, home-made rockets that do not have the technical capability to be guided." The original Qassam rocket was a 1-meter-long tube filled with 6 kilograms (13 pounds) of explosives and had a range of 3 to 10 kilometers (1.8 to 6.2 miles). The Qassam-2 has a range of up to 8.8 kilometers (5 miles) and can carry a payload of some 9 kilograms (20 pounds) of explosives. The upgraded rockets, or Qassam-3s, now have a range of more than 12.5 kilometers (7.5 miles). The longest shot to date was an attack on Ashkelon, an Israeli town 8 kilometers north of the Gaza Strip.

Qassams were first fired at Israeli targets on 16 April 2001; the firings have been ongoing and have increased in frequency since then. The first time an Israeli city was hit was on 5 March 2002, when two rockets struck Sderot.

Credible sources provide varying statistics on the number of Qassams fired into Israel and the number of resulting deaths. One states that from 2001 until May 2008, over 3,050 Qassam rockets have been fired at Israeli targets; these have killed fifteen Israelis and injured 433. Israeli photo-journalist Edi Israel reports that, between 2001 and 2008, twenty Israelis were killed, mostly civilians, and 583 were wounded, most not seriously, by some 15,000 Qassam rockets. B'Tselem reports that, from June 2004 to the end of 2007, eleven Israelis, four of them minors, were killed by Qassam rockets fired by Palestinians. According to United Nations figures, 1,194 Qassam rockets were fired at Israel (about 100 a month) in 2005; in 2006 the rocket fire increased to 1,786 (an average of 149 a month), and in 2007 it decreased to 1,331 (an average of 111 a month).

According to the al-Qassam Brigades, the Qassam rocket was first developed by Nidal Fat'hi Rabah Farahat and produced under the direction of Adnan al-Ghoul, known as the "Father of the Qassam," who was killed by the Israeli military in October 2004.

The rockets have been fired at various Israeli towns, in particular at Sderot and Kibbutz Saad and Nir Am in the Negev and, prior to ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005, at some Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip. However, they rarely caused injuries and did not kill an Israeli in Gaza until 28 June 2004.

Despite the Qassam's meager characteristics as a rocket, its use shocked the Israeli military and public, who are used to the Palestinians lacking any method of long-range warfare. The Lebanese group Hizbullah, in contrast, has long shelled Israel from Lebanon using the Katyusha rocket, hitting cities as well as farms and military targets in the sparsely populated northern border zone.

Israel has tried to stop the development and manufacture of Qassam rockets by assassinating suspected resistance fighters and by destroying facilities (such as metal shops) that could be, or actively are, used for their construction. It has also destroyed the family homes of many Palestinians it claims have been involved in the smuggling or firing of rockets.

See HAMAS

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Qattan, A. M., Foundation

The A. M. Qattan Foundation is a private, family-funded, Palestinian foundation that began operating in 1998 with a focus on two principal areas: EDUCATION and culture. Its two major educational institutions are the Qattan Center for Educational Research and Development based in Ramallah, WEST BANK, and the Qattan Center for the Child in the GAZA STRIP. The Ramallah Center participates in raising the standards of education and teaching in Palestine by working directly with schoolteachers to develop their skills and improve their knowledge base and by attempting to create better learning conditions for Palestinian schoolchildren. A major objective of the center is improving the curriculum for students at all levels (one through twelve) by developing programs in the arts, alternative mathematics, narrative and language, technology, and other areas. Additionally, the foundation has launched a Culture and Science Program to provide financial and moral support to talented persons in a variety of fields of creative endeavor. (www.qattanfoundation.org).

Al-Qawuqji, Fawzi (1890–1977)

Fawzi al-Qawuqji was an Arab-nationalist military man from Tripoli, LEBANON, and graduate of the Ottoman Military Academy, who fought the British and French throughout the Middle East, including in Palestine. In 1936 he mobilized several hundred volunteers to fight alongside the Palestinians in the ARAB REVOLT, but he stayed in Palestine only a short time because of differences with local leaders. He returned again in 1947 as commander-in-chief of the ARAB LEAGUE's 4,600 irregular forces. Never very effective on the battlefield, al-Qawuqji was ordered to leave Palestine in May 1948 when the regular armies of the Arab states entered the fray. He returned briefly to assist the Palestinians of JERUSALEM and later fought for a short time in northern Palestine.

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Qibya

Qibya was a WEST BANK Palestinian village, then under Jordanian occupation, that was a target of an Israeli reprisal attack on 14 October 1953. The military action by two Israeli units, a paratroop company, and UNIT 101, under the command of ARIEL SHARON, led to the death of over fifty Palestinians, almost all civilians, and the demolition of nearly all the houses in Qibya.

The attack was part of the Israeli strategy, in place from 1951, of carrying out massive military reprisals against Palestinian villages in the West Bank from which Israel believed that a cross-border INFILTRATION had come. The majority of such infiltrations were not military in character but involved Palestinians attempting to return to their homes, harvest their crops, locate family members, and so on. However, on 12 October 1953, an unarmed Jewish woman and her two children were killed in an armed infiltration. Under the order of Israeli defense minister Pinhas Lavon, the Israeli government decided to carry out a retaliatory operation against the village of Qibya, although there was no specific evidence that the infiltrators had come from there.

The military operation at Qibya took place in the evening of 14 October and began with an artillery barrage on the village that continued until Israeli troops reached its outskirts. Land mines were laid on roads to prevent Jordanian troops from fighting the Israelis. Israeli soldiers then laid explosives around many of the houses and blew them up. At dawn the operation was considered completed and the Israeli troops returned home. In addition to the deaths, forty-five villagers' houses were destroyed, as well as the mosque, the school, and the water reservoir. The Israeli government initially claimed that the operation was carried out by Jewish civilians living near the border but later admitted that it was done by military forces.

The original orders issued by the Israeli general staff were relatively confined in scale: "blowing up a

number of houses . . . and hitting the inhabitants." However, going down the command ladder, before they reached the units' commanders, the orders changed to demand "maximum killing." Sharon later wrote in his diary that he received orders to inflict heavy damage on the village's inhabitants. "The orders were utterly clear: Qibya was to be an example for everyone."

The UNITED NATIONS observer who investigated the scene, Major General Vagn Bennike, chief of staff of the UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, wrote: "One story was repeated time after time: the bullet splintered the door, the body sprawled across the threshold, indicating that the inhabitants had been forced by heavy fire to stay inside until their homes were blown up over them." Israeli historian Avi Shlaim wrote this of the massacre: "Sharon's order was to penetrate Qibya, blow up houses and inflict heavy casualties on its inhabitants. His success in carrying out the order surpassed all expectations." Initially, via the heavily censored ISRAELI MEDIA, the Israeli public was left unaware of the attack, but word got out through a number of sources, and the attack had far-reaching consequences. It was widely criticized, not only by the international community but also by many Israelis themselves. The UN Security Council condemned Israel in a resolution on 24 November, and the UNITED STATES temporarily suspended economic aid to Israel.

See also INFILTRATION (PALESTINIAN) AND RETALIATION (ISRAELI)

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Quartet

The Quartet was a loose association among the UNITED STATES, the UNITED NATIONS, the EUROPEAN UNION, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION that came together in Madrid, Spain, on 10 April 2002 to press for a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Later, the Quartet produced the ROAD MAP—a process or set of procedures—for Israel and the Palestinians to follow so as to attain peace.

The Quartet first began to coalesce late in 2001, although it is not clear why the United States opted for this multilateral approach when it had a firm unilateral policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (articulated most clearly in a speech by President GEORGE W. BUSH on 24 June 2002). The administration may have felt that, given its plans for a global war on TERRORISM in the post-9/11 era and its war on IRAQ, having a cooperative relationship with the Europeans, Russians, and the United Nations would be in its interest as it pursued controversial policies globally.

On 10 April 2002, the Quartet produced its first joint communiqué, calling for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION based on the relevant UN Security Council resolutions (UN RESOLUTIONS 242, 338, and 1397), for negotiations leading to Israeli withdrawals, and for Arab recognition of and peace with Israel. It warmly endorsed Saudi crown prince Abdullah's peace initiative, in turn supported in Beirut in the ARAB LEAGUE Peace Initiative (27–28 March 2002), as a "significant contribution toward a comprehensive peace including SYRIA and LEBANON."

In terms of immediate and concrete steps, the Quartet called on Israel to "halt immediately its military operations" in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and asked for an "immediate, meaningful ceasefire and an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities" to positions held on 28 September 2000. It required "an end to all SETTLEMENT activity" and called on the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) "to act decisively and take all possible steps within its capacity to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure, including terrorist financing, and to stop incitement to violence." To this end, the Quartet also urged the parties to agree to a cease-fire. Last, it called upon Arab states to assist in rebuilding the PNA and for international donors to contribute to a humanitarian relief effort in the wake of the destruction caused during Israel's 2002 offensives.

From the outset, the Bush administration had pursued a significantly different policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than that of its predecessors and of the Europeans and the United

Nations. Bush was uninterested in mediation, preferring "conflict management"—for example, the cease-fire initiative of the Mitchell Commission Report (May 2001) and the Tenet Plan (June 2001)—and tilted decisively toward Israel. Then, just two months after the Quartet's first joint policy communiqué, President Bush delivered a major policy address that was radically at odds with the Quartet's statement. In fact, the president introduced two completely new elements into the Israeli-Palestinian equation: first, he insisted on a new Palestinian leadership before there could be any movement on a peace process, and second, he negated the concept of an independent Palestinian state, calling instead for a "provisional state." Instead of urging the Arab states to bolster the PNA, Bush called on them to cooperate in suppressing all terrorism and incitement. And, instead of urging Israel to immediately halt its military operations and withdraw its forces, he stated that Israel could only be expected to do this "as we make progress towards security." Bush set out major preconditions in the sphere of Palestinian political, economic, and social reform and specified that they must be fulfilled before Israel needed to reciprocate. Bush's "performance-based plan" held the Palestinians to an extremely high standard while requiring little of the Israelis.

On 16 July in New York, the Quartet issued its second joint communiqué by explicitly reaffirming its first statement of 10 April; however, it went on to say that, although the Quartet "recognized [the] elected leader [the PNA] of the Palestinian people," it also, like Bush, wanted reform in the PNA. It welcomed the willingness of Arab states to contribute to peacemaking and called upon them to do this by "helping Palestinians build institutions of good government and democracy." The Quartet renewed its call for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and progress in moving toward security. It affirmed a process of parallel Israeli and Palestinian peacemaking steps that appeared to differ from Bush's emphasis on Palestinian performance in fighting terror and ending incitement and violence, and called for immediate Israeli release of Palestinian funds frozen at the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. The Quartet did not repeat Bush's call for a provisional Palestinian state, but neither did it affirm the idea of an independent state. Although there were some variances between the Bush plan and the Quartet's proposal, it appeared that the Quartet was moving closer to the Bush perspective.

On 17 September 2002, the Quartet issued a third communiqué, the Road Map, following a meeting of its principals as well as representatives of five Arab states (EGYPT, JORDAN, Lebanon, SAUDI ARABIA, and Syria), the Palestinians, and Israel. In the Road Map, the Quartet called for a "performance-driven and hope-driven" plan aimed at achieving a "final and comprehensive settlement within three years." The 17 September communiqué, which more obviously reflected Bush's ideas, implicitly endorsed the idea of a new Palestinian leadership produced by ELECTIONS. It also called for an Israeli halt to settlement activity but only following the Palestinian establishment of the conditions and reforms first outlined in the Bush speech. It also acknowledged Bush's idea of a provisional Palestinian state by proposing that the definition of the state's BORDERS be deferred to FINAL STATUS TALKS. It did, however, leave out one item from Bush's proposal: it required immediate Israeli withdrawals in parallel with Palestinian steps rather than as a result of them.

This outline was finally fleshed out in a draft document circulated on 15 October 2002, entitled "Elements of a Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," which would later be published as the official Road Map. Circulated in October and published in April, it described three phases of implementation for a final peace in 2005. The Quartet met again on 20 December 2002 to discuss the gap between Bush's plan and the Quartet's proposal. Bush indicated that he was "strongly committed to the vision that [he] outlined on June the 24th" and insisted the other members "get on board."

On 18 March 2003, PNA president YASIR ARAFAT bowed to intense pressure for reform in the PNA and appointed a prime minister, MAHMUD ABBAS, who accepted the Road Map. The United States and Israel had demanded that Arafat be neutralized or sidelined in the Road Map process, claiming that he had not done enough to stop Palestinian attacks against Israelis while in charge, and the United States refused to release the Road Map until a Palestinian prime minister was named. With Abbas in place, the Road Map was released on 30 April 2003. On 26 May 2003, Israel announced a highly qualified acceptance of the

plan with fourteen reservations—substantive enough to undercut the acceptance.

With Israel opposed to the involvement of the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations and with the United States unhappy with the Quartet's divergences from Bush's June 2002 parameters—though at this point they were minor indeed—any meaningful diplomacy on the Israel-Palestine question was ended. Then, less than a year later, Israel came up with a "revised disengagement plan" after it concluded "that at present, there is no Palestinian partner with whom it is possible to make progress on a bilateral peace process." This was the genesis of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA. The first paragraph of the plan continued: "The State of Israel is committed to the peace process and aspires to reach an agreed resolution of the conflict based upon the vision of US President George Bush."

With this unilateral move, Israel simply eliminated the Palestinian people from the list of decisionmakers and in practice abolished all the agreements signed with them—from the OSLO ACCORDS to the Road Map. George Bush was in full collaboration with Israel on this step and in turn persuaded the Quartet to accept Israel's "Revised Disengagement Plan" for all of the Occupied Territories.

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Qurei', Ahmad Ali Muhammad (1937–)

Ahmad Qurei' (Abu Ala) is an economist who was director-general of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S (PLO) Economic Department. He was an architect of the OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel, a PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) legislator, head of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and PNA prime minister. Born in ABU DIS (a suburb of JERUSALEM), Qurei' remained in the WEST BANK under Jordanian rule and then fled in 1968 after the Israeli OCCUPATION to SAUDI ARABIA, where he worked as a banker. He joined the FATAH party in the late 1960s and moved to LEBANON with the PLO after BLACK SEPTEMBER, the 1970 civil war in JORDAN.

As head of the PLO's economic and production enterprises in Lebanon, Qurei' developed a system (SAMED) for employing Palestinians and marketing the products they produced. By the mid-1980s, his business generated an annual income of about $40 million and, with 6,500 full-time employees, ranked as one of the largest employers in Lebanon. When the PLO was forced out of Lebanon, Qurei' went to TUNIS with PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT. With the death or assassination of other senior PLO leaders, he gradually gained more influence until he was elected a member of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE in 1989.

That marked the start of his political career, and he began to play an increasing role in peace negotiations. He was the key Palestinian negotiator in the Oslo Accords, after which he continued to participate in numerous negotiations with the Israelis. One of his main contributions was to help put together a Palestinian development plan, which was presented to a World Bank conference on aid

in 1993. It was Qurei' who came up with the idea and found funding for the plan, which then became a central aspect in the PLO's development strategy for the Palestinian territories. He played a key role in developing the PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION (PECDAR), an organization that raises international capital from donor countries for projects in the Occupied Territories, and headed it until he was elected to the PLC in 1996.

Since founding PECDAR, Qurei' has continued to play a crucial role in the organization and was, additionally, minister of economy and trade and minister of industry in the PNA from 1994 to 1996. He also headed the negotiations for the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT II on economic relations between the autonomous Palestinian territories and Israel in April 1994 and negotiated the Oslo INTERIM AGREEMENT in September 1995.

After the resignation of Palestinian prime minister MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen) on 6 September 2003, Arafat nominated Qurei' to fill the post, but Qurei' said he would only accept the job if Washington "guarantees Israeli compliance with a United States–backed peace plan, including a halt to military strikes." Although the UNITED STATES provided no guarantees, he bowed to pressure from Arafat and accepted the position. Appointed by an emergency decree on 5 October 2003, he was sworn in on 7 October but on 12 October threatened to resign due to a dispute with Arafat over control of the security services. The emergency cabinet's term expired on 4 November, and Qurei' declared that he was willing to lead a new cabinet provided he could obtain the support of the PLC, which he received on 12 November. Nevertheless, on 17 July 2004 he submitted his resignation amid growing chaos in the GAZA STRIP, the rising strength of HAMAS, and the kidnapping of Palestinian security officials, including the chief of police for the Gaza Strip and five Frenchmen. Arafat refused to accept his resignation, reportedly drawing a giant X over Qurei's letter of resignation.

Subsequently, Arafat granted Qurei' limited control over parts of the security apparatus, one of the powers he requested to carry out reforms, and Qurei' retracted his resignation on 27 July 2004, stating: "I am satisfied that President Arafat is serious this time, that it is not just words but that this time there will be action." Arafat, however, retained control over the bulk of the dozen or so security services, which Qurei' and other critics claimed exhibited internal corruption and lawlessness, while United States–led mediators blamed the Palestinians for preventing the advance of the ROAD MAP for peace.

When Arafat became ill in October 2004, Qurei', together with Abbas, took control of the PNA and PLO. After Arafat's death and Abbas's subsequent victory in the Palestinian presidential election of 2005, Qurei' was asked to continue in his post and form a new cabinet. Because of repeated demands by Fatah officials and PLC members to make the new cabinet more reform-minded, a vote of confidence was repeatedly delayed. It was finally passed on 24 February 2005 after Qurei' revised the list of ministers to accommodate these demands.

In 2004, a Palestinian parliamentary committee found that Qurei's family company, Al-Quds Cement, ships cement to Israel from Egypt. That cement, the committee found, was specifically used for building the Barrier. The inquiry committee first investigated whether Qurei's cement company had been selling cement to Israeli settlements. On 11 February 2004, Israeli Channel 10 TV reported that the Al-Quds Cement company was providing the materials to help build Israel's Barrier Wall. Television footage also showed cement mixers leaving the Al-Quds company and driving to the Jewish settlement of MA'ALE ADUMIM, just a few kilometers away. Qurei' denied the claims.

A further serious scandal involving Ahmad Qurei' emerged when the PNA ambassador to Romania, Adli Sadek, released a document purporting to demonstrate that Qurei' deposited $3 million of PLO funds into his private bank account. Qurei' published a strong denial in the PALESTINIAN MEDIA. While admitting that he did take the money, Qurei' said he transferred the sum to a PLO bank account. He added that the $3 million was part of a $5 million investment that had been deposited in a bank account under Yasir Arafat's name.

Qurei' argues that some of his rivals in Fatah are trying to discredit him so as to destroy his chances of emerging as potential successor to Abbas, whose term in office officially expired. Sources close to Qurei' have named former Fatah security commander MUHAMMAD DAHLAN and top PLO official YASIR 'ABD RABBU as those behind the "smear campaign." Qurei' has demanded that

Fatah take disciplinary measures against the two, vowing to file libel suits against all those who try to damage his reputation.

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R

Ra'am

Ra'am (Reshima Aravit Me'uhedet, or United Arab List) is a primarily Palestinian political party in Israel that was established in 1996 as a union between two political forces: the ARAB DEMOCRATIC PARTY (consisting of Hezb al-Democraty al-Arabi and Miflaga Democratit Aravit) and elements related to the Islamic movement and to the National Unity Front. (It is not related to the original United Arab List that existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.) In the 1966 elections, the party won four seats. During the Knesset term, the Arab Democratic Party became a faction within the United Arab List, and its name was dropped from the party title.

The next elections saw the party increase its share of the vote and pick up five seats. However, internal disagreements saw three members of the Knesset leave; two left and established the Arab National Party and the third left and formed the National Unity–National Progressive Alliance Party. In the 2003 elections, Ra'am support dropped by more than a third, with the party winning only two seats.

For the 2006 elections the party entered an alliance with AHMAD TIBI's Ta'al party. Running together, the alliance won four seats, three of which were taken by the United Arab List. The same alliance was maintained for the 2009 elections, which initially saw the Israeli Central Elections Committee ban the party from participating, but this was overturned by the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. In these elections, the alliance again won four seats.

Ra'am supports the creation of a Palestinian state, with East JERUSALEM as its capital, and a TWO-STATE SOLUTION as a resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ra'am also promotes strengthening the Arab sector within Israel. In the 1999 elections, it won five seats, making it the largest Israeli-Palestinian list in the Knesset. Its constituency consists mostly of religious and/or nationalist Israeli Arabs, and it enjoys popularity among the BEDOUIN.

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Rabat Summit, 1974

The Rabat Summit conference in October 1974 brought together the leaders of twenty Arab states, including JORDAN's King Husayn and representatives of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). The PLO asked the conference for an official statement to the effect that any Palestinian territory liberated by Arab forces would be turned over to the "Palestinian people" as represented by the PLO. Although Jordan protested, because it had its own designs for reoccupying the WEST BANK, the summit adopted a compromise solution that favored PLO interests. The conference formally acknowledged the right of the Palestinian people to a separate homeland but without specifying that its territory was restricted to the West Bank. Most important, the PLO was for the first time officially recognized by all the Arab states as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." The Arab heads of state further called for close cooperation between the front-line states (EGYPT, Jordan, SYRIA, and LEBANON) and the PLO but prohibited interference by other Arab states in Palestinian affairs. The Rabat Summit declaration conferred a mantle of legitimacy on the PLO that had been previously absent. It gave official Arab recognition to PLO territorial claims to the West Bank and unambiguously put the fate of the Palestinian people solely in the hands of the PLO.

Although King Husayn opposed the declaration, he eventually signed it under intense Arab pressure and after the Arab oil-producing states promised to provide Jordan with an annual subsidy of US$300 million. Despite his acquiescence to

the Rabat declaration and subsequent statements in support of the PLO, Husayn persisted in viewing the West Bank as rightly Jordanian territory, although the PLO, along with the rest of the Arab world, viewed Husayn's consent at Rabat as a renunciation of Jordanian claims to the West Bank. The wide gulf separating the two views was the major source of tension between the PLO and Jordan throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Following the Rabat Summit and because of it, the PLO scored an impressive political victory in the international arena. In late November 1974, the UNITED NATIONS recognized PLO representation of the Palestinian people, and PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT addressed the General Assembly. In addition, in a joint communiqué issued the same month, US president GERALD R. FORD and general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev acknowledged the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians in accordance with UN resolutions. Nonetheless, a UN draft resolution in 1976 proposing to reaffirm the right of the Palestinians to self-determination—including the right to establish an independent state—was vetoed by the UNITED STATES in the Security Council. In the coming years, the PLO was invited to establish diplomatic missions in over 100 countries.

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Rabbis for Human Rights

Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR) was founded in 1988 in response to serious abuses of human rights by the Israeli military authorities in the suppression of the First INTIFADA. The indifference of much of the country's religious leadership and religiously identified citizenry to the suffering of Palestinians during the uprising was a cause of concern to the Israeli organization. RHR's intent is to remind and demonstrate to both the religious and nonreligious sectors of the public that Judaism has another face, that human rights abuses are not compatible with the age-old Jewish tradition of humaneness and moral responsibility or the biblical concern for "the stranger in your midst"—even in the face of the danger to public order and safety, which the uprising represented to Israel.

RHR is the only Orthodox (or other) religious organization in Israel concerned specifically with giving voice to the Jewish tradition of human rights and the only one that teaches a different understanding of the Jewish tradition. It comprises rabbinic organizations made up of Reform, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reconstructionist rabbis and students. RHR has no affiliation with any political party or ideology and counts among its members rabbis in national leadership positions as well as educators and congregational rabbis capable of influencing change at the grassroots level. RHR attempts to encourage thinking about human rights through the development of a Talmudic-style commentary on the Israeli DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. After completion, this document will be used as a tool in Israeli schools to help Israeli youth understand their rights and obligations as members of a Jewish, democratic state with respect for universal human rights for all peoples. (www.rhr.israel.net).

Rabin, Yitzhak (1922–1995)

Yitzhak Rabin was an Israeli general, politician, and prime minister who was born in JERUSALEM. Following the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS, Rabin received the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize together with Israeli foreign minister SHIMON PERES and PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT.

Rabin's father immigrated to Palestine in 1917 from the UNITED STATES, and his mother in 1919 from the Ukraine. On completing his secondary schooling, Rabin volunteered for the PALMAH, the elite Zionist fighting force, when it was founded in 1940, and he participated in the Allied invasion of SYRIA in 1941. In 1944, as second in command of a Palmah battalion, he took part in underground military actions against the BRITISH MANDATE regime. In April 1948, Rabin was appointed commander of an elite Palmah unit, the Harel Brigade. Together with YIGAL ALLON, he was responsible for the conquest of LYDDA and RAMLA and the expulsion of the Palestinian residents of the two towns in Operation Danny. Thereafter, Rabin went on to "cleanse" the Negev of Palestinians. After 1948, he joined the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and remained in the army for twenty-seven years. In the 1967 WAR, as

chief of staff, he presided over the defeat of JORDAN, EGYPT, and Syria and the conquest of vast Palestinian and Arab territories.

After retiring from IDF service on 1 January 1968, Rabin was appointed Israeli ambassador to the United States. He returned to Jerusalem in the spring of 1973 amid something of a scandal over his wife's private bank accounts and became active in the Israeli LABOR PARTY. In the December 1973 elections, he won election to the Knesset, and when GOLDA MEIR formed her government in April 1974, he became minister of labor. When Meir's government resigned shortly afterward, on 2 June 1974, the Knesset voted in a new government headed by Rabin. As prime minister, he placed a special emphasis on improving the economy, solving social problems, and strengthening the IDF. Under intense US mediation, he concluded the interim agreement with Egypt in 1975, and consequently the first memorandum of understanding was signed between the government of Israel and the United States. In June 1976, the Rabin government ordered the ENTEBBE rescue operation after a Palestinian group hijacked a commercial French plane.

Following the Labor Party's defeat in the May 1977 elections, Rabin served as a member of the Knesset in the opposition and was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee until the formation of the National Unity Government in September 1984, in which he served as minister of defense from September 1984 to March 1990. As defense minister during the First INTIFADA, Rabin imposed stringent repressive measures, an "IRON FIST," against what was essentially a nonviolent civil uprising. He instructed the Israeli security forces, without fear of punishment, to enter Palestinian homes and "break the bones" of the residents. During the first two years of the Intifada, 120,000 Palestinians were arrested.

From March 1990 to June 1992, Rabin again served as a Knesset member in the opposition. Before the 1992 elections, in the Labor Party's first nationwide primaries, he was elected party chairman in February 1992, and, in the June 1992 national elections, he was elected prime minister. Although Rabin had given reluctant approval to the secret Oslo talks with the PLO, which were initiated by Peres, he was less than enthusiastic when he was informed of the outcome. On 13 September 1993 in Washington, D.C., Rabin, Peres, and Arafat signed the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP) outlining proposed interim self-government arrangements, ostensibly the first step in the Palestinian quest for statehood. The first of the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT, signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994, addressed the implementation of the first stage of the DOP.

Although Rabin was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his participation in the OSLO PROCESS, in a 21 September 1993 speech to the Knesset, Rabin articulated the limits to the peace process with the Palestinians: "This agreement [DOP], which permits the Palestinians to run their affairs, safeguards the following issues for Israel: Unified Jerusalem remains under Israel's rule, and the body that will run the lives of the Palestinians in the territories will have no authority over it. . . . United and unified Jerusalem is not negotiable and will be the capital of the Israeli people under Israel's sovereignty . . . forever and ever. . . . The Israeli SETTLEMENTS in Judea, Samaria [the West Bank], and Gaza will remain under Israel's rule without any change whatsoever in their status. The authority of the Palestinian Legislative Council will not apply to any Israeli in the areas of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The IDF will continue to bear overall responsibility for the security of the Israeli settlements in the territories, the security of every Israeli staying in the territories, and for external security—namely for the defense of the current confrontation lines along the Jordan River and for the Egyptian border. The IDF will deploy in all areas of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District on the basis of these missions. All the issues pertaining to the permanent arrangement will be put off for the negotiations that will begin two years after the date stipulated in the agreement, while preserving the Israeli government's freedom to determine its positions regarding the permanent solution. This means that the Declaration of Principles leaves all the options open on this issue. . . . The [Palestinian Legislative] Council will be established only after we agree with the Palestinians about its structure, composition, and functions. . . . In any event, the might of the IDF—the best army in the world—is available for our use if, God forbid, we are faced with such a challenge [from the Palestinians]. . . . Above all, I want to tell you that this is a great victory for ZIONISM."

Rabin again addressed the Knesset on 5 October 1995: "The Palestinians will have a policing authority regarding civilian issues, *subject to several constraints*. . . . [It] allows blanket [IDF] protection of . . . the settlements in the Gaza Strip.

. . . [There are] constraints on Palestinian building and other issues. . .In other areas—such as religion, ARCHAEOLOGY, WATER, electricity, construction and planning, telecommunications, postal services, and population registration affairs—*the transfer of power will be subject to certain constraints in order to secure essential Israeli interests*. . . . [It] stipulates that a liaison committee . . . will be established to . . . decide on the principles concerning the entry of persons who left Judea and Samaria in 1967. Take note we are not talking about REFUGEES from 1948 but about people displaced in 1967. . . . This clause stipulates that all decisions on this issue must be made unanimously by all the members of the [joint Liaison] committee. In other words, without Israel's agreement, the committee will not be able to determine how many people will be allowed in and in what stages" (emphasis added).

On 11 May 1994, Rabin put before the Knesset his detailed plans for a permanent settlement, which differed drastically from that of the Palestinian and other observers (except for the United States) regarding the meaning of the Oslo Accords. Rabin stated: "[T]he permanent solution lies in the territory of the State of Israel made up of *Eretz Yisrael* as it was under the BRITISH MANDATE . . . and alongside it, a Palestinian entity that will be the home of the majority of the Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. We want the entity to be *less than a state*. . . . The BORDERS of the State of Israel . . . will *exceed* the borders that existed prior to the Six Day War. We will not return to the lines of 4 June 1967. . . . [A] united Jerusalem—to include also MA'ALE ADUMIM and GIV'AT ZE'EV—[will serve] as the capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty. . . . The security border for the defense of the State of Israel will be situated in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY [the eastern salient of the West Bank] along the broadest possible interpretation of that term. There will be settlement blocs . . . [throughout] Judea and Samaria. . . . I must stress the activity to build security components at the Israeli settlements: fences, by-pass ROADS, lights, electronic gates. The by-pass roads are aimed at enabling Israelis to move without crossing the Palestinian population areas. . . . [We will maintain] responsibility for external security on the borders with Egypt and Jordan, in the airspace over all the territories, and in the naval space in the Gaza Strip" (emphasis added).

Rabin was devoted to the ALLON PLAN and stated repeatedly in public (and private) pronouncements that nothing in the Oslo agreement contradicted that plan. Devised in 1967, the Allon Plan calls for Israeli retention of the Jordan Valley, including the Allenby border crossing with Jordan, absorption of the Judean "desert" region, and the creation of a vastly expanded "GREATER JERUSALEM" that would connect the three areas. The plan indicates that a Palestinian "autonomous" area, whatever its final boundaries, would be an island—or islands—surrounded by Israeli territory, settlements, and military installations.

Thus, Rabin's vision of peace with the Palestinians included territorial compromise only to the extent of ensuring that Israel would maintain an 80 percent Jewish majority in its sovereign territory, and he ruled out a return to the 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT borders. He demanded permanent control of the Jordan Valley as a security border and cited Israel's cluster of communities in Gaza as a model for places to be retained by Israel in a permanent solution. Rabin ruled out the uprooting of any settlement until a permanent agreement was reached. He also emphasized Israel's commitment to retain control over Jewish HOLY SITES in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, including the Cave of the Patriarchs/AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON and Joseph's Tomb in NABLUS. Rabin introduced an additional key element of conditionality, linking Israel's further withdrawals from the Occupied Territories to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) and changing the Palestine National Covenant, the founding document, which does not recognize Israel. Rabin further declared, "No [Palestinian] detainee or PRISONER will be released unless he signs a commitment to obey the law, to not commit acts of TERRORISM and involvement in them." Hundreds remained in jail because they refused to sign.

Following the Israeli-PLO Accords, Rabin and King Husayn signed the Israel-Jordan peace treaty on 26 October 1994. On 4 November 1995, a Jewish fundamentalist, YIGAL AMIR, who was influenced by settler rabbis to believe it was against God's will to give away any portion of the biblical land Eretz Yisrael, assassinated Rabin. In considering Rabin's contributions, at the very least, he was a man of many contrapositions. Israeli analyst Gideon Levy pointed out many of these contradictions. Rabin waged war and made peace, issued commands to break the bones of

Palestinians, and sat with them at the negotiating table. He built settlements while condemning the settlers in scathing terms. He signed an accord with the PLO but refrained from evacuating even a single settlement. He deliberated with Arafat while expressing physical repugnance for him. He claimed to be ready to travel to Gush Etzion with a visa but did nothing to advance this issue. He was shocked by the massacre of twenty-nine Palestinians in Hebron carried out by Jewish settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN but was unwilling to evacuate the Hebron settlers.

When he refused to remove the Hebron settlers, Rabin revealed an important, if rarely mentioned, characteristic: although a statesman, he was somehow lacking in courage. Perhaps if he had evacuated the Hebron settlers then, when an excellent opportunity for this arose, he would have prevented the development of the leviathan that grew in the city and that has succeeded in driving tens of thousands of Palestinians from their homes. He also did not have the courage to put the evacuation of settlements, even from the Gaza Strip, on the Oslo agenda, despite his conviction that at least some of them should be evacuated. The decision to recognize the PLO and sign an agreement with it was a courageous act, but it came after years of refusing to deal with the Palestinian organization, years in which the settlement movement implanted itself in the Occupied Territories and in Israeli politics, and years of bloodshed and suffering on both sides.

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Rafah Crossing

The Rafah border crossing, between the GAZA STRIP and EGYPT, is Gaza's sole connection with the outside world not under direct Israeli control. In the context of Israel's CLOSURE of all other crossings from Gaza during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, Rafah became a vital window for Gaza residents seeking to enter or leave the Strip for Egypt or other parts of the world. During the periods that regular traffic through Rafah crossing was possible, tens of thousands of people traveled through it in both directions every month. However, beginning in June 2006, Israel, in cooperation with Egypt, kept the crossing closed 85 percent of the time, and after June 2007 it was permanently closed. Gazans wanting to travel abroad, access HEALTH CARE services unavailable in Gaza, seek opportunities for academic studies or employment abroad, end long separations of family members on either side of the border, or engage in commerce and business were increasingly unable to do so. The closure contributed to a humanitarian disaster in Gaza and a feeling among residents of the Gaza Strip that they are enclosed, isolated, and entrapped, resulting in severe psychological repercussions. The Gaza Strip is often referred to as the world's largest open-air prison and this characterization is not hyperbolic.

Historic Background

The Gaza Strip was created following the 1948 WAR; its BORDERS were determined in the ARMISTICE AGREEMENT between Israel and Egypt in 1949; and until 1967, it was under Egyptian administration. Under Cairo's control, entrance into Egypt for Palestinians in Gaza through the

Rafah border required a travel document, and this Egyptian document obliged its holder to have a visa to enter or transit Egypt.

After Israel occupied the Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli army declared the entire Strip a CLOSED MILITARY ZONE, whose residents could leave only with the approval of the district commander. In 1972, residents were given general exit PERMITS to Israel and the West Bank (a policy that remained in effect until 1991), although those who wished to travel abroad still had to acquire Israeli exit permits, which involved a protracted and tedious bureaucratic procedure. Israel denied many such requests for permits over the years based on individual or collective restrictions. Under the general exit permit system, Gazans wanting to journey abroad—subject to Israel's approval—could travel to al-Arish (approximately 30 miles [50 kilometers] from Gaza's border) in Israeli-occupied Egyptian Sinai, but only for "humanitarian reasons" and in coordination with the International Red Cross. Or they could pass through ERETZ CROSSING into Israel, and from there either travel through the Allenby Bridge between the West Bank and JORDAN or fly via Ben Gurion Airport. After signing a peace agreement with Egypt (1979) and withdrawing from the Sinai (1982), Israel opened Rafah Crossing on 25 April 1982, under the operation of the Israel Airports Authority (IAA), once again becoming the link between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.

In September 1991 the general exit permits, which had to be secured in advance, were canceled, and Israel imposed a much harsher, more restrictive policy on Gaza Strip residents under which they were required to ask for exit permits at the border crossing on their way abroad. (This requirement remained in effect until the implementation of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in September 2005.) Nevertheless, until the outbreak of the Second INTIFADA in late September 2000, Rafah was open twenty-four hours a day, almost every day, except for Yom Kippur (the Jewish Day of Atonement) and Eid al-Adha (the Muslim Festival of Sacrifice). During those years, between 1,200 and 1,500 Palestinians crossed through Rafah every day in both directions, and twice as many in the summer, when relatives from Arab countries came to visit the Gaza Strip.

In the first stage of the implementation of the OSLO ACCORDS, that is, GAZA-JERICHO Agreement I (the Cairo Agreement), signed in 1994 between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, which defined the transfer of powers from Israel to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in Gaza and Jericho, Rafah came under joint Israeli and Palestinian control. The agreement, however, left Israel with full security responsibility at the crossing and the power to prohibit the crossing of Palestinians not registered in the Population Registry or whom Israel deemed "security threats," as well as the right to interrogate or detain travelers. Simultaneous with the negotiation of Gaza-Jericho I, in 1994, Israel built a 36-mile [60-kilometer] BARRIER around the Gaza Strip composed of barbed-wire coils, an electronic fence, and two patrol roads. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) layered restrictions around the strip, including remote control machine guns, robotic jeeps, a double fence, ditches, and fifty cement pillboxes equipped with 50-caliber machine guns with laser sights that can be fired from Israeli control rooms equipped with monitors. Additionally, along the Egyptian border with Rafah, Israel erected a steel and concrete wall along the PHILADELPHI ROUTE, with several large armored posts across it.

Nevertheless, Rafah Crossing essentially continued to function in the same way it had in previous years. Despite the presence of Israeli and Palestinian security officers, a similar number of people continued to travel between the Gaza Strip and Egypt every day, although Israel persisted in restricting the exit of Palestinians traveling abroad as it saw fit—even though the agreement did not require a resident of the Strip to obtain a permit from Israel to go overseas. Moreover, as with the Israeli practice before the Oslo Accords, residents did not know that Israel had classified them as "denied permission to go abroad" for security reasons until their arrival at the border.

From the Outbreak of the Intifada (2000) until the Disengagement (2005). With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, Israel began closing Rafah Crossing periodically. Meanwhile, it prevented the residents of Gaza from going abroad by other means and drastically restricted their access to Israel and the West Bank. On 17 January 2001, Israel completely took over Rafah Crossing and forbade the entrance of the Palestinian border terminal staff. The longest initial period of closure ran from December 2004 to January 2005, following an incident in which

Palestinians killed five Israeli soldiers and injured another five by blowing up a tunnel dug under an Israeli sentry position at the crossing. Rafah Crossing remained closed for forty days for entry and fifty-two days for exit, preventing the passage of tens of thousands of Palestinians who were accustomed to crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. On the days that it was open, Rafah Crossing usually operated for only seven hours, compared to the previous twenty-four hours a day. Israel defined tens of thousands of residents of the Gaza Strip as "denied permission to go abroad for security reasons" and imposed collective restrictions for varying lengths of time according to age and family status. Israel forbade the passage through Rafah of people aged sixteen through thirty-five, including the sick, for four and a half months in 2003, as well as for ten months from April 2004 to February 2005. With few exceptions, Egypt also made the terms of entrance into its territory stricter and in the years of the Intifada required all residents of the Gaza Strip to obtain entrance visas to Egypt, a requirement previously applied only to men under the age of forty. The frequent closure of Rafah Crossing, the reduction of its hours of opening, and the restrictions imposed on those passing through it greatly extended the waiting time for travelers, which could last for a number of days or even weeks. Likewise, the number of Gaza Strip residents who managed to travel abroad through Rafah Crossing dropped significantly. According to IAA figures for the years 2001–2004, the average number of passengers per day was 590, meaning there was a 54 percent decrease from the 1,300 passengers who had traveled through previously.

After Israel's Disengagement and the Agreement on Movement and Access Principles for Rafah Crossing. In August and September 2005, Israel removed all its SETTLEMENTS and military installations from Gaza, and the IAA pulled out of the Rafah terminal. This, however, was a unilateral action; Tel Aviv had not consulted with the PNA about the operation. On 7 September 2005, Israel and Egypt closed Rafah. It remained almost completely closed for two months (12 September–15 November 2005), during which time Egypt and the PNA, in coordination with Israel, opened the crossing for only five full days and six half days. On those days only a limited number of Palestinians traveled through Rafah, and thousands of Palestinians seeking to return to their homes or to leave the strip were stranded on either side of the crossing.

On 15 November 2005, Israel and the PNA signed the "Agreement on Movement and Access Principles for Rafah Crossing" (AMA), mediated by the United States and the EUROPEAN UNION (EU) and with the tacit approval of Egypt. The AMA involved, among other things, agreed-upon principles for the operation of Rafah Crossing. The professed goal of the agreement was "to promote economic development" and to "improve the humanitarian situation on the ground." US secretary of state CONDOLEEZZA RICE, who played a leading role in the negotiations that led to the agreement, said at a press conference after it was signed that "the agreement is meant to give the Palestinian people freedom to move, trade, live normal lives. . . . For the first time since 1967, Palestinians will gain control over entry and exit from their territory." Javier Solana, the EU representative on the negotiating team, declared, "This is the first time that a border is open and not controlled by Israelis." The agreement stated, "Rafah will be operated by the Palestinian Authority on its side, and Egypt on its side, according to international standards." However, Israel added an important caveat: "The PNA should operate the Palestinian side of the border under the supervision of an EU force." A World Bank document, meant to clarify the language of the AMA, stated that one of the three principles guiding the agreement is the continuous operation of the crossings. "GOI [Government of Israel] has clarified that it will not close a passage due to a security incident unconnected with the passage itself. . . . A passage will only be closed if there is a clear and direct threat to that specific passage."

Rafah Crossing was opened on 26 November 2005 under the new arrangement as agreed in the AMA, but an examination of the implementation of the agreement in practice and over time shows that, contrary to the declarations, the agreement did not allow the Palestinians independent control of exit from and entrance into their territory. The principle of the continuous operation of the crossing was not honored, and the crossing was closed frequently by Israel unrelated to incidents threatening the crossing itself. The implementation of the AMA signaled the end of Israel's military presence at Rafah Crossing, but not the end of its substantive domination over the crossing. Israel continued to exercise authority through its control

of the Palestinian Population Registry, which determines who is allowed to go through Rafah Crossing, its power to prevent the passage even of Palestinians listed in the Population Registry on security grounds, the right to veto the passage of foreigners, and its ability to decide to close the crossing at its will. In actuality, Israel's involvement in the border crossing emerges from the provisions of the agreement itself, which states that crossing through Rafah is limited to holders of Palestinian IDENTITY CARDS, namely Palestinians registered in the Palestinian Population Registry, a provision that includes both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a registry whose updating still requires Israel's permission. This requirement means that a decision by Israel not to register a Palestinian as a resident of the Gaza Strip or the West Bank denies him or her the right to exit or enter the Gaza Strip through the crossing. Moreover, even though the AMA does not say so explicitly, both parties—Israeli and Palestinian—have interpreted it as allowing Israel to veto the passage of registered Palestinians who it claims are "terror operatives." According to the AMA, foreign nationals, including Palestinians who previously resided in the Gaza Strip or whose relatives hold Palestinian identity cards, are not allowed to enter the Strip through Rafah at all, and therefore need to receive entrance visas to Israel and permits to enter the Gaza Strip through Eretz Crossing. The agreement lists exceptional categories of foreigners allowed to enter the strip through Rafah Crossing: diplomats, foreign investors, employees of international organizations, and humanitarian cases. According to the language of the agreement, the PNA must inform Israel of any such travelers in advance, Israel must explain any objection to their passage, and the PNA must inform Israel of its decision.

Israel's supervision of the travelers at Rafah is carried out from a control room located a few kilometers south at the Kerem Shalom Crossing, under full Israeli control, near the "three borders" point between Israel, Egypt, and the Gaza Strip. In the control room, Israeli security officers, European inspectors, and Palestinian representatives observe the activity at Rafah Crossing through some thirty closed-circuit video cameras. The Israeli representatives can monitor the identities of those wishing to enter or exit the Gaza Strip by looking up information about them in computerized databases. The operation of the control room by Israeli security officers, the presence of EU monitors at Rafah Crossing, and the presence of PNA representatives are conditions for its opening. Therefore, Israel has the de facto power to prevent the opening of the crossing by not operating the Israeli control room or by controlling the arrival of the European team to the crossing. Technically Israel can prevent the European monitors, who live in the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon, from reaching Rafah Crossing because to get there they have to travel through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, which is in Israeli territory and under complete Israeli control. To prevent the monitors from reaching the crossing, all Israel has to do is inform the European team that the crossing is closed. That is because the European force interprets the AMA to commission the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) authority to oversee the crossing on the participation of both parties to the agreement: Israel and the PNA.

The Passage of Goods through Rafah. After the Gaza-Jericho I accord was signed in 1994, Rafah Crossing began to serve as a terminal for the import of goods as well as the travel of persons, and every month hundreds of trucks entered the Gaza Strip through the crossing, carrying raw materials for construction, food, clothing, medicine, electrical appliances, and other merchandise from various countries. With the outbreak of the Intifada, Israel increasingly restricted the passage of vehicles through the Rafah terminal, allowing only pedestrian traffic. In the first year of the Intifada the freight terminal at Rafah was closed more than 70 percent of the time. The number of trucks passing through Rafah dropped from 5,122 per month in 2000 to only 405 in 2001. In the following years, the number rose gradually, and by 2004 more than 8,600 trucks entered Rafah Crossing. However, Israel prevented all imports through Rafah in September 2005 and thereafter as part of the implementation of the disengagement plan.

Moreover, the November 2005 AMA agreement between Israel and the PNA forbade the entry of merchandise into the Gaza Strip through Rafah Crossing beyond personal effects, thereby preventing the possibility of importing goods such as cement, generators, or other machinery and materials for INFRASTRUCTURE repair and functioning. According to the agreement, import to the Gaza Strip should take place through the Kerem Shalom Crossing, which, as noted, is located inside Israel and is under its direct control. The agreement allowed the use of Rafah Crossing to export goods

to Egypt, but arrangements were not established to make that possible. The prohibition on imports through Rafah Crossing also created difficulty for export through it, because Israel demanded that a Palestinian truck loaded with merchandise could leave Gaza through Rafah as part of the AMA, but could not return via Rafah even if empty. Thus, both exports and imports gradually ceased to pass through Rafah.

In the first seven months of AMA implementation, from 25 November 2005 to 24 June 2006, Rafah Crossing operated regularly. During those months, the crossing was open every day for an average of more than 9.5 hours. Every day an average of 1,320 people crossed in both directions, similar to the number of passengers through Rafah Crossing before the imposition of the Intifada restrictions. However, on 25 June 2006, Palestinian militants attacked an Israeli military outpost at Kerem Shalom and captured Israeli soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit. That day Israel ordered Rafah Crossing closed. Thereafter, Israel stopped implementing the AMA and mostly kept the crossing closed. Israel told the European force that security risks precluded opening it; however, comments by senior Israeli security officials revealed that it was a political decision intended to pressure the residents of the Gaza Strip and their leadership to release the captured soldier.

The Israeli Defense Ministry officially declared that Rafah Crossing was "closed to continuous operation, . . . [but will be] open periodically, mainly for humanitarian traffic." However, once Rafah was closed for regular traffic, the joint committee that was supposed to discuss exceptional requests for the passage of foreigners also stopped meeting. On the few occasions when Israel allowed the crossing to open, it was done ad hoc and without sufficient prior notice to residents. Sometimes the crossing opened for a few hours and only in one direction, sometimes only in the other direction. This situation, according to Noga Kadman from Gisha, the Israeli Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, "caused an extreme and dangerous situation of overload, crowding and congestion at the border crossing by Gaza residents wishing to travel." On 8 March 2007, for example, word spread throughout the Gaza Strip that Rafah would open and thousands of Palestinians crowded into the Rafah terminal in an attempt to leave to Egypt. An old man was crushed to death and nine residents were injured by the pushing of the crowds and shooting by Palestinian security forces who were trying to restore order. Because of the incident, Israel closed the crossing after only one and a half hours of activity, leaving thousands of residents stranded. Among those waiting were dozens of patients who had been referred for medical treatment in Egypt, and at least some of them never managed to get out.

In practice, it was Israel that made the final decisions and had the power to prevent the entry of foreigners through Rafah Crossing, even when they belonged to one of the categories of foreigners allowed to cross, for example representatives of international NGOs. Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) declared that "requests for the passage of foreigners who do not carry Palestinian documents are subject to the approval of the Israeli side after being approved by the Palestinian side." According to representatives of EUBAM at the crossing, a joint committee is supposed to decide on the exceptional passage of foreigners, but it is Israel that decides what constitutes a humanitarian case for the purpose of such passage.

Rafah Crossing Shuts Down, Closure Tightens. In the ELECTIONS for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006, the HAMAS movement won a majority of the seats. Movement leader ISMAIL HANIYEH became prime minister of the new Palestinian government, most of whose ministers came from the ranks of Hamas. FATAH continued holding junior positions in the cabinet ministries and retained the authority to coordinate with Israel, including regarding the crossings into the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Fatah leader MAHMUD ABBAS continued to serve as president of the PNA, and the security apparatus of the PNA's PRESIDENTIAL GUARD continued to operate at the crossing points between the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and Israel. After the elections, Israel and the United States reiterated their declarations that Hamas was a terrorist organization and that their policy was to abstain from contact with it. The United States and the EU froze their aid to the Hamas-controlled PNA, and Israel refused to transfer the customs money it had collected that belonged to the PNA. The ongoing power struggles between Fatah and Hamas forces led to acts of violence between the two movements in the Gaza Strip, even after the MECCA AGREEMENT and the creation of a national unity government in March 2007. The clashes reached a peak during

9–15 June 2007 with a wave of fighting in the Gaza Strip in which 188 Palestinians were killed and 840 were wounded. On 15 June, the fighting ended with Hamas taking over the Gaza Strip and seizing its internal government. Fatah-PNA members were gradually pushed out of their positions of power in the cabinet ministries, in the security apparatuses, and at the border crossings. Hamas members replaced them in all positions, with the exception of low-level Fatah officials who continued to staff positions related to coordination with Israel, such as the Civil Affairs Committee.

On 10 June 2007, Israel froze implementation of the AMA and simultaneously tightened the closure of all the land crossings between the Gaza Strip and the outside world. Tel Aviv claimed that there was no legitimate party on the Palestinian side to take responsibility for operating the various border crossings and that terrorist threats against the crossings had increased, endangering those operating them. In the eleven and a half months between the capture of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006 and 10 June 2007, Rafah Crossing was closed for 265 days, or approximately 76 percent of the time. During those months 163,632 people crossed the border in both directions, averaging 468 people a day—35 percent of the number during the time it operated regularly after the disengagement, when an average of 1,320 people per day crossed in both directions. The figure 1,320 indicates the actual demand for crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt and results in an estimate that the closures of the crossing between June 2006 and June 2007 prevented, on average, 852 people from exiting and entering the Gaza Strip every day. In fact, on most days during this period not one person passed through Rafah Crossing because it was rarely open. The inability to predict when it would open made it difficult to plan travel from Gaza in advance and required many residents to wait for days and weeks on the Egyptian side of the border on their way home to the Gaza Strip.

Along with the sweeping prohibition against passage of travelers after the Hamas coup, Israel severely restricted the transfer of goods (e.g., KARNI CROSSING, the main transit point for goods, was closed), upon which the economy and society of the Gaza Strip depend. The main consequence of those developments was a drastic reduction in supplies of food, medicine, fuel, flour, and cooking oil—the essentials of daily existence—resulting in a major humanitarian crisis.

Rafah Crossing, which opened for the last time on 9 June 2007 after being closed for most of the previous year, was thereafter completely closed to regular traffic. The PNA's (Fatah) Presidential Guard, the force that until that time had operated the Palestinian side of the crossing, was pushed out of its position following the Hamas takeover. Therefore, according to Israel, the PNA could no longer carry out its part of the AMA. Egypt closed the border because of its inability to continue operating it in the absence of PNA representatives, even though Hamas guards took over from the Presidential Guard. Israel demanded a total closure of Rafah (over which it claimed to have no control) since stipulations in the AMA were no longer in effect. On 15 June the European force in charge of the border crossing announced it was suspending its activity because of the EU policy of abstaining from contact with Hamas. Yet despite the closure of Rafah, all of the parties involved in the AMA—the PNA and Israel, which were signatories to it; the EU, which constitutes a third party; the United States, which mediated it; and Egypt, which participated in the discussions that preceded it—continued to treat the agreement as valid and as the basis for reopening the crossing. The mandate of the European force, whose job it is to monitor traffic through Rafah according to the AMA, continued to be renewed periodically. Their mandate is in effect as of mid-2009 even though, since June 2007, just a small team of European monitors has been staying in the Israeli city of Ashkelon, awaiting renewed implementation of the agreement.

To counteract Israel's total boycott of the Gaza Strip, Hamas dug hundreds of tunnels from Gazan Rafah to Egyptian Rafah through which most of the necessities of life were transported. Israel, claiming that weapons were being smuggled through the tunnels, relentlessly bombed them, but Hamas just as relentlessly kept digging them. Without them the humanitarian crisis would have been far worse than it was.

An Exception to the Closure. In December 2007, Egypt and Hamas cooperated in the passage through Rafah of pilgrims from Gaza to SAUDI ARABIA for the Hajj, a yearly holy event when Muslim pilgrims from all over the world travel to Mecca and Medina. Egypt, in coordination with the Hamas government and based on lists supplied by the latter, allowed 2,200 Palestinians to leave the Gaza Strip through Rafah, crossing to Sinai and

from there to Saudi Arabia. This was done without coordination with the PNA or Israel. Nor was there any Israeli supervision of the passengers. While the event passed smoothly, it created tension between Israel and Egypt, and increased hostility between the PNA and Hamas. European observers were not present because the crossing was, in theory, closed. However, at the end of December, in anticipation of the return of the pilgrims who exited through Rafah, Israel demanded that they return to Gaza only through an Israeli-controlled crossing, and Egypt agreed. The pilgrims, however, protested fiercely, burning tents and vandalizing property in the temporary camps built for them in Al-Arish, Egypt, and refused to undergo Israeli inspection. Ultimately, Egypt allowed the returnees to cross through Rafah, which they did on 2 January 2008, while Israeli officials declared that this contradicted the understandings between the countries.

The Breach of the Gaza-Egypt Border by Hamas. After the return of the pilgrims, Rafah Crossing remained closed, while the needs of the residents of the Gaza Strip to leave—to obtain food, medicine, and other basic goods unavailable in Gaza as a result of Israel's blockade—became more pressing. In mid-January 2008 there was an escalation in fighting between Hamas forces and other militants in the Gaza Strip. Following the clashes on 18 January, Israel hermetically closed the border crossings from Israel to the Gaza Strip and, for the next four days, cut the Gaza Strip off completely from any supplies. The Gaza power plant shut down two days later because Israel prevented the supply of industrial diesel, on which it depends for operation. The duration of ensuing power outages, frequent even prior to the border closure, extended to twelve hours a day in some parts of the Gaza Strip. The electricity shortage prevented the supply of running water to at least 40 percent of the residents of the Gaza Strip and escalated the collapse of the sewage system, leading to the dumping of untreated sewage water into the Mediterranean Sea. On 22 January, Israel somewhat eased the stranglehold on the Strip but still allowed only a very limited entry of goods. According to sources in the Israeli defense establishment, the border crossings would be open henceforth only for the transfer of a minimal amount of goods and aid to prevent a humanitarian disaster and to curb international criticism of Israel.

Early the following morning (23 January), Hamas militants blew up most of the 12-kilometer (7.5-mile) wall separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt. At dawn, residents from all over Gaza began swarming toward the breached barrier and into Egypt. While no exact number is available, various estimates suggest that as many as a hundred thousand residents crossed the border. The masses stocked up on food, medicine, cigarettes, oil, and many other goods that were severely lacking in the Strip, or whose prices had risen sharply because of the closure. The Egyptian forces let the Palestinians enter Egyptian territory up to Egyptian Rafah and al-Arish, but prevented them from continuing into the Sinai and Egypt proper, excepting a small number of people who were allowed to go to the Cairo airport. The media said that Egyptian president HOSNI MUBARAK instructed the Egyptian security forces to let the Palestinians come in and buy food because they were hungry. Meanwhile, Israel pressured Egypt to close the border crossing: Israel said it "expects the Egyptians to solve the problem," and the US administration expressed its concern that "Hamas would take advantage of the situation." On 3 February, twelve days after the border was breached, Hamas and Egyptian security forces closed the border together following Egypt's request.

Rafah Crossing remained closed through the end of 2008 and into 2009, including throughout Israel's OPERATION CAST LEAD in Gaza. Thereafter, despite the carnage of Operation Cast Lead, Egypt opened the border only sporadically, usually for no more than two or three days a month, and carefully monitored who could enter Egypt—usually only the very ill who had doctors' certificates. In the words of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in August 2009, "The passage of people into and out of Gaza remains strictly limited, only those classified as medical or humanitarian cases can cross via Rafah with special authorization by the Palestinian authorities in Gaza and Egyptian authorities."

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; EGYPT; ERETZ CROSSING; GAZA STRIP; ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; KARNI CROSSING; OPERATION CAST LEAD; OPERATION RAINBOW; PHILADELPHI ROUTE; TERRORISM

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Rafi

Rafi (Reshimat Po'alei Yisrael, or Israel Workers' List) was a political party founded in July 1965 by Israel's first prime minister, DAVID BEN-GURION, and seven other Knesset members. The founders of Rafi seceded from the MAPAI labor party because of dissension created by the controversy over the LAVON AFFAIR, a failed Israeli covert operation in EGYPT. Rafi advocated Israeli self-reliance in matters of national security, peace with neighboring countries through overwhelming strength, electoral reform, and several other domestic issues.

During 1965, Rafi offered its own slate in the HISTADRUT (labor federation), Knesset, and municipal elections and received 12.1 percent of the vote in the Histadrut and 9.7 percent in the Knesset, which gave it ten seats. In the municipal elections in JERUSALEM, Rafi's candidate, TEDDY KOLLEK, was elected mayor. Rafi remained in opposition to the government until the eve of the 1967 WAR, when it entered a government of national unity, and one of its members, MOSHE DAYAN, became minister of defense. In January 1968, Rafi rejoined Mapai and together with AHDUT HA'AVODAH formed the Israel LABOR PARTY. Ben-Gurion declined to participate and formed a party of his own (Reshima Mamlakhtit, or State List), which in 1973 merged with the LIKUD PARTY.

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Rajub, Jibril (1953–)

Jibril Rajub was PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT's national security adviser and headed the Preventive Security Service (PSS) in the WEST BANK. He retains considerable influence in both the PSS and the Tanzim, the FATAH-organized military force. Rajub was considered close to PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY president MAHMUD ABBAS (Abu Mazen) until Abbas chose MUHAMMAD DAHLAN, Rajub's sworn rival, as minister of security.

Rajub was born to a prominent agricultural and landowning family in Dura near HEBRON, in the West Bank, which remains the geographical base of his support. At fifteen, he was given a life sentence in prison for throwing a grenade at an ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) convoy. He spent seventeen years in Israeli prisons (1968–1985), where he learned fluent Hebrew and English and translated into Arabic former prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN's *The Revolt*. In 1985 Rajub was released as part of a PRISONER exchange, but in 1988 he was deported from the West Bank to LEBANON in the context of the First INTIFADA. After a short stay, he left Lebanon and moved to TUNIS, where he served as adviser on the Intifada to Fatah deputy leader KHALIL AL-WAZIR. After Israel assassinated al-Wazir, Rajub became a close lieutenant of Arafat and spent seven years in exile with him.

Rajub returned to the West Bank in 1994, following the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS between Israel and the PLO. In May, Arafat appointed him West Bank preventive security chief for the PNA, based in newly autonomous JERICHO. Rajub kept his preventive force from participating in anti-Israeli activity, using it generally as a tool for building up the PNA and defending its institutions from the growing influence of the Islamists. He soon shifted away from the OLD GUARD Tunisian leadership and began to develop his own power base. Rajub became more closely allied with the YOUNG GUARD Fatah leaders in the territories, cultivating close ties with the West Bank Tanzim chief MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI (with whom he once shared a prison cell in Beersheba jail) and other local leaders. As his power grew, so did his use of repression and involvement in corruption. In a 1997 Palestinian Legislative Council report on corruption, he was criticized for profiting from the PNA's oil-importation monopoly in the West Bank. On the Palestinian streets, Rajub was more feared than popular because he used the PSS (including the use of torture) to quash dissent and harass political opponents critical of the Arafat regime and the PNA.

Rajub is viewed as a pragmatist concerning relations with Israel, advocating a TWO-STATE SOLUTION and peaceful coexistence. He clamped down hard on HAMAS and the Palestinian ISLAMIC JIHAD in 1996–1997 to keep them from undermining the influence of PNA institutions and because he opposed their attacks on Israeli civilians, which he believed undermined rather than strengthened the Palestinian national cause.

Throughout the years of the Oslo Accords, Rajub publicly criticized the rising influence of religious fundamentalism in Palestinian society and schools. Following a 3 April 2002 attack by the IDF during OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD on Rajub's headquarters in the West Bank, he escaped but surrendered some fifty Islamists inside the building to Israel in a deal brokered by the US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA). Rajub lost considerable respect for saving himself by "betraying" others and was widely condemned for it—and not only by the Islamists.

When the AL-AQSA INTIFADA began in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, Rajub kept the Palestinian security forces from attacking Israeli targets. It was therefore a cause of some surprise when he was wounded in an IDF tank and helicopter attack on his home on 20 May 2001. The Israeli government offered conflicting explanations for the attack, which was widely regarded as a shift in Israeli policy from not hitting those who did not take an active role in the Intifada. Despite the attack, Rajub's distrust of Islamist organizations has won him favor in Washington and Tel Aviv. He also has long-standing and very close ties to the CIA and with Israeli security officials. In May 2002, US officials urged Arafat to unify the various PNA security agencies into a single organization under the control of Rajub. Arafat responded by firing Rajub on 2 July 2002. Although he refused for two days to go and protests were organized in his support in Hebron, Rajub eventually accepted the decision.

When Abbas was elected PNA president on 9 January 2005, he appointed Rajub as his national security adviser, but relations between the two men have been stormy. Subsequent to Hamas's landslide victory in the January 2006 elections in Gaza and the West Bank, Rajub (and Muhammad

Dahlan as well) led armed demonstrations by Fatah supporters in Gaza and the West Bank against Hamas and also called for the resignation of Abbas and the Fatah Central Committee. Some saw this as a crass power grab by Rajub (and Dahlan). In a none-too-oblique reference to Rajub and Dahlan, the AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES criticized the organizers of the demonstrations as "ones who spread corruption and greatly contributed to the humiliating Fatah defeat." Rajub has been accused of fomenting a civil war between Hamas and groups loyal to him. Many Palestinians view Rajub as an Israeli collaborator, and some of his longtime supporters have left his force.

At Fatah's sixth convention, held in BETHLEHEM in August 2009, Rajub was elected to the eighteen-member ruling Central Committee.

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Rakah Party

Rakah (Reshima Komunistit Hadasha, or New Communist List) is a communist political party in Israel and forms part of the political alliance known as HADASH. In 1965, Rakah split from Israel's traditional communist party (MAKI) into a pro-Palestinian faction led by Tawfik Toubi and Meir Vilner. Before the 1977 elections, Rakah joined with other left-wing and Israeli Arab parties to form Hadash. In the meantime, the original Maki had disappeared after merging into RATZ in 1981. In 1989, members of Rakah decided to change the party's name to Maki to reflect its status as the only officially communist party in Israel. The party remains to this day the leading force in Hadash, which usually gets about three seats in the Knesset.

After the 1965 split, the SOVIET UNION recognized Rakah as the "official" communist party of Israel, rather than the traditional Maki. The 1965 elections saw the new party, which was non-Zionist and opposed to the 1967 WAR, win three seats, comprehensively beating Maki, which had slumped to just one. In the 1969 elections, Rakah again won three seats. By the late 1960s, Rakah had become a party of mostly Palestinian communists and had increased its strength significantly among the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL. Its popularity was evident in the 1973 elections, when it won four Knesset seats. After the 1965 split from Maki, Rakah not only increased its share of the Arab vote but also became the single most powerful political force among the Israeli Palestinians.

The first real test of Arab political mobilization with communist backing came about in March 1976 when Palestinians organized a general strike in opposition to Israel's continued confiscation of Arab LANDS. This was not the first LAND DAY demonstration, but because of communist involvement, it was much better organized and had far broader participation. It also involved a change of tactics for the Palestinians that entailed a direct confrontation with the Israeli authorities. In the demonstrations, six Palestinians were killed and some 100 injured. In its aftermath, Rakah emerged as an even stronger institution around which Palestinians could mobilize.

After Land Day, Palestinians saw Rakah as the most important organization working for equality in the social, political, and economic status of Arabs and Jews. It became the single largest party in the Arab sector, despite government warnings to the Arabs not to vote for the communists. Although some Arab communists did not join the party, all saw Rakah as a vehicle for Arab political mobilization in the struggle for equality with the Jewish majority. Rakah was strongest among the GREEK ORTHODOX Christian Arabs from the northern urban areas, while it was weak in the rural areas, mainly because of the Palestinians' attachment to their traditional leaders and social structure and to Islam. Those leaders believed that, in order to assimilate into society and politics, they had to cooperate with the ruling Zionist political parties whose dispensation of patronage was a significant factor in their positions. The small and medium-sized villages, where the local traditional leaders were strong, tried to maintain good relations with the military government, which pressured them not to let the communists gain influence among the rural Arab population.

Rakah attempted to expand its support by incorporating Arab nationalism into its ideology.

Thus, the party attempted to ally itself with Arab national organizations and to champion Arab causes of equality in social and political activities. Some Arab urban dwellers, mostly educated, saw the link as a possible vehicle for Palestinians to reach their goals. Meanwhile, in the early 1970s the party did garner support from some Arab rural men who worked in the cities. Additionally, Rakah helped Arab students lobby for a better educational curriculum, which stressed Arab literature and culture and deemphasized the Zionist and Hebrew culture taught in Arab schools. Rakah also provided Arab high school graduates scholarships to universities in communist bloc countries. In return, these students stayed loyal to the Rakah and evidenced their support at election time, even though some did not support the communist ideology. In addition to the students, their parents typically voted for Rakah in most elections. The 1989 change in the party's name from Rakah to Maki did not affect its support or standing. It remains the leading force in Hadash, which won four seats in the 2010 election.

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Ramadan War

See OCTOBER WAR

Ramla

The administrative capital of Palestine in the eighth century, Ramla was the site of a mass expulsion of its Arab residents by Israel during the 1948 WAR. Out of a population of more than 15,000, only about 400 inhabitants remained. The city, now located in Israel, was founded in 716 CE by the Umayyad caliph Sulayman ibn 'Abd al-Malik, who made it the Palestinian capital, replacing LYDDA, until the arrival of the First Crusade in 1099. The caliph fortified the city and built public buildings, gardens, and the mosque complex of Al-Jami al-Abyad (the White Mosque). The complex's minaret, known as the White Tower, begun by the MAMLUK sultan Baybars in the thirteenth century and completed a century later, remains standing today. Near the tower is the tomb of a venerated Muslim prophet, Nabi Salih, who lived before the Prophet Muhammad.

Located on the coastal plain a few miles southeast of JAFFA, the city maintained a prominent strategic position at the crossroads of the main caravan route connecting Damascus, Baghdad, and EGYPT. Ramla became a thriving administrative and commercial center and during this period had a flourishing dye industry that exported its products throughout the Arab world.

A coin mint was also established there. After the First Crusade, Ramla became a dominion of the Kingdom of JERUSALEM, but much of the original city was later destroyed by BEDOUIN raids and earthquakes. In 1187 the Muslim leader SALADIN captured the city. Under the rule of the Mamluk sultan Baybars (1260–1277), Ramla revived and became an important commercial center, provincial capital, and the largest town in Palestine.

CHRISTIANITY was always present in Ramla as well. In 1296 a Franciscan community was established there that maintained a hospice for pilgrims traveling from Jaffa to Jerusalem. Another Franciscan monastery was built in 1750 but was deserted in 1948.

At the start of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, the town was in decline but continued as a market center for the region. In the nineteenth century, Ramla, situated in the midst of large olive plantations and orange groves, was a center for agricultural production and one of the main areas of soap production. A carriage road, built in the 1860s, increased travel, and the inauguration of the Jaffa-Ramla-Jerusalem railroad in 1892 further increased the town's importance. According to Ottoman records, in 1548, Ramla's population consisted of 528 Muslim and eighty-two Christian households. Little change in this size or composition of the population occurred until late in the nineteenth century, when a period of expansion began. During the BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948), the population grew steadily, increasing to about 12,000 Muslims and 3,000 Christians in 1944. Until 1948, there were very few Jewish inhabitants. In the 1947 Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181), the UNITED NATIONS designated Ramla as part of the Palestinian state.

During the 1948 War, Ramla's geographic location (on the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road) made it an extremely desirable Zionist target. On 12 July 1948, Ramla fell with almost no resistance as part of Operation Dani. Even after its surrender and the flight of many of its Palestinian residents, Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION gave the order to expel the remaining inhabitants of Ramla "toward the lines of territory held by the Arab Legion"—that is, the West Bank. YITZHAK RABIN, who was a commander in the HAGANA, the underground military organization, wrote that he agreed with Ben-Gurion's order to expel the Arabs of Ramla. The expulsions from Ramla began en masse on 13 July and continued for three days. The city's Arab residents who had surrendered without incident were put on buses and driven to the front lines of the fighting, where they were ordered to walk; most trekked to the Jordanian-occupied WEST BANK in the blazing summer heat. Of the 400 inhabitants who remained, most were either Christian or had had prior dealings with Jews. Some thirty villages in the Ramla District were also depopulated and destroyed. In November 1948, the Israeli government began to use the nearly depopulated town as a source of housing for Jewish immigrants. By February 1949 the Jewish population had exceeded 6,000.

According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2004 there were 63,462 people living in Ramla, 16 percent Muslim and 4 percent Christian. In 2006, 12,000 immigrants from the SOVIET UNION were settled in Ramla, and 5,000 Ethiopians immigrated there.

See also IMMIGRATION; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; WAR, 1948

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—Betsy Folkins

Rantisi, Abd al-Aziz (1947–2004)

Abd al-Aziz Rantisi was a physician, Islamic activist, and cofounder and principal spokesperson for HAMAS, the militant Islamic organization. A pediatrician by training, Dr. al-Rantisi was a popular figure in the GAZA STRIP who defended any means that would force Israeli troops and settlers to leave Palestine. Born in Yibna, a village southwest of RAMLA, Palestine, his family was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and fled to Gaza, where Rantisi grew up in Khan Yunis REFUGEE camp amid extreme poverty. For four years, he lived with his parents, eight brothers, and two sisters in a tent; his family then moved into an abandoned

school building, where they remained until the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) provided them with a house. In 1965 Rantisi attended UNRWA secondary school in Khan Yunis and graduated at the top of his class. At that time, Egypt offered university education to exceptional Gazan students who were too poor to pay tuition, and that fall Rantisi began studying pediatric medicine at the University of Alexandria. There he ran into a familiar face, Shaykh Mahmoud Eid, who had been imam of the mosque in Khan Yunis. Eid introduced him to the Muslim Brotherhood and its belief that native Islam, not Egyptian president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's imported socialist-based pan-Arabism, would solve the problems of the Arab world. As a philosophy, Islamism had a great appeal for Egyptian students after Nasir's defeat in the 1967 War with Israel.

After Rantisi completed his degree in 1972, he returned to Gaza, where, a year later, he founded the Gaza Islamic Centre. By this time, Gaza was under Israeli Occupation, and its refugee camps provided thousands of recruits for Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, while anarchy ruled on the streets, with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) activists targeting Israeli soldiers and local Palestinian collaborators. In 1974 Rantisi returned to Alexandria for a two-year master's program in pediatrics. On his return to Gaza in 1976, he formally joined the Muslim Brotherhood and took up an internship at Nasser Hospital, the main medical facility in Khan Yunis refugee camp. (In 1983, Israel dismissed him as the head of pediatrics.) He also joined the faculty of science at the Islamic University of Gaza on its opening in 1978.

In 1986 Rantisi began to organize the Muslim bloc in student council elections at the Islamic University, and Islamists won 80 percent of the vote. That same year, he launched a bloody (and largely successful) campaign to rid the university of the PLO because the organization was not staunchly Islamist. The movement carried out organized attacks on the PLO and purged the school of its supporters, although not all Islamists supported his policy of confrontation with the PLO. In January 1988, Israel arrested Rantisi and accused him of authoring Hamas's street pamphlets, which incited support for the Intifada. He was sentenced to two and a half years, and after Israel released him, on 4 September 1990, he effectively led Hamas (with Mahmoud A-Zahhar) until being arrested again for incitement in November 1990. After serving a twelve-month sentence, Rantisi represented Hamas in the July 1992 reconciliation accord that ended Palestinian infighting in the Gaza Strip.

In December 1992, after Hamas killed six Israeli soldiers in one week, Israel responded by expelling 416 alleged Islamists to Marj al-Zuhur in South Lebanon, including Rantisi, who acted as spokesperson for the deportees. On his return, Rantisi was rearrested by Israel (in December 1993) and held until April 1997. In April 1998, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) arrested Rantisi after he called for the resignation of its leaders, whom he accused of collaborating with Israel in killing a Hamas militant. The PNA held him in custody without trial for twenty months, and he was arrested again in July 2000 after calling the Palestinian participation in the Camp David Summit an act of treason; he was released in December 2000. Intermittently rearrested, Rantisi nevertheless continued his public opposition of the PNA, which eventually led to his house arrest. Rantisi initially opposed the June 2003 *hudna* (truce), one of the Phase One obligations of the US-backed Road Map peace plan, although Hamas eventually joined it. Rantisi subsequently defended the *hudna* as a means of preventing the United States from forcing the PNA into a civil war with Hamas.

On 10 June 2003, Rantisi survived an Israeli assassination attempt that killed two bystanders and left twenty-seven wounded (including one of Rantisi's sons, who was paralyzed). Although wounded from shrapnel in the chest and leg, Rantisi vowed from his hospital bed that Hamas would "not leave one Jew in Palestine." Coming less than a week after the Aqaba summit that launched the Road Map, the attempt on Rantisi's life caused considerable consternation, even in Washington.

Following the assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin on 22 March 2004, Rantisi was appointed head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. He knew he was a marked man as soon as he took office but declined to go underground and was philosophical about the prospect of assassination: "It's death whether by killing or by cancer; it's the same thing," he said the day after he was chosen Hamas leader. "Nothing will change if it's an Apache [helicopter] or cardiac

arrest. But I prefer to be killed by Apache." Rantisi was assassinated in an Israeli helicopter missile strike as he returned from a clandestine visit to his family on 17 April 2004.

See also HAMAS

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Ras al-Amud

Ras al-Amud is a Palestinian neighborhood in East JERUSALEM that has been the target of intense colonization efforts by ATERET COHANIM, Nahalat Shimon International, Miami millionaire IRVING MOSKOWITZ, and others. Like other Palestinian neighborhoods, such as SILWAN, A TUR, and SHAYK JARRAH, Ras al-Amud is part of the larger plan for the Judaization of all of East Jerusalem. As of August 2009, Ras al-Amud had two settler colonies: Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim (Olive Heights) Phase 1 (inhabited) with fifty families (some 250 people) and Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim Phase 2 with sixty housing units nearly completed. These two settlements cover an area of some 14.5 dunums or approximately 4 acres, consisting (besides the apartments) of a commercial center, synagogue, kindergarten, clinic, *mikveh (*ritual bath), and parks and public spaces. There is also a regular bus line to ferry the settlers to a nearby Jewish cemetery (Har HaZaytim). Additionally, a new development is in the making—Ma'ale David. This new settlement extends the existing Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim onto the 11-dunum (3-acre) lot vacated by the WEST BANK police headquarters (which moved to E1). It is planned for 104 housing units, a synagogue, *mikveh*, kindergarten, country club, library, swimming pool, and large parking lot. At a later stage there will be a bridge connecting Ma'ale David to Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim. Before September 1997, no Jews lived in the neighborhood.

The colony of Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim is strategically located on the slope of the Mount of Olives, creating continuity with the Jewish cemetery and BEIT OROT, a yeshiva with an attached residential complex, on a four-dunum (1-acre) plot between Mountain Scopus and the Mount of Olives in the Arab neighborhood of A Tur, then with the Hebrew University, finally reaching another Palestinian neighborhood, Shayk Jarrah. Right-wing activists ascribe great significance to widening Jewish construction in Ras al-Amud, and to realizing ownership of lots and buildings that it has managed to acquire in recent years in that vicinity. According to the thinking of the settlers (and their supporters), Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for the Palestinians to create a territorial corridor, a "safe passage" between the West Bank to the east and the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. Indeed, the colony will serve to preempt any possibility of dividing Jerusalem in a future peace agreement.

There is a further dimension to the settlers' interest in Ras al-Amud, which involves developing the E1 area between the West Bank settlement MA'ALE ADUMIM and Jerusalem. In consequence of US pressure, Israel has several times deferred initiation of settlement construction in the E1 region; however, in 2008 a police station was completed on an area within E1 the size of four football fields, and less than two miles from Jerusalem. It will be followed by full colonization of the area, creating a contiguous swath of Jewish settlement from Ma'ale Adumim to East Jerusalem that severs the Palestinian West Bank in half from east to west. When the police moved to E1, its former headquarters in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Ras al-Amud was available for conversion into apartments for Jewish settlers. Negotiations for the sale of the building and its land, which is located in a heavily populated Palestinian area about 500 meters from the wall of Jerusalem's OLD CITY, had been under way for several years.

Prior to its completion, the main police station (the Samaria and Judea District Police Headquarters), which served the settlements in the West Bank, was located in Ras al-Amud on a lot allegedly purchased by the Bukharan Community (Central Asian Jews from the khanate of Bukhara, Samarkand, and the Ferghana Valley) during OTTOMAN EMPIRE times to expand the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, although it was never used for this purpose. Writing in *Ha'aretz* in 2008, Nadav Shragai reported that "the right-wing groups active in 'redeeming Jerusalem' by buying up Arab land were negotiating with the Bukharan Community Committee to purchase the land and

building that housed the police station in Ras al-Amud."

Effie Eitam, a leader of the pro-settlement NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY and former housing minister (2003–2008), said he initiated the plan to move the police force to E1 to free its building and the 11 dunums (3 acres) of land surrounding it in Ras al-Amud for Jewish housing. "When the Judea and Samaria police move out, the state will have to think about what will be the alternative function of the building, and I see no reason why the state would not allow more Jews to live there. I accelerated the process, and I think it's very legitimate." In early 2005, Eitam moved into a five-story, fifty-one-unit apartment compound across the street from the Ras al-Amud police headquarters.

In 2005 Rabbi David Nisanov, head of the Bukharan Jewish Community of Jerusalem, which supposedly owns the police station and the land surrounding it, said he was negotiating to sell the property to the apartment complex's developers once the police relocate. At the time, *Ha'aretz* reported that the settlers' "big plan" was to receive the police building from the Bukharan Community Committee, which would give them significant territorial contiguity within Ras al-Amud.

That same year in an agreement signed between the committee and the Israel police, the Bukharan Committee undertook to apply to the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION to arrange for 14 dunums (approximately 3.5 acres) of land to be allocated in area E1 for constructing a replacement building for the police. The committee also undertook to plan the replacement building and surrounding development at its own expense. This barter arrangement allowed the police to finance the new headquarters while bypassing the Budget Law. The agreement stipulates that the committee "or its agents" would carry out all the construction work on the new police station, after which it would receive the police building in Ras al-Amud, and that the Bukharan Community Committee would obtain from the Civil Administration the 14-dunum (3.5-acre) allotment for the station in the E1 area. Experts estimated the cost of the project at $10 million. The agreement authorized the committee to contract out all of the labor, from the architect and interior designer to the electrician and safety engineer. The only restriction was that they had to meet the field security requirements of the Israel police. The national police commissioner Moshe Karadi signed the agreement.

Approval was almost immediate, and in August 2001, Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON ordered the plans for the new police station in E1 submitted for approval. In February 2002, the Civil Administration's Supreme Planning Committee approved the plan after rejecting objections submitted by Palestinian residents in the area. The Israeli advocacy group IR AMIM petitioned the state, claiming that the agreement proves that the real reason behind moving the Judea and Samaria police station to E1 is to enable the settlers in Ras al-Amud to use the building.

Asked on what authority the police had handed over land it received from the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION (ILA) to an entity that designates it for residential construction in a sensitive area, the Public Security Ministry said: "At issue is an agreement that was signed with the ILA, the police and the Bukharan Community's endowment, whose rights to the land in Ras al-Amud were recognized by the court. In a circular agreement, the endowment undertook to build a new building for the district headquarters in return for the old headquarters."

The history of the land involved in the Ras al-Amud settlement dates to the early nineteenth century. In 1928, two Orthodox Jewish organizations, Chabad and Fahlin, registered this piece of land with the British authorities in their names. These organizations may have been part of the Bukharan community that appeared on the scene later, though the document does not say so. However, when Chabad and Fahlin registered the property with BRITISH MANDATE authorities, it already belonged to the Hussein el-Ghoul family, who had purchased it nearly one hundred years earlier, in 1837, and had been using the land ever since. The family, like the majority of both small- and large-scale landowners in Palestine, chose, for tax and conscription purposes, not to comply with the 1859 Ottoman law regarding land registration. In 1960, a representative of the el-Ghouls sued the Jordanian Custodian of Enemy Properties (CEP) in Jordanian court, although a decision was not rendered until 1962. In that year, both the Jordanian courts recognized the ownership of the land by the el-Ghoul family and registered it officially in the name of the family.

After the Israeli OCCUPATION of the West Bank in the 1967 WAR, the Chabad and Fahlin societies sued the owners (the el-Ghouls) and users (the el-Ghouls and tenant farmers) of the land. The

societies ignored the decision of the Jordanian courts, relying instead on the registration decree issued in 1928 during the Mandate. The Israeli Central Court issued a decree canceling the Jordanian registration and designated the land as "disputed." The land was then transferred to the Israel Lands Administration, who placed it under the administration of the Jerusalem Municipality, and it finally went to the police—"for public purposes." Those were the events of the first stage of Israel taking control of the land.

In 1984 the Jerusalem Municipality sold Ras al-Amud to a housing development corporation owned by Irving Moskowitz. When, in the early 1990s, the Palestinian residents of Ras al-Amud (together with residents of Silwan) submitted a development plan to the Jerusalem Municipality, the municipality deferred adopting the plan for years, claiming that the suburb belonged to the Jewish people. When the municipality finally agreed to the Palestinian Ras al-Amud plan, it imposed the condition that the residents had to accept the establishment of a Jewish colony in the neighborhood. More disturbing, the plan the municipality proffered to the Palestinian residents of Ras al-Amud only allowed them to build on 55–65 percent of the land area and with a maximum of two floors/stories per building. On the other hand, the municipality allowed the Jews to build on 40 percent of the land area with a maximum of seven floors/stories per building.

On 26 July 1997, the Jerusalem municipal government granted Irving Moskowitz permission to build Jewish housing in Ras al-Amud, adding a new source of antagonism to the already tense standoff between Israelis and Palestinians. The decision authorized the financier to construct a two-story apartment building on a plot he owns in Ras al-Amud, and among the first settlers in Ma'ale Ha'Zeitim were Moskowitz and his son-in-law Arieh King, a far-right political activist and business associate of Moskowitz.

In early November 1998, Jewish settlers began excavating land in Ras al-Amud using large earthmovers to prepare it for construction. At the time, the Israeli authorities claimed that the digging was an excavation for an archaeological site. In reaction, a wave of Palestinian protests erupted, leading to harsh Israeli reprisals, including the arrest of a number of prominent Israeli and Palestinian peace activists, several members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and Israeli-Arab Knesset members. Despite being an outspoken supporter of colonization activities, Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU decided to temporarily freeze construction in Ras al-Amud, awaiting the results of Israeli elections on 17 May 1999; however, the legal committees and government agencies heading the project approved its continuation.

LABOR PARTY leaders condemned the Ras al-Amud project, and shortly after taking office in May 1999, Prime Minister EHUD BARAK promised to freeze Jewish settlement expansion in the West Bank. Nevertheless, the prime minister quietly permitted construction of the Ras al-Amud settlement to go forward. After Barak's election, Irving Moskowitz boldly declared that it was unlikely that the prime minister–elect would bar him from building a Jewish colony in Ras al-Amud, pointing out that Barak was the "godfather of the Ras al-Amud settlement." Moskowitz added that Barak had personally endorsed the blueprints for the settlement and that he was eager to see East Jerusalem populated by Jews.

In September 2000, new Israeli settlement OUTPOSTS were established in the Palestinian area of Ras al-Amud. According to reports, Jewish youth from the Israeli settler group Ateret Cohanim occupied two Palestinian houses near the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives. The two houses, which cover an area of 210 square meters (2,260 square feet), had been tenanted by Palestinian families until they were forcefully evacuated in 1988 due to ownership claims made by the Israeli "Jerusalem Burial Society."

The two occupied houses have given additional support to the other Ateret Cohanim settlement outposts in Ras al-Amud and are being refurbished with the sponsorship of Irving Moskowitz. Jewish settlers in Ma'ale Zeitim Phases I and II have been signing contracts for the apartments at prices ranging from $103,000 to $212,000.

When Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was elected in early 2001, he gave the official go-ahead for completion of Ras al-Amud and stated that he was determined to undermine the "corridor plan" outlined at the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (2000) for Palestinian access to the al-Haram ash-Sharif. Indeed, it was Sharon's objective to implant Jewish enclaves and outposts throughout the HOLY BASIN to preclude any division of Jerusalem in future negotiations. His administration provided significant financial and material support to the

settler groups working to Judaize Silwan, Ras al-Amud, the Mount of Olives, ABU DIS, and other Palestinian neighborhoods. In short, Israeli settlement activities in Ras al-Amud and elsewhere in East Jerusalem aim to abort any possibility for dividing the city in the future. It is notable that past Israeli-Palestinian talks, especially those at Camp David, included the idea of establishing such a corridor running through the old Jericho road, the Mount of Olives region, Motta Gur Street, up to the Lion's Gate, and to the al-Haram ash-Sharif. Such a corridor would give West Bank Muslim and Christian Palestinians access to their holy sites in the Old City without ceding to them any control or sovereignty. Now even that corridor is seriously in question.

The Israeli government is working in close cooperation with the settlers in Ras al-Amud and elsewhere to build a human cordon around Jerusalem's Old City. Government involvement with the settler projects was revealed in a report by the State Attorney's Office reported in *Ha'aretz* (first reported in the Israeli daily newspaper *Yedioth Aharonoth),* which concluded that almost every major ministry in the Israeli government assisted in the construction, expansion, and maintenance of illegal settlement outposts around East Jerusalem. The report found that "every echelon, from minister to low-level clerks, ignored settlers' violations of the law . . . bypassing the zoning laws and master plans" and improperly funneling state money to settlement expansions, even after being ordered not to by Israel's attorney general. This is true of both Labor and LIKUD governments.

See also ATERET COHANIM; HOLY BASIN; JERUSALEM; IRVING MOSKOWITZ; SETTLEMENTS (B'TSELEM); SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SILWAN; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Rashid, Muhammad (1954–)

Muhammad Rashid (Khalid Salam) was a close political and economic adviser to PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT and, to a considerable extent, controlled the financial affairs of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Born to an Iraqi Kurdish family, Rashid joined FATAH and the PLO in the late 1970s, and, in the early 1980s, as editor of *Sawt al-Bilad*, a weekly newsmagazine published in the WEST BANK, he became a close and trusted adviser to Arafat. At the time, Arafat was suspicious of his longtime comrades and was engaged in what many have described as an obsessive drive to control all aspects—especially financial—of the Palestinian movement. Rashid was an ideal ally because, being Kurdish and from IRAQ, he had no inherent clan or other loyalties that could conflict with Arafat's interests. Since Rashid did not hold other loyalties, he could be absolutely loyal to Arafat as his benefactor and mentor. Moreover, once Arafat chose him as his economic adviser and political confidant, Rashid's standing escalated rapidly.

Within a few years, Rashid became the most powerful man in Arafat's entourage. Even before the Palestinian leadership returned from exile in TUNIS to the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, international companies and major contractors made courtesy calls to Arafat, who they thought would soon be head of Palestine. In most meetings, the businesspersons visiting Arafat would request his blessing for their projects and plans, but invariably Arafat and his associates handed over contracts and other business requests to Rashid. It was not long before it became clear to investors, contractors, and other businesspersons that to get the coveted blessing of Arafat for their ideas, projects, or products they needed to convince Rashid. Moreover, to get Rashid on board, an incentive was needed, which meant, in some cases, a considerable share in the new enterprise for Rashid—up to a third or even half in some, or in others a straightforward percentage of the expected profits. Investors were never sure if this share was a tax for the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA) or simply a bribe. In any case, Rashid's signature was needed to complete any major business deal or issue a contract or concession.

The net result of this was that Rashid became the owner, in part or in full, of numerous companies, including advertising, gasoline, communications, cement, and electricity. Of all the enterprises that Rashid was involved in, the most controversial was the JERICHO casino, owned by Austrians, private Israelis, and the PNA. Named the "Oasis," it employed Palestinians but allowed only Israelis and foreigners to gamble. As Israel has no casinos, the enterprise was a major attraction for its citizens, while Islamist Palestinians strenuously objected to the alcohol, scantily clad women, and gambling. Nevertheless, thanks to the extraordinary security provided by the Palestinian security services, the casino was a success until the eruption of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in the fall of 2000. Despite persistent attempts by Palestinians to ascertain who owned the Palestinian shares of the Oasis, no one was able to come up with a clear answer. Many believed that the profits made from the casino and by the many companies established by Rashid went to a slush fund controlled by Arafat.

The escalation of violence in the Intifada and the key role that Palestinian activists played in it resulted in a major setback to newly wealthy individuals like Rashid. Not only were they affected by the collapse of the Palestinian economy, but accusations of corruption against Rashid and others like him became louder and louder, at times repeated publicly in official forums like the Palestinian Legislative Council. Ironically, however, Rashid's demise did not come from his business dealings but from his political activities, specifically his involvement in the siege of BETHLEHEM'S CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY, in which Israel held over 150 Palestin-

ian civilians and armed militants hostage in April–May 2002. While publicly appointed negotiators were trying, to no avail, to reach an agreement with the Israelis, Rashid's use of his Israeli contacts bore fruit. As a result of the settlement brokered by Rashid, thirteen Palestinians who were inside the church were released and deported to a variety of European countries, and another group were deported to the Gaza Strip. Many Palestinians felt that this was a bad compromise that legitimized DEPORTATION. Shortly after it became public that Rashid was behind the controversial Church of Nativity arrangement, his home was attacked. No one was hurt, but the message was clear and, soon thereafter, reportedly after consultation with Arafat, Rashid left Palestine for Cairo, where he is reportedly carrying out financial deals for the Palestinian leadership.

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Ratz

Ratz, officially the Movement for Civil Rights and Peace, was a left-wing Israeli political party founded in 1973 by SHULAMIT ALONI and was active until 1997, when it merged with MAPAM and SHINUI to form MERETZ. For the entirety of its existence, Ratz opposed the OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP and called for a peace settlement with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

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Reagan, Ronald Wilson (1911–2004)

Ronald Reagan was an actor, broadcaster, politician, governor of California (1967–1975), and the thirty-third president of the UNITED STATES (1981–1989). Born in Illinois, he attended Eureka College, where he studied economics and sociology. In his early political life, Reagan was a Democrat and a supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but by the mid-1950s he had moved far to the right. As president of the Screen Actors Guild (1947–1952 and 1959–1960), he testified before the US House of Representatives Un-American Activities Committee on communist influence in Hollywood. He supported the practice of blacklisting in Hollywood and monitored actors he considered disloyal to the United States, informing on them to the FBI under the code name "Agent T-10." Concluding that the Republican Party was better able to combat communism than was the Democratic Party, Reagan backed the presidential candidacies of DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER in 1952 and 1956 and RICHARD NIXON in 1960, 1968, and 1972.

President Reagan had two secretaries of state during his presidency—ALEXANDER HAIG and GEORGE SHULTZ—both of whom were deeply involved in Middle East policymaking. Overwhelmingly preoccupied with the Soviet threat, Reagan viewed the world in terms of black and white, good and evil. He considered groups resisting Israeli OCCUPATION, such as the HIZBULLAH in LEBANON, Palestinians in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, and left-wing guerrillas fighting US-backed

right-wing military dictatorships, to be Soviet pawns and "terrorists." In fact, the Reagan administration made "international TERRORISM" one of the centerpieces of its foreign policy, and Palestinian "terrorism" was high on the list of offenders.

On the other hand, Israelis fondly remember Reagan as perhaps the most pro-Israel president in US history (although he preceded GEORGE W. BUSH, who undoubtedly holds that distinction). At an emotional level, Reagan related to Israel, though he never visited the Jewish state. Part of this emotional attachment no doubt stemmed from his religious beliefs and part from his Manichaean worldview that placed Israel clearly on the side of good against the "evil empire" of the Soviet Union. In the context of the Cold War, Reagan considered Israel an important STRATEGIC ASSET in fighting communism. More concretely, he was the first US president to declare (on 2 February 1981) that Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the Occupied Territories were "not illegal."

To the extent that the Reagan administration was concerned with the Middle East, it was worried about the Soviet-Syrian relationship. US officials expressed concern for Israel's security in the Middle East, which, in effect, legitimized Tel Aviv's continuous air raids against PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) bases. It also led to a Reagan administration memorandum of understanding, on 30 November 1981, affirming Israel's position as a strategic asset to US interests. But when, on 7 June 1981, Israel bombed the Osiraq reactor outside Baghdad, IRAQ, Reagan was furious, temporarily suspended the delivery of F-16 jet fighters to Israel, and supported the UN Security Council resolution condemning Israel. On the other hand, the US ambassador to the UNITED NATIONS, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, was one of Israel's staunchest defenders, and, during her tenure, the United States vetoed more than a dozen other resolutions critical of Israel. However, in December 1981, when Israel annexed the Golan Heights from SYRIA, Reagan suspended the strategic cooperation agreement, which prompted Israel's Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN to accuse Reagan of treating Israel like a "banana republic." In both instances, however, the penalties were only temporary.

When the Reagan administration sold weapons—AWACs—to SAUDI ARABIA in 1981, Israel vehemently opposed this deal, and its Washington lobby, the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, went into overdrive with the executive and legislative branches in an attempt to impede the sale. Nevertheless, the administration went ahead with the agreement, which in reality did not diminish Israel's overall military superiority in the Middle East. But that President Reagan prevailed on the sale of AWACs was something of a watershed event because the lobby never mounted a significant challenge to an arms sale again. Still, the AWACs campaign was notable for its nastiness. It was cast as Reagan versus Begin, and the president did not hide his distaste for the Israeli leader.

Haig, Reagan's first secretary of state, saw the world much as the president did, with an overarching preoccupation with the Soviet Union and the inclination to view all local conflicts as a manifestation of the Soviet threat. In the Middle East this translated into US support for Israel and Soviet support for Syria. In early 1982, Haig gave Israel the green light for its invasion of Lebanon, apparently without informing the president, and Reagan was uncomfortable with the Israeli thrust. He strongly opposed Israel's drive to occupy Beirut, and senior Reagan officials protested the Israeli siege and aerial bombardment of Lebanon's capital. Reagan instructed Kirkpatrick to support a 6 June Security Council demand for Israel to withdraw immediately and unconditionally and dispatched his special adviser for the Middle East, Philip Habib, to Lebanon to "stop the hostilities." However, once the prospect of superpower confrontation was reduced by the 11 June Israeli-Syrian truce, Reagan and his top officials began to champion key Israeli goals—for example, urging that all Syrian and PLO forces leave Lebanon, endorsing the candidacy of Bashir Gemayel for president of Lebanon, and even supporting Israel's control over a 40-kilometer (about 25-mile) zone north of its border. In the end, Israel suffered no sanctions for its invasion of Lebanon, and US marines participated in the multinational force that supervised the evacuation of the PLO.

On 1 September 1982, the president announced the REAGAN PLAN for Middle East peace. During the LEBANON WAR, unknown to Israel, Reagan had formulated a new diplomatic initiative designed to stimulate peace negotiations, improve Israel-EGYPT relations, and provide impetus for JORDAN to join the peace process. The plan was also aimed at signaling those Arab states that had accepted PLO evacuees from Beirut that the United States was seeking a solution to the

Arab-Israeli conflict. The Reagan Plan opposed the creation of a Palestinian state, calling instead for Palestinian autonomy in association with Jordan. Reagan said that JERUSALEM should remain undivided but its final status negotiated. He called for a freeze of Jewish settlements but stated that Israel could not be expected to return to the 1967 BORDERS.

Despite interest and positive responses from a number of Arab states and the PLO, Begin flatly rejected the plan, which left the initiative dead in the water. Two weeks later, Israel violated the truce and entered West Beirut, much to the chagrin of Reagan officials, including the president. This was followed by SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE of Palestinians by Lebanese militiamen allied with Israel, who had been let into the camps by Israel. Reagan quickly returned the marines to Beirut in a revived multinational force to ensure Israel's withdrawal and provide belated protection for Palestinian civilians. (Haig abruptly resigned or was asked to resign in 1982 reportedly over policy disagreements.) By the summer of 1983, however, the US forces were no longer playing the role of a neutral peacekeeper, but firing their 16-inch guns into Shi'a and Druze villages in the mountains. The result was a devastating attack in October 1983 on the marine barracks that left some 241 dead. ISLAMIC JIHAD took responsibility for the attack, but it is believed by most analysts that Hizbullah was the power behind the nom de guerre. In February 1984 the United States withdrew from Lebanon completely.

In his opposition to the Soviet Union, President Reagan worked to free SOVIET JEWS and approved the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY–sponsored rescue, together with Israel, of 500 Ethiopian Jews in Operation Joshua in 1985. Under Reagan, US economic assistance to Israel increased substantially. In 1987, Israel began to receive $3 billion annually in foreign aid and from 1985 on, the aid was in the form of grants. The Reagan administration permitted Israel, at least for a time, to use US funds to develop its own fighter plane, the Lavi. In 1985, Washington also signed the first free trade agreement between the United States and Israel. In fact, during the Reagan administration, a series of memoranda of understanding, signed between US agencies and their Israeli counterparts, promoted cooperation in a wide range of fields, such as EDUCATION, space research, and HEALTH CARE. Reagan was also responsible for helping to reform Israel's economy. In 1985, following a severe economic crisis in Israel that sent inflation rates soaring as high as 445 percent, the United States approved a $1.5 billion emergency assistance package and helped formulate Israel's successful economic stabilization plan.

Reagan's greatest substantive contribution to the US-Israeli relationship was the 1981 institutionalization of STRATEGIC COOPERATION, which created a web of ties between the Pentagon and ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and led to a progressive strengthening of Israel's military capability. Initially, three joint groups were set up: political-military, economic development, and, in 1986, security assistance planning. By 1987 more than twenty-four military-technological agreements were signed. Reagan designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally, thus codifying its de facto status in the organization and enhancing its ability to sell military equipment to the United States. In addition to the high-level strategic cooperation, Israel provided covert support for Reagan's policies toward IRAN and in Central America. Israel played a key role in providing Iran with arms, though at the same time the United States also sold weapons to Iraq. These arms were paid for by US-diverted proceeds from the sale of weapons to the Contras in Nicaragua, in what became known as the "Iran-Contra affair."

On 11 February 1985 PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT and King Husayn of Jordan put forward a major peace initiative (HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT). The Reagan response was to ignore the substance of the proposal but to reject it on procedure, opposing an international conference because it would involve the Soviets. In addition, the president argued that the PLO still had not fully accepted UN RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arafat's rejoinder was that the PLO would explicitly accept Resolution 242 when the United States acknowledged the Palestinian right to self-determination.

Subsequently, Secretary of State George Shultz, who had assumed office in 1982 and who was particularly interested in fostering a peace process among Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians, together with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, visited the Middle East and suggested a possible meeting between a

US official and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. A session was scheduled for August, but after Murphy and an "approved" delegation arrived in Amman, Jordan, President Reagan abruptly canceled the meeting, ostensibly because the PLO refused to affirm Resolution 242 prior to the meeting. In so doing, the president sent a strong message that the administration was not interested in negotiations or the plight of the Palestinians.

Thereafter, violence spiraled out of control in the region: Palestinians assassinated three Israelis in Larnaca, Israel bombed the headquarters of the PLO in TUNIS, the *ACHILLE LAURO* was hijacked by Palestinians, and in December 1987 the First INTIFADA erupted in the West Bank and Gaza. By this time, it was not clear how much Reagan was involved with the details of Middle East policy. In any case, Shultz undertook a major initiative in 1988 known as the Shultz Plan, a proposal for Middle East peace that preoccupied him for a full year. It culminated with the low-level United States–Palestinian Liberation Organization DIALOGUE initiated by Washington in late 1988, which was more about US interests than about Palestinian concerns.

President Reagan still considered Palestinians part of the Cold War empire of "evil." This was evident in Reagan's intense interest in the Lebanese-Israeli relationship and in Jordan's abrogation of the Husayn-Arafat initiative. Only the First Intifada and subsequent explicit shifts in PLO diplomatic positions (undertaken to meet Washington's dictates) compelled officials in the Reagan administration to reassess the US stand and begin to see the Palestinians as more of an autonomous actor.

See also ALEXANDER HAIG; REAGAN PLAN; GEORGE SHULTZ

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Reagan Plan, 1982

US president RONALD REAGAN launched a peace initiative on 1 September 1982, following Israel's war against the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in LEBANON, based on UN RESOLUTION 242 and the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. Reagan spoke about the opportunities created by the respite in the Lebanese civil war and the PLO evacuation from Beirut. He noted the homelessness of the Palestinian people and stated, "The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians." By declaring that the United States would "not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the WEST BANK and GAZA" and would endorse changes in the 1967 lines to ensure Israel's security, he sought to reassure Israel. While he reiterated Washington's ironclad commitment to Israel's security, Reagan also stated that the UNITED STATES would not support annexation or permanent control by Israel of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and called for an immediate freeze on Jewish SETTLEMENTS.

The Reagan Plan proposed autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza during a transitional period of five years, which would

begin after the election of a self-governing authority. The purpose of the transition period would be to prove that the Palestinians could run their own affairs and that Palestinian autonomy posed no threat to Israel's security. The final status of the West Bank and Gaza would be decided through negotiations, but the United States strongly preferred that Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza organize in an association with JORDAN, which in Washington's view offered the best chance for a durable, just, and lasting peace. The president further stated that "we remain convinced that JERUSALEM must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations."

From the perspective of the Palestinians and Arab states, the plan had several notable omissions: Reagan did not refer to PLO representation in negotiations; it denied the Palestinians self-determination by saying they must join in confederation with Jordan; and it did not speak to the fate of the Palestinian REFUGEES from the wars of 1948 and 1967 living outside the Occupied Territories, to the status of the Golan Heights, or even to the method of negotiation. Reactions to the Reagan Plan were varied. The Israeli government, headed by Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN, flatly and unequivocally rejected it, and, to give more weight to its rejection, Israel announced its intention to immediately establish new settlements in the Occupied Territories. The attitude of the Israeli prime minister was not entirely shared by the Israeli LABOR PARTY, which believed the plan offered a suitable basis for negotiation with Jordan. In fact, the Reagan Plan corresponded in many respects to Labor's political program. Labor was opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state and insisted on the preservation of Jewish settlements but was willing, in the context of a formal peace treaty, to give Jordan significant portions of the West Bank (subject to the exclusion of such territory as Israel would consider necessary for its security), including the OLD CITY of Jerusalem.

The Arab states demonstrated their interest in the Reagan Plan at the Arab Summit in September when they presented the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE, which differed little from Reagan's plan except on the issues of the PLO and Palestinian self-determination. The intense negotiations between Jordan and the PLO that culminated in the HUSAYN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT illustrated the seriousness with which both the PLO and Jordan took the plan. But Israel's rejection of the plan and Reagan's disinclination to involve himself deeply in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulted in the Reagan Plan's failure to transform into a coherent diplomatic strategy, and consequently it faded away in a very short time.

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Reform Party

The Reform Party (al-Hizb al-Islah) was formed in August 1935 by Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi to strengthen his position after his election as mayor of JERUSALEM in 1934. The Palestinian party's objectives included attaining freedom for Palestine, establishing Palestinian self-government, working for the welfare of farmers and workers, encouraging education, and opposing a Jewish national home in Palestine. Although the Reform Party never had any appreciable influence over public opinion, Khalidi had considerable influence in Jerusalem, and his views were publicly expressed in the local Arab press. A member of the first ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, he was deported, in 1937, by the BRITISH MANDATE government to the Seychelles for his nationalist activism.

See also DEPORTATION; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Refugees and the Right of Return

The origins of the Palestinian refugee problem can be found in great power interests in the region following World War II, the massive problem of resettlement of Jewish refugees and displaced persons after the war, and the Zionist plan to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Although there is significant historical and social science literature about these three main underlying factors of the Palestinian refugee problem, there is disagreement on what actually caused and has maintained the refugee exodus and long-standing displacement. Commentators disagree primarily about the historical accuracy of the narratives describing the key factors listed above. Zionists provide one historical narrative, while the Palestinians provide another.

Underlying the contentious nature of the Palestinian refugee problem is a lack of clarity about the difference between political positions and legal rights. Commentators dispute whether Palestinians are refugees; whether they have a right to return, and to where; whether they were forcibly expelled or simply left of their own volition; and whether a Palestinian "right to return" is equivalent to a Jewish "right to return" and can or cannot be realized without negating equivalent Jewish rights.

The philosophical/political debate about whether Palestinians are refugees relates directly to the Jewish/Israeli position that such refugee recognition might impute a Palestinian "right" to return that would trump a Jewish right of return to Israel. This argument is described in varying ways: that the Palestinians were historically not a "people" with recognized rights to Palestine; that they were not forced out or expelled by the Israelis, but fled on their own (or in response to orders by Arab leadership to leave); that they lost their land because of a war launched by the Arab states to prevent Israel from becoming a state and Israel was the victor in that war; and that Jews were the native people of Palestine, and historically its rightful owners, and in "returning" to it have redeemed it for the Jewish people. Underlying these arguments is the premise that Israel has the right to maintain a state of exclusively Jewish character, or Jewish majority, and that the Partition Resolution was an affirmation by the international community of the right to a Jewish state.

Each of these arguments is contested by historical and legal research, but the legal/historical conclusions are not as widely known. Some conclusions can be drawn from the weight of legal and historical fact on the issue of whether Jews are a "people" with self-determination rights that exclude or supersede the self-determination rights of Palestinians. Historical and archaeological research has established that Jews were among many peoples populating ancient Palestine, and were even a significant minority population in the first millennium BCE. However, from the seventh century CE onward, Arab descendants of the Canaanites and later-arriving Arab people were the majority population in the area of Palestine when Jewish IMMIGRATION began in the 1880s. At that time, the Arab population of Palestine was 450,000, with about 20,000 Jews. By 1917, Palestinians comprised 90 percent of the population, and by 1947, after significant Jewish immigration, the Arab population numbered approximately 1,200,000, while the Jewish population was around 600,000.

The historical record corroborates certain key facts and events underlying the Palestinian refugee problem. The Zionist program for a "Jewish national home" originated in the first WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS in 1897 in Switzerland, in which THEODOR HERZL argued for a Jewish state in Palestine. By 1901, the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION had established the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND to purchase LAND for Jewish settlers in Palestine as well as in other areas in the Middle East. Herzl and the World Zionist Organization envisioned the Zionist project of "redeeming the land" for Jews as taking land from the Arabs and expelling them from Palestine. The Zionists succeeded in aligning their plan with British interests in the Middle East, and in 1917 the British cabinet endorsed a letter that became known as the BALFOUR DECLARATION. The Balfour Declaration stated that the British government "viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people . . . it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The Zionists interpreted the endorsement of the declaration as a British commitment to the "Jewish people" for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. There are serious deficiencies in this interpretation. First, Britain had no legal authority to create any political entity in Palestine that disregarded the rights of the indigenous Palestinian population, a fact recognized in the language of the declaration itself ("viewed with favour the establishment of a Jewish national home . . . nothing shall be done to prejudice the rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine"). Second, such an interpretation violated the explicit agreements (HUSAYN-MCMAHON) made between the British government and Arab leaders during World War I that guaranteed self-determination and independence of the Arabs in all the regions under authority of the Sharif of Mecca once the war had ended. Third, there was no legal concept of the "Jewish people" as a political entity with recognized rights as separate from the religious or cultural concept of the "Jewish people." Fourth, the history of the Balfour Declaration reflects that the British government did not believe that the Zionists represented the rights or interests of the "Jewish people," particularly since ANTI-ZIONISM Jews made it clear to Britain that the Zionist proponents of Balfour did not speak for them. Although the Zionists succeeded in getting Britain to incorporate the Balfour language into its League of Nations Mandate treaty over Palestine, the British Parliament did not pass the Balfour letter as a resolution or endorse it; it was defeated in both houses when put to a vote. The most consistent legal interpretation of the Balfour Declaration with the negotiations, drafting history, and INTERNATIONAL LAW as it existed at the time is that Britain intended to provide a sanctuary for Jews in Palestine without violating the rights of Palestinian Arabs or the rights of Jews in any other country in the world: in other words, establishing for Jews a home in Palestine, but not a Jewish state. This reading remains consistent with later political and legal developments.

Following World War I, the 1922 League of Nations Mandate "entrusted" Palestine and other Arab regions formerly ruled by the OTTOMAN EMPIRE to the British government "until such time as [these communities could] stand alone." Yet the BRITISH MANDATE for Palestine also incorporated Britain's commitment as mandatory power to "put into effect" the Balfour Declaration—a "national home for the Jewish people." The Palestine Mandate granted the Jewish minority in Palestine and nonresident Jews elsewhere in the world full political rights in Palestine, while the majority indigenous Palestinian Arab population was only granted civil and religious rights, thus setting the stage for the claims of a nonindigenous population to displace the indigenous Palestinians through TRANSFER and other means under the guise of legality. The Zionist program was further given ostensible legitimacy by the Partition Resolution. In UN RESOLUTION 181 of 1947, the General Assembly recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state following Britain's relinquishment of its responsibilities under the Mandate after World War II. The new "Jewish" state was to be established in 56 percent of historic Palestine to benefit the less than one-third of the population that was Jewish and owned no more than 7 percent of the land of Palestine, while the "Arab" state would give no more than 44 percent of Palestine to the Palestinians, who comprised 95 percent of the indigenous population and owned 93 percent of the land.

As a legal matter, claims based on ancient title do not supersede claims of long possession or otherwise clear title of individual or collective ownership—nor can they, if the ancient claims are based on religion, because legal title to land cannot be based on discriminatory preferences for one religion over another. Thus, if the collective Jewish right to the land of Palestine is based on ancient possession or title, it does not find support in the historical record or under international law. Moreover, Jews may have been a distinct minority in historic Palestine as well as an identifiable group elsewhere in the world, but those facts alone do not confer the right of self-determination in Palestine. There has been no historical or scientific evidence to support a claim that Jews are a homogeneous ethnic group as opposed to a heterogeneous religious group. The UNITED NATIONS has never recognized Jews as a distinct "people" with exclusive rights to self-determination, in Palestine or elsewhere. The UN could not do so, both because the rights of Palestinians to independence and self-determination in Palestine had already been affirmed and because it would violate the fundamental principles of nationality and nondiscrimination in international law to recognize Jewish citizens of almost every country as having a distinct nationality from the states in which they resided. The consequences of such a recognition

can be immediately seen as every state in which Jews reside could then denationalize them for possessing another nationality.

In contrast, following World War I, the League of Nations expressly recognized the rights of Palestinians and other Arab peoples to self-determination and established the French and British Mandates as temporary trusteeships until the Mandate communities could be brought to independence. The League of Nations Covenant prohibited new colonization, as did the later charter of the United Nations. The UN Charter, and the International Court of Justice decisions interpreting it, outlawed aggression and required self-determination for the former colonized communities—absolutely prohibiting the taking of any territory by force. Thus, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 181 could not have "given" Palestine to the Jewish people to the exclusion of the self-determination rights of the native Palestinians without violating the League Covenant, the UN Charter, and the weight of international law.

Resolution 181, a nonbinding recommendation by the General Assembly, was a political solution to the British desire to quit its Mandate responsibilities in Palestine in the face of growing civil warfare and Zionist TERRORISM directed at Britain as well as Palestinian Arabs. The resolution recommended the establishment of two states, one Arab and one Jewish, with economic union between them, with the Jewish area comprising 498,000 Jews and 407,700 Arabs and an Arab area of 10,000 Jews and 725,000 Arabs, and an "international zone of JERUSALEM" with 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews. Even in the Jewish area there would be a bare Jewish majority. Aside from the issue of whether the General Assembly had legal authority to recommend partition of territory, let alone to confer title of territory held by people who did not agree to relinquish their land, 181 did not authorize establishment of an exclusive "Jewish state." Among the most important provisions of 181 were the nondiscrimination provisions, which required each state to treat all of its citizens as equal—that is, discrimination of any kind on the basis of race, religion, or national origin was prohibited. Nor did 181 include any provisions for transfer of population from one area to another. Hence, 181 gave no authority for an exclusive Jewish state, as it could not do so without violating the UN Charter.

The organized Jewish groups declared Israel a state in May 1948 based on that part of 181 recommending a "Jewish state," but immediately began expelling the non-Jewish population from its self-declared territory, and then commenced expanding into the territory that was to have been the "Arab state." Following the passage of Resolution 181, even before the declaration of formal hostilities between Israel and the Arab states, armed and well-organized Jewish militias forced approximately one-third of the Palestinian Arab population, or about 200,000 people, out of their towns, cities, and villages. During the war that followed, the disorganized and primarily unarmed Palestinian population was displaced and expelled in huge numbers by Zionist militias through a combination of tactics that included attacks on civilians, massacres, looting, destruction of property, and forced expulsion. Israeli military forces carried out "shoot to kill" policies to prevent refugees from returning to their homes and lands. The Israeli government continued its expulsion policies, both within the cease-fire lines and outside, following the ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS of 1949.

Historical research, and in particular Israeli archival research, has established that the Zionist militias carried out a policy of forced expulsion that resulted in half of Palestinian refugees becoming so prior to the entry of the Arab state forces into the conflict in May 1948. The largest number of refugees fled in April and early May 1948 under "PLAN DALET," the Zionist military plan to expel as many Palestinian Arabs as possible under the guise of necessity of war. Systematic data gathered by Erskine Childers and others of radio and other broadcasts by Arab leaders during the 1948 WAR established that no calls were made to encourage Palestinian Arabs to leave their homes. The earliest of the massacres documented by the Red Cross was that of the village of DEIR YASSIN in April 1948, in which more than one hundred Palestinian men, women, and children were killed by the militant Zionist groups IRGUN and the STERN GANG, and it set the stage for terrorizing the Palestinian population. Other massacres followed, including nine in October 1948, in which hundreds of Palestinian villagers were killed and thrown in mass graves. As refugees were forcibly expelled or fled their homes, Israeli forces systematically destroyed hundreds of their villages. More than 400 Palestinian villages were depopulated and destroyed, and in several key districts no villages were left intact. An estimated

two-thirds of Palestinian homes in Israel were destroyed, and the remaining one-third were taken and occupied by Jews. Although the historical record is overwhelming that the Palestinian refugees were forcibly expelled as part of a systematic plan to transfer as much of the Palestinian population as possible to make room for Jews, the contention that they left on their own has no relevance to their main legal rights as refugees: the right to return, the right to property restitution, and the right of compensation for real or personal property loss.

General Statistics on Palestinian Refugees

There are differing calculations of the numbers of Palestinians who became refugees or internally displaced during the 1948 War, but the best-documented calculations arrive at 750,000–800,000 Palestinian refugees, or about 85 percent of the Palestinian population from what became Israel.

There are three primary groups of Palestinian refugees. The largest group comprises Palestinians displaced from their places of origin due to armed conflict and the 1948 War. This includes refugees who are eligible for assistance from the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA), known as "registered refugees," and those who were also displaced in 1948 but were either ineligible for UNRWA assistance or did not register with the agency. The second group of refugees—usually termed "displaced persons"—comprises those displaced for the first time from their homes in the territories Israel occupied after the 1967 WAR. The third group includes those who were not refugees from either the 1948 or the 1967 conflict, but who are outside of Palestine and are being denied the right to return due to Israel's discriminatory residency and expulsion laws.


There are two additional groups of Palestinians in "refugee-like" conditions. The first group comprises internally displaced persons who remained within the "recognized borders" of Israel after they were expelled or forced to flee from their homes during the 1948 conflict, or when their homes were expropriated or demolished. The second group comprises internally displaced persons who suffered similar Israeli actions within the 1967 Occupied Territories.

Today, some 7 million persons out of a global population of 10.1 million Palestinians are refugees or internally displaced. The most comprehensive figures appear in the yearly *Survey on Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons,* compiled by BADIL RESOURCE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY AND REFUGEE RIGHTS. The most recent *Survey* (2007) reviews the numbers and locations of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons, relying on and analyzing a wide range of authoritative sources. The *Survey* concludes that at the beginning of 2007, there were more than 7 million Palestinian refugees and 450,000 internally displaced persons out of the worldwide Palestinian population of 10.1 million. The refugee figure includes approximately 6 million of the original 1948 refugee population, of which over 4.5 million are registered with UNRWA for assistance, and 250,000 to 300,000 refugees from the 1967 conflict.

Approximately 1.3 million Palestinian refugees are residents of fifty-nine official refugee camps scattered throughout the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, JORDAN, LEBANON, and SYRIA, established and run by UNRWA. The majority of the camp populations are 1948 refugees and their descendants, while the rest are 1967 refugees and their descendants. UNRWA also operates another dozen "unofficial" camps to house Palestinian refugees who can no longer be accommodated in the existing official camp locations.

UNRWA's figures give its registered refugee populations as of June 2009 as 1,967,414 in Jordan, 421,993 in Lebanon, 467,417 in Syria, 771,143 in the West Bank, and 1,090,932 in Gaza. However, not all Palestinian refugees live in camps; for example, in Jordan the majority do not live in camps. Conditions for Palestinian refugees in each host state and area vary substantially based on the laws and policies of each country, and change frequently depending on the political climate.

Understanding these categories of refugees requires an explanation of the term "Palestinian refugee." The issue is a complex one because there is more than one definition. The earliest record of a discussion within the United Nations of how to define "Palestine refugees" appears during the drafting of UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194. As hundreds of thousands of refugees fled from Palestine in the wake of the Partition Plan, the UN took up the issue of its responsibilities toward them. In passing Resolution 194 of 11 December 1948, the General Assembly established the UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE (UNCCP) with a very



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Map 35. Palestinian Refugees: Area of UNRWA Operations

broad mandate to resolve both the conflict and the massive refugee problem; defined the refugees for whom the UNCCP would provide "international protection"; and in 194(III) paragraph 11, set out the required legal formula for resolving the refugee problem.

There is no clear definition of "Palestinian refugee" incorporated in the language of Resolution 194 itself. However, in discussing "Palestine refugees" the UNCCP's authoritative *Analysis of Paragraph 11 of the General Assembly's Resolution of 11 December 1948* states that "the term 'refugees' applies to all persons, Arabs, Jews and others who have been displaced from their homes in Palestine. This would include Arabs in Israel who have been shifted from their normal places of residence. It would also include Jews who had their homes in Arab Palestine, such as the inhabitants of the Jewish quarter of the Old City. It would not include Arabs who have lost their lands but not their houses, such as the inhabitants of Tulkarm." This was the definition accepted by the drafters of Resolution 194 for purposes of defining the entire group of persons from Palestine who were entitled to the protection of the international community. The UN's authority was later confined to the Palestinians within this category, as Israel took responsibility for all the Jews in Palestine covered by the definition.

This definition is different from the universally adopted definition of "refugee" that appears in the important international instruments, but is consistent with the general legal understanding that a refugee is an individual meeting certain criteria who lacks the protection of his or her state of nationality or origin. The need for "international protection" arises only when a refugee's own state no longer provides him or her that protection. This concept also underlies the extension of international protection toward persons who are stateless, that is, persons who are not recognized nationals of any state as a matter of either law or fact, and persons who are internally displaced in situations where the state of origin or nationality fails to provide protection. The UN drafters included in their definition the internally displaced Palestinians who had lost their homes and lands but remained in Israel, recognizing that such individuals, like the "refugees," were not receiving the protection of the Israeli state.

The definition of "Palestine refugees" for purposes of international protection and UNCCP's mandate is also different from the definition given to "Palestine refugees" for purposes of UNRWA's mandate. UNRWA coverage extends to registered Palestine refugees residing in UNRWA's areas of operation in the occupied Palestinian territory, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria only. UNRWA has defined a Palestine refugee as any person whose "normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict." Palestine refugees eligible for UNRWA assistance are mainly persons who fulfill the above definition as well as descendants of fathers fulfilling the definition. It should be noted that UNRWA's definition of refugees is necessarily restricted to those eligible to receive its aid, as the definition explicitly states that the refugee must have lost both home and means of livelihood to be eligible for registration with UNRWA. Thus, for the purposes of repatriation or compensation, as envisaged in UNGA Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948, the term "Palestine refugee" is used with a different, much less restrictive meaning as compared to UNRWA's need-based definition. As of June 2009, UNRWA lists over 4.7 million as registered Palestinian refugees.

Despite the UN's sustained involvement, for close to six decades Palestinian refugees have been denied major aspects of international protection and remain today without a durable solution to their condition. The lack of effective international protection toward Palestinians includes two key aspects: the day-to-day physical security and integrity of the person, and the longer-term durable solution to their unique condition as a refugee population. Palestinians as a nationally identifiable population are unique in that they comprise the largest global population of refugees, internally displaced, and stateless persons. Despite fierce contention about whether Palestinians are indeed "refugees," it remains true that Palestinians comprise one of the largest and longest-standing refugee, or refugee-like, populations in the world—a fair approximation is that two out of five refugees in the world are Palestinian.

Palestinian Refugee Rights under International Law

Immediately after the declaration of the state, Israel adopted measures to prevent return. The measures were incorporated in a plan called

"Retroactive Transfer: A Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in the State of Israel." Among the measures recommended and implemented were destruction of Palestinian-Arab population centers, settlement of Jews in Arab towns and villages, and passage of legislation to prevent refugee return. Israel's Nationality Law of 1952 retroactively repealed Palestinian citizenship as recognized under the British Mandate and provided that every Jewish immigrant was automatically entitled to Israeli nationality, but placed such stringent conditions on the eligibility of Palestinian Arabs for Israeli nationality that few could qualify. Israel also passed a series of laws defining Palestinians who had been forcibly removed from their lands or had fled as "absentees," defining their lands as "absentee properties," and then confiscating such "absentee" Palestinian properties. Subsequent Israeli legislation converted vast amounts of confiscated Palestinian properties for the exclusive benefit of Jews and prohibited restitution of such land to Palestinian Arabs in perpetuity. The ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAWS also deprived Palestinians who had remained on their land and become Israeli citizens of possession of their properties through the legal fiction that they were "PRESENT ABSENTEES" and therefore subject to the expropriation laws. Such Palestinians are internally displaced—they are Israeli citizens, but, as non-Jews, they have been moved from their homes and do not have the same rights as Jews to own and possess their land under Israeli law. Through its laws of nationality, citizenship, and land regulation, Israel denationalized the majority of Palestinian Arabs from the nationality of their homeland; permanently expropriated Arab lands, homes, and collective properties; and created an entire population of stateless persons.

While the Palestinian refugee problem is unique in the special responsibility of the UN for creating the refugee flow through passage of the Partition Resolution, some aspects of the problem are not unique to the Palestinian refugee case. Similar situations of conflict-induced mass exodus, widespread violations of human rights, and institutionalized discrimination concerning nationality and property rights are experienced by many refugees around the world and contribute to protracted refugee situations. Elements of the Palestinian refugee problem can be found in numerous mass refugee situations in Africa, Central America, Asia, and Europe. What remains unique about the Palestinian refugee problem are the persistent and severe denial of international protection and the lack of access both to a durable solution and to the mechanisms for implementing a durable solution—minimum protection guarantees that are available over time to other refugee populations in the world. Contributing to the denial of protection to Palestinian refugees is a severe gap in understanding and implementing the key provisions of law applicable to the Palestinian case—a situation now widely known as the Palestinian "protection gap."

The international instruments protecting the rights of refugees and stateless persons were drafted after World War II, primarily in response to the massive postwar flow of Jewish and other refugees and displaced persons in Europe. In addition to the key instruments—the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons—the UN also established several international agencies with particular mandates over refugees and others. The three important agencies relevant here are the UN Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP), established in December 1948; the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), established in 1949; and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), established in 1950. The motivation for drafting the Refugee and Stateless Persons conventions and for setting up the UNHCR was to change pre-existing law and practice concerning refugees and others in refugee-like situations in key ways: first by shifting responsibility for mass refugee flows to the entire international community ("burden-sharing"); second by reaching consensus on a new, individualized definition of refugee to replace the prior group or category approach; third by shifting the emphasis from returning refugees to their places of origin to focusing on resettlement in third states; and fourth by restricting the conditions in which persons could be made stateless, and obliging states to grant protection to stateless persons. There was a consensus that three particular groups had to be covered by this new refugee regime, as they were deserving of international protection: refugees, stateless persons, and displaced persons.

The refugee rights Palestinians have under international law relate to whether Palestinians are defined as refugees as a legal matter, a more complex issue than the international definition applied

to other refugees under the relevant instruments. The international legal definition of "refugee" is, at its core, a determination about which individuals are unable or unwilling to obtain national protection, and thus deserve the protection of the international community. Under the main international provisions that define refugees and others "deserving of international protection," Palestinians clearly qualify not only as refugees, but also as internally displaced and stateless persons.

The first relevant instrument is the 1951 Refugee Convention. Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention incorporates an individualized definition of refugee that prohibits a state party from returning or sending any individual to a state where she or he risks persecution for reasons of race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or social group. Article 1D of the Refugee Convention has very different definitional criteria and, although it doesn't mention any particular group, was meant to apply exclusively to Palestinian refugees. Article 1D states that the Refugee Convention "shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the UNHCR protection or assistance." Its second sentence provides: "When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with [relevant UN resolutions] these persons shall *ipso facto* be entitled to the benefits of this Convention." Article 1D's two clauses have been subjected to widely divergent interpretations by states, the UN, and experts in the field. The most widely held interpretation is that 1D is an *exclusion* clause, preventing Palestinians from being recognized as refugees since UNRWA is assumed to be providing them with international protection. The general result is that Palestinians have been denied most of the minimum protection rights guaranteed other recognized refugees under the Refugee Convention.

Two other provisions apply to the status of Palestinians as subjects of international refugee law: Article 1 of the Stateless Persons Convention and paragraph 7(c) of the Statute of the UNHCR. Both incorporate language similar to the first sentence of Article 1D, thereby precluding an extension of UNHCR's mandate toward Palestinians as refugees, and an application of the benefits of the Stateless Persons Convention. A provision similar to Article 1D also appears in the more recent 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It excludes the protections of that convention vis-à-vis Palestinians as well. The prevalent interpretation of these provisions has had severe consequences for Palestinians seeking benefits as refugees, stateless, and displaced persons worldwide. As a result, Palestinians have been precluded from many of the critical aspects of international protection, both in the day-to-day exercise of their human and civil rights and in their longer-term desire for protection, intervention, and mechanisms for obtaining a durable solution to their condition as refugees and stateless persons.

Significant recent research into the drafting history of these provisions reveals that interpreting these provisions to exclude Palestinians from protection guarantees is an incorrect application of the drafters' intentions. The *travaux préparatoires* clarify the ambiguities in Article 1D and the related provisions. The UN delegates drafting these provisions reached an overwhelming consensus that Palestinian refugees deserved, and were in need of, both protection and assistance. The UN discussions reveal a consensus that Palestinians deserved special attention for several critical reasons: their large-scale persecution and expulsion as a people, the complicity of the UN itself in creating the refugee problem, and the consensus already embodied in UN Resolutions that the durable solution for Palestinians was repatriation and not resettlement. In fact, it was recognized that Palestinians as an entire group of people fell into all three categories of main concern to the international community, and thus qualified as an entire group or category of refugees. The purpose behind these provisions was to set up a separate regime to specifically protect Palestinian refugees, and not to dilute the particular responsibility of the UN toward them by incorporating them in the Refugee Convention/UNHCR regime that focused on resettlement. The separate regime was the establishment of two UN agencies: the UNCCP and UNRWA, with complementary mandates to cover the full range of assistance and protection needs for this population. Moreover, since Palestinians as an entire people qualified as refugees in the eyes of the UN, they should not be required to meet the individualized refugee definition found in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. The language agreed upon in Article 1D was that "such persons shall *ipso facto* be entitled to the benefits of the Convention," in other words, the provision

does not refer to them as "refugees" under the Article 1A(2) Convention definition and precludes them from the requirement of meeting the individualized fear of persecution definition incorporated in that provision. Article 1D was intended as a *contingent inclusion* clause that would operate to automatically bring Palestinian refugees as an entire category under the coverage of the Refugee Convention regime should either prong of the special regime—the protection and assistance provided by two agencies—fail for any reason.

Because the majority of Palestinians are considered not to meet the main refugee definition in the convention and are specifically excluded from the mandate of UNHCR by its statute, they are presumed not to be "refugees" for purposes of eligibility for international protection. However, the drafting history of the instruments and the mandates of the agencies relevant to the Palestinians reflect that international protection was of utmost concern to the UN for this population of refugees. The UNCCP, established by UNGA Resolution 194 in December 1948, was entrusted to provide international protection, in particular the implementation of the durable solution mandated within 194 itself. UNRWA, established a year later, was entrusted with providing the day-to-day assistance of food, clothing, and shelter to the refugees pending the resolution of their situation. Of the two, UNCCP was clearly the agency that had the attention of the UN in its efforts to resolve both the refugee problem and the wider Palestinian-Arab-Israeli conflict. The UNCCP had an indefinite mandate, while UNRWA was initially established for only three years. The reasons for the UNCCP losing its role as the instrument of international protection are not entirely clear, but by 1952 the UNCCP had been reduced to no more than a small office to maintain records of Palestinian refugee property holdings. Thus, of the special, dual-agency regime set up to protect and assist Palestinian refugees, only UNRWA remained. Although UNRWA's valuable services have provided subsistence needs for Palestinian refugees for five decades, it is legally constrained from providing the main international protection guarantees to the refugees that could bring their plight closer to a permanent resolution.

The issue of whether Palestinians are "refugees" as a legal matter is a critical one, as the argument is made that if they are not refugees, they do not have any legal right to "return" to Israel. Opponents of a Palestinian right to return argue that Palestinians were displaced during a defensive war; that Israel has no obligation to allow them to return since they left voluntarily; that neither international human rights nor humanitarian law incorporates a right of return for war refugees; and that, even if there were such a right, it applies only to the return of individuals and not to mass return. Opponents also argue that Israel, as a successor state, had the right to define its "nationals" to include or exclude any category of people it chose, and since Palestinians became "non-nationals" under Israeli law, they had no right to return there. Opponents further claim that key UN resolutions supposedly grounding a right of return, such as UNGA Resolution 194, are nonbinding; that they do not, in fact, create a right of return; and that, even if they did, they condition it on certain factors that have not been met.

Each of the above positions negating a Palestinian right of return has been countered with significant legal authority, analysis, and state practice, the essence of which can only be summarized here. Beginning with humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict, concerning the right of war refugees to return after displacement, humanitarian law makes no distinction between forcible and nonforcible displacement in guaranteeing such persons their right to return to their homes. Critical humanitarian law provisions such as Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations forbid the forcible transfers of individuals or groups of people from territories taken during war, and require their repatriation "back to their homes" as soon as hostilities have ceased. They require the occupier to restore the occupied area to the normal community life existing before the outbreak of conflict. The underlying principle of prohibiting removal of civilians from their homes during conflict and requiring their repatriation immediately after the conflict has ceased is now considered a principle of binding customary humanitarian law.

In addition to humanitarian law, human rights provisions underlying the right of refugees or displaced persons to return to their places of origin are found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, Article 13) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, Article 12). Other provisions are repeated in many other international and regional human rights instruments, such as the European Convention on

Human Rights (Protocol 4, Article 3), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 22), and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (Article 12). Although there is much contention about whether these provisions oblige a state party to implement return of someone who is no longer a national of that state, the universal instruments—UDHR and ICCPR—grant a returnee the right to return to his or her precise place of origin regardless of current nationality or citizenship status by deliberately using the phrase "right to return to his own country" instead of the phrase "right to return to the country of his nationality." Moreover, these instruments make no distinction between individual and mass return, and the drafting history of their provisions does not indicate that the drafters intended the provisions to apply only to individuals seeking to return.

These provisions are consistent with the requirements of another area of law relevant to this question: the law of state succession. A core principle of this law is that "the population follows the change of sovereignty in matters of nationality." Thus, the new state must grant nationality to all of the original inhabitants of the territory. This principle has been codified in many treaties and legal decisions. It also appears in the UN's authoritative International Law Commission Articles on Nationality and State Succession. Although a state has almost unfettered discretion in defining its citizens and nationals, it cannot violate certain recognized principles of international law, such as arbitrarily excluding the original inhabitants of the territory it acquires or defining its citizens/nationals on a discriminatory basis. The principle of nondiscrimination is a fundamental one, found throughout human rights law. Article 5(d) of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) specifically requires states "to prohibit . . . discrimination in all its forms and guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin . . . the enjoyment of rights (including) the right to leave any country, including one's own and to return to one's country." Israel is a party to all the universal rights instruments referenced here—the Fourth Geneva Convention, the ICCPR, and CERD—and the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that the 1907 Hague Regulations are binding on Israel. Moreover, Israel has made no reservations limiting the application of these instruments on the issue of Palestinian right of return. Thus, Israel's massive denationalization of Palestinian Arabs on the basis of their national/ethnic origin was prohibited, and under these principles, is an ongoing violation of international law until today.

The debate about whether any UN resolutions support a Palestinian right of return is misleading in that it positions United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions against United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions. It is argued that the latter are nonbinding and that the former do not incorporate any clear statement affirming such a right. This debate also misconstrues the scope of UN resolutions, both on a refugee right of return in general and on Palestinian refugee right of return in particular. There are hundreds of both UNGA and UNSC resolutions dating back more than fifty years that affirm and reaffirm the right of return for refugees to their homes in every part of the world. The drafting history of UNGA Resolution 194, embodying the right of return for Palestinian refugees, makes quite clear that the drafters, particularly UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte, understood that the right of return was already a principle of customary law by 1948. Quite aside from the depth and breadth of evidence available through general and particular UN resolutions that there is a refugee right to return that all states must implement, state practice makes such a rule abundantly clear. In every part of the globe, the right of refugees to return to their homes and lands of origin is incorporated in peace treaties, implemented individually or through mass repatriation, and recognized by all states. In fact, the right of refugees to return is one of the most, if not *the* most, widely implemented and recognized right that exists in refugee law. Taking only one decade as an example, in the 1990s an estimated 12 million refugees repatriated to every region in the world. In contrast, only approximately 1.3 million refugees were resettled during that decade. UNHCR itself calculates that today only one-half of 1 percent of the world's refugees are resettled, while the overwhelming majority are repatriated or return post-conflict. This is so despite over fifty years of practice under the Refugee and Stateless Persons conventions, with their emphasis on resettlement. Based on state and international practice alone, it is evident that under international law, refugee return is the rule and that the nonrecognition of Palestinian refugees' right to return is an aberration.

UNGA Resolution 194 is the earliest resolution on Palestinian refugee return, and its language

must be understood in light of the state of international law existing at the time and the clarifications made by the UN drafters. The resolution embodies a three-pronged solution in hierarchical order: return, restitution of properties, and compensation. Paragraph 11 of that resolution states that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and . . . compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under the principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible. . . . [The UN] instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation." This language meant the Palestinian refugees must be permitted to return if they so chose, a point that has become clear from the intentions of the UN mediator who drafted it, as well as in the discussions by the UN delegates when 194 was passed. The principles of restitution and compensation of property were understood in the language referring to "under principles of international law or equity." The law of reparations at the time was already grounded in customary law, treaties, and a seminal decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) dating to the interwar period. In the *Chorzow Factory (Indemnity)* case of 1928, the PCIJ established the principle that restitution was the required remedy for unlawful property-taking, and only if restitution were impossible—strictly construed—should compensation be paid for property loss. The paragraph 11 formula set out both restitution and compensation under prevailing law ("loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible"). The *Chorzow Factory* decision made clear that reparations for property takings must, first and foremost, undo the effect of the violation, a formulation understood and incorporated in Bernadotte's formulation of Resolution 194. Paragraph 11 also makes return, restitution, and compensation equally enforceable, according to the refugee's own choice.

This understanding of 194 is the most consistent with refugee law principles in general, as recognized and implemented by states and international organs. UNHCR implements three forms of durable solution for refugees: return to place of origin, host country absorption, and third-state resettlement. As indicated above, return is the preferred solution for the overwhelming majority of refugees. However, UNHCR's implementation of any of the durable solutions is driven by the principle of refugee choice. The notion of international burden-sharing for refugees is meant to create meaningful and reasonable choice for refugees among safe and voluntary return, absorption, and resettlement—to the extent the latter two options are available in any particular refugee crisis. At the same time, of the three solutions, only return is an absolute obligation on states since no states are required to absorb or resettle a refugee, despite the provisions in the Refugee Convention encouraging them to do so. However, every state is required to permit its refugees to return home. In most instances of mass refugee flows since the 1970s, all three options have been available to a greater or lesser degree, and resolutions of mass refugee flows have been most successful when all three choices have been meaningful ones for the refugees themselves. For the issue of Palestinian refugee return, all of these principles have become even stronger since 1948, when Resolution 194 was passed, in that implementation and codification of return, restitution, and compensation have become more widespread. Until recently, the UN General Assembly also reaffirmed Resolution 194 itself on a yearly basis.

Consequences of the Protection Gap to Palestinian Refugees

The overall lack of a recognized legal status directly contributes to the deplorable conditions in which the majority of Palestinian refugees find themselves. Although conditions on identifiable criteria do vary significantly country by country, Palestinians worldwide are, in important ways, measurably worse off on the whole than their fellow non-Palestinian refugees or stateless persons in similar circumstances. Conceptually and legally, conditions of Palestinian refugees affect the two main aspects of protection: their day-to-day physical security and human needs, and their prospects for the realization and implementation of durable solutions for ending their refugee and stateless status. These two main aspects are further differentiated in two main global regions: the Arab states, where the majority of Palestinian refugees are located, and the non-Arab world.

Physical security, human dignity, and basic needs of Palestinian refugees within the Arab world vary significantly from state to state. In the Arab regions where UNRWA operates—the West Bank and Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan—refugees registered with the agency obtain benefits for basic survival needs. To provide assistance to the refugees, UNRWA administers refugee camp housing, allots food and clothing rations, establishes and runs primary schools, and operates medical facilities within its mandate. Other rights and benefits outside UNRWA's mandate that are within the realm of "international protection" are left to the discretion of the host state, as neither UNHCR nor any other international agency has the authority to provide such protection to Palestinians within the Arab world. Thus, no state or agency has the authority to intervene to protect the refugees' physical security, or to guarantee (or prevent violations of) their core human rights, despite UNRWA's many services that have aimed over the decades to narrow the protection gap.

The ongoing reality for Palestinian refugees is one of extreme vulnerability, particularly in the Arab world. Most states in the ARAB LEAGUE are not signatories to the international instruments guaranteeing the rights of refugees and stateless persons. Thus, the most important document in this regard is the 1965 Casablanca Protocol of the League of Arab States, which requires the Arab state signatories to guarantee to Palestinians in their territories the same treatment in employment, freedom of movement between Arab states, granting and renewing travel documents, freedom of residence, and rights to leave and return as they give their own nationals. In comparison to provisions of the international instruments, such as the Refugee Convention, the Casablanca Protocol provides more guarantees in a number of ways. Nevertheless, the degree to which Arab states have complied with these obligations has depended on the political environment affecting attitudes toward Palestinians in their territories, rather than on compliance with treaty standards. In general terms, most Palestinians in Arab states are treated like foreigners in that they are unable to obtain permanent residence status or security of residence, even if they marry citizens of the country or have children born in that Arab state. Movement between Arab states is extremely restricted because of lack of travel and residency documents. Employment is restricted in many states, as is housing, access to education beyond primary school, and family reunification. Using these criteria, Palestinians in Lebanon face the worst conditions. They are restricted to living in overcrowded, substandard, unsanitary, and often dangerous refugee camps. They are denied the right to work in over seventy professions and are also denied the rights to quality education and family reunification. Palestinians in Syria, on the other hand, enjoy quite favorable conditions in terms of day-to-day rights. Although they are not eligible for Syrian citizenship, they receive most of the same residency, social, education, employment, and civil rights as Syrian citizens.

Lack of residency rights or security of residence in most of the Arab states where Palestinians reside has had devastating consequences for the refugee/stateless populations. Without security of residence, Palestinians have been subjected to repeated expulsion and dispossession for decades, a situation that continues today. Aside from the expulsions from historic Palestine/Israel and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES that began in 1948 and continue today, almost every decade has brought mass expulsion of Palestinians from one Arab state or another. For example, in the 1950s, Palestinian workers were expelled from the Gulf states; in the 1970s hundreds of Palestinians were expelled from Jordan in the wake of conflict and the "BLACK SEPTEMBER" massacre. Other forcible displacements were the more than 100,000 Palestinians who were forced out of Lebanon during the civil war between 1976 and 1991, more than 400,000 Palestinians who were expelled from KUWAIT during the 1900–1991 GULF WAR, and the thousands of Palestinians forced out of Libya in 1995. Most recently, several thousand Palestinians have been displaced or expelled from IRAQ since the second US war on Iraq began in 2003. Palestinian refugee families have suffered multiple displacements within the Arab world due to lack of access to security of residence, a recognized nationality, or citizenship.

In the non-Arab world, where over 500,000 Palestinian refugees reside, their physical and human condition is directly related to the host state's interpretation of the relevant provisions of the refugee and stateless persons instruments discussed above. UNHCR has recently formalized its position that in the non-Arab world it may exercise its protection mandate toward Palestinians, depending on the attitude of the host state. Most

states in the Western world are signatories of the Refugee Convention, one of the two Stateless Persons conventions, or some combination of these. Nevertheless, most states do not apply Article 1D at all, misinterpret it as an exclusion clause toward Palestinians, or apply the individualized refugee definition of Article 1A(2). Generally, the result is that Palestinians are not recognized either as refugees or stateless persons in the majority of cases in the Western world and reside in a precarious status where they are also vulnerable to multiple displacements due to their "non-returnability." Since Palestinians are unable to regularize their status, they are subjected to prolonged detention in many cases because there is no state of nationality or habitual residence to which they can be returned. Nor do states provide them residence in fulfillment of the obligations to reduce statelessness. For example, states frequently identify Palestinians as of "unknown origin," or "unclear nationality," rather than as stateless or Palestinian refugees. Using these definitions allows such states to avoid applying the provisions of the stateless and refugee conventions to Palestinians in their territories.

The legal protection gap for Palestinians is even more acute in terms of the ultimate resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem, a resolution that requires guarantees for and mechanisms to implement durable solutions. Since the provisions of the major instruments that guarantee rights to refugees and stateless persons are perceived as excluding Palestinians, they are left outside the norms and mechanisms by which other refugees can realize return, absorption in other states, restitution of properties, compensation, and other rights. UNHCR is the primary agency with the international mandate to work toward realization and implementation of these rights for other refugees and stateless persons. It does not, with few exceptions, exercise these rights for Palestinians. Most importantly, it does not play the key role of intervention with the state primarily responsible for causing Palestinians to be refugees and stateless persons—Israel—in seeking implementation of the solution preferred by the refugees, that of repatriation/return to place of origin. In the Palestinian case, UNHCR has been absent from the key role it plays in other mass refugee situations, that of developing the framework for a durable solution based on refugee choice as part of peace negotiations and postconflict resolution. UNRWA, having no protection mandate, has been excluded from such a role with the effect that the key international mechanisms for implementing refugee return and related rights have been unavailable for Palestinians.

Lack of Durable Solutions in Israeli-Palestinian Agreements

From the perspective of international engagement with durable solutions, there has been almost no reference to fundamental legal principles in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. From the earliest various peace negotiations and agreements between the Israelis and Palestinians to the most recent, the core international legal principles governing refugee rights summarized above have been singularly absent.

There is widespread consensus on the core applicable legal principles to durable solutions for refugees. They are the right to return to one's home and place of origin in safety, the right to voluntarily choose among available resettlement options, the right to full restitution of property left behind, and the right to compensation for loss or damage to refugee property. For Palestinian refugees, these rights have been reaffirmed at least yearly by the UN General Assembly since their incorporation in UNGA Resolution 194 (III) of December 1948. These individual refugee rights of return, restitution, and compensation have been widely implemented by state practice concerning other refugee populations since they were outlined for the Palestinians in 194. Peace agreements in the former Yugoslav states of Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina recognize and implement refugee return and property restitution. The same is true for peace agreements concerning Georgia; Tajikistan; the multistate CIREFCA agreement of Central America involving Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico; and many African countries, such as Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, and Liberia. In Macedonia, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Guatemala, and Liberia, negotiated agreements specifically require that refugees and displaced persons be permitted to return to their homes or former places of residence. These and other agreements recognize and implement property restitution, including those for Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Rwanda, Croatia, Burundi, and Georgia. The most detailed return and property restitution agreement for refugees and other returnees can be found in Annex VII of the Dayton Accords of 1995, in

which the return of all property is a core requirement. Implementation of Dayton is particularly interesting because, to date, no compensation has been paid for property because all refugee property has been order restituted, with a primary focus on accommodating secondary occupants in other places rather than frustrating restitution to the original owners.

In contrast to the plethora of peace agreements requiring implementation of core refugee rights, the various agreements in the Israel-Palestine situation, from Oslo to the ROAD MAP, omit any references to Palestinian or to international human rights law in general, or replace the understood international framework with a political framework that distorts the legal requirements themselves. A very general review of the incorporation of international law on individual refugee rights through the main negotiation processes is discussed here.

The Oslo Agreements. The set of negotiated agreements under the "OSLO PROCESS" include the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, the 1994 GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT, and the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PLO. In all of these instruments, there are extremely limited references to human rights in general. The 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP), the initial framework agreement between the parties, states that its purpose is to recognize mutual legitimate and political rights to achieve a "just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process." There is no explanation of what will define the "legitimate rights" involved, or reference to any of the key instruments or customary law on refugee rights. The 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement refers generally to "accepted human rights norms" as governing the "powers and responsibilities" of the parties, but without any specification of what norms or rights apply, and without reference to treaties or UN Charter obligations. Of note in the 1995 Interim Agreement, there is a reference to "rights," but the only legal rights specified are those concerning government and absentee property acquired by Israelis in the Occupied Territories. This provision requires Palestinians to respect these rights; however, no parallel rights are recognized for Palestinian refugee or absentee property acquired by Israel or any other individual Palestinian rights. Both the Interim Agreement and the 1998 WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM imply that internationally accepted norms are subject to the agreements themselves, rather than, as international law requires, the other way around.

Concerning key refugee rights, the Oslo Process postponed discussion of the refugee issue until the final stage, which, to date, has never materialized. Thus, the main rights discussed above were not referenced at all. However, the lack of commitment to an international legal framework as the reference for negotiations is a main factor in the failure of the entire Oslo enterprise.

Taba. The January 2001 TABA TALKS between the PLO and Israel resulted in two separate draft proposals published by the parties. The proposals, one by the Palestinians and one by the Israelis, reflect much deeper discussion of the Palestinian refugee issue than in prior negotiations, but also reflect two dramatically different approaches to refugee rights and legal principles.

The Palestinian proposal reflects a sophisticated understanding of the international law of Palestinian refugee rights, incorporating the consensus legal framework, a refugee definition, mechanisms and modalities for implementing durable solutions for the refugees, and an "end of claims" clause. The Palestinian proposal is consistent with the framework and principles underlying UNGA Resolution 194, international law, and practice on refugee rights. It focuses on the voluntary choice of the refugee to decide to return to home or land within 1948 Israeli borders or to choose from available resettlement options. The Palestinian proposal discusses Israel's moral and legal responsibility for forced displacement and dispossession of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and for preventing their return.

The Israeli proposal, called a "private non-paper draft," responded to the Palestinian proposal and includes the Israeli narrative of the Palestinian refugee issue, a framework for solution and mechanism for implementation, modalities for compensation and rehabilitation, a special clause related to Jewish refugees, and an "end of claims" clause. It does not have a refugee definition. The Israeli response is, in essence, a political framework, inconsistent with UNGA Resolution 194, in that, although it lists five options for a solution, the solution is driven by Israel's concern for preservation of an institutionalized Jewish-privileged state, including Jewish control of land, rather than implementation of individual refugee choice to return and obtain restitution of Palestinian property. The five options set out in the Israeli proposal

are a limited number of refugees "returning" to Israel, a land swap, resettlement primarily in a Palestinian state, rehabilitation in Arab host countries, and some resettlement in third states. The Israeli proposal does not acknowledge direct Israeli responsibility for the refugee issue or for implementing durable solutions, but states that Israel has indirect responsibility along with "all those parties directly or indirectly responsible."

The Geneva Initiative. The Geneva Initiative, a private, nongovernmental initiative made public in October 2003, is also inconsistent with the international law framework. The key UN resolutions referenced in Geneva are UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In Article 7 of Geneva, the main provision on refugees, the drafters state that "the parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Res. 242 and the Arab Peace Initiative concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement." In other words, 194, 242, and 338 mean what the drafters interpret them to mean, rather than what international legal consensus and state practice require.

Like the Israeli response to Taba, Article 7 of Geneva presents a number of options for the refugees. They include "return" to "the state of Palestine," areas in Israel to be transferred to Palestine in a land swap, third-country resettlement, and limited "return" to Israel in a total number that Israel agrees to accept. Israel's acceptance of limited refugee return, moreover, would be part of a formula in which the largest proportion will be required to be resettled in third states and absorbed in Arab host states. Although the provision states that the solution process for refugees shall be driven by a free and informed choice, the real choice of return at refugee discretion is not part of the formula. Property compensation is discussed, and a mechanism for compensation through an international commission is described. Israel would agree to a single "lump sum" contribution to an international fund, which would be the total accepted Israeli liability for the Palestinian refugee problem. Property of Israeli settlers left in the Occupied Territories would be used to offset Israeli payments to this fund. Israel would also contribute to a "refugeehood" fund to be distributed to refugee communities for development, but the details of this fund have not been made public.

The Road Map. In contrast to Taba and the Geneva Initiative, the latest intergovernmental proposal, the QUARTET's Performance-Based ROAD MAP, issued in April 2003, does not refer to international law on individual refugee rights or to any outside framework at all. Its sole focus is whatever the parties agree upon. The Road Map, like the Oslo Process, refers to the refugees as part of the third and final phase, when the parties are to "reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the Occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue." The three Security Council resolutions referenced do not address any of the individual refugee rights at all. The language of 242, "affirming the necessity for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem," is simply recalled in 338 and 1397. Although there is an argument that this language, by implication, must refer back to 194 because that is the international consensus for the resolution of the refugee problem, and this may have been the PLO's assumption, it is clearly not Israel's assumption or intention. The absence of any reference to 194 appears quite deliberate.

These three resolutions—242 (1967), 338 (1973), and 1397 (2002)—set out a solution based on "land for peace." The exchange of most Palestinian land for peace for Israel is considered the basis of the two-state solution incorporated into 1397 as "a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders." This formula, however, leaves out the individual rights of Palestinians as refugees to return, restitution, and compensation, and appears to incorporate a trade-off between the "right" to a state and individual rights. All of the negotiation processes thus far have been based on the formula of two ethnonational states in the mandate Palestine area. Under such a plan, the refugees would be resettled in a future state of Palestine in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Thus, the settlement of the refugee question would be based on some notion of humanitarian/political considerations, not legal principles. There is no explicit reference to rights of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes or to housing and property restitution as understood under international law.

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Refuseniks

See BREAKING THE SILENCE; CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; COURAGE TO REFUSE; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; NEW PROFILE; PILOTS' LETTER; REFUSER SOLIDARITY NETWORK; SHMINISTIM; YESH G'VUL

Refusenik Watch

Refusenik Watch is a continuously updated list of Israeli CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, refuseniks, high school refusers, and others who refuse Israeli military service. As of December 2004, at least 1,686 individuals had refused to serve in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Some had been imprisoned for obeying their conscience, totaling at least 11,851 days in military jails as of the end of 2004. Moreover, activists have documented interviews with seventy-seven prisoners of conscience who refused to serve the OCCUPATION without signing any of the formal "pledges," such as the COURAGE TO REFUSE—COMBATANTS' LETTER. The numbers are based on a comprehensive refusenik list that Oz Shelach compiles regularly from the lists published online by YESH G'VUL, the SHMINISTIM, Courage to Refuse, and the PILOTS' LETTER, as well as from information supplied by NEW PROFILE. The list is kept open as evidence of the accuracy of the Refusenik Watch banners that publicly displayed the changing numbers of refuseniks. Because three of the groups do not do endorsements in English, the list is currently available in Hebrew only. (http:// oznik.com/web_masters.html)

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI MILITARISM; individual groups listed under REFUSENIKS

Refuser Solidarity Network

Refuser Solidarity Network (RSN) was formed in April 2002 to provide support for the growing Refuser Movement in Israel, made up of those who refuse to serve in the military in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The initial impetus for the establishment of the RSN was the publication in January 2002 of the COMBATANTS' LETTER by a group of over fifty reserve officers, which later became COURAGE TO REFUSE (Ometz Le'sarev). The overall objective of the RSN is to support all Israelis who refuse to serve the OCCUPATION, all reservists who refuse to serve in the Occupied Territories, and all men and women conscripts who refuse to serve in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES as part of their opposition to Occupation. RSN works to build support for and visibility of the refusers and their movement because it believes that these voices are crucial to convincing Israelis that a new course must be chosen if there is to be lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. (http://www.refusersolidarity.net).

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; ISRAELI MILITARISM; individual groups listed under REFUSENIKS

Rejection Front

See PALESTINE REJECTION FRONT

Religious and Ethnic Communities in Pre-1948 Palestine

The divisions in ethnicity and religion in pre-1948 Palestine served Ottoman, British, and Zionist strategies of domination. To begin with, the Ottoman caliphate favored Sunni Muslims, especially those of Ottoman Turkish ethnic background. Non-Muslims were constituted as religio-ethnic communities (*ahl al-dhimma,* protected, tribute-paying peoples) whose representatives to Istanbul were the chief religious figures of the respective faiths, for example, patriarchs and rabbis. The British, in turn, adapted the Ottoman practice, maintaining Christians and Jews as separate groups while reducing the Arab Sunni Muslim majority to the level of a religious community alongside the others. After 1948, the state of Israel continued this system by constituting Palestinians administratively not as a national community in their own right but rather as disparate non-Jewish religious and ethnic minorities.

In the *Survey of Palestine* and the subsequent *Supplement*, two documents compiled from 1945 to 1947 for the ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY and the UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE, respectively, BRITISH MANDATE statisticians identified two ethnicities—Arab and Jew—and three main religions—CHRISTIANITY, Islam, and Judaism. They also briefly described the smaller Druze, Baha'i, Mutawali, and SAMARITAN communities, referred to as "other religions" in the report's statistics. Table 6, drawn from the *Survey* (Volume I: 141), summarizes the census data for the "settled population" from 1922 to 1944. Between those years, the Jewish community increased by more than sixfold, while all other groups roughly doubled in number. Waves of Jewish emigration from Europe largely accounted for this difference.

Sunni Muslim Community

The Sunni Muslim community in Mandate Palestine included urban, rural, and nomadic-pastoralist groups. The urban milieu differentiated further among the older landowning notables (*al-a'yan*); the younger, university-educated sons of the *a'yan*; small shop owners; and landless rural laborers drawn to industrial cities like HAIFA. Despite these cleavages, institutions such as the *awqaf* (religious endowments administration) and the nascent Palestinian nationalist movement that built on these structures fostered a degree of integration among Sunnis.

Following the Ottoman land reforms of 1858, the notables came to dominate the *awqaf* as well as the city councils, especially in JERUSALEM. In 1921, a SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL (SMC) was created "for the control and management of Muslim *Awqaf* and *Shari'a* affairs in Palestine," headed by the mufti (advisory scholar of Shari'a law) of Jerusalem. A year later AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, a young, rising figure from an important landowning family in Jerusalem, was selected by the British to be mufti and president of the SMC. Husayni transformed the SMC into a patronage machine through which he dominated the emerging Palestinian nationalist movement. The SMC functioned as a parallel government to the Mandate by building mosques, community centers, and landmarks such as the National Palace Hotel; appointing its own officials; and advocating for the Palestinian cause among Arab and Muslim leaders abroad. The dominance of the notables, however, was never completely stable. A series of peasant uprisings, culminating in the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT, took aim against the urban landowning families, who were blamed for selling

Table 6 Census Data for Settled Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Other Religious and Ethnic Communities in British Mandate Palestine

Census Date	Muslims	Jews	Christians	Others
1922	486,177	83,790	71,464	7,617
1935	770,135	355,157	105,236	11,031
1944	994,724	528,702	135,547	14,098

village lands to the Zionists and collaborating with the British as much as against the British authorities and Zionist settlers.

Jewish Community

The pre-1948 Yishuv, or Jewish community, was composed of two main ethnic groups: European ASHKENAZI immigrants (the vast majority) and Middle Eastern MIZRAHI and SEPHARDI Jews (most of whom had lived in Palestine for centuries). Until after the First and Second ALIYAS (IMMIGRATIONS) of 1881–1903 and 1904–1914, respectively, the Mizrahi and Sephardi Jews were the majority. Concentrated in towns, primarily Jerusalem, SAFED, TIBERIAS, and HEBRON, they based their communities on *Halacha* (religious law), rabbinic authority, and the pursuit of trades, small business, and some agriculture. Although rooted in religio-ethnic communal structures, the early Yishuv, especially the Mizrahim and Sephardim, interacted with the surrounding Arab Muslim society and received recognition from the Ottoman authorities. Indeed, the Mizrahim and Sephardim were Ottoman subjects, represented in Istanbul by their *hakham bashi* (chief rabbi).

The Zionist movement, and the waves of immigration to Palestine it promoted, shifted the demographic balance toward the Ashkenazim. In so doing, it reoriented the Yishuv away from its traditional religious ethos toward a secular-nationalist and European orientation focused intently, despite internal splits, on the single objective of building a Jewish state. ZIONISM transformed the status of the Mizrahim and Sephardim, subordinating them to Ashkenazi dominance, and introduced changes in intercommunal relations. Yishuv leaders, such as DAVID BEN-GURION and the General Federation of Hebrew Workers (the HISTADRUT), emphasized the importance of "Hebrew labor" and insisted on creating agricultural communes and industries that employed Jewish workers to the exclusion of the increasingly landless *fellahin* (the Arab peasantry). This ethnic-cultural exclusivity resulted in the expanding Yishuv becoming a target of resentment among the *fellahin*. Moreover, the Yishuv created a Jewish-only educational system during the 1920s–1930s, as well as a public health structure based on the Histadrut Sick Fund and the Hadassah Organization. The Zionists also revived Hebrew, making it the standard language of school instruction. Rabbinic institutions were no longer the central organizing structures of communal life, although they retained control over marriage and divorce through a Rabbinic Council.

Christian Community

The pre-1948 Christian community was predominantly urban and middle-class and divided primarily along confessional lines. According to the 1922 census, the largest group was the GREEK ORTHODOX, comprising 33,369 members, or 45.7 percent of all Christians. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem was the dominant institution, although important lay organizations had started to emerge in the 1800s. The Patriarchate was overseen by the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulcher, a Greek monastic order that concerned itself mostly with maintaining its grip on Christian pilgrimage sites. Members of the brotherhood are the administrative officers of the Patriarchate, and the Metropolitans, Archbishops, Bishops, Archimandrites, Hieromonks (monks who are also priests but from the local Palestinian Orthodox community, not Greece), Hierodeacons (monks who have been ordained a deacon also from the local Palestinian flock), and Monks (also local) of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. In the late 1800s, the Arab laity and local monks began to agitate for local control, staging a series of uprisings. In these agitations, the lay leadership allied itself with Palestinian nationalist institutions such as the MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATIONS, first established in JAFFA in 1918, and the Supreme Muslim Council. The conflict between the Greek hierarchy and the local Palestinian priests and monks continues through the present.

The second largest Christian group, comprising 14,245 members in 1922, was the Roman Catholic, or *al-Latin*. The Franciscans, as well as a host of other monastic orders and the Latin Patriarchate, were the institutional mainstays, developing an extensive network of charitable societies and educational institutions at every level by the end of the Mandate. The third largest Christian community—12,645 members according to the 1931 census—was the Greek Catholic (*al-malākiyya*). Formed during the 1724 Greek Orthodox schism in SYRIA and LEBANON, this group possessed strong local control over its hierarchy, with Palestinians serving as its priests and bishops. Greek Catholic bishops became active in the pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalist movements and later supported PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) activism. The remaining Christian

groups included the Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Chaldean Orthodox, Ethiopian Orthodox, and Coptic Orthodox. Each of these churches had a "Uniate" analogue—that is, a splinter movement that aligned with Roman Catholicism. There were, in addition, several Protestant denominations with roots in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Western missionary activity.

Other Groups

Several other smaller communities existed alongside the Sunni Muslim, Jewish, and Christian groups. Among these was the Baha'i, numbering 400 in 1945–1946. An offshoot of Iranian Shi'a Islam, Baha'i appeared in the Haifa-ACRE region after the Ottomans deported a segment of the movement to the area in the late 1860s. Another small group, adhering to what it considered the purist form of Judaism as practiced in Old Testament times, was the Samaritans, comprising just 267 individuals in the NABLUS and Jaffa areas in 1945–1946. Yet a third group was the Mutawali, adherents of Twelver Shi'ism, based mostly in southern Lebanon and Syria. In 1945–1946, the Mutawali in Palestine numbered 4,600 members in the Acre and Safed areas. A fourth group, the Circassians (Sunni Muslims originally from the northwest Caucasus), had settled in two villages in the Galilee region. This segment of the Sunni community dispersed to various parts of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE in the 1860s after Russia forcibly annexed the Caucasus region.

The most significant of the smaller groups, numbering about 13,000 in 1945–1946, was the Muwahhidun (Unitarians), known commonly as the Duruz, or Druze. Originating as an offshoot of eleventh-century Fatimid Isma'ilism ("Sevener" Shi'a) in EGYPT, the Druze eventually became situated mainly in Lebanon and Syria, but several thousand relocated to northern Palestine following the 1860 clashes with Lebanese Maronite Christians. The community became endogamous and adopted a distinction between *al-juhhal* (the "ignorant," i.e., uninitiated members of the community) and *al-'uqqal* (the "knowing" or "wise," i.e., the elders privy to the secret teachings, councils, and rituals). The heads of the *'uqqal* were known as *shaykh*s and one of these *shaykh*s served as the Druze representative to the Mandate under the designation of chief *qadi,* or judge. During the pre-1948 period, the Druze leadership pragmatically alternated among alliances with Arab nationalists, the British, and finally the Zionists.

Since the establishment of the state of Israel, the demographic and political status of the various religious and ethnic groups has continued to evolve in different directions. After 1948, to ensure Jewish demographic and political dominance, Israel created a Ministry of Religious Affairs that perpetuated the Mandate's categorization of individuals according to religio-ethnic identity (Jews, Muslims, Druze, Christians, etc.). After 1967, PLO nationalism countered the Zionist stress on religio-ethnic solidarities by developing a multiconfessional outlook that construed the different religious groups, including those Jews who predated the arrival of the European-Ashkenazi settlers, as tributaries of the Arab-Palestinian national collective. During the 1980s, a new generation of young lay leaders among the "1948 Arabs" (those Palestinians who had remained in what became Israel) challenged the traditional elites, who had the support of the Israeli state. Their efforts across the sectarian divides served to revitalize not only an activist religious consciousness but also conceptions of solidarity that went beyond narrow religio-communal lines. Since the 1980s the PLO's multiconfessional orientation has lost its hegemonic status among Palestinians and now contends with deeply rooted and institutionally diversified Islamist movements that seek to revitalize a Shari'a-based Muslim Palestine. Caught between a resurgent Islamism and a powerful Jewish-identified Israel, some West Bank and Gaza Christians, whose number continues to rapidly decline as entire families leave for Europe and the Americas, have retreated into their communal enclaves.

See also DEMOGRAPHY; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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—Loren D. Lybarger

Religious Zionism

See ZIONISM

Restrictions on Movement I

Israel uses a variety of measures to restrict Palestinian freedom of movement. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES claim that the restrictions on movement imposed on Palestinians are intended to ensure the free movement of Jews in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and protect the security of all Israelis, but the practical result is complete control over the lives of ordinary Palestinians and a practice of inequality forbidden in international law.

The measures include CLOSURE, SIEGE, CURFEW, CHECKPOINTS, the BARRIER, the PERMIT system, and ROADBLOCKS, among others. Some of them have been utilized since the beginning of the OCCUPATION in 1967; others were instituted in 1991 and tightened in 2000. Virtually all remain in effect as of 2009. Indeed, the restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed since the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA are unprecedented in the history of the Israeli Occupation—in their scope and duration and in the severity of damage they cause to the 3.75 million Palestinians. International human rights law requires Israel to respect the right of residents of the Occupied Territories to move about freely in the Occupied Territory. This right is recognized in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and others.

Freedom of movement is also important because it is a prerequisite to the exercise of other rights, such as those set forth in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, among them the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to HEALTH CARE, the right to EDUCATION, and the right to protection of family life. Moreover, human rights organizations maintain that Israel's policy involves overt discrimination based on national origin in that the restrictions apply only to Palestinians. Jewish residents of the Occupied Territories are permitted to enter and leave the settlements without restriction.

Summary of Restrictions

Because each of the restrictions has an independent entry, they will not be more fully elaborated here, but in a January 2007, *Ha'aretz* (the preeminent Israeli daily), correspondent Amira Hass provided the following summary of the restrictions on freedom of movement for Palestinians.

Ongoing Prohibitions

- Palestinians are forbidden to enter East Jerusalem.
- Palestinians from the GAZA STRIP are forbidden to stay in the WEST BANK.
- West Bank Palestinians are forbidden to enter the Gaza Strip through the ERETZ CROSSING.
- Palestinians are forbidden to enter the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY.
- Palestinians are forbidden to enter villages, lands, towns, and neighborhoods along the "seam line"

between the separation Barrier and the Green Line (some 10 percent of the West Bank).
- Palestinians who are not residents of Beit Furik and Beit Dajan in the NABLUS area and Ramadin, south of HEBRON, are forbidden entry to these villages.
- Palestinians are forbidden to enter the Jewish SETTLEMENTS area (even if their lands are inside the areas claimed by settlers but not built up or near the actual settlement).
- Palestinians are forbidden to enter Nablus in a vehicle.
- Palestinian residents of JERUSALEM are forbidden to enter Area A (Palestinian towns under control of the PNA in the West Bank).
- Gaza Strip residents are forbidden to enter the West Bank via the Allenby Crossing.
- Palestinians are forbidden to travel abroad via Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv.
- Children under age sixteen are forbidden to leave Nablus without an original birth certificate and parental escort.
- Palestinians with permits to enter Israel are forbidden to enter through the crossings used by Israelis and tourists.
- Gaza residents are forbidden to establish residency in the West Bank.
- West Bank residents are forbidden to establish residency in the Jordan Valley, seam line communities, or the villages of Beit Furik and Beit Dajan.
- Palestinians are forbidden to transfer merchandise and cargo through internal West Bank checkpoints.

Periodic Prohibitions
- Residents of certain parts of the West Bank are forbidden to travel to the rest of the West Bank.
- People of a certain age group—mainly men from the ages of sixteen to thirty, thirty-five, or forty—are forbidden to leave the areas where they reside (usually Nablus and other cities in the northern West Bank).
- Private cars may not pass the Swahara–ABU DIS checkpoint (which separates the northern and southern West Bank). (This restriction was canceled for the first time, in mid-December 2006 under the easing of restrictions.)

Travel Permits Required
- Magnetic cards (intended for entrance to Israel but ease the passage through checkpoints within the West Bank).
- Work permits for Israel (for which the employer applies from the civil administration offices).
- Permits for medical treatment in Israeli and Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem (require applicants to produce an invitation from the hospital, their complete medical background, and proof that the treatment they are seeking cannot be provided in the Occupied Territories).
- Travel permits are required to pass through Jordan Valley checkpoints.
- Merchants must obtain permits to transfer goods.
- Permits are required to farm along the seam line (require a form from the land registry office, a title deed, and proof of first-degree relations to the registered property owner).
- Entry permits for the seam line (for relatives, medical teams, construction workers, etc., and require those with permits to enter and leave via the same crossing).
- Permits to pass from Gaza through Israel to the West Bank.
- Birth certificates for children under sixteen.
- Resident identity cards for those who live in seam line enclaves.

Checkpoints and Barriers
- Seventy-five manned checkpoints in the West Bank (as of January 2007).
- On average 150 mobile ("flying") checkpoints each week (as of September 2006).
- Nearly 500 obstacles/roadblocks placed between roads and villages, including concrete cubes, earth ramparts, eighty-eight iron gates, and 45 miles (74 kilometers) of fence along main roads.
- Eighty-three iron gates along the separation Barrier, which divide lands from their owners. Only twenty-five of the gates open occasionally; fifty-eight are closed permanently.

Main Roads Closed to Palestinians—Officially or in Practice
- Road 90 (the Jordan Valley thoroughfare).
- Road 60 in the north (from the Shavei Shomron military base, west of Nablus and northward).
- Road 585: along the settlements Hermesh and Dotan.
- Road 557: west from the Taibeh–Tul Karm junction (the Green Line) to Anabta (excluding the residents of Shufa), and east from south of

Nablus (the Hawara checkpoint) to the settlement Elon Moreh.
- Road 505: from Zatara (Nablus junction) to Ma'ale Efraim.
- Road 5: from the Barkan junction to the Green Line.
- Road 446: from Dir Balut junction to Road 5 (by the settlements Alei Zahav and Peduel).
- Roads 445 and 463: around the settlements Talmon, Dolev, and Nahliel.
- Road 443: from Maccabim-Reut to Givat Ze'ev.
- Streets in the Old City of Hebron.
- Road 60: from the settlement of Otniel southward.
- Road 317: around the SOUTH HEBRON MOUNTAIN settlements.

Travel Time before 2000 versus Today
- Tul Karm–Nablus: from half an hour, at the most, to at least an hour.
- Tul Karm–Ramallah: from less than one hour to two hours.
- Beit Ur al-Fawqa–Ramallah: from ten to forty-five minutes.
- Katana/Beit Anan–Ramallah: from fifteen to sixty–ninety minutes.
- Bir Naballah–Jerusalem: from seven minutes to one hour.
- Katana-Jerusalem: from five minutes to "Nobody goes to Jerusalem anymore."

See also BANTUSTANS; BARRIER; CHECKPOINTS; CLOSED MILITARY ZONES; CLOSURE; CURFEW; PERMITS; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT II: AIRPORT, SEAPORT, AND BARRIER; ROADBLOCKS; ROAD SYSTEM IN THE WEST BANK; SIEGE

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Restrictions on Movement II: Airport, Seaport, and Barrier

Among the many contentious issues that consumed Israeli-Palestinian talks after the ceremonial signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES between Israeli and PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) leaders on 13 September 1993 was freedom of movement for Palestinians within and outside the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Predictably, this matter was and remains critical for Palestinians who have been subject to Israeli military restrictions, CHECKPOINTS, control over border crossings, and other prohibitions on movement.

The physical confinement of the Palestinian population goes back decades, most markedly to June 1967, when Israel's military rule expanded to include East JERUSALEM, the WEST BANK, and the GAZA STRIP. After the outcome of the 1967 WAR, Israeli restrictions on freedom of movement were most visible at border crossings in Gaza and the West Bank, chiefly those bordering EGYPT and JORDAN, respectively. The Israeli takeover of the BORDERS and the concomitant restrictions on movement resulted in a serious interruption to the flow of labor abroad and the capital remittances it engendered. Before the border restrictions, much of the income generated by tens of thousands of Palestinians abroad found its way back to the economically stagnant Occupied Territories, thus helping struggling families cope with poverty and the near-total absence of a meaningful economic INFRASTRUCTURE. Additionally, both Egypt and Jordan had been used as starting points for Palestinian professionals and laborers seeking employment in the oil-rich Arab Gulf States.

Confined to the Occupied Territories and subjected to the economic reality therein, Palestinians found themselves turning to Israel for financial relief. The relatively vibrant Israeli economy and its constant need for manual labor were the only respite Palestinians could find, and tens of thousands were quickly transformed into a pool of cheap labor for Israel's economy. For Palestinians,

this relationship signaled the commencement of a historic period of severe economic dependency, which for decades made Palestinian economic growth entirely dependent on Israel's interests. It is against this backdrop that ordinary Palestinians welcomed the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS in 1993, perceiving the framework for future negotiations as an opportunity to shake off their reliance on Israel, be rid of Israel's restrictions, enjoy freedom of movement within and without the Occupied Territories, and develop their ECONOMY without foreign constraints. It was also assumed that Palestinians would soon have control over their own border crossings. Palestinian officials fueled this optimism by speaking repeatedly about a Palestinian-controlled seaport, an airport, and a safe passage to link the West Bank and Gaza, all of which they claimed were promised under the provisions of Oslo and would be implemented at later stages.

The WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, signed on 23 October 1998 under US auspices, specifically promised the opening of the Gaza airport and safe passage. The airport was built with funding from Japan, Egypt, SAUDI ARABIA, Spain, and GERMANY. It was designed by Moroccan engineers at a total cost of $86 million. Finally, on 27 November 1998, the Palestinian airport was officially opened. Most Palestinians celebrated their airport as a symbol of sovereignty and nationhood, as well as a first step toward the attainment of their long-sought independence. However, although the airport bore Palestinian signs and symbols and was to operate "jointly," according to the Oslo Accords and Wye Memorandum, it operated under strict Israeli control with Israeli personnel, who made the final determination about who would be granted or barred entry.

Less than two years later, in response to the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, Israel closed the Gaza airport, with the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES ordering the nearly 450 staff to evacuate at gunpoint. In the early months of 2001, in another strong message to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), Israeli tanks and bulldozers destroyed the airport's runway and control tower. Following ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in August 2005, the PNA sought to rebuild the airport (at an estimated cost of $26 million). Although in principle agreeing to the Palestinian request, Israel nevertheless expected to retain control over the facility for "security reasons." In late 2009, negotiations are still in progress, while the airport, now named YASIR ARAFAT International Airport, is half destroyed and abandoned.

In September 1999, the SHARM AL-SHAYKH MEMORANDUM stipulated the need to open a Gaza seaport for exclusive Palestinian use. "The Israeli side agrees that the Palestinian side shall commence construction works in and related to the Gaza seaport on October 1, 1999," the agreement read in part. However, the construction of the port did not begin until July 2000, only to be halted by Israel in October of the same year after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Frequent Israeli raids on Gaza and on the partially completed port facilities, as well as Israel's refusal to facilitate construction, sent the project back to the drawing board. When the Israeli Knesset voted to approve Israel's disengagement plan, it required Israel to retain control over Palestinian territorial waters and provide WATER to Gaza. According to Israeli sources, US secretary of state CONDOLEEZZA RICE brokered a deal with Israeli officials in November 2005 to allow Palestinians in the region to work on rebuilding the seaport. Israel's war with HAMAS in Gaza, however, has prevented any construction.

The issue of safe passage, a core aspect of Palestinian national aspirations, was aimed at facilitating movement of persons and goods between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, free from Israeli interference. Safe passage was a topic of prime importance in the early rounds of Oslo negotiations. Moreover, under the Oslo, Wye River, and Sharm al-Shaykh agreements, Israel specifically accepted two routes of safe passage that would enable Palestinians to move freely between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Sharm al-Shaykh promised 1 October 1999 as a date for the operation of the southern route, although the northern route was deferred to a later date.

According to the agreement, Palestinians wishing to travel or transport goods between the West Bank and Gaza would be required to apply to the PNA for a permit, which in turn would apply to Israel for a selected number of applicants. Those individuals who passed the Israeli security check would be allowed to use the routes for a single round-trip during fixed daytime hours and for specific periods, but if they wanted to use the passage again, they would have to reapply using the same procedures. The southern route of the safe passage was eventually opened on 25 October 1999, but Israel closed it a year later, again in response to the

al-Aqsa Intifada. The northern route, scheduled for opening on 5 February 2000, was delayed indefinitely.

See also RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT I

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—Ramzy Baroud

Returnees

The Returnees, also called the Tunisians, the Oslo elite, or the OLD GUARD, are Palestinians who lived in TUNIS with YASIR ARAFAT in the last PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION headquarters in exile, after its 1982 expulsion from LEBANON, and who returned with Arafat to the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES during the OSLO ACCORDS period (1993–2000). Estimates of their number vary widely, from 10,000 to 40,000 to 100,000. Most worked in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) as bureaucrats who ran the PNA or were former guerrillas who dominated Arafat's enormous security apparatus.

Charges of corruption and indifference to the suffering of the Palestinian people were directed against the returnees, especially in the GAZA STRIP. As foreign aid flowed to the PNA and nongovernmental organizations, many of the returnees used their outsized salaries, often supplemented with graft, to construct ostentatious new homes and frequent the new discos and restaurants that sprang up in Gaza City, Ramallah, and elsewhere. This extravagance and their disdain for local norms bred resentment among local Palestinians, many of whom had seen their standard of living decline precipitously after the Oslo Accords. Returnees were accused of using legal loopholes that they helped create in the economic agreements with Israel to personally profit from Palestinian autonomy. Although not all returnees were corrupt and amoral, perceived differences between locals and returnees help fuel political opposition to the PNA.

It was mainly in Gaza that the returnees took root, with their array of ministries, authorities, and special agencies, police stations and sentry posts, choice rooftop apartments, villas, and places of entertainment. Within a short time, most Gazans came to feel that the returnees were as alien and as unfit to rule as those (Turks, British, Egyptians, and Israelis) who came before them. Moreover, because they were actually Palestinian and came as liberators, the disappointment was even worse. Especially in Gaza, the poorest of Palestinian communities, the returnees took at least as much as they brought. Part of the problem was that Arafat promised the Gazans on his return that he would turn Gaza into a "new Singapore" and that the Palestinian executives who made their fortunes building the Arab oil states would now invest in the homeland. Three years later, however, there was precious little investment in the Strip. Not only were businessmen deterred by Israeli restrictions—CLOSURE, PERMITS, and so forth—but the extensive corruption in the PNA also made investment highly risky. Some have speculated that Arafat did not really want the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA investors, because they could have undermined his control, which he had achieved through a combination of police surveillance and financial power. He preferred "donor money" from Western institutions that presented far less of a challenge to his power. Thus, instead of any kind of independent,

wealth-producing capitalism, Arafat and his coterie of unofficial economic advisers threw up a ramshackle, nepotistic edifice of monopoly, racketeering, and extortion that enriched them as it further impoverished society at large. As Gaza's economy went from bad to worse, the returnees received the blame.

See also OLD GUARD; PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY; TUNIS

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Revisionist Zionism

See ZIONISM

Rice, Condoleezza (1954–)

Condoleezza Rice became the sixty-sixth US secretary of state, on 28 January 2005 in the second term of President GEORGE W. BUSH, thus becoming the first black female secretary of state. During the first Bush term, she served as assistant to the president for national security affairs, or national security adviser. She received her Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver in 1981 and was a professor of political science at Stanford University, where she served for six years as provost (1993–1999). Rice was a member of multiple boards of directors, including the Chevron Corporation, the Charles Schwab Corporation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, and the International Advisory Council of J. P. Morgan.

Rice was a consistent supporter of Israel and defended Israel's right to protect itself in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a 2003 interview with the Israeli newspaper *Yediot Aharonot*, Rice, then national security adviser, talked about her feelings toward the state: "I first visited Israel in 2000. I already then felt that I am returning home despite the fact that this was a place I never visited. I have a deep affinity with Israel. I have always admired the history of the State of Israel and the hardness and determination of the people that founded it. . . . Israel was a state who in the beginning was not given a chance to survive, she survived mainly because of the hardness of the Israelis and their readiness to sacrifice their lives for the state."

As national security adviser, Rice was a key player in promoting the 2003 ROAD MAP step-by-step peace plan, which includes the establishment of a Palestinian state. On 29 August 2006, she stated that the region "should be a Middle East in which there is a Palestinian state in which Palestinians can have their own aspirations met, one that is not corrupt, one that is democratic, [and] one in which there is only one authority." During her tenure as secretary of state, she continued to promote the Road Map even when Bush backed away from it.

On 9 February 2007, Rice met with leaders from the major American Jewish organizations and assured the participants that the UNITED STATES would not pressure Israel and would not come up with its own suggestions for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict once the Road Map negotiations began. She said her goal involved "providing the Palestinians with a 'political horizon,'" eliminating misunderstanding between Palestinians and Israelis, and improving the atmosphere between them. According to several participants, Rice stressed the need to show the Palestinians that the key to achieving an independent state was in the hands of PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) president MAHMUD ABBAS, not HAMAS, the militant Islamic organization.

Rice made more than twenty trips to the Middle East. Although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not the central focus of each trip, the secretary could not avoid the issue in most Arab capitals. In her July 2005 trip, Rice traveled to Arab capitals to advocate and gain support for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA and four small WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS in the context of its larger CONVERGENCE PLAN. Skeptical Arab leaders were not particularly receptive to the idea of Israel unilaterally determining its final BORDERS and excluding the Palestinians, among whom Israel claimed to have no partner with

which to negotiate. The secretary returned to the region in November to negotiate the opening of Gaza's border crossings to facilitate the movement of Palestinian goods and people. She found the Israelis disinclined to make other than cosmetic concessions, but on 15 November 2005, Rice presided over an accord between Israel and the PNA called the "Agreement on Movement and Access Principles for Rafah Crossing," which involved, among other things, agreed principles for the operation of RAFAH CROSSING "to promote economic development" and to "improve the humanitarian situation on the ground." Rice declared that "the agreement is meant to give the Palestinian people freedom to move, trade, live normal lives. . . . For the first time since 1967, Palestinians will gain control over entry and exit from their territory." Israel violated the agreement almost immediately by closing Rafah for lengthy periods and was not criticized by Rice or anyone else in the US administration. The January 2006 electoral victory by Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council led Rice to mount an international campaign to garner global support for a total economic boycott of the PNA. The embargo that ensued left the overwhelming majority of Palestinians unemployed and existing below the poverty line. At the time, Rice chided Hamas, "You cannot have one foot in politics and the other foot in terror."

Rice's next occasion for a Middle East visit came in July 2006 in the context of Israel's wars in LEBANON in retaliation for the 12 July kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers by HIZBULLAH, and in Gaza (OPERATION SUMMER RAINS) for the capture of an Israeli soldier and the killing of two others by Hamas. On the Lebanon War, the US administration's position was a strong endorsement of Israel's actions, rushing delivery of precision-guided bombs and strenuous efforts at the UNITED NATIONS to prevent a cease-fire resolution until Israel had achieved a decisive military victory. In her visit to the region on 24 July, spending a few hours in Beirut and several days in Israel until 27 July, Rice described the destruction of Lebanon as "the birth pangs of a new Middle East." On 11 August, the United Nations passed a cease-fire resolution (UN Resolution 1701), which led to a 14 August cessation of hostilities, although Israel continued some operations through September. Rice, reflecting the administration's position, expressed strong support for the war in Gaza.

Secretary Rice returned to the Middle East in October 2006, a trip that noticeably demonstrated the linkage between IRAQ and Palestine. Though Rice's objective was to garner Arab support for the US war in Iraq, when she visited Jeddah, SAUDI ARABIA, she was confronted with the insistence that she explain what her plans were for solving the Palestinian issue. She replied that she planned to meet with PNA president Mahmud Abbas and discuss the following areas: "More funds to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, security sector reform, and more access between Gaza and Israel, and Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad." Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal replied that the ARAB LEAGUE was holding funds for the Palestinians but had not been able to get them through, an issue he urged her to "resolve as quickly as possible." He told her that reduced donor aid and Israel's suspension of transfers of Palestinian tax revenues, among other problems, were shrinking the Palestinian economy to levels not seen in a generation. The foreign minister further pointed out that a real solution to the Palestinian economic crisis would require sovereign Palestinian control over resources, trade, and development—effectively, an end to Israel's OCCUPATION. As for "security sector reform," a euphemism for strengthening the forces that report to Abbas as opposed to those of Hamas's interior minister Sa'd Siyyam, it was pointed out that this would only exacerbate the already brewing factional conflict and potentially lead to civil war. The interior minister explained to Secretary Rice that Hamas is a deeply rooted social and political movement and that Abbas had rightly sought diplomatic ways to mediate differences. If Rice really wanted to support Abbas, she should accept the compromise language Abbas had been able to secure from Hamas, which is willing to let him lead political negotiations and to play a smaller part in a unity government. With regard to movement between and within the Occupied Territories, al-Faisal noted that the "Rafah Arrangements," supposedly to give Gazans access to the outside world through the Rafah Crossing, were a dead letter. There is no evidence that Rice incorporated any of Saudi Arabia's advice or suggestions.

Rice's January 2007 Middle East trip was a mission to promote Bush's new plan for a surge in troops in Iraq and to inform regional leaders about the upcoming trilateral meeting among the United

States, Israel, and the PNA. Jordanian analyst Labib Kamhawi expressed the strong doubts many Arab leaders had regarding Bush's plan and noted that they had a difficult time throwing support behind it "when there has been a total failure in Iraq and the Palestinian territories with no attempt to soften the anger that is seething in the Arab and Muslim countries." Arab leaders have been unambiguous that, in exchange for their support on Iraq, the United States must show more commitment to solving the Israeli-Palestinian question and that the Arab world expects more than press conferences and promises. At the outset of this trip, Secretary Rice admitted that she had no new plans or proposals for peace. However, the February 2007 trilateral meeting was undoubtedly conceived as a means of responding to Arab state demands.

As Rice prepared for the late February Israeli-Palestinian-US meeting, she said that Israel and the Palestinians could pick any agenda they wanted for a preliminary peacemaking summit with the United States, but that it was too early to tackle the toughest issues. "We're not yet at the point where I think we can determine what we would do about formal negotiations, when and if they can occur," she stated. "It's really a time to try to get the parties into more of a confidence-building phase and we'll see what comes after that." Rice further said that she hoped to discuss more than the outlines or borders of an eventual Palestinian state. "There's always been a lot of concern about what the borders of the state would be, but there wasn't much attention given to its internal composition, its democratic processes, its institutions." She also expressed her hope that the trilateral meeting would be part of a wider effort to support Abbas in his fight with Hamas. Rice further stated that the dormant Road Map, though now "something of an obstacle in restarting talks between the two sides," would remain the frame of reference. "Everybody understands the obligations in it, but we'd gotten to a place that it was stalled because if they weren't making progress on the first phase of the road map, then you couldn't talk about the end of the road map and what might lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state."

In a brief statement delivered after the February meeting, Rice said the three participants "affirmed our commitment to a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, agreed that a Palestinian state cannot be born of violence and terror, and reiterated our acceptance of previous agreements and obligations," including the Road Map to peace. She said that Israeli prime minister EHUD OLMERT and Abbas had discussed how to move forward on mutual obligations aimed at implementing the first phase of the Road Map.

Subsequent visits to the region (September 2007, November 2007, January 2008, March 2008 (two trips), April 2008, May 2008 (two trips), June 2008, July 2008, August 2008, September 2008, and November 2008) and the 2007 Annapolis Conference, at which a two-state solution was articulated as a mutually agreed-upon outline for addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, led to statements of commitment and agreement, but very little tangible progress toward peace in the region. Condoleezza Rice was an activist secretary of state on Middle East issues, but neither she nor President Bush had any real commitment to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a just and comprehensive manner. Both were overtly pro-Israel and appeared to care little about the welfare or rights of the Palestinians.

See also: OPERATION SUMMER RAINS; RAFAH CROSSING

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Right of Return Law

Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE of 14 May 1948 embodied the right of return: "The State of Israel will be open for Jewish IMMIGRATION and for the ingathering of the exiles." On 5 July 1950, this right was codified into a BASIC LAW. The law was amended in 1970, to grant the right to immigrate to Israel to non-Jews who are either children or grandchildren of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, or the spouse of a child or grandchild of a Jew. The amendment was intended to accept families, mainly from the former SOVIET UNION, where mixed marriages were abundant and where individuals and family members not considered Jews under the traditional definition nevertheless wanted to come to Israel.

The Law of Return has been the subject of much controversy since it is an exclusive Jewish right and excludes Palestinian REFUGEES who wish to return home to their native land. In theory, the Israeli law does not categorically exclude non-Jews from immigrating to Israel. Any person who wishes to settle in Israel may do so, at least hypothetically. In practice, Israel has prevented Palestinians from returning to their homeland. Persons who are permitted to "return" must meet the requirements set forth in the Law of Entry to Israel (1952) and the Law of Citizenship (1952), regarding naturalization.

See also REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN


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Roadblocks

Roadblocks are permanent or mobile physical impediments used by Israel to block movement by Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Some are constructed and others improvised; they can be cement towers, revolving gates, manned CHECKPOINTS or ROADS closed off by heavy cement blocks, earth mounds, trenches, or observation towers. Although a few are border checkpoints located between Israel and the Occupied Territories, most are within the WEST BANK, where fundamentally the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) obstruct the passage of Palestinians from one place to another, in the stated interest of security. Internal roadblocks are one element in the increasingly sophisticated lockdown that disrupts all aspects of Palestinian life in the West Bank, which is being carved up into separate geographical entities with travel between them becoming more difficult, often requiring a PERMIT. In addition to the permit system, checkpoints, the BARRIER wall, and other aspects of Israel's matrix of control, they impede access to schools and universities, medical care, commerce, social life, and so forth. In 2005 there were 376 internal roadblocks, and by August 2006 there were 550 (some analysts put the number at over 700), of which 60 were permanent roadblocks, that is, checkpoints manned by IDF soldiers or Border Police.

Israeli analyst Meron Benvenisti considers Israel's disdain for the Palestinians and its "arrogant use of a mentality of submissiveness" as being reflected not only by the roadblocks themselves but by the checking procedures that occur there, "which are conducted without any sensitivity to the dignity and needs of the Palestinians, who are expected to wait in line in silence or else



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Map 36. Roadblock and Checkpoints in the West Bank, 2002

be 'punished.'" Thus, rather than Israeli authorities dictating the lives of the Palestinians on a daily basis in their towns and their villages, they impose an "indirect regime of imprisonment" on them by fencing them off and interfering with their daily routines. Here, says Benvenisti, "the ruler does not encroach on their space, but they are forced to plead with him in the temples of the OCCUPATION, the roadblocks; and as long as they surrender to the rules imposed on them, the occupier knows his status is secure."

Benvenisti further described the roadblocks as performing three major roles in the hegemonic system of Israeli control: symbolic, geostrategic, and sociopolitical. The hundreds of permanent and mobile roadblocks "are all designed for one purpose: to show who has the power to control the lives of the Palestinians. . . . This domination is implemented for the most part without any need for force, by exploiting the fear of the Palestinians." The geostrategic function of the roadblocks resides in the fact that they "institutionalize the expropriation of the physical space and the public INFRASTRUCTURE of the West Bank and their transference to the exclusive use of the Israelis. The map of the hundreds of roadblocks erected in Palestinian populated areas outlines the physical division of the West Bank into areas west of the Barrier that have been annexed de facto, and the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY that has been cut off from its surroundings, and [the] 10 Palestinian enclaves from Jenin in the North to Mt. Hebron in the South." Last, in the sociopolitical role the roadblocks play, the Palestinian community is being fragmented into weak and impoverished subcommunities where centers are disconnected from peripheries, urban centers are eroding and rural areas are becoming poorer, families are separated, and medical treatment is denied along with access to higher education. "This division is imposed in the hopes that the political and social SIEGE will result in demographic distress and perhaps to emigration," Benvenisti states.

In late December 2006, Israeli prime minister EHUD OLMERT offered to remove twenty-seven roadblocks as a gesture of support for Palestinian president MAHMUD ABBAS in his struggle against HAMAS. Olmert's cabinet also agreed to make improvements at the KARNI CROSSING between Israel and the Gaza Strip to speed the flow of goods and to ease travel restrictions on senior Palestinian officials and medical crews. There was considerable skepticism concerning the prime minister's real intentions (a week earlier he announced construction of a new settlement in the Jordan Valley), or even if this small gesture would be implemented.

As of mid-2009, Israel had not improved access at Karni or in any other way eased the restrictions on the movement of goods and persons.

See also KARNI CROSSING; OCCUPATION; PERMITS

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Road Map

The Road Map, released on 30 April 2003, was a multistage plan to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and was drawn up and sponsored by the QUARTET, composed of the UNITED STATES, the EUROPEAN UNION, RUSSIA, and the UNITED NATIONS. The four parties presented the plan to the Palestinians and Israelis as "a performance-based and goal-driven road map, with clear phases, timelines, target dates and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet." The Road Map displayed a renewed international engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the wake of the US-led invasion of IRAQ in 2003. However, Israeli and Palestinian reservations about the details of the plan, the inherent difficulty of achieving the plan's benchmarks, and a lack of international, especially

US, follow-up led to the voiding of the plan's timeline and its marginalization as an all but rhetorical guide for peacemaking.

The plan set out three stages to move from the stalemate present at its announcement to a final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first stage, to take place by May 2003, sought to end Israeli-Palestinian violence; the second stage, set from June 2003 until December 2003, was intended to initiate a period of transition in which a Palestinian state with provisional BORDERS would be established; and the third phase, to take place by 2005, was to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a permanent final-status agreement.

The first phase called upon Palestinians to "immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence . . . accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel" based on the Tenet Plan of 2001. Thus, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) should "undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere." The Palestinians were also to begin institutional reforms within the PNA to produce a draft constitution for Palestinian statehood and to empower the prime minister with executive authority. Reform was also to extend to ministers, an independent electoral commission, the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, and the judicial branch. In return for these Palestinian actions, Israel was to take "no actions undermining trust." Most significantly, Israel was to freeze all SETTLEMENT activity and to dismantle settlement OUTPOSTS erected after March 2001. Israel was also urged to take "measures to improve the humanitarian situation" in the Occupied Territories and to support and facilitate the reform of Palestinian institutions. With improved security performance, Israel was to withdraw the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES progressively until "the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to 28 September 2000," that is, before Israel reoccupied the territory returned to the Palestinians during the OSLO PROCESS.

In the second phase of transition, efforts were to be "focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement." This goal could be achieved "when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state." Moreover, this phase of the Road Map called for the Quartet to convene an international conference to support the founding of the Palestinian state (with provisional borders), to renew the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks of the peace process, and to revive multilateral negotiations toward a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

The third phase sought the "consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005." These objectives were to be achieved through a second international conference, which was to reach a "final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005." This would be implemented "through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on [UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS] 242, 338, and 1397 that ends the OCCUPATION that began in 1967. [It would] include an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the REFUGEE issue; and a negotiated resolution on the status of JERUSALEM that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide. [It would] fulfill the vision of two states, Israel and a sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security." Moreover, Arab states would accept full and normal relations with Israel in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

Although the Road Map had multilateral authorship and responsibility, it was also a symbol of the renewed engagement of US president GEORGE W. BUSH in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Until 11 September 2001, President Bush refrained from high-level actions aimed at abating the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. In a June 2002 speech, however, Bush set out his vision for reenergizing the peace process that was distinctly at odds with the Road Map. Although Bush gave explicit US support for an independent Palestinian state, he also called for the removal of YASIR ARAFAT from the leadership of the PNA. However, the implementation of Bush's speech waited until after the invasion of Iraq under US leadership in March 2003. Moreover, the

Road Map, as the formalization of this policy, was partly the result of pressure on Bush by British prime minister Tony Blair, who sought to lend credibility to the Iraq war effort by showing greater international engagement in Israeli-Palestinian affairs.

Because the Palestinian leadership preferred the Road Map to the vision outlined in Bush's 2002 speech, it accepted the terms of the Road Map despite reservations about the plan's emphasis on Palestinian responsibilities for meeting the Road Map's goals and about the deepened institutional reforms, which were seen as undermining Arafat's power. In contrast, the Israeli government did not fully accept the Road Map in its stated form. Instead, Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON expressed reservations on fourteen points that he insisted did not fit with the objectives expressed by Bush in his June 2002 speech. Moreover, many critics questioned the Road Map's gradual timetable in light of the failures of the OSLO ACCORDS, between the PLO and Israel, in meeting deadlines and phased objectives. In addition, critics pointed out that, although the Road Map called on the Quartet to monitor and encourage progress, the Israeli government expected the United States to be the only external party involved. Thus, many questioned the will of the Bush administration to promote the implementation of the Road Map, given the close ties between the US president and the Israeli premier.

The plan set out its benchmarks with the assumption that "as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations. . . . Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress." In response to external calls for reform, the PNA created the office of Palestinian prime minister in March 2003, and MAHMUD ABBAS was appointed to that position by Arafat. However, the Road Map was not able to overcome the inertia of Israeli-Palestinian violence or to motivate extensive international—especially US—involvement in peacemaking. While the first cease-fire was declared in July 2003, it and many others were broken. Sharon saw any violent act by Palestinians against Israelis as a reason to halt the peace process, which gave even the smallest Palestinian faction a veto over the progress of the Road Map. Moreover, Israel refused to freeze settlement activity. Thus, the progress of the Road Map was impeded.

The Road Map, however, remained a rhetorical touchstone for Israelis, Palestinians, and interested external actors. With the death of Arafat in November 2004, many called for a resumption of the Road Map and viewed ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in August 2005 as a step in the return to the map's stages, a position endorsed by Sharon himself, despite the fact that a Gaza withdrawal was not cited in the Road Map's provisions. Despite the plan's lack of success, the Road Map remained the Bush administration's central contribution, or lack thereof, to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

See also FINAL STATUS TALKS; LEBANON; QUARTET; SYRIA; GEORGE TENET

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
—Russell E. Lucas

Road System in the West Bank

Beginning in the 1970s with the birth and emboldening of the Jewish SETTLEMENTS movement, Israel has gradually created a new transportation grid in the WEST BANK. The purpose of much of the new road system is to connect Israeli settlements to each other and to the Israeli transportation grid inside the Green Line while bypassing Palestinian towns and villages. Thus, many of these roads are referred to as bypass roads, which cater to the Israeli settlers

who, even before the outbreak of the INTIFADA, wanted to be able to commute to Israel and throughout the West Bank easily and safely.

The roads are also a way of making settlements more attractive to prospective residents. In the Israeli *Settlement Master Plan for 1983–1986*, the chapter discussing roads states, "The road is the factor that motivates settlement in areas where settlement is important, and its advancement will lead to development and demand." According to the



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Map 37. Israel's Road System in the West Bank, 2004

plan, one of the primary objectives determining the routes of the roads was to "bypass the Arab population centers," and accordingly Israel built dozens of new roads in the West Bank during the 1980s. Significantly, the road system also forms a clear axis of Israeli control throughout the West Bank. The settlement master plan also expressly states that one of the primary considerations in choosing a site to establish settlements is to limit construction in Palestinian villages. For example, in its discussion of the mountain ridge area, the plan states that it "holds most of the Arab population in the urban and rural communities. . . . Jewish settlement along this route (Route 60) will create a psychological wedge regarding the mountain ridge, and also will likely reduce the uncontrolled spread of Arab settlement."

The Israeli human rights group B'TSELEM estimates that in the West Bank there are seventeen routes on which Palestinian vehicles are completely prohibited, comprising about 75 miles (124 kilometers); ten routes on which Palestinian travel is partially prohibited (Palestinians need special movement PERMITS), comprising about 150 miles (244 kilometers); and fourteen routes on which Palestinian travel is restricted (Palestinian access only allowed through an ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES checkpoint), comprising about 225 miles (364 kilometers).

When Israel first began building roads in the West Bank, around the same time as the first settlements were established in the 1970s, in many instances the location of the settlements required new routes over difficult topographic terrain. This Israeli policy led, among other things, to extensive ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION of the West Bank. Moreover, as B'Tselem notes, the construction far exceeded the transportation needs resulting from the increase in population and economy of the area, in the interest of attracting more settlers.

Ironically, road construction in the West Bank accelerated in tandem with progress in the peace process. Beginning in 1993 with the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, and in the framework of the redeployment of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the West Bank, the bypass road system gained significant momentum. By 1995, new road construction reached a peak, with Israel undertaking the construction of more than 60 miles (100 kilometers) of roads in the area. Israel's post–OSLO ACCORDS ROAD MAP of 2003 involved the construction of an extensive system of bypass roads intended to meet four key needs as defined by the Ministry of Defense: (1) permit Israelis to travel without passing through Palestinian population centers; (2) permit Israelis to travel across the Green Line by the shortest route; (3) maintain "an internal fabric of life" within the Israeli settlement blocs; and (4) ensure that Palestinian traffic did not pass through the settlements.

Following the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in 2000, settlers suffered repeated attacks from Palestinians on existing roads, and construction of bypass roads again accelerated when Israel issued military orders for a new wave of LAND requisitions. Israel seized private Palestinian lands to construct new bypass roads and to replace old roads and bypass roads that were allegedly no longer safe. By May 2002, eight new bypass roads were in various phases of construction, at a total cost of NIS 228 million (around $47 million). In 2006, Israel continued to build bypass roads throughout the West Bank. According to PEACE NOW's research (including aerial and ground surveys), projects at the time included construction of a new JERUSALEM-Nokedim road (bypassing BETHLEHEM from the southeast) and construction to upgrade Highway No. 5 (the Trans-Samaria Highway) and Highway No. 1 (the MA'ALE ADUMIM–JERICHO road). In addition, the Nili-Ofarim bypass (west of Ramallah) had been recently completed and opened to traffic.

Most of the bypass roads are planned, built, and paid for by the government of Israel, but, in some cases, the settlers have planned and illegally built roads by diverting public funds allocated for other purposes. According to the State Comptroller, in most cases in which IDF officials realized that road work was being done without approval, the army obtained requisition orders to legalize retroactively the injury to private Palestinian property. In one case (the Wallerstein road linking the Beit El and Dolev settlements), part of the road built by the settlers ran through Area B, in which, according to the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT, Israel was not entitled to seize private Palestinian property for that purpose. Although the necessary requisition orders were not issued and no order was given for the IDF to take control of the land, the IDF did not stop construction work on the road by settlers. Building new roads on the initiative of set-

tlers without approval from the relevant authorities has become common because of the many illegal OUTPOSTS erected in the West Bank since the end of the 1990s.

There are no exact figures regarding how many kilometers of bypass roads exist in the West Bank, but, taken together, the bypass roads form a modern transportation system, in places constituting major multilane interstate highways. The roads are generally wide (with significant buffer zones along the sides) and well constructed (with banked turns, clearly marked lanes, and modern on-ramps and off-ramps). The bypass system features roads and tunnels that cut through (rather than being routed around) large hills (especially in the area south of Jerusalem). Roads are well lit and include amenities such as modern signage in Hebrew and English (often indicating information only for settlements and locations inside Israel with no indication that the driver is in the Occupied Territories), covered bus stops (for settlers and soldiers), and, in some cases, sidewalks. Travel on the bypass roads is extremely efficient and easy, in part because they are usually free of traffic, reflecting the fact that even after thirty-plus years of settlement, there are still relatively few Israelis living in the West Bank.

Since the roads are planned according to the interests of the settlers, with little or no recourse for Palestinian landowners, it is not unusual to find one that cuts through the middle of a mature olive grove or a cultivated field. Indeed, in addition to their role in connecting settlements, bypass roads often block the development of the Palestinian communities in the West Bank, creating BORDERS and barriers between communities and routes that in the past were connected. With only a few exceptions, the transportation grid that existed in the West Bank when Israel took control of the area in 1967 involved routes that had existed for centuries and remain today as the roads that Palestinians use. These routes reflect the social and economic behavior of the local population—connecting people with markets, villages, and larger population centers. As with other systems developed in areas inhabited before the advent of modern machinery, they tend to reflect the topography of the area, coexisting with rather than conquering the landscape—for example, skirting a hill rather than going through it. Although a small part of Israel's limited investment in West Bank INFRASTRUCTURE since 1967 included upgrading existing Palestinian roads, overall the investment has gone to creating the alternative transportation grid that does not reflect Palestinians' social and economic needs.

Bypass roads are constructed chiefly on confiscated privately owned Palestinian land. In order to build on this land, the Israeli government uses two main methods: requisitioning the land for military use or expropriating the land for public use. Both are illegal under INTERNATIONAL LAW. In September 1996, Palestinians petitioned the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT to prevent the IDF from seizing over 1,000 acres (4,386 dunums) of their private land for road construction. The court rejected the petition, as it consistently has, accepting the state's argument that the construction of the roads was needed for "absolute security needs."

Prior to the outbreak of the violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000, Palestinians could, with the requisite permits, use most of the bypass roads. Palestinians made use of the bypass roads wherever it made sense to do so—for example, traveling from Jerusalem to HEBRON. However, the roads' utility to the Palestinians was often limited by, for example, the absence of on- and off-ramps serving many Palestinian locales and by other Israeli restrictions; for instance, a Palestinian from Ramallah could not take the direct route to Bethlehem because the road passes through Jerusalem and Palestinians are prohibited from entering Jerusalem. After the outbreak of violence in September 2000, Israel drastically reduced Palestinian access to all roads in the West Bank, including bypass roads. According to the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, an arbitrary (and unwritten) system of road controls has come into being that restricts Palestinian access on certain roads. On some roads, Palestinians are forbidden (sometimes referred to as "sterile" routes), and on others Palestinian travel is prohibited unless the driver possesses a special permit (called a Special Movement Permit at Internal Checkpoints in Judea and Samaria, which is difficult to obtain). On restricted-use roads, Palestinian vehicles are not prohibited, but access is controlled by Israeli CHECKPOINTS (permanent on some routes and periodic, or "flying checkpoints," on others). Palestinians traveling on roads that are forbidden or for which they do not have proper permits risk fines, imprisonment, and confiscation of their vehicle. The only roads on which Palestinian travel is generally unrestricted are those within the built-up area of a Palestinian village or town.

In some instances, Palestinians are not allowed to cross bypass roads by car, which restricts Palestinians from reaching other roads. In these cases, Palestinians can travel along the road until they reach a forbidden road, where they get out of the car, cross the forbidden road by foot, and get into another vehicle. For example, in the area between JENIN and the villages situated to its east runs a "forbidden" road that links the settlements Ganim and Kadim to Israel. As a result, residents of Jalbun, Faqqu'a, and Deir Abu Da'if cannot make the journey to or from Jenin in one vehicle.

In late October 2005, *Ha'aretz*, the preeminent Israeli daily, reported that the ARIEL SHARON government had implemented a strict prohibition on travel by private Palestinian cars as "part of the plan [a contingency plan for separating all Palestinian traffic] as an immediate response to TERRORISM."

See also INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; OLIVE TREE UPROOTING; ROAD MAP

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Robinson, Mary (1944–)

Mary Robinson was president of Ireland and the UNITED NATIONS High Commissioner for Human Rights. As commissioner, Robinson headed two missions to the Occupied Territories—in November 2000 and April 2002. The missions were based on the "grave concern" of the member states of the Human Rights Commission about reports of "serious, widespread and flagrant violations" of human rights in the territories. Robinson's reports were critical of Israel's policies and practices, and consequently she came under enormous pressure from the UNITED STATES, to the extent that Washington was able to engineer the nonrenewal of her position when her term ended.

After her first trip to the Occupied Territories as high commissioner in 2000, Robinson detailed her findings in a comprehensive report. She pointed to a range of Israeli abuses, including excessive use of force, RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, and the impact of the conflict on children, and said that "the bleak human rights situation in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES" warranted urgent international attention. She called for an international monitoring presence to be deployed in the territories and for the states that are high-contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions to take action "to reduce the terrible violence."

At the behest of the October 2000 special session, the United Nations established a commission of inquiry composed of three independent experts to investigate human rights and humanitarian law violations in the territories. In its report to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in March, the group said that the "IDF, assisted by settlers on occasion," was responsible for most violations, but noted that Palestinians had also committed violations, either under the authority of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY or acting individually. It too called for an "adequate and effective international presence" to be established "to monitor and regularly report on" continuing violations. EUROPEAN UNION ambassadors in Israel jointly confirmed that "the issues and findings" in the report "truly reflected facts on the ground" and said the European Union would fully endorse its recommendations. The subsequent CHR Resolution 2001/7, while condemning and deploring the Israeli human rights violations identified in the inquiry's report, omitted reference to Palestinian violations. Politics then intervened, and although the resolution was adopted by the CHR in April, the United States and Guatemala voted against it, and twenty-two states, including the European Union countries, abstained.

Earlier, the UN Security Council informally considered draft proposals to establish a UN military and police observer force in the Occupied Territories but did not proceed to a vote when the United States indicated that it would exercise its veto. In March 2001, the United States did veto a draft Security Council resolution calling for the secretary-general to consult with the parties to the conflict and recommend "an appropriate mechanism to protect Palestinian civilians, including through the establishment of a UN observer force." Explaining the veto, chief US delegate James Cunningham said the resolution prescribed a role for the secretary-general that was not realistic, given Israel's staunch opposition to a UN observer role.

After her 2002 visit to the Occupied Territories (following OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS and OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD), Robinson authored and presented to the Geneva-based UN Commission on Human Rights a second report on the situation in the Occupied Territories, which included the following points: "It is indisputable that there has been extensive loss of life on the Palestinian as well as the Israeli side. Recent SUICIDE BOMBINGS by Palestinians had killed 62 people and injured 363, while the Palestine Red Crescent Society reported that Israeli troops had killed 217 Palestinians and wounded 498 from 29 March to 21 April. These figures will still require confirmation since there has not been access to all areas."

Citing information from the UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA), the high commissioner said, "The [ISRAEL] DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) caused extensive damage to hundreds of private homes. UNRWA estimates that in the JENIN refugee camp 800 dwellings have been destroyed and many more damaged leaving 4,000 to 5,000 people homeless." Robinson pointed to reports by the human rights group B'Tselem, saying that "while the number of Palestinians under arrest or in detention remains uncertain, over 2,500 persons were being held." The report documented widespread concern over the lack of access to medical assistance in the Occupied Territories as well as obstacles to humanitarian deliveries there. It also examined Israel's denial of the accusations. Robinson concluded that "the [Israeli] military operation must be brought to an end. Equally, all attacks against Israeli civilians must end." She also emphasized the need for "accountability on all sides for what has happened," warning that a failure to investigate widespread allegations of serious human rights abuses "risks undermining the integrity of the international human rights system." She offered her office's assistance in facilitating a dialogue between the two sides aimed at enhancing mutual understanding.

After leaving her post as UN high commissioner, Robinson gave an interview to *Salon* magazine. She said that the GEORGE W. BUSH administration's strong lobbying and pressure not to extend her term were a consequence of three main factors: her defense of the Durban Conference Against Racism, which the United States and Israel walked out of; her reports to the United Nations on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and her condemnation of the US treatment of prisoners in Camp X-ray at Cuba's Guantánamo Bay. As part of its campaign against Robinson, the United States put out the word in the corridors of power in Washington and New York's UN headquarters that Robinson was "difficult to work with" and "extremely biased." Robinson defended her principles, saying that she had spoken fairly about abuses of human rights by both Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, although "I came to understand that in Washington, criticizing Israel damned me."

She said her main commitment was "to the integrity of the human rights agenda and shaping it so it's not politicized. I applied that faithfully to addressing the problems both in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Israel and I have mentally, emotionally and intellectually, tried to be bound by it. . . . I have condemned unequivocally suicide bombing, and reiterated the need for human security in Israel for political debate. . . . [D]rive-by shootings and suicide bombing [are] of course appalling and cannot be condemned strongly enough, certainly not justified by any cause—but the Israeli responses are also excessive." She said she found it "disheartening that there is not more understanding here [in the United States] of the appalling suffering of the Palestinian population, nor appreciation that this is not going to lead to a secure future. It's going to lead to greater hatred and desperation, and to further suicide bombings."

See also OCCUPATION; OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD; OPERATION DETERMINED PATH; OPERATION JOURNEY OF COLORS

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Roed-Larsen, Terje (1947–)

Terje Roed-Larsen is a Norwegian diplomat and sociologist who played an important role in 1992–1993 as a secret, back-channel facilitator for the pre–OSLO ACCORDS negotiations between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and Israel. In 1999 Roed-Larsen was appointed as UN secretary-general Kofi Annan's personal representative to the PLO and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP. He was also the UN's official coordinator for peace negotiations in the Middle East, including managing relations with LEBANON and SYRIA.

In 1981 Roed-Larsen founded and directed FAFO (Fagbevegelsens Forsknings Organisasjon, the Institute for Applied Social Science). It was through his work with FAFO in the West Bank and Gaza that Roed-Larsen became involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and partly the reason he was asked to act as an intermediary in the secret negotiations between Israel and the PLO. His wife, Mona Juul, a Norwegian diplomat, facilitated high-level contacts with the Norwegian foreign minister, JOHAN JUERGEN HOLST, who was also instrumental in facilitating the OSLO ACCORDS, and his deputy, Jan Egeland.

In December 1992, Israeli academic and historian Yair Hirschfeld met secretly in London with AHMAD QUREI', a trusted lieutenant of YASIR ARAFAT, and decided to accept Roed-Larsen's invitation to negotiations in Oslo. Thereafter, under the protection of Norwegian intelligence, Israeli and Palestinian delegations were spirited in and out of Norway. The Norwegians nurtured trust and camaraderie through relaxed hospitality at Larsen's home during at least fourteen secret sessions. Higher-level officials from both sides eventually joined the secret talks, and in August 1993 the negotiators initialed an accord, the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, in Oslo that was signed at the White House the following month.

Roed-Larsen also served from June 1994 until October 1996 as the first special coordinator in the Israeli-Occupied Palestinian sector under UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In 2004 Roed-Larson left the position of special coordinator for peace negotiations in the Middle East to become president of the International Peace Academy, a New York–based think tank, and was also designated as UN special representative for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for Syrian political and military withdrawal from Lebanon. At the time of the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Lebanese territories in the summer of 2000, Roed-Larson represented the United Nations in delineating the blue line that divided the Lebanese borders from those of Israel.

Roed-Larsen retains a link with Norway as the cochairman of the group of nations that contribute economically to the PNA.

See also JOHAN JUERGEN HOLST; SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

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Rogers, William Pierce (1913–2001)

William P. Rogers was a lawyer, US government official, and secretary of state from 1969 to 1973 under President RICHARD NIXON. From 1947 to 1950, he served as chief counsel to two Senate

investigating committees before becoming, in 1953, deputy attorney general under President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. He lobbied vigorously for passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and later, as attorney general from 1957 to 1961, Rogers set up the civil rights division of the US Justice Department.

When Nixon appointed Rogers secretary of state in 1969, he instructed him to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rogers had a different perspective on the Middle East than the president and his national security adviser, HENRY KISSINGER, who viewed the Arab-Israeli conflict through the prism of Cold War competition with the SOVIET UNION. Rogers, on the other hand, had a strong sense of the local and regional dynamics at work in the conflict and believed a resolution was possible through the intervention of the world's great powers.

Rogers undertook several initiatives to solve the conflict, the most important being his 1969 ROGERS PLAN. In 1970 he arranged a cease-fire between Israel and EGYPT in the WAR OF ATTRITION, but Israel opposed each of Rogers's efforts. It turned out that Rogers was not the only actor making Middle East policy in the Nixon administration. Although Nixon had supposedly prohibited Kissinger from involving himself in the region, he was very shortly meddling and undermining every Rogers initiative. Indeed, a battle occurred between the two: while Rogers attempted to broker a solution, Kissinger made every effort to thwart it. Whereas the State Department believed that the key problem was Israeli intransigence, Kissinger believed the Israeli victory in the 1967 WAR was a glorious defeat of the Soviets and considered Israel a STRATEGIC ASSET to US Middle East interests.

In 1973 Rogers resigned and retired to the private sector. In 1986 he returned to public life one last time when he headed the special presidential commission set up to investigate the explosion of the space shuttle *Challenger*.

See also ROGERS PLAN

Rogers Plan, 1969

US secretary of state WILLIAM P. ROGERS announced his plan for Middle East peace on 9 December 1969. Rooted in UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, it called for Arab leaders to agree to peace and for Israel to withdraw from Arab territory occupied during the 1967 WAR. In addition to Israel's unwillingness to withdraw from the territories it occupied in 1967, there was an intensifying WAR OF ATTRITION between Israel and EGYPT that portended a conflict among the world's great powers. Appointed by the UNITED NATIONS to work with Israel and the Arab states to try to implement UNSC Resolution 242, Dr. Gunnar Jarring had failed in his mediation. In response, Rogers arranged "Two Power Talks" (the UNITED STATES and the SOVIET UNION) and "Four Power Talks" (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and FRANCE), authorized by President Richard Nixon, both of which lasted for eight months and came to naught. Israel rejected all the proposals put forward by these parties.

Further, by the summer of 1969, Israel had escalated the War of Attrition, flying across the Sinai to bomb and strafe Egyptian forts and artillery emplacements. Then Tel Aviv undertook a series of "deep penetration raids" far inside Egypt, some missions involving the bombardment of civilian suburbs in Cairo. The Soviet Union became more deeply involved, resupplying destroyed military equipment, including planes, and constructing a missile defense system for Egypt. In this context, Secretary Rogers decided to make his ideas on a Middle East settlement official and outlined a proposal for conflict resolution. This was in actuality Rogers Plan A, since a second plan, detailed in the spring of 1970 by the secretary, came to be known as Rogers Plan B. The first is the most well-known.

In introducing his plan, Rogers stated, "When this administration took office, one of our first actions in foreign affairs was to examine carefully the entire situation in the Middle East. It was obvious that a continuation of the unresolved conflict there would be extremely dangerous; that the parties to the conflict alone would not be able to overcome their legacy of suspicion to achieve a political settlement; and that international efforts were needed to help support process. The United States decided it had a responsibility to play a direct role in seeking a solution.

"Our policy is and will continue to be a balanced one. We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the UN Resolution without achieving an agreement on peace would be partisan towards the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan towards Israel. Therefore, our policy is to

encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council Resolution [242]."

Rogers Plan A listed four basic principles that he considered essential for securing peace in the Middle East.

1. An agreement among outside powers could not be a substitute for an agreement among the parties themselves.
2. A durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of all sides.
3. The framework for a negotiated settlement must be in accordance with the entire text of Resolution 242.
4. There must not be a protracted period of no war/no peace, since recurrent violence and spreading chaos would serve the interests of no nation in or out of the Middle East.

Rogers also endorsed demilitarized zones and related security arrangements, averred that any changes in preexisting boundaries should not reflect the weight of conquest, and stated that JERUSALEM should be a unified city under international trusteeship.

Although the Rogers Plan did not recognize any Palestinian national or political rights, it did refer to the centrality of the refugee problem and the need to take into account the desires and aspirations of the REFUGEES themselves. According to Rogers, "There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 made homeless. This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the United States for over 20 years. During this period, the United States has contributed about 500 million dollars for the support and education of the Palestine refugees. We are prepared to contribute generously, along with others, to solve this problem. We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the Governments in the area. The problem posed by the refugees will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948, which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration towards hope and justice."

JORDAN forthrightly accepted the Rogers Plan, Egypt indicated a willingness to accept it but asked for certain clarifications, and Israel rejected it out of hand. Prime Minister GOLDA MEIR described the Rogers Plan as a disaster for Israel, saying, "It would be irresponsible for any Israeli government to support such a plan." The following months saw the effect on the US government of Israel's will and its ability to torpedo the Rogers Plan in combination with National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger's machinations to ensure that it failed. Together they succeeded, and the plan was consigned to history.

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Ross, Dennis (1949–)

Dennis Ross is a controversial US diplomat with close ties to Israel and a history of pushing hardline policies toward IRAN. He served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Office during the GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration, the Special Middle East Coordinator under President BILL CLINTON, and as a special adviser for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia (which includes Iran) to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In the summer of 1993 President Clinton named Ross Special Middle East Envoy, as which he helped facilitate the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PLO, brokered the HEBRON PROTOCOL in 1997, and facilitated the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. For more than twelve years (1989–2001), Ross played a leading role in shaping US policy on Middle East peace and in dealing directly with the parties in negotiations. He left public service in 2001 and became a director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the

pro-Israel think tank WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY and chairman of the JERUSALEM-based Jewish People Policy Planning Institute.

Ross has also been a prolific author. His publications include *Acting with Caution: Middle East Policy Planning in the Second Reagan Administration* (Policy Papers #1, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1985); *Reforming the Palestinian Authority: Requirements for Change* (Policy Focus #43, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 2002); *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004); and *Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East* (Viking, 2009).

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Rothschild, Baron Edmond James de (1845–1934)

Baron Edmond Rothschild was a member of the French branch of the Rothschild banking dynasty, though he himself did not pursue banking. He was a collector of fine art, a philanthropist, and a deeply committed Zionist. Rothschild grew up in Paris in the world of the Second Republic and the Second Empire and was a soldier (Garde Nationale) in the first Franco-Prussian war. In 1882 Rothschild cut back on his purchases of art and began to buy LAND in Palestine.

He first became interested in establishing Jewish colonies in Palestine in 1882 on learning of the work being done there by the HOVEVEI ZION movement. When he became aware of the young colonies' need for funds, in particular at Rishon le-Zion, he immediately donated 30,000 francs (around $6,000 at the time) to save the latter. In 1883 he purchased land for the founding of a new settlement, Ekron (later renamed Mazkeret Batya) and also funded Rosh Pina and Zikhron Ya'akov, both founded by Hovevei Zion groups. Eventually, he became known as Ha-Nadiv ha-Yadu'a (the well-known benefactor) and the father of the pre-state Jewish Yishuv. After World War I, he joined the political activity of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION by aiding CHAIM WEIZMANN and NAHUM SOKOLOW.

Although Rothschild was a leading proponent of the Zionist movement and the establishment of a Jewish homeland, in the 1890s he clashed with THEODOR HERZL, the founder of the Zionist movement, on the interpretation of political ZIONISM. He had a similar disagreement with AHAD HA'AM and members of the Hovevei Zion. The result was Rothschild's creation of the JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION and the establishment of twelve settlements under its auspices. Eventually, he articulated an alternative policy to that of the Zionists, promoting industrialization and respect for the Arabs. In 1924 he established the PALESTINE JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION, which acquired more than 125,000 acres (506 square kilometers) of land and set up business ventures.

Rothschild also helped found Israel's wine industry by planting vineyards in the Palestine settlements of Russian Jews who fled pogroms in the 1880s. It is estimated that Rothschild spent over $50 million in supporting settlements in Palestine, where he also financed development of an electric generating station. Although he developed and supported thirty colonies in Palestine and made countless trips to Palestine, his home remained in Paris. During World War I, Rothschild used his international influence to secure FRANCE's agreement to the British BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, and later to ensure the award of the Mandate for Palestine to the British. The Balfour Declaration (from Sir Arthur James Balfour) was addressed to Baron Lionel Walter Rothschild, who was Edmond's British cousin, the Second Baron Rothschild.

After his death, Israel honored the contributions of Edmond Rothschild. In April 1954, his remains and those of his wife were removed from the French cemetery, where they had been buried twenty years earlier, and transported to Israel aboard a naval frigate. A state funeral was held with former prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION giving the eulogy, following which Rothschild and his wife were reinterred in Ramat Hanadiv Memorial Gardens. In a memorial to Rothschild's Jewish philanthropy, his son bequeathed the funds to construct the building for the Knesset. Israel's 1982 Independence Day coin is dedicated to the memory of Rothschild and marks the centenary of his first projects in Israel.

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Royal Commission

See PEEL COMMISSION

Ruppin, Arthur (1876–1943)

Arthur Ruppin was a sociologist and Zionist settlement leader. He was known as "the father of Zionist settlement" and "the father of Jewish sociology"—titles that reflect his two convergent careers.

Born in GERMANY to a once-affluent family, Ruppin earned a doctorate in law and economics and worked for several years in the judicial system. He also was director of Berlin's Bureau for Jewish Statistics and DEMOGRAPHY from 1902 to 1907. In 1907 the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL sent Ruppin to Palestine to assess the possibilities for Zionist settlement. One year later, in 1908, Ruppin immigrated to Palestine, settling in JAFFA. He was appointed director of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION'S PALESTINE LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, which was responsible for acquiring LAND and establishing Jewish settlements all over the country. In 1925 Ruppin became head of the Zionists' Land Settlement Department. From this point on, Ruppin labored tirelessly for Jewish settlement. He believed that ZIONISM's most immediate need was to amass land and, through a variety of urban and rural communities, systematically settle the country as the means of establishing a state. Ruppin's efforts affirmed the importance of Jewish labor and Jewish settlements and offered official support to the new immigrants.

Ruppin's interest was in land throughout the country, and he was instrumental in obtaining financial assistance for Ahuzat Bayit (later Tel Aviv), as well as in acquiring land on Mount Carmel, in the Jezreel Valley, and in JERUSALEM. He also promoted a variety of settlement possibilities, including the KIBBUTZ, agricultural farms, and cooperatives. It is in these activities that Ruppin's background in demography and sociology helped map out the settlement of the pre-state Jewish Yishuv. Although initially a supporter of BRIT SHALOM, which called for a binational state in Palestine, he rejected the idea following the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES of 1929, insisting thereafter on the need for a single Jewish state. In Ruppin's opinion, the only practical way to realize this goal rested on the successful acquisition and settlement of land and, after 1929, on TRANSFER of the Palestinians. Ruppin is quoted by Israeli historian Tom Segev in *One Palestine, Complete,* in a discussion with colleagues: "I do not believe in the transfer of an individual. I believe in the transfer of entire villages." As early as 1913, Ruppin told a colleague, as reported in Benny Morris's *Righteous Victims*, "Land is the most necessary thing for establishing roots in Palestine. Since there are hardly any more arable unsettled lands . . . we are bound in each case . . . to remove the peasants who cultivate the land." Ruppin, of course, was only one among the majority of Yishuv leaders who advocated transfer.

In 1926 Ruppin joined the faculty of Hebrew University while continuing his work in settling Jewish immigrants, including both the German wave and the Yemenites. He died in Jerusalem.

See also BINATIONALISM; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Russia

See MOSCOW

Russian Federation

See MOSCOW

S

Sabeel

Sabeel (The Way) is a nonviolent organization that promotes Palestinian liberation theology in an ecumenical grassroots movement that is based on Christian biblical interpretation. It was founded in 1989 by an ecumenical ad hoc committee of ten Palestinian clergy and lay theologians who wanted to explore ways to foster liberating interpretations of the Bible among the poor and oppressed Palestinian Christians. Sabeel encourages women, men, and youth to discern God's message as their faith connects with the hard realities of their daily life: one of poverty, OCCUPATION, violence, discrimination, and human rights violations. In the context of these difficulties, Sabeel searches for ways to strengthen the faith of Palestinian Christians in Palestine and to promote nonviolent direct action. The Sabeel Liberation Theology Center is located in JERUSALEM, with a branch in NAZARETH. (www.sabeel.org).

See also CHRISTIANITY

Sabra and Shatila Massacre, 1982

On 16–18 September 1982, Lebanese PHALANGE militias massacred Palestinian REFUGEES in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in the suburbs of Beirut. The Israeli-supported militias were under the direct command of Elie Hobeika and under the observation of Israeli forces then in occupation of Beirut.

On 1 September the evacuation of PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) fighters driven from Beirut by Israel was completed. Two days later, in a clear breach of the cease-fire agreement arranged by US envoy Philip Habib, Israeli forces entered and occupied the city, deploying troops around the refugee camps. The next day, ARIEL SHARON, Israeli defense minister at the time, claimed that 2,000 PLO fighters had remained in Beirut and were hiding in the camps, although Palestinians and Lebanese groups allied with the PLO strongly disputed this allegation. The supervising forces, including the UNITED STATES, did not demand that Israel withdraw, despite the fact that the United States had given written guarantees that it would ensure the protection of the Palestinian civilians of West Beirut after the departure of the PLO. Israel's entry into Beirut also violated its agreements with Muslim forces in Beirut and with SYRIA.

Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN justified the Israeli occupation of Beirut as "necessary to prevent acts of revenge by the Christians against the Palestinians" and to "maintain order and stability." However, several days later, Sharon told the Knesset, "Our entry into West Beirut was in order to make war against the INFRASTRUCTURE left by the terrorists." Once in occupation of the city, the Israeli army then disarmed, as far as they were able, anti-Israeli militias (Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze) and civilians in West Beirut, while leaving the Christian Phalangist militias fully armed.

On 12 September Begin summoned Bashir Gemayel, newly elected president of LEBANON and a close Israeli ally, to Nahariya in northern Israel and strongly urged him to sign a peace treaty with Israel. He also demanded Gemayel's acceptance of a permanent Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon under the control of Major SAAD HADDAD (another Lebanese ally of Israel) and action from Gemayel to attack the Palestinian fighters allegedly hiding in the refugee camps, including Sabra and Shatila. Forced to balance the interests of many competing factions within Lebanon and personally offended by what he considered Begin's high-handed attitude toward him, Gemayel refused Israel's demands to sign a peace treaty or to authorize operations in the refugee camps. On 14 September Gemayel was assassinated in a massive explosion that demolished his headquarters. Palestinian and Muslim leaders denied any responsibility, although Sharon blamed the assassination on Palestinians, which inflamed the existing animosity of the Phalangists toward Palestinians.

Sharon then invited Lebanese Phalangist militia units, trained and equipped by Israel, to enter the

Sabra and Shatila refugee camps to "clean out the terrorists." His instructions to the Phalangists emphasized that the Israeli military was in command of all the forces in the area. Under the Israeli plan, Israeli soldiers would control the perimeters of the refugee camps and provide logistical support while the Phalangists would enter the camps, find the PLO fighters, and hand them over to Israeli forces. By the evening of 15 September, the Israeli military had completely surrounded and sealed off the camps and set up observation posts on the roofs of nearby tall buildings. The next day Israel announced that it controlled all key points in Beirut. Throughout the day, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) met with top Phalangist leaders to arrange the details of the operation. For the next two nights, from nightfall until late into the night, the Israeli military fired illuminating flares above the camps to assist the militia. At 6:00 P.M. on the evening of 16 September 1982, a unit of 150 Phalangists led by Elie Hobeika, including, according to Saad Haddad, some SOUTH LEBANON ARMY fighters, entered the camps. The militiamen were armed with guns, knives, and hatchets, and, for the next thirty-six to forty-eight hours, the Phalangists massacred the inhabitants of the refugee camps while the Israeli military guarded the exits and continued to provide illumination flares. At 8:00 P.M., a Phalangist officer reported 300 killings, including civilians, to the Israeli command post, and further reports of killings followed through the night. Some of the reports were forwarded to the Israeli government in JERUSALEM and were seen by a number of Israel's senior officials.

At one point, a militiaman's radioed question to Hobeika about what to do with the women and children in the refugee camp was overheard by an Israeli officer, who heard Hobeika reply. "This is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that; you know exactly what to do." In the background, Phalangist troops were reportedly heard laughing. The Israeli officer reported this to his superior, General Amos Yaron, who warned Hobeika against hurting civilians but took no further action. The Kahan Commission, which later investigated the massacres, cited Lieutenant Avi Grabowsky as having witnessed the murder of five women and children. He told his battalion commander, who replied, "We know, it's not to our liking, and don't interfere." A Visnews cameraman filmed Israeli soldiers around the camps turning back refugees attempting to flee the massacre. Throughout the massacre, Phalangist militia regularly returned to Israeli units for food, water, and ammunition. The Israeli chief of staff and the Phalangist staff held a meeting later in the afternoon. According to the Kahan Commission's report, the chief of staff concluded that the Phalange should "continue action, mopping up the empty camps south of the Fakahani neighborhood until tomorrow at 5:00 a.m., at which time they must stop their action due to American pressure." He claimed that he had "no feeling that something irregular had occurred or was about to occur in the camps." At this meeting, he also agreed to provide the militia with a tractor, supposedly to demolish buildings.

On Friday, 17 September, while the camps still were sealed, a few independent observers managed to enter. Among them were a Norwegian journalist and a Norwegian diplomat, Ane-Karine Arvesen, who observed Phalangists during their cleanup operations, "removing dead bodies from destroyed houses in the Shatila camp." The Phalangists did not exit the camps at 5:00 A.M. on Saturday as ordered but forced the remaining survivors to march out of the camps, randomly killing individuals, and sending others to the stadium for interrogations—this went on for the entire day. The militia finally left the camps at 8:00 A.M. on 18 September. The first foreign journalists allowed into the camps at 9:00 A.M. found hundreds of bodies scattered about the camp, many of them mutilated. The first official news of the massacre was broadcast around noon and provoked outrage around the world. On 16 December 1982, the UNITED NATIONS General Assembly condemned the massacre and declared it an act of genocide. No PLO fighters were handed over to Israeli forces, and no weapons were found in the camps. Documents presented in the 2001 Belgian war crimes lawsuit against Sharon allegedly show that the claim about the presence of the PLO fighters in the camps was a cover story prepared by Israel. However, the case was dismissed in 2002, and no documents from the suit were made public.

The exact numbers of victims of the massacre are hard to pin down because of the chaotic conditions during and after the massacre, burials, and initial victim counting by several international agencies, as well as by the fact that it is a politically sensitive issue, even to the present day. The number of civilian deaths ranges from the Kahan Commission's estimate of 460; to IDF figures of

700 to 800; to 1,300 by a Lebanese analyst; and, finally, to Robert Fisk, one of the first journalists to visit the scene, who quotes unnamed Phalangist officers as saying that 2,000 died.

On 28 September the Israeli government established a commission of inquiry led by former ISRAELI SUPREME COURT justice Yitzhak Kahan. The report stated that there was no evidence that Israeli units took direct part in the massacre and that it was the "direct responsibility of Phalangists." It did, however, regard Israel as bearing "indirect responsibility." The KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT provides some answers to what happened, although other inquiries are often at odds with major findings of the report. Critics of the Kahan Report pointed to the fact that Israel was investigating itself and argued that the report amounted to a whitewash. For instance, Shimon Lehrer, in the Israeli newspaper *Ha'ikar Hehaser*, demonstrated that Kahan's conclusions were untenable and argued that the defense minister and chief of staff should have faced twenty-year jail sentences for premeditated murder under Israeli law. Some commentators, such as Fisk, suggested that Israel could have prevented the massacre, while others refuted that there were any PLO members in the camps. On 14 February 1983, *Der Spiegel* (the German magazine) carried an interview with one of the Phalangists who participated in the massacre and said that Israeli soldiers fought along with the Phalangists and shelled the camp.

In 2005, Lebanese film directors made a documentary about Sabra and Shatila, and, for the first time, it told the story of the slaughter through the voices of the killers. In *Massaker*, six former Christian Phalange militiamen tell of their training by Israeli allies and recount the events of 16–18 September 1982. The ninety-minute documentary includes militiamen boasting about their killing skills with AK-47 assault rifles and butchers' knives. One of the most controversial revelations in the film is the alleged extent of Israeli involvement in the preparation and execution of the operation, down to providing body bags before the killings began. "You'll be needing these," one of the militiamen is told by an Israeli officer.

See also KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT; LEBANON WAR; ARIEL SHARON

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Safed

Safed is a picturesque town in the hills of eastern Galilee and historically the most important town in the northern region of Palestine. At an elevation of 2,790 feet (850 meters), Safad is Israel's highest town and probably its coldest. Safad did not become an important center of Jewish life until the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. It is not mentioned in the Torah. In 1948, Zionist militia forced most of the town's Arab residents to flee, and today it is largely Jewish. Founded in the second century during Roman

times, Safed has a strategic and economic significance that resulted from its location along crucial trade and communications lines between SYRIA and EGYPT. Safed came under Muslim rule in the seventh century, was conquered by the Crusaders, was retaken by the Muslim dynasties in the late thirteenth century, fell to the OTTOMAN EMPIRE under Selim I, and was conquered by Napoleon Bonaparte for a short time. After 1918, Great Britain was the dominant power.

In addition to Muslims and probably some Christians, Safed had a small Jewish community, which grew considerably after 1492 and the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. Many prominent rabbis found their way to Safed, which became a center of Jewish mysticism, known as Kabbalah. The influx of SEPHARDI Jews made Safed a center for Jewish learning as well as a regional center for Arab merchants throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Economic activity centered on trade, the production of wool and cotton textiles, and, because of its summer climate, tourism. A plague in 1742 followed by an earthquake in 1769 led to a drastic decline in the Jewish community in Safed, leaving only seven families at its nadir. Although the Arab community suffered from these disasters as well, it gradually reconstituted itself, and, from then until 1948, Safed was an overwhelmingly Arab town. During the nineteenth century, Safed was again struck with earthquakes and plagues, as well as by one incident of intercommunal violence. With the coming of ZIONISM in the twentieth century, there were occasional periods of tension in Safed, but overall Arab-Jewish relations were cordial. However, during the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, which began in JERUSALEM and escalated into serious violence in HEBRON, Safed did not escape the hostilities. In the western district of the town, where most Jews lived, eighteen were killed and the area was sacked.

In 1948, Safad had a population of some 13,300, including 2,000 Jews. The city was home to eight mosques, according to the UN CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE, all of which were destroyed in the war. The Arab Association for Human Rights (AAHR) reported in December 2004 that some 250 non-Jewish places of worship had been destroyed during or since the 1948 WAR, or had been made inaccessible to Arab Israelis.

Between 30 April and 10 May 1948, some 10,000 of Safed's Palestinian residents fled as a result of Operation Yiftah by the elite Zionist fighting force PALMAH. A soldier who took part in the conquest of Safed wrote of his experience: "One of the Palmah commanders, YIGAL ALLON, convinced us that winning Safed was the key to conquering the rest of the Galilee, and we became determined to do so. We first tried to storm the Citadel at the top of the mountain, but we were totally unsuccessful. We also attacked the Police station—the building is still riddled with bullet holes to this day. But then one rainy night we made overwhelmingly effective use of our Davidka mortars which had always seemed to cause much more noise than actual damage. This time, however, it served to shock the Arab fighters immensely. When dawn broke on 10 May, the Palmah lifted the siege. We had forced the Arabs to flee from Safed and we celebrated our control of the town." After the war, Israel built the Davidka Monument in the central area of the city to commemorate the dispossession of Safed's Palestinians.

Most of the refugees who fled from Safed went to Beirut or Damascus. One of the more well-known is MAHMUD ABBAS, who was elected president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY in 2006. In 2008 the population of Safed was about 32,000, with almost no Palestinians living in this once overwhelmingly Arab town.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; WAR, 1948

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Safe Passage

See RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT II

Safiyya, Afif (1950–)

Afif Safiyya is a Palestinian academic and diplomat. Born in JERUSALEM to a Roman Catholic family, he studied in FRANCE and Belgium, receiving an M.A. from the Institute of National Politics in Paris. Safiyya was a visiting scholar at Harvard University from 1985 to 1987 and was the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) representative to the Netherlands from 1987 to 1990. From 1990 to 2005, he served as the PLO general delegate to the United Kingdom and to the Holy See. In October 2005, Safiyya became the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's ambassador to the UNITED STATES. Four years later, disillusioned by the hostility and ostracism of official Washington, he requested a transfer and was named the PNA's ambassador to the SOVIET UNION. However, on 25 March 2009, PNA president MAHMUD ABBAS arbitrarily fired Safiyya for attending a rally, organized by Hamas, in Moscow in support of the Palestinians under siege during Israel's OPERATION CAST LEAD.

The report of Safiyya's attendance was written by a so-called security adviser, dispatched to the PNA embassy in Moscow without Safiyya's knowledge, apparently to monitor the ambassador. The PNA's security experts are trained and funded by the United States and EUROPEAN UNION countries. Safiyya, in dismay, explained that he had not attended the rally as a supporter of the Hamas movement, but in his capacity as PNA ambassador to Russia, tasked with promoting the Palestinian cause abroad. In the speech he presented during the rally, Safiyya praised the resilience of the people of the GAZA STRIP in their resistance against the Israeli OCCUPATION.

Ha'aretz, the Jerusalem newspaper, wrote of him: "Afif Safiyya is considered the most articulate Palestinian diplomat in Europe, and possibly the world. The most experienced speakers the foreign ministry can muster have been sent to face off against him in international conferences and on BBC talk shows and they have run into difficulty opposite the Jerusalem-born Palestinian with the rich vocabulary and smooth delivery."

When Pope John Paul II visited the Holy Land in 2000, many criticized him for not addressing the issue of sovereignty over the holy city of Jerusalem. Safiyya, on the other hand, said that he was not disappointed because the VATICAN had signed a document with the PLO regarding Jerusalem in February and thus had probably decided it did not need to say anything more on the matter. Safiyya added that Palestinians should also take heart from the pope's visit to the al-Dheisheh refugee camp near BETHLEHEM, which is home to 10,000 Palestinian REFUGEES. There, the pope called on political leaders in the Middle East and the international community to work toward a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, saying that the refugees had an "inalienable right" to justice. Through such actions, Safiyya said, the pope had clearly demonstrated the Vatican's support for the Palestinians' right to live in their own independent homeland.

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Said, Edward W. (1933–2003)

Edward Said, a Palestinian American, was one of the twentieth century's greatest thinkers, a unique individual who has left an indelible legacy in numerous fields and across many disciplines. He was an internationally renowned literary and cultural critic, a philosopher of history, an accomplished pianist, a music critic, a Middle East specialist, a political theorist, a political activist, and a most deeply humane voice of conscience. His career combined distinguished academic achievements with passionate political interventions on behalf of the Palestinian and Arab peoples.

Born in JERUSALEM, Said, together with his family, was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and settled in Cairo. He came to the UNITED STATES in 1951 to attend college, receiving a B.A. from Princeton and a Ph.D. in comparative literature from Harvard. Said began his academic career as an assistant professor at Columbia University, where he taught English and comparative literature until his death. In 1990 he was appointed university professor, the highest academic rank bestowed by the institution. Said authored more than a dozen books and over 250 articles and presented at least fifty endowed lectures. His writings appeared in twenty-six languages in the most prestigious and

widely read periodicals, newspapers, and scholarly journals. In addition to his career at Columbia, Said was a visiting professor at Yale, Harvard, and Johns Hopkins, as well as a fellow at numerous centers of learning and advanced studies around the world. He was general editor of a book series at Harvard University Press titled Convergences: Inventories of the Present. He also wrote a regular music column for the *Nation* and a regular column for *Al-Ahram* in Cairo.

Together with a few colleagues, Said was responsible for creating the basis for postcolonial studies as a new discipline. He provided the linguistic and methodological tools to facilitate an understanding of the nature of imperialism and its impact on colonial societies. His articulation of the relationship between culture and power marks another of his major contributions to knowledge. In both *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993), he demonstrated how the concept of empire was ever present in the literary works of the age, but that a falsely claimed "knowledge" of the "orient" created a perspective that enabled the West to exercise power over the East, spreading its hegemony in ways that distorted and fragmented the political development of colonial societies. Indeed, perhaps Said's most important intellectual contribution was *Orientalism*, which analyzed the set of racist ideas that the West has used to characterize and dominate the Middle East and Asia since the nineteenth century.

Another of Said's intellectual contributions was demonstrating how embedded the justification for empire building was in the Western cultural imagination and how even today the imperial legacy colors relations at all levels between the West and the formerly colonized world. He posited that all cultures are interdependent; thus the West and its former subjects must recognize that the true human community is global. Said's stature as one of the world's leading literary theorists is based on works such as *Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography* (1966) and *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (1993). In them he demonstrated that literature can only be understood in its historical and social context.

Despite Said's stature in the scholarly world—the *New York Times* once described him as "one of the most influential literary and cultural critics in the world"—he did not detach himself from the reality of politics, especially Palestinian politics. Said served for many years on the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) parliament-in-exile, and he advocated for the Palestinian cause in every possible way, such as by actively participating in the Arab American Association of University Professors as well as in conferences and meetings on the Palestinian issue. His *The Question of Palestine* (1979) remains the best introduction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict available.

Said's message was universal, and he typically spoke with empathy for Jewish suffering and Palestinian misery at the same time. Like Gandhi, his opposition to the ZIONISM project and his adherence to the "requirements of justice" did not stand in contradiction to an expressed sympathy for "the life long persecution of the Jews." The reality of Said's universal humanism was underscored by his friendship with the distinguished pianist and chief conductor for life of the Staatskapelle Berlin, Israeli-Argentinean Daniel Barenboim. Together, in 1988, Barenboim and Said organized and institutionalized the training of young Arab and Israeli musicians, and their East-West Divan Workshop continues to retain its musical vibrancy, as well as being a living testament to a joint struggle for equality as the alternative to apartheid and perpetual conflict.

Despite Said's lifelong commitment to the Palestinian cause, when PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT opted for the open-ended OSLO ACCORDS and abandoned the Palestinian consensus, Said publicly broke with him, resigned from the PNC, and directed his scathing critiques at the accords and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY that they created. With the death of the TWO-STATE SOLUTION, Said began to realize that the Oslo Accords' architects had inadvertently set the stage for a single nonsectarian state in all of Palestine. From that moment onward, he became a principal voice for a pluralist existence in historic Palestine, for a single, secular, democratic republic based on justice and equality for both Jews and Arabs. Said's long battle against leukemia never dulled his analytic prowess or productivity, nor did it deter him from writing, traveling, and contributing. His commitment to the universal values that govern just societies has been the hallmark of his scholarship and activism. Said never succumbed to accommodation with those in power but remained true to his ideals and principles.

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—Naseer H. Aruri

Sa'iqa

Sa'iqa (Thunderbolt, Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization) was a Syrian-controlled, Palestinian guerrilla force established in 1968, mostly by Syrian BA'ATHIST officers and officials, and represented one aspect of SYRIA's attempt to influence Palestinian politics. Subsequently, it merged with a small group, the Palestine Popular Liberation Front, to form the secular, leftist Palestinian nationalist VANGUARDS OF THE POPULAR LIBERATION WAR Organization. Syria required all Sa'iqa members to undergo military training and encouraged them to serve in guerrilla bases. Sa'iqa had seats on the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL and initially worked closely with FATAH as well as hosting units of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY—though under Syrian control. However, it fought alongside Syria in the Lebanese civil war and against the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. Moreover, in the 1983 Palestinian civil war, Sa'iqa again fought against Fatah. Nevertheless, it remained nominally part of the PLO and was considered a pragmatic, or nonideological, group, though it remained under Syrian sponsorship. It never had many supporters, and none in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The group has played no role in Palestinian politics since the OSLO ACCORDS of 1993.

See also SYRIA

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Al-Sakakini, Khalil (1878–1953)

Khalil al-Sakakini was a Palestinian essayist and innovative educator, perhaps the most important Palestinian intellectual of his time, who was responsible for the introduction of a new curriculum and teaching methodology in Palestine education. Born in JERUSALEM to a Greek Orthodox family, he was educated in missionary schools, including the Greek Orthodox School, the Christian Mission Society College, and the Zion English College, where he studied literature. As a young man, al-Sakakini went to the UNITED STATES to seek his fortune, but was disappointed with the opportunities available to him. During his nine-month stay in the United States, he translated and wrote for Arabic literary magazines on the East Coast and did translations for Professor Richard Gottheil at Columbia University. He supported himself by teaching Arabic and working in a Maine factory and as a street vendor. Upon his return to Palestine in 1908, he worked as a journalist for the Jerusalem newspaper *Al Asmai'* and taught Arabic at the renowned Jerusalem Salahiyya School, as well as to expatriates at the American Colony. In 1909 he founded the Dusturiyya School, which became known for its humane, tolerant, imaginative, democratic, broad-minded, and mind-broadening educational doctrines and for its advocacy of Arab nationalism. He pioneered a system at Dusturiyya that he was to use later: there were no grades, prizes, or punishments for students, and there was an emphasis on music, education, and athletics. This was the first school in Palestine to admit pupils regardless of sect, religion, or ethnic background.

Sakakini led a movement to reform and Arabize what he saw as a corrupt GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH of Jerusalem and wrote a pamphlet in 1913 titled "The Orthodox Renaissance in Palestine," which led to his excommunication. Ottoman authorities arrested him in 1917 and jailed him in Damascus for sheltering a Jewish-

Polish immigrant who was (unbeknownst to al-Sakakini) a US spy. After his release in late 1918, Sakakini went to work for the British Educational Authority of Palestine in Jerusalem and was appointed head of the Jerusalem Teachers' College. He went on to become inspector of education for Palestine, a post he held for twelve years, until his resignation in protest of the British appointment of the Jewish HERBERT SAMUEL as high commissioner in Palestine. At the same time, he wrote political commentaries for the newspapers *al Muqtataf, al Hilal,* and *al Siyassa al Usbu'iyya*; composed a number of patriotic poems; and spoke at political rallies. In 1925 Sakakini founded the Wataniyya School; in 1926 he worked as a school principal in Cairo; and when he returned he became an education inspector. This allowed him to bring his educational philosophy to rural villages. In 1938 he founded the an-Nahda College in Jerusalem.

In May 1934 Sakakini began to invest much of his time, resources, and energy in building a new home in the Katamon neighborhood of Jerusalem. The project took three years to complete.

Sakakini joined the ranks of the ARAB REVOLT (1936–1939) against the British Occupation and Zionist settlement of Palestine, and he wrote its anthem. During the 1948 WAR, shells fell near his home every night, and his family was in constant danger. This, combined with the psychological shock of the recent massacre by Zionist militias at the Arab village of DEIR YASSIN (an hour's walk from his home), motivated Sakakini to flee his beloved home and city with his family and become a REFUGEE in EGYPT. Katamon later became part of West Jerusalem and his house was confiscated and given to a Jewish immigrant family. Sakakini's wife, Sultana, died in October 1939, and he lived in consummate grief ever after, writing a number of poems eulogizing her.

Throughout his life Sakakini embraced European culture and consistently expressed humanistic ideas. His business card read: "Khalil Sakakini: human being, God willing." At the same time, he defined himself first and foremost as an Arab, and he is hailed as one of the founding fathers of Arab nationalism in the region. He was an advocate of pan-Arabism and envisaged Palestine united with Syria. He saw ZIONISM as a great threat and believed that the Jewish right to the LAND had expired while the Arab right was "a living one." He supported the Arab resistance during the Arab Revolt, although he was also concerned about the rebellion's violence. He wrote: "I feel the pain of the troubles, whether they fall on Arabs or on the English or on the Jews. For that reason you will sometimes find me on the side of the Arabs, at other times on the side of the English, and still other times on the side of the Jews. And if there were animals who suffered from even a faint whiff of these troubles, I would sometimes be on the side of the animals."

Khalil Sakakini left twelve publications in his name, including educational works; poetry collections; literary, ethical, and political essays; and a journal. He published more than a dozen books of essays, including *Mutala'at fi al-Lugha wa al-Adab* (Readings in Language and Literature, 1925) and the two-volume work *Ma Tayassar* (What's Available, 1943–1946). His most endearing writings, however, are his letters to his son, Sari, when the latter was in college; these are collected in *Sari* (1935). His book on the death of his wife, *Li-Dhikraki* (In Memory of You, 1940), and his own highly revealing memoir, *Kadha Ana, Ya Duniya* (Such Am I, Oh World, 1955), were published posthumously by his daughters. Over seven books and essays have been published about Sakakini, and a street and school in Jerusalem, the Jazzar's mosque library in ACRE, and a Cairo street have been named after him. His papers are now at the Hebrew University. In Ramallah, the Khalil Sakakini Cultural Centre Foundation, founded in 1996, is dedicated to the promotion of arts and culture in Palestine.

See also OTTOMAN EMPIRE; PALESTINIAN IDENTITY; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Saladin/Salah al-Din (ca. 1138–1193)

Saladin, or Salah al-Din Yusuf ibn Ayyub, was a Kurdish Muslim who became the sultan of EGYPT and SYRIA. He led the Muslims against the Franks and other European Crusaders and eventually recaptured Palestine from the Crusader Kingdom of JERUSALEM after his victory in the Battle of Hattin. As such, he is a revered figure in Kurdish, Arab, Persian, Turkish, and Muslim culture. His chivalrous behavior was noted by Christian chroniclers, and despite being the nemesis of the Crusaders, he won the respect of many of them, including Richard the Lionheart. At the height of his power, Saladin ruled over Egypt, Syria, IRAQ, the Hejaz (western Arabia), and Yemen. In 1171, he proclaimed himself Sultan of Egypt after dissolving the Shi'a Fatimid Caliphate and subsequently established the Ayyubid Sunni Muslim dynasty that was centered in Cairo and Damascus and ruled much of the Middle East, including North Africa, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries CE. Its power was gradually sapped by the Mongols, and in 1342 the last Ayyubid ruler was deposed. During their relatively short-lived tenure, the Ayyubids ushered in an era of economic prosperity in the lands they ruled, and the facilities and patronage they provided led to a resurgence in intellectual activity in the Islamic world. This period was also marked by an Ayyubid process of vigorously strengthening Sunni Muslim dominance in the region by constructing numerous madrasas (Islamic schools) in their major cities.

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Salamah, 'Ali Hasan (1940–1979)

'Ali Hasan Salamah (Abu Ali Hasan), called the "Red Prince" for his flamboyant, Western lifestyle, was the chief of operations for the Palestinian BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION, which was responsible for the massacre of Israeli athletes at the MUNICH OLYMPICS in 1972 and other attacks. A confidant of PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT, Salamah was a commander of FORCE 17 (Arafat's personal security force) and the PLO/FATAH's intermediary with the UNITED STATES in Beirut from 1970 until his death at the hands of Israeli agents. As such, he personally provided protection to US diplomats, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) agents, and others.

Salamah was born in Qula near LYDDA, where his wealthy, businessman father, Shaykh Hassan Salamah, had fought the Zionists, first as a member of ABD AL-QADIR AL-HUSAYNI's Jihad al-Muqaddas (HOLY WAR ARMY) in 1934; then as commander during the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT in the Lydda district; and, in 1938, as regional commander of the bureau of the Arab Revolt in Palestine. During the 1948 WAR, the elder Salamah was leader of a resistance group acting in the Lydda-RAMLA area of the country and was killed by Israeli snipers in Ras al-Ein (Ramla) in June 1948. 'Ali Hasan was educated in GERMANY, where he spent considerable time. Although he always felt that he had to live up to his father's heroism, he was a playboy who liked fancy clothes, cars, parties, and women. Shortly before his death, he married a former Miss Universe, a Lebanese Christian named Georgina Rizak.

In 1968 Arafat sent Salamah to EGYPT for training in Fatah commando operations and intelligence work, and later he became head of Fatah security agencies. In 1971, after losing his seat on the Fatah Revolutionary Council due to intelligence failures, he spectacularly rehabilitated himself by masterminding the assassination of Jordanian prime minister Wasfi Tal on 28 November. He then set about recruiting cadres for his cause, and quickly followed the Tal operation by wounding the Jordanian ambassador to London in an attack on 15 December. On 8 February Black September bombed a Dutch gas company and a German electronics company that were accused of cooperating with Israel. Salamah organized numerous other attacks, including the 1972 hijacking of Sabena flight 572 to Tel Aviv and the killing of twenty-seven tourists at Israel's Lod airport. But after the Munich Olympics massacre, in which fifteen people were killed, including nine Israeli athletes, he was the first of those involved to renounce international TERRORISM.

As head of Force 17, Salamah was Arafat's contact with the US Embassy in Beirut and with the CIA. During Arafat's persistent efforts to open a dialogue with the United States and in the context of the chaos in West Beirut after civil war erupted in 1975, Fatah assumed responsibility for the protection of US diplomats. Salamah's men guarded Americans and other foreigners as the US Sixth Fleet evacuated them from a West Beirut seaside swimming club on 20 June 1976. Not long before Salamah's death, a grateful CIA agent took him to Florida's Walt Disney World, a place he had always wanted to visit. This uniquely American gesture compounded Arafat's bitterness and sense of betrayal when Israel killed Salamah.

David Ignatius reported in the *Wall Street Journal* that Salamah was "a backdoor channel between the US and the PLO" and that he furnished senior US diplomats, including Secretary of State HENRY KISSINGER, with tips about assassinations planned by radical Palestinian and other terrorist groups. Salamah is believed to have supplied similar information to security organizations in West Germany, Italy, and Japan to demonstrate that Fatah had gone out of the terror business and become a valid diplomatic interlocutor.

In his memoirs, Kissinger reveals that Arafat initiated an attempt at dialogue in the aftermath of the 1973 Middle East war. Kissinger's secret envoy, Vernon Walters, met with an unnamed Arafat confidant—almost certainly Salamah—in Rabat, Morocco, on 3 November "to gain time and to prevent radical assaults on the early peace process." "Afterwards," Kissinger continues, "attacks on Americans—at least by Arafat's faction of the PLO—ceased." Kissinger made a point of having key Arabs and Israelis briefed on the clandestine PLO encounter. In the ensuing peace talks in 1974 and 1975, Israel extracted a pledge from the United States not to negotiate with the PLO until the PLO recognized Israel's *right* to exist, and PLO-US contacts ceased.

It is reasonable to assume that Israel was unhappy about this back channel. When Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN came to power in 1977, President JIMMY CARTER was already on record as favoring "a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years." Moreover, Carter had outraged Israelis by meeting with Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad on the eve of the election that brought Begin to office. The MOSSAD, Israel's intelligence agency, had supposedly ended its TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS campaign against Black September terrorists in 1973 after a botched operation in which Israeli agents were arrested in Lillehammer, NORWAY, for killing an innocent Moroccan waiter whom they mistook for Salamah. However, the Begin government revived plans to assassinate Salamah, and he was blown up in his car as it passed a booby-trapped parked Volkswagen in West Beirut on 22 January 1979. Israel said it was a revenge killing, but it is more likely that the Salamah killing was intended to disrupt Fatah's fitful secret dialogue with the United States.

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Salih, Nimr (ca. 1928–1991)

Nimr Salih (Abu Salih) was a leading FATAH party leftist. Born in LYDDA, Salih was dispossessed with his family in the 1948 WAR, becoming a REFUGEE. For a time, he was the head of political guidance within the Fatah general command. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR

ARAFAT later appointed Salih head of the Fatah militia in JORDAN, where he began to form a power base of his own. Although the top echelons of the PLO warned him in 1968 not to sow dissent within Jordan, they subsequently dismissed him because Jordan perceived Salih as a subversive.

In September 1971 Salih was elected to the Fatah Central Committee, and he assumed overall responsibility for SYRIA and LEBANON after the death of Walid Nimr. Although he was initially in general alignment with Arafat's policies, he began to work with leftist figures within Fatah to form a new independent faction. In October 1973, Salih argued for a role for the SOVIET UNION in the Palestinian struggle and became the leader of the "Soviet group," forming an alliance with KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad). He supported an anti-Syria position and spoke out against the Palestinian attack on Maronite strongholds in early 1976 in the Lebanese civil war. He also backed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, causing a rift between the PLO and SAUDI ARABIA.

Salih condemned the FAHD PLAN and REAGAN for peace and denounced Arafat in November 1982 for supporting the FEZ PEACE INITIATIVE and for his cooperation with Jordan in general. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Abu Salih was one of the prominent Fatah dissidents in the PLO split and civil war, joining the rebel faction known as the NATIONAL ALLIANCE. As a result, Arafat froze his membership in the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE in January 1983 and dropped him from the Fatah slate for the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. In June 1984, Syria placed Abu Salih under house arrest, where he died of a heart attack in September 1991.

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Salomon, Gershon (ca. 1928–)

Gershon Salomon is the founder and leader of the Temple Mount Faithful and the Land of Israel Faithful Movement, Israeli groups seeking to build the Third Temple on the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF/TEMPLE MOUNT). Born in JERUSALEM, a tenth-generation Jewish Jerusalemite, he fought in every Israeli war since 1948 and was among those who captured the al-Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount area during the 1967 WAR. Salomon believes that MOSHE DAYAN, then Israeli defense minister, made a wrong decision in 1967 by giving control of the Temple Mount to the Muslim authorities of Jerusalem and considers it a tragedy that Muslims have control over the al-Haram ash-Sharif. Salomon plans that the Temple Mount Faithful will reverse this situation, expel the Muslims, destroy the DOME OF THE ROCK and AL-AQSA MOSQUE, and rebuild the Third Temple, a re-creation of the biblical Temple of Solomon, in their stead.

During a battle with the Syrians in 1958, Salomon was wounded when an Israeli tank accidentally ran over him and broke his spine. While lying near death on the battlefield, Salomon claims that God told him "he was not yet finished with him," which Salomon understood as a divine call to consecrate himself to building the Third Temple as soon as possible, because the Messiah would come in this generation. By approximately 1985, the Temple Mount Faithful had few followers in Israel, but after Salomon made connections with end-time churches in the UNITED STATES, televangelist Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network and a host of other Christian dispensationalist groups have promoted Salomon and provided the cash for his project.

When he is not devoting himself to the Temple Mount Faithful, Salomon conducts research on the history of the national movement of the Kurdish people and lectures on Middle Eastern studies. He is an officer in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF).

See also THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Samaria

Samaria, the Hebrew word for the northern area of Palestine/Israel, is mainly used in modern times by Jewish religious fundamentalists and secular

ultra-nationalists in Israel in a conscious attempt to reassociate the region with biblical times and thus emphasize Israel's relationship with and right to the area. This area is more widely known (together with Judea) as the WEST BANK.

See also JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; JUDEA; WEST BANK

Samaritans

The Samaritans are a small ethnoreligious group who believe they are descendants of the original Israelites and that everything that evolved in Judaism after the Babylonian exile is heresy. The Samaritans broke with the Jewish majority in the sixth century BCE. They do not recognize Jews outside their own community as authentic Jews. They are strict adherents of the Torah, whose ancient scrolls form the center of their lives, and they scrupulously follow its laws. They accept only the Law of Moses (Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy) as authoritative and have a slightly different version of these books than is found in the Torah. They do not recognize the prophets and their writings as divinely inspired. Based on the Samaritan Pentateuch, Samaritans claim that their worship is the true religion of the ancient Israelites, predating the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem. Samaritans believe that the Temple of Yahweh is not on Mount Zion in Jerusalem, but on Mount Gerizim in NABLUS.

As of 1 November 2007, there were 712 Samaritans, half of whom reside in the Israeli settlement of Har Brakha on Mount Gerizim in Nablus, which is sacred to them, and the rest in the city of Holon, just outside Tel Aviv. There are also four Samaritan families residing in Binyamina, Giv'at Ada, Matan, and Ashdod.

Until the 1980s most of the Samaritans resided in the Samarian town of Nablus below Mount Gerizim. Since then, many have relocated to the settlement on the mountain itself, according to Israel because of the First INTIFADA. Yet relations between the Palestinians of Nablus and the Samaritans have traditionally been quite cordial, and it seems unlikely that any Palestinian would harm them. The PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY granted them passports and designated one seat on the Palestinian Legislative Council for Samaritans. As a small community physically divided between neighbors in a hostile region, Samaritans have been hesitant to overtly take sides in the Arab-Israel conflict, fearing that doing so could lead to negative repercussions; however, Samaritans who live in Holon tend to be more politically aligned with Israel and have to some extent assimilated to the surrounding culture, including speaking modern Hebrew. Samaritans who are Israeli citizens are drafted into the military, along with the Jewish citizens of Israel. Samaritans who continue to live on Mount Gerizim speak Arabic and tend to be quietly sympathetic to the Palestinians. For liturgical purposes, all Samaritans speak Samaritan Hebrew, also known as ancient Hebrew, and Aramaic.

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Samuel, Herbert Louis (1870–1963)

Herbert Louis Samuel, the First Viscount Samuel of Mount Carmel and of Toxteth, was a British philosopher and statesman. He was involved in the Zionist politics that resulted in the BALFOUR DECLARATION, which promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, and was the first high commissioner of the BRITISH MANDATE of Palestine, serving from 1920 to 1925. As such, Samuel was the first Jew to govern Palestine in 2,000 years.

Born in Liverpool and raised in London, he studied at University College in Hampstead and Balliol College, Oxford. By the age of eighteen, Samuel had become an active liberal. In 1902 he

entered Parliament as a Liberal Party member and in 1906 held his first junior ministerial office at the Home Office. In 1910 Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith appointed Samuel to the cabinet and later as home secretary. During World War I, Samuel began to take part in Zionist activities and became close friends with CHAIM WEIZMANN, leader of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION.

Lloyd George, the British statesman who had been retained as legal counsel by the Zionists some years before, assured Samuel that "he was very keen to see a Jewish state established in Palestine." After discussions with Weizmann and Lloyd George, Samuel produced a Zionist memorandum on Palestine, in January 1915, that contained arguments in favor of combining British annexation of Palestine with British support for Zionist aspirations and ended with objections to any other solution for Palestine. In this memorandum, which Samuel circulated to his colleagues in the cabinet, he proposed that a British protectorate be established in Palestine that would allow for increased Jewish settlement and, in time, a considerable degree of autonomy for the future Jewish majority. Samuel believed that a Jewish center would flourish spiritually and intellectually, resulting in the character improvement of Jews all over the world. Prime Minister Asquith, however, was not interested in pursuing such an option, and no action was taken at the time. Yet significant work had been accomplished, and it was largely because of Samuel's efforts that the Balfour Declaration was later written.

It is not known if the cabinet formally considered Samuel's memorandum, but Asquith wrote in his diary on 13 March 1915 of Samuel's "dithyrambic memorandum," of which Lloyd George was "the only other partisan." Certainly, at this time, Zionist claims and aspirations were secondary to British policy toward Russia and the Arabs. In February 1916 Samuel approached British diplomat Mark Sykes, who knew Samuel to be sympathetic to the ideas of THEODOR HERZL for a Jewish state in Palestine, with a plan. The plan put forward by Samuel was in the form of a memorandum, which Sykes thought prudent to commit to memory and destroy, likely believing it to be politically sensitive. Commenting on it, Sykes wrote to Samuel suggesting that if Belgium, rather than Britain, should assume the administration of Palestine, it might be more acceptable to FRANCE as an alternative to the international administration that Samuel wanted and the Zionists did not. Referring to boundaries marked on a map attached to the memorandum, he wrote, "By excluding HEBRON and the East of JORDAN [from the Palestine Mandate], there is less to discuss with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them, and further does away with any contact with the BEDOUIN, who never cross the river except on business."

On the same day, Samuel developed the Zionist position more fully in a conversation with the foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey. He spoke of Zionist aspirations for the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish state and of the importance of its geographical position to the British Empire. Such a state, he said, "could not be large enough to defend itself," and it would therefore be essential that it be, by constitution, neutral. Grey asked whether SYRIA as a whole must necessarily go with Palestine, and Samuel replied that this was not only unnecessary but also inadvisable, since it would bring in a large and unassimilable Arab population. "It would," he said, "be a great advantage if the remainder of Syria were annexed by France, as it would be far better for the state to have a European power as a neighbor than the Turk."

An informal committee of Zionists, with Mark Sykes representing the British government, met on 7 February 1917 at the house of Moses Gaster, the chief rabbi of the SEPHARDIC congregations in England. Gaster stressed Zionist support for British strategic interests in Palestine, which were to be an integral part of any agreement among Zionist leaders in Britain. As these interests might be considered paramount to British statesmen, support for Zionist aims in Palestine, Gaster said, was fully justified. ZIONISM was irrevocably opposed to any internationalization proposals, even a joint Anglo-French dominion, believing that its best chance for success was through a British-only mandate for Palestine. Herbert Samuel followed with an expression of hope that Jews in Palestine would receive full national status that would be shared by Jews in the DIASPORA. The question of conflict of nationality (with the Arabs of Palestine) was not mentioned, and a succeeding speaker, Harry Sacher, suggested that the sharing should not involve the political implications of citizenship. Weizmann spoke of the necessity for unrestricted IMMIGRATION.

Sykes outlined the obstacles: the inevitable Russian objections to any imperialist ventures, the opposition of the Arabs, and strongly pressed French claims to all of Syria, including Palestine. The meeting ended with a summary of Zionist objectives: international recognition of a Jewish right to Palestine, juridical nationhood for the Jewish community in Palestine, the creation of a Jewish chartered company in Palestine with rights to acquire LAND, a union and one administration for Palestine, and extraterritorial status for the HOLY SITES.

When the Liberal Party split into Asquith and Lloyd George factions in 1916, Samuel sided with Asquith and was thus left out of the cabinet when Lloyd George became prime minister. During the course of World War I, Britain conquered Palestine in 1917 and in the election of 1918, Samuel lost his seat and became a candidate to represent British interests in the new territory. Once the British Mandate was granted by the League of Nations, he was appointed to the position of high commissioner of Palestine in 1920.

As high commissioner, Samuel was at pains to demonstrate his neutrality and attempted to mediate between Zionist and Arab interests, acting to slow Jewish immigration and win the confidence of the Arab population. Islamic custom at the time was that the chief Islamic spiritual leader, the grand mufti of Jerusalem, was chosen by the temporal ruler, the Ottoman sultan in Constantinople, from a group of clerics who were nominated by the indigenous clerics. After the British conquered Palestine, this led to the bizarre situation in which a Jew, Herbert Samuel, was to appoint the Islamic leader, in this case AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, who later proved a thorn in the side of the British administration in Palestine. During Samuel's time as high commissioner (1920–1925), the Jewish population doubled, Jewish settlement grew, local councils were organized, and the Hebrew language was recognized as one of the three official languages of the country. However, the leaders of the Jewish Yishuv were disappointed by Samuel's efforts to "appease" Arab interests.

After returning to England, Samuel's interest in the development of the Zionist project remained vital. He was a supporter of the Hebrew University and a member of its board of governors. He fought against the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER because of its attempt to rein in Zionism, as well as against Britain's attempt to balance its policy in Palestine after World War II.

See also BRITISH MANDATE; OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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San Remo Conference, 1920

The San Remo Conference of the post–World War I Allied Supreme Council determined the allocation of Class "A" League of Nations mandates for administration of the former Ottoman-ruled lands

of the Middle East by the victorious powers. The decisions of the conference, held 19–26 April 1920 in San Remo, Italy, mainly confirmed those of the First Conference of London (February 1920). Britain received a mandate for Palestine and IRAQ, while FRANCE gained control of SYRIA, including present-day LEBANON. The boundaries of these territories were left unspecified, to "be determined by the Principal Allied Powers," and were not completely finalized until four years later. To enforce its mandate, France shortly thereafter intervened militarily in Syria to depose the nationalist Arab government that King Faysal had established in Damascus.

The conference reaffirmed the terms of the Anglo-French SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT of 16 May 1916 for the region's partition and the BALFOUR DECLARATION of 2 November 1917, in which the British government favored the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. The conference's decisions were contained in the stillborn Treaty of Sèvres (Section VII, Article 94-97). Because TURKEY rejected this treaty, the conference's decisions were only finally confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922 and the 1924 Treaty of Lausanne.

See also BRITISH MANDATE; OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Sartawi, Isam (1935–1983)

Isam Sartawi was a Palestinian resistance figure and an early peace activist who met with progressive Israelis beginning in the 1970s. Born in ACRE, Palestine, he was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and fled to Baghdad as a REFUGEE. After he earned a B.A. from Baghdad University, he began the study of medicine and developed an interest in cardiology. He then came to the UNITED STATES, where he obtained an M.D. After he left the United States, Sartawi turned his interests toward politics in 1967 and formed the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) in Baghdad, with the goal of providing medical support to Arab fighters. A year later, the AOLP merged with YASIR ARAFAT's FATAH organization, but Sartawi separated from Fatah in November 1968 after an argument with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman during a PLO meeting. In 1968 Sartawi was one of the founders of the Palestine Red Crescent Society.

The AOLP received support from Iraqi troops in JORDAN partly as a result of Sartawi's prior residence in Baghdad and the good relationship he had with Iraqi leaders. Iraqi troops provided protection for the AOLP's training camp; however, in July 1971 the AOLP rejoined Arafat's Fatah and thus stopped getting support from IRAQ. After Sartawi's reincorporation into Fatah, he became a special adviser to Arafat on US and European affairs and was charged with developing contacts with moderate Israelis. In 1976–1977 Sartawi began clandestinely meeting with progressive Israelis, first with Arie Eliav and other members of the ISRAELI COUNCIL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE (ICIPP). In 1979 Sartawi and Eliav received the Austrian Kreisky Prize for their efforts in exploring a peaceful end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Later Sartawi met with URI AVNERY and MATTIYAHU PELED—also from the ICIPP. At PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL meetings Sartawi was frequently criticized for his meetings with Israelis, and he repeatedly attempted to resign, although Arafat always refused to accept his letters of resignation. Sartawi later criticized Arafat for not defending him publicly.

Sartawi was shot and killed in Portugal at a meeting of the Socialist International, probably by the hard-line FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL organization, led by SABRI AL-BANNA (Abu Nidal).

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Sasson Report, 2005

The Sasson Report is an official Israeli government report, commissioned by Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON, under pressure from US president GEORGE W. BUSH, and written by the former head of the State Prosecution Criminal Department Talia Sasson. It was published on 8 March 2005 and focuses on the revelation that since 1994, Israeli government bodies had been secretly diverting millions of dollars to build WEST BANK OUTPOSTS that are illegal under Israeli law. According to Sasson, "The outposts are mostly established by bypassing procedure and violating the law, dis-

playing false pretense towards some of the State authorities, and enjoying the cooperation of other authorities in harsh violation of the law."

The report found widespread complicity and collusion among government officials in successive Israeli governments—LABOR PARTY and LIKUD—to spend state money to build the illegal outposts. It details how officials in various government ministries and the Settlement Division of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO) have cooperated to implement and finance the colonies with millions of dollars. Sasson termed the spending a "blatant violation of the law" and said that "drastic steps" were needed to rectify the situation, also acknowledging, however, that "the process of outpost expansion is profoundly under way." Significantly, as the outposts steadily become permanent communities, taking up ever wider swaths of the West Bank that Palestinians envision as the heartland of their future state, the prospects for any peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict correspondingly decrease.

The term "outpost," actually a type of SETTLEMENT, refers to any area (usually a hilltop) with a number of structures that are totally separated from the closest permanent settlement. The distance between an outpost and a permanent settlement can be a few hundred meters, although the majority of outposts tend to be located a number of kilometers away. Typically, small groups of settlers—often young men (the "hilltop youth")—undertake the initiative to establish an outpost, assuming, correctly, that once they are in place the government will provide the necessary support. The plan for all outposts is to become de facto settlements in their own right. The purpose of these new outposts is to minimize the existing open space between permanent settlements by creating large settlement blocs encompassing more land in the West Bank. Each outpost collects its own taxes, has its own secretariat and absorption committees, and so on. The outposts typically contain small clusters of trailers or other buildings to give settlers and the Israeli soldiers who protect them a foothold for expanding into actual settlements. Indeed, some outposts grow within a few years into full-scale settlements with hundreds of residents.

The Sasson Report, while concerned only with outposts, contains much insightful detail. It names 150 communities/outposts in the West Bank with incomplete or nonexistent PERMITS. Sasson cautions, however, that this list was not exhaustive due to the lack of cooperation of some ministries and government offices, which she asserts failed to provide her with relevant documentation that she requested. Among the outposts that she is aware of, Sasson found at least fifteen that had been built entirely on LAND privately owned by Palestinians and "are totally illegal and must be removed." At least seven outposts are on disputed land, twenty-six are on land in the West Bank claimed by Israel as STATE LAND, and an additional thirty-nine are on parcels of land that include private Palestinian property.

The report places direct and major responsibility for this situation on ongoing secret cooperation among various government ministries and official institutions, specifically the Ministry of Defense and the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF), including the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, the Settlement Division of the WZO, and the Ministry of Interior Affairs. It claims:

- The Housing Ministry supplied 400 mobile homes for outposts on private Palestinian land.
- The Defense Ministry approved the positioning of trailers to begin new outposts.
- The Education Ministry paid for nurseries and their teachers.
- The Energy Ministry connected outposts to the electricity grid.
- ROADS to outposts were paid for with taxpayers' money.

According to the report, the Housing Ministry (HM) created a new budget line in 2001 called "miscellaneous general development" that was used to finance illegal outposts. The budget line doubled from 2001 to 2003, and during the period 2000–2004 the ministry gave more than $16.7 million to illegal outposts. The ministry also transferred 400 mobile homes to the outposts, placing them on private Palestinian land and in other unauthorized areas without official government approval. Additionally, the HM sent 140 trailers to the outposts even before the tender process for purchasing them was complete. "Not surprisingly," Sasson writes, "the company that won the tender was the company that had already manufactured the trailers."

The Israeli HM allocated the largest sum—$1.16 million for INFRASTRUCTURE and $167,000 for public structures—to the Nof Harim outpost,

which was set up in 1995 when Israeli Knesset member BENJAMIN BEN-ELIEZER held the position of housing minister (and YITZHAK RABIN was prime minister). Nof Harim was established in part on privately owned Palestinian land.

The year 1995 also saw the illegal establishment, also on private Palestinian land, of two outposts in the Ofra-Beit El area—Pisgat Yaakov and Emunah. In the initial years after their establishment, these two outposts received funding of more than $1.33 million, half of which came from the HM. The Horsha outpost, set up that same year on land whose ownership Sasson stated was "yet to be determined," received $347,000 from the Housing Ministry.

Sasson further wrote that the Migron outpost, established in May 2001, lies entirely on land belonging to the adjacent Palestinian villages of Ein Yabrud and Burka. The HM spent more than $780,000 on infrastructure and $178,000 on public buildings for Migron.

Other highlights of Sasson's report include that the Defense Ministry approved and assisted in the positioning of trailers to establish new outposts. The IDF, "in practice . . . do not enforce the law. . . . *The commander spirit*, as described to me, sees the settlers' acts building outposts as Zionist deeds, although illegal, and asks them not to inspect such acts through the eyes of the law. This commander spirit is nourished by the involvement of State authorities and public authorities in establishing unauthorized outposts." The Education Ministry paid for nurseries and teachers in the illegal outposts. The Energy Ministry and the Israel Electric Corporation connected outposts to the electricity grid. The Mekorot Israeli WATER utility provided water systems for the outposts. Conversely, Sasson reports, taxpayers' money paid for new access roads to the outposts.

Figures in the report's appendix, correct as of June 2004, reveal that the funds were allocated to 753 settler families (plus a few dozen Israeli bachelors and students), who settled in sixty-one illegal outposts during BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's term in office (1996–1999), and another 600 individuals who settled in outposts established during Ariel Sharon's period as prime minister (2001–2006). Moreover, the sums noted in the appendix did not include tens of millions of shekels allocated to the outposts by the Israeli Defense Ministry, the WZO Settlement Division, regional councils, and private donors from Israel and abroad. The WZO did not furnish data on the funds it invested in the outposts and said only that it funded initial encampments, planning, production means, and generators.

The Sasson Report could have been embarrassing to Prime Minister Sharon because, when he was foreign minister under Netanyahu in 1998, Sharon publicly urged settlers to seize hilltops in order to break up the contiguity of Palestinian areas and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. The BBC reported his admonitions: "Let everyone get a move on and take some hilltops! Whatever we take will be ours, and whatever we don't take will not be ours!" Sharon was not criticized for the report's findings—at home or abroad—with some exceptions in the liberal Hebrew press. Despite the fact that Sasson demanded the criminal investigations of individuals involved in the outpost movement, and in the face of legal action called for against officials implicated in funding illegal settlements (by PEACE NOW and other groups), it does not appear that Sharon or any other, former or current, government official will face any legal repercussions. Sharon suffered a massive stroke less than a year later (January 2006), thus his responsibility became moot. As of July 2009 no one has been charged for these offenses.

Although, as prime minister, Sharon promised President George W. Bush that Israel would freeze all new settlement activity and dismantle illegal outposts erected since he came into office in March 2001, Washington had little comment on Sasson's report. US officials said that they expected Sharon "to keep his promises to the president," but it was also evident that Washington would not pressure Sharon on the issue while ISRAEL'S UNLATERAL DISENGAGEMENT from GAZA was in play.

Settler leaders rejected all criticism of illegality and wrongdoing, protesting that they were participating in officially sanctioned community planning initiatives. Settler leader Shaul Goldstein said Sharon should be the one to face questioning over the report's findings, adding, "It's obvious that the one who sent us in order to protect the roads and land is the prime minister so he should look in the mirror. Mr. Sharon has to be questioned—not us." A spokesman for the settlers' YESHA COUNCIL said, "The report did not surprise us in terms of factual content. All along the council claimed that the government knew what was being done and we assumed that all that was being done was government-approved from the top down." By mid-summer 2009

only four outposts (two uninhabited) had been dismantled and many new ones had been established.

See also ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; OUTPOSTS; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Saudi Arabia

Saudi policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflect a unique Islamic-Arabian worldview and an evolution in Saudi perceptions of how best to respond that are still in progress. The issue first came to light on 14 February 1945 when King Abd al-Aziz accepted an invitation for a secret meeting with President Franklin Roosevelt. They met at the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal aboard the USS *Quincy,* which was carrying Roosevelt home from the Yalta summit conference. During the meeting, the king expressed his opposition to the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, saying that GERMANY was the cause of Jewish suffering during the HOLOCAUST, and it, not the Palestinians, should be punished. Roosevelt promised the king that he would never do anything that was hostile to the Arabs, and that the UNITED STATES government would make no change in its basic policy toward Palestine without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs. Roosevelt put this promise in a letter to the king dated 5 April 1945. One week later the president was dead.

The following fall, Roosevelt's successor, HARRY TRUMAN, recalled the US envoys accredited to EGYPT, to Saudi Arabia, and to LEBANON and SYRIA, and the consul general in JERUSALEM to discuss the partition of Palestine. All agreed that the partition of Palestine would be a violation of the promises given to King Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia by President Roosevelt and that it risked destabilizing the entire Arab world. Truman's reply was, "I am sorry gentlemen, but I have hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of ZIONISM; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents." Truman's response was a harbinger of things to come.

When the BRITISH MANDATE over Palestine ended and partition occurred in 1948, the Saudi Arabian kingdom shared the Arab consensus that partition of Palestine violated the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. But the Saudi reaction differed to the extent that its view of foreign affairs is deeply embedded in ancient desert Arabian tradition overlaid in the seventh century by Islamic norms and values. Thus perhaps even more perfidious to the Saudis than the denial of self-determination, particularly to Prince Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister and Abd al-Aziz's son, was Truman's refusal to honor Roosevelt's promise to consult with his father and other Arab leaders before taking any action on partition. Breach of promise is highly dishonorable in traditional Saudi culture. Moreover, consultation (*shura* in Arabic) means far more than simply asking for one's opinion. It is an Arabian tradition to consult with major leaders and opinion makers in order to arrive at an overall consensus (*ijma'*) that legitimizes group policy decisions.

Saudi foreign policy is also imbued with strict adherence to Islamic values that are compatible

with its traditional conservative Islamic-Arabian culture. The political ideology of the Saudi regime has always been based on a puritan Islamic revival movement founded in the eighteenth century by Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and labeled "Wahhabism" by his detractors. The founder of the Al Saudi dynasty, Muhammad ibn Saud, was one of its first followers. Wahhabism has historically had its opponents. The earliest were Arabian Muslims who opposed its strict teachings, which they felt undermined their social and economic welfare. But in recent years Wahhabism's chief critics have been Westerners who link it to the rise of militant Jihadism, particularly since the rise of Islamist TERRORISM after the end of the Cold War. There are indeed some radical Wahhabis, but ironically the movement's main emphasis is on strict monotheism and on opposition to any "innovations" that crept into the religion since the time of the Prophet Muhammad, not on militant Jihadism as holy war. Wahhabism stresses the broader meaning of Jihadism, which is the promotion of virtue and the prevention of vice in one's personal as well as corporate life. (The full name of the Saudi religious police [Mutawa'a] is the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice.)

Islam is basically a legal system like Judaism, not a theological system like Christianity. Its theology can be captured in the Confession of Faith (*Shahadah*): "There is no god but God and Muhammad is His Messenger." The Saudi constitution and judicial system are based on Islamic law (*Shari'a*). In addition, Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and the site of its two holiest places, Makkah and al-Madinah, which are located in the Hijaz, which is bounded by the Red Sea. It is not surprising, therefore, that as custodians of two holy places the kingdom feels a special responsibility for seeking the welfare of the Muslim world.

Operationally, King Abd al-Aziz's major foreign policy priorities were the economic welfare of his subjects in the face of a harsh, subsistence environment, and national security threats that had expanded from local tribal warfare to include regional rivalries and conflicts. His vision of how to address both priorities, however, was to a great extent influenced by the traditional Arabian tribal tradition of seeking the cooperation of strong outside powers with mutually perceived self-interests, and for both he ultimately looked to the United States. Mutual Saudi-US economic interests date back to 1933, when the king granted an oil concession to US companies, fearing that if it were to grant concessions to European oil companies, European imperialism would follow in their wake. It was in dealing with what became the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) that Abd al-Aziz learned to admire and trust Americans.

Mutual Saudi-US security interests began during World War II, when Saudi Arabia had no standing armed forces, and matured in the 1950s with the advent of the Cold War; and the spread of atheist communism and the rise of radical secular Arab nationalism loomed as major threats to the kingdom. For protection, the king turned to the United States, the free world's superpower. Atheist communism was seen by the Saudis as a threat to the entire Muslim world, and radical Arab nationalism as a threat to the entire Middle East. In return for US economic and security partnership, the kingdom would undertake to maintain a secure flow of oil for the global economy at stable market prices. From this vision, two pillars of Saudi foreign policy evolved: looking to the United States for national security and using "oil money diplomacy" in support of national foreign interests.

Although King Abd al-Aziz considered the partition of Palestine deplorable, he nevertheless believed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it spawned was less of a security threat to the kingdom and to the entire Muslim world than Soviet communism. And at any rate, the kingdom had little influence to reverse partition. As a result, initial Saudi policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict focused on financial support to the Palestinians rather than the militant confrontation adopted by the radical Arab states.

King Abd al-Aziz died in 1953 and was succeeded by his son, Prince Saud. In 1964, Saud was succeeded by his half-brother, Prince Faisal. King Faisal can well be called the author of modern Saudi foreign policy. He was the kingdom's first foreign minister under his father and then under his brother King Saud, and he remained foreign minister even as king. Faisal was the most experienced person in the country in international affairs. While still in his teens, after World War I, he represented his father on an official visit to Britain and FRANCE, and after World War II he participated in the creation of the UNITED NATIONS.

King Faisal was steeped in Islam, having been tutored by his mother's family, the al-Shaykhs, who were descendants of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Beginning with his father's vision

of foreign policy as a base, Faisal's Islamic vision of foreign affairs emphasized seeking the welfare and security of mankind, first for his citizens, then for the Arab world and the greater Muslim world beyond, and finally for all peoples in need and in search of freedom. The main vehicle for helping those in need was financial aid made possible by the kingdom's oil wealth.

He believed that the greatest foreign security threats to the kingdom came from three sources: imperialism, ZIONISM, and communism. Because the kingdom never experienced imperialism, his opposition to it lay for the most part in the political instability it spawned throughout the Arab and Muslim world by dissidents seeking independence. Like his father, Faisal also considered the partition of Palestine to be an abomination, but his opposition to the creation of a Jewish state did not focus on Judaism, which Islam recognizes as one of the great monotheistic religions. Rather, he castigated Zionism as a secular political movement that had no right to dispossess the indigenous Palestinian Muslims and Christians, who made up 70 percent of the population.

Nevertheless, Faisal, like his father, also believed atheistic communism to be the greatest threat to Saudi Arabia and the entire Muslim world. The classic Islamic worldview is bipolar: Dar al-Islam, the Abode of Islamic Law and Peace, and Dar al-Harb, the Abode of War outside the law. For the king, this bipolar vision meshed closely with the bipolarity of the Cold War between atheist communism and the free world led by the largely monotheistic Christian United States. But because he placed a higher priority on allying with the United States against communism than on castigating it for denying Palestinians the right of self-determination by supporting the creation of Israel, Faisal drew strong condemnation from militant, secular Arab nationalists outside the kingdom who were the most vocal supporters of the Palestinian cause.

The outcome of the 1967 WAR was a turning point for Saudi policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although the Saudis had sent troops to JORDAN, they saw no action in the war. And although the loss of the rest of Palestine to Israel was humiliating to all Arabs, perhaps the most devastating loss from King Faisal's point of view was the AL-AQSA MOSQUE complex (AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF), the third holiest site in Sunni Islam after the Haram Mosque in Makkah and the Prophet's Mosque in al-Madinah. The Saudi position on Jerusalem further hardened when Israel unilaterally "annexed" East Jerusalem after the war. Still, Saudi Arabia sought to avoid direct confrontation with the United States over Palestine.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war began on 6 October with Egypt and SYRIA attacking Israel to regain the territories that Israel had occupied in the 1967 War. Initially, the war did not appreciably alter Saudi Arabia's low-profile approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This changed, however, when President RICHARD NIXON sent a message to Faisal promising him that the United States would be evenhanded in the war. But on 18 October Nixon asked the US Congress to authorize $2.2 billion in emergency military aid to Israel. The request was a public acknowledgment that the United States had been transferring a massive amount of military equipment to Israel. Even worse, from Faisal's perspective, was the fact that Nixon had broken his personal promise to be impartial; it was a repeat of Truman's breaking President Roosevelt's personal promise to King Abd al-Aziz twenty-eight years earlier.

Faisal had been warning the West for almost a year before the war that unless there was progress on a Middle East settlement that addressed Palestinian rights, the Arabs would use oil production as a political instrument. Two days after Nixon announced his intention to provide arms to Israel, Faisal instituted the Arab oil embargo, enforced by members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). Saudi Arabia had always considered that its economic interests lay in maintaining moderate oil prices, but in response to what Faisal perceived to be an egregious betrayal of a personal promise by Nixon, the king put politics ahead of economics. The response was immediate and worldwide. The global oil market was very tight, and, as prices spiked, so did a vitriolic campaign against Saudi Arabia, particularly from its critics in the United States and also from Israel, where the kingdom was now viewed as a powerful threat because of its economic influence as the world's leading oil producer. Nevertheless, although Faisal maintained an inflexible posture against Zionism, he continued to avoid playing a more active role in seeking a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He believed that only the United States had the capability to pressure Israel to address the key Palestinian issues required for a

peace settlement: BORDERS, REFUGEES, SETTLEMENTS, and the status of Jerusalem. He was convinced, however, that it did not have the political will to do so because of US domestic politics, which determined unquestioning US support for the Zionist state.

Following King Faisal's assassination in 1975, the basic broad outlines of his foreign policies remained constant. Nevertheless, each successor has put his personal stamp on policymaking. In addition, changing conditions at home and abroad have altered foreign policy priorities. For example, imperialism was no longer a burning issue by the time of Faisal's death; by 1991 the Cold War had ended, making Faisal's bipolar, anticommunist policies less relevant; a new bipolar strategic threat to the region from militant Islamic Jihadist organizations began to evolve, pitting not only Muslims against non-Muslims but also Muslims against Muslims.

In this changing environment, a new Saudi policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also began to evolve. Faisal's immediate successor was King Khalid, and the Crown Prince was Prince Fahd, to whom Khalid delegated day-to-day government operations beginning in 1975. Both were adamant that the Palestinians must be accorded the full right of self-determination. Fahd also perceived that peace could not be achieved without Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist. Thus, while Saudi Arabia retained the policies toward the conflict laid out by King Faisal, the Crown Prince initiated a far more active and independent role as befitting the kingdom's new status as the world's leading oil producer in seeking a permanent peace settlement.

Fahd began by creating an Arab consensus for a more moderate, unified position toward the peace process. In the summer of 1977, he used his influence to persuade PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) chairman YASIR ARAFAT to back away from the PLO's claim to all of Palestine and to extend implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist by accepting UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel to withdraw from occupied Palestinian territories. Arafat agreed to do so but backed out at the last minute under heavy Syrian pressure, greatly embarrassing Fahd.

The kingdom was further frustrated when Egypt's President Anwar Sadat broke another Arab consensus for collective Arab peace negotiations with Israel. In 1977 Sadat traveled to Israel in a lone effort to negotiate a permanent settlement. Saudi Arabia was convinced that Sadat could not obtain anything more than a separate peace from Israel without US pressure and that his gesture would fail. In September 1978, when President JIMMY CARTER invited Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN and Sadat to Camp David for peace talks, there was hope in Riyadh that the United States would finally exert the needed pressure on Israel for a settlement. However, the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS that came out of the meeting, though hailed by the United States, Egypt, and Israel as a major step toward peace, were considered by the Saudis to be the realization of their worst fears. From their perspective, the Israelis gained a separate peace with Egypt while conceding nothing on the Palestinian right to self-determination; it was reduced to limited local autonomy. There was no mention of Palestinian refugees or of the status of Jerusalem. The Saudis were also irritated that Sadat agreed to the terms of the accords without consulting them or any other Arab leaders and without input from the Palestinians. On the urging of Carter, the Saudis did not condemn the accords outright. However, when Sadat signed a separate peace treaty with Israel the following year, Saudi Arabia joined the Arab consensus in expelling Egypt from the ARAB LEAGUE and severing diplomatic and economic relations.

While Israel and Egypt went on to sign a bilateral peace treaty, the Camp David Accords ultimately collapsed. Their failure convinced Fahd that the United States was unwilling or unable due to domestic political pressure to exert sufficient pressure on Israel to achieve a permanent settlement that realized Palestinian rights as well as guaranteed Israeli security. Though still seeking to maintain close relations with the United States, particularly on security matters, the kingdom was not willing to continue following Washington's lead on an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. In 1981, Saudi Arabia launched its own independent peace initiative. On 7 August Fahd announced an eight-point comprehensive peace plan that became known as the FAHD PLAN, which sought the following:

1. Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian territory occupied in 1967
2. Removal of all Israeli settlements created in occupied Palestinian territories since 1967

3. Guaranteed freedom of worship for all religions at Israel/Palestine's HOLY SITES
4. Right of all Palestinians to return to their homes and compensation for those who chose not to do so
5. UN control of the WEST BANK and GAZA for a transitional period
6. Establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital
7. Affirmation of all states in the region to live in peace
8. Implementation and guarantee of these principles by the United Nations or some of its members

Fahd had obtained Arab consensus for the plan, including concurrence with point 7, which was intended to give implicit Arab recognition to the existence of Israel. Israel, however, rejected the plan in its entirety, stating that it did not explicitly guarantee its right to exist. It also opposed any mention of Israeli settlements, Arab refugees, or the status of Jerusalem.

At the 1982 Arab Summit in Fez, Morocco, the plan was approved with slight modifications by the Arab League, but it was rejected by the United States. Fahd, who had become king the previous June, continued to push for a comprehensive peace, and in December 1982 the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL accepted the partition of Palestine and the UN resolutions relating to it, including 242.

In September 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, in which they agreed formally to recognize each other. Saudi Arabia supported the OSLO ACCORDS, but it was not prepared to accept any peace settlement that did not address the Palestinian right of self-determination or that did not end Israeli control of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. After King Fahd suffered a stroke in November 1995, Crown Prince Abdallah, his half-brother, took over day-to-day government operations. Abdallah continued Fahd's insistence on Palestinian rights as well as control of the Muslim holy places. He also believed it imperative to find a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and was outspoken in his criticism of Israel's punitive tactics in response to rising Palestinian violence and terrorism. Israel and American Zionists responded by charging that Saudi support of charities that provided aid to impoverished Palestinians, including families of those who did SUICIDE BOMBINGS, was tantamount to supporting terrorism.

Nevertheless, Abdallah continued efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. As violence between Israelis and Palestinians increased in the wake of the collapse of peace talks in September 2000, he initiated another Saudi peace plan at the Arab League summit meeting in Beirut in March 2002 where it was endorsed by all those in attendance. Labeled the "Abdallah Initiative," it called for complete Israeli withdrawal from all the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967; Israeli acceptance in principle of an agreed, just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem; and creation of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as the capital. In return, it called for the Arab states to accept that the Arab-Israeli conflict was over and to sign a peace treaty with Israel to verify a comprehensive peace for all the states of the region and the establishment of normal Arab-Israeli relations in the context of a comprehensive peace.

This initiative was more forthcoming than any previous Arab plan, and it was generally well received, even by some Israeli officials. Again, however, the Abdallah Initiative was rejected by Israel and subsequently by the United States.

Abdallah became king on 1 August 2005, following the death of King Fahd. Although longstanding Saudi priorities for an Israeli-Palestinian peace have not changed under King Abdallah, what has changed is the king's personal style in Saudi foreign policy. It is far less nuanced and cautious than that of his predecessor. Nevertheless, although he still values bilateral Saudi relations with the US, he has long been skeptical that any US administration will have the political capital to pressure Israel into accepting Palestinian priorities for a just settlement, namely a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, mutually agreed boundaries—essentially those before the 1967 War—withdrawal of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory, acknowledgment of the Palestinian refugees' right of return if not their actual return, and a solution for Jerusalem that considers the rights of both Palestinians and Israelis in return for Palestinian/Arab acceptance of Israel's right to exist and pledging security guarantees.

In February 2007, Saudi Arabia exercised its role as a leader in Arab politics by brokering the Makkah Accord, aimed at creating a Palestinian national unity government and ending the violent

power struggle between moderate FATAH, led by MAHMUD ABBAS, president of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, and HAMAS, a radical Islamist party that had won a majority in recent legislative elections. Although the accord was accepted by both parties, Hamas refused to agree to a conditional commitment to recognize Israel as a precondition to peace negotiations. A national unity government was established on 17 March, but Hamas's refusal foreclosed progress on peace negotiations. Backed by the United States, Israel labeled Hamas a terrorist organization and refused to negotiate without Palestinian prerecognition. There was much discussion in the Western media of Saudi Arabia having derailed the peace process, but in reality the kingdom has not deviated from the 2002 Abdallah Initiative. Nevertheless, negotiations were not resumed. Viewed from the Saudi perspective, in the absence of any commitment by Israel to address key Palestinian concerns over borders, settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem, renewed negotiations could not lead to a final settlement.

For the present, therefore, the kingdom will stick with the Abdallah Initiative, which was reendorsed at the Riyadh Arab League Summit convened on 28 March 2007. From the Saudi point of view, if the United States would persuade Israel to agree to negotiations based on the initiative, Hamas's holding out could not overcome a broad Arab consensus created by the Arab League. Hopes were raised throughout the Arab world that incoming president Barack Obama would fulfill his campaign promise to restart the Arab-Israeli peace process. But when President Obama, meeting with King Abdallah in April 2009, asked him to make a gesture toward Israel in order to restart the peace process, the king declined. Saudi foreign minister Saud Al Faisal was even more adamant in rejecting the US request. Making incremental gestures to improve relations with Israel in the absence of any Israeli conditional commitment to withdraw from occupied Palestinian territories, he said, has not and in the Saudi view will not bring about a settlement.

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—David E. Long

Saudi Peace Initiative (Fahd Plan), 1981

See FAHD PLAN; SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Peace Plan, Abdullah Initiative, February 2002

See ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, 2002 AND 2007; SAUDI ARABIA

Saunders, Harold H. (1930–), and the Saunders Plan, 1975

Harold Saunders was the architect of a peace initiative in 1975 that for the first time in US diplomacy articulated the issue of the political rights of the Palestinians as an essential element of Arab-Israeli peace.

Saunders was a longtime US public servant who had a Ph.D. from Yale, with a dissertation on US intellectual history. For six years, while already in government service, he lectured on US history and US diplomatic history at George Washington University. Saunders was a first lieutenant in the US Air Force and spent three years at the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY before moving to the State Department. He served in the US government for twenty-five years under five presidents, from the time he joined the National Security Council in 1961 up to his resignation from the State Department as President JIMMY CARTER's term came to an end in January 1981. He received the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service—the US government's highest award for civilian public servants—and the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award.

Saunders, as deputy assistant secretary of state, gave a speech to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East on 12 November

1975 in which he recognized, for the first time in US diplomacy, the political rights of the Palestinians. The context for the address involved a number of important factors, including the growing international legitimacy accorded the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). In the 1974 RABAT SUMMIT, the Arab states had declared the PLO the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In November 1974, the UN General Assembly had invited PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT to address it and had subsequently passed Resolution 3236 recognizing the national and political rights of Palestinians, as well as Resolution 3237, which granted the PLO permanent observer status at the UN General Assembly. Saunders thus put forward an outline, referred to as the Saunders Plan, of what he considered a necessary and appropriate change in US policy regarding the Middle East, especially concerning the Palestinians. In the speech, he said: "In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians. . . .

"Today, however, we recognize that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the REFUGEES, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors. . . .

"Other Arab leaders, while pressing the importance of Palestinian involvement in a settlement, have taken the position that the definition of Palestinian interests is something for the Palestinian people themselves to sort out, and the view has been expressed by responsible Arab leaders that realization of Palestinian rights need not be inconsistent with the existence of Israel. . . .

"What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process, which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests—a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found."

Israel utterly rejected Saunders's statement and made its anger known in Washington. Saunders's ideas did not begin to bear fruit until more than twelve years later, when in 1988, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat announced that the PLO accepted UN RESOLUTION 242, recognized Israel's *right* to exist, and renounced TERRORISM. It required many more years before direct Israel-PLO negotiations actually began, and more years still before they failed. Nevertheless, Saunders's vision, while ahead of its time, is considered a highly significant contribution to US foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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Savir, Uri (1953–)

Uri Savir is an Israeli diplomat who played a crucial role in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel.

He was a longtime member of the Knesset, where he was head of the Subcommittee for Foreign Affairs. Savir is a senior career diplomat, having served as the head of the Israeli Foreign Service, and was the chief negotiator of the OSLO ACCORDS, after which he entered private life. He established two international nonprofit organizations over which he presides: the Global Forum (Rome), which pursues a new balance between global and local forces in today's world, and the SHIMON PERES Center for Peace.

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Al-Sayigh, Anis (1931–)

Anis al-Sayigh is a Christian Palestinian scholar and writer. Born in TIBERIAS, he was in boarding school in JERUSALEM when Tiberias fell to Israel. His family was forced to leave the city and became REFUGEES in LEBANON. He received his undergraduate education at the American University in Beirut and his Ph.D. in political studies from Pembroke College, Cambridge University. In the scholarly tradition of his prominent family, Sayigh has written more than twenty books on the history of the Arab world and on the question of Palestine. From 1966 to 1974, he directed the PALESTINE RESEARCH CENTER of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, which his brother Fayez established in Beirut. Anis al-Sayigh was the target of three Israeli assassination attempts, and one of them, a letter bomb in 1972, left him nearly blind. Nevertheless, he went on to be editor-in-chief of the six-volume Arabic-language *Palestinian Encyclopedia*.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS

Al-Sayigh, Fayez 'Abd Allah (1922–1980)

Fayez al-Sayigh was a Palestinian scholar and diplomat born in TIBERIUS, who together with his family became REFUGEES in LEBANON in 1948. He obtained a B.A. and an M.A. from the American University of Beirut and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University. He taught at several universities in the UNITED STATES, worked for the UNITED NATIONS, and was a member of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, although as a young man he had belonged to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (a pan-Arabist party). Al-Sayigh also served on the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL and established the PLO's PALESTINE RESEARCH CENTER in Beirut.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

Al-Sayigh, Yusif (1916–2004)

Yusif al-Sayigh was a renowned Palestinian economist, scholar, academic, and politician. Born just before his family's move to Palestine from LEBANON during the Druze Uprising of 1925, he attended school in Sidon and earned a B.A. in business administration in 1938 from the American University in Beirut (AUB), which he left to help support his five younger brothers through college. During the BRITISH MANDATE, al-Sayigh was an official in the national fund of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE. In 1949, after spending nine months in an Israeli prisoner-of-war camp, he was deported, rejoined his REFUGEE family in Beirut, and returned to AUB. In 1952 he obtained an M.A. in economics and began teaching in the Economics Department at AUB. In 1954 he was awarded a Fulbright scholarship to study at Johns Hopkins University, where he received a Ph.D. in political economy in 1957. His doctoral dissertation was later published as *Entrepreneurs of Lebanon: The Role of the Business Leader in a Developing Economy* (Harvard University Press, 1962).

In 1957 al-Sayigh returned to AUB, where he was appointed assistant professor in the Department of Economics. He spent 1959–1960 at Harvard University as a visiting research associate, and in 1960 he was invited to Princeton University as a visiting associate professor. Back at AUB, he was promoted to full professor in 1963. He was director of the AUB Economic Research Institute from 1962 to 1964 and remained an active faculty member until 1974, when he took early retirement. Yusif al-Sayigh was an assiduous researcher and writer, with fifteen books to his credit (of which the two-volume study *The Economies of the Arab World and Determinants of Arab Economic Development* is the best known), as well as forty journal articles (in English) and numerous others in Arabic. His main field of specialization was eco-

nomic development in the Arab world, but he also wrote about oil, the Lebanese economy, the Israeli economy, and Arab economic integration.

Al-Sayigh was active beyond the university as well. In 1964–1965, on sabbatical from AUB, he served as adviser to the Planning Board of KUWAIT, when he drew up a five-year development plan for the country. After retiring from AUB, he served as consultant to the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, the UNITED NATIONS Food and Agricultural Organization, and the Arab Industrial Development Organization. From 1968 to 1971 he directed the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) Research Center, and during 1971–1974 he was treasurer of the PLO's PALESTINE NATIONAL FUND and a member of the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE. His last appointment was as the PLO's senior economic adviser and official representative to the World Bank.

Yusif al-Sayigh was a founding member of the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, as well as of the ARAB THOUGHT FORUM (JORDAN) and of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, IRAN, and TURKEY. He was also president of the Arab Society for Economic Research from 1992 to 1995. He was the recipient of many awards, among them recognition from the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research for distinction in the field of economic development in the Arab world (1981) and the Abdallah Al-Tariqi Award in 2000.

See also DEPORTATION; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

Scandinavian Countries

Since the 1980s, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have all been involved in efforts to foster peace in the Middle East, specifically between the Israelis and Palestinians. These small Scandinavian countries share certain features that have allowed them to play a unique role in conflict-resolution efforts. In sharp contrast to other European states, the foreign policies of these three Western industrialized countries have tended to favor neutrality and nonalignment. Geographically they are on the periphery of Europe, but, more importantly, they have tended to take cautious positions in relation to the idea of a united Europe and the partisanship this has sometimes implied. Denmark did not join the European Community until 1973 and has opted out of several key aspects of EUROPEAN UNION (EU) policy. During the Cold War, Sweden viewed EU membership as contravening its neutrality and only joined in 1995. After two failed public referenda on the issue of membership, Norway has never joined the EU.

Additionally, all three countries espouse a "Nordic model," both at home and abroad. Domestically, this model is characterized by democratic openness and a strong role for the state in social welfare and in fostering ongoing dialogue and consensus building among social groups (especially business and labor). Internationally, among the industrialized countries, these countries have been leading donors of international aid and have taken an active engagement in the multilateral, cooperative, and peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Not least of all, the governments of all three countries share the reputation of being "honest brokers" in their dealings with other states, precisely because they respect the norms and rules of other countries. In the Middle East, this characterization is further aided by the fact that none of the Scandinavian countries were directly implicated in the colonial history of the region (as were, for example, both Great Britain and FRANCE with the mandate system created by the League of Nations after World War I).

For the first two decades following World War I, the national claims made by Palestinians and the plight of Palestinians after 1948 were not centrally recognized issues in the foreign policies of any of the Scandinavian countries. A more immediate concern continued to be the horror of the HOLOCAUST and the plight of Jewish refugees in Europe during and after World War II. In 1947, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark all voted in favor of the Partition Plan (for separate Arab and Jewish states) in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 181. After the 1948 WAR, all three countries quickly established ties with the newly proclaimed Israeli state. Even given the role of the Israeli extremist STERN GANG in the 1948 assassination of Swedish diplomat COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE in his capacity as UN mediator in Israel, the Swedish government was largely supportive of the state of Israel. This support continued during the service of Swedish UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjöld, whose diplomatic activity was directed primarily toward supporting the ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS between Israel and the Arab states, as well as mediating the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR.

As with other countries of the EU generally, however, the 1967 WAR marked a turning point in which political elites and the public in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark began to reflect more closely on the Palestinian issue. Specifically, the swift victory of the Israelis and the decisive capture of the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and the GAZA STRIP, coupled with the OCCUPATION, led to new questioning of who was David and who was Goliath. As a result, without ever becoming hostile toward Israel or employing coercive policies (e.g., economic or other sanctions), these states gave increased attention to the actual claims of Palestinians for recognition, representation, and even statehood. This attention increased with the institutionalization of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) after 1964 and its call for a liberated, secular, and democratic Palestine.

There are also distinguishing characteristics and historical variabilities among the Scandinavian countries toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 1973 War, the actions of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that led to higher oil prices, and the ensuing oil crisis, which had special implications for resource-dependent European countries, heightened the attention of the Scandinavian countries toward the fundamentals of the conflict. By the 1980s, efforts at finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were taking place in Sweden, followed in the 1990s by Norway and, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, by Denmark. Occurring in different decades, these efforts have not involved any formal coordination among the countries. Their style of peacemaking has concentrated on facilitating dialogue and even fostering limited agreements among both state and non-state actors from the key parties (the UNITED STATES, Israel, and the Palestinians). Because these dialogues have mostly occurred behind closed doors beyond the scrutiny of the public and the MEDIA, academic analyses of the dynamics of these sessions are variable and difficult to authenticate. However, it is possible to generally outline the processes and to understand their timing in light of shifting regional dynamics in the Middle East and Europe as well as shifting global dynamics (the Cold War from roughly 1947 to 1989, the end of the Cold War in 1989, and the post–11 September 2001 period). These regional and international dimensions are presented chronologically in considering each country's peacemaking efforts.

Sweden

In 1988, Sweden took an active role in establishing a dialogue between the United States and the PLO. This initiative ultimately resulted in PLO leader YASIR ARAFAT's explicit recognition of the state of Israel and condemnation of all forms of TERRORISM, including state terrorism. The Swedish role in this development is related to the assumption to power of socialist prime minister Olof Palme in 1969 and the new perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict he brought to the government. Under Palme, for both ideological reasons (Sweden's neutrality in the Cold War and its support of anticolonial national liberation movements) and pragmatic reasons (its dependence on oil), the position of the Palestinians began to receive greater legitimacy. Sweden was one of the first European countries to establish ties with the PLO; Arafat and Palme met in Algiers in 1974, and in 1983 Palme received Arafat in Stockholm. Throughout the 1970s, Sweden (unlike the United States and Israel) consistently supported the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people as well as the right of Palestinians to self-determination. In this regard, UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 (1967) AND 338 (1973), which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, served as the stated basis for peace. Sweden was, however, also critical of these resolutions for not going far enough in supporting Palestinian political interests. (The resolutions' only reference to the Palestinians was the call for "a just settlement of the REFUGEE problem." They failed to mention Palestinian political rights, which is why the PLO did not accept the resolutions until 1988.) At the same time, consistent with its mediating tradition in the Middle East, Sweden was careful to support Israeli security concerns and denounced as well UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 (1975), which equated ZIONISM with racism. Even so, in contrast to the period 1948–1969, there was greater friction between Israel and Sweden from 1970 onward.

When socialist Sten Andersson became Sweden's foreign minister in 1985, he took an active interest in the Middle East, and this interest continued after the 1986 assassination of Palme. As the construction of Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the Occupied Territories expanded and the First INTIFADA intensified, Andersson visited the Occupied Territories in 1988 and promoted the idea of

an Israeli-PLO dialogue. As a first step toward this goal, and in recognition of the critical role played by the United States in the region, Andersson orchestrated and oversaw a discussion in Stockholm in late November 1988 that involved a small group of Jewish Americans (acting as private US citizens) and members of the PLO leadership (excluding Arafat). The basis for this dialogue was the legitimacy of Palestinian self-determination in an independent state and the PLO's acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 (accomplished in mid-November 1988 by the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL).

Although US secretary of state GEORGE SHULTZ knew about and approved of this meeting, he considered the official statements that ensued from it, calling for mutual recognition and peace, as falling short of US requirements for a dialogue with the PLO. Thus, in December 1988, Andersson convened a second meeting in Stockholm that involved a larger group of Jewish Americans as well as Arafat. Parallel to this meeting and aided by the Swedes, Arafat also engaged in a direct round of discussions with Shultz. With the encouragement of Andersson, Arafat ultimately agreed to the US phrasing of a statement in line with Washington's conditions for a dialogue: Palestinian acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, a clear recognition of Israel's *right* to exist, and a clear renunciation of "all forms of terrorism." In making these declarations in 1988, the PLO, under Arafat's leadership, had moved from ARMED STRUGGLE and pursuit of the transformation of Israel and Palestine into a secular, democratic state to a TWO-STATE SOLUTION and the reliance on diplomacy to achieve a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem in coexistence with Israel. Thus in December 1988 a low-level US-PLO DIALOGUE commenced during the RONALD REAGAN administration. It lasted for eighteen months, ending in June 1990 by US fiat without the Palestinians having accomplished any of their objectives.

Despite the evolution in the PLO's tactics and strategy and the major concessions made by the Palestinians, President GEORGE H. W. BUSH unilaterally suspended the US-PLO dialogue after the PLO failed to condemn a foiled attack on a Tel Aviv beach by a small faction led by ABU AL-ABBAS. The US action emphasizes that small countries such as Sweden cannot alter the basic power dimensions of global politics without the willingness of key parties to the conflict. Moreover, suggesting the difficulty of being an "honest broker" in as contested a struggle as that between the Israelis and Palestinians tends to lead to zero-sum perspectives, especially on the Israeli side. For example, a number of influential Israeli leaders such as Foreign Minister Moshe Arens came to view Sweden as biased against Israel. Andersson's larger goal for an Israeli-PLO dialogue was further compromised when the Swedish Social Democrats, who had dominated Swedish politics for decades, were swept out of power in 1991.

Norway

Whereas Sweden was not, in the end, the site of an Israeli-PLO dialogue, another Scandinavian country, Norway, was. The position Arafat took in 1988 helped lay the basis for the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, which resulted from unprecedented secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, between Israel and the PLO. The OSLO PROCESS and the Oslo Accords (beginning with the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES on Interim Self-Government and subsequent agreements) fostered a series of agreements in the 1990s that led to the Israeli withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza and the creation of a PLO-led administrative structure known as the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). Although the passage of time showed Israeli-Palestinian peace to be elusive, the prominent role played by the Norwegians in the Oslo Process merits further examination.

There is evidence to suggest that because Norway had a closer relationship with the United States than Sweden (as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and gave more unequivocal support to Israel, Arafat viewed Norway as an important state for possible mediation of the conflict. Even during the 1980s, the idea found some support among Norwegian politicians, such as Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, who met with Arafat in 1989 to discuss the possibility of dialogue. Nonetheless, at that time there was little interest among Israeli leaders for such a process. By the 1990s, a number of factors converged to support a peace process. First, the end of the Cold War, as signified by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the SOVIET UNION, changed the nature of relations at the international and regional levels. In relation to the Middle East, the so-called new world order was ushered in by the US-led 1991 GULF WAR following the Iraqi

invasion of KUWAIT in 1990. The weakening of IRAQ made it clear that there was no realistic military option among Arab states and the PLO for achieving a Palestinian state. Second, the PLO, which was exiled in TUNIS, and specifically Arafat's leadership, faced new challenges. The support Arafat gave to Saddam Husayn during the 1991 Gulf War cost the PLO dearly in political and economic support from the Arab states. A new generation of Palestinian leaders, as evidenced by the Washington talks spawned from the MADRID CONFERENCE, began to emerge. Sponsored by the United States and supported by Russia, the conference of October and November 1991 brought together Israeli and non-PLO Palestinian representatives. In contrast, the Oslo Process gave Arafat the chance to potentially deliver something to the Palestinians and simultaneously revive his own tarnished leadership. For Israel, Oslo meant that it faced an extremely weakened PLO and the certainty that its interests would prevail in any negotiation; Oslo also provided Israel with an opportunity to counter the negative political fallout—domestically and internationally engendered by its human rights abuses during the First Intifada.

During the 1990s, mediation, including in the Middle East, emerged as an important component of Norwegian foreign policy—a development that paved the way for the country's role in other world conflicts, including in Guatemala, the Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Cyprus. This emphasis is related to Norway's long history as an advocate of peace since 1901, symbolized by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the role played by Norway in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also due to the tenacity and actions of specific individuals, most notably TERJE ROED-LARSEN, the former director of the nongovernmental Norwegian Labor and Social Research Institute (FAFO).

From 1989 to 1991, Roed-Larsen was active in seeking opportunities to encourage the idea of talks among Palestinians and Israelis. Larsen's spouse, Mona Juul, was a high-level Norwegian diplomat involved in Middle East affairs, and their efforts were quickly communicated to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. By September 1992, Jan Egeland, the Norwegian state secretary and an advocate of the power of small states to make a difference internationally, traveled to Israel on behalf of Foreign Minister Stoltenberg. The Norwegian channel, facilitated initially by Roed-Larsen and FAFO, evolved in 1993 into the venue in which the Israelis and Palestinians came to agree on an interim peace agreement that deferred the difficult and most intractable obstacles to peace (especially the question of Palestinian refugees and a Palestinian state) for later discussions. The secret meetings, held with the knowledge of the United States, ultimately brought together Arafat, Israeli foreign minister SHIMON PERES, and Israeli prime minister YITZHAK RABIN. Along the way, the Norwegian role seemed to move from one of facilitation to mediation, particularly once incoming Norwegian foreign minister JOHAN JUERGEN HOLST (who died in January 1994 according to his wife Marianne Heiberg because "he had worked himself to death with the peace process"), became involved after April 1993. The Oslo Accords were finalized in Norway on 20 August 1993 and culminated with the signing ceremony and handshake between Rabin and Arafat on 13 September 1993 in Washington, D.C., with US president BILL CLINTON acting as host and witness.

Subsequently, Norway played an important role in building a Palestinian structure to handle aid money and in the provision of aid, as well as in putting together a Palestinian police force, although it did not play any role in the INTERIM AGREEMENT on the West Bank and Gaza Strip signed in 1995 (Oslo II). Despite the good intentions and endless work, the Oslo Process and Accords failed to deliver a lasting peace. The reasons for this are manifold and include the fact that key issues, especially around Jerusalem, settlements, BORDERS, Palestinian statehood, and refugees, were not dealt with, largely because of the asymmetric power relations between Israelis and Palestinians and Israel's unwillingness to make compromises on these and other issues. A small power such as Norway could not affect the conflict in the absence of willingness by both Palestinians and Israelis and without the direct involvement of the key actor, the United States. In May 1996, Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU essentially declared the end of the Oslo Process, with no repercussions from the United States.

Denmark

Attempts to revive the Oslo Process, such as the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT in 2000 orchestrated by President Bill Clinton, failed. By 2000 the AL-AQSA INTIFADA ushered in a new spiral of vio-

lence involving Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBINGS and a massive Israeli military response, including the reoccupation of the West Bank. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack in the United States turned intense attention on the Middle East, but the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a low priority under the presidency of GEORGE W. BUSH.

In contrast, in the context of the European Union, the post–September 11 period was characterized by a more explicit articulation of the relevance of dealing with the Palestine-Israel conflict as well as greater coordination among members. Thus European Council meetings of September and October 2001 stressed the need to restart Middle East peace talks, and in the latter part of 2002, when Denmark held the presidency of the European Council, the ROAD MAP was conceived. This performance-based peace proposal developed and adopted by the QUARTET (the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) involved Denmark both in its capacity as EU Council Presidency and in shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East to help devise the steps for the Road Map. That the EU was a participant in the Quartet reflects the growing integration of Europe since the 1990s, its emerging common position, and the fact that it is now an international actor.

In the context of the EU, Denmark is, among the Scandinavian countries, the oldest member, having joined the European Community in 1973. Since joining, both civil society groups and political parties in Denmark have voiced criticisms about the pace and structure of European integration. In national referenda Danes rejected the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and rejected joining the new European currency (Euro) in 1999. In contrast to this larger trend, Denmark may be seen to have shifted toward the emerging common position of the EU in relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. In the 1970s and 1980s an atypical form of division had emerged among certain member states of the EU on the conflict: consequently, France, Ireland, Italy, and Greece were more willing to accommodate Palestinian considerations than were the Netherlands, Denmark, and GERMANY. However, the far-reaching position of some member states actually contributed to the advancement of the European position as a whole. Denmark, for example, finally accepted and recognized the PLO and the idea of establishing a Palestinian state—although almost twenty years after the French and Greeks had demanded it.

In addition to advocating a two-state solution today, Denmark has emerged as a major government donor of humanitarian and development funds to the Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian NGOs. Danish funding is provided through multiple channels: direct funding, government-funded Danish NGOs, and other European bodies. The three main frameworks for Danish government funding of NGOs are DanChurchAid (DCA), Mu'assasat (the Multi-donor Secretariat) and its successor, and the European Union, including support for the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), which is based in Copenhagen, and the European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR). The Danish International Development Agency (Danida) reported that in 2007 alone, Danish assistance to the Palestinians amounted to approximately $35.5 million (almost 180 million DKK), making it one of the largest international donors to the Palestinians. Denmark is also one of the largest donors to the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA). From 2002 through 2007, Denmark contributed more than $65 million to UNRWA's regular budget and in 2007 gave an additional $14 million in emergency appeals. Denmark's direct funding through Danish NGOs in 2007 was $197 million (932.4 DKK) for development projects and $86 million (407.1 DKK) for humanitarian assistance. Some of the NGOs receiving Danish funding are BADIL RESOURCE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY AND REFUGEE RIGHTS; the PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (PCHR); B'TSELEM, the Israeli Center for Information on Human Rights in the Occupied Territories; the World Council of Churches (WCC); AL-HAQ: LAW IN THE SERVICE OF MAN; Defence for Children International/Palestine Section (DCI/PS); Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement; ADDAMEER: PRISONERS SUPPORT AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION; Mossawa: the Advocacy Center for Arabs in Israel; PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS–ISRAEL; plus small grants to the ISRAELI COMMITTEE AGAINST HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, the Campaign for the Right of Entry/Re-entry to the Occupied Palestine Territory, the ARAB THOUGHT FORUM, and Stop the Wall Campaign.

In January 2007, Danish minister for foreign affairs Per Stig Møller delivered a major address at a conference held in Madrid entitled "Madrid: 15

Years Later." In this address he stated: "a Roadmap for Peace has been formulated, endorsed by the UN Security Council, and accepted by the primary parties as the basis for how to reach that elusive, but desirable goal of two viable and sustainable states. In other words, we all know more or less what the solution will look like—the problem is how to get there."

While the United States participated in developing the Road Map, it soon lost interest, in part because of Israel's opposition. This provides an example of how the European Union's tenuous common policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict may also be held back by Washington. While it remains to be seen what will evolve under the US presidency of Barack Obama, what has been a notable development since 2005 are the growing demands among civil society activists in European countries for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) against Israel as a means to hold the Israeli state accountable to INTERNATIONAL LAW and human rights norms. The inability or unwillingness of states to pursue BDS, especially following Israel's war in Gaza in 2008–2009, fostered renewed calls from grassroots civil societies and local NGOs. In this context, developments in the Scandinavian countries are notable. For example, in 2005, Norwegian activists launched a national Boycott Israel campaign that led the local council of the region of Sør-Trøndelag to pass a motion for a comprehensive boycott of Israeli goods. Even though this motion was reversed in 2006, the new forms of coalition-building in Scandinavian and other European countries emerging from the BDS efforts are a relevant feature of the contemporary terrain of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

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—Yasmeen Abu-Laban

Seaport, Palestinian

See RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT II

Security Fence

See BARRIER

Separation Wall

See BARRIER

Sephardi

A Sephardi (plural, Sephardim) is a Jew whose origins reside in the Iberian Peninsula; the descendants of Jews who left Spain or Portugal

after the 1492 expulsion are Sephardim. In modern Israel, all non-European Jews (from Africa, the Middle East, etc.) are termed MIZRAHIM, and these terms are often used interchangeably; however, whereas all the Sephardim are Mizrahim, all Mizrahim are not Sephardim. The prevalence of the Sephardic rite among Mizrahim is largely due to migration of the population expelled from the Iberian Peninsula joining the Mizrahi communities. Over the last few centuries, the more prestigiously perceived Sephardic rite has influenced or altogether replaced the Mizrahi ones.

The situation for Jews in Spain blossomed in 711 when Spain fell under the rule of the Muslim Moors. Both Muslims and Jews built a civilization based in Córdoba, known as Al-Andalus, which was more advanced than any civilization in Europe. Jews coexisted peacefully with their neighbors, and the era of Muslim rule in Spain (eighth to eleventh centuries) was considered the Golden Age for Spanish Jewry. Jewish intellectual and spiritual life flourished, Jewish economic expansion was unparalleled, and many Jews served in Spanish courts. In Toledo, Jews were involved in translating Arabic texts into the Romance languages as well as translating Greek and Hebrew texts into Arabic. Jews also contributed to botany, geography, medicine, mathematics, poetry, and philosophy, and a number of well-known Jewish physicians practiced during this period, including Hasdai Ibn Shaprut (915–970), who was physician to the caliph (Muslim leader of Spain). Many famous Jewish figures lived during the Golden Age and contributed to making this a flourishing period for Jewish thought, including Samuel Ha-Nagid, Moses ibn Ezra, Solomon ibn Gabirol, Judah Halevi, and Moses Maimonides. Islamic culture also influenced the Jews, and Muslim and Jewish customs and practices became intertwined. For example, before entering the synagogue, Jews washed their hands and feet, a practice done before entering a mosque, and Arab melodies were often used in Jewish songs. The Sephardic Jews developed their own language, which was a combination of Old Castilian (Spanish) with borrowings from Sephardic Hebrew, known as Ladino. A Romance language, Ladino is still spoken by some Sephardic communities and is often used in their literature.

In 1098 the Christians conquered Toledo, and initially the Jews in Christian Spain were unharmed, while those in Muslim Spain did less well under the North African Almohad dynasty in the south. Still, both Jews and Muslims were involved in the cultural, economic, intellectual, financial, and political life of Christian Spain. However, by the mid-thirteenth century, the Christians controlled most of Spain and increasingly persecuted Jews and forced them to convert to Christianity. Those who did convert, called Marranos or New Christians, have sometimes been called "crypto-Jews," because many practiced Judaism in secret and taught their children in the Jewish tradition. During the fifteenth century, the situation worsened for the Jewish community when the Marranos were tortured or killed in the Spanish Inquisition. Father Tomas de Torquemada, the pope's inquisitor-general, felt that if the Jews remained in Spain, they would negatively influence the new converts to Christianity. In 1492 Torquemada convinced King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella that the Jewish community was expendable, and the monarchy forced some 200,000 Jews to leave Spain. In 1499 the last Moorish stronghold at Granada fell. Many Muslims escaped, but those who were unable to flee were forced to convert to Christianity and became known as Moriscos. In 1525 the monarchy militarily crushed their revolt, and a century later the 500,000 remaining Moriscos were expelled from Spain. After the exile from Spain, large Sephardic communities were founded in Venice and Leghorn, Italy; London; Bordeaux and Bayonne, FRANCE; and Hamburg, GERMANY. These immigrants spoke Portuguese and Spanish, and many adopted mainstream Western European culture. They tended to have a secular education and to accumulate great wealth. Many of the European Sephardim created successful business enterprises, and their trade networks became well-known worldwide. Throughout the medieval period in Europe, Jews treated the Sephardic Jews as elites.

Besides Europe, in the first Sephardic DIASPORA, a large number of Jews settled in North Africa and in the OTTOMAN EMPIRE. Spanish exiles brought with them a unique culture, language, and traditions. Many of these immigrants continued to speak Ladino until the twentieth century. For hundreds of years, Sephardic Jews lived in relative peace with their Muslim neighbors and rulers and

prospered throughout the area, especially in Morocco and IRAQ. In the Ottoman *dhimini* system, they were officially considered second-class citizens but were free to practice their own religion and to participate in commerce. Much as in Spain and Portugal during the Golden Age, the Sephardic upper class in the Ottoman Empire were entrepreneurs, translators, and members of the professions. The Sephardic communities in the Arab world were more receptive to modernity than were their ASHKENAZI counterparts in Europe. Moreover, the Zionist movement was of far less interest to Sephardic Jews than it was to Jews in Europe, and very few came to Palestine until after it became Israel. Few Sephardic rabbis in the Ottoman Empire supported ZIONISM; fewer still immigrated to Palestine.

After the establishment of the state of Israel (1948), in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, conditions for Jews in many Islamic countries grew increasingly uncomfortable. Pressured by Zionist emissaries during the 1950s and 1960s, tens of thousands of Sephardic (and Mizrahi) Jews immigrated to Israel from North Africa and other countries in the Middle East. Once they came to Israel, however, the absorption ministry placed most of the Sephardic immigrants in transit camps, where they became dependent on welfare. The conditions in these camps were terrible, and it was difficult for the newcomers to work their way out of the lower rung of Israeli society, especially since the established Ashkenazi community held all the positions of power. Consequently, many worked in blue-collar professions.

Since its arrival, the Sephardic community (together with the Mizrahim) has been Israel's underclass, languishing far behind the Ashkenazim in economic, cultural, and educational status and success. The Sephardim make up 75 percent of Israel's poor, and, as one analyst noted, "women are the underclass of the underclass." Sephardic girls traditionally marry at a young age, have little formal education, and are expected to produce many children while helping to support the family. There have been a number of recent positive strides for the Sephardim, such as the growing number of intermarriages between the Ashkenazim and Sephardim and the respect for Sephardi Yitzhak Navon, the fifth president of Israel (1978–1983). But there are also more reports of resentment among Sephardim, brought on partly by the extraordinary Israeli efforts to accommodate the large-scale, middle-class influx of Jews from the former SOVIET UNION from 1968 to 1988. The Sephardim feel that they have been shunted aside and are still the have-nots in a society that has made great financial gains. The Ashkenazi elite discriminate against the Sephardim in housing, employment, and educational opportunities. The Sephardim possess no real power base—intellectual, political, or commercial. After fifty-plus years in the state of Israel, relations between the Sephardim and the European Ashkenazim still generate a great deal of tension in Israeli politics. Primarily, the Sephardim resent the dominance of Jews of European origin in the Israeli establishment and well remember the harsh welcome given to Sephardim settling in Israel. They accuse the Ashkenazim of showing no respect for their particular traditions and customs, of trying to turn them into Europeans, and of treating them as second-class citizens.

In 1977 Sephardi resentment toward the Ashkenazim led them to give their vote to the LIKUD PARTY and to MENAHEM BEGIN for prime minister, as a vote against the LABOR PARTY of the Ashkenazim. This has meant adopting right-wing Likud Party policies, especially toward the Palestinians. At a psychological level, the Sephardim have translated their feelings of inferiority to superiority over the Palestinians, and they make up the hard-core mass support for retaining the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and for rejecting compromises with the Palestinians. Israeli-Sephardic scholar Sami Shalom Chetrit clearly expresses this complex phenomenon (using "Mizrahim" interchangeably with "Sephardim"): "When you learn that Jewish history is European Jewish history, and that the Arab culture is inferior or bad, and there's nothing to learn from the Arabs, and there's nothing in Jewish history where you see a positive benefit from Arab/Muslim experience . . . there is very little left for Mizrahim to experience something positive from their Arab/Muslim historical roots. . . . You grow up and you know that to be an Israeli is not to be an Arab, because an Arab is the enemy. It's not only what they teach you, it's the way they treat Arabs.

"You look at the Arab and actually you're looking in the mirror, and you've been taught that the reflection in the mirror is actually bad, negative, low, enemy, so you start spitting in the mirror. It's hard to spit in the mirror every day, because

you go crazy. It's hard to live with self-hatred, you get sick, so what do you do? You channel everything to the Arab [Palestinian]. It's very simple social psychology. That is how we all became Arab haters, because if we don't hate them, we're going to hate ourselves. That's the trap, it's why they keep the OCCUPATION going and why they'll never end the Occupation, unless it comes to an end by *force majeure* or by outside forces—never because the Israeli establishment will never voluntarily cede the territories. They won't back down because if they do, they will lose their *Ashkenazi*, Zionist hegemony—I say that because today, many *Mizrahim* are Zionist you know. When I say *Ashkenazi* Zionist that includes many *Mizrahi* Jews. Once they give up the territories and let the Palestinians get on with their lives, and deal with the whole issue of the REFUGEES, and JERUSALEM, and we have a generation of a relatively peaceful life, everything in the *Mizrahi* identity will be channeled inside Israel, whether it's poverty or oppression or the need for educational reform. Right now, in my view, everything is collapsing but no one complains because 'we are at war,' and they, the Palestinians, are at war."

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Settlements

Between 1967 and 2005, Israel established 152 settlements in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES that were recognized by the Interior Ministry: 121 in the

WEST BANK, 12 in East JERUSALEM, and 16 in the GAZA STRIP. In addition, settler activists and/or the government established dozens of OUTPOSTS of varying size. Most of these outposts are actually settlements, but the Interior Ministry has not recognized them as such. In August 2005, the government unilaterally withdrew the settlements and its military installations from Gaza and has since focused on expanding the West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements. After more than a year of fighting for the freedom of information, the PEACE NOW movement succeeded in officially extracting from the defense establishment the fact that "about one-third of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank (44 out of 120) were built on privately owned Palestinian LAND that was seized, by means of confiscation orders, for 'security needs.' From the data it emerges that at least 19 of the 44 settlements were built on private land without the 'security' justification to confiscate the land and transform it into 'STATE LAND,' even after prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN decided in 1979 that the construction and expansion of settlements would take place only on state-owned land." Additionally, the separation BARRIER consumes 8.6 percent of West Bank land and encompasses 49 settlements.

In 2009, B'Tselem reported that the settler population in the West Bank and East Jerusalem at the end of 2008 stood at 479,500, up from 370,548 in 2000. This figure is based on two components: according to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS), in 2008, 285,800 settlers were living in the West Bank *excluding* East Jerusalem, up from 198,300 in 2000. The settler population in East Jerusalem at the end of 2008 was estimated at 193,700, up from 172,248 in 2000. In HEBRON, to take a dramatic case, 600 Jewish settlers live in the midst of 160,000 Palestinians and control 20 percent of the city, including the holy sites sacred to both Muslims and Jews.

From 2000 to 2008 there were 18,361 new housing starts and 105 new outposts. During 2008 alone the annual growth rate in the settlements was 4.9 percent, compared to Israel (areas inside the Green Line) where the annual growth rate in 2008 was 1.8 percent. During 2008, 1,518 new structures were built or set up (in the case of temporary housing, generally in the form of mobile homes, referred to as "caravans") in settlements and outposts, compared to 898 structures in 2007. Of these, at least 261 were in illegal outposts. This constitutes a 60 percent increase in new structures compared to 2007, when 800 new structures were built in settlements and another 98 in outposts. In addition, the ground was prepared (INFRASTRUCTURE development, earthworks, etc.) for the construction of 63 additional new structures: 61 percent of the new structures (927 structures) were built west of the route of the Barrier and 39 percent (591 structures) east of it; of these, 25 percent of the new structures were in outposts.

Another indicator of settlement expansion is the issuance of tenders—invitations for construction in settlements. In 2008, tenders were issued for the construction of 539 new housing units in the settlements. This was an eight fold increase compared to 2007, when tenders were issued for only 65 housing units. An additional indicator is building starts, which are tracked by the ICBS. The ICBS figures for 2008, which only cover January through September, record 1,647 new housing units in settlements, compared to 1,389 in all of 2007. Moreover, despite government declarations that no new land was confiscated in 2008, Peace Now learned of and made public a number of decisions and orders whose practical effect is the confiscation of new land and its transfer to state ownership, in the amount of 275 dunums (approximately 69 acres). (This includes land of Al-Khadr, near the settlement of Efrata; land of Hussan, near the settlement of Beitar Illit; land of Brukin, near Ariel; and land of Al-Uddeisa, near Hebron.)

On 2 March 2009 the Israeli government announced plans to build more than 73,300 new housing units in the West Bank, out of which 5,722 will be in East Jerusalem. Peace Now estimates that if all of the units are built, it will mean a 100 percent increase in the total number of Israeli settlers and that some settlements, including the two largest, Ariel and MA'ALE ADUMIM, would double in size.

An examination by Peace Now of the 2009/2010 state budget shows that nearly 1 billion shekels (approximately $265 million) are explicitly designated for the settlements each year. This includes only special budget items for the settlements, without the general items where budgetary expenses involving the settlements are hidden and amount to approximately 100 million shekels (approximately $26.5 million). That amounts to 8.9 percent of the total transfers from the state to councils while the number of residents in the settlements was 3.8 percent of the residents of Israel. Therefore the budget for the settlements was more

than double the relative size in the population. Moreover, "at least 16 outposts are enjoying department support. The socioeconomic situation of most West Bank settlers is comparable to the most affluent communities in Israel. Indeed, settlers enjoy annual incomes almost 10 percent higher than those of Israelis living inside the Green Line, with an average income of 13,566 NIS (approximately $3,600) per settler family per month in 2006 [$43,200 per year], compared to 12,343 NIS (approximately $3,300) per month inside Israel [or $39,600 per year]. Nonetheless, the settlements enjoy the status of 'preferred area A' and all the benefits that go with it."

In the Occupied Territories, Israel has created a separation and discrimination regime in which it maintains two systems of laws, and an individual's rights are based on his or her national origin. This regime is the only one of its kind in the world and brings to mind dark regimes of the past, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa.

As part of this regime, Israel has stolen tens of thousands of dunums of land from the Palestinians, on which it has established dozens of settlements in which hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians now live. Israel forbids Palestinians to enter and use these lands, and it uses the settlements to justify numerous violations of Palestinian rights, such as the right to housing, to earn a living, and freedom of movement. The Palestinian right to self-determination in a viable state has been rendered impossible because of the extreme changes Israel has made to the map of the West Bank.

The settlers, on the other hand, benefit from all rights given to citizens of Israel who live inside the Green Line and in some instances additional rights. The great effort Israel has expended in the settlement enterprise—financially, legally, and bureaucratically—has turned the settlements into civilian enclaves within an area under military rule and has given the settlers a preferred status. To perpetuate this unlawful situation, Israel has continuously violated the Palestinians' human rights.

Especially conspicuous is Israel's manipulative use of the law to create a semblance of legality for the settlement enterprise. So long as Jordanian law assisted Israel in advancing its goals, Israel seized the argument that INTERNATIONAL LAW requires an occupying state to apply the law in effect in the territory prior to OCCUPATION, thereby construing international law in a cynical and tendentious way. When Jordanian law was unfavorable for Israel, it did not hesitate to revoke the law through military legislation and develop new rules to meet its ends. In doing so, Israel tramples on international agreements to which it is a party that are intended to reduce human rights violations and protect people under occupation.

Since the very establishment of the settlements is illegal, and in light of the human rights violations resulting from the existence of the settlements, B'TSELEM demands that Israel evacuate the settlements. Israel should undertake such action in a way that respects the settlers' human rights, including the payment of compensation.

Clearly, evacuation of the settlements will be complex and will take time. However, Israel can undertake intermediate steps to reduce, as far as possible, human rights violations and breaches of international law. For example, the government should cease new construction in the settlements, whether to establish new settlements or to expand existing ones. It must also freeze the planning and building of new bypass ROADS, and it must cease expropriating and seizing land intended for bypass roads. The government must return to Palestinian villages all the non-built-up land that it placed within the municipal jurisdiction of the settlements and regional councils, eliminate the planning boards in the settlements, and, as a result thereof, revoke the power of the local authorities to draw up outline plans and grant building PERMITS. Also, the government must cease the granting of incentives to encourage Israeli citizens to move to settlements and instead make resources available to encourage settlers to move inside Israel's BORDERS.

International Law

The establishment of settlements on the West Bank violates international humanitarian law, which enumerates the principles applying during war and occupation. Moreover, the settlements lead to the infringement of international human rights law.

The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the occupying power from transferring citizens from its own territory to the occupied territory (Article 49). The Hague Regulations prohibit the occupying power from undertaking permanent changes in the occupied area, unless these are due to military needs in the narrow sense of the term, or unless they are undertaken for the benefit of the local population.

The establishment of the settlements leads to violation of the rights of the Palestinians as enshrined in international human rights law. Among other violations, the settlements infringe on the right to self-determination, equality, property, an adequate standard of living, and freedom of movement.

The illegality of the settlements under international humanitarian law does not affect the status of the settlers. The settlers constitute a civilian population by any standard and include children, who are entitled to special protection. Although some of the settlers are part of the security forces, this fact has absolutely no bearing on the status of the other residents of the settlements.

Taking Control of the Land in the West Bank

Israel has used a complex legal and bureaucratic mechanism to take control of more than 50 percent of the land in the West Bank. This land has been used mainly to establish settlements and to create reserves of land for the future expansion of the settlements.

The principal tool used to take control of land is to declare it "State Land." This process, which began in 1979, is based on a manipulative implementation of the Ottoman Lands Law of 1858, which applied in the area at the time of Occupation. Other methods employed by Israel to take control of land include seizure for military needs, declaration of land as "abandoned property," and the expropriation of land for "public needs." A different legal foundation provides the justification for each of these. In addition, Israel has assisted private citizens who are purchasing land on the "free market."

The process employed in taking control of land breaches the basic principles of due procedure and natural justice. In many cases, Palestinian residents were unaware that their land was registered in the name of the state, and by the time they discovered this fact, it was too late to appeal. The burden of proof always rests with the Palestinian claiming ownership of the land. Even if he meets this burden, the land may still be registered in the name of the state on the basis that it was transferred to the settlement "in good faith."

Despite the diverse methods used to take control of land, all the parties involved—the Israeli government, the settlers, and the Palestinians—have always understood them as part of a mechanism intended to serve a single purpose: the establishment of civilian settlements in the territories. Accordingly, the precise method used to transfer the control of land from Palestinians to Israel is of secondary importance. Moreover, because this purpose is prohibited under international law, the methods used to secure it are also unlawful.

Israel uses the seized lands to benefit the settlements while prohibiting the Palestinian public from using them in any way. This use is forbidden and illegal in itself, even if the process by which the lands were taken was fair and in accordance with international and Jordanian law. Israel is the occupier in the Occupied Territories, and as such it is not permitted to ignore the needs of an entire population and to use land intended for public needs solely to benefit the settlers.

The Israeli Supreme Court of Justice has generally sanctioned the mechanism used to take control of land. In so doing, the court has contributed to giving these procedures a mask of legality. The court initially accepted the state's argument that the settlements met urgent military needs and allowed the state to seize private land for this purpose. When the state began to declare land "State Land," the court refused to intervene to prevent this process.

The Policy of Annexation and Local Government

The Israeli administration has applied most aspects of Israeli law to the settlers and the settlements, thus effectively annexing them to the state of Israel. This has taken place even though, in formal terms, the West Bank is not part of the state of Israel and the law in effect there is Jordanian law and military legislation. This annexation has resulted in a regime of legalized separation and discrimination. This regime has given rise to two separate legal systems in the same territory, with the rights of individuals being determined by their nationality.

Local government in the settlements is based on the usual model inside Israel and is managed in a similar manner, ignoring the relevant Jordanian legislation that should apply in the West Bank. Twenty-three Jewish local authorities operate in the West Bank: three municipalities, fourteen local councils, and six regional councils, including 106 settlements recognized as distinct communities. In addition, 12 settlements were established in the areas annexed to the municipality of Jerusalem in

1967, areas in which Israeli law has been officially imposed.

The areas of jurisdiction of the Jewish local authorities, most of which extend far beyond the built-up area, are defined as "CLOSED MILITARY ZONES" in military orders. Israel forbids Palestinians from entering these areas without authorization from the Israeli military commander. Conversely, it permits Israeli citizens, Jews from throughout the world, and tourists to enter these areas without the need for special permits.

Encouragement of Migration to the Settlement

Successive Israeli governments have implemented a consistent and systematic policy intended to encourage Jewish-Israeli citizens to migrate to the West Bank. One of the tools used to this end is the granting of financial benefits and incentives to citizens, both directly and through the Jewish local authorities. The purpose of this support is to raise the standard of living of these citizens and to encourage migration to the West Bank.

Israel defines most of the settlements in the West Bank as national priority areas (A class or B class). Accordingly, the settlers and other Jewish-Israeli citizens working or investing in the settlements are entitled to significant financial benefits. These benefits are provided by six government ministries, including the Ministry of Construction and Housing, which provides generous loans for the purchase of apartments, part of which are converted to grants. The ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION provides significant price reductions to persons leasing land. The Ministry of Education offers incentives for teachers, exemption from tuition fees in kindergartens, and free transportation to school. The Ministry of Industry and Trade provides grants for investors, infrastructure for industrial zones, and other benefits. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs gives incentives for social workers, and the Ministry of Finance provides reductions in income tax for individuals and companies. In 2003 the Ministry of Finance cancelled the income tax reduction that residents of settlements previously received.

The Ministry of the Interior offers more grants for the local authorities in the territories than for communities within Israel. In the year 2000, the average per capita grant in the Jewish local councils in the West Bank was approximately 65 percent higher than the average per capita grant in local councils inside Israel. The discrepancy in the grants for the regional councils is even greater: the average per capita grant in 2000 in the regional councils on the West Bank was 165 percent higher than for a resident of a regional council inside Israel.

One of the mechanisms used by the government to favor the Jewish local authorities in the West Bank is to channel funding through the Settlement Division of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION. Although the entire budget of the Settlement Division comes from state funds, as a nongovernmental body it is not subject to the rules applying to government ministries in Israel.

Private Settlement Financing from the United States

For many years, the UNITED STATES has had a policy against spending aid money to fund Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which successive administrations have regarded as an obstacle to peace. Yet, as the *Washington Post* revealed in March 2009, private organizations in the United States continue to raise tax-exempt contributions for the activities that the government opposes. All US taxpayers are thus supporting indirectly, through the tax-exempt contributions, a process that the government condemns. "A search of IRS records identified 28 US charitable groups that made a total of $33.4 million in tax-exempt contributions to settlements and related organizations between 2004 and 2007."

One of the Israeli organizations that has led the way in the settlement project in East Jerusalem is ELAD, which has developed the Ir David (or City of David) project in the heart of the Palestinian neighborhood of SILWAN. Like other pro-settlement groups, it engages in an active fundraising effort in the United States. According to Form 990s filed with the IRS, Friends of Ir David raised $8.7 million in 2004, $1.2 million in 2005, and $2.7 million in 2006. The group's primary tax-exempt purpose, according to the IRS filings, is "to create a charitable fund to provide financial aid and other reasonable assistance to benefit the Jewish people of the Old City of Jerusalem; to teach about the history and archeology of the biblical city of Jerusalem; and to offer aid and assistance for education, housing and the rehabilitation of distressed properties." In reality, pro-settlement groups such as ELAD are seeking to transform the demographic character

of East Jerusalem so that a TWO-STATE SOLUTION with Jerusalem shared by Israeli and Palestinian governments will be impossible.

Hebron is another controversial area where settlements have received substantial tax-exempt gifts from the United States. According to IRS records, the Hebron Fund donated $860,637 in 2005 and $967,954 in 2006 for "social and educational well-being"; the fund's online mission statement makes clear this is for Israeli settlers inside the city. The Hebron settlement of KIRYAT ARBA received $730,000 in 2006 from a group called American Friends of Yeshiva High School of Kiryat Arba.

Often such US charities specify that their gifts are going to charities in Israel, even though the recipients are in the West Bank or East Jerusalem, which the United States regards as occupied territory. American Friends of the College of Judea and Samaria, for example, said its donations were "to provide for the expansion and furtherance of the needs of educational institutions in Israel," even though the college is in the settlement of Ariel. Similarly, other filings speak of gifts to "Elon Moreh, Israel," "Gush Etzion, Israel," "Karnei Shomron, Israel," "Efrat, Israel," and "Bat Ayin, Israel," despite the fact that these are all settlements in the occupied West Bank and illegal.

A 2005 report by the Congressional Research Service stated: "The United States stipulates that US aid funds cannot be used in the Occupied Territories." Of course money is fungible—the massive amount of aid given to Israel (without strings) frees up equal amounts of money from Israeli sources for the settlements. The issue came to a head during a 1992 dispute over the use of US loan guarantees. A story in the *New York Times* in January 1992 said that Secretary of State JAMES A. BAKER had cautioned Israel's ambassador "that the administration was not going to underwrite Israeli policies that fundamentally contradict its own principles and long-stated policies."

Settler Violence

A cardinal task of any government is to enforce the law and protect the life, property, and rights of persons under its authority. For Israel, this duty applies not only to Israeli citizens residing within the state or territories under Israeli control but also to Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories.

When Palestinians attack Israelis, the authorities invoke all means at their disposal—including some that are incompatible with international law and constitute gross violations of human rights—to arrest the suspects and bring them to trial. Defendants convicted by military courts can expect harsh sentences.

In contrast, when Israeli civilians attack Palestinians, the Israeli authorities employ an undeclared policy of leniency and compromise toward the perpetrators. This policy is reflected in the actions of officials in charge of law enforcement, the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and the Israel Police Force (IPF), which do not do enough to prevent harm to the life and property of Palestinians and to stop the violent attacks by settlers while they are taking place. All law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities demonstrate little interest in uncovering the substantial violence that Israeli civilians commit against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

The many failures of law enforcement against Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories, and the discrimination underlying these failures, greatly undermine the rule of law in Israel, not only in the Occupied Territories but also in the state of Israel.


East Jerusalem

Since 1967, when Israel annexed East Jerusalem, the government of Israel's primary goal has been to create a demographic and geographic situation that will thwart any future attempt to challenge Israeli sovereignty over the entire city. To achieve this goal, the government has confiscated vast areas of land, constructed large settlements, and taken actions to increase the number of Jews and reduce the number of Palestinians living in the city.

In the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 WAR, Israel redefined the BORDERS of East Jerusalem. Under Jordanian rule, the city had covered 6.5 square kilometers (2.5 square miles); Israel expanded it to 64 square kilometers (24.7 square miles) or some 64,000 dunums. The newly designated area of "East Jerusalem" contained twenty-eight Palestinian villages together with their grazing and farming lands. According to Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed, "Israel had purposely" drawn the new city borders "to include the maximum territory possible, with the minimum possible Palestinian population." They described it thus: "The government simply issued orders to expropriate [land that was owned by Palestinians] . . . taking advantage of a legal system in Israel that gives [Arab] owners little recourse against the authorities taking away private property. . . . In January 1968, Israel carried out

its first major expropriation . . . some 3,345 dunum (826 acres) were taken from . . . Arab landowners to build the Jewish [settlement] of *Ramot Eshkol*; 486 dunum (120 acres) were expropriated for [a second settlement]. Four months later another 900 dunum (222 acres). . . . But Israel's land grab in 1968 was nothing compared with the one that occurred at the end of August 1970, when eight separate expropriation orders were carried out, covering 10,000 dunum (2,471 acres) of land."

By 1970, at the end of the first three years of Occupation, Israel had expropriated more than



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Map 38. East Jerusalem Land Expropriations

Table 7 B'Tselem: Statistics on Land Expropriation and Settlement in East Jerusalem


Neighborhood	Date of Expropriation	Amount of Land Taken (in Dunums)	Size of Neighborhood (in Dunums)	Number of Housing Units 2002	Number of Residents 2002
French Hill and Mount Scopus	8 Jan. 1968	3,345	2,019	2,108	7,867
Ramot Eshkol and Givat Hamivtar	8 Jan. 1968		588	1,153	2,948
Ma'alot Dafna (East)	8 Jan. 1968	485	380	907	3,617
Neve Ya'akov	14 April 1968	765 + 470 (at 30 August 1970)	1,759	4,735	20,250
Old City (Jewish Quarter)	14 April 1968	116	122	556	2,348
Ramot Alon	30 Aug. 1970	4,840	2,066	8,687	38,992
Shu'afat	30 Aug. 1970	2,240	No Data	2,165	8,000
East Talpiot	30 Aug. 1970		1,196	4,299	12,591
Gilo	30 Aug. 1970	2,700	2,859	8,911	27,569
'Atarot (including the airport)	30 Aug. 1970	1,200 + 137 (at July 1 1982)	3,327	290	10,781
Ben-Hinnom Valley	30 Aug. 1970	130	–	Public Area	Public Area
Jaffa Gate	30 Aug. 1970	100	–	Public Area	Public Area
Ramat Rachel area	30 Aug. 1970	600	264	In Planning	In Planning
Pisgat Ze'ev	20 March 1980	4,400	5,468	10,799	38,684
Har Homa	16 May 1991	1,850	2,523	No Data	No Data
Total		**23,378**	**22,571**	**44,610**	**176,647**

16,000 dunums (3,950 acres) of Palestinian land to constitute East Jerusalem. Following the land confiscations from 1967 to 1970, there was a ten-year hiatus until 1980, when Israel seized 4,400 dunums (1,083 acres) from Palestinian landholders. The next land grab was in April 1991, with the seizure of 1,850 dunums (457 acres) of Jabal Abu Ghanem. Altogether, as Table 7 illustrates, as of 2002, Israel has confiscated 23,378 dunums (5,777 acres) of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem for Jewish settlements.

At the end of 2002, the population of Jerusalem stood at 680,400: 458,600 Jews (67 percent) and 221,800 Palestinians (33 percent). About 58 percent of the residents live on land that was annexed in 1967 (45 percent of whom are Jews and 55 percent Palestinians). Since the Palestinians have a higher growth rate than the Jews, Israel has used various methods to achieve its goal of maximizing the Jewish population: (1) physically isolating East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, in part by building the separation Barrier; (2) demolishing houses and discriminating in land expropriation, planning, and building; (3) revoking residency and social benefits of Palestinians who stay abroad for at least seven years or who are unable to prove that their center of life is in Jerusalem; and (4) unfairly dividing the budget between the two parts of the city, with harmful effects on infrastructure and services in East Jerusalem. All of Israel's policies gravely infringe on the rights of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and seriously violate international law.

East Jerusalem is Occupied Territory. Therefore, it is subject, as is the rest of the West Bank, to the provisions of international humanitarian law that relate to Occupied Territory. The annexation of East Jerusalem breaches international law, which prohibits unilateral annexation. For this reason, the international community, including the United States, does not recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem.

Additionally, in what Israel has termed "the HOLY BASIN"—the area surrounding the OLD CITY—there are Jewish settlements in all the Palestinian neighborhoods, including SHAYKH JARRAH, A TUR, RAS AL-AMUD, ABU DIS, Silwan, and Abu Tor. In 2008, tenders were issued for the construction of 1,184 new housing units in East Jerusalem, compared to 793 in 2007, an increase of 50 percent (of the 793 tenders issued in 2007,



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Map 39. Israeli Settlements around the Old City of Jerusalem

747 were issued in December 2007, immediately after the US-hosted Annapolis Conference, so the increase after Annapolis was twenty-five times more than the year before). Moreover, during 2008, construction plans for 5,431 housing units in East Jerusalem were submitted for public review, of which 2,730 housing units received final approval, compared to 391 housing units approved during 2007, an increase of 600 percent.

The Future of the Settlement Project

From 1996 until 2008, no Israeli government had officially decided to establishment a completely new settlement in the West Bank; however, in 2008 Defense Minister EHUD BARAK approved Plan 303 for the establishment of a new permanent Israeli settlement in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. Israel began work on Maskiyot in late 2008, and in September 2009, Peace Now wrote: "Massive construction for some 20 permanent housing units and 5 caravans, in the settlement of Maskiyot, Jordan Valley has just recently begun." This new settlement, and the accelerated growth in all aspects of the settlement project, are occurring in a highly charged international political context that includes the settlement freeze demanded in the first phase of the 2002 ROAD MAP, Prime Minister EHUD OLMERT's pledge to freeze settlement growth in the context of the November 2007 Annapolis Conference, plus President Barak Obama's admonitions to Israel to cease all settlement construction. Settlement growth is the key impediment to a genuine Israeli-Palestinian peace, a violation of commitments undertaken by Israel, and a humiliating slap in the face to the US president.

Maskiyot, in the northern Jordan Valley, originally served as an IDF outpost in the 1980s, and since 2002 has been virtually abandoned. When the IDF left the base, a small group of religious students came to live there periodically. Following the evacuation of the Gaza Strip in 2005, a group of evacuees moved to the area to establish the settlement of Maskiyot. The creation of a new permanent, civilian settlement in the Jordan Valley is especially provocative, given periodically declared Israeli intentions to retain control of the Jordan Valley, even if there is a peace accord and despite the fact that such a demand would make a peace agreement difficult if not impossible. There are already twenty-seven settlements in the Jordan Valley, with a total population of 9,358, plus nine illegal outposts. In addition, a series of outposts has been established in recent years east of the settlements of Shilo, Itamar, and Elon Moreh. The apparent purpose of these outposts is to connect isolated mountain ridge settlements to the Jordan Valley. Moreover, virtually all of the land in the Jordan Valley, other than actual built-up areas of the Palestinian population, has been placed under the jurisdiction of the settlement regional councils in the area ('Arvot Hayarden and Megillot). This means that land not defined as belonging to a specific settlement is still under the control of the settlements' regional councils (and off-limits to the Palestinians), and in some cases is actively farmed by settlers. The Palestinian population in the Jordan Valley as of mid-2005 was around 53,000. In addition, the area is home to an unknown number of BEDOUIN, estimated at several thousand, who maintain a seminomadic lifestyle.

A second new settlement, Sansana, received a green light in 2008 from the minister of defense to proceed with the approval process for Plan 501/1 (i.e., initiating the procedures to gain the necessary approvals to start construction). This plan involves the construction of sixty housing units in the SOUTH HEBRON MOUNTAIN area at a site at which a group of settlers have been living in temporary housing for some time. Officially, the government of Israel defines Plan 501/1 as a plan for a new "neighborhood" of the settlement of Eshkolot. Eshkolot, however, is located 4 kilometers (about 2.5 miles) away from Sansana. The connection is even more tenuous than this distance implies: this distance is measured "as the crow flies," as there is no road connecting the sites. The plan clearly constitutes the establishment of a new settlement. An English-language website describes Sansana in detail but omits any mention of Eshkolot, making clear that Sansana is an independent settlement. Illegal construction of permanent structures at Sansana began a few years ago but was stopped following pressure by various organizations, including Peace Now and Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights. As soon as Defense Minister Barak approved moving forward with Plan 501/1 in 2008, the settlers restarted construction, even though the plan itself has still not undergone all of the planning procedures or been granted all the necessary approvals (it was only at the beginning of January 2009 that the plan was deposited for public objections, a key stage in the approval process). It is worth noting that the Barrier route in this part of the West Bank has been gerrymandered to dip sharply into the West Bank to include

Sansana and Eshkolot and surrounding land on the Israeli side of the Barrier.

On 7 September 2009 Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU authorized tenders for 450 new housing units in the major East Jerusalem settlement of Pisgat Ze'ev, which in 2008 had nearly 50,000 settlers. According to Peace Now, this was "a deliberate decision to poke a finger in the eye of President Obama and Special Envoy GEORGE MITCHELL. It is the latest effort by Netanyahu to use settlement-related developments in East Jerusalem to challenge and undermine President Obama's peace effort. Thus, this appears to be a case of Netanyahu—just as in the Shaykh Jarrah evictions—of using East Jerusalem construction to 'up the political ante' domestically and with the US."

In November 2009, a government planning commission gave final approval to the addition of 900 housing units in Gilo, another major East Jerusalem settlement where 40,000 Israelis already live. The plan was initiated by the Israel Lands Administration and had received an initial green light, but on 16 November the authorization was finalized. In reality these units won't be inside the existing footprint of Gilo; rather, they will be on the settlement's southwestern flank, expanding Gilo in the direction of the Palestinian village of Wallajeh (a village in which a large number of the households are fighting Israeli demolition orders). This new Gilo plan clearly dovetails with another plan to build another new settlement, called Givat Yael, which would straddle the Jerusalem border and significantly extend Israeli Jerusalem to the south, further sealing the city off from the BETHLEHEM area and the West Bank (and connecting it to the Etzion settlement bloc). That plan, reported in the Israeli press, also appears to be suddenly gaining steam. Other building plans in various stages of approval include some 4,000 new housing units in Gilo and adjacent areas.

President Obama responded to Israel's commitment to build extensively in and around Gilo by declaring that it "complicates administration efforts to relaunch peace talks and embitters the Palestinians in a way that could be very dangerous . . . [and] that additional settlement building doesn't make Israel safer." *Ha'aretz* reported that an aide to Prime Minister Netanyahu dismissed US anger at Israel's building plan, calling it "a routine process." A member of the commission that approved the plan stated, "The fact that the United States is against this or not is not a factor." Based on the figures given at the outset and the concluding analysis, it can only be surmised that Israel and its US friends intend to push the settlement project to the fullest extent possible.

See also DEMOGRAPHY; GREATER JERUSALEM; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON DISTRICT SOUTHERN; HOLY BASIN; ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA; JERICHO; JERUSALEM; JORDAN RIFT VALLEY; LAND; METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS IN EAST JERUSALEM PLAN; SETTLER VIOLENCE; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT; WATER RESOURCES AND ACCESS

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—B'Tselem and Peace Now

Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

The Jewish settlement project in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES—the WEST BANK (or, as some refer to the area in its biblical form, Judea and Samaria) and the GAZA STRIP (until 2005)—has had a profound and lasting impact on the development of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From the Israeli perspective, and on the part of consecutive governments, it is the most committed expression of the intent to keep parts or all of the contested area under Israeli rule for an indefinite period. Furthermore, the settlements create and continuously recreate Israeli interests in the Occupied Territories. From the Palestinian viewpoint, the settlements are the most glaring symbols of Israeli OCCUPATION, repression, and exclusion, carrying with them numerous direct and indirect infringements on Palestinian human and legal rights, individual and collective, and representing the ongoing usurpation of their national patrimony. In terms of peace talks the expansion of settlements constantly redefines issues encountered by negotiators, and has transformed the time frame of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adding urgency to decisions regarding the future of the Occupied Territories and possible political solutions.

The rationales through which Israel gives legitimacy to the settlements are manifold and have changed through time. Immediately following the Occupation of the territories in the 1967 WAR, Israel decided to keep some limited regions that hold historic and security value and trade the rest with the neighboring Arab countries for a comprehensive peace agreement. The main thrust of Jewish settlement in the early years of Israeli Occupation, until 1977, was along lines determined by the so-called ALLON PLAN, in accordance with Israel's perceived security needs.

With the appearance on the scene of the GUSH EMUNIM movement in 1974, which propagated an ideology that demanded Jewish settlement in all the biblical land of Israel as part of the implementation of divine redemption, and with greater force following the 1977 change of government from LABOR to LIKUD PARTY, the Occupied Territories were opened to wider Jewish settlement, based on ideological and theological motivations. Under the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT ideology, settlements were created wherever LAND was available, at times in close proximity to Palestinian villages and cities. Many of the smaller settlements were constructed through the ideological zeal of small groups of religious activists, while others, mainly those nearer to the Green Line separating Israel from the West Bank, were marketed to the general Israeli public using capitalist initiatives such as subsidies and tax breaks.

As a geographical consequence of these historical developments, Jewish settlement in the West Bank is roughly organized along three north-south strips. In the eastern strip, the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, there are mainly small agricultural settlements, established in the early years after the 1967 War. In the middle strip lies a string of ideological settlements, mostly inhabited by hard-core supporters of the Gush Emunim movement and its fringe offshoots. On the western strip, closest to the Green Line, are relatively larger quality-of-life settlements, whose interests are less ideological and more practical, connected through population characteristics and economic interests to the Israeli urban centers west of the Green Line. (A decision about what should be discussed under the heading of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories is never devoid of political implications, and its presumptions should be stated up front. Eastern JERUSALEM was annexed to Israel immediately after the 1967 War. The approximately 200,000 Israelis who found residence there in a string of suburban neighborhoods will not be discussed here because the history and sociopolitical logic of their residential choices and the legitimacy claims of their presence raise different kinds of issues that merit a separate discussion. The same applies to the Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights and the settlements in the Sinai Peninsula evacuated in 1982.)

Estimates of the numbers of Jews residing in the settlements vary. The data for 2005, as informed by the Israeli Statistical Bureau, show 282,000 Jews living in the West Bank in 126 settlements of varying size, thirteen new colonies not formally accredited, and fifty-five illegal OUTPOSTS. They are set against a Palestinian population in the West Bank estimated by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) Statistical Bureau to be 2.5 million.

The Occupation of the West Bank in the 1967 War brought about two conflicting considerations that affected decisionmakers in Israel. On the one hand, many of the areas conquered by the Israeli army were considered the cradle of the Jewish nation, and many believed they should remain

under permanent Israeli rule based on the fundamental tenets of Zionist ideology. Surrendering HEBRON or NABLUS was seen as a betrayal of national destiny. On the other hand, the relatively large number of Palestinians residing in the territories, as well as international opinion (e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW, UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 [1967], and the position of the UNITED STATES and the European states), made it practically impossible for Israel to annex the territories in the aggregate. Consequentially, East Jerusalem was annexed, while the rest of the territories were defined as "bargaining chips," to be kept temporarily until negotiated for in a comprehensive peace agreement.

Israeli settlement policy followed the Allon Plan of 1967, conceived by Vice Prime Minister YIGAL ALLON shortly after the war. The plan marked the Jordan River as Israel's eastern border and suggested a limited autonomy for the Palestinians until the future of the area was decided. Although the plan was constantly debated and never formally adopted, it was accepted in general, at least rhetorically, by Israeli governments prior to 1977 and placed some limits on regions open to Jewish settlement. The first two settlements established, however, were the inverse of Allon's plan and undermined its logic in that they didn't involve security but instead ideology. In September 1967, Kfar Etzion was established several miles south of BETHLEHEM. The children of warriors who had lived and fought in the area in the 1948 WAR decided to return to the place where many of their fathers had died and rebuild the religious kibbutz. Because the 1948 fight over the region was one of the heroic stories of Israel's war of independence, the return of the young settlers was accepted in the face of an ambivalent but acquiescent government but with much public approval.

The second settlement that reversed Allon's logic was in Hebron. On Passover in 1968 a group of religious Jews headed by RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER rented rooms in the local PARK Hotel to celebrate the holidays. Refusing to leave after the holiday, they were allowed to move to a building belonging to the Israeli military administration. The government then constructed a settlement for them, and, by 1972, the group had moved into their new colony, KIRYAT ARBA, overlooking Hebron. From its early days, this group encountered Palestinian resistance and Israeli opposition, yet it enjoyed some support at the government level, especially from Allon, who integrated the new religious settlement in his plan for the territories.

These two settlement events, carried out by mainly religious groups, were an opening for things to come with the establishment of Gush Emunim in 1974. At the time, however, most settlements and settlers were secular and, conforming to the principal lines of the Allon Plan, built their homes mainly along the Jordan Valley, which was assumed to be the long-term eastern border of the state. The Jordan Valley settlements were built first as army outposts (through the NAHAL units) and later replaced by the civil population, reflecting the long-standing Zionist position that civil settlements are instrumental in fending off enemy armies. The Jordan Valley settlements continued established Zionist practices of agricultural outposts at the BORDERS of the state and were considered in Zionist circles as exemplifying the pioneering spirit in new terrain. Consonant with other historic Zionist practices, the Jordan Valley was portrayed as empty space with few or no Palestinian inhabitants. Although reality was somewhat different, the "land without people" prose enhanced the legitimacy of the Jordan Valley settlements. By 2004 there were twenty-six Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley, approximately 7,500 settlers among some 47,000 Palestinians.

Overall, in the first few years after the 1967 War, Israeli settlement in the Occupied Territories was limited, rarely encountered local Palestinian resistance, and was not the object of much public debate. The voices calling for annexation of the territories and unlimited Jewish settlement at that time were marginal and contained. All this was to change in the wake of the 1973 War, the emergence of Gush Emunim, and the change in government in 1977.

Gush Emunim and Settling the West Bank

The development and expansion of Jewish settlement in the West Bank are connected to Gush Emunim, a JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM movement that was established in March 1974, soon after the 1973 War, in which SYRIA and EGYPT attempted to retake their territories seized by Israel in 1967. After protesting and demonstrating against withdrawal plans, Gush Emunim proceeded to implement its major strategy to arrest further withdrawals through a physical presence in the contested areas. In the mid-1970s, Gush Emunim supporters attempted several times to settle in the Samaria region, under the slogan of

bringing Jewish life back to the site of ancient Schlem (Nablus). However, the Israeli government, headed by YITZHAK RABIN, refused to allow them to stay, and the settlers were evicted by army forces until their eighth attempt in December 1975, when they succeeded in convincing the Israeli government to allow a group of families to stay. The so-called Kadum compromise, which brought about the establishment of ELON MOREH near Nablus, marks the beginning of a new type of Jewish settlement in the West Bank—that is, based on ideology. Whereas Elon Moreh symbolized the defiant nature of Gush Emunim's settlement project, Ofra, established in May 1975, represented the tacit agreement and cooperation with the government, another trademark of the Gush Emunim. A settlement group related to Gush Emunim worked at the nearby army base and built its residential camp nearby. The government, through the attempts of Minister of Defense SHIMON PERES, approved the site for settlement. The group, which originally planned to settle elsewhere, decided to stay in Ofra, ten miles north of Jerusalem, and this area became an important center of the Gush Emunim settlement project, where many leaders took up residence and major institutions formed.

Elon Moreh and Ofra remained the only Gush Emunim settlements established during Rabin's period as prime minister. Immediately after reaching power in 1977, the new prime minister, MENAHEM BEGIN, of the right-wing Likud Party, declared that there "will be many Elon Morehs." And indeed, with state backing and funding the number of settlements in the West Bank quickly increased. Israel's evacuation from Sinai, decided in 1978 and implemented fully in 1982, was a setback for Gush Emunim supporters, who were disappointed by the limitations placed on their expansion due to international pressure. However, most of the settlements existing today were built during the late 1970s through the 1980s. Gush Emunim held the advantage of arriving ready for the settlement project, with the ideology, motivation, manpower, logistics, and even a prepared map based on extensive knowledge of the terrain. Movement leaders put forward the Yesh (acronym for Judea and Samaria) Plan, which became the blueprint for further settlement in the West Bank, superseding the Allon Plan. According to the Yesh Plan, new settlements would be established in locations of strategic importance at close proximity to and overlooking Palestinian villages.

Through the years, Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories have undergone a process of institutionalization. In the initial years, settlers created organizations to coordinate action and bring their voice to the Israeli population. The charismatic young leaders of Gush Emunim became well-known MEDIA figures who were well connected to high Israeli political echelons. New organizational initiatives mushroomed, most important among them Emuna, the official settlement organization of Gush Emunim that helped new settlements in their first steps; the monthly journal *Nekuda* (Hebrew for "full stop," a point, or a location on the map), which expressed the views of the settlers and their supporters; and the YESHA COUNCIL, an informal umbrella organization that represented the settlers and fought to enhance their project. During the 1970s, Gush Emunim faded out, and the Yesha Council gradually replaced its functions and took upon itself the leadership of the struggle. The numerous Jewish settlements gave rise to new local organizations and jobs, mainly in administration, education, and religious services, and often held by former Gush Emunim leaders. Through its institutional development, the settlement project received state funds that were often, in turn, used to finance further settlement activity and the political struggles against government decisions unfavorable to the settlements.

The Gush Emunim settlements are planned communities, established by the willful acts of visionaries and designers through a political and administrative process. In this respect, Gush Emunim settlements followed the well-established Zionist practice of political settlement and resemble other types of planned rural settlements in Israel, such as the KIBBUTZ and the MOSHAV. Hence, the construction of the Israeli settlements always meant more than merely finding a place to live for a growing population; it held national import and was the object of heated political controversy. In many other respects, however, the Gush Emunim settlements are unique in the landscape of Israeli rural settlements. Previously, Zionist settlements were considered to have intrinsic social value as special types of human organizations that radiated their influence inside and across the Israeli borders. The kibbutzim, as the main example, were regarded and admired as an important social experiment, and their attempt at sharing production and consumption among residents, as well as restructuring family roles, was viewed by many

with great interest. According to Zionist perception, establishing a presence on the land, although certainly an important national goal in itself, should be complemented with an ideological statement about communal life.

In the Gush Emunim settlements, however, the residents usually work elsewhere and share neither production nor consumption. Much as in the modern suburb, many of the workers leave home each morning and return in the evening. The settlers prefer this arrangement because of the terrain, which does not favor intensive agriculture; the proximity to Israeli urban centers; and the social makeup of the residents, most of whom are white-collar workers. Gush Emunim targeted mainly middle-class city dwellers, who would probably not have come had the settlements demanded transformation of lifestyle and redistribution of property. Thus, whereas the kibbutzim demanded the redemption of man (which is one reason they remained small and exclusive), the Gush Emunim settlements strove for the redemption of land.

Unlike the kibbutz movement, Gush Emunim has little to say about social and economic relations and the structure of communities, beyond a general penchant for religious communal life. The religious decree and political will to settle the entire Land of Israel are much stronger than any urge to transform Israeli society or create a new Israeli man. The Gush Emunim settlements have a distinctly religious nature, and the wish to live within an observant community is an important motivation for moving to a settlement. The secluded religious community offers a fuller religious experience than the average Israeli city. Local rabbis enjoy more authority, the gates to the settlement are closed on Shabbat, and the environment is controlled to exclude behaviors that offend religious sensibilities. Regardless of these differences, the Gush Emunim settlers attempted to connect themselves to the founding myth of Zionist settlement and compared themselves to the early Zionist pioneers (the *halutzim*). This historical analogy, which attempted to legitimize the Gush Emunim project using sacred national memory, enraged many Israelis. While outside of Israel, Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories were considered as infringing upon the human rights of Palestinians, they were also harshly criticized within Israel for a variety of reasons. The opposition, consisting of Israeli political parties and social movements, most notably PEACE NOW (Shalom Achshav), protested the settlement project in general and many settlements in particular. Their main claims were that settlements on contested territories block peace possibilities, infringe on the human rights of Palestinians, and divert valuable resources from important social projects to risky and unjust operations. Furthermore, whereas the settlers claim to embody true ZIONISM, their opponents claim that they undermine the fundamental moral nature of Zionist ideology.

Although the Israeli peace camp has had some local and short-lived successes, the basic differential of resources has made their struggle difficult and frustrating. Whereas the settlers were based on their home territory and most of their leaders were funded by the state and worked in the local municipality, the peace protesters had to return to their homes within the Green Line and found it difficult to sustain pressure on the settlers. The Israeli peace camp has developed strategies aimed at confronting this power differential—for example, publishing reports directed at the Israeli and international public on the settlement project's advancement. The Israeli peace camp sees its main achievement as keeping the settlement question in front of the Israeli public despite the massive national investment in the territories. Some critics claim that the Israeli peace movement has had a paradoxical role of legitimizing the settlements in that it has displayed Israel's democratic virtue of freedom of speech, thereby diverting criticism from military occupation and state-sponsored settlement in contested areas.

Settlements created their own dynamics—demanding new spaces in which to expand and flourish, ROADS that were convenient and safe, and army camps nearby for protection. Whenever there were violent acts by Palestinians against the settlers, the settlers demanded what they referred to as "a proper Zionist response," such as constructing a new settlement or clearing trees and buildings along the roads leading to existing settlements. In other words, the very existence of the settlements re-creates and redefines their interest in the area, bringing about recurring conflicts with their Palestinian neighbors. This, in turn, forces the Israeli government and army to deepen their involvement in the well-being of the Jewish settlers.

Ideological Jewish Community

The Jewish ideological settlement is concomitantly a political statement and a living, develop-

ing community. It is the most important resource that the Israeli right wing holds, and it exemplifies both the possibilities and problems of maximalist territorial policy. Along with the strategic rationale, the new settlements were established according to historic, religious, and symbolic logic. The names of the settlements reveal a craving to return to biblical times and to rebuild ancient locations—such as Giveon, Beit-El, or Tekoa—in roughly their original spots. Other settlements reproduce through their name later Talmudic times, such as the HAREDI town of Beitar. A special case is Susia, south of Hebron; a village by that name was never mentioned in ancient Jewish texts but was revealed in archaeological excavations. Thus the concrete settlement map can also be understood as a symbolic map, encompassing various periods of Jewish existence in the area. Some second-generation Jewish settlers, nicknamed "the youth of the hills," attempt to connect to symbols of authenticity in a more direct way by adopting simple ways of life, traditional occupations, and other neobiblical symbols and characteristics.

Some of the settlements were established by government decision, whereas others were started as unauthorized outposts that gradually received legitimacy and became institutionalized. While in some settlements the houses were complete before the arrival of residents, in most a temporary camp preceded construction. The future residents live at the new site in various types of shelters, including old Jordanian houses, army barracks, old police stations, or, more often, mobile homes. The erection of a temporary camp pressures the government to authorize the settlement deed and hasten construction work. When the fixed settlement is established, the temporary camp is usually not dismantled but used for public institutions or to absorb new families. Some of the mobile homes are reused in the next settlement site elsewhere. The temporary mobile home became an important symbol of the defiant nature of the Gush Emunim project, especially the concept of the movement as a vanguard, capturing one hill after the next. The outpost indicates temporality—under constant threat of eviction by the Israeli army in case of a government decision and a prelude to the settlement that will be established on roughly the same spot, freeing the mobile home for further uses. As a sign of pioneering bravery and commitment, the mobile homes star in the lore of the settlers.

Apart from the very first ones, settlements are often found on the top of hills, are built according to similar principles, and share common visual features. As a natural element, the hilltops determined much of the settlements' architectural designs. Following the topographical contours of the specific hill chosen, the settlements were built in concentric rings—round or elliptic. The lots for residential buildings are of roughly equal size and shape and are located in long chains on the perimeter, encircling, in a sense protecting, the public buildings in the high middle. Settlements stick out of their environment, usually as a human presence within a desert or among barren hills or as a uniform structure adjacent to traditional Palestinian villages. Whereas their names represent their commitment to biblical tradition, their construction declares a commitment to modernistic aesthetic values and suburban lifestyle. Because they are so radically different from their environment, some architects, landscape artists, and others have described the settlements in negative terms. For example, Israeli architects Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal had the following to say about the design of Israeli settlements: "Palestinian human and political rights are violated not only by the presence of the settlements, but also by their location, size, form, and internal layout—in short by their very design. Just like the tank, the gun, and the bulldozer, here building materials and INFRASTRUCTURE are used as weapons to commit crimes. Planning in the West Bank finally shed the last shred of its social pretense of facilitating the welfare of an abstract 'public' and ended up as the executive arm of the strategic and geopolitical agenda of the Israeli state."

Because of security considerations and symbolic significance, Gush Emunim settlements are usually located on high ground, overlooking their surroundings. The land that was traditionally occupied and cultivated by the Palestinians was mainly in the valleys, and, because there was little organized land registered for the area, Israel claimed rights, not recognized in international law, to confiscate land that was not cultivated. As a result, substantial parts of the West Bank were divided vertically, with the hilltops practically annexed to Israel and the lower areas remaining in Palestinian hands. This geostrategic division results in the settlements being isolated from each other and contiguous Jewish regions. At the same time, this division also precludes any possibility of a

continuous Palestinian space, hindering the feasibility of a Palestinian state.

Quality-of-Life Settlements

After the 1977 government victory for the expansionist Likud, Israel's settlement policy was to open the entire space of the Occupied Territories for Jewish settlements. Most of the new settlers are not connected to the theological and ideological camp but rather moved their residence over the Green Line for practical reasons, such as quality of life, cheap housing, and nearness to the main Israeli metropolitan centers. Plots of land and houses were marketed using capitalist marketing strategies, government subsidies, financial incentives, tax advantages, loan forgiveness, and other inducements. As a result, these methods brought to the Occupied Territories religious and secular Jews of various socioeconomic interests and political opinions. As part of the promise, the quality-of-life settlements were located, whenever possible, relatively far from Palestinian villages, where newly built roads could connect settlers to the large Israeli urban centers without passing through potentially hostile environments. This type of settlement can be understood, and was marketed, as an integral extension of the Israeli metropolitan areas beyond the Green Line separating Israel from the West Bank.

The largest Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories is Ariel, placed near the main road crossing the Samaria region and designated the "capital city of Samaria." The Judea and Samaria College, moved from the nearby small ideological settlement of Kedumim to the town, draws students from nearby cities and towns, mostly from inside the Green Line. Near Ariel is a large industrial zone named Barkan. Apart from being the urban center for the nearby settlements, Ariel is an expansion eastward of the dense Israeli Coastal Plain. The quality-of-life settlements open opportunities for other colonies to engage in the settlement project. Some new towns are Haredi (ultra-Orthodox)—Beitar Ilit, Modi'in Ilit, and Immanuel—and are tightly connected to the Haredi centers inside Israel, especially to Bnei-Brak and Jerusalem. The isolation enables the Haredim to preserve their secluded lives and to enhance the religious character of their communal existence. Within Haredi enclaves in the Occupied Territories, the population can express its values and style of life without the pressures of secular neighbors and consumer culture to adapt to more modern ways. Thus, for example, in the municipal elections of Immanuel, the community decided not to allow women to vote, a decision that would have cost them political power if it had been a mixed city.

Palestinians and most of the international community recognize little difference between the quality-of-life settlers and the more ideological ones, viewing them both as illegal appropriators of Palestinian land. The ideological settlers also prefer to obscure the differences and are especially content to see "regular" Israelis joining their ranks for whatever reason. However, most of the residents in the quality-of-life settlements, as well as most other Israelis, make clear and important distinctions between types of settlers, seeing the nonideological settlers as a distinct category. Secular settlements face toward Israel and, in some important respects, turn their backs to the ideological settlers. Their everyday life, places of work and leisure, political alignments, and identity formation can all be seen as a continuation of the attributes of Israelis on the western side of the Green Line.

Although the quality-of-life settlers are, in general, uncommitted to the Greater Israel ideal, and their place of residence is a consequence of their wish to improve their standard of living, the political meaning of their residential choice is crucially important to the future of the West Bank. Political geographer MERON BENVENISTI claimed as far back as the 1980s that the situation in the West Bank had passed the irreversible point, not because of the deeds of the ideological settlers but rather through the expansion of Israeli urban centers eastward toward the new spaces opened by the 1967 War. In his analysis, the quality-of-life settlements have erased the Green Line as a viable option for future Israeli withdrawal, and the fact that the nonideological settlers are "innocent victims" strengthens the commitment that the Israeli government and the Israeli public hold toward them. Furthermore, the new settlements beyond the Green Line have transformed the Israeli state in such a profound way as to merit a new definition, which Benvenisti names "the second Israeli republic." This new republic includes under its wide wings citizens and noncitizens, Israelis and Palestinians, in a demographically indivisible, continuous space from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. In other words, because of the arrival of regular Israelis, the ideological settlers

may have practically fulfilled their dream of Greater Israel.

Removal of the Gush Katif Settlement

In August 2005, Gush Katif, a settlement bloc in southwest Gaza Strip comprising sixteen settlements and housing approximately 6,000 residents, was evacuated. The Jewish settlements in the Strip, where Palestinians number 1.5 million, took up 20 percent of the land and a great portion of other resources and came to symbolize the problematic nature and the stubborn resoluteness of the Israeli presence in the occupied areas.

During the first years following the Occupation, the Israeli army partly evacuated Palestinian residents from the area that became Gush Katif. The first settlement, Kfar Darom, was established in October 1970. Similar to Kfar Etzion, Kfar Darom was described as a return and reconstruction of an earlier settlement that was evacuated and destroyed in the 1948 War. Other settlements soon followed. At the northern tip of the Gaza Strip, there were three small settlements, and Netzarim was established between the Palestinian city of Gaza and the Dir el-Balah refugee camp. Within the contiguous area of Gush Katif, at the southeastern tip of the Strip, the largest settlement was Neve Dekalim, home to approximately 2,000 residents. Gush Katif was situated between the dense Palestinian population and the sea, but within the Gush area several thousand Palestinians remained. As a result of the evacuation of the Sinai settlements and the bulldozing of the buildings in April 1982, Gush Katif received support and a demographic boost. Some of the settlements commemorated, through their name, the destroyed region, and, in Neve Dekalim, a monumental building for the Yamit yeshiva was built in the form of a Star of David, with one point buried in the ground, symbolizing the demise of the Sinai settlements. The Katif region became the border region between Israel and EGYPT and accordingly received more government assistance.

Economically, the Jewish residents of the Gaza Strip made their living from agriculture, especially greenhouse vegetables and crops uniquely suited to the Israeli religious community. With swimming beaches and a hotel, the residents attempted to develop local and international tourism but, because of the precarious situation of the region, the tourists who came were mainly visitors from the national religious camp, combining vacation with a political statement of solidarity. The private houses, gardens, swimming pools, and open spaces were a glaring contrast to the lives of the Palestinians around the settlements, many in refugee camps. Apart from Palestinians who worked inside the settlements, mainly in construction and greenhouses, the two populations were completely distinct. For many years, the settlements were targets for Palestinian attacks, which grew in number and intensity with the start of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000. Most attacks involved firing on the settlements with rifles and locally made rockets, penetrating into the settlements and settlers' homes, and targeting cars on the roads to the Israeli region.

In 2003, after the Knesset elections, Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON initiated his plan of ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA: an evacuation and destruction of all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West Bank. Immediately, the Gush Katif residents and their supporters from other settlements and the Israeli national religious camp in general led a struggle to try to prevent the evacuation. However, despite numerous demonstrations and protests, and a victory in a plebiscite in the ruling Likud Party, the disengagement plan was implemented and the Gaza Strip was evacuated of Israeli civil and military presence. The failed struggle to save Gush Katif sent shock waves through the settlements, especially those connected most intimately with Gush Katif, namely, the ideological Gush Emunim settlements. It became clear that the Israeli government could initiate, organize, and follow through with a large-scale evacuation, while the relevant agencies, especially the army and police, had little reservation in carrying out such orders. It was also evident that the general Israeli public, apart from the national religious camp, would either support or sit idly by while settlements were being dismantled. Some settler leaders lamented that, although they succeeded in settling on the ground, they failed in settling in the hearts of most Israelis. Others vowed to use more extreme measures should such events repeat themselves in the West Bank.

All sides involved see the Gaza evacuation as an experiment for possible future larger evacuations. Indeed, Prime Ministers Sharon and EHUD OLMERT stated that such steps were forthcoming, and it is clear that a further massive evacuation will encounter greater resistance. Following the eruption of Palestinian violence in the Gaza Strip,

including rockets fired at nearby Israeli towns, and the 2006 war in LEBANON illustrating the damaging military potential of nonstate organizations, plans for further evacuations are currently on hold.

Position of Israeli Government

Since the beginning of Jewish settlement in the Occupied Territories, Israeli governments and governmental offices, almost regardless of partisan lines, have either shown support for or expressed ambivalence toward the settlers. Even though the settlers were often unruly and sometimes posed a threat to state legitimacy, their ideological zeal and political power, along with thinly veiled threats to use violence, made government officials comply with many of their demands. Furthermore, many politicians and officials at all levels of government sympathized wholeheartedly with the settlers and their ideology. Often governments spoke with two voices, condemning the illegal and violent acts of the settlers while providing them with funds, building their infrastructure, and supporting them politically. Influential posts within ministries responsible for Israeli settlement policy were often occupied by settler leaders, both at top levels as ministers and ministerial general managers and as employees in the offices administering the Occupied Territories, and they assisted the settlements often in ways directly opposite to declared governmental policies.

The ambivalence toward the settlers reaches back to the very beginning: the decisions to enable Jews to return to Kfar Etzion and the reluctant acceptance of Rabbi Levinger's dramatic acts in Hebron. The Israeli government was divided over both issues, and the settlers manipulated the doubts and inconsistencies to their advantage. Israeli governments were often worried about the international implications, possible Palestinian resistance, and the trickle-down effect of unruliness on Israeli society, yet the Greater Israel ideal was close to the heart of many government officials, and the memory of the Zionist pioneers, on whom the settlers modeled themselves, was a strong compelling image. Security issues and real-estate considerations also played a large part in decisions to assist the settlers.

In the years 1974–1977, Yitzhak Rabin's government had to contend with the attempts of Gush Emunim to settle in the West Bank without authorization. Although Rabin himself was hostile to these efforts, his minister of defense, Shimon Peres, was more favorably disposed toward the settlers, allowing them, for example, to establish the settlement of Ofra. The inner conflicts within the government enabled the Kadum compromise in 1976, which allowed settlers in limited numbers to remain in the Samaria district. Though Menahem Begin promised, both before and after his arrival to power in 1977, that the Occupied Territories would be open to unrestricted Jewish settlement, he could not fulfill his words. International pressures, especially with the advancement of the peace negotiations, forced the Israeli government to exercise some control over its settlement activity. However, as with all governments in all periods while Israel formally stopped building new settlements, various government agencies continued to assist the settlers, and the settlement project continued to expand.

The ambivalence was also apparent in the all-important issue of gaining control of enough land to enable the settlements to emerge and prosper. In June 1979 a major legal case came before the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT in the context of private Palestinian land confiscated in order to establish Elon Moreh. The state claimed that the confiscation was justified because of security reasons and brought experts, including ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) chief of staff Rafael Eitan, to back its claim. The plaintiffs brought their own security experts, including former Israeli generals, to claim the contrary. The settlers undermined their own case by declaring that they intended to stay indefinitely, regardless of security needs. In a watershed decision, the Supreme Court annulled the confiscation and thereby forced the government to search for other legal means to implement its settlement policy. Although land confiscation continued, the legal solution chosen to enable further settlement was based on an old Jordanian law stating that land at a certain distance from villages was considered as belonging to the state. Using this law, large portions of the Occupied Territories were declared STATE LAND and used for settlement. The Supreme Court did not contest this principle, ignoring the fact that it was contrary to an important tenet of international law that prohibits moving other populations into occupied territories or using resources from the area for the benefit of anyone other than the local population. On these matters the Israeli courts refrained from intervening, claiming those issues to be of an inherently political nature, beyond its jurisdiction. Critics of the settlement project in Israel and abroad

therefore consider Israeli courts and the judicial system as accomplices in legitimizing Israeli civil presence in the Occupied Territories.

Law enforcement is another institutional realm in which the Israeli state played a double game with the settlers. Regular Israeli law is enforced only partially in the Occupied Territories. For example, violence toward Palestinians is usually ignored and rarely punished. The small ideological communities, whose residents are frequently implicated in vigilante actions against Palestinians, form tight groups that protect each other and do not enable police penetration. Furthermore, agencies of social control rarely wish to pursue legal matters to their conclusion when the suspects are settlers and the victims are Palestinians.

Israel has invested billions, much of it well hidden in obscure clauses in the national budget, in settlement financing. Although the real amount is a matter of conjecture and will probably never be calculated, the *Ha'aretz* Israeli daily newspaper (in a special September 2003 supplement) estimated that the sum approximates US$10 billion of extra civil expenditure, excluding military expenditure for guarding the settlers. Critics of the settlement project argue that these funds could have been used to achieve important social goals inside the Green Line. Furthermore, the settlements have, in a sense, created a partial alternative for the weakening Israeli welfare system, offering cheap housing and subsidies to many who chose to leave poor neighborhoods and development towns and move to the Occupied Territories.

The illegal outposts are a glaring example of the inconsistency of state agency vis-à-vis the settlement project. These outposts, mushrooming in the West Bank since the mid-1990s, manifest young settlers' zeal and dedication. Their practice evolved out of what they believe is necessity, as consecutive Israeli governments slowed the establishment of new settlements, giving the settlers an excuse to forge ahead with new settlement activity, knowing from experience that governments tend to accept a fait accompli. The new outposts, built without permission, license, or government decision, were brought to the attention of peace movements in Israel and global civil rights organizations. Their unlawful establishment and the often illegal deeds of their residents, which spread fear in the nearby Palestinian villages, were widely known to Israeli law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, various government agencies assisted the outposts in a variety of ways and enabled the legal, economic, and military substructure necessary for their success. Although there were occasions when the Israeli army evacuated an outpost, even in the face of violent settlers' opposition (Amona in 2005 being the most notable example), in general, Israeli governments have been characterized by the contradictory interests of different state agencies, which enabled the outposts to survive and even thrive.

The ambivalent complacency of Israeli governments in the development of the settlement movement raises two important questions: whether the settlement project can be understood as an integral part of the Zionist project, and whether the Judaization of the land within the pre-1967 borders, widely legitimized by the Israeli public, will be equally accepted with new frontiers absent Gaza in the Occupied Territories. The ideological settlers have a vested interest in presenting their project as a continuation of the century-old Zionist project, while their critics vehemently dispute this claim, drawing a distinct line between traditional Zionism and the new settlements in the Occupied Territories. Researchers are divided in their judgments according to their own academic conceptions. Critical political scientists, sociologists, and historians, such as Oren Yiftachel, Ilan Pappé, and Gershon Shafir, claim that settlement and Judaization of the Occupied Territories are a direct continuation, albeit using new strategies, of Zionist logic and basic motivations. Notably, however, they are highly critical of the original Zionist project. The inconsistent behavior of Israeli governments enables both the critical scholars and their opponents to build and strengthen their case.

Impact on the Palestinians

The settlements' impact on the lives and well-being of the Palestinians residing nearby is extensive and harsh, though it cannot easily be detached from the general effect of Israeli Occupation. On the macro level, the settlers symbolize for the Palestinians the most enduring aspect of the Occupation and the greatest threat to their collective future. On a more daily basis, many of the settlers are involved in numerous breaches of human rights and, through direct and indirect actions, participate in injuring the communal and private lives of Palestinians. In turn, the settlers are hardest hit by Palestinian rage and violence.

Although the Palestinian presence is crucial for understanding the settlement project, it is

nevertheless often denied and overlooked by the settlers. On the one hand, the settlement project is a direct contestation of the Palestinian claims to nationhood, sovereignty, and native status on their land, and, in one sense, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be conceived as a geopolitical war over territorial interests in the contested area. On the other hand, the Palestinian population is often declared inconsequential to the determination of the area's future. For example, the first Jewish settlers in the Jordan Valley arrived under the explicit assumption that the presence of Palestinians in the area had no relevance to the settlers' future. Gush Emunim settlers, who could not ignore the massive presence of Palestinians around their settlements, claimed that their neighbors ought to accept their presence. Their reasoning was based on the religious and historical basis for Jewish return to the land, which they argued should be well understood by religious Palestinians, who are themselves, according to the settlers' worldview, descendants of the same biblical patriarch, Abraham. At the same time, the settlers' religious leadership declared that the Palestinians are temporary visitors in a land that can only belong to the Jews and that they should be thankful for the right to remain on Jewish soil and not be evicted to their assumed Arab "homelands."

These images and concepts, in turn, influenced government policies and resource allocation. The government rarely considered the well-being of the Palestinians in the development of the settlement project and did not view the local population as holding collective rights or interests in the area or having a voice in the development of the territory. Furthermore, land and WATER resources were diverted to assist Jewish settlement, further weakening and impoverishing the local Palestinian population. In fact, Israel has contributed to the decline of Palestinian agriculture, curtailed the development of industry, and kept the territories as an open market for its own products. The settlers further restricted the Palestinian economy by overusing resources, especially water, and demanding ROADBLOCKS and CURFEWS, carried out by the army. They also actively harmed the Palestinian subsistence economy through violent acts, for example, OLIVE TREE UPROOTING or driving shepherds from grazing fields. Because of the threatening presence and violent actions of the Hebron and Kiryat Arba settlers, the Hebron Arab Market was slowly destroyed until it eventually closed. On the other hand, Palestinians found work, mainly in construction, building the emerging settlements. Apart from that, the economies of the settlers and the Palestinians are distinct and verging on apartheid.

More than other groups in Israeli society, the settlers have suffered from TERRORISM. For the Palestinians, the settlers represent the Occupation, and their proximity makes them relatively easy targets for violent actions. All through the 1980s, Palestinians' main action against the settlers was throwing stones at vehicles driven by Israelis, especially when the settlers were inside Palestinian towns. In addition, some settlers were killed by shooting or knifing, especially in the city of Hebron. The retaliation of the settlers included the actions of the so-called Jewish underground, whose leaders were important members in the settlement movement, which targeted Palestinians and made plans to blow up the mosques on the TEMPLE MOUNT in Jerusalem. In 1984, when the group was exposed and its members apprehended by Israeli security forces while it was attempting to blow up Palestinian buses, an argument ensued among the settlers regarding their rights to retaliate and use force against their neighbors. While the emergence of another organized clandestine network among the Jewish settlers is possible, in the meantime individuals and small groups have often taken the law into their own hands and targeted Palestinians.

Starting in December 1987, the First INTIFADA targeted mainly Israeli soldiers and Jewish settlers. From mainly stone-throwing, the Palestinian uprising escalated to gunfire and resulted in about 100 Israeli deaths. In 1994 a Kiryat Arba physician, BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, murdered twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in the CAVE OF MACHPELAH, and in the following violent demonstrations, more Palestinians were killed by the army. Under Prime Minister Rabin, the Israeli government considered evacuating the Jewish enclave in Hebron but decided against such action. The Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBINGS reached their height during the Second (al-Aqsa) Intifada and targeted mainly Israeli cities inside the Green Line. However, the settlers were still the main victims of Palestinian rage and accounted for approximately 20 percent of Israeli dead in the Intifada years. Another 20 percent were killed inside the Occupied Territories, mainly IDF soldiers. Counting the number of Palestinian attacks during the Second Intifada,

more than 95 percent occurred in the Occupied Territories. The settlements were subjected to gunshots, makeshift missiles, and penetrations into houses and public buildings.

For the settlers, the violent events changed their conception of possible peaceful relations with their neighbors, resulting in important policy changes and strategic decisions. The idea of bringing prosperity to all residents of the region was replaced with unveiled anger, hate, and alienation. Before the Intifada, most settlements refused to accept fences around the perimeter, claiming that it limited their possibility for expansion in their homeland. However, with the growing dangers, most settlements accepted and even demanded electronic fences and stronger security measures. The settlers were also critical of the decision, following the OSLO ACCORDS between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel, to construct bypass roads around Palestinian villages, claiming that they needed to bring a Jewish presence to every spot in the land, all of which belonged to them. Currently they are content to use the safer bypass roads and mostly refrain from driving through Palestinian towns.

The first settlers in the Occupied Territories did not take the rage of the Palestinians into consideration, but it turned out to be the most crucial factor affecting their prospects for the future. Palestinian violence has had paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it pulls the Israeli army inside the Occupied Territories to strengthen its control on Palestinian movement and everyday life. On the other hand, it has raised the price for individuals considering a move to the territories and raises the overall Israeli cost for maintaining the settlements. Sharon's disengagement plan has shown that the cost of holding settlements in close proximity to hostile Palestinians is a price that many Israelis are unwilling to pay.

Future of the Settlements

Although the Jewish settlement project across the Green Line enjoyed direct or tacit governmental support for most of its existence, starting in the early 1990s, it has found itself in growing difficulties and facing problems that, while not curtailing its expansion, have cast doubt on its chances of long-term survival. In the second Rabin government that came to power in 1992, certain Knesset members, especially from the left-wing MERETZ PARTY, were openly hostile to the settlements and suggested "drying them out," that is, decreasing subsidies so they would leave. At the same time, the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians were the greatest political failure of the Israeli right and a disastrous blow to the settlers for numerous reasons. They narrowed the land that the settlers believed should eventually belong to them. Arming the Palestinian police formed an immediate threat, and the result was building fences around the settlements and constructing bypass roads. All this marked the Israeli government's distancing from the settlers, the Israeli public's relative indifference to the settlers' change in status, and the demise of the Greater Israel ideology.

The settlers, however, responded by opening up their settlements. Supporters who had hesitated to move to the territories decided it was time to strengthen the project, and the number of settlers doubled in the few years after the Oslo Accords. At the same time, the number of settlements stayed roughly the same, as Israel found itself constricted by growing international pressure and binding agreements with the Palestinians. The solution found by the settlers was the creation of new neighborhoods at the fringes of the established settlements, thus expanding the existing settlements to include new land. Against governmental restrictions, a large number of illegal outposts were created, each housing a few families and individuals. While some are in a process of evolving into full-fledged settlements, others remain small and are centers of the so-called youth of the hills.

The prospects for the settlement project received two substantial blows in the new century. Following the suicide attacks in Israeli cities, Israel began construction in 2002 of a BARRIER separating the Occupied Territories from Israel—in many places deep into the West Bank, dividing the space between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Although human rights organizations point to the suffering that the Barrier causes the large Palestinian population in the divided area, this wall also posits grave problems to the settlers. In fact, many claim that the Barrier will decide Israel's future borders, dooming many of the settlements on the "wrong" side to a slow process of degeneration. Symbolically, the Barrier defines the settlers as being outside the territory that would eventually be left in Israeli hands. The second blow was a more direct and unequivocal one, namely, ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005 and the destruction of twenty-two settlements there, ordered by Sharon, who was

considered until then the builder and guardian of the settlements.

Although their future looks uncertain, Jewish settlements have had profound influence on the territories where they have been planted. Realizing that they were losing land and resources with every day that passed, the Palestinians found themselves needing to change the situation, either through diplomatic means or through escalation of violence. At the same time, the Israelis found newly established interests in protecting the territories under their control, while realizing the high cost of continued Occupation. The ideological settlers residing in the Occupied Territories are a determined group, refusing any territorial compromise. Although the Israeli settlements and the Greater Israel ideology are currently out of favor with much of the Israeli public, the settlers' sheer numbers and resolute determination ensure that any Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank will be met with great resistance and come at a dear cost to Israelis and Palestinians alike.

See also DEMOGRAPHY; GREATER JERUSALEM; HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON: DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA; JERUSALEM; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SETTLER VIOLENCE; SUICIDE BOMBINGS; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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—Michael Feige

Settler Groups and Settlements, East Jerusalem

Since the OCCUPATION began in 1967, successive Israeli governments have made efforts to transform the Arab character of East JERUSALEM, eradicate all Palestinian signifiers, and create a Jewish mass that will in turn construct a new geopolitical reality. This process is aimed at assuming control not only of the physical space of the city's eastern half but also of its local identity, thus Judaizing East Jerusalem at the expense of its Palestinian heritage.

When Israel conquered East Jerusalem in June 1967, it adopted two basic principles with regard to the city. The first was to rapidly increase the Jewish population in the eastern sector in order to maintain a demographic ratio of 70 percent Jews to 30 percent Arabs. The second was to hinder the growth of the Palestinian population and to force Arab residents to make their homes elsewhere. This logic has driven Israeli policymakers from 1967 through the present. On 30 July 1980, the Knesset passed a BASIC LAW making Jerusalem unified and the eternal capital of Israel.

Immediately after the 1967 WAR, the Israeli government also undertook a policy of Israelization with regard to East Jerusalem by annexing land that was confiscated from twenty-eight Palestinian villages, expanding the area of what was previously considered East Jerusalem from 6.5 square kilometers (2.5 square miles) to 71 square kilometers (27 square miles). On this confiscated land Israel built twelve major SETTLEMENTS in a ring around East Jerusalem with Israeli-only roads and associated INFRASTRUCTURE. In 2009, the combined population of these ring settlements stood at 235,000.

Consecutive governments have pursued implementation of increasing the Jewish population and hindering the growth of the Palestinian community by integrating two forces that operate in tandem and feed on each other. One is the official, state organ that expropriates LAND and builds Israeli neighborhoods and enterprises. The second, unofficial organ is composed of settlers who perform what the state is unable to do for legal reasons, that is, establish Jewish neighborhoods within Palestinian neighborhoods and try to force the Palestinians out. The settlers' *amutot* (nonprofit associations) are the long arm of government, moonlighting contractors for the Israeli government—both LABOR and LIKUD PARTY. They have flourished and developed with governmental backing and sponsorship and are embraced by every lawful authority—from the municipality to the police to the national government. As a result a close, almost symbiotic relationship has formed between the settler groups and national government representatives, to the extent that occasionally it is unclear who is running whom—the state the settlers, or the settlers the state.

In the wake of the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, the 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, and the election of Barack Obama, the possibility that Jerusalem could be divided as part of an overall peace agreement has given the Jewish settlement project in East Jerusalem its greatest impetus. Israel's government and the Jerusalem municipality work on the assumption that the Western powers will eventually enforce a diplomatic arrangement roughly in the form of the ROAD MAP, and featuring some sort of division of the city between Palestinians and Jews. When that time comes, the existence of settlements will determine the city's boundaries, just as it did in 1948 when the map of settlements was used to chart the new state's BORDERS. As a result, the state, the municipality, and settler organizations are making tremendous efforts to create "facts on the ground" that will rule out any future division of the city.

The spatial spread of the East Jerusalem settlements is part of a comprehensive religious-political strategic program. The settlers' objective is to create a strip of Jewish localities around the OLD CITY—the historical and spiritual Jerusalem for Christians, Muslims, and Jews—that will fulfill two roles: sever Palestinian territorial contiguity between the north and south of the city, and envelop the Old City with Jewish "islands" that will rule out the possibility that East Jerusalem can function as the capital of the Palestinian state if and when it is declared. This is particularly

obvious when one locates those Jewish islands on the map: from the south a broad belt starts in SILWAN with the City of David complex and continues toward RAS AL-AMUD and Kidmat Zion, from where it continues toward the E1 area and MA'ALE ADUMIM.

The Jewish settlements in Palestinian neighborhoods—whether a single house or an entire colony—rapidly become fortified sites. Every Jewish site in East Jerusalem requires a security fence, guard posts with armed security personnel, projectors, and often closed-circuit cameras, plus a provocative Israeli flag. In their wake come the Border Police with their jeeps, who patrol the site and are a constant irritation to Palestinian residents. Whenever Jews leave their home in the Old City, they are escorted by a pair of armed security guards, attesting to the provocative nature of the way in which settlers mark their presence there.

This entry focuses on actions by settler groups in the heart of East Jerusalem's Palestinian population. It does not deal with the twelve major settlements built in the eastern half of the city that are a well-known and thoroughly documented phenomenon, but with the blocs of houses being built in the midst of the Arab population in Jerusalem's Old City and in the surrounding neighborhoods.

The settler project is a well-thought-out attempt to thwart future peace plans. Quietly and furtively, Israel's government is using the settlers to seal the last loopholes through which peace could conceivably occur and is creating indelible facts that preclude any Palestinian authority in the city. It is not certain whether the string of settlements will manage to significantly modify East Jerusalem's character, but what is certain is that they are capable of sabotaging any form of peace agreement. Both the Israeli government and the Palestinians are aware that when the belt of colonies encircles the city and settlers have taken possession of sites that are important to Islam, East Jerusalem will be unable to function as the capital of a Palestinian state.

Several settler associations operate in East Jerusalem, the most notable being ATERET COHANIM, BEIT OROT, ELAD, and Shimon Ha'Tzadik. Pivotal figures in those associations are Matti Dan, David Beeri, Arieh King, BENYAMIN ELON, Avi Maoz, Meir Davidson, Rabbi Elhanan Bin-Nun, and Rabbi Shlomo Aviner. Their major efforts are focused on the Old City and the area of Silwan, which they call Ir David (City of David), and other neighborhoods surrounding the Old City—from Wadi Kadum in the south to SHAYKH JARRAH in the north. All the organizations collaborate in a framework known as the JERUSALEM FORUM, which provides a linkage among the groups working to Judaize East Jerusalem, including the messianic groups hoping to build the THIRD TEMPLE on the TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF.

Types of Land Purchases

In terms of formal affinity, Jewish groups within East Jerusalem consist of three principal types: settler-controlled ideological groups, real-estate ventures by businesspeople, and government initiatives. There is no comprehensive statistical information available on the number of properties acquired by settler associations, because they have not yet occupied some of the properties and Arab middlemen are living in others. Nevertheless, a reliable picture can be put together from the information available, even if incomplete.

Settler-Controlled Areas. Within the Old City's walls, operations are coordinated by Ateret Cohanim, which has taken over thirty-one buildings in the Muslim and Christian quarters, in which sixty families, or some 300 Jews, reside. Most of the buildings are grouped along Al-Wad Street (HaGai Street in Hebrew) near the Damascus Gate; the most famous of them is the symbolic but unused home of former prime minister ARIEL SHARON. In 1990, Ateret Cohanim acquired St. John's Hostel, a large building of fifty-three rooms close to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, although a legal dispute is still pending over settlers' rights to the hostel. More recently, it purchased two hotels near the Jaffa Gate—the Imperial and the Petra hotels, over which legal proceedings continue. The association has submitted plans to build an Israeli enclave in Burj Il Laqlaq, just inside Herod's Gate, one of the northern gates to the Old City. The association also operates outside the walls of the Old City and is behind the unlicensed construction of a seven-story building in the area known as the Yemenite neighborhood on the outskirts of Silwan.

Abetting the settlement process in the Old City is the Company for Rehabilitation and Development of the Jewish Quarter, a subsidiary of the municipality and the national government. In 2001 it published a grandiose plan to build hundreds of homes in the Jewish quarter and on

Mount Zion, as well as several tourism projects, at a cost of $36.4 million. In the project's marketing brochure the objective of the project is stated as "bringing back a strong Jewish presence to the Old City." The trend is to create continuity between the Old City and the rest of Jerusalem by augmenting the Old City with hundreds of housing units for Jews, thus "improving" the demographic balance. A tunnel will be excavated beneath Mount Zion linking West Jerusalem to the WESTERN WALL, and a residential and business center will be built. A promenade is to be built over the roofs of the Arab market, connecting the Jewish quarter with the other islands of Jewish presence scattered throughout the Muslim and Christian quarters. Public buildings are planned on Mount Zion.

The Palestinian neighborhood of Silwan and its surrounding area are the focus of the ELAD association, which was founded in 1986 and in 1991 took over two Palestinian homes in Wadi Hilweh, the Ir David area of Silwan. Today, twenty-seven Jewish families live in ten buildings in Ir David. The association owns another twenty buildings, most of which were seized from Palestinians for settler housing in February–April 2004, and twenty-three families now live there. In all, the number of settler families residing in Silwan is around fifty, comprising some 250 persons. ELAD's official publications reflect pride in having seized more than 55 percent of the area of Ir David. It is believed that many more buildings inhabited by Palestinians have been targeted by ELAD and that the association is poised for the most suitable moment—politically—to take possession of them. In addition, in an area of Silwan that the settlers have renamed the Yemenite neighborhood, Ateret Cohanim members are planning a large Israeli complex.

At the entrance to Silwan, on an 11.5-dunum (2.5-acre) plot known as the Givati Park, a five-story building is planned that would include a banquet hall, a commercial center with a view toward the Western Wall plaza, and an underground car park. Although the investors have shrouded the project in secrecy, it is known that they are members of ELAD.

In the Shaykh Jarrah Palestinian neighborhood, the SHIMON HA'TZADIK ASSOCIATION has established a strong presence in what it has renamed the Shimon Ha'Tzadik neighborhood and has taken over seven buildings from Palestinians that provide homes for around forty people, as well as a yeshiva where another fifty young people study. Across the road are more than twenty buildings to which the association claims ownership, alleging that the land was purchased by the SEPHARDIC Jewish community at the end of the nineteenth century. The community granted power of attorney to the Shimon Ha'Tzadik Association to file a legal claim for the property under the law of right of return. It should be noted that the families currently living in these houses are REFUGEES from West Jerusalem, and were relocated to this area after the 1948 War by JORDAN and UNRWA; they have no recourse to reclaim their West Jerusalem property under Israeli law. At present the court has ruled in favor of the Shimon Ha'Tzadik association in four cases, and the families living in these houses have been evicted; rulings on the remaining houses are pending. The association claims ownership on an additional seventeen dunums (four acres) in the area surrounding Shaykh Jarrah, purchased by an American company named Nahlat Shimon International, and plans to build a complex of 160 housing units.

In July 2009 the municipality approved plans to build thirty-one residential units in the Shepherd Hotel located in Shaykh Jarrah on the road to Mount Scopus. IRVING MOSKOWITZ, a US citizen who is one of the biggest donors to the settler movement, is the developer, and acquisition connections lead to Ateret Cohanim. The plans involve the construction of ninety-plus housing units. Near that location, Moskowitz has also acquired a GREEN AREA, called Kerem el Mufti, comprising sixteen dunums (four acres). No request for a building PERMIT for this area has yet been submitted, possibly out of concern that an application to amend the existing law that preserves green areas would set off an outcry among green organizations. Significantly, this development is one of the links in the chain that connects the Shimon Ha'Tzadik neighborhood to the government complex in Shaykh Jarrah.

The Beit Orot yeshiva is an ideological settlement strategically situated at the intersection between Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives. Founded by Rabbi Benny Elon in the early 1990s, the yeshiva houses eighty students. When Elon was minister of tourism, he transformed the area near the yeshiva into a national park, known as Ein Tzurim, and in 2006 the municipality approved a plan that

includes public buildings and housing units on an overall area of ten dunums (2.5 acres). The plan was submitted by Irving Moskowitz. In 2007, settlers acquired two four-story buildings not far from Beit Orot in the Palestinian neighborhood of A Tur. The site was announced as a new settlement called Beit HaHoshen and, together with Beit Orot, ensures Israeli control on either side of A Tur.

In 1998, Ma'aleh HaZeitim, an Israeli settlement consisting of 132 apartments, was established in the Palestinian neighborhood of Ras al-Amud. An adjacent building, which housed the Judea and Samaria Police Headquarters, a special police force responsible for enforcing Israeli law on settlers, was purchased by Moskowitz and is currently being converted to include an additional 104 units and will be called Ma'alot David. The police station has been moved further into Palestinian areas in the West Bank, into a new facility that was constructed in a politically sensitive area called E1 situated near the settlement of Ma'ale Adumim that threatens to bisect the West Bank.

On the outskirts of Abu Dis, Moskowitz is financing the Kidmat Zion complex, consisting of 340 housing units on a thirty-dunum (seven-acre) plot. Although the plans were approved in 2002 and passed all the statutory committees, construction is on hold due to US pressure stemming from their concern over Kidmat Zion's proximity to the Palestinian parliament building in Abu Dis. Given the collapse of the peace process, however, it is possible that the settlement plans will ultimately be implemented. The settlers have seized possession of two buildings in Abu Dis—one they purchased and another they built—which are intended to stress their presence and safeguard the land from the Palestinians.

There are also several isolated settler buildings throughout East Jerusalem, including in Abu Tor, Musrara, and Jabel Mukaber, where a few families live and operate offices. There are approximately ten such housing units. Other settler properties throughout the eastern half of the city—for example, in the Shuafat–Beit Hanina area—are apparently intended for use as bargaining chips for land that interests the settlers, such as in Silwan and the Old City. The settlers' assumption is that Palestinians living in highly congested areas where building permits are not granted will gladly exchange their homes for more spacious ones in areas where building permits can be more easily obtained.

In addition, several yeshivot (ultra-Orthodox schools) serve the purpose of staking out a Judaic religious presence in every Palestinian neighborhood in the Old City. The most notable are the yeshivot of Aderet Eliyahu, Ateret Cohanim, Ateret Yerushalayim, Hazon Yehezkel, Shuvu Banim, and Torat Haim.

Private Developers. The Nof Zion complex, a settlement located in the Palestinian neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber, is part of a growing trend of settlements built by real-estate developers unconnected with ideological settlers. The development extends over 115 dunums (28 acres) and will eventually contain 350 housing units, a 150-room hotel, and service buildings. Plans have been submitted for a similar project on a 12-dunum (3-acre) plot in Shufat, which would include five buildings of four or five stories each and a commercial center.

A third settlement of this kind was approved in October 2009. Private Jewish real-estate developers will build 398 residential units over an area of 624 dunums (156 acres) near Mar Elias Monastery just north of Bethlehem. The plan was first submitted in 2001, but was then suspended until it was resubmitted in early 2009, with one telling difference—the original name, Bethlehem Gates, was changed to Homat Shmuel, in order to give the impression that it is a suburb of the nearby settlement of Har Homa, which was built in memory of Shmuel Meir. The change obfuscates the fact that it is a new settlement meant to link Har Homa and Gilo, in clear violation of Benjamin Netanyahu's promise to Obama not to change the status quo in Jerusalem.

Government Sources. At the government's initiative, generally that of the Housing Ministry, several complexes are planned for construction in East Jerusalem. In the Givat HaMatos area, a new neighborhood comprising 1,500 homes will soon be constructed. Although the site has been occupied for over a decade by new immigrants and disadvantaged families, it is presented as a new project. Part of the area of Givat HaMatos is land belonging to the Palestinian neighborhood of Beit Safafa.

A vast development project that is partly within the Jerusalem municipality and partly within the West Bank is planned for construction near the Palestinian village of Wallajeh. With 3,500 homes, Givat Yael will be the largest settlement in the Jerusalem area and is intended to be

the link connecting Jerusalem with the Gush Etzion settlement in the West Bank. Government officials have offered plans for 2,000 dunums (about 500 acres) to the Ministry of Interior, while another 1,000 dunums (about 250 acres) are in reserve.

The Housing Ministry is also planning to expand the settlement of Har Homa in two directions: the Har Homa C complex will extend toward Gilo, while Har Homa D will be built on land close to Khirbet Mizmoriya-Nuaman. Together with the Housing Ministry, the Jerusalem municipality is drawing up a framework plan to augment the Jewish presence in the city's southeastern part by creating a wall that would prevent continuity among Palestinian Beit Sahur, Sur Bakher, and the neighborhoods to the south of the city.

In the el-Bustan area in the village of Silwan, the Jewish municipality is planning to build an "archaeological park" where eighty-eight Palestinian buildings now stand, although international pressure has caused the government to temporarily suspend the project. In the Tel-el-Ful area, the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION claims ownership of 200 dunums (50 acres) of land and is pressuring for the evacuation and destruction of the existing buildings to make way for industrial and commercial development.

The planned settlement in Burj Il-Laqlaq near Herod's Gate in the Old City cuts through both the ideological and governmental categories. Although a government initiative, it is designed for the settlers of Ateret Cohanim. Plans show that thirty-three buildings will be erected together with a synagogue that will soar seven meters over the Old City wall, presumably attempting to compete with the DOME OF THE ROCK.

In February 2009, a plan was submitted to the Ministry of Interior for the demolition of the wholesale market located just outside Herod's Gate. This site is to be rebuilt as a tourist complex including 200 rooms and halls, which will undoubtedly fall in the hands of Jewish contractors from Israel or abroad. The site represents one very important link to complete the ring of control around the Old City.

"Green" Settlements

Another method for increasing the Israeli presence in East Jerusalem in sites where residential construction is not an option is transforming extensive swaths of land into "green" and "tourism" areas with an overwhelming Jewish cultural ambience. Transforming open space into parks is specifically aimed at preventing a Palestinian presence or, as the state calls it, the Arab takeover of the land. Typically, in the ensuing stage, Israeli institutions and housing for Israeli residents are built there. But even if no institutions or homes are constructed, public parks are enough to reinforce the Israeli hold over the site. The signposts, guards, and paths in the parks create continuity between Israeli sites, and the architectural style contributes to an extensive network of Israeli sites with political significance and weight. An example of this from the 1970s is Canada Park, a beautiful nature park that is a major tourist attraction for visitors to Israel. It was constructed on the former site of three Palestinian villages—Yalu, 'Imwas, and Beit Nuba in the Latrun area of the West Bank that Israel demolished after the 1967 War—though picnickers and hikers would never know, as the erasure of the Palestinian presence is complete. The JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, with the assistance of the Jewish community in Canada, provided funding for the park. The former inhabitants of the villages, whose population, including their descendants, reaches 30,000 to date, are now REFUGEES and are prohibited from visiting their former homes as well as from visiting and preserving three Muslim cemeteries that remain intact but in poor condition after the destruction.

The project to create Israeli parks in the Jerusalem area has been managed by the public parks authority in the Jerusalem District, headed by Evyatar Cohen, who lives in the settlement of Ofra and is a former employee of ELAD. Thus the government's goals are the same as the settlers'. For example, the parks authority declared the area of land known as Tzurim Park in the A-Swanna neighborhood a national park, which has been fenced off by the municipality to prevent Palestinian owners of the land from building there. The state accomplishes two goals simultaneously in designating this land as Tzurim Park*:* it prevents Palestinians from building on the land, and it gains control of the land without expropriating it and without compensating its owners.

Another project that uses natural and scenic values to bolster the Israeli presence in the Old City is being implemented by the East Jerusalem Development Company—another of the municipality's subsidiaries. Costing 75 million shekels ($20 million), this project entails designing a

national park composed of fifteen separate areas, located from A Tur via the King's Valley (Silwan), the Sultan's Pool, the Lions Gate, Mount Zion, and up to the foothills of the Mount of Olives, all connected by a network of paths. A brochure outlining the project demonstrates the merging of tourism with political considerations: "due to the deteriorating situation of the tourism infrastructure, resulting from wide-scale illegal construction and squatters, rapid action is necessary to preserve the area's status as a tourist attraction," although much of this deterioration is due to a lack of municipal budgeting for Palestinian areas. The government has defined the project as a "national mission," which, as stated before, means more than planting trees and placing park benches—something more political and ambitious. When interviewed by a local newspaper, the development company's spokesperson used the phrase "the battle for Jerusalem," which has the short-term goal of preventing Palestinian construction and the long-term objective of emptying the city of its Palestinians. These projects should therefore be considered as constituting further tools for the takeover of the city, and as an integral part of the overall settler plan.

Methods for Acquiring Property

Settlers acquire Palestinian properties in East Jerusalem by using three methods: legally purchasing the property, taking over absentee property, and arranging business deals with Palestinians. In the first case, Palestinians are offered exorbitant sums of money for their property, making it very difficult for them to resist the temptation to sell. A brochure published by Ateret Cohanim targeting potential donors offers sums between one and two million dollars for relatively small properties.

The second way is through the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY, a body subordinate to the Justice Ministry. The ties between the custodian and the settlers were revealed in 1992 when YITZHAK RABIN's government set up a state commission headed by Haim Klugman, then director-general of the Justice Ministry. According to the KLUGMAN REPORT, in the 1980s the custodian regularly and clandestinely transferred to the settlers properties belonging to Palestinians who were allegedly absentee owners. First the custodian declared a property "an absentee-owned building," on the basis of information and documents given him by the settlers. Without thoroughly examining the veracity of the documents, he then transferred the property, in a circuitous process, to the settlers. Although these dealings were ended for a time, the practice has not completely stopped.

In the last case, settlers exploit vulnerable persons who are more easily convinced to sell their properties. First, a member of a Palestinian family who is involved in criminal activity is willing to sell everything he can for financial gain. People like these are easy prey and can be tempted without special efforts. Second, in properties where a HOUSE DEMOLITION order is shortly to be carried out, usually due to lack of a building permit, the Palestinian owners face the alternative of selling their home to settlers or losing everything. In such cases, municipal inspectors pass on information to the settler associations concerning homes about to be destroyed and dispatch an Arab broker who closes the deal on the settlers' behalf. Third, families who have fallen into debt and must sell their property to remain solvent are also easy prey for the settlers. This has been a common phenomenon over the past few years, particularly since the Second INTIFADA, when the Palestinian economy collapsed and many workers in the construction, hotel, hospitality, and other sectors lost their jobs. Trade and tourism also slumped because of the security situation, severely harming the livelihood of many families in East Jerusalem.

When seizing buildings, the settlers typically use a Palestinian COLLABORATOR from a village, who usually is a new resident in the neighborhood, not from the neighborhood, and in economic straits that make him unable to buy or even rent a place of comparable size. By operating through a collaborator, the settlers avoid arousing a seller's suspicion that his house is being purchased by Israelis. The new resident continues living in the building until the settlers decide the time is ripe to seize the building themselves. Until then, the collaborator lives for free.

Another source of real-estate transactions has involved the GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH. Although this highly sensitive issue has not been thoroughly clarified, the Greek Orthodox patriarch has himself sold or enabled others to sell church property to both the Israeli government and settler associations. In the Old City such a transaction occurred in connection with St. John's Hostel, the Imperial and Petra hotels, and a string of shops close to the Jaffa Gate. In at least one case, the transaction was

executed by Richard's Marketing Corporation, a straw company headquartered in the Virgin Islands that is represented in Israel by attorney Yossef Richter. Church sources also sold a large building in the A Tur neighborhood to settlers and a substantial plot of land near the Mar Elias monastery. In his November 2005 petition for recognition from the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, Orthodox patriarch Theophilos III declared that he accepted the state of Israel's condition that it recognizes his appointment based on his authorizing land transactions. Later, the patriarch maintained that government pressure forced him to make the statement.

The settlers also are working for the "reclamation" of land they claim is STATE LAND, as well as of land privately owned by Jews. Arieh King, one of the most prominent individuals in settler circles and chairman of the Jerusalem branch of the MOLEDET PARTY, maintains that the state owns 3,000 dunums (740 acres) in East Jerusalem and that a further 702 dunums (173 acres) are privately owned by Jews, although these figures cannot be verified. For the most part, State Land is owned by the Jewish National Fund and the majority of the land is in the north of the city—in Atarot, Qalandiya, Neveh Ya'akov, and K'far Aqub—while the land privately owned by King and Moskowitz is in Anata, Beit Hanina, Shuafat, and Abu Dis. King maintains that much of that land is in separate blocs registered in the Land Registry; for example, a 160-dunums (39-acre) bloc is in the Beit Hanina area, which was bequeathed to the Hebrew University by a man named Nahum Honig. But ownership of only 96 dunums (23 acres) of that land has been identified. King is energetically working for the destruction of Palestinian houses on land he maintains is state owned and for what he terms "fulfilling Jewish sovereignty in those areas." (See the SILWAN entry for a detailed discussion of the work of a collaborator.)

Settler Ideology

The ideology that motivates the settlers in East Jerusalem is a combination of messianic and nationalistic ideas and thus differs little from that of settlers elsewhere in the West Bank—especially those in HEBRON, KIRYAT ARBA, and the GUSH EMUNIM. Their primary goal is to redeem the land in East Jerusalem and hand it over to the Jewish people. An Ateret Cohanim advertisement defines its goal as engaging in "buying, renovating and introducing new Jewish tenants into houses and properties in and around the Old City, plot by plot, home by home, step by step, a little at a time." Fueled by a radical interpretation of religious commandments and the sense of a divine plan guiding their work, they consider their activity in East Jerusalem a mission that fulfills not only the nation's supreme goals but also the divine will. It is a belief that imbues their life with significance and fills them with pride. Those sentiments were borne out by a settler from the City of David complex who reported, "Living here is a huge privilege! It means living in a place with immense value, not only archaeological and historically, but a place with inner spiritual value, it really is the Holy Land. Living here means being plugged into eternal values." In the settlers' world of metaphors, they are actively planning to establish a Kingdom of Israel in which Jewish religious law will supersede secular law and democratic values. As a result, they are ready to sacrifice a safe and comfortable life for the sake of the overarching goal. That integration of nationalistic and messianic ideas makes for a highly inflammable situation in Jerusalem.

Beyond religious motivations, the underlying political intentions are clearly visible. The settlers want to, as noted, create "facts on the ground" that will render impossible any future division of Jerusalem. The website of Ateret Cohanim states this openly: "Determination and collaboration with the authorities have proven the old method of ZIONISM—it is Jewish settlement that determines the borders of the state!" Aryeh King, one of the instigators of the Ras al-Amud complex, has remarked that its construction was aimed at protecting Jerusalem by creating a buffer on its eastern side. After seizing sixteen houses in Silwan, a member of ELAD said that the association's plan is "to unite Jerusalem with deeds, not words."

In tandem with the physical Jewish presence itself, the settler associations have educational and informative activities, including tours, lectures, and seminars, that are part of the battle for the hearts and minds of the broader Jewish population. Also intended to promote beliefs in Israel's history, the settler associations are involved in ever multiplying ARCHAEOLOGY digs in and around the Old City. Of these, potentially the most inflammatory is the dig being carried out in the Muslim quarter near the Muslim shrine of al-Haram ash-Sharif. Intended to reveal concrete evidence of Jewish history even where there is none, the excavations damage traces

of other historic periods that do not match the ideological aspirations of the untrained settler "archaeologists" directing the work. Even more dangerous are the constant attempts to reach the remains of the Temple. Since 2003, the Western Wall Heritage Foundation, a governmental agency working in close collaboration with Ateret Cohanim, has been carrying out an extensive archaeological project on El-Wad Street, only meters from the AL-AQSA MOSQUE and the Dome of the Rock, a project liable to plunge Jerusalem into violence if these two sacred Islamic sites are damaged. The settlers do not conceal their opinion about what should happen on the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif, and they are generating personal ties with messianic organizations intent on destroying the al-Haram ash-Sharif and building the THIRD TEMPLE in its place. For the settlers, a war between the Muslim world and the state of Israel, following damage to the Haram, is considered a phase in the biblical War of Gog and Magog, which will hasten redemption. They dream of bringing redemption closer by whatever means, so that the coming of the Messiah, Son of David, will expedite the establishment of the Kingdom of Israel.

Funding Sources

Both state and private sources fund the settlers' operations in East Jerusalem. The governmental sources are clouded in secrecy and pass through various government ministries under confusing names. Until 1992 the state transferred absentee property and vast sums to the settlers through different ministries, in particular the Housing Ministry. The Klugman Report (1993) estimated that the government transferred around $8.2 million to the settlers to buy buildings and an additional $12.8 million for renovating old buildings. The report also disclosed that the Jewish Quarter Renovation Company transferred $1.7 million to the settlers in the form of monies originating in the Housing Ministry. A $7 million transfer was also made to the Imanuta Company to facilitate the acquisition of St. John's Hostel in the Christian quarter. However, following Klugman's report, the pipeline through the Housing Ministry was significantly narrowed. Currently the state provides support to the settlers in two ways: it finances the security companies at an annual cost of 40 million NIS ($10 million) and also employs many of the settlers as security guards and in managing the City of David archaeological site.

Regarding the purchase of the Petra and Imperial hotels, it is noteworthy that the state refuses to disclose to the church's legal counsel the transaction's financing sources, which raises concerns about whether state funds are still making their way to the settlers. It is equally hard to distinguish the private donors because they demand anonymity. Best known is Moskowitz, who has become the financial patron of the East Jerusalem settlers and around whom a group of Jewish millionaires from the UNITED STATES have formed and who generously support the settlers. Another well-known figure is US billionaire Ira Rennert of Brooklyn, who is a major supporter of the Ateret Cohanim association and, among other things, funded the opening of the WESTERN WALL Tunnel. Money also flows from US Christian fundamentalist groups, who are anxious for the fulfillment of biblical prophecy (i.e., the return of the Jews, the construction of the Third Temple, and the second coming of the Messiah). On several occasions, state organizations have actively helped to raise funds for the settlers' associations. While serving as mayor of Jerusalem, EHUD OLMERT addressed an event organized by Moskowitz that was aimed at raising funds for building projects in Ras al-Amud.

The Case of Silwan

Silwan is one of the Arab neighborhoods around the Old City where it is difficult for a Palestinian to receive a building permit. Because of its archaeological sensitivity, building is not allowed—neither on plots of land nor as additions to existing buildings. Palestinian residents who enlarge their homes by constructing annexes or additional stories are fined and the additions demolished. However, over the past few years, several Jewish enclaves have sprung up without receiving building permits, and the municipality has not halted their construction or removed the buildings. Three recent cases throw light on the contrast between the treatment of Palestinians and Jews who live in the same neighborhood.

In early 2002, construction began on a seven-story building in the middle of Silwan, but it was only "discovered" in June the following year when the building was occupied by the Ateret Cohanim association. Though registered in a local resident's name, the plot had been sold to Ateret Cohanim settlers, who paid for the construction work. When the lack of a permit was discovered, the munici-

pality took no action but instead left matters as they were, citing the grounds that it was not clear "who the owners of the building were." From 2003 until March 2004, city hall investigated the matter but refrained from filing charges against the tenants. In the same period, the municipality issued dozens of demolition orders against Palestinian homes that lacked permits and brought them to trial. Similarly, the municipality refrained from charging the Ateret Cohanim building's tenants the *arnona* (municipal tax). The manager of the Billing Division wrote in March 2005 that no records were kept concerning the building, which contravenes internal procedures that require city inspectors to report any new building to the billing division, so it can bill for *arnona*—even if it is illegal.

In the second case, criticism regarding the discrepancy between the treatment of Israelis and Palestinians emanated from the legal establishment. Presiding over the district court, Justice H. Lahovtzky revoked an administrative demolition order against a building owned by Palestinians because the municipality discriminated in failing to file indictments against Israeli neighbors for the same offense. As soon as the lack of a permit was discovered, the Arab-owned building received an administrative demolition order. In contrast, a building intended to serve as an ELAD association yeshiva, with three stories, only received a cessation-of-work order. In dismissing the charges filed by the municipality, the judge commented that, while the two offenses were identical, the municipality applied the most stringent procedures permitted by the law against the Palestinian-owned building while it "chose to act in a more lenient judicial way" against the Israeli-owned building. The judge concluded: "Whatever the ownership of the two buildings and whatever the designated purposes of both buildings the difference in the procedures applied by the respondent [the municipality] towards the two is discordant and insufferable to such an extent that the court can no longer disregard it."

The third case involves an open space on the way to the Siloam Pool, where, in 1998, a mini-settlement started to grow composed of mobile homes and guard posts. Though temporary in nature, that sort of construction is prohibited under the Planning and Building Law, and Palestinians who place mobile homes on sites immediately receive evacuation or demolition orders. Nevertheless, for years the municipality refrained from issuing any kind of order against the settlers. In February 2002 a file was opened, and in October 2004 the district court handed down its ruling. Then, at the last moment, the settlers' attorney produced a document stating that the complex was not, in fact, owned by ELAD but by an Arab named Yussuf Gamal, who holds a British passport, and the indictment should be in his name, not the settlers'. The court agreed and indicted Gamal. The ploy of settlers registering a property in the name of Arabs is an old story at the municipality. Moreover, the municipality's behavior raises questions about the ties between the settlers and the municipal authority.

See also Absentee Property Law; Abu Dis; A Tur; Demography; Holy Basin; Jerusalem; Klugman Report; Musrara; Old City; Ras al-Amud; Sasson Report; Settlements; ShaykH Jarrah; Silwan; Third Temple Movement

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—Meir Margalit

Settler Violence

Settler violence against Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES is a widespread and ongoing phenomenon that began during the early 1970s with the first settlers and has continued unabated. The scope and intensity of settler violence surged during the Palestinian uprisings of the First INTIFADA (1987–1993) and increased again dramatically during the AL-AQSA INTIFADA (2000–). Between 9 December 1987 and 18 March 2001, Israeli settlers killed 119 Palestinians, of whom 23 were minors. Between 30 December 2001 and 30 December 2008, settlers killed 45 Palestinians. In thousands of other incidents, settlers have wounded Palestinians, caused extensive property damage, and committed a variety of acts of vandalism. The essential objective of the violence and harassment is to intimidate the Palestinians to such an extent that they will leave voluntarily.

The Israeli government at all levels has afforded tacit support to the settlers who engage in this behavior. Various Israeli bodies, including the KARP COMMISSION, the SHAMGAR COMMISSION, and numerous detailed reports from B'TSELEM, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, have censured law enforcement policy and the judicial system in cases of violence against Palestinians. Each stated that Israel's law enforcement authorities—the military, the police, the state prosecutor, and the court system—have adopted an undeclared policy of absolution, compromise, and mitigation for Israeli citizens who harm Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and that this attitude has emboldened the settlers to continue their attacks.

Violence Dating to Early Days

From the earliest days of the settlement project, the Israeli government authorized settlers to carry weapons, and the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) issued Uzi and M-16 assault rifles to early settlers. As the settlement enterprise became more firmly established and the numbers of settlers grew, the IDF expanded its institutionalized security role for the settlers. In June 1988, soon after the outbreak of the First Intifada and increased confrontation between settlers and Palestinians, Defense Minister YITZHAK RABIN authorized "civilians living in the territories who see Arabs holding petrol bombs . . . to shoot at them." He reportedly said that civilians can shoot in response to other unspecified "imminent dangers." Less than a week before the

1994 massacre of 29 Palestinians in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON, Minister of Police Moshe Shahal announced the formation of civil guard units in all major SETTLEMENTS to provide security in the Occupied Territories. The first of the units was established in the settlement of MA'ALE ADUMIM, east of JERUSALEM, in December 1993. These "organic military units," composed of settler-residents, were granted authority to detain Palestinians but only within settlement confines. The IDF provided settlers with weapons, training, and equipment as part of a program aimed at increasing settler participation in military security operations.

A more recent development is armed patrols that act on their own initiative and are not part of any official framework and not subject to the IDF or the Israel Police Force, although sometimes given unofficial cover by them. The patrols focus on the areas around NABLUS, in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, and the settlements around Ramallah and Gush Etzion. In addition, settlers established independent guard posts on the Qalqiliya BYPASS ROAD between Kedumim and Alfe Menashe.

Amos Harel described this phenomenon in *Ha'aretz*: "Also acting within this Wild West are the settlers. Their regional defense army units are at least subject to military command. The armed patrols operating now in four sectors in the WEST BANK and in the Jordan Valley do not receive instructions from anyone. The IDF, like the government, does not dare prevent the patrols from operating." Settler violence takes many forms. By definition, the phenomenon is Jewish settlers, individually or in organized groups, carrying out attacks on Palestinian persons and Palestinian property. The most severe result, of course, is loss of life. In August 2005, for example, Asher Weisgan shot dead four Palestinian employees at the Shilo settlement—two he was driving home after work. Prosecutors said he had hoped to stop Israel's withdrawal from the GAZA STRIP by diverting resources to the West Bank to quell unrest. Weisgan was convicted of murder, but he is one of few settlers who have been so punished, and it remains to be seen if he will serve his full sentence.

In addition to murder, other settler actions against Palestinians include beating, hurling stones, chasing stone-throwers and firing at them, abusing merchants and owners of market stalls, destroying their goods and ruining produce, hurting Palestinian medical crews, and attacking journalists. Settler violence also involves killing livestock; poisoning wells; destroying crops; uprooting trees; torching automobiles, trucks, and homes; burning mosques; shooting solar panels and WATER storage tanks on the roofs of buildings; shattering windowpanes and windshields; preventing farmers from getting to their fields; and preventing Palestinian vehicles from using the roads. During the olive-picking season, when many Palestinians are at work in the orchards, settler violence increases. This violence takes the form of gunfire that prevents Palestinians from harvesting their crops, causes destruction of trees and theft of the olive crops, and sometimes results in casualties among the Palestinian olive pickers. In 2008 the IDF began refusing permission to Palestinian farmers to harvest in order to "protect them" from the settlers in nearby settlements. In retaliation for Palestinian attacks on settlers, settlers also engage in mass rioting. The riots involve large numbers of participants, are anticipated by the security forces, and are committed openly. Many of these riots occur in broad daylight, sometimes in front of television cameras. In most cases, the settlers attack by the tens or hundreds.

Some acts of the settlers have caught the attention of international organizations. For example, in April 2005, Amnesty International issued a special report calling "on the Israeli authorities to investigate recent incidents of poisoning of Palestinian fields and the increasingly frequent attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian villagers in the West Bank. . . . In recent weeks, toxic chemicals have repeatedly been spread on fields located near the villages of Tuwani, Umm Faggara and Kharruba in the southern Hebron region."

Israeli Response to Violent Offenses

Over the years, law enforcement in the Occupied Territories against settlers who have harmed Palestinians has been severely criticized. The 1982 report of the commission headed by Deputy Attorney General Yehudit Karp indicated serious defects in the manner in which Israeli authorities enforced the law against Israeli civilians suspected of committing offenses against Palestinians. That same year, the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT also sharply criticized the failures of the police in investigating Palestinian complaints.

The Karp Commission's conclusions included the following:

- The police failed to honor its commitment to the High Court of Justice in showing vigilance regarding violence in sensitive locales and preventing unlawful actions.
- The number of cases that police closed on grounds of "offender unknown" was inordinately high, and in some cases the police did not make a significant effort to locate the offenders.
- The police were lenient with settlers who refused to cooperate under interrogation.
- Investigation results showed that the police were ambivalent in their investigations.
- The police rarely questioned eyewitnesses, making the investigations one-sided.

Studies conducted subsequent to the Karp Commission indicate that the police have not implemented the commission's recommendations. For example, in 1985 the Palestinian Human Rights Information Center released research on 23 cases in which Palestinians were killed and settlers were the suspected perpetrators. In all 23 cases, only one settler was tried. Similarly, Knesset member Dedi Zucker studied 40 police investigations of offenses committed by Israeli civilians against Palestinians and found that suspects were tried in only 5 cases. B'Tselem's 1994 report indicated a similar situation. From a sample of 158 cases in which Israeli civilians had injured Palestinians or damaged their property, only thirty-two indictments were filed.

The 1994 Shamgar Commission, established following the massacre of twenty-nine Palestinian worshipers by settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN, concluded that law enforcement against settlers in the Occupied Territories was a failure and that over the years no measures had been taken by the Israeli government to improve it. The commission said that law enforcement failed to investigate incidents in which settlers were involved and was inadequate in prosecuting the settlers to the extent of the law.

In 1988, for the first time, procedures were formulated to regulate the division of powers between the police and the military in matters relating to law enforcement against settlers. In practice, however, these procedures have virtually never been implemented. Ten years later, in 1998, Israel's attorney general instituted a new procedure for "enforcing law and order on Israeli offenders in YESHA [an organization that represents settlers]," which was formulated together with the IDF, police, and the General Security Service. However, it too has not proven effective.

The settler practice of blocking roads illustrates this problem. The practice, which takes place throughout the West Bank for months at a time, involves prohibiting Palestinians from using West Bank roads. The IDF and the police almost never take action against individuals who block roads, although these illegal and violent actions are committed openly and during daylight hours. For example, in response to information that a road blockade had been set up by armed settlers south of Nablus, the IDF spokesperson stated, "The IDF has no orders for settlers to set up ROADBLOCKS." Yet, no real effort was made to combat the phenomenon. An article in *Ha'aretz*, an Israeli daily newspaper, described a roadblock in Gush Etzion by settlers from Neve Daniel*:* "Armed settlers prevented Palestinian vehicles from traveling toward Jerusalem, and threw stones at cars whose drivers did not obey. IDF officers and police stood aside and did not intervene. One of the offenders did not hesitate being interviewed for the newspaper article, with his name being mentioned, indicating his lack of fear that action would be initiated against him. The blocking of roads is organized and on more than one occasion, has been announced in the MEDIA." Another example involves the handling of the case in which Fahed Bachar 'Odeh was killed by a settler on 7 October 2000. In a letter sent to B'Tselem on 30 January 2001, the police contended that they had no record of this incident even though the press and IDF had reported the event. An announcement by the IDF spokesperson, given a day after the incident, stated that during "Palestinian and Israeli disturbances" in the West Bank, "a Palestinian was shot and killed by a resident from the area of Bidia Village." No investigation into the murder was ever initiated.

Of the 119 Palestinians killed by settlers between 1987 and 2001, 29 were killed in the al-Ibrahimi Mosque by Goldstein, who was himself killed during the incident. Of the remainder, B'Tselem's research found:

- In six homicides the police did not open an investigation.
- In 39 cases, the investigation file was closed (fifteen files were closed by the police and twenty-two by the State Attorney's Office, while two other files were closed by the military). The vast majority were closed on grounds of "offender unknown" or "lack of evidence." Five files were closed because of "lack of culpability."

- Of the 22 cases in which the defendants were convicted, six were convicted of murder. The others were convicted of lighter offenses: seven for manslaughter; seven for causing death by negligence (five of whom had initially been charged with manslaughter); and two for firing in a residential area, possession of a weapon without a permit, and endangering persons on a roadway.
- Four of the six settlers convicted of murder had their sentence reduced, by pardon or shortening of the sentence by Israel's president or when the Parole Board reduced the sentence by one-third.
- The sentences of seven settlers convicted of manslaughter ranged from eighteen months to four years of imprisonment. In another case, the defendant was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison and another to six months of public service.
- Five of the seven settlers convicted of causing death by negligence were sentenced to public service. The two others were sentenced to five months and to eighteen months of imprisonment, respectively.
- In the other cases, 9 are still unresolved, and in 5 cases the defendants were acquitted.

In 2005 a new Israeli human rights group, YESH DIN, emerged with the specific objective of enforcing the laws against settlers who engage in violence against Palestinians. In June 2006, twenty-four years after the Karp Commission report, Yesh Din released a 148-page report based on 92 cases, entitled *A Semblance of Law*. Among its findings are the following:

- Ninety percent of the police investigations dealing with settler violence end in failure. Most of the files are closed on grounds of "lack of evidence" or "perpetrator unknown," and a significant percentage of complaints filed by Palestinians are "lost" and thus not investigated.
- The IDF repeatedly shirks its law enforcement responsibilities in the territories. Often IDF soldiers do not prevent Israeli civilians from committing criminal acts and almost never arrest them.
- Palestinians attempting to file complaints face obstacles from the police, who are often not available to take complaints or refuse to take them, and in many instances the police require Palestinians to present documents before filing a complaint.

Yesh Din explains the high rate of failure in investigations:

- Testimony often was not taken from key witnesses, including suspects and Palestinian and Israeli eyewitnesses.
- In the files examined in which the suspects claimed alibis, none of the claims were verified before the file was closed.
- Police investigators rarely went to the scenes of the offense, and, if they did, they failed to document the scene.
- Live identification lineups with Israeli civilian suspects were rarely conducted.
- About one-third of the investigation files were thin and indicated a hasty closure of the file.
- The decision to close files on grounds of "no criminal culpability" appeared questionable, and the cases appeared to be insufficiently investigated.

Another factor in the issue of settle violence is that Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are subject to military rule, whereas Israeli settlers are subject to the Israeli judicial system and are afforded liberties and legal guarantees that Palestinians are denied. The government has created an extraterritorial personal status for Israeli civilians living in the Occupied Territories, regulations that the Knesset regularly extends under the Israeli local government system of regional councils.

B'Tselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) issued numerous reports from 2007 to 2009 on the continuing settler violence. Several examples from their reports:

- March 2007. "In a new settlement in the heart of the a-Ras Palestinian neighborhood in Hebron the Palestinian residents have suffered great harm and extensive infringement of their human rights . . . settlers attacked Palestinians . . . includ[ing] beatings, blocking of passage, destruction of property, throwing of stones and eggs, hurling of refuse, glass bottles, and bottles full of urine, urinating from the settlement structure onto the street, spitting, threats, and curses. . . . The soldiers and police who witnessed attacks failed to take sufficient action to

stop the attacks and enforce the law. At times, they did nothing. . . . Palestinians who sought the aid of security forces standing at the site of the attack were told that their only duty was to protect the settlers. . . . Violence against Palestinians by soldiers and police. . . [in] the a-Ras neighborhood . . . has included beatings with rifles or hands, frightening Palestinians by firing blanks or by threatening live gunfire, destruction and theft of property, blocking of passage, and swearing and making racist comments."

- 22 March 2007. "Police severely beat S'adi J'abri, 18, a resident of Hebron, and then handed him over to soldiers who, along with a settler, continued to beat him."
- 24 July 2008. "Settlers assaulted Palestinians in the area of Yitzhar and damaged orchards and property. . . . Settlers assaulted shepherds and torched houses in Burin burning them to the ground, and a settler threw stones at a vehicle driving on Route 60 severely wounding a woman and her daughter."
- 18 September 2008. "Settlers threw stones at Palestinian vehicles at the Shilo intersection, torched olive orchards . . . and some twenty masked settlers assaulted farmers, causing serious damage to their farms."
- October and November 2008. In Hebron "settlers . . . repeatedly assaulted Palestinians living nearby and their property. . . . includ[ing] stone throwing, setting fires to fields and homes. . . . Security forces entered the village and attacked the Palestinians, using crowd control measures and gunfire. . . . As a result, Palestinians were injured and much damage was done to Palestinian property."
- 4 December 2008. "Dozens of settlers enter[ed] a Palestinian neighborhood in Hebron and the security forces enabled them to assault Palestinians. . . . [They] fired at members of one family, injuring two of them."
- 22 June 2009. "Settlers uprooted around 150 olive and grape leaf trees in Safa and in the village of Susya settlers set fire to one of the main tents with people inside at four in the morning."
- 21 November 2009. "During the previous week settlers cut down 300 olive and fruit trees in Mureir and 90 olive trees in Burin in the Nablus district."

See also Hebron; Olive Tree Uprooting

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—Julia Pitner

Al-Shafi, Haydar 'Abd (1919–2007)

Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi was one of the most influential and respected leaders in the Palestinian national movement. He was a prominent physician and politician who was head of the Palestinian delegation to the MADRID CONFERENCE. A longtime affiliate of the PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, al-Shafi consistently eschewed ARMED STRUGGLE, recognized Israel's existence, and advocated a TWO-STATE SOLUTION. He was born in the GAZA STRIP and studied medicine at the American University in Beirut, where he joined the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS. He graduated in 1943, returned to Palestine, and worked briefly at a British government hospital in JAFFA. From 1943 to 1945 he served as a medical officer in the Trans-Jordanian Arab Legion. In 1948 al-Shafi ran a medical clearing station in Gaza, working closely with the Quakers to provide relief for the more than 700,000 REFUGEES from the 1948 WAR. When the UN RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA) was established in 1951, he left Gaza for the UNITED STATES, where he studied surgery for two years; he returned to Gaza (then under Egyptian administration) in 1954 and established a private practice. When Israel temporarily occupied Gaza in 1956, it installed a municipal council and appointed al-Shafi as one of its ten members. However, al-Shafi compared Israeli rule unfavorably to Egyptian control and refused to serve on the council.

Al-Shafi was a delegate to the first all-Palestine conference (PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL), which convened in Jerusalem in 1964 and established the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), and served as a member of the first PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (1964–1965). Throughout this time, al-Shafi developed a constituency and political base through the Gaza clinic system, and by 1966 he was the leading PLO figure in the Gaza Strip. During the 1967 WAR, al-Shafi worked as a volunteer at Gaza City's Shifa hospital; at war's end he was temporarily detained by Israel for allegedly supporting the military activities of GEORGE HABASH's POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). Upon his release from prison in 1968, he refused to cooperate with Israel's plans to develop a common INFRASTRUCTURE for Gaza and Israel. As punishment, Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN deported him for three months. In September 1970 al-Shafi was again subjected to DEPORTATION for two months, this time to LEBANON, together with five other prominent members of the Gazan leadership, in retaliation for a PFLP hijacking with which he had no connection.

From 1972 until his death, al-Shafi was a founder and director of the Palestine Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip, providing free medical care and a forum for cultural activities to the refugee population. Because he was critical of the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS between Israel and EGYPT, Israel prohibited him from leaving Gaza and threatened the Red Crescent with closure. In May 1988, during the First INTIFADA, al-Shafi was one of three Palestinians (together with SAEB EREKAT and HANAN ASHRAWI) to participate in ABC-TV *Nightline*'s "Town Hall" meeting from JERUSALEM. In 1991 he led the Palestinian element of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to the Madrid peace conference and subsequently headed the Palestinian negotiating team for twenty-two months in the bilateral Washington talks (1992–1993). In April 1993 he resigned from the negotiations over the issue of Jewish SETTLEMENTS but later resumed his position under pressure from his colleagues. In May 1993, however, he urged the Palestinians to completely suspend their participation in the talks.

Eventually he made a final break with the Palestinian negotiating team over the OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel and was one of the first to predict that the OSLO PROCESS would collapse because it failed to tackle the settlement issue.

In 1996 al-Shafi was elected to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's (PNA) Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), but in October 1997 he resigned from the PLC because the legislature did not have any real power to change the Palestinians' situation. He became one of PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT's strongest critics, calling for more democracy within the PNA, transparency, and a national unity leadership. Al-Shafi was lukewarm toward the US-backed ROAD MAP, believing that the Palestinians should focus on ending settlement activity and only then move step by step to a two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders. Al-Shafi was also commissioner-general of the PALESTINIAN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR CITIZENS' RIGHTS, a founding member of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL INITIATIVE launched in June 2002, and a member of the BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY Board of Trustees.

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Shahak, Israel (1933–2001)

Israel Shahak was a Jewish intellectual in the broad, classical meaning of the term and a moral philosopher, political activist, and chemist. His childhood was spent in Nazi Poland, the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. At the end of the war, he was the only male left in his family. He was liberated from Bergen-Belsen in 1945 and immigrated to Palestine with his mother. As a HOLOCAUST survivor, he dedicated his life to opposing all forms of racism and oppression. Shahak had a distinguished career as professor of chemistry at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he was repeatedly voted the most admired teacher by his students. By the end of his life, he had produced a scholarly body of work that showed the connection between messianic delusions and racial and political ones. During his chairmanship of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, he set a personal example that has been difficult to emulate.

In the 1960s, Shahak's first political steps were in the Israeli League Against Religious Coercion. However, after the 1967 WAR, he disavowed this organization because while his colleagues were using liberal principles to fight against religion, they were silent on the crimes of the Israeli OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories. Shahak quickly evolved from radical opposition to the Occupation to an overall challenge to ZIONISM as a regime based on structural discrimination and racism. Following the 1967 War, Shahak became a leading member of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights and was elected chairman in 1970. He devoted the rest of his life to opposing Israel's inhumane treatment of its Palestinian citizens and oppression of the Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. In 1970 Shahak established the Committee Against Administrative Detentions (CAAD) and always insisted that members of the CAAD work together for the common good. This principle was especially applicable when Shahak brought together activists from the PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY and MATZPEN, despite their ideological differences and the reluctance of the communists to be identified with a group that openly supported the Palestinian national resistance.

Shahak dedicated much of his time to collecting and translating into English articles from the Israeli mainstream MEDIA, which he used as documentary proof for his radical criticism of Zionism. For many years, the *Shahak Papers* were the only valuable resource for any scholar or anyone else abroad who was interested in knowing what was

going on in Israel or who wanted to challenge the Zionist discourse. In his last years, Shahak increasingly focused his public attacks—especially in letters to the *Ha'aretz* and *Kol Hair* newspapers—against the Palestinian national movement and the radical left in Israel. In his eyes, the Israeli left was not critical enough of the Palestinian nationalists, whom he saw as corrupt and authoritarian. For Shahak, the duty of an honest person was, first and foremost, to tell the truth and to unmask the hypocrites, no matter what the political implications and the effect.

Israel Shahak's vision can perhaps best be found in his books, *Jewish History, Jewish Religion,* and *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*. In *Jewish History,* Shahak pointed out that while Islamic fundamentalism is vilified in the West, JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM goes largely ignored. He argued that classical Judaism is used to justify Israeli policies, which he viewed as xenophobic and similar in nature to the ANTI-SEMITISM suffered by Jews in other times and places. In his view, this is nowhere more clearly evident than in Jewish attitudes toward the non-Jewish peoples of Israel and the Middle East. In *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*, Shahak and coauthor Norton Mezvinsky lament the dramatic growth in recent years of Jewish fundamentalism, which manifested itself in opposition to the peace process and played a role in the TARGETED ASSASSINATION of Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN and the murder of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer by the US-born fundamentalist BARUCH GOLDSTEIN.

It troubled Shahak greatly that the lesson many Jews learned from the Nazi period was to embrace ethnocentric nationalism, which had created such tragedy in Europe, and to reject the older prophetic Jewish tradition of universalism. He was particularly dismayed with the organized Jewish community in the UNITED STATES and other Western countries, which promoted ideas of religious freedom and ethnic diversity in their own countries but embraced Israel's rejection of these same values. During his life Shahak was rebuked, spat upon, and threatened with death for his defense of human rights. It was his view that bigotry was morally objectionable regardless of who the perpetrator was and who the victim. Shahak once declared, "The support of democracy and human rights is . . . meaningless or even harmful and deceitful when it does not begin with self-critique and with support of human rights when they are violated by one's own group. Any support of human rights for non-Jews whose rights are being violated by the 'Jewish state' is as deceitful as the support of human rights by a Stalinist."

MICHEL WARSCHAWSKI, one of his Israeli colleagues, wrote of Shahak in an obituary: "I think Shahak was above all one of the last philosophers of the 18th century school of enlightenment, rationalism, and liberalism, in the American meaning of the concept. While rejecting Marxism, Shahak was deeply committed to social justice and to what he called a humanist socialism."

"As a true liberal, he was deeply opposed to any kind of religious coercion against individual life and equally opposed to religious involvement in politics. Shahak, on the other hand, was not only ready to speak out loudly against Occupation, ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTIONS, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and torture, but also ready to act on these issues. He did so with people and organizations that were very far from his own milieu, both socially and ideologically."

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Shahar

Shahar (Dawn Movement), an acronym for Peace, Education, and Welfare, was founded by YOSSI BEILIN, former Israeli justice minister, a leading

dove in the Israeli LABOR PARTY and one of the architects of the OSLO ACCORDS between the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and Israel. Its purpose was to unify the pro-peace groups into a powerful political movement that could stop Israel's march to war and self-destruction. At its founding on 3 June 2002, Beilin told his supporters: "You called me to run, and I call on you to join me in forming a new movement with the goal of uniting the peace camp and guaranteeing that the state will be founded on democracy, social justice, and peace."

Beilin lashed out at Labor Party prime minister EHUD BARAK for the failure of the July 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT among Barak, PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY president YASIR ARAFAT, and US president BILL CLINTON: "Camp David failed because Barak did not know how to negotiate; not because peace is unattainable. If Camp David had been handled properly, this debilitating war [the AL-AQSA INTIFADA] could have been avoided." He blamed Barak for convincing the public that the Intifada began because of the Palestinians' rejection of peace. He called for a peace plan along the lines of the Saudi initiative and the CLINTON PARAMETERS (TWO-STATE SOLUTION and Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines) and said that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the only one with an obvious solution. "Achieving peace is not difficult at all," he said, but entails the Israeli withdrawal from the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, the evacuation of Israeli SETTLEMENTS, and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Beilin's initiative came amid a raging debate within Israel on how to unite the peace camp into an effective political force, one that could defeat the rising right wing. Attempts at achieving this unity had so far failed because of Labor's presence within the national unity government, where it rubber-stamped Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON's most extreme policies, including turning the West Bank into eight BANTUSTANS. After the peace camp's poor showing in the 2003 elections, Shahar merged with MERETZ and the Democratic Choice Party to form YACHAD, which also focused on uniting and resuscitating the Israeli peace camp. In March 2004 Beilin was elected to a two-year term as the first chairman of Yachad. In the 2006 elections Meretz-Yachad won 3.8 percent of the vote, giving it five seats in the Knesset. In the elections of 2009, Meretz-Yachad won 3 percent of the vote, giving it three seats.

See also BARAK'S GENEROUS OFFER; ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES AND SETTLEMENTS

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Shaka'a, Bassam (1930–)

Bassam Shaka'a is a former politician; elected mayor of NABLUS, WEST BANK; and survivor—though he lost both legs—of a TARGETED ASSASSINATION attempt by extremist Israelis. Born to one of the wealthiest and most distinguished families in Nablus, he was the most prominent Palestinian politician in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES during the 1970s and 1980s.

As a young man in Jordanian-occupied Nablus at the beginning of the 1950s, Shaka'a joined the Ba'ath Party, a secular, pan-Arab nationalist party that propounded the unity of the Arab world. For his participation, the Jordanian authorities persecuted Shaka'a, forcing him underground and then into exile in SYRIA, LEBANON, and EGYPT. In 1965 he was permitted to return to Nablus, where he headed the West Bank National Bloc of PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) leaders in the city and was elected mayor in 1976, serving until the Israeli military government deposed him in 1982.

Shaka'a was a dominant figure in the NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE (NGC), a body established in the Occupied Territories to organize nonviolent resistance to the Israeli OCCUPATION. In 1979 the Israeli military issued a DEPORTATION order against Shaka'a after the defense establishment accused him of incitement to murder Israelis. Shaka'a petitioned the order to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, won his case, and returned to Nablus a hero. On 2 July 1980, his car exploded after the settler underground placed a bomb in it. Shaka'a continued to serve as mayor until the Israeli military government deposed him again. Hundreds of individuals from all walks of life came to visit the former mayor, confined to a wheelchair, as Israel kept him under house arrest.

Shaka'a was an early critic of the OSLO ACCORDS and later a vocal critic of the corruption

and cronyism in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), led by YASIR ARAFAT. On 29 November 1999, Arafat put the now-elderly Shaka'a under house arrest, while arresting seven others because of their criticism of Arafat and the PNA.

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Shamgar, Meir (1925–)

Meir Shamgar was a Jewish lawyer and jurist who became president of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. Born in Danzig (Gdansk, Poland), he immigrated with his family to Palestine in 1939. He studied history and philosophy at the Hebrew University of JERUSALEM and law at the Government Law School of London University. During his service in the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES, he attained the rank of brigadier-general and, as the military advocate-general (1961–1968), he wrote the *Manual for the Military Advocate in Military Government.* He subsequently became president of Israel's Supreme Court (1983–1995).

In his *Manual*, Shamgar created the "legal" framework for the Israeli military government in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Written *prior* to the 1967 WAR and Israel's subsequent OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, it outlines the principles of a legal doctrine for Occupation. In what became official Israeli policy, Shamgar determined that Israel would not "occupy" these areas but rather "administer" them and that therefore the Fourth Geneva Convention (pertaining to occupation of conquered territories and their civilian population) was inapplicable (though Israel could choose to abide by certain of its humanitarian considerations). Shamgar further determined that Palestinians would have no inherent legal rights under Israel's administration and that Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the "administered areas" would be legal.

In 2005 Shamgar received the prestigious Democracy Award from the Israel Democracy Institute for his "unique contribution to Israeli democracy in establishing normative administrative procedures, in inculcating the rule of law, in defending human and civil rights and in making law and justice more accessible to the general public." He headed two significant investigatory bodies, both named after him: the SHAMGAR COMMISSION to Investigate the Massacre Perpetrated by BARUCH GOLDSTEIN and the Shamgar Commission to Investigate the Assassination of YITZHAK RABIN. In both cases, the commissions found that a single gunman, acting alone, perpetrated the crime. In the case of YIGAL AMIR, Rabin's assassin, the commission refuted the possibility of more than one gunman and the involvement of some elements of the security services. In Goldstein's case, the Shamgar Commission dispelled arguments that sought to exonerate Goldstein, a settler who murdered twenty-nine Palestinians.

See also ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Shamgar Commission, 1994

Subsequent to the massacre of twenty-nine men at prayer in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON, perpetrated by BARUCH GOLDSTEIN on 25 February 1994, the Israeli government appointed a commission of inquiry headed by MEIR SHAMGAR, president of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. The findings of the Shamgar Commission, submitted in June 1994, included the following:

- Goldstein, a US-born settler, acted alone in planning the massacre, telling no one of his scheme.
- Coordination among the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF), the police, and the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION was problematic.
- The political leadership and security forces could not have predicted the massacre.
- Testimony from survivors referring to IDF assistance to the settlers and grenade explosions during the massacre were found to be contradictory and inconsistent.
- Prior to the massacre, Palestinian residents of Hebron were notified by the *Ez a-Adin Alqass* [sic] through leaflets, loudspeakers, and wall inscriptions to stock up on food, for a large attack on Jews would take place and a CURFEW would probably follow.

Additionally, the commission's conclusions strongly and broadly criticized the authorities' failure to enforce the law in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES against settlers and Israeli citizens who had committed crimes against Palestinians and noted serious defects in the handling of law enforcement. The commission noted that police failed to properly investigate incidents involving settlers and to implement the judicial processes against them. It repeatedly emphasized that general principles of the Israeli criminal procedure law must be applied to police investigations in the Occupied Territories. These principles stipulate that the police must investigate every incidence of a crime and not only when the victim files a complaint. Investigations should only be closed for reasons such as insufficient evidence or "lack of public interest," according to the principles established by the criminal procedure law. The commission recommended clearly defining police unit tasks in the territories, reinforcing police presence in the SETTLEMENTS, and providing a suitable budget. In addition, it recommended improving coordination between military forces in the area and the police to ensure dissemination of information about crimes and military assistance for police investigations.

Subsequent to the Shamgar Commission's recommendations, several measures were taken to rectify deficiencies in law enforcement. Police presence in the area was expanded, a new police district—the Shai district—was created for the WEST BANK, an additional police station was established in Hebron, and a new prayer schedule was set at the al-Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of the Patriarchs for settlers and Palestinians. In addition, shortly after the massacre, the authorities took measures against the settlers, including ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION, restrictions on their freedom of movement, and the banning of the militant KACH and KAHANE CHAI movements, which were declared illegal pursuant to the Ordinance to Prevent Terror. Nevertheless, law enforcement vis-à-vis settlers, and particularly settlers in Hebron, has remained seriously deficient, and SETTLER VIOLENCE in Hebron is among the most egregious in the West Bank.

See also HEBRON AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS; HEBRON CITY; HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA; SETTLER VIOLENCE

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Shamir, Moshe (1921–2004)

Moshe Shamir was a Jewish author and dramatist. Both for the volume of his work and for its direct confrontation with issues of Israeli society, he is considered one of the most important writers of Israeli literature. Born in SAFED, Palestine, he grew up in Tel Aviv, was active in HASHOMER HATZAIR, and lived in KIBBUTZ Mishmar Ha'emek for six years before returning to live in Tel Aviv. After the 1967 WAR, Shamir's left-wing political views were radically transformed, and he became a strong proponent of the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL ideology. From 1977 to 1981, he was elected to the Knesset as a member of the LIKUD PARTY but left the party over its decision to return the Sinai to EGYPT. Shamir was one of the founders of the ultra-right-wing TEHIYA PARTY.

Shamir's literary career began in 1947 as the editor of *Bamahaneh*, the underground weekly of the HAGANA, the Jewish underground military organization, and later the official publication of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES. He went on to write in many genres, including fiction, historical fiction, drama, children's literature, poetry, essays, and literary criticism. For his prolific career and major contribution to Israeli literature, Shamir was awarded the Israel Prize in 1988. Shamir's work directly tackles issues of modern Israeli society through various stages. His early fiction, written immediately before and after the establishment of the state (1948), focuses on the pioneering spirit, which he felt was essential to realizing the Zionist dream. The hero of his 1947 novel, *He Walked the Fields*, for example, is the strong native-born kibbutznik who struggles with issues of family, society, and the army as he demonstrates his dedication to his country. Shamir's laudatory stance toward the young, idealistic Israeli and Israeli society is characteristic of his early work.

Shamir's later work becomes both more questioning and more critical of Israeli norms. His historical novels, written in the 1950s, are metaphors for modern problems of leadership as well as character studies of individuals, such as Alexander Yannai of the Hasmonean era and King David. Other contemporary and later works dwell on problems of class and social structure in Israel,

issues in kibbutz life, and an emptiness in Israeli values. Among his most famous works are *The Frontier* (1966), which examines the moral decline of Israeli values in the 1960s, and the trilogy *Far from Pearls* (1973–1992), which deals with Jewish life in Eastern Europe in the twentieth century.

See also HEBREW LITERATURE

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Shamir, Yitzhak (1915–)

Yitzhak Shamir (born Icchak Jaziernicki) was an underground guerrilla leader during the BRITISH MANDATE, spymaster, parliamentarian, foreign minister, and prime minister of the state of Israel. Born in Ruzhany, Poland (now Belarus), he attended Bialystok Hebrew secondary school, where, at age fourteen, he joined the BETAR youth movement. In 1935 he left Warsaw, where he was studying law, immigrated to Palestine, and enrolled at the Hebrew University. In 1937, opposing the mainstream Zionist policy of restraint vis-à-vis the British Mandatory administration and the Palestinian Arabs, Shamir joined the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI (Etzel), one of the Revisionist Zionist underground organizations. When the Irgun split in 1940, Shamir sided with the most militant faction, headed by AVRAHAM STERN—LEHI (LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL, Fighters for the Freedom of Israel). This group proposed to GERMANY that it would open a military front against the British in the Middle East in exchange for the expulsion of the Jewish population of Europe to Palestine, but the Nazis rejected the offer. In LEHI, Shamir was part of the leadership troika coordinating organizational and operational activities. Israeli author Avishai Margalit describes an incident involving Shamir and Lehi: "In July 1946 British troops surrounded Tel Aviv in an effort to wipe out the headquarters of the Jewish underground fighters, who they assumed were somewhere in the city. Yitzhak Shamir, one of the commanders of the underground Lehi—or the Stern gang—happened to be in Tel Aviv that day, to meet with MENAHEM BEGIN, the commander of the other underground group, the Irgun. Shamir was disguised as an Orthodox rabbi in traditional dress and he used the name Rabbi Shamir. A British detective officer, John Martin, identified him immediately in spite of his disguise and ordered his arrest. That he did so cost the detective his life. Two gunmen from the underground, dressed as tennis players, waited for Martin at the court of his tennis club on Mount Carmel, and there they shot him down."

During Shamir's leadership of LEHI, it was responsible for the 1944 TARGETED ASSASSINATION of Britain's minister of state for the Middle East, LORD MOYNE, and an assassination attempt against Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner for Palestine in the same year. In 1948, LEHI assassinated the UNITED NATIONS representative in the Middle East, COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, who, although he had secured the release of 21,000 Jewish prisoners headed for Nazi extermination camps during World War II, was seen by Shamir and his collaborators as an anti-Zionist and "an obvious agent of the British enemy."

Following the 1948 WAR, which established Israel's independence as a state, Shamir worked for several years managing commercial enterprises, then joined Israel's security services and held senior positions in the MOSSAD, the Israeli intelligence agency, from 1956 to 1965. He returned to private commercial activity in the mid-1960s and became involved in the struggle to free SOVIET JEWS. In 1970 he joined Menahem Begin's opposition HERUT PARTY and became a member of its executive. In 1973 he was elected a member of the Knesset for the LIKUD PARTY, a position he held for the next twenty-three years. During his first decade as a parliamentarian, Shamir was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and in 1977 he became speaker of the Knesset. In this capacity, he presided over the historic appearance of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in the Knesset and the debate that ratified the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS two years later, although he abstained in the vote on the accords, primarily because of the requirement to dismantle Jewish SETTLEMENTS. As minister of foreign affairs from 1980 to 1983, Shamir achieved closer ties with Washington, reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding on STRATEGIC COOPERATION with the UNITED STATES and the agreement in principle on free trade between the two nations. He also initi-

ated diplomatic contacts with many African countries that had severed diplomatic ties during the 1973 oil crisis. After the 1982 LEBANON WAR, Shamir directed negotiations with LEBANON that led to the 1983 peace treaty (never ratified by the Lebanese government).

Following the resignation of Begin in October 1983, Shamir became acting prime minister until the general elections in the fall of 1984. During that year, he concentrated on economic matters (the Israeli economy was suffering from hyperinflation), while also nurturing closer strategic ties with the United States. Indecisive results in the 1984 general elections led to the formation of a National Unity Government based on a rotation agreement between Shamir and LABOR PARTY leader SHIMON PERES. Shamir served as vice premier and minister of foreign affairs for two years, while Peres was prime minister (then the positions were reversed). Subsequently, Shamir served for six years as prime minister, from 1986 to 1992, first heading a National Unity Government and then as head of a narrow coalition government. During the period of his prime ministership in the national unity arrangement, he torpedoed a peace accord known as the London Agreement, or the HUSAYN-PERES AGREEMENT, arranged by Shimon Peres and King Husayn of JORDAN.

Yitzhak Shamir's term as elected prime minister was marked by several major issues: the 1991 GULF WAR, during which Shamir, under enormous pressure from Washington, chose a policy of restraint, and the October 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE, which inaugurated direct peace talks between Israel and the neighboring Arab states as well as multilateral regional talks. Two events overshadowed all other issues on Shamir's public agenda. The first, beginning in 1989, was the victory in the long struggle for Soviet Jewish emigration, which brought 450,000 immigrants to Israel in the next two years; the second was Operation Solomon in May 1991, in which 15,000 Ethiopian Jews were brought to Israel in a massive airlift.

After his party lost the 1992 elections, Shamir stepped down from the party leadership, and in 1996 he also retired from the Knesset. Upon his electoral defeat, Shamir made clear his passionate views on the GAZA STRIP and WEST BANK in an interview he gave to the Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv.* He discussed the Likud Party's commitment to the ideology of the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL, which posits that the entire land of Israel, including the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, belongs exclusively to the Jewish people, and his commitment to expanding the Israeli settlements in these areas in an effort to incorporate the region into the state of Israel. He stated that he viewed the Arabs as a monolithic and implacable entity bent on destroying the state of Israel and "throwing all the Jews into the sea." Shamir dismissed all of the compromises put forward by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and its chairman, YASIR ARAFAT, in November–December 1988, as nothing but a "propaganda exercise" by an eternally terrorist organization.

In May 1989, in the context of the First INTIFADA and under intense pressure from Washington (President GEORGE H. W. BUSH and Secretary of State JAMES BAKER) to come up with something that could contribute to peace, the Israeli prime minister put forward the "Shamir Plan." It called for ELECTIONS in the West Bank and Gaza to select non-PLO Palestinians with whom Israel could negotiate an interim agreement on limited autonomy. The negotiations would be based on the principles laid down in the Camp David Accords. It also stated that there could be no "additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan," reflecting Shamir's and the Likud's position that there already is a Palestinian state, namely, Jordan; that "Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO"; and that "there will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the [Israeli] Government." Hence, the issue of self-determination for Palestinians was negated. The basic premises of Shamir's plan incorporated the "Four No's" of the official Labor Party program: no return to the 1967 borders, no removal of settlements, no negotiations with the PLO, and no Palestinian state. The United States fully endorsed this proposal. Secretary Baker explained, "Our goal all along has been to try to assist in the implementation of the Shamir initiative. There is no other proposal or initiative that we are working with."

In December 1989 the US Department of State released the BAKER PLAN, which mirrored Shamir's proposals and stipulated that Israel would attend a "dialogue" in Cairo with EGYPT and "acceptable" Palestinians (vetted by Israel), who would be permitted to discuss implementation of the Shamir Plan but would not vote or have a

decisionmaking role. Secretary Baker embraced the plan presented by Prime Minister Shamir in 1989, calling it "the only game in town"; however, Shamir reneged on his plan and the Cairo meeting never occurred. Shamir did not generally support negotiations and compromise because he believed that Israel could not retreat from any territory—including all the territory of "Eretz Yisrael." Thus, he opposed the Camp David Accords and Israel's withdrawal from Sinai, and he supported Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. In his peace plan, he reaffirmed this position, knowing that no Arab or Palestinian state or group would negotiate on this basis. That the United States supported it and later put it forward as the Baker Plan demonstrates the extent of American deference to Israel's positions. Moreover, even the limited conditions Shamir offered in 1989 were a pretense, as he admitted some years later, saying, "I would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years, and meanwhile we would have reached half a million people in Judea and Samaria."

Ironically, then, Baker's first initiative for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement was thwarted by the very person who had defined the parameters and determined the prerequisites of the scheme. Nevertheless, the United States soon after attempted to catalyze the peace process with what became the Madrid Conference. Secretary Baker engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy to persuade Israel, the Arab states, and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to attend the Madrid Conference. From March to September 1991, he made eight trips to the Middle East. Israel, opposed to the conference from the outset, made no concessions (except to attend) and greeted each visit by Baker with a new settlement. The Arab states, however, made numerous concessions, which were incorporated into a letter of invitation signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 October 1991.

While essentially eschewing participation in a peace process, Israel was in a very strong position. During the Gulf War, IRAQ had lobbed several Scud missiles onto Israeli territory but, bowing to US importuning, Tel Aviv did not retaliate. Israel promoted itself as a victim and this, combined with the upheaval of the Intifada (the stone-throwing and civil disobedience of which were also presented as a major security threat and further victimization), consolidated the hard-line forces in Israel. The war thus provided Israel with an opportunity to impose its diplomatic framework on any negotiations in which it participated. Ultimately Shamir provided Baker with a list of stipulations, which the United States had to fulfill if Israel was to come to Madrid. It was Shamir, for example, who insisted on two parallel negotiating tracks and on the replacement of an international conference called for in UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, with a regional conference hosted by the United States and the now powerless Russian Federation, although both were congruent with US policy, as was ensuring that the UNITED NATIONS had no substantive role. Baker's preconference diplomacy reflected the administration's strong pro-Israel bias, which involved highly unequal treatment for the Palestinians and dismissal of their fundamental interests. A few examples shed further light.

Baker's acquiescence in Shamir's exclusion of any delegates from the PLO, the DIASPORA, or Jerusalem seriously undermined the Palestinians' ability to credibly press for their rights. The exclusion of the PLO from the Madrid Conference was not a mere formality. Rather it signaled the intention to disarticulate Palestinian national rights, including the right to self-determination in a sovereign state anywhere in Mandatory Palestine and the right of return. By excluding Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, Israel's claim to all of Jerusalem was reinforced.

Discussion of the fundamental issue of OCCUPATION was placed beyond the parameters of debate through the numerous encumbrances built into the conference, including its structure, participants (including the Mandatory joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation), the limits on speech, and the frequency of meetings.

The two-track approach also represented a mechanism for sidestepping the Palestine question as the central issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Issues of arms control, WATER resources, economic development, regional security, and ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, which made up the agenda of the multilateral talks, did not arise out of an ideological conflict between the Arabs and Israel: they derived naturally from the central issue, Palestine.

The transitional period represented another substantive issue packaged as procedural. An unrepresentative segment of the five and a half million Palestinians, carefully chosen to satisfy Israeli requirements and meticulously screened for their willingness to operate within defined constraints, would, after an interim period of limited

autonomy, sit across the table from an Israeli team free of any constraints to negotiate the final status of the Occupied Territories.

With Secretary Baker's acceptance and implementation of Shamir's demands, Israel came to the Madrid Conference, which opened on 30 October 1991, but made no concessions on any issue.

See also JAMES BAKER; GEORGE H. W. BUSH; IMMIGRATION; MADRID CONFERENCE

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Shamir Plan

See YITZHAK SHAMIR

Shaml

Shaml: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Center, located in Ramallah, WEST BANK, is an independent nongovernmental organization dedicated to researching issues related to Palestinian REFUGEES and the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA. It was established in 1994 by a group of concerned academics and human rights activists who wanted to explore issues pertaining to Palestinian refugees in a comparative perspective, encompassing relevant experiences of peoples in other parts of the world. Shaml aims to:

- Raise public awareness, regionally and globally, about the conditions of Palestinian refugees and their basic rights and the problems and difficulties they face.
- Conduct primary research on refugee issues in Palestine and elsewhere, including comparative research in the sociology of migration.
- Help formulate and develop a coherent long-term policy for Palestinian refugees in the context of promoting a greater understanding of their needs.
- Strengthen links between Palestinian communities in the Diaspora and their homeland.

(www.shaml.org/zshaml/site).

Shammut, Isma'il Abdul-Qader (1931–2006)

Isma'il Shammut was the founder of modern Palestinian visual arts and a leading Palestinian painter as well as an art historian. The first Palestinian to enroll in the Cairo College of Fine Arts, he later studied at the Academia de Belle Arti in Rome. He was a prolific and consistent painter of realistic scenes of the Palestinian tragedy and struggle; his paintings, in a variety of styles, deal primarily with the exodus of REFUGEES, civilian massacres, the rise of resistance to Israel, and the *fida'iyyun*, although he also painted idyllic depictions of Palestinian rural life. Palestinian publications have reproduced many of his works, which have become domestic icons of sorts.

Born in LYDDA, Palestine, Shammut was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and, after a tortuous journey, settled in Khan-Yunis refugee camp in the GAZA STRIP. In 1950 he began his studies in Cairo, and in 1953 Shammut had his first exhibition in Gaza City. In 1954 he opened his first major exhibition in Cairo, sponsored and inaugurated by Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR. Also exhibiting at the same time was the Palestinian artist Tamam Aref Al-Akhal, a refugee from HAIFA who originally fled to Beirut and who later became his wife. In 1955 Shammut moved to Rome and the following year to Beirut, where he lived and worked at various artistic and cultural endeavors. In 1969 he joined the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) as director of arts and national culture. In 1983, following the LEBANON WAR, Shammut left Beirut with his family for KUWAIT, but the 1991 GULF WAR and the forced expulsion of Palestinians put Shammut adrift again. This time he migrated to Cologne, GERMANY, but in 1994 Shammut settled in Amman, JORDAN, where he resided until his death.

Shammut exhibited widely in almost every Arab capital, Europe, the UNITED STATES, and elsewhere. He received, among many honors, the Revolution Shield for Arts and Letters, the Jerusalem Medal, and the Palestine Award for the Arts, yet he was often described as a solitary, melancholy, and bitter man. Undoubtedly the

events of 1948 scarred him deeply. After describing the idylls of his youth, Shammut related: "Then there was the *Nakba* [Palestinian exodus] of 1948. I lived through it in excruciating detail; every part of me experienced the *Nakba* as fully as possible. I became a refugee." In his painting *The Rift,* Shammut depicted the Palestinian defeat of 1948 and the establishment of the state of Israel in a graphically symbolic mode: a bride stands at the edge of a great abyss where the land is split in two; on the other side, tortured Palestinians hang and squat, half naked, in chains. He once said, "During the period of dispossession we were in great need of a loaf of bread, the price of which, my father did not possess." For a year, Shammut abandoned his education and worked in Gaza to help with the family's finances. "You want to know what I did? I sold *halawa* [sesame candy]. I was a *halawa* peddler. The lengths and breadths of Gaza I crossed in full, on foot, selling *halawa*."

During the 1953 exhibit in Gaza, Shammut had something of an epiphany: "I saw, clearly for the first time, the extent to which art is capable of affecting the psyche. People would be standing before the paintings, staring at them, and suddenly they would burst out crying as they discovered how another Palestinian human being had managed to express their pain and hope, emphasize their identity and picture their lives. It was then that I made my historic decision that art would be my road and the human side of the Palestinian issue, my subject."

In 1997 Shammut and his wife visited Palestine for the first time since they left. "This visit had a tremendous effect on the two of us; we relived the events of 1948 and their repercussions," he said. "We returned to Amman with the notion of producing something monumental and comprehensive in which to summarize our experience through the last five decades." The project, which took "four years of constant toil," yielded the epic *Al-Sira wal-Masira* (Epic Procession). Shammut said: "These paintings are not for sale; they are our gift to the Palestinian people. The Geneva-based WELFARE ASSOCIATION, which funded the exhibition's journeys over the past year and with which we concluded the deal, has a budget of over $10 million to establish a museum [in Amman, Jordan], and these paintings will be the kernel of the plastic arts department."

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Sharabi, Hisham B. (1927–2005)

Hisham Sharabi was a Palestinian intellectual, academic, writer, and activist. Born into a wealthy family in JAFFA, Palestine, he studied at the Friends School in Ramallah, and in 1947 he received a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the American University of Beirut (AUB). During his years at AUB, he was a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP—founded in Beirut in 1932, it is a secular, nationalist political party in SYRIA and LEBANON and advocates the establishment of a Greater Syrian nation-state spanning the fertile crescent, including Syria, Lebanon, IRAQ, JORDAN, Palestine, Cyprus, KUWAIT, Sinai, southeastern TURKEY, and southwestern IRAN). The group's commitment to Palestine appealed to the young Sharabi, who, in turn, impressed the group's leader with his intellectual acumen. On graduating, Sharabi left for the UNITED STATES to pursue graduate studies; however, in 1948 he put his academic studies on hold and returned to Lebanon, where his family fled after their dispossession from Palestine. Sharabi resumed his activities with the SSNP, becoming the editor of its monthly magazine, *al-Jil al-Jadid* (The New Generation). Soon thereafter, the Lebanese government began to repress the SSNP, and Sharabi fled to Jordan, then returned to the United States. In 1948 Sharabi earned an M.A.

in philosophy and, in 1953, a Ph.D. in the history of culture—both from the University of Chicago. In 1955 he officially ended his affiliation with the SSNP.

Sharabi's first academic position was teaching intellectual history at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., where he was Omar al-Mukhtar Professor of Arab Culture and where he remained until he retired. In 1975, together with several colleagues, Sharabi founded the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown, the only academic institution at the time in the United States focusing solely on the study of the modern Arab world. For twenty-four years, he served as editor of the English-language quarterly *Journal of Palestine Studies*, published by the INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES. After the 1967 WAR, Sharabi again became politically active. In 1970 he moved to Beirut to work in the Palestine Planning Center and was visiting professor at the American University in 1970–1971. The eruption of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, however, thwarted his plans to settle in Lebanon permanently, and he returned to Georgetown University.

In 1977, along with like-minded colleagues and friends, Sharabi founded the Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development in Washington. The fund's original mission was to provide scholarships to Palestinian-Israeli university students for study in Israel, the WEST BANK, and abroad. In 1981 the fund expanded its mission to provide direct assistance for Palestinian educational, cultural, health, and community service institutions. In 1991 Sharabi and the Jerusalem Fund Board of Directors established the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine (later renamed the Palestine Center) to provide a Palestinian/Arab perspective for political, academic, and MEDIA establishments in Washington. In 1979 he founded the Arab-American Cultural Foundation and the Alif Gallery in Washington.

Sharabi is the author of eighteen books, numerous articles, monographs, and conference papers, published in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Unlike most expatriate intellectuals, he maintained a continuous dialogue with the Arab world, with which he charted a new epistemological approach. Some of the books that established this tradition are *Muqaddimat li Dirasat al-Mujtama al-Arabi* (Introduction to the Study of Arab Society), published in 1975; his two-volume autobiography, *Al-Jamr wa al-Ramad: Dhikrayat Muthaqqa Arabi* (Embers and Ashes: Memoirs of an Arab Intellectual), published in 1978; and *Suwar al-Madi: Sira Dhatiyya* (Images of the Past: An Autobiography), published in 1993. Perhaps Sharabi's most well-known work in the United States, published in 1988, is *Neopatriarchy: Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society (al-Nizam al-Abawi)*, which provided an alternative way to understand Arab society and has had a great impact on scholarly and intellectual circles in the Arab world and the West.

The issue of women was one of Sharabi's most crucial concerns. He understood that the oppression of women is the cornerstone of the neopatriarchal system and argued that the liberation of women is an essential condition for overthrowing neopatriarchal hegemony. Sharabi returned to Lebanon to spend his last years.

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Sharansky, Natan (1948–)

Natan (Anatoly) Sharansky is a well-known Soviet human rights activist and dissident. Born in Ukraine, he graduated from the Physical Technical Institute in MOSCOW with a degree in mathematics. For a period he worked as an English interpreter for the human rights activist Andrei Sakharov. Sharansky's human rights work focused mainly on the issue of SOVIET JEWS and their right to immigrate to Israel. In 1973 he applied for an exit visa to immigrate to Israel, which Moscow refused, but Sharansky remained active in Zionist politics. In 1977 he was arrested and accused of treason and of spying for the UNITED STATES; in 1978 he was convicted of these charges and sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment. Sharansky spent sixteen months in Moscow's Lefortovo prison before being transferred to a prison camp in the Siberian gulag.

After his imprisonment, intense high-level international diplomatic efforts were made to secure Sharansky's release, and he was finally freed in 1986 as part of an East-West PRISONER exchange. When he was released on the border of a still-divided GERMANY, the Israeli ambassador met him and presented him immediately with his new Israeli passport under the Hebrew name of Natan (rather than Anatoly) Sharansky. When he arrived in Israel on 11 February 1986, he was greeted by Prime Minister SHIMON PERES and given a hero's welcome.

Many expected that Sharansky would continue his human rights work once in Israel; however, this did not happen and he became a right-wing politician. Prior to his emigration to Israel, Sharansky portrayed himself as a symbol of the struggle for human rights as universal norms, but his activities in Israel have raised questions about his belief in human rights as universal and indivisible. Not only does he oppose any Israeli concessions that could lead to Palestinian self-determination, but he also advocates policies that could lead to the dispossession of Palestinians living in Israel, the WEST BANK, and the GAZA STRIP. In 1988 Sharansky was elected president of the newly created Soviet Jewry Zionist Forum, an organization dedicated to lobbying on behalf of Soviet immigrants. He also served as an associate editor of the *Jerusalem Report.* In 1995 Sharansky created a new political party, YISRAEL B'ALIYA, to represent the interests of Soviet Jewish immigrants. In the elections the following year, the party won seven Knesset seats and Sharansky became minister of industry and trade, a position he held from 1996 to 1999. He served as minister of the interior from July 1999 until his resignation in July 2000, and as minister of housing and construction and deputy prime minister from March 2001 until February 2003. As housing minister, he systematically enlarged SETTLEMENTS on expropriated Palestinian LAND in the West Bank. In February 2003 Sharansky was appointed minister without portfolio, responsible for JERUSALEM, social, and DIASPORA affairs. However, he resigned from the government on 2 May 2005 because of his opposition to Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON's plan for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA. Politically, he is considered right of Sharon, especially on the Palestinian issue. Sharansky has opposed all Israeli concessions that could eventually have led to the creation of a Palestinian state, and he believes that Israel must hold on to all the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

One of the first signs of Sharansky's attitude toward the Palestinians occurred with the so-called Husayni affair. A meeting had been arranged between Sharansky and FAYSAL AL-HUSAYNI, the leader of the Palestinian community in East Jerusalem. Sharansky agreed but at the last moment withdrew, saying that he had not known that al-Husayni belonged to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

In 2004 Sharansky published a book, *The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror*, in which he wrote that the world is "divided between those who are prepared to confront evil and those who are willing to appease it." He wrote that peace between Israel and the Palestinians will prevail only if the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) is transformed into a truly free society, where the Palestinian people's natural inclination toward peace can prevail over the manipulations of their hate-mongering leaders. Sharansky was dismissive of the election of MAHMUD ABBAS as the new head of the PNA on 9 January 2005 and wrote that it would take time to extirpate YASIR ARAFAT's entrenched legacy of hatred. Sharansky believes that true Palestinian democratization might take "many years, even decades," and, in the meantime, that Israel should avoid the fatal mistakes of the OSLO ACCORDS (between the PLO and Israel), especially territorial concessions. Even following a successful Palestinian transition to full democracy, Sharansky would not unambiguously recommend an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, saying only that the final status of the West Bank "must be determined through negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians."

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Sharett, Moshe (1894–1965)

Moshe Sharett (originally Shertok) was an Israeli statesman and Zionist leader. He was the second prime minister of Israel, serving for a little less than two years (1954–1956) between DAVID BEN-GURION's two terms.

Born in Kherson, Ukraine, he immigrated with his family to Palestine in 1906. Sharett's first home was in the Palestinian village of Ein Sinia, where he learned the Arabic language as well as Arab customs and culture. In 1910 Sharett and his family moved to JAFFA, where they became one of the founding families of Ahuzat Bayit, the earliest nucleus of the city of Tel Aviv. He was a member of the first graduating class of the first Hebrew high school in the country, the Herzliya Gymnasium.

Sharett began studying law in Istanbul, TURKEY, but World War I interrupted his studies when the German army operating in Turkey enlisted him as a translator. On returning to Palestine, he worked as an Arab affairs official and LAND purchase agent for the postwar Palestine Jewish Community's Representative Council. He was a member of AHDUT HA'AVODAH (Unity of Labor) and later of MAPAI (Israel Workers' Party). From 1922 to 1924 he studied at the London School of Economics and was active in PO'ALE ZION (Workers of Zion). Then, in 1925 he became deputy editor of the HISTADRUT labor federation's daily *Davar* newspaper, and he edited its English-language weekly until 1931, when he assumed the post of secretary of the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL's Political Department. In 1933, after the murder of HAIM ARLOZOROV, he became head of the department and held the post until the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.

From 1933 until 1948, Sharett was in effect the Zionist movement's ambassador and chief negotiator vis-à-vis the BRITISH MANDATE authorities. His function was to maintain day-to-day contacts with the British in Palestine and to conduct a wide range of public relations activities furthering the Jewish cause before the long series of British commissions of inquiry regarding the status of the region. During World War II, Sharett worked to establish the British army's Jewish Brigade, which provided the postwar lifeline and illegal IMMIGRATION route to Mandatory Palestine for tens of thousands of European Jews. Together with other leaders of the Jewish Agency and of the prestate Yishuv, he was arrested by the British in June 1946 and detained for four months at Latrun prison.

In 1947 Sharett appeared before the UNITED NATIONS General Assembly in the debate over Palestine's partition into a Jewish and Arab state and was one of the signatories of Israel's DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. After becoming Israel's first foreign minister in 1949, he established the nation's diplomatic service, as well as bilateral relations and embassies with dozens of countries. In January 1954 he succeeded Ben-Gurion as prime minister when the latter resigned. However, Ben-Gurion opposed Sharett, who, as a moderate, advocated diplomacy with neighboring Arab states, and he deposed Sharett from the prime ministership. On leaving the top office, Sharett again accepted the post of foreign minister but, because of sharp disagreements with Ben-Gurion, eventually resigned and left the government in 1956. In 1960 he was elected chairman of the executive of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION and of the Jewish Agency for Israel, and he devoted his last years to Zionist and literary activities.

Sharett's central achievement was the development of the methods and machinery of Zionist and Israeli diplomacy. Twenty-five years of his life were devoted to the task of training men for diplomatic work, in particular with the developing nations among whom Sharett believed Israel could play a special role. He was not only a deft politician but also a keen translator of poetry, a powerful public speaker, and a master of the Hebrew language. Upon retirement, he became the head of the Am Oved (Working Nation) publishing house, chairman of Beit Berl College, and representative of the LABOR PARTY at the Socialist International.

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Sharm al-Shaykh Declaration, 1996

The Sharm al-Shaykh Declaration was a statement condemning TERRORISM and supporting the OSLO PROCESS, made by the leaders of thirty-one countries and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) at a conference in Sharm al-Shaykh, EGYPT, that was convened by the UNITED STATES at Israel's behest in March 1996. The immediate reason for the conference was four SUICIDE BOMBINGS carried out by the militant Islamic group HAMAS that killed approximately sixty Israelis. The meeting exclusively focused on Palestinian terrorism and the need for the PNA to restrain Hamas and guarantee Israel's security. Terrorism against Palestinians, whether the February 1994 massacre in HEBRON'S AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE, the ongoing SETTLER VIOLENCE, the government's TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, or other forms of state terrorism, was not on the agenda.

In early January 1996, Israeli prime minister SHIMON PERES gave the General Security Services (SHIN BET) permission to assassinate a Hamas leader, YAHYA AYYASH, who was allegedly the mastermind behind several earlier suicide attacks. On 5 January 1996, Israel killed Ayyash by means of a booby-trapped cellular phone, and Hamas immediately declared him a martyr and promised revenge. Shortly thereafter, Hamas carried out the four bombings.

See also OSLO PROCESS; SUICIDE BOMBINGS; TERRORISM

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Sharm al-Shaykh Fact-Finding Committee

See GEORGE JOHN MITCHELL

Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum, 1999

On 4 September 1999, Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) signed a memorandum of understanding in the Egyptian city of Sharm al-Shaykh, known both as the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum and as Wye II (Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations). Prime Minister EHUD BARAK signed for Israel and President YASIR ARAFAT for the PLO, while the UNITED STATES, represented by Secretary of State MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, sponsored the accord; President HOSNI MUBARAK of EGYPT and King Abdullah of JORDAN witnessed and cosigned the memorandum.

Initially, Barak, who had been elected in May of that year, had decided to put the Palestine question on the back burner and instead pursue a treaty with SYRIA. However, when Damascus failed to capitulate to Israel's demands regarding a final border, Barak turned his attention to the Palestinians, who were unhappy about a series of unfulfilled commitments made by Israel in earlier agreements. Negotiations at Sharm al-Shaykh revolved around reinvigorating the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM and resulted in an understanding that Israel would implement, in three stages, the second redeployment specified in the HEBRON PROTOCOL. The date of redeployment and extent of territory of the third redeployment were left unspecified, but Wye II called for an immediate Israeli redeployment from a further 11 percent of the WEST BANK. The agreement required Israel to begin the release of Palestinian political PRISONERS with an immediate release of 350, to facilitate the construction of a SAFE PASSAGE between the GAZA STRIP and the West Bank, and to permit Palestinian construction of a SEAPORT in Gaza. At the same time, the PNA recommitted to the pledges it made at Wye River to guarantee Israel's security. A timetable for FINAL STATUS TALKS, which would deal with JERUSALEM, BORDERS, REFUGEES, and SETTLEMENTS, set a framework agreement to be achieved by February 2000 and a permanent agreement by September 2000. All the Israeli com-

mitments made at Sharm al-Shaykh had been negotiated in prior agreements, several as far back as the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT (1994), but had been suspended or canceled by various Israeli governments. Moreover, Wye II, as with previous agreements, was qualified by a series of appendices, modifications, and annexes insisted on by Israel.

Barak failed to implement the majority of the commitments he promised in the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum by the start of the July 2000 CAMP DAVID SUMMIT, which was the main reason the Palestinians did not want to hold the summit.

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Sharon, Ariel (1928–)

Ariel Sharon (originally Ariel Scheinermann) was an Israeli army general, defense minister, prime minister, and LIKUD PARTY leader. He was also a prominent and consistent proponent of military solutions to the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a key supporter of SETTLEMENT expansion in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. He was born in Kfar Malal in BRITISH MANDATE Palestine to a family of "Lithuanian Jews"—Shmuel Sheinermann of Brest-Litovsk (now Brest, Belarus) and Dvora (formerly Vera) of Mogilev—who immigrated to Palestine during the second ALIYA.

Military Career

At age ten, Sharon entered the Zionist youth movement Hassadeh ("the Field"). In 1942 at the age of fourteen, he joined the Ha-Gadna, a paramilitary youth organization, and later became a member of the HAGANA, the underground military force that, after 1948, formed the basis of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF). At the time of Israel's establishment, he was a platoon commander in the Alexandroni Brigade and was seriously wounded by the British-led Jordanian Arab Legion in the Second Battle of Latrun. From the outset of his military career, Sharon evidenced a remarkable will to fight and take risks and demonstrated immense physical courage. These qualities, along with his ideological commitment to the Jewish, more than the democratic, nature of the new Israeli state, attracted the attention of military leaders. In 1949 Sharon, then only twenty-one years old, was promoted to company commander (of the Golani Brigade's reconnaissance unit), and then in 1951 to intelligence officer. Sharon's own description of himself, as noted in his autobiography, is "Warrior." Yet questions have shadowed Sharon's military career for more than six decades. His role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been controversial and polarizing. Zionists view him as a tough and uncompromising hero capable of doing whatever is necessary to defend the Jewish state. Palestinians, as well as many others, view him as a war criminal who enjoyed immunity for a series of grave violations of international humanitarian law stretching from the early 1950s until the present day.

In the fall of 1951, Sharon studied history and Middle Eastern culture at the Hebrew University of JERUSALEM. Eighteen months later, he was asked to return to active service with the rank of major as leader of the newly formed group UNIT 101, Israel's first Special Forces platoon. Unit 101 quickly undertook a series of retaliatory raids against Palestinians and neighboring Arab states that helped bolster Israeli morale and fortified the young state's aggressive and deterrent image at home and abroad, while also drawing negative responses from the international community, including the UNITED STATES. In the fall of 1953, Unit 101 was criticized for targeting civilians in the widely condemned massacre in the West Bank village of QIBYA, then under Jordanian control. Sharon's troops blew up forty-five houses and killed sixty-nine Palestinian civilians, about half of them women and children.

The US Department of State issued a statement on 18 October 1953 expressing its "deepest sympathy for the families of those who lost their lives" in the Qibya attack, as well as the conviction that those responsible "should be brought to account and that effective measures should be

taken to prevent such incidents in the future." In a 1999 film documentary, *Israel and the Arabs: The 50 Year War*, Sharon recounted: "I was summoned to see [Prime Minister DAVID] BEN-GURION. It was the first time I met him. And right from the start [he] said to me: 'Let me first tell you one thing: it doesn't matter what the world says about Israel, it doesn't matter what they say about us anywhere else. The only thing that matters is that we can exist here on the land of our forefathers. And unless we show the Arabs that there is a high price to pay for murdering Jews, we won't survive.'" This philosophy underpinned Sharon's entire military and political career.

Unit 101 was soon merged into the 202nd Paratroopers Brigade, of which Sharon became the commander. Under Sharon the brigade continued to attack military targets, culminating in an attack on the Qalqilya police station on the West Bank (then part of JORDAN) in the autumn of 1956. During the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR, Sharon was responsible for taking the Sinai's Mitla Pass from EGYPT. His forces were initially heading east, away from the pass, but he reported to his superiors that he feared a possible enemy attack in the Mitla Pass that could endanger his brigade from the rear. Although Sharon's requests for permission to attack the pass were denied, he was authorized to send a small reconnaissance unit to backtrack, which met with heavy fire and became trapped in the middle of the pass. Sharon then unilaterally ordered the rest of his troops to attack the Egyptians to save their comrades. Over forty IDF soldiers died in the ensuing battle, but Sharon's brigade succeeded in capturing Mitla Pass. In a scenario that would be repeated later in his career, Sharon's commanding officers harshly criticized him for defying his superiors, taking risks, ignoring orders, and endangering his troops. In 1995 a controversy erupted when evidence came to light that paratroopers under Sharon's command in 1956 had executed over 250 Egyptian prisoners of war. The killings were revealed in a paper on the Sinai campaign commissioned by the army's military history division.

In 1957 Sharon studied at the Camberley Staff College in Great Britain. From 1958 to 1962, he served as an infantry brigade commander and then as infantry school commander, being appointed head of the IDF's Northern Command in 1964 and head of the Army Training Department in 1966. In the mid-1960s, Sharon also obtained a law degree from Tel Aviv University. Although the 1956 Mitla incident slowed Sharon's military career, his role in the 1967 WAR marked a change in his fortunes and ensured his upward trajectory in the ranks of the IDF. In the 1967 War, Sharon served as commander of the most powerful armored division in the Sinai, which broke through the Kusseima-Abu-Ageila fortified area, guaranteeing the IDF's control of the Egyptian front.

In 1969 Sharon became head of the IDF's Southern Command. Four years later, in August 1973, he retired from military service. However, Sharon's military career was far from finished. Two months later, with the outbreak of the 1973 OCTOBER WAR with SYRIA and Egypt, he was called back to duty and commanded a reserve armored division. In this capacity, he identified a breach in the Egyptian forces' lines that he rapidly exploited by capturing a bridgehead on 16 October and building a bridge across the Suez Canal the next day. As in the past, Sharon ignored or violated orders from his superiors and cut the supply lines of the Egyptian Third Army to the south of the canal crossing, isolating it from other Egyptian units. His troops then advanced into Egypt, eventually stopping just 100 kilometers (62 miles) outside of Cairo. Although a military tribunal investigated Sharon's unilateral actions, no charges were brought given that his initiatives and risk-taking were crucial in defeating the Egyptian army. In fact, many Israelis viewed his actions as the key turning point of the war in the Sinai. Because of his prominence during the 1973 war, Sharon attained popular status as a gutsy war hero whose pluck and courage had saved Israel during a dark hour.

The mid-1970s marked the beginning of his political career, and in the early 1980s, as minister of defense in MENAHEM BEGIN's Likud government, Sharon would once again figure prominently on the military scene—as would sharp controversies over his decisions on the field of battle.

Defense Minister and Lebanon War

Within the IDF Sharon's hawkish political positions were controversial, and he was relieved of duty in February 1974. After retiring from military service, he was instrumental in establishing the Likud in July 1973 by a merger of HERUT, the LIBERAL PARTY, and independent elements. Sharon became chairman of the campaign staff for that

year's elections, which were scheduled for November. Two and a half weeks after the start of the election campaign, the October War erupted and Sharon was called back to reserve service. In the elections Sharon won a seat, but a year later he resigned.

From June 1975 to March 1976, Sharon was a special aide to Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN. He planned his return to politics for the 1977 elections; first he tried to return to the Likud and replace Menahem Begin as the head of the party. He suggested to Simha Erlich, who headed the Liberal Party bloc in the Likud, that he was more fit than Begin to win an election victory; he was rejected, however. He then tried to join the LABOR PARTY and the centrist Democratic Movement for Change, but was rejected by those parties, too. Only then did he form his own list, Shlomtzion, which won two Knesset seats in the 1977 elections. Immediately after the elections he merged Shlomtzion with the Likud and became minister of agriculture.

Sharon's political fortunes and Israel's electoral landscape changed dramatically after he forged a strategic alliance with Begin in the late 1970s. In 1977, in cooperation with Begin, the center-right Likud defeated Labor in the Israeli elections for the first time. Upon assuming office in the new right-wing government, Sharon became an avid supporter of the GUSH EMUNIM (Bloc of the Faithful) settlers, eventually becoming identified as the patron of the messianic political movement. Under Begin and Sharon, Jewish settlement construction in the Occupied Territories escalated dramatically. Sharon facilitated a network of new settlements in the West Bank, creating "facts on the ground" meant to prevent any future return of these territories to the Palestinians. His unstinting efforts doubled the number of settlements in the West Bank and GAZA STRIP in just a few years. Though he was never religious himself, Sharon's support for Gush Emunim reflected his commitment to a GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL.

After the 1981 elections, Begin rewarded Sharon for his important contribution to Likud's narrow win by appointing him minister of defense. On 16 January 1982 US president RONALD REAGAN, in his diary, wrote that Sharon was "the bad guy who seemingly looks forward to a war." Indeed, the 1982 LEBANON WAR proved Reagan's remarks prescient.

The most controversial chapter of Sharon's military career and role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unfolded in 1982 as Israel launched OPERATION BIG PINES (Peace for Galilee) and invaded war-torn LEBANON. In 1981 Begin had appointed Sharon as his defense minister, and Sharon used this post, together with a broad right-wing network he had cultivated in Israel and abroad during the previous two decades, to strengthen an existing alliance with Lebanese Christian militias and lobby the Reagan administration for wider leeway for Israeli military intervention in Lebanon—ultimately to launch the IDF's 1982 military adventure in Lebanon. The stated purpose of the invasion was twofold: to retaliate for the attempted assassination of Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London and to prevent attacks on northern Israel from PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) positions in southern Lebanon, even though Israel's northern border had been relatively quiet throughout 1981–1982 and Argov's would-be assassins turned out to be unaffiliated with YASIR ARAFAT's PLO. Sharon's actual aim in invading Lebanon was to destroy the PLO's INFRASTRUCTURE in Beirut and thereby weaken the political will of Palestinians in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In May and June 1982, Sharon and his allies, including US secretary of state ALEXANDER HAIG, laid the groundwork for the invasion of Lebanon, a military operation that involved laying siege to Beirut and destroying the PLO's institutions and presence in Lebanon. According to statistics published in the *Third World Quarterly* in 1984, Israeli forces killed or wounded over 29,500 Palestinians and Lebanese between 4 July 1982 and 15 August 1982. Most of these were civilians, and approximately 40 percent were children. The IDF used cluster, phosphorus, and vacuum bombs in the densely populated western half of Beirut. In August relentless air strikes on the city killed hundreds in a matter of hours. For the first time in the history of the Jewish state, world opinion began to turn against Israeli military actions. The invasion of Lebanon also catalyzed significant opposition to Sharon from within Israeli society, mobilizing many to speak out, including decorated IDF officers and prominent intellectuals.

The darkest chapter of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the darkest chapter in Sharon's military career, was the September 1982 massacre of over 1,000 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians at

the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on the southern outskirts of Beirut. The slaughter in the two contiguous camps, which lasted from the evening of 16 September until the morning of 18 September, took place in an area under the undisputed control of the Israeli armed forces. The perpetrators were members of the SAAD HADDAD'S SOUTH LEBANON ARMY and the PHALANGE (Kata'eb) militia, Lebanese forces that were armed, trained by, and closely allied with Israel since the onset of Lebanon's civil war in 1975.

The question of direct Israeli involvement in the SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE is one that has never been fully resolved. However, as many journalists and investigators noted, it was not credible that Israeli troops surrounding the two camps were unaware of the atrocities occurring inside. The IDF's observation post atop the Kuwaiti Embassy afforded a clear view into the camps, including areas where bodies were piled. Sharon had given assurances in August 1982 to US envoy Philip Habib that Israeli and Phalangist forces would not enter West Beirut following the negotiated departure of PLO leader Yasir Arafat and Palestinian fighters. However, following the assassination of Israel's ally and newly elected Lebanese president Bashir Gemayel on 14 September 1982, Sharon and his staff ordered the Israeli army to enter West Beirut to "keep the peace." IDF control of West Beirut facilitated the entry of Phalangist and other forces into the camps. Once inside, the IDF supplied the Christian militia with food, water, medicine, and ammunition throughout the hours of the massacre, and provided light with illuminated flares during the nights of the massacre.

An official Israeli commission of inquiry, chaired by Yitzhak Kahan, president of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, investigated the massacre in the fall of 1982. In February 1983, the Kahan Commission, as the nonjudicial inquiry is known, published its findings that Sharon, among other Israelis, bore "personal responsibility" for the massacre while carefully sidestepping any accusation of direct IDF involvement in the killings. The KAHAN COMMISSION REPORT stated: "It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense [Ariel Sharon] for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the REFUGEE camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged." The commission also concluded: "[I]n his meeting with the Phalangist commanders, the Defense Minister made no attempt to point out to them the gravity of the danger that their men would commit acts of slaughter. . . . Had it become clear to the Defense Minister that no real supervision could be exercised over the Phalangist force that entered the camps with the IDF's assent, his duty would have been to prevent their entry. The usefulness of the Phalangists' entry into the camps was wholly disproportionate to the damage their entry could cause if it were uncontrolled." The commission further noted, "It is ostensibly puzzling that the Defense Minister did not in any way make the Prime Minister [Menahem Begin] privy to the decision on having the Phalangists enter the camps."

The taint of the Sabra and Shatila Massacre did not fade with time. In 1987, *Time* magazine published a story implying that Sharon was directly responsible for the massacres, and Sharon sued *Time* for libel in US and Israeli courts. *Time* won the suit in the US court because Sharon could not establish that the magazine's editors had "acted out of malice," as required under US law, although the jury found the article false and defamatory. Nearly a quarter of a century after the massacre, just as Sharon was emerging as the lead candidate for prime minister in early 2001, twenty-eight survivors of the massacre filed a formal legal complaint in Belgium charging Sharon, IDF generals Amos Yaron and Rafael Eitan, and various Phalangist leaders with war crimes and crimes against humanity. From 1993 until 2003, Belgium had an "anti-atrocity" law that enabled victims of violations of international humanitarian law to seek justice in Belgian courts under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Four months before the trial was to begin, the Belgian legislature, responding to US pressure, rescinded this law and halted the use of Belgium's national courts for the pursuit of international justice—this after the Belgian Supreme Court ruled in 2003 that the Sabra and Shatila plaintiffs had a sturdy case and that investigations could begin concerning the roles of all but Sharon in the lead-up to and commission of the

massacre. As a sitting prime minister, Sharon would have enjoyed procedural immunity, in keeping with a decision in a similar case by the International Court of Justice in the Hague in February 2002. The Sabra and Shatila case raised new questions about overall IDF involvement in the massacre, alarmed the Israeli government, and disturbed Israeli-Belgian bilateral relations.

Political Career

In 1983, because of the Kahan Commission findings, Sharon resigned from the Defense Ministry but remained a member of the Knesset and a minister without portfolio. He subsequently served as minister of trade and industry (1984–1990) and minister of construction and housing (1990–1992). In the Knesset, he was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (1990–1992) and chairman of the committee overseeing Jewish IMMIGRATION from the Soviet Union. During this period he was a rival to Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR, but failed in various bids to replace him as chairman of Likud. Their rivalry reached a head in February 1990, when Sharon snapped the microphone from Shamir, who was addressing the Likud central committee, and famously exclaimed: "Who's for wiping out TERRORISM?" The incident was widely viewed as an apparent coup attempt against Shamir's leadership of the party.

In 1996 Sharon became minister of national infrastructure in BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's cabinet, and in 1998 he was also appointed foreign minister. After Netanyahu lost the prime ministership to ONE ISRAEL (Labor) PARTY leader EHUD BARAK in 1999, Sharon succeeded Netanyahu as leader of the Likud bloc.

In the realm of international relations, Sharon played a key role in renewing diplomatic relations with African states that had broken ties with Israel during the 1973 War. In November 1981, he engineered a more detailed STRATEGIC COOPERATION agreement between Israel and the United States and widened defense ties between Israel and many nations, including South Africa. While he served as minister of trade and industry, he concluded the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. As minister of construction and housing, he oversaw a massive increase in settlement construction in the Occupied Territories. Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the waves of immigration to Israel from Russia, Sharon initiated and carried out a program to absorb the immigrants throughout the country, including the construction of 144,000 apartments. He also helped bring thousands of Jews from Ethiopia to Israel through Sudan. In 1998 Sharon was appointed foreign minister.

Apart from his close association with the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, perhaps the greatest impact Sharon has had on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been his successful and unrelenting efforts to consolidate settlements and associated infrastructure in the occupied Palestinian territories. According to an Agence France-Presse report of 15 November 1998, while addressing a meeting of militants from the extreme right-wing TZOMET party, then–foreign minister Sharon stated: "Everybody has to move, run, and grab as many hilltops as they can to enlarge the settlements because everything we take now will stay ours. Everything we don't grab will go to them." During the Oslo period, owing to efforts by both Sharon and the Likud and Labor governments, Israel established thirty new settlement outposts and thus nearly doubled the settler population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, from 109,000 in 1993 to nearly 200,000 in 1999.

After Ehud Barak became prime minister in 1999, Sharon succeeded Netanyahu as leader of the Likud bloc. One year later, in late September 2000, he made headlines and helped provoke the Palestinian uprising, the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, when he visited the AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF (which most Israelis call the TEMPLE MOUNT) in the company of hundreds of security guards. Sharon's visit to the third holiest site in Islam was an attempt to demonstrate Israel's sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, especially over the al-Haram ash-Sharif, and to provoke an angry response. Ever the strategist, though, Sharon's ultimate goal was not to make a symbolic statement but to catalyze the right wing of the Israeli public, which later castigated Barak for being too restrained in the face of the ensuing Palestinian uprising. On 19 October 2000, the UN Human Rights Commission, meeting in an emergency session, condemned "the provocative visit to the Al-Haram Ash-Sharif on 28 September 2000 by Ariel Sharon, the Likud party leader, which triggered the tragic events that followed in occupied East Jerusalem and the other Occupied Palestinian Territories, resulting in a high number of deaths and injuries among Palestinian civilians."

Despite the Kahan Commission's findings in 1983, which many thought would halt Sharon's political as well as military career, he was elected prime minister of Israel in February 2001. Following the 11 September 2001 al-Qaida attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., Sharon's unilateralist and aggressive strategies toward the Palestinian people and their political representatives received increased support from the administration of GEORGE W. BUSH. Discourses emphasizing a "clash of civilization," a need to confront "the axis of evil," and the equation of Islamic political movements with terrorism enabled Sharon to undertake, with impunity, a wide-ranging military thrust, OPERATION DEFENSIVE SHIELD, and other major military offensives in the West Bank in the spring of 2002. In response to a series of SUICIDE BOMBINGS against Israeli civilians and soldiers by Palestinian militants, most but not all of whom were members of Islamist groups, the IDF reoccupied towns and villages that had been under control of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in the mid-1990s. The headquarters (*al-muqata'*) of PNA president Arafat in Ramallah was a target of particularly relentless IDF attacks. Its destruction and Arafat's subsequent isolation and marginalization in the bombed-out *al-muqata'* symbolized Palestinian powerlessness. In addition to destroying numerous homes, businesses, and much of the JENIN refugee camp during the spring of 2002, the IDF under Sharon's prime ministership also destroyed the law enforcement and security structures of the PNA. Despite pursuing a policy of decapitating the Palestinian leadership and the emerging institutional legal frameworks in the West Bank and Gaza, Sharon continued to call upon the Palestinians to exercise more control over their violent factions and to guard the security of the Israeli state in return for a resumption of negotiations.

Paralleling the US "global war on terror," the IDF under Sharon's government used F-16 fighter jets, armored bulldozers, Apache attack helicopters, TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS, systematic HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and the killing of international peace observers and journalists to crush the al-Aqsa Intifada. In July 2002, the Israeli air force dropped a one-ton bomb on a heavily populated apartment building in the Gaza Strip to assassinate an alleged HAMAS party leader, killing more than a dozen other people, seven of them children. Sharon termed this operation a "great success." Despite worldwide outrage at the IDF's heavy-handed techniques in suppressing the Intifada, Sharon continued to be warmly welcomed in Washington as a "man of peace" by President Bush.

Sharon's national unity government collapsed in October 2002, forcing him to call elections for early 2003, which resulted in another Likud victory. In 2003 his government accepted the internationally supported ROAD MAP for peace, with, however, fourteen "clarifications" that repudiated the plan's essence. He briefly resumed negotiations with the Palestinians in 2003, but in the same year the IDF launched massive incursions into the Gaza Strip, razing homes and refugee camps in the Rafah area and killing hundreds of civilians in the process. On 20 July 2004, Sharon called on French Jews to emigrate from FRANCE to Israel immediately, in light of an increase in French ANTI-SEMITISM, causing a confrontation with French president Jacques Chirac. From 16 August to 30 August 2005, as a means of consolidating Israel's control over the West Bank and preventing the establishment of a viable, contiguous Palestinian state, Sharon instructed the IDF to remove 8,500 Jewish settlers from twenty-one settlements in Gaza. ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA was welcomed by some Israelis and by some in the PNA, as well as by the United States and the EUROPEAN UNION, as a step toward a final peace settlement, but it drew criticism from within the Likud Party, which believed it was unacceptable to withdraw from any part of Eretz Yisrael. Despite emotional protests and threats emanating from those to the right of the prime minister, Israeli settlers and soldiers formally left Gaza on 11 September 2005 after bulldozing every settlement structure except for several former synagogues.

Never a supporter of the OSLO ACCORDS initiated by Rabin with the PLO, Sharon pursued policies that many believe have permanently damaged the prospects for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, the most salient being the BARRIER separating Palestinians from their lands, families, and religious and educational institutions. In a July 2004 advisory ruling, the International Court of Justice at The Hague declared the Barrier to be a violation of international humanitarian law. As initially proposed by Labor leaders and resisted by the Likud, the Barrier would have demarcated Israel's borders with the Palestinians on the internationally recognized Green Line separating Israel from the Occupied Territories. Under Sharon, however, the

Barrier has been built in such a way as to include Israeli settlements and prime Palestinian farmlands on the Israeli side of the Barrier while leaving Palestinians in isolated communities on the other side. Using arguments that resonate with current US and even European Union concerns with security and the prevention of terrorist attacks, Sharon managed to prevent Israel from paying any price for building this structure in violation of INTERNATIONAL LAW.

In November 2005, in the context of refusing to resume any bilateral negotiations with SYRIA, Sharon stated that Israel would not return the Golan Heights (which Israel had taken in the 1967 War) to Syria and hinted at Israel's next move—annexing the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. On 27 September 2005, Sharon narrowly survived a leadership challenge by a 52–48 percent vote. His main rival, Netanyahu, who had left the cabinet to express his opposition to Sharon's Gaza withdrawal, launched his challenge to Sharon within the Likud Party's central committee. Sharon responded by creating a new party, KADIMA, taking with him many Likud members as well as some individuals from Labor.

In early January 2006, Ariel Sharon suffered a massive stroke and never regained consciousness, although he remains alive in early 2010.

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—Laurie King-Irani

Sharon's Unilateral Disengagement from Gaza

See ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA

Shas

Shas (Shomerei-Torah Sephardim or Shisha Sedarim, meaning Six Orders of the Mishnah and Talmud) is a HAREDI SEPHARDIC political party in Israel. Founded in the early 1970s, it first entered the Knesset in 1984, winning 4 seats (of 120). In the 1999 election it won 17 seats; in 2003 it won 11 seats; and in the 2006 elections it gained 1 more seat and joined EHUD OLMERT's coalition. In 2009 Shas won 11 seats and became part of the coalition government of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU. Often the third largest party in the Knesset, Shas has frequently served a pivotal role in the formation of governing coalitions. Although Shas defines itself as an Orthodox religious party, it draws votes from the wider Sephardic and MIZRAHI communities, largely because it has secured increased government allotments to education, housing, and HEALTH CARE services for its constituencies.

Shas's position on the Palestinian issue is somewhat ambiguous and has changed over time. The following constitute Shas's primary principles:

- Supports the Talmudic precept of the supreme value of preserving life and is therefore amenable to an unspecified territorial compromise if that would bring true peace
- Supports the Greater Israel consolidation movement
- Supports autonomy for Palestinians but opposes a Palestinian state
- Supports existing Jewish SETTLEMENTS but would agree to freeze settlement expansion activity in the Occupied Territories under certain, unspecified circumstances
- A strong advocate of Halakha (Jewish religious law) playing a pivotal role and providing a fulcrum for the operation of the state and its identity
- Opposes negotiations with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION or any other Arab "terrorist" organization
- Demands and endorses an immediate compensation package for those Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews who were forced to leave their host countries and their subsequent property behind

In the past, Shas's views on the Palestinians were relatively flexible. More recently, however, it has moved to the right because many Haredi now live in West Bank settlements, and Shas has a vested interest in incorporating the territories into Israel. The Haredi came to the settlements for three reasons: they needed affordable housing no longer available in and around JERUSALEM or Tel Aviv for their typically large families of eight to twelve children; they were rejected by other Israeli cities as too cultlike; and officials wanted their presence to broaden Israel's narrow BORDERS. Major Haredi settlements include Beitar Illit with a population of 40,000 and Modi'in Illit, the largest settlement, with 45,000 residents and sixty births a week, the fastest-growing Jewish community in the WEST BANK. Other Haredi settlements, smaller in size, are Immanuel, Matityahu, Ma'ale Amos, Nahliel, and Asfar. In 2005 there were over 70,000 ultra-Orthodox living in the West Bank.

Originally Shas was created to provide representation for the ultra-Orthodox Sephardim and to promote Torah education. It came about as a result of ethnic and religious divisions in Israel between the Sephardic-Mizrahi communities on the one hand and the ASHKENAZI (European) Jews on the other. During the first decades of Israeli statehood, Oriental Jews—that is, Sephardic and Mizrahi—did not establish their own political or religious movements or institutions, and most were absorbed into the established Ashkenazi bodies. The main religious political movements, the AGUDAT YISRAEL and the prestate Mizrahi (which evolved into the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY), had few Sephardim among their leadership. By the mid-1970s, the Agudat Yisrael movement continued to see itself as an Eastern European constituency, and the great Sephardic rabbinic authorities were often held in disdain. The result was the creation of a Sephardic equivalent to Agudat Israel—Shas, with its own Council of Torah Sages. (www.aishdas.org/webshas).

See also ISRAELI POLITICAL PARTIES AND SETTLEMENTS; RABBI OVADIA YOSEF

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Sha'th, Nabil (1938–)

Nabil Sha'th is a Western-educated, wealthy Palestinian businessman and a senior PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) official; he was also a close personal adviser to the late YASIR ARAFAT. Born in JAFFA, Palestine, he was dispossessed with his family in the 1948 WAR and settled in the Egyptian city of Alexandria. After his studies in Alexandria, he earned a Ph.D. from the Wharton School of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. After Sha'th returned to Cairo from the UNITED STATES in 1965, he went to LEBANON in 1969 to teach at the American University in Beirut. While at the university, he also worked as an industry consultant and management trainer (heading a company called TEAM) in Algeria, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, and Lebanon. Sha'th also worked with several Arab governments as a consultant. He established the Engineering and Management Institute and the Arab Center for Administrative Development in Beirut and Cairo with fourteen branches throughout the Arab world that trained thousands of Arab business managers.

Sha'th joined the PLO in 1970, served as an adviser to Arafat from 1971 until Arafat's death in 2004, and was the head of the PLO Planning Center from 1971 to 1981. For years he dreamed of a single, secular nation of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Palestine, and he is credited as being the founder of the Democratic Secular State approach, although today he is committed to the TWO-STATE SOLUTION of separate Jewish and Palestinian states. In 1974 he wrote the "gun or the olive branch" speech that Arafat delivered to the UNITED NATIONS General Assembly and subsequently headed the first Palestinian delegation to the United Nations. In 1993 Sha'th, together with AHMAD QUREI' (Abu Ala), founded the PALESTINIAN ECONOMIC COUNCIL FOR DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION (PECDAR).

In March 1990 Sha'th was appointed to the Fatah Central Committee. He was a member of the delegation to the MADRID CONFERENCE and played a leading role in the OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel, writing the Palestinian draft of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES for the Oslo agreement and helping to write the GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT I. Sha'th served as the PLO's chief negotiator at the TABA TALKS and was a Palestinian Legislative Council member for Khan Yunis in the GAZA STRIP. Sha'th made news in October 2005 by commenting for a BBC documentary that in a 2003 meeting with US president GEORGE W. BUSH, Bush was "driven with a mission from God," a claim he later retracted. On 15 December 2005 Sha'th became acting prime minister of the PNA after Ahmad Qurei' resigned. He lost that position nine days later when Qurei' returned to office.

Despite Sha'th's vast personal wealth, which is believed to be extensive from his business enterprises around the Arab world, in 1997 he was accused by the Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO legislative body, of gross corruption. The PNC demanded that he give up his positions in the PNA and be brought to trial, and recommended his imprisonment. Although in August 1998 a commission found evidence of criminal corruption, Sha'th remained in power and was given another high position in the PNA under the presidency of MAHMUD ABBAS. Considered aloof and arrogant, Sha'th does not have a local power base among Palestinians in the WEST BANK and Gaza. He is known to be pro–United States, favors concessions to Israel, especially on security issues, and opposes rights for Palestinian REFUGEES.

At Fatah's sixth general conference, held in BETHLEHEM in August 2009, Nabil Sha'th was elected to the twenty-one-person ruling Central Committee.

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Shaw Commission, 1930

The Shaw Commission was a British committee of inquiry sent to Palestine to investigate the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, which led to the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Palestinians. Its mandate was to determine the cause of the violence and to propose policies that would prevent further con-

flict. Headed by Sir Walter Shaw, the commission issued its findings in March 1930 and linked the violence with the Palestinians' feeling of animosity and hostility toward the Jews due to the rapid development of the *Yishuv,* their increasing economic insecurity, LAND confiscation, and continuous Jewish IMMIGRATION, in addition to the Palestinians' own political and national aspirations. The report stated that Palestinians feared that through "Jewish immigration and land purchases they may be deprived of their livelihood and placed under the economic domination of the Jews."

Based on these findings, the Shaw Commission recommended a British policy of restricted Jewish immigration and limited land purchase. The British government, however, took no action on the commission's recommendations and instead sent another committee of inquiry to Palestine—the HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION—in May 1930 to study and investigate the issues further. The findings of the Hope-Simpson Commission were made public in the 1930 PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER.

See also BRITISH MANDATE

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Al-Shawwa, Hajj Rashad (ca. 1908–1988)

Rashad al-Shawwa was a leading Palestinian citrus merchant and large landowner, a conservative, pro-Jordanian politician, and twice mayor of the GAZA STRIP. In September 1971, hoping that he could help to quell the Palestinian disturbances in the Gaza Strip, Israel appointed al-Shawwa mayor. His mayoralty, however, did nothing to calm the nationalist uprising (a feat ultimately accomplished by ARIEL SHARON in a massive military operation in 1972). Al-Shawwa formed a municipal council, but he and his council received intense criticism because many nationalists in the Gaza Strip viewed the appointments as collaboration with Israel. In October 1972 al-Shawwa resigned, and Israel immediately reinstated direct military rule throughout the Gaza Strip. However, in 1975, at Israel's request, al-Shawwa agreed to a reappointment as mayor. In 1981 the Israeli government imposed a CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, an integral part of the military structure in Gaza (and the WEST BANK), which was given responsibility for HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION, social services, and civic matters. In protest, Mayor al-Shawwa announced a general strike, which caused Israel, in turn, to again dismiss him and the municipal council in 1982.

Although al-Shawwa had a long history of shifting his loyalties among Israel, JORDAN, and the FATAH party, for many years he attempted to get Palestinian notables to support Jordan's King Husayn in an effort to create a Jordanian-Palestinian federation. Al-Shawwa intensely distrusted nationalist passions, but, under immense pressure from Palestinian nationalists in the Gaza Strip, he pledged support to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). However, few believed that he was sincere, and al-Shawwa was the target of several assassination attempts. He eventually formed an alliance with the Fatah leadership, which placed him on the Council of Higher Education in 1980. After Israel dismissed him from the mayoralty, he signed the (unreleased) "Palestinian Peace Document" of November 1982, which recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, but urged them to authorize King Husayn to negotiate on the Palestinians' behalf and to accept a confederation with Jordan.

Al-Shawwa enjoyed the exclusive franchise, granted by Israel, for issuing travel PERMITS for Gazans who wanted to visit Jordan—the so-called Shawwa passports—and applicants formed a crowd outside his offices daily. However, the al-Shawwa permit system for leaving the Gaza Strip was widely resented because of the personal control he used over the allocation of travel documents. He was the founder of al-Kharaiyeh, a benevolent society in Gaza to provide services to Gazans and to ensure his continued control. Al-Shawwa also established the Shawwa Cultural Center in Gaza City, which is used today for numerous functions.

Shaykh Jarrah

Shaykh Jarrah is a Palestinian neighborhood to the north of the OLD CITY of JERUSALEM. In the western portion of Shaykh Jarrah, close to the 1949

Armistice Line, or Green Line, lies an 18-dunum (4.5-acre) area known as Shimon Ha'Tzadik (Simon the Just), after the Second Temple high priest believed to be buried there. This area has become a focal point of settler development plans in the neighborhood. Under contention are approximately twenty-eight residential structures, currently housing descendants of twenty-seven of the Palestinian families who arrived in 1956 (about 500 people) and five or six settler groups (about 30 people). Since 1972, Israeli settlers have been working to establish Jewish land claims and a Jewish presence in the area, and Palestinian residents have faced legal challenges regarding landownership and residency rights.

Right-wing settlers, led by ultranationalist Knesset member BENYAMIN ELON (minister of tourism in ARIEL SHARON's government), who is an advocate of TRANSFER, and his activist HOMOT SHALEM ASSOCIATION, together with the even more aggressive Nahalat Shimon Settler Association, have spearheaded the drive.

As of August 2009, settlement activity in Shaykh Jarrah included the existing settlement of Shimon Ha'Tzadik Compound, made up of eight families and twenty Yeshiva students (approximately fifty people). There were also significant settlement developments in process: Shepherd Hotel Compound (Town Planning Scheme, TPS, 2591), 31 housing units, building PERMIT approved to IRVING MOSKOWITZ in July 2009; Shepherd Hotel Compound (TPS 11536), 90 housing units with public building of a kindergarten and synagogue, plan submitted by C & M Co. to municipal planning department in 2005; Shimon Ha'Tzadik Compound (TPS 12705), 200 housing units, plan submitted by Nahalat Shimon Ltd. and archived by the municipal planning department in May 2009.

Eviction activity related to this settlement development included the Hanoun and Rawi extended families on 2 August 2009 (approximately fifty-three people); the al Kurd family in November 2009; and judicial evictions in process for another four extended families.

On 17 May 2009 two Palestinian families from the Shaykh Jarrah neighborhood of East Jerusalem received court orders to vacate their homes by 19 July. At that point, the houses were turned over to the landlord: the settler organization Nahalat Shimon International. The actual and pending evictions of several Palestinian families from Shaykh Jarrah have sparked international controversy. Israeli authorities claim that Palestinian residents have lost their rights as protected tenants due to delinquency in rent payments, while Palestinians maintain that Israeli ownership claims are baseless. Currently, settlers inhabit six buildings in the area, and active court cases threaten four Palestinian extended families.

Complementing Nahalat Shimon International's legal battle against Palestinian residents is that same group's plan to demolish the existing residential structures and evict hundreds of Palestinian residents to clear the way for a new Israeli settlement that would be a massive expansion of the existing Shimon Ha'Tzadik compound. This project constitutes one of a series of plans that seek to penetrate and surround Shaykh Jarrah with Israeli settlements, yeshivas, and other Jewish institutions as well as "national" (i.e., Jewish) parkland, and to complement government efforts to ring the Old City with Jewish development, effectively cutting it off from Palestinian areas.

The struggle for the area highlights the ongoing attempt of Israeli settlers, backed by the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION (ILA), to "reclaim" plots of land in East Jerusalem that were owned by Jews under BRITISH MANDATE or Ottoman rule. These efforts continue throughout East Jerusalem, despite the ongoing refusal of Israeli courts to recognize similar claims by Palestinian owners in West Jerusalem.

Shaykh Jarrah in Context

On 28 August 2008, Nahalat Shimon International, a settler-related real estate company, filed TPS 12705 with the Jerusalem Local Planning Commission. If TPS 12705 comes to pass, the existing Palestinian houses in this key area would be demolished, about 500 Palestinians would be evicted, and 200 new settler units would be built for the expanded Shimon Ha'Tzadik area. Such a plan would advance the creation of Israeli and Jewish strongholds in the HOLY BASIN surrounding the Old City. In Shaykh Jarrah (north of the Old City), the Mount of Olives to the east, and SILWAN to the south, development plans aim to ring the Old City with Jewish settlements and public projects abound, aimed at severing Palestinian territorial contiguity with the Old City. These developments unilaterally create an integral Jewish population link between the Old City and West Jerusalem, strengthen Israeli control of this sensitive area, and thwart the feasibility of future

agreed-upon BORDERS for Jerusalem in the context of a TWO-STATE SOLUTION.

In recent years, settler organizations have made great strides in the Shaykh Jarrah area, acting with varying degrees of public funding and support. Recently completed projects in the area include the BEIT OROT Yeshiva with a number of student and teacher housing units and the adjacent Ein Tzurim "National" Park. ELAD, the settler organization known for its archaeological and settlement activity in Silwan, is involved in running the park. Three additional Israeli development plans are being advanced in the Shaykh Jarrah vicinity.

Historical Background

Much of the following involves complex legal issues, as discussed by IR AMIM, but these should be considered as merely one facet of the Shaykh Jarrah story. Official Israeli statements on Shaykh Jarrah have framed events as being solely within the domain of the courts. However, a broad look at recent events in Shaykh Jarrah reveals the differential use of the legal system to carry out eviction orders again Palestinian residents but not against settlers, and to support pre-1948 Jewish LAND claims in East Jerusalem while opposing pre-1948 Palestinian land claims in West Jerusalem. This systemic distortion results in the cynical use of a highly politicized legal system in the service of advancing an inequitable and inflammatory political agenda. Employment of the legal system to establish facts on the ground prejudges the results of a land claims reconciliation process that will inevitably take place in the context of a political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

These legal battles have focused on three intertwined issues:

- Legal recognition of land and building ownership
- Tenancy rights of the Palestinian residents
- Differential enforcement of the law regarding settlers and Palestinians, living in the structures without legal recognition

There are currently four relevant legal cases in regard to this area:

- *Sephardic Community Committee vs. Sabbagh* (seven family members). This Civil Court case charges the defendants with rent delinquency and seeks their eviction.
- *Mohammed Kamel Al-Kurd vs. Avi Dichter, Minister of Public Security, and Nitzav Ilan Franco, District Police Chief*. In this Supreme Court case, the al-Kurd family charges the Israeli police with differential law enforcement regarding the settlers in their home. The case was heard in November 2009, and the family was evicted.
- *Sephardic Community Committee and Nahalat Shimon International vs. Abed Al-Fatah Ghawi and Maher Khalil Hanun*. In this Civil Court case, the plaintiffs sought to evict the Ghawi and Hanun families from their homes, on the grounds of rent delinquency. The families were also tried for contempt of court. This case was heard 17 May 2009, and the families were evicted in August.
- *Suleiman Darwish Hijazi vs. Sephardic Community Committee, the Knesset Israel Committee, Nahalat Shimon International, and the Jerusalem Lands Settlement Officer.* In this Magistrate Court appeal, Hijazi challenges the grounds upon which the 1982 case was decided and seeks to prove his ownership of the disputed land. The case is still in court.

Pre-1967. A small Jewish community established in the late nineteenth century around the site of the tomb of Shimon Ha'Tzadik was gradually abandoned beginning in the 1920s and 1930s through the 1948 WAR. No Jews were left in the area after 1948. In the period of Jordanian rule from 1948 to 1967, the Jordanian government took control of these plots under the Enemy Property Law. In 1956, twenty-eight Palestinian families who had been receiving REFUGEE aid and assistance from UNRWA were selected to benefit from a relief project in conjunction with the Jordanian Ministry of Development. According to the agreement, the families would forfeit their baskets of refugee assistance and would pay token rent for three years until the ownership of the houses would be transferred to their names.

The houses, according to the agreement, would be built on "formerly Jewish property leased by the Custodian of Enemy Property to the Ministry of Development, for the purpose of this project." Three years passed and ownership was not formally transferred to the families.

1972–2001. In 1972 twenty-seven families (one family had left of its own accord) received notice that rent was due to the Sephardic Community Committee and the Knesset Israel

Committee—landlords they had not known they had. That year, the committees initiated a process in coordination with the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) to register the lands in their names, based on nineteenth-century, Ottoman-era documents.

Ten years later, in 1982, the two committees brought a legal case against twenty-three families for rent delinquency. Itzhak Toussia-Cohen, the lawyer representing the Palestinian families, did not contest the legitimacy of the committees' ownership claims, and instead arrived at a court-sanctioned agreement—a binding agreement that can be appealed only if proven to be based on false grounds—that secured "protected tenancy" status for residents. Families claim Toussia-Cohen did not have their authorization to make this agreement.

The decision would come to serve as the legal precedent for rulings on subsequent appeals, including the present-day cases. Most families, not wanting to authorize the Sephardic Committee's ownership claims, refused to pay rent. In 1997, following years of lawsuits filed for rent payment and eviction, a Palestinian Jerusalemite, Suleiman al-Hijazi, filed a lawsuit that challenged the ownership claims of the committees and asserted his ownership of the disputed territory. His case was rejected in 2002, as was its SUPREME COURT appeal four years later, and a Magistrate Court appeal was rejected on 31 March 2008. The residents' legal counsel is reviewing options for further legal recourse. Though the committees' ownership was not corroborated in the 2006 "Agreement Between the HASHEMITE Kingdom of JORDAN and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) for an Urban Housing Project at Shaykh Jarrah Quarter, Jerusalem," 3 July 1956, under this classification tenants and their cohabiting kin are guaranteed the security of living in their units, so long as they pay rent and abide by rigid restrictions regarding maintenance and renovation. The court decision was never revoked, and subsequent rulings have reinforced the 1982 precedent.

In 1999, settler activity in the neighborhood began in earnest and has continued unabated. The first group of settlers acquired one family's tenancy rights and subsequently subdivided the structure to make room for additional families. Today a small playground stands on a formerly empty lot with a booth for an armed guard who provides settlers with twenty-four-hour-a-day protection and reportedly prevents Palestinian children from playing on the playground. A second guard booth stands above an adjacent structure. The Sephardic Community Committee, which as co-owner is legally required to approve tenancy changes, has historically avoided commenting on the political dimensions of the conflict.

Also in 1999, following charges of rent delinquency and illegal renovation/construction, a member of the al-Kurd family was forcefully evicted from the added section of the home and the section was sealed. Two years later, settlers illegally broke into the addition and established residence there.

2001 and After. On 28 March 2004, Mohammed and Fawzia al-Kurd were ordered to evict the settlers from the added section of the house, demolish it, and seal any remaining openings. The sentence was reiterated on 25 February 2007. Being unable to demolish the house with the settlers inside it, the al-Kurds repeatedly sought police assistance and filed requests and complaints with the district police. Eventually they sued the police in the lower courts, and a hearing at the High Court of Justice was scheduled for November 2009.

In November 2008, following the loss of a protracted appeals process, Fawzia and Mohammed al-Kurd were forcefully evicted from their home, to much local and international attention. The settlers left in February 2009, and the renovated section is now sealed. Residents and lawyers have evidence, however, that settlers have returned and are residing inside.

A fourth family, Sabbagh, has been sued for rent delinquency and eviction. The case has not yet been heard. The exact number of families paying rent—and therefore still considered protected tenants—is unknown. According to residents, a number of the other households may soon find themselves at risk of eviction. Suleiman Hijazi's appeal to the Magistrate Court to establish his ownership of eighteen plots in the disputed territory was rejected on 31 March 2009. He had presented an official letter from the Ottoman archive in Ankara stating that the archive had no record of the Sephardic Committees' 1875 registration.

See also BENYAMIN ELON; HOLY BASIN; JERUSALEM; IRVING MOSKOWITZ; OTTOMAN EMPIRE; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Shehadeh Family

The Shehadeh family is a Christian clan from JAFFA, Palestine, that was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR; remaining family members mostly live in Ramallah on the WEST BANK. The family produced generations of well-educated and talented writers and especially lawyers.

Shehadeh, Bulus (1882–1943). Bulus Shehadeh was a journalist, poet, and politician. Director of the Orthodox School in HAIFA from 1907, he was active in Palestinian national politics, serving on the ARAB EXECUTIVE, attending the ARAB CONGRESSES, and founding, with others, the Palestinian Arab National Party.

Shehadeh, Aziz (1921–1985). The son of Bulus, Aziz Shehadeh was a lawyer and political activist. Dispossessed in the 1948 War, he fled Jaffa and settled in Ramallah, where he worked as a journalist before being admitted to the bar. Aziz practiced law with his brother Fuad, and many considered their firm the best in the Jordanian-occupied West Bank. Politically, Aziz was an advocate of Palestinian self-determination in a TWO-STATE SOLUTION but at a time and in a political context when that was not yet acceptable to a variety of parties. He met with Israeli defense minister MOSHE DAYAN in 1968 to discuss the possibilities for such a solution, an initiative for which he was condemned by the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION and by West Bank leaders. In 1985 unknown assailants murdered him.

Shehadeh, Fuad (1925–). Son of Bulus and brother of Aziz, Fuad Shehadeh was also a lawyer. Together, Fuad and Aziz worked on many famous cases, including the 1951 defense of two men accused in the TARGETED ASSASSINATION of Jordanian King Abdullah I, the 1974 trial of Archbishop Hilarion Cappuci on charges of arms smuggling, and the 1979–1981 extradition case of Ziyad Abu Ayn, a senior Fatah operative.

Shehadeh, Raja (1951–). The son of Aziz, Raja Shehadeh is a lawyer, writer, prominent human rights activist, and the founder of AL-HAQ: Law in the Service of Man. Raja has written numerous books, including *Palestinian Walks: Forays into a Vanishing Landscape* (2008); *The Third Way: A Journal of Life in the West Bank* (1982); *Occupiers' Law: Israel and the West Bank* (1988); *Strangers in the House: Coming of Age in Occupied Palestine* (2003); *Samed: Journal of a West Bank Palestinian* (1984); *When the Birds Stopped Singing: Life in Ramallah under Siege* (2003); *From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestine Territories* (1997); and *The Sealed Room* (1992).

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

Shelli

The Shelli Party (Shalom L'Yisrael, or Peace for Israelis, Equity for Israelis) was created in 1977 by two existing Israeli parties—MAKI (the Israel Communist Party) and MOKED, from the Jewish pro-peace left. Shelli won no seats in 1981, merged into the RATZ party in 1981, and disbanded before the 1984 elections.

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Shemer, Naomi (1930–2004)

Naomi Shemer was a prolific songwriter and composer known as the "First Lady of Israeli Song." She was much beloved in Israel as the writer of "Yerushalayim shel Zahav" (Jerusalem the Gold), which became Israel's unofficial national anthem and made her a nationalist cultural icon. Born in Kvutzat Kinneret KIBBUTZ, where her parents were among the founders, Shemer started playing piano at the age of six and began writing songs in her twenties. After serving in the military cadre NAHAL's entertainment troupe, she left the kibbutz to study music at JERUSALEM's Rubin Academy of Music in 1955 and later moved to Tel Aviv to devote herself to songwriting.

Many of Shemer's songs were composed for army entertainment troupes. The song "Hoopa Hey," which she composed for the IDF Central Command entertainment troupe, won an international song contest in Italy in 1960. In 1963 she wrote "Hurshat Haecalyptus" (The Eucalyptus Grove) for a musical marking the jubilee of Kibbutz Kinneret. Many of her texts were adapted from the poems of Rachel, which describe the landscape of the Kinneret and the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY where they both lived. When Shemer moved to Tel Aviv, she wrote the words to the musical *Hamesh-Hamesh* (Five-Five), first performed by the IDF Central Command entertainment troupe and later by Haohel Theater. In 1967, Jerusalem mayor TEDDY KOLLEK asked Shemer to write a song about the city. Several weeks after "Yerushalayim shel Zahav" was first performed at a Hebrew Song Festival, the 1967 WAR broke out, and the song became the war's anthem. After the war, Shemer added an additional verse to reflect Jerusalem's new reality.

After the outbreak of the 1973 War, Shemer wrote "Lu Yahi" (May It Be), which she originally conceived as a Hebrew version of the Beatles' "Let It Be." In 1977, Yehoram Gaon recorded Shemer's

"Lo Ahavti Di" (I Have Not Loved Enough), which quickly became a favorite, especially among folk dance enthusiasts. In 1979 the line "Do not tear up that which is planted" from the song "Al Kol Aleh" (For All These Things) became the slogan of the campaign against the evacuation of Yamit, a SETTLEMENT that was dismantled in the context of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. In 1987 Shemer was awarded the Israel Prize for her contribution to Israeli music.

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Shimon Ha'Tzadik Association

The Shimon Ha'Tzadik Association, founded in 1967, is dedicated to reclaiming Jewish land and property in East JERUSALEM. It has established a strong presence in the Shimon Ha'Tzadik area in the Palestinian neighborhood of SHAYKH JARRAH, where activists claim to have taken over some seven Palestinian buildings that now house forty Jewish settlers and a yeshiva with approximately fifty students. The association works together with the Homot Shalem Association and its leader BENYAMIN ELON, Zion Settlers, and several other settler groups.

See also SETTLERS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; SHAYKH JARRAH

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Shin Bet

The Shin Bet (General Security Service, GSS, Sherut Bitahon Kelali, or Shabak) is Israel's domestic secret security service. Its most important functions are upholding state security, exposing terrorist organizations among Israeli civilians (both Jewish and Arab), interrogating terror suspects, providing intelligence for counterterrorism operations in the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP, practicing counterespionage, and preventing the funding of underground movements and terror groups whose members are Israeli citizens. It accomplishes these goals primarily by using interrogations and secret agents, or HUMINT. (Short for human intelligence, HUMINT is an intelligence-gathering discipline for collecting information by either interviewing or tracking a subject of investigation or by using a combination of "black" techniques to gain confessions or involuntary disclosure of information.)

Shin Bet makes extensive use of informants—COLLABORATORS—from the local Palestinian population to gather intelligence about political activities, organizations, militant groups, and individuals. It attempts to learn about planned attacks against Israeli soldiers and settlers, SUICIDE BOMBINGS against civilians, and the location of leaders targeted for assassination. After 1967, Shin Bet's network of agents and informers in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES destroyed the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO's) effectiveness, forcing it to withdraw to bases in JORDAN, and the agency continues to run a large network of Palestinian informants. Shin Bet also extracts information by interrogating suspects. B'TSELEM, the Israeli human rights organization, and Amnesty International regularly accuse Shin Bet of employing harsh physical methods that amount to torture according to international conventions. Shin Bet's interrogation methods, especially of Palestinians, have been controversial and highly criticized. Human rights groups have claimed that many PRISONERS have died at the hands of Shin Bet or were left paralyzed after a period of detention.

In 1987 the Israeli government-appointed LANDAU COMMISSION investigated the practice of torture and recommended that interrogators be permitted to use "moderate physical and psychological pressure" to secure confessions and obtain information. In addition, the Shin Bet chief is permitted by law to allow interrogators to employ "special measures" that exceed the use of "moder-

ate physical and psychological pressure" when it is deemed necessary to obtain information that could potentially save Israeli lives. In 1992 the International Committee of the Red Cross declared that such practices violate the Geneva Convention on prisoner treatment. Human rights groups and attorneys have challenged the use of "special measures" before the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT on a number of occasions. Israeli authorities maintain that torture is not condoned but acknowledge that abuses sometimes occur. In 2000 the Israeli Supreme Court ruled against the use of torture by Shin Bet, although the use of informants as proxies is rumored to serve as a loophole.

Shin Bet is believed to have three operational departments and five support departments. Its Arab Affairs Department is responsible for antiterrorist operations, political subversion, and maintenance of an index on Arab terrorists. The department worked with undercover detachments (known as Mist'aravim) to counter the AL-AQSA INTIFADA and the military wing of the Islamic HAMAS organization. Shin Bet is at the forefront of undercover operations against Palestinian activists and militants. Israeli security experts say that Shin Bet has a large number of Jewish agents who are fluent Arabic speakers, able to pass themselves off as Palestinians, and move freely about the Occupied Territories.

See also COLLABORATORS, PALESTINIAN; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM; LANDAU COMMISSION; MOSSAD; TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS; TERRORISM

Shinui Party

Shinui (Mifleget Ha'Shinui, or Change) is a secular, Zionist political party that was established in 1974. In 1977 it joined the Democratic Movement for Change and formed the first non-Labor coalition government in Israel. In 1992 it joined MAPAM and RATZ to create MERETZ, but in 1997 it split again and won six seats in the 1999 Knesset elections. In 2000 Shinui adopted a new platform, calling itself "a Democratic, Liberal, Zionist, Non-religious, Peace seeking party." In 2003 the party won fifteen seats alone, but lost them all three years later after most of its Knesset members left to form new parties. The party was a member of Liberal International. Though it had been the standard-bearer of liberal economic policy and secular values in Israel for thirty years, the 2005 formation of KADIMA robbed Shinui of its natural constituency, and in January 2006 the party split into small factions, none of which managed to overcome the 2 percent threshold needed to enter the Knesset.

While the party is liberal in opposing ultra-Orthodox attempts to impose Halacha (Jewish religious law) on the state, its position on the Palestinian question is more conservative. According to Shinui's platform, it supports the peace process, although only through negotiations with "moderate Palestinians," since "the cessation of TERROR[ISM] is an indispensable condition for progress in the diplomatic negotiations." The group states that "illegal OUTPOSTS [linked to Jewish SETTLEMENTS] must be evacuated immediately. As part of the peace arrangements, Israel will also have to leave settlements scattered in the heart of Palestinian populations, but Israel will not evacuate settlement blocs, and these will be integrated within Israel's BORDERS. There are also large settlements, which will be subject to negotiation." Shinui is committed to the BARRIER separation wall between Israel and the Occupied Territories "as a partial defense against the frequency of terrorist infiltrations." Its position on JERUSALEM is "to find a *modus vivendi* . . . to enable both sides to coexist in peace, with respect for the holy sites of all the three religions." And a Palestinian state "will be established only after the Palestinians renounce their right to return" to their homeland.

See also ZIONISM

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Shministim

In June 2001, ten Israeli high school students, mostly from the Tel Aviv area, gathered to discuss new ways to resist Israel's OCCUPATION of the Palestinian territories. Following a tradition of protest letters by high school seniors to Israeli prime ministers, the group decided to write a letter and enlisted others to help draft it. The final version condemned the Occupation of 1967 and Israeli "war crimes" and pointed to the connection

between Israeli aggression and the increase in attacks on Israeli citizens by Palestinians. In August 2001 the group published its first high school seniors' letter, with sixty-two signatories.

One year later, the number of signatories had more than quadrupled. Over the same time, the political situation had deteriorated. ARIEL SHARON's government and the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES had reoccupied the territories with sweeping public support. The signatories of the high school seniors' letter felt a need to protest against the Occupation and decided to organize in a framework called the Shministim (High School Students) movement to help them to act and influence events. In September 2002 they published a second letter to Prime Minister Sharon with more than 300 signatories. The letter stated, in part: "When the elected government tramples over democratic values and the chances for a just peace in the region, we have no choice but to obey our conscience and refuse to take part in the attack on the Palestinian people. As youth about to be called to serve in the military, we pledge to do all that we see fit so as not to serve the Occupation. Some of us will refuse to serve beyond the Green Line, others will avoid military service in other ways—we view all these means as legitimate and necessary, and we call on other youth, conscripts, soldiers in the standing army, and reserve service soldiers to do the same."

In March 2005, 250 additional high school students sent a letter to Sharon that stated in part: "We the undersigned, Israeli boys and girls, believing in the values of democracy, humanism, and pluralism, hereby declare that we shall refuse to take part in the Occupation and repressive policy adopted by the government of Israel. . . . The Occupation has corrupted Israel, turning it into a militaristic, racist, chauvinistic and violent society."

This youth movement aims to expand the circles of CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS and to promote awareness of this phenomenon, primarily in high schools and within youth groups but also among the general public and the international community. They carry out their work in solidarity vigils, demonstrations, and other direct actions. In addition to street activity, the movement works to support those who refuse to serve and who suffer as a result, such as from discrimination in the schools or at work.

See also COMBATANTS' LETTER; COURAGE TO REFUSE; NEW PROFILE; PILOTS' LETTER

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Shoman Family

The Shoman family, originally from Bayt Hanina north of JERUSALEM, is one of the great banking families of the Arab world.

Shoman, Abd al-Hamid (1888/90–1974). Abd al-Hamid Shoman was born in Bayt Hanina and immigrated in 1911 to the UNITED STATES, where he became a successful businessman. He returned to Palestine in 1929 a wealthy man and founded the Arab Bank in 1930 in Jerusalem. During the years after he returned to Palestine, Shoman also took a keen interest in Palestinian nationalist issues. He had a close relationship with the mufti (AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI) and was twice detained by the British during the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT for his support of the nationalist cause. In 1945 he financed a committee made up of Palestinian political parties that was aimed at slowing Jewish LAND purchases and IMMIGRATION to Palestine; ultimately this led to the reconstitution of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE. At the same time, the bank expanded rapidly and had branches in all major towns in Palestine; it flourished until 1948, when the family was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and moved to Amman, JORDAN. From Amman, the Arab Bank spread to all the capitals of the Arab world, becoming the most prestigious private Arab banking institution in the Arab world.

Abd al-Hamid became an enormously wealthy man, and he used his financial position to assist the Palestinian national cause, such as by helping establish the PALESTINE NATIONAL FUND, which funded the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. He also became a noted philanthropist and patron of the arts and culture.

Shoman, Abd al-Majid (1912–2003). The son of Abd al-Hamid, Abd al-Majid Shoman was a banker also. Born in Bayt Hanina, he was dispossessed in 1948 and received an M.A. in economics from New York University. He started working at the Arab Bank in 1946, and by 1974 he was chairman and general manager of the bank. From 1964

to 1969, Abd al-Majid was the first chairman of the Palestine National Fund, and in 1983 he became chairman of the WELFARE ASSOCIATION, which supports sustainable development in Palestinian society. He served for a time in the Jordanian senate but resigned in 1988. In 1995 he led a group of prominent Palestinian businessmen on a visit to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY to explore possibilities for investment.

Shoman, Khalid (1931–2001). The son of Abd al-Hamid, Khalid Shoman entered the family banking business after obtaining a B.A. and M.A. in economics in 1955 and 1959, respectively, from Cambridge University. He served as deputy chairman of the Abd al-Hamid Shoman Foundation and in 1993 cofounded the Darat el Funun artistic complex in Amman, Jordan, with his wife. He died in Europe in 2001, after which the family established the Khalid Shoman Foundation.

Shoman, Abd al-Hamid (1947–). The son of Abd al-Majid and the grandson of Abd al-Hamid, his namesake, Abd al-Hamid Shoman is also a banker. He received a B.A. from the American University of Beirut. Abd al-Hamid has worked for the Arab Bank since 1972 and has also served on the board of trustees of the Abd al-Hamid Shoman Foundation.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

Shrines, Religious

See HOLY SITES IN PALESTINE

Shultz, George Pratt (1920–)

George Shultz served as UNITED STATES secretary of state from 1982 to 1989 under President RONALD REAGAN. Prior to that, he served as secretary of labor from 1969 to 1970 and as secretary of the treasury from 1972 to 1974. In 1942 Shultz received a B.A. in economics from Princeton University and joined the US Marine Corps, where he served until 1945, attaining the rank of captain. In 1949 Shultz earned a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in industrial economics. Shultz was the second secretary of state in the Reagan administration, after the resignation of ALEXANDER HAIG.

In the context of the first Palestinian INTIFADA in January 1988, Shultz put forward a peace plan that proposed an international conference, termed an "event," that would facilitate separate, bilateral negotiations for a final settlement between Israel and local Palestinian leaders but would have no veto or enforcement power. The event would be attended by all parties that accepted UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and by all parties that renounced violence and TERRORISM. The PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) was excluded; instead, Shultz proposed that Palestinians from the Occupied Territories would be represented by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would negotiate the terms of a three-year transitional period of self-administration for the territories. The plan suggested that ELECTIONS for a council of Palestinians would be held by fall and negotiations on a permanent solution would begin by December, based on the principle of exchanging territory for peace.

Essentially, the plan was a rehash of the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, the September 1982 REAGAN PLAN, and others. Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR rejected Shultz's initiative out of hand, while EGYPT and JORDAN supported it, as did SHIMON PERES, then the Israeli foreign minister. Although SYRIA and the PLO objected to it, the Shultz Plan set off a debate within the PLO and the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) about accepting Resolution 242. As part of his initiative, on 26 March 1988 Shultz met with two US professors who were members of the PNC (although not authorized by that body or by the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE to meet with Shultz)—IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD and EDWARD SAID. Both apparently saw the Shultz invitation as some form of recognition of the PLO's right to represent the Palestinians. Although both succeeded in stating the Palestinian position forcefully to Shultz, the meeting did not alter existing US policy.

A 15 November 1988 PNC meeting in Algiers produced a PLO DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, which included acceptance of Resolution 242, indicating a de facto recognition of Israel. This breakthrough by the PLO, however, did not alter its continued exclusion from the peace initiative but did lead to the refusal by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories to meet with Shultz on his various shuttle trips to the area. Shultz made several trips to the Middle East to promote his peace plan. However, President Reagan did not make his job easier when he told a

Washington press conference, just before the secretary arrived in the region for the first time, that the unrest in the Occupied Territories was being fomented by "outsiders." Shultz corrected the president, explaining that the anti-Israeli demonstrations by Palestinians were "essentially indigenous" and against Israel's OCCUPATION.

In the end, as had all previous US initiatives, the Shultz Plan simply faded away. In December 1988, subsequent to further concessions by the PLO and YASIR ARAFAT personally, Shultz presided over the opening of a low-level, short-lived, but nevertheless historic US-PLO dialogue.

See also JAMES BAKER; BAKER PLAN; MADRID CONFERENCE; REAGAN PLAN; ROGERS PLAN; UNITED STATES–PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION DIALOGUE

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Shuqayri, Ahmad (1908–1980)

Ahmad Shuqayri was once the symbol of the Palestinian national struggle and was the first chairperson of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Born in Tibnin in South LEBANON, where his father was exiled by Ottoman authorities, he later moved to Tulkarm, Palestine, where he lived with his mother. In 1916 Shuqayri moved to ACRE, Palestine, for his education and completed high school in JERUSALEM in 1926. He joined the American University of Beirut but was expelled by the French authorities for participating in a demonstration. He then moved back to Jerusalem and completed law studies.

In the 1936–1939 ARAB REVOLT, Shuqayri was active both as a lawyer defending Palestinians accused by British authorities of various charges and as an author writing copiously in the Palestinian and Arab press against ZIONISM and the BRITISH MANDATE. In 1949 the SYRIAN government, impressed with his oratorical skills, appointed him a member of its UN mission, and later he served as assistant secretary-general of the ARAB LEAGUE. In 1957 he became the Saudi ambassador at the UNITED NATIONS, where he represented the Arab point of view and engaged in legendary, sometimes bombastic fights with Zionist representatives and journalists. In 1963, SAUDI ARABIA dismissed Shuqayri because he was sympathetic to EGYPT's president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR's views on inter-Arab politics. In 1964 the Arab League appointed Shuqayri the PLO's first chairperson, but he did not have much political power. Nasir, who controlled the PLO, selected Shuqayri for that position because he trusted his utmost loyalty to the Egyptian regime. For many Palestinians, however, especially Palestinian revolutionaries, Shuqayri was increasingly seen as a tool of Nasir. Later he was seen as a buffoon, a perception contributed to by Western MEDIA, especially when they used his bombastic rhetoric to falsely attribute to him the threat to "throw the Jews into the sea." Shuqayri denied in his memoirs that he ever said that, and nobody ever produced evidence that he actually did. After 1967, Palestinian revolutionaries forced his retirement, and by 1969 YASIR ARAFAT had taken over the PLO. During his retirement, Shuqayri resided in Cairo and spent his summers in Lebanon, but, after the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which he considered an act of high treason, he relocated to Tunisia. He died in 1980 and was buried in JORDAN.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Siege

The term "siege" refers to the totality of restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement of Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Since the beginning of the 2000 AL-AQSA INTIFADA, these restrictions have reached an unprecedented level, including CLOSURES, blockades, CHECKPOINTS, ROADBLOCKS, and CURFEWS, and have negatively affected the lives of Palestinians in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, as well as crippling the Palestinian ECONOMY. Unemployment and poverty have spiraled, malnutrition has emerged, anemia and

other health problems have increased, and the quality of EDUCATION has seriously declined.

No Palestinian has escaped the impact of the RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT in the Occupied Territories. In 2001 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights described Israel as perpetrating "continuing gross violations of economic, social and cultural rights in the Occupied Territories, especially the severe measures adopted by the State party to restrict the movement of civilians between points within and outside the Occupied Territories, severing their access to food, WATER, HEALTH CARE, education and work."

Amnesty International has detailed the myriad methods by which Israel's siege restricts Palestinian movement and, more important, the consequences for Palestinians of these measures.

Physical Barriers

The Israeli army controls movement in and out of the main towns and many villages in the Occupied Territories by setting up checkpoints on primary and secondary ROADS, by blocking other roads with earth barricades and cement blocks, and by digging deep trenches across the roads to stop Palestinians from opening closed roads or from passing on foot. During the winter, rain and mud fill the trenches and make the slopes slippery, and the Israeli army sometimes diverts sewage into the trenches. Some villages are completely isolated by earth barriers, cement blocks, and trenches, making vehicle access impossible, even for ambulances and water tankers. Passage on foot is also difficult, requiring long detours and climbing up and down dirt mounds or trenches.

In addition to the permanent or long-term closures of roads by checkpoints, blockades, trenches, and other physical obstacles, other roads are often temporarily blocked by Israeli tanks or other military vehicles in what are called "flying" roadblocks. Israeli military and emergency legislation gives military commanders broad discretion to declare CLOSED MILITARY ZONES, restrict the use of roads, and impose curfews.

Curfews

West Bank towns and villages are often placed under curfew, in many cases for prolonged periods. After the Israeli army retook control of the main West Bank towns in the spring of 2002, it imposed twenty-four-hour curfews for days and in some cases weeks or months, preventing vital service providers and ambulances from functioning. At times Israel lifts curfews for a few hours to allow Palestinians to purchase essential supplies. NABLUS, under curfew for longer than any other city, remained under twenty-four-hour curfew for five months after 21 June 2002, apart from one month when it was under a night curfew only. In the H2 area of HEBRON, some 30,000 Palestinians have been under full or partial curfew most of the time in order to allow some 500 Israeli settlers to move freely.

The Barrier

The BARRIER separation wall, some 400 kilometers (around 250 miles) long and up to 100 meters wide, is built along the perimeter of the West Bank and north and south of JERUSALEM and comprises a complex of obstacles, including deep trenches, electric fences, trace paths, and patrol roads for tanks. The stated aim of the project is to prevent Palestinians from crossing clandestinely from the West Bank into Israel. However, Israel is constructing most of the separation Barrier on Palestinian land inside the West Bank to encompass a number of Israeli SETTLEMENTS. The Barrier cuts off scores of Palestinian villages from the rest of the West Bank or from their farming land. The land in these areas is among the most fertile in the West Bank, with better water resources than elsewhere, and agriculture in the region constitutes the main source of income for the Palestinians.

The Barrier has serious economic and social consequences for over 200,000 Palestinians in nearby towns and villages. Beyond LAND confiscation, the construction of the Barrier results in increased restrictions on movement. Palestinians who live in these areas have to cross the Barrier at designated checkpoints, which are only open at certain times, to go to work, to tend their fields, and to sell their agricultural produce, and have no access to education and health facilities. Moreover, Palestinians require special PERMITS to enter these areas.

Living Standards

Since 2000, some 60 percent of the Palestinian population is living below the poverty level of US$2.10 per day, and unemployment has risen to close to 50 percent. Because there is no unemployment benefit system in the Occupied Territories, an unemployed person's only means of support is from family or community networks and the limited assistance available from the UN RELIEF AND

Works Agency, the Palestinian National Authority's Ministry of Social Welfare, and charitable and humanitarian organizations. The dramatic decline in the standard of living among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories has led to increased malnutrition and other health problems. As Palestinians are increasingly forced to rely on charity to meet their basic needs, feelings of hopelessness and alienation have grown, damaging the fabric of society and fueling resentment. In the predominantly youthful Palestinian community, the lack of prospects for the future has contributed to increased radicalism and violence.

Unemployment

Loss of jobs in Israel, where wages are significantly higher than in the Occupied Territories, was followed by a reduction in demand for goods and services in the Occupied Territories. Closures and curfews have disrupted the import and transport of raw materials, creating shortages and sharply rising prices. Because of the closures, most Palestinian export businesses have lost their export markets and have difficulties transporting their products between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip or even short distances to local markets. Perishable foodstuffs spoil when repeatedly handled and delayed at checkpoints or border crossings, making them unmarketable or reducing their price.

In addition to increased unemployment, there has been a huge increase in underemployment and a significant drop in wages. Those who still have jobs have often been unable to reach their workplaces because of curfews and closures. For laborers who are paid on a daily basis, failure to show up for work means loss of a day's wages, as well as an increased risk that their place will be filled by another.

Farming

Families in rural areas traditionally turn to farming in times of rising unemployment and declining incomes, but farm incomes have also shrunk, and some farms operate at a loss because of restrictions on movement. In many areas, farmers do not have regular access to their land because it is within a closed military area or near an Israeli settlement or settlers' roads. Lack of access at key times of the year results in crops being lost or damaged or in yields that are severely reduced.

Expenditure on agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticides, and animal feed, has risen sharply, as suppliers have passed on increased transport costs. Some products are no longer available or farmers cannot afford to buy them. Some villages are not connected to a water network and farmers have to buy water, which has increased in price by an average of 80 percent because of increased transport costs. To cover their basic, immediate needs, some farmers have sold off productive assets, such as livestock and even land, thus jeopardizing their long-term prospects.

Use of Force to Enforce Closures and Curfews

When a town or a village is under curfew, the Israeli army usually allows the movement of civilians for a few hours during daylight. However, scheduled breaks in the curfew are often canceled without notice, so many Palestinians are caught unawares. To enforce closures, members of the Israeli security forces have frequently resorted to lethal force, killing or injuring scores of unarmed Palestinians. Soldiers have opened fire on Palestinians who have bypassed checkpoints, crossed trenches, removed barriers, broken curfews. They have fired at ambulance personnel, municipal employees, and journalists, including those who coordinated their movements in advance with the Israeli army.

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Silver, Abraham "Abba" Hillel (1893–1963)

Abraham "Abba" Hillel Silver was a rabbi and an American Zionist who had enormous influence in swaying US government policy and US public opinion in support of the Zionist cause. His leadership of the Zionist movement in the UNITED STATES was exceptional. Born in Lithuania, Silver was raised in a traditional home in which Jewish scholarship was strongly emphasized. In 1902 Silver's family immigrated to the United States, arriving in New York City, where Silver spent the rest of his youth. In New York he became president of the Herzl Zion Club, a Hebrew-speaking group that debated the Jewish issues of the day. Silver was ordained a Reform rabbi in 1915 by the Hebrew Union College in Cincinnati, Ohio. After his first two years as a rabbi in Wheeling, West Virginia, he was appointed rabbi at Congregation Tifereth Israel, a large Cleveland, Ohio, congregation, which was to be his home for the remainder of his career.

In 1937 Silver ardently opposed the PEEL COMMISSION plan, which recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, claiming that the BRITISH MANDATE administration in Palestine violated its mandate of ruling Palestine. Silver held numerous influential positions in organized Jewish life in the United States: founder and cochair of the United Jewish Appeal and president of the United Palestine Appeal; representative of the American Zionist movement at WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESSES; and, from 1945 to 1947, president of the Zionist Organization of America and president of the Central Conference of American Rabbis (an American Jewish Reform organization).

Silver's skills as an orator were renowned—whether he spoke about social issues or on behalf of the Zionist cause. Although he identified with the Republican Party, he was also respected by Democrats. Most important, Silver was relentless in his pursuit of US governmental support for the creation of a Jewish state. Although many American Zionists believed that Jews should not pressure the US people and their government during wartime, Silver insisted that winning US public opinion was crucial to the cause. Under his guidance, the American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC) was overwhelmingly successful in molding public opinion, and Silver transformed American ZIONISM into a vigorous activist movement, mobilizing both grassroots Jews and pro-Zionist Christians to demonstrate, write, and pressure Congress and the White House to support Jewish statehood. In 1944 Silver convinced the Republican Party to include a pro-Zionist plank in its platform, which forced the Democrats to do likewise—a precedent that gave Zionist concerns a permanent place in US electoral politics. And Silver's nationwide protest campaign in 1948 against partition helped secure swift US recognition of the new state of Israel—the first step in cementing the US-Israel friendship.

Silver was also able to sway world opinion to favor the creation of a Jewish state. In his capacity as chairman of the US section of the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, he addressed the General Assembly of the UNITED NATIONS for the Zionists in 1947. However, after the establishment of the state of Israel, Silver faced opposition from within the Zionist movement as control of the movement slowly transferred to Israeli officials. The resulting power struggles and controversies about fundraising led Silver to resign his positions at the Zionist Organization of America, AZEC, and the Jewish Agency in 1948–1949. Nevertheless, Silver's support for Israel remained strong. In addition to his work in the political arena, Silver was a prolific writer. His sermons, articles, and books covered a range of topics relating to issues of Jewish concern.

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Silwan

Silwan is a Palestinian neighborhood in East JERUSALEM that borders on the southern wall of the OLD CITY close to the AL-AQSA MOSQUE, Mount Zion to the north, the neighborhood of Abu Tor to

the west, the Mount of Olives to the east, and the neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber to the south and southeast. It lies at the heart of the HOLY BASIN and has a population of some 31,000 Palestinians and about 500 Jewish settlers in a 2,194-dunum (542-acre) area. Wadi Hilweh and al-Bustan constitute two of the quarters of Silwan.

The process of Israeli takeover of Silwan has been accelerated, primarily in the area the settlers call the City of David, or Wadi Hilweh, as it is known by Palestinians. Indeed, Silwan stands on the front line of the Israeli offensive to erase the Palestinian presence in the east of the city, and its Jewish enclave has grown rapidly since 2004. Unlike most of the other Palestinian neighborhoods where settler groups are carving out enclaves, in Silwan ARCHAEOLOGY is being employed in the service of nationalism and as a justification for the dispossession of Palestinians. The settler group spearheading the drive, ELAD (the Hebrew acronym for "To the City of David"), is a far-right-wing ultranationalist association headed by David Be'eri, which is empowered by several arms of the Israeli government, including the Jerusalem Municipality (JM), the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION (ILA), and the Israel Antiquities Authority (IAA), among others.

In recent years, significant parts of Silwan have been wrested from the local population. Public land and property have been "privatized" without tenders and handed to private organizations from the ideological right. These organizations act as contractors and receive the protection of government agencies, but they are not held accountable to the public or subject to the legal and administrative restrictions that apply to government bodies. Israeli policy openly discriminates against the Palestinian residents of Silwan and aims to displace them, most evident in the plan by the JM to evict the residents of al-Bustan, destroy their houses, and establish an archaeological park in their place.

The settler groups seeking to gain control of Silwan are supported with the initiative, encouragement, aid, funding, and protection of the government and its ministries and their national and municipal arms. They are motivated by two main forces. The first is the national-religious cause, which draws its strength from deep currents in the religious right. That is complemented by the political will, which significantly intensified after the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, to thwart any possibility of dividing Jerusalem as part of a future peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. According to IR AMIM: "Silwan is the keystone to a sweeping and systematic process, whose aim is to gain control of the Palestinian territories that surround the Old City, to cut the Old City off from the urban fabric of East Jerusalem, and to connect it to Jewish settlement blocs in northeast Jerusalem and the E1 area." Since the beginning of Israeli settlement in the area in the 1990s, Israeli officials and MEDIA have widely used the name "City of David" to describe Palestinian Wadi Hilweh. In the narrow sense, the name City of David refers to the hill allegedly upon which stood ancient Jerusalem; but for the Palestinians, the City of David area is simply a part of the Wadi Hilweh quarter of Silwan.

History

In the second half of the nineteenth century, archaeological missions began excavating this hill of ancient Jerusalem. Later, the Israel Antiquities Authority uncovered some extremely important findings in excavations at the City of David. The diggings, which have continued on and off to this day, have revealed that the area has been inhabited almost continuously since the fourth millennium BCE. Impressive fortifications were unearthed on the slope of the hill, as well as a sophisticated water system, all testifying that a sizable city stood in this place as early as the eighteenth century BCE—the Canaanite period, which preceded the Israeli conquest by 700 years. The excavations also discovered artifacts from the end of the First Temple period (the seventh and sixth centuries BCE), including important signets; and excavations at the Givati parking lot revealed the ruins of a palace dated to the Hellenistic period (331–323 BCE), a crowded neighborhood, and an impressive structure from the late Byzantine or early Muslim period (sixth to eighth centuries CE), including a rare trove of gold coins. Researchers are divided over the significance of the city in the tenth and eleventh centuries BCE, the period of the "united kingdom" of David and Solomon. According to Samuel 2, David conquered the city from the Jebusites and named it after himself. Not much has been found relating to the united kingdom, although material has been discovered suggesting that it was used as a Hebrew governmental center in the period of the late Judean Kingdom (eighth to sixth centuries BCE).

The archaeological excavations have also revealed evidence of the destruction of Jerusalem after Nebuchadnezzar conquered the city in 586 BCE. The area was populated later, in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah (sixth century BCE). In the time of the Second Temple, most of the Jewish population resided within the walls of the city. According to archaeological and historical findings, settlement in the area continued after the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE). In the Byzantine and early Muslim periods, settlement in the area was quite developed, including a Karaite neighborhood. The area was destroyed in an earthquake in 1033, and from then until the start of the modern era the hill was only sparsely populated. Over the years, the village of Silwan grew on the hill east of the Kidron River Valley, and its Palestinian residents continued to cultivate the land of Wadi Hilweh, west of the river.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, BARON EDMOND DE ROTHSCHILD acquired land on the eastern slopes of the Wadi Hilweh hill with the intention of dedicating it to archaeological excavations. A short time earlier, in the 1880s, a group of Jews purchased lands in an area near southern Silwan, where they established a community known as Kfar Shiloah (Shiloah Village). At its height over a hundred Jewish families of Yemenite origin lived there. During World War I, residents began abandoning the village, and by the late 1920s and early 1930s all the Jewish residents of Kfar Shiloah had moved elsewhere.

Since 1967 the number of residents in Silwan has increased significantly, and the village has assumed a more urban character. But over the years, the neighborhood suffered from intense neglect on the part of Israeli authorities: Silwan ranks at the bottom of Palestinian Jerusalem neighborhoods according to the Central Bureau of Statistics' socioeconomic index. Many of Silwan's ROADS are unpaved. The neighborhood lacks regular garbage collection and some of its houses are not connected to the sewage system. One high school serves 31,000 residents, and students are forced to travel to distant schools in the city. The neighborhood does not have a public youth center or community centers in general, nor does it have a single public park. This situation is repeated throughout all of Palestinian East Jerusalem and reflects municipal and national government policy that encourages the Palestinians to leave. But the main tool that Israel has used to gain control over sizable parts of Silwan by undermining residents' hold on their land has been with "laws" in general, and with construction "laws" (or the lack thereof) in particular.

In the forty-two years of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, the planning institutions have approved only a few town planning schemes, and in only a small fraction of Silwan's territory. In the Wadi Hilweh and al-Bustan area, not a single town planning scheme has been approved. Since 1967, fewer than twenty construction PERMITS have been issued to Palestinians in the Wadi Hilweh area, and those were mainly for minor additions to existing construction.

As of 2009, the vast majority of buildings in Silwan in general and in al-Bustan in particular were built without permits, and thousands of residents of the neighborhood are "construction offenders" in theory and in practice. As such they face the constant threat of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS. Since 1967, hundreds of Palestinian residents have been convicted of building without permits and have been fined for amounts ranging from a few thousand to tens of thousands of shekels, and hundreds of houses have been demolished. Against this background, the JM announced that it intends to carry out massive house demolitions (of some ninety houses) in the al-Bustan quarter on the grounds of their being "illegal."

The policy of enforcing construction laws is completely different when it comes to settlers' homes in Silwan, as is seen in the case of Beit Yehonatan, a seven-story building built by a contractor for the ATERET COHANIM organization in the heart of the settler "Yemenite Neighborhood" in Silwan. The building was erected without a permit and deviated from the regional outline plan, which permits building up to two stories. The legal counsel of the JM testified in writing that he was under heavy pressure from right-wing Knesset members and even from senior officials of the JM to "legalize" Beit Yehonatan ex post facto. Despite the illegality of its very existence, the entrance to Beit Yehonatan received constant police protection, and as of today its tenants continue to receive ongoing security protection, financed by the Housing Ministry.

While Israel systematically undermines the legal connection between the Palestinian residents of Silwan and their homes and lands, it has deepened its control of the neighborhood in stages connected to rules regarding land and houses: until

1992, by seizing houses, some of which were declared "absentee property," on the basis of the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW; after 1992, by buying houses from Palestinians, through a process that involved—according to witnesses, accomplices, and—Israeli court rulings threats, false depositions, forged documents, and posthumous witness signatures.

In the mid-1980s, ARIEL SHARON, then minister of planning and construction, encouraged Jewish settlement in East Jerusalem, and his office orchestrated the transfer of dozens of properties in the Old City and throughout East Jerusalem to settler organizations. This policy was temporarily delayed following the Klugman Commission's presentation of its conclusions in 1992, but by the late 1990s, the momentum accelerated again.

The Takeover of Palestinian Homes

The first settlers from the ELAD organization entered the City of David/Wadi Hilweh area in October 1991 after comprehensive preparation by Ariel Sharon and with the active help of his ministry. Ministry companies transferred properties inhabited by Palestinian residents to ELAD in exchange for nominal sums of money, after some of those properties were taken away from their Palestinian owners on the basis of "absentee property" laws. The main (but not only) execution contractor of this policy was the ELAD organization. ELAD—there should be no doubt—is part and parcel of the settlement movement, but in the saga of Silwan ELAD serves for all practical purposes as a government agency.

The method of taking control of property worked like this: Be'eri, the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND (JNF), and Himnuta (a subsidiary private company of the JNF) reached an unwritten agreement that Be'eri would identify properties that had been owned by Jewish families in Silwan in the early twentieth century, and the JNF would act to evict the Palestinians who have lived in them for decades. Under the law, it is allowed to register property as "absentee" if it has been proven that the owner of the property was absent on the effective date in May or June 1948.

The registration of property as absentee is not public, and the owner of the property has no way of knowing that his property was so registered; he cannot stop the expropriation with legal measures; and he is not entitled to compensation for property registered as absentee. However, he can go to court and ask to cancel registration of the property as absentee if he can prove that the owner of the property was not absent on the effective date in 1948. ELAD undertook to compensate the Palestinians who were evicted from their homes and, in exchange, to rent or lease the properties from the JNF for token fees—usually protected tenancy—for an unlimited period of time in another location. Those agreements were reached and made without tender. So, for instance, in 1987 an agreement was signed between the JNF and ELAD that the organization would pay eviction compensation to the Gozlan family, who lived on a property that had belonged in the distant past to the Jewish National Fund, and in exchange the JNF gave ELAD a protected tenancy contract for the property. The fact that the father of the Gozlan family saved Jewish lives in the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES did not help Mohamed Gozlan and in 2005, after exhausting protracted legal procedures, he was evicted from his home with his family.

Another method of acquiring houses under the Absentee Property Law involves the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY declaring certain Palestinian properties "absentee property" as a result of information that he received (sometimes from the very same settler organizations plus a Palestinian who worked in their service) and signing a series of depositions, many of which were false. The "absentee" homes were transferred to the ILA, then to the Jerusalem Development Authority, and from there to the Amidar Company or another branch of the Housing Ministry, which, in turn, transferred them to ELAD under protected tenancy contracts and in exchange for small sums.

It is of note that as early as 1968, Attorney General MEIR SHAMGAR forbade the Absentee Property Law from being applied to Palestinians from East Jerusalem, but after the administration of MENAHEM BEGIN was established in 1977, the law was reactivated at the initiative of then–agriculture minister Ariel Sharon. In 1992, following the KLUGMAN REPORT, Attorney General Harish ordered that the use of the law be terminated; but in 2004 Sharon, as prime minister, decided to activate it again. A year, later Attorney General Mazuz, quoting Shamgar's arguments, ordered application of the law to "stop immediately."

Nevertheless, in the course of taking over property in Silwan, the problematic law was

applied extensively. One of the properties the custodian seized in Silwan was the Abbasi family home near the Gihon Spring, which included nine apartments and two warehouses. David Be'eri of ELAD had his eye on the Abbasi house and posed as a tour guide so he could see the house from the inside. In September 1987 the Abbasi house was declared "absentee," as a result of the pressure that the ILA and Be'eri put on the Custodian of Absentee Property. In July 1991 the Amidar Company rented the property to ELAD, and on 10 October that year members of ELAD broke into the house in the middle of the night while the family was sleeping. The intruders suspended themselves by rope from a window in the roof, broke door locks, threw furniture into the courtyard, and ascended to the roof, where they broke into song and dance and waved the Israeli flag in the light of the breaking day. The Jerusalem District Court ruled that the declaration of the Abbasi home as absentee property was based on a false deposition, without any factual or legal basis, and the entire process was tainted by "extreme lack of good faith." Nevertheless, as of this writing (2009), that property remains caught in convoluted legal procedures, ELAD people live in it, and the Abbasi family remains dispossessed.

Altogether, in this manner sixty-eight properties in East Jerusalem were transferred to the hands of right-wing settler organizations, including fourteen in Silwan that were transferred to ELAD. Additionally, according to figures collected by advocate Daniel Seidemann of Ir Amim, the Jewish National Fund and the Custodian of Absentee Property transferred 28 dunums (7 acres) of Palestinian land in Silwan to ELAD. Moreover, according to Seidemann's figures, the government gave ELAD two more dunums that it owned in Silwan, a legacy of land that the BRITISH MANDATE government had expropriated, and lands that the state had purchased at the settlers' request. All in all, the state and the JNF gave ELAD 36 dunums (9 acres) of the total area (about 116 dunums, or 29 acres) of the City of David/Wadi Hilweh, or one quarter of the neighborhood's land.

In light of the findings of the Klugman Commission (1992), it is possible to outline the dynamic by which properties such as the Abbasi house were transferred from Palestinian hands to Israeli ownership, under the auspices and support of government agencies:

1. Representatives of the settlers' organizations (ELAD, Ateret Cohanim, etc.) identified Palestinian properties considered desirable for settler takeover and were involved in the process of declaring the property as absentee. Some of the depositions were signed before the organizations' own lawyers and many of them were signed by a serial deposer who was proven to be unreliable.
2. The Custodian of Absentee Property declared the property to be absentee without checking the veracity of the depositions.
3. The custodian "sold" (for nothing) the property to the Jerusalem Development Authority (of the ILA).
4. A joint committee of the Amidar Company and the Ministry of Housing decided to whom to lease or rent the properties. The committee included representatives of the same right-wing organizations that were involved, as described above, in "marking" the properties as absentee. As Amidar project managers they also determined the amounts of money that would be allocated for renovating the said properties before they were handed over to the Jewish tenants, and approved their security budgets. All told, such renovations amounted to tens of millions of shekels.
5. The same committee members also decided to lease or rent the properties to Ateret Cohanim (in the Old City) and to ELAD (Silwan)—that is, to the organizations they represented.

Following the findings of the Klugman Commission, the government, headed by Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN, instructed the State Comptroller's Office to investigate the affair, but the investigation was discontinued at the request of the security cabinet. Additionally, the actions of the "shadow cabinet" were curbed, and in the following decade Israel's settlement enterprise in Silwan switched to a different method: the direct purchase of properties from their Palestinian owners. That is how the area called the "Givati parking lot" in the northern part of the neighborhood was bought. The area was part of the "Aderet compound" in the middle of Wadi Hilweh Street, which the municipality calls the "Ma'alot Ir David" ("the ascent of the city of David"), and which was bought by IRVING MOSKOWITZ's Everest Foundation, as well as the area containing "Beit Yehonatan." Likewise, representatives of

the settlers have claimed in various interviews that they have bought additional properties in Silwan but haven't moved into them, in order to protect the lives of the Palestinian COLLABORATORS.

At least in some of the transactions in which Palestinians supposedly sold properties in Silwan to Jews, the buyers made use of fake documents. In at least one case the court nullified such a transaction. In another case police are investigating suspected criminal aspects in a transaction to Jews. There is also proof of pressure being placed on Palestinians to sell properties to Jews. The house purchases are conducted with the precision of military operations. "When I enter a house," Be'eri told Minister Avi Dichter, "I go in as if it were a military operation. . . . Always with a gun, with radio, with someone with me and with somebody outside that knows." Before the purchase, an intelligence network is used to find out about, among other things, conflicts and disputes among Palestinian families in Silwan that could help buying a property. Muhammad Maraga, who served as a straw man in transactions between Palestinians and settlers from Ateret Cohanim, testified that he had been recruited to work for the settlers after he got in trouble with the law. His recruiter was a member of the Jerusalem Police Department's minority division. According to Maghara, many of the Palestinian straw men used by the settlers have criminal records.

Muhammad Maraga's story, reported by Meron Rappoport in *Ha'aretz* on 1 April 2005, illustrates the settlers' methods in working with Palestinian collaborators. Maraga was induced—by vast amounts of money, good times overseas, casinos, limousines, and prostitutes—to forge documents, buy properties, and even sell a plot owned by his extended family. A man with a weak character and a criminal record, he began by buying property for the settlers, chiefly in the Yemenite quarter of Silwan. First, he bought the home of the Asla family for Ateret Cohanim and received brokerage fees of $10,000, and he later bought a plot from his uncle Hamidan Maraga, for which he was paid 20,000 Jordanian dinars ($28,000) and received a package holiday in Antalya and sessions with call girls in Jerusalem's finest hotels. Maraga was promised that once the building was constructed on the plot, the settlers would help his immediate family emigrate to Canada. He then bought two other buildings in the Yemenite neighborhood, one belonging to the family of Achmed Faraj and another in his own family's possession. For those two deals he was paid $30,000 and given a visit to Atlantic City, New Jersey. However, the owners of one of the buildings filed a complaint with the police declaring that the documents under which the transactions had been performed were forged. At that point Maraga realized he was in danger and began planning his flight from Israel, but the settlers convinced him to remain in the country until the transaction was completed and promised him a $150,000 fee and a plane ticket overseas. Before he could leave, however, Maraga was forced by the village elders to flee Silwan, and he hid out for a period in Eilat until he disappeared in August 2005. No trace of him has since been found.

In another case, a key decisionmaker in the purchase transactions of the right-wing organizations in Silwan introduced himself as a "real estate broker." He posed as an Israeli lawyer (which he was not) and informed Palestinian residents in writing that they had debts to the tax authorities, but could have them erased if they sold their properties.

As noted earlier, due to the lack of town plan schemes in Silwan, most of the Palestinian construction in the area is done without building permits; and legal procedures, fines, and demolition orders are pending against many residents. Residents of Silwan say that representatives of the settlers approach them and promise that if they sell their real estate to Jews, the legal procedures against them will be dropped. Senior officials in the Jerusalem Municipality confirmed that settler representatives approached them more than once to find out whether and how they could close illegal construction cases, after the real estate was sold to Jews.

Despite the suspicion of criminal activities in the Silwan transactions, no charges have so far been brought in these cases. Moreover, when members of the organizations enter or invade Palestinian homes, as in the case of the houses in the "Yemenite neighborhood," they receive police guards, without the police checking the legality of the transactions or the legal status of the buildings into which the Jews move. On the other hand, these cases illustrate the complaints of the Palestinians that the Jewish organizations, and the straw men who operate on their behalf, enjoy immunity before the law, and that their chances of winning legal disputes are scant when the settlers present "purchase papers" of their properties. Moreover, the legal procedures take many years, and most of the Palestinians whose

properties have been seized have difficulty paying legal fees.

Wadi Hilweh is guarded by the Modi'in Ezrahi company for 20 million shekels a year (as of 2005), funded by the Housing Ministry. The Modi'in Ezrahi guards serve as a "private police force" for the settlers; they supervise the movement of the Palestinians in the neighborhood with cameras, restrict their movement, and in some cases even arrest them. The guards prevent Palestinians from parking near their homes and capriciously throw up ROADBLOCKS and frequently erect CHECKPOINTS at the entrance to the neighborhood, allowing only Jewish residents to pass through. The security company installed fifty-three cameras throughout Wadi Hilweh, some above private Palestinian homes, which broadcast to a control center in one of the buildings that is under the control of ELAD in the village. The supervision by the private guards employed by the settler organizations augments the RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT imposed by the IDF and police on the residents of Wadi Hilweh.

The Takeover of Public Space

An additional stage in the program to assert Jewish control over Silwan began in the 1990s. It sought to take control of the public space in Silwan by transferring the national park that was under the control of the Israel Nature and Parks Authority (INPA), including the archaeological excavations in the area, to the exclusive control of ELAD. Settlement in the national park has proven an effective and sophisticated instrument for the de facto takeover of land, and for rewriting the historic memory of the area.

The area of the City of David National Park (CDNP) covers 24 dunums (6 acres). It is located at the heart of the Wadi Hilweh/City of David neighborhood, and includes sites such as Siloam Channel, Siloam Pool, and the excavation site at the City of David. In historical value it is significant, both nationally and universally. The park is one of the components of the Walls of Jerusalem National Park, whose area is 1,100 dunums (275 acres). For many years the INPA delegated management of the Walls of Jerusalem National Park to the Jerusalem Municipality. But in October 1997, a year after BENJAMIN NETANYAHU was elected prime minister and Ariel Sharon was appointed minister of infrastructure, an "authorization contract" was signed between the ILA and ELAD, giving the organization the "guardianship and maintenance" of the Walls of Jerusalem National Park within the confines of the City of David National Park in Silwan for seven years. The contract was signed without being preceded by a tender, and its existence was hidden from relevant government bodies such as the Israel Antiquities Authority. In its wake, the Jerusalem Municipality, which at the time was headed by EHUD OLMERT, transferred its powers over the park to ELAD. That contract too was made without a tender. The transfer of powers was done contrary to the opinion of the senior professional echelon in the INPA, but with the declared support of Minister of the Environment Rafael Eitan (a member of the ultra-right-wing TEHIYA PARTY, founder of the ultranationalist TZOMET party, and an advocate of TRANSFER).

The move drew opposition from archaeologists and the Israel Antiquities Authority. Following a petition to the Israeli Supreme Court, the Israel Lands Administration canceled its permission, and the attorney general told the court that control of the park would be restored to the National Parks Authority, as it had been in the past. Despite the commitment to the High Court of Justice, in 2002 the INPA renewed the agreement with ELAD to manage the City of David National Park. The minister of the environment, with whom the INPA is affiliated, was at that time Tzachi Hanegbi (a former justice minister who in 2006 was indicted for making political appointments to civil service posts during his time as environment minister). The agreement was made without a tender and without a discussion in the plenary of the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, which is supposed to oversee its activity. According to the chairman of the Council of National Parks and Nature Reserves, which supervises the INPA, the City of David is the only case in which the administration of a national park was delegated to a private political body. Nonetheless, as of this writing ELAD has managed the site, collected entry fees, and transferred the money to its coffers. Its representatives guide visitors on tours that include a visit to the Siloam Channel.

The handover of the control of the City of David National Park is significant for several reasons. First, it reduces the public space for the Palestinian residents of Silwan. About a quarter of all of the public areas that in the past were open to all are now closed to the local residents, and entry into

them requires a fee and a security check. In addition, the transfer of the park to ELAD marks its transformation from a national park to "a park of the Jewish nation only," while subordinating its history and archaeology to the service of the Jewish narrative. According to the authorization that ELAD received for managing the City of David National Park, it is the main underwriter of the excavations at that site, whose historic importance is enormous, and ELAD has the power to influence their location, dimensions, and goals. Moreover, ELAD decides almost exclusively how the findings will be presented to visitors at the CDNP as well as the content of the guided tours. Visitors to the park do not receive "regular" history lessons about the area's past, including its Canaanite, Jewish, Byzantine, and Muslim history, but a lesson in Jewish history, with almost exclusive emphasis on the periods of Jewish settlement at the site. The ELAD guides either fail to point out anything that is not from the Jewish period or, worse, tell visitors that things from other periods are actually from the Jewish era.

The City of David is one of the most visited sites in Israel. According to figures provided by ELAD, 360,272 people visited the national park in 2007, and of those, 152,527 received guided tours from the ELAD visitor center. Moreover, tens of thousands of soldiers, on various joint programs run by ELAD and the Israel Defense Forces, visit annually. The importance of these "heritage tours," when conducted by tour guides informed by a declared national religious ideology, cannot be overstated. The tours are led by ELAD guides, for whom, according to a Tel Aviv University archaeologist who excavated the City of David in the 1980s, "history began with the Kingdom of David and ended with the destruction of the Second Temple, and began again when they [ELAD] settled here at Silwan."

The tours for soldiers are part of two separate projects jointly run by the Israel Defense Forces and ELAD: the Moriah project, as part of the education corps, and a project by the chief military rabbinate. Many different parties are involved in the Moriah project, but one important one is the "City of David Visitor Center." An officer from the education corps information unit (stationed in the Jewish Quarter), who served in the Moriah project, related that the tour, the buses, the entrance to the sites, and lunch are all at the expense of ELAD. As for the contents, he related, "It was important to the information unit to present the three religions in Jerusalem, but they [Be'eri and Dvir Kahane of ELAD] insisted only on Judaism. You could not pick between the periods. You had to take Second Temple." Another officer who served in the project said, "They demanded that every tour go through the City of David." An officer who served in the information unit said that he "was given training" by ELAD, and in it "they talked only about the Jewish narrative. They didn't mention the Palestinian residents; as if they jumped over 2000 years of history."

An additional problematic in the handover of the control of the City of David National Park to ELAD, with its sole focus on "Jewish" Jerusalem, became apparent in May 2008 when human bones from the eighth or ninth century, that is, the early Muslim period, were found at the Givati parking lot site. According to reports in *Ha'aretz*, the skeletons were cleared from the site without being reported to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as required by the Israel Antiquities Authority's (IAA) own regulations. The IAA called the incident a "grave mishap," but there seems little doubt that the IAA is aware that ELAD, an organization with a declared ideological agenda, treats the archaeology of the City of David in a biased manner.

The greatest significance of the handover of the CDNP to ELAD is, simply, territorial. The case of "Plot #44" illustrates what the public areas of Silwan can expect in the future. This plot is east of the main road of the neighborhood of Wadi Hilweh. For many years the Kara'in family who lived nearby cultivated the plot and planted it with olive, almond, and other trees. When the national park was designated at Silwan in 1974, the plot was included in the boundaries of the park, but the family continued to cultivate it. In 2002, the family's patriarch, Khaled Kara'in, stated that people of the Israel Nature and Parks Authority entered the plot with David Be'eri, who said, "there will be a nice kindergarten here." A month later all of the trees that Khaled's father had planted in the plot were uprooted and the land was leveled. Shortly thereafter several mobile homes were placed on the land, which serve as ELAD offices and warehouses. Next to them is a large tent that serves as a synagogue and a space for social functions. Five years later, on 17 December 2007, ELAD submitted to the Jerusalem planning committee a town plan scheme in which the organization asked permission to build a synagogue,

kindergarten classrooms, ten housing units, and underground parking for 100 cars on Plot #44 and a nearby plot even though the Israel Nature and Parks Authority's law forbids any "degradation" of a national park, "including . . . a change of the terrain, including digging, constructing a building or facility," unless a written permit is received from the authority. There is no evidence of ELAD receiving any permit from the authority. Of note is that Plot #44 is adjacent to the Aderet compound, under the private ownership of the Irving Moskowitz Everest Foundation.

Additionally, the Israel Nature and Parks Authority's inspectors frequently harass Palestinians. In October 2008, when Kamal Jabr built a step out of soil in the area next to his house, so that his old father could reach the olive trees he cultivates, he received a letter from the INPA in which he was ordered to remove the dirt step or face legal proceedings. Other residents of Wadi Hilweh report cases in which INPA's inspectors entered their homes in the neighborhood and confiscated birds in cages, claiming they were protected birds, and cases in which inspectors who find garbage next to Palestinian homes fine them, claiming that the Palestinians are degrading the national park.

Control Underground

The Israeli takeover of Silwan goes beyond the aboveground space of the settlements and "nature and parks" to the underground area of archaeological digs. ELAD is deeply involved in all of the archaeological excavations at the City of David and Mount Zion, usually as underwriter and sponsor. These excavations have been greatly expanded during the years 2005–2009. Most of them are fenced off and closed to the general public, preventing the entrance of residents to large spaces that, until the 1990s, were part of the public space of Silwan.

The first excavations, carried out by the IAA, were begun in the early 1990s in the area of the "Fountain House" next to the Gihon Spring, on the eastern slopes of the City of David Hill. Since then, the excavations in the "Fountain House" area have been going on for fifteen years. In the last few years, excavation activity has expanded to other sites in the City of David/Wadi Hilweh, including Siloam Pool and the Givati parking lot.

Some of these excavations were carried out under residents' homes in violation of the law and in a way that caused harm to their property. In January 2008, parts of the road on Wadi Hilweh Street sank; only then did the residents discover that the excavation in the area went under their homes and the land they owned. Seven local residents filed a petition to the High Court of Justice to stop the work, and the court issued an *order nisi* to stop it. In addition, twenty-five Palestinian families living next to the Givati parking lot petitioned the High Court in November 2008 to stop work at that site. The petitioners complained that the excavations were causing various kinds of damage to their homes: floors sinking, parts of ceilings collapsing, cracks opening in the walls and floors. Moreover, the work was being performed from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M. without a break, using heavy machinery and causing intolerable noise. The petition went on to argue that the excavation was part of the groundwork for construction of a giant 115,000-square-meter (28.4-acre) commercial center, even though such a building does not have a construction license, nor was a town plan scheme submitted for it. In an *order nisi* issued by the High Court, the archaeological excavation itself was allowed to continue, but drilling, digging, and construction at the site were forbidden. The Jerusalem Municipality was to check whether work at the site was licensed, and if it was not, to stop it immediately. Work has not stopped. In February 2009, part of the stairwell leading from the City of David visitor center at the Gihon Spring collapsed, along with an electric pole that stood next to the stairs. Large amounts of dirt were cleared from the site, including many antique pottery vessels.

The Future Silwan as an Archaeological Amusement Park

The continuing expropriation of the geographical space of Silwan in favor of Jewish Jerusalem will soon reach a new record in the form of Town Plan Scheme 11555, deposited with the local building and planning committee at the end of 2007 and covering 548 dunums (135 acres) of the area of Silwan, including the eastern slopes of the Wadi Hilweh/City of David hillside and most of the al-Bustan quarter.

Town Plan Scheme 11555, developed by the Jerusalem municipality, intends to transform the whole area of the City of David/Wadi Hilweh from a Palestinian neighborhood into an Israeli and Jewish archaeological park, while building on an area of 100,000 square meters (24.7 acres). Implementing the plan requires destroying the al-Bustan area

almost completely (the municipality says twenty-one to twenty-two houses will remain standing in it after the demolition), evicting more than a thousand of its residents, and expropriating large properties from the Palestinians. This area had been designated as an "open public area, special public area and area reserved for archaeological excavations"; however, the new plan designates it as "areas for roads, parking lots, paths, a promenade, open areas, a special public area, public buildings and institutions, engineering installations and housing." Among the main features mentioned in the plan are: on the ruins of al-Bustan, an archaeological garden in the "spirit of the Second Temple" will be built; a promenade will be built from Mount Zion to Dung Gate; and there will be a cable car connecting the City of David to the Mount of Olives or between the City of David and Armon HaNatziv Promenade. Additionally, TPS 11555 involves building a tunnel ("a three-dimensional compound") that will expose the city's drainage system from Herod's time. That tunnel will begin at Siloam Pool, ascend under the residents' homes up to the Givati parking lot, run under the Dung Gate, and exit at the archaeological park in the southern Western Wall, a few meters from the al-Haram ash-Sharif and only a few dozen meters from the opening of the Western Wall tunnel (the HASMONEAN TUNNEL). The Western Wall tunnel itself is also undergoing a significant expansion and was recently connected by tunnels to a synagogue on al-Wad Street (HaGay) in the Muslim quarter of the Old City, on the way to which it runs under the homes of Palestinian residents. This plan is being carried out by the IAA in cooperation with the East Jerusalem Development Authority, underwritten by ELAD.

In the town plan scheme, al-Bustan is called "area cell 309," and it will "be developed as a continuous garden . . . using historic elements and combining the water flowing from the Siloam Pool" and will include "shady sitting areas, various paths such as wooden decks and stairs . . . escalators and visitor transportation systems," after a "landscape rehabilitation, including construction of traditional terraces," with an emphasis on the "historic and cultural significance of the valleys, water works, necropolis and vegetation that characterized the site." Added to this plan is another by the Jerusalem Municipality, born in a government decision from August 2001 and being carried out in cooperation between ELAD, the Ministry of Transportation, and the East Jerusalem Development Authority, to invest 30 million shekels (approximately $7.5 million) in upgrading the road ascending from Siloam Pool to the Givati parking lot. This plan includes building nine parking lots in Wadi Hilweh, most of which will be built on private Palestinian land, whose expropriation the Jerusalem Municipality announced in 2008. The residents, who asked to postpone the work, petitioned the court, with the help of the ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL and Bimkom (Planners for Planning Rights, an Israeli nonprofit organization formed in 1999 by a group of planners and architects, to strengthen democracy and human rights in the field of planning), and asked for the land they owned to be used to build vital services for the residents and not parking lots for tourists coming to the City of David.

The idea to destroy al-Bustan and build a national park on its ruins was proposed in 1995 by the steering committee for the development of tourism in Jerusalem, but only in 2004 did Jerusalem city engineer Uri Shetreet instruct the building inspection department to clear the "illegal structures," that is, the homes of Palestinian residents. Publication of the intention to demolish the homes drew Palestinian and international protest, and Uri Lupolianski, the mayor at the time, suspended the plan. In the last months of 2008 the demolitions in al-Bustan resumed, and city bulldozers, accompanied by a large police force, came to the neighborhood to destroy the home of the Siyam family and forcibly evict the family members.

After the November 2008 elections for mayor of Jerusalem that brought Nir Barkat to the position, the municipality began a new drive and asked the residents of the neighborhood to evacuate voluntarily to another part of East Jerusalem. The residents rejected the offer. On 1 March 2009 a commercial strike took place in East Jerusalem and the West Bank in protest against the intention to demolish the al-Bustan homes. Hillary Clinton, the new secretary of state in the Barack Obama administration, mentioned the issue during her visit to Jerusalem, when she said that demolishing the homes was "not helpful" to the peace process.

In March 2009, in the al-Bustan area of Silwan, eighty-eight to ninety homes, housing some 1,500 residents, were re-served with eviction notices—notices first issued in 2005 but deferred due to international and especially US pressure. With the

reinstatement of the eviction decrees, Mayor Barkat, with the support of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, offered to transfer the residents to Beit Hanina or "somewhere else." About seventy Jewish families already live in Silwan in homes previously owned by Palestinians or new homes built on land after a Palestinian home was demolished.

See also Absentee Property Law; Ateret Cohanim; ELAD; Holy Basin; Israeli Supreme Court; Jerusalem; Klugman Report, 1993; Settler Groups and Settlements, East Jerusalem; Third Temple Movement

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Simpson Commission, 1930

See HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION

Sinai/Suez War, 1956

On 29 October 1956, in a premeditated agreement with the European powers, Israel attacked EGYPT through the Sinai Peninsula, and within forty-eight hours Great Britain and FRANCE invaded Egypt. France wanted to punish JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, the Egyptian leader, for supporting the rebels against France in Algeria; Britain wanted to punish him for nationalizing the Suez Canal; and Israel wanted to topple him and acquire additional territory, including Sharm al-Shaykh, al-Arish, Abu Uwayulah, and the GAZA STRIP. The UNITED STATES, SOVIET UNION, and UNITED NATIONS exerted intense pressure on all three countries, which forced the French and British to depart on 7 November; however, Israel defied all entreaties to withdraw, remaining in occupation of the entire Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip until March 1957. A United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was stationed on the Egyptian side of the border and kept the peace until 1967.

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Siniora, Hanna (1937–)

Hanna Siniora is a Palestinian journalist, editor, politician, and diplomat. Born in JERUSALEM to an Anglican Christian family, he was trained as a pharmacist in India and graduated in 1969. In 1974 Siniora became the editor of the Palestinian daily *al-Fajr,* following the disappearance of Yusuf Nasr, and he was editor-in-chief from 1983 to 1993. In 1978 Siniora established *Al-Usbu'a al-Jadid*, a pro-PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION journal that appeared intermittently until becoming a weekly in 1982, then a bimonthly after November 1988. Israel allowed *Al-Usbu'a al-Jadid* to circulate in the WEST BANK for only one year, during 1991. In 1985, under joint editorship with Zuhayr al-Rayyes,

Siniora established a third publication, *Al-Mawkef,* that appeared weekly until April 1987. Israel permitted distribution of this journal only within Jerusalem, and political disagreement between the editors led to its demise. Siniora subsequently founded the *Jerusalem Times* and the *New Middle East Magazine* (both established mid-1994).

Siniora was active in the First INTIFADA (1987–1993), when he articulated strategies of nonviolent resistance. He advocated that Palestinian communities become self-sufficient in the basic necessities of life so they would not have to buy Israeli products, pay taxes, or work for Israeli employers. Siniora expressed the hope that such methods would do "what the Gandhi movement did in India and the black and civil rights movement did in the United States." He served as adviser to the Palestinian delegation at the MADRID CONFERENCE (1991) and later joined the Palestinian-Jordanian negotiating team. He was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council during the OSLO ACCORDS (1993–2000) but resigned in protest against the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY's corruption. Siniora is cochair of the Israel-Palestinian Center for Research and Information (IPCRI) in Jerusalem and chairs the Palestinian Chamber of Commerce in its relations with the UNITED STATES and Europe. An occasional writer for the *Jerusalem Times*, he is also the general manager of the Biladi advertising agency in Jerusalem.

In June 2002 Siniora was a signatory to a statement that appeared in *al-Quds* appealing for an end to SUICIDE BOMBINGS of Israelis by Palestinians. In September 2005, together with Gershon Baskin and under the umbrella of the IPCRI, he produced "The Baskin-Siniora Peace Plan: Creating the Two-State Reality—The Six Point Plan." More recently, Siniora has taken on a new vocation: he is broadcasting on the new Voice of Peace, a venture of Israel's Givat Haviva Jewish-Arab Center for Peace. The station's programming—music and news—is in Hebrew, Arabic, and English.

Six Day War

See WAR, 1967

Sokolow, Nahum (1859–1936)

Nahum Sokolow was a prominent Zionist leader, pioneer in Hebrew journalism, and prolific Hebrew author. Born in Wyszogrod, Russian Poland, into a rabbinic family, he received a traditional Jewish education. In secular subjects, he spoke German, French, Spanish, and Italian as well as English, Yiddish, Hebrew, Polish, and Russian. At the age of seventeen, he began writing reports for the Hebrew newspaper *HaTzefira* and soon became a regular columnist, finally becoming its editor and publisher. He was unique in being able to attract as his reading public both Westernized Jewish intellectuals and extreme, anti-Haskalah Orthodox rabbis. By profession he was a journalist, but eventually he became an author and published a number of books, including one on Hebrew geography and another on ANTI-SEMITISM. In 1901 he wrote a tract in which he attempted to convince religious Jews that, despite the secular leadership of the Zionist movement, there was no ideological reason for them to oppose the cause. Sokolow later translated Zionist leader THEODOR HERZL's *Altneuland* into Hebrew, giving it the title *Tel-Aviv*. In 1918 he wrote one of the earliest accounts of the history of ZIONISM, beginning his study in the mid-seventeenth century. In fact, Sokolow wrote so much and on so many topics that the Hebrew poet HAYYIM NACHMAN BIALIK once remarked that it would take 300 camels to bring all his writings together in one place.

When Herzl's *The Jewish State* was published, Sokolow dismissed as an illusion the idea of Eretz Yisrael, which claimed the whole land of biblical Palestine for the Jewish people. However, Sokolow went through a metamorphosis and rallied to the Zionist movement, in particular after David Wolffsohn, Herzl's successor as president of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO), called on him to become the WZO's secretary general. Sokolow held this position from 1907 to 1909, but differences over the political nature of Wolffsohn's Zionism led to a rift between the two men. In 1911, under a new administration, Sokolow became responsible for the political portfolio and tried to win support for the Zionist idea in the UNITED STATES and Britain. Just before the outbreak of World War I, he visited various Arab leaders with the same intention, but, with the outbreak of hostilities, he moved to England, where he worked closely with CHAIM WEIZMANN.

Sokolow became a key figure in the negotiations for the BALFOUR DECLARATION, in which the British government promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, when he met with French

officials and won a pro-Zionist statement from them in May 1917. Cardinal Gasparri, the papal secretary of state, received Sokolow and assured him that Zionism need not fear opposition from the VATICAN. These missions elevated his status in the movement, as evidenced by the fact that, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, he headed the Zionist delegation. In 1921 Sokolow was elected chairperson of the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE, during which time he traveled extensively, putting the movement's case before various dignitaries, including Italy's Mussolini. In 1931, following Weizmann's departure from the WZO presidency, Sokolow assumed his mantle and continued his policies. When, in 1935, Weizmann returned to the presidency, Sokolow was elected honorary president and assumed responsibilities in the newly formed Cultural Department.

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Sons of Martyrs

The Sons of Martyrs is an institution of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION that cares for and educates the children of men who have been killed fighting for the Palestinian cause.

South Hebron Mountain

See HEBRON, DISTRICT SOUTHERN AREA

South Lebanon Army

The South Lebanon Army (SLA), also "South Lebanese Army," was a Lebanese militia that emerged during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). After 1979 the militia operated under the authority of SAAD HADDAD's Government of Free Lebanon.

In 1976, as a result of the civil war, the Lebanese army began to break up. Major Saad Haddad, commanding an army battalion in the south, broke away from the Lebanese army and founded a group known as the Free Lebanon Army, which was initially based in the towns of Marjayoun and Qlayaa in southern Lebanon. It fought against various groups, including the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), AMAL, and, after the 1982 Israeli invasion, the newly emerging HIZBULLAH.

During the first Israeli invasion of LEBANON in 1978, when Tel Aviv established a self-proclaimed "security zone" in southern Lebanon, it allowed the Free Lebanon Army to gain control over a much wider area in southern Lebanon. The Free Lebanon Army was renamed the South Lebanon Army in May 1980. Following Haddad's death due to cancer in 1984, leadership was assumed by Antoine Lahad (a retired lieutenant general).

From its inception, the SLA was closely allied with Israel, policing its "security zone" and fighting against the PLO and other Lebanese guerrilla forces. In return, Israel supplied the organization with arms, uniforms, and other logistical equipment.

In 1985 the SLA opened the Khiam detention center in Khiam, southern Lebanon. It was widely reported that torture was a common tactic and occurred on a large scale in Khiam. Israel denied any involvement, even though the SLA and Israel were closely intertwined at this point in history, and claimed that Khiam was the sole responsibility of the SLA. This assertion has been contested by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International.

Because there were only 1,000 to 1,200 Israeli troops in southern Lebanon at any one time, the SLA carried much of the fighting itself. It also handled all civilian governmental operations in Israel's zone of control. Due to increasingly effective attacks on the SLA during the 1990s by Hizbullah, the SLA experienced a progressive loss of morale and members. By 2000 the SLA was reduced to 1,500 fighters as compared to 3,000 ten years earlier. (At its peak during the early 1980s, the SLA had been composed of over 5,000 fighters.)

When in May 2000 EHUD BARAK withdrew Israeli troops from Lebanon, Israeli forces handed over some forward positions in the occupied zone to the SLA; however, as the somewhat chaotic withdrawal progressed, civilians overran SLA positions and returned to their villages, while Hizbullah guerrillas quickly took control of the areas the SLA had previously controlled. With the Israeli retreat

the SLA quickly collapsed, and on 24 May 2000 the sight of Saad Haddad's statue being dragged through the streets of Marjayoun was a sure sign that the South Lebanon Army was gone.

Many SLA members, some with their families, fled to Israel, while others gave themselves up to the Lebanese authorities or were taken prisoner by Hizbullah, who handed them over to the police. Some accepted Israel's offer of full citizenship and a financial package similar to that granted to new immigrants, and settled permanently in Israel. On 6 April 2006 the Israeli Knesset Finance Committee approved the payment of 40,000 shekels per family to SLA veterans, to be paid over the course of seven years. The Government of Free Lebanon, on whose behalf the SLA fought, has operated from JERUSALEM since 2000 and still claims to be the true government of Lebanon.

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Soviet Jews

In the 1970s, the years of détente between the SOVIET UNION and the UNITED STATES, large numbers of Jews were allowed for the first time in some fifty years to leave the Soviet Union. The vast majority, over 130,000, made ALIYA to Israel. When the doors of détente closed in the late 1970s, once again the Soviet Jews (and everyone else) were locked in. The opportunity for emigration became available again only in the mid-1980s, after some strong lobbying by the West, especially by the RONALD REAGAN administration and through the Jackson-Vanick Amendment (which tied US trade with the Soviet Union to its release of Jews). Not surprisingly, tens of thousands of Jews clamored to leave. The question was to where?

The issue was made more difficult by the fact that Jews or anyone else could only leave the Soviet Union, with its record of ANTI-SEMITISM and persecution of Jews and Jewish life, if they had an official invitation and an entry visa to another country. Israel filled this role for the Soviet Jews, and virtually any Jew who wanted to leave could be assured of an automatic visa to Israel. On the strength of that visa, the person could leave Russia, and in the absence of direct flights to Israel, the would-be immigrants were taken to European destinations such as Vienna, where JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL representatives were on hand to complete the transfer to Israel. It soon became clear, however, that many of the Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union were looking for a way to the West, that is, the United States.

Many organizations, not all Zionist, were involved with the issue of Soviet Jewry. The major welfare agency of American Jewry assisting Jewish immigrants, the United Hebrew Immigrant Aid Service (HIAS), believed that Jews who had escaped from Russia should be helped to start over wherever they wanted and lobbied the US Congress and government to give Soviet Jews special preference as refugees. US refugee status has been reserved traditionally for those with a "well-founded fear of persecution" based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. HIAS leaders argued that being a Jew in the lands of the Soviet Union automatically opened one up to persecution and that therefore each Russian Jew who had managed to leave Soviet Russia and wished to come to America should be welcomed. With the active help of American Jewish organizations such as HIAS and others, the United States opened an office in Rome to provide assistance, and thousands of émigrés left Vienna for Rome. In May 1978, out of 1,169 Jews who left the Soviet Union on Israeli visas, only 109 chose to go to Israel.

The WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION and the Israeli government were furious at the approach of the American organization. The foundation of Israel and ZIONISM is the idea that every Jew must return to Zion/Israel, and anything, or anyone, who helped the Russian Jews to settle anywhere but Israel as a traitor. In addition, Israel needed immigrants to maintain its demographic superiority over Israeli

Arabs. In 2005, for example, the Jewish population of Israel (roughly 80 percent of the total) was 5,021,506. If the Soviet immigrants were subtracted from the total, the number of Jews in Israel would fall to 3,741,506, in comparison with the 1.3 million PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, altering the ratio of Palestinians to Jews considerably. Thus, from a demographic as well as a Zionist perspective, encouraging immigration from the Soviet Union has been an exceedingly important priority for Israel.

In the early 1980s, the Israeli government decided to fight the "dropout" issue of Soviet Jews choosing to immigrate to the United States in two ways. First, it exerted enormous pressure directly on the US government as well as on American Jewish leaders to reverse their position on refugee status for ex-Soviet Jews. Israel argued that these people were not Jewish refugees, since a refugee is a person who has no home to go to, whereas Israel was the natural homeland of Jews from all over the world, including all the Soviet Jews, according to Zionist ideology. Second, in a far more effective step, the Israeli government decided in June 1988 to organize more direct flights to Israel for Soviet Jews. Although HIAS opposed the Israeli government's initiatives, other American Jewish groups supported it and intensely lobbied the US government. Bowing to Israeli and domestic pressure, Washington set new and stringent limits on the number of Russian Jews permitted to enter the United States. Once the Reagan administration decided to restrict immigration, most Jews who wished to leave Russia would have to go to Israel.

According to the American-Israel Cooperative Enterprise, between the late 1970s and the end of 2003, some 1.28 million Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel from the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. However, the fall of communism in 1991 transformed the situation. Because their absorption in Israel has been accompanied by many problems, such as employment and housing availability, many Jews in Russia no longer believe that aliya is the solution to all their woes. With this has come the start of a new era based on the attempt to rebuild Jewish life in the lands of the former Soviet Union.

See also DEMOGRAPHY; DIASPORA, JEWISH; IMMIGRATION

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Soviet Union

See MOSCOW

State Land

Since the beginning of the OCCUPATION, Israel has used complex legal and bureaucratic mechanisms to take control of more than 50 percent of the LAND in the WEST BANK. This land has been used mainly to establish Jewish SETTLEMENTS and to create reserves of land for the future construction and expansion of settlements. The principal tool employed is to declare it "State Land," a process

that began in 1979 and is based on an interpretation of the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, which, according to Israel, was applicable in the West Bank at the time of Israel's 1967 Occupation of Palestinian territory. Other methods used to take control of Palestinian land include seizure for military needs, declaration of land as "abandoned property" or "absentee property," and expropriation of land for public needs—each based on different legal interpretations. In addition, the government of Israel has provided assistance to private citizens purchasing Palestinian land on the free market. Of all the methods used to gain Palestinian land, however, land seized by virtue of being declared State Land constitutes some 40 percent of the total.

In many cases, Palestinian residents have been unaware that their land has been registered in the name of the state, and by the time they discover this fact it is too late to appeal. The burden of proof rests with the Palestinian claiming ownership of the land, and, even if he meets this burden, the land may still remain registered in the name of the state on the grounds that it was transferred to the settlement "in good faith." Although the confiscation of land and the construction of settlements in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES are prohibited under INTERNATIONAL LAW, the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT of Justice has generally sanctioned the State Land method for acquiring territory for settlements. Initially, the court accepted the state's argument that the settlements met urgent military needs and allowed the state to seize private Palestinian land for this purpose. When the state began to declare land as State Land, the court declined to intervene to prevent this process.

Legal Foundations

In the 1970s, the Israeli government was faced with several demands. On the one hand, the government wanted to expand the settlement project, and others—the settlers, especially GUSH EMUNIM, and right-wing parties (for example, HERUT, GAHAL, and others)—were also exerting intense pressure on the government to accelerate settlement expansion. At the same time, the Supreme Court was receiving an increasing number of Palestinian petitions aimed at stopping land seizures, and the government feared the potential—actualized in the *Elon Moreh* case—that the court would thwart the establishment of a settlement. All this led the Israeli government to seek new mechanisms for confiscating West Bank land. The solution was found in the use of the Ottoman Land Law, which Israel used to declare approximately 40 percent of the area of the West Bank as State Land. According to Pliya Albeck, former head of the Israel Civil Department in the State Attorney's Office, "Approximately 90 percent of the settlements have been established on land declared state land."

The legal foundation used by Israel to undertake this procedure is based on two key articles from the 1907 Hague Regulations. The first, Article 43, requires the occupying power to respect the laws applying in the Occupied Territory. Israel argues that the essential elements of the Ottoman Land Law were adopted by BRITISH MANDATE (1917–1948) legislation and later by Jordanian legislation and thus, according to certain Israeli legal experts, continued to apply at the time of the Israeli Occupation in 1967. The second foundation is Article 55, which permits an occupying power to manage the properties of the occupied country and to derive profits therefrom, while at the same time maintaining the value and integrity of those properties. Based on this clause, Israel has argued that the establishment of the settlements is a lawful act of deriving profits, which also contributes to maintaining the properties of the Jordanian government.

The use of State Land for the establishment and expansion of settlements, unlike the use of private lands seized for military needs, has enabled the high court to avoid the issue. Petitions filed by Palestinians against the process of declaring State Land and against the existence of the Military Appeals Committee, which is the sole arbiter of Palestinian complaints, have been rejected by the court, which has affirmed the legality of these mechanisms. After recognizing the state's right to these lands, the Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the Palestinians' right to object to their use, claiming they could not prove that they personally were injured. Because no petitions have ever been filed with the high court challenging the legality of the settlements under the Hague Regulations, the Supreme Court has never had to state its position on this issue.

The Ottoman Land Law defines four types of possession or ownership of land.

1. *Mulk*—completely privately owned land. The proportion of land in the West Bank defined as

mulk is negligible and found mainly within the built-up area of towns.
2. *Waqf*—includes two subtypes: land intended for religious or cultural activities and land used for all other purposes, which is protected against confiscation according to the laws of Islam. In general, Israel has refrained from taking control of both these types of land.
3. *Miri*—lands in Ottoman law that are situated close to places of settlement and suitable for agricultural use. A person may secure ownership of such land by holding and working the land for ten consecutive years. If a landowner of this type fails to farm the land for three consecutive years for reasons other than those recognized by the law (e.g., the landowner is drafted into the army or the land lies fallow for agricultural reasons), the land is then known as *makhlul*, in which case the sovereign may take possession of the land or transfer the rights therein to another person. The rationale behind this provision of the Land Law was to ensure that as much land as possible was farmed, yielding agricultural produce that could then be taxed.
4. *Mawat* (dead land)—land that is half an hour's walking distance from a place of settlement or where "the loudest noise made by a person in the closest place of settlement will not be heard." According to the legal definition, this land should be empty and not used by any person. In this case, the sovereign is responsible for ensuring that no unlawful activities take place in such areas. *Matruka* land, a subcategory of *mawat* land, is intended for public use, where "public" may mean the residents of a particular village, as in the case of grazing land or cemeteries, or all the residents of the state, as in the case of roads.

An additional method of ownership, known as *musha'a*, exists alongside the above-mentioned types in many parts of the West Bank. According to this method, the residents of each village own land collectively. Each family is responsible for farming a particular section of land during a fixed period, at the end of which the plots of land are rotated. Although this method was not recognized in the Land Law or in the British and Jordanian legislation that the law absorbed, it continued to exist in the West Bank as a reflection of local tradition.

Process of Taking Land

The declaration of land in the West Bank as State Land was first based on the 1967 Military Order Regarding Government Property (Judea and Samaria No. 59), which authorized the person delegated by the commander of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) in the region to take possession of properties belonging to an "enemy state" and to manage these at his discretion. Issued shortly after the Occupation began, this order was used through 1979 to seize control of land registered in the name of the Jordanian government when it controlled the West Bank in 1948–1967. Initial examinations revealed that a total of 527,000 dunums (130,000 acres) was eligible for the status of registered State Land, and additional searches of Turkish and British ownership certificates during the first five years of the Occupation found another 160,000 dunums (39,000 acres). Accordingly, in 1979, the custodian for government property (hereafter referred to as "the custodian") in the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION declared an area of 687,000 dunums (170,000 acres), encompassing some 13 percent of the total area of the West Bank, as State Land. The LABOR PARTY–led governments through 1977 used some of this land to establish settlements within the borders defined in the ALLON PLAN and included land purchased by Jews (individuals or the ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS) prior to 1948. After the 1948 WAR, this land was held and managed by the Jordanian Custodian of Enemy Property, in accordance with the rules established in a British Mandatory order from 1939. One estimate puts the total area of such land at approximately 25,000 dunums (6,000 acres). In quantitative terms, the main concentrations of this land are in Gush Etzion to the south of Ramallah and around Tulkarm, while smaller areas are found in JERUSALEM and HEBRON.

In December 1979, following the ELON MOREH SETTLEMENT, the custodian began, with the guidance of the Civil Department of the State Attorney's Office, to prepare a detailed survey of all the ownership records currently available at the regional offices of the Jordanian Land Registrar. In addition, using aerial photographs taken periodically, the Civil Administration initiated a project to map systematically all areas under cultivation. This double investigation led to the location and marking of lands that the sovereign (Israel) felt entitled to seize under the Ottoman Land Law and the Jordanian laws that absorbed the Land Law.

These included *miri* land that was not farmed for at least three consecutive years and thus became *makhlul*; *miri* land that had been farmed for less than ten years (the period of limitation), so that the farmer had not yet secured ownership; and land defined as *mawat* due to its distance from the nearest village.

In these investigations, the custodian located approximately 1.5 million dunums (370,000 acres), or some 26 percent of the area of the West Bank, as belonging to one of these categories. The process of declaring the land State Land comprised several stages after the initial phase of locating the land. In the first stage, the relevant decisions and documents relating to land earmarked for registration as State Land were forwarded to the State Attorney's Office for examination and for a decision as to whether the land was eligible for such status. If the decision was positive, the custodian began to act, forwarding the file to the District Office responsible for the area in which the land was situated. The custodian's representative in this office summoned the *mukhtars* from the villages adjacent to the declared State Land, took them for a tour of the intended site, and showed them the BORDERS of the area that the custodian believed was government property. Thus, the custodian transferred to the *mukhtars* the responsibility for informing those liable to be affected by the custodian's decision to seize possession of land. Once the declaration was made, those liable to be injured by the registration had forty-five days to submit an appeal to a military appeals committee.

During the period 1980–1984, approximately 800,000 dunums (197,000 acres) of Palestinian land were declared and registered as State Land. Thereafter, the pace of declaration decelerated, partly because of changes in the government's composition following elections, but mainly because, by this stage, the settlements had already been promised enormous reserves of land for the foreseeable future.

The declaration of hundreds of thousands of dunums in the Occupied Territories as State Land was made possible mainly because much land was not registered in *Tabu* (the Ottoman land registration office). Although the Ottoman Land Law required the registration of every plot of land, many residents during the period of Turkish rule did not observe this provision. The reasons for this included a desire to preserve the collective ownership system (*musha'a*), a desire to evade tax liability, and an effort to avoid being drafted into the Turkish army. The records that survived from this period are vague and do not easily permit the identification of a specific plot of land. Only in 1928, during the British Mandate period, was a systematic process introduced to survey all land and register ownership based on plot identification numbers. The process of regulation continued at an extremely slow pace during the period of Jordanian control of the West Bank. By the time Israel occupied the West Bank, regulation proceedings had been completed for approximately one-third of the area, particularly in the JENIN area and the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. In areas where registration had not been completed, ownership continued to be managed over the years according to possession of land and the mutual recognition of the connection of each person to a given plot of land.

At the beginning of the Israeli Occupation of the West Bank, a military order was issued halting the registration of land owned by Palestinian residents of the West Bank. Israel said this was necessary to prevent injury to the rights of people who left the area during the 1967 WAR and were therefore unable to oppose the registration of their land under another person's name. However, to enable Israel to continue the process of registering land, it was determined that the order would not apply to the State Land in the custodian's name, and the declaration process continued at an accelerated pace based on a Jordanian law of 1964. In addition, another military order was issued establishing a Special Land Registry for the registration of transactions of land held by the custodian, which enabled the transfer of State Land use rights to one of the "settling bodies" (e.g., the Ministry of Housing or the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION).

Military Appeals Committee

The military appeals committee is composed of three persons appointed by the commander, one of whom must have legal training. The central principle guiding the committee in hearing appeals by Palestinian residents against the custodian's rulings is that the burden of proof rests with the alleged landowner disputing the State Land claim. If the custodian has confirmed in a signed certificate that property is government property, it remains so until proven to the contrary. If the committee decides to reject an appeal or if an appeal was not filed on time (in forty-five days), the process is completed and the land is registered in

the custodian's name. The chances that a Palestinian resident will be successful, by means of the appeals committee, in nullifying the process of declaring and registering an area of State Land that he believes he owns are extremely low. In most cases, the appeals committee merely rubber-stamps the military administration's decisions. Because the appeals committee is the only body before which the decisions of the custodian may be challenged, its existence has allowed, on one hand, the Israeli authorities to continue the process of declaring lands as State Land while claiming, on the other hand, that this process is under judicial review. Historically, the first obstacle facing Palestinian efforts to prevent the registration of their land as State Land was their ignorance of the procedure. The information provided by the *mukhtar*s regarding the declared area was often vague because the *mukhtars* themselves received only partial information from the custodian. Also, the *mukhtars*, who were appointed by the military, had problematic relations with the residents and often preferred not to act as spokespersons for Israeli decisions. As a result, it was only when a settlement began to be built that the residents first realized their land had been declared State Land. Since actual construction usually began months or even years after the date of declaration, the forty-five-day period for filing an appeal had long since passed.

The case of the Makhamara *hamula* (clan) illustrates this problem. Four families from the Makhamara *hamula* jointly held some 280 dunums (69 acres) of land near Yatta (HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA), southwest of the Ma'on settlement. The families had farmed the land consistently for over one hundred years. At the end of 1997, a settler from the Susiya settlement erected a trailer on Makhamara land and threatened members of the *hamula* with firearms, preventing them from reaching the field to farm their land. After the family filed a complaint at the Hebron police station claiming that the settler was trespassing on their land, a clerk representing the custodian informed them that the land had been declared State Land fifteen years earlier. For its part, the Mount Hebron Regional Council added that the land in question belonged to the council, based on a contract it had signed with the World Zionist Organization in December 1983.

The Makhamara *hamula*, represented by the ASSOCIATION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL, filed a protest with the appeals committee of the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY. In his response to the appeal, the custodian claimed that, "according to the aerial photographs held by the Respondent [i.e., the custodian], the preparatory and farming work took place a few years ago in a completely rocky area, in a manner that does not grant rights to the Appellants." The custodian further said that the land the Susiya settler claimed "has been transferred to the World Zionist Organization in an allocation agreement, and in connection therewith the Respondent shall claim that the Appellants missed the date for submission of an appeal." The case is pending before the appeals committee.

"Palestinian residents who receive word of the State Land declaration in time to appeal encounter another obstacle. Preparing an appeal entails enormous expense, including payment of a fee upon submission, precise mapping by a qualified surveyor of the land of which the appellant claims ownership, and retaining an attorney to prepare an affidavit and represent the appellant before the committee. Additionally, those who overcome these obstacles and appeal the custodian's decision before the deadline have difficulty proving their rights to lands declared State Lands. Because the declarations generally take place in areas where the British or Jordanians did not register the land, the appeals committee hearings inevitably center on possession and farming as the basis for the right to the land. The appellant is required to prove that the land in question had been held and farmed for ten consecutive years to substantiate his ownership of the land. For the appeal to succeed, the evidence brought by Palestinians has to contradict the periodic aerial photographs taken by the custodian that indicated the cessation of farming at any stage. Receipts for payment of land tax, whether from the Jordanian authorities or the Civil Administration, may constitute *prima facie* evidence in disputes between two individuals but do not constitute evidence against the state or impair the state's rights."

Many Palestinians have discontinued or reduced their involvement in agriculture partly because of Israeli policies in two key spheres: WATER and the labor market. First, Israel rejects all applications submitted by Palestinians to receive PERMITS to drill agricultural wells. Second, during the 1970s and early 1980s, Israel encouraged the integration of Palestinians in its own labor market; many Palestinians were attracted because of the

high salaries relative to those in the West Bank and then abandoned agriculture.

Even if a Palestinian appellant meets the burden of proof required by the committee and convinces its members that he indeed owns the land in question, the committee can still deny the appeal. Sometimes the hearing before the committee takes place after the custodian has already signed permission contracts with one of the settler groups and after preparatory work has begun on constructing a settlement. Accordingly, to prevent the reversal of an existing situation, Section 5 of Order No. 59 Regarding Government Property includes the following provision: "No transaction undertaken in good faith by the Custodian and another person in any property which the Custodian believed, at the time of the transaction, to be government property shall be nullified, and it shall continue to be valid even if it is proved that the property was not at that time government property."

The "good faith" argument has been used by Israel to approve new construction in the settlements, even when there was no permission contract for the land between the custodian and the body initiating construction. For example, the state comptroller notes that construction of three new neighborhoods in the settlement of Giv'at Ze'ev (Moreshet Binyamin A, B, and C) began before all the land on which these neighborhoods were established had been declared State Land and without the signing of permission contracts with the custodian. Despite this fact and the fact that the Civil Administration did not approve the outline plan for these neighborhoods, the planning board of Mate Binyamin Regional Council granted permits for development work and for private construction on all three sites. When this situation became apparent, the head of the Civil Department in the Ministry of Justice, Pliya Albeck, prepared a legal opinion in which she stated, "Notwithstanding the defects, questions and doubts, it would seem desirable to enable the continued construction of phase A of Moreshet Binyamin, both since the houses were built in good faith by residents who received building permits, and because the absence of objections provides a foundation for believing that the land was acquired lawfully."

Additional problems regarding the military appeals committee have to do with its place in the military hierarchy and its mode of operation. First, the appeals committee is dependent on the military administration or the commander of the IDF in the region, whose actions it is reviewing in the appeals process. Thus, the same body that issues land seizure orders is also the primary legislative body that established the committee—and the only body entitled to appoint or dismiss its members. Moreover, the Order Regarding Appeals Committees stipulates that the committee's decisions are merely "recommendations," while the final decision rests with the commander in the region, who is entitled to accept or reject these recommendations at his discretion without any public criteria established for his decision.

Second, the appeals committee is not subject to the rules of legal proceedings or the usual rules of evidence pertaining in Israel or in any other legal system. According to one of the sections in the order, "the Appeals Committee shall not be bound by the laws of evidence and legal proceedings, except for those established in this Order, and shall determine its procedures." The existence of a quasi-judicial body such as the appeals committee prevents the submission of petitions to the Supreme Court. One of the conditions for intervention by the high court is the absence of alternative relief. The presence of the appeals committee does not completely bar such intervention, but it significantly lessens the willingness of the court to intervene.

See also Absentee Property Law: Economy: the Effects of Occupation on the Palestinians; Gush Emunim; International Law; Land; Ottoman Empire; Settlements; Water; West Bank

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Stern, Avraham "Yair" (1907–1942)

Avraham Stern was a dedicated Zionist, a poet, and the founder of the militant underground group Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI), also known as the Stern Gang. Born in Poland, he immigrated to Palestine in 1926 and studied in the Hebrew Gymnasium in Jerusalem and afterward at the Hebrew University, where he specialized in classic languages and literature. On graduation, Stern received a scholarship to study Greek and Roman languages and literature at Florence University in Italy. As early as 1934, he prepared his first poetry

book for publication. His most famous poem, "Hayalim Almonim" (Unknown Soldiers), became the anthem of the IRGUN T'ZEVA'I LE'UMI and LEHI. Together with David Raziel, he wrote *The Revolver*, a textbook on the training and use of revolvers, as well as numerous ideological articles on liberation and underground movements.

During the 1929 WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES, Stern participated in their suppression as a member of the HAGANA, the main Jewish underground military organization in Palestine from 1920 to 1948. However, his views became more militant following the Arab uprising, and in 1931 he joined a group of fighters that split from the Hagana, believing that it was insufficiently militant vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the BRITISH MANDATE government, and helped found the Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi. Stern took on the nom de guerre "Yair" in tribute to the commander of the Zealots at Massada, Eliezer Ben Yair. In 1937, during the ARAB REVOLT, the Irgun split and many of its members returned to the Hagana, but Stern and others remained in the Irgun under the command of VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY and continued their militant activities. In 1939 differences of opinion emerged between Stern and David, the commander of the Irgun, which led to a split in the organization and the establishment of a new faction, LEHI.

In August 1940 the Irgun decided to suspend their attacks on the British in the context of World War II, but Stern's LEHI continued fighting them. Stern vehemently opposed tempering the resistance against the British in any way and maintained that, even in the face of the Nazi danger, it was the British who posed the major threat to the Jews. Doubting the Allies could win the war, he advocated an alliance with Nazi GERMANY and Fascist Italy, believing these ties would assist the ZIONISM effort in Palestine. In January 1941 Stern attempted to make an agreement with the Nazi authorities, offering to "actively take part in the war on Germany's side" in return for "the establishment of the historic Jewish state on a national and totalitarian basis, bound by a treaty with the German Reich." Another attempt to contact the Germans was made in late 1941, but there is no record of a German response in either case.

In 1942, British intelligence officers assassinated Stern, after which YITZHAK SHAMIR led the group. In 1944 two LEHI members assassinated Lord Moyne, the British minister for Middle East affairs in Cairo. In 1948 the group assassinated the UNITED NATIONS envoy to Palestine, COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE. In 1981 the town Kochav Yair (Yair's star) was founded and named after Stern.

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Stern Gang

See LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL; AVRAHAM STERN

Strategic Asset

The term "strategic asset" reflects a perception or a belief about Israel's ability to further the strategic objectives and interests of the UNITED STATES in the Middle East and globally. It is a concept that Israel and its US supporters have long and strenuously promoted. Some US analysts of the US-Israeli relationship believe that Israel's utility in furthering US interests is so important that it constitutes the foundation of the relationship. Moreover, they believe that Israel's utility justifies the massive amounts of military and economic aid Washington gives the Jewish state, the diplomatic support the United States affords Israel at the UNITED NATIONS and other global institutions, and the US deference to Israel's position in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Most US administrations, from LYNDON JOHNSON—and perhaps including JOHN F. KENNEDY—through the present, have behaved as if Israel were a strategic asset. However, RONALD REAGAN was the first president to state explicitly that Israel functioned in this manner for the United States. Even before he was elected, he expressed his conviction: "Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus, can we build the foundation for thwarting MOSCOW's designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being."

Efraim Inbar, who supports the thesis, writes: "Despite the troubling questions regarding Israel's

strategic behavior in the summer of 2006, Washington still understands that Israel remains its most reliable ally in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. There is no other state in the Middle East where an American airplane can count with certainty on being welcomed in the near future. . . . Israel is one of the few countries in the world that does not see US primacy in international affairs as a troubling phenomenon. Unlike much of the rest of the world, Israel is not preoccupied with how to tame American power. In fact, Israeli foreign policy displays an unequivocal pro-American orientation . . . Israel's strategic culture is much closer to that of the US than to that of many of the US's European allies. . . . Israel supports America's unilateralism. . . . Cooperation with Israel on security matters confers many advantages [to the] American military . . . Israel is also an important source of military technology."

Leon Hadar, who opposes the theory, writes, quoting Anthony H. Cordesman, "'Far from Israel being the American proxy in a war against IRAN, we've become Israel's proxy in its war against Hizballah.' . . . At the same time, American policymakers need to recognize that the interests of Israel—a small Middle Eastern power focused on maintaining its security—are not necessarily compatible with those of the United States, a superpower with broad global interests that require cooperation with the leading Arab and Muslim states. In fact, taking into consideration the constraints on their relationship, Washington has never established a formal military alliance with Israel—whose status remains that of a client state that needs U.S. military support in order to preserve its margin of security . . . the [strategic asset] paradigm would make Israel a modern-day crusader state, an outlet of a global power whose political, economic and military headquarters are on the other side of the world. America's commitment to the security of the Israeli 'province' would always remain uncertain and fragile, reflecting changes in the balance of power in Washington and the shifting dynamics of U.S. politics and economics. . . . If Israel is limited in its ability to provide security services to the United States, American hegemony cannot make the Middle East safe for Israel. Perhaps it is not too late for the Israelis to figure out how to take a path toward normalcy in the Middle East that leads to peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians and their other neighbors in the next generations. Achieving that goal would advance the long-term interests of both Israel and the United States. It is also the case that because of its relations with other nations in the Middle East, Israel has never been able to send troops to support American military operations in the region."

See also MOSHE DAYAN

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Strategic Cooperation

Strategic cooperation is the vehicle by which Israel's interests are embedded in the US government. It began during the JIMMY CARTER years but reached its apogee during and since the Reagan administration. RONALD REAGAN was the first president to formalize the idea when, on 30 November 1981, he signed a memorandum of understanding on "strategic cooperation" with Israel. On 29 November 1983, Reagan signed a new agreement creating the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and a group to oversee security assistance, the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP). The JPMG was originally designed to discuss means of countering threats posed by increased SOVIET UNION involvement in the Middle East. Subsequently, it placed increasing emphasis on bilateral concerns about the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and more recently on global TERRORISM.

Formed in response to Israel's economic crisis in the mid-1980s, the JSAP is a binational group that meets annually in Washington to examine Israel's current and future military procurement requirements. It also formulates plans for the allocation of US foreign military sales credits in light of current threat assessments and US budgetary capabilities. An example of cooperation between the branches occurred on 23 January 1987, when the US Congress designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally, thus allowing Israel's industries to compete equally with NATO countries and other close US allies for a significant number of defense contracts.

In April 1988 President Reagan signed another memorandum of understanding with Israel that encompassed all prior agreements and institutionalized the strategic cooperation relationship. By the end of Reagan's term, the UNITED STATES had prepositioned military equipment in Israel, regularly held joint training exercises, began codevelopment of the Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile, and was engaged in a host of other cooperative military endeavors. Since then, US-Israel strategic cooperation has continued to evolve. Today, these strategic ties are stronger than ever. To cite a few examples:

- The United States uses Israel for training, maintenance, and prepositioning of military material and supplies.
- More than 300 US Department of Defense personnel travel to Israel every month to consult about Middle East issues.
- Joint military exercises are regularly held. Israel has had more extensive naval exercises with the United States than has any other country in the Middle East and has conducted training exchanges with special US antiterrorist forces.
- Senior US Navy officials have declared Israel's HAIFA port the best and most cost-effective facility of its kind in the region. Haifa receives approximately forty US Navy ships each year, hosting thousands of US sailors and Marines.
- Israel makes other facilities available to the United States, including hospitals, training areas, and bombing ranges in the Negev Desert.

- There is a special joint Anti-Terrorism Working Group that collaborates to develop antiterrorism technology.
- The Pentagon and the Israeli Defense Ministry maintain a joint hotline.
- The United States continues to fund research and development of Israeli weapons systems and military equipment, including the Arrow missile, the Tactical High Energy Laser, the Barak Ship Self-defense Missile System, reactive armor tiles, crash-attenuating seats, the Have Nap missile, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
- In early 1997 the United States permitted Israel to link up to the US missile-warning satellite system, which will provide Israel with real-time warning if a missile is launched against it, and with much previously secret intelligence data.

The strategic cooperation agreements established Israel as a de facto ally of the United States, institutionalized military-to-military contacts, sent a message to the Arabs that the United States was not afraid to risk upsetting them, and shifted at least part of the focus of relations with Israel from Congress to the executive branch.

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Suicide Bombings

Suicide bombings constitute one form of TERRORISM, which is defined as the intentional conduct of random political violence against protected categories of persons, namely, civilians and civilian sites such as schools, hospitals, restaurants, buses, trains, or planes; or is simply the random murder of innocent people. Palestinians have frequently used suicide bombings in Israel, terrorizing the population and causing death and injury.

According to B'TSELEM, from the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA on 29 September 2000 until 26 December 2008, there were 54 suicide bombings, causing 349 fatalities. The Israeli Foreign Ministry cites a higher number of 144 bombings and 542 deaths, but it lumps together all bombings (roadside bombs, petrol bombs, etc.) with suicide bombings. For the eight-year period in total, B'Tselem states that 490 Israeli civilians were killed inside the Green Line (90 members of the security forces were killed in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES for a total of 580 Israeli deaths in the eight years of fighting). B'Tselem does not report on how the Israeli civilians died, but it can be assumed that the majority were killed in suicide bombings, although 23 were killed by QASSAM ROCKETS. For the exact same period, B'Tselem reports that Israeli security forces killed 4,837 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, of whom 3,741 were civilians. Palestinian sources put the number higher but B'Tselem's figures serve well enough to make the point.

In responding to horror about the number of Palestinian suicide bombers, critics of Israel point out that Israel has dropped bombs on Palestinian neighborhoods, villages, and REFUGEE camps using F-16 and F-15 fighter-bombers, Apache and Cobra helicopter gunships, and, since 2004, unmanned drones with air-to-ground missiles. Additionally, Israel has used tanks, armored troop carriers, and armor-plated jeeps, from which soldiers fire heavy weapons. In contrast, the Palestinian arsenal includes demonstrations, commercial strikes, calls for a boycott of Israeli products, car thefts, leaflets, stones, Molotov cocktails, pistols, rifles and light machine guns, mortar shells, roadside bombs, explosive devices, hand grenades, homemade Qassam rockets, and "living bombs"—the suicide bombers. Some believe the disparity in the means of force between Israelis and Palestinians contributes to the impetus to suicide bombings, especially in the context of Israel's OCCUPATION of Palestinian territories. In a sense, perhaps, one can understand the suicide bomber as the weapon of the powerless in a conflict of vast power disparities in which the Palestinians, for forty years under Israel's military Occupation, have few other weapons with which to struggle for freedom.

The Occupation resulted from a military conquest of Palestinian territories and the imposition of a military regime over the people that has controlled every aspect of the lives of the Palestinians through armed force and other forms of repression. The late Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling commented on this issue: "Since 1967, millions of Palestinians have been under a

military Occupation, without any civil rights, and most lacking even the most basic human rights. The continuing circumstances of Occupation and repression give them, by any measure, the right to resist that Occupation with any means at their disposal and to rise up in violence against that Occupation. This is a moral right inherent to natural law and INTERNATIONAL LAW."

Another issue raised by suicide bombings is "legitimate" versus "illegitimate" uses of violence and who determines this. Israeli intellectual and writer Meron Benvenisti analyzes this question: "Israelis are demanding for themselves the absolute right to determine when the use of violence is legitimate. Moreover they see themselves as the ones who have a total monopoly over legitimate violence, because violence derives from aggressive enforcement and its justification stems from the absolute imperative of self-defense and from the essential obligation of a ruling authority to maintain law and order and thwart killings and terrorism. . . . In essence the Israelis are striving to define the violence—theirs and the Palestinians'—for their own greatest convenience. When it suits them—as in the case of the assassination policy and regulations on opening fire—it is a 'war' and when it suits them—such as when soldiers are fired on—it is 'attempted murder.'" Benvenisti continues, "The Palestinians cannot, of course, accept the Israeli definitions of legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence. They cannot agree to describe someone who challenges the occupying regime as a criminal offender."

Adding to this perspective, Israeli analyst Amira Hass wrote the following: "According to this [Israeli] representation of reality, everything started with the first Palestinian stone, the first Palestinian bullet, and the roadside bomb on the Netzarim-Karni road. There is probably little chance of convincing the Israeli public today that there is a link between that stone, bullet and bomb and the fact that the Oslo years did not offer the Palestinian public a future of independence, nor a hope for social well being. Those who in recent years gladly adopted the victorious, Israeli version of reality . . . cannot be and are not interested in recognising the Occupied population's right to rebel. Those who yield to the victim-mindset that is daily fed by Israeli Occupation mechanisms, those who count their own dead and wounded while remaining indifferent to the huge number of dead and wounded on the other side, are making no attempt to understand the meaning of the experiment that began in the last decade of the 20th century."

Gideon Levy, another Israeli analyst, provides a further dimension to this discussion: "Who is a terrorist? Aida Fatahia was walking in the street; Ubei Daraj was playing in the yard. She was the mother of three; he was nine years old. Both were killed last week by IDF bullets, for no reason. Their killing raises once again, in all its horror, the question of whether Palestinian violence is the only violence that should be called terrorism. Is only car bombing terrorism, while shooting at a woman and child is not? Fatahia and Daraj join a long list of men, women, and children who were innocent of wrongdoing and killed in the past five months by the IDF. In the Israeli debate, their deaths were not the result of 'terror actions' or 'terrorist attacks' and the killers are not 'terrorists.' Those are terms used only for Palestinian violence."

Reasons for Suicide Bombings

Amira Hass has also examined a variety of potential contributing factors for the existence of suicide bombers, including the poverty that has spread so widely; the wretchedness of begging for handouts in the face of unemployment; the RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT; the "imprisonment in cages in the WEST BANK and GAZA"; the absence of a chance to study, to find independent housing, to offer their children more than just food and a roof over their heads; and so on. She concludes: "Potential suicide bombers know that the near future does not promise them a livelihood, decent housing, chances for study and personal development, travel abroad, life in orderly cities, the development of agriculture in their villages or high-tech initiatives. But each of these deficiencies and all of them together, are not enough to explain the readiness of so many to die at a young age. . . . These deficiencies, of the past and future, build up to internalize a conviction that there is an omnipotent force, a powerful country that since 1967 has dictated and intends to continue dictating, the Palestinian society's scope of development and freedom to make decisions. This is a suffocating, unbearable feeling for the Palestinians, a feeling that the future is not worth living. The society raising this army of suicide bombers is convinced that Israelis, on the other hand, are able to look forward to a future that would be a shame to miss."

There are numerous theories about suicide bombers. One highly popular but deeply flawed explanation resides in the version of Islam that says the bombers are brainwashed to believe that if they die martyred, they will go to paradise where some seventy-two virgins await them. Psychologist Michael Shaw Bond disputes this point: "[T]he reason for this [suicide bombing] has nothing to do with culture, and everything to do with human nature." Very few young Palestinians have ever met an Israeli. "The only experiences they have of Israelis are the shells and missiles that are fired at them from F-16 bombers and Apache helicopters and tanks. . . . Thus Palestinians see only Israeli violence. Most have no experience of Israelis as human beings, capable of suffering, capable of compassion."

Deprivation and Revenge. Yom and Saleh provide another plausible explanation, backed with quantitative data, for why individuals become suicide bombers. They argue that suicide bombing is a consequence of two overriding factors: economic deprivation and the natural human instinct for revenge. They consider suicide bombing a social and political phenomenon. Suicide bombers, they write, are not simply the instruments of terrorist organizations. Suicide bombings can be sustained over time only when there already exists a high degree of commitment among the pool of potential recruits—a commitment that primarily arises out of economic deprivation. Deprivation includes unemployment, poverty, and the inability to provide basic human needs to one's family. The instinct for revenge occurs when a close relative has been killed, when one has been subjected to harsh and humiliating torture, and when one's father has been humiliated, among other factors."

Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell elaborates on the revenge dimension: "More and more people are beginning to understand that the Israeli reprisal operations only engender despair, and despair gives rise to suicide bombers. Israel's assassination policy that has targeted political leaders from all the factions is certainly one that gives rise to extreme despair as well as rage and a desire for revenge."

The overwhelming majority of suicide attacks within Israel proper have come in retaliation for an Israeli action—an assassination, incursions into areas controlled by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), or some other provocation. Typically, HAMAS or ISLAMIC JIHAD has taken credit for the actions; however, as the al-Aqsa Intifada entered its second year, several dissident FATAH factions claimed responsibility for some of the bombings. In an interview, a leader in Islamic Jihad said: "I hate this violence, I fear for my family. It's not how I want to live. But if we cannot be safe in our cities, they will not be safe in theirs. If they kill our children, we will kill theirs." The first suicide bombing inside Israel occurred on 4 April 1994 and was Hamas's revenge for the settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN's murder of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in HEBRON on 25 February 1994.

A common cycle of Israeli attack and Palestinian revenge looks like this: On 14 May 2001, Israeli troops killed five Palestinian police officers staffing a PNA CHECKPOINT in the West Bank (which Israel later said was an "error"). In retaliation, a suicide bomber killed five Israelis and wounded forty others at a shopping mall in Netanya. In response, Israel bombed the West Bank towns of NABLUS and Ramallah using F-16 warplanes. This produced another two suicide attacks on 25 May—one in Hadera (Israel) and another at a security outpost in Gaza. On 1 June a suicide bomber killed nineteen Israelis at the Dolphinarium discotheque in Tel Aviv. PNA president YASIR ARAFAT condemned the attack and ordered an immediate cease-fire throughout the Occupied Territories. Israel, however, broke the truce when it shelled Gaza and killed three women huddled in a tent; it then assassinated, by helicopter gunships, three Palestinian activists associated with Hamas. Hamas retaliated with two car bombs in central Israel. Thus the cycle proceeds.

Revenge need not be a group response; indeed, not all of the suicide bombings are carried out by persons with a political affiliation or organizational backing, although most are linked to resistance groups. For example, Khalil Abu Ulba from Gaza, a middle-aged bus driver with a wife and eight children, was one out of 16,000 Palestinians (of a total of over three million) that Israel's intelligence services considered apolitical and reliable enough to retain his PERMIT for working in Israel. On 14 February 2001 he rammed his empty passenger bus into a group of soldiers at a junction south of Tel Aviv, killing eight people. His family and friends confirmed that he was not affiliated with any political movement, but his wife stated, "Abu Ulba had talked about his deep despair over the on-going SIEGE and economic devastation, of

his rage at the intense bombardment and gassing of Khan Yunis that week, and of his anger at the aerial assassination of a Palestinian activist in Jabalya, close to his home, the day before." Other suicide bombers are assumed to have acted on their own—especially when no faction claims credit.

Despair and Role of Father and Power. Another explanation for the choice to become a suicide bomber resides in a despair so overwhelming that individuals believe they have no future and thus want to kill themselves. Psychiatrist Eyad Sarraj has written about despair and suicide bombers: "It's despair—a despair where living becomes no different from dying. When life is constant degradation, death is the only source of pride." That life begins after death is a widespread religious belief, certainly not exclusive to Islam, and in the context of the humiliations, depredations, and hopelessness of the Occupation, some choose to make their death a political statement. In fact, creating despair has been a long-standing Israeli tactic vis-à-vis the Palestinians. DAVID BEN-GURION, Israel's first prime minister, wrote in 1936, "A comprehensive agreement is undoubtedly out of the question now. For only after total despair on the part of the Arabs, despair that will come not only from the failure of the disturbances and the attempt at rebellion, but also as a consequence of our growth in the country, may the Arabs possibly acquiesce to a Jewish *Eretz* [Greater land of] Israel."

Sarraj, founder and director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Center, did a field research project in the summer of 2004 on twelve-year-old children in Gaza and found that 36 percent of the boys and 17 percent of the girls who were interviewed wanted to die as martyrs when they became eighteen. He believes the most important factor in the making of a militant and a suicide bomber is the relationship with power, particularly the relation between the son and the father. In Arab Palestinian society, Sarraj says, the father is the symbol of power, but, during the First INTIFADA, Israeli soldiers damaged this image of the father when children witnessed the beating and humiliation of their fathers.

"Many children seeing their father's impotence immediately and unconsciously switched their identification from the father to new models of power. Some adopted the Israeli soldiers, an identification which resulted in their becoming aggressive and violent towards other children. Others identified with the Palestinian militant, the masked fighter with his gun.

"Since the first Intifada, these children searched for a replacement not only of the father but the family, a replacement that they found in political groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad—groups that presented a new kind of family where the leader is strong and powerful, and the family is disciplined and loyal. The new family has its own system of ideology; it demands absolute loyalty and adherence to religious concepts and behavior. Hamas, one new family, has decided that it is their mission to protect the Palestinians, to liberate Palestine and to avenge the defeat of Muslims."

Gideon Levy, an Israeli analyst already quoted, provides one final dimension to this discussion: "Are not massive LAND expropriations, systematic HOUSE [DEMOLITIONS], the uprooting of orchards and groves, cutting off entire towns and villages from their WATER source, denying medical attention to residents, forms of violence? A pregnant woman whose baby dies or a patient who died because they couldn't get to the hospital—something that has become almost routine in the territories—aren't they victims of terrible violence? What about the behaviour of soldiers and police at checkpoints, on the ROADS, everywhere? The humiliations, the beatings, and the settlers' own violence against Palestinians—what should that be called?"

See also ECONOMY; THE EFFECTS OF OCCUPATION ON THE PALESTINIANS;OCCUPATION; SETTLER VIOLENCE; TERRORISM

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Supreme Court

See ISRAELI SUPREME COURT

Supreme Muslim Council

The transformation from Ottoman rule to BRITISH MANDATE governance in 1917 left the Palestinians without many of the fundamental institutions that had been part of their life. In the area of religion, the traditional Islamic *waqf* (religious trust) and the Shari'a courts no longer existed because the chief Muslim administrator under the Ottoman EMPIRE, the Shaykh al-Islam, no longer had authority over the Muslim community. Instead, Palestinians found themselves governed by a Christian power and administered by two Zionist officials—HERBERT SAMUEL (who was Jewish), the high commissioner, and Norman Bentwich, the legal secretary of the Mandate.

Recognizing the incongruity of this situation, in December 1921 Samuel proposed the creation of a Supreme Muslim Council that would be responsible for the management of the *waqf* and Shari'a affairs in Palestine. He appointed AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI to head the council until an election could be held. In January 1922 al-Husayni won the election and went on to use the Supreme Muslim Council as his vehicle for creating an Islamic cultural revival in Palestine and for propelling himself to power.

The council established a Muslim orphanage, restored religious buildings, supported schools, and expanded health clinics. It also undertook a major renovation of the Muslim shrine AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF and the buildings on it—especially the DOME OF THE ROCK and the AL-AQSA MOSQUE.

Al-Husayni remained president of the council until 1937. When JORDAN occupied Jerusalem in 1948, it dissolved the Supreme Muslim Council, but the council was reconstituted in Jerusalem after the 1967 WAR.

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Sweden

See SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916

The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 9 May 1916 was a secret understanding between the governments of Britain and FRANCE defining their respective spheres of post–World War I influence and control in the Middle East. The boundaries of this

agreement remain today in much of the common border between SYRIA and IRAQ.

French diplomat Georges-Picot and British diplomat Mark Sykes negotiated the agreement in November 1915. Picot was far more experienced and managed to get more territory for France than expected. By the accord, Britain was allocated control of areas roughly comprising JORDAN, Iraq, and a small area around HAIFA, Palestine, while France was allocated control of southeastern TURKEY, northern Iraq, Syria, and LEBANON. The controlling powers were free to decide on state boundaries within these areas.

The area that subsequently fell under the BRITISH MANDATE of Palestine was designed for international administration, pending consultations with RUSSIA and other powers. This area, subject to significant subsequent controversy, had the following borders:

- Southern: approximately midway between Balah and the GAZA STRIP, eastward to the Dead Sea in a horizontal line, passing north of Beersheba and south of HEBRON
- Eastern: starting at the Dead Sea in the south and proceeding roughly due north along the River Jordan to Lake Tiberius and a few miles north of the lake
- Northern: a line approximately west-northwest from the area just north of Lake Tiberius, passing barely south of Tzfat to meet the sea approximately midway between Haifa and Tyre
- Western: the Mediterranean Sea

This agreement conflicted with the HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE of 1914–1915 between the British and Arab nationalist leaders; London attributed the conflicting accords to changing imperial interests during the war. Britain initially needed Arab assistance to defeat the Ottoman Turks and promised the Arabs it would ensure the unity and independence of the Arab world if the Arabs would join forces and fight with it against the Turks (which they did). Subsequently, London attempted to enlist the help of Jews in the UNITED STATES in getting Washington to join the war effort (hence the BALFOUR DECLARATION, 1917).

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was later expanded to include Italy and Russia. Russia was to receive Armenia and parts of Kurdistan, while the Italians would get certain Aegean islands and a sphere of influence around Izmir in southwest Anatolia. The Italian presence in Anatolia, as well as the division of the Arab lands, was formalized in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. However, the Russian Revolution in 1917 led the new Soviet government to renounce previous imperial accords. At the same time, Lenin released a copy of the confidential Sykes-Picot Agreement as well as other treaties, causing great embarrassment among the Allies and growing distrust among the Arabs. The Sykes-Picot Agreement arbitrarily divided the Middle East into separate states, utterly negating the objectives of the pan-Arab nationalist movement for a unified and independent Arab state, and the Arabs felt intensely betrayed. The betrayal became even greater when the British facilitated the ZIONISM movement's objectives in Arab Palestine.

Attempts to resolve the conflict were made at the San Remo Conference of 1920 and in the CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM of 1922, which stated the British position that Palestine was part of the excluded areas of "Syria lying to the west of the District of Damascus" specified in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. However, an examination of that agreement, together with a map, demonstrates British dissemblance. The principal terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were reaffirmed by the inter-Allied San Remo Conference and by the ratification of the resulting League of Nations mandates by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922. Subsequently, in every new state (with the exception of Palestine), Britain and France imposed a puppet government, usually a monarchy, which led to enormous instability after the powers themselves withdrew. In carving up an area that was linguistically, socially, religiously, and in every other way a coherent nation, the Sykes-Picot accord and the system it created are responsible for the past seventy-five years of conflict in the Middle East.

See also OTTOMAN EMPIRE


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Map 40. Sykes-Picot, 1916

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Syria

Syria's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict began even before the Syrian and Israeli states came into existence. As early as May 1910, a group of Muslim notables from the region around Aleppo petitioned the Ottoman authorities to block a prominent Beirut landholder from selling large tracts of agricultural LAND to Zionist agents. At the end of the year, articles strongly critical of increasing Jewish settlement in Palestine appeared in an Arabic-language newspaper published in Istanbul, TURKEY. These essays, which were written by individuals who later became leading figures in the Arab nationalist movement in Damascus, accused the settlers of treason against the OTTOMAN EMPIRE and demanded an end to the influx of European Jews into the sultan's domain. In December 1910, the Damascus daily *al-Muqtabas* published an open letter from the future Syrian nationalist Shukri al-'Asali to a senior Ottoman military commander that pointed out a wide variety of ways in which the new immigrants were flaunting both imperial law and local customs.

Attacks on Jewish IMMIGRATION in the Syrian press abated during the Ottoman crisis years of 1911–1912, then moderated somewhat in early 1913 after the editor of a pro-Zionist newspaper in Istanbul reached an informal agreement with influential Syrian members of the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization (Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah al-Idariyyah al-'Uthmani) to work together to press for greater provincial autonomy. By the fall of 1913, however, the Ottoman government's evident willingness to accommodate the party's program weakened its enthusiasm for tactical collaboration with the growing Jewish community in Palestine. In the months leading up to World War I, dealings between Arab nationalists in Damascus and the Zionist leadership collapsed.

After the war ended, leading Syrian nationalists expressed strong opposition to further Jewish immigration, most notably in the Damascus Program, which was presented to the KING-CRANE COMMISSION in July 1919. Popular demonstrations erupted throughout the country at the news that Great Britain had been granted a mandate from the League of Nations to administer Palestine. In February 1920 a rump grouping of radical representatives to the disbanded Syrian Congress in Damascus adopted resolutions that proclaimed Palestine to be an integral part of Syria and declared ZIONISM to be a threat to Syria's national interests. The influential Arab Club (al-Nadi al-'Arabi) in Damascus raised funds and recruited fighters to resist the creation of additional Jewish settlements. Nevertheless, the government of King Faisal bin al-Husayn proved willing to accommodate the Zionist movement. Faced with rising pressure from FRANCE and desperate to win the friendship of Britain, Faisal in January 1919 joined Zionist leader CHAIM WEIZMANN in signing a document that provided for Syrian recognition of a fully autonomous Palestine in which Zionist organizations would play a major role. The king added a handwritten codicil to the document stipulating that he would only be bound by the agreement "provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in my memorandum dated 4 January 1919, to the Foreign Office of the Government of Great Britain." He continued: "But if the slightest modification or departure were to be made, I shall not then be bound by a single word of the present agreement which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity and I shall not be answerable in any way whatsoever."

That summer, Faisal drew up a draft treaty that provided for equal rights for all inhabitants of Palestine—Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. The proposal was rejected out of hand by the Jewish National Council (Va'ad Leumi) as being a "ridiculous and dangerous scheme." In the wake of this episode, Faisal's tolerance for Zionist activism

wavered. He told the *Jewish Chronicle* during a visit to London in September 1919 that he had envisaged Jewish immigration to Palestine to amount to only 1,000 to 1,500 persons per year and that he expected the Jews to administer no more than a province within an independent Arab state. Before the impact of this shift in posture could play out, the French army seized control of Damascus and ousted Faisal's government.

Syrian expatriates in Cairo, EGYPT, attempted to carry on Faisal's program under the auspices of the Party of Syrian Unity (Hizb al-Ittihad al-Suri). In 1922, Palestinian members resigned from the party, charging that it was devoting too much attention to Syrian and Lebanese affairs and too little to crucial issues regarding Palestine. Party leaders subsequently attempted to convince Palestinian representatives to come to terms with the Zionist movement and went so far as to talk directly with prominent Zionists in London and JERUSALEM in an effort to find a compromise. But after key figures in the party returned to Damascus in the fall of 1921, they concentrated their energies almost exclusively on winning independence for Syria. French authorities routinely muffled press criticism of Zionist activities in Palestine and suppressed popular pro-Palestinian protests, which were also strongly discouraged by the leaders of the influential National Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wataniyyah), on the grounds that they jeopardized the movement for Syrian independence. For this reason, the nationalist leadership in Damascus decided not to send a delegation to the 1931 congress in Jerusalem to debate the future of Palestine.

Popular Support for Palestinians

It required the 1936 ARAB REVOLT, a Palestinian general strike against the British occupation and Zionist settlement, to change the National Bloc's noncommittal posture toward events taking place in British-controlled Palestine. Those Syrians who championed the cause of pan-Arabism feared that an independent Jewish state would stand squarely in the path of Arab unity. Merchants engaged in foreign trade viewed with concern the rise of HAIFA as a threat to Beirut, while industrialists worried that well-capitalized Jewish factories might diminish demand for their own products. At the same time, workers remembered that their Palestinian comrades had supported them during the general strike of January–February 1936 and took pains to reciprocate. Consequently, large-scale anti-Zionist demonstrations were organized by the League of National Action (Usbah al-'Amal al-Qawmi), as well as by the heterogeneous collection of militant Islamist associations that later constituted Syria's MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD (Ikhwan al-Muslimin). These groups, along with the equally radical Independence Party (Hizb al-Istiqlal), smuggled arms and recruits to guerrilla units operating inside Palestine. In August 1936 a respected veteran of the 1925 Syrian revolt against the French, FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI, took command of a band of guerrillas in the name of "the Arab Revolution in Southern Syria."

Senior National Bloc leaders reacted to this explosion of popular support for the revolt by admonishing both Syrians and Palestinians to restrain themselves so as not to disrupt ongoing negotiations with the French government over Syrian independence. Some even held discussions with Zionist representatives in an attempt to defuse the gathering conflict. In July 1936 a delegation from the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL traveled to Damascus to meet with a key figure in the National Bloc, Fakhri al-Barudi, who ended the meeting by soliciting the agency's help in persuading the French to act in a more conciliatory fashion in the Syrian negotiations. But other nationalists, including Shukri al-Quwwatli, took advantage of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict to enhance their influence and reputations as men of action. Al-Quwwatli played a major role in orchestrating support for al-Qawuqji and took an active part in the September 1937 BLUDAN CONFERENCE to protest the PEEL COMMISSION's recommendation to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.

When al-Quwwatli resigned his Syrian cabinet post in 1938 out of disgust with the government's lack of enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause, radicals in the League of National Action, the Independence Party, and the militant Islamist associations stepped up their efforts to support the Palestinian revolt. Yet the success of British military operations against Palestinians in Palestine as the year went by steadily sapped the public's will to send money and fighters to Palestine. As a result, Syrian nationalists of all stripes drastically curtailed their concern for and involvement in Palestinian affairs. Although Egypt and IRAQ tried to mediate between the British and the Palestinians during the fall and winter of 1939–1940, there was no sign of similar Syrian initiatives. There is, on the other hand, some evidence that Syrians

engaged, as did the Zionists, in transferring abandoned Vichy weapons and supplies to Palestine after British troops occupied the country in June 1941.

In April 1946, Syria became fully independent. The following month saw the publication of the final report of the ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY, which recommended that Palestine be turned over to the UNITED NATIONS and wartime limits on Jewish immigration be repealed. These findings prompted a series of Arab summit conferences, at which Syrian representatives tended to argue that any attempt to reclaim Palestinian rights by force of arms must be postponed until British troops left the area. When US president HARRY S TRUMAN publicly urged the British to permit 100,000 European Jews to immigrate to Palestine five months later, the authorities in Damascus gave a green light to acts of sabotage along the route of the US-sponsored oil pipeline (Tapline) project. In early 1947, Syrian officials welcomed al-Qawuqji back to the country from Palestine, then worked to prevent the United Nations from implementing Israeli statehood. When it became clear that the effort was failing, al-Qawuqji began to issue increasingly belligerent calls to arms.

It was in this heated atmosphere that the ARAB LEAGUE's Political Council met in October 1947 in Alaih, LEBANON, where Syria agreed to join Iraq, JORDAN, Lebanon, and Palestine on a joint military committee to prepare for future conflict. Syrian commanders issued orders for a partial mobilization of the regular armed forces but rescinded them in the face of British protest. Army units were nevertheless deployed along the border with Palestine at the end of the month. News that the United Nations had approved partition sparked widespread rioting in Aleppo and Damascus. Syrian president al-Quwwatli told soldiers to be "strong and great in faith and honor to defend with our lives our unquestionable rights" in Palestine. The government then allocated $2 million to purchase weapons and ordered universal military training. Meanwhile, a number of organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ba'ath Party, set up the Society for the Liberation of Palestine, which in turn sponsored the formation of a People's Army with al-Qawuqji in command.

At an extraordinary Arab League summit in December 1947, Syria agreed to host the headquarters for the guerrilla and popular units that the league's military committee entrusted with the task of fighting the Jews—the ARAB LIBERATION ARMY (ALA), commanded by al-Qawuqji. These formations initiated operations along the border in mid-December and moved into Palestine itself in January 1948. Syria's League of Religious Scholars issued a ruling that designated the conflict against the Jews as a holy war, and Jewish employees were fired from state offices and public utilities. Strikes by the Jewish underground military organization HAGANA against Palestinian villages in April 1948 generated public anger throughout Syria but failed to persuade the government to order either the ALA or regular Syrian troops to intervene. Not even an appeal from the head of the Palestinian guerrilla forces convinced al-Quwwatli to put Syria's meager forces in jeopardy. The government's unwillingness to back up the ALA contributed to the Hagana victory at SAFED over elements of the ALA led by Adib al-Shishakli, al-Qawuqji's primary lieutenant.

Fighting against Jewish Forces

Meanwhile, Syrian officials cultivated an alliance with EGYPT and SAUDI ARABIA in an attempt to block Jordan's ruler, King 'Abdullah bin al-Husayn, from controlling that part of Palestine designated for a Palestinian state. President al-Quwwatli reinforced positions on the borders with Palestine and Jordan until almost half of the regular armed forces were concentrated around Dir'a, a rural area south of Damascus. When major hostilities broke out on 15 May 1948, units advanced toward Samakh, just east of the River Jordan, and Jewish settlements south of the Sea of Galilee, but the offensive was beaten back with severe losses. More successful were operations between the Sea of Galilee and Lake Hula in the north and along the Yarmuk River to the east. As a result of these operations, some sixty-six square kilometers (twenty-five miles) of formerly Palestinian territory was occupied and held by Syrian troops.

On 11 June 1948, Damascus accepted the terms of the UN Security Council Resolution and ordered all forces under its command to cease firing. The Hagana then launched a counteroffensive between Lake Hula and the Sea of Galilee and pushed eastward from 'En Gev on the eastern shore. These activities prompted the Security Council to adopt a more comprehensive cease-fire resolution, which Syria immediately accepted, although the ALA refused to accept the truce and continued to fight in the Galilee hills throughout

the summer. These activities were disowned by the Syrian government, which ignored al-Qawuqji's requests for assistance, and the ALA was finally pushed into southern Lebanon in late October. Al-Qawuqji turned to Jordan and the Syrian Social National Party for relief and threatened to collaborate with either one or both to overthrow the regime in Damascus.

In November 1948, Syria's delegate on the Security Council stated that the Arab governments would only negotiate with Jewish representatives if the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION acknowledged the right of Palestinian Arabs to form an independent state, which it did not. Damascus did not join the UN-sponsored mediation process until March 1949. A month later, the Israeli-Syrian Armistice Conference opened, with Syrian representatives insisting that the talks deal exclusively with military issues, while the Israelis demanded that any agreement be considered a political measure. After thirteen meetings, the two sides signed a formal ARMISTICE AGREEMENT that set up four demilitarized zones along the border, backed by larger districts "in which defensive forces only shall be maintained." For practical reasons, but over Damascus's objections, these areas were patrolled by Israeli police units stationed at 'En Gev and Mishmar Ha-Yarden.

Negotiations regarding the armistice accompanied a dramatic change in Syria's domestic politics. On 30 March 1949 a group of officers led by Colonel Husni al-Za'im overturned the liberal democratic regime. The new leader quickly contacted US officials and offered to resettle as many as 300,000 Palestinian REFUGEES between the Euphrates and Khabur rivers. This proposal followed secret contacts with Israeli agents, in which al-Za'im had signaled that he would make peace with Israel in exchange for financial support for the coup. It remains unclear whether such payment was made. Shortly after seizing power, al-Za'im indicated a willingness to meet personally with DAVID BEN-GURION, but the Israeli prime minister, who made no attempt to encourage further negotiations, rejected this overture.

In August 1949, officers led by Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi ousted al-Za'im, and the new government's foreign policy concentrated on Iraq and Jordan. The political party that dominated the cabinet, the People's Party (Hizb al-Sha'b), stood firmly opposed to Israel but believed that Syria stood no chance of confronting this adversary successfully unless it forged close alliances with other Arab states. Four months later, this regime was ousted by officers led by Colonel Adib al-Shishakli, who resumed al-Za'im's campaign to improve relations with Israel and reiterated the offer to accept Palestinian refugees in return for secure access to the Jordan River and Sea of Galilee. Once again, Ben-Gurion dismissed the proposal.

In February 1951, Israel started work on a project to drain swampland at the southern end of Lake Hula. Syrian officials protested that the work infringed on the demilitarized zones and jeopardized the livelihoods of Arab farmers. While discussions took place under the auspices of the Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC), Israeli bulldozers set to work. On 15 March persons in Arab clothing shot at one of the earthmovers. Soon shootings became more frequent, and Israeli police ordered the residents of two Arab villages in the district to evacuate. On 4 April, in a skirmish with Syrian soldiers at al-Hamma along the Yarmuk River, seven Israeli police officers were killed, and the next day Israeli warplanes struck Syrian positions around the town. After Damascus brought the crisis to the UN Security Council, Israel relocated the project to a part of the demilitarized zone that had no Arab villages and resumed work. Israel subsequently refused to attend meetings of the MAC.

During the spring of 1954, armed skirmishes between Syrian and Israeli forces occurred along the northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. The MAC determined that responsibility for the incidents was evenly divided between the two sides. A more serious clash took place in December 1955, prompting the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 3538, which charged Israel with flagrantly violating the Armistice Agreement. Documents captured during this incident show that Syrian commanders had standing orders to open fire on Israeli patrol boats if they came closer than 250 meters to the coastline. From February 1958 to September 1961, Syria played little part in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but merged with Egypt to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). Officials in Damascus, however, expressed little enthusiasm for Cairo's landmark March 1959 proposal to create a "Palestine Entity" (al-Kiyan al-Filastini) that would enable the Palestinians to act "as a unified people rather than mere refugees." In March 1962 fighting resumed along the border. The ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) attacked the district around

al-Nuqaib, north of ‘En Gev in Syrian territory, claiming that Syrian troops had set up fixed fortifications in the area, although a UN investigation found no evidence that Syria had violated the terms of the armistice.

Arab Anger over Water Diversion Project

Meanwhile, Israel initiated a massive project to divert water from the Jordan River to the Negev Desert. The Ba’ath Party–led regime in Damascus, which had overthrown the post-UAR civilian government in March 1963, complained to the UN Security Council and called for all Arab heads of state to gather in Cairo for an extraordinary summit in January 1964. At the conference, the Arab leaders agreed to change the course of the Hasbani, Bani Yas, and Yarmuk rivers to reduce the flow of water into the Jordan River; to set up a joint military command to improve coordination among their armed forces; and to authorize AHMAD SHUQAYRI to orchestrate the establishment of the Palestine entity. In May, Palestinians residing in Syria took part in the inaugural congress of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, which created the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) to act as the movement’s vanguard, although the Ba’athist leadership in Damascus criticized the PLO almost immediately for pursuing a relatively moderate program. Syria tended to support the more revolutionary actions undertaken by the Palestine Liberation Movement (FATAH, or Harakah Tahrir Filastin), although on occasion it charged Fatah with splitting the Palestinian movement.

During 1964–1965, periodic skirmishes broke out along the Syrian-Israeli border. In July 1965, Fatah took advantage of the opportunity to launch a strike into Israel from Syrian territory; in response, Syrian security forces arrested Fatah officials in the country. Greater violence flared in the spring of 1966, when a number of armed incursions into Israeli-held territory took place and the Syrian leadership imprisoned PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT for two months—something he never forgot or forgave. The more radical Ba’athist leadership that took power in Damascus in February 1966, led by Salah Jadid, credited Fatah guerrillas with carrying out most of these operations and openly provided the organization with supplies and training facilities. Jadid’s regime, galvanized by Israel’s diversion of the water of the Jordan (the National Water Carrier), was the most militant and pro-Palestinian that Syria had witnessed. Israeli aircraft retaliated by attacking construction and farm machinery situated well inside Syrian territory, which led the Syrian air force to strike a pair of Israeli police boats in the Sea of Galilee on 15 August 1966. On that occasion, Radio Damascus declared that Syria had decided “that she would not confine herself to defensive action but would attack defined targets and bases of aggression within the occupied area. Syria has waited for a suitable opportunity to carry out this new policy. That opportunity was presented today.” Chief of Staff General Ahmad al-Suwaydani concurred: “We have always been the defenders, but in this battle we were not resisting blows, but delivering blows.” Furthermore, the government set up the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (Jabhah al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyyah) to support Fatah’s activities.

Throughout the spring of 1967, Damascus exhibited an increasingly belligerent posture toward Israel. In early April, when Israeli farmers moved armored tractors into the demilitarized zone north of the Sea of Galilee, Syrian units responded not only with artillery and mortar fire but also with tank and aircraft forays into the disputed area. Israeli armored and air force units counterattacked, bombarding villages across the border inside Syria and engaging Syrian warplanes in the skies over Damascus. In the wake of this battle, the Syrian government stepped up its support for guerrilla operations by Palestinian commandos based in Jordan and Lebanon. In addition, Damascus dispatched military missions to Cairo to persuade Egypt to implement a November 1966 mutual defense pact. Syrian pressure, accompanied by MOSCOW reports that the IDF had massed along the Syrian-Israeli border, convinced Egypt’s president JAMAL ‘ABD AL-NASIR to request the withdrawal of the UN Emergency Force from the Sinai and close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. On 5 June 1967, war erupted between Israel and Syria, Egypt, and Jordan.

Cautious Participation in Fighting

Syrian bellicosity played a crucial role in escalating the confrontation of April–May 1967 into full-scale warfare between the Arab states and Israel. Nevertheless, when fighting broke out, the Syrian high command proved inordinately cautious in joining the battle. Syrian artillery shelled Israeli settlements around the Sea of Galilee, and ground

forces advanced across the border in two locations. However, combat only escalated after the IDF turned its attention northward on the fifth day of the war. After al-Qunaytirah quickly fell, Israeli troops occupied the surrounding Golan Heights. On 10 June the two sides agreed to a cease-fire. Embarrassed by the ease with which the IDF had captured the country's southwestern corner, Damascus flatly rejected Israeli calls to enter into negotiations. Senior officials urged Palestinian guerrillas to continue the ARMED STRUGGLE and refused to endorse UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Military commanders remained careful, however, to prevent Palestinian guerrillas from striking across the Syrian border, lest such action provoke Israel retaliation. In December 1968 the Syrian government set up a guerrilla formation of its own, called SA'IQA (Bolt of Lightning), partly to counteract a rapprochement between Fatah and Cairo and partly to offset the emergence of the more radical POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), whose leader, GEORGE HABASH, the Syrians imprisoned for several months. Throughout 1969–1970, Sa'iqa joined various Palestinian militias in undertaking raids into Israel and Israeli-occupied territory.

November 1970 witnessed the downfall of Jadid's regime, which had orchestrated the runup to the 1967 WAR and its replacement by military officers headed by Ba'athist minister of defense General Hafez al-Asad. The new government continued to inveigh against Israel as forcefully as had its predecessor and remained unwilling to accept Security Council Resolution 242, although it gradually replaced the virulent anti-Jewish rhetoric of the mid-1960s with more nuanced condemnations of Israeli policy. Furthermore, the al-Asad regime adopted a more businesslike orientation toward the long-term struggle with Israel. New arms contracts were signed with the Soviet Union, greater efforts were made to coordinate military planning with Egypt and Jordan, and Palestinian guerrilla units were kept on a tight leash. Al-Asad's strategy was to contain Israel without giving it an excuse to attack. Commanders loyal to al-Asad had already put Sa'iqa under strict Ba'ath Party control.

Reining in the guerrillas turned out to be more difficult than Damascus had imagined. Following the Jordanian civil war of September 1970 (BLACK SEPTEMBER), most Palestinian commando units decamped to bases in Beirut, Tripoli, and southern Lebanon. The activities and often the mere presence of these formations attracted repeated Israeli air strikes. Al-Asad could not abide the PLO's insistence on maintaining its independence and formulating its own strategies, which led to continuous and increasing tension between Arafat and al-Asad. Nevertheless, from 1970 to 1975, Syria essentially supported the PLO. In February 1973, al-Asad prohibited Palestinian militias from launching raids into Israel or Israeli-occupied land from Syrian territory, and these constraints remained in place during and after the 1973 OCTOBER WAR, during which Egypt and Syria attempted to take back territory lost in the 1967 War (for Egypt, the Sinai; for Syria, the Golan Heights). The PLO, however, enjoyed significant freedom and Syria's blessing to launch raids from Lebanese territory. Meanwhile, Damascus rejected Egypt's March 1972 proposal to form a Palestinian government-in-exile, because such a move would weaken the armed struggle against Israel and it viewed the PLO as the only legitimate Palestinian authority.

Simmering hostility between Syria and Israel in the winter of 1973–1974, combined with the growing potential for US and Soviet military involvement in the conflict, persuaded US secretary of state HENRY KISSINGER to begin eight months of concerted mediation. In an effort to encourage Damascus to be flexible, Kissinger suggested the Israeli government offer to pull back to the positions in the Golan Heights that its troops had occupied prior to the outbreak of the October war. After initially rejecting the suggestion, Israeli officials eventually conceded and, in May 1974, signed a disengagement agreement with Syria. It provided for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from al-Qunaytirah, the creation of a buffer zone patrolled by UN peacekeeping forces, strict limitations on the number and composition of Israeli and Syrian units on each side of the buffer zone, and procedures for exchanging prisoners of war. At the same time, Damascus resisted Egypt's efforts to convene a GENEVA CONFERENCE, as well as the PLO's insistence that it be designated the sole representative of the Palestinian people. On the other hand, Sa'iqa joined Fatah in approving the "phased political program" that was ratified by the Palestine National Council in June 1974.

Despite the disengagement agreement, Syria's relations with Israel remained frigid. Damascus expressed sharp criticism of Egypt's accelerating rapprochement with Israel, but, as fighting intensified among Lebanese militias during the fall and winter of 1975–1976, Syrian officials moderated their vituperation against Cairo and made new overtures to Washington. In fact, the dominant aspect of these years was the civil war in Lebanon (a traditional Syrian sphere of influence). Given the factious character of Lebanon, the PLO held the key to war or peace. Al-Asad was anxious to maintain peace in Lebanon to deny Israel any excuse for intervention, but factions within the PLO elected to enter the conflict on the side of the leftist Lebanese forces. These developments set the stage for Syria's military intervention in Lebanon in the spring of 1976, as well as for US pressure on Israel to refrain from attacking Syrian forces north of a line from Saidah to Jazzin (the so-called Red Line). In return, Damascus refrained from interfering in the region south of the Zaharani River. Subsequently, al-Asad stated that he stood ready to negotiate a peace agreement with Israel if it pulled out of the lands it had seized in 1967 and recognized the Palestinians' right to set up a state. Such statements encouraged US secretary of state CYRUS VANCE to make a series of trips to Damascus, and al-Asad conferred directly with President JIMMY CARTER in Geneva in May 1977. Whatever potential there might have been for a thaw in relations between the two sides disappeared when Israel's LIKUD PARTY bloc gained control of the Knesset and its leader, the Revisionist Zionist MENAHEM BEGIN, became prime minister. Nevertheless, Damascus scrupulously prevented Palestinian guerrillas from crossing into Israel and Israeli-occupied territory from Syria, and it also restrained its troops from interfering when the IDF carried out a large-scale offensive against PLO bases in South Lebanon in March 1978.

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Process

Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's dramatic peace initiatives toward Israel in 1977–1978 convinced Damascus that Cairo was preparing to abandon its Arab allies and pursue a bilateral peace agreement. Al-Asad responded by trying to persuade the leaders of Jordan and Saudi Arabia to join him in condemning Egypt's policy, but an Arab summit meeting in December 1977 produced no more than vague pronouncements of the continuing need for Arab unity, although the PLO ended up endorsing Syria's position to a greater extent than expected. Because Damascus refused to put aside its long-standing differences with Iraq, it found itself unable to do more than protest the steadily accelerating Egyptian-Israeli peace process and the bilateral treaty that the two governments signed in March 1979. Determined that it would never again be left hanging by a strategic partner, the Syrian leadership undertook to achieve "strategic parity" with Israel by enlarging and upgrading its armed forces and signing a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Damascus also sought to prevent the PLO from implementing the "phased program" based on PLO willingness to assume control over small areas of the WEST BANK as part of a graduated settlement.

During the first months of 1981, Israel began to complain that the Syrian military presence in Lebanon posed a strategic threat. Prime Minister Begin unleashed a succession of fulminations against Syria and hinted that the IDF might come to the rescue of Lebanese Christians. That December, the Likud government imposed Israeli law on the occupied Golan Heights. Subsequently, Israeli troops deployed along the northern border and, in June 1982, initiated the massive LEBANON WAR. For the first two days of the offensive, Syrian units held their fire, but they finally engaged with the IDF to defend Jazzin. Israeli aircraft and artillery then attacked Syrian positions in the Biqa' and clashed again when the Israelis rolled into the southern suburbs of Beirut. When the fighting ended, Damascus's relations with the PLO collapsed, with the two sides blaming each other for their evident lack of tactical coordination. Syrian agents even encouraged dissidents inside the PLO to challenge Arafat, who then distanced himself from al-Asad and made overtures to Jordan.

For the next three years, the focus of Syrian-Israeli relations remained fixed on Lebanon. Militias sponsored and supplied by Damascus engaged in a war of attrition against the IDF that ended up pushing Israeli troops south of the Litani River. In November 1985 a pair of Syrian warplanes buzzed an Israeli observer aircraft in Lebanese airspace, only to be shot down by IDF interceptors. Syrian commanders responded by deploying anti-aircraft missile batteries back to the Biqa' and along the Golan Heights. Three months later, Israeli military aircraft forced a Libyan jet

carrying the speaker of the Syrian parliament to land in Israel and only permitted it to take off after Syria complained to the UN Security Council. Subsequent Israeli bombings against a variety of targets in Lebanon and Syria convinced the leadership in Damascus that renewed military confrontation with Israel was probable. In contrast to the situation in October 1973, however, Moscow made it clear that it would not come to Syria's assistance, and the threat of war gradually subsided. Sporadic attacks on Israel and Israeli-occupied territory by Syrian-sponsored guerrilla organizations in southern Lebanon nevertheless persisted, which heightened Israeli hostility toward the al-Asad regime. As a result, a February 1988 peace initiative undertaken by US secretary of state GEORGE SHULTZ elicited no more than a flat rejection from Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR.

A subtle but significant shift in Syria's stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was evident in 1989. Senior officials, perhaps encouraged by indications that the new US administration of GEORGE H. W. BUSH intended to adhere to a more evenhanded approach to the Middle East, hinted at a broad willingness to take part in negotiations based on the principles codified in UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. More important, Damascus took steps to reconcile with Cairo and raised no public objection to the PLO's overtures to Israel. During the course of a July 1990 summit meeting with Egypt's president HOSNI MUBARAK, al-Asad told reporters that his government was fully prepared to sign a formal treaty with Israel based on exchanging territory for peace. Yet Damascus showed a marked reluctance to jump onto the bandwagon behind a US-sponsored effort to convene an international conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the immediate aftermath of the 1990–1991 GULF WAR. Following a meeting with US secretary of state JAMES BAKER in early April 1991, Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' reaffirmed Damascus's position that the United Nations should play "a significant role" in such a conference and that the results of any negotiations must be "based on Resolutions 242 and 338." Although Syrian officials later retreated from their insistence that the United Nations sponsor the talks, they persisted in demanding that the two Security Council resolutions serve as the primary basis for deliberations. On the eve of the opening of the MADRID CONFERENCE, Damascus announced that it would take no part in follow-up talks concerning economic and environmental issues unless there was clear progress in resolving the issue of the Occupied Territories.

Israeli-Syrian Negotiations

Syria boycotted the January 1992 Moscow round of talks on the grounds that any discussion of long-term regional security issues was premature as long as Israeli troops remained in control of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza. Bilateral negotiations in Washington two months later produced a virtual deadlock between Syria and Israel. While Damascus tried to focus attention on the Occupied Territories, the Israelis complained of Syrian threats to Israeli security. When negotiations resumed in August, Syrian delegates expressed optimism that the LABOR PARTY government in Israel would adopt a more conciliatory posture. Damascus reiterated its demand for the complete return of the Golan Heights, rebuffing Israeli hints that unspecified territorial concessions might follow the signing of a peace treaty. At the same time, the Syrians seemed willing to demilitarize the Golan Heights or place it under international supervision. Israel responded by stating for the first time that it considered the Golan Heights to be covered under the terms of Resolution 242, suggesting that it might be willing to give up territory. Such mutual flexibility resulted in a dramatic improvement in the atmosphere surrounding the talks, and in September the Syrian delegation circulated a draft Declaration of Principles that outlined the general terms of a comprehensive peace agreement.

Nevertheless, the seventh round of discussions in October evidenced none of the optimism that had pervaded the preceding session. Syria denounced Israel's rejection of a complete withdrawal from the Golan Heights, as well as the IDF's escalating air and artillery strikes in southern Lebanon. When Israeli delegates announced that they were going home early, the head of the Syrian team called the talks "frustrating." Syria's position became even more intransigent during the early November recess. When talks resumed, Syria restated its demand that a full Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories precede discussion of any other issues. As the talks foundered, President al-Asad softened Syria's hard line. He told reporters that it was conceivable, even likely, that

some aspects of the conflict would be settled in advance of others as long as the ultimate objectives of a comprehensive peace were kept firmly in mind. When a reporter asked whether Syria would be willing to sign an agreement that did not turn over the West Bank to the Palestinians, the president replied that he "did not want to go into details," but that the notion of comprehensiveness referred to the range of topics under consideration, not to the amount of real estate involved. He then repeated that as long as all the Arab delegations retained their confidence in one another, "it would be possible for one side to progress more speedily than the others." In mid-March, however, al-Asad reverted to a less conciliatory position. He told an audience in Damascus that any separate Syrian-Israeli settlement would be rejected and that Syria would under no circumstances abandon its Arab partners in the talks but could instead be counted on to treat issues vital to the Palestinians, Lebanese, and Jordanians as important to Syria.

Just prior to the ninth round of negotiations at the end of April 1993, Syrian delegates reaffirmed the president's harder line. The head of the negotiating team told the Lebanese newspaper *al-Diyar* that Damascus had no intention of making a separate deal with Israel but instead remained "committed to a comprehensive peace, and solving the Arab-Israeli conflict on all fronts." A week later Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam stated: "Peace requires withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories, and recognition of the national rights of the Palestinian people," both of which were presently rejected by Israel.

By all accounts, President al-Asad was caught completely off-guard by the August 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES between Israel and the PLO. Syrian officials immediately branded the agreement a "partial solution" that effectively undermined the overall prospects for an honorable settlement. They also invited a variety of radical Palestinian groups, which were equally upset with the PLO, to set up offices in the Syrian capital. These included the PFLP, the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND, the Palestinian ISLAMIC JIHAD, and HAMAS. At the same time, Damascus opened the door to more active US mediation. Secretary of State WARREN CHRISTOPHER presented al-Asad with a secret offer from Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN to pull out of the Golan Heights in exchange for security guarantees and normal diplomatic relations. While Rabin envisioned a withdrawal to the Golan Heights boundary that had been laid down by British and French authorities in 1923, which put the entirety of the Jordan River and Sea of Galilee inside Israeli territory, al-Asad wanted withdrawal to the border that had existed as of 4 June 1967. Consequently, al-Asad rejected the proposal but agreed to meet President BILL CLINTON in Geneva in January 1994, at which time al-Asad expressed commitment to "establish normal relations in the area." Clinton inferred that Syria was willing to complement diplomatic ties with broader economic and social connections, but Israeli officials interpreted al-Asad's statement as an intention to hold back until an agreement was reached concerning the West Bank and Gaza. Talks once again stalemated. In January 1995 al-Asad sent a letter to Clinton outlining the fundamental guidelines that might govern future security in the Golan Heights. The letter was reworked by US officials into a one-page Statement of Aims and Principles and presented to Syria and Israel in May. Rabin refused to accept any written version of the principles, prompting al-Asad to doubt that Rabin was serious about the oral pledges he had made. Before such misgivings could be assuaged, Rabin was assassinated, and US diplomats passed along the details of Rabin's secret proposal to his successor, SHIMON PERES.

New Israeli Governments

President al-Asad found Peres to be an enigma. Whereas al-Asad understood diplomacy to involve precise language and firm commitments, Peres employed vague formulations and broad visions. Furthermore, Peres's conception of a new Middle East, in which state borders became irrelevant and mutual prosperity trumped political differences, appeared to Syrian leaders to be simply a cover for Israel's unlimited exploitation of the water resources of the Golan Heights and domination of the regional economy. Nevertheless, Damascus joined a new round of bilateral talks beginning in December 1995. But in early February 1996, Peres called new parliamentary elections and then suspended negotiations with Syria in the wake of a string of SUICIDE BOMBINGS inside Israel.

BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's government in 1996 abandoned the "land for peace" formula that had long been associated with UN Security Council Resolution 242 and insisted instead on a less tangible concept, "peace with security." The new

prime minister pledged that Israel would never return the Golan Heights and announced that any talks with Damascus would proceed "without preconditions"; that is, he would ignore his predecessors' proposals and actions. Syrian officials demanded that talks be resumed at the point where they had been broken off by Peres and said that any other procedure would imply that "the negotiations could last another century . . . since every time there is a new Israeli government we have to return to point zero." US representatives elicited support from Damascus for resurrecting negotiations, but there were no reciprocal signals from the Israeli government. Syrian-Israeli relations remained frozen while Netanyahu served as prime minister.

Damascus welcomed the May 1999 electoral victory of EHUD BARAK. The incoming prime minister signaled that he was willing to negotiate the Golan Heights issue on the basis of the 4 June 1967 boundary, although he added that any final agreement might require "very marginal border adjustments" to ensure Israel's security and access to vital water supplies. The thaw in Syrian-Israeli relations prompted the PFLP to reconcile with the mainstream PLO. That December, al-Asad informed US secretary of state MADELEINE ALBRIGHT that Syria was prepared to restart negotiations "where they had left off." Washington immediately organized a new round of bilateral talks and put together a draft peace treaty to provide a basis for discussion. However, the Syrian delegation soon discovered that the Israelis were basing their proposals on the 1923 border. Furthermore, Israel demanded unrestricted access to the water resources of the Golan Heights, including the various tributaries of the Jordan River, while the Syrians maintained that water rights would conform to conventional international standards. After three months of sparring, the Israeli government pulled out of the talks.

In June 2000 al-Asad died unexpectedly, and his successor, Bashar al-Asad, hinted on a number of occasions over the summer of 2000 that he hoped that negotiations with Israel would resume. Before the two sides could work out a mutually agreeable starting point, however, the second Palestinian uprising (AL-AQSA INTIFADA) erupted. At the end of October, the Israeli government began building 1,500 new houses for Jewish settlers in the Golan Heights. February 2001 saw the electoral defeat of Barak and his replacement by hard-liner ARIEL SHARON. The Sharon government stepped up Israeli military operations in South Lebanon, and in April it attacked a Syrian radar post in retaliation for operations by the Shi'a Islamist group Hizbullah along the Lebanese border. Despite these setbacks, Damascus again signaled that it would be interested in reopening bilateral discussions. Israel rebuffed the signals, to the growing irritation of the Syrian president, who escalated his anti-Israel rhetoric. More important, al-Asad revived the notion that any Syrian-Israeli peace must be predicated on a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such sentiments led Washington to exclude Syria from the initial stages of the so-called ROAD MAP to peace that was drawn up by the QUARTET—the United States, the United Nations, the EUROPEAN UNION, and Russia—in the fall of 2002.

The US invasion of IRAQ in March 2003 accompanied renewed signs of Damascus's interest in resuming bilateral talks with Israel. Sharon appeared receptive to the idea as long as discussions took place "without conditions." However, the Israeli government linked the resumption of negotiations to an end of strikes against Israeli targets by Hizbullah and other guerrilla organizations. Taking the hint, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad closed their Syrian offices, while the PFLP reduced its activities to a bare minimum. In October 2003 the IDF bombed an alleged Palestinian training camp north of Damascus. The year closed with the announcement that Israel intended to double the number of Jewish settlers in the Golan Heights. Yet al-Asad took advantage of a December interview with the *New York Times* to reiterate his willingness to pick up talks where they had left off in January 2000.

During 2004, US and Israeli demands that Syria eject all radical Palestinian organizations from its territory heightened tensions. In September Israel uncharacteristically claimed responsibility for the killing of an influential member of Hamas outside his Damascus house. The attack derailed Syrian overtures to the Sharon government, which were being undertaken through the former US ambassador to Israel, MARTIN INDYK. Nevertheless, between September 2004 and July 2006, in a series of secret meetings in Europe, Syrians and Israelis formulated understandings for a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. What happened to this agreement is unclear. Further initiatives

proved impossible in the wake of the February 2005 assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, which sparked a major crisis in Syria's relations not only with Lebanon but also with Israel, the United States, and France.

On 6 September 2007, in an operation codenamed "Operation Orchard," Israel bombed a site in the Deir ez-Zor region of Syria, claiming the site was a nuclear facility. Syria denied the nuclear allegation, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tests came up with no indication to back the claims of Israel. Israel also made allegations about "significant" traces of uranium found at the site, but these findings have been disputed by Syria. The IAEA discovered possible evidence of uranium processing at the site, but the evidence has been inconclusive and attempts at investigation are ongoing.

Perhaps more important, Israel has actively sabotaged Syrian initiatives by undercutting its influence and credibility abroad. The aforementioned attack on Syria's perceived nuclear facility and the involvement of Mossad in the 13 February 2008 assassination of Imad Mugniyah (Hizbullah's top military commander) in Damascus serve as recent examples of such efforts.

See also ARMED STRUGGLE; BA'ATHISM; LEBANON; UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION; WAR, 1948; WAR, 1967

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—Fred H. Lawson

Syrian-Israeli Conflict over Water, 1950–1965

See UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

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Ta'ayush

Ta'ayush (Life in Common) is a grassroots movement of Palestinians and Israelis who, in their own words, "work to break down the walls of racism and segregation by building a true Palestinian-Jewish partnership." In the fall of 2000, a group of like-minded individuals came together and proclaimed that, as "Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel . . . a future of equality, justice and peace begins today, between us, through concrete, daily actions of solidarity to end the Israeli OCCUPATION of the Palestinian Territories and to achieve full civil equality for all Israeli citizens."

Ta'ayush's ongoing activities include a campaign against the BARRIER separation wall, donations to families in the Rafah refugee camp and to the cave dwellers of the South Hebron Mountains for strengthening their steadfastness (*sumud*), protests against Palestinian HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and solidarity activities with the Yanoun villagers in the southern hills of Hebron and with Palestinian residents of the Susiya region. (www.taayush.org).

See also HEBRON DISTRICT, SOUTHERN AREA

Taba Talks, 2001

The Israeli-Palestinian talks held at Taba, EGYPT, from 21 to 27 January 2001 were the last negotiations in the OSLO PROCESS between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. Considerable progress was made on many issues that had been left unresolved at the CAMP DAVID SUMMIT six months earlier, but, rather than pursuing peace, the newly elected prime minister, ARIEL SHARON, escalated the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, and the achievements made at Taba were not followed up. The EU envoy to the talks, Miguel Moratinos, took extensive notes, which are paraphrased here. Both sides accepted Moratinos's notes as an accurate record of what took place.

In order to find ways to arrive at joint positions, the two sides referred to the extensive work that had been undertaken on permanent status issues such as territory, JERUSALEM, REFUGEES, and security. At the same time, there were serious gaps and differences between the two sides, left to be overcome in future negotiations.

Territory

The two sides agreed that, in accordance with UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the basis for the BORDERS between Israel and a future state of Palestine would be the 4 June 1967 lines. Also, it was implied that the GAZA STRIP would be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but the details were not worked out. If Israel gave up control, the Jewish SETTLEMENTS in Gaza would be evacuated.


Safe Passage/Corridor from Gaza to the West Bank

Both sides agreed to a SAFE PASSAGE for Palestinians from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun) to the HEBRON DISTRICT, and that the WEST BANK and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked. However, Israel insisted that it retain sovereignty over the safe passage, with the Palestinians receiving only usage rights to the land. The issue of control over Palestine's international BORDERS remained unresolved for the same reason, as did the question of who would control the border control posts.

Jerusalem

Both sides accepted (in principle) US president BILL CLINTON'S suggestion of Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and Israeli sovereignty over Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem. The Palestinians agreed to discuss an Israeli request for sovereignty over Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed after 1967, but not Jabal Abu Ghanem and RAS AL-AMUD or settlements in the Jerusalem metropolitan area; namely, MA'ALE ADUMIM and GIV'AT ZE'EV.

"The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to accept Palestinian sovereignty over the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, including



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Map 41. Map Presented by Israel at Taba, 2001

part of Jerusalem's OLD CITY. The Israeli side understood that the Palestinians were ready to accept Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the Armenian Quarter."

Both sides favored the idea of an open city. The Israelis' geographical scope encompassed the Old City of Jerusalem, plus an area defined as the HOLY BASIN (or Historical Basin), which includes the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City of David, and Kidron Valley. It also contains numerous Palestinian neighborhoods, including SILWAN, SHAYKH JARRAH, Ras al-Amud, ABU DIS, and others. Although the Palestinians agreed to consider Israeli interests and concerns provided that these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty, they rejected the Israeli parameters for the open city and instead supported one that encompassed the full municipal borders of both East and West Jerusalem.

The Israeli side accepted Jerusalem as the capital of the two states: Yerushalaim, capital of Israel, and Al-Quds, capital of the state of Palestine. Regarding a capital, the Palestinians were only concerned that East Jerusalem be their capital.

Holy Sites

Both parties accepted the principle of control over each side's respective HOLY SITES. Accordingly, Palestinians recognized Israel's sovereignty over the WESTERN WALL, although there was disagreement over the delineation of the Western Wall. The Palestinian side insisted on distinguishing between the Western Wall and the Wailing Wall segment, which is recognized in the Islamic faith as the Buraq Wall.

Although no resolution was reached on the question of TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF, the coexisting Jewish temple and Muslim shrine, both sides were close to accepting Clinton's proposal for Palestinian sovereignty over al-Haram ash-Sharif.

Refugees

Both sides agreed that the issue of the Palestinian refugees was central to the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, and that a comprehensive and just solution was essential for a lasting peace. The two parties further agreed that the basis for a settlement of the refugee problem was UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194, which calls for return or repatriation to Palestine/Israel of the refugees and for their compensation. The Palestinian side reiterated that the refugees should have the right of return to their homes, whereas the Israeli side said that return and repatriation should be either to Israel, to Israel-swapped territory, or to the Palestine state; that rehabilitation should take place in the host country where the refugee currently resides; and that relocation should be to a third country.

Both sides agreed to the establishment of an international commission and an international fund as a mechanism for dealing with compensation. Both sides agreed that "small-sum" compensation should be "fast-tracked" to refugees for loss of property. They also saw progress on Israeli compensation for material losses and expropriated land and assets, including agreement on an Israeli lump sum payment or amount to be agreed upon that would feed into the international fund. However, the Israelis sought to base the calculation of this payment on a macroeconomic survey that would evaluate the assets in order to reach a fair value, whereas the Palestinians wanted to calculate a fair value based on the records of the UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE, and other relevant data, with a multiplier.

Security

Both sides committed to promoting security cooperation and fighting terror. Specifically, the Israelis wanted three early warning stations on Palestinian territory, which the Palestinians accepted, subject to certain conditions. In addition, Israel wanted to maintain and operate five emergency locations on Palestinian territory (in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY), although the Palestinians agreed to only two emergency locations, conditional on a time limit for their dismantling, and only if maintained by an international body rather than by Israelis. During emergency situations, Israel also wanted to deploy its armed forces on Palestinian territory, which the Palestinians refused although they were open to international forces used in that capacity, particularly within the context of regional security cooperation efforts. The two sides were also unable to agree on the scope of arms limitation for a Palestinian state. While Israel wanted a nonmilitarized Palestine, per the Clinton proposals, the Palestinians were prepared to accept some limitation on its acquisition of arms, but not a total ban.

In the sphere of civil aviation, the Palestinians were interested in exploring models for broad cooperation and coordination but were unwilling to cede overriding control to Israel. At the same time,

the Israelis requested military operations and training in Palestinian airspace, but the Palestinians rejected this as inconsistent with the neutrality of the state of Palestine.

Annexation

The large stretch of territory between Ma'ale Adumim and Giv'at Ze'ev contains both a fairly large Palestinian population and East Jerusalem's most important land reserves. Initially, the Palestinians were amenable to having these two settlements be annexed to Israel but changed their minds after Israel insisted on annexing also the large tract of land that joins them, upon which event Palestinian citizens would find themselves in sovereign Israeli territory.

Another dispute that remained unresolved stemmed from Israel's refusal to accept the Palestinian demand for a 1:1 ratio between the area of the West Bank annexed to Israel and the parts of Israel that would be given to the Palestinians in exchange. Instead, Israel proposed a ratio of 1:2, in its favor. In addition, the Palestinians rejected Israel's proposal that the Halutza Dunes in the Negev, the area of safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and the part of Ashdod Port that would be set aside for Palestinian use be considered part of the land swap. Instead, they insisted that the land they received be contiguous with either the West Bank or Gaza, and that it not include any land over which they would not have sovereignty.

See also OSLO PROCESS

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Tabenkin, Yitzhak (1887–1971)

Yitzhak Tabenkin was a founder of the Meyuchad KIBBUTZ movement and one of the principal thinkers and founders of the kibbutz movement in general. A prominent LABOR PARTY leader, in 1967 he was a founder of the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT, which holds that the entire land of Israel belongs exclusively to the Jewish people. After the 1967 WAR, he was the leading ideologue for retaining all of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, opposing even the ALLON PLAN as too lenient.

Born in Byelorussia, Tabenkin had an Orthodox education until he attended university, studying in Warsaw, Vienna, and Berne. In Poland, he was one of the founders of the socialist Zionist party PO'ALE ZION and a strong supporter of agricultural settlements in Palestine. In 1911, he immigrated to Palestine and worked as a "watchman" in the settlements of Rehovot, and later Kinneret, eventually joining the paramilitary organization HASHOMER. After World War I, Tabenkin was involved in the founding of AHDUT HA'AVODAH, the underground military organization HAGANA, and the labor federation HISTADRUT. In 1921, he joined JOSEPH TRUMPELDOR's Gedud ha-Avoda (Jewish Labor Legion) and settled in En Harod, beginning its transformation into a major collective.

Tabenkin believed firmly in kibbutz living and supported the idea of big collective settlements open to large membership. He also became involved in Labor Party politics and was one of the founders of the MAPAI, and later of MAPAM. After the establishment of the state (1948), Tabenkin became a mem-

ber of the Knesset and was a key Labor leader. He consistently upheld the importance of the Land of Israel. When in 1947, Israel founder DAVID BEN-GURION could not decide how to respond to UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 181, on partition, he asked Tabenkin for advice. Tabenkin told him that the Land of Israel does not belong to any particular generation, but is the patrimony of all generations, and that there could be no compromise to the Jews having the whole of Eretz Yisrael. It was out of this commitment that Tabenkin joined the Greater Land of Israel Movement after the 1967 War and became its chief thinker.

See also GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT

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Tal al Za'tar

Tal al Za'tar was the largest Palestinian refugee camp in LEBANON, situated in the outskirts of Christian east Beirut. In the mid-1970s, it had a population of approximately 15,000 REFUGEES, a result of the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Palestinians were less welcome and more oppressed in Lebanon than in any other country in which they took refuge—primarily because of the country's Christian dominance. During the 1975–1976 Lebanese civil war between rightist Christian forces and the leftist Sunni, Shi'a, and Druze coalition, Palestinian factions joined the leftists. In June 1976, the Christian Lebanese Front, composed mainly of rightist Phalangist forces, laid siege to Tal al Za'tar. In addition to the 15,000 civilians in the camp, some 2,000 armed Palestinian guerrillas had collected there. During the siege, which lasted for three months until 12 August, when Christian fighters overran the camp, some 1,600 people died in the fighting and blockade, and 4,000 were wounded. When the Lebanese forces entered the camp, they carried out a wholesale massacre of Palestinian civilians, and then leveled the camp with bulldozers. The surviving civilians were relocated to other Palestinian refugee camps.

See also LEBANON; LEBANON WAR; PHALANGE; SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE

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Talk Peace Make Peace

The Talk Peace Make Peace (Re'ut-Sadaka) project is a HAIFA-based organization that works to improve relations between Israelis and Palestinians at the individual level. The goals of the Talk Peace Make Peace program are to build trust between young Palestinians and Israelis as a basis for multicultural and multinational coexistence and cooperation, established through mutual respect and equality. In keeping with this mission, the following objectives have been set for the program: promoting interpersonal relationships; acquiring awareness of each other's culture and of pluralism within each group; reducing stereotypes, prejudice, and ethnocentrism; internalizing feelings of respect for others; and increasing the ability to deal with conflict through communication rather than violence.

The project involves a series of weekend workshops that begin as separate uninational events devoted to discussions about participants' expectations, stereotypes, prejudices, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself. This is followed, a month later, by a second uninational workshop for each community. Then come four binational weekend workshops, held once a month, in which Israeli and Palestinian participants meet in mixed educational groups to discuss personal, cultural, and ethnic identities; to deal with each other's feelings; and to recognize and break down stereotypes and prejudices. (www.bkluth.de/reut/TPMP.html).

Tami

Tami (Movement for the Heritage of Israel) was a MIZRAHI-dominated political party in Israel during the 1980s. It was founded shortly before the 1981 elections and was led by Aharon Abuhatzira. It won three seats in the elections; however, in 1984 it won only one seat, after which it merged into the LIKUD PARTY and ceased to exist.

Tanzim

In its first incarnation, the Tanzim (the Organization) was a military force set up in 1995 by PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) president YASIR ARAFAT and the FATAH party leadership to offset the growing power of the Palestinian Islamist groups. At least part of Fatah's motivation in establishing such a group came from a series of armed confrontations between Fatah and the Islamist parties. In November 1994, for example, a showdown between PNA security forces and the Islamic group HAMAS resulted in the death of thirteen civilians in the GAZA STRIP.

The character of the Tanzim evolved fairly quickly, and as it did, the relationship between the Tanzim and Fatah grew increasingly contradictory. On the one hand, the Tanzim provides the military and political base of the PNA's rule. On the other, its members are potentially its most seditious opposition. The Tanzim is the stronghold of the insiders, or the YOUNG GUARD, who represent the common Palestinian in the "street" (as opposed to the TUNISIANS or the elite OLD GUARD). At the beginning of the OSLO PROCESS between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, the Tunisians largely marginalized the young guard, although some were co-opted into the PNA's new ministries or into one of its myriad police and intelligence forces. Despite its origins in the Fatah/PNA, the Tanzim, in its second incarnation, has been largely a grassroots organization with branches throughout the Palestinian territories and its leadership based at community levels rather than national. The vast majority of its leaders are graduates of the First INTIFADA, many of whom spent time in Israeli prisons for their activities during the Palestinian uprising. One of the most senior Tanzim figures is MARWAN AL-BARGHUTHI, the WEST BANK Fatah chief, who narrowly escaped TARGETED ASSASSINATION by Israeli rockets in 2001 and subsequently was arrested and given multiple life sentences.

The Tanzim members see themselves as being in the vanguard of the future Palestinian state. One of the lessons born of Fatah's long experience with the governments of the Arab world is the need for self-sufficiency, an idea the Tanzim has vigorously promoted. The group also advocates for Palestinian nationalism and the mobilization of young people into nationalist frameworks by motivating them to take an active role in the nationalist and political activities of Fatah as well as in demonstrations and military operations. Its organizational structure consists of geographical sectors subdivided into cells, and it has branches in every neighborhood, village, REFUGEE camp, and high school. In Ramallah, for example, the Tanzim has ten neighborhood branches in addition to its main headquarters. The organization's strongest branches operate within the universities—BIRZEIT, Bethlehem, and An-Najah. It claims both to have tens of thousands of members (mainly Palestinian men aged twenty to thirty-five) and that virtually every Fatah member

ever imprisoned in Israel belongs to the Tanzim, although neither assertion can be verified. The fact that a number of the Tanzim's leading members also serve in the Palestinian security services provides another contradiction.

After 1996, as popular discontent with the Oslo Process grew and support for Fatah as a movement independent of the PNA declined, opposition to Oslo was expressed at various levels. Within the PNA's new institutions, especially the elected Palestinian Legislative Council, it tended to be Fatah Tanzim deputies who led the crusade against the general corruption, mismanagement, and lawlessness of the PNA's governance. On the street, Tanzim activists took the lead in protests against Israel's SETTLEMENT policies and for the release of Palestinian political PRISONERS. On occasion, the Tanzim sponsored protests against the PNA, especially against the old guard–led security forces, who were known for arresting, torturing, and sometimes killing detained Fatah activists.

Most important, the Tanzim promoted a process of democratic reform that began years earlier. In 1991, West Bank leaders established the Fatah Higher Council, made up of the former Intifada leadership and consisting of local leaders and ex-prisoners drawn from throughout the West Bank. According to journalist Graham Usher, from 1994 to 1999, some 122 Fatah conferences were held in the West Bank, involving the participation of some 85,000 Fatah activists and resulting in the election of 2,500 leaders. A similar process occurred in Gaza, but at a slower pace, and with less participation. The aim of these regional conferences, according to Usher, was to convene the first meeting of the Fatah General Conference in eleven years to elect a new FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE (FCC) and a new Fatah Revolutionary Council (FRC), the two highest decision-making bodies of the movement. It was clear that once that conference convened (it did convene in August 2009), there would be a massive increase in the representation from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES' leadership at the expense of the pro-Oslo leadership formerly exiled in Tunisia. To prevent this, Arafat repeatedly intervened to stall the democratization process, usually in the name of national unity but actually to protect those he appointed to the FCC in 1989, and who have since become the inner core of the national leadership. These leaders—AHMAD QUREI', MAHMUD ABBAS, SAEB EREKAT, NABIL SHA'TH, and Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim—are generally viewed as the most pro-American of the leadership, and the Tanzim badly wants to replace them.

The Tanzim's politics are somewhat difficult to ascertain, because they are committed to the basic nationalist ideology of Fatah. However, with the demise of the Oslo Process, three themes appear to be common among its grassroots leaders. The first, according to Usher, is a growing critique of the Oslo terms, in which Palestinian national aspirations are suborned to a negotiating strategy based on US-led diplomacy and security cooperation with Israel's military and intelligence forces. In its stead, the Tanzim puts forward other options than negotiations and the consolidation of the PNA. Relations with the Israeli government, the peace camp, and diplomatic cooperation with the UNITED STATES and the EUROPEAN UNION are acceptable, but not as substitutes for other options. In al-Barghuthi's words, "We can negotiate, but we must also have action on the ground."

The second theme calls for wrenching the Palestinian struggle out from under the tutelage of US regional diplomacy and Israeli hegemony to where the Tanzim believes it properly belongs—the UNITED NATIONS and the Arab world. Usher states, "The Tanzim asserts that any 'end of conflict' must be predicated on Israel's full withdrawal to the 1967 lines, including East JERUSALEM, and recognition of the principle of Palestinian refugees' right of return 'to their homes' in geographic Palestine."

Finally, the West Bank insiders advocate a "genuine national coalition among all the Palestinian factions, especially the non-PLO Islamist movements of Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD, united behind the commonly held national goals of independence, return, sovereignty and ending the OCCUPATION." The precondition of such a coalition is the destruction of the terms of the OSLO ACCORDS, and especially the security cooperation it envisioned among the PNA, Israel, and the US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

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Tanzimat

The Tanzimat (Reorganization) was a program of political reform in the OTTOMAN EMPIRE that began in 1839 and lasted until 1876. It was initiated and promoted by prominent reformers, who were European-educated and deeply influenced by European systems and ideas. Many of the changes introduced in this period were symbolic, but others were attempts to graft successful European practices onto the Turkish empire. The reforms included universal conscription, educational reform, and the elimination of corruption. At its heart, the Tanzimat was an attempt to institute limited modernization in the Ottoman Empire, so as to preserve it from penetration, fragmentation, and domination by European countries, but the effort came far too late.

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Targeted Assassinations

The concept of "targeted assassination," an Israeli term, is deeply rooted historically, institutionally, and theoretically in the political and ideological life of the Jewish state. Israel's political use of assassination, mostly of Palestinians, dates to the pre-state period (before 1948) of the Yishuv. For many years, assassinations of Palestinians were typically the work of the militant Zionist groups IRGUN and LEHI, but on 27 December 1947, the HAGANA, the main Jewish underground military organization at the time, issued a general order for what became the first comprehensive operational plan for assassination. Operation Zarzir (Starling) was carried out by the Fourth Battalion of the PALMAH, the Hagana's elite strike force, which included the Arab Department (Shahar, or Dawn)—Jewish soldiers disguised as Arabs—today called Mist'aravim.

Under Operation Zarzir, the list of assassination candidates was long and, in Israeli analyst Ze'ev Schiff's words, "testified to the political-strategic intentions of the Hagana on the eve of the 1948 WAR. Assassins were told, among other things that 'the operation should look like an Arab action,' i.e., as though it was an Arab who had murdered an Arab. All the brigade commanders were asked to assist in Zarzir actions. The commander of the whole operation had to report on his activities once a week and Allon ordered Agmon to give a direct and regular report of the assassinations to MOSHE DAYAN. Before the war broke out in full force, the country was [geographically] divided between two officers who were in charge of the assassinations. When the war was over, the assassination activities ended for a while. The original list of candidates for assassination included twenty-three Palestinian leaders and high-ranking officers from all over the country. The largest group was in the JERUSALEM area; the second largest was in JAFFA. Several of them, like Emile al-Ghuri, were political leaders. Others were prominent military leaders, such as Hasan Salamah and ABD AL-QADIR AL-HUSAYNI both of whom were killed during battles with Israel."

During the late 1950s, Israel returned to a policy of assassinations, although on a smaller scale. The effort was directed against Egyptian intelligence personnel and attachés involved in organizing Palestinian groups for the purpose of attacking Israelis. In 1963, while YITZHAK SHAMIR was a member of the secret intelligence service MOSSAD (1955–1965), Israel sent booby-trapped packages to Germans accused of assisting EGYPT in developing its missile program. Many of them were killed. During the 1970s and early 1980s, Israel made wide use of assassination when it sought revenge for acts of TERRORISM perpetrated by the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION, although, of the many dozens of Palestinians assassinated, very few were connected with Black September operations. Eitan Haber, who served as the spokesperson for the late prime minister YITZHAK RABIN, told the Israeli newspaper *Yedioth*

Ahronoth "that several persons were killed 'by mistake' despite the fact they had no relations with any Black September group . . . but that . . . the operation managed to spread fear among the Palestinian community in Europe." On 13 June 1980, Israel assassinated Yehia El-Mashad in Paris. He was an Egyptian nuclear scientist and a professor at Alexandria University.

In 1987, Israel carried out one of its most spectacular operations with the assassination of FATAH party cofounder KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad) in his home in Tunis. The killings that have occurred in the Oslo period are part of an explicit policy, a policy employed by the Yishuv/Israel in Palestine and abroad for well over the past half century.

The targets of such assassinations have not been limited to Palestinians. In February 2007, the Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* reported that "in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Mossad was involved in the deaths of scientists involved with the IRAQ's nuclear program. At least three scientists were killed in those operations." In 1990, the Mossad assassinated Canadian engineer Gerald Bull in Brussels, allegedly because he was involved in Iraq's drive to build a "super-gun." In 1992, Israel assassinated the leader of the Lebanese resistance party HIZBULLAH, Abbas el-Moussawi, his wife, and his son. The occasion for the *Ha'aretz* article was Mossad's assassination, in January 2007, of Professor Ardashir Hosseinpour, a world authority on electromagnetism, who until his death was working on uranium enrichment at a facility in IRAN.

In the Palestine theater, according to B'TSELEM, the Israeli human rights group, Israel assassinated 621 Palestinians from the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000 through December 2008. Of the 621 who were killed, 234 persons were actually "targets"; the remaining 387 were civilian bystanders. It was during this period that, in response to strong international criticism, Israel changed the name from simply "assassination" to "targeted assassination" to convey the perception that its hits were precise and clean.

Unnamed security personnel, together with the Israeli army, play the role of informer, attorney, judge, and executioner, and the decision to kill is implemented with no judicial process whatsoever. The target of the assassination is not given a chance to present evidence in his defense or to refute the allegations against him.

During the Yishuv, assassination techniques were primitive compared to the variety of methods Israel now uses, including air-to-surface rockets launched from Israeli helicopters, booby-trapped mobile phone explosions, car bombs, sprays of gunfire at a target as he approaches a CHECKPOINT, hunting down and killing individuals in their homes, poisonous injections, and explosions in homes. Such methods are, however, highly problematic. Most of the assassinations are carried out in densely populated civilian areas, and there is a high risk that bystanders will be killed—as is evident in the above numbers. Errors may also occur both when selecting the target and while carrying out the assassination. Those who carry out the assassination may err in the identification of the victim. Israeli undercover units have killed the wrong person more than once. As Yael Stein from B'Tselem noted, "Problems are rife from the initial decision through all stages of the process, problems which render any legal justification Israel could mount irrelevant."

B'Tselem regards Israel's assassination policy as illegal and a departure from the principles of Israeli and INTERNATIONAL LAW. In addition, the policy of assassination is a political failure, because it has never stopped Palestinian resistance to the Israeli OCCUPATION, and generations of murdered activists have been replaced by new waves of leaders. In fact, assassinations lead directly to SUICIDE BOMBINGS by Palestinians, as can be shown by correlating the dates of assassinations and the dates of suicide bombings and matching groups that claim responsibility for bombings with the assassinations of such groups' leader or senior official. A nearly certain predictor for a suicide bombing is when Israel assassinates a senior commander or political leader of a militant group, especially when it does so during or in negotiations for a truce.

See also MOSSAD

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Tax Revolt: Bayt Sahur

During the First INTIFADA, which erupted in December 1987, Palestinians developed several strategies of NONVIOLENCE to challenge the Israeli OCCUPATION. One involved a January 1988 exhortation by HANNA SINIORA, the editor of *al-Fajr*, a Palestinian newspaper, that Palestinian communities become self-sufficient in the basic necessities of life so that they will not have to buy Israeli products, pay taxes, or work for Israeli employers. Another Palestinian, Mubarak Awad, established in 1985 the PALESTINIAN CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF NON-VIOLENCE, which sponsored a number of nonviolent actions during the early months of the Intifada, including calling for tax revolts and the planting of olive trees on land slated for new settlements, thereby taking advantage of an Israeli law forbidding the confiscation of land upon which fruit trees grow.

The most rigorous application of the idea of nonviolent resistance took place in the predominately Christian community of Bayt Sahur. The encouragement of church leaders gave the population moral sustenance, but the strength and endurance of the people arose from their opposition to the Occupation and their desire to end it.

A village close to BETHLEHEM, Bayt Sahur initially promoted backyard gardening, which expanded into the development of a dairy farm that Israel viewed as a security threat and subsequently attempted to eliminate. However, the operation to seize the cows failed after the residents of Bayt Sahur moved them to a secret location. In July 1988, Bayt Sahur residents undertook a tax revolt against the Occupation and invited Israeli Jews to come to the village and pray with them. Seventy Israeli peace activists responded and prayed in Palestinian homes on the Jewish Sabbath. In November 1988, this was followed by a service for peace in Bayt Sahur's GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH, which had become a center of nonviolent resistance. Anglican archbishop Desmond Tutu lent his support to this effort. In response, the Israeli army arrested eighty-nine people and besieged the town. The UN Security Council proposed a resolution condemning Israel's actions in Bayt Sahur, but the UNITED STATES vetoed it.

Largely due to enormous international pressure, Israel lifted the SIEGE after forty-four days. However, on the forty-third day, Israel closed all the entrances connecting Bayt Sahur with other towns and cities, including Bethlehem, cut phone lines, imposed a CURFEW, and prohibited mass MEDIA representatives from entering the town. Then the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) rampaged through the town. Workshops, factories, and homes were ransacked. Machinery, cars, tools of production, jewelry, and money were stolen. Israel confiscated outright NIS 600,000 ($385,000) in bank accounts, and the commercial, industrial, and economic INFRASTRUCTURE of the town was destroyed. Moreover, the soldiers and tax collectors proceeded to seize all the property of the residents and businesses, including machinery, tools, cars, ovens, refrigerators, clothing, and washing machines, in order to compensate for the taxes that Bayt Sahur was refusing to pay. Medical supplies were destroyed. Israeli-confiscated goods from homes were valued at $15 million. When the pressure of the Israeli tax authority and the IDF reached an unbearable level, Palestinians from Bayt Sahur passively handed their IDENTITY CARDS to the Israeli authority.

Israel deported Mubarak Awad before the end of 1988, and membership in committees organizing

nonviolent protests became punishable by ten years in prison. Israel arrested nonviolent organizers and rescinded the right to judicial review of jail sentences.

See also NONVIOLENCE IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE

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Tehiya Party

The Tehiya (Renaissance) Party was founded in 1979 during the term of the ninth Knesset, in a split from the LIKUD PARTY by settler activists angry at MENAHEM BEGIN's agreement to return the Sinai Peninsula to EGYPT and the eviction of the Israeli settlers there. It was composed of both secular nationalists and religious fundamentalists, led by Geula Cohen and Moshe Shamir, and was an extreme right-wing party. Tehiya was strongly affiliated with the extraparliamentary movement of GUSH EMUNIM, and included prominent members of Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP such as Hanan Porat, Elyakim Haetzni, and physicist Yuval Ne'eman. On 9 May 1984 Yuval Ne'eman endorsed the car bombing of three Palestinian mayors as "positive." He said it "paralyzed the main instigators of the [West Bank] without killing anyone."

In its first electoral test, the 1981 elections, Tehiya won three seats. Despite their previous disagreement, they were included in Menachem Begin's coalition alongside Likud, the NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY, AGUDAT YISRAEL, TAMI, and the TELEM PARTY. Although Cohen did not take a ministerial position, Ne'eman became minister of science and development.

In the 1984 elections, Tehiya became the third largest party in the Knesset after the Alignment (LABOR PARTY) and Likud, albeit with only five seats. However, they were excluded from SHIMON PERES and YITZHAK SHAMIR's national unity government. During the Knesset session, Rafael Eitan defected from Tehiya to found a new party, TZOMET. In the 1988 elections, the party was reduced to three seats and was again left out of Shamir's national unity government. However, when the Alignment left the coalition in 1990, Tehiya was invited into a new, narrow, right-wing government that included Likud, the National Religious Party, SHAS, Agudat Israel, DEGEL HATORAH, and the Party for Advancing the Zionist Idea. Although Cohen again declined a ministerial position, Ne'eman was appointed minister of energy and infrastructure and minister of science and technology. Despite its late entry to the government, the party pulled out of the coalition on 21 January 1992 in protest over Yitzhak Shamir's participation in the MADRID CONFERENCE. In the 1992 elections the party failed to gain enough votes for even one Knesset seat and subsequently disappeared. It is likely that most of its electorate went to Eitan's Tzomet, which jumped from two seats in the 1988 elections to eight in the 1992 votes. The two parties had competed for the same secular right-wing electorate, though Tzomet had a much more pronounced secular, even antireligious, stand.

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Tekuma

Tekuma (Rebirth) Party was an extreme right-wing Israeli political party founded in 1998 in the WEST BANK as a faction that broke away from the Orthodox NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY. Led by legislators Hanan Porat and Zvi Handel, the party was a strong advocate of the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT, adamantly opposed a Palestinian state, and advocated TRANSFER of the Palestinians from the

OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Together with MOLEDET and HERUT they formed the NATIONAL UNION PARTY, which won four seats in the 1999 elections. For the 2003 elections YISRAEL BEITENU joined the National Union (though Herut left), and with its increased support helped Tekuma to win seven seats. The party was included in ARIEL SHARON'S coalition alongside the LIKUD PARTY, SHINUI, National Religious Party, and YISRAEL B'ALIYA.

Tekuma was ideologically opposed to ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, and one of its leaders, Handel, lived in a Gazan SETTLEMENT. There was much infighting. Sharon sacked National Union ministers BENYAMIN ELON and AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN, and the party left the coalition. However, the National Union was bolstered by the addition of Ahi, which had split off from the National Religious Party when they decided to remain in the coalition.

Before the 2006 elections, Yisrael Beitenu left the alliance to fight the election alone. However, at the last minute the National Religious Party decided to join the alliance, which won nine seats, two of which were allocated to Tekuma and were taken by Hendel and Uri Ariel.

On 3 November 2008, Tekuma announced a merger with Ahi, the National Religious Party, and Moledet to form a new right-wing party, which was later named The Jewish Home. However, around half the former Tekuma members later left the party to reestablish the National Union alongside Moledet, Hatikva, and Eretz Yisrael Shelanu.

See also TEHIYA PARTY

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Telem Party

In 1981 Minister of Foreign Affairs MOSHE DAYAN formed the Telem Party, which advocated unilateral disengagement from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. That same year, Dayan was elected to the Knesset on the Telem slate but died shortly thereafter. The party received only two seats in the subsequent elections.

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Temple Institute

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Temple Mount

The Temple Mount (Har HaBayit in Hebrew; AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in Arabic [Noble Sanctuary]) is a compound sacred to Jews and Muslims, covering some thirty-five acres in the OLD CITY of East JERUSALEM, and is at the very center of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Considered under INTERNATIONAL LAW to be Occupied Territory, the compound is a rectangular area that towers over its surroundings and houses two of Islam's holiest sites: the DOME OF THE ROCK and the AL-AQSA MOSQUE. It was the site of the First and Second Jewish Temples in the first millennium BCE and, according to Judaism, will be the site of the third and final temple in the time of the coming Messiah. As such, it is the holiest site in Judaism. One of the walls surrounding the compound, the WESTERN WALL of the Temple Mount, is sacred to Jews as the last remnant of the Second Temple. For religious Jews, the Mount is where redemption will take place when the Messiah arrives; for secular Jews, the Temple Mount is a profound national symbol. Israel's capture of the Western Wall in 1967, along with the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, and East Jerusalem, was considered a great national achievement. Yet the same area is of deep religious, political, and national significance to Palestinians and to Muslims around the world: Palestinians consider it imperative that East Jerusalem be the capital of their future state and that al-Haram ash-Sharif be under Palestinian-Muslim sovereignty.

Jewish and Muslim Traditions

According to the Bible, King David purchased a threshing floor overlooking Jerusalem to erect an altar to Jehovah so that the plague would spare Jews. The construction of a permanent temple fell to his son Solomon, who completed the First Temple circa 950 BCE. After this temple stood for 410 years, Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonians destroyed it in 586 BCE. The reconstruction that

became the Second Temple began after the seventy-year Jewish exile in Babylonia. In 63 BCE, the Romans entered Jerusalem, and Judea became a subject kingdom of the Roman Empire. The most famous of the client kings was Herod, who was a great builder, and one of his major construction projects, around 20 BCE, was the renovation of the Second Temple to make it more grandiose than the First Jewish Temple. Around the Mount, Herod built four large walls, with a large surface between them, turning the area into a giant rectangle, which has been retained in the current shape of the Temple Mount; one of Herod's walls is the Western Wall.

In 70 CE, Titus destroyed the temple, although the Romans were unable to topple the walls. The Roman rulers, who later converted to CHRISTIANITY, did not allow Jewish pilgrimage to the Temple Mount. Later on, the rabbis themselves forbade Jews from ascending the Mount; in their view, so long as Jews are in DIASPORA, no Jew will be pure enough to enter the site of the Temple. However, Jews continued to pray at the site of the Western Wall.

According to medieval Jewish Geniza documents, when Muslims first entered the city of Jerusalem in 638 CE, the Christian inhabitants were using the ruins of the temple as a rubbish dump to humiliate the Jews and fulfill Jesus's prophecy that not a stone of the temple would be left standing. Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (companion of Muhammad) was horrified to see it in such a state and ordered the temple cleaned. He also built a mosque on the site to commemorate the Prophet Muhammad's journey to Jerusalem. Several of the earliest non-Muslim sources—notably the Byzantine chronicler Theophanes Confessor and the Jewish Secrets of Rabbi Simon ben Yohai—indicate that the Jews of the time hailed Umar's action as a restoration of the temple.

Subsequent to the Muslim conquest of this region, Muslims called the Temple Mount al-Haram ash-Sharif and have since considered it the third holiest site in Islam, after Mecca and Medina. Islam reveres David and Solomon as prophets and regards the temple (mentioned in Qur'an 17:7) as one of the earliest and most noteworthy places of the worship of God. In verse 17:1 of the Qur'an, there is mention of the "farthest Mosque," which Muslims traditionally interpreted as referring to the site on the Temple Mount where the al-Aqsa Mosque now stands. In 686 CE, the ninth caliph, 'Abd al-Malik, commissioned the construction of an octagonal shrine (not a mosque) built over the rock whence Muslims believe Muhammad ascended on his miraculous night ride to heaven; this shrine became known as the Dome of the Rock. In 715 CE, the Umayyads rebuilt Umar's mosque, by then almost a ruin, into a grand mosque, which they named al-Masjid al-Aqsa, the al-Aqsa Mosque—that is, "the farthest Mosque." Earthquakes have destroyed the al-Aqsa Mosque several times, and the current version dates from the first half of the eleventh century. For Muslims, the holiness of both the dome and the mosque contributes to the holiness of the city of Jerusalem.

Current Conflict

The Zionists who came to Israel at the end of the nineteenth century held Jerusalem as a Jewish symbol, even though the majority of them were not religious. After the British took control of Palestine in 1918, the Temple Mount and the Western Wall became a point of tension between Jews and Arabs inside the greater conflict for national sovereignty. The Arabs claimed that they traditionally held control over the arena in front of the Western Wall, and a Jewish attempt to put a bench next to the Wall during Yom Kippur in 1928 was one of the sparks that led to the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES in 1929. After the revolt, the BRITISH MANDATE government decided that the Western Wall arena should retain its status quo: nothing could be taken out of it or brought into it. Jewish tradition says that on the holidays of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, a *shofar* (ram's horn) is to be blown. Violating the status quo, the Jews brought the *shofar* into the arena in 1930, which Muslims considered a provocation. The British decreed that the *shofar* must not be brought to the Western Wall. The unceasing efforts of some Zionist groups to bring the *shofar* into the arena have been a source of continuous friction.

In the 1948 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, JORDAN occupied the Old City, including the Temple Mount and the Western Wall. Even though the cease-fire agreement between Jordan and Israel stated that Jews would have free access to the wall, this part of the agreement was never implemented. Israeli culture continued to cultivate a yearning for the Western Wall, and in the 1967 WAR, when Israel conquered East Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount, it was a dream come true for many Israelis. For Arabs, the defense of al-Aqsa became a major point in the conflict.

In 1967, Israel granted a *waqf* (an Islamic trust) partial autonomy on the Temple Mount to administer the mosque and shrine (as it continues to do), although Israel controls all security issues. Mainstream Jewish thought has held that the construction of the next temple on the Temple Mount would come with the arrival of the Messiah, and that ordinary people could not undertake its reconstruction. Moreover, until recently, rabbis admonished Jews not to climb the Temple Mount in impurity. These factors allowed the situation to remain stable for some time. However, the emergence of extreme, Jewish fundamentalist groups in the mid-1980s created new conflicts. In 1969 a young evangelical Christian set fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque and severely damaged it. In the 1980s two underground extremist Jewish organizations plotted, each separately, to destroy the Muslim sites, although both plans were thwarted. In 1990, an attempt by a small Jewish group to ascend the Mount brought about major demonstrations by Muslim worshipers who threw stones at Jewish worshipers at the Western Wall and overran a police station on the Temple Mount. Israeli border police officers opened fire at the demonstrators, killing seventeen. Palestinians refer to the incident as the al-Aqsa Massacre, and Israelis call it the Temple Mount Riots.

Even after the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), the Temple Mount remained a source of conflict. Threats to the mosque were a rallying cause for PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT, who attempted to strengthen his claims in negotiations with the Israelis. In September 1996, the government of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU opened an ancient tunnel (the HASMONEAN TUNNEL) that borders on the Temple Mount without informing the Islamic authorities. Muslims saw the tunnel opening as both a threat to the physical stability of the mosque and the Dome of the Rock and a political statement about Israel's intention to control the city and the HOLY SITES. Fighting broke out between Israelis and Palestinians that lasted three days, in which fifty-eight Palestinians (including eleven Palestinian security officers) and sixteen Israeli soldiers and border police officers died.

The status of the Temple Mount was one of the main areas of disagreement in the negotiations for a final peace settlement in the OSLO PROCESS. While Jewish traditionalists as well as most of the secular Israeli public would not agree to give up control of what they regard as the holiest place in Judaism, the Muslim population saw any sign of Israeli sovereignty over the compound as a religious and political affront. Following rumors that Israeli prime minister EHUD BARAK was willing to cede control of the Mount, right-wing opposition leader ARIEL SHARON visited the Temple Mount on 27 September 2000 to make a political statement about Israel's sovereignty in all—East and West—Jerusalem. Palestinians viewed Sharon's presence as an intentional provocation, and the following Friday, demonstrations similar to the ones of 1990 broke out, triggering the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, which began in September 2000.

Complicating matters is the THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT, a widespread movement among Jewish fundamentalists, supported by Christian Zionists, to reconstruct the Third Temple over the ashes of the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque.

Archaeological Claims

In addition to the contending claims of religious and historical sanctity, which have been transformed into opposing political claims, the rival archaeological interests make this site a place of inevitable conflict. In recent years, Israelis have voiced many complaints about Muslim construction and excavation on and underneath the Temple Mount, while Muslims have complained about Israeli excavations—two under the Temple Mount and others around it. Some claim the excavations will lead to the destabilization of the retaining walls of the Temple Mount, including the Western Wall, and allege that the other side is deliberately causing the collapse of their sacred sites. Israelis complain that the Palestinians are deliberately removing significant amounts of archaeological evidence about the Jewish past from the site, while Muslims accuse the Israelis of deliberately damaging (during excavation) the remains of Islamic-era buildings.

In 1968–1969, Israeli archaeologists carried out excavations at the foot of the Temple Mount, immediately south of the al-Aqsa Mosque, and opened two ancient Second Temple period tunnels that penetrate beneath the mosque, five meters into one and thirty meters into another. At the Temple Mount's south wall, Israelis uncovered Arabic Umayyad palaces and Crusader remains. Over the period 1970–1988, Israeli authorities excavated a tunnel passing immediately to the west of the

Temple Mount and northward from the Western Wall, sometimes using mechanical excavators. Palestinians claim that these excavations have caused cracks and structural weakening of the buildings in the Muslim Quarter of the city above the tunnels. The dig was finally halted until steel buttresses were put in place to secure the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock.

In 1997 the Western Hulda Gate passageway was converted into another mosque—the Marwani Mosque. In November 1999 a buried Crusader-era door was reopened as an emergency exit for the Marwani Mosque, opening an excavation claimed by Israel to be 18,000 square feet (1,700 square meters) in size and up to thirty-six feet (eleven meters) deep. According to the *New York Times*, the Israeli police had urged an emergency exit upon the *waqf,* and the Israeli Antiquities Authority acknowledged its necessity. In autumn 2002, *waqf* officials reported a significant bulge in the southern retaining wall of the Temple Mount. *Waqf* archaeologists feared that that part of the wall might seriously deteriorate or even collapse. Although *waqf* officials would not permit detailed Israeli inspection, an agreement with Israel led to a team of Jordanian engineers repairing the wall by January 2004, costing 100,000 Jordanian dinars (US$140,000) for restoration of 250 square meters (2,500 square feet) of wall.

On 11 February 2004 an earthquake damaged the eastern wall of the Temple Mount. The damage threatens to topple sections of the wall into the area known as Solomon's Stables. On 16 February 2004 a portion of a stone retaining wall collapsed; the wall supports the ramp that leads from the Western Wall plaza to the Gate of the Moors—Bab al-Maghariba (Arabic), Sha'ar HaMughrabim (Hebrew)—and on to the Temple Mount.

See also AL-AQSA MOSQUE; ARCHAEOLOGY; DOME OF THE ROCK; AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Temporary International Presence in Hebron

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) was a civilian observer mission in the WEST BANK city of HEBRON, created as a consequence of settler BARUCH GOLDSTEIN's 25 February 1994 slaying of twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION's (PLO) ensuing concern about the security of Palestinians in Hebron. TIPH's main task was to monitor and report on misconduct by either side to Israel and the PLO. Israel prohibited TIPH from intervening directly in incidents, and it had no military or police functions.

The legal basis for TIPH resides in UN Security Council Resolution 904, which condemned the Goldstein massacre and called for a temporary international force in Hebron. The DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES between the PLO and Israel of 13 September 1993 also provided for such a presence. After the massacre, PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT announced that the PLO would withdraw from any further peace negotiations with Israel unless Israel agreed to international observers in Hebron. It was three years after the Goldstein affair, however, before Israel fully consented to international observers in the city. The first step in the process occurred on 31 March 1994, when representatives from the PLO and Israel signed an agreement asking Italy, Denmark, and NORWAY to provide support staff and observers for the first Temporary International Presence in Hebron. Its primary mandate was to assist in

promoting stability and restoring normal life. On 8 May 1994, the TIPH mission was in place, but the PLO and Israel could not reach an agreement on an extension of its mandate, and it withdrew from Hebron on 8 August 1994.

On 28 September 1995, Israel and the PLO signed the INTERIM AGREEMENT, which called for a partial redeployment of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) from Hebron and for another temporary international presence established during the redeployment. On 12 May 1996, the second TIPH mission, consisting of Norwegian members only, was created under the condition that it would be replaced by a new TIPH mission upon the IDF's redeployment from parts of Hebron. This second mission operated until the partial Israeli redeployment from Hebron, which was agreed upon in the HEBRON PROTOCOL of 17 January 1997.

On 21 January 1997, Israel and the PLO signed a new accord, "The Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron," which called for Norway, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and TURKEY to provide personnel for TIPH, with Norway as the coordinator. The agreement also delineated the tasks of TIPH and set the mandate period at three months, renewable for an additional period of three months, unless otherwise agreed between the two sides. Furthermore, with the consent of the two sides, TIPH could extend the period or change its scope of operation, as agreed.

On 30 January 1997 in Oslo, the six participating countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding in accordance with the TIPH agreement. On 1 February 1997, the multinational TIPH mission entered into force. However, TIPH's mandate was so restricted that it could not intervene in SETTLER VIOLENCE against the Palestinians, but could only observe it. In addition, Israel prohibited TIPH from speaking or writing about what it observed. The observer mission was disappointing to the Palestinians, who wanted protection from the settlers, but the settlers considered it so serious a threat that they harassed TIPH almost as much as they did Palestinians. (www.tiph.org).

See also HEBRON; SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

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Tenet, George (1953–)

President BILL CLINTON appointed George Tenet director of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) in 1997. Prior to his nomination, Tenet had served as deputy director of the CIA for two years. Although CIA directors are usually replaced by an incoming administration, Clinton's successor, President GEORGE W. BUSH, kept Tenet in his position throughout most of his first term, reportedly out of respect for his independence from the previous Democratic administration. For example, during the US-brokered Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at Wye River in 1998, Tenet threatened to resign if Clinton acceded to Israeli demands that convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard be pardoned. Tenet received harsh criticism for the CIA's failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks and his support of inaccurate intelligence estimates of IRAQ's biological and chemical weapons capability prior to the 2003 US invasion, although others argued that the bulk of responsibility for both failures lay primarily with the White House.

In June 2001, after the release of the findings from the commission headed by former senator GEORGE MITCHELL on ending Israeli-Palestinian violence in the context of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, President Bush dispatched Tenet to the region to push for a cease-fire, as called for in the 2000 Mitchell Plan. Tenet apparently did not press Israel to alter its policies, such as the ongoing expansion of Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the occupied WEST BANK, which Mitchell's report cited as encouraging the violence. The Tenet Plan for a cease-fire called for a complete cessation of violence for one week, followed by a six-week cooling-off period during which Israeli forces would withdraw to where they were prior to the outbreak of violence in September 2000. It also called for an end to Israeli CLOSURES, enhanced security cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian officials, preemptive operations by the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) against suspected terrorists in areas of PNA control, and Israeli action to prevent violence by Jewish settlers. The PNA also agreed

to allow for CIA assistance in preventing terrorist attacks by Palestinians against Israelis.

Tenet's cease-fire plan technically went into effect on 13 June 2001 but never fully materialized, largely because it didn't provide the Palestinian population with adequate incentives to end their uprising. Not only did Tenet's proposal not stop Israel from building additional settlements, in contravention of the Mitchell Plan, but no international monitors were authorized to verify the cease-fire, and no buffer zones were established separating the two sides. Instead, the UNITED STATES essentially permitted Israel to serve as the monitor and verifier as well as the decisionmaker regarding implementation of the Tenet Plan and subsequent steps. Within days of the agreement, Israel launched TARGETED ASSASSINATION squads into PNA-designated areas, killing several Palestinian leaders, while asserting that these killings were not cease-fire violations but self-defense against TERRORISM. In response, the Islamic group HAMAS and armed Palestinian groups resumed their attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians.

See also WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM

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—Stephen Zunes

Terror Against Terror

Terror Against Terror (TNT) was a militant settler underground movement that was active throughout the WEST BANK from 1978 to 1984. Composed of religious Jews with a right-wing nationalist agenda, it functioned with financial support from many sectors, including sympathetic American Zionists and the KACH movement under RABBI MEIR KAHANE. Some American members received paramilitary training organized by the JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE. TNT also had strong ties with GUSH EMUNIM (Bloc of the Faithful)—the settler political movement centered in KIRYAT ARBA—and with many right-wing Israeli politicians and prominent rabbis.

According to Israeli police, TNT was composed of four main cells. The largest and most active of the four, named after its leader Yorem Livni, was the Livni cell, based in Kiryat Arba; it had among its members Israeli military officers and munitions experts. On 2 June 1980, the Livni cell planted bombs in the cars of NABLUS mayor BASSAM SHAKA'A (who lost both of his legs in the blast), and Ramallah mayor Karim Khalaf (who lost half his foot). Cell members also put a bomb on the garage door of el-Bireh mayor Ibrahim Tawil that blinded an Israeli soldier who tried to defuse the explosive. The settlers later claimed that their aim in attacking the West Bank mayors was "not to kill them; killed[,] they would become martyrs, while wounded they would serve as a living ongoing deterrent [to Palestinian political activity]." A TNT bomb exploded that same day in a crowded HEBRON market, injuring eleven Palestinians, among them four children. The Livni group obtained the weapons used in bombing the mayors' cars from the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES as part of a "regional defense program." The settlers were issued weapons while serving in the Israeli military reserve, service that they were permitted to perform near their settlements. They also stole mines left over from the Syrian defense positions on the Golan Heights.

In October 1982, TNT bombed a soccer stadium in Hebron, injuring two Palestinian children. In February 1983, Muslim guards found bombs in two mosques in Hebron just before they exploded. In July 1983, TNT carried out a military-style assault on the Islamic College of Hebron. Wearing Arab clothing and driving a West Bank car, the settlers sprayed machine-gun fire and tossed hand grenades, killing four students and seriously injuring over thirty others. Like the other TNT cells, the Livni group had an elaborate plan to blow up the DOME OF THE ROCK and the AL-AQSA MOSQUE in JERUSALEM. In the past, the members of this group had desecrated the mosque several times, but the bombing was called off, allegedly because the group could not get permission from the prominent rabbis in the Gush Emunim movement—leading to a split in TNT. Other settlers known as the "Tribe of Judah" tried to blow up the mosque in 1984 but were seen scaling the walls with guns and explosives by Arab guards, and were later arrested.

After the attempted bombing of six Arab-owned buses in Jerusalem in 1984, Israeli police broke up the Livni cell and arrested twenty-four settlers on charges ranging from conspiracy to premeditated murder. The settlers had planted three four-kilogram bombs packed with high explosives under each bus. Had the bombs exploded in central Jerusalem as planned, an untold number of people, including many tourists, would have been killed or injured. Few of the group were convicted and those who were received relatively light sentences, and were subsequently given pardons.

See also GUSH EMUNIM

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Terrorism

One cannot read or hear about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict without encountering the accusation of "terrorism." Terrorism is not a religious phenomenon, although some acts of terrorism have been given license by Jewish and Muslim religious authorities. Palestinian terrorists have ranged from leftist revolutionaries to Christian and Muslim nationalists to self-defined Islamic warriors. Israeli terrorists have included zealous settlers, Jewish millenarians, secular nationalists, racists, and state functionaries. In this essay, the focus is upon the deliberate, unjustifiable, and random uses of violence for political ends against civilian groups. The perpetrators may be states, agents of states, organized groups, or individuals acting independently. The qualifying condition is that their actions constitute a uniquely abhorrent and morally objectionable assault on noncombatants for political purposes.

In light of the size of the population of Israel (more than 6 million) and the size of the Palestinian population (about 5 million), the casualties on both sides caused by political violence, including clear acts of terrorism, have been considerable. For instance, from the beginning of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA in September 2000 until the end of 2008, more than 335 Israeli security personnel and more than 700 other Israelis were killed, including 490 within Israel (and the remainder in the Occupied WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP); these numbers include 123 Israeli minors. On the Palestinian side, the toll has been larger still: over 4,800 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces (98 percent in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES), including 950 youths. More than 500 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians, one-fifth of whom were accused of being COLLABORATORS. Many of the dead on both sides were victims of terrorism.

History of Violence in Conflict

Some of the prototypical terrorist groups in the modern Middle East emerged in BRITISH MANDATE Palestine (1917–1948), the most famous being the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI (the National Military Organization), usually referred to as the Irgun or Etzel. The group was inspired by the right-wing Zionist revisionism of VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY and led by MENAHEM BEGIN (who became prime minister of Israel in 1977). Although the Irgun often attacked Palestinians, especially during and after the ARAB REVOLT of 1936–1939, its most sensational attacks were directed at the British Mandatory authorities. Although it largely suspended attacks on the British during World War II—judging Nazi GERMANY a greater threat to Jews than Britain—the attacks resumed in 1943. The most sensational act, and arguably an act of terrorism, was the blowing up of the KING DAVID HOTEL in JERUSALEM in which ninety-one people died, including many civilians. After Irgun terrorists were captured and hanged, Irgun kidnapped and hanged two British soldiers in retaliation. Begin's memoir, *The Revolt*, is widely considered a semi-

nal insider's account of insurgency and terrorism, including by contemporary Arab groups (Lebanese HIZBULLAH for one).

A frequent ally of the Irgun was the more extremist LEHI (LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL), usually called the Stern Gang after its founder, AVRAHAM STERN. Stern was killed in 1942 by the British, and one of his successors was YITZHAK SHAMIR (who, like Begin, later went on to become prime minister). LEHI was committed to keeping open the doors to Palestine to Jewish IMMIGRATION, and, for this reason, the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which declared Britain's opposition to Palestine becoming a Jewish state, was considered a declaration of war on Jews. Significantly, both Irgun and LEHI shared the same nationalist ideology, which emphasized an expansive geographic definition of Israel—from the Nile to Euphrates rivers—but the two groups differed significantly on issues of strategy. Indeed, LEHI actually approached Nazi GERMANY to explore the possibility of an alliance against Britain, whereas the Irgun suspended attacks on the British during the war years.

Over the span of its existence, LEHI was responsible for at least forty-two TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of Britons and Palestinians, including several consequential killings. In 1944, LEHI assassins felled Lord Moyne, the British minister of state for the Middle East, angering a number of leading British officials, reportedly including Prime Minister Winston Churchill himself. As a result, the Jewish underground military organization HAGANA cooperated with the British authorities in launching a campaign against the Irgun. The move to suppress the Irgun (which was not responsible for the murder of Lord Moyne) anticipated Zionist retaliation against Palestinian guerrilla groups in that mainstream Zionists held the organizations collectively responsible for acts of violence. In official parlance: "They are all terrorists."

In September 1948, just four months after the state of Israel came into existence, LEHI ambushed and killed Swedish diplomat COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE just outside of Jerusalem. Furthermore, both Jewish groups participated in an infamous act of terrorism against a Palestinian village in April 1948 when they attacked DEIR YASSIN, which lay on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Over 100 Arabs—all or nearly all the residents—were slaughtered, exacerbating the fears of Palestinians, who fled Palestine in greater numbers than ever before when news of the massacre spread throughout the country. To this day, the events at Deir Yassin are a durable component of the historical narrative of Palestinians, many of whom view the event as symptomatic of their suffering in their conflict with Israel. In retaliation for the Deir Yassin killings, Palestinians killed more than seventy medical workers from the Hadassah hospital on Jerusalem's Mount Scopus. Nearly a quarter century later, in 1972, a group of Japanese Red Army terrorists opened fire inside the Lod airport. Among the victims of the attack, which the group named Operation Dayr Yasin, were a group of Puerto Rican tourists who, the terrorists claimed, supported Israel merely by being in Israel—a claim not unlike that made by Begin in *The Revolt* about the British in Mandatory Palestine.

Palestinian violence during the Mandate period was significant as well, but much more fragmented in organizational terms. The Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 was sparked by growing Arab concern over rising numbers of Jewish immigrants in Palestine and the upsurge in LAND sales. Many of the protests and acts of violence committed by Palestinians during this period were directed at the British Mandate authorities, but there were also a number of attacks on Jewish settlements. Perhaps the best-known act of anti-Jewish violence during the uprising was in TIBERIAS in October 1938, when twenty Jews, almost all civilians, were killed by Palestinians. In retaliation, the Irgun launched its own anti-Arab campaign, which featured a number of bombings of crowded Palestinian shopping areas. In fact, during the uprising, the preponderance of casualties were inflicted on the Arabs, who suffered some 5,000 losses. During the same period, approximately 200 British officers and 415 Jews of the Yishuv were killed.

Escalation after 1967 War

The early 1950s were marked by Palestinian refugees' infiltrations into Israel and massive Israeli retaliations. The infiltrators were mostly unarmed and crossed the border from JORDAN, EGYPT, and LEBANON seeking to find relatives, to return to their homes lost in the 1948 WAR, to recover material possessions, to tend their fields, to harvest crops, and, occasionally, to seek revenge. According to Israeli historian Avi Shlaim, from 1949 to 1956, more than 90 percent of all infiltrations were motivated by social and economic concerns, while in the same period, Israel mounted punitive raids,

killing between 2,700 and 5,000 persons. From 1956 through the early 1960s, organized Palestinian raids and guerrilla attacks were mounted from Gaza under the encouragement of the Egyptian army, but the small independent *fida'i* groups that existed were insignificant, and their raids into Israel were usually inconsequential. After the stunning Arab defeat in the 1967 WAR, this changed dramatically. The routing of Egypt, Jordan, and SYRIA in a mere six days left a void that the secular-nationalist *fida'iyyun* were intent on filling. Palestinians, who had put their trust in the Arab states, especially in JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, the charismatic Egyptian president, when it came to defeating Israel, were now persuaded that liberation would come only by their own hands, not through the efforts of the discredited Arab regimes. Over the course of the ensuing twenty years, the major Palestinian umbrella group, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), gained legitimacy and notoriety, as did its constituent groups, for a variety of attacks, including a number of well-known acts of terror.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s (until the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel), almost any official or journalistic mention of the PLO in Israel included the adjective "terrorist." Any aerial bombardment by Israel against the PLO, which until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was a major armed presence in that country, was described routinely by Israeli spokespersons and journalists as an attack on "terrorist targets," even though hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were killed in these bombing raids. This is not to argue that the label was undeserved in some instances—constituent groups within the PLO committed blatant acts of terrorism, including hijacking seven passenger jets from 1968 to 1970. When the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP) hijacked four civilian jetliners in the summer of 1970, it not only disrupted air travel around the globe, but its coordinated operation helped precipitate the civil war in Jordan known as BLACK SEPTEMBER.

Throughout the 1970s, *fida'i* attacks were launched at civilian sites throughout Israel, and scores of civilians were slaughtered, including many children in towns such as Misgav Am, KIRYAT SHMONA, Nahariya, MA'ALOT, and Beit She'an, either by the perpetrators or in the response by Israeli police and soldiers. Perhaps the most notorious incident of this period occurred during the 1972 MUNICH OLYMPICS when the previously unknown BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION kidnapped the Israeli Olympic team. Eleven of the team members died in a blaze of gunfire and explosions when German police attempted a rescue operation as the perpetrators and their captives tried to board escape helicopters. Following the Munich incident, Israel launched a secret operation—Wrath of God—to kill those Palestinians deemed responsible. The victims included an unfortunate Moroccan waiter in Lillehammer, NORWAY, whose murder led to the arrest of five members of an Israeli assassination squad. Throughout much of the 1970s, a secret war between the Black September Organization and Israel continued and included letter bombs, assassinations, and hijackings.

In 1982, the attempted assassination of Ambassador Shlomo Argov by the Fatah Corrective Movement provided the pretext for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was intended to destroy the PLO and put in place a Lebanese government willing to make peace with Israel (as Egypt had done in 1979). The Fatah Corrective Movement, known popularly as the Abu Nidal group, was led by SABRI AL-BANNA (widely known by his nom de guerre, Abu Nidal), a Palestinian dissident who was a rival of PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT, and his group targeted a number of PLO officials. (Al-Banna was assassinated in Baghdad in 2002.) When Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan was advised that the Abu Nidal group was responsible for the London attack, not the PLO, he replied: "Abu Nidal or Abu Smidal, the PLO must be f—." His response illustrates Israel's approach to Palestinian nationalist groups—they were all terrorists.

Beginning of Peace Process

The only way for Arafat to gain a seat at the negotiating table was his renunciation of terrorism, as well as the declared willingness of the PLO to accept Israel's *right* to exist. In 1988, in the final months of the RONALD REAGAN administration and a year into the First INTIFADA, which erupted in 1987, Arafat fulfilled these requirements, which led the UNITED STATES (Israel held out considerably longer) to recognize that there was no serious alternative to the PLO as a diplomatic interlocutor. Especially after the 1973 War, the momentum within the PLO was quite clearly toward the acceptance of a TWO-STATE SOLUTION between Israel and Palestine. The formulaic precision of Arafat's statement, which was presented twice,

was necessary to satisfy the dictates of domestic politics in the United States, including the US Congress, which had passed legislation banning any diplomatic contact with the PLO as long as it espoused terrorism and refused to recognize Israel's *right* to exist. The fact that the breakthrough occurred in the last months of President Ronald Reagan's term in office, when he had little to lose, had as much to do with the degree to which the terrorist label has become entangled with interest group politics in the United States as with the factors on the ground in the Middle East.

As the peace process gathered momentum in the early 1990s with the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, the umbrella PLO and its largest component group, FATAH, were erased from the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations. During most of the two terms of President BILL CLINTON (1993–2001), Arafat, previously the quintessential terrorist in popular discourse in the United States, gained considerable respectability. Later, particularly after the failure of the Clinton-sponsored CAMP DAVID SUMMIT and more so following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States by al-Qaida, Arafat was ostracized by the administration of President GEORGE W. BUSH and Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON, who held Arafat culpable for the launching of the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 and for supporting anti-Israeli terrorism. The example of Arafat, however flawed he was as a leader, is to illustrate that terrorists may be transformed, sometimes simply for political convenience or because the political context has changed substantially. In short, the question of who is and who is not a terrorist is sometimes, though not always, a matter of what his or her opponent seeks to achieve.

Even after the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, Israel continued to be the occupying authority in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Since 1967, attacks launched against the OCCUPATION authorities could be, and were, punished by the Israelis. To the extent that the targets for attack were functionaries of the Occupation, the Palestinians enjoyed significant international support. But after 1993, when the peace process began to gain momentum, international support for "resistance" violence declined precipitously. Of course, since the assassination of Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN in 1995, the peace process has almost collapsed. Significant elements on both sides have declared the Oslo Accords irrelevant, although both the Israeli government and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) accepted the QUARTET'S April 2003 ROAD MAP. The Road Map obliges both sides to take specific confidence-building steps, but, like the Oslo Accords that it is supposed to implement, the Road Map is observed in the breach. The Road Map commits the PNA to reiterate Israel's right to resist, to end violence and terrorism, and to pursue and arrest perpetrators who persist in carrying out violence. Israel is required to affirm its commitment to a two-state solution; to stop punitive attacks, including the destruction of homes and the destruction of Palestinian institutions; and to cease all SETTLEMENT activity. Both sides have paid little more than lip service to the Road Map, with Israel declaring that violence carried out by Palestinians violates the PNA's obligation to cease such attacks and with Israel continuing to confiscate land, expand settlements, and undermine and destroy Palestinian institutions. In 2002 the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) reoccupied the areas that it evacuated in the 1990s. The result is that the West Bank, notwithstanding the obligations of the Oslo Accords, is occupied territory. The legitimacy of armed resistance (as opposed to blatant acts of terrorism) under these conditions is at least debatable.

Terrorism as Defined by State

Academics, diplomats, and international lawyers have been struggling with the definition of terrorism for years. Acts that one state denounces as terrorism may be—and often are—justified by another state. Although scholars and practitioners have produced more than 100 definitions, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Some authorities stress the illegality of terrorism, although legality is sometimes problematic. The laws of a state, taken as a whole, may be morally commendable or morally reprehensible. An example of the latter would be the apartheid-era race laws in South Africa. To argue that an act is unlawful (a factual statement) is not the same as arguing that it is illegitimate (a normative conclusion). It is important to distinguish between those political systems in which all citizens, regardless of their race, religion, or ethnicity, may effectively voice their demands and realize their rights, and those in which categories of citizens are disenfranchised. In the first category of states, political violence is both illegal and illegitimate, because the enfranchised citizen need not resort to violence to be

heard and to enjoy the protection of the state. In contrast, in the second category, in which the state is deaf to its citizens and residents, violence may be justifiable and legitimate even though it is deemed illegal by the state. The question of what is and is not terrorism therefore turns, in part, on arguments about the legitimacy of violence.

As such, some anti-Occupation violence by Palestinians may be legitimate. The right of a people to resist foreign occupation is widely, if erratically, upheld. Few observers outside the Soviet Union described the Afghan resistance fighters as terrorists in the 1980s after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. Although the *mujahedeen* were often decried as terrorists in MOSCOW, so long as the Afghan *mujahedeen* directed their efforts against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, they were widely supported both in the Muslim world and in the West, especially by the United States. By the same token, though agreement is less general, especially in the United States, the resistance by the Lebanese to the Israeli occupation of a portion of southern Lebanon until 2000, despite Israeli spokespersons' penchant for describing those who attack its soldiers and client-militiamen as "terrorists," was undoubtedly permitted under the laws of warfare as widely understood around the world. Moreover, this point was tacitly conceded by Israeli officials, who never seriously challenged the right of Lebanese to attack occupying Israeli forces or Lebanese proxy forces directed by Israel. However, if Afghans or the Lebanese resistance forces broaden their campaigns to encompass protected categories of noncombatants, their actions lose their privileged status. It is possible to readily distinguish between attacks on soldiers occupying foreign lands and attacks on persons in universally accepted protected categories, such as children or, more broadly, noncombatants.

The disparate perspectives on terrorism help to illustrate that an international convention against terrorism would be unattainable in practice, and the UNITED NATIONS has never been able to craft a universally accepted definition. The contrasting views are illustrated by the different approaches of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which brings together Muslim states, and the United States. In the OIC's annual meeting held in TURKEY in 2004, the OIC urged the UN Security Council to ensure international peace and security by calling upon Israel to end its "state terrorism" and aggression. This was defined in the conference resolution as "the killing of civilians, assassinations, detentions, collective punishment, incessant incursions, occupation of cities, villages and Palestinian refugee camps, demolition of Palestinian homes, and destruction of the institutions and INFRASTRUCTURE of the PNA and the national economy." In particular, the OIC made reference to the protocols of the 1949 Geneva Convention and Israel's responsibilities under the convention, including observing the prohibition on colonizing occupied Palestinian territory.

In contrast, in 2004 the United States officially codified as public law (Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f[d]) the treatment of terrorism. Although the law emphasizes the targeting of innocent people as a defining aspect of terrorism, in practice it tends to be applied only against acts of violence perpetrated by enemies of the United States or enemies of the United States' friends and allies. Most important, the definition does not address the possibility that a state may engage in terrorism.

"The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience."

"The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country."

"The term 'terrorist group' means any group that practices, or has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism."

The current legal description used by the United States is in contrast to a definition of terrorism developed by the US Department of State in 1983, which clearly addressed the role of states as sponsors or perpetrators of terrorism: "Terrorism is the threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, *whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority* when such actions are intended to influence a target group wider than the immediate victim or victims" (emphasis added). Given the more restricted definition of terrorism now in use and the emphasis on its international dimension, terrorism as seen by the United States does not include any actions by the state of Israel, although it may include both Jewish and Palestinian groups.

Admittedly, the international system is biased in favor of the state (the alternative, at present, would be chaos), and states can often get away

with heinous activities that would earn nonstate actors swift reprisal. Although often little can be directly done about the behavior of a state—particularly when it is acting within its own borders—this by no means precludes a moral indictment, which often has more weight than may be thought. Even the most autocratic and ruthless governments are often preoccupied with their image. Of course, condemnation is a sword that can swing both ways. Certain scholars, including the late Raymond Aron, describe the Anglo-American carpet-bombing of Germany in World War II as terrorism precisely because it was, by design, indiscriminate.

The Impact of 11 September 2001

Following the attacks by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 specifying a series of steps that were to be taken to combat al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and their resources. The groups were described as terrorists of "global reach." Neither the Islamic group HAMAS nor the Lebanese Islamist group Hizbullah was included in that executive order, although both were on the US State Department's terrorist list. These omissions prompted a lively debate in which pro-Israeli lobbying groups, particularly the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, the influential Washington-based group that describes itself as "America's pro-Israel lobby," as well as a number of members of Congress, argued strenuously for including Hizbullah and Hamas in the executive order. Many US officials resisted the move, emphasizing that the focus should be on al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the attack, and noting that the United States would need the support of many Arab states that recognize Hamas and Hizbullah as bona fide resistance groups. Although leading figures in the Bush administration, notably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, argued that the additional designation was unnecessary and redundant, the administration amended the executive order to include Hamas and other groups as enemies in the "war against terrorism." Meanwhile, in Israel in the days following 11 September, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon promptly moved to associate Israel with the US war on terrorism so as to gain further leverage and support for Tel Aviv's policies against its enemies.

The United States listed the following twelve Middle East–related groups as "terrorist groups of global reach," including seven Palestinian (P) groups and one Israeli (I) group: Abu Nidal organization (P), AL-AQSA MARTYRS' BRIGADES (P), Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) (P), Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Hizbullah (Party of God), Islamic Jihad Group (P), KAHANE CHAI (KACH) (I), PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (P), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (P), the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (P), PFLP–GENERAL COMMAND (P), and al-Qaeda. Thus, by US law, anyone supporting, for instance, Hamas is supporting a terrorist group. By definition, any act of violence that it commits or seeks to commit is an act of terrorism. This designation may be convenient for law enforcement officials, spies, or soldiers, but it does not help to explain why Hamas has been able to sustain an impressive social and political following in the Occupied Territories.

Defining Terrorism in Moral Terms

As defined, the tactic of terrorism may be employed in a variety of contexts, including widely sanctioned struggles as well as regional conflicts. Thus, it makes more sense to concentrate on the moral legitimacy of the means rather than on the technical legality of the ends. It is also sensible to attempt to focus on categories of objectionable acts that may be clearly distinguished from general political violence. Legal character notwithstanding, there is a significant difference between an attack on a police station and an attack on a crowded shopping street.

From an analytical perspective, terrorism is construed as opprobrious because it is characterized by intentional political violence against protected categories of persons—namely, civilians—and civilian sites, such as schools, hospitals, restaurants, buses, trains, and planes. This perspective is close to that of political philosopher Michael Walzer, who argues that terrorism's method is "the random murder of innocent people." Randomness is the crucial feature of terrorist activity. Patent examples include the anonymous car bomb exploded on a crowded shopping street in Beirut, random shooting in the Rome and Vienna airport departure lounges, the destruction of Pan Am 103, and the wholesale slaughter of patients in a Mozambican hospital. Even warfare has a framework of moral rules. Although these rules fail to make warfare anything less than horrific, without them war would be even more horrendous. Noncombatant immunity is a basic principle of the laws of warfare. As a minimum standard, what is impermissible in war—specifically, and especially, the intentional targeting of civilians—should be just as impermissible

outside war zones. The clear delineation of an ethical boundary separating clearly objectionable forms of violence from other acts of violence is not only morally compelling but of practical utility as well. In a complex, increasingly intertwined world, the minimal expectation must be that people can travel without fear of being blown up or raked by machine-gun fire.

The perpetrators of opprobrious violence, whether of terrorism or other types of violence that victimize protected categories of persons, go to lengths to justify their actions, often to the extent of blaming the victims. This is exemplified by the positions offered by both Israeli and Palestinian apologists. For instance, Efraim Inbar, the head of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Ben-Gurion University, argues that "Palestinian losses are not Israel's moral responsibility. . . . War is a competition in inflicting pain, and the Palestinians must bear pain in even greater dosages than they have been accustomed to. . . . Palestinian casualties of all kinds are therefore the necessary condition for putting an end to Palestinian terrorism." More commonly, the protected status of noncombatants is recognized but described as "regrettable" collateral damage. The conventions of warfare, and especially "just war" theory, take account of the "doctrine of double effect," which refers to the fact that, in the course of war, although protected persons may not be intentionally targeted, they may permissibly be unintentionally killed or injured as a side effect of targeting the enemy. It is expected that combatants use weapons and tactics that do not cause excessive civilian casualties, but killing innocent people is not illegal, per se, in war, and it is not terrorism.

Over the course of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has carried out what it calls "targeted killings"—political assassinations justified only by the assertion that the intended victim is either culpable for "terrorism" or is about to carry out "terrorism." Some of the victims are patently political officials who have little to do with security matters, and some have been notably associated with pragmatic wings of groups such as Hamas. Many of these assassinations have claimed the lives of innocent bystanders. When the leader of Hamas, SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, was killed by Israel in March 2004, as many as six bystanders were also killed, and a dozen were wounded. Yasin's successor, ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI, was also assassinated in April 2004, less than a month after Yasin was killed. Of the 350 Palestinians killed in Israeli assassination operations from the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada until the end of 2008, no more than 220 were the intended target.

Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBINGS have taken a large toll in Israeli civilian lives. Indeed, in contrast to the use of suicide attacks by Hizbullah in southern Lebanon during the 1980s, which were targeted precisely against Occupation forces, the Palestinian attacks have often been expressly aimed at causing mutilating injuries and deaths among Israeli civilians. These are blatant acts of terrorism. The years from 1993 to 2003 saw as many as 250 suicide attacks, of which 135 were carried out by Hamas, 70 by Islamic Jihad, 39 by Fatah, and the remainder by the PFLP and smaller Palestinian groups. This underlines that the tactic has arguably been motivated as much by Palestinian nationalist sentiment as by religion.

Some Palestinian officials have argued that the suicide bomber is merely a "low-tech" response to an enemy—Israel—that has a sophisticated arsenal. Thus, Dr. Ramadan Shalah argues: "Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its army is trained to a very high standard . . . . We have nothing with which to repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives . . . human bombs cannot be defeated, not even by nuclear bombs." However, the issue is not the technique, but the intended target: civilians. Were the suicide bombers to strike at Israeli Occupation forces, it would be hard to fault their method.

Some Muslim clerics have offered a tepid condemnation of these attacks on civilians and suggested that the attacks would be legitimate if they focused on the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza. Nonetheless, this position has not been sustained, and popular clerics, notably Yusif al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian based in Qatar who is regularly featured on the al-Jazeera network, provide a novel defense. Although he does not deny the protected status of civilians in principle, he argues that Israel is an armed camp, and that all Israelis either are in the military, were in the military, or, potentially, will be in the military (including the young). The old, who are no longer fit to serve, would presumably qualify as victims by virtue of having served, or merely by having supported those who do. Implicitly, any victim who does not fit al-Qaradawi's category of a militarized Israel would count as col-

lateral damage. Al-Qaradawi's argument is a slippery slope, and although he did explicitly condemn the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York for intentionally targeting civilians, it is only a few stops down the slope to al-Qaeda's formulation that all Americans are culpable for their government's actions because they live in a democracy.

It is important to point out that the use of suicide attacks has been no more mindless than Israel's assassination policy. In fact, it is demonstrable that the suicide bombings have often come in retaliation for Israeli attacks, especially when they inflicted large numbers of casualties on Palestinian civilians. For example, one wave of Palestinian suicide attacks followed the mass murder of twenty-nine Muslim worshipers in HEBRON in February 1994 at the hands of an Israeli settler named BARUCH GOLDSTEIN. Similarly, Palestinians returned to sending suicide bombers on Israeli buses in 1996 after Prime Minister SHIMON PERES ordered the killing of YAHYA AYYASH, a mastermind of Palestinian attacks.

Notwithstanding the moral condemnation that rightly follows attacks on innocent people, there is no denying that campaigns and sometimes single incidents have often had momentous political effect, sometimes quite counterproductive and sometimes not. The massacre at Deir Yassin in 1948 by Jewish terrorists lent momentum to the fear that propelled many Palestinians to flee their homes as refugees. The violence mounted by Hamas and Islamic Jihad prompted Rabin to make peace with the PLO in 1993 so as to forestall the rising power of Islamist groups. Suicide attacks in 1996 helped determine the course of the Israeli elections and prompted Israeli voters to cast their vote for BENJAMIN NETANYAHU rather than Shimon Peres, electing an avowed enemy of the peace process and a man who did as much as any Israeli to scuttle it. And no reader needs to be reminded of the extraordinary impact that attacks on a morning in September 2001 had on the course of world history in the early twenty-first century. These examples suggest that, notwithstanding the rightfully strong condemnations that terrorism and parallel acts provoke, terrorism is likely to continue as a weapon in the arsenal of at least some of the belligerents in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, at least until an equitable solution is reached.

See also AL-AQSA INTIFADA; HOUSE DEMOLITIONS; INFILTRATION AND RETALIATION; LEBANON WAR, 1982; SUICIDE BOMBINGS; TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS

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—Augustus Richard Norton

Terrorists

See TERRORISM

Textbooks

See EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF TEXTBOOKS

Third Temple Movement

Numerous groups are actively involved in a variety of ways in constructing the Third Temple on the TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF in JERUSALEM. It is a serious movement with considerable resources,

including significant funding from many US fundamentalist Christian churches. This temple is to be built over the destroyed Muslim sacred sites—AL-AQSA MOSQUE, the DOME OF THE ROCK, and the various other buildings presently on the Haram, the third holiest location in Islam after Mecca and Medina. This "Third" Temple is to replace the ancient First and Second Jewish Temples of Jerusalem, which once stood on the site.

Jews who want to reconstruct the Third Temple and extend Israel's sovereignty to the whole "Land of Israel" base their position on a literal reading and a unique interpretation of what they believe is God's word in the Covenant of Peoplehood between God and Abraham and his descendants. An essential feature of the covenant is that the children of Abraham and Sarah will be God's chosen people—chosen to be in a covenant with God, to serve God, and to obey his commandments. Crucial to the Jewish notion of chosenness is that it creates obligations exclusive to Jews that, in order to fulfill, required a plot of land. The land was given to the children of Abraham and Sarah not as a reward, but because it is necessary and essential in fulfilling the covenantal task. The land is the means for the sanctification of everyday life, which is the purpose of the covenant. The Covenant of Peoplehood blossomed into the Covenant of Torah and *mitzvot* (commandment) made with the Jews as a people in the revelation at Mount Sinai. Taken together, the Covenant of Peoplehood, the Covenant of Torah, and *mitzvot* mean that Judaism is an indivisible partnership involving God, Torah, People, and Land. The Temple is sacred, for in its Holy of Holies was the Ark of the Covenant that held the two tablets of the law given to Moses by God. This innermost sanctuary of the Temple was considered the dwelling place of the Divine Presence (Shekhina) and could be entered only by the high priest and only on the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur). Significantly, Jewish fundamentalists believe that the Temple must be rebuilt for the Hebrew Messiah to come and redeem the Jews from exile.

Writing in 1999, Yizhar Be'er of the Center for the Protection of Democracy in Israel demonstrated that there had been an enormous expansion and consolidation of Jewish groups targeting the Temple Mount. Until the early 1990s, the number of individuals involved in Third Temple activities, who considered destruction of the mosques on the Temple Mount a necessary goal, did not exceed a few dozen activists in a number of minimally influential movements. But in 1999 Be'er argued, "Threats to the Temple Mount have reached a critical stage. . . . Tens of thousands of people are actively engaged in establishing the Third Temple." Ten years later, in 2009, that number has critically multiplied.

Among the various groups involved in the Third Temple Movement, there is what *Ha'aretz* correspondent Nadav Shragai, writing in January 2005, terms a "Temple Culture." This culture is manifest in countless ways, including Temple songs, Temple literature, up-to-date models of the Third Temple and its environs, a huge stone block ritualistically paraded around Jerusalem as the "cornerstone" of the Third Temple, Temple games for children, formal study of Jewish laws about the Temple, the reproduction of historical Temple rituals and garments, sacrifices and offerings, and paintings and pictures of the proposed Temple.

There are "Temple Feasts" held annually, with a festive stage, a model ceremony in which the *mincha* (afternoon prayer service) sacrifice is prepared—a blend of loaves and crackers customarily sacrificed in the Temple in front of the gathered diners—preceded by a symposium of the luminaries of the movement and political leaders. At the March 2005 Temple Feast, more than 1,000 people, among them rabbis, professors, Knesset members, and Christians, all pursuing the goal of erecting the Third Temple, took part in the festive dinner. The participants were in unanimous agreement that God, acting through human agents, will find a way to rebuild the Temple. Subsequent Temple feasts have had increasingly greater attendance.

Many of the groups involved in Third Temple activities have their own special niche, but they all share the general ideology of Shocharey HaMikdash, the coordinating umbrella organization for the movement, based on the realization of their objective through stages, starting with studying and reinstituting the sacred practices and rituals, and then constructing the Temple. There are broad categories of groups that engage in Third Temple work, including (1) *Halachic* (Jewish law) bodies such as the Temple Mount Rabbinical Court; (2) *amutot* (nonprofit organizations) located in Jerusalem, such as ATERET COHANIM, which focus on purchase of property near the walls of the Temple Mount; (3) extremist yeshivas such as

Shuvu Banim; (4) the YESHA COUNCIL (acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza); (5) protest movements such as Zo Artzeonu ("This [is] our Land/Country") and Matteh Maamatz ("United Headquarters in the Zionist Camp"); (6) political groups such as Medinat Yehuda (the State of Judea or Torah State) and the Manhigut Yehudit (the Jewish leadership) faction within the LIKUD PARTY; and (7) the "Repentant Jews."

Encouragement by the Israeli state since about 2000 has in considerable measure contributed to the expansion in public consciousness regarding the Third Temple. The state also regularly finances the activity of the institutions acting to reinstitute the Temple rituals and the conventions of Shocharey HaMikdash. The Jerusalem Municipality also assists the organizations in their activities, and Jerusalem's previous mayor (and former Israeli prime minister), EHUD OLMERT, placed himself at the head of the Temple Mount campaign. According to Israeli journalist Joseph Algazy, in 1997 Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU gave a silver plaque with all the Muslim shrines replaced by a model of the Great Temple to Archbishop Maximus Salum of HAIFA on the occasion of the Christian New Year. Additionally, behind those taking the lead on the erection of the Temple are figures close to the Likud government—for example the right-wing politician Moshe Feiglin, who is head of the Temple Mount Faithful Movement.

The Israeli government reopened the Temple Mount to Jews in October 2004, and *Ha'aretz* reported that in the first eighteen months after its opening some 85,000 Jews visited the Mount. Tzachi Hanegbi (former Likud minister for internal security), who pressured the government to permit such visits, wrote that these visits, which necessitate the presence of a permanent police force on the Mount, "are getting the Palestinians accustomed to accepting the deep connection of the Jewish people to the place where the Temple stood. This, of course, will bolster our claim to sovereignty over the Mount."

Many of the organizations within these broad categories present themselves as solely involved in history, culture, and education, but all are actively endeavoring to establish the Third Temple. Thousands of activists in dozens of organizations, some small and of minimal influence, others large and highly authoritative, dedicate their time and energy to "redemption of the Temple." The activity of some of the groups can be perceived as legitimate because they ostensibly do not imperil anyone. In the broader context, however, the activity of all the groups together, which is often coordinated, has a cumulative effect. The ultimate objective of all is the same—establishment of the Temple in its original location, on the Temple Mount in the place of the Islamic mosques, and the establishment of a *Halachic* Jewish state in Israel.

In Be'er's view, the most immediate danger of an attack on the Temple Mount is present primarily among fringe elements—isolated individuals or groups of Repentant Jews (such as Shuvu Banim) who will be willing to sacrifice themselves in the manner of YIGAL AMIR (who in 1995 assassinated Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN) and BARUCH GOLDSTEIN (who in 1994 murdered twenty-nine Muslims at prayer in AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE/Cave of the Patriarchs). Be'er focuses on extremist Jewish groups not only because he sees a great potential for danger in their activities, but because many of the activists have a record of violent nationalistic criminal offenses. Such activists include, though not exclusively, former members and offshoots of the now-banned KACH Party, followers of late rabbi MEIR KAHANE, and former members of the defunct Jewish underground (TERROR AGAINST TERROR), operating in a context that includes calls by rabbis that are understood as permission to attack the mosques on the Temple Mount; the explicit urgings of Shocharey HaMikdash to "destroy the mosques"; and the desire to avenge the 2000 death of Rabbi BINYAMIN KAHANE (son of Meir Kahane), who led KAHANE CHAI.

Be'er argues that there are two main reasons for the growth of the Temple Mount movement among Jews, one external and one internal. The external reason is the fear of a peace agreement with the Palestinians that will institutionalize the existing situation in which the Palestinians hold the Temple Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharif. The internal reason is the increasing involvement of Jews with the concept of the Temple. What was once barely a part of the Jewish consciousness has now penetrated into all religious sectors. At the same time, the WESTERN WALL, historically the focus of Jewish emotional and theological yearnings, has diminished significantly in importance while the focus has been redirected toward the idea of the Third Temple. For example, while the subject of establishing the Temple was once attributed only to the will of the Almighty, the current attitude is

that human action must be taken to prepare for the founding of the Temple.

Financial support for reconstruction of the Third Temple comes from various sources, but three are most important: (1) as noted, the Israeli government provides significant funding; (2) wealthy Jews from the DIASPORA, such as the American physician and bingo tycoon IRVING MOSKOWITZ and fugitive financier Jack Abramoff, who after his conviction in US courts fled to Israel, lives in the ultra-Orthodox WEST BANK settlement Beitar Illit, and changed his name to Shmuel Ben Zvi; and (3) American Christian Zionist groups are also a treasure trove for Third Temple organizations. Ralph Reed, who launched Stand for Israel; Jerry Falwell; and most importantly, Pat Robertson have provided tens of millions of dollars to the movement.

The following are among the most important Israeli individuals in the Third Temple Movement: Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, Rabbi Michael Ben Horin, Rabbi Elhanan Ben Nun, Chief Rabbi She'ar-Yashuv Cohen, Rabbi Yosef (Yossi) Dayan, Rabbi Yehuda Edri, Professor Aryeh Eldad, Rabbi Yosef Elbaum, Rabbi BENYAMIN ELON, Avigdor Eskin, Yehuda Etzion, Rabbi Moshe Feiglin, Rabbi Nachman Kahane, Rabbi Yehuda Kreuzer, Yoav Lerner, Rabbi Dov Levanoni, Rabbi Dov Lior, Baruch Marzel, Rabbi Moshe Chanina Neiman, Yaakov Novick, Member of the Knesset Moshe Peled, Member of the Knesset Hanan Porat, Rabbi Shlomo Riskin, Shmuel Sackett, Rabbi Yoel Schwartz, GERSHON SALOMON, Rabbi Dov Stein, Adin Steinsaltz, Professor Hillel Weiss, and Rabbi OVADIA YOSEF.

These thirty men are dedicated to the construction of the Third Temple and the institution of Third Temple culture, including reinstating the priesthood (*Kohanim*), and reestablishing the practices, rituals, sacrifices, clothing, and so forth that were employed during the time of the Second Temple. Some are scholars, but many are active in the various organizations in the Third Temple Movement. Among them nineteen are rabbis, three are academics, four are or have been Knesset members, fourteen are settlers, thirteen were members of Kach or one of its offshoot organizations, seven have been arrested for antistate activities, all oppose the OSLO ACCORDS, most support the TRANSFER of Palestinians from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, most opposed ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, and all support a *Halachic* state in Israel rather than a secular democracy.

According to Be'er's investigation in 1999, at least ten organizations were actively involved at the forefront of the practical promotion of establishing a Third Temple; however, by 2008 that number had risen to more than thirty groups. Each of the following entities is involved in its own unique manner, but all share the hope—indeed, expectation—of a Third Temple.

1. *Shocharey HaMikdash* (Temple Lovers Group). This is the umbrella group that unites most of the Third Temple organizations and it is headed by Hillel Weiss. It holds an annual feast to bring together all the leaders in the movement. According to Shocharey HaMikdash, the establishment of the Third Temple requires reinstating the Sanhedrin.
2. *Sanhedrin* (Council of Elders). The Sanhedrin was the highest judicial and ecclesiastical council of the ancient Jewish nation, Judaism's highest-ranking legal-religious tribunal. It was composed of from seventy to seventy-two rabbis and convened adjacent to the Temple before its destruction in 70 CE, and outside Jerusalem until about 400 CE. Individuals and groups involved with the contemporary Third Temple Movement have been keen to reestablish the Sanhedrin. A group appointed by the Sanhedrin will establish a forum of architects and engineers to begin plans for rebuilding the Temple.

   In 2006, Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz was elected as temporary president of a group aspiring to become the renewed Sanhedrin. In addition to the election of Steinsaltz, the rabbis present chose a seven-man committee, headed by him, to publicly campaign for the acceptance of the idea of a Sanhedrin. In addition to Steinsaltz they chose Rabbi Nachman Kahane, Rabbi Dov Levanoni, Yisrael Ariel, Rabbi Yoel Schwartz, Rabbi Dov Stein, and Rabbi Yehuda Edri.

   In 2007, according to the Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz,* the Sanhedrin Rabbinical Court decided to purchase a herd of sheep for ritual sacrifice at the site of the Temple on the eve of Passover, "conditions on the Temple Mount permitting." It further called on the Jewish people to contribute to the acquisition of materials for the purpose of rebuilding the Temple—including the gathering and preparation of prefabricated, disassembled construction

modules to be stored and ready for rapid assembly, "in the manner of King David."

3. *Malchut Israel* (Kingship for Israel or Kingdom of Israel). Malchut Israel advocates the restoration of the monarchy in Israel in the person of the authentic heir to King David's throne. A fair number of people have had their lineage traced back 3,000 years to the line of King David, but at this writing it appears that only three men fall directly in all-male unbroken lineage and would qualify as Kohanim (high priests): Yosef (Yossi) Dayan, Rabbi Nachman Kahane, and Rabbi Shlomo Riskin.

   Two active groups provide the gateway to Malchut Israel, the Forum of the Three Commandments and Lishkat HaGazit (School of Government). The Forum is directed by Rabbi Yosef Dayan, and its most important activity is to gather those families who have Davidic roots and to encourage genealogical research. The Forum stands behind the initiative to construct a Psalms World Center in Jerusalem. The Lishkat HaGazit promotes itself as an "independent educational institution, established to cast the light of the Torah upon the question of Jewish government. It will prepare the future bearers of public office to serve the nation when the kingship is reestablished, the sooner the better." It lists its academic staff as Yoel Lerner, Yosef Dayan, Baruch Ben Yosef, Hillel Weiss, Hayim Odem, and Shulamit Bar-Yitzhak.
4. *Bet Din* ("House of Judgment"; The Temple Mount Rabbinical Court). This body includes rabbis who are Temple Lovers, such as Dov Lior, Nahman Kahane, and Israel Ariel. It is an institution that seeks to alter the traditional *Halachic* prohibition on Jews ascending the Temple Mount. In August 2000, the Temple Mount Rabbinical Court issued a *Halachic* ruling allowing Jews to ascend the Temple Mount in places that are not part of the Holy of Holies enclosure. This provided the way for the Israeli government to officially open the Temple Mount to Jews in 2004. Other controversial *Halachic* rulings include those concerning the laws regarding a *moser* (someone who informs against or hands over another Jew) and a *rodef* (someone who pursues a person with the intent of killing him), which do not apply in the present-day Israeli government, although according to religious law these crimes are punishable by death. For example, the head of the Sanhedrin, Bet Din (rabbinical court) sent a letter to the head of the Israel Defense Forces Central Command, in which he accused an officer of being a *moser* for signing eviction notices for twenty Jewish outpost residents. According to Amiram Barakat, writing in *Ha'aretz* on 20 April 2006, the rabbis from the rabbinical court are planning legislation that would bypass Israel's High Court rulings, subjecting all Israelis to the dictates of religious law.
5. *Machon HaMikdash* (Temple Institute). The Temple Institute was founded in 1983 by Moshe Neiman, Michael Ben Horin, and Rabbi Yisrael Ariel. Rabbi Ariel is the primary mover and head of the Temple Institute. He is also head of the Bet Din (Sanhedrin rabbinical court). Rabbi Yehuda Glick is director-general of the Institute. This is perhaps the largest—in terms of the breadth of its activities—of all the groups.

   Rabbi Ariel believes that the Temple will be built not by miracles but through active human initiatives. Toward this end, Machon HaMikdash focuses on preparing the vessels for reinstitution of the 200 commandments that can only be performed when a Temple exists. By mid-2007 over a million people had visited the Temple Institute. Rabbi Ariel commented: "We have to prepare and behave as though the Temple will be built tomorrow." Activities of the Temple Institute include

   - Publication of a monthly newsletter (*Welcome to the Temple Institute*) describing the organization's programs and achievements; books, including *mahzorim* (holiday prayer books), Temple *siddurim* (daily prayer books), and books about the Temple, rich in illustrations, diagrams, and drawings that bring the Temple ritual to life; a scholarly rendition of *Tractate Yoma* (regulations concerning the two goats on the Day of Atonement, how they were slaughtered, sent away, etc.); and a scholarly treatise on the use of the ashes of the Red Heifer
   - Preparation of a Golden Menorah (candelabra) stored alongside the Yehudah Halevi staircase leading from the Jewish Quarter to the Western Wall Plaza for safekeeping until the Temple is complete

- Completion of a ten-year project producing precise reconstructions of the High Priest's garments: breastplate, vest, gold headband, and blue coat with bells and pomegranates
- Reconstruction of some seventy Temple ritual objects, including a gold candelabrum, a gold altar, a showbread table, shovels, and the *mizrak* for collecting and pouring blood and incense, with plans to re-create another 150 such items
- Establishment of a museum of Temple vessels, spices, priestly vestments, and other items
- Establishment of a workshop on producing the colors of the *bigdei kehuna* (priestly garments)
- Organization of a harvest of *tola'at shani* (crimson worms) needed for creating the *avnet,* a sixteen-meter-long belt for the *bigdei kehuna* (priestly garments) now in production
- Completion of the weaving of the linen *mitznefet* (the headgear worn by the *Kohanim hedyotim*, the "common" priests) and 120 sets of linen garments for lay priests
- Completion of the *tzitz* (the golden crown worn by Kohanim Gado, the Jewish high priest) of pure gold; a reproduction of the *Kinnor David* (King David's Harp); and a new *copper laver* (a basin of water for the Kohanim to wash in at the start of the day)

6. *House of Harrari*. Micah and Shoshanna Harrari are the founders of this group, which is named after them. It builds exact reproductions of harps used in biblical times for use in the Third Temple. According to their website, they "have made an attempt to bring back the Biblical harp and its music to Israel after 2000 years." Built in a small workshop in the Jerusalem forest, "each harp is individually designed to combine the patterns of antiquity with the personal visions and ideas of each client, creating true Temple quality heirlooms of prayer and healing for the mind, body and soul." (www.harrariharps.com).
7. *The Red Heifer.* In various locations in Israel, Shocharey HaMikdash has been attempting to raise a red heifer—an animal from whose ashes the *Kohanim* may be purified—and prepare for their sacred acts in the Temple. This purification is a necessary precondition for sacred acts in the Temple, because, according to *Halacha*, every Jew is impure from contact with or being in the same building as a human corpse (*tumat metim)*. According to *Halacha*, the red cow must be three years old, perfectly red, and of uniform hue (even a few hairs of a different color invalidate it for sacred use). Its horns must also be red. It may not have a blemish, and a yoke must never have been placed on it. After many failures in Israel to produce a *Halachaly* pure red heifer, in 2006, Tennessee Pentecostal minister Clyde Lott and Israeli (American-born) Hasidic rabbi Chaim Richman began breeding red heifers to be sent to Israel when the Third Temple is built. These two believe that the coming of the Messiah will happen only when there is a Third Jewish Temple on the Temple Mount. (www.bible-prophecy.com/redheifer.htm; www.redheiferpress.com; www.templemount.org/heifer.html; www.haydid.org/redcow.htm).
8. *Mitzpeh Yericho.* This is a settlement of Orthodox Jews overlooking the Palestinian city of JERICHO. It has a *kolel* (yeshiva for married men) that specializes in Temple studies. Every day at 6:00 A.M., a group of men, under the instruction of the settlement's rabbi, Yehuda Kreuzer, gather and study the laws about the Temple and the ritual sacrifices of slaughtering lambs, cows, and fowl. A second project of the settlement, headed by Moshe Neiman, is the building of a replica of the Temple on the hills of Mitzpeh Yericho. Neiman is also involved in raising funds and recruiting supporters for Temple organizations.
9. *Beged Ivri* (Hebrew Clothing). The main goal of this group is to create and sell biblical clothing designs in preparation for the Third Temple. The group was founded by Reuven Prager and is both a commercial endeavor and a commitment to the Third Temple. Priestly garments have not been worn since the destruction of the Second Temple by Rome in 70 CE and cannot be used until a Third Temple is constructed. The Temple Institute inaugurated this workshop.

When the Temple is rebuilt, *Kohanim*, in particular, must wear the proper outfit to perform their obligations. Beged Ivri is making individually tailored sets of clothing that include a turban, a light blue tunic threaded

with silver, pants, and a crimson belt at a cost of NIS 2,500 ($675) per set. Years of diligent research were needed to create the garments in conformance with Jewish law. Special flaxen thread was imported from India, and overseas travel was necessary to obtain the correct colors for the clothes, including travel to Istanbul to purchase *tola'at shani* (crimson worms), because the harvest in Israel was insufficient to meet the need. The secret of the correct shade of blue had been lost since the destruction of the Second Temple, and the identification of *chilazon* (the snail from which it was extracted) was uncertain until the Ptil Tekhelet (the Association for the Promotion and Distribution of Tekhelet—biblical blue dye) discovered it. Beged Ivri identified it as the *murex trunculus* found near the Mediterranean Sea.

The group is additionally working to revive ancient Jewish marriage ceremonies and biblically described prayer clothing. (www.israelvisit.co.il/beged-ivri/; www.tekhelet.com).

10. *El Har Hamor* (To Mount Hamor). This is a group whose principal members are from the Yitzhar settlement, located in the West Bank near NABLUS. Over 130 families, some 500 people, live in this Orthodox Jewish community, which has many adherents in Third Temple groups as well as among settler and Third Temple rabbis. The goal of El Har Hamor is twofold: to bring to life the words of the rabbis and rebuild the Temple, and to open the Gates of Heaven to prayer by dancing and singing on the original grounds of the Temple. Every Rosh Chodesh (beginning of Jewish month) at approximately 6:45 P.M., a march around the gates of the Temple Mount is held in conjunction with the organization El Har Hamor.
11. *Mishmarot HaKohanim* (The Kohanim's Preserves). This organization is composed of members of the Cohen family, who are considered the descendants of Moses's brother Aaron, the Tribe of Levi, whose task is to assist in performing the sacred practices in the Temple. The sacred practices and the expertise required of Mishmarot HaKohanim include skills in building, cleaning, slaughtering, offering the ritual sacrifices, musicianship, and other matters. In the days of the Temple, *Kohanim* performed the most significant duties within the Temple. Approximately one-third of the commandments in the Torah cannot be accomplished without a temple, including the obligations of the *Kohanim*. *Kohanim* priests today must be directly descended from Aaron, recognized by the Temple Institute as such if their paternal grandfathers observed the tradition.
12. *Hai v'Kayam* (Enduring; David, King of Israel, Lives and Endures). This group was established in the early 1990s by Yehuda Etzion and a group from the Bat Ayin settlement and defines itself as a messianic "Redemption Movement to Renew the Kingdom of Israel." Its members describe themselves as belonging to the "Third Temple culture." In addition to advocating for reestablishment of the Temple, they are activists who have attempted to storm the Temple Mount on numerous occasions.
13. *Institute for Talmudic Commentaries*. The goal of this group is to undertake and publish research relating to the Third Temple. Rabbi Nahman Kahane heads it. Its major contribution to the movement is the maintenance of a computer database of all rabbis/priests in Israel. Some eighty-eight rabbis have gone to study at the Institute for Talmudic Commentaries.
14. *The Movement for the Establishment of the Temple*. This is a small and unique group within modern-day ultra-Orthodox circles in Israel. It is headed by Rabbi Yosef Elbaum, and the group's major activist is Yoel Lerner. This organization seeks to achieve a religious revolution within Israeli Orthodoxy through its demand to rebuild the Temple and to abolish the *halakhic* prohibition against entering the Temple Mount area. (The latter has been partially accomplished.) The movement argues that Orthodox passivity and theological error were responsible for this state, and accordingly offers an alternative historiographic and theological approach. Rabbi Elbaum commented: "The archeologists sold out to the enemy. The rabbinate are traitors." Its founding motivation was the OSLO ACCORDS and the fear that secular Israeli leaders would "give away" some of the land of Israel and the Temple Mount. The Movement for the Establishment of the Temple holds

monthly "Temple Mount Gates Marches" in which typically some 1,500 people take part.

15. *Lechatchila* (At the Beginning). This group is headed by Rabbi Moshe Feiglin and centers its activities on building the Third Temple by human effort in accordance with the commandment "make me a Temple"—which is not dependent on the coming of the Messiah as it is in traditional Jewish theology. The conviction that man must intervene with God's plan for redemption and rebuild the Temple now makes this group highly influential.
16. *Mishnarot hamikdash* (Temple Work Shifts). The founders of this organization are Yehuda Etzion and Moshe Feiglin. Their aim, in accordance with the ancient customs of the Second Temple period, is to have a continuous presence of activists in shifts at the entrance to the Temple Mount, bearded and dressed in white. Another purpose involves renewing the customs of the Temple. The group directs the people going up onto the Mount to the places where Jews are permitted to enter, according to the view of the rabbis who belong to Shocharey HaMikdash groups.
17. *Ne'emaney Har HaBayit* (Temple Mount Faithful). This group was founded by Gershon Salomon, who states on the organization's website that its objective is building the Third Temple "in our lifetime" and securing its "liberation from Arab (Islamic) occupation." Salomon describes himself as a "messenger" of God and the mission as a "fulfillment of end-time prophecy."

    The Temple Mount Faithful is a major organization in the movement, although it operates mainly outside the umbrella organization, Shocharey HaMikdash. Salomon raises funds from fundamentalist Christian communities in the United States and Europe, which consider establishment of the Third Temple a necessary theological stage preceding the Second Coming of Jesus. Salomon contends that nearly 10,000 Christians from around the world, including some from Muslim countries—EGYPT, Indonesia, and African states—have recently joined his movement. He further contends that his movement has a registered membership of more than 10,000 people in Israel.

    The Temple Mount Faithful condemn Israeli leaders who have contemplated a settlement with the Palestinians, saying that "[o]ften weak leaders in Israel itself, under the pressure of the enemies, are ready to divide the land and to create an evil terrorist and anti-Godly state in the midst of the Land of Israel which God gave to His people alone—a so-called anti-Godly named 'Palestinian' state." (www.templemountfaithful.org).
18. *Hara'ayon Hayehudi* (The Jewish Idea). This is a yeshiva and a movement that is a branch of the Kach movement, which remains active after having been declared illegal. It has a front organization called Hazit Hara'ayon (the Ideological Front), one of whose activists is Itamar Ben Gvir (a leader of and the spokesman for the Chayil Party, a far-right organization whose goals include the transfer of all non-Jews from Israel). The organization publishes a newsletter called *The Youth of Jewish Sovereignty*. The group is headed by Rabbi Nahman Kahane, brother of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane; it was also headed by Binyamin Kahane. The members of Hara'ayon Hayehudi play an active role in the Temple organizations. At Feasts of the Temple the activists distributed their newsletter, which calls for its readers "to remove and eliminate. . . . It is enough, we are fed up. The time has come to do what should have been done a long time ago. Government of Israel, remove the Gentiles and the Arabs from the Temple Mount." (jidea@netvision.net.il; kahane.blogspot.com/2006/01/bsd-yeshivat-haraayon-hayehudi.html).
19. *Revava* (Masses). This is a small organization led by David Ha'Ivri, an outspoken advocate of theocracy for Israel, a follower of the late Rabbi Meir Kahane and resident of Kfar Tapuach, a West Bank settlement. Ha'Ivri has organized mass attempts to ascend to the Temple Mount, though most have been stopped by the police. Some have garnered significant media attention, particularly on 4 September 2008 when, according to Aaron Klein of *WorldNet Daily*, Ha'Ivri was able to bring 10,000 people to the Temple Mount. Ha'Ivri is the author of *Reclaiming the Temple Mount*, a book that describes the history of the Temple Mount and activities of the Jewish organizations involved in reclaiming the site for the Jewish people, and is publisher of the *Ideas in Action* newsletter. He advocates the

transfer of all Arabs from the land of Israel and the annexation of all parts of the historic land of Israel to the Jewish state. Since the murder of Binyamin Ze'ev Kahane, son of Rabbi Meir Kahane, David Ha'Ivri has assumed responsibility for the continuation of the Kahane publications, printing new editions of many Rabbi Kahane classics that had been out-of-print, as well as making available translations, websites, and printed newsletters. (www.revava.org;www.revava.org/content/section/4/53/).

20. *Ascend the Temple Mount in Purity.* Since 2004, Jews have been going up to the Temple Mount, among them rabbis, *roshei yeshivat* (deans of Talmudic academies), and their students. This group teaches the Temple aspirants the required rituals. After emersion in a *mikva* (ritual bath of purification), and after learning the laws of the permissible areas to walk in and other *Halachot* about the Temple Mount, Jews go up every day via the Mughrabi Gate to the territory of the Temple Mount.
21. *Virtual Beis Hamikdash.* This is a website, designed by Rav Zalman Koren Shlit'a, that presents a computer-generated visual model of the proposed Third Temple and tells the biblical story of the Temple. (www.neveh.org/mikdash/default.html).
22. *Chai Vekayam* (Alive and Existing Movement). There is little information available in English about this group. The head of the group, Yehuda Etzion, has said of the Third Temple: "[It is an] aspiration to a different culture and totality" and "[an] aspiration for a life of togetherness, a life of absolute mutuality, between us and the Blessed Be He, while the State of Israel of today is characterized by an attempt to create a reality of division—a reality of the individual who is unshackled from holiness." Together with Yoel Lerner and Avigdor Eskin, Yehuda Etzion is a member of the Temple Mount Treasury, a group that raises funds to rebuild the Temple.
23. *HaTenu'ah LeChinun HaMikdash*. This group aims to generate popular commitment from the breadth of the Jewish people, its rabbis, and its leaders to rebuild the Third Temple and return the *Kohanim* (priestly class) to their service. They conduct national and regional conferences and organize ascents to the Temple Mount of individuals, groups, and the public at large. They also put out a publication called *Yibane HaMikdash* (The Temple Will Be Rebuilt), which serves as a forum on Jewish law and thought on subjects relating to the Temple Mount and the renewal of the Temple service and rituals. (yirmi@shani.net; www.kadosh.co.il).
24. *Sivuv She'arim* (the custom of walking around the Old City). In July 2008 a group of some 3,000 Jews, mostly teenagers, armed with flags and loudspeakers and playing music, marched around all four sides of the Temple Mount, beginning at the Western Wall, entering four of its gates, passing through one gate on the northwest corner, and then continuing through three more gates on the northern edge. The group culminated its march by passing through the Dung Gate, exuberantly singing "Yibaneh Hamikdash" and dancing with linked arms.

    The youth marched under the organization Sivuv She'arim, who has gathered people from across the country to march around the Temple Mount, uniting them in a desire to speedily rebuild the Temple. Sivuv She'arim founder Rabbi Tzvi Rogin (head of the Temple Mount Information Center) envisioned the marches as a means for all Jews to forge a connection to the Temple Mount, regardless of religious or political persuasion.
25. *El Har Hamor* (To the Mountain of Myth), a yeshiva and Third Temple group that has overseen Sivuv She'arim since 2001, has as its main objective constructing the Third Temple as expeditiously as possible by mobilizing as many people as feasible to participate in the project, and opening the "Gates of Heaven" to prayer by dancing and singing on the grounds of the Temple Mount.
26. *The Temple Women.* This group is headed by Michal Aviezer, a housewife and pleader in the rabbinical courts, resident of Kiryat Shmuel, near HAIFA. The organization collects gold jewelry and precious stones in preparation for establishment of the Temple. The jewelry and precious stones are kept in the safe of Machon HaMikdash (an organization in Jerusalem devoted to making replicas of Temple implements so that when the Third Temple is built, they will have something to use there).
27. *The Amutot for Settling Jerusalem* (JERUSALEM FORUM). The Jerusalem Forum is an *amuta* (nonprofit organization with major tax

exemptions) that unites and coordinates other *amutot,* for example, BEIT OROT, ELAD, Ateret Cohanim, and ATERET L'YOSHNA, that redeem houses in the HOLY BASIN and OLD CITY of Jerusalem. The defining ideology of the *amutot* is redemption of land in Jerusalem, with emphasis given to land near the wall of the Temple Mount. Many activists in the settlement *amutot* are also activists in Temple Mount organizations. See the text for discussions of each of these settler groups as well as the Palestinian neighborhoods wherein they have established colonies—for example, SILWAN, SHAYKH JARRAH, RAS AL-AMUD, and ABU DIS.

Christian Involvement in the Third Temple Movement

Christian Zionists, especially from the United States, share with the Jewish activists discussed above the goal of building the Third Temple on the Temple Mount, and provide a significant amount of financial support as well as services and information.

Christian Zionists are Premillennial Dispensationalists. Premillennialism teaches that the Second Coming of Christ will only occur after the Jews have returned to Zion, rebuilt the Third Temple, reintroduced the Mosaic sacrificial system, and re-established the priestly class. The Second Coming, then, is dependent on the construction of the Third Temple. This doctrine is largely based upon a literal interpretation of Revelation 20:1–6 in the New Testament of the Bible. Dispensationalism, an aspect of premillennialism, is a theological system that teaches that biblical history is best understood in light of a number of successive administrations of God's dealings with humankind, which it calls "dispensations." It maintains fundamental distinctions between God's plans for national Israel and for the New Testament Church. In other words, although the Jews' return to Israel and the reconstruction of the Third Temple are essential, after the Second Coming of Christ and the ensuing Day of Judgment, God's dealings with adherents to Judaism will have ended, with only Christians being saved.

Christian and Jewish Zionists are generally united in the conviction that the Muslim Dome of the Rock must be destroyed, the Third Jewish Temple built on that site, the priests consecrated, and the sacrifices reinstituted in fulfillment of biblical prophecy to ensure the coming of the Messiah. The Christian Zionists who hold to this perspective have perhaps 30 million or more core members, with a subset of 3 million hard-core fundamentalist activists.

Gershon Salomon of the Temple Mount Faithful told a receptive Christian audience: "The mission of the present generation is to liberate the Temple Mount and to remove—I repeat, to remove—the defiling abomination there. The Israeli Government must do it. We must have a war. . . . The Messiah will not come by himself; we should bring Him by fighting." Some observers of Salomon's organization claim that he has a greater following among Christian premillennialists in the United States than he does in Israel among Jews. That is difficult to determine, but it is clear that without financial support from the United States, the work of the Temple Mount Faithful would not be possible.

Prominent, contemporary Christian Zionists who have written or preached in advocacy of the rebuilding of a Third Jewish Temple include the late Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Oral Roberts, Ralph Reed, Ed McAteer, David A. Lewis, Thomas Ice, Randall Price, Mike Evans, Grant Jeffrey, Tim LaHaye, Dave Hunt, and Hal Lindsey (who is regarded as the Father of the Modern-Day Bible Prophecy movement). Their combined published book sales exceed 70 million in more than fifty languages. They are endorsed by some of the largest theological colleges and missionary institutions as well as a significant proportion of Evangelical, Charismatic, Pentecostal, and fundamentalist Christians worldwide.

Funding the Work: The Temple Treasury. Stephen Sizer, vicar of Christ Church, Virginia Water, UK, has revealed that the International Christian Embassy (Jerusalem), as well as megachurches such as Chuck Smith's Calvary Chapel in Costa Mesa, California, has been associated with the funding of the Jerusalem Temple Foundation (JTF) founded by an Israeli, Stanley Goldfoot (who died in 2006), and several leading US evangelicals. Goldfoot had been influential in raising large sums of money for the JTF through American Christian television and radio stations and evangelical churches. Although Jan Willem van der Hoeven (who died in 2008), the founder of the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ) and director of the International Christian Zionist Center (ICZC), denied direct involvement in efforts to see the Jewish Temple rebuilt, he did admit that "when supporters volunteer to give money for building a temple, he directs them to Goldfoot."

Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network has also assisted in raising enormous amounts of funds for Salomon's Temple Mount Faithful. Robertson is one of the most, if not the most, influential of American evangelists. He told a *Ha'aretz* reporter in October 2004 that Evangelical Christians feel so deeply about Jerusalem that if President GEORGE W. BUSH "shifted his position toward support for Jerusalem as a capital for both Israel and a Palestinian state, his Evangelical backing would disappear." Pastor John Hagee, who is a towering leader in the Evangelical Church, has dedicated a great part of his enormously successful ministry to raising money for the Third Temple.

Christian Zionists tend to find solidarity with the religious right wing of Israeli society, although every Israeli prime minister, LABOR PARTY or LIKUD PARTY, has spoken at each of the International Christian Zionist Congresses held annually in Jerusalem since 1980. In an open letter to BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, then Israel's ambassador to the UNITED NATIONS, the International Christian Embassy affirmed its commitment that Jews be able to worship again on the Temple Mount.

There is a clear and unambiguous symbiotic relationship between Christian and Jewish Zionist organizations committed to rebuilding the Jewish Temple. For example, Jews for Jesus provides information on, and offers direct Internet links to, eight extreme and militant Jewish organizations, including the Temple Institute and Temple Mount Faithful. Support for extreme Jewish organizations among Christian Zionists is also associated with an antipathy to Islam. At the Third International Christian Zionist Congress, for example, held in 1996 under the auspices of the ICEJ, the following affirmation was endorsed: "The Islamic claim to Jerusalem, including its exclusive claim to the Temple Mount, is in direct contradiction to the clear biblical and historical significance of the city and its holiest site."

Following are some of the Christian Zionist groups involved in Third Temple activities:

1. The Hope: To Realize the Vision of Jerusalem in Our Lifetime: The City of Peace, a House of Prayer for all the Nations. www.thehope.org.
2. National Leadership Conference for Israel. www.nclci.org.
3. Christians for Israel. www.c4israel.org.
4. National Unity Coalition for Israel. www.pinn.net/~sandy/linkspage.htm.
5. Bridges for Peace. www.bridgesforpeace.com.
6. Christian Friends of Israeli Communities. www.cfoic.com.
7. International Fellowship of Christians and Jews. www.ifcj.org/site/PageServer.
8. The Jerusalem Temple Foundation. www.namebase.org/xjam/Jerusalem-Temple-Foundation.html.
9. Pat Robertson. www.patrobertson.com/Speeches/speechreaction.asp.
10. Temple NOW: Rapture Utopia—Christian Zionism. www.scari.org/temple_now.html.
11. Biblebelievers. www.biblebelievers.org.au.
12. International Christian Embassy Jerusalem. www.icej.org.
13. Temple Now (Christian), headed by Gus O. Kahan. www.scari.org/temple_now.html.
14. Lovers of Israel, Inc. Mike Evans, founder and president of Christian Action for Israel. http://christianactionforisrael.org.

See also CHRISTIANITY; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; ZIONISM

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Tiberias

The city of Tiberias is situated approximately at the midpoint on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee, the largest urban settlement in the Galilee region. In 1948, Tiberias was the site of the first wave of the mass exodus of Palestinians fleeing the Israeli army.

The city, which sits on a steep slope rising from the lake, was founded in the first century CE on the remains of the ancient city of Rakkath, by Herod Antipas, son of the Roman governor Herod, and was named after the then-reigning Roman emperor Tiberius. According to Christian tradition, Jesus performed several miracles in the Tiberias district, making it an important pilgrimage site for devout Christians. During the second century, the Sanhedrin (Jewish supreme lawmaking authority) chose the city as its place of residence, and a Jewish presence remained in Tiberias for hundreds of years thereafter.

The city was long an important part of the administrative apparatus in Palestine for various governments. It was the headquarters of the Jund al-Urdunn province during the early Islamic period as well as the subdistrict of Tiberias, itself subsumed within the district of ACRE during both the OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1516–1922) and BRITISH MANDATE (1922–1948) periods. Historically the walled town lay along caravan routes connecting SYRIA and EGYPT and therefore was a place of strategic importance. During the Crusader wars, Tiberias was virtually destroyed and was still only sparsely inhabited in 1523. A severe earthquake in 1837 destroyed the walls, which were never rebuilt.

The relatively continuous, if small, Jewish presence from the second century was augmented by an edict issued in 1562, by the Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, which encouraged Jews to resettle in Tiberias. The town is the site of the tomb of the Jewish religious scholar Maimonides. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Tiberias received an influx of rabbis who established the city as a center for Jewish learning, and Tiberias became one of the Jewish "four holy cities," together with JERUSALEM, HEBRON, and SAFED. ZIONISM attracted new immigrants, a process further encouraged under the British Mandate. Thus, in 1922, Jews constituted half of the town's total population of 6,950. By 1944, the population of Tiberias had increased to 11,310, with Jews accounting for just under half. Prior to the onset of Zionism the relationship between Arabs and Jews in Tiberias was good; however, in the context of Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchase, relations were marred by several violent incidents, the worst of which occurred in October 1938 when, in the Palestinian uprising, anti-Jewish violence killed twenty Jews, almost all civilians. Still, the Jewish and Palestinian populations of Tiberias maintained relatively cordial, if distant, relations.

In the 1948 WAR, however, the situation changed drastically. After capturing the Arab villages along the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem Road in the second half of April, the Jewish underground military organization HAGANA began its offensive against major Palestinian population concentrations in the Galilee. On the night of 18 April, Tiberias's approximately 6,000 Palestinians, under pressure from the Hagana forces, fled the town for NAZARETH, later fleeing to distant countries. Following the war, no Palestinians remained in Tiberias.

According to Palestinian historian Walid Khalidi, one of the most significant aspects in the fall of Tiberias was the way the British forces handled the situation. Until their withdrawal from Palestine, it was the British duty to maintain security and peace. Yet, while Tiberias was under heavy mortar fire from the Hagana, the only effort exerted by the British was to advise the commander of the Arab garrison "to stop fighting and evacuate the Arab inhabitants." Justifying this passive stance, the British military historian Major Wilson said that the British forces were obliged to stick to a certain time schedule for the anticipated withdrawal. By the time the Hagana attacked Tiberias, the British troops were "too weak in number," making material intervention impossible.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; WAR, 1948

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Tibi, Ahmad (1958–)

Dr. Ahmad Tibi is a Palestinian-Israeli physician, politician, and member of the Knesset. Born in al-Tayyiba in the Galilee, he received his education, including his medical degree, from the Hebrew University in JERUSALEM. He describes himself as Arab-Palestinian in nationality but has called Israel his "homeland."

During the 1980s Tibi was a major connection for Israelis (e.g., URI AVNERY, MATTIYAHU PELED, among others) seeking to meet with members of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, which was then illegal under Israeli law. By 1991 Tibi had become a vital emissary and mediator for the PLO. He advised the Palestinian delegation at the MADRID CONFERENCE; during the lead-up to and after the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, he mediated between YITZHAK RABIN and YASIR ARAFAT; and later he mediated between the PLO and HAMAS. In 1993, Tibi was appointed special adviser to Chairman Yasir Arafat for the negotiations that preceded the OSLO ACCORDS. For several years, he served as a political adviser to Arafat, representing the Palestinians at the 1998 Wye River negotiations.

In late 1995, Tibi formed the Arab Movement for Renewal (AMR, Ta'al) but backed away from it. After he resigned as Arafat's adviser in 1999, Tibi won a seat in the Knesset as a member of AZMI BISHARA's BALAD PARTY. In 2002 right-wing Member of the Knesset Michael Kleiner initiated actions in the Knesset to restrict movement by Tibi inside the GAZA STRIP and the WEST BANK. Kleiner claimed that Tibi was assisting the Palestinians in their war against Israel. Tibi protested the Knesset's decision as unconstitutional and illegal under Israeli law, and appealed to the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, which deferred a decision on the case. Ahead of Israel's 2003 elections, Tibi reconstituted Ta'al as an Arab nationalist party and prepared to run for the Knesset; however, several right-wing politicians, including the heads of the NATIONAL UNION PARTY and NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY (Mafdal), sought to have Tibi banned from holding Knesset office because he was not a Jew. LIKUD PARTY Knesset member Michael Eitan brought the official motion to disqualify Tibi's candidacy. After the Israeli Supreme Court rejected their arguments, Tibi ran on the Ta'al slate on a joint ticket with HADASH, winning office. In 2004, Tibi served as a member of the house and economics committees in the Knesset. Before the 2006 elections, Tibi took his Ta'al party out of the Hadash coalition and joined the UNITED ARAB LIST. He retained his seat and became a deputy speaker of the Knesset. He was reelected on the joint UAL-Ta'al list in the 2009 elections.

See also PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM

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Tomb of the Patriarchs

See CAVE OF MACHPELAH; AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE

Torah and Shabbat Judaism

Torah and Shabbat Judaism is a coalition of ASHKENAZI ultra-Orthodox (HAREDI) parties who believe that government policies should be based on *Halacha* (Jewish religious law) and that the land of Israel was given to the Jewish people by God. This being the case, no compromises can then be made that would give up any part of the land—in other words, territorial compromise with the Palestinians is anathema. The coalition won six seats in the 2006 Knesset elections and six seats again in 2009.

Torat Cohanim

Torat Cohanim is a yeshiva in the Muslim quarter of the Old City of JERUSALEM, established by the settler group ATARA L'YOSHNA, which works to identify and reclaim Jewish property in the Muslim quarter. It was intended as a center for the study of Jewish law related to the Third Temple (thus the name Torat Cohanim). Over the years, Atara L'Yoshna, together with other associations such as ATERET COHANIM, have taken possession of numerous Palestinian buildings throughout the Old City.

See also SETTLERS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

Torture

See COLLABORATORS; ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM; ISRAELI SUPREME COURT; MOSSAD; SHIN BET

Transfer and Displacement

The assumption behind the notions of transfer and displacement is that there can be no viable Jewish state in all or part of Palestine unless there is a mass displacement of Arab inhabitants.

Separation, displacement, transfer, ethnic cleansing, and virtual imprisonment behind the twenty-six-foot concrete BARRIER appear to be the most extreme elements of a radical right-wing policy against the Palestinians. But they are not products of LIKUD PARTY governments alone, and did not even originate with them. Nor are they confined to the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; rather, they represent a general approach of the Zionist movement, best described in 1923 by the Revisionist leader VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY as that of an "Iron Wall." Indeed, the elements of displacement and transfer are not mere "policies," but structural and ideological products of the Jewish nationalism expressed primarily in the Zionist claim that the entire land of Israel (i.e., the western part of the land of Israel stretching from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River) belongs exclusively to the Jewish people. Hegemonic exclusivity over a territory is inherent in any ethnocracy—namely, wherein one group within a multiethnic or multireligious state dominates to the extent that it determines the nature of the state. In the case of Israel, however, it takes on a special priority and urgency, since ZIONISM represents a form of ethnonationalism that was not in situ, a form in which the "natives" came from outside the country, claiming that they were "returning" to their native land, thus rendering the indigenous inhabitants "intruders." The

historical process in which conquest, displacement, and delegitimization of an existing majority population are carried out by an external minority one is, in Israel, called "Judaization," which by definition relies heavily on issues of historic claims, rights, LAND, and DEMOGRAPHY and is inevitably accompanied by conflict and exclusion.

The various expressions of Judaization—separation, confinement, displacement, transfer—can be combined under the general rubric of displacement, or *nishul* in Hebrew. In Palestine/Israel, proposals for a transfer of Palestinians from their homeland go back to the very beginning of the Zionist enterprise, openly articulated and discussed as part of the process of "reclaiming" the country. It culminated during the 1948 WAR in the expulsion of 75 percent of the Palestinian people, who became either REFUGEES or "internally displaced" PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL and who have not been allowed to return to their homes, with many living in UNRECOGNIZED VILLAGES in Israel. The process was repeated in the flight and DEPORTATION of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories in the 1967 WAR and thereafter. Judaization continues through policies of "quiet transfer," continuing economic de-development, Israel's PERMIT system for the Occupied Territories with its myriad restrictions, and other such policies designed to induce Palestinian emigration and the confinement of the remaining Palestinians to tiny "cantons."

Before and during 1948, Zionist, Arab, and British leaders and officials understood and enunciated the logic of *nishul*. As early as 1895, THEODOR HERZL, the prophet and founder of Zionism, who anticipated the establishment of the Jewish state, wrote in his diary, "We shall try to spirit the penniless [Arab] population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our country. . . . The removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly."

Zionism did not always result in physical displacement. In circumstances where that proved impossible, *nishul* assumed other forms. Palestinians, for example, may remain more or less in place but lose title to their lands and property through expropriation or blocked access—a form of dispossession. When physical displacement was carried out on a massive scale, it also meant that the displaced group's claims, narrative, and even identity were suppressed and denied by the dominant group, which asserts the validity only of its own claims and narrative. In Israel, this has taken the form of reducing the Palestinians to merely an ethnic or minority group, an excluded sector of the broader Jewish society, rather than recognizing them as an equal national entity. In fact, the Arabs (Israeli Jews refer to Palestinians inside Israel, and in general, solely by that generalized and undifferentiated term) fall outside the dominant narrative altogether and are rendered irrelevant, merely part of the landscape.

In the end, the prime goal of *nishul* is not only physical displacement, but also the normalization of displacement so that a previous reality cannot be recovered or even recalled. As a strategy and process of expansion and displacement, *nishul* has proven its effectiveness in Zionism's attempt to wrest the land of Israel from its Palestinian inhabitants, especially in its ability to normalize displacement and turn it into a non-issue. This effectively devolves responsibility for the inevitable and endemic conflict from the perpetrators to the victims, casting the resistance of the latter as illegitimate violence or TERRORISM. In Israel's case, it legitimizes the notion of a Jewish state and enables it to mobilize support from within its Jewish population and abroad for policies of *nishul*.

Stages of Displacement

The stages of displacement/*nishul* in the history of Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be generally summarized in five time periods.

Beginnings of Zionism (1904–1914). Elements of *nishul* were already appearing in the last years of the nineteenth century when Zionism crystallized as an ideology and movement, given the necessary political, organizational, and financial influence of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION. At this time, a self-contained, compelling metanarrative emerged asserting the Jews' exclusive title to the country as returning natives. Although the terms "conquest" and "colonization" were used to describe the process of reclaiming the land, the claim itself was seen as just, self-evident, and beyond dispute, while Palestinian claims or rights were seldom entertained. Their presence in the land of Israel was cast as "the hidden question" or "the Arab problem," which was to be addressed in various ways. For the century that followed, until (and even then indirectly and ambiguously) the signing of the OSLO ACCORDS between Israel and the PALESTINE

LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) in 1993, the existence of Palestinians as a national collective was denied, and their claims to both land and the country were dismissed.

Physical displacement began in 1904 with the establishment of the Palestine office of the World Zionist Organization and the systematic purchase of lands from Arab ABSENTEE LANDLORDS, which necessitated the removal of the Palestinian peasantry. The first tangible expression of physical displacement took place in the years before World War I, when HASHOMER (The Guardians), a heavily armed Zionist paramilitary group mounted on horses and attired as Arabs, forcibly evicted Palestinians from lands they had cultivated for centuries. In 1911, ARTHUR RUPPIN, the director of the World Zionist Organization's Palestine office, first publicly used the term "transfer" when he proposed that dispossessed Arab Palestinian peasants be resettled in SYRIA. ISRAEL ZANGWILL, a leading Zionist figure (who coined the expression "A land without people for a people without a land"), lobbied for an "Arab Trek," reflecting the trek of the Boers into Transvaal, though in the direction of other Arab lands.

Since they had no part in the Jewish national narrative (except as foils), Palestinian attempts to resist displacement, which became more organized and articulated after the Young Turk rebellion of 1908, further fostered the popular Zionist image of the Arabs as illegitimate claimants to Jewish land who were inherently hostile and violent. Such an image only legitimized whatever measures were necessary to realize redemption of the land and its inverse, displacement of the Arab population. Ideology was backed by force, organization, effective international political support, and massive financial support.

Systematic Zionist Expansion (1918–1947). Until the end of World War I, the process of *nishul* was still somewhat vague in its conception and scale, although the vision of reclaiming the entire country underlay all Zionist policies. The Jews comprised only 10 percent of the country's population, and Ottoman/Turkish rule seemed firmly in place, requiring great care in pressing the authorities for concessions to Zionist projects without directly confronting the Arab population. When Great Britain assumed governance over Palestine in 1917 (the BRITISH MANDATE), the Jewish community saw it as a pro-Zionist regime (especially after the 1917 BALFOUR DECLARATION), while the Palestinians and other Arabs, to whom the British had promised independence and unity in the 1914–1915 HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE, considered it a betrayal. The years 1918–1920 represent the origin of what historian Israel Kolatt called "maximalist Zionism," the attempt to establish a Jewish state with an overwhelming Jewish majority on *both* sides of the Jordan River—that is, both Transjordan and Palestine.

In 1923, following the outbreak of what Israelis call the Arab riots of 1921 and Palestinians refer to as AL-NABI MUSA DEMONSTRATIONS, plus the subsequent 1922 CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM, which retreated from the Balfour Declaration's promise of a Jewish "homeland," Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky, the founder of Revisionist Zionism and the ideological source of today's Likud Party, formulated his seminal "iron wall" doctrine: "Every indigenous people will resist alien settlers as long as they see any hope of ridding themselves of the danger of foreign settlement. This is how the Arabs will behave and go on behaving so long as they possess a gleam of hope that they can prevent 'Palestine' from becoming the Land of Israel. [The sole way to an agreement, then,] is through the iron wall, that is to say, the establishment in Palestine of a force that will in no way be influenced by Arab pressure. . . . A voluntary agreement is unattainable. . . . We must either suspend our settlement efforts or continue them without paying attention to the mood of the natives. Settlement can thus develop under the protection of a force that is not dependent on the local population, behind an iron wall which they will be powerless to break down."

This was certainly one of the first times the process of *nishul* was explicitly set forth. It was also one of the first formulations that considered the "natives" and their reactions to Zionism. Israeli-British historian Avi Shlaim and US political scientist Ian Lustick argue that DAVID BEN-GURION, Israel's founder, fully adopted the iron wall doctrine, and it became a central tenet of Zionist policy that continues to this day. Although Ben-Gurion entertained notions that the Jewish state could "expand to the whole of Palestine" through negotiations with Transjordan's Emir Abdullah, in the end the iron wall approach diminished the relevance of the Palestinians. It sought to co-opt them within a wider political arrangement struck between the Yishuv and Arab leaders such as Abdullah, thus eliminating them as a factor requir-

ing consideration. In the current political context, in which the iron wall doctrine is often invoked, it is assumed that the Palestinians (Arabs) will be perpetually hostile to the existence of Israel, and that, in the absence of the JORDANIAN OPTION (that is, Jordan receiving all Palestinians), Israel must assert its claim over the entire country by force, only after which the Arabs will finally submit.

How, it might be asked, did a minority of less than 10 percent in the post–World War I years justify the displacement (politically, economically, and geographically, if not physically) of an overwhelming native majority? Kolatt makes the crucial observation that, for the Zionists, Palestine belonged to two unequal peoples: the worldwide Jewish people of 14 million, who are the country's "true" natives in the process of returning to reclaim the land, and a Palestinian population of 600,000, generally cast as recent immigrants from other Arab countries and therefore "intruders," with no legitimate counterclaim to the land.

Although characterized and minimized by analysts as mere "riots," the ARAB REVOLT of 1936–1939 finally convinced the Zionists that they were facing a growing nationalist movement that made claims of its own to the country, and to its right of self-determination. At this juncture, the notion of "voluntary transfer" or "resettlement" of displaced Arab peasants gave way to the perceived Zionist need for "compulsory transfer." In June 1938, Ben-Gurion reported to the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL: "I am for compulsory transfer; I don't see anything immoral in it. We have to state the principle of compulsory transfer without insisting on its immediate implementation."

The riots and the 1937 British PEEL COMMISSION, which proposed partition of the country into separate Arab and Jewish states, for the first time galvanized the Yishuv leadership. From this point on, Jewish sovereignty over the entire country became a priority superseding any attempts to reconcile the conflict with the Palestinians. It might be more appropriate to characterize the Yishuv's approach to the Palestinians as pragmatic rather than ideological. It was not directed against Arabs, because Arabs or Palestinians did not fit into the Zionist weltanschauung except practically. Ben-Gurion and the others believed that one day the iron wall and Jewish IMMIGRATION would lead the Arabs to accept the Zionist presence and, if not, that the Zionists would have the power to enact a transfer, if necessary. The issue was a purely technical one, as it is today. Witness this statement of Ben-Gurion: "If we have to use force we shall use it without hesitation—but only if we have no choice. We do not want and do not need to expel Arabs and take their places. Our whole desire is based on the assumption—which has been corroborated in the course of all our activity in the country—that there is enough room for us and the Arabs in the country and that if we have to use force—not in order to dispossess the Arabs from the Negev or Transjordan but in order to assure ourselves of the right, which is our due to settle there—then we have the force."

In comments about Ben-Gurion, his official biographer, Shabtai Teveth, writes: "Prior to 1928–1929, we find no evidence that Ben-Gurion intended to dispossess and to ethnically cleanse the Palestinian people. . . . [Dispossession was conceived as] a Zionist rather than an Arab question, posed to Zionists who were perplexed about how they could fulfill their aspirations in a land already inhabited by a Palestinian Arab majority." When, in 1942, the Zionist movement formally adopted the BILTMORE PROGRAM, it asserted that "Palestine be constituted as a Jewish Commonwealth." The Palestinians were not mentioned. Instead, the problem of establishing a democratic Jewish state in a country where the Jews made up only a third of the population was presented solely as a practical demographic issue.

Exodus after the War (1948). By the end of World War II, faced with what it considered an anti-Zionist shift in British policy, the Yishuv leaders agreed to consider once again the idea of partition, which had been rejected in the Biltmore Program. The need to establish a Jewish state as soon as possible was seen as paramount. The 1948 War—for Israel the war of independence and for Palestinians the *Nakba* (catastrophe)—witnessed displacement as a conscious and active form of what today would be called "ethnic cleansing" (from the point of view of one group driving out or displacing another, not in terms of massive killing as in Bosnia or Rwanda). Research of recent years clearly shows that plans for transfer of Palestinians were prepared even before the war. The TRANSFER COMMITTEE, constituted in the spring of 1948 under the direction of YOSEF WEITZ, drew up plans for every phase of such a process. Even if the suddenness and scale of the Palestinian exodus initially surprised the Zionist leaders, by the second half of the war, the Israeli

military actively and intentionally caused, encouraged, and facilitated the exodus.

"From April 1948, Ben-Gurion is projecting a message of transfer," states an Israeli historian of that war, Benny Morris, in an interview in the *Guardian*. Although there was no explicit order or policy, "there is an atmosphere of [population] transfer. . . . The entire leadership understands that this is the idea. The officer corps understands what is required of them. Under Ben-Gurion, a consensus of transfer is created." When the interviewer asks if Ben-Gurion was a "transferist," Morris assents. "If he had not done what he did, a state would not have come into being. That has to be clear. It is impossible to evade it. Without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen here." As for the term "cleanse," Morris said he found it in the 1948 documents he researched. "I know it doesn't sound nice but that was the term they used at the time."

The Israeli historian Ilan Pappé sums it up as follows: "If the Palestinians weren't happy with the Zionist idea of partition, it was time for unilateral action. The Jewish leadership turned to its May 1947 map, showing clearly which parts of Palestine were coveted as the future Jewish state. The problem was that within the desired 80 percent, the Jews were a distinct minority (660,000 Jews versus 1 million Palestinians). But the leaders of the *Yishuv* had foreseen this difficulty at the outset of the Zionist project in Palestine. The solution as they saw it was the enforced transfer of the indigenous population, so that a pure Jewish state could be established. On 10 March 1948 the Zionist leadership adopted the infamous DALET [PLAN], which resulted in the ethnic cleansing of the areas regarded as the future Jewish state in Palestine."

Preparations were also made for consolidating the gains that the exodus created, including preventing the refugees' return. In the course of the 1948 War, the process of erasing the collective Palestinian presence from the country began. Entire villages were systematically demolished—not during the fighting, but after their residents had left. Eventually, by the 1960s, some 418 villages had been destroyed—two-thirds of the villages of Palestine.

Consolidation of Nishul (1948–1966). At partition, when the UNITED NATIONS passed UN RESOLUTION 181 (29 November 1947), Jews owned 7 percent of the land of Palestine but were allocated a full 56 percent. After the 1948 War, Israel controlled 78 percent of the country (of the other 22 percent, the WEST BANK was formally annexed by JORDAN in 1950, and the GAZA STRIP came under Egyptian administration). To consolidate its gains, Israel immediately instituted a legal system to expropriate vast tracts of land from its Palestinian population—external refugees, internal refugees, and in situ residents alike. The late Israeli social historian Baruch Kimmerling sets out four stages whereby Israel confiscated Palestinian land within Israel from its Palestinian owners. This process is implemented within Israel today and is currently being applied in adapted forms to the Occupied Territories.

Stage 1: Israel Claims Sovereignty. The Israeli parliament passed the ABANDONED AREAS ORDINANCE section 1(A) in 1948, which defines "abandoned territory" as "any area captured by the armed forces or surrendered to them or land abandoned by all or some of its inhabitants." This definition allows land to be declared "abandoned" whether or not its residents have left it; it can then be appropriated by the state.

Stage 2: Creating "Present Absentees." The Provisional Council of the State (1948) created a "CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY." The ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW (1950) defines an "absentee" as an owner of a property in 1947–1948 who was a national or a citizen of LEBANON, Syria, Transjordan (which became Jordan after 1950), IRAQ, Egypt, SAUDI ARABIA, or Yemen; who was in any of these places or in parts of Palestine outside of Israel (West Bank/Gaza and East JERUSALEM) in 1947–1948; or who was a Palestinian citizen who left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine for somewhere else before September 1948 or for "a place in Palestine held at the time by forces, which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its establishment." This definition includes almost all Palestinians, including Israeli citizens, who left their homes during the war, as most did, even to go to a neighboring village. Thus were created the internal refugees—the "internally displaced" or "PRESENT ABSENTEES."

Palestinians were also removed from their land by other means. The DEFENSE EMERGENCY REGULATIONS (1945) empowered military commanders to declare certain areas as CLOSED MILITARY ZONES, for which entrance to or exit from was prohibited. Thirteen Palestinian villages and their lands were declared closed areas, and the

policy of restricting Palestinians from their lands was reinforced by the CURFEW of the 1948–1966 military administration that ruled the Palestinians.

Actual evacuation of populations was made possible by several military orders, such as Regulation 8(A) of the Emergency Regulations, Security Areas (1949), which reads: "An authorized source may command a permanent resident of a security area to leave the area." Most regions of the upper and eastern Galilee, as well as a ten-kilometer strip along the border with Jordan, were declared "security areas," as were sections of the Negev. This allowed the expulsion of the residents of the Palestinian villages of Ikrit and Baram, for example, as well as BEDOUIN groups (such as the Jahalin tribe) from the Negev. This was reinforced by the Law of Land Acquisition in Time of Emergency of 1948, which empowered Israeli authorities to issue a land acquisition order in cases deemed "necessary for the defense of the state and public security."

Extralegal means of expulsion were also employed from 1949 to 1959. Whole communities were expelled, including Mag'dal, now Ashkelon, to the Gaza Strip in 1950, and the Jahalin Bedouin from the Negev to Lod and subsequently to Jordan (the West Bank). These were presented by Israel as voluntary evacuations, although the circumstances were murky. By the time Mag'dal was captured by Israeli forces in Operation Yoav on 4 November 1948, for example, it had dwindled from a substantial town of about 11,000 Arab residents to just 1,000. Israeli general YIGAL ALLON ordered their expulsion, but the local commanders did not carry it out. During the next year or so, the Arabs were held in a confined area while a secret debate took place about their fate. Some, such as General MOSHE DAYAN and Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, wanted them expelled, while others, such as the left-wing minority party MAPAM, wanted them to remain. The government finally decided that the Arabs should be expelled, but not without their consent, a concession probably due to growing international pressure; however, inducements to leave included harassment and nighttime raids. Eventually most of the Arabs agreed to leave "voluntarily," though it was alleged that many never gave their consent. After the majority were taken on trucks to the Gaza Strip, only twenty Arab families remained by October 1950, most of whom later moved to LYDDA or Gaza.

Stage 3: Israel Takes Ownership. A number of legal means were instituted in the early years of the state to expropriate Palestinian lands and hand them over to Israeli owners. The Emergency Regulations for the Cultivation of Fallow Lands (1948) empowered the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture to seize lands not (or under-) cultivated to ensure their cultivation. When used together with the Security Areas Regulations and the Regulations on Closed Areas, both of which prevented Palestinians from reaching their fields, these laws proved an effective means of confiscation.

In 1950 the DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, which later became the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION, was created with the goal of acquiring supposedly abandoned Arab territories and lands and developing them. This was in line with the policy of not allowing Palestinian refugees or present absentees to return to their land. Although compensation was offered for lands (at 1950 rates, well below later market prices), most Palestinian owners refused it, because taking compensation would validate the loss of their lands and signal their relinquishing them. Many owners also had no authority to sell what were collectively owned lands or could not agree to do so without other family members. Regulations issued in 1953 allowed the state to expropriate the lands of 250 abandoned Arab villages and individual parcels of land belonging to absentees, equaling 1.5 million dunums (375,000 acres).

Stage 4: De-Arabization. In general, Palestinians' ownership of land or even their territorial presence was perceived as a threat to Israeli sovereignty and the Jewish character of the state. Therefore, the land had to be "nationalized." After the 1948 War, Israel consisted of 20 million dunums (5 million acres), or 72 percent of Palestine. However, the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND owned only about 1 million dunums (250,000 acres), while Palestinians owned 5 million dunums (25 percent of the land in Israel, mainly in the Galilee). The Law of Absentee Property allowed the acquisition of millions more, so that by 1962, 92.6 percent of the land belonged either to the state (15,205,000 dunums, or 3,800,000 acres) or to the Jewish National Fund (3,570,000 dunums, or 893,000 acres). Palestinian ownership was down to 7.3 percent (1,480,000 dunums, or 370,000 acres).

By the time the process of physical displacement was largely completed within Israel proper, Jews had sovereignty over the entire country and

actual control of almost 93 percent of the land. Now 70 percent of the Palestinians were refugees beyond Israel's BORDERS, and, of those that remained, some 40 percent were internal refugees who had been separated from their lands. Yet Israeli governments still felt their hold over the country was tenuous, and the process of *nishul* continued. By the early 1960s for example, only 8 percent of the population of the Galilee were Jews (10,000 of 120,000 people). This led the government to develop a policy of Judaizing the Galilee. Thousands of acres of Palestinian-owned land were expropriated for the building of Carmiel, Upper Nazareth (NATZERAT ILLIT), and other development towns. When the Jewish population still did not reach a critical point of domination, dozens of OUTPOSTS (community settlements) were established on hilltops to ensure territorial control even with limited Jewish populations. Other policies of *nishul* were developed for the center of the country, and especially for the Negev.

At the same time, legislation was strengthened (such as the BASIC LAW: "Israel Lands," 1960) to prevent lands or houses built on either STATE LANDS or lands controlled by ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS from being sold, leased, or rented to Palestinian citizens of Israel. This ploy, subcontracting state authority over land to nonstate yet national institutions such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund, allows Israel to formally maintain its promise to "ensure social and political rights to all its inhabitants" while unofficially institutionalizing discrimination. Wherever possible—as in the current construction of the massive Trans-Israel Highway, which has the partial rationale of Judaizing the Galilee—maximum amounts of Arab land are expropriated. As a result, Palestinian ownership (formal or customary) was reduced from 93 percent in prewar 1948 to 25 percent immediately after the war to just 4 percent today.

Simultaneous with removing Palestinians from their land and title to their land, the process of *nishul* involved a thorough Judaizing of the landscape. The Israeli historian Meron Benvenisti, in *Sacred Landscape*, describes in detail the process of creating a Hebrew map of the country. The replacement of Arab place-names by Jewish ones had already begun in the 1920s when the Jewish National Fund set up a committee to determine Jewish names for all new settlements and their environs. Jews working for the British during the Mandatory period, either as employees of the survey department or within the British army, lobbied hard for Hebrew designations of sites, and when that failed they produced their own Hebrew maps, which proved invaluable to the Jewish underground military organization HAGANA in the 1948 War. With the establishment of the state, the Hebrew map became official, but there were still too many Arabic names for comfort. When Ben-Gurion convened the Committee for the Designation of Place-Names in the Negev Region in July 1949, he wrote: "We are obliged to remove the Arabic names for reasons of state. Just as we do not recognize the Arabs' political proprietorship of the land, so also do we not recognize their spiritual proprietorship and their names."

Occupation and Colonization (1967–Present). In the 1967 War, another 250,000 to 300,000 Palestinians were physically displaced or transferred from the Occupied Territories. Israeli forces destroyed the villages of 'Imwas, Yalu, and Bayt Nuba, located in the "no-man's-land" of Latrun, and expelled their 5,000 inhabitants. So, too, in the Mughrabi neighborhood in Jerusalem, Israel demolished 135 homes to create a large plaza in front of the WESTERN WALL. Since then, displacement in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza (the last slightly modified by ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005) has taken three main forms:

1. *Expansion of settlements.* The process of displacement, including the denial of national rights of self-determination within Palestine, was to be halted and partially compensated by the TWO-STATE SOLUTION enshrined in UN RESOLUTION 242 and, most recently, in the US-sponsored ROAD MAP peace initiative. The territory envisioned for the future Palestinian state (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza) constitutes only 22 percent of historic Palestine, yet successive Israeli governments have endeavored to incorporate large swaths of that territory into Israel proper. These efforts include policies of land expropriation, settlement activity, and a growing INFRASTRUCTURE of ROADS that intersect with the Israeli highways, making a coherent Palestinian state impossible.

   This policy of creating facts on the ground has resulted in massive expropriation of Palestinian land, part of a systematic campaign designed to confine Palestinians to small,

disconnected enclaves while expanding Israel's SETTLEMENTS. Since 1967, Israel has expropriated Palestinian land for Israeli-only highways and bypass roads, military installations, nature reserves, and infrastructure; it has "frozen" Palestinian construction in some 24 percent of the West Bank and 89 percent of Arab East Jerusalem, thus creating space for Israeli settlements. More than 150 settlements have been constructed in the Occupied Territories, containing some 450,000 Israelis (220,000 in the West Bank and 225,000 in East Jerusalem), according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. The settlements, the infrastructure serving them, and the security system necessary to protect them have carved the Occupied Territories into some seventy Jewish enclaves that, under Prime Minister EHUD BARAK, were consolidated into seven settlement blocs that ensure Israeli control over any Palestinian entity.

In Jerusalem, the Israeli government and the municipality are quietly creating facts on the ground to Judaize the city and rule out any future division. Both are aware that East Jerusalem will not be able to function as the capital of Palestine, a goal of Palestinians, when a belt of settlements encircles it and settlers have taken possession of sites that are holy to Islam. The SETTLER GROUPS operating in East Jerusalem—ELAD, ATERET COHANIM, ATARA L'YOSHNA, BEIT OROT, and SHIMON HA'TZADIK—focus their activities primarily on the OLD CITY area: SILWAN (which they have renamed Ir David, the City of David) and Palestinian neighborhoods surrounding the Old City from Wadi Kadum in the south to SHAYKH JARRAH in the north. Further afield, the Israeli government has initiated the annexation of the GIV'AT ZE'EV, MA'ALE ADUMIM, and Etzion settlement blocs into a metropolitan Israeli Jerusalem controlling the entire central portion of the West Bank and stunting the urban growth of the Palestinian areas of the city.

The effect of the settlement enterprise is to preclude the establishment of a viable Palestinian state and effectively institutionalize an apartheid system of an expanded Israel controlling a dependent and truncated Palestinian state. Israeli government terminology phrases this process in the century-old Zionist notion of "separation," which finds its ultimate and decisive expression in the construction of the Barrier, or separation wall, intended to demarcate the borders of the expanded Israel and permanently determine the extent of the cantons that Israel will reserve for the Palestinians.

2. *Military measures inducing displacement.* Although Israel presents its rule over the Occupied Territories as one of CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION, it is nevertheless defined by its military presence and by the imposition of a military government empowered to rule by some 2,000 military orders. Military Order 59 (1967), for example, grants the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property the authority to declare uncultivated, unregistered land as Israeli state land. Since Israel refuses to recognize Ottoman- or British-era land deeds and Military Order 291 (1968) stopped the process of land registration, Israel was able to classify a full 72 percent of the West Bank as state lands, making expropriation from their Palestinian owners an easy administrative matter. To take one more example from among many, Military Order 393 (1970) grants any military commander in Judea and Samaria (that is, the West Bank) the authority to prohibit Palestinian construction, if he believes it necessary for the security of the Israeli army or to ensure public order. By effectively curbing the development of Arab communities, preventing the construction of homes, and alienating land from its Palestinian owners, many Palestinians (from the middle class in particular) are forced to leave the country to seek a normal life. Another military policy, imposed since the early 1990s (1988 in Gaza), is an increasingly tight CLOSURE that limits internal movement and trade within the Occupied Territories, severely hampers export of commercial products, and locks Palestinian workers out of the Israeli economy. It has also had disastrous consequences for the ECONOMY and society, contributing measurably to the flight of the Palestinian middle class. Add to this the effect of outright and repeated Israeli military attacks on Palestinian population centers (from 2000 to 2008, some 6,816 Palestinians were killed, of whom some 60 to 70 percent were civilians) with massive damage to homes, public institutions, and infrastructure.
3. *Administrative measures inducing emigration.* ZONING LAWS and planning policies subtly obstruct the natural development of Palestinian towns and villages and ultimately induce emigration, hiding Israel's political agenda behind a facade of technical maps, neutral professional jargon, and administrative procedures. Two

British Mandate planning documents—the Jerusalem Regional Planning Scheme RJ5 (1942) and Samaria Regional Planning Scheme RS15 (1945)—have been adopted as the basis of Israeli planning for Palestinian communities, which has the effect of freezing Palestinian development in Jerusalem and the West Bank as it was in the 1940s. RS15, for example, zones the entire West Bank as agricultural land, thus giving the Israeli authorities a "legal" basis for denying Palestinians building permits and demolishing illegal homes (12,000 homes since 1967).

In Jerusalem, the municipality, together with the Israeli Ministry of Interior, also employs planning and zoning, backed by an aggressive policy of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS to severely restrict Palestinian construction and, ultimately, maintain a 72 percent majority of Jews over Arabs. By constricting Palestinian housing construction, the municipality has created an artificial shortage of some 25,000 housing units in the Palestinian sector of the city, thereby raising significantly the cost of scarce shelter. Because 70 percent of Palestinians residing in Jerusalem live below the poverty line, they are forced to find affordable housing outside the city borders. Once they have shifted their "center of life" from Jerusalem, the Interior Ministry revokes their Jerusalem residency, turning them into West Bank residents (if they have not left the country altogether), thus bolstering the Jewish majority.

These, plus a variety of other administrative measures to further emigration and displacement, including the revoking of residency rights of Palestinians who have spent various periods of time studying or working outside of the country, have been called by the Israeli human rights group B'TSELEM Israel's policy of "quiet deportation." They accompany outright acts of exile and deportation, which have been denounced in several UN resolutions, as well as continued talk of transfer that has become an acceptable part of Israeli political discourse. Targeted in particular are the educated middle classes, whose departure would greatly weaken Palestinian society—a form of selective transfer.

Completion of the Nishul *System*

First Attempt: The Oslo Process (1993–2000). Although the OSLO PROCESS appeared to be a breakthrough in Israel's opposition to Palestinian self-determination, in fact it represented a continuation of the process of *nishul*, seeking to formalize Israel's control of the entire country while holding out (though not formally) the possibility of a Palestinian mini-state. Indeed, the Oslo Process did not recognize the Palestinians as a nation with legitimate claims to the land and the collective right of self-determination. On the contrary, in the Oslo Accords, Israel merely recognized the PLO as its negotiating partner. Even as Israel doubled its settler population during the seven years of negotiations and initiated the construction of twenty-nine major highways to link the settlements to Israel proper, it confined more than 90 percent of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories to about seventy disconnected enclaves (Areas A and B), which have since become permanent cantons. One could argue that, by the end of the Oslo Process in early 2001, the process of *nishul* had been essentially completed, with Israel firmly in control of the entire country—90 percent of it in its hands and the prospect of a viable Palestinian state virtually eliminated.

Second Attempt: Policy of Unilateral Separation (2001–Present). ARIEL SHARON's rise to power and the creation of a broad national unity government with the LABOR PARTY heralded a new and final phase, Israeli policymakers hope, in the century-old process of displacement. First, the prime minister moved quickly to consolidate the matrix of control and those facts on the ground that might conceivably be reversed. Sharon adopted Barak's METROPOLITAN JERUSALEM PLAN, that is, one including East Jerusalem, and the annexation of seven settlement blocs in the West Bank, and induced the GEORGE W. BUSH administration to formally recognize them, in April 2004, as parts of Israel, which was approved almost unanimously by the UNITED STATES Congress.

Sharon then adopted the concept of separation as a means by which the displacement and containment of the Palestinians could be achieved. "The day he was elected prime minister," relates Arnon Sofer, a professor of geography at Haifa University and the self-proclaimed intellectual progenitor of the separation policy, "Sharon asked me to bring him a [disengagement] map I published in 2001. . . . Look, these demographics are facts. The world is going insane. Islam is going wild. There is going to be a clash of civilizations. In the Middle East, there is going to be the highest Arab birth rate in the world. There cannot be peace. . . . This is why I keep saying that in order to save the State of Israel we will have to separate unilaterally, and as quickly as possible. . . . Unilateral separation does not

guarantee 'peace'—it guarantees a Zionist-Jewish state with an overwhelming majority of Jews."

The Sharon government sought to unilaterally expand Israel to encompass those settlement blocs (including a Metropolitan Jerusalem) included within the Barrier, a policy pursued by his successors EHUD OLMERT and BENJAMIN NETANYAHU. In Sharon's and Olmert's conception, this would create a truncated Palestinian mini-state on 10–15 percent of the country that conforms to his declared plan of "cantonization," and the process of *nishul* would then be complete. Israel as a Jewish state would formally possess about 85 percent of the country west of the Jordan and all its resources and borders, and render any meaningful return of Palestinian refugees to the country infeasible. (Netanyahu, for whom even a truncated Palestinian BANTUSTAN is too great a concession, has not yet indicated whether he will seek a Bantustan defined by the separation Barrier and the settlement blocs or merely an indefinite prolonging of the status quo.)

As concern over the country's dwindling Jewish majority rises (recent census figures indicate that the Palestinians now constitute a majority in the area west of the Jordan River), overt public discussion about transferring the Palestinians out of the Occupied Territories—and even out of Israel proper—has become increasingly common in the MEDIA, the Knesset, and public forums. According to a poll conducted in 2005 by the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, a security-oriented think tank affiliated with Tel Aviv University, 46 percent of Israel's Jewish citizens favor transferring Palestinians out of the Occupied Territories, while 31 percent favor transferring Israeli Arabs out of the country; 60 percent of respondents said they were in favor of encouraging Israeli Arabs to leave the country.

See also ANTI-ZIONISM; DEPORTATION; FAMILY REUNIFICATION; OCCUPATION; OTTOMAN EMPIRE PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; SETTLERS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM; WAR, 1948

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—Jeff Halper

Transfer Committee, 1948

In May 1948, a Transfer Committee was established by non–Cabinet members of the first government of Israel to determine the feasibility of expelling the Palestinian population. YOSEF WEITZ, representing the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, was the moving force behind it with the approval of Foreign Minister MOSHE SHARETT. Besides Weitz, the committee consisted of Eliyahu Sasson, who headed the Arab Affairs Department at the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, and Ezra Danin, representing the Israeli War Cabinet. The committee, especially Weitz, had open-door access to Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION, the rest of the Israeli Cabinet, and local HAGANA (the military organization) officials in the field, which enabled it to become effective in achieving its goals.

The Transfer Committee came into being as the result of a letter Danin wrote to Weitz, in May 1948, suggesting a committee to seek ways to carry out transfer of the Arab population at this opportunity when it had left its normal place of residence. "Let us not waste the fact that a large Arab population has moved from its home, and achieving such a thing again would be *very* difficult in *normal* times. . . . [I]f we do not seek to discourage the return of the Arabs . . . then they must be confronted with *faits accomplis*." Among the faits accomplis he proposed were the destruction of Palestinians' houses, "settling Jews in all areas evacuated," and expropriating Palestinian properties.

On 28 May 1948, Weitz met with Sharett (who had played a role in the 1937 Transfer Committee set up by the Jewish Agency) and inquired whether "action should be taken to turn the flight of the Arabs from the country and blocking their return into an established fact." If so, he proposed to entrust two or three persons "to deal with this according to a premeditated plan." He also suggested that a three-person committee, composed of Danin, Sasson, and himself, be appointed to "work out a plan of action directed [at achieving] the transfer goal." Sharett congratulated Weitz on his initiative and declared that he, too, believed that these "phenomena [Palestinian flight] must be exploited and turned into an established fact."

Two days later, Weitz noted in his diary, "From now on, I shall call it the Transfer Committee. It seems that Sharett took measures approving the appointment of this committee the day before yesterday [on 28 May] in talks with secretaries. In the evening I discussed this question [population transfer] with [Eliezer] Kaplan [finance minister] and he also thinks that the transfer fact should be consolidated and the departing Arabs not allowed to return." On 5 June 1948,

Weitz met Ben-Gurion in Tel Aviv and gave him the blueprint of the Transfer Committee, titled "Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Problem in the State of Israel." The document, contained in a three-page memorandum signed by Weitz, Danin, and Sasson, called for the following:

- "Retroactive transfer"
- Preventing Palestinian Arabs from returning to their homes
- Destroying Palestinian Arab villages during military operations
- Preventing cultivation and harvesting of Palestinian Arab lands
- Settling Jews in Palestinian Arab towns and villages
- Instituting legislation to bar the return of the REFUGEES
- Launching a propaganda campaign for the resettlement of the refugees in other places

According to Weitz, Ben-Gurion "agreed to the whole [transfer policy] line, but thought that the first priority should be destruction of the Palestinian villages, establishment of Jewish settlements and prevention of Palestinian cultivation and only later worry for the organized resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries." In early May 1948, Ben-Gurion gave his approval to the committee to oversee "the cleaning up [*nikui* in Hebrew] of the Arab settlements, cultivation of [Arab] fields and their settlement [by Jews], and the creation of a labor battalion to carry out this work."

Although the Israeli Cabinet had not yet given its approval of the Transfer Proposals, the committee supervised the systematic destruction of villages in various sectors as part of a policy designed to further Palestinian exodus and impede the return of the refugees. The actual destruction was the joint effort of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and the Jewish settlements. Israeli historian Benny Morris described the influence that Weitz and the Transfer Committee had on the Israeli Cabinet and the implementation of its goals: "At this stage [early June] Weitz was not to be deterred by the lack of formal, written permit for his [Transfer Committee's] activities. . . . [He talked] with Danin about how to go about destroying the abandoned villages—where would the money come from, the tractors, the dynamite, the manpower? And where was it best to begin? . . . With most able-bodied men conscripted into the Israeli Defense Forces, with most equipment, such as tractors and tracked caterpillars, in use by the army or in agriculture, and with dynamite in perennially short supply, Weitz had a job of it organizing what amounted to an enormous project of destruction."

There is no doubt that Ben-Gurion agreed to Weitz's blueprint. Eliezer Kaplan said as much to Weitz when they met on 8 June, adding his own endorsement of the plan. On 13 June, Weitz traveled north to Bet She'an and the Jezreel Valley, where he saw "[o]ur people . . . reaping in the fields of [the Arab village] Zar'in," as he recorded in his diary. In KIBBUTZ Bet ha-Shita, Weitz met David Baum from Kfar Yehezkeel and Avraham Yoffe, the commander of the IDF's Golani Brigade battalion in the Jezreel Valley. "From the start of our talk," Weitz recorded, "it became clear that there is agreement among us on the question of the abandoned villages: destruction, renovation, and settlement [by Jews]." On 16 June 1948, Weitz gave Ben-Gurion a progress report on the destruction of the Palestinian towns: "Maghar, Fajja, Biyar Adas have been destroyed. [Destruction is proceeding in] Miska, Beit Dajan (east of Tel Aviv), [in] Hula, [in] Hawassa near HAIFA, in Sumeiriya near ACRE and Ja'tun [Khirbat Ja'tun] near Nahariya, Manshiya . . . near Acre. Daliyat ar Ruha has been destroyed and work is about to begin at Buteimat and Sabbarin."

In late October 1948, as the majority of the Palestinian refugees had been already transferred, the Transfer Committee submitted its final memorandum to the Cabinet, stating: "The Exodus of the Arabs beyond the boundaries of the State of Israel was not from the start an impossible occurrence and its occurrence is not among the surprises that have never been predicted. . . . On the contrary, much had been said about such a possibility, which has come out of planned considerations, in recent years, as a solution to the problem of the whole Land of Israel." At that point, Israel came under increased UNITED NATIONS and international pressure to allow the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes, farms, and businesses. Sasson wrote to Sharett in September 1948, "I would advise reconsidering the refugee problem. . . . I do not by this advice mean, heaven forbid, the return of all the refugees. No, again no. My meaning is the return of a small part of them, forty to fifty thousand, over a long period . . . [starting] immediately, to silence a lot of people in the next meeting of the UN."

In August 1948 a report reached the leadership of the MAPAM party describing the destruction of the Palestinian villages. The report stated: "The destruction of the Arab villages has been going on for some months now. We [the Transfer Committee] are on the Syrian border and there is a danger that Arabs will use [the abandoned villages] for military operations if they get the chance. But I spoke to a number of members from [Kibbutz] Ma'ayan Baruch and nearby Kibbutzim and I got the impression that there exists the possibility that there is a desire to destroy the villages and houses so that it will be impossible for the Arabs to return to them. A week ago, a representative of the JNF [Jewish National Fund] came to visit. He saw that in the [abandoned Palestinian] village of As Sanbariya, which is a kilometer from Ma'ayan Baruch, several houses are still standing, albeit without roofs. He told the secretariat of the kibbutz to destroy the houses immediately and he said openly that this will enable us to take title to the village's lands, because the Arabs won't be able to return there. . . . [T]he kibbutz agreed immediately."

The committee stopped functioning in October 1948, but, soon after the war's end in 1949, Weitz pleaded with Ben-Gurion to take a firm and unequivocal stand against any possibility of restoring the Palestinian refugees to their homes. In September, he proposed a series of measures that would drive the refugees far from the border areas, deep into the Arab hinterland. He insisted that Palestinian refugees "must be harassed continually." In mid-1949, Weitz recommended that if Israel was to be compelled to repatriate Palestinian refugees in the future, it must categorically refuse to return them to their villages—but only to the towns where they would not exceed 15 percent of the Jewish population.

See also WAR, 1948

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Truman, Harry S (1884–1972)

Harry S Truman was the thirty-third president of the UNITED STATES, serving from 1945, on the death of Franklin Roosevelt, through 1953. When he put the weight of the United States behind the UNITED NATIONS partition plan, without which UN RESOLUTION 181 would not have passed, Truman birthed the new state of Israel and committed the United States to supporting it thereafter.

Truman was born in Lamar, Missouri. When he was six years of age, his parents moved the family to Independence, Missouri, and it was there that Truman spent the bulk of his formative years. After graduating from high school in 1901, Truman worked at a series of clerical jobs before he became a farmer in 1906, an occupation in which he remained for another ten years. He was the last president not to earn a college degree, although he studied for two years toward a law degree at the Kansas City Law School.

With the onset of US participation in World War I, Truman enlisted in the National Guard and was chosen to be an officer, then commanded a regimental battery in France. At the war's conclusion, Truman returned to Independence and, together with his friend Eddie Jacobson, opened a men's clothing store. In 1922, the store went bankrupt, an event for which Truman blamed Republican economic policies; thus he joined the Democratic Party. He and Jacobson remained friends for the rest of their lives, and it was to Jacobson that he often turned for advice on the Zionist issue.

In the 1934 election, Truman ran for Missouri's open Senate seat, campaigning as a New Dealer. Once elected, he supported President Roosevelt on

most issues. During his second term, Truman gained national prominence when his military preparedness committee (popularly known as the Truman Committee) made a scandal of military wastefulness by exposing fraud and mismanagement. His advocacy of commonsense, cost-saving measures for the military gained him wide respect, and he emerged as a popular choice for the vice-presidential slot in 1944. Truman was barely installed as vice president when Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, elevating him to the presidency.

The new president had a plethora of major international problems on his platter, and the question of Palestine was not paramount. Yet by 1947 it had a prominence greater than its objective significance. When, in 1947, Great Britain announced its intention to withdraw from Palestine and turn the issue of partition over to the United Nations, the United States assumed the role of the dominant power in the conflict and was faced with the issue of whether or not to support the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. Truman was deeply committed, on a humanitarian basis, to Jewish refugees' admission to Palestine from Nazi camps. On 29 November 1945, the ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY recommended immediate admission to Palestine of 100,000 European refugees, although it did not recommend partition or formation of a Jewish state. On 30 April, Truman publicly backed the committee's request for 100,000 certificates of IMMIGRATION and called for an end to the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER limitations on Jewish immigration.

In 1947 the United Nations appointed a UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE to investigate the situation and report back to the world body. The committee itself was hopelessly divided, presenting two reports: the majority recommended partition, and the minority opposed it. Truman had not previously supported partition or an independent Jewish state, and, moreover, his closest advisors were seriously divided on the issue. Strong opposition came from the State Department, including Secretary of State George Marshall, Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, John Foster Dulles, and Robert McClintock. Also opposed were the War Department, the Joint Chiefs, the Department of the Navy, and its secretary James Forrestal, among others. All feared that the establishment of a Jewish state in the midst of the Arab world would generate instability, foster communist penetration of the region, and impede US access—especially to the all-important commodity of oil. On the other hand, members of Truman's staff and a number of close personal friends strongly favored partition and convinced the president of its efficacy. These included David K. Niles, Clark Clifford, and Eddie Jacobson, who brought the future president of Israel, CHAIM WEIZMANN, to the White House. In the final analysis, Truman threw the weight of the United States behind the UN Partition Resolution, carrying with it a number of previously undecided countries, and, on 19 November 1947, Resolution 181 legitimized the Zionist project. To a considerable extent, Truman's pro-Zionist outlook was based on humanitarian, moral, and sentimental grounds, many of which were an outgrowth of the president's religious upbringing and his familiarity with the Bible.

Truman did not support the Zionists on all issues—for example, he rejected Israel's request for armaments. Instead, the president, on the advice of the State Department, instituted a formal arms embargo on 5 December 1947 in order to prevent a regional arms race. This position was consistent with the US view that security and stability in the Middle East were essential for Washington to pursue its interests in the area. Despite the formal embargo, Zionists were able to procure large amounts of weapons illegally in the United States and to raise enormous sums of money to purchase arms elsewhere, but not because of Truman's policies. Additionally, President Truman declined to provide US troops to assist the Zionist cause despite the importuning of Moshe Sharett of the Jewish Agency and others. Aside from not wanting to embroil the US military in the Palestine question, there were serious concerns about the United States' having insufficient leverage in Europe if its troops were tied down in Palestine.

Conversely, Truman gave the Zionists a huge boost by providing the new state, on the same day that it declared its independence (14 May 1948), immediate de facto recognition. He also strongly opposed the 11 June 1948 plan devised by Swedish diplomat COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE for a resolution of the conflict. Moreover, at the urging of Weizmann, Truman provided Israel with a $100,000 loan that was crucial to its economic development. He named as ambassador to Israel James G. McDonald, who had been sympathetic to the Zionists when he served on the Anglo-American Committee (and in so doing passed over

the entire career foreign service bureaucracy). Further, Truman worked hard to ensure Israel's admission to the United Nations. Israel's 29 December 1948 application was rejected, but, due to intense US pressure, its second application, on 24 February 1949, was accepted.

It is significant, however, that although Truman backed the partition resolution and the independence of the new Jewish state, he ignored the provision for a Palestinian state. Moreover, despite his deep humanitarian instinct regarding European Jewish refugees, when the 1948 WAR created almost 800,000 Palestinian REFUGEES, he evidenced no interest in their plight. He once told a group of State Department representatives concerned about his policies on Palestine: "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of ZIONISM: I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."

See also SAUDI ARABIA

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Trumpeldor, Joseph (1880–1920)

Joseph Trumpeldor was a soldier and early pioneer-settler in Palestine who dedicated his life to organizing the military defense of the Jewish settlements in Palestine. His life and his death defending Tel Hai settlement made him a legendary hero.

Born in a small town in the northern Caucasus, Trumpeldor was strongly influenced in his youth by the model of collective communal life, which he witnessed at a nearby farming commune established by followers of the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy. In Trumpeldor's mind, the idea of collective living merged with the Zionist ideal of settling Palestine, and he dreamed of establishing agricultural communes in Palestine, which, if necessary, would be defended by armed force. Before he could realize his dreams, he was drafted into the Russian army and lost an arm while fighting in the Russo-Japanese war. In 1912, he immigrated to Palestine and worked for a while at KIBBUTZ Degania, participating in the defense of the Jewish settlements in the lower Galilee. When World War I broke out, he was deported to EGYPT after he refused to join the Turkish army. In Alexandria, he called for the formation of a legion of volunteers drawn from the Jewish deportees to be at the disposal of the British and help liberate the country from the Turks.

The British granted him permission, and in 1915 he founded the ZION MULE CORPS and saw action in Gallipoli, where he was shot in the shoulder. From 1915 to 1919, Trumpeldor traveled widely, spending time in England and Russia, promoting the organization of Jewish regiments, which would fight the Ottomans, and Jewish paramilitary units, which would protect the settlements in Palestine. In Russia, in particular, he was active

in the organization of the He-Halutz movement, whose aim was the training of young Jews for settling in Palestine.

In 1919 he returned to Palestine, and in January 1920 he was called to the northern Galilee to help organize the defense of the settlements there, which had come under increasing Arab attacks. On 1 March, he was mortally wounded while participating in the defense of Tel Hai; his dying words were "*Ein davar, tov lamut be'ad arzenu"* ("Never mind; it is worthwhile to die for the country"). Trumpeldor was buried near Tel Hai, and in 1934 a memorial was erected at his gravesite. Shortly after his death, a new settlement at the foot of Mount Gilboa was named Tel Yosef in his honor, and songs, poems, and stories were written about him as a hero of the Jewish settlement of Palestine. His life story served as an inspirational model to both the pioneering socialist youth movements and the right-wing youth groups. One of the largest and most successful of the latter was named in his honor: BETAR, an abbreviation of Berit Trumpeldor.

See also OTTOMAN EMPIRE; ZIONISM

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Tsemel, Lea (1945–)

Lea Tsemel, a pioneer in the practice of human rights law, is a Jewish Israeli lawyer who defends Palestinians in the Israeli judicial system, especially before the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT. One of her colleagues, sharing a podium with Tsemel, called her "the valiant lawyer who defends Palestinian PRISONERS and the REFUSENIKS, who represent the conscience of Israel."

Born in HAIFA to Jewish immigrant parents—her father from Poland and her mother from Russia—she grew up with a comfortable life style, which she later described as "typically middle class," in a neighborhood full of Jews who came from different places. During her formative years, Tsemel was strongly socialized, both at home and at school, in the ideology of ZIONISM. She was taught that Zionist ideals and the Israeli state were the best in the world, while the Palestinians, whose defense was to become her life's work, were invisible. In 1963 Tsemel joined the Israeli army, as obligated, but did not enjoy the experience and was discharged honorably after one year of service (rather than the usual two). It was during her military service that Tsemel began to study law at night at Tel Aviv University. Her interest in the law stemmed from her desire to pursue social justice: "I had such a strong feeling that injustice was intolerable that I had to do something about it." After her discharge, she moved to JERUSALEM and continued her law studies full-time at the Hebrew University.

During the 1967 WAR between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Tsemel was a volunteer fighter near the BORDER in Jerusalem. When the war was over, Tsemel was one of the first Israelis to visit the OLD CITY and the first Israeli woman to see the WESTERN WALL. In appreciation of the volunteers' service, the army took them on a victory tour, and it was on this excursion that Tsemel witnessed several events that affected her tremendously and drew her attention to the Palestinian cause. The first incident took place in a BETHLEHEM cinema where soldiers and Israeli civilians were celebrating raucously. In the middle of this triumphant jubilee, twenty Palestinian notables were brought in by the Israeli army to share in the festivities with the soldiers and Israeli civilians. Tsemel recalls that her first reaction was to feel sorry for them, but that this emotion was quickly displaced by a feeling of utter shame as the victors humiliated the Palestinians. She realized that there could never be peace between Israel and the Palestinians "because this great victory for us was a complete disaster for them."

Her second disturbing experience on the victory tour took place on the road to JERICHO where she saw a whole new generation of REFUGEES carrying their belongings and fleeing the Israeli OCCUPATION. Tsemel recalls, "I couldn't bear it. It was directly a picture of the Jews in Europe and it was clear that they were being forced to leave. The feeling in me was horrible." She also witnessed the Israeli army's destruction of a Palestinian neighborhood (the Moroccan Quarter) near the Wailing Wall and learned of an incident at the Damia Bridge where Palestinians were trying to swim across the Jordan River to return to their homes, and the Israeli army opened fire on the defenseless population. A final episode, shortly after the war, involved the destruction of three villages in the Latrun area near RAMLA. "So I was shocked,

really, really shocked. I couldn't believe that we were doing these things."

At the Hebrew University after the war, Tsemel took an interest in politics and joined a radical movement, MATZPEN, whose main tenets were ANTI-ZIONISM and socialism. The organization was active throughout Israel—demonstrating, giving speeches, issuing pamphlets, and engaging in other forms of political activity. "But we were extremely isolated in Israeli society. We faced incredible opposition. I knew I was not accepted—people would see me and call me a traitor." Soon, Tsemel's views became widely known, and when she finished her formal studies in 1968, she had a hard time finding a lawyer who would accept her for the required two-year practicum. Eventually, she did locate someone to supervise her practicum, and she completed her legal apprenticeship. In 1970 she took her law exams, after having also obtained a certificate in criminal law from the Hebrew University. Her first case as a lawyer was defending the Black Panthers (underprivileged MIZRAHI/SEPHARDIC Jews) who were mobilizing and demonstrating for equal treatment in Israeli society. In 1972, she defended a Jewish-Palestinian network that belonged to an organization the state had declared illegal. Some had gone to SYRIA for training, and one of the Jews had given the Syrians some sensitive information. Tsemel defended them all the way to the Supreme Court, and the case was a turning point for the young lawyer, who met many Palestinian political prisoners in the military and civil courts. Thereafter, she dedicated her life to these prisoners and became the only Jewish lawyer, besides FELICIA LANGER in Israel, who fought for the Palestinians.

As a human rights lawyer, she has focused on cases of torture, FAMILY REUNIFICATION, DEPORTATION, HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, compensation for the deaths and injuries of Palestinian civilians uninvolved in political activity, and ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION. Tsemel worked with Belgian attorney Luc Waulleyn, one of three lawyers representing twenty-three survivors of the 1982 SABRA AND SHATILA MASSACRE in LEBANON, in their case against ARIEL SHARON. Tsemel believes that the lawsuit's importance is primarily in "the message it sends to soldiers, army officers, and members of the other security organizations. They have to understand that there are legal aspects to every action they take against the Palestinian population. A day will come when the people they uproot from their homes, the people they torture, will require legal aid from international courts."

Tsemel's tireless work on behalf of Palestinians, though deeply appreciated by the thousands she has helped, has not been, in her own mind, successful: "My parents left Europe just before the HOLOCAUST and they lost most of their family members in it. They came to that part of the world, which today is called Israel, and used to be called Palestine, to promise me a better life and the security of a state of our own. After almost 60 years I cannot say that they succeeded; on the contrary. It seems that my parents and others who wanted to build the state of Israel did not understand that it is impossible to build a new future on the relics of oppression. I've been defending Palestinians in Israeli courts for some 30 years and despite my efforts I have still not succeeded in making judges, whether in military tribunals or the Supreme Court of Justice, understand this basic truth. The situation deteriorates and last year, as in all of the past 25 years, I took two or three steps backwards for every one forwards."

See also ISRAELI MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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Tunis: The Tunisian Interlude

When Israel invaded LEBANON in 1982, the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) was expelled. In response, Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba invited the PLO to set up headquarters in Borj Cedria near Tunis, and the PLO leadership decamped to Tunis (most of the lower-level soldiers were sent to a variety of countries). The leadership remained in Tunis until 1994 when, under the OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel, they came to the GAZA STRIP. Tunis was also the headquarters of the ARAB LEAGUE, which had been transferred from Cairo to punish EGYPT for signing a peace agreement with Israel.

The expulsion of the PLO from Beirut marked the start of a long crisis for the Palestinian organization, isolated in North Africa, far from the countries where Palestinians were concentrated, and in dire financial straits. Although the elite lived well, the PLO could neither pay its employees nor help Palestinian REFUGEES. Moreover, after the PLO was forced to Tunis, many Palestinians increasingly questioned PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT's leadership. The more militant PLO factions based in SYRIA and Lebanon gained influence at the expense of the PLO's FATAH party, and Arafat seemed to lose his once-firm grip on Palestinian politics.

On 1 October 1985, allegedly in retaliation for the murder of three Israelis in Cyprus on 25 September, Israel bombarded the PLO's Tunisian beachfront headquarters, destroying almost the entire complex, including Arafat's bureau and the headquarters of FORCE 17, Arafat's security guard. Over sixty Palestinians were killed and another seventy injured; there were no Israeli losses. Arafat miraculously survived.

As the year 1988 opened, Arafat and the PLO were beginning the struggle for control, from Tunis, of the spontaneously ignited INTIFADA in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The PLO saw much potential in the uprising against the OCCUPATION, if only it could harness and direct it. However, on 16 April 1988, Israel's intelligence agency MOSSAD, authorized by Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR, sent a commando team to assassinate Arafat's deputy, KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), who was in charge of attempting to guide the Intifada. His death, in his Tunis home along with his bodyguards, was a significant loss to Arafat personally, to the PLO, and to the Palestinian cause.

By the year's end, worldwide MEDIA coverage of the Intifada had won new international sympathy for the Palestinian cause, support that reached beyond the traditional Arab/Islamic and Soviet blocs. At a PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC, the PLO's legislative body) meeting in Algiers on 12–15 November 1988, Arafat sought to capitalize on this groundswell of support by issuing a DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE for a Palestinian state. The PNC based the Algiers Declaration on UN RESOLUTION 181, the 1947 partition plan that divided BRITISH MANDATE Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. On 14 December 1988, Arafat for the first time told the UNITED NATIONS that the PLO denounced TERRORISM and recognized Israel's *right* to exist. He said the PLO supported the right of all parties to live in peace—Israel included. The UNITED STATES found these statements insufficient for engaging in direct talks, but using prominent American Jews as a back channel for communications, the RONALD REAGAN administration made it known that if Arafat would more explicitly renounce terrorism and more clearly recognize the state of Israel, the United States was prepared to enter into a dialogue with the PLO. In Geneva later that month, Arafat publicly accepted UN RESOLUTIONS 181, 242, AND 338 and "renounced" the use of terrorism. In turn, the United States acknowledged that all its preconditions had been met and opened low-level talks with the PLO in Tunis in December 1988 (which it terminated in June 1990).

Arafat, however, managed to squander these successes within three years by siding with IRAQ in the 1991 GULF WAR. Consequently, the PLO's very existence was at stake when the Israeli-Arab negotiations opened in the MADRID CONFERENCE on 30 October 1991, with the PLO excluded. Only non-PLO Palestinians "from inside" the Occupied Territories were allowed to participate. Arafat told his colleagues that the United States wanted "to humiliate and eliminate [him]," which meant "eliminating the PLO and all of you."

The secret talks leading to the Oslo Accords offered Arafat a way out of this desperate corner. So weakened was the PLO at this juncture that Arafat endorsed a DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, which was a retreat even from the autonomy plans put on the table with the 1979 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. However, as political scientist Yezid Sayigh points out, for Arafat the main thing was that "it extended formal Israeli recognition of the PLO and ensured the transfer of the Tunis state-in-exile to the Occupied Territories." It was the PLO's political survival, then, rather than the substance of the Oslo Accords' Declaration of Principles, that led to Arafat's acquiescence. As time would show, it was a disastrous agreement for the Palestinian cause, but in 1994, Arafat and the PLO leadership were able to leave Tunisia for the soil of their homeland.

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Tuqan, Fadwa (1917–2003)

Fadwa Tuqan is often called the "Poet of Palestine" for her forceful expression of a nation's sense of loss and defiance. MOSHE DAYAN, the Israeli general, is said to have likened reading one of Tuqan's poems to facing twenty enemy commandos. Yet the true power of her words derives not from warlike imagery, but from their affirmation of Palestinian identity and the dream of return.

Born in NABLUS, Palestine, her upbringing was privileged yet strictly circumscribed by social norms. During the 1948 WAR, when thousands of Palestinian Arab REFUGEES poured into Nablus, the town assumed the cultural mantle of the lost cities of JAFFA, HAIFA, and West JERUSALEM. Paradoxically, the Palestinian *Nakba* (catastrophe) and the death of Fadwa's stern father in 1948 engendered a sense of liberation in the poet. Suddenly, young and educated women could mix freely with their male counterparts. "When the roof fell on Palestine, the veil fell off the face of the Nablus woman," she wrote. Tuqan was the younger sister of the poet and playwright IBRAHIM TUQAN, who tutored her in poetry via letters posted from Beirut, where he was lecturing. Imbued with this heady spirit, Tuqan followed her initial collection, *My Brother Ibrahim* (1946), with new ones: *Alone with the Days* (1952), *Give Us Love* (1960), and *Before the Closed Door* (1967). They trace the evolution of Palestinian political consciousness: from shock, despair, and victimhood to *sumud* (steadfastness), resistance, and renewed pride.

Israel, however, was not her only foe. Another was Arab society itself and, in particular, its treatment of women. In her autobiography, translated as *Mountainous Journey* (1990), she describes how Arab women were hidden in the household like frightened birds in a crowded coop. Resisting those shackles, Tuqan studied at Oxford University during 1962–1964, studying English language and literature. She fell in love with the English countryside and wrote affectionately of the "aged metropolis," London. Tuqan, who never married, traveled widely in Europe and the Middle East, borrowing motifs from her life in exile and mingling them with daring expressions of untrammeled sensuality.

But even poems based on distinctly non-Palestinian subjects—such as "Visions of Henry," inspired by a painting—hark back to her "lost homeland" and reveal the clash between escapism and the "black rock" of memory. After Israel conquered Nablus in 1967, Tuqan's poetry became more overtly nationalistic. OCCUPATION provided new topics—the ordeal of waiting at border crossings, the indignity of HOUSE DEMOLITIONS, and the fervor of the youth uprising. Yet her poems also display recognition of Israelis' bonds to the land, which had previously been absent in Palestinian poetry.

After her poetry was translated into English in the 1980s, Tuqan gained an international audience. While young Arab Americans read her work to rediscover their roots, Israeli and Jewish feminists divined a sympathetic resonance from their sister across the border. Tuqan won poetry prizes from Italy, Greece, and JORDAN; gained the Palestinians' Jerusalem Award for Culture and Art in 1990; and served on the board of trustees for An-Najah University in Nablus. Many Israelis, however, regarded her political analyses as simplistic, while some Palestinians felt that her attacks on Arab society merely reconfirmed the "orientalist" prejudices of Westerners. Ultimately, Tuqan will be remembered for the potency of her poetry and as a woman who preserved her people's memories and expressed their aspirations.

See also PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Tuqan, Ibrahim (1905–1941)

A poet, playwright, and the director of Radio Palestine, Ibrahim Tuqan is considered by many to be the foremost Palestinian poet of the first half of the twentieth century. Reaffirming the continuing involvement of Arab poets in their societies, he fought for social and political justice. Born in NABLUS, Palestine, during Ottoman rule to a wealthy and prestigious family, Tuqan was the older brother of the poet FADWA TUQAN. He graduated from the American University of Beirut in 1934 and served as subdirector in charge of the Arabic Programme Section of the Jerusalem Palestine Broadcasting Station from 1936 to 1941.

Tuqan was, with Abu Salma (ʻABD-AL-KARIM AL-KARMI) and Abd al-Rahim Mahmud, from the beginning of the 1930s the most prominent and popular of the nationalist poets who inspired the whole of Palestine. The work of these three men displays an extraordinary appreciation of what was going on politically, economically, and socially. For example, in 1932, the feudal-clerical leadership established a national fund, supposedly to prevent the LAND of poor peasants from falling into the hands of the Zionists. However, "Eight of those responsible for the fund project were land brokers for the Zionists," Tuqan wrote of this project.

As early as 1929, Tuqan began writing about the role that the big Arab landowners were playing in connection with the issue of land sales to the Zionists: "They have sold the country to its enemies because of their greed for money; but it is their homes they have sold. They could have been forgiven if they had been forced to do so by hunger, but God knows that they have never felt hunger or thirst. . . . Let him abstain from selling land and keep a plot in which to lay his bones." In the same year, Tuqan wrote his epic poem *al-Thalatha al-Hamra* (*Red Tuesday*) on the death sentences passed by the BRITISH MANDATE government on three Palestinian guerrillas—Fuad Hijazi of SAFED and Muhammad Jumjum and Ata al-Zir of ACRE. This poem became famous and part of the Palestinian revolutionary heritage. Tuqan is most respected for laying the foundations of Palestinian resistance poetry that later, under Israeli OCCUPATION, would become one of the most important manifestations of the endurance of the Palestinian masses.

See also PALESTINIAN POETRY; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

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Turkey

Turkish government and military leaders of the Kemalist (secular) establishment have generally had positive attitudes toward and good relations with Israel. Throughout the Cold War and since, its leaders have considered ties with Israel a part of Turkey's Western orientation, indeed of its overall foreign policy. This pro-Israel orientation has also had a domestic component, as evidenced, for example, in the case of the June 1997 "silent coup" against Islamist prime minister Necmettin Erbakan and his Welfare (*Refah*) Party colleagues. At the same time, public opinion in Turkey has been generally more sympathetic than the government to the situation of the Palestinians, and consecutive governments have had to consider this, especially regarding relations with countries in the Arab world and with the increasing importance of world oil prices.

Although the Turkish government opposed the partition of Palestine in November 1947, since the 1948 WAR, it has tried to balance its relations with Israel and the Arab states, including the

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), with whom it established formal contacts in the mid-1970s. Yet Turkey's relations with Israel and the Palestinians have fluctuated depending on Turkey's perception of its national interests, either in terms of security or of economic issues. For the most part, during the 1950s and throughout the Cold War and again during the 1990s (at least until the 2000 Palestinian Intifada), when tensions with SYRIA increased over that country's support of the Kurdistan Workers' Party and Turkey's increased usage of upstream WATER resources of the Euphrates River, Turkish-Israeli relations were at their best. In the interim and since the start of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, Turkish-Arab and Turkish-Palestinian relations were (or have been) closest.

All Turkish governments, with the exception of Welfare Party officials in Erbakan's coalition government (1996–1997), have been supportive of the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace processes. Conversely, most Turkish Islamists, until the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul's Justice and Development Party (AKP), elected in November 2002, have been distrustful of Western initiatives, which they have considered as serving Israel's interests at the expense of the Palestinians. At the same time, Islamists (and leftists) have been the most critical of ZIONISM, the state of Israel, and Israeli policies in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Indeed, while in late 2002 the AKP's vice chairman strongly criticized the policies of ARIEL SHARON's government toward the Palestinians, as had the previous Turkish government led by Bulent Ecevit, he also stated that strategic relations with Israel would not change and that religious and ideological concerns would not determine the AKP's foreign policy.

Despite opposing the 1947 UN General Assembly (UNGA) partition of Palestine, Turkey remained neutral during the 1948 War, although it sent tents and other supplies to Palestinian REFUGEES. Turkey also abstained on a UNITED NATIONS vote on admitting Israel to the world body. It eventually established de facto relations with Israel in March 1949 and exchanged chargé d'affaires with the Jewish state early the following year, becoming the first Muslim state to do so. Turkish foreign minister Necmettin Sadak explained his government's position in early 1949: as more than thirty countries had already recognized Israel, and the Arab states themselves were holding talks in Rhodes, Greece, with the Jewish state, Israel was a reality. Yet many in the Arab world saw Turkey's policy as a betrayal, as they did Ankara's trade relations with Israel in light of the Arab boycott.

During the 1950s, the Turkish government felt that cooperation with Israel would bring good press in the UNITED STATES and a more favorable reception in Washington for its political and economic interests. At the same time, Turkey granted IMMIGRATION of Bulgarian, Syrian, and Iraqi Jews to Israel. After the 1958 IRAQ revolution, Turkey, Israel, and IRAN developed extensive intelligence cooperation with US encouragement. Reportedly, in return for information from the Israeli intelligence agency MOSSAD on Soviet activities in Turkey, the Turkish National Security Service provided Israel with data on Arab agents. This top-secret program, code-named "Trident," fit perfectly into the Israeli-inspired "peripheral alliance," which also included Ethiopia. Another factor in Turkish-Israeli relations has been the Jewish community in Turkey, numbering more than 20,000. In 1955, when anti-Greek mobs attacked Jewish property in Istanbul during the Cypriot crisis, the Turkish government apologized and reassured Israel that it had no intention of prejudicing the security or the rights of Jews living in Turkey.

During the SINAI/SUEZ WAR of 1956, despite Ankara's distrust of Egyptian leader JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR and his opposition to Israel's right to use the Gulf of Aqaba (and the Suez Canal), Turkey disapproved of the British-French-Israeli military operation against EGYPT. Concerned that the Soviet Union would utilize the crisis to make inroads in the Middle East, Turkey withdrew its chargé d'affaires from Tel Aviv and declared that the diplomat would not return until the Palestine question was resolved in a just and lasting manner in accordance with United Nations resolutions. This proved to be a temporary and largely symbolic gesture, as Turkey also informed Israel that its diplomatic recall was intended to save the Baghdad Pact and should not be interpreted as a hostile act. Over the years until 1991, the legations in both countries were generally fully staffed and usually headed by diplomats of ambassadorial rank, despite their technical listings as chargé d'affaires.

After the 1960 Turkish military coup, which restored civilian rule the following year, Turkey greatly improved its relations with the Arab world. One motivating factor was to seek support for its

Turkish Muslim brethren on Cyprus, especially after 1964, when the United States sternly warned Turkey against taking military action when the Greek Cypriots reneged on constitutional promises. Later, it sought to gain favor with petroleum-producing Arab states during the oil-price hike that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli OCTOBER WAR. Just prior to the 1967 WAR, Turkey kept silent when Egypt closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping; moreover, the Turkish government reportedly told Egypt that it would not allow NATO bases to be used against Arab states (unlike in 1958, when the United States had intervened in LEBANON). In the war's aftermath, Israel's OCCUPATION of vast amounts of Arab land negatively affected Turkish public opinion toward Israel. Ankara made clear its opposition to territorial gains achieved by the use of force.

Ferenc Vali, in *Bridge across the Bosporus,* describes Turkey's policy of "benevolent neutrality" as "diplomacy at its best," because that country was able to express sympathy toward the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli conflict without offending Israel. Indeed, Turkey has consistently refused to break off relations with Israel despite occasional pressure from some of the countries in the Arab and Muslim world. Furthermore, while Turkey called—and still calls—for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from territories occupied during the 1967 War, it never labeled Israel an "aggressor" in that confrontation. Turkey opposed Israel's annexation of East JERUSALEM following the 1967 War, but kept its consulate in that city open until 1980, when Israel's Knesset declared all of Jerusalem its capital. At that time, Turkish prime minister Suleyman Demirel told the ambassadors from Muslim countries in Ankara that Israel's action was "unwise, wrong and contrary to INTERNATIONAL LAW and fundamental justice."

During the 1970 BLACK SEPTEMBER crisis that pitted the Jordanian army against Palestinian guerrillas, Turkey took a cautious approach, despite its concern for the predicament of Jordan's King Husayn in his fight against the PLO. Ankara declared that it considered the events in JORDAN a domestic affair of that country and that foreign interventions would aggravate the situation and handicap efforts to end the fighting. The Turkish government thus refused to allow the US Sixth Fleet use of its harbors during the Jordanian crisis. It also did not permit the United States to use Turkish military facilities to ship supplies to Israel during the October War in 1973, but was quiet when the Soviets used Turkish airspace to supply Syria. In the face of severe domestic economic troubles and political problems associated with its 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, Turkey tilted more toward the Arab world, which it saw as a source of political and economic support. Indeed, it supported the November 1975 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3379, which defined ZIONISM as a form of racism, but in December 1991, when it upgraded relations with both Israel and the PLO to ambassadorial level, it abstained when that same resolution was repealed.

During the 1970s, Turkey opened contact with the PLO through its embassy in Cairo and, in October 1979, allowed the organization to open an office in Ankara, with its chief representative having the same rank as his Israeli counterpart—chargé d'affaires. A few months earlier, the PLO had helped mediate a peaceful ending to the takeover by Palestinian militants of the Egyptian embassy in Ankara. While the Turkish government was thankful for that assistance, it was concerned that the PLO might be training Armenian and Turkish left-wing terrorist groups.

In September 1986, Turkey decided to upgrade its relations with Israel and sent an experienced diplomat of ambassadorial rank, Ekrem Guvendiren, to Tel Aviv as chargé d'affaires; the following year, the size of the legation was greatly increased. In 1982, during its invasion of Lebanon, Israel captured a number of Turkish terrorists, whom it handed over to Turkey along with information on Armenian and Turkish terrorist groups. Also, by 1985 there was a drop in world oil prices, and Jordan and the PLO appeared to be undertaking a major peace initiative.

During the first Palestinian INTIFADA, which began in December 1987 and continued until 1993, Turkey occasionally publicly expressed disapproval of Israel's treatment of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories; however, at the same time, its political and economic relations with Israel improved. In 1988, Turkey opposed an Arab-sponsored attempt to withdraw Israel's diplomatic credentials at the United Nations, and, during the late 1980s and into the 1990s, Turkey's trade with Israel grew considerably. At the same time, trade with the Arab world decreased significantly from its zenith in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By early 1988, Turkey had contracted with Israel to upgrade its artillery force and F-4 Phantom jet fleet for some $2 billion.

In November 1988, when the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (the PLO's legislative body) met in Algiers to declare Palestinian statehood as well as accepting all UN resolutions, including 242, which recognized the *right* of Israel's existence, Turkey became the eleventh country in the world to recognize the new entity, and the only member of NATO to do so. It has continued to support the idea of an independent Palestinian state in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, while criticizing excessive Israeli actions against Palestinians there.

In November 1993, just months after the signing of the PLO-Israel DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, Turkey's foreign minister Hikmet Cetin visited Israel, becoming the highest-ranking Turkish official to do so. During the following year, Israeli president EZER WEIZMAN and Foreign Minister SHIMON PERES visited Turkey, while Turkish prime minister Tansu Ciller made a visit to Israel, where she compared Israeli founder DAVID BEN-GURION to Turkey's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and declared Turkey's relationship with Israel as "strategic." While there, Ciller made an unannounced visit to East Jerusalem's ORIENT HOUSE to meet with a Palestinian delegation.

In February 1996, Turkey and Israel signed a Military Cooperation and Training Agreement, of which the full and official text was never made public. The agreement was publicly acknowledged by Turkey, and it received varying degrees of criticism in the Muslim world, the strongest of which came from Syria, a country giving sanctuary (until late 1998) to Abdullah Ocalan, whose Kurdish Workers' Party had been engaged in an insurrection against Turkey since 1984. A month later, Turkish president Suleyman Demirel visited Israel.

In May 2004, following a six-day Israeli attack on the Rafah refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan told visiting Israeli infrastructure minister Josef Paritzky, who was in Ankara to sign an $800 million deal for the construction of three natural gas power stations in Israel, "You cannot fight TERRORISM with terrorism." In January 2005, when Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul visited Israel and the Palestinian territories, he told *Al Jazeera* TV that Turkey saw itself as a mediator between the Israelis and Palestinians, alongside efforts by both the United States and Egypt. Gul went on to say that Turkey's clear goal was to stop the "bloodbath" in the region and establish peace and stability there so that the Palestinians could set up their own state "in security." At the same time, he said Israel had to be assured of the same security in the region.

Israel's 2006 wars with HIZBULLAH and HAMAS exacerbated its relations with Turkey, but the latter attempted to broker peace between Israel and Syria. Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan felt that Israel was responsible for the lack of success in that endeavor. Following Israel's 2009 war with Hamas, he got into a shouting match at the Davos economic conference with Israel's president Shimon Peres over what he regarded as Israel's excessive use of force in the war. In November 2009, Turkey joined a huge majority in the United Nations General Assembly by voting in favor of the Goldstone Report, which accused Israel and Hamas of committing international war crimes. A month earlier, Turkey had refused to participate together with Israel in a multinational air force exercise that was supposed to take place on its territory. Israeli defense minister EHUD BARAK downplayed the rift by stressing the two countries' "longstanding, important, and strategic" ties.

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—Michael B. Bishku

Two-State Solution

"Two-state solution" is the name for a class of proposed resolutions for the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict that involve two independent, sovereign states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side in a formal condition of peace, with some sort of shared arrangement for JERUSALEM. Various proposals under this rubric differ in their details, although all share the basic concept of two states for two peoples, in contrast to the binational solution of a single democratic secular state, or the solution of the forced TRANSFER—expulsion—of all Palestinians.

Proponents of a two-state solution, which have included the UNITED NATIONS and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), generally advocate two separate states west of the Jordan River, one intended primarily for the Jewish population and one for the Palestinians. The territories that Israel captured in the 1967 WAR—the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, plus at least part of East Jerusalem—would become the new Palestinian state, although they constitute only 22 percent of historic Palestine. Their Palestinian inhabitants would be given citizenship by the new state, which might also be offered to Palestinian REFUGEES in the worldwide DIASPORA as well. Arab citizens of present-day Israel would likely have the choice of staying in Israel or becoming citizens of the new Palestinian state, though opinion polls have shown that most Israeli Arabs would prefer to remain in Israel.

Variations on the basic idea have a long history. The PEEL COMMISSION report of 1937 envisioned a partition of the BRITISH MANDATE Palestine area into three sections: Arab, Jewish, and a small continued Mandate area (effectively under international control), containing Jerusalem. The next major proposal to suggest a partition was the 1947 UN RESOLUTION 181, which also proposed a three-way division, again with Jerusalem held separately, under permanent international trusteeship. After the 1948 WAR, Israel controlled 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine—approximately one-quarter more than Resolution 181 allotted it. Concern for the fate of the Palestinians led to a series of UN Security Council resolutions, beginning in 1976, supporting the two-state solution; however, the UNITED STATES, standing with Israel, vetoed each one even as, since the mid-1970s, the idea has had overwhelming support in the UN General Assembly. However, by that time, Israel had begun to implement its massive SETTLEMENT program intended to colonize most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in order to ensure that a Palestinian state could not emerge there.

In its goals for a solution to the conflict, the PLO underwent a number of transformations, the first being the liberation of Palestine. By 1967, however, that objective began to give way to the idea of a democratic, secular state, including Jews and Palestinians, in Palestine. The idea was dismissed by Israel, and the PLO had once again to rethink its position. At the close of the twelfth Palestine National Council (PNC), in June 1974, the PLO issued a political communiqué that called for the establishment of "a Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian areas liberated from Israeli control." This was the first formulation of the idea of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel—the two-state solution.

Despite Israeli and US abjuration, the PLO achieved considerable international legitimacy for adopting and advocating the two-state concept. In October 1974, an Arab Summit conference meeting in Rabat, Morocco (the RABAT SUMMIT), proclaimed the PLO "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians." The following month, PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT was invited to address the UN General Assembly, and the PLO

was accorded the status of an "observer-member." At the thirteenth PNC, in March 1977, the two-state idea was further refined and clearly articulated as policy, and the PLO formally declared its willingness to participate in negotiations for a political settlement. Official PLO policy, then, from 1977 through 1993 (explicitly detailed in the 1988 PNC resolutions), was centered on the objective of securing an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem—the two-state solution. It also disclaimed the ARMED STRUGGLE and TERRORISM against Israel and sought to engage in a diplomatic process that would achieve its goals.

The momentous nineteenth PNC, in November 1988, concretized the PLO's historic compromise, and, on 13 December 1988, the UN General Assembly convened a special session in Geneva specifically to hear an address by Arafat after the US government denied him permission to come to New York. In his speech, Arafat unequivocally reaffirmed the PLO's commitment to diplomacy and a two-state solution. During all these years of PLO concessions, and adoption and advocacy of the two-state solution, Israel and the United States continued to reject the idea, the PLO, and Arafat. In the 1990s, however, the pressing need for peace in the Middle East brought the two-state idea back to center stage in US thinking. At one point in the 1990s, considerable diplomatic work during the OSLO ACCORDS went into negotiating a two-state solution between Israel and the PLO. However, because Israel wanted to retain significant amounts of the 22 percent of Occupied Palestine (settlements, WATER resources, ROADS, military bases, etc.), including East Jerusalem, no final agreement was achieved.

A significant number of Israelis hold that the two-state solution was implemented in 1922 when Britain split off the eastern part of the Mandate to create Transjordan, which became JORDAN, a state with a Palestinian majority due to the influx of refugees in 1948 and 1967. Some Israeli politicians argue for a form of two-state solution in which a Palestinian state is granted the symbolic attributes of an independent state—that is, autonomy—but without most aspects of sovereignty. The Palestinian leadership does not view such proposals as being in the true spirit of the two-state solution concept. In 2002, Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah of SAUDI ARABIA proposed an ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, which garnered the unanimous support of the ARAB LEAGUE. President GEORGE W. BUSH initially announced his support for a Palestinian state, manifest in the US-backed ROAD MAP peace proposal, but nothing has come of either initiative. By 2005, Israel had control of over 50 percent of the West Bank and had created so many "facts on the ground"—settlements, roads, military installations, and others—that a viable, contiguous Palestinian state was essentially precluded, and most observers believe that the possibility of a two-state solution no longer exists.

See also BINATIONALISM; PEACE; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT

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Tzomet

Tzomet (Crossroads—Movement for Renewed ZIONISM) is a small, secular, ultra-right-wing party in Israel. The party was the one that first brought the "peace for peace" slogan, which today is used by all Israeli right-wing parties and movements. "Peace for peace" means that Israel should not give up any territory in exchange for peace (that is, UN RESOLUTION 242's core principle of land for peace) and if Palestinians really want peace they should stop the policy of demanding land and using threats but give up on their demands and accept that all of Eretz Yisrael belongs to Israel. In 1983 Israeli general Rafael Eitan founded the Tzomet Party after retiring from the position of chief of staff in 1982. He headed the party throughout its existence and modeled it as a secular, right-wing party with a strong agricultural component. Many of Tzomet's members and Knesset members were Eitan's neighbors in Tel Adashim (a small agricultural community). Tzomet's focus was opposition to any accord with or any concessions to the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), particularly the OSLO ACCORDS between the PLO and Israel.

Tzomet ran for the 1984 elections on a joint slate with the TEHIYA PARTY, and Eitan was its

only Knesset member. In 1987, Tzomet and the Tehiya parted ways, and Tzomet ran independently in the elections of 1988 (winning two seats). The party joined YITZHAK SHAMIR's government in 1990 and Eitan was appointed minister of agriculture; however, it left the coalition in December 1991 in protest at Yitzhak Shamir's participation in the MADRID CONFERENCE. In the 1992 elections Tzomet gained eight seats but was not included in the left-wing governing coalition. Moreover, the party's success was also its downfall. None of the new Knesset members had any political experience, and most were completely anonymous. Allegations of tyrannical behavior by Eitan were raised, and three members left and founded the Yiud party (which then splintered into Atid). One of the three who left did so because he was offered the position of minister of energy by YITZHAK RABIN if he voted in favor of the Oslo Accords, which Tzomet opposed.

All this reduced the popularity of the party, and in the 1996 elections it chose to run in a joint list with the LIKUD PARTY and GESHER under the name "National Camp List." Tzomet was assured several relatively high places in the combined list, partly as a reward for the withdrawal of Eitan as prime ministerial candidate (the 1996 elections were the first Israeli elections to feature a double vote, one for the Knesset and one direct vote for prime minister). Eventually, three Tzomet candidates were voted into the Knesset, though one of them, Moshe Peled, broke away to form his own faction and then joined MOLEDET.

In the 1999 elections Tzomet ran alone for the Knesset. However, it had lost almost all its support, and won just 4,128 votes, less than 10 percent of the number needed to cross the 1.5 percent electoral threshold. After the humiliating defeat, Eitan retired from the political life.

The party continues to exist and ran in both the 2003 and 2006 elections, winning only 2,023 and 1,342 votes respectively. In the 2009 elections it again failed. Tzomet's platform reveals its positions, which have far wider influence than the number of Knesset members from the party:

- "[Tzomet] [b]elieves in pursuit of peace, but [is] opposed to territorial compromise for security and secular, nationalistic reasons; Israel should annex Judea, Samaria and Gaza as part of the Land of Israel."
- "The Palestinians in the territories should be offered a very limited municipal autonomy."
- "Arab refugees in and from the territories should be resettled in Arab countries."
- Promotion of Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria [the West Bank], and Gaza.
- Separation of religion and state.

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U

'Udwan, Kamal (1925–1973)

Kamal 'Udwan (Abu Hisham) was a Palestinian teacher, engineer, and founding member of the FATAH party. Born in Barbara Village, a district of the GAZA STRIP that came under Israeli control in November 1948, he was dispossessed along with all of Barbara's inhabitants, who became REFUGEES. 'Udwan played an active role in the UNITED NATIONAL FRONT that emerged in Gaza after the Israeli OCCUPATION in 1967 and was arrested by Israeli forces.

In the late 1950s, 'Udwan worked as a teacher in Qatar and then trained as a petroleum engineer in Cairo. In 1964 he attended the first PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL meeting, where he called for a war of popular liberation. Beginning in September 1971, PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION chairman YASIR ARAFAT appointed him head of the Occupied Homeland Bureau, and, at the same time, he became a member of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE. He is believed to have had a role in the BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION'S TERRORISM operations. On 10 April 1973, 'Udwan was assassinated in Beirut during an Israeli raid led by EHUD BARAK.

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Unilateral Disengagement from Gaza

See ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA

Union of Zionist-Revisionists

See WORLD UNION OF ZIONIST REVISIONISTS

Unit 101

Unit 101 was an Israeli Special Operations unit of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) organized and led by ARIEL SHARON on orders from Prime Minister DAVID BEN-GURION in August 1953. Ben-Gurion instructed Sharon to create a "Special Forces unit" that would operate behind the 1948 armistice lines in reprisal and preemptive strikes against the Arabs. Sharon was in charge of the military training as well as the psychological and ideological indoctrination of the troops. During a five-month period in 1953, Unit 101 carried out a series of terror raids across Israel's BORDERS into REFUGEE camps, villages, and BEDOUIN encampments, mainly in Jordanian- and Egyptian-controlled territory and mainly against civilians.

In *Israel's Border Wars*, Israeli historian Benny Morris describes the squad, which had no more than fifty men: "The new recruits began a harsh regimen of day and night training, their orientation and navigation exercises often taking them across the border; encounters with enemy patrols or village watchmen were regarded as the best preparation for the missions that lay ahead. Some commanders, such as [Shlomo] Baum and Sharon, deliberately sought firefights. Unit 101 recruits went on forced marches and did calisthenics, judo, and weapons and sabotage training, at their base camp at Sataf, an abandoned Arab village just west of JERUSALEM."

Immediately after its establishment, Unit 101 began a series of cross-border operations. On 28–29 August the unit attacked al-Bureij refugee camp in the GAZA STRIP (then under Egyptian administration). According to the local UN officer, Major General Vagn Bennike of the UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, "One of the latest and gravest incidents in the Gaza Strip has been the attack upon several houses and huts in the Arab refugee camp of Bureij on the night of 28 August. Bombs were thrown through the windows of huts in which refugees were sleeping and, as they fled, they were attacked by small arms and automatic weapons. The casualties were 20 killed, 27 seriously wounded, 35 less seriously wounded."

Morris also records the attack on the civilian population: "Foreign observers called the Bureij raid 'an appalling case of deliberate mass murder.'" He quoted the acting director of UN Relief and Works Agency, Leslie Carver, as saying the "incident has caused intense alarm and unrest in the whole Strip" and said that Carver urged the

UNITED NATIONS to strongly protest to Israel against the "unprovoked attack upon harmless and defenseless refugees. . . . Israel denied responsibility, leading diplomats and officials to the conclusion that 'Israeli settlers' or 'a local kibbutz' had carried out the raid on their own initiative."

In the following month, September 1953, Unit 101 carried out an attack on the Azzama Bedouin in demilitarized Al-Auja, on the western Negev-Sinai frontier. According to E. H. Hutchison, a UN truce observer, "Israeli airplanes attacked Arabs and their herds of camels and goats. At the same time, incidents of increasing gravity occurred in the demilitarized zone itself. Israeli armed groups patrolled the zone; they shot at Bedouins at the two main wells; Arabs and their herds were killed by air and ground attacks; armed Israeli forces, up to approximately 30 men, shot the herds and burned the tents of Bedouins."

In October 1953, Unit 101 carried out a raid on the village of QIBYA in the northern WEST BANK, then a part of JORDAN. Over fifty civilians were killed in this operation, which was similar to that of al-Bureij but on a much larger scale. Israel received wide international criticism for this attack, but Ben-Gurion denied any knowledge of it. Yet, in its aftermath, the Israeli leadership officially forbade the IDF from directly targeting innocent civilians.

By January 1954, Unit 101 had disbanded and merged with Tzanhanim Company, which became a brigade-size unit composed of two battalions: 869 Battalion (from the original Tzanhanim Company personnel) and 101 Battalion (from the former Unit 101 personnel). Sharon became the new commander of the enlarged Tzanhanim infantry brigade and was able to launch full-scale Special Forces attacks against Arab targets. Beginning in 1954, 101 Battalion's activities were mostly confined to military targets. In particular, up to twenty such attacks were carried out in 1955–1956, culminating in the Qalqilya Raid of October 1956, a battle in which eighteen Israeli soldiers and upwards of 100 Jordanian Legionnaires died.

According to an Israeli military source, "The creation of Unit 101 was a major landmark in the Israeli Special Forces history. Unit 101 established small unit maneuvers, activation and insertion tactics that are utilized even today. Beside Sayeret MATKAL [an IDF infantry Special Operations unit], Unit 101 is considered to be the unit with the most influence on the Israeli infantry oriented units including both special and conventional units."

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS; INFILTRATION (PALESTINIAN) AND RETALIATION (ISRAELI)

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United Arab List

See RA'AM

United National Front

The United National Front (UNF), which was active from circa 1973 to 1976, was an indigenous opposition movement in the GAZA STRIP that was intimately connected to the PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT in the WEST BANK. Gaza's UNF, like its West Bank sister, was a coalition of Palestinian leftist-nationalists and communists. In part, it grew out of the communist NATIONAL LIBERATION LEAGUE, which had been active in the Gaza Strip since 1948. Despite its acknowledgment of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, there can be little doubt that the decision to form the UNF and to mobilize Gazans for grassroots activism against the OCCUPATION came from within the Gaza Strip.

Throughout the early 1970s, Israel tolerated the communists' existence and allowed them some level of political activity—possibly because the PLO refused to admit the PALESTINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY. In addition, since the communists had accepted partition in 1947, recognized Israel, and

favored political over military struggle, they were initially less of a threat than other political parties in Israel's eyes.

The UNF was instrumental in nationalist politics, mobilizing and organizing at the grassroots level as well as engaging in institution building in Gaza. Like the National Liberation League, the UNF reached its supporters principally through high school and college student associations and, to a lesser extent, through labor and trade unions. In 1976, when Israel decided to crack down on all Palestinian political parties, it dismantled the UNF, imprisoned its leaders and activists, and outlawed all its activities.

See also PALESTINE NATIONAL FRONT

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United Nations

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the world's longest international conflicts, engaging most of the world's major powers, creating the world's largest refugee population, and involving some of the most widespread violations of international humanitarian law. As such, this conflict, more than any other, has occupied the attention of the United Nations' security, political, and humanitarian bodies.

Partition and the 1948 War

As the conflict between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine intensified in the late 1940s, Great Britain—which had served as Mandatory power following the collapse of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE—brought a partition plan before the United Nations. On 29 November 1947, based on the recommendations of the UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP), the UN General Assembly (UNGA) approved UN RESOLUTION 181, which created an international trusteeship for greater JERUSALEM, while allotting 57 percent of the remaining parts of Palestine for a Jewish state and 43 percent for a Palestinian Arab state. The vote was 33 to 13, with nearly unanimous opposition from Middle Eastern, African, and Asian states, which perceived that the United Nations was being used by Western powers to support the creation of a colonial settler state at a time when demands for decolonization were growing across the globe. Critics also claimed that the partition went beyond the powers vested in the General Assembly and that it violated the UN Charter provision that recognized the right of self-determination. Western governments saw it as the best means of resolving the conflicting claims of the two communities and addressing the desires for a national homeland by a persecuted people barely two years after the end of the Nazi-led genocide. At that time, Jews were less than one-third of the Palestine population and owned less than 10 percent of the LAND. In addition, much of the territory allocated for the Jewish state contained a majority of Arabs, and the Arab city of JAFFA was an isolated enclave, disconnected from the rest of the Arab state. Both the perceived unfairness of the partition and the partition itself led to the rejection of the UN resolution by the LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES. Zionist groups provisionally accepted it, though subsequently released documents revealed that many in the Zionist leadership saw partition as merely a first step toward controlling all of Palestine. On 14 May 1948, BRITISH MANDATE forces withdrew, and Israel declared itself an independent state that same day. After months of growing intercommunal violence, which resulted in the exodus of tens of thousands of Palestinians, armies from neighboring Arab countries joined in the battle that came to be known as the 1948 WAR.

On 11 June the Swedish UN mediator COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE arranged a cease-fire under the UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION (UNTSO). On 8 July fighting resumed after failure to arrange an extension to the truce and continued until 18 July 1948, when the UN Security Council (SC) passed Resolution 54 mandating a cease-fire and threatening armed intervention on behalf of the United Nations. By that time, Israel had seized control of close to 78 percent of Palestine, including the western half of Jerusalem. Egyptian forces were in control of the southeastern coastal area, which became known as the GAZA STRIP, and Jordanian forces took control of most of the highland regions, including the eastern half of Jerusalem, on the WEST BANK of the Jordan River. In the meantime, most of the Palestinian Arabs, totaling approximately 750,000 individuals, were transformed into REFUGEES.

Following Bernadotte's assassination by an Israeli terrorist in September 1948, American Ralph Bunche became head of UNTSO. Fighting resumed in October 1948 before a series of

ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS in February and March 1949 led to Israeli withdrawal from parts of Egyptian and Lebanese territory seized during the fighting. In April an armistice agreement between Israel and JORDAN resulted in the division of Jerusalem, and in June a series of small demilitarized zones separated Syrian and Israeli forces. With Israel's conquest of the majority of the territory mandated by the United Nations to become part of the Palestinian state, Jordan annexed the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), and EGYPT instituted an administration over the Gaza Strip. Thus, the UN plan for an independent Palestinian state never came to fruition. In December 1948 the UN General Assembly passed UN RESOLUTION 194, which declared (among other things) that "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so" and that "compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return." The resolution also mandated the creation of the UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE to solve the refugee problem and conclude the war. Neither refugee compensation nor return has been implemented, although Resolution 194 remains valid by virtue of renewal by the General Assembly every two years.

The 1956, 1967, and 1973 Wars

On 29 October 1956, in retaliation for Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR's nationalization of the Suez Canal, British and French forces attacked Egypt after Israeli forces had moved into the Sinai Peninsula. The vast majority of the international community, including the UNITED STATES, condemned the tripartite invasion. Because FRANCE and Britain were permanent members of the UN Security Council and could therefore cast a veto, the United Nations organized its first emergency Special Session of the General Assembly (under the 1950 Resolution 337 [V]) on 30 October 1956, which produced a cease-fire resolution (Resolution 997). On 4 November 1956 the General Assembly approved Resolution 998 (ES-1), a plan for an intervention force for the attack on Egypt, originally proposed by Canadian diplomat (and later prime minister) Lester Pearson. The resolution created the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)—the first-ever UN peacekeeping force and mission—along the Israeli-Egyptian border. Because Israel refused to allow UNEF forces on its side of the border, it was stationed only on the Egyptian side. Resolution 999 of 4 November 1956 gave the authority for organizing peacekeeping missions to the UN secretary-general.

In 1967, Israeli encroachments on the demilitarized zone with SYRIA led to a series of countermoves from Syria and Egypt, including forcing the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai. On 5 June 1967, Israel attacked Egypt as well as Jordanian forces in the West Bank and later Syria. Within six days (the 1967 WAR), Israel seized the remaining parts of Palestine from Jordan and Egypt as well as all of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Syrian Heights (renamed the Golan Heights by Israel). On 22 November 1967, the Security Council adopted UN RESOLUTION 242, establishing a plan for creating a permanent peace in the Middle East. Written by the British and US ambassadors, it reiterated the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force but acceded to Israeli concerns regarding the ongoing threats by neighboring Arab states. The resolution therefore established the principle of "land for peace," which has since been considered the key to ending the Arab-Israeli conflict: Israeli withdrawal from the territories seized during the 1967 War in return for peace treaties and security guarantees from its Arab neighbors. The resolution said nothing about establishing a Palestinian state or Palestinian national rights; indeed, the Palestinians were not even mentioned aside from a provision calling for a "just resolution of the refugee problem."

Though the Arab states initially rejected Resolution 242, in the early 1970s, Egypt began to make overtures toward peace with Israel along the lines of the resolution. Following Israel's rejection of the offers, Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israeli OCCUPATION forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights (OCTOBER WAR). Fighting officially ended on 22 October with a cease-fire established by UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338, which called for a realization of the principles for peace established in Resolution 242 (1967). Following continued Israeli advances into Egyptian territory on the west (Egyptian) side of the Suez Canal, the Security Council passed a second resolution (Resolution 339) the following day, resulting in a belated cease-fire between Egypt and Israel.

Israeli Military Actions against Lebanon

The government of LEBANON had largely avoided military engagements with Israel during the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars, but, in the late 1960s, Israel

initiated a series of air strikes and commando raids against Lebanese territory, allegedly in retaliation for attacks by Palestinian groups based there. Israel's actions led to a series of UN Security Council resolutions critical of Israel, particularly its attacks that resulted in large-scale civilian casualties and damage to the civilian infrastructure.

When Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in 1978 in response to a terror attack that killed a US tourist and thirty-seven Israelis, the Security Council passed Resolution 425, calling on all states to recognize Lebanon's legitimate sovereign territorial boundaries and demanding that Israel immediately and unconditionally withdraw from all Lebanese territory. Security Council Resolution 426 provided the guidelines for Resolution 425 and established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to help maintain peace and return legitimate power to the Lebanese government. Israel pulled back its occupation forces but did not completely withdraw from Lebanese territory as required. The UN Security Council passed eight subsequent resolutions reiterating the call for Israel's unconditional withdrawal from Lebanese territory, but, beginning with President RONALD REAGAN's administration, the United States vetoed subsequent draft resolutions calling for an Israeli withdrawal.

In June 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon (LEBANON WAR). Within weeks, Israel occupied nearly half the country and laid siege to Beirut; it also bombed Syrian positions in eastern Lebanon and shot down dozens of Syrian military aircraft. The United States vetoed a series of UN Security Council resolutions demanding an Israeli withdrawal. Subsequent resolutions that called only for a cease-fire were also blocked by US vetoes until August, when the United States allowed a cease-fire resolution to pass (Resolution 516), but this watered-down resolution failed to reiterate previous resolutions that required Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Over subsequent months, increased Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israeli occupation forces led Israel to withdraw from most of Lebanon, but Israel maintained its occupation of a strip of Lebanese territory north of the Israeli border and along the northeastern edge of the occupied Golan region of Syria. UNIFIL forces were largely unsuccessful in maintaining peace between the Israeli occupation forces and a growing guerrilla resistance movement under the leadership of the Islamist HIZBULLAH.

Thereafter, a series of major Israeli assaults on civilian population centers in southern Lebanon resulted in the international community's condemnation of Israel, but US vetoes blocked the United Nations from enforcing peace. In 1996 the Israelis launched a mortar attack against a UN compound near the Lebanese village of Qana, which was sheltering Palestinian refugees from nearby villages that had been under Israeli assault for several days; the attack killed more than 100 civilians. A report by the United Nations—confirming earlier investigations by Amnesty International and others—indicated that the bombardment was, in all likelihood, intentional, but these conclusions were rejected by Israel and the United States. Some reports have indicated that the US decision to veto UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reelection the following year was related to his refusal to suppress or tone down the UN findings on the Israeli assault on Qana.

In May 2000, Israel finally withdrew from Lebanon, with the exception of the disputed Shebaa Farms area along the Syrian border, and, despite widespread violations of Lebanese airspace by the Israeli air force, the area remained largely quiet. However, an attack by Hizbullah fighters on an Israeli border post in July 2006 prompted massive Israeli air assaults on Lebanon's civilian INFRASTRUCTURE and an incursion by ground troops into Lebanese territory. After repeatedly blocking UN Security Council efforts for a cease-fire for nearly a month, the United States finally acquiesced to a cease-fire resolution in August (Resolution 1701), which eventually resulted in an Israeli withdrawal and a dramatically expanded UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon.

Peace Efforts

The United Nations has long advocated the need for a comprehensive peace settlement among the Arab states, the Palestinians, and Israel, stressing the importance of the inclusion of all parties in any peace initiative, but these efforts have been undercut by US and Israeli insistence on bilateral negotiations facilitated by the United States.

The one international peace conference the United Nations was able to organize took place between 21 December 1973 and 9 January 1974 in Geneva under UN Security Council Resolution 334. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim supervised the conference, and invitations went to Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Syria. However, the

conference largely failed because the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION was not invited and Syria refused to attend the meeting. Nevertheless, it did establish a Military Working Group that would continue to negotiate peace between the parties after the conference ended. For example, the Military Working Group took part in the Syria-Israeli Agreement on Disengagement in 1974 as well as the Egypt-Israeli Agreements on Disengagement in 1974 and 1975.

The United Nations is one of the four members of the QUARTET—along with the United States, RUSSIA, and the EUROPEAN UNION—overseeing the "Performance-Based ROAD MAP to a Permanent TWO-STATE SOLUTION to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict" put forward in 2003. The United States, however, demanded that INTERNATIONAL LAW and UN Security Council resolutions not be major components of the Road Map, and it has largely marginalized the UN role in the stalled peace effort. For example, the Annapolis Declaration of December 2007 declares that "implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map, *as judged by the United States*" (emphasis added).

UN Peacekeeping Missions

In addition, the United Nations has set up peacekeeping missions in three states involved in the Israel-Palestinian conflict: Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Egypt. The United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was established following the 1956 War, lasted until June 1967 and contained troops from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, and Yugoslavia, at a total cost of $214 million. Following the October 1973 War, UNEF II was established along Egypt's Suez Canal between Egyptian forces and Israeli occupation forces. The mission lasted until July 1979, cost $446.5 million, and included troops from Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, and Sweden.

Syria. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established in March 1974 through the Agreement on Disengagement (S/11302/Add 1 Annexes I and II) and Security Council Resolution 350 following the October 1973 War. Since then, UNDOF has patrolled a narrow demilitarized zone separating Syrian forces and Israeli occupation forces in the Golan Heights. UNDOF tasks have included inspecting the region for military trespassing, identifying and marking all landmines, and supporting the Red Cross in its transportation of persons and staff in the region. Countries that contribute troops include Austria, Canada, India, Japan, Nepal, Poland, and Slovakia. UNDOF's annual budget is approximately $42 million.

Lebanon. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which was established following Israel's March 1978 invasion of southern Lebanon, was stationed along the international boundary between Israel and Lebanon and tasked with monitoring violations at the border and preventing an outbreak of fighting. However, Israel's refusal to withdraw completely from Lebanon forced UNIFIL to remain six to twelve miles north of the border. In the Lebanon War, it was unable to prevent Israel's June 1982 invasion, and after that war UNIFIL's role evolved into trying to protect civilians in the conflict zone from Israeli forces that were involved in an increasingly bloody counterinsurgency campaign against Lebanese guerrillas. In subsequent years, scores of UN peacekeepers were killed, primarily by forces from the SOUTH LEBANON ARMY, a right-wing rebel faction that served as a proxy of the Israeli armed forces. In May 2000, Israel finally withdrew from southern Lebanon, allowing UNIFIL forces to fulfill their original mandate from twenty-two years earlier to patrol the Israeli-Lebanese border and necessitating an increase in their numbers to over 7,000.

In March 2001, Security Council Resolution 1337, which established UNTSO, reduced UNIFIL troop strength to 5,700, and by 2002, as the border area remained relatively stable, down to 2,000. Following Israel's assault on Lebanon during the summer of 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 included provisions to increase UNIFIL's numbers to 15,000 in order to assist Lebanese soldiers in maintaining security and sovereignty along the borders and to provide humanitarian aid. Countries contributing troops to UNIFIL included Belgium, CHINA, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, GERMANY, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and TURKEY.

Humanitarian Relief

Starting in 1950, following its creation under UNGA Resolution 302 the previous year, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has provided medical, educational, and emergency relief, as well as social services, to 4.3 million Palestinian refugees. UNRWA operates in five locations: the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank. Ninety-six percent of its money comes from monetary donations from the European Union and other governments around the world. Some 24,000 people work for UNRWA, most of whom are Palestinian refugees themselves. UNRWA, which has had its mandate extended every three years since 1950, works along the same lines as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). However, as a result of a decision made at the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Palestinian refugees cannot participate in the international refugee law regime as long as UNRWA remains operational and thus cannot obtain direct assistance from UNHCR.

As of 2006, UNRWA works in fifty-nine official refugee camps with 267,915 families and 1,306,191 registered refugees inside the camps, with a total of 4,375,050 registered Palestinian refugees in all five areas of operation. In the Gaza Strip, UNRWA works in eight official camps with 92,322 registered families in the camps, including 474,130 registered refugees, with a total of 993,818 registered refugees in all of Gaza. The West Bank has nineteen official camps with 38,954 registered families and 185,121 registered refugee individuals in the camps, with a total of 705,207 registered refugees throughout the West Bank. Jordan has ten official camps with 61,063 registered families and 316,549 registered refugee individuals, with a total of 1,835,704 registered refugees in the country. Lebanon has twelve official camps with 49,836 registered families and 214,093 registered refugee individuals in the camps, with a total 405,425 registered refugees in the country. Syria has ten official camps with 25,740 registered families and 116,253 registered refugee individuals in the camps, with a total of 434,896 registered refugees in the country. The major functions of UNRWA have included the following.

Health Care. In the 1950s the major problems facing Palestinian refugees, in addition to being homeless, landless, and stateless, were malnutrition, communicable diseases, infant mortality, and poor sanitation. In 1951 UNRWA implemented a program that provided one meal a day to children fifteen and under as well as monthly rations of cod liver oil and milk for tuberculosis patients and expectant and new mothers. Immunizations through vaccinations began in 1954, and UNRWA organized several rehydration and nutrition centers throughout the five camp locations in the 1970s. It eradicated protein-calorie malnutrition during the early 1990s and achieved a significant decrease in mortality rates: from 180 per 1,000 births to 32–35 per 1,000. The health care program operates according to World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines.

Education. UNRWA, assisted in part by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), provides primary and junior high/middle school education to all refugee children, equally to boys and girls, and offers college scholarships of $200–$1,000 each year to students who qualify. It also has eight vocational training centers for technical and vocational training.

Small-Business Initiatives. In the 1990s UNRWA established a microfinance and microenterprise program in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in response to the dramatic increase in unemployment and the growing poverty after the 1987 Intifada and the Gulf War. The program was set up as an attempt to create business and work in these regions and to support small-scale enterprises, solidarity groups, and consumer lending programs. Because the program is not part of UNRWA's regular budget, donations and grants cover the costs.

Relief and Social Services. UNRWA administers a special hardship program that provides financial and material assistance to people with disabilities and chronic illness and single mothers and women who were left (in one form or another) by their husbands, including $136 per person per year for bimonthly food rations. In times of war or armed conflict, particularly with Israel's building of the Barrier separation wall between Israel and the West Bank, an additional emergency relief assistance program allows for a temporary monetary boost in food, financial, and unemployment programs to all people in the region affected by war and conflict—refugees and nonrefugees alike. In 1993 another initiative was started to repair refugee shelters that were in damaged condition. Finally, UNRWA established specific centers for women and poverty alleviation in the

UNRWA locations to teach women and others who are impoverished their legal rights, civic education, literacy, and monetary management, as well as providing childcare centers.

Over the years, UNRWA has faced allegations from various right-wing organizations in the United States and elsewhere claiming that it supports TERRORISM and teaches anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish themes in its education program. UNRWA has formally responded to such allegations on a number of occasions, including in its 9 April 2003 statement at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva as well as on its website (http://www.ohchr.org), which lists the most common allegations and provides data and other information to counteract each charge.

Role of the UN General Assembly

The UN General Assembly consists of representatives of all member states of the United Nations—51 nations at the founding of the United Nations in 1945 and now 192 countries. Each member state has one vote, and a simple majority makes most decisions. Though the General Assembly's recommendations are an important indication of world opinion and can represent the moral authority of the community of nations, it does not have the power to enforce its resolutions on states. Prior to the emergence of a sizable Afro-Asian majority resulting from decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, the General Assembly—with the support of Western nations—was able to exert more power, but in recent decades its resolutions have become largely symbolic.

With the rise of nationalist governments in the third world during the 1970s, these former colonies—in alliance with the Soviet Union and its communist allies—passed a series of resolutions that focused on the major grievances of the world's poor majority, particularly the maldistribution of global wealth and other legacies of colonialism. Also of concern was what was largely seen as contemporary manifestations of colonialism, particularly the apartheid system then in effect in South Africa and the ongoing Israeli occupation of Arab land since the June 1967 War. A series of resolutions critical of Israel were pushed through the General Assembly, most of which were based on well-documented Israeli violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention and related international covenants on human rights, though others appeared to be largely based on ideological opposition to Israel itself. Particularly controversial was a resolution passed in October 1975 as an amendment to a General Assembly resolution establishing the Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, which claimed that ZIONISM was a form of racism and racial discrimination. In 1991 this resolution was repealed.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the subject of hundreds of General Assembly resolutions since the UN founding, more than any other conflict. For example, the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), one of six committees of the whole assembly, spends nearly one-third of its time on resolutions and debates regarding Israeli policies. Given the ongoing refusal of Israel, often backed by Western powers, to abide by these resolutions, most of them are reiterations of resolutions passed during previous years. For example, resolutions calling for the enactment of UNGA Resolution 194, which was first approved in December 1948 and called for the repatriation of Palestinian refugees to their homes, have been passed by the General Assembly every year since then.

In 1974 the General Assembly granted the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) observer-member status, making it and the Southwest Africa People's Organization, then struggling against the South African occupation of Namibia, the only two national liberation movements to sit at the United Nations. The General Assembly also established a UN Division for Palestinian Rights and in 1977 dedicated 29 November as the annual UN Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

Role of the Security Council

As the body concerned with maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council has been actively engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The UN Security Council is a fifteen-member body that includes five permanent members, which are the major victorious allies of World War II: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Each has the power to veto any Security Council resolution. Ten nonpermanent members representing regional blocs serve two-year terms and do not have veto power. Unlike the General Assembly, the Security Council does have the power to enforce its resolutions through sanctions, military force, and other measures if it deems there is a threat to international peace and security.

As of 2007, the UN Security Council had passed more than 265 resolutions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, many of which were critical of Israeli actions. More than 40 additional draft resolutions critical of Israel failed because of a US veto. (See Table 8.)

Israel remains in violation of most of the resolutions that have passed that challenge the legality of its policies. For example, Resolutions 446, 452, 465, and 471 require Israel to cease its colonization of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES through the establishment of Jewish SETTLEMENTS—illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention, which explicitly prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian population onto lands seized by military force. Another series of Security Council resolutions is concerned with Israel's alteration of the status of Jerusalem. Israel is currently violating Resolutions 262, 267, 476, and 478, which call upon Israel to rescind its annexation of Arab East Jerusalem and surrounding areas—seized in the early days of the 1967 War—and to cease other activities that attempt to change the city's status.

Other Security Council resolutions that Israel is currently violating are (1) Resolution 487, which calls upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities under the safeguard of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency; (2) Resolution 497, which demands that Israel rescind its imposition of domestic laws in the occupied Syrian Golan region; (3) Resolution 573, which calls on Israel to pay compensation for human and material losses from its 1985 attack against PLO offices and nearby buildings in Tunisia; and (4) Resolutions 1402, 1403, and 1405, which require Israel to withdraw from Palestinian areas in the West Bank reoccupied in 2002. Over a dozen more resolutions still being violated insist that Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention regarding the Occupied Territories, including ceasing its DEPORTATION and TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS of Palestinians and its HOUSE DEMOLITIONS of Palestinian dwellings and other forms of collective punishment, as well as controlling SETTLER VIOLENCE against the Palestinian population.

UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed following the 1967 War (reiterated in UNSC Resolution 338 in 1973), remains the key Security Council action related to peace between the Arab states and Israel. (A 1976 draft resolution reiterating 242, but with the added proviso of establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, was vetoed by the United States.) The Arab states and the PLO initially rejected 242 and 338, though there were indications that some of them were moderating this rejectionist stance as far back as the early 1970s. By the beginning of the 1990s, the PLO and virtually every Arab state had indicated their readiness to accept the principle of land for peace. In March 2002 the Beirut summit of the League of Arab States unanimously adopted a resolution endorsing a peace plan by Saudi prince Abdullah, which, in essence, restated 242 and 338—the ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE.

Israel, however, backed by the United States, puts forward a far more limited definition of its responsibilities under the resolution. For example, the Israeli government claims that Resolution 242 spoke of "territories" rather than "*the* territories," implying that there is no obligation for a full withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. By this interpretation, previous Israeli withdrawals, such as the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1981, fulfilled Israel's obligations. However, the resolution's text in French (the other official language of the United Nations) does use the definite article. Furthermore, the authors of the original resolution, the US and British ambassadors, explicitly stated that they were thinking only in terms of very minor and reciprocal adjustments of the jagged BORDERS that were based on cease-fire lines in the 1949 armistice agreements.

There has also been an effort by Israel and the United States to expand the interpretation of security guarantees in Resolution 242, which were generally interpreted as peace treaties with promises of nonaggression by neighboring states, presumably enforced by some combination of arms control, demilitarized zones, early warning systems, and international peacekeeping forces. The United States and Israel now claim that the resolution essentially requires guarantees for the physical safety of every Israeli citizen. In effect, the Israeli and US governments argue that Israel is under no obligation to withdraw from the Occupied Territories unless there is a total halt to Palestinian terrorism and other violence. Because most SUICIDE BOMBINGS and other attacks against Israeli civilians come from terrorist cells that are beyond the effective control of any government (particularly a disempowered PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY under siege by Israeli occupation forces) and that explicitly want to sabotage the peace process

Table 8 US Vetoes in the Security Council on Behalf of Israel

Date	Issue	Vote
10 Sept. 1972	Condemned Israel's attacks against southern Lebanon and Syria	13 to 1, with 1 abstention
26 July 1973	Affirmed the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, statehood, and equal protections	13 to 1, with China absent
8 Dec. 1975	Condemned Israel's air strikes and attacks in southern Lebanon and its murder of innocent civilians	13 to 1, with 1 abstention
26 Jan. 1976	Called for self-determination of Palestinian people	9 to 1, with 3 abstentions
25 March 1976	Deplored Israel's altering of the status of Jerusalem, which is recognized as an international city by most world nations and the United Nations	14 to 1
29 June 1976	Affirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people	10 to 1, with 4 abstentions
30 April 1980	Endorsed self-determination for the Palestinian people	10 to 1, with 4 abstentions
20 Jan. 1982	Demanded Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights	9 to 1, with 4 abstentions
2 April 1982	Condemned Israel's mistreatment of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and its refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention protocols of civilized nations	14 to 1
20 April 1982	Condemned an Israeli soldier who shot eleven Muslim worshipers on the Temple Mount of the al-Haram ash-Sharaf near the al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem	14 to 1
9 June 1982	Urged sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from its invasion of Lebanon	14 to 1
26 June 1982	Urged sanctions against Israel if it did not withdraw from its invasion of Beirut, Lebanon	14 to 1
6 Aug. 1982	Urged cutoff of economic aid to Israel if it refused to withdraw from its occupation of Lebanon	11 to 1, with 3 abstentions
2 Aug. 1983	Condemned continued Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, denouncing them as an obstacle to peace	13 to 1, with 1 abstention
6 Sept. 1984	Deplored Israel's brutal massacre of Arabs in Lebanon and urged its withdrawal	14 to 1
12 March 1985	Condemned Israeli brutality in southern Lebanon and denounced Israel's "Iron Fist" policy of repression	11 to 1, with 3 abstentions
13 Sept. 1985	Denounced Israel's violation of human rights in the Occupied Territories	10 to 1, with 4 abstentions
17 Jan. 1986	Deplored Israel's violence in southern Lebanon	11 to 1, with 3 abstentions
30 Jan. 1986	Deplored Israel's activities in occupied Arab East Jerusalem that threaten the sanctity of Muslim holy sites	13 to 1, with 1 abstention
6 Feb. 1986	Condemned Israel's hijacking of a Libyan passenger airplane on 4 February	10 to 1, with 1 abstention
18 Jan. 1988	Deplored Israel's attacks on Lebanon and its measures and practices against the civilian population of Lebanon	13 to 1, with Britain abstaining
1 Feb. 1988	Called on Israel to abandon its policies against the Palestinian uprising that violate the rights of occupied Palestinians, to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention, and to formalize a leading role for the United Nations in future peace negotiations	14 to 1
15 April 1988	Urged Israel to accept back deported Palestinians, condemned Israel's shooting of civilians, called on Israel to uphold the Fourth Geneva Convention, and called for a peace settlement under UN auspices	14 to 1
10 May 1988	Condemned Israel's 2 May incursion into Lebanon	14 to 1
14 Dec. 1988	Deplored Israel's 9 December commando raids on Lebanon	14 to 1

Table 8 ***(Continued)***

Date	Issue	Vote
17 Feb. 1989	Deplored Israel's repression of the Palestinian uprising and called on Israel to respect the human rights of the Palestinians	14 to 1
9 June 1989	Deplored Israel's violation of the human rights of the Palestinians	14 to 1
7 Nov. 1989	Demanded that Israel return property confiscated from Palestinians during a tax protest and allow a fact-finding mission to observe Israel's crackdown on the Palestinian uprising	14 to 1
31 May 1990	Called for a fact-finding mission on abuses against Palestinians in Israeli-occupied lands	14 to 1
17 May 1995	Declared Israel's expropriation of land in East Jerusalem invalid and in violation of Security Council resolutions and the Fourth Geneva Convention	14 to 1
7 March 1997	Called on Israel to refrain from settlement activity and all other actions in the Occupied Territories	14 to 1
21 March 1997	Demanded that Israel cease construction of the settlement Har Homa (called Jabal Abu Ghneim by the Palestinians) in East Jerusalem and cease all other settlement activity in the Occupied Territories	13 to 1, with 1 abstention
26 March 2001	Called for the deployment of a UN observer force in the West Bank and Gaza	9 to 1, with 4 abstentions
14 Dec. 2001	Condemned all acts of terror, the use of excessive force, and destruction of properties and encouraged establishment of a monitoring apparatus	12 to 1, with 2 abstentions
19 Dec. 2002	Expressed deep concern over Israel's killing of UN employees and Israel's destruction of the UN World Food Program warehouse in Beit Lahiya and demanded that Israel refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force in the Occupied Territories	12 to 1, with 2 abstentions
16 Sept. 2003	Reaffirmed the illegality of deportation of any Palestinian and expressed concern about the possible deportation of Yasir Arafat	11 to 1, with 3 abstentions
14 Oct. 2003	Raised concerns about Israel's building of a security fence through the occupied West Bank	10 to 1, with 4 abstentions
25 March 2004	Condemned Israel for killing Palestinian spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in a missile attack in Gaza	11 to 1, with 3 abstentions
5 Oct. 2004	Condemned Israel's military incursion in Gaza, which caused many civilian deaths and extensive damage to property	11 to 1, with 3 abstentions
13 July 2006	Accused Israel of a "disproportionate use of force" that endangered Palestinian civilians, and demanded Israel withdraw its troops from Gaza	10 to 0, with 4 abstentions
12 Nov. 2006	Condemned Israel for its military actions in Gaza and called for an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area	10 to 0, with 4 abstentions
30 Dec. 2008	Called for a cease-fire in Israel-Gaza war	14 to 1

through violence, this effectively means that Israel is not obliged to withdraw. Moreover, because the Israeli definition of terrorism is so broad that it applies even to nonviolent political activities by individuals from groups Israel has designated as terrorist, the likelihood of Israel ever withdrawing from the Occupied Territories under such parameters is remote.

International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (also known as the World Court) has its origins in the Permanent International Court established in the Hague in 1899. Since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, the World Court has functioned essentially as the judicial arm of the UN system, designed to enable nations to settle their disputes nonviolently based on the rule of law. The court does not have the authority to enforce its decisions, though the Security Council has used its verdicts as the bases for binding resolutions. Based in the Hague, the court is made up of fifteen judges who are elected.

The most noteworthy decision related to the Arab-Israeli conflict concerned Israel's Barrier in

the Occupied West Bank. In 2003 the General Assembly voted to send the issue to the World Court after the United States vetoed an otherwise unanimous UN Security Council draft resolution that declared, "the construction by Israel, the occupying power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949, is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed." The World Court claimed jurisdiction partly because the United States, by its veto, had frustrated the Security Council from exercising its authority to address actions by Israel that it deemed a "threat to international peace and security." The court reasserted the authority of the General Assembly to seek such an advisory opinion to rectify what it considered Washington's abuse of its veto power.

On 9 July 2004 the World Court determined that the Israeli government's construction of the Barrier running through the occupied Palestinian West Bank was illegal. Among other things, the court noted that the construction of the first 125 miles of the proposed 450-mile Barrier built at that point had "involved the confiscation and destruction of Palestinian LAND and resources, the disruption of the lives of thousands of protected civilians and the de facto annexation of large areas of territory." The court called on Israel to cease construction of the wall, to dismantle what had already been built in areas beyond Israel's internationally recognized border, and to compensate Palestinians who have suffered losses due to the Barrier's construction.

The vote was 14 to 1, a not unexpected margin given the overwhelming consensus of international legal experts regarding the responsibilities of occupying powers; the sole dissenter was the US judge, Thomas Buergenthal, who did so largely on procedural grounds. The fifty-seven-page decision examined in detail the various arguments raised by the interested parties and was consistent with strictures set by the UN Charter, a series of UN Security Council resolutions, previous World Court rulings, and relevant international treaties. Israel and the US government immediately denounced the ruling, and Israel has refused to abide by it.

Charges of Anti-Israel Bias

Despite the instrumental role of the United Nations in the creation of the state of Israel, critics have frequently charged it with having an anti-Israel bias. For example, those challenging the United Nations' disproportionate attention to Israeli human rights abuses have observed that many of Israel's most strident critics have often been governments whose human rights records are worse. However, most of Israel's human rights abuses have taken place in territories recognized as being under belligerent occupation, so the inhabitants are therefore under the protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which is under the purview of the United Nations. Conversely, most other human rights abuses in the world take place within the territory of sovereign states, where the options for UN interference are far more limited. At the same time, the fact that nearly 30 percent of resolutions adopted by the UN's Human Rights Commission and its successor organization, the UN Human Rights Council, which addresses human rights abuses overall, have been directed toward Israel does indicate a disproportionate degree of attention to Israel. In addition, the far more significant violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention by Indonesia during its occupation of East Timor (1975–2000) received far less attention from UN bodies than did Israeli violations. Similarly, issues regarding Moroccan settlers in the Western Sahara and other violations of international humanitarian law of that occupied territory have not been subjected to the level of scrutiny or the subject of resolutions that comparable Israeli actions have.

However, on examination of the UN Security Council, the only body that has enforcement capability, charges of anti-Israeli bias appear to have little merit. For example, IRAQ's 1990 invasion and occupation of KUWAIT was condemned, and the Security Council authorized the use of force to back up its resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal. When Morocco invaded the Western Sahara in 1975 and Indonesia invaded East Timor that same year, the United Nations demanded the withdrawal of the occupying armies and underscored the right to self-determination. Similar demands were made of Turkey when it seized the northern third of Cyprus the previous year. Though none of these resolutions were enforced (in part due to the close strategic relationship that veto-wielding Western powers had with the invaders), the Security Council did reiterate basic legal principles against such territorial expansion. By contrast, UN Security Council Resolution 242—passed when Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, the Golan Heights of Syria, the West

Bank (including East Jerusalem), and the Gaza Strip—did not include demands comparable to these other resolutions for the occupying army to withdraw unconditionally and grant the right of self-determination. Instead, Israeli withdrawal was conditional on neighboring states recognizing Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized borders free from acts or threats of force.

Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency placed sanctions on IRAN for its failure to abide by UN Security Council resolutions demanding its compliance with special limitations on its nuclear program. Yet, the Security Council has refused to enforce sanctions on Israel for its ongoing refusal to abide by a 1981 resolution (UNSC Resolution 487) that called on Israel to place its nuclear facilities under the trusteeship of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Role of the United States

As a permanent member of the Security Council and the largest single financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has used its considerable leverage to limit the UN role in the Arab-Palestinian conflict and to protect the perceived interests of its Israeli ally. On several occasions the United States has withdrawn or has threatened to withdraw badly needed financial support from UN agencies that have supported Palestinian rights. For example, the United States threatened to withhold all funding from the United Nations when it upgraded the PLO's status in 1989. That same year, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization faced a deep cut in US financial support because of its assistance to the Palestinians. In addition, the United States threatened to withdraw from the World Health Organization when it considered admitting Palestine as a full member. One of the justifications for the US withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984 was its educational assistance to Palestinian children.

There have also been scores of occasions on which the United States was the only country besides Israel (sometimes joined by one to four small third world states dependent on US aid) to vote against otherwise unanimous resolutions in the UN General Assembly. More critically, since 1972 the United States has used its veto power in the Security Council more than forty times to block resolutions critical of Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories. This is in addition to the scores of times when the threat of a US veto has led to a weakening of a resolution's language or the withdrawal of the proposed resolution prior to the vote.

After the Palestinians renounced ARMED STRUGGLE and unilaterally recognized Israeli control of 78 percent of Palestine in the 1993 OSLO ACCORDS, their strongest remaining tool was a series of UN Security Council resolutions reconfirming principles of international law that applied to their conflict with Israel. The Palestinians assumed that the United States, as guarantor of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES framework for future accords, would pressure Israel to make needed compromises based upon UN Security Council resolutions that the United States, as a Security Council member, was obliged to uphold. However, both the BILL CLINTON and the subsequent GEORGE W. BUSH administration claimed that the Oslo Accords superseded the UN resolutions and that the United Nations no longer had any standing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Clinton's ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, stated, "Resolution language referring to 'final status' issues . . . should be dropped, since these issues are now under negotiations by the parties themselves. These include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty and the status of Jerusalem." However, the international community does not agree with this attempt to negate the authority of the United Nations. Only a vote by the body in question can rescind a UN resolution. Neither the UN secretary-general nor any other member of the Security Council agrees with the US assessment discounting the relevance of the resolutions. Furthermore, no bilateral agreement between two parties can supersede the authority of the UN Security Council. This is especially true when one of the two parties (in this case, the Palestinians) has made it clear that such resolutions are still relevant.

In 1988 the US Congress passed a law banning the PLO from operating its UN mission, an effort later voided by rulings from both the World Court and a US federal court, citing US commitments to the United Nations upon its founding. Undeterred, the United States, which is also required to allow invited guests of the world body access to UN facilities, prevented PLO chairman Yasir Arafat from addressing the Forty-third UN General Assembly, which moved its session to UN facilities in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to hear his speech. In 1997 MARTIN INDYK, President Clinton's ambassador to Israel (who had also served as his assistant secretary of state for the

Middle East) publicly encouraged Israel to keep its occupation forces in Lebanon indefinitely, effectively calling on Israel to defy ten UN Security Council resolutions. The following day, Clinton defended Indyk's remarks, while public opinion polls in Israel ironically showed that the vast majority wanted their forces to pull out of Lebanon.

A series of resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the 2004 World Court ruling, affirm the illegality of Israel's settlement policy and Israel's obligation to stop construction of new settlements and remove its colonists from the existing settlements. In contrast, US policy in recent years has been that the fate of the settlements must instead be determined through negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority and that the United States would not pressure Israel and would shield it from any other state attempting to apply pressure to abide by these UN decisions.

The United States itself may be in violation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For example, Article 7 of UN Security Council Resolution 465 forbids all member states from facilitating Israel's colonization drive, yet the United States has assisted in funding the construction of the so-called BYPASS ROADS and other INFRASTRUCTURE reinforcing Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. In addition, Article 5 of Resolution 478 calls upon all member states of the United Nations to accept the Security Council's decision that Israel's annexation of greater East Jerusalem is null and void, yet, through a series of executive orders and congressional resolutions over the past decade, the United States has effectively recognized Israeli sovereignty over the illegally annexed Palestinian territory.

Public opinion polls have shown that more than two-thirds of Americans believe that the United Nations should take the lead in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and a similar percentage believe that the UN Security Council should decide the territorial boundaries between Israel and a Palestinian state. Despite this, a cornerstone of the US-led peace process has been to exclude the United Nations: a 1991 memorandum of understanding between the United States and Israel explicitly stated that the United Nations would not have a meaningful role.

See also FINAL STATUS TALKS; JERUSALEM; LEBANON WAR; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES; WATER

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—Stephen Zunes

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) was established at the third session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1948. Its mandate resided in UN RESOLUTION 194 (11 December 1948), better known for its call for repatriation of the Palestinian REFUGEES from the 1948 WAR. The UNCCP was established as a three-member body—the UNITED STATES, FRANCE, and TURKEY—"to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them." In other words, the UNCCP was to broker a comprehensive, permanent peace treaty between Israel and each of the Arab states. The comprehensive

settlement was to be based on three principles: (1) the Palestinian refugees who had fled or been expelled from their homes during the 1947–1948 fighting were to be permitted to return to their homes at the earliest possible date; (2) the final boundaries of the state of Israel were to be delineated; and (3) the international regime for JERUSALEM was to be implemented. In addition to creating the UNCCP and forcefully addressing the refugee issue, Resolution 194 restated (based on UN RESOLUTION 181, [1947]) the demand that Jerusalem be an international city under permanent UN trusteeship.

The UNCCP considered its most important objective to be facilitating permanent peace treaties between the Arab states and Israel. Soon after establishing headquarters in Jerusalem in January 1949, the UNCCP undertook a series of official preliminary visits to the governments of EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950), IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, and Israel to ascertain their views. Following these initial contacts, the UNCCP invited the Arab states to hold meetings in Beirut (21 March to 15 April 1949) for the purpose of exchanging views on the issue of the Palestine refugees. Similarly, the UNCCP met with Israeli prime minister DAVID BEN-GURION in Tel Aviv on 7 April 1949 to examine in depth the refugee question. At a later stage, the UNCCP invited the parties to the LAUSANNE CONFERENCE in Switzerland, held from 27 April to 15 September 1949. The commission emphasized that these talks were not to be considered peace negotiations but rather exchanges of views that could lead to the ultimate resolution of the outstanding issues and conflict among the parties. Throughout, the commission stressed the interrelationship of all aspects of the conflict, particularly the refugee and territorial questions, urging the parties to expand their dialogue to include all problems covered by Resolution 194. In this regard, the UNCCP requested the parties to sign a protocol that would constitute the basis of its continuing work. The relevant paragraph stated: "to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property as well as territorial and other questions." The protocol was accompanied by a map indicating the boundaries defined in UNGA Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947—the Partition Resolution.

The Lausanne meetings were resumed in Geneva in 1950 from January to July, followed by meetings in Paris from September to November 1951. Ultimately, UNCCP efforts at conciliation and mediation proved unsuccessful because of the irreconcilable differences among the parties on fundamental issues and Israel's refusal to abide by Resolution 181 (II) on boundaries and Jerusalem and to comply with paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) on the Palestine refugees. The UNCCP terminated the Paris Conference, concluding that neither side was fully prepared to implement the resolutions guiding its work. From 1961 to 1962, the UNCCP undertook efforts, by means of a special representative, to explore the views of the parties regarding possible actions that could be taken to implement paragraph 11 of Resolution 194. Then, in 1963, the United States proposed that, as a member of the commission, it would initiate a series of high-level talks with the governments concerned. However, these initiatives did not result in any progress in terms of the UNCCP's mandate for conciliation or for the Palestinian refugees.

With regard to the part of its mandate pertaining to Jerusalem, the UNCCP established a Committee on Jerusalem and Its Holy Places and authorized it to establish contact with relevant authorities for the purpose of obtaining detailed information on how best to carry out its responsibilities. The committee also conducted interviews with parties directly concerned, including representatives of Arab and Jewish local authorities, and with religious representatives in Jerusalem and around the Middle East, seeking to encourage acceptance of an international regime for Jerusalem. According to UNCCP records, the Arab delegations were generally prepared to accept the concept of an international regime for the Jerusalem area provided that the UNITED NATIONS offered the necessary guarantees for its stability and permanence. Israel, however, rejected the principle outright, accepting only limited international control of Jewish and Muslim HOLY SITES.

In September 1949 the UNCCP submitted a draft proposal to the General Assembly with numerous provisions for how a special status for Jerusalem could be effected, including the establishment of a general council of Arab and Jewish representatives for the city, an international tribunal to ensure respect for the plan, and the protection of and free access to the holy places. At the same time, this special status would allow for

normal powers of government by the two adjoining states, namely Israel and Jordan, within the Jewish and Arab parts of Jerusalem, respectively. Although the UNCCP fulfilled that part of its mandate regarding Jerusalem, Israel never accepted it and so the proposal was never implemented.

With regard to the Palestinian refugees, the UNCCP determined that their repatriation or resettlement would be a lengthy process and that, in the meantime, urgent humanitarian intervention was necessary to alleviate their plight. Accordingly, the UNCCP established a Technical Committee in June 1949 to undertake several studies. The UNCCP subsequently dissolved the relatively ineffective Technical Committee and in August 1949 established the Economic Survey Mission. The mission was charged with examining the economic situation in the countries affected by the conflict in order to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees as well as the payment of compensation to countries of residence. Following the mission's interim report to the General Assembly, the assembly adopted Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, which established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

On 14 December 1950 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 394 (V) mandating that the UNCCP set up a Refugee Office in Jerusalem. After its establishment in May 1951, officials determined that the office's immediate task was to arrive at a comprehensive estimate of the value of abandoned Palestinian refugee property in Israel. It estimated that the expanse of land that came under the control of Israel was approximately 16,324 square kilometers (about 6,300 square miles), of which 4,574 square kilometers (1,750 square miles) were cultivable.

The Refugee Office estimated the total value of this abandoned land at about 100 million Palestine pounds (about $280 million) and concluded that the approximate value of movable property belonging to the refugees before their exodus was 20 million Palestine pounds (about $56 million). These estimates, however, were strongly criticized by the Arab parties and refugee representatives as being too low.

The Refugee Office also prepared an initial plan for individual assessment of refugee properties. This task was later assigned to the UNCCP's Office for the Identification and Valuation of Arab Refugee Properties (Technical Office), whose work spanned the years 1952 to 1966. The Arab countries strongly criticized the Technical Office's work, especially with regard to the noninclusion of the vast majority of the Negev lands. Moreover, from their perspective, the office was by policy not entitled to consider compensation without repatriation. As for Israel, it refused to commit to the Technical Office's assessment and reserved its right to make detailed observations at an appropriate time and on the general question of compensation. During the 1970s, in response to formal requests from interested parties, the commission decided to make available copies of certain land records, with the understanding that the recipients would continue to treat valuation figures on a confidential basis.

The technical work done by the UNCCP is of great importance because it delineates Palestinian property and other losses. In UNGA Resolution 51/129 of 1996, the General Assembly requested the secretary-general to undertake efforts to "preserve and modernize the existing records" of the UNCCP. In response, the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People decided to reallocate part of its financial resources over the period of two years to cover the expenses of the modernization project in cooperation with the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. A private company under supervision of the UN Division for Palestinian Rights carried out the project.

In an annual resolution regarding the Palestine refugees, the General Assembly, in response to the yearly report of the UNCCP, expresses regret that paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) has not been implemented. It also expresses regret that the UNCCP has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the repatriation or compensation of the refugees and requests the UNCCP to exert continued efforts toward Resolution 194's implementation and to report to the General Assembly on the matter.

See also JOHN F. KENNEDY; PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROPERTY CLAIMS; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194

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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 is the 1947 resolution that partitioned Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Following World War II, escalating hostilities between Arabs and Jews over the fate of Palestine and between the Zionist militias and the British army compelled Britain to relinquish its Mandate over Palestine in 1948. The British requested that the recently established UNITED NATIONS determine the future of Palestine. A UN-appointed committee—the UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP)—of representatives from various countries went to Palestine to investigate the situation. Although members of this committee disagreed on the form that a political resolution should take, there was general agreement that the country would have to be divided to satisfy the needs and demands of both Jews and Palestinian Arabs.

At the end of 1946, 1.3 million Palestinian Arabs and 608,000 Jews resided within the BORDERS of BRITISH MANDATE Palestine. Jews had purchased approximately 7 percent of the total LAND area of Palestine, amounting to about 20 percent of the arable land. When, on 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted to partition Palestine, it divided the country in such a way that each state would have a majority of its own population. Nevertheless, some Jewish SETTLEMENTS would have fallen within the proposed Palestinian state, and many Palestinians would have become part of the proposed Jewish state. Despite the larger Palestinian landownership and population, the territory allotted to the Jewish state was larger than the Palestinian state (56 percent and 43 percent of Palestine, respectively). The resolution stipulated an economic union between the states, and the area of JERUSALEM and BETHLEHEM was to become an international trusteeship under permanent United Nations authority. Highlights of the resolution follow.

Holy Sites

Freedom of "access, visit, and transit shall be guaranteed" to Muslim and Jewish holy places, "in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other state [i.e., Israel and Palestine] and of the City of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum."

Religious and Minority Rights

"No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (or by a Jew in the Arab State) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation, full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession."


Economic Union and Transit

The provisional councils of the government of each state would work together to establish an economic union "utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and cooperation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States." The objectives of the economic union were to achieve or establish (1) a customs union; (2) a joint currency system with a single foreign exchange rate; (3) operation in the common interest on a nondiscriminatory basis of railways and interstate highways; postal, telephone, and telegraphic services; and ports and airports for international trade and commerce; (4) joint economic development, especially for irrigation, land reclamation, and soil conservation; and (5) access for both states and Jerusalem to WATER and power facilities.

Jerusalem

The city was to be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime administered by the United Nations, which would hand over its power to a trusteeship council designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations. Jerusalem's boundaries would include the present municipality plus the surrounding villages and towns, bordered on the east by ABU DIS, on the south by Bethlehem, on the west by 'Ein Karim (including the built-up area of Motsa), and on the north by Shu'fat.

Publicly, the Zionist leadership accepted the UN partition plan but considered it only a first step to controlling all of Palestine. Zionist leaders were extremely concerned about the large number of Palestinians who would become part of the Jewish state. The Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding



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Map 42. Borders Stipulated in UN Resolution 181 Compared with Israel's Borders after 1948 War

Arab states rejected the UN plan and regarded the General Assembly vote as an international betrayal. Although some argued that the UN plan allotted too much territory to the Jews, most Arabs regarded the proposed Jewish state as a settler colony and argued that it was only because the British had permitted extensive Zionist settlement in Palestine, against the wishes of the Arab majority, that the question of Jewish statehood was on the international agenda at all.

Immediately after the United Nations announced the resolution, sporadic demonstrations

and some violence occurred among the Palestinians against the Jews, but it waned within a few days. Within weeks, however, in December 1947, the HAGANA and other Jewish underground groups began a campaign to depopulate the Palestinian areas that fell within the boundaries of the Jewish state, an operation that continued unabated through 1948. The Arab states fulminated but took no action, while DAVID BEN-GURION expressed satisfaction with the de-Arabization process: "We are told the army had the ability of destroying a whole village and taking out all its inhabitants, let's do it." And further, "Every attack has to end with occupation, destruction and expulsion." As Israeli historian Ilan Pappé notes, "Ben-Gurion meant that the entire population of a village had to be removed, everything in it leveled to the ground, and its history destroyed. In its place, a new Jewish settlement would emerge." Significantly, the ethnic cleansing began and progressed while the British Mandate authority was still in Palestine—not until 15 May 1948 was the Mandate terminated.

On the day the British officially evacuated Palestine, Zionist leaders proclaimed the state of Israel. Neighboring Arab states (EGYPT, LEBANON, SYRIA, JORDAN, and IRAQ) then invaded that part of Palestine allotted to the Palestinians in an effort to prevent Jewish forces from seizing the area. In 1949 the war between Israel and the Arab states ended with the signing of ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS. Some 750,000 Palestinians had been dispossessed and had become REFUGEES. The country once known as Palestine was now divided into three parts, each under separate political control. The state of Israel encompassed some 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine, including West Jerusalem (up from the 56 percent stipulated in Resolution 181). Jordan occupied East Jerusalem and the hill country of central Palestine (the WEST BANK), and Egypt took control of the coastal plain around the city of Gaza (the GAZA STRIP). Although the Palestinian Arab state envisioned by the UN partition plan was never established, Resolution 181 remains as valid today as when it was adopted and still provides the legal basis for an independent Palestinian state.

See also UNITED NATIONS; WAR, 1948

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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194

Resolution 194 consists of fifteen articles, the most well-known being Article 11, which calls for return or repatriation to Palestine/Israel of the Palestinian REFUGEES and for their compensation. The UNITED NATIONS General Assembly passed Resolution 194 on 11 December 1948, near the end of the 1948 WAR. It expresses appreciation for the efforts of UN envoy COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE after his TARGETED ASSASSINATION by militant Zionists. It deals with the situation in Palestine at the time, including the role of the UN CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE. Other relevant articles are Article 7 (protection and free access to Jewish and Muslim HOLY SITES), Article 8 (demilitarization and UN control over JERUSALEM), and Article 9 (free access to Jerusalem).

Article 11, which continues to be significant and relevant, "resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors, should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return, and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible." The article "[i]nstructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

Resolution 194 was the international response to the exodus of more than 750,000 Palestinians from Palestine/Israel during the 1948 War. Consistent with existing principles of refugee law and practice, the resolution created a special inter-

national body to provide protection and seek durable solutions for Palestinian refugees. Until the establishment of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950, the international community largely dealt with refugee flows in an ad hoc fashion and as problems solely involving the directly affected states.

The emphasis on "return" in Resolution 194 was unique only in terms of the focus on returning to Palestine. Until the Palestinian situation, most refugee crises involved third-country resettlement and population exchanges or transfers—such as for European war refugees who did not wish to return to their homes of origin. Moreover, numerous historical precedents for restitution of property already existed by 1948, when Palestinians were displaced from their homeland. Resolution 194 embodied international legal principles that were already binding on states and continue to be binding today.

Resolution 194, paragraph 11, affirms three separate rights—the right of return, the right to restitution, and the right to compensation—and two distinct solutions regarding return—restitution and compensation *or* resettlement, restitution, and compensation governed by the principle of individual refugee choice. Most analysts consider the primary durable solution for Palestinian refugees as return, restitution, and compensation for loss of or damage to property. Resolution 194 *does not* resolve that Palestinian refugees should be resettled in other states. The right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes is mentioned nine times in UN mediator Bernadotte's September 1948 progress report to the Conciliation Commission. "[N]o settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the homes from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine." He concludes that "the right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective."

Although no aspect of Resolution 194 has been implemented, which constitutes a serious breach of international law and United Nations legitimacy, it remains the preeminent resolution concerning the majority of Palestinian refugees and any peace agreement that is not consistent with this resolution, in effect or with intent, will likely be questioned or even rejected by the refugees themselves. That Israel wishes to maintain itself as an ethnically "Jewish" state does not negate the fundamental rights of the people originally dispossessed so that a Jewish state could come into being.

See also REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN

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United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379

On 10 November 1975 the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 3379, which stated that "ZIONISM was a form of Racism and racial discrimination." The resolution passed by 72 to 35 with 32 abstentions. It was mainly supported by the developing countries, including Arab, African, and Soviet-bloc states.

The resolution was adopted in the context of continued Israeli OCCUPATION and oppression of the Palestinians in the territories it had seized in the 1967 WAR plus its refusal to recognize or negotiate with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, as well as to some extent against the background of Israeli economic and military cooperation with the apartheid regime of South Africa.

Although it was the UNITED NATIONS that created and legitimized Israel in its 1947 UN RESOLUTION 181, one of the practical effects of Resolution 3379 was to eliminate permanently any moral influence of the United Nations on the Jewish Israeli public. However, as early as 1949, Israel evidenced disregard for the United Nations and its resolutions. Others suggest that the resolution gave great impetus to the most extreme Zionist politicians, who asserted that Israel was completely surrounded by enemies and could never expect any justice from the international community. Long before 1975, however, such propaganda was prevalent in some circles and not just among the "extremists." Others argue that the "Zionist is

Racism" resolution became the justification for establishment of new SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK and stymied attempts to further a negotiated solution. Events on the ground and an analysis of Israeli policymaking do not support such assertions. ARIEL SHARON, for example, did not intensely promote the settlement project and refuse to deal with the Palestinians because of Resolution 3379; rather he had been pushing the settlement program since immediately after the 1967 WAR.

In 1991, when President GEORGE H. W. BUSH and his secretary of state, GEORGE SHULTZ, were attempting to organize the MADRID CONFERENCE, Israel made revocation of Resolution 3379 a condition of its participation in the peace conference. The Bush administration employed a great deal of pressure and political capital in the General Assembly and was successful. Resolution 3379 was revoked on 16 December 1991 by UN General Assembly Resolution 46/86, which passed by a vote of 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions. President Bush personally introduced the motion for revocation of Resolution 3379.

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United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

See UNITED NATIONS

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338

On 22 November 1967, in the aftermath of the 1967 WAR, the UNITED NATIONS Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 (S/RES/242) calling for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict" in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The "territories" refer to the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, the GAZA STRIP, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights, which were conquered by Israel in the 1967 War. The resolution embodies the Security Council's basic program for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular, ending the state of belligerency among EGYPT, JORDAN, SYRIA, and Israel. It insists upon the termination of all states of war in the area; guarantees the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of all Middle Eastern nations; and calls for a "just settlement" of the REFUGEE question.

Owing to vigorous Israeli diplomacy in the person of ABBA EBAN, the resolution contains a built-in ambiguity reflected in the differing French and English versions. The French version, accepted by the entire international community except the UNITED STATES and Israel, calls for "Israeli withdrawal from *the territories*" (emphasis added), which implies withdrawal from *all* the territories occupied in 1967, including the West Bank and Gaza. The English version calls for "Israeli withdrawal *from territories*" (emphasis added), which Israel has used to argue that it is required to withdraw from *some* territories, which it fulfilled with the return of the Sinai in the Israeli-Egyptian treaty, but not *all* the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Besides Israel and the United States, no other country accepts this interpretation of the resolution.

The essence of Resolution 242 is the principle of "land for peace"—Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in exchange for peace with its Arab neighbors. At the time, this was an important advance, considering that there were no peace treaties between any Arab state and Israel. Yet land for peace only served once as the basis for Israeli-Arab state peace treaties—in the 1979 Israel-Egypt treaty, in which Israel retreated from the Sinai Peninsula (and Egypt withdrew its claims to the Gaza Strip). Jordan and Israel signed a treaty of peace in 1994, but that accord did not involve land for peace because Israel refused to return the West Bank, and Jordan acceded. The Jordan River marks the demarcation line as the border between Israel and Jordan, although the status of the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem remains unresolved.

On 23 November 1967, the UN secretary-general appointed Gunnar Jarring as special envoy to negotiate the implementation of Resolution 242 with the parties—the so-called Jarring mission. The governments of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon recognized Jarring's appointment and

agreed to participate in his shuttle diplomacy, although they differed on key points of interpretation of the resolution. The government of Syria rejected Jarring's mission on the grounds that total Israeli withdrawal from all Occupied Territories was a prerequisite for further negotiations. Under Jarring's auspices, the talks lasted until 1973 but bore no results. In the meantime, the United States proposed the so-called ROGERS PLAN (1969), which all the parties also rejected. After 1973, bilateral and multilateral peace efforts replaced the Jarring mission.

After the OCTOBER WAR of 1973, the Security Council passed Resolution 338, which was a restatement of Resolution 242.

Later, Tel Aviv showed some interest in peace with Syria by haggling with Damascus over the Golan Heights on such issues as security, access to WATER resources, and whether the border should be the 1949 line or the 1967 boundary. Throughout the 1990s and beyond there were several Israeli-Syrian negotiations regarding a normalization of relations, but a Tel Aviv–Damascus accord has proved elusive—primarily because Israel has no real desire to return the Golan Heights. Under intense Israeli pressure, LEBANON and Israel signed a peace treaty after Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR. On 17 May 1983, Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel and Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN initialed the agreement, which involved no exchange of territory. On 14 September Bashir was assassinated, and his brother, Amin Gemayel, became president, whereupon he abrogated the treaty.

In addition to disagreements on interpretation of Resolution 242 ("the" or not), the two sides have also disagreed over its implementation. Israel generally focuses on the latter part of the resolution, which calls for the "termination of all states of belligerency" in the area, and thus views the refusal of the Arab states to formally end the official state of war as a continuing breach of 242. On the other hand, the Arab states have repeatedly offered Israel full peace and recognition in exchange for territory, but Israel has preferred to hold on to the Palestinian territories. The most recent proposal was the 2002 ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, which all the Arab states signed.

After territorial issues, perhaps the most widely disputed element of 242 is the call for "a just settlement of the refugee problem." Israel continues to refuse to consider any large-scale repatriation of Palestinian refugees in Israeli territory, claiming that such a move would undermine the Jewish character of the state and lead to its collapse. Moreover, Tel Aviv refuses to compensate Palestinian refugees. Israel's official stand is that refugees must be resettled either where they currently live or in a newly constituted Palestinian state, at such time as it might be established. Recent evidence suggests that a moderate Palestinian leadership would accept a "symbolic right of return" (a few thousand refugees) to Israel in the framework of an overall peace agreement, along with an acknowledgment from Israel of its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem. Israel rejects this compromise.

Moreover, although the resolution advocates a "just settlement of the refugee problem," it does not specifically mention the Palestinians or their political and national rights. This was the main reason that the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) rejected the resolution until 1988, when the PLO's legislative body, the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, voted to recognize Israel unilaterally within the pre-1967 lines and to accept Resolution 242. At least symbolically, the resolution served as the basis for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that led to the OSLO ACCORDS. Their main premise, the eventual creation of a Palestinian state in some of the Occupied Territories in return for Palestinian recognition of Israel, is the land-for-peace principle. However, Israel is adamant that it will not withdraw its SETTLEMENTS from the West Bank and that Jerusalem will remain a united, sovereign Israeli city instead of having shared sovereignty. In the context of the OSLO PROCESS, Israel, with US backing, took the position that the Oslo Accords superseded Resolution 242 (and other relevant UN resolutions) and that the Occupied Territories are "disputed," not "occupied." No other state in the international system accepts this premise, but because the United States does, the land-for-peace formula has been effectively removed from the political agenda. As of 2009, nothing had come of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and it did not appear that anything resembling an independent Palestinian state would emerge.

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United Nations Special Committee on Palestine

On 15 May 1947 the UNITED NATIONS General Assembly, after deliberating for three weeks in a special session devoted to the deteriorating situation in Palestine, voted to create an eleven-member committee of inquiry. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was instructed by the General Assembly to investigate "all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine" and report back no later than 1 September 1947 "with such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine."

The General Assembly assumed responsibility for Palestine after a formal request by the British government on 2 April 1947 that the United Nations find a solution for the fate of its Mandate territory. The eleven countries selected to serve on UNSCOP were Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Guatemala, IRAN, the Netherlands, Peru, SWEDEN, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The representatives, selected by their countries, were a collection of senior diplomats, jurists, and former politicians. The committee chose Emil Sandstrom of Sweden, a former Supreme Court justice, as its chair. Victor Hoo, the UN assistant secretary-general, served as the representative of the UN secretary-general to the committee, aided by Ralph Bunche.

The UNSCOP members arrived in Palestine on 15 June 1947 and set up their operations in JERUSALEM. After receiving a private briefing from the BRITISH MANDATE government, the committee toured Palestine between 18 June and 3 July, visiting all of the major Palestinian, Jewish, and mixed cities; the Galilee; the Negev; and several Jewish agricultural settlements. From 4 to 17 July, UNSCOP held twelve public meetings and received evidence from a number of organizations, primarily those representing the Jewish Yishuv. Zionist leaders DAVID BEN-GURION and CHAIM WEIZMANN made oral presentations to the committee, supporting the argument for the partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states.

In contrast, the committee had little exposure to Palestinian organizations. The ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, the leading (and fractious) umbrella organization that comprised much of the Palestinian leadership, had decided to boycott UNSCOP, claiming that its conclusions were predetermined and hostile. It would not permit even informal meetings with the committee. To compensate for the missing Palestinian perspective, UNSCOP proceeded to Beirut on 20 July and met with representatives of the ARAB LEAGUE. In these meetings, the committee was told that the neighboring Arab governments were opposed to partition, to further Jewish IMMIGRATION, and to a Jewish state in Palestine. The Arab League representatives advocated a Palestinian state with constitutional guarantees for minority political and religious rights. Some members of the committee also met with King Abdullah of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) in Amman.

While the committee was in Palestine and LEBANON, the conflict around it sharpened. In late June the Stern Gang (LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL, the militant underground group) killed three British soldiers. The British army hanged three IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI terrorists in late July, and the Irgun retaliated by hanging two British sergeants later the same day. Most dramatically, on 18 July the British navy captured the *Exodus* near HAIFA, Palestine, with 4,500 Jewish refugees on board and sent it back to Europe. The *Exodus* had been attempting to breach the British restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine, which had been put in place to improve the DEMOGRAPHY equilibrium between Palestinians and Jews. Several committee members, including the chair, witnessed the *Exodus* incident.

The committee reconvened in Geneva on 6 August and began the process of drafting its report. While in Geneva, UNSCOP created a subcommittee to visit a number of Jewish displaced persons camps in Austria and GERMANY to determine the strength of the sentiment among Jewish refugees for resettlement in Palestine. The subcommittee interviewed a small number of HOLOCAUST refugees and determined that the "overwhelming majority of the persons questioned affirmed that they would not consider resettlement in any country except Palestine." In its report to the full committee, the subcommittee stated that it was

struck by the "squalor, misery and over-crowding" of the camps. This report proved influential, as a majority of the UNSCOP subsequently accepted the principle of linking the Jewish refugees in Europe with the future of Palestine.

As the reconvened committee contemplated the options for the future political structure of Palestine, it drew a list of six possible alternatives: (1) a unitary Jewish state, (2) a unitary Arab state, (3) a binational STATE, (4) a federal state, (5) a cantonization of Palestine, and (6) partition into two separate Jewish and Arab states. The committee accepted that the British Mandate had to end soon, independence of some sort had to be granted, and any form of international trusteeship could only be a short-term solution. Early in its deliberations in Geneva, the committee ruled out both a unitary Arab state and a unitary Jewish state as unfair and unworkable. A majority of the committee also dismissed the viability of BINATIONALISM, which had been advocated by JUDAH MAGNES, the president of Hebrew University. Cantonization offered too weak a political structure to be considered a promising option, and most members had been persuaded during their time in Palestine that sustained cooperation between the two communities was unlikely. This left two options as the only serious alternatives: federation and partition.

Seven members of the committee—Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay—adopted the partition option, stating that "the two intense nationalisms" make "partition . . . the most realistic and viable settlement." Ivan Rand of Canada, while supporting the creation of two separate states, advocated an economic union between the two as well as the internationalization of Jerusalem. These features were accepted by the rest of the majority members. For the majority, a separate Jewish state with control over immigration was the only realistic political structure that could solve the problem of the European Jewish refugees. Three members of the committee—India, Iran, and Yugoslavia—favored a federal structure, which would have a federal legislature but with separate Jewish and Palestinian political institutions, each having control over local affairs. In their view, partition was an artificial solution that "could not possibly provide for two reasonably viable states." One member, Australia, took no position on the options.

The committee members signed the final report, containing both the majority and minority positions, on the evening of 31 August 1947, within minutes of the expiration of their mandate. The report listed unanimous agreement on eleven general principles, including protection for Jewish and Muslim holy sites and religious interests, the urgent amelioration of the Jewish refugee problem in Europe, the protection of minorities in Palestine, and the continued economic unity of Palestine. In addition, eight members recommended that "it be accepted as incontrovertible that any solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in general."

The majority report recommended the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab state, with the city of Jerusalem under an international trusteeship (*corpus separatum*) under the United Nations. The two states would sign a treaty to establish an economic union, and they would share with Jerusalem a common currency and a customs union. The Jewish and Arab states would become independent no later than 1 September 1949, provided that they each enacted a constitution that would provide specified guarantees, including minority religious and political rights. During the transition period, Britain would continue the administration of Palestine under the supervision of the United Nations. In addition, the constitutions would each provide for the creation of a legislative body that would be elected by universal suffrage and secret ballots on the basis of proportional representation. During the transition period, 150,000 Jews were to be admitted into Palestine. The majority report also provided a detailed map with proposed boundaries for the two states and Jerusalem. Under the majority proposal, the Jewish state would comprise approximately 62 percent of the land of Palestine, and exactly half the population would be Palestinian Arab, counting the BEDOUIN.

The minority report proposed a federal state, with Jerusalem as its capital and with a common federal legislature but separate Jewish and Arab local states. Independence for the federal state would occur after a transition period of no more than three years. The federal state would have an executive and two legislative chambers, one based on proportional representation and the other based on equal representation of the two populations. The vote of both chambers would be required to adopt legislation, and a deadlock would be resolved by a designated arbitral body. The constitution of the federal state would include both

minority guarantees and civil rights for all and provide for a common citizenship. The two states would have full powers of local self-government, and an international commission would control immigration to the Jewish local state.

The UNSCOP report, in five volumes, was delivered to the General Assembly on 1 September. The majority report formed the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 181, passed on 29 November 1947. The partition boundaries proposed by the majority report for the two independent states were altered slightly by the General Assembly, with the size of the proposed Jewish state reduced to approximately 55 percent of Mandate Palestine. The majority report's recommendations for Jerusalem and an economic union were largely adopted by Resolution 181.

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—Michael Lynk

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was created on 14 May 1948 to assist the special mediator for Palestine (at the time Count Folke Bernadotte) in enforcing the first truce in the 1948 War between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which went into effect in May 1948 and lasted ten days. UNTSO also supervised the second, four-week truce in July–August. Most important, with the conclusion of four general Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1949, UNTSO's function was extended to assist the parties in supervising the application and observance of those truces. UNTSO became an autonomous operation, officially a subsidiary organ of the United Nations Security Council, with the chief of staff of UNTSO assuming command.

Sixty years later, UNTSO's 152 military observers, supported by UN international and local civilian staff, are still deployed throughout the Middle East region, and their mandate has not changed. They continue to observe and maintain the unconditional cease-fire ordered by the Security Council pending final peace settlements and to assist the parties as necessary in the supervision and observance of the terms of the Armistice Agreements. With headquarters in Jerusalem and offices in Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus, Syria, UNTSO operates in the areas of southern Lebanon, the Syrian Heights (later renamed Golan), and the Sinai Peninsula.

Since 1949 the region has experienced a number of wars that changed the territorial cease-fire lines. Following the wars of 1956, 1967, and 1973, UNTSO's functions changed in the light of changing circumstances, but its military observers remained in the area, acting as go-betweens for the hostile parties and as a means by which isolated incidents could be contained and prevented from escalating into major conflicts. Because there is no element of enforcement in their functioning, the military observers operate with the consent of the parties and are dependent on the cooperation of the parties for their effectiveness.

In the Israel-Syria sector, UNTSO military observers are attached to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, which controls eleven observation posts located near the area of separation on the Golan Heights and in the area of the cease-fire lines on both sides. They conduct fortnightly inspections of the areas regarding limitation in armaments and forces as provided for under the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement of 1974. In the Lebanon-Israel sector, the observers are assigned to assist the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the fulfillment of its tasks. At present, operating from Naqoura (South Lebanon), they maintain five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Armistice Demarcation Line, conduct patrols, and carry out liaison duties with parties active in and around the UNIFIL area of operation. And in the Egypt-Israel sector, UNTSO observers, based in

Ismailia, Egypt, conduct patrols to ensure no cross-border infiltrations along the Suez Canal and throughout the Sinai Peninsula except for an area under the independent (non-UN) Multinational Force and Observers. In addition, UNTSO has maintained the machinery for the supervision of the Armistice Agreements in those sectors not covered by the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

UNTSO observers cooperated closely with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was deployed in the Sinai in the aftermath of the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR. After the 1967 WAR UNTSO observers demarcated the cease-fire lines and established two cease-fire observation operations—in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. In 1972 a similar operation was set up in southern Lebanon, without the agreement of Israel. The OCTOBER WAR of 1973, through which UNTSO continued to function, resulted in a further arrangement that included the establishment of a new, armed UN force assigned to staff a buffer zone in the Sinai desert.

Until 1967, UNTSO observers continued to conduct patrols along the Armistice Demarcation Line and also supervised a neutral zone in Jerusalem and two demilitarized zones in the Egyptian El Auja area and near Lake Tiberias (the Ein Gev and Dardara sectors). In the 1950s a number of observation posts were established along the Israel-Syria demarcation line. Israel refused to "compromise its sovereignty" by allowing UNEF on its territory, and its resistance to certain aspects of the work of UNTSO made it difficult for the Truce Supervision Organization to protect it. The responsibility for the cease-fire observation operations was entrusted to the UNTSO chief of staff in Palestine and to the UN military observers assigned to that mission. At the same time, UNTSO had continued to maintain the machinery for the supervision of the Armistice Agreements, but as Israel ceased to recognize those agreements, UNTSO was unable to carry out its functions and duties between Syria and Israel.


UNTSO played an important role in several issues involving Israel. When the 1948 War ended, the only parts of the northern sector of BRITISH MANDATE Palestine not occupied by Israel were the areas along the Jordan River controlled by Syria. Although Israel insisted on retaining all the territory it had seized in the war that had been designated for the Palestinian state, it demanded that Syria not be allowed to remain in the areas that it occupied after the war. UN mediator Ralph Bunche convinced Syria to withdraw on the understanding that the sovereignty of the three demilitarized zones (DMZs) (totaling 66.5 square miles) would remain undetermined until a peace settlement.

The smallest DMZ, in the northeast salient of the Israeli-Syrian frontier near Bani Yas Spring, was uninhabited, although Palestinians used the land for farming and grazing. The central DMZ was a narrow strip that stretched from the southern edge of Lake Huleh to the northern tip of Lake Tiberias, straddling the Jordan River with a triangular bulge in the middle. It contained one Jewish settlement, Mishmar HaYarden, and four Palestinian villages: Kirad al-Baqqara, Kirad al-Ghannama, Mansurat al-Kheit, and Yarda. The largest DMZ was the southern sector, which began about halfway along the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias, ran south to the tip of the lake, and then jutted east to meet the Yarmuk River where the borders of Syria, Israel, and Jordan meet. It contained one Jewish settlement, Ein Gev, and three Palestinian villages: al-Hamma, Nuqeib, and al-Samra.

Each DMZ represented two concentric circles: the DMZ (a completely demilitarized inner core) and an outer shell limited to defense forces, and both circles were monitored by UNTSO. UNTSO's responsibilities were linked to the work of the Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs), which were set up by the Armistice Agreements and chaired by the UNTSO chief of staff. Their main task was the investigation and examination (by UNTSO observers) of the claims or complaints presented by the parties relating to the application and observance of the Armistice Agreements.

Tensions built in the early 1950s as Jews in increasing numbers moved into the Upper Galilee and established settlements and farms on Palestinian property. In 1950 the Israelis established a new KIBBUTZ at Beit Katzir in the southern DMZ. Like most of the kibbutzim in troubled areas, it was fortified with trenches and a double-apron barbed-wire fence from behind which its settlers sallied out to cultivate the surrounding land. They dug a system of irrigation canals to move the WATER from Lake Tiberias, and before long no Arab farmer in the area was allowed into the stretch of land between the kibbutz and the lake.

From here they extended their activities so that the inhabitants of the two neighboring Arab villages, Lower and Upper Tawafiq, observed the



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Map 43. Israel-Syria: Demilitarized Zones, 1949

kibbutz tractor drivers swerving out at each turn along the eastern boundaries of their fields, thus slowly but surely extending their "previous" cultivation eastward into Palestinian land.

This was part of a premeditated Israeli policy to edge east through the DMZ toward the old Palestine border and to push all the Arabs out of the area. Gradually, beneath the glowering eyes of the Syrians, who held the high ground overlooking the zone, the area had become a network of Israeli canals and irrigation channels edging up against and encroaching on Arab-owned property. Israel then undertook a series of specific moves that enraged Syria and Jordan. On 21 January 1951 the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND and the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION agreed to help finance a $250 million development project that included drainage of the 15,000-acre Huleh Marshes (an integral part of the Jordan River system) for irrigation of the Negev and the Jerusalem corridor. Almost from the beginning, it was obvious that the drainage channels would impinge on Syrian territory within the central DMZ. On 13 March 1951 Israel began digging a drainage ditch. The Syrian-Israeli MAC examined Syria's complaint and ruled that the Israeli project "constitutes a flagrant violation" of the armistice. On 24 March 1951 Israel for the first time asserted that it held sovereignty over the zone and thus had a right to proceed; it then resumed digging in the DMZ. Clashes between Syrian and Israeli forces ensued. On 30 March Israel retaliated by expelling 785 Palestinians from the three villages in the central DMZ and bulldozing their homes. On 4 April seven Israeli soldiers on patrol were killed in an ambush by Syrian troops. The next day the Israeli cabinet decided, in secret, that the DMZs should be "cleared of Arabs [Palestinians]." On that same day, Israel bombed the Al-Hamma district in the southern DMZ, killing two Palestinian women and wounding other civilians. Though the UNITED STATES protested that the Israeli actions were "in no way justified," about 1,200 Palestinians in the central and southern sections were forced out, and Syria's counterattack was repulsed. On 18 May 1951 UN Security Council Resolution 92 called on Israel to stop draining the marshes of Lake Huleh and allow the return of the Palestinians. Israel prevented all but 350 of them from returning. On 20 June 1951 Israel informed the UNTSO that it would no longer attend meetings of the Syrian-Israeli MAC as long as complaints involving the DMZs were on the agenda. Israel argued that since it alone had sovereignty over the zones, Syria had no rights and therefore no standing to discuss the zones.

UNTSO chief of staff General Burns made the following observation: "The Israelis claimed sovereignty over the territory covered by the DMZ. . . . They then proceeded, as opportunity offered, to encroach on the specific restrictions and so eventually to free themselves, on various pretexts, from all of them. Thus, Israel immobilized the MAC. Further, Israel refused to allow UN observers to demarcate the line of the DMZs and thereby no one was ever sure exactly where the line lay."

In September 1953, Israel launched a diversion project on a nine-mile channel midway between the Huleh Marshes and Lake Tiberias in the central DMZ. The plan was to divert enough water to help irrigate the coastal Sharon Plain and eventually the entire Negev desert. Syria claimed the plan would dry up 12,000 acres of Syrian land. The UNTSO chief of staff, Major General Vagn Bennike of Denmark, noted that the project was denying water to two Palestinian water mills, was drying up Palestinian farmland, and was a substantial military benefit for Israel against Syria. The United States temporarily cut off aid to Israel, but the Israeli response was to clandestinely increase work. UN Security Council Resolution 100 asked Israel to stop work pending an investigation. Israel finally backed off but only briefly.

On 11 December 1955, under the command of ARIEL SHARON, Israel launched "Operation Kinneret," attacking Syrian military posts and the village of Kursi outside the DMZ, near the northeast shore of Lake Tiberias. Fifty-six Syrians were killed while Israel lost six soldiers. The United States expressed "shock" at Israel's "flagrant violation" of the Armistice Agreement. Israel was hoping Damascus would attack, and the purpose of the strike was to provoke Egypt into honoring its mutual defense pact with Syria, thereby igniting the war Israel sought with Egypt. However, Egypt did not take the bait, and Israel had to wait almost a year for the SINAI/SUEZ WAR. Israel also had in mind its long-term policy of establishing exclusive control over Lake Tiberias.

On 30 October 1956 Israel attacked Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula, and drove the remainder of the Palestinians living in the DMZs into Syria. Commenting on this, UNTSO chief of staff Odd Bull of NORWAY observed: "I imagine that a number of those evicted settled somewhere in the

Syrian [Golan] Heights and that their children have watched the land that had been in their families for hundreds of years being cultivated by Israeli farmers. From time to time, they opened fire on these farmers. That, of course, was a violation of the armistice agreement, though I could not help thinking that in similar circumstances Norwegian peasants would almost certainly have acted in the same way. In the course of time all Arab villages disappeared." By late 1956, Israel had quietly resumed work on its water diversion plan called the National Water Carrier, but it avoided the DMZs and thereby US objections. It diverted water directly from Lake Tiberias, sending it to irrigate the northern section of the Negev desert. It did this without consulting Syria and Jordan, riparian states with the right of consultation on usage of joint waters. However, the precedent was set, and the Arab states felt free to develop their own schemes. In August 1956, Jordan began work, without consulting Israel, on the East Ghor canal to siphon water from the Yarmuk River before it joined the Jordan. However, there was a major difference between the Israeli National Water Carrier and the Jordanian plan. The Jordanian plan returned the water within the Jordan River complex. The Israeli plan removed the water to the Negev, thus depriving Syria and Jordan of their share. Israel condemned the Jordanian plan and bombed and destroyed the canal. These were some of the issues that led to the 1967 War.

At present UNTSO continues to play a role in Middle East developments, fulfilling its mandate with professionalism and sometimes the ultimate sacrifice. Since its start, twenty-seven UNTSO staff members have lost their lives in the line of duty.

See also ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS; WATER

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United States

The close relationship between the United States and Israel has been one of the most salient features in US foreign policy since Israel's founding in 1948 and particularly since the late 1960s. Since the early 1970s, Congress has authorized an average of more than $3 billion annually in military and economic aid to Israel. Supporters of this policy include liberals who normally challenge US aid to governments that engage in human rights violations and conservatives who usually oppose foreign aid in general. Although virtually all Western countries share the United States' strong support for Israel's legitimate right to exist in peace and security, none comes close to giving Israel the level of diplomatic support provided by Washington. Frequently, the United States is the only country supporting Israel at the UNITED NATIONS and other international forums when objections are raised over ongoing Israeli violations of INTERNATIONAL LAW and human rights norms.

By contrast, the US government has traditionally been hostile to Palestinian national aspirations. The United States ended its formal opposition to

Palestinian statehood only in 1993 after the signing of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). In 2002, Washington finally went on record as supporting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, although only if the Palestinians met specific conditions—for example, eliminating corruption within the PLO, ending all acts of violence against Israelis, and accepting Israel's definition of its national BORDERS and Israel's restrictions on Palestinian autonomy. Over the years, the United States has provided some financial support for UN relief operations for Palestinian REFUGEES and for various development projects by nongovernmental organizations in the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP, although from the outset, it severely limited direct support for the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA).

History of the US Role in the Conflict

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel, just minutes after its DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE on 14 May 1948. US president HARRY S TRUMAN (1945–1953) had strongly encouraged Great Britain, which held the Mandate to govern Palestine, to support the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Truman was also among the first US political leaders to promote the idea that US backing for Israel would be beneficial in advancing US strategic objectives in the region as well as a popular policy domestically. Still, during Israel's first twenty years, the United States was relatively cautious and balanced regarding Israel's conflict with its Arab neighbors, and it provided little direct military or economic aid to Israel. While Great Britain and FRANCE emerged as Israel's chief foreign backers, on a number of occasions the United States directly challenged Israeli policies that it thought could destabilize the region and threaten US interests.

For example, during the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR, when Israel, Great Britain, and France attacked EGYPT, President DWIGHT EISENHOWER's administration (1953–1961) strongly opposed the invasion, both at the United Nations and in harshly worded communications to the invading governments. US officials feared that to do otherwise would leave the Soviet Union as the only major power to object to what most of the international community saw as a blatant act of neocolonialism and imperialism, and that would push much of the Arab and Islamic world to align with MOSCOW. There was also concern that the tripartite aggression would create a dangerous precedent, in that such an overt violation of the UN Charter could risk a breakdown of the post–World War II international legal system critical to international stability. Eisenhower's threat of US economic sanctions against Britain and France, which were still heavily in debt to the United States from World War II, as well as his threat to end the tax-deductible status of American Jewish charities supporting the Israeli government, forced a withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt within a relatively short time. (France and Britain withdrew in December, and Israeli forces pulled back in March 1957.) Even though Eisenhower's confrontation with Israel met with strong objections from leading American Zionist groups, and despite it being the eve of a presidential election, he was reelected by a landslide.

Similarly, President JOHN F. KENNEDY (1961–1963) challenged Israel's resistance to the JOHNSTON PLAN regarding Jordan River WATER rights, as well as its periodic armed clashes with SYRIA and its burgeoning NUCLEAR PROGRAM at Dimona. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy also pursued a relatively balanced US policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, advocating restrictions on arms transfers and repatriation and compensation for Palestinian refugees.

The strong tilt in support for Israel began during the administration of LYNDON JOHNSON (1963–1969), when in 1966 the United States first approved the sale of offensive weapons to Israel. The Johnson administration backed Israel over the Arab states in the 1967 WAR, even to the point of covering up an apparently deliberate Israeli attack on the US spy ship *LIBERTY*. Together with Great Britain, the United States was the principal sponsor of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which established the land-for-peace formula that formed the basis of all subsequent peace efforts until the OSLO ACCORDS (1993).

It was during RICHARD NIXON's administration (1969–1974), however, under the leadership of National Security Adviser (and later Secretary of State) HENRY KISSINGER, that the United States first became Israel's principal foreign supporter. During this period, Washington commenced large-scale military and economic aid to Israel and began using its veto in the United Nations Security Council to block resolutions critical of Israel. In addition, Nixon and Kissinger readily acquiesced to Israel's

nuclear program. In 1969 US Secretary of State WILLIAM ROGERS put forward a peace plan that would have required Israel to return, with some minor alterations, land taken in the 1967 War in return for peace with the Arabs, but Kissinger privately informed the Israelis that the administration would not place pressure on them if they rejected it. When Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made peace overtures toward Israel in 1971, Kissinger advised the Israelis to ignore them, arguing that their military superiority made it possible for them to hold on to occupied Arab lands without fear of negative consequences. As a result, Egypt, along with Syria, attacked Israeli forces in October 1973, advancing into Israeli-occupied territories in the Sinai Peninsula and Syrian (Golan) Heights. A massive US resupply operation enabled Israel to mount a successful counterattack. After the war, the Nixon administration supported disengagement talks under US auspices, rejecting calls for an international peace conference. Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" resulted in a partial pullback of Israeli occupation forces in the Egyptian Sinai to allow for the reopening of the Suez Canal, and also in a smaller Israeli pullback in the Syrian Golan Heights.

During the 1970s, with the emergence of Palestinian nationalism and with the PLO and the Arab states beginning to hint at their openness toward peace with Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, an international consensus began to emerge regarding a TWO-STATE SOLUTION to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but this was rejected by the United States. A 1976 draft UN Security Council resolution reiterating UN Security Council Resolution 242 with an additional proviso that called for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was struck down by a US veto. The United States also ruled out including the Palestinians in peace negotiations, insisting that JORDAN's King Husayn serve as the Palestinians' representative. The United States had strongly backed the Jordanian monarch in the 1970–1971 civil war (BLACK SEPTEMBER) against the Palestinians and their Jordanian leftist allies.

JIMMY CARTER assumed the presidency in 1977 and, after initial unsuccessful efforts to convene an international peace conference cosponsored with the Soviet Union, took advantage of Anwar Sadat's trip to JERUSALEM to push bilateral Israeli-Egyptian talks under US auspices. Strong US diplomatic pressure on both sides resulted in a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt signed at the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland, leading to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory in return for full diplomatic relations and security guarantees. A second accord, not tied to the first, addressed the Palestinians' concerns by calling for a freeze on Jewish SETTLEMENTS and a process for Palestinian self-rule—provisions that Israel failed to carry out and the United States never enforced. In certain respects, the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS were more of a tripartite military pact than a peace agreement in that another annex included provisions for $5 billion in US arms to the two governments, which have been renewed every year since then, as well as increased STRATEGIC COOPERATION between the United States and Israel.

Though strongly committed to Israel and hostile to the PLO, Carter was also willing to challenge Israel on occasion, forcing a partial withdrawal from Lebanese territory after Israel's 1978 incursion and voicing opposition to Israel's settlement policy, both of which the Carter administration saw as violations of international law.

The RONALD REAGAN (1981–1989) administration dramatically increased US support for Israel, then under the leadership of the right-wing LIKUD PARTY government of MENAHEM BEGIN, as part of a broader anticommunist "strategic consensus" of Middle Eastern states that included Arab regimes hostile to Israel but opposed to the Soviet Union and its allied regimes. Though President Reagan successfully overcame vehement opposition from the domestic pro-Israel lobby in pushing through the sale of advanced AWACs airborne radar systems to SAUDI ARABIA, he strongly allied the United States with Israel, seeing it as the United States' most important Cold War asset in the region. In 1983 and 1984 the United States and Israel signed memoranda of understanding on strategic cooperation and military planning and conducted their first joint naval and air military exercises. At the same time, US military and economic aid to Israel continued to increase. Ignoring the Saudi FAHD PLAN, which was based on the principle of land for peace and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, in September 1982 Reagan proposed a peace plan in which Israel would withdraw from most of the West Bank and the Palestinian areas would become a self-ruled entity federated with the Kingdom of Jordan. Both sides rejected the plan, however, and it was not pursued. Earlier that

summer, the United States was virtually alone in the international community in blocking UN efforts to halt Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR, which resulted in large-scale civilian casualties, the forced evacuation of most Palestinian fighters and political officials from the country, and the installation of a rightist PHALANGE-led government in Beirut. As Israeli troops pulled back from the Lebanese capital, Reagan sent in US forces, which joined Israel in battling leftist and Muslim militia as well as in bombing Syrian forces; this episode culminated in the 23 October 1983 suicide truck bombing that killed 241 US servicemen.

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

In the late 1970s, some sectors in the US government acknowledged that the Palestinians had legitimate concerns that should be addressed, although the US position continued to reject direct negotiations with Palestinians, even after the international community had recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative. The US position, originating in the early 1970s, was that the PLO could participate in the peace process only if it agreed to three conditions: (1) recognition of Israel's *right* to exist, (2) recognition of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of the peace talks, and (3) a renunciation of TERRORISM. There were, however, no similar conditions placed upon the government of Israel, which rejected Palestine's right to exist, which also failed to recognize Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations, and whose armed forces had also targeted civilians.

For more than a decade, the PLO had indicated it would be willing to accept such conditions if Israel made reciprocal commitments. Faced with Washington's refusal to press for such mutual and simultaneous declarations, however, the PLO in 1988 formally accepted the three provisions without any reciprocity from Israel. Despite this, the United States still refused to allow the PLO to participate directly in the peace process and limited official contact with the organization to the US embassy in Tunisia, where the PLO had relocated following its 1982 ouster from Lebanon. Yet even this low-level US-PLO DIALOGUE was broken off within two years when the administration of President GEORGE H. W. BUSH determined that the PLO had not sufficiently criticized an attempted terrorist attack against Israel by a small Palestinian splinter group.

Continuing to reject calls for an international conference under UN auspices but wanting to assuage Arab concerns over the plight of the Palestinians as part of US efforts to enlist Arab state support for the 1991 GULF WAR, President Bush agreed to organize a Middle East peace conference in Madrid in 1991. Although some meetings were to take place on a multilateral basis, the United States made certain that the real negotiations would take place only bilaterally and with a strong US presence. Even when the United States invited most Arab nations to participate, it explicitly excluded the PLO. Bush and his secretary of state, JAMES BAKER, only allowed Palestinian delegates to participate who were part of the Jordanian delegation, lived neither in the PALESTINIAN DIASPORA nor in Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem, and had no affiliation with the PLO. At the same time, Baker and other administration officials were concerned about growing hostility toward the United States in the Arab and Islamic world because of US support for the Israeli OCCUPATION and began to pressure Israel to consider territorial compromise. As a means of exerting some leverage, President Bush initially refused to approve a proposed $10 billion loan guarantee to Israel until the Israeli government agreed to freeze the construction of new settlements in the Occupied Territories. Though the United States ultimately backed down on that condition, the delay was instrumental in the defeat of the rightist Likud prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR and the election of the more moderate LABOR PARTY alignment leader YITZHAK RABIN in June 1992.

BILL CLINTON defeated Bush in the November 1992 US presidential election, taking more liberal positions on most domestic issues but criticizing the Bush administration from the right regarding its policy on Israel and Palestine, as well as reiterating US policy opposing the inclusion of the PLO in the peace process. Unable to meet with the PLO in the US-sponsored peace talks in Washington, Israelis entered into negotiations with the PLO in NORWAY. Unaware of the secret Israeli-PLO talks, the Clinton administration put forward what it called a "compromise" proposal for Palestinian autonomy during the summer of 1992. However, the proposal put forth by Israeli negotiators at the same time was actually more favorable to the Palestinians than the US version, which Palestinian officials described as

being "closer to the Israeli Likud position." This is one of a number of instances when the United States has taken a harder line toward the Palestinians or other Arab nations than have the Israelis themselves.

Despite not being included in the negotiations that led to the OSLO ACCORDS, the United States became the guarantor of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, hosting a signing ceremony on the White House lawn in September 1993. Israel insisted that the United States assume this role because of Washington's traditional support for Israel's positions in the conflict with the Palestinians, and the PLO agreed on the assumption that the United States was the only power that could pressure Israel to make the necessary compromises for peace. In the fall of 1993, peace talks resumed in Washington within the Oslo framework, yet the Clinton administration initially did little to move the process forward. Israeli negotiators recognized that domestic Israeli politics made it difficult politically for the Israeli government to take the required steps for achieving peace without pressure from the United States, but no such pressure was forthcoming.

Over the next seven years, the Clinton administration brokered a series of Israeli-Palestinian agreements that led to the redeployment of Israeli forces from most of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, and to limited Palestinian self-rule over much of the Palestinian population. When the Palestinians signed the Declaration of Principles, they did so on the assumption that the United States, as guarantor of the agreement, would ensure that Israel fulfilled the letter and the spirit of the agreement: that the interim period before the final-status issues were resolved would be no more than five years, that residents of the Occupied Territories would enjoy concrete improvements in their lives, and that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 would constitute the basis of a permanent settlement. However, the Clinton administration consistently backed Israel's positions on virtually all of the outstanding issues in the negotiations, even when the right-wing Likud bloc came to power again, while also defending ongoing Israeli violations of international humanitarian law in the Occupied Territories. The result was increased frustration and disillusionment with the peace process in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the resulting rise of Islamist radicals.

Departure from Previous US Policy

Indeed, the Clinton administration departed from prior US administrations in a number of key areas. For example, the Clinton State Department began referring to the Israeli-occupied territories as "disputed territories" and actively (and largely successfully) encouraged the US MEDIA to do the same. This marked a significant change in the US view of the conflict, because occupied territory is land belonging to another nation that was seized by military force, whereas a disputed territory implies that both sides have a legitimate claim. This distinction is of further significance in that the Fourth Geneva Convention protects persons living under foreign military occupation, which is obligated to uphold certain standards of human rights, whereas those living in disputed territories are not protected. Furthermore, through a series of executive orders and congressional resolutions, the United States also effectively recognized Israel's annexation of greater East Jerusalem, seized by Israeli forces in June 1967, which the UN Security Council formally recognized as illegitimate because it was seized in war.

Another shift to the right under the Clinton administration came in regard to Israeli settlements. The Oslo Accords refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a "single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period," which essentially prohibits either side from taking steps that could prejudice the permanent-status negotiations for a Palestinian state. As a result, the Palestinians assumed that this would prevent the Israelis from building more settlements in the West Bank on land that was slated to be part of the future Palestinian state. However, over the next decade Israel nearly doubled the number of settlers in the Occupied Territories, without apparent US objections. The Clinton administration even went on record as accepting the "natural growth" concept of settlement expansion, even though the UN Security Council had previously declared all settlements illegal and called upon Israel to evacuate them.

Under pressure from peace and human rights groups, Congress had attached a provision to the $2 billion annual installment of the $10 billion loan guarantee to Israel, signed in August 1992, requiring the president to deduct the costs of additional settlement activity, which totaled approximately a half billion dollars annually. Nevertheless, President Clinton promised the Israelis that aid would remain constant

regardless of Israeli settlement policies, and the State Department's DENNIS ROSS, serving as coordinator for the peace talks, immediately let the Israeli government know that the Clinton administration would find a way to restore the full funding. Indeed, in each of the five subsequent years, the United States increased aid to Israel by amounts closely approximating the total deducted from the loan guarantees in 1992. The result was that the United States began effectively subsidizing the settlements.

As part of what President Clinton referred to as "implementation funding" of the 1998 WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, in which Israel agreed to redeploy from an additional 14 percent of the West Bank, the United States offered $1.2 billion in supplementary foreign aid to the Israeli government. Most of the funding was for armaments unrelated to the redeployment, and much of the nonmilitary funding was unofficially earmarked to help build bypass ROADS for Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories. These highways, which were built to connect the settlements with each other and with Israel proper, are designed to create a series of internal BORDERS and barriers, effectively isolating Palestinian areas into noncontiguous units. US financial support of the INFRASTRUCTURE supporting these illegal settlements placed Washington in violation of Article 7 of UN Security Council Resolution 465, which prohibits member states from assisting Israel in its colonization efforts in the Occupied Territories.

Failure of Final Status Talks

Throughout the Oslo peace process, the Clinton administration largely ignored Palestinian concerns about delaying the FINAL STATUS TALKS on Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and the boundaries of a future Palestinian state. In so doing, the United States allowed Israel's confiscation and consolidation of large swaths of Palestinian territory to continue unabated. In the summer of 2000, however, the Clinton administration decided to jump ahead to final status negotiations without prior confidence-building measures, such as a freeze on new settlements or the fulfillment of previous Israeli pledges to withdraw from additional segments of the West Bank. Despite strong Palestinian objections that they needed more time to prepare, President Clinton insisted that the two parties come to Camp David in July to try to hammer out a final agreement, telling Arafat, "If it fails, I will not blame you." However, not only did the president put enormous pressure on Arafat to accept the Israeli proposals, but he also blamed Arafat for the collapse of the talks when the Palestinian leader rejected them on the grounds that they fell far short of both Israel's obligations under international law and what the Palestinians needed for a viable independent state. At the news conference at the close of the talks and later on Israeli television, Clinton declared that "Prime Minister EHUD BARAK showed particular courage, vision and an understanding of the historical importance of the moment," while insisting that it was Arafat who had been unwilling to compromise. Clinton thought that he could pressure Arafat to accept Israel's terms, even though negotiations up to that time indicated that the two sides were still far apart on key issues. Even if Clinton had been successful in forcing Arafat to agree to Israeli terms, there would not have been enough support among the Palestinian population to make it a viable agreement.

When the Palestinian uprising (the AL-AQSA INTIFADA) began in late September 2000, the Clinton administration blamed Arafat and the Palestinian National Authority for the violence and defended Israel's disproportionate military response, which was heavily criticized throughout the human rights community.

In December President Clinton unveiled the most comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace plan ever put forward by a US president. Based on the US-Israeli proposal from Camp David, it was initially rejected by the Palestinians. However, because the proposal reduced the level of Israeli control of the West Bank and allowed for fewer RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT for Palestinians, it finally appeared that both sides were close to an agreement. Israeli-Palestinian TABA TALKS in, Egypt, the following month, without active US participation, led to additional concessions by both sides, and hopes were high that a final settlement could be reached. However, with ARIEL SHARON's election in Israel and GEORGE W. BUSH's in the United States, the Oslo Process effectively ended.

The Bush administration, which assumed office in January 2001, did not follow up on Clinton's peace proposal and said the United States would not support the resumption of peace talks until Palestinian violence was halted for an extended period. This effectively gave Palestinian extremists who opposed the peace process an incentive to launch further terrorist attacks and other acts of violence to make sure that the talks would *not* resume. The possibility for future talks was further

hampered by Prime Minister Sharon's insistence that his government was far less willing to make the necessary territorial compromises than its predecessor. During its first year in office, the Bush administration made a number of contradictory statements regarding the conflict. US secretary of state COLIN POWELL criticized certain Israeli policies on several occasions, only to have his statements soft-pedaled by the White House and then openly challenged by both Republican and Democratic congressional leaders. The overall Bush administration position was premised on the idea that the two parties needed to work things out between themselves and that both sides needed to compromise. However, bilateral negotiations between a government representing the strongest economic and military power in the region with a weakened and corrupt leadership of an occupied people placed the Palestinians at a distinct disadvantage. The US policy of ignoring this gross asymmetry in power led to the failure to reach an agreement, resulting in continued Occupation, repression, and colonization from the Israeli side and rioting, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism from the Palestinian side.

In an effort to undercut a recently announced UN mission to the Occupied Territories, President Clinton had appointed a separate commission headed by former senator GEORGE MITCHELL to investigate how to end the violence and move the peace process forward. Although the Mitchell Commission Report, released in April 2001, did not call for Israeli withdrawal from its settlements, it did emphasize that there was no hope to end Palestinian violence unless there was a freeze on settlements. However, the Bush administration—spearheaded by CIA director GEORGE TENET—followed up the Mitchell Commission Report by pushing for a unilateral cease-fire agreement from the Palestinians even while the Sharon government pledged to continue building more settlements. The Bush administration and Congress essentially accepted the Mitchell Commission Report in terms of its recommendations for a cease-fire but dropped the report's insistence on a settlement freeze and other Israeli responsibilities. The US-brokered cease-fire technically went into effect in June 2001 but never fully materialized.

Fight against Terrorism

The Al-Qaida terrorist attacks on the United States in September of that year solidified the Bush administration's support for Sharon's continued SIEGE in the Occupied Territories. Despite State Department and CIA analysts' noting Sharon's ongoing provocations and overreactions, President Bush continued to focus on Palestinian terrorism as the cause of the crisis, and statements by Bush administration officials and congressional leaders of both parties tried to equate Israeli assaults in the Occupied Territories with the US struggle against Al-Qaida. In a departure from previous administrations, President Bush gave Defense Department officials unprecedented clout in the formulation of US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which had previously been largely under the purview of the State Department. One result was that the hard-line NEOCONSERVATIVE Pentagon officials who viewed the conflict strictly in security terms—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith—came to dominate US policy toward the conflict. Prior to joining the administration, Feith contributed to a 1996 paper that advised Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU to make "a clean break from the peace process." Similarly, Feith wrote a widely read 1997 article that called on Israel to reoccupy "the areas under Palestinian Authority control," even though "the price in blood would be high." These hawkish voices were reinforced by a coalition of Democrats and right-wing Republicans in Congress, who attacked the State Department's more moderate voices. In the eyes of the Bush administration and both parties in Congress, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a key battle in the US-led war on terrorism.

When Israel launched a massive military offensive in April 2002 in response to a series of Palestinian SUICIDE BOMBINGS, the United States was virtually alone in the international community supporting the attacks, which resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and the partial destruction of the PNA's civilian infrastructure. Washington also blocked UN efforts to halt the fighting and investigate alleged Israeli war crimes, while increasing US military aid to Israel. The Bush administration and Congress largely ignored the March 2002 ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE, drawn up by Saudi crown prince Abdullah and endorsed by the Arab League, including the PNA, which offered Israel security guarantees and full normal relations in return for withdrawal from the Occupied Territories seized in the 1967 War. Though it was largely a reiteration of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,

long considered by previous administrations the basis for Middle East peace, Washington refused to endorse it or to press Israel to consider it. However, in response to international pressure regarding the worsening situation in the Occupied Territories, the Bush administration agreed to cosponsor—along with the EUROPEAN UNION, Russia, and the United Nations—the "Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." Reaching consensus among the four parties, which became known as "the QUARTET," was initially difficult in part because the United States tried to downplay international law and UN Security Council resolutions as major components of the Road Map plan toward a two-state solution and insisted on incorporating much of the Tenet Plan in its first phase. By late 2002 the Quartet had essentially accepted the US positions, though the Bush administration insisted that the plan not be formally released until after the Israeli elections in the spring of 2003, fearing it might hurt Sharon's reelection chances against the left-leaning Labor Party challenger Amran Mitzna. Though the Palestinians accepted the Road Map, the Israelis did so only conditionally, insisting upon including fourteen "reservations," a number of which contradicted the plan's key provisions. Though most observers considered these reservations as essentially a rejection of the plan, the Bush administration argued that Israel was in fact on board and that Phase I, scheduled to go into effect by the end of the year, would move forward. As with the OSLO PROCESS, however, Washington favored Israel's interpretation of the Road Map's requirements over that of the other members of the Quartet and the Palestinians. For example, the call for dismantling the "terrorist infrastructure" of militant Palestinian groups was just one of twenty-four mutual and simultaneous steps required by both sides in Phase I, but a series of statements by the Bush administration and several congressional initiatives, supported by an overwhelming bipartisan majority, insisted that it was the first and most important step in the Road Map. Because of this US insistence that Israel was not required to fulfill any of its obligations until this provision was fully satisfied, the Road Map never moved forward.

In December 2003, leading Israeli and Palestinian figures signed an unofficial draft peace agreement (the GENEVA ACCORD) after negotiations that had started from where the two sides had left off when Israel, backed by the United States, suspended negotiations for an accord in February 2001. The draft agreement called for an Israeli withdrawal from virtually all of the Gaza Strip and West Bank (with minor and reciprocal border adjustments); an evacuation of most Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories; recognition of Jerusalem as the co-capital of both Israel and Palestine; and the establishment of a new demilitarized Palestinian state with strict international guarantees for Israeli security, including the disarming and disbanding of private militias and terrorist groups. Although it was hailed by the international community as an important breakthrough, the Bush administration refused to support it and the Israeli government categorically rejected it.

Facing increasing pressure for territorial compromise within Israel, however, Prime Minister Sharon came to Washington in April 2004 with four separate disengagement plans involving varying degrees of unilateral Israeli withdrawal from occupied Palestinian territory, with the remaining Palestinian lands becoming part of Israel. President Bush ended up endorsing the one that—while including ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA—allowed Israel to annex the largest amount of Palestinian territory, incorporating virtually all of the settlements in the occupied West Bank into Israel and leaving the Palestinians with a series of noncontiguous and economically nonviable Bantustans. In an apparent attempt to short-circuit the Geneva Accord and the Road Map, President Bush went on record as insisting that "the United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose any other plan." An overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress went on record as supporting Bush's endorsement of Sharon's "CONVERGENCE PLAN," formally ending nearly four decades of nominal US support for the land-for-peace formula spelled out in Security Council Resolution 242.

The United Nations and the Palestinian Question

Under both Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has sought to minimize the role of the United Nations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. US opposition to the Palestinians has run so strong that Washington has withdrawn or has threatened to withdraw financial support from UN agencies such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, UNESCO, and

others that have supported Palestinian rights. On scores of occasions, the United States was the only country besides Israel (sometimes joined by a few small third world states dependent on US aid) to vote against otherwise unanimous resolutions in the UN General Assembly. In the Security Council, the United States has used its veto power more than forty times since 1980 to block resolutions critical of Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories, more than any other country has exercised its veto power on all other issues combined during this period. In addition, the threat of a US veto has on many occasions led to a weakening of a resolution's language or the withdrawal of the proposed resolution prior to the vote.

In the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PLO renounced ARMED STRUGGLE and unilaterally recognized Israeli control of 78 percent of Palestine; thus the strongest tool left at the Palestinians' disposal to advance their position was a series of UN Security Council resolutions reconfirming principles of international law that applied to their conflict with Israel. These included the illegality of transferring the civilian population of the occupying power into occupied territory, the illegitimacy of expanding a country's territory by force, and respecting the human rights of civilians under occupation. However, both the Clinton and subsequent Bush administrations claimed that the United Nations no longer had any standing in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing that the UN resolutions that addressed the conflict were superseded by the Oslo Accords. This unilateral interpretation contradicted assumptions made by the Palestinians, the UN secretary-general, other Security Council members, the International Court of Justice, and a broad consensus of international legal scholars, which held otherwise.

For nearly twenty years, Washington barred the PLO from participating in the US-sponsored peace process, in part because the PLO refused to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of negotiation. However, in a paper to the delegations in the Washington peace talks in June 1993, the United States, at the apparent behest of Israel, for the first time refused to recommit to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

US diplomatic opposition to Palestinian rights has extended to attempts to block debate at the United Nations, where the PLO has had observer status since 1974. In 1988, Congress passed a law banning the PLO from operating its UN Mission in the United States, an effort later voided by rulings from both the International Court of Justice and a US federal court, which cited US commitments to the United Nations at its founding. Undeterred, the United States, which is required by the agreement to allow invited guests of the world body access to UN facilities, prevented PLO chairman Yasir Arafat from addressing the Forty-third UN General Assembly, which caused the assembly to move its session to UN facilities in Geneva to hear his speech.

Despite this history of hostility toward the United Nations, public opinion polls have shown that more than two-thirds of Americans believe that the UN should take the lead in resolving the conflict; a similar percentage believe that the UN Security Council should decide the territorial boundaries between Israel and a Palestinian state.

According to Resolutions 242 and 338, the only caveat for Israel's complete withdrawal from the Occupied Territories is security guarantees from Israel's Arab neighbors. This was widely understood to mean promises of nonaggression by neighboring states, presumably enforced by some combination of arms control, demilitarized zones, early warning systems, and international peacekeeping forces. However, the United States has dramatically expanded this interpretation, now insisting that the PLO must essentially guarantee the physical safety of every Israeli citizen. In effect, the United States argues that Israel is under no obligation to withdraw from the Occupied Territories unless there is a total halt of attacks against Israelis. Because most of these come from terrorist groups that are beyond the effective control of the recognized Palestinian leadership, this effectively means that Israel is not obliged to withdraw.

By contrast, the United States rejected international calls to halt the violence by Israeli occupation forces and settlers against the civilian population. In 2002, Washington vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for the deployment of unarmed monitors to report on compliance by all parties to the conflict with international human rights and humanitarian law standards. During this period, both the Bush administration and congressional leaders of both parties went on record as defending Israel's use of TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS against suspected Palestinian militants and rejected findings by human rights groups of Israeli war crimes in the Occupied Territories, stating that Israeli violence was "aimed only at dis-

mantling the terrorist infrastructure." In addition, both the administration and Congress went on record as condemning the International Court of Justice for its landmark 2004 decision calling on Israel to cease construction of the BARRIER separation wall within the occupied West Bank and to abide by the Fourth Geneva Convention.

With the US government ruling out enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions, virtually the only significant diplomatic weapon left for the Palestinians has been the Arab boycott of Israel. Initiated in 1948 to impede Israeli economic development, the boycott has restricted and/or impeded trade between Israel and most of its Arab neighbors and has pressured some US companies not to invest in Israel. As a result, immediately after the Oslo Accords were signed, the United States greatly escalated its pressure against Arab states and US companies for an end to the boycott. Most Arab governments expressed their willingness to do so, but only after Israel recognized Palestinian self-determination and complied with UN Security Council resolutions and international law. Washington strenuously objected to any such sanctions against its ally Israel. Instead, US officials have repeatedly emphasized the need to end economic pressure against Israel over its occupation and to integrate the region economically under US and Israeli leadership prior to a peace settlement. As far back as 1993, Arab states offered to end the boycott of Israel in return for an Israeli freeze on building new settlements, but the US government has insisted that the boycott be ended unconditionally.

Israeli-Syrian Conflict

Since the 1980s, US policy toward Syria has been geared toward challenging the regime in Damascus with both US and Israeli military power. Washington's initial conflict with Syria stemmed in large part from its alliance with the Soviet Union. Yet, despite the collapse of Syria's Soviet patron and the resulting weakening of Syria's military prowess, US hostility toward Damascus has increased. Although Israel shares US antipathy toward the Syrian government for its alleged role as an exporter of terrorism, some Israeli officials, expressing concern that US efforts to destabilize the Ba'athist government could result in internal chaos and the ascendancy to power of hard-line Islamists, have encouraged the United States to back off.

The United States has refused to insist that Israel end its occupation of Syria's Quneitra Province (Golan Heights), despite previous US endorsements of the concept of "land for peace" as spelled out in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Washington had long considered Syria unreasonably hard-line for its earlier rejection of these resolutions. In the early 1990s, Syria dramatically moderated its policies and has gone on record as accepting Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of negotiations with Israel, although the United States now considers the Syrians too hard-line for their insistence on the resolutions' strict implementation. In 1991, Washington convened peace talks between Syria and Israel at the MADRID CONFERENCE as part of a broader peace process initiated after the Gulf War, but Israel broke off the talks in 1996 and resumed negotiations in late 1999. The two sides came close to an agreement in early 2000, but talks broke down regarding the exact demarcation of the Israeli-Syrian border. Despite subsequent initiatives by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to resume negotiations, President George W. Bush rejected such talks, even to the point of blocking tentative Israeli efforts to resume the peace process during the fall of 2006.

Throughout the region, the double standard in US policy toward Syria and Israel has been widely noted: for example, the United States insists that Syria unilaterally disarm its missiles and chemical weapons stockpiles but allows Israel to maintain its stockpile; it demanded enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions regarding Syrian forces in Lebanon while blocking enforcement of resolutions regarding Israeli forces in that country.

Israeli-Lebanese Conflict

In the aftermath of the US-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the United States was unsuccessful in forcing Lebanon to ratify a peace agreement with Israel. Unable to contain a stubborn guerrilla war and despite US air strikes and other military support, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon within two years, though it remained in control of a strip of Lebanese territory in the south, which it deemed its "security zone," in violation of a series of UN Security Council resolutions calling for a total withdrawal. The Clinton administration came to Israel's defense during its July 1993 and April 1996 military offensives in Lebanon, blocking UN efforts to end the fighting and rejecting reports by journalists, UN officials,

and human rights groups of widespread Israeli violations of international humanitarian law. By the late 1990s, with increasing casualties among its occupation forces in Lebanon, a majority of Israelis were demanding a unilateral withdrawal. In response, the US ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk—backed by President Clinton—publicly encouraged Israel to keep its forces in Lebanon. Despite US hopes that Israel's ongoing occupation of southern Lebanon and its military strikes against Lebanon's infrastructure would force the Lebanese government to cut its close ties to Syria, Israel finally withdrew from Lebanese territory in May 2000, over US objections, in the face of ongoing guerrilla warfare from the Lebanese Islamist HIZBULLAH militia.

Despite the coming to power of a pro-Western government in Beirut and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in 2005, Washington backed Israel in its devastating 2006 incursion and massive air strikes against Lebanon's civilian infrastructure in response to Hizbullah provocations. With broad bipartisan support in Congress, the Bush administration, like its predecessors, defended the Israeli attacks, blocked UN efforts to impose a cease-fire for several weeks, and dismissed widespread reports of Israeli war crimes.

Israeli-Jordanian Conflict

Following Jordan's King Husayn's formal renunciation of territorial claims over the West Bank in 1988, the United States dropped its long-standing insistence that Jordan was the legitimate representative of the Palestinians and that any Palestinian entity that emerged from Israeli occupation would need to become part of that pro-Western monarchy. Soon thereafter, Washington began to apply pressure on Jordan to change its policy of refusing to make a separate peace with Israel unless and until the Palestinian issue was resolved. Faced with pressing economic problems in the early 1990s due to a reduction in US aid and strict international sanctions against its neighbor IRAQ, Jordan signed a separate peace treaty with Israel under considerable pressure from the Clinton administration. With the promise from the United States of increased military and economic aid, forgiveness of loans, and other incentives, in October 1994 King Husayn and Israeli prime minister Rabin signed a peace agreement, with President Clinton as witness. Jordan won most of its demands regarding WATER rights, security concerns, and control of several small strips of disputed territory, as well as related agreements regarding telephone and electrical grids, air transport, and joint efforts to combat drug smuggling and other illegal activities. The agreement also gave tourists coming from Jordan "free access" to Israeli-controlled areas through special crossing points where they could avoid the crowded main CHECKPOINTS. However, the Clinton administration's insistence that such a treaty be signed absent a comprehensive peace process was seen by many as a setback to hopes for an end to Israel's conflicts with the Palestinians.

Foreign Aid

US AID TO ISRAEL is unlike any other in the world or, indeed, in history. In sheer volume, it has been the most generous foreign aid program ever between any two countries, totaling more than $100 billion since 1959. Unlike most recipients of US foreign aid, which tend to be poorer developing countries, Israel is an advanced, industrialized, technologically sophisticated country as well as a major arms exporter. Some US aid to Israel began in the early 1950s, but after the 1967 War the United States dramatically expanded military loans, which were replaced exclusively by grants in 1985, and economic loans, which were replaced with grants in 1981. Since then, the annual US subsidy for Israel has remained at more than $3 billion in military and economic aid annually, in addition to assistance from other parts of the US budget or off the budget, which have totaled up to an average additional $500 million annually, as well as two major loan guarantees totaling $19 billion. Most US recipients of economic aid are required to use the bulk of the money for specific projects, such as purchasing certain US agricultural surpluses or finished goods, and are subject to strict oversight of the targeted programs, which are administered directly through nongovernmental organizations or under cosponsorship with a government agency. By contrast, most US nonmilitary aid to Israel went directly into the government's treasury to use at its discretion; Congress would set the funding level and it would become simply a cash transfer to the Israeli government.

In addition, congressional researchers have disclosed that, from 1974 to 1989, $16.4 billion in US military loans was converted to grants, and that this was the understanding between Israel and the United States from the beginning. Indeed, Congress has forgiven all past US loans to Israel. Beginning

in 1984, US policy was that economic assistance to Israel must equal or exceed Israel's annual debt repayment to the United States. Furthermore, unlike other countries, which receive US aid in quarterly installments, US aid to Israel is given in a lump sum at the beginning of the fiscal year, leaving the US government to borrow from future revenues. Israel would even lend some of this money back through US treasury bills and collect the additional interest, costing the US government approximately $50 million to $60 million each year.

Most US economic aid to Israel was finally phased out by 2008, though military aid was projected to increase.

In addition to direct US government support, more than $1.5 billion in private US funds goes to Israel annually in the form of $1 billion in private tax-deductible donations and $500 million in Israel Bonds. The ability of Americans to make what amount to tax-deductible contributions to a foreign government, through a number of Jewish charities, does not exist with any other country. These figures do not include short- and long-term commercial loans from US banks, which have run as high as $1 billion annually in recent years.

For a country that consists of just one-tenth of 1 percent of the world's population, total US aid to Israel as a proportion of the foreign aid budget has been quite large, with approximately one out of every four dollars of US foreign aid in recent decades having gone to Israel. Israel's gross national product (GNP) is higher than the combined GNP of its immediate neighbors Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Though this high level of aid to Israel had often been justified by US officials as necessary to support the peace process, US aid to Israel has increased as the peace process has stagnated and then collapsed. Furthermore, repeated public pronouncements by US officials that aid to Israel is unconditional have left Israel with little incentive to make concessions necessary for peace.

There are also questions regarding how helpful this aid has been for Israel. The vast majority of the military aid provided to Israel goes to US arms manufacturers to produce weapons for the Israeli military. The economic aid provided Israel was only slightly more than what Israel paid to private US banks as interest payments on previous loans for US weapons. Furthermore, US arms transfers cost the Israelis two to three times their value in maintenance, spare parts, training, personnel costs, and related expenses. As a result, growing numbers of Israelis are questioning whether US aid to Israel is in their country's best interest, given the strains on their economy and the resulting dependence on a foreign power.

Reason for the US Support for Israel

US support for Israel, like US support for allies elsewhere in the world, is not motivated primarily by the recipient nation's objective security needs or a strong moral commitment to the country but is designed primarily to advance perceived US strategic interests. If Israel's security interests had been paramount in the eyes of US policymakers, US aid to Israel would have been highest in the early years of the Jewish state, when its democratic institutions were strongest and its strategic situation most vulnerable. Instead, the trend has been in the opposite direction: major US military and economic aid did not begin until after the 1967 War. Indeed, 99 percent of US military assistance to Israel since its establishment came only after Israel proved itself to be far stronger than any combination of Arab armies and after Israel became an occupying power.

Even as compared with the 1970s, after the United States became Israel's major foreign backer, US aid to Israel has grown as Israel's objective security needs have lessened. For example, in the 1970s Egypt's massive and well-equipped armed forces threatened war; today, Israel has a long-standing peace treaty with Egypt and a large demilitarized and internationally monitored buffer zone keeping its army at a distance. At that time, Syria's military was expanding rapidly with advanced Soviet weaponry; today, Syria has made clear its willingness to live in peace with Israel in return for the Golan Heights and Syria's military capabilities have declined significantly as the result of the collapse of its former Soviet patron. Also in the 1970s, Jordan still claimed the West Bank and stationed large numbers of troops along its lengthy border and the demarcation line with Israel; today, Jordan has signed a peace treaty and has established fully normalized relations. At that time, Iraq was embarking upon its vast program of militarization; since then, Iraq's ability to launch an offensive war has been completely eliminated as a result of the Gulf War, international sanctions, a UN inspections regime, and the US invasion and occupation.

In the hypothetical circumstance that all US aid to Israel was immediately cut off, it would be many years before Israel would be under a serious military threat greater than it is today. Israel has both a major domestic arms industry and an existing military force far more capable and powerful than any conceivable combination of opposing forces. Though the escalation of terrorist attacks inside Israel following the breakdown of the peace process in 2000 raised widespread concerns about the safety of the Israeli public, the vast majority of US military aid has no correlation to the funding of counterterrorism efforts.

Many argue that strong support for Israeli policies hurts US strategic interests, because in the long run such support encourages anti-Americanism and Islamic extremism in the Middle East and beyond. Yet there remains a broad bipartisan consensus among US policymakers that support for Israel, at least in the short and medium term, advances US strategic interests in the region, for the following reasons:

- Israel assisted in preventing victories by radical nationalist movements in Lebanon and Jordan, as well as in Palestine.
- Israel has waged war against Palestinian and Lebanese radical Islamists.
- Israel has kept Syria, for many years an ally of the Soviet Union, in check.
- Israel's air force is predominant throughout the region.
- Israel's frequent wars have provided battlefield testing for US arms.
- Israel has served as a conduit for US arms to regimes and movements too unpopular in the United States for openly granting direct military assistance, such as apartheid South Africa, the Islamic Republic in IRAN, the military junta in Guatemala, the Nicaraguan Contras, and, more recently, right-wing Colombian paramilitary groups.
- Israeli military advisers have assisted pro-Western governments and pro-Western insurgencies, as well as advised and trained US forces in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.
- Israel's MOSSAD has cooperated with the US CIA in intelligence gathering and covert operations.
- Israel has missiles capable of reaching well over 1,500 miles and possesses a nuclear arsenal of hundreds of weapons.
- Israel has closely cooperated with the US military-industrial complex with research and development for new weapons systems, including jet fighters and antimissile defense systems.

However, US support for Israel is based on more than strictly strategic objectives. First, many liberals, particularly among the post–World War II generation currently in leadership positions in government and the media, have a strong sentimental attachment to Israel. Many Americans identify with Israel's internal democracy, progressive social institutions (such as the KIBBUTZIM), relatively high level of social equality among its Jewish citizens, and its important role as a sanctuary for a historically oppressed minority group that spent centuries in Diaspora. Added to this is a mixture of guilt regarding Western ANTI-SEMITISM, personal friendships with Jewish Americans who identify strongly with Israel, and fear of inadvertently encouraging anti-Semitism by criticizing Israel.

Second, the US Christian right wing, with tens of millions of followers and a major base of support for the Republican Party, has thrown its immense media and political clout in support of right-wing Israeli leaders. Based in part on a messianic theology that sees the ingathering of Jews to the Holy Land as a precursor to the second coming of Christ, the battle between Israelis and Palestinians is in their eyes simply a continuation of the battle between the Israelites and the Philistines.

A third reason for strong US-Israeli ties is that mainstream and conservative Jewish organizations have mobilized considerable lobbying resources, financial contributions from the Jewish community, and citizen pressure on the news media and other forums of public discourse in support of the Israeli government. The AMERICAN–ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC) is one of the most powerful lobbying groups in Washington. Together with its allied political action committees, AIPAC has played an important role in some tight congressional races and in helping to create a climate of intimidation among those who seek to moderate US policy, including growing numbers of progressive Jews who oppose Israel's occupation policies.

Fourth, the arms industry, which has even more influence, through campaign contributions, congressional campaigns, and lobbying efforts, than AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups, has played a considerable role in supporting the

massive military support for Israel and in blocking arms control initiatives.

Fifth, the widespread racism in the United States toward Arabs and Muslims, often reinforced by the media, leaves little room for empathy or support for Palestinian interests. This is compounded by the identification many Americans have with ZIONISM as a reflection of their own historic experience as pioneers in North America.

A final reason directly involves the failure of progressive movements in the United States to challenge US policy toward Israel and Palestine in an effective manner. For many years, most mainstream peace and human rights groups avoided the issue. As a result, without any countervailing pressure from their base, liberal members of Congress have caved in to pressure from supporters of the Israeli government.

Though US policy is widely seen as "pro-Israel," many Israelis argue that US support enables the Israeli government to pursue policies that threaten Israel's legitimate security needs and makes a peaceful resolution to its conflict with the Palestinians and other Arab nations more difficult. Some on the Israeli left feel that Israel is discouraged from making peace because an Israel in a constant state of war with its neighbors is more likely to cooperate with US strategic designs in the region than an Israel at peace.

See also AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; BA'ATHISM; CHRISTIANITY; MOSHE DAYAN; GREATER JERUSALEM; MEDIA, US; NEOCONSERVATIVES; NUCLEAR PROGRAM, ISRAEL; STRATEGIC ASSET; STRATEGIC COOPERATION; UNITED NATIONS; US AID TO ISRAEL; individual entries for US presidents and secretaries of state

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—Stephen Zunes

United States–Palestine Liberation Organization Dialogue

In December 1988 President RONALD REAGAN authorized the US State Department to enter into a low-level dialogue with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), reversing previous US policy, dating to commitments made by Secretary of State HENRY KISSINGER, of refusing to talk to the organization. The PLO met three conditions that the UNITED STATES imposed for the dialogue: (1) recognize Israel's *right* to exist; (2) accept UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; and (3) renounce the use of TERRORISM. Secretary of State GEORGE SHULTZ essentially dictated to PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT the words he must publicly use to satisfy the US requirements.

In the background, the INTIFADA had created a sense of concern among administrative officials, but the November 1988 PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL's resolutions and DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE seemed to suggest a more moderate PLO. Yet despite the talks, the United States continued to reject the key Palestinian demands for self-determination and statehood. Israel, however, was upset about the dialogue because it complicated the Jewish state's desire to marginalize the PLO and develop an alternative leadership. During the few months of the talks, pro-Israel groups in the United States attempted to pressure Congress and the president to terminate the dialogue.

The administration played down the talks as much as possible but still wanted to have some influence over the PLO. It never appointed an official with a specific mandate for the talks, choosing rather to conduct them through Robert Pelletreau, the US ambassador to Tunisia, where the PLO leadership resided. The United States insisted on meeting only with low-level PLO officials (with the exception of one secret and much-criticized encounter between Pelletreau and SALAH KHALAF, second in command in the PLO prior to his assassination on 14 January 1990). Substantively, the United States had two conditions for the dialogue: there must be no international conference, and the PLO must call off the Palestinian uprising (Intifada), which Washington viewed as terrorism against Israel. It did not use the talks to better comprehend the Palestinian situation, consider Palestinian political or national rights, or attempt to broker a compromise between Israel and the Palestinians.

The succeeding GEORGE H. W. BUSH administration terminated the dialogue in June 1990, eighteen months after it began, ostensibly because the PLO failed to condemn an aborted 30 May raid on Israel by the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF), a small faction backed by IRAQ and headed by ABU AL-ABBAS. Because the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE refused to expel al-Abbas, the United States charged that the PLO was again engaged in terrorism. However, even before the talks ended, Washington demonstrated hostility to the PLO. For example, in May 1990 the Security Council invited Arafat to address it, but the Bush administration refused to give the PLO leader a visa. In response, the Council convened a special session in Geneva to enable Arafat to address the body. The United States was the only member state that was absent.

The dialogue concluded with no visible achievements.

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United Torah Judaism

United Torah Judaism (UTJ, or Yahadut HaTorah) is an Israeli coalition of two small HAREDI parties, AGUDAT YISRAEL and DEGEL HATORAH, that submitted a joint slate in the 1992 election and won four Knesset seats. In the 1999 elections UTJ won five seats. In 2004 the UTJ joined ARIEL SHARON's coalition, then split into its two constituent factions. Before the 2006 elections, Degel HaTorah and Agudat Israel agreed to revive their alliance under the banner of United Torah Judaism to not waste votes and achieve maximum representation in the seventeenth Knesset, in which they won six seats. The two factions again united for the eighteenth Knesset elections in 2009 and won five seats.

Led by Meir Porush, UTJ opposes negotiations with the Palestinians and the formation of a Palestinian state. It also supports increasing SETTLEMENTS throughout ERETZ YISRAEL (Greater Israel) for religious, economic, social, and security reasons. In regard to religious and state issues, UTJ wants to maintain a status quo relationship.

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Unity Government, Palestinian 2007

See MECCA AGREEMENT

Unrecognized Villages

More than 150 Palestinian villages in Israel—45 in the Negev region and the remainder in the Galilee—are not officially recognized by the Israeli government. More than 90,000 Palestinian citizens of Israel live in these villages, which are facing destruction, prevented from being developed, and do not appear on any official map. These villages first became "unrecognized" in 1948 with the establishment of the state of Israel. Even though these Palestinian villages existed tens and hundreds of years ago, consecutive Israeli governments have ignored their existence and have denied their inhabitants their rights as citizens of the country.

In the Negev, the majority of unrecognized villages are inhabited by BEDOUIN. Although the image of the Bedouin is one of nomadic lifestyle, by the turn of the twentieth century most of this population in Palestine was settled and engaging in agriculture. Today virtually all of the Bedouin in Israel are sedentary. When Israel designated the majority of the Negev as STATE LAND, Bedouin habitation on their traditional lands of hundreds of years was classified as illegal and unrecognized, thus preventing the Bedouin from engaging in their general means of subsistence, agriculture and grazing.

Government policy considers the inhabitants of the unrecognized villages as lawbreakers. It prevents them from repairing existing homes or building new ones; withholds basic rights such as drinking WATER, sewage, EDUCATION, and HEALTH CARE clinics; and, in certain cases, even fences off whole villages. These measures coincide with a wider policy of concentrating Palestinian Arabs into enclaves and redeeming their lands for new Jewish *mitzpim* SETTLEMENTS (i.e., "lookout"—settlements that were established as part of the program to Judaize the Galilee region and change the demographic balance of Palestinian areas). Many of the *mitzpim* settlements, in both the Galilee and the Negev, are built next to the unrecognized villages, often illegally, yet with complete provision of services.

The 1965 Planning and Construction Law officially delegalized the villages and established a framework of regulations and a national plan for the country's future development. While leaving these villages out of the planning scheme, the law reclassified their lands as agricultural, a designation that doesn't allow for any form of construction or development. Consequently, existing buildings in these villages were unable to get PERMITS, and those that already had them, such as schools, saw them removed. The ownership of the

lands was not disputed, but the law created a situation in which whole communities as well as each individual house became instantly illegal. Ninety-five percent of the houses were built before the law was instituted, but, because the villages were unrecognized, the villagers had no local authority to which to appeal for a change in the status of their lands and no representation on regional or national planning committees.

The Planning and Construction Law allows Israeli planning authorities to prosecute homeowners for building without a permit and to demolish their houses when it is determined to be in the public interest. Moreover, the law allows the courts to issue demolition orders retroactively. This is significant because, as noted, 95 percent of the houses in the unrecognized villages were built before this legislation was enacted. The political use of these legal powers was amplified following the report of the Markovitz Committee in 1986 on unlicensed construction in the Arab community, which made three main recommendations:

1. Immediate demolition of 1,000 existing unlicensed houses and the administrative demolition of all new unlicensed construction.
2. Classification of 4,419 houses in the unrecognized villages as "grey" houses slated for demolition at a later date and in the meantime not entitled to any services and unable to be repaired.
3. Extension of power to administrators of regional planning committees to issue demolition orders without going to court and the establishment of a "grey" unit empowered to implement these administrative demolition orders.

In the wake of the Markovitz report, Article 238A of the Planning and Construction Law was amended to allow officials to issue administrative demolition orders on houses in unrecognized villages within a month of their completion. Consequently, planning officials maintain monthly checks of the villages through aerial photographs and visits and have prosecuted villagers for home additions and repairs.

Article 97A allows for retroactive approval for buildings established on agricultural land and was used to retroactively legalize the *mitzpim* settlements. However, the HOUSE DEMOLITION policy is implemented unevenly: a 1997 Interior Ministry report on house demolitions stated that it focused on unrecognized areas. From 1993 to 1996, 1,440 Palestinian Arab houses were demolished in the unrecognized villages—624 of them outside of any court process. During this period, Palestinian homes accounted for 94 percent of all demolitions in Israel, despite accounting for only 57 percent of all recorded unlicensed building. In court appeals, homeowners have found that all building in the unrecognized villages has been defined as against the public interest. They are usually required to demolish their homes and, if they fail to do so, are fined for contempt of court and can be imprisoned for up to a year. In addition, the authorities can charge the homeowner for the cost of the demolition.

There is a very high population density within the unrecognized villages, with an average of ten people per house. The government has undertaken a clear policy to make the villages uninhabitable by depriving their residents of basic rights and services. For example, a 1993 internal report for the Misgav Regional Council on how to "concentrate" the residents of twenty-two unrecognized villages includes the following methods of pressure: obstructing villagers' farming, neglecting to provide school transport from the villages, failing to meet the residents' needs for health services, denying the villages electricity, and withholding drinking water. Article 157A of the Planning and Construction Law prohibits national utility companies from connecting a building to national electricity, water, or telephone networks if the building owners have no building permit. It was designed specifically to dislodge residents from the unrecognized villages.

The ASSOCIATION OF FORTY, a nongovernmental organization in Israel that works for the recognition of unrecognized villages, surveyed 150 unrecognized localities. It found that 130 localities are not connected to the water network, which means that residents must transport water from neighboring villages. The quality and quantity of water available for each resident are far below normal health standards. Following a 1992 International Water Tribunal ruling that Israeli government policy was illegal, one tap has been fitted for each village. In September 2006 the HAIFA district court rejected a petition to connect the unrecognized Bedouin villages in the Negev to clean water sources.

The association also found that health services are available in only four Galilee villages

and in only one village in the Negev. None of these villages are connected to a sewage network. Because of polluted water, outbreaks of jaundice and diarrhea among children have frequently occurred. Only one village is connected to the electricity network. Most villages run private generators that provide sufficient electricity for lighting only. None of the villages are connected to the main ROAD network. Some villages have fences placed around them by the government to prevent the villagers from gaining access to their traditional lands.

In three unrecognized villages in the north (Galilee), schools were closed and only one remains. In other villages, students travel 10 to 15 kilometers (6 to 9 miles) to school. Because of distance and the lack of a suitable study environment at home, achievement levels are low and there is a high student dropout rate. For example, in El-Naim (population 400), only one student has ever completed high school.

In the early 1990s, the Israeli government agreed to recognize nine of the unrecognized villages in the north and center and to partially adopt some of the solutions of the Association of Forty plan. Despite this agreement, none of the meaningful parts of the plan have yet been carried out. The budget put aside in 1996 to implement recognition has still not been released by the parliamentary finance committee. In some villages, the area to be recognized has been reduced to 20 percent of the area originally agreed upon, and in others up to 40 percent of the existing houses have been left off the approved plan. In all the villages, demolition orders are still outstanding, and, in some, new ones have continued to be issued.

See also BEDOUIN IN ISRAEL; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

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US Aid to Israel

By the end of 1987, Israel had received $58.8 billion from the UNITED STATES, as much aid in inflation-adjusted dollars as was provided to rebuild Western Europe under the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II. Aid to Israel has come to be seen by Israel and its supporters as well as by presidents, members of Congress, and the US public as an ongoing commitment. By the end of 2007, the amount of US foreign aid provided to Israel had climbed to over $100 billion, distributed roughly in allocations of $3 billion to $4 billion in military and economic assistance annually. In his last year in office President GEORGE W. BUSH signed an agreement with Israel that would provide it with $30 billion in military aid over a ten-year period. In addition, Congress approved $10 billion in loan guarantees in 1992 and $9 billion in guarantees in 2003, which allowed Israel to borrow from international lenders at a substantially lower interest rate than it would get on its own. Another source of US funding is from the sale of State of Israel Bonds to public and private investors and state and union pension funds for which exact figures are not available but are estimated to be at least $500 million a year. Private, tax-deductible cash transfers from American Jews and Jewish charities are said to be around $1 billion annually. Some of these funds have been used to construct or assist illegal Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK and East JERUSALEM. Total funding from all sources—private and public combined—is estimated to be over $1,000 a year for each Israeli Jew.

Apart from funds appropriated under the foreign assistance program but included in the overall total is nearly $1 billion in research and development grants under the "STRATEGIC COOPERATION" agreement since 1988 for the joint development with Israel of the Arrow antimissile missile, $1.3 billion for developing the Lavi fighter jet before the program was canceled, $200 million to improve Israel's Merkava tank, and $130 million to develop a high-energy laser antimissile system. On seven occasions between 1973 and 1995, attempts by Israel to sell weapons systems to CHINA and other countries that incorporated US technology have been blocked by Washington, but none of these violations of the Arms Export Control Act were prosecuted.

In November 1999 Congress awarded Israel an additional $1.2 billion as part of the WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM that Tel Aviv had signed the previous year with the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, despite Israel's failure to fulfill all but a small part of its agreed-upon withdrawals from the West Bank. Of that figure, $200 million was to be spent on redeployment of Israeli troops from bases in the West Bank, but half went for weaponry, including Apache helicopters, electronic warfare, light surveillance aircraft, and armored personnel carriers. An additional $200 million for Israel was included as part of the Homeland Security Act passed by Congress in 2002, legislation intended to provide for domestic defense against a future attack.

It was not until 1968, following the 1967 WAR, that the United States moved to adopt Israel economically and militarily. Until that time, Israel's economy had been largely underwritten by reparations from postwar GERMANY. The restitution monies, among other things, helped pay for its arms purchases, including its acquisition of nuclear capability, which was mainly from FRANCE. French president Charles de Gaulle, however, broke off relations with Tel Aviv to show his displeasure with Israel for having initiated the 1967 War against his advice. Even then, US assistance from 1968 through 1970, both in arms and in money, came to only $360 million, almost all of it in loans. In 1971 it began its ascent to the current levels when the US loaned Israel $634 million. This was ostensibly Israel's reward for preventing SYRIA from coming to the aid of the Palestinians in JORDAN in 1970, when King Husayn launched an attack on the Palestinian refugee camps during BLACK SEPTEMBER, even though Israel did not participate in that conflict in any manner, Jordan by itself having repulsed the Syrian tanks.

Israel now routinely receives over one-quarter of the US foreign aid budget, but for the first twenty years of its existence, such aid amounted to only 1.1 percent of that budget. Moreover, from 1949 to 1959 the United States gave no military assistance to Israel, and by 1966 it had only reached a maximum of $90 million, and that was in the form of loans. Compared to the present, the lower figures reflected both a lack of interest in Israel on the part of both Washington and American Jewry and less influence over Congress by the emerging pro-Israel lobby. Prior to the 1967 War, US newspapers reported that more Jews were emigrating from Israel than making ALIYA and that the economy of the Jewish state had stagnated. Israel's swift victory in 1967 over EGYPT, Syria, and Jordan quickly shifted the mood of American Jews to one of pride and triumph that has lasted to the present day and has provided the impetus for a closer US-Israeli relationship and dramatic increases in economic and military assistance.

Over the years, individuals and groups have offered various reasons to justify the ongoing high aid levels. These include Israel being the only democracy in the Middle East, its "shared values" with the United States, and its status as a STRATEGIC ASSET in the region for the United States, although to what degree is subject to dispute. The second GULF WAR provided another argument for Israel's supporters: the use by US forces of technology developed in Israel, including the US Army's Hunter drones, the targeting systems on the Marines' Harrier jets, and improved fuel tanks on its F-15 fighters. More significant, however, Israel positioned itself as an ally in the "war on TERRORISM" engaged in by the United States since the 9/11 attacks, in which Israel's position as a non-Muslim country in the Middle East has linked it to the aims of the United States. Finally, another likely reason, advanced by its critics, is that Congress is influenced by Israel's Washington lobby, the AMERICAN-ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (AIPAC), and routinely approves Israeli aid appropriations without debate.

Twice a year, high-level Israeli officials meet with their US counterparts and present their wish list, and agree upon the appropriation for the following year. The administration then presents this to Congress, which frequently approves additional funding, even if Israel has not requested it. What is significant is that the condition of the US economy, even in times of recession, has had no bearing on the House vote to provide aid to Israel, which, included in the overall foreign assistance legislation, usually passes by a comfortable three-to-one majority.

In addition to Israel being annually awarded the lion's share of US foreign aid, it benefits from perks not available to other recipients. First, since 1982, at Israel's request, grants have been paid in one lump sum at the start of the fiscal year rather than quarterly, as with other aid recipients. This

Table 9 US Aid to Israel (FY1949–FY2007, millions of dollars)

Year	Total	Military Grant	Economic Grant	Immigrant Grant	ASHA[a]	All Other
1949–1996	68,030.9	29,014.9	23,122.4	868.9	121.4	14,903.3
1997	3,132.1	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	2.1	50.0
1998	3,080.0	1,800.0	1,200.0	80.0	?	?
1999	3,010.0	1,860.0	1,080.0	70.0	?	?
2000	4,131.8	3,120.0	949.1	60.0	2.75	?
2001	2,878.3	1,975.6	838.2	60.0	2.25	?
2002	2,850.6	2,040.0	720.0	60.0	2.65	28.0
2003	3,744.1	3,086.4	596.1	59.6	3.05	?
2004	2,690.4	2,147.3	477.2	49.7	3.15	9.9
2005	2,612.1	2,202.2	357.0	50.0	2.95	?
2006	2,534.5	2,257.0	237.0	40.0	?	0.5
2007	2,500.2	2,340.0	120.0	40.0	2.95	0.2
2008	2,423.9	2,380.0	0	40.0	3.90	0
2009	2,550.0	2,550.0	0	?	?	0
TOTAL	**106,164.7**	**58,573.4**	**30,897.0**	**1,558.2**	**144.2**	**14,991.9**

Note: a. American Schools and Hospitals.
Sources: Data obtained from Congressional Research Service (5 January 2006) http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/upl-meta-crs-8124/RL33222_2006Jan05.pdf, accessed 10 August 2009, and Jewish Virtual Library http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/U.S._Assistance_to_Israel1.html, accessed 10 August 2009.

requires the Treasury Department to borrow the money and pay interest on it—an estimated $50 million to $60 million annually—adding an additional $1.5 billion to the US deficit by the end of the fiscal year. Israel, in turn, invests the money in US Treasury notes to collect interest, which, by the end of 2005, earned Tel Aviv an additional $2 billion. Second, since 1985 all US aid has been given in grants, not in repayable loans. Third, economic aid goes directly to the Israeli government, and Washington does not require an account of how the money is used. The absence of a binding need to report how/where it spends US aid provides Israel with enormous latitude. Although it has been official US policy that US aid may not be used in the West Bank and, before 2005, in the GAZA STRIP, which would give the appearance of endorsing Israel's annexation of Palestinian land, in practice the United States has taken only token steps to penalize Israel for violating this prohibition. That Israel violates US policy has rarely affected direct aid. Israel also violates the prohibition against using weapons purchased or received from the United States against a civilian population, as in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES or in LEBANON. On only one occasion was this prohibition enforced, when President RONALD REAGAN briefly withheld further shipments of cluster bombs from Israel during its 1982 invasion of Lebanon.

A fourth perk for Israel is that, whereas other foreign aid recipients go through the Defense Department for military purchases from US companies, Israel deals directly with the companies. And, whereas other countries must make a minimum purchase of $100,000, Israel has no minimum. The Israeli Purchasing Mission in New York pays the companies and is reimbursed by the US Treasury. Fifth, since there is no oversight, a quarter of US military aid may be used within Israel for research and development, for purchases from its own arms stocks rather than US weaponry—which is required of all other arms recipients—or for nonmilitary purposes.

In 1984, Israel's economy received a boost when California senator Alan Cranston, a recipient of more than $250,000 from pro-Israel political action committees, introduced an amendment to the foreign aid legislation (Section 534, P.L. 98-473) that came to bear his name. It required Congress to provide Israel with no less than the amount Israel owed the United States in annual debt service payments (principal and interest). The amendment was included in subsequent foreign aid legislation through 1997, after which it was no longer needed. Although, technically, the United States has not canceled any of Israel's debts, it has waived repayment of past loans. Following the 1973 OCTOBER WAR and urged on by Congress, President RICHARD NIXON requested an emergency arms appropriation for Israel that included loans for which, by prior agreement, repayment would be waived. Israel reportedly preferred that the aid be listed in the form of loans rather than grants to avoid having a US military unit stationed in Israel to oversee a grant program. Since 1974, some or all of US military aid has been provided in this manner. From fiscal year 1985 through 2003, Israel received more than $45 billion in such grants.

In 1996 Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU told a joint session of Congress that Israel would reduce its need for US aid by 2000. In 1998, Israel proposed gradually eliminating economic aid, which at the time had been fixed at $1.2 billion annually, while increasing the $1.8 billion military aid appropriation by $60 million a year over a ten-year period, a request that Congress accepted. As a consequence, Israel no longer receives direct economic assistance. The ongoing need by Israel for loan guarantees would indicate, however, that it still requires US help. That Congress has made US taxpayers ultimately responsible for paying off these loans should Israel default makes it likely that it would renew economic aid should Israel have problems meeting its loan payments, regardless of the state of the US economy. A second reason is a provision in the aid legislation providing for cash flow financing. This permits Israel to set aside funding for the current year only, rather than the full cost of multiyear purchases. According to the US Government Accounting Office, this obligates Congress to furnish aid in future years to meet subsequent payments.

Another compelling reason that US economic aid to Israel may at some point be resumed would be to protect public and private institutions that have purchased tens of billions of dollars of State of Israel Bonds since 1951, much of them at below-market rates. The bondholders reportedly include 1,700 labor unions that are estimated to have invested $5 billion of their members' pension funds in the bonds—9,500 pension funds overall, involving at least twenty state governments, over 3,500 banks, 1,800 foundations, and 500 insurance

companies. Through these sales, Israel has in effect obligated the bondholders to lobby Congress to make sure that Israel's economy remains healthy so their investments will not be jeopardized.

See also AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MOSHE DAYAN; SETTLEMENTS; UNITED STATES

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—Jeffrey Blankfort

US Media

See MEDIA, US

USSR

See MOSCOW

V

Vance, Cyrus Robert (1917–2002)

Cyrus Vance was US secretary of state under President JIMMY CARTER, holding office from 1977 until he resigned in 1980 over a disagreement with a military plan to rescue US citizens held hostage in IRAN. (The plan was implemented and failed.) A lawyer by profession, Vance had been a longtime official in the Department of Defense and a veteran of the JOHN F. KENNEDY and LYNDON JOHNSON administrations (1960–1968). After leaving Carter's cabinet, Vance returned to law practice, but in the early 1990s he participated in diplomatic missions in Croatia and Bosnia.

Vance approached foreign policy with an emphasis on negotiation over conflict, and he had a special interest in arms reduction. However, he had to contend with Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was a hard-line Cold Warrior and tended to view the Middle East through an anti-Soviet and anticommunist prism. The result of the two men's conflicting approaches was that the president's foreign policy tended to be ambiguous.

Soon after assuming office, Carter put forward several ideas about solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, none of which pleased Israel, especially the president's statement that the Jewish SETTLEMENTS in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES were "illegal." In 1977 Vance prepared a working paper ahead of scheduled international meetings in Geneva in which he mentioned the need to find a solution to the "problem of REFUGEES," referring to Palestinian refugees. Israel responded by putting forward a proposal about "Jewish refugees" that did not get off the ground, but Vance's initiative failed, mainly because large segments of Jews in both Israel and the UNITED STATES rejected it.

On 1 October 1977 Vance issued a joint communiqué with Soviet foreign minister Andre Gromyko that declared: "The United States and the Soviet Union believe the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference [1973] specially convened for these purposes with participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the Palestinian people, and legal and contractual formalization of the decisions reached at the conference."

The idea of an international peace conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not new. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338, passed during the 1973 OCTOBER WAR, restated UN RESOLUTION 242 (which called for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict) and insisted on such a conference. Former secretary of state HENRY KISSINGER organized the GENEVA CONFERENCE in 1973, albeit in truncated form and substance. Nevertheless, already enraged about the Carter/Vance position on settlements and refugees, Israel was apoplectic about the possibility of convening another international conference and brought great pressure to bear on the administration. In a 4 October 1977 meeting in New York between the president and Israeli foreign minister MOSHE DAYAN, Dayan was able to dissuade Carter from convening the Geneva Conference. Vance strongly objected to the president accepting Dayan's dictates because it undermined the US position issued less than a week before.

Vance and Carter appear to have made a serious attempt to gain PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) acquiescence to the conditions (acceptance of UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognition of Israel's right to exist) demanded by Israel of the PLO prior to any negotiations. Because Kissinger had acceded to this condition in 1975 to gain Israel's agreement to the Sinai II accord, it was US "policy." Their efforts ultimately failed, largely because the PLO felt unable to make these major concessions without any expectation of concessions from Israel. The Palestinians specifically objected to Resolution 242 because it did not address them in national terms, referring only to "the refugee problem."

Nevertheless, for most of his years in office, Vance regularly consulted with EDWARD SAID, who was a Palestinian professor of literature at Columbia University, a confidant of PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT, and a member of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. Throughout the Carter administration, Said served as a back-channel link between the White House and the PLO. Said wrote about one such contact: "To take one example of which I have personal knowledge: in the late Seventies, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance asked me to persuade Arafat to accept Resolution 242 with a reservation (accepted by the US) to be added by the PLO which would insist on the national rights of the Palestinian people as well as Palestinian self determination. Vance said that the US would immediately recognize the PLO and inaugurate negotiations between it and Israel. Arafat . . . turned the offer down, as he did similar offers."

Regardless of these failed initiatives, Vance continued to test options about the possibility of the PLO being part of peace negotiations. On 8 November 1977 Vance met with a group of Arab Americans who argued for inclusion of the PLO in any immediate and future negotiations. William Quandt, then the Middle East specialist on the US National Security Council, argued for the meeting between Carter and the Arab Americans, which took place on 15 December 1977. In between these two meetings, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat made his famous trip to JERUSALEM on 19 November 1977 to address the Israeli Knesset, after which the Carter administration's attention focused almost exclusively on finalizing an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

During the Iran hostage crisis of 1980, Arafat, at the request of Vance and with the approval of President Carter, arranged the release of the first thirteen hostages from Tehran. Later, Arafat obtained the bodies of eight US service members killed in Desert One, the failed mission to rescue the hostages. In a 1988 *Playboy* interview with Arafat about the release of the Iran hostages, Arafat said, "There was a special and permanent contact between me and President Carter." Vance later confirmed that he communicated with Arafat by phone about the hostages. There were also, however, extensive lower-level contacts, especially security liaisons, between Carter administration figures and PLO leaders in LEBANON, where the PLO was headquartered. US ambassador to Lebanon John Gunther Dean was authorized by Vance to contact the PLO in Beirut, and Dean has stated that he met local Palestinian representatives at least forty times. On several occasions, he requested security assistance from the PLO through KHALIL AL-WAZIR (Abu Jihad), a close adviser of Arafat who was later assassinated by Israel.

Together with Carter, Vance brokered the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS in 1979. It must be assumed that he, as did Carter, supported the autonomy plan for Palestinians in that agreement. As a generalization, it is probably fair to say that his views differed little from Carter's on Israel and the Palestinians. Carter believed that the Palestinian problem of statelessness and homelessness was the "core and crux" of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that "no progress" could be achieved without its solution. However, Vance made several statements that provide some insight into his thinking. On 21 March 1980, speaking on behalf of the Carter administration, Vance declared, "US Policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to INTERNATIONAL LAW, and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process. . . . Article 49, paragraph 6, of the Fourth Geneva Convention is, in my judgment, and has been in the judgment of each of the legal advisors of the State Department for many, many years, to be . . . that [settlements] are illegal and that [the Convention] applies to the territories."

That Cyrus Vance and Jimmy Carter were unable to translate any of these principles regarding the Palestinians into policy probably had to do with politics—domestic and international.

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Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War

Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War (Forces of the Lightning Bolt) was a Palestinian political-military organization established in 1966 and led by Tahir Dablan, who had been purged from the Syrian army. It was created by SYRIA's BA'ATHIST leadership as a counter to the FATAH Party's growing popularity and was Arab-nationalist in orientation. Soon after its formation, it merged with the Syrian sponsored SA'IQA group. At various stages, it allied with the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (within the PLO), which eventually formed the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE.

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Vanunu, Mordechai (1954–)

Mordechai Vanunu was a technician at Dimona, Israel's nuclear installation, from 1976 to 1985, during which time he discovered that the plant was secretly producing nuclear weapons. In 1986 he provided the *London Sunday Times* with facts and photos that revealed Israel's NUCLEAR PROGRAM. His evidence showed that Israel had stockpiled up to 200 nuclear warheads, with no public debate or authorization from the Knesset or its citizens. On 30 September 1986 the MOSSAD, the Israeli intelligence agency, lured Vanunu from London to Rome, where he was kidnapped, drugged, and shipped to Israel. On 24 March 1988, after a secret trial, he was convicted of treason, espionage, and revealing state secrets and sentenced to eighteen years of imprisonment, eleven of which he spent in solitary confinement. Although Israel admitted that Vanunu posed no threat to its security, his many applications for parole were denied because of his refusal to acknowledge any guilt, and because the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT consistently rejected appeals against his conviction and sentence.

Born on 13 October 1954 to a religious Jewish family in Morocco, Vanunu immigrated with his family to Israel in 1963. After completing three years of military service, from 1971 to 1974, he began work as a nuclear technician in 1976 at the Nuclear Reactor Centre at Dimona. During 1980–1985 he pursued graduate and postgraduate studies in philosophy and geography, and in 1986 he was baptized in an Anglican church in Sydney, Australia, giving up his Jewish faith.

After he gave his story to the *Sunday Times* in 1986, he was debriefed by reporters from the *Times* and by British scientists. In October the *Times* published Vanunu's story with photographs of Dimona under the title "Revealed: The Secrets of Israel's Nuclear Arsenal." Andrew Neil, then editor of the *Sunday Times,* has since said this was the most important story that the paper ever carried while he was editor.

After Vanunu's conviction, a small group of Israelis organized the Committee to Free Vanunu, which shortly had support groups throughout the world. These committees organized demonstrations, information campaigns, and petitions, not only to tell Vanunu's story but also to promote a nuclear-free world. Countless international conferences were held on his behalf, many with speakers from the scientific elite. The European Parliament passed resolutions, celebrities held benefits, and Amnesty International called for his immediate and unconditional release. On Vanunu's fortieth birthday, Harold Pinter cut the cake at a special gathering to mark the occasion. In Barcelona

Vanunu was awarded the prestigious Sean McBride Peace Prize. (Israel forbade Vanunu from receiving the prize personally or even from his jail cell.) Norwegian supporters of Vanunu set up a replica of Vanunu's cell with banners along the route followed by replicas of former Peace Prize winners SHIMON PERES and YITZHAK RABIN. In 1995 a British medical delegation went to Israel to visit Vanunu in prison, but Israel refused the delegation permission to see him, and in the same year Professor Joseph Rotblat, at his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance ceremony in Oslo, supported the release of Vanunu.

In March 1998 Vanunu was released from solitary confinement, and, on 10 April 1998, 600 Israeli academics, in an advertisement in the *Ha'aretz* newspaper, called on the authorities to release Vanunu from prison. At the same time, Committees to Free Vanunu from around the globe presented to the Israeli Embassy in London a petition with 17,280 signatures calling for his immediate and unconditional release.

Vanunu was released from prison on 21 April 2004. He indicated a desire to completely dissociate himself from Israel, initially refused to speak in Hebrew, and planned to move to Europe or the UNITED STATES as soon as the Israeli government would permit him to do so.

A number of restrictions were placed upon Vanunu by Israeli authorities, who gave their reason as fear that he would spread more state secrets. He must inform the authorities of his place of residence and his movements between cities, and he is not allowed to leave the country. These restrictions were extended in April 2006, and then in April 2007, because of his violations of court orders. Although a court found in 2005 that he should be free to travel to the GAZA STRIP and WEST BANK, the 2006 restrictions forbade him to visit either, reversing the court's initial decision. In addition, Vanunu is not allowed to meet with foreigners or to contact them by phone or e-mail, enter or approach any embassy, visit any port of entry, or come within 500 meters of any international border crossing.

Vanunu says that his knowledge of Israel's nuclear program is now completely outdated and that he has nothing more he could possibly reveal that is not already widely known. Despite the stated restrictions, he has freely given interviews to the foreign press, including a live phone interview to BBC Radio Scotland.

In 2004 Vanunu asked the Norwegian government for asylum in that country for "humanitarian reasons." He sent applications for asylum to other countries, saying that he would accept asylum in any country because he fears for his life. NORWAY, SWEDEN, and Ireland all rejected his applications on the grounds that they could not accept his absentee application. An unclassified document from Norway reveals that members of the government considered that granting Vanunu asylum might be seen as an action against Israel and compromise Norway's traditional role as a friend of Israel and a political player in the Middle East. In 2008 the Norwegian Lawyer's Petition for Vanunu was released, which called on the Norwegian government to urgently implement a plan within the framework of international and Norwegian law to allow Vanunu to travel to and live and work in Norway. In 2006 Microsoft was accused of assisting Israeli police in obtaining documents incriminating Vanunu. Court documents reveal that Israeli police had led Microsoft to hand over all the details of his Hotmail e-mail account by suggesting that he was being investigated for espionage. This was done before a court order had been obtained.

In November 2004 Vanunu was arrested by the International Investigations Unit of the Israeli police. The arrest stemmed from an ongoing probe examining suspicions of leaking national secrets and violating court rulings. Police removed papers and a computer from the room he had been renting since his release, and he was put under house arrest for seven days. In December of that year he was apprehended by Israeli police while attempting to enter the West Bank to attend mass at the Church of the Nativity in a vehicle marked as foreign press. After posting bail, he was released into five days of house arrest.

In January 2005 the BBC reported that its JERUSALEM bureau chief, Simon Wilson, had been banned from Israel after he refused to submit materials from an interview with Vanunu, made in defiance of court orders, to the Israeli censors. Wilson was allowed to return to Israel after submitting an apology letter and acknowledging that he had defied the law. On 18 November 2005 Vanunu was arrested at the al-Ram checkpoint north of Jerusalem as he was returning by bus from the West Bank. The Israeli authorities say Vanunu's travel ban includes visits to the Palestinian territories.

Vanunu continues to live under the restrictions on travel and communication renewed by the Israeli authorities. He continues his stance of open opposition, which has led to further arrests. A six-month jail sentence for speaking to foreigners was reduced to three months and remains under appeal as of this writing.

Vanunu has garnered support for his situation from around the world. He received the Right Livelihood Award in 1987, and was given an honorary doctorate by the University of Tromsø in 2001. He was nominated by Joseph Rotblat for the Nobel Peace Prize every year from 1988 to 2004. In September 2004, artist and musician Yoko Ono gave Vanunu a peace prize in memory of her late husband John Lennon, and he received the Peace Prize of the Norwegian People (Folkets fredpris). In December 2004 he was elected, as a statement of solidarity, by the students of the University of Glasgow to serve as rector for three years, despite his confinement in Israel.

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Vatican

The most important issue for the Vatican in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the welfare of Roman Catholic adherents in the Holy Land and the HOLY SITES in JERUSALEM and elsewhere, including NAZARETH and BETHLEHEM. For this reason, the Vatican has taken an intense interest in the conflict since its inception—an interest that continues through the present.

The Vatican and Israel and Jews

On 30 December 1993 the Holy See and Israel signed a historic accord. It was not only a question of establishing diplomatic relations between the Vatican and the state of Israel, but also a change in the long and painful relations between Catholicism and Judaism. Jewish organizations and institutions had been lobbying intensely for years for such a formal accord, arguing that only the Vatican's recognition of Israel could atone for centuries of ANTI-SEMITISM. From Israel's perspective, the absence of diplomatic relations between the Holy See and Israel constituted a serious breach in its quest for international legitimacy and was an obstacle in the dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people, and in efforts to improve that relationship.

In its preamble, the accord speaks of being "conscious of the special nature of the relations between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people, and of the historic process of reconciliation and development within a framework of mutual understanding and friendship between Catholics and Jews."

The attitude of the Catholic Church toward the Jews, motivated by deeply rooted theological considerations, first began to be modified under the influence of Pope John XXIII, who instilled a new orientation as one of the first acts of his papacy. In 1959, on the first Good Friday after his election to the papacy, he ordered the expression "perfidious Jews" to be deleted from the prayers of that holy day. The Second Vatican Council, also initiated by Pope John and completed under the papacy of Paul VI, approved in the 1965 Nostra Aetate Declaration, which affirmed that "Jews were most dear to God and that a great spiritual patrimony was shared by Christians and Jews." Nostra Aetate delegitimized the *deicide* accusation and rejected the doctrine that there is a collective indictment against the Jews because of Christ's crucifixion. Hatred toward the Jews was judged to be incompatible with the doctrine of the church. An important milestone in the relationship between the church and the Jewish people, Nostra Aetate paved the way for a constructive dialogue that gradually led to a better mutual understanding and to a change of attitude.

In the meantime, important gestures were made by the Catholic Church, most particularly the visit by Pope John Paul II to the Great Synagogue in Rome in April 1986—the first visit

made by a pope to a synagogue. There he declared, "You are our brothers and, in a certain way, our dearly beloved older brothers." It was the first time any pope had made such a gesture of fraternity. The distance separating Vatican City from the Great Synagogue in Rome is a few hundred meters, but many centuries had to pass before it was crossed. There were other gestures, such as the declaration made by Pope John Paul II in 1980 when he stated, "The Jewish people, after the tragic experiences linked to the slaughter of many of its sons and daughters, motivated by a desire for security, established the State of Israel." In 1984 the pope demanded for the Jewish people in Israel "the desired security and tranquility that are the prerogative of every nation, as well as required conditions for the life and progress of every society." In 1987 he declared, "The Jews have a right to nationhood, as do all other peoples, according to INTERNATIONAL LAW."

The definitive turning point in the attitude of the Holy See came about as an outcome of the dramatic changes in the international order resulting from the breakdown of communism, the GULF WAR, and, above all, the MADRID CONFERENCE, which set in motion the peace process between Arabs and Israelis. This process, which brought Arabs and Israelis to the negotiating table, created a climate in which the Vatican was more disposed to relations with Israel. On 29 July 1992, the state of Israel and the Holy See agreed to set up a joint working commission to discuss bilateral topics of mutual interest with a view to normalizing relations. The commission was to deal with matters such as relations between the state of Israel and the church and cooperation in the fight against racism and anti-Semitism. Intensive negotiations continued until 29 December 1993. The following day the Fundamental Agreement was signed in Jerusalem.

Although the agreement contains no specific provisions concerning relations between Christians and Jews, it does not ignore the problematic historical backdrop to these relations, referred to in the preamble as the "nature of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people," and the historic process of reconciliation between the two. One of the most important points in this context is Article 2, which refers to cooperation in the fight against anti-Semitism. From the Israeli point of view, in light of the history of Catholic-Jewish relations, the shared aspiration to combat "all forms of anti-Semitism and all kinds of racism and of religious intolerance" is one of the most significant achievements of the agreement.

The Vatican and the Palestinians

Because of the Christian Palestinian minority in Israel and occupied Palestinian territories, the Holy See has tended to be most concerned with the fate of the Palestinians, and not only Roman Catholics but all Palestinian Christians. Indeed, since the creation of the state of Israel, the Vatican has adopted a sympathetic stance toward the Palestinian people, regardless of their faith and including Muslims.

Historically Muslim relations with the Roman Catholic Church have been as troubled as those with Jews. The Crusades, a series of nine religiously sanctioned military campaigns (with the official blessing of the Pope), over a period of nearly 200 years between 1095 and 1291, were waged mainly against Muslims and had the goal of recapturing Jerusalem and the Holy Land from Muslim rule. Not until the 1965 Nostra Aetate Declaration, in which the church sought peace and forgiveness from the Jews, were Muslims ever acknowledged by the church, and even in that Papal Nuncio they were given far less specific apologies than the Jews. Notably, the question of Islam was not on the agenda when Nostra Aetate was first drafted, or even at the opening of the Second Vatican Council; however, pressure from Middle Eastern bishops led to two references to Islam in the final document: (1) "The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. . . . In addition, they await the day of judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting." (2) "Over the centuries many quarrels and dissensions have arisen between Christians and Muslims. The sacred Council now pleads with all to forget the past, and urges that a sincere effort be made to achieve mutual understanding; for the benefit of all men, let them together preserve and promote peace, liberty, social

justice and moral values." Additionally, the second Vatican Council declares that "the plan of salvation also includes Muslims, due to their professed monotheism." Nevertheless, in anticipation of the possible emergence of a Palestinian state that might have control over the church's holy sites, the Vatican undertook several initiatives to ensure that its interests would be protected.

In the 1980s, when the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) transformed its objective away from ARMED STRUGGLE to retake all of Palestine into a TWO-STATE SOLUTION, recognized Israel's right to exist, and sought a peaceful resolution of the conflict, the Vatican openly spoke about Palestinian rights and began to establish contacts with PLO leaders. PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT met with the pope nine times at the Vatican. After the eruption of the First INTIFADA in 1987, Pope John-Paul II took the historic decision of appointing a Palestinian monsignor, Michel Sabbah, as Latin patriarch of Jerusalem. The Vatican's position on Jerusalem has been consistent since 1948: it views East Jerusalem as part of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES to which UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 242 applies and thus considers it inadmissible to acquire territory by force.

The Vatican is the only Christian institution possessing an international legal personality and the right to deal with states as equals. As such, in October 1998 the Vatican undertook a direct intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a symposium for representatives of Catholic bishops' conferences from around the world, held in Jerusalem under the auspices of Patriarch Sabbah. Addressing this gathering, the secretary for the Holy See's relations with states (in effect the Vatican's foreign minister), Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran, reaffirmed that the Vatican adhered "to the position of the majority in the international community, as expressed . . . in the pertinent UN resolutions," and had "the right and duty" to remind the parties "of the obligation to resolve controversies peacefully, in accordance with the principles of justice and equity within the international legal framework," that is, a two-state solution and UN Resolution 181 declaring that Jerusalem remain a unified, open city under permanent UN trusteeship. He declared that Israel's OCCUPATION of Jerusalem is "a case of manifest international injustice . . . brought about and maintained by force. . . . East Jerusalem is illegally occupied."

In this statement, Tauran is clearly affirming that the Vatican considers Israel's military occupation an unjustified use of force that is illegal per se, quite apart from any particular crimes committed by the Occupation authorities. This conclusion has far-reaching implications, not least of them being that under Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which outlaws agreements that violate fundamental norms of international law, any treaty purporting to legitimize continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories or the illegal consequences of such occupation would automatically be void.

In Rome on 15 February 2000, the Vatican signed a historic agreement with the PLO that made clear the Vatican's position vis-à-vis Jerusalem lest any party exploit the pope's planned visit the following month to the Holy Land for partisan purposes. The Vatican-PLO accord reiterated the Holy See's view that "an equitable solution for Jerusalem" must be based on "international legality and UN resolutions," which are a condition for "a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East." In the accord, the Vatican considered all "unilateral measures" that alter the status and DEMOGRAPHY of Jerusalem to be "morally and legally unacceptable." In Vatican discourse, it should be noted that the word *morally* is more powerful than *legally*. In essence, the Vatican believes that there are two national aspirations to be satisfied and three religious rights to be respected in Jerusalem.

The Vatican-PLO accord also sought to secure the rights of the Roman Catholic Church in a future Palestinian state, protect Christian freedom of religion, and assert the legal status of Christian churches. By formally lending its moral authority to the Palestinian cause, the church secured commitments for legal rights and religious freedom for Christians in an eventual Palestinian state—guarantees that the Vatican has not succeeded in obtaining from existing Muslim countries. The agreement also recognizes the "inalienable national legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people." It also requires Palestinian leaders to recognize the rights and privileges of the church. In itself, the document put in writing what had been church policy since the Vatican established official relations with the PLO in 1994.

Israel responded to the PLO-Vatican accord by summoning the Vatican's envoy in Israel to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry. A statement from

the ministry expressed "great displeasure" with the declaration in Rome, "which includes the issue of Jerusalem and other issues which are the subjects of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on permanent status." The statement said the agreement was a regrettable intervention in the talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Church experts say that Israel forced the Vatican's hand by making no provisions to safeguard church property and rights in its previous agreements that turned over LAND to Palestinian control. In addition, the Vatican was alarmed by a 1999 Israeli decision to allow Muslim leaders to build a mosque next to the NAZARETH BASILICA OF THE ANNUNCIATION.

See also CHRISTIANITY; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Venice Declaration, 1980

The European Community (EC) issued the Venice Declaration in the wake of the US-brokered CAMP DAVID ACCORDS between EGYPT and Israel to signal its intention to play a more active role in the search for a more comprehensive approach to peacemaking in the Middle East. According to the declaration, "the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige [the EC members] to play a special role" in the pursuit of regional peace. The formulation of the declaration was in itself a milestone in the EC's quest for a common foreign policy.

The declaration, however, was condemned by Israel, since it made explicit Europe's sympathy for the Palestinian cause. On the basis of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338, which called for Israel's withdrawal from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in exchange for an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as positions expressed by the EC on several previous occasions, the declaration stated that "the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community; the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The declaration went on to state that the Palestinian problem was not simply one of REFUGEES, but that the Palestinian people must be able to "exercise fully their right to self-determination" and that the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) would have to be associated with the peace negotiations, from which it had been previously excluded. Further, the EC stressed that it would "not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of JERUSALEM" and that "[Jewish] SETTLEMENTS as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories are illegal under INTERNATIONAL LAW."

In the aftermath, the EC made only half-hearted attempts to follow up the declaration with action. In part, efforts were stymied by opposition to the initiative from Israel, Egypt, and the UNITED STATES and their preference for the bilateral Camp David process. Israel's reaction to the Venice

Declaration was particularly negative. Two days after it was issued, the Israeli cabinet issued a statement: "Nothing will remain of the Venice decision but a bitter memory. The decision calls on us and other nations to bring into the peace process that Arab SS which calls itself 'the Palestine Liberation Organization.'. . . All men of goodwill in Europe, all men who revere liberty, will see this document as another Munich-like capitulation to totalitarian blackmail and a spur to all those seeking to undermine the Camp David Accords and derail the peace process in the Middle East."

The EC's move toward a more forthright endorsement of the Palestinian right to self-determination and of PLO involvement in peace negotiations progressed slowly. Beginning in December 1987, its response to the INTIFADA caused much adverse publicity for Israel in the EC. In November 1988 the EC formally welcomed the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL's (PNC) decision to accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for an international conference, which implied, for the EC, "the acceptance of the right of existence and of security of all the states of the region, including Israel." The EC also welcomed the PNC's renunciation of TERRORISM.

Nevertheless, Israel remained critical of all EC statements in support of Palestinian rights. In January 1989, for example, Israeli prime minister YITZHAK SHAMIR told the chairman of the European Parliament that it was difficult to conceive of the Europeans as participants in the political process in the Middle East because the EC had demonstrated a pro-Palestinian bias.

See also EUROPEAN UNION; FRANCE; GERMANY; SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

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Village Leagues

In 1978 the Israeli government of Prime Minister MENAHEM BEGIN and Defense Minister ARIEL SHARON implemented the Village Leagues, which were composed of local Palestinians—village heads, or *mukhtars*—who worked as COLLABORATORS with Israel's new CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. The project was intended to counter and undermine Palestinian nationalism and local support for the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and to pacify Palestinian opposition to the massive Jewish SETTLEMENT drive undertaken by Begin and Sharon.

Hebrew University professor Menahem Milson established the first Village League in HEBRON, in the WEST BANK, in 1978, headed by MUSTAFA DUDIN, after which additional leagues were created in other West Bank villages during the early 1980s. Milson and the Israeli leadership expected the leagues to foster a local and moderate collaborationist Palestinian leadership that would mediate Israel's relationship with Palestinian residents. Their objective was to shift the identity and loyalty of Palestinians away from the PLO to a group of community pro-Israel Palestinian leaders. Through a series of military orders issued during the early 1980s, the Village Leagues were authorized by Israel to arrest and detain political activists and establish armed militias, as well as to carry out other tasks, such as issuing (or not issuing) PERMITS. For example, if a Palestinian wanted to obtain a permit to allow family members abroad to visit him or to repair a well or extend a house, he would be more likely to receive it if he cooperated with the Village Leagues and asked for their assistance.

The idea for the Village Leagues came after the 1976 Israeli-sponsored Palestinian municipal elections in the West Bank and GAZA STRIP brought pro-PLO politicians to power. Given its expansive settlement plans, Israel felt the need for a new method of dealing with the Palestinian population under OCCUPATION. It was Milson's job to somehow undo the results of those elections and radically alter Palestinian political culture. Based on the Egyptian-Israeli CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, the Palestinians were to have "limited autonomy" under a "Civil Administration." However, although the Civil Administration represented Israeli government offices to the Palestinian population in the territories, the Israeli military continued to operate throughout the territories, monitoring the Palestinians and providing security for Israel and the settlers.

Milson believed that through a series of carrots and sticks he could create a class of collaborators in

the territories who would participate in the autonomy program. Indeed, he was convinced that the 70 percent of the population in the West Bank who did not live in the main towns but in the small villages were more parochial, conservative, less politicized, and easier to manipulate. Much to Milson's surprise, however, many of the traditional village notables and the rural intelligentsia refused to join an organization that had the declared aim of extinguishing Palestinian nationalism, and the Palestinian people overwhelmingly supported the PLO. Their refusal to accept Village Leagues ultimately led to the demise of the project. Palestinians viewed the leaders of the Village Leagues as oppressors and collaborators, and the caliber of the people recruited by Israel was often criminal and usually not very bright. A poll conducted by PORI, an Israeli opinion research organization, revealed that 86 percent of Palestinians wanted an independent state run by the PLO (98 percent wanted an independent state) and that local pro-PLO figures were highly popular, whereas Mustafa Dudin and other village leaguers achieved 0.2 percent support.

To counter the influence of the PLO and force the Palestinians to accept autonomy, Sharon attempted to support Milson through other measures. He outlawed the NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE (NGC), which was established in 1978 and had led the campaign against the Camp David Accords, the Civil Administration, and the Village Leagues. Sharon also dismissed the elected mayors of al-Bireh, NABLUS, Hebron, JENIN, and Ramallah, who won their positions in the Israeli-run elections of 1976 because they declined to have a meeting with Milson, whom they refused to recognize. To justify the dismissal of democratically elected Palestinian officials, Milson claimed, on 26 March, that the 1976 elections "were not democratic elections, these were elections held under TERRORISM, intimidation, bribery."

None of Sharon's measures, however, helped to weaken support for the PLO in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES or to gain support for the Village Leagues. The Village Leagues were dealt another blow on 9 March 1982 when the Jordanian government announced that all members of the leagues were traitors. Sharon finally concluded that the only way to destroy the will of the West Bank Palestinians was to strike at the heart of the PLO in Beirut, its headquarters in exile. This was one of the major objectives of the LEBANON WAR in 1982. Its objective was to destroy and disperse the PLO in order to create a political vacuum into which, he thought, the Village Leagues could expand. However, even after the PLO's destruction in Beirut, West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians still supported it. Milson may or may not have agreed with Sharon's thinking regarding LEBANON, but by 1982 he was convinced that his experiment was a failure, resigned his position, and went back to the university. The INTIFADA that erupted in December 1987 marked the definitive end to the Village Leagues.

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Villages, Destruction of (1948–1949)

The *Nakba* of 1948–1949 consisted not only of the flight of some 750,000 to 800,000 Palestinians but also the wholesale destruction of their LAND, orchards, citrus groves, olive trees, and most importantly their villages. In the words of Israeli scholar Ilan Pappé, "The countryside, the rural heart of Palestine, with its picturesque one thousand villages was ruined. Half of the villages were erased from the face of the earth, run over by

Israeli bulldozers at work since August 1948 when the government decided either to turn them into cultivated land or to build new Jewish settlements on their ruins."

Meron Benvenisti, scholar and former deputy mayor of JERUSALEM, writes, "Early in June 1948 the demolition of villages took on the character of a political mission whose objective was to block the return of the REFUGEES to their homes. . . . The destruction of the Arab villages was the key to preventing this return and was, along with the cultivation of the abandoned land and the establishment of Jewish settlements, supposed to ensure that the 'miraculous exodus' would indeed become 'retroactive TRANSFER.'"

Israel destroyed more than 400 villages through a variety of means: by setting fire to them, blowing them up, planting mines in their debris, and especially bulldozing and razing them. Military attacks on Palestinian villages began as early as December 1947 and continued through 1949 (and after); however, as time went on, numerous other groups became involved in the destruction. Benvenisti points at the TRANSFER COMMITTEE, ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION, Department of Public Works, and what he terms "Zionist mercenaries," that is, traditional KIBBUTZ leaders who wanted more land for themselves.

The numbers of villages destroyed by district were (Arabic name followed by Hebrew): Akka (ACRE) District, 26 villages; Bysan District, 29 villages; Beer As Sab (Beersheba) District, 3 villages; Ghazzah (GAZA) District, 45 villages; HAIFA District, 48 villages; Al-Khalil (HEBRON) District, 16 villages; Yaffa (JAFFA) District, 23 villages; Al-Quds (Jerusalem) District, 38 villages; Jinin (JENIN) District, 6 villages; An Naasirah (NAZARETH) District, 4 villages; Al-Ramla (Ramallah) District, 58 villages; SAFED (Safad) District, 67 villages; Tabariyya (TIBERIAS) District, 25 villages; Tulkarem District, 17 villages.

By the end of 1949 approximately 20 percent of new Israeli settlements were built over destroyed villages; by 1952 there were some seventy Jewish settlements in destroyed villages. At the same time Arab village names disappeared and were replaced by Hebrew ones. As much as possible, everything Palestinian was erased—as if it had never existed. MOSHE DAYAN made a famous speech before students at the Israeli Institute of Technology (here repeated by Amos Elon quoting *Ha'aretz*, 4 April 1969): "Jewish villages were built in the place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages, and I don't blame you because geography books no longer exist, not only do the books not exist, the Arab villages are not there either. Nahlal arose in the place of Mahlul, Kibbutz Gvat in the place of Jibta, Kibbutz Sarid in the place of Huneifis, and Kefar Yehush'a in the place of Tal al-Shuman. There is not one single place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population."

The Committee of Namin renamed the new settlement of Lavi from its Arabic Lubya. Safuria became Zipori. DAVID BEN-GURION, the first prime minister of Israel, explained that this was done as part of an attempt to prevent future claims to these villages. It was also an act supported by the Israeli archaeologists, who had authorized the names not as a takeover of a title but rather as poetic justice that returned to "ancient Israel" its old map. From the Bible they salvaged geographical names and attached them to the destroyed villages.

See also TRANSFER COMMITTEE; WAR, 1948; YOSEF WEITZ

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Virtual Beis Hamikdash

See THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

W

Wadi Juz

Wadi Juz is a Palestinian neighborhood located at the head of the Kidron Valley, just north of the OLD CITY in the heart of East JERUSALEM. With a population of approximately 7,400 in 2006, it is one of the many Palestinian neighborhoods that Israel has targeted for Judaization, that is, forcing out the Palestinian residents and filling the area with Jews. The last Palestinian mayor of Jerusalem, Rawhi Khatib, moved the Industrial Zone from Nablus Road to Wadi Juz; however, the site chosen for the Industrial Zone was located on twelve dunums (three acres) of private *waqf* land. The redrawing of the city's urban map in 1967 led to a business boom in the Industrial Zone that lasted into the late 1980s. Wadi Juz became a main thoroughfare, and Israelis made up 70 percent of the customers. The costs of setting up a garage in Wadi Juz were significantly lower than elsewhere, which led several Israelis to establish garages there. The construction of new ROAD systems, particularly Highway 1, isolated the Industrial Zone, but it was the First INTIFADA that had the most significant impact on business. Israeli customers stayed away, partly from fear and partly because of the limited services available during the frequent and unpredictable strike days. What had made Wadi Juz a success were its flexible, informal labor practices and the fact that the garages could fix a car for half the price in half the time of the garages in West Jerusalem. Today garage owners and mechanics in the Industrial Zone are struggling to survive and face destruction of the entire zone.

In 1984, Jerusalem's mayor TEDDY KOLLEK (1965 to 1993) thought it would be good public relations for the city to refurbish the neighborhood and told his adviser on Arab affairs: "I want to clean the mess up in Wadi Juz [the Industrial Zone]. You should make getting this done a top priority." The mayor wanted the dozens of small factories and garages moved out of Wadi Juz and the area redeveloped with homes, hotels, and commercial space. Nothing ever came of the mayor's plan because the Israeli government refused funding for it, choosing instead to redevelop Mamilla, a poor Jewish neighborhood in West Jerusalem. When ARIEL SHARON was minister of housing (1990–1992) under the government of Prime Minister YITZHAK SHAMIR, he drew up a plan to evict all the residents from Wadi Juz to make way for Jewish development. Although he ran into legal difficulties that kept his plan from moving forward, in October 1990 Sharon met with Matti Dan, head of the ATERET COHANIM settlement group, and Meir Davidson, who worked closely with Dan, and ordered that Arab homes and lands, including those in Wadi Juz, be placed under the authority of the CUSTODIAN OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY and "sold" to Ateret Cohanim, ELAD, and ATARA L'YOSHNA. The following year, 1991, Sharon institutionalized the East Jerusalem settlement project by establishing a special settlement committee to oversee the acquisition of Arab properties and their transfer to the settler groups. Matti Dan was especially interested in constructing a large Jewish housing project in Wadi Juz. It called for, among other things, the Ma'amuniya Arab girls' school then under construction to be part of the Jewish neighborhood instead.

In 1993 Prime Minister YITZHAK RABIN appointed a committee headed by Haim Klugman to investigate illegal transfers of government money to East Jerusalem settlers. The results were confirmed within the year in the KLUGMAN REPORT, which analysts Cheshin, Hutman, and Melamed recount: "the government worked behind the scenes to support settlers in East Jerusalem. From SILWAN and the Old City to the Mount of Olives and Wadi Juz, millions of dollars of State funds have been used by the settlers to acquire Arab homes. . . . In other cases, the settlement activists, with the support of state officials, took advantage of outdated legislation—the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW of 1950—to take over Arab homes and evict their Arab residents." Rabin did not react decisively to the report, and, although the settlers were slowed for a time, they eventually continued with their work unabated.

The process of Judaization began in Wadi Juz in 1995, when the West Jerusalem Municipality

(WJM) outlined plans to move the Wadi Juz industrial zone to Qalandia because an Israeli shareholder company wanted to take over that site. When completed, this relocation of the Industrial Zone will lead to a significant upsurge in unemployment for Palestinians. In March 1995, when the Israeli government first announced that the Housing Ministry planned to build seventy-two housing units in Wadi Juz, Jewish settlers marched through the neighborhood chanting "death to Arabs." Shortly thereafter, some 1,000 settlers in Wadi Juz demonstrated, vandalized cars, and chanted anti-Arab slogans. On 27 November 1997 Israel demolished Samir Hijazi's home in Wadi Juz. This was the first complete housing demolition in the neighborhood, although in 1967 the 400-year-old agricultural residence (*qasr)* of the Khatib family was demolished.

Moving the Wadi Juz Industrial Zone to Qalandia, about eight kilometers (five miles) from the Jerusalem city limits, is fraught with problems. Qalandia is a village and a REFUGEE camp in the WEST BANK that connects Jerusalem with Ramallah. In 2001 the authorities constructed a CHECKPOINT at Qalandia, which by 2005 had been transformed into a massive system of cement walls, gates, and lanes marking the northern entrance to Jerusalem. According to B'Tselem: "Jewish settlers bypass the Qalandia checkpoint altogether, entering the city through alternate roads, but all West Bank Palestinians must transit it and Palestinians from Jerusalem wishing to go to Qalandia or elsewhere in the West Bank must also pass through this checkpoint. In order to pass, all Palestinians must have special PERMITS, few of which are issued. Absurdly, it is also located inside the territory of annexed East Jerusalem, such that Qalandia serves as the transit point for traffic within Jerusalem and traffic within the West Bank."

In June 2003 Uri Lupolianski was elected mayor of Jerusalem. He had previously served as deputy mayor and chairperson of the Planning and Building Committee, and he remained a member of the National Building and Planning Committee and the Committee for the Development of Holy Places. In March 2004 the Israeli magazine *Yerushalaim* reported that Israel's Regional Planning Committee had approved plans for a new Jewish neighborhood of 190 dwellings plus a park in the Wadi Juz area. In September 2004 Mayor Lupolianski announced plans to rezone a section of Wadi Juz, in the eastern part of the neighborhood, to settle Jews in the area.

In a letter sent to the Housing Ministry, Lupolianski wrote, "Zoning the neighborhood for a Jewish population is likely to contribute significantly to the unification of the city because we are dealing with a neighborhood that lies between Mount Scopus and the Old City, in [its] eastern section. . . . The neighborhood is located below Hebrew University, while the homes of the neighborhood are slated to overlook the main road to MA'ALE ADUMIM [SETTLEMENT] on the one side, and the Emek Tzurim national park on the other. In light of this and for security reasons too, I believe that the neighborhood should be zoned for a Jewish population. This will ensure the safety of those traveling on the road to Ma'ale Adumin on the one hand, as well as the safety of the visitors to the national park on the other, thereby helping with the development of the park as part of the national park in the Old City basin."

In 2007 the Jerusalem Municipality demolished the Center for Autistic and Special Needs Children in Wadi Juz. The demolition was carried out according to the final decision of the district court. The center hosted children for two-week special stays and was an afternoon daycare center. It is important to note that all special education schools in the east of the city are located in the Wadi Juz area. This center was the only service provider in the entire East Jerusalem area providing for the special needs and therapy for autistic, handicapped, or challenged children.

Again in June 2008 the *Jerusalem Post* reported that the "Jerusalem Municipality plans to build tens of thousands of new apartments in the city [including in Wadi Juz], including a couple thousand flats in various Jewish neighborhoods of east Jerusalem, has received final approval." It would seem, then, that after twenty years of planning the Jewish neighborhood in Wadi Juz, only now is the project being implemented. Given the success that various settler groups have had over the past fifteen years in implanting Jewish colonies in Palestinian neighborhoods, it is an open question why it took so long at Wadi Juz.

See also HOLY SITES IN PALESTINE; SETTLER GROUPS AND SETTLEMENTS, EAST JERUSALEM

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War, 1948

The term "1948 War" is a recent appellation given to the events that shook Palestine between 29 November 1947, the day the UNITED NATIONS passed the Partition Resolution (UN RESOLUTION 181), which called for division of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, and 1 June 1949, the day the last ARMISTICE AGREEMENT between Israel and the Arab states was concluded. This is a neutral term replacing previous titles favored in Western MEDIA and academic circles, all of which, in one way or another, reflected the Israeli historical narrative: for example, *Genesis 1948*, as Dan Kurzman's book would have it, or the more common "Israel's War of Independence." Palestinian historiography, far less popular in the West, attempted to challenge these descriptions by promoting the "Palestinian Nakba (catastrophe)" representing the Palestinian collective memory and interpretation of these events.

What both the Israeli and Palestinian narratives had in common was the reference to the events of those years as a "war." This association gave rise, in more recent and professional historiography, to the term "1948 War." Not only did the new historiography opt for a more neutral title, but its overall understanding and analysis of that period also challenged the Zionist narrative and tended to accept many of the Palestinian claims about it. This shift in representation resulted from the emergence of a group of professional historians in Israel who, during the 1980s and 1990s, used newly declassified documents from local and foreign archives, especially those belonging to Israel, Great Britain, and the UNITED STATES, to gather factual information previously unavailable. With the help of the new, raw data, Israeli historians were able to piece together, on an almost daily basis, the events of this period—the picture of which validated the principal chapters in the Palestinian narrative.

The present entry is based on this harvest as well as on an even more recent perspective that challenges the description of the events in 1948 as a war. In reality, there were two different conflicts in Palestine. One was a conventional military confrontation, the "real" war, between the newly formed Jewish state and the Arab armies that entered Palestine on the day the BRITISH MANDATE ended—15 May 1948. The other was an ethnic-cleansing campaign in which Jewish military troops acted within the civil, rural, and urban Palestinian areas, and were faced with little, if any, resistance.

The term "ethnic cleansing" refers to various policies of forcibly removing people of one ethnic group. At one end of the spectrum, it is virtually indistinguishable from forced emigration and population exchange, while at the other it merges with DEPORTATION and genocide. At the most general level, however, ethnic cleansing can be understood

as the expulsion of an undesirable population from a given territory as a result of religious or ethnic discrimination; political, demographic, or ideological considerations; or a combination of these. In its most direct usage, ethnic cleansing means simply the displacement or expulsion from a territory of one ethnic group by another, usually by force. There have been numerous examples of ethnic cleansing throughout history, but the practice has been most frequently used during colonization projects. For example, in the colonization of North America, British and American settlers ethnically cleansed millions of Native Americans, forcibly relocating them to remote and often inhospitable reservation land.

This entry will sketch the historical developments in both the war between the Israeli and Arab states and the Zionist ethnic-cleansing campaign against the Palestinians.

British Departure

On 1 February 1947, the British cabinet decided to leave Palestine after thirty years of Mandatory rule. A variety of factors contributed to this decision. An economic crisis caused by the new realities created in postwar Europe by US policy gave rise to a feeling of exhaustion and a desire to withdraw from the responsibilities of the empire, especially in the face of global decolonization movements. More specifically, Palestine was a secondary asset, even at the best of imperial times, and appeared even less vital to the new Labor government in post-1945 Britain. Finally, the 1945 decision by the Jewish underground movements to force out the British also contributed to the withdrawal.

The JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, the embryo government of the Jewish community in Palestine (the Yishuv), was bitterly disappointed with British policies after World War II. The Yishuv leadership had expected the Labor Party, which was pro-Zionist, to declare unequivocal support for the creation of a Jewish state and leave the country. Contrary to their expectations, the leading figure in the British government, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, wanted to divide the country into three cantons: Jewish, Arab, and British, all having autonomy under British trusteeship. The British would thus continue to control Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases. In response, the underground movements joined forces and attacked British installations and troops, and in 1946 they blew up the KING DAVID HOTEL, the British headquarters in Palestine. Although the British had used harsh measures to quell the ARAB REVOLT in the 1930s, they did not dare use similar means against the Jewish campaign in the wake of the HOLOCAUST. Apart from the confiscation of arms, a few executions, and imprisonments, the British response to the Jewish uprising was lukewarm. This approach forced the British to field 100,000 troops in Palestine to maintain stability, more than the entire number of soldiers they had in the Indian subcontinent.

Under the leadership of DAVID BEN-GURION, the Jewish Agency prepared itself for the British withdrawal long before it actually occurred. These preparations were summed up in a 1946 master plan, code-named "Plan B," that provided a detailed program for taking over all the institutions of the Mandatory state immediately after the British departed, including hubs of government, central banks, customs services, and military installations. In addition, there were all the institutions of the Yishuv, which itself fully constituted a "state in waiting."

The second form of preparation was amassing military power. Conceptualizing strategy and needs, Ben-Gurion mobilized a military force with all the necessary capabilities for the Zionist takeover of Palestine. To supervise firsthand these preparations, he appointed himself as head of all the committees and outfits within the Jewish Agency that were entrusted with the issues of defense and war. The major developments in the military field were twofold: (1) the introduction of compulsory service, which greatly increased the number of troops; and (2) an intensive weapons purchase campaign. The new military planning included a successful integration of Jewish troops that had served in the British army during World War II with local military structures. The increased troop numbers, the new weapons, and intense training equipped the Jewish community with all the necessary means for the military challenge ahead.

The third area of Jewish preparation was diplomatic. Anglo-Saxon Jews were recruited for the political campaign, which was focused on securing international recognition for a Jewish state in at least 80 percent of Palestine. The Jewish Agency provided the international community with a map that defined the area coveted by the Zionist movement, which more or less reflects contemporary Israel without the WEST BANK and the GAZA STRIP. The early engagement with

diplomacy was crucial to the success of the overall Zionist effort. The British government decided not only to leave Palestine, but also to entrust its fate to the United Nations. In 1947, when the Palestine problem was officially given to the United Nations, the international body was still inexperienced and very much under the influence of the United States. Zionist leaders understood that the path to success at the United Nations ran through the United States, and tremendous efforts were expended to win Washington to the cause.

The United Nations did have significant impact on the Palestine question, but its point of departure was ZIONISM, not the Palestinians. The United Nations took for granted that Zionist colonization was a legitimate project, as was the right of the Jews to have a state in Palestine. The special commission it appointed to deal with the Palestine question, the UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE (UNSCOP), reduced the 80 percent of Palestine desired by the Jews to 56 percent, but it nonetheless implied from the outset that it would recognize the Jewish state as compensation from the international community for the Holocaust and in recognition of the historical Jewish connection to the land. The facts on the ground, such as the Palestinians being the indigenous people who constituted two-thirds of the overall population and owned the vast majority of the land, were ignored. Had the United Nations applied the democratic principle of self-determination to a prospective solution, these facts would have suggested only one possible settlement: a Palestinian state in Palestine.

The last and most important form of Jewish preparation for the British departure and Israel's own impending statehood included the policies formulated regarding the Palestinian population. As the Zionist leadership prepared to take over as much of Palestine as possible, it began to carefully plan the fate of the million Palestinians living in areas that would become part of the Jewish state. It was again Ben-Gurion who was the moving force behind these politics. By March 1948 the decision had been made: the only means for fulfilling the Zionist ideal of a Jewish state in Palestine was to ethnically cleanse the country of its Arab population. The term "ethnic cleansing" was not used at the time, but the Hebrew words for "cleansing"—*le-thaher* and *le-vaer*—were frequently mentioned in the master plan for the depopulation of the Palestinians.

Arab Response to the British Departure

News of the British withdrawal caught the Palestinians and the Arab leaders by surprise and unprepared. The Palestinian nationalist elite had been crushed by the British during the 1936 Arab Revolt, and their leader, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, and other Palestinian leaders were barred from returning to Palestine. No less significant was the irreversible damage inflicted by the British army on Palestinian military capabilities, limited as they had been, during the revolt. Most Palestinian paramilitary units that had some fighting capability had been disbanded. The Palestinians were prepared in none of the four areas in which the Jewish side was prepared, and there was no plan for taking over the country. Military and diplomatic matters were left in the hands of the ARAB LEAGUE, the federation of Arab states. And, although some leading Arab notables and intellectuals spoke publicly of the possibility of an impending ethnic cleansing, nothing, or almost nothing, was done.

What remained of the ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, which was formed in April 1936 in the context of the Arab Revolt, attempted to revive the 1936 structure of rural and urban defense based on national committees throughout the country. These emergency outfits consisted of notables, well-off members of society, and religious dignitaries within the communities. They were promised money and arms by Arab state elites, none of which ever arrived, but even if they had, the class status of these people suggests that they would not have been first-class fighters. The committee essentially waited for the Arab League's guidance for future policies and actions. The Arab League, in turn, waited for the United Nations to make its final decision on Palestine, although the league's leaders resolved to boycott the international diplomatic process if, as they predicted, it ended with the creation of a Jewish state over most, if not all, of Palestine. But apart from that, the league was passive between February 1947 (the date of the British decision to leave) and November 1947, when UNSCOP submitted its final recommendations for the partitioning of Palestine.

One member state of the Arab League, Transjordan (renamed JORDAN in 1948), pursued its own policy. Its king, Abdullah of the HASHEMITE dynasty, began a series of secret talks with the Jewish Agency in 1946 over the partitioning of post-Mandatory Palestine between the Jews and the Jordanians. The two sides reached a tacit

understanding that severely impacted the results of the 1948 War. In 1947 these negotiations intensified and adapted themselves to the developing UN partition plan. Palestine was indeed to be divided, yet not between Jews and Palestinians but rather between Jews and Hashemites.

The British government ordered its forces, officials, and civil servants to focus on one objective only—a safe withdrawal. This meant not being embroiled in any action against Jews or Arabs unless it was required for safeguarding British life or property. More importantly, the British government gave its blessing to the Jewish-Transjordanian negotiations and to the emerging agreement to partition the land between Israel and Jordan, at the expense of the Palestinians. On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted in favor of partition. The two-thirds majority was obtained through heavy-handed US pressure on reluctant member states. But Resolution 181 was ultimately meaningless, as it was officially rejected by the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League, on the one hand, and was ignored by the Jewish Agency, on the other. It did, however, demarcate the borders of the Jewish and Arab states. This is important for understanding the policies and conduct of both the Jewish Agency and the Arab states. The Jewish Agency felt that it had carte blanche in the areas allocated to it in the UN partition plan, and what it most wanted was to cleanse those areas of their indigenous population. It also wanted to enlarge, beyond the 56 percent granted by the United Nations, the land area of the Jewish state and planned to do so by force. Both objectives were officially deferred until the British were gone.

First Phase of the Ethnic Cleansing (December 1947–March 1948)

The day after the UN resolution was adopted, Palestinians—leaders and ordinary people alike—were faced with a new reality for which they were not prepared. The dismay and frustration were translated into three days of demonstrations and strikes, including several violent attacks on Jewish businesses and residential areas in urban centers and random sniping at Jewish traffic en route to isolated Jewish settlements. But the energy of the demonstrators dissipated rather quickly, and the Palestinian population tried to return to normalcy, which surprised the Jewish political and military commands. Their expectation had been that a civil war would ensue, which would allow them to implement ethnic-cleansing operations as retaliation against Palestinian villages and neighborhoods. Ben-Gurion, in conjunction with the TRANSFER COMMITTEE, formulated the policy that every shot fired by the Palestinians would be returned with severe collective punishment: the depopulation and destruction of villages and towns. But because the limited nature of Palestinian attacks could not justify such massive retaliation, a new policy was needed to facilitate the de-Arabization of the future Jewish state.

In January 1948 the Jewish military command decided to attack villages even when there was no provocation. At first, in the 1930s, the pretext was assaults by one or another village against Jewish targets, but even that proved to be negligible. Thus the requirement for an "excuse" was abandoned. Initially, British authorities protested against this policy to the Jewish leadership, but eventually they simply stood aside. The turning point came in the middle of February 1948, when, for the first time, whole Palestinian villages were systematically emptied of their inhabitants. The first of these villages were located on the Mediterranean coast near the ancient city of Caesarea. Palestinian villages, unlike the Jewish settlements, were not organized as military outposts and were thus vulnerable to Jewish operations.

When, in mid-February, the news of the operations emerged, the Arab League felt obliged to do more than utter words. The foreign ministers of the Arab states decided to create an army of volunteers—the ARAB LIBERATION ARMY (ALA)—and dispatch it to defend the Palestinians. An Iraqi general, Ismail Safwat, was appointed to head the ALA, and a veteran commander of the 1936 revolt, FAWZI AL-QAWUQJI, was its acting commander. The ALA operated primarily in the north of Palestine, while the south was assisted by Egyptian volunteers from the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. These troops were reinforced by small, Palestinian paramilitary groups. But even together they were no match for the main Jewish military, which included several underground organizations plus the regular forces of the HAGANA that began with more than 50,000 well-armed and well-organized troops. The ALA confined its activity to the "Arab" areas, those parts of Palestine allocated to the Palestinians in the UN partition plan, and it had some limited and short-term successes—attacking a few isolated settlements and convoys making their way to those areas.

The month of March 1948 was crucial in regard to Jewish objectives. On 10 March the DALET PLAN, a strategic program for the cleansing of Palestine, was adopted by the Jewish high command. The plan elaborated the tactics for achieving two overarching goals: (1) to take over the hub and networks of statehood from the Mandatory government in every area from which British soldiers and officials would withdraw; and (2) more generally, to cleanse the future Jewish state of its Palestinian inhabitants. As with the earlier program, the Dalet Plan was based on retaliation: Arab villages or urban neighborhoods that fired on Jewish forces would have their populations expelled. In practice, this meant that no Palestinian village or town had a chance of escaping once word of the February evictions spread, because Palestinians would inevitably resist even the appearance of the Jewish military.

After 10 March, the Jewish leadership divided the country into some ten zones, each of which was the responsibility of a brigade (twelve by May 1948). Each brigade commander received a list of the villages and urban centers in his zone with the order to "destroy and cleanse the following places." The list not only enumerated names of localities but also provided a timetable for the expulsion of their populations and destruction of villages. The plan graphically explained how "to destroy": encircle a village and occupy it, assemble all the inhabitants and expel them outside the country's BORDERS, blow up or ignite the houses, and plant mines in the debris to prevent future return. The first significant development of March 1948, then, was the introduction of a master plan for the massive expulsion of the Palestinian population from the soon-to-be Jewish state. The Dalet Plan did not include a map, but it referred to "the territorial span of the future state," which went significantly beyond the 56 percent of Palestine allotted in the Partition Resolution and annexed part of the territory designated for the Arab state—an area termed "the security zone." The size of this zone was not specified, but once it was implemented it amounted to an additional 22 percent of Mandatory Palestine.

The second significant development in March 1948 was the realization by the United Nations and the United States that the Partition Resolution did not resolve the conflict over Palestine but instead was leading to a major war. The US State Department wanted to retract partition and instead impose an international trusteeship to allow further negotiations, but strong pressure by the Zionist lobby on President HARRY TRUMAN foiled this shift in policy.

Destruction of Urban Palestine (April–May 1948)

Once it became clear that the international community was not going to alter the partition plan, both the Jewish leadership and Arab politicians in the neighboring states undertook new courses of action. Chronologically, the Jewish action preceded the general Arab and Palestinian reactions. Under Ben-Gurion's leadership, the Jewish high command decided to accelerate implementation of the Dalet Plan; the main objective—to take over the ethnically mixed towns and cities of Palestine and their rural hinterlands—was largely realized between the second week of April and the second week of May. In most places, the pattern was similar: Jewish forces attacked one or two villages in the vicinity of a town or a city; followed this with heavy bombardment of the urban center, which frequently caused the local elite to flee; and then occupied the area, causing mass expulsion. These huge operations were sporadically accompanied by the massacre or execution of a small number of inhabitants, intended to strike fear and hasten the pace of departure.


The first city to fall was TIBERIAS, a town on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee. After a massacre in a nearby village of Nasr al-Din, the city was heavily bombarded on 19 April 1948. The British senior commander still remaining in the area contacted the ad hoc leadership of the Palestinians in Tiberias and offered to facilitate the city's evacuation. The leadership consented after it considered the balance of power: the presence of a few Arab volunteers and armed locals against the organized military might of the Jews. Not one Palestinian was left in the city. Based on this relatively easy success, the Jewish leadership expected similar developments in the other urban centers, but such was not always the case. Ten days earlier, on 9 April 1948, Jewish forces massacred more than 100 people in DEIR YASSIN near JERUSALEM, terrifying many of Jerusalem's notables, who left the city. But in Jerusalem, as elsewhere in Palestine, those who could not afford to leave stayed behind. Following the massacre, Jewish forces bombarded and shelled Jerusalem for days, but, unable to empty all the city's neighborhoods, they had to physically occupy

and expel the residents. The western part of Jerusalem was completely depopulated, but Transjordan's Arab Legion protected the eastern half.

One of the primary targets of the Dalet Plan was HAIFA, but it was not easily taken. From December 1947 onward, Jewish forces undertook a mixed campaign of terror and intimidation in the Arab sector, which included sniping and detonating barrels of dynamite to destroy buildings and cars. These actions caused the wealthy Palestinians to leave for what they assumed would be a short period. On the last day of 1947, Jewish forces massacred around seventy men, women, and children in the village of Balad al-Shaykh on the eastern flank of Haifa. This was retaliation for the killing of thirty-nine Jewish workers in the Haifa refinery plant, which was itself retribution for a Jewish bombing of Palestinian workers there that killed six and injured forty-two. Within a few weeks, an entire Haifa neighborhood, Hawassa, was evicted by force. After the local elite left, the majority of Haifa's 75,000 Palestinians were still left in the city, exposed to shelling and attacks.

Subsequent to the capture of Haifa's rural hinterland (as part of Operation Cleansing the Leaven, or Biur Hametz, which began in April 1948), direct attacks on Palestinian neighborhoods in the city were resumed. The few notables who were left in Haifa approached the British commander of the northern subdistrict and requested his protection, but he was only willing to mediate between them and the Jewish command for an orderly eviction, which was organized on 21 April 1948. The next day, masses of Palestinians concentrated at the old market, next to the port. Heavy shelling began, and the people ran for their lives to the ships and boats in the harbor—a stampede that left many dead and wounded. The operation that led to the city's final fall was named Operation Misparayim (scissors). On 20–21 April the city was captured by the Carmeli Brigade and the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI.

Many refugees from Haifa left for ACRE, which was captured at the beginning of May, together with JAFFA, SAFED, and Beisan, and their Palestinian populations were evicted by force and terror. Houses and businesses were looted, and the few who remained were subjected to a chaotic military regime that allowed soldiers to abuse and harass them. Parallel to the usurpation of the towns, ethnic-cleansing operations began in the



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Map 44. Zionist Military Operations outside the UN-Proposed Jewish State, April–May 1948

rural areas and intensified throughout the month of May. On 15 May 1948, the British Mandate ended, but it was not a significant date; events moved forward much as in the preceding period. The only difference was that in the first part of the month the Jewish forces concentrated on the areas allocated to the Jews in the UN plan, and in the second half they moved into the territory designated by the United Nations for the Arab state. What the Jewish forces found hard to achieve was a steady connection with and protection of their isolated settlements, situated at the heart of the Arab area. Convoys to these spots were attacked, and a substantial number of Jews were killed in assaults on buses and trucks.

Real War's Early Stages (15 May–10 June 1948)

The Jewish army, now the Israeli army, had more than 50,000 well-trained and well-armed troops at its disposal. It faced an almost equal number of troops coming from neighboring Arab countries. These troops, however, were poorly trained and armed, disorganized, and without a central command structure. The Arab League only decided on the campaign on 30 April 1948, ostensibly to ensure that the area of Palestine allotted to the Palestinians did not fall to Israel. The largest of the contingents came from EGYPT, whose government did not decide to join the war effort until 12 May. Half of these troops were from the Muslim Brotherhood, volunteers with no prior experience, although they acquitted themselves better on the battlefield than most of the regular armies.

The most experienced Arab army was the Jordanian Arab Legion, but it was constrained by the tacit alliance between King Abdullah and Israel. That agreement was finalized in the last days of the Mandate and allowed the Jordanian army to enter and occupy the areas slated for the Palestinian state (today's West Bank), which it did with little military effort. The two sides, however, had failed to reach an agreement on Jerusalem; thus fierce fighting broke out in May 1948 between Jordan and Israel, which resulted in Jordan's capturing East Jerusalem, including the Jewish quarter of the OLD CITY and the Latrun area on the Jerusalem-Jaffa road.

Parallel to the Jordanian military effort, the other Arab armies entered the areas allocated to the Palestinians in the Partition Resolution. Although many leaders in the Arab League suspected Abdullah of colluding with the Jews over Palestine's future, they nonetheless consented to placing him as titular head of the military operation, together with an Iraqi general who was loyal to him. None of the generals were anxious for a head-on confrontation with Israel, since most regarded that as doomed to failure. Thus, Abdullah was responsible for coordinating the Arab effort, and he exploited this position for implementing the agreement he had with Israel.

The Syrian army entered through the northeastern border of Palestine and succeeded in occupying, for a short time, four isolated Jewish settlements. The Egyptian forces, too, had some success in this respect, but again, it was short-lived, not more than a few days. That the Arab armies took any settlements, however briefly, was largely a result of Ben-Gurion's strategic decision not to allocate many troops for the protection of isolated settlements. In any event, it took no more than a week of fighting to sever the Arabs' hold over any settlement. Military confrontations continued until the UN mediator, COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE, who arrived on 20 May, succeeded in arranging a truce that went into effect on 10 June. At this point in the real war, Arab armies were scattered throughout the territory of the ephemeral Palestinian state, and most remained in areas adjacent to the countries from which they had come. In addition to the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian troops, LEBANON and IRAQ were involved in the fighting. The Lebanese units stayed close to their border, and the Iraqi contingent was dispatched to the northern part of the country (today's West Bank). Together with the ALA, Iraq's army was a significant factor on the ground, and it fended off successive Israeli attempts to occupy the West Bank and areas near it.

Encouraged by the situation unfolding a week after 15 May, a euphoric Ben-Gurion, now the Israeli prime minister, determined that the time was ripe for the Israeli forces to expand the boundaries of the state beyond what the Partition Resolution had stipulated, and perhaps even beyond Palestine. Israel proceeded to repeatedly attack Wadi 'Ara, a valley that connects the Marj Ibn 'Amir (the Jezreel Valley of today) and the coast near the town of Hadera. Some fifteen villages lay near the road connecting these two areas. The Israeli forces, however, failed to take them because of the resistance of the Iraqi contingent of about 3,000, together with some 1,000 ALA

volunteers. An even more ambitious Israeli plan involved seizing SYRIA's Syrian (renamed Golan by Israel after the 1967 WAR) Heights, the Upper Galilee, and southern Lebanon. These plans were postponed shortly after they were articulated: the first was not captured until 1967, and the other two in the fall of 1948. The 10 June truce held for a month; on 8 July fighting resumed for ten days.

Ethnic-Cleansing Front (until the First Truce)

While Israeli troops clashed with the units of Arab regular armies and the ALA, ethnic-cleansing operations continued unabated. With the termination of the British Mandate on 15 May, the Israeli army could now act against the Palestinians without concern about possible British intervention, and it was free to openly send its brigades to depopulate and destroy villages. The pace was astonishing. In a very short time, some fifty villages on the coast were taken, their populations evicted by force, and the houses demolished. Gratuitous brutality was not part of the policy, and when a case did occur, it grew out of circumstances that developed on the ground. Villages suspected by the Israeli forces of being involved in attacks on convoys en route to isolated settlements (operations in which Israel lost 200 people) were penalized by cruel treatment of entire villages. This was the situation with the village of al-Bassa near Acre, which was assaulted in a vicious manner as revenge for a previous ALA attack on a convoy to Kibbutz Yechiam. There were other cases, or pretexts, for atrocities. Villages known for their involvement in the 1936 revolt were also subjected to a more callous takeover than others.

The most brutal acts occurred when the conventional method of village occupation failed for one reason or another. The usual routine was to encircle a village from three flanks, leaving open the forth for driving out or causing flight. When villages, such as Ayn Zaytun in the north, Tantura on the coast, and al-Dawayima south of HEBRON, were surrounded from all four flanks, the Israeli soldiers were faced with a large, hostile population. Either as a result of something gone amok or coldblooded preplanning, masses of people were massacred. A preplanned operation typically went as follows: After a village was occupied, an army intelligence officer appeared. With the help of a hooded, local COLLABORATOR he would first identify "suspicious" individuals—people on prepared lists or those that the Israeli army defined as "men of military age" (which could range from the ages of ten to fifty). Suspicious men were executed, and those of military age were transferred to prison, where they were held for more than a year.

Most of the ethnic-cleansing operations had code names. Some had "cleansing" in the title, while other names were more innocuous but menacing in their intentions. Such was Operation Nachson (Travelers Book of Prayers), implemented before 15 May, the first maneuver under the Dalet Plan and which included the massacre of Deir Yassin and the cleansing of many villages in the Greater Jerusalem area. One operation was never code-named. Beginning before 15 May and ending in July 1948, it involved a sweeping cleansing of the coastal villages from south of Tel Aviv to north of Haifa. Of the sixty-four villages that were attacked, only two remain. The task was mainly entrusted to Brigade Alexandroni and included the 22 May massacre in Tantura. Another was Operation Cedar, one of the first ethnic-cleansing actions after 15 May, which focused on Marj Ibn 'Amir, the area stretching between Afula and JENIN. Dozen of villages in the *marj*/plain were taken by surprise, their people expelled, and houses destroyed. Among the more well-known villages that were cleansed in Cedar were Lajun and Zarain. The Iraqi contingent succeeded in foiling the more ambitious part of the plan, the capture of Jenin. This was the first of many attempts to seize not only Jenin but also the Wadi 'Ara area, which was defended by the Iraqi contingent, the ALA, and local people who attempted to protect their homes. Their defense of the Wadi is one of the few chapters of military success in the history of Palestine's ethnic cleansing. Until the end of 1948, the Israeli army tried repeatedly to occupy the Wadi but was always repelled. Ironically, as a result of the armistice agreement signed by Israel and Jordan in April 1949, this area was annexed to Israel.


After 15 May the early operations of ethnic cleansing moved from areas allocated to the Jews in Resolution 181 to those within the designated Arab state. That meant that some of the operations took place at the same time as battles between Israel and the Arab armies. Nevertheless, the militarily superior Israeli forces were capable of engaging in both simultaneously and prevailing in each. In areas away from the borders with Arab states, Israel forces moving against the rural villages were opposed only by Arab volunteer units and local villagers and were able to seize and destroy several

villages a day and drive out their populations. In the area of Latrun, the Jordanian Legion successfully prevented the Israeli army from capturing this valley on the slopes of the Jerusalem mountains, but other villages not protected by the Jordanians—Dir Ayyub, Bayt Jiz, Bayt Susin, and others—fell to the Israeli army. Three villages—Imwas, Yalu, and Bayt Nuba—were protected by the Jordanians because they were within areas the Jordanians deemed as their territory, but they were destroyed by Israel after the 1967 War in an act of revenge. In the central plains, while the Israeli army was frustrating the advance of the regular Egyptian forces, the villages of Qubayba and Zarngha were the first two of many destroyed in the area that today is Rehovot. Later, the town of Yibneh, one of the large locales in that area and within the UN-designated Arab state, was cleansed by the Israeli forces. South of there, near the Egyptian border, Julis, Yasud, Bitani-Arabi, and Jusayer were cleansed of their residents.

With a similar pace, the army took over the areas on the northern coast of Palestine, south of the Lebanese border, down to Acre. Here, too, its units captured, cleansed, and blew up several villages. By 29 May much of the area known as Western Galilee was in Israeli hands. In the Mandatory period, more than 90 percent of its inhabitants and lands were Palestinian, yet within two weeks very few Palestinians remained. The rest of the Galilee did not give in so easily, and today most of the Palestinian citizens of Israel live in the lower and upper Galilee.

First Truce (10 June–9 July 1948)

When the first truce commenced on 10 June, almost 400 villages had been destroyed and half a million Palestinians had become REFUGEES. The exhausted Arab armies welcomed the truce, and the Israeli command wanted a short lull as well but wanted to complete the ethnic cleansing as soon as possible. Both the Arab armies and Israel used the



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Map 45. (Left) Land Ownership in Palestine, 1947; (right) Palestinian Villages Depopulated in 1948 and 1967 and Razed by Israel

truce to replenish equipment and arms. While Israel established a fruitful connection with the Eastern Bloc that provided its army with updated and heavy weaponry, the Arab armies were not that fortunate. Their main suppliers were Britain and FRANCE, both of which imposed an arms embargo on Palestine, crippling the already strained and inefficient Arab forces. The issue of weapons resupply exposed a rift in Israeli politics between the extremist Jewish militia, the Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi or Irgun, and the mainstream Israeli forces. At the beginning of June, Hagana, the main Jewish underground military organization in Palestine, intercepted an Irgun shipment of arms for its fighters, and an exchange of fire occurred. After that event, the Israeli army was a more unified force than it had been, as Irgun was marginalized and lost status as a result of its own movement of arms. Irgun members were sent to control the already occupied Arab areas, especially in the mixed towns, where small communities of Palestinians still lived among Jews. However, their harassment of the Palestinians led, in several cases, to their replacement by regular soldiers. The Irgun also served as guards in the POW camps, where mostly young Palestinians were held for long periods.

During the period of the truce, Bernadotte promoted a settlement of the conflict that deviated from the Partition Resolution. He recommended that Palestine be divided according to the Mandate location of Jewish and Arab communities, demanded the return of all the refugees, and reiterated the demand that Jerusalem be an internationalized city. Because Bernadotte, as the former head of the Swedish Red Cross, had helped to save Jews during World War II, Israel had agreed to his role as mediator. However, when he announced his recommendations, Israeli officials deeply regretted their earlier consent and categorically rejected the proposals. Thus the first truce saw an attempt at peace, its failure, and the beginning of the next stage of ethnic cleansing. This included mainly the demolition of the houses in already occupied villages whose populations had been expelled. It also involved looting, official and unofficial, of Palestinian urban assets, including bank accounts. By the time the fighting resumed, Israel had established a military regime over the areas it had seized.

Ten-Day War (8–18 July 1948)

On 8 July 1948 Bernadotte announced that he had failed to secure agreement to extend the truce. Israel resumed its military effort, while the Arab armies were digging in to defend the areas they still controlled. A few bold Arab generals suggested counteroffensive operations, but these failed to materialize. In Israel's Operation Cypress, Syria was the first Arab contingent to be defeated and driven out of Palestine. The Iraqi contingent was also targeted during the "ten days' war" that lasted until the second truce, but it held on. However, an area neighboring Wadi 'Ara and northeast of Jenin, the Gilboa Mountains, fell in the Israeli offensive, and the villages in this zone were seized and destroyed and their populations expelled. In the northern part of Palestine, the Iraqi and Syrian fronts were the only two in which some sort of real war continued to be waged. In the rest of the Galilee, ethnic cleansing continued. Operation Palm Tree was the code name for Israel's seizure of NAZARETH and its environs on 16 July 1948, although the local commander decided to leave the city intact, concerned about international repercussions given its significance as a Christian holy site. But the surrounding villages, some of them already overwhelmed by previous waves of refugees, were not so fortunate. Among them, Mujaydal and Saffuriya were the most well-known, and many of their residents relocated to Nazareth, where they reside today in neighborhoods that face their original villages. Under the same operation, villages on the road between Acre and Safed were captured, including Birweh, Kafar Yasif, Amqa, and Quweiqat.

Israeli forces did not empty all the villages in this area, sparing those that had Druze communities. At the end of May, the leaders of the Druze community in Palestine decided to tie their community's fate with that of the new Jewish state. The Druze units that were serving in the ALA became an auxiliary force in the Israeli army, assisting in the cleansing operations in Galilee and forming the nucleus of a special unit that enforced the military regime over the Palestinian areas in its early stages.

Pockets of resistance on the coast were also taken in those ten days, and some of them resisted the cleansing operations. For instance, in the villages of Ijzim and Ayn Ghazal, south of Haifa, the Israeli army needed to continue its operations to complete the expulsion even after a second truce was declared by the United Nations on 19 July. The operation against these villages during the second truce was code-named "Policeman," as the

troops were disguised as a policing force to mislead the UN observers.

Elsewhere within the ten days' war, the cleansing operations focused on LYDDA and RAMLA. They were the target of Operation Dani, which involved one of the most brutal acts of mass expulsion. Israeli soldiers committed countless atrocities: families were forcibly driven from their houses; over 250 men were massacred in the mosque; and all the families, consisting of some 70,000 people, were marched to the West Bank in one of Palestine's hottest summers. Although these towns were supposed to be protected by the Jordanian Arab Legion and were within the state allocated to the Arabs in the UN resolution, the legion deserted them, preferring to protect the Latrun area west of the towns and closer to Jerusalem. The legion's repeated success in repelling the overall Israeli attempt to occupy the Latrun area suggests that it could have saved Lydda and Ramla. The Hashemite dynasty blamed the British chief of the Arab Legion, John Glubb Pasha, for the decision to desert the towns. When he was deposed in the 1950s, his conduct in the case of Lydda and Ramla was given as the principal reason. In addition, many villages between Ramla and Lydda that were east of Jaffa on the plain stretching as far as the Jerusalem Mountains were cleansed in the ten days' war, including Isshawa, Kisla, and Zuba. In Jerusalem, Israel used the ten days to occupy the last of the Palestinian villages in the western part of the city; Malha and Ayn Karim were the most well-known of them. On the night before the second truce was to go into effect, Israeli forces tried to capture SHAYKH JARRAH and the Old City of Jerusalem. As in Latrun, they could not defeat the Jordanian Arab Legion.

The real war was still being waged in the south during the ten days. The Israelis put into effect Operation An-Far (Anti-Farouq) to push the Egyptian contingent farther into the south. It succeeded in driving a wedge between the Egyptian units, encircling some in pockets from which they could not escape and thus eventually had to surrender. After the eviction of the Egyptian forces from the northern Naqab (Negev), the last days of the fighting before the second truce commenced were devoted to fresh ethnic-cleansing operations: Tal al-Safi and Masmiyya were the largest of the villages depopulated in the internal plains on the way to the Naqab. Today, where most of these villages once stood, there are Jewish settlements. During the ten days' war, Israel accomplished most of its military and demographic objectives with relative ease, compared to earlier stages, because it had come into possession of a newly built air force with planes purchased from Czechoslovakia.

Second Truce and Resumption of Battle (July–January 1949)

The second truce lasted, with sporadic violations, until 19 October 1948. A kind of war of attrition between Israeli and Egyptian forces continued, but elsewhere, until the beginning of October, the fighting subsided. Israel used the period to flatten the remaining villages and Arab neighborhoods to prevent future repatriation. Most were transformed into Jewish settlements and some into recreational grounds. These actions were undertaken to preempt international pressure on Israel to allow the return of the refugees. And, indeed, Bernadotte's final recommendations to the United Nations, delivered on 16 September 1948, repeated his insistence on the repatriation of the refugees as a precondition for a lasting peace, alongside the partitioning of Palestine and the internationalization of Jerusalem. Although, for a time, the United Nations embraced Bernadotte's proposals and expected Israel to allow an unconditional repatriation, Israel refused and prepared for further ethnic-cleansing operations. A day after his report was handed to the United Nations, Bernadotte was assassinated by the Jewish extremist group LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL, or LEHI, although the diplomatic effort continued while Israel unrelentingly established facts on the ground.

At the beginning of October, skirmishes in the south turned into a full-scale confrontation between Israeli and Egyptian forces, including a week of tank battles. On 16 October 1948 the Egyptian government stopped sending reinforcements or new equipment, and the Israeli army began a large-scale offensive, code-named Operation Yoav, that ended in the withdrawal of most Egyptian units from Palestine (apart from a pocket in Faluja in the Negev and the Gaza Strip). The removal of Egyptian forces from areas that fell within the parameters of Yoav (which covered the area parallel to the Gaza Strip of today, to the south as far as Bir Asluj, some fifty miles south of Bir Saba) left several villages and towns defenseless, and they were destroyed. The UN Security Council was concerned that Israeli forces would enter Egyptian

territory and drag Britain, which had a defense treaty with Egypt, into the war. Therefore, it ordered Israel to cease fighting on 19 October, but the Israeli army continued its operation another two days and stopped only after the Security Council threatened to impose sanctions if fighting continued. Within these two days, Israeli forces seized the town of Bir-Saba and expelled all its inhabitants, as well as pushing out a large population of BEDOUIN tribes in the Naqab. By 22 October there were no significant Arab forces in the south of Palestine and few inhabitants—peasants, urbanites, or Bedouin.

The last phase of the war began on 28 October. The thrust of Israel's effort was the final takeover of the Galilee region, which was not coincidentally code-named Operation Hiram, after the biblical king of Tyre in southern Lebanon. The military command had ordered the operation for the north of Palestine to include the occupation of not only the Galilee but also of southern Lebanon, where the Litani River was a critical WATER resource. Within sixty hours, both areas fell into Jewish hands, including thirteen villages in southern Lebanon. The small Lebanese army, fragmented and poorly armed, together with ALA volunteers and local men, attempted unsuccessfully to defend the villages. Nevertheless, that dozens of villages remained in the Galilee is due to that resistance. On the other hand, the resistance triggered some of the worst atrocities committed by the Israeli army in its ethnic-cleansing operations. Labun, Safsaf, and Sasa suffered most, but many Palestinians from other villages recall October as the most frightful month of the war, with a night attack on Sasa and massacres in Safsaf and the village of Hula.

The worst case was not in the Galilee, however. While Operation Hiram raged, other Israeli forces were mopping up and cleansing pockets within areas already occupied. One such area was south of Khalil (Hebron), where the village of al-Dawayima was seized at the end of October (as part of Operation Winery). A report submitted to the United Nations described the massacre of more than 400 men, children, and women in a spree of killing.

After a military stalemate throughout November 1948, Israeli forces carried out the final stages of Operation Yoav. The Egyptian forces, though outnumbered and confronted with superior weapons, waged a last battle against Israeli forces. The final confrontation took place in Uja (today Nizana, a kibbutz on the international border with Egypt). The battle peaked on 27 December, and the Israeli forces were so successful that they began moving into the Sinai Peninsula. It took a very firm British ultimatum and a strong condemnation by President Truman to halt the Israeli offensive into Egypt proper. Ben-Gurion had to order the Israeli troops to withdraw. In the beginning of January, the British RAF sent reconnaissance aircraft to make sure Israeli forces had exited areas in the Sinai. The Israeli air force shot down five British planes, and the two countries were close to war, but US mediation averted a direct confrontation. The way was now open to an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Armistice and Futile Peace Negotiations (January–July 1949)

The last month of the war was marked by intense diplomatic activity at the United Nations with two major objectives: concluding armistice agreements between Israel and each Arab state, and pushing beyond the truces to a comprehensive settlement. The acting mediator who replaced Bernadotte was US diplomat Ralph Bunche, who was put in charge of the armistice talks. A committee, the PALESTINE CONCILIATION COMMISSION, consisting of Turkish, French, and US diplomats, was to pursue the goal of a comprehensive political settlement. At first, Bunche attempted to force Israel back to the October lines but failed. One of the reasons for the UN reluctance to take a tough line on this issue was the decision of Jordan to de facto annex the West Bank (officially in 1950). This part of Palestine was occupied by the Jordanians almost without a shot, as part of their prior agreement with Israel. The other part of the UN-designated Palestinian state remaining in Arab hands was the Gaza Strip. In September the Egyptians had allowed former Palestinian leaders to establish an ALL PALESTINE GOVERNMENT in Gaza City, but it was an empty gesture, evidenced by Cairo's forcible dismantlement a short time later. Under these circumstances, Bunche decided to try to draw armistice lines according to the status quo and not to force Israel to withdraw—apart from its presence in Lebanon.

The first armistice negotiations were with Egypt. The domestic scene in that country pushed the Egyptian government to seek a way out of the Palestine fiasco as rapidly as possible. The major opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood, still supported the Palestinians, engaged in pitched battles with government forces, and was probably

responsible for the assassination of Egyptian prime minister Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi. Bunche decided to hold the talks on the island of Rhodes in Greece, where the Israeli and Egyptian delegations arrived at the beginning of January 1949. On 23 February a permanent cease-fire was concluded with much pomposity and publicity. The road was now open for Israel to occupy the last part of the southern Negev. In March 1949, troops implemented Operation Fait Accompli, expanding Israeli control over the southern Naqab as far as Um Rashrash on the Red Sea's coastline (today the location of Eilat). On the way, the army annexed some areas of Wadi Arava from Transjordan to Israel.

Armistice talks between Israel and Jordan had started in December, commencing with an agreement to divide Jerusalem, and then moved to Rhodes, where the official negotiations began on 1 March. The long history of tacit agreements between the two parties had determined, in many ways, the results of the 1948 War. Jordan's annexation of the West Bank and the decision of its legion not to enter Jewish areas during the war were the two most notable consequences of the collusion. Israel wanted to annex the entire Wadi 'Ara area, a region it had repeatedly tried and failed to seize by force. At the time of the Rhodes negotiations, Wadi 'Ara was under Jordanian control. In March 1949, while the talks were in progress, the Israeli army conducted several intimidating maneuvers, signaling Jordan that it would take Wadi 'Ara by force if the area was not given to them in negotiations. King Abdullah capitulated, and the armistice was signed in April.

Negotiations with Lebanon were conducted in March as well, leading to Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In Syria a coup d'état brought to power Husni Za'im, and the internal upheavals delayed armistice negotiations. They were concluded in June 1949 with the creation of a problematic no-man's-land between the Golan Heights and Israel, where the UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION attempted, but failed, to prevent Israel's water diversion projects. The zone became an arena for continuous military friction, the intensification of which, in the 1960s, contributed to the 1967 War.

While these negotiations were taking place, the Palestine Conciliation Commission was attempting to craft a comprehensive political settlement. It regarded the return of the refugees as the cornerstone of any future settlement, together with the partition of the land into two equal parts and the internationalization of Jerusalem. In April 1949 the Palestine commission called upon the parties to participate in a peace conference in Switzerland, which failed because of Israeli intransigence and US inaction. On 11 December 1948 the UN General Assembly, with an overwhelming majority, had adopted UN RESOLUTION 194 endorsing the above three principles. In many ways the failure of the United Nations to replace its ill-fated partition plan with a different arrangement sealed the fate of the Palestinians: it allowed Israel to force 750,000 Palestinians from their homes, destroy 531 villages and eleven urban neighborhoods, and take over 78 percent of Mandatory Palestine. The war also started a chain of events inside the Arab world that brought down many of the Arab regimes that took part in the war. But the outcome for the Palestinian people was far worse than for the individual Arab politicians who miscalculated the consequences of the fiasco into which they walked after the British left Palestine. The general Arab failure to save the Palestinians produced the *Nakba* that still fuels the Palestinian conflict today.

See also DALET PLAN; DEMOGRAPHY; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; TRANSFER CO; VILLAGES, DESTRUCTION OF (1948–1949)

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—Ilan Pappé

War, 1967

The 1967 War was fought between Israel and its Arab neighbors EGYPT, JORDAN, and SYRIA. It began on 5 June when Israel launched a preemptive attack against the Egyptian and Syrian air forces, destroying virtually all of Egypt's fleet and most of Syria's. It ended on 10 June, after Israel had completed its final offensive in Syria's Syrian (renamed Golan by Israel) Heights, and a cease-fire was signed the following day. In those six days, Israel soundly defeated the three most developed Arab states, conquering and occupying the GAZA STRIP and the entire Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the WEST BANK of the Jordan River including East JERUSALEM from Jordan, and Syria's Syrian Heights. Overall, Israel's territory grew by a factor of three and placed some one million Arabs under Israel's direct control in the newly captured territories.

On 5 June, after Israel carried out highly successful air attacks against the major Egyptian and Syrian airfields and planes, the Jordanian, Syrian, and a few Iraqi air forces mounted limited attacks against Israel. Subsequent Israeli attacks against secondary Egyptian airfields as well as Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi airfields wiped out almost all those nations' air forces. Israel claimed to have destroyed 416 Arab aircraft in total while losing 26 of its own. Throughout the war, Israeli aircraft continued strafing Arab airfield runways to prevent their return to usability.

Also on 5 June, Israel massed around 70,000 men, organized in three armored divisions, on the Egyptian front. One used two brigades to the north of Um-Katef, the first to break through the defenses at Abu-Ageila to the south, and the second to block the road to El-Arish and encircle Abu-Ageila from the east. The battles continued for three and a half days until Abu-Ageila fell, after which the Egyptian defense minister ordered all units in the Sinai to retreat. This order effectively meant the defeat of Egypt. By 8 June Israel had completed the capture of the Sinai, including the Gaza Strip. Sharm al-Shaykh, at the southernmost tip of the peninsula, had been taken a day earlier by units of the Israeli navy.

On 6 June Israeli units attacked Jordanian forces in the West Bank, and by the afternoon they had destroyed the Royal Jordanian Air Force in its entirety. By the evening of that day, Israeli ground forces had completed the encirclement of Jerusalem, although, fearing damage to holy places and having to fight in built-up areas, Minister of Defense MOSHE DAYAN ordered his troops not to advance into the city itself. But on 7 June heavy fighting led Israel to capture the fortress at Latrun, advance through Beit Horon toward Ramallah, and take the area of northwest Jerusalem that links the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University with the city of Jerusalem. By evening the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) had secured JERICHO and thus reinforced Jerusalem.

Fighting continued for several days within Jerusalem and adjacent areas, but by 9 June Israel completely controlled the OLD CITY as well as Gush Etzion and HEBRON. By the evening of 9 June, Israel had conquered the entire West Bank.

On 9 June Israeli troops marched on the Syrian Heights (after the 5 June air attack, during which it destroyed two-thirds of the Syrian air force), forcing the remaining Syrian air forces to retreat to distant bases, after which it played no further role in the ensuing warfare. A minor Syrian force tried, but failed, to capture the water plant at Tel Dan (the subject of a fierce escalation two years earlier). Several Syrian tanks were reported to have sunk in the Jordan River. In any case, the Syrian command abandoned hopes of a ground attack and began shelling Israeli towns in the Hula Valley instead. The unique terrain of the Syrian Heights (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several kilometers running east to west) and the general lack of ROADS in the area, plus the advantage of excellent intelligence collected by MOSSAD operative Eli Cohen (who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions, served Israel very well. By 10 June Syria too was defeated; Israel occupied the Heights and was preparing to move on to Damascus when pressure from the UNITED STATES and the UNITED NATIONS halted its advance.

The Israeli casualties in the war were quite low considering it defeated three major countries. The following figures are as confirmed by Israel: in total, 800 Israeli soldiers were killed and 2,563 Israelis were wounded. Arab casualties were much higher: in total, 21,000 Arab soldiers were killed and 45,000 others were wounded. Of these, 10,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed, with a further 1,500 Egyptian officers plus 20,000 soldiers wounded. Another 6,000 Egyptians were listed as missing. In 1995, Israeli military researcher Aryeh Yitzhaki claimed that Israeli troops massacred some 1,000 Egyptian prisoners of war in several incidents in the Sinai. On 26 February 2007, Israeli Television's Channel One aired a documentary film about the 1967 War titled *Unit Shakidan.* It was described by its director as a "self-examination" of Israel's use of force during the 1967 War and showed mass graves where 250 Egyptian prisoners of war were buried. The Israeli government denies all such allegations. Jordan lost 700 soldiers with around 2,500 wounded. Syrian losses were 2,500 dead and 5,000 wounded. Altogether, Israel captured 6,000 Arab soldiers and destroyed 416 Arab aircraft.

In his book *Righteous Victims*, Israeli historian Benny Morris writes that immediately after the war, "in three villages southwest of Jerusalem [Imwas, Yalu, and Beit Nuba in the Latrun area], Israel expelled the residents and destroyed the villages. . . . In the Old City of Jerusalem, Israel depopulated and demolished the Mughrabi (Moroccan) quarter adjacent to the WESTERN WALL to make room for a public square." Israel also depopulated the villages of Beit Marsam, Beit Awa, Jiftlik, and al-Burj as well as half the city of Qalqilya, where, according to Moshe Dayan in his *Memoirs*, "houses were destroyed not in battle, but as punishment . . . and in order to chase away the inhabitants. . . . In Qalqilya, about a third of the homes were razed and about 12,000 inhabitants were evicted, though many then camped out in the environs." In occupied eastern Jerusalem, Israel immediately disbanded the local municipal council and extended Israeli law and jurisdiction. A military government was installed in the West Bank and Gaza and, together with the municipal orders imposed on eastern Jerusalem, controlled the Palestinian population by policies of separation, isolation, and force.

Many thousands of other Palestinians took to the roads. Perhaps as many as 70,000, mostly from the Jericho area, fled during the fighting; tens of thousands more left over the following months. By September 1967 about one-quarter of the population of the West Bank, some 250,000 to 300,000 Palestinians, were expelled or fled, some for the second time. By December 1968 Israel had expelled or otherwise facilitated the departure of 75,000 Palestinians from the Gaza Strip out of a total population of 400,000. A smaller number of Palestinians were internally displaced during the war, including Palestinians expelled from the Old City of Jerusalem.

There is some evidence of IDF soldiers going around with loudspeakers ordering West Bankers to leave their homes and cross the Jordan. Some left because they had relatives or sources of livelihood on the East Bank and feared being permanently cut off. Israel put thousands of Palestinians on buses that drove them from East Jerusalem to the Allenby bridge. This Israeli-organized transportation, which began on 11 June 1967, went on for about a month. At the bridge Palestinians had to sign a document stating that

they were leaving of their own free will. On 2 July the Israeli government announced that it would allow the return of those 1967 refugees who desired to return, but no later than by 10 August, which was later extended to 13 September. Few Palestinians even heard the Israeli offer, and fewer still had the means to make the trek back or overcome the onerous bureaucratic procedures involved. In practice only 14,000 of the 120,000 who did apply were actually allowed by Israel to return to the West Bank. In addition, between 80,000 and 110,000 Syrians fled the Syrian Heights, of which about 20,000 were from the city of Quneitra.

In response to the war, on 22 November 1967 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 ostensibly to provide a road map for Arab-Israeli peace. The Palestinians were not included in the resolution except in a phrase calling for a solution to the REFUGEE problem. That resolution has remained the internationally recognized basis for peacemaking among Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians through this day, although Israel disputes it. Israel won another "victory" from the war: policymakers in Washington, D.C., were so impressed with Israel's military performance that they adopted the idea (desired by Tel Aviv) of Israel as a STRATEGIC ASSET—a militarily superior Israel that could dominate the Middle East in the interests of US power, and massive amounts of US arms and dollars began flowing into the Jewish state.

Prior to the start of the war, Israel produced a plan for the soon-to-be OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Meir Shamgar, a lawyer and jurist who became president of the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT, was the military advocate-general (1961–1968) when he wrote the *Manual for the Military Advocate in Military Government.* In his manual, Shamgar created the "legal" framework for the Israeli military government in the Occupied Territories. Written months before the beginning of overt hostilities, Shamgar devised the principles of a legal doctrine for Israel's OCCUPATION of the West Bank and Gaza. In what later became official Israeli policy, he determined that Israel would not be "occupying" these areas, but rather "administering" them, and that therefore the Fourth Geneva Convention was inapplicable. Shamgar further determined that Palestinians would have no inherent legal rights under Israel's administration and that Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the "administered areas" would be legal.

The Causes of the War

Several factors contributed to the 1967 War, some dating back to the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR and others as far back as the 1948 WAR.

Following the 1956 War, the United Nations mandated that a UN Emergency Force (UNEF) be stationed in Israel and Egypt to prevent future hostilities. Israel refused to accept the UNEF on its territory, and it was thus stationed solely on Egyptian soil. From the end of the Sinai/Suez War until the beginning of the 1967 crisis, the Israeli-Egyptian border was peaceful. This, however, was almost exclusively the result of Egyptian preference rather than a consequence of the presence of UNEF, although the UNEF did supply JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR with a rationale for refraining from permitting Palestinian guerrilla activity from Egyptian territory. However, as tensions escalated in the spring of 1967 and in the context of public Israeli threats against Syria, inter-Arab pressures forced Nasir to ask for a *partial* withdrawal of UNEF forces and the positioning of Egyptian troops in the Sinai. This led UN Secretary-General U Thant to immediately withdraw *all* the UNEF forces. Then, under intense pressure from Syria and other Arab states, Nasir closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli transit. These combined factors gave Israel the excuse to portray Egypt as the aggressor in the 1967 War.

On the other hand, in the post-1956 period, the Israeli-Syrian border was far less calm for several reasons. First and foremost was the fundamental Arab-Israeli conflict, which always seemed at its most intractable between Syria and Israel. But specific issues also contributed to the tensions, including fishing rights in Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), Palestinian guerrilla incursions into Israel from Syrian territory, Israeli encroachments on the demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the Syrian border, and the Israeli development of the Jordan River project (the "National Water Carrier"). This last issue, though part of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, had a specifically Syrian dimension because it was centered along the Syrian border.

The escalation of all these issues became the trigger for war in 1967, although other regional developments provide an important backdrop. At the first Arab Summit conference that met in Cairo in January 1964, 'Abd al-Nasir took the position

that the Arab states needed to coordinate their military apparatuses to provide for their common defense against another Israeli invasion. To this end they attempted to organize a United Arab Command, but it never materialized. They also established an authority to implement an Arab project for ensuring that the Arab states received their share of the water resources Israel was rapidly draining. This never functioned either. Finally, the summit created the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION to control the small guerrilla groups that were carrying out incursions in Israel, fearing that Israel would attack the states from which they operated.

Thus, by 1965 the outlines of the third Arab-Israeli conflict were beginning to take shape around two sets of issues. The first was composed of inter-Arab competition and conflict, including Nasir's desire to maintain leadership of pan-Arabism in the context of rivalries among Egypt, Syria, Jordan, SAUDI ARABIA, and IRAQ. The second lay within the broad context of animosity between Arabs and Israelis, but it centered on the continuous conflict between Israel and Syria over the demilitarized zone and the National Water Carrier project, as well as FATAH guerrilla activities and the Israeli strategy of massive retaliation.

Two more specific incidents are important: the 13 November 1966 Israeli raid on three Palestinian villages near Hebron (then under Jordanian control) and the 7 April 1967 Israeli attack on Syrian planes over Syrian soil. The villages involved were Es Samu (which gives its name to the raid), Jimba, and Khirbet Kirkay. The Es Samu raid was without provocation from Jordan or from any Palestinian territory it occupied. Israel dispatched 4,000 troops in armored vehicles and tanks supported by several air squadrons in an attack on the villages, killing eighteen Jordanians and Palestinians and wounding fifty-four, including civilians. It also demolished 140 houses and other buildings, including the school, clinic, and mosque. The UN Security Council, by a vote of 14 to 0, censured Israel for the raid. Jordan was outraged, and shortly thereafter Amman signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt at Cairo's importuning.

From January to April 1967 there was a series of clashes between Israel and Syria, aggravated by Israel's announcement that it intended to cultivate all the areas in the DMZ. On the morning of 7 April 1967, Israel sent tractors into the DMZ; Syria fired mortars at the tractors; Israel struck back with artillery, tanks, and aircraft. Seventy Israeli planes penetrated Syrian airspace and shot down six Syrian aircraft. Then followed five weeks of intense Arab and Israeli inflammatory rhetoric, the partial Egyptian mobilization on 14 May, Israeli mobilization on 15–16 May, the departure of UNEF on 16 May, and Israel's preemptive strike on 5 June.

At the end of June 1967, the Knesset passed a law effectively annexing Arab East Jerusalem. The United Nations responded on 3 July 1969 with UN Resolution 267, stipulating that Arab Jerusalem was defined as "occupied territory." The vote was unanimously against Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem; however, the annexation remained.

After successfully conducting the war, Moshe Dayan pacified the West Bank and developed a long-term plan—the DAYAN PLAN—for establishing Israeli control over the area. Within two weeks of the war's end, both he and YIGAL ALLON (the ALLON PLAN) conceptualized and made ready for the Israeli cabinet discussion two perspectives for Israel's long-term control of the territories, providing the guiding framework for the settlement movement in the years to come.

On 8 August 1982 Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN, addressing the National Defense College in Jerusalem, stated that the 1967 War was not a "war of necessity" but rather a "war of choice . . . Nasser did not attack us. We decided to attack him."

See also FATAH; INFILTRATION (PALESTINIAN) AND RETALIATION (ISRAELI); PROPAGANDA, ARAB; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

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War, 1967: Consequences for Israel

On 5 June 1967, Israeli forces attacked EGYPT, destroying its entire air force on the ground and launching a war that lasted six days and ultimately extended to JORDAN and SYRIA. It was a war that erupted after weeks of growing tension during which domestic, regional, and international dynamics took on a life of their own.

Although the origins of the war can be located at any number of points in the years preceding the confrontation, the proximate buildup began when Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR responded to a miscommunication from the SOVIET UNION regarding the imminence of an Israeli attack on Syria. Nasir mobilized his forces in Sinai, requested the UNITED NATIONS to withdraw the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Egyptian-Israeli border, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. In 1957, Israel had defined the straits as a *casus belli*, and thus the likelihood of war increased dramatically. Although Nasir's goals appear to have been largely political, he could not control the growing excitement among the Arab people throughout the region, where rhetoric about undoing the failures of the 1948 WAR, in which Israel defeated Arab forces, contributed to heightened mass expectations and to the decision by Jordan's King Husayn to enter into a defense alliance with Egypt on 30 May. In Israel, the feeling of being encircled by hostile Arab states and years of war gave rise to demands for a national unity government as well as to the appointment of MOSHE DAYAN, a well-respected military leader, as minister of defense.

In Israel, the immediate military success of the war—coupled with few casualties and the rapid conquest of significant territories, including the Sinai and the GAZA STRIP, the WEST BANK, East JERUSALEM, and the Golan Heights—gave rise to relief as well as euphoria. The initial Israeli intent, to return most of the newly won territories in exchange for peace treaties, was quickly replaced by a commitment to the unification of Jerusalem and an adamant refusal to return to the 4 June borders. At the same time, the magnitude of the defeat ensured that Arab states as well as the newly emerging Palestinian movement would seek redress for the humiliation suffered.

The 1967 War is also known as the Six Day War, an appellation coined by Dayan that has biblical symbolism because it refers to God's creation, which took six days. It also highlights the military drama of a conflict that changed the map of the Middle East in less than a week. Although these descriptions imply a rapidly completed confrontation, the 1967 War had profound ramifications for Israelis, who entered the conflict with barely nineteen years of statehood behind them. Its impact must be understood both in the concrete changes the war brought and in the meanings ascribed to it. Moreover, central to any assessment must be an analysis of the ways in which this war complicated efforts to deal with issues left unresolved after the 1948 War and how it reopened basic questions related to the nature of the state. The 1967 War was not limited in its impact to the immediate belligerents: Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This conflict made Israel a visibly dominant state in a region already the site of Cold War rivalries, ideological challenges, uncertain political legitimacies, and economic difficulties heightened by disparities of resources as well as by the international interest in oil. Israel's deepening identification with the UNITED STATES in the aftermath of the war must also be taken into account. Simultaneously and perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the recognition Israel gained after the war as the dominant regional power coincided with the emergence of a new movement that embodied, for Israelis, their worst and most deeply repressed fear: the assertion of Palestinian national claims.



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Map 46. The Near East after the 1967 War

Whereas the outcome of the 1948 War appeared to shift the conflict decisively from that of two different ethnic communities—Palestinian Arabs and Jews struggling over their rights to the same piece of land—to a more typical one of interstate conflict, the 1967 War reunited the territory of Mandate Palestine and, with it, the centrality of Palestinian-Israeli dynamics. Thus, a discussion of the 1967 War and its meaning for Israel must consider the ways in which Israel's military victory contributed to shaping and inhibiting the ongoing process of nation-state formation as well as to the expansion and contraction of its power to define its position in the world.

Domestic Context of War

The state of Israel, which appeared briefly in 1967 to be remarkably powerful and united in its defense against an external threat, was in fact a state that had failed to resolve many of the internal issues on which there was significant disagreement. The policies of its first prime minister, DAVID BEN-GURION, emphasized the consolidation of state institutions dominated by his party (MAPAI) and contributed significantly to a central role by the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) in both foreign and domestic policy. The military, viewed as creator and defender of the nation, emphasized the centrality of Israel's regional threat as formative to the state.

The failure of peace negotiations in 1949 left open a number of issues that remain undecided to this day (the status of Jerusalem, final BORDERS, and solutions for the displaced Palestinian REFUGEES from the wars), and the failure was accompanied by the decision to delay the writing of an Israeli constitution. Ben-Gurion believed that experience would eventually ease the complexity of making decisions about potentially difficult issues, such as relations between the state and religion. In fact, Ben-Gurion came to an agreement with religious parties on maintaining the status quo. The result appeared to facilitate governing coalitions in which Mapai, a secular labor party, dominated Israeli politics but failed to resolve differing perspectives on the meaning of what was now defined as the Jewish state. Similarly, the relationship between Israeli citizenship and the Jewish people remained subject to debate. In all these arenas, the ongoing atmosphere of Israel's isolation in the region enhanced the perception that discussion should be delayed until security had been ensured. Directly connected to these phenomena were policies that bound internal relations to external relations. Thus, the military administration over the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL who remained within the physical boundaries of Israel furthered separatism among Israelis and undermined any efforts at including the Arab population that constituted a distinct minority in the new national entity.

Three additional factors were formative influences in the period prior to 1967. The first can be described as the ramifications of post-HOLOCAUST IMMIGRATION (1947–1950), with its symbolic as well as political and economic effects. The second was the immigration of large numbers of Jews from the Arab world who brought with them cultural and social perspectives distinctively different from those of the European survivors and who were perceived by the dominant Israeli elite as a challenge to integration (1948–1954). Finally, the international context of decolonization and the Cold War established specific parameters and choices for the new state. These issues, unlike the creation of a constitution, for example, required immediate decisions and could not be finessed as the domestic ones had been. The result was that the emphasis on collective survival and security obscured the degree to which pre-state differences were now supplemented by new rifts among competing parties, ideologies, and policies.

By 1966 the Israeli society and economy were experiencing significant challenges. Rapid expansion, fueled in part by reparation payments by GERMANY, added to social inequalities and was followed by a recession, which raised fears about whether the state could maintain its pace of growth. The role of ZIONISM and its ideological mobilization, so important to the creation of the state, were now open to question as a new generation came of age. Increasing outmigration and decreasing immigration were reflected in the potential emergence of a more stable Israeli public, which might allow reconsideration of the relationship between the state and, on one hand, its citizenry and, on the other, the Jewish DIASPORA. At the same time, the termination of the internal military administration over the Palestinians (1966), combined with the slowdown in immigration, created the possibility of defining the concept of "citizen" in far more diverse ways than Zionist ideology had foreseen.

Pulling in another direction, however, were regional and international developments whose interpretation was critical both to decisionmaking by policymakers and to public reactions. Intrastate tensions within the Arab world contributed to the emergence of Syrian support for a newly active Palestinian commando movement, FATAH. An Egyptian arms buildup and Cairo's ties to the Soviet Union highlighted the polarization that accompanied Cold War divisions, intensifying Israel's search for stronger military support from the United States. Thus, in the aftermath of the Eichmann trial (1961), which had strengthened Israeli Jews' identification with the trauma of the Holocaust, hostile Arab rhetoric and regional actions were readily translated into a public search for security through support for military policies. Without recognizing it, Israeli civil society had become highly militarized. Initiatives undertaken by the IDF—a reprisal raid against the Jordanian village of Samu in the fall of 1966 as well as flights over Syria in early 1967—were understood by the Israeli public within the context of self-defense and security. The reality hidden from the public, but later revealed by Moshe Dayan, was that the flights were intentional provocations against Syria. Equally obscured from the Israeli public was the reality of Israeli military superiority.

Events in the weeks leading up to the war affected both Israelis and Jews throughout the world, particularly in the United States. From 16 May 1967, when 'Abd al-Nasir requested removal of UNEF from Sinai, to 1 June, when a national unity government was formed in Israel, the Israeli public mistrusted the capacity of Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL, not a militaristic-oriented leader, to deal effectively with the threat. The rapidity with which UN Secretary-General U Thant removed UNEF further reinforced the perception of isolation. As Arab capitals became the site of demonstrations supporting confrontation with Israel, and the rhetoric of "throwing Jews into the sea" further raised expectations of revenge, Israelis came to believe that they were facing an existential threat comparable to that of 1948. Well aware of the vulnerability of their borders, Israelis reacted with fear to the growing encirclement of an Arab alliance now seemingly united and determined. At the same time, the realities of a small state in which the military had to mobilize its citizenry and could not readily sustain a long period of mobilization, compared with the resources of Egypt and Syria, which had more leeway in this regard, became more starkly evident.

When it came, the war brought with it cathartic relief and shock at the same time. In the place of a besieged state hemmed in and unrecognized by any of its neighbors, Israelis found themselves with extraordinary power and expansive space. It was a situation for which they were unprepared as much in the practical sense as in the political one. Although many individuals quickly discerned the conundrum of a military victory that had no clear political goals, the political system was poorly positioned to formulate a policy predicated on the new realities. The unity of security readily gave way to a fragmentation of competing visions and interpretations, now vying for support. The euphoric reaction of a public temporarily released from fear did not create an environment hospitable to sober analyses.

Interpreting Victory

It is widely recognized that the 1967 War helped to revive and legitimize religious forms of Zionism that laid claim to historical events to justify their actions. Thus, Israel's capture of the West Bank and Gaza, viewed by some as restoration of the biblical Land of Israel, provided a new site of contestation to define the meaning of the state. What scholar Ian Lustick has called the "fetishization of Jerusalem" was an important piece of this process, in which secular nationalist interests in absorbing all of Jerusalem were accompanied by religious justifications. At the same time, secular leaders without messianic beliefs nevertheless contributed to the success of what became an entirely new movement of settlers developing their own material and spiritual investments in occupying this territory. This conjunction of forces reflected a continuity of failure to confront differences over the place of religion in the state, but it was also reflective of two other factors. On the one hand, the dominance of security and military values and interests led secular leaders to insist on the need for expansive, secure, and defensible borders. On the other hand, the absence of a clearly articulated legal basis for secular democracy, typically defined in a constitution, rendered the traditional LABOR PARTY leadership ambivalent in its efforts at containing messianic forces such as the GUSH EMUNIM settler movement.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, notable voices expressed strong opinions about the need to

withdraw from the territories occupied in the war and the dangers to Israeli society of remaining as an occupying power. Ben-Gurion and philosopher YESHAYAHU LEIBOWITZ were among the most prominent of those arguing that Israel could not afford to take responsibility for the Palestinian population now under its control. Despite the fact that an Arab summit in August 1967 agreed on the three no's—to recognition of Israel, to negotiation with Israel, and to peace with Israel—UN RESOLUTION 242, passed in November 1967, created the basis for a negotiated settlement leading to Israeli withdrawal in exchange for peace. From 1967 to 1973, numerous efforts were made by representatives of the UNITED NATIONS and the United States to broker agreements between Israel and Egypt as well as Jordan.

In hindsight, it must be asked why the governments of Israel in that period could not respond positively to these initiatives. This is particularly striking given the fact that already in 1969, the WAR OF ATTRITION between Egypt and Israel showed that there would be a continuing toll from the conflict with Egypt, while the development of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) and its attacks added a new element of insecurity. The war of 1967, with its promise of security and dominance, ironically led to less rather than more security for the population. This reality, however, was obscured by the mistrust that now belatedly infused popular perceptions of peace plans based on withdrawal. The disparity in regional military forces lent credibility to the Israeli idea that there was no need to act urgently and that withdrawal could be more dangerous than a situation of no war/no peace.

One way of understanding the impact of this war is to separate Israel's victory over the Arab states from its effective loss, given the emerging Palestinian national movement. The war of 1967 was itself partially stimulated by the activism of Palestinian commandos on the borders, but it was only after the war that the PLO emerged as a new voice internationally. The reunification of the territory that had been governed by the BRITISH MANDATE signified in many ways the return of the repressed. For Israelis it meant confrontation with their own earlier history, with the unresolved ending of the Mandate and with the price of the 1948 victory. The reluctance or inability to withdraw from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES when Jordan would have been the logical negotiating partner inevitably meant the reincorporation of a communal conflict that had been suppressed and that many believed could be forgotten and/or denied. Although Dayan famously announced that he was waiting for a phone call from the Arab states, he was also responsible for the open bridges policy allowing Palestinians to travel freely between the Occupied Territories and Jordan and for creating a policy of OCCUPATION that was predicated on the possibility of benign control of the Occupied Territories with sufficient economic integration (coupled with rigorous military control) to preclude revolt. Both policies were part of a broader stance in which the Israeli government once again decided not to decide: avoiding the confrontation required to define what territory Israel would or would not give up, what kind of state would or would not emerge, and who would or would not belong to its citizenry.

The emergence of the PLO on the international stage was a critical outcome of the 1967 War and an important component in determining the impact of the war on Israel. Although the leaders of Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, IRAQ, and Syria might utilize rhetoric to call Israel a colonial intruder, a threat to Arab unity, and a danger to the entire region, they nevertheless were bound by the constraints of their own interests, which required respect for Israel's growing economic and military power. The PLO, however, was initially determined to establish its own claim to legitimacy in the name of a national liberation movement that sought to replace Israel and to identify it with other colonial powers such as FRANCE in Algeria. In the atmosphere of the late 1960s and early 1970s with the ongoing Vietnam War, PLO activism, including terrorist actions as well as guerrilla attacks, challenged Israel's military success with an appeal to justice and an attack on Israel's legitimacy as a state. This attack, although answered with a counterattack both denying Palestinian history and equating the PLO with TERRORISM, nevertheless spoke to the never-confronted internal differences with regard to the Zionist movement, the grounds on which the Israeli state had established itself. Ironically, moreover, INTERNATIONAL LAW and the United Nations as the basis of Israel's legitimacy lost credibility in a situation colored on the one hand by a United Nations seen increasingly as hostile to Israel, and on the other hand by Israeli unwillingness to adhere to international law with regard to its Occupation and SETTLEMENTS.

Emergence of the Settlement Movement

In these circumstances, the most profound impact that the 1967 War had on Israeli society and polity was the emergence of a settler movement whose perpetual challenge to state laws laid bare the serious contradictions between the state's declared policies and its secret support for those who undermined the law. The illusory freedom of action generated by the outcome of 1967 and the acquiescence of a Palestinian population largely stunned by its new position allowed members of the Israeli government to maintain their public opposition to illegal settlements while simultaneously failing to act decisively against them and even enabling them. In an interview Dayan gave in 1976 (published only in 1997 after his death), he maintained that one of his two most serious mistakes was not to threaten resignation over the entry of settlers into HEBRON, although he recognized the transformative implications of that event. What was at stake was the basis for Israeli-Palestinian relations; the settlers clearly articulated their intention of utilizing state power in the service of their own messianic goals. Another war in 1973, the victory of the LIKUD PARTY in 1977, the rapid growth of settlements, and with them a constituency devoted to permanent expansion of the state, all signaled the weakness of the Labor establishment. Labor had been losing credibility in all areas—national security, economic development, and the capacity to represent citizens who felt historically marginalized (both MIZRAHI Jews and Israeli Palestinians).

The outcome of the 1967 War contained the potential for developments in widely disparate directions. Physically, it broke down barriers that had served to isolate but also to define Israel in the nineteen years of its existence. Lack of integration into the region as well as a prohibition on local travel had only reinforced domestic divisions between a dominant political and cultural elite with ties to Europe and a population of Arab-Jewish immigrants as well as the Palestinian community. For Palestinians living in Israel, the nineteen years of disconnection from surrounding states, coupled with having citizenship in a state that expected disloyalty (and thus imposed direct and indirect controls), now was replaced by a politics in which the advantages of citizenship were insufficient to affect a political arena increasingly ethnonational in its definition. Thus, the new uncertainty of physical borders coincided with increased emphasis on communal differences. Materially, the sudden expansion further intensified the imbalances and stratifications that governed the capacity to make gains in the new environment. By 1977, when the change in government from Labor to Likud also ushered in a decisive ideological shift, the early emphasis on statist centralization was replaced by increasing differentiation, both socially and economically.

The Israel of 1966, in economic recession and disillusionment, gave way after 1967 to an Israel of renewed economic expansion and growing external investment, tourism, and expanding immigration. A critical component at all levels was the beginning of what was to become a singular relationship with and dependence on the United States. The importance of this link—between victory in 1967 and reliance on the United States—can hardly be overemphasized. When, in 1973, the United States came to Israel's aid during an unexpected war with Syria and Egypt, the connection was cemented in ways that helped to determine the direction that Israeli development would take thereafter.

US-Israeli Relationship

The 1967 War was critical in consolidating trends already embryonic before the conflict. In the 1960s, AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS that had worried about the 1961 Eichmann trial's potential to generate ANTI-SEMITISM had gradually moved closer to identification with Israel. At the same time, the replacement of President JOHN KENNEDY by President LYNDON JOHNSON evidenced warmer relations at the official level, including an increase in military aid and a decrease in challenges to Israel's NUCLEAR PROGRAM. Additionally, it was not until after the war of 1967 that international polarization and Israeli military strength began to generate more direct US engagement in efforts to manage the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the war of 1973 (and the concomitant OPEC oil boycott), Israel's dependence on US resupply and on US support in the United Nations became even more striking as its position internationally was characterized by renewed isolation and loss of diplomatic relations with numerous other countries. Although the US-Israeli relationship was sometimes conflicted, its importance was striking when compared to the pre-1967 era. It contributed to maintaining the significance of the military in Israeli society and culture, and, together with its attendant

technological and industrial developments, the relationship was critical to Israeli policy as well as to its national identity.

At the same time, the 1967 War had an enormous impact on an American Jewish community that responded to the weeks prior to war with apprehension and mobilization and that viewed the subsequent victory as a source of pride and security. In the period after 1967, American Jews began to immigrate to Israel in greater numbers and, perhaps as importantly, to articulate views of the Arab-Israeli conflict based on this identification. Thus, whereas prior to the war there was decided evidence of differentiation between Israeli nationality and the Jewish community, the war itself shifted emphasis to a conceptualization that insisted on the centrality of a particular Jewish identity to the Israeli state and on the related significance of American Jewish participation in its support.

There was, however, another aspect to the new US-Israeli partnership: Israel perceived that to ensure the support of the US government and the American Jewish establishment, it had to appear strong and dominant, identified with democratic values and institutions, including capitalism, and committed to fighting any manifestation of Soviet power in the region. These constrained the directions the state could take and seriously weakened any forces within Israel that might have challenged them. Additionally, Israeli public opinion had come to identify the ties to the United States as necessary for security and therefore challenged none of the state's policies.

If the war created a new political arena and reopened questions that had been considered closed, it also created extremely powerful pressures to articulate the legitimacy and interests of Israel's "case" on the world stage. The paradox of this situation lay in the fact that the opportunities created by the war—to finally face and resolve that which had been suppressed after 1948—were now largely inhibited by the need to justify rather than reconsider. This situation was reinforced both by the links to US policy and by the challenges posed by a Palestinian movement now in its formative stages. As a result, Israeli policy from 1967 to 1977 was typically characterized by defensive efforts to ward off demands for withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and to emphasize security as well as the status quo while minimizing the impact of Occupation in creating new realities.

Effects of Occupation

The land conquered by Israel in 1967 had been governed by three separate and distinct states—Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In two cases—Egypt and Syria—the territories that they expected to regain (Sinai and the Golan Heights) were not densely inhabited, although in both cases they entailed the loss of significant resources as well as symbolic importance. In contrast, Israel's control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank required from the outset the definition of relationship, the creation of an administrative structure, and the development of a framework for daily existence. The Palestinian population now subject to Israeli control carried memories not only of its loss in 1947–1948 but also of the subsequent nineteen years of assimilative efforts under Jordanian annexation and of separatism under Egyptian administration. It was a population characterized by different experiences in the years since 1948 but with a historical framework of leadership and national identity that was distinctly rooted in the Mandate history of 1917–1948 and long before. The reunification of Palestinian territory brought Palestinians face-to-face with the reality of change since 1948 and, with it, the fact that the Israeli state was now governing every aspect of their daily existence.

For many Israelis, however, there were also memories and deep emotions that surfaced in this encounter. Meron Benvenisti, former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, has written about his reactions to Israeli Occupation of the West Bank. Like others who had lived in Palestine during the Mandate, he had personal memories of it as accessible before it was severed in 1948. These memories were connected to Jerusalem and other locations with religious significance but also with a life in Palestine where both Arabs and Jews constituted communities under British government. Those experiences, the positive and the painful, inevitably came nearer the surface, and with them the visibility of the price paid for the success of the Zionist project. Although Prime Minister Golda Meir might famously have said in 1969 that there were no Palestinians, many Israelis who had lived that history knew full well the meaninglessness of her statement.

Thus, when the Israeli government had to make decisions with regard to administering the West Bank and Gaza, its decisionmaking was governed, on the one hand, by the historical and

legal framework of the Mandate and the earlier Israeli military administration of Israel's Arab citizens from 1948 through 1966 and, on the other, by a history of competing with Palestinians for control of land and political legitimacy. Official statements might have insisted on identifying Palestinians with all other Arabs, but policies revealed that the distinctions were well understood. It was in this context that the government assessed options that from the first included suggestions for Palestinian autonomy, as well as for returning the territory and its inhabitants to Jordan and for its annexation to Israel. Instead of adopting any one of these, the government formulated a policy intended to be temporary that would allow Occupation until conditions were favorable for peace on Israel's terms. Israel's leaders understood military victory in a war of self-defense as one that ensured long-term security and political recognition. In the absence of these, their official perception was that they could afford to wait. These decisions were the outcome of euphoria in 1967, but the war of 1973 decisively reawakened fears. First was the success of the PLO—its official recognition at the Arab League's 1974 RABAT SUMMIT meeting as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," its invitation to address the UN General Assembly, and its increasing recognition from European states. These reawakened fears ensured that the Israeli public would accept the view that security, as defined by military control over the Occupied Territories, continued to be critical while they remained largely oblivious to the impact of that control on the Palestinian population.

Public Discourse and Division

In the aftermath of June 1967, the Israeli government and public were faced with the fact that extraordinary military victory did not have the anticipated effect. Although the Israeli government had operated on the expectation that there would be renewed military conflict with the Arab states at some point, it was presumed that proof of Israel's military superiority would eventually lead to settlement of the conflict. Instead, Israel's 1967 victory failed to yield political resolution or reconciliation with the Arab states. Why and how this was the case, who or what was responsible, what was the wisest way to react to this new reality, and what were the choices—all these and other issues inevitably entered into the domain of public discussion. That discussion, which took various forms over the course of time and as the results of 1967 became themselves part of Israeli history, has continued to this day.

From an ideological perspective, 1967 led to new debates about the meaning of Zionism. Some (Greater Land of Israel Movement, Gush Emunim, etc.) interpreted the war as a stimulus to support the continuation of Zionism as an activist movement of immigration and settlement, often appealing to religious legitimization for their claims and seeing victory as justification for an expansion that had earlier been denied. Others ultimately grieved over what they saw as the death of the secular Labor Zionism to which they were attached. Those who believed that Zionism had succeeded when the state was established but that it had to give way to the "normalization" they had sought now felt that Zionism was being hijacked in the service of new goals by new claimants to political influence. Because many of the tools and modes of operation utilized by Labor Zionism in the prestate period were now used to serve messianic competitors, the more profound questions being raised had to do with the degree to which contradictions within Labor Zionism itself could or would be confronted. Once again, however, appeals to national security and immediate needs largely deflected attention until the Labor defeat at the polls in 1977 introduced a new political reality.

It was in connection with the Sadat-Begin negotiations, which followed that election, that an organized peace movement began to consolidate its presence as a visible actor. The importance of this development, as well as of the intensified support by the new government for Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, was to make unmistakable the fact that the post-1967 foreign policy challenges were intimately linked to the unsettled nature of the relationships between the Israeli state and society: in the deeply conflicted process of defining the bases of the state as well as its normative and legal frameworks, its historical and legal legitimacies were brought to the surface. As differences in these areas emerged in a society increasingly diverse and deeply divided, the debate on security and peace often involved alternative conceptualizations of the nation and the state. The interpretation of ongoing external threats then often served to make more difficult a process that entailed recognition of historical as well as contemporary challenges to political consensus.

Although there have been two wars and two INTIFADAS, along with periods of terrorism and border conflicts, since 1967, no one event has so thoroughly altered Israeli geography, politics, society, and economy as the war of 1967. At the time, it appeared in some ways as the fulfillment of fantasized wishes, but in retrospect it has at times seemed the origin of ongoing nightmares. Although the state of Israel came into existence in 1948, it was still very much in the process of developing in 1967, and that development was permanently altered and its course formed or, some would say, deformed by its outcome.

In many ways, Israel has flourished since that time. It has become a country with a highly developed economy that includes successful high-tech sectors relevant to both military and civilian arenas. Its population, enhanced by successive waves of immigration as well as natural growth, has expanded to support a far more varied culture and a well-developed civil society. When the LEBANON WAR of 1982 triggered significant opposition inside Israel and the first generation of REFUSENIKS in the military, the emergence of criticism generated confrontations but also open debate. Despite constant political and military challenges, it was not until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 that the price of 1967 was widely recognized. The effects of having achieved significant dominance in the region while simultaneously governing a large Palestinian population under Occupation now became inescapable as a new generation of Israelis educated after 1967 confronted their Palestinian peers. Overall, neither side had been educated with a historical or political framework that would allow them to locate the "other" in a meaningful set of relationships creating context for the immediate enmity and obvious disparity of power.

Despite the clear asymmetry between Palestinians and Israelis, the Intifada made evident their interdependence as well. The 1967 War had changed Israel from a small, predominantly Jewish country with an Arab minority of 10 percent and an orientation toward Europe as its model to a state that incorporated under its government a Palestinian Arab population with growing ties to Palestinian Israeli citizens (20 percent of the Israeli population in 2000) and a Mizrahi community with increasing cultural, political, and religious claims to identity. Even though the Occupied Territories were not formally annexed, there were those who argued, as early as 1986, that economic ties and settlements were creating a reality in which it would be impossible to disentangle one population (Israeli citizens) from the other (Palestinian Arabs in the territories).

As the First Intifada brought the situation to a head, two additional developments served to deflect popular attention from this reality and to support the hopes of those who wished for a TWO-STATE SOLUTION to resolve the conflict. The first was the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, along with it, increasing immigration of SOVIET JEWS to Israel, which once again changed the demographic balance as well as the political arena. The second was the MADRID CONFERENCE (1991), followed by the OSLO PROCESS (1993–2000), predicated in effect on the idea of undoing the 1967 War, on what has been called land for peace—Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in exchange for peace with Arab states. This formula worked in the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and could theoretically govern a resolution between Syria and Israel. However, the formula does not recognize the impossibility of undoing historical processes that have taken on a life of their own: 1948 has been labeled a catastrophe for Palestinians; 1967 has been memorialized as a victory for Israelis. Both wars have been central to creating conditions for national mobilization predicated on difference, and their continuing impact is central to the failures to recognize mutuality.

See also MOSHE DAYAN; DEMOGRAPHY; GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT; GUSH EMUNIM; HOLOCAUST; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; MEDIA, ISRAELI; MIZRAHI; OCCUPATION; OUTPOSTS; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; POST-ZIONISM; SEPHARDI; SETTLEMENTS; ZIONISM

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—Ylana Miller

War, 1967: Consequences for the Palestinians

The June 1967 WAR represented a massive defeat for the Palestinians and for the Arab states, revealing their military weaknesses, bringing more LAND under Israeli control, and causing more Palestinians to become REFUGEES. Yet the war also galvanized the Palestinians, politically and militarily, transforming their relations with the Arab states and the international community.

Life in the Occupied Territories

At the end of the war, Israel controlled all of the land that had formerly comprised the BRITISH MANDATE of Palestine. This included the 140-square-mile GAZA STRIP. To the west of it, Israeli forces captured and occupied all of the Sinai Peninsula. Palestinians in Gaza were thus cut off from EGYPT, with which they had a long cultural, economic, and administrative relationship. The Israeli military also conquered the WEST BANK, referred to by Palestinian resistance groups as Central Palestine and constituting 2,270 square miles claimed by JORDAN. With it the Israelis captured East JERUSALEM and its OLD CITY, which contained the Islamic holy area of AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF (the TEMPLE MOUNT) and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher sacred in CHRISTIANITY as well as the WESTERN WALL venerated by Jews. A demographic transformation accompanied the territorial transformation. As in 1948, a wave of refugees, some of whom the Israeli military expelled, fled the newly conquered areas of Palestine during the war and in the months following. Between 200,000 and 250,000 departed the West Bank, reducing its population to about 600,000 by September 1967. By December 1968 the Israeli government had evicted or facilitated the departure of about 75,000 of the total population of 400,000 in the Gaza Strip, transporting a large proportion of the evictees to Jordan. For the first time, more than half of all Palestinians lived in exile from any part of Palestine.

The Israeli defense minister, MOSHE DAYAN, attempted to create an "invisible OCCUPATION" in the territories and thus advanced the economic integration of the occupied areas into the Israeli economy. Because the war had caused extensive economic dislocation for Palestinians who remained and had left a high proportion of the labor force unemployed, Dayan reversed Israel's initial policy of banning Palestinians of the territories from working inside Israel. The Israeli government's policy became one of pursuing full employment and what it deemed to be a "reasonable standard of living" for the Palestinians under military Occupation. Five labor exchanges were opened in the Gaza Strip and seven in the West Bank by the end of 1968. Within the next six months, about 18,000 Palestinian workers found employment in Israel, the majority of them illegally.

Israeli Occupation authorities in Gaza at first attempted to create jobs locally in public works and by supplying small loans to businesses and agricultural enterprises. Palestinians established about 100 new factories, and production in Gaza's industrial sector expanded by nearly 30 percent per year from 1967 to 1973. Israeli investors established twelve enterprises employing Palestinians in the ERETZ industrial zone, located on the northern edge of the Gaza Strip. Occupation authorities also encouraged local agricultural production that did not compete with Israeli produce. Although Gaza's citrus producers benefited by the arrangement, Palestinian dairy and poultry producers could neither compete with government-subsidized Israeli producers nor reach an alternative market and thus went out of business. Despite the increase in investment in the territories, 15 percent of the West Bank and Gaza's total gross national product (GNP) in 1970 derived from wages for work in the Israeli economy. That proportion continued to grow, especially after 1972, when Israel lifted RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT of Palestinians from Gaza into Israel.

The economic life in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES consequently became increasingly dependent upon Israel, and Israeli policies intensified the sense of the

permanence of the Occupation for both Palestinians and Israelis. This economic dependence intensified in the Gaza Strip where the Israeli national electrical grid was extended to the main towns. Prior to the war, about 5,000 homes received electricity. The number reached 24,000 by 1970. In the West Bank, however, local companies established prior to the war continued to supply electricity, and Israel pursued an "open bridges" policy with Jordan, allowing commerce and family contacts across the Jordan River. That policy, in addition to maintaining the Jordanian currency in the West Bank, ameliorated the effects of the Occupation on Palestinians. The more important benefit of the open-bridges-to-Israel policy was to create an outlet for goods produced in the territories that threatened to compete with Israeli products. At the same time, Israel's exports to the Occupied Territories made them its second largest export market after the UNITED STATES.

Israeli regional military commanders, who were responsible for administration of the territories, coordinated their policies with representatives of Israeli civilian ministries. Thus, even under military Occupation, the authority and policies of the Israeli government were extended into the territories. In 1968, the Israeli government officially changed the name of the West Bank to JUDEA and SAMARIA, and the Gaza Strip became the Gaza District, indicating that it was no different from any administrative district inside Israel. These changes further suggested the permanence of Israel's control over the occupied lands.

One of the clearest indicators of the enduring nature of the Occupation was Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and its roughly 66,000 Palestinian inhabitants less than three weeks after the end of the war. Even before the cessation of hostilities, Israeli municipal authorities demolished the homes of 650 Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem's Maghrabi quarter, in the vicinity of al-Buraq (the WESTERN WALL). In the area surrounding East Jerusalem, the Israeli government confiscated about 4,000 acres of private Palestinian land by 1970. The government also advanced the political integration of the territories into Israel by immediately establishing SETTLEMENTS in the West Bank. Construction of the first civilian settlement, Kfar Etzion, began in September 1967 on the site of a Jewish settlement destroyed by Jordanian forces during the 1948 WAR. Soon after, the government built a number of military bases–cum–agricultural settlements known as NAHAL units, mostly in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, and in 1970, followers of RABBI MOSHE LEVINGER established the settlement of KIRYAT ARBA, adjacent to the city of HEBRON. There were seventeen settlements in the West Bank by 1973, most of them in the Jordan Valley. The government permitted the first civilian settlement in Gaza in 1971, but soon after, the military constructed five Nahal units there. The settlements materially demonstrated to Palestinians the continued incorporation of the Occupied Territories into Israel and laid the foundation for the rapid intensification of the settler movement after 1977. The net of effect of Israel's policies following the 1967 War was to bring about the effective annexation of the territories without extending citizenship or any other rights to Palestinians.

New Guerrilla Strategy

Israel's rapid and total defeat of three confrontation states—Egypt, SYRIA, and Jordan—during the 1967 War discredited the Arab states individually and collectively in the eyes of Palestinians. Their confidence in the Arab governments continued to erode in the immediate aftermath of the war. The ARAB LEAGUE, convening in Khartoum, Sudan, in August 1967, produced a resolution calling for no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel. Despite this language of confrontation, the resolution required the Arab governments only to "ensure the withdrawal" of Israeli forces from lands "occupied since the aggression of 5 June," but not to achieve the liberation of all of Palestine. The Khartoum resolution also implied the continued intention of the Arab states to restrain the Palestinian guerrilla organizations by stating that the task of regaining the lands lost in the war was that of the Arab states. Egypt and Jordan, in particular, envisioned coexistence with Israel after regaining their territory through a diplomatic process. This soon became clear when both governments indicated their acceptance of UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, which called for the recognition of Israel and its right to exist within secure borders in exchange for the return of land it conquered in the course of the war. The resolution made no reference to Palestinian national rights, calling only for "a just settlement of the refugee problem."

The failures of the Arab states led to an emphasis on Palestinian identity and self-reliance, exemplified in the rapid strengthening of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. The guerrilla organization that best exploited the new circumstances was FATAH, which like the other numerous

guerrilla groups, was small, clandestine, and poorly funded before the war. Israel's Occupation of Palestinian territories, with their population of more than 900,000 Palestinians, led Fatah strategists to envision launching a popular war of liberation inside Israel and the territories, modeled upon the examples of guerrilla warfare in CHINA, Vietnam, and Algeria. Fatah leaders also intended to coordinate their military operations with a wave of strikes and nonviolent protests that West Bankers had begun in response to the annexation of Jerusalem. By August, the organization had established a clandestine headquarters in the Old City of NABLUS and begun operations.

The Israeli military responded with security sweeps in the West Bank, using captured Jordanian intelligence files to identify suspects and detaining them up to six months without trial under the terms of emergency regulations enacted by the British during the Mandate period. The policy of expulsions and arrests stymied the emergence of a West Bank leadership after the end of Jordanian administration, and the open-bridges policy also sufficiently eased the hardship of the West Bankers that they were not so desperate as to resort in large numbers to armed insurrection. By December 1967 the Israeli military had successfully prevented the attempted insurrection in the West Bank. Although Fatah had inflicted few casualties on the Israeli military or civilians, sixty-five guerrillas had been killed, and between 1,000 and 1,250 Palestinians were in Israeli prisons.

The situation in Gaza was quite different. There, fighters from a Palestinian Ba'athist group, the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT, and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION'S (PLO) PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY began a campaign of attacks on Israeli targets in conjunction with large protest demonstrations conducted by Palestinian women and children. More than 400 attacks each year in 1969 and 1970 resulted in nearly 250 Israeli casualties. The fighters also assassinated and intimidated Palestinian COLLABORATORS and workers who entered Israel. By 1970, the guerrillas virtually controlled Gaza after dark. The Israeli military suppressed the insurgency by early 1972, but only by resorting to the massive destruction of refugee housing and the killing or DEPORTATION of suspected guerrillas and their supporters. The Israeli government also constructed a security fence around Gaza, thus controlling movement into and out of the area. Despite the resistance in Gaza, from the end of 1967 until the INTIFADA twenty years later, the center of Palestinian activities moved into exile. Those activities concentrated most immediately on Jordan's East Bank, where the largest number of Palestinians resided and which had the longest frontier with Israel.

Competition for Fatah

The war and the Occupation of the remainder of Palestine also affected the more than 300,000 PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, forcing them to reconsider their political identities as Israeli Arabs. They were impressed by the political and military activity of Palestinians in the territories, which contrasted with their own situation. Until only a year before the war, they had lived under military government, their freedom of travel and expression severely restricted. Within their community, the Israeli Communist Party was the only political organization allowed some semblance of free political activity. A few Israeli Arabs fled Israel and joined the guerrilla organizations after the war, and from 1967 to 1973, Israeli courts convicted 320 Arab citizens of security offenses. However, the political mobilization of Israeli Arabs progressed much more slowly than that of the Palestinians in the territories or in the DIASPORA.

Although the insurgency inside Israel and the West Bank failed to materialize, Fatah soon reaped the political rewards of ARMED STRUGGLE by attracting the attention of Egyptian president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR, just as the organization's former patron, Syria, reduced its support and restricted Fatah from launching attacks across the Syrian-Israeli cease-fire line. Nasir saw in Fatah a means of maintaining military pressure on Israel until Egypt's military could be rebuilt and it could regain the Sinai through a combination of diplomacy and force. Beginning in 1968, Nasir therefore sent supplies to guerrilla groups in Amman, Jordan, and began training Fatah units in Egypt. Thus strengthened, Fatah's leaders turned their attention to either or gaining control over or dissolving the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had been established in 1964 under the supervision of Arab states as a means of controlling the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Fatah demanded the resignation of PLO chairman AHMAD SHUQAYRI in December 1967, and with prodding from Nasir, Shuqayri stepped down to be replaced by Yahya Hamuda, a leftist lawyer. The next month, Fatah held a conference in Cairo

attended by seven guerrilla groups and formed a new national front intending to assert itself against the traditional PLO.

Fatah's chief rival for leadership of the guerrilla movement was the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), the core of which was composed of Palestinian members of the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS. Students at American University in Beirut, including most notably the Palestinian GEORGE HABASH, had formed the MAN around 1951. It was a Pan-Arab nationalist organization that, after the 1956 SINAI/SUEZ WAR, looked to Nasir for leadership in Arab affairs. At the time of the 1967 War, the MAN was fragmented and largely clandestine, especially in Jordan. However, as Fatah entered the territories to start an uprising, the MAN leadership in Beirut felt compelled to match their rival. They thus joined several small guerrilla groups led by a former officer of the Syrian army, AHMAD JIBRIL, and another of the Jordanian army, Ahmad Za'rur, to form the PFLP in September 1967. The MAN announced the Popular Front's existence when it launched its first (unsuccessful) operation against Israel in December 1967. A month later, as Fatah exploited its rising status to challenge the PLO, the PFLP boycotted Fatah's conference of guerrilla organizations in Cairo and emphasized its support for the PLO as the representative organization of the Palestinian movement. The PFLP adopted a new tactic in the war against Israel in July 1968 by hijacking an Israeli airliner en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. The PFLP's hijacking operations and attacks on Israeli airliners from 1968 to 1972 brought the Palestinian movement worldwide attention, and it also served the PFLP in its competition with Fatah.

Transformation of the PLO

Although Fatah did not drop its ambition of launching a people's war of liberation inside Palestinian territories, it focused its efforts on establishing sanctuaries within the confrontation states. By early 1968, there were between 600 and 1,000 fighters on the East Bank, the largest proportion of them affiliated with Fatah. In January and February, guerrillas operating from Jordan made more than forty attacks on Israeli targets. They conducted thirty-six such operations in March. According to an Israeli report to the Security Council, the attacks killed six Israelis and wounded forty-four. The Israeli government, in response, decided to make an incursion to destroy the guerrilla bases in and around the town and refugee camp of AL-KARAMA, in the Jordan Valley. Aware of Israeli preparations for the assault, PFLP commanders Za'rur and Jibril decided to withdraw their thirty fighters from the area, knowing they were no match for the hundreds of Israeli infantry and paratroopers that were massed for the operation with tanks, artillery, and air support. Fatah leaders, in contrast, recognized the political gains to be made from a direct confrontation with the Israeli military. They resolved to face the Israeli forces with 200 Fatah guerrillas and a small number of PLO fighters. Although Jordan's King Husayn had little interest in defending the guerrilla organizations, which challenged the Jordanian government's authority, he feared that Israel might occupy parts of the East Bank as a way of forcing him to sue for peace. He thus sent a division of the Jordanian army with tanks and artillery into the area. The Israeli forces that crossed the Jordan River on the morning of March 21 rapidly occupied al-Karama. By evening, when they withdrew, the Israelis had destroyed much of the town, captured or killed a high proportion of the guerrillas, and inflicted substantial casualties on the Jordanian troops. The cost to the Israelis was also high relative to that of previous such operations: al-Karama's defenders killed twenty-eight Israeli soldiers, wounded more than 100, and destroyed or damaged fifty-two tanks and other vehicles.

What was a minor military success for Israel was a major political victory for the Palestinian guerrilla groups, especially for Fatah. Although the Jordanian army had inflicted most of the casualties on the Israeli troops, the Fatah fighters had made a determined stand in the face of an overwhelming Israeli force, dying in large numbers rather than conceding the field. Consequently the reputation of the Palestinian guerrilla organization reached new heights among both the scattered Palestinians and the citizens of the Arab states. After the battle at al-Karama—coincidentally the Arabic word for "honor"—the Arab public rapidly ceased to associate Palestinians with the image of powerless refugees and began to identify them with heroic fighters who stood up to Israel when the leaders of Arab states would not. The symbolism of armed struggle and martyrdom soon permeated PALESTINIAN MEDIA and cultural production.

Al-Karama also had the effect of transforming the small, clandestine guerrilla organizations into a

mass movement with a recognizable leadership. Less than two months after the battle, Fatah named YASIR ARAFAT its leader and official spokesperson, giving the organization a personality that was identifiable among the Arab public. Fatah claimed at the time, with probably some exaggeration, that 20,000 students and army veterans volunteered for service at its offices in Cairo and that 1,500 people a week applied for membership at its Baghdad office. The PFLP likewise received more applicants than it could accommodate. By that time, fighters poured into Jordan, setting up bases along its cease-fire line with Israel and opening offices in Amman. Attacks from Jordan on Israeli military targets and civilians increased sharply in the months after Karama and reached a pace of over 200 a month in 1969 and 1970.

Arab States and the PLO

After al-Karama, Arab governments immediately recognized the challenge to their credibility presented by the Palestinian organizations and attempted to portray themselves as supporters of the guerrillas. Even King Husayn, whose troops had recently destroyed guerrilla bases in Jordan, declared on state television his support for the Palestinian fighters. King Faisal of SAUDI ARABIA invited Fatah leaders to the country and promised them financial support. The events at al-Karama reconfirmed to Nasir the utility of supporting the guerrilla organizations to complement his planned WAR OF ATTRITION against Israel and the diplomacy by which he hoped to regain the land Egypt had lost to Israel. He thus invited top Fatah leaders to Cairo to meet senior Egyptian officials, and by June, his military had begun to increase the number of Fatah guerrillas it trained in Egypt. Fatah also began a relationship with the Egyptian intelligence services, providing the Egyptians with information collected by Palestinian infiltrators into Israel. Egypt became the third largest supplier of arms to the guerrilla organizations after China and Algeria.

The Syrian government likewise recognized the growing popularity of the guerrilla movement even before Karama. Having sharply curtailed Fatah's freedom of action in the country since the June war, the ruling Ba'ath Party created in September 1967 its own guerrilla organization, the Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War, and in the spring of 1968, it merged with a smaller organization to form SA'IQA (the Thunderbolt). After Karama, membership in Sa'iqa grew rapidly. Fatah continued to cultivate good relations with the Syrian government because of vital supply routes running from Syria into Jordan. The organization was also able to establish bases on Syria's Golan Heights, near the cease-fire line with Israel. With other guerrilla groups, Fatah expanded these significantly during the next year.

The MAN, headquartered in Beirut, had attracted the most Palestinians in LEBANON until al-Karama. Since the war, however, Fatah cadres endeavored to build a following in Lebanon, where they focused on recruiting university students. From its modest presence in South Lebanon, Fatah began attacks on Israel. In December 1968, Israeli commandoes launched a raid on the Beirut international airport, destroying thirteen civilian aircraft on the ground in retaliation for an attack by the PFLP on an Israeli airliner. The Lebanese government therefore increased its restrictions on the guerrillas, arresting their supporters in the areas bordering Israel and closing offices of the guerrilla groups in the spring of 1969. By October, Lebanese army units battled guerrilla units in the south of the country.

The Lebanese government's policies toward the Palestinian guerrilla groups exacerbated the debate within the country over its relationship with the larger Arab world. The Lebanese opposition, generally Muslim and broadly favoring pan-Arabism, staged a large demonstration of protest in April against the Christian-dominated government's restrictions on the Palestinian fighters. The government suppressed the demonstrations by force, but in August, Palestinians confronted Lebanese security forces that entered refugee camps, and the residents seized control of most of the camps by October. At the same time, fighting broke out between Palestinian guerrillas and the Lebanese army.

Nasir, who had launched his War of Attrition in the Canal Zone in March 1969, wanted to maintain the Palestinian fighters' ability to operate from Lebanon in another front against Israel. At the invitation of Lebanese president Charles Helou, the Egyptian president thus agreed to mediate between the Palestinian organizations and the Lebanese government. The negotiations at the end of October, between Arafat and Hilu, produced a secret document known as the CAIRO AGREEMENT, under whose terms the Lebanese government conceded control of the refugee camps to the PLO and acknowledged the right of Palestinians in Lebanon

to employment, residence, and freedom of movement. The agreement also permitted the guerrilla organizations to attack Israel through designated routes in South Lebanon. Soon after the agreement's signing, the guerrilla organizations opened offices in the refugee camps, and reflecting their rising status since al-Karama, attracted recruits probably numbering in the thousands. The PLO and the guerrilla groups thus achieved formal recognition for their sanctuary in Lebanon, which continued at least until the PLO's expulsion from Beirut in 1982. The guerrillas, however, soon exceeded the limits on their activities imposed by the Cairo Agreement and established new bases near the cease-fire line with Israel.

One of the significant indications of the changed relationship between the Arab states and the Palestinian movement after the 1967 War was the takeover of the PLO by the guerrilla organizations, with Fatah in the paramount position. Following al-Karama, the leaders of Fatah believed that the PLO, under their leadership, could provide the disparate and scattered Palestinian movement with an institutional framework. Fatah leaders recognized also that the PLO constituted an official commitment on the part of the Arab states to the Palestinian movement. In the months after al-Karama, the PLO and Fatah conducted negotiations over the representation of Fatah and its allied guerrilla organizations in the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC, the PLO's representative body). As a result, the guerrilla organizations received 88 of the 100 seats, with the largest single bloc going to Fatah.

Fatah's new influence in the PLO became clear at the Fourth PNC of July 1968 in Cairo, where the delegates amended the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER. Most evident was the change of the document's title from "al-Mithaq al-Qawmi," which denoted pan-Arab nationalism, to "al-Mithaq al-Watani," which carried the meaning of discrete territorial nationalism and thus emphasized Palestinian identity. Although the document stated that Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine were "two complementary objectives," it also claimed that Palestinian people were in a stage that required the safeguarding of their identity. This reflected Fatah's long-standing claim that the slogan of Arab unity leading to the liberation of Palestine should be reversed to assert that the liberation of Palestine was the way to Arab unity. The document further stated that the Palestinians declared the "independence of their national movement" and rejected "all forms of intervention, trusteeship or subordination." The increasing independence of the Palestinian movement from the policies of the Arab states was also indicated by the national covenant's declaration that Palestine could not be divided and that it must be liberated in its entirety. Further, the document stated that armed struggle was the only means of liberation. These positions clearly contradicted those of the Arab states articulated at the Khartoum Conference a year previously.

Fatah was able to assert its dominance at the next PNC, also in Cairo, in February 1969. The organization's rising status gave it the power to demand the largest allocation of seats in the PNC, and, with the support of many independent delegates, Fatah was able to have Yasir Arafat elected chairman of the PLO. After Fatah's capture of the leadership of the PLO, the organization constituted a forum for political discourse that the Palestinians, dispersed among numerous countries, had not previously enjoyed. The PLO rapidly expanded its social services, beginning with its fund for the families of guerrillas who had been killed, wounded, or captured. The organization added a medical services branch for guerrillas and established the Palestine Red Crescent Society to provide free medical care and social services to civilians. The elaboration of the PLO's administrative functions and the influx of Arab financial support also gave Fatah a source of patronage to dispense, thus reinforcing its predominance in the movement.

New Ideological Orientations

The guerrillas' takeover of the PLO achieved a markedly increased unity and an unprecedented degree of autonomy for the Palestinian movement. Nonetheless, the nearly one dozen guerrilla organizations in the PLO, each dependent on backing from one or more Arab states, meant that the PLO remained a fractious organization penetrated by considerable state influence. The PFLP emerged as the chief opponent of Fatah's new position of leadership, and with a few allies among independents in the PLO, the Popular Front boycotted the fourth and fifth PNCs. The PFLP's new estrangement from the PLO was another manifestation of the changed relation-

ships among the guerrilla organizations and the Arab states since the June war, and especially since al-Karama. In August 1968 a leftist tendency within the PFLP asserted itself and issued a statement harshly critical of the "petty bourgeois" Arab regimes that were unwilling to confront Israel, including among them Egypt. Nasir responded by ending support for the organization that had formerly idolized him. At the same time, he increased his support for Fatah, which he had regarded with suspicion before the 1967 War. Fatah was able to exploit the divisions within the PFLP by offering protection to its leftist wing, then facing a campaign of intimidation, kidnappings, and beatings from the PFLP's Old Guard in Jordan. Under the leadership of the Jordanian NAYIF HAWATIMA, the leftists broke away from the PFLP to form the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, known after 1974 as the DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE. Although it remained small, the DFLP was soon rewarded with representation in Fatah-dominated bodies within the PLO.

With the departure of the DFLP, the PFLP, still under the leadership of George Habash, began to compete for the support of the Left by portraying itself as a Marxist-Leninist party. It thus aspired to the revolutionary transformation of the Arab states as a necessary step toward the liberation of Palestine and intended to establish an "Arab Hanoi" as a secure base from which to wage its people's war. The PFLP shared this position not only with the rival DFLP but also with Ahmad Jibril's POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC), which had broken away from the PFLP in October 1968. With the shift toward revolutionary intervention in the affairs of the Arab states, the PFLP's former parent organization, the pan-Arab nationalist MAN, rapidly ceased to exist as a viable political organization among Palestinians. The development was a further indication of the ascendancy of Palestinian political identity at the expense of pan-Arab nationalism in the period following the June war, although the PFLP received support from the IRAQ's Ba'athists.

The period of 1967 to 1970 was the high point in relations between the guerrilla organizations and the Arab governments, but the contradictions inherent in the relations between the states and guerrilla movements were evident. Especially in Jordan, the independent activities of the guerrillas and the revolutionary programs of leftist organizations called into question the sovereignty of the state. In the summer of 1970, confrontations between the Jordanian army and the PLO intensified to the level of a civil war, remembered as BLACK SEPTEMBER. By July of the next year, the army had completely eliminated the guerrilla presence in Jordan and reasserted government authority. In the process it killed some 3,000 Palestinians, many of them noncombatants. Black September at first appeared to signal the end of the guerrilla movement, but the PLO had attained a level of institutional durability that permitted it to rebuild itself in its sanctuary in Lebanon over the course of the next three years. During the period of new diplomacy in the year following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Arab states at the RABAT SUMMIT (1974) recognized the PLO as "the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated." The latter phrase, "any palestinian territory that is librated," was formally adopted in June 1974 by the PLO at the Twelfth PNC. This marked a major transformation in PLO objectives that began with liberating Palestine and was altered to the demand for a democratic secular state. The PLO committed itself to an independent Palestinian state *alongside* Israel—the TWO-STATE SOLUTION, which was to be achieved primarily by diplomatic means eschewing armed struggle. This radical transformation brought the PLO in line with the policies of the Arab states and opened the UNITED NATIONS and subsequently European doors to the PLO.

International Consequences

The new relationship between the Arab states and the guerrilla organizations after al-Karama advanced the status and recognition of the Palestinian movement internationally to a level few could have imagined before June 1967. In July 1968, Nasir took Arafat to MOSCOW as part of an Egyptian delegation. The visit resulted in a commitment of half a million dollars in arms from the Soviet Union to Fatah, although Egypt controlled the flow of weapons to the organization. Arafat led the first PLO delegation to the Soviet Union in February 1970. However, Moscow supported the PLO only to the extent that the Soviets perceived that the aid advanced their relationship with the

Arab states. Consequently, the PLO did not obtain a permanent mission in Moscow until 1978.

Contacts with China had begun even before the June war, when Arafat, exploiting an Algerian initiative, visited Beijing in 1964. The next year, Ahmad Shuqayri represented the PLO in Beijing. Chinese support for both the PLO and Fatah shifted toward the latter only a few months after al-Karama. The Chinese press then began referring to Fatah as the leadership of the Palestinians, and the Chinese government supplied many of the weapons for Fatah's rapid expansion in Jordan from 1968 to 1970. Even in Western Europe, the Palestinian movement exerted some attraction for university students of the New Left. Perhaps as many as several hundred young Europeans volunteered at DFLP bases in 1969.

In November 1974, with support from the Arab League, Yasir Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly and, at the same time, the UN granted the PLO observer status. Many of the General Assembly's newer member states had gained their independence not infrequently by wars of liberation. The recognition those states conferred upon the Palestinian movement was, in part, the fruit of its intensification of armed struggle after the Six Day War.

See also YASIR ARAFAT; ARMED STRUGGLE; COMMUNISTS IN ISRAEL; DEMOGRAPHY; ECONOMY; FATAH; GAZA STRIP; NATIONAL GUIDANCE COMMITTEE; OCCUPATION; PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION; PROPAGANDA, ARAB; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT WAR 1967; WEST BANK

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—Weldon C. Matthews

War of Attrition

The War of Attrition was a limited war fought between Israel and EGYPT from June 1967 to 7 August 1970. It was initiated by the Egyptians as a way of forcing the Israelis to negotiate on favorable terms the return of the Sinai, which had been under the control of the Israelis since the 1967 WAR. This objective was not realized, however, and instead the hostilities ended with a cease-fire agreement signed between the countries in September 1970, with frontiers remaining in the same place as when the war began and with no real commitment to serious peace negotiations.

Israel lost 1,424 soldiers and 127 civilians killed and 2,000 soldiers and 700 civilians wounded. It also lost 15 aircraft. Egypt lost approximately 5,000 soldiers and civilians killed, and 101 aircraft.

The Egyptian army, the most powerful in the Arab world, yearned for retaliation for Egypt's humiliating defeat in 1967 when Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula up to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. Sporadic clashes took place along the cease-fire lines almost from the end of the war. The same year (1967), Egyptian missile boats sank an Israeli destroyer on 21 October. Egypt began shelling Israeli positions along the Bar Lev Line (a chain of fortifications built by Israel along the eastern coast of the Suez Canal after it captured the Sinai), using Soviet heavy artillery, MIG aircraft, and various other forms of assistance from MOSCOW. Israel responded with bombardment and ground raids on Egyptian military positions and aerial raids on strategic facilities deep within Egypt; eventually it bombed the outskirts of Cairo.

The international community considered the possibility that the conflict could seriously escalate. The UNITED NATIONS sent the Jarring Mission

to enforce UN RESOLUTION 242 as a means of finding a diplomatic solution, but it failed. Subsequently, US president RICHARD NIXON sent his secretary of state, WILLIAM ROGERS, to secure an end to the conflict. He developed the ROGERS PLAN, but it too failed.

In August 1970, Israel, JORDAN, and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire under the terms proposed by the Rogers Plan. The plan contained restrictions on missile deployment by both sides and required the cessation of raids as a precondition for peace. Shortly thereafter, the Egyptians moved their missiles near the Suez Canal and began constructing an antiaircraft system. Israel responded with a policy that it called "asymmetrical response," wherein Israeli retaliation was disproportionately large in comparison to any Egyptian attacks. Egypt's president JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR died on 28 September 1970. His successor, Anwar al-Sadat, put a unilateral end to the fighting, and both sides declared victory.

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War of the Camps

See CAMPS' WAR, 1985–1987

Warschawski, Michel (1949–)

Michel (Mikado) Warschawski is a veteran activist in the Israeli ANTI-ZIONISM left. Born in Strasbourg, FRANCE, he was the eldest of seven children of Mireille and Rabbi Max Warschawski, who was the chief rabbi of the city for more than three decades and one of the most respected Jewish spiritual leaders in Europe. Warschawski was educated in both Jewish Orthodoxy and the spirit of the European Enlightenment. In 1966 he left France for JERUSALEM to deepen his theological knowledge at the famous Talmudic school MERCAZ HARAV, from which he graduated.

The 1967 WAR marked a turning point in Warschawski's life. While volunteering in a KIBBUTZ on the border of the WEST BANK, he witnessed the expulsion of the Arab residents of 'Imwas, Bayt Nuba, and Yalu. Though he did not fully understand what he was seeing at the time, this event marked a defining moment in his political evolution from theology to more secular leftist thought. It was, however, contact with the reality of OCCUPATION that made the change immutable. These sentiments are well expressed in an excerpt from his partially autobiographical book, *On the Border*: "Although born after the war, my childhood and adolescence were steeped in memories of the Nazi occupation. The word 'occupation' referred to absolute evil, fear, hatred, racism and death. . . . The religious education I had received in my youth was indifferent to ZIONISM and I had only a little knowledge of the creation of the Jewish State and of the Israeli-Arab conflict. It was through the June 1967 War that I discovered Israel, not just the Holy Land, but the State of Israel. One recollection [was] from July 1967 at the Hebron market. . . . At that very moment I saw the submissive and humiliated look of the Arab merchant with whom I was trying to bargain for a lamb's skin with the arrogance of all the colonizers of the world. As if slapped in the face, I suddenly became aware that, this time, he was the oppressed, and I was on the other side of the border, with the strong, with the ones in power. I immediately and spontaneously refused to be on that side. . . . I was unwilling . . . [to be] an occupier: I felt a natural compassion with the occupied."

After the 1967 War, Warschawski left the Talmudic schools as well as religious practice and faith. He attended the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he graduated in 1971 with degrees in philosophy and political science. During these years, Warschawski came into contact with MATZPEN, a small socialist, anti-Zionist organization, and in 1968 he joined the group, in which he was active until its dissolution in 1998. Parallel to his activities in Matzpen, where he was the editor of its Hebrew-language monthly magazine for more than ten years, Warschawski was involved in several movements against the Occupation, including the Committee in Solidarity

with BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY (1981), the Committee Against the War in LEBANON (1982–1985), and Day La-Kibbush (1987–1990). He was one of the founders of the soldier's movement YESH G'VUL (1982), which organized reserve officers and soldiers who refused to serve in LEBANON and later in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. As a "REFUSENIK" himself, he was sentenced three times to short military prison terms.

In 1984, together with a few Palestinian and Israeli activists, Warschawski founded the ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION CENTER (AIC), the first, and for a long time the only, joint Israeli-Palestinian organization. Its objectives included providing information to both societies in the conflict and promoting Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and partnership. In February 1987 the Israeli Security Services closed the AIC and charged Warschawski, who served as its director, with supporting terrorist organizations. After a three-year trial, the court dropped the main charge but found Warschawski guilty of providing services to illegal organizations. He was sentenced to thirty months in prison, which the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT later reduced to twenty months and suspended twelve of them. In November 1990 Warschawski was released from prison.

In 1999 Warschawski resigned his directorship of the AIC but remained as cochair of its board of trustees. Since then he has focused his activities on the international arena and in particular on the World Social Forum, where he represents Israeli social and political organizations in the International Council. Warschawski defines himself as an uncompromising internationalist, struggling for the integration of the Jewish-Israeli national community into the Arab world and for a strong Palestinian-Israeli partnership. As such, he rejects Zionism as a philosophy of ethnic separation and its manifestations in an ethnic state. Warschawski believes in BINATIONALISM as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, although he is not opposed to the formation of an independent Palestinian state in the Occupied Territories. He believes that true reconciliation requires that Israel recognize the Palestinian REFUGEES' right of return, recognize the responsibility of Zionism in the Palestinian tragedy, and be ready to repair the damages caused by the Zionist colonial enterprise.

In addition to hundreds of articles and essays published in Hebrew and Arabic throughout the world, Warschawski is the author of several books that have been translated into different languages and is the recipient of numerous prestigious awards, including the Radio France Internationale Award and Les Amis du Monde Diplomatique Best Book Award.

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See AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS; MEDIA, US; US AID TO ISRAEL

Water: Israeli-Syrian Conflict, 1950–1965

See JOHNSTON PLAN; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION

Water Resources and Access

Lack of access to adequate, safe, and clean water has been a long-standing problem for the Palestinian population of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Though exacerbated in recent years by the impact of drought-induced water scarcity, the problem arises principally due to Israeli water policies and practices, which discriminate against the Palestinian population of the OPT. This discrimination has resulted in widespread violations of the human right to an adequate standard of living, which includes the rights to water, adequate food and housing, work, and HEALTH CARE. Although the water

restrictions were severe in the mid-1980s, they became far more stringent in the ensuing years.

Israel's restrictions on Palestinian access to water have adversely affected agriculture, retarded commercial and industrial development, and exacerbated health and nutrition problems. Water shortages and poor sanitation services throughout the OPT affect all sectors of the Palestinian population, though especially the poorest and most vulnerable communities, that is, those living in isolated rural areas and in overcrowded REFUGEE camps.

Israel controls all the water sources in the OPT and restricts Palestinian access to a level that does not meet their needs or constitute a fair and equitable portion of the shared water resources. Israel uses more than 80 percent of the water from the WEST BANK Mountain Aquifer, the only source of underground water in the West Bank, as well as all of the surface water available from the Jordan River Basin, of which Palestinians are denied any share.

The inequality in access to water between Israelis and Palestinians is striking. The World Health Organization and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recommend 100 liters of water per person per day as the minimum quantity for basic consumption. Palestinian consumption in the OPT is approximately 70 liters a day per person. In some rural communities Palestinians survive on far less than even the average 70 liters, in some cases barely 20 liters per day. Israeli daily per capita consumption (both inside the Green Line and in the SETTLEMENTS) stands at more than 300 liters, over four times as much.

Table 10 Comparison of Water Consumption between Israelis and Palestinians

	Palestinians	Israelis
Total Population	**3,647,845**	**6,716,000**
Consumption, millions of m^3		
Domestic	140	688
Industrial		122
Agriculture	155	1,021
Total consumption	**295**	**1,831**
Consumption per capita, m^3		
Irrigation	43	152.0
Domestic	38	102.4
Total	**81**	**254.4**

While the water shortage in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES has resulted primarily from the restrictions Israel placed on Palestinian residents' access, it also arose from Israel's relatively minimal investment in water INFRASTRUCTURE. The neglect in infrastructure is conspicuous in two areas: the lack of construction of infrastructure to connect village residents to a running-water network and the lack of maintenance of existing water networks to prevent loss of water from leakage. In June 2009, after four decades of OCCUPATION, in the West Bank the number of residents not connected to a running-water network amounted to at least 215,000 living in more than 150 villages. Although 74 percent of the total Palestinian communities are connected to the water network, in many cases the water network coverage in these communities is only partial; indeed Amnesty International estimated that 15 percent of the total population living in connected communities is not served by the water network. One problem is water-pipe leakage resulting from improper maintenance, which has led in some instances to a loss of 60 percent of the quantity of water supplied. This predicament affects water networks throughout the West Bank. Moreover, approximately 94 percent of communities, mainly those located in areas served by the Israeli national water company Mekorot that are connected to the water network, experience some degree of main valve closure. This is particularly true of Palestinian communities located close to the Israeli settlements, where the supply of water to Palestinians depends on the needs and requirements of the settlers. At times of high demand, Mekorot increases the amount of water supplied to the settlers, at the expense of supply to Palestinian towns. Reduction of water to Palestinian communities is accomplished by closing the valve of the main water pipelines that direct water to Palestinian towns. As a result of all these factors, communities throughout the West Bank have experienced a major increase in water-related diseases, including skin infections, diarrhea, and amebiasis.

Among those particularly suffering from this water deprivation are residents of villages and refugee camps, but even in towns and villages that are connected to the water network, the taps often run dry. Water rationing is common, especially but not only in the summer months, with residents of different neighborhoods and villages receiving piped water only one day a week or every few weeks. Consequently, many Palestinians have no choice but to purchase additional supplies from mobile water tankers, which deliver water at a much higher price than that of tap water and of often dubious quality. As unemployment and poverty have increased in recent years and disposable income has fallen, Palestinian families in the OPT must spend an increasingly high percentage of their income—as much as a quarter or more in some cases—on water.

Palestinian communities that are not served by water networks depend on rainwater, well water, and water purchased and brought in by tanker from other areas to meet their needs; water consumption in these areas is generally much lower than average, often as little as 20 liters per person per day. When there is good annual rainfall, water is collected on rooftops and stored in underground rain-harvesting cisterns, which can meet families' water consumption needs for up to several months, generally from November to May. In the summer, these residents must collect water from nearby springs (if such exist) in plastic bottles and jerricans, or purchase water from private dealers at high prices.

Rainwater-harvesting cisterns have been used in the region for centuries. Household cisterns are mostly small, with an average capacity of 50 cubic meters. Agricultural cisterns, with a slightly larger capacity, are built in the ancient Nabataean tradition—located at the lowest point of a specially contoured area that is created with slopes and berms to increase rain runoff and collect the rainwater. The cisterns are circular or square, dug into the ground, and lined with stones or concrete to prevent leakages, with an opening at the top that is kept covered to prevent evaporation and contamination. But when the stored rainwater runs out, villagers have to purchase additional water from water tankers and store that water in their cisterns.

The Israeli army frequently destroys Palestinian water facilities, including rainwater-harvesting and storage cisterns (household and agricultural), agricultural pools, and spring canals on the grounds that they were constructed without PERMITS from the army. Such destruction is often accompanied by other measures that aim to restrict or eliminate the presence of Palestinians from specific areas of the West Bank. These are areas where Israel has a particular interest in appropriating LAND, usually for the expansion of settlements and related infrastructure, or with a view to its possible future annexation to Israel. The destruction of cisterns is devastating to families dependent on rainwater collection.

Wells are another source of water for Palestinians, but under the Israeli military regime imposed in 1967, Palestinians can no longer drill new wells or rehabilitate or even repair existing ones, or carry out any water-related projects (from pipes, networks, and reservoirs to wells and springs and even rainwater cisterns), without first obtaining a permit from the Israeli army. In theory, such permits for drilling or rehabilitating wells could be obtained after a lengthy and complicated bureaucratic process; in practice, most applications for such permits have been rejected. Only thirteen permits were granted in the twenty-nine years from 1967 to 1996 (when the Palestinian Water Admin-istration, PWA, was established), but all of these involved projects for domestic use and were not sufficient to make up even for the replacement of wells that had dried up or fallen into disrepair since 1967.

The Israeli army not only has prevented the development of new Palestinian wells and infrastructure, limited the use and upkeep of existing ones, and prevented the rehabilitation of old wells, butt has additionally imposed quotas on the quantity of water that Palestinians can extract from their wells, capping the amount at the level that existed when the well was first metered. Meters were installed in the early 1970s to monitor pumping and to ensure Palestinian compliance with the capped allowance. The measures were simply imposed; there was no process of consultation with local Palestinian communities about their needs and how these would be met. Furthermore, the army sealed many existing wells to restrict Palestinians to a very low quota of water. Together all these measures have contributed significantly to the deterioration of agriculture as well as depriving Palestinians of sufficient water for human needs. With regard to agriculture, the World Bank noted, "The cost to the economy of foregone opportunity in irrigated agriculture is significant, with upper bound preliminary estimates that could be as high as 10% of GDP and 110,000 jobs." Palestinian officials say Israel controls some fifty deep West Bank wells, with a total capacity of 50 million cubic meters (MCM) per year, directing it mainly to Jewish settlements, which house more than 479,500 people. Palestinians control about 200 shallow wells in the occupied West Bank, many of them drilled before the 1967 WAR. Those wells produce about 105 MCM per year, but they are meant to supply water to 2.5 million Palestinians. An Israeli official from the Israeli Water Authority stated that permitting Palestinians to drill more wells could "ruin" the existing West Bank aquifers. Mekorot operates thirty-six wells in the northern West Bank that produce 54 MCM per year. A certain portion of this is sold to the Palestinian population, but the overwhelming share is sold to the settlers in the West Bank.

West Bank Palestinians supplement available water by buying up to 45 MCM of water from

Israel. Another 5 MCM bought from Israel goes to the GAZA STRIP, supplementing the 50 MCM from the Coastal Aquifer. Mekorot sells water at highly subsidized prices to Israeli settlers in the illegal settlements in the West Bank while nearly 40 percent of water supplied to Palestinians in the West Bank is distributed by Mekorot at much higher, unsubsidized prices. Palestinians in the West Bank are charged, relative to their per capita income, eight times as much per unit of household water as in Israel and twenty times as much as settlers pay. According to B'Tselem, "For running water in their homes (as opposed to water they collected or purchased), Palestinian consumers pay the same price as the Israeli consumer (some NIS 3 per cubic meter). [But] since the average income is much higher in Israel than in the Occupied Territories, the financial burden for a Palestinian family is significantly heavier than for an Israeli family. To illustrate this difference, the per capita GDP for Israelis is twelve times higher than the per capita GDP for Palestinians. In areas unconnected to water networks, Merokot supplies water by mobile tankers at an average of ten cubic meters per family per month at a price of NIS 6.5 per cubic meter. In July 1997, average per capita daily water consumption in such areas totaled only 58 liters. In comparison, average per capital daily consumption in Israel was 288 liters, and even higher in the summer. The water shortage during the summer compels Palestinian residents in the unconnected areas to buy water from private water tankers. The owners of these tankers buy the water from public and private wells, and charge a price fluctuating between NIS 15–30 per cubic meter, depending on the distance from the house to the well and the height of the water storage container. This price is five to ten times higher than that charged by the municipalities for running water. A family can, therefore, spend hundreds of shekels a month for water, which is a heavy financial burden for a family whose average monthly income does not exceed NIS 1500."

While Palestinians throughout the occupied West Bank are being denied access to an equitable portion of the shared water resources and are increasingly affected by the lack of adequate water supplies, Israeli settlers face no such challenges, as indicated by their intensive irrigation farms, lush gardens, and swimming pools. The more than 479,500 Israeli settlers who live in the West Bank and East JERUSALEM in violation of INTERNATIONAL LAW use as much or more water than the Palestinian population of some 2.3 million. Moreover, some of the largest settlements, such as Ariel and Kedumim, are located directly above the Western Basin.

In the face of water shortages and amid deepening poverty in recent years, some Palestinians have resorted to drilling unlicensed wells while others have connected to a water network illegally, and many have stopped paying their water bills. These practices have further compounded the problem by undermining the economic viability and authority of the PWA, which has proven to be unable or unwilling to stop such practices.

Due to Israel's failure to fulfill its obligations as the occupying power, the burden of dealing with these challenges has fallen to international donors and, since its establishment in the mid-1990s, to the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA), the PWA, and other local service providers, all of whom are nearly totally dependent on international donors for funds. The effectiveness of these measures has been markedly decreased by the choices and priorities of individual donors and poor coordination among donors. Adding to this, the PNA and PWA have been beset by internal divisions compounded by weak and fragmented management structures, lack of expertise and political will, and allegations of mismanagement and corruption.

Israel's Goals in Its Water Policies

Israel's goals in controlling West Bank and Gazan water are manifold. The first is to provide water resources for Israel, both for its heavily irrigated agricultural sector and for human consumption. By 1986 approximately one-quarter of the water used by Israel annually inside the Green Line for irrigation and consumption came from the West Bank. Second, Israel uses Palestinian water to supply the illegal settlements in the West Bank, and, until August 2005, the Gaza Strip.

Underlying these objectives, Israel's water policy in the Occupied Territories is and remains limiting the overall amount of water (and land) available to the Palestinian population, while preserving for itself privileged access to most of the water and land in the OPT. Through its water-limitation policies and confiscation of land, Israeli policy aims at retarding Palestinian agriculture, de-developing Palestinian industry, and preventing the emergence of a viable, independent Palestinian state while simultaneously fostering the growth and development of the settlements, with the

ultimate goal of annexing most of the West Bank. Israel's objective in limiting the productivity of the Palestinian agricultural sector is also related to its goal of protecting Israel's agricultural sector from competition. Although irrigated areas cover approximately 269,692 dunums (67,000 acres) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and 2,177,500 dunums (538,000 acres) in Israel, the agricultural sector contributes 8.2 percent of the GDP in Palestine compared to 2.6 percent of the GDP in Israel. Israel's water policy in the Occupied Territories has benefited it in two other ways: preservation of the unequal division of the shared groundwater in the West Bank's Western and Northern Aquifers, and utilization of new water sources to which Israel had no access prior to 1967, such as the Eastern Aquifer (in the West Bank) and the Gaza Coastal Aquifer, primarily to benefit Israeli settlements established in those areas.

To promote this policy, Israel drastically changed the "legal" and institutional system of the water sector in the Occupied Territories that was in effect prior to the Occupation. This change was made in two main stages. In the first stage, which began just after the 1967 War ended, all powers relating to water, which had been under Jordanian and Egyptian authority, were transferred to the Occupation authorities. Military legislation significantly augmented these powers, and Israel imposed a series of military orders that promptly put all water resources in the OPT under Israeli control. Military Order No. 2 (7 June 1967) declared all water resources in the OPT to be "Israeli state property." On 15 August 1967 the Israeli military commander issued Military Order No. 92, which granted complete authority over all water-related issues in the OPT to the Israeli army. This order was followed by numerous others that further enforced basic changes in the water laws and regulations in the West Bank. Under Military Order No. 158 of 1967, which applies to all wells and irrigation installations, it is not permissible for any person to set up, assemble, possess, or operate a water installation unless the area commander grants a permit, and the commander's refusal does not need to be justified.

In the second stage, which began in 1982, a substantial portion of the powers held by the Occupation authorities, among them control of most of the water supplied to the urban centers, was transferred to Mekorot, which operates under the supervision of Israel's Water Commissioner and Ministry of Agriculture. The result of these changes was the total integration of the water resources of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with those of Israel and their operation by the Israeli bureaucracy as a single, centralized system.

Israel utilized these legal and institutional changes solely to promote its own interests, almost completely ignoring the needs of the Palestinian population, which was left on its own to face a growing water shortage. Other Israeli restrictions, not directly related to its water policy and stemming from other factors (allegedly security or ecology), reduced Palestinian access to water. For example, a strip of land along the lower Jordan River was declared a CLOSED MILITARY ZONE, and Palestinian farmers in the West Bank were unable to utilize it for irrigation as they had done prior to the Occupation. Another example is classification of areas with freshwater springs as "nature reserves," where access is prohibited or entails payment.

Israel's legal and institutional changes involved both the restrictions it placed on Palestinian access to water sources and its minimal investment in water infrastructure, together resulting in Tel Aviv's direct responsibility for the water crisis facing Palestinians. The neglect is evident, as discussed above, in the failure to connect village residents to a running-water network, lack of maintenance to prevent loss of water of the existing networks with the attendant water-pipe leakage, and Mekorot's closure of main valves in order to provide the settlers with additional water.

Despite the lack of figures on the scope of Israeli investment in the water sector in the Occupied Territories, it is reasonable to assume that it was comparable to the general pattern of Israel's economic policy in the Occupied Territories (e.g., infrastructure, health, etc.). Several economic research projects found that the amount of public expenditure in the Occupied Territories (in all fields) was lower than the revenues from taxes that Israel collected from the Palestinian population. The surplus of revenues minus the gap between expenditures and revenues flowed regularly into the Israeli state treasury.

Water Sources, Water Access, Water Restrictions

The West Bank. Natural water sources are normally divided into two kinds, groundwater and

surface water. Groundwater includes water that seeps into the ground and collects in an underground aquifer, and water from springs, which flows above ground. Surface water flows and is collected above ground, as from rivers, streams, and lakes. For the sake of this discussion, this division is maintained, although from a hydrologic perspective, the two sources are interdependent and should not be considered independent.

Israelis and Palestinians share two water systems: the groundwater system, called the Mountain Aquifer, traverses the border between the West Bank and Israel. The shared surface-water system is the Jordan Basin, which is also shared by JORDAN, SYRIA, and LEBANON. The drainage basin of the Jordan River stretches over 330 kilometers (205 miles) from the Upper Galilee in the north to the Dead Sea in the south and has an average width of thirty meters. Since its founding, Israel has intensively used the Jordan Basin's water. Its territorial expansion resulting from the 1967 WAR and its control of most of the basin's water sources led to an increase in utilization of the basin's waters: today Israel extracts 630 million cubic meters (MCM) a year from the Jordan Basin, constituting 30 percent of all the water used by Israel. Jordan also diverts the flow of the Jordan River's tributaries within its territory, as do Syria and Lebanon further upstream. As a consequence, compared to 1953, when a UN report estimated the yearly flow of the Jordan River through the West Bank as 1,250 MCM, this flow has now been reduced to a trickle of high-saline water heavily contaminated by untreated sewage. The drying up of the Jordan River has had a disastrous impact on the Dead Sea, which has seen the fastest drop in its water level to unprecedented lows. Since Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967, it has denied its Palestinian inhabitants access to the water resources of the Jordan River, depriving them of a crucial source of water, preventing them from physically accessing the riverbanks, and diverting the river flow upstream into Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), which supplies an additional 700 MCM/year of water to Israel.


Since Israel has denied Palestinians any access to the water of the Jordan River Basin, the Mountain Aquifer is the only remaining source of water for the West Bank. Groundwater flows in three main directions from the Mountain Aquifer and, hence, three main groundwater drainage basins can be identified: the Western Aquifer System, the Northeastern Aquifer System, and the Eastern Aquifer System. But Israel has consistently refused West Bank Palestinians access to more than 20 percent of the Mountain Aquifer's water while it takes 80 percent of the aquifer's water. According to Amnesty International, the total amount of water available to Palestinians from the aquifer has been a maximum of some 170 to 180 MCM per year, which reportedly fell to a mere 135 MCM in 2008. Moreover, as much as a third of this is lost in leakages due to old and inefficient pipeline networks, which cannot be readily repaired or replaced due to Israeli restrictions.

Conversely, the 80 percent of the annual safe yield of the West Bank Aquifer System that Israel is currently exploiting amounts to approximately 30 percent of Israel's total water needs, which include its growing settlements as well as its military infrastructure in the West Bank.

Israel's water consumption stands at some 2,000 to 2,200 MCM per year for a population of seven million (some 1,500 MCM is freshwater, with the remainder composed of desalinated seawater and treated wastewater). Most of Israel's freshwater supplies are drawn from the shared groundwater and common surface water resources—more than 400 MCM per year from the Mountain Aquifer and up to 650 MCM per year from the diverted Jordan River.

According to the Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, "This aquifer supplies about 417 MCM/y, a quarter of the total national production, although the average multi-annual natural replenishment rate is estimated at about 360 MCM." The World Bank puts Israel's extraction from the Western Aquifer in 1999 at 591 MCM, which is in excess of the aquifer's yearly sustainable yield by 174 MCM (or 229 MCM according to the OSLO ACCORDS figures). Such sustained overextraction has reduced the aquifer's current yield and future reserves and has caused potentially serious damage to the quality of the water supply for both Israelis and Palestinians. As the Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection noted, "Over-exploitation may lead to a rapid rate of saline water infiltration from surrounding saline water sources."

According to the World Bank, "Palestinians have access to one fifth of the resources of the Mountain Aquifer. Palestinians exstract about 20% of the 'estimated potential' of the aquifers that underlie both the West Bank and Israel. Israel



Map 47. West Bank Water Sources

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Map 48. Surface Water in the West Bank and Surrounding Area

exstracts the balance, and in addition overdraws without JWC [Joint Water Committee] approval on the 'estimated potential' by more than 50%, up to 1.8 times its share under Oslo. Over-extraction by deep wells combined with reduced recharge has created risks for the aquifers and a decline in water available to Palestinians through shallower wells."

In 2007, according to the World Bank, overall Palestinian water extraction from the Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank was 113 MCM (down from 138 MCM in 1999), and according to PWA figures, total Palestinian extraction in 2008 was 84 MCM, with the reduction due to operational problems for some wells and a drop in the level of the water table caused by Israeli overextraction and low annual rainfall. According to the Israeli authorities, Palestinians also extract some 10 MCM per year from unlicensed wells and obtain some 3.5 MCM per year from illegal connections to Israeli water lines in the West Bank. To boost insufficient supplies the Palestinians must buy water from Israel—water that Israel extracts from the Mountain Aquifer and which the Palestinians should be able to extract for themselves if Israel were to allow them a more equitable share of the aquifer. In recent years the quantity of water bought by Palestinians from Israel has increased, to some 50 MCM per year, but this is not enough to match the increase in population in the West Bank, and supplies are often reduced by Israel to the Palestinians (but not to the Israeli settlers in the OPT) during the hot season, when needs are greater.

The Gaza Strip. In the Gaza Strip, the Coastal Aquifer, which traverses the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip, is a groundwater system that is shared by Israel and the Palestinians. It is the only water resource available to Gazan Palestinians, but it is grossly insufficient for the needs of the population. This aquifer has been depleted and contaminated by overextraction, leakage of sewage, and seawater infiltration. Stringent restrictions imposed in recent years by Israel on the entry into Gaza of material and equipment necessary for the development and repair of infrastructure have caused further deterioration of the water and sanitation situation in Gaza, which has reached a crisis point.

With a population of over 1.5 million, of whom over 960,000 are refugees registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the Gaza Strip faces an especially problematic water situation. Gaza already has one of the highest population densities in the world, estimated at 3,612 persons per square kilometer (9,356 per square mile), and a rapidly growing population that is expected to reach almost 2 million by 2015. In terms of quantity, the average amount of water available to each inhabitant of Gaza slightly exceeds the average amount available in the West Bank, at about 80–100 liters per capita a day; however, the Coastal Aquifer in Gaza is contaminated, and according to Amnesty International, "90–95 percent of Gaza's water is polluted and unfit for human consumption."

Coupled with the long-term consequences of the former Israeli military Occupation and settlements, which ended in principle in September 2005, Gaza has suffered a steady increase in debilitating ecological and hydrological problems. These include desertification, salinization of freshwater, lack of sewage treatment, waterborne disease, soil degradation, and the depletion and contamination of underground water resources. These are due primarily to overpumping, which has resulted in an annual replenishing deficit of 90 MCM, and by pollution resulting from fertilizers and sewage. Untreated sewage continues to seep in and harm the water supply as well as contaminating and damaging the aging water infrastructure of the territory. These problems have crippled agricultural and economic production and damaged the health of Gaza's burgeoning population.

In March 2009 the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expressed concern that "following Operation Cast Lead, a twenty-two month-long blockade, restricted access to vital agricultural areas and prolonged water stress, the agriculture community in the Gaza Strip remains on the brink of collapse. In one year alone, the number of people employed in agriculture fell by 60 percent. Coupled with an estimated US$180 million in direct damages to agricultural assets, agriculture-dependent families have exhausted options for maintaining their livelihoods. Without urgent action this once vital economic sector will take years rather than months to regain even pre–December 2008 productivity levels. Meanwhile, the blockade continues to restrict the import of agricultural inputs needed for the immediate response, rehabilitation and reconstruction process to begin, thus restricting any real, long term improvement of agricultural livelihoods."

In the Gaza Strip, the poor quality and amount of contamination in the water affect the Palestinians' quality of life and expose them to serious health risks. In the Gaza Strip the southern end of the Coastal Aquifer is the sole source of water for the 1.5 million Palestinian inhabitants of the Strip, but it is only one of several sources of water for Israel. Due to the aquifer's east-west flow, the quantity of water extracted in Gaza does not diminish the available yield in Israel, but extraction by Israel from this aquifer in the area to the east of Gaza affects the supply available to be extracted in Gaza. Most of the water from Wadi Gaza, a stream and surface water source that originates in the HEBRON mountains in the West Bank and then flows southeast through Israel into Gaza, has been diverted into a dam in Israel just before it reaches Gaza. The yearly sustainable yield of the Coastal Aquifer in Gaza, some 55 MCM, falls far short of the population's needs. With no other source of water available to them, Palestinians in Gaza have long resorted to overextraction from the Coastal Aquifer, by as much as 80–100 MCM per year—a rate equivalent to twice the aquifer's yearly sustainable yield. The result has been a marked, progressive deterioration in the quality of the water supply already contaminated by decades of sewage infiltration into the aquifer.

Overextraction from this aquifer began before the Occupation; however, the new deep wells that Israel drilled to supply water for the Israeli settlements that were established in the Gaza Strip led to further ecological damage to the aquifer. This damage resulted from the extraction of water that otherwise would have served the Palestinian population and thus slightly reduced overextraction. Other than drillings for the settlements, Israel's responsibility for the destruction of the Gaza Aquifer stems primarily from omission rather than commission. Until the early 1990s, Israel failed to supply water to the Gaza Strip from its own sources or from West Bank sources. In fact, Israel does not allow the transfer of water from the West Bank to Gaza. Even in the 1990s, when it supplied small quantities of water, it was insufficient to abate the damage to the aquifer.

According to Merokot the approximately 8,000 Israeli settlers in the Gaza Strip prior to 2005 consumed about 8 MCM annually, of which approximately half was pumped from the Coastal Aquifer and half imported from Israel. Settler consumption amounted to in excess of 2,500 liters per person per day for domestic, municipal, industrial, and agricultural (especially extensively irrigated hot houses) usage. This means that the average Israeli settler consumed eight times as much water as his Gazan counterpart each and every day. The 2005 Israeli withdrawal of its settlers from Gaza did not materially improve the water situation for Palestinians in Gaza because the sole local water source is the Coastal Aquifer, from which 96 percent of the water is drawn.

History of Water Conflict

The roots of the current water conflict originated at the end of the nineteenth century when the ZIONISM movement began to implement its plans for creating a Jewish homeland. In 1885 early Zionists proposed that such a homeland should encompass Palestine, the Negev, southern Lebanon, and parts of Jordan, together with their water resources, so that up to fifteen million Jews could eventually be absorbed. In 1922, during the BRITISH MANDATE, the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL formed a special technical committee to conduct studies on the utilization of water and on the feasibility of irrigating unarable land. In 1926 the British HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE granted the Jewish-owned Palestine Electricity Corporation a seventy-year concession to utilize the water of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers to generate electricity.

In 1937, Great Britain assigned a hydrologist to serve as the director of development for the Trans-Jordanian government (Jordan after 1950) and to conduct a study of the water resources and irrigation potentials of the Jordan River Basin. This study served as the main reference in the preparation of the proposed UNITED NATIONS partition plan (UN RESOLUTION 181). In 1955 the United States presented the JOHNSTON PLAN for allocating the Jordan River waters among its riparian countries, as shown in Table 11. The plan also suggested the construction of a West Ghour canal, which would have provided Palestinians with 250 MCM per year.

Table 11 Allocation of the Jordan River Waters According to Johnston's Plan of 1955 (in MCM)

	First Johnston Plan	Revised Johnston Plan	Present Usage
Syria	50	132	153
Lebanon	—	35	5–10
Jordan	829	720	480
Israel	426	375–475	647

However, the plan has never been ratified, and the waters of the Jordan River have been exploited by unilateral projects without any compliance with the water allocations that were identified in the plan. The most significant projects carried out in the Jordan River Basin are the Israeli National Water Carrier, through which Israel diverts the water from Lake Tiberias to the Negev desert, and the Jordanian East Ghor Canal. These projects have reduced the annual water flow of the Jordan River from 1,250 MCM in the early 1950s to less than 200 MCM of highly saline and poor-quality water.

Following the 1967 War, Israel strengthened its control over the water resources in the region through its occupation of the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and West Bank. In the OPT, Israel imposed restrictions on water use by Palestinians, declared the lands located alongside the Jordan River as closed military areas, and deprived the Palestinians of their right to utilize the river's waters, which they were partially utilizing until 1967. Furthermore, immediately after the 1967 War, Israel imposed a series of military orders that put all water resources in the OPT under Israeli control. Israel exercises control over Palestinians' utilization of water by placing severe restrictions on wells and employing differential pricing as well as through other means. The Israeli settler population in the West Bank has access to ample water supplies, in some cases up to nine times as much per capita as the average West Bank Palestinian. Water for settlements is supplied by Mekorot, partially from wells within the West Bank, from which over 44 MCM is supplied to settlements, and partially from sources in Israel. It has been estimated that settlers use a total of approximately 160 MCM of West Bank Aquifer water per year.

Table 12 illustrates the West Bank's water sources and their utilization.

Table 12 Selected Sources of Water and Its Utilization (in MCM)

Source	Total Annual Recharge (MCM)	Palestinian Utilization	Israeli Utilization
Renewable Aquifers			
Eastern Aquifer	172	71.9	132.9
Northeastern Aquifer	145	36.9	147.1
Western Aquifer	362	29.4	591
Gaza Coastal Aquifer	65	110	
Surface Water			
Jordan River Basin	1,300	0	685

Water and the Peace Process

Under the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (DOP), referred to as the Oslo I Agreement, between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestinian water rights were not recognized—that is, the PNA did not have the right to assess Palestinian needs and utilize water resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. As in the case of land, water remained under Israeli sovereignty, and Palestinian access continued to be dependent on Israeli permission. In the 1994 GAZA-JERICHO AGREEMENT, the PWA was given jurisdiction over the Gaza Coastal Aquifer, though not over any West Bank aquifers or Israeli settlements and military installations in Gaza. The result was that, despite formal PNA dominion over the Coastal Aquifer (as well as required cooperation in its maintenance), Israel had unrestricted access to all Palestinian water sources in the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, the water needs of the settlers in Gaza and in the West Bank take precedence over the needs of the Palestinians.

In the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PLO, Palestinian water rights were recognized for the first time, but Israel only acknowledged Palestinian needs, not the right of Palestinians to sovereignty over their water resources. Moreover, water rights were deferred to the FINAL STATUS TALKS. To date, no negotiations have been held. The future water needs of Palestinians were estimated to be between 70 and 80 MCM per year, but it was agreed to provide them with 28.6 MCM of water annually to be extracted mostly from the Eastern Basin. However, Israel did not fulfill its obligations and only provided the Palestinians with a water quantity of no more than 15 MCM. It is worth mentioning that there are serious doubts that Palestinians can extract the water quantities specified in the agreement from the Eastern Basin, as there has been an average annual drop of more than 25 meters in the water table level, which is raising alarm about the sustainable yield of this basin. Nowhere in the Oslo Accords was the issue of Palestinian access to the Jordan River addressed.

Moreover, the Joint Water Committee (JWC) established under the terms of Oslo II (the Interim Agreement) proved unable to facilitate equitable water distribution arrangements because Israel retained a virtual veto power on the committee and was unwilling to fulfill agreed-upon obligations.

In accordance with Article 40, any proposed management measures, investments, or infrastructure projects pertaining to the development of the water or sanitation sectors within the OPT are subject to the approval of the JWC. A high proportion of Palestinian projects have been rejected or long delayed in the JWC. Records show that out of the 417 projects presented to the JWC during the period 1996–2008, only 57 percent were approved, 143 water projects are still awaiting JWC approval, and 22 projects were rejected. Regarding the well-drilling projects, out of 202 projects, 65 were approved by the JWC. Of those, only 38 were implemented and then only after receiving the additional approval of the Israeli CIVIL ADMINISTRATION. In contrast, any water projects for the Israeli settlements (which have been illegally constructed on Palestinian land) do not require the approval of the JWC.

In preparatory talks in 1998 about the final status negotiations, Israel refused to discuss Palestinian water rights and rejected Palestinian demands for water rights in the Jordan River. Instead, Israeli negotiators proposed desalination to overcome Palestinian water shortages. However, the high cost of desalination per cubic meter of water is not affordable by Palestinians, whose GNP is about one-tenth that of Israelis.

Effects of the Segregation Barrier and the Eastern Segregation Zone

Israel's construction of the BARRIER wall between Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, starting in 2002, has seriously affected Palestinian access to water. In the northern part of the West Bank, thirty-one artesian wells have been isolated on the western (Israeli) side of the wall that tap the Western Basin with an annual discharge of 4.5 MCM, representing around 20 percent of the Palestinian share of the Western Aquifer.

The wall has also made inaccessible thirty-two springs with annual discharge of 62 MCM used by Palestinians. The Eastern Segregation zone (which includes the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY and the shores of the Dead Sea), representing 27.5 percent of the West Bank, has cut the majority of Palestinians off from their water supply and has imposed more restrictions on them. The area that contains forty Israeli settlements and forty-five Palestinian localities has 156 artesian wells and fifty-three springs used by Palestinians. The annual discharge from these wells and springs reaches around 55 MCM. In 1998 Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON was quoted as saying, "My view of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] is well known, the absolute necessity of protecting our water in this region is central to our security. It is a non-negotiable item." Most important is the segregation wall and the Eastern Zone severance of Palestinians on both sides of the wall from water and agricultural resources, resulting in a growing threat to economic life and public health.

See also BARRIER; ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION; GAZA STRIP; HEALTH CARE; INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES; JOHNSTON PLAN; LAND; OCCUPATION; OSLO ACCORDS; SETTLEMENTS; UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION; WEST BANK.

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—Jad Isaac

Al-Wazir, Khalil Ibrahim (1935–1988)

Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was a founder and one of the top three leaders of FATAH, the dominant faction in the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). When YASIR ARAFAT became the chairman of the PLO in 1969, he gave al-Wazir effective control of the military department of the PLO, known as the Supreme Military Council (although to placate the Syrian regime, Arafat appointed Zuhayr Muhsin, head of the pro-Syrian SA'IQA group, to the position of chairman of the department). Arafat also assigned al-Wazir control over the Fatah army, although Arafat was the overall commander of AL-'ASIFAH (the military arm of the Fatah movement). Ultimately, al-Wazir became the PLO's chief military strategist.

Born in RAMLA, Palestine, al-Wazir was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR, like most of his countrymen, and fled to the GAZA STRIP. There he settled in the Burayj REFUGEE camp and was educated by the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY (UNRWA), later going to EGYPT for university education. In Egypt he became close to the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD and was persecuted because JAMAL 'ABD AL-NASIR's regime did not tolerate activities sponsored by the Brotherhood. The Egyptian government also did not tolerate independent Palestinian activities, especially military, but al-Wasir is believed to have received military training near Cairo. He also attended the University of Alexandria but did not complete his degree. In the late 1950s he settled in KUWAIT, where many Palestinian activists were planning to form an independent Palestinian national organization that would function without the heavy-handed intervention of the Nasirite regime.

In Kuwait, al-Wazir joined Arafat and others in the late 1950s in forming the Fatah liberation movement. The Fatah leadership dispatched him to Algeria, where he established contacts and official relations with the Front de Libération Nationale. Visiting CHINA and Vietnam, al-Wazir studied the international examples of people's liberation wars. It is unclear how much actual military training al-Wazir ever had, but he soon emerged as the overall military strategist for the Fatah movement (and later for the PLO). In 1965 al-Wazir settled in Damascus, SYRIA, benefiting from the rise of the BA'ATHISM party under Salah Jadid, who believed that a war of people's liberation was the best approach to recovering Palestine from the Israelis. The Arab defeat in the 1967 WAR only helped to boost the standing of the Fatah movement and allowed it to wrest control of the PLO from the hands of Arab regimes.

After 1967 al-Wazir joined PLO leaders in their established base in JORDAN and remained there through the BLACK SEPTEMBER (1970) war with Jordan, which killed some 3,000 Palestinians. Thereafter, Arafat put him in charge of military operations in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. Despite

his military stature, al-Wazir was a moderate in Palestinian politics, and the leftist faction within Fatah distrusted him. He consistently counseled against confrontation with Arab regimes, and, when the PLO relocated to Beirut in 1970–1971, al-Wazir declined to join the Iraqi- and Libyan-financed leaders whose profligate ways led to massive corruption in the ranks of the Palestinian revolution. He was also opposed to the PLO entering the Lebanese civil war, which the leftist faction within Fatah championed. In LEBANON, al-Wazir tried to insulate himself from the disputes within the Fatah movement and focused instead on building a new conventional military force, but he did not have the independence that such a task required. His relations with Arafat were less contentious than Arafat's relations with other PLO leaders, but the chairman insisted on interfering (as he did in all matters relating to the Palestinian resistance movement) in Wazir's efforts to transform the guerrilla forces into a disciplined conventional military.

During the long years of diplomatic maneuvers with Arab states and others that Arafat pursued, al-Wazir favored the "pragmatic" option and often helped the chairman push for his point of view within the Fatah movement and the PLO. But al-Wazir was careful not to alienate the leftists within Fatah, and he maintained good relations with other Palestinian factions, including those suspicious of Arafat and his ties to conservative Arab regimes. He also maintained good relations with Arab regimes from Syria to SAUDI ARABIA. However, his tenure as the PLO's primary military strategist was not exemplary. He was responsible for changing the military doctrine of the PLO from guerrilla warfare into a conventional army, but the army failed to mount an effective defense against Israeli attacks on PLO strongholds in Lebanon either in 1978 or in 1982. However, al-Wazir does not alone bear responsibility for these failures; contributing factors were Arafat's nepotistic appointments of weak military commanders and the generally corrupt political environment in which al-Wazir had to operate.

After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, al-Wazir was one of many PLO leaders and fighters who were forced to relocate outside of Lebanon. He settled in Tunisia, where he became convinced that the solution to the PLO's problem lay not with the Arab states but in careful and methodical organizing work inside the Occupied Territories. That was also the doctrine of his predecessor, KAMAL 'UDWAN, who was assassinated in Beirut by Israeli agents in 1973. Al-Wazir was successful in laying the foundation for the myriad organized social service committees that sprang up during the First INTIFADA in 1987. In 1988 Israeli commandos assassinated al-Wazir in his home in TUNIS. There has been some speculation, though no proof, that elements of the Tunisian police, if not the government itself, conspired with Israeli intelligence and military in the operation. Had al-Wazir survived, he would have been the most likely successor to Arafat. Pictures and posters of al-Wazir appear on the walls of Palestinian refugee camps and cities around the region. Al-Wazir has been remembered as a noncorrupt leader totally dedicated to the Palestinian cause.

Al-Wazir was married to Intisar Al-Wazir (Umm Jihad) (1941–), born in Gaza, who was a longtime figure in Palestinian politics, joining the Fatah party in 1959. In 1965 she helped to found the General Union for Palestinian Women (GUPW) to support Palestinian women socially, economically, and legally. She served as the secretary-general of the GUPW from 1980 to 1985. She was a member of the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL beginning in 1974 and a member of the FATAH CENTRAL COMMITTEE from 1987 to 2009. In 1983 she served as the deputy secretary-general of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. In 1988 she served on the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE in the wake of her husband's assassination. In 1994 she was elected to the PALESTINIAN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, and served as the minister of social affairs in the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY. Umm Jihad's role within the Fatah movement, however, has been reduced, and she was not elected to the Fatah's Central Committee in the 2009 party congress.

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—As'ad AbuKhalil

Weitz, Yosef (1890–1972)

Yosef Weitz was from 1937 to 1948 head of the Yishuv's TRANSFER COMMITTEE in Palestine, which determined the feasibility of expelling the

Palestinian population, and was also director of the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND's (JNF) Settlement Department from 1932 to 1948. Born in Volhynia, Russia, he immigrated to Palestine in 1908. From 1918 to 1932 Weitz was head of the JNF's Plant and Afforestation Department and, much later, director of the Subcommittee for Naming Agricultural Settlements and chairman of the Land Development Council of the JNF (1960–1967). He was chairman of the ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION, a prolific publicist for emigration of Jews to Israel, and author of books on LAND, colonization, and afforestation. In addition, Weitz was active in the acquisition of the Emek Hefer lands; in bypassing British restrictions on land acquisition after the 1939 MACDONALD WHITE PAPER, which proposed strict regulations on land sales to Jews and a limit on Jewish IMMIGRATION; and in writing the 1940 Land Law. He participated in the establishment of Hanita and Beria, and, as an avid supporter of the "Tower and Stockade" settlements, he had a significant role in creating eleven such settlements in the Negev.

Weitz is remembered for his forceful advocacy of TRANSFER of Palestinians to other states and for his role on the Transfer Committee, especially after 1948. He was assiduous about keeping a diary, contained in five volumes from 1932 until his death, which records his thinking and activities with regard to transfer of the Palestinians from the new state of Israel. Located in the Zionist Archives in JERUSALEM, these volumes provide a wealth of information on his thoughts and activities, especially regarding transfer, and numerous Israeli scholars have studied them carefully. Weitz's opportunity to set in motion his long-nurtured plans for transfer came when the UN General Assembly passed UN PARTITION RESOLUTION 181, which called for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, and Jewish leaders began planning for the coming hostilities of the 1948 WAR.

In one diary entry Weitz wrote, "Amongst ourselves, it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples in this country. No 'development' will bring us closer to our aim to be an independent people in this small country. After the Arabs are transferred, the country will be wide open for us; with the Arabs staying, the country will remain narrow and restricted. . . . There is no room for compromise on this point . . . land purchasing . . . will not bring about the state. . . . The only way is to transfer the Arabs from here to neighboring countries, all of them, except perhaps BETHLEHEM, NAZARETH, and Old JERUSALEM. Not a single village or a single tribe must be left. And the transfer must be done through their absorption in IRAQ and SYRIA and even in Transjordan [JORDAN after 1950]. For that goal, money will be found—even a lot of money. . . . There is no other solution— And only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brothers and the Jewish problem will cease to exist. There is no other solution."

Weitz repeats these comments numerous times throughout the diaries. Weitz's obsession with transfer began early and continued until it was realized in 1948. On 18 March 1941, while visiting Jewish colonies in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY, he recorded in his diary, "Once again I come face to face with the land settlement difficulties that emanate from the existence of two people in close proximity. . . . We have clashing interests with the [Palestinian] Arabs everywhere, and these interests will go and clash increasingly . . . and once again the answer from inside me is heard: only population transfer and evacuating this country so it would become exclusively for us [Jews] is the solution. This idea does not leave me in these days and I find comfort in it in the face of enormous difficulties in the way of land-buying and settlement."

Weitz not only wanted the Palestinians transferred and their villages destroyed, but, like other Zionist leaders, he also wanted more territory for Israel. "The land of Israel is not small at all, if only the Arabs will be removed, and if its frontiers would be enlarged a little; to the north all the way to Litani [River in Lebanon], and to the east including the Golan Heights . . . while the Arabs be transferred to northern SYRIA and IRAQ. . . . From now on we must work out a secret plan based on the removal of the Arabs from here. . . . [T]oday we have no other alternative. . . . We will not live here with Arabs."

According to Israeli historian Benny Morris, Weitz had considerable influence in the highest Zionist circles: "Through 1948 he had ready access to cabinet ministers . . . and often, he met with [DAVID] BEN-GURION. . . . Weitz's connections also encompassed the Yishuv's military brass. . . . [He] was well-placed to shape and influence decision-making regarding the Arab population on the national level and to oversee the implementation of policy on the local level." Weitz made a list of the Arab villages that he felt "must

be cleared out in order to complete Jewish regions. I also made a summary of the places that have land disputes and must be settled by military means."

Weitz wrote in his diary in January 1948 about the inhabitants of the Arab village of Daliyat al-Rawha' south of HAIFA. "Isn't now the time to be rid of them? Why continue to keep in our midst these thorns at a time when they pose a danger to us? Our people are weighing up a solution." He wrote on 20 February about the BEDOUIN crossing the Baysan valley to Transjordan: "It is possible that now is the time to implement our original plan: transfer them there." He also wrote about the inhabitants of the Arab villages of Qumya and al-Tira in the Baysan valley: "Not taking upon themselves the responsibility of preventing the infiltration of irregulars. . . . They must be forced to leave their villages until peace comes."

On 10 June 1948 the JNF directorate allocated I£10,000 ($2,500) to Weitz to carry out his transfer work. In his diary, Weitz noted that "it became clear that there is agreement among us on the question of the abandoned villages: Destruction, renovation and settlement [by Jews]." On 16 June 1948, while watching the destruction of a Palestinian village (al-Maghar), Weitz wrote in his diary: "Three tractors are completing the destruction. I was surprised nothing moved in me at the sight. . . . No Regret and No Hatred, as this is the way of the world. . . . The dwellers of these mud-houses did not want us to exist here."

Weitz described in one entry the ways by which commanders of the HAGANA, the Jewish underground military organization, used violence, intimidation, and fear to "encourage" Palestinians into flight. On 24 April 1948, Weitz wrote regarding the ethnic cleansing of several Palestinian villages in the Haifa area: "I was happy to hear from him [a Hagana officer] that this line was being adopted by the commander . . . to frighten the Arabs so long as flight-induced fear was upon them." In late November 1948, Weitz recorded that two JNF officials complained that "the army continues to destroy villages in the Galilee, which we are interested in [for settling Jewish immigrants]." In that regard, Weitz wondered if it was not a "greater revenge" if the "abandoned" Palestinian properties could be used by the "homeless" Jewish refugees.

While Weitz was instrumental in formulating and implementing the transfer solution, he was also among the few (along with MOSHE SHARETT and Aharon Cizling) to warn that the "Palestinian refugee problem" would not solve itself in due course, contrary to what other Zionist leaders, such as David Ben-Gurion, MENAHEM BEGIN, and GOLDA MEIR, thought.

See also TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; TRANSFER COMMITTEE; WAR, 1948

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Weizman, Ezer (1924–2005)

Ezer Weizman was an Israeli air force general, politician, and seventh president of the state of Israel, serving from 1993 until 2000. He was the nephew of CHAIM WEIZMANN, Israel's first president. For a long time, his political approach was marked by the belief that Israel's existence depended on its military strength and its ability to defeat threats from its Arab neighbors. But, during five decades of military and political involvement, he moved from being a full-blooded hawk, who favored Jewish control of the whole of the biblical GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL, to being a left-leaning

moderate, envisioning a negotiated settlement with the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

Born in Tel Aviv in 1924, Weizman was raised in HAIFA. In 1942 he joined the British army to help the British defeat the Nazis, starting out as a truck driver in the Western Desert campaigns (EGYPT and Libya). In 1943 he joined the British Royal Air Force (RAF), which sent him to Rhodesia for aviation training, and he served as a combat pilot with the RAF in India, returning to Palestine in early 1944. During 1944–1946 he was a member of the underground militant Zionist group IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI, and from 1946 to 1947 he studied aeronautics in England. During the 1948 WAR he served as a pilot for the HAGANA, the Jewish underground military organization, and is acknowledged as the "father" of the Israeli Air Force (IAF). In May 1948 Weizman went to Czechoslovakia, where he learned to pilot the Avia S-199 airplanes to bolster the fledgling Israeli air corps. On returning to Israel, he flew bombing missions against Egyptian ground forces. In the famous combat between the IAF and British RAF aircraft on 7 January 1949, he was a pilot in a group of four Israeli Spitfire fighters that clashed with fourteen British Spitfire and Tempest aircraft, after an earlier squadron of British Spitfires had infringed on Israel's southern border for reconnaissance. In this engagement, the IAF shot down three RAF planes.

After the establishment of the state of Israel, Weizman joined the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) and served as chief of operations on the General Staff. From 1958 to 1966 he served as the commander of the IAF and later as deputy to the general chief of staff. Weizman earned high credit for his contribution as the chief of operations in Israel's overwhelming victory over Arab forces during the 1967 WAR. He directed the early morning surprise air attacks against the Egyptian air bases, which resulted in Israel's almost total air superiority over the Sinai battlefields.

After his retirement from the army in 1969, Weizman joined the GAHAL PARTY (Gush Herut Liberalism, which later became the LIKUD PARTY) and served as minister of transportation in LEVI ESHKOL's national unity government until Gahal left the coalition in 1970. He led Gahal-Herut up to 1972 and then left the party. In 1976 Weizman returned to HERUT and, in 1977, served as defense minister in MENAHEM BEGIN's government. During this time, Israel launched OPERATION LITANI against Palestinian guerrillas in South LEBANON and initiated the development of the Israeli Aircraft Industries Lavi fighter. Weizman was a strong supporter of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (CAMP DAVID ACCORDS) of 1978.

In 1980 Weizman quit the government and considered establishing a new party with MOSHE DAYAN. As a result, Herut expelled him from the party and plans for the new party floundered. From 1980 to 1984 Weizman turned to business. In 1984 he established a new centrist party called YACHAD, which won three seats in the Eleventh Knesset. Weizman and Yachad joined a national unity government in which SHIMON PERES and YITZHAK SHAMIR served as prime ministers in rotation. In October 1986, Yachad joined the Israeli LABOR PARTY.

In 1993 Weizman was elected Israeli president. Throughout his life, he was well-known for having an outspoken, informal manner, regardless of his rank or position. In face-to-face meetings, this endeared him to almost everyone he encountered. As president, some of his public remarks earned him considerable criticism, but his public support was never significantly damaged. After the TERRORISM attacks by the Islamist groups HIZBULLAH and HAMAS in 1993–1994, Weizman visited all the bereaved families and victims of the attacks. During his presidency, he scrupulously visited all families of soldiers killed on duty, called on hospitals, and cheered the wounded. As the president in a parliamentary system, Weizman had no executive power, and most of his predecessors had chosen to remain above politics, but he frequently flouted this norm and expressed his opinions. In an attempt to encourage the peace process with the Palestinians, he invited PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT for a private visit to his house in 1996. In conflict with official Israeli policy, Weizman vocally supported withdrawal from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with SYRIA.

At the end of 1999, Israeli newspapers carried stories accusing Weizman of receiving large amounts of money from wealthy businessmen without reporting it to the proper authorities. Although the investigating authorities decided not to prosecute, public criticism following this publicity led Weizman to resign from office in 2000.

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Weizmann, Chaim Arizel (1874–1952)

Chaim Weizmann was the first president of Israel and longtime leader in the Zionist movement. He was born in the small village of Motol near Pinsk in the Russian Empire (today in Belarus). In high school he became active in the Zionist movement through membership in the HOVEVEI ZION society. In 1892 he began his university studies in Darmstadt, GERMANY, and then transferred to Charlottenburg Polytechnic University in Berlin, where, by his third year, he was working in organic chemistry. As a student he was active in politics, engaging in heated debates with socialist students and favoring Zionist nationalist principles. He left his studies in 1895 to assist his family in moving from Motol to Pinsk, where he helped establish a progressive Jewish school, teaching a modern curriculum and Hebrew, which did not endear him to the traditional rabbis in the region. When he returned to Berlin in 1896, he met AHAD HA'AM, who in turn inducted him into Bnei Moshe, a European circle of Jewish academicians and intellectuals working to encourage modern Jewish education.

In 1899 he graduated from the University of Fribourg in Switzerland with a doctorate in biochemistry. He lectured in chemistry at the University of Geneva from 1901 to 1903 and continued his involvement in the local Hovevei Zion society. By 1902 he was clearly identified as the leader of the progressive faction of the Russian Zionists, opposing political ZIONISM founder THEODOR HERZL's proposal for a Jewish colony in Uganda, an issue that roiled WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO) meetings until Herzl's death in 1904. Though he was recognized as a strong and effective politician, Weizmann was too young at thirty to be considered as Herzl's replacement. Not happy with the choice of David Wolffsohn as president and equally unhappy with his academic position at Geneva, he accepted a position at the University of Manchester in 1905, moved to England, and became a British subject in 1910, and was elected to the General Zionist Council. Over the next four years, he focused on his teaching and research, as well as learning English.

In 1911 Weizmann began his work on a fermentation process to produce large quantities of acetone, which, when mixed with cordite, produces a relatively cool and smokeless explosion. In 1914, at the beginning of World War I, the process was refined. As it became clear that Britain would need far larger quantities of acetone than it could produce by the older methods, Minister of Munitions Lloyd George hired Weizmann as his chemicals adviser to begin using the new procedure. It proved to be extraordinarily successful, to the relief of ARTHUR BALFOUR, by now serving as first lord of the Admiralty. Patents on the acetone and related derivatives processes made Weizmann independently wealthy.

Weizmann also became active in English politics, thus coming to know Arthur Balfour, then representative to Parliament from East Manchester and fast-rising leader of the Conservative Party, as well as Winston Churchill, elected to Parliament from Manchester in 1906 as a liberal. Weizmann's scientific assistance to the Allied forces in World War I brought him into close contact with British leaders, enabling him to play a key role in the issuing of the BALFOUR DECLARATION in 1917, in which Britain committed itself to the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine.

Though Weizmann was chosen as a delegate to the first WZO congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897, he was unable to attend, but, at the second congress the next year, he was appointed to the twenty-man steering committee. From this point on, he was fully engaged in WZO activities, consistently supporting Ahad Ha'am's push for modern cultural activities, pressing for the establishment of a Jewish university, and distancing himself from his traditional East European roots. One of his strongest opponents in these early years was Rabbi Isaac Reines and his largely Russian-based MIZRAHI Party, which emphasized the centrality of religion in Zionist goals.

In 1907, at the eighth WZO congress, he carefully positioned himself between the "practical" Zionism of Ha'am and the "political" wing of Wolffsohn. In 1911 he used his position as chair of the WZO steering committee to force Wolffsohn's resignation. He was replaced by Otto Warburg, a wealthy German scholar of botany with an estab-

lished Europe-wide reputation and, like Weizmann, of "practical" bent.

His development of the acetone process, together with his tireless efforts on behalf of the British wartime efforts, gave him the political support necessary to push through what was arguably his greatest contribution to the Zionist cause, the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which promised Zionists a landed home in Palestine. Once the declaration was issued, a reluctant British cabinet had to be persuaded to implement it after the war. To ensure implementation, Weizmann traveled to Palestine three times from 1918 to 1922 as head of a ZIONIST COMMISSION largely of his own making. The BRITISH MANDATE to rule Palestine, ratified in July 1922 by the League of Nations, was in part written by Weizmann.

Weizmann had made his first visit to Palestine in 1907 as an educated upper-class European with the attitudes and prejudices of his day. In his correspondence, he described the Arabs as "savages" and "uncivilized," although he was equally scornful of the impoverished traditional Jewish community of JERUSALEM. He saw nothing wrong and much good in European empire and colonization of the world beyond Europe. The 1907 visit, ostensibly a business trip to investigate the possibilities for industrial investment, was actually focused on the broader problems and possibilities of the Zionist colonial enterprise. Upon his return to England, in a speech to the Zionist Society of Manchester, he laid out his primary impression of the trip and the policies that followed from it. Arab laborers, who made up 60 to 80 percent of the Jewish settlements' workforce, must be replaced by Jews and LAND must be bought "between the [Zionist] colonies to form geographically united centers belonging entirely to Jews."

When Weizmann returned to Palestine in March 1918 as head of the Zionist Commission, little had changed in his attitudes. He met Emir Faysal, then tenuously king of SYRIA, and found in him some hope for Arab tolerance of the Jewish settlements in Palestine; Faysal seemed to care little for the Arabs of Palestine and was primarily interested in blocking French attempts to take over Syria. They signed an accord in January 1919, known as the WEIZMANN-FAYSAL AGREEMENT, but little came of the rapprochement. By 1918 the headquarters of the WZO had moved to London, and in 1920 Weizmann became its president. His policy in the following years was to keep the organization on a course that maintained cooperative relations with the British Mandate government, while he personally pressed through private channels for Zionist advantage. Underlying this approach was his conviction that a slow and steady inflow of Jewish immigrants to Palestine—whether Zionist or not, secular or religious—along with strategic land purchases, would inexorably produce the long-sought Jewish state. It was a policy that reflected Weizmann's early membership in Hovevei Zion and the views of his political mentor, Ahad Ha'am. It also reflected his involvement in the higher circles of conservative English politics and society; his East European WZO opponents often scathingly referred to Weizmann as "that English gentleman."

Weizmann was the founder of a strain of Zionism called "Synthetic Zionism" in which he supported both grassroots colonization efforts and high-level diplomatic activity. He was generally associated with the centrist General Zionists and later sided neither with Labor Zionism on the left nor Revisionist Zionism on the right. In 1917, he expressed his view of Zionism in the following words: "We [the Jewish people] have never based the Zionist movement on Jewish sufferings in Russia or in any other land. These sufferings have never been the mainspring of Zionism. The foundation of Zionism was, and continues to be to this day, the yearning of the Jewish people for its homeland, for a national center and a national life."

Weizmann's approach to the Zionist project was termed *havlagah*, or "self-restraint," and it fit well with WZO goals for Mandate Palestine from 1919 to 1929; however, it was increasingly called into question following 1929. In that year, law and order collapsed following riots between Arabs and Jews during the WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES in Jerusalem, HEBRON, and SAFED. Britain's response was to call for limitations on Jewish immigration (in the SHAW COMMISSION Report of March 1930). To counter Shaw's recommendations, Weizmann argued in London that if resentful Arab farmers displaced by IMMIGRATION were the problem, it could be solved by transferring the farmers to Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) or IRAQ. The TRANSFER scheme, as it was called, was rejected by the Mandatory government as "politically impractical," and Weizmann backed down. Weizmann advocated transfer of the Palestinians from 1929 to1931; however, in late 1931 he spoke publicly

against the idea, though privately it would remain a key policy thrust of his and of other Zionist leaders throughout the Mandate period. On the heels of the Shaw Commission and British rejection of the idea of transfer came London's PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER (October 1930), proposing still tighter immigration controls. This triggered vociferous demands from Zionist activist groups led by VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY and his Revisionist Party for an immigration policy that would produce a Jewish majority or, at minimum, a demographic parity of Arabs and Jews in Palestine. When the issue came up at the WZO conference in Basel in June 1931, Weizmann spoke against it, declaring, "I have no sympathy or understanding for the demand for a Jewish majority. A majority does not necessarily guarantee security. . . . A majority is not required for the development of Jewish civilization and culture. The world will construe this demand only in one sense: that we want to acquire a majority in order to drive out the Arabs." Shouted down by the delegates, Weizmann was forced to resign as president. Events were overtaking his *havlagah* policy.

Shortly after his resignation, Weizmann immigrated with his family to Palestine, where he took up the task of establishing the Daniel Sieff Research Institute (renamed the Weizmann Institute of Science in 1949 in his honor) near Tel Aviv for the study of agriculture and biochemistry. From 1931 to 1935 he traveled extensively, raising money. In 1933 he took charge of the Bureau for Settlement of German Jews, unsuccessfully lobbied FRANCE for permission to establish Jewish settlements in SYRIA and LEBANON, and met with Mussolini, from whom he received support for the use of Italian ports for Jewish immigrants. He kept his distance from the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE, with its differing policies and personal animosities, and avoided attendance at WZO conferences. Weizmann was appalled by the TERRORISM increasingly carried out against the British by Revisionist Party guerrillas and by the assassination of HAIM VICTOR ARLOZOROV, a leading LABOR PARTY official, by members of the Revisionist movement. Jabotinsky, however, withdrew from the WZO in 1935 to form his own WORLD UNION OF ZIONIST REVISIONISTS. With the Revisionists gone, Weizmann returned to the WZO fold.

When he resumed the presidency in 1935, Weizmann continued his policy of cooperation with the British Mandate government, but events in Europe and Palestine made this policy less and less politically tenable within Zionist ranks. By the outbreak of war in 1939, Zionist policy in Palestine was dominated by supporters of active resistance against the British, led by DAVID BEN-GURION and his nemesis, Jabotinsky. And while Weizmann still had influence on policy, his role was reduced to public spokesman, diplomat, and fundraiser. Although Weizmann had spoken of his hope that Jews and Arabs might live together peacefully in an independent state of Palestine, by 1939 he had given up such thoughts. As WZO spokesman, Weizmann first worked against the proposed partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states but later supported it as a first step toward independence. Much to his dismay, however, matters were taken out of his hands by the explosion of World War II in Palestine beginning in 1946.

In August of that year, he ordered the HAGANA, the military wing of Ben-Gurion's MAPAI Party, to cease and desist from anti-British activities, but Ben-Gurion countered the order. In December Weizmann was forced out of the presidency by the activists, a final repudiation of his *havlagah* policies. Still recognized as a spokesman, he lobbied in New York at the new UNITED NATIONS in 1947 for partition and was in Washington lobbying President HARRY TRUMAN and Congress in 1948 for recognition of an independent state of Israel. That recognition came on 15 May, the day after the state was proclaimed. On 16 May, Weizmann received a telegram from Tel Aviv appointing him as president of the new state, a position he held until his death in 1952.

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—Jon Mandaville

Weizmann-Faysal Agreement, 1919

The Weizmann-Faysal Agreement was a short-lived accord for Arab-Jewish cooperation based on the development of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and an Arab nation encompassing a large part of the Middle East. It was signed on 3 January 1919 by Emir Faysal (son of Sharif Husayn of Mecca, of the Hejaz or eastern Arabia, and leader of the Arab nationalist movement at the time) and CHAIM WEIZMANN, head of the ZIONIST COMMISSION (later president of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION). The context of the accord was the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which was attempting to settle disputes stemming from World War I. The League of Nations had carved up the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, giving mandates to the French and British for various areas of the Arab world. The Arabs disapproved intensely, citing British promises made in the 1914–1915 HUSAYN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE.

Weizmann first met Faysal in June 1918, during the British advance from the south against the Ottoman Empire. As leader of the impromptu Zionist Commission, Weizmann traveled to southern Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) to forge an agreement between Faysal and the Zionist movement to support Jewish settlement in Palestine. Palestinian Arabs were not included in the meeting, and, indeed, both men seem to have held the Palestinian Arabs in considerable disdain. Weizmann had called them "treacherous," "arrogant," "uneducated," and "greedy" and reported that Faysal was "contemptuous of the Palestinian Arabs whom he doesn't even regard as Arabs."

In preparation for the 1919 meeting, the BRITISH MANDATE authorities urged Faysal to cultivate the Zionist movement as a powerful ally rather than to oppose it. In a secret communication, the British wrote to Faysal, "We know that the Arabs despise, condemn and hate the Jews," but added that the Jewish race is "universal, all-powerful and cannot be put down." In their meeting, Weizmann and Faysal established an informal agreement under which Faysal would support Jewish settlement in Palestine while the Zionist movement would assist in the development of the vast Arab nation that Faysal hoped to establish.

Weizmann and Faysal met again later in 1918 in London and soon afterward at the Paris Peace Conference. On 3 January 1919 they signed the written agreement, which is known by their names. The agreement committed both parties to conduct all relations by goodwill and understanding, to work together to encourage large-scale IMMIGRATION of Jews into Palestine while protecting the rights of the Arab peasants and tenant farmers, and to safeguard the practice of religious observances. In addition, the Muslim HOLY SITES were to be under Muslim control. The Zionist movement promised to help the Arab residents of Palestine and the future Arab state to develop their natural resources and establish a growing economy. In return, the Arabs would accept the British BALFOUR DECLARATION of 1917, calling for a Jewish national home in Palestine.

The Weizmann-Faysal Agreement survived only a few months. Faysal had conditioned his acceptance on the fulfillment of British wartime promises to the Arabs contained in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, which committed Britain to facilitate a unified, independent Arab state throughout the Arab world. But the outcome of the Paris conference did not provide the unified, independent Arab state that Faysal had been promised, mainly because the British and French had struck their own secret SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT in 1916, dividing the Middle East between their own spheres of influence. Faysal began to express doubts about cooperation with the Zionist movement, and within a year he was calling on Britain to grant Palestinian Arabs their political rights as part of his Syrian kingdom.

See also HASHEMITE GENEALOGY FROM THE HEJAZ

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Welfare Association

The Welfare Association (Ta'awoun, or Cooperation) is a private, nonprofit foundation established in 1983 in Geneva, Switzerland, to support sustainable development in Palestinian society. Between its founding and 2000, the Welfare Association contributed over $100 million for development projects. It uses the intellectual and financial resources of Palestinians in the DIASPORA to conceive and implement development projects in the WEST BANK, GAZA, and East JERUSALEM, as well as humanitarian assistance projects for Palestinian REFUGEES in LEBANON. In the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, the association focuses on three broad areas: culture and identity, human resource development, and capacity building. (www.welfareassociation.org/english/index.htm).

West Bank

The West Bank emerged as a geopolitical entity in the wake of the 1948 WAR and the establishment of the state of Israel on Palestinian lands lying to its west. As a result of the forces of war, military conquest, and regimes of control and governance, it became endowed with distinct social, political, and cultural contours and identities. The designation "West Bank" assumes an "East Bank," and indeed these two terms gained currency after the unification of the eastern and western banks of the Jordan River under the Jordanian state. Before it fell under Israeli Occupation after the 1967 WAR, the West Bank had been ruled since 1948 by JORDAN, which annexed the territory in 1950. From 1920 to 1948 it was under the BRITISH MANDATE, and prior to that it was part of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

The 2007 census put the Palestinian population of the West Bank at 2,350,583, with an annual growth rate of 3 percent. REFUGEES constitute 28.1 percent of the West Bank population (in the GAZA STRIP they constitute 67.9 percent), and the population is young, with 41 percent under the age of fifteen. Only seven Palestinian locales in the West Bank have populations over 30,000, and only 25 percent of West Bank households live in cities of more than 30,000. In 2009 approximately one-quarter of the 762,820 Palestinians registered as refugees with the UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST (UNRWA) and under Israeli jurisdiction lived in the West Bank camps. The poorest live in nineteen camps scattered throughout the West Bank and are supervised by UNRWA. The camps with the largest numbers of registered refugees are located in the northern West Bank: Balata Camp near NABLUS (23,600), Tulkarm Camp (18,310), and 'Askar Camp near Nablus (15,887). Many tens of thousands of refugees do not live in camps but are scattered in villages and major urban centers. Apart from Gaza City, Ramallah is the Palestinian city with the highest percentage of refugees. Data from the 2007 census reveal that only 42 percent of Ramallah–Al-Bireh residents are nonrefugees, compared to 72.1 percent in Nablus and 78.7 percent in HEBRON.

Jordanian Rule

Jordanian rule over the West Bank lasted less than two decades, although its annexation in 1948 was intended to permanently integrate it within the kingdom, and Palestinians in the West Bank were granted Jordanian citizenship. The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship underwent several phases, the most dramatic of which was the Jordanian decision, in 1988, to formally "disengage" from the West Bank, which was then under Israeli OCCUPATION. Consequently, Amman revoked West Bank Palestinians' citizenship and issued temporary passports enabling Palestinians to travel. However, this declaration, issued at the height of the Palestinians' First INTIFADA, or uprising, did not end Jordan's interest in the West Bank; it follows the situation there with intense interest. At the same time, Israeli leaders continue to speak of the "JORDANIAN OPTION" of pushing the Palestinians into Jordan's East Bank as a possible solution to Palestinian demands for an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

During its rule over the West Bank, Jordan established a hegemonic political presence but did not integrate the West Bank into the Jordanian economy. Development and investment strategies were concentrated in the East Bank, resulting in the marginalization of the West Bank. The migration of thousands of Palestinians—especially

professionals and those with financial means—to the East Bank led to the concentration of Palestinian capital and professional resources there, to the detriment of the West Bank. To this day, a large proportion of Jordanian industrialists, businesspeople, and professionals are Palestinians who emigrated or who were expelled from Palestine in the 1948 War.

After 1967, when both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip fell under Israeli military rule, the term "OCCUPIED TERRITORIES" entered the political lexicon and gained currency as a political concept. Under the leadership of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), Palestinians proposed a political entity encompassing these two territories. Thus, beginning in the mid-1970s, and into the 1980s and beyond, the political struggle of the Palestinians centered on the realization of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The OSLO ACCORDS of 1993, between Israel and the PLO, recognized the West Bank and Gaza as "one territorial unit," a unified political and administrative entity. However, Israel allowed no significant steps to realize this unification. If anything, the two territories have grown further apart, separated as they have become by political, legal, and physical barriers.

Context and Background

The term "Occupied Territories" does not adequately capture the dynamics of the relationship between Israel and the West Bank (and Gaza). According to INTERNATIONAL LAW, territories captured during wartime are considered under the temporary rule of the occupying force. International rules and conventions govern the conduct of the occupying power, including provisions for the preservation of the status quo. In the case of the West Bank, Israel has not only defied international law in its treatment of the Palestinian population, but more importantly it has radically altered the status quo through a consistent policy of LAND confiscation, SETTLEMENT, and more recently the erection of the BARRIER (the Wall). Although Israel has not formally annexed West Bank territory beyond East JERUSALEM, for all intents and purposes it has solidified its control over land and resources in such a way as to prejudice the outcome of any political process. Palestinian legal expert Raja Shehadeh's observation in 1985 is still largely relevant today: "The policy that Israel has been pursuing in the West Bank is intended to drive out the Palestinians, to take over their land, and eventually to annex the occupied territories." This analysis is unaltered by the fact that Israel withdrew its armed forces and evacuated its colonies from the Gaza Strip in 2005, or that there has not been a mass expulsion of Palestinians. Most analysts as well as many Israeli officials concur that the cantonization and encirclement of West Bank cities, towns, and communities by the Wall, the PERMIT system, CHECKPOINTS, and other measures will encourage the silent "TRANSFER" of Palestinians out of the area. A historically central concept in the Zionist project in Palestine, transfer is still alive in government, policy, and academic circles in Israel. Demographic politics, according to Palestinian sociologist Elia Zureik, is another central theme in Zionist and Israeli thinking, arising from the desire to ensure a Jewish majority in historic Palestine.

Yet, while "demographic politics" is a staple of Zionist and Israeli thinking, "geographic politics," embodied in the drive to colonize as much land in historic Palestine as possible while keeping as many Palestinians as feasible outside the purview of the state, has in fact driven Israeli practice for several decades now, and has been intimately connected with "demographic politics." Former Israeli prime minister ARIEL SHARON was among the most vociferous proponents of the settlement drive for most of his political career. Israeli analyst Yossi Alpher has noted that one of the key consequences of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA has been that Israelis are increasingly opting for DEMOGRAPHY over geography. Instead of advocating occupying West Bank territory through de facto annexation, Sharon promoted the idea of reducing Israeli control over much of the Palestinian population to ensure that Israel remains a predominantly Jewish state and to avoid the South Africa type of fate awaiting Israel if it does not relinquish territory.

Separation and segregation were among the basic cornerstones of the apartheid regime in South Africa, and an Israeli strategy of separation cannot avoid the comparison. Ideas of autonomy and self-rule for Palestinians are consistent with this model as well. Analyst Geoffrey Aronson articulated this idea very succinctly some years ago: "Autonomy and its successors have been conceived as mechanisms for the institutionalization of Palestinian inferiority in the context of permanent Israeli rule." Today, increasing numbers of scholars and analysts are making the case for the analogy with South Africa's system of apartheid. They argue that Israel,

through its relentless policy of colonization, separation, and encirclement of Palestinian communities, is either in the process of laying the foundations of an apartheid state or has already become one. A 2009 study commissioned by the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa concluded that Israel's Occupation had become a colonial enterprise that implements a system of apartheid.

Geographer Ghazi Falah has shown that far from being a recent phenomenon, the "enclavisation of space" has been implemented as an instrument of spatial expansion and control since 1967 and is rooted in a long-standing policy of territorial expropriation—to dismember the space of the remaining Palestinian population. Indeed, as Leila Farsakh notes, the permit system, the territorial fragmentation of the occupied Palestinian territory under the Oslo Accords, and the expansion of settlements have all contributed to the creation of disconnected Palestinian population reserves that have the characteristics of BANTUSTANS rather than of cantons, one of the terms used by analysts to describe the enclaves created by the Barrier and its associated regime. More dramatically, sociologist Sari Hanafi has called the Israeli colonial project "spacio-cidal," targeting land so as to render inevitable the "voluntary" transfer of the Palestinian population primarily by targeting the space upon which they live.

Profiles of the West Bank and Gaza have stressed political homogeneity and social heterogeneity between the two regions. United by the Israeli Occupation, Palestinians in both areas have experienced much the same regime of control and surveillance and have suffered alike from the effects of colonization, theft of land and WATER resources, and political repression. Yet social, economic, demographic, and political conditions in the West Bank and Gaza are different, and if the prevailing circumstances of total separation between the two continue, the differences between them are likely to intensify. Successive Israeli governments have settled Jewish Israelis and immigrants in colonies in the West Bank since the late 1960s, and their total number in 2009 was close to 500,000. The majority live in the large settlement blocs around Jerusalem and in settlements in the central and southern West Bank. Most Palestinians in the West Bank do not come into daily contact with settlers, although Palestinian laborers employed in settlements or those who must pass in the vicinity of colonies have a long experience of conflict with the Israelis in their midst. Only one city, Hebron (al-Khalil), has Israeli colonists living in its heart, and bitter conflict with settlers has been a regular feature of life in this divided city.

West Bank Economy

The turbulent history of Palestine, particularly in the period since 1948, provides the context for understanding many features of West Bank society. Although it is true that the West Bank was spared the violent uprooting and trauma of the 1948 War and has maintained much of its social fabric, its present reality is nevertheless a product of this defining moment as well as of the subsequent transformations unleashed by the military Occupation of 1967. Conditions of instability and vulnerability induced by cycles of war, near-war, invasion, flight, migration, imprisonment, and punishment have shaped patterns of sociality, community life, and institutional arrangements as well as political organizing and resistance activities. One of the most striking features of the ECONOMY of the West Bank is its nearly total dependence on the Israeli economy. Israel fostered this relationship through a variety of processes and mechanisms, the most important of which have been the absorption of Palestinian labor in Israel and the creation of a captive market for Israeli goods in the West Bank and Gaza. Patterns of Palestinian employment in Israel have varied over the years. In the first two decades after 1967, through the period just before the outbreak of the first GULF WAR, great numbers of West Bank Palestinians (the vast majority of whom were peasants) were employed in Israel. Israeli construction, agriculture, services, and industry employed nearly half of the Palestinian labor force.

The other major mechanism of economic integration with Israel was the imposition of severe restrictions on the entry of West Bank goods into Israel and on the export of Palestinian agricultural produce to the Arab world and Europe. The combined effects of labor migration to Israel, land confiscation for Israeli colonizing activities, restrictions on the use of water, and competition from Israeli goods led to the marginalization of agriculture, which had traditionally formed the backbone of the economy in the West Bank and had been the main source of livelihood. By the 1980s, wage labor from work in Israel and within the West Bank itself became the main source of household income. Agriculture, once the main economic activity of the West Bank, by 1990

employed only 18.4 percent of the labor force in rural areas, where slightly more than half of the West Bank population lives. The marginalization of agriculture has been a gradual process, motivated primarily by the availability of wage labor in Israel in the first decades of the Occupation and exacerbated in subsequent years by land confiscation for the building of settlements and ROADS, restrictions on water use, difficulty of exporting produce, and competition from Israeli agricultural commodities. By the 1980s, wage labor from work in Israel and within the West Bank itself became the main source of household income.

Because of the predominance of wage labor and the fact that the family farm no longer constitutes the basic unit of production, Palestinians living in West Bank villages cannot be considered peasants and do not live in a peasant economy. However, agriculture still provides a part of family income in most villages. Landholdings are small to medium-sized, with commercial agriculture a viable enterprise only in the northern plains and in the JORDAN RIFT VALLEY. In the hilly regions, rainfed agriculture predominates, with olives and olive oil the main agricultural products.

After the establishment of the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) in 1994, investment by both local and expatriate Palestinians stimulated the West Bank economy somewhat, notably in real estate and construction, telecommunications, tourism, and services. However, at the same time, Israel began to limit the entry of Palestinian laborers to Israeli work sites, a policy that was tightened after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in late 2000, when a formidable network of military checkpoints, gates, trenches, and other barriers severely restricted the movement of Palestinians. Palestinian farmers have been especially hard hit, with income lost due to the inability of farmers to transport their produce in a timely manner across the many obstructions erected by the Israeli army. However, the impact of the Wall between Israel and the West Bank promises to be more durable and severe. Once it is completed, Palestinian farmers—as well as all other Palestinians—will find themselves imprisoned in discrete cantons: Nablus and JENIN in the north, Ramallah and Salfit in the center, BETHLEHEM and Hebron in the south; and JERICHO in the east. In 2009 a UNITED NATIONS agency reported that the Israeli CLOSURE system, comprising over six hundred physical barriers, remained the primary cause of poverty and the humanitarian crisis in the West Bank (and Gaza)—a system that restricted access to HEALTH CARE and EDUCATION services, employment, markets, and social and religious networks.

Many West Bank villages, particularly in the central area, have witnessed a building boom in recent decades, thanks to increased income from wage labor in Israel and remittances from family members outside the country. Modern architectural styles (multistory apartment buildings and residential villas) have spread to villages. Although traffic between villages and their urban centers continues in the West Bank, the uncertainty of travel and long periods of closure have prompted local entrepreneurs (many with shops and businesses in the nearby city) to set up grocery stores, car repair shops, and other services in villages rather than travel to the cities. Physicians, dentists, hairdressers, and other professionals and service providers have also been part of this "forced" urbanization of villages.

Major Cities and Towns

Palestine's steady trajectory toward urbanization was aborted because of the loss to Israel of the coastal cities and West Jerusalem in the 1948 War, while subsequent decades witnessed the exponential growth of the Jordanian capital, Amman (mainly through Palestinian immigration), and the gradual stagnation of Jerusalem. The major cities and towns of the West Bank are Nablus (population 126,132), Tulkarm (51,300), Qalqilya (41,739), and Jenin (39,004) in the north; East Jerusalem (225,416), Ramallah–al-Birah (65,662), and Bethlehem (25,266) in the center; and Hebron (158,918) in the south. In 1948 the major Palestinian cities were HAIFA, JAFFA, and the western part of Jerusalem.

The main cities in the West Bank (Nablus, the eastern part of Jerusalem, and Hebron) absorbed succeeding waves of refugees and immigrants since 1948; however, because of the close proximity of villages to urban centers and relatively good communication networks, rural-urban migration has not been considerable in the West Bank. Only after the establishment of the PNA did the West Bank witness significant internal migration. Most of this movement is to the once-peripheral town of Ramallah, largely because, as the de facto seat of the PNA, it has become a center for the government bureaucracy, trade, services, and Palestinian nongovernmental organizations. Recent data on population movement indicate that, of those

reporting having changed their place of residence within the West Bank and Gaza, the highest proportion have moved to the Ramallah district, followed by the Hebron and Nablus districts. The highest proportion of respondents who reported having changed their place of residence had bachelor's degrees or more. These data suggest that we may be witnessing a specific rather than general type of population movement involving mainly educated professionals, and to Ramallah more than to the other cities. This points to the emergence of pockets of economic growth and prosperity centered in the Ramallah region, but also to the rise of pockets of destitution in other areas where the less educated are trapped and unable to move out.

East Jerusalem, which during the 1970s and 1980s had become an important political and cultural center, has lost its status as the West Bank's metropolitan center. As a result of a series of administrative, legal, economic, and military measures implemented by Israel, it has been reduced to a fragmented and impoverished city. Moreover, after 1994, Jerusalem fell further behind when Ramallah became the seat of the PNA and witnessed expanded growth at the expense of Jerusalem and other Palestinian towns and cities. The final blow is the Wall. Once completed, it will not only cut off Jerusalem's Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank but also lock the residents of its Palestinian suburbs into discrete pockets without easy access to the heart of the city. The integrity of East Jerusalem as an urban center and as an urban community is thus in the balance.

Other than Jerusalem, the cities of the West Bank historically have not been sites of cosmopolitanism or modern lifestyles. Even during the early part of the twentieth century, when Palestine was being incorporated into the world economy and Jerusalem and its coastal cities were flourishing, the inland cities of Nablus, Hebron, NAZARETH, and Bethlehem were not affected by the wave of urban modernity that was sweeping the region from Beirut to Alexandria. Only a small segment of the commercial and landed elite in these cities partook of modern education for their sons and daughters. Hebron, for example, remained an insular city where skills in trade and manufacturing were acquired within the family; even today it has the lowest education levels among West Bank cities.

After 1967 the Occupation cut off the West Bank as a whole from intellectual, cultural, and political trends and movements in the growing cities of the Arab world. Despite considerable movement of people between the West Bank and the Arab world and other Palestinian DIASPORAS, West Bank cities maintained their small-town, conservative auras. Established social hierarchies were largely maintained, even in the face of the erosion of urban-rural networks of power and patronage due to the spread of wage labor and the marginalization of agriculture, and notwithstanding the growing hegemony of the youthful cadres of PLO-affiliated parties, fronts, associations, and federations. Ramallah has been the one exception. There, the depletion through migration of the ranks of the local elite has led to the formation of new hegemonic groups composed of migrants from other areas within the West Bank and high-ranking PNA officials.

West Bank Society

Although Palestinians have lost their traditional political and cultural center in Jerusalem, forces are also at work to curtail national-level life and introduce localism on a wider scale. The social and political effects of the ever-expanding network of RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT, including the Wall, are diverse. One of these has been the development of commercial and service-related enterprises in villages where regular communication with traditional market centers in nearby cities and towns has become precarious, as noted above. Other developments, whose full implications are yet to unfold, threaten the political, cultural, and social integrity of West Bank society as a whole. Already, and by the beginning of the Second Intifada, the difficulty of movement has resulted in increased fragmentation of cultural, political, and intellectual life. Palestinians' social worlds are contracting, and localisms of a kind not observed anywhere else in the Arab world are threatening to take hold of their lives: a "cosmopolitan" localism in Ramallah, as isolated from the rest of the West Bank as the localisms of insular Hebron or Jenin. Clan-based networks and relationships have lost much of their relevance in the everyday lives of most Palestinians in the West Bank. The *hamula* (clan) is no longer a central functional socioeconomic unit or a basis for action and solidarity, although it can be evoked and mobilized in times of crisis or political exigency (such as in settling disputes or in mobilizing for municipal or parliamentary election campaigns). The larger (extended) family, however, is still central to social life and survival, even though 83 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank live in nuclear family

households. Although the family is traditionally the principal mainstay of Palestinian society in times of adversity, serving as the main agency of survival, social mobility, and sociality, the proverbial role of the family as "shock absorber" is being stretched thin, especially under the difficult conditions of rampant unemployment and poverty ushered in by the Second Intifada. One indicator of the inability of the family to provide for its members is the large number of families receiving assistance. Data show that in 2005 a quarter of West Bank households were receiving social assistance, and over 60 percent indicated that they were in need of such assistance. This has policy implications for the provision of basic services and support by public agencies, because it cannot be assumed that families are always there to function as a social safety net.

In the coastal cities and Jerusalem in the early decades of the twentieth century, non-kin-based forms of association and sociality and a growing public sphere prevailed and found expression in political parties, labor unions, charitable societies, literary clubs, café life, and other associations and forums. At the same time, Palestinian society in the West Bank outside Jerusalem and the coastal cities was largely characterized by more parochial ties and forms of association. Although political parties and societies existed in Nablus, Hebron, and other West Bank cities in the early part of the twentieth century, these were largely restricted to the urban elite. It was only in the 1970s that non-kin-based associations broadened to encompass cities, villages, and refugee camps, driven by the PLO-affiliated political parties, particularly those on the left, and educational institutions, primarily the several new universities and colleges founded by Palestinian educators and funded by grants channeled through the PLO.

Youth at universities, colleges, and secondary schools were politicized within the framework of political parties, student federations, and youth organizations; and branches of women's associations, labor federations, and voluntary work committees were established in all major cities, towns, and refugee camps. Membership in these associations and organizations, coupled with the education acquired at universities, became the main vehicles for social and political mobility. Whereas national-level politics had been the prerogative of the elite until then, the 1980s witnessed the emergence of a youthful political leadership drawn from villages, refugee camps, and the urban middle and lower classes. This was the generation that led the First Intifada (1987–1991), and many of the current political leaders received their initiation into national politics in the PLO's mass organizations and during the Intifada. The experience of PRISONERS, shared by tens of thousands of activists in Israeli jails, was another important source of national-level association and organizing.

Residents of refugee camps, most of which are located in and around major urban centers, are part of the social dynamics of these communities, notwithstanding their unique identity and legal status. Because of the presence of basic services provided by UNRWA, education levels in refugee camps are higher than in most villages, and health conditions are also better, although overcrowding and unemployment rates have been consistently higher. Refugee camps are vibrant communities of people with a strong sense of identity as refugees. All major political parties, factions, and movements organize within the camps, which are also sites of sociality, community work, and organizing. Most camps, particularly the larger ones adjacent or close to urban centers, have community centers, popular committees, youth clubs, sports teams, and other forms of association. During the First and Second Intifadas, committees in camps played an active role in collecting donations, supervising the delivery of services, and organizing resistance activities.

The expansion of the public sphere in the West Bank is linked to these political and social developments and their extensions into the 1990s and beyond. In the opening decade of the twenty-first century, a vibrant and diverse public sphere exists where, despite the forces of fragmentation, there is considerable debate over issues of national importance. National and local television and radio stations, newspapers and magazines, electronic discussion groups and news services, conferences and workshops, and the growing network of NGOs constitute the multiple sites and forums for this debate. One indicator of the expansion of the public sphere is the growing interest in PUBLIC OPINION; no fewer than ten Palestinian organizations conduct regular polls on political and social issues, attracting the interest of the informed public as well as that of politicians and foreign governments. Trans-Arab satellite television is also an important actor in the Palestinian public sphere; interestingly, the two principal Arabic-language television channels, Al-Jazeera and Al-'Arabiyya, serve as prime vehicles for bringing Palestinians in the Diaspora together in debate and are often the

first to bring breaking news about the Occupied Territories to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Overall, and despite the forces of fragmentation and isolation, Palestinians have a window onto the world and a means of national-level debate and discussion. Still, this will provide only a partial remedy at best to the increasing fragmentation taking place on the ground.

See also BANTUSTANS; BARRIER; CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA; ECONOMY; FAMILY REUNIFICATION; GAZA STRIP; JERUSALEM; LAND; OCCUPATION; REFUGEES AND THE RIGHT OF RETURN; SETTLEMENTS; SETTLER VIOLENCE; WATER RESOURCES AND ACCESS

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—Lisa Taraki

West Jerusalem

See JERUSALEM

Western Wall

The Western Wall in the OLD CITY of JERUSALEM is a retaining wall that many believe dates from the time of the Second Temple, between 516 BCE and 70 CE. In Hebrew, it is Kotel Ma'aravi, or Kotel, or Wailing Wall, and in Arabic it is al-Buraq or Waqf Abu Madiyan al-Buraq. It is one of the most contentious sites in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beginning with clashes that erupted there in 1920, 1928, and 1929. The Second Temple was a reconstruction of the First (Solomon's Temple, built in the tenth century BCE and destroyed by the Babylonians in 586 BCE). It was without the Ark of the Covenant and other sacred objects, focusing instead on rituals and sacrifices known as the *korbanot*. It is the most sacred building in Judaism and the center of Jewish worship.

Around 19 BCE, Herod the Great began a massive renovation and expansion of the Second Temple complex, which was located on Mount Moriah. He destroyed the original temple and built a new one in its place. He also built the vast retaining walls that surrounded the small, quasi-natural plateau on which the First and Second Temples stood and on which the wide-open spaces of the TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF are today. The resulting structure is sometimes called Herod's Temple, but Jews consider it the Second Temple because the sacrificial rituals continued unabated throughout the Roman construction process. In 70 CE, Roman legions under Titus conquered and destroyed all of Jerusalem, including the Second Temple, and Jews fled Palestine in a second exile. The city remained under Roman and Byzantine rule and fell into ruin until it was conquered by Muslim forces in 638. The wall abutted the neighborhood of the al-Maghariba (Moroccans), and throughout the OTTOMAN EMPIRE until World War I it was part of a Muslim *waqf* property named after one Abu Madiyan (Sidi Abu Madiyan [1126–1198], who was a Sufi teacher, scholar, writer, and poet, the single most important founder of Sufism in the Maghreb and Andalusia, and known as "the teacher of teachers").

The wall that remains in Jerusalem today is the only remnant of the Second Temple. As such, it was the Western Wall toward which Jews historically focused their prayers. For 2,000 years Jews have prayed at the wall, believing that that spot has greater holiness than any other accessible place on earth and that God is nearby listening to their prayers. The tradition of placing prayers or requests written on a small piece of paper into a crack in the wall goes back hundreds of years.

The Western Wall is also holy to Muslims, who believe that Moses, Abraham, Solomon, and their successors are prophets to be venerated. Additionally, Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad made a spiritual journey to Jerusalem on a winged horse, al-Buraq, in 620 CE. While there, he tethered the horse to a wall, which Muslims believe to be the Western Wall. Hence, the Arabic name for the wall is the al-Buraq Wall. Moreover, a passage in the Quran refers to the "furtherest Mosque," which Muslims interpret as Mount Moriah and which led to the construction there, by the second caliph, of the AL-AQSA MOSQUE. Later, Muslims built the DOME OF THE ROCK over the place where Muhammad began his "night journey." Both the dome and the mosque plus the numerous other shrines that sit on the al-Haram ash-Sharif/Temple Mount are considered the third holiest site in Islam.

In 1517 the Islamic Ottoman Empire under Selim I took the land of Palestine from the Egyptian MAMLUKS (1250–1517). The Ottomans had a benevolent attitude toward the Jews, having welcomed thousands of Jewish refugees recently expelled from Spain. The Turkish sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent, was so impressed with the Old City of Jerusalem that he ordered the construction of a magnificent fortress-wall surrounding the entire city, which still stands.

Throughout the Ottoman period, until World War I, the Western Wall remained a Muslim *waqf* (religious trust), and during those years Jews had to obtain permission from the Muslim authorities to visit the site, although they were not allowed to treat it as a place of pilgrimage and regular worship. In 1840 Ibrahim Pasha of EGYPT, briefly in control of Palestine, issued a *firman* (edict) forbidding the Jews to pave the passage in front of the wall. It also cautioned them against "raising their voices and displaying their books there." They were, however, allowed "to pay visits to it as of old." The edict was reissued by the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1889 and this became known as the "status quo."

Immediately after the British conquest of Jerusalem in 1919, Zionist leader CHAIM WEIZMANN proposed to the British military governor of Jerusalem, Ronald Storrs, that the Zionists be allowed to purchase the wall. He offered between £75,000 and £100,000 (approximately £5 million, or about $7 million, in modern terms) and also offered to purchase the area at the foot of the wall and rehouse the occupants, the al-Maghariba community that had lived in the area ever since coming to Jerusalem as pilgrims beginning in 1209. (The quarter was established in 1193 by SALADIN's son, al-Malik al-Afdal, according to the fourteenth-century historian Mujir ud-Din, as a *waqf* dedicated to Moroccans). Storrs was enthusiastic about the idea but negotiations broke down after strong Muslim opposition.

Under the BRITISH MANDATE, the authorities eased conditions for the Jewish worshipers, while agreeing with both sides to preserve the "status quo" with regard to all the HOLY SITES in Jerusalem. After World War I, however, the Jewish community was the largest in Jerusalem, and the British Mandate government, which tended to be pro-Zionist, enabled the Zionists to increase their presence at the site by small increments. Muslim anger about these changes led to several bloody conflicts.

While Kamil al-Husayni was mufti (1908–1921), the Muslim authorities reacted mildly to Jewish breaches of the status quo at the wall, but once the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL (1922) was launched and Jewish confidence grew, clashes at the site intensified. AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI (mufti from 1921 to 1948) kept calling the government's attention to the fact that the Jews were bringing more objects and religious appurtenances, including chairs and benches, into the area in front of the wall. The Palestinians connected this behavior to statements made by Jewish and Zionist figures about the need to build a Third Temple. The council presented the government with retouched photographs that the Zionist community was sending to potential donors overseas, showing the Jewish Third Temple standing on the al-Haram ash-Sharif. Throughout the 1920s, the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE and the Supreme Muslim Council sent delegates and appeals to all parts of the Muslim world, asking for assistance against the threat of a Jewish takeover of the al-Haram ash-Sharif.

In 1922, the Mandatory authority in Palestine, referencing the Ottoman status quo, forbade the placing of benches near the wall, although they soon backed down in the face of Jewish protest. In place of the status quo, a relatively flexible modus vivendi emerged, and screens to segregate men and women were put up from time to time when large numbers of people gathered to pray. In 1925 there was a flare-up over access to the Western Wall, following which the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL demanded that the British government compel the Muslim religious authorities to sell the wall. The following year the Jewish Agency proposed purchasing 50 meters (about 150 feet) of the al-Haram ash-Sharif, including the wall, and began to negotiate with the government, but the deal fell through.

On 28 September 1928, the Jewish Day of Atonement, British police forcefully removed a screen used to separate men and women at prayer. Women who tried to prevent the screen from being dismantled were beaten by the police, who used pieces of the broken wooden frame as clubs. Chairs were then pulled out from under elderly worshipers. District commissioner of Jerusalem Edward Kitrutch described the screen as violating the Ottoman status quo that forbade Jews from making any changes in the Western Wall area. At the end of 1928, Weizmann wanted to offer 61,000 Palestinian pounds ($305,000) for the property but

accepted the advice of the HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR PALESTINE, John Chancellor, to wait for a more opportune moment. In 1929, Jewish extremists instigated riots at the wall (WESTERN WALL DISTURBANCES), which spread beyond Jerusalem, killing many Jews and Palestinians. In 1931 the British government issued a document affirming Muslim property rights to the wall and placing strictures on Jewish observance.

Muslims also sought to legitimize and solidify their control of the holy sites. One of the most effective ways for the mufti of Jerusalem, al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, to enhance local and regional interest in Jerusalem was by restoring the shrines on the al-Haram ash-Sharif. They had already been in need of such work in late Ottoman times, but now the main impetus for the enterprise was political. In 1923–1924 al-Husayni managed to raise substantial contributions from all over the Muslim world and started the renovation, which culminated in the gold plating of the Dome of the Rock.

During the 1948 WAR, Israel and JORDAN divided Jerusalem, contravening UN RESOLUTION 181, and the area near the wall fell under Jordanian control. Though the two countries signed an armistice, Jordan denied Jews access to the wall, in violation of the agreement. During the 1967 WAR Israel brought the wall under complete Jewish control and demolished the Palestinian al-Maghariba neighborhood. In its place, they built a large plaza in front of the wall, where on Jewish holidays thousands of Jews gather, and which has become a favorite year-round tourist attraction. Many foreign heads of state who visit Israel come to the wall to demonstrate respect for its significance to Israel and to Jews worldwide.

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Western Wall Disturbances, 1929

As tensions rose in the 1920s between Jews and Arabs over the expanding Zionist project that increased Jewish IMMIGRATION and LAND purchases in Palestine, Jerusalem's WESTERN WALL took on political and nationalist significance for both sides. In 1929 a dispute between Jews and Arabs over access to the wall spread to other parts of Palestine and resulted in the deaths of 133 Jews and 116 Arabs and in the wounding of 339 Jews and 232 Arabs.

The Western Wall, sometimes referred to as the Wailing Wall, is the remaining supporting wall of the Second Temple that was built by Herod and destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE, and is the holiest site in Judaism. In Arabic, the wall is known as al-Buraq, named for the Prophet Muhammad's horse. According to Islamic tradition, Muhammad tethered his horse at the wall prior to his night journey to heaven, and the wall is sacred to Muslims. During OTTOMAN EMPIRE rule (1517–1918), Jews were allowed a customary right of access, including the right to pray at the wall, and on the high holidays they were sometimes allowed to blow the *shofar* (ram's horn) and to set up temporary benches and an ark for the Torah scrolls; however, they could not bring the full accoutrements for a religious service. The Western Wall and the adjoining entire TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF were always considered the property of the Islamic *waqf*. BRITISH MANDATE authorities attempted to continue this "status quo" after assuming control of Palestine under the League of Nations mandate, but, as part of their growing political power and militancy, Jews sought to expand their right of access to the wall.

Jewish philanthropists and the Zionist movement itself made several attempts to purchase the wall, known in Hebrew as Kotel Ma'aravi. In September 1928, conflict over the Western Wall began when the status quo was challenged during the Jewish high holidays, and the Jews attempted to secure additional rights while Muslim leaders sought to emphasize the *waqf*'s ownership of al-Buraq. On 23 September 1928, on the eve of Yom Kippur (the Jewish Day of Atonement), Jews placed

a screen at the wall to separate male and female worshipers. Muslim leaders protested this action, seeing it as a first step by Jews and the Zionist movement to claim permanent possession of the wall. AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, who as the British-appointed mufti of JERUSALEM was the highest-ranking Muslim official in Palestine, led the call for action by the Mandatory authorities. The next morning, on Yom Kippur, British police went to the wall, destroyed the screen, and in the ensuing melee roughed up some Jewish worshipers.

Shortly after this incident, VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY, leader of the militant Zionist Revisionist Party and the BETAR youth movement, arrived in Palestine to establish permanent residence. Jabotinsky and his followers sought to push Jewish claims to all of Palestine and to challenge the status quo concerning the Western Wall.

Tensions increased on several occasions in 1929 as Muslim worshipers leaving Friday noon prayers at the AL-AQSA MOSQUE threw stones at Jews praying at the wall below. Tensions rose further as the Jewish high holidays approached, and all parties expected trouble. On 14 August 1929, which was the Ninth of Av (a Jewish holy day commemorating the destruction of the First and Second Temples), approximately 6,000 Jews, including many Revisionists and Betarim, gathered at the wall. In addition to traditional prayers, they sang the Zionist anthem "Hatikva," waved Zionist flags, and shouted "The wall is ours." An Arab counter-rally, organized by the SUPREME MUSLIM COUNCIL, was held following the noon prayers on 16 August, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad. The protest turned violent: Arabs attacked Jews praying at the wall, desecrated Torah scrolls, and burned the prayers placed by Jewish worshipers in the wall's crevices. The following day, Arabs attacked and killed a Jewish youth who was playing soccer. On 21 August thousands of Jews attended the boy's funeral, which turned into a Zionist protest rally. Militant Zionists clashed with British police, and approximately twenty-five Jews were injured.

The volatile situation erupted into major rioting on 23 August. Palestinians from throughout the Jerusalem area came to the al-Haram ash-Sharif to pray and to protest, many armed with knives and clubs. In the late morning, Jews in Jerusalem's OLD CITY were attacked, and, around noon, Jews killed two Arabs in Mea She'rim, a Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem. In this tense atmosphere, small local incidents of violence on both sides sparked waves of larger and more deadly attacks against Jews in Jerusalem, HEBRON, SAFED, and elsewhere, which continued off and on for about one week. The greatest violence occurred in Hebron, a city holy to both Jews and Muslims as the burial place of the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In 1929 about 20,000 Arabs and fewer than 1,000 Jews, who were ultra-Orthodox and non-Zionist, lived in Hebron. The Jews of Hebron had lived largely in peace among Hebron's Arabs for nearly eight centuries, until the early 1920s, when Palestine's intercommunal tensions reached the city. With false rumors spreading that the Jews were killing Arabs and that they were going to seize the al-Aqsa Mosque, armed Arabs (many from outlying areas) attacked Hebron's Jews. Law enforcement was scarce. The British Mandatory government had fewer than 300 policemen in all of Palestine, and the Hebron police force consisted of only a few poorly armed officers who were easily overwhelmed by the violence.

On 23 and 24 August, Jewish Hebronites were attacked in their synagogues and homes in acts of extreme barbarism that included beatings, stabbings, beheadings, and rapes. Houses, shops, and synagogues were burned and looted. Sixty-seven Jews were killed in the massacre, including approximately a dozen women, seven yeshiva students from North America, and three children under the age of five. Scores of Jews were wounded, and nine Arabs were killed by the police or by Jews. As the frenzy of violence gripped the town, Arab Hebronites from twenty-eight households hid a total of 435 Jews in their homes, sometimes placing their own lives at risk in doing so. After the violence subsided, the British authorities evacuated the remaining Jews from Hebron.

On Thursday, 29 August, in one of the last incidents of the weeklong rioting, Arabs from villages surrounding Safed attacked Safed's largely SEPHARDIC Jewish community, killing and mutilating residents, including children in an orphanage. Eighteen Safed Jews were killed, forty were wounded, and scores of buildings were burned or looted. In the riots of 1929, Arabs killed most of the Jews, while the police or British soldiers killed most of the Arabs. Jews killed a few Arabs, including some women and children, and desecrated at least one mosque. Following the riots, the Mandatory government put on trial approximately 790 Arabs and 160 Jews. Twenty-five Arabs and two Jews were sentenced to death. Most of the

death sentences were commuted, but three Arabs were executed. In accordance with the Collective Punishments Ordinance, the British authorities fined two dozen Arab towns and villages whose inhabitants they deemed guilty of participating in attacks against Jews. But the local British authorities held Jabotinsky and the Revisionists largely responsible for provoking the riots. When the Revisionist leader left Palestine for a trip to Europe shortly after the riots, the British permanently barred him from returning. Jabotinsky would never again set foot in Palestine.

In late 1929 a special commission led by Sir Walter Shaw was sent to Palestine to investigate the causes of the violence. The SHAW COMMISSION'S report, issued in March 1930, declared, "The outbreak in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier murders by Jews has been established." However, the report concluded that the "fundamental cause" of the violence was "the Arab feeling of animosity and hostility towards the Jews," which was based on the Arabs' fear "that by Jewish immigration and land purchases they may be deprived of their livelihood and in time pass under the political domination of the Jews." The Shaw Commission recommended a reduction in both Jewish immigration to Palestine and land sales to Jews. These recommendations were included in the subsequent HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION report and the PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER of 1930.

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—Pierre M. Atlas

White Paper, 1922

See CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM

White Paper, 1939

See MACDONALD WHITE PAPER

White Paper/Passfield, 1930

See HOPE-SIMPSON COMMISSION; PASSFIELD WHITE PAPER; SHAW COMMISSION

Wilson, Woodrow (1856–1924)

Woodrow Wilson was the twenty-eighth president of the UNITED STATES, serving from 1913 to 1921. Born in Staunton, Virginia, his father was a Presbyterian minister, and Wilson grew up within a white southern and religious environment immediately following the Civil War. As a function of this upbringing, he was imbued with a religious conception of Palestine as the "Holy Land" of the Bible as well as a deep-seated racial bias against people of color, whom he considered as less capable and cultured than white people of European extraction. This worldview influenced his attitude toward the people of Palestine and their rights as compared with the claims of Zionists and made it easy for Zionist friends of Wilson, such as Supreme Court justice LOUIS BRANDEIS and Reform rabbi Stephen S. Wise, to turn the president's sympathies into meaningful political support for the founding of a Jewish homeland. Indeed, Wilson was flattered at the prospect of playing a role in re-creating a Jewish Palestine. As he told Wise in 1916, "To think that I, a son of the

manse, should be able to help restore the Holy Land to its people."

That help was most significantly realized in Wilson's 1917 endorsement of the BALFOUR DECLARATION, in which the British government promised a "national home" to the Jews in Palestine after World War I and thereby sealed an alliance between Great Britain and the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION. The British made this alliance in the hope of securing the help of world Jewry to, among other ends, encourage the United States to enter the war on the side of Great Britain. Thus, in the minds of the British leaders, the concept of a Jewish national home and an alliance with the United States were tied together. When Wilson endorsed Balfour in the form of a nonpublic diplomatic statement of approval, in essence he linked the United States not only to the Zionist cause but also to a British war aim.

It was ironic, then, that from this point on the Zionists grew increasingly frustrated with Wilson. However well disposed the president was toward the Zionists, they were not the only ones with a strong interest in the Middle East to have Wilson's ear. Just as Wilson's Christian religiosity inclined him to the Zionist cause, it also led him to be a long-standing supporter of the American Protestant missionary effort that had brought hundreds of missionaries and millions of dollars of investment into the OTTOMAN EMPIRE. It was Wilson's opinion that "it would be a real misfortune . . . if the missionary program for the world should be interrupted" by World War I. With the US entrance into World War I imminent, the Ottoman Empire could well become a mortal enemy of the United States and then would certainly intern US missionaries and confiscate their property. In part it was to keep this from happening that Wilson convinced the US Senate to declare war on GERMANY and Austria-Hungary but not on the Ottoman Turks, and decided to avoid any public endorsement of the Zionist claims to Palestine. The American Zionists seemed not to understand the subtleties of the president's position and spent the rest of the war years complaining about his silence and badgering him for public statements of support. All they could get from him was a public statement, in August 1918, praising the Zionists' "reconstructive work" in Palestine.

As the war approached its end, political alliances and national interests became more complicated for Wilson. On 8 January 1918 Wilson addressed Congress and outlined his famous fourteen points constituting US war aims. Among them was a promise to support the right of self-determination for the peoples of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman Empires. By 11 November 1918 the war was over, and soon the issue arose of what to do with the collapsed enemy empires. Under Wilson's leadership, the United States might have fought for the self-determination of the conquered peoples, but its British and French allies not only wanted to preserve their own empires but also had every intention of enlarging them by taking over the non-European imperial territories of the vanquished.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, in the face of British and French demands, Wilson struck a compromise known as the Mandate system. Under this scheme, the European peoples of the German and Austrian Empires were accorded self-determination. However, the non-European peoples were deemed to be at an inferior state of political development and in need of "tutelage" by the European victors. Thus, Wilson agreed that the British and the French could expand their empires into the Middle East and elsewhere under the guise of tutoring the locals in the techniques of good government. To keep up this pretense, their new colonies were called Mandates. Later, the League of Nations (which itself was a creation of the peace conference) put its stamp of approval on the Mandate system.

Wilson went along with this because he had inherently racist opinions about nonwhites and non-Europeans. Palestine became a case in point. The British took for themselves the Mandate for Palestine and soon began importing large numbers of European Jews into the territory in fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration. Already the Zionists were describing the Jews as an oppressed people who deserved self-determination, and, as Wilson saw Jews as Europeans, he had no problem with the Jewish IMMIGRATION. On the other hand, Wilson's secretary of state, Robert Lansing, and his legal adviser, David Hunter Miller, argued that "the rule of self-determination would prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine."

Things became more complicated when a leading American missionary by the name of Howard Bliss (who was president of the Syrian Protestant College, later the American University of Beirut) showed up at the peace conference as part of an Arab delegation. He forcefully argued that the wishes of the people of greater SYRIA

(including Palestine) must be determined if the notion of self-determination was to mean anything. It was belatedly starting to dawn on the missionaries that Zionist dominance in Palestine would not be good for their own ambitions in that land. By forcing the issue with Wilson at Paris, Bliss embarrassed the president into creating the KING-CRANE COMMISSION, which was an effort to find out what the leading citizens of greater Syria wanted for their political future. What the US team of investigators discovered, and related in a subsequently suppressed report submitted to the US government in August 1919, was that the Arabs of the region wanted independence and were unanimously opposed to Zionist ambitions in Palestine.

Although Wilson suffered a stroke in October that turned him into an invalid incapable of further influencing world events, there is no reason to believe that he would have acted on the commission's findings, particularly as they applied to Palestine. Wilson essentially agreed with Arthur Balfour's judgment that "ZIONISM, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land." It is this shared conviction that had led him to tell Wise, as late as March 1919, "Don't worry Dr. Wise, Palestine is yours." For Wilson, as for Balfour, Palestine was a non-negotiable issue. Wilson, who died in 1924, is still remembered by Zionists as the US president whose support was second only to that of HARRY TRUMAN in helping to establish the state of Israel.

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—Lawrence Davidson

Withdrawal from Gaza

See ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA

Women in Black

Women in Black is an international peace network that was started in Israel in 1988 by women protesting against Israel's OCCUPATION of the WEST BANK and GAZA. Wearing black as a symbol of sorrow, they stand in silent vigil, often in JERUSALEM and Tel Aviv, to protest war, rape as a tool of war, ethnic cleansing, and human rights abuses. It is a silent protest because they believe "mere words cannot express the tragedy that wars and hatred bring." Women in Black "refuse to add to the cacophony of empty statements that are spoken with the best intentions yet may be erased or go unheard under the sound of a passing ambulance or a bomb exploding nearby."

Their silence is visible. They invite women to stand with them, reflect about themselves and women who have been raped, tortured, or killed; who have disappeared; whose loved ones have disappeared or have been killed; and whose homes have been demolished. They wear black as a symbol of sorrow for all victims of war, for the destruction of people, nature, and the fabric of life.

In June 2001 an event in Jerusalem drew both Palestinian and Israeli women for peace in a mass vigil. Since they first organized in 1988, every Friday at noon the Women in Black hold a vigil at Hagar Square in Jerusalem. It originated with only a few Jewish Israeli women but now includes both Jewish and Palestinian Israelis, internationals, and Palestinians from the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES when it is possible for them to enter Jerusalem. (www.womeninblack.net).

See also COALITION OF WOMEN FOR PEACE, NEW PROFILE; REFUSER SOLIDARITY NETWORK

Women in Green

Women in Green (Women for Israel's Tomorrow) is a pro-SETTLEMENT movement that emerged in 1993 in Israel to oppose the OSLO ACCORDS and advocates for the retention of all the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES under Israeli sovereignty. It has chapters throughout Israel and abroad, including Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Toronto.

Women in Green hold weekly street theater and public demonstrations, write articles, commission


posters, advertise in newspapers, and lecture to groups. In particular, these women, who are dedicated to the ideology and practice of the GREATER LAND OF ISRAEL MOVEMENT, are active in fighting for a united JERUSALEM and in supporting the Jewish community in HEBRON. They opposed ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA in 2005.

Woodhead Commission, 1938

In 1938 the British established the Woodhead Commission (Palestine Partition Commission) to examine the details of the PEEL COMMISSION plan and make recommendations for its implementation. In 1937 the Peel Commission had recommended the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, with the Palestinian area absorbed by Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) and a population TRANSFER. In spite of the rejection by both Jews and Arabs of the Peel partition plan, the British government sent the Woodhead Commission, composed of four members, to Palestine to determine the possibility of partition and to recommend boundaries that would permit the establishment of self-supporting Jewish and Arab states. The boundaries were to include areas with as few Jews as possible in the Arab state and areas with as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish state.

British officials were concerned about the "absorptive capacity" of Palestine; that is, the amount of Jewish IMMIGRATION that Palestine's limited resources could accommodate. In particular, they worried about the lack of WATER, without which even the most fertile LAND was useless. Partly in response to conflicting reports regarding the limits of this "absorptive capacity," the Woodhead Commission conducted a hydrological study that contributed to its conclusion that the partition of Palestine was not economically viable. Instead, the commission recommended an economic federation between the two political entities.

The Woodhead Commission's recommendation against partition, as well as the MACDONALD WHITE PAPER OF 1939, which limited Jewish immigration to 75,000, motivated Zionist attempts to justify massive immigration and to provide proof of the high absorptive capacity of a land they depicted as virtually uninhabited. The most prominent individual in this effort was W. C. Lowdermilk, whose 1939 essay, "Land of Promise,"



Map 49. Woodhead Partition Plan C, 1938

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(based on Palestine Partition Report, Woodhead Report, 1938, London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office), reprinted with permission.

commissioned by the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL and later published in book form, was highly influential. Lowdermilk emphasized the abundance of land and water in Palestine, which he maintained was being used by a mere 300,000 Arab inhabitants who through centuries of neglect had destroyed the region's land and water capital. The figure obviously was false, for an estimated 750,000 to 880,000 Palestinian Arabs became REFUGEES during the 1948 WAR alone. Moreover, the last census taken by the British, in 1931, determined that there were 858,708 Palestinian Arabs.

While concluding the impracticability of partition, the Woodhead Commission did submit three boundary plans. However, both Jews and Arabs rejected completely the idea of partition. In a policy statement in November 1938, the United Kingdom accepted the conclusion of the Woodhead Commission that, politically, administratively, and financially, partition would be impossible.

With the publication of the Woodhead report, the British government also announced its intention to hold a general conference in London to include both Zionist and Palestinian leaders as well as representatives of the neighboring Arab countries. However, the British vetoed the participation of the paramount Palestinian leader, AL-HAJJ AMIN AL-HUSAYNI, chairman of the still-outlawed ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE. The LONDON/ST. JAMES CONFERENCE lasted from 7 February to 27 March 1939 without reaching a settlement satisfactory to the Zionists or the Palestinians.

See also BRITISH MANDATE

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World Union of Zionist Revisionists

The World Union of Zionist Revisionists (WUZR) was established in 1925 by VLADIMIR (ZE'EV) JABOTINSKY as an alternative to the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION (WZO) led by CHAIM WEIZMANN. The WUZR institutionalized the ideas of Jabotinsky, who is considered the father of Revisionist ZIONISM, and its ideological tenets became enormously influential within the general Zionist movement. Even moderate political Zionists, led by DAVID BEN-GURION, eventually adopted the principles and practices of the Revisionists, though without giving them credit. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Jewish community in Palestine was divided over the best political approach to achieving independence. The World Zionist Organization supported cooperation with the British and advocated violence only in self-defense. In contrast, the WUZR would accept nothing short of full independence, including all of Transjordan (JORDAN after 1950) as well as Palestine, and advocated aggressive retaliation against the Palestinians for attacks and offensive operations against the BRITISH MANDATE government.

The fundamental ideology of the WUZR involved a major revision of the relationship between the Zionist movement and Great Britain. It actively challenged British policy and openly demanded immediate Jewish statehood. The root cause of the WUZR's dispute with the official Zionist leadership was its conception of the Jewish state. Two principles formed the core of the Revisionist Zionist ideology and its political program. The first was disagreement with the territorial extent of Eretz Yisrael: the Revisionists considered the land of Israel indivisible over both banks of the Jordan River within the original borders of the Palestine Mandate. The WZO thought it impolitic to demand Transjordan as well as Palestine for Israel; the WUZR considered it essential. The second was the WZO's objection to the immediate declaration of the Jewish right to political sovereignty over the whole of this area. The WZO believed the Zionist movement was not yet ready to undertake sovereignty; the WUZR wanted a state directly. Additionally, a pillar of revisionism was the concept of the "iron wall," the belief that the use of Jewish force—invincible force, the iron wall—would be necessary not only to establish a national home in Palestine, but also to sustain it by subjugating the local population. By the 1940s,

Labor Zionism adopted this principle as well. A militant parallel group to the WUZR was BETAR.

See also VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY; ZIONISM

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World Zionist Congresses

From 1897 to 1921, twelve Zionist congresses met periodically to discuss the concerns of Zionists from around the world under the auspices of the Zionist Organization (WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION after 1960). The first Zionist congress was convened by THEODOR HERZL in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, as a symbolic parliament for those in sympathy with the implementation of the Zionist goal: establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. A Viennese journalist who is considered the father of modern political ZIONISM, Herzl had planned to hold the gathering in Munich, GERMANY, but because of local Jewish opposition, he transferred the gathering to Basel. Prior to the events of World War II, the vast majority of European Jews were not in favor of Zionism because they were broadly integrated into the national life of the countries wherein they resided. The same was not true for Jews in Russia and Poland, and many of the early Zionists came from those two countries. Although the exact number of participants at the first Zionist congress is disputed, the approximate figure is 200 delegates from seventeen countries, 69 of whom were from various Zionist organizations and the remainder individuals. In attendance also were ten non-Jews, who were expected to abstain from voting, and seventeen women, some of them in their own capacity and others who accompanied representatives; the women were allowed to participate but did not have voting rights.

The main items on the agenda were the presentation of Herzl's plans, the establishment of a Zionist organization, and the declaration of Zionism's goals—the BASEL PROGRAM, which expressed the following objective: "Zionism seeks for the Jewish people a publicly recognized legally secured homeland in *Eretz Israel* secured under public law." The program contemplated the importance of Jewish IMMIGRATION, LAND acquisition and reclamation, and the need to raise funds. Basel's goals would be attained by the following means:

- Promotion of the settlement in Eretz Yisrael (the biblical land of Israel) of Jewish farmers, artisans, and manufacturers
- Organization and uniting of the whole of world Jewry by means of appropriate local and international institutions, in accordance with the laws of each country
- Strengthening and fostering Jewish national sentiment and national consciousness
- Preparatory steps toward obtaining the consent of governments, where necessary, in order to reach the goals of Zionism

These goals gave clear expression to Herzl's political Zionism, in contrast to the more loosely organized and more practical settlement activities of the HOVEVEI ZION network of Jewish community circles in Russia, Poland, and Romania.

At the first congress, Herzl was elected president of the Zionist Organization (ZO), later renamed the World Zionist Organization (1960), and MAX NORDAU was elected one of three vice presidents. Thereafter, the Zionist congress met every year until 1901, then every second year until 1939, and approximately every four years after World War II.

Second Congress—Basel, 1898

Herzl called on the second congress to "conquer the communities" in the face of more active opposition to Zionism from among various Jewish leaders. In essence, this was a demand that the Zionist movement focus its attention not only on political activity for Palestine but also on work within European and American Jewish communities. At this congress, the foundations were laid for the establishment of the JEWISH COLONIAL TRUST, a financial body aimed at the development of Pales-

tine. It was also at this congress that a group of socialists first appeared, demanding representation within the Zionist leadership, which until that time had been all capitalist.

Third Congress—Basel, 1899

Herzl opened the third congress with a report on his meetings with Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II in Constantinople and JERUSALEM. Despite the fact that this meeting produced no practical results, that it took place at all was of considerable symbolic value and maintained the viability of the movement. The congress spent a good deal of its time discussing the political dimensions of Zionism, although opposition to this orientation was voiced by those who thought that the more practical efforts of Hovevei Zion settlers should be encouraged. In a debate on the Jewish Colonial Trust, the congress decided that its funds could only be spent in Palestine or SYRIA. Whereas delegates were increasingly concerned with what was called the question of culture—the Zionist attempt at a national/ethnic identity for the Jews—Herzl was preoccupied with the political matters at hand, that is, seeking great power backing and a charter for the movement. Some historians argue that Herzl was not so much disinterested in these cultural matters as he was frightened of their potential to split the infant movement.

Fourth Congress—London, 1900

Held in London primarily to mobilize public opinion for the Zionist idea in that country, the congress met in an atmosphere of growing concern over the situation facing Jews in Romania, where many thousands had been forced to leave and the remainder were subject to persecution. Although this appeared to provide further evidence of the need for a "charter" from some reigning sovereign, Herzl had nothing substantial to offer that might bring succor to these Jews. On the cultural question, the religious Zionists, led by Rabbi Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines, demanded that the Zionist movement restrict itself solely to political matters, viewing Zionism as a profane and illegitimate platform for the pursuit of the coming of the Messiah. The congress also discussed the lack of opportunity for Jewish workers in Palestine and the question of a national Jewish sports movement.

Fifth Congress—Basel, 1901

Herzl reported to the congress about his meeting with Sultan Abdul Hamid II of TURKEY, from whom he had been pursuing a charter for Zionism, and of the progress of the Jewish Colonial Trust. These achievements did not satisfy all the delegates, in particular those associated with the recently formed Democratic Faction. That group, led by Leo Motzkin, MARTIN BUBER, and CHAIM WEIZMANN, called on the Zionist movement to adopt a program of Hebrew culture and a greater degree of democracy within the organization. The more concrete achievement of the congress was the establishment of the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, which was to raise funds for land purchase in Palestine.

Sixth Congress—Basel, 1903

A resolution was adopted determining that the next congresses would take place every alternate year rather than annually. In his opening speech, Herzl detailed the efforts to secure a charter on behalf of the movement, but these attempts were increasingly desperate as the situation of the Jews, particularly following the anti-Jewish Kishinev pogrom, deteriorated. This gave rise to various temporary solutions, such as the El Arish project (Jewish colonization of the Sinai), which was negotiated with the British statesmen Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Landsdowne. After the collapse of this scheme, the British offered Herzl the possibility of an autonomous Jewish settlement in East Africa (commonly known as the Uganda project). Herzl called on the congress to give serious consideration to the plan even though he believed that it could not replace Palestine as the Jewish homeland. In the debate that followed, Nordau, Herzl's major confidant, argued that Uganda would be a night refuge, an expedient if not preferred solution. Despite considerable opposition and a walkout by the Russian Zionists, the delegates agreed, 295 to 178 (with 98 abstentions), that a committee should be dispatched to examine the possibility of Jewish settlement in East Africa. Also discussed at the congress was a report on the possibility of cooperative settlements in Palestine, which influenced the creation of various settlements a few years later. This was Herzl's last congress, as he died a year later.

Seventh Congress—Basel, 1905

After the congress opened with a eulogy to Herzl by Nordau, debate resumed on the question of Jewish settlement outside Palestine. The commission that had been sent to East Africa had concluded that Uganda was unsuitable for mass Jewish settlement,

and the congress proceeded to vote against a national home anywhere except in Palestine and its immediate vicinity. The territorialists, who were willing to accept a broader range of locations for a homeland and who were led by ISRAEL ZANGWILL, left the congress in protest and established the Jewish Territorial Organization. The congress also discussed practical work in Palestine—giving support to agricultural settlements and industrial activity. Although Nordau seemed the natural choice to succeed Herzl as ZO president, he refused, and instead David Wolffsohn assumed this position. The organization's executive moved its offices from Vienna, Austria, to Cologne, Germany.

Eighth Congress—The Hague, Netherlands, 1907

The decision to hold the congress in The Hague was based on the knowledge that the Second International Peace Conference was to be held in that city. At the congress, the major debate concerned the conflicting approaches of the practical and political Zionists. The political Zionists demanded that a charter be secured before practical work began in Palestine, while the practical Zionists argued that without substantial settlement there was little hope of gaining legal sanction from one or more of the world powers. Although the practical faction supported a number of pragmatic efforts and established a Palestine branch of the ZO, to be headed by ARTHUR RUPPIN, several delegates, including Weizmann, called for the adoption of synthetic Zionism—a synthesis of the two positions.

Ninth Congress—Hamburg, Germany, 1909

Wolffsohn and Nordau expressed the hope that, following the Young Turk Revolution against Ottoman rule, Zionist endeavors might enjoy a change in fortune with the change of that government. In the meantime, the congress was once again divided over the question of how to implement the Zionist program. The practical lobby accused Wolffsohn of focusing on political activity and his executive of judging projects by their commercial value. This rival leadership included Menahem Ussishkin, Weizmann, and NAHUM SOKOLOW, who gained support from the representatives of the workers' movement in Palestine.

Tenth Congress—Basel, 1911

Often described as the Peace Congress, the tenth congress finally laid to rest the debate between the practical and political Zionists, with synthetic Zionism becoming the operational mode of the movement. Under this solution, considerable attention was given to the question of practical work in Palestine as well as to the suffusion of Hebrew culture. The question of Zionist relations with the Arabs was raised, and, for the first time, a session of the congress was held in Hebrew. Wolffsohn was succeeded as president by Otto Warburg, a German Jew and distinguished scientist who was identified with the practical Zionist camp. The ZO moved its headquarters from Cologne to Berlin.

Eleventh Congress—Vienna, 1913

The congress spent much of its time discussing settlement activities in Palestine and the work of the organization's office in JAFFA. Nordau, who had objected to the establishment of a center in Palestine as a deviation from Herzl's approach, was conspicuous by his absence. Weizmann and Ussishkin won the support of the congress for the establishment of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, although twelve years were to pass before the facility opened.

Twelfth Congress—Carlsbad (Karlovy Vary), Czech Republic, 1921

This was the first congress to be held after World War I, during which time the Zionist movement had won British support for its endeavors to create a Jewish national home in Palestine (BALFOUR DECLARATION, 1917). The congress welcomed the decision of the principal allied powers to grant the Mandate for Palestine to Britain and encouraged the ratification of the BRITISH MANDATE by the League of Nations. With the end of the war, the defeat of Germany, and the success of the London branch of the Zionist movement, it was clear that the leadership there would be rewarded. Weizmann became president of the ZO and Sokolow president of the executive. The congress discussed the activities and organization of Keren HaYesod (United Israel Appeal, literally "The Foundation Fund"), which had been established a year earlier for the purpose of raising funds for the upbuilding of Palestine from among the Jewish communities of the DIASPORA. A further issue discussed at the congress was the question of Zionism's relations with the Arabs, which had become serious because of Arab demonstrations in Jerusalem (1920) and in Jaffa (1921). The congress passed a resolution

declaring that Zionism seeks "to live in relations of harmony and mutual respect with the Arab people" and called on the executive to achieve a "sincere understanding with the Arab people." The twelfth congress reflected the growing trend of party and territorial divisions within the Zionist movement. The executive now met in London and Jerusalem.

See also OTTOMAN EMPIRE; ZIONISM

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World Zionist Organization

The Zionist Organization was founded by THEODOR HERZL at the first ZIONIST CONGRESS in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897; it was renamed the World Zionist Organization in 1960. As set forth in the BASEL PROGRAM, it proclaimed that ZIONISM seeks to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine, secured under public law. Membership in the Zionist Organization was given to anyone who accepted the Basel Program and paid Zionist *shekels* (dues). The third congress in 1899 passed the Zionist Organization's first constitution, although it was amended over the years.

The Zionist Organization served as an umbrella organization for the Zionist movement. Herzl, a Viennese journalist who is considered the father of modern political Zionism, organized the first congress and later wrote, "At Basel I founded the Jewish State. . . . Perhaps in five years, and certainly in fifty, everyone will know it." Subsequent to its foundation, the Zionist Organization established companies and institutions to carry out its policies; these included Keren HaYesod (international financial arm), the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND, the JEWISH COLONIAL TRUST, and the Jewish Colonial Trust's subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine Bank.

When the BRITISH MANDATE for Palestine was issued, it called for the establishment of an agency to represent the Jewish people vis-à-vis the Mandatory government and to cooperate with it in establishing the national home. Although the Zionist Organization initially assumed this role, in

1923 an expanded JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL was established as a partnership between the Zionist Organization and non-Zionist, public Jewish groups. At the founding conference in Zurich, half the delegates were representatives of the Zionist Organization, and half represented the non-Zionist organizations. CHAIM WEIZMANN, president of the Zionist Organization, was elected president of the newly founded Jewish Agency.

In the period before Israel became a state in 1948, the Jewish Agency operated as a quasi-government, working to organize IMMIGRATION, including illegal immigration, and to absorb the immigrants in Palestine. It founded youth ALIYA; maintained labor, settlement, and industry departments; and created enterprises such as the Palestine Electric Company, the Palestine Potash Company, and the Anglo-Palestine Bank. In addition, the agency was a senior partner in the establishment of the Yishuv's defense force (HAGANA) and of the "stockade and watchtower" settlements—quickly erected huts, fortifications, and fences dominated by a watchtower from which to scan for signs of hostility. When the new state came into being, questions arose as to the relationship among the Israeli government, the Zionist Organization, and the Jewish Agency. The Zionist congress adopted a resolution calling on the state of Israel to recognize the Zionist Organization as the representative body of the Jewish people in all matters that involved the organized participation of DIASPORA Jewry in the upbuilding of Israel.

In response, on 24 November 1952 the Knesset passed the Zionist Organization–Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law, and later a covenant was signed between the government of Israel and the Zionist Organization Executive, according to which the organizations' main areas of responsibility remained those related to aliya, immigrant absorption, and settlement. The 1952 Status Law also established the Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency as organizations with governmental status in fulfilling Zionist objectives: the immigration, LAND reclamation, and settlement of Jews in Palestine.

The background to the Status Law involves the Israeli government, the Zionist Organization, and the Jewish Agency's objective of securing the land of Israel for the sole benefit of the Jewish people. The concept of creating "Israeli lands" meant securing the land not only for Jewish Israelis but also for all Jews across the world to claim at any point in the future, through exercising the 1950 LAW OF RETURN. Conversely, non-Jews, including PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL, were barred from owning or leasing land. To make these organizations an integral part of the state apparatus, the government enacted a series of laws that gave pre-state Zionist organizations such as the Zionist Organization, Jewish National Fund, and Jewish Agency quasi-governmental powers. The 1953 Land Acquisition Law (Validity of Acts and Compensation) gave international Jewish agencies increased powers in the development of land for Jewish settlement and "security" purposes.

In August 1970 another agreement was signed that modified the structure and functions of the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization. Half the members of the expanded Jewish Agency's assembly were representatives of the World Zionist Organization, 30 percent represented the United Jewish Communities (US), and 20 percent represented organizations affiliated with Keren HaYesod in the rest of the world. Under the agreement, the Jewish Agency would deal with immigration from countries of persecution and the World Zionist Organization with immigrants from affluent countries. In June 1979 the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization signed two new covenants with the government of Israel. The Jewish Agency retained its responsibility for initial absorption of immigrants in Israel, support for educational activities and work with youth, immigrant absorption in rural settlements, immigrant housing, and welfare services. At the same time, the World Zionist Organization would concentrate on work in the Jewish Diaspora: education, youth, and so forth.

Under the 1970 rearrangement, the WZO was separated in terms of its functions, but not its leadership, from the Jewish Agency. This was necessary because of the restrictive provision of the US tax code pertaining to taxes and gifts. Those activities that were "political" or otherwise questionable from a tax-exemption standpoint had to be grouped separately and placed under the WZO. The organization was directed to continue as the organ of the Zionist movement for the fulfillment of Zionist programs and ideals, but its operations were to be confined mainly to the Diaspora. After 1970 the WZO's mission was Jewish education, Zionist organizational work, information and cultural programs, youth work, external relations, rural development, and the activities of the Jewish National Fund. For the most part, these functions were financed by funds

funneled through the Jewish Agency, which continued to serve as the main financial arm of the WZO. However, because of US tax-law stipulations, funds allocated for the WZO by the Jewish Agency were required to come from those collected by Keren HaYesod (Israel Foundation Fund). By 2007 the WZO defined its mission as "Aliyah, the Israel Experience, Zionist Education, Hebrew Education, Israel Advocacy, Shaping Israel, and Cultural Nationalism."

The WZO's executive is elected at the Zionist congresses, which convene every four to five years. Delegates to the congress are elected on behalf of their organizations in the Diaspora and on behalf of the Zionist political parties, represented in accordance with their relative representation in the Knesset. Most delegates are from Israel and the United States. The Zionist executive operates on behalf of the congress, gathering on a yearly basis. The executive runs four departments: the department for aliyah and immigrant absorption, the department for agricultural settlement, the department for youth aliyah, and the treasury. A board of directors oversees the activities.

The WZO is composed of thirty-two federations. Every federation that accepts the Zionist program and the WZO's constitution may be a member of the organization. The admission of a Zionist federation as a member is decided, upon proposal by the executive, by the council. The organization builds the connection between the Diaspora communities and Israel through the Zionist federation in a number of ways, including the arrangement of reciprocal visits, promotion of the Hebrew language, and the organization of events celebrating the Israeli culture, such as film festivals and food fairs.

The member federations include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, FRANCE, GERMANY, Greece, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Spain, SWEDEN, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, UNITED STATES, Uruguay, and Venezuela. (www.wzo.org.il).

See also ISRAELI DIASPORA; ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS; JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL; JEWISH NATIONAL FUND

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Wye River Memorandum, 1998

The purpose of the Wye River Summit, convened at Maryland's Wye River Plantation, was to persuade Israel and the Palestinians to fully implement the interim arrangements of previously signed agreements—including the 1993 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT, and the 1997 HEBRON PROTOCOL—in order to begin FINAL STATUS TALKS. Its key components included redeployment of Israeli troops previously agreed on but never undertaken and a far more extensive Palestinian commitment to Israel's security. The agreement was brokered by the UNITED STATES and negotiated between Israel and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA). It was signed on 23 October 1998 after nine days of difficult talks. JORDAN's gravely ill monarch, King Husayn, attended the signing in an effort to bolster the peace process. Less than two months after the signing of the accord, on 20 December 1998, Israel suspended all the agreements concluded at Wye.

The genesis for the Wye Summit resided in the fact that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, suspended by Israel in March 1997, had remained frozen for nineteen months (except for CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY–sponsored security talks). The situation on the ground had deteriorated to such an extent that the United States became concerned and persuaded Israeli prime minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU to meet with PNA president YASIR ARAFAT in an attempt to break the impasse.

The violence of the time had several dimensions. On 24 September 1996 Netanyahu ordered the opening of the northern exit of the HASMONEAN TUNNEL, an extension of the WESTERN WALL tunnel, which completely changed the status quo in JERUSALEM. This occurred in the context of very public proclamations by several groups that the Third Temple was going to be rebuilt over the AL-AQSA MOSQUE and the DOME OF THE ROCK on the TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM ASH-SHARIF. Palestinians, fearful for their holy sites, saw this tunnel

opening as the potential beginning of the Third Temple project, were enraged, and took to the streets to protest. In four days of fighting, fourteen Israeli soldiers and sixty-nine Palestinians were killed, and hundreds were wounded on both sides.

On 19 February 1997, five years into the peace process, Netanyahu, who publicly opposed the peace process and had voted against the Declaration of Principles, announced the beginning of construction of a new SETTLEMENT, HAR HOMA (in an area called Jebel Abu Ghneim by Palestinians), within the post-1967 GREATER JERUSALEM municipality. The area of the Har Homa settlement project comprises 2,056 dunums (500 acres) of LAND held by "absentee" Palestinians from the BETHLEHEM area. The move was in violation of both an instruction from the Israeli attorney general to stop applying the ABSENTEE PROPERTY LAW in East Jerusalem and explicit promises to the United States not to apply that law in Jerusalem's eastern quarters. The announcement infuriated Palestinians, who, in addition to objecting to Israel's confiscation of more Palestinian land, saw it as a unilateral move to solidify Israel's claim to all of Jerusalem. Once again they took to the streets in protest. Between 6 and 20 March, Israeli troops killed eight Palestinian demonstrators and wounded over 1,000. Two Israeli soldiers were killed.

In the first five years after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, 405 Palestinians were killed by Israelis and 256 Israelis were killed by Palestinians (mainly in seven SUICIDE BOMBINGS), and in 1996–1997, Israel twice imposed a total closure on the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

At the same time, the Palestinian standard of living was plummeting while Prime Minister Netanyahu continuously emphasized a policy of "three no(s)": no withdrawal from the Golan Heights, no discussion of Jerusalem, and no negotiations under any preconditions. Palestinians were infuriated over the Hebron Protocol, which divided the city between Jews and Arabs and placed the AL-IBRAHIMI MOSQUE in the Jewish sector. Moreover, Israel engaged in a rapid expansion of settlements throughout the WEST BANK.

This, then, was the context in which the Wye talks began.

President Clinton pushed hard to get the two sides to make good on their previous promises and move ahead. After a rocky start, the president held a twenty-one-hour marathon session with Arafat, Netanyahu, and their senior negotiators as well as Clinton's Middle East advisers. As intensive negotiations began at Wye, Netanyahu made a controversial change in his cabinet on 14 October, designating General ARIEL SHARON, also a leading opponent of the OSLO ACCORDS, as his foreign minister, thus strengthening the Israeli front against any territorial compromise. Arafat then put all his hope in the Americans, believing they would deliver a fair compromise, a decision that turned out to be a major miscalculation.

In addition to the major issues of security (a security plan to crack down on violence by terrorists) and redeployment (Israeli troop redeployment from an additional 13.1 percent of West Bank land to take place over a ninety-day period), the Wye agreement allowed for the building of an international AIRPORT in the GAZA STRIP. Israel also agreed to release 750 Palestinian security PRISONERS (ultimately only 250 were released), Arafat agreed to a second revocation of clauses in the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER that Israel considered hostile, and Netanyahu agreed to guarantee two corridors of SAFE PASSAGE between Gaza and the West Bank. The redeployment and security issues are discussed below in depth.

The Redeployment Dimension: Israel's Commitment

According to the 1995 Interim Agreement/Oslo II on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the first of three "further redeployments" was scheduled to begin in October 1996. All three redeployments were to have been completed, according to the Oslo II timetable, by October 1997. None were. A final status agreement was to have been completed by October 1999.

At Wye, Israel agreed to implement the first and second "further redeployment" (FRD). This was to consist of the transfer to the Palestinian side of 13 percent from Area C (under full Israeli control) as follows: 1 percent from Area C to Area A (full Palestinian Authority control) and 12 percent from Area C to Area B (Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control). Under intense pressure, the Palestinian side agreed that it would allocate an area or areas amounting to 3 percent from the 12 percent in Area B as "GREEN AREAS and/or Nature Reserves" and that the Israeli side would retain in these areas the overriding security responsibility. Thus, out of a meager allocation of 13 percent of FRD, the Palestinians had to essentially "return" this 3 percent. There were no specifications about the second or third phase of further redeployments, no timetable for redeployment, and no map.

Moreover, although the territory that the Palestinians were to receive, a portion of which lay close to NABLUS, would have increased the territorial continuity of the PNA, remaining portions near Ramallah that Arafat hoped for were vetoed by Israel, which insisted that no land around Ramallah, Jerusalem, or Bethlehem would be returned to the PNA. The desert territory east of the settlement of Nokdim that Arafat agreed to accept at Wye had more symbolic than practical value.

In other words, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998 divided Oslo II's second "further redeployment"—scheduled for April 1997—into three phases, with no date or specification of the territorial extent of the third redeployment. Additionally, Israeli redeployment was formally linked to Palestinian fulfillment of Israel's security requirements. Netanyahu carried out the first phase of the agreement but refused to implement the second and third, suspending all agreements negotiated at Wye on 20 December 1998.

The Security Dimension: The Palestinians' Commitment

The Palestinian side, in turn, committed to outlawing and combating terrorist organizations and making known its policy of zero tolerance for terror and violence against both sides. A work plan toward this end to be developed by the Palestinian side would be shared with the United States, and implementation would begin immediately to ensure the systematic and effective battle against terrorist organizations and their infrastructure. In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a US-Palestinian committee would meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies, and abets TERRORISM. The Palestinian side would apprehend the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the purpose of further investigation and would prosecute and punish all persons involved in acts of violence and terror. A US-Palestinian committee would review and evaluate information pertinent to the decisions on prosecution, punishment, or other legal measures regarding individuals suspected of abetting or perpetrating acts of violence and terror.

The Palestinian side would also ensure that an effective legal framework was in place to criminalize, in conformity with the prior agreements, any importation, manufacture, or unlicensed sale, acquisition, or possession of firearms, ammunition, or weapons in areas under Palestinian jurisdiction. In addition, the Palestinian side would establish and vigorously and continuously implement a program for the collection and appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior agreements. The United States agreed to assist in carrying out the program. A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee would be established to assist and enhance cooperation in preventing the smuggling or other unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosive materials into areas under Palestinian jurisdiction.

The Palestinian side would issue a decree prohibiting all forms of *incitement* to violence or terror and would establish mechanisms for acting systematically against all *expressions* or threats of violence or terror. A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee would meet on a regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and to make recommendations and reports on how to prevent such incitement. The Israeli, Palestinian, and US sides would each appoint a MEDIA specialist, a law enforcement representative, an educational specialist, and a current or former elected official to monitor Palestinian compliance.

Security Cooperation

The two sides agreed that their security cooperation would be based on a spirit of partnership and would include, among other things, full bilateral security cooperation between them that would be continuous, intensive, and comprehensive; forensic cooperation, including an exchange of forensic expertise, training, and other assistance; and trilateral cooperation, including a high-ranking US-Palestinian-Israeli committee that would meet regularly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective security cooperation and coordination, and address the steps being taken to combat terror and terrorist organizations.

The Palestinian side would provide a list of its policemen to the Israeli side in conformity with the prior agreements. Should the Palestinian side request technical assistance, the United States indicated its willingness to help meet those needs in cooperation with other donors. The Monitoring and Steering Committee would, as part of its functions, monitor the implementation of this provision and brief the United States.

To meet Wye's security requirements, the PNA virtually annulled its judicial system,

substituting imprisonment without charge, torture under detention, and summary executions. The PNA also eliminated freedom of speech, the press, and political opposition. Not only were suspected supporters of Hamas and ISLAMIC JIHAD jailed, but also secular intellectuals, academics, and politicians were imprisoned for expressing criticism of the Wye accord or any other aspect of the OSLO PROCESS. Additionally, in December 1998 Arafat convened the PLO's PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL (PNC) to expunge the 1964 Charter of all clauses that Israel found objectionable.

Wye, then, drew a series of red lines on Israeli-Palestinian reality, spelling out exactly what behavior was expected and when, a great ambition given that very few of the Oslo deadlines had ever been met. It would be a mistake to infer that there were equal restraints on Israel and the Palestinians. When the Palestinians failed to live up to a commitment, they were faced with the wrath of and punishment by Israel and the United States, whereas Israel could violate any aspect of any agreement with the assurance of US backing. The asymmetries of power were never more apparent.

During the Wye River negotiations, the United States made a number of secret deals supposedly to help secure Israel's and the PNA's agreement to the final memorandum. It agreed to overlook Israeli plans to build at Har Homa if the Israelis did not oppose the ongoing delay in moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in violation of the Jerusalem Embassy Relocation Act of 1995. (This bill was passed by the US Congress, demanding that the president move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; the Senate supported the legislation 93 (for) to 5 (against), while the House supported it 374 to 37.)

Israel agreed to restrict building new settlements in the West Bank except as was necessary to meet the needs of "natural growth" in return for a US pledge to force the Palestinians to defer indefinitely their planned declaration of a Palestinian state beyond 4 May 1999 (the date when the Oslo Process was to have been concluded).

The United States agreed to provide funding to both parties: $300 million to the Palestinians for developing the West Bank's antiquated "economic INFRASTRUCTURE" and $1 billion to Israel to cover its costs of redeploying from the West Bank, including funds for new BYPASS ROADS and infrastructure relating to the needs of the settlements. At the start of Wye, twelve new bypass roads were in various stages of planning and construction. This was in addition to the massive settlement expansion Netanyahu had been pursuing since taking office. The financial grant provided by Clinton showed perceptible US acceptance of the settlements, in contrast to administrations preceding Clinton's, which had considered them "illegal" and "obstacles to peace." Additionally, in return for Israel's signature on the agreement, the United States pledged to enhance "Israel's defensive and deterrent capabilities" and upgrade US-Israeli STRATEGIC COOPERATION.

Since it was considered unlikely that there would ever be full agreement between Israel and the Palestinians on all the issues, the Wye Memorandum introduced a third party—the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—to act as a monitor and arbiter on security issues and the anticipated contradictions between Israeli and Palestinian interpretations of compliance.

This very visible interjection of the CIA into the peace process was an important aspect of Wye. Israel's commitment to withdraw from the West Bank by an additional 13 percent was conditioned on the Palestinians' agreement to a detailed "work plan" under which they were to cooperate with the CIA in tracking down and arresting extremists in the Hamas and Islamic Jihad groups. The official interference of the CIA in monitoring the implementation of the "security measures" to be taken by the Palestinian side in "fighting terrorism" was hitherto unprecedented. The previous covert role of the CIA in the Occupied Territories now became official US policy.

On the final day of the negotiations, the agreement almost fell through. Prime Minister Netanyahu had asked President Clinton, in exchange for his attending the Wye Summit, to release Jonathan Pollard, an American naval intelligence officer who is serving a life sentence since 1985 for treason—that is, giving classified information to Israel. A bitter disagreement arose, with Netanyahu claiming that Clinton had promised to release Pollard and Clinton saying he had only promised to "review" the case. Director of the CIA GEORGE TENET threatened to resign if Pollard was released.

In sum, Palestinians viewed fulfillment of this agreement as key to the revival of peace talks and final status negotiations. Israel did not, however. Tel Aviv fulfilled the first stage of the redeployment but matched it with an equal amount of



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Map 50. Wye River Memorandum, 1998

settlement construction and refused to make any other redeployments. On 17 May 1999 Netanyahu was succeeded as prime minister by EHUD BARAK, who was also disinclined to proceed with the implementation of the Wye River Memorandum. Barak promised President Arafat and President Clinton that Israel would fully carry out its obligations, but he did not follow through. Thus arose the need for the Sharm al-Shaykh Summit that opened on 4 September 1999.

On 14 December 1998 the PNA convened the PNC in Gaza and voted overwhelmingly to amend the Charter. The PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE and the PALESTINE CENTRAL COUNCIL reaffirmed in a letter dated 22 January 1998 from PLO chairman Yasir Arafat to President Clinton the nullification of the Palestine National Charter, which satisfied Clinton, although it did not satisfy the Israelis.

Subsequently, Netanyahu announced that he was suspending the next two redeployments unless the PNA agreed to a set of six additional requirements. Among them, the PNA was required to publicly announce that it was "renouncing the intention to declare a state unilaterally," to immediately "take measures against those who violate the anti-incitement order," to immediately jail "at least twenty-two of the thirty Palestinian wanted fugitives," to "reduce the size of the Palestinian police force to 30,000," and to give an explicit public announcement reaffirming the PNA's agreement that "prisoners with blood on their hands would not be released." The PNA refused the new Israeli demands, and the peace process once again seemed to have reached a dead end.

Another summit followed approximately a year later at Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, with the participation of Egyptian president HOSNI MUBARAK and with the same agenda that had given rise to Wye.

See also OSLO ACCORDS; OSLO PROCESS; SHARM AL-SHAYKH MEMORANDUM

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Y

Yachad

Two unrelated Israeli parties have had the name Yachad. The first was a center-rightist party formed by EZER WEIZMAN prior to the 1984 Israeli elections. After the party elected three members to the Knesset, it was invited to join YITZHAK SHAMIR's coalition government, in which Weizman became minister without portfolio. Shortly after the Knesset came into session the party merged with the Alignment, which subsequently became the LABOR PARTY.

The second, and more influential, is Yachad (Social Democratic Party of Israel, or SDI). It was founded by YOSSI BEILIN in December 2003 following elections earlier that year in which the Israeli peace camp made a poor showing. It involved the merger of MERETZ with Yossi Beilin's SHAHAR and Roman Bronfman's Democratic Choice Party (DCP) and was explicitly created to unite and resuscitate the Israeli Zionist peace camp within the dovish wing of the Israeli Labor Party. These efforts, however, were unsuccessful because, except for the original Meretz, Shahar, and the DCP, no other faction joined the new party, which suffered from declining popular interest in left-wing peace movements as a result of the rise in Palestinian violence in the AL-AQSA INTIFADA. In 2004 only 20,000 Israelis registered as members of the Yachad Party and half that number were registered as Meretz members in the 1999 party primaries.

In March 2004, Beilin was elected party leader and started a two-year term as the first chairman of Yachad. In July 2005 the party decided to change its name to Meretz-Yachad, because opinion polls revealed that the name Yachad was not recognizable to the Israeli public and that they preferred the old name, Meretz. However, in the 2006 election campaign the party dropped the Yachad part, running as just Meretz, under the slogan "Meretz on the left, the Human in the centre." Nevertheless, the name change failed to stop the party's decline, as they won just five seats in 2006. In late 2007, Beilin decided to retire from politics after it became clear in the party leadership contest that Haim Oron was leading in the polls. Oron went on to win the internal elections held on 18 March 2008 with 54.5 percent of the vote, and to become Meretz's new chairman.

Because Meretz had failed to attract voters disappointed with the Labor Party despite Labor's falling numbers in the ballot box, or even those who had voted for the Pensioners Party, an initiative was launched to broaden Meretz's representation. Polls showed most such voters preferred TZIPI LIVNI's KADIMA PARTY, which was widely viewed as committed to pursuing peace with the Palestinians. Kadima and Meretz held talks over assembling a government under the leadership of Livni, and an agreement was achieved; Livni even promised Meretz it could count on fielding two ministers. Ironically, many Meretz voters ultimately chose Kadima in the 2009 elections. On 22 December 2008 Meretz finalized another merger for the 2009 elections, with Hatnua HaHadasha ("The New Movement"), but the alliance failed miserably, winning just three seats. The left-wing bloc in general suffered a harsh blow in the Israeli legislative elections in 2009. Kadima, though winning a majority of seats in the Knesset, was unable to form a coalition, and the LIKUD PARTY's BENJAMIN NETANYAHU formed a new far-right government.

Yachad supported the following principles regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: (1) peace between Israel and the Palestinians based on a TWO-STATE SOLUTION as laid out in the GENEVA ACCORD, (2) the protection of Palestinian human rights in the Israeli OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, and (3) dismantling most of the Israeli SETTLEMENTS in the WEST BANK. Meretz-Yachad's approach toward the conflict has abandoned the "securitist" approach of its predecessor, Meretz, and focused its criticism at the conduct of former prime minister ARIEL SHARON and the government. The party was split over whether to support Sharon's plan for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA, though in November 2004, it announced that it would abstain in motions of no confidence in the Likud government in order

to prevent the government from falling prior to implementation of the plan. With the defection of the SHINUI PARTY from Sharon's government, Meretz-Yachad's decision helped Sharon to carry out his disengagement plan.

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Yadin, Yigal (1917–1984)

Yigal Yadin was a military commander, political leader, and archaeologist. His father, Eliezer Lipa Sukenik, immigrated to Palestine from Bialystok, Poland, in 1912. Born in JERUSALEM, Yadin joined the underground military organization HAGANA in 1933 at age fifteen. He became a key figure in its leadership, as well as in its elite fighting force, the PALMAH, for which he was operations officer and helped devise and implement many of its strategies. In 1946, however, he left the Hagana following an argument with its commander, Yitzhak Sadeh.

Yadin was a university student when, in 1947, shortly before the state of Israel declared its independence, he was called back to active service by Israel founder DAVID BEN-GURION. He served in various positions during the 1948 WAR and was responsible for many of the key decisions made during the course of that conflict. On 9 November 1949, Yadin was appointed chief of staff of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES and served in that capacity for three years. He resigned on 7 December 1952 over disagreements with then prime minister and defense minister Ben-Gurion about cuts to the military budget. By age thirty-five he had completed his military career.

Upon leaving the military, Yadin devoted himself to research and began his life's work in ARCHAEOLOGY. In 1956 he received the Israel Prize for his doctoral thesis on the translation of the Dead Sea Scrolls. As an archaeologist, he excavated some of the most important sites in the region, including the Qumran Caves, Masada, Hazor, and Tel Megiddo. Employing thousands of volunteers from Israel and abroad, his vast archaeological digs expanded the field tremendously. Yadin's findings have shed light on various periods of biblical ancient Israel, such as the Canaanite, First Temple, and Herodian periods, as well as the Bar Kokhba revolt. Perhaps his most famous contribution was decoding and interpreting several scrolls from the Dead Sea and the Judean Desert area.

Yadin also did much to make archaeology a more accessible and less exclusively esoteric field. His writing appeals to both scholars and a more widespread audience. He strove not only to document his archaeological findings but also to place them in a context whereby they contributed to an understanding of Hebrew cultural history. Yadin was sometimes forced to deal with the theft of important artifacts, occasionally by prominent political and military figures. In one instance, when the thefts were commonly attributed to the famous general MOSHE DAYAN (who was blind in one eye), he remarked: "I know who did it, and I am not going to say who it is, but if I catch him, I'll poke out his other eye, too." The Israeli government used many of Yadin's archaeological discoveries as a means to enhance Israel's national myth about its past.

Yadin never completely abandoned public life, even as an archaeologist. On the eve of the 1967 WAR, he served as a military adviser to Prime Minister LEVI ESHKOL, and, following the OCTOBER WAR of 1973, he was a member of the Agranat Commission, which investigated the government's failures that led to the war. In 1977 Yadin formed a new political party—the rightist Democratic Movement for Change, known by its Hebrew acronym DASH—together with Amnon Rubenstein, Shmuel Tamir, Meir Amit, and other prominent public figures. The party appealed to many Israelis who were displeased with alleged corruption in the LABOR PARTY and to the increasing sense of frustration and despair in the aftermath of the 1973 War and the social and political developments that followed in its wake. Many people regarded Yadin, a warrior and a scholar, as the prototype of the ideal Israeli, untainted by corruption, who could lead the country on a new path.

In the 1977 elections, the new party did remarkably well on its first attempt to enter the Knesset, winning 15 of the 120 seats. As a result, LIKUD PARTY leader MENAHEM BEGIN was able to form a coalition with DASH, thereby excluding the Labor Party for the first time in Israel's history. As the new deputy prime minister, Yadin played a

pivotal role in many events, particularly the contacts with EGYPT that eventually led to the signing of the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS and the peace treaty between Israel and its neighbor. Nevertheless, DASH proved unable to sustain its original support, and the party broke into numerous splinter factions. By the elections of 1981, the party no longer existed in its original form, and that same year Yadin retired from politics.

See also ARCHAEOLOGY

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Yaffa

See JAFFA; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948

Yahadut HaTorah

See UNITED TORAH JUDAISM

Yasin, Shaykh Ahmad Ismail (1936–2004)

Shaykh Ahmad Yasin was a founder and spiritual leader of HAMAS (an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement meaning "zeal"), which he cofounded with ABD AL-AZIZ RANTISI in 1987, originally calling it the Palestinian Wing of the MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD. Born in the village of Al-Jora near Majdal (renamed Ashkelon), he became a REFUGEE with his family in a GAZA STRIP camp during the 1948 WAR, which saw the destruction of Al-Jora. A childhood sporting accident left Yasin a quadriplegic, confined to a wheelchair, nearly blind, and with poor hearing. Despite his paralysis, he fathered eleven children.

In 1968 Yasin spent a year on a charitable scholarship studying at Ein Shams University in Cairo, where it is believed the Muslim Brotherhood recruited him. In 1970 Yasin organized the al-Mujama al-Islami (Islamic Compound), which opened mosques, hospitals, and libraries and carried out other philanthropic work. After Ein Shams, Yasin returned to Gaza as a preacher and teacher and worked as head of the Islamic Compound in Gaza. During Israel's OCCUPATION, he became the most famous preacher in the Gaza Strip—charismatic, daring, and logical. After the 1979 Islamic revolution in IRAN, Yasin founded the Majd al-Mujahedin (Pride of the Faithful Warriors), a more radical group than Islamic Compound. In 1983, Israel arrested Yasin on charges of weapons possession, formation of a secret organization, and incitement against the existence of the state of Israel. Although he was sentenced by an ISRAELI MILITARY COURT to thirteen years' imprisonment, he was released in 1985 in the context of a PRISONER exchange between Israel and the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND.

In 1987, after his release, Yasin founded Hamas. Initially, Israel encouraged its formation, viewing Hamas as a useful religious counterweight to the surging secular nationalism of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), but it soon regretted its mistake. Hamas gained a reputation for ruthlessness against fellow Palestinian Muslims suspected of collaborating with Israel. In 1988 the Occupation authorities raided Yasin's home and threatened to deport him to LEBANON. In 1989, Israel accused Yasin of authorizing the killing of Palestinian COLLABORATORS and of ordering the execution of two captured Israeli soldiers, a crime for which an Israeli military court convicted him and sentenced him to life imprisonment. In 1997, however, Yasin was released from prison as part of an arrangement with JORDAN following a failed assassination attempt against KHALID MESHAL, conducted by the Israeli intelligence agency MOSSAD in Amman. In exchange for two Mossad agents who had been arrested by Jordanian authorities, Yasin was released on condition that he not advocate SUICIDE BOMBINGS against Israel.

Returning to a hero's welcome in Gaza and later going on a tour of Arab and Muslim countries, where he collected $35 million in donations, Yasin soon became a thorn in PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) president YASIR ARAFAT's side because of his popular appeal and unwillingness to submit to Arafat's agenda. Arafat repeatedly placed Yasin under house arrest. However, each arrest only made the physically ailing shaykh more popular, and, after extended demonstrations by his supporters, he was typically released. Unlike the Arafat

administration, with its extravagant spending and corruption, Yasin was revered for never taking money for himself or his family and for leading a simple lifestyle. For all his physical frailty, Yasin was a powerful inspiration for young Palestinians disillusioned with the collapse of hopes for peace. He inspired them to offer up their lives, promising that suicide bombers who were willing to die for the dignity of Palestinians and in the service of a longer-term victory would achieve martyrdom.

Following his 1997 release, Yasin resumed leadership of Hamas. He also renewed his calls for struggle against the Occupation, including the use of suicide bombings against both Israeli military and civilian targets, thus violating the condition of his release. His most famous quote is "We chose this road, and will end with martyrdom or victory." On 13 June 2003, unnamed Israeli officials announced that Yasin was "not immune" to the Israeli policy of TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS. Three months later, on 6 September 2003, an Israeli Air Force F-16 dropped a quarter-ton bomb on a building in Gaza City where Yasin was staying, but he was only lightly wounded and survived. Israeli officials later confirmed that Yasin was the target of the attack. Subsequently, Yasin told reporters, "Days will prove that the assassination policy will not finish the Hamas. Hamas leaders wish to be martyrs and are not scared of death. Jihad will continue and the resistance will continue until we have victory, or we will be martyrs." Yasin further promised that Hamas would teach Israel an "unforgettable lesson" because of the assassination attempt. He made no effort to hide from further assassination attempts or to conceal his location. Journalists who visited his Gaza address found that Yasin maintained a routine daily pattern of activity, including being wheeled every morning to a nearby mosque. Believing that a divided leadership would undermine Palestinian interests, Yasin sought to maintain good relations with the PNA and with other regimes in the Arab world. But he remained uncompromising on the issue of peace. "The so-called peace path is not peace and it is not a substitute for jihad and resistance," Yasin repeatedly said in interviews.

On 22 March 2004, while he was being wheeled out of a mosque where he had made the early morning prayer, an Israeli helicopter gunship fired Hellfire missiles at Yasin and both of his bodyguards. They were killed instantly, along with six other Palestinians, while more than a dozen people were injured, including two of Yasin's sons. Some 200,000 people took to the streets of the Gaza Strip for Yasin's funeral, as Israeli forces declared a national alert. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi replaced Yasin as Hamas leader in the Gaza Strip, but Israel assassinated Rantisi on 17 April 2004. While Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON and other Israeli officials made public statements expressing their delight at Yasin's death, British foreign secretary Jack Straw said, "All of us understand Israel's need to protect itself—and it is fully entitled to do that—against the TERRORISM which affects it, within INTERNATIONAL LAW. But it is not entitled to go in for this kind of unlawful killing and we condemn it. It is unacceptable, it is unjustified and it is very unlikely to achieve its objectives." The UN Security Council offered a draft resolution condemning Yasin's assassination, but the UNITED STATES vetoed it because it did not include an explicit condemnation of Hamas terrorism.

See also HAMAS

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Yehoshua, A. B. (1936–)

A. B. Yehoshua is the pen name of Abraham B. ("Bulli") Yehoshua, an Israeli novelist, essayist, and playwright. He was born to a fifth-generation JERUSALEM family of SEPHARDI origin on his father's side, and his mother was an immigrant from Morocco. Yehoshua served as a paratrooper in the Israeli army from 1954 to 1957. After studying literature and philosophy at the Hebrew University of JERUSALEM, he began teaching in Jerusalem. From 1963 to 1967 Yehoshua lived and taught in Paris and served as the general secretary of the World Union of Jewish Students. Since 1972, he has taught comparative and Hebrew literature at HAIFA University, where he holds the rank of full professor. In 1975 he was a writer-in-residence at St. Cross College, Oxford. He has also been a visiting professor at Harvard (1977), the University of Chicago (1988, 1997, 2000), and Princeton (1992).

From the end of his military service, Yehoshua began to publish fiction. His first book of stories, *Mot Hazaken* (The Death of the Old Man), was published in 1962. He became a notable figure in the "new wave" generation of Israeli writers who differed from earlier writers in their focus on the individual and interpersonal rather than the group. Yehoshua names Franz Kafka, Shmuel Yosef Agnon, and William Faulkner as formative influences. In an article in the *New York Times*, Harold Bloom compared Yehoshua to Faulkner and also mentions him in his book *The Western Canon*.

Yehoshua is the author of nine novels, three books of short stories, four plays, and four collections of essays, most recently *Ahizat Moledet* (Homeland Lesson), a book of reflections on identity and literature. His most acclaimed novel, *Mr Mani*, is a multigenerational look at Jewish identity and Israel through five conversations over the span of a century. His most recent novel, *Friendly Fire,* explores the nature of Israeli familial relationships. In a drama that moves back and forth between Israel and Tanzania, Yehoshua explores personal grief and bitterness. His works have been published in translation in twenty-eight countries, and many have been adapted for film, television, theater, and opera.

An activist in the ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT, Yehoshua tends toward a centrist position. He attended the signing of the GENEVA ACCORD and freely airs his political views in essays and interviews. He is a long-standing critic of Israeli OCCUPATION but also of the Palestinians. He and some other intellectuals mobilized on behalf of the dovish New Movement shortly before 2009 elections in Israel, but won no seats. Yehoshua said in *La Stampa* (Italian daily newspaper) that even before the 2008–2009 Israeli offensive in Gaza began, that he had published an appeal to Gaza residents urging them to end the violence. Next he explained "why the Israeli operation was necessary, but also how quickly it needs to end." Precisely because the Gazans are our neighbors, he said, "we need to be proportionate in this operation. We need to try to reach a cease-fire as quickly as possible." "We will always be neighbors, so the less blood is shed, the better the future will be," he added. Yehoshua added that he would be happy for the border crossings to be opened completely, and even for Palestinian workers to come to work in Israel as part of a cease-fire.

His novels published in English include *The Lover,* 1977; *A Late Divorce*, 1982; *Five Seasons*, 1987; *Mr. Mani*, 1990; *Open Heart*, 1994; *A Journey to the End of the Millennium*, 1997; *The Liberated Bride*, 2001; and *A Woman in Jerusalem*, 2004.

Yehoshua has been the recipient of numerous awards and honors, including the Brenner Prize, 1983; the Alterman Prize, 1986; the Bialik Prize for literature co-recipient (jointly with Avner Treinin), 1989; and the Israel Prize for Hebrew Literature, 1995, among many others. In Italy, he received the Viareggio Prize for Lifetime Achievement and in 2003 his novel *The Liberated Bride* won both the Premio Napoli and the Lampedusa Literary Prize. *Friendly Fire* won the Premio Roma in 2008. Yehoshua has received honorary doctorates from Hebrew Union College (1990), Tel Aviv University (1998), Torino University (1999), and Bar-Ilan University (2000).

See also HEBREW LITERATURE

Yemen

See ARAB STATES: INTER-ARAB POLITICS; LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

Yesha Council

The Yesha Council is the umbrella organization of the various municipal councils of Jewish communities in Yesha, the Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which are otherwise referred to as the WEST BANK and GAZA STRIP. It was founded in the 1970s, as the successor to GUSH EMUNIM, to oversee the movement of Jewish settlers to what they consider their homeland in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. The council consists of twenty-five democratically elected mayors and ten community leaders. Its mandate is to provide security for the settlers; to oversee improvements in INFRASTRUCTURE, such as ROADS, electricity, and WATER supplies; and to act as domestic and international emissaries on behalf of the settlers and the SETTLEMENT movement. The main objectives of the Yesha Council are to retain the Occupied Territories under Israeli sovereignty and to promote additional settlements in the West Bank and JERUSALEM; it opposes any territorial settlement with the Palestinians.

The council serves as a powerful political representative of the settlers and a lobby for their cause in the Knesset and with the government; it is also in charge of public relations campaigns and grassroots protests when needed. In 2005 the Yesha Council led the settlers' campaign against ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA with mass protests and demonstrations, including a human chain of some 130,000 persons, a march at Kfar Maimon, and rallies at the WESTERN WALL and in Tel Aviv.

When in mid-November 2009, under intense pressure from US president Barak Obama, Prime Minister BENJAMIN NETANYAHU announced a ten-month moratorium on settlement construction, the Yesha Council erupted in unprecedented fury. Settler leaders immediately vowed that they would prevent Israeli inspectors from enforcing a moratorium on new construction in West Bank settlements and called on the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) to disobey any orders related to the moratorium. The statement by the Yesha Council came after officials said inspectors, armed with aerial maps and empowered to confiscate construction, had begun enforcing the policy. Gershon Messika, head of the Samaria Regional Council in the northern West Bank, tore up a stop-work order delivered to him by an IDF major. "This is an order to halt construction in the state of Israel. This is a racist, immoral and illegal decision which is therefore invalid," Messika said. Protesters blocked security forces from entering the community to enforce a construction freeze.

A violent confrontation between settlers and CIVIL ADMINISTRATION inspectors broke out in the West Bank settlement of ELON MOREH. Settlers began a march from Elon Moreh toward NABLUS to protest the building moratorium as well as the enforcement of the freeze by the Civil Administration inspectors. Leading the march was head rabbi of Elon Moreh, Elyakim Levanon.

The settler leaders also announced that they would not enforce construction-related violations, saying the government had stripped them of their authority to manage planning and construction in their communities. In KIRYAT ARBA, several dozen settlers, led by local council head Malachi Levinger and right-wing activist Itamar Ben-Gvir, tried to block the inspectors' path. At Kfar Tapuach, the gate was locked and police accompanying the inspectors had to break in. Some one hundred demonstrators crowded the inspectors at the settlement of Revava. Extreme-rightist Baruch Marzel called on his camp to "prepare to topple Netanyahu and toss him into the trash bin of Jewish history, together with the scoundrels (former prime ministers [EHUD] OLMERT and [ARIEL] SHARON) who betrayed their constituents and their path."

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Yesha Rabbis

The Yesha rabbis are Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox religious leaders in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES who provide Torah and Talmudic sanctions for the actions of radical religious settlers. Their religious interpretations from the Torah provide justification for the settlers taking Palestinian LAND and houses, harassing and using violence against Palestinians, destroying Palestinian olive harvests, and even killing them.

In September 2004 the settler rabbi leaders produced a manifesto calling on the government to toughen its policies in the territories, even at the cost of civilian Palestinians' lives, noting that non-Jewish blood is less sacred than Jewish blood. They also declared that the army should show less regard for the welfare of Palestinian civilians if terrorists are hiding in their midst. The manifesto was initiated by Rabbi Haim Druckman, the head of the Bnei Akiva network, active throughout the world in Orthodox Jewish communities; Eliezer Melamed, head of the Har Bracha yeshiva; and Rabbi Yuval Sharlo, head of a yeshiva in Petah Tikva that combines Torah learning with active ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (IDF) service. Shortly after the manifesto was sent to Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz, the rabbis, heads of WEST BANK yeshivot, and members of the YESHA COUNCIL urged the government not to avoid harming Palestinians if it meant an effective war on TERRORISM. The manifesto argued that the enemy must be fought even when it is known that innocents will be killed in an attack.

In the past, Israeli law enforcement agents treated rabbinical manifestos with leniency, even if they appeared to have broken the law against incitement to violence. In July 1995, for example, the Israeli attorney general decided not to prosecute rabbis for a similar manifesto because of an explicit policy not to prosecute for rhetoric and because freedom of speech outweighs the complaint. Prosecution of rabbis was also avoided because of the desire to avoid disputes in an already polarized (religious/secular) society. However, ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA marked a turning point. Yesha rabbis called on religious soldiers and officers to disobey orders from their commanders that might lead to evacuating the "holy land." In response, the IDF senior command and the government were unequivocal: soldiers could not obey orders from a source outside the military. As it turned out, disobedience was minimal, despite the calls by rabbis and dire estimates that thousands of soldiers would refuse to participate in the withdrawal. Only sixty-three soldiers refused to obey IDF orders, and most were in the regular army. Only five were professional officers. All were tried by military courts and imprisoned.

By 2009 the phenomenon of religious soldiers refusing IDF orders had grown tremendously. Nehemia Shtrasler wrote in *Ha'aretz* in November 2009: "It is no accident that the refusal movement began in the Kfir brigade. It operates solely in the West Bank, with a high percentage of soldiers from *hesder* yeshivas (which combine army service with religious studies) and from settlements. At first, two soldiers in basic training with the brigade's Shimshon battalion held up a protest sign during a swearing-in ceremony at the WESTERN WALL: 'The Shimshon battalion won't evacuate Homesh [outpost].' Two weeks later, 25 reservist soldiers attached to the unit sent a harsh and unprecedented letter to their commanders in which they protested its 'use for the destruction of Homesh in Samaria.' Subsequently six soldiers of the Nachshon battalion held up a sign saying 'Nachshon won't evacuate Jews either.' . . . We should know that in all *hesder* yeshivas, and not only those of 'extremist rabbis,' the students undergo brainwashing against yielding any piece of holy land in the territories, and they listen to their rabbis before they obey their commanders. There are entire battalions in the army today comprised solely of *hesder* yeshiva soldiers, who are likely to change sides and fight against the evacuation of settlements. The very fact that they belong to a large, strong and united community, broadly backed by a supportive population, by rabbis and politicians, arouses the suspicion of a mutiny."

Gershom Gorenberg, writing in *The American Prospect* the same month, noted: "Driving through the West Bank recently, I picked up two hitchhikers. Both wore the long, thick sidelocks and extra-large skullcaps that have become the mark of young men on the religious right, especially among settlers. . . . The hitchhiker in the back seat said he didn't intend to serve. 'The Israel Defense Forces,' he argued, 'hurts Jews'—a point he presumed was obvious from the 'uprooting' of settlements in Gaza four years ago and the occasional dismantling of tiny, illegal settlement outposts in the West Bank more recently. 'Besides that,' he said, the IDF 'doesn't want to kill Arabs because it wants to look nice in the world.'. . . It's increasingly clear that . . . those soldiers believe in a right-wing version of selective conscientious objection: They won't carry out orders that conflict with their pro-settlement principles. In their view, they answer to a higher law, which says Jews have the right to live throughout the Whole Land of Israel, which includes Judea and Samaria, a.k.a. the West Bank. Many have also studied under clerics with a harsh view of combat ethics that doesn't fit the

IDF's official stance of seeking to minimize Arab civilian casualties."

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM; SETTLER VIOLENCE; THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Yesh Din

Established in March 2005, Yesh Din is an Israeli group composed of volunteers, who receive guidance from a professional team of lawyers, human rights experts, and media consultants, organized to oppose the continuing violation of Palestinian human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. "We are united by our deep concern over the serious damage the OCCUPATION is inflicting on both Palestinian and Israeli societies." Their mission is to achieve a long-term structural improvement in the human rights situation in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, although they work for an immediate and meaningful change in the Israeli authorities' practices by documenting and disseminating accurate and up-to-date information about the systematic violation of human rights in the territories, by raising public awareness of such violations, and by applying public and legal pressures on government agencies to end them. (http://www.yesh-din.org/site/index.php?page=about.us&lang=en).

Yesh G'vul

Yesh G'vul (There Is a Limit) is an Israeli peace group that supports soldiers who refuse duties of a repressive or aggressive nature. It arose in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion of LEBANON, when 168 servicemen were imprisoned after refusing to serve. The actual number of refusals was far greater, but their rising numbers deterred the army from prosecuting most of the REFUSENIKS. The first Palestinian INTIFADA in 1987 likewise prompted further refusals, with approximately 200 jailed, though the army again backed down from jailing many of the noncompliant soldiers. A notably high ratio of refuseniks are combat officers (ranking from sergeant to major)—that is, soldiers who have served with distinction. Yesh G'vul provides moral support to those refusing and material and financial support to families whose head is in prison for refusing. The organization also lobbies the government for support of its position. During the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, Yesh G'vul stated that the "brutal role of the Israeli army in subjugating the Palestinian population placed numerous servicemen in a grave moral and political dilemma, as they were required to enforce policies they deem illegal, immoral and ultimately harmful to Israeli interests."

From the outset, Yesh G'vul has fostered the refuser movement, which has taken a number of different paths. Defying official intimidation, including surveillance by police and security services, the group counsels soldiers wrestling with the choice between carrying out policies they find abhorrent and defying military discipline. To those who elect to refuse service, Yesh G'vul provides full moral and material backing, ranging from financial support for families of jailed refuseniks to vigils at the military prisons where they are held. Whenever a refusenik is jailed, Yesh G'vul publicizes his imprisonment as a notification for the broader peace movement and for other soldiers in a similar dilemma.

Although Yesh G'vul is a small group with limited human and financial resources, the unique thrust of its campaign has put it in the vanguard of the ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT. With members drawn from a range of political views, Yesh G'vul is not bound to any specific peace program. Its overall aim is to terminate the OCCUPATION and to combat the misuse of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES for offensive actions that result in high numbers of civilian casualties. The group supports the TWO-STATE SOLUTION as the key to peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and in the interests of both peoples. (www.yeshgvul.org).

See also CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS; COURAGE TO REFUSE; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAELI PEACE MOVEMENT; REFUSER SOLIDARITY NETWORK

Yisrael b'Aliya

Yisrael b'Aliya (Israel on the Rise) was a right-wing, secular, Zionist political party founded in 1995 by NATAN SHARANSKY, a Russian human rights activist and dissident, to articulate the needs of Russian immigrants in Israel. In 1996, Yisrael b'Aliya won seven Knesset seats; in 1999, six seats; and in 2000, four seats. After what was considered a poor showing in the 2003 election in which it won only two seats, Sharansky resigned as party leader. The party subsequently merged

with the LIKUD PARTY. The party worked to address unemployment and underemployment, lack of adequate housing, and discrimination, among other trials faced by newly arriving immigrants. It supported continued SETTLEMENT in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, opposed a Palestinian state, and conditioned any deal with the Palestinians on the democratization of Palestinian society. To this end, the party proposed establishing a coordinating body, headed by the UNITED STATES, to prepare Palestinians for democracy. This body would operate for at least three years and ensure that democratic conditions were right before negotiations with Israel could begin and perhaps move toward a final agreement. The coordinating body would formulate an EDUCATION curriculum that advocates peace and ensures political, speech, and journalistic freedom for Palestinians. During the time in which the body was in operation, Israel would continue to shoulder responsibility for security and RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT of Palestinians. These ideas were a reflection of those promoted by Sharansky in his book *The Case for Democracy*, said to have had a major influence on President George W. Bush in his approach to Israel and the Palestinians.

See also IMMIGRATION; MOSCOW

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Yisrael Beitenu

Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home), founded in 1999 by AVIGDOR LIEBERMAN and several other men disaffected with the LIKUD PARTY especially with the 1997 WYE RIVER MEMORANDUM, which they considered a complete negation of fundamental Zionist principles, is a right-wing political party in Israel whose main support comes from immigrants from the former SOVIET UNION. The party describes itself as "a national movement with the clear vision to follow in the brave path of [VLADIMIR] ZE'EV JABOTINSKY, the founder of Revisionist ZIONISM." Yisrael Beitenu takes a very hard line against the PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL and Palestinians in the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, the former characterized by their 2009 election slogan "No loyalty, no citizenship." It also encourages socioeconomic opportunities for new immigrants in conjunction with efforts to increase Jewish IMMIGRATION generally.

The two key principles held by the Yisrael Beitenu movement are the creation of a favorable socioeconomic environment for new immigrants to Israel and a hard line on the Palestinians and other Arab states. By giving in to PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) president YASIR ARAFAT's demands, argued Yisrael Beiteinu, the government would aggravate the threat of Palestinian activism by strengthening the Palestinians' resolve to demand the right of return of Palestinian REFUGEE families to Israeli territory.

In the 1999 elections the new Yisrael Beitenu won four seats. On 1 February 2000 the party joined an alliance with the NATIONAL UNION PARTY, itself a coalition of right-wing parties led by BENYAMIN ELON. In the 2003 elections the joint list won seven seats, with Yisrael Beiteinu being given four of them. The alliance joined ARIEL SHARON's government and Lieberman was made minister of transport; however, the party left the government on 6 June 2004, in opposition to the plan for ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA. In 2005 the party received much attention when it published the "Lieberman Plan" as an alternative to plans for the Israeli unilateral disengagement from Gaza. Lieberman's plan would transfer most Israeli Palestinian citizens and some small parcels of pre-1967 land to the WEST BANK in exchange for recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the larger settlements in the Occupied Territories, including Gush Katif (in Gaza). The plan would transfer to the PNA areas that include the "triangle" in central Israel—Taibe, Tira, and Umm el-Fahm. The plan was condemned by most members of the Knesset as racist and also caused a stir among Israeli Arabs, many of whom identify with the Palestinians as compatriots yet call for equal status in Israel as citizens and want to remain there. Yisrael Beitenu calls the Arab Israelis a Trojan horse for Jews in the state of Israel.

On 1 February 2006, shortly before the elections that year, the party split from National Union in order to run alone in the elections. The election results saw the party increase in strength to eleven

seats. Although it remained outside EHUD OLMERT's government formed in May 2006, it joined the coalition in October 2006; however, in 2007, when LABOR PARTY leader Amir Peretz nominated a Muslim for the position of minister of science and technology, Lieberman condemned the nomination and called for Peretz's resignation, accusing him of harming Israel's security, while Peretz accused Yisrael Beiteinu of being a racist party. Yisrael Beiteinu's member of the Knesset Esterina Tartman referred to Peretz's decision as a "lethal blow to Zionism," adding that a Muslim's presence in the cabinet would damage "Israel's character as a Jewish state," and that "we need to destroy this affliction from within ourselves. God willing, God will come to our help." Tartman's comments were immediately condemned as racist by other Knesset members.

In January 2008 the party left the government of Ehud Olmert in protest against talks with the Palestinian National Authority, saying certain issues negotiated were not to be tolerated. Lieberman pulled out of the government and left his position as minister of strategic affairs. On 22 December 2008, Lieberman approved the party's list for the 2009 elections. The results of that election saw the party win fifteen seats, making it the third largest after the KADIMA PARTY (28) and Likud (27). In March 2009 Yisrael Beiteinu joined BENJAMIN NETANYAHU's coalition, and party leader Avigdor Lieberman became deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, while the party received four other ministerial portfolios and one deputy minister post.

Yisrael Beiteinu came to international public attention again in May 2009, when it announced it would propose laws banning Israeli Arabs from marking the anniversary of the Palestinian *Nakba,* with a jail term of up to three years for violators. Arabs mark Nakba Day on 15 May every year. The *New York Times* reported that the proposed ban was widely viewed as a violation of Israel's free speech laws. The draft bill was changed by ministers to bar public money being spent in recognition of Nakba Day.

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Yom Kippur War

See OCTOBER WAR

Yosef, Rabbi Ovadia (1920–)

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (Abdullah Youssef) is an Israeli Orthodox rabbi, Talmudic scholar, and recognized authority in Halakha (Jewish religious law). A former SEPHARDIC chief rabbi of the state of Israel, he is the founder and current spiritual leader of the SHAS political party in Israel. A major figure in HAREDI (ultra-Orthodox) Judaism and revered by his followers, he considers voting in elections the key to influencing the government of Israel.

Born in Baghdad, IRAQ, as part of the ancient community of Iraqi Jews, Yosef immigrated to JERUSALEM with his family in 1924. He received *semicha* (rabbinical ordination) at the age of twenty and served at various times as chief rabbi of EGYPT and of the cities of Tel Aviv and HAIFA. He lives in the Jerusalem neighborhood of Har Nof. Yosef is considered a scholarly genius with an encyclopedic memory, and many religious Jews view him as a grand Halakha arbiter, as well as one of the most important religious authorities for Sephardic and MIZRAHI Jews—that is, Jews of Spanish and Portuguese origin and of Middle Eastern origin, respectively. He has sought to gain equality or even superiority for Sephardic religious interpretations over ASHKENAZI (Jews of European origin) interpretations, which are dominant within Israel.

Rabbi Yosef is also one of the most powerful figures on Israel's political and cultural scene. He has devoted untold energy to politically organizing Sephardic and Mizrahi Jews. In these efforts, he has enjoyed a fair degree of success in changing Israeli society and the perception of much of its population regarding Jewish culture and worship by non-European Jews. As the spiritual leader of Shas, the major Haredi party, Yosef has an agenda much broader than mere politics. His goal is to shift Israeli culture and ideology as well as Jewish religious practices toward conservative Orthodoxy under Sephardic laws and practices.

In the past, Yosef and the Shas party supported the peace process, maintaining that giving land to the Palestinians could be justified because it would increase Israel's security and save Jewish lives. However, in the mid-1990s Yosef took Shas far to the right, and he is famous or infamous for the derogatory comments he has made about Palestinians. As the OSLO PROCESS stalled and relations between Israelis and Palestinians began to deteriorate, especially following the outbreak of the AL-AQSA INTIFADA, Rabbi Yosef and the party pulled "rightward," supporting the LIKUD PARTY. In April 2001, for example, he stated: "How can you make peace with a snake? They [the Palestinians] are all accursed, wicked ones. They are all haters of Israel. It says in the Gemara that the Holy One, Blessed be He, is sorry he created these sons of Ishmael. . . . It is forbidden to be merciful to them. You must give them missiles, with relish—and annihilate them. Evil ones, damnable ones." He has also referred to Arabs as enemies who have tried to hurt the Jewish people from the time of the exodus from Egypt to this day. He generated further controversy in 2000 when he declared that Prime Minister EHUD BARAK had "no sense" because he was trying to make peace with the Palestinians. "Will we make peace with a snake?" he asked.

Despite his overt racism, an article in the Hebrew daily newspaper *Ma'ariv* identified Yosef as the second most influential rabbi in Israel, second only to Rabbi Yosef Shalom Eliashiv. Mainly because he controls the Knesset members of Shas, he has considerable political strength. In the 1999 Knesset elections, Shas won seventeen seats, putting it in a position to be the pivotal factor in any coalition it chose to join. In 2003 the party dropped to eleven seats, and in 2006 received twelve seats.

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Young Guard

See INTIFADA ELITE

Youth Revenge Group

The Youth Revenge Group (Revenge Youth Organization, Munazzamat Shabab al-Tha'r) was the first Palestinian group associated with the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN) to organize for ARMED STRUGGLE. In 1965 MAN leader GEORGE HABASH decided to begin preparations for guerrilla warfare against Israel and the conservative Arab regimes of JORDAN and EGYPT, and he directed part of MAN, the Palestinian Action Command, to rename itself Youth Revenge Group and begin recruitment in the GAZA STRIP. In 1967 MAN and another group affiliated with it—Heroes of the Return (Abtal al-Awda)—joined with the PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT to form the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE.

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Al-Zabri, Mustafa (1938–2001)

Mustafa al-Zabri (Abu Ali Mustafa) was a Palestinian nationalist, a resistance leader, and an official of the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP). He was born in the WEST BANK village of Arraba, near JENIN, which came under Jordanian occupation in 1948. In 1955 al-Zabri joined the MOVEMENT OF ARAB NATIONALISTS (MAN); two years later JORDAN imprisoned him for five years for his role in guerrilla raids into Israel, which brought massive retaliation by Israel on Jordan. In 1963 he emerged as a militant pro-Palestinian and was an early proponent of MAN in Jordan from 1966 until he was rearrested that same year. Al-Zabri planned and executed numerous *fida'iyyun* attacks on Israel. In 1965 he received military training in EGYPT and had a key role in reestablishing MAN-PFLP's position in Jordan after the 1967 WAR. In September 1967 he infiltrated the West Bank to lead supporters there, heading the PFLP's operations and barely escaping an Israeli crackdown in January 1968. He became the PFLP's military commander in late 1968, and, after AHMAD JIBRIL split from the PFLP, he held responsibility for military affairs following the first PFLP politburo in February 1969. Al-Zabri was considered a "rightist" within the PFLP, opposing leftist mobilization for action based on communist ideology within the ranks.

In September 1970 al-Zabri played a decisive role in the hijacking of commercial airliners to Jordan's Dawson Field and only escaped from 'Ajlun in July 1971 because Jordan's intelligence chief, Muhammed Rasul al-Kaylani, escorted him to Jordan's SYRIAN border. Subsequently, al-Zabri adopted a clear leadership role, especially after April 1972, when he assumed control over the PFLP in Jordan and the West Bank. In 1981 GEORGE HABASH appointed him deputy secretary-general, and he led the PFLP's delegation to the Aden-Algiers talks in 1984, which attempted to reunify the fractured PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO). Beginning in 1987, al-Zabri was the PFLP's representative to the European Community. He strongly supported IRAQ's invasion of KUWAIT but was taken off the PLO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL in September 1991, allegedly to assume effective control of the PFLP after Habash suffered the first of two strokes. With Israel's permission, al-Zabri returned to the West Bank in 1999, intending to live there. When Habash stepped down in April 2000, he appointed al-Zabri head of the PFLP, and in July 2000 al-Zabri was elected secretary-general of the PFLP.

One year later, on 27 August 2001, Israel assassinated him for allegedly creating an infrastructure of PFLP supporters among the Palestinian residents of East JERUSALEM, though it did not accuse him of perpetrating or inciting violence. The killing caused outrage among Palestinians, tens of thousands of whom took to the streets for an emotional funeral. Many saw it as a sign that Israel was now targeting their political as well as military leaders. On 17 October 2001, two months after Israel assassinated al-Zabri, a small PFLP commando group killed REHAVAM ZE'EVI, Israeli minister of tourism, in retaliation for al-Zabri's killing.

See also ADEN-ALGIERS ACCORD; TARGETED ASASSINATIONS

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Zangwill, Israel (1864–1926)

Israel Zangwill, an Anglo-Jewish writer and political activist, was probably the best-known Jew in the English-speaking world at the start of the twentieth century. He was born in London to parents who had emigrated from Eastern Europe, and his family eventually settled in London's East End, where Zangwill attended and then taught in the Jews' Free School. He graduated from the University of London in 1884 with honors in English, French, and mental and moral science.

Zangwill began his career as a journalist and humor writer, contributing to Jerome K. Jerome's periodical *The Idler* as well as to Jewish periodicals.

His novel *Children of the Ghetto*, first published in 1892, made him a literary celebrity. It was followed by the collections *Ghetto Tragedies* (1893 and 1899), *Dreamers of the Ghetto* (1898), and *Ghetto Comedies* (1907), plus the comic novel *The King of Schnorrers* (1894), as well as several novels and many stories not specifically on Jewish themes. Additionally, throughout the 1890s, Zangwill was a literary and social critic for British and US magazines.

Zangwill was an early supporter of ZIONISM and an insistent proponent of TRANSFER of Palestinians to other Arab states. He was a leading member of the Order of Ancient Maccabeans, a Zionist society already established in 1891, before THEODOR HERZL visited London in 1895. The father of modern political Zionism met with Zangwill, who arranged for Herzl to address the leaders of Anglo Jewry. In April 1897 he was a member of a group of English Jews who went on a pilgrimage to Palestine. In the course of this visit, Zangwill had the opportunity to see the Arab situation firsthand. In one of his meetings with ELIEZER BEN-YEHUDAH, Zangwill raised the question of what to do about the Arabs but was not happy with Ben-Yehudah's answer that they are a people the Israelis could live with in peace. However, it took Zangwill a few years to formulate his own solution to the Arab question.

In the December 1904 issue of the American Jewish newspaper *The Maccabaean,* Zangwill put forward his proposal for the transfer of Arabs from Palestine in an article entitled "Zionism and England's Offer": "There is, however, a difficulty from which the Zionist dares not avert his eyes, though he rarely likes to face it. Palestine proper has already its inhabitants. . . . So we must be prepared either to drive out by the sword the tribes in possession as our forefathers did, or to grapple with the problem of a large alien population, mostly Mohammedan and accustomed for centuries to despise us." He also wrote that the Zionists must extend their "idea of Palestine" at least to the Euphrates and the border of EGYPT.

After the seventh WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESS of 1905 rejected the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Uganda, Zangwill founded the Jewish Territorial Organization (JTO), which was dedicated to the establishment of a Jewish autonomous settlement in any part of the world. Under Zangwill, the JTO considered territories in North and East Africa, Australia, Mexico, Canada, and elsewhere. He thus lost interest in Palestine until the end of World War I, when he returned to the Zionist fold and accordingly returned to his proposal, as summed up in the words of Joseph Nedava: "The Arabs of Palestine must vacate the land designated to be the Jewish State." Following the issuance of the BALFOUR DECLARATION the JTO fell into decline, and in 1925 it was officially dissolved. Zangwill then supported Zionist efforts in Palestine, calling for a radical approach with regard to both the demand for the early establishment of a Jewish state and the solution of the Palestinian question.

In a lecture delivered to the Fabian Society in December 1915, Zangwill broached his plan for the transfer of the Arabs from Palestine. "Unless therefore, the Arabs would trek into Arabia, or could be peacefully expropriated, any Government set up on a constitutional democratic basis would result, not in a Jewish autonomy but in an Arab autonomy." A few years later, he wrote that if the Jewish national home were "to be built up without an Arab trek, it can only be by methods strictly unconstitutional." In the summer of 1916, Zangwill met near London with VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY, the founder of Revisionist Zionism. Over twenty years later, in 1939, Jabotinsky wrote an account of his "Conversation with Zangwill," which mainly dealt with Zangwill's proposals for the Arabs of Palestine. Jabotinsky did not agree with Zangwill about transfer, and he was offended at Zangwill's comment that "to allow such a situation in our Jewish state [allowing the Palestinians to remain] would be like gouging out our eyes with our hands. If we receive Palestine, the Arabs will have to 'trek.'" (The reference to the word *trek* is related to the "Great Trek" made by the Boers of South Africa: Zangwill evidently had such a mental image of the Palestinians leaving Palestine.)

In an article written a few months before the publication of the Balfour Declaration, in which the British promised Zionists a national home in Palestine, Zangwill again tried to grapple with the Arab problem in Palestine. "The country holds 600,000 Arabs," he wrote, "and unfortunately the soil is occupied by the Arabs." He considered that the "only solution of this difficulty lies in the consideration that Palestine is not so much occupied by the Arabs as over-run by them. . . . We cannot allow the Arabs to block so valuable a piece of historic reconstruction. . . . And therefore we must greatly

persuade them to 'trek.' After all, they have all Arabia with its million square miles—not to mention the vast new area freed from the Turks between SYRIA and Mesopotamia—and Israel has not a square inch." Finally, he wrote that the Arabs should be encouraged "to fold their tents" and "silently steal away."

In one of his books, Zangwill stated categorically that his "suggestion of amicable race-redistribution or a voluntary trek" was the only method of creating a Jewish state in Palestine. "If it is as impracticable as is generally alleged, then the whole Zionist project is a chimera." Referring in a letter to historic precedents in the universal migrations of primitive people, Zangwill added that the "Arab semi-nomadic *fellah* had created nothing in Palestine to attach him to the soil." Hence, there was "no Arab people living in intimate fusion with the country, utilizing its resources and stamping it with a characteristic impress: there is at best an Arab encampment." He recommended again that the Arab carry "his primitive plough to his own new and vast Arabian kingdom." Thus, he argued, the Arabs would be masters in their own house and in a state of peace rather than in perpetual friction with the Jews of Palestine.

In a response to a critic, journalist and diplomat Lucien Wolf, Zangwill wrote that, "if, as you say, the Arabs have been in Palestine 2000 years, then it is high time they trekked, like the Boers from Cape Colony." In reply to Zangwill's letter, Wolf wrote, "If the so-called Arabs were really Arabs—that is, natives of Arabia—and if the Jews were really Palestinians—that is indigenes of Palestine—there might be something to be said for your argument on the crazy basis of Territorial Nationality, which is the root curse of all our policies. But the Arabs are not Arabs. They are only the Moslemized descendants of the indigenous Canaanites, and hence they are in their rightful homeland which, however poor and feckless they may be, is their own. This is so well established an anthropological fact that you will find it referred to as beyond dispute in any good encyclopedic article on Palestine."

Zangwill published numerous additional articles and correspondence in the *Jewish Chronicle* and elsewhere on the subject. In 1919 he wrote a piece in the *Open Forum* in which he argued that the Jews' claim to Palestine did not rest "merely on history" but also on the fact that, while they were the only people in the world without a national home, Palestine was at that time a derelict country. He then continued with his oft-repeated statement that the presence of 600,000 Arabs was the "gravest obstacle to the rise of the Jewish State." These Arabs had "created nothing there except trouble for the Jewish colonies, and should be gradually and amicably transplanted to the Arab Kingdom, which is to be re-established next door [in Arabia], and with which the Jewish State would cordially co-operate." Zangwill considered that race redistribution was "in the interests of general world happiness" and that it was one of the functions of the League of Nations.

In October 1923, at the invitation of the AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, Zangwill delivered a lecture at Carnegie Hall in New York. The audience included nearly 4,000 people at the hall, and the lecture was broadcast by radio throughout the UNITED STATES and to England. In this talk, which the *New York Times* headlined "Zangwill Calls Political Zionism a Vanished Hope," he declared that the Jews must forego their political hopes in Palestine or start a conflagration. In the course of this lecture, he commented that he would "always remain persuaded that a Jewish State was possible at the moment when the Arab was a defeated enemy, liberated from the Turk and glad enough to take on any political impress [including] . . . a policy of racial redistribution such as is now in operation between the Greeks and the Turks." An editorial in the New York Jewish weekly *The New Palestine* pointed out that this address made headlines on the following day all over the United States and that there was a "volley of protests and denunciations" against his general theme that Jews must give up their hopes regarding Palestine, but no criticism of his comments about the Arabs.

In the period following the establishment of the BRITISH MANDATE over Palestine, the British expressed strong opposition to the transfer of Arabs from Palestine. Toward the end of 1919, Winston Churchill had said, "There are the Jews, whom we are pledged to introduce into Palestine, and who take it for granted that the local population will be cleared out to suit their convenience," but London was not going to accommodate them. Just over a year or so later, AARON AARONSOHN (one of the founders of the secret NILI organization), who had earlier been a critic of Zangwill's ideas, suggested

a transfer proposal for the Arabs. According to William Bullitt, a member of the US delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Aaronsohn proposed that, because "Palestine was to be turned into a Jewish state, the Arabs of Palestine should be offered land in IRAQ—more fertile than their holdings in Palestine—in the hope of persuading large numbers of Arabs to emigrate to Iraq." It took some fifteen years for the majority of the mainstream Zionist leaders to become enthusiastic supporters of transfer. Zangwill had been a decade and a half ahead of his time.

See also TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; TRANSFER COMMITTEE; WAR, 1948; YOSEF WEITZ

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Zayyad, Tawfiq (1929–1994)

Tawfiq Zayyad was a poet, writer, politician, member of the RAKAH PARTY, member of the Knesset, and mayor of NAZARETH. Born in Nazareth, he remained there after the 1948 WAR and became an Israeli citizen. Zayyad was educated in MOSCOW. In 1975 he was elected mayor of Nazareth and was reelected until his death. In 1976 he was elected to the Knesset on the Communist Party slate of Rakah and was repeatedly reelected until his resignation in 1991. He was also a key figure in the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

Zayyad's poetry has strong rhetorical lyricism and reflects an uncompromising streak of Palestinian Arab nationalism. He published one collection of Palestinian folk poetry and many other poems. His most well-known poems include "Fire of the Magi," "The Impossible," "Here We Will Stay," and "On the Trunk of an Olive Tree." Typical of his style is the first stanza of "Here We Will Stay": "As though we were twenty impossibilities / In LYDDA, in RAMLA, in Galilee / We shall remain. / Like a wall upon your chest, / And in your throat / Like a shard of glass, / A cactus thorn. / And in your eyes / A sandstorm." Israel's response to this kind of poetry was severe. Zayyad was repeatedly placed under town arrest for incitement.

In his poetry and in every other aspect of his life, Zayyad never let his Arab constituents forget the REFUGEES from the 1948 War. He had a monument constructed in Nazareth to those who were expelled from Palestine or had fled, which he hoped would be a permanent reminder of those Palestinians. When he first ran for mayor of Nazareth in 1975, Israeli government officials tried to stop his election. Part of Israel's concern stemmed from the fact that Zayyad was in the vanguard of forming a "front" in Israel—the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality—a coalition of Rakah, the Black Panthers (a group of MIZRAHI Jews), and independent Arab and Jewish figures. The front stood for peace and an end to Israeli OCCUPATION of Palestinian lands captured in 1967; it opposed annexation and confiscation of Palestinian LAND and fought racism in Israel. With these positions, it challenged the other major political parties in Israel.

Israeli officials offered the people of Nazareth the return of some land if Zayyad was not elected and made veiled threats against his life. Moshe Barain, the Israeli minister of the interior, said, "The people of Nazareth must not imagine that the state of Israel would allow the town administration to fall into the hands of an admitted agent of [YASIR] ARAFAT." Zayyad was a supporter of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO), but not an "agent" of Arafat; the PLO at that point did not recognize the Communist Party. The Israeli government felt so threatened by the prospect of Zayyad becoming mayor that it warned the residents of Nazareth that if they elected him, they would lose all government assistance to their community. At this time, in the mid-1970s, Nazareth had no industries, no public library, and no social services. A majority of its inhabitants, like those of the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, left their town every day to work in menial jobs in Israeli industry. From their windows many could see land they once farmed. Now, as "non-Jews," they could not live, rent, or even be employed on land that had belonged to their families for generations. They were ready to resist, and so they voted Zayyad into office.

When the government did, in fact, suspend its assistance after Zayyad was elected, he responded by creating a summer work camp in Nazareth that has, to this day, annually brought thousands of young people from around the world to perform community service and implement public works projects for the city. In an effort to bring some prosperity to Nazareth in the context of the third millennium of Christianity in 2000, Zayyad was successful in getting the VATICAN to choose Nazareth as one of three sites for the celebration. Just before his death, Zayyad met with Pope John Paul II to discuss the plan, which included a promise of substantial funds to build hotels, to restore the old Nazareth market, and to rebuild "Mary's Fountain" and other holy sites in Nazareth. He died in an automobile accident when returning to Nazareth from a meeting with PLO chairman Arafat in JERICHO.

See also HIGH FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE AND THE MADA MANIFESTO; NATZERAT ILLIT AND NAZARETH; NAZARETH; NAZARETH: BASILICA OF THE ANNUNCIATION; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; PALESTINIAN POETRY

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Ze'evi, Rehavam (1926–2001)

Rehavam Ze'evi, known as Gandhi, was an Israeli soldier and a politician. Born in 1926 in JERUSALEM, he started his career as an army officer in the PALMAH, the elite Zionist fighting force founded during the BRITISH MANDATE, and held the rank of major general when he retired in 1974. During the early 1970s, Ze'evi was military governor of the WEST BANK. He was the head of the MOLEDET PARTY and served in the Knesset from 1988 until his death, variously serving on the Foreign Affairs and Defense, Education and Culture, and State Control committees.

Ze'evi was one of the most extremist figures on the Israeli political scene. He vociferously advocated the TRANSFER of Palestinians from the Israeli-occupied West Bank and GAZA STRIP to the Arab nations of the region. This policy, he argued,

would "cure [Israel's] DEMOGRAPHIC ailment"—that the Arab population in Israel would otherwise become larger than the Jewish one. Ze'evi's fanaticism was evident in numerous public pronouncements, as when he condemned Palestinians working illegally in Israel as "lice" and a "cancer." He further said, "We should get rid of the ones who are not Israeli citizens the same way you get rid of lice." On various occasions he called US president GEORGE H. W. BUSH an "anti-Semite and a liar," PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION chairman YASIR ARAFAT a "viper" and a "war criminal," and former Israeli prime minister MENAHEM BEGIN "insane" for agreeing to the CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (1979) with EGYPT.

In March 2001 Ze'evi vowed to quell the Palestinians' Second INTIFADA by finding the Palestinians' "weak spots and pressing them until they come to us on all fours begging for a ceasefire." Ze'evi was an ardent supporter of Israel's strategy of TARGETED ASSASSINATIONS against Palestinians. He told an interviewer, "Each one eliminated is one less terrorist for us to fight." Ze'evi was a fierce advocate of retaining the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES and extending the Jewish SETTLEMENT project. He saw the settlers as pioneers in the reclamation of biblically ordained "Eretz Yisrael," although he was not a particularly observant Jew.

In 1988 Ze'evi joined YITZHAK SHAMIR's government, serving from February 1991 through January 1992, whereupon he resigned in protest over the peace talks at the MADRID CONFERENCE (1991). Moledet won three seats in the Knesset in 1992 and went into opposition. He returned briefly to shore up the beleaguered government of BENJAMIN NETANYAHU in 1998. In 1999 his Moledet movement united with HERUT and TEKUMA into a single faction, the NATIONAL UNION PARTY. Following the election of Prime Minister ARIEL SHARON in February 2001, Ze'evi joined the governing coalition and was made the minister of tourism on 7 March 2001. On 14 October Ze'evi declared that his party would quit the government following the withdrawal of the ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES from the Abu-Sneina neighborhood in HEBRON, condemning also Sharon's agreement to a Palestinian state and his alleged "sabotaging" of the Israeli military.

Ze'evi died on 17 October 2001 in an assassination by the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, in retaliation for Israel's assassination of the front's leader, MUSTAFA AL-ZABRI. Despite his radical views, Ze'evi was squarely within the Israeli political establishment. A year after his death, the Israeli government undertook a campaign to establish Ze'evi's heritage as a hero among Israeli icons. Respected opinion polls demonstrated that an estimated 20 to 30 percent of Israelis supported his call for transfer or mass expulsion of Palestinians. The government encouraged all schools to commemorate the date of his death by offering lessons about his "heritage." Not all schools were willing to do so, and something of a national controversy emerged. Those promoting Ze'evi's legacy controlled the Ministry of Education and other government institutions and identified themselves with a Jewish nationalism of territorial expansion and power. Those rejecting his ascent to hero status identified themselves with territorial compromise with the Palestinians and humanistic values. Whatever the outcome of the debate over Rehavam Ze'evi's place in Israeli history, it will reveal much about the future direction of Israel.

See also ANTI-SEMITISM; DEMOGRAPHY; TERRORISM

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Zeidan, Muhammad Ahmad Fahd Abbas (1948–2004)

Muhammad Ahmad Fahd Abbas Zeidan (also known as Abu al-Abbas, Muhammad Abbas, and Abul Abbas) was head of the PALESTINE LIBERA-

TION FRONT (PLF), an Iraqi-backed faction within the umbrella of the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) that carried out the *ACHILLE LAURO* hijacking in 1985. Born near HAIFA, Palestine, Zeidan's family was dispossessed in the 1948 WAR and settled in the Yarmuk REFUGEE camp near Damascus, SYRIA. He studied English and Arabic literature at Damascus University.

In 1968 Zeidan joined the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE, later leaving it to join the POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP–GC) under AHMAD JIBRIL. In 1977, major disagreements arose among the PFLP–GC, the PLO, and other Palestinian factions based in LEBANON. Zeidan, who opposed Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war and the pro-Syrian stance of the PFLP–GC, left Jibril's faction and created the PLF. After Israel's 1982 LEBANON WAR, and against the background of the rift in the PLO and the 1983 pro-Syrian FATAH UPRISING, the PLF split into three factions: pro-Syrian, pro-Iraqi, and pro-PLO. The pro-PLO group was led by Zeidan, joined the Arafat camp, and subsequently came under the patronage of FATAH and PLO chairman YASIR ARAFAT. In 1982 the PLF moved its headquarters to TUNIS, and in 1984 Zeidan was elected to the PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, while the PLF held seats in the PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL, the PLO's legislative body. Zeidan and the PLF consistently supported Arafat's peace initiatives, including the TWO-STATE SOLUTION and negotiations with Israel. Nevertheless, the PLF, from its inception and continuing after 1982, was fundamentally a guerrilla organization that carried out raids—mostly failures—against Israel.

The most prominent operation perpetrated after 1982 was the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* passenger liner, in which one passenger was killed. Despite intense US pressure, Arafat and the PLO leadership declined to condemn Zeidan for the hijacking, and Washington retaliated by terminating the low-level US-PLO DIALOGUE it had begun in December 1988. IRAQ president Saddam Husayn gave Zeidan asylum, and reportedly, Zeidan's PLF troops were trained in Husayn's hometown in Tikrit at bases belonging to the now-dissolved Republican Guard. In 1993 Zeidan laid down his arms when Arafat signed the OSLO ACCORDS. In an interview with CNN, he said the time of ARMED STRUGGLE was over and that it was time to rebuild Palestine with Arafat. After the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York, he gave an interview in the *New York Times* condemning TERRORISM and Osama bin Laden. In 1996 he returned to Palestine to attend the Palestine National Council meeting convened in the GAZA STRIP to amend the PALESTINE NATIONAL CHARTER and was welcomed by Arafat. During his stay in Gaza, as part of his effort to make peace with the past, Zeidan made a public apology for the *Achille Lauro* hijacking and the murder of passenger Leon Klinghoffer, and he openly supported the peace process and negotiations between Palestinians and Israel. The UNITED STATES government and the Klinghoffer family, however, rejected the apology; the family insisted that he be brought to justice, despite the large financial settlement it had earlier accepted from the PLO.

Zeidan last visited the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in August 2000, one month before the INTIFADA broke out. Arafat advised him not to return, fearing that the Israelis would either kill him, as they did many members of the resistance, or place him under house arrest (as was the case with Arafat, who was locked in his office in Ramallah beginning in December 2001). On 15 April 2003, US troops arrested Zeidan in Baghdad, Iraq, after defeating Husayn. The US Army accused him of involvement in acts of past terror and pledged to bring him to court, despite strong opposition in the Occupied Territories and the Arab world. Eventually the United States offered to extradite him to Italy, where he could be tried for the 1985 hijacking, but Italy declined to take him. The Italian government feared that detaining Zeidan or bringing him to court in Italy would provoke terrorist attacks against Italian targets. Instead, he was left sitting in a Baghdad jail while the United States decided what to do with him. On 9 March 2004 Zeidan died in US custody of heart problems, according to US officials, although there are numerous doubts and suspicions about this claim.

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Zinni Plan, 2002

Anthony Zinni served as a general in the UNITED STATES Marine Corps and as commander of the US Central Command (1997–2000), which oversaw theater operations for US armed forces in the

Middle East. At the request of President GEORGE W. BUSH, he produced a plan in 2002 for a truce between Palestinians and Israelis during the Second Intifada. Previously, he had commanded forces in Vietnam and Somalia as well as humanitarian relief operations in Kurdish areas of IRAQ in the aftermath of the 1991 GULF WAR. Following his retirement, he became one of the more outspoken critics among former high-ranking US military officers of the US war in Iraq.

In November 2001, to follow up on the failed cease-fire between Israel and the PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY (PNA) arranged by CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY director GEORGE TENET, President Bush dispatched the recently retired Zinni, who had only limited experience in diplomacy, as his special Middle East envoy. His mission was solely to establish a cease-fire between Israelis and Palestinians, not to restart negotiations.

Zinni's plan for a truce, presented on 26 March 2002, strayed from Tenet's proposals in putting the onus of responsibility on the Palestinian side. For example, he proposed that Palestinians "cease" violent activities, while asking the Israelis to "commit to cease." This new US proposal dropped the Tenet Plan's requirement that Israel stop its attacks on "innocent civilian targets" and the plan's restrictions against "proactive" Israeli military operations. Instead, Zinni's proposal permitted Israel to attack PNA buildings, including prisons, "in self-defense to an imminent terrorist attack."

In several other areas regarding the enforcement of a cease-fire, mutual obligations put forward in the Tenet Plan became unilateral Palestinian responsibilities under Zinni's plan. Israeli obligations regarding withdrawal from Palestinian areas reoccupied since September 2000 and ending CLOSURE of Palestinian population centers were reworded so that implementation was conditional upon Israel's interpretation of Palestinian compliance. In addition, PNA obligations regarding the suppression of armed Palestinian groups were strengthened, while Israeli obligations regarding curbing violence by armed settler groups were weakened. The Palestinians rejected such revisions from the Tenet Plan, while the Israeli government accepted the new proposals with reservations. A cease-fire never materialized.

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—Stephen Zunes

Zionism

From its emergence as a coherent political project at the very end of the nineteenth century, Zionism sought to unify and mobilize Jews around a nationalist program whose chief goal was the creation in Palestine of an independent Jewish state in which most of the world's Jews would eventually settle. Like other nationalist movements, however, Zionism has never been monolithic but has encompassed a range of distinct political and ideological currents and factions that have often disagreed (sometimes bitterly) over how to pursue Zionism's aims; the social, economic, and cultural character of the projected Jewish state; relations with Palestine's indigenous Arab population; and much else.

Palestinians have regarded Zionism (and the state of Israel, which it brought into being) as essentially a colonial-settler enterprise, whose goal or at least inevitable result was to dispossess them of their ancestral homeland and subordinate or even physically displace them; in fact, these have been the chief consequences of the Zionist project for the Palestinians. Zionists, however, have focused not on the actual consequences of their project for the Palestinians but on their own avowedly benign intentions and on the overriding need (as they see it) to save the Jewish people through the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, to which they deem Jews to have an exclusive, or at least superior, claim. To adequately understand Zionism as a historical phenomenon and to grasp the specificities, contradictions, and ironies of this project, it is therefore necessary to consider both Zionist discourse and Zionist practice, as well as to explore how intentions and ideologies translated, within specific historical conjunctures, into actual outcomes for the Palestinians and other Arabs but also for Jews.

Broadly speaking, Zionism can be seen as one of the many nationalist movements that sprang up in Europe in the course of the nineteenth century. At the same time, the fact that European Jews did not live in a compact mass, on a more or less defined territory within which they constituted the majority population, made Zionism different from other contemporary European nationalisms. It had to be a nationalist movement focused not on securing an independent nation-state for the Jews within Europe, where most of them actually lived—an obvious impossibility—but on organizing migration to and colonization of some territory outside Europe where the Jews could hope to secure a majority and eventually a state of their own. This reality, as well as Jewish immigrants' encounter in Palestine with that land's indigenous Arab population, profoundly shaped the Zionist project (and the state it created) and gave it much of its specificity.

Historical Origins of Zionism

From the perspective of modern Jewish history, Zionism was only one of several contending solutions proposed to address what in the late nineteenth century was often referred to as Europe's "Jewish problem": what many saw as the apparent failure (or even futility) of efforts to eradicate ANTI-SEMITISM and secure acceptance, integration, and equality for the Jews of Europe. In the medieval and early modern periods, Jews in Christian Europe were frequently subjected to segregation, discrimination, and persecution. However, from the French Revolution onward, Jews in much of Western and Central Europe were gradually granted equal legal status and citizenship rights, and social anti-Semitism seemed to be on the decline. The way thus appeared to be open for these Jews to integrate themselves on an equal basis into the societies in which they lived.

This process of "emancipation" did not extend, however, to most of Eastern Europe. In 1880, of the world's eight million Jews, 90 percent lived in Europe, with 75 percent of those in Eastern Europe—the great majority within the tsarist Russian empire. The Jews under tsarist rule (most of them impoverished) were generally compelled to live in certain provinces along Russia's western border, known as the PALE OF SETTLEMENT, forbidden to reside in many cities and towns even within the Pale, and subjected to various forms of official discrimination and harassment. The path of social, cultural, and political integration that emancipation had opened to many Jews in Western and Central Europe was thus not available to any significant number of Russian Jews. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Russian Jews (like the Jews of Central and Western Europe earlier) were affected by the cultural movement known as the HASKALAH (the Jewish "enlightenment"). This movement challenged Jewish religious tradition and (along with rapid urbanization, rising levels of education, and the spread of newspapers and book publishing) fostered the emergence of new forms of secular Jewish identity that defined the Jews as an ethnic or national group rather than as a religious community. In particular, the mid-nineteenth century witnessed the flourishing of a new secular culture in Yiddish, the mother tongue of virtually all Jews in the Pale (and most Jews elsewhere in Eastern Europe), and somewhat later (and on a smaller scale) a literary revival in Hebrew, a language that had hitherto been used largely for religious purposes.

The situation of the Jewish masses in Russia was thus characterized by both poverty (exacerbated by rapid demographic growth) and virulent anti-Semitism, both official and popular. Their condition worsened with the outbreak of a wave of pogroms (mob attacks on Jews) in 1871, and then on a much wider scale in 1881–1884 after the assassination of the relatively liberal Tsar Alexander II. The extent and duration of that second wave of violence, and the fact that the Russian authorities tolerated or even encouraged it, extinguished any hope among Jews that the tsarist regime would evolve in a more liberal direction. And although it was the crisis of Eastern European Jewry that seemed most acute, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century new manifestations of anti-Semitism in Western and Central Europe also began to undermine the confidence of many apparently well-integrated and middle-class Jews. They became less able to take for granted that the spread of education and social progress would secure their status as full and equal citizens of their native lands.

Many different analyses of and proposed remedies for the Jewish problem in its late nineteenth-century manifestations were formulated and debated. In the east, a great many Jews simply "voted with their feet" in the hope of escaping poverty and oppression and of finding tolerance and opportunity. Several million Jews from Eastern Europe joined the vast 1880–1924 wave of impoverished European Christian peasants and

workers who left their homelands emigrating mainly to the UNITED STATES but also, in smaller numbers, to Western Europe, Latin America, and South Africa. Estimates show that in the first quarter of the twentieth century alone—before the United States and other Western countries sharply curtailed IMMIGRATION from Eastern and Southern Europe—about one-fifth of all European Jews migrated overseas.

Of the majority who remained, a great many, especially in the east, held fast to religious tradition, following the lead of their rabbis who generally rejected and resisted the new secular ideas and modes of life that were undermining the old ways (and their own status as communal leaders). But in the same period many secularized Jews in Russia rebelled against both their own communal elites and the double burden of class and ethnic oppression from which the Jews of tsarist Russia suffered. Substantial numbers joined clandestine parties and movements seeking to overthrow the tsarist autocracy and establish a democratic and socialist Russia purged of anti-Semitism. Of these, some joined all-Russian revolutionary socialist parties, in whose leadership Jews came to play a disproportionately large role. Others were attracted to the Jewish-socialist Bund, founded in 1897 to organize and mobilize Jewish workers as an independent component of the Russian social democratic movement.

Proto-Zionism in Eastern Europe

Others, though initially a small minority, came in this same period to embrace a very different solution to the crisis that seemed to be engulfing the Jews, especially in Eastern Europe. In the nineteenth century, the notion that the nation (usually distinguished by its unique language) was the key unit into which humanity was naturally divided spread widely across Europe and beyond. This notion informed struggles by a growing number of peoples to throw off what now came to be perceived as alien (and therefore illegitimate) rule and secure unified and independent nation-states of their own. Jews could not ignore the struggles for national independence and unification waged in the course of that century by Greeks, Serbs, Poles, Italians, Hungarians, Germans, and other European peoples, especially as the creation of new polities based on nationality often raised the question of whether their indigenous Jewish minorities would be accepted as part of the new "national family." In this context, and given the spread in this same period of new secular and ethnic forms of Jewish identity, it is entirely unsurprising that some Jews began to reimagine Jewish identity in a new national sense and to argue that the Jewish problem could only be resolved through the creation (or restoration, as they saw it) of a national homeland for the Jews. This, they believed, would enable the Jews to overcome their "abnormal" lack of their own national territory, shed their status as a dispersed and alien minority, achieve national-cultural rebirth, and take their rightful place as an equal member of the family of (European) nations.

Historically, rabbinic Judaism had rejected any engagement in politics or striving for political power. For the rabbis, the exile of the Jews from the land of Israel and their dispersion, subordinate status, and even sufferings were manifestations of God's will and could be rectified only at the end of days, with the coming of the Messiah, the restoration of the House of David, and the "ingathering of the exiles" in their ancestral homeland. In premodern Judaism, the land of Israel was deemed holy, venerated, and idealized, and prayers invoked and perpetuated the dream of an eventual return to it; but, in fact, one could be a good Jew wherever one lived, as long as one abided by God's law and fulfilled God's commandments. Over the centuries a trickle of Jews had migrated to and settled in Palestine, since 1516 part of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE, but they were not motivated by anything remotely resembling a state-building project; they came simply to live and be buried in the Holy Land, acts that were religiously meritorious but lacked any political meaning.

In the mid-nineteenth century, a handful of rabbis and secular Jews broke with this tradition by asserting that Jews could and should initiate their own redemption by returning to the land of Israel, but it was only later that these figures were rescued from their contemporary marginality and acclaimed as forerunners of Zionism. Around the same time, there also emerged the phenomenon of Christian Zionism, a belief among some Protestants that the restoration of the Jews to Palestine was a necessary precondition for the second coming of Christ, which fostered a heightened interest in notions and projects of this kind. Cheap transportation had made pilgrimage and tourism in the Holy Land easier for Europeans, and the land was more widely represented through the new technology of photography; as a result, Palestine came to occupy a new place in the imagination of Europe. Between the late 1860s

and the outbreak of World War I in 1914, a German Protestant sect known as the Temple Society (or Templers) went so far as to send a few thousand German Christian settlers to Palestine and established a number of agricultural and urban colonies there, an enterprise that has sometimes been portrayed as a precursor of Zionism.

But it was only in the aftermath of the Russian pogroms of 1881–1884, which sent a shock wave through European (and especially Russian) Jewry, that the idea of resolving the crisis by promoting Jewish immigration to and settlement in Palestine, and the reconstitution there of Jewish national life, began to gain traction among Jews. The adherents of the loose-knit movement that emerged in Russia to promote this project were known as HOVEVEI ZION, or Lovers of Zion. (*Zion* was originally a synonym for JERUSALEM but came to stand for the entire land of Israel; *Zionism* as the standard term for Jewish nationalism emerged in the 1890s.) As romantic nationalists, the ideologists and activists of the Hovevei Zion movement saw Jewish migration to Palestine as ontologically different from Jewish migration to any other place. It was not only, or even mainly, a quest for safety, tolerance, and opportunity; it was essentially a return through both space and time to the ancestral homeland. For these proto-Zionists, Palestine was the land in which the Jews had become a nation, and it remained the only place on earth where—through their devotion, their love, and their labor on the LAND—they could tap into the wellsprings of the nation's eternal spirit and achieve both personal and collective regeneration.

Beginnings of Zionist Settlement in Palestine

In Zionist historiography, 1881 is taken as the beginning of the First ALIYA (wave of modern Jewish immigration to Palestine, from the Hebrew term for "going up," because pilgrimage to Jerusalem and, by extension, migration to the land of Israel were traditionally depicted as an ascent). Although this date is often depicted as a momentous milestone in Jewish history, in reality this was a very modest beginning: by 1891 eight new Jewish agricultural settlements (called *moshavot*) had been established in Palestine on land purchased with funds raised in Eastern Europe, with a total population of about 2,400, mainly immigrants from Russia but also from Romania, whose government was equally notorious for its anti-Semitism.

But the Hovevei Zion movement lacked the resources to sustain a settlement project even on this modest scale, and within a few years many of the new settlements were on the verge of bankruptcy and collapse. They were rescued by the generosity of BARON EDMOND JAMES DE ROTHSCHILD (1845–1934), an assimilated and very wealthy French Jew who had little interest in Hovevei Zion's romantic nationalism but was aroused by the plight of the Eastern European Jewish masses. Rothschild favored Jewish resettlement—though preferably not in FRANCE, where an influx of poor Yiddish-speaking Jews from the east might fan the flames of anti-Semitism and undermine the tenuous place that the Rothschilds and other assimilated Jews had secured in French society. Rothschild, and later other Jewish philanthropists, assumed control of many of the settlements and provided them with large-scale financial support, along with technical assistance and a large dose of paternalistic supervision.

By 1900 there were twenty-two *moshavot* in Palestine with a total population of about 5,000. Most of these settlements were organized on the model preferred by Rothschild and his agents, which was similar to that employed in this same period in French-ruled Algeria to settle European immigrants on land confiscated from the indigenous Muslim population: European Jewish farmers employed local Arab peasants to cultivate their vineyards, citrus groves, and fields. Zionist historiography has tended to highlight these farmers as the forerunners of Zionism's settlement and state-building project and as the dynamic new element within the Yishuv (the Hebrew term for the Jewish community in pre-1948 Palestine). Yet the great majority of the Jews in Palestine, including most of those who came during the First Aliya of 1881–1903, preferred to live in towns, and many (including traditionally religious Jews and indigenous Arabic- or Ladino-speaking Jews) belonged to what Zionist historiography denigrates as the "Old Yishuv." The latter was then still quite distant from, or even opposed to, the vision of Jewish national-cultural rebirth in Palestine put forward by the Hovevei Zion. In any case, the momentum of proto-Zionism in Eastern Europe had largely dissipated by the mid-1890s.

Herzl and the Foundation of the Zionist Organization

It was THEODOR HERZL (1860–1904) who played the key role in reenergizing a diffuse and languishing proto-Zionism and recasting it into a

modern, institutionalized, and international mass political movement. Born in Budapest, Hungary, into a well-to-do and assimilated Jewish family, Herzl had only a superficial acquaintance with Jewish tradition and history; he identified strongly with German culture, and as a young man he moved to Vienna, Austria, capital of the multiethnic and polyglot Austro-Hungarian Empire, where he made a name for himself as a playwright and journalist. Though always aware of anti-Semitism, it was during the early 1890s, when Herzl lived in Paris as a correspondent for a Vienna newspaper, that he came to see it as both threatening and ineradicable, and eventually embraced Zionism as the only feasible response to it. The eruption in 1894 of the Dreyfus Affair, in which a French Jewish army officer was falsely convicted of espionage for Germany, demonstrated the extent of both official and popular anti-Semitism even in France, birthplace of the Enlightenment. Herzl's new convictions would be reinforced a year later by the sweeping victory of the openly anti-Semitic Christian Social Party in municipal elections in Vienna, his hometown.

In 1896 Herzl published a pamphlet whose title is usually translated into English as *The Jewish State*, though *The Jews' State* would be more accurate; as its subtitle explained, it offered "An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question." He argued that no matter what the Jews did, European Christians would inevitably see them as threatening aliens and subject them to exclusion, discrimination, persecution, or expulsion. Anti-Semitism was on the rise everywhere in Europe, and Herzl insisted that its religious, social, economic, and political causes were ineradicable. The only way out was to launch an organized effort to establish a Jewish state somewhere outside of Europe—Herzl proposed both Argentina and Palestine as possible sites—to which Jews could emigrate and in which they could build a free and independent national life and thereby benefit not only themselves but also all humanity.

Herzl's mention of Argentina in this context may seem strange today, but at the time many Europeans envisioned Argentina as a vast, fertile, but largely empty land suitable for large-scale settlement. Moreover, in the 1890s the JEWISH COLONIZATION ASSOCIATION, founded and financed by the Jewish railroad magnate Baron Maurice de Hirsch, actually resettled several thousand Russian Jews in Argentina as farmers on land Hirsch had purchased, and announced plans to bring many more. Herzl therefore found it possible to imagine that Argentina would be willing to cede some territory for a Jewish colony and eventually a Jewish state, especially as, in the mid-1890s, the colonization association's resettlement efforts in Argentina seemed more successful than those of the Hovevei Zion in Palestine.

In the years that followed the publication of *The Jewish State*, Herzl devoted himself to transforming an inchoate and fragmented proto-Zionism into a unified, coherent, and effective international political movement. In August 1897, thanks largely to Herzl's efforts, a ZIONIST CONGRESS convened in Basel, Switzerland, for the first time bringing together the Eastern European Hovevei Zion movement with Zionist societies and personalities from elsewhere in Europe. The congress formally established the Zionist Organization (later, WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION), with Herzl as its first president, and adopted a program declaring that Zionism sought "to secure for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured home in Palestine." Though it was clear that the Zionists ultimately sought a sovereign Jewish state, Zionist leaders chose the vague term *home* to avoid antagonizing the Ottoman government, whose support for Zionism Herzl hoped to win. At the same time, the words "publicly recognized" and "legally secured" signaled that this "home" was not to be simply a haven granted to Jewish refugees for humanitarian purposes. At a minimum it was to be an autonomous entity of some sort, a stepping-stone toward an eventual state, to be guaranteed by and recognized in INTERNATIONAL LAW, which would of course require the support of one or more of the European powers.

Herzl devoted the remaining seven years of his life to building the fledgling Zionist Organization into an institutionalized and effective mass movement and to obtaining from the Ottoman Empire or from one of the European powers a "charter" that would secure for Jews the right to settle in Palestine and enjoy some degree of autonomy there. Over the years, the Zionist Organization developed a ramified network of institutions, including elected decisionmaking bodies, a financial apparatus (initially called the JEWISH COLONIAL TRUST), and an agency to acquire land in Palestine for Jewish settlement (JEWISH NATIONAL FUND), and it gradually won adherents in Jewish communities across Europe

and beyond. But despite unremitting lobbying efforts, before World War I neither Herzl nor his successors were able to secure for Zionism a great-power sponsor, without which it had little prospect of success. In 1903 the British government seemed willing to offer the Zionists land for settlement in what was then called Uganda (situated in today's Kenya). Herzl favored pursuing this option, at least to secure a temporary haven for persecuted Jews, but the proposal almost split the Zionist movement, most of whose mass base bitterly opposed anywhere but Palestine as the site of the future Jewish homeland, and in the end the scheme came to nothing. For its part, the Ottoman government dismissed Herzl's grandiose promises that, in return for Palestine, wealthy Jews would rescue the empire from its desperate financial straits; instead, Istanbul sought to restrict immigration and land purchases in Palestine by foreign Jews, whom it regarded as potentially dangerous interlopers who might ultimately undermine Ottoman control of this part of its beleaguered empire.

Emergence of Labor Zionism and Religious Zionism

By the time Herzl died in 1904, the movement he had founded already encompassed rival factions that questioned his fixation on "political Zionism"—that is, the effort to secure a foothold in Palestine through diplomacy—and challenged the secular, liberal (in the nineteenth-century European sense of the term), and middle-class orientation he and his colleagues in the Zionist leadership embodied. Among them was a "Labor Zionist" or "socialist Zionist" camp, originally known as Po'ale Zion (Workers of Zion). This group combined Zionism with the socialism popular among the impoverished Jewish masses of Eastern Europe and advocated not big-power diplomacy but gradual immigration and settlement work in Palestine itself ("practical Zionism"), which would lead to the development there of a social democratic Jewish society that would, in turn, form the basis of the future Jewish state.

Adherents of Labor Party Zionism made up a significant proportion of Jewish immigrants to Palestine during the Second Aliya (1904–1914). These self-proclaimed pioneers (*halutzim*), much mythologized in Zionist historiography, were mainly idealistic single young men from Russia. They routinely used the term "Hebrew" instead of "Jewish" to refer to themselves and their organizations, in order to express their denigration and rejection of Diaspora Judaism, which they associated with statelessness and hence powerlessness, and to identify themselves with the ancient Hebrews, whom they idealized as a sovereign people firmly implanted in the soil of their homeland. They hoped upon their arrival in Palestine to transform themselves through physical labor into authentic and productive agricultural workers organically rooted in the land, thereby achieving both personal and national redemption and becoming the vanguard of the Zionist settlement project.

This vision, a blend of Tolstoyan agrarianism, utopian socialism, and romantic nationalism, soon ran headlong into realities in Palestine itself. The inability of these settlers to realize their vision raised the prospect that the Zionist project would founder because neither jobs nor sufficient resources for settlement (including both land and capital) were available to maintain them or attract others. Eventually, in the decade preceding World War I and into the 1920s, a process of trial and error resulted in the elaboration of a new strategy for the implementation of practical Zionism. Spearheaded by the Labor Zionist camp, it sought to create a separate, self-sufficient, and relatively high-wage Jewish economic sector in Palestine in which only Jews would be employed, thereby laying the foundation of an economically (and, eventually, politically) autonomous Yishuv. The Zionist leadership came to endorse and underwrite this strategy through subsidies, land purchases, capital investment, and political support, creating the basis for an alliance between the largely bourgeois Zionist leadership and the Labor Zionist movement. This alliance, as well as the latter's ability to organize and mobilize Jewish workers in Palestine into a potent sociopolitical force, would enable Labor Zionism to play the leading role in the Yishuv, the state of Israel, and the international Zionist movement for some four decades, from the 1930s into the 1970s.

Soon after the foundation of the Zionist Organization, a distinct religious Zionist tendency also emerged. Adherents of this tendency rejected the secularism of both the bourgeois liberals at the helm of the early Zionist movement and the socialist Zionists, but they also broke with the great majority of Orthodox rabbis who vociferously denounced Zionism as false messianism and state-worshiping idolatry. Instead, they sought to synthesize Orthodox Judaism and Zionism, arguing

that the two were (if properly understood) complementary rather than contradictory. Religious Zionist thinkers like AVRAHAM YITZHAK HACOHEN KOOK (1865–1935), who from 1921 until his death served as the first ASHKENAZI chief rabbi of Palestine, went so far as to construe the doings of even the most antireligious Zionists as furthering God's plan for the Jews and as harbingers of the imminent coming of the Messiah. In 1902, religious Zionists founded the MIZRAHI movement (an acronym for "spiritual center" that means "eastern"), which collaborated with Zionism's secular majority despite continuing conflicts over religious and cultural issues. Such conflicts persist in Israel to the present day, for example over demands by religious parties that the state use the criteria established by Orthodox Judaism to determine who is a Jew—an important issue given that being officially recognized as Jewish confers specific rights and privileges in the self-proclaimed Jewish state.

Zionism, Judaism, and the Question of Language

Even though most Zionists were secular and advocated a concept of Jewish identity based not on religion but on common nationhood, the movement freely appropriated symbols, practices, personalities, and episodes from the religious tradition and Jewish history, recast them in a "nationalized" form, and used them for its own purposes. For example, the international Zionist sports movement took its name from the Maccabees, the nickname of the Jewish family that, in 167 BCE, launched an ultimately successful revolt against Seleucid rule and for a time restored Jewish sovereignty in the land of Israel. Similarly, Zionists portrayed Shimon Bar Kokhba, leader of a failed revolt against the Romans in 132–135 CE, as a Jewish national hero even though generations of rabbis had condemned him as a false messiah whose hopeless rebellion had brought disaster upon the Jews. The Zionist movement also mythologized as national heroes the Jewish rebels who, in 73 CE, had reportedly committed suicide in the besieged fortress of Masada rather than surrender to the Romans. After 1948 the Israeli army invoked their example at torch-lit swearing-in ceremonies for new recruits staged at the excavated and reconstructed site. These rebels were exalted even though their revolt had resulted in the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, after which most rabbis made their peace with Roman rule, renounced the dream of political sovereignty, and forged a new kind of Judaism focused on achieving holiness in daily life by studying and obeying God's law. More broadly, Zionism's core vision of accomplishing the "redemption" of the Jews from the bane of "exile" can be seen as a secularized nationalist appropriation of Jewish messianism.

One key cultural issue over which the Zionist movement struggled in its early years and eventually achieved consensus and success was the question of language. As early as the First Aliya period, many of the Hovevei Zion had argued that Jewish national rebirth in Palestine required the revival and propagation of Hebrew. They believed that, because Hebrew was the language of the Bible and of the Jews when they had lived as a sovereign people in their own land, Hebrew must be the language of a modern Jewish state. This idea reveals how deeply Zionism partook of nineteenth-century romantic nationalism, which regarded a nation's language as a unique and crucial manifestation of and vehicle for its eternal spirit. Still, the victory of Hebrew was not a foregone conclusion. It required the efforts of people like ELIEZER BEN-YEHUDAH (1858–1922), a Hovevei Zion leader who came to Palestine in 1881 and played a key role in transforming Hebrew into a functional living language by (among other things) producing the first modern Hebrew dictionary. Often bitter struggles were waged by the advocates of Hebrew (including many of those who came to Palestine during the Second Aliya) against those who championed other languages, including Russian or German (deemed to be European languages of high culture) or even Yiddish, the mother tongue of the Eastern European Jewish masses. Hebrew eventually won out and flourished as the spoken and written language of the vast majority of the Jews in Palestine and later Israel.

Key Elements of Zionist Discourse

Whatever the differences among them, nearly all Zionists shared a set of core beliefs and a specific narrative of Jewish history. Zionism defined all Jews everywhere, regardless of language, culture, citizenship, or degree of religiosity, as constituting a single nation. That nation had emerged in ancient times in the land of Israel, and it had endured even when the Jews ceased to be a sovereign people in their own homeland and were eventually dispersed from it. Over the ensuing 2,000 years, scattered among other peoples, the Jews in the Diaspora had

lived (as Zionism portrayed it) in an abnormal situation of existential exile, because without a nation-state of their own they were rootless, powerless, and alienated from their essential nature, even when (as in modern liberal democratic states) they thought themselves settled, secure, and happy.

For Zionism, the Jews would never be able to assimilate in the lands of their exile: anti-Semitism was inevitable wherever Jews and non-Jews lived together, and neither education nor social change could eradicate it. Ultimately, even Jews in the most apparently tolerant and liberal European countries (and the UNITED STATES, as its Jewish population grew) would face growing anti-Semitism, find their situation intolerable, and be compelled to migrate. For Zionism, the only real and permanent solution to this state of affairs was the territorial concentration of all or most of the world's Jews in Palestine, where Jewish national rebirth and sovereignty would be achieved. In their own state the Jews could finally, after 2,000 years of rootlessness and abnormality, accomplish their "return to history" and again become a normal people, freed of the negative traits that exile had instilled in them. They would thereby secure what they had been denied for so long: acceptance as equals by their fellow Europeans.

Early on, the Zionist movement had included people (like Herzl himself in *The Jewish State*) who were willing to consider lands other than Palestine as the object of Zionism. But advocates of this approach, who became known as Territorialists, seceded from the Zionist Organization after the failure of the Uganda scheme, and their separate organization soon faded away. For the great majority of Zionists, the land of Israel had played too central a role in Jewish history, especially as the site of ancient Jewish statehood, and still occupied too important a place in the Jewish imagination, however idealized or symbolic, to allow anywhere but Palestine to excite much interest as the land in which the restoration of the Jewish nation was to take place.

But at the outbreak of World War I, Zionism had yet to win the support of the majority of Jews in the Diaspora; indeed, until World War II it remained a minority movement among Jews and the object of a great deal of controversy and criticism. As noted, most Orthodox Jews regarded it as a form of false messianism and a secularizing heresy, and they denounced its glorification of the nation-state rather than of God's law as set forth in the Torah and the Talmud. At the same time, many secular and liberal Jews in Western and Central Europe, and in the United States, rejected what they saw as Zionism's embrace of the key premise of anti-Semitism—that in the long run non-Jews could never accept Jews living among them as equals—because it negated their own hopes of living in their native lands as full and equal citizens.

Jewish socialists in Russia and elsewhere were equally critical of Zionism. Rather than traipsing off to Palestine and pursuing some utopian pipe dream there, they believed that Jews (most of whom were poor) should remain in their native lands, organize themselves, and fight for their rights, which could only be permanently secured in the era of equality and social justice that would ensue after the overthrow of capitalism. Jewish socialists denounced Herzl's efforts to promote Zionism to reactionaries and anti-Semites, in Russia and elsewhere, by claiming that it would weaken Jews' attraction to socialism and reduce their numbers through emigration. They were particularly outraged when, in 1903, Herzl met with top officials of the tsarist government, including Interior Minister V. K. Plehve, who was regarded by Jews as a notorious anti-Semite responsible for a bloody pogrom in Kishinev just a few months earlier. Both Jewish socialists in Eastern Europe and Jewish liberals in Western and Central Europe rejected Zionism's call for all Jews to leave the European lands where they had lived for many centuries. They argued that Zionism was thereby abetting anti-Semitism, to the detriment of the vast majority of European Jews, who had no intention of migrating to Palestine and wanted equality and a better life in what they saw as their homelands, or in places like the United States, which Zionism considered just one more dead end.

Even some Jews who were sympathetic to Zionism criticized Herzl and his fellow political Zionists for what they saw as an unrealistic and counterproductive fixation on a Jewish state that would quickly encompass all or most of the world's Jews. For example, Asher Ginzberg (1856–1927), far better known by his pen name AHAD HA'AM (One of the People), was the preeminent Hebrew essayist of his day and the leading literary light and publicist of the Hovevei Zion movement. As he saw it, Herzl's concept of a Jewish state (more accurately, a state for the Jews) lacked any authentic Jewish content—Herzl seems to have

envisioned it as a sort of Switzerland that happened to be inhabited by Jews—while the notion that millions of poor Jews could quickly be settled in Palestine was a fantasy. Ahad Ha'am insisted that what the Jewish people really needed, and what Zionism could actually attain in the foreseeable future, was the creation in Palestine of a relatively small but vibrant community that could serve as a spiritual center, a sort of incubator for the revival of a flourishing Jewish national culture that could sustain and inspire the Jews in the Diaspora as they confronted the challenges of the modern world.

Ahad Ha'am is often regarded as the founder of "Cultural Zionism," a loose-knit current within the broader Zionist movement that emphasized Jewish cultural revival rather than political action and state-building. A number of the Yishuv's leading intellectual and cultural figures—for example, JUDAH LEON MAGNES (1877–1948), one of the founders of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, which opened in 1925—were identified with this current, and he and others (including prominent sympathizers like Albert Einstein) also urged the Zionist movement to seek an accommodation with the Palestinian Arabs. In the long run, although adherents of cultural Zionism made significant contributions to modern Israeli-Hebrew culture, their political impact was negligible.

"A Land without a People"

Zionism could only hope to create a Jewish state through large-scale immigration to, and settlement in, a territory outside of Europe, which meant that it had to be a project of colonization focused on a land whose indigenous population would be entirely or largely non-Jewish. Moreover, as an ideology and a movement, Zionism emerged just as the age of imperialism was reaching its zenith. In that period European states (and the United States as well) were extending their formal and informal empires to encompass almost the entire globe. And they were generally doing so based on the conviction that Western civilization (or, for adherents of the new "biological" or "scientific" racism then emerging, the "Caucasian" race) was superior to all others and entitled its bearers to hegemony over less civilized or less advanced peoples or races. In this historical context, it was inevitable that Zionism's conception of, and attitudes and policies toward, Palestine's indigenous Arab population would not only be profoundly shaped by the need to assert its own superior claim to this land but also be infused by elements of contemporary European colonial discourse and practice. Zionism was similarly influenced by widespread contemporary European representations of "the Orient" and its peoples.

There was undoubtedly a great deal of ignorance and misinformation about Palestine among early Zionists. Some may well have believed that Palestine was an empty land, in the sense of being completely or largely uninhabited. There is a well-known (but perhaps apocryphal) episode, dating to the early years of the Zionist project, in which Herzl's friend and colleague MAX NORDAU one day "discovered" that Palestine already had a substantial settled population and exclaimed to Herzl, "But then we are committing an injustice!" And from Herzl's *The Jewish State* it would be impossible to learn that Palestine was at the time anything but empty: the Arabs were simply not mentioned, as if they did not exist or their presence was utterly irrelevant to Zionism. But another, ultimately more durable and important way of framing this question emerged almost simultaneously, one that did not so much displace as supplement the representation of Palestine as empty and its inhabitants as invisible. Once it was beyond question that the land in which Zionism sought to establish a Jewish state actually had inhabitants, those inhabitants were represented as essentially, ontologically marginal or even alien to the land and its destiny. Their physical presence in large numbers, settled in hundreds of villages and towns, was perhaps no longer disputable, but the character of their relationship to the country was represented as fundamentally different from and inferior to that of the Jews.

Palestine, which Jews commonly referred to as the Land of Israel, was portrayed in Zionist discourse as essentially and eternally Jewish, regardless of the fact that Jews had for many centuries constituted only a small fraction of that land's actual population. This portrayal buttressed the idea that no other people could have an equally authentic historical or contemporary presence in it, or an equally valid claim or organic link to it. An early Zionist slogan proclaimed that Palestine was "a land without a people for a people without a land." It was not so much that Palestine was perceived as literally empty, entirely devoid of population; rather, for Zionism, the Arabs of Palestine, despite making up the great bulk of the land's population, did not constitute a distinct people or

nation with a legitimate claim to the land or deep roots in it. Conversely, the Jews possessed such a claim and had such roots. For Zionists the land thus lacked not people in the sense of inhabitants; rather, it lacked *a* people, the one nation that was organically and eternally linked to this particular territory. Zionism would remedy this lack, this absence, by returning the Jews to their native land (and thus to their authentic national being) and would thereby also restore the land to its rightful owners.

As a result, Zionist discourse generally depicted Palestine's Arab population as so heterogeneous and internally fragmented as not to constitute a nation with rights to this land, as allegedly newcomers to the land and thus lacking any historical claim to it, as having failed to make it productive (or as productive as it might be with the application of European capital and technology) and therefore not entitled to possess it, or simply as having a much weaker connection (and therefore right) to it than the Jews. The Arabs were, moreover, generally portrayed as uncultured, backward, and ignorant and (as opposition to Zionism grew) as irrational, fanatical, and prone to violence. In the same period, similar assertions were advanced by other European settler-colonial projects about other non-European peoples and lands (for example, in Algeria, South Africa, and Australia, and in the United States by Euro-Americans about Native Americans) and used as a rationale for dominating, dispossessing, or displacing them. Though these other projects lacked Zionism's origin as a response to a very real (and worsening) oppression in Europe itself, Zionism's claims about Palestine and the Palestinians were in this sense not unique, though they were powerfully shaped by its own specific vision and aspirations, and by its fixation on this particular territory.

Moreover, despite some romantic rhetoric early on about the Jews returning to their "Oriental" roots, the new Jewish nation that nearly all Zionists sought to create might not be located *in* Europe but it would certainly be *of* Europe. Indeed, the attainment of Jewish sovereignty would for the first time allow the proud "new Jews" that Zionism would create to participate in the great project of Western civilization on an equal footing. Herzl himself asserted in *The Jewish State* that a Jewish state in Palestine would "form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism." Similarly, after 1948, Israeli leaders, insistent that the new Jewish state be culturally European, would warn against and seek to combat the threat of "Levantinization" allegedly posed by the massive influx of Jewish immigrants from Arab lands.

Not all early Zionists ignored the Arabs of Palestine or downplayed their significance for the future of the Zionist project; some (like Ahad Ha'am) berated Jewish settlers for mistreating their Arab neighbors and warned of an emerging Arab national sentiment with which Zionism would have to reckon. Unsurprisingly, given Zionism's fixation on the plight of the European Jews and its own mission, these voices were largely ignored. Determined to build a thoroughly European and, if possible, wholly Jewish society and state in Palestine, few Zionists had much interest in the aspirations, history, or culture of the country's indigenous population or any desire to integrate into this predominantly Arab region. Then as now, for example, few even took the trouble to learn Arabic, except for some instrumental purpose (such as business dealings or intelligence work).

It seems unlikely, however, that attending to those who tried to raise what some have called early Zionism's "hidden question" would have made much difference. As would become obvious after World War I, the Zionist project of Jewish immigration, settlement, and statehood in Palestine was irreconcilable with the emerging national aspirations of the country's Palestinian majority, so that there was little if any basis for compromise. But even before World War I, this conflict had already begun to manifest itself on the ground in Palestine in a variety of forms. These included clashes between dispossessed Arab peasants and Jewish settlers, efforts by Jewish workers to exclude Arabs from employment in Jewish enterprises, and growing demands in the Arab press in Palestine and by Arab delegates to the Ottoman parliament that the government take more effective measures to block Jewish immigration and land purchases. Arab opposition was thus already beginning to shape the course and contours of the Zionist project and, as subsequent decades would show, most Zionists would prove ready to do whatever was required to overcome it and realize their goals.

World War I, the Balfour Declaration, and the British Mandate

On the eve of World War I, Zionism's prospects for success did not look particularly promising. For one, it was clear that, over the previous three

or four decades, relatively few Jews had actually answered the call of Zion and immigrated to Palestine. Of the approximately 2.4 million Jews who left Eastern Europe between 1881 and the outbreak of World War I, some 85 percent went to the United States and another 12 percent to other countries of the Western Hemisphere (mainly Canada and Argentina), to Western Europe, or to South Africa. Less than 3 percent of this great outpouring headed for Palestine, and for a high proportion of those, Palestine proved only a temporary way station on the road westward.

By 1914 the Jewish population of Palestine had reached somewhere between 60,000 and 85,000. About 12,000 Jews lived in some thirty-odd agricultural settlements, mainly on the coastal plains, but all told, Jews owned only about 2 percent of Palestine's land. The great majority of Jews lived in urban centers, including Jerusalem, which now had a Jewish majority, but also in the still-small but growing town of Tel Aviv (Hill of Spring), founded in 1909 on the outskirts of largely Arab JAFFA and envisioned as the first modern Jewish city in Palestine. Only about half the Jews in Palestine were Zionist immigrants, and altogether Jews still constituted no more than 12 percent of the country's population, which remained overwhelmingly Arab and largely Muslim. The average annual natural increase of the Arab population substantially outpaced average annual Jewish immigration and natural increase combined, indicating that, under current conditions, Zionism's prospects for securing a Jewish majority were rather dim. The Ottoman government remained hostile to Zionism; none of the major European powers had endorsed its agenda; and although Zionism had become an active presence on the European Jewish scene, it had not won the support of anything close to a majority of Jews.

The course and outcome of World War I would dramatically enhance Zionism's prospects, finally enabling it to move ahead decisively with its state-building project under the protection of a major European power. During the war, Zionist leaders vigorously lobbied governments on both sides. The central office of the Zionist Organization was located in Berlin, GERMANY, and there was a great deal of pro-German sentiment among Jews throughout Eastern Europe and in the United States. They regarded tsarist Russia as the land of vicious anti-Semitism and pogroms and hoped for its defeat and downfall at the hands of Germany, where Jews enjoyed legal equality and full citizenship. But, in the end, Britain would be the first European power to embrace Zionism.

Key to this success was CHAIM WEIZMANN (1874–1953), a Jewish chemist of Russian origin who had become a British subject and contributed to the British war effort through his work developing better explosives. Building on his connections with government officials, Weizmann worked tirelessly to convince the British government to endorse Zionism. He won the support of David Lloyd George, a Christian Zionist who would become prime minister in December 1916, but also of other British officials who felt that a Jewish entity in Palestine under British protection could serve as a "Jewish Ulster," comparable to the loyal Protestant enclave in largely Catholic (and often rebellious) Ireland. A Jewish Palestine could thus help safeguard the eastern approaches to the Suez Canal, enhance British control of the eastern Mediterranean, and bolster British influence in the Levant. Some in Whitehall also argued that endorsing Zionism might strengthen Britain's claim to Palestine when the spoils of war were divided among the victorious Allies. Others believed that Britain's endorsement of Zionism might help win Jewish support for the Allied cause in the United States, which entered the war in April 1917, and in Russia, where in February 1917 the tsarist regime had been overthrown and popular pressure was growing on the provisional government to withdraw from the war. Weizmann and his colleagues also argued that, if Britain hesitated, Germany might declare its support for Zionism first, to the detriment of the Allied war effort.

Even as British officials were arguing about whether officially embracing Zionism would serve British imperial interests, they were making secret plans with their allies France and Russia to divide up the predominantly Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire (including Palestine) after the war (SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT) and simultaneously making deals with anti-Ottoman elements within the Ottoman Empire. Notable among the latter was Sharif Husayn of Mecca, who agreed that he and his HASHEMITE clan would launch an armed revolt against the Ottomans (equipped with British weapons, money, and advisers) in return for a British promise to support a postwar

independent Arab state (HUSYAN-MCMAHON CORRESPONDENCE). Whether or not the British had agreed that Palestine was to be part of that state would be argued for decades to come, though Arab nationalists certainly thought so.

In November 1917, after many months of internal debates, British foreign secretary Lord Balfour issued a letter (which became known as the BALFOUR DECLARATION) addressed to Lord Rothschild, head of the British Zionist movement, conveying the decision of the war cabinet: "His Majesty's government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights or political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country." The Balfour Declaration was full of ambiguities and apparent contradictions. Weizmann would have preferred explicit use of the term "Jewish state" rather than the deliberately ambiguous "national home for the Jews." The final clause seems to have been included to satisfy anti-Zionist Jews who felt that endorsement of Zionism might undermine their right to full and equal citizenship in the liberal democracies. It was also hard to fathom how the establishment of a "national home for the Jews" in Palestine could possibly avoid infringing on the rights of the country's indigenous Arab majority. Nonetheless, the Balfour Declaration was obviously a tremendous victory for Zionism: for the first time a major European power—indeed, the very power whose military forces were even then conquering Palestine from the Ottomans—had explicitly endorsed Zionism's goal of creating a Jewish polity in Palestine.

Despite the wartime promises of independence that the British had made to the Arab nationalist movement, and despite the Allies' avowed commitment to national self-determination for subject peoples, after the war ended, the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire were divided into a number of new states, each of which was placed under the control of either Britain (Palestine, IRAQ, and Transjordan [renamed JORDAN in 1949]) or France (SYRIA and LEBANON). (The new Soviet government that came to power in Russia late in 1917 withdrew from the war, and renounced the secret treaties made by the tsarist regime.) In what was essentially a thinly disguised new form of colonialism, Britain and France had the new League of Nations (which they dominated) grant them a "mandate" to rule these states and prepare them for eventual self-government. Despite vociferous Arab protests, Britain, as the mandatory power for Palestine, committed itself to fulfilling the pledge made in the Balfour Declaration. As Balfour himself put it in 1919, "In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country. . . . Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-old traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far greater import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit the ancient land."

Zionism and Palestine during the Mandate Period

With the imposition on Palestine of a British colonial regime committed to fostering the building of the Jewish national home (and suppressing Arab opposition to that enterprise), the Zionist movement was finally able to achieve substantial progress toward realizing its goals. The pace of Jewish immigration accelerated, so that, by the middle of 1926, the country's Jewish population had doubled from prewar levels to nearly 150,000 and by 1931 had grown to 174,000—about 17 percent of the total population. Jewish land purchases and settlement activity accelerated as well under much more favorable conditions than during the Ottoman period. The Yishuv gradually developed a dense and ramified network of political, economic, social, and cultural institutions that came to encompass the great majority of the Jewish population, increasingly composed of immigrants from Europe or their offspring. A semiclandestine military organization, the HAGANA (Defense), was also established that would eventually form the nucleus of the Israeli army.

There were certainly setbacks and crises along the way. A Palestinian Arab nationalist movement emerged to oppose Jewish immigration and land purchases and to demand majority rule and the country's independence as an Arab state. In 1920 and 1921, and then on a wider scale in 1929, Arab anger erupted into violent attacks on Jews. Though these were suppressed by the BRITISH MANDATE authorities, they led some British officials to question official policy and advocate additional limits on Jewish immigration and land purchases, proposals that were generally

defeated by vigorous and effective Zionist lobbying in London and Jerusalem. There were also periods of economic slowdown and high unemployment, and in 1927, more Jews actually left Palestine than entered. But overall, during the first decade of British rule, the increasingly Zionist Yishuv continued to grow and to strike ever deeper and more substantial roots in Palestine.

In that process, the Labor Zionist camp came to play an increasingly prominent role, with the HISTADRUT (the General Organization of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel) as its central vehicle. With a membership of 4,400 at its founding in 1920, rising to some 25,000 eight years later, the Histadrut not only encompassed most of the organized Jewish workers in Palestine but also, in keeping with Labor Zionism's strategic vision, became a central institution in the Yishuv. It gradually built up an extensive network of industrial, agricultural, construction, housing, commercial, marketing, banking, insurance, and transport enterprises; provided a broad range of social, educational, cultural, and health care services to its members; and led the struggle to exclude Arab workers from employment in Jewish enterprises. By the early 1930s, the Histadrut's growing mass base and social weight helped make the Labor Zionist movement the leading political force in the Yishuv and, increasingly, in the international Zionist movement.

After World War I, Weizmann and his largely middle-of-the-road, middle-class, and secular General Zionist faction led the Zionist Organization. But, from the early 1930s, officials of MAPAI (Workers' Party of the Land of Israel), the dominant Labor Zionist party in Palestine, began to assume key positions in the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL. This institution was established in 1929 to bring together Zionist and non-Zionist Jews to promote the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine, but it was soon dominated by Zionists and served as the de facto leadership of the Yishuv. By 1935 DAVID BEN-GURION (1886–1973), secretary of the Histadrut and leader of Mapai, had assumed the role of chair of the executive of the Jewish Agency. Although Weizmann served as president of the Zionist Organization for most of the pre-1948 period and remained its most internationally prominent leader and chief diplomat, the General Zionists increasingly came to play the role of junior partner to the Labor Zionists, who became the dominant force in the Yishuv itself. The religious Zionist Mizrahi movement also generally allied itself with Labor Zionism, in Palestine and internationally.

Rise of Revisionist Zionism

In the 1920s a new faction emerged within the Zionist movement that rejected what it saw as the excessively gradualist, compromising, and pro-British policies of both Weizmann and the Labor Zionists. The dominant figure in what was known as Revisionist Zionism was the Russian-born VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY (1880–1940). Insisting that the Jews had a superior right to all of the land of Israel, he opposed the Zionist leadership's acquiescence in Britain's decision in 1922 to exclude Transjordan from the terms of the Balfour Declaration and constitute it as a separate Arab entity. He also demanded that Zionism explicitly proclaim that its goal was a sovereign Jewish state, to be established in the near future, whereas the Zionist leadership preferred to keep its ultimate aim vague, so as not to unduly alienate either the British or the Arabs, and gave priority to long-term immigration and settlement activity. Jabotinsky also became increasingly antisocialist, and in the early 1930s, before Mussolini embraced Hitler's anti-Semitism, Revisionism developed links with fascist Italy. This, along with the Revisionists' ultranationalism, militarism, and glorification of their leader Jabotinsky, led many critics to denounce them as Jewish fascists.

Most of Jabotinsky's fellow Zionists insisted that Palestinian Arab nationalism was inauthentic and explained Arab popular opposition to Zionism as the result of "incitement" of the ignorant masses by their scheming, self-interested, and often anti-Semitic social superiors—still a key element of Israeli discourse today. In contrast, Jabotinsky acknowledged that Palestinian Arab nationalism was natural and inevitable: any people would resist losing their homeland. But he insisted that the Jews had a far superior moral claim to the land and must therefore adopt the strategy he termed the "iron wall": achieve military superiority and use whatever degree of force was necessary to compel the Arabs to accept Jewish control of Palestine (which for Jabotinsky included Transjordan). Mainstream Zionist leaders publicly denounced this way of thinking and continued to insist that their goals were achievable by peaceful means. In practice, however, the Zionist movement (and later Israel) would come to embrace the doctrine of the iron wall, manifested, among other things, in the

widely held belief that the only thing that Arabs really understand is force, and therefore that only force could eventually compel them to acquiesce in the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

In 1933, tensions between the Revisionists and the center-left Zionist majority reached the boiling point when HAIM ARLOZOROV, a leader of Mapai and director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, was murdered in Tel Aviv, a crime that was widely blamed on Revisionist extremists. Two years later Jabotinsky took his followers out of the Zionist Organization and formed his own independent movement, which (with support from the anti-Semitic Polish government) advocated the rapid transfer of a million and a half (mainly Polish) Jews to Palestine, thereby creating a Jewish majority and soon a Jewish state. Meanwhile, his followers in Palestine broke away from the Hagana, which was controlled by the Labor Zionist movement, to form their own clandestine National Military Organization, the IRGUN TZEVA'I LE'UMI, known in Hebrew by its acronym Etzel and in English as the Irgun.

The rise of the Zionist right in the 1930s and of an increasingly aggressive posture on the part of the Zionist mainstream can be understood in the context of developments in both Europe and Palestine. In 1933 the National Socialist (Nazi) party led by Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany and quickly began to implement its viciously anti-Semitic ideology. A campaign for an international economic boycott of Germany was soon launched to protest and combat the Nazi regime's anti-Jewish policies. But the Zionist movement felt that its priority must be not to oppose the Nazis—anti-Semitism was, after all, an inevitable feature of the Diaspora—but to get as many Jews (and as much of their property) as possible out of Germany and into Palestine, because a Jewish homeland was deemed the only real and permanent solution to anti-Semitism. Despite bitter protests by many Jewish leaders, the Jewish Agency sabotaged the boycott movement by reaching the so-called Transfer Agreement with the German government, whereby some of the assets of emigrating German Jews were exported to the Yishuv in the form of German goods.

The Nazi ascent to power in Germany and rising anti-Semitism in Poland, which had the largest Jewish population of any country in Europe, led to a great surge in Jewish immigration to Palestine. By this time, the United States and the other Western democracies had more or less shut their doors to further Jewish immigration. From 1932 to 1935, Palestine's Jewish population more than doubled to reach 375,000, about 27 percent of the total, with most of the new immigrants settling in the large coastal towns, especially Tel Aviv, which, with its suburbs, now came to account for more than a quarter of the Yishuv's population. The surge in Jewish immigration was accompanied by a large influx of capital, which greatly stimulated the Yishuv's economy.

For the Palestinian Arabs these were ominous developments, since for the first time a Jewish majority and state in Palestine seemed within the realm of possibility. In 1936 a countrywide Arab general strike erupted that soon turned into an armed insurrection against British colonial rule and the Zionist project it fostered and protected (ARAB REVOLT). It took the British, supported by Jewish paramilitary forces, three years to fully crush the revolt, inflicting a decisive defeat on the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement. The PEEL COMMISSION, appointed to investigate the causes of the revolt, recommended in 1937 the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states. Arab nationalists vehemently rejected partition as a violation of the right of Palestine's Arab majority to self-determination, while the Zionist leadership reluctantly agreed to entertain the proposal in the hope that eventually a much larger Jewish state could be secured. In the end, the British government failed to pursue the proposal.

In 1939, with Palestine pacified and another European war imminent, the British government moved to conciliate the Arabs by restricting Jewish immigration and settlement and promising that in ten years a unitary Palestine with an Arab majority would be granted independence. This new policy signaled the breakdown of the British-Zionist alliance, which for some two decades had given Zionism the big-power sponsor it needed to pursue its goals. By this point, however, the Yishuv was almost strong enough—in demographic, economic, military, and political terms—to stand on its own and, as postwar events would show, to defy its erstwhile protector and launch a successful campaign for a Jewish state.

World War II, the Holocaust, and the Drive for Statehood

Zionism had always assumed that sooner or later most of the Jewish masses of Europe—and especially Eastern Europe—would end up in Palestine,

providing the "human material" with which the future Jewish state would be built. In the course of the war, however, the Nazis and their allies systematically murdered some 6 million European Jews (including 90 percent of Poland's Jews), out of a prewar European Jewish population of about 9.5 million. No Zionist leader or thinker could have foreseen the scope or scale of the catastrophe that befell European Jewry, and in the final analysis, it was the victories of the Allies at Moscow, Stalingrad, El Alamein, and elsewhere that saved the Jews of Palestine from suffering the fate of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. But even as the HOLOCAUST deprived Zionism of its original raison d'être—the salvation of the Eastern European Jewish masses—it also seemed to powerfully confirm Zionism's analysis of and prescription for the Jewish problem. It thereby secured much broader moral and political sympathy and support, among both Jews and non-Jews, for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

In 1942, radicalized by reports of the mass murder of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe but powerless to do anything to save them, the Zionist movement for the first time made its key goal much more explicit by demanding that after the war all of Palestine be established as a "Jewish commonwealth," by which was meant a Jewish state. This new stance opened the way for the Revisionists to rejoin the Zionist Organization in 1946. It can be seen more broadly as signaling a convergence between Revisionism and mainstream Zionism, with the latter implicitly adopting key elements of Jabotinsky's thinking, including a clearer definition of Zionism's ultimate goal and a readiness to use force to achieve it, though there remained significant differences over strategy and tactics.

As the war approached its end, the Zionist movement launched what became an all-out political, diplomatic, and military campaign, first to compel the British to open the gates of Palestine to European Jewish survivors of the Holocaust and then to achieve statehood. Weizmann and his colleagues furiously lobbied the Allied governments, while Zionist officials launched an effective public-relations campaign to highlight the plight of the survivors. At the same time, dramatic efforts were made to defy British restrictions on immigration, while Zionist paramilitary groups, especially Irgun and its offshoot, LOHAMEI HERUT YISRAEL (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, or LEHI, called the Stern Gang by the British), at times joined by the much larger Hagana, attacked British officials, soldiers, and installations to demonstrate that unless the British acceded to Zionist demands, Palestine would be made ungovernable. The Zionist movement took full and effective advantage of the fact that Britain, much weakened by the war, was finding it difficult to maintain control of its colonies. It also benefited from the widespread feeling in Europe and the United States that a Jewish state in Palestine would help compensate the Jewish people for the Holocaust. During and immediately after the war, the focus of the Zionist movement's efforts increasingly shifted to the United States, where Zionism found new supporters in the large and increasingly established Jewish community. It also won growing support from non-Jews in the United States, just as that country was emerging as the preeminent global political, military, and economic superpower.

In 1947, Britain, unable to suppress the Zionist insurgency in Palestine and lacking support from the United States, referred the Palestine question to the new UNITED NATIONS, which at this time included relatively few states that had until recently been under colonial rule and might therefore have been more sympathetic to the Arab case. In any event, in this forum as well as in the broader struggle for world opinion, the Zionists were much more effective at lobbying and propaganda, and much better connected in world capitals, than were the Arabs. In August 1947 the UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE recommended the partition of the country into independent Arab and Jewish states, with the latter apportioned about 55 percent of its territory; Jerusalem was to be under international administration. The Zionist leadership, which had hoped for more (or all) of Palestine, including the predominantly Jewish parts of Jerusalem, accepted the plan with reservations, while the Palestinian Arab nationalist movement and the neighboring Arab states vehemently rejected partition and vowed to prevent it.

The partition plan won the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union, which was ideologically hostile to Zionism but hoped that an independent Jewish state led by avowed socialists might weaken Britain's grip on the Middle East. In November 1947 the UN General Assembly voted to endorse the partition plan, touching off a rising tide of intercommunal fighting in Palestine. In the months that followed, Jewish military forces

largely defeated the poorly organized Palestinian Arab militias, and in May 1948, just as the British Mandate was formally terminated, Zionist leaders in Palestine proclaimed a Jewish state, to be known as Israel. Military forces from several of the neighboring Arab states immediately entered Palestine to help the Palestinians and prevent partition. In the 1948 WAR they were soundly defeated by Israeli forces, and when the fighting ended in 1949, Israel was in control of 77 percent of Mandatory Palestine (including the western half of Jerusalem). The remainder was either annexed by neighboring Transjordan (the WEST BANK, including East Jerusalem) or placed under Egyptian administration (the GAZA STRIP). Less than a fifth of the Palestinians who two years earlier had lived within Israel's new borders remained; the great majority had fled to escape the fighting or been expelled by Israeli forces, and then when the fighting ended were not permitted to return to their homes.

Zionism after the Creation of Israel

After 1948 some Israeli leaders (among them Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister) argued that there was no further need for the Zionist Organization because it had achieved its goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, which could now assume its functions. But although the new state did in fact take over many of the tasks formerly carried out by institutions of the Zionist movement, the World Zionist Organization (as it has officially been called since 1960) has continued to function. It promotes and raises money for Jewish immigration to Israel, carries on Jewish educational and cultural work in the Diaspora, and lobbies on behalf of Israel. Although many of the Jewish Agency's functions were also assumed by the Israeli government after 1948, it too continues to operate, mainly coordinating Israel's relations with Diaspora communities. One reason for the perpetuation of these formally autonomous Zionist institutions, often referred to as ISRAELI NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS and, in practice, arms of the Israeli state, is that they have provided mechanisms whereby Israeli Jews can gain preferential or exclusive access to certain state resources—for example, public lands, which PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL were prohibited from leasing. (Recent rulings by the ISRAELI SUPREME COURT have challenged aspects of the state's preferential treatment of Jews and discrimination against its Palestinian citizens.)

More broadly, in keeping with Zionist ideology, Israel continues to define itself as a Jewish state, that is, a state not of its citizens (about 18 percent of whom are today Arabs), but of all Jews everywhere who have an automatic right, solely by virtue of being Jewish, of immigrating to Israel and acquiring citizenship. This automatic right to citizenship is denied to Palestinians whose ancestors may have lived in the land for centuries. Because all Jews everywhere are considered as belonging to the Jewish nation, there is in Israeli law no such thing as an Israeli nationality: the state officially categorizes its citizens as Jewish, Arab, and so forth by nationality and as Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and so forth by religion.

Within its pre-1967 borders, Israel is thus a formally democratic state in which one national group (the Jewish majority) enjoys a structurally privileged status and superior rights, while the members of the largest minority group (officially termed Israeli Arabs) are legally citizens with supposedly equal rights but in practice are subordinate and subject to various forms of discrimination and control. Israel's Zionist self-definition and sense of mission have also led it to continue the process of "Judaizing" the country—for example, through the confiscation of Arab-owned land for exclusive Jewish use and official efforts to settle more Jews in Arab-populated districts. And, in addition to its 1.33 million Palestinian citizens, Israel now rules over some 4 million Palestinians who are not citizens: the residents of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, which Israel has occupied since 1967 and to which it has extended the Zionist project by implanting half a million Jewish settlers, largely on confiscated Palestinian land. (Israel withdrew its forces and settlements from Gaza in 2005 but continues to control its land borders, airspace and sea access, and to conduct military operations within it.)

Although Israeli Jews are often bitterly divided along ethnic, class, secular/religious, and ideological lines, most continue to see themselves as Zionists. What this means varies a great deal, however. It may mean belief in the right of the Jews to settle and control all of the land of Israel (i.e., pre-1967 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories), a feeling that Israel should provide a safe haven for persecuted Jews, or merely a vague sense of connection with Jews worldwide. For many, Zionism overlaps with Israeli patriotism, though the two are analytically distinguishable.

For younger Israeli Jews overexposed to and weary of official discourse, the term "Zionism" has been used as a slang synonym for "bombast." In recent decades social, cultural, and political changes have somewhat weakened the once nearly monolithic grip of Zionist ideology and opened greater space for non-Zionist and post-Zionist perspectives in certain circles. Nonetheless, when they feel threatened, Israeli Jews (including avowedly leftist and liberal Zionists) have tended to put their doubts and conflicts aside and close ranks. Criticism of Zionism by non-Jews—for example, the 1975 UN General Assembly resolution denouncing Zionism as "a form of racism and racial discrimination," repealed in 1991—and even criticism of Israeli policies and actions with regard to the Palestinians and the Arab states are widely perceived in Israel as manifestations of anti-Semitism. And Jewish critics are often denounced as "self-hating Jews." Despite their state's military strength, many Israeli Jews continue to see themselves as misunderstood and wronged victims, threatened and largely isolated in an essentially hostile world.

In the years since 1948, there have been some noteworthy developments within Zionist ideology. For example, Zionism's traditional denigration of the Diaspora as not only unsafe but also morally degrading has eased somewhat, fostering a more positive evaluation of Jewish life outside the land of Israel and a practical (if not theoretical) acceptance of the fact that many or most Jews will continue to live elsewhere. In Israeli public life and official discourse, the Holocaust (which received relatively little attention in the state's early years) has come to be represented as the central event in and key metaphor for all of Jewish history, proving the need for a Jewish state strong enough to prevent its repetition. The widespread sense of eternal victimhood engenders a fear among Israeli Jews that the Palestinians (and the Arabs in general) would exterminate them if they could, which makes them extremely skeptical about any peace agreements. Since 1967 much of the once relatively moderate religious Zionist camp has embraced a more extreme, even messianic, form of religious-nationalist ideology (JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM) and has become the vanguard of the movement to settle and annex the West Bank (and until 2005, Gaza as well). At the same time, continuing a process that can be traced back to the 1930s, most ultra-Orthodox religious groups in Israel and elsewhere have in practice (if not in principle) mitigated their rejection of Zionism, and though most Israeli Jews define themselves as secular or vaguely "traditional," Orthodox clericalist influences have grown significantly in recent decades.

Meanwhile, the descendants of immigrants from Arab and Muslim lands (the "Oriental" Jews or MIZRAHIM, who now constitute about half of Israel's Jewish population) have fought to secure less discriminatory treatment, equal social status, and greater weight in the Zionist historical narrative and Israeli public life. Before 1948, Zionism, whose founders and leaders were exclusively of European origin, displayed little interest in these Jews. But after 1948 the Arab-Israeli conflict and rising Arab nationalism rendered their situation in most of their home countries untenable. Many migrated to Israel, where for decades they found themselves second-class citizens, consigned to the worst jobs and the least desirable neighborhoods and towns, and treated as uncultured. Their alienation and resentment, together with social, economic, and political changes set in motion by Israel's 1967 conquest of the remainder of Mandatory Palestine, helped undermine the hegemony of (largely Ashkenazi-led) Labor Zionism and set the stage for the ascendancy of the Zionist right (the ideological heirs of Jabotinsky), as well as for a reconfiguration of many aspects of Israeli Jewish society in subsequent decades.

Since the 1967 WAR, support for and identification with Israel have come to be a key component of secular Jewish identity for many Jews in Western Europe and especially the United States, which has the world's largest Jewish community. But that identification, which might be regarded as a victory for Zionism, is unencumbered by any personal sense of obligation to live in Israel. In fact, few Jews from these countries have chosen to immigrate to Israel, nor does it seem likely that significant numbers will start doing so anytime soon. For most Jews, Zionism has continued to be, as the old joke goes, a matter of "an American Jew donating money to a French Jew to fund a Russian Jew's immigration to Israel." Indeed, generally speaking, large numbers of Jews have gone to Palestine (and later to Israel) only when confronted with inequality of rights and opportunities, discrimination, or persecution in their own countries, and only when other options have been foreclosed. Even many SOVIET JEWS emigrating in the 1970s or 1990s showed a preference for the United States or other

Western countries, requiring strenuous efforts by the Israeli government and Zionist organizations to channel them to Israel. So although one might say that Zionism has widely permeated Jewish identity in the Diaspora, in that Israel has come to be seen as central to that identity and to Jewish life (outside of traditionally anti-Zionist Orthodox circles), it has done so in a rather diluted form.

Zionism: A Balance Sheet

In one obvious sense, Zionism can be judged a tremendous success: the grandiose, one might even say crackpot, dream of a Viennese journalist was realized five decades later with the creation of a new nation-state. That state now contains about 40 percent of the world's Jews; it has repeatedly proven its strength and durability; and, despite class and ethnic inequalities and divisions, it has a relatively well-educated populace, a highly developed economy, and a lively political and cultural life. Yet things are not quite so simple or clear-cut. For one thing, despite its overwhelming military superiority, Israel has in the six decades of its existence failed to compel the indigenous Arabs of Palestine to abandon their aspirations for an independent nation-state of their own in some or all of their ancestral homeland. Indeed, since 1948 a distinctive sense of Palestinian nationhood has, if anything, grown stronger and more widespread among Palestinians within and outside of Palestine than it was in the British Mandate period.

It is true that, although nearly all Palestinians continue to reject Zionism's moral claims to Palestine, in the past two decades many (including the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION leadership) have declared their willingness to accept the existence of a Jewish state encompassing three-quarters of what was once Palestine. This acceptance, however, is predicated on the Palestinians securing their own independent state in the remaining one-quarter (the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem) and some reasonable resolution of the REFUGEE problem. Widespread (but not universal) Palestinian acquiescence in Israel's existence within its 1967 borders could be reckoned a major victory for Zionism, and liberal and left-wing Zionists have advocated such a deal (endorsed by virtually the entire world community, including most Arab states) as being in Israel's own best long-term interests.

But no Israeli government has actually been willing to accept this Palestinian offer for a compromise resolution of the conflict. The dominant political forces in Israel remain enmeshed in Zionism's narrative of Jewish history, rights, and claims, including the claim to part or all of the Occupied Territories and the Jewish SETTLEMENTS implanted in them since 1967. Seeing themselves as innocent victims of inexplicable and irrational Arab hatred and violence rather than as powerful occupiers, they continue to find it difficult to accept the legitimacy of the rights and aspirations of the Palestinians—and all too often even their humanity. Nor can they grasp the basic fact that Zionism's triumph, the creation of Israel as it unfolded in 1947–1949, was for the Palestinians a catastrophe for which Israel must accept some degree of moral responsibility. Israel is accustomed, moreover, to pursuing policies based on the firmly held axiom (with deep roots in Zionist thought and practice) that Israel can only achieve security and peace by using its overwhelming military superiority to compel the Palestinians to capitulate. Yet despite massive Israeli repression and increasingly brutal and indiscriminate levels of violence, Israel has so far failed to secure this goal.

Israel has also not been able to compel most of the Arab states to accept peace on its terms and without a prior or simultaneous resolution of its conflict with the Palestinians. As a result, the struggle for control of Palestine and Israel's conflicts with most of the Arab and Muslim states in the region grind on, exacting a terrible price from the Palestinians (and sometimes other Arabs) but also requiring Israeli Jews to live in a highly militarized society and endure an apparently permanent state of threat, conflict, and abnormality. This is not what Zionism promised to deliver. Equally ironic (and tragic) is the fact that, although Zionism promised to establish a safe haven for Jews, of all the world's major Jewish communities, it is in Israel that Jews face the gravest threat to their physical safety.

The apparently ineradicable persistence of the Palestinians also suggests that, even if Israel retains its military superiority, the Zionist achievement after 1948 of a Jewish majority in historic Palestine will be impermanent. Barring mass expulsions of Arabs or an unlikely massive surge in Jewish immigration, Arabs (including both the residents of the occupied West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian minority within Israel's 1967 borders) will within a decade or so again be a majority within Palestine. This looming "demo-

graphic threat" has recently impelled Israeli leaders from the broad center of the political spectrum to try to implement the physical separation of Jews living within and beyond Israel's 1967 borders from West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. One key way to achieve this has been the construction of a massive BARRIER, or wall, designed to maintain Israel's control of as few Palestinians but as much land and as many Jewish settlements as possible. This effort to separate the two populations while perpetuating one group's domination of the other (yet another manifestation, this time in concrete and barbed wire, of Jabotinsky's iron wall, and for Palestinians a logical extension of Zionism's century-long effort to dispossess them) has evoked comparisons with apartheid South Africa's BANTUSTANS and is likely only to exacerbate the conflict between them.

It is also worth recalling that the realization of Zionism's dream of Jewish independence has always required the support of a major power to enable it to overcome local and regional resistance. From 1917 to about 1939, that sponsor was Great Britain. In the years just before 1948, US and Soviet support was crucial in the campaign to secure a Jewish state. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Israel allied itself with France, with which it shared a common interest in combating Arab nationalism. And, from the late 1960s, it developed increasingly close ties with the United States, which remains Israel's chief sponsor today even as Israel's policies have left it increasingly isolated on the world scene—in fact, something of a pariah state. It is, in fact, massive US economic and military aid and strong political support—a unique "special relationship"—that has enabled Israel to persist in the policies it has pursued since 1967.

The extraordinary level of US support for Israel is often explained in one of two ways (though they are not mutually exclusive). Some emphasize the effectiveness and power of the "Israel lobby" (AMERICAN JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS) in securing official and popular support for Israel in the United States. Others have stressed Israel's STRATEGIC COOPERATION with the United States since the late 1960s, when Israel began to act as a US client and proxy in confronting Soviet-backed regimes and radical nationalist forces in the Middle East and beyond. From the 1990s, a key factor has been Israel's ability to promote its usefulness to the United States in fighting both TERRORISM (the rubric under which Zionism and then Israel have long classified all forms of Palestinian resistance) and the "Islamic threat." In this period, right-wing evangelical Christians have become some of Israel's strongest and most hard-line boosters in the United States, mainly because their eschatological vision requires the restoration of Israel in order to pave the way for Christ's second coming—though the ensuing "end time" is not envisioned as ending happily for the Jews. Given some Zionists' willingness to work even with anti-Semites to achieve their goals, perhaps this rather unholy alliance between the US Christian right and the Israeli right should not be surprising. But it is nonetheless ironic that Israel's strength, perhaps even its survival, is still in large measure dependent on the favor of a distant superpower—and, one might add, on the political influence and financial donations of the Jews who from a Zionist perspective languish in exile in that superpower. Again, this is not exactly what the early Zionist visionaries had in mind.

From a historical perspective, one might suggest that Zionism emerged too late. Zionism's project of creating a Jewish majority and a Jewish state in Palestine got under way just as a national consciousness was beginning to take root among the indigenous inhabitants of that land, making Palestinian Arab resistance to Zionism inevitable. More broadly speaking, though Zionism was originally conceived during the heyday of the colonial era, it achieved its greatest success—the creation of Israel—just as the era of decolonization was beginning. In that era, Israel's origins as the product of European migration to and settlement in a non-European land, its Zionist character, its post-1967 OCCUPATION and settlement of the remainder of Mandate Palestine, and its treatment of the Palestinians would come to be widely perceived—especially but not exclusively in the Arab and Muslim worlds—as unjust anomalies. Finally, and ironically, Israel was established only after, and to a significant extent as a consequence of, the murder of most of the European Jews whose salvation Zionism had hoped to achieve. Yet Zionism as a full-blown nationalist ideology and political project could not have arisen any earlier, as it was very much the product of a specific late nineteenth-century historical conjuncture within Europe. Nor is it likely that Zionist settlement and state-building in Palestine would have gotten very far had British colonial rule not been imposed on this land after World War I.

A century after the emergence of the Zionist project the struggle for Palestine continues, under very different local, regional, and world-historical conditions, and it seems unlikely to be resolved anytime soon. Though Zionism overcame enormous obstacles and successfully created a strong Jewish state that today dominates all of Palestine and enjoys widespread loyalty among Jews, the long-term prospects of this project nonetheless remain uncertain. For Israeli Jews are unlikely to achieve the security and normality that Zionism promised unless they can somehow come to terms with the Palestinians and with the other peoples of the region in which they live—a prospect whose realization continues to be thwarted by key aspects of Zionist ideology and practice.

See also ANTI-ZIONISM; DEMOCGRAPHY; ISRAELI MILITARISM; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; OCCUPATION; PALESTINIAN CITIZENS OF ISRAEL; PALESTINIAN SOCIETY, PRE-1948; TRANSFER AND DISPLACEMENT; TRANSFER COMMITTEE; WAR, 1948; YOSEF WEITZ; ISRAEL ZANGWILL

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—Zachary Lockman

Zionist Commission, 1917

In 1917, after the British government issued the BALFOUR DECLARATION, it appointed the Zionist Commission (Va'ad ha-Tzirim), made of up Zionist leaders, to advise Britain on the implementation of the declaration.

CHAIM WEIZMANN, who had exercised enormous effort and influence to obtain the Balfour Declaration, was appointed head of the Zionist Commission. In 1918 he traveled to Palestine for the purposes of (1) forming a liaison between the British military administration and the Yishuv; (2) coordinating relief work in Palestine and aiding the repatriation to Palestine of Jewish exiles, evacuees, and refugees; (3) assisting in the restoration and development of Jewish settlements and organizing the Jewish population; (4) assisting Jewish organizations and institutions in Palestine in the resumption of state-building activities that had been disrupted by World War I; (5) helping to establish friendly relations with the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities; (6) gathering information and reporting on possibilities of further development of Jewish settlements and of the country in general; and (7) investigating the feasibility of establishing a Hebrew University.

The commission, which arrived in Palestine in April 1918, consisted of five representatives of Jewish communities from Britain and one representative from FRANCE. They were joined later that year by two representatives from Italy and, in 1919, by representatives from the UNITED STATES. The commission spent a week in JERUSALEM with two days out for visiting BETHLEHEM, HEBRON, and Beersheba. In Jerusalem, Weizmann spoke publicly in an effort to allay Palestinian fears that the Jews were coming to take over. In spite of his assurances, many Arabs resented the fact that the Zionist Commission paid salaries to Jewish policemen and clerks and that the Birthday Parade of British king George V was postponed so it would not be on the Jewish Sabbath. Colonel Ronald Storrs, the British military governor, tried to keep the peace between Zionists and Palestinians—at one point, he had to prohibit the display of the Zionist banner. Later, Weizmann offered to purchase the Maghariba (Moroccan) quarter next to the WESTERN WALL for 75,000 pounds (around $375,000), an offer the mufti considered, but negotiations eventually broke down.

Weizmann also ran into conflict with the Orthodox Jews. He proposed that Jewish schools in Palestine teach in Hebrew—he even offered to subsidize schools that taught in Hebrew. But Orthodox leader Rabbi Sonnenfeld would not talk to Weizmann because he was a secular Zionist. Another member of the Zionist Commission, Menahem Ussishkin from RUSSIA, stayed in Jerusalem and established Kiryat Anavim (Vineyard City, or Raisin Town), which was the closest non-Arab source of food for Jews. After leaving Jerusalem, the group made a rapid journey through northern Palestine, visiting Ramallah, NABLUS, JENIN, NAZARETH, HAIFA, and ACRE, meeting with settlers at most of these places. On 4 June 1918 Weizmann met Emir Faysal (later King Faysal) in a desert encampment near Aqaba, where reportedly the emir expressed appreciation of the reconstructive work being done by the Zionists in Palestine.

On 22 July British general Edmund Allenby approved a city plan for modernizing Jerusalem. On 24 July Allenby and Weizmann laid the first twelve stones on Mount Scopus for the future Hebrew University. Meanwhile, in September, Colonel Ronald Storrs established the Pro-Jerusalem Society, which aimed to encourage development of the city. He raised money for this society from within Palestine and from British and US citizens. With this money the Zionists were able to repair and clear away rubble from the Citadel (the Tower of David in the OLD CITY), among other projects.

On 2 November the Zionist Commission organized a parade with singing and dancing to celebrate the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. But the Arabs were fearful, and on 3 November a delegation, headed by Mayor MUSA KAZIM AL-HUSAYNI, brought a petition to Storrs protesting Zionist policies and making clear that the Palestinians did not want a Jewish state in Palestine. Later that year, Weizmann persuaded some Orthodox rabbis to form the Joint ASHKENAZI-SEPHARDIC Council. These were the first Orthodox Jews to break their resistance to Zionism.

At the end of its tour, the Zionist Commission was unanimous that

- Palestine officially be proclaimed as a "national home" for Jews.
- The land be politically organized as a "Jewish Commonwealth."
- Immediate authorization be given for the free IMMIGRATION of Jews from any part of the world, for the unrestricted purchase of LAND by Jews, and for recognition of Hebrew as an official language.
- Great Britain be the mandatory power over Palestine, protecting the Jews and furthering the realization of the scheme.
- The scheme be executed, as the great powers of the world have declared in favor of it.

Differences existed along two lines: whether the Jewish commonwealth should be set up in the near future or after a considerable lapse of time, and whether the chief emphasis should be upon a restoration of the ancient mode of life and ritual, and exclusiveness and particularism of the Jews, or upon economic development in a modern fashion, with afforestation, electrification of WATER power, and generally full utilization of resources.

In the autumn of 1919, the Zionist Commission and the JAFFA Palestine Office merged, and all departments, except for the Immigration Department, were moved to Jerusalem. As of mid-1920, this merged group was the sole representative body of the (WORLD) ZIONIST ORGANIZATION in Palestine.

See also WEIZMANN-FAYSAL AGREEMENT

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Zionist Congresses

See WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESSES

Zionist Executive

The Zionist Executive is the executive organ of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION. In 1935 DAVID BEN-GURION was elected chairman of both the World Zionist Organization and the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL. As head of the Zionist Executive,Ben-Gurion led the struggle to establish the state of Israel. The Zionist Executive continues to be the most powerful body in the World Zionist Organization.

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Zionist General Council

The Zionist General Council (Va'ad Hapoel) is the supreme body of the WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION in periods between WORLD ZIONIST CONGRESSES. It considers and decides upon all matters relating to the organization, in particular inspecting and supervising the activities of the ZIONIST EXECUTIVE. It has all the powers of the congress except for those expressly reserved for the congress. The members of the Zionist General Council are elected at the Zionist Congresses.

The Zionist General Council oversees and, insofar as necessary, decides upon the manner in which the executive will implement the decisions of the congress and of the council. It receives and considers the reports of the executive.

The Zionist General Council includes members of the Elected Assembly (the Va'ad Leumi), the supreme institution of the organized Jewish community in Palestine. The Va'ad Leumi was founded in 1920 and in its early years mainly fought for legal recognition of its activities. Later it became less active in politics and concentrated on the internal affairs of the Yishuv. In the 1930s, the Va'ad Leumi took on more functions—education, health care, and welfare services—and its budget was enlarged. The departments of the Va'ad Leumi included the Political Department, which dealt with relations with the Arabs, ties with the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL, and negotiations with the British government; the Education Department; the Health Department; the Communities Department; the Rabbinate; and the Social Welfare Department. The Va'ad Leumi was also involved in internal defense and security

matters, and organized recruitment to the British forces during World War II.

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Zionist Organization

See WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

Zion Mule Corps

VLADIMIR JABOTINSKY, the founder of Revisionist Zionism, proposed that a JEWISH LEGION be formed to join the British in liberating Palestine from the Turks during World War I, but the British resisted the idea of Jewish volunteers fighting on the Palestinian front. Instead, they suggested the Jews serve as a detachment for mule transport at another location along the Turkish front. JOSEPH TRUMPELDOR subsequently formed the 650-strong Zion Mule Corps, of which 562 men were sent to the Gallipoli front.

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Zo Artzenu

Zo Artzenu (This Is Our Land) was an Israeli political protest movement created in the early 1990s and led by Moshe Feiglin, right-wing politician, and Shmuel Sackett, loyal follower of RABBI MEIR KAHANE, to block Israeli LAND concessions to the Palestinians, especially in the context of the OSLO ACCORDS between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. The movement blocked ROADS and used other forms of civil disobedience to make known their goals. Zo Artzenu has led the fight to keep land in Israel and the OCCUPIED TERRITORIES in Jewish hands and has also organized campaigns throughout the WEST BANK, GAZA STRIP, and East JERUSALEM to make its positions clear to Palestinians.

Feiglin and Sackett established Zo Artzenu after the Knesset banned the KACH party for its violence in pursuit of the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the Occupied Territories. They were determined to find a way to continue the goals of Meir Kahane and to foster a more "Jewish" and secure Israel, though by peaceful means. According to Feiglin, Zo Artzenu has initiated dozens of nationwide nonviolent protest activities and believes in employing nonviolent civil disobedience "against any attempt to uproot SETTLEMENTS or to hand over parts of Eretz Israel to the enemy." It does not agree with the more militant approach of Kahane's son, Rabbi BINYAMIN ZE'EV KAHANE, who organized the KAHANE CHAI movement, which was subsequently also officially banned.

See also THIRD TEMPLE MOVEMENT

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Zoning Laws and Regulations

Zoning laws and regulations are one method Israel uses to restrict the living space of Palestinians. Discriminatory zoning is implemented inside the Green Line, in the WEST BANK, and especially in East JERUSALEM.

Green Line

Inside Israel, the state has restricted Palestinians to underdeveloped enclaves, with reduced access to necessary resources, services, and facilities. Israel has no laws to prevent discrimination in issues of LAND ownership, leasing, and residency. Instead, it uses quasi-governmental agencies (e.g., the JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL and the ISRAEL LANDS ADMIN-

ISTRATION) and zoning or planning laws to confine Palestinians to particular areas and prevent natural growth. Within "mixed" Israeli cities, Arab communities are often ghettoized as second-class citizens.

Israel creates National Development Areas to disburse larger funds for development and to provide tax incentives for Israeli industry, EDUCATION, and housing benefits. Although development areas are supposed to be determined according to socioeconomic criteria, the zones are drawn to include a disproportionate number of Jewish localities and to exclude nearly all Palestinian ones. In the 1998 classification, out of 429 localities accorded Development Area A, the highest priority status, only four were Palestinian, despite the fact that Palestinian towns and villages are consistently at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale in Israel.

West Bank

The zoning laws applied to Palestinian communities date back to 1942, when the British classified the vast majority of West Bank land as agricultural. The basic concept of this zoning scheme remains in effect to this day, meaning that the Palestinian population of Area C (defined in the 1995 INTERIM AGREEMENT between Israel and the PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION as more than 70 percent of the West Bank and fully controlled by Israel) is confined essentially to urban or village boundaries of fifty years ago, although its present population, including massive influxes of REFUGEES from the 1948 and 1967 WARS, has grown four times as large. The military authorities of the West Bank have granted to Palestinians only a small fraction of the building PERMITS required for housing, business, industrial, and urban development.

Since 1999, housing permits for Palestinians have been frozen in Area C, and the political intent of restricting the natural growth of Palestinian towns and villages has become clear. At the same time, Jewish SETTLEMENTS, including Jerusalem satellite settlements, are rezoned to permit massive construction and expansion. The Israeli settlements are part of a geopolitical and military strategy to make the formation of a viable Palestinian state impossible. Usually located near existing Palestinian towns and villages, and often overlooking them, the settlements often restrict expansion of Arab villages and towns and prevent the development of much-needed new housing through the imposition of zoning and housing regulations. Palestinians thus are prevented from moving outside refugee camps or from the patches of land on which they exist in the West Bank.

In the early 1990s, the CIVIL ADMINISTRATION of the West Bank prepared master plans for about 400 Palestinian villages that drew tight boundaries around the villages and were designed to contain instead of develop them. Most Palestinian towns are found in Area A (the 3 percent of the West Bank that was under Palestinian control until 2002), with pieces of towns and villages in Area B (the 27 percent of the West Bank, according to the Interim Agreement, under joint Israeli-Palestinian control, but since 2002 under sole Israeli control). Because of the restrictive boundaries around existing Palestinian towns and villages, any natural expansion that occurs is liable to extend into Area C, for which building permits are routinely refused, even if the property is isolated from any Israeli settlement or ROAD. To give a legal pretext for its actions, Israel has created a Kafkaesque system in which Palestinians have no voice in planning and no access to the administrative bodies that decide where and when houses will be demolished.

HOUSE DEMOLITIONS are a common practice implemented by Israel against Palestinians. One reason frequently cited by Israeli authorities for such demolitions is that houses have been built without permission. Yet many build illegally because zoning policies have made it extremely difficult for Palestinian owners to obtain permits to build on their own land or to add additional rooms to existing structures. Israel has almost routinely rejected any Palestinian application for a building permit since 2002.

East Jerusalem

In East Jerusalem, a commonly used strategy to achieve Israel's goal—maximum territory with minimum non-Jewish population—has been the zoning of Palestinian land as GREEN AREAS. These large areas of land in Jerusalem are officially labeled public spaces but, in fact, serve as land reserves for the construction of Jewish settlements, which at the same time effectively freeze any Palestinian construction.

In East Jerusalem, Israel blocks Palestinians' access to 66 percent of the land area through zoning, planning, and building restrictions. Whereas in the rest of the West Bank the Israeli authorities have cited old plans from 1948 to 1967, which give no opportunity for development, in East Jerusalem they have revoked or delayed development plans. In 1974

the Israeli authorities canceled the (Jordanian) development plan that had been approved in 1966 and that gave extensive opportunity for development. In the late 1970s, work started on an outline plan for some Palestinian neighborhoods. The first such plan was approved in 1984, but, as of 2006, four of the eighteen neighborhoods still have no approved plan. In contrast, the timescale for preparing plans for the Jewish settlements has been a matter of months.

Israel issues separate outline plans for Jewish settlements and for Palestinian neighborhoods. This allows different standards and procedures to be adopted for the parts of Jerusalem to be inhabited by the two ethnic groups. The need to confine the boundaries so as not to exceed Israeli planners' quota on the number of Palestinians living in East Jerusalem is cited in Israeli records as justification for the tight development boundaries. The plans for Palestinian neighborhoods have three main deficiencies: they are geographically restrictive, they have insufficient capacity, and the procedures are unsatisfactory.

Geographically, the plans for Palestinian neighborhoods establish a "blue line" boundary around most existing development within which land is zoned to allow "infill" development (i.e., in empty plots between existing buildings). Israeli authorities have never allowed significant allocation of new development land.

Israel zones land outside the blue line for *shetah nof patuah* (open landscape area). No development may take place there, which, in practice, often precludes even agriculture. Consequently, only 9 percent of East Jerusalem has been approved for Palestinian housing, and the great majority of this is already developed.

Most of the recent and current land confiscation by Israel is unplanned land or *shetah nof patuah*. Zoning as *shetah nof patuah* was frequently used in the past to "sterilize" land until later confiscation for Jewish settlement (as at Reches Shu'fat, Beit Safafa, and the major new settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim [HAR HOMA]). For example, land at Shu'fat was zoned for Palestinian housing in the 1966 plan; this zoning was canceled in 1974 and the land later zoned as *shetah nof patuah* and planted with cypress trees; in 1994 it was allocated to the JEWISH NATIONAL FUND for housing, which has since been built.

The opportunities for Palestinian development in the plans are also restricted by the low permitted densities. The average plot ratio (permitted floor space divided by plot area) in Palestinian areas is only 60 percent, whereas the figure in Jewish areas is usually 150 to 200 percent. Building height in Palestinian areas is limited to two stories (in a single case, three), whereas Jewish development of up to eight stories is allowed even in visually sensitive areas.

See also BARRIER; BUILDING PERMITS; CLOSED MILITARY ZONES; DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY; EMERGENCY ARTICLES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF UNCULTIVATED AREAS; GREEN AREAS; HOUSE DEMOLITIONS; ISRAEL LANDS ADMINISTRATION; JERUSALEM; JEWISH NATIONAL FUND; LAND; STATE LAND; WATER

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GLOSSARY

Abu Followed by a personal name, means "father of." Individuals in the Palestinian National Movement were often given the title *Abu* as a pseudonym or nom de guerre—for example, Abu Jihad for Khalil Wazir.

Allah God (Arabic).

Aquifer Rain-fed underground stores of water that can be utilized through wells and springs.

Arab Legion Transjordan's (later Jordan's) regular army, formed in 1921 by the British. In 1939 John Bagot Glubb, known as Glubb Pasha, became the Arab Legion's commander and transformed it into the best-trained Arab army and the most successful of the Arab armies during the 1948 War.

Armon HaNatziv Promenade The former palace of the British High Commissioner; a ridge that is among the most senstitive spots in Jerusalem outside the Old City walls; it is the Hill of Evil Counsel, holy to Christians; Jewish settlers are planning for massive construction at the site, including a large number of tourism and sports complexes, linking Silwan to East Talpiot.

Back-to-back A cumbersome system by which goods are transferred from trucks approaching from one side of a checkpoint/roadblock to trucks taking the goods onward from the other side. The system is also used to transfer the sick from one ambulance to another.

Bar (Bat) Mitzvah A ceremony usually accompanied by a feast to celebrate the occasion when a Jewish boy (girl) reaches the age of twelve or thirteen, and is then obliged to fulfill all religious commandments and becomes capable of sinning.

Beka'a Valley A fertile and strategically important region in Lebanon that separates the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains.

Beriha An underground operation during 1944–1949 to move Jews from Europe to Palestine, largely through means of illegal immigration.

BILU (Beit Ya'akov Lekhu Ve-nelkha/Let the house of Jacob go!) Student organization formed in Russia in 1882 that established several early colonies in Palestine, most of which did not last.

Bin "Son of."

Bnei Brak Israeli town near Tel Aviv, inhabited almost only by Haredim, mainly Ashkenazi.

Bund Organization of socialist and communist Jews of Eastern Europe who sought to preserve Jewish culture and nationality through socialism and perpetuation of Yiddish language and culture. Mainly anti-Zionist.

Al-Buraq Western Wall (Arabic). Also the name of the winged steed Prophet Muhammad rode on his mystical night journey to heaven from the site of the Dome of the Rock, and which he tethered at the Western Wall.

Bypass roads Roads that are for exclusive use of Jewish settlers in the West Bank, designed to circumvent Palestinian built-up areas.

Caliph Successor to the Prophet Muhammad, head of the Islamic community. There were two Sunni dynastic caliphates: the Umayyads (661–750 CE, ruled from Damascus) and the Abbasids (750–1258 CE, ruled from Baghdad).

Canaanites A Semitic people inhabiting Canaan

(Palestine) from late prehistoric times who were conquered by the Israelites around 1000 BCE.

Christian Zionism Protestant fundamentalists, supporters of Israel whose backing is based on a literal reading of the Book of Revelation, which requires the ingathering of Jews before the second coming of Christ can occur. It views the modern state of Israel as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy, and thus deserving of political, financial, and religious support, all of which it generously gives.

Circassians A term derived from the Turkic *Cherkess*, not the self-designation of any people. The term is used to designate various peoples of the north Caucasus who are Christian. Today a significant number of Circassians live in diaspora. Circassians began arriving in the Levant in the 1860s and 1870s through resettlement by the Ottoman Empire.

Collective punishment The punishment of a group of people for the crime of a few or even of one. It is contradictory to the modern concept of due process, where each individual receives separate treatment based on individual circumstances — as they relate to the crime in question. It is prohibited in international law.

Corpus Separatum Term used in the 1947 UN Resolution 181 (partition plan) to describe the proposed independent status of Jerusalem (and Bethlehem) that would not be the exclusive property of either the proposed Arab or Jewish state but under a permanent international trusteeship.

Covenants Contracts between God and man (or between men).

Cultural Zionism Belief that successful settlement and repopulation of the land of Israel required revitalization of Jewish culture and the Hebrew language before a state could be established. Jewish immigrants to Palestine were encouraged to establish a cultural and spiritual center for Diaspora Jewry. Based primarily on the ideas of Ahad Ha'am.

Dabkeh A traditional Palestinian folk dance.

Dead Sea An inland, salty sea that lies along the border between Jordan and Israel. The lowest point on earth.

Dinar Unit of Jordanian currency often used in the West Bank.

Dispensationalism A theological system that teaches that biblical history is best understood in light of a number of successive administrations of God's dealings with humankind, which it calls "dispensations." It maintains fundamental distinctions between God's plans for national Israel and for the New Testament Church, and emphasizes prophecy of the end times and a pre-tribulation rapture of the church prior to Christ's second coming.

Druze Members of a schismatic religious sect that broke from Shi'a Islam nearly a thousand years ago. Members live mostly in Lebanon and Syria and in the mountains around Haifa in Israel. Druze serve in the Israeli military, often as border guards.

Dunum Unit for measuring a surface area, especially land; 1 dunum = 0.2471 acre or 1,000 square meters; 1 acre = 4.04 dunums; 10 dunums = 1 hectare.

East Bank The land east of the Jordan River that is the state of Jordan.

Effendi Title given by the Ottomans to important Muslim clerics, lower-level bureaucrats, and educated members of the urban elite.

Effendiya Generally an urban middle class composed of first-generation urbanites from notable rural families who have taken advantage of expanded education and employment opportunities. Sociologically it served to erode the power and influence of traditional sectors.

Eid Muslim feast.

Elect Chosen by God.

Eretz Yisrael/Eretz Israel The Greater Land of Israel, whose borders for some Israelis include parts of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria as well as the West Bank and Gaza plus present-day Israel.

Eschatology The branch of Christian theology that is concerned with the end of the world or of humankind. A belief or a doctrine concerning the ultimate or final things, such as death, the destiny of humanity, the second coming of Christ, and the Last Judgment.

Fatwa Formal legal opinion issued by an Islamic jurist.

Fellahin (singular, ***fellah***) The rural Palestinian

farming communities with communally shared ownership of the land and communally owned means of cultivation.

Fertile Crescent A well-watered and fertile area that arcs across the northern part of the Syrian desert. It is flanked on the west by the Mediterranean and on the east by the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and includes all or parts of the West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Israel.

Fida'i (singular) One who is ready to sacrifice his or her life for a cause.

Fida'iyyun (plural) Palestinian guerrilla fighters wherever they were located outside Palestine/Israel.

Fiqh Understanding, comprehension, or knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence. A jurist is a *Faqeeh* (pl. *Fuqahaa*) who is an expert in matters of Islamic legal matters. A *Faqeeh* may pass verdicts within the rules of Islamic law (Shari'a).

Gadna/Gedudei Noar Israeli youth corps run by the Israeli Ministry of Defense for premilitary training of teenagers.

Gahelet A secretive, exclusive fraternity of young men who were followers of Rav Tzvi Yehuda and graduates of the Bnei Akiva yeshiva. Forerunners of Gush Emunim.

Galilee Northernmost, very fertile, mountainous region of Palestine, now Israel. The majority of Israel's Palestinian-Arab citizens live in its cities (e.g., Acre, Nazareth, Safed, and Tiberias) and smaller villages in this area. Israel has undertaken a major effort to Judaize the Galilee.

Gar'inim/Garin A cell of a larger youth movement, such as the Israeli Scouts or youths from a particular kibbutz, usually formed by young men of high school age in order to take part in various public welfare and/or military activities.

Geniza The storeroom or depository in a synagogue, used specifically for worn-out Hebrew-language books and papers on religious topics, although the *geniza* also contain writings of a secular, historical nature.

Gentile Anyone who is not of the Jewish faith or is of a non-Jewish nation.

Golan Heights/Syrian Heights. Syrian territory that is part of the governate of al-Qunaytirah, captured by Israel in the 1967 War, renamed "Golan Heights," and annexed in 1981. Remains the main issue of contention between Syria and Israel.

Goyim Somewhat pejorative term used by Jews to refer to anyone not Jewish.

Green Line The boundary separating Israel from the West Bank, which came into being as a result of the 1948 War and the 1949 armistice agreement between Jordan and Israel. Following the 1967 War, when Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan, the Green Line has represented the boundary separating Israel proper from the Occupied Territories.

Ha'apalah (or Aliya Bet) Illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Hadith The collection of sayings and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, part of the Sunna and Shari'a.

Hajj The Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca; also the honorific title given to a man who has made the pilgrimage.

Halakah/Halakhic The entire body of Jewish religious law. This corpus of religious law regulates every aspect of the Orthodox Jew's life, including religious ritual, familial and personal status, civil relations, criminal law, and relations with non-Jews.

Halutz (plural ***Halutzim***) Jewish "pioneer," especially in agriculture in Palestine. In the framework of the Yishuv the *halutzim* farmed the land, built roads, and established new settlements.

Hamam (Turkish) A public bath.

Hamulah (plural ***Hamayel***) Clan, extended kinship unit.

Hasbara Propaganda, explanation, advocacy.

Hasidism. A *Haredi* Jewish religious movement that originated in Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century, founded by Rabbi Israel ben Eliezer (1700–1760), also known as the Ba'al Shem Tov. It grew out of discontent with the Orthodox rabbinate and involved gravitation toward Jewish mysticism—the Kabbalah.

Haskalah Jewish Enlightenment. Jewish rationalistic movement in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe.

Hectare A unit of area commonly used for measuring land. One hectare = 10 dunums. One hectare = 10,000 square meters. One hectare = 2.471 acres.

Heder Premodern Jewish school system.

HeHalutz (The Pioneer) An association of Jewish youth in the Diaspora whose aim was to train its members to settle in Palestine, which became an umbrella organization of the pioneering Zionist youth movements.

Herod's Temple The Second Temple. Built by the Jewish Roman king Herod on the site of what was believed to have been the First Jewish Temple. Destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE.

Hesder A yeshiva in which the students combine military service with religious studies. Also the name for religious units in the Israeli army that serve by special arrangement.

Hijab Muslim headscarf worn by observant women.

Hijaz A region of northwest Saudi Arabia on the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. It includes the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

Hill Youth Radical younger generation of Orthodox religious Jews who oppose any resolution with the Palestinians and who are in the forefront of the movement of establishing outposts.

Housing Ministry Israeli ministry responsible for construction infrastructure and housing solutions. One of the most politicized ministries in the Israeli government in regard to the financing (legal and illegal) of housing and infrastructure in the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem, as well as the issuance of tenders for new housing in the West Bank.

Hudna (Arabic) Truce or cease-fire.

Ibn "Father of."

Intifada Uprising, literally "shaking off."

Jabal (Arabic) Mountain.

Jahalin Bedouin tribe displaced by the expansion of the Ma'ale Adumim settlement.

Jewish National Home Terminology used in the Balfour Declaration, understood by the British to mean a type of "home" for the Jews *in* Palestine; understood by Zionists to mean an independent "state" *of* Palestine.

Jezreel Valley A large plain and inland valley in the north of Palestine/Israel; part of the Lower Galilee region in Israel.

Jihad A Muslim concept that means first and foremost a struggle within to bring oneself into total submission to God and his laws. Also, the Muslim religious duty to expand and defend Islamic territory. Used as a synonym for "holy war."

Jilbaab Muslim dress; long, drab, shapeless, worn by observant women.

Jordan River The major river in Palestine. It runs from the Sea of Galilee to the Dead Sea along the West Bank's border with Jordan. It has been the center of the water conflicts in the region.

Judaization The process of transforming a geographical area of mixed ethnicity into an exclusively Jewish area.

Kabbalah Jewish mysticism.

Karaite Jews who maintain that everything Moses commanded was recorded in the written Torah, and that an Oral Law was not given at Mount Sinai; thus Karaite Jews do not accept the Mishnah or the Talmud as binding.

Khilafa Caliph.

Kilometer One kilometer equals the distance 1,000 meters or 0.62 mile.

Kollel An institution for the study of the Talmud by adults who have finished their yeshiva studies.

Kotel (Hebrew) Western Wall.

Kuffiyah An Arab headdress consisting of a square piece of cloth folded into a triangle and fastened over the crown by an *agal*.

Ladino The language of Sephardic Jews, based primarily on Spanish, with words taken from Hebrew and Arabic, as well as other languages.

Lurianic Kabbalah The most important branch of Kabbalah since the early seventeenth century, dominating all subsequent Jewish mysticism.

Ma'apilim Illegal Jewish immigrants during the British Mandate.

Madrasah A Muslim educational institution specializing in the teaching of the Arabic language and Islamic studies.

Masada A mountain fortress overlooking the shores of the Dead Sea where Jewish Zealot insurgents held out for three years against the Romans after the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE and then committed mass suicide to avoid capture. Masada has remained a symbol of Jewish heroism.

Maskilim (enlightened ones) Name adopted by the Jews who introduced modern influences into Judaism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (during the period of the Jewish Enlightenment).

Millet (Turkish) A religious community other than Islam under the sovereignty of the Ottoman state, mainly Christian or Jewish, in which the community had the right of autonomy in religious matters, personal status, community affairs, and all other matters that did not come into conflict with the laws of the sovereign.

***Miri* lands** (Turkish) In the Ottoman system, lands that belonged to a local or distant ruler who had peasants working them. The peasants were allowed to consume and sell the products of their labor, but they had to pay the owners heavy taxes.

Mishnah (repetition) The basic and easier part of the Talmud often studied by itself and accompanied by special commentaries.

Mosque A place for prayer and worship in Islam.

Mount of Olives Hill outside the Old City of Jerusalem, venerated by Christians as the site of the ascension of Jesus Christ. It also contains a Jewish cemetery and is presently the object of Jewish settlers' Judaization.

Mufti A Muslim scholar who interprets Shari'a (Islamic law). One who gives legal opinions (*fatwa*).

Mukhabarat (Arabic) Police, internal security service.

Mukhtar Village headman, elder, often head of a kinship group (*hamula*) who is respected by the entire village; engages in the settling of conflicts that arise among members of the community; and intercedes with the government on behalf of the village/clan.

***Mulkh* lands** (Turkish) In the Ottoman system, such lands were privately owned, belonging directly to private people. Both title and usufructuary rights were privately owned. (Contrast with *miri.*)

Muqata The Ramallah compound that was the headquarters of the Palestinian National Authority, where the Israeli government imprisoned Yasir Arafat from early 2002 until his final days, and where he was buried.

Musha Agricultural land collectively owned by and cultivated within a village.

Muslims People who believe in one God, the God of the Jews and Christians, and believe that the man Muhammad was the final or "seal" of the monotheistic prophets, beginning with Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and on through and including Jesus, to receive revelations from God/Allah.

Nakba (Catastrophe) Term used by Palestinians to describe the outcome of the 1948 War.

Nasba Arabic for the magnitude of the defeat in the 1967 War.

Negev Large, oppressively hot, arid desert region of southern Palestine, now Israel.

Neighborhood procedure A practice used by the Israeli military whereby ordinary Palestinian civilians—neighbors—are used as human shields to protect soldiers when, for example, it is deemed necessary to break into a home.

Or Committee Investigative body established by Israel to determine why 13 Israeli Palestinian citizens were killed by Israeli police in the course of demonstrations that erupted in northern Israel in October 2000.

Oriental Jews (Mizrahim) Collective name used for Israeli Jews who are not Ashkenazi.

Orthodox In Israel and elsewhere, a common name for Jews who keep the rules of Halacha, or at least most of them. Orthodoxy refers to the behavior and practices of Orthodox Jews. (Contrary to Christianity, orthodoxy in Judaism refers mostly to practices and not to beliefs.)

Palestinians A nation of Semitic people (Muslim, Christian, and before the establishment of Israel, Jews) who speak Arabic, share common cultural traits, and have lived in the historical territory of Palestine for centuries.

Pan-Arabism A concept or movement for the political union of all Arab nations. Whether expressed through Nasirist or Ba'athist discourse, or in some other organization or ideological trend, it was inexorably linked to Arab political unity. The objective was one unified and sovereign Arab state across the Arab world.

Premillennialism Belief system that teaches that the second coming of Christ will occur before a literal thousand-year reign of Christ from Jerusalem upon the earth. This view is often contrasted with postmillennialism, which sees Christ's return *after* a golden "millennial age" in which Christ rules spiritually from his throne in heaven, and amillennialism, which sees the millennium as a figurative reference to the current church era. The greatest development and spread of premillennialism since the early church came in the late 1800s through the early 1900s with the rise of US fundamentalism and dispensationalism. Premillennialism has become prominent in the Evangelical faith.

Qadi A Muslim religious judge.

Qatruz (peasant) The *qatruz* is a farmworker with little or no landownership and without possession of working animals. The *qatruz* would work for landowners for a share of the harvest. Although the *qatruz* existed in Palestinian society, they were less numerous than the communal *fellahin*.

Al Quds (Arabic) Jerusalem.

Qur'an (Arabic, "The Recitation") The sacred scriptures of Islam that were revealed to Muhammad by Allah/God through the archangel Gabriel. He then recited them to his followers.

Rapture The popular term used to describe one aspect of the Lord's return as presented by the Apostle Paul in 1 Thessalonians 4:17. In Christian eschatology, the Rapture is the name given to a future event in which Jesus Christ will descend from heaven, accompanied by the spirits of all the saints of God, and then the bodily remains of these saints will be transported from the earth to meet the Lord and be rejoined with their corresponding spirits in the air. Immediately after this, all Christians alive on the earth will be simultaneously transported to meet the Lord and those who have preceded them. All will be transformed into immortal bodies like that of Jesus, often referred to as the "Resurrection body."

Redemption For Jews redemption means God will redeem them from exile and return them to the "promised land"; for Christians it means that God will redeem them from their sins and allow them to pass into heaven.

Restricted area An area the Israel Defense Forces arbitrarily deem "restricted" for a variety of reasons and which no one can enter except with a permit, which can be denied.

Sabra A native-born Israeli.

Sages The customary English translation of the Hebrew term "our wise men of blessed memory." Used primarily to designate all rabbis mentioned in the Talmud, but also to refer more vaguely to all past Orthodox rabbis.

Samud (Arabic) Steadfast.

Sanhedrin Ancient Jewish legal and religious institution in Jerusalem that appears to have exercised the functions of a court between 63 BCE and 68 CE.

Sanjak (Turkish) An Ottoman subprovince headed by an official called a *mutasarrif*.

Seam Area/Line The area between the Green Line and the Barrier wall in which many Palestinian villages and lands have been trapped as a result of the construction of the Barrier; constitutes 10 percent of West Bank land.

Security road A road constructed around a Jewish settlement or colony in the Occupied Territories by Israeli military forces or by colonists ostensibly to be used for patrols. However, these roads often end up being precursors for the expansion of the colony.

Semitic Anthropologically, a linguistic group originating in northern or southern Arabia. Both Hebrew and Arabic are Semitic languages. Religiously, a description of Middle East peoples that traces their origin from the biblical Noah and his son Shem; these include Jews and Arabs.

Shabab (Arabic) Pro-Fatah youth movement often associated with the stone-throwing teenagers of the First Intifada.

Shari'a Islamic religious law. Deals with ideology and faith, behavior, manners, and practical daily matters. Derived from the Qur'an (the word of God) and the Sunna (the teachings, sayings, and actions of the Prophet Muhammad).

Sharif (Arabic, "illustrious") An Arab prince or ruler who is typically a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. The governor or chief magistrate of Mecca during the years of Ottoman Turkish rule.

Shaykh A title of respect given to the venerable leader of a kinship (*hamula*) unit. Also a title given to a respected leader of an Islamic Sufi brotherhood. Also a title given to an instructor of Islamic religious sciences. Informally, a person very learned in religion and/or respected for piety.

Shekel The basic unit of currency in Israel, also widely used throughout the Occupied Territories.

Shi'a Lineage of Muslims who consider Ali ibn Abi Talib (656–661 CE) the first caliph because he was directly descended by blood from the Prophet Muhammad. Considered the rightful successors to the Prophet. Only about 9 percent of all Muslims are Shi'a, but in the Middle East they are the majority sect in Lebanon, Iraq, and overwhelmingly in Iran. There are no Shi'a in Palestine.

Sulha (Arabic) A form of mediation.

Sunni The word *Sunni* comes from the word *sunna,* which refers to the tradition of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, and his successors. Approximately 87 percent of the world's Muslims are Sunni. All of Palestine's Muslims are Sunni.

Suq Large, usually open-air, traditional Arab market.

Talmud (study) Although there are two Talmuds, Palestinian and Babylonian, the term without qualification always refers to the Babylonian Talmud, regarded as the most authoritative text by Orthodox Jews. The Palestinian Talmud (much shorter and inferior in its arrangement) enjoys only a supplementary authority. The basic part of both Talmuds is the Mishnah, a collection of terse laws written in Hebrew. The other part, called the Gemarah, consists of a discussion of those laws mixed with many legends.

Talmudei Torah Orthodox elementary schools for boys.

Talmudic period The period from 70 CE when Rabbi Judah the Prince redacted the Mishnah until 640 CE when the Geonim wrote the Gemarah. The Tanach (Hebrew) scriptures were written during this period, and the rabbis were primarily teachers and interpreters of the Torah. They developed the liturgy, calendar, and other aspects of post-Temple Judaism.

Tarbush A brimless, usually red, felt cap with a silk tassel worn by some, usually middle-class, Middle Eastern Muslim men, either by itself or as the base of a turban. Associated with Ottoman rule.

Tawijihi Palestinian standard examination taken at the end of the twelfth year of school for "certification."

Tell In archaeology, a hill or a mound; in particular an ancient mound in the Middle East composed of the remains of successive settlements.

Templars Protestants from southern Germany who began moving to Palestine in 1868 to establish their vision of ideal Christian communities. Descended from the Knights Templar, an eleventh-century monastic-military order that played a key role in the Crusades.

Torah (Teaching/Instruction) The God-given written law in Judaism consisting of the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, part of the Tanaka.

Ulama Muslim religious official or scholar who was often appointed to official positions.

Ulpan Class or school for intensive study of the Hebrew language.

Umayyads The first of two Islamic dynasties. The Umayyad caliphs were based in Damascus and ruled the Islamic world from 660 to 750 CE. They were replaced by the Abbasids, who ruled from Baghdad until 1250. Surviving Umayyad monuments are found in Syria and Palestine. These two dynasties are considered legitimate successors to the Prophet Muhammad in Sunni Islam.

United Arab Republic The union between Syria and Egypt forged in 1958. It lasted until Syria's secession in 1961, although Egypt continued to be known as the UAR until 1971. It marked the high point of pan-Arab nationalism.

Va'ad Leumi (National Council) The National Council of the Jewish community in the pre-state

Yishuv; elected governing body/executive branch from 1920 through 1948.

Vilayat (Turkish) An Ottoman administrative subdistrict.

Wadi Dry riverbed that fills with water for a short time during the rainy season in the winter.

Wahhabism A Sunni fundamentalist Islamic movement named after Muhammad ibn 'abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), and carried forward by Ibn Saud, the first regent of Saudi Arabia. It is the dominant form of Islam in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Waqf A Muslim religious endowment. An endowment or assignment of funds or revenues for religious or charitable purposes in the form of a trust, meaning that the funds may not be shifted to another purpose. Landed property rendered permanently inalienable, the revenues from which finance charitable endeavors. Also, state lands and other property passed to the Muslim community for the public welfare.

Yamit An Israeli settlement of 600 homes and approximately 2,500 inhabitants in the northeastern part of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula that was established during Israel's control of the peninsula from the end of the 1967 War. It was returned to Egypt in 1982 as part of the terms of the 1979 Israeli-Egypt Peace Treaty. Yamit was evacuated on 23 April 1982.

Yerushalaim (Hebrew) Jerusalem.

Yesha The Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

Yeshiva (plural **Yeshivot**) Institution for higher Talmudic studies. A Jewish rabbinic academy of higher learning.

Yiddish The language historically of Ashkenazi Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, resulting from a fusion of elements derived from medieval German dialects and secondarily from Hebrew and Aramaic, various Slavic languages, and Old French and Old Italian.

Yishuv (Settlement). The body of Jewish residents, settlements, and institutions (e.g., banks, *kibbutzim*, political parties) in Palestine before the establishment of Israel.

CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT

Prehistory–History BCE

Human settlement in Palestine continues through the Bronze Age. Palestine's location at the center of routes linking three continents makes it the meeting place for religious and cultural influences from Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Asia Minor, and the Arabian Peninsula. It is also the natural battleground for the great powers of the region and subject to domination by adjacent empires, beginning with Egypt.

4500–3000 BCE (Chalcolithic period)

Along the Jericho–Dead Sea–Gaza–Sinai route, a culture originating in Syria, marked by the use of copper and stone tools, brings new migrant groups to the region, contributing to an increasingly urban fabric.

3000–2200 BCE

By the early Bronze Age, independent Canaanite city-states—one of which was Jericho—are situated in plains and coastal regions. Surrounded by mud-brick defensive walls, most of these cities rely on nearby agricultural hamlets for their food needs. They become urbanized and develop an alphabet. The Canaanite city-states hold trade and diplomatic relations with Egypt and Syria. Parts of the Canaanite urban civilization were destroyed around 2300 BCE, though there is no consensus as to why. Incursions by nomads from east of the Jordan River who settled in the hills follow soon thereafter.

2700–2500 BCE

The Sumerian king Gilgamesh rules the city of Ur, which then had a population of more than 50,000. Gilgamesh was the subject of an epic, "Gilgamesh and Enkidu in the Nether World," (Sumerian), which was redacted and written in a Semitic language spoken by the Babylonians. Thus, though Gilgamesh was Sumerian, his epic is Babylonian. The stories in "The Epic of Gilgamesh" foreshadow the Hebrew bible, in the account of the great flood for example.

2200–1500 BCE

In the Middle Bronze Age, Canaan is influenced by the surrounding civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, and Syria. Diverse commercial ties and an agriculturally based economy lead to the development of new pottery forms, the cultivation of grapes, and the extensive use of bronze. Burial customs from this time seem to be influenced by a belief in the afterlife.

1900–1800 BCE

Sometime between these dates, according to legend, a Semitic clan of nomads migrates from the city of Ur in Sumer to Canaan and then on to Egypt. They are led by the patriarch Abraham, a caravan trader, who becomes the father of the tribes of Israel as well as of other Semitic groups, including the Arabs.

1790–1750 BCE

The Amorite king Hammurabi (1792–1750) conquers all of Sumer. He writes his Code of Laws containing 282 rules, including the principle of "an eye for an eye." It is one of the first codes of law in world history.

1600 BCE

Though they preserve most of the Sumerian culture, the Amorites introduce their Semitic language, an early ancestor to Hebrew, into the region.

1400–1200 BCE

Sometime between these dates the Persian prophet Zoroaster (Zarathushtra) founds the religion known as Zoroastrianism, which is the oldest of the revealed creedal, organized monotheistic faiths in the world. It has a profound influence on Judaism and, in turn, on Christianity and Islam, whose leading doctrines they adopt. It is the state religion of the Achaemenians and the Sassanids.

1390–1330 BCE

Political, commercial, and military events during the Late Bronze Age are recorded by ambassadors and Canaanite proxy rulers for Egypt on cuneiform tablets known as the Amarna Letters.

1379–1362 BCE

Egyptian pharaoh Akhenaten bans the worship of all gods except one, Aten. With his wife, Nefertiti, Akhenaten establishes a new capital at Tel El-Amarna dedicated to the worship of Aten, a significant, if short-lived, monotheistic religion.

1200 BCE

The Philistines (after whom Palestine was later named), an Aegean "Sea People" of Indo-European stock, arrive and mingle with the local population, losing their separate identity over several generations.

—Egyptian hegemony and Canaanite autonomy are constantly challenged by such ethnically diverse invaders as the Amorites, Hittites, Hyksos, and Hurrians. These invaders, however, are defeated by the Egyptians and absorbed by the Canaanites, who at that time are thought to have numbered about 200,000.

1200–1000 BCE

Egyptian power begins to weaken; new invaders appear, including the Hebrews, a group of Semitic tribes, and the Philistines ("Sea Peoples"). The Philistines conquer the Levant and engage in conflict with the Israelite tribes. This ongoing conflict provided the occasion for the creation of Hebrew monarchy.

1020 BCE

Saul's anointing with oil as king of the Israelites.

1004–960 BCE

David, king of the Israelites, finally defeats the Philistines and they eventually assimilate with the Canaanites. The unity of Israel and the feebleness of adjacent empires enabled David to establish a large independent state.

999 BCE

Jerusalem, the mountain stronghold of the Jebusites, falls to the Israelites.

952 BCE

King Solomon, David's son, builds the First Temple in Jerusalem. Under Solomon, Israel enjoyed peace and prosperity, but at his death the kingdom was divided.

923 BCE

Upon Solomon's death the united monarchy splits in two: a northern kingdom, Israel, based on ten tribes and having Shechem (the modern village of Balata, Nablus today) as its capital [later, c. 880, Samaria], and a southern kingdom, Judea, based on the remaining two tribes and having Jerusalem as its capital. The two kingdoms were competitive, politically hostile, and engaged in constant uprisings and intrigues—weakening both and paving the way for their subsequent capture.

734–732 BCE

The northern kingdom, Israel, is conquered by Assyria, which devastates the country and deports the people.

724–722 BCE

A new Assyrian ruler completely subjugates Israel.

597–586 BCE

Judea is conquered by Babylonia. The Babylonian leader, Nebuchadnezzar, enters Jerusalem, destroys the Temple, kills many from the elite classes, and, as was the custom of the time, sends the conquered people into captivity in Babylonia. The Jews living in Babylonia would have almost certainly come into contact with Zoroastrianism and, possibly, the Epic of Gilgamesh and the Code of Hammurabi. This is the period when the Torah was first codified.

538–515 BCE

Cyrus the Great founds the Achaemenian Persian Empire, conquers Babylonia, and permits the Jews to return to Judea, a district of Palestine. Under Persian rule the Jews are allowed considerable autonomy.

500 BCE

The beginning of a large influx of Semitic peoples, including Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula, into Palestine.

400 BCE

The Nabataeans make inroads into southern

Palestine and build a separate civilization in the Negev that lasts until 160 BCE. Intact remains of this civilization can be seen in Jordan today.

334–200 BCE

Persian domination of Palestine is replaced by Greek rule when Alexander the Great of Macedonia takes the region. Alexander's successors, the Ptolemies of Egypt and the Seleucids of Syria, continue to rule the country. The Seleucids try to impose Hellenistic (Greek) culture and religion on the population—with considerable success among the elites on cultural forms, but not on religion.

165–63 BCE

The Maccabees, Jewish rebels, fight against the rule of Antiochus IV Epiphanes of the Seleucid dynasty. They found the Hasmonean dynasty and establish Jewish independence in the land of Israel for about one hundred years until 63 BCE.

63–37 BCE

First period of Roman rule in Palestine.

44 BCE

Rome crowns Herod the king of Judea. Jerusalem is overrun by Rome, and Herod slaughters the last of the Hasmoneans, then orders a lavish restoration of the Second Temple.

37 BCE–4 CE

During the rule of King Herod, Jesus of Nazareth is born and begins his teaching mission. His attempts to call people back to the pure teachings of Abraham and Moses are judged subversive by the authorities. He is tried and sentenced to death.

32–35 BCE–135 CE

Jewish revolts erupt continuously, numerous Jews are killed, many are sold into slavery, and the rest are not allowed to visit Jerusalem. Judea is renamed Syria Palaistina.

70 CE

Titus of Rome lays siege to Jerusalem. The Temple eventually falls, and with it the whole city. Titus orders the total destruction of the Herodian Temple. A new city named Aelia is built by the Romans on the ruins of Jerusalem, and a temple dedicated to Jupiter is built. Jews are not permitted to live in Jerusalem.

73 CE

Masada, an isolated rock plateau on the eastern edge of the Judean desert overlooking the Dead Sea, becomes famous for the battle (one of the last in the series of Jewish revolts) fought there between a small band of Jewish Zealots and besieging Roman troops. When defeat becomes imminent, almost all the surviving defenders commit mass suicide. The episode holds great psychological significance in contemporary Israeli society.

132–135 CE

Bar Kokhba's revolt against the Roman Empire by the Jews of Judea.

200 CE

During the second century the ancient Jewish oral tradition, explaining what the Torah scriptures mean, how to interpret them, and how to apply the laws—the Talmud—is first compiled and written in a document called the Mishnah.

313 CE

Roman emperor Constantine I legalizes Christianity. His mother, Helena, visits Jerusalem and Palestine, and the "Holy Land" becomes a focus of Christian pilgrimage. A golden age of prosperity, security, and culture follows. Most of the population becomes Hellenized and Christianized.

324 CE

Constantine of Byzantium marches on Aelia. He rebuilds the city walls and commissions the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. Christian pilgrimage accelerates significantly.

614–628 CE

Sassanid Persian occupation of Palestine after Persia defeats the Byzantine Christians.

628 CE

Muslim Arab armies invade Palestine, conquer the Sassanids, and begin to establish themselves.

638 CE

Umar ibn Khattab captures Jerusalem from the Byzantines and renames it Filastin. Arabization and Islamization begin. The Arab conquest in 638 begins 1,300 years of Muslim presence.

661–749 CE

Rule of Umayyad dynasty, seat in Damascus.

688–691 CE

Abd al-Malik builds Dome of the Rock shrine in Jerusalem.

705–715 CE

Al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik rebuilds al-Masjid al-Aqsa (Al-Aqsa Mosque) in Jerusalem, the third holiest mosque in Islam.

749–1258 CE

Rule of the Abbasids from their seat in Baghdad. The caliphate falls entirely in 1258 to the Mongol hordes, but it is fragmented before that, and several small dynasties govern Palestine, including the Tulunids (877–906), Ikhshidids (935–969), Fatimids (970–1079), Seljuks (1079–1098). In 1098, Palestine falls to the Crusaders and endures the rule of successive Crusader kingdoms until 1187.

1193 CE

Salah al-Din defeats the Crusaders in Jerusalem at the Battle of Hittin and then establishes his own dynasty, the Ayyubids.

1193–1206 CE

Ayyubid rule in Palestine.

1260–1517 CE

Mamluk rule in Palestine.

1516

Ottoman rule begins in Palestine after the Battle of Marj Dabiq.

1517–1917

Ottoman rule in Palestine.

1746–1775

Rule of local leader Zahir al-Umar in northern Palestine.

1775–1804

Rule of local leader Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar in northern Palestine.

1799

French army under Napoleon Bonaparte captures portions of Palestine.

1830

Egyptian army under Ibrahim Pasha captures Palestine from the Ottomans.

1834

Arab anti-Egyptian revolt in Palestine.

1837

Severe earthquake strikes northern Palestine.

1856

Tanzimat Ottoman reforms, including requirement to register ownership of land in Palestine and pay taxes on it.

1870s

Formation of Hovevei Zion in Russia.

1876

Palestinians representing Jerusalem sit in first Ottoman parliament.

1878

First Zionist settlement, Petah Tikva, established.

1882

Leon Pinsker writes *Auto-Emancipation*.

1882–1903

Formation of Bilu; first wave of Jewish immigration (Aliya) into Palestine.

1892

Railroad line built from Jaffa to Jerusalem.

November Ottoman government bans sale of certain categories of land to non-Ottoman Jews.

1893–1894

Dreyfus trial, Paris.

1897

First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland.

1900

June Ottoman government dispatches commission to study effects of Zionist immigration and land purchases.

1901

Fifth Zionist Congress establishes Jewish National Fund.

July Rally among Palestinian cultivators in Tiberias area over Zionist land purchases.

1902

Herzl publishes *Altneuland.*

1904

Beginning of Second Aliya (through 1914).

—Writer Najib Azuri warns of political claims of Zionists in Palestine and of future conflict between Arabs and Jews.

August–September Conflict between Zionist settlers and Palestinian cultivators in Tiberias area.

1905

Seventh Zionist Congress.

1907

August Ottoman governor of Jerusalem circulates report on methods of Zionist land purchases and immigration outside the law.

1908

Young Turks revolt; new parliament; delegates from several Palestinian cities sit in second Ottoman parliament.
—Establishment of Palestinian newspaper *Al-Karmel* in Haifa.

March 16 Zionist-Palestinian violence breaks out in Jaffa. One Palestinian killed, 13 Jews wounded.

1909

Establishment of first kibbutz—Deganya; foundation of paramilitary group HaShomer.
—Establishment of al-Dusturiyya School, first private secular school in Palestine.

1911

January Establishment of Palestinian newspaper *Filastin*.

May 16 Ottoman parliament conducts first major debate on Zionism.

1912

Parliamentary elections return delegates from several Palestinian regions.

1914

Outbreak of World War I.

1914–1915

Husayn-McMahon Correspondence.

1916

May 16 Sykes-Picot Agreement.

June Husayn bin Ali declares beginning of Arab revolt against the Ottomans.

1917

November 2 Balfour Declaration.

December 9 British forces occupy Jerusalem.

1918

Establishment of the Arab Club literary association in Palestine.

April Zionist Commission arrives in Palestine.

June Emir Faysal and Chaim Weizmann meet.

September Remainder of Palestine occupied by British forces.

October First Muslim-Christian Association established in Jaffa.

October 30 Mudros Armistice ends Ottoman allied fighting.

1919

Paris Peace Conference begins.
—Beginning of Third Aliya (through 1923)

January 3 Faysal-Weizmann Agreement.

January 27–February 10 First Palestinian National Congress meets in Jerusalem. Sends declarations to Paris Peace Conference calling for independence, rejecting Balfour Declaration.

February National meeting of Muslim-Christian Associations in Palestine.

June–July King-Crane Commission tours Middle East.

August 28 King-Crane Commission issues report to Paris Peace Conference after touring Middle East.

1920

March General Syrian Conference in Damascus declares Greater Syria independent under Husayn bin Ali's son Faysal bin Husayn.
—Al-Nabi Musa demonstrations.
—British dismiss Musa Kazim al-Husayni as mayor of Jerusalem, appoint Raghib al-Nashashibi.

April 25 San Remo Conference assigns mandates.

June Hagana organized.

July Herbert Samuel appointed High Commissioner for Palestine.
—French army expels Faysal from Damascus.
—British establish civil government in Palestine.

October Third Arab National Congress (Haifa) elects Arab Executive; elects Executive Committee known as the Arab Executive, headed by Musa Kazim al-Husayni.

December Histadrut established.

1921

Twelfth Zionist Congress; Chaim Weizmann elected president.

March First moshav founded.
—British appoint Faysal king of Iraq and Abdullah emir of Transjordan.

April San Remo Conference awards Britain a "mandate" to rule Palestine.
—Britain appoints al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni mufti of Jerusalem.

May May Day clashes among Jews in Tel Aviv lead to Arab clashes with Jews in Jaffa.
—British authorities prevent convening of Second Arab National Congress in Palestine.

October 1 Palin Commission report on al-Nabi Musa disturbances issued, not published.

1922

January Beginning of Fourth Aliya (through 1932).
—Britain establishes the Supreme Muslim Council with al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni as its president.

February Palestinian delegation goes to London.

May 1 Palestinian-Jewish violence in Jaffa kills 47 Jews, 48 Palestinians.

May–June Fourth Arab National Congress in Jerusalem.

June 3 Churchill Memorandum links Jewish immigration to Palestine's absorptive capacity.

July League of Nations ratifies British Mandate including Balfour Declaration.

October Haycraft Commission links Jaffa disturbances with Palestinian fear of Zionist immigration.

1923

February 21 Second Palestinian delegation to London rejects Balfour Declaration.

May Palestinians reject British-proposed Legislative Council.

August Fifth Arab National Congress (Nablus) calls for economic boycott of Zionists.

September 29 Official onset of British Mandate for Palestine.

October First British census in Palestine issued: 757,182 persons, 78 percent Muslim, 11 percent Jewish, 9.6 percent Christian.
—British propose creation of Arab Agency; rejected by Palestinians.

1925

Palestine Arab Workers Society established.
—Hebrew University officially inaugurated.
—Revisionist Movement founded by Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky.
—Brit Shalom founded by Martin Buber, Judah Magnes, and others, advocating a binational state.

October Sixth Arab National Congress meets in Jaffa.

1927

July Earthquake kills 272 persons throughout Palestine.

1928

June Seventh Arab National Congress in Jerusalem.

September 23 Jewish attempts to amend traditional liberties of worship afforded Jews at the Western Wall in Jerusalem, an Islamic *waqf* property.

November Islamic Conference meeting in Jerusalem calls for protection of Islamic rights to disputed area in Jerusalem.

1929

August 15 Zionist demonstrations at Western Wall.

August 23–29 Hebron Disturbances. Tensions over Western Wall lead to Palestinian attacks against Jews in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed, and other locales; 133 Jews and 116 Palestinians killed.

October Palestinian conference on Western Wall controversy convenes in Jerusalem.
—Arab Women's Congress meets.

1930

Establishment of Arab Bank.

January 14 League of Nations forms commission to study Palestinian and Jewish rights to Western Wall.

March British-established Shaw Commission attributes 1929 violence to Palestinian fear of Zionist takeover.
—Palestinian delegation travels to London to respond to Shaw Report.

October 20 Hope-Simpson Commission report on Jewish immigration and land shortages asserts country's inability to absorb large numbers of Zionist immigrants.
—Passfield White Paper proposes to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine.

December League of Nations commission on Western Wall upholds Islamic ownership rights to Wall.

1931

Irgun (Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi, IZL, or Etzel) formed by Jabotinsky and others.
—Arab National Fund established to help Palestinian cultivators retain their land in face of Zionist land purchasing efforts.

February 14 MacDonald Letter (the "Black Letter") retracts Passfield White Paper.

November Second British census of Palestine: 1,035,154 persons, 73.4 percent Muslim, 16.9 percent Jewish, 8.6 percent Christian.

December French report on Palestine landlessness issued.

December 16 Pan-Islamic Congress in Jerusalem.

1932

Beginning of Fifth Aliya (through 1939).
—National Congress of Arab Youth held in Jaffa.

August 2 Establishment of Istiqlal Party, first major Palestinian political party.

1933

Opening of Port of Haifa.
—Adolf Hitler assumes power in Germany.
—Creation of Arab Agricultural Bank.
—Meetings between Jewish Agency head David Ben-Gurion and Palestinian figures, including Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, Musa al-Alami, and George Antonius, on future of Palestine.

August Ha'avara (Transfer) Agreement. German-Zionist cooperation involves German economic advantages in exchange for emigration of wealthy German Jews to Palestine.

October Palestinian demonstrations and strikes to protest Jewish immigration and Zionist political objectives; Arab Executive announcement of general strike leads to political unrest.

1934

March Death of Musa Kazim al-Husayni, president of Arab Executive, leads to its demise.

1935

—Nuremberg Laws passed against Jews in Germany.

March 27 Arab Party founded.

June 23 Reform Party founded.

October 5 National Bloc Party established.

November Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam and other guerrillas killed by British forces.

1936

April–October The five major Palestinian parties call for a general strike, which is widely observed and lasts until October.
—Arab Higher Committee formed from major Palestinian political parties to guide general strike. Presided over by al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni.

August 25 Lebanese guerrilla leader Fawzi al-Qawuqji and 150 volunteers from surrounding Arab countries enter Palestine to assist insurrection.

October 11 Arab Higher Committee agrees to cease general strike following intervention by Arab monarchs. Violence wanes.

November 11 Royal Commission, also known as the Peel Commission, arrives to investigate causes of the uprising.

1937

July 7 Peel Commission report issued, marking first proposal to partition Palestine between Jews and Palestinians.

July 23 Arab Higher Committee rejects Peel Commission proposal. Rebellion resumes.

September 8 Congress of representatives from Arab countries begins in Bludan, Syria; rejects Peel Commission. Marks increasing involvement of surrounding Arab states in the affairs of Palestine.

October British authorities ban Arab Higher Committee and other Palestinian political organizations. Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni flees to Lebanon; other leaders arrested and deported to Seychelles Islands.
—Palestinian Arab Revolt resumes.

1938

Palestinian rebels control most of Palestine's major towns (Nablus, Ramallah, Tiberias, Old City of Jerusalem, Beersheba). Reinforced British troops defeat rebels and reoccupy the country.

November 9 The Woodhead Commission reports on its mission that finds partition unworkable.

1939

February 7–March 27 London (St. James) Conference: British, Arab, and Zionist representatives attend. Conference ends inconclusively.

May 17 MacDonald White Paper limits Jewish immigration to Palestine to 75,000 in total, restricts Jewish land purchases (regulations come into effect in 1940), and envisions an Arab Palestinian state.
—Jews found the Mossad l'Aliya Bet to arrange for illegal immigration.

September 3 Britain and France declare war on Germany. In Palestine, soldiers are recruited for the British army. About 26,000 Jews and 6,000 Arabs join and fight with the allies.

1940

LEHI, Lohamei Herut Israel, underground is formed by Avraham Stern.

1941

May Palmah underground established, originally with British help, as part of a force that is to fight a Nazi takeover in Syria.

June *Farhoud* against Jews takes place in Baghdad.

November 25 The Jewish illegal immigrant ship *Patria,* carrying refugees from Europe and detained in Haifa by the British, is blown up by the Hagana to prevent transshipment of the refugees to Mauritius. The explosion is supposed to cause a small leak. Instead, the ship sinks and 252 people die.

1942

Federation of Arab Trade Unions is formed out of dissension within Palestine Arab Workers Society.

May 9 Biltmore Program, in which Zionist leaders, headed by Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion, set their postwar program involving an end to the British Mandate and demanding Jewish control over immigration to Palestine with the aim of founding a Jewish "Commonwealth."

1943

Warsaw Ghetto uprising.
—Palmah parachutes behind enemy lines in Europe.

1944

Jewish Brigade is formed to fight as part of the British forces in World War II.

October 7 Arab leaders meet in Alexandria to discuss postwar plans for independence and ways to prevent implementation of Jewish control over Palestine.

November 6 Members of the Jewish LEHI underground Eliyahu Hakim and Eliyahu Bet Zuri assassinate Lord Moyne in Cairo. Moyne is minister of state for the Middle East.

1945

Paramilitary youth organization Najjada established in Jaffa.

March 22 League of Arab States (Arab League) formed in Cairo.

May Germany surrenders.

November 22 (Second) Arab Higher Committee reconstituted.

December 2 Arab League organizes boycott of Jewish goods produced in Palestine.

1946

First branch of the Muslim Brotherhood organized in Palestine (Jerusalem).

April Report of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry published. Recommends admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine.

May 28–29 Arab League summit in Egypt calls for Palestinian independence.

June Fourth Arab Higher Committee constituted.

June 11–12 Arab League meeting in Bludan, Syria, adopts secret proposal to link shipment of Arab oil to Britain and the United States to their policies regarding Palestine.

July Morrison-Grady Plan is issued for a unified, federal government in Palestine.

July 22 Irgun blows up British headquarters in King David Hotel, Jerusalem, killing 91 persons.

July 31 Anglo-American Conference meets in London, proposes implementation of the Morrison-Grady Plan.

August US president Truman asks Britain to admit 110,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine.

September British limit Jewish immigration into Palestine to 1,500 a month.
—British start deporting illegal Jewish immigrants to detention camps in Cyprus.
—London Conference on Palestinian problem ends without agreement.

1947

January Paramilitary youth organization Futuwwa established.

January 26 London Conference reconvenes but yields no progress.

February 18 In wake of failed London Conference, Britain declares it will turn over future of Palestine to the United Nations.

April 28 Special session of UN General Assembly dealing with Palestine opens.

May 15 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) formed to suggest ways of resolving Jewish-Palestinian claims in Palestine.

July 18 Britain rams the illegal Jewish immigrant ship *Exodus* on the high seas. They tow it to Haifa, where it is the subject of extensive publicity, generating enormous public sympathy for the Zionist cause. The British Royal Navy then seizes the ship and deports all its passengers—all Holocaust survivors—back to Europe.

September 8 UNSCOP report published; recommends partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Palestinian states, with area encompassing Jerusalem and Bethlehem to be an international zone.

September 26 Britain announces its intention to end the Mandate.

October 7–15 Arab League meeting in Alayh, Lebanon, decides to finance military operations to assist Palestinians.

November 17 Emir Abdullah of Transjordan meets Jewish official Golda Meir in Naharayim.

November 29 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) to partition Palestine.

1948

Jewish-Palestinian violence erupts in Palestine. The period until May is characterized by numerous skirmishes, road ambushes, demonstrations, and clashes, organized by one or the other side, or spontaneous.
—Hagana implements Plan Gimel to capture strategic areas of the country in advance of British evacuation.
—Arab League forms Arab Liberation Army to assist in defense of Palestine; first units cross into Palestine led by Fawzi Al-Qawugji.

April 4 Hagana initiates Dalet Plan to capture areas of Palestine assigned by UN to the proposed Arab state.

April 5 Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, head of the Palestinian force called the Army of the Holy Struggle, killed at Battle of Qastil.

April 9 Deir Yassin massacre: 100 Palestinians killed by forces from Irgun and LEHI.

April 13 Hadassah Convoy Massacre, in retaliation for Deir Yassin; Arabs kill about 80 Jews on their way to Hadassah hospital.

April 19 Tiberias falls.

April 22 Haifa falls.
—King Abdullah meets Golda Meir in Amman.

May 12 Safed falls.

May 13 UN appoints Count Folke Bernadotte as mediator in Palestine.
—Etzion Bloc falls (to the Jordanian Arab Legion).

May 14 Last British high commissioner leaves Palestine; Israel becomes an independent state.
—Jaffa falls.
—David Ben-Gurion begins his first term as prime minister (Mapai).

May 15 Units from Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, and Saudi armies enter Palestine to combat Zionist forces.

May 17 Acre falls.

May 19 Battle for Jerusalem begins between Hagana and Jordanian forces.

June 11 First truce begins and lasts until 8 July.

July 11 Lydda falls.

July 12 Ramla falls.

July 16 Nazareth falls.

July 19 Second truce, lasts until 15 October.

September–October All Palestine Government formed in Egyptian-controlled Gaza. Dissolves quickly.

September 17 UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte assassinated by LEHI in Jerusalem.

October Israeli offensive breaks Egyptian siege of Israeli settlements in the Negev (Operation Yoav). Beersheva falls. In the north, Operation Hiram defeats the Arab Liberation Army.

October 15 Second truce ends.

November Pro-Jordanian notables at Jericho Conference call for Jordanian annexation of West Bank.

December 11 UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) accords refugees right of return and compensation.
—George Habash, Hani al-Hindi, and others form Movement of Arab Nationalists in Beirut.

1949

February Israel and Egypt sign armistice at Rhodes.

March Israel and Transjordan sign armistice at Rhodes.

March 17 General Refugee Congress meets in Ramallah.

April 27 Lausanne peace talks begin, which last through September 15.

July 20 Israel and Syria sign armistice.

July 27 UN mediator Ralph Bunche announces end to the fighting after completion of four Arab-Israeli armistice agreements.

December Jordan annexes that part of Palestine controlled by its forces (known as the West Bank); UN establishes United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

1950

January Israel annexes West Jerusalem.
—Israel passes Law of Return.
—Israel imposes military law on its Palestinian citizens.

March 14 Israeli Absentee Property Law leads to Israel's seizure of vast area of land left behind by fleeing Palestinian refugees.

April 24 Jordanian parliament confirms annexation of West Bank and East Jerusalem.

1951

Israel begins draining Huleh Valley swamps.

July 20 Jordan's King Abdullah assassinated by a Palestinian in Al-Aqsa Mosque.

1953

August Husayn (Abdullah's grandson) becomes king of Jordan.

October 14 Unit 101 of the Israeli army, commanded by Ariel Sharon, attacks village of Qibya in West Bank, killing 53 Palestinians.

1954

January 26 Moshe Sharett begins his term as prime minister (Mapai).

July Lavon Affair.

1955

Numerous incidents between Syria and Israel, and Egypt and Israel.

February 28 Israel attacks Gaza.

November 3 David Ben-Gurion returns to the prime ministership (Mapai).

1956

October 29 Beginning of Suez War. Israel invades Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula. France and Britain join the war on Egypt on October 31.

—Israeli border guards massacre 49 Palestinian citizens of Israel in Kafr Qasim.

1957

Formation of Arab nationalist al-Ard movement in Israel.

March 1 Israel withdraws from Gaza and Sinai.

1958

Beginning of Israel's nuclear program at Dimona with French assistance.

—Egypt and Syria form the United Arab Republic.

1959

January Fatah formed by Yasir Arafat and others.

November Israel begins work on National Water Carrier.

1963

Al-Ard banned by Israeli authorities.

June 26 Levi Eshkol assumes the prime ministership (Mapai/12 January Alignment)

1964

Formation of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Cairo at first Arab Summit. Ahmad Shuqayri becomes first chairman. Palestine Liberation Army and Palestine National Fund also established.

May First meeting of the PLO's Palestine National Council (PNC) in East Jerusalem and formal formation of PLO.

September Second Arab Summit. Attempts to formulate a plan to counter Israel's water diversion.

1965

January 1 Fatah announces first raid into Israel from Jordanian territory.

May 31–June 4 Second PNC meeting held in Cairo.

August Arab-Jewish split in Israeli Communist Party leads to formation of Rakah.

1966

November 13 Israeli army attacks Jordanian-controlled West Bank village of as-Sammu.

December 1 Israeli government lifts military law from its Palestinian citizens.

1967

June 5–10 Israel launches preemptive strike against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, defeating all three countries in six days and capturing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. All of Palestine is now under Israeli control.

June 28 Israel extends jurisdiction of West Jerusalem municipality over a greatly enlarged East Jerusalem. Declares unified Jerusalem its eternal capital.

September Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum.

—Israel approves first Jewish settlement in West Bank at Gush Etzion.

November 22 UN Security Council adopts Resolution 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal in return for right of all states to live in peace in the Middle East.

December Formation of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under George Habash.

—Beginning of UN peace mediation efforts by Gunnar Jarring.

December 24 Third PNC meeting in Cairo. Ahmad Shuqayri resigns as PLO chairman.

1968

March 21 Battle of al-Karama.

July 10–17 Fourth PNC meeting in Cairo. PLO leadership organs taken over by guerrilla groups; Palestine National Charter adopted in 1964 is revised.

July 23 Israeli airliner hijacked to Algiers by PFLP; first Palestinian hijacking.

December Israel responds to hijacking by destroying 13 Lebanese civilian airplanes on the ground in Beirut and damaging airport.

1969

February Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) formed by Nayif Hawatimah and others following disputes within PFLP.

February 1–4 Fifth PNC meeting in Cairo elects Yasir Arafat, chairman of Fatah, as chairman of the PLO; proposes democratic secular state in Palestine.

February 26 Yigal Allon (Alignment) assumes the post of prime minister of Israel after Levi Eshkol dies.

March 17 Golda Meir becomes prime minister (Alignment).

August 3 Israeli prime minister Meir announces that Israel will keep the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and part of Sinai, as well as East Jerusalem.

September 1–16 Sixth PNC meeting in Cairo.

November 2 Cairo Agreement between PLO and commander of Lebanese army.

December 9 United States announces Rogers Plan for ending War of Attrition between Egypt and Israel.

1970

May 30–June 4 Seventh PNC meeting in Cairo.

July War of Attrition (Israel-Egypt) ends after three years with a cease-fire.

September 6 PFLP hijacks civilian planes to Jordan.

September 16 Beginning of Black September, during which Jordan crushes and expels PLO.

September 28 Jamal ʻAbd al-Nasir dies of a heart attack.

1971

January–July Israeli army crushes Palestinian guerrilla uprising in the Gaza Strip.

February 28–March 5 Eighth PNC meeting in Cairo.

July Jordanian army expels remaining Palestinian fighters from northern Jordan.

July 7–13 Ninth PNC meeting in Cairo.

November 28 Black September Organization kills Jordanian prime minister in Cairo.

1972

Bir Zeit College assumes university status; first Palestinian university in Occupied Territories.

March–April Municipal elections in West Bank return mostly nationalist mayors.

April 6–12 Tenth PNC meeting in Cairo.

May PFLP and militant, revolutionary Japanese Red Army kill 27 in an operation at Israel's Lod Airport.

September 5–6 Fatah faction known as Black September kills two Israeli athletes, takes nine others hostage during Olympic Games in Munich. All nine, plus five Palestinians, die during gun battle with West German police. Israel bombs Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in reprisal, killing hundreds.

1973

January 6–12 Eleventh PNC meeting in Cairo.

April 10 Israeli hit squad kills three senior PLO officials in Beirut.

August Palestine National Front is formed in Occupied Territories.

October 6 October War (also called Ramadan War, Yom Kippur War) begins with Egyptian-Syrian assault on Israeli positions in occupied Sinai, Golan Heights.

October 22 UN Security Council Resolution 338 ends the war. Reaffirms principles contained in Resolution 242.

December 10 Israel deports eight leaders of the Palestine National Front.

December 21 Inconclusive Arab-Israeli peace conference takes place in Geneva.

1974

April 11 PFLP–General Command takes hostage in Kiryat Shemona (Israel) and demands a prisoner exchange. Israel refuses; Israel Defense Forces (IDF) storms building; 18 die.

May 15 DFLP gunmen take over a school in the Israeli town of Ma'alot, demand release of prisoners. Twenty-six schoolchildren die in resulting battle with Israeli forces.

June 1–9 Twelfth PNC meeting; PLO adopts revised strategy from democratic secular solution to one of establishing a "national authority" on any part of Palestine liberated from Israel, representing beginning of Palestinian acceptance of a two-state solution.

June 3 Yitzhak Rabin becomes prime minister (Alignment).

October Iraqi-backed Rejection Front formed by PFLP with other groups, in opposition to new PLO strategy articulated in June.

October 28 Arab Summit at Rabat recognizes the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

November 13 Arafat addresses the UN General Assembly.

November 22 PLO gains observer status at the United Nations.

1975

Emergence of National Committee of Heads of Local Arab Councils in Israel, an important national organization among Palestinians in Israel.

April Lebanese civil war begins.

September US government bows to Israel's demand that it will have no contact with PLO until it accepts UNSC Resolution 242 and renounces terrorism.

November 10 UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 defining Zionism as a form of racism.

November–March 1976 Massive civil disobedience campaign is sustained in West Bank.

1976

January Fatah joins Lebanese civil war on side of Lebanese National Movement.

March 27 Israel deports two Palestinian mayoral candidates.

March 30 Land Day protests against Israeli confiscation of Palestinian land in Israel leads to death of six Palestinians in Galilee.

April 12 Pro-PLO mayors sweep municipal elections in West Bank.

May 31 Syrian forces intervene in Lebanese civil war, soon are engaged in action against PLO–Lebanese National Movement fighters.

July 4 Palestinian hijacking to Entebbe, Uganda; Israeli commandos raid airport, free passengers.

August 13 Lebanese Phalangist forces massacre some 2,000 Palestinians at Tal al Za'tar refugee camp following 53-day siege.

1977

Establishment of Arab Thought Forum in occupied West Bank.

—Establishment of Rakah-led Democratic Front for Peace and Equality in Israel.

—Emergence of Abna al-Balad movement in Israel.

March 12–22 Thirteenth PNC meeting in Cairo calls for an "independent national state" instead of "total liberation."

March 16 US president Jimmy Carter affirms right of Palestinians to a "homeland," first US president to do so.

May 17 Likud wins plurality in Knesset elections.

June 20 Menachem Begin becomes prime minister (Likud).

November 20 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat addresses Israeli Knesset.

1978

Israeli military occupation in West Bank and Gaza Strip replaced by "civil administration."

March 11 Fatah squad hijacks bus near Tel Aviv.

March 14–June 13 First Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Operation Litani.

June 13 Israel withdraws from Lebanon except for six-mile "security zone."

September 5–17 Camp David summit among US president Jimmy Carter, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and Israeli prime minister Menahem Begin. Camp David Accords signed September 17 in Washington, laying foundation for Egyptian-Israeli peace.

November Palestinians form National Guidance Committee in West Bank and Gaza Strip.

1979

Arab Studies Society formed in Jerusalem.

January 15–22 Fourteenth PNC meeting in Damascus.

March 26 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed in Washington.

March 31 PLO and Arab League break diplomatic relations with Egypt in wake of treaty.

September 19 Arafat and King Husayn discuss idea of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

1980

June 13 European Community adopts Venice Declaration.

July 30 Israeli Knesset resolution states Jerusalem is "eternal capital of Israel."

September 22 Iraq attacks Iran, beginning eight-year war.

1981

April 11–19 Fifteenth PNC meeting in Damascus.

June 7 Israel destroys Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in bombing raid.

July Severe PLO-Israeli fighting across Lebanese border. Israeli planes bomb Beirut, killing hundreds. PLO artillery fires from Lebanon into northern Israel, killing several Israelis.

July 17 Three hundred civilians die in Israeli bombing of Beirut.

July 24 US mediator Philip Habib arranges PLO-Israeli cease-fire, indirectly given that neither the United States nor Israel recognizes the PLO.

August 8 Saudis announce Fahd Plan.

October 6 Egyptian president Anwar Sadat assassinated.

November 20 United States and Israel sign strategic cooperation memorandum.

December 14 Israel annexes the Golan Heights.

December 18 United States temporarily suspends strategic cooperation with Israel.

1982

March Israel bans National Guidance Committee and fires most elected West Bank mayors.

June 3 Israel's ambassador in London is wounded by a member of Abu Nidal's group.

June 6 Second Israeli invasion of Lebanon—Operation Big Pines/Peace for Galilee—to destroy PLO and Palestinian nationalism in Occupied Territories.

August 21–31 PLO withdraws from Beirut.

September 1 Reagan Plan for Arab-Israeli peace.

September 9 Fez Peace Initiative announced by Arab League.

September 16–18 Sabra and Shatila Massacres.

1983

February 14–22 Sixteenth PNC meeting in Algiers.

April 18 Bombing of US embassy in Beirut kills 60. Hizbullah claims responsibility.

May Anti-Arafat uprising begins among certain Fatah units in Lebanon, led by Sa'id Musa Muragha (Abu Musa) and backed by Syria.
—Israel and Lebanon conclude an abortive peace treaty; Lebanese president Gemayel assassinated shortly after signing.

September 16 US Navy begins hitting targets in Lebanese Hills.

October 10 Yitzhak Shamir becomes prime minister (Likud).

October 23 Truck bomb kills 241 US marines in Beirut.

December 20 Arafat is forced out of Tripoli, Lebanon, by Fatah dissidents.

December 22 Arafat meets Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Cairo.

1984

September 13 Shimon Peres becomes prime minister (Alignment).

November 28 Seventeenth PNC meeting in Amman calls for an independent Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan.

1985

February 13 Husayn-Arafat Agreement announced from Amman.

March Palestine National Salvation Front established in Damascus by Palestinians opposed to Husayn-Arafat Agreement.

May Beginning of the Camps' War fought by Amal, backed by Syria, against the Palestinians in the refugee camps. It lasts until April 1987.

September 15 Three Israelis killed on yacht off the coast of Larnaca by Force 17.

October 1 Israeli air force bombs PLO headquarters in Tunis, killing 68, but fails in attempt to assassinate Arafat.

October 7 Abu al-Abbas's group hijacks the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship; one passenger is killed.

November 7 Arafat issues the Cairo Declaration renouncing terrorism.

1986

March King Husayn disassociates himself from Husayn-Arafat Agreement.

March 16 Major Palestinian groups sign the Tunis Document laying the foundation for the reuniting of the PLO.

October 20 Yitzhak Shamir becomes prime minister (Likud).

1987

April 25 Eighteenth PNC meeting in Algiers restores unity among Palestinian groups.

December 9 Beginning of First Intifada in the Occupied Territories.

1988

February Establishment of Hamas.

April 16 Israeli commandos assassinate PLO leader Khalil al-Wazir in home near Tunis.

May 13 First communiqué of the United National Command of the Intifada.

July 31 King Husayn cuts administrative ties between Jordan and the West Bank.

November 19 PNC meeting in Algiers declares a Palestinian state in absentia; accepts UNSC Resolution 242; issues declaration of independence.

December 13 Arafat addresses UN General Assembly in Geneva (after US bans his entry to US), announces PLO recognition of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizes *right* of Israel to exist, renounces terrorism.

December 14 Arafat gives press conference using US-designated terminology, after which the United States opens a low-level dialogue with the PLO in Tunis.

1989

October 6 US secretary of state James Baker presents his five-point plan (based on the Shamir proposals).

1990

May 30 Israeli navy captures commando boats of Abu al-Abbas near an Israeli beach.

June 20 United States halts dialogue with PLO.

August 2–February 28, 1991 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War lead to retaliatory expulsion of some 400,000 Palestinians from Arab Gulf countries in wake of Arafat's support of Iraq.

October 8 Israeli forces kill 18 Palestinian demonstrators at al-Haram ash-Sharif.

1991

January 14 Fatah official Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) assassinated in Tunis.

January 16 US-led coalition initiates Gulf War with Iraq.

January 18 Iraq's first use of Scud missiles against Israel.

April Secretary Baker initiates dialogue with Palestinian leaders in Jerusalem.

September Twentieth PNC meeting in Algiers.

October 30 Madrid Conference begins; PLO excluded.

December 10 Bilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations commence in Washington.

December 16 UN General Assembly adopts Resolution 4686 repealing 1975 "Zionism is Racism."

1992

July 13 Yitzhak Rabin begins term as Israeli prime minister.

September National Democratic and Islamic Front (also known as the Damascus Ten) formed in Damascus by Palestinian groups opposed to peace talks.
—Secret talks begin between Israeli and PLO representatives in Norway.

December 17 Israeli government deports 417 Palestinians from Occupied Territories to southern Lebanon.

1993

January 16 Israel repeals law banning contact with PLO.

August 20 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles (DOP) finalized in Oslo.

September 10 United States resumes dialogue with PLO.

September 13 Israel and PLO sign DOP in Washington, agreeing to mutual recognition. Beginning of Oslo Process.

December 13 Target date passes to begin Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip and Jericho.

1994

February 9 Israel and PLO sign Gaza-Jericho Agreement I.

February 24 Israeli settler opens fire in al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron; 29 Palestinians massacred.

April 6 First Hamas suicide bombing in retaliation for Hebron massacre.

May 4 Israel and PLO sign Gaza-Jericho Agreement II, incorporating April 29 Protocol on Economic Relations.

May 12 Entrance of first units of Palestine Liberation Army into Jericho to serve as Palestinian police.

July 1 Yasir Arafat enters Gaza Strip to head Palestinian National Authority (PNA).

August 29 Israel and PLO sign Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Early Empowerment).

September 26 Israel approves more housing construction in the West Bank, contravening the spirit of the DOP.

October 19 Hamas blows up bus in Tel Aviv.

October 26 Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

October 30 First Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca leads to decision by Arab Gulf states to end aspects of the Arab boycott of Israel.

November 18 Clashes between Palestinian police and Islamic militants in Gaza Strip end with accord to end violence, signed on November 21.

December 10 PNA president Yasir Arafat, Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres awarded Nobel Prize in Oslo.

1995

January 19 Rabin and Arafat meet; Rabin agrees to halt new settlements.

January 22 Car bombings at Bet Lid. Israel suspends negotiations with the PLO.

January 25 Israel approves building 2,200 new housing units in West Bank.

July 24 Hamas bus bombing in Ramat Gan.

August 31 Hamas bus bombing in Jerusalem.

September 28 Israel and PLO sign Interim Agreement (Oslo II).

October 26 Israel assassinates Fathi Shiqaqi, leader of Islamic Jihad, in Malta.

October 29–30 Second Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit held in Amman.

November 4 Israeli prime minister Rabin assassinated by Jewish militant in Tel Aviv.
—Shimon Peres becomes acting prime minister in wake of Rabin's death.

1996

January 5 Israel assassinates Hamas bomb maker Yahya Ayyash.

January 20 First elections held for presidency and legislative council of the PNA. Arafat elected president. Fatah dominates in seats in Legislative Council.

February–March Four Hamas suicide bombings in Israel to avenge Ayyash's death kill 58 Israelis.

March 6 Mass arrests of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists by PNA security forces.

March 13 Sharm al-Shaykh Declaration on terrorism.

March 27 First meeting of Palestinian Legislative Council in Gaza Strip.

April 22–26 Twenty-first PNC held in Gaza Strip (first PNC meeting in Palestine since 1964). PNC votes to delete anti-Israel sections of 1968 Palestinian Charter.

May 3 Acting Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres delays scheduled Israeli troop redeployments.

May 5–6 Israel-PLO Joint Communiqué on Permanent Status Negotiations.

June 18 Benjamin Netanyahu becomes prime minister (Likud).

June 21 Arab Summit in Cairo calls on Israel to live up to commitments.

September 25–26 Battles between Israel and PNA security forces over Israel's opening of the controversial Hasmonean Tunnel under one wall of the al-Aqsa Mosque; 86 Palestinians and 15 Israeli soldiers killed.

November 12 Third Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit opens in Cairo.

December 2 Israel approves construction of new housing units in West Bank.

December 13 Israeli cabinet restores top-level priority to settlement expansion.

1997

January 14 Israeli Army begins forced removal of 400 Jahalin Bedouin from lands near Ma'ale Adumim settlement.

January 15 Israel and PLO sign Hebron Protocol.

February 10 Israel's armed forces present "final status" map to cabinet; 51.8 percent of West Bank would remain under Israel.

March 7 Israeli cabinet approves a troop redeployment on the West Bank that accords the PNA 2 percent more land.

March 18 Israeli prime minister Netanyahu breaks ground for construction of new Jerusalem settlement, Har Homa, on Palestinian land near Jebel Abu Ghneim. Israeli-PLO talks break down.

March 21 Suicide bomb in Tel Aviv café kills three Israeli women and bomber.

March 22 Israel closes off Israel to all residents of West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading to a week of clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians in Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, and Ramallah. Disturbances continue throughout the Occupied Territories.

July 30 Two suicide bombers kill 15 Israelis in a market in West Jerusalem. Israel tightens the closure, suspends financial transfers to the PNA, and arrests 200 Palestinians.

September 4 Three suicide bombers kill four Israelis.

September 8 Palestinian police arrest 200 Hamas members in Gaza Strip.

September 25 Israeli agents in Amman, Jordan, bungle the assassination of Hamas leader Khalid Meshal. Israel releases Sheikh Ahmad Yasin (Hamas leader) to compensate King Husayn for the humiliation.

December 17 Israel and PLO sign Memorandum on Security Understanding.

1998

January 7 Israeli government approves construction of 574 more housing units in Efrat, near Bethlehem.

March 10 Clashes in Hebron after three Palestinians are killed.

April 11 PNA security forces arrest dozens of Hamas members.

May 26 Clashes in East Jerusalem as Ateret Cohanim builds more Jewish housing in Muslim quarter of Old City.

June 8 ELAD settlers seize houses in Silwan, East Jerusalem.

July 31 UN Human Rights Commission (Geneva) criticizes Israel's treatment of Palestinians in Israel and Occupied Territories.

August 27 Pipe bomb in Tel Aviv injures 18 people. In retaliation Israel approves construction of 132 Jewish homes in the Palestinian neighborhood of Ras al-Amud.

October 15–23 Negotiations at Wye River for an interim thirteen-percent redeployment in three stages over twelve weeks.

October 23 Israel and PLO sign Wye River Memorandum.

November 11 Israeli cabinet conditionally ratifies Wye agreement.

November 24 First flight from Gaza airport.

December 14 President Bill Clinton becomes first US president to visit Palestinian Authority; he addresses the PNC meeting in Gaza that revises the Palestinian Charter.

December 20 Israeli cabinet votes to suspend Wye agreement until PNA agrees to a new set of conditions.

December 31 Israeli Housing Ministry issues tenders to construct 1,051 housing units in the West Bank.

1999

February 7 King Husayn dies; his eldest son is crowned King Abdullah.

May 4 End of five-year period by which Israel and PLO are to have resolved all final peace arrangements in "final status" agreement.

July 6 Ehud Barak becomes prime minister (One Israel/Labor).

September Israeli Supreme Court bans torture of Palestinian prisoners.

September 4 Israel and PLO sign Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum on Implementation of Outstanding Commitments.

October 25 "Safe Passage" opens between Gaza and Tarqumiyah in Hebron, but under Israeli control.

November 8 Israeli and Palestinian teams begin final status negotiations.

November 15 Israel postpones second of three land transfers agreed to in Wye II.

2000

May 10 One track of final status negotiations begins in Sweden.

May 24 Israeli army withdraws from southern Lebanon after 22 years of occupation.

June 10 Syrian president Hafez al-Asad dies.

June 13 Another track of final status negotiations begins at Bolling Air Force Base.

July Construction begun on the Gaza seaport, but unilaterally halted by Israel in October.

July 11–25 Barak and Arafat negotiate at Camp David, hosted by Bill Clinton. The two sides fail to reach an agreement.

—B'Tselem releases statistics on fatalities from the First Intifada, which it dates as December 1987 to September 2000: 1,376 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces, of them 281 minors under the age of 16; 113 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians, of them 23 minors under 16; 91 Israeli security forces killed by Palestinians; 94 Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians, of them 4 minors.

September 28 Ariel Sharon visits al-Haram ash-Sharif with a Likud Party delegation and surrounded by hundreds of Israeli riot police to "show that under a Likud government [the

Temple Mount] will remain under Israeli sovereignty."

September 29 Demonstrations begin at al-Haram ash-Sharif. By the end of the day, 7 Palestinians dead and some 300 wounded. Al-Aqsa Intifada begins.

October Demonstrations erupt across the West Bank and Gaza, violence escalates. In the first five days, at least 47 Palestinians are shot dead and 1,885 are wounded as a result of both live fire and rubber-coated steel bullets used by the Israeli police.

October 1 A general strike and demonstrations across northern Israel begin and continue for several days, known as "October 2000 events." Thirteen Arab citizens of Israel and a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip are killed by Israeli police.

October 6 Israel hermetically seals the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

October 7 UN Security Council passes Resolution 1322 by 14–0 (US abstaining), which "deplores the provocation carried out at Al-Haram ash-Sharif in Jerusalem on 28 Sept. 2000, and the subsequent violence. . . . and condemns acts of violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinians."

October 8 Israel closes Gaza International Airport, the Gaza seaport, the Safe Passage, and Rafah Crossing, and suspends all fishing rights.

October 12 Two Israeli reservists who enter Ramallah are arrested by the PNA police. Palestinian mob storms the police station, beats the soldiers to death, and throws their mutilated bodies into the street from a second-floor window. In response, Israel launches a series of retaliatory air strikes against the PNA.

October 17 Clinton and Mubarak convene Sharm al-Shaykh summit with Arafat and Barak.

October 22 Tunisia and Oman announce their severing of ties with Israel and closing their trade representations in Tel Aviv.

October 23 Morocco severs ties with Israel, closing the consulate in Tel Aviv and Israel's interest office in Rabat.

—Israel closes King Husayn border passage to Jordan.

November 10 Arafat addresses UN Security Council, pleads for an international force to protect Palestinians.

November 20 The Israel Lands Administration issues a tender for 76 new housing units in the settlement of Elkana near Qalqilya, bringing the total of tendered settlement housing units by the Barak government to 3,575.

December 4 A Peace Now study on the Oslo period shows that housing in settlements grew 52.49 percent since September 1993 and the settler population rose about 70 percent.

December 9 Israeli prime minister Barak announces his resignation.

December 23 US president Clinton presents the Israelis and Palestinians with his proposals for an agreement on the final status (Clinton Parameters).

December 27 Barak accepts the Clinton Parameters as a basis for discussion but wants clarifications.

2001

January 3–8 PLO chairman Arafat meets with US president Clinton and accepts his proposed parameters "with reservations."

January 15 Israel closes Gaza's border with Egypt (Rafah) and destroys the runway and control tower of Gaza International Airport. Israel bans all trade through the Karni Crossing and cuts off electricity and water supplies to Khan Yunis. Hundreds of settlers rampage, torching Palestinian greenhouses and destroying trees and irrigation.

January 21–27 Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians at Taba, Egypt, end in joint statement reporting substantial progress.

January 28 Ehud Barak breaks off peace talks with the Palestinians until after the prime ministerial election on February 6.

February 8 The administration of US president George W. Bush declares Clinton's December proposals off the table. Barak sends a letter to Bush in which he declares Clinton's

proposals at Camp David and after are non-binding.

February 13 In Gaza Strip, Israeli forces assassinate Force 17 member Masoud Ayyad with missiles from a helicopter.

February 14 Israel imposes a complete blockade on the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 8 people are killed and 21 injured when a Palestinian bus driver rams his bus into a packed bus stop.

February 21 Human Rights Watch accuses the Israeli military of using indiscriminate force in response to Palestinian gunfire, causing excessive civilian casualties, and calls on Israel to prosecute or discipline responsible soldiers.

February 27 Labor leader Shimon Peres persuades party to join Ariel Sharon's right-wing government of National Unity—Peres to be foreign minister.

March 7 Ariel Sharon becomes prime minister (Likud).

April 3 Islamic Jihad commander Mohammed Abdel A'ael killed by Israeli helicopters in Gaza.

April 17 For the first time since the Intifada began, Israeli troops seize land controlled by the PNA in Gaza (Area A) and divide the Strip into three parts.

May 5 Israeli forces assassinate Islamic Jihad activist Ahmed Ismail.

May 18 Suicide bomber blows himself up in a shopping mall in Netanya, killing 6 and wounding over 100. In response Israeli F-16 fighter jets bomb Nablus and Ramallah.

May 20 Mitchell Report released, calling for an immediate cease-fire, a freeze on Jewish settlements, and more determined action against terrorism by the PNA.

May 22 Ariel Sharon rejects the Mitchell Report's call for a freeze on Jewish settlement expansion, describing the settlements as "a vital national enterprise."

May 31 Faysal al-Husayni dies in Kuwait.

June 1 A Palestinian suicide bomber kills 19 young Israelis at the Dolphinarium discotheque in Tel Aviv. Yasir Arafat orders his forces in the Occupied Territories to enforce a cease-fire.

June 3 Israeli authorities ban all private Palestinian vehicles from traveling on Israeli-controlled roads in the Occupied Territories and set up additional roadblocks around Palestinian villages.

June 13 A new and fragile cease-fire takes shape after talks chaired by CIA director George Tenet. It calls on Yasir Arafat to clamp down on militants, and on Israel to withdraw from territory seized during the Intifada.

June 24 Israeli forces assassinate Fatah activist Osama Jawabreh from Nablus.

June 26 The second meeting in three months between US president George W. Bush and Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon.

June 28 Yasir Arafat wins the support of the United States for a monitoring force to oversee a Middle East cease-fire.

July 2 Two car bombs explode in central Israel, hours after three Palestinian militants are killed by Israeli helicopter gunships. Israeli ministers say they will continue the policy of "targeted assassinations."

July 19 Israel rejects a call from the G-8 summit in Genoa for international observers to monitor its somewhat theoretical cease-fire with the PNA.

July 25 Israeli troops assassinate a Hamas militant, Salah Darwaza, with antitank missiles near the West Bank city of Nablus.

July 30 Six Palestinian activists in Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement are killed in an explosion at a refugee camp near the West Bank city of Nablus. Palestinians blame the Israeli army, but Israeli officials say the deaths are a "work accident."

August 9 A suicide bomber blows himself up in a crowded pizza restaurant in central Jerusalem, killing 15 people and wounding 90. At least 6 of the dead are children. Responsibility is later claimed by Hamas. Palestinian president Yasir Arafat condemns the bombing and calls on Israel to declare a joint cease-fire.

August 10 Israeli warplanes level the headquarters of the Palestinian police in the West Bank city of Ramallah in retaliation for the Jerusalem suicide bombing. Special forces seize the offices of the PLO at Orient House in East Jerusalem.

August 14 Israeli tanks move into the West Bank city of Jenin and destroy a Palestinian police station.

August 15 Israeli troops kill Palestinian militia leader Emad Abu Sneineh in a roadside ambush.

August 25 Guerrillas infiltrate an Israeli post in the Gaza Strip, killing three soldiers. The attack is claimed by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).

August 26 Israeli F-16 and F-15 warplanes destroy security installations in Gaza and the West Bank.

August 27 Abu Ali Mustafa, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), is killed in an Israeli attack on his office, the highest-ranking Palestinian official so far targeted for assassination.

September 1 Taiseer Khatab, an aide to the Gaza Strip intelligence chief, is killed by a bomb under the seat of his car. Two other people were wounded.

September 4 A suicide bomber kills himself and injures 20 others in an attack near a school in Jerusalem.

September 11 Major terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon outside Washington, DC, are carried out by al-Qaida.

September 12 Israeli tanks enter the desert town of Jericho in the second invasion of a Palestinian-ruled town in 48 hours.

September 15 Israeli forces make a major incursion into the Gaza Strip. Helicopters fire missiles into a Palestinian security compound in Gaza City, hit a security position in the Nusarit refugee camp just outside the city, and fire ground-to-ground missiles into a police station in Rafah.

September 18 PNA president Arafat reaffirms his commitment to a cease-fire and orders his security forces not to fire on Israeli troops even in self-defense. Israeli army withdraws from areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that are supposed to be under full Palestinian control.

September 26 Israeli and Palestinian negotiators agree to confidence-building measures aimed at ending a year of fighting.

September 27 Israeli tanks move into a refugee camp in southern Gaza, killing five Palestinians and placing the newborn truce into jeopardy.

September 28 Thousands of Palestinians mark the first anniversary of their Intifada, or uprising, against Israel with marches, prayers, and three minutes of silence.

October 2 President George W. Bush announces that he is prepared to back the creation of a Palestinian state.

October 5 Israeli tanks and troops move into Palestinian-controlled areas of Hebron in the West Bank, killing at least five Palestinians and ending the fragile truce.

October 11 The Bush administration unveils a new blueprint for Middle East peace, envisaging Jerusalem as a shared capital for an Israeli and a Palestinian state.

October 14 Israel assassinates Palestinian militant Abed Rahman Hamad.

October 15 UK prime minister Tony Blair gives his public backing to the creation of a Palestinian state following a meeting at 10 Downing Street with Yasir Arafat.

October 17 A right-wing Israeli minister, Rehavam Ze'evi, is shot dead in a Jerusalem hotel by a Palestinian gunman. The PFLP claims responsibility.

—Israel demands that Yasir Arafat hand over the killers of Ze'evi and calls on Arafat to outlaw militant groups such as the PFLP.

October 18 Israeli tanks roll into two West Bank towns as a first retribution for the Ze'evi assassination.

October 20 Israeli forces enter two more West Bank towns.

October 22 The US criticizes the Israeli military action and subsequent civilian deaths.
—Israel bans activists and leaders of radical groups from state radio and television.
—A top Hamas militant, Ayman Halawe, is blown up in his car in the West Bank city of Nablus in the fourth Israeli assassination in nine days.

October 23 Ariel Sharon flatly rejects a US demand to end occupation of Palestinian lands and threatens the survival of Yasir Arafat.

October 27 Israel agrees to pull out its troops from Bethlehem, as a test case for other withdrawals from the six West Bank towns that it invaded in search of Palestinian militants. Sharon later cancels the withdrawal from Bethlehem, blaming continuing Palestinian violence.

November 23 A US peace mission to the Middle East is thrown into disarray as Israel asassinates a senior Hamas militant, Mahmud Abu Hannud.

November 25 Israeli missiles hit Palestinian security posts and political offices in Gaza ahead of the arrival of two US peace envoys.

December 3 Israel helicopter gunships fire missils at targets near Yasir Arafat's headquarters in Gaza City.

December 4 Israeli helicopters and jets hit PNA targets in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, in retaliation for the killing of 25 people in three suicide bombings over the weekend.
—Sharon declares Arafat "irrelevant" and orders the Israeli air force to bomb his Gaza beachfront home.

December 7 Israel resumes air strikes against Arafat's PNA, with bombers hitting a Palestinian police compound in Gaza, injuring at least 20 people.

December 9 United States strongly condemns Yasir Arafat's failure to rein in Islamist militants and threatens to abandon its attempts to broker a truce.

December 10 Israeli-Arab parliamentarian Azmi Bishara goes on trial, charged with undermining the state and treason.

December 16 Arafat calls for an end to suicide bombing attacks against Israelis as he seeks to reengage with the Jewish state and the international community from his besieged Ramallah headquarters.

December 17 Israel assassinates Yacoub Aidkadik, a Hamas militant, in the West Bank, and detainis Sari Nuseibeh, a leading Palestinian peace activist in Jerusalem.

December 24 Israel bars Arafat from traveling to Bethlehem for his traditional attendance at midnight mass on Christmas Eve.

December 27 Israeli troops arrest at least 17 members of Arafat's police force and his Fatah movement in a predawn raid on the West Bank village of Azun.

2002

January 3 Israel intercepts the *Karine A* carrying 50 tons of arms allegedly intended for the PNA. Arafat denies that the shipment was ordered by the PNA.

January 10 Israeli bulldozers destroy 32 homes in the Rafah refugee camp, where two militants were shot dead the day before, following an attack on an Israeli army post.

January 12 Israeli battleships raid Rafah port and confiscate Palestinian boats; fishing and maintenance equipment are destroyed. In Rafah refugee camp, 40 more homes are destroyed and many others damaged.

January 14 Israeli forces assassinate Fatah leader Ra'ed Al-Karmi in Tulkarm.

January 17 A gunman belonging to the al-Aqsa Brigades shoots dead 6 people and wounds 30 in the northern Israeli town of Hadera.

January 18 Israeli jets destroy the PNA's main police headquarters in Tulkatem, killing one policeman and injuring 40 more.

January 21 Israeli troops seize Tulkarm, imposing a curfew and conducting house-to-house searches for Palestinian fugitives. It is the first time since the uprising began that the Israelis have occupied an entire town.

January 25 A Palestinian suicide bomber blows himself up in a crowded street in Tel Aviv, wounding at least 25 people. Hours later, Israeli warplanes bomb targets throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

February 11 Israel attacks Palestinian security headquarters in Gaza City on the second day of reprisals for a round of Qassam rockets fired from Gaza into southern Israel.

February 18 Operation Journey of Colors begins, first of several major military offensives to reestablish Israeli authority in West Bank.

February 19–20 Six Israeli soldiers are killed in a raid by Palestinian guerrillas at an Israeli army checkpoint at Ein Ariq, near Ramallah; reprisal strikes leave 16 Palestinians dead.

February 24 Israel grants Yasir Arafat permission to travel within Ramallah.

February 28 The Israeli army storms the Balata refugee camp (near Nablus), the biggest in the West Bank, strafing it from the air, a mountaintop, and other strategic positions. A simultaneous invasion of the Jenin refugee camp marks the most concerted effort by Prime Minister Sharon to crush Palestinian militants on their home terrain since the uprising began.

March 3 Ten Israelis—including seven soldiers—are shot and killed by a lone Palestinian sniper. Another Israeli soldier is killed and four others injured in an attack in the Gaza Strip.

March 4 Israeli planes bomb Al-Muqata'a compound, where Arafat is under house arrest, and totally destroy the headquarters of Palestinian General Intelligence. Thereafter Arafat is confined to a few rooms.

March 8 On the deadliest day of fighting since the intifada began 18 months prior, Israeli troops kill 40 Palestinians in an assault on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Earlier, a Palestinian militant had opened fire on a military academy in the Jewish settlement of Atzmona in the Gaza Strip, killing 5 teenage officer cadets and wounding another 24.

March 12 Twenty thousand Israeli troops invade refugee camps in the Gaza Strip and reoccupy the West Bank town of Ramallah. At least 31 Palestinians are killed and hundreds more ordered out of their homes. Seven Israelis are killed when a Palestinian gunman opens fire on a kibbutz near the border with Lebanon.

—UN Secretary General Annan condemns Israel's use of heavy weaponry against Palestinians and demands that Israel "stop the bombing of civilian areas, the assassinations, the unnecessary use of lethal force, the demolitions, and the daily humiliation of ordinary Palestinians" as well as "end the illegal occupation."

March 14 US Mideast envoy Anthony Zinni arrives in Israel again, meets Sharon, and urges him to leave the PNA areas.

March 20–21 Two suicide bombings in Israel kill 9 people.

March 25 George W. Bush asks Israel to release Arafat from his confinement in Ramallah to allow him to attend the Arab League meeting in Beirut.

March 26 Arafat announces he will not attend the Arab Summit as Ariel Sharon makes new demands, including asking the United States to sanction his permanent exile if there are further terrorist attacks while he is in Beirut.

March 27 Palestinian suicide bomber kills himself in a hotel in Netanya, north of Tel Aviv, killing 29 Jewish guests who were participating in a Passover Seder. Hamas claims responsibility.

March 28 The Arab League summit comes to a final agreement: it promises Israel peace, security, and normal relations in return for a full withdrawal from Arab lands occupied since 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a "fair solution" for the 3.8 million Palestinian refugees.

March 29 Israel launches second major offensive, Operation Defensive Shield, in the West Bank, reoccupying all the major Palestinian cities. In Ramallah, Israeli troops lay siege to Arafat's presidential compound, to which he is confined thereafter.

March 31 A suicide bomber kills 16 in Haifa, and 4 more are injured by a suicide bomber in the Efrat settlement; Israeli tanks thunder into Qalqilya; Ariel Sharon declares Arafat an "enemy of Israel."

April 1 George W. Bush calls on Arafat to do more to "denounce" terror.

April 2 Israeli warplanes, armor, and infantry launch a huge attack on Bethlehem as Ariel Sharon pushes ahead with the second phase of his five-day assault on Palestinian targets. Wit-

nesses describe desperate close-quarter fighting in the old part of Bethlehem.

April 4 President Bush tells Sharon to end West Bank occupation and blames Arafat for failing to halt the current wave of suicide bombings. The IDF pushes on to Nablus, the Bethlehem standoff continues, and Israeli troops enter Hebron.

April 8 Sharon says he will complete his military operation against Yasir Arafat's "regime of terror," a move that directly defies US calls to pull troops out of the West Bank immediately.

April 10 Palestinian suicide bomber kills eight Israelis in an attack on a crowded bus, as Israeli forces hunting Palestinian militants move deeper into two West Bank refugee camps.

April 12 US secretary of state Colin Powell holds talks with Sharon in Jerusalem but fails to secure an immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank.

April 13 Yasir Arafat condemns terrorism in a statement put out by a Palestinian news agency after meeting Colin Powell.

April 15 Marwan al-Barghuthi, a popular young Palestinian leader, is seized by Israeli Special Forces from his home in Ramallah. Journalists enter the Jenin refugee camp, describing it as a "silent wasteland."

April 19 George W. Bush calls for a probe into civilian casualties in the assault on the Jenin refugee camp.

April 21 Israeli tanks and armor redeploy around the cities of Nablus and Ramallah as Ariel Sharon says the first stage of the offensive has ended.

April 22 The International Committee of the Red Cross accuses Israel of breaching the Geneva Conventions by recklessly endangering civilian lives and property during its assault.

April 26 Israeli forces raid Qalqilya, defying fresh calls from President Bush to complete their pullout from reoccupied Palestinian areas.

April 30 Israel again refuses to cooperate with the UN inquiry into the fighting in the Jenin refugee camp.

May 1 The PNA hands over six high-profile prisoners to Anglo-American custody.

May 2 Arafat emerges briefly from confinement.

May 9 A deal to end the Bethlehem siege is drawn up by EU negotiators that would see 13 militants exiled in several European countries after first flying to Cyprus. Ending the siege is widely seen as a precursor to an Israeli military offensive in Gaza.

May 12 After hours of debate the prime minister's party (Likud) "rejects forever" the setting up of Palestinian state on land currently occupied by Israel.

May 16 An adviser to Arafat says the Palestinian leader has agreed to fresh presidential elections in six months.

May 17 Israel makes a new raid on the Jenin refugee camp.

May 30 President Arafat signs Basic Law.

June 5 A Palestinian suicide bomber detonates a car packed with explosives next to an Israeli bus crammed with soldiers and civilians at Megiddo junction, killing 17. Within hours Israeli helicopter gunships attack Jenin and tank columns move to its outlying areas.

June 6 A six-hour wrecking mission by Israeli tanks flattens Arafat's Ramallah headquarters. No building in the compound remains intact—not even Arafat's bedroom, which sports a large crater in the wall.

June 10 Israeli tanks and troops make a predawn raid on Ramallah and declare a curfew. In Washington, George Bush backs Israel's demand that the Palestinian leadership be overhauled before meaningful peace talks can begin.

June 17 The PNA is condemned by US national security adviser Condoleezza Rice as a "corrupt" body that "cavorts with terror."

June 18 At least 20 people are killed and more than 40 wounded, including several schoolchildren, when a suicide bomber blows himself up on a crowded bus in Jerusalem during the morning rush hour.

June 19 Tel Aviv launches helicopter gunship

strikes on Palestinian refugee camps in retaliation. Israel says it will reoccupy Palestinian land on the West Bank and hold it indefinitely in reprisal for the bombing.

June 20 Yasir Arafat orders his people not to attack Israeli civilians. He says recent suicide bombs "have given the Israeli government the excuse to reoccupy our land."

June 22 Operation Determined Path, third major Israeli offensive in West Bank, begins.

June 23 The Israeli cabinet approves by a vote of 25–1 the construction of a "security fence" (the Barrier) east of the Green Line and around Jerusalem, a 20-kilometer buffer zone west of the Jordan River, and the continued presence of IDF in the West Bank.

June 24 US president Bush gives major speech at odds with "Road Map," dismissive of Palestinians, very pro-Israeli.

June 25 Israeli troops storm the PNA headquarters in Hebron. The invasion brings the total of reoccupied cities to seven, leaving only Jericho, isolated in the Jordan Rift Valley, under effective Palestinian control.

June 26 A Palestinian cabinet minister, Saeb Erekat, announces elections for Yasir Arafat's job in January 2003 and details planned reforms in the PNA.

June 30 Colin Powell "renounces" Arafat.

July 1 Hamas vows to redouble its suicide bombing attacks after Israel assassinates Muhamed Taher.

July 2 Arafat sacks two of his most senior security chiefs—Jibril Rajub, effectively head of security in the West Bank, and Ghazi Jibali, the police chief in Gaza.

July 4 Rajub and Jibali defy Arafat's dismissal order, creating turmoil in the PNA. They later agree to stand down, but the episode has cast doubt on the Palestinan leader's ability to deliver reform.

July 9 Ariel Sharon's government moves to silence a Palestinian peace activist who endeared himself to Israelis late last year when he suggested Palestinians give up the right of return for refugees as part of peace deal. Dr. Sari Nusseibeh, a philosopher and negotiator at the Madrid Peace Conference, has boxes of files, student and personnel records, and research carted away from al-Quds University in East Jerusalem.

July 16 Eight Israeli settlers on the West Bank are shot dead as gunmen ambush a bus.

July 19 The Israeli army rounds up 21 relatives of suspected militants for exile and blows up their homes.

July 21 CIA director George Tenet's PNA security reform plan is made public and official.

July 22 An Israeli jet attack on a residential area of Gaza City kills the Hamas military leader, Salah Shehadeh, and 14 other people, including 9 children.

July 31 The Hebrew University in East Jerusalem is attacked by a Hamas bomber, killing two Israelis and five US nationals. Investigators believe the bomb was left in a bag in the cafeteria.

August 1 A UN report on the fighting at the Jenin refugee camp in April disputes Palestinian claims of an Israeli massacre but accuses both sides of endangering civilian lives and criticizes the Israeli army for the widespread destruction of property.

August 4 The Israeli army bulldozes the homes of families of nine suicide bombers. Hamas stops releasing its bombers' names to prevent retaliation.

August 5 Israel announces a total ban on Palestinian travel in much of the West Bank and seals off a chunk of the Gaza Strip with tanks. A car explodes in northern Israel, killing one person and injuring another.

August 14 The Israeli State Attorney's Office submits an indictment against Marwan al-Barghuthi, charging him with murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and participation and membership in a terrorist organization.

August 15 Israeli forces fire rockets into a house in the West Bank, killing a disabled Hamas leader, Nasr Jarra, as well as another Palestinian.

August 25 An Israeli cabinet minister, Danny

Naveh, admits that plans for a gradual Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza had been "frozen."

September Nuseibeh-Ayalon Agreement issued.

September 3 Israel's Supreme Court rules in favor of sending relatives of suspected suicide bombers into internal exile—despite protests from human rights groups that the action contravenes international law.

September 9 Yasir Arafat uses his first appearance before the Palestinian parliament in 18 months to condemn "every act of terror against Israeli civilians."

September 10 Fatah announces a unilateral halt to attacks on Israeli civilians and says it will try to prevent other militant Palestinian groups from carrying out suicide bombings and other such attacks.

September 17 The Quartet—the United States, European Union, Russia, and United Nations—issues final draft of "Road Map" for Israeli-Palestinian resolution by 2005.

September 18 In New York, Israeli negotiators reject a Palestinian proposal to suspend attacks on civilians in Israel as the first stage in a complete cease-fire.

September 19 A suicide bomber detonates his explosives on a bus at lunchtime in a crowded Tel Aviv street, killing seven people, including himself.

September 20 Israeli tanks and bulldozers smash their way through Arafat's compound in Ramallah, destroying half of the last building still under his control and demanding the handing over of 20 men on its wanted list who are believed to be inside.

September 21 Israeli troops haul down the Palestinian flag from the Palestinian Ramallah headquarters.

September 24 The UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding Israel withdraw from Palestinian towns and end the destruction of Palestinian property.

September 26 Hamas threatens retaliation "everywhere" in Israel for an air strike in Gaza that killed two of its members.

October 1 Israeli troops reoccupy three buildings near Yasir Arafat's headquarters.

October 2 A UNICEF special representative in the region, Pierre Poupard, issues a statement saying that "a generation of Palestinian children is being denied their right to an education," as over 226,000 schoolchildren out of one million in the West Bank, and 9,300 teachers are denied access to their schools.

October 7 Israeli troops make an early morning raid on the Gaza Strip. Ten Palestinians die as an Israeli helicopter fires into a crowd.

October 10 A Palestinian suicide bomber blows himself up in Tel Aviv in retaliation for the Gaza Strip air attack, killing one woman and injuring 16 others.

October 14 Israeli security forces use a booby-trapped public telephone outside a hospital to blow up a Palestinian member of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades in Bethlehem.

October 25 Hundreds of Israeli troops seize control of Jenin in the biggest military assault since April.

October 30 The Israel coalition government collapses as Benjamin Ben-Eliezer leads his ministers out of Ariel Sharon's cabinet.

October 31 Sharon begins the task of patching together right-wing support for his fragile Likud administration by appointing a former army chief, Shaul Mofaz, who has led campaigns against Palestinian militants and favors ousting Arafat.

November 5 Sharon accepts that he cannot regain a parliamentary majority after Labor ministers quit his National Unity Government. He calls for elections within 90 days.

November 9 Israeli army kills the head of Islamic Jihad in Jenin, Iyad Sawalhe, who Israel claims was responsible for two of the worst suicide bombings this year.

November 10 A Palestinian gunman opens fire on a kibbutz near the West Bank, killing five Israelis, including a mother and her two young sons.

November 12 The Israeli army raids the West Bank town of Tulkarem and lays siege to Nablus.

November 15 Palestinian gunmen kill 12 Israelis after opening fire on a group of settlers making a weekly pilgrimage to a holy site in Hebron.

November 19 Five Palestinians are killed as Israeli soldiers sweep through the West Bank town of Tulkarem in an apparent attempt to capture Tarek Zaghal, a leader of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades militia.

November 21 A Palestinian suicide bomber kills 11 people—half of them children—on a crowded Jerusalem bus.

November 22 A British UN official and an 11-year-old Palestinian boy die after Israeli soldiers storm a Jenin refugee camp.

November 28 Three Palestinians open fire on Likud headquarters during the party's leadership election. Six Israelis die in the attack.

November 29 Ariel Sharon wins the Likud leadership contest.

December 3 The Knesset begins proceedings to bar three Arab members and their parties from next month's election because of their support for the Palestinian resistance.

December 22 Yasir Arafat's cabinet calls off scheduled January elections for a Palestinian president and legislature because it says the Israeli military occupation of West Bank cities makes a free ballot impossible.

December 26 The Israeli army kills at least seven Palestinians in a series of targeted assassinations in the West Bank.

2003

January 5 A dual suicide bombing in Tel Aviv kills 25 people, ending a six-week lull in attacks on Israel and coming just three weeks before an Israeli general election.

January 6 Palestinian officials are barred by Israel from attending a meeting in London to discuss progress toward an independent state. The travel ban was imposed by the Israeli cabinet in direct response to the previous day's suicide bombings.

January 19 Sharon dismisses European peace efforts as anti-Israeli, saying that only the United States matters in deciding the fate of the Palestinians.

January 26 Two days before the Israeli elections in which Sharon is campaigning on his militarist policies, Israeli forces launch their biggest raid on Gaza since the prime minister came to power. The raid kills 12 Palestinians and critically injures 8.

February 7 The Israeli army arrests two dozen Palestinians in raids across the West Bank. Israeli strikes also kill at least six, including two Palestinian nurses in Gaza.

February 10 Following a secret meeting between Ariel Sharon and Yasir Arafat earlier this week, cease-fire talks between Israel and the Palestinians begin. Israeli officials describe the meetings as the start of a process that will lead to a lasting settlement with the Palestinians.

February 15 Yasir Arafat bows to intense international pressure and agrees to appoint a prime minister—a vital prerequisite for the resumption of formal peace talks with the Israelis.

February 18 Israel lifts its foreign travel ban on Palestinian leaders, allowing them to discuss the peace process in a series of meetings beginning in London. The Israeli move is in acknowledgment of Arafat's pledge to devolve some of his powers to an as-yet-unnamed prime minister.

February 20 The Israeli army kills at least 11 people during six hours of fighting in Gaza.

February 21 Ariel Sharon says that he will not discuss the division of Jerusalem or the return of Palestinian refugees during peace negotiations, a blow to the prospects of a successful Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

March 3 In the latest of a series of raids in Gaza, Israeli soldiers kill eight people.

March 5 At least 15 people are killed after a Palestinian suicide bombing of a bus in the northern Israeli town of Haifa. In response, Israel launches helicopter gunship attacks on Gaza refugee camp in Jabalya.

March 7 Yasir Arafat nominates his deputy in the PLO, Mahmud Abbas, as Palestinian prime minister, as part of reforms aimed at reviving peace talks with Israel.

March 8 Senior Hamas leader Ibrahim al

Makadme is killed by an Israeli helicopter strike on his car. Hamas vows to avenge the assassination.

March 16 A US peace activist, Rachel Corrie, 23, is crushed to death as she tries to block an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip.

March 18 Yasir Arafat signs legislation surrendering most of his authority to a new Palestinian prime minister, opening the way for the release of the Road Map peace plan.

March 19 Mahmud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) officially accepts Yasir Arafat's offer of the post of Palestinian prime minister.

March 30 A suicide bomber blows himself up in the Israeli coastal town of Netanya, injuring 58 people.

April 2 Israeli forces launch two days of raids on occupied Palestinian territories, killing six Palestinians and detaining more than 1,000 boys and men.

April 8 President Bush announces that he will publish the internationally brokered Road Map once the recently designated Palestinian prime minister, Mahmud Abbas, names his cabinet. Meanwhile a senior Hamas leader, Sa'ad al-Arabeed, and four other Palestinians are killed in a targeted Israeli air strike.

April 9 A bomb explodes on a West Bank school playground in a village south of Jenin, injuring 20 Palestinian children.

April 20 The Israeli military carries out one of the largest raids in Gaza since the start of the Intifada, killing 6 people and wounding 48 in Rafah.

April 23 Arafat and prime minister–designate Mahmud Abbas finally agree on the composition of the new cabinet. A Palestinian suicide bomber blows himself up at a crowded railway station in central Israel, killing one.

April 28 Palestinian prime minister–designate Mahmud Abbas says he will not travel abroad to meet foreign politicians until Israel lifts its travel ban on Yasir Arafat. Israel states it will not lift the ban on Arafat.

April 30 The United States releases its long-awaited Road Map for peace to Israeli and Palestinian leaders hours after Mahmud Abbas and his cabinet are sworn in.

May 1 Israeli troops raid the home of an alleged Hamas bombmaker in Gaza, killing 14 Palestinians during a fierce gun battle.

May 10 US secretary of state Colin Powell arrives in Israel for talks with Ariel Sharon and Mahmud Abbas on the US-backed Road Map.

May 17 Sharon meets his Palestinian counterpart, Abbas, in Jerusalem, for three hours of talks.

May 18 A suicide bomber blows up an Israeli bus in Jerusalem, killing seven passengers.

May 19 A suicide bomber kills two people in a shopping center in Afula, Israel.

May 25 The Israeli cabinet votes to accept the Road Map to an independent Palestinian state within three years. But Sharon's government attaches opt-out clauses and other demands.

June 4 The summit meeting among Ariel Sharon, Mahmud Abbas, and US president George W. Bush convenes in Aqaba, Jordan.

June 10 An Israeli army helicopter attempts to assassinate the Hamas political leader in Gaza, drawing criticism from Washington, accusations of terrorism from the Palestinians, and a vow by Hamas to respond in kind.

June 11 A teenage suicide bomber kills 16 people on a rush-hour bus in the heart of Jerusalem, fulfilling a vow by the militant Islamist movement Hamas to avenge a botched Israeli attempt to assassinate its political leader a day earlier.

June 13 Israeli helicopters fire three missiles at a car, killing one person and wounding 22, including 7 children.

June 22 Israel assassinates a Hamas leader, drawing threats of retaliation from the Islamic organization and criticism from US secretary of state Colin Powell.

June 29 Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement formally announce a three-month cease-fire.

July 3 Israel's army chief claims victory over the

Palestinian Intifada, saying the cease-fire announced by Hamas and other groups is an admission of defeat.

July 6 The Israeli cabinet agrees to free several hundred Palestinian prisoners to bolster the US-led Road Map to peace.

July 25 President Bush hosts Prime Minister Abbas in a visit designed to quicken a sluggish peace process and shore up the authority of Abbas.
—An Israeli soldier shoots and kills a four-year-old Palestinian boy and injures two other children when he fires a tank-mounted machine gun at a northern West Bank roadblock.

July 29 Ariel Sharon shrugs off President George Bush's request to halt construction on the security barrier through the West Bank, vowing that the work will continue.

August 4 Palestinians condemn a list of prisoners whom Israel plans to release from its jails, saying that the number is below what had originally been promised and those slated to be released had served their sentences.

August 5 Israel calls a halt to its gradual military withdrawal from Palestinian cities following the wounding of a Jewish settler and her three children near Bethlehem.
—Bush administration threatens to impose financial sanctions on Israel if it persists in pushing its security wall deep into Palestinian territory.

August 13 Israeli troops kill a top Islamic Jihad fugitive, prompting threats of revenge by the militant group and placing further strain on an already shaky cease-fire.

August 17 Efforts to keep the Middle East Road Map peace process (a six-week-old cease-fire) on track hit a snag when Israel reneges on an agreement to transfer control of four West Bank cities to the Palestinian Authority.

August 19 A Palestinian suicide bomber blows apart a bus in the heart of Jerusalem, killing at least 20 people, including children; wounding more than 100; and inflicting the most serious blow yet to the cease-fire.

August 21 Israel launches a helicopter strike in Gaza. Three people, including Ismail Abu Shanab, a political leader of Hamas, are killed. Palestinian militant groups call off their cease-fire.

September 1 Israeli helicopters kill a Hamas activist, wound a second, and injure 25 bystanders in a missile attack on Gaza City.

September 5 Israeli troops kill a Hamas commander in the West Bank city of Nablus, further undermining the troubled leadership of Mahmud Abbas.

September 8 Yasir Arafat fires Prime Minister Mahmud Abbas and nominates Ahmad Qurei' for the position.

September 9 Fifteen die in suicide attacks on troops at a nightspot.

September 10 Israeli warplanes bomb the home of a senior Hamas leader, Mahmoud Zahar, wounding him and his wife and killing two others, including his son.

September 14 The Israeli government is considering killing Arafat as one of the means to carry out its threat to "remove" him as an obstacle to peace, Israel's deputy prime minister says.

September 16 The United States vetoes a UN resolution demanding that Israel neither harm nor expel the Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat.

September 24 A group of Israeli air force pilots declare their refusal to fly missions that could endanger civilians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

September 25 Edward Said—scholar, literary critic, and the most eloquent supporter of the Palestinian cause—dies in New York after a long battle with leukemia.

October 7 *The Guardian* reports that Yasir Arafat has suffered a mild heart attack but the Palestinian leadership has sought to keep his health problems secret for fear it will create panic.

October 9 Palestinian leadership is thrown into jeopardy when the new prime minister, Ahmad Qurei', threatens to resign in a dispute with Arafat.

October 9–12 The Israeli army fights its way into Rafah refugee camp in Gaza in search of weapons-smuggling tunnels under the border with Egypt. At the raid's end, three tunnels have been found, more than 100 homes rock-

eted or flattened by bulldozers, about 1,500 people left homeless, and two children killed by Israeli helicopter fire.

October 20 Israeli aircraft kill 10 people and injure nearly 100 others in five waves of air strikes in Gaza.

October 21 Hamas launches a barrage of missiles at targets inside and outside Gaza.

October 26 The Israeli military orders thousands of Palestinians living near the steel and concrete separation Barrier through the West Bank to obtain special permits to live in their own homes.

November 12 A new cabinet led by prime minister Ahmad Qurei' is approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council in a move seen as crucial to reviving the US-backed peace plan.

November 18 European Union formally condemns Israel's controversial security fence, or Barrier, in the occupied West Bank.

November 28 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declares Israel in violation of international law for flouting a UN resolution calling for its "security barrier" to be dismantled.

December 1 Geneva Accord signed; initiated by Yossi Beilin and Yasir Abed Rabbu.

December 18 Ariel Sharon says he is prepared to deliver an ultimatum to the Palestinians to act against terrorists or he will embark on a "unilateral separation" plan within months.

December 23 An Israeli army raid in southern Gaza leaves eight Palestinians dead in the worst outbreak of violence in two months.

December 25 Five Palestinians, including three members of Islamic Jihad, are killed in an Israeli air strike in Gaza. Minutes later four Israelis are killed by a suicide bomber near Tel Aviv.

December 26 Israel closes the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the suicide bomb that killed four people near Tel Aviv, ending nearly three months of relative calm in the region.

2004

January 9 Palestinian prime minister Ahmad Qurei' warns he will seek a single state for both Jews and Arabs if Ariel Sharon annexes parts of the West Bank and imposes borders on Palestine.

—It emerges that the Israeli army has killed 19 people in a futile search for the leader of "the heart of the terror networks" during a three-week occupation of Nablus.

January 13 The Israeli government announces that it expects to begin withdrawing from parts of the Occupied Territories and redefining their borders if there is no progress toward a negotiated peace settlement.

January 28 At least 13 Palestinians are killed in clashes in the Gaza Strip.

January 29 At least 10 people are killed and another 50 wounded in a suicide attack on a bus outside Ariel Sharon's official residence in Jerusalem. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades claim responsibility. The attack fails to derail a prisoner swap in which Israel begins freeing 436 of the 9,000 Palestinian detainees it holds in exchange for an abducted Israeli businessman and the bodies of 3 dead soldiers.

February 2 Ariel Sharon declares his intention to withdraw from virtually all Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip, with or without signing a final peace agreement with the Palestinians.

February 9 Israeli civil and human rights groups launch a legal action against the West Bank "security barrier" in the country's Supreme Court, claiming that it infringes on the human rights of Palestinians affected by its construction.

February 11 Fifteen Palestinians—including Abu Shkail, a Hamas activist—are killed in a gun battle with Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip. Hamas vows revenge for the attack.

February 18 The International Committee of the Red Cross calls on Israel to halt construction of the steel and concrete "security barrier" through the West Bank because it breaches international law and is causing widespread harm to Palestinians.

February 22 A suicide bomber murders eight people on a rush-hour bus in Jerusalem.

February 23 Israeli troops fire tear gas at Palestinians protesting at the barrier being constructed in the West Bank as a court case on its legality opens in The Hague.

March 7 The biggest Israeli raid into Gaza for months leaves 14 Palestinians dead, amid fears of a sharp upsurge in violence before Israel's planned withdrawal from the Palestinian territory.

March 14 Ten people are killed when two Palestinians from Gaza blow themselves up in the Israeli port of Ashdod, prompting Prime Minister Sharon to cancel his first summit meeting with his Palestinian counterpart, Ahmad Qurei'.

March 16 Israeli forces launch a new offensive in the Gaza Strip, killing at least 6 Palestinians and wounding 27 in a series of air strikes.

March 23 Hamas names Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, doctor turned Islamist fighter, as its new leader in Gaza.

March 22 Prime minister Ariel Sharon describes Israel's asassination of Ahmed Yassin as an attack on the "first and foremost leader of the Palestinian terrorist murderers."

March 25 The United States blocks a UN resolution condemning Israel's assassination of the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, on the grounds that the text is "one-sided."

April 17 Israeli forces assassinate Hamas leader Abd al-Aziz Rantisi in the start of a campaign to destroy the organization before Israel pulls out of Gaza.

April 23 Sharon issues an ominous warning that Yasir Arafat could be the next Palestinian leader to be in Israel's line of fire. The Israeli prime minister says he told President Bush that he is no longer prepared to exempt Arafat from physical harm.

April 27 Israel's highest court rules that the government acts illegally in routinely denying press accreditation to Palestinian journalists on the grounds that they pose a threat to security. The High Court of Justice orders the government to lift the ban after news agency Reuters and the Arabic television station al-Jazeera challenge the practice of denying press cards to Palestinian journalists.

May 5 Israeli government auditor reveals that the Israeli Housing Ministry has spent £3.7 million building illegal settlements and outposts in the West Bank in the past three years.

May 11 Six Israeli soldiers are killed in fighting with Palestinian militants in Gaza City, the highest Israeli death toll in a single operation in nearly two years. Five Palestinians are also killed and 88 wounded.

May 12 Palestinian fighters kill five Israeli soldiers by blowing up an armored vehicle in a Gaza refugee camp as troops fight house to house in a Gaza City neighborhood to search for the body parts of the six soldiers killed in a similar attack the previous day.

May 14–18 Israel launches a massive offensive in Gaza, Operation Rainbow, razing hundreds of homes in Rafah; army kills at least 20 people.

May 19 At least 10 Palestinians are killed and 35 wounded when Israeli forces fire on a crowd demonstrating against the invasion of a Gaza refugee camp.

June 19 Yasir Arafat tells an Israeli newspaper that he recognizes Israel's right to remain a Jewish state and accepts the return of only a fraction of the Palestinian refugees.

July 1 The Israeli High Court of Justice rules that the government's security barrier is violating the human rights of Palestinians.

July 10 The International Court of Justice brands Israel's vast barrier through the West Bank a de facto land grab and tells Israel to tear it down and compensate the victims.

July 21 Israel accuses the EU of "encouraging Palestinian terrorism" by supporting a UN General Assembly resolution pressing the Jewish state to tear down the "security barrier."

August 17 Israel announces plans for 1,000 new housing units in the West Bank, violating the US-brokered Road Map for peace in the region.

August 23 Israel announces plans to build an additional (to the previously announced 1,000) 530 new homes for settlers in the West Bank, following a US policy shift (in Israel's favor) on settlements.

August 31 At least 16 people are killed and 80 injured when Palestinian militants carry out suicide bombings on two buses in the southern Israeli city of Beersheba.

September 6 An Israeli attack on Hamas training camp near Gaza City kills at least 13.

September 8 Israel's agriculture minister, Israel Katz, announces plans for further expansion of Jewish settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley by expropriating 8,000 acres of land.

September 30 Israeli forces kill at least 23 Palestinians as the army makes a rare push into the heart of a heavily defended Gaza refugee camp.

October 5 Israeli forces demolish the homes of hundreds of Palestinians, bulldozing huge swaths of agricultural land and destroying infrastructure in their bloodiest assault on the Gaza Strip in years.

October 26 The Israeli government gives Yasir Arafat permission to leave his Ramallah headquarters for the first time in two years to receive medical treatment.

October 29 Arafat is flown to Paris for medical treatment.

November 11 Yasir Arafat dies. His body is flown to Cairo, where his funeral will take place before he is buried in Ramallah.

November 22 US secretary of state Colin Powell visits Israel and the West Bank in an attempt to resuscitate the peace process.

December 18 Ariel Sharon secures a historic deal with his bitter political foe, Labor Party leader Shimon Peres, to guarantee the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza. The deal marks the rehabilitation of Peres after years in the political wilderness.

December 19 Israel agrees to release 170 Palestinian prisoners as a gesture of goodwill to Egypt and the new Palestinian leadership. Approximately 8,500 prisoners remain in Israeli custody.

2005

January 4 The Israeli military kills seven Palestinians and wounds six others in response to Palestinian rocket fire, prompting moderate Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas to denounce Israel as the "Zionist enemy."

January 8 Israel pulls its troops back from Palestinian towns in the West Bank for 72 hours to allow free movement during the weekend's Palestinian presidential election.

January 10 Mahmud Abbas claims a landslide victory in the Palestinian presidential election and prepares to outline a post-Arafat program encompassing internal reforms, securing a cease fire from militant groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and revitalizing peace talks with Israel after a four-year impasse. Abbas says the Palestinians are "ready for peace" and he is eager to resume the negotiations with Israel abandoned four years ago.

January 11 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon telephones Mahmud Abbas to congratulate him on winning the Palestinian presidential election.

January 14 Palestinian militants detonate a bomb on the edge of the Gaza Strip, killing at least five Israelis.

—Sharon orders that all contact with the newly elected Palestinian leader, Mahmud Abbas, be severed until he reins in militants.

January 17 The Israeli government orders the army to resume assassinating Palestinian militants in Gaza after three days of violence, which has left six Israelis and eight Palestinians dead.

January 18 Hamas suicide bomber strikes at Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip.

January 20 Israeli cabinet lifts its ban on contacts with the PNA as the new Palestinian leadership appeals for cooperation with its attempts to curb bomb and rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.

January 21 Hundreds of armed Palestinian police are deployed across the northern Gaza Strip to prevent rocket attacks by militants.

January 27 Israel agrees "in principle" to withdraw forces from West Bank cities and give Palestinians policing rights in these areas.

January 31 President Abbas holds talks with Russian president Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin as he attempts to gain Moscow's support prior to peace talks with Israel.

—An Israeli government report reveals that Israel has quietly seized thousands of acres of Palestinian-owned land in and around East Jerusalem after a secret cabinet decision to use

a 55-year-old law against Arabs separated from farms and orchards by the vast "security barrier."

February 2 Hamas and seven other Palestinian groups threaten to call off a truce and return to "all-out martyrdom attacks"—suicide bombings—unless Israel commits itself to ending army raids and killings in the Occupied Territories.

February 8 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas agree to a cease-fire and pledge to end violence after more than four years of Intifada, which has claimed over 4,500 lives.

February 12 Mahmud Abbas demands that military leaders stop firing mortars and rockets at Israeli settlements and towns.

February 14 Rafik Hariri, Lebanon's former prime minister, is assassinated in a huge bomb attack that kills at least 9 others, injures more than 100, and threatens to shatter the country's fragile peace.

February 16 Ariel Sharon declares that Israel will not give up the main Jewish settlements in the West Bank as part of a final peace deal with the Palestinians.

February 20 The Israeli cabinet approves the removal of Jewish settlers from the the Gaza Strip and four small West Bank outposts.

February 23 Palestinian Legislative Council forces Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei' to make sweeping changes to his cabinet, criticized for being dominated by corrupt and incompetent ministers too closely associated with the late Yasir Arafat.

February 24 Palestinian Legislative Council approves a 24-member cabinet, dominated by professional appointees, in a significant government reform.

February 25 A suicide bomber blows himself up in a crowd of Israelis waiting outside a nightclub near Tel Aviv's beachfront promenade, killing five people, wounding dozens, and shattering the unofficial truce.

—Israel announces plans to build more than 6,000 new homes in Jewish settlements in the West Bank, in a move that would offset its imminent withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

February 26 Acting on orders from Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas, security forces arrest three suspected militants in connection with the previous day's suicide bombing that killed four Israelis at a Tel Aviv nightclub.

March 8 An official Israeli government report, the Sasson Report, finds Israel guilty of systematic fraud, "institutional lawbreaking," and theft of private Palestinian land to covertly establish illegal Jewish outposts in the West Bank.

March 16 Israeli troops hand Jericho to Palestinian security control amid signs that an informal truce is starting to pay off.

March 22 Israeli government approves the construction of thousands of homes around one of the largest Jewish settlements in a further move to consolidate its grip over parts of the West Bank ahead of any peace negotiations.

April 12 US president George W. Bush insists he will not permit settlement blocking off a Palestinian East Jerusalem.

April 15 Prime Minister Ariel Sharon brushes off a warning from President Bush not to allow further West Bank settlement growth, indicating that Israel will continue to solidify its hold on areas it considers of strategic importance.

April 23 A leading UK union (Association of University Teachers) votes to boycott two Israeli universities that it accuses of being complicit in the abuse of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

May 20 Israel says it will resume attacks on Palestinians who attempt to fire rockets from the Gaza Strip, after dozens of mortars hit Jewish settlements, without causing serious injury.

May 27 President George Bush rebuffs an appeal from Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas for a swift revival of peace negotiations and the rapid creation of a Palestinian state after Israel pulls out of the Gaza Strip.

June 5 Israel releases 398 Palestinian prisoners. Some 9,000 remain.

June 13 The United States imposes temporary sanctions on Israel after a dispute over Israel's sale of drones—unmanned aerial vehicles—to China.

June 22 A rare meeting between Ariel Sharon and Mahmud Abbas ends in deadlock after the Israeli prime minister says there could be no political progress, or even gestures, "so long as terrorism continues."

July 8 Leaders of the G-8 agree to a $3 billion (£1.7 billion) annual package to help the Palestinians, in particular to rebuild the Gaza Strip after the scheduled withdrawal of Israel this year.

July 14 Ariel Sharon orders "a relentless attack" on the leadership of Islamic Jihad following a suicide bombing the previous day.

July 15 Israel launches a wave of air strikes on Gaza targets in response to rocket attacks that killed a woman in her home.

July 16 The five-month Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire is in tatters as Israeli air strikes kill six Hamas militants.

July 17 Israel launches fresh missile strikes in Gaza and vows to keep targeting gunmen to prevent rocket attacks ahead of its planned withdrawal from Gaza the following month.

July 18 Israel masses thousands of troops along the border of the Gaza Strip and warns that it will invade unless the PNA acts to prevent the firing of missiles at Israeli towns.

August 5 An Orthodox Jewish soldier shoots and kills four Israeli-Arabs on a bus before being beaten to death by an angry crowd.

August 22 The last of 1,500 Jewish settler families are evacuated from the Gaza Strip.

September 15 Israel's highest court rules that the country has the right to build its "security fence" on occupied land, reversing an earlier decision.

September 24 Israel kills 4 Hamas militants and wounds more than 20 civilians in a sustained series of air strikes on the Gaza Strip.

September 30 Israel kills 3 militants and arrests 420 in a series of raids across the West Bank. Hamas says arrests are designed to undermine it.

October 17 The Israeli government suspends contacts with the PNA and imposes travel restrictions on the West Bank after gunmen kill three people in two drive-by shootings.

October 20 Israeli army seals off main West Bank route to Palestinian vehicles.

October 25 International Middle East envoy James Wolfensohn accuses Israel of behaving as if it has not withdrawn from the Gaza Strip by blocking its borders and failing to fulfill commitments to allow the movement of Palestinians and goods.

October 26 Five people are killed in a suicide bombing at an open-air market in Israel.

October 29 Israeli military kills a Palestinian militant in a missile strike on a car in the Gaza Strip as Ariel Sharon presses ahead with his "broad and continuous" offensive.

October 30 Palestinian officials say that agreement has been reached with Israel to cease hostilities in the Gaza Strip.

November 1 The Israeli Defense Ministry bars foreign journalists from entering the Gaza Strip.

November 2 Citing security issue, Israel closes all Gaza border crossings and prevents the flow of all goods into Gaza.

November 3 UN condemns nightly sonic booms in Gaza as indiscriminate, saying they cause trauma and miscarriages.

November 11 The new leader of Israel's Labor Party, Amir Peretz, says that he intends to force a general election next spring after pulling his party out of Ariel Sharon's government.

November 14 Former US president Bill Clinton urges Israel to return to negotiations and not to rely on unilateral measures to try to impose a solution to their conflict.

November 21 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon says that his departure from Likud in order to form a new centrist party came because he did not want to waste time with "political in-fighting."

November 22 Israel launches air strikes inside Lebanon in what it describes as the largest-scale action against Hizbullah militants since Israeli forces pulled out of the country in 2000.

November 30 Veteran Israeli politician Shimon Peres announces he is leaving the Labor Party he led until three weeks ago to give his support to Ariel Sharon.

December 5 At least five people are killed in a suicide bombing at a shopping center in the Israeli city of Netanya.

December 9 Palestinian families are driven from homes by settlers in "cleansing" of Hebron.

December 14 At least four Palestinians are killed and four others wounded when their car is hit in an Israeli air strike.

December 16 Palestinian militant group Hamas wins a landslide victory in local elections in key West Bank cities, dealing a blow to the ruling Fatah party just six weeks before a parliamentary election.

December 18 Ariel Sharon is rushed to the hospital after suffering a mild stroke, but his condition is not life-threatening, according to his aides.

December 20 Sharon leaves the Jerusalem hospital where he has received treatment for a mild stroke and says he plans to return to work quickly.

—Two dozen armed members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades seize Bethlehem's city hall in Manger Square and appear on the roof, pointing guns at onlookers.

December 28 Israeli army shells Gaza after missile lands near nursery; no injuries.

December 29 Suicide bomber kills an Israeli soldier and two Palestinians after he is apprehended at a checkpoint near the West Bank town of Tulkarem.

2006

January 4 Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon suffers a major stroke and is unconscious in the hospital. Doctors treating Ariel Sharon say he is unlikely to return to work.

January 7 Ehud Olmert assumes position as acting prime minister in the wake of Sharon's illness.

January 10 Under pressure from Washington, Israel says it will allow Arab residents of East Jerusalem to vote in Palestinian parliamentary elections this month.

January 12 Hamas drops call for destruction of Israel from manifesto. Shift comes in runup to Palestinian election. Commitment to armed struggle remains.

January 16 Ehud Olmert, acting Israeli prime minister, is formally chosen to lead the Kadima Party into nationwide elections due to take place in March.

—East Jerusalem Palestinians are allowed to vote in Palestinian parliamentary election, but Israel bars Hamas from election. Police arrest activists for campaigning.

January 19 Palestinian suicide bomber blows himself up in Tel Aviv, injuring at least 15 people and casting a shadow over the Palestinian parliamentary elections scheduled for next week.

January 25 Hundreds of thousands of voters turn out for a parliamentary election expected to produce a major shake-up of Palestinian politics.

January 26 Hamas wins a large majority in the elections for the new Palestinian parliament, claiming 76 of the 132 parliamentary seats, giving the party the right to form the next cabinet under the PNA's president, Mahmud Abbas, the leader of rival Fatah.

—US president George Bush insists Hamas cannot be a partner for peace without first renouncing violence.

January 27 President Mahmud Abbas says he will ask Hamas to form a government following its victory in the elections.

January 28 Fatah activists demand the party leadership resign following the crushing election defeat by Hamas.

January 30 Mahmud Abbas urges the international community not to cut aid to his people following last week's election victory by Hamas.

February 5 Israeli forces fire a missile at a car in the northern Gaza Strip, killing two Palestinian militants.

February 6 Corruption inquiry into Palestinian Authority results in 25 arrests and 10 warrants. "May have lost billions." Graft concerns helped Hamas to achieve victory at polls.

February 8 The political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, says that he will accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict if Israel withdraws to its pre-1967 borders and accepts the right of return of Palestinian refugees.
—Israel unveils plan to encircle Palestinian state. Olmert says he will keep control of Jordan Rift Valley and all settlement blocks.

February 11 Israel accuses Russia of stabbing it in the back after President Vladimir Putin invites Hamas leaders to visit Moscow as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people after the Islamic group's election landslide last month.

February 14 Israel excludes Palestinians from fertile Jordan Rift Valley. Permit system seen as bid to annex West Bank land.

February 20 Israel freezes contacts with what it calls the "terrorist" Palestinian Authority and puts a block on the transfer of funds.

February 28 EU to pay £94.5 million to avert collapse of PNA. Fund to be used for utility bills, wages, health, and schools. No direct payments after Hamas assumes power.

March 7 Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz warns that the incoming Palestinian prime minister, Ismael Haniyeh, could be targeted for assassination if Hamas resumes its campaign of violence.

March 10 Israel's acting prime minister, Ehud Olmert, says the country will draw its final borders within four years without consulting the Palestinians if Hamas does not recognize the Jewish state.
—Israel institutes blockade of Gaza.

March 13 Efforts by Hamas to form a National Unity Government that will win international acceptance are faltering after the group delivers a statement of principles to the Palestinian president that the administration reserves the right to "reassess" peace accords with Israel.

March 19 Hamas unveils its new government.

March 22 Gaza rations food as Israel cuts supplies. Bakeries close and shelves empty as supplies dwindle.

March 25 President Mahmud Abbas is to approve the appointment of a new Hamas-led government but warns that the administration has no future—and will be acting against the interests of the people—unless it agrees to deal with Israel.

March 28 Israelis vote in general election that sees a plurality of seats for new Kadima Party, followed by the Labor Party, and a major loss for the Likud Party. Ehud Olmert of Kadima claims a mandate for his plan to impose Israel's final borders.

March 29 United States bans its diplomats from having any contact with the Hamas-led cabinet as it was sworn in by President Mahmud Abbas.
—Hamas warns that if the new Israeli government does not begin peace negotiations and end the confiscation of Palestinian land, it will revert to "armed resistance" to the occupation of the West Bank.

March 31 Suicide bomber claims three victims in West Bank attack. Attack comes as election victors draft their plans. United States rules out talks with Hamas government.

April 3 Shells, rockets, and leaflets are ammunition in Gaza battle. Israel uses gunboats to bombard open land. Clashes between Fatah and Hamas underline tensions.

April 5 Kadima and Labor agree to share power; Peretz backs Olmert to remain as prime minister.

April 6 Israeli forces arrest a Palestinian cabinet minister as he tries to enter the West Bank from Jerusalem, the first time Israel has directly interfered with the new government.

April 8 At least six people are killed when an Israeli missile hits a car full of Palestinians in the southern Gaza town of Rafah.

April 9 Hamas is to abandon its use of suicide bombers in any future confrontations with Israel, its representatives tell *The Observer*.

April 10 The EU increases the pressure on the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority to recognize Israel and renounce terrorist violence by suspending all direct aid to the new government.

April 17 A suicide bomber kills 9 people and wounds at least 49 others in Tel Aviv in an attack described by Hamas as an act of "self-defense."

April 18 Israeli leaders blame the Hamas-led PNA for the previous day's suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, but decide against a military retaliation.

April 21 President Mahmud Abbas blocks Hamas's plans to set up a controversial security force, which would consist of militants and be headed by the second on Israel's wanted list.

April 30 Acting Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert wins over enough parties to form a majority coalition, clearing the way for his plans to reshape the West Bank and set final borders.

May 5 Abbas urges Israel's new prime minister, Ehud Olmert, to resume peace talks the day after the new Israeli cabinet is sworn in.

May 7 Six Palestinians are killed in Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip over the weekend.

May 15 The Israeli High Court upholds a law barring many Palestinians from living with their Israeli spouses in Israel.

May 17 Hamas deploys a security force of about 3,000 armed men on the streets of the Gaza Strip in a challenge to the authority of President Mahmud Abbas.

May 21 Islamic Jihad commander dies in Israeli missile strike, a targeted assassination.

May 23 Heavy fighting between Hamas and the Fatah-Palestinian police in Gaza City.

May 26 Abbas puts Hamas on the spot with ultimatum to revive peace talks. Abbas sets ten-day deadline before calling referendum.

May 27 Hamas pulls its armed militia off Gaza's streets to defuse tensions that have led to 10 deaths in fighting between Hamas and Fatah-controlled forces.

June 1 United Nations calls for massive increase in aid to Palestinians. Unprecedented appeal to avert economic collapse is necessary as curbs by EU, US, and Israel starve Hamas government.

June 9 Palestinian militants promise to avenge the death of the Hamas-led PNA's security chief in an Israeli air strike the previous day.

June 9–14 Israeli forces attack the Gaza Strip with a series of air strikes and artillery fire, killing at least 36 Palestinians.

June 19 EU wins backing to send £70 million in aid to the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Quartet agrees to bypass Hamas government with the financing to fund health care and utility supplies.

June 21 Hamas makes a major political climbdown by agreeing to sections of a document that recognizes Israel's right to exist and a negotiated two-state solution.

—Three young Palestinians in Gaza's largest refugee camp are killed by an overnight Israeli air strike.

June 22 Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmud Abbas meet for the first time since the former took office, both promising to hold further talks in the coming weeks.

June 25 In a predawn raid Gaza militants attack an Israeli military installation, kill two soldiers, and kidnap Corporal Gilad Shalit. Hamas denies holding Shalit, but Israel vows revenge.

June 26 The Israeli army masses on Gaza's border poised to invade.

June 28 The Israeli air force attacks the only electrical power plant operating in the Gaza Strip with missiles, destroying the plant's six transformers.

—The Israeli army, under cover of the air force, enters southern Gaza beginning a major offensive, called Operation Summer Rains, to secure the release of the Israeli soldier taken hostage by Palestinian militants. It marks the beginning of a war that is to last six months.

—Victory for Abbas as Hamas gives in on peace talks. Two-state solution agreed to after referendum threat. Freeze on foreign aid said to have prompted U-turn.

June 29 Israeli troops arrest dozens of Hamas ministers and parliamentarians.

July 5 Israel's security cabinet approves the reoccupation of parts of the Gaza Strip.

July 7 At least 17 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier die in the most serious violence since Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip last year.

—The European Union condemns Israel's incur-

sions into the Gaza Strip and warns that the military actions are provoking a humanitarian crisis.

July 12 Hizbullah captures two Israeli soldiers; Olmert calls it an "act of war" and invades Lebanon in an all-out ground, air, and sea military conflict that lasts 34 days.

July 18 Israeli forces kill 13 Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank as the army begins a new push into a refugee camp in central Gaza, clashing with gunmen and bulldozing farmland.

July 25 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, agree to stop firing rockets at Israel and to free the captured Israeli soldier in a deal brokered by Mahmud Abbas, the Palestinian president.

July 27 At least 21 Palestinians are killed when the Israeli army renews its hostilities in the Gaza Strip. About 50 tanks and armored vehicles enter northern Gaza and begin demolishing buildings and trees at dawn.

August 21 Israel has arrested almost one quarter of the members of the Palestinian parliament as part of its campaign to free an Israeli soldier captured in Gaza in June.

August 30 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan calls for Gaza Strip to be reopened.

September 1 Israeli military court puts arrested Hamas officials and parliamentarians up for trial. Fifteen West Bank politicians face up to 10 years in jail. Speaker of Palestinian parliament is shackled.
—Western nations pledge $500 million (£263 million) in aid to the Palestinians as the UN humanitarian chief warns that an economic crisis means the Gaza Strip is a "ticking time bomb."

September 12 Rival Palestinian factions agree to unity government. Hamas hands over negotiating role to PLO. Deal could end blockade and facilitate peace talks.

September 27 Israel's military court orders the release of the Palestinian deputy prime minister after more than a month in jail.

October 10 A Qatari initiative to broker an agreement between the two main Palestinian political groups, possibly paving the way for a restoration of foreign aid to the beleaguered Palestinian government, ends in failure.

October 12 Gaza sliding into civil war. Economic crisis worsens, as do clashes between Hamas and Fatah.

October 15 Hamas accuses the United States of fomenting internal strife among Palestinians as new details emerge of a US campaign to funnel millions of dollars in funds to Fatah and to provide Fatah forces with weapons and military training.

November 1 Israeli strike on Gaza kills eight. Largest operation since reinvasion. Hamas fires rockets into Israel.

November 7 Israeli troops pull out of the Gaza Strip town of Beit Hanoun, ending a weeklong offensive in which almost 50 Palestinians were killed.

November 8 At least 18 civilians, including 8 children, are killed when Israeli tank shells strike a residential neighborhood north of the Gaza Strip town of Beit Hanoun.

November 11 Defiance in Gaza grows as Israeli grip stifles economy. Restricted fishing, closed crossing points, and refusal to hand over tax credits bring territory close to crisis.

November 13 The two main Palestinian political factions have agreed on a prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, to head a National Unity Government in a move aimed at lifting economic sanctions.

November 21 United Nations condemns massive human rights violations by Israel in Gaza. High commissioner calls on leaders to stop violence.

December 8 United Nations pleas for millions in Palestinian aid amid fears of economic collapse. Half of population is short of food.

December 14 Israel orders the closure of the Rafah Crossing between Egypt and Gaza, apparently to prevent Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh from returning home with millions of dollars in donated money.

December 15 Violence between rival Palestinian groups edges closer toward civil war as security forces loyal to the ruling Fatah organiza-

tion fire on Hamas supporters rallying in the West Bank.

December 19 Jordan offers to host talks between warring Palestinian factions after a resumption of major violence around Gaza City kills 4 people and injures almost 20 others, including a group of schoolchildren caught in crossfire.

December 22 Hamas and Fatah militants fight more fierce battles in the West Bank and Gaza as a shaky truce between the rival Palestinian groups threatens to break down completely.

December 29 Israel allows arms deliveries to Abbas's Fatah forces. Egypt sends guns and ammunition to Gaza to help Fatah security force in fight with Hamas.

2007

January 1 Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv* reports that the government has allocated special subsidies in the 2007 budget for settler industries and agriculture in the West Bank and Golan Heights expected to suffer financially under new EU tariffs on goods from the Occupied Territories.

January 9 The Israeli Military General declares Force 17 an illegal organization.

January 11 Hamas accepts the existence of the state of Israel but will not officially recognize it until the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, according to the radical Hamas leader in Damascus Khalid Meshal.

January 18 Al-Aqsa Institute reveals Israeli excavation work beneath al-Aqsa Mosque walls.

January 21 PNA president Mahmud Abbas meets with Hamas leader Khalid Meshal in Damascus.

January 30 Prince of Qatar calls on Israel to start dialogue with Hamas and affirms that peace with Hamas is possible.

—Israeli presidential candidate Shimon Peres (Kadima) in Qatar states the separation barrier is temporary and will be demolished eventually.

February 1 Israeli renovations near the Mughrabi gate of the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem spark widespread unrest in the Arab world over false charges that Israel is destroying the mosque.

February 3 President Abbas and Prime Minister Haniyeh call separately for a cease-fire under Egyptian sponsorship.

February 6 Israel begins demolishing a hilly area leading to Bab al-Mughrabi Gate in Old City, Jerusalem.

February 8 Under the sponsorship of Saudi king Abdullah Ben Abdul Aziz, Fatah and Hamas sign a historic conciliation accord known as the Mecca Agreement and approve a political program for a National Unity Government.

February 18 An Israeli expert announces that archaeologists have discovered a mosque beneath Bab al-Mughrabi Hill.

—Trilateral Israeli-Palestinian-US summit (Rice, Abbas, and Olmert) ends with no progress.

February 25 The EU announces expansion of scope of its assistance to the Palestinians.

—Israel demolishes road to Bab al-Mughrabi Gate.

February 27–28 Violence significantly increases between the IDF and Palestinian militants following an Israeli air strike that killed five Hamas fighters and Hamas's retaliation launching of 73 rockets from Gaza, which hit Sderot, Ashkelon, and other areas in southern Israel.

February 27–March 4 The IDF stages a large military operation into Gaza named Hot Winter which in addition to hundreds of deaths and injuries, exacerbates the deteriorating humanitarian situation resulting from the near-total blockade of Gaza since June 2006.

March 1 Israeli decree to keep names of those involved in selling lands to Jews confidential.

—United Nations reports that 248 homes and shops in Nablus are damaged during Operation Hot Winter.

March 2 Qatar transfers to the Arab League $22 million to support salaries of striking Palestinian teachers.

March 3 Establishment of the Islamic-Christian Front to defend Jerusalem and the Holy Sites.

March 6 PNA arrests 70 Palestinians, including 18 activists from al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, after they lay siege to the Intelligence Apparatus Building in Ramallah.

March 7 The IDF raids the PNA Military Intelligence headquarters in Ramallah, arresting 18 wanted al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade members who are taking refuge there plus 50 other PNA Military Intelligence officers (most of whom are released after interrogation).
—In Israel, the police arrest Shaykh Raed Salah, leader of the Islamic movement in Israel.

March 8 Israel allows the Rafah Crossing to Egypt to open temporarily.

March 11 European Union gives up condition that the Palestinian unity government must recognize the state of Israel.
—Executive Support Force (ESF), a military force linked to Hamas, closes local roads, damages four homes of Fatah members with explosive devices, and sets fire to local PNA National Security Forces and Force 17 offices.

March 12 The IDF revives Operation Hot Winter in Nablus.
—In Gaza City, suspected Fatah gunmen assassinate Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades commander Ala' al-Haddad.

March 16 World Bank states that Israeli restrictions are the major obstacle facing Palestinian trade activities.

March 17 PNA president Mahmud Abbas swears in the first Palestinian National Unity Government, headed by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh (Hamas/Change and Reform Party), in keeping with the Mecca Agreement reached by Fatah and Hamas, and aimed at halting intra-Palestinian violence.

March 18 UN Secretary General Annan states that formation of the National Unity Government is a positive development. Nevertheless, Israel and United States decide to boycott it.

March 21–25 Fatah and ESF members exchange fire in Bayt Labia, northern Gaza, and Gaza City.

March 25 President Abbas meets with US secretary of state Rice in Ramallah and talks about regular meetings with Prime Minister Olmert in the future.

March 26 Hamas members fire at and then occupy the Fatah-affiliated Bayt Hanun Sports Club.

March 27 The IDF begins work on a new segment of the separation barrier south of Wadi Rahan near Bethlehem.

March 27–28 Arab Summit renews March 2002 Arab peace offer to Israel and calls on Israel to peacefully resolve the Palestinian situation.

March 28 The IDF shells north Gaza for the first time since the November 26 cease-fire after militants fire nine rockets into Israel.

March 30 Bedouin residents of the unrecognized village of al-Nasara in the Negev report that over the past three weeks, Israel has issued eviction orders to around 250 residents, declaring plans to build an IDF installation on the site of the village.

April 1 Israel seals West Bank and Gaza border crossings for the weeklong Passover holidays.
—IDF issues eviction orders to 70 Palestinian families in Dahiyat al-Salam in East Jerusalem, claiming the land on which they live is owned by a Jewish woman who recently inherited the property and wants them to leave (no documents are provided).

April 3 Israeli defense minister Amir Peretz authorizes the IDF to resume "pinpoint operations against terrorists" in Gaza.

April 4 Fatah official Dahlan announces plan to build professional security apparatus.
—The Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem issues demolition orders for a playground and six houses in the Muslim Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem on Palestinian land that has been sought by Jewish developers in order to build 30 homes, a synagogue, and a religious school for Jews only.

April 10 US Congress ratifies $60 million in assistance to the Fatah security services.

April 13 The IDF suspends its Nablus commander after the Israeli daily *Yedi'ot Aharonot* releases video showing soldier using two Palestinian boys as human shields to guard military vehicles.

April 14 Palestinian National Unity Government ratifies the security plan proposed by Dahlan. A dialogue to reactivate the PLO starts in Damascus.

April 15 Abbas and Olmert meet and Israel promises to remove checkpoints in the West

Bank. (Israel removes 10 unmanned checkpoints/roadblocks, terming it a measure aimed at showing goodwill and easing conditions for Palestinians. Some 440 remain.)
—Abbas issues a presidential decree on formation of the National Security Council headed by Dahlan (to exclude Hamas).
—Egyptian border police demolish two smugglers' tunnels on the Rafah border.

April 19 Sweden announces $23 million in assistance to the Palestinian people.

April 20 An international consensus declares that all assistance to PNA is to be transferred to a PLO account under the supervision of PNA minister of finance Salam Fayyad.

April 22 Facing deportation on political charges, Azmi Bashara submits his resignation from the Knesset and announces he will not return to Israel at the present time.
—Citing nine killings in two days, Hamas's Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades declares an end to its observance of the November 26, 2006, cease-fire, though Prime Minister Haniyeh says that the PNA still has every intention of making it work.
—The IDF evicts some 80 Palestinians from Hadidiyya in the north Jordan Rift Valley (the Israeli High Court ruled in January that they posed a security threat to Jewish settlers in nearby Ro'i settlement).

April 23 UNESCO calls for protection of the Old City of Jerusalem.

April 27 Israel allows the Rafah Crossing to open briefly for the first time since April 19.
—Gunfire breaks out among the 5,000 Palestinians waiting to enter Egypt; UN monitors overseeing the passage say Israel's closures have left the crossing too crowded to operate.
—In Israel, hundreds of Palestinian Israeli citizens of Jaffa protest actions by the Israel Lands Administration (ILA) in the past year to evict some 500 Arab families from the al-Ajami and Givat Aliya neighborhoods so as to develop the seafront properties; the ILA calls the Palestinian families "invaders" who built on the sites illegally.

April 28 PNA president Abbas meets with Hamas leader Khalid Meshal in Cairo; agreement on forming a committee to deal with issues of partnership, calm, and internal security.
—IDF troops on the Gaza border fatally shoot three Hamas members who approach the border fence near Gaza City. The Israeli navy fires on Palestinian fishermen off the Rafah coast, forcing them back to shore.

May 1 Qatar transfers $22 million to pay salaries of Palestinian teachers. PNA bankrupt.

May 4 Israel rejects a US plan for providing freedom of movement for the Palestinians.
—IDF troops cross into northern Gaza and arrest three Palestinian farmers working their fields near the border fence at Bayt Lahiya; also send bulldozers and tanks into Gaza near Nahal Oz to level land.

May 6 Palestinians fire some seven rockets from Gaza into Israel, hitting a gas station in Sederot, lightly injuring two Israelis.
—Jewish settlers from Einav near Tulkarm set fire to 80 dunums of Palestinian olive and almond trees nearby.

May 9 Abbas and Haniyeh agree on developing and implementing the security plan.

May 10 Israel declares a plan to build three new settlement quarters in Jerusalem, including the construction of 20,000 new housing units.
—Abbas deploys 3,000 PNA security forces (all Fatah) under his control in Gaza City and northern Gaza as part of a new, high-profile "law and order" campaign meant to undermine Hamas.

May 11 Fatah security forces clash with local Hamas members in Gaza City and Jabaliya refugee camp in the heaviest Fatah-Hamas fighting in two months, wounding at least 10.

May 12 Fatah and Hamas agree on withdrawing the security forces and armed men from the streets of Gaza.

May 13 Renewed clashes between Hamas and Fatah.
—Israel allocates $1.5 billion to increase the number of Jews in Jerusalem and to develop their communities there.

May 14 PNA interior minister Talab al-Qawasmi resigns in protest of Abbas's deployment of Fatah PNA forces without coordination with his ministry, but blames both Hamas and Fatah for failing to take his security reform efforts seriously; Haniyeh will assume the post until a replacement is chosen.

May 16 Bloody factional clashes in Gaza continue.

May 20 Israeli five-day offensive in Gaza kills 23 Palestinians and wounds 86.
—Hamas and Fatah sign a document to end the internal fighting.

May 21 The Palestinian government calls on Israel for a reciprocal concurrent comprehensive calm in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
—EU extends its monitoring mission at Rafah Crossing for 12 months.
—Israeli town of Sderot emptied following the first death from a Qassam rocket attack in six months; Israeli government says it will consider assassinating Palestinian prime minister Haniyeh.
—Israel intensifies its attacks on Gaza with an air strike on the home of a Hamas political leader that kills eight of his relatives and neighbors.

May 22 Israel rejects the calm, rejects truce offer, and decides to continue its raids.

May 25 The PLO calls on the UN Security Council to stop the Israeli aggression and send international observers.

May 30 Quartet Committee calls for halting the rocket firing and release of Hamas prisoners.

June 1 Hamas begins a bloody coup to oust Fatah from Gaza that terminates the National Unity Government.

June 6 A settler organization announces it is building 100 new housing units near the Dead Sea and in the northern West Bank.

June 11 New Israeli instructions on permits canceling the role of the Palestinian Liaison Office.

June 15 Hamas announces "liberation" of Gaza Strip after violent fighting. Fatah ousted. Hamas controls the preventive security headquarters, the general intelligence headquarters, and the presidential guard headquarters.
—President Abbas discharges the government of Ismail Haniyeh who refuses the decree.
—Salam Fayyad is commissioned by the president to form an emergency government. Israel closes all crossings with Gaza Strip.

June 16 President Abbas suspends several articles in the Basic Law because of the state of emergency.

June 17 An emergency government is sworn in before President Abbas.
—Haniyeh rejects the emergency government, announces that his government will continue to work, and issues several decisions with regard to the security services.

June 18 United States and European Union announce official resumption of assistance to the new government headed by Abbas and end of sanctions. Sanctions on Gaza continue.

June 19 Fatah Central Committee rejects any dialogue or contact with Hamas and commissions Zakaria al-Agha to head Fatah committee in Gaza Strip.
—Egypt moves its embassy from Gaza to Ramallah.

June 20 Palestine Central Council calls for early presidential and legislative elections.
—Haniyeh calls for unconditional dialogue.

June 24 President Abbas renews his position rejecting any dialogue with Hamas.

June 25 Sharm al-Shaykh Summit II, gathering Abbas, Olmert, Mubarak, and Jordan's King Abdullah II affirm support of Palestinian legitimacy headed by Abbas. Leaders discuss ways to contain Hamas in the Gaza Strip and means to strengthen Abbas's Fatah party in the West Bank.
—As a "goodwill gesture," Olmert announces the Israeli government's intention to release 250 Fatah prisoners who have "no blood on their hands" and who pledge to renounce violence, most of whom were about to be released. Israel still holds approximately 10,000 Palestinian prisoners.

June 26 Abbas issues a presidential decree banning all armed militias.
—Mubarak affirms Egyptian readiness to mediate between Fatah and Hamas.

June 30 Hamas launches a strong campaign against Abbas and Fayyad. Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades threaten to target any international troops who enter the Gaza Strip.

July 9 UNRWA halts all construction projects because of severe shortage of basic construction material in Gaza Strip.

July 10 President Abbas calls for deployment of an international force in Gaza Strip.

July 11 The Palestinian Legislative Council fails to convene in the second term because Hamas members (who won a majority in last election) boycott.

July 13 End of the legal period for the state of emergency; President Abbas says it will not be extended. Fayyad is commissioned to form a new caretaker government.

July 14 UN Secretary General Annan demands opening all Gaza Strip crossings to avoid collapse of conditions in Gaza Strip.

July 15 Haniyeh renews offer on long-term truce with Israel.

July 16 Abbas meets with Olmert and demands launching of final status negotiations.

July 18 France grants the PNA 15 million euros in aid.

July 19 The Palestine Central Council supports the call of President Abbas on holding early elections and decides to form a committee to prepare for a PNC meeting in the Occupied Territories.
—Hamas threatens to sabotage any early elections.

July 20 Israel releases 255 Palestinian prisoners.

July 23 Jewish extremists break into al-Aqsa Mosque.
—France contributes 22 million euros to support the municipalities and water projects in Jenin.

July 26 President Abbas accepts the resignation of Dahlan as head of the National Security Council.

July 30 A report says European assistance to the Palestinian people has reached US $1 billion dollars this year.

August 2 Fayyad and US secretary of state Rice sign in Ramallah an agreement on a US $80 million grant to reform and develop the Fatah security services.

August 9 The Israeli air force destroys the tower of Gaza airport.

August 12 British parliament committee calls on British prime minister Tony Blair to start a dialogue with Hamas moderates.

August 14 Tawfiq al-Tirawi appointed head of the General Intelligence Apparatus under Abbas.

August 15 Abbas declares that any future elections must be held in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the current split between the two sectors is temporary.

August 17 The Palestinian electric company that supplies most of the Gaza Strip cuts power to the area because Israel has shut a crossing through which fuel supplies are transported.

August 21 Europe resumes financing fuel supplies to Gaza power station on a temporary basis.

August 26 Israel opens six roads to serve the settlers in the heart of the West Bank.

September 4 President Abbas affirms no elections before unity of homeland and people.

September 7 Israeli minister Ramon presents a plan for the permanent solution with the separation barrier as the border of the Palestinian state.

September 11 Sixty-nine Israeli soldiers injured in rocket shelling at a base near Ashkelon in southern Israel.
—Israel imposes a total closure on the Palestinian territories until further notice.

September 13 IDF transforms Jerusalem into a military compound and prevents Muslim worshipers from reaching al-Aqsa Mosque.

September 19 Israeli declares Gaza Strip a hostile entity and threatens to further reduce supplies of fuel and electricity.

September 20 European Commission links size of its economic assistance to the Palestinian people with progress in the peace process.

September 22 US secretary of state Rice supports the Israeli position that there should only be a joint statement at the upcoming Annapolis Conference, but without a timetable for moving to peace.

September 23 The Quartet Committee promises to finance the Palestinian government and calls on Israel to maintain basic services to the Gaza Strip.

—Israel allows the deployment of 500 additional Palestinian policemen in Nablus.

September 24 Abbas meets with US president Bush in New York.

September 25 Haydar ʻAbd al-Shafi dies in Gaza at 88.

October 1 Israel releases 57 prisoners from West Bank.

October 2 Israel releases 29 prisoners from Gaza Strip.

October 3 A meeting between Abbas and Olmert reveals wide gaps.

October 4 United Nations confirms increase in number of Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank.

October 14 Israel announces continuation of digging works at al-Mughrabi Gate.
—Olmert appoints Tzipora Livni as head of the Israeli negotiating team and refuses to set a timetable for resolution of conflict.

October 15 Abbas meets with US secretary of state Rice amid disagreement over the need for a timetable.

October 17 A plan prepared by British prime minister Blair includes removal of checkpoints and establishment of a city near Ramallah and industrial zones in Jalameh and Tarqoumia.

October 19 European Union ratifies a German proposal to set up a European action plan on the Middle East.

October 21 President Abbas requests directing of humanitarian assistance to Gaza Strip.

October 25 President Abbas confirms that Hamas is in contact with Israel on the issue of calm and normalization of relations.
—Israeli officials propose dramatic cuts—two-thirds—in the supply of electricity and fuel to Gaza in a new effort to halt rocket attacks by Palestinian militants.

October 26 A meeting between Abbas and Olmert results in commitment to the Road Map with the Quartet Committee as monitoring body.

October 27 Israel implements fuel reduction to Gaza Strip.

October 29 Kuwait offers $20 million to the Palestinian Authority treasury.

November 1 Al-Aqsa Institute warns of new Israeli excavation works south of al-Aqsa Mosque.

November 2 A new Israeli scheme announced to open a new tunnel in Old City of Jerusalem, 100 meters away from al-Aqsa Mosque.

November 3 UN report finds there are 561 checkpoints and barriers in the West Bank.

November 8–9 US intervention to resolve issues ahead of the planned Annapolis Conference reveals deep Israeli-Palestinian disagreements.
—Washington announces offering US $1 million to implement development projects in Nablus.

November 10 United Nations reveals that Israel informed it that it will not remove any checkpoints in the West Bank.
—PLO demands that Israel open the Jerusalem Palestinian institutions.

November 12 Palestinian officials announce that negotiations have reached a deadlock. Olmert sets specific conditions and links between implementing any final agreement and security conditions.

November 14 The Knesset adopts a draft law to obstruct any settlement with the Palestinians over Jerusalem.
—Britain announces offer of $500 million to reconstruct the Palestinian territories if security progress is achieved.

November 15 Abbas rejects recognition of Israel as a "Jewish state."

November 16 Abbas holds discussions with Saudi king and expresses pessimism regarding chances of anything concrete coming out of planned Annapolis Conference.
—The Israeli government agrees to release 500 prisoners but rejects opening Jerusalem institutions.

November 21 Israeli minister Ramon says that what is being offered to the Palestinians in Annapolis is less than half of what was offered at Camp David.

November 23 President Abbas justifies canceling the joint document to prevent Israel from achieving gains.

—Hamas organizes marches to reject Annapolis Conference and support the resistance.

November 24 Washington proposes forming a follow-up committee to monitor progress of negotiations and another meeting in Moscow.
—Hamas vows increase of operations against the Israelis after Annapolis Conference.

November 25 A series of meetings are held in Washington before Annapolis Conference in an attempt to bridge the gap between Israel and the Palestinians.

November 26 Failure of intensive contacts to reach a joint document in the last hours before Annapolis Conference.

November 27 Annapolis Conference.

November 28 Bush officially announces the launching of final status negotiations and appoints General James Jones as security coordinator.
—United Nations states that peace process without Hamas cannot be implemented.

November 29 Jewish extremists escalate their attacks against al-Aqsa Mosque in response to Annapolis Conference.

November 30 An Israeli court ratifies reducing fuel supplies to Gaza Strip.

December 2 Gas stations in Gaza Strip close, as there is no more fuel in their reserve tanks.

December 3 Israel releases 429 prisoners, most of whom have nearly completed their sentences.
—Hundreds of hajj pilgrims head to Mecca through Rafah Crossing after coordination between Israel and the Egyptian authorities.

December 4 Israel announces plans to build 307 new settlement units at Jabal Abu Ghneim in East Jerusalem amid angry reactions from the PNA.

December 7 US secretary of state Rice says ongoing Israeli settlement construction jeopardizes peace efforts.

December 10 A negotiating session between the Israelis and Palestinians to launch the final-status negotiations ends in failure.

December 17 Paris Conference gathers $7.4 billion for the PNA.
—French president Nicolas Sarkozy proposes forming an international force to ensure security in the Palestinian state.
—Israel announces it will allow construction inside the existing settlements in the West Bank and resumes excavation works near al-Aqsa Mosque.

December 18 Talks between President Abbas and British prime minister Gordon Brown in London result in announcement to organize an international investors' conference in Bethlehem.

December 19 Israeli *Ha'aretz* newspaper reveals an Israeli scheme to build a new Jewish quarter north of Jerusalem.

December 22 Israel apologizes for Kafr Qasim Massacre of 1965.
—Haniyeh's adviser says Hamas is ready to reach a truce with Israel.

December 23 Israel announces new settlement projects to be included in 2008 budget—construction of 250 new housing units in Ma'ale Adumim settlement and 500 housing units in Jabal Abu Ghneim.
—Israel refuses truce with Hamas.

December 29 Gaza Strip hajj pilgrims stranded after closure of Rafah Crossing.

December 30 Olmert accuses the PNA of failing to perform its security duties and threatens to refrain from any easing measures.

December 31 President Abbas calls on Hamas for dialogue and poses once again the option of early elections to overcome the internal crisis.

2008

January 1 Israel continues powerful incursion in Gaza and against Hamas, leaving Palestinians in a humanitarian crisis without fuel, power, food, and water.

January 2 Israeli forces kill six Palestinian gunmen in the Gaza Strip.

January 3 Israeli aircraft hit two targets in Gaza City.

January 4 IDF troops kill two Hamas gunmen in Gaza, wounding three others.

January 7 Israel says it was committed to acting "expeditiously" to dismantle unauthorized West Bank settlement outposts and will tell that to President George W. Bush when he arrives for talks. Israel first pledged to remove West Bank outposts in 2003, under the US-backed "Road Map" for peace, which stalled amid recriminations from Israel and the Palestinians that its terms were not being honored.

January 9–11 President George W. Bush visits Israel, occupied West Bank, and a number of Middle East countries, starting in Israel. Bush urges the Palestinian side to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure and calls on Israel to halt settlement construction and remove unauthorized settler outposts.

—Bush calls on Israel to end the Occupation, saying agreement must be reached to establish Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people.

January 15 Israeli forces kill the 24-year-old son, Hussam, of a powerful Hamas leader, Mahmoud Zahar, in Gaza in one of the bloodiest days of fighting since the group took control of the Gaza Strip in June.

—Seventeen Palestinians die in clashes, which began when Israeli troops targeted a house east of Gaza City.

January 18 Israel closes the crossings into Gaza and prevents even UN trucks from delivering food aid. UNRWA says the latest closure has left it unable to deliver 15 truckloads of aid and warns of growing despair in Gaza, where 80 percent of the population already relies on UN food.

January 20 Large parts of Gaza are pitched into darkness after its only power plant is shut down following a move by Israel to halt fuel shipments under its new closure of Gaza. Israel says its closure of the Gaza Strip is intended to halt the firing of makeshift rockets by Palestinian militants into southern Israel.

January 22 European commissioner for external relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner says the Israeli policy in Gaza is "collective punishment."

—UNRWA says the increasingly desperate humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip has often been ignored in the two years since the Islamist movement Hamas won the Palestinian elections and took full control of Gaza. UNRWA, which provides crucial food aid to 870,000 Gazans, warns that it will have to stop distributing its food support because it cannot import the bags or the fuel to deliver the food.

—John Ging, director of UNRWA's operations in Gaza, says the rocket fire from Gaza, though illegal, does not justify such punitive measures against the civilian population, and the Israeli civilian population hit by the rockets, notably in Sderot near the boundary with Gaza, also deserves protection.

January 23 After months of preparation, Hamas blasts holes in Gaza/Rafah barrier, allowing hundreds of thousands of Gazans to enter Egypt freely to purchase food, medicines, and other necessities not available in Gaza. Border breach is partly closed by Egyptians by January 28, but is reopened by Hamas and eventually resealed by Egypt. Palestinians pour into Egypt from Gaza.

January 24 Egyptian police attempt to reseal border with Gaza as Palestinians continue to flood through the smashed wall. Tens of thousands take the opportunity to stock up on supplies as Israeli closure of crossings deepens crisis.

January 25 Egyptian soldiers in riot gear use water cannons and rolls of barbed wire in unsuccessful attempt to stop hundreds of Palestinians from rushing into Egypt after a bulldozer tears down another section of the border fence. In the process they turn back thousands of Palestinians who have flooded across.

January 26 George Habash, guerrilla leader who founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, dies at the age of 81.

January 28 Dozens of Egyptian policemen in riot gear at Egyptian checkpoints set up in pouring rain just a few miles from the border with Gaza the previous day fail to halt the relentless flow of Palestinians into Egypt five days after the border was breached.

—Hamas helps Egyptian troops restore order and seal the border at the town of Rafah, but Fatah demands that Hamas not have a role in running the border between Gaza and Egypt.

January 30 Supreme Court upholds Israeli government's move to reduce fuel and electricity supplies to the Gaza Strip.

February 2 Egyptian security forces close the border with the Gaza Strip nearly two weeks after the wall was first breached.

February 4 Two Palestinian suicide bombers who crossed into Israel from Egypt strike the Israeli city of Dimona, killing one woman and injuring seven others.

February 5 Hamas signals a return to suicide bombing in Israel for the first time in more than three years when it claims responsibility for the attack in Dimona.

—Israeli strikes and Hamas rocket attacks continue in the aftermath of the suicide bombing in Dimona.

February 11 Israeli defense minister warns that armed forces are preparing for a broad offensive against Gaza in response to rocket attacks on southern Israeli towns.

February 12 Some 255 Palestinian prisoners near the end of their sentences are released as an Israeli gesture toward a new round of peace talks.

February 25 Gazans form human chain along Israel's border in protest of Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip. Israel sends troops to quell fears of mass exodus, similar to previous month's Gaza-Egypt border breach.

February 27 More than 100 people have been killed in the past few days in escalating violence between Israeli troops and Palestinian militants. West Bank leaders threaten to suspend peace talks in protest against the Israeli attacks, which came as Gaza militants hit southern Israel with rockets and mortars.

February 28 Israel launches Operation Hot Winter with sustained air strikes on Gaza, resulting in 112 Palestinians and 3 Israelis killed.

February 29 A surge in fighting after Israel destroys five Hamas rocket launchers, prompting Hamas to more than double its missile attacks into Israel's neighboring towns. Israeli air and artillery strikes kill at least 60 Palestinians in its most violent assault on the Gaza Strip since the Islamic militant group Hamas seized power last June.

March 1 Hamas-Fatah violence erupts in Gaza, leaving one Fatah fighter dead and seven people wounded.

—Israel faces widespread international condemnation for its onslaught in Gaza, as the United Nations and European Union demand an end to a "disproportionate" response to Palestinian rocket attacks, which are also denounced. Israel's prime minister, Ehud Olmert, rejects the criticism and vows to press on with the offensive.

—Mahmud Abbas, the Palestinian president, freezes all contact with Israel.

March 3 It is revealed that the Bush administration embarked on a secret project for the armed overthrow of the Islamist government in Gaza. *Vanity Fair* reports that President George Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed off on a plan for the Palestinian president, Mahmud Abbas, to remove the Hamas authorities in Gaza. The plan called for Washington's allies in the region to funnel arms and salaries to Fatah fighters who would lead an uprising against Hamas.

March 5 Israeli incursions and air strikes in Gaza after Hamas fires rockets into Ashkelon. More than 120 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces in the past week. During the same period, 3 Israelis were killed, 2 of whom were soldiers taking part in the attacks.

—Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas agrees to resume peace talks, reversing a threat to boycott negotiations until Israel reaches a truce with Hamas.

—According to a coalition of eight UK humanitarian and human rights groups, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are living through their worst humanitarian crisis since the 1967 War. Movement is all but impossible and supplies of food and water, sewage treatment, and basic health care are no longer reliable. The economy has collapsed, unemployment is expected to rise to 50 percent, hospitals are suffering 12-hour power cuts, and schools are failing, all creating a "humanitarian implosion."

—Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Jerusalem said she has received assurances from Israeli and Palestinian leaders that they will resume the peace negotiations.

March 6 An Israeli soldier is killed and another seriously injured when Palestinian militants blow up an Israeli army jeep on the Gaza border.

—A Palestinian gunman kills eight and injures 20 in incident at Jewish religious school in Jerusalem.

March 9 Right-wing settler movement declares that last week's massacre in a Jewish religious school targeted them directly, and vows to build a new illegal outpost in the West Bank for every one of the killed students. Prime

Minister Ehud Olmert embraces the settler movement, saying he shares their pain in the wake of last week's killings at the religious school, and approves 530 new settler homes in the West Bank.

March 11 Hamas has sharply curtailed its missile attacks on Israel, provoking speculation that a cease-fire has been brokered between the warring parties. The uneasy calm appears to have been brokered with Egypt acting as an intermediary. A spokesman for Egypt's Foreign Ministry, Hossam Zaki, says that his government has spoken to both sides.

March 12 Israel asks for 30-day "trial period" of quiet, after which it will consider accepting Egyptian calls for cease-fire. Hamas publicly calls for a cease-fire with Israel, asking for a "reciprocal, comprehensive and simultaneous" cessation of the conflict in Gaza and the West Bank.

March 13 Hamas and Israel's tacit seven-day cease-fire ends when Islamic Jihad launches 17 rockets into Israel, which responds with an air raid on Gaza.

March 29 Israel makes a modest attempt to ease myriad restrictions on West Bank Palestinians, pledging to remove 50 roadblocks and to upgrade checkpoints to reduce waiting time. The measures win praise from the United States, which has previously criticized Israel for failing to do enough to ease the burden of the 580 roadblocks, dirt mounds, and checkpoints that stop Palestinians from moving within the West Bank.

April 1 Hamas reaffirms that Israeli corporal Shalit, captured near Gaza two years ago, will not be freed until Israel agrees to release several hundred Palestinian prisoners.

April 9 Palestinian gunmen attack the Nahal Oz fuel depot on the Gaza border, killing two Israeli civilian workers and injuring two others as militants fire waves of mortars at the crossing post. Islamic Jihad and a smaller armed faction, the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), claim responsibility for the raid.

April 10 Israeli forces launch attacks in the Gaza Strip in retaliation for deaths the previous day. They rush forces and tanks across the border into northern Gaza and an air strike hits a car carrying militants near Gaza City. Six people are reportedly killed.

April 16 Three Israeli soldiers and four Hamas gunmen are killed in clashes near Gaza's main fuel terminal. Fifteen Palestinians, including at least four members of Hamas, and three Israeli soldiers are killed in separate clashes in the Gaza Strip. Eight of the dead are killed when Israeli helicopters fire four missiles into central Gaza.

April 17 Twenty Palestinians die in Gaza clashes after a firefight at a fuel crossing. Heavy fighting at Nahal Oz fuel crossing leads to Israeli tank and aircraft strike in several areas of Gaza Strip.

April 18 Israel announces plans for 100 new houses in West Bank settlements. Plans draw swift criticism from Palestinian officials.

—Israel seals off the Gaza Strip and West Bank for at least a week to observe the Jewish Passover holiday.

April 21 Six Hamas militants are killed in four Israeli air raids, following an attack by an Islamist group on Gaza's perimeter that wounds 13 soldiers.

—Hamas says it will accept a Palestinian state on land occupied in the 1967 War, but it will not explicitly recognize Israel. Khalid Meshal, the leader of Hamas, says the group will "respect Palestinian national will even if it was against our convictions," an apparent reference to a referendum on a peace deal. His comments come at a news conference in Damascus, Syria, after a rare series of meetings between former US president Jiimmy Carter and Hamas Islamists in the West Bank, Cairo, and Damascus.

April 22 Hamas ready to accept Gaza truce. Group says it is prepared to accept a partial truce that will cover only the Gaza Strip, in an apparent softening of its position.

April 24 President Bush receives President Mahmud Abbas at the White House.

—United Nations halts food handouts to up to 800,000 Palestinians because of a severe fuel shortage in Gaza brought on by the Israeli economic blockade. John Ging, the director of operations in Gaza for the UNRWA, says there had been a "totally inadequate" supply of fuel from Israel to Gaza for ten months until it was finally halted two weeks ago. "The devastating humanitarian impact is entirely predictable," he says.

April 25 Israel dismisses a proposal by Hamas for a six-month truce inside the Gaza Strip, saying

that the Palestinian group would use the time to prepare for more fighting rather than peace.

April 27 Other humanitarian agencies, including Oxfam, say that they too are suspending operations because of the fuel shortages that have brought the Gaza Strip to a standstill. Supplies of fuel to power-generating stations are said to be "on their last drop."

April 28 A Palestinian mother and her 4 young children are killed during an Israeli military attack in the Gaza Strip. Two older children from the same family and 10 others who were nearby are also injured.

—Efforts by Egypt to arrange a cease-fire between Israel and the militant groups in Hamas-controlled Gaza fail and violence continues.

May 2 Middle East Quartet urges all sides to commit to talks amid mounting unease about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. Israel urged to end blockade of Gaza as talks begin in London.

May 3 Quartet demands freeze on all settlement activity and easing of the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

—Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert urged to resign over corruption charge.

May 10 Scandal threatens peace talks with Hamas as colleagues' unease grows about fifth inquiry into Olmert since 2006.

—Israel's sixtieth-anniversary celebrations overshadowed as details of US witness in high-level bribery investigation are revealed.

May 12 UN official says Israel's blockade of Gaza is feeding a "growing sense of injustice" among its population.

—Gaza's fishing industry is drying up as high fuel costs and an Israeli navy blockade make finding profitable catches almost impossible.

—Egyptian mediator to meet Israelis after Hamas agrees to cease-fire plan. Initiative comes two days before George Bush is due to visit the region to discuss flagging Gaza peace talks.

May 13 Tony Blair, Middle East envoy, hails Israeli agreement to scrap one checkpoint this week and remove or relocate several others. Some 450 remain.

May 14 Three reported seriously injured as missile fired from Gaza damages Ashkelon mall.

May 15 President Bush in Israel for country's sixtieth anniversary, amid little hope for peace talks, condemns Hizbullah and Hamas in Knesset speech and says he looks forward to the day when Muslims "recognize the emptiness of the terrorists' vision and the injustice of their cause."

—Palestinians commemorate Nakba.

May 16 US president George Bush suggests that offers to negotiate with America's enemies in the Middle East are comparable to appeasement of Hitler.

May 21 Israel and Syria confirm holding indirect peace talks, with Turkey acting as a mediator. Israel wants Syria to cut ties to Islamist groups while Syria wants return of sovereignty over Golan Heights.

May 27 US businessman tells court that he gave at least $150,000 over 15 years to the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert. Financier's testimony is major embarrassment to Israeli leader in fifth corruption investigation brought against him.

June 1 Israel frees a convicted Hizbullah spy and sends him back to Lebanon, while Hizbullah turns over the remains of what it says are two dead Israeli soldiers.

June 6 "Unavoidable" attack on Iran looms as that country's nuclear weapons program may leave no other option, says key member of Olmert's security cabinet.

June 11 Captive Israeli soldier begs for life in letter home. Corporal Gilad Shalit, held by Palestinian militants for almost two years, begs his government to win his release.

June 16 Jerusalem's city council unveils plan to build 40,000 new apartments over the next ten years. US secretary of state Rice strongly condemns Israel settlement plans.

June 18 Israel and Hamas agree on a cease-fire as air strikes kill six Palestinian fighters. Hamas agrees to halt all attacks from Gaza in return for Israel halting its military strikes.

June 19 A six-month cease-fire between Israel and militants in Gaza begins at dawn amid skepticism from both sides.

June 21 Large-scale Israeli military exercise in

Mediterranean a warning to Iran that Israel has the capacity to strike nuclear facilities.Tehran says warning flights over Mediterranean prove Jerusalem is "dangerous."

June 24 The Egyptian-brokered cease-fire between Israel and Hamas comes under pressure as Palestinian militants in Gaza fire a rocket at the Israeli border town of Sderot.

July 1 Israel closes all Gaza crossings after report of rocket strike at Israel. Hamas accuses Israel of fresh blockade.

July 2 In Jerusalem at least three people killed and dozens injured after man ploughs bulldozer into buses and other vehicles. Driver shot dead. Militant groups compete to claim Jerusalem attack but police believe the construction worker's rampage was spontaneous.

July 4 Israel's deputy prime minister calls for some Arab districts of East Jerusalem to be cut off from the city.

July 20 British prime minister Gordon Brown, visiting Israel, says settlement expansion "has made peace harder to achieve."

July 23 US presidential candidate Barack Obama pledges "unshakeable commitment" to Israel after spending day speaking to Middle East leaders.

July 24 New building plans in Occupied Territory approved by Israeli Defense Ministry despite worldwide calls for a freeze on construction, which is illegal under international law.

July 27 Palestinians under siege as Israel tightens grip on Holy City. The battle for Jerusalem enters a new phase after a series of attacks by settlers ratchets up the tension.

July 30 Ehud Olmert announces his resignation as prime minister under cloud of scandal.

August 5 The Palestinian president resumes discussions with Israel for the first time since peace talks were thrown into jeopardy by Ehud Olmert's decision to resign as prime minister.

August 14 The Israeli military will not take action against a tank crew that killed a Reuters television cameraman and eight other Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Reuters is "deeply disturbed" that the Israeli military has decided the tank crew will not face legal action.

August 23 Forty-six peace activists on two boats hope to challenge the economic blockade imposed on Gaza to deliver a cargo of 200 hearing aids for a deaf school and other basic essentials. Israel states it will stop mission, which it describes as a "provocation," but backs off at the last moment and decides not to intercept the two boats at sea, as it has done with previous such humanitarian efforts.

August 26 Israel releases 198 Palestinian prisoners in what it calls a "goodwill gesture" to encourage negotiations; some 10,000 remain in prison.

August 27 Despite continuing negotiations with Palestinians, Israel accelerates (doubles) construction of homes in Jewish settlements.

September 3 Palestinians propose Arab military force for Gaza Strip. Foreign troops will be deployed to keep the peace in Gaza once Fatah and Hamas agree to a coalition government.

September 12 HaMoked and B'Tselem study reveals an alarming increase in forcible transfers of West Bank residents to the Gaza Strip, effectively making refugees of those falling victim to punitive policy.

September 17 Members of Israel's ruling Kadima Party vote for new leader, with Foreign Minister Tzipora Livni winning favorite.

September 26 Pipe bomb wounds peace advocate and academic Zeev Sternhell in suspected attack by right-wing Jewish exremists.

September 29 Outgoing prime minister Olmert says there will be no peace without withdrawing from "almost all" land captured in 1967 War.

October 11 Israel hires British public image consultants Acanchi to give the nation an image makeover.

October 27 Livni wins the election by one vote and has the opportunity to put together a coalition; however, she is unable to do so.

November 4 Israel breaks the June 19 cease-fire when IDF troops penetrate almost 400 meters into Wadi al-Salqa village, east of Deir al-Balah, backed by air strikes, killing six. Clashes subsequently erupt between IDF

troops and members of the Izz-al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (the armed wing of Hamas).

November 5 The Israeli government seals all passages into and out of Gaza.
—Hamas fires rockets after Israel kills six; no injuries result.

November 7 Rival Palestinian factions meet in Egyptian-led effort to end Gaza economic blockade. Also engaged in talks about unity government.

November 11 Israel renews some fuel deliveries, ending weeklong ban that follows rocket attack.
—Israeli police evict Palestinian couple from their Jerusalem home of 52 years. Several foreign governments have tried to intervene but without success.

November 13 Production at Gaza's only power station is suspended and the turbines shut down because it has run out of industrial diesel due to Israel's blockade.
—The UN agency for Palestinian refugees says it will have to suspend food distribution in Gaza after Israel blocks humanitarian supplies from entering the Strip.

November 15 Five-month cease-fire appears to be collapsing fast as Hamas militants fire rockets into southern Israel after Israeli forces kill 10 gunmen. Israel keeps all crossings to the territory closed.

November 20 BBC, CNN, and others "gravely concerned" at Israel's move to keep foreign journalist out of Gaza Strip.

November 26 Journalists launch legal fight to overturn Israel's media ban in Gaza Strip.

December 1 Vessel carrying 3,000 tons of humanitarian aid intended to challenge economic blockade on Gaza Strip is blocked by Israeli navy.

December 6 About 35 Palestinians injured in clashes with settlers in occupied West Bank.

December 15 Palestinian prime minister Salam Fayyad says there is little prospect of a deal with Israel if West Bank settlement activity continues.

December 18 Militants declare six-month truce dead as Israeli-Palestinian violence in Gaza escalates.

December 19 In answer to Israeli air raid, militant Islamists who rule Gaza fire eight rockets and five mortars at Israel's southern towns; no injuries.
—June cease-fire set to end; Hamas officials declare they will not renew it.

December 22 Gaza near collapse as Israel tightens grip. Tit-for-tat attacks across Gaza border intensify following end of truce.

December 27 Support for Israel's ultra-nationalist parties grows as Jewish state and Hamas approach major confrontation.

December 28 Beginning of massive Israeli air, sea, and ground offensive in Gaza—Operation Cast Lead.

2009

January 9 UN Security Council passes resolution calling for immediate cease-fire.
—Amnesty International accuses Israel of war crimes over phosphorus use.

January 17 Israel declares unilateral cease-fire in Gaza Operation Cast Lead. In the 22 days of the operation the Palestinian Center for Human Rights puts the Palestinian death toll at 1,417, of which 926 are civilians, including 313 children and 116 women. Noncombatant police officers constitute 255, and 236 combatants were killed, representing 16.7 percent of the total deaths. The IDF reports 10 fatalities, all combatants, of which 4 were killed by friendly fire, one inside Israel by a Qassam rocket, and 5 in combat with Palestinian forces. Three civilians were reportedly killed.

January 21 Gazans begin reconstructing and repairing tunnels between Gaza and Egypt to bring essential goods to people.

January 22 John Ging, head of UNRWA, reports that phosphorus shells hit Gaza UN school.

January 27 President Barack Obama's special envoy George Mitchell heads to Middle East to initiate dialogue between Israel and Hamas.
—Israeli soldier and Palestinian civilian killed in Gaza during outbreak of violence.

January 28 Obama gives his first foreign interview to an Arab TV station, al-Arabiyya.

January 29 Olmert tells Mitchell that Gaza cross-

ings will reopen only when Israeli soldier (Gilad Shalit, captured in June 2006) is free.
—Israeli and Hamas attacks undermine Gaza cease-fire. Rocket fire and air strikes come as US envoy Mitchell meets PNA leader in effort to reinforce truce.

January 30 Dozens believed dead in reprisal attacks as Hamas retakes control from Fatah challenge. The dead are Fatah officials, suspected collaborators, and escaped prisoners.

February 1 Israel threatens "disproportionate" response to Palestinian rocket fire.

February 2 Israel pays £1.5 million to cameraman James Miller's family. Relatives see sum as admission of guilt for death in Gaza while filming documentary.

February 3 Gaza rocket hits Ashkelon; first Grad rocket to be fired at city since cease-fire. No injuries. Israeli foreign minister says terror must be met with force.

February 4 Israeli opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu says no to territorial concessions to Palestinians. Land would just be "grabbed by extremists."
—PNA president Abbas accuses Israel of war crimes in Gaza, adds to calls for prosecution.

February 5 Israeli navy intercepts Lebanese boat on its way to Gaza. Reporters say ship carrying aid was fired on and crew beaten.

February 8 Israeli military forces are intensifying their incursions into the West Bank after their unilateral cease-fire in the Gaza Strip. IDF stages attacks on the various areas of the West Bank almost on a daily basis for the next six months under the excuse of arresting Palestinian fighters. They detain Palestinians and take them to unknown locations.

February 12 Kadima and Likud claim victory in Israeli elections; extremely tight race gives Tzipora Livni slight lead over Benjamin Netanyahu. Israel may have to wait 42 days before it learns who has won election, based on which of the two is able to put a coalition together.

February 15 Gaza cease-fire hinges on release of soldier. Egypt has brokered talks on swap of hundreds of Palestinians for Israeli soldier, but deadlock remains. Outgoing Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert says militants must release Gilad Shalit before truce can be reached or economic blockade lifted.

February 20 Hamas refuses to free Israeli soldier in return for lifting Gaza blockade. Leaders call for international pressure on Israel to force borders open to relieve humanitarian crisis.

February 23 Amnesty International calls on United States to suspend arms sales to Israel. Hellfire missiles and white phosphorus artillery shells among US weapons used in "indiscriminate" attacks on civilians, says human rights group.

March 4 US secretary of state Hillary Clinton condemns Israel's plans to bulldoze dozens of Palestinian homes in Arab East Jerusalem.

March 7 EU report attacks Israeli efforts to annex East Jerusalem and accuses Israel of weakening support for peace talks.

March 9 Israeli military imposes a three-day total closure on the West Bank for the Jewish holiday of Purim.

March 13 Israeli undercover soldiers in civilian clothes shoot and kill five alleged militants outside a bakery in the southern West Bank city of Bethlehem.

March 15 IDF fires live rounds at West Bank protesters. Israelis uses war against Hamas to reintroduce banned bullets and a new tear-gas canister.

March 16 Palestinian attack is suspected after two Israeli policemen are shot dead near Massuah in the West Bank. No Palestinian group claims responsibility.

March 19 Published soldiers' testimonies contradict official version of events in Gaza war, saying Israeli troops shot "unarmed Palestinian civilians under orders."

March 24 Israeli riot police fight with residents in the Arab-majority town of Umm al-Fahm when trouble flares following a right-wing Israeli march in the town. About 2,500 police in riot gear flank about 100 far-right activists as they march waving Israeli flags. Police use tear gas and water cannons against Arabs and arrest 13.

March 25 Labor joins coalition being put together by Benjamin Netanyahu.

March 31 Benjamin Netanyahu becomes Israel's prime minister (Likud). Avigdor Lieberman, founder and leader of the ultra-right Yisrael Beitenu party, becomes foreign minister and deputy prime minister.

April 1 Avigdor Lieberman rules out "concessions" to Palestinians. Israel never ratified Annapolis Middle East peace talks, new foreign minister says in debut speech.

April 3 Israeli exports hit by European boycotts after attacks on Gaza. A fifth of Israeli exporters report drop in demand.

April 6 At least seven Palestinian civilians are kidnapped by the Israeli military during morning invasions that target Jenin, Hebron, and Bethlehem while troops ransack and search homes.

April 7 Israeli police shoot motorist during house demolition.

April 10 Jordan's King Abdullah visits White House.

April 17 Tear-gas canister shot kills Palestinian demonstrator. Activists say Bassem Abu Rahmeh is eighteenth person to die since 2004 during demonstrations against Barrier.

April 22 Fatah and Hamas continue clashes in Gaza.

April 23 Jerusalem's mayor defends demolition of 88 houses in Arab area. Nir Barkat rejects international criticism and says East Jerusalem could never be capital of Palestinian state.

April 23–28 ReliefWeb reports that Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) continue systematic attacks against Palestinian civilians and property in the occupied Palestinian territory and continue to impose a total siege on the Gaza Strip.

April 27 Nonviolent protests against Barrier become increasingly violent as Israel uses tear gas, stun grenades, and sometimes live ammunition against peaceful demonstrators.

May 1 United Nations tells Israel to end Palestinian house demolitions in Jerusalem.

May 3 Israel bombs tunnels on Gaza-Egypt border.

May 4 Lieberman begins European tour in attempt to sway EU policy on Israel.

May 5 UN accuses Israel of "grave offenses" in Gaza offensive, holding it responsible for deaths, injuries, property destruction, and damage to UN buildings. Israel dismisses UN accusation as biased.

May 6 Washington's chief nuclear arms negotiator calls on Israel to sign nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, leading to a diplomatic row between the United States and Israel.

—AIPAC urges members of US Congress to sign letter to Barack Obama calling for Israel to set pace of negotiations with Palestinians.

—UN report finds the continuing Israeli military occupation around Bethlehem is severely restricting its growth, undermining its economy, and compromising its future.

May 7 Israeli troops kill an unarmed Palestinian at the entrance to al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.

May 10 Israel "using tourist sites to assert control over East Jerusalem." Peace groups say government's secret plans with settler groups could prevent two-state solution.

May 11 King Abdullah of Jordan warns of war within 18 months if talks don't progress; says Muslim nations "would recognize Israel" in peace deal.

May 13 Giving speech in Bethlehem, Pope Benedict XVI expresses solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza Strip, makes strongest call yet for a Palestinian homeland, offers his solidarity to Palestinians of Gaza, and urges removal of Israeli blockade.

May 18 Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits the White House. President Obama declares there must be a halt to settlement building and Israel must honor commitments, but Netanyahu remains noncommittal on the issue of an independent Palestinian state and says settlement expansion for "natural growth" must continue. Obama restates support for Palestinian state.

May 19 Iran test-fires missile capable of reaching US bases or Israel.

May 21 At a ceremony marking the Israeli takeover of East Jerusalem during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Netanyahu says the city "has always been—and always will be—ours. It will never again be divided or cut in half.

Jerusalem will remain only under Israel's sovereignty."

May 26 Israeli vice premier Moshe Ya'alon rules out the creation of any "Palestinian entity" at a conference at the Knesset.

May 27 US secretary of state Hillary Clinton urges Israel in unusually blunt terms to completely halt settlements on land that Palestinians claim as part of a future state of their own.

May 28 President Obama receives Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas at White House. Obama administration increases pressure on Israel to stop all building in Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

—Hillary Clinton says stopping settlements is a key part of moving toward a deal establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Israel retorts that construction will continue in East Jerusalem and West Bank.

May 29 Israel again rejects US president's demand for an end to grabbing land in West Bank.

—Amnesty International reports that some 600 Israeli military checkpoints and barriers remain in the West Bank, restricting the movement of Palestinians and hindering their access to workplaces, education and health facilities, and other services.

May 30 Soldiers and civilian police attack and beat peaceful activists assisting farmers working their lands in Safa, West Bank, then arrest them.

May 31 Six die as Fatah and Hamas clash in West Bank.

June 1 Hamas must renounce violence to enter peace talks, Tony Blair says. Quartet will not deal with Islamist movement, but "back-channel" contacts are open, according to envoy.

—UN Human Rights Council investigative panel led by Judge Richard Goldstone enters the Gaza Strip to investigate alleged Israeli war crimes. Israel refuses to cooperate.

June 3 The IDF declares Nablus, its refugee camps, and surrounding villages a closed military zone.

June 4 President Obama gives major speech in Cairo, reaches out to Arab-Muslim world, calls for an end to occupation and settlements, and an independent Palestinian state.

June 6–12 This week the Israeli military conducts at least 24 military invasions into Palestinian communities in the West Bank, hitting Hebron and Bethlehem in the south and Ramallah and Nablus in the north especially hard. During the attacks troops seize and take away 24 civilians, including 6 children.

June 11 Scores of olive trees are damaged when Israeli settlers set them on fire near Hebron City. The owners tell media that the settlers came from the nearby Kharsina settlement. Witnesses say that Palestinian firefighters managed to stop the fire but at least two dozen trees were destroyed.

—Another group of Israeli settlers set fire to farmlands that belong to Palestinians from the villages of Aqraba and Yanoon near Nablus City. The farmers say that settlers, protected by the Israeli military, set fire to their crops. The fire destroys two acres of farmland before the farmers are able to put out the fire.

June 14 Prime Minister Netanyahu gives a major speech in which he says Palestinians must recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people before any negotiations; he is prepared to see the creation of a limited and demilitarized Palestinian state in the future, as long as the international community can guarantee that it will not have any military capabilities; he declares that an undivided Jerusalem must remain the unified capital of Israel; the government must be allowed to accommodate natural growth in the settlements. He emphasizes that the Jewish people have been linked to the land of Israel for over 3,000 years and rules out the option of granting Palestinian refugees the right to settle within Israeli borders, and he says Israel will not negotiate with terrorists who wish to destroy it and that Palestinians must choose between path of peace and Hamas.

—Member of the Knesset Aryeh Eldad (National Union) accuses Netanyahu of violating his own promises and says the nationalist camp can no longer support his policies. "Today the prime minister lost the leadership of the nationalist camp by not only transgressing his own red lines, but by converting from his own religion."

—Gideon Levy of *Ha'aretz* says, "Netanyahu adopted the language of the day before yesterday. No Palestinian people, rather a 'Palestinian population' that lives in Judea and Samaria. He invoked the infamous lexicon of Golda Meir, not of occupation, rather 'Israeli pres-

ence' in the West Bank. There was also the repeated flight from the subject of final borders, the lack of even superficial reference to the road map peace plan, the repetition of 'Jerusalem forever undivided,' the repeated claim that 'they started it,' and the ridiculous, excessive demand that Palestinians recognize the Jewish state by one who has failed."

——*Ha'aretz* editorial says, "The prime minister was never a believer [in a two-state solution]. He has had to loosen the American noose on a daily basis, and he made the effort. Anyone who believes a Palestinian state will arise under Netanyahu, even if he lasts out his term, raise your hand now. . . . Why did he wait until yesterday? Why belatedly, onto the lingering two-state wagon? Netanyahu speech was aimed solely for Obama's ears."

—Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas says that the speech "sabotages" regional peace efforts due to his unwillingness to compromise on the status of Jerusalem.

—PNA official Nabil Abu Rudeinah says, "Netanyahu's remarks have undermined all initiatives, paralysed all efforts being made and challenges the Palestinian, Arab and American positions."

—Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak says the speech "scuttles the chances for peace."

—Former president Jimmy Carter says, "Netanyahu brought up several obstacles to peace in his speech that others before him have not placed."

—President Obama hails Prime Minister Netanyahu's speech in which he endorsed a limited Palestinian state, calling the speech "an important step forward."

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