


# AFTER LEBANON

*The Israeli-Palestinian Connection*



EDITED BY HILLEL SCHENKER

---

# AFTER LEBANON

---

## *The Israeli-Palestinian Connection*

---

EDITED BY HILLEL SCHENKER

---


*After Lebanon* is the first collection of materials compiled after the Lebanon war. This anthology contains a comprehensive analysis of the war from the point of view of the Israeli peace movement. Tracing the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue from 1975 to now, the book includes the famous Yassir Arafat interviews by Israeli journalists Uri Avnery and Amnon Kapeliuk, translated into English for the first time; peace proposals by Abba Eban and Walid Khalidi, the well-known Palestinian professor and writer at Harvard University; articles by King Hussein of Jordan, Prince Khalid of Saudi Arabia, Egyptian Minister of State Dr. Butros Ghali, the late Nahum Goldmann, former Israeli Chief-of-Staff Mordecai Gur, former ministers Aharon Yariv, Victor Shemtov and Moshe Kol, Philip Klutznick, Professor Hisham Sharabi, former Jordanian Defense Minister Anwar Nusseiba, and Palestinian activist Raymonda Tawil, as well as prominent voices from the Israeli peace movement.

In addition, the book contains a wide-ranging collection of documents relevant to the Israeli-Arab conflict, from the British Mandate and the

*(continued on back flap)*

DISCARD

CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY  
HAROLD WASHINGTON LIBRARY CENTER



R0033027748

R00330 27748

DS  
119.7  
.A62853 After Lebanon, the  
1983 Israeli-  
Palestinian  
connection

SSH

DS  
119.7  
.A62853 After Lebanon, the  
1983 Israeli-  
Palestinian  
connection

R00330 27748

DATE

BORROWER'S NAME

JAN 10 1984

THE CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY

Social Sciences and History Division

DISCARD









---

# AFTER LEBANON



# --- **AFTER LEBANON**

**The Israeli-Palestinian  
Connection**

---

edited by  
**HILLEL  
SCHENKER**

The Pilgrim Press  
New York



Copyright © 1983 The Pilgrim Press  
All rights reserved

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise (brief quotations used in magazines or newspaper reviews excepted), without the prior permission of the publisher.

**Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data**  
Main entry under title·

After Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian connection.

1. Jewish-Arab relations—1973— —Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Israel-Arab Border Conflicts, 1949— —Lebanon—Addresses, essays, lectures.

I. Schenker, Hillel.

DS119.7.A62853 1983 956'.048 83-3973  
ISBN 0-8298-0654-7

Maps by Roby Newman.

The Pilgrim Press, 132 West 31 Street, New York, N.Y. 10001

SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HISTORY DIVISION  
THE CHICAGO PUBLIC LIBRARY

434  
To the memory of Emil Grunzweig, who was murdered at a "Peace Now" rally on Thursday evening, February 10, 1983, opposite the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem, while defending humanism, freedom of expression, democracy, and peace.

To Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab comprehensive peace.

To the twenty-fifth anniversary of *New Outlook* magazine.



# CONTENTS

## PART 1 THE WAR IN LEBANON

Introduction	3
The War in Lebanon	ELIAHU AGRES 9
Israel: Opposition to the War	NEW OUTLOOK Editorial 15
A Military Analysis	MEIR PA'IL 20
Open Letters to Menahem Begin	YEHOSHUA ZAMIR and YAACOV GUTERMAN 39
The Apocalyptic Realities of Today	GHASSAN TUENI 43
The Massacre	NEW OUTLOOK Editorial 51
Israel Reacts to the Massacre	JOHN GOLDBERG 56
Why Didn't We Prevent This War?	HILLEL SCHENKER 61
The War in Lebanon: A Moral Evaluation	CHAIM SHUR 70

## PART 2 THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONNECTION

Introduction	77
The Right to Self-Determination	PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE 84
Sa'id Hammami	SIMHA FLAPAN 87
Sa'id Hammami—The Man Who Paid with His Life for His Ideas	DAVID SHAHAM 89
Hammami: My Enemy, My Friend	URI AVNERY 93
The Palestinian Choice	NEW OUTLOOK Editorial 103
When Enemies Dare to Talk	TONY KLUG 107
Camp David: The Unfinished Business	ABBA EBAN 121
The Strategy of Peace	SIMHA FLAPAN 134
Mystics and Moderates at the Crossroads	SAUL FRIEDLANDER 139

<b>On War and Peace in the Middle East</b>	HISHAM SHARABI	143
<b>Why Many Palestinians Stayed Home</b>	RAYMONDA TAWIL	148
<b>Israel, The U.S., and American Jewry—A Complex Relationship</b>	NAHUM GOLDMANN	151
<b>For Peace and a Sane Zionism</b>	ORLY LUBIN	161
<b>The Palestinian Problem—A New Approach</b>	ABBA EBAN	164
<b>In Favor of a Jordanian-Palestinian Federation</b>	MOSHE KOL	172
<b>Should the Palestinians Change the Charter?</b>	URI AVNERY	178
<b><i>Al-Fajr</i> Editorial</b>		195
<b>Joint <i>Al-Fajr</i>–<i>New Outlook</i> Meeting</b>		197
<b>Israel's Dilemma: Zionism or a Normal State</b>	ADNAN ABU ODEH	201
<b>Recognize the Palestinian Right to Self-Determination</b>	AHARON YARIV	208
<b>The PLO and the Israeli Peace Camp</b>	MATTITYAHU PELED	212
<b>Why the Dialogue Must Go On</b>	ELIAS H. TUMA	219
<b>The Majority Today Wants Coexistence</b>	ANWAR NUSSEIBA	224
<b>A New International Era: Nationalism and Internationalism</b>	H.R.H. PRINCE KHALED	236
<b>Israel and the PLO</b>	MORDECHAI GUR	244
<b>Prepared to Pursue the Cause of Peace</b>	HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN	248
<b>Facing Mid-East Realities</b>	PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK	257
<b>The Arabs Have Helped Israeli Expansionism</b>	ISSAM SARTAWI	264
<b>Dr. Sartawi and the Dilemma of Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue</b>	SIMHA FLAPAN	268
<b>We Must Build the Future Together</b>	BUTROS GHALI	276
<b>The Road to Comprehensive Peace</b>	VICTOR SHEMTOV	282
<b>A Meeting with Arafat</b>	URI AVNERY	289
<b>A Chance for Dialogue? Interview with Arafat</b>	AMNON KAPELIUK	304



## CONTENTS

ix

<b>A Chance for Dialogue—And More</b>	<i>NEW OUTLOOK</i>	
Editorial	310	
<b>The Reagan Proposals</b>	<i>NEW OUTLOOK</i>	Editorial 312
<b>The Fez Conference: A Step Toward Peace</b>	<i>NEW OUTLOOK</i>	
Editorial	314	
<b>Nahum Goldmann (1895–1982)</b>	ARIE (LOVA) ELIAV	317
<b>Pierre Mendès-France (1907–1982)</b>	ARIEH YA'ARI	319
<b>For an Outspoken Diaspora</b>	<i>NEW OUTLOOK</i>	Editorial 321

## PART 3

### THE FUTURE ROAD TO PEACE

#### Israelis and Palestinians—Can They Make Peace?

SIMHA FLAPAN	327	
<b>A Sovereign Palestinian State</b>	WALID KHALIDI	342
<b>Alternative to a Nightmare</b>	ARIE (LOVA) ELIAV	350

## APPENDIX I

### THE MODERN DILEMMA

<b>The Right to Criticize</b>	ARTHUR HERTZBERG	359
<b>The Duty to Oppose</b>	ABBA EBAN	365
<b>Roots of the Lebanese Crisis</b>	AHARON COHEN	370
<b>The Economic Viability of a Palestine State in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip</b>	CHAIM DARIN-DRABKIN	387

## APPENDIX II

### MAPS AND DOCUMENTS

<b>British Documents</b>	413	
<b>League of Nations Document</b>	417	
<b>Jewish-Arab Documents</b>	420	
<b>UN Resolutions</b>	425	
<b>Zionist Documents</b>	437	
<b>PLO Documents</b>	440	
<b>Peace Treaties</b>	447	
<b>American Documents</b>	459	
<b>Soviet Documents</b>	471	
<b>American-Soviet Document</b>	474	
<b>European Document</b>	476	
<b>Arab Documents</b>	479	

<b>Israeli Documents</b>	<b>485</b>
<b>International Jewish Document</b>	<b>507</b>

APPENDIX III

*NEW OUTLOOK, THEN AND NOW*

<b>A Brief History of <i>New Outlook</i></b>	<b>508</b>
<b><i>New Outlook's</i> First Editorial, July 1957</b>	<b>515</b>
<b>Dialogue and Peace</b> <b>MARTIN BUBER</b>	<b>518</b>

PART 1

---

THE WAR  
IN LEBANON



---

# Introduction

When the Six Day War broke out in June 1967, I found myself in a trench above my kibbutz, two and a half kilometers from the West Bank border, holding a machine gun I had never fired, waiting for the Jordanians to come. On Radio Ramallah, the broadcaster had promised that “we are coming to get you,” and had then played a record of what he called the most popular song of the day, machine-gun fire.

In October 1973, when the Yom Kippur War broke out, I felt that, whether or not I had fully agreed with my government’s policies, my country was being attacked, and I instinctively wanted to participate in its defense. I found myself hurtled, together with my unit in the combat engineering corps, to the foothills of the Golan Heights. The next five months consisted of a jumble of mines, fortifications, shellings, threats of germ warfare, barbed-wire fences, winter snow, and the recapture of the Golan Heights and of Mount Hermon.

In June of 1982, when the Israeli Likud government, led by Prime Minister Begin and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, ordered the Israeli army to enter Lebanon, my instincts, my gut reaction, and my intellect all said that this was wrong and unnecessary. I knew that if I was called up, I would have to face a major moral dilemma: whether to allow myself to be a tool of a policy I totally disagreed with. (In the end, I was called up to do a quiet tour of duty in August on the West Bank, in a desolate, desert area of primordial beauty, north of Jericho, near the Jordan River, where I had to do battle with the flies, the mosquitoes, and the heat.)

This war was wrong and unnecessary because, in the summer



of 1981, after two weeks of Israeli aerial bombardment of Beirut and PLO countershellings of Israeli settlements in northern Galilee, a cease-fire had been worked out between the Israeli government and the PLO, through the good offices of American mediator Philip Habib.

This cease-fire on the northern border had been maintained from July of 1981 through June of 1982. No Israeli children had been forced to sleep in shelters during this period, and there were growing signs of PLO moderation, which might have eventually produced a formula to enable a renewal of negotiations over the fate of the West Bank and Gaza.

Prominent leaders of the Israeli opposition in the Knesset, including former IDF Chiefs of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, Chaim Bar-Lev, and Mordechai Gur, had all declared that there was no military, only a political resolution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And they had all warned against a large-scale military operation in Lebanon.

A political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires an abandonment of the vision of "Greater Israel," i.e., the eventual annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a vision held to by both Begin and Sharon. They prefer to believe in the possibility of a military resolution of the conflict, in the possibility that, through military confrontation, they can destroy the PLO as a viable organization representing Palestinian nationalism, and they can discourage Palestinian aspirations for self-determination in any part of the Land of Israel/Palestine (i.e., in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

Ariel Sharon, by his own admission, began to plan a large-scale military operation in Lebanon on the first day he entered office in the Defense Ministry after the 1981 elections. He was simply waiting for the "appropriate justification." It finally appeared to come, in his eyes, and in the eyes of the Israeli Likud-led government, when Israeli Ambassador to Britain Shlomo Argov was the victim of a terrorist attack in London. The irony is that the perpetrators of the attack appear to be the Abu Nidal dissident group of Palestinian rejectionists, who also have Yasir Arafat on their hit list.

In a meeting in Jerusalem after the invasion had begun, Begin

told the opposition Alignment leaders that "the operation will be over in twelve to twenty-four hours." Sharon told him not to exaggerate. It "might take forty-eight hours."

On the third day of the war, I attended a large meeting of Peace Now activists in Tel Aviv. There was unanimous opposition to the war. The only question was when and how this opposition should be pressed. The majority felt that public opposition should be deferred until word came back from the Peace Now activists who were at the front. After all, much of the moral and political weight of Peace Now in Israel stems from the fact that in times of genuine crisis Peace Now leaders and activists are ready to participate in the forefront of the country's defense. Many of the Peace Now activists had fought in the Yom Kippur War, and some had also fought in the Six Day War.

As the war in Lebanon grew, so did the opposition to the war. An ad hoc group called the Committee Against the War in Lebanon held a demonstration in the square in front of Tel Aviv city hall, and 20,000 people came to express their opposition, including many of the Peace Now activists. By now, word had come back from Peace Now activists at the front, some of whom had been back for their first leave, that "you've got to do something to stop the madness." A demonstration was called for the following Saturday, under Peace Now auspices, at the same square in Tel Aviv, and on the evening of July 3, 100,000 people gathered to express their opposition to the war.

The massacre in the Sabra and Shatila camps in West Beirut in September, though not a premeditated Israeli action, and though not carried out directly by Israelis (I do not believe that IDF soldiers could ever have acted as barbarically as the Phalangist and other Christian forces acted), was an outgrowth of the Israeli Likud government policy in Lebanon, a policy based on a calculated application of power, on a clear-cut alliance with one of the sides (the Christian Phalangists) in the Lebanese civil war, and on an insensitive disregard of Palestinian rights. Underlying all of this is an irrational fear of the Palestinians and other Arabs, who are seen, particularly by Begin, as being perpetrators of Nazilike activity against the Jews. And past Palestinian atrocities have only served to nourish this fear.

However, fear is one thing, and an actual, concrete massacre is quite another.

Israelis were so shocked by the massacre, and by the Israeli involvement in the activities which led up to the massacre, that they demonstrated their courage in unprecedented numbers: 400,000 Israelis gathered together at a demonstration in the same square in front of Tel Aviv city hall, organized jointly by the Labor Party, Mapam, Citizen's Rights, the Shinui Party, the Independent Liberal Party, Peace Now, and Soldiers Against Silence. The demonstration was also supported by Sheli and by the Bir-Zeit Committee. These 400,000 Israeli demonstrators were the proportional equivalent of 30,000,000 American demonstrators.

We are witnessing today an Israel which is highly polarized, almost split down the middle. One segment supports a vision of Israel and Zionism based upon "Greater Israel" (the state of Israel plus the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), a vision based upon a fundamental mistrust in the world's attitude toward the Jews, the application of power to mold political realities, and an implacable, unresolvable confrontation with the Palestinians. Menachem Begin, Ariel Sharon, and a major part of the Likud Party and its coalition partners support this vision.

The other segment supports a vision of Israel and Zionism which is rooted in Jewish traditions of humanism and democracy; it believes in territorial compromise ("territories for peace") as a means of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it believes in a limited use of power in order to defend the legitimate perimeters of Israeli society (Jews in general and Israelis in particular do have authentic enemies, as we all know). Almost the entire Israeli opposition, led by the Labor Alignment, and a small minority within the government coalition support this vision.

The resolution of the struggle between the groups which support these two visions will have a decisive influence on the future direction of the State of Israel. It will also be one of the key factors which will determine whether the Middle East will move forward towards a comprehensive peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, or will degenerate towards another massive round of Israeli-Arab warfare, with catastrophic consequences for the region, and possibly for the rest of the world as well.

**POSTSCRIPT—FEBRUARY 1983**

The hand grenade that killed Emil Grunzweig during a “Peace Now” demonstration on February 10, 1983, opposite the Prime Minister’s office in Jerusalem, was a watershed in Israeli politics.

President Navon declared that “verbal violence leads to physical violence.” Mapam Secretary General M. K. Victor Shemtov said the “grenade was thrown at the heart of democracy.” Emil himself wrote in his M.A. thesis on democracy about the importance “of fighting [political] battles with words and not with swords. . . . Without the existence of universal standards for rational decision-making between argued alternatives, the speaker himself becomes the only criterion for the value of his assertions. And the only resolution possible becomes the elimination or silencing of the holders of alternative beliefs.” His statement turned out to be a horrifyingly accurate premonition of his own death.

Israel is clearly divided into two camps. One believes “Greater Israel Is Better than Peace,” while the other believes “Peace Is Better than Greater Israel.” These camps are divided in their attitudes toward the use of power. The opposition essentially believes in the need for a limited use of power to defend the state of Israel’s legitimate interests. Begin believes in the accumulation of power to compensate for past Jewish weaknesses, particularly during the Holocaust. Both Begin and Sharon advocate the unlimited use of power to mold regional political realities.

A direct line leads from the bombing of the Iraqi reactor, through the repressive policies in the occupied territories, to the war in Lebanon. That line has now reached the grenade that killed Emil Grunzweig.

It is becoming clear that an unrestrained use of power, and a dehumanization of the Palestinians (who are called two-legged animals, terrorists, and Nazi-like) does not stop at the Green Line (the 1967 borders). It is only a short step from the uncompromising use of power against dehumanized external enemies, to dehumanization of internal rivals—the doves, the moderates, who are called traitors, PLO lovers, knife stabbers in the back of the nation—and the use of power against them.

On February 14, 1983, over 10,000 people from all over the



country traveled to a cemetery near Haifa to honor Grunzweig, whom most of them did not know. For seven rainy days, vigils were held in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. Participants were also expressing their identification with Israeli democracy and humanism, with what writer Amos Oz called "all that we have built, with blood and tears, for four generations."

The issue is no longer just war and peace, or "Greater Israel" versus "Territorial Compromise." The issue has become the very nature of Israeli society. In addition to believing that "Greater Israel Is Better than Peace," there are those on the right who also appear to believe that "Greater Israel Is Better than Democracy," and that "Sharon Is Better than Democracy."

That democracy was proudly served by the members of the Commission of Inquiry, their methods of investigation, their findings and their recommendations. It was those recommendations, and perhaps unknowingly that democracy, that the grenade-thrower was trying to undermine.

And to the passersby who shouted "too bad only one was killed," it should be clear that hundreds of thousands of Israelis, together with their friends and supporters around the world, will continue to defend and pursue their vision of a just, democratic, pluralistic, and humanistic society, a vision of the Jewish experience which is worthy of the best elements of the Prophetic tradition, a vision of an Israel which will one day live in peace with all its neighbors.

HILLEL SCHENKER



---

# The War in Lebanon

ELIAHU AGRES

It was as if everything were part of a Greek tragedy. The protagonists knew they were facing the abyss and still continued to march toward their inevitable fall—a fall foreordained by an angry god on Olympus. And now everything the protagonists did or said, everything other gods or moral heroes were doing, or trying to do, was of no avail. Nothing could prevent their doom.

In our case, the angry god whose command brought about the doom of the Lebanon war is Israel's Minister of Defense since July 1981, Ariel Sharon.

Over the last year, the outbreak of war had more than once appeared to be a virtual certainty. The Israeli cabinet discussed the situation—and reached decisions on action in Lebanon. The aims were clear: an invasion of Lebanon and occupation of an area reaching up to the eastern quarters of Beirut and to include the quasi-Christian state now existing in the center of the country, the expulsion of the PLO forces to Syria and the forming of a Christian-led government to be headed by Bashir Gemayel. Any Syrian attempt to interfere would result in a smashing blow dealt to Syria by the Israeli forces.

Yet each time, until June 1982, war was prevented at the very last moment. The scenario repeated itself time after time. A PLO act of terror committed in Israel or elsewhere in the world brought about the inevitable Israeli reaction. This was in keeping

---

ELIAHU AGRES is the managing editor of *Davar*, the Israeli daily associated with the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and with the Labor Party.

with the Israeli interpretation of the cease-fire agreement between Israel and the PLO of July 1981, which viewed acts of terror against Israeli targets anywhere in the world or by way of any of Israel's borders as a violation of the accord. The PLO, on the other hand, regarded the cease-fire as binding only as far as terrorist activity in and from Lebanon was concerned.

As a result of such terrorist actions, Israeli planes were usually sent to bomb PLO bases inside Lebanon. Hawks within the cabinet assumed that the PLO would react to these raids by bombing the Israeli settlements in the north, thus giving Israel justification to carry out large-scale action in Lebanon. But the PLO disappointed them and did not react in the way they expected. The settlements were not shelled in retaliation for Israel's disproportionate bombing raids. The only such result occurred on May 8, 1982, when the northern border area was shelled for a short time after Israeli planes attacked PLO bases and civilian targets in south Lebanon. The damage to property was minimal, and there were no casualties. The PLO later officially announced that it had purposely refrained from hitting Israeli settlements.

A year ago, on July 29, 1981, two Syrian helicopters were brought down by Israeli jets over Zahle in Lebanon in an act of support for the Lebanese Christians. The Syrians reacted by introducing into Lebanon missile batteries that, until the war, hampered Israeli Air Force surveillance missions in the area. The Syrians also moved armored units and artillery southward.

The war was carefully planned by Defense Minister Sharon. His concept was a simple one; in light of an absence of security problems along the Egyptian border, the time was right for the extermination of the PLO in Lebanon. The PLO must be hit, the Syrians expelled from Lebanon, and a government led by Bashir Gemayel formed in Beirut so that it could reach a peace treaty with Israel. Actually he admitted at a press conference held on June 18, 1982, that he started to plan the war the first day he became Defense Minister.

The Chief of Staff, Raphael Eitan, was in complete agreement with Sharon's view. But he was not satisfied with merely convincing the Prime Minister and other cabinet members of this. He tried actively lobbying the northern settlements in order to gain their support for a preventive war. These two succeeded on a

number of occasions in creating a war psychosis. But until June 1982, war had been prevented due to various outside factors.

In mid-May, on the day when the attack was going to be launched, word reached Israel of the intention of the Zaire President, Mobutu, to renew diplomatic ties with Israel, and that his special representative was already on his way to Jerusalem to officially inform Prime Minister Begin of this decision. It was clear to Begin that the planned action in Lebanon would have serious repercussions upon Mobutu's decision and upon additional diplomatic moves then being carried out in other African states. Therefore, he hurriedly summoned the leaders of the opposition to consultation, and then, received cabinet approval to cancel the Lebanese action.

The Americans, alarmed about Israel's plans to invade Lebanon, threatened sanctions and the cutting-off of military supplies. The United States feared that war would cause an escalation of tension in the region and further undermine the stability of all the pro-Western countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Using the stick-and-carrot method, the United States followed up its threats of sanctions with goodies: The U.S. administration announced its readiness to renew the strategic understanding canceled (or suspended) after Israel annexed the Golan Heights. In addition, Begin and Sharon were invited to visit Washington.

Despite constant brainwashing, there was no national consensus in Israel in support of such an action in Lebanon. The feeling of "no choice" prevalent during all of the previous wars fought by Israel, was absent. Instead, there was a feeling that the proposed goals were unattainable. The PLO could not be destroyed militarily. A strong blow dealt to the PLO would not solve the problem. Such a blow delivered to the Egyptian and Syrian Armies in 1967 did not prevent their speedy recovery and return to the field six years later in October 1973.

If we add to these the uncertain state of Begin's parliamentary majority, which placed the government in daily danger of being toppled, one can understand the braking system that prevented Sharon and Eitan from carrying out their plans till June 1982.

But they did not give up. They persisted in heating up the atmosphere and utilizing every minor incident as an excuse to create a hysterical war atmosphere.

For several months, large military forces were concentrated near the Lebanese border, awaiting the action.

Sharon was finally given the excuse for a war when on June 3 Shlomo Argev, the Israeli Ambassador in London, was shot and severely wounded by a terrorist from the Abu Nidal organization—an organization of dissident fanatics outside the PLO. The following day, the Israeli air force, navy, and artillery commenced a massive bombardment of targets in Lebanon. The PLO leaders were not wise enough to forbear so as to prevent escalation and war; their reaction was the shelling of Israeli settlements in the north. The people of Galilee went to the bomb shelters. One Israeli was killed and ten were wounded. There was enormous damage to property.

On June 6, 1982, Israeli troops crossed the Lebanese border. From its beginning to this day (mid-July 1982) this war has been a manifestation of fallacy and deception. The purpose of the war, as was declared on its first day, was to remove the terrorists forty kilometers farther away from the Israeli border, and to liberate the people of Galilee from fear of the Katyushas (though, as a matter of fact, this purpose was already achieved in July 1981, when a cease fire between Israel and the PLO was achieved). Hence this war was called “Operation Peace for Galilee” (not a “war”). In addition to that, it was announced in a cabinet meeting that this operation would last twelve to twenty-four hours; but within two days the IDF had gone far beyond this goal and the real target of war became clear: destroying the PLO’s military infrastructure in south Lebanon, removing the Syrian troops from Lebanon, and establishing a stable Lebanese government headed by Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Christian Phalangists.

The escalation of this war was supported by only one man—the Minister of Defense. Every time the cabinet was assembled it was not to decide on the tactics of the war but to authorize them after they had already been carried out. The Knesset Committee on Foreign and Military Affairs did not receive credible information on military developments, and its members were groping in the dark. The state of affairs in Israel today is that one man has most of the power, and this man is the Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon. This is where the real danger to Israel’s democracy lies.

The scale of this war and the occupation of densely populated



cities have brought about severe consequences: the killing and wounding of thousands of civilians in Beirut and Tyre, Sidon and Damur, vast migration of refugees, ruin and destruction in the cities and villages of south Lebanon.

Noteworthy is the stand and role of the opposition, i.e. the Labor Party, in this war. The leaders of the Labor Party met the Prime Minister before the war and expressed their objection to an armed confrontation. They suggested securing peace for Galilee by maintaining the cease-fire between Israel and the PLO, by acts of deterrence to prevent the destabilization of the cease fire, and by limited reactions to violations of the cease fire, if such violations took place.

On June 6, 1982, when war broke out, the leaders of the Alignment were invited to a meeting with the Prime Minister. They declared their unlimited support of the government in maintaining the purpose of the war—to secure peace for Galilee.

When the war was rapidly escalated, the Alignment decided to oppose the expansion of the confrontation beyond its original outlines.

The changing views within the Alignment testified to its confusion (it reminds one of the Jewish story of the matchmaker who tried to persuade a man to marry a certain girl, praising her greatly, and who, when he was told by his listener that the girl was pregnant, said: "It's nothing, she is only a little bit pregnant").

This situation led to the appearance of opposition from a totally unexpected direction: soldiers from the front line. Soldiers in elite units decided not to remain silent and as soon as it became possible presented petitions to the Prime Minister, to members of the cabinet, and to the media. They also appeared in public gatherings, expressing their stand against the war. They, who are ready to obey every order, feel they have been cheated.

The following letter, signed by thirty-six combatants (including many officers), was addressed to the Prime Minister. It reflected these feelings:

Mr. Prime Minister,

This is not what I volunteered to the special unit for. It was clear to me that if I were called to a war it would be a just war to defend our lives and existence as a nation. This time I went to a war whose

declared purpose was to remove the terrorists 40 km. further from the settlements in the North. Today it is clear to me that I was deceived and called to the first war in the history of Israel which was not a defensive war but a dangerous gamble on achieving political goals—a gamble for which the IDF paid a heavy price in human life, and for which innocent civilians were hurt. This step establishes a dangerous precedent and causes severe damage to our image, our moral strength, and to the prospects for peace in this blood-drenched region.

I want you to know that the voices of those who speak against the war not only do not discourage me, but are, in fact, what give me strength out there in the battlefield, knowing that sanity and humanism still exist back home. Even now I continue to obey my commanders' orders, knowing that I am risking my life in a war which I do not believe is just. I have no faith in the Minister of Defense!!!

These soldiers, after they finished their army service, formed a movement called Soldiers Against Silence, whose purpose was to demand the resignation of the Minister of Defense and to stop the war in Lebanon and demand that their service would be within the State of Israel.

An impressive expression of the protest against the war was the demonstration organized by the Peace Now movement in Tel Aviv on July 3, in which 100,000 people participated.

The biggest mistake of this war is in the distorted concept of the Likud government, which seeks to solve the problem called the PLO by military means. The PLO, whatever we may think about its tactics and views, still represents the Palestinian people and their desire for self-determination and political independence. You can oppress this aspiration, but you cannot obliterate it.

This war originated from a mistaken perception and has been conducted in deceitful and fallacious ways.

JULY 1982

# **Israel: Opposition to the War**

---

Most Israelis were shocked by the outbreak and rapid escalation of hostilities.

In the first week of June, IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan was still being roundly criticized by editorial writers, political commentators, and others, for saying to a group of high-school students in Tiberias that the only solution to the Palestinian problem (he prefers to call them "the terrorists") was a military solution. Former Prime Minister and IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was equally adamant in his repeated public declarations that "the Palestinian problem cannot be resolved through military means."

The initial response to the war was shock and silent disbelief. This was compounded by the fact that the government and the IDF spokesman activated an almost total blackout on news from the front. Some commentators wondered whether this was to confuse the enemy, or to confuse the Israeli public.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, there was clearly no national consensus in favor of a large-scale military action in the north. However, once the fighting broke out, a national dynamic went into effect which states that "as long as the fighting is going on, and friends, sons, fathers, and loved ones are fighting and dying, this is not the time for open criticism."

Labor Party Chairman Shimon Peres' response to a no-confidence motion presented to the Knesset by the Democratic Front was to call for an Alignment rejection of the motion as long as the fighting was going on. He declared that accounts with the government and its policy would be settled after the fighting stopped.

The six Mapam Members of the Knesset present (Imri Ron was the only Member called up for reserve duty), Yossi Sarid (Labor), and Shulamit Aloni (Citizen's Rights) did not accept this approach, and they demonstrated the fact that there was no national consensus behind the government's policy by not participating in the vote. They were joined by Mordechai Vershuvsky (Shinui).

At a meeting of the national forum of Peace Now, which was followed by a meeting of the Tel Aviv branch, unanimous opposition to the government's policy was expressed by the activists present. However, it was felt that open criticism would be most effective after the fighting ceased.

Sheli issued official pronouncements of opposition to the war, coupled with a call for a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.

The Committee for Solidarity with Bir-Zeit in Tel Aviv and the Campus student group in Jerusalem demonstrated against the war. The demonstrators were attacked by passersby in Tel Aviv and right-wing students in Jerusalem.

As the government appeared to be moving beyond the original goals it set for itself in the fighting, and the number of deaths grew, there began to appear political and editorial commentaries against conflict with the Syrians and massive fighting in Beirut. Victor Shemtov (Mapam), a member of the Knesset's Security and Foreign Relations Committee, called for an immediate cease fire, and an ad against the war appeared in *Ha'aretz*, signed by hundreds of public figures. The text said: "Enough! We the undersigned call upon the Government of Israel to stop the war and to withdraw from Lebanon immediately."

In *Ha'ir*, the weekly distributed by *Ha'aretz* in Tel Aviv, Major (Res.) Benny Barabash challenged the wisdom of the slogan "When the cannons roar, the muses are silent." In an article written on Wednesday morning, he said that those who support the war should not think that they have a monopoly over national responsibility and concern for the lives of the soldiers at the front. Barabash wrote that the Lebanese action was clearly one which was initiated by Israel. He concluded that: "During these days when the IDF once again reaffirms its absolute superiority over the armies of our neighbors, it is important to assert once again



that we must use the massive strength of our army as a factor which enables us to activate courageous political initiatives. We must arrive at a fundamental long-term solution to our problems in the north, in the West Bank, and in Gaza, we must see that the problems are interrelated, and we must find an adequate and humane answer to the Palestinian problem." Major (Res.) Barabash was one of the six reserve officers who spoke at a press conference organized by Peace Now before the fighting began, against the official policy in the territories.

At the same time, the mother of Major (Res.) Jonny Harnick, who died in the battle for Beaufort Castle, requested that Peace Now publish an obituary notice of his death.

On Friday and Saturday, courageous TV journalists also managed to use their time spots in the evening news to photograph some of the destruction in Lebanon, to interview innocent Lebanese victims, to talk to Israeli soldiers who are wrestling with heavy moral dilemmas, and to raise some basic questions about the war.

Other questions were raised about the war on the cover of *Hotam*, the weekly of *Al Hamishmar*, and by *New Outlook* editorial board member Boaz Evron, "There Is No Consensus," and by Sylvie Keshet, "My Country—Right or Wrong?" in their columns in *Yediot Aharonot*.

All of this happened during the first week of the war. As the excesses of the war became known, and the government pushed the IDF way beyond its declared goals (moving the PLO units beyond artillery range of the northern settlements, an act which was supposed to be accomplished in "twenty-four to forty-eight hours"), opposition to the war began to grow, both at the home front and on the front lines.

On Saturday, June 27, an ad hoc group appearing under the name of the Committee Against the War in Lebanon held a demonstration in the square in front of Tel Aviv city hall. Much to the organizer's surprise, 20,000 people attended.

The following Saturday night, a similar demonstration was held in the same place under the banner of Peace Now, and 100,000 people attended.

This was an unprecedented expression of opposition to a war in

Israel while the war was still going on (despite the numerous cease-fires). It proved that there is no national consensus behind the Likud government's policy.

A much smaller, though noteworthy demonstration was held in the same location on Saturday, July 24, by a group of Sephardic Jews from the poorer neighborhoods. The demonstration featured Shlomo Bar and his Breira Tivit singing group. Only a few hundred people attended, but the demonstration may signal the beginning of a serious attempt at a Sephardic expression of the desire for peace, compromise, and integration into the region.

One of the most significant types of demonstrations against the war has been carried out by groups of demobilized reserve soldiers who served at the front. Upon their return to civilian life, they wrote letters to the Prime Minister, and formed groups such as Soldiers Against Silence, and There's a Limit.

One of the high points of the protest against the war in June and July was the personal act of courage of Colonel Eli Geva, a young war hero who refused to enter west Beirut. Born into a family which had always been dedicated to the defense of the country (his father, Yosef Geva, was a major general during the Six Day War), he asked to be relieved of his command because he "couldn't look the parents of [his] soldiers in the eyes if [he] had to order them to enter west Beirut." Long personal conversations with Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, and IDF Chief of Staff Eitan did not convince him to change his views, and he was relieved of his command and discharged from the army.

The government reacted to these protests in two ways: One was to accuse the protestors of treason—the "knife in the back" theory—without realizing perhaps that the Nazis originated that slogan in Germany. This was accompanied by attempts by a young Likud Member of the Knesset, Michael Kleiner, to ban demonstrations during wartime.

The other government response was to call a counterdemonstration. Held at the same square in front of Tel Aviv city hall, organized with the aid of Tel Aviv Mayor Shlomo Lahat, the pro-government demonstration featured appearances by Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Sharon, and NRP Interior Minister Dr. Burg. The government even spread a rumor that Danny Kaye was going to appear, which proved false.

With Begin haranguing the opposition, the event attracted an estimated crowd of 250,000.

The pro-government demonstration accomplished two contradictory goals: 1) The fact that the organizers felt it necessary to bring Begin and Sharon proved that the war is a partisan policy, which doesn't enjoy the support of a national consensus. 2) On the other hand, Begin and Sharon did convincingly demonstrate that their policies have a populist demagogic appeal with a significant percentage of the public.

The pro- and anti-war demonstrations are also a clash between two different cultures: The pro-war demonstration was an expression of the cult of leadership, while the anti-war demonstrations were an expression of grassroots culture.

JULY 1982

# --- A Military Analysis

DR. (COL. RET.) MEIR PA'IL

## THE PRETEXT

It would seem there was a causal chain leading up to the IDF's invasion of Lebanon. On Thursday, June 3, 1982, an Arab terrorist group attempted to kill the Israeli Ambassador in London; on Friday, June 4, Israel retaliated by a massive air bombing of terrorist bases and headquarters in Beirut and Lebanon; the PLO reacted by shelling Jewish settlements in Galilee. In response to that, the government of Israel decided to carry out an invasion, by land, air, and sea, into southern Lebanon on Sunday, June 6, beginning at 11 a.m., an operation which was given the loaded name of "Peace for Galilee."

With little effort one can prove that the links in this chain are but poorly connected. For instance: The British security forces captured the murderous terrorists and found out that they belonged to the dissident Palestinian organization of Abu Nidal, connected to Libya and Iraq—and some claim it even has indirect connections with the USSR. One of the aims of this terrorist group is to eliminate the leadership of the PLO, and it has no center or headquarters in Lebanon. So there was no military need to begin a direct campaign against Lebanese territory or the PLO. Another example: There is no evidence, in our military history at least, which shows that retaliation operations decrease terrorist

---

DR. PA'IL is a noted military historian, and a former director of the Military Academy (for officers' training) of the IDF. A former member of the Knesset for the Moked and Sheli Parties, he is currently doing research on the IDF leadership at Columbia University.



hostilities. The conclusion of the IDF was that retaliation, rather than bringing about a decrease in infiltration and terrorist attacks, brought about an escalation, as admitted by a former chief of staff, Moshe Dayan, in his book *The Diary of the Sinai Campaign*. How much more so when it is a case of massive retaliation against military and political targets that had nothing to do with the attempted assassination. Clearly, there is no causal chain but a clumsily sewn pretext.

## THE AIM OF THE INVASION

What then was the aim of the government of Israel when it endorsed the calling up of the reserves and allowed the plan of invasion to be put into effect?

The aim first proclaimed was to take control of the southern regions of Lebanon, so as to prevent the PLO units and the Syrians from future shelling of the settlements in Galilee with conventional artillery, the longest-range weapons being the Soviet 130-mm. caliber cannon.

But after the invasion got under way, when the IDF forces went past the original 40-km zone, reached Beirut, joined up with the Maronite Phalangists of Gemayel and blocked the Beirut-Damascus road, the government spokesmen started to explain that the aim was to destroy the military bases of the PLO in Lebanon and to prepare the ground for a new independent Lebanese government that would sign a peace treaty with Israel. This would create a peace from the shores of Tripoli and Beirut in the north, through the western shores of Israel, and down to the delta of the Nile; something like a Pax Israeliana or a limited Middle East peace with American favor: a Mini Pax Americana.

However, if we follow with utmost attention the pattern of the operation in Lebanon, and the behavior of the government and the IDF on other Arab fronts like the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, we may surmise that the invasion of Lebanon carries with it a message of vital import to the Palestinians, i.e.: "Beware, you Palestinians living under Israeli rule!! All that we have done to the refugee camps, the cities and towns and villages of south Lebanon, on the coast of the Mediterranean between Rashidiye, Tyre,

and Beirut we can do to you in Gaza, Judea, Samaria . . . and even perhaps in Um-el-Faham and Nazareth. And we can do that now, especially, given that there is no PLO or any other legitimate organized body that could be seen to represent the Palestinian cause. If you will bend down and follow our rules, it would be best that you accept the limited autonomy offered you as defined by Begin-Sharon-Milson; if not, your fate will be that of Rashidiye (near Tyre), Ein-Hilwa (near Sidon), or Beirut." Was that the real aim of the invasion?

If we turn to explore the government's behavior inside Israel we will be able to isolate the central aim of the invasion internally, i.e., to erase the "disgrace" of the retreat from Sinai and the destruction of Yamit: to effect a brilliant military operation so as to bestow on the descendants of Jabotinsky and his followers a glory of fighters and conquerors beyond that of men who make territorial concessions for peace. All of this was meant to strengthen their position in the Israeli public and to unite the people under their leadership. The best strategic choice to achieve that end was shattered Lebanon, where the PLO was consolidating its presence between Tyre and Beirut on the coast and between Litani and Awali in the east. There was to be found the weakest enemy, it would seem, guaranteeing a clear-cut military victory. For this purpose American support would be forthcoming, whose interest is to shake up the PLO and the Syrians so that they turn their backs on the Soviets and join the countries supported by the U.S. Moreover, by punishing the Palestinians in Lebanon, Israel would be warning those on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

## THE ETHICAL-CULTURAL PROBLEM

The IDF did all that was possible and necessary to abide by the principle of purity of arms on the tactical level of land forces. There was no deliberate killing of civilian population, prisoners were taken, and everything was done so as not to repeat some of those things that happened in the Litani Campaign of March 1978 which were connected with Danny Pinto and Aryeh Sadeh, who were convicted of murdering prisoners and pardoned by Raphael

Eitan. It is important to understand that to destroy the bases of widespread guerrilla forces in refugee camps, suburbs, towns, and cities, one has no alternative but to conquer and systematically go through the buildings. To prevent any needless casualties among our forces as well as among the population, the IDF used loudspeakers and flyers to ask the civilians to leave the buildings and go to the beaches or orchards before the attack began. This procedure enabled the IDF to carry out a "smash-up" operation, including massive air bombing, heavy shelling from the sea and land, and the wholesale bombing of houses, all of which facilitated the military conquest and also saved lives.

So, although there was a reasonable military explanation, the result was that the coast of Lebanon from Tyre and Rashidiye in the south up to Beirut in the north looked as though it had suffered a major earthquake in the "best" tradition of the Vandal conquests in ancient times or of the Mongols in the Middle Ages. This destruction and ruin will be the haunting memorial which points to Israel and the IDF as the inheritors of the Mongols in the Middle East. Many, many years will pass before we can remove the stigma of this "smash-up" method.

In the IDF's invasion of Lebanon we were, therefore, careful to observe the principle of the purity of arms on its low and minimal scale, but allowed a deterioration into contempt of that same principle on the national scale. Our air force, whose missions in the past were always pinpointed and well defined, this time had "to drop its bombs on unspecified targets, to devastate and raze the city and, apparently, to destroy the houses together with their terrorist residents." Now it is clear why the IDF refrained from occupying Tyre and Rashidiye during the Litani Operation (March 1978). IDF commanders presumed then that the occupation of the built-up areas of Tyre would demand a heavy price in IDF's casualties—as was the case in the city of Suez on the last days of the Yom Kippur War (October 23–24), and in East Jerusalem during the Six Day War (June 6–7, 1967). Therefore it was clear that in order to occupy Tyre and Rashidiye, the IDF had to raze those places before it attacked them, using the "smash-up" technique. In the Litani Operation the IDF did not want to do that and did not occupy Tyre. It took four years for us to convince ourselves that the "smash-up" technique was accept-



able. In April 1982 the IDF used that technique with mechanical equipment only in Yamit; while in June 1982, in the Arab-populated areas of Lebanon, we used this "smash-up" technique in various ways: in air, naval, and artillery bombardment, and with tanks, rockets, and mechanical equipment. Ariel Sharon is the best representative of this technique: this is what Sharon could teach the pupils of Ze'ev Jabotinsky.

Whatever the political settlement is as a result of the IDF's invasion of Lebanon, it will be darkened and stained by the destruction and devastation we caused in Lebanon. Ultimately, we will have to pay for the "smash-up" technique both in economic compensation and in major political concessions imposed on us by the international consensus that will make the utmost use of our decision to cast off our moral shield.

And, as if this is not enough, there are also disturbing signs that we are becoming spiritual slaves to the culture of physical force. On Friday, June 4, 1982, the day after our ambassador was shot and while our air force was bombing Beirut and other places in Lebanon, Yitzhak Modai, the "Minister without Portfolio," made a speech over the Voice of Israel. He, who claims to possess a "liberal point of view," stated that Israel would not imitate France, which endured the assassination of its ambassador in Beirut. He emphasized firmly that Israel is a country with power and honor, which reacted in the past and will react in the future forcefully, using its military superiority. Without our noticing it, this claim and what followed it exemplify how, in order to win the people's faith, our leaders have on the one hand to reject, even scorn, any policy of forbearance and moderation; and, on the other hand, to adopt the image of powerful and unrestrained military activism. When one of us stops and asks: "What is the use of bombing Beirut when Abu Nidal and his gang are not there?" he is bound to be answered by the national consensus: "Then what do you expect us to do, to keep silent? We must strike, destroy, oppress, even if only to appease our restless minds." This is a resurrection of the spirit of blood feuds, or perhaps it is some sort of spiritual therapy which is operated by letting out all of one's violence on the alien and the foreigner, without regard for whether it is necessary or self-destructive.

As a result of the prolonged time our people spent in exile, in which they were persecuted by many, culminating in the Holocaust, and of the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict, many good people among us tend to think that national independence means, first of all, a military superiority which scorns any political, moral, cultural, social, or economic considerations. It is not enough for them that we have established the best and most powerful military force in the Middle East; they would like it to strike and hit more and more, trying to do so with minimum loss of human lives on our side. They love to hear our Minister of Defense promising we can get to Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Tadmor, and Haleb, and they grovel at our Chief of Staff's feet when he declares that we shall have no difficulty in destroying the PLO through military means. However, if one dares to suggest that this military superiority enables us not to fear the sons of Ishmael and to offer to make peace in exchange for territories—then they become alarmed and fearfully declare that those who are willing to give back the occupied territories (even for a chance of peace) endanger the very existence of the state of Israel until it may, God forbid, be on the verge of a second Auschwitz or Warsaw. Indeed this is a modern Zionist schizophrenia: on the one hand the mentality of Samson, and on the other hand that of Menachem Mendel and his Diasporan fears. Both of these characters, Samson and Menachem Mendel, are the recipe for national failure. The way to link them is not by schizophrenia but by a synthesis of mental composure which uses military force as a limited means, which is politically and morally calculated, with our long-run objectives always in mind.

## THE PLO, THE CHRISTIANS, AND THE PHALANGISTS

It has been known to the Israeli Intelligence for several years now that the PLO was accumulating military power in southern Lebanon, along the seashore from Rashidiye through Tyre to Beirut, and in the areas between the Litani River in the south and the Zaharani and Awali in the north; and still farther up east to

Mount Hermon. Unlike what Israel's Prime Minister and Chief of Staff claim, the Israeli Intelligence proved to be credible and its information on the PLO's organization in Lebanon was, by and large, verified. When the IDF invaded Lebanon it found out that the PLO had approximately 100 T-34 Soviet tanks (from the Second World War and the Korean War), some 120 unmotorized artillery pieces of various types (including Katyushas, some of which were posted on trucks), and about 20,000 personal weapons. According to official IDF published estimates, all of these could, after strenuous training, prolonged organization, and meticulous indoctrination, provide five infantry brigades with the military ability to perform defensive or offensive missions. What was it that kept the PLO going in Lebanon?

As we all know, Suleiman Franjiyeh, Lebanon's Maronite President, invited the Syrians, in 1976, to move their army into Lebanon and to restore order in it, after the bloodshed in the intersectorian riots beginning in 1975 threatened to bring total destruction to the country. The Palestinians, via some of the PLO groups, played an active role in the disorder: first as moderate intermediators, but later, since spring 1976, as an anti-Maronite power. The Syrian army restored order in Lebanon by means of power and in doing so was supported by pro-Syrian Palestinian elements: the Palestinian Liberation army, which belongs to the Syrian army, and the Al Saika organization, which is part of the PLO. All these worked together against a variety of elements from all sides, including most of the factions of the PLO. The Syrian army's entrance into Lebanon was later officially authorized by the Arab League, which called the two Syrian divisions "the Arab Deterrence Force." The Israeli government, with Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister, was very concerned about the Syrian army's activity in Lebanon, and it managed, through American intermediation, to impose on the Syrians a "red line" stretching from Sidon eastward, which the Syrians were not to cross so as not to get too close to the Israeli border. This "red line" is about 40 kilometers to the north of the international border between Israel and Lebanon; though, in the district facing Metula, this line crosses the Litani Valley less than 20 kilometers from Israel's northern border.

The area between the "red line" and Israel's northern border was, in name, under Lebanese sovereignty; but the collapse of the Lebanese army in 1976, and the loss of control on the part of the legitimate and official Lebanese authorities, made this area into a sort of no-man's-land. The northern part of this area was occupied by the PLO, which was gathering military power with Syrian, Libyan, Saudi, and, indirectly, Soviet help in money, arms, and other means; while in the southern part, the Israelis were helping Major Haddad, the Greek Catholic, to establish a Christian-Shiite enclave from "the Good Fence" to the north, as a barrier between Israel and the PLO. Meanwhile Israel was also encouraging Maronite attempts to establish a Maronite-Phalangist enclave in the western part of Mount Lebanon between Beirut and Tripoli—a territory which logistically depended on Juniye's seaport. It is safe to assume that the quantity of guns and ammunition given to Haddad's men in southern Lebanon and to the Phalangists in Mount Lebanon and Juniye, equals, more or less, the quantity of weapons in the PLO's possession. What differs is the kind of weapons used by the two sides; for instance, Haddad's men use the improved Sherman tank, while the PLO uses the Soviet T-34. The military building of the PLO and the Christian elements stems from two kinds of reasons: from internal reasons connected with the struggle for hegemony in collapsing Lebanon; and from external reasons founded on the Arab-Israeli conflict on its two levels: the distinct Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, and the conflict between Syrian and Pan-Arab nationalism and Israel.

In 1978, after the Litani Operation, UNIFIL forces moved into Lebanon to form a barrier between "Haddadland" and the PLO, from Tyre to the Litani River. The PLO had undoubtedly strengthened its military base and organization in the four years since then, and established in the area between the Syrian army and UN forces a semi-autonomy, dominated by the PLO and supported by those who believe themselves to be the Lebanese left—Sunnite, Druse, and Greek Orthodox. In the beginning of 1982 the PLO was, historically, in the classical period of transition that every guerrilla movement undergoes—the transition from coordinated combat on a very small scale to the control over



comprehensive and connected territories. Due to the peculiar historical circumstances of the Syrian-Israeli conflict, to the collapse of the central Lebanese regime, and to the presence of some 400,000 Palestinian refugees, mainly in southern Lebanon, this period of historical transition was initiated not in the territories of Palestine itself, but in southern Lebanon, though PLO spokesmen have made low-toned attempts to label their south Lebanese strongholds "North Palestine." At least they had something to lose. It is most likely that precisely these advantages achieved by the PLO were what led this organization gradually to develop the first signs of moderation, which led to its consent to sign a cease-fire agreement with Israel in July 1981—an agreement that was established through the indirect intermediation of Ambassador Philip Habib of the American State Department.

## **THE PALESTINIAN CENTER OF GRAVITY AFTER THE OPERATION IN LEBANON**

During the first three days of the Lebanon War, on June 6–8, 1982, the IDF used sophisticated and powerful military strategy against the PLO. There were crashing assaults; land, sea, and air outflanking with helicopters, and well-planned coordination with the air force. Within three days almost all the PLO factors south of Damour were surrounded, and all that remained was to clear those areas with not easy, but then also not so heavy, battles. Here also the IDF used the system of loudspeakers, leaflets, evacuation to the nearest seashore or grove, and finally the "smash-up" technique with its final and absolute destruction. We may safely determine that after two months of IDF activity in Lebanon the Arab side had ten thousand human losses, many of whom were people who decided to remain inside their homes.

Within three days of fighting, the PLO's regular army was completely defeated, and the only way left for it was to return to guerrilla warfare, in and out of Lebanon. This military achievement of the IDF proves beyond any doubt that there was no reason to create a panic in Israeli and international public opinion about the dangers of the PLO's military organization in Lebanon.

It became clear that the PLO cannot be a military rival of the IDF, even when it fights in defensive posts in which the Arabs were until now successful, as demonstrated in Beirut and by the Syrians in east Lebanon.

However, we should deal with the claims of the threat of the Palestinian regular army more systematically. As was said before, the PLO had enough ammunition and weapons to equip five infantry brigades, after prolonged training, organization, and indoctrination. Could this potential be a threat to Israel?

In order to answer this question we must consider comparative quantitative data. The severest surprise attack IDF ever had to face occurred in the Yom Kippur War (October 6–24, 1973). In the Golan Heights the IDF was surprisingly attacked by three Syrian divisions equipped with the best Soviet weapons and protected properly by anti-aircraft missiles. Later the Syrian army brought in two more divisions. These five Syrian divisions included fifteen armored and mechanized brigades and well-trained and equipped infantry brigades. In addition to that, we also had to face two Iraqi armored divisions, which included approximately six armored and mechanized brigades and which were supported by two Jordanian armored brigades. During the Yom Kippur War the Arabs operated a military force of twenty-three brigades in the Golan Heights alone, and were repulsed and beaten by the IDF. At the same time the Egyptian army launched a surprise attack, crossing the Suez Canal with five divisions simultaneously. This force included at least fifteen armored, mechanized, and infantry brigades. Later in the war the Egyptian army operated four more armored and mechanized divisions which included twelve brigades. The total number of modern brigades of all kinds operated by the Egyptian army was twenty-seven. And still we managed (by crossing the canal) to defeat the Egyptian army in the Yom Kippur War far more thoroughly than we did the Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi forces in the Golan Heights and the Houran territory.

Since the Yom Kippur War the Arab armies accumulated greater military power in land, air, and sea, and so did the PLO. But then the IDF, too was not exactly inactive, as its performances in Entebbe, at the Iraqi nuclear reactor raid, and in the

Litani Operation clearly indicate. Why then do the Israeli leadership and its official information sources have to frighten both Jews and non-Jews in and out of the country, with horrible stories of the PLO's military potential. Surely it seems that any way to arouse and encourage our innate Menachem Mendel Diasporan feelings is kosher!

It is hard to tell what will become of the PLO after the problem of West Beirut and the political settlement that will evolve are finally decided upon in the coming months. But it seems that it can be determined with great certainty that Palestinian terror and guerrilla operations are going to be continued in the future, from Tripoli in Lebanon and from other Arab countries that will decide to continue to be part of "the Rejection Front," such as Libya, Algeria, possibly Iraq, Iran, and South Yemen, and, under certain conditions, also Syria. It also seems that a revival of the Palestinian Liberation army is to be expected: surely within the Syrian, Lebanese, and Iraqi armies, and possibly also in the Libyan, Jordanian, and Iranian armies. It is even possible that part of the Palestinian leadership, if eventually evacuated, or saved, from West Beirut, whether it gets to Syria, Jordan, or Egypt, will agree to join the Camp David framework as a Palestinian government-in-exile or as the Palestinian authorized representative, and to play an active role in the negotiation of "full autonomy" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the five-year period of transition. These Palestinian leaders will later be able to struggle for the acceptance of "the legitimate rights and the just requirements of the Palestinian people" according to the Camp David Accords, striving for their national independence alongside Israel.

Whatever the development of the Palestinian problem will be, its center of gravity is not and will never be in Lebanon. The core of the Palestinian problem is in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. The historical responsibility for a comprehensive political settlement of the Palestinian problem is Israel's, since Israel is the occupier and ruler of these Palestinian centers of gravity. There is no use in looking for the solution to this problem under imaginary lamp posts outside the western part of the Land of Israel and beyond the political responsibility of the Israeli government. Meanwhile, the Israeli "smash-up" technique destroyed



great parts of the Palestinian refugee camps, and opened with Israel's own hands the old-new Pandora's box, calling to mind once again the difficult humanitarian and political problem of the 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

## THE CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA

Once the Israeli supreme command (the cabinet and the general staff) had decided to instruct the IDF to enter 40 kilometers into Lebanon (at least that is what was announced), it was obvious that a military confrontation with the Syrian troops residing along the upper Litani River in the Lebanon Valley and on the two hilly sides of the valley was inevitable, since the "red line" of Syrian military presence there was only about 20 kilometers from Israel's northern border.

It is possible that the Israeli government's public announcement that the IDF intended to enter only 40 kilometers into Lebanon, and that it had no intention to create military combat-contact with Syrian troops, was meant to hint to the Syrian government to withdraw its troops to a new "red line," so as to save themselves the unpleasantness of running into Israel's modern armored divisions. All signs indicate that the Syrians either did not understand, or did not wish to understand, Israel's hints; or maybe they did not have enough time to fully grasp Israel's meaning? The number of Israeli armored and air force formations activated in the Lebanon Valley and the southern Lebanon mountains indicates that Israel's supreme command estimated from the very beginning that a military confrontation with the Syrians was expected. It almost looks as if someone was waiting impatiently to involve the Syrians in an extensive confrontation. The fourth day of the invasion (June 9, 1982) witnessed the climax of the IDF's confrontation with the Syrians: the Israeli air force destroyed the Syrian anti-aircraft missiles in the north and center of the Lebanon Valley, while shooting down more than twenty Syrian Soviet-made aircraft. There were those who said it was unwise to use secret and sophisticated methods in this unnecessary operation, and it was better to save them for greater and more

vital military challenges. This air force attack was coordinated with Israeli armor and infantry frontal and outflanking attacks on Syrian troops.

The situation beginning on June 9 was that the deeper the IDF invaded Lebanon, the stronger and greater was its confrontation with Syrian troops, until the two sides were engaged in massive combat along the Mediterranean coastline south of Beirut and in the central mountain front near and on the Beirut-Damascus road. Undoubtedly the Syrians were more and more obstinate in their defensive combat, making the IDF pay a heavy price in human lives for every military achievement it gained. And still the Syrians were not able to prevent the IDF's union with the Phalangist troops in East Beirut and in the western parts of Mount Lebanon; and thus the southwest part of Beirut was disconnected from the Syrian troops stationed on the road to Damascus.

All signs indicate that the U.S. gave reasonable political backing to the IDF invasion of Lebanon, even when it became clear that it was delivering quite a heavy blow both on land and in the air to the Syrians in Lebanon. It will not surprise us if we hear that the Americans were actually interested in the IDF teaching the Syrians a lesson and persuading them to abandon their strong military alliance with the Soviets, in exchange for American guardianship. Even the claim that the Soviets provided the Syrians with not so efficient missiles, aircraft, and tanks will, for that purpose, suffice. Syria's cautious decision not to expand the confrontation to the Golan Heights helped the Syrians to avoid the test of an extensive war against the battle-eager IDF, and limited the Syrian-Israeli confrontation to Lebanon only. If the Syrian government manages to restrict the military conflict to Lebanon alone, and if it yields, even partly, to American hints of accommodation, it will not give the IDF the excuse to renew its massive attack on the Syrian army. Then Syria will be able to claim that hers is the army that prevented the total occupation of Lebanon.

The IDF's deep invasion of the densely populated areas of Lebanon, and its confrontation with Syrian troops in the hilly and narrow areas of Lebanon, brought the IDF into a position which did not enable it to carry out its full maneuverability. Some go

even further, suggesting that, in a way, the IDF “had its fingers caught” in this battle, and was in a position of “not swallowing and not vomiting.” Indeed, Israel’s air supremacy weighted the scales in Israel’s favor, but the battle on land was left in the mire, and extraction from it may mean paying a heavy price in human casualties. It has, of course, to be considered whether Israel will achieve some political profit from the renewal of combat, or will our human losses have been in vain? Or maybe it is better for Israel to get its knees out of the mire of Lebanon before it sinks deeper, down to its waist.

## THE REVIVAL OF AN INDEPENDENT LEBANON?

The union of IDF forces with the Maronite-Phalangist forces in East Beirut indicates that “the pillar of fire” leading the invasion of Lebanon is the Israeli government’s vision that the best political settlement to the problem of Lebanon means removal of all foreign forces from Lebanese soil, and the re-establishing of a Lebanese independent Christian-dominated regime, according to the old national treaty of 1943, or possibly with even greater Maronite influence. The Israeli government’s political view is that this kind of Lebanon will sign a peace treaty with Israel. However, this vision is nothing but a daydream, for the following reasons:

A. There is not a single political power in the world which can remove the Syrians from northern Lebanon and the northeast valley. The only force which can get them out of Lebanon is the IDF, and in order to do so it has to renew its attack in air, land, and sea. Whether it is limited to Lebanese soil or extended to other fronts, an Israeli total occupation of Lebanon that would enable the Maronites to assert their hegemony in this country would demand a heavy price in IDF casualties. And even then, for how long would such a settlement hold? Will there be someone else to replace the IDF as the Phalangists’ protector?

B. The intersectarian enmity and alienation which caused the Lebanese regime of 1975–6 to collapse are still very much alive, and, even in these days, one can clearly observe the internal conflicts between the Christian, Druse, and Shiite sects. Even

Major Haddad and Bashir Gemayel cannot sit at the same negotiation table. A Maronite regime can exist only if the countries of the world send an army of at least three or four divisions into Lebanon to defend it. It seems that no country in the world has an interest in sending its troops into Lebanon to defend a Lebanese regime which has been politically bankrupt. Should Israel supply these forces? Or remove the Syrians from Lebanon in bloody combat? Both Israeli public opinion and the international consensus will not tolerate this possibility, especially when it gives Israel no political profit.

C. There are about 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who are regarded as unwanted and aliens by those fanatic Lebanese, Maronite, and other groups that see themselves as the descendants of the Phoenicians and which maintain a military alliance with Israel. Every particular Maronite Lebanese regime will want to remove all of the Palestinians from Lebanon, especially now when the IDF has, once again, left many of them homeless. Since no other faction in the Middle East, or in the world, will agree to absorb those refugees, the pressure will be to bring them back to their "homeland"—Israel. Indeed, an interesting dish the Israeli government has brewed for us—a classical example of political shortsightedness.

## THE U.S. AND THE USSR ON THE LEBANESE FRONT

The two superpowers are now waging a cold war against one another on the issue of their impact and control in the Middle East. Their interest in this region is due to the fuel resources in it and to its strategic position. What the two superpowers feel about the IDF's invasion of Lebanon is the direct consequence of their interests and power position in the Middle East and the whole world.

There are now two relatively strong military powers in Lebanon: the Israelis in the south and the Syrians in the north and northeast. In addition to that there are in Lebanon other, weaker local forces that are mentioned here according to their military capacity: the Phalangists, the PLO (even though it was delivered



a heavy blow) in Tripoli and the Lebanon Valley, the Al Amal Shiite units, the remains of the Lebanese regular army, Sa'ad Haddad's troops, and other smaller elements.

Any superpower which wishes to increase its influence in the Arab and Islamic countries must significantly contribute to the removal of the IDF from Lebanon. This is the only way a superpower can restore or strengthen its impact in the Middle East. The only way the USSR can contribute to the removal of the IDF from Lebanon is by the threat of force—either a direct threat, which is bound to be followed by American warning, or an indirect threat, by helping Syria and, possibly, Jordan and the remains of the PLO to strengthen their military power; though this help cannot bear fruit in the future. The U.S., on its part, can get the IDF out of Lebanon using economic and diplomatic means without having to involve military force; and the U.S. will do so when the political fruits of the IDF's invasion of Lebanon are in her possession. For example: a change in the PLO's views and its acceptance of the Camp David Accords as a formula for peace with Israel; and maybe even a shift in the Syrian defense and foreign policy from a Soviet to an American orientation.

It seems that Israel's invasion of Lebanon opened new horizons for the U.S., which hopes to improve its status among the Syrians and the PLO after it brings about an Israeli withdrawal. This development has not yet occurred. But if the political reality is fixed, and if the Syrians relent, Israel will be, in one year, maneuvered out of Lebanon, with Syrian troops replacing the IDF as protectors of Lebanon—at least up to the Litani River; while UNIFIL will regain its position in southern Lebanon and Haddad will remain in those areas adjacent to the Israeli border. This settlement, if indeed achieved, is the greatest political profit the U.S. can make out of the IDF's invasion, and there is no reason in the world why it will not do its best to win this profit. Syria will shift its alliance from the USSR to the U.S. and promise to maintain the cease-fire along the new "red line," and in return it will receive the guardianship of Lebanon after the IDF has "cleansed" south Lebanon for it.

Meanwhile, in the absence of a comprehensive settlement, the Americans will first initiate a disengagement of forces that will move the Israelis a few kilometers south of Beirut and of the

Beirut-Damascus road, while the PLO leadership gets its "dignified" retreat under indirect American protection, and with an American prospect of involving the PLO in the Camp David process in the future. If this disengagement agreement is not successful and the Israelis attack West Beirut, the Americans will renew the pressure on Israel immediately afterwards, using the evidence of the destruction Israel brought upon the city to hasten an Israeli retreat, and to manifest their goodwill to any relevant independent Palestinian leader, to Syria, and to the Arab world. [This passage was written before the Israeli attack on West Beirut.—Ed.]

It should also be considered that some of the European Common Market states would prefer that those petro-dollars which used to flow into Beirut from the Persian Gulf be directed in the future to European and American banks. Is it also for this reason that the U.S. administration did not stop Israel from crushing West Beirut?

It is not unlikely that most of the UNIFIL soldiers, supported by American troops, will take part in the international power supervising the first stage of disengagement. Eventually in a year or so, UNIFIL will return to southern Lebanon as the IDF moves out.

## **DID THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT REACH ITS GOALS?**

Our conclusion should examine in what ways the Israeli government has reached its goals in this extensive operation.

It seems that in the foreseeable future there are not many chances that Galilee will be shelled by Arab or Palestinian artillery. Any force that controls southern Lebanon will have to keep it that way; but there may be infiltration here and there. After several years there may be shellings, unless a peace treaty which includes Lebanon is, some way or another, signed between Israel and Syria; although such an agreement could possibly have been reached without having to invade Lebanon in the first place. Who will remember in a few years that we had a cease-fire arrangement in Galilee between July 1981 and May 1982 after Ambassador

Habib arranged an indirect settlement between Israel and the PLO?

As for the destruction of the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon, it does look as if the PLO was delivered a heavy blow and lost the autonomy it was beginning to form. But we must understand that the PLO and the various elements in it have enough bases left to organize intelligence and terrorist acts throughout the world, and that it can still send its secret agents and terrorists into Israel. Moreover, the 400,000 Palestinian refugees left in Lebanon are still, as long as their problem is not solved, a fertile soil in which any violence aimed at Israel can grow.

The chances of re-establishing collapsed independent Lebanon out of its ruins and of imposing a peace treaty with Israel, with the Syrians objecting, look less than poor. The Israeli government will soon learn that the Lebanese "Tower of Babel" cannot stand on its own and has to be supported by foreign armies. It will also become clear that the Maronites' objective interest on the question of the Palestinian refugees is necessarily contradictory to Israel's long-term interest.

Will the "smash-up" operations frighten the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? It is possible that they may for a while. But within a year or two the political demographic reality will continue to demand a political solution; and since Israel will still be the conqueror and governor in those areas, it will have to provide this solution. The issue of Palestinian national independence in the occupied territories will continue to face Israel again and again, on the political and military levels.

If Israel does frighten the Palestinians to the extent that they keep quiet while we annex the occupied territories, then we will bring on ourselves a greater calamity—an apartheid binational country whose daily routine will resemble that of Northern Ireland. We can only hope that common sense will win and the Israelis will, on their own initiative and before it is too late, offer the Palestinians national independence in the West Bank and Gaza. If the Americans manage to extract from Beirut some Palestinian leaders who will agree to join the Camp David framework in order to maneuver Israel beyond the Begin autonomy plan toward a Palestinian state, then we can say that the invasion of



Lebanon at least brought about one good thing, though this will surely not correspond with the Begin-Sharon-Shamir concept.

It seems that of all the expected goals of the invasion of Lebanon, the government might win only in internal politics. A large part of the Israeli population support the use of military force, offensive initiative, and punishment with the rod. The Techiya movement lost its uniqueness and has joined the coalition. Even some Labor Party leaders want to join a national unity government "in this time of trouble." The real goal of Israel's internal information campaign is to bring together most of the flock (which today looks more like a pack of wolves, not of sheep), under the guardianship of the shepherd, Menachem Begin, and his government. And if the way to do so is to get rid of Sharon and place Rabin in his position, then let it be so.

In the meantime something has happened in Israel: For the first time since Israel's independence, people are beginning to have serious doubts about the necessity and righteousness of a war, specifically this destructive and "smash-up" type of war.

There is no better representative of the moral frustration and painful feelings of the assaulting echelons in IDF than Colonel Eli Geva, who has tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Prime Minister that he saw women and children nearby and within the target buildings through his binoculars. Soldiers and civilians are gradually beginning to suspect that they and their loved ones were sent to battle not to defend necessary national interests, but to further the internal political status of their leaders. Especially when every positive political achievement, if achieved, could also have been reached through diplomatic and political initiatives, without having to shed blood.

JULY 1982

# Open Letters \_\_\_\_\_to Menahem Begin

My son, Yaron, fell at the Beaufort on Sunday, June 6, 1982. Since that day I have not stopped crying, and my hands shake now as I hold the pen. I found a poem in his diary, which he wrote on July 16, 1978. The last lines are:

*and that small individual world of hate,  
together with the others and a protest singer  
can now stand up and rebel  
and implore the world: Stop the killing!*

The day before yesterday my family gathered at my brother's kibbutz—his son-in-law was also killed, in Alei, in Lebanon, on Wednesday, June 23. His wife is pregnant and was holding a son not yet nine months old.

My brother's other son-in-law was crippled in the Six Day War. My brother's son is also serving in Lebanon and his wife's family lost two men in Israel's previous wars.

My tears dried and my hands stopped shaking when I heard his children saying to their mother: "Now it's our turn!"

At night I am terrified that someone will knock on my door to bring me more terrible news. Sixty members of my kibbutz are still conscripted. And all of them are my family.

I emigrated from the United States in 1945 and entered the country as an illegal immigrant together with many others from Kibbutz Aliya Daled. More than fifty of its seventy original immigrants are still in the country, forty of them on Kibbutz Ein Dor. I have never had any doubt, not even for a moment, that this is my country. Our human and Zionist education has born excellent fruit.

We live in the Lower Galilee at peace with our Arab neighbors, and that is the way that I educated my children. And what could I say to a neighbor who came to offer me his condolences on the death of my son Yaron, on a day when members of his family were under fire in Sidon? And what could I say to Yaron when he returned from a demonstration by the Druse in the Golan which was broken up because they refused to accept Israeli identity cards?

And how could I look him in the eye when IDF soldiers shot women and children in the territories? Is it really possible that the most powerful army in the Middle East has no other way of dealing with these children? Today, the ground has been knocked away from under my feet. Is it our fate to always live by the sword? A sword defiled by the blood of children? Has the time not come to stop shooting and to start talking?

I do not dismiss the guilt of the PLO's leaders, a very serious guilt. After the Nazi atrocities, my blackest day was May 15, 1974, on which innocent children were killed in Ma'alot.

But it is possible to search and find someone to talk to, just as we found the Egyptians. We returned Sinai to the Egyptians—why should we not find a fair compromise with the Palestinian people as well?

A great deal of pain was caused me on that night (Monday, June 7) when you appeared with Sharon on the Beaufort with smiles on your faces and you turned to him and said, "What mountain air there is on the fortress"—with the blood of our children who fell there still not dry.

You cannot return my son Yaron to me. But do not add more pain, loss and suffering. Stop the bombing of the civilian population. Do not try and enforce our rule in Lebanon with spears—and the bodies of our sons. I go back to the words of my son Yaron: Stop the killing!

You have denied your own vow, "No More War"; you should have returned the Nobel Peace Prize.

In pain and in sorrow and in the hope that the war will not continue.

Yehoshua Zamir  
Kibbutz Ein Dor  
JULY 1982

AN OPEN LETTER TO MENAHEM BEGIN, ARIEL SHARON, AND RAPHAEL EITAN AND THE MINISTERS WHO VOTED FOR THE WAR IN LEBANON:

I am the descendant of a Rabbinical family, the only son of Simha Guterman, a Zionist and socialist who died as a hero and a fighter against the Nazis in the Warsaw uprising. I was rescued from the Holocaust and brought to Israel. I served in the army and built my home in Israel.

A son was born to me, Raz his name, a son who grew up to be a great pride to his family, strong and beautiful and honest and upright in his character.

Despite personal misfortunes and difficulties, I raised him with unending love and affection and with great pride as a father. In my secret thoughts I saw him as a link in the chain of history and in his being and character, along with others like him, the realization of our people's renewal.

When the time came for him to join the army, he volunteered in the spirit he was educated in, to one of the special units, one of the most challenging units of the army, and there he served with great effort and devotion his very demanding and difficult military service. He was due to be released in a few weeks, and his plans were many.

Along with my son and his friends, I was aware of the government's intentions and we lived in constant fear. Every night I went to bed with a prayer in my heart that war might be avoided.

Every child knows that you sought a reason to break into Lebanon, to instigate the first war that was not a war of defense.

All your failures, inadequacies, and frustrations, all of your political shortcomings you sought to undo with this questionable military victory.

I remained with a prayer in my heart that reasonable and concerned people in Israel and abroad would prevent you from this madness, but my desire and the desire of the sons was not fulfilled.

The bullet fired in London caused you to send lethal war machines to spread death into the cities of Lebanon and its villages.

When the Katyushas returned fire, the hour you were waiting for impatiently finally arrived.

With unabashed nerve you sloganized "Peace for the Galilee" when there had been no shots fired on Galilee for over a year.

My son Raz, my beloved son and his friends were sent with their unit in great haste and in frenzied irresponsibility to bloody battle to take Beaufort Castle.

He was the first one to break through the trenches leading to the fortress. He fought valiantly and there he found his death.

Thus you murdered my son. Thus was severed the chain of unending Jewish generations ancient and full of heroism and suffering, and thus you cut off the flowering of a life that was just beginning to blossom.

And thus you caused the destruction of my whole world.

How many years of this generation would it have taken the Palestinian terrorists to kill and injure so many Israeli soldiers as you did in the course of one week of this damnable war?

How much loss and mourning have you caused?

Even before the blood was dried on the rocks of the mountain of Beaufort, you hurried into your helicopters, surrounded by photographers, motion picture cameras, and microphones to declare and sound forth with your vanity and vexation of spirit, and you didn't even ask for forgiveness for your nationalistic schemes and your adventurous irresponsibility.

And the voice of our sons' blood cries from the ground.

Remember: the history of our ancient people, our wise and suffering people, will judge with whips and scorpions, and your deeds will be a warning and a verdict for generations!

And if you have only a spark of conscience and humanity, may my great pain forever pursue you, the suffering of a father in Israel whose world has been destroyed and the joy of life destroyed in him forever, in your sleeping and your waking, and may it be a mark of Cain upon you forever!

Yaacov Guterman  
Kibbutz Haogen  
JULY 1982



# **The Apocalyptic Realities of Today**

---

**GHASSAN TUENI**

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ADDRESS DELIVERED BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON AT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPON THE OCCASION OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT ON JUNE 22, 1982.

The representative of Lebanon will certainly be understood, and I trust excused, if today he has no words on universal disarmament, save the pious prayer that it should happen soon enough for his country to survive.

While this Second Session on Disarmament has been considering issues of the highest importance for the fate of the human race, of our planet, a small nation, a nation the world has always loved, was allowed to be martyred and crucified.

Can we, then, Mr. President, can we realistically expect Lebanon, or any other peace-loving nation of similar dimension, to listen to discourses on how we can prevent an atomic holocaust with trust and confidence, while the dynamics of war continue their implacable course?

The atomic holocaust of tomorrow becomes a problematic danger, remote and almost unreal, to those who are living an actual holocaust: the holocaust of their mother earth, of men, women,

---

**GHASSAN TUENI was Lebanon's Ambassador to the United Nations. He is currently in Beirut and is active in the reconstruction of Lebanon after the war.**

and children physically destroyed along with the cities they built and loved.

Mr. President, it is more than a choice between security and anguish. It is a choice between today and tomorrow. Between surviving immediate death, and thinking—but only thinking—of preventing ultimate destruction.

No nation in the world, no nation in history, can ever be called upon to overcome such trauma of the present, such cataclysm, and stake its existence on what is still much less than a promising design.

Yet, Mr. President, my people are said to derive their historic name from the legend of a sacred bird, the Phoenix, who could always resurrect from the ashes of fire. And so our ancient cities, many times destroyed and burnt into ashes, were able to rise again and flourish and bring to the history of humanity their eternal message of liberty and love. Those cities have names that now haunt us every hour of every day: Tyre, six thousand years ago capital of an empire not of war, but of dialogue, of trade and learning; Sidon, beloved by the gods; and Beirut, or Berytis, the city of the laws.

But “the countenance of Lebanon” is not today what Solomon described, in the Song of Songs, “excellent as the cedars.” Now the ashes of the Phoenix cover “the lions’ dens. . . , the mountains of the leopards. . . , the fountain of gardens, [the] well of living waters and streams.”

Mr. President, we are not here to lament, but to hope. My people will know how to heal their wounds. Soon the scars of our earth shall be dry and covered with flowers and trees. Houses and factories shall be built again, where instruments of destruction and death are now displayed with insolence, and where bodies are buried under rubble of civilization.

Soon we shall be strong again.

But is the world community really interested in a strong and healthy Lebanon?

If so, the following principles of national policy must be allowed, without hesitancy, to govern Lebanon’s future:

ONE: That Lebanon should never again be the arena, the battlefield, where friends and foes alike find it convenient to wage their wars;

TWO: that Lebanon should never again allow its liberty to be taken hostage by those to whom it was extended;

THREE: that Lebanon should be capable of defending not only its liberty, the liberty of land and people, but also its free democratic institutions;

FOUR: that Lebanon should have a strong national army, not merely as a protection against further destabilization and conquest, but as a catalyst, integrating a traditionally pluralistic society, capable of absorbing and containing present fragmentary forces;

FIVE: that the safety and security of Lebanon, the defense of its territorial integrity, the protection of its sovereignty, and the assertion of its independence should not remain contingent upon extraterritorial considerations of any sort, whether regional or international.

Mr. President, many are those who are now proposing to redraw our map for us, rewrite our constitution, and even renegotiate, on our behalf, our new national compact.

To all of those, friends and foes alike, may Lebanon say that its future shall be only what the Lebanese, and the Lebanese alone, decide for themselves. Not in the shadow of guns, all the guns, the guns of murder and destruction, will Lebanon be reconstructed; but by the general will of all the Lebanese, all the Lebanese, to whatever community they belong, brought together once more, not in a mere social contract, but in this more everlasting historical contract: a covenant between generations past and present, and the generations to come.

Rejecting the ancillary role of strategic accessories, the Lebanese are now determined to achieve peace in Lebanon not independently from, but without waiting for, the just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East question.

Immediate peace in Lebanon is not only a moral imperative for the Lebanese; it is also a pragmatic necessity for regional and international security. Indeed, events of the past two weeks are proving beyond doubt what we always feared: that the war in Lebanon was becoming a danger not to Lebanon alone, but to others as well, and probably to the entire world.

This, however, should not be construed to mean that Lebanon is in any way or manner resigning its Arab responsibilities. Quite

to the contrary, we are more than ever determined to assume our regional and international role, fully unhampered.

Our reservations, past and present, concerning Palestinian military activities in Lebanon do not undermine our solidarity with the Palestinian cause and our commitment to support the Palestinians' legitimate right to their national state, in their own homeland.

Just as we rejected, in the past, any settlement of the Palestinian question at the expense of Lebanon, we shall in no way accept today, as a consequence of Israel's war against the PLO, a settlement of the Palestinian question which will force the half-million Palestinians now in Lebanon, armed and unarmed, to relinquish their "right of return." Furthermore, the Israeli invasion does not reduce Lebanon's sovereign right to exercise, solely and exclusively, all political as well as military authority over all of its territory, and freely determine its own destiny.

It may be necessary, in this context, to emphasize that Lebanon's determination to consolidate the restructuring of its armed forces will release the Arab deterrent forces from the roles they now assume in Lebanon. This determination is not new, and it shall not be altered by recent developments. It was officially conveyed to the appropriate Arab councils over a year ago, and was emphatically stated in our address to the 36th Session of this General Assembly of the United Nations, on the 5th of October, 1981.

Hence, in practical terms, the so-called cease fire between Israeli and Syrian forces that have been engaged in combat in Lebanon can only be viewed as a purely transient and technical measure. Consequently, no cease-fire arrangements and no cessation of hostilities on Lebanese territory can give any non-Lebanese forces any rights over Lebanese territory, nor can any party then be allowed to evoke so-called "security claims" by virtue of temporary presence inside our internationally recognized boundaries.

Need we add that we are particularly concerned lest the notion of "symmetrical withdrawal" be used as a pretext for a prolonged symmetrical presence?

Mr. President, in asking for the immediate and unconditional



withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the re-establishment of the sole and exclusive authority of the Lebanese army over all of Lebanon's territory, we are depending on the dual support of the United Nations and of the League of Arab States. We are reassured that the most eloquent, and indeed effective expression of Arab support came, as expected, from a geographically remote Arab capital—Riyadh, said to be too concerned with another war to care about our fate.

Speaking with utmost clarity, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia warned that his country will take the lead in fulfilling its "historic responsibility" in the defense of Lebanon, by all the means at its disposal. King Fahd also warned that the invasion of an Arab capital, Beirut, "will invalidate every political effort and every Arab endeavor."

Equally reassuring are attitudes taken by leaders and governments still more remote: offers to respond to any Lebanese appeal, such as that by President Mitterand of France; active involvement, such as the relentless American diplomatic effort; a warning to the enemy, such as from Moscow, and innumerable expressions of solidarity from everyone else, everywhere.

This universal attitude toward the Israeli invasion was embodied in the unanimous resolutions adopted by the Security Council, and particularly Resolution 509.

We know that resolutions are not solutions. We know how shattered the authority of the Security Council has become.

But we also know the value of such an instrument of international law as Resolution 509, which clearly and unequivocally establishes the criteria of Israeli withdrawal: that it should be both immediate and unconditional.

Israel's continued defiance of this resolution does not weaken our determination to pursue its reaffirmation and to insist that our friends in the world community should employ, and continue to employ, in the name of international legitimacy, every possible effort to enforce what, by virtue of the charter, is a binding executive decision of this organization.

Mr. President, the Security Council has also adopted a resolution which confirms a UN physical presence and concrete responsibility in Lebanon. I am referring to Resolution 511 of June 18,



which renewed the mandate of UNIFIL for an interim period of two months, despite the very adverse conditions in which the peace-keeping force now finds itself.

The past performance of UNIFIL and its present dramatic situation make it necessary that we reiterate here what we have often said in the Security Council. UNIFIL was entrusted with a most challenging *dynamic* mission, for which it was given *static* prerogatives.

It is the very future of peace-keeping operations which is now at stake. Should peace-keeping continue to depend on what is termed "cooperation of all the parties concerned"? Or are the small nations entitled to expect that peace-keeping forces should be enabled to defend them against aggression, "restore international peace and security," and "assist" their governments—as explicitly decided in Resolution 425 of March 19, 1978—"in ensuring the return of their effective authority"?

Mr. President, to many in this Assembly, this may be a question which can be examined at leisure and through endless debates.

To us, in Lebanon, this is a question of great urgency.

Within two months, my government will have to make an existential, not an intellectual choice.

Do we need a UN force? And if we do, then what UN force can credibly confirm the withdrawal of an invader, and assist us in restoring our sovereignty over all our territory?

If, on the other hand, such a force cannot be expected from the UN, then what other force must we resort to?

Should we seek assistance in the probably more debatable frameworks of regional or multinational peace-keeping?

And what effect will this have on the future of the UN and of its role in the settlement of disputes and the establishment of international peace and security?

Mr. President, this question was not born today.

Four years ago, my delegation supported, during the debate of the First Special Session on Disarmament, an old idea, which has since lost currency: the creation of a "*permanent international peace-keeping force*," capable of guaranteeing, in a concrete and operative manner, the independence and territorial integrity of those smaller nations that are unwilling to invest in armaments

and illusory security, at the expense of their more vital needs, such as development and progress.

The question is still entirely relevant and poignant to countries such as mine, who are the constant and perpetual victims of external destabilization.

Mr. President, in that same debate on disarmament, we also suggested a concept of international neutrality, "applicable to countries where external conflicts have projected, and may still project, into internal divisions, and where internal structures inevitably project into external, as well as civil wars" (A/S-10/PV.16).

Many events during the last four years have demonstrated, at a tremendous cost, the need for such internationally guaranteed neutrality, and for a United Nations prepared, as we pleaded, to "assume a new responsibility: that of providing international shelter for the weak against the powerful, for the poor against the rich, for the underdeveloped against the overdeveloped, for the peace-loving against the aggressive" (ibid.).

Mr. President, instead of seeking peace through the just settlement of disputes, the Israeli delegation treated our Assembly to an old proposal, invoked here in the most ludicrous manner: namely, a "*nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East*."

Can we really be expected to take this proposal seriously, while the Middle East is witnessing not only the most savage war in years, but a competition between conventional armaments developed to reach a maximalized capacity for destruction? While many have had the obscenity to state that the invasion of Lebanon is offering a unique opportunity to test sophisticated technological progress?

Now, if this is not the ugliest aspect of the armaments race, what could be even uglier or more cynical?

Mr. President, before establishing a "nuclear-weapon-free zone" in the Middle East, let us put an end to aggression, and its consequences for the future of man and polity.

Let us freeze the race for conventional armaments. Let us use no cluster-bombs. Let us freeze the race which makes us all bleed, the poorest as well as the wealthiest. Even those who now feel secure by an illusion of strength might soon become an impoverished society, breeding its own violence. The pursuit of war

and external terror will become but an expedient to absorb internal terrorism and revolution.

Need one remind this Assembly that the atomic option, now available in the Middle East to Israel alone, as a mark of its so-called "qualitative edge," might one day become a commodity of international terrorism? "Nuclear gangsterism," as it is called, today a feature of political "fiction," should not be allowed to become, tomorrow, the possible and frightening reality of a new radicalism, created by frustration and the logic of despair.

Mr. President, armaments, whether conventional or nuclear, are not the problem. They are but an extension of the problem. The real problem, the problem is, and remains, political. It is the question of peace.

In simple and direct terms, let us solve the Lebanese question, and reach a just and comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. Then there will be no arms race in this vital area of the world, nor will the international order continue to be shattered as it is by the specters of war.

My country, sir, my country, now a martyr of both war and peace, appeals to you all. Let us not allow this Assembly to be diverted by abstract testimonies for peace, and no less abstract analyses of the causes of war.

Concerned as we all are with the necessity of halting the race toward the atomic holocaust of tomorrow, let us remember the no less apocalyptic realities of today.

JUNE 1982

---

# The Massacre

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL APPEARED IN *NEW OUT-LOOK*, FOLLOWING THE MASSACRES IN THE SABRA AND SHATILA PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN WEST BEIRUT.

The Jewish New Year of 5743 was a sorrowful holiday, depressing and frustrating for the citizens of Israel. On the eve of the second day of the holiday, the first television and radio reports of the atrocities perpetrated in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut began to appear. The scenes shown on television and the broadcast accounts evoked associations from the past, both distant and more recent. Associations with pogroms in the Ukraine, in which rioters murdered men, women, and children, raped and pillaged, while the Czarist police stood by and did nothing, or even protected the rioters as they carried on their criminal activities. There were also associations with the days of the Holocaust, when in the Nazi-occupied territories in the east, particularly the Ukraine, the Germans did not personally murder the Jews but left it to their Ukrainian neighbors to carry out the task—and were not disappointed.

It is horrifying that the reality should justify such analogies. Is it possible to draw a comparison between a Jewish government and the Czarist regime, or the actions of the Nazis in their occupied territories? It is of course unthinkable, and one's hand trembles when writing these lines. Yet it is inevitable when one hears and reads of the sequence of events that took place during the Jewish New Year, and especially so after learning of the things said and written by those responsible for the atrocities.



How did the events unfold which led to the massacre of many hundreds (perhaps a thousand) in the two refugee camps of West Beirut? After the explosion in the Phalangist headquarters in Beirut in which Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel was killed, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, defense Minister Ariel Sharon, and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir decided (without conferring with the other cabinet ministers) that the IDF should enter West Beirut and occupy the Palestinian refugee camps of Fakhani, Sabra, and Shatila. Washington firmly conveyed its objection to the invasion; and cabinet ministers, learning of the operation through the media, also opposed it and charged that "Sharon used the opportunity to accomplish what he had long desired, but had not received government approval to do."

In an interview given two days after the operation and a day before the massacre, Chief of Staff Major General Raphael Eitan said: "The IDF is holding all the strategic points in Beirut and remains in a state of high alert. The refugee camps of Burj el Barajneh, Shatila, Sabra, and Fakhani are surrounded and sealed off by IDF forces, but the troops have not entered them." Ariel Sharon, in an interview on the same day, said: "The IDF invasion of West Beirut, the surrounding of the refugee camps and the terrorists inside them, and the holding of all the key points and intersections, has averted the danger of a renewed attempt by the terrorists to return and turn Beirut into a capital of terror."

On September 16, 1982, the Israeli government met to discuss the IDF's entry into West Beirut. During the meeting the Chief of Staff reported that the IDF planned to send Phalangists into the refugee camps. A cabinet decision reached at the session states that the entry of IDF forces into West Beirut was prompted by the desire to prevent any outbreak of violence, bloodshed, and chaos. The decision also said that the IDF would be ordered to withdraw from West Beirut once the Lebanese army took upon itself the supervision of the points under IDF control. In fact, the Phalangists were already in the camps when the government reached the decision. That very night the savage pogrom in the camps began. It went on for thirty-six hours, and during that time hundreds, perhaps even a thousand men, women, and children met their deaths.

The man who permitted the Phalangists to enter the camps two



days after the murder of their leader, Bashir Gemayel, is responsible for what occurred therein. It appears that the Minister of Defense approved the Phalangists' entry into the refugee camps, though they had an ample record of murder, despite the objections of senior officers. The Phalangists are, it is true, close allies of the Israeli government, but is it possible that the Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff and the rest did not know who their allies were? They had slaughtered thousands of Palestinians in the Tel az Zaatar camp in Beirut in August 1976. They had massacred the Franjiyeh family and its militia so as to gain hegemony over the Christian forces. And in recent weeks they have murdered, tortured and degraded the Druse—after the IDF conquest of southern Lebanon.

Did those responsible for Israel's security not know that the Phalangists are not fighters but are known for massacring helpless civilians and looting? What happened in west Beirut was a war crime. And those responsible for the crime are those who went to war in order to institute a new order and stability in Lebanon, and "to establish in it a regime friendly to Israel." He who entered Beirut on the pretext of enforcing order and yet brought about a massacre and an atrocious pogrom—he is responsible for the results and must bear that responsibility. (There is an opinion which holds that not only political or public responsibility, but actual criminal responsibility is involved. For in law, having knowledge of a crime that is about to be committed and making no reasonable attempts to prevent it is punishable by two years imprisonment.)

Chief of Staff Eitan indeed said that anyone who recognized the realities of life in Lebanon and was aware of the deep animosity between the different ethnic communities, and the desire for revenge after the murder of Bashir Gemayel, might have expected such things to occur.

No less atrocious than the pogrom itself was the government's reaction. The cabinet met immediately after the holiday ended, a day after the pogrom, to review the situation. The statement issued following the meeting begins thus: "During Rosh Hashana (the Jewish New Year), a blood libel was mounted against the Jewish State." No expression of sorrow over the killings, no mourning for the innocent victims, no sympathy for the feelings

of the stricken families—simply a “blood libel.” In other words: anyone who holds the Israeli government responsible for the actions perpetrated in the area under its control is accused of “blood libel.” In Jewish tradition, a “blood libel” is a false accusation against Jews for allegedly using the blood of Christian children in Passover ceremonies. During that same cabinet session, the Prime Minister expressed his amazement: “If Goyim kill Goyim—are we to blame?”

Only President Navon was capable of giving appropriate expression to the feelings of Israeli citizens. Departing from the accepted norms of his position, he appeared on television to express his condolences to the bereaved families and called for a thorough investigation by reliable and independent persons into everything that occurred in this sorry affair, and the establishment of comprehensive conclusions.

The crime perpetrated in the Palestinian refugee camps is only another in the series of disasters that have already resulted from the Lebanese war (cynically called by the Prime Minister the “Peace for Galilee” operation):

- The decline of Israel’s ties with the only country friendly to it, the U.S.A. Not only have our ties with the administration been weakened but also those with the American people, the Congress, and the mass media.
- A major undermining of Israel’s position in Europe.
- The erosion of Israel’s economy due to the war, which has eaten away a substantial part of the budget for the next few years.
- The creation of a split within the Israeli public and its army.
- The cooling of relations between the state of Israel and the Jewish people throughout the world. The Jews of the diaspora have begun to dissociate themselves from the Jewish state out of concern for their physical security.
- Increased antagonism between Jews and Arabs and Druse in the state of Israel and the occupied territories.
- A severe blow to the peace agreement with Egypt and a halt to the normalization process of establishing ties with that country.
- 350 war dead and thousands wounded—that is the price Israel has paid up to now for a senseless military adventure.

Yet, when the opposition proposed in the Knesset the setting-

up of a commission of inquiry to investigate this horrible affair and to draw conclusions from it, the Prime Minister rejected the move. Even if a commission of inquiry is appointed, it will not be a speedy and efficient solution. We cannot spare the many weeks or months it would take such a commission to complete its work and reach its conclusions.

The pressure of public opinion in Israel proved stronger than Begin's efforts to evade a full investigation. The Prime Minister was compelled to call a special meeting of the government and decide to establish a judicial commission of inquiry to look into the Beirut massacre. Though the appointment of the commission is a first step in the right direction, it is only a part of the solution. The steps called for are:

- The immediate withdrawal of Israel's forces from Lebanon, in order to extricate Israel from an intolerable situation.
- In view of the danger to Israel's existence represented by this government, it should recall and heed the words of Oliver Cromwell to the Rump Parliament: "It is not fit that you sit here any longer! . . . you shall now give place to better men."

E.A.

OCTOBER 1982

# **Israel Reacts to the Massacre**

---

**JOHN GOLDBERG**

Revulsion, followed by an honest desire to discover those responsible, characterized the reactions of the majority of Israelis, both privately and publicly, to the Beirut massacre. Initial condemnation and horror at the murder of Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila evolved quickly, during the week that followed the killings, into overwhelming calls for an investigation into the murders. By the week's end, demands for the setting up of a state commission of inquiry and, to a lesser extent, for the resignation of Minister of Defense Ariel (Arik) Sharon, had been issued by a wide spectrum of the public.

The first news of the murders in Beirut reached most Israelis on Saturday evening, the Jewish New Year. On the following day, 2,000 Peace Now supporters gathered outside the residence of Prime Minister Begin in Jerusalem to voice their outrage at the massacre and to call for the resignations of those responsible for the crime—Begin and Sharon. The demonstrators, who included six Members of the Knesset, termed Begin and Sharon “war criminals.” They were violently dispersed by police. On the same day, demonstrations in various other parts of the country were held, mainly organized by Peace Now.

Meanwhile, the opposition also reacted to the massacre. The

---

**JOHN GOLDBERG** is a student of Political Science and Literature at Tel Aviv University. He is the coordinator of Mapam's English language student activities. A member of the *New Outlook* staff, he served in the IDF during the month of July.



Alignment issued a statement calling on Begin and Sharon to draw personal conclusions "because they had ordered the IDF into West Beirut days before." Labor Party leader Shimon Peres said on television that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense were personally responsible "as they knew what was liable to happen." Mapam went further and called for an immediate withdrawal from Beirut, the severing of ties with the Phalangists, and the resignation of the entire government. Sheli called for the bringing of Begin, Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Chief of Staff Raphael Eitan to trial for aiding and abetting mass murder.

Halfhearted attempts by Likud politicians to stem rising anti-government resentment by criticizing those "who [are] pointing an accusing finger at Israel" (a charge issued by deputy minister Dov Shilansky) sounded hollow, particularly after a number of coalition members themselves supported the call for a thorough investigation of the killings.

Government attempts to defuse the dangerous situation by denying any connection to the events, coupled with almost hourly revelations of new facts implicating the Israeli government in the massacre, spurred on internal opposition. By Monday, most newspaper editorials bitterly denounced the government and called for the punishing of those responsible for the massacre. Arik Sharon was particularly singled out. The prestigious *Ha'aretz* wrote: "Removal of Major General Eitan and Arik Sharon from the circle of decision-makers is a first and necessary condition for us to be once more able to look at ourselves and at the world around us, in the eyes."

Prime Minister Begin's desire to prevent the setting up of a commission of inquiry, as evidenced in the cabinet session on September 21, 1982, and in a Knesset debate on the following day, drew criticism from innumerable groups and public figures throughout the country. Apart from those usually associated with the opposition, such as kibbutzim, labor councils, and left-wing political parties and groups, the call for a commission of inquiry came from apolitical and even right-wing sources. Heading them was Israeli President Yitzhak Navon. In an unprecedented move, the President spoke on television and said: "We cannot and must not ignore what has happened. We owe it to ourselves and to our



image in the world . . . and to the cultured world of which we see ourselves a part, to find out quickly and exactly what happened. If need be, we must draw the necessary conclusions." Others who followed his lead were groups of academics, former diplomats, Amnon Goldenberg, the head of the Israeli Bar Association (who had been slated to be Begin's minister of justice), Ze'ev Chefetz, director of the Government Press Office, the chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, and even Professor Menachem Milson, head of the civil administration in the occupied territories, who resigned in protest. The Likud's coalition partners, suffering from an overwhelming onslaught of negative public opinion, also supported the call for an inquiry. Thus the NRP (National Religious Party), Tami, and a number of the Liberals, including Yitzhak Berman, the Minister of Energy, who resigned over the issue, put pressure upon the Prime Minister to create a commission of inquiry.

Demands for the dismissal of Sharon multiplied during the week. His attempts to cover up the issue and slander the opposition only weakened his position. The calls for Sharon's removal characterized the demonstrations that continued daily. They took place all over the country and were initiated by Peace Now, The Committee against the War, There's a Limit, Young Mapam, Soldiers Against Silence, and others. Similar demands for the resignation of Sharon emanated from within the ranks of the army. The head of IDF's Staff and Command College left his post in protest. Another high-ranking officer, a battalion commander, also called upon Sharon to resign.

In the Arab sector, grief over what had occurred in Beirut inflamed passions. In a one-day strike held in protest over the massacre, there were violent clashes between police and demonstrators on a scale unknown since Land Day six years ago. In Nazareth, in particular, the clashes were fierce and there were many wounded.

## **GIANT ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION IN TEL AVIV**

The climax of all the protest activity was the demonstration that was jointly organized by the Labor Party, Mapam, Citizen's

Rights, Shinui, the Independent Liberal Party, Peace Now, and Soldiers Against Silence, on September 25, 1982. The demonstration was also supported by The Committee Against the War in Lebanon, Sheli, and the Bir-Zeit Committee.

An estimated 400,000 demonstrators filled Tel Aviv's central square to call for the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the Beirut massacre and for the resignation of Prime Minister Begin and Minister of Defense Sharon. The demonstration was the largest in Israel's history, the participants numbering ten percent of the entire population.

The demonstration was officially called to demand the setting up of a judicial commission of inquiry into the massacre of Palestinians in the Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Nevertheless, many of the speakers at the rally called for the resignations of Begin and Sharon. Labor Party chairman Shimon Peres said that "the policies of the Likud government are unacceptable to the people." He went on to say: "We are not the Israel that accepts. We are the Israel that yearns for the truth and demands responsibility. We do not fear truth or responsibility." Former Premier Yitzhak Rabin called on the government to resign immediately. Mapam Secretary-General Victor Shemtov called on the Prime Minister to resign. Addressing Menachem Begin, he said: "You must resign because of the irresponsible decision to enter Beirut which has traumatized the state as a result of the terrible murder of the refugees." Amnon Rubinstein, leader of the Shinui Party, referred to the approaching Day of Atonement in his speech: "Yom Kippur is a day in which we ask forgiveness, but some of the crimes of the Begin Government cannot be forgiven. We shall not rest until this government has been deposed." Other speakers included Peace Now leaders Tzali Reshef and Benny Barabash, Avraham Burg, a leader of Soldiers Against Silence and the son of the Minister of the Interior, and Shulamit Aloni, Citizen's Rights head, who called on "those who sent the army into Lebanon and West Beirut to stand up and face the responsibility for their actions and the consequences of those actions."

The protesters, who gathered from cities, development towns, villages, and kibbutzim from all over Israel, were orderly and well-behaved. But the speeches delivered by many of the speakers were often interrupted by deafening chants of "Begin, go

home!" Attempts by a number of Likud supporters to disrupt the protest were unsuccessful, and police arrested twenty of them.

The demonstration was preceded by a march of thousands of supporters of The Committee Against the War in Lebanon through the streets of Tel Aviv. The protesters, who were led by a group of women in black, also called for the resignation of Begin and Sharon. It should also be noted that, unlike the situation in July, the Likud Party quickly abandoned an attempt to organize a counterdemonstration

OCTOBER 1982

# **Why Didn't We Prevent This War?**

**HILLEL SCHENKER**

**"I'M ONLY HERE BY ACCIDENT," SAID THE PALESTINIAN WITH AN OXFORD ENGLISH ACCENT. "I CAN'T FIGURE OUT WHY I'M HERE, EITHER," RESPONDED THE ISRAELI SOLDIER.—FROM THE ISRAELI PRESS**

The war in Lebanon was neither necessary nor inevitable. Even the Likud government does not pretend that this was a war to defend and preserve Israel's existence. Ze'ev Shiff, the respected military correspondent of *Ha'aretz*, reports that all of the weapons that we captured are barely enough to arm one PLO division. Even the official Likud government estimate is that the arms captured would have been able to arm only five PLO divisions. This definitely did not pose a threat to Israel's existence. So, if that is the case, why weren't we able to prevent this war? I believe that all of us who are concerned with trying to reach a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace in the Middle East must ask ourselves this question.

The war in Lebanon is a multidimensional human tragedy. It is also a dynamic laboratory, unfolding before our eyes. We must find the emotional and intellectual strength to try to analyze what happened, so as to prevent an even further deterioration of the situation.

To be blunt, the two main reasons why we didn't prevent this war are:

1. the fact that the Likud won the Israeli elections in June

1981, resulting in the fact that Menachem Begin formed his second government and appointed Ariel Sharon to be his Defense Minister; and

2. the fact that Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter for the American presidency in 1980, and appointed Alexander Haig to be his Secretary of State.

Regarding the internal Israeli factor, despite the rather sorry showing of the Labor Party leadership since the war broke out, an Alignment-led government would not have initiated large-scale military activity in Lebanon at this time. The entire Alignment leadership is on record as having been opposed to such a war, and Members of the Knesset Yitzhak Rabin, Mordechai Gur, Chaim Bar-Lev, and Victor Shemtov have all declared that there is no military, only a political solution to the Palestinian problem.

I am not saying that an Alignment victory in 1981 would have produced an Israeli government ready to initiate steps which could have broken the political impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The current official positions of the Alignment, coupled with the lack of courage exhibited by Shimon Peres as head of the opposition, do not lead me to draw such a far-reaching conclusion. However, I do believe that an Alignment victory in 1981 would have produced a situation that would have created a broader time span for the political process to work itself out. All of the factors, both internal and external, involved in the Middle East drama would have had more time to try to move the peace process forward.

However, the Alignment did not win the elections, and the moment that Begin became Prime Minister for the second time, and appointed Ariel Sharon to be his Defense Minister, the die was cast (a Begin-Weizmann team might have been a different story).

Sharon, with his unprincipled bulldozer mentality, has proudly proclaimed that he began planning this operation on the first day he stepped into the Defense Ministry. And I remember Peace Now deliberations before the war when a sense of fatalistic resignation was expressed that there was no way to prevent Sharon from eventually finding the excuse for initiating his longed-for Lebanese war.

This leads me to the American external factor.



If Jimmy Carter had been re-elected President in 1980, it can be assumed that he would have continued to pursue a policy based upon a combination of the Camp David approach and the Brookings Report. Whatever Carter's weakness (the economy, Iran, the projection of a consistent leadership image), he was clearly quite effective in his Middle East policy, both in terms of American and in terms of Israeli and Arab interests. The Camp David Accords and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty could not have been achieved without the efforts of Carter and his administration. And since the maintenance of the accords and the treaty are dependent upon the fulfillment of the second stage of the Camp David Accords, i.e., movement forward toward a resolution of the Palestinian problem and comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace, it can be assumed that Carter and his team would have placed a high priority on progress in this area, and they were armed with a strategy which had a good chance to move the Israeli-Arab peace process forward.

This would have created a much less congenial atmosphere for large-scale Israeli military activity in Lebanon.

However, Reagan's victory, whatever its implications in other spheres of American and international life, meant that a new president entered the White House who had no clear-cut Middle East policy. To compound matters, Reagan chose to focus first on internal economic matters, and in external affairs he and his Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, focused first on El Salvador and then on Poland, and they downgraded the importance and urgency of the Middle East and the Israeli-Arab peace process.

Begin and Sharon also exploited Reagan's confrontationalist anti-Soviet anti-détente peace-through-strength view of the world to convince him that the "red menace" was the great threat to the Middle East, and that Israel was the West's greatest ally in confronting this threat. This, despite the fact that most Arabs, many American experts, and many Israelis keep insisting that the greatest threats to Middle Eastern stability are Islamic fundamentalism and a frustrated, desperate Palestinian nationalism, rather than Soviet expansionism.

Reagan's approach to international and Middle Eastern affairs enabled Begin and Sharon to sell him the concept of a special Israeli-American relationship, which produced a "strategic

understanding." All of this was carried out presumably with the support, and perhaps decisive influence, of Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

Whether the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was carried out with or without American "collusion" is not clear. It is also inconsequential. The atmosphere for American acquiescence to Israeli military activity in the north (though perhaps not such large-scale activity) was created by the immediate official American policy, coupled with the lack of a clear-cut long-range Middle East policy.

I believe that America has three fundamental policy choices in the Middle East. The one I would prefer is based upon *détente* and a basic respect for the human rights of all of the peoples of the Middle East. I also believe that in the long run—because of the interplay of American, Soviet, and local interests—a policy based upon *détente* and a fundamental respect for the right to self-determination of all peoples in the Middle East is the only realistic policy.

For ideological reasons, it is unlikely that the Reagan administration will be open to adopt such a policy, even if it could be demonstrated that it is in America's best interest.

That leaves America with two other options: a policy based upon a special relationship with Israel, which has led all of us into the current mess in Lebanon; or a policy based upon a "strategic consensus," which relies on a delicate balance of relations between America and Israel, and America and a series of pro-Western countries and factors in the Middle East.

Such a policy would seek ways of halting the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, which threatens to overthrow moderate pro-Western governments. It would also seek avenues for a resolution of the Palestinian problem, since frustrated Palestinian nationalism also threatens the stability of the pro-Western governments in the region.

An active policy of "strategic consensus" would have discouraged large-scale Israeli military activity in Lebanon, i.e., would have helped to prevent the war.

A policy of "strategic consensus" would also be more beneficial to Israel than a "special relationship" policy, because Islamic

fundamentalism and frustrated Palestinian nationalism are also greater threats to Israel's security than any threat, real or imagined, coming from the Soviet Union.

The new Secretary of State, George Shultz, appears to be more inclined to a "strategic consensus" approach, and this appears to be good news, not only for the Saudis, but for the Israelis as well. Shultz has also declared that he understands the need to move forward to satisfy the legitimate needs of the Palestinian people, and this is also good news, not only for the Palestinians, but for the Israelis as well.

Three other factors might have contributed to the prevention of this war.

1. *The Palestinian Factor.* If Arafat had been ready to meet with Israeli journalists Uri Avnery and Amnon Kapeliuk before the war, rather than in the midst of the war, he might have been able to prevent the outbreak of the war.

The Palestinian people have suffered greatly during this century, first as pawns in the machinations of Turkey, and later Great Britain, with their respective Middle East imperial dreams. And since the beginning of the century they have also suffered from the consequences of the ongoing clash between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism.

Many committed Israeli doves are aware of the fact that a struggle is going on within the Palestinian national movement, between those who support a political solution, based upon compromise and the mutual right to self-determination, and those who continue to prefer an absolute uncompromising solution to the conflict, which stresses military means and leaves no room for the right of a state of Israel to exist.

However, as Uri Avnery pointed out to Yasir Arafat, this war could not have taken place if the majority of the Israeli people didn't genuinely believe that the Palestinians are not ready to compromise. The average Israeli continued to hear too many prominent Palestinian voices that denied his right to exist.

If the Palestinians wanted to prevent this war, they should have come out much more unequivocally in favor of a diplomatic solution based on compromise and the mutual right to self-determination and coexistence. For the average Israeli, this re-

quires some form of disassociation with articles of the Palestinian Covenant that deny that the Jews are a nation, and deny the right of the state of Israel to exist.

This is not a question of honor, it is a question of Realpolitik, which can be expressed in a language that takes into account the issue of honor, but which shouldn't avoid the essential problem.

2. *The Soviet Factor.* There is a basic contradiction in Soviet policy. On the one hand, the Soviet Union recognizes the right to self-determination of all peoples in the Middle East. Within the context of this policy, it wisely recognizes Israel's right to exist, and it also supports the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. At the same time, it contradicts this policy by not maintaining relations with Israel, the very same Israel whose right to exist it recognizes. Then when Israel acts in a way which threatens Soviet interests, drawing a warning telegram to Begin (via Reagan), the Soviet Union finds itself without any political leverage, because of its lack of relations with Israel, and in effect it has abandoned the field to the Americans.

The Soviet Union could protect its legitimate interests in the Middle East more effectively by re-establishing relations with Israel, rather than by providing arms to weak and relatively unreliable allies in the Middle East.

The re-establishment of Soviet-Israeli relations would reduce the level of fear of Soviet intentions that many Israelis (and Americans) genuinely feel. This fear is one of the factors that produces an Israeli policy which aims at establishing a strategic understanding with the United States, reinforces Israeli fears of a "Soviet-backed" Palestinian nationalism, and eventually leads to significant Israeli support for a preventive war in Lebanon.

Thus, a renewal of Soviet-Israeli relations might have contributed to the prevention of the war in Lebanon.

3. *The Jewish Factor.* Many Jews in the Diaspora are uncomfortable with an Israeli policy which relies on military power rather than on realistic political solutions to outstanding problems to preserve Israel's existence. They also believe that a realistic solution of the Palestinian problem based upon compromise and recognition of the mutual right to self-determination and peaceful coexistence is in Israel's best interest.



Unfortunately, many Diasporan Jews are also afraid to express these views publicly. This produces a situation which enables the Begin-Sharon-led government to "get away" with a policy which produces an avoidable, unnecessary preventive war in Lebanon, without fear of too great a "Diasporan Jewish backlash." This Jewish reticence also makes it difficult for the American administration to pursue a policy based upon either *détente* or a "strategic consensus," rather than a "special relationship" policy.

Since comprehensive peace and a fair resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in Israel's best interest, Diasporan Jews should be more open in the expression of support for policies that would help to move the peace process forward, both in their home countries and in Israel.

If Diasporan Jews had been more open in their support for alternative policies, perhaps they would have contributed to the prevention of the war in Lebanon.

Other third parties—Europe, the Arab countries, the UN, international peace groups—could have helped to prevent this war, if they had been more active in the promotion of realistic formulas for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As for the Israeli peace camp, the moment we didn't succeed in preventing the establishment of the Begin-Sharon government in 1981, there was little else we could do to prevent this war in immediate terms. At the beginning of this article, I cited the fatalism about Sharon's desire for a war in Lebanon, expressed at a Peace Now meeting, earlier this year.

Just a few words about the future.

The Israeli moderates who believe in a political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based upon compromise and the mutual right to self-determination, are in the process of a major soul-searching re-evaluation of their strategy for peace.

I believe that we have to focus on a number of areas:

1. The eventual political defeat of the Begin-Sharon government. And we should have no illusions on this matter. It won't be easy, because of the growing nationalistic and chauvinistic trends in Israeli society.

2. We, who believe in the possibility of Israeli-Palestinian peace, have to try to prove that this is possible to the majority of



the Israeli public, which remains unconvinced, by reaching out to Palestinians who are prepared to demonstrate their readiness for compromise and peaceful coexistence.

3. We moderates, most of whom are Ashkenazi Jews, have to establish avenues of communication to the Sephardic Jews. The Sephardis, who are the main targets of Menachem Begin's chauvinistic populist approach, have become the mass constituency that backs the Likud government. Despite the fact that Arafat finds it hard to believe (see Avnery's interview with him), the Sephardis are one of the mainstays of hawkishness in Israeli society. Psychologists would say that they have a love-hate relationship to our Arab neighbors. We must try to find the way, together, to tip the scales from hate to love.

4. We have to lay the educational foundation for a return to the original humanistic values that characterized the mainstream of the Jewish national liberation movement in its earlier years. In doing this, we must counteract the current chauvinistic education that prevails in large segments of Israeli society.

5. Since the state of Israel is the product of the Jewish national liberation movement (Zionism), and it was established for the sake of the entire Jewish people, both the Jews living in Israel and the Jews in the Diaspora should have a say concerning the policies which guide the state of Israel. We, the Israeli moderates, should encourage a new mature partnership between Jews living in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora. This is the moral basis for Israeli doves to reach out to their fellow Jews in the Diaspora—to be unafraid to express their support for policies which will help to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and will ensure Israel's future existence, an Israel that will live in a state of peace and security, in accordance with democratic and humanistic values.

6. We have to learn to communicate the message of peace, understanding, and a realistic compromise, in a language which the majority of the people (Israeli and Diasporan Jews) will understand. Too many of the Israeli moderates use an elitist jargon, characterized by intellectual concepts and code words that go over the heads of the majority. Our approach should take into account the legacy of fear and trauma that all Israeli and Diasporan Jews carry with them. And in our attempts to break the communication barrier with many Sephardic and religious Jews, we should also be ready to and capable of using imagery and language that stem from the prophetic, humanistic Jewish tradition.

Our overreliance on a purely secular, and frequently classical

liberal-socialistic terminology is simply beyond the cultural frame of reference of many of the people we have to reach.

In the final analysis, no one factor will bring comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace to the Middle East. All of the factors that I have dealt with in this article—the Israeli moderates, the Americans, the Palestinians, the Russians, and other third parties, have a role to play.

As an Israeli peace activist, I believe that the future wisdom of the Palestinian leadership, the political sophistication of the American administration, and the readiness of Diasporan Jews to speak out in favor of alternative policies will be among the most crucial elements in determining the future of the Israeli-Arab peace process.

JULY 1982

# **The War in Lebanon: A Moral Evaluation**

---

CHAIM SHUR

One of the objectives of an IDF reprisal raid into Lebanon carried out in the early seventies was the blowing up of a PLO command post. Because the command post building was adjacent to another in which civilians lived, it was necessary to calculate precisely the amount of explosive material to be used. Some maintained that the amount of explosives used should be sufficient to ensure the destruction of the command post even if the neighboring building came down with it. Others held that the neighboring building should not be endangered, and that a smaller amount of explosives should be used even at the risk that the command post might not be completely destroyed. The then Chief of Staff, Major-General David Elazar, settled the argument, opting for the smaller amount of explosives. The lives of non-combatant civilians were not to be endangered.

On a Saturday evening during the first week of the war I was driving to the north of the country to take part in a kibbutz discussion. The car radio was turned on, and every few minutes the announcer reported a heavy IDF shelling of refugee camps ("ter-

---

CHAIM SHUR, a member of Kibbutz Shuval, has been the Secretary of the Kibbutz Artzi-Hashomer Hatzair kibbutz federation, editor of the Hebrew daily *Al Hamishmar*, deputy director of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, and co-director of *Mapam's* International Relations Department. A long-time advocate of Israeli-Arab peace, he became editor of *New Outlook* in the summer of 1982.

rorist camps" was the term used) in Beirut. I shuddered as I drove. Those of us who have grown up in this country know what a refugee camp is, and have seen the degree of overcrowding that exists in such camps. I do not know how many "terrorists" were killed in the IDF bombardment of the camps, but would estimate—and this is no wild guess—that for every "terrorist" killed in the bombings at least 100 non-combatant civilians were killed. Even if those civilians could not exactly be regarded as our friends, in the past we always knew how to distinguish between active fighters and non-combatants. That distinction no longer exists. It is a retrogression, and the process is clearly one of dehumanization, a process which is harming many who are not of our people but which will also, ultimately, corrupt and distort the shape of Israeli society itself beyond recognition.

## BLUNTING OF SENSIBILITIES

When, at a previous kibbutz discussion, I ventured to use the term "dehumanization," I was asked to measure my words. After all, I was told, there are many cases of our soldiers risking their lives solely to avoid endangering the lives of civilians. I am well aware of this and have frequently praised such behavior. Nevertheless, I should like to present here the testimony of a young soldier in a combat unit who was recently sent on policing and patrolling assignments in West Bank towns. He told me: "In that atmosphere, a process of 'rhinoceros-ization' is inevitable. Daily, another soldier falls victim to it." This soldier, open-minded and sensitive, who received a humanistic education in our kibbutz society, said that he did not know how much longer he himself would be able to resist the process. He feared that sooner or later he would also become brutalized and cease to regard fellow beings who happened to be Arabs as fully human.

In this war, as in those of the past, the number of our (kibbutz) sons in the front lines has been inordinately great in relation to the population as a whole, and the percentage among the fallen is correspondingly large. This is our "fault": We brought them up to do their duty and defend the Jewish people to the very end,

risking their lives if need be to protect the lives of others. We taught them not to shun compassion. This, I believe, is the true meaning of patriotism.

We of the kibbutzim, therefore, more than many others—and certainly more than those who chant “patriotic” slogans in the city squares—have the moral right to demand that the IDF retain its humane image.

To this day I remain convinced that what I am saying is the sober truth. I am not harming the IDF. I am trying to protect it from those who, by their deeds and behavior, long ago shed any semblance of the fundamental value of respect for the lives of one’s fellow men, regardless of race or religion, save in defense of one’s own life.

It is still too early to speculate on the manner of our withdrawal from Lebanon. We have already seen political battles that raged in the not-so-distant past relegated to history. But the spiritual scar that this war has left on our people’s soul is a scar that will not heal so quickly. In addition, the political implications of this war cannot be ignored.

## **ONLY BY POLITICAL COMPROMISE**

There is no need to borrow Prime Minister Begin’s imagery to recognize that the PLO ranks foremost among Israel’s enemies. But a distinction should be drawn between the PLO that makes hostile and threatening declarations, and the organization’s real strength. Unlike the other Arab states who have waged war against us, the PLO does not in fact threaten Israel’s existence. Consequently, there are various military options that may be employed against the PLO short of total war. Actions against the PLO have been carried out in the past. Many were successful, but even they did not result in its destruction. It may be assumed that the same will be true this time. We cannot escape the fact that the PLO derives its power from the yearning of the Palestinian people for an independent national life—a yearning in which, for various reasons, it enjoys the world’s sympathy.

As long as a people is defending its very existence it has no obligation to take into consideration its future ties with its enemy.



Defending its existence is paramount. But this is not our case now: Efforts to achieve a political solution must take precedence over total warfare. Moreover, it is clear as daylight that only political compromise will bring about a transformation of the PLO's nature.

Begin, however, thinks differently. In his opinion there is no Palestinian problem, and it would not exist had the world not inflamed the issue. There is a PLO problem, and the PLO must be liquidated. The path toward realization of the dream of a Land of Israel stretching from the Mediterranean sea to the Jordan River will then be clear.

But this is an impossible dream, the price of which we are paying in blood. A people's desire for independent nationhood cannot be obliterated. What is more, our basic sense of justice has, whether we like it or not, strengthened that of our Palestinian neighbors.

There are those who claim that the war has opened new options for the furthering of the peace process: Syria has suffered a defeat, the PLO is licking its wounds, the U.S. has extended—for reasons of its own—more diplomatic support than in any previous war. Perhaps, yet I am skeptical about this. A political solution, even after a war, is possible—given a readiness to compromise. Begin, however, is unwilling to compromise. He wants all of the Land of Israel, which is the mutual homeland of two peoples—the Jewish and the Palestinian; and in the absence of a readiness to compromise, the PLO will recover, its motivation will be strengthened and its animosity increased. Everything will return essentially to what it was before, even if a short-term impression of gains is created. The voices resounding in the city squares will undoubtedly attempt to augment this impression.

The number of our casualties has been far greater than the casualties suffered in all the PLO attacks since the Litani Operation, which was a reaction to the attack staged on the bus on the coastal road.

We had ample foreknowledge of the war we just launched. We live close to each other; when there were alerts, our sons were among the first to be called, and we saw them off with heavy hearts. We warned against the war. We explained, over and over again, the political damage that it would cause and the human

cost in lives that it would entail. We are suffering and grieving over that price now, and I would like, in all humility, to ask a question: Were we not right before the invasion, when we continually warned against it?

I remain convinced that we were right. I see no reason not to say so while the battles rage and the people go to war: They have no choice, even when the statesmen err, but that does not mean that we must refrain from speaking our minds, and in the most explicit way.

I have often quoted the words of the American philosopher, George Santayana: "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it." Personally, I see no reason why we should not begin today to study the bloody history that is fresh in our minds.

There are times in the life of a community when much courage is needed to remain in the minority. I hope that we have that courage, just as I am certain that our path—the path of peace at the price of compromise with a neighboring people—will, sooner or later, turn into the high road for the State of Israel.

I only hope that, before this path, our path, is realized, there will be no further bloodshed.

NOVEMBER 1982

PART 2

THE ISRAELI-  
PALESTINIAN  
CONNECTION



---

# Introduction

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is essentially a conflict between two national liberation movements over the same territory. The Jews originally arrived in the area around 1800 B.C. They ruled intermittently, between 12 B.C., the time of King Saul's reign, and 135 A.D., the time of the Roman destruction of the Second Temple and the expulsion of the Jews of Jerusalem.

The Arabs ruled the area from 634 A.D. until 1071. There followed a series of occupations, by the Seljuk Turks (1071–1099), the Crusaders (the twelfth and thirteenth centuries), the Tartars and Mongols (1244–1260), the Mamelukes of Egypt (1260–1517), the Ottoman Turks (1517–1917), and the British Mandate (1918–1947).

Some Jews always remained in their homeland, and others began returning to the Land of Israel in the fifteenth century.

The modern Jewish national liberation movement, Zionism, was born in the 1880s, an eastern and western European reaction to the continued persecution that Jews were suffering in their host countries on the European continent, coupled with a longing to return to their ancestral homeland.

Modern Arab nationalism and the beginnings of a unique Palestinian Arab nationalism began to appear in the early 1900s, a reaction to long years of Turkish occupation and the European colonialism which succeeded it after World War I.

In the twentieth century, Zionism and modern Arab nationalism, and eventually Palestinian nationalism, found themselves on a collision course.

Within Zionism there were essentially three trends. The majority, the Labor Zionists led by Ben Gurion and the liberals of the Weizmann variety, believed that the Jews should aspire to the



establishment of a society in any part of the traditional Jewish homeland available to them. The Revisionists (today's Herut Party, the dominant group within the Likud bloc), led by Jabotinsky and Begin, aspired toward the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth in the entire Land of Israel that was encompassed with the British Mandate, and their slogan was "Both Sides of the Jordan" (i.e., what is today Israel, the West Bank, *and* Jordan). The third trend, led by the Hashomer Hatzair Movement (today's Mapam Party within the Labor Alignment) and the Ihud group led by Martin Buber, Judah Magnes, Gershom Scholem, and others, supported a "binational solution" to the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine.

Although there were various attempts made to establish forms of Jewish-Arab cooperation during this century, the nascent Palestinian national movement was not ready, on the whole, to cooperate with the Jewish national movement on an equal basis, and it must be said for the record that the Jewish national movement did not always offer its hand in friendship.

The situation that evolved in the 1930s and 1940s was essentially a struggle for primacy between the Jewish and Arab national movements.

In 1947, when it became apparent that an adequate response to the idea of binationalism was not forthcoming from the Arab side, even Hashomer Hatzair abandoned its advocacy of the "binational solution" and joined the majority of the Zionist movement, which supported the UN partition plan.

History records that at this critical juncture of Israeli-Palestinian history, the moderates within the Jewish national liberation movement were in the majority, and they accepted the partition compromise offered to them by the world community. It is the misfortune of the Palestinian national liberation movement, which was at an earlier stage in the evolution of its national consciousness, that the majority among the Palestinians rejected the partition compromise, which provided for the establishment of both a Jewish *and* an Arab (Palestinian) state. They heeded the advice of the Arab states in the region, who also rejected the UN partition plan and thought that they could resolve the conflict on behalf of the Palestinians on the battlefield. Thus a historic oppor-

tunity to establish a Palestinian Arab state in part of the Land of Israel/Palestine was missed.

In 1948, after the establishment of the state of Israel was declared in the Jewish part of the partition, seven neighboring Arab states invaded the fledgling state. The fact that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled the area during the war, whether by their own volition or because they were encouraged to do so by either the neighboring Arabs or the Israelis, is the original source of the Palestinian refugee problem.

The overwhelming Israeli victory in 1967 was a watershed in Israeli–Arab and Israeli–Palestinian relations. The evident social, economic, technological, and military strength of Israeli society was undeniable. And additional Palestinian refugees were created. Most observers believe that this was the turning point in Arab perceptions of Israel. If the state was not going to evaporate, disintegrate, or roll over easily, it would have to be come to terms with.

A revolutionary new situation was created in 1967. Israel now had something to offer in exchange for Arab recognition—territories for peace.

When the Six Day War began, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol declared that Israel had no desire to conquer additional territory. The first settlements in the occupied territories were established only for security reasons. However, as the political status quo continued, expansionist tendencies within Israeli society began to develop, based on religious, mystical, security, and ideological reasons. These were capped by the Likud bloc's victory in the 1977 elections. For the first time in Zionist history, the Revisionists became the dominant force in governmental politics.

The Six Day War also marked a major turning point in Palestinian history. From 1948 to 1967, the Palestinians placed their faith in a pan-Arab solution to their problems. Most organizational attempts to deal with the Palestinian question were supported by one or another Arab state. The Palestine Liberation Organization (the PLO), which was founded in 1964, was essentially an extension of Nasserite pan-Arabist politics. In 1968, Fatah, led by Yasir Arafat, became the dominant factor in the PLO, and an amended Palestinian National Covenant was adopted. In the

wake of the inter-Arab defeat in 1967, the Palestinians began to assume control over their own national movement. This tendency was given an inter-Arab confirmation at the Arab League Conference in Rabat in 1974, when it was resolved that the PLO was the authorized spokesman of Palestinian nationalism.

The next watershed in Israeli-Arab relations was Sadat's initiative. This had been preceded by the Yom Kippur War, which enabled the Arabs to regain their pride and broke the impasse in the political process. Sadat's initiative, which led to the Camp David Accords and the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, proved that a major Arab factor could recognize Israel. It also proved that the Arabs could regain territory from Israel in exchange for peace.

The war in Lebanon has set the entire Israeli-Arab political process in motion once again. It is still too early to evaluate all of its implications. This was the first time that an Israeli government opted to initiate a war which was not supported by a broad national consensus. This was the first direct Israeli-Palestinian war. And this was the first time that an Israeli government decided to activate the Israeli Defense Forces (the IDF) for regional purposes, i.e., to help resolve the Lebanese civil war in favor of the Christian Phalangists.

Certain things can already be said about the war. It has proved, both to the Israelis and to the Palestinians, that there is no military resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It has caused much soul-searching among both the Israelis and the Palestinians. The Reagan initiative of September demonstrates American readiness to assume the role of an active mediator in the search for a fundamental peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The post-war resolutions of the inter-Arab Fez conference appear to provide indirect though not yet outright general Arab recognition of the state of Israel's right to exist. All of this has come together to produce another crucial crossroads in Middle Eastern history.

It would be tragic if the moderates among the Palestinians should prevail and succeed in producing an operative formula that enables them to participate in the political process, at precisely the time when Israeli politics are being led (by a thin majority) by the Revisionists, who are not prepared to discuss a territo-



rial compromise in the Land of Israel/Palestine. This situation has not yet happened, but if it does, it would produce a mirror image of the situation which existed in 1947, i.e., the moderates among the Palestinians would be in the majority, while the extremists would be in the majority in Israel.

Just as partition was the only workable formula for a resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in 1947, today too, the concept of partition is the only basis for a resolution of the conflict and the achievement of Israeli–Palestinian peace. Such a peace will be based upon the mutual right to self-determination. The Jews have realized their right to national self-determination in the state of Israel, while the Palestinians will realize their national right to self-determination primarily in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The form that this self-determination will take will either be an independent state, a Palestinian–Jordanian federation, or an Israeli–Palestinian–Jordanian confederation. The Palestinians and the course of the negotiations will determine the form. The nature of the final borders will be determined during the negotiations, and they will undoubtedly take into account the security needs of both sides. Also, it is presumed that both Palestinians and Jews will have the right to live as a national minority within the area of the other people’s sovereignty. It should be noted that no country is totally independent today—we are all interdependent. And even the original UN partition plan provided for the establishment of independent Jewish and Arab (Palestinian) states, accompanied by an underlying *economic union*.

One obstacle to such a resolution is the fact that the current Israeli government refuses to consider it. It is to be hoped that an alternative Israeli government, dominated by the successors of the original socialist-Zionist and liberal forces who established the state, will be more ready to follow this path.

A second obstacle is what the Palestinians call “their only bargaining card”: their unwillingness to recognize Israel until guaranteed an adequate return for such a gesture. I have never fully understood this claim, and believe that the Palestinians are making a mistake.

Israeli fear of Palestinian and Arab intentions may seem irrational, but it is a *genuine* fear, a legacy of centuries of exile and persecution, culminating in the Nazi Holocaust, which decimated

one-third of the Jewish people within our living memory. This legacy has now been compounded by the scars left by eighty years of Jewish-Arab conflict, including five wars. Open recognition of the state of Israel's right to exist, as long as it is not at the expense of the Palestinian right to self-determination, will go a long way toward reducing these fears and will enable the Israelis to take much more flexible positions.

However, if this obstacle is a given, then we have to seek out formulas to bypass it, such as simultaneous recognition, or the joint formulation of potential models for a future Israeli-Palestinian peace, which can later be brought to the negotiating table.

We also have to understand that we are not working in a vacuum. A specter is haunting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the specter of the Likud government settlement policy in the West Bank. Dr. Meron Benvenisti, the former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, has pointed out in a much-publicized study that the Likud government is going ahead with the investment of vast sums of money in the West Bank, to attract more Jewish settlers. Currently there are 25,000 Jews and 800,000 Arabs in the West Bank. If the Likud government succeeds in its plan to attract hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers with cheap housing and employment opportunities, it will have effectively established a *de facto* annexation of the West Bank. This will either produce an untenable apartheid-like situation, where first-class Israelis will rule over second-class Palestinians, with catastrophic consequences for Israelis and Palestinians alike, or will lead to a voluntary or involuntary Palestinian exodus from the West Bank, which would produce new generations of refugees and a lasting, implacable Arab hatred for Israel.

A second specter haunting the Israeli-Arab conflict is the specter of extremist Islamic fundamentalism. This is a potential outlet for Arab frustration and despair which would make Israeli-Arab reconciliation impossible.

And a third specter haunting the conflict is the potential nuclearization of the region. If the Israeli-Arab conflict is not resolved in the coming decades, most experts believe that Israel will not remain the only (presumed) nuclear power in the region.



This too could have potential catastrophic consequences, both for the peoples of the region and the rest of the world as well.

Modern Jewish nationalists did not pay enough attention to the presence in their ancient homeland of Palestinian Arabs, and they did not do enough to advance the possibilities of Jewish-Arab cooperation and peace. Modern Palestinian nationalists did not appreciate the tenacity and strength of Jewish nationalism, and they have taken a long time to be ready to reconcile themselves to coexisting alongside Jewish nationalism.

Unexpectedly, the Israelis and the Palestinians have evolved into Siamese twins. Our fates have become inexorably linked. What is waiting in store for us in the next pages of the script? One apocalyptic vision, proposed by Israeli author Amos Oz, has both peoples withdrawing into obstinate shells, with the final act resembling a Shakespearean tragedy, with all of the major protagonists lying dead all over the stage. A second vision has the two peoples coexisting, and combining their manifold powers to further the betterment of both the Israelis and the Palestinians, creating a peaceful center of dynamic and productive activity, which will help to enrich the entire Middle East.

I fervently hope that the moderates on both sides, the realists on both sides, the visionaries on both sides, together with their friends around the world, accompanied by wise international mediation, will enable the second vision to prevail.

Hillel Schenker

NOVEMBER 1982

# **The Right to Self-Determination**

---

PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE

NOVEMBER 1977 WAS A VERY BUSY AND DRAMATIC TIME IN ISRAEL. PRESIDENT SADAT CHOSE THAT AUTUMNAL MONTH FOR HIS HISTORIC VISIT TO JERUSALEM. AS HE WAS THE FIRST NEIGHBORING ARAB LEADER OPENLY TO VISIT ISRAEL AND PUBLICLY TO EXPRESS HIS READINESS TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY, HIS ACT CREATED A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN ISRAEL. THE STATE OF SIEGE WHICH HAD SURROUNDED THE COUNTRY FOR TWENTY-NINE YEARS WAS BROKEN, AND EUPHORIA REIGNED, EXCEPT AMONG A FEW DIE-HARD ISRAELI REJECTIONISTS.

AT THE SAME TIME, *NEW OUTLOOK* MAGAZINE WAS HOLDING ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM IN TEL AVIV, UNDER THE TITLE "WHEN THE GUNS FALL SILENT" (THE NAME OF A BOOK BY EGYPTIAN AUTHOR MOHAMMED SID-AHMAD). SADAT SENT A GREETING TO THE OPENING OF THE SYMPOSIUM BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL, THE FIRST PUBLIC GREETING BY AN ARAB LEADER TO AN ISRAELI BODY, AND DURING THE COURSE OF HIS VISIT HE RECEIVED A DELEGATION FROM THE SYMPOSIUM, THE

---

The late PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE, one of the most beloved post-World War II prime ministers in France, was particularly known for his ability to extract France from its disastrous involvement in Indo-China in the mid-1950s. A proud Jew, he was also known for his compassion for other people. Perhaps his last major public act was to publish the Paris Declaration in July 1982, together with Dr. Nahum Goldmann and Philip Klutznick, calling for "mutual recognition [and] coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians based on self-determination."

ONLY NONPARTY DELEGATION HE MET WITH DURING HIS STAY IN ISRAEL. PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE WAS ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, ALONG WITH DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN, SIMHA FLAPAN, DAVID SHAHAM, PROFESSOR SHIMON SHAMIR, PROFESSOR SAUL FRIEDLANDER, INGE LEDERER GIBEL, SAM RUBIN, DAVID SUSSKIND, AND DAN GILON.

WHILE THE SYMPOSIUM PARTICIPANTS DULY NOTED, WITH MUCH ENTHUSIASM, THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT, THEY ALSO PUT GREAT STRESS ON THE CENTRALITY OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM FOR A COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT.

THE FOLLOWING IS A MAJOR EXCERPT FROM PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE'S ADDRESS TO THE SYMPOSIUM, WHICH IS DEDICATED TO THE QUESTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

The moral strength that millions of people the world over attribute to the Israelis is the wish for liberty, independence, and self-determination—the self-determination of Israel. At times, when the very survival of Israel was threatened, its moral force, to which the whole world responded, lay in its self-determination, its desire to be a free nation and to survive all the threats surrounding it. The legitimacy of the Israeli cause stems from the fact that it is based fundamentally on the right claimed by the Israeli people to be free in its own home—within its frontiers, and in its rights. But Israel cannot refuse to others the principle of self-determination to which Israel herself so justifiably and proudly lays claim. Endless discussions are being held on the future fate of the Palestinians. No one has the right to determine it arbitrarily. The men and women of Arab Palestine themselves are the only people who can determine it. I have heard a great deal said on this subject—sometimes by peoples from this region, and sometimes by people from afar. Sometimes by Israelis, sometimes by Palestinians, by people belonging to the PLO, and some-

times by others of different tendencies. I do not have the right—I do not feel I have the right—to decide between them. Only the citizens of Palestine, freely consulted, can reply when the day comes; only they should, in a sovereign way, make their own decision. The PLO has—let us put it frankly—entered the struggle with sometimes an excess of bloodshed—inevitable, alas, in such a war—but they have most profoundly and traumatically shaken this country, whose life was already endangered from outside. In any case the PLO has come to personify a national struggle, the PLO personifies a resistance which cannot be overlooked, and for this reason too one cannot withhold from the Palestinian people—today under a regime of occupation—the right to determine its own future by itself, and the form of its state, its relations with its neighbors, and the future of its children. Self-determination is an inalienable right for Israel, and Israel will enhance even further the value of that principle and that law by recognizing that all the other peoples of this region are entitled to this same right.

NOVEMBER 1977

---

# Sa'id Hammami

SIMHA FLAPAN

SA'ID HAMMAMI WAS THE OFFICIAL PLO REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON. IN 1975 HE BEGAN TO HAVE DIRECT TALKS WITH ISRAELIS WHO DEFINED THEMSELVES AS ZIONISTS. IN THE BEGINNING OF 1978 HE WAS MURDERED, APPARENTLY BY PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISTS, WHO DISAGREED WITH HIS MODERATE APPROACH.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS A TRIBUTE TO SA'ID HAMMAMI, THE MAN AND THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS PEOPLE.

## AN HONOR

I first met Hammami in the summer of 1975 upon my arrival for a "sabbatical" in London. His views were known to me before: we have published them and discussed them in *New Outlook*. It was the beginning of a series of meetings centering on theoretical, ideological aspects of the Zionist-Palestinian confrontation. I will withhold my assessment of his personality until more auspicious circumstances allow me to pay full tribute to it. All I can say now about Sa'id is what Dr. Weizmann once wrote about Prince

---

SIMHA FLAPAN has a long and distinguished record as a pioneer of Israeli-Arab dialogue, first in his capacity as head of the Arab Department of Mapam, and, since 1957, in his capacity as the founding editor in chief of *New Outlook* magazine. He is currently at Harvard, working on the second volume of his book *Zionism and the Palestinians* (Croom Helm, London).



Faisal, the son of the Sheriff of Mecca: "It would be a privilege to have him as an ally; it is an honor to have him as an enemy."

## DEDICATED TO HIS CAUSE

Hammami was not a pacifist. He was a fighter, unconditionally dedicated to his cause and convinced of its justice. He arrived at the idea of a "peace strategy" the hard way; not at once, but gradually, through struggle and confrontation with harsh realities. He had to go through bitter experiences before he got rid of the illusions of pan-Arabism and Arab solidarity, guerrilla romanticism, of an uprising of the "revolutionary" Matzpen forces and of a common front with the Sephardic Jews against the "oppressive Zionist structure," etc. He remained loyal to the idea of a common binational state, but arrived at the conclusion that it could be realized only through peace, by mutual consent, after the two national states had overcome their fears and the legacy of fifty years of war and hatred.

## A HARBINGER OF CHANGE

His contacts with Israelis and Zionists originated in the desire to "know the enemy better." But recognition of the enemy is always the first step to peace. Zionism remained the enemy for him, but he gradually understood the futility of permanent war. Hammami was not a functionary or a professional diplomatic type, though he possessed, in abundance, the skills needed for such a task. He was a militant patriot with an independent, courageous mind. He fought for his views inside his own movement, inviting the wrath of all the fanatics. He was a harbinger of change and he paid for it with his life. The murder of Hammami was intended to prevent that change. But ideas have a life of their own; they cannot be killed. The idea of a reconciliation between the two peoples will outlive the assassins and will one day become a reality.

# **Sa'id Hammami— The Man Who Paid with His Life for His Ideas**

---

DAVID SHAHAM

Three years ago a new voice suddenly appeared out of the ranks of the PLO. It was the voice of Sa'id Hammami, the PLO representative in London. It was an entirely different voice from those we were used to hearing.

The time had come for the Palestinians to admit that the goal they had set for themselves—the elimination of the state of Israel—was an unattainable goal, said Sa'id Hammami openly, since the Israelis are too strong. The world supports them and won't allow their state to be destroyed. The Palestinians have no choice but to compromise with this entity, which was established on their land against their will and against natural justice, and to find the way to coexist in peace with it.

Of course, if an Israeli had written Hammami's words, he would have built his argument in a different way. He would have spoken about the right of the Jews to their own homeland; about our historical attachment to the land of Israel; about our unchallengeable right to our land.

---

DAVID SHAHAM has been at the vanguard of the quest for Israeli-Arab peace for many years. He was a leader of Hashomer Hatzair in Israel in his youth, a novelist, the editor of the official Labor Party organ, *Ot*, in the early 1970s, and editor of *New Outlook* from 1974–1982. He is currently involved in the establishment of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East.

## TO THE PALESTINIANS

But Sa'id Hammami was a Palestinian, a refugee from Jaffa. He spoke to the Palestinians. He wanted to explain to them in terms which were taken from their conceptual world that there is no possibility of realizing their aspirations; that they would have to accept the state of Israel as an existing fact and to reconcile themselves to the fact that, at most, they would be able to establish a state in a part of the land, which they consider belongs to them in its entirety.

He spoke to the Palestinians in the manner that the Zionist leaders spoke to their public in 1947 (in general, it is interesting to hear with what admiration the Palestinians speak about the Zionist movement and its achievements in the years that preceded the establishment of the state of Israel, and how much they would like to imitate its methods of action!); therefore he also spoke about the injustice of the establishment of the state of Israel, and how there was no choice but to become reconciled with that injustice.

## BINATIONAL VISION

In order to make it easier for his Palestinian audience to swallow this bitter pill, he wrapped it in a sugar coating: all of this is only a stage in the path toward the realization of the final dream. The Palestinian state, which will be established alongside of Israel, will continue to carry on a dialogue with it. The borders will be open, and those Israelis who want to settle in the Palestinian state will be allowed to do so, provided they take upon themselves Palestinian citizenship, and provided that Palestinian Arabs are allowed to settle in Israel. Over the years—claimed Hammami—Israel would cease to be a Zionist state (basing this more on wishful thinking than on a scientific analysis), the two states would willingly become united, and the binational vision would be a reality.

## BEFORE SADAT

In those years, before Sadat's initiative, the Israelis were convinced that every Arab who spoke about the destruction of Israel was telling the truth, since it was known that all Arabs want to destroy Israel, while any Arab who spoke about reconciliation with Israel was lying, or consciously deceiving, since everyone knew that all Arabs want to destroy Israel.

That was the official response to Hammami's words and those of other Palestinians: those are false words that are meant to deceive Israel. There aren't extreme and moderate Palestinians. All of them are extremists. Those who appear to be moderate are doing so as emissaries of the extremist leadership, in order to soften and weaken us.

Now at least, after someone has given his life for such words, it's possible to see that those weren't just words.

## PAID WITH HIS LIFE

Hammami paid with his life for his moderation. I don't know who killed him. But I have no doubt that the murderer wanted to undercut the moderates among the Palestinians, to frighten them, to shut their mouths, to unite them around extremism and the continuation of the armed struggle.

Anyone among us who thinks that our situation has been improved by Hammami's murder is wrong, and is making the same error that was made until now.

We should have spoken to the moderates in a different language from that which we used with the extremists; to prove to the Palestinians that extremism doesn't pay, and that moderation does. But we spoke to all of them in a language meant for the extremists, and thus, consciously or unconsciously we are helping to transform all of them into extremists.

We didn't respond to Hammami's outstretched hand. It was outstretched by a man who represents an underground movement, which has vowed to destroy our state; an underground movement which has many members who honestly believe that

the only choice they have is victory or death, and who refuse to consider a compromise.

## THE FRAIL PEACE

Hammami's hand is no longer outstretched toward us. There are still a few more hands left, and Hammami's fate doesn't exactly encourage them. But if we don't distinguish between Palestinians who offer us their hand, and Palestinians who want to strike out at us, we'll succeed in convincing all of them that their only choice is victory or death. And they'll fight to the death. And drag with them the others, and destroy the frail peace which may be beginning to appear through the fog, and once again, we will back into bloody wars and destruction.

The signs are multiplying that Sadat is also tiring of the extremists among the Palestinians. But he knows very well that if he isn't able to prove to the moderates that he can gain more for them than the extremists can, his fate may be similar to Hammami's.

If we don't see the accusing finger, we have only ourselves to blame.

FEBRUARY 1978



# **Hammami: My Enemy, My Friend**

---

URI AVNERY

What is the fate of a refugee? What are his crucial childhood years like? Sa'id Hammami didn't grow up in a refugee camp. He didn't suffer from hunger. His family was wealthy and they had relatives in neighboring countries.

But worse than the wounds of the body are the wounds of the soul. During the course of our meetings, he described to me a number of typical incidents.

## **SIXTEEN IN SYRIA**

As a sixteen-year-old youth, a Palestinian refugee in Syria before the Egyptian-Syrian union and before the Ba'ath revolution, he was attracted to the Ba'ath ideology, the pan-Arab revolution, the establishment of a huge Arab state. Many of the Palestinian refugees were attracted to these ideas as a possible answer to their problems.

---

URI AVNERY was a member of the Irgun in pre-state days. However, unlike Begin, he soon realized that peace and security for Israel would have to be based upon a compromise between Jewish and Arab nationalism in the Land of Israel/Palestine. He has been a constant crusader for Israeli-Arab dialogue, on the pages of his Hebrew language weekly *Haolam Haze*, in the Knesset as a member of the Haolam Haze and Sheli Parties, and as a founding member of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace.

One day Hammami was arrested by the Syrian security police together with other youths. All of the others (Syrians) were released, and he was held and beaten up.

He never forgot this incident, not because of the physical torture, but because of the impact on his psychology. From that day on he resolved that he was neither a Syrian, a Jordanian, nor a Lebanese. He was a Palestinian.

## MEETING JA'ABARI

A second incident occurred after he finished his studies. He had to earn a living, and the natural thing for a young Palestinian intellectual to do was to become a teacher in the West Bank. His uncle was a respected sheikh, a graduate of the famous El-Azhar University in Cairo, and he arranged an appointment for him with the man who made all of the teaching appointments for the Hashemite kingdom: Sheikh Ali Ja'abari, the Mayor of Hebron and the Jordanian Minister of Education.

Two generations of Palestinians faced each other. Hammami remembered the conversation very well.

"Do you believe in Allah, my son?" asked Ja'abari.

"I respect the Muslim tradition," responded Hammami, who was not religious.

"Are you a Communist?"

"No, my Sheikh."

"Are you a Nasserist?"

At this point Hammami expressed his nationalistic beliefs.

"Are you loyal to our King?"

It appears that the sum total of his answers didn't please the royal minister, but for the sake of the uncle, he agreed to give the young man a position. It was not in Palestine, in the West Bank, but rather on the East Bank, in an out-of-the-way place on the road to Aqaba. Hammami refused to accept the offer.

Hammami was seven years old when his family was forced to leave Jaffa. He was twenty-two when the second revolution occurred in his life, and in the life of his people.

## BIRTH OF THE REVOLUTION

He remembered the exact date: the 17th of July, 1963. A date which doesn't mean anything to the Israeli public, but to Hammami, this was the day of the birth of the Palestinian revolution.

The Egyptian-Syrian union had already broken down, and the Palestinian youth had despaired of the Ba'ath Party. They admired Nasser, who was being attacked by the rulers of Baghdad and Damascus.

On that summer day, July 17, 1963, the regiments of the Palestine Liberation army that were attached to the Syrian army rebelled, and captured the Defense Department in Damascus. But the Syrian rulers repressed the rebellion, and slaughtered the Palestinians with mass executions.

This blood-bath broke the final bonds between the Palestinian nationalist movement and the pan-Arab movements. An abyss now existed between the Palestinians and the other Arab national movements, which could no longer be bridged. Hammami understood that the Palestinian movement had no friends. It would have to find salvation by itself.

## FATAH

Soon afterwards, the Fatah movement was established, which expressed this new consciousness. Its leader was an unknown man, Yāsir Arafat, and one of the first enthusiastic members was Sa'id Hammami.

Fatah is a political movement which has a military arm, Al Usifa, but they are a minority among its members. Hammami spoke with pride about the fighters ("Only 5 percent of those who enter Israel return"). But with the humility of a man who is neither a soldier nor a fighter he said: "I don't even know how to bear arms."

## THE BATTLE OF CARAMA

The next fateful day in Hammami's life was, however, connected with a battle which occurred on March 20, 1968. On that

day, the IDF attacked a concentration of Palestinian Fedayeen in the city of Carama on the East Bank of the Jordan. Yasir Arafat was there at the time, along with many other leaders, including Hammami. The Palestinians believed that they won that battle, and it was a turning point in their perception of the conflict. Hammami claimed that he saw Israelis turn and run, which proved to him that they weren't supermen, only men.

## **RIISING IN THE RANKS**

The young intellectual from Jaffa, with the nationalistic fervor and the sharp mind, attracted the attention of Yasir Arafat. He became known within Fatah as one of Arafat's young men. He rapidly rose in the political hierarchy of the movement. Arafat, who respected his political judgment, began to take him to important political meetings. During historical meetings with Nasser and Sadat, which were frequently very stormy, Hammami quietly sat in a corner and watched. Afterwards, Arafat would ask him for his impressions of the meeting.

## **AMBASSADOR TO LONDON**

As a political man, Hammami served in a position of great importance for a number of years. He represented the PLO in London—as the unofficial ambassador of a Palestinian government which had yet to be formed.

Hammami was very popular in the British capital. He soon gained a broad circle of friends among the journalists and politicians. The 34-year-old man with the pleasant appearance, the black hair and the brown eyes, aroused automatic appreciation among the British because of his seriousness, his cultured style, his reserved language, his good English, his modesty, and his complete dedication to the cause he represented.

**MAKARIOS—A FELLOW REFUGEE**

Hammami frequently utilized his position in order to help others. When Archbishop Makarios was a refugee in London, Hammami tried to help him to be received with as much respect as possible. There were Arab diplomats who differed with him, and who didn't see any benefit for the Arabs, but Hammami said simply: "I am a refugee. I know what it is to be a refugee, and I am helping Makarios because he is a refugee." In the end, when Makarios returned to power, it turned out that this aid was also a wise political act.

It is possible that the British attitude toward Hammami was influenced by the traditional appreciation for the underdog. They remember that Hammami remained in London even when it became dangerous, at a time when he was exposed to the danger of assassination, after the Paris and Rome representatives of the PLO were killed.

But the main reason why the British appreciated Hammami was his outlook. The British like reasonable men, and Hammami was a reasonable man.

Long before he reached London, while he was still filling a position for Fatah in Jordan, Hammami began to believe in some unconventional ideas.

**STUDYING ISRAEL**

He began to study the Israeli reality, with an increasing curiosity to understand the history of the state which had caused him to leave his home. He didn't become an admirer of Israel, nor did he become reconciled with the Zionist philosophy. But he came to the conclusion that Israel was a reality, that it was impossible to eliminate it without paying a terrible price.

Reality, in Hammami's eyes, was that there are two national units in the Land of Israel, an Israeli-Jewish one, and a Palestinian-Arab one, and that they have no choice but to recognize the existence of each other. A settlement could only come about between them, without outside intervention. In today's reality,



such a settlement could only be based on the coexistence of an Israeli state and a Palestinian state, one alongside the other.

At the same time, Hammami became aware of the fact that in Israel there were people who believed in the same solution. Once, Hammami saw a copy of *Hada El Alam*, the Arab version of *Haolam Hazeh*, that contained an open letter to Yasir Arafat, and thus he learned that there were Israelis who were willing to have a dialogue with the PLO in order to achieve peace. Hammami didn't hide his views within Fatah. He openly espoused them, among his friends, among PLO activists, and to Yasir Arafat. Arafat listened; he neither responded nor rejected. Hammami was never ordered to stop voicing his views or to change them.

On the contrary, he rapidly rose within the movement. He was elected to the Palestinian National Council, the parliament of the Palestinian state-to-be, and was given the important mission of serving in London, a mission that guaranteed broad exposure for his views.

## PUBLICIZING HIS VIEWS

His views first became known to the general public in November of 1973, shortly after the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The most prestigious newspaper in England, *The Times*, published two of his articles, in which for the first time he publicly called for the participation of the PLO in the peace process, within the context of mutual Israeli-Palestinian recognition.

His articles drew a minimal reaction in Israel. The response was: Who is Hammami? He's just a man expressing his private views.

He had a simple answer for British journalists who asked him whom he represented: "I am the official representative of the PLO in London. As with any ambassador, I express the views of those who sent me. I was not recalled after the publication of the articles. I was not attacked at any forum of the PLO. It is true that there were some wild attacks on me, but they came from extremist elements."

During 1975, Hammami made a number of similar statements

concerning the anticipated solution of the problem. Meanwhile, the PLO was very successful in the international arena. At the Rabat summit conference, the Arab countries decided, unanimously despite the fact that none of them wanted it, that the PLO was the official representative of the Palestinian people. Afterwards, Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly, receiving a very dramatic reception.

But Sa'id Hammami was not overly impressed by these successes. "If 100 nations recognize us, and Israel does not, it will all be worthless," he once told me.

## THE "HAMMAMI DOCUMENT"

The next major date in Hammami's life was March 20, 1975. But unlike the other dates, he himself was responsible for the act that made this day important. On that day the National-Liberal Club opened a three day seminar in London. Hammami gave a historic speech before this forum, which since has become known as the "Hammami Document."

Very few know how this document was born, which actually isn't the "Hammami Document," but rather the "Arafat Document." It was originally intended for publication in *The Times*, but for various reasons it was decided to present it before the Liberal forum.

The document was prepared with great care, a product of weeks of work, as a result of constant consultations with the leadership of the movement in Beirut. Every word was weighed over and over again, since it was viewed as a major political act.

The document opens with a sharp attack on the history of Zionism, and on the process of the establishment of Israel. But its operative conclusion is that the Palestinian people have no choice but to live alongside the Zionist state, which is an existing fact. In the process, Hammami expressed a number of revolutionary ideas. Among them are:

- The end of the state of belligerency if the PLO became a partner in the negotiating process.

- The establishment of a Palestinian state in the areas that would be returned by Israel as a result of a peace settlement.
- Open borders between the state of Israel and the Palestinian state, in order “to encourage” mutual cultural and economic activities.
- The granting of the right of Israeli Jews to live in Palestine, in exchange for the right of an equivalent number of Palestinian Arabs to return to Israel.
- Security guarantees for the Palestinian state and for the state of Israel.
- The withdrawal of Israel to the borders of June 4, 1967, as a part of the peace settlement.
- The opening of a dialogue between Palestinian and Israeli seekers of peace, in which both sides would freely express their opinions.
- The aspiration for the reunion of the country, based upon the agreement of both nations, eventually, “perhaps not during our lifetime,” in the form of a federation, or any other form.

## THE ISRAELI RESPONSE

These words were spoken and published in Great Britain, and the correspondents for the Israeli daily press reported them to their papers in a few lines. Hammami and his superiors in Beirut waited for the results.

They were convinced that this revolutionary act would open a new avenue for peace, and would bring some sort of response from the Israeli government. They were prepared for a cautious and reserved response. But they were astonished by that which they did get: a total lack of response. The Israeli establishment simply ignored the whole matter.

The only result was the establishment of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, whose founders clearly based their tenets upon Hammami's declaration. They formulated thirteen Israeli principles which corresponded to a great degree to the principles in the “Hammami Document.”

The fact that the Israeli government ignored it entirely weakened the impetus of Hammami's initiative, but it didn't end it.

**“OUR ONLY CARD”**

Frequently, Hammami was asked why Arafat preferred to have him make statements, rather than making them himself. In response, he said “What do we, the Palestinians have to bring to the discussion table with Israel? Israel holds our land, and a great part of our people. They have all of the practical cards. We have only one, the recognition by the Palestinian people of Israel’s right to exist. This recognition will put an end to the generations-old war between the Arab world and Israel. If we put this card on the table before the opening of negotiations, what will be left to negotiate?”

Hammami became known as the number one expert on Israeli affairs among the PLO leadership. He was opposed to anti-Semitism, which he considered to be an ally of Zionism. He was also very critical of the Arab countries, whose persecution of the Jews caused them to emigrate to Israel. “Those Jews have strengthened Israel, and they fight against us, but the other Arab countries don’t care.”

**HAMMAMI’S DREAM**

One of Hammami’s fondest dreams was to visit his old home in Jaffa once again. He knew that if a Palestinian state were established alongside of Israel, he wouldn’t live in Jaffa, but rather in the new state. He would then be able to visit his old home, but would build his new home under a Palestinian flag.

If this dream is ever realized by peaceful means, then Sa’id Hammami will have played a great part in bringing about the realization of that dream.

**MY ENEMY, MY FRIEND**

The last time I saw you, three months ago at a seminar in London, you said from the platform: “There is no misunderstanding between us. There is a dispute between us. We are not friends. We are enemies. But because we are enemies, we have to

make peace between us. You don't make peace among friends, only among enemies."

May you rest in peace, Sa'id, my enemy, my friend, my brother.

FEBRUARY 1978



# **The Palestinian Choice**

---

MOST OF 1978 WAS CHARACTERIZED BY ACTIVITY WHICH STEMMED FROM PRESIDENT SADAT'S HISTORIC VISIT TO JERUSALEM. THE INITIAL EUPHORIC FEELINGS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN IMMEDIATE PEACE SETTLEMENT SOON GAVE WAY TO A CLASH BETWEEN SADAT'S SWEEPING GRAND VISION AND BEGIN'S PENCHANT FOR LEGALISTIC DETAIL. WHEN ISRAELIS BEGAN TO FEEL THAT BEGIN, ALONG WITH HIS AGRICULTURAL MINISTER, ARIEL SHARON (WHO SET UP A SERIES OF "PHANTOM" SETTLEMENTS IN SINAI), WAS BEGINNING TO STALL FOR TIME AND TO PLACE OBSTACLES ON THE ROAD TO PEACE, THE PEACE NOW MOVEMENT WAS BORN.

YOUNG ISRAELIS, MAINLY IN THEIR TWENTIES AND THIRTIES, MANY OF WHOM HAD FOUGHT IN ISRAEL'S WARS, TOOK TO THE STREETS TO "KEEP THE LEADERSHIP HONEST."

IN SEPTEMBER, PRESIDENT CARTER DECIDED TO BREAK THE IMPASSE IN THE PEACE PROCESS BY INVITING THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT AND THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER AND THEIR ENTOURAGES FOR A MARATHON "POLITICAL ENCOUNTER SESSION" AT CAMP DAVID.

BACK IN TEL AVIV, 100,000 SUPPORTERS OF PEACE NOW GATHERED TOGETHER IN THE KINGS OF ISRAEL SQUARE OUTSIDE OF TEL AVIV CITY HALL TO BROADCAST A MESSAGE TO THEIR PRIME MINISTER: "BEGIN, BRING PEACE BACK FROM CAMP DAVID, OR DON'T COME BACK!" AND MUCH TO EVERYONE'S SURPRISE,

AFTER THIRTEEN DAYS, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WERE FORMULATED AND SIGNED.

IMMEDIATELY RETURNING TO THE PALESTINIAN ASPECT OF THE ISRAELI-ARAB CONFLICT, NEW OUT-LOOK PUBLISHED THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL IN OCTOBER 1978.

The Camp David agreements enjoy wide support from many sides, but evoke little enthusiasm from any side. It may be regrettable that what seems to be the first real breakthrough toward peace in a long and bloody conflict is met with so little genuine joy, and creates so much apprehension, but the reasons for this are understandable.

The doubts inside Israel are a result of the growing pains caused by the departure from a long-nurtured illusion. They do not reduce the wide support given the agreements by the great majority, and they serve to underline the realization that the old policy of "peace with territories" is doomed. Until recently, this awareness was shared only by the few; now it has become the consciousness of the many.

The apprehensions in the Arab world are also understandable. Many ask themselves whether the rights of the Palestinians were not neglected at Camp David. Prime facie, there are many signs that support this feeling.

But here a sharp distinction should be drawn. Those who still support the notion that the "rights of the Palestinians" include the right to obliterate Israel, and to establish a Palestinian state instead of it, do indeed have something to worry about. It is doubtful, even with Egypt in the fold, whether such a goal was attainable. Surely it is becoming sheer fantasy, with Egypt embarking on the road toward peace with Israel. But even those who realize that the only right that the Palestinians have is to establish a state alongside Israel, which will peacefully coexist with it—even they have cause for concern.

It is the declared policy of the Likud government that Israel

should not renounce its claims for "sovereignty" over the West Bank and Gaza, and that "settling" will continue after the initial three-month period set aside for the conclusion of the negotiations with Egypt. Are these policies conducive to the spirit and the letter of the Camp David agreements, or are they contradictory? Only time, and the response of the other parties—Egypt and the United States, as well as the internal Israeli response to the government's policies—will tell.

There is a great difference between a situation in which Egypt is left to "go it alone" with Israel, and one in which other Arab states, and the Palestinians themselves, join in on the peace process. In the first instance, the result may be either a separate Israeli–Egyptian peace, which will not guarantee any rights for the Palestinians, or the eventual breakdown of the negotiations and a revival of the danger of war—a war which would not improve the situation of any side, but would inflict suffering and pain on all sides. In the second instance, the Camp David agreements, with their specific provisions which limit the duration of the "autonomy plan" to an interim period of five years, along with the many other provisions for Palestinian participation, are almost certain to lead to a comprehensive solution, within which the Palestinians can realize their legitimate aspirations. No amount of stalling on the part of Begin's government will help. The withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the recognition of the right of self-determination for the Palestinians will become inevitable.

The question is: will the extremists on both sides continue to cooperate to block a possible solution to the heart of the problem—the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; or will the moderates on both sides find a way to renew their dialogue? Will the Palestinians once again adopt the "all or nothing" attitude which damaged their cause so much in the past, and played into the hands of the extremist Israelis, or will they embark on the road of realism, and try to make the most out of the existing situation, to achieve whatever goal is attainable? Will they join the momentum and try to direct the wagon a little closer to their direction, or will they stand in its way, and try to stop it completely, at the risk of being bypassed by it?

The choice is theirs. Only they can create their own state alongside Israel. And only they can prevent it from being created. Every peace-loving person in the world should help them make the right decision.

*D.S.*

OCTOBER 1978

# When Enemies Dare to Talk

---

TONY KLUG

WHILE THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT WAS TAKING PLACE, A CONCURRENT AND PERHAPS EQUALLY HISTORIC MEETING WAS OCCURRING IN JERUSALEM. A JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DEBATE WAS ORGANIZED UNDER *NEW OUTLOOK*'S AUSPICES.

Another meeting took place recently. In contrast with the fanfare of Camp David, this one passed almost unnoticed. There were no press conferences, no speculative reports, no latest bulletins. It just started one day and ended the next. But during the intervening hours, something quite unique in the history of the Middle East conflict occurred: Israeli Zionist Jews and Palestinian pro-PLO Arabs sat down together in their city of Jerusalem to talk at each other, and—to the astonishment of both—ended up communicating.

The meeting took place for one simple reason: enough people on both sides had reached the point where they were ready for it. Some were positively keen; others were hesitant. Some dropped out a day or two before; others joined in at the last moment. But nearly all who were approached felt the time had come for those who were looking for an accommodation to get together and talk about it.

---

TONY KLUG, an Englishman, helped to organize the debate. He has written pamphlets for the Fabian Society on the Middle East, his doctoral thesis is on Israeli policy in the West Bank from 1967 to 1973, and he is currently active in Amnesty International in London.



## **HIGH-CALIBER PARTICIPATION**

The original intention was to have an approximately equal number of Israeli and Palestinian participants. As it turned out, some twelve Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip took part over the two days, as against fifteen to twenty Israelis. However, the imbalance in numbers was not so important in itself, for the caliber of participation on both sides was high, with each having some pretensions to mainstream representativity, as can be seen from the list of participants.

With greater or lesser degrees of enthusiasm, all the Palestinians who took part considered the PLO to be their legitimate leadership. At the same time, they accepted the necessity of their movement to recognize Israel's right to live, and to do so free from threat, but emphatically not as an occupying power. They all favored the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose ties with Jordan were no one else's business but would be determined after independence by the Palestinians themselves in conjunction with the Jordanian regime. They would not agree to their state being totally demilitarized.

## **RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION**

For their part, all the Israelis present recognized the Palestinians' right to self-determination, although there were differences on how best this should be expressed. Some favored the Palestinian state formulation, whereas others—probably the majority—supported the creation of a Jordanian–Palestinian state across the two banks of the river. The main fear of this latter group was their belief that an independent state, especially if led by the PLO, would be inherently irredentist, thus constituting both a strategic and a tactical threat to Israel and her citizens. Fears were also expressed that it might be used as a Soviet base.

The Palestinians made little of these fears, basing their case on a number of arguments. Firstly, they pointed to the fact that the 1967 war broke out precisely at a time when the west and east banks did form one state—and yet Israel felt herself threatened,

claiming that war to be defensive. "If it didn't help then, why should it help now?" Rather, the Palestinians contended, there will always be a threat to Israel as long as there is a conflict, and there will always be a conflict as long as there is not a Palestinian state.

## A DISTINCTION WAS MADE

Secondly, drawing on historical analogies, a distinction was made between the leadership of a national liberation movement prior to independence—often based in exile—and the composition of the government after the achievement of statehood. The intended implication was that in the latter case the indigenous inhabitants of the new state would have to be more fully represented at the levels of decision making and policy implementation. This would be a positive move, it was felt, because unlike the Palestinians in the Diaspora who often persist in denying the facts, the Palestinians under occupation are more in tune with the realities and would thus influence policy in a more accommodating direction. Further to this point, one Palestinian participant suggested that it might be helpful if there were West Bank and Gaza Strip representation on the Palestinian National Council at this time—a move which the Israeli government would doubtless continue to veto.

Little credence was given to the Soviet base idea by the Palestinians, who, as a sideswipe, pointed to the heavy American influence in Israel, which no one thought to consult them about. From what was said, there was no evidence of support for radical or rejectionist ideologies among these Palestinian representatives of an essentially conservative society. In contrast, there appeared to be far more self-proclaimed socialists on the Israeli side. The Palestinians seemed to be singularly unimpressed with the occasional protestation by an Israeli that, as a socialist, he naturally accepted self-determination for all. They were more concerned that Israelis, as Israelis, accepted the right to self-determination of the Palestinians specifically. The basic divisions at this meeting were clearly national—not ideological or anything else.

## PREVIOUS ENCOUNTERS

This was not the first time that Israelis and Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza had attempted a dialogue. Shortly after the war of June 1967, a number of such meetings were arranged, but after a comparatively brief period they ground to a halt. They were smaller, less representative, and less formal than on this occasion, but what really distinguished this encounter from any of its predecessors was that during the final session there were signs that genuine communication was at last starting to take place—and this realization had quite a staggering impact on those present.

## THE FIRST DAY

The debate was opened by Simha Flapan, the editor in chief of *New Outlook*, who set the tone of the two days by proclaiming: "The voice of the Palestinians will not be heard at Camp David. So let it be heard here." In response, the Palestinian chairman of the first session emphasized that Palestinian attendance at the debate should in no way be interpreted as implying recognition of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Nearly all subsequent interventions that day were notable for two main characteristics: one was polite courtesy and ostensible respect for the opinions of fellow participants; and the other was the speed with which they turned into lectures to the other side, stuffed full of advice on how they ought to conduct their affairs.

The most common lesson some (but not all) Israelis tried to impress upon the Palestinians was the harm they were doing themselves in supporting the PLO—an unelected band of murderous exiles who potentially were a greater threat to the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip than to Israel. Why didn't the Palestinian inhabitants have the sense to abandon the PLO, form a parallel organization, and enter into negotiations with the Israeli government? When it was pointed out, *en passant*, that political parties and activities had been banned in the occupied territories since the inception of Israeli rule (and under Jordan for that matter), it was suggested that an assembly of the elected

~~mayors might do the trick.~~ This, of course, provided that the Israeli government and the PLO first give their approval!

## ISRAEL MUST MAKE AMENDS

The Palestinians, for their part, were keen to impress upon the Israelis that once justice was done—and that depended entirely on Israel making amends for past misdeeds—peace and security for all would automatically follow. One Palestinian declared that his people were not taken in by the supposed fears that the Israelis have of Arabs in general and of the Palestinians in particular; and they fully recognized that the proclaimed security threat was merely a pretext for conquering and annexing Arab land, and denying Palestinian rights. After all, Israel is a superpower in the Middle East, and no combination of Arab forces could defeat her.

Broadly speaking, these statements represented the two most common positions on either side at the close of the first cordial but not very fruitful day. The Palestinians undertook to think overnight on the various questions raised by the Israelis which were concerned with more than just the identity of their leadership. For example, one Israeli participant, who supported the moral basis of the Palestinian claim to self-determination, wanted to know whether the Palestinians in turn accepted the justice of Israel's case or merely the fact of her existence. He realized it didn't matter very much either way from a practical point of view, but it was important to him that they should.

## A REVEALING QUESTION

This was a most revealing question. Here was a young and knowledgeable Israeli writer, active in the peace movement and sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, laboring under the illusion that an affirmative reply to his question was at least conceivable. He was quickly disabused of his hope the following morning when he was told quite frankly, though politely, that Palestinians saw no justice on the side of Israel, whose very creation was the



~~cause of the injustices inflicted on them. As they were refugees still, the injustices continue to be deeply felt.~~

The fact of the matter is that the most an Israeli can expect of a Palestinian is that he recognize that Israelis consider their own cause to be just. Even that is an achievement. After all, the moral appeal of Israel's claim lies largely in the treatment of Jews at the hands of others, but not at the hands of the Palestinians. That is one place where the symmetry breaks down.

## ASYMMETRY

This asymmetry was one message that came across on the second day. Another was contained in a series of speeches by Israelis angered at the allegation that there was no real foundation to their security fears. One Israeli described in graphic terms what it was like trying to raise a family on a kibbutz within gun range of the Syrian Golan Heights before June 1967. Every night, he said, his children had to sleep in the bomb shelter. Another Israeli who spoke movingly of the historical experience of the Jews—a people which has been threatened with extinction before, and seen the threat carried through almost to the end—asked rhetorically what the intentions of five invading Arab armies were in 1948, what the Palestinian National Covenant means if not what it says, and ridiculed the notion that Israel could not be defeated in time with vulnerable borders if there were a concerted Arab attempt to do so.

The point was finally accepted—quite genuinely, it seemed—by the very Palestinian who made the charge in the first place. In openly confessing that the discussion had changed his understanding, he added that it was very difficult for the average Palestinian to comprehend this fear—be it rationally or irrationally based—in view of Israeli actions over the last thirty years.

## FOOD FOR THOUGHT

Regarding the possibility of an alternative leadership to the PLO, the point was repeatedly made by the Palestinians that this



is a nonstarter. The explanations given might not have convinced all the Israelis present—especially those who see only red whenever the organization is mentioned—but by raising issues that rarely figure in an internal Israeli debate on the question, a perspective was introduced that gave food for thought to most. By now the temperature of the meeting had risen, and people had begun to actually listen to what others were saying instead of immediately trying to show them where they were wrong.

In affirming that they all support the PLO, the Palestinians stressed that that did not mean that they support all its tactics—nor all its declared goals for that matter. Terrorism was openly deplored: “I would not like to be on a bus with a bomb,” said one participant. “It might not be the greatest leadership in the world,” said another, “but it is the leadership.” “What it has done for us is indescribable.” Through it, international recognition has been bestowed on the Palestinian people. Its policies and methods apart, it represents the concept and the reality of a national movement. It has brought hope, self-respect, a sense of future—sentiments which Israelis of all people should have little difficulty understanding. These were not great achievements, but they were the only ones the Palestinians had to show after many decades of struggle, and they had no intention of undermining them by creating a rival political structure or an alternative leadership. Besides, the Palestinian problem involved not just the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, but also those of the refugee camps elsewhere and of the Palestinian Diaspora at large.

## A PERTURBING CLAIM

The return of the 1948 refugees to the new Palestine was given by one Palestinian as the reason why the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be too small for the purposes of the new state. So Israel would have to cede extra territory—presumably part of Galilee—and then there could be peace. This claim seemed to prove all the worst Israeli fears—the “salami” tactics would not end even at the 1967 borders. The most perturbed were the “extreme peaceniks,” who had long argued that a Palestinian state in the West Bank of Gaza Strip would herald the end of territorial

claims on the part of either side. This argument—and their own belief in it—all of a sudden looked rather fragile. Subsequent speeches were injected with greater emotion, and the casualness which had typified the atmosphere gave way to more frequent moments of tension.

The claim itself was patently weak, as small chunks of Galilee were hardly likely to make much difference to the potential problems of overcrowding. Insofar as this might prove to be a problem it would be part of a wider problem of planning, and would have to be tackled on a broader, more comprehensive basis. Besides, the claim flew in the face of the other common Arab charge that Israel will inevitably seek to add to her own confined territory to cater to the needs of her own expanding population—fueled by her version of the ingathering of the exiles. If there were any truth in this latter charge, what was the sense in looking to reduce the small area over which Israel did have sovereign title?

## INHERENT EXPANSIONISM

Now it was out in the open. Both parties often claimed that the state of the other was or would be inherently expansionist. That, it was said, was the nature of Zionism, be it of the Jewish or the Palestinian variety. Now both sides were able to support these claims by pointing to declarations made by prominent personalities from the other party. Those who thought the meeting would end with a large measure of agreement were shaken.

The claim on Israeli territory, among other claims, prompted one Israeli to assert that while “moderate” Israelis had distanced themselves greatly from the positions of the Meir and Begin governments, the Palestinian “moderates” were only a few yards from the PLO position. This was obviously meant as a rebuke, but as with many Israeli arguments it assumed a symmetry in certain areas which does not exist. Certainly there are many parallels in the Israeli and Palestinian cases, especially as regards their own self-perceptions. Moreover, the analogy can be shown to extend to the policies of each side with respect to the other: the Palestinian National Covenant seeks to deny the right to self-

determination of the Jews in a state of their own, as Israeli policy does deny that right to the Palestinians. However, the symmetry breaks down inasmuch as the one exercises it, albeit under threat, while the other does not.

## A STRUCTURAL IMBALANCE

There is thus a structural imbalance which reflects itself in just about every aspect of communication and relations between the two peoples. The policies and practices of the governments of sovereign states, and the outlooks of their citizens, are rarely the same as those of the organizations which preceded them. Ben Gurion, for example, was not able to strike effectively at his own extremists before the achievement of independence and statehood. The Palestinian national movement is at a very different stage from that of the Jewish national movement, which now has much greater room to maneuver, and can tolerate broader expressions of dissent. But all this is easy to overlook when apparent equals sit down together around a table to engage in cordial discussion.

The inherently unequal standing of the two societies participating at this meeting—born of the structural imbalance—manifested itself in more ways than one. Firstly, it could be seen in the age structure of those taking part. On the Israeli side, the majority were under fifty. These were university lecturers, writers, journalists, politicians—all products of an institution-rich society with thirty years of independent statehood behind it. Of the Palestinians, all but two were over fifty. A society which has few and poor economic, social, and political institutions is not likely to keep its talented young for long. Where is the Palestinian youth? In Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Kuwait, the Gulf, Europe America; in the institutions and agencies of the PLO all over the world—an organization which is largely run by the young; but not in the West Bank, where there is no government bureaucracy, no political parties, and only small-scale indigenous economic activity. The primary role of the inhabitants of the West Bank under Israel is essentially the same as it was under Jordan—a reservoir

of labor for the ruling society. Israelis and East Bank Jordanians can talk on a more or less equal basis. In talking to either, West Bank Palestinians begin with a built-in handicap.

## THE CONFIDENCE OF INDEPENDENCE

Secondly, independence brings with it a confidence and assertiveness frequently lacking in dependent peoples. Time and again, particularly on the first day, Israelis interrupted fellow Israelis to defend or explain one or another Palestinian position. This, despite the fact that Palestinians were present in person and well able to speak up for themselves. The tendency to patronize by even well-meaning Israelis is an unhealthy symptom of an occupation which has lasted too long, and which has had an insidious influence even on those unsuspecting members of the ruling society who probably consider themselves immune to its effects.

## REFERENCES TO THE PAST

Something else which emerged from this encounter was the futility—even the harm—of trying to avoid all explicit references to the past. It just does not work with this type of conflict. In the first half of the meeting there were brave attempts by several speakers to confine their remarks to the present and the future. But almost every point that was made was heavily laden with historical overtones, even if this was not always realized. Just think of the historical questions that are begged with such expressions as “peace based on justice” and “peace with security”—ideals that everyone can agree to in the abstract. But to go along with the pretense that these are statements about the future, as distinct from the past, is to add to the fiction and to increase the frustrations.

Almost anything that is said on this topic subsumes one or another interpretation of history. What, in practical terms, does each party mean by justice, and what by security? To rectify the deeply felt senses of injustice and insecurity necessarily entails



delving into the past, not just so that the perceived grievances and fears of each party can be aired—which might well be of therapeutic value—but so that they can be properly understood. Without that, any discussion of the future is barren. And that is precisely what the discussion on the first day was.

## A POSITIVE PROPOSAL

On the second day, following an informal buffet supper the previous evening, which helped to create a more conducive climate, the barriers were lowered, the past was explicitly thrown up, emotionalism was not suppressed, and communication took place. Long-standing enemies started to get things off their chests in the presence of each other, and it was a sobering and exciting experience. Moreover, it led to perhaps the only positive proposal regarding the next stage, and took many of the participants by surprise. It came from a Palestinian who introduced his remarks by saying that he did not (ideally) want to see his proposals implemented, but he was fed up with eleven years of occupation and felt the time had come to be constructive by putting forward what he described as amendments to Begin's "autonomy plan." These were:

- The refugees should be allowed to return to the West Bank, which should include the PLO if it was ready to fight on a political platform. (It was not clear whether he had in mind the 1948 or 1967 refugees).
- No more Jewish settlements should be established in the West Bank or Gaza.
- There should be a one-year interim period, during which time security would be the combined responsibility of Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. (Presumably the first two would take responsibility for the West Bank, and Israel and Egypt for the Gaza Strip.) The security forces would supervise the orderly transfer of power and the removal of Jewish settlements.
- At the expiry of one year, Israel would withdraw, leaving Jordan and Egypt to help the Palestinians set up their own institutions and make their own decisions about the future.

Many will regard these suggestions as hopelessly unrealistic.



But that is not the point. What these suggestions do indicate is that the negativism which has long seemed to characterize Palestinian political attitudes is at least partly a product of their being consistently excluded from the decision-making processes. Here was a forum where Palestinians were for a change involved instead of ignored, and here was probably the first time in the current phase that a responsible Palestinian felt prepared to openly submit constructive initial proposals relevant to the issues at hand. If their voices were encouraged instead of stifled, a settlement in the area might be a lot nearer than many suspect.

## LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

If the debate accomplished nothing else, it revealed the considerable potential for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Many of the participants on both sides readily confessed to having learned a great deal during these two days, and expressed the view that similar activities should take place in the future. If they do—and it is *New Outlook's* intention to facilitate this—all that they learn about each other, and indeed about themselves, they might not like. But the alternative is to guarantee their status as pawns who have no choice but to go along with decisions imposed from above and afar.

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Shulamit Aloni	<i>Herzlia</i>	Member of Knesset, Citizen's Rights Party
Yossi Amitai	<i>Kibbutz Gevulot, Negev</i>	Member of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Prof. Yehoshua Arieli	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Professor of Modern History at the Hebrew University
Dr. Yaacov Arnon	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Economist
Ibrahim Dakkak	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Head of the West Bank Engineering Union
Latif Dori	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Responsible for liaison with the Arab Community on behalf of Mapam

Yigal Eilam	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Researcher on the history of Zionism
Arie (Lova) Eliav	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Member of Knesset, Sheli Party, former Secretary General of the Labor Party
Amos Elon	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Writer/journalist
Elias Freij	<i>Bethlehem</i>	Mayor of Bethlehem
Dr. Hatem Abu Ghazaleh	<i>Gaza</i>	Physician, former member of Gaza municipal council
Rabbi Manachem Hachohen	<i>Ramat Gan</i>	Member of Knesset, Labor Party, rabbi of the Moshavim Movement and of the Histadrut
Prof. Yehoshafat Harkabi	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University
Shula Koenig	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Industrialist, deeply involved in peace activities
Prof. Zvi Lamm	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Professor of Education at the Hebrew University
Muhammad Milham	<i>Halhul</i>	Mayor of Halhul
Dr. Nafez Nazzal	<i>Ramallah</i>	Associate Professor and Chairman of the Middle East Studies Dept., Birzeit University; author of the book <i>The Palestinian Exodus from Galilee</i>
Anwar Nuseibeh	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Attorney, former minister in the Jordanian government, former Jordanian Ambassador to London
Ibrahim Odeh	<i>Haifa</i>	Mechanical engineer, general inspector for technical education in the Israeli Ministry of Education, Arab sector
Amos Oz	<i>Kibbutz Hulda</i>	Born in Jerusalem, writer and novelist
Dr. Yochanan Peres	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Dept. of Sociology, University of Tel Aviv
Dr. Haydar Abdul Shafi	<i>Gaza</i>	Member of the Board of Trustees of Birzeit University

Prof. Shimon Shamir	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Associate Professor of Middle Eastern History, Tel Aviv University
Aziz Shehadeh	<i>Ramallah</i>	Attorney
Shmuel Toledano	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Member of Knesset, Shinui Party
Prof. Gaby Warburg	<i>Haifa</i>	Associate Professor of History of the Middle East, Haifa University
A. B. Yehoshua	<i>Haifa</i>	Writer; Senior Lecturer in the Dept. of General Literature, Haifa University
Achi Yotam	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Psychologist
Dov Zakin	<i>Kibbutz Lehavot Habashan</i>	Member of Knesset, Mapam
Hanna Zemer	<i>Tel Aviv</i>	Editor of the daily newspaper <i>Davar</i>
Ziad Abu Ziad	<i>Jerusalem</i>	Journalist on the East Jerusalem newspaper <i>Al Fajr</i>

## NEW OUTLOOK EDITORIAL COUNCIL

Simha Flapan	<i>Editor in Chief</i>
David Shaham	<i>Editor</i>
Willy Gafni	<i>Managing Director</i>
Hillel Schenker	<i>Managing Editor</i>
Muhammad Watad	<i>Editorial Council</i>
Victor Cygielman	<i>Editorial Council</i>
Tony Klug	<i>Editorial Council</i>

OCTOBER 1978

THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED TO CLOSE THE DEBATE TO THE PRESS, TO PREVENT GRANDSTANDING AND TO ENSURE AN HONEST, IF SOMETIMES PAINFUL DEBATE. HOWEVER, THEY DID AGREE IN ADVANCE TO THE EVENTUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPTION OF THE TWO-DAY DEBATE. IT WAS PUBLISHED IN 1979 BY CROOM HELM, LONDON, UNDER THE TITLE *When Enemies Dare to Talk*.

# **Camp David: The Unfinished Business**

**ABBA EBAN**

The army of pundits and experts that marches in the procession of international affairs is becoming very much like the chorus in Greek tragedy, whose vocation was to express musical consternation at events that it was powerless to control.

Even after Camp David these are precarious times for the commentators. There is no full certainty yet of a new and stable Middle Eastern order, and Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin should make the most of their Nobel laurels while the euphoria persists. Autumn foliage has a bright but fleeting glow. The hard truth is that on the most crucial and complex issue—that of the Palestinians and the West Bank—the Camp David signatories did little more than postpone their confrontation by the kind of semantic dexterity that is quick to wear out.

Yet no amount of prudent reserve can diminish what they have already achieved. Like all negotiated compromises the Camp David agreements have their detractors. But the noisy anguish of the militants on both sides merely enhances the impression that a

Reprinted by permission from *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79, Copyright 1978 by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

---

Member of the Knesset, ABBA EBAN, in his various positions as Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ambassador to the UN, etc., has been a consistent, eloquent, and original advocate of moderate policies. This article was written during the period between the signing of the Camp David Accords and the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

victory has been won for temperance and equilibrium. Nearly two centuries have passed since Benjamin Franklin said: "I have never known a peace made, even the most advantageous, that was not censured as inadequate, and the makers thereof condemned as injudicious or corrupt."

The Camp David signatories have not escaped this fate. Sadat is censured only by the Arab radicals for whom any peace with Israel, "even the most advantageous," would be total heresy. Begin, on the other hand, comes under converging fire. Some denounce him for having disposed of Sinai—and of his own past slogans—with too much speed and too little recompense. Others, more shrewdly, suspect that his concessions in Sinai were designed merely to be the cover for continued obduracy in the West Bank and Gaza. A third school (to which I belong) believes that Mr. Begin's sincere intention is, as he himself asserts, to maintain permanent Israeli control everywhere west of the Jordan, but that the agreements that he has signed have their own contrary dynamic so that Arab "self-government," once put into effect, would inexorably lead to an Arab rather than an Israeli destiny for the West Bank. History works more in paradox than in logic, and the rational consequence of "self-government" should interest the Palestinians more than the contradictory and varied intentions of its proponents.

## **NOTHING CAN EVER BE THE SAME AGAIN**

No matter how these complexities evolve, the Middle East is set on a new course, and nothing after Anwar Sadat's voyage to Jerusalem can ever be the same again. His main achievement was to separate our future from our past. Both nations, Arabs and Israelis, give great reverence to history. But the past is the enemy of the future. The images that the Arabs deduce from their history do nothing to prepare them for the idea of a sovereign Jewish state in what they call "the Arab region." For them the Middle East, in the political sense, is a monolith of a single, Arab-Muslim color; for us it is a tapestry of many colors of which the salient thread was woven by Jewish experience centuries ago. Jews do appear in the turbulent drama of Arab history, but always as subjects, members of a deviant religious faith, merchants and



craftsmen, scholars, doctors and advisers, sometimes as the objects of transient tolerance, more often as the victims of intolerance and persecution, but never as the bearers of an autonomous political and territorial legacy. The Arab intellectual torment about the reality of modern Israel is authentic, and should not be taken lightly.

In similar degree, Israel's past is not conducive to easy conciliation. Our national experience is tragic. It therefore generates a traumatic reaction to any new condition bearing on our physical security. Israelis, as the product of Jewish history, are more aware of the dangers than of the opportunities involved in any grave decision. Israel's meticulous vigilance about physical security should be understood even by those who find it inconvenient.

Anwar Sadat's great achievement in November 1977 was to make a simultaneous breach in the walls of Arab rejection and Israeli suspicion. For the first time, the Arab world was presented with a vision of the Middle East that did include the sovereign Jewish state of Israel. The promulgation of this vision by a major Arab leader marked an ideological revolution in modern Arab history. The rhetoric and literature of rejection lives on elsewhere, but on November 19, 1977, it lost its dogmatic force, and can no longer be described as the normative Arab doctrine.

On the same day, Israelis, for the first time, began to look upon peace, not as a unilateral fantasy, but as a concrete and vivid diplomatic possibility. Some of us have always believed that, once peace became a credible prospect, the Israeli consensus about the value of certain territories would undergo a sharp transformation. Sadat was the first to put this to a convincing test, and his reward was dramatic. The truth is that at every stage during the past decade, the Arab refusal of peace has been the primary issue, to which the Israeli attitude on territorial change has been subsidiary. A nation can be empirical about the negotiation of its boundaries, but not about its own legitimacy.

## THE SCOPE AND THE LIMITATION

If Camp David produces a viable and effective peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, what is the exact scope and limitation

of the achievement? The fact that the Middle East deadlock has been broken by something that falls short of a "comprehensive" settlement has caused rage in the radical Arab countries, embarrassment in parts of Egyptian opinion, and some restraint on enthusiasm in the Western world. It is important to recall that Sadat's voyage to Jerusalem evoked ambivalent sentiments in the American policy-making establishment and in Europe. It cut clean across the prevailing fashions both in the procedure and in concept. It was difficult not to salute the first real gleam of peace on the Middle Eastern horizon, but there was a curiously disconcerted reaction to the new trend. In many foreign ministries the response could be summed up in the phrase, "Yes, but . . ." Was an agreement useful if it was "only" with Egypt? Might this not radicalize the rest of the Arab world? Sadat was inaugurating a process that deliberately excluded the Soviet Union and the PLO. Was this wise? Even if he obtained a treaty with Israel and an agreed statement of principles about the future of the Palestine Arabs, would not this still be far from the "comprehensive" agreement that the United States and other Western governments had enunciated as the highest, and, indeed, the only good? Reservation followed objection in a cascade of troubled skepticism. And all the doubts were summarily expressed in a curious nostalgia for Geneva.

I take my full responsibility for my own part in the decision to establish the Geneva Peace Conference in 1973 as a means for ensuring the cease-fire and disengagement and securing Arab agreement to such previously forbidden ideas as "negotiation" and "peace between Israel and Arab States." (These had all been forbidden words in the vocabulary of the United Nations for over twenty years, and none of them had appeared even in Resolution 242.) But by 1977 it should have been plain that deliverance could not possibly come by means of a spectacular international conference in which all the parties—Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Nations—would simultaneously negotiate agreements on all the territories, all the aspects of peaceful relations, all the security checks and balances and all the interlocking interests of all the parties. Sadat has done chivalrous service to the United States by rescuing it from this quagmire of impossible perfection.

And American diplomacy has shown a wise humility in changing course so as to accommodate itself to the atmosphere and results of the Jerusalem and Ismailia meetings of late 1977. If you try to involve all the parties in the solution of all the issues, you give a veto power to the most intractable issue—and to the most obdurate party.

Nations are accustomed to appoint commissions of inquiry to ask themselves what went wrong. After the undoubted success of Camp David, it is important to define what went right. This event has intrinsic significance for the Middle Eastern dispute, which is still far from fully resolved, and exemplary importance for what it can teach us about diplomatic concepts and techniques across a wider field.

It was right to avoid making Geneva another of the Holy Places of the Middle East. The Middle Eastern capitals and Washington are more natural as well as more stimulating venues. And it was right to neutralize Camp David from the encroachment of the news media. The most disruptive change in the diplomatic tradition during this generation has been the vast encroachment of publicity on negotiation. It is right, and indeed inevitable, that agreements should be published; it is quite another matter when every negotiating phase, every trial balloon, every tentative idea has to be submitted by the negotiators to their own constituencies through the press before final agreement is secured. Seated on a stage with the whole world as audience, statesmen are more likely to illustrate their virile nationalist fundamentalism than be caught in the flagrant act of concession. Compromise is the key to successful negotiation; and compromise, in essence, means that you accept today what you vehemently rejected as inadequate a week before. This is a necessary and salutary exercise, but is not something that political leaders like to be photographed doing. I am convinced that if the concessions agreed to by Sadat and Begin had been reported to their constituencies before—and without—the compensating advantage of the final agreement, the entire effort would have been frustrated at an early stage.

It was right to prefer private conciliation to public multinational debate. Camp David stands as a posthumous monument to the disinterested legacy expressed by Dag Hammarskjöld in his final report. In theory, he should have been the high priest of open,



public diplomacy. In practice he became convinced of the limitations and even the injury of multilateral debate: "The best results of negotiations between two parties cannot be achieved in international life any more than in our private world in the full glare of publicity, with current debate of all moves, avoidable misunderstandings, inescapable freezing of positions due to considerations of prestige—and the temptation to utilize public opinion as an element integrated into the negotiation itself."

## THE END OF IRRECONCILABILITY

The degree of common understanding already achieved between Egyptian and Israeli leaders throws a light on many other corners of fact and hypothesis that were obscure during the decades of immobility. A death-blow has been dealt to the theory of irreconcilability, according to which the Arab-Israeli dispute, unlike all others, was inherently insoluble, endemic, implacable, deeply embedded in the very bloodstream of Arab culture, and capable at best of transient and illusory periods of relative quiescence. In the Arab world this defeatism had become axiomatic, and in Israel it had been elevated into an academic discipline which never became fully canonized or officially endorsed, but which made great inroads on the nation's mood.

The truth is that what nations say to each other at the negotiating table bears little relation to the speeches that they were making a few weeks before. Pre-negotiation rhetoric is discarded without too much difficulty under the transforming effect of human encounter. For some time after the Six Day War in 1967, Israel insisted that direct meetings with Arab representatives were an essential condition of progress. We were persuaded to relinquish this view in deference to friendly counsel that implored us not to make an issue of mere procedure and prestige. What did it matter how peace was obtained, if it could be secured even by unconventional courses? There were bizarre Soviet proposals in the early 1970s for making peace by the "depositing of documents." Israel would, as it were, put the territories in an envelope and slide them under the Arab door, and the Arab states would wrap peace in a package and deposit it for Israel's acceptance in a

post office box at Geneva. Experience has proved that encounter is a matter of substance, not merely of form. Negotiation does not merely photograph positions; it is capable of transforming them in a process of authentic interchange.

On the other hand, the insistence that negotiation must be "direct," without any mediation beyond the use of good offices, has not prospered. Israel and Arab states have been brought to contractual agreements only when mediation has been assertive, as with Ralph Bunche in 1949, when he was acting UN mediator, Secretary of State Kissinger from 1973 to 1975, and President Carter in 1978. When mediation has been excessively amiable and passive, as with UN Special Representative Jarring in the late 1960s and Secretary of State Rogers from 1969 to 1971, the objective potentialities of agreement have not been fully explored.

Above all, there has been vindication of a gradualist approach to conflict resolution. The interim and disengagement accords of 1974 and 1975 were indispensable stages toward peace. They proved that negotiation could produce benefits, that agreements could be kept, that there was usually more than one possible solution for dilemmas of physical security, and that modest partial agreements were more likely to develop a positive momentum toward further agreement than to "freeze" situations or "destroy incentives" as the critics of Kissinger and of the disengagement agreements seemed, or professed, to fear. When you descend to earth from an exceptionally tall ladder, it is often prudent to use the intervening rungs, rather than seek posthumous glory by a single leap.

## COMPREHENSIVE AND SEPARATE

The debate about "comprehensiveness" as against separate or phased agreements remains unresolved by the Camp David accords. This is not procedural or technical discussion at all. It takes us deep into the essence and nature of Arab nationalism, and non-Arabs who are vitally affected by its outcome have no duty to withhold their impression and counsel.

Anwar Sadat's critics virtually deny the contractual sovereignty of individual Arab states. According to their theory,



you have made no valid contract with any part of the Arab world unless you have made it with all that world; and the Palestinians are the arbiters of legitimacy, honor, and solidarity in inter-Arab relations. This doctrine was expounded in its most extreme and eloquent form in the July issue of this journal:

The Arab states' system is first and foremost a "Pan" system. It postulates the existence of a single Arab Nation behind the facade of a multiplicity of sovereign states. . . . From this perspective, the individual Arab states are deviant and transient entities: their frontiers illusory and permeable; their rulers interim caretakers, or obstacles to be removed. Their mandate is from the entire Arab Nation. Before such super-legitimacy, the legitimacy of the individual state shrinks into irrelevance.—Walid Khalidi, *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978

Observe that the Arab Nation is in capital letters, while the Arab states have to be satisfied with a lesser orthographical dignity. The indivisibility of Arab nationhood, and therefore of Arab diplomacy, is thus asserted with the solemnity of revelation. It is a dogma to be accepted, not a point to be argued. Indeed, the text goes on: "It is this resonance (of the concepts of pan-Arabism) that gives them sanctity as dogmas."

It is clearly a momentous event in Arab history when the leader of the largest Arab state openly revolts against this sanctity and these dogmas. And it is significant that peace between Israelis and Arabs can only be approached and perhaps even attained when the sonorous rhetoric of pan-Arabism has been tempered with a due measure of pragmatic realism. The tension between unity and particularism runs throughout the whole of Arab history. There is a sense in which all men of Arab speech are a single community, linked by the special social energy that Ibn Khaldun called "assabiya," a unifying spirit that gives coherence to the Arab historic adventure. But there are also domains in which the separate sovereignties of Arab states are much more than juridical fictions. To wait until all the twenty-two states and the Palestine people have a simultaneous and equal interest in a settlement with Israel is to postpone peace until a Messianic age in which the need for diplomatic craftsmanship will, in any event, be transcended by divine grace.

Sadat's voyage, with a clear mandate from the popular senti-

ment of Egypt, proved that the Arab world is marked not only by solidarity, but also by diversity. The strong assertion of national particularism, within a general assumption of Arab unity, has been more prominent in Egyptian literature and politics than in those of other Arab states. If peace is a vital objective for the international system, and if Egypt is under stronger compulsions and constraints to pursue peace than are other Arab communities, the non-Arab world has no rational course but to respect Egyptian sovereignty as a legitimate reality, and not as a "deviant and transient entity" or a "facade." The PLO's disrespect for the sovereignty of Arab states has got the Palestinians into no less trouble, and into more frequent and sanguinary violence, than its quixotic and virulent doctrine of Israel's "illegitimacy."

### **DELIBERATELY EQUIVOCAL**

While the Camp David document on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is reasonably specific and clear, the document relating to the West Bank and Gaza is deliberately equivocal. Both Begin and Sadat portray it as consistent with their previous positions. One of them has clearly got it wrong. My conviction is that the future of these territories and populations will be determined less by the fine print of the document than by the realities that lie beyond and behind the text.

Equivocal language is often used in diplomacy to cover up disagreement on issues which must be included for some reason in a larger settlement, or which must be dealt with as if there were agreement. In other words, there is a degree of complicity involved in the ambiguous language. There is nothing inherently wrong in this practice, so long as the parties know what they have done and do not delude themselves with the hope that their joint signature creates a common policy.

Whether the absence of progress on the Palestine question would impair the fulfillment of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty is not so much a juridical question as an issue of political determination and regional atmosphere. Just as PLO supporters are wrong in assuming that Egypt has no particular interests to be legitimately

defended within the terms of its sovereignty, so would Israelis err badly if they thought that Anwar Sadat's independence of spirit reflected an intention to resign from the Arab family. Continued deadlock on the future of the West Bank and Gaza would, at the very least, injure the Egyptian-Israeli treaty relationship.

The most dubious aspect of the Camp David agreement, as drafted on September 19, is the underlying assumption that the major problems remain to be decided only after three or five years. It would be more realistic to assume that a Middle Eastern crisis could arise in full intensity within a few weeks of an Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The danger can be forestalled or surmounted only if Israel and the Palestinians move beyond their present attitudes.

Israel's urgent need is to grasp that the avoidance of Israeli rule over the million Palestine Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza is not only a concession by Israel to her adversaries, but also a service that Israel should render to her own interest and destiny. It is legitimate and, indeed, crucial to improve the security prospect by defensible boundaries that would involve changes of limited size which could be crucial in their strategic effects. Previous Israeli governments have always assumed that in a peace settlement there would have to be an international boundary constituted somewhere west of the River Jordan. The partition logic cannot be denied, even if it takes different cartographical forms. History has created such a duality of national identities that any unitary framework can only be coercive and morally fragile. Not for one second in the twenty-four hours of each day do the million Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza share a common emotional experience, a common vision, or a common dream with the Jews now living under Israel's sovereign law. On the one side there is a total saturation with Hebrew speech, Jewish experience, and Zionist values. On the other side, every sound and sight, every movement of heart and mind respond to the images and associations of Arab history. Neither of these two worlds seeks harmony with the other through any compromise of its separate nature. The areas are properly described as Judea and Samaria, but this does not make their inhabitants Judeans or Samaritans. They are Arabs in all their notions and fidelities.

It might have seemed quixotic a few months ago to urge an

Israeli government under its present leadership to accept Arab sovereignty in most of the West Bank and Gaza, subject to agreed improvements of the Israeli boundary. But the autonomy proposal signed by Mr. Begin at Camp David could serve as a natural bridge to such a solution, which the Labor Alignment still supports. Nobody in his senses would have predicted a few months ago that Mr. Begin, Mr. Dayan, and Mr. Weizmann, with the concurrence of Mr. Ariel Sharon, would approve a document laying down that "the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government," and further that after a transitional period "the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza [shall] decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement." There is also to be "a withdrawal of Israeli armed forces . . . and . . . a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security zones," and "a strong local police force . . . which may include Jordanian citizens."

The emphasis and atmosphere of this language point clearly to a drastic reduction of Israel's involvement in the life and future of the Arab-populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Mr. Begin is too precise and intelligent a man for us to believe that he does not comprehend how short a step separates this kind of "self-government" from some form of eventual Arab sovereignty. Anyone who rules out the idea of ultimate Arab sovereignty in large areas west of the river ought not to have signed the Camp David Accords. Those of us who approve and accept those agreements should understand clearly what it is that we approve and accept.

## THE CREATIVE CHALLENGE

The prospect is that Israel will be smaller in the territory that it controls, but will have a larger world-arena in which to deploy its resources of dynamism and intellect. The conflict with the Arab world has been the sustaining myth of Israeli society. It has created our military priorities, our economic predicaments, and our international dilemmas. Its general effect has been oppres-



sive, but not all the results have been negative. It has set up an entire system of defensive and compensatory reactions, including the creation of a formidable military power and a commercial and economic system more far-flung, sophisticated, and resilient than we would have had to create if Arab markets, rather than those of the European Economic Communities and the Atlantic world, had been our major economic arenas. And because our lives were at stake we developed solidarities that might not otherwise have triumphed over the disruptive and diverse elements in the Jewish character and experience. Future historians may well pay tribute to the conflict as the inadvertent architect of Israel's strength. Yet most Israelis will prefer the difficult and creative challenge of regional coexistence to the familiar zest of embattled siege.

## JORDAN'S ROLE

The negotiations at Camp David may have shown deficient tact in allotting so large a place in their program to Jordan without associating Jordan in their discussion. But this failure does not liberate Jordan from the inescapable fact that a decision by King Hussein in June 1967 created the anomalies and tensions that surround the future of the West Bank. If most Israelis believe that it would be rational to trust a Jordanian role in preventing injury to Israel's security from the West Bank, whereas it would be foolhardy to entrust that function to Palestinians affiliated to the PLO, it follows that Jordan's refusal to join the Camp David agreements has the paradoxical effect of prolonging direct Israeli administration beyond Israel's own desire. The irony is all the deeper when we reflect that King Hussein was the intellectual pioneer of the notion that, since Israel was manifestly permanent, it would be more rational and useful for the Arab world to come to terms with her than to sustain the endless misery of an interminable state of war. There are moments in international, as in national life, when passivity is an extreme form of intervention, and on the wrong side at that.

To associate Jordan in the peace process may be more feasible after the Egyptian treaty is concluded than before. Washington showed an excess of zeal by undertaking diversionary conversa-



tions with Jordanian and West Bank leaders at a time when every resource and preoccupation should have been focused on the Egyptian treaty.

## THE PALESTINIAN DECISION

In the final resort, the Arab cause in the West Bank will stand or fall by the decision of the Palestinian Arabs. Their diplomatic history refutes any idea that nations usually act in their own best interest. They have invariably rejected what has been available to them, only to look back nostalgically on the rejected proposal after its availability had expired. I should be less than frank if I were to deny that there are those in Israel who count, without excessive anguish, on the likelihood that this will happen again.

But there is also a deep stirring of minds and consciences in Israel, greatly stimulated by Sadat's audacious voyage; and the desire to explore a new harmony between Israelis and Palestinian Arabs has taken a strong hold on the national imagination. Many of us who thought that there were better solutions than the "self-government" proposal of Camp David are supporting that proposal precisely because of its open character. If it does not satisfy the Palestinian national ambition, it certainly does not preclude any rational option; and it can be left to the momentum of historical development to decode the obscurities of the Camp David accords. The Palestine Arabs have the great advantage of their massive physical presence. When the status of areas is decided, this reality cannot for long be ignored.

My experience teaches me that men and nations do behave wisely, once they have exhausted all the other alternatives. All of us in the Middle East share great burdens of regret for the rich potentialities that have been allowed to flow away into an ocean of tears that need never have been shed. Our goal today should be not merely a secure peace, but the creation of a Middle Eastern community of sovereign states, with a free commerce of men and goods moving across open bridges and borders in such intensity of interaction, such mutuality of discourse and contact, that in the course of time we shall hardly be mindful of where the political boundaries are.

# --- The Strategy of Peace

SIMHA FLAPAN

FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN PEACE TREATY IN MARCH 1979, WITH NO APPARENT PROGRESS TOWARD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECOND, PALESTINIAN PHASE OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, *NEW OUTLOOK* DECIDED TO ORGANIZE AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM DEDICATED TO "THE MIDDLE EAST: BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE." NEWS OF THE IMPENDING SYMPOSIUM PROVOKED A RAGING DEBATE IN THE ISRAELI PRESS. FOR TWO WEEKS, JOURNALISTS, POLITICAL COMMENTATORS, AND POLITICIANS ARGUED WHETHER SUCH AN EVENT WAS "GOOD OR BAD FOR THE JEWS." THE MAJORITY CLEARLY FAVORED THE EXPLORATION OF ANY POSSIBILITY FOR DIALOGUE WITH PALESTINIAN MODERATES, AND FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE PEACE PROCESS.

THE SYMPOSIUM WAS HELD IN WASHINGTON IN OCTOBER 1979, AND THE THREE DAYS OF DEBATES ATTRACTED OVER 800 AMERICAN, ISRAELI, JEWISH, ARAB, AND INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPANTS.

## PEACE OR CONFRONTATION

All of our symposia have coincided with a major turn of events in the Middle East. The last one, held in Tel Aviv, in November 1977, was a prelude to President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. The Camp David agreements which resulted from this visit were a turning point and created a new, and I believe, irreversible reality in the Middle East. But the question of whether

they will lead to a comprehensive and durable peace or whether they will prove to be only a realignment of forces in the context of the superpower confrontation remains unanswered. This depends on the international cooperation between superpowers, the termination of the arms race in the region, and guarantees for the security and sovereignty of all peoples in the area, including the Palestinian people.

In his message to the 1977 symposium in Tel Aviv, President Sadat wrote, "The only way to bring about a fruitful dialogue between Israelis and Arabs . . . is to see the living reality of the Palestinian people and their inalienable right to statehood."

And, indeed, the Palestinian problem is the crucial issue which will determine the chances for the consummation of the peace process initiated by the Camp David agreements. The vicious circle of violence between the Israelis and Palestinians and the deadlock on the future of the West Bank and Gaza may precipitate a new crisis in the Middle East.

## THE HEART OF THE CONFLICT

The Palestinian problem remains the heart of the conflict. In 1947, the Palestinians refused to recognize the necessity of partition in order to set up two states, one Jewish and one Arab, in Palestine. Their attempt to prevent it by force ended in a national calamity. They became a people of refugees. Today, Israel refuses to recognize the Palestinians' need for a state of their own in part of Palestine, though Palestinian homelessness is the greatest threat to stability in the Middle East. Mr. Begin hopes to find Palestinian moderate leaders to negotiate an autonomy which lacks land, water, legislative powers, and the right to self-determination. He is determined to maintain Israeli rule indefinitely by establishing numerous Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and by suppressing any movement for Palestinian independence.

On the other hand, the PLO, though it has signaled its readiness to discuss a Palestinian state in part of Palestine, has not officially renounced the aim of "dismantling the Zionist state" postulated in the PLO Covenant, and continues the strategy of

war which reduces the chances for an Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.

## TO MOBILIZE PUBLIC OPINION

The purpose of this symposium is to mobilize international public opinion and particularly Jewish public opinion, as well as progressive, realistic, and moderate elements in Israel and among the Palestinians for a dramatic change of attitudes from mutual nonrecognition to mutual recognition. This explains its timing and location. Washington is the decision-making center, but it is in the U.S., where decisions are influenced by public pressure, that the public is least informed if not misinformed by propaganda lobbies, which, feeding on fears and mistrust, stir passions and emotions. The deep commitment of the American Jewish community to Israel's security is not accompanied by sufficient knowledge of the situation in Israel. Many leaders of the Jewish community support, without reservation, whatever the Israeli government prescribes as necessary. While open debate and pluralism are characteristic of Israeli political life, the organised Jewish establishment in the U.S. has reduced itself to the role of a rubber stamp for an unstable and failing government coalition. We undertake the symposium to bridge over this information gap. Forty Israelis representing the whole spectrum of the Israeli opposition and peace community will present their views on the Israeli situation in a special session at this symposium. Their views are different on many issues, and, in particular, on how to solve the Palestinian problem and guarantee the security of Israel. But they are all united in opposition to policies motivated by mystical, nationalistic, and expansionist aims. They all oppose an Israeli rule over the Palestinian people and permanent occupation or annexation of Arab territories.

We are particularly happy to announce the presence here of a delegation of the Peace Now movement—a spontaneous, grass-roots, nonpolitical movement in Israel which has captured the imagination of world Jewry, and which has become one of Israel's major political forces which will determine its future.



## THE PALESTINIAN ABSTENTION

While planning the confrontation between the Israeli peace community and the American public, we thought the time was ripe also for a confrontation between this community and Palestinians who are ready to discuss a realistic solution based on mutual recognition. Last year we were able to hold a two-day debate, the first one in the seventy-year-old conflict, between a group of Israelis and Palestinians, both representative of the mainstream of Israeli and Palestinian opinion. The account of this unique and dramatic debate is now available to all participants in the form of a book, entitled *When Enemies Dare to Talk*.

With the knowledge of and in consultation with Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and abroad, we decided to include on the agenda a debate on, "How Can Palestinian National Aspirations and Israeli Security Be Made Compatible?" We hoped for a sizable Palestinian delegation, comprising personalities from the West Bank and Gaza, from Europe and the U.S., as well as Palestinian leaders who have made known in public their position in favor of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza alongside and in peaceful coexistence with the state of Israel.

A few days ago we received the sad news that the delegation decided to abstain from the symposium. Instead, only representatives of this delegation have come to explain the reasons for this regrettable decision.

This reflects, undoubtedly, a situation of crisis. While President Sadat continues negotiations with Prime Minister Begin on how to implement the Camp David agreements, Israelis in favor of the Palestinian right to self-determination are unable to meet with Palestinians struggling for this right. This is a grave setback. In this situation we thought it advisable to change the program of the symposium. We are unable to have a debate on the compatibility of Israeli and Palestinian national aspirations because of the absence of Palestinians authorized and competent to enter such a debate. Some of them could not come, and most of them decided to abstain. Instead, we shall have a debate on the question of whether an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue is possible, and how? We are glad to have with us a number of Palestinians to explain what happened and to discuss this question.



## PEACE REQUIRES DIALOGUE

In these opening remarks I would refrain from any judgment on what happened and what caused this regrettable setback. It is for the participants themselves to discuss and draw the conclusion.

As one, however, whose record on the struggle for Palestinian self-determination is known, I would like only to say this: the absence of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue will be a tragedy for both peoples. The Israeli peace community has little chance of winning the public without it. The Palestinian movement striving for self-determination and peace will find it difficult to acquire credibility without it.

There is a fundamental difference between a strategy of war and a strategy of peace. Unlike war, peace cannot be planned in secrecy. It requires an appeal to the people, both to its own and the adversary. It requires the recognition of the enemy as a *potential* ally. It requires a dialogue.

With these remarks I would like to open the Sixth International Symposium of *New Outlook*, and I appeal to all participants to enter it in a spirit of dialogue. Martin Buber once said, "A dialogue is the opposite of two monologues." It requires listening before speaking, and trying to understand before reacting.

I hope this spirit will prevail in the difficult and bitter debates awaiting us, and tolerance and not passion will dominate in this symposium. Thank you.

NOVEMBER 1979

# **Mystics and Moderates \_\_\_\_\_ at the Crossroads**

**PROFESSOR SAUL FRIEDLANDER**

Today we are approaching the moment of truth. We know that soon we shall have to make the most difficult decisions. . . . And everybody else involved knows it too. Two years ago almost to the day, President Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem, opening thereby a process toward peace which seems today to be irreversible. But at that time it was clear, as it is today, that President Sadat's initiative couldn't lead to a general peace settlement without the Palestinian problem being tackled directly; and in fact, without it being considered as the main issue, the heart of the conflict.

Today we are approaching the moment of truth. We know that in a few months we shall have to make most difficult decisions as far as the Palestinian problem is concerned. And everybody else involved knows it too, which explains the rise of tensions, of fears, and of hopes during the last few weeks. In a sense, what happens around this symposium—and I shall be talking about it later on—reflects the general situation in microcosm.

Let me try within the very short time at my disposal to say a few words about the past of our relations with the Palestinians, about the present political situation as I see it, and about the possible openings too.

---

**PROFESSOR SAUL FRIEDLANDER**, author of *When Memory Comes* and other books, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Geneva, was the keynote Israeli speaker at the 1979 symposium.

## ATTITUDES UNTIL 1967

When one considers the past of our relations with the Palestinians, one clearly sees that up to 1967 there have been three main attitudes in regard to this problem within the Zionist movement and within the State of Israel.

- There were those for whom Zionism was and is a movement of revolt and liberation of Jews against a two-thousand-year-long bondage, with the implicit right to start a new life in the Land of Israel, but who are aware that this right clashes with the right of another people living on the same territory. This attitude implies that there should be a limitation in the setting of the goals and in the use of the means for the implementation of Jewish rights in the Land of Israel. In concrete terms, this means the partition of the country between Jews and Palestinians, and as far as possible, following the road of compromise and not of confrontation.

- At the other extreme, the opposite tendency considers the return of the Jews to the Land of Israel as a process of redemption, and therefore as an ultimate value which cannot have any limitation. Therefore, there should be no limits to the ultimate goal and no limits set on the means. Within the framework of that conception, the Palestinians have no rights whatsoever.

- Between those two extreme positions we find the majority of the Zionist movement, which, I would dare to say, has mostly been maximalist in its aims but very pragmatic as far as the means are concerned.

Since 1967, that is since the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by Israel, a polarization process has started whereby part of the middle group has moved to the “right,” fired by the new enthusiasm created by the control of the whole of the Land of Israel, and other groups moved to the “left” when confronted with the realities and with the consequence of the occupation.

During this whole period, that is from the very beginning of the state of Israel through the Yom Kippur War, the Palestinian position toward Israel and Zionism is quite easy to sum up: no recognition and no compromise. This leads me to the situation as it is now.

## THE COUNTRY IS DIVIDED

Nowadays, the process of polarization which I just mentioned within the Israeli camp is growing faster than before, and one could say that the country is by now divided almost equally into those who deny any rights to the Palestinians, as far as sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza is concerned, under any form, and those who, without agreeing on the details, understand that the Palestinians have rights of their own in part of the Land of Israel. Within the former group, the extreme mystics are in favor of annexation without further ado; the prudent mystics would be for autonomy under Israeli control; and the right-wing realists favor some kind of Jordanian–Israeli condominium.

Among those who accept the existence of Palestinian rights to sovereignty in the Land of Israel, the views vary between those who favor some kind of Jordanian–Palestinian entity, those who believe in the autonomy process leading to some sovereign Palestinian entity, and those who are in favor of outright negotiations with the PLO for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Simultaneously, we notice the growth of a moderate group among the Palestinian themselves, and the very presence at this symposium of Palestinian representatives—still impossible three or four years ago—shows on the Palestinian side a new awareness of the rights of the Jews to have their own sovereign state in the land of Palestine.

## A TIME FOR MODERATES

This very succinct analysis of past and present positions raises the main question: Is the way to compromise and peace opening now on that issue? If one considers the Israeli scene, the deadlock between the two opposite camps doesn't seem to be easy to break. External pressure has no great chance of bringing decisive changes, and the process of negotiation about the autonomy seems to be more and more an empty gimmick aimed at gaining time.

Actually, the only concrete hope for change seems to hinge on

action by moderates on both sides. It's only if the Israeli public is convinced that the voice of moderation is growing within the Palestinian camp that further concessions will be accepted. And it's only if the Palestinians understand that Israel is willing to recognize them and eventually accept a Palestinian state that they will be ready to enter the process of negotiation.

The seemingly circular position can be opened up by initiatives like the one taken here by *New Outlook*, and therefore, it was more than a minor disaster when the Israeli participants discovered a few days ago that some of the moderate representatives of the West Bank Palestinians refused at the last moment to participate in the symposium. Such refusals wouldn't change positions based on principle, but could have had the effect of weakening the political effectiveness of the moderate group in Israel. Luckily, the arrival of a few prominent Palestinians at the very last moment raises the hope for an essential dialogue.

## ONLY BY TAKING RISKS

We shall not at this stage be able to convince each other of the rightness of all our positions, but we shall exchange ideas and try to listen to each other. All of us are taking risks, individual and political risks, but it's only by taking those risks and by trying to understand the other side, that we may hope to contribute something to the process which ultimately will lead to Israelis and Palestinians living side by side within sovereign states and with equal rights in the land of Palestine, which is also the Land of Israel.

NOVEMBER 1979



# On War and Peace in the Middle East

HISHAM SHARABI

Basically, dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis as well as between Palestinians and European and American Jews may be conducted on two levels: one political, the other moral. But discussion on either level will be both difficult and unrewarding if the two sides to the conflict fail to understand one another.

To each side, its own position is crystal clear, unquestioned in its justice; the other's is doubtful, clouded by fear, suspicion, and hate. We are two peoples who, perhaps because we have suffered so much, have been unable to see each other very clearly.

## AN ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIP

As a Palestinian, I shall try to explain to you how things appear from the Palestinian side. What I have to say will probably displease some of you, but I would be dishonest to speak otherwise.

First of all, to the Palestinians reality is defined by three facts: dispossession, exile, and occupation. To them, suffering is not a memory, a shattering experience in the past, but a daily experience.

In their eyes, they stand in regard to the Israelis in an asymmetrical relation—in the relation of the conquered or the oc-

---

PROFESSOR HISHAM SHARABI, the editor of *The Journal of Palestinian Studies*, and Professor of History at Georgetown University, was the keynote Palestinian speaker at the 1979 symposium.

cupied to the occupier. Given this reality, it is not surprising if they see themselves as victims and fail to see their adversary as he sees himself, also as victim.

## MORAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL REALITY

Yet the question is not one merely of perception. In actual reality, it is the Palestinians, not the Israelis, who are the subject of dispossession, exile, oppression, denial of basic rights. My point is that it would be unrealistic to undertake a genuine dialogue just by turning a new leaf on thirty years of agony. The fact that the other side is psychologically unable, because of its own vast agony, to admit moral guilt or to assume political responsibility does not change the fundamental reality confronting us. Thus our dialogue must base itself on a frame of reference that transcends the merely psychological view of reality, and focuses on actual reality defined as it is by the specific historical process of Palestinian uprooting, expulsion, and subjugation.

On the political level the issue becomes much clearer once the moral and the psychological aspects have been confronted. Today the political position of the Palestinians is backed by the majority of world opinion, and is daily gaining support in this country as the facts become known. I know that many of you take a liberal and humanistic view of the issue and support the human rights of the Palestinians, and that all of you by your presence here tonight support the goal of a just and lasting peace in Palestine. Let me emphasize here the point on which there is general agreement: that without peace with the Palestinians there can be no real or lasting peace in the Middle East.

## JUSTICE AND MINIMAL NEEDS

All refugee groups in the twentieth century have been either resettled or absorbed or repatriated—except the Palestinians. After thirty years they are a cohesive, well-organized, and deter-

mined group. Clearly they will not just disappear as some have hoped.

Perhaps all of us will agree that genuine peace must fulfill at least two basic conditions, the sense of justice and the minimal practical needs of each side.

As for the Palestinians, their demands on both scores are identical with those of all peoples seeking liberation, including the Jewish people. These demands consist of the right to self-determination, including the right to independent political existence, and the right to repatriation or compensation as internationally prescribed by consecutive UN resolutions since 1949. The modalities of settlement are not for us to discuss here. These are the product of formal negotiations between the states concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

## THE AMERICAN FACTOR

We all know that the Israeli government is openly opposed to Palestinian rights and to granting the Palestinians the same privileges its people already enjoy. The Camp David Accords, concluded without the Palestinians' agreement or participation, have incorporated Mr. Begin's demanding autonomy plan, which the Palestinians reject out of hand. It is unfortunate that American policy should have boxed itself in this manner, for the United States remains a major actor in any peace settlement in the Middle East.

The Palestinians are mistrustful of U.S. policy because this policy does not recognize their right to self-determination and to establish their own independent state. The United States has tolerated, even subsidized Israel's twelve-year occupation of Arab lands. And because of American ambivalence about basic principles of international law, it was possible for the Begin government and reactionary elements in Israel to expropriate Arab land with impunity.

Mr. Strauss said the other day that he is certain that sooner or later some Palestinians will join the Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks. He thinks that the Palestine Liberation Organization can be

bypassed and that an alternative can be found for it. This is at best wishful thinking. Mr. Strauss knows well enough that only the Palestine Liberation Organization speaks for the Palestinian people, and that no Palestinian can speak for them without the PLO's explicit authorization. Thus for the United States to continue to refuse to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization is not only unrealistic, but self-defeating and unbecoming in a great power.

## ACKNOWLEDGE THE WRONGS

Clearly, dialogue that does not take seriously into account these facts—whether or not we agree on them—will not get very far. And let me again state the cardinal point: It is not enough to juxtapose two rights or two national movements and to acknowledge the painful contradiction we face. Without also acknowledging the wrong that has been done to the Palestinian people—apart from the reasons and circumstance of how that happened—our grasp of the lethal contradiction we face will remain insufficient and our ability to deal with it inadequate both morally and politically.

The Palestinians put large store by the human rights and peace movement in Israel and give it all their support. In particular I wish here to express the Palestinian people's gratitude to those gallant Israelis—Israel Shahak, Felicia Langer, Lea Tzemel, to name a few—who have actively defended the human rights of Palestinians both in Israel and the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

## WHAT NEXT?

The success or failure in the months to come of the forces of peace will significantly influence the course of developments in our region. Whether there will be escalating violence, full-scale war, or real progress towards peace depends on how much these forces succeed in closing ranks and cooperating effectively. The conditions for reconciliation between our two peoples now objectively exist, probably for the first time in thirty years. Whether

this possibility can be translated into political reality will depend in large part on the good will and trust that we can engender between us in this critical phase.

## **A STEP**

This conference is probably no more than a long shot, but it does provide the opportunity for taking at least a step toward this goal which the entire world supports us in seeking.

NOVEMBER 1979



# **Why Many Palestinians Stayed Home**

---

**RAYMONDA TAWIL**

RAYMONDA TAWIL HAS BEEN BOTH A PASSIONATE SPOKESPERSON FOR PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND A CONSISTENT ADVOCATE OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE. SHE WAS DELEGATED TO REPRESENT THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PALESTINIANS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AT THE WASHINGTON SYMPOSIUM.

I would first like to thank all those Israelis from different sections of Israeli society who, since 1967, have been backing our struggle for national rights, freedom, and independence. Many of them are present here at this symposium. Others are not.

## **UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION UNDER OCCUPATION**

There is more than one reason why a bigger Palestinian delegation from the West Bank and Gaza is not here with you today. One of the most important has to do with the uncertainty and confusion generated by living under occupation. Mr. Bassam al-Shak'a, mayor of Nablus, and Dr. Haydar Abdul Shafi of Gaza, two prominent Palestinian personalities, were denied exit permits

---

RAYMONDA TAWIL is the editor of the Palestinian Press Service in East Jerusalem. She is the author of *My Home, My Prison*.

to attend the Palestine Human Rights Campaign last month. There were rumors that they as well as others were to be refused exit permits to attend this conference. The confusion was further compounded when news reached us that the quest for entry visas to the U.S. made by some PLO Palestinians living abroad, such as Issam Sartawi and Sabri Jiryis, were rebuffed by the State Department. In addition, most mayors thought that their coming to the *New Outlook* Symposium would be interpreted as an approval of the Camp David agreements and the autonomy plan. On Tuesday, October 23, a decision was taken by most of those who had been invited not to come to Washington. This decision is in no way to be interpreted as an expression of opposition to the goals for which this symposium was framed. On the contrary, I wish to state on behalf of my people in the West Bank and Gaza that we Palestinians fully support every effort to bring about a just and lasting peace with Israel on the basis of mutual recognition of national rights, which would enable the Palestinians' rights to self-determination and independence to be fulfilled. We wholeheartedly support the peace movement in Israel and extend to it our hand in friendship.

## ISRAELI INITIATIVES CAN ESTABLISH TRUST

For Palestinians, the recognition and acceptance of Israel's existence as well as its security are irrevocably linked to the emergence of a Palestinian homeland in which Palestinian aspirations to the fundamental human rights of political, social, and economic freedom can be exercised.

I would like to sketch a brief outline of a transition program of constructive Israeli action which would help in breaking the long-standing hostility between Israelis and Palestinians and begin to establish the trust needed for mutual recognition.

Such Israeli initiatives should include:

1. A call for, and implementation of, a moratorium on all Israeli settlements in all territories occupied by Israel beginning in June 1967, and a reversal of the land purchase policy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2. A call for and support of the right of Palestinians in the

West Bank and Gaza to unrestricted internal dialogue and debate on the future of the West Bank and Gaza and their relationship to their neighbors. This should include an open dialogue with Israelis, protected by the democratic right of free speech.

3. A call for and a recognition of the right of the Palestinians to choose their own representatives.

4. A call for and implementation of West Bank and Gaza rights to economic and social self-expression through: a) the lifting of Israeli restrictions on the free economic development of the territories; b) assisting in the build-up of the basic social and economic infrastructures; c) the development of a self-reliant private sector; d) the growth of economic organizational activity.

Present Israeli impediments to development must be removed. Israel must permit and encourage international support for and involvement in development activity in the Territories. Palestinian expatriates should be permitted to return and participate as catalysts in the process.

## **ALL ARE ENTITLED TO FREEDOM**

At the end, I would like to stress that many Palestinians like myself did not wait for international symposia to start a dialogue with Israelis of good will on the basis of mutual respect.

Immediately following the 1967 War, and in spite of my being in the position of an occupied Palestinian, I never refused, and on the contrary often initiated, a dialogue with many Israelis who came to my house and found there an open mind and an open heart for their problems, inasmuch as they themselves were conscious of the fact that we Palestinians were entitled, just as they, to a free life, free of occupation in our own independent homeland.

Thank you.

NOVEMBER 1979

# **Israel, The U.S., and American Jewry— —A Complex Relationship**

**NAHUM GOLDMANN**

I am very sorry that an accident prevents me from participating in this conference, and I am grateful for this opportunity to express the ideas I would have liked to elaborate on in my address.

The initiators of this conference deserve full credit both for the timing and the location of its convening. Criticism was voiced in Israel against holding the conference in Washington, but this decision is fully justified, because the United States plays a decisive

---

The late DR. NAHUM GOLDMANN was the president of both the World Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization. He helped to establish the American Jewish Conference during World War II, and initiated and served as the first president of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations in 1956. He played a major role in the international political activity which led to the establishment of the state of Israel, and was instrumental in negotiating the reparations agreement between the government of Israel and the government of the Federal Republic of (West) Germany.

One of his last public acts was to publish the "Paris Declaration," together with Pierre Mendès-France and Philip Klutznick, calling for "mutual recognition [and] coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians based on self-determination" in July, 1982.

Dr. Goldmann could not attend the 1979 symposium in person, and his speech was presented in the form of a film.

role in the whole complex and confusing situation of the Middle East, and the attitude of American Jewry is one of the crucial aspects of the issue. It is therefore very useful that a number of Israeli, American, and European, Jewish and non-Jewish personalities interested in the solution of the Middle East problem come together in Washington to exchange views.

## **GRAVEST CRISIS—BEST PROSPECTS**

Since the proclamation of the state of Israel thirty-one years ago, the Middle East has been in permanent crisis, more or less violent, with one war following another. It is no exaggeration to say, however, that no crisis in the past was as menacing as the present one. My Israeli friends present at this conference know more about the details of the situation from the Israeli point of view than I; suffice it to point to the inflation beyond 100 percent, the growing abyss between a small rich minority which is getting richer and the vast majority getting poorer, the growing polarization of the inner political scene and, internationally, the total isolation of Israel, supported only by the U.S. primarily for internal political reasons, especially in view of the approaching presidential election.

On the other hand, and this is the paradox of the situation, there was never, in my view—and I have followed political developments in Israel since its creation and long before—any moment offering such chances for a real total peace. I have this optimistic hope not only, nor even chiefly, because of the Camp David agreement, which, despite its significance, will end in failure if it remains isolated, but because I begin to believe that the Arabs are undergoing a change of mind. From all I know both from my personal contacts and through greater experts than I, the majority of the Arab states seem to have realized that there is no chance for them in any foreseeable future to destroy Israel and, instead of wasting any more of their enormous economic financial, and psychological resources on a hopeless attempt to liquidate Israel, they would be ready, under certain conditions, to accept Israel and to establish normal relations. This is valid also



for the greater part of the Palestinians and the PLO. There are many clear indications that the PLO would be ready to recognize Israel and to live together with it in some yet to be determined form (possibly a confederation with Jordan or an Economic Market of the Middle East), which would mean a change in their charter, on condition, of course, that the Palestinian right of self-determination be universally recognized, including by Israel. I must, at this point, express my deep regret that few Palestinian representatives have come to this conference. I must also state that the time has come for the PLO to cease using terror as one of its methods. Not only is terrorism in itself immoral; I rejected it as such when, in the past, it was used by some Jews in Israel. It is also, from a political point of view, totally unjustified since, having reached recognition by a large part of world public opinion, the Palestinian cause can only be harmed by the use of terrorism.

Should the conditions for an overall Middle East settlement—which concern borders, the question of Jerusalem, and a solution to the Palestinian problem—be fulfilled, the acceptance of Israel by the Arab states, some quicker, some slower, would follow. If, however, no solution is found by a policy of flexibility and moderation on both sides—pushing the extremists in the Israeli as well as in the Arab camp into the background—the chance for peace may be lost for a long time. The tragedy of such a development, from a Jewish point of view, consists in the fact that time works more and more against Israel and in favor of the Arabs; in case of another conflict, more violent, brutal, and devastating than previous ones, one must not forget that the world could imagine the Middle East without Israel, but not without the Arabs.

## JUDAISM AND ISRAEL'S PERSPECTIVE

The details of a settlement can only be worked out by negotiations, bargaining, and political maneuvering. I shall limit myself here to commenting on three main factors, whose attitude will determine the outcome of such negotiations: 1) Israel; 2) the Arabs, especially the Palestinians; 3) the U.S. and American Jewry.

In my speeches and essays I have always maintained that the decisive front of a people, which determines its destiny, is not the external but the internal one. The gravest danger to Israel's survival today is neither the Arabs nor the PLO, nor the hostile states all around the world, but the erosion of its moral strength and the disappearance of a minimal national consensus in all important spheres. Zionism was a great success story in its first fifty years, culminating in the creation of the state of Israel, and so were the first ten or twenty years of the existence of Israel, because its moral, intellectual, and psychological front was strong and justly admired by the majority of the peoples of the world. From day to day, however, Israel is losing its moral qualification and is becoming only a small, aggressive state, overestimating its potentialities, not paying attention to its image nor to the opinion of the non-Jewish world, thus losing the respect and the admiration of the larger part of world public opinion which in turn has its effect also on the solidarity of the Jewish Diaspora for Israel.

Jews lived for two thousand years in complete isolation, persecuted and despised by the majority of non-Jews. They could afford to overcome this situation because they lived on the fringe of history, in their own "portable fatherland" (to quote Heinrich Heine) in their *shtetl* and *mellahs*, sure in their faith in their own God and in their messianic destiny. The greatness of the Jewish people was, to a large degree, the result of this attitude, which has nearly no parallel in world history. Jews were always troublemakers, and their persecution and mistreatment was the consequence of the negative reaction of the non-Jewish world to Jewish nonconformism. But as long as the troublemakers were Abraham, who preached monotheism, and Moses, who gave mankind the Ten Commandments, or the Prophets, or Spinoza or, in modern times, Einstein or Freud, the non-Jews would often get angry but could not help admiring and respecting them. When the troublemakers are Menachem Begin and Arik [Ariel] Sharon, it is not difficult to understand that the non-Jewish world only gets angry, without any element of admiration or respect. Israel today is trying to have the best of two worlds: it wants to be a state like all other states, with an army, power, political maneuvers, expansion, etc., but nevertheless to continue to live in the psychology of the Jews in the Diaspora.

## THERE ARE FEW IDEALISTS LEFT

To formulate it in another way: Jews survived the Diaspora because they remained firm and rigid in their strategy, in their loyalty to their faith, and in the conviction that they were the chosen people and would bring salvation to all humanity by their Messiah. When it came to tactics, escaping dangers, surviving tragedies, remaining alive in persecution, they were flexible and yielding, running away, hiding, using all kinds of stratagems to save themselves. What Israel does today is just the opposite. The government of Begin and the majority which it still commands gets more rigid, more aggressive, and more unable to reach a settlement as far as borders, new colonies, and occupation of territories is concerned. When it comes to ideals, Zionism, socialism, new forms of social life, there are few idealists left. One of the paradoxes of Israel today is that the only real idealists are the religious and nationalistic extremists of Gush Emunim, but it should be said in this context that some of the great tragedies in history were caused not by criminals but by fanatics who followed wrong ideals. As a matter of fact, the claim by certain religious zealots that they have to conquer Greater Israel because it was promised them by God is really a *hillul hashem*, a profanation: nowhere in the Bible were the Jews commanded to conquer Greater Israel by war or bombs. From this point of view the anti-Zionist Orthodox Jews—the *Nuturi Karta* or the followers of the *Satmar Rebbe*—are right when they declare that, from their point of view, the state of Israel is not the one brought about by the Messiah according to divine promise. Without going so far, some of the important religious leaders of world Jewry and Israel have stated that, according to Jewish tradition, the safeguarding of human lives is more important than territory in the Holy Land.

Developments in the Arab world tend in the opposite direction. Although a minority of the PLO is just as fanatic as the “hawks” in Israel, the majority are more flexible today than ten or twenty years ago, and the courageous and visionary gesture of Sadat was a first indication of this new state of mind. The Camp David agreement, though not officially accepted by the other Arab states, may hopefully be followed by other similar agreements.

## U.S. STILL HOLDS THE KEY

The key to the solution of this tragic deadlock lies in the United States. Israel has reached a point of exclusive reliance on American support, which is in itself a contradiction of the original Zionist ideal of achieving independence for the Jewish people. Israel is more dependent today on the United States than were the Jews on the rulers under whom they lived in centuries of Diaspora life. Financially, economically, or militarily, Israel could not survive even for a short while without American support. Not only is the budgetary burden which this represents being viewed negatively in the States, but also the political isolation in which the United States finds itself, because the Arab countries, the Third World, and practically all the European states oppose the American policies with regard to the Middle East. Under these circumstances, Israel's belief that "what is good for Israel is good for America" is naive and absurd.

I am firmly convinced that peace could have been achieved long ago if the United States had taken a stronger and more determined position vis-à-vis both the Arabs and Israel. Naturally, the other powers of the world will have to play a role too, and neither the Communist bloc nor chiefly the USSR can be completely eliminated from the peace process. Israel's lack of confidence in guarantees by other powers is psychologically understandable after the tragedy of the Holocaust, which annihilated one-third of the Jewish people while the democratic world remained indifferent. In the present circumstances, however, the alternative to ongoing wars, with Israel's proportionate strength weakening from year to year, can only be international guarantees for Israel's survival, accompanied by the stationing of international troops on the Arab-Israel borders for a certain time, until a psychological climate of peace and mutual goodwill develops. The initiative for such guarantees must come from the United States, and this is another reason why its position is decisive.

## THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONNECTION

In the shaping of American policies, an important element is American Jewry. I may be allowed to be personal on this point. I



made my first Zionist speech at the age of fourteen, which means that I have seventy years of Zionist activity behind me. I lived more than twenty years in America, helped establish the American Jewish Conference, the first united representative body of American Jewry during the Second World War (together with Weizmann, Wise, Silver, Lipsky, and Monsky), and took the initiative to create the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations in 1956, of which I was president for the first eight years. During several decades I was president of the World Jewish Congress and for twelve years of the World Zionist Organization. All this gives me credentials to state certain things which some among the American Jewish leadership may resent. Having retired from active political work and holding no ambition in any sphere of Jewish public life, I can afford to be as frank as I think I should be, without worrying about criticism. American Jewry is a unique phenomenon, with magnificent qualities and great weaknesses. While its forefathers were poor, miserable, and persecuted in Europe, it reached a position of considerable wealth and political influence within two or three generations, and, in the last decades, great cultural achievements. This experience inevitably went to the head of American Jewry. Lord Acton's famous saying that "power corrupts" applies to peoples more than to individuals, and the greatest danger looms for a people which, after centuries of persecution and lack of power, came to a position of strength, wealth, and power within one short generation. I have often said that the problem of world Jewry in our times is how to behave in good times; how to do it in bad times we learned in two thousand years of tragedy and suffering.

Another element which explains the psychological attitude of American Jewry is the impact of the Holocaust and the feeling of responsibility and guilt for having insufficiently reacted to the fate of European Jewry under Hitler. American Jews were warned against the impending tragedy, but refused to take Hitler seriously; for instance, when the World Jewish Congress proclaimed the boycott against Nazi Germany, the Jewish establishment in the United States, with few exceptions, refused to cooperate. During the entire period, American Jews reacted only in a minimal way and the realization of this failing is one of the bases



for their present total solidarity with Israel, in the fear that the Arabs may cause another Holocaust. The unlimited support for whatever Israel does has become a policy of blind solidarity since the coming to power of the Likud, despite the fact that many American Jews do not approve of Israel's present policies and realize—consciously or unconsciously—that it represents a danger to Israel's survival.

## DANGERS OF BLIND SUPPORT

It may appear paradoxical if I state that this blind support of the Begin government may be more menacing for Israel than any danger of Arab attack. American Jewry is more generous than any other group in American life and is doing great things, financially and socially, in favor of Israel. But by misusing its political influence, by exaggerating the aggressiveness of the Jewish lobby in Washington, by giving the Begin regime the impression that the Jews are strong enough to force the American administration and Congress to follow every Israeli desire, they lead Israel on a ruinous path which, if continued, may lead to dire consequences.

I have never believed in the principle "my country right or wrong." Just as the best American citizens fought their administration over the war in Vietnam, and other progressive groups in different countries never hesitated to oppose policies which they regard as wrong, American Jewry and Jews all over the world have not only the right but the moral duty to advise Israel and to warn it, instead of pledging automatic support for any action, however wrong or even immoral it may seem. If the United States has, on any occasions—such as with regard to Gunnar Jarring's mission or the Rogers plan—refrained from making use of the possibilities to bring about a full settlement in the Middle East, it was to a very large degree because of electoral considerations, of fear of the pro-Israel lobby and of the Jewish vote. The operation of lobbies is a normal element of every democracy, and I personally helped establish the pro-Israel lobby when I lived in the United States twenty years ago. But the Jews have always been a people of superlatives, inclined to think in extremes. The support

of America under the pressure of American Jewry has been precious for Israel, but it is now slowly becoming something of a negative factor. Not only does it distort the expectations and political calculations of Israel, but the time may not be far off when American public opinion will be sick and tired of the demands of Israel and the aggressiveness of American Jewry. To give one example, Israel's request for financial support from the United States this year equals the total amounts given to all other countries by the United States. It is obvious that the Congress will not accept such a provocative demand. In this connection one should also remember the defeat suffered by the Israeli lobby in the question of arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

## OIL AND HYPOCRISY

A word should be said about the problem of oil and its repercussions on the general issue of the Middle East. Israelis, Jews, and non-Jewish friends of Israel have decried as immoral and unacceptable the fact that the Arab oil-producing countries link both the quantities supplied and the prices to America's unlimited support of Israel. I consider this condemnation as unrealistic and hypocritical. Politics in general, and especially in this brutal and complex twentieth century, is based on interests. Moral considerations did not prevent the war in Vietnam, nor did they hinder Nixon from bringing about the fall of Allende in Chile or from destroying the happy people of Cambodia. Moral considerations did not deter Israel for years from delivering arms to the Somoza regime and to other reactionary governments in the world. One cannot blame Israel, because its first duty is to take care of its defense needs, and the situation in the Middle East would make it foolish to act only out of moral considerations. But on the other hand it is hypocritical to become indignant when politicians in America or Arab leaders try to use the powerful oil argument in the search for a solution to the conflict.

## PEACE ON THE HORIZON

Despite all this, I want to end on an optimistic note, not in order to comfort my listeners and readers, nor to conclude *bachi*

*tov*, with the best, but because I believe in it. For the first time in the thirty-one years of Israel's existence, I am hopeful that there may be peace in the near future, and I base this hope, as I said at the outset, on developments in the United States, the Arab world, and in Israel and world Jewry.

Not only America but the entire world has had enough of the Middle East conflict, which has been continuing for thirty years. The only fact which may yet delay a quick solution is the holding of presidential elections in the United States next year, which may postpone the attempt to achieve an all-embracing settlement until after 1980. But the situation in the Middle East may not allow the President to wait, and I am still hopeful that a decision will be taken soon.

As to the Arabs, there is a growing flexibility, indicated by Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the subsequent negotiations, as well as by the resolutions of the Baghdad conference of the more extreme Arab states, ready, under certain conditions, to recognize the existence of Israel and live in peace with it.

With regard to Israel and world Jewry, the sooner they understand that they have to be flexible and give a positive reply to the Palestinian problem, the better will be the solution for Israel. A majority in Israel seems to realize that the alternative which Menachem Begin offered proved its bankruptcy faster than expected, and that a completely different political line has to be followed in order to achieve peace. This is of utmost importance for world Jewry as well, which, in a certain way, is menaced by the continuation of the Middle East conflict. The creation of the State of Israel in itself did not solve the Jewish problem, as Herzl naively thought it would; for the time being it has only aggravated it. Only a change of Israel's policies, opening the road to mutual concessions and total peace, will allow the start of a new chapter in Jewish history, that of the full realization of the Zionist ideal.

NOVEMBER 1979

# **For Peace and a Sane Zionism**

---

ORLY LUBIN

MENACHEM BEGIN WROTE TO ISRAELI AUTHOR AMOS OZ SAYING THAT THE 100,000 PEACE NOW DEMONSTRATORS IN TEL AVIV IN SEPTEMBER 1979 "HAUNTED" HIM AT CAMP DAVID.

THE PEACE NOW MOVEMENT WAS REPRESENTED AT THE 1979 SYMPOSIUM BY SIX REPRESENTATIVES. THIS WAS THE FIRST VISIT OF THE YOUNG GRASS-ROOTS MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS TO THE UNITED STATES.

Any evaluation of the peace process and of Israel's role in the peace process must begin by stating that the Camp David Accords are a significant breakthrough for all the forces of peace in the Middle East. Camp David represents the first time that hostility between Israelis and Arabs has been formally overcome. Camp David put Israel on the road to peace. We must not overlook the fact that Camp David was also a step toward a solution of the Palestinian problem. It seems to me that despite the many reservations which exist in all camps in this connection, Camp David was a serious gain for the Palestinians and created certain mechanisms, among them autonomy, which could be used by all the parties to advance the Palestinian issue. Of course, the autonomy proposed by the Begin government is unacceptable. But

---

ORLY LUBIN, one of the Peace Now representatives at the symposium, is a student and assistant lecturer at Tel Aviv University, and is currently the co-editor of *Ba'shaar*. In the summer of 1982 she helped organize the Enough! petition campaign against the war in Lebanon.



there are policies through which the various political actors can still turn it into a vehicle for progress.

## THE TEST LIES AHEAD

But the Camp David agreements are only the beginning of a process and not the end. The hardest part is still before us. The solution of the Palestinian problem, of the political expression of the people of the West Bank, always was and still remains the central and fundamental problem of the conflict. This problem has by no means been solved. The Peace Now movement understands this, and has committed itself to taking an active role in the long struggle ahead for the rights of the Palestinians. On the Israeli side, there are many tasks in the struggle. Important changes in Israel's governing institutions must be made. There are parties and people in the Knesset, many of whom are here, who are working for such a change. But there is another crucial factor in the peace process alongside that of conventional parliamentary politics, and that is public opinion. In the past two years public opinion in Israel has undergone enormous changes. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem profoundly altered certain assumptions that the Israeli public held for thirty years. There can be no doubt that this reaction of the Israeli public has an important impact upon subsequent developments.

## PEACE NOW IN THE PROCESS

Peace Now has undertaken to continue this momentum in Israeli thinking, to push public opinion further in the direction of accepting certain fundamental principles and political actions on the Palestinian question. So far we have done this effectively. And we have undertaken to do this because we are convinced that negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians will not take place until the political climate on both sides has been changed. The man or woman in the street is as important in this respect as his or her representative in government. Our aim in this work is twofold:



- to pressure our own government by proving that hundreds of thousands of Israelis oppose its Palestinian policy;
- to develop sensitivity and understanding among the Israeli public of our Palestinian neighbors so that genuine exchanges of ideas and feelings between the two peoples will be possible.

This is not the only work to be done, but it is essential and constructive. As it comes at a time when so much misunderstanding and suspicion exist, it may be the most important task to be done.

Peace Now is committed to the peace process because we paid heavily for the war process, and because there must be a just solution of the Palestinian problem. But there is a third and no less important reason for our commitment, and that is that the peace process is necessary for the moral and social sanity of our country. The occupation is a corrupting influence on our society. It is a disgrace to Zionism. We cannot feel free while we rule another people, especially because we are Jews. There are tendencies in the Israeli political system whose values and goals are dangerous. At the present time, the major obstacle to the success of these influences is Peace Now. We are Gush Emunim's most powerful enemy. We stand in the way of their settlements by publicizing them and by mobilizing mass support against them. We have shown the Israeli public that Gush Emunim and its supporters, in and out of the government, have no monopoly on concern for Israeli security. Peace Now, in other words, stands for *sane* Zionism, for the Zionism that bases itself on the ethical right of every people to national self-expression. Peace Now believes that the peace process is not just for peace, but also necessary for the maintenance of the democratic character of Israeli society. This concern we share with many other Israelis. We will continue to work with them and to develop our own strategies in the struggle to reach the hearts and minds of Israelis.

NOVEMBER 1979

# **The Palestinian Problem— A New Approach**

---

**ABBA EBAN**

THE FOLLOWING IS FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN'S PROPOSAL FOR A CONFEDERATIVE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.

There is no area on the face of the globe whose status is more obscure and paradoxical than Judea and Samaria. The administration is Israeli, the citizenship predominantly Jordanian, the national sentiment Palestinian. These territories are not amongst the world's most tragic areas of violence or suffering. Life beats with a normal pulse. Hundreds of thousands of residents go daily about their peaceful concerns. But it is not reasonable to assume that the present situation can be maintained for very long. It is a source of regional and international tension. It obstructs further progress toward peace and places a mark of interrogation over the progress already achieved through the treaty with Egypt.

Israel's rule over one million Arabs who are not its citizens—if maintained permanently—will disfigure its image in the eyes of the nations of the world and of the Jewish Diaspora. It distorts its democratic character, and creates sharp conflicts within Israel itself. The truth is that our rule over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza is based upon coercion rather than upon agreement. It is therefore out of accord with the first principle of democratic government,

which is that “governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed.”

The previous Israeli governments envisaged our rule over all of the areas of the military government as a temporary situation, which would be eliminated with the coming of peace and the fixing of permanent borders. But for the past two and half years, the government of Israel has supported Israeli rule over one million Palestinian Arabs as a permanent goal and an immutable policy. This drastic change in the basic Israeli position, which involves a tangential departure from the concepts of partition (“no boundaries shall ever separate Israel from Judea, Samaria, and Gaza”), has sent shock waves throughout the international system and has alienated many of Israel’s traditional friends.

At the same time, no linguistic acrobatics can bridge the gap between the Camp David Accords, which the Israeli government signed, and a policy of “unpartitioned Greater Israel.” The refusal of the present government to enact the application of Israeli law over the territories reveals that the government itself does not fully believe its own principles.

### **“FULL” AUTONOMY MEANS “EMPTY” AUTONOMY**

The Egyptian–Israeli autonomy negotiations are becoming intellectually absurd, since parties which are sharply divided on their final goals are not likely to agree upon intermediary steps.

If the autonomy program had been carried out meticulously and moderately, leaving all options open, it might have delayed the confrontation over the final political status of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. This, in fact, was the fundamental logic of the program. The prospect that all parties would regard their ambitions intact during the interim period earned much world support for the Camp David agreements.

But the government’s declarations, including those of the former Foreign Minister, against all options which could ever lead to a new partition, and the attempt to disrupt the homogeneity of the Arab populations by means of “settlements” which have a clear-cut political purpose, have clarified the fact that this government interprets full autonomy as closing all the options to which

any Arab would ever be willing to reconcile himself. The "full" autonomy which Begin accepted at Camp David has been converted into an "empty" autonomy.

The Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza are described in the Camp David agreements as the "Palestinian people," which has "legitimate rights and just needs," which will be resolved in the long run together with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, all of whom will participate in "the determination of the status of the territories." But according to Dr. Burg's proposals, they are to be subjects living under a foreign regime without any expression for Arab national identity. Moshe Dayan and Ezer Weizman's public opposition to this interpretation intensifies the atmosphere of paradox which accompanies the autonomy discussion. Autonomy is a positive idea which has become emptied of its content.

## ALL PROPOSALS TO DATE ARE FLAWED

For the past dozen years, three basic proposals have been made concerning the final status of the territories of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza within the framework of a permanent peace: It has been proposed that these territories become an integral part of the state of Israel, separate from the Arab world; that they become the territory of a Palestinian state, separate from Israel and Jordan; or that they become a part of a Jordanian-Palestinian state as in the period which preceded the 1967 war.

Not one of these three proposals has stood the test of negotiation. Each of the proposals has its weaknesses.

The flaw in the first proposal—the application of Israeli sovereignty—has already been dealt with. *Throughout the entire world there is not one free state which is composed of two nations against the will of one of them.*

The proponents of this solution are replacing the concept of a "Jewish State," which implies a certain compactness, with an entirely different concept which subordinates the Jewish character of the state to its geographical dimensions.

The "Greater Israel" approach is in essence an anti-Zionist doctrine because of its departure from the primacy of the Jewish



criterion as the central characteristic of the state. And in addition, the principle of an unpartitioned Israel under Israeli rule will never gain international support or Arab acceptance. Thus it cannot be considered a possible "peace program." It expresses the despair of peace, and this despair fundamentally contradicts the essence of Zionism, which holds peace to be one of its central aspirations.

On the other hand, a separate Palestinian state which cuts itself off from any obligations toward the state of Israel or Jordan, which does whatever it so desires, which determines its own level of armament and international policy according only to its own perceptions—will be a danger to Israel, which will have the right to defend itself fully and determinedly against such a threat. This position held by Israel is a direct outgrowth of the PLO's policies over the past fifteen years. A separate Palestinian state would be a source of turbulence and irridentism at the expense of the stability of Israel and Jordan alike.

## THE NONEXISTENT JORDANIAN OPTION

The second proposal is that those areas of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza which would be given up by Israel within the framework of a peace treaty would be added to the Jordanian kingdom, and this would give expression to the national identity of the Palestinian people.

This proposal, which is included in the Labor Party's platform, once seemed the most logical and reasonable one. It expressed a certain historical continuity which had been broken—against Israel's desires—as a result of King Hussein's aggressive initiative in June 1967. I know that the initiators and supporters of Resolution 242 were aiming at such a solution. One of its advantages is that it would prevent the division of the Palestinian people into two units—one to the east and one to the west of Jordan.

There are those who claim that only Hussein can be relied on to put down Palestinian terror, and that his large kingdom would be less concerned than a Palestinian state with getting back every inch of the territory which fell under Israeli control following the



Jordanian aggression in June 1967. In other words: It would be easier to arrive at a territorial compromise with the Hashemite Kingdom.

"There is a time and a place for everything under the sun." I admit that for many years I supported the Jordanian solution, and today too I would approve it, if it were attainable. But any lucid view of our region's reality places great question marks over this option.

Experience has not proved that Jordan is capable of taking into account Israel's right to changes in the vulnerable and dangerous lines that existed between 1949 and 1967. On the contrary: I can bear witness that on the territorial question, there has never been the slightest crack in Jordan's unreserved hard line. Its government has never considered the possibility that would take the lead both in making peace and in relinquishing territory, thus breaking Arab anti-Zionist solidarity on two fronts. To whatever degree it has been flexible concerning the principle of peace—it has been tough and uncompromising concerning borders. The Allon Plan, which demands heavy territorial concessions from the Jordanian government, has always aroused an angry Jordanian reaction.

Recently, some more fundamental doubts have arisen concerning the feasibility of the Jordanian solution. The Jordanian King does not consider "the West Bank and Gaza" to be a part of his domain. He accepts the verdict of the Rabat Conference, and warmly greets Yasir Arafat with brotherly declarations. Events in Iran may have produced doubts in his heart as to the advisability of annexing a million residents with radical views, who might work toward the elimination of his regime.

He does not suffer from any burden stemming from the fact that Judea, Samaria, and Gaza are not incorporated within his kingdom. On the contrary, as a result of his acceptance of the Rabat resolutions, he has gained a status of national legitimacy, integration into the mainstream of Arab nationalism, and respectable membership in the ranks of the "nonaligned."

Hussein would possibly be willing to respond to a request on the part of the Palestinians and the Arab states to assume responsibility in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. But it is difficult to imagine that Hussein would be ready to fight for this "right" against the present Israeli government as well as against the Palestinians and

the rejectionist states. Thus, there is something incongruous in the abundance of articles and expressions coming from the leaders of the Labor movement in Israel, who are volunteering to Hussein, the King of Jordan, the ruler over a million Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. *We are offering something we don't possess—to someone who doesn't want it.*

Corresponding to the growth of a trans-Jordanian consciousness in Amman, there is an even more vigorous growth of a separate identity-among the Palestinians themselves. A Palestinian consciousness has developed which is not any longer identical with a Jordanian consciousness. The wounds that were opened in September 1970 have not healed. The Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have become used to a more secular, republican, modern, and sophisticated rhetoric than that which they had accepted when they considered themselves to be subjects of His Majesty the Hashemite King. The flag, the dreams of sovereignty which fill their hearts are no longer dreams of Jordan.

This situation creates a particular difficulty for the Labor Party; a social-democratic party now finds itself singing the praise of a monarchical regime which is not exactly the "wave of the future" in the Middle East. This leads to a credibility gap. We are proposing that another native live under the kind of regime which we Israelis under no circumstances would be willing to accept for ourselves.

## A NEW PROPOSAL

All of the flaws and deficiencies that I have listed for the traditional solutions imply a criticism of the classic formulation of hermetic borders. Geography wanted the Land of Israel on both sides of the river to be united. History has made division inevitable since there is no unity of national conscience. Many areas in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza have to be separate from Israel for national-political reasons, but we need not envisage a social and human separation which would lead to the renewal of barbed wire and closed bridges.

Free movement and mutual accessibility are achievements that should not be given up. Jews who have come in contact with

landscapes connected to the history of Israel should not be cut off from them as they were before. A separate Palestinian consciousness also distinguishes Jordan from the Palestinians, and prevents a straightforward annexation of the Palestinian territories by Jordan. But that does not mean that it is desirable or possible to cut off the national and family ties that have always linked the two Arab populations.

The only idea in our generation which can reconcile the contradiction between political separation and social and economic integration is the idea of community. The European Community began with the Benelux union—three sovereign states tied together by a network of mutual links and responsibilities. Each nation in the European Community flies its own flag, but none of them is effectively free to attack the vital interests of its neighbors.

The Western states were not ready to reconcile themselves to a separate German sovereignty after World War II, but they believed that a community structure would defuse the traditional German militancy. In the words of Robert Schuman: "The solidarity that will crystallize in the wake of these agreements will ensure that any war between France and Germany will not only be unlikely, but impossible."

My proposal is that the Labor Party should continue to support a territorial compromise with the necessary border changes (particularly in the Jordan Valley and the Etzion area), while expressing willingness to transfer the heavily populated Arab areas to Arab rule. But instead of looking at the addition of these areas to Jordan as the exclusive option for any agreement, we should express a willingness to sign a peace treaty with a Palestinian nation which would be ready to integrate itself into a community with Israel and Jordan.

The community structure will guarantee free movement in all of the areas of the Land of Israel; it will prevent the possibility of a negative Palestinian international orientation; it will satisfy their aspirations for a flag and other attributes of sovereignty; it will place such limitations on that sovereignty as are necessary for peace and stability; and it will liberate Israel from the difficulties that stem from its current positions. In other words, the Jordanian option and the Palestinian state option should coexist within the idea of a community embracing the entire Land of Israel.

**THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM**

This proposal is based upon a respect for the status of Jerusalem as a united city, the capital of Israel. It would be natural for the institutions of the community to be located in Israel's capital and that a limited area—about a half square kilometer—should have diplomatic status, as in Brussels, Strasbourg, or Luxemburg, where the institutions and apparatus of the European Community are concentrated. The fact that Israel will be the largest state among the three members of the community will justify the location of the institutions of the community in its capital—even if we didn't take into account the special eminence of Jerusalem compared to all the other cities in the region.

**A DUAL AIM**

There is no certainty that any Palestinians—certainly not the PLO—would accept this program today. But every Israeli proposal should have a dual aim. It should be realizable if accepted, and if rejected by the Arabs, it should at least be able to extract Israel from the difficult situation that its image suffers from today. The vision of a Middle Eastern community of sovereign states could save our area from its current political and intellectual impasse, and help to encourage a breakthrough similar to that which Anwar Sadat initiated in Egyptian-Israeli relations in 1977.

JANUARY 1980



# **In Favor of a Jordanian-Palestinian Federation**

---

**MOSHE KOL**

A LONGTIME ADVOCATE OF ISRAELI-ARAB PEACE AND COMPROMISE, MR. KOL PRESENTS AN ARTICULATE EXPLANATION OF THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE "JORDAN OPTION" AS THE BASIS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT.

There will be no real peace in our region without a solution to the Palestinian question. Today, even those who over the years denied the existence of the Palestinian people and the need to find a solution to their national problem are convinced of this. But the solution for the Palestinian people must be fair and auspicious for a permanent peace between Israel, the neighboring Arab states, and the Palestinians.

## **BEGIN'S NO-WIN AUTONOMY**

The autonomy proposed by our government can only be a temporary solution. But even in terms of a temporary solution we are far from agreement with Egypt, and it's doubtful that Jordan or the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will join in these talks.

---

**MOSHE KOL is the chairman of the Independent Liberal Party and a former minister in the Rabin and Meir governments.**



Our government proposes an autonomy for individuals, while the Camp David Accords speak of full autonomous rule with jurisdiction over water and land resources and an internal police for the maintenance of order. Another two months remain until the conclusion of the autonomy negotiations. The joint committee which meets nearly every week has meanwhile agreed only on marginal and administrative matters, and not on fundamental issues. The pressure on the United States by Arab states (with which the United States would like to cooperate in defense of the Persian Gulf), as well as by Muslim states in Asia and Africa, to advance self-determination for the Palestinians is intensifying. The United States will transfer this pressure onto Israel, and it will increase after the presidential elections. Meanwhile, the PLO is intensifying its political activities and has won recognition by many countries. Without the PLO's consent, the Palestinians will not negotiate with Egypt, Israel, and the United States on autonomous rule, particularly while our government continues with its settlement policy; a sign to the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza that they have no chance to realize their aspirations under the present Israeli government. Elections to the Knesset will take place in a year and a half, if not sooner, and there is reason to hope for a new government, more amenable to negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians. This time the Labor Alignment won't make the same mistakes it made in the past, particularly since Egyptian and American pressure will be intense.

## DANGERS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE

But neither can future negotiations by an Alignment government be conducted on the basis of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. Despite King Hussein's declarations, it is unlikely that he desires the establishment of a state that is likely to undermine his regime. And we in Israel also have reason to fear such a state, which would ally with the radical Arab world, which is opposed to the peace with Egypt and hasn't yet come to terms with Israel's existence. Such a state would be without a sufficient economic base to absorb the refugees who would want to resettle there. It is

likely to be an irredentist force, always aiming to expand its borders at Israel's expense. The USSR would certainly encourage it in this effort. The PLO's agreement to such a state (if it should come) would be motivated by its desire to create an independent political base for the continuation of the struggle against Israel, and perhaps against Jordan as well. It is doubtful that the PLO or some other Arab factor which doesn't yet exist (since we have prevented the rise of any moderate Arab force in the West Bank) would sign an agreement with Israel which calls for the relinquishment of all remaining territorial claims in the western part of Palestine which today forms the state of Israel. Such a state is also likely to agitate the Arabs of Israel, and cannot bring lasting peace to our region. Abba Eban's proposal for an Arab Palestinian commonwealth which would arise out of an agreement with Israel and Jordan is original, but I'm not sure that it is realistic and practical. To the best of my knowledge, the solution to the Palestinian problem must stem from an agreement between Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinian people. Today, relations between the PLO and Jordan are normal (but don't take the hugs and kisses between Hussein and Arafat too seriously). We, for our part, would be happy if Egypt and maybe even the United States attends, even participates, in these negotiations, but the three main participants who must compromise amongst themselves are Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians.

## THE "JORDANIAN OPTION"

The majority of Jordan's population is Palestinian, and a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, with large areas east of the Jordan, could offer a solution for the Arab refugees. The Jordanian-Palestinian federation must be comprised of two autonomous areas. There would be an independent government in the Palestinian sector, with its own flag and emblems, but it would be under the Hashemite crown of the kingdom. The central government, headed by the King, would be responsible for the federation's security and foreign affairs, as well as for economic planning and the absorption of the refugees.

For the sake of such an agreement with Jordan and the Pales-

tinians, Israel must be prepared to relinquish extensive areas in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, and to allow Jordan port facilities in Gaza and a link between Gaza and the West Bank. Israel would have to insure her security with settlements in the Jordan Valley and south Gaza, and the agreement with the Jordanian-Palestinian federation must insure that no offensive weapons or anti-aircraft missiles are deployed in that part of the federation west of the Jordan. It is possible to reach an agreement on common development of agricultural and water resources and on bilateral security and jurisdictional matters between Israel and this federation. The Palestinian people must express its self-determination within the framework of this federation. This is the surest step toward a lasting peace.

## PALESTINIAN THINKING

In the book *Palestinians—From Peasants to Revolutionaries* by Rosemary Sayigh, there is a detailed argument as to why a Palestinian state on the West Bank is not a solution to the Palestinian problem. The author, a scholar and journalist who has lived in London for more than twenty years and is married to a known Arab academician, interviewed hundreds of Arabs and relates their stories in their own words.

The author cites Palestinian scholar and scientist Walid Khalidi, who holds that the purpose of establishing a state of Palestine on the West Bank is to consolidate the regimes of the present status quo. Such a mini-state would be surrounded—by Israel on one side, and by Jordan on the other—and would have little chance to serve as a “brush fire spark”—the dream of the Palestinian fighters since 1948—and would not be able to solve the Palestinian problem. This solution would leave Israel with her militaristic and racist regime. Khalidi’s argumentation is designed to convince the Americans that such a state is dangerous, and he depicts this proposal as unattractive to the Palestinian people. Such a Palestinian state, if established, would, like Jordan, be just a tool for the suppression of the struggle of the Arab liberation movement. Even if a state is established on the West Bank, it wouldn’t be able to absorb the great majority of the Palestinians.

The Arab exile would continue and pressures for a change in the status quo would intensify. Animosity to the idea of a state on the West Bank among the Palestinian residents of the camps in Lebanon has been great, since the proposal was aired in 1973. The Arabs in the camps there come mainly from Galilee and the coastal cities of Palestine; they have no homes to return to the West Bank. Many of them don't regard the proposal of a state on the West Bank as serious, and think that it is advanced in order to split the liberation movement. Their arguments are, essentially: "No one among our suffering people is prepared to renounce our right to continue our struggle. We must push our leaders to continue the revolutionary program instead of continuing to fly about, meeting with this king or that president, and acting in a manner which degrades us. We have a revolution, and the Arab nations offer us a state. A people's war does not just last ten years but continues until it achieves its goal."

## PALESTINIAN IRREDENTISM

These opinions have been voiced in the camps since 1973. Though there are signs that the leaders of Fatah believe in the sincerity of the proposal for a Palestinian state, the fighting residents of the camps in Lebanon do not believe that their leaders will agree to sell out the revolution, the "Rejection Front," and its demands.

It is clear that Ms. Sayigh is inclined more toward the "Rejection Front" than toward the PLO. Both in this book and in others that have recently appeared in the Palestinian camp, it can be discerned that even if part of the PLO leadership agrees to a Palestinian state on the West Bank, the issue would cause a split within the PLO. The second faction would continue with the armed struggle and strengthen the irredentist movement in this small state.

Thus, the hopes spread among us by Sheli and Rakah that a Palestinian state alongside Israel would bring a lasting solution and real peace between us and the Palestinians are without foundation, particularly since there doesn't seem to be any indication that the PLO leadership (despite the fact that Dr. Nahum Gold-



mann regards them as moderates) will agree to sign, in the name of the Palestinian people, an agreement which renounces all Palestinian land within the state of Israel. Therefore, we should not delude ourselves that a Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan is a peaceful and secure solution. It would likely be a base for the continuation of the Palestinian struggle against Israel and for the undermining of the Jordanian regime. Only a full agreement, which provides for the return of the Arab refugees in the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation, massive international aid, and the participation of Israel, is a viable and genuine answer to the problem.

## TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

There is no chance that the present Israeli government will follow this path which requires serious concessions on most of the territories of the West Bank for the sake of peace. The present Israeli government does everything against such a solution: Its settlement policy and its actions in Hebron and Nablus prove this. A viable peace conference can only arise from the participation of the main elements related to this issue: Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people. An agreement among these elements would also advance a peace settlement with the other Arab states. Lebanon, released from the burden of the Palestinian refugees who were a major factor in its destruction, will sigh with relief. Syria will have no reason to continue in the struggle with us, because we will be prepared for a fair compromise in the Golan which would provide for our security and allow Syria to save face. An agreement between us and the Palestinians would compel the Syrians to follow the path of compromise, as Syria would be convinced that there is no chance of our descending from the Golan Heights and returning to the 1967 borders, when the Syrian army was in the Golan and fired on our settlements in the Galilee. We are no longer able to rely on promises and good intentions. Therefore, after Israel has surrendered all of Sinai for the sake of peace with Egypt, we will have to fight for secure borders in the Jordan Valley, the Golan Heights, and the Rafiah Salient south of the Gaza Strip.

# Should the Palestinians Change the Charter?

URI AVNERY

IN JANUARY OF 1980, THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ARAB WEEKLY *THE MIDDLE EAST*, WHICH IS PUBLISHED IN LONDON, DEVOTED ITS COVER STORY TO CURRENT PALESTINIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PALESTINIAN CHARTER (OR COVENANT).

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE CONTAINS A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CHARTER AND OF THE RESPONSES TO *THE MIDDLE EAST* ARTICLE.

The picture was terrifying. A serpent embracing a document bearing the title "Murderous Weapon of 37 Articles." An evil hand was writing in ink. At first sight it looked like a classic piece of anti-Semitic propaganda, such as the cover of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. The symbol of the Jewish serpent trying to poison the world in order to bring about the evil purposes set in the protocols has often appeared in this incitement. Yet the picture appeared in *Ha'aretz*, a respectable Israeli newspaper, over a report about the Palestine Charter (which, by the way, has 33 and not 37 articles). It is a pity that a discussion on such a serious issue, requiring the utmost effort at rational thinking, includes an anti-Semitic picture of this sort, whose intention is to influence the darker layers of the reader's subconscious mind.

## A BASICALLY DEFECTIVE DOCUMENT

We should differentiate, first of all, between the wretched *Protocols* and the unfortunate charter. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were nothing but a forgery. The Jewish Congress mentioned in them never existed. Moreover, the resolutions made there are a malicious invention. The Palestine Charter, however, is genuine. It was ratified in a real conference. The present version was agreed upon in 1968 (an earlier, more severe version was accepted when the PLO was established in 1964, in the days of the notorious Ahmad Shukairi). There is no question as to its reliability and formulation. Any sensible person who reads it without bias will necessarily conclude that the charter advocates the elimination of the state of Israel. It claims the whole of Israel as the property of the Palestinian people. Those Jews only who were in the country prior to the "Zionist invasion" are recognized as Palestinians—a definition which could be variously interpreted as referring to the emigration of the Biluyim (1880s), the Balfour Declaration (1917), or to the founding of the state of Israel (1948). From an Israeli point of view there is no doubt about the severity of this document. It is inconceivable that any sensible Israeli could in any way accept it. This, however, is not the subject under dispute in Israel. The debate, as far as it exists, is related to the question of how important the charter is in the present-day reality, the need for an official act of its annulment, and the framework for such a step—if it is taken at all. There is a similar debate among the Palestinians. It is not easy for an Israeli to understand this debate, its forms and nuances, because it is not conducted openly and in straightforward language.

For reasons that will presently be dealt with the debate is conducted below the surface, and those taking part in it often use a language of indirect hints only accessible to the expert. Whoever wishes not to understand what is actually going on, or maliciously wishes to blur the reality, has an easy job. We shall yet explain what makes the Palestinians themselves apparently help Israeli propaganda. A glimpse of this debate was revealed following a report in *The Middle East* weekly of an interview with a group of Palestinian leaders. The Arabic weekly, published in Europe,

asked them explicit questions on the charter. The official Israeli propaganda pounced on this as though it were rich plunder. It immediately declared that even the most moderate Palestinians support this charter calling for the destructions of Israel. That was taken to mean that there are no Palestinian moderates, and that the Likud government is clearly right to refuse any dialogue with the PLO, or to accept in any form whatsoever the possibility of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The sheer extremism of "Greater Israel" requires its counterpart—"Greater Palestine." And here in the words of the Palestinian leaders was to be found support for this. They are all extremists, they all desire the destruction of Israel, they all support the charter. The truth of the matter is more complicated than that. What the leaders said in their interview was much more sophisticated than would appear at first reading. Even someone who does not know the people (and I know several of them) and assesses the matter solely on the basis of what is written can learn a great deal if he considers the text carefully.

In order to understand a political text, especially one dealing with another people living in a completely different mental and political reality, one needs first to understand the actual context of what is being said. Let us try to do so with utmost objectivity, without erring in the direction of excessive optimism, but likewise not falling into the opposite trap.

## ELEVEN SPOKESMEN

First, then, who are the speakers?

The journal interviewed eleven people who are a fairly representative range of the present Palestinian upper echelon.

- Ahmed Sidqi Dajani, described as "an independent member of the Executive Committee of the PLO," is an official in the organization, a professional diplomat. As a professional he sticks to the official positions of the organization, without deviating from them. Dajani accompanied Arafat in his meetings with Bruno Kreisky and Willy Brandt in Vienna, and with leading officials in the Spanish government. I met him four months ago at the conference in Rome.



- Mahmoud Labadi is the PLO spokesman and, in fact, the private spokesman of Yasir Arafat. Naturally, he expresses the official positions of the organization and its leader.

- Zehdi Terzi is the PLO representative at the UN, a professional diplomat. It may be recalled that Andrew Young was dismissed from his function as head of the U.S. delegation at the UN after meeting with him. Terzi has sometimes met Israelis. He is considered a moderate Palestinian, but as a diplomat he must publicly adhere to the official positions of the organization.

- Sabri Jiryis is the director of the PLO Research Center, an institute known for its competence. He is the main authority on Israeli affairs in the organization and a close associate of Yasir Arafat. Sabri is an Israeli Arab, born in the village of Fasouta in Galilee and educated at the Hebrew University. He was associated with the El-Ard group, got into trouble with the security services in Israel, and eventually moved to Beirut. He is considered very moderate. He attracted worldwide attention when he published an article in a Beirut Arab newspaper favoring an Israeli-Palestinian peace. I met him many times as a young man in Israel and later in Europe, in the course of discussions between a Palestinian delegation and the delegation of the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestinian Peace.

- Khaled Fahoum of the well-known Nazareth family is the chairman of the Palestine National Council. This is the parliament of the PLO. Fahoum obviously adheres to the resolutions of this body.

- Edward Said is a world-renowned Palestinian intellectual from Columbia University and one of the central spokesmen of the Palestinians. He has met with Israelis several times.

- Fayez Sayigh is the consultant to the Kuwaiti delegation at the UN and also belongs to the intellectual group.

- Hisham Sharabi is a brilliant intellectual from Georgetown University in Washington, respected and well-known spokesman of the Palestinians. Sharabi, like Said, had been mentioned as one of the potential Palestinian representatives in a new Geneva Conference, when the idea of creating an all-Arab united representative body was put forward, in which Palestinians would participate who were not official representatives of the PLO. This idea died with the visit of Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem. I met Sharabi at the *New Outlook* Symposium in Washington and talked to him also about the charter.

- Musa Nazzawi is Professor of International Law at Lon-

don University. (The above nine belong more or less to the central stream of the PLO—that is, to the central tendency of the Fatah organization—or are close to it in their outlooks. Half of them are intellectuals and half are members of the administrative staff—Sabri Jiryis is both. The remaining two are official representatives of the Rejection Front.)

- Bassam Abu-Sharif is the spokesman of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the organization of George Habash. Among his predecessors was the brilliant writer Asan Kanfani, who was killed by a bomb in Beirut.

- Abder-Rahim Ahmad is the Secretary General of the Arab Liberation Front, the organization in the service of Iraq.

These two were included in the interview in order to complete the picture, but there is no need to specify their opinions. They continue to adhere to the goal of the destruction of Israel.

It makes sense, however, to analyze the words and opinions of the other nine, both the official and the unofficial representatives. Much more can be learnt from them than seems at first glance.

### “IF,” “UNTIL,” “NOT YET”

The response in the Israeli press (the information was taken from a single source) was that all those interviewed refused to amend the Palestine Charter, which proves yet again that “there are no Palestinian moderates.” Whoever reads the text carefully would come to a totally different conclusion. Although superficially it seems that all the nine say the charter should not be amended, in fact almost all of them say that it should be amended. The question is—how and when?

In a diplomatic style the affirmative is sometimes expressed through negation; one gathers the yes from the no. Here, for instance, in the characteristic style of Zehdi Terzi: “The charter should not be changed or replaced until conditions change.” This statement can be understood in at least three ways:

A. The charter *should not* be changed or replaced, until conditions change.

B. The charter should not be changed or replaced *until* conditions change.

C. The charter should not be changed or replaced until *conditions change*.

The first interpretation is correct at a superficial reading. But a professional diplomat who knows the context and the circumstances would understand the sentence the other way round: The charter *can be* changed or replaced (i.e. annulled) *when conditions change*. Clearly then, it is worth placing the emphasis on what the nine said (I am ignoring the other two, whose opinions are known, and who represent a recognized minority) by quoting the decisive sentence only and bringing to the fore the key words:

- Dajani: "The question of amending the charter is only a storm in a teacup that Zionism has raised as an obstacle to peace."

(The charter is obviously opposed to any peace. The mere mention of the possibility of peace with Israel, even as a hint, contradicts the charter.)

- Labadi: "Our charter is not a bible. It was formulated by human beings and it can be amended by human beings to make it more rigid or more flexible. Good intentions for peace are more important."

(Once again, the word "peace" contradicts the charter.)

- Terzi: "The charter should not be changed or replaced until conditions change, then it will be replaced by the provisional constitution of an independent state of Palestine."

(It should be noted that the word "Palestine" rather than "the whole of Palestine" implies partition.)

- Jiryis: "Why should the charter be amended before we get any indication of flexibility on the Israel side?"

- Fahoum: "The resolutions taken in the various sessions of the Palestine Council reflect PLO policy of the present day. There is no need for us to amend the charter. The Israelis do not want us to seem moderate or rational and therefore they refer to the charter only."

(The implication is clear: one can reevaluate the resolutions of the Palestine Council, but not the Palestine Charter. This means that the resolution of the Palestine Council favoring the establishment of a Palestinian state in part of the country is the determin-

ing fact, and for this reason there is no need to change the charter specifying the contrary.)

- Said: "I certainly do not think this is the right time" (to change the charter). (I.e. it is a question of the "right" timing.)
- Sayigh: "I do not favor changing the charter, but should the circumstances so warrant, consideration might be given to the adoption of a new political program."

(This is clear: when the right time comes, the charter should be replaced by another document.)

- Sharabi: "There is no charter that is sacrosanct or will serve all circumstances at all times. Historical experience proves this. It also shows that the way fundamental documents are changed is usually not by direct amendment but by practical *de facto* supersession."

(Here too the implication is clear: political resolutions of the PLO contradicting the charter can be accepted without necessitating any change of the charter itself.)

- Mazzawi: "Unless there is a fundamental change in circumstances, no Palestinian would want to abandon the ultimate and noble aspirations contained in the charter. What would the Palestinians get in return for the surrender of some of their rights?"

(It is worth reading the last quotation again to understand it properly. It has two clauses: the first expressing a total rejection of the idea of changing the charter, but showing reservation in the words "unless there is a fundamental change." The second clause states that there is readiness to abandon the "ultimate and noble aspirations" if there is an appropriate reward for doing so—the intention is the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This is how Mazzawi puts it, like the others, each in his own particular style.)

In fact, all the nine say that they are prepared to annul the charter and/or its objectives if "conditions change" and an appropriate reward is given to the Palestinian people. Most of them see the condition for this to be a change in Israel's policy, which adheres to "Greater Israel" while refusing any recognition of the Palestinian people or their rights.

It seems that whoever claims that all the nine are against the



amendment of the charter is right. But, in fact, it is a complete untruth; the opposite is true. Reading carefully with political awareness shows that all the nine adhere in one way or another to the amendment of the charter, at this point in time or another, under these circumstances or others.

Why don't the Palestinians simply state positively that they are prepared to amend the Palestine Charter? To answer this it is necessary to understand the Palestinian reality and the place of the charter in it.

In the eyes of an Israeli—any Israeli—the charter is an abhorrent document, threatening our existence. In the eyes of a Palestinian (maybe any Palestinian) the charter is a national symbol, a turning-point in the history of his people.

The present version was born at one of the darkest periods in the history of the Palestinians, in July 1968. The previous year Israel had conquered the remaining Palestinian territory, after having conquered most of it in the 1948 war. UN Resolution 242 completely ignored the existence of the Palestinian people. The Arab armies were beaten and humiliated in the Six Day War. The Palestinian people remained alone, half of them living under conquest, the other half scattered in hostile and alienating Arab states. In order to understand (to understand, not to forgive) the charter, it is necessary to grasp the fact that, at the time, it answered three basic psychological needs of the Palestinian soul:

- To express from the depths of a debased condition an almost messianic national faith, totally severed from reality. The charter is a rejection of the bitter reality and perhaps therein lies its power.

- To fortify the historical claim of the Palestinians that Israel is not a lawful entity. From here arises the article stating that the Jews are not a nation, that there was a Zionist invasion into the country, that the mere existence of Israel is illegal, and so on.

- To proclaim the independence of the Palestinian people to the Arab regimes, who tried to impose their authority on the Palestinians, to exploit them for their own ends and toy cynically with their fate. The present charter was accepted at the time of Yasir Arafat's taking over the Palestinian revolution, and the deposition of Ahmad Shukairi, who was an agent of foreign governments (especially of Egypt). Fatah (the abbreviation meaning the Palestine Liberation Movement) was started at the end of the '50s, when

one of its aims was to free the Palestinians from the burden of their Arab custodians.

This explains Article 28, which rejects "all forms of interference, custodianship, and dependence," referring to the various Arab states. This article did not appear in the original charter of May 1964, and was inserted at the Fourth Palestine Council in July 1968, when the final up-to-date version of the document was accepted.

## FOUR QUESTIONS

Every sensible Palestinian understands that the charter was accepted at the time in order to satisfy those particular needs and is no longer relevant to the reality of the present day. After all, the circumstances have changed. The Palestinians are no longer a beaten and isolated people whose cries the world refuses to hear. The PLO is no longer a peripheral group, whose position in any respectable society remains unrecognized. On the contrary, more than 100 states now recognize the PLO in one way or another; it has a network of diplomatic representation around the world, and an observer's seat in the UN. This change in position has been accompanied by a change in outlook. The organization now publicly announces its intention to establish a Palestinian state "in every part of the country which will be liberated from or vacated by Israel," at least as an immediate aim. The charter has become irrelevant. Nevertheless, no one would dare to demand openly the Palestine Council to act at once in accordance with Article 33, which says: "This Charter will not be amended unless there is a two-thirds majority among all members of The National Council of the PLO, in a vote held at a special session." Why?

I think what is happening here is a combination of several factors:

First of all, the actual sacredness of the document is anchored now in the Palestinian consciousness. We shall talk about the implications of this later on.

There is an awareness that any attempt to change will meet the strong opposition of the Rejection Front organizations, Arab

states supporting them, and perhaps also the part of the Palestinian public which no longer adheres to the more extreme views of the charter, but for whom it has sentimental value.

It follows that there is a half-submerged debate going on among the political and intellectual leaders of the Palestinian public.

As shown by the *Middle East* interview, the debate is no longer whether the charter should be changed, but about four, more practical, questions:

What form should the change take?

When should the charter be changed?

Which sections of the charter should be changed?

What reward should changing the charter bring?

## “TO REPLACE,” NOT “TO CHANGE”

There are various opinions as to what form the change should take, all of which are implied in the answers of those interviewed. Some believe that it is possible to change the charter itself, when circumstances allow. I think, however, that those who are of this opinion are a small minority. Those who are opposed to an official change of the charter argue that a nation never changes sacred documents of this kind. Did the Soviets annul the Communist Manifesto, calling for world revolution when they established détente with the United States? Did Israel amend the Basel Program or any of the extreme proclamations made over the years by the Zionist movement? Was the Biltmore Program, calling for the establishment of a Jewish state in the whole of Israel, changed? Has Israel officially disowned the divine promise stating that the Jews were given the entire country from the Nile to the Euphrates? Did Menachem Begin change in Camp David the political program of the Likud (of Herut), claiming that the Jewish people are entitled to an Israel on both sides of the Jordan? According to this view, a document of this kind is the product of its time, belongs to its period, and is not to be changed after the deed. Like other period pieces, it is a museum exhibit.

If so, how can it be changed? By a new document. There are various suggestions how this should be done, among them:

- When the time comes, there will be a temporary Palestine government with a temporary Palestine constitution instead of the charter.

- The Palestine National Council will simply ignore the charter and make a number of new resolutions contravening the main points of the charter.

- The peace agreement which one day will be reached between Israel and the PLO will itself be the annulment of the charter, since it will include a recognition of, and be the starting point of relations with, Israel.

There has been another original line taken recently by, among others, Ahmed Sidqi Dajani, who took part in the interview. He simply declares that the charter does not mean what it says, that it does not deny the existence of Israel and does not advocate the expulsion of the Jews. According to the facts this is incorrect—yet even a new “interpretation” of this sort could, in his eyes, be a change of the charter. Arafat himself has also taken this line.

The general tendency is “to replace” rather than “to change” the charter. For the Palestinians, as for many others in their situation, it is simply much easier. Any “change” would offend sacred feelings, while “replacing” is just a political act.

## WHEN?

Whatever the form of change or of replacement, the question is when to do it? The answer to this question is also implied in the answers in the interview. Those who sympathize with the Palestinians would like it to be done immediately as the condition for the dialogue with the Palestinians, so as to enable the United States and many in Israel to recognize the PLO.

Why are the majority of the Palestinians opposed to this?

The simple answer is that the recognition and acceptance of Israel is the only card in the hands of the Palestinians, and it would be wrong to ask them to place it on the table before Israel has agreed to a return of the conquered territories and to the establishment of a Palestinian state. According to this view, the Palestinians should show their readiness to recognize Israel only in the course of negotiations and accept it only in the context of a Palestinian–Israeli peace agreement. According to another view,



this could be done to begin with, in exchange for an Israeli recognition of the PLO. That is, that at least *de facto* mutual recognition, is a condition for negotiations and that final recognition, *de jure*, will be part of the agreement reached.

There is yet another answer which is related to the internal situation of the PLO. As the umbrella organization, it is a very broad coalition of organizations and outlooks. While the PLO itself is independent and maneuvers among the various Arab states, most of the other organizations depend on one or another Arab state. Some of them are extreme and belong to the Rejection Front. Arafat's genius lies in having kept this coalition together for such a long period of time. Any change in the charter, in whatever form, paving the way to peace with Israel and its recognition will cause an internal conflict between the majority led by the Fatah and the "dissenting" minority. Many of the leaders of the Palestinians know that this conflict is inevitable. But they are determined to postpone it as far as possible, at least until they are able to show the Palestinian multitudes a concrete achievement—for instance, Israel's consent to the establishment of a Palestinian state. "Ben Gurion, too, did not disband the *Etzel* [Irgun] and *Lehi* [Stern] organizations until the establishment of the state of Israel," one of those interviewed explained to me. "Why should we break our ranks before we have achieved anything?" (By the way, I am always amused by the reliance of the Palestinians on our own cases, such as Altelena, and the murder of Bernadotte.)

The situation could possibly have been different if the "moderates" in the PLO could have pointed to any particular achievement following their contacts with Israelis. Yet the fact remains that the Israeli government has not changed its positions at all, that the peace forces in Israel remain weak, their influence on the policy toward the Palestinians negligible. From all that was said by the speakers in the interviews, it is clear that almost all of them think that the time has not yet come for any change whatsoever in the charter.

## JUSTICE AND TERRORISM

Even when the time comes and an appropriate way for changing or replacing the charter is found, the question relating to the

range of change will remain. The charter contains 33 articles on various subjects. Even those who think it should be changed do not think all of it should be changed: for example, Article 19, which states that the UN resolution to partition Israel was illegal and the articles that assert that the Jews of the world are not one nation or people, and that anyhow Zionism is not a national liberation movement but an agent of imperialism, etc.

Those Palestinians who want or agree to peace with Israel do not necessarily relinquish these views. Even he who is prepared to recognize Israel as a *fait accompli* to be accepted, and would concede that there exists now in Israel an Israeli nation, is not necessarily prepared to concede that Zionism was a just movement or that the Jews had a right to Israel. A true acceptance of this kind—viewing Zionism in a different light, and accepting the process which led to the establishment of the state of Israel as a just and lawful act—could only be the outcome of a prolonged development, maybe in the next generation.

The typical Palestinian moderate says: "Zionism was a racist and imperialist movement, and so it remains. It has caused historical injustice to the Palestinian people. The foundation of Israel was illegal. Yet what was done was done, and cannot be eradicated. We cannot rectify a wrong by creating a new one. There is now an Israeli nation in the country. This fact has to be accepted. The practical solution is coexistence in two national states, side by side."

If and when the charter is replaced by a new document, it is reasonable to suppose that it will reflect a view such as this one.

There is also a similar debate going on about terrorism. What to any Israeli looks like a series of ghastly barbaric acts seems to all Palestinians to be rightful acts of self-defense after Israel has expelled them from their country, refuses to let them build their own state, and even uses its excellent army to bombard them in Lebanon. The Israelis see before them terrible murderers attacking women and children indiscriminately. The Palestinians see before them young heroes, whose odds to die are close to 100 percent, penetrating the most well-protected country in the world.

In the eyes of the Israelis this is base "terrorism." In the eyes of the Palestinians it is "the struggle for national liberation," not

only sanctioned by the law of nations, but a matter of duty to a conquered people. This view is expressed in Article 9 of the charter. In my opinion there is no possibility of bridging the chasm between these two conceptions, both with respect to the past and the future. The only thing that is feasible is to act so as to put an end to future raids, at least when Israeli-Palestinian negotiations for peace begin.

The Israeli propaganda claims that this is absolutely impossible because of that particular article in the charter. The Palestinians say that the leadership of the PLO can do it when conditions justify it—though this would obviously lead to a conflict with the Rejection Front organizations, who would be unwilling to agree to such a resolution. For this reason too, the question of timing is of importance. It cannot be done until the Palestinian multitudes in the Diaspora are convinced that it has come about in exchange for a suitable national gain. As for the gain, it is clear what it should be according to the Palestinians: the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including the eastern part of Jerusalem (with a municipal arrangement for preserving the physical unity of the city). The big question is: will this be the final point or simply a transitional step before the establishment of a Palestinian state in all parts of the country? Here the subject of the charter is raised anew. The Israeli enemies of an Israel-Palestinian peace find ample ammunition in the charter. The charter advocates the establishment of an Arab-Palestinian state in all parts of the country, “in the borders of the British Mandate” (and it is not clear whether the intention is to the mandate borders before the partition of Jordan, or after it). Contrary to a common error, the charter does not speak of “a secular democratic state” in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims will live together peacefully and equitably. This is a later development, contradicting the charter, which deals only with an Arab-Palestinian state where Jews who had been living in Palestine “before the Zionist invasion” would receive citizenship. According to the charter, a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank can be the basis for continuing “the armed struggle” against Israel, until the “liberation” of the whole country and the obliteration of “the Zionist phenomenon.”

The Palestinian leaders are faced with this difficulty. Since they



are still unprepared for an official annulment of the charter, they are forced to seek a different solution. Arafat himself has said that the unification of Palestine is "a dream," and one is allowed to dream. This implies that it is an unreasonable and impractical political goal. Others have said that the unification will be realized at some point in the future, "after a hundred years," as the late Sa'id Hammami once said, or "not in our time," as others have put it. Therefore they are saying that the Israeli peace treaty including a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will be final, and any change in it would be made on the basis of mutual agreement; that is, through peaceful means. Ultimately, the Palestinians will have to recognize the fact that these formulations are insufficient, and that in exchange for Israel's consenting to the establishment of a Palestinian state it will be necessary to assert unequivocally that this is the ultimate goal (as far as there is anything that is final in life).

## THE POWER OF A DOCUMENT

The Palestinians try in private conversations and also in public debates to convince the Israelis that the whole business of the charter is unimportant. The charter, even in the lives of the Palestinians themselves, is not something concrete. The majority of them don't even remember its contents. (Many times I have discussed the text of the charter with one Palestinian or another, and in the end it turned out that my version was correct, while my interlocutor was thinking of a completely faulty version). Once, in one of those conversations, a central Palestinian figure exclaimed: "To hell with the charter!" At the *New Outlook* conference in Washington, I too said "to hell with the charter!" To judge from the facial expressions of the Palestinians present, they seemed quite in agreement with me. But this message has to be qualified. Today the charter is a paper obstacle on the road to peace. It is ammunition in the hands of the enemies of peace in Israel, and most Palestinians hold that Israel sticks to the charter for malicious reasons while the Palestinians have in fact already abandoned it. This is true, but not entirely so. There is another side of the coin. Beyond everyday political life, sacred docu-



ments have a life and power of their own. They influence, they create states of mind, they bring suspicion and apprehension. The dream of "Greater Israel" still carries a lot of weight among certain circles. The Communist Manifesto, studied in Soviet schools, even today is influential, almost 150 years after it was written. Who knows what goes on in the subconscious minds of the Soviet leaders nurtured on this document? The Palestine Charter, even if today it is not directing the policy of the main sections of the PLO, can influence the subconscious minds of a great many people. Therefore, I do not doubt that it should "be changed or annulled," one of these days, in order to achieve peace.

My contribution to the debate is the suggestion to include, when the day comes, in the Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty, an article stating that "all charters, resolutions, and proclamations of both sides which are opposed to the spirit and language of this treaty are hereby annulled."

## A PAPER TIGER

But at this hour, when the resolution of the historic conflict between the two peoples is being discussed, it makes no sense to discuss the Palestine Charter. It is a trick to distract attention. Some do it innocently, some maliciously. The falsification of the *Middle East* interview by Israelis who know they are not saying the truth is nothing but another example of this.

Lately this fabricated debate has become an instrument of internal politics in the hands of so-called doves in order to bludgeon the true peace camp, seeking true solutions. These trendy doves, trying to preserve their popularity and to bludgeon those who are consistent seekers of peace who maintain contact with the Palestinians, argue with us: "Why don't you demand the immediate annulment of the charter? How can you sit with them without their doing so?" We are professionals in the quest for peace. We were not born yesterday, and we are not the children of passing fashions. We attempt to understand the complex problem and, among other things, the place of this paper tiger in the general system of things. The charter still exists. It is not unimportant,

but one of the problems to be faced: one among many and not the most important. Whoever raises the charter as the only problem, or the main one, as though it were more important than the refusal of the government of Israel to return the conquered territories in exchange for peace, or even to recognize the existence and rights of the Palestinian people, is distorting reality. Whosoever conceals maliciously the difficulties of the Palestinians and claims simply that the Palestinians "refuse to annul the charter," and that for this reason "there are no Palestinian moderates" is also lying, unless he is an incurable simpleton. In this spirit I repeat and say, "To hell with the charter!"

APRIL 1980

---

## ***Al-Fajr* Editorial**

ALMOST TWENTY-THREE YEARS AFTER *NEW OUTLOOK* PUBLISHED ITS FIRST EDITION IN JULY OF 1957, A CORRESPONDING PALESTINIAN VOICE APPEARED. *AL-FAJR*, ONE OF THE THREE PALESTINIAN DAILIES PUBLISHED IN ARABIC IN EAST JERUSALEM, BEGAN PUBLISHING AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE WEEKLY IN APRIL OF 1980. IN 1982 IT ALSO BEGAN TO PUBLISH A WEEKLY IN HEBREW.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE INTRODUCTORY LEAD EDITORIAL, WHICH APPEARED IN THE FIRST EDITION OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE WEEKLY.

An independent Palestinian state is what all Palestinians have been calling for. One of the arguments against such a state is that it will not be economically viable.

Such an argument can be easily refuted if we examine the status of the existing sovereign states in the region.

Israel, with few natural resources, has grown into a developing industrial nation. With money and technology from the West, it was possible to build up a viable economy. A more striking example is Jordan, the desert tract of land lacking the natural resources as well as the money and technology that are given to Israel. And yet, both states do exist. Israel does so in spite of a tremendous burden of armament and the servicing of a backbreaking foreign debt; Jordan is actually flourishing with only phosphate as its natural resource.

Indeed, should peace prevail in the region, then only a portion

of the money spent on armament would be sufficient to render the economies of all the states in the region not only viable, but also prosperous.

The Palestinians have proved beyond doubt that they have the ingenuity and the will to transform wasteland into arable land and to make the desert bloom.

This determination will eventually surmount all obstacles and lead to an independent Palestinian state.

The Palestinians as a people have been suppressed for a long time, and yet, they have been unyielding in their demand for recognition of their inalienable right to self-determination and an independent state on their national soil.

The Palestinian legitimate rights have won the sympathy and recognition of the majority of the United Nations member states from both the Eastern and Western blocs.

A Palestinian state will sooner or later become a reality whether or not Israel accepts that reality. World opinion, together with the Arab financial, political, and moral support, will facilitate the emergence of such an independent state.

That is inevitable. The dawn of statehood is close now for a people who have lived for such a long period of time under the darkness of occupation.

We, in this paper, feel it is our duty to extend a hand to the peace-loving Israelis who would help us in bridging the gap that separates the two nations. It is time that some sort of understanding is reached. We therefore exhort those peace-loving Israelis to help precipitate the birth of a Palestinian state and to facilitate its establishment through peaceful means.

For unlike the prevailing impression about Palestinians, which is mistaken, we would say that there does indeed exist a visible strain of moderation.

APRIL 23, 1980



## **Joint *Al-Fajr*— New Outlook Meeting**

IN RESPONSE TO THE PASSAGE IN *AL FAJR*'S INITIAL EDITORIAL WHICH STATED THAT "WE, IN THIS PAPER, FEEL IT IS OUR DUTY TO EXTEND A HAND TO THE PEACE-LOVING ISRAELIS WHO WOULD HELP US IN BRIDGING THE GAP THAT SEPARATES THE TWO NATIONS," A JOINT MEETING WAS HELD BETWEEN THE EDITORIAL BOARDS OF *NEW OUTLOOK* AND *AL-FAJR*. PARTICIPATING ON BEHALF OF *NEW OUTLOOK* WERE SIMHA FLAPAN, YA'ACOV ARNON, DOV BARNIR, WILLY GAFNI, Yael LOTAN, AND HILLEL SCHENKER. ON BEHALF OF *AL-FAJR*, THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ZUHEIR RAYYEIS, HANNA SINIORA, ELIAS ZANANIRI, ZIAD ABU ZIAD, DAVID KUTTAB, AND JONATHAN KUTTAB. THE FOLLOWING IS A CONDENSED VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPTION OF THAT MEETING.

Simha Flapan opened the discussion by stressing that "we are in a very dangerous period." He said that the Israel government is intensifying its efforts to prevent the self-determination of Palestinians and the creation of a Palestinian state, by trying to create "irreversible conditions in the occupied territories, by confiscation of land, and large-scale settlement." Begin is exploiting the double advantage of the American election year and Sadat's desire to regain all of Sinai. To frustrate his plan it is

necessary, first of all, to topple the government—and there is a reasonable chance of achieving this; secondly, we should encourage criticism of current Israeli government policies by Diaspora Jewry.

These are short-term aims. “The root of the problem is how to effect a radical change in attitudes.” This requires cooperation. The extremists on either side reinforce each other. When we address a Jewish community and say that “the position of the PLO is that, with the establishment of a Palestinian state, it would recognize the state of Israel, and work out all the problems that will arise,” we are confronted with disbelief. People say: “Do you have proof? Why can’t you produce leaders of the Palestinian movement who will say this clearly?”

Simha Flapan said that he understood the Palestinian difficulty in this matter, when confronted by an uncompromising official Israeli government policy, but “this impasse is the vicious circle that we have to break.”

*New Outlook’s* editor in chief expressed appreciation for *Al-Fajr’s* initiative in publishing an English language edition, which allows for dialogue, and drew a parallel with the founding of *New Outlook*, twenty-three years ago.

Zuheir Rayyeis responded on behalf of *Al-Fajr*, expressing appreciation for the sincere and devoted effort of the people at *New Outlook*. He said that “a much larger body of opinion in the occupied territories realizes that you are struggling for a noble cause.”

In answer to a question concerning the evidence of Palestinian readiness to coexist, he said that “we believe that the Israeli public and political movements should understand that the PLO is the solution. It stands for a settlement on an equal basis with Israel.” He added that “Israelis believe that the PLO is just a gang of murderers. The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinian struggle. There are many moderate trends within the PLO, and they should be considered as such. Any activities without the consent of the PLO are seen, logically, as a split and the establishment of alternative leadership.”

Hanna Siniora (the editor of *Al-Fajr’s* English edition) added that “the sole purpose of the English *Al-Fajr* and the future Hebrew edition is to enable the Israeli public to understand our point

of view. This way the human relations you talked about could start. Also, by agreeing to this meeting today, we are undertaking the first steps of personal relationships between both groups." Ziad Abu Ziad added that some Israelis are already saying that the English edition is propaganda, meant "to deceive the Israelis into believing that we are doves," so our task will not be easy.

Dov Barnir discussed the problems posed by the autonomy plan, which seems to be leading to a dead end. He said that direct negotiations for a total solution are the only realistic way. "Mutual recognition is the key, but everyone speaks about it on behalf of Arafat, except for Arafat himself."

In response, both Zoheir Rayyeis and Elias Zananiri stressed that such statements have been made many times by Farouk Kaddumi, by Arafat himself, and others. However, they said, the Israelis prefer to concentrate on "radical" statements by PLO officials.

Jonathan Kuttab said that from the Palestinian viewpoint, in the last two months, there is a totally new situation. "The seeds have always been here, and people on your side recognize that you cannot continue to rule over people against their will for very long. Soon repression is going to create resistance."

Recently, settlers have shown that they don't like the "subtle" approach. "Among Palestinians right now, there is a feeling of immediate physical danger and fear on a daily basis. Though the occupation has always been there, you now feel that *you* can be arrested, *your* land could be taken away." There is a fear of being directly attacked by armed Gush Emunim people and soldiers, with no one to come to your rescue. "Now people who never thought of active resistance, are seriously considering it, because they are afraid . . . ." He went on to say that, though Kahane and Gush Emunim are numerically small, it appears that they have great influence in the government, and are right in the middle of ideological Zionism. "After all, aren't they Jews coming back to live in the Land of Israel?"

Hillel Schenker said that it is important for Israelis to hear the Palestinians' views and feelings. There is a growing escalation of fear on both sides. As for Gush Emunim and Meir Kahane, "the majority of Israelis do not consider them to be representatives of mainstream Zionism, but rather a distortion of it." We should try

to arrange a meeting between *Al-Fajr* and Peace Now, to show that there are many Israelis who are ready to go into the West Bank to demonstrate their identification with the rights of the Palestinians, and to show that they are ready to confront Jewish extremists. Peace Now was established in response to Sadat's initiative, and it's time for it to move to the next stage, which involves facing the Palestinian question.

Dr. Arnon stated that, from his experience in economics, (he is the former director general of the Israeli Finance Ministry) the best solution might be to seek out effective third-party arbitration.

Elias Zananiri recalled that one of the main lessons of the Vietnam war "was that the U.S. government had to negotiate with the Vietnamese revolutionaries." He said that the PLO is the Palestinian leadership "not only because it is the political representative, but because it is the military leadership of the revolution."

Others, on both sides, pointed out that the issue is not who has the guns ("Gush Emunim also has guns"), but the fact that the Palestinians have just grievances.

JUNE 1980



# **Israel's Dilemma: Zionism or \_\_\_\_\_ a Normal State**

**ADNAN ABU ODEH**

**THIS ARTICLE, WHICH IS THE TEXT OF A LECTURE DELIVERED IN AMMAN IN JANUARY 1980, WAS THE FIRST ARTICLE WRITTEN BY A JORDANIAN TO BE SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION IN AN ISRAELI JOURNAL. THIS WAS CONSIDERED NOTEWORTHY ENOUGH TO BE INCLUDED AS AN ITEM ON ISRAELI TELEVISION'S MAJOR EVENING NEWSCAST.**

Israel was not created by a people who had lived in their land for hundreds or thousands of years during which they spoke a single language. Nor was it established by the majority of the people in the country of its creation, for these were, in 1948, Palestinian Arabs. Israel was conceived by European Jews and established in Palestine, in Asia, to be a homeland for individuals or groups coming from many countries and with diverse cultural backgrounds. All that united them was their common religion. Most Israelis, in their accounts of Zionist history, attempt to obscure this background. Israeli writers promote the idea that the 1948 war was against the Arabs as a war of liberation, in which Israel had won the right to self-determination. Strong efforts are made by Zionist historians to present the Jewish minority that lived in Palestine at the beginning of this century as having constituted

---

**ADNAN ABU ODEH is the former Minister of Information in Jordan.**

the nucleus of a people who then simply expanded under the British Mandate to the point where they could establish a state.

Zionist settlement, as we know it, was dictated in fact by constant efforts to achieve three objectives: First, the psychological mobilization of Jews, wherever they lived, and especially in Europe, in support of the projected nation-state, by the use of religion and fear of persecution as basic themes. Jews were made to feel that they were aliens in the countries they lived in, so that they would take the decision to uproot themselves from their cultural environment and their homelands and go to Israel as immigrants. Second, the securing of land and work for these immigrants through collective efforts; this was the reason for the establishment of the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, and other political and financial institutions. Third, the uprooting of the original population, the Palestinian Arabs, from their land.

The Arab world rejected the state of Israel, established in 1948, and war was fought. The state of Israel, however, became a member of the United Nations, with the same rights and obligations as the other member states. In Israel itself, state institutions were set up and the military terrorist organizations were dissolved and replaced by the army. The first Knesset was elected and the first parliamentary government was formed. But behind the familiar façade of statehood, Israel retained a number of institutions that had been established by the Zionist movement in the period before the building of the state, e.g., the Jewish Agency, the Settlement Department, and the Jewish National Fund, which had close links with the earlier settler movement.

Thus, Israel had two sets of institutions, those of the state, and parallel with them, those of the Zionist movement. Even the political parties in Israel made a point of retaining their own settlement departments. In other words, the establishment of the state of Israel did not put an end to the Zionist movement's institutions. On the contrary, the government allotted a ministerial portfolio to absorption, thereby proving that the state was still operating in conformity with the principles of the Zionist movement. It was understood, however, that these settlement institutions would operate within the boundaries established in the 1948 war. The Israeli government called for permanent peace with its

Arab neighbors, who persisted in rejecting her. Nasserism was anathema to Israel. There started to grow in the consciousness of the Israeli people the seeds of Israeli nationalism, as a natural and viable alternative to the Zionist idea with its expansionist tendencies and its emotional content. The question was, basically, whether Israel was to be the expression of grand national ambitions, i.e., a country whose destiny was subordinated to the original plans of Zionism, or whether it should regard itself as a state in the Middle East, whose principal purpose was to seek accommodation with other states and achieve a normal existence.

Then came the 1967 war, in which Israel won a rapid military victory that astonished her as much as it astonished her enemies. The war likewise served to win her the admiration of her friends and sympathizers. But the outcome of the war was not the only surprise. The Arabs accepted UN Resolution 242, implicitly recognizing Israel, and the world wished for peace between the Arabs and Israel, in this area which is strategically and economically important because of its oil reserves. All were surprised to find that, instead of exploiting its military victory to obtain the peace it claimed to have been seeking for two decades, Israel was now dragging its feet, procrastinating and impeding the peace efforts being made under the auspices of the United Nations. The international community was also surprised to see the dormant aspirations of settler Zionism breaking out afresh, and Israel transformed into a broad base from which settlers fan out in all directions, northward to the Golan, eastward into the West Bank, and southward into the Gaza Strip and Sinai. The seeds of Israeli nationalism, which had started to germinate and flourish on the eve of the June war, went into hibernation in the sands of Sinai, the soil of the Jordan Valley, and the summits of the Golan. This was revealed in statements like the one made by Yehuda Harel, one of the settler leaders in the Golan Heights, when he was interviewed by *The New York Times* in August 1975: "Israel is a country without frontiers. Our frontiers will be where we settle."

One manifestation of the change that has taken place in Israeli thinking was the renewal of the settlement movement in the occupied territories. Instead of setting peace with her neighbors in the forefront of its priorities, Israel chose territorial expansion. If

we recall that Israel's seizure of land had, from the start, been one of the principal causes of its conflict with the Arabs, we realize that in taking this step it had decided once more to risk provoking the hostility of its neighbors through expansion. It had chosen to follow the course of the Zionist movement, rather than acting in accordance with the requirements and interests of the state on the basis of international law and the rules governing international relations. This situation remained unchanged until the outbreak of the 1973 war. Regardless of its military results, which Arabs and Israelis appraise differently, this war had one important and unexpected result: it made the Israeli people aware of the yet-unexploited Arab capacities. Today there are two tendencies in Israel: the Zionist idea of Israel as an organic body with expanding frontiers; and the second, which sees Israel as a national home which does not need expanded frontiers so much as recognition, as a prelude to coexistence with the wider environment. These conflicting trends can be found in most Israelis, even those who come down on the side of the Zionist idea.

In its unmitigated form, the Zionist trend is characterized by emotionalism, impulsiveness, and aggressiveness. It denies the existence of the people of Palestine, and believes that the population of the occupied territories must be dispersed and absorbed in the other Arab countries. It maneuvers to gain time to create a fait accompli, and to exploit the land and natural resources of which it has already taken possession. It believes in force and in the effectiveness of military superiority to prevent any increase in Arab strength. It favors preemptive war. It also exerts every kind of economic and psychological pressure on the Palestinian Arabs under its rule, with a view to fragmenting their national cohesion. The advocates of this trend believe that Israel's policy of force and her military superiority will one day oblige the Arabs to accept her on her own terms, and that in the meantime Israel should expand over as large an area as possible.

The second trend, on the other hand, acknowledges the existence of the Palestinian people and their right to establish an independent state or national entity. It sees the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a curse rather than a blessing, because they impede efforts to achieve peace and render it more difficult to attain. It argues that these make Israel a garrison con-



stantly in danger of attack, with doubtful prospects of being able to hold out, because in the long run time is on the side of the Arabs. It believes that Israel can survive only if she can do away with her image as an alien body in the area—an image that is intensified the more Israel provokes her neighbors and makes them feel that it endangers their very existence. It insists that Israel must withdraw from the territories it occupied in the June war, and allow the Palestinian people to decide their own future in their homeland. This alone will assure Israel's survival as a national state for the Jews. The people who follow this trend of thought maintain that Israel must accomplish these aims soon, before bitterness and hostility reach such a pitch that rapprochement becomes no longer possible, and that failure to do so would be a betrayal of the original objective of Zionism, namely, the establishment of a national home, not a fortress under perpetual siege.

As we have seen, these two trends reflect a division in the consciousness of the Israeli people that transcends the limits of political parties and blocs. They are differing concepts of how survival is to be ensured, not of a political or economic program. The Zionists are not the first settlers in history, nor is Palestine the first land to be subjected to colonial settlement. Nor, indeed, is this the first time that Palestine has been subjected to such settlement. The Phoenicians settled North Africa in ancient times, the Crusaders settled the coast of Syria and Palestine, as well as part of Egypt and Jordan, in the Middle Ages, and the Europeans settled North America, Australia, and many parts of Africa. A study of these patterns of settlement and their results shows that some of them met with success, others with disappointment and failure. For example, the Crusader pattern of settlement failed, while the European pattern succeeded in North America and Australia, though it failed in Africa. It may well be that the peace agreement recently concluded in London, under the auspices of the British government, to solve the problem of Rhodesia, marks the beginning of the end of another chapter in the history of European settlement in Africa. Before that, the French had had to give up Algeria, and the Portuguese left Angola and Mozambique. Why does one settlement succeed and another fail? An analysis of the patterns of success and failure enables us

to distinguish a number of factors that govern the destiny of settlement movements. The numerical ratio between the settlers and the indigenous population is one constant factor; there is also a series of variable factors, such as military or technological superiority, political relations, links with world powers, or common interests with such powers.

Before trying to apply these criteria to successful and unsuccessful settlements, I want to make clear that by "constant factor" I mean the one that continues to operate against one party, without being liable to change, and by "variable factors" those that are not necessarily restricted to one party to the exclusion of the other. If, for example, settlers enjoy military, technological, or economic superiority over their opponents, that does not mean that this superiority is necessarily permanent; for the other party may progress in one of these fields and turn the variable factor to its side of the conflict. Settlement, in its profoundest sense, is the uprooting of the indigeneous population and its replacement by foreign settlers. Such an operation, by its very nature, cannot be achieved without severe tensions culminating in a bloody conflict, and the more firmly rooted the culture of the natives, and the stronger their sense of identity, the longer will the conflict last and the more elusive its resolution. If we take the American case as a successful pattern of European settlement, we find that the Europeans had no difficulty in building a bridgehead in North America, thanks to the variable factor of their technological superiority over the Indians. As a result, Europeans poured into America, until in a relatively short time they achieved numerical superiority over their opponents. An example of an unsuccessful European settlement is that of the Crusaders in Syria and Egypt. The reason for the preliminary success achieved by the Crusaders was the variable factor of their military superiority over the local Muslim population. Once the region was united under the leadership of Saladin, it was certain that the Muslims would win the final victory, because the constant factor was turned in favor of the original population, with its distinctive civilization and superior numbers.

But which of these patterns applies to the present situation in Israel? Can Israel last and survive, in conformity with the European pattern in America, or is she doomed to failure, as happened

to the Crusader kingdom in the same area which Israel is trying to claim in the twentieth century? Israel has succeeded so far, thanks to the variable factors of military, scientific, and technological superiority and its close links with a world power, the United States. On the other hand, Ben Gurion himself pointed out the constant factor, namely the overwhelming demographic superiority of the Arabs. Should Israel's policy of annexation and the denial of Palestinian rights be continued, a Crusader, rather than an American, outcome seems more likely.

As I see it, the peace agreement with Egypt was an expression of the trend in Israel placing the preservation of the state in the Middle East above ideological considerations, especially as it involved the dismantling of the settlements in Sinai. On the other hand, insistence on a unified Israeli Jerusalem and on Begin's so-called "autonomy" plan for the Palestinians is a clear expression of the persistence of the Zionist trend. In basing its proposed solution of the Palestine problem on a partial withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the restoration of the Palestinian people's links with Jordan, the Israeli Labor Party is trying to achieve a compromise between the rationale of the state, which is prepared to recognize that the Palestinian people exist and have their own land, and the Zionist ideology, which cannot accept the Palestinian people's full right to self-determination, and seeks to establish new settlements on the West Bank and Gaza.

At present, the emotional trend of the Zionist movement still prevails over the more rational attachment to the survival of the state. Is there any hope of the rational trend growing and expanding? Could it become the basis for a program of a broad-based Israeli political party? And if this happens, what will be the attitude of the Palestinians, and of other Arabs, who have on more than one occasion hinted that they are prepared to have dealings with the state, but not with the movement? Until this interplay is settled in favor of the state, the Israeli people will continue to suffer from this dualism between expansionist settler ideology and the desire for normal existence and peace.

# **Recognize the Palestinian Right to Self-Determination**

---

**AHARON YARIV**

THE ORIGINAL "YARIV-SHEMTOV FORMULA" WAS CREATED BY AHARON YARIV AND VICTOR SHEMTOV WHEN THEY WERE RESPECTIVELY THE MINISTERS OF INFORMATION AND HEALTH IN RABIN'S GOVERNMENT IN 1974. AT THE TIME, IT WAS NOT ADOPTED AS OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POLICY. THE FOLLOWING IS YARIV'S UPDATING OF THE FORMULA IN DECEMBER 1980.

The Labor Party, in its election platform, adopted a plank substantially similar to the well-known Yariv-Shemtov formula, for possible future negotiations with the Palestinians: to deal with those elements which recognize the state of Israel and are willing to relinquish the use of terrorism as a means of obtaining their goals.

"You're probably pleased," I recently said to Yariv, "Here is a large political party with a good chance of becoming the ruling one, whose point of view is similar to yours."

---

GENERAL (RES.) AHARON YARIV, a former head of Israeli Intelligence and a former government minister, is currently the head of the Institute for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. This interview, done by Ariel Guiney, originally appeared in *Yediot Ahronot* on December 26, 1980.



He replied: "Naturally. But in the meantime, both my point of view and the situation have changed and we must be prepared to reach even further. It is impossible to be content with making decisions on who is entitled to negotiate with us. We must also decide, at most within a year or a year and a half, on what should be said to them. I believe this event will be of historic importance, the third most important in the history of our nation in the twentieth century (the first being the Holocaust, the second, the establishment of the state of Israel). This third event will have to be: recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, under well-defined conditions. I will return to this later. Such recognition, based on self-determination, will open the way to an era of Israel's acceptance by the Middle East, an era in which our neighbors will come to terms with Israel's permanent existence in this area."

## MULTIPLE DANGERS

"For a prolonged period of time, there were no options open to Israel. It was totally rejected by its Arab neighbors, and all Israeli policy was dictated by this fact. Israel relied on its military prowess: its readiness and ability to thwart any intent on the part of the Arabs to destroy it. It was fortunate that Israel was able to rely on this strength—even though it could not eliminate the military potential of the Arab nations.

"This situation lasted until after five wars, when Egypt reached the fateful decision that peace with Israel was a necessity. This development enabled Israel to skip past the stage of being totally rejected by the Arab world, which is coming to terms with Israel's existence, albeit not willingly.

"This is a transitory stage which may endure for a good while and may entail, as far as Israel is concerned, many dangers. However, it also provides us with many opportunities."

"We are no longer faced with a situation of 'no options'; we do have one now. What is this option?" I asked.

- "To retain, or to strive to retain, all territory to which Israel has historic and legitimate rights, and to which it has deep emotional bonds—and which, at the same time, is important for its

national security. The only poser is that these territories are inhabited by another nation, the Palestinians.

- “To relinquish our rights to the greater portion of these territories on condition that cultural and emotional bonds would be maintained; that Israel’s security would not be affected, and if so, minimally; that in so doing, Israel would be contributing its share to the process of peace with all its neighbors.”

## IMMEDIATE EFFECT

“What we tend to forget,” says Yariv, “is that in both cases, there are many inherent dangers. Of course, the first solution seems obvious, and more certain. Actually, however, it does not assure us of any prospects of our living in peace as an integral part of this region.

“The second alternative, which involves the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination—preferably within the framework of a federation with Jordan—is a more complex one. Though less certain, it opens the way to new possibilities.

“Israel’s recognition of the right to self-determination of the Palestinians will undoubtedly make a tremendous impact. We should bear in mind, however, that by so doing, we would be moving only one step forward, since we already admitted at Camp David to their legitimate rights and their just demands. This act would have an immediate effect on our relations with Egypt and on our international position.”

“Does this imply a rapid resolution of the issues at stake with the Palestinians themselves and their supporters?” I asked.

Aharon Yariv explained: “First of all, this self-determination must be a gradual process. At first, there will be a transition from real autonomy, initially applied in the Gaza Strip region—later implemented in the negotiations on the mode in which self-determination is to be implemented. Naturally, we shall categorically refuse to let Jerusalem, Israel’s capital, be divided. At the same time, it will be necessary to make clear our basic assumption that the Palestinian refugee problem must be resolved outside the borders of Israel, and that the borders of the Jewish state are no longer those of 1967.”

**NO ILLUSIONS**

Aharon Yariv continued "It seems, therefore, that my position will not be readily accepted by the Arabs. However, the moment their goal is self-determination, real negotiations will be possible and that will drastically improve our international position.

"I have no illusions, and I cannot say with any certainty that any negotiations carried out on this basis will lead to recognition and agreement. But at least, they might, and the sooner we recognize the Palestinians' right to self-determination, the greater the impact this recognition will evoke, the slighter the risks, and the stronger our chances to work out solutions amenable to us.

"We must realize that we have to live within the immediate midst of the Palestinians. Any attempt to reach a solution acceptable to both sides is, therefore, in our national interest. The sooner it is reached, the more readily will we enter upon an era in which an independent and flourishing Israel will be an integral part of the Middle East."

JANUARY 1981

# **The PLO and the Israeli Peace Camp**

**MATTITYAHU PELED**

DR. PELED HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT PROPONENT OF THE EVALUATION THAT THE MAJORITY WITHIN THE PLO ARE READY TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A "TWO-STATE SOLUTION," I.E., A PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP ALONGSIDE THE STATE OF ISRAEL. THE FOLLOWING IS HIS CRITIQUE OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL HELD IN MADRID IN NOVEMBER 1980.

No one who is familiar with the Israeli political scene could read without astonishment the strange resolution of the Fifteenth Post-war Congress of the Socialist International, held in Madrid in November 1980, stating that "the Israeli Labor Alignment, led by Shimon Peres, [is] the only viable force for peace for and with Israel." The political chapter of the new platform of the Labor Party, which calls for the "active defense against the PLO both in the security and ideological-political arena," and for the imposition of Israeli sovereignty over approximately 50 percent of the

---

GENERAL (RES.) DR. MATTITYAHU (MATI) PELED was the head of the General Staff quartermaster's branch and military governor of the Gaza Strip. He is currently the head of the Arab Literature Department at Tel Aviv University. He is a leading member of the Sheli Party, and was one of the founders of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace in December 1975, most of whose central figures are members of Sheli.



West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the whole of the Golan Heights as a minimal condition for making peace with Jordan and Syria, can best be described as a program for war and not a contribution to peace. For in practical terms what the new Labor platform means is simply that peace has become conditional upon the Arab consent to the elimination of all national aspirations of the Palestinian people and to the territorial expansion beyond the July 4, 1967, borders of Israel. This far exceeds what can be called "minor rectifications." No one would believe that the Socialist delegations assembled in Madrid knowingly designated a party announcing such a program "a viable peace force," and the process by which they were persuaded to take their amazing resolution certainly merits a closer examination. Dr. Isam Sartawi, for instance, who attended the International session as an observer on behalf of the PLO, suggests, in his interview to *Monday Morning* (December 15–21, 1980), that the resolution was adopted only because Labor's new platform was not made available to the delegates. He calls it "a deliberate deception of the Socialist International," which resulted in the adoption of a resolution not based on the commitment made by the Labor Party before the Israeli public but on some hearsay conveyed by Shimon Peres to some of the leaders of the International.

## THE REAL PEACE GROUP

The gravity of that resolution can be fully realized when it is remembered that by adopting it the Congress of the Socialist International dealt an unnecessary and undeserved insult to genuine peace forces in Israel, whose programs need not be concealed from anyone in order to be recognized as such. It is significant that of all those present at the Congress it was the PLO observer who did not forget the real peace forces in Israel, because for the PLO, the question of peace ceased to be a theory to be tossed around or an empty phrase meant to improve a tarnished image, as is probably the case with the Labor Party of Israel. It is therefore not at all surprising that the first protest voiced against the callous disregard revealed in the Congress of the Socialist International of the peace camp of Israel was that of the PLO ob-

server, namely Dr. Sartawi. Referring to the assertion that the Labor Party is the only viable peace force in Israel, he commented: "Such an assertion eliminates with a stroke of the pen all the peace forces of Israel, including the Sheli Party, the Peace Now movement, the *New Outlook* group, and the Rakah Party. By stating that the Labor Party is the only peace force in Israel, the Socialist International is saying that all the other peace forces do not exist or have nothing to do with peace; it is dethroning those bonafide peace groups and replacing them with the Labor Party. This is an act which I believe is beyond the mandate of any international body."

The SI had, of course, an alternative resolution it could adopt. The draft proposed by the Spanish Worker's Socialist Party and the Italian Socialist Party and supported by the delegations of Sweden, Senegal, Venezuela, Austria, and others, was undoubtedly, a more balanced and realistic position for the SI to take. It insisted on the need to base the peace in the Middle East "on the security of Israel as well as all the other states in the region, and on a definitive solution to the Palestinian problem, founded on the recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights." Stating that "All peace initiatives that have attained important results . . . warrant support"—thus backing President Sadat's peace initiative and its consequences—the Spanish-Italian draft went on to declare that "The problem, however, continues to be the establishment of direct and positive relations between the Israelis and Palestinians, between a state whose sovereignty and integrity must be respected, and the PLO, an organization representing the Palestinian people and widely recognized as such on an international level."

This draft resolution was vehemently opposed by the Israeli Labor delegation and actively supported by the PLO observer, which, in itself, should have stopped the SI from declaring the Labor Alignment a peace force, let alone a viable one. As for the PLO, it is most distressing that, having given its support to a draft resolution calling for the safeguarding of Israel's sovereignty and integrity, it was not even mentioned in the final resolution, and its willingness to accept peace on the basis of coexistence and mutual recognition went totally unrecognized by the SI Congress.

**PLO NOW CONSIDERED RESPECTABLE**

The unavoidable conclusion from this questionable position of the SI must be that it has failed to assert itself as a viable organization insofar as the Middle East is concerned. Petty party considerations certainly outweighed any desire to live up to the requirements of the hour. For the time being the EEC initiative, which has yet to gather momentum, seems to be holding greater hopes for the peace forces in the Middle East than that of the SI. But on the level of the bilateral relations between the peace forces and the PLO, a great deal has been achieved which merits closer scrutiny.

Taking as a starting point the Paris talks which began in June 1976 between the PLO and the Israeli Council for Israel-Palestinian Peace (ICIPP), the progress made since then can be summarized as follows. On the Israeli side there is clearly a greater awareness among the public of the development that has taken place in the political thinking of the PLO over the last seven years. Contact with PLO officials is no longer considered a punishable crime, and the number of individuals who seek such contacts and obtain them is increasing. No longer does an Israeli who meets a PLO official have to explain his conduct, as did Naftali Feder at the time, because of an accidental encounter with a PLO official during an international meeting. Meeting PLO officials has become in Israel a respected phenomenon which is still vigorously opposed by political circles, who maintain that Israel's interests dictate a denial of the Palestinian's legitimate rights. It would be well to remember that the Labor Party, dubbed by the SI as the only viable peace force in Israel, is a major champion of the latter position. But neither the Labor Party nor the Likud government dares hinder free and acknowledged contacts between Israel and the PLO.

The significance of this achievement may not be readily appreciated outside Israel, but it should not be underestimated. In a situation where an Israeli government might have to consider a new policy toward the PLO, the public will be found ready and willing to support it. The old argument, so much liked by the humdrum politician of Israel, that in whatever he is doing he is

merely following the national consensus, is already untrue. The willingness of the public to put to the test a different policy toward the Palestinian problem has risen from some three percent in December 1975, when the ICIPP was announced, to close to 50 percent in more recent polls.

## NEW POLITICAL REALITIES

But in all fairness these developments inside Israel can hardly be compared to those seen on the Palestinian side. Suffice it to point out, as does Dr. Sartawi in his letter to the ICIPP on the occasion of its fifth anniversary, that Chairman Arafat can state now that talks between the PLO and Sheli have for their purpose the creation of new political facts in the Middle East and that the world accepts this astonishing declaration. This declaration is significant as well for the other elements it contains. The reference, of course, is to the interview Mr. Arafat gave to *Al-Hawadess* on December 19, 1980, where he stated that those very talks were being conducted pursuant to the PNC resolution of 1977 and that he was bound by that resolution to maintain those contacts with the various Israeli political parties mentioned in the interview. Furthermore, he stated that "anyone who is prepared to join these talks is welcome to do so." No clearer invitation to other Israeli parties to join the talks can be offered, considering the open hostility toward the PLO by the Israeli government and its major opposition, the Labor Party.

As for the new political facts alluded to, Dr. Sartawi seems to be in no doubt as to what they are: "Sooner than all our combined enemies think, peace shall reign between the Palestinian and Israeli states and their peoples," he states in his letter. All Israeli commentators with any integrity admitted in their columns that such unequivocal statements have never been heard before and cannot be overlooked. It still remains to be seen, however, how long it will take for the "only viable peace force in Israel" to awaken to the new reality.

But important and dramatic as these developments are, no Israeli would ignore the profound change that is taking place in the perception of Israeli reality by important Palestinian individuals.



In an extremely important article published both in the daily *Falastin al-Thaura* and the weekly by that name, Dr. Sartawi has analyzed the new political program of the Labor Party of Israel. In this context he felt it was necessary to distinguish three trends of thought inside the Zionist movement of today: the right wing, led by Likud, which aims at total annexation of the occupied territories and the eventual expulsion of all its Palestinian inhabitants, in accordance with the well-known precept that the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish people and has never belonged to others; the Labor school of thought, which realizes that the Likud goals are unattainable on practical grounds and therefore is prepared to settle for the annexation of only part of the occupied territories (practically the whole of the Golan Heights and 50 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip) and leave the Palestinian population in the nonannexed, densely populated Palestinian areas, deprived of any political rights. The third trend, however, is recognized as one which calls for complete withdrawal from all the territories occupied in 1967, including eastern Jerusalem, and supports the right of the Palestinians to establish their own state under the leadership of the PLO.

## GROWING AWARENESS OF RAPPROCHEMENT

This was probably the first time that thousands of Palestinian refugees could read in their own newspaper an analysis which shows that their national aspirations can be achieved without necessarily expecting this to be conditioned upon eliminating the Zionist entity. For us Zionists in Israel, who find ourselves recognized in the third trend of Sartawi's analysis, this signals the beginning of a whole new era. It has always been of the utmost importance for us that Zionism, as the embodiment of the historical hope of the Jewish people for a secure sovereign existence in its ancient land, should be recognized as compatible with the realization of similar aspirations of the Palestinian national movement. That now, after so many years of struggle and suffering, for which many must be blamed, this hope seems to be realized, is a development whose importance transcends any political circumstance of the moment. It is perhaps a sign of the rapidly changing

attitudes of other parties that the Rakah Arabic paper *al-Itihad* has reproduced Dr. Sartawi's article in full, allowing thereby thousands of Arabs living in Israel to be aware of the great change taking place among Palestinian leaders outside, regarding the nature of Zionism. The flat, two-dimensional perception of Zionism as a homogeneous, unified, single-colored ideology that bears no variations, is now replaced by a more penetrating perception of that most complex and stirring phenomenon of the resurgence of Jewish national awareness.

Faced with such far-reaching developments in the Palestinian camp, what is there on the Israeli side to equal it? The answer need hardly be spelled out: rigidity of thought, egocentrism or even autism, which precludes any response to surrounding processes, have become the distinguishing traits of Israeli foreign policy.

In 1975, when the first signals of the dynamics of PLO political thinking became noticeable in Israel, a number of Israeli citizens appealed to the government to signal back that we were eager for further signs of a possible Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. The appeal went unheeded, so these Israelis decided that the next best thing they could do was form an organization of their own which would undertake the task of signaling back to the PLO that some of us were watching them with increasing hopes for the eventual reconciliation. So the ICIPP came into being in December of that year. Now, confronting a government bent on tenacious hostility to the Palestinians and an opposition which is bent on disallowing any change in that policy, the ICIPP thought the least they could do to signal their appreciation of the dramatic developments in the PLO was to announce their adoption of the Palestinian and Israeli flags posed side by side, as their formal insignia, thus demonstrating their belief in the vision of the two states living in peace sooner than most people expect.

FEBRUARY 1981

# Why the Dialogue Must Go On

---

ELIAS H. TUMA

DR. TUMA, A CONSISTENT ADVOCATE OF ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE AND THE NEED FOR COEXISTENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PEOPLES BASED ON THE MUTUAL RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, WROTE THIS ARTICLE IN THE WAKE OF THE POSTPONEMENT OF AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN DIALOGUE WHICH WAS BEING JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY *NEW OUTLOOK* AND *AL-FAJR*.

When is a good time for a dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians or between Jews and Arabs? Who benefits from such a dialogue, and what are the functions and objectives of this and other dialogues between "adversary" parties? The answers to these questions are interdependent. The right time and who benefits are closely related to the functions and objectives of the dialogue and to whether these objectives are realized. It is reasonable, therefore, to suggest that a time of uncertainty is as good a time as any for the dialogue. It may even be especially appropriate as a means of removing or reducing the uncertainty, for the benefit of the

---

DR. TUMA is a Palestinian Professor of Economics at the University of California at Davis. He is the co-author, together with the late Dr. Chaim Darin-Drabkin, longtime chairman of *New Outlook* editorial council, of *The Economic Case for Palestine*, published by Croom Helm in London, a study which argues in favor of the potential economic viability of a Palestinian state based on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

voters who might be able to influence the outcome of the elections in the "desired" direction.

The elections in the United States are over and a new administration is in, which for all apparent reasons cannot be expected to improve on the previous administrations and gear the United States Middle East policy in a more even-handed and peace-conducive direction. It will be disastrous for the peace prospects if the Israeli elections result in an equally "unpromising" government. What the peace forces need is not only a change of government in Israel, but a change of philosophy and outlook in a manner that will enhance the peace prospects, lead to negotiations between the adversary parties, and reduce the waste and insecurity suffered by all those concerned.

The polls, rumors, and expectations of most commentators seem to suggest that the Likud and Mr. Begin will not be re-elected and that Labor under Mr. Peres will be in. Obviously some will be disappointed and others will cheer, but will this change be in the interest of peace between the Arabs and Israel? A hasty answer can be misleading. It is easy to conclude that Mr. Begin's policies with regard to the Palestinians and peace have been anything but favorable. He has not only continued all the unfavorable policies of the past and added to them, but he has also crowned these policies with an aura of legitimacy by defending them as consistent with the long-standing goals and objectives of a Zionist Israel. The continued military occupation and illegal settlement in the occupied territories, infringement and penetration in Lebanon, discrimination and oppression against Palestinians within and outside Israel, total disregard for United Nations resolutions, and the sustained determination to obliterate the rights of the Palestinians as a people are the proud policies of Mr. Begin and Likud; they are formidable obstacles to peace. The question, then, is: will a Labor government under Mr. Peres be different? Will it be more sympathetic toward the Palestinian national rights of self-determination, toward nonexpansionism, or toward the ending of military rule, oppression, and discrimination against the Palestinians? Will that government publicly acknowledge that peace without the Palestinians will be an incomplete and unstable peace, and will it commit itself to deal directly with



the Palestinians and their internationally recognized leaders to establish a comprehensive, complete, and secure peace?

Some of the answers to these questions have been given by Mr. Peres on behalf of the Labor Party ("A Strategy for Peace in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1980, pp. 887-901). The Labor Party of Israel, according to Mr. Peres, "believes that the Zionist movement has been driven by a double dream—the return of the dispersed Jewish people to their historic homeland and the construction of a new society based on universal and Jewish ideals of social justice. . . . We do not wish to dominate the Arabs against their will, nor would we like them to serve as an unskilled labor force, having succeeded, after so many years of exile and alienation, in having Jews till the land and becoming manual workers in industry and construction." However, when choosing his strategy for peace, Mr. Peres contradicts these double dreams or reinterprets them freely. For example, on the question of territory, he states, "while not ignoring our historical rights over the whole territory [of Palestine?], our sights are set on the security and peace of the future. The map we have in mind thus implies territorial concessions for the sake of peace and retaining strips of land vital for security." Apparently it is only a matter of concession rather than of rights that Israel will withdraw from some of the occupied territories. It does not seem to matter either whether the territory has been occupied by force or not; it is might rather than right that counts.

As for the people, the Labor Party will not dominate the Arabs against their will, but Mr. Peres will not acknowledge the existence of the Palestinian people nor their right to self-determination—how could he dominate them against their will if he does not even acknowledge their existence? Mr. Peres is emphatic in this regard: "We are in firm conviction that the option of opening negotiations with the PLO does not really exist," even though the PLO may be the leadership chosen by the Palestinians to represent them. Instead, Mr. Peres proposes to negotiate with Jordan, as if the Palestinians did not exist, and on the basis of Resolution 242, which speaks of the Palestinians only as refugees.

Mr. Peres and the Labor Party have questions about the Sadat version of the autonomy plan because that version may lead to a

Palestinian state next to Jordan, "itself already in reality a Palestinian state." Here again Mr. Peres elects to not only ignore the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination or to having a state of their own, but in a way he allows himself to infringe on the sovereignty of Jordan by calling it a Palestinian state, against the wishes of both the government of Jordan and the Palestinian people. Mr. Peres ignores these matters and proceeds to outline a procedure that may be followed in case negotiations on autonomy or with Jordan were to be conducted.

Mr. Peres' program offers nothing new, nothing creative, and nothing conducive to peace in the Middle East. It has little if any substance that would differentiate it from the current policy of Mr. Begin. Nor does it offer anything that would differentiate it from the programs of previous Labor or coalition governments, as far as they relate to the Palestinians inside or outside Israel.

The uncertainties of the elections thus become certainties of the programs offered by the prospective parties, regardless of whether Labor wins or not. It is because of this gloomy prospect that a dialogue should be held now. Indeed a dialogue should be a continuing process between the Palestinians and Israelis and between the Arabs and Jews who desire peace in the Middle East. Such a dialogue will have especially important functions now, before the elections, as well as after the elections. The dialogue may be a vehicle by which the elections will put into office people with programs that are conducive to peace, who are intent on implementing such programs, and who are convinced that the peace and security of Israel depend on peace and security of the Palestinian people. The dialogue may not change the people or the parties, but it may help to modify their programs; it may increase their commitment; and it may raise the awareness of the electorate regarding these commitments and thus increase the accountability of the winners toward fulfilling their election promises.

It may be a victory for Labor and other liberal parties to unseat Mr. Begin and his coalition, but it will be a victory for peace only if the new government adopts a platform of peace, if it acknowledges the existence of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, if it commits itself to nonexpansionism whether by force or by illegal settlement on the occupied ter-

ritories, if it undertakes to eliminate oppression and discrimination against the Palestinians, and if it recognizes that peace and security for one people is best assured by peace and security for the other people.

The dialogue may not lead to such a party platform, but it can prod the conscience of the voters and their nominees, and it can remind the various parties and their leaders that a new approach to peacemaking is long overdue.

APRIL 1981

# **The Majority Today Wants Coexistence**

---

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA**

ANWAR NUSSEIBA, ONE OF THE MOST ARTICULATE SPOKESMEN FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A PRO-JORDANIAN ORIENTATION. SINCE 1967, HE HAS MAINTAINED AN ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH ISRAELI LEADERS. THE FOLLOWING INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED BY ASHER MANIV AND NATAN RA'ANAN, THE EDITORS OF *MIGVAN*, THE LABOR PARTY IDEOLOGICAL JOURNAL.

**QUESTION:** Let me begin with a question which does embody a certain degree of historical commentary, but is also of very topical significance today: If we compare the histories of the two nationalist movements in this country—the Zionist movement and the nationalist movement of the Palestinian Arabs—we can find both radicals and moderates in both of them. But whereas in the Jews' case it was generally the moderates who set the keynote and determined policy while constantly willing for compromise, in your case it is precisely the radicals who hold the helm. And indeed, the Zionist movement, acting through compromises and gradual progress, has reached some very significant achievements, while the nationalist movement of the Palestinian Arabs has not actually attained any of its

---

ANWAR NUSSEIBA is a former Jordanian Minister of Defense. He is currently chairman of the board of directors of the (East) Jerusalem Electric Company, and led a successful legal struggle against the Likud government's attempts to close the company.



goals. Does this seem to you to be an accurate interpretation of history, and aren't the implications clear with regard to the current political situation?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I believe this comparison is not entirely correct. I can agree with you, perhaps, that the Zionist movement is much more sophisticated than the Palestinian Arabs' resistance to Zionism. The Zionist movement was also much better organized. But in the long run, as far as long-term goals are concerned, I am not sure if there is a great difference among the various streams of Zionism. The difference lies rather in the means, not in the ends. I agree on that point.

The factor which enabled these differences to coexist constructively, in my opinion, was the fact that Zionism was a movement on the offensive, a movement striving to achieve something it had not previously had. From the end of the last century and all through the Mandate period and thereafter, everything the Zionists achieved was indeed achieved through their own efforts, labor, planning, and even sacrifice. But every successive compromise they were ready to accept was in fact an additional gain that sought Arab acceptance of what they had already attained against Arab resistance. On the other hand, every sacrifice demanded of the Palestinian side has always been in the form of a loss in this process, be it land, national rights, or political aspirations.

**QUESTION:** But hasn't an "all or nothing" policy left you in the end with nothing?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Yes, I agree. I am not trying to defend that policy right now. I am trying to examine the development objectively and to understand why the side which is constantly scoring gains finds it easier to win the support of the majority for its pragmatic approach, than does the side which loses at every such step.

## COEXISTENCE WITH ISRAEL

**QUESTION:** And now, lately, do you believe that this is still the relative situation of the two sides?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I do not know what to think about this right now. . . . That is a very difficult question to answer. But let me say one thing: I believe the Zionists have made it very difficult for our moderates. I shall give a current example, and this perhaps answers your last question: The very broad consensus today, in the Arab world and among the Palestinians, is that we must reach a settlement that will allow the Palestinians their right to political self-determination, here, in this land, and not in Tanganyika or any other place. Just as your people once said.

**QUESTION:** Excuse me, but is there really such a consensus among the Palestinians concerning coexistence with the state of Israel?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I do not speak for the Palestinian Arabs, but judging from what I hear and read, it seems to me that there is certainly a consensus, not only regarding the possibility of coexistence, but in fact regarding the necessity for such coexistence. Either we live together or we sink together. And no one wants to sink.

**QUESTION:** Does willingness for coexistence mean political recognition of Israel?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Look, everything I am saying represents my own unendorsed conclusions. But I believe the answer is yes. Of course, this question must be put to the test. Therefore I would say that if the PLO could be given the incentive to recognize Israel . . .

**QUESTION:** But they are not ready to.

## MUTUAL RECOGNITION

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Just a moment. One must sit with them. If in return, Israel were ready to recognize the Palestinians' right to self-determination, then a way could be found to do it. Mutual recognition: that would be a step of tremendous importance.

**QUESTION:** Who could find the way, and how? If the present situation is that most Israelis are unwilling to recognize the PLO and the PLO is unwilling to recognize Israel—not only our political right but any right of the Jews to this land—how, then, could a way be found for mutual recognition?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I believe we could do it by clearing the air. For example, we could stop calling each other names like terrorists, aggressors, imperialists, and so forth. If—perhaps by diplomatic means—we could attain such an exchange of thoughts and intentions, if we were ready to examine the possibilities of meeting and discussing, then no one could lose a thing, by merely agreeing to do this.

## **LEADERS IN THE TERRITORIES WILL ALWAYS BE SUSPECT**

**QUESTION:** Can the leaders of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip serve as partners in talks with Israel on the future of the area?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Look, without being a leader of any kind myself, I have held talks with the Israelis for the past thirteen years. And it has been a great privilege for me to exchange views with them. I cannot speak for the Palestinian people, but I know what this people wants and I know what the minimum requirements are in order to reach an agreement, because I am a Palestinian myself. But these discussions are one thing, and official recognition leading to negotiations is another; the latter is what is needed. Perhaps someone in the occupied territories who is on good terms with both sides could create an atmosphere that would enable this. Really, I don't know. Maybe the Americans could do it; maybe the Russians. But I am sure that it is possible and that it must be tried.

**QUESTION:** Let us suppose the Israeli leaders were to take the initiative of addressing you and Palestinian leaders like you, in order to work out some settlement. Would it be possible?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** No. What is possible is to work out a formula with us, on whose basis Israel could then negotiate the terms of a settlement with the PLO.

You must understand my situation: It doesn't matter what I would do. I am reminded of what happened in Egypt: There was Nahas Pasha, leader of the Patriots, and there were politicians in opposition who were perhaps more realistic but less popular. No matter what the opposition did—even if it succeeded in ousting the British—they would still be considered traitors, while Nahas (even if he did not waver) would still be the great patriot. That is the way of human beings. Therefore anything we could achieve in the occupied territories would be suspect; we would be suspected of fearing the Israelis, or of having been morally corrupted by the Israelis, both of which are false, of course. But this is the climate we are living in. I therefore believe that if the talks are to be completely free, they must be held on a different level.

**QUESTION:** Are there differing streams of thought among the Palestinian leaders in the territories?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I believe not. I think the consensus is that the PLO represents the Palestinians. In any case, that is my feeling. Perhaps you people know more about that than I.

**QUESTION:** Are there no differences of opinion, for example, regarding Jordan?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Perhaps. Look, a man like me, who has participated in the Jordanian experiment (and I am not ashamed, I am very proud of it), a man like me, who sees Jordan as an Arab country and believes in the idea of Arab unity (I may be naive, but that is nevertheless my basic belief)—I think the Palestinians must act in future in cooperation with Arab countries in general and with Jordan in particular, because it is our *Hinterland*. Without it, it would be very difficult. But that is my personal opinion. In the end, the question must be put to a referendum, and whatever is so decided will be accepted. If the majority of the Palestinians disagree with my opinions, I must accept the opinion of the majority.



## DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH AMONG VARIOUS ISRAELI LEADERS

**QUESTION:** You mentioned your talks with Israeli leaders over the past thirteen years. What conclusions have you reached as a result of these talks?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** To tell the truth, there was a time, immediately after the war of 1967 and in 1968, also when I was very optimistic. I was particularly optimistic after a conversation with your late Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. I liked him; he was a very likable fellow, a patriarchal type. I spoke with the late Golda Meir and enjoyed our conversations, but found her much more rigid. And I have spoken with others. But it seems to me that in 1967 and 1968 there was much greater flexibility, and consequently many more possibilities, than we see today. Back then both sides believed things would work out somehow, that we must let time take its course, that the solution must ripen. But it didn't. Today we know the problem will not solve itself unless we find a solution. If we do not sit down together and be honest and fair with each other, I do not see how we can reach any kind of solution.

**QUESTION:** Have there been differences of approach among those with whom you have spoken—not only between Eshkol and Golda, but also among living leaders like Peres, Eban, Dayan, and others?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Yes. While Eshkol was willing to talk about territorial compromise, I have never heard Mr. Dayan speak of territorial compromise. He has spoken of a functional settlement rather than a territorial one.

## A TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT

**QUESTION:** Is a territorial settlement more acceptable to you than a functional settlement?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Yes, because a functional settlement leaves the sovereignty question unsolved and clouds the future. We

need a clear decision. In my opinion, there are two possibilities: Either we live together in a single society (and that is a possibility that you, not we, reject), or there is a physical line that politically divides us, and you live on one side and we on the other. But both live in peace and both live in complete independence.

**QUESTION:** To use a favorite term of Mr. Begin's, does a functional compromise seem "totally unacceptable"?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Yes.

**QUESTION:** And what about autonomy, in general or as an intermediate settlement?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Autonomy on the basis of the Camp David Accords is unacceptable.

**QUESTION:** And autonomy of another kind?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I do not know why autonomy at all. Am I less competent at handling my own affairs than my Israeli neighbor? I don't think so. If it is a question of security, let us discuss it and find a solution. But for us it is a question of self-respect. Look, we objected to the British Mandate for two reasons: First, because it included the Balfour Declaration, and secondly because it struck at what we believed was our sovereign right—and I stress the word "sovereign"—to handle our own affairs. Now, after fifty or sixty years, you want to turn the wheel back and tell us that we have no sovereignty and must live under someone else's control?

**QUESTION:** And what about Moshe Dayan's proposal of granting autonomy on a unilateral basis so you could handle your affairs with no interference on our part?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** That is an unacceptable proposal. I know you are much stronger and much more skilled than we are. But to be realistic, you must see things from our viewpoint as well. We want our own sovereign rights.

**QUESTION:** I have read that some Palestinian leaders have said that in their eyes there is no real difference between the Likud

and the Labor Alignment, or even that a Labor Alignment government would be more dangerous for them than the Likud government. Do you agree?

## **THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE LIKUD AND THE ALIGNMENT**

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** No; it may be that there is no difference with regard to some goals. I do not know. But there is a difference of another kind; I have met Labor Alignment leaders. Likud leaders? I met one of them on two occasions—Mr. Modai; on the last occasion he wanted to confiscate my company. Of course I did not enjoy that meeting. I also met, and enjoyed talking to Mr. Weizmann when he was Defense Minister. I also met Dr. Katz, Minister of Labor and Welfare, on a personal matter and he tried to be helpful. However, on the whole, I find Labor Alignment leaders are more accommodating. Furthermore, one of the most impressive phenomena in this country is that it is a socialist country, a country of workers, of farmers. You have traders and capitalists, yes; but the great majority are people who came here to work.

**QUESTION:** What, then, are the chances of an agreement with a future Labor government?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I do not know. Let us wait and see.

**QUESTION:** Yes, but you keep referring us to the PLO. How can you expect any Israel government to negotiate with an organization whose declared goal is the annihilation of the state of Israel?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** We must do something about that. But you must encourage us, and there are many ways to do that, if that is indeed your intention. What the PLO says openly is that recognition is the only card we have. If we give up that card, we want in return your recognition of our right to self-determination. If such a step is possible, then the next step will not be difficult. You must understand that they are speaking as

the side that has been on the losing end of the equation, so this step must come from you.

## **VIOLENCE CAUSES DAMAGE, BUT . . .**

**QUESTION:** In this context, what is your opinion of terrorist methods?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** No one justifies terrorism, of course. But it happens in liberation movements. And what is your opinion of indiscriminate reprisals, as a form of better-organized terrorism? And what is your opinion of your terrorism in 1946?

**QUESTION:** In those days, there were those on our side who made it clear what they thought of terrorism. But the question was whether you condone terrorist methods.

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Of course I believe that by its very nature, violence causes damage. But that is the world we live in. Many liberation leaders in the past have been called terrorists—people like Makarios, a priest!—because they believed that was the only language the rulers could understand.

## **IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO THE BORDERS THE LABOR PARTY PROPOSES**

**QUESTION:** Don't such explanations give at least post facto legitimization to terrorism?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** No, absolutely not. But look, let us forget this whole thing. Let us forget the past and look to the future. Let us give people hope.

**QUESTION:** Well, I asked you about the future. You said we must encourage you to change the goal of annihilating Israel, and I asked: If a Labor government is elected, how do you believe it should go about it?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** What I would like to know is, to what extent would a Labor government be willing to accept a territorial



settlement, would it be willing to accept the Palestinians' right to self-determination within those territories from which Israel would withdraw, and what would be the conditions for such a settlement, in every sense of the word: good neighborly relations, security, and all the rest. Once the answers to these questions become clear, it will be possible to assess the possibility for progress.

**QUESTION:** You must have heard of the resolutions of the Labor Party on these issues: territorial compromise within the framework of defensible borders, meaning no return to the 1967 boundaries, as well as a desire for a peace settlement with a Jordanian-Palestinian state and a willingness for talks with Palestinian leaders who will recognize Israel, abstain from terrorism, and so forth. Is this a basis for a settlement, in your opinion?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** It would be very difficult for the Palestinians to agree to a territorial compromise within the borders the Labor Party has spoken about. Therefore, in my opinion—and this is only my personal opinion—security would have to be thought of in different terms, in order to solve this problem. But I can say no more, since this is a matter for negotiation between the parties.

**QUESTION:** Who are the parties to negotiation? Is Jordan one of them?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** No, at this stage it is Israel and the PLO. But Jordan cannot be left outside the picture. After all, if Israel is not ready to take back the refugees—and I fear it will not—then the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will clearly not be able to absorb three million refugees. So what are we to do with them? We cannot agree to refugees being left homeless. In Jordan they have a home; in Lebanon they do not. Therefore, additional parties should be introduced to the negotiations in order to reach a comprehensive settlement. In my opinion, that should be possible.

**QUESTION:** You keep saying that is possible. You also say the talks should be held between Israel and the PLO. But you also

know that the PLO has not changed its goal of annihilating Israel, and every time there has been talk of an imminent change in that resolution, the outcome has been a reiteration of the Palestinian Charter. How, then, is it possible to propose such negotiation?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** The only thing I can say on this topic is on a second- or third-hand basis. But from what I hear from people who have spoken with PLO leaders—Americans and others—it seems to me that on a basis of mutual and simultaneous recognition, the PLO would be willing to progress.

## THE ISRAELI JUDICIAL SYSTEM

**QUESTION:** Let us go on to another question, if you don't mind. Pending negotiations and a settlement, there is still the question of coexistence under the status quo, the military government vis-à-vis your daily lives. How, in your opinion, can this coexistence be improved?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** A great deal can be done. For example, provocations like the confiscation of the Electric Company could be avoided. I do not see the justification. Or the question of Jewish settlement. I do not think the transition should be taken advantage of in order to impede the chances of a future settlement. And unfortunately, this is precisely what your authorities apparently want to do.

**QUESTION:** About the Electric Company, I seem to remember you saying "justice will prevail." Are you satisfied with the Israeli system of justice?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Look, I know the political obstacles confronting courts of law. I know because I myself have been a lawyer and a judge. Many of your lawyers and judges are my friends and former colleagues. But I also believe that a judicial system must be independent and effective. This is the only guarantee that an individual or group of people have in the face of a potential injustice on the part of the executive branch.

**QUESTION:** Do you find the Israeli judicial system independent and effective?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I do not know, since to date I have boycotted it. But I am satisfied with my case, although this opinion is not shared by all my compatriots, who are dissatisfied with the very fact that the issue was brought to law.

**QUESTION:** This brings us back to my last question: Is it only on this issue that your opinions are divided? Do all your colleagues accept your opinion regarding Israeli-Palestinian coexistence? Would Basam Shaq'a, for example, agree?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** I think so. I know Basam Shaq'a. What he says is that we want self-determination for the Palestinian people, that we would agree to coexistence with Israel as a Palestinian state—an independent state and not an autonomy—and that we want to choose our own leaders, just as the Israelis choose Mr. Begin or Mr. Peres, and we choose the PLO.

**QUESTION:** Beyond that there are no differences of opinion among you?

**ANWAR NUSSEIBA:** Of course there are differences of opinion among us, but not as many as among you. We are less nonconformist than you are. You are the world's nonconformists. The Jews have been the leaders of nonconformist thought in many states of human history. In any case, I believe that beyond any differences of opinion among us, the majority today wants coexistence between the state of Israel and a Palestinian state. But to date the two parties have not succeeded in coping with the fact that there are two peoples here who in the end must learn to live together.

# **A New International Era: Nationalism \_\_\_\_\_and Internationalism**

**H.R.H. PRINCE KHALED**

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A SPEECH THAT PRINCE KHALED OF SAUDI ARABIA DELIVERED TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1981. IT WAS DELIVERED AT A TIME WHEN PRINCE (NOW KING) FAHD'S PEACE PLAN AND THE STRUGGLE OVER THE AWACS DEAL WERE IN THE NEWS.

It is a privilege to be with you today and to express to you some of my thoughts on the world situation. We are living in a politically, economically, and socially diffused world—a world consisting of 160 independent, nationally oriented states that are complex, free agents; each sovereign over its lands and peoples.

Potentially, we could say that there exists a free-wheeling, irresponsible set of states, each doing its own thing!

However, and in fact, this fortunately is not the situation. Given the balance of economic, political, and military powers, an international system has developed which has helped transform this free-wheeling set of states into an interdependent interna-

---

**H.R.H. PRINCE KHALED BIN SULTAN BIN ABDAL AZIZ** is the director of projects and planning of the Saudi Army Defense Command.



tional system which goes beyond the individuality of the state, for the good of the whole world.

Yet, it is important to retain a certain individuality. May I explain to you my views on the importance of individuality? I use the term rather specifically. It represents to me the creativity of a particular people—including its culture, traditions, and unique values. I prefer this term to individualism, which often implies self-centered egoism and selfishness. I believe that a people which maintains its individuality can retain its right to self-determination, and at the same time remain committed to the human race as a whole.

I make this distinction because we Saudis believe that it is our responsibility to maintain our Muslim religious standards and our Bedouin social traditions in order to insure our cultural heritage.

Much of the world's social and political problems come from the fact that as an international body, we fail to understand and appreciate each other's individualities—that is: our different customs, values, and points of view. We feel, for example, that just because we do things differently or approach solutions to problems from a different perspective than the Western nations—this does not mean that we are automatically wrong. We are very proud of our Islamic laws. Therefore, when we are criticized by the Western media and government officials, we wonder if you even try to understand our way of life—as we try to understand yours.

Let me give you a specific example by contrasting our perspectives on the death penalty and justice for criminals. The way we see it in your laws, the question of human rights supports the criminal. We note that your judges and police forces can barely proceed in justice because of constraints placed on them to insure the rights of the criminal. In contrast, we view human rights as a question of support of the innocent people—those who have suffered acts of injustice and unfairness by criminals. Because of this perspective we are much harder on the criminal, including the death penalty. Which point of view, I ask you, is correct? Are we wrong and you are right? That is a question you have to ask yourselves and the families of victims. I might add that for many years Saudi Arabia has had the lowest crime rate in the world.

## EQUAL HUMAN RIGHTS

What is human rights and justice between nations? Does it mean that you stop the support of the Pakistani people because they have been accused of producing the atomic bomb? Or stop the support of Turkey, which is one of your most important NATO allies, when it disagrees with you on the Cyprus question? We find these actions especially difficult to understand when you contradict these policies and give unlimited support to the Israelis—when it has been proven that they have had the capacity for nuclear weapons for some time, and who use their defensive weapons to napalm Lebanon and to bomb the Iraqis.

If these policies are a question of human rights and justice for all nations: why not, then, treat the Pakistanis, the Turks, and the Israelis alike?

Another example of the inconsistent U.S application of human rights and justice with different nations is the question of Rhodesia. There, the United States insisted that there was no way for a lasting peace unless the three black, political guerrilla groups, who represented the Rhodesian people, were involved themselves in the negotiations which led to the establishment of Zimbabwe. Yet, you refuse to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization, which represents the Palestinian people, as a party to participate in the negotiation of the Palestine problem. Why this difference in policy? Should not human rights have the same common basis for all? After all, there is much more to the PLO than the Western media reports. For example, although the Palestinians do not have a state, they do have a parliament which consists of 350 members. The speaker of this council, Mr. Khaled Fahou, even suggests—and I quote him—that “if Israel would recognize the PLO, the PLO would reciprocate by recognizing Israel.” This certainly does not suggest the destruction of Israel, that Arabs are so often accused of seeking by western media and government officials. Rather, it is an expression of the desire to negotiate, involving all concerned peoples. Why not treat this problem the same way you treated Rhodesia?

**BEYOND CAMP DAVID**

You will recall that the UN adopted Resolution 3236 in November 1974, declaring that the realization of Palestinian rights is essential to the solution of the problem of Palestine, which continues to endanger international peace and security. This resolution and the recent, logical peace plan of His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Fahd, spell out a realistic approach to Middle East peace.

We implore the U.S. to go beyond Camp David and to involve the Palestinians themselves in their self-determination.

This uneven application of justice for all nations by the U.S. has kept the Arab peoples unsettled and suspicious. Let me say that we understand very clearly the problems of constituencies. We know that U.S. government officials depend upon the votes of their constituents in order to be returned to office. We, too, depend on the good will and support of our constituents; and, at present, they are not happy with the turn of events and with U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. When unlimited support is given to Israel, as it follows a course of expansionism, when it attacks its neighbors in Lebanon and threatens attacks on Syria—how would you expect our constituents to react?

Your government has announced that one of its major foreign policy goals is to contain the Soviet threat and to prevent Communist expansionism throughout the world. You have asked for our help. But can you really expect the Muslim peoples to give you their unlimited support on this request when you continue to back the Zionists, who have officially announced their expansionist plans to dominate and occupy Palestinian lands, including Jerusalem—one of the holiest cities of the Muslim faith?

Of recent concern to the average Arab person is the illegal flight over Jordan and part of Saudi Arabia to bomb Iraq's nuclear energy station. After all, Iraq has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, and has opened its station to the International Atomic Energy Agency's inspection teams, with no deviations found. Yet, the United States still supplies arms to Israel—including the recent release of the sixteen fighter aircraft that had been impounded by the United States after the Iraqi bombing and the

bombing of civilians in Lebanon. Certainly our people do not understand why the United States continues its unlimited support of a nation that claims that their violent acts of war and aggression are “defensive” in nature! Perhaps your officials, like our people, are unclear on what the real “Israeli” meaning of “defensive” is?

What the world really needs are examples of statesmanship. We do need leaders of stature. We in the developing nations look to the United States for statesmanship and leadership. But when we see that some of your congressmen, senators, and government officials who determine United States foreign policy are directed by certain Zionist interest groups, in return for a few votes—even when it is against the U.S. national interest—then how can you blame us for our amazement and reluctance to support you completely?

I do apologize for being so candid, but this is the way it is and decision-makers, even in your great nation, are aware of this unfortunate fact of political life.

## THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA

In spite of the problems I have just referred to, we still realize the necessity of interdependency, so I should like to explain to you the role we see the Saudi Arabian nation playing in the world community and to relate the problems and benefits we see in this mutual participation.

As you are aware, Saudi Arabia has approximately 25 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves—which furnish 20 percent of America’s crude oil imports. Oil and wealth from oil have provided a great opportunity for change, giving us the means to improve our society. Today we are very much a part of the world economic community. Because of our unique position, we have been able to moderate the price increases of the OPEC nations, and have been able to increase the output of oil to the industrial nations in times of need.

Likewise, we feel a responsibility to help developing Third World nations with their problems, thereby making a more equal distribution of wealth and balance of goods in the international



society. During a recent two-year period, for example, the Saudi Arabian foreign aid program spent over 11 billion U.S. dollars; more than 6 percent of our annual gross national product—this in contrast to less than 1 percent contributed by the major industrialized nations. We are most fortunate to have these vital resources to share. Our actions confirm our Islamic belief that what God has given us should be shared unselfishly with others.

Yet, because of the resources and our strategic, geographic vulnerability, we are faced with grave problems of defense of our people and of these vital products. We have an essential mission therefore to deter any attack against our borders, our oilfields, and supply routes. To do this we must strengthen our armed forces with the best hardware available. It is for this reason we have entered into agreements with the Western world—and particularly with your great nation, so that we may improve our defenses. We must build a strong defensive force which will serve notice to any potential enemy who attacks our borders and oilfields that they will be met with a swift retaliation. We are trying to be as self-sufficient as possible in this venture.

However, we realize that our individuality is not enough. There are forces in the world which we would be powerless to face alone. These external forces are not only a threat to our country, but also to the Western world.

One of the fundamental sources of strength of our nations is belief in God. This faith is not compatible with manmade philosophies whose plan is to dominate the world. For this reason, we, like you, are committed to the ideological, economic, and political struggle against Communism. I don't have to enlighten you about the expansionism of the Communists and their allies in Africa and Southwest Asia, and even on our frontiers of the Arabian Peninsula. We are threatened by these events and we are aware that the raw materials of the Middle East and Africa have an essential importance to the Soviets and their allies: in the short term they would like to control them to deprive the United States and the Western industrial nations of these vital resources; and, in the long term, they want them for themselves against the time when their own resources diminish.

Unfortunately, my personal prediction is that we might be faced with the necessity of relying on these very people, with

ideologies so foreign to us, because of the problems we face in U.S. arms sales.

## WE MAY TURN ELSEWHERE

As we continue to prepare for our defense, we face again the dual policy of the United States in reference to arms sales. In the case of the F-15 and AWACS<sup>1</sup> sales, our people feel that U.S. media and government officials have attacked our integrity. May I say quite frankly that from the first request for U.S. arms until they are delivered, we always receive so much criticism that by the time the sale is approved, we lose all appreciation for it. It is ridiculous! After all, Saudi Arabia pays cash for arms purchases whereas Israel, who actually used U.S. produced defensive weapons in offensive acts, has received your military aid and financial support—with few or no questions asked. If you compare what Israel has done with her U.S. weapons in contrast to Saudi Arabia, you will find that our buildup has been, and is, strictly defensive, whereas Israel has done nothing but continue its expansionism and attacks on its neighbors.

If we cannot count on the United States to sell us the defensive weapons we need without continual insults, then, quite frankly, we may turn elsewhere for our military hardware to defend our country. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, we are willing to deal with the devil himself if it is in our national best interest.

You may wonder why some Middle East countries like Syria, Iraq, and Egypt have dealt with the Soviet Union. They were forced to do this so they could have the arms necessary to defend themselves against Israeli aggression and expansion. Because of the United States' unlimited support of Israel, there has been no choice but to seek help and aid elsewhere. So, in some cases it has not been just Soviet Union expansionism that has caused their presence in the Middle East, but United States foreign policy.

What we would prefer to see happen in the Middle East would be for the United States to adopt and practice a foreign policy

<sup>1</sup>AWACS: Airborn Warning and Control System.

based on that famous phrase from the American Constitution: "justice for all." If this were to happen, we are convinced that many of the present problems could be solved and that our mutual friendship would continue to the advantage of both countries.

May I urge you to consider my suggestions:

1. Allow us to protect ourselves, our lands and our heritage to the extent of our abilities.
2. Share with us your technology and your wisdom as we share our resources and our knowledge of the Middle East and the Third World with you.
3. Finally, help us to achieve a permanent peace in the Middle East, with a just and fair solution to the Palestine problem, so we can both concentrate our fight against the expansionism of the Communists.

Trust, friendship, and mutual understanding can come about if we communicate and attempt to understand each other realistically. I do hope my frank communication with you today will enhance the already strong relationship that has existed between our two countries.

I pray that we may work together to save the world from poverty, disease, and political ills, so we can preserve our beliefs, our cultures, and the survival of the human race.

I can assure you that we in Saudi Arabia are committed to these goals.

Thank you.

NOVEMBER 1981

---

# Israel and the PLO

## MORDECHAI GUR

MORDECHAI GUR HAS BEGUN TO SPEAK OUT IN FAVOR OF THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, BASED UPON TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. HE HAS ALSO DECLARED THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE READY TO SPEAK TO THE PLO UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

IN THE SUMMER OF 1982, HE PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE DOVE CAUCUS WITH THE LABOR PARTY, WHICH WANTED THE PARTY TO BE MORE ASSERTIVE IN ITS CRITICISM OF THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES IN LEBANON.

Since when does Israel have the right to decide for other nations who their representatives are? Would we allow foreigners to intervene in our internal democratic process and do we dare intervene in what is happening under the guise of "democracy" in Egypt, the very same Egypt which signed a peace treaty with us and tomorrow may, under the same democratic process of arrests and coercion, decide to abandon it? Or can anyone conceivably think of returning to the debate of the early seventies about the existence or nonexistence of a Palestine entity after the Begin government has recognized, through the Camp David agree-

---

GENERAL (RES.) MORDECHAI (MOTA) GUR, a former chief of staff of the IDF, is a newly elected Member of Knesset for the Labor Party. He is active in the Knesset's Security and Foreign Affairs Committee.



ments, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians? What interests us and what should interest us is one thing only—the attitude toward us in theory and in practice.

. . . Yasir Arafat is an international terrorist, and his hands are dirty with the blood of innocent people. I have no doubts about this, and that is why on several occasions I tried to strike him, and will support such an attempt in the future if his methods continue with terrorism and murder. To my great sorrow this is not the way he is seen by his nation or by the majority of the nations in the world and their leaders. In their view he is the leader of a national liberation movement, using the same methods as other such movements in the world—in Africa, in Asia, in South America, and in Europe (Ireland). In all those places quiet citizens are murdered day and night in their homes, in restaurants, in the street, in trains and in movie houses. Although this is not our way, and it is needless to say and to stress how much this goes against our moral thinking as humans and as Jews, nevertheless we cannot hide from the political fact that these things exist and to a certain extent enjoy recognition, understanding, and sympathy.

Another unfortunate fact is that the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza did not, up to the present day, produce any leadership prepared to take the place of the PLO and to discuss their political future with Israel. In contrast to many extremists among us who talk mainly to themselves and to their ilk, I engaged in many conversations with the leaders in the territories. Those who identified with the PLO, as well as who opposed it, make it very clear that they feel that Israel will have to discuss the future of Arab-Israeli coexistence with the PLO too—although not only with the PLO. On the other hand, quite a few of them understand that Israel cannot do this until the PLO recognizes Israel. Any person who sees the Arab-Israeli conflict with open eyes is aware that the problem is deep, almost beyond the point of resolution. The conclusions derived from this run in two directions: complete severance or an attempt at talks.

In its ideological platform the Labor Party opts for talks, and indeed it initiated and expanded the chances for this. Knowing the difficulties arising from the present conflict, we opened by

explaining our position, and this appears in great detail and with no ambiguity in the text, wherein the central idea on the Palestinian question is based on the following points:

- commitment to the Camp David accords;
- rejection of the policy “not one inch” in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza;
- a peace treaty with Jordan based on territorial compromise;
- Palestinian self-determination that will find its expression in a Jordanian–Palestine state;
- rejection of an additional Palestinian state in an area between Jordan and Israel;
- the Palestinian–Jordanian area west of the Jordan river will be demilitarized and no foreign troops can cross the Jordan westward;
- such demilitarization will not preclude security arrangements involving the presence of Israeli troops; the platform specifies which areas will remain under Israeli sovereignty: the Jordan Rift, the environs of Jerusalem, Gush Etzion, and the southern part of the Gaza Strip, and the possibility of negotiating for other areas based on requirements stemming from a peace treaty with Jordan.

With respect to the human side of Israeli relations with Jordan and the Palestinians, and with an eye toward creating opportunities for negotiations, the platform indicates specifically a broadening of the Palestinian representation: in accordance with their desire to end the Arab–Israeli conflict, the Labor Party would be willing, as in the past, to have talks with Palestinian figures (in addition to agreed representatives from the territories) who would recognize Israel and would repudiate terrorism. Peace between Israel and the Jordanian–Palestinian state will be based on mutual respect for sovereignty, structure, and internal government. This section answers the question which arose during the discussion: the possibility that PLO leadership will be elected to head the Jordanian–Palestinian state. And our answer is clear—we do not interfere with that!

In order to eliminate any doubts about this issue we further specified: the PLO—which denies the right of existence to Israel—and any other organization which is based on the Palestin-

ian Covenant or which employs terrorism, cannot be partners in peace negotiations. And we further add: one must intensify political and ideological activity among the public governments, parliaments, and international organizations against granting legitimacy to terrorist and sabotage organizations and against leniency toward their murderous actions.

But, unlike the extremist groups, the Labor Party believes one cannot talk about the negative without leaving an opening for the positive. Hence we stress our total rejection of the PLO, its way and its leaders—and we will continue to act against them and fight them with all acceptable political and military means. However, we leave every Palestinian Arab, including the PLO, a way out of their extremist dilemma: to reject the Palestinian Covenant that calls for the annihilation of Israel; to desist from terrorism and to recognize Israel and its sovereign right to exist as an independent Jewish state based on the Law of Return, the right of immigration of every Jew in the world.

The PLO that does this will not be the PLO of today either in content or in form. This way is also the only way that enables us to contest the PLO in the international arena: we leave the door open and the PLO has to decide whether to enter or not. If they refuse, this will help us show the world what they are really like and will enable us to fight so long as our security and existence require it.

JANUARY 1982

# **Prepared to Pursue the Cause of Peace**

---

## **HIS MAJESTY KING HUSSEIN**

KING HUSSEIN, DESPITE MANY PREDICTIONS TO THE CONTRARY, HAS BEEN THE ONGOING RULER OF HIS COUNTRY FOR TWENTY-NINE YEARS. AS HE SAYS, "I HAVE BEEN PRIVILEGED TO KNOW SEVEN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS." IT IS ALSO KNOWN, THOUGH NOT YET PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED, THAT HE HAS MET DIRECTLY WITH A NUMBER OF ISRAELI PRIME MINISTERS, FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND DEFENSE MINISTERS. HUSSEIN, THE GREAT SURVIVOR, HAS HAD MANY UPS AND DOWNS IN HIS ROLE IN ISRAELI-ARAB AFFAIRS. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SEPTEMBER 1 (1982) INITIATIVE HAS RETURNED KING HUSSEIN TO THE CENTER OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICAL STAGE. THE KING HAS WELCOMED THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, AND HAS SAID IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE BBC THAT "THE ARABS SHOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED ISRAEL A LONG TIME AGO." HE HAS ALSO PROPOSED A JORDANIAN-PALESTINIAN FEDERATION AS A FORMULA THAT WOULD ENABLE THE PALESTINIANS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PEACE PROCESS ON EQUAL TERMS.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A SPEECH WHICH KING HUSSEIN DELIVERED TO THE LOS ANGELES WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL ON NOVEMBER 6, 1981.

---

**KING HUSSEIN is the King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.**



Since last I met with you here in Los Angeles in 1976 much has changed in the Middle East, but much too has remained the same. Major changes have come about in consequence of the Camp David agreement of 1978, but the basic issue that has troubled our region remains unresolved. I refer to the still unrealized right of the Palestinian people to self-determination of their own future on their own national soil.

Perhaps, before I turn to that theme, you will permit me a word on the related theme of constancy and change in Arab-American relations. I mention this because I am told that American officials, congressmen, and senators have been concerned of late with problems of "instability and unforeseen change in the Arab world."

You will perhaps not be surprised to learn that we in Jordan have experienced similar concerns on your account. Through circumstances and God's favor, or lack of it, I have been the leader of Jordan for twenty-nine years. During that time I have been privileged to know seven American presidents and nine secretaries of state.

Sometimes over these years, I must confess, I have been mystified by what seem to an untrained foreign eye to be sudden and unexplained shifts of policy, and even actions that seem to go against your own declared policies. But over these three decades there has been one central constant factor in our relations: that is the unbroken confidence and friendship we feel for the United States, despite what I must admit have been certain disappointments in your policies in the past.

### **"AN IMPERATIVE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION"**

Our confidence is built on the principles the United States has stood for in the world, and even more on those instances in which you acted forthrightly to put them into practice. We recall the period of World War I—when my great-grandfather was leading the Arab struggle for freedom and independence from the Ottoman Empire. It was President Wilson, alone among the leaders of the great powers, who stood up for the right of peoples to self-

determination. To President Wilson the principle of self-determination was more than a phrase or ideal. It was, he said, "an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril."

It was twenty-five years ago that I made the decision to lead Jordan into the closest possible friendship with the United States. I was twenty years old at the time and President Eisenhower became a source of sound advice and inspiration to me. I took encouragement from the fact that he expressed and also practiced high ideals. I recall especially his forthright stand against the acquisition of territory by force in the wake of the second Arab-Israeli war in 1956. President Eisenhower took his stand both before and after the elections of 1956. In a historic speech, broadcast on national television on February 20, 1957, President Eisenhower earned for the United States the respect and admiration of the world with these words: "The basic pledge of all the members of the United Nations is that they will settle their international disputes by peaceful means, and will not use force against the territorial integrity of another state. If the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by using force, then we will have destroyed the very foundation of the organization, and our best hope of establishing a world order. That would be a disaster for us all."

## WE HAVE BEEN CONSTANT

The events I wish to recall to you today begin in 1967. But it is important to set them against the background of the ideals and principles for which the United States has stood in the world. The basic principle spelled out in Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967—the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force"—is a reaffirmation of principles that Presidents Wilson and Eisenhower not only preached but also did their best to put into practice in the world.

We in the Arab world have adhered with constancy since 1967 to this and the other principles spelled out in Resolution 242, including Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the termination of belligerency, the acknowledgment of the right of

“every state in the area” to “live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries,” and the obligation of states to settle their disputes by peaceful means in compliance with the United Nations Charter.

The eight-point peace plan recently proposed by Saudi Arabia is entirely consistent with these principles, and it is also close to what Jordan has been advocating for many years. When I addressed the council on April 6, 1976, I called for appropriate guarantees of “all states in the area, including Israel,” and for Israel’s withdrawal from “all Arab territories occupied since June 1967” as well as for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and their right to return to their homes or be compensated for their lost property.

Jordan made it clear on that and many other occasions that it was prepared to pursue the course of peace with Israel on these terms. We have been constant since 1967 in our adherence to Security Council Resolution 242—as both we and the United States understood it at the time.

Since 1967, questions have been raised as to the true meaning of 242—specifically, whether it required Israel to withdraw from *all* of the Arab territories occupied, or only some parts of them. Legal scholars have disputed the placement of commas within the resolution and compared the English and French texts—all for the purpose of finding a loophole for Israel to escape its obligation.

There were no such disputes at the time. I was in New York in November 1967 and participated in the formulation of Security Council Resolution 242. During the negotiations I was in constant contact with President Nasser, and exerted my best efforts on behalf of Egyptian and all other Arab interests as well as those of Jordan. We knew that sufficient votes were available for a resolution much stronger than the one that was finally adopted.

It was, in any case, our strong preference to work with the United States and to frame a resolution that the United States would support, adopt, and help to implement. We were advised by American officials that they had the full support of President Johnson to frame a resolution on which we could all agree. I asked for clarification of the withdrawal provision and was told the United States was prepared to make a commitment that

would be understood to require Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories of the West Bank, with “minor reciprocal border rectifications” conditional on mutual agreement. And since the said border had been a cease-fire line, I said that if that was what the proposed resolution meant, I would accept it. I was assured that was what it meant and I so advised President Nasser, who also concurred.

An essential part of the understanding, as conveyed by the representatives of the United States, was that Israel had acquiesced in the agreed interpretation of what Resolution 242 would require. The specific term used was that Israel was “on board.” And furthermore, that six months would be the outside limit for its implementation.

It was on the basis of these precise assurances that I agreed to Security Council Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967—that Israel would withdraw from all occupied territories with “minor reciprocal border rectifications,” and that Israel was “on board” with this interpretation of the resolution.

## ISRAEL WAS NOT “ON BOARD”

In the years that followed, each succeeding American administration confirmed its commitment to this interpretation. It became apparent that Israel was not, in fact, “on board.” Nevertheless, despite our disappointment, but with faith in the American commitment, we cooperated patiently and to the fullest with all subsequent efforts to implement 242, including the Jarring mission of 1969 and all the initiatives made by or under the auspices of the United Nations and the United States.

We were encouraged when Secretary of State William Rogers, on December 9, 1969, reaffirmed the principle that any changes in borders “should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security.”

We were then deeply disappointed that the United States, for various reasons, did not feel itself able to act upon the Rogers plan.

Following the 1973 war the United States undertook to arrange



“disengagement” agreements between Israel on the one side and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan on the other. These arrangements obviously fell far short of Security Council Resolution 242 and the understanding of it that had been agreed upon in 1967. Nevertheless it was represented as the beginning, and thus we remained open-minded and lent our full cooperation. It was understood in 1974 that, in addition to negotiating disengagement agreements for the Sinai and the Golan Heights, the United States would undertake to arrange a uniform disengagement on the West Bank as well. Israeli intransigence soon convinced Secretary of State Kissinger that this would be difficult. He thereupon abandoned the West Bank disengagement and shifted his energies to what came to be known as “Sinai II” in 1975. Secretary Kissinger indicated to us later that he had missed a “golden opportunity.”

Throughout this succession of initiatives and disappointments we continued to place our hopes and confidence in the leadership of the United States. When President Sadat went to Jerusalem in November 1977, we regretted that the action was taken without prior coordination with other Arab nations, but we endorsed to the fullest President Sadat’s statement to the Knesset calling for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem, and for the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, “including their right to establish their own state.” That speech included the total indivisible prescription for the long-sought just and durable peace.

President Sadat and I exchanged letters before he went to Camp David in September 1978. I assured him that he had my full support in seeking an agreement based on the principles he had spelled out before the Knesset. President Sadat said that we were in agreement on these principles.

## A VERY DIFFERENT KIND OF AGREEMENT

As is now well known, a very different kind of agreement emerged from the Camp David conference—an agreement profoundly at variance with the principles spelled out in President Sadat’s Knesset speech, with Security Council Resolution 242, and with the assurances I had been given in 1967 about the mean-

ing of 242. How and why this came about I cannot of course explain, since I was not consulted on the Camp David proceedings. But I can categorically state that Israeli intransigence and arrogance, together with all the factors which caused the late President Sadat to deviate from his set course outlined in his Knesset speech, were a major factor contributing to his sadly tragic end.

Until this point Jordan had remained resolutely "on board" with the United States. With sadness and regret I concluded in September 1978 that Jordan could not accept or in any way participate in an agreement that clearly constituted a retreat from Security Council Resolution 242. Until that time we had allowed ourselves to hope that 242 was merely being postponed, or perhaps would be implemented "step-by-step" through an evolutionary process. Now we were forced to abandon that hope as it became evident that the Palestinian people were to be offered nothing more than a constricted autonomy under a perpetuated Israeli occupation, while Jordan was to be invited to assist the occupying power in maintaining order against the people under occupation.

The central issue is and always has been the right of the Palestinian people to exercise their inalienable right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine if they so desire. The peace made through Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of March 1979, which set the central issue aside, is one that Egypt, had it desired, could have made many years earlier. Israel has always been willing to pay a price, including the evacuation of Sinai, to detach Egypt from its Arab brethren. President Nasser told me not long after the 1967 war that he had received clear indications that the Israelis would give back Sinai if he would make peace. President Nasser refused; he told me that he would make peace with Israel only when all of the occupied territories were returned.

## TRADING TERRITORY FOR PEACE

I am aware that the Camp David agreement is regarded in the United States as a great and historic achievement. For our part,

we see the failure of Camp David not in what it did but in what it failed to do. We rejoice in Egypt's recovery of Sinai and, as we have repeatedly said, we are anxious to attain a final comprehensive settlement which Israel and all her neighbors can enjoy for all time in our part of the world, where the security of all can be guaranteed. Such a peace must, however, accord to the Palestinian people exactly the same terms that Camp David accorded Egypt. Israel made a deal with Egypt, trading territory for peace. The same principle must apply to all others, particularly to the Palestinians, in terms of their full rights over their now occupied national soil. Under such conditions I would suggest that a real, lasting, secure peace is Israel's for the asking.

I have no doubt that the Israelis want peace if they can have it on their own terms. But it is apparent that, for whatever reasons, they fear peace on terms that would allow genuine reconciliation. They want peace but they also want territory. The former Israeli Defense Minister, Ezer Weizmann, who participated in making the Camp David Accords, wrote in his recently published book: "Whereas the Egyptians saw the Sinai Agreement as the model for similar understandings with Jordan and Syria over the West Bank and the Golan Heights, Begin saw it as the precise opposite. As far as he was concerned, the withdrawal from the Sinai would be the end of the story." The former president of the World Jewish Congress, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, wrote last year: "The outlook for the Camp David Accords is hopeless. . . . Begin thought that Sadat would give him a free hand in the West Bank."

Since Camp David we have observed with dismay the steady expansion of Israeli settlements on the West Bank, despite the "very clear understanding" President Carter said had been reached at Camp David: that there would be no new settlements for at least five years. Then our dismay was compounded as American officials reiterated their conviction that the settlements were "illegal and an obstacle for peace," yet showed that they were unprepared to back these statements with appropriate sanctions. We in the Arab world were even further mystified when in June 1980 a proposal offered by Senator Adlai Stevenson to reduce aid to Israel by the amount used to sustain these illegal settlements was defeated in the United States Senate in a vote of 85 to 7.

It has also become apparent to us that Israel's favored solution for the Palestinian problem is to transfer the problem to Jordan. Just as the Palestinians were compelled, against their will, to compensate the Jewish people for the wrongs done by others, Jordan is now asked to compensate the Palestinians for the wrongs done them by Israel.

## WE RETAIN OUR FAITH

Behind the complexities the basic issue is a simple one. A Palestinian poet and author wrote: "A people are free or not free, independent or not independent, they are a determining force in their own destiny or are ruled by the gun. The problem of choice, in the context of Palestinian rights, is inescapable. Palestinians have rights or do not."

We retain, despite many previous disappointments, our faith and confidence that the United States will help to retrieve those rights.

To that basic goal we have been and will remain constant but we also remain flexible and open-minded as to how a settlement based on lofty principles, some of which were contained in Resolution 242, may still be achieved.

We believe that eventually, and hopefully before it is too late, you will not turn your backs on your own past and your own principles. It is on this belief that we base our confidence that you will not turn your backs on those who seek peace with justice in the Middle East. An honorable peace that future generations can live with and uphold to enjoy a far better life than any of us have had. We are aware of our responsibilities toward future generations, their security, dignity, and peace. If and when others share the same awareness, or are persuaded to do so, a just and lasting peace in the Middle East could be achieved.

FEBRUARY 1982



# Facing Mid-East Realities

---

PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK

PHILIP KLUTZNICK HAS BEEN AN OUTSPOKEN SUPPORTER OF THE NEED AND POSSIBILITY FOR AN ISRAELI-ARAB COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT. IN AUGUST 1981, HE PARTICIPATED IN A FOUR-MEMBER PRIVATE STUDY TOUR OF FIVE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THE GROUP PUBLISHED ITS FINDINGS IN *THE PATH TO PEACE: ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE AND THE U.S.* (SEVEN SPRINGS CENTER, OCTOBER 1981). THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS KLUTZNICK'S CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING THE STUDY TOUR.

Since the traumatic AWACS battle a flurry of statements involving the Camp David negotiations and the Saudi Arabian eight-point peace plan, plus King Hussein's visit here, have finally focused the Reagan administration on the intricacies and imperatives of peace in the Middle East. The stalemated Palestinian autonomy talks, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and our own concentration on domestic economic problems come close to sounding the death knell to the Camp David negotiations—

---

PHILIP KLUTZNICK is the president emeritus of the World Jewish Congress, the honorary president of B'nai B'rith International, a former Secretary of Commerce in the Carter Administration, and a former American Ambassador to the United Nations. In July of 1982, Klutznick published the Paris Declaration, together with Dr. Nahum Goldmann and Pierre Mendès-France, calling for "mutual recognition [and] coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians based on self-determination."

beyond the separate Egyptian-Israeli arrangements. Yet there will not be a viable and lasting peace in the Middle East region without the active, constructive, and courageous participation of the American government.

During August, in company with several others, I spent three weeks visiting five Middle Eastern countries plus the West Bank. Once again I visited Israel and Egypt. Then for the first time I ventured into new territory, visiting new faces in the West Bank and traveling to Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. In times past I had hesitated to even request visas to these countries. But, after my latest service in the cabinet of President Carter, I felt it worth the risk to see for myself the new realities I have heard so much about. This laborious introduction is needed to justify the expression of some hopes I feel as well as some fears that disturb me.

The welcome reopening of the autonomy talks and the resurfacing of the Saudi plan are beginning to provide the press with an unfortunate substitute for the AWACS daily features. Yet nothing can be more dangerous to our hopes for peace than forcing the leaders of the governments involved to engage in open clashes about their differences. From my recent talks with senior government officials throughout the Middle East, including a number of heads of state, I know first-hand how many are the disputes and areas of distrust that need be adjusted before a peace can be achieved. These differences and mistrusts are not simply between Israel and her neighbors; but between Arab nations and within Arab nations. The one certainty that I feel is that open and contentious diplomacy in the daily headlines may destroy or long delay the present possibilities for peace between Israel and her Middle Eastern neighbors—a possibility which in my judgment is the greatest since the years preceding Israel's creation in 1948.

Finally the Reagan administration may be putting itself on a constructive course. The United States needs to encourage every effort to resolve the genuine and deep-seated differences that exist.

## **A CRUCIAL TURNING-POINT**

Looking back, anyone who expected the Camp David Accords to be accepted by all the states in the Middle East was unaware of

the sensitivities that were either ignored or shelved for later consideration. Likewise, anyone who now expects the Saudi eight points to be universally applauded is remiss in appreciating the real facts of life in the region—both in Israel and among parties less thoughtful than the Saudis.

However, the acceptance by Jordan, the PLO, and others of the overall Saudi approach may be a crucial turning point in Middle East diplomacy. For the first time certain states have, even if indirectly, turned away from “outlawing” Israel as an illegitimate sovereign state and looked to “coexistence” as the eventual goal. There was a hint of this possibility at the Baghdad summit following the Camp David agreements. But now with the Saudi proposals there is the potential at least for multilateral and direct negotiations involving both Israel and the Palestinians.

Many remember Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem and the ecstasy it aroused around the world. Forgotten are the speeches at the Knesset where Sadat and Begin stated positions which were hardly palatable to the other side. It is not easy for political leaders to do a 180-degree turn overnight after years of enmity and hostility. Yet, I recall one of the fine leaders of Israel listening to a critic of Sadat’s speech complaining how Sadat was offering little in return for the concessions being demanded of Israel. Yigal Allon responded by reminding the critic that for thirty years Israel asked for recognition and the hand of peace from her Arab neighbors, and now the leader of the most populous Arab state was saying “We had been wrong not to accept you before.” “And you get upset about details! Those we will work on and find answers to,” Allon insisted.

I feel somewhat the same about the current situation. The eight-point plan was publicized in an interview in August this year while Sadat was visiting Washington. I felt that the timing was significant even though the Crown Prince took special care to emphasize that the Saudis had previously made these points in various ways. Then in the Kingdom, our group hazarded the view in our conferences with leading Saudi officials that perhaps the Saudis were not prepared to take a lead in the peace-making process. But we were assured that such a prospect was unlikely since the Saudis were very circumspect about getting “out front.” We were reminded of the Saudi role in the Lebanese cease fire—

careful, behind-the-scene diplomacy. Yet, now the Saudis have taken a significant lead; though essentially tabled at the short-lived Fez summit on November 25, the Saudi principles remain essential to future Middle East diplomacy.

My visits in the various Arab countries convinced me that with very few exceptions there was a general feeling at the highest levels that Israel was here to stay, that she had developed into a military superpower, that Jewish nationalism was accepted as fact if not understood, and that the time had finally come to find an answer to the basic problem that stood in the way of peace.

## THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Over and over again the Palestinian issue dominated conversation and viewpoint. The Palestinians have become a special people in the Arab world, in some ways like the Jews in the Western world following World War II.

In a sense, Zionism's success spawned another national movement in this century. In Jordan, for instance, no one spoke seriously of the "Jordanian option" as either viable or desirable. As one leading personality in Jordan self-critically remarked: "The Israelis and Jewish community should have no guilty conscience about the Palestinians; they have been mistreated by the Arab community for many, many years longer."

Aside from this coalescing of opinions about the centrality of the Palestinian issue to achieving peace, the next most significant conclusion was that the PLO was the only party qualified to speak for the Palestinians. There will be those who will say that such a conclusion is naive or ill-founded. Perhaps so; but it remains a fact that the PLO has sufficient strength in an increasing number of capitals to either accelerate or abort the peace process that was begun so auspiciously in Jerusalem with Sadat's visit four years ago this month.

The PLO seems to be increasingly taking a lesson out of Jewish experience. They are trying to create, and with some success, an organization that handles many social and economic problems even as they continue to build a more sophisticated military potential. They have banks and industries and they have friends in



the Middle East who help bank them in large sums. Today the Palestinians are spoken of as "the modern-day Jews of the Arab world."

Another widespread conclusion we found was private awareness that while the Camp David Accords might have been a beginning, they were rejected not so much out of unwillingness to contemplate peace but because the agreements failed properly to link the Egyptian-Israeli treaty with resolution of the Palestinian issue. Many condemn Camp David for this, forgetting that without this beginning there probably would not be today's Saudi initiative. Others feel that Camp David has served its function and should be supplemented or transcended.

## AN OPENING GAMBIT

It would be tragic and unthinkable to lose the momentum begun at Camp David. The autonomy discussions should now be accelerated in an attempt to draw some Palestinian representation into the negotiations. But if the autonomy talks fail to deal adequately with the Palestinian dimensions of the problem, there is no dishonor in supplementing them with the ideas and suggestions of others.

Here the Saudi approach may prove useful, at least as an opening gambit. The Saudi plan is not incompatible with Camp David, as President Mubarak in Egypt has suggested, and as the Reagan administration has implied. Some of the ideas in the plan are in some ways an outgrowth of the events of the past few years. If it is endorsed at the Arab summit at Fez later this month, American, Israeli, and Egyptian negotiators should carefully consider the virtues of enlarging the participation in the peace process. Such a development was, in fact, envisioned at Camp David. In recent discussions with President Carter I found him very much inclined to this possibility.

For while it is indispensable to an earnest and honest solution in the Middle East that the United States continue to play a key role, it is also necessary that Saudi Arabia and other constructive Arab states enter the peace process and that the Europeans be encouraged to participate in accordance with their legitimate in-

terests. The United States should not want to have a monopoly on peace-making in the Middle East.

Since the position and status of Saudi Arabia may be crucial to the eventual success of Middle East diplomacy, let me make a few additional observations. I knew the representatives of Saudi Arabia when I served in the United Nations in the mid-1950s and again in the 1960s. They were represented in the main by mercenaries who were not really native Saudis nor polished diplomats. Energy economics and twenty years have transformed the Saudi situation. The accomplishments which oil billions have made possible are impressive. Yet the ruling family, it appears to me, senses that many more changes need to be made. Many of the younger people who are not a part of the family have a degree of competence that is unlike that which seemed to prevail but a few years ago.

No one can tell at this stage what will be the Saudi future, but to ignore the changes, the resources, and the leadership which circumstances have imposed on Saudi Arabia is to think of yesterday and not today and tomorrow. In my dealings outside the Kingdom with representatives of the Saudi monarchy and with Saudi private businessmen I have found a metamorphosis which is difficult to appreciate unless one experiences it. Comparing Saudi Arabia with Iran under the Shah is unrealistic. In fact there is little comparison to Saudi Arabia today or probably in history—the country is *sui generis*. Nor do I find the measure of alleged Saudi arrogance many others attach to the Kingdom. In its place there actually seems to be a kind of modesty accompanied by serious anxiety about the unknown future.

Any unprejudiced observer would have to conclude that Saudi influence has been used for some time in opposition to Israel's hopes. Yet, in the past few years the Saudis have begun to mature quickly. I am forced to conclude that no genuine and lasting peace will be achieved anytime soon without some real measure of participation by the Saudi Kingdom. I do not believe that it is simply the hope within me that causes me to conclude that the leaders of the Kingdom may be signaling their readiness to become involved in a peace process building upon Camp David but going beyond it.

If this conclusion is correct, or even if the conjecture has pos-

sibilities, then it should be explored by both the United States and Israel. Inflammatory rhetoric should be replaced by thoughtful contemplation. Such possibilities should not be conceived as substitutes for Camp David, nor should we assume that the autonomy negotiations will lead nowhere. What is necessary is to transcend and build on the remarkable progress that Camp David has made possible. For we are at a moment in the modern history of the Middle East which may be midstream between the beginnings of a limited peace and the achievement of a comprehensive peace. If we fail to grasp that moment and encourage active and diligent negotiations quietly conducted toward that larger end, then all of us may fall prey to the whirlwinds of the far bleaker alternatives.

FEBRUARY 1982

# **The Arabs Have Helped \_\_\_\_\_Israeli Expansionism**

**ISSAM SARTAWI**

DR. SARTAWI HAS BEEN CARRYING ON A DIALOGUE WITH ISRAELIS IN EUROPE SINCE 1976, INITIALLY "AT THE REQUEST OF THE EXECUTIVE OF THE PLO, AND LATER, WITH THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL (IN MARCH 1977)." IN THE SUMMER OF 1982, HE GAVE A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH DR. MATI PELED. HE HAS INVITED MEMBERS OF THE KNESSET MOTA GUR AND YOSSI SARID (LABOR) AND VICTOR SHEMTOV AND MUHAMMAD WATAD (MAPAM) TO HAVE A DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH HIM.

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE IS BASED UPON A CONVERSATION BETWEEN DR. SARTAWI AND ERIC ROULEAU, THE NOTED MIDDLE EAST CORRESPONDENT, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN *LE MONDE* ON JANUARY 22, 1982.

The Arabs, and in particular the Palestinians, encouraged Israel to put its expansionist policy into action: this is the theory that was outlined to us by Doctor Issam Sartawi, member of the Palestinian National Council (Parliament) and one of the advisers on international policy to Mr. Yasir Arafat, President of the PLO. "It is obvious," he declared, "that Mr. Begin is trying to annihilate

---

DR. ISSAM SARTAWI, a member of the Palestinian National Council, is one of the major PLO spokesmen in Europe.



the Palestinian people, and take away their country completely, but this is not a reason for us to supply him with pretexts and means to attain his goals."

The annexation of the Golan, according to the Palestinian leader, would not have been possible if the Israeli peace movement had had at their disposal at least ten Members of Knesset who, due to the parliamentary distribution, could have acted as arbitrators. "We did not manage to contribute to the success of the democrats and the progressive Israelis who, contrary to appearances, have the support of a comparatively wide electorate." The peace movement, according to Dr. Sartawi, is not composed only of the Rakach Party (Communist) and Sheli, but also groups and personalities, Zionist or not, who accept the following principles: Israel's return to the 1967 borders, recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to a sovereign state, with the understanding that the PLO is their sole legitimate representative.

If Sheli—a group animated noticeably by General Peled and Mr. Uri Avnery—did not obtain in the last elections their four or five expected seats, stated Mr. Sartawi, it is because it was not credible in the eyes of the Israelis, largely due to the Palestinians. "My secret conversations with the progressive Israelis as of Autumn 1976, first at the request of the Executive of the PLO, then with the endorsement of the Palestinian National Council (March 1977), should have been publicly admitted, justified, and defended in the core of the Arab world and before Israeli opinion." Such a spectacular gesture, audacious as it may seem, was indispensable for the Palestinian leaders: "We should have invited our Israeli counterparts to Beirut for an exchange of views directly with Mr. Yasir Arafat; better still, they should have been invited to address the Palestinian National Council, which held its meeting in Damascus last April, two months before the elections in Israel. The PLO could then have demonstrated concretely its willingness to bring about a true peace, acceptable to both parties, which could have granted a measure of credibility to the Israeli pacifists in the eyes of their countrymen."

Mr. Sartawi was disavowed implicitly by his superiors. Not only did the Palestinian National Council not invite him to present a report on his conversations with the progressive Israelis,

but a resolution was adopted forbidding contacts with any Jew who was not an anti-Zionist "both in theory and in practice." Mr. Sartawi's protest resignation from the Palestinian National Council was not accepted. But Mr. Arafat's adviser immediately broke off the talks with his Israeli partners in dialogue. "I am a disciplined militant," he explained, "and I have never acted beyond the directives of the representatives of the Palestinian people." He thinks more or less that his superiors were mistaken in giving way to discouragement. "The intransigence of Mr. Begin's coalition and the lack of sensitivity of the Labor Party should have, on the contrary, incited us to double our efforts rather than fall into the trap that the enemies of peace held out to us."

Accordingly, Mr. Sartawi took various initiatives with a view to resuming the dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians "on a more solid and wider basis." He hoped to obtain first the backing of the PLO, then that of the Arab League, preferably on the occasion of a forthcoming summit meeting.

Does he feel that he is carrying on a solitary battle? No, he said, on the contrary: It is enough to mention that over a million and a half Palestinians in the occupied territories understand, like him, the vital importance of Israeli public opinion and highly appreciate the moral and material support given to them by the democratic Jews, when faced with the repression of the occupying forces.

"The PLO should take into account the opinion and aspirations of all the sectors of the Palestinian people, especially those of the occupied territories, otherwise the PLO would risk its representativity and its function," stated Mr. Sartawi vehemently.

Is he not afraid to be the next victim of a dissident group of Palestinians of Abu Nidal who threatened to kill the "traitors," those who preach, like him, a policy of dialogue and compromise? "Contrary to appearances," replied our speaker, "Abu Nidal is not a maximalist servicing the cause of the Rejection Front, but a renegade who is in the service of Israel. The Austrian Security Services have established, without any doubt, that the right-hand man of Abu Nidal not only killed the municipal councilor Heinz Nittel, May, 1, 1981, and attacked the synagogue of Vienna in August, but also murdered, on June 1, Naim Khader, the representative of the PLO in Brussels. They intended to at-

tack Yasir Arafat during his intended visit to Vienna the following week. Who but Israel could be interested in eliminating our leaders? Who was interested in discrediting the Palestinian resistance by committing crimes of such a scandalously anti-Semitic nature?"

"We do not ask ourselves these questions anymore," continued Mr. Sartawi, "since the members of the group of Abu Nidal whom we hold in Beirut admitted to having been recruited by the Mossad (the Israeli Intelligence) in the occupied territories. Curiously, Abu Nidal benefited equally from the help of certain Arab countries, who utilized him for their own aims."

Mr. Sartawi refused to name the Arab countries to which he referred, but it is widely known that Syria and Iraq have granted their hospitality and support to the commandos of Abu Nidal. "In spite of the advantages which they derived," concluded Mr. Sartawi, "we hope that the Arab countries will put an end to their cooperation once the documents in our possession, that incriminate their protégé, are brought to their knowledge."

MARCH 1982

# **Dr. Sartawi and the Dilemma of Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue**

---

SIMHA FLAPAN

Dr. Sartawi's statement in *Le Monde* is a document of historical importance, and a challenge to the PLO. It comes from a man whose stature and task cannot be downgraded or understated. Dr. Sartawi is neither a "pacifist" nor an "outsider"; nor is he an opportunist motivated by personal careerism. He is a fighter who dedicated his life and career to the struggle for the rights of his people to national independence and statehood.

Like his predecessor—Sa'id Hammami, the London representative of the PLO, who back in 1973 raised the demand for a Palestinian strategy for peaceful coexistence—Dr. Sartawi took part in PLO combat in the belief that a return to Palestine is possible only by war. Before he reached the conclusion that Palestinian national aspirations should be realized in peace, coexistence, and recognition of Israel, he, like Hammami, had to go through the severe, bitter experiences of the futility and failure of strategic concepts and illusions, some of which still dominate the minds of many Palestinians: pan-Arabism and Arab unity, guerilla romanticism, an uprising of the revolutionary Matzpen forces, a common front with Sephardic Jews against the "oppressive Zionist structure," reabsorption of Arab Jews to their countries of origin, the de-Zionization of Israel as a result of boycott



and total isolation at the United Nations, and, finally, the concept of a "democratic secular" state over the whole of Palestine in which Muslims, Jews, and Christians would live together in equality and peace.

This concept, adopted as official policy by the Palestine National Council, is still presented alongside the proposal of a "two-state" solution as an alternative or a vision for the more distant future.

Sa'id Hammami's idea of peaceful coexistence was a personal view which he was allowed to express in spite of his official position. Israeli spokesmen interpreted this as a maneuver and trick of deception aimed at confusing and weakening the Israeli refusal to recognize the PLO as a partner to the peace settlement. However, his assassination by the Rejectionists in 1978 proved that his contacts and talks with Israelis were not at all aimed to deceive, but to pave the way for a dramatic change of attitudes from nonrecognition to mutual recognition. Even before his assassination, Dr. Sartawi entered the scene as a special envoy of Yasir Arafat. He paid tribute to Hammami's moral courage but developed the idea of peaceful coexistence into a comprehensive doctrine which became the basis of extensive and prolonged political efforts to establish contacts with Israeli and Jewish Diaspora leaders, as well as with European governments and liberal and socialist statesmen. In this he proved to be the possessor of an outstanding talent, ingenuity, and intelligence. It is impossible to separate the enormous sympathy and support for the Palestinian rights to self-determination and statehood, so widespread in European society and politics, from Dr. Sartawi's mission.

The image of the PLO as an indispensable component of the Middle East peace process and partner to negotiations was, to a very large extent, created by Dr. Sartawi. It was also he who developed contacts and negotiations with Israelis who, in response to Hammami's ideas, established the Israeli Council for Israeli Palestinian Peace. At the end of 1976, these contacts led to an agreement on the principles of a "two-state" solution, based on mutual recognition, coexistence, and peace with guarantees for sovereignty and security to both peoples. Such an agreement, if adopted and confirmed by the Israeli government and the PLO, could open the way to negotiations and lead to a solution of the

eighty-year-old bloody conflict between Palestinian nationalism and Zionism. But it was rejected by both. Farouk Kadoumi, the political secretary of the PLO, vehemently denied the fact that there had been any negotiations and agreement. The Prime Minister of Israel, who had been informed of the meetings, forbade participation of leaders from the West Bank in the Cairo meeting of the Palestine National Council (March 1977), at which Dr. Sartawi was supposed to report and open the debate on his negotiations with the ICIPP; he declared, soon after the meeting opened, that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO, even if it changed the Palestinian Covenant calling for the liquidation of the Jewish state.

Why Dr. Sartawi and the Israelis did not succeed in convincing their respective establishments at least to explore the chances of a solution to the basic aspect of Israeli-Arab relations is a problem which merits serious study and analysis, and which will be dealt with on another occasion. What is more important to stress here is the historical significance of the Israeli-Palestinian discussions on the way to a solution compatible with the *national aspirations* and coexistence of *both peoples*. There were meetings between Palestinian and Israelis before Dr. Sartawi initiated his venture. For some time the leaders of Matzpen—a marginal group of anti-Zionist, Trotskyite revolutionaries—were viewed as the Israeli partners to a solution. Later the Palestinians focused their interest on the communist party of Rakach because of its anti-Zionist ideology, the preponderance of Arabs in its membership, and its affinity with the USSR, which was expected to play a major role in Middle East developments, and in the solution to the conflict. Between 1968 and 1977, it was the Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East, run and supervised by Communist leaders in Italy and France; it attempted to build an Israeli-Arab dialogue in a number of international conferences (among them the so-called Bologna conferences). This dialogue was a priori limited to members, friends, and fellow travelers of the Rakach Party. Its impact on Israeli public opinion was negligible. It was Sa'id Hammami who established a "breakthrough," initiating talks with Israeli Zionists. The story of this dramatic change, and the role *New Outlook* played in it, has not been publicized and will have to be told at the proper time. Hammami did not initiate

it because he had lost his faith in the justice of the Palestinian struggle, or perhaps because he had discarded his vision of a united binational state. However, he recognized the cruel necessity of a choice between the vision and the limits of reality. "What separates us is not a 'misunderstanding,' but a real conflict. We are not friends—we are enemies, and that is why we have to make peace," was the leitmotiv in the talks he initiated with Israelis. Dr. Sartawi went further than that: Aware of the deep ideological and political struggles between the fanatical dogmatist and the foresighted, realistic forces, and of the correlation of their strength and chances in both national movements, he undertook to elaborate the principles and strategy of contacts and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians in their struggle for peace. In this he proved to be not only a professional and brilliant diplomat, representing his establishment, but also a militant and courageous fighter for his views inside his own movement, unafraid of the wrath of the fanatics and their threats.

His belief in the great importance of the Israeli peace camp for the realization of Palestinian self-determination was not shaken by its defeats in the 1977 elections to the Knesset.

The failure of the peace forces in the 1977 elections caused a grave shock to all those concerned with the prospect of peace. Particularly disappointing was the nonsuccess of the Sheli party, whose leaders—Lova Eliav, Dr. Matti Peled, Uri Avnery, and Dr. Ya'acov Arnon—were the founders of the ICIPP and Dr. Sartawi's negotiation partners.

The major cause for the poor achievement—two Members of the Knesset out of 120—was the rise of annexationist and militaristic tendencies, enhanced by the policies of the Labor government, which paved the way to Begin's ascent to power. But, undoubtedly the PLO's disavowal of the talks with the ICIPP contributed heavily to this setback. Dr. Sartawi tried to rectify the damage by inviting the ICIPP to meet Arafat and to address the Palestine National Council in Damascus, before the new elections in Israel. Whether this would have prevented the even greater defeat of peace forces in the 1981 elections (in which Sheli lost its 2 Knesset seats, Rakach 25 percent of its votes, and Peace Now candidates failed to gain a seat) is difficult to judge.

The problem is whether the decline of support for the peace



forces was caused only by the absence of a clear-cut PLO peace policy. The fact is that alongside the rising mood of chauvinism there is now more understanding among Israeli public opinion of the centrality of the Palestinian problem and its impact on the prospects of peace. More and more Israelis, from different parties, tend to approve an exploration of the credibility of PLO declarations in favor of a peace settlement. They would like to put an end to occupation and rule over 1½ million Palestinians, and do not oppose, in principle, their right to self-determination. But they have doubts about the viability of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and fear that it might become a base for irredenta, terror, and warfare. The problem that arises here is whether these Israelis ought to be drawn into contacts and discussions with Palestinians, in order to disperse their doubts and fears, or whether the dialogue should be restricted to Israelis already "converted" to the solution of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Perhaps something could be learned from the experiences of *New Outlook*, which in September 1978 initiated a frank discussion between representatives of the mainstreams in Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, without a previously agreed political platform (the proceedings were published later on in *When Enemies Dare to Talk*, by Croom Helm, London, 1979). The discussion did not lead to an agreement but left a deep impression on the Israeli participants, all of whom became activists against the policy of annexation and occupation. *New Outlook* tried to follow up this debate with a large public symposium in Washington (October 1979), where a fascinating discussion between Israeli, Diaspora Jews and Palestinian intellectuals took place before a large audience of 700 people. However, the absence of the mayors from the West Bank and Gaza, who at the last moment canceled their participation in the symposium, impaired its impact on Israeli public opinion and provided the establishment with material for propaganda about Palestinian indisposition and objection to peace talks. The last-minute abstention of the West Bank mayors was caused, as explained by their special emissary, Mrs. Ramonda Tawil, not by their opposition to the *New Outlook* initiative but by various pressures and the refusal of the State Department to grant visas to Dr. Sartawi and Sabri Jiryis, who were invited to take part in the Symposium. However, the 40



Israeli delegates, including Knesset Members and prominent scholars, who came would not liberate themselves from the feeling that a "rejectionist" attitude, or pressure, played a role in the abstention. This disappointment did not detract from the value and influence of the fascinating symposium debates in the U.S., (where they are now circulated on videotape), but caused a setback in the support for the idea of cooperation with the Palestinians among the Israeli public.

The shortcomings of the symposia organized by *New Outlook* lie in the absence of a clear-cut political platform and resolutions. This, however, is compensated for by providing Palestinian and Israeli protagonists of the two-states solution a wide and diversified forum of potential supporters. One of the reasons for the nonsuccess of the ICIPP was the impression that it was a front group of a political left-wing socialist party (Sheli). The same impression caused the isolation of the Peace Committee run by Rakach. The Palestinian problem, however, is a national problem and every effort should be made to prevent its transformation into a platform or flag of any particular party.

Despite the setback in the 1977 and 1981 elections, Dr. Sartawi continued his contacts with the ICIPP and with *New Outlook*, as well as the pressure on the PLO leadership to eliminate its ambiguities, evasions, and equivocations with regard to its objectives, its readiness for recognition and coexistence with Israel in the framework of a solution, its approval of contacts and dialogue with the Israeli peace camp.

He demanded clear-cut approval of contacts with Israelis and Jews who are in favor of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, regardless of their Zionist beliefs. In his interview with the Beirut weekly *Monday Morning*, and with the official organ of the PLO, *Falastin Al Thawra* (January 1981), he makes a distinction between "three trends in the Zionist movement": the Likud bloc, the Labor Alignment Bloc and the peace camp, which, as he specifies, includes the Sheli Party, the Peace Now movement, the *New Outlook* group, and other organizations the Zionist character of which cannot be doubted. At the same time he sent a cable of greetings to the ICIPP meeting in Jerusalem, which ended with the significant and unprecedented statement that "Sooner than all our combined enemies think, peace shall and must reign between

the Palestinian and Israeli states and their peoples." The storm of protests and vilifications which these bold acts provoked in the Palestinian movement did not deter Dr. Sartawi from presenting himself at the Palestine National Council Meeting in Damascus (April 1981) to demand a debate and unequivocal confirmation of contacts with Israeli peace groups. When he was refused permission to speak, and when the council adopted a resolution approving only of contacts with Israelis who oppose Zionism "in theory and in practice," Dr. Sartawi submitted his resignation. It was not accepted, but Dr. Sartawi continues his struggle for clear-cut approval of a dialogue with the Israeli peace camp, as a condition for further contacts.

It would be a mistake to regard his behavior as a struggle for his personal position and authority. It is the expression of a very wide movement among the Palestinians—and in the Arab world in general—aiming to end the war with Israel, which has become self-destructive and counterproductive to social and economic Arab development, and to a just solution of the Palestinian problem. The hope that time will work in the favor of the Arabs and Palestinians proved to be an illusion. Motivated by this fear, Israel engaged in a desperate and feverish buildup, a technological, industrial, and military potential which eliminates any chance that the terms of a settlement can be dictated to Israel by war, or the threat of war. With the help of the United States, obsessed by the fear of Soviet penetration, Mr. Begin proceeds with the *de facto* annexation of the West Bank and a policy aimed at breaking, morally, physically, economically, and politically, the Palestinian National movement. Chances for a settlement depend upon the political forces in the world interested in stability, peace, and détente, on the concern of Israeli and Diaspora Jews with the erosion of the liberal-humanistic values and the growth of militaristic, chauvinistic, paranoiac, oppressive trends in the Jewish state, and finally, on the ability of the Arabs and Palestinians to develop a strategy of peace. It seems that more and more Palestinians, as well as Arab statesmen in the region, understand that a peace initiative is the best way to prevent the terrible dangers involved in the policy of Mr. Begin and Mr. Sharon.

Dr. Sartawi is neither a secessionist nor an opposition leader. His voice is not a lone voice and it is not in the wilderness. Voices

like his are heard from Palestinians everywhere. They express the view of the majority, and the majority is not silent. It is the policy of Mr. Begin, his total rejection of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, his violent oppression of their national aspirations, and his ruthless war against the PLO that prevent this majority from establishing a new policy leading to peace based on mutual recognition and coexistence.

However, for a peace initiative to be effective, it is necessary that it take into account the need to disperse Israel's paranoiac fear and to answer satisfactorily the objective, legitimate security needs. This can only be achieved by what Dr. Sartawi suggests—an unequivocal formulation of the PLO peace objectives and an open, direct dialogue with the Israeli peace forces. There is a fundamental difference between a strategy of peace and a strategy of war. Unlike war, peace cannot be planned in secrecy; it requires an appeal to the people, both its own and the adversary's. It requires recognition of the enemy as a potential ally. It requires dialogue. This is Dr. Sartawi's mission, and it is a mission of historical importance. However, Dr. Sartawi's declaration is also a challenge to Israel. He calls upon the Arabs to strengthen the Israeli peace camp. Our duty is to strengthen the Arab peace camp. Our duty is to mobilize all Israeli, Jewish, and international forces to stop the policy of oppression, to put an end to occupation, and to recognize the right of Palestinians to national independence and self-determination in the framework of peace and coexistence.

MARCH 1982

# **We Must Build the Future Together**

**BUTROS GHALI**

THE FOLLOWING ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN IN THE SPRING OF 1982, BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF THE THIRD STAGE OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI. IT TOOK THE FORM OF A LETTER TO THE ISRAELI PEOPLE, WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN HEBREW IN *YEDIOT AHRONOT*.

As I write this article, I find myself confronted by a deep sense of confusion. On the one hand, I am still under the painful impression of the manifestations of the Israeli conquest in the West Bank as they are reflected on the screens of the European television stations, and I know that a successful continuation of the peace process has a very low credibility at present.

On the other hand, I still firmly believe that we must continue the peace process, and must prepare ourselves for the continuation of the process after April 26, until its final conclusion.

Despite the fact that I still feel a sense of shock as a result of the recent events in the West Bank, and I am still deeply worried about the inhuman attitude toward the Palestinians and the violations of their basic civil and human rights; and despite the fact that I feel a deep solidarity with those Palestinians who have been

---

**DR. BUTROS GHALI**, the Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, accompanied Sadat on his initial visit to Jerusalem and has been an active participant in all of the stages of the peace process.



imprisoned and humiliated by the Israeli military authorities—I still put my faith in peace.

I know that this optimism seems to be rather utopian, totally cut off from reality. If we focus on the clashes in the West Bank and on the huge obstacles that stand in the way of a successful realization of the peace treaty, we get the impression that there really is no basis for optimism. But we have learned from the past that ideas that were initially considered utopian were converted into reality when there existed a political desire to make such a transformation, to change the character of reality.

I remember my long talk with Yigal Allon and with Ezer Weizmann on the evening after President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem. We were like people who had arrived from two entirely different planets.

In those days, peace between us appeared to be much more of a utopia—even more so than the subjects we are talking about today. Therefore, this is the promising perspective within which I view the future of the relations in our region—between Egypt and Israel, between Egypt and the Arabs, and between Israel and the Palestinians.

An impression is being created that within Israel there is a fearful *dybbuk*, that after April 26 the nature of our bilateral relations will change. How can we overcome this pessimism?

- Firstly, I believe that we must maintain the momentum of peace.
- Secondly, we should forge a peace process which will enable us to involve the rest of the Arabs.
- Thirdly, we must overcome the triple misunderstandings that may arise after April 26.

I am referring to misunderstandings between the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the other Arabs. All three of these factors may find themselves in a situation of illusion and of an awakening from illusion, and there is a dialectical connection between these different ways of thinking.

The Israelis are deluding themselves into thinking that everything will change after April 26, that they will then find themselves in an inferior tactical position, and that there will be a great reduction in the normalization process.

The Arabs, on their part, are cultivating the illusion that there will be a great reconciliation between themselves and the Egyptians, at the expense of normalization with Israel.

This will be even more complicated by the Palestinian factor, in light of the uncertainty concerning their future.

The Egyptians, on their part, may find themselves divided between the tendency to want to be partners to the expectations of the other Arabs, and the tendency to want to reassure the fears of the Israelis.

Let us return to the problem of how to overcome the Israeli fears. The impression is that we could achieve this if we reached a greater understanding of the existing reality, and of each other. We could try to crystallize and institutionalize the Israeli-Egyptian dialogue by developing it on three separate planes. On the governmental level, we have already resolved to carry out consultations between our foreign ministers every three months. At the party level, we can carry out joint political meetings between our party and the political parties in Israel. I have already discussed this idea with the leaders of the Israeli Labor Party. On the academic level, the Israeli Academic Center which is currently being established in Cairo will undoubtedly contribute to an improvement of the relations between the academics of our two peoples.

And above all, we must not take a negative attitude toward the problem of our relations in the future.

What can be done concerning the matter of misunderstandings with the Arab countries?

1. We must make clear to them that we intend to maintain relations with the Arab world, that Egypt is an Arab country, and that Egypt wants to maintain full relations with the Arab countries.

2. We must explain to them that our relations with the Arabs will not be developed at the expense of normalization with Israel.

3. We must explain that we want to involve them in the peace process—whether it be the Palestinians, the Jordanians, or any other Arab state.

4. We can propose that as an initial stage, we can begin indirect contacts between Israel and the Arab states; i.e. that Egypt can receive a mandate from certain Arab states or from the Palestinians to pave the way toward a constructive Arab-Israeli dialogue.

Where do the Palestinians enter into this picture?

I think that we have to promise them that the fact that we liberated our lands doesn't mean that we will cease working for the liberation of their lands, while taking into account Israel's security needs and while striving for the cultivation of the trust of the Palestinians.

Despite all of the present difficulties, we must try over and over to seek ways and means to establish mutual trust between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and to advance the coexistence between the two sides. In our contact with the Arab states, we will try to convince them to show consideration for the genuine interests of the Palestinians, and not just to concentrate solely on their own interests. They should give aid to the Palestinians, and not use their distress in order to solve internal problems of the Arab states, or to resolve internal political power struggles.

The most important thing is not to sink into pessimism. When I recall the difficult moments we have gone through on the path we have taken until now, I draw encouragement concerning the present situation. I recall my first discussion with Moshe Dayan, which took place during a ride in a car from the airport to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977. I quickly discovered that there was a deep gap between our two approaches. I got the impression that Dayan knew very little about the Arab world, and it is quite certain that Dayan received a similar impression concerning the level of my knowledge about Israel. But after a number of hours of discussions, we began to develop mutual trust and we began to speak with greater openness and frankness about the ways to solve certain problems. And many problems were overcome, which led in the end to the signing of the peace treaty.

I also remember a moment during the peace process, in January 1978, when the peace talks collapsed. We waited at the airport for our luggage until 3 o'clock in the morning. That was an opportunity for another long talk between Dayan and myself. Both of us were depressed because of the collapse of the talks and the huge obstacles that were preventing progress, at a stage when we didn't even see the beginnings of a solution on the horizon.

There were similar moments and moods during the talks at Camp David, during that Friday when President Sadat decided to leave. Everyone was convinced that the process had collapsed,

and that the idea of peace would be delayed for an unlimited amount of time. Dayan even said: "It will take us generations before we will reach peace." Sadat was boiling with anger, and he said: "They don't want peace." And yet, despite all of that, the political desire overcame in the end all of those difficulties. All three sides demonstrated a readiness to arrive at a positive conclusion. And while Carter wanted to defend his political image, the other two sides—the Egyptians and the Israelis—were the real rivals. Both knew that they would pay the price of failure, and that they would receive the reward for victory, in the form of peace between our two nations.

There were also moments of crisis during the talks at the Madison Hotel. The Israelis were lodged on the eleventh floor and we were on the tenth floor. The atmosphere was very cool, and frequently the two sides refused even to speak to each other. But afterwards, we began to visit each other. We met on a private basis in the rooms of Dayan and General Ali. The talks that took place there gave hope to both sides, and awakened a trust in the peace process. The fact that we were able to overcome all of those moments of crisis should give us inspiration to initiate a new stage in the peace process after April 26. We must build upon an agreed principle that we have to develop a comprehensive peace, and not stop at a separate peace between Israel and Egypt.

The symbolic value given to April 26 by the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Arabs, and the Palestinians may create additional problems after that date. Any slowdown in the normalization process may be interpreted by the Israelis to be a premeditated Egyptian policy. Any step of renewed Egyptian rapprochement toward the Arab states may be interpreted as a hostile act.

The Israelis may interpret our desire to help the Palestinians as an additional gesture of hostility. All of this may stem from the mistaken Israeli premise that Egypt was only interested in the liberation of Sinai. You must remember the words of President Sadat during his first speech at the Knesset, that "you must put your faith in the peace process. Peace has clear advantages in the economic and political spheres. However, if we don't have faith in peace, then we will undoubtedly lose its advantages."

How can we be certain that the peace will be maintained?

Actually, there is no guarantee. The thought that it is possible



to guarantee peace through physical means will only create new illusions, which will lead in the end to frustration. The only guarantee is the strengthening of mutual trust and the political desire to overcome the differences between us. It will be unrealistic to assume that, because we have signed a peace treaty, there will be no more differences of opinion between us. We must prepare ourselves for additional instances of misunderstanding, friction, and misconception, as a result of the fact that we have not yet resolved all of our problems. The important thing is to prepare ways of overcoming this friction, by seeing that we are moving from the day of the maintenance of peace, to the days of building a comprehensive peace.

That is the way we should prepare together for the future.

**JUNE 1982**

# --- The Road to Comprehensive Peace

VICTOR SHEMTOV

VICTOR SHEMTOV IS THE CO-AUTHOR, TOGETHER WITH GENERAL (RES.) AHARON YARIV, OF THE SHEMTOV-YARIV FORMULA. HE IS CURRENTLY ACTIVE IN THE KNESSET'S SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, AND DURING THE SUMMER OF 1982 HE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF DEFENSE MINISTER SHARON'S ACTIVITIES, CALLING FOR HIS RESIGNATION. AFTER THE MASSACRES IN SABRA AND SHATILA BECAME KNOWN, HE AND MANY OTHERS CALLED FOR THE RESIGNATION OF THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT. IN NOVEMBER, HE ISSUED A JOINT CALL, TOGETHER WITH MEMBER OF THE KNESSET YOSHI SARID (LABOR), FOR A FREEZE ON SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, IN ORDER TO HELP MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A SPEECH WHICH HE DELIVERED TO THE ASSEMBLY OF PROGRESSIVE JUDAISM IN PARIS ON APRIL 24, 1982.

I do not want to hide the difficulties facing an Israeli trying to assess Israel's situation today. There is a tragic contradiction between the image of an Israel struggling to exist and of an Israel

---

VICTOR SHEMTOV is the general secretary of the Mapam Party, which is in partnership with the Labor Party in the Alignment. He served in the Meir and Rabin governments as Minister of Health.

maintaining military rule over a million and a quarter Arabs against their will.

Since the Six Day War the world has grown accustomed to looking upon Israel as a military power. That is the way, too, that it is presented by our Minister of Defense, Ariel Sharon, to prove Israel's ability to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip without taking anyone or anything else in the world into consideration. The objective truth is that from its establishment, despite all its military strength and its victories on the battlefield, Israel has been struggling for its very right to exist. To this day all the Arab world around us, with the exception of Egypt, stubbornly denies the state's very existence.

The most fanatic in refusing to recognize Israel has been the PLO, which claims to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. I do not forget the statements of individual Palestinians, like Dr. Sartawi, for example, whose courage I very much admire, in favor of recognizing the state of Israel, and of persons on the West Bank like my friend Mr. Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem, who are willing to deal with Israel. It is a fact, however, that the PLO itself has never moderated its opposition to Israel's existence.

## ISRAEL IS ISOLATED

Since 1948 Israel has been in conflict with the Arab world around it. The Arab peoples are the dominant power in the Middle East. Israel is isolated here. Its military strength is essentially defensive; our army is sufficiently strong to prevent our annihilation; it is not strong enough to destroy the military power of the Arab world.

In the Six Day War we occupied wide stretches of Arab land from the Suez Canal in the south to the Golan Heights in the north. The empty Sinai desert we are now returning to Egypt. That is the price of peace with Egypt. For fifteen years Israel has been ruling by force of arms over one million two hundred thousand Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israeli governments in the past defined these territories as "occupied areas" and saw them as bargaining assets in the negotia-

tions for a just and lasting peace in the region. To my great sorrow, today's Israeli government defines the occupied territories as "liberated territories" and declares its firm determination to annex these territories to Israel. Thus the temporary rule over a million and a quarter Arabs has become a continuing military occupation.

The longer the occupation continues, the sharper the confrontation between Jews and Arabs; the sharper that confrontation becomes, the more brutal the occupation. There occur more collective punishments, more shooting at unarmed demonstrators. An embargo is imposed upon peaceful Druse villages in the Golan Heights; universities are closed by decree. Terror leads to counterterror, and the bloody cycle continues to expand.

## THE FATE OF CONQUERORS

History teaches us that prolonged military conquest ultimately corrupts the conqueror. Opposition is called treason, and opposition spokesmen, traitors. The left is charged with "stabbing the nation in the back." This development is isolating Israel, giving it a false image. That is why I have come here this evening, friends, to tell you that there is also another Israel! That is an Israel different from the one pictured by the world media, an Israel whose one desire is peace and Jewish-Arab understanding.

I believe that the Israeli-Egyptian peace, under President Hosni Mubarak's leadership, too, presages the beginning of a new era during which all the Arab countries will reconcile themselves to Israel's existence and to the idea of peace with Israel. That development, however, is not something we can be sure of in advance. The peace with Egypt can grow stronger, develop, and serve as an example for the other Arab countries; it can also dwindle and wither away and turn into just another piece of paper.

## PEACE PROCESS MUST CONTINUE

The final outcome depends upon whether there is progress toward a solution of the Palestinian problem. Certain Israeli



leaders believed that Sadat signed a separate peace with Israel and would not intervene in matters concerning the future of the Palestinian problem. Today it is obvious to all that this was a delusion. The Israeli-Arab peace can only exist if it turns gradually into an inclusive peace with all the Arab countries. That inclusive peace will not be established without "solving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects" and without considering the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and its just demands," as stated in the Camp David agreements.

The conclusion is therefore: we must guarantee the continuation of the peace process by progressing toward a solution of the Palestinian problem. In this matter there are two preliminary questions we must answer:

With whom will Israel negotiate for peace on its eastern front?

On what will Israel negotiate?

Let us attempt to answer the first question. Israel must declare its readiness to conduct negotiations on peace with Jordan, with whom we have a long border which will be finally delineated in the peace treaty. We must negotiate with any representative Palestinian element recognizing Israel's existence and prepared to live in peace with it. The Israeli left rejects the repeated statements by the official leaders to the effect that "Israel will never negotiate with the PLO." That declaration is political stupidity. Politics does not know any such thing as "never." It is not we who will determine who represents the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people themselves will choose their representatives. We will also not be allowed to pick the enemy with whom it is most amenable for us to conduct peace negotiations. At the negotiations table we will have to meet any Palestinian elements wanting to make peace and recognizing Israel, including the PLO.

Though mass movements in Israel such as Peace Now and parties like Mapam have stated their agreement to what we call the "Shemtov-Yariv formula" declaring Israel's readiness to negotiate with any Palestinian element recognizing Israel, the PLO leadership has never found the political wisdom or the courage to state that recognition, even if only conditional and in principle alone. That fact weakens the peace forces in the Middle East and reinforces the extremist camps on both sides. The argument sometimes presented by Palestinians, that their recognition

of Israel would deprive them of their only bargaining card, was refuted by the Israel–Egyptian peace. Sadat was able to state in advance that he was prepared to recognize Israel and sign a peace treaty with it on condition that it give Egypt back all its occupied territories.

The PLO's refusal to declare its conditional recognition of Israel reinforces the fears held by many that it is still loyal to the PLO Charter, not only as an apocalyptic vision but as a practical program to remove Israel from the map, this to be done in stages, the first of which would be the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. That stubbornness has led the Palestinians up a blind alley.

I would like to propose an honorable way out of the dead end for the two sides. I propose the mutual and simultaneous recognition of both peoples' rights to self-determination. Such a declaration would make it possible to begin an Israeli–Palestinian dialogue. As long as the PLO refuses to publish such a statement and chooses the path of terror rather than of negotiations, it is preventing the beginning of that dialogue.

The second question is: what are we going to negotiate with Jordan and the Palestinians recognizing Israel? In other words, how and in what form will the Palestinian people's right to self-determination be fulfilled?

## CONDITIONS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

We socialists argue that no people has an unconditional right to self-determination. The first condition to any people's right to self-determination is that it does not harm any other people's right to live in peace and security. The PLO's demand for a so-called "secular and democratic" state is a chauvinistic and reactionary one leading to war rather than peace, as does the extremist Israeli demand for a "Greater Israel."

The peace forces within Israel are opposed to the annexation of the territories occupied in 1967. We do not want to rule over the West Bank and Gaza with a million and a quarter Palestinians, who have a right to their own national lives. Israel must return these territories to Arab sovereignty. What we demand are bor-

der changes vital for our security, to be agreed upon in the negotiations between the parties.

I do not want to conceal the fact that the large majority in Israel's socialist camp believes that the Palestinians' right to self-determination can be fulfilled within a federative Jordanian-Palestinian state or a confederation including Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Within the large area of a Jordanian-Palestinian state it would be possible to unite the million Palestinians living today in the territories under Israeli occupation and to absorb the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians still in refugee camps. Such a federative solution would also make it possible to demilitarize the West Bank when it is returned to Arab sovereignty. Without that condition, Israel will be unable to return it.

Many Palestinians reject the Jordanian-Palestinian solution and want an independent state of their own, even if only within the limited and densely populated territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In that case there are of course questions of where they will absorb the refugees and how such a state can be demilitarized. There is also the question of whether such a state would not inevitably turn to irredentism. Despite all this, not one of us can deny the Palestinians' right to demand the establishment of a separate state in the course of the negotiations. Both parties will have to come to the discussion table with their own opening positions.

## THE ROAD TO COMPREHENSIVE PEACE

Let me sum up and say:

1. In order to guarantee that the peace between Israel and Egypt persists and grows stronger we must achieve an inclusive peace between Israel and the other Arab states within the region.
2. An inclusive peace will be established only if a true solution is found for the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.
3. In order to move forward toward a solution of the Palestinian problem, Israel and the Palestinians must simultaneously recognize each other and the rights of both sides to self-determination.
4. After this mutual recognition, direct peace negotiations

could be opened between Israel, Jordan, and any representative Palestinian element recognizing Israel's right to exist. These negotiations would be conducted without any preconditions, though all the parties would come to the discussions with their own opening positions.

5. The Palestinian people's self-determination would be achieved in stages, with the full autonomy agreed upon in the Camp David agreements as the first step toward the full solution.

The road to peace in the Middle East is a hard one. It will be an extended one, replete with crises. I believe, however, with all my heart, that peace is not only a beautiful dream but also a possibility.

JUNE 1982



# **A Meeting with Arafat**

---

**URI AVNERY**

URI AVNERY'S INTERVIEW WITH YASIR ARAFAT IN BESIEGED BEIRUT MADE HEADLINES IN ISRAEL AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE PLO CHAIRMAN AGREED TO GRANT AN INTERVIEW TO AN ISRAELI JOURNALIST. MR. AVNERY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CORRESPONDENT SARIT YISHAI AND PHOTOGRAPHER ANAT SARAGUSTI. MEMBERS OF MR. ARAFAT'S STAFF WHO TOOK PART IN THE MEETING INCLUDED MR. AMAD SHAKUR, SHAFIK AL-HUT, SPOKESMAN MAHMUD LABADI, AND POET MAHMUD DARWISH.

THIS IS THE FIRST PUBLICATION OF THE ENTIRE TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW IN ENGLISH.

**AVNERY:** I am happy to be received by you after so many years. I regret that it is under these circumstances.

**ARAFAT:** I am also glad to meet you personally. I have been reading your articles since 1967.

**AVNERY:** In our Arabic edition?

**ARAFAT:** Yes, the Arabic edition.

**AVNERY:** He [Amad Shakur] once worked on the staff of that edition.

**ARAFAT:** [Laughs] Really?

---

**YASIR ARAFAT** is the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (the PLO).

**AVNERY:** And I have known Ghasi [Khour] for five, six years, since he was the assistant of Dr. Issam Sartawi.

**KHOURI:** Seven years.

**AVNERY:** Seven years already! In the beginning, I used to talk with Sa'id Hammami.

**ARAFAT:** Please greet all of our friends, Matti [Mattityahu] Peled and the others.

**AVNERY:** They are all fighting, all fighting against this war.

**ARAFAT:** Give my best wishes to them, please. We are following their actions, their steps, the reports, and I am very grateful to them for what they are doing.

**AVNERY:** They are doing it for our people as much as for your people.

**ARAFAT:** I am sorry that this Israeli military junta does not want to understand what is going to happen. In my opinion, they are very stupid. You can't control another people by power. I'll give you examples from all over the world. Where is Hitler with all his power? Where is Attila with all his power? Maybe you can control by power for a certain, for a very short time. So what?

**AVNERY:** The trouble is that some of our people have become intoxicated by power, because the Jewish people did not have power for so long, that once they got power, they became intoxicated by it and think they can solve things by this power.

**ARAFAT:** It is the arrogance of power, but it means nothing.

**AVNERY:** If you were addressing today the mass demonstration of the Peace Now movement in Tel Aviv [the demonstration of 100,000 people took place a few hours after Avnery's meeting with Arafat.—ed.], what would you tell these people, who are dedicated to peace and against the war?

**ARAFAT:** We are human beings. And we have the right to live.

**AVNERY:** That is putting it very briefly. What do you think they should do?

**ARAFAT:** See that the United Nations resolutions are implemented. We are not asking for the moon!

**AVNERY:** You see, the real question, the real problem we are facing in Israel, is that it's very difficult to convince the Israeli people that if a Palestinian state comes into being in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with its capital in East Jerusalem, this will be the real solution, not just a solution for—

**ARAFAT:** For me, the United Nations resolutions are the guide.

**AVNERY:** 242?

**ARAFAT:** No, 242 has been rejected by our [national] council.

**AVNERY:** Because it did not mention the Palestinians?

**ARAFAT:** Because it completely neglected the Palestinian cause, the Palestinian people. It is a resolution which was adopted after the 1967 war against the Arab armies, and although the Palestinian cause was and still is the crux of the whole Middle Eastern crisis, they neglected this crux of the whole issue. And here we are. It is the truth. And here we are: three divisions are blockading Beirut, threatening to invade, besides the navy, besides the air force. But tell me, can they solve the issue with this huge power? Let them try!

**AVNERY:** So when you say the United Nations resolutions, you mean all the UN resolutions?

**ARAFAT:** Yes, we have to look for all the resolutions. You know, Israel is the only state that has been created according to one of the United Nations resolutions, and I am sorry to say that it is the only state that does not respect any of the United Nations resolutions. I will give you a shameful example: you remember that the invasion here in Lebanon was done through the United Nations troops in the south, without respecting at all this flag, this international flag. There was [in Arabic] *thawato*.

**KHOURI:** A conspiracy.

[Some members of Mr. Arafat's entourage also translate the Arabic into Hebrew.]

**ARAFAT:** Some of the leaders and officers of the United Nations

conspired with the Israelis, and they [the Israelis] crossed through the UNIFIL forces. So the Israelis do not respect the United Nations forces, the United Nations flag, the United Nations resolutions. For how long, I ask? I am addressing this to all Israelis. How long will you be able to act with this arrogance? For how long? Ten years? Twenty years? Fifty years? OK, we can take it. We have the ability to bear it and to survive. But the results will be a disaster. Not for us. This is very important. I am a man [conscious] of history. I can see it. I can see it, faintly but very clearly. So it's very important for everyone of us to think deeply of the future!

**AVNERY:** I think many Israelis understand this.

**ARAFAT:** It seems not, because the majority has not had the ability, until now, to unmask the whole story.

**AVNERY:** If I may say why I think this happened, it is because the great majority of Israelis, who I think are basically peace-loving people, have become convinced by our official propaganda that the PLO does not really want peace.

**ARAFAT:** The PLO?

**AVNERY:** How can we convince—

**ARAFAT:** The PLO? You know it is not so! We have declared our approval for the American–Soviet communiqué of [October] 1979. We have declared our approval! We have declared our approval and appreciation of President Brezhnev's initiative [of 1981].

**AVNERY:** Which says that the security of all states in the area, including Israel, which it explicitly mentions, will be safeguarded.

**ARAFAT:** You see, when we said OK to this initiative, this means that we accepted all its parts. We said that it is a good platform for a peaceful settlement, for a just settlement, for a peaceful solution in the Middle East. And you remember that I myself have declared that the Fahd proposals are a very good platform for a solution in the Middle East. So we gave many signals that we are looking for peace. But I am sorry to say that this mili-



tary Israeli junta is acting in this arrogant way. I am sorry they can't see the lessons of history. It seems that we are not learning enough from history.

**AVNERY:** Very few people are able to learn from history.

**ARAFAT:** But I am not worried at all.

**YISHAI:** If the Israeli people do not believe that the Palestinians want peace, it is for two reasons. First, you have in the Palestinian Covenant this paragraph which says that there is no such thing as a Jewish nation, that there is no Jewish people.

**ARAFAT:** No! I am sorry, but this is not so! I know exactly our covenant, our constitution, and there is nothing there concerning this. We didn't say anything concerning the Jews at all!

**AVNERY:** Every Israeli believes—

**YISHAI:** Doesn't it say—

**ARAFAT:** No, no, no! I have to remind you that our famous resolution, which was adopted at the fifteenth—or the thirteenth—session of our Palestinian National Council, says that we have to start a dialogue with all democratic, progressive forces in Israel. What is this for?

**AVNERY:** The trouble, Mr. Chairman, is that there were in this resolution a few additional words about Zionism, which were very disturbing to many Israelis. The Israelis are all Zionists, they consider themselves Zionists, even if they don't know exactly what it is and what it means, and this emphasis on . . . We don't ask you to be a Zionist, or Ghasi to be a Zionist, but ordinary Israelis are Zionists.

**ARAFAT:** For me it is something else. I don't accept all your theories—

**AVNERY:** You don't have to.

**ARAFAT:** You see, you have your own theories, or some of the Israelis have their own theories, but we have to speak also frankly. Not all the Jews are Zionists. I will give you an example. His Excellency Chancellor Kreisky [of Austria] said that

he is not a Zionist. He is a Jew, and we respect him. We have a very good relationship with him.

**AVNERY:** But in Israel—

**ARAFAT:** You can't expect me to accept Zionist theories.

**AVNERY:** Certainly not, but—

**ARAFAT:** At least from the point of view of religion, I can't accept it. Judaism is a part of our tradition. You can't say I'm anti-Semitic. So Judaism is a part of our tradition, Islam is a part of our tradition, and Christianity is a part of our tradition.

**YISHAI:** Unfortunately, Israelis believe that some Palestinian said, "We want to throw the Jews into the sea."

**ARAFAT:** No! Who said it?

**YISHAI:** This is what Israelis believe.

**ARAFAT:** No! Who said it? Who said it? It is one of the big lies, a very big lie! Nobody, no Palestinian has said it, this big lie. Give me one proof that this has been said by a Palestinian.

**AVNERY:** Maybe Shukeiry at some time . . .

**ARAFAT:** No, no, we have checked the story! It is one of the biggest lies!

**YISHAI:** You were aware of this lie? You were aware of this lie? You were aware that there is such a story circulating in Israel?

**ARAFAT:** I know that they are using this lie to push—

**SHAKUR:** Now I remember that once, before the 1956 war, I had an argument about this with Professor Shlomo Avineri [of the Hebrew University] and I proved to him that it was a lie. I was a student then. I proved to him that no one ever said it. Since then he has stopped mentioning it. And suppose that somebody said it, so what?

**KHOURI:** But actually and truly no one has ever said it.

**AVNERY:** You see, the greatest damage, as far as our people—

**ARAFAT:** You mean that they [the Israeli army] are here because of this big lie?

**AVNERY:** Yes!

**YISHAI:** Yes!

**AVNERY:** Exactly!

**ARAFAT:** At the battle front—

**AVNERY:** I would put it this way: they would not be able to be here if the great mass of the Israeli people did not believe this. That is, the soldiers who are fighting. Arik [Ariel] Sharon has his own ideas, a very clear-cut idea of what he wants to do. Arik Sharon wants to annex the West Bank to Israel. In order to make this possible, he wants to destroy the PLO.

**ARAFAT:** Sharon [in Arabic] is a merchant of blood, a speculator in blood.

**AVNERY:** But he would not be able to do it, and the soldiers would not follow him, if they did not really believe that the PLO wants to destroy the state of Israel.

**ARAFAT:** You don't want to tell me that this very intelligent, and this very clever people, the Jewish people, can believe these big lies!

**AVNERY:** They believe it.

**YISHAI:** Simple people believe it.

**ARAFAT:** You see, this is very important. You are not from the Third World—

**YISHAI:** We have many Jews from the Third World.

**AVNERY:** Half of the Jews in Israel are from the Third World.

**ARAFAT:** But they have been in Israel for thirty-three years! Definitely you are not—

**YISHAI:** It is a fact that the Jews who came from the Arab world hate the Arabs more than the others.

**ARAFAT:** I don't understand this dilemma.

**AVNERY:** By the way, Anat [Saragusti] is from a Moroccan family, and Sarit [Yishai] is from a Sephardi family from Yugoslavia. They are both Sephardi. I am Ashkenazi.

**YISHAI:** But my family has been living for generations in this country. I am a Palestinian.

**SHAKUR:** We are all Palestinians.

**ARAFAT:** Yes, we are all Palestinians.

**SHAKUR:** And Sharon is fighting against all of us.

**AVNERY:** I have been waiting for this meeting with you for many years, for this is exactly what we wanted to tell you: that the real problem is that a great number of Israelis really believe these stories about the Palestinians never being ready to recognize the state of Israel, even in the context of peace based on the coexistence of the state of Israel and a state of Palestine. This is one thing which has to be made clear, in a way that any man in the street can understand: that what we want is a solution—a peace based on mutual understanding, mutual respect, and mutual recognition.

**ARAFAT:** Let's leave this political dilemma for a moment. What about the people? What about the Palestinian people? I have to ask you: what about the Palestinian people who are living in this area? I have to ask every Jewish person, not only Israelis, all over the world, every Jew. What about the Palestinian people? What about these four million Palestinians?

**AVNERY:** They must go back to Palestine, to the Palestinian state.

**ARAFAT:** What about their future? To be refugees? And now Sharon is dictating to this area and insists that we have to leave. Where to? To Crete? Where to? Where do I have to live? Crete? Cyprus? Where to? I am a human being. And our children have a right to live also. Very simple. But it seems that this Israeli military junta insists on not seeing the realities, the facts and the future.

**AVNERY:** I believe—



**ARAFAT:** I am not worried. I am not worried at all about the future. In spite of all this big invasion. It is a big American-Israeli parade, eight divisions. It is a shame for the Israeli army. Even from the tactical military point of view, it is a shame. I am not going to speak about the massacre, the genocide that has been done against the Palestinians in the south, in Rashidiye, in Burg-al-Shamadi, in Bin-al-Hilvah. I hope that you will have the opportunity to go there. Every Israeli must go there and see for himself this shameful, dirty work.

**AVNERY:** I was in Saida [Sidon].

**ARAFAT:** It is very important; I am asking everybody all over the world to come and see this superpower, this huge power, the Israeli army, what they done against the Palestinians, against our refugees, against our children, against our women. Do they think that they can solve the problem by this genocide? OK, they can kill half a million of the Palestinians here, but there are still three and a half million of us. This is definitely shameful. OK, if this is the way. History is not only battles.

**SHAKUR:** Chairman Arafat has already denied that anyone has ever said that he wants to send the Jews into the sea. But what is General Sharon doing here? He is sending us to graves in the desert.

**ARAFAT:** Not into the desert.

**SHAKUR:** To graves in the desert.

**ARAFAT:** No, now he is throwing us into the sea, into graves in the sea. He is doing it. He is doing it in a very dramatic, spectacular way. With the TV around him.

**LABADI:** I want to ask you a question. This meeting between Chairman Arafat and you, doesn't it mean that he accepts the idea that we can live together with the Jews?

**ARAFAT:** Yes! We have declared it in our constitution, in our resolutions, that we want to live with all the Jews. We are not against the Jews. We said it.

**AVNERY:** As I already told Chairman Arafat, today there is a big mass demonstration against the war in Tel Aviv. People in Israel are not for the war. The situation in Israel today is like this, and has been so for a long time: you have a minority in Israel which would support Begin and Sharon always—they want to destroy the national identity of the Palestinian people and to annex the West Bank. But this is a minority. On the other side, there is a minority which is against the war and understands the Palestinian problem. In the middle, you have the great mass of the people who can be influenced this way or that way, and our job is to influence them in the direction of peace.

**ARAFAT:** The Jews are a religious people, they used to follow their religion. This Israeli military junta is spoiling all the features of life, but they are also spoiling, in a very shameful way, the spirit of Judaism.

**AVNERY:** One has to make the people on both sides want to live in peace and believe that peace is possible. The great challenge is to make the people believe that peace is possible; despite the war which has been going on for a hundred years between the Palestinians and the Israelis, that peace is possible. This is the one important thing—if the mass of the Israeli people would believe this.

**ARAFAT:** Not through guns.

**AVNERY:** Not through guns.

**ARAFAT:** Not through the barrels of the guns and the tanks. You see, if it is through the barrels of the guns, the tanks, sooner or later we will find a way to overcome the guns and the tanks. And here we are. You know, this is the longest Israeli-Arab war.

**AVNERY:** Yes, this is the longest.

**ARAFAT:** The longest war. I am challenging him [Sharon] as a general, or his generals, to declare the exact number of the casualties. From our side I have declared it—we have thirty thousand killed and wounded.

**YISHAI:** How many killed?

**ARAFAT:** Ten thousand or eleven thousand killed, and about eighteen, nineteen thousand wounded, thirty thousand Arabs killed or wounded.

**AVNERY:** How many Palestinian fighting men have been killed?

**ARAFAT:** We are not announcing this. During the war I am not declaring my casualties. The war is still going on. But you see, ten thousand are still missing. Hundreds of thousands are refugees, Palestinians and Lebanese, women and children.

**LABADI:** For the third time.

**ARAFAT:** For the third time, some of the Lebanese for the fifth time. From the south to the north, from the north to the south.

**YISHAI:** I would like to know, if it is possible, and I hope so: do you have only one Israeli prisoner?

**SHAKUR:** There is only one prisoner of war, the pilot.

**YISHAI:** And there are no more?

**ARAFAT:** No, I have to tell you.

**SHAKUR:** In Beirut we have only one.

**YISHAI:** Because there are some missing.

**SHAKUR:** We have some dead bodies. Two or three.

**ARAFAT:** Four bodies.

**SHAKUR:** No, there are four bodies from the previous war.

**ARAFAT:** And there are the bodies of the two captains.

**YISHAI:** From this war?

**ARAFAT:** Yes, from the helicopter from the second day of the war.

**YISHAI:** Maybe I shouldn't ask, but you are a very nice person: can we have the names of the soldiers whose bodies you have?

**ARAFAT:** Yes, yes, we have them, we can give them to you. Do you want to see the pilot [who was taken prisoner]?

**AVNERY:** We would very much like to!

**ARAFAT:** Yes, yes, I can arrange for you to see him. You can ask him how we treat him. Ask him, not us! Yesterday a leaflet was thrown from Israeli airplanes, by the Israeli army, and it says: We know that you have prisoners.

**SHAKUR:** [Explains in Hebrew] The leaflet says: we know that you have prisoners and we warn you to tell us where they are; otherwise, we shall do so and so and so.

**ARAFAT:** I would like to have more time with you, but I am sorry that just when you were coming here, I was supposed to meet the [Lebanese] Prime Minister.

**AVNERY:** Mr. Arafat, if the Israeli government came today and said, OK, we had a war, you have fought very bravely, our people have fought very bravely—

**ARAFAT:** Definitely fought bravely, we know that.

**AVNERY:** Let's make peace now, based on mutual respect of the people who have been fighting—you shall have a Palestinian state, we have the state of Israel, we shall live peacefully together. What would you say?

**ARAFAT:** You see, we have given a positive answer, but nobody has offered it to us. You know that.

**AVNERY:** I know, but I want the Israeli people to know.

**ARAFAT:** Because we want to live and let others live.

**AVNERY:** [After a German TV team has been allowed to enter] I would like to have a copy of this film. It is very important, at this moment, for the Israeli public to see this unbelievable thing happening. [Excerpts of the film were later shown on Israeli TV—Ed.]

**YISHAI:** I believe I am dreaming.

**ARAFAT:** [Laughs.]

**LABADI:** I was in Berlin in 1970 when I was still a student. I heard there a lecture by Mr. Avnery about his book, in which he



proposed a federation of Semitic peoples, a Semitic union.  
[Explains the idea in Arabic to Mr. Arafat.]

**ARAFAT:** *Inshallah!* [If God so wills.]

**SHAKUR:** I have got the book here.

**AVNERY:** You see, I believe that in the end, after everything is finished, there should be an Israeli state, and a Palestinian state, with its capital in East Jerusalem, and there should be a general regional organization unifying all the Arab states and Israel in one economic and political union.

**ARAFAT:** Abba Eban proposed a Benelux arrangement. Yes.  
[Arafat is referring to Eban's Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian confederative proposal.]

**AVNERY:** If the Labor Party had been more courageous, the whole situation today would be different. The people in the street today are more courageous than the Labor party.

**ARAFAT:** This morning I read an article by Zeev Shiff [the military analyst for *Ha'aretz*, a respected military commentator]. He gave a very good analysis of this war.

**YISHAI:** Did you read it in Hebrew?

**ARAFAT:** No, in translation.

**YISHAI:** Do you know any words in Hebrew?

**ARAFAT:** Yes, *ma nishmah?* *Ani ohev otach!* [How are you? I love you!] [General laughter.]

**DARWISH:** [In Hebrew to Sarit Yishai.] You have a good chance. He is a bachelor.

**AVNERY:** That would be a solution. Yasir Arafat would marry an Israeli girl. This would solve the whole problem.

**ARAFAT:** No! [Laughter.] But if this is the solution, OK, I would do it today.

**YISHAI:** But today is Ramadan [a holy Moslem religious holiday]. Would you like him to marry? [Addressing Arafat's assistants.]

**DARWISH:** Yes, oh yes.

**YISHAI:** Why?

**DARWISH:** Because we would have more time to work. [General laughter.]

**AVNERY:** Mr. Arafat, what are the chances for a political solution of the present problem in Beirut?

**ARAFAT:** For the sake of the six hundred thousand Lebanese people who are here in West Beirut, and the two hundred thousand Palestinians, together about eight hundred thousand people, we look for a political solution. This has been discussed also in the committee [the inter-Arab meeting that took place on the previous day in Saudi Arabia, with the participation of Bashir Gemayel].

**AVNERY:** If there is a chance for an honorable move from here, where do you think it is possible [to go]?

**ARAFAT:** To Palestine.

**AVNERY:** I mean tomorrow, not next year.

**ARAFAT:** To Palestine. It is my right. You go there?

**AVNERY:** Today.

**ARAFAT:** You think that you have the right to go there, and I have no right to come back? Where to go? I am a human being too! Where to, except my homeland? I want to go to my homeland!

**YISHAI:** When you say Palestine, what do you mean by Palestine?

**ARAFAT:** For all of us? All of Palestine! For you and for us!

**YISHAI:** You mean, together?

**ARAFAT:** Together. Why not?

**YISHAI:** You don't mean a separate state [for the Palestinians]?

**ARAFAT:** You know our famous slogan: a democratic, secular state. And if not, if this is not the solution, then two separate states.

**SARAGUSTI:** What kind of government?

**ARAFAT:** You know that we have a democratic constitution. At least it is better than yours. About that there is no doubt. At least we don't have these forms of military arrogance among us.

**YISHAI:** When you say that it won't be possible for us to live in one state, and you are talking about two states—about what part of Palestine are you talking?

**ARAFAT:** You see, as I have mentioned, we have offered—we, the victims—have offered two solutions. Officially and openly. Sixty percent of my people are refugees, homeless, stateless, and we have offered two solutions. The first solution, which we offered in 1969: we said, let us all of us live in this democratic state, where Jews, Christians, and Muslims can live on an equal footing. This has been rejected. In 1974, our Palestinian National Council offered another solution: OK, we are ready to live in any part of Palestine from which the Israelis withdraw or which is liberated. Any part.

**AVNERY:** In practice, this means the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

**ARAFAT:** Any part. I am giving you the accurate thesis, the exact words which have been used in our resolution, and don't forget: I have been elected on the basis of this political platform. So we have declared, and our Palestinian National Council has accepted, these two solutions. But the other side, what have they offered us?

By this war, they have already shaken the volcanos in this area very deeply, and this is a fatal mistake, their fatal mistake. Till now, the battle has been going on. Maybe we shall reach a compromise, maybe not. But this is not important. The most important historical fact is that they shook the volcanos. They are shaking the volcanos. They are very narrow-minded, very narrow-minded.

# **A Chance for Dialogue?**

## **\_\_\_\_ Interview with Arafat**

**AMNON KAPELIUK**

AMNON KAPELIUK CONDUCTED THE FOLLOWING INTERVIEW WITH YASIR ARAFAT ON BEHALF OF *NEW OUTLOOK* AND *LE MONDE*. IT WAS ALSO PUBLISHED IN *YEDIOT AHRONOT*. THE INTERVIEW WAS CARRIED OUT IN BESIEGED WEST BEIRUT IN AUGUST 1982. DESPITE THE FACT THAT DOZENS OF JOURNALISTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD WERE WAITING FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTERVIEW THE PLO CHAIRMAN, HE SPECIFICALLY ASKED TO BE INTERVIEWED BY AN ISRAELI JOURNALIST.

**KAPELIUK:** Is this the hour of truth? A decisive battle—with all its consequences—or a retreat from Beirut; what are the future prospects for the PLO and the Palestinian people?

**ARAFAT:** We agreed on a final arrangement with the Lebanese government and the American mediator Philip Habib regarding the departure of our forces to several Arab countries—Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt—that are willing to accept us. We also believe that the worst is possible: Begin and Sharon may try to deceive us. I want to tell them that we were taught the lessons

\_\_\_\_ **DR. AMNON KAPELIUK** is a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs. He is a longtime member of *New Outlook's* editorial board, has been Middle East affairs correspondent for *Le Monde*, and is currently the correspondent for the occupied territories for the Israeli daily *Al Hamishmar*.



of Masada and the Warsaw Ghetto—and we are ready to sacrifice ourselves, if it is necessary.

I am not afraid of death; it is up to my enemies to fear the consequences. The course of history cannot be changed. The war has proven that the Palestinians fought with courage and honor for the realization of their just goals.

**KAPELIUK:** But where do you intend going to?

**ARAFAT:** We have always had forces in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, in Lebanon and in Algeria. The PLO headquarters used to be in Cairo until Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Then it was transferred to Damascus.

**KAPELIUK:** Does the passive attitude of the Arab world surprise you?

**ARAFAT:** Absolutely not. I did not expect anything else since the failure of the Fez conference [the first Fez conference was convened in the fall of 1981, and it disbanded after five hours—Ed.]; several Arab countries have agreed to accept our forces, but these are just temporary solutions. Where will we go afterwards? The whole world has to deal with the next problem: an international conference that will include all the countries—including the superpowers—after the war's end.

**KAPELIUK:** You took a step toward the United States, but did not achieve anything. Are you disappointed?

**ARAFAT:** The United States is a superpower, and we will go on trying to influence American thinking. For the United States will soon realize that it cannot ignore the needs of 4.5 million Palestinians.

## WHERE IS THE ISRAELI DE GAULLE?

**KAPELIUK:** Many Israelis are wondering whether the time has not come for a historical reconciliation between the Jewish-Israeli nation and the Arab-Palestinian people; for acceptance of a "peace between the brave" similar to the one De Gaulle offered Algeria.

**ARAFAT:** Is there anyone in the Israeli military establishment who even remembers General de Gaulle? I have my doubts about this. I have stated already on previous occasions that our National Council adopted several resolutions calling for the holding of discussions with the democratic forces in Israel. We are ready to establish relations with all those who recognize our right to self-determination.

**KAPELIUK:** The Israelis are waiting for your official recognition of Israel. Are you ready to agree to this?

**ARAFAT:** Begin and Sharon have stated on many occasions that they do not need our recognition. They have said that even if we recognize Israel, they will never agree to deal with us. They place us on the same level as Nazis even though their actions in Lebanon and in the refugee camps in Beirut remind us of the Nazis' behavior. I repeat what I have already told Representative McCloskey: we accept all the UN resolutions—I want to stress—all UN resolutions concerning the Palestinian question. Don't forget that the state of Israel was created by a UN resolution. Israel has everything, but we have nothing. Now we are asked to recognize Israel, that on its part categorically refuses to recognize our right to self-determination. I say this without pressure even though Sharon's tanks now surround us. I repeat: the question is—more than ever before—our right to existence and self-determination.

**KAPELIUK:** Is the UN Security Council Resolution 242 among those you accepted?

**ARAFAT:** You must surely know that this resolution regards our problem as merely a problem of refugees. In 1977, the Carter administration proposed that we accept this resolution. With some reservations we accepted this proposal on three conditions: the initiation of a dialogue between the UN and the PLO; the recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination; and the creation of an independent Palestinian state—needless to say, the dialogue stopped. Since then our National Council has adopted several statements concerning this resolution. Beside this, since when has Begin become such a great defender

of Resolution 242? Don't forget that he left—in August 1970—the Israeli National Unity government in protest over Golda Meir's acceptance of the resolution, which—in his view—includes an implicit call for a withdrawal from all the occupied territories.

**KAPELIUK:** Some Israelis claim that you would not be satisfied by a state on the West Bank and in Gaza and therefore you would be a threat to Israel?

**ARAFAT:** Ridiculous. I do not understand these allegations. Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. How can anybody fear a Palestinian state that will need more than twenty years to become self-sufficient? The Israeli military establishment believes that it can control the region with its technical abilities and U.S. dollars. But for how long? It must strive for coexistence with the countries of the region instead of imagining artificial problems. It is up to Israel to find a solution to the Palestinian tragedy that was created by it.

**KAPELIUK:** Your National Covenant is a weapon in the hands of your political adversaries. At school Israeli kids are taught one of the stipulations of the Covenant that denies Israel's right to exist, that does not recognize the Jews as a people and states that an armed struggle is the only way to achieve a state.

**ARAFAT:** Concerning our National Covenant: we have already affirmed on many occasions that we no longer regarded an armed struggle as the only possible strategy. Many things have been said about this covenant and there have been distorted interpretations of it. In order to put an end to this ambiguity, I propose that after the war a conference be convened with the participation of Palestinian, Israeli, and Arab intellectuals. The conference should examine these problems seriously and attempt to reach conclusions. It could possibly take place somewhere in Europe under the aegis of an organization or a political party mutually agreed upon by the participants.

**KAPELIUK:** During the last years there have been clear developments in the Palestinian approach to the new situations that occurred.

**ARAFAT:** We are not stuck to unalterable positions. It is Begin who is absolutely intransigent.

**KAPELIUK:** Do you think that you have made mistakes in the past?

**ARAFAT:** Yes. We did not explain our positions to the Israelis and we did not understand the Israeli mentality. Also, we did not invest enough effort in the field of information in order to explain our ideas to the inhabitants of Israel.

**KAPELIUK:** And the operations carried out against Israeli civilians?

**ARAFAT:** I have always been against this kind of operation for political and ideological reasons. Although I understand the motives behind the desperate Palestinians who choose these methods, I was always against them. I tell you this as chairman of the PLO, as the leader of the Palestinian revolution. Beside this, it must be said that in certain cases—such as Munich, Maalot, Savoy—the deaths of innocent people could have been avoided, if the Israelis had not opened fire. Things that Begin and Sharon have done during the war in Lebanon, such as the bombardment of Beirut that caused about 500 civilian deaths last week, will remain an inextinguishable mark on the foreheads of the Israeli leaders.

**KAPELIUK:** What is your reaction to the attitudes of the inhabitants of the occupied territories during this war?

**ARAFAT:** The Palestinians who are inside—like Bassam Shakaa, Karim Khalaf, Elias Freij, Rashad A-Shawa (Shakaa, Khalaf, and A-Shawa are the deposed mayors of Nablus, Ramallah, and Gaza, and Freij is the Mayor of Bethlehem—Ed.) and some others—have shown their devotion to our people's cause under difficult conditions.

**KAPELIUK:** Finally: what do you do want to say to the Israelis?

**ARAFAT:** I find myself encircled and address the Israeli soldiers and the average citizen and tell them to stop. Military arrogance will not break us. I would like to say a word to Colonel Eli Geva: despite our differences I respect his humane princi-



ples and his decision to refuse to participate in the assault on Beirut. His noble attitude derives from true Jewish values. Peace will reign over the Holy Land, despite the arrogance of these leaders whose brute force is the only guideline in the life of the nation. I invite the Peace Now movement activists, *New Outlook*, and those who recognize our right to self-determination to come to Beirut in order to see the destruction and the suffering of the population. A day will come when the Israelis will feel ashamed and will wish to forget what their present leaders have done to the Palestinian people during this summer of 1982, in Lebanon.

AUGUST 1982

# A Chance for Dialogue— And More

---

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL WAS WRITTEN IN RESPONSE TO THE INTERVIEW GRANTED BY YASIR ARAFAT TO *NEW OUTLOOK* EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBER AMNON KAPELIUK.

The interview given by Yasir Arafat in besieged Beirut to Amnon Kapeliuk, a member of the *New Outlook* Editorial Board, represents a significant political event.

Despite the PLO leader's diplomatic answers to direct questions, they do show remarkable progress. The answers remove most of the obstacles which, until now, prevented Israeli-Palestinian dialogue on the basis of lack of mutual recognition.

Arafat's resolute rejection of terror; his acceptance of *all* UN resolutions (including 242, with the demand that it be amended to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination); his call for peaceful coexistence; his appeal to the Israeli peace movement, particularly Peace Now and *New Outlook*; his openness to self-criticism concerning past errors—all these must be seen as encouraging developments.

The most important passage in the interview concerns the infamous articles of the Palestinian National Covenant which deny the right of existence of Israel, and even refuse to admit that there is a Jewish nation.

In his answer, Arafat admits the necessity that with the end of the war there should be a conference of Israelis, Palestinians, and other Arabs in Europe, under the auspices of a mutually-agreed-upon institution, to end misunderstandings and to arrive at a com-

mon basis for solution. In a word, Arafat strengthens here Issam Sartawi's position and drops his obstinate and long-standing refusal of any dialogue with representative Israelis.

Obviously this is an inadequate answer to this crucial question. However, his readiness to reconsider the problem together with Israelis could open the way to official changes being made in the covenant by the Palestinian National Council.

*New Outlook* welcomes this proposal and is ready to take upon itself the historic task of organizing such a conference. Our twenty-five-year struggle has not been conducted only through the pages of this magazine; the six conferences which we organized with the participation of hundreds of intellectuals and political figures from all over the world have given us rich experience and genuine prestige. However, they failed to achieve concrete results because of the absence of authoritative Palestinian representation, and the refusal of most Israelis to meet them under present conditions.

We believe that after this terrible war we will be able together to make a breakthrough toward a true reconciliation of the two peoples of this land, condemned to live or die together. Mutual recognition is the *only* key to an age of peace for Israelis and Palestinians. It is more than that. It is the precondition for peace in this tragic, bloodied region which was once the cradle of civilization.

A.Y.

AUGUST 1982

# --- The Reagan Proposals

ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1982, PRESIDENT REAGAN GAVE A SPEECH OUTLINING A NEW, ACTIVE AMERICAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY (SEE APPENDIX II).

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL EXPRESSES *NEW OUTLOOK*'S RESPONSE TO THE REAGAN INITIATIVE.

We at *New Outlook* regard U.S. President Reagan's proposals, which are supposed to serve as a basis for negotiations that will ultimately result in a comprehensive peace in this region, as a positive step. We regard the proposals as positive because they include many elements of a fair compromise between Israel and the Palestinian people, because they don't negate the basic national interests of the two parties, and because they indicate a readiness on the part of the U.S. government to once again play an active role in the peace process and to use its influence to bring negotiations to a successful end.

The fact that the government of Israel offhandedly rejected the proposals without showing any readiness on its part to enter into negotiations is hardly surprising. The Begin government is ideologically and politically committed to the idea of the West Bank being an inseparable part of the Land of Israel. The government is unwilling to budge from this concept even if the price for this is the giving up of the chance for a peaceful solution of the conflict. However, we must stress that President Reagan's proposals were endorsed by the opposition in Israel as a basis for negotiations. Recent public opinion polls show that this basis, namely a readiness for territorial compromise, is supported by a substantial majority of the Israeli citizens.

In contrast to the Israeli government, the summit of Arab heads



of state, which convened recently in Fez, Morocco, did not reject the Reagan proposals, though it did not accept them either. This in itself is an important, though still insufficient, step. Nevertheless, one must note that this is the first time that a summit of Arab leaders has not reacted with outright rejection to proposals that call for peace with Israel. It is certainly a very far cry from the Khartoum resolutions of 1967, which included the infamous three no's: no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and no peace. Unfortunately, the roles have now been reversed. Today, Israel is officially taking an extreme line while the Arab states are becoming more moderate, though as yet insufficiently so.

The Reagan proposals didn't clearly accept the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. This is certainly a drawback. In this respect, *New Outlook's* position has been well known for many years. Our position advocates the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and this view is gaining more and more support in Israel.

Due to this long-standing position held by *New Outlook*, we feel we have the right to ask Palestinian representatives to participate in a dialogue based upon the formula, accepted by the Israeli peace camp, of simultaneous mutual recognition. If this formula is accepted by the Palestinians as well, it will certainly help to pave the way toward fruitful negotiations and to the ending of the long-lasting conflict, which has brought so much misery to the Jewish and Palestinian peoples.

C.S.

OCTOBER 1982

# **The Fez Conference: A Step Toward Peace**

IN 1981, THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT FEZ WAS NOT ABLE TO UNIFY AROUND THE SAUDI PEACE PLAN AND WAS DISBANDED AFTER FIVE HOURS. IN THE FALL OF 1982, FOLLOWING THE WAR IN LEBANON AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, THE ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE WAS ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY UNITE AROUND THE FEZ RESOLUTIONS (SEE APPENDIX II).

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL CONTAINS *NEW OUTLOOK*'S RESPONSE TO THE FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS.

It appears that the most important aspect of the Fez Summit Resolutions is the readiness of the Arab world to break with the past, a past in which Israel's very existence was both unacceptable and unthinkable, and in which the "Zionist entity" was anathema, fit only to be cursed, ruthlessly fought, and marked out for destruction. In its preamble, the summit document states that the Fez Resolutions take into account the Bourguiba plan, which considers that "the solution of the Palestinian problem should be founded on international legality." It is well known that President Bourguiba, an isolated voice crying in the Arab wilderness, has for years advocated recognition by the Arab states of the UN 1947 partition plan, which provided for the establishment in Palestine of two states, one Arab and one Jewish.

The acceptance by the Arab summit conference (including former rejectionists such as Syria, Iraq, and the PLO) of the principle of legitimate Jewish national statehood, a principle that the

Arab world had systematically rejected for the past thirty-five years, is of paramount importance, for it reflects a fundamental change in the Arab attitude toward the existence of the state of Israel. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Fez Resolutions states that the UN Security Council should "guarantee peace between all the states of the region, including an independent Palestinian state."

This resolution implicitly recognizes Israel's right to live in peace with its neighbors. The Arab summit's insistence on the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and statehood, under PLO guidance, and its demand for Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in June 1967, including Arab (East) Jerusalem, does not detract from the Arab conference's indirect recognition of Israel's right to a peaceful existence within its pre-1967 borders.

We at *New Outlook*, who have long been advocating recognition of the Palestinians' right to national self-determination on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alongside the state of Israel, would have preferred a more definite commitment by the Arab summit to peace with and recognition of Israel. Moreover, it is to be deplored that there is not the slightest reference in the Fez Resolutions to the necessity for entering into peace negotiations with Israel in order to achieve an overall agreed-upon settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

One cannot escape the impression that, despite Egypt's pioneering example, the Arab world continues to regard the state of Israel as a leper of sorts, to be held at arm's length and with whom all direct contact is to be avoided. The Arabs still prefer to talk, rather vaguely, of the need for a just peace in the Middle East instead of the need for a just peace with Israel. The Fez Resolutions clearly imply that withdrawal from the occupied territories, on the one hand, and Palestinian statehood on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, on the other, should and can be obtained by external, international pressure on Israel rather than through negotiations. This concept is, of course, politically unrealistic and morally unacceptable, as well as offensive to the Israeli people. The Arab conference did break with the past. However, it was not a clean break, and certainly not the breakthrough that many Israelis and Palestinians had hoped for.

Nevertheless, the Fez Resolutions are probably not the last

word from Arab summitry and may be, let us hope, construed as a blueprint, or a framework to be filled in, during the negotiating process in future. Within this perspective, the Fez conference may be considered to have taken an important, if modest, step toward a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

V.C.

OCTOBER 1982



# **Nahum Goldmann**

## **(1895-1982)**

---

**ARIE (LOVA) ELIAV**

Toward the end of 1976 I met Dr. Goldmann in his Paris apartment. With him was his good friend, the distinguished French Jew Pierre Mendès-France. Dr. Issam Sartawi, one of the leaders of the PLO, came with me. For a number of months Dr. Sartawi had been in contact with a number of Israeli Zionist personalities. They had been attempting to work out ways to arrive at a peaceful coexistence of the two peoples and their two national movements. Nahum Goldmann, who had for years, at every opportunity, called for meetings with Israel's Arab enemies in order to seek peace, wholeheartedly and enthusiastically supported these encounters.

Already then, Dr. Goldmann had captured the meaning of the biblical phrase "Love peace and pursue peace" in the most sublime sense of this unique Jewish concept. He traveled tirelessly from place to place, conferring on the subject of peace with friends and intimates, some the surviving giants of World War II, others contemporary world leaders.

With all of his strength and abilities he tried to build a bridge of

---

**ARIE (LOVA) ELIAV** has been chairman of the Labor Party, a deputy minister, a Member of the Knesset for Labor and Sheli, and has been involved in and coordinated many diplomatic and development projects during his illustrious public career. Author of *Land of the Hart* and other books, he has devoted many years to the cause of Israeli-Arab peace.

peace and to call a halt to the continuing bloodshed between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel.

Pierre Mendès-France and Nahum Goldmann listened carefully to my words and those of Issam Sartawi. They both promised to help my friends and myself in every way possible. Both emphasized that if we, the opposing sides, did not manage to find a means of dialogue rapidly, we would be dragged once again into yet another bloody war.

The two of them appealed in particular to Dr. Sartawi to deliver a message to those who had sent him that mutual recognition between the two peoples and the two national movements must be stated clearly, unequivocally and simultaneously, and that peace could come only after such a declaration had been made, based on compromise, in a land which the two peoples regard as their homeland.

In his later years Dr. Goldmann was hounded because of his pursuit of peace and because he had dared to state so early that without a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem there could be no end to the Jewish-Arab conflict. He withstood the attacks, the harassment, and the gibes with dignity, good humor, and forgiveness. But that was outwardly. As one who knew him intimately, I realized how badly hurt he really was and how every arrow of ridicule and derision aimed at Nahum wounded and pained him.

The day will yet come—it is perhaps far off but it will arrive eventually, without a doubt—when Jews and Arabs, living side by side in peace and amity, will raise a monument of gold to Nahum Goldmann, Prince of Peace of the Zionist movement and Minister of Peace of the Jewish people, who went to the ends of the earth in his pursuit of peace.

OCTOBER 1982

# **Pierre Mendès-France**

---

## **(1907-1982)**

**ARIEH YA'ARI**

The issues of peace and respect for the right of every people to independence were the cornerstones of Pierre Mendès-France's enlightened outlook. It was only natural that, in his last years, he should devote all his energy and influence to the achievement of peace between Israel and the Palestinian people.

A descendant of an ancient Jewish family of Portuguese origin, he had an enlightened secular outlook but also a proud attachment to his Jewishness; and already, as a student, he fought courageously against the anti-Semitic toughs of *Action Française*. In the National Assembly, he was one of the most vigorous opponents of the Munich Pact. When the Second World War broke out, he insisted on his right to enlist as a navigator in a bomber squadron in order to fight the Nazi enemy.

A friend and admirer of Chaim Weizmann, he warmly sympathized with the undertaking of national liberation for the Jewish people. As Prime Minister, he encouraged scientific cooperation between the two states and later visited Israel on different occasions, serving as an adviser to the government and various economic institutions.

---

**DR. ARIEH YA'ARI** has written extensively on Israel and general political questions in Israeli and international journals. A member of Kibbutz Ein Dor, he has served as head of the Hashomer Hatzair movement in Israel, and as Mapam European representative. He is currently involved in the establishment of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East.

His last visit to Israel was in order to participate in an international symposium organized by *New Outlook* in November 1977. Together with Dr. Nahum Goldmann, he led a delegation that was warmly received by Egyptian President Sadat during his visit to Jerusalem.

His home in Paris served as a place of pilgrimage for Jewish and Arab peace-seekers. It was there that the famous meetings between PLO representatives and members of the Israeli peace camp took place. Like his good friend Nahum Goldmann, he enjoyed the unreserved trust and respect of both sides.

His sympathy and attachment to Israel did not prevent him from expressing reservations about the Sinai Campaign of 1956, which, he predicted, would have negative implications for the future of peace, and he followed with growing alarm the Likud government's policies in the occupied territories. In one of the last conversations I had with him, he told me: "If I were twenty years younger, I would emigrate to Israel so that I could contribute to the struggle for peace which is so necessary for both the peoples in your tormented land."

His last public action was to issue an appeal, together with Nahum Goldmann and Philip Klutznick, in July, during the Lebanese war. This call for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and for negotiations to ensure peaceful coexistence based on the right to self-determination of both peoples, may be regarded as the political testament of Pierre Mendès-France.

We will cherish the noble memory of our great friend by redoubling our efforts toward the realization of his will—the achievement of the longed-for peace.

OCTOBER 1982



# For an Outspoken Diaspora

---

THE WAR IN LEBANON, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MASSACRE IN SABRA AND SHATILA, CREATED A NEW SITUATION WITHIN WORLD JEWRY. SIGNIFICANT PERSONALITIES AND REPRESENTATIVES OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS BEGAN TO SPEAK OUT IN PUBLIC IN FAVOR OF ALTERNATIVE ISRAELI POLICIES.

THE FOLLOWING EDITORIAL EXPRESSES *NEW OUT-LOOK*'S POSITION CONCERNING THE NEED FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION OF OPINION WITHIN ISRAEL AND THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE WORLD.

If the present trend continues, we may find ourselves facing an unfamiliar situation. Diaspora Jewry may, at long last, gain the right of free speech with regard to all the vital issues, including those relating to Israel. Up to now, the Jews of the Diaspora had to choose between supporting the Israeli government and remaining silent. Due to the vast human resources and tremendous intellectual abilities of Diaspora Jewry, a change of this sort could have revolutionary implications.

The deep-rooted support for Israel amongst world Jewry stems from a genuine source, a feeling of empathy with the achievements of fellow Jews, who managed to realize an age-old dream and to establish a state of their own. This support is a product of fulfillment and national pride, felt particularly at a time of worry and concern. However, these true feelings have too often been exploited for fast political benefits. Far too often, world Jewry

has been used as a rubber-stamp by those who conduct Israel's affairs. The Jewish people have been called upon to support and blindly defend acts which they could not condone, acts to which they were often opposed.

Whenever anyone tried to question this practice or to express doubts, a familiar technique of emotional blackmail was immediately applied: How dare you offer advice or even ask questions? You live safely here, while Israelis will have to pay for the wrong decisions that may result from your advice! Very few dared ask the opposite question: What if, as a result of your silence, mistakes that could have been averted are made—won't you share the blame for the disaster? Moreover, by maintaining silence in what was referred to as internal Israeli affairs, world Jewry did, in effect, intervene in these affairs. Yet only in one direction—in support of the Israeli government and against the opposition! The Israeli government could always count on the support of world Jewry. This support was always cited by the government supporters inside Israel as proof of the merits of the government's policies.

This practice was always intellectually and morally wrong. It became disastrous after Begin rose to power and began to act upon his ideological convictions.

Begin is a virtuoso in evoking the guilt feelings of Diaspora Jews. His overuse of Holocaust themes is not only calculated to silence the Gentiles, it is directed at the guilt complexes of the large Jewish communities which could do nothing about the Holocaust. He harps on sensitive strings and manages to line up what appears to be the solid support of Diaspora Jewry for his policies. This solid support forms one of the foundation stones of his hold on the Israeli public. Thus, what begins as innocent support for Israel, or even self-conscious and self-imposed silence, becomes an interference in internal Israeli affairs and support for one of the sides in the great national debate which is now going on inside Israel.

Many conscientious Jewish leaders were aware of the trap they had fallen into, but seemed unable to extricate themselves from it. Then came the Lebanon war which opened the eyes of many, both in Israel and the Diaspora, to the dangers inherent in the situation. The Jews of the Diaspora have been ready to come to

the defense of Israel whenever they felt that Israel's existence was at stake, even if doing so meant opposing their own governments. The charge of dual loyalty was always hanging over their heads, but where Israel's survival was concerned, they felt this was a risk worth taking.

In the Lebanon war, survival was not the issue. Begin himself called it "a war of choice," indicating that his cabinet had the option not to launch the war but believed that certain interests would be best served by launching it.

This is the gist of the matter. Clearly, there are many complex issues involved. The security issue cannot so easily be invoked after Lebanon as it could previously.

The Likud government stands alone in the whole world in its insistence on ignoring the national aspirations of the Palestinians and pursuing a suicidal policy in its determination to establish a Greater Israel. Highly responsible leaders of world Jewry want no part of it. The international community realizes that the time is ripe for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on mutual recognition, self-determination, and peaceful coexistence. Diaspora Jewry does not want to find itself pitted against the international community in supporting an extremist, intransigent regime. It is encouraged by the voices of dissent and opposition coming from Israel. The clearer and more determined those voices become, the more outspoken will become the voice of Diaspora Jewry, and it will possibly evolve into an important, perhaps even decisive, factor in the struggle for an equitable solution to the Middle Eastern conflict.

This time the interests both of Israel and of Diaspora Jewry are at stake. Both are dependent on the free expression of opinion, within Israel and in the world outside.

*D.S.*

OCTOBER 1982





PART III

— THE FUTURE  
ROAD TO  
PEACE



# **Israelis and Palestinians—Can They Make Peace?**

**SIMHA FLAPAN**

OPENING ADDRESS AT THE SEMINAR ON "THE PROSPECTS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST" ORGANIZED BY THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY IN CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, ON NOVEMBER 18-19, 1982.

In dealing with the future of Israel, the Arab World and the prospects for peace in the Middle East, it is impossible to avoid a critical review of the past. Both Israelis and Palestinians conceive of the future with ideas and concepts from the past, when mutual ignorance led to distorted images of mutual national aspirations. In debating a solution to the conflict it is also necessary to remove elements of propaganda. Leaders and decision-makers on both sides have become propaganda's prisoners; the people its victims. Examples of this include Golda Meir's famous statement that there is no such thing as Palestinian people and the PLO leaders' equation of Zionism with racism and imperialism.

At the beginning of this century Theodor Herzl issued a manifesto on the creation of a Jewish state. A short time afterward a Palestinian Arab, Najib Azuri, wrote the first manifesto of Arab Nationalism, the main essence of which related to the Palestinian question. Herzl predicted that within fifty years a Jewish state would be a reality. Azuri predicted that within several decades the Middle East would be the setting for a clash between two

nationalist movements, which would determine the fate of the region and possibly of peace in the world. He saw Palestine as the center of the Arab struggle. Both prophecies proved true. A Jewish state has become a dynamic reality, a dominant factor in the Jewish diaspora and a major power in the Middle East. But at the same time, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people has become the central and decisive issue in the whole region.

Many factors have played a role in this conflict. But there is no doubt about the major problem: the claim of two peoples to the same territory, Palestine, as an exclusive base for their national development and sovereignty. There is an astounding similarity in the attitudes and policies of both, in spite of the enormous differences in their culture, in their social and economic structures and in their problems of national revival. Both refuse to accept each other's right to self-determination. Both deny the right of the other to have a state in Palestine or in part of it. The PLO Covenant's aim to dismantle the Zionist state and Israel's violent opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state are two sides of this same coin.

There are more similarities. Both sides justify the use of violence for the achievement of their aims—indiscriminate acts of terror on one side, massive retaliation by armed forces on the other. Innocent civilians are the victims of both. Both sides attempt to weaken the demographic strength and presence of the other: Palestinians struggled to stop Jewish immigration and demanded the departure of Jews who arrived in Palestine after a certain date; Israelis encouraged the Arab exodus from Palestine in 1948 and Arab emigration from the territories occupied in the war of 1967. They oppose the return of Palestinian refugees who left their homes in the course of fighting. Both were ready to offer only a vague personal-cultural autonomy, but not a national autonomy. One major difference is that in 1946, Palestinians were ready to give the Jewish minority proportional representation in the legislative and executive bodies of a Palestinian state; Mr. Begin does not offer Palestinians either citizenship or representation in the Parliament, even though an important goal of his is to annex the heavily Palestinian West Bank and Gaza. Begin's plan for a five-year transition government in these Palestinian



territories deprives the people of any powers of legislation or self-determination.

Similarities should not obscure the enormous differences in the objective situations of both peoples. The Jewish people have a state. It's a dynamic powerful state whose development is marked by impressive achievements: economic, technological, scientific and military. The Palestinians are a people of refugees, dispersed all over the Middle East, without a national home or self-government, mistreated, discriminated against and oppressed by Israel and the Arab regimes. This fundamental asymmetry obliges Israel to assume more responsibility in the search for a solution, though it does not liberate the Palestinians from their duty to elaborate a policy which would lead to a peaceful settlement.

It is important to note the reversal of roles played by Israel and the Palestinians in this conflict. Both sides underwent dramatic changes in their attitudes, unfortunately in opposite directions. The war in 1948 broke out because the Palestinians attempted to prevent the self-determination of Israelis, in accordance with the 1947 UN resolution on the establishment of a Jewish state in the framework of partition. The war in Lebanon in 1982 took place because of the Israeli policy to prevent by force the self-determination of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, in accordance with multiple UN resolutions.

An Arab thinker, Cecil Hourani, in an article entitled "The Moment of Truth" (*Encounter*, November 1967) submitted Arab policies to a merciless scrutiny. He claimed that the Arab debacle in the Six Day War was caused by emotional prejudice, misjudgment of strength, illusions of power and the refusal to accept compromise because compromise is a sign of weakness. Rereading this critique today, it is easy to apply the very same criticisms to Israel's policy. The Arab world is moving, after Sadat's initiative and the Fez resolution, from intransigence to moderation. After the terrible massacre in Sabra and Shatila, the Fez resolution issued a call not for revenge but for peace in the region. This demonstrates an unprecedented desire to end the bloody conflict. Also, the PLO is moving gradually from a past policy of guerrilla terror aimed at dismantling the Zionist State toward a more mod-

erate political stance today, as evidenced by its own resolutions and by its support for the Fez resolution. This phenomenon is not a result of the war in Lebanon: the Fez resolution was preceded by King Fahd's proposals, the PLO signaled its readiness for a two-state solution before the war and the evacuation of Beirut. What the war produced was a state of emergency, a feeling that time is running out and a fear that the peace process started in Camp David could collapse if a solution is not found to terminate the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Before 1948 Israel followed a policy characterized by pragmatism, flexibility and readiness to compromise. It did not view the Palestinians as a national entity entitled to self-determination. Israel was Pan-Arab in its orientation, believing that in return for its support for the United Arab Kingdom, the leaders of the Arab National Movement would concede a small parcel of their vast territories to the Zionist enterprise. The Pan-Arab orientation provided also a moral justification for supporting the transfer of Palestinian Arabs to the neighboring countries—an idea which, though not made public as an official position, played a much greater role in Zionist thinking and action than is generally admitted.

The Palestinians were also Pan-Arabs, but for different reasons. They were not ready to be victims of a compromise between Arab Nationalism and Zionism. Their Pan-Arabism originated in the feeling that fewer than one million people were unable to oppose, without the support of the whole Arab world, the thrust of Jewish immigration and colonization initiated by a people 10 million strong and deeply rooted in key positions of international finance and politics.

In spite of the non-recognition of Palestinian national rights and the hope for an eventual transfer of the Palestinians to Jordan, the Zionist leadership refrained from a policy of violence and oppression. During the Mandate period the emphasis was not on statehood or power but on immigration, settlement and the building of a new society imbued with high moral values, as well as an emphasis on equality and social justice. The Jabotinsky party, preaching conquest by blood and force, was excluded from the decision-making body of the mainstream Zionist Movement, whose leadership was influenced by many liberals, humanists,

binationalists and socialists of great stature. Thus, in spite of the escalation of the conflict, riots, and civil wars, the policy was one of self-restraint, political prudence, and moderation. The principle of non-domination was reiterated by almost every Zionist Congress; proposals for a legislative council and parity in government were seriously considered though never adopted as a program.

What made this realistic and pragmatic approach futile and ineffective was the Zionist policy of economic and social separation, which created an abyss between all classes of the Jewish and Arab societies, and the intransigence of the Arab leadership which demanded an end to Jewish immigration and colonization as a precondition for any political solution. There were many important Zionist leaders who tried to develop a political program to allow Jewish immigration and settlement as well as Palestinian self-government in a binational or federative state. Jews and Arabs would share equally the power. The supporters of this parity formula had no chance to influence Zionist policies because the few moderate leaders in the Palestinian community were victims of their own intransigent leadership. This same leadership rejected even the British White Paper of 1939, which terminated the obligations of the Balfour Declaration to promote a Jewish national home; it decided to stake the future of Palestine on the victory of Nazi Germany in World War II. This decision had disastrous consequences, leading to the total discreditation and disintegration of the Palestinian movement. It paralyzed the Jewish peace forces and it stimulated mainstream leadership to adopt the Biltmore Program's aim to make Palestine a Jewish Commonwealth. Moshe Sharett declared that "one does not have to go to Arabs and agree with them, because it is not they who will have the final word but the British and the Americans." Hadj Amin al Hussein's collaboration with Hitler and, later on, the trauma of the Holocaust provided moral justification for this line. The Biltmore Program was not realized. The post-war settlements were not, as the Zionist leaders believed, a system of punishment and reward for behavior in the war but a reflection of Great Power interests. The maximalist demands of the Biltmore Program, with its complete disregard for the problem of Palestinian rights and for the importance of the Arab world in international politics and



global strategies, left the Zionist Movement in a trap. Only the revival of the partition-plan was able to save it. But this time it was not the British Partition Plan of 1937, ceding Arab Palestine to Transjordan, but a UN Partition Plan providing for the establishment of a Palestinian State alongside Israel. Many Arab forces in Palestine, Egypt and Iraq supported the UN resolution but the leadership decided to prevent its implementation. The war of 1948 ended in tragedy for the Palestinians and opened a period of turmoil in the Arab world, traumatized by the humiliating defeat of its armies. To most Israelis the war seemed to vindicate the policy of non-recognition of the Palestinian people. The annexation of the West Bank by Jordan and the dispersion of the Palestinians nurtured the illusion that the Palestinian national problem had disappeared, leaving only the residual humanitarian problem of the refugees to be solved. Nearly thirty years passed before it became clear that the Palestinian refugee problem, characterized by dispersion and homelessness, closely resembled the Jewish problem of bringing exiles home.

It was precisely the refugee problem which kept Palestinian nationalism alive. Like the Jewish refugees who survived the Holocaust and war, the Palestinians became:

A group of people, severed from their homeland and from their culture . . . [trying] to reconstitute as best as it can a simulacrum of its inherited civilisation and way of life. Anything less seems a grievous loss and a deprivation. Objects, manners, customs and ideas associated with the home country acquire an enhanced value as though group survival depended upon them—as perhaps it does. (Harry I. Shapiro, "The Jewish People," Unesco, p. 47)

The refugee camps themselves undermined the cease-fire and armistice agreements signed between Israel and the Arab states after the 1948 war. The assumption that the Palestinian refugees would be absorbed by the developing Arab countries and forego their attachment to their homeland has proved completely incorrect. For a time, this thesis seemed supported by the fact that the refugee camps developed the best educational system in the area. Schools produced tens of thousands of intellectuals, technocrats and professionals who spread all over the Middle East, acquired important positions and helped to build up commerce, press, edu-



cation, banking, and oil industries in most of the Arab states. This created a Palestinian Diaspora inside the Arab world.

Israel's policy of placing the entire responsibility for the refugee problem on the Arabs, of refusing even a partial repatriation, and of linking up the problem of compensation with that of the loss of Jewish property in Arab countries (a problem having nothing to do with the Palestinians) played into the hands of those who wanted to use the refugee problem as a poisonous weapon against Israel. For the Arab politicians and military leaders, motivated by the powerful urge to vindicate the humiliating defeat of 1948, the refugee problem became an excellent argument for anti-Israeli propaganda. The refugee camps themselves became hotbeds of hatred. Palestinians used political and social unrest to foster a movement for Arab unity, promoting a policy of belligerence and confrontation with Israel. They became the most militant and enthusiastic supporters of the Ba'ath party and Abdul Nasser. Supporting Arab unification served to divert attention from internal social problems and economic development. The fedayeen or soldiers in the '50s and later Al Fatah in the '60s acted as detonators in the wars of 1956 and 1967.

Israel's objective should have been to lessen the explosive situation by sharing responsibility in the solution of the refugee problem and by assuaging the fears of the Arab states about Israeli expansionism.

What was done was precisely the opposite. Golda Meir opposed the return of Arab refugees to Israel because, she said, they would become a time-bomb. She failed to see the danger of explosion of that time-bomb at Israel's doorstep. Al Fatah expressed the refusal, by the second generation of refugees, to accept the perpetuation of their homelessness and stagnation. Oddly, Golda Meir later justified Israel's occupation and rule over the West Bank and Gaza, with its hundreds of thousands of refugees, after the '67 war, with the argument that this was necessary for Israel's security!

The absence of a solution and the perpetuation of the refugee condition could only generate a movement of fedayeen who perpetrated raids of sabotage and terror inside Israel, not always with the encouragement and often against the wishes of their hosts. These raids resulted in massive retaliation from Israel,

which hoped to compel the Arab governments to constrain the fedayeen. But the result was a vicious circle of escalating violence. Placing the entire responsibility for the solution of the refugee problem on the Arab states was disastrous. The massive reprisals against the raids quickly became major battles, creating extreme political tensions, rending the whole area prey to a Great Power rivalry and a feverish arms race, which culminated in full-scale wars. The Arab countries, which before 1948 were a factor of moderation in the Zionist-Palestinian conflict, became Israel's main enemy and security problem. The argument that the primary aim of the Arab states was to launch a new war and that Israel had no choice except a policy of preemptive military action is not corroborated by facts. No one can deny the hostility of Arab leaders, their thirst for revenge, their threats and bloodcurdling propaganda. But the prolonged convolutions following the 1948 war and expressed in coups d'état, upheavals, revolutions and inter-Arab conflicts, made any plans for a new Arab aggression inoperative. Israel should have encouraged Arab moderates and given credibility to its desire to live in peace and to become part of the Middle Eastern family. Instead, Israel's collusion with Great Britain and France in the war of 1956, and its support for French colonialism in Algeria, increased Arab fears and left even deeper wounds in the Arab world.

What followed from the escalation of military clashes was that the subordination of foreign policy and socio-economic development in Israel gave way to the aim of building up a military deterrent, with massive reprisals and periodic demonstrations of the deterrent's efficiency, by recourse to preemptive actions intended to prevent a substantial change in the military balance in the Middle East. A corollary of this was Israel's belief in its role as a "great mini-power," able to match the combined strength of all Arab states and to prevent unfavorable change in the region's political structure.

The most astounding fact is that, in spite of the fedayeen's activities and the escalation, in their wake, of military clashes with the Arab states, the Palestinian problem was obliterated from Israeli political thinking. The Arab states, and in particular Egypt, since the coup d'état in 1952, were seen as the arch enemies and major threat to Israel's existence. Israeli studies on

the Arab world between 1948 and 1967 do not deal with the Palestinian problem. The fedayeen were seen as agents of the Arab military rulers in their preparations for a war of revenge. Israel accused the Arab government of a deliberate policy to prevent rehabilitation and absorption of refugees, in order to maintain hotbeds of hostility and tension and to use the refugees for guerilla warfare, harassment and violation of cease fires.

What is puzzling is how the Jewish people, who have themselves experienced all the aspects of the refugee problem, including the powerful striving to return to their homeland, could have adopted such a shortsighted position. The War of 1967, in which Israel established its rule over the whole of Palestine, has put an end to the effacement of the problem.

The future of the West Bank and Gaza, with more than one million Palestinians, representing the largest group of Palestinian people, became Israel's chief policy issue. Two alternatives were possible: the annexation of the occupied territories despite the wishes of the population, or the recognition of its right to self-determination, considering its decisiveness as a factor in the peace process. The war caused great suffering to the population of the West Bank and left wounds which could not easily be healed. A regime of military occupation, however liberal and enlightened, involves both oppression and hostile reactions, particularly in a conflict which bred antagonism for half a century. In spite of this, and perhaps because of it, the pattern of relations was of crucial importance for the future. The occupation of the West Bank offered Israelis direct confrontation with the Palestinian people for the first time. The collective experience of one million Palestinians engaged in daily contacts with 3.5 million Jews provided a chance for the formation of a new relationship, liberated of the poisonous propaganda which distorted each other's images. The meeting with the population in the West Bank and Gaza, after 20 years of warfare, created a shock in Israeli public opinion. Encounters between Jews and Arabs, in spite of the complex relationship between occupiers and occupied, still destroyed many of the demonic images which dominated both sides for so long. There was a possibility for mutual discussion. Many important Israeli politicians came out with a proposal to initiate the establishment of a Palestinian state in the



West Bank, expecting it to be the first to sign a peace treaty with Israel. But they aimed at a state that would exist under Israeli military occupation and under conditions, set down by Israel, concerning the delineation of frontiers, foreign policy and defense to prevent it from becoming a new base for aggression for the Arab armies. Many of the Israeli peace forces regarded it as a proposal for a colonial protectorate completely dependent on Israel's good will to solve its economic and social problems. As the Israeli policy at the time was to annex, at least, part of Sinai and the Golan Heights, such a Palestinian state would have been deprived of any contacts with the Arab world, and would have been seen as a puppet state run by Quislings, which would have provoked a nationalist and revolutionary opposition by Palestinians living outside.

The idea of a Palestinian state was rejected by the Israeli Cabinet, which then represented a national coalition with Menachem Begin. Begin's pressure for the annexation of the West Bank killed this initiative, and so did the intoxication of many Labor leaders with their military victories, and their belief that Israel, with its overpowering military capacity, could acquire new territorial dimensions, new strategic frontiers. The Allon Plan proposed to achieve these frontiers unilaterally, by setting up settlements. Ideological differences between Labor and Begin were blurred. This paved the way for Begin's rise to power. The Labor government sacrificed its historical vision and farsighted statesmanship for short-term gains. The denial of the right of the Palestinians for self-determination, the annexation of Arab lands, the creation of civilian settlements in the occupied territories, the display of force and arrogance, the insistence on direct negotiations with the Arab Governments and the refusal to establish contacts with the PLO, the severe oppression of its followers in the occupied territories through expulsion, detention and collective punishment of families—all this led to a total collapse of Israel's image as a liberal democratic and peace-aspiring nation. The practices of the military administration in the West Bank were a denial of the Zionist declarations of peace, justice and non-domination.

This policy strengthened and increased the influence of the Movement for the Greater Israel, among whose founders were



many prominent Labor Party members who exerted pressure for the enlargement and acceleration of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The ground and climate were thus prepared for Begin to launch his policy of Jewish colonization, which included Jewish control over Palestinian land, water, and electricity and encouragement of private companies to build dwellings and townships in the West Bank. These measures could only be implemented with brutal force and oppression, including the dismissal of democratically elected mayors, expulsion of scholars and teachers, closing down of journals and universities, censorship, curfews, dispersion of student demonstrations with weapons and prohibition of cultural and political activities expressing the national aspirations of the Palestinians.

All this was an attempt to set up a collaborationist leadership, which would accept Begin's miserly autonomy, deprived of legislative powers, of control over land and water, and of the right to self-determination. In signing the peace treaty with Egypt, Begin was motivated to a very large extent by the aim to eliminate the military potential of the largest and strongest Arab country from Israel's confrontation with Syria, Jordan and the PLO who opposed the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel, and who insisted on the restitution of these territories to Arab and Palestinian sovereignty. The war in Lebanon was the continuation of the policy in the West Bank; its main objective was the liquidation of the PLO, viewed by 95 percent of the Palestinians as their only legitimate representative. The war became a turning point in Israel. It generated a national crisis of unprecedented depth and dimension; it revealed the centrality of the Palestinian problem and the impossibility of forceably destroying the aspirations for independence from the heart and souls of a people; it increased the prestige and influence of the PLO.

The objectives of this war as well as its nature, which led to the massacre of Palestinian refugees by the phalangist militia, have generated a moral revulsion in Israel, and a nation-wide movement struggling for a change in government and policy. The opposition has not yet formulated a clear-cut alternative to Begin's policies and still hesitates or refuses to recognize the PLO or to accept its demand for independent statehood. The Labor Party still clings to the Jordanian option and the idea of a territorial

compromise—a policy which brought Begin to power. It ignores the fact that King Hussein can enter the play only if authorized by the PLO, with an acceptance of Palestinians' right to self-determination and statehood. There is, however, a widespread feeling that the continuation of the present policy toward the Palestinians must involve brutal force and oppression—which would lead to a terrible cycle of violence, to the collapse of the peace-process with Egypt, to a total isolation in the world, to a crisis in the relations with the Diaspora and to a period of new turbulence and turmoil in the region in which the special relationship with the United States is bound to erode. The national crisis in Israel is only beginning. The opposition is not only a movement of protest against the war. It represents the revival of the historical struggle in Zionism and in Israeli society between the liberal-humanistic-socialist trend aspiring for peace and co-existence and the ethnocentric, militaristic, expansionist and chauvinistic Zionism for which not peace but power and territory are the primary objectives to be achieved, by force and oppression if necessary. The outcome of this struggle will depend on the position of Diaspora Jewry, on United States policy in the Middle East, and on the PLO's suggestions for a political solution. The PLO's recognition of Israel's reality and existence is crucial.

There is a consensus in the Israeli peace camp that occupation must end. So too must Israeli brutalities. Recent history is seen as an erosion of the human and moral values from which Zionism drew its strength. There is also a consensus that peace is impossible without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. From this point, there is only a short distance to the view that the best way to real peace is to negotiate it with the PLO. But this distance can be crossed only if the PLO adopts a clearcut policy in favor of a peace settlement.

I do not agree with those who view the PLO Covenant as insignificant and unimportant. It expressed an ideological credo which became a program for action when Al Fatah took over the PLO leadership. But it was precisely the failure to implement the Covenant which generated serious changes in PLO positions. Until 1967, the PLO was run by traditional leaders of the old generation like Ahmed Shukeiri, whose propaganda for the liberation of Palestine by armed struggle was a cover-up for his being an obe-

dient instrument in the hands of Nasser and Hussein. Al Fatah was formed by a new generation whose mentality was formed by Baathist and Nasserist ideas and who grew up when the wave for Arab unity and revolution was at its highest point. They became revolutionary nationalists who threw themselves into the battle for the redemption of Palestine and Arab unity with enthusiasm and desperation. They became the most militant Baathists and Nasserists. They were pan-Arabs because Arab unity was seen as the only way for the liberation of Palestine. But a stormy controversy arose in the Arab world over the priority to be accorded to this aim. The controversy led to the collapse of the United Arab Republic in 1961, to the failure of the three-cornered federation of Syria, Egypt and Iraq, to the paralysis of the Arab League and the Arab summits.

The Palestinians viewed with horror the decline of the movement for Arab unity and the growing tendency of Arab states involved in economic and social development to shelve the Palestine problem for an unspecified period. That's what prompted Al Fatah to engage in an action to compel the Arab states, willing or not, to return to the policy of confrontation with Israel. It was not important whether the Arab states were prepared for the war because for Al Fatah even a war lost would be a victory, as it would maintain the Palestine issue's primacy in the Arab world. This policy was one of desperation felt by the second generation of refugees, despised, rejected, abandoned, and frustrated by Israeli non-recognition and Arab disengagement. There was a contradiction between the goal of the immediate liberation of Palestine, and the realization of Arab unity. The latter required social reforms, modernization and economic development, all of which would have priority over the confrontation with Israel. The Palestinian answer was that the struggle for their cause would forge, through revolutionary means, Arab unity; and that the confrontation with Israel would lead to a real Arab revolution. The members of Al Fatah saw themselves as Palestinian patriots and as forerunners of the Arab Revolution, for the rebirth of the Arab nation. Thus, the initiative of Abdul Nasser to revive the PLO, originally meant both as a diversion and as a means to strengthen his leadership, boomeranged. The confrontation with Israel was not determined by logic, rational policy or exigencies of war lo-



gistics, but by a propaganda battle which created an atmosphere charged with uncontrollable tensions and passions. The war of 1967 was a war for the Palestinians, placing their problem in the center of Middle East policies.

One of the founding members of Al Fatah was reported to have stated to a French journalist (B. Karlinski): "For us the best result of the War of 1967 would have been the largest possible occupation by Israel of Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian territories. The dispersion of its army into the four corners of the Middle East would have marked the diplomatic and military end of Israel. By occupying 20 million Arabs instead of 1 million in the West Bank the vulnerability of this army to the guerrilla could have been multiplied by twenty. . . ." Only the feelings of extreme alienation and isolation could produce such a desperate plan.

Al Fatah's strategic and political thinking was heavily influenced by the impact of the Algerian struggle for independence, the war in Vietnam and by the theory of a popular war of liberation promoted by the Syrian Ba'ath. The attempt to implement a guerrilla war and the policy to mobilize the Arab world for a final confrontation with Israel to enforce the Covenant forced the PLO to confront the realities and to learn their plan's impossibility. The PLO underwent tragic and bitter experiences: the failure to maintain a sanctuary and territorial base in Jordan, the limitations imposed by Syria and other host countries, the financial dependence on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the failure of the diplomatic campaigns to impose UN sanctions on Israel, the war in Lebanon—these are only a few examples of the defeats of the PLO doctrine and the strategy to liberate Palestine "by armed struggle," which mean de facto indiscriminate acts of terror. On the other hand, the PLO has had an enormous success in achieving moral and political support all over the world for its claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in their struggle for self-determination and statehood and to be an active participant in the process of negotiations. It is against this background that one has to view the seriousness and importance of its signals and indications of readiness to negotiate a political solution to the conflict. The passivity of the Arab regimes during the war in Lebanon, their submission to United States pressure



and their consent to the dismantlement and evacuation of the PLO bases in Lebanon, the inability of the USSR to stop the war and prevent this outcome—and at the same time the massive and stormy demonstrations in Israel against the war and the destruction of Palestinian refugee camps and massacres of their population—have made deep impact on the PLO which is now compelled to evolve a new strategy in view of its dispersion among all Arab states and the absence of a territorial base and sanctuary. In the past, the Palestinians were unable to perceive the internal struggle in Zionism as relevant to their destiny. They viewed it as a Jekyll and Hyde phenomenon of the same movement. They saw Jabotinsky as the true spokesman of Zionism, and Weizmann as a hypocritical concealer of the real expansionist aims. This can be understood in view of the fact that the liberal, humanistic and socialist ideas had little practical impact on Zionist policies. Today, however, the PLO realizes that the outcome of the internal struggle will be fateful for them. A solution based on Palestinian self-determination, mutual recognition and coexistence with Israel is not possible without a change of government and policy in Israel, without an Israeli peace camp victory.

Can a solution based on mutual recognition, self-determination and coexistence be achieved? Only when the Israelis understand that peace is unobtainable without a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If the conflict continues, the Camp David agreements will collapse, a new arms race will begin and turmoil will reign in the Middle East. Peace will be achieved when the Palestinians reach the conclusion that a mobilization of the Arab world for a new confrontation with Israel is impossible. The only way to achieve national independence and sovereignty is to recognize Israel, to partition Palestine, and to negotiate peacefully. Substantial numbers on both sides are not far from these conclusions but they need support and encouragement—from each other and from their friends all over the world.

# **A Sovereign Palestinian State**

---

**WALID KHALIDI**

THE FOLLOWING IS AN ARTICULATE PALESTINIAN PRESENTATION OF THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE BASED ON THE WEST BANK, THE GAZA STRIP, AND EAST JERUSALEM, ALONGSIDE THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

The cornerstone is the concept of Palestinian sovereignty in a sovereign, independent Palestinian state. Only such a state would win the endorsement of the PLO. Only such a state is likely to effect a psychological breakthrough with the Palestinians under occupation and in the Diaspora. It would lead them out of the political limbo in which they have lingered since 1948. It would end their anonymous, ghostlike existence as a nonpeople. It would terminate their dependence on the mercy, charity, or tolerance of other parties, whether Arab, Israeli, or international. It would be a point of reference, a national anchorage, a center of hope and achievement.

Of all peoples, the Jewish people are historically qualified to understand this. Only such a state, through PLO endorsement,

---

**DR. KHALIDI**, one of the most respected Palestinian intellectuals, was a professor at the American University of Beirut when this was written. He is a member of the Palestinian National Council and is currently a visiting professor at Harvard. This article originally appeared in the Palestinian English language weekly *Al Fajr*, on August 3, 1980.

would win the support of Arab opinion and the majority of Arab states. These results could not ensue from a Bantustan "federal" formula under a Hashemite dressing, or the perpetuation of Palestinian minority status under international guardianship. They are less likely to result from an Israeli mosaic of Indian reserves and *hen-runs*, crisscrossed by mechanized patrols and police dogs and under surveillance by searchlights, watchtowers, and armed archaeologists. But there is no reason why the concept of Palestinian sovereignty should not accommodate provisions designed to allay legitimate fears of neighbors on a reasonable and preferably reciprocal basis.

## THE FRONTIERS OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE

The frontiers of 1967 with minor and reciprocal adjustments are the most realistic under the circumstances. They would include East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Contact between the West Bank and Gaza Strip could be maintained through guaranteed freedom of access along a specified route or routes. This need not necessarily entail the extraterritorial status of the routes.

Such a solution embodying Palestinian sovereignty is a reversion to the old concept of partition. The difference is that no former partition proposal gave the Jewish state anywhere near as much territory as a settlement along the 1967 frontiers would. Given the historical context of the evolution of the Palestine problem, a partition solution (particularly along the 1967 frontiers) does no violence to Zionism. It should be borne in mind that on the eve of the UN General Assembly's partition resolution, six months before the declaration of the state of Israel, Jewish land ownership in Palestine did not exceed 6.5 percent of the total territory of the country.

The fact that partition is an old formula is no argument against its validity today. After all, the idea of a Jewish return to Palestine is of considerable vintage. Nor is it a valid argument against partition that Palestinian and Arab leaders rejected it at the time. Given the context and circumstances, it was inevitable that they should do so. This was known beforehand to all proponents of

partition, including its chief beneficiary, the Zionists. A different generation of Palestinian and Arab leaders in different circumstances today are prepared to say that they accept it with all the implications of such acceptance for Israeli-Arab reciprocal recognition and coexistence.

If it is wondered why it was that throughout the period 1948-67 no one talked of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the answer is simple: Palestinian and Arab opinion was not prepared for it. They aspired to the recovery of the whole of Palestine or the establishment of a democratic secular state in it. Acceptance of partition or a state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was treason. In some Palestinian and Arab quarters it still is. Therefore, if partition is accepted today over a much smaller area of the country than under any previous partition formula, this is a measure of the evolution in the last decade or so of Palestinian and Arab pragmatism. It is the development that has long been awaited by outside observers and Israelis. It would be tragic if it were not recognized when it occurred. It would be more tragic if it were recognized and ignored.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE STATE

Given the security concerns of its neighbors and the balance of power between it and them, it would make sense for the Palestinian state to declare its nonaligned status vis-à-vis the superpowers and other powers, particularly in the defense and military fields. Some variant of the Austrian model could be applicable in this connection. This could involve agreement between the superpowers, their allies and clients to recognize this nonaligned status. Those Arab states party to the settlement, as well as other powers, could subscribe to this agreement. The arrangement could be guaranteed by the UN Security Council and the Arab League.

This does not mean that the state need be demilitarized. Nor would it preclude its membership in the United Nations, the Arab League, and other international organizations. Nor would it prevent it, again like Austria, from having a foreign policy.

The closest relations of the Palestinian state would naturally be with Arab League members. These relations could cover the



political, economic, commercial, cultural, and social fields. But its most intimate relations are likely to be with Jordan. Consanguinity, historical ties, and common economic interests would all demand this. Jordan would be the nearest Arab neighbor, the gateway to the Arab world and the sea. Naturally, relations with Jordan would have to be on an interstate basis of equality. But this does not preclude a consensual evolution of relations toward greater intimacy.

## ARMED FORCES OF THE STATE

A state bristling with the most sophisticated lethal weapons systems is unrealistic. A demilitarized state would be self-defeating. Without national armed forces the political leadership of the state would become the laughingstock of the Arab world. Their eunuchlike image would be enhanced by the formidable Israeli arsenal next door. So would the state's own sense of insecurity. This would increase its vulnerability to criticism by opponents of the settlement at home and abroad. For several years large segments of the population would continue to live in "refugee" camps, posing security problems to the authorities. There would be a need to curb adventurism across the border into Israel. There would be a need to stand in the way of armed excursions by extremist Israeli groups of would-be settlers. The Palestinian state would be likely to become a great center of tourism and pilgrimage for Diaspora Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, as well as for Jews and Christians. This could involve the influx of hundreds of thousands annually. Reliance for all this on borrowed security made available by UN forces would be impracticable. It would be unstable politically and psychologically. But this does not preclude the use of such forces in a supplementary role or for specific purposes. They could be stationed, for example, along the borders as well as at airports, harbors, and the points of exit from and entrance to the West Bank-Gaza Strip highway.

## EAST JERUSALEM

Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to

the south. Together with its Arab suburbs it is the largest Arab urban concentration on the West Bank. It is the former capital of Jerusalem district under the Ottomans (land surface of 60 percent of Mandate Palestine), as well as of Mandatory Palestine.

The highest proportion of the Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It is the site of the holiest Muslim shrines on Palestinian soil. It evokes the proudest Palestinian and Arab historical memories. It contains the oldest religious endowments of the Palestinians, their most prestigious secular institutions—the cumulative and priceless patrimony of a millennium and a quarter of residence. Architecturally it is distinctively Arab. In ownership and property, it is overwhelmingly so. It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.

To make it so would involve the partition of the city along the 1967 lines. But not necessarily a return to the status quo ante bellum in all its details. The Israeli argument for a unified city must not obfuscate the military conquest of East Jerusalem. The argument contains two themes. The first is an implicit justification for Israeli annexation. The second endows this annexation with an ecumenical purpose. Neither is sacrosanct. Continued Israeli occupation precludes an overall settlement. This in itself frustrates any ecumenical purpose. Such a purpose is best served if a Jerusalem settlement symbolizes and consecrates the principles most worthy of association with the uniqueness of the Golden City. These are the principles of nonexclusivity, coequality, non-dominance, cosharing, noncoercion, palpable justice, the absence of a victor-vanquished equation, the nondictation of spiritual hierarchies.

There is no monopoly in history or common sense for any one of the three great monotheistic faiths over the fate or future of Jerusalem. But if only because of the chronological sequence of its occurrence, it is Islam alone of the three faiths that encompasses in its reverent ken the other two. Abraham and Moses, David and Sarah, Jesus and Mary occupy the same pedestal alongside Muhammad in Muslim adoration.

A partition solution does not mean the erection of a wall. The frontiers could remain open between the capital of Israel in West Jerusalem and the capital of Arab Palestine in East Jerusalem. Provisions could be agreed to at the interstate level for freedom of

movement and residence between the two capitals. Regulation of entrance and exit between the capitals and the two states could also be included. A joint interstate great municipal council could operate and supervise certain essential common services, while residual services would fall under the separate municipalities of each sovereign state. Another grand interfaith council of senior representatives of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, under UN or rotating chairmanship, could oversee the special interests, holy places, and institutions of each religion and act as an arbitration and conciliation body for disputes or claims arising with regard to them. An irreversible right of access to the Wailing Wall would be an integral part of the settlement, while a special regime for the Jewish-owned properties adjacent to the Wailing Wall could be created.

These arrangements could be overseen by the grand interfaith council or by a special interstate Israeli-Palestinian body, under the guarantees of the UN Security Council, the Arab League, and the Islamic states. It would be supremely fitting if both capitals could be demilitarized in part or wholly, except for essential internal security forces.

Only some such solution for Jerusalem is likely to capture the imagination of the world and stamp out for all time the ugly embers of holy wars. Only by some such solution would Jews, Christians, and Muslims translate their veneration of Jerusalem from rhetoric to the idiom of accommodation and love.

## INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE STATE

If the PLO is to endorse the settlement, it has to participate in the government of the Palestinian state. The likelihood is that the centrist Fatah, the backbone of the PLO, will be the backbone of any Palestinian government. Those Palestinian elements that do not subscribe to the settlement will of themselves decline to participate in such a government. A Palestinian government built around Fatah will almost certainly be a national coalition. And the Palestinians who have lived under occupation since 1967 will in the nature of things play a major role in any coalition. Given their experiences, they will strengthen the centrist tendencies in



Fatah. So will the monumental task of state-and nation-building facing the new government. This will demand the extensive support of the entrepreneurial and professional Palestinian elite in the Diaspora.

These centrist tendencies will be further strengthened by economic dependence on international and foreign sources as well as on oil-rich Arab countries. The need for close cooperation with Jordan will promote the same result. There is little reason to believe that Fatah and its coalition partners will want to squander overnight the fruits of decades of terrible struggle and sacrifice by the Palestinians. Considerations of pride will impel them to demonstrate how Palestinian genius can build, those of prudence to avoid playing into the hands of others, those of self-interest to survive and prosper.

One of the first tasks of the new Palestinian government will be to draw up the constitution of the new state, to replace the National Charter.

## REFUGEES

As many refugees as possible need to be settled in East Jerusalem, on the West Bank, and in the Gaza Strip. Cooperation with Jordan is essential for the fullest exploitation of the Jordan Valley.

UN General Assembly Resolution 194 II of 1948, providing the refugees with the choice between compensation and return, will have to be implemented. It is impossible to know how many will choose to return to pre-1967 Israel. While Israel may not be expected to welcome inundation by all those who will want to return, its acceptance of a mere handful will offer no solution.

Many Palestinians in the Arab countries have become middle class. Most of those in the Gulf countries and the Peninsula have not been granted and are unlikely to be granted the nationalities of the host countries. Their acquisition of a Palestinian nationality, in addition to its psychological impact on them, will regulate their status in their countries of residence and make it easier for them to return or commute to the Palestinian state. The balance of the Diaspora refugees who cannot return to pre-1967 Israel



(because of Israeli objections) or to the Palestinian state (because of lack of absorptive capacity) will still have the options of compensation and Palestinian citizenship.

## ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS

Given the need for every inch of territory in East Jerusalem, on the West Bank, and in the Gaza Strip to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, it would not make sense to maintain the Israeli settlements established in these territories after 1967. Their presence would become a ready target for criticism and agitation by refugees (and their supporters) who had been barred by Israel in the past from return or who were unable to settle in the Palestinian state because of lack of space. The protection of these settlements and their inhabitants en route to or from them would develop into a major security risk.

The circumstances in which these settlements were established would be a constant reminder of the hated occupation. The rights and claims of villages trespassed upon during their establishment would continue to plague the Palestinian authorities. Far from contribution to or symbolizing Israeli-Palestinian harmony or coexistence, the settlements are likely to exacerbate interracial relations. Palestinians would not stop wondering why, after having acquired 77 percent of Palestine, Israelis should want to settle in yet more Palestinian territory. The continued presence of the settlements would undermine the authority of the Palestinian government and the stability of the overall settlement. There would be challenge enough for Palestinians and Israelis to try out the experiment in "hostile symbiosis" in Jerusalem. It would be folly to overload the system.

SEPTEMBER 1980

# Alternative to a Nightmare

---

ARIE (LOVA) ELIAV

THIS IS A SUMMARY OF A LECTURE GIVEN BY ARIE (LOVA) ELIAV AT THE KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AT HARVARD DURING HIS RECENT FELLOWSHIP AT THE UNIVERSITY.

The Jewish–Arab conflict in the Middle East has its source in the head-on clash of two national movements which, for reasons rooted in history, culture, religion, and nationality, lay claim to the same territory.

One of these movements, Zionism, claims *Eretz Yisrael*; the other, the Arab Palestinian movement, claims *Falastein*. Both are identical with the territory extending roughly between the Mediterranean on the west and a desert on the east, and from the slopes of Mount Hermon on the north to the Red Sea in the south. This was Palestine when it came under British mandatory rule after World War I.

Over the years, the conflict spread from this source across the Arab and Moslem world and the Jewish world. Due to its geopolitical location, the region also became an arena of contention between blocs and the superpowers.

It is my belief that the only way to localize and eventually terminate the conflict is to divide this territory between the two national movements and the two peoples after the bloody warfare of four generations and more.

The Jewish national movement, on its own and by a supreme effort, achieved its political (but not its social and economic) goal in 1948, with the establishment of the state of Israel, and the War of Independence. Within the bounds of this state, Zionism can achieve all its aims under conditions of peace.

But Israel must understand that the conflict will not be resolved unless and until Israel and Zionism also recognize the right of the Arab-Palestinian national movement to self-determination in the territory taken over by the state of Israel in the defensive Six Day War, namely, the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

This recognition will lead to peace negotiations with the representatives of the Arab-Palestinian national movement, on condition that they, in turn, recognize Israel and sit with it at the conference table to negotiate a complete peace treaty.

The Palestinian Arabs will have to be given the right to determine the nature of the links between themselves and the Kingdom of Jordan, which is a part of the Israeli-Palestinian problem. It will also be their right to determine the manner in which the problem of the Palestinian refugees is handled in their areas, as well as the relationship with the Palestinian Diaspora, just as Israel will maintain its unshakable Zionist connection with the Jewish people all over the world.

The evacuation of the territories will need to be carried out in agreed stages over a period of several years, with an Israeli army presence maintained until it is completed. The territory will remain demilitarized even after the Arab-Palestinian movement is granted sovereignty under the joint supervision of Israel/Falasteen or Israel/Falasteen/Jordan. The duration of this demilitarization and supervision will be set by the peace treaty. The purpose of these terms will be to make sure that no elements within or outside the region hostile to Israel will be in the position to threaten its security.

Only when this lengthy process is completed will the peace between Israel and Egypt be a genuine peace, and only then will Israel be able to attempt to achieve peace with Syria and Lebanon, and establish normal regional relationships.

I am well aware that these ideas are still unacceptable to many sectors in the contending parties. They do not reflect the current

stand of Israel's current government or of the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. But I am convinced that there is no other way of terminating the conflict.

I accept the fact that the pre-1967 boundaries are not ideal for Israel from the standpoint of security (although they are not as bad as generally presented). I also go along with the view that they are not ideal for the Palestinian Arabs either.

But the decisive factor is that these borders of the state of Israel, in which the Zionist goals can be fulfilled, already have tremendously important international acceptance. The parties who have agreed to them are the superpowers—the United States and the USSR (as stated by them repeatedly and explicitly), China, all the members of the EEC, and a significant majority of the Third World nations.

Moreover, this agreement takes in (for reasons of sheer realism rather than enthusiasm) quite a few Arab states, headed by Egypt and including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Sudan, and the Persian Gulf Emirates. As against this, *there is not a single country in the world other than Israel itself* which approves of the annexation of the territories and disregards the political problem of Palestinian nationalism. Israel cannot, nor does it have to, face the world in isolation. It can make use of the consensus on the part of almost the entire world community to obtain the optimum conditions (including, primarily, the military supervision terms) for its security. Should Israel go on maintaining its presence in the territories by force, by bolstering the settlements and by annexing land, it will not only subject itself to increasingly ignominious global isolation, but will also find itself in a progressively more intolerable ruler-subject situation, in which its military control over the Palestinian Arabs will inevitably become harsher. That situation will completely distort and falsify the image, content, and essence of the state of Israel and of Zionism.

In place of this ominous scenario, let me describe what might well happen if both sides were to proceed along the course I have indicated.

Following the first period (likely to last several years) of separate and extremely suspicious existence, bred by decades of bloody conflict, we may hope for the activation of the positive dynamic forces of three entities: Israel, Falasteen, and Jordan.



These forces will emerge from the common destiny of some seven million Semites, the sons of Abraham, whom fate has brought to a strip of land, sacred to them all, and who are linked by mutual political, economic, and social interests.

Without conceding them full sovereignty and independence, a process of cooperation will set in, in many and varied fields. Such a process is not unfamiliar in recent history in other countries no less hostile to each other in their immediate past. In our case, the compactness of the political entities and their unique geographical location will lead to a form of consolidation (call it a confederacy, a common market, or some such) of the three. In the course of this process (which may also take years), we shall see this consolidation arise, which, for the sake of brevity, I shall call ISFALUR, an acronym of *IS*rael-*FAL*asteen-*UR*dun (the Arabic for Jordan).

I should like to describe the centripetal forces which will bring about the emergence and crystallization of ISFALUR, as well as the benefit which (in addition, of course, to the precious reward of peace itself), the three partners will derive from their joint enterprises.

Scanning the ISFALUR map of the future, from north to south, we can visualize four major regional enterprises.

## NORTHERN WATER PROJECTS

ISFALUR can harness the water sources in the north and regulate them for the general benefit. Assuming peace with Lebanon and Syria as well, ISFALUR will be able to effect a rational regional division of the Jordan waters (and the Litani River, with Lebanon's consent), plus the Yarmuk, turning the Sea of Galilee into a perennial reservoir for irrigating vast additional tracts of land on both sides of the Jordan rift, as well as in southern Israel and the Gaza Strip.

## A JORDAN RIFT PROJECT

This, based on both sides of the river, will produce food for export and building of modern food plants. This project will form

the infrastructure for large-scale settlement efforts for Palestinian refugees; agricultural production will form a solid base for the establishment of villages, towns, and cities to absorb myriads of new settlers. The Jordan Rift, like the Jordan and Bet-Shean Valleys in Israel, will become a densely populated, highly productive exporting region.

Within the framework of this rehabilitation and development enterprise, to which Israel can offer its experience and expertise, we should examine the feasibility of digging a canal from the Mediterranean to the Bet-Shean Valley and southwards. The canal will be a source of hydroelectric power, but its main purpose will be to pour sea-water into artificial lakes with large desalination plants on their shores, to add to the supply of water for irrigation. On their shores, too, an inland shipping industry will develop, carrying produce to the Haifa Bay ports. The lakes will also be used for sports, vacationing, and recreation. Together with the Sea of Galilee, they will attract multitudes of tourists from all over the world.

## A DEAD SEA PROJECT

The Sea of Salt is ISFALUR's largest natural reservoir and quarry; its three members surround it on all sides. Exploitation of the quarry is still in an elementary stage. The Dead Sea Works in Israel's territory and the small potash plants in the Jordanian sector are only the tips of the saline chemical and metallurgical icebergs. The 1980s and 1990s will undoubtedly witness tremendous technological breakthroughs in the exploitation of new energy sources, as well as advanced chemistry, and the Dead Sea can spearhead these breakthroughs, specifically in the use of solar energy in the chemical industry. The sea, or parts of it at first, can act as a giant mirror able to provide enormous quantities of relatively cheap energy to industry, agriculture, urbanization and tourism along the coast and throughout ISFALUR.

Potash will not be the only mineral—perhaps not even the most important—to be extracted from the Dead Sea. Already bromine is being mined in big quantities, very soon to be followed by the extraction of iodine and many other requirements of the chemical

and pharmaceutical industries. But most important of all will be the light metals such as magnesium and aluminum and the rare chemicals needed for the aeronautics and space industries, as well as others based on scientific technology.

The Dead Sea treasures may be readily exploited without impairing the qualities of the area for holiday resorts and health spas. The deposits may be transported to distant localities in the Arava and along the Syro-African rift, to Eilat and Aqaba and to ISFALUR's Mediterranean ports, when great plants are constructed for advanced chemical industries. In the framework of this project, a canal may be dug connecting the Dead Sea with the Mediterranean and the ISFALUR western shores, to serve as an additional major source of hydroelectric energy.

## AN ARAVA PROJECT

This will straddle the Arava region from south of the Dead Sea to the Eilat-Aqaba gulf. It will involve the construction of a modern transport infrastructure, to include freeways, fast trains, and airports. The enterprise will encompass a major agrotechnical industry of modern food production, mainly for European markets. This region will also accommodate chemical and fertilizer industries (utilizing the rich phosphate deposits) and metallurgical undertakings.

New towns, similar to Arad, will be built right down the Arava, on both the Israeli and Falasteen-Jordanian sides, plus new villages and towns capable of absorbing hundreds of thousands of new settlers, among them a refugee population. The future Arava will be a dense and flourishing center of habitation, like the Mediterranean coastal strip from Rosh Hanikra to the Rafiah area.

The greatest of the Middle East projects will be the construction of the multicity complexes and TEAHAK and ERGASH seaports. This will be ISFALUR's crowning achievement, forming as it will a turning point in the development of the entire Middle East. It will be a joint enterprise of five founding states—the three ISFALUR members, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (possibly to be joined by others later).

Let us look at the present geopolitical and economic conditions in the region:

Saudi oil is found in the northeastern part of the country, near the Persian Gulf–Arabian Sea. Thence (together with the oil from Kuwait, the Emirates, Iraq, and Iran) it is transported in giant tankers to Europe and America through the Strait of Hormuz, around the Arabian Peninsula, and up the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. As a result of political developments, Hormuz Strait has become one of the most dangerous waterways in the world, constantly under a threat of blockade.

ISFALUR could offer Saudi Arabia a partial but very significant alternative to the Hormuz Strait, and in so doing also achieve enormous regional development for northwestern Saudi Arabia and for Egypt's northern Sinai.

The following are the main features of this alternative:

- A large proportion of the Saudi oil will be transported via a giant-diameter pipeline network to the area of Hakul, a Saudi fishing village some kilometers south of Aqaba. Hakul will be transformed not only into a terminal for this pipeline but also into a major port linked to Jordan's Aqaba, Israel's Eilat, and a fourth port to be constructed by Egypt at Taba.

- In this joint enterprise, the four cities and seaports will form a new urban conglomerate, which we shall refer to by the acronym TEAHAK.

- From TEAHAK the Saudi oil, or its refinements (and perhaps also Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli oil, if and where found), will flow via another pipeline toward the Mediterranean to a second urban and seaport conglomerate, consisting of the ports of El-Arish (Egyptian); Rafiah, Gaza (Palestinian); and Ashkelon, Ashdod (Israeli), which we shall call ERGASH.

From ERGASH the oil will be transported by tanker to European and North American ports. This will be the shortest and most reliable route, as well as the most economical, for the distance of the proposed pipelines from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean is 900 miles, as against 3,600 miles via the Hormuz Strait and around the Arabian Peninsula. Perhaps most important of all is that it will allow the Hormuz Strait to maintain its importance but will divest it of its exclusivity and its resulting dangerous potential.

I see in the establishment of the TEAHAK and ERGASH cities a regional, and even an international goal and challenge compara-



ble to the digging of the Panama and Suez Canals. The two conglomerates will be among the largest and most developed in the Middle East, filling roles similar to those of Antwerp and Rotterdam in Western Europe. In and around these cities, basic industries—chemical, petrochemical, and metallurgical—will arise to serve other industries—pharmaceuticals, plastics, fine chemicals, and fine metals. The edifice will be topped with science-based industries, electronics, and computers.

TEAHAK and ERGASH, lying at the crossroads of three continents—Africa, Asia, and Europe—will be the confluence of three great civilizations—Moslem, Jewish and Christian—and of the tremendous petrodollar wealth and the latent genius of Abraham's children—Isaac and Ishmael.

All these projects may seem like bubbles floating in the air, but even if they are dreams, they can also be implemented by human hands. They are the alternatives to other dreams—nightmares rather—of unceasing murder and bloodshed, which may turn the entire region, perhaps the entire world, into a heap of rubble with a radioactive halo. For this is what Moses, the father of the prophets, sanctified by all the faiths involved in this conflict, had to say—and he said it amid the same rocks, the same deserts, and the same seas about which we are speaking:

“I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before thee life and death, the blessing and the curse; therefore choose life. . . .”

MARCH 1981



## APPENDIX I

# \_\_\_\_\_ **The Right to Criticize**

## ARTHUR HERTZBERG

“Why are you so critical and why so publicly?” I have been asked this question hundreds of times during the last dozen years, but never with such emotion as this summer. For that matter, I have never been as warmly congratulated on my supposed “courage” to speak my mind, as this summer in Israel. Obviously, in today’s heated and divided political atmosphere, both the compliments and the attacks are all sharper than they used to be.

In a few days I shall be returning for the next half-year to what is still, for a while yet, my continuing work in the Diaspora, within the Jewish community in the United States. I have not the slightest doubt that, if God gives me strength and years, I will continue to speak my mind, and I will, therefore, often be in conflict with the official doctrine which comes from Jerusalem. Precisely because Israel is now so tense and divided, and the Jewish world is floundering, I feel it a duty to state my own Jewish and Zionist credo and, yes, to answer the question: Why do you criticize?

---

**PROFESSOR (RABBI) ARTHUR HERTZBERG** is a vice-president of the World Jewish Congress, a former president of the American Jewish Congress, and editor of *The Zionist Idea* and many other books. This article appeared in Hebrew in *Ha’aretz*.

## MORAL CONSCIENCE

In the first place, and most fundamentally, loving Israel and being a Zionist cannot and must not silence moral conscience. I recall the time in the late 1960s when the official wisdom in Jerusalem was that the American war in Vietnam was good for Israel, because it showed America's resolve to fight for its smaller allies. There were some Jews, myself among them, who said, as Zionists, that this was a silly and dangerous argument, for it equated a democratic and essentially just Israel with a corrupt regime in Vietnam, which had no roots in its people and was despised in America. To hint at support for Johnson and Nixon on Vietnam was politically convenient in the short run, for Israel's interests in Washington (I remember those who said to me: The protestors cannot send us planes), and perhaps the prime ministers were right from their point of view. Those like myself who stood against this linkage were "impractical moralizers"—but were we? We helped to save some of our own children, who are the major part of the pressure in America against that war, for Zionism and for Israel. Without our opposition, without somebody to separate the cause of Jerusalem from that of Saigon, the young Jews who were so prominent in the liberal-left politics in the late 1960s in America would have been totally cut off from their Jewishness.

The most immediate issue of conscience today is, of course, the West Bank. I know that even by saying "West Bank" instead of Judea and Samaria, a meaning has already been conveyed. There are those who insist, in their own good conscience, that the Jewish people have an absolute right to Judea and Samaria, based on biblical promises and on historical memory. Clearly there are also many other Jews, in Israel and abroad, who believe that occupying territory which is peopled today by sullen and unwilling subjects is, at very least, morally questionable. In this essay I do not want to argue that my own views are more in line with the Jewish tradition than those of the hard-liners in Israel or America. Clearly I have as much responsibility as any other caring Jew does, to say what his individual Jewish conscience demands of him. Here too, will the Jewish people be better off if all those who detest this occupation have no Zionist voice?



I am not arguing here, let me insist, for the rightness or wrongness of my own particular views through the years. I am insisting that if being part of the organized Jewish community requires of me that I consult only the political tactics of the moment—"good for Israel or bad for Israel"—then I have essentially made the prime minister of Israel, whoever he may be, into the ultimate moral guide of the Jewish world. He is no longer a political figure, subject to debate. At least for the Diaspora, he calls all the tunes and I dare not oppose him, even when I feel morally offended. Very ugly names could be given to such a construction. Let me content myself with the most ancient, the one in the Bible. Kings always preferred false prophets, for the other kind have always been accused of "weakening the national resolve."

### **"WE ARE ONE PEOPLE"**

My second reason for criticizing is precisely because I care. Zionism arose to assert that there was one Jewish people. "We are One People," Herzl said. This means that we are not two peoples, one in Israel which lives its national life, and another outside Israel which helps out but which ought not to be involved too closely in Israel's affairs. Much of world Jewry is now showing dangerous tendencies to regard Israel not as the center of its life, but as a problem. Israel keeps requiring money and support, but Israel is all too often getting bad press or doing embarrassing things.

Too many Jews in America are not thinking about the American Jewish community as a body which has to worry about its own destiny and its own inner content, as separate from Israel. In part, this is the result of years of insistence by Israel's leadership that what Israel does and decides is its own affair, and that American Jews can either agree or go away.

The existence of the Jewish state certainly means that the Diaspora is not in the same situation that it was before 1948, but to reduce it to the roles of a warehouse of usable parts for Israel and an automatic cheering section is to complete the division of world Jewry into two peoples. A family may be scattered and remain one; it may yet be reunited, especially if its various parts still

scream at each other. If brothers and cousins abroad become merely sources of money and of approval and if they are regarded as too alien to have opinions within the family, they will soon walk away and disappear, or they will start new families of their own.

I am a Jew and a Zionist. That means for me that I am part of this family, that I am a limb of its body. Some of the things that my brothers and cousins do hurt me very personally. Yes, some of the things that I do or say might, and should, pain my relatives. Unquestioning support may be convenient to those who are supported, but it vanishes, sooner or later. Caring is the only thing that lasts.

## CRITICISM AND MAXIMUM SUPPORT

In the third place I criticize, and will continue to criticize, paradoxically, because I want to maintain the maximum support for Israel in the non-Jewish community. I shall, therefore, criticize not in private, not in somebody's office, or in Yiddish in some obscure weekly, but in those organs of opinion in which I will be heard by the general community, as well as by Jews. It is, of course, impossible, both in Israel and in the Diaspora, when addressing Jews, not to be heard by everybody, for there is no private language, not even Hebrew, which only Jews use and read. For that matter, nothing that a critic like myself is likely to say is unique. It is printed, day after day, by *The New York Times* or *Le Monde* or *Time* and *Newsweek* from the mouths or pens of major leaders in Israel. Can non-Jews speak, and any Israeli too, but Jews in the Diaspora must not even agree in public with the opposition in Israel? This is absurd. It would be convenient to a Jew like me to let the battles be fought by Israelis, but precisely because I live in the Diaspora, I have the obligation to speak up.

Every time the point is made in London or New York, by someone like the Chief Rabbi of England or myself, that there is a difference between supporting Israel and always agreeing with its immediate policies, we help both Jews and non-Jews out of an all too familiar trap: either they are for the immediate policy of Israel, without deviation, or they are called anti-Zionists, and pos-

sibly crypto anti-Semites, or even worse. The Jewish people has enough real enemies in the world, without increasing their number.

## ISRAEL'S CENTRALITY

There remains the painful and vexing question that has come up again and again: "What gives Diaspora figures, whose families are not living the immediate dangers and problems in Israel, whose children are not in the army, the right to speak up? What right do they have to play with our destiny?" Generally, when so confronted, Diaspora leaders turn offensive and start listing the immediate members of their family who are indeed in the firing line, as their passport to have an opinion. This is a futile exercise. Obviously, there are some Diaspora critics who really do not have any immediate relative in the army, or living in range of Katyushas. Must they therefore be quiet?

The answer is more fundamental: everything that Israel does involves and helps determine the life of Jews all over the world. That is the meaning of its centrality. Its actions can help increase or decrease the inner temperature of Jewish life abroad. What Israel does with its economy or with its social structure can make *aliya* (immigration) more or less attractive, and, to be absolutely blunt, what Israel does lessens or increases the immediate tension between Jews and Gentiles in the Diaspora. This has been said over again by Israel itself. It keeps reminding the Diaspora that Israel raises the dignity of the Jews of the world and increases their Jewishness. How are such Jews to respond when they feel lessened? By total silence and trust in the wisdom of fallible men in Jerusalem?

In 1967, the American Jewish community rallied unanimously against its government to pressure for Israel. It did again in 1973. Such action cannot be demanded of it when it serves some passing tactical purpose of Israel. Those who live in the Diaspora, precisely because they care for the Jewish people and love Israel, know very well that you cannot scream all the time at the non-Jewish world. At this point in my many discussions in Israel, someone always gets emotional about the Holocaust and insists

that anything less than total confrontationism in the Diaspora is a repeat of the vile conduct of Western Jews in the Hitler era.

We, the Jews today, are either one people or two peoples. Those in Israel who want unquestioning agreement in the Diaspora have already given up on the unity of the Jewish people. What they want of world Jewry is that it be a colony that is obedient, an alien. Those who believe that Jews are one people must continue to live with the strains and the arguments of a functioning family. In the great days of Zionism, immediately before and after the creation of the state of Israel, we were an often quarrelling family, but we knew that we were one people, and so did the world. Are we really better off today? I do not think so. In conscience, I must act on my beliefs.

DECEMBER 1981



# --- The Duty to Oppose

ABBA EBAN

One of the early friends of Zionism in the West was C.P. Scott, an editor of the Manchester *Guardian*. He coined a phrase which ought to be prominently displayed in every newspaper office and parliamentary chamber: "*Facts are sacred. Opinions are free.*"

There is one false opinion masquerading as a "fact" which is heard too often in the Israeli political dialogue. It is asserted that the normal tradition of democracies is to suspend criticism of military operations or other governmental policies in order to avoid nourishing criticism abroad. Some Likud zealots go on to suggest that there is something eccentric or "close to treachery" in the reluctance of Israeli opposition leaders to follow this tradition.

There is not even a microscopic particle of truth in this bizarre myth. The "tradition" of silence is not followed because it does not exist.

Many recent precedents should have warned Mr. Begin that military actions, undertaken without interparty agreement, which fail to achieve any affirmative result always incur vehement domestic criticism. The opposition represents the great mass of the "unconsulted." In previous epochs, up to the eighteenth century, even the fiercest wars affected a surprisingly small fraction of the peoples involved. Today, since war is everybody's tragedy, peace has become everybody's business. Public opinion is no longer ready to leave strategy and diplomacy to groups of specialized mandarins moving loftily in a reserved domain. People in

\*This article originally appeared in the *Jerusalem Post*.

democracies have a strange curiosity to know why they are getting killed, or why others are killed in their name.

## BAY OF PIGS AND VIETNAM

The most modern era in diplomacy began in the early sixties with the Bay of Pigs adventure, which taught how military decisions undertaken without prior consensus usually bring those who make them into failure and discredit. The American war in Vietnam and Cambodia forced successive administrations to hold a fierce dialogue simultaneously with their foreign critics and their domestic constituency. It was natural for those in power to react impatiently to criticism. In his autobiography, Henry Kissinger describes as "hysteria" the view of those who doubted whether continuing the war beyond 1972 would have a better result than abandoning it at once. In the short term, the critics seemed to be wrong. The "Christmas bombings" of 1972 brought North Vietnam to the negotiating table. But, as a contemporary writer was to point out, "the horror of that terrible finale had cast a pall over the final settlement." Soon, the whole of Indochina was under Communist control, and the sacrifices of those who tried to avoid that result were seen as a tragic waste.

## LEGITIMACY OF DISSENT

While the critics of the Indochina war were accused of being wrong, no American in his senses sought to deny the legitimacy of their dissent or made assinine appeals for silence in order to give a mendacious impression of unanimity. Governments understand that if they authorize dangerous enterprises, they will have to fight hard on their domestic front and accept the limitations which the domestic contest imposes on their diplomacy and strategy. The fact that American opinion had shown freedom of dissent did not save—or doom—Vietnam, but it may have helped to save America as a free society with an unexhausted international role.

**BRITISH EXPERIENCE**

Those in the Likud who pretend to believe that dissent in moments of crisis is unprecedented in parliamentary history should take a long look at parliamentary reports in Britain at the time of the abortive Suez expedition in 1956, or, more impressively, at the vote of "no confidence" proposed in the British House of Commons after the failures at Tobruk and Singapore. In fact, I defy any reader or student to find a single case in which a democratic people has agreed to suppress its criticism of a national policy out of deference to what foreigners might say or think. The decision has always been dictated by a sense of priority. To avoid wrong decisions by criticism at home is more important than to avoid being quoted abroad.

**CRISIS AND DISSENT**

The subject of silencing dissent is usually mentioned in reaction to "times of crisis." The truth is that crisis is the most excellent reason for an opposition to be seen and heard. It is in moments of turmoil that the opposition represents the legitimacy of the public interest more acutely than does the government. In democratic theory, a people has a right not only to comment on innovations of policy after they have appeared, but also to exercise a prerogative of warning and prevention. Governments sometimes usurp this right by secrecy, as in the Bay of Pigs, or by concealment of purpose, as in the bombing of Cambodia, or by the evasion of constitutional process, as with Eden in the Suez crisis, or by the obdurate evasion of interparty consultation, as by Mr. Begin in all defense decisions since April. Without giving way to superstition, the student of contemporary history might note that in every case where a government has claimed a monopoly of counsel and decision in a military operation, the operation has failed in its objective and the deciding government has been condemned to solitude of guilt.

In all the international cases that I have cited, the critics of governmental decisions were vindicated fairly soon after the

event. They thus illustrate the special value of the opposition in a parliamentary system. Most constitutional scholars support the view expressed by Ivor Jennings (*Cabinet Government*, Cambridge 1959, p. 15) that in a parliamentary system "the Opposition is almost as important as the Government. . . . If there be no Opposition, there is no democracy."

## THE INNER BALANCE

It is sometimes forgotten that parliamentary democracy is the first and only system that makes criticism of the government no less a part of the system than the government itself. It is therefore an error for well-meaning Israelis and friends of Israel abroad to urge us to corrupt the inner balance of the system by suspending the opposition's role in favor of such fantasies as "national unity governments." It is in moments of crisis, more than in other times, that a nation should decline to give up the restraints whereby it protects itself against the tyranny of uninhibited executive power.

With the present trend toward centralized authority, even in democracies, nothing could be more disruptive of the constitutional balance than the enlargement of government and the abolition of the opposition. This would be especially serious in a country such as ours, where the cabinet has already surrendered its restraining function by capitulating uncritically to all the Prime Minister's impulses. (Ministers support Mr. Begin's ideas in the cabinet room, and express their derision and concern in the Knesset cafeteria.) A strong, candid opposition is little short of a life-and-death necessity when a prime minister passes from impulse to execution without an intervening stage of analysis. A Likud government without a powerful opposition is like a vehicle without brakes—a danger to its own passengers and to all who cross its path.

## IMPERIAL NUDITY

. . . Some Likud supporters who quaintly call themselves "Liberals" have suggested that the best way of dealing with failure is



to pretend that it does not exist, and to legislate an anti-treason bill to be applied to anyone who hints at the imperial nudity. The truth is that it would be treachery to shelter the government from criticism under the specious excuse of prejudice against what is euphemistically called the government's "information campaign." There is nothing at all in the argument that dissent at home encourages criticism abroad. The shock reaction at the pictures of children being dug out of the debris, blinded or killed, in Beirut would not have been less if, in addition to that spectacle, the entire Israeli nation had evinced a callous and uniform contempt for what others felt and thought.

## **FROM DWARF TO GIANT**

Moreover, the Likud view of world opinion is grossly incoherent. When military action is planned, "world opinion" is described as so trivial a factor that it may never be invoked against the action itself. When it comes to the opposition role of criticism, "world opinion" is promoted from the stature of a negligible dwarf to that of an imposing giant. World opinion does not restrain the government from reckless action, but it must restrain the opposition from moderate criticism!

If the Labor Movement and the entire press had pretended to be in favor of policies that they reject, foreign criticism would be just as vehement as it has been, without the saving grace of Israel's democratic nature as the lever for the reconstruction of our international support.

JANUARY 1982

# **Roots of the Lebanese Crisis**

**AHARON COHEN**

Lebanon is more than a pawn in inter-Arab and international politics. The crisis's roots are to be found in the country's internal contradictions, which have a long history, and in which class differences transcend merely religious ones. There is a lack of distinction between minorities which belong to a national category (like the Kurds in the east or the Berbers in the Magreb)—which differ from the Arabs in language, but not in religion—and the various ethnic and religious minorities, Arabs in nationality but different from most Arabs in religious beliefs, or sects within the same religion.

Islam, for instance, is divided into two main denominations: Sunnite, the main orthodox group, adhered to by 90 percent of the world's 500 million Muslims; and Shi'ite Islam.

In Sunnite Islam there are four *Tariqas* (schools of interpretation), which differ mainly in customs for everyday behavior. Each is found in a different geographical area, but all four are considered equally legitimate. In the Shi'ite Islam there are the "Ismailite" Shi'ites and the Shi'ites "of the twelve" (the Metualites in Lebanon), Ziyadi Shi'ites (in Yemen), Alawis (in Syria and Lebanon), Ibadis (in Oman). The Druse of Syria, Lebanon, and Israel also had their origin in Ismailite Shi'ite Islam.

---

The late AHARON COHEN, author of *Israel and the Arab World*, an acknowledged authority on Middle Eastern affairs, was a member of Kibbutz Sha'ar Ha'amakim.

## ARAB WORLD CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES

Alongside the Muslims, there are about a dozen Christian communities, like the Copts in Egypt, followers of the Monophysite church (with a section called the Coptic Catholic Church); the Maronite Church, which is an autonomous section of the Catholic Church; the Greek Orthodox Church (*Maliki*, meaning church of the King), which was the official church of the Byzantine empire, and the Greek Catholic Church; the Assyrian Nestorian Church and the Caldaic (a branch of the former, which united with the Catholic Church); the Syrian Orthodox and Syrian Catholic Churches; The Armenian Orthodox (Gregorian) and the Armenian Catholic Churches; and the Protestant communities, also divided according to the origins of the missionaries who spread Protestantism among Christian communities in the East.

We have only mentioned the main branches, from the national and communal-religious points of view, not the national minorities, which are not very numerous in the Arab countries; such as the Turks, the Turkmans, and the Circassians, or syncretistic religions (combining elements from several religions) such as the Yezidis in Iraq, which are Kurds by language, the Mandites or Christians of John the Baptist, also found in Iraq, etc.

This population mosaic created ideal conditions for the classical policy of "divide and rule," which in some countries (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq) achieved remarkable political achievements.

## RELIGION FOR GOD AND HOMELAND FOR ALL

The rise of the Arab national movement brought with it attempts to foster separatist tendencies: the "Phoenicianism" in Lebanon, Pharaonism in Egypt—currents which were rejected and which disappeared with the rise of national consciousness in the Arab public, and with the waning of the external and internal forces interested in their success. Moreover, while the foreign rulers and their local allies worked hard for national and religious division, the population of this region grew more and more aware of the need to unify forces in the struggle for the common aspira-

tions of national independence and cultural and economic progress.

Sa'ad Zaghloul (1869–1927), who founded and led the Egyptian *Wafd* toward the end of World War I, coined the slogan "*Ad-din li-Allah wa-al-watan li-al-jami*" (Religion for God and the Homeland for all). The rise of the national movement brought about cooperation between adherents of different religions (Muslims and Copts in Egypt, Muslims, Christians, and Druse in Syria and Lebanon, Sunnites and Shi'ites in Iraq). The opposite was true in periods of retreat.

The problems stirring Lebanon from time to time are not problems of "national entities"; the line dividing the varying camps does not pass between "ethnic (national) entities," but between social and class interests, common to corresponding elements in different communities. In order to make this point clear it is necessary to dwell upon the relations between things specific to a community and those to a national entity.

## THE MARONITES

The largest among Lebanese religious communities, Christians, are descendants of the ancient population (Aramites) that inhabited Syria prior to the Arab Muslim conquest in the seventh century A.D. They split from the Byzantine Church in the fifth century, and are called Maronites after their leader, St. Maroun. According to estimates, which were accepted as the basis for the distribution of community representation in Lebanon (based on an official census held in 1932 and directed by the French), Christians were considered to account for 53 percent of the population, and the Maronites about 55 percent of the Christians.

The rest of the population of Lebanon was considered as follows: 40 percent Muslims (slightly over one-half Sunnites, and the rest Shi'ites) and 7 percent Druse. But from the national point of view nearly 98 percent of the Lebanese population are Arabs, Maronites included. Furthermore, the Maronites have taken an especially active part in the Arab revival movement since the middle of the nineteenth century and onwards, particularly in its



initial stages, when it was mostly a cultural-literary revival rather than one of political aspirations. To illustrate this point it is sufficient to mention Maronite personages such as Butrus al Bustani (1819–1883), founder of the *Arab Encyclopedia* and author of an Arab dictionary and textbooks, which helped the revival of the Arab language and the awakening of national consciousness among the Arabs; Suleiman al Bustani (1856–1925), researcher and translator, member of the Turkish parliament and head of various delegations sent to Europe; the linguist and poet Nassif al Yazigi (1800–1871), his son the linguist and researcher Ibrahim al Yazigi, who played an important role in the development of the theory of the literary Arab language, and his daughter the author Warda al Yazigi (1838–1929); Salim and Bisharah Taqla, founders of *Al-Ahram* in Egypt; and the author Mariana Marash, one of the most famous Syrian women authors, in the early twentieth century. These were only the most outstanding personalities.

## THE DRUSE

The Druse, though a special community by origin and religious belief, are Arab in all that concerns their nationality, and many of them played a major role in the Arab national movement and in its political struggles. To illustrate, let us recall the Druse Najib Shuqayr, one of the first activists in the Arab national movement (and incidentally, an enthusiast of the idea of Arab–Jewish understanding—he played a role in the negotiations between Weizmann and Emir Faisal, and between the latter and the Zionist delegation to the Peace Conference in 1919); the Emir Adil Arsalan, who was Faisal’s adviser toward the end of the first World War; the well-known author Emir Shakib Arsalan, who headed the “Syrian–Palestinian delegation” to Geneva (between the two world wars). In Ben Gurion’s book *Meetings with Arab Leaders* he is mentioned as influential in the Arab national movement, and in parentheses it is noted “Arsalan is a Druse but is assimilated to Arabism.”

Already in 1934 there was apparently a tendency to make the Druse a special “nation.” One should not forget that the man who

led the great Syrian rebellion against the French (1925–1927—named Rebellion of the Druse since it started on Mount Druse) was the Druse leader Sultan al Atrash (Sultan is a name, not a title), an intimate of the Hashemite Emir Faisal. Kamal Jumblatt, founder and leader of the Socialist Progressive Party of today, is a Druse.

Like the Maronites and the Druse in Syria and Lebanon are the Copts in Egypt, a community separated religiously (descendants of the ancient Egyptians who did not accept Islam but maintained Christianity) but Arabs in the cultural and political domains. Many of them were active in the Arab movement. Let us mention the top financial expert of the Wafd, Makuam Ubayid, and the great Egyptian author Salama Majasn, both Copts and by no means exceptional. Thus, whoever is not familiar with this religious and communal ethnographic mosaic will obviously find it a baffling maze. Total ignorance of this complex subject led Ben Gurion to the absurd statement that “The non-Arab minorities in the Arab countries are more numerous than the Arabs themselves.”

Although Ben Gurion was not known as a researcher in this subject, his conception, as demonstrated in the passage cited above, not only reflected the misunderstanding existing in the Israeli public on this topic, but also was one of the factors amplifying this ignorance.

## SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE CRISIS

It is impossible to understand the events in Lebanon without knowing the country's history. The connection between the struggle inside the “Land of Cedars” and the tension on its border with Israel is merely one of the factors aggravating this struggle.

Even without the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lebanon would be subject to a serious civil struggle. The political conditions in which its exceptional sort of political structure was formed—in the period of the French rule—have fundamentally altered. It was impossible that the political structure introduced by the French, according to their own interests, would continue to exist for a long period after the French were ousted from the country.

## THE BIRTH OF LEBANON

The core of the state of Lebanon of today was the district of Mount Lebanon, granted autonomy in internal affairs in 1861 within the Ottoman Empire, under European guardianship. This agreement was forced upon the Turks following a massacre of Maronites (supported by the French) by the Druse (supported by the British).

The special status granted to this district was the first bridgehead of the European powers on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. The area of this district was 7500 square kilometers and its population about 400,000 of whom 80 percent were Christian (of which three-quarters were Maronites); 10 percent Druse, and nearly 10 percent Muslims (both Shi'ites and Sunnites). The autonomy expressed itself in the appointment of a Christian governor (not Lebanese) to the district and beside him an administrative council with the power to appoint officials, to collect taxes, to supervise the judicial system, and to assure public security. The population was relieved of the obligation to serve in the Turkish army, while the latter was allowed to enter the district only if asked to do so by the governor. This special status for Mount Lebanon remained until World War I, when it was abolished by the Turks.

After World War I, according to a secret treaty between England and France (Sykes-Picot, May 1916), France extended its rule over Lebanon and Syria. The local population resisted. France tried to weaken it by partitioning the country into autonomous districts. In each of these it relied on the dignitaries of the cultural-religious minorities (Alawi district, the Druse mountain district of Hudbieh, Halib and Alexandretta regions).

At the beginning of September 1920, long before authorization of the French mandate by the League of Nations, the French High Commissioner announced the formation of a Greater State of Lebanon (in today's borders: 10,400 square kilometers). To the district of Mount Lebanon were attached the city of Beirut, the district of Tripoli in the north (mostly Sunnite Muslims), the district of Sidon in the south (essentially Shi'ite), and the districts of Zahla and Baalbek in the valley of Lebanon, whose citizens are also mostly Druse and Muslims.

Thereby the French realized several aims at once: tension was created between Syria and Lebanon on account of the Muslim districts that were separated from the former and joined to the latter. Due to economic unity between the two countries (common customs, a common railway in need of subsidies, foreign monopolies and trusts functioning inside both countries, and the issuing of currencies for both states in the hands of the Bank of France), a council for common interests was created, in which the French played the role of arbiter, thus enhancing its ability to initiate and exploit conflicts between Beirut and Damascus. The annexation of the above-mentioned districts to Lebanon created a very delicate equilibrium between the Christian population (with all its sects) and the Muslims and Druse. This delicate equilibrium was supervised by the French.

The annexation of these regions to Lebanon was supposed to secure its economic viability and ability to serve as a base for French rule over the whole Levant, in the event that France was unable to hold to its mandate over the region.

## STRUGGLE AMONG POLITICAL TENDENCIES

With all the present significance of the relation between the inner struggle in Lebanon and the problem of the Arab-Israeli relations (especially the question of the Palestinian refugees camped in Lebanon, with all that it entails), one should refer to these problems in the correct historical context, without exaggerating their importance.

For many years there has been a covert and sometimes even open struggle between various political tendencies. Some (mostly Maronites) desired independence for Lebanon under limited French protectorate, while others called for unlimited independence (such as the followers of Riad as-Sulh, the Druse Emir Majid Arsalan, and others); some called for Lebanese independence in its present borders, along with maximal cooperation with the other Arab nations, while others opposed extended political relations with the Arab world. (Lebanon has been a member of the Arab League since its inception in 1945.)

Among the leaders of the Sunnite Muslims and also among



those of the Greek Orthodox community (which was a minority in Syria, just over 200,000 people), many were inclined toward "total Arab unity," that is, unification of Syria and Lebanon or at least, as favored by some of the Sunnite leaders, return of the districts with Muslim majority to Syria. This last aspiration was checked by the Syrian leaders, who preferred an extended state of Lebanon, independent and cooperating with the Arab world, to a tiny Lebanese state, mostly Christian, acting as a base for the Western powers.

## THE INHERITANCE OF COLONIAL RULE

The period of French rule left Lebanon the governmental system of regional-community representation, by which the members of Parliament are elected according to a fixed community-regional scheme. This scheme was the result of prolonged bargaining, internal pressures (of the different communities), external pressures (the French), demographic influences from within and without the state, the natural rate of population increase in the different communities, the composition of the immigrant group (mostly Maronite; the number of Maronites outside Lebanon is larger than that within), etc. This system of government, which was inevitable in the first stages of political independence, and the socio-political differentiation, embedded the communal squabbles in the political life of the state. They also brought about the formation of a system in which it was impossible to be elected to the House of Representatives without accords and agreements between different groups, families, and personages. Ever since Lebanon received independence, the composition of this house has been a fixed ratio: six Christians to five Muslims, Druse, and others (Jews and various small Christian sects).

The complicated mosaic of various interests and considerations (community interests, regional considerations, family and class interests, and even personal interests), crossing and colliding as interwoven threads, constitutes fertile ground for political turbulence, which very frequently seriously jolts the foundations of the state.

The structure based on the above-mentioned scheme of community and regional representation violates one of the most elementary democratic principles: equal votes for all.

The Lebanese press reported that in one region 7,200 votes were needed (on the average) for the election of a representative, 12,400 in a second, in a third 18,000, and in a fourth 22,700. Even more important is that this system prevents the representation of real social interests common to members of corresponding social classes in different communities, since to a certain extent each community is in itself a social pyramid, at the top of which are a number of rich, privileged capitalists, and at the base a mass of exploited and neglected. In the existing political structure the masses are necessarily tied to the struggles of the heads of communities, usually representing the conservative forces. Contrary to their real interest, the force of the peasants, workers and working intelligentsia is directed not against those with opposing interests in all sects and communities, but against their natural allies in the other communities.

## FORM OF REPRESENTATION

Serious doubts have arisen even with regard to the scheme of representation itself (the relative influence of the various regions and communities in the House of Representatives), fixed more than forty years ago—and corresponding more to French interests than to those of the local population.

The rate of population increase differs from one community to the other. According to an official estimate at the end of 1942, the yearly increase (average taken for the years 1932–1942) of the Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox was 1.25 percent, of the Maronite 1.80 percent, of the Sunnite Muslims 3.10 percent, of the Druse and Shi'ite Muslims, 3.80 percent. This in itself probably changed the numerical proportions among the different communities, which continue to be represented in Parliament according to the old system. One needs only a simple calculation to verify that today Christians are only 40 percent of the Lebanese population. The same goes for the influence of economic progress, which also varies from one region to the other.

The articles of the constitution (May 1926), affirming the right of every community to take its relative part in the administration of the state, provoked immediate opposition in circles which saw in it an intention to fragment the Lebanese public by intercommunal conflicts and differences. But the reality of this community mosaic and the interdependence in matters of government representation forced the Lebanese state of minorities to find a way of coexistence throughout the decades. The six major communities, Maronites, Sunnite Muslims, Shi'ite Muslims, Greek Orthodox, Druse, and Greek Catholics, were always represented in the government. A tradition for the distribution of important government posts among the representatives of the different communities became entrenched. The president was a Maronite, the prime minister a Sunnite Muslim, the president of the parliament a Shi'ite Muslim. Similarly, a practice of distribution of posts in the public services and in the state apparatus took root. According to the constitution there is no official religion in Lebanon and every community has the right to practice its religion and its matrimonial law freely.

## AN INEVITABLE QUESTION

The question: "How long will the representational scheme, inherited from foreign rule and impeding the country's progress, survive?" has been made legitimate by objective developments—even if for some it implies adverse consequences.

It is an extremely superficial and distorting view to consider the entire present political crisis in Lebanon as resulting from a "desire of extreme Muslim forces to destroy Lebanon's special character and to engulf it in the Arab sea." Not only is it false to say that those struggling for a reform of the constitution are "extreme Muslim forces," but in fact there are progressive forces belonging to different communities, including Christians and Muslims. As is well known, one of the leaders of this struggle is the Druse Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Socialist Progressive Party, which includes people from different communities. Also participating is the Communist Party—whose members are mostly Christians—and the Ba'ath Party of Lebanon—also not a

"Muslim party." But the greatest fallacy of the statement is in the total disregard of the social class background of the political crisis.

## INEVITABLE SOCIAL CONFLICT

The present political crisis in Lebanon was aggravated by the great social polarization resulting from the development of capitalist relations in the country.

Due to historical circumstances (old relations with the West enabling the colonial powers to have a base in the Arab world, development of a special type of population, economy and status in the region), Lebanon became in a way a "Switzerland of the Middle East": a tourist center for the upper middle class (lately for the oil princes); a center of commerce from which merchandise comes and goes to and from the countries of the Middle East; a financial center for the whole region. Income from commerce and services makes up two-thirds of the gross national product of Lebanon, while industry and agriculture together form the remaining third. This special economic structure manifests itself in the gap between the rate of growth in Beirut and its neighboring areas (Mount Lebanon, mostly Christian) and that of the north, south, and coastal regions, where the majority of the population is Druse and Muslim.

The "shining bourgeoisie" of Beirut is mostly Christian. French rule, which relied on it, bestowed upon it various privileges in the domain of education, state apparatus, finance, etc. The number of illiterates among the Christians is much smaller (some say, two to three times) than among the Muslims and Druse. Even now, with Christians no more than 40 percent of the population, they occupy most of the administrative and governmental posts, especially the top ones; they are the majority of the managers, businessmen, university people, and professionals. Thus their standard of living is generally higher than that of Muslims and Druse.

The Lebanese bourgeoisie, essentially enriched by transit affairs, finance, and services, was never interested in developing the north, the south, and the valley in the east, which are essentially agricultural. Opposite the flourishing Beirut administrative



capital—a crossroads of international transportation (modern air and sea ports), a city of 600,000 inhabitants, institutions of higher education, etc.—are marginal regions, retarded in their development. In thirty-two years of independence the government has never carried out a program for rural development worthy of its name. Neither important irrigation plants nor assistance in technical, economic, or credit assistance were implemented. A peasant in need of credit can obtain it only from a usurer at 30–60 percent interest. The village youth, which remains in poverty, leaves to join those seeking their luck in the big, glittering city: Beirut.

## MAJOR SOCIAL POLARIZATION

The banks and transit businesses enrich a few, but do not supply work to all those looking for it, who are attracted to the shining center. The status of Lebanon as an important finance center of the entire area has been harmed lately by the competition of financial centers rising with the petrodollars, such as those of Iraq and Kuwait.

The general crisis of the capitalist world shows its signs in Lebanon as well: slowing down of trade and tourist cycles; cuts in new construction; growth of unemployment; shifting of unutilized capital to land speculation; rises in rent; inflation; and as a consequence of all these, enlarged social polarization. The rich continue to get richer, and the situation of the poor deteriorates. It is said that the population of the slums around Beirut is as large as the population of the city itself. Not far from the rich neighborhoods enjoying their blatant luxury, between a quarter and a third of the population is living on the verge of starvation. A *Le Monde* correspondent who visited Beirut in the summer of 1975 found that “while prices of essential goods in this city are as high as in New York, 72 percent of the workers receive on the average 125 Lebanese pounds per month, a third of the minimum necessary for feeding and housing (with hygienic installations) a family of six, and this without taking into consideration clothing, schooling, medicines, etc.” Not only the unemployed, but also an immense number of workers with low salaries, find it harder and

harder to provide food, schooling, and medical aid as needed, when confronted with rising prices. The rate of death in the poor neighborhoods is two to three times higher than the general average of the country.

## THE SOCIAL STRUGGLE

As usual, the aggravation of economic crisis brings about a sharpening of the struggle over the ways in which the burden will be apportioned, over budgetary structures, and over essential services to be given to the people. Successive Lebanese governments usually served the interests of the ruling and possessing few. They never worried about unemployment, the development of agriculture and industry, social security, and essential services. Thus, real common interests of members of the different communities—workers, peasants, unemployed intelligentsia, service workers with low pay, etc.—began unifying them in the struggle for their indispensable needs: securing the possibility of decent human existence in the city and in the village, amelioration of the living conditions, blocking inflation, which hurts the poor first, and constitutional reforms bent on expanding their rights and opportunities. The refugees from Palestine, both those who found their place in the country's economy and those located in the refugee camps, living for years on UN aid, are naturally allied with those attacking the anachronistic regime. Due to this, the leaders of the Phalanges and their allies want to make them scapegoats in the sharpening political and class struggle. The struggle sometimes takes the form of the collapse of law and order: growing tobacco without permission and marketing it through channels other than the monopolistic ones specified for this task; refusal to pay taxes, rent, and fees for water, etc. The press informed us of armed attacks on supermarkets, on furniture warehouses and even on ladies' hairdressers, which in the eyes of the poor, represent the luxurious life to which they have no access.

In the face of this development, the right sought to establish a "strong arm" rule, which, relying on the army and the "Christian

militias" of the Phalanges, would check intercommunity forces trying to put an end to the political structure inherited from the period of foreign domination. But the army, with a Christian majority in its top ranks, reflected this complicated mosaic of the country's population, and saw as its task the protection of the borders of the state against intruders from outside. Any task of internal "checking" assigned to it necessarily led to a real civil war.

## MISLEADING DEFINITIONS

The attempts to define the bloodbath in Lebanon as "self-defense of the Christians against Muslim attacks," or opposition to the Phalanges and their allies as "Muslim leftists" distort the reality and project misleading definitions. The activists of the Socialist Progressive Party under the leadership of Jumblatt, most of the members of the Lebanese Communist Party, and followers of the Ba'ath Party and the Qawmiyyun (Nasserites), all leading a struggle against the policy of the right wing in Lebanon, are not necessarily Muslims. On the other hand one should not define as "leftist" claims for constitutional reforms, aimed at securing the fundamental rights of every citizen and abolishing all laws or regulations limiting democratic freedoms and equality between citizens; claims for a clear definition of the power of the president and the government; claims for the adjustment of parliamentary representation in accord with the real distribution of political forces, by passing a law of regional and proportional elections; and lastly, claims for a clear definition of the army as responsible for the security and integrity of the state without intervention in internal conflicts, and passing the army command to a council under government control. Neither should demands for urgent measures for the solution of vital problems of the people, such as unemployment, housing, medical services, education, insurance, be defined as "leftism." Misleading definitions, which are often the result of unfamiliarity with the actual facts, cannot be very helpful in promoting an understanding of the events.

## THE PHALANGES

One of the main factors in the Lebanese political crisis are the Lebanese Phalanges. In Israel these forces are usually defined as "Christian parties" or at least "Maronite parties." What are they in fact?

The birth of the organization was in 1936. Its founder and leader is Pierre Gemayel (born in 1905, a pharmacist by profession. He visited Germany, Italy, and Austria in the early thirties and came back very impressed and enthusiastic about military youth organizations. The organization he founded was at first a paramilitary youth organization, which later became a political party providing a framework for military training and for storage of arms. Oriented toward France and toward the West in general, the party opposed integration in the Arab world or with neutralist blocs, while supporting strong ties with the colonial powers. In internal affairs it adopted a conservative policy. Their main aim was promotion of the interests of the "Maronite" community, maintenance of the privileges rendered to them at the time of the French rule, establishment of the "Christian character" of Lebanon, and preservation of its social structures.

Consistent with their policy of putting Lebanon's affairs above all-Arab policy, the Phalanges oppose various agreements between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian organizations, such as the well-known Cairo Agreement (November 1969). And even though, *prima facie*, they share the declared all-Arab views with regard to Arab-Israeli relations, and theoretically approve of the PLO and accept its general policy, they oppose execution of these policies and warfare from Lebanese territory. This stand of the Phalanges' party has three motivating factors: 1) fear of involving Lebanon in war with Israel, 2) opposition to the special status of the Palestinian organizations, whose leadership and main forces are concentrated in Lebanon, like a state within a state, 3) the possibility that a quarter of a million Palestinian refugees, mostly Muslims, will influence the delicate balance of forces in Lebanon.

It is an error to see in the Phalange a party of all the Maronites. Bashara al-Khuri, the first president of independent Lebanon (1943-1952), founder of the "Constitutional bloc," who spent time



in prison for his opposition to the French rule, was also Maronite. In alliance with the leader of the Sunnite Muslims, Riad as-Sulh, he established the country's Arab character and tightened its relations with the Arab world. Well-known Maronites, including all of Lebanon's presidents since its independence and other person-ages occupying leading positions in public life, are all Maronites but do not support the Phalanges. Moreover, prominent personalities in the Lebanese left have been Maronites, men such as the engineer Antoun Thabit, one of the leaders of the anti-fascist circles since the thirties, author and editor, member of the world executive of the peace movement; or the secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party, Farajallah al-Hilou, and many others in the trade union movement and in culture and politics. This participation extends up to the present day.

Thus, the Phalangist party is not the "party of the Maronites," but rather the party of the Maronite right. According to the community-regional scheme mentioned above, the Phalangists had 18 of 55 seats in the Parliament of 1943. In August 1950 the number of seats in the Parliament was set at 77, with 23 seats for the Maronites (and 18 for other Christian groups). But under this arrangement, the first election, in 1951, gave the Phalangists only 3 seats. In 1968, when the number of seats was 99, including 30 assigned to the Maronites (and 24 to other Christians), the Phalangists won 9 seats, less than a third of the Maronite seats, one-sixth of the total number assigned to Christians. It is true that they were the core of the right wing in the Lebanese Parliament. In 1966 they managed to set up a parliamentary bloc supported by 25 members out of 55 Christians. But in Lebanon's stormy political affairs, such blocs do not last too long. Moreover, popular political developments are breaking down the old political structures, formed in the relatively distant past of foreign rule and pre-independence.

## NECESSARY CHANGES

The members of the Christian communities need changes toward democratization and increased progress and liberty as much as the masses of Muslims and Druse need them. It would be

impossible to avoid this struggle even if the regions joined to Lebanon in 1920 were re-separated and a mostly Christian country restored in the district of Mount Lebanon.

The ever-widening gap between the glittering palaces and stores full of luxury, and the crowded shanty towns, poverty-stricken and socially neglected, cannot be bridged any longer by inciting religious and intercommunity conflicts.

The battles which turned into a civil war gave prominence to the problems that had been avoided and ignored for such a long time. The loss of life so far exceeds that suffered by Israel over the past twenty-eight years. The stance taken by the major powers, avoiding involvement to stop the bloodshed, reflects their fear lest this conflict overflow its local boundaries and trigger a global crisis. Nevertheless, it is clear that the burning flame in Lebanon is nurtured by both propaganda support and material support coming from abroad, from far and near. By all accounts the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in Lebanon are not the least important factor in the civil war. A constructive solution of the Palestinian problem would make an important contribution to solving Lebanon's problems. But acts by any party making Lebanon one of the "confrontation states" in the Arab-Israeli war could lead to an explosion whose consequences nobody can guess.

JUNE 1976

# **The Economic Viability of a Palestine State in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip**

---

**CHAIM DARIN-DRABKIN**

## **1. THE GOAL AND THE CRITERIA FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH**

The aim of this paper is to investigate the possibilities of solving the Palestinian problem through the establishment of an independent political economic unit, that is, a Palestinian state in the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

According to findings on the economic viability of small nation states, such a unit should achieve an appropriate gross national product level, efficiently using the human and physical resources of the country.

The main task of the proposed unit is to absorb the entire

---

The late DR. CHAIM DARIN-DRABKIN was an international expert in land development. He was one of the founders of *New Outlook* and served for many years as chairman of its editorial board. He was the author of *The Other Society* and books on economics, housing, and cooperative agriculture. In 1978 he co-authored a book together with Professor Elias H. Tuma, called *The Economic Case for Palestine* (Croom Helm, London). It was the product of three years of joint cooperation between an Israeli Jew and a Palestinian Arab. This article is based on the research done for the aforementioned book.

Palestinian population wishing to return to their homeland, which is presently dispersed in several countries, some living as refugees in camps and others in regular settlements mixed with the local population. Therefore, the requirements for absorbing a potential additional population of up to 1,200,000 inhabitants, now living in different countries, has to be investigated. This means doubling the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is presently about 1,120,000 (670,000 permanent residents and about 450,000 refugees).

One of the economic objectives is to reach a GNP per capita of about \$800.00, instead of the present \$600.00. One of the conditions for achieving such a level of GNP is to increase the number of the actively employed in the population in the domestic economy, which today reach only 14 percent of the total population (in addition to the 6 percent that are employed in Israel). The goal of the first five-year period is to achieve a level of 23 percent actively employed out of the total population.

In order to achieve this goal, local resources must be efficiently exploited, and the employment structure should be adapted toward achieving a high rate of economic growth.

## THE DOUBTS

Generally, there are doubts as to the capacity for achieving so great a goal. One of the arguments against the ability to create a viable economy in a Palestinian state is the small territory of the suggested state. Six thousand square kilometers for a population of 2,400,000, a density of 400 person/km<sup>2</sup>. An additional argument is the present low level of development of the West Bank and the Gaza strip and the scarcity of resources as against the enormous financial expenditure required for the high rate of economic growth necessary to double the population figure in a short period.

## NEITHER UNIQUE NOR PECULIAR

A survey of several countries may show that the suggested development within a Palestinian state is neither unique nor pecu-



liar. There is a significant difference between growth patterns in cases of migration-sparked manpower increases joined with import of foreign capital for investment and economic growth based on existing manpower and local financial means.

Most previous studies were based solely on investigations of locally based sources. The examples of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Israel, as well as the rapid growth of the migration countries of North and South America in the nineteenth century, may serve to negate any premises which deny the possibility for achieving economic viability in the proposed Palestinian state.

A comparison between several large countries with a low GNP level and many small countries with a high GNP level might illustrate the incorrect approach to territory as a dominant factor in economic viability.

## THE TERRITORIAL FACTOR

Territory *was* an essential factor for development in the period when agriculture dominated the national economy. The huge development of industry and services along with the rapid development of science and technology made the human factor the essential basis for economic and social development. During the hunting era, the human being needed many square kilometers for survival; in the first period of agricultural settlement the area was diminished to some dozens of hectares. Today, irrigated agriculture permits the production of enough food for family survival in one hectare or even less, while the space for industrial development requires no more than 200 square meters per employee and for services, 10–30 square meters per employee (the figures are based on a UN study).

The present low economic level and the weak socioeconomic structure of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are factors influencing public opinion to doubt the possibility of creating an economically viable political entity in the territory of this area.

An investigation of the economic development and the socioeconomic structure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the British administration (until 1948) and during the Jordanian and Egyptian rule in 1948–67, as well as under the Israeli administra-

tion from 1967–77, may show how the lack of political independence has weakened the economic structure, preventing the efficient use of local resources.

An examination of changes in the percentage of those employed out of the total population is one example. The number was 25 percent during the British Mandate, decreasing to 21–23 percent under the Jordanian rule of the West Bank and finally reaching only 14 percent during the Israeli administration, with the addition of 6 percent employed in the Israeli economy.

Our investigation of the forecast for future development will be based, therefore, on an analysis of available resources in the areas, as well as a possible increase in the existing unused potential of land, water, minerals, and manpower.

## 2. RESOURCES

### LAND

*The West Bank.* The total land area of the West Bank is 5,500 square kilometers. Cultivable land comprises about 2,000 kilometers or 200,000 hectares; one half of this is used in accordance with its present potential, while the other half is sparsely cultivated. Approximately 140 square kilometers are used for urban land and agricultural settlements.

After deducting the area presently utilized for agricultural and urban purposes, as well as the waste lands, it is estimated that the land space available for urban and industrial development is about 2,250 square kilometers.

*The Gaza Strip.* The total area is 362 square kilometers, of which 267 square kilometers are cultivated land, for the most part intensively cultivated. About 100 square kilometers are available for urban and industrial development.

An enormous difference (124 inhabitants per square kilometer) exists between the population density of the West Bank and that of the Gaza Strip (Gaza—1,119 per square kilometer.) The overall average for both areas is 183 inhabitants per square kilometer.

## LAND REQUIREMENTS FOR URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Land requirements for human settlements have been analyzed in a comprehensive report by the UN Center for Housing, Building and Planning, published in 1973, revised in a more recent study to be published in 1977. According to this study, 250 square meters per person are sufficient space for all land uses, including green space, housing, industry, and public services, to insure a high quality of human settlement.

General land requirements for human settlement also include the space necessary for national roads, electric power, and other public utilities of national importance, as well as regional and national recreation space. The UN report estimates that for these purposes, an additional 250 square meters are needed per person. The total space requirement per person is thus estimated at 500 square meters; or 500 square kilometers for a population of 1 million.

Therefore, projected forms of land use in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip take into account the future settlement of an additional 4–5 million inhabitants. Obviously, such a projection is based on conditions for extensive urban industrial development, combined with the efficient use of land for agricultural development.

## WATER

An investigation of the water reserves in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip indicates the enormous gap between water consumption based on the presently known water potential and the projected possibilities of consumption after developing the additional water potential.

The similarity in water consumption figures for the West Bank (2,000 square kilometers under cultivation) and the Gaza Strip, with only 200 square kilometers under cultivation, is one of the results of the nonutilization of the water potential.

*The West Bank.* Groundwater reserves are estimated at 100 million cubic meters per year. There are an additional 50 mil-

lion cubic meters, which are slightly salty, at Ein Feshka (near the Dead Sea). It is estimated that 50 million cubic meters can be collected from surface run-off waters.

According to the Johnson Plan, an important potential water resource is the Yarmouk River, estimated to have approximately 200 million cubic meters.

Total water resources are, therefore, estimated to be 400 million cubic meters per year.

Present water consumption in the West Bank is about 100 million square meters per year (mostly irrigation).

Domestic and industrial consumption in towns and villages is very limited and generally involves the use of local water sources existing from ancient times. It is interesting to note, in passing, that in ancient times the population figure was about two million and the use of water sources far more efficient than today.

Consumption in the towns is 20 square meters per person.

The projected figure for the future is 50m<sup>3</sup>/person or 50 million square meters per 1 million inhabitants.

*The Gaza Strip.* Eighty-five percent of water consumption is devoted to irrigation of the 9,000 hectares of agricultural land and 15 percent, or, 15 million square meters per year are used by the population of 400,000 and minor industrial workshops.

Daily water consumption per capita is, therefore, about 30 gallons or 35 square meters per year.<sup>1</sup>

The suggested consumption for a population of 500,000, which could be reached after a decade, should be double the amount; the required quantity per year will thus reach 40 million square meters per year.

## PROPOSED PROJECTS

The study by the Middle East Institute investigated the possibility of exploiting the favorable soil and climate conditions of the Gaza Strip and North Sinai for the installation of desalination plants to irrigate a substantial part of the land in agricultural use in the Gaza Strip and even some dunes which may be

<sup>1</sup>The Middle East Institute, Washington, *A North Sinai-Gaza Development Project*, by Jerome F. Fried, p. 36.



converted to good cultivated land under conditions of sufficient water supply. This project is based on erecting a large-scale desalination plant, supplying water not only for the Gaza Strip but for an area of North Sinai within Egyptian territory.

Extensive research on nuclear energy centers for development of industrial and agro-industrial complexes was carried out by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In a summary report, published by the Director of the Institute, Dr. Alvin M. Weinberg, in 1969, cost-benefit analyses on the use of desalinated water for increasing agricultural production in five areas of the world were given. The Sinai-Negev region, in the framework of Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, was investigated together with selected areas in Western Australia, India, California, and Peru.

## NUCLEAR ENERGY

The results of this investigation, as well as the specific survey of the Middle East Institute, prove the profitability of nuclear energy for desalinating sea water to increase agricultural output by exploiting land for agricultural development unsuited for this purpose without water supply.

These studies prove that high earning from selected crops which achieve a high yield under optimal conditions of water supply (and sufficient sunshine) can cover the large expenses. The cost of water in proportion to general production costs in industry and consumer expenses makes the use of desalinated water for urban industrial development even less expensive.

The present costs of a small 1 mgd (million gallons per day) plant, based on information from Mekorot (The Israeli Water Authority), are estimated at \$1.50 per square meter in Eilat, decreasing to \$0.70 per square meter in a plant of 100 mgd, producing 100 million square meters per year. In the event that such a plant would be used for dual purposes (water desalination and electricity), the cost might be reduced to \$0.30-\$0.40 per square meter, if it were operated on nuclear energy.

Research carried out in different countries on the use of desalinated water for increasing agricultural production makes the erecting of such a plant in the Gaza Strip of vital importance

not only for the proposed Palestinian state, but also for planning in many other developing, as well as developed, countries.

In summary, the comparison between the actual and potential consumption of water resources shows that there is no problem in supplying water for the urban-industrial development of a population of three to four million inhabitants who will require 200 million square meters per year. Discovery of additional resources may enable the irrigation of a substantial part of the agricultural area.

For the long-term future, a regional water development scheme based on regional cooperation between Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Israel, which form one geographical unit, should be taken into account.

## MANPOWER

One of the essential factors influencing the economic viability of a country, whether developing or developed, is the level of its manpower. The human factor can be considered the most essential element affecting the rate of economic growth. A rapid increase in technological know-how demands qualified manpower, and the latter is the deciding factor when it comes to a country's ability to use technological progress in order to increase its economic potential.

It may, therefore, be suggested that the human element is the decisive factor in small densely populated countries lacking in mineral resources. Obviously, the case of the Netherlands now comes to mind.

## HIGH LEVEL OF PALESTINIAN MANPOWER

We might, therefore, argue that the high level of Palestinian manpower is one of the essential factors with regard to the possibility of achieving economic viability in the small area of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. As a result of the very special situation of those Palestinians living in refugee camps, and the extended vocational training and educational opportunities offered by the UNRWA educational network, a large majority of the younger generation of Palestinians has attained a compara-

tively high level of education. One of the important features of the educational system has been the introduction of various opportunities for vocational skills. This is particularly important if we consider the fact that in most developing countries, including the Arab nations, manual labor and even industrial work is considered to be low status employment in comparison with clerical work in government offices.

In addition to the activity of UNRWA within the camps, the Jordanian government has also played a key role in encouraging young people to achieve a high level of education by introducing a higher salary (measured in GNP units) than is customarily received in developed countries for professionally trained personnel in government offices, for physicians, nurses, engineers, and even teachers.

### **UNIVERSITY GRADUATES**

As a minority, the Palestinians needed to concentrate their efforts in order to achieve a high educational level which would ensure them employment and status vis à vis the majority. Various experts have estimated that as a result of this situation, the number of Palestinian university graduates in proportion to the total population is similar to that of the Israelis.

There is an enormous disparity between the educational level of the Palestinians in general (those living abroad as well as those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) and the weak employment structure in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, the high percentage of Palestinians employed in Israel, as well as in the Arab countries, and their great adaptability to the technological level prevailing in these countries, prove the existence of a potential manpower force of highly skilled labor which might be mobilized for the rapid development of the new independent Palestinian entity.

### **3. ENVISAGED FUTURE**

The forecast for the future should be based on the efficient use of the existing natural and human resources potential as well as

the additional manpower of returning Palestinians and the appropriate capital investment required to utilize efficiently resources and production factors.

It should be emphasized that one of the basic prerequisites for the absorption of additional manpower, (increasing present employment threefold) is the creation of a basis for rapid industrial development. The existence of qualified manpower and the growing effective demand in the neighboring countries may enable the allocation of an important part of the new industrial potential for export.

An increase in water supply and organized marketing services can serve as a basis for enlarging the agricultural potential. It should be stressed that the essential pre-condition for rapid economic development is the creation of the economic infrastructure necessary to carry out essential development works such as water supply projects, energy sources, improved transport networks, and appropriate social services to ensure the proper level of requested manpower.

The estimates for the future development of different economic branches should be seen only as indications of the possibilities, while results will depend on various factors, economic as well as sociological. The following sections will outline the existing potential for future development in the various branches necessary for the creation of the basis for a viable economy.

## AGRICULTURE

There is difficulty in forecasting the figure for increased employment in the future. However, it will not be an exaggeration to estimate an additional 55,000 workers in agriculture and agricultural services.

The possibility of exploiting additional water resources, especially in the Jordan Valley area, will not only increase the employment figure, but will also increase the supply of food for an increased population as well as some of the raw material required for industrial development, e.g., cotton and sugar beets.

The planned use of land and water resources may also considerably increase the general Gross Domestic Product.

However, water is only one of the factors for more efficient



land use. Mechanization and other means of modern agro-techniques are essential elements for agricultural progress.

The present structure of land ownership, the high frequency of small farms, and the enormous fragmentation of the cultivated plots even within the small and medium farms, make the introduction of mechanization difficult.

Reparceling the existing farms and to create large production units is one of the conditions for efficient land use. The traditional tight grasp of farmers on their plots and their resistance to any change will have to be considered. The first stage should envisage a change of land-ownership patterns and the introduction of modern agro-techniques on a cooperation basis.

The use of cooperative organizations which have roots in mutual assistance traditions in the rural areas may be an effective method of organizing the supply and distribution of agricultural produce. Such cooperative organizations might also be helpful in marketing agricultural produce to foreign markets.

## INDUSTRY

The forecast for future development is related to the prospects of enlarging the domestic market due to the GNP growth rate and a considerable increase in population.

Moreover, the high level of the manpower, presently employed abroad and in Israel, and the prospects for considerable capital investment and permanently growing consumption in the Middle East countries, create favorable conditions for export industries.

The prospects for doubling the population and a considerable rise in the GNP will allow an increase in the number of employed in industry from 20,000 in 1975 to 80,000 in the future. Existing industries will be modernized and adapted to new conditions, and some industrial branches will increase their capacity many times over, especially those connected with construction.

## HOUSING

Supplying housing for additional population and improving the housing conditions of the present population, as well as enlarging the scope of the infrastructure, will require an increase in the

production of building material and of those branches producing wood and metal products needed for construction.

The assumption of real prospects of export to the neighboring countries and to the European market was the basis for a careful multi-disciplinary study carried out by Tel Aviv University, in order to erect three industrial towns for sectors producing for export.

This study assumed the availability of required manpower for industry and the prospects for the export of thirty-five selected products to neighboring Arab countries and the European Common Market.

### SPACE NEEDED

The space needed for the projected 100,000 employees was estimated at 2,000 hectares, in three locations. During the first stage there would be 15,000 employees. The final figure of 100,000 might be attained in the future. The investment per employee was estimated at about \$11,000 (infrastructure works and buildings, \$6,300; machinery, \$4,500). The time needed from the moment of actual decision-making until the start of the industrial process was estimated to be five years.

Table 1 shows the six groups of commodities, including details about the required area per worker in each branch.

A comparison of the relationship between the different factors shows the great divergence in investment required per worker, varying from about \$1,000 for various kinds of textiles such as blankets, woven carpets, clothes, leather products; to \$50,000 for

TABLE 1.

	AREA PER WORKER IN SQ. M.
Electricity & Electronics	30
Textile	31
Food	42
Metal	52
Wood	60
Rubber & Plastic	63
Average	46.3

tobacco products, cement, clay, and lime products. Obviously, there is a higher ratio of investment/output in branches of low investment per worker than in those with large capital investment per employee.

The choice of commodities was based on additional factors such as the impact of the industrial production of some branches, on the economic activity of other sectors, e.g., the role of the cement industry in construction activity.

## ORIENTATION VALUES

It should be noted that the figures are of orientation value only, and are based on the prices and import volume for 1968. During recent years, import possibilities increased considerably as a result of an increase in the GNP. At the same time, the figures for required investment increased by about 60 percent, and the role of different commodities in private consumption increased, especially in some of the developing countries and in the oil-rich countries located nearer to the proposed industrial towns.

Basing our figures on the findings of different studies, we have tried to estimate the employment figure for industry in the event of the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity.

The projected figure for the first five years might be estimated to reach 80,000 at the end of the five-year period. This figure might reach 100,000 in the future, bearing in mind the export possibilities.

## PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE BUILDING ACTIVITY

It may be estimated that the requirements for improving the housing conditions of the permanent population in the towns and the rural settlements as well as the need to settle the 400,000 refugee population will increase the number of employed in the building industry by about 25,000 workers.

There is difficulty in evaluating the needed manpower for erecting the settlements for an additional population of 1 million inhabitants. The number of employed depends on the estimated norm of space per person, and the actual time for settling the additional population. If we were to use the norm of 10 square

meters per person or 60 square meters per family of 6 persons, 10 million square meters would be required. In addition, another 25 percent in building space is required for public and private services for the additional population. The total required space for housing and related purposes might be estimated to be 12.5 million square meters.

Using as a basis a 5-year time span, the annual constructed space should be evaluated at 2.5 million. For such building activity, a labor force of 45,000 will be required. The number of employees required for improving the housing conditions of the present population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was estimated at 25,000 yearly; the total estimated manpower required for future housing activity may be estimated at approximately 70,000.

It will not be an exaggeration to estimate the required manpower for carrying out the basic development works to be one-third of those employed in housing construction, or, 25,000 employees.

The total manpower required for building activities should reach 100,000 employees instead of the 10,000 presently working in the building industry.

A considerable increase of those employed in the building industry seems unrealistic when compared to the slow rate of increase of those employed in the agriculture and industry sectors.

Yet the experience of countries with a rapid population growth resulting from outside migration proves that the building industry is the main source of employment in such countries during the first stage of development, and is at the same time one of the main factors influencing the general growth rate of economic activity.

## SERVICES

The forecasted increase of population and a higher GNP per capita may influence a parallel increase in employment in the services.

The modernizing patterns of agriculture and industry will probably create a network of economic services capable of supplying the increased requirements for these essential economic



branches, and will introduce new distribution patterns which will increase the number of those employed in the services sector.

The estimated increase in the number of employees in public services which results from the independent political framework of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is noteworthy. A considerable investment will be needed to create the appropriate social infrastructure such as education and health improvement services.

The development of tourism as a result of cooperation between neighboring countries and the attractiveness of the area, will be an additional factor in increasing employment within the services sector.

An emphasis should also be placed on the forecasted development of private services such as banking, information services, wholesale, trade, etc.

The role of the services in employment will probably not be drastically changed from the present figure of 47 percent—in our estimation it will reach about 49 percent, which means 267,000 of the total forecasted population of 546,000 to be employed in the future.

The essential change in employment will probably be expressed in the change of the interrelationships among different parts of the services sector.

An additional expected change will probably be an increase in the role of the services in the total GNP.

## SETTLEMENT COSTS FOR ADDITIONAL POPULATION

According to figures published in the UN Study on Urban Land Policies and Land Use Control Measures in Western Europe (based on the Council of Europe), the costs for infrastructure works for additional population in urban settlements per capita are as follows: Turkey, \$1,100; Ireland, \$1,910; United Kingdom, \$4,500; Norway, \$5,360.

The per capita GNP for these countries in 1974 was as follows: Turkey, \$769; Ireland, \$2,176; United Kingdom, \$3,375; Norway, \$5,825.

One of the factors determining the large differences in the infra-

structure costs for more industrialized countries and less developed ones is the variety of the items required for an improved infrastructure. Countries with a high GNP per capita must include subways, highways, dense telephone networks, recreation services, large housing space, and quality buildings among the items needed for an expanded infrastructure.

An additional factor influencing infrastructure costs are the expenses for housing which are, in turn, influenced by the quality of building and family size.

The housing cost for absorbing the additional population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is estimated on the basis of present housing expenditure in this area, which is almost \$150 per square meter. We will take as a space norm 10 square meters per person. Such a norm is quite low when compared to that obtained in the industrialized countries, but quite high if compared with the developing countries. For instance, in India, the Bombay Development Scheme hopes to provide a dwelling of 40 square meters for a family of 6 persons. In Singapore, where the GNP is \$700 per person, the norm is not higher.

While estimating housing costs at \$1,500, we shall add an additional \$1,500 for other infrastructure costs, including both the physical and social infrastructure, but not including investments in commerce and industry.

## GENERAL INFRASTRUCTURE COSTS

The general infrastructure costs for an additional population of 1 million in new human settlements should be estimated to be \$3,000 million.

For evaluating total costs, \$1,000 million should be added in order to absorb the 400,000 refugees living in the outskirts of the existing urban and rural settlements, as well as for improving the living conditions of the permanent population in existing human settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Obviously, the estimation of infrastructure costs should include the required investment in the national infrastructure.

Our estimate is only a rough approximation for the following items.

TABLE 2

ITEMS	IN \$ MILLION
Human settlements for 1 million additional population	3000
1. Electricity	300
2. Roads in the West Bank	200
3. Roads in Hebron and Gaza	70
4. Gaza Port	70
5. Desalination plants	200
6. Other water development projects	100
7. Natural resources development (Dead Sea)	100
8. Tourism	100
9. Education, health and public services in national framework	360
Total	4500

#### 4. INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS

Investment requirements are influenced by the scope of expenditure for creating employment and the costs for expanding the physical and social infrastructure on the local and national level.

Financial resources are, obviously, one of the dominant factors influencing the possibility to achieve the development objectives.

Coordination between investment in the infrastructure and in employment sources according to different stages of development can influence the implementation of the development scheme.

The employment structure is one of the main elements influencing the scope of investment for creating employment sources, as well as for some items of infrastructure.

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF INVESTMENTS	IN \$ MILLION
1. Human settlements for 1 million additional population	3000
2. Improving conditions for the existing population	1000
3. National infrastructure	1500
Total	5500

Source: *Economic Case for Palestine*, Elias H. Tuma, H. Darin-Drabkin. Croom Helm Ltd., Publishers, London.

The extent of the additional population and the share of employed in the total population may influence the employment structure and the infrastructure costs.

Table 4 presents the employment structure of the additional population in comparison with the structure of the presently employed population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and summarizes the prospective employment structure.

Future estimated population: 2,374,000 (546,000 employed, or, 23 percent of the total population).

Population in 1975: 1,120,000 (139,000 employed, or, 13 percent of total population).

The enormous increase in manpower, almost three times greater than the present figure, and the prospective influx of an additional 1.2 million inhabitants within a short period of five years, influenced the high figure of employed in construction.

It may be suggested that employment in infrastructure works will form the main source of employment during the first stage of development, even before commencement of housing construction for the additional population. At the same time, the establishment of vital public services will be an additional source of employment in the initial stage.

The enlargement of the productive basis of agriculture and industry will enable the absorption of additional manpower only in later stages of development.

The figure cited in the table must be considered a very rough estimation. The general figure of employed manpower might be lower as a result of the low participation of women and a slower rate of immigration.

In evaluating the required investment according to different sectors of the economy, we shall try to reach an estimate on the

**TABLE 4**

	1975 EMPLOYED	%	ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT	FORECASTED EMPLOYMENT	%
Agriculture	44,000	31.8	55,000	99,000	18.1
Industry	21,000	14.5	60,000	21,000	14.8
Construction	10,000	7.3	90,000	100,000	18.2
Services	64,000	46.4	202,000	267,000	48.9
Total:	139,000	100.0	407,000	487,000	100.0



basis of investments in the same economic sectors in other countries, while constantly keeping in mind the peculiar conditions of the GNP level in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This may, in turn, bring about lower wages, customs, and indirect taxes, which are increasing the investment expenditure in some countries, e.g., Israel.

The figures in Table 5 are based on an investigation of the required investment in the different sectors of the economy in Israel and in some other countries, with a certain reduction of the required investment in comparison with these countries. However, even some lowering of the investment figure may bring it closer to a higher limit of required capital than to a lower one. The figure in each sector is an average resulting in large disparities between the different branches in the same sector.

#### INVESTMENT NEEDED TO CREATE ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT SOURCES

The total figure of about \$3,000 million for creating 407,000 additional jobs implies an average of \$7,500 per employee. To this amount an additional investment required to modernize existing employment sources should be added. We estimate that about \$3,500 per employee is required for improving the level of employment sources of the 140,000 presently employed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; or about \$500 million.

The overall investment required to create a sound employment structure is approximately \$3.5 billion. In addition, the investments requirement should include expenditures for creating the infrastructure.

TABLE 5.

	NUMBER EMPLOYED	INVESTMENT PER EMPLOYEE IN % 1955	TOTAL INVESTMENT (\$ THOUSAND)
Agriculture	55,000	\$14,000	770,000
Industry	60,000	12,000	720,000
Construction	90,000	3,000	270,000
Services	202,000	6,000	1,212,000
Total	407,000		2,972,000

Table 6 summarizes the overall required investment.

This amount is calculated in dollars for 1975. It might be estimated presently at about \$13 billion.

## A GENERAL IDEA

More extensive research may show that some items of our estimation were exaggerated and others underestimated. The aim of our evaluation is to give a general idea of the investments needed to create a basis for a viable economy. Obviously, the result of investments depends not only on the amount of expenditure but on the appropriate timing of the use of capital, and especially on the appropriate planning of the different stages of development and coordination between the different bodies responsible for the absorption of the additional population and for the implementation of the development schemes.

The required investment may be considered an exaggeration when compared to the present GNP level of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is not more than \$640 million yearly.

The investment required to create an independent Palestinian economy is equal to the yearly military expenditure of Egypt and Israel in the year 1967. If we suggest that the investment of 13 billion dollars should be carried out within a five-year period, this means about 2.5 billion dollars yearly, which is less than the amount for annual military assistance of the United States to Egypt and Israel.

The required financial help may be provided by different international factors: oil-producing countries, compensation from Israel, as well as from investment from foreign private firms, and local savings.

**TABLE 6**

Creating sources of additional employment	\$3,000 million
Modernizing present employment conditions	\$500 million
Investment in human settlements (for 1 million population)	\$3,000 million
Improving conditions of the existing population	\$1,000 million
National Infrastructure	\$1,500 million
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$9,000 million</b>

## CONCLUSIONS

The economic viability of a small country is based mostly on a high percentage of people occupied in industry and in services. Economic efficiency presumes the close connections of a small country with its neighboring nations and with the outside world.

Independence does not mean separation. In our times, independence must be based on regional cooperation in the light of conditions peculiar to each country of the region. Probably an independent Palestinian entity will be linked with Jordan and Israel in framework by a permanent regional cooperation authority. Such cooperation may be an important factor in the development of Palestinian economic independence rather than an annex to a dominant economy as in the past.

The main question is whether it is realistic to expect an industrialized state to be created within a society and culture which has been traditionally agricultural.

## A UNIVERSAL PHENOMENON

The experience of most developing countries—and we assume the same would hold true for a Palestinian state—shows that the process of transforming a rural population is a universal phenomenon. However, this process occurs under more difficult conditions in developing countries than in industrialized countries because in the former, the rate of urbanization is not tied to the rate of industrialization. The result is serious underemployment and the overutilization of public services. Our model hopes to avoid this problem by developing sources of employment concurrent with urbanization.

The most pressing problem in assuring resources for the future population will not be land but water. This problem could be solved on a large regional basis by using the water resources of the entire region for the benefit of the various nations comprising the region. The accomplishment of such a scheme would be indicative of Middle East cooperation and the ability to live side by side in peace.

## PEACE

A stable and lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors would, at the very least, permit a pooling of the efforts of all the nations for the common good, and would hold out the promise that ultimately these nations, with their ancient cultures, will play an important role in the future as they have in the past.

1979



# APPENDIX II



Palestine, within which the Jewish homeland was to be created according to the Balfour Declaration, 1917



Palestine, within which the Jewish homeland was to be created according to the British White Paper of 1922

MAP I



0 50 100

Scale of Miles

MAP 2

*Boundaries Proposed in UN Resolution, 1947*



Jewish State



Independent Arab State



International Trusteeship Area



0 10 20 30 40 50

Scale of Miles


MAP 3



Israel after War of Independence, 1948



Emirate (later Kingdom) of Jordan



Scale of Miles



Israel before June 10, 1967

MAP 4



Israel-held territory after June 10, 1967



0 50 100  
Scale of Miles



---

## British Documents

### SECOND NOTE FROM SIR HENRY MCMAHON TO SHARIF HUSSEIN OF THE HEJAZ, 24 OCTOBER 1915

It is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on . . . behalf [of the government of Great Britain] the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction—

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice of our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits.

As for those regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter—

(1) Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.

(2) Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognize their inviolability.

(3) When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

(4) On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her friends the Arabs and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them. . . .

### **THE BALFOUR DECLARATION, 2 NOVEMBER 1917**

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet—

His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

### **BRITISH AND ANGLO-FRENCH STATEMENTS TO THE ARABS, JANUARY–NOVEMBER 1918**

MESSAGE FROM COMMANDER D. G. HOGARTH OF THE  
BRITISH ARAB BUREAU IN CAIRO TO SHARIF HUSSEIN  
IN JANUARY 1918

(1) The Entente Powers are determined that the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in

the world. This can only be achieved by the Arabs themselves uniting, and Great Britain and her Allies will pursue a policy with this ultimate unity in view.

(2) So far as Palestine is concerned we are determined that no people shall be subject to another . . .

(3) Since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration, His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal. . . .

#### BRITISH DECLARATION TO SEVEN ARAB SPOKESMEN, 16 JUNE 1918

His Majesty's Government have considered the memorial of the seven with the greatest care. His Majesty's Government fully appreciate the reasons why the memorialists desire to retain their anonymity, and the fact that the memorial is anonymous has not in any way detracted from the importance which His Majesty's Government attribute to the document.

The areas mentioned in the memorandum fall into four categories—

1. Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war;
2. Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the present war;
3. Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied by the Allied forces during the present war;
4. Areas still under Turkish control.

In regard to the first two categories, His Majesty's Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs inhabiting these areas and support them in their struggle for freedom.

In regard to the areas occupied by Allied forces, His Majesty's Government draw the attention of the memorialists to the texts of the proclamation issued respectively by the General

Officers Commanding in Chief on the taking of Baghdad and Jerusalem. These proclamations embody the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the inhabitants of those regions. It is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that the future government of these regions should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed and this policy has and will continue to have the support of His Majesty's Government. . . .

### ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION, 7 NOVEMBER 1918

The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing and recognising these as soon as they are actually established.

Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions they are only concerned to ensure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves. . . .



# League of Nations Document

---

## MANDATE FOR PALESTINE: FROM THE PREAMBLE TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1923

### THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been for-

mulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations.

Art. 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Art. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Art. 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Art. 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home. . . .

Art. 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not

prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Art. 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine. . . .

Art. 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country. . . . It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. . . .

Art. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. . . .

Art. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic. . . .

# **Jewish-Arab Documents**

---

## **AGREEMENT BETWEEN EMIR FEISAL AND DR. WEIZMANN, JANUARY 3, 1919**

His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal, representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz, and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous further of confirming the good understanding which exists between them, have agreed upon the following Articles:

### **ARTICLE I**

The Arab State and Palestine in all their relations and undertakings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and understanding, and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents shall be established and maintained in the respective territories.

### **ARTICLE II**

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon by the parties hereto.

### **ARTICLE III**

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the



fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of the 2d of November, 1917.

#### ARTICLE IV

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic development.

#### ARTICLE V

No regulation nor law shall be made prohibiting or interfering in any way with the free exercise of religion; and further the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

#### ARTICLE VI

The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan control.

#### ARTICLE VII

The Zionist Organisation proposes to send to Palestine a Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will place the aforementioned Commission at the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will use its best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof.

#### ARTICLE VIII

The parties hereto agree to act in complete accord and harmony on all matters embraced herein before the Peace Congress.

#### ARTICLE IX

Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contract-

ing parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at London, England, the third day of January, one thousand nine hundred and nineteen.

*Chaim Weizmann*  
*Feisal ibn-Hussein*

#### RESERVATION BY THE EMIR FEISAL

If the Arabs are established as I have asked in my manifesto of January 4th addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be answerable for failing to carry out this agreement.

*Feisal ibn-Hussein*

#### FEISAL-FRANKFURTER CORRESPONDENCE

*Delegation Hedjazienne,*  
*Paris, March 3, 1919*

Dear Mr. Frankfurter: I want to take this opportunity of my first contact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to say to Dr. Weizmann in Arabia and Europe.

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, having suffered similar oppressions at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment of their national ideals together.

We Arabs especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through: we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

With the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann, we have had and continue to have the closest relations. He has been a great helper of our cause, and I hope the Arabs may

soon be in a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness. We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements complete one another. The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist. Our movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours, ignoring the need for cooperation of the Arabs and Zionists have been trying to exploit the local difficulties that must necessarily arise in Palestine in the early stages of our movements. Some of them have, I am afraid, misrepresented your aims to the Arab peasantry, and our aims to the Jewish peasantry, with the result that interested parties have been able to make capital out of what they call our differences.

I wish to give you my firm conviction that these differences are not on questions of principle, but on matters of detail such as must inevitably occur in every contact of neighbouring peoples, and as are easily adjusted by mutual good will. Indeed nearly all of them will disappear with fuller knowledge.

I look forward, and my people with me look forward, to a future in which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in which we are mutually interested may once again take their places in the community of civilised peoples of the world.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

*(Sgd.) Feisal.*

5th March, 1919.

Royal Highness:

Allow me, on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, to acknowledge your recent letter with deep appreciation.

Those of us who come from the United States have already been gratified by the friendly relations and the active cooperation maintained between you and the Zionist leaders, particularly Dr. Weizmann. We knew it could not be otherwise; we knew that the aspirations of the Arab and the Jewish peoples were parallel, that each aspired to reestablish its nationality in its own homeland,

each making its own distinctive contribution to civilisation, each seeking its own peaceful mode of life.

The Zionist leaders and the Jewish people for whom they speak have watched with satisfaction the spiritual vigour of the Arab movement. Themselves seeking justice, they are anxious that the just national aims of the Arab people be confirmed and safeguarded by the Peace Conference.

We knew from your acts and your past utterances that the Zionist movement—in other words the national aims of the Jewish people—had your support and the support of the Arab people for whom you speak. These aims are now before the Peace Conference as definite proposals by the Zionist Organisation. We are happy indeed that you consider these proposals “moderate and proper,” and that we have in you a staunch supporter for their realisation. For both the Arab and the Jewish peoples there are difficulties ahead—difficulties that challenge the united statesmanship of Arab and Jewish leaders. For it is no easy task to rebuild two great civilisations that have been suffering oppression and misrule for centuries. We each have our difficulties we shall work out as friends, friends who are animated by similar purposes, seeking a free and full development for the two neighbouring peoples. The Arabs and Jews are neighbours in territory; we cannot but live side by side as friends.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) *Felix Frankfurter.*



---

# UN Resolutions

## UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 181 (II) OF 29 NOVEMBER 1947—PARTITION OF PALESTINE A.

*The General Assembly:*

. . .  
*Recommends* to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

*Requests* that:

(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

. . .  
*Calls upon* the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

*Appeals* to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations.

### B.

#### PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

##### PART I—Future Constitution and Government of Palestine

##### A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE—Partition and Independence.

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948. . . .

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and III below. . . .

#### B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

. . .

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. . . .

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines. . . .

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. . . .

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below. . . .

**D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT**

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. . . .

*The Economic Union of Palestine*

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be:

(a) A customs union;

(b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;

(c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;

(d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;

(e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a nondiscriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. . . .

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. . . .

**Part II—Boundaries**

. . . .

**Part III—City of Jerusalem**

**A. SPECIAL REGIME**

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations. . . .

**C. STATUTE OF THE CITY**

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed stat-

ute of the City which shall contain, inter alia, the substance of the following provisions:

1. *Government machinery; special objectives.* The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

(a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem; . . .

2. *Governor and administrative staff.* A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. . . .

4. Security measures.

(a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders. . . .

5. *Legislative organization.* A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. . . .

13. Holy Places.

. . .

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum. . . .

## UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 194 (III) OF 11 DECEMBER 1948—UN CONCILIATION COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE

*The General Assembly:*

*Having considered further the situation in Palestine, . . .*

2. *Establishes* a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations:

. . .



5. *Calls upon* the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. *Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. *Resolves* that the Holy Places—including Nazareth—religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; . . .

8. . . . *Requests* the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

*Instructs* the Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area: . . .

11. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations; . . .

14. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution; . . .

**JORDAN-ISRAELI GENERAL ARMISTICE  
AGREEMENT, APRIL 3, 1949 (*SECURITY COUNCIL  
DOCUMENT S/1302*)**

. . .

**Article VII**

1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where geographical considerations make this impractical as at the southernmost tip of Palestine and the coastal strip. . . .

**Article VIII**

1. A Special Committee, composed of two representatives of each Party designated by the respective Governments, shall be established for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application.

2. The Special Committee shall be organized . . . and shall direct attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such matters as either Party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following, on which agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads; resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus and free access thereto; free access to the Holy Places and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resumption of the Latrun pumping station; provision of electricity for the Old City; and resumption of operation of the railroad to Jerusalem. . . .

**Article XII**

. . .

2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the Security Council of 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice. . . , shall

remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is achieved. . . .

### **UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 273 (III) OF 11 MAY 1949—ADMISSION OF ISRAEL TO UN MEMBERSHIP**

Having received the report of the Security Council on the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations,

*Noting that*, in the judgment of the Security Council, Israel is a peace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter,

*Noting that* the Security Council has recommended to the General Assembly that it admit Israel to membership in the United Nations,

*Noting furthermore* the declaration by the State of Israel that it “unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations,”

*Recalling* its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and 11 December 1948 and taking note of the declaration and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions,

*The General Assembly:*

Acting in discharge of its functions under Article 4 of the Charter and rule 125 of its rules of procedure,

1. *Decides* that Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out those obligations;

2. *Decides* to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations.

### **UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 2254 (ES-V) OF 14 JULY 1967—ON JERUSALEM**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,

*Having received* the report submitted by the Secretary General,

*Taking note* with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel of resolution 2253 (ES-V),

1. *Deplores* the failure of Israel to implement resolution 2253 (ES-V);

2. *Reiterates* its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. *Requests* the Secretary General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

## **UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 242 (1967) OF 22 NOVEMBER, 1967—PRINCIPLES FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

### *The Security Council*

*Expressing* its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

*Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security.

*Emphasizing further* that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories of recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms Further* the necessity

(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;



(b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;  
(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution,

4. *Requests* the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

### **UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 2314A (XXII) OF 19 DECEMBER 1967—REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF UNRWA FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE NEAR EAST**

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962, 1912 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2002 (XIX) of 10 February 1965 and 2052 (XX) of 15 December 1965, and 2154 (XXI) of 18 November 1966.

*Noting* the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1966 to 30 June 1967,

1. *Notes with deep regret* that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by

repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. *Expresses its thanks* to the Commissioner-General and the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. *Directs* the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue his efforts in taking such measures, including rectification of the relief rolls, as to assure, in co-operation with the Governments concerned, the most equitable distribution of relief based on need.

## **UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 338, 339 CONCERNING THE OCTOBER WAR, OCTOBER 22-27, 1973**

### **RESOLUTION 338 (OCTOBER 22, 1973)**

#### *The Security Council*

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts:

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

### **RESOLUTION 339 (OCTOBER 23, 1973)**

#### *The Security Council*

*Referring to* its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms* its decision on an immediate cessation of all

kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

### **GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3236 CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE, NOVEMBER 22, 1974**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of Palestine,

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

*Having also heard* other statements made during the debate,

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

*Expressing its grave concern* that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter,

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;

(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;

2. *Reaffirms* also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;

3. *Emphasizes* that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;

4. *Recognizes* that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

5. *Further recognizes* the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

6. *Appeals* to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.

*2296th plenary meeting*

*22 November 1974*



# --- **Zionist Documents**

## **THE BASEL PROGRAM ADOPTED BY THE FIRST ZIONIST CONGRESS IN 1897**

Zionism seeks for the Jewish people a publicly recognized, legally secured homeland in Palestine.

*To achieve this goal, Congress envisages the following methods:*

1. By fostering the settlement of Palestine with farmers, labourers and artisans,
2. By organizing the whole of Jewry in suitable local and general bodies in accordance with the laws of their respective countries,
3. By strengthening the National Jewish feeling and National consciousness,
4. By taking preparatory steps to attain government consent which may be necessary to reach the aim of Zionism.

## **THE BILTMORE PROGRAM, 11 MAY 1942**

• • •

4. In our generation, and in particular in the course of the past twenty years, the Jewish people have awakened and transformed their ancient homeland; from 50,000 at the end of the last war their numbers have increased to more than 500,000. They have made the waste places to bear fruit and the desert to blossom. Their pioneering achievements in agriculture and in industry, em-

bodying new patterns of cooperative endeavor, have written a notable page in the history of colonization.

5. In the new values thus created, their Arab neighbors in Palestine have shared. The Jewish people in its own work of national redemption welcomes the economic, agricultural and national development of the Arab peoples and states. The Conference reaffirms the stand previously adopted at Congresses of the World Zionist Organization, expressing the readiness and the desire of the Jewish people for full cooperation with their Arab neighbors.

6. The Conference calls for the fulfillment of the original purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which "*recognizing the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine*" was to afford them the opportunity, as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish Commonwealth.

The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity. The White Paper seeks to limit, and in fact to nullify Jewish rights to immigration and settlement in Palestine, and, as stated by Mr. Winston Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, constitutes "a breach and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration." The Policy of the White Paper is cruel and indefensible in its denial of sanctuary to Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution; and at a time when Palestine has become a focal point in the war front of the United Nations, and Palestine Jewry must provide all available manpower for farm and factory and camp, it is in direct conflict with the interests of the allied war effort.

7. In the struggle against the forces of aggression and tyranny, of which Jews were the earliest victims, and which now menace the Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the Jews of Palestine to play their full part in the war effort and in the defense of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.

8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow victory cannot be established on foundations of peace, justice and equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.

The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened;

that the Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the development of its unoccupied and uncultivated lands; and that Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new democratic world.

Then and only then will the age-old wrong to the Jewish people be righted.

### **RESOLUTION OF THE 23RD ZIONIST CONGRESS (1951)**

The task of Zionism is:

The consolidation of the State of Israel; the ingathering of the exiles in Eretz Israel; and the fostering of the unity of the Jewish people.

### **“THE JERUSALEM PROGRAM” ADOPTED BY THE 27TH ZIONIST CONGRESS, JUNE 18, 1968**

The aims of Zionism are:

The unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of Israel in Jewish life;

The ingathering of the Jewish people in its historic homeland, Eretz Israel, through *Aliya* (immigration) from all countries;

The strengthening of the State of Israel which is based on the prophetic vision of justice and peace;

The preservation of the identity of the Jewish people through the fostering of Jewish and Hebrew education and of Jewish spiritual and cultural values;

The protection of Jewish rights everywhere.

---

# **PLO Documents**

## **THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT**

This Covenant will be called "The Palestinian National Covenant" (al-Mithâq al-waṭanī al-filasṭīnī).

Article 1: Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people; it is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.

Article 2: Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.

Article 4: The Palestinian identity is a genuine, essential and inherent characteristic, it is transmitted from parents to children. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people, through the disasters which befell them, do not make them lose their Palestinian identity and their membership of the Palestinian community, nor do they negate them.

Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father—whether inside Palestine or outside it—is also a Palestinian.

Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article 7: That there is a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual and historical connections with Palestine are



indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in an Arab revolutionary manner. All means of information and education must be adopted in order to acquaint the Palestinian with his country in the most profound manner, both spiritual and material, that is possible. He must be prepared for the armed struggle and ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win back his homeland and bring about its liberation.

Article 8: The phase in their history, through which the Palestinian people are now living, is that of national (waṭanī) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Thus the conflicts among the Palestinian national forces are secondary, and should be ended for the sake of the basic conflict that exists between the forces of Zionism and of imperialism on the one hand, and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis the Palestinian masses, regardless of whether they are residing in the national homeland or in diaspora (mahajir) constitute—both their organizations and the individuals—one national front working for the retrieval of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people assert their absolute determination and firm resolution to continue their armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution for the liberation of their country and their return to it. They also assert their right to normal life in Palestine and to exercise their right to self-determination and sovereignty over it.

Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national (waṭanī) struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation and victory.

Article 11: The Palestinians will have three mottoes: national (waṭanīyya) unity, national (qawmiyya) mobilization and liberation.

Article 12: The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In

order to contribute their share towards the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it.

Article 13: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work towards the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work towards the realization of the other.

Article 14: The destiny of the Arab nation, and indeed Arab existence itself, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine cause. From this interdependence springs the Arab nation's pursuit of, and striving for, the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine play the role of the vanguard in the realization of this sacred national (qawmī) goal.

Article 15: The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab viewpoint, is a national (qawmī) duty and it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. Absolute responsibility for this falls upon the Arab nation—peoples and governments—with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard.

Article 16: The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual point of view, will provide the Holy Land with an atmosphere of safety and tranquility, which in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and guarantee freedom of worship and of visit to all, without discrimination of race, color, language, or religion. Accordingly, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17: The liberation of Palestine, from a human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people look forward to the support of all those who believe in the dignity of man and his freedom in the world.

Article 18: The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is a defensive action necessitated by the demands of self-defence. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, desirous as

they are of the friendship of all people, look to freedom-loving, justice-loving and peace-loving states for support in order to restore their legitimate rights in Palestine, to reestablish peace and security in the country, and to enable its people to exercise national sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19: The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time, because they were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and to their natural right in their homeland, and inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, particularly the right to self-determination.

Article 20: The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine and everything that has been based upon them, are deemed null and void. Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own, they are citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21: The Arab Palestinian people, expressing themselves by the armed Palestinian revolution, reject all solutions which are substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine and reject all proposals aiming at the liquidation of the Palestinian problem, or its internationalization.

Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically associated with international imperialism and antagonistic to all action for liberation and to progressive movements in the world. It is racist and fanatic in its nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonial in its aims, and fascist in its methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement, and a geographical base for world imperialism placed strategically in the midst of the Arab homeland to combat the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress.

Israel is a constant source of threat vis-à-vis peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist and imperialist presence and will contribute to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for the support of all the progressive and peaceful forces and urge them all, irrespective of their affiliations and be-



liefs, to offer the Palestinian people all aid and support in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland.

Article 23: The demands of security and peace, as well as the demands of right and justice, require all states to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement, to outlaw its existence, and to ban its operations, in order that friendly relations among peoples may be preserved, and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.

Article 24: The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity, and in the right of all peoples to exercise them.

Article 25: For the realization of the goals of this Charter and its principles, the Palestine Liberation Organization will perform its role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with the Constitution of this Organization.

Article 26: The Palestine Liberation Organization, representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in its struggle—to retrieve its homeland, liberate and return to it and exercise the right to self-determination in it—in all military, political and financial fields and also for whatever may be required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international levels.

Article 27: The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its potentialities; and will adopt a neutral policy among them in the light of the requirements of the war of liberation; and on this basis it shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 28: The Palestinian Arab people assert the genuineness and independence of their national (waṭanīyya) revolution and reject all forms of intervention, trusteeship and subordination.

Article 29: The Palestinian people possess the fundamental and genuine legal right to liberate and retrieve their homeland. The Palestinian people determine their attitude towards all states and forces on the basis of the stands they adopt vis-à-vis the Palestinian case and the extent of the support they offer to the Palestinian revolution to fulfill the aims of the Palestinian people.

Article 30: Fighters and carriers of arms in the war of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army which will be the protective force for the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.



Article 31: The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. All this shall be decided upon in accordance with a special regulation.

Article 32: Regulations, which shall be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall lay down the manner in which the Organization, and its organs and institutions, shall be constituted; the respective competence of each; and the requirements of its obligations under the Charter.

Article 33: This Charter shall not be amended save by (vote of) a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organization (taken) at a special session convened for that purpose.

PLO Organization Research Center, Beirut  
December 1969

## RESOLUTIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL

*Editor's Note*—The following resolutions by various Palestinian National Council meetings have been referred to by Palestinian leaders as expressions of the evolution of the PLO's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They declare that these resolutions represent their operative program.

### RESOLUTION #2 OF THE POLITICAL PROGRAM. CAIRO, JUNE 9, 1974

The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favor of our people and their struggle.

### RESOLUTION #11 OF THE 13TH PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL. CAIRO, MARCH 21-25, 1977

The Council resolves to pursue the struggle to recover our people's national rights and, first and foremost, their right to

return, to exercise self-determination and to establish their independent national state on their own land.

**RESOLUTION #14 OF THE 13TH PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL. CAIRO, MARCH 21–25, 1977**

The Council stresses the importance of relations and coordination with Jewish democratic and progressive forces inside and outside the occupied homeland, which are struggling against the ideology and practice of Zionism; and calls on all freedom-, peace-, and justice-loving forces and states in the world to discontinue all forms of aid to and cooperation with the racist Zionist regime, to condemn it and to reject all contacts with it.

**RESOLUTION #15A OF THE 13TH PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL. CAIRO, MARCH 21–25, 1977**

Stresses its commitment to the PLO's right to participate, independently and on a basis of equality, in all international conferences, forums and efforts related to the Palestine question and the Arab-Zionist conflict with the intention of realizing our non-negotiable national rights which have been recognized by the UN General Assembly since 1974, in particular resolution 3236.

**EXCERPT FROM THE FINAL POLITICAL STATEMENT OF THE 15TH SESSION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL. DAMASCUS, APRIL 11–19, 1981**

The Council welcomed President Brezhnev's statement on the Middle East crisis at the 26th Conference of the Soviet Communist Party, in which he stressed the importance of the role of the PLO in reaching a just solution of the crisis and the need for the implementation of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish their independent national state as affirmed by the UN resolutions on the Palestine question, and the importance of the UN playing a role in the solution of this problem.

---

# Peace Treaties

## VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID,<sup>1</sup> SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

### PREAMBLE

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.<sup>2</sup>

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

<sup>1</sup> Accompanying letters may be found in: *The Camp David Summit, September 1978*, Department of State Publication 8954, Near East and South Asian Series 88 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1978).

<sup>2</sup> The texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are annexed to this document.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

—Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

#### FRAMEWORK

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations.



They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

#### A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israel forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements

for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- 1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

- 2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of this agreement.

4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

#### B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the

timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

### C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

(a) full recognition;

(b) abolishing economic boycotts;

(c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

## FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.



It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

#### STATIONING OF FORCES

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will

supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

#### INTERIM WITHDRAWAL

Between the three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this time to be determined by mutual agreement.

## VII. THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

### TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL<sup>1</sup> MARCH 26, 1979

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel:

<sup>1</sup>The additional Treaty Protocols may be found in: *The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979*, Department of State Publication 8976, Near Eastern and South Asian Series 91, Selected Documents no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1979).

## PREAMBLE

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel":

## ARTICLE I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in

Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

#### ARTICLE II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

#### ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

- a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
- c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due



process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

#### ARTICLE IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

#### ARTICLE V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

## ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

## ARTICLE VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

## ARTICLE VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

## ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

# --- American Documents

## SUMMARY OF THE BROOKINGS REPORT, DECEMBER 1975

The study group reached five main conclusions.

1. *U.S. interests.* The United States has a strong moral, political, and economic interest in a stable peace in the Middle East. It is concerned for the security, independence, and well-being of Israel and the Arab states of the area and for the friendship of both. Renewed hostilities would have far-reaching and perilous consequences which would threaten those interests.

2. *Urgency.* Whatever the merits of the interim agreement on Sinai, it still leaves the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli dispute substantially untouched. Unless these elements are soon addressed, rising tensions in the area will generate increased risk of violence. We believe that the best way to address these issues is by the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement.

3. *Process.* We believe that the time has come to begin the process of negotiating such a settlement among the parties, either at a general conference or at more informal multilateral meetings. While no useful interim step toward settlement should be overlooked or ignored, none seems promising at the present time and most have inherent disadvantages.

4. *Settlement.* A fair and enduring settlement should contain at least these elements as an integrated package:

(a) *Security.* All parties to the settlement commit themselves to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the others and to refrain from the threat or use of force against them.

(b) *Stages.* Withdrawal to agreed boundaries and the establishment of peaceful relations carried out in stages over a period of

years, each stage being undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage have been faithfully implemented.

(c) *Peaceful relations*. The Arab parties undertake not only to end such hostile actions against Israel as armed incursions, blockades, boycotts, and propaganda attacks, but also to give evidence of progress toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations.

(d) *Boundaries*. Israel undertakes to withdraw by agreed stages to the June 5, 1967, lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted. Boundaries will probably need to be safeguarded by demilitarized zones supervised by UN forces.

(e) *Palestine*. There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestine state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestine entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.

(f) *Jerusalem*. The report suggests no specific solution for the particularly difficult problem of Jerusalem but recommends that, whatever the solution may be, it meet as a minimum the following criteria:

—there should be unimpeded access to all of the holy places and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith;

—there should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free circulation throughout it; and

—each national group within the city should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates.

(g) *Guarantees*. It would be desirable that the UN Security Council endorse the peace agreements and take whatever other actions to support them the agreements provide. In addition, there may well be need for unilateral or multilateral guarantees to some or all of the parties, substantial economic aid, and military assistance pending the adoption of agreed arms control measures.

5. *U.S. role*. The governments directly concerned bear the responsibility of negotiation and agreement, but they are unlikely to be able to reach agreement alone. Initiative, impetus, and inducement may well have to come from outside. The United States,



because it enjoys a measure of confidence of parties on both sides and has the means to assist them economically and militarily, remains the great power best fitted to work actively with them in bringing about a settlement. Over and above helping to provide a framework for negotiation and submitting concrete proposals from time to time, the United States must be prepared to take other constructive steps, such as offering aid and providing guarantees where desired and needed. In all of this, the United States should work with the USSR to the degree that Soviet willingness to play a constructive role will permit.

*The Brookings Institution, Washington*

DECEMBER 1975

## THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1982

My fellow Americans, today has been a day that should make us proud. It marked the end of the successful evacuation of the P.L.O. from Beirut, Lebanon. This peaceful step could never have been taken without the good offices of the United States and, especially, the truly heroic work of a great American diplomat, Ambassador Philip Habib. Thanks to his efforts, I'm happy to announce that the U.S. Marine contingent helping to supervise the evacuation has accomplished its mission. Our young men should be out of Lebanon within two weeks. They, too, have served the cause of peace with distinction and we can all be very proud of them.

But the situation in Lebanon is only part of the overall problem of conflict in the Middle East. So, over the past two weeks, while events in Beirut dominated the front page, America was engaged in a quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to lay the groundwork for a broader peace in the region. For once, there were no premature leaks as U.S. diplomatic missions traveled to Mideast capitals and I met here at home with a wide range of experts to map out an American peace initiative for the long-suffering peoples of the Middle East, Arab and Israeli alike.

It seemed to me that, with the agreement in Lebanon, we had an opportunity for a more far-reaching peace effort in the region

and I was determined to seize that moment. In the words of the scripture, the time had come to "follow after the things which make for peace."

Tonight, I want to report to you on the steps we've taken, and the prospects they can open up for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

America has long been committed to bringing peace to this troubled region. For more than a generation, successive United States administrations have endeavored to develop a fair and workable process that could lead to a true and lasting Arab-Israeli peace. Our involvement in the search for Mideast peace is not a matter of preference, it is a moral imperative. The strategic importance of the region to the United States is well known.

But our policy is motivated by more than strategic interests. We also have an irreversible commitment to the survival and territorial integrity of friendly states. Nor can we ignore the fact that the well-being of much of the world's economy is tied to stability in the strife-torn Middle East. Finally, our traditional humanitarian concerns dictate a continuing effort to peacefully resolve conflicts.

### FOLLOWING PREDECESSORS' LEAD

When our Administration assumed office in January 1981, I decided that the general framework for our Middle East policy should follow the broad guidelines laid down by my predecessors.

There were two basic issues we had to address. First, there was the strategic threat to the region posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, best demonstrated by the brutal war in Afghanistan; and second the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors. With regard to the Soviet threat, we have strengthened our efforts to develop with our friends and allies a joint policy to deter the Soviets and their surrogates from further expansion in the region, and, if necessary, to defend against it. With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, we've embraced the Camp David framework as the only way to proceed. We have also recognized, however, solving the Arab-Israeli conflict, in and of itself, cannot assure peace throughout a region as vast and troubled as the Middle East.

Our first objective under the Camp David process was to insure the successful fulfillment of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. This was achieved with the peaceful return of the Sinai to Egypt in April 1982. To accomplish this, we worked hard with our Egyptian and Israeli friends, and eventually with other friendly countries, to create the multinational force which now operates in the Sinai.

Throughout this period of difficult and time-consuming negotiations, we never lost sight of the next step of Camp David, autonomy talks to pave the way for permitting the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights. However, owing to the tragic assassination of President Sadat and other crises in the area, it was not until January 1982 that we were able to make a major effort to renew these talks. Secretary of State Haig and Ambassador Fairbanks made three visits to Israel and Egypt early this year to pursue the autonomy talks. Considerable progress was made in developing the basic outline of an American approach which was to be presented to Egypt and Israel after April.

The successful completion of Israel's withdrawal from Sinai and the courage shown on this occasion by Prime Minister Begin and President Mubarak in living up to their agreements convinced me the time had come for a new American policy to try to bridge the remaining differences between Egypt and Israel on the autonomy process. So, in May, I called for specific measures and a timetable for consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel on the next steps in the peace process. However, before this effort could be launched, the conflict in Lebanon pre-empted our efforts. The autonomy talks were basically put on hold while we sought to untangle the parties in Lebanon and still the guns of war.

## NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE

The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for Middle East peace. We must seize it now and bring peace to this troubled area so vital to world stability while there is still time. It was with this strong conviction that over a month ago, before the present negotiations in Beirut had been completed, I directed Secretary of State Shultz to again review

our policy and to consult a wide range of outstanding Americans on the best ways to strengthen chances for peace in the Middle East.

We have consulted with many of the officials who were historically involved in the process, with members of the Congress, and with individuals from the private sector, and I have held extensive consultations with my own advisers on the principles that I will outline to you tonight.

The evacuation of the P.L.O. from Beirut is now complete. And we can now help the Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country. We owe it to ourselves, and to posterity, to move quickly to build upon this achievement. A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region. The people of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the past several years into a new dawn of hope.

But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two consequences are key to the peace process:

First, the military losses of the P.L.O. have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and second, while Israel's military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.

The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And that answer can only come at the negotiating table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be acceptable to all and that true peace will require compromises by all.

## FRESH START NEEDED IN REGION

So, tonight I'm calling for a fresh start. This is the moment for all those directly concerned to get involved—or lend their support—to a workable basis for peace. The Camp David agreement



remains the foundation of our policy. Its language provides all parties with the leeway they need for successful negotiations.

I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision and courage.

I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future.

And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel, and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.

In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.

The time has come for a new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East. The State of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries, and has been denied by every Arab state except Egypt. Israel exists. It has a right to exist in peace, behind secure and defensible borders, and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those facts.

I have personally followed and supported Israel's heroic struggle for survival ever since the founding of the state of Israel 34 years ago. In the pre-1967 borders, Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I agree. The Camp David agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. For peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process, most immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians, will Israel

be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be respected by its neighbors. Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a secure peace.

These then are our general goals. What are the specific new American positions, and why are we taking them?

In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to express openly their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably, their views have differed on many points.

The United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator. We have avoided public comment on the key issues. We have always recognized, and continue to recognize, that only the voluntary agreement of those parties most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it has become evident to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.

First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

The purpose of the five-year period of transition which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs, and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American position well understood: The purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly

transfer of authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

### JORDAN ROLE IN WEST BANK

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort.

It is the United States' position that—in return for peace—the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in them.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises, and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put

forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal—from any party and at any point in the negotiating process—that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad and, I might add, so is mine.

During the past few days, our Ambassadors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host governments the proposals in full detail that I have outlined here today.

Now I am convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace.

The United States will stand by these principles with total dedication. They are fully consistent with Israel's security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians. We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table as envisaged by the Camp David accords. And I fervently hope that the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues, will accept this opportunity.

## CONFLICT A THREAT TO WORLD

Tragic turmoil in the Middle East runs back to the dawn of history. In our modern day, conflict after conflict has taken its brutal toll there. In an age of nuclear challenge and economic interdependence, such conflicts are a threat to all the people of the world, not just the Middle East itself. It's time for us all, in the Middle East and around the world, to call a halt to conflict, hatred and prejudice; it's time for us all to launch a common effort for reconstruction, peace and progress.

It has often been said—and regrettably too often been true—that the story of the search for peace and justice in the Middle East is a tragedy of opportunities missed.

In the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon we now face an opportunity for a broader peace. This time we must not let it slip from our grasp. We must look beyond the difficulties and obstacles of the present and move with fairness and resolve toward a brighter future. We owe it to ourselves, and to posterity, to do no less. For if we miss this chance to make a fresh start, we may look



back on this moment from some later vantage point and realize how much that failure cost us all.

These, then, are the principles upon which American policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict will be based. I have made a personal commitment to see that they endure and, God willing, that they will come to be seen by all reasonable, compassionate people as fair, achievable, and in the interests of all who wish to see peace in the Middle East.

Tonight, on the eve of what can be a dawning of new hope for the people of the troubled Middle East—and for all the world's people who dream of a just and peaceful future—I ask you, my fellow Americans, for your support and your prayers in this great undertaking.

Thank you and God bless you.

## **U.S. STATEMENT TO ARAB LEAGUE DELEGATION, OCTOBER 21, 1982**

This delegation is coming to the United States at the request of the Arab League. The purpose of the delegation's visit to Washington is to exchange views on how best to restore momentum to the Middle East peace negotiations.

The delegation will present the views of the Arab League. The United States will present its own views based on the President's initiative of Sept. 1.

The delegation will be expected to seek clarification on the President's proposal and the United States will seek clarifications on the Arab League session. It will not be a negotiating session, aimed at reconciling differences between the two, but rather an exchange of views. We do not expect any dramatic breakthroughs but rather thoughtful discussions.

We value the views of Arab League member states and believe this is an important opportunity for the President personally to set forth his views on how best to move the peace process forward as outlined in his Sept. 1 speech. The President is committed to the positions set forth and intends to remain firmly behind his proposals.

We seek broadened Arab participation in the negotiations. We remain fully committed to the security of Israel, and to assuring that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians are addressed. U.N. Resolutions 242, 338 and the Camp David framework are central to the negotiations. There is no change in the United States position in dealing with the P.L.O.

We will not recognize or deal with the P.L.O. until that organization unequivocally recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. We stated before this is the first card for anybody to play who is interested in peace.

The United States believes the only constructive course for achieving progress is at the negotiating table. We believe the time has come to stop talking about talking about peace and start sitting down at the table, negotiating directly between Israelis, and Arabs, and the United States, and start achieving Palestinian rights, and start achieving the broader peace which is the key to the stability and security for Israel.

# --- **Soviet Documents**

## **EXCERPTS FROM A SPEECH BY SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO**

If the ruling circles in Israel were guided not by the thirst to obtain the territories of others, but by a real wish to guarantee peaceful conditions favourable to the existence and development of the Israeli state, this could easily be achieved. All that is required is that Israel abandon her course of annexing the territories of others, let them go and follow a course of peace with the Arab countries. If she so wishes Israel can obtain the most firm guarantees, in an agreement to which the USSR would also subscribe, which would ensure the conditions necessary for the existence and development of all the states in the Middle East area.

The basic and essential constituent of the problem of a Middle East settlement is the guaranteeing of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

A great deal has been said, recently in particular, about the need to reconvene the Geneva Middle East peace conference. This demand rests on a firm basis and the USSR also insists on it. Experience has shown that partial deals concluded in isolation from the deep-rooted problems facing the settlement do not bring that settlement any nearer; on the contrary they make it more difficult to solve the main problems.

Such an incorrect method cannot relieve the gravity of the situation in the Middle East which threatens to explode again. On the contrary it helps to aggravate this situation, with all the consequences this might involve.

When discussing the Middle East it goes without saying that

[the Geneva conference] must deal with the real problems. What we object to is that the conference, which must be attended by representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization on a basis of equal rights with the other parties concerned, be turned into that sort of showy display which, even if it results in the issuing of declarations of a political nature, does not necessarily result in the implementation of these declarations. We believe that the Geneva conference should meet as soon as possible and that there should be serious preparation for it so that, from the first day, it may be in a position to study the specific problems of the settlement.

In our view the basic programme of the conference should be to reach agreement firstly on the liberation of all Arab territories from foreign occupation; secondly on guaranteeing the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including that of constituting their state; and thirdly on ensuring and guaranteeing the rights of all states in the Middle East, including the State of Israel, to existence, development and a future. This sums up our policy line as regards the problems of the Middle East.

MOSCOW, APRIL 23, 1975

### **EXCERPTS FROM THE ADDRESS BY SOVIET PRESIDENT LEONID I. BREZHNEV TO THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET UNION**

Now for the Middle East problem. Striving for a dominant position in the Middle East, the United States embarked on the path of the Camp David policy, on the path of splitting the Arab world and organizing a separate deal between Israel and Egypt. American diplomacy has failed to turn this separate anti-Arab deal into a broader capitulatory-type agreement. But it has succeeded in another way: There has been a new aggravation of the situation in the region. A Middle East settlement is now further off than before.

What next? It seems to us that it is time to move things out of deadlock. It is time to return to honest, collective searches for a comprehensive settlement on a just and realistic basis. In present



conditions, this could be done, for instance, within the framework of a specially convened international conference.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in this work, in a constructive spirit and from positions of goodwill. We are prepared to do this in conjunction with the other interested parties—the Arabs (including the Palestine Liberation Organization, of course) and Israel. We are prepared for such a search in conjunction with the US—may I remind you that we had a certain amount of experience in this respect some years ago. We are prepared to cooperate with the European states, with all those who display a sincere desire to ensure a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Evidently the UN could also continue to play a useful role in this whole question.

As far as the essence of the matter is concerned, we remain convinced that if there is to be genuine peace in the Middle East, there must be an end to the Israeli occupation of all Arab territories seized in 1967. The inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, up to and including the creation of their own state, must be realized. It is necessary to ensure the security and sovereignty of all states in this region, including Israel. Those are the basic principles. Needless to say, the details could be the subject of talks.

Moscow, 1981

# **American-Soviet Document**

---

## **JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR, NEW YORK, OCTOBER 1, 1977**

Having exchanged views regarding the unsafe situation which remains in the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko have the following statement to make on behalf of their countries, which are cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East:

1. Both governments are convinced that vital interests of the peoples of this area, as well as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general, urgently dictate the necessity of achieving, as soon as possible, a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions.

The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for insuring the security of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab states as the establishment of demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of U.N. troops or observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as of the observance of the terms of the settlement can also be established should the contracting parties so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees, subject to their constitutional processes.

2. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference, specially convened for these purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people, and legal and contractual formalization of the decisions reached at the conference.

In their capacity as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the United States and the USSR affirm their intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than December 1977. The cochairmen note that there still exist several questions of a procedural and organizational nature which remain to be agreed upon by the participants to the conference.

3. Guided by the goal of achieving a just political settlement in the Middle East and of eliminating the explosive situation in this area of the world, the United States and the USSR appeal to all the parties in the conflict to understand the necessity for careful consideration of each other's legitimate rights and interests and to demonstrate mutual readiness to act accordingly.

# --- **European Document**

## **THE EUROPEAN DECLARATION**

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE DECLARATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF A TWO-DAY SUMMIT IN VENICE, JUNE 13, 1981.

1. The heads of state and government and the ministers of foreign affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.

2. The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way toward peace.

3. In this regard the nine countries of the Community base on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 19 September 1978, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 34th United Nations General Assembly.

4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence



and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the United Nations by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including guarantees on the ground.

6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavoring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the Palestine Liberation Organization, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

8. The Nine recognize the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access of everyone to the holy places.

9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.

---

# Arab Documents

## BAGHDAD ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS

By the initiative of the Government of the Republic of Iraq and at the invitation of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the ninth Arab summit conference convened in Baghdad 2-5 November 1978.

In a high spirit of pan-Arab responsibility and joint concern about the unity of the Arab stand, the conference studied confrontation of the dangers and challenges threatening the Arab nation, particularly after the results of the Camp David agreements signed by the Egyptian Government and the effects of these agreements on the Arab struggle to face the Zionist aggression against the Arab nation.

Proceeding from the principles in which the Arab nation believes, acting on the unity of Arab destiny and complying with the traditions of joint Arab action, the Arab summit conference has emphasized the following basic principles:

First: The Palestinian question is a fateful Arab issue and is the essence of the conflict with the Zionist enemy. The sons of the Arab nation and all the Arab countries are concerned with it and are obliged to struggle for its sake and to offer all material and moral sacrifices for this cause. The struggle to regain Arab rights in Palestine and in the occupied Arab territory is a general Arab responsibility. All Arabs must share this responsibility, each in accord with his military, economic, political and other abilities.

The conflict with the Zionist enemy exceeds the framework of the conflict of the countries whose territory was occupied in 1967, and it includes the whole Arab nation because of the military,

political, economic and cultural danger the Zionist enemy constitutes against the entire Arab nation and its substantial and pan-Arab interests, civilization and destiny. This places on all the countries of the Arab nation the responsibility to share in this conflict with all the resources it possesses.

Second: All the Arab countries must offer all forms of support, backing and facilities to all forms of the struggle of the Palestinian resistance, supporting the PLO in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied land, struggling for liberation and restoration of the national rights of its people, including their right to return to their homeland, to determine their future and to establish their independent state on their national soil. The Arab states pledge to preserve Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Palestinian action.

Third: Commitment is reaffirmed to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, particularly the sixth and seventh summit conferences of Algiers and Rabat.

Fourth: In light of the above principles it is impermissible for any side to act unilaterally in solving the Palestinian question in particular and the Arab-Zionist conflict in general.

Fifth: No solution shall be accepted unless it is associated with a resolution by an Arab summit conference convened for this purpose.

The conference discussed the two agreements signed by the Egyptian Government at Camp David and considered that they harm the Palestinian people's rights and the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied Arab territory. The conference considered that these agreements took place outside the framework of collective Arab responsibility and are opposed to the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences, particularly the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summit conferences, the Arab League Charter and the UN resolutions on the Palestinian question. The conference considers that these agreements do not lead to the just peace that the Arab nation desires. Therefore, the conference has decided not to approve of these two agreements and not to deal with their results. The conference has also rejected all the political, economic, legal and other effects resulting from them.



The conference decided to call on the Egyptian Government to go back on these agreements and not to sign any reconciliation treaty with the enemy. The conference hopes that Egypt will return to the fold of joint Arab action and not act unilaterally in the affairs of the Arab-Zionist conflict. In this respect the conference adopted a number of resolutions to face the new stage and to safeguard the aims and interests of the Arab nation out of faith that with its material and moral resources the Arab nation is capable of confronting the difficult circumstances and all challenges, just as it has always been throughout history, because it is defending right, justice and its national existence.

The conference stressed the need to unify all the Arab efforts in order to remedy the strategic imbalance that has resulted from Egypt's withdrawal from the confrontation arena.

The conference decided that the countries that possess readiness and capability will coordinate participation with effective efforts. The conference also stressed the need to adhere to the regulations of Arab boycott and to tighten application of its provisions.

The conference studied means to develop Arab information media beamed abroad for the benefit of the just Arab issues. The conference decided to hold annual meetings for the Arab summit conference and decided that the month of November each year will be the date for holding the summit.

After studying the Arab and international situation, the conference asserts the Arab nation's commitment to a just peace based on the comprehensive Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem, the guaranteeing of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including the right to establish their independent state on their national soil.

The conference decided to embark on large-scale international activity to explain the just rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. The conference expressed its deep appreciation and gratitude for all the states that stood on the side of the Arab rights.

The conference expressed its appreciation to the Syrian Arab Republic and its heroic army, and to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its heroic army, and expressed its pride in the struggle

of the Palestinian people and its steadfastness inside and outside the occupied territories, under the leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The conference praised the "charter for joint national action" signed by fraternal Syria and Iraq, and the conference regarded the charter as a great achievement on the way to Arab solidarity. The conference also expressed its great appreciation for the initiative of the Iraqi Government under President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr in calling for the convening of an Arab summit conference in Baghdad so as to unify Arab ranks and to organize Arab efforts to face the threats to which the Arab nation is currently exposed. The conference expressed its thanks for President al-Bakr's efforts to make the conference a success.

The conference took a number of resolutions and measures to face the next stage and to protect the aims and interests of the Arab nation. These resolutions stem from the conviction of the conferees that the Arab nation is able, through its material and moral capabilities and through its solidarity, to face all the difficult circumstances and all the challenges, as it always faced them throughout history, because it is defending justice and right and protecting its national existence.

BAGHDAD, NOVEMBER, 1978

*Editor's Note*—The passage in bold letters has been frequently referred to as the first formal expression of an inter-Arab indirect readiness to recognize Israel. It did not appear in bold letters in the original text.

## SAUDI ARABIA'S PEACE PLAN (AUGUST 1981)

FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FROM THE ARABIC OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PLAN PROPOSED BY CROWN PRINCE FAHD OF SAUDI ARABIA AND PUBLISHED BY THE SAUDI PRESS AGENCY.

1. Israeli evacuation of all Arab territories seized during the 1967 Middle East war, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem.
2. Dismantling the settlements set up by Israel on the occupied lands after the 1967 war.

3. Guaranteeing freedom of religious practices for all religions in the Jerusalem holy shrines.
4. Asserting the rights of the Palestinian people and compensating those Palestinians who do not wish to return to their homeland.
5. Commencing a transitional period in the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip under United Nations supervision for a duration not exceeding a few months.
6. Setting up a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace.
8. Guaranteeing the implementation of these principles by the United Nations or some of its member states.

## FEZ SUMMIT RESOLUTIONS

THE ARAB SUMMIT WHICH MET IN FEZ, MOROCCO, ADOPTED AN EIGHT-POINT PEACE PLAN. BELOW ARE THE PLAN'S POINTS ACCORDING TO THE CONFERENCE'S OFFICIAL ENGLISH VERSION, AS THEY WERE PUBLISHED IN THE *JERUSALEM POST* OF SEPTEMBER 12, 1982.

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab El-Kuds (Jerusalem).
2. The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on the Arab territories after 1967.
3. The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religions in the holy shrines.
4. The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the exercise of its imprescriptible and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, its sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of all those who do not desire to return.
5. Placing the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the control of the UN for a transitory period not exceeding a few months.
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with El-Kuds as its capital.

7. The Security Council guarantees peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian state.

8. The Security Council guarantees the respect of these principles.



---

# Israeli Documents

## STATE OF ISRAEL PROCLAMATION OF INDEPENDENCE

The Land of Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and national identity was formed. Here they achieved independence and created a culture of national and universal significance. Here they wrote and gave the Bible to the world.

Exiled from the Land of Israel the Jewish people remained faithful to it in all the countries of their dispersion, never ceasing to pray and hope for their return and the restoration of their national freedom.

Impelled by this historic association, Jews strove throughout the centuries to go back to the land of their fathers and regain their statehood. In recent decades they returned in their masses. They reclaimed the wilderness, revived their language, built cities and villages, and established a vigorous and ever-growing community, with its own economic and cultural life. They sought peace, yet were prepared to defend themselves. They brought the blessings of progress to all inhabitants of the country and looked forward to sovereign independence.

In the year 1897 the First Zionist Congress, inspired by Theodor Herzl's vision of the Jewish State, proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national revival in their own country.

This right was acknowledged by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, and re-affirmed by the Mandate of the League of Nations, which gave explicit international recognition to the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and their right to reconstitute their National Home.

The recent holocaust, which engulfed millions of Jews in

Europe, proved anew the need to solve the problem of the homelessness and lack of independence of the Jewish people by means of the re-establishment of the Jewish State, which would open the gates to all Jews and endow the Jewish people with equality of status among the family of nations.

The survivors of the disastrous slaughter in Europe, and also Jews from other lands, have not desisted from their efforts to reach Eretz-Yisrael, in face of difficulties, obstacles and perils; and have not ceased to urge their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their ancestral land.

In the second World War the Jewish people in Palestine made their full contribution to the struggle of the freedom-loving nations against the Nazi evil. The sacrifices of their soldiers and their war effort gained them the right to rank with the nations which founded the United Nations.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Resolution requiring the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The General Assembly called upon the inhabitants of the country to take all the necessary steps on their part to put the plan into effect. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their independent State is unassailable.

It is the natural right of the Jewish people to lead, as do all other nations, an independent existence in its sovereign State.

ACCORDINGLY WE, the members of the National Council, representing the Jewish people in Palestine and the World Zionist Movement, are met together in solemn assembly today, the day of termination of the British Mandate for Palestine; and by virtue of the natural and historic right of the Jewish people and of the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

WE HEREBY PROCLAIM the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine, to be called *Medinat Yisrael* (The State of Israel).

WE HEREBY DECLARE that, as from the termination of the Mandate at midnight, the 14th–15th May, 1948, and pending the setting up of the duly elected bodies of the State in accordance with a Constitution, to be drawn up by the Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October, 1948, the National Council shall act as the Provisional State Council, and that the National Administra-

tion shall constitute the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, which shall be known as Israel.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open to the immigration of Jews from all countries of their dispersion; will promote the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of liberty, justice and peace as conceived by the Prophets of Israel; will uphold the full social and political equality of all its citizens, without distinction of religion, race, or sex; will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, education and culture; will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and will loyally uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter.

THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be ready to co-operate with the organs and representatives of the United Nations in the implementation of the Resolution of the Assembly of November 29, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the Economic Union over the whole of Palestine.

We appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building of its State and to admit Israel into the family of nations.

In the midst of wanton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve the ways of peace and play their part in the development of the State, on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its bodies and institutions—provisional and permanent.

We extend our hand in peace and neighbourliness to all the neighbouring states and their peoples, and invite them to co-operate with the independent Jewish nation for the common good of all. The State of Israel is prepared to make its contribution to the progress of the Middle East as a whole.

Our call goes out to the Jewish people all over the world to rally to our side in the task of immigration and development, and to stand by us in the great struggle for the fulfillment of the dream of generations for the redemption of Israel.

With trust in the Rock of Israel, we set our hand to this Declaration at this Session of the Provisional State Council, on the soil of the Homeland, in the city of Tel-Aviv, on this Sabbath eve, the fifth of Iyar, 5708, the fourteenth of May, 1948.

## THE PARTY PLATFORMS: 1981

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES FAVOR THE "GREATER ISRAEL" APPROACH.

### THE LIKUD

Likud election propoganda declares in big posters that "A vote for Simon Peres is a vote for a Palestinian state under Yasir Arafat's leadership". It stresses the fact that Prime Minister Begin was the first Israeli leader to sign a peace treaty with an Arab head of state. They also say that the Likud has kept Israel out of war (Lebanon and Iraq notwithstanding). All of the Likud's leading spokesmen on foreign affairs, Prime Minister Begin, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon, and M. K. Moshe Arens, the Chairman of the Knesset's Security and Foreign Affairs Committee, have come out unequivocally in favor of Greater Israel, and an eventual annexation of the occupied territories. Prime Minister Begin views his autonomy plan as a corridor toward eventual annexation. M. K. Moshe Arens says that Israel must retain military control over the West Bank in order to defend itself. And Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon has declared that the Palestinians already have a state, Jordan, and has even recommended to the PLO on a number of occasions that they overthrow King Hussein and take over. The amount of funds being poured into settlements on the West Bank is another indication that those who set the tone in the Likud want to create major obstacles in the way of any possibility for compromise on the West Bank.

The only dissonant tones to this generally accepted line within the Likud are voiced by Deputy Prime Minister Simha Erlich and some of his followers in the Liberal Party, who support some form of territorial compromise in the occupied territories, but even within the Liberal Party, they are in the minority. (Since the war in Lebanon, Deputy Prime Minister David Levy has also been accused by some of his colleagues of "being soft on the West Bank.")

The only fact that contradicts this general annexatory chorus is the fact that Menachem Begin, on behalf of the Likud-led govern-



ment, is a signatory to the Camp David Accords, which state that negotiations concerning the future of the West Bank and Gaza should "be based upon all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242," and must "recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and their just requirements."

## THE NRP

The NRP platform and propaganda favor the Greater Israel approach, though party chairman Interior Minister Dr. Yosef Burg is considered to be a dove, in favor of territorial compromise, and M. K. Avraham Melamed is a member of "Oz v'Shalom" and a supporter of Peace Now. (Since the war in Lebanon, some of the hawkish NRP leaders have begun to reconsider their positions. Education Minister Hammer has said that "morality is more important than territory," and Deputy Foreign Minister Bent Meir has concurred.)

## TEHIYA

On the right, Tehiya ("Renaissance"), the party that broke away from the Likud because of its opposition to the Camp David Accords, accuses Begin of "selling out" on Sinai and of being soft on the Palestinian issue, because he attached his signature to the accords that support "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." They are also afraid that the dismantling of settlements in Sinai will serve as a precedent for the other fronts. Tehiya believes that "any recognition of a Palestinian entity, including the autonomy plan, will lead inevitably to the establishment of a Palestinian state, that will by nature, be hostile to Israel. . . ." Tehiya further believes that the Palestinians are not a people, and therefore have no historical rights in the Land of Israel. They support an exchange of populations, saying that the Palestinians have twenty-two nations to choose from. They offer three options to the residents of Judaea and Samaria: 1) to accept Israeli citizenship, with all of its obligations and privileges, 2) to be residents of Israel and citizens of the Palestinian state on the East Bank of the Jordan, or 3) to emigrate.

## KAHANE

Further to the right, Meir Kahane's Kach Party accuses even Tehiya of being soft on the Palestinian issue, because Party Chairman Professor Yuval Ne'eman once declared that he would be ready to compromise on the West Bank if more Soviet Jews were allowed to come to Israel. Kahane's party is running on a blatant racist platform, that calls for the expulsion of all Arabs from the occupied territories and from Israel itself. His party has also stated that sexual relations between an Arab and a Jew should be declared a criminal offense.

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES ARE AGAINST ANNEXATION  
OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AGAINST RULING  
OVER THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND IN FAVOR OF  
VARYING DEGREES OF TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE.

## THE LABOR ALIGNMENT

Its platform, and campaign posters state that the Alignment favors an Israel which is "a Jewish, independent, and democratic state, that maintains full equality for all of its citizens." They repeatedly state that the Alignment "does not want Israel to rule over one and a half million Arabs (in the occupied territories) against their will". The platform goes on to say that "a lasting peace is the central goal of Israeli policy during the period before us."

The question is, how to achieve this goal.

The platform states that "An Israeli government under the Alignment's leadership will initiate negotiations for peace with all of Israel's neighbors, without preconditions on any side, based upon Security Council Resolutions 338-242. Israel will examine every proposal brought before it for negotiations by authorized partners.

"The Israeli government under Alignment leadership will work to achieve a peace agreement with Jordan and with Syria within defensible borders, that will be based upon territorial compromise with each of them, in accordance with security considerations."

The official Alignment position rejects the Likud's total annexation approach, and rejects a return to the 1967 borders.

Concerning the Palestinian question, the platform states that "Being aware of the existence of the Palestinian problem, Israel will be ready to help solve the problem within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian state. The Jordanian-Palestinian state will comprise the entire area of Jordan, the majority of whose residents are Palestinian, and defined densely populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza, which will be evacuated by the IDF when peace is achieved."

Former Minister Yisrael Galili added a verbal interpretation to this plank which stated that it doesn't matter whether the Jordanian-Palestinian state would be headed by King Hussein or by Yasir Arafat, "that's their business."

The Alignment also states that "Israel rejects the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the area between Israel and Jordan. . . . The area of the Jordanian-Palestinian state to the west of the Jordan River will be demilitarized." Concerning the PLO, the platform states the "The PLO and any other organization based upon the Palestinian Charter, which rejects the right of existence of the state of Israel, the national character of the Jewish people, and uses terrorist methods, will not be a partner to the negotiations." This is an indirect way of saying that the Alignment has officially adopted the Yariv-Shemtov formula, which states that mutual recognition of the PLO and Israel is the only feasible solution, and which rejects the use of terror.

The Alignment views autonomy as one of the possible interim stages toward a fundamental solution of the conflict, and would like to include authorized representatives of the Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza in the autonomy negotiations, with or without the participation of Jordan.

Mapam, the left-wing partner of the Labor-Mapam Alignment, adds its own nuances to the above formulation. Its platform states that "Historic Palestine (Israel) on both sides of the Jordan is the joint homeland of the Jewish people returning to its home and of the Arab people dwelling in it. Mapam favors a political solution based on the existence of two independent sovereign states; Israel on the one hand and a Jordanian-Palestinian state on the other, that in addition to Jordan will include most of the area of

the West Bank and the Gaza Strip . . . (except for) border rectifications that will depend upon security considerations." Mapam adds that it does "not favor a solution based upon the establishment of a third state between Israel and Jordan. At the same time, Israel must respect the democratic decisions of the Palestinians and the Jordanians in everything concerning their sovereignty and independence beyond its borders, on condition alone that they continue to fulfill all the clauses of the agreement and security agreements included within it." The Mapam program also states that "The Israeli government must immediately cease settling in all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commence the planned dismantling of all Gush Emunim settlements in the heart of the Arab community, and freeze the existing situation in all matters concerning the lands of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."

It should also be noted that there are written platforms, and there are verbal positions. Alignment spokesmen have been known to be more moderate than the written platform. The Alignment's candidate for Prime Minister, M.K. Simon Peres, said at the World Jewish Congress gathering in Jerusalem (January 1981) that he was in favor of partition as the basis for a resolution of the conflict. People will remember that former Prime Minister M. K. Yitzhak Rabin once said that he "wouldn't mind visiting Gush Etzion (in the West Bank) with a visa." Candidate for the Defense Ministry M.K., Chaim Bar-Lev, got a lot of flak when he said that much trouble would be avoided if Jews wouldn't settle in the heart of Hebron. It is known that the Alignment's candidate for the Finance Ministry, Professor Chaim Ben Shazar, is a dove, and that Foreign Ministry candidate M.K. Abba Eban has supported a confederative Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian solution. Mapam's two ministerial candidates, M.K. Haika Grossman and Eliezer Ronen, are also outspoken doves.

### CITIZEN'S RIGHTS (CRM)

The Citizen's Rights platform states that "The State of Israel's greatest desire is peace with all its neighbors, peace evolving from security and world acknowledgment of Israel as a sovereign state, within secure and internationally recognized borders. The



Camp David Accords, and the peace agreement with Egypt, are rightfully regarded as commendable beginnings toward comprehensive peace, and should be extended to include representatives of Palestine and Jordan." The platform continues by stating that "continuous control over another nation with its process of subjugation and disregard of the national aspirations of its inhabitants, and settlement of occupied areas that are designed to perpetuate this state of affairs, result in a lowering of moral standards, the dissipation of economic resources of Israel, isolation in the community of nations, severance of the ties that bind us to World Jewry, and a danger to our very existence." Concerning the Palestinians, the platform states that "The state of Israel must recognize the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and conduct negotiations aimed at securing peace with all or any of their representatives on the basis of mutual recognition."

## SHINUI

The Shinui Party platform states that "since there is no choice but to partition the land, the final border of Israel will be determined in accordance with security considerations. The areas that will be evacuated will be demilitarized. An Israeli military presence for a period of time along the Jordan River can guarantee this. Shinui is opposed to the establishment of a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and supports the granting of an expression to Palestinian distinctiveness within the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian state . . ."

## THE ILP

The Independent Liberal platform states that "The state of Israel will continue to strive toward peace with its neighbors and toward a solution of the Palestinian problem while carefully preserving the security of the Jewish State. Attempts will be made to realize autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, but if it becomes apparent that the negotiations have reached an impasse, it will be necessary to begin negotiations for a permanent resolution of the Palestinian problem within the framework of a Palestinian-

Jordanian state. Palestinian factors will be invited to these negotiations should they recognize the state of Israel, be ready to live in peace with it, and oppose the use of terror."

### MOSHE DAYAN (TELEM)

Moshe Dayan rejects both the annexation of the occupied territories, and the readiness to evacuate them. The main plank in his peace and security platform is the call to Israel to initiate a unilateral autonomy plan, by withdrawing the military government from densely populated Palestinian areas in the West Bank and Gaza. (After Dayan's death, the party disintegrated.)

### AGUDAT YISRAEL

Agudat Yisrael, though more Orthodox on religious matters than the NRP, tends to take a more pragmatic approach on matters of peace and security. It states that territorial questions should be determined by generals and politicians, and not by rabbis. The current head of the party's Knesset list, industrialist Avraham Shapiro, is a former disciple of the late Pinchas Sapir, a Labor Finance Minister, who was noted for being a pragmatic dove.

### TAMI

Abu-Hazeira's Tami Party, which was formed at the last minute, has no platform, though its leaders are not hawks. The party's patron, World Sephardi Union Chairman Dr. Nessim Gaon, has expressed some very unconventional and courageous views on questions of peace and security, and is clearly in the dove camp.

THE FOLLOWING PARTIES SUPPORT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE ALONGSIDE THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

### SHELI

Sheli's platform states that "The central goal of Israeli security and foreign policy is to end the Israeli-Arab conflict, and to estab-

lish a comprehensive and stable peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, including the Palestinian–Arab people. In order to achieve this goal, Israel should adopt policies that are not affected by extreme nationalist positions on either the Arab or the Jewish side.”

Israeli peace initiatives should be based on the following principles; “Israel will be able to realize the goals of the Zionist idea only if it is a sovereign state, with a large Jewish majority. It will not be able to do this if it maintains a political and military rule over a large Palestinian–Arab minority. In order to achieve peace, and in order to refrain from ruling over the Palestinian–Arab people, Israel will declare in advance its readiness to give up the territories it acquired during the Six Day War, except for minor border rectifications, that will be agreed by both sides.

“Israel will evacuate the territories within the framework of a peace agreement, that will contain the political recognition of Israel by its Arab neighbors and by the Palestinian–Arab people, and their agreement to maintain normal peaceful relations with Israel. ‘Normal peaceful relations’ means: mutual recognition of the right to existence, sovereignty, independence, security, and the territorial integrity of each state. Israel recognizes the right to self-determination of the Palestinian–Arab people. The Palestinian–Arab people will decide for itself its political status, and if it so desires, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. . . . The Palestinians will be a party to negotiations for an agreement with Israel, by means of their authorized and accepted representatives. If they so desire, the negotiations will be carried out with the PLO, based upon mutual recognition. . . . The territories that Israel will evacuate will be demilitarized. . . . The arms race will be curtailed. . . . The Palestinian refugee problem will be resolved in the main within the framework of the Palestinian state, if the Palestinian people choose to establish it. Israel will help resolve the problem. . . .”

### THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT (DFPE)

The Democratic Front platform states that “Peace will be based upon respect for the rights of all states and peoples in our region, including Israel and the Palestinian–Arab people, in accordance

with the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN, that were taken after the June 1967 war. The borders of June 4, 1967, will be the recognized borders between the state of Israel and the Arab states." The platform "recognizes the right of the Palestinian-Arab people to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, alongside the state of Israel." The platform also calls for "respect for the rights of the state of Israel and of the Arab states to sovereign existence and development within conditions of peace and security. . . ." It calls for a "just resolution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees . . . the dismantling of the settlements in the conquered territories . . . and the neutralization of Israel and the Middle East. . . ." In order to establish peace, the Democratic Front favors the "convening of an international conference under the auspices of the UN with the participation of all the parties involved in the conflict, including the PLO, as the authorized and agreed upon representative of the Palestinian-Arab people, the Soviet Union, the United States, and other states.

## **FUNDAMENTAL POLICY GUIDELINES OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AS APPROVED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE KNESSET ON AUGUST 5, 1981**

### **ARTICLES RELEVANT TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT:**

1. Recognition of the common fate and joint struggle for the existence of the Jewish people in the Land of Israel and in the Diaspora.
2. The right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel, an eternal right that cannot be called into question, and which is intertwined with the right to security and peace.
3. The government will continue to place its aspirations for peace at the head of its concerns, and no effort will be spared in order to further peace. The peace treaty between Israel and



Egypt is a historic turning point in Israel's status in the Middle East.

4. The government will continue to use all means to prevent war.

5. The government will diligently observe the Camp David agreements.

6. The government will work for the renewal of negotiations on the implementation of the agreement on full autonomy for the Arab residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district.

7. The autonomy agreed upon at Camp David means neither sovereignty nor self-determination. The autonomy agreements set down at Camp David are guarantees that under no conditions will a Palestinian state emerge in the territory of Western *Eretz Yisrael*.

8. At the end of the transition period set down in the Camp David agreements, Israel will present its claim, and act to realize its right of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district.

9. Settlement in the Land of Israel is a right and an integral part of the nation's security. The government will act to strengthen, expand, and develop settlement. The government will continue to honor the principle that Jewish settlement will not cause the eviction of any person from his land, his village, or his city.

10. Equality of rights for all residents will continue to exist in the Land of Israel, with no distinctions [on the basis] of religion, race, nationality, sex, or ethnic community.

11. Israel will not descend from the Golan Heights, nor will it remove any settlement established there. It is the government that will decide on the appropriate timing for the application of Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan Heights.

27. Education will be based on the eternal values of Israel's Torah, on the values of Judaism and Zionism, love of the people of Israel and love of the homeland.

28. The government will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion to every citizen and resident, will provide for community religious requirements using state means, and will guarantee religious education to all children whose parents so desire.

34. The government will cultivate an attitude of respect toward

the heritage of Israel implant its values, strengthen the ties between the people in the Land of Israel and the Diaspora, and [strengthen] mutual responsibility and intergenerational ties.

35. Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel, indivisible, entirely under Israeli sovereignty. Free access to their holy places has been and will be guaranteed to followers of all religions.

## 1977-1981: A COMPARISON

The 1977 Knesset breakdown was:

PARTY	SEATS
Likud	43
Alignment	32
DMC (Yadin)	15
NRP	12
DFPE	5
Aguda	4
Shlomzion (A. Sharon)	2
Sheli	2
Poalei Aguda	1
CRM	1
Flatto Sharon	1
ILP	1
United Arab List	1

The breakdown of the voting in 1981 was as follows:

PARTY	VOTES	%	SEATS
Likud	718,941	37.11	48
Alignment	708,536	36.57	47
NRP	95,232	4.92	6
Aguda	72,312	3.73	4
DFPE	64,918	3.35	4
Tehiya	44,700	2.31	3
Tami	44,466	2.30	3
Telem (Dayan)	30,600	1.58	2
Shinui	29,837	1.54	2
CRM (Aloni)	27,921	1.44	1
Poalei Aguda	17,090	0.88	—

ILP	11,764	0.61	—
United Arab List	11,590	0.60	—
Flatto Sharon	10,823	0.56	—
Sheli	8,691	0.45	—
Arab Brotherhood	8,304	0.43	—
Aliya (Nes)	6,992	0.36	—
Kach (Kahana)	5,128	0.26	
Atzmaut	4,710	0.24	
One Israel	3,726	0.19	
Arab Citizens	2,596	0.13	
Pensioners (Retired)	2,404	0.13	
Ihud	1,293	0.07	
Ya'ad	1,228	0.06	
Otzma	839	0.04	
Ohalim	545	0.03	
Income tax repeal	503	0.03	
Amcha	460	0.02	
Youth	412	0.02	
Council for a Changing Society	405	0.02	
Yozma	400	0.02	

---

## EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS—PEACE NOW

### OBJECTIVES

Peace Now is a broad-based non-partisan movement. It seeks to further the following objectives:

- The fulfillment by the State of Israel of Zionism as the national liberation movement of the Jewish people in its homeland.
- Israel living in security and peace with all its neighbors.
- Israel as a state of law, freedom, and full equality of rights for all its citizens, regardless of religion or nationality.
- Israel capable of attracting *aliyah* (immigration) and providing a focus of identification for the Jews of Diaspora.

These objectives will not be attained so long as our rule over the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza continues.

The continuing rule over another people—

- Involves acts which violate human and Jewish ethics.
- Leads to the corruption of society, to the undermining of democracy, and to violence.
  - Erodes the wide-based national consensus.
  - Imposes upon the Israeli Defense Forces tasks which distort its character as an army defending its people.
  - Escalates the struggle in the territories, causes bloodshed, and increases the danger of war.
  - Creates barriers between Israel and the Jews of the Diaspora, and isolates Israel from the family of nations.

Therefore, peace on all our borders is crucial for us.

This ongoing struggle for the attainment of the true Zionist dream is a struggle of the entire Jewish people.

## PEACE NOW AND THE WAR IN LEBANON

Before the war began Peace Now opposed an Israeli incursion into Lebanon. A demonstration against the possibility of such an incursion was staged during the missile crisis of May–June 1981. During the intervening year, and up to the very hours prior to the June 1982 invasion, the movement issued numerous statements, lobbied, and pressured in an effort to avert a military confrontation on Israel's northern border.

In the early weeks of the war, with many of its members and leaders in the front lines, Peace Now spearheaded the growing public protest to Israel's involvement in Lebanon. On July 3, 1982 a mass rally of 100,000 people was held in Tel Aviv to protest the war and its aims. Speakers called upon the government to seize the opportunity presented by the new situation, to turn to the Palestinians and initiate negotiations aimed at resolving the problems of the West Bank and Gaza.

Throughout the course of the war Peace Now sustained a continual stream of protest in the form of meetings, symposia, vigils, and demonstrations. These activities gave voice to the views of those Israelis who decried the use of the IDF in a non-defensive action, the attempt to force a new order upon Lebanon, and the reliance upon military strength to settle the



conflict with the Palestinians. Peace Now's opposition to the war in Lebanon rests upon the following principles:

- Military action will not and cannot solve the Palestinian issue. This can only be achieved through negotiations.
- The invasion of Lebanon was not necessary to Israel's defense, and did not further Israel's legitimate security interests.
- The elimination of the military arm of the PLO does not eliminate the PLO as an effective political force nor does it effect the likelihood of PLO terrorist activity in the future.
- Intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon involves Israel in a deep political quagmire. Such involvement is detrimental to Israel's security.
- Israel's involvement in a war the aims and conduct of which many Israelis and much of world Jewry reject have created a rift within the nation and between the Israeli government and world Jewry. Moreover, the war has further isolated Israel within the international community.

## PEACE NOW AND THE BEIRUT MASSACRE

Members of Peace Now, like many other Israelis, were horrified at the news of the senseless slaughter of Palestinian refugees by Christian militiamen in the Sabra and Shatila camps. The movement claimed that the massacre cannot be disassociated from the Israeli government's fundamental attitude towards the Palestinian problem: that the problem could be resolved through the use of force. This approach first led us into Lebanon and led us to assume responsibility for West Beirut. Therefore, the movement charged that the government was morally and politically responsible for the tragic events in the refugee camps, and took the lead in organizing a public outcry against the meaningless destruction of human life.

The day after the news of the massacre reached Israeli TV and radio, Peace Now staged a demonstration outside the Prime Minister's house. During the next ten days, the traditional Days of Awe between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, the movement organized and led a series of meetings, rallies, and demonstrations throughout the country giving expression to the general sentiment of horror and anger. The movement

demanded that a judicial commission of inquiry be established to investigate the events leading up to the killings. Further, Peace Now called for the resignation of those responsible for the decision to invade West Beirut and to send the Christian militia into the refugee camps.

On September 25, 1982 the largest rally in Israel's history was held in Tel Aviv, organized by Peace Now, the Labor Party, *Mapam*, and *Shinui*. Four hundred thousand Israelis gathered to express sympathy for the victims of the tragedy and to press for the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry. Speakers denounced the Begin-Sharon path of war which had led Israel into a political morass, and which had alienated our friends in the United States and Europe. The demonstration called for a new policy grounded upon negotiations as the only way to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

## PEACE NOW AND THE QUEST FOR A JUST PEACE

At this moment, more than ever before, there is a pressing need to find a lasting solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. Peace Now has set forth guidelines for the peace process.

### THE PRINCIPLES OF A SETTLEMENT:

The peace agreement shall be founded on the following principles:

- Readiness by both sides to agree to a partition of *Eretz Yisrael*. While the people of Israel have a bond with the entire land of Israel, the existence of two peoples on this land necessitates partition as the basis for any compromise solution. Herein lies the basic contradiction between realistic Zionism and the conception of a greater Israel.
- Recognition of Israel. The peoples of the region, including the Palestinians, should recognize Israel's right to sovereign existence within secure and agreed-upon borders, and should abandon the road of war and terror.
- Recognition of Palestinian national existence. Israel should recognize the right of the Palestinians to a national existence, which will be realized in a manner to be agreed upon by the parties concerned.

- Peace with security. The interests of Israel's security shall be assured in any peace agreement. Security has many aspects; recognized defensible borders are only one phase of the security for which we strive.

- Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, shall not be redivided. Within its boundaries as one city, proper expression should be given to Jerusalem's unique status in the Moslem and Christian worlds, as well as to the national affinity of its Arab residents.

#### THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS:

The continuation of the peace process requires that:

- Israel shall take an initiative aimed at breaking the vicious cycle of Israeli-Palestinian hostility. The government of Israel shall declare its readiness to negotiate with those representatives of the Palestinians who recognize negotiations as the only path towards resolution of the conflict.

- Israel shall strive to engage Jordan in the peace process, and so also any other Arab state which seeks to play a constructive part in the peace process.

- Israel shall continue to nurture peaceful relations with Egypt, whose contribution to the process of a comprehensive peace in the region is essential. Continuing confrontation with the Palestinians endangers the existence of the peace which has already been achieved.

- Any temporary arrangement which precedes a peace treaty must be consistent with the principles of the permanent agreement.

- The Autonomy Plan must not be used as a vehicle for annexation and as an obstacle to any future peace agreements.

#### ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVES

First and foremost, however, Israel must immediately do its part:

- A moratorium should be placed on any further settlement and expropriation of land in the West Bank.

- The settlers, some of whom contribute significantly to the spread of hatred, violence, and friction, should be restrained.

- The restrictions placed upon the Arab population shall be removed, except for those limitations which are clearly required for security reasons. The right of these residents to man-

age their own affairs and to maintain their own institutions should be preserved.

- The well-being, property, and dignity of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, currently under Israeli control, should be stringently safeguarded.

- All resources currently channelled towards settlements in the West Bank should be redirected towards solving the problems of the social gap and of deprivation within Israel.

#### THE REAGAN PLAN

The proposals aired by President Ronald Reagan on September 1, 1982 constitute a basis for negotiations between Israel and her Arab neighbors. Peace Now calls on the government of Israel to reconsider its rejection of the US program and accept it as a starting point for constructive negotiations.

Peace with Egypt has been achieved. The goal which faces us now is to complete the peace process throughout the entire region; to attain peace that will enable all the peoples of this war-torn region to live securely and to flourish.

#### TO FRIENDS OF ISRAEL AND OF PEACE NOW

Recent events have compelled Israelis to engage in a reassessment of their country's fundamental policies in an effort to insure the security of Israel as a democratic Jewish state at peace with its neighbors.

Peace Now calls upon you to join this historic dialogue, in the belief that Jews everywhere have an unshakeable right to participate in Israel's internal political debate.

"Freedom of debate is one of the central values of a democracy. It is a safeguard against the arbitrary use of power, and its exercise strengthens the spirit of dedication and sacrifice amongst civilians and soldiers alike.

The role of diaspora Jews in the creation and defense of Israel is so central that it would be absurd to deny them the opportunity of giving their opinion and counsel on matters affecting our country's destiny. The responsibility of decision rests with Israel's citizens alone, but if we are alone in decision we do not have to be alone in discussion and good counsel. These princi-



ples apply to PEACE NOW just as they apply to others with different or contrary views.”

Abba Eban

Peace Now welcomes the support and advice of all Jews committed to and concerned with the future of Israel and the character of the state.

## **THE ISRAELI COUNCIL FOR ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES—JANUARY 1976**

We Affirm

1. That this land is the homeland of its two peoples—the people of Israel and the Palestinian Arab people.

2. That the heart of the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs is the historical confrontation between the two peoples of this land, which is dear to both.

3. That the only path to peace is through co-existence between two sovereign states, each with its distinct national identity: the state of Israel for the Jewish people and a state for the Palestinian Arab people, which will exercise its right to self-determination in the political framework of its choosing.

4. That the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state alongside the state of Israel should be the outcome of negotiations between the government of Israel and a recognized and authoritative representative body of the Palestinian Arab people, without refusing negotiation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, on the basis of mutual recognition.

5. That the border between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arab state will correspond to the pre-war lines of June 1967, except for changes agreed upon by the parties and after settlement of the problem of Jerusalem.

6. That Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel. Being sacred to three religions and inhabited by the two peoples, it deserves a special status. It will remain united under a common municipal roof-organization and will be accessible to people of all nations

and faiths. Jerusalem will continue to be the capital of the state of Israel, and the Arab part could become, after the establishment of peace, the capital of the Palestinian Arab state. The Holy Places of all three religions will be administered autonomously by their respective institutions.

7. That the border between Israel and the Palestinian Arab state will be open to the free movement of people and goods throughout the land. Palestinian Arabs will not settle in Israel nor Israelis in the Palestinian Arab state other than by consent of the two governments.

8. That the creation of a Palestinian Arab state will contribute decisively to the solution of the national and humanitarian problem of the refugees. Israel will assist in this solution.

9. That the early stages of Israel-Palestinian co-existence will require mutually-agreed-upon security arrangements. There will be guarantees that foreign military forces will not enter the territory of either of the two states.

10. That the two states will be sovereign in all respects, including matters of immigration and return. The state of Israel will preserve its inalienable link to Zionism and to the Jewish people throughout the world, and the Palestinian Arab state will maintain the link of its people to the Arab world.

11. That the two states will aim to conduct a continuing dialogue in order to forge closer relations between them, to solve common problems in a spirit of cooperation and for the benefit of both nations. The two states shall not engage in any acts to alter the structure of the co-existence between them, except by mutual agreement.

12. That for the benefit of all nations in the area there should be a system of regional co-operation, in which both the state of Israel and the Palestinian Arab state will participate.

# **International Jewish Document**

---

## **THE PARIS DECLARATION, JULY 2, 1982**

Peace need not be made between friends, but between enemies who have struggled and suffered. Our sense of Jewish history and the moral imperatives of this moment require us to insist that the time is urgent for mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinian people. There must be a stop to the sterile debate, whereby the Arab world challenges the existence of Israel and Jews challenge the political legitimacy of the Palestinian fight for independence.

The real issue is not whether the Palestinians are entitled to their rights, but how to bring this about while ensuring Israel's security and regional stability. Ambiguous concepts such as "autonomy" are no longer sufficient, for they too often are used to confuse rather than to clarify. Needed now is the determination to reach a political accommodation between Israeli and Palestinian nationalisms.

The war in Lebanon must stop. Israel must lift its siege of Beirut in order to facilitate negotiations with the PLO, leading to a political settlement. Mutual recognition must be vigorously pursued. And there should be negotiations with the aim of achieving coexistence between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples based on self-determination.

**Dr. Nahum Goldmann,**  
Former President of  
the World Zionist Organization,  
Founder-President of  
the World Jewish  
Congress.

**Philip M. Klutznick,**  
Former U.S. Secretary of Commerce,  
President Emeritus of  
the World Jewish  
Congress, Honorary  
President of B'nai  
B'rith International.

**Pierre Mendès  
France,**  
Former Prime Minister  
of France.

## APPENDIX III

# **A Brief History of *New Outlook***

---

In the first issue of *New Outlook* which appeared in July, 1957, Martin Buber wrote that "The hour has come for the peoples of the Middle East to get a new outlook in order to see where their great common interest lies and to act accordingly."

The hour was less than one year after the second Arab-Israeli war, which took place in October, 1956.

The Statement of Purpose, published in the first issue of the magazine declared that:

It is the desire of the sponsors and editors of *New Outlook* that this publication serve as a medium for the clarification of problems concerning peace and cooperation among all the peoples of the Middle East. It will, therefore, be open to the expression of opinions, however diverse, having that general aim in view.

In his introductory remarks to the Washington Symposium on "The Middle East Between War and Peace" in October, 1979, Founding Editor-in-Chief Simha Flapan described the magazine's aims in the following manner:

Our magazine was founded twenty-two years ago, at the inspiration of Professor Martin Buber, by a small group of Israeli Jews and Arabs from different walks of life and of different political and social philosophies. We set ourselves three aims: First, to study the roots of the Israeli-Arab conflict by stripping off all the prejudices, stereotypes, and images created by fear, mistrust, and propaganda.



The second aim was to build up and develop a Jewish-Arab dialogue on the ways to reconcile the national aspirations of both peoples.

The third aim was to involve international public opinion in the peace efforts. We perceived the Israeli-Arab conflict as an international problem *par excellence*, insoluble without the help of the world community.

This explains why we publish *New Outlook* in English and why we organize international symposia. *New Outlook* provides an open forum for a Jewish-Arab dialogue and for new ideas. The symposia serve two purposes: they serve—if I may introduce a new word into the English language—as a “sincerometer”, meaning, to probe the depth of seriousness and the sincerity of new ideas and their potential of becoming an active political trend. The symposia are also meant to induce, stimulate, and mobilize people for action. But let me make it clear: the editors of *New Outlook*, though united by a basic approach, are not unanimous in their views on how to achieve peace and solve the Palestinian problem. We invite to our symposia personalities who are not associated with *New Outlook*, formally or otherwise, and who represent a wide spectrum of public opinion. We do not base the Symposium on a specific political platform, and we do not conclude it with resolutions and statements. All we are interested in is an open debate, a frank exchange of views, and direct human and personal contacts, which enable both sides to listen and understand each other.

The magazine's intentions were well reflected by the contents of the first issue: In addition to articles by Albert Einstein (“On Israeli-Arab Relations”) and Nahum Goldmann (“Hands Proffered in Friendship”), there are pieces on “The Arab Minority in Israel” (by Abdul Aziz Zuabi of Nazareth, a founding editor, who later became the first Arab Deputy Minister in Israel), “Planning a Modern Arab Village,” “Camels and Combine Harvesters,” “New Outlook on Israeli Foreign Policy” and “Developments in Jordan.”

*New Outlook* has a long history of participation in international symposia. The first was held in Florence, Italy, late in 1958. It was devoted to relations between the nations bordering the Mediterranean and took place under the auspices of the idealistic mayor of Florence, Prof. Giorgio La Pira.

Simha Flapan wrote at the time that "[Though] originally planned as a meeting of scholars, philosophers and religious and spiritual leaders devoted to the cause of peace between nations, it attracted statesmen and politicians as well. The importance of the conference did not lie in its deliberations. It lay rather in the fact that French and North Africans, Israelis and Arabs, came voluntarily to a meeting designed in advance to promote understanding and agreement between nations. It also lay in the fact that heads of government, including Charles de Gaulle and Gamal Abdel Nasser, sent greetings as well as delegates and observers. . . ."

It is interesting to note that the present King of Morocco, Hassan II, who has subsequently been closely involved in the peace process between Israel and Egypt, chaired the meeting.

In its pursuit of peace, *New Outlook* has also been active in helping to establish and publicize a wide range of public groups and organizations in Israel. Thus, in 1959, it was instrumental in the founding of the "Committee for the De-nuclearization of the Israeli-Arab Conflict." In 1967, it was involved in the establishment of "The Movement For Peace and Security," and in 1978, it was associated with the emergence of another important Israeli peace movement, "Peace Now."

Some of *New Outlook's* initiatives have aroused great controversy. "New Paths to Peace," a symposium held in January 1963 in Tel Aviv and Nazareth to celebrate *New Outlook's* fifth anniversary, was highly appreciated by Mr. Antony Benn, then a young British parliamentarian, who said: "This symposium has established *New Outlook* as a distinguished forum for ideas inside Israel."

Four years later, months before the outbreak of the Six-Day War, the renowned French philosopher and writer, Jean-Paul Sartre, accompanied by Simone de Beauvoir, arrived in Israel. Their visit followed a tour of Egypt, and was organized jointly by *New Outlook* and the Egyptian publication *Al-Taliya*. Sartre's visit to Egypt and Israel was planned, coordinated, and executed by Mr. Ali-Al-Samman, the Director of the Egyptian Middle East News Agency in Paris, and *New Outlook's* founder-editor, Simha Flapan. Both of them have collaborated with Jean-Paul Sartre in the preparation and publication of *Temps Modernes* (No. 267, March 1967) on the Israeli-Arab conflict. This was the first publi-

cation in which Arabs and Israelis presented their case side by side. During their visit, Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir explored and discussed the ways to a peaceful solution with President Abdul Nasser and President Zalman Shazar, Ministers of the Egyptian and Israeli governments, as well as with writers, trade unionists, experts, and people in the streets. The special issue of *Temps Modernes* was later translated into many languages (including Arabic) and served as a "dossier" to all concerned with Israeli-Arab conflict.

"The Goldmann Affair" of 1970 caused a public uproar in Israel. It resulted from the Israel government's refusal to endorse an unofficial meeting between the late Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the President of the World Jewish Congress, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

In the aftermath of the affair, Dr. Goldmann published an important, and perhaps prophetic, two-part article in *New Outlook* dealing with Israeli policy towards the Arab world. Entitled "A Time for Re-evaluation," it spelled out an alternative policy line. Up to his death a short while ago, Nahum Goldmann was a staunch friend and supporter of the magazine. During its twenty-five years of existence, he contributed many controversial pieces.

The late seventies saw renewed hope for dialogue and peace, despite the forming of a right-wing nationalist Likud government. *New Outlook's* twentieth anniversary, in 1977, coincided with the visit of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Israel. The historic visit also coincided with a symposium planned months earlier by the journal. Held in November of that year, it was slated to deal with such issues as "the Palestinian problem, Israel and the world community." The symposium drew a number of prominent world figures and many leading Israelis and Palestinians. Among the cabled greetings received by the symposium's organizers was one signed by Mohammed Anwar Sadat. In his first public statement to an Israeli group, the Egyptian leader wrote: "It is only within the bounds of a truly new outlook on the world of human affairs that men of goodwill may find their way to build peace together, and to beat their swords into ploughshares. Only then will they be able to lift the nightmare of renewed military confrontation from our suffering and anguished peoples." At the symposium's closing session, former French Premier Pierre Mendès-France said:



"The motto and slogan which has been the keynote of this symposium, and which was suggested by *New Outlook*, is 'Can the Guns Fall Silent?' That depends on us all—on our tenacity, on our will to ensure that the reply to tomorrow, after these new endeavours. . . will at last be 'Yes,' and that peace will finally be granted, throughout the world, to all men of goodwill."

Before his departure from Jerusalem, President Sadat received a special delegation from the *New Outlook* Symposium, including Dr. Nahum Goldmann and Pierre Mendès-France. He emphasized in this meeting the centrality of the Palestinian problem and implored *New Outlook* to devote itself to this question.

Less than a year later, in 1978, a unique event took place in Jerusalem: a face-to-face dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. Attended by fifteen to twenty Israelis and twelve Palestinians—writers, intellectuals and political figures—the debate dealt openly with the issues relating to Palestinian national rights and coexistence. One of the organizers, Tony Klug, commented: "If the debate accomplished nothing else, it revealed the considerable potential for an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue." The full text of that debate was published under the title, "When Enemies Dare to Talk" (Croom-Helm, London, 1979).

In October, 1979, *New Outlook* carried out its most ambitious venture to date. An international symposium was held in Washington, D.C., under the title "The Middle East Between War and Peace." Over 700 Israelis, Arabs, Europeans and Americans gathered together to discuss the problems and prospects for peace. This was the first time that prominent members of the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps appeared together in front of an American audience, and it also marked the first visit to America of the young "Peace Now" Activists.

An important step toward an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue was made by the Palestinian scholar, Professor Elias Tuma who, together with Dr. Haim Darin-Drabkin, founder and chairman of *New Outlook's* editorial board, published a study on the viability of an independent Palestinian state. Professor Tuma joined the editorial council of *New Outlook*.

For the last three years *New Outlook* has focused its efforts on the journalistic side of the magazine. To improve the quality of the coverage of Middle Eastern events and to broaden its



readership in the Arab world, it was decided to employ a regular Cairo correspondent, Abd Elsattar Eltawila, who in 1980 became the first Egyptian correspondent for an Israel-based publication. His début article, on "Moslem Groups in Egypt," appeared in September 1980.

Another aspect of this journalistic drive was the publication of a special French-language issues of *New Outlook* in January of the following year. The issue, entitled "The Sephardim and Peace," included articles by Israeli President Yitzhak Navon, former MK Shalom Cohen, Elie Eliachar and Nessim D. Gaon, and was widely distributed in France.

Inside Israel, *New Outlook* initiated the annual "Sylvia Shine Peace Prize" for Jewish-Arab understanding. At a prize ceremony held in Jerusalem under the auspices of Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, prizes are awarded to individuals and organizations that have done outstanding work in the field of Jewish-Arab relations.

In 1981, *New Outlook* also began to hold public forums in Israel on problem-topics of the day, such as "The 1981 Elections: An Analysis," "The Israeli Arabs," and "*Sephardi-Ashkenazi* Relations."

1982, the year of the Lebanese war, was highlighted by the worldwide activities of peace movements against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. *New Outlook* contributed its share to this vitally important cause by publishing a special issue dealing with "The Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation and Confrontation in the Middle East." However, anti-nuclear activities planned by the *New Outlook* staff for June were postponed due to the invasion of Lebanon.

Members of *New Outlook* are currently involved in another ambitious venture, the establishment of "The International Center for Peace in the Middle East" (ICP-ME), an alternative policy study institute, which will be based in Israel.

In commenting on *New Outlook's* 25th anniversary, Mr. Zvi Klementynovski, the former Deputy Mayor of Tel Aviv and a member of the Independent Liberal Party (ILP), said that "*New Outlook* has always comprised a cross-section of viewpoints in Israel, both Jewish and Arab." Mr. Klementynovski has been associated with *New Outlook* since its inception. *New Outlook's*

Editorial Board and Editorial Council are comprised of journalists, authors, and academics who are members of the Labor Party, Mapam, Sheli, Citizen's Rights, the ILP, Shinui, The DFPE, the NRP, and many independents. In its earlier years, it also included members of the Liberal Party within the Likud, some of whom are still sympathetic to *New Outlook*. Yeshayahu Ben Porat, a senior political analyst for the Israeli daily *Yediot Ahronot* has said that "*New Outlook* is a platform par excellence of the dove camp in Israel."

Many greetings were received upon the occasion of *New Outlook's* 25th anniversary, from Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Pierre Mendès-France, Philip Klutznick, Lord Caradon, Victor Shemtov, Arie (Lova) Eliav, Raymonda Tawil, and many others. One of the most significant greetings was from a noted American political scientist, Dr. Don Peretz, who said that "*New Outlook* is prized, not only in the English speaking countries, but in the Arab East, where it is read and cited among influentials in Cairo, Beirut, Amman, and Damascus. It is therefore a bridge, one of the very few, between Israel and its neighbors."

In its 25th year, a younger generation is assuming responsibility for *New Outlook's* journalistic and other activities. The magazine will continue to analyze, discuss and describe events in the region and the prospects for peace. It will continue to be a forum for dialogue, and hopefully, it will grow from being a Jewish-Arab magazine in Israel to a genuine regional magazine, just as the partial peace between Israel and Egypt will hopefully develop into a genuine comprehensive peace between Israel and all of the other nations and countries in the Middle East.

## ***New Outlook's* First Editorial, July 1957**

*New Outlook* will devote itself to regional cooperation, to a peaceful and constructive solution to the problem of Israel-Arab relations, to the integration of Israel within the Asian-African world.

Eighty years ago, the Jewish people began to return and to rebuild its ancient national home. The anomaly of the Jewish position everywhere, the discrimination and persecution to which vast numbers of Jews have been subjected, made this process inevitable.

The necessity to rescue the dispersed Jewish people, and especially the remnants who survived the slaughter of six million by Nazi terror, intensified the urge that has actuated Jews to get together to create a new economy and society.

The Jews who devoted themselves to this task of rebuilding sincerely believed it possible to do so in friendly cooperation with their Arab neighbors.

The Arabs, freed forty years ago from long centuries of subjugation by the Ottomans, and awakened to national consciousness, had to fight against British rule and strove with perseverance for self-determination, independence, and unhampered national development.

Unhappily, these two national movements clashed. Attempts to establish good relations and cooperation failed. Misunderstandings, fears, armed outbreaks,—all sharpened and deepened the gulf. Yet the tenacity with which both peoples pursued their aims has proved how deeply rooted are their national aspirations.

The United Nations General Assembly Decision of November

29, 1947, to partition Palestine into two states within an economic union was followed by an invasion from neighboring Arab states. This war terminated in a very uneasy truce between Israel and the Arab states, and in the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of homeless Arab refugees. Truce violations have created a spiral of fedayeen raids and retaliations, with their climax in the Sinai Campaign.

The present situation gravely endangers the peoples of the area and world peace. It has become increasingly clear that the resort to force is not the means whereby relations between peoples can be normalized.

*New Outlook* is deeply convinced that peace is consistent with the national interests of Jew and Arab alike. It sees Israel as part of the fabric of social, cultural, and economic development of the whole Middle East. It believes that Israel can and should be a useful and equal member of the family of nations in the area and that the sources of friction can and must be eliminated.

It seeks an equitable and humanitarian settlement for the Arab refugees and peace with mutual security and benefit between Israel and the Arab states. Only a firmly established and lasting peace between the Arab states and Israel, a peace which would ensure the rightful claims of the peoples concerned, can further the consummation of their national aspirations. Only peace can extricate the peoples of the area from the dangers of great-power rivalry and ensure conditions of free development. To this aim the efforts of *New Outlook* will be devoted.

The essential need of all the people in the area is to live and be at peace with their neighbors. The achievement of full equality and opportunity for the Arabs in Israel as well as for all national groups in all countries of the Middle East, which this journal will consistently advocate, will be facilitated by peace.

The refugee tragedy demands a peaceful and reasonable solution. The neighboring Arab lands, too, can gain from peace. Tensions and outbreaks only make the Middle East more susceptible to big-power interference and contribute an element of instability fraught with dangers. The Arab movement for liberation has always had the sympathy of the Jewish national movement. The aspirations of the Arab peoples for complete emancipation would be helped rather than hindered by good relations with the national



movement of the Jews. And within the larger framework of Asia and Africa, Israel, with its mixed population of European and Afro-Asian origin, with its rapid industrialization and its scientific potential, could be a very useful partner instead of an outsider.

It is because of considerations such as these that *New Outlook* hopes and believes that Arab-Jewish and Afro-Asian-Israeli cooperation is possible. It will, obviously, not come easily. It has to be built. *New Outlook* is a forum by and for those who want to consider how such cooperation can be developed, what obstacles hinder it, how to remove these obstacles. The journal has no specific solution. It invites serious consideration of the problem. It is willing to face the grave difficulties and misunderstandings, to acknowledge the suffering on both sides and the conflicting needs.

*New Outlook* wants, first of all, to create an opportunity for Israelis and Arabs, for Asians, Africans, Europeans, and Americans, to discuss these problems together, to express their apprehensions, to submit their suggestions, even to debate with each other. It aims to achieve some measure of mutual understanding by facilitating contacts, clarifying problems, and disseminating unbiased information on all aspects of the life and culture of the peoples involved.

The idea of a publication such as *New Outlook* had its origins in the Jewish-Arab Association for Peace and Equality. It is actually being established by a group of Jews and Arabs in Israel of varied social background and streams of thought. It welcomes participation by anybody who wishes to support its broad purposes.

Peace in the Middle East today is one of the primary concerns of world opinion. An objective consideration of this problem, issuing from the Middle East itself, and in a language available to a large international public, can be an instrument to enlighten and clarify this opinion and to activate it constructively.

It is with a sense of dedication to these ends that the first issue of *New Outlook* goes to press.

---

# Dialogue and Peace

MARTIN BUBER

MARTIN BUBER WAS ONE OF THE FOUNDERS AND SPIRITUAL FATHERS OF *NEW OUTLOOK*. IN HIS GREETING TO THE FIRST ISSUE, HE SAID THAT "THE FUTURE OF THE NEAR EAST DEPENDS ON A COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION OF JEWS AND ARABS. THE HOUR IS COME FOR THE PEOPLES TO GET A NEW OUTLOOK, IN ORDER TO SEE WHERE THEIR GREAT COMMON INTEREST LIES AND TO ACT ACCORDINGLY IN COMMON."

Hearkening to the human voice, where it speaks forth unfalsified, and replying to it, this above all is what is needed today. The busy noise of the hour must no longer drown out the *vox humana*, the essence of the human which has become a voice. This voice must not only be listened to, it must be answered and led out of lonely monologue into the awakening dialogue of the peoples. Peoples must engage in talk with one another through their truly human men if the great peace is to appear and the devastated life of the earth renew itself.

The great peace is something essentially different from the absence of war.

There is an early mural in the town hall of Siena in which the civic names are assembled. Worthy and conscious of their worth,

---

MARTIN BUBER was a noted theologian, philosopher, educator, and prolific writer. He was a consistent advocate of Jewish-Arab cooperation and peace from the time of his arrival in Palestine in the 1930s until his death in 1965.

the women sit, except one in their midst who towers above the rest. This woman is marked not by dignity but rather by composed majesty. Three letters announce her name: Pax. She represents the great peace I have in mind. This peace does not signify that what men call war no longer exists now that it holds sway—that means too little to enable one to understand this serenity. Something new exists, now really exists, greater and mightier than war. Human passions flow into war as the waters into the sea, and war disposes of them as it likes. But these passions must enter into the great peace as ore into the fire that melts and transforms it. Peoples will then build with one another.

The Sienese painter had glimpsed this majestic peace in his dream alone. He did not acquire the vision from historical reality, for it has never appeared there. What in history has been called peace has never, in fact, been aught other than an anxious or an illusory blissful pause between wars. But the womanly genius of the painter's dream is no mistress of interruptions but the queen of new and greater deeds.

May we, then, cherish the hope that the countenance which has remained unknown to all previous history will shine forth on our late generation, apparently sunk irretrievably in disaster? Are we not accustomed to describe the world situation in which we have lived since the end of the Second World War no longer even as peace but as the "cold" phase of a world war declared in permanence? In a situation which no longer even seeks to preserve the appearance of peace, is it not illusory enthusiasm to speak of a great peace, which has never existed, being within reach?

It is the depth of our crisis that allows us to hope for this. Ours is not the historically familiar malady in the life of peoples which can eventuate in a comfortable recovery. Primal forces are now being summoned to take an active part in an unrepeatable decision between extinction and rebirth. War has not produced this crisis; it is, rather, the crisis of man which has brought forth the total war and the unreal peace which followed.

War has always had an adversary who hardly ever comes forward as such but does his work in the stillness. This adversary is speech, fulfilled speech, the speech of genuine conversation in which men understand one another and come to a mutual understanding. Already in primitive warfare fighting begins where men

are no longer able to discuss with one another the subjects under dispute or submit them to mediation, but flee from speech with one another and in the speechlessness of slaughter seek what they suppose to be a decision, a judgment of God. War soon conquers speech and enslaves it in the service of its battle-cries. But where speech, be it ever so shy, moves from camp to camp, war is already called in question. Its cannons easily drown out the word; but when the word has become entirely soundless, and on this side and on that soundlessly bears into the hearts of men the intelligence that no human conflict can really be resolved through killing, not even through mass killing, then the human word has already begun to silence the cannonade.

But it is just the relation of man to speech and to conversation that the crisis characteristic of our age has in particular tended to shatter. The man in crisis will no longer entrust his cause to conversation because its presupposition—trust—is lacking. This is the reason why the cold war which today goes by the name of peace has been able to overcome mankind. In every earlier period of peace the living word passed between man and man, time after time drawing the poison from the antagonism of interests and convictions so that these antagonisms did not degenerate into the absurdity of “no farther,” into the madness of “men-wage-war.” This living word of human dialogue that from time to time makes its flights until the madness smothers it, now seems to have become lifeless in the midst of the nonwar. The debates between statesmen conveyed to us by the radio no longer have anything in common with human conversation, the diplomats do not address one another but the faceless public. Even the congresses and conferences which convene in the name of mutual understanding lack the substance which alone can elevate the deliberations to genuine talk: candor and directness in address and answer. What is concentrated, then, is only the universal condition in which men are no longer willing or no longer able to speak directly to their fellows. They are not able to speak directly because they no longer trust one another, and everybody knows that the other no longer trusts him. If anyone in the hubbub of contradictory talk happens to pause and take stock, he discovers that in his relations to others hardly anything persists that deserves to be called trust.



And yet this must be said again and again, it is just the depth of the crisis that empowers us to hope. Let us dare to grasp the situation with that great realism that surveys all the definable realities of public life, of which, indeed, public life appears to be composed, but is also aware of what is most real of all, albeit moving secretly in the depths—the latent healing and salvation in the face of impending ruin. The power of turning that radically changes the situation, never reveals itself outside of crisis. This power begins to function when one, gripped by despair, instead of allowing himself to be submerged, calls forth his primal powers and accomplishes with them the turning of his very existence. It happens in this way both in the life of the person and in that of the race. In its depths the crisis demands naked decision, no mere fluctuation between getting worse and getting better, but a decision between the decomposition and the renewal of the tissue.

The crisis of man which has become apparent in our day announces itself most clearly as a crisis of trust, if we may employ, thus intensified, a concept of economics. You ask, trust in whom? But the question already contains a limitation not admissible here. It is simply trust that is increasingly lost to men of our time. And the crisis of speech is bound up with loss of trust in the closest possible fashion, for I can only speak to someone in the true sense of the term if I expect him to accept my word as genuine. Therefore, the fact that it is so difficult for present-day man to pray (note well: not to hold it to be true that there is a God, but to address Him) and the fact that it is so difficult for him to carry on a genuine talk with his fellowmen, are elements of a single set of facts. This lack of trust in Being, this incapacity for unreserved intercourse with the other, points to an innermost sickness of the sense of existence. One symptom of this sickness, and the most acute of all, is the one from which I have begun: that a genuine word cannot arise between the camps.

Can such an illness be healed? I believe it can be. And it is out of this, my belief, that I speak to you. I have no proof for this belief. No belief can be proved; otherwise it would not be what it is, a great venture. Instead of offering proof, I appeal to that potential belief of each of my hearers which enables him to believe.

If there be a cure, where can the healing action start? Where must that existential turning begin which the healing powers, the powers of salvation in the ground of the crisis, await?

That peoples can no longer carry on authentic dialogue with one another is not only the most acute symptom of the pathology of our time, it is also that which most urgently makes a demand of us. I believe, despite all, that the peoples in this hour can enter into dialogue, into a genuine dialogue with one another. In a genuine dialogue each of the partners, even when he stands in opposition to the other, heeds, affirms, and confirms his opponent as an existing other. Only so can conflict certainly not be eliminated from the world, but be humanly arbitrated and led toward its overcoming.

To the task of initiating this conversation those are inevitably called who carry on today within each people the battle against the antihuman. Those who build the great unknown front across mankind shall make it known by speaking unreservedly with one another, not overlooking what divides them but determined to bear this division in common.

In opposition to them stands the element that profits from the divisions between the peoples, the contra-human in men, the sub-human, the enemy of man's will to become a true humanity.

The name Satan means in Hebrew the hinderer. That is the correct designation for the anti-human in individuals and in the human race. Let us not allow this Satanic element in men to hinder us from realizing man! Let us release speech from its ban! Let us dare, despite all, to trust!





















(continued from front flap)

Balfour Declaration through the U.N. Partition Plan, Resolutions 242 and 338, basic Palestinian documents such as the National Covenant and National Council Resolutions, Zionist and Israeli documents including the policy guidelines for the present Likud government and the peace platforms of the various parties and extra-parliamentary groups, down through the most recent relevant documents, including the Reagan initiative and the Fez Resolutions. The final section of the volume contains Israeli and Arab visions of the future road to peace, and concludes with a brief history of *New Outlook* magazine (now celebrating its 25th anniversary in Tel Aviv), the long-standing liberal publication started by Martin Buber as a home for Israeli and Palestinian dialogue.

*After Lebanon* is a basic handbook for both peace activist and scholar, and for all people who are disturbed and confused by the headlines coming out of the Middle East.

HILLEL SCHENKER is an editor and special projects director at *New Outlook* in Tel Aviv. He has also been a Peace Now activist since its inception in 1978. He has published articles extensively in Hebrew and English and is the former editor of the English language magazine of the Kibbutz Artzi Federation.

JACKET DESIGN BY VINCENT TORRE

JACKET PHOTOS: HAOLAM HAZEH NEWSMAGAZINE, TEL AVIV

**The Pilgrim Press**  
132 West 31 Street  
New York, N.Y. 10001

## From *AFTER LEBANON* by Hillel Schenker

### ABBA EBAN

"Israel's urgent need is to grasp that the avoidance of Israeli rule over the million Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza is not only a concession by Israel to her adversaries, but also a service that Israel should render to her own interest and destiny."

### KING HUSSEIN

"We are anxious to attain a final comprehensive settlement which Israel and all her neighbors can enjoy for all time in our part of the world, where the security of all can be guaranteed. Such a peace must, however, accord to the Palestinian people exactly the same terms that Camp David accorded Egypt."

### YASSIR ARAFAT


"We accept all the UN resolutions—I want to stress—all UN resolutions concerning the Palestinian question. Don't forget that the State of Israel was created by a UN resolution. Israel has everything, but we have nothing."

### PROF. HISHAM SHARABI

"The conditions for reconciliation between our two peoples now objectively exist, probably for the first time in thirty years. Whether this possibility can be translated into political reality will depend in large part on the good will and trust that we can engender between us in this critical phase."

### PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK

"We are at a moment in the modern history of the Middle East which may be midstream between the beginnings of a limited peace and the achievement of a comprehensive peace. If we fail to grasp that moment and encourage active negotiations quietly conducted behind the scenes, we may reap the whirlwinds."



9780829806540  
2015-03-20 13:6

22