



# MEN *of* CAPITAL

SCARCITY AND ECONOMY  
IN MANDATE PALESTINE

SHERENE SEIKALY

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*Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine*

**Sherene Seikaly**

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*To Ramzi and Samia Seikaly*



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## **Men of Capital**



## Introduction

### The Politics of Basic Needs

ON 5 APRIL 1948, Fu'ad Saba, founder of the accounting firm Saba and Company, wrote the Arab Higher Committee (AHC).<sup>1</sup> He was requesting an exit permit on behalf of Khalil Sa'ada.<sup>2</sup> Sa'ada, the assistant director of Saba's Jaffa office, was moving to the company's Baghdad branch. Once in Baghdad, Sa'ada could better serve other Palestinian businesses that were also relocating their headquarters. That year, 1948, marked the birth of Israel and the death of contiguous Palestine.

Urgency and desperation united the requests the AHC received in those momentous months. A letter from the National Committee of Bir al-Sabi' implored the AHC: "We are being attacked and the Jews are close to taking over all of the transportation roads between Palestine and Egypt, please lend us tanks and heavy machinery or direct us to where we can buy [them]. . . . We have sent you many requests but have not received military attention or organization . . . we are without leadership or direction."<sup>3</sup> But Saba's tone was more measured. Saba and the businessmen of his cohort were rapidly transferring their capital and interests to other parts of the Arab world. He was a self-made man whose entrepreneurship had already borne considerable fruit. In the 1930s, Saba and his colleagues had drawn on diverse philosophies to craft economic thought and envision an economic *nahda*, or renaissance. They defined themselves as men of capital, and they preached to their elite brethren about the proper spending and saving patterns that would ensure Palestinian progress in a pan-Arab utopia of free trade, private property, and self-responsibility.

In their earlier developmental projects, Saba and his colleagues had done their best to sever the economic from the political. They lobbied the British colonial government for institutions, statistical surveys, and calculations, which they believed were necessary for realizing what they called a healthy economic life. They knew that the British Mandate and its foundational commitment to the Zionist enterprise in Palestine subordinated them as political subjects. They collaborated with and resisted this subordination, engineering initiatives that wedded economic achievement to national independence.

Shut out of institutional spaces, these men of capital proselytized economy not as a science of markets but as a science of the self. They differentiated between needs and luxuries and emphasized the imperative of management, while creating and guarding new notions of class and status. In their periodical *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-ʿarabiyya* (*The Arab Economic Journal* in its editors' translation), these men of capital had been careful not to address the Great Revolt (1936–1939); at the same time, some of them had funded the rebels. Saba himself had taken part in the AHC's effort to wrestle the Revolt from the hands of the rebels and contain one of their most radical demands: social change. And as a result, the British colonial government exiled Saba and his colleagues to the Seychelles.

The end of the 1930s was a period of devastation for a majority of Palestinians—the farmers and villagers. Landlessness and indebtedness had plagued most Palestinians throughout the Mandate period (1923–1948). The British colonial government's brutal counterinsurgency during the Revolt further heightened these conditions. Bankruptcy, unemployment, house demolitions, mass detentions, torture, and the wounding, imprisonment, exile, or killing of over 10 percent of Palestinian males were the consequences of this brutality.<sup>4</sup> In 1939, Saba and the banker and dissident Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, alongside the better-known Palestinian national leader al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, waited in exile for news from the ground. When the news came, total war was on the horizon, and it would irreversibly change the course of the years to come.

The onset of World War II meant an influx of capital, war-induced industrialization, and the implementation of ambitious rationing, distribution, and marketing schemes. The British colonial government transformed Palestine into the empire's second largest military base in the Middle East after Egypt. A crisis of supply and an abiding fear of further upheaval forced the British colonial government to begin calculating bod-

ies and their consumption in Palestine. New indices such as the calorie and the cost of living, wrapped in the ambiguous folds of the science of nutrition and the aim of colonial development, became tools of governing, or rather, as was the case most of the time, misgoverning.

Perhaps for a moment, one could imagine that men like Saba and Ibrahim would welcome what appeared to be a colonial turn to developing Palestinian economy. That economy, especially the “Arab” part of it, had never been fully legible, divided in its numerical representations into “Jewish” and “Arab” sections, with the former enjoying the parastatal institutions and its calculations of which the Palestinians could only dream. In the settler colonial context of both British rule and Zionist settlement, the Palestinians could never become developmental subjects.

World War II brought this reality into stark focus. It was a time of deep crisis, which exposed long-festered realities. Men like Saba and Ibrahim could no longer separate their economic visions from their political obligations. The self-proclaimed vanguards of the future turned away from their imaginings of a broad Arab horizon of commercial plenty. Through the nascent institutions of the Chambers of Commerce, they focused instead on the realities of scarcity and the urgency of managing basic needs. It was during the 1940s that they sought to address the many others, who in the previous decade they had naturalized as their inferiors—those “Bedouin” and “peasants”—as objects of representation. Economy was no longer an index of individual and national uplift; it became linked to a continued presence on the land.

But very few would maintain that presence. With the Nakba, or catastrophe, of 1948, the large majority of Palestinians, 700,000 to 800,000 people,<sup>5</sup> became stateless refugees. The 150,000 Palestinians who did remain on the land became second-class “citizen strangers” under military rule in that 80 percent of Palestine that was now called Israel.<sup>6</sup> As for Sa’ada, the young man traveling from Jaffa to Baghdad, in 1948 he became part of a broad diasporic network of firms and contacts.

Saba, Ibrahim, and the businessmen and bankers who made money and shaped economy in Palestine do not appear in the historical record. Their invisibility is not the result of one condition, but a confluence of several. First among them is the history and historiography of settler colonialism in its British and Zionist articulations. Second are three characters that continue to dominate the historiographic scene: the aristocrat, the comprador, and the middle-class hero. Finally, there are the linked impulses of

nostalgia, mourning, and idealization of pre-Nakba Palestine that flatten the topography of Palestinian social life.

Saba, along with Abd al-Muhsin al-Qattan and Hasib Sabagh among others, became leading figures in accounting, banking, contracting, and insurance throughout the Arab world. They accumulated wealth and expertise and took part in leading the commercial horizon they had imagined in the 1930s. Yet despite these successes, Saba was never quite the same after 1948. There was, his grandson explains, a lot of silence in the house.<sup>7</sup> Saba remained in Beirut until his death. Not far from where he lived stood Sabra and Shatilla, the refugee camps where the majority of Palestinian refugees remain confined until today.

### Settler Colonialism

Until 1948, the majority of Arabs in Palestine were small farmers and sharecroppers. The formation of large estates and the growing power of merchant capital in the late nineteenth century began causing the indebtedness and displacement that would characterize rural life.<sup>8</sup> Palestinians would survive the economic duress and famine of World War I only to face a new regime of colonial control that the League of Nations called Mandatory rule. In 1919, the Covenant of the League of Nations divided the world into “advanced nations” and those peoples who were “not yet able to stand by themselves.”<sup>9</sup> Based on the principles of “well-being and development,” the Covenant sought to provide “tutelage” to these not-yet-peoples of the former German and Ottoman territories, which the document further divided into a three-tiered hierarchy (A, B, C) based on potential for self-rule. The Covenant graded the Arab provinces of the former Ottoman empire—Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq—as A territories, whose independence could be provisionally recognized. Under the monitoring body of the Permanent Mandates Commission, the Mandate system was distinct from imperial frameworks because it promised eventual self-rule. At the same time, it continued what Uday Mehta has called the metaphor of childhood that informed British liberal understandings of imperial subjects.<sup>10</sup>

Mandatory rule in Palestine was exceptional. Typically we think of this exceptionalism as rooted in British support of Zionism, a result of conflicting promises to Arabs and Jews in a post-World War I order, and/or an outcome of British colonial ambiguity and incoherence. These explana-

tions are accurate but not accurate enough. They can lead to a faulty narrative framework that pits a settlement movement and a colonized people as equivalent national movements competing over one strip of land. This narrative has persisted until the present, as has the reality on the ground of an occupier and an occupied that cannot be equated. The Mandate in Palestine was not simply exceptional because the colonial government supported one so-called side over another. The Mandate in Palestine was exceptional because it was the only case in which the Permanent Mandates Commission endorsed settler colonialism.<sup>11</sup>

The November 1917 Balfour Declaration inaugurated the British commitment to “a national home for the Jewish people” with the qualification that this would supposedly not prejudice “the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities.”<sup>12</sup> This short memorandum rendered Jewish an ethno-national category in Palestine. It defined the land and its inhabitants by this category, despite the fact that Jews constituted 5 percent of the people who lived in Palestine at the turn of the twentieth century.<sup>13</sup> The memorandum rendered the majority of the Palestinians who lived on the land nameless; it defined them by what they were not. Two parallel processes began to take root. First was the partitioning of people into categories of Jewish and non-Jewish, deserving and undeserving of a national home. Second was the erasure of the Palestinian, who appeared only as a non-Jewish inhabitant bearing religious and civil but not political rights.

One of the first partitions that took place after World War I was the separation of Palestinian Jews from their former Muslim and Christian brothers under Ottoman rule.<sup>14</sup> It is at this point that what Edward Said called the malicious simplifications of Arab and Jew began to harden, although that hardening would be evolutionary, processual, and always partial.<sup>15</sup> Despite scholarly arguments that the Balfour Declaration was primarily a piece of war propaganda and not a blueprint for British rule,<sup>16</sup> the two principles that the Declaration inaugurated—the erasure of the Palestinian and the partition of the people into those deserving versus those undeserving of a national home—became the foundation of the Mandate document. Article 2 of that document recognized the Jewish Agency as the body responsible for realizing the Jewish national home in Palestine. It was the only non-Anglo institution that received official recognition in Mandate Palestine. Article 6 committed British colonial rule to Zionist land settlement and Jewish immigration. From its inception, British colonial rule was premised on enabling the settler movement and denying the



possibility of politics for Palestinians. Mandate rule brought into law the Zionist mantra of “a land without a people for a people without a land.”

This mantra has enjoyed an impressive longevity. However, we should qualify its meaning to get at the specific condition of Palestinian invisibility in colonial epistemologies. Zionists of the late nineteenth century did not imagine that there were *no people* on the land of Palestine, but rather that they were not *a people*. Theodor Herzl described a set of caricatures that inhabited what he called the land of Israel: the wealthy effendis who could be had for a price and the remaining impoverished peasants who could be smoothly removed without incident. These people were a motley crew without anything defining or unifying them.<sup>17</sup> Zionists from various political leanings did not share Herzl’s confidence that the people who lived in Palestine would not be attached enough to its land to resist their displacement.<sup>18</sup> However, the Zionist emphasis on the lack of a politically coherent and distinct people in Palestine who deserved to make claims to the land on which they had resided for hundreds of years would continue apace. The caricatures of the effendi and the peasant, as well as the depiction of the Palestinians as insufficiently rooted, continue to have currency.

In the meantime, Zionists were hard at work shaping a cohesive settlement community around a new ethno-national understanding of what it meant to be Jewish. They called themselves the Yishuv. Zionism promised Jews who had suffered religious, political, and racial persecution for centuries in Europe that they could finally become European but only by *leaving* Europe. Anti-Semitism and Zionism had one thing in common: the belief that Jews could never assimilate in Europe.<sup>19</sup> The process of becoming European by realizing a settler colony would be an abundant source of persecution: For the Palestinians it entails ongoing erasure; for the eastern (Mizrahi) Jews who did not fit the Ashkenazi (European) mold, it has meant decades of marginalization; and for the Ashkenazi, it required killing centuries of tradition, language, and culture to fit the template of the new Jew.<sup>20</sup>

The process of becoming European was based on the consolidation of a parastatal infrastructure. By the 1920s, the Zionists had realized a network of institutions that would become the foundation of the state of Israel. These included the governing body of the Jewish Agency; the Jewish National Fund, which Zionists had established in 1901 to purchase land; the labor organization of the Histadrut, which organized Jewish laborers during the Mandate; the military organization of the Haganah; and the Vaad Leumi, a

Jewish people's council that would become the Israeli parliament or Knesset in 1948. The British colonial administration bolstered the legitimacy of each of these institutions. In addition, as various crises of supply and informal markets during World War II amply indicate, these institutions often out-ranked the British colonial government in capital and expertise.<sup>21</sup>

The colonial government also supported Zionist enterprise in Palestine. Conventionally, colonial policy deemed tariff manipulation "uneconomic."<sup>22</sup> The British colonial government departed from this convention, supporting Yishuv industry through tariff manipulation. Article 11 of the Mandate stated that the colonial government could arrange with the Jewish Agency "to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country."<sup>23</sup> It was on this basis that the colonial government granted three major monopoly concessions to Zionist interests in the 1920s: the electricity concession to the Palestine Electricity Corporation, Limited (established in 1923),<sup>24</sup> the Dead Sea salt concessions to the Palestine Potash Company (established in 1929), and the salt concession in 1922 to the Palestine Salt Company.<sup>25</sup>

In addition, there was a long list of companies to which the Palestine government made specific customs concessions. The developing diamond industry, which flourished during World War II, received a concession from High Commissioner Herbert Samuel in 1923 to allow uncut diamonds duty-free entry and also encouraged the export industry.<sup>26</sup> Other companies that received customs concessions on duty-free raw material imports included the Nesher Cement Company, Palestine Oil Industry (Shemen) Ltd., the Delfiner's Silk Factory, the Yehuda Steam Factory, the Raanan Company Ltd. (confectionaries), and the Lodzia Textile Company, Ltd. The economic historian Jacob Metzer has argued that it is "empirically unverified" that the prime beneficiaries of the tariffs were Jewish industrialists and that these benefits were in any way consequential.<sup>27</sup> For Metzer, British colonial support was simply in response to the demands of what he calls a growing and modernizing Jewish-led economy.<sup>28</sup> Beyond the value-based assessment of Jewish economic superiority deserving of colonial support, Metzer undermines his argument. A brief glimpse at the historical record supports Barbara Smith's point that the colonial government's concessions protected Jewish industry.<sup>29</sup>

The traditional Zionist approach to economy in Palestine posited a backward, primitive, semi-feudal Palestinian Arab society based on subsis-

tence agriculture with an Islamic reluctance regarding moneylending. In these accounts, Zionism in the late Ottoman and Mandate period civilized the Palestinian primitive–native. Jewish capital introduced a set of progressive changes that benefited the peasant, or *fellah*.<sup>30</sup> Never mind that Jewish land settlement and expropriation displaced the *fellah*, who became unemployed, a condition impossible on the land as Nahla Zu‘bi points out.<sup>31</sup> But in these renditions obdurately wedded to how settler colonial economic growth could ostensibly benefit the colonized, Palestine is marked by two distinct economic systems with limited market relations.<sup>32</sup> There were two separate national economies—the traditional and backward Palestinian economy and the Jewish capitalist economy—and each developed independently. One sector did not exploit the other. What emerged was a competition between the two, accompanied by a crisis of modernization in the Arab sector.<sup>33</sup>

Scholars such as Roger Owen, Alexander Schölch, and Beshara Doumani have long overturned the conviction that Palestine came into the world capitalist system with the onset of British colonialism. Before 1882, Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre were important export points for external trade. Nablus was the most important center for local and regional trade and manufactured soap, oil, and cotton. Jaffa exported the produce of southern Palestine—wheat, barley, maize, olive oil, soap, oranges, and other crops—to France, Egypt, England, Asia Minor, Greece, Italy, Malta, and northern Syria.<sup>34</sup>

Yet the dual-economy model continues to be conventional wisdom. It is perhaps most potently articulated in Metzer’s thorough study, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine*.<sup>35</sup> The stark binary between the modern Jewish economy and the pre-modern Arab economy takes visual form on the cover of the paperback edition. There, a 1946 photograph depicts a camel caravan passing the electric power station in Tel Aviv. The image resonates with Metzer’s reasoning that Zionist industry and economic growth were beneficial to Palestinians.<sup>36</sup> Recent work has overturned these conclusions. Amos Nadan has effectively shown that Metzer’s claims of progressive growth in the Arab agrarian economy are unfounded.<sup>37</sup>

In most of these accounts, there is a resounding silence on Arab capitalist practice. The scantiness, unavailability, and extremely speculative character of figures on Palestinian wages, commerce, trade, and industry justify this silence. Metzer claims that “the dynamics of manufacturing in Mandatory Palestine was primarily, although *definitely not exclusively*, a Jewish story.”<sup>38</sup> Thus, the Palestinian story becomes an acceptable gap in historical

inquiry. This lack enables the divided economy narrative of modern, European industry versus rural, traditional Palestinian agriculture to proceed unchecked. Certainly the Yishuv's forces in 1948 attempted to erase Palestinian presence on the land as well as the records of that presence.<sup>39</sup>

Moreover, Metzger is accurate in his claim that the Palestinians did not create statistical mechanisms for the systematic collection and analysis of economic data.<sup>40</sup> Ronen Shamir, building on the idea that economy does not exist independently of the sciences that define and measure it, takes Metzger's conclusion one step further. Since Arab economists did not assemble a separate economy, Shamir explains, "the 'Arab economy' . . . perhaps may be better understood as a 'negative assembly.'" <sup>41</sup> This negative assembly "mainly existed as a kind of ephemeral shadow, appearing as the ambiguously inferior 'other' of its Jewish counterpart."<sup>42</sup> Shamir is, of course, correct in pointing to the Yishuv's successful "politics of calculation."<sup>43</sup> But here archival absences can play a pernicious role. While there *may* be a Palestinian story, the documents that can reveal it do not exist.<sup>44</sup> The assumption that there are no traces to unearth does not simply result in the story remaining untold. It leads to the conclusion that there is no story to tell.<sup>45</sup>

As it turns out, there is a story to tell about Arabs, calculation, and economy in Palestine. The best response to these accounts of stories untold comes from a return to scholars like Baruch Kimmerling and Gershon Shafir, who historicized Zionism in Palestine as a settler colonial movement.<sup>46</sup> Zachary Lockman began a relational approach that insisted on understanding Zionism, not as an isolated European phenomenon (or as a colonial subject and his shadow), but in its interaction with the land and the people of Palestine.<sup>47</sup> This work in turn inspired scholarship that sought to study both Arab and Jewish life in Ottoman and Mandate Palestine.<sup>48</sup> Yet, in this scholarship, perceived or actual archival absences also lead to a particular formula: The Jews of the Yishuv act and the Palestinians react.

However, despite archival absences, scholars have provided intriguing portrayals of early twentieth-century Palestine as a dynamic time of cultural and literary production, as well as a period of significant social transformation that included an active women's movement, labor organizing, mass mobilization, and popular politics.<sup>49</sup> Yet the picture of Palestinian social life peopled by poor, illiterate masses of peasants and workers, alongside a small group of venal notables fraught with internecine competition, continues to run rampant in most historical portrayals and contemporary imaginings.

## The Aristocrat, the Comprador, the Hero, and the Catastrophe

For earlier periods in Palestine, social life does not appear quite so static and unchanging. Beshara Doumani powerfully revealed the rise and fall of old and new urban elites in relation to shifting village politics from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.<sup>50</sup> Yet as the historical trajectory edges closer to the British Mandate era, there is an intensified scholarly investment in the predictability of elites. They appear doggedly out of step with the times. Weldon Matthews's work on the Istiqlal Party in Palestine is an important corrective to this general trend of homogenizing elites.<sup>51</sup> He addresses the growing influence of pan-Arab populism and destabilizes stock characters and stale strategies.

Yet there continues to be a scholarly insistence on the Palestinian elite as unchanging and easily understood. Take, for example, the scholarly and popular penchant to refer to families such as the Husaynis and Nashashibis as an "aristocracy."<sup>52</sup> Such a term is profoundly ahistorical, not simply in Palestine and the "non-West," but for much of Europe as well. Parallel to the long life of the aristocracy as a social category of historical narrative is the continued insistence on describing pre- and early modern economic organization in Palestine as "feudal." While less fashionable in academic circles, the moniker of the feudal, or *iqtaʿ*, is still salient in everyday vernacular, particularly in Arabic. Subaltern Palestinians were innovating strategies and visions as they confronted both settler colonialism and social hierarchy. The correlative assumption that continues to limit our thinking is that among the elites it was the same old story. In this cartography, Palestinian men of capital cannot take shape as historical figures.

When they do take shape, they appear as compradors or as indistinct or as overwhelmingly Christian. For example, Walid Kazziha has argued that it was the notables in the Middle East who were the nascent bourgeoisie. They were compradors because they aligned with colonial rule while benefiting from economic growth and industrialization.<sup>53</sup> In Palestine, Salim Tamari has argued that a "middling" new class of merchants and manufacturers was growing in the Mandate period particularly in the coastal cities of Gaza, Jaffa, Haifa, and Acre. However, this class was not distinguishable because of their organic links to landowners.<sup>54</sup> Another characterization of this period is that many of these actors were Christian and thus exceptional.<sup>55</sup> Thus "Christian merchants" become an easily un-

derstood collective, who appear in some accounts as unified in their stance against the boycott and the Revolt.<sup>56</sup>

During Ottoman rule, affiliation with European consulates and institutions privileged Christians in the realms of education and capital accumulation. However, the sectarian representation of men of capital is a drastic misreading. Christians played important roles in the propagation of an economic *nahda* in Palestine, but they were not dominant among the men who forged their philosophies in periodicals like *Iqtisadiyyat* or in spaces like the Chambers of Commerce. Eliding sect with politics is also inaccurate. Christian businessmen such as Imil Butaji (Emile Boutagy) and Jad Suidan did oppose the boycott and the Revolt in Haifa. But others, like Fu'ad Saba, funded the rebels. Moreover, Muslim businessmen like Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim shared the concern that the Revolt would lead to their economic ruin.

Historians have used the divides between the comprador and authentic economic nationalist to explain late capitalism and the failure of the national bourgeoisie to uproot older forms of economic power. This expectation of bourgeois revolution is often idealized and mostly unrealized even in that amorphous body of countries called Europe.<sup>57</sup> Robert Vitalis has thoroughly upended the comprador and nationalist divide in his work on capitalists in Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century. Scholars depicted that period as one of a confrontation between parasitic compradors that shunned productive investment and consorted with colonial power and a patriotic, nationalist faction. Vitalis argued that local investors created private enterprises and national industries because of their access to both state and foreign capital. He has shown how businessmen, irrespective of label, undermined British attempts to construct a neocolonial regime in the decades after World War I.<sup>58</sup>

Palestinian businessmen, like their Egyptian counterparts, used nationalism in a flexible way to protect their interests.<sup>59</sup> They shaped an ideal "social man" and categorized people into ranks and classes based on education and vocation. Central to these categorizations was the "middle class" [*al-tabaga al-wusta*], which these men used to define themselves and their social world. In the optimistic 1930s, men of capital in Palestine confined the middle class to the so-called civilized people who were to embody a new kind of economic conduct. By the 1940s and in the face of both wartime constraints and the rapid erosion of political possibilities, men of capital expanded their understanding of the middle class to include what

they called the authentic Bedouin and *fellah* who they feverishly and belatedly sought to represent.

This shifting and exclusionary middle-class project has, like its protagonists, been subject to both neglect and celebration. Keith Watenpaugh has suggested that this neglect is a wider phenomenon in Middle East historiography.<sup>60</sup> Because of the impression of its slavish imitation of its European cognate, the middle class has embarrassed scholars and led to “a paucity of work on this group.”<sup>61</sup> Watenpaugh has argued that the middle class in early twentieth century Syria formed civil society institutions that articulated participation, accountability, and equality as legitimate social expectations.<sup>62</sup> This middle class failed to realize these expectations because its members were vulnerable to the bonds of religion, ethnicity, and family. But perhaps the time has come to question this rendition of civil society as a space distinct from and purified of other social loyalties. Perhaps too, we should more carefully attend to a broader global conviction that the middle class has the potential to eradicate inequality and political instability.<sup>63</sup> As Barbara Weinstein and Ricardo Lopez point out, such a conviction positions the Anglo-American model as both universal and exceptional. In comparison, all other historical classes, within Europe and outside of it, will always be “found wanting.”<sup>64</sup>

But beyond the inevitability of frustrated emulation, the deeper problem is the middle class’ self-description as a force of social change. After all, the goals of eradicating inequality and instability are not necessarily compatible. The imperative of stability works, historically and in the present, not to challenge social and economic inequality but to maintain it. As men of capital in Palestine put it in the 1940s, rebellion and uprising were “not in anyone’s interest.”<sup>65</sup> Should we indict, then, men of capital as the villains of the early twentieth century? This is a tempting conclusion, especially in light of the urge to explain the devastation of the Nakba.

When the story of a people pivots on a moment of tragic loss, the quiet before the storm is a source of nostalgia. As Rema Hammami points out, oral history and Nakba commemoration have taken on a life of their own in the West Bank, Gaza, and the various sites of Palestinian exile. There are countless attempts to recreate the times of pre-Nakba Palestine.<sup>66</sup> In many ways the Nakba marks the scope and borders of what we can know. It is the beginning and the end of Palestinian time. Some scholars continue to explain the outcome of 1948 as a result of a Palestinian “lack” and the absence of an “authentic nationalism.”<sup>67</sup> Idealization and nostalgia

are linked to historical renditions of a period that epitomizes the failure to realize a nation-state. Given the widely scattered realities of Palestinians, the continued siege and occupation of Gaza, the occupation of the West Bank, and the persistence of statelessness, it is compelling to search the Palestinian historical record for what went wrong.

But in such a search, it is almost inevitable that nationalism—its “lack,” its “strength,” or its “weakness”—will stand as a metonym for politics. In some renditions, the weakness of normative nationalism—a “political deficiency” and a lack of a national “spirit”—resulted in, as the leading historian of collaboration continues to argue, the catastrophe of 1948.<sup>68</sup> In response, scholars have documented a national project among the Palestinians. This work is invaluable and has shifted the terms of debate as well as our understanding of the social and cultural geography of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Palestine. However, to continue reveling in the marriage between national consciousness and politics reifies colonial epistemologies. Moving beyond nationalism as both the means and ends of politics is long overdue. Certainly, nationalism was one aspect of subjectivity formation, but it was not the only way to make politics.

What I seek to destabilize here is not whether Palestinians were sufficiently national, but to ask why that sufficiency and/or its lack continues to be the measuring stick for whether people can remain on the land they resided on for centuries. Must people’s investment in the random and shifting borders that imperial and colonial officials drew determine their status? Are there other ways to think about politics outside, beside, underneath, and alongside this national prism?

I propose here that we think of the political as the stuff of the everyday: the new anxieties about money, how to manage it, how to shape and reform the social body that both money and its lack threatens. I propose too that the very idea of needs, and more crucially still, basic needs, are deeply political. What is a need? How does a need change? Who has what needs? These are all questions that occupied Palestinian men of capital and the British colonial officers who ruled them.

## Men of Capital, Women of Thrift

Elites in Palestine were not homogenous. A growing group of men working in commercial, and to a much lesser extent, industrial ventures were accumulating capital and expertise in the early twentieth century.



These businessmen were a primarily urban, relatively wealthy group of men who attempted to author a new sort of hegemonic power. Their strategies and visions were as invested in shaping and maintaining new forms of social hierarchy as radicals and rebels were in dislodging them. Elites shaped philosophies and visions of the ideal social body [*hay'a ijtimā'iyya*], the ideal "social man," and his ideal partner, the domestic manager. Attending to these figures and their projects opens up new ways to think about Palestine's past, its present, and its relationship to the intellectual and social world in which it existed.

The British commitment to maintaining the status quo among Palestinians strengthened a handful of the landowning nobility.<sup>69</sup> The Husayni family and its main rival the Nashashibis used municipal elections, competition for mayoral posts, and control of institutions like the Supreme Muslim Council to jockey for power and create alliances. The foregone conclusion has been that the property, money, income, and power of these urban notables dominated the entire country.<sup>70</sup>

However, there is a history outside of this seemingly impenetrable narrative of Palestinian factionalism and family rivalries. As Issa Khalaf has shown, by World War I, local industries including flour milling, soap making, weaving, pipe making, and metal shops saw a diversification.<sup>71</sup> Between 1918 and 1927, Arabs and Jews established 2,269 commercial and manufacturing enterprises. Sixty percent of these enterprises were Arab, representing an investment of 613,000 Palestinian pounds.<sup>72</sup> By 1927, there were 3,505 industrial establishments in Palestine. By 1935, Arab capital investment was mostly in tobacco, cardboard, soap and milling factories, and a growing textile industry, but Arabs also made industrial advances in metals, chemicals, leather, beverages, and quarrying.<sup>73</sup>

The largest shift occurred in the wartime period. In 1939, there were 339 Arab industrial establishments employing 4,117 people. The number of Arab industrial establishments jumped in 1943 to 1,558, employing 8,804 people. Arab capital investments went from 703,565 Palestinian pounds in 1939 to 2,131,307 pounds in 1942.<sup>74</sup> These numbers are small in comparison to the rapid growth of Jewish manufacturing during the Mandate, which went from generating 50 percent of Palestine's output in the 1920s to 60 percent in the early 1930s and reached 80 percent during wartime-induced industrialization.<sup>75</sup> Palestinian stagnancy and paralysis, however, was not the corollary of the growing hegemony of European Jewish industry.

A "middling" class existed that was not synonymous with the land-

owning class who continued their hold over inland cities like Tiberias and Nablus. Despite this hold, important shifts in political economy took place along the coast. Khalaf draws on a study of 100 political figures<sup>76</sup> to show that 35 percent of these elites were engaged in private enterprise and that many fell in the “middling” as opposed to wealthy categories. The Jaffa and Jerusalem Chambers of Commerce records are evidence of a growing commercial and manufacturing class distinct from the landed nobility. In Jerusalem, for example, between 1938 and 1947 there was a rise from 84 to 118 businesses and companies.<sup>77</sup> The Jerusalem Chamber included 260 general commission agencies, importers of luxury goods and appliances, retailers and wholesalers, and automobile parts, tires, and car dealers.<sup>78</sup> The Jaffa Chamber in the late 1940s shows a similar growth in trade, commercial sectors, and light industry. Of the 670 businesses in Jaffa, only 23 belonged to individuals from large landowning families. Similarly in Jerusalem, 56 of 528 businessmen were from these families.<sup>79</sup>

Economic diversification was not dependent on businesses associated with the investments of the urban nobility in imports and exports of cereal, the sale of construction materials, and milling factories.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, Tamari’s insistence on cross-fertilizations between a “middling” sort and a landowning class is crucial. Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, an influential man of capital in 1930s and 1940s Palestine, was “a landowner,”<sup>81</sup> “a prominent merchant, a leader of the Haifa Islamic Society, and . . . a member of the Istiqlal Party,”<sup>82</sup> “a Haifa businessmen . . . [and a] banker,”<sup>83</sup> and a “Chamber activist.” None of these descriptions are inaccurate. They point to the many positions that Ibrahim and men like him could occupy. Indeed, it is this “unevenness” and multiplicity of affiliation that renders Palestinian history a rich and complex arena of study.<sup>84</sup>

### A Material *Nahda*

Men of capital, such as Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, and “women of thrift,” such as the domestic reformer Salwa Sa’id, did not understand themselves only, or even primarily, through their confrontation with Zionism. In their projects of economic cultivation and domestic reform, they positioned themselves as part of a broader Arab *nahda*. Positioning Palestine and Palestinians in this world of Arab thought and social life provincializes the Zionist–Palestinian conflict as the only way to tell the story of the early twentieth century. It tells a different story, one that allows for a

critique not just of Palestinian elites but the broader Arab liberal project, and the violence and exclusions that such a project was founded on.

The *nahda* was that heterogeneous movement wherein the nation was to rise up, discard corrupt and outdated traditions, and realize the triumphant arrival of the modern.<sup>85</sup> Historians have understood the inter-war period as falling “between the end of the first Arab *Nahda*, or cultural renaissance, and the beginnings of the second.”<sup>86</sup> But for economic thinkers in 1930s Palestine, the *nahda* was very much alive. They too were alive with it, formulating the contours of a utopic capitalist future in terms of conduct, ethics, and territories. The rights of the individual were crucial to their prescriptions on a healthy and organic social body. They drew on various universes of thought that spanned al-Ghazali and Ibn Khaldun to Adam Smith, Rousseau, Locke, and Karl Marx. Men of capital shaped social life in ways parallel to and divergent from European liberal thinkers whose relationship to imperialism has been the subject of rich and ongoing debate.<sup>87</sup>

The *nahda* then was an intensive time of intellectual exchange and plurality. Ilham Khuri-Makdisi has gone far in de-exceptionalizing the intellectual history of the Middle East by narrating the significance of socialism among thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Her groundbreaking contributions challenge the overwhelming force of nationalism as the only way to think about Arab and Middle Eastern intellectual life. However, the importance of economic thought—that is, the free market and capitalist threads of the *nahda*—have not been overstudied as Khuri-Makdisi suggests, but on the contrary not studied enough. In fact, we do not have a historical narrative of economic thought in the Arab world that goes beyond particular moments. Moreover, one of the intriguing nuances of Khuri-Makdisi’s account is her finding that individuals, such as Amin al-Rihani, who was a leading socialist voice, would regularly share drafts with the Islamic modernist, Muhammad Abduh. Khuri-Makdisi positions these exchanges in older practices of collective writing. But they help us further complicate the *nahda* as a type of intellectual environment in which the categories of Islamist, capitalist, and socialist were neither stable nor ones that could preclude a shared intellectual project. Indeed Rihani contributed to the Palestinian economic periodical *Iqtisadiyyat*. Through a carefully crafted *nahda* narrative, he portrayed a transhistorical commercial essence of Arab culture that could unite the quest for awakening, dignity, and modern arrival.

Thus, the twentieth century in Palestine was not simply a period of “unfulfilled promise” that entailed “a pervasive cultural tone of anguish and disgust, of resentment, resistance, rebellion, and death.”<sup>88</sup> Elite Palestinians envisioned and imagined the future not through anguish and disgust but through notions of progress, class distinction, and civilizational superiority. It was not until the 1940s that a pervasive tone of conspiracy and crisis became prevalent. But even that decade was not, as scholars have long described it, a period of political or social paralysis.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, while we are accustomed to understanding visions of pan-Arabism as wedded to socialist economic planning, here we see another type of marriage that is worthy of further exploration: an Arab utopia built on the foundations of private property, investment, self-responsibility, and the accumulation of capital.

### Making Economy Visible

Palestinian men of capital and British colonial officers mobilized economy as a site of social management in the early twentieth century. They took part in broader efforts to forge economy as objective, bounded, and external.<sup>90</sup> The shaping of economy as a separate and distinct sphere has a long history.<sup>91</sup> While the word *economy* originates in Ancient Greece, Chris Hann and Keith Hart argue that in Mesopotamia as far back as the third millennium BC we can find the division of labor stemming from markets and money.<sup>92</sup> Of course, economy is a keyword in modern life, and since the nineteenth century has come to mean the sum of the sale and purchase of goods in national territory.<sup>93</sup> It was the synthesis of the nation-state and industrial capitalism that birthed these configurations.<sup>94</sup> When governmental bureaucracies began attempting to manage money, markets, and accumulation in a national space, “economy” as we know it today entered vernacular speech.<sup>95</sup>

The conception of economy as a self-reproducing flow of production and consumption was inextricable from new regimes of calculation, from a new emphasis on visibility. Thus, as Timothy Mitchell has shown, economy as a totality of relations emerged in a mid-twentieth century crisis of representation.<sup>96</sup> This entity, the economy, which was squarely located in a geographical political space, required the compilation of new kinds of data.<sup>97</sup> John Maynard Keynes and his work, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936) often provides a point of origin for the national articulation of economy. The constituent elements of the *General*

*Theory* are economic aggregates like output, employment, investment, and consumption, and synthetic averages like rates of interests, real wage, money wage level, and price level.<sup>98</sup> But Keynes is one point of many.

Mapping territory, growth, time, and the future became central preoccupations for bureaucrats and theorists alike in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Calculations made the future and progress statistically representable and rationally attainable.<sup>99</sup> They also required the separations of various entities as constitutive outsides such as the state and the household. Such distinctions could work to render the so-called informal economy residual when in fact it could be at the very heart of economic production.<sup>100</sup> The push to calculate and make visible also led to new possibilities in surveillance. Managing economy through statistics was a different art of government in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century.<sup>101</sup>

Adam Tooze has argued that new technologies of data led bureaucrats to fantasize about controlling economy not only by manipulating national aggregates but also by innovating systems of individualized surveillance.<sup>102</sup> Catherine Gallagher has shown that the health and vitality of the laboring body demanded constant attention from economic theorists.<sup>103</sup> Economic representations and forms of knowledge dominated subjects. However, Janet Roitman has pointed out that new “techniques of the self” were also components of that domination.<sup>104</sup> Through this calculability, and the many areas it rendered invisible or residual, men and women constructed the object of economy.<sup>105</sup> Economy from this perspective is not a preexisting reality but an achievement.<sup>106</sup>

How did that entity, the economy, take shape outside the “the homes of Quesnay, Petty, Smith, Playfair, Ricardo or Marx?”<sup>107</sup> Certainly, in Palestine, just as for much of the world outside the West, colonial domination accompanied the forging of economy as an autonomous sphere.<sup>108</sup> The particular form of colonial domination in Palestine was the Mandate system. This system, Antony Anghie has argued, was an experiment in international management that attempted to address the gap between the civilized and the uncivilized in economic terms. The pervasive discipline of economics promoted the development of the colonized through new ostensibly neutral indicators.<sup>109</sup> But as we have seen, the Mandate in Palestine was exceptional in its endorsement of settler colonialism. How then did the achievement of economy take shape in a settler colonial context? What happened when the large majority of bodies to be counted were not only colonized but also stripped of a political name and inhabited a foreclosed national future?

In Palestine, the division between politics and economics, the politics of growth and abundance, and the shaping of the household and the body as sites of management and surveillance were all in process. Moreover, the colonial regime did attempt to subject bodies and commodities to greater surveillance.<sup>110</sup> But it was not growth that inspired these colonial efforts. It was the threat of war and the management of scarcity that necessitated them. Incoherence and inefficiency marked the metrological regimes that the British colonial regime introduced, through new indices such as the cost of living and the calorie. Time and again British colonial officers failed in standardizing and homogenizing everything from weights to rations. This failure was intimately linked to the settler colonial condition of the Palestinian present and future. It would be much longer before the overall project of constructing economy ushered in a “new sociality for things and persons.”<sup>111</sup> It was elite Palestinian conceptions of social hierarchy that more quickly consolidated and marked those techniques of the self.

To map these Palestinian techniques, it would be wise to avoid what Tooze has called the “tree model” of cultural development where branches, stems, and shoots of conceptions of economy all sprout from Keynes and his cohort.<sup>112</sup> Drawing on Franco Moretti, Tooze advises a “wave” approach to understand how innovations in conceiving and measuring economy swept the globe in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>113</sup> Following Manu Goswami, the aim here is not to map “a repository of pure difference”<sup>114</sup> that will cleanse the “derivative”<sup>115</sup> character of Palestinian economic thought. One of the reasons men of capital in Palestine are difficult to understand today is because they occupied multiple universes of thought that are not immediately accessible to us. It would be more productive to approach these universes not through a closed tautology of original and copy but through an attention to how the idea of economy, the imperative of management, and the crisis of bare needs worked across national, regional, and colonial divides.

## To What End?

What does the visibility of men of capital accomplish? Is their existence simply a response to Golda Meir’s infamous declaration that there was no such thing as a Palestinian? Does it prove once and for all that there was a Palestinian economy that was more than a “negative assembly”? Or alternatively, is it a way to evidence a heroic character, invested in some

pure and distinct space called civil society, as the historical alternative to the twentieth and twenty-first century suicide bomber, as Keith Watenpaugh<sup>116</sup> has suggested?

To relegate the Palestinian businessman to the shadows of inferiority or to recover him as an artifact of the modern are two sides of the same conceptual bind. The first takes colonial epistemology for granted: The colonial figure and his shadow become an acceptable way to tell the history of Palestine. The second impulse, recovering the shadow into the light, appears at first glance to respond to this colonial logic. But it is trapped within it. The recovery works as a salve against everything that is wrong with the Palestinian and Arab present.<sup>117</sup> To access and critique the debates that have shaped the present requires rejecting the logic of the colonial body and its shadow,<sup>118</sup> decentering the colonial body, and asking new questions.

Jacob Metzer points out that the Palestinians did not create mechanisms to collect and analyze Arab economy.<sup>119</sup> He is right. The Palestinians were unable to calculate their commercial, financial, and industrial ventures. Avi Shlaim has argued that the Palestinians did “next to nothing” to build an independent state.<sup>120</sup> He is right too. Missing from these assessments is the condition with which Palestinians continue to grapple to this day: settler colonialism. Palestinian men of capital understood the need for calculation, statistics, and economic visibility; they understood the need for national institutions; and they forged attempts and intellectual projects around both. What was the content of these projects and how did settler colonialism foreclose them?

In a different vein, scholars like Issa Khalaf and Salim Tamari have argued that the Palestinian “bourgeoisie,” to the extent that it existed, did not succeed in realizing a national economy. They too are right. Men of capital failed in realizing the economic accumulation that would realize national independence. What were the conditions of this failure? How did men of capital link their economic interests to national sovereignty? More importantly still, in what ways did these men of capital succeed?

As opposed to the easily understood and reiterated narratives of Palestine in the early twentieth century, the following chapters present a diverse set of characters: the man of capital, the false intellectual, the true intellectual, the unemployed youth, the spendthrift urbanite, the fashionable but frugal domestic manager, the maid, the worker, the native, the foreigner, the abundant farmer, and the law-abiding and authentic Bedouin and

*fellah*. A set of spaces also come into view: the “black market”; new “houses of entertainment,” cafes, cinema houses, and restaurants; the idyllic and healthy Arab home; and a broader territory of capitalist pan-Arab utopia.

The focus on economy highlights the significance of the *nahda* in Palestine and Palestine’s significance to the *nahda*. The tropes of modern arrival and the preoccupation with sleep and wakefulness were in full circulation, traveling and adapting in interesting ways. In turn, the centrality of economy in Palestinian thought, as a mode of conduct and as an indicator of wellbeing challenges how we have understood the *nahda* in the broader Arab world. It was not only a cultural or literary project. It did not only contain national or radical ideologies. In the 1930s in Palestine and beyond, the *nahda* was an economic project that shaped subjectivity and territory.

It was at this time, too, that the British colonial government embarked on a series of its own attempts to count and regulate subjects and territories. In the 1940s, it used the calorie and the cost of living as technologies of rule in Palestine. It was not an obsession with numbers or a fascination with omniscience that drove their efforts. It was the crisis of supply, the fear of upheaval, and the exigencies of war that propelled them to action. Far from the depiction of Mandate rule as a tidy experiment in management, economics, and development, we find a messy, inconsistent project. This disarray qualifies the tempting coherence of economic calculation as a disciplinary project in Palestine and beyond.

Yet regardless of its limitations, economic calculation would have lasting legacies for the relationship between basic needs and political containment. Indices like the calorie and the cost of living across colonial and postcolonial divides functioned to contain dissident politics. These indices’ claim to being universal was contingent on exclusion. In Palestine a diversity of people and practices defied categorization and resisted homogenization. For example, a disastrous colonial scheme to control vegetable production, distribution, and marketing in Palestine nourished the informal markets that it ostensibly sought to “rationalise.” In another example, the category of the “Oriental Jew” confounded colonial scientists as they sought to forge a nutritional economy and identify “racial expenditure groups.”<sup>121</sup> At every turn, the attempts to make economy visible revealed how deeply the colonial government had neglected Palestinians as subjects to be counted and categorized. That neglect, regardless of ongoing speculation about British colonial intent, was not coincidental or contingent.



The invisibility of the Palestinian in the colonial archive, and the last ditch effort to render bodies and their consumption and production visible, was one component of the broader condition of settler colonialism.

The story of men, and women, of capital in a settler colony is about formation and interruption at once. Palestinian economic thinkers and businessmen may tempt us at first as indicators of a lost world, glimpses of an alternative future. But we must reject the impulse to mourn. The emphasis on private property, individual freedom, and self-responsibility in which Palestinian capitalists were so invested in the 1930s receded in the face of austerity in the 1940s and national dispossession in 1948. That recession, however, was temporary. Indeed, in business narrations of the time, it was abnormal. The imperative of profit as a vehicle for and an indication of progress and its inextricability from the closely linked goals of maintaining social hierarchy and containing politics would not simply flourish; they would become the scaffolding of the future.

# 1

## Men of Capital

### Making Money, Making Nation

IN THE MID-1930s IN PALESTINE, a group of elites who defined themselves as “men of capital” shaped economics as a body of knowledge. Shut out of the institutions that defined economy as a science of markets, they formulated economy as a science of the self. They sought to propagate what they understood as social progress, shape new notions of class and status, and guard their interests. Meanwhile, during this very period, the rebels of Palestine realized horizontal solidarities and achieved considerable gains in challenging British colonial rule, Zionist settlement, and Palestinian social hierarchy. In the midst of social and political upheaval, “men of capital” took part in a broader Arab intellectual and cultural project of awakening, the *nahda*, to proselytize the ideal economic subject.

The trajectories of these men challenge the conventional depiction of pre-1948 Palestinian social life as defined by ineffectual and factionalized notables, an increasingly disenfranchised peasantry, and an active but small group of workers. Elite efforts to shape the saving and spending patterns of “social man” and his relationship to what they called the “social body” [*al-hay’a al-ijtima’iyya*] reveal formative ideas about the individual and his and her relationship to economy, nation, and the colonial state. These men’s stories and projects provide a biography of economy, which challenges some longstanding assumptions. Conventional and even revisionist scholarship continues to present elites as a group of notables whose ways of seeing the world were ineffective and out of date. However, these men were making money and nation in new ways. They were not all landowners; there were bankers, accountants, commercial businessmen, and

to a lesser extent industrialists. Economics as a body of knowledge and economy as a science of the self were central to their visions and projects. These men located their ideas on capital accumulation and its relationship to national economy in a broader Arab project. In doing so, they challenge the temporal and conceptual boundaries of Arab liberal thought.

In his preface to the 1983 reissue of *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, Albert Hourani defined liberal as the changes of a new world order that sprang from technical and industrial revolutions during the two hundred years his seminal work covered. This order expressed itself in “the growth of a European trade of a new kind [and] the consequent changes in production and consumption.”<sup>1</sup> However, he argued, there were few precise ideas about social reform and economic development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Arab thinkers assumed that social and economic change “could and should wait until after the attainment of independence.”<sup>2</sup> Few were aware of the problems of “maintaining standards of administration” and “defining the frontiers between private enterprise and State control.”<sup>3</sup> It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that the new nationalism defined welfare not “in terms of individual freedom, but rather economic development, a rise in general living standards and the provision of social services.”<sup>4</sup> Mark LeVine echoes these conclusions when he explains that under British rule Palestinians “did not think in individualistic, capitalist terms, they were not concerned with maximizing their individual income.”<sup>5</sup> Thus, for several generations historians have accepted the claim that economic thought was static.

However, neither economic thought nor the Arab liberal project was as linear or as singular as it appears in these accounts. Scholars have gone far in pluralizing the *nahda* as a heterogeneous phenomenon that transcended religious, ethnic, and social categories.<sup>6</sup> Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, in particular, has challenged historiographic conceptions of the late nineteenth century as the antechamber of nationalism in Syria and Egypt.<sup>7</sup> She reveals the period before 1914 as rich in the articulation and dissemination of socialist and anarchist principles. Khuri-Makdisi has argued that Middle East historians have deradicalized authors by interpreting them as promoters of free market and liberal economic thought.<sup>8</sup> Yet despite this claim, scholars have not explored the complexities and trajectories of economic thought as a formative component of the *nahda*. The linking of vitality and economy as well as concerns with economic growth and its relationship to general welfare, government intervention, and private

enterprise have an important and overlooked history. Palestinian articulations that tied profit to progress while reifying their social power are an entry point into this history.

### Alternates

In the mid-1930s just as international recession spread and Palestinian social and political discontent was progressing into a guerilla war against colonial power, a group of men in Jaffa began publishing the periodical *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* (*The Arab Economic Journal*, in its editors’ translation). The editors assured their readers of “a complete economic arrival.” As late as 1936, in the midst of global depression and in the very moment of social upheaval in Palestine, it was possible for this group of elites to envision the future in overwhelmingly optimistic terms. As largely urban-based small industrialists, merchants, bankers, and professionals, they were shielded—like others in the colonial world, where urban small industry saw a boom in this decade—from the depths of rural poverty, which also gave rise to new ideas and movements.

Palestine was an active site for these new ideas and movements. Scholars have convincingly evidenced that the Great Revolt of 1936 to 1939 was not a historical rupture but a culmination of radical mobilizing that sought to dislodge the failed politics of notable elites.<sup>9</sup> Charles Anderson has rigorously shown how the rise of workers’ syndicates, youth societies, unions, and village and migrant associations in the late 1920s and the early 1930s expressed a new mode of mass politics.<sup>10</sup> Building on the work of Ted Swedenburg and Ghassan Kanafani, he challenges “the effendi thesis,” the historiographic conviction of a rigid Palestinian social hierarchy in which only elites had agency.<sup>11</sup> Bringing in radical social forces is crucial to destabilizing this thesis; but another as yet untouched assumption is that elites were unchanging. Engaging the innovations and strategies of these elites reveals the politics—not of revolution, but of men of capital.

The men in *Iqtisadiyyat* complicate our understandings of the constituencies and projects of Palestinian elites. New modes of politics challenged and inspired these commercial elites. There were common threads that crossed radical and elite divides, most notably the definition of “the political.” For example, in the wake of rising national tensions culminating in competing religious claims on the Wailing Wall/al-Buraq in 1929, youth radicals organized a conference of Arab students in Jaffa. They defined

their work as “nonpolitical,” in part to receive approval as a registered society but also to distance themselves from factional rivalries.<sup>12</sup>

Men of capital in *Iqtisadiyyat* made a similar move for altogether different reasons. They defined their journal as “an open space for serious research,” which would provide “men of the nation” with the tools to participate in an “economic *nahda*.”<sup>13</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat*, the editors explained, was a unique intervention in a landscape of political division and party factionalism. The editors presented their project as distinct from, if not superior to, the work of “men of politics.”<sup>14</sup> They did this neither to effect radical change nor to cling to old privileges. Rather, they sought to shape economics as a neutral and scientific realm of nation building, to define class and status in new ways, and to safeguard their own power. *Iqtisadiyyat* expressed the interests of an alternate group of “intellectuals, men of science, art, education, capital, and works.”<sup>15</sup>

Who were these alternate “men of the nation”? The moving force behind *Iqtisadiyyat* was Fu’ad Saba, the first Palestinian licensed as an auditor under the British Mandate. Saba received a bachelor’s degree in commerce at the American University of Beirut. The son of an Anglican pastor, he was a self-made man who established a highly successful team of accountants, Saba and Company, in 1920.<sup>16</sup> He was also the main architect of the Palestinian National Fund, which was established in 1930 and sought primarily to purchase lands.<sup>17</sup> In June 1936, Saba was appointed secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, the group of cross-factional elite figures who sought to contain and control the Revolt’s potential.<sup>18</sup> Saba and his colleagues challenge a simplified portrayal of Palestinian social life and the ongoing dismissal of businessmen as self-evidently colonial collaborators.

The numbers we have for the Mandate period reflect the consolidation of Arab and Jew as mutually exclusive categories. Economic calculations intend to make indices and process legible. Yet, in this case, they rendered thousands of Sephardi, Maghrebi, and Yemeni Jews in Palestine invisible.<sup>19</sup> As Michelle Campos has succinctly put it, the separation in Palestine between Jew and Arab was a result of the Zionist–Palestinian conflict, not its cause.<sup>20</sup> This separation shaped the stories we tell about British-ruled Palestine, as well as the very tools we have to tell them.

With these qualifications in mind, we can identify the period just before World War I as a time when a nascent commercial class separate from the landed elite had begun coalescing in Palestine.<sup>21</sup> In line with broader late Ottoman trends, new opportunities in banks, trade bureaus, shipping



**FIGURE 1** Fu'ad Saba in his first office in Jerusalem, ca. 1920s. Courtesy of Fuad Saba.

companies, printing works, customs posts, and commercial agencies expanded the small but important group of shopowners, distributors, and retailers as well as professionals such as teachers, journalists, lawyers, and civil servants.<sup>22</sup> A decade before the war, the proliferation of Arabic dailies like *Filastin* and *Al-Karmil* were crucial sites of intellectual production and political expression for these constituencies. By 1914, there was already a diverse range of local industries, including flour milling, soap making, weaving, pipe making, and metal shops.<sup>23</sup> The post–World War I period featured an intensification of this dynamic. Between 1918 and 1927, Arabs and Jews established 2,269 commercial and manufacturing enterprises. Sixty percent of these enterprises were Arab owned.<sup>24</sup>

By the 1930s, even as economic separatism began to become entrenched as a result of the Zionist conquest of land and labor, Palestine was nevertheless experiencing a heavy period of economic growth.<sup>25</sup> The combination of cheap labor and surplus capital meant the expansion of a trade and industrial class of importers, exporters, wholesalers, brokers, and small manufacturers. Palestinian capital investment in this period reached 2 million pounds, mostly in tobacco, cardboard, soap and milling factories, and a growing textile industry.<sup>26</sup>

During World War II, trading and industrial ventures further expanded. In 1939, there were 339 Arab industrial establishments employing 4,117 people. The number of Arab industrial establishments jumped in 1943 to 1,558 employing 8,804 people.<sup>27</sup> These numbers are small in comparison to the rapid growth of Jewish manufacturing during the Mandate, which went from generating 50 percent of Palestine's output in the 1920s, to 60 percent in the early 1930s, reaching 80 percent during wartime-induced industrialization.<sup>28</sup> The growth of Jewish industry did not, however, necessitate Palestinian economic stagnancy.

Indeed, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry estimated that Palestinian ownership of capital (liquid assets, rural land, industrial capital, commercial stocks and commodities, motor vehicles, agricultural buildings, tools and livestock) totaled 132.6 million pounds.<sup>29</sup> Palestinians held considerable cash in the two Arab banks, which expanded faster in this period than any other financial institution in Palestine at the time.<sup>30</sup> Between the years of 1939 and 1946, deposits and credits grew by a factor of twenty-six in the Arab Bank and fourteenfold in the Arab National Bank.<sup>31</sup> In 1941, the total capital in both banks was 532,215 Palestinian pounds. By 1945 that number rose to seven million.<sup>32</sup>

Corporate forms of organization and limited companies witnessed a rapid growth after World War II, resulting in the establishment of businesses such as Middle East Airlines in 1943 and the Arabia Insurance Company in 1944.<sup>33</sup> Both firms reopened in Beirut after 1948. Their shareholders would rapidly become some of the wealthiest Palestinians in the world.<sup>34</sup> As Palestine fell, these men would rush to guard their wealth.<sup>35</sup> Some would transfer funds to neighboring branches. Saba and Company had established offices in Amman, Damascus, and Beirut before 1948. Others, like Abdul Hamid Shoman, who founded the Arab Bank in 1930, conducted daring exploits to smuggle documents, safe deposit boxes, cash, and bank accounts across rapidly shifting borders.<sup>36</sup> In the 1950s and 1960s, men like Saba, Shoman, Yusif Baydas, and Abdel Muhsin al-Qattan led some of the largest and most successful insurance, banking, and contracting ventures in the Middle East. These included firms such as Arabia Insurance, the Arab Bank, Intra Bank, the Contract and Trading Company, the Commercial Building Company, and the Al-Mashriq Financial Investment Company.<sup>37</sup> The stories of these businessmen usually begin after 1948. However, they began amassing their wealth decades earlier. On the pages of *Iqtisadiyyat*, we can trace how they shaped economics as an object of knowledge and economy as a means of social reform.

Saba and his colleagues combined a commitment to free enterprise and private property with support for armed struggle and guerilla warfare. This pattern would survive the defeat of 1948 and continue long after into the 1950s and 1960s. Recounting these businessmen's relationship to the Great Revolt and to armed resistance more broadly complicates how businessmen, or sometimes even more simplistically Christian merchants, serve as synonyms for collaborators.<sup>38</sup> Certainly, in the mid-1930s many businessmen packed up their wares and temporarily relocated until the "troubles" died down. And in Haifa, Christian businessmen such as Imil Butaji (Emile Boutagy) and Jad Suidan actively opposed the men they called the "bandits" of the Revolt.<sup>39</sup>

But we should be careful not to abide too strictly to these representations that elide merchant, Christian, and collaborator. Saba is a case in point. He was an Anglican, a businessman, and funder of the rebels. Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim is another example. A Muslim, a close comrade of the populist Islamist radical 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam and the editor of the Islamist-leaning *Yarmouk* newspaper, Ibrahim led the National Committee in Haifa during the Great Revolt, was a founding member of the



pan-Arabist Istiqlal Party, and positioned himself as a dissident, a radical nationalist, and a man of capital. Lest we fall into the equally dangerous trap of romanticizing these figures as heroic nationalists, we should be clear that both Saba and Ibrahim were committed to redefining and sustaining their class project. To engage these men's histories and critique the formative legacies on economy, needs, and management that they left behind, it is necessary to move beyond indictment and vindication.

### An Organ of Change

Defining itself as the “organ” [*lisan hal*]<sup>40</sup> not of a party but of the alternative group, *Iqtisadiyyat* first hit the presses in 1935. It went from being a bimonthly publication in its first year to a weekly in the remaining two years that it ran. The editorial team consisted of Saba and his colleagues ‘Adil Jabr and Tawfiq Farah. Both men self-identified as economists [*iqtisadiyyin*]. The journal came to a halt in 1937 when the British colonial government exiled Saba to the Seychelles for his support of the Revolt.

*Iqtisadiyyat* was one component of a longer and broader phenomenon of cultural ferment and intellectual production in the Arab world. From the late nineteenth century on, journals, books, and newspapers as well as printing shops, publishing companies, bookstores, literary societies, and reading rooms marked the cultural life of Beirut and Cairo.<sup>41</sup> The excitement and energy of the *nahda* was not limited to these two centers, but included Aleppo, Alexandria, Damascus, Tripoli, Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and beyond.<sup>42</sup>

The resonances of the *nahda* were far-ranging in Palestine. The Khalidiyya library in Jerusalem provides hints of the periodicals Palestinians were reading in the late nineteenth century, including Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq's semiweekly news journal *Al-Jawa'ib*; Butrus al-Bustani's literary biweekly *Al-Jinan*; Ya'qub Sarraf and Faris Nimr's scientific monthly *Al-Muqtataf*; and Jurji Zaydan's literary and history monthly *Al-Hilal*.<sup>43</sup> It was in the late 1890s that privately owned Arab presses enabled the production of Palestinian periodicals such as *Al-Quds* (Jerusalem, 1898), *Al-Karmil* (Haifa, 1908), *Al-Akhbar* (Jaffa, 1909), and *Filastin* (Haifa, 1911). During this time the Egyptian dailies that were in circulation in Palestine included *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Muqattam*, *Al-Balagh*, *Al-Jihad*, and *Al-Misri*.<sup>44</sup>

The interwar period was also an intensive time of translation in Palestine. ‘Arif al-‘Azwani translated Gorky and other works of Russian

literature; Ahmad Shakir translated Shelley; and 'Adil Zu'aytar translated Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws*, Rousseau's *The Social Contract*, and Voltaire's *Philosophical Writings*.<sup>45</sup>

At the turn of the century, people in Palestine eagerly consumed newspapers in streets, railway stations, homes, and shops.<sup>46</sup> Local papers sold 200 to 300 copies daily.<sup>47</sup> By the 1920s, periodical production expanded out of the urban centers of Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa to include Acre, Bethlehem, Gaza, and Tulkarm. *Filastin* was the most popular publication and reportedly sold 3,000 copies per issue.<sup>48</sup> After the political upheavals of the late 1920s, there was a higher demand for daily news. By 1934, Ibrahim al-Shanti established the other leading paper, *Al-Difa'*, which quickly matched *Filastin* in popularity. By the early 1940s, each paper sold up to 10,000 copies daily.<sup>49</sup> It is difficult to estimate how many people were "literate" and reading these copies, since literacy itself was a pliant notion. Palestinians throughout cities and villages were intensively exposed to printed text through collective and vocalized reading.<sup>50</sup>

Palestinian Christians played an important role in this scene. Primarily urban, Christians made up 10 percent of the population in Palestine and had higher levels of education.<sup>51</sup> Christians, like other non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire, enjoyed legal, economic, and social advantages because of their affiliations with European merchants and consuls. Despite this differential access to education, capital, and in the British Mandate era, publishing licenses, the trajectories of the *nabha* as well as those of the men of capital in Palestine are in no way Christian stories.

By the 1930s, Palestine had become an important location in a broader cultural and literary scene as *Iqtisadiyyat*'s subscriptions show. In addition to broad distribution in Palestine (from Safad to Jaffa), there were also subscribers in Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Mosul, and Cairo. The editors boasted of the subscriptions of governments, banks, and consuls. They "marveled" at the journal's reception among traders, professionals, teachers, and clerks throughout the Arab world. The journal also received accolades from among "our kings and princes" such as King Ghazi in Iraq who read the journal from its inception as well as Sultan Sa'id bin Taymour of Muscat.<sup>52</sup>

*Iqtisadiyyat* typically included an editorial feature by an editor or a guest contributor. These were followed by news on business, trade, commerce, and commercial legislation from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the Gulf, and North Africa. The journal featured translations ranging from *Economist* articles to the work of the English political theorist, economist,

and socialist G. D. H. Cole.<sup>53</sup> Each year, *Iqtisadiyyat* published a special bilingual English and French issue, which featured translations of the Arabic issues as well as specially commissioned articles, which addressed colonial officials and international capital in the Arab world.

The editors presented *Iqtisadiyyat* as providing the latest in scientific research [*abhath 'ilmiyya*]. They aimed to study economic and fiscal problems, advise on improved methods in agriculture trade and industry, provide information on business institutions, inform their readers on world affairs, and finally promote trade with other countries.<sup>54</sup> Businessmen would find information on commodities, markets, and laws on the journal's pages. Farmers and agriculturalists would remain up to date on technological advancements in plowing, irrigation, fertilization, and harvesting. Capitalists [*mutamaawwilin*], industrialists, and professionals would learn about innovations in accounting, insurance, and finance. *Iqtisadiyyat* also addressed the educator, the housewife, and the civil servant in all matters economic. Its didactic tone and missionary zeal in cultivating [*tathqif*] an “economic culture” indicates the editors’ hopes to proselytize to the “common” Palestinian. In the following pages, I analyze a dozen editorial articles and a number of contributed pieces. I explore how these Palestinian thinkers defined economy, described the economic conditions they lived in, and sought to shape an ethical economic subject.

## Guiding Light

The idea of economy as a site of imperial, national, and internecine contest was not new in Palestine. Indeed, Ottoman Palestinians drew on Western liberal and Islamic notions of liberty, justice, consultation, public good, and accountability.<sup>55</sup> The turn to creating an Ottoman “national economy” [*milli iktisat*] was a crucial component of these efforts.<sup>56</sup> These concerns only heightened under the linked pressures of British colonialism and Zionist settlement. Indeed, in the early 1930s, men of capital—such as the bankers Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim—charted plans for local production and regional imports to sustain an anti-Jewish boycott.<sup>57</sup> The boycott of 1936 that spearheaded the Great Revolt was based on the principle of an ethical Arab consumption as a tenet of national independence. A perusal of the mainstream press provides clear evidence of the centrality of economic matters to both everyday life and the ever-threatened possibility of a national future.

The importance of this particular journal, *Iqtisadiyyat*, was in its emphasis on economics as a distinct realm to be studied, understood, and inculcated. The men the journal featured were among the financial leaders of a post-1948 world. Their ideas on saving, spending, class, and knowledge were part of a broader project of shaping social norms. On the pages of *Iqtisadiyyat*, Palestinians mapped economy as a distinct sphere and rendered it in national and regional terms. The editors of *Iqtisadiyyat* were on a relentless mission to forge economy as an essential form “embedded” in all aspects of social life.<sup>58</sup> Like many thinkers before and after them, they described an object that they took part in constructing.<sup>59</sup>

In a series of articles on the relationship between economics and politics, literature, and law, *Iqtisadiyyat* distinguished economics as a discrete discipline. By conceptualizing economy and producing knowledge on it, Saba and his team distinguished it as discrete from the political, which was “dealt with thoroughly in other papers.”<sup>60</sup> For example in the debate on the formation of a legislative council, the editors left the matters of its shape and conditions to the “experts” but insisted on the need for overcoming “legal disorder” in agriculture, industry, and trade as crucial for the general wellbeing of the country.<sup>61</sup>

Having relegated the political to the margins of their pages, how then was this project of “economic cultivation” to wield influence? The editors revealed economics as an irreplaceable essence. Economic matters, they explained, were at the core of politics. Poverty, the editors pointed out, drove Europe’s “momentous upheavals,” such as the “the hunger revolt” of 1848.<sup>62</sup> A brief glance at the daily press, Saba and his team exhorted, would reveal that the management of petrol, cotton, coal, wheat, and transportation were the primary concerns of the day. These concerns evidenced not just the “unity of politics and economics” but also the very superiority of the economic. Indeed aside from the “natural” [*fitri*] demand for independence: “the remaining aims of politics are economic.”<sup>63</sup> Thus the science of economics provided people with an “ideal plan”; it served to guide conduct and organize exchanges and relationships. But economics was more than a blueprint for social order and management. It did not just provide the tools for progress. It *was* progress: “Politics are a means, while economics are not just a goal, they are the ends.”<sup>64</sup>

In this means-ends landscape, which is reminiscent of the longstanding debate between the formalists and the substantivists,<sup>65</sup> an exploration of the ties between literature and economics posits ideas as commodities:

“For some time past, people have become accustomed to dividing intellectual production [*muntajat fikriyya*] into two: literature and science.”<sup>66</sup> But the “products” of the mind were not so easily divided as “science and literature complete one another and cannot do without each other.”<sup>67</sup> In this marketplace of ideas, economics functions as a metonym for science. This had not always been the case; economics had “oscillated for a long time between ethics and religious studies” and was only now securely and independently situated in that rationalistic realm of the “experimental sciences.”<sup>68</sup> Of all experimental sciences, it was economics that had the “most solid connection with literature.”<sup>69</sup>

To reveal these cross-fertilizations, the editors referenced an Arab heritage of utility. They used *adab* both in the disciplinary sense of literature as well as the broader notion of using the will to exercise proper behavior and good taste.<sup>70</sup> The editors cited a story from ninth-century historian and writer al-Jahiz. In his *Avarice and the Avaricious* he tells of a woman who exhausts every last use of a sheep. In addition to promoting maximum utility and minimum waste, the story presents knowledge as the key to progress: “Our ignorance can render [human wealth and resources] such as fertile land . . . useless.”<sup>71</sup> It is this recurring and framing theme of progress that reveals the “solid connection” between literature and economics. Both serve as transparent reflections of the “conditions of nations”; they were the “race horses in the square of life” that differ in means but shared the same goals: “serving man, his happiness, and his welfare [*rafahiyya*].”<sup>72</sup>

Thus economics emerges as a rational science in the service of man. The producer of intellectual products risks irrelevance should he choose to ignore economics. The editors celebrated Hafiz Ibrahim and Khalil Mutran for translating the French political economist Paul Leroy-Beaulieu’s *Précis d’économie politique*.<sup>73</sup> This translation proved that “there is no paucity of terms for this science or any other in the Arabic language.”<sup>74</sup> Indeed, the works of the canonical figures of both Arabic and Western literature, the editors explained—from al-Jahiz to Ibn Khaldun, Rousseau to Kipling, and Ibsen to Sinclair Lewis—were “eternal” precisely because of their engagement with the “principles of economy.”<sup>75</sup> What were these exalted principles?

“The age of slavery, feudalism, despotism, kings and sultans has passed. The sun of freedom has risen.”<sup>76</sup> It was the “guiding light” of economic science, preached the lawyer Sa’di Bsisu, a graduate of the Institute of Economic and Financial Sciences at the University of Paris, which led

this dramatic change. Bsisu listed the canon of thinkers that informed his exploration of the relationship between law and economics: Smith, Ricardo, Say, Sismondi, and Marx. Influenced by the French incorporation of political economy in the curriculum of law, Bsisu moved on to map three “foundational doctrines” that law and economics shared: individual freedom [*huriyya fardiyya*], private property [*al-mulkiyya al-khassa*], and “self-responsibility” [*mas’uliyya dhatiyya*].<sup>77</sup> It is these “rights,” Bsisu explained, that assure freedom. In “every civilized state,” economists and lawyers cooperated to protect the individual and ensure his property. These two imposing figures, the lawyer and the economist, were in harmonious collaboration on every matter from “inheritance law to the protection and organization of free trade” [*al-tijara al-hurra*].<sup>78</sup>

But there was trouble in paradise. For one, economy and law could not agree on the notion of “equality.” Law held it in high esteem but equality in economy appears primitive in Bsisu’s hands. A “throng” [*zumra*] of Communists, he explained, sought to realize this apparently backward notion of economic equality. Thankfully, he pronounced, the attempt was “ostracized by most contemporary countries.”<sup>79</sup> There were other divides between the two masterful disciplines. Law was subject to “political inclinations,” while economics stood in the realm of the rational, untouched by subjective matters. Lastly while the “general economic interest” was important, economics unlike law, focused not on the collective but the “minute . . . matters of individuals.”<sup>80</sup>

Bsisu described this ideal individual in the making by touching on the natural sciences and then detailing the social sciences. Among the various fields of the latter, including religion, language, politics, and philosophy, “the most solid connection clearly emerges between ethics, economics, and law.”<sup>81</sup> This connection pivoted on the figure of “social man.” Ethics expounds man’s obligations and rights, law regulates them, and economics provides the means to fulfill his material and spiritual needs and desires. Together they protect humanity from “the danger of nature and the evil of man.”<sup>82</sup>

In these various editorial reflections, economics appears, to paraphrase Nancy Cartwright, as an imperialist discipline that aspires to account for everything in the social world.<sup>83</sup> While these thinkers presented economics as one of the social sciences, they also insisted on placing the disciplines of politics, literature, and law within the orbit of economic life. Throughout, the elision of the spiritual and the material functioned alongside economic gain and accumulation to form an ethical economic subject.

## Social Man

Like other Arab thinkers across disciplinary and national boundaries, the editors of *Iqtisadiyyat* attempted to develop what Omnia El Shakry has called an integrative science of self.<sup>84</sup> Economics was first and foremost a new science of the self that could provide exact guidance on the rational decisions of the individual as opposed to the more classical liberal understandings of economics as the science of a self-regulating market.<sup>85</sup> The editors presented a number of normative values that they hoped to shape into conditions that could, to follow Saba Mahmood, cultivate forms of desires and capacities for ethical action.<sup>86</sup> In *Iqtisadiyyat*, the ethical subject in formation was the sober, realistic, productive man and his scientific, frugal, but fashionable mate.

In his article “Our Need for Economy,” Shukri Bey Sha‘sha’a, the treasurer of the Transjordan government, laid out “economic conduct” [*al-khulq al-iqtisadi*] as a way of life. Quoting Sa’d Zaghloul, Sha‘sha’a explained, “we are not in need of much science, what we need are ethics.”<sup>87</sup> He indicted Arab societies for their “lack” in this regard and for their focus on “external appearances” and “shallow matters.” Making a living was no longer easy; the present was “compounded, complicated, and contorted.”<sup>88</sup> It required “incessant effort, continuous toil, precise calculations, and prudent appraisal”<sup>89</sup> and above all being awake to the future.

Sha‘sha’a, like most editors of *Iqtisadiyyat*, conjured a teleological understanding of historical advancement. The framing goal was securing a future of individual accumulation, which was inextricable from national prosperity: “Do not think that the benefit is yours alone, no: it will also benefit your nation [*ummatika*].” The individual’s increase of wealth would increase the nation’s capital [*ra’s mal*], its capacities for production, and its ability to repel the enemy, here scripted as the “greedy.”<sup>90</sup> Sha‘sha’a, like many of his colleagues, displayed the paradox that Smith made canonical in his reflections on moral philosophy and political economy: a disgust for vulgar materialism coupled with an endorsement of economic growth.<sup>91</sup>

To survive as individuals, and more importantly as nations, Arabs had to be vigilant and courageous in meeting the needs of the present while saving for the future. They had to “constantly think and act to realize the largest profit with the least money and effort.”<sup>92</sup> Armed with “good sense,” a “stern will,” a “mature mind,” and an ability to accurately assess their

future needs, Arabs had to undergo “a mental battle” [*jihad nafsi*], “curb the self,” and do without luxuries. Saving and acquisition were the pillars of this conduct, and they required “simplicity, order, and organization.” In sum: “Do not buy three shirts, if two are enough and spend on what is beneficial before all else.” This, Sha‘sha‘a explained, “is what scientists call economic conduct [*tasarruf*] and management [*tadbir*].”<sup>93</sup> Sha‘sha‘a echoed Smith’s paradox and his resolution to it: the self-imposition of “the rules of propriety and the calculus of saving.”<sup>94</sup>

One recurring figure in need of reform was the false intellectual [*al-adib al-za‘if*] who was “excessive in imagination” and unable to face life’s challenges.<sup>95</sup> He could not name the carpenter’s tools much less describe the modern factory or the large farm. He was one of an “army” of “unprofessional poets and writers who wander aimlessly about in every valley.”<sup>96</sup> A poor educational system that emphasized literature and provided “trivial” and “useless” “theoretical knowledge” turned youth into these false, unemployed, loitering, and dependent literati who deprived “kin and homeland” of their potential efforts.<sup>97</sup>

The “true intellectual” [*al-adib al-haqiqi*] was the “man of the nation.” They were successful businessmen like Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, who established the Arab National Bank and the Karaman-Dik-Salti “industrial group” who owned tobacco companies, mills, and ice factories.<sup>98</sup> Such men exhibited the “judicious and prudent work” of “authentic nationalism.”<sup>99</sup> They were “noble” because they understood the need for technological innovation as well as the facilitation of “small financiers” and their contributions. In addition to their material achievements, these men provided a moral compass. Distant and scientific, they were above “arrogance, pageantry, and ostentation.”<sup>100</sup>

Two similarly contrasting Palestinian women appear in this landscape of economic conduct: the *musrif*a [spendthrift] and the *hasifa* [judicious one].<sup>101</sup> The *musrif*a was an urbanite. It was common to see her frequenting elegant clothing and jewelry stores; she spent her husband’s earnings without restraint. Yet her wastefulness could have a “profound impact on national economy” [*al-iqtisad al-qawmi*].<sup>102</sup> This was particularly the case when her natural tendencies were directed at domestic products [*muntajat wataniyya*]. Domestic products, the editors preached, must be promoted, their manufacture mastered, and their markets expanded. It is not an accident that the editors articulated the idea of a “national economy” and the imperative of domestic products in this context of shaping gendered



norms. The spatialization of a national economy is inextricable from the separation of the domestic as a parallel but separate domain.

Women were “born to spend.” But the *hasifa* could overcome this biological determination and her “instinctive tendency to buy clothes.”<sup>103</sup> The historical *hasifa* sat in the light of day, and with her soft hand and the tip of her foot, she operated the spinning wheel. Her “levity and grace” had inspired the idea of industry and the age of machines. Her spinning wheel had “mothered” the grand steam and electric machines of the present. The descendant of this inspiration played her role in agriculture and light industry with “feminine qualities of taste, skill, and precision.”<sup>104</sup> She toiled in the large factories and vast mines of the contemporary age with no regard for hardship or hazard. She competed in the “free trades”: She was a doctor, a lawyer, a judge, a teacher, a writer, a journalist, and an engineer.

The *hasifa* was a man’s “equal in intelligence, skill, sharpness of will, and wisdom of politics.”<sup>105</sup> Yet, she was at her most sublime at home, assuring the nation’s prosperity [*umran*], and its progress [*ruqiy*]. Frugal but fashionable, she would visit clothes shows, pick out her desired dress, and through direct observation devote the design to memory to create it at home. Economic conduct served as a basis for the ideal subject, gendered on familiar lines. The Palestinian normative woman was to be “fluent in the sciences and practices of modern achievement” so as to take “her place alongside her man in economics” and become the effective mate of “social man.”<sup>106</sup>

In drawing out this utopic scene and idyllic characters, *Iqtisadiyyat*’s editors and contributors addressed questions that concerned Arab philosophers such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Khaldun and occupied every Western philosopher who as Istvan Hont has put it, “was worth his salt” from the period of Rousseau to the French Revolution.<sup>107</sup> Was luxury to be celebrated as the arrival of progress or shunned as a corrupting force? What was the delicate balance between need and luxury in the face of economic change and growth?

As with much of the work of *Iqtisadiyyat*’s contributors, the description of needs followed a *nahda* narrative structure. It began with a point of origin, described a latent state, and then followed a teleological path to awakening. For example, a need was “first born” in the “psyche” [*nafs*] as desire. It then transformed into the pursuit of its attainment. Every year, needs grow and a new need emerges. Needs travel a biological path from a simpler to a more complicated form. “Each rung on the evolutionary ladder entails an increase in needs.”<sup>108</sup> Human societies in their primor-

dial state had solely physiological needs, the editors explained. But man's proclivities broadened and increased as societies progressed. The editors described a world where there were thousands of new needs that promised comfort, wellbeing, and health.

Yet, while the proliferation of needs marked social advancement, it did not necessarily mean "that man today is happier than he was in the past."<sup>109</sup> So what was the ethical relationship to needs? How should the ideal consuming subject act? Wise men and religious philosophers "of old" believed that man should control his needs. This pattern continued, the editors explained, well into the eighteenth century, when thinkers insisted "that satisfaction is another word for laziness and stagnation."<sup>110</sup> But in the face of economic growth and change, abstinence hampered productivity and was irrational.

*Iqtisadiyyat* conjured markets as the definition of the social. Needs, they insisted, created "bonds of mutuality and reciprocity between people."<sup>111</sup> Only the recluse could abstain and survive on minimal needs, but his lifestyle went against the "instinct of civilized man." Who was this civilized man? He was "social man of course."<sup>112</sup> Consumption thus comes into view as the obligatory act of the normative social subject.

But, the editors warned, "social man's" relationship to needs also had to be ethical. When needs were "natural," they were easy to determine. But when they entered the realm of the "social," they became obscure. Both deprivation and excess would lead to pain. The editors drew on the twelfth-century philosopher, theologian, and mystic al-Ghazali and his careful condemnation of both miserliness and extravagance. For while thirst was a hardship, they explained, in medieval ages "pouring water down the throats of the sentenced was the most painful of punishments."<sup>113</sup>

The editors' attempts to proselytize an ethical consumption revealed the contours of their economic models and the social man they sought to shape. First, they adhered to the marginal model, which presumed that value arises from interactions of consumers trying to maximize their satisfaction and producers trying to maximize their profits.<sup>114</sup> The editors preached the "law of substitution" as the solution for the proper balance between deprivation and satisfaction.<sup>115</sup> This law gave the consumer [*mustanfidi*] an exit from the "yoke" of needs that were difficult to obtain. It was also a haven from the "monopolizing merchant" when that other law of "free competition" failed. Consumers could substitute the horse with a bicycle, the book with a newspaper, the cinema for the theater, and

the radio for the piano. The law of substitution also had ethical value in the hands of modesty [*ta'afuf*] associations who transformed taverns [*hanat*] into coffee shops or libraries. Thus “harmful” needs like alcohol could be substituted with “honorable and beneficial” needs like reading and controlled socializing.<sup>116</sup>

Second, the category of “social man” was one of exclusion. The central characters in this scene of economic conduct thoroughly expose the editors’ class project. The main actors in their drama of arrival were authentic and judicious men and women, who could balance need and luxury and reject the vainglory of the false intellectual spendthrifts. The worker haunted this unfolding plot. He was at once a menace to social order and an object of sympathy. Rapid industrialization encroached upon him, threatening him with irrelevance. But his unemployment was a burden on the social body [*al-hay'a al-ijtima'iyya*] and government treasuries. The worker serves as yet another site of the economists’ social supremacy. For, it is the economist who both invents and guards the worker’s right to wages, health, and education. Through his scientific research and experiments, the economist alone could formulate the reforms needed to battle the “growing tyranny of capitalists.”<sup>117</sup>

The exclusions and limits of the category of “social man” are the most apparent in *Iqtisadiyyat*’s attempts to define “needs” and desires, most notably in an article entitled, “Hajat al-bashar.”<sup>118</sup> The editors translated this piece in the journal’s English index as “Human Wants,” as opposed to “Human Needs,” which would be the more accurate rendition. The slip between needs and wants illustrates the blurry lines the editors traveled as they emphasized both accumulation and moderation. For the “civilized people” [*ahl al-hadara*], “needs” included not just food but dining tables and silverware. If worthy of the moniker “civilized,” one had to also account for the “needs” of “large gatherings”: flowers, crystal, silver plates, special clothes, and music.<sup>119</sup> Workers, on the other hand, had a much more circumspect list of “human wants.” “There was a time,” the editors explained, “when workers did not wear garments or shoes, they did not drink coffee or tobacco, they did not eat meat or wheat bread.”<sup>120</sup> But in contemporary times, these “needs” had become deeply entrenched; their lack led to “grief and heartbreak.”<sup>121</sup> The editors’ self-perception here is of the empathetic humanist, who has the capacity to generously recognize the “needs” of his other. It was the editors’ understandings of class difference as essential and predetermined that allowed for this slipping between needs and desires.

Needs, entitlements, and ultimate happiness come into view as inextricable from class. The specter of the worker appears again. He was at once oppressed and liberated by capitalism's force. It is true, the editors conceded, that the "working classes labor and toil due to the multiplication of needs."<sup>122</sup> But, the editors assured, "this should not distress us." For "were it not for the multiplication of needs, those working classes would remain eternally in slavery and bondage."<sup>123</sup> The editors took part in a long debate within political economy on how commercial conditions resulted in both the condition of extreme inequality and the satisfaction of the poorest laborers' basic needs.<sup>124</sup> In such conditions, the laborers' share would increase in absolute terms, but his oppression would hamper that improvement in relative terms.<sup>125</sup> Palestinian elites' resolution to this problem of the laborers' plight was the careful division of class status. The worker was neither author nor reader. He bore the burden of civilized man. He would remain firmly ensconced at a lower rung on that evolutionary consumer ladder. Moreover, it was the economists and reformers who would guard the laborers' rights by promoting the "purity of saving" and helping the worker avoid "places of entertainment" [*malahi*] in order to "elevate his condition."<sup>126</sup>

Thus it was "intellectual and eminent figures" who would realize economic conduct as "a natural and imminent disposition." While economic conduct was expected of "the poor and middle classes" [*al-tabaqat al-wusta wal faqira*], it was the "established and wealthy classes" who were the agents of "economic management." Establishing the necessary "tools and institutions" such as "savings banks" was in fact their national duty [*amal watani*].<sup>127</sup> The benefits would trickle down: Workers would find better opportunities for labor and higher wages, and their own capacities for earning and saving would increase.

Shaping "national economy" relied on cementing and naturalizing differences that were scripted in class terms. Capital accumulation and consumption held both the promise of the future and the potential threat to social hierarchy. The editors of *Iqtisadiyyat* believed that the "continual increase of needs is the source of contemporary civilization and progress."<sup>128</sup> These men were in step with what Susan Buck-Morss has identified as the defining moment of modernity, when the "unlimited increase of objects produced for sale" marked the progress of civilization.<sup>129</sup> Advancement was contingent on the careful division between the "civilized people" [*ahl al-hadara*] and their others, who no matter how "honorable" or "pure," remained inferior.

## The Frontiers of Private Initiative

How did these “civilized people”—in their emphasis on ambition, initiative, simplicity, and order—understand their relationship to the colonial government that ruled them? Palestinian men of capital were invested in the shift of economy from the incessant management of household detail to the practices and categories that would become the art of government.<sup>130</sup> It is not surprising that their conceptualization of national economy led them to the state as an implicit unit of analysis.<sup>131</sup> The editors argued that it was necessary for the “state to take up more duties upon itself to safeguard public interest.”<sup>132</sup> These duties included producing statistics, equitably controlling custom duties, encouraging industry, assisting agriculture, establishing cooperatives, opening a Department for the Development of Tourism, and holding agricultural and industrial exhibitions.<sup>133</sup>

Yet these demands revealed men of capital at their most political and intellectually vulnerable. For as Rashid Khalidi has pointed out, Palestinians under British rule lacked the attributes of “stateness” that people in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq enjoyed.<sup>134</sup> Like the other Arab territories of the former Ottoman empire, the League of Nations deemed Palestine a “class A mandate” in 1914. In the League of Nations’ racialized hierarchy, the Arab mandates were childlike and in need of European mentorship before they could attain national independence. Iraqis, Lebanese, and Syrians experimented with cabinets, parliaments, and other institutions, however nominal, of state rule. However the British commitment to a Jewish national home left the Palestinians bereft of any real or symbolic sites of sovereignty. Indeed, because of the British–Zionist alliance and its legal enshrinement in the Mandate document, Palestinian recognition of British rule was an acceptance of political and national subordination.<sup>135</sup>

Despite this bind, men of capital lauded the colonial government. In his piece, “The Role of Scientific Research in the Development of Palestine,” the Palestinian chemist T. P. Malouf focused on the role of the colonial government in scientific research, which had undergone profound changes in response to “the reconstruction and rapid development of the world after the Great War.”<sup>136</sup> No longer were people using “trial and error methods.” The new mode consisted of “the observation and collection of data, their systematic assortment, and interpretations in terms of useful inventions.”<sup>137</sup> Radio and television, rayon and rubber, benzene and oil, and other products were first produced in small laboratories and then

manufactured in factories. Thus scientific research, Malouf insisted, was the basic foundation “of all progressive and sound economic development in any country.”<sup>138</sup> As he saw it, the inauguration of this scientific research coincided with British rule. Indeed, in Palestine such research did not exist before the war, but since then due to government and private initiatives, “Palestine’s name has been registered in the scientific journals of the West.” Malouf’s vision for the future was characteristically optimistic: “As it once led the world spiritually [Palestine] will be able to help materially in raising the standard of living in the Near East.”<sup>139</sup>

To make this material leadership possible, it was necessary to recognize the significance of scientific research, which was as “necessary as capital in the development of the untapped natural resources (agricultural and mineral) of Palestine.”<sup>140</sup> Palestinians would use this research to “adopt proper agricultural and industrial practices.” Scientific invention would uncover new sources of wealth. Finally, Malouf made a reference to eugenics: If “chemists can discover a way for producing synthetic hormones similar to the hormones produced by nature, then a revolution in the development of the human race will occur. This day is not very far.”<sup>141</sup>

The government was central to this future horizon of an improved human race. Malouf praised the British government’s establishment of nine agricultural experiment stations and demonstration farms as well as its financial assistance of the “Zionist Organization’s” three research centers: the Kiriath Ainavim Agricultural Station, the Rehovoth Agricultural Experiment Station, and the Hebrew University’s biology department.<sup>142</sup> Malouf made no mention of the disparity between Arab and Jewish access to resources and capital. He presented instead a utopic scene: “the great staff of Government and private research institutions, Arab and Jewish scientists, work for solving the numerous problems which affect the development of Palestine.”<sup>143</sup> This emphasis on and praise of statistics indicates the investment of these Palestinians in a new kind of progress, one that was no longer subjectively perceived or experienced but statistically representable, measurable, and open to intervention.<sup>144</sup> The editors were proud to have been cited by the government of Palestine as a “sign of advancement” in its annual report to the League of Nations.<sup>145</sup>

Yet the conferral of recognition was not in itself an acceptance of the tenets of colonialism as revealed by *Iqtisadiyyat*’s translation of an *Economist* article titled “The ‘Necessity’ for Colonies.”<sup>146</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat* mediated the narrative of the “Haves” and the “Have-Nots,” translated as the “colonizer”

[*al-musta'mir*] and the “deprived” [*al-mahrum*]. The logic behind the translation of this piece appears at first a mystery. The article is not about the disparity of power between the colonizer and the colonized, but about the “discrimination” between countries that have colonies and those that do not.

Slowly but surely, if not so convincingly, the *Economist* editors and their Palestinian translators chip away at the idea that empires derive benefit from their colonies. They argue against the four economic arguments that colonies supply the metropole with raw materials, markets, fields of investment, and destinations for “surplus population.” Their analysis runs as follows: Colonies would not discriminate against interested buyers, “industrial countries” were better markets than colonies, the Have-Nots did not have surplus capital to invest in the first place, and European settlement proved a failed venture time and again. As the story’s tautological argument concludes, the Palestinian editors’ interest in the piece becomes clear: The Have-Nots have “no case for demanding colonies,” and more powerfully still, the Haves have “equally no case in clinging to them.” Thus, in a clear echo of Joseph Schumpeter, the *Economist* clarified: The entire question of colonialism was not “a rational problem at all but an irrational conflict of prestige and jealousy among the great imperialist States.”<sup>147</sup>

Despite these translations and praise, the anomaly of Palestine’s structural conditions in comparison to its neighbors could not remain completely invisible. The editors looked to the “young government” in Iraq, which entered the League of Nations as an “independent” nation in 1932, as a model for “developing economic resources.”<sup>148</sup> There the government addressed labor conditions through the Agricultural and Industrial Bank; it valued “technical education” and sent Iraqis abroad; and it “invited foreign experts to study certain economic phases in Iraq.”<sup>149</sup> The most impressive of these schemes, the editors argued, was “the construction of modern villages in which all modern conveniences necessary for a productive villager are available.” Such schemes secured “better conditions of production and healthier bodies for work,” in addition to inspiring the “initiative and ambition of the people concerned.”<sup>150</sup>

The editors also congratulated, if begrudgingly, the British colonial government’s establishment of the Office of Statistics in the Department of Migration and Statistics (1936). Because, in Palestine, “most of the political problems are deeply bound with economic considerations,” such a step had been neglected for too long.<sup>151</sup> The editors explained that one of the country’s most basic problems could be solved through “an accurate

study of [its] absorptive capacity.”<sup>152</sup> Absorptive capacity was the technical measure that the British colonial government used to calculate annual Jewish immigration between 1922 and 1939. For Palestinians, the measurement was a denial of their political and historical claims in the face of the colonial government’s support for the Zionist enterprise.<sup>153</sup> The editors explicitly confronted the British and Zionist claims about Palestine’s ability to absorb Jewish immigrants. The country’s “economic considerations” required unbiased and reliable “economic data”; the government’s turn to measurement was, in the editor’s words, “better late than never.”<sup>154</sup>

Thus, these men of capital held an ambivalent relationship to the colonial government. On the one hand, they funded armed rebellion against British colonialism and Zionist settlement. On the other hand, they could, at least officially, understand the British colonial government as a necessary, if temporary, enabler of the prosperous future and look on to neo-colonial Iraq as a model. Yet, despite all their maneuvers, British colonial subordination of Palestinian political rights rendered feeble and suspect any attempt to position the British metropole as a potential ally in the capital-utopia of the future. Palestine’s anomalous structural conditions necessarily hampered *Iqtisadiyyat*’s discussion of the economic as nonpolitical.

### An Economic *Nahda*

The closely detailed proliferation of needs that the writers of *Iqtisadiyyat* described is telling of how these thinkers assessed their times. World War I appears as an important ideological divide that left in its wake broad transformations in social order. For these men, the decades after the war “marked a transition from an economy of scarcity to an economy of plenty.”<sup>155</sup> The editors propagated an economic *nahda* and detailed its indications with confident optimism. The economic *nahda*’s benefits were plentiful: the appearance of new classes, an increase in a “national income” [*al-dakhl al-qawmi*], an increase in import trade, and “new markets for those countries that gave birth to industrial civilization.”<sup>156</sup>

The Arab world generally, in the editors’ assessment, had fared well, and a “general invigoration” was everywhere to be seen. It was in fact *Iqtisadiyyat*’s mandate to provide evidence of this “blessed revival” whether through the indexing of businesses, the listing of regional conferences, or the promulgation of new commercial laws. The editors narrated a present in which the “people of the East, and the Arab countries in particular”



were in the throes of a “complete economic revival,” which would have a “great influence on their futures.”<sup>157</sup> The envisioning and securing of that future, that final state of material wakefulness, was the informing imperative.

Palestinian thinkers looked to the east, north, and west as the horizon of the *nahda*'s arrival. That arrival relied on the boundaries of the nation-state, which the editors represented visually (through maps and illustrations) and textually. In each issue, lead articles and world financial news were followed by the categories of “Palestine and Transjordan,” “North Africa,” “Egypt and the Sudan,” “Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula,” and “Syria, Lebanon, Latakia, and Djebel Druze.” Under these headings, the editors featured commercial legislation, import and export figures, government budgets, and customs rates. Moreover, international commercial rates comparing imports and exports rendered each nation and locale as well as the broader Arab nation more visible, its productivity and economy both legible and measurable.

The production of these borders and the horizons of the future, in addition to maps, illustration, and figures, also relied on a *nahda* narrative structure. This structure typically began with the diagnosis of that ubiquitous disease of slumber, which symbolized the obstacles to Arab modern arrival. It moved to an affirmation of the overall health of Arab and Islamic civilizations. It turned to the description of and the comparison with the encroaching enemy. Then came the nostalgic unearthing of an Arab and Islamic civilizational superiority illustrated through a long teleology of tolerance, adaptability, and integrity. The narration typically ended with the revelation of a concrete cultural essence as the antidote for the disease.

The goal, time and again, was to awaken. In *Iqtisadiyyat*, the tool of that awakening, was the new understanding of economy—ethical, forward-looking, and informed by the need for both capital accumulation and consumer moderation.

In featuring various perspectives and voices, *Iqtisadiyyat* displays the flexibility and malleability of economic thought and the broader *nahda*. Most articles emphasized the values of individual responsibility, private property, and investment. At the same time, the journal could feature the work of a leading socialist thinker, Cole, mentioned above, in part perhaps because his investment in natural sociality paralleled its own emphasis on “social man.”<sup>158</sup> Another unexpected and influential voice *Iqtisadiyyat* featured was Amin al-Rihani. Khuri-Makdisi has identified Rihani and

Farah Antun as the main Syrian radicals whose writings became canonical among Arabic readers sympathetic to the left in Beirut, Cairo, Alexandria, and the Americas.<sup>159</sup>

In *Iqtisadiyyat*, Rihani's sardonic piece, "May God Reward Adversity,"<sup>160</sup> provides a beautiful example of the *nahda* narrative. Rihani unfolded the disease: "The first enemy, my Palestinian brother, is in you, the second enemy is on your land."<sup>161</sup> While the "Arab Palestinian people know the mortal enemy," the "latent enemy" was more bitter still. The enemy within was ignorance, tradition, personal disputes, and party politics. It had to be awakened for battle with another internal latent force, the "friend": intelligence, pride, ancestry, as well as moral, spiritual, and ethical strength.<sup>162</sup>

The visible enemy, the unnamed Zionist enterprise, provided a guide of conduct with its use of knowledge and capital: "If he subjugates knowledge to futility, let us subjugate knowledge to truth and the homeland [*al-watan*]. If he uses his money for appropriation and colonialism, let us use ours to defend the homeland [*al-watan*]."<sup>163</sup> "Economic strength" was the most important means to be triumphant over the "anomalous reprehensible conditions that surround Palestine today."<sup>164</sup>

Following the *nahda* narrative, Rihani returned to the Umayyad and Andalusian periods to emphasize Arab civilization's secret: a flexible character that adapted to its environment while maintaining a firm set of morals drawn from a spiritual and ethical heritage. The Arab nation could similarly adapt to today's moral progress and civilization but only by severing the "fetters of ignorance and submission, the shackles of sterile traditions, the chains of fanaticism . . . just as it had severed in the past the fetters of the *jahiliyya* . . . the chains of nomadism, tribalism, and regional chauvinism."<sup>165</sup>

The invoking of an "eternal heritage" was a critical component of most narrations in *Iqtisadiyyat*. The editors conjured Arab caravans and ships carrying merchandise from Iraq to the farthest western port of Morocco. The grandiosity of a past of unity without borders, a past that held "the most important markets in the world," was reducible to one trans-historical essence, a "commercial disposition" that lied "latent," ready to be lit once again.<sup>166</sup>

There was one voice that dissented from an element of this narrative while remaining faithful to its overall structure. In his piece, "Our Need for Economy," Sha'sha'a located the disease of slumber in the very

place that his colleagues found its antidote—the Arab past. The reasons for Arab “oblivion” to the “science of economy” were to be found among “our ancestors, God forgive their trespasses against us.”<sup>167</sup> One such example, according to the author, was in al-Ghazali’s philosophy. Drawing on the work of the twentieth-century writer, poet, and teacher Zaki Mubarak, Sha’sha’a cited al-Ghazali, who preached: “Man should meet his needs in the present” and spend the rest of his money without saving: “And he who saves for a year is not a believer in any case, he says!” This idea of spending on the necessary and not saving for the future was what historians identified as the cause of the “collapse of the Arab kingdom.” But how could the science of economy, Sha’sha’a asked, “be respected in a nation that is told by the imam of imams: if you save money for forty days you will be deprived of your extolled place in the hereafter?!”<sup>168</sup> Sha’sha’a’s condemnation of al-Ghazali puts him at odds with his colleagues in *Iqtisadiyyat* as well as contemporary scholars who recognize the philosopher as not only condemning both miserliness and extravagance, but also an influential economic theorist who analyzed exchange, production, money, the role of the state, and public finances.<sup>169</sup>

The second historical model for economic slumber was the “extravagance and squander of our Arab ancestors.”<sup>170</sup> Sha’sha’a critiqued the work of Ibn Taqtaqi for presenting extreme generosity as an indication of virtue in his book *Al-adab al sultaniyya wal duwwal al-islamiyya*. Ibn Taqtaqi told the story of Ibn Shabrama who sought assistance from the Abbasid minister Ayyub al-Muryani to pay his daughter-in-law’s dowery. Originally asking for 2,000 *durham*, Ibn Shabrama ultimately leaves the minister’s quarters with 50,000. This excessive generosity was “neither noble nor virtuous.” Unlike his colleagues, Sha’sha’a did not unearth a commercial transhistorical essence that would deliver Arab progress and prosperity. He insisted, instead, that “our nation” was “new to economic matters.”<sup>171</sup>

The diagnosis of slumber and the prognosis for wakefulness presented economic *nahda* and national economy as mutually dependent. But the formations of “national income” and a “national economy” were also marked with ambiguity. Saba and his team narrated the dissolution of the Ottoman empire as a divisive moment that led to “oppressive economic conditions.”<sup>172</sup> They believed that any boundaries on free trade were artificial intrusions. “Untenable and unnatural” borders isolated the Arab countries into separate “states and kingdoms” despite their common bonds of language, religion, and tradition.

Thus pan-Arabism was not systematically and solely coupled with “socialism” as scholars have concluded.<sup>173</sup> In this case Palestinian visions of a capitalist utopia were dependent on some form of Arab commercial unity. For them, the national was neither “natural” nor viable. Only one phenomenon could transcend these conditions—economic interests. Economy again emerges as essential and superior: “Politics set these boundaries and economic interests transcended them.” Indeed, economic interests “united what was divided and expanded what had contracted.”<sup>174</sup> While national borders were “unnatural,” Arab unity was not. These thinkers envisioned a future of unified commercial and custom laws. In an indication of the discord and strife the future held, the editors looked to an economic conference in the Balkans as an example for regional unity.<sup>175</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat* presented its readers with the benefits of capitalist investment in a vision that included the nation-state but located it in a broader Arab context.

The editors understood themselves as the vanguard of “an interesting stage of economic evolution” in the Arab world.<sup>176</sup> The themes of slumber and awakening permeated throughout the pages of *Iqtisadiyyat*, as did the emphasis on humanity’s relentless movement forward on the path of advancement. Things were changing rapidly, and new and useful innovations had become a daily occurrence. It was only through economic conduct and management that the Palestinian and the Arab could “keep up with the world and its race.”<sup>177</sup> The keys to the chase lay in the economy and productivity that would enable Palestine and the broader Arab world to “raise the standard of living of their people, educate the masses, and share more in world trade.”<sup>178</sup>

## Conclusion

Private property and individual freedom were basic tenets for men of capital in Palestine. The proliferation of needs and commodities marked an evolutionary stage of progress and civilization. Throughout their visions and projects, there was an insistence on envisioning, securing, and improving the future. Editors studiously molded economics as a science in the service of “social man”—his welfare, his development, and his standard of living. Economics for these men was a realm of production and exchange, a body of knowledge, and a site of social management. The writers who contributed to *Iqtisadiyyat* saw capital accumulation as the source of modern arrival, even for the worker, whose class and inferiority they presented

as predetermined natural differences.<sup>179</sup> They imagined themselves as envisioning spaces for the limited mobility of this underclass, but because the worker could never embody the central heroic figure of “social man,” or his stylish but frugal mate, the editors did more than simply bolster existing social hierarchies: They created new ones.

These economic thinkers took part in defining economy as social. They embarked on a *nahda* project that focused on economic advancement as core to civilizational progress. Much of their work continues what Margaret Schabas identified as the “denaturalization” of economics.<sup>180</sup> The emphasis on economic revival and the studied lack of engagement with the carefully separated field of the “political” occurred at the height of Palestinian confrontation with settler colonialism. The editors of the journal funded the rebels but decided not to feature the Great Revolt of 1936–1939 on their pages. The maintenance of a façade of a separate economic realm that constituted both the subject and object of research seemed, at least until Saba’s own deportation, impenetrable. The editors attempted to form the very substantive distinctions between the economic and the political that thinkers today counsel giving up.<sup>181</sup> The divisions of the economic and the political were then, as they continue to be, one of capital-holders’ most highly effective defense mechanisms.<sup>182</sup>

The ideal Palestinian “social man” was a scientific, rational, preferably nonpolitical expert. While there is no indication that they ever read these works, *Iqtisadiyyat*’s editors echoed the many debates taking place in the 1930s on the technocrat. Technocrats focused on technicians, especially engineers, as the rational elite that could reorient economic order through rational production and distribution. The technocrat could benefit all, in these visions, precisely because of his ascendance from politics and partisanship.<sup>183</sup> Even though Palestine suffered at this time from a lack of engineers, *Iqtisadiyyat*’s editors echoed these principles: an optimistic vision of an abundant future and an emphasis on order, science, rationality, and neutrality. These Palestinian elites bought into what Manu Goswami has critiqued as the idea of economy as a self-regulating force beyond politics.<sup>184</sup> Yet despite this investment, men of capital could not realize a technocratic vision in part because politics in Palestine could never be residual.

By 1939, the exigencies of world war, the influx of capital, the intensive British restructuring of production and consumption, and the irreversible erosion of Palestinian political rights all functioned to irrevocably shift these men’s understandings of economics and its proper disciplinary

relationship to the political. The horizon of an Arab future, with national borders that could be transgressed through capital accumulation, investment, and exchange, had receded. The borders that men of capital took part in shaping now clearly spelled erasure. The imperative of individual freedom and interests would give way to the “public good.” The prescriptions for an ethical economic subject would give way to sustaining basic needs. Plenty would give way to scarcity. Figures such as Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, celebrated in *Iqtisadiyyat* as the authentic man of the nation who would lead the Palestinians in a broader project of Arab revival, would by the 1940s function in a state of siege. The British colonial government was no longer a background force that could confer recognition of the modern. It was a facilitator of that siege. Yet, regardless of these shifts and the attenuation of an Arab capitalist *nahda*, Palestinian men of capital maintained, perhaps more than ever, the will to shape and guard social hierarchy.

In both decades the understanding of economic matters, economic conduct, and economics as a discipline were inextricable from the health of the social body. The stories of the 1930s trouble the temporal boundaries of economic thought, which have a longer genealogy than intellectual historians have accounted for. More importantly, they help us ponder how economic life, economic affairs, and economic culture constituted Arab liberalism. Men like Bsisu and Saba very much understood themselves as part of a broader Arab project of enlightenment. For them, Arab liberalism was not just a political and cultural project. It also involved envisioning a new rational economic subject.

Palestine’s men of capital could emphasize private property, investment, and self-responsibility while featuring self-defined socialist thinkers such as Rihani who preached that an Arabo-Islamic “commercial essence” would deliver Arab awakening. These cross-fertilizations and exchanges are indicators of the multiple discourses these Palestinians drew on as they navigated what economic growth meant for social life. Yet, just as we recognize this flexibility and richness, we must also attend to how these Palestinians, like so many of their contemporaries in the Arab world, were deeply invested in maintaining their social power. Even the radicals Khuri-Makdisi studies while addressing the “masses” still sought to educate and inculcate the broad and amorphous category of the people as the object not the subject of *nahda* visions and projects.

Palestine and Palestinian history must always be studied through the lens of an ongoing confrontation with a multipronged settler colonial

enterprise. But we should also engage alternate historical formations and moments. Palestinians did not always and only play second fiddle to the European Jews' main act. Given the ongoing erasure of Palestine and the dispersal of the Palestinian people, there is an urge to celebrate the economic thought laid out on *Iqtisadiyyat*'s pages as evidence of history and rootedness. In moving beyond that initial urge, we perceive the horizons these men envisioned, the optimism they had for the future, and their perceptions of Arab progress. We can begin to see their project of producing the Palestinian "social man" and the ethical Arab consumer. Only after submitting these interrupted projects to historical interrogation can we begin the more crucial work of critiquing formations and genealogies of social hierarchies and norms. Such hierarchies, norms, and values (like those that wed vitality with economy and profit with progress) continue to inform the Palestinian social, however dispersed it may be. In transcending the urge to celebrate, we can understand these men, their modes of economic thought, and the way they viewed sovereignty as a vehicle to realize their material aims—not as a glimpse of what could have been but an indication of what was to come.

## 2

### Women of Thrift

#### Domesticity and Home Economics

**THE TEN YEARS IN PALESTINE** from 1935 to 1945 spanned the Revolt, the defeat of the rebels, and the onset of World War II. The Great Revolt shook the foundations of Palestinian social hierarchies. In their brief experiments with self-rule, the rebels presented an alternative social order that challenged the old notable elites as well as the new commercial elites who defined themselves as “men of capital.” Through their projects of “economic cultivation” [*tathqif iqtisadi*], these men aimed to be the guardians of the rational progress of Palestinian social life.<sup>1</sup>

By 1939, the defeat of the rebels, the British promulgation of the White Paper, and the onset of World War II came together to establish a new post-Revolt order. The British colonial government fortified Palestine and Egypt as bases to secure the Middle East front. In the meantime, elite Palestinians constructed new norms of class, gender, and collectivity. The home was an important site of these innovations. Elites drew on Ottoman, European, and Arab discourses to shape a Palestinian domestic awakening, or *nahda manziliyya*.<sup>2</sup> The home became a site for the fortification of social hierarchies at the same time that the discourse on domesticity described itself as a force for social reform and change. Domestic reform was a response to a rapidly shifting social landscape and a ubiquitous but decidedly unnamed battle.

In the following, I analyze an article on the family budget and a nine-part radio program on the ideal Arab home. In 1935, the editors of *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* (*The Arab Economic Journal* in its editors’ translation) featured a lead piece titled “The Family Budget.”<sup>3</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat* was



a specialized economic journal based in Jaffa. Its mission was to “elevate the Arab nation” through inculcating economic norms and practices.<sup>4</sup> The journal sought to provide the nation and the youth of Palestine with the tools to lead “an honorable and happy life.” Five years after the piece on the family budget, Salwa Sa‘id, a woman well-known for her prescriptive advice on cultural and social norms,<sup>5</sup> ran a nine-part radio series called “The New Arab Home.” The radio program aired on the Arabic section of the Palestine Broadcasting Service (PBS) in late 1940 and 1941.<sup>6</sup> It was transcribed in the mainstream newspaper, *Filastin*.

As they looked at the social landscape, *Iqtisadiyyat*’s editors and Sa‘id narrated a world of towering buildings, cinema house, and cafés. In contrast to this representation of urban accumulation and proliferating sites of consumer experience was the stark reality that confronted Palestinians in cities such as Jaffa and Haifa. By the 1940s the conditions of migrant laborers and their families had reached new lows of impoverishment. In 1945, an estimated 70 percent of Jaffa’s residents lived in shantytowns, where typically one block of thirty-four rooms sheltered up to 151 people.<sup>7</sup> In Haifa too, an estimated 41 percent of the city’s residents lived in slum conditions. Laborers and their families built ramshackle shelters of mats and sacks on the roofs of overcrowded houses.<sup>8</sup>

How can we explain the disparity between the reality of poverty and the narrative of promise? Was this the elite culture of acquisition that Ottoman officials had commented on just after World War I?<sup>9</sup> Or was it that in the 1930s, just as twenty years earlier, the rich were happy to pursue their unrestricted gain while the majority of Palestinians lived in abject poverty? A closer look reveals more complicated processes that can tell us about Palestine’s past and its present.

The modern world that these elites envisioned contained both promise and danger. It required new modes of management and new understandings of basic needs. In this context as in many others, the distinction between need and luxury was crucial to the construction of class differences as natural.<sup>10</sup> These two prescriptive accounts—the article on the family budget and the radio program on the new Arab home—crafted a class of the “model middle” that sought to reform the prodigal elite and bestow it with a monopoly on education, seamlessly elided with culture, all in an “authentic” Eastern framework. Elites shaped the home as a space of order and suitability where the ideal woman could realize a scientific domestic awakening, run the household economy, and produce a quiet and con-

tained individuality. The space of the new home and its temporal rhythms, as well as the tool of the family budget, regulated the saving and spending patterns of this quiet, contained self and, most importantly, her relationship to her other—the maid.

Elite ideas and practices were not staid and unchanging but adaptable and innovative. The prescriptions on the new Arab home and the family budget reveal a shift from the older notable politics to a consumption and class-based notion of social status. Detailing the new Arab home and describing the domestic manager who was to run it sheds light on how elites shaped a new “economic culture” as well as how they understood the upheaval that surrounded them. It makes visible norms of class and gender that were formative in the early twentieth century and would have lasting legacies for the contours of what these elites called the civilized and the cultured.

## Readers and Listeners

Palestinians were exposed to print media from Egypt and the broader Ottoman world in the late nineteenth century. By the early twentieth century, local Palestinian periodicals had become common fare in collective (male) reading sites such as the barbershop, the café, and the grocery store.<sup>11</sup> From the late 1920s and into the 1930s, monthly publications became dailies in response to a growing demand for local news in the face of the rapidly intensifying Zionist–Palestinian conflict. Indeed, by the 1940s, *Filastin* and *Al-Difaʿ*, the two most popular publications in Palestine, sold 7,000 to 10,000 copies daily.<sup>12</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat* certainly came nowhere near such numbers, but a quick glance at its subscriptions as well as its regional distribution, ranging from Baghdad to Muscat, suggests that hundreds in Palestine and throughout the Arab world consumed the journal. *Iqtisadiyyat* is not a representative or mainstream account of early twentieth century Palestine. It was a journal on the margins of social life, run by a group of men who would become among the most important contractors, bankers, investors, and accountants in the Middle East. It provides us with an early effort to institute an economic culture, which has had a long and largely unwritten history.

Palestine obtained its first broadcast frequency in 1933, and soon the radio would add to the consumption of vocalized and printed text, a public custom Ami Ayalon has discussed as an addiction.<sup>13</sup> The radio broadcasts of “The New Arab Home” likely exposed a broad spectrum of women to Saʿid’s teachings, as her anxiety that “the rough classes” [*al-tabaqat*

*al-wa'ra*] were listening to the radio indicates. The PBS was on the air for thirteen years. But the only program that *Filastin* published transcripts of was “The New Arab Home.” A relatively large number of men from different backgrounds and classes were exposed to *Filastin*, which featured Sa'id's teaching on its front page. Women's exposure was likely limited to elites' access to the paper, collective reading sessions in elite women's associations, or what women may have heard from their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers.

### The Model Middle

The editors of *Iqtisadiyyat* described a “compelling world” of “thrilling opportunities for spending.” Sweeping transformations in technology had changed individuals' everyday expectations and experiences. As the editors pointed out, even that lowest of ranks, the worker, found more opportunities for leisure and entertainment “than kings of past years could attain.” Technology had made life easier in far-off lands: The common *fellah*, or peasant, in China who traveled in a carriage now could cross long miles in a car. Other “novelties of this contemporary life” included the cinema and the radio. These changes inspired social and ethical dilemmas on the distinction between need and luxury: “Should we spend our money on everything that crosses our mind or should we spend most of our money on food and drink?” Were beautiful clothes “a necessity”? What of other “needs,” such as accommodation, furniture, an automobile, and medical bills? And how much should one spend on “cultural needs,” like newspapers, listening to music, attending concerts [*haflat*], and donating to charities [*jami'iyyat*]?<sup>14</sup>

In pondering the distribution of wealth and the distinction between necessity and luxury, *Iqtisadiyyat*'s editors unfold a rich set of intellectual influences and innovations. Their reflections on the improved conditions of the common *fellah* are clear echoes of Adam Smith's query about how it was that “the ‘industrious and frugal peasant’ in a commercial society was able to live better than an ‘African king.’”<sup>15</sup> The editors' fixation on defining “basic needs” also explicitly drew on the twelfth-century philosopher al-Ghazali, who distinguished between needs and luxuries and condemned both extravagance and miserliness.<sup>16</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat* was engaging in a European debate that spanned from Rousseau to the French Revolution: Was luxury an indication of mankind's corruption or its modern ascent?<sup>17</sup> Both *Iqti-*

*sadiyyat* and “The New Arab Home” were shaping the relationship between consumption and production, the household, and a national economy.

These familiar questions were not limited to Palestine, but they did preoccupy these Palestinian elites in specific ways. Ostensibly, the editors addressed the “middle class,” which was a “model” because it was “in the middle between the budget of a worker, which consists of some tens of guineas a year and the budget of a wealthy man [*al muthri*], which consists of thousands of guineas.”<sup>18</sup> This “model middle” was made up of “a family of an educated man who has a wife and two children and a servant.” The editors argued that “most people” lived in this imaginary “middle.” This claim resonates with other contexts in which the “middle class” appears as a self-evident category relevant to the majority.<sup>19</sup>

The cultivation of “middling” tastes and practices may have provided the needed accouterments for families rising up the social ladder. However, the actually existing majority in Palestine—the “Bedouin,” the “peasant,” “the maid,” or “the worker”—were either invisible in these accounts or appeared as stock figures that threatened the social order. “The Family Budget” and “The New Arab Home” deemed at times to address the “less moneyed” official, professional, and domestic manager. However, in both accounts the subject and object of their reforms were the prodigal elite.<sup>20</sup>

The editors indicted Palestinian elites for their consumer practices. Men prioritized their individual pleasure over familial comfort. Women cared more about personal appearances than “cultural” wellbeing. A sincere “economic” conduct necessitated turning away from personal desire and investing in the wellbeing of the household. An overwhelming temptation to spend now surrounded them, and they searched desperately for an antidote. The antidote was the family budget, a necessary tool for preserving what they referred to as the broader social body, or *al-hay’a al-itimiya’iya*.

The calculation of the budget entailed in turn the determination of the “standard of living.”<sup>21</sup> The standard of living, the editors explained, differed according to “rank” [*maqama*] and “class” [*tabaqa*] as well as overall “progress of civilization” [*taqqadum al-madaniyya*]. The editors then split the “social body” into a clear hierarchy. Every person, the editors explained, has a “rank” [*daraja*]: “The writer has a rank, the bank manager has a rank, and the prime minister has a rank.” Each “rank” corresponded to specific needs. The worker ate “simple food,” wore “cheap clothes,” and was content with just a few luxuries. The “very wealthy man” [*al-ghany al-kabir*] went on trips and donated “hundreds of guineas to charity.” The

clerk [*muwathaf*] however was more interested in reading [*mutala'a*] and leisure. The editors' use of the verb *mutal'a* here is noteworthy, for its standard attributes are "individuality and silence" as opposed to the more fluid notion of *qira'a*, in which a person could be reading to oneself, reading to an audience, or reciting from memory.<sup>22</sup> Thus, quiet but contained individuality was a defining trait of the "middling" sort.


Finally, it was the educational status of the man of the household that, above all, defined the Palestinian middle class. Educating the mind was a critical task that the "East" had neglected: "reading has not reached the necessary extent among the Eastern middle class" [*al-tabaga al-wusta al-sharqiya*]. The burden of this lack lay on the man's shoulders; his indifference was to blame. Men were responsible for the financial and "cultural" needs of the middle-class family. The model middle had a monopoly on education, which, in 1930s Palestine, as it continues to be in the Arab world more broadly, was elided with "culture."

The editors of *Iqtisadiyyat* located the model middle and its normative Arab home in an Eastern and specifically Palestinian social superiority. "The middle class in this country does not encounter the difficulties the middle class in European cities encounters." For Palestinians the home was "the pillar of the family's happiness." This emphasis on superior Eastern values was built into *nahda* projects throughout the Middle East and in this context underlies the ubiquitous critique of both exhibitionism and mimesis. This obsession with imitation and its relationship to spending and saving has a long history. As Julia Elyachar reminds us, Adam Smith in both *The Wealth of Nations* and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* did not merely point to the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange to explain people's market behavior. Rather, foreshadowing Pierre Bourdieu, Smith also highlighted the obsession with imitating the wealthy.<sup>23</sup> Mimesis in this context challenged the Palestinian elite-turned-middle class with the encompassing danger and temptation of the Western model. The West is materialistic, shallow, and socially fragmented. The East is principled, authentic, and values the family circle.

This is why it was so important to fit consumption into the mold of "Eastern" values. The home was more than "four walls and a ceiling where we seek refuge from the heat of summer and the cold of winter." It was where "the lady of the house" spent "no less than 90 percent of her time, and the husband no less than half of his time." It was essential then that this home be a place of comfort and suitability, as it was "the place where

children grow up.” Sa‘id, in “The New Arab Home,” would later echo this emphasis on comfort and propriety.

But the home was also a space to safeguard morality. For, even in the context of the self-prescribed moral superiority of Palestine, conspicuous consumption could lure the man away from his “true” values. How were women to guard against this dizzying sea of temptations and possibilities in these rapidly proliferating but unspecified “places of entertainment” [*dur al-malahi*]? Studies in the “West,” the editors assured, proved that “if a man finds comfort in and enjoys spending his time in the house, he will not need to do much visiting of places of entertainment and cafés.” It was the proper, orderly, comfortable, and calculated home that could shelter the man from himself. Men’s obligations to provide for the family’s financial and cultural needs, the editors explained, were a rational response to a “social need.” But his vulnerabilities and temptations were irrational. Thus, women’s responsibilities were to protect what these editors called “social man” from his own natural instincts.<sup>24</sup>



**FIGURE 2** A house interior in Jaffa, ca. 1935. Source: Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), photo number 166. Courtesy of the Institute of Palestine Studies.

For these editors, as for so many others, if people were not grounded in social relations and values, money and its lack could lead to ruin.<sup>25</sup> Managing money, in turn, was crucial to maintaining social norms. Thus, the editors provided precise calculations for the saving and spending patterns of the model middle. They accounted for differences between a small clerk [*muwatthaf sagir*] and an official [*muwatthaf kabir*], and they hoped to supply an adaptable budgetary reference. The focus of their efforts was on the “middling family” [*usra mutawassita*] in “one of the cities of Palestine” whose income did not exceed 360 guineas a year.

The most important aim of these budgetary prescriptions was saving, which emerges as the basic principle of a healthy and successful family. The editors conceded that in reviewing annual costs, saving appeared to be a challenge. The matter hinged on that delicate balance between need and luxury. The model budget devoted 10 percent of income to saving; 20 percent to food; 5 percent to water, light, and fuel; 24 percent to rent and taxes; 2 percent to “renewing and refurbishing furniture”; 12 percent to the family’s clothing; 3 percent to education; 1.6 percent to medical costs; 2 percent to books, newspapers, and club memberships; almost 3 percent to gifts and charity; 6 percent to “travel and parties”; and 2 percent to sundries. The “servant” category takes up 7 percent of annual income at 24 guineas a year.

Food in this account was a necessity for bodily needs as well as pleasure. Here the influence of the ascending science of nutrition appeared. Food, “the doctor teaches us,” brought “heat to the body” and its “nutritional materials . . . replace the tissues that dwindle though work and toil.” Meeting nutritional requirements was also important in that recurring emphasis on moving beyond exhibitionism: “it will not do that we scrimp on our body . . . just because food is one of the internal matters that others [*al-ghayr*] do not see.” Food was important to another location in domestic and familial life—the dining table, which was “the center for discussion between individuals of the family.” The editors emphasized the importance of regulating and “ordering” this site as integral to “the family’s happiness.” Educational expenses included books, newspaper and journal subscriptions, and memberships in literary societies [*jam’iyyat adabiyya*]. Spending on primary and secondary education was a necessity for all children, but higher education was a budgetary item for males only. Gifts and charitable associations were another necessity for the model middle. “Sentiment, religion, good manners, and logic” all required a charitable



attitude to a “brother if he falls upon scarcity [*diq*] or hardship [*shidda*].” Indeed the pleasure of giving was so deep, the editors promised, that it was akin to what “we feel when we eat sumptuous food or listen to moving music.” Given the intensity of these moral and sensual benefits, the allotment of 3 percent of annual income to charity seems rather meager.

This scantiness is made all the more visible in comparison to the 6 percent allotted for “travel, outings, and parties.” Visiting Western countries and studying “new practices” resulted in great pleasure, psychological benefit, and the acquisition of “historical, geographic, and archeological” knowledge. However, travel could prove to be a dangerous mode of consumption if spending exceeded the set allotments. Again, the editors cautioned against excessive and thoughtless mimesis. They spoke of the “natural tendency” to “imitate one who is richer than us.” The Palestinian middle, they explained, had to rid itself of the belief that if unable to travel by first-class standards then it was better not travel at all.

Finally, the point of entry into the article, savings, received a 10 percent allotment of annual family income. Saving was a grave matter, and if ignored, the individual would incur harm on “himself, his family, and his surroundings.” The editors equated a lack of saving with the severe consequences of its other extreme, stinginess [*taqtir*]. The editors thus highlighted stinginess as a social danger and promoted charity as a basic tenet of civilized conduct and social responsibility.

Ultimately, the editors preached for sound economic management in the home. Doing without luxurious pleasures and “coming to terms” with proper management would “endear you to economy.” Economic conduct would be a source of personal empowerment and great individual benefit. But the advantages were even broader. Accumulating and saving money was a national obligation: “For if your wealth increases, so too the nation’s capital [*ra’as mal*] and its capacity to produce and ward off the greedy will multiply.”<sup>26</sup> *Iqtisadiyyat* addressed its piece on the family budget to men as economic and cultural providers who would successfully differentiate between need and luxury. Sa’id’s weekly radio program, “The New Arab Home,” was addressed to women as managers of that budget and lifestyle.

## The New Arab Home

Sa’id conducted a “series of useful conversations” every Thursday evening for fifteen minutes from mid-December 1940 to early February



1941. Her talks aimed to provide women advice “for the home, economy, order, and assuring family happiness.”<sup>27</sup> Sa‘id’s “creative” lessons preached the transformation of a chaotic and pathological Palestinian household into an ordered, distinct, and minutely managed home. Sa‘id’s Lebanese background and upbringing<sup>28</sup> exposed her to a plethora of women’s magazines and journals.<sup>29</sup> She drew on a much longer set of Ottoman and Middle Eastern debates on domesticity, order, and reform.<sup>30</sup>

Unlike *Iqtisadiyyat*’s editors, Sa‘id was not invested in any form of Eastern superiority. Like many of the periodicals she was exposed to, she found Eastern women consistently wanting in the “general qualities of knowledge, energy, and capability.”<sup>31</sup> To rise to the aspired level, the new woman had to overcome “the outmoded and unscientific methods of yesterday.”<sup>32</sup> A relentless Anglophile, Sa‘id compared Palestine to an amorphous and homogenous Europe/West that had its most refined and genteel articulations in English conduct, comportment, and taste.<sup>33</sup> The comparison consistently bore bitter fruit. In Europe, the home was a site of art, order, beauty, and comfort.<sup>34</sup> In Palestine, the homes were chaotic, ostentatious, uncomfortable, impractical, stiff, worn-out, dark, stuffy, and stale. Palestinian homemakers were lazy, inefficient, disorderly spendthrifts, who blindly imitated the wrong Western models. Sa‘id’s purpose was to influence “my nation’s daughter” in her appeal for domestic culture” [*al-thaqafa al-manzaliyya*].<sup>35</sup> This domestic culture would transform the dirty and uncomfortable Arab house into the social and familial site that “the English call—Home.”<sup>36</sup> The word “Home” appeared in bold English letters and capitalized in the transcript of the program, and Sa‘id most likely said it in English on the radio as well.<sup>37</sup>

The home, Sa‘id taught, was a new realm of authority, a small kingdom where the woman could administer the “family circle” in order to prepare the individual to participate fully in national life.<sup>38</sup> Sa‘id’s lectures spoke to her “Arab sisters” about improving this small kingdom so that it would “fit the pressing needs of the times.”<sup>39</sup> In line with the Palestinian businessmen and reformers of her time, Sa‘id’s work was situated in a brand of the *nahda* that heavily relied on the maintenance and naturalization of class privilege. Domestic awakening depended upon women’s realization that “the foremost concern of the human spirit is tireless and constant progress” [*irtiqa*].<sup>40</sup> Sa‘id called upon a tight and exclusionary kinship of “the most educated and refined women of society.”<sup>41</sup>

## Contemporary Taste and Sound Science

Familiarity with modern science and expertise were prerequisites for the new Arab home.<sup>42</sup> Virtually all of women's misfortunes—including marital strife, infertility, and illness—were direct results of a lack of order in “our ideas and practices.”<sup>43</sup> Because “refined nations” valued order, they were able to produce new “astonishing means of transportation and communication over land, sea, and air.”<sup>44</sup> The domestic “circle” should be subject to the same regimes of order. Sa‘id separated the household from, and made it parallel to, broader regimes of scientific management as well as national and civilizational development.

Domestic management and discipline created possibilities for women's participation. By being thrifty but civilized, disciplined but cultured, Sa‘id's “sisterhood of the refined” could participate in processes from which she would otherwise be excluded. Thus, domestic management produced the elite woman as a subject whose participation in economy and science were confined to the home. Sa‘id urged women not to relegate science to the “realm of men.” These new sciences included engineering, architectural design, interior decoration, home economics, and nutrition. But among all the sciences, it was domestic management [*tadbir manzili*]<sup>45</sup> that was “foremost among the arts a woman must attend to.”<sup>46</sup> Through engagement with this science, and art, women could “accustom themselves to order” in cooking, shopping, and housework. This insistence on accepting a particular kind of order drove Sa‘id's reform project. Women's administrative management was necessary for Palestinians to “gradually” develop “contemporary taste [*dhawq mu‘asir*] and sound science [*al-‘ilm al-salih*].”<sup>47</sup>

Like the editors of *Iqtisadiyyat*, Sa‘id rejected mimesis: “We see the towering buildings and the imposing palaces that increase day by day in all corners of the country. The house that we are aspiring to is not this kind.”<sup>48</sup> The new houses in those buildings were “tight and constrained”; their rooms were small, and their ceilings low. They were hot in the summer and cold in the winter. Sa‘id voiced the concerns of these buildings' residents to articulate the potential degeneracy of modern life:

What constricts us the most is the lack of familial independence [*istiqlal ‘a‘ili*] because the houses are all stuck to one another. . . . We whisper when we speak, we are quiet when we cough and when the children play, so that we do not disturb our neighbors, as they do us most of the time.<sup>49</sup>

Sa'id instructed, "Not all that is new and beautiful is appropriate."<sup>50</sup> Sa'id's condemnation of the rush to blindly imitate [*taglid*]<sup>51</sup> the European mode provided her the opportunity to idealize pastoral renditions of the past:

Our old village house that had one room surrounded by almond, evergreen, and oak trees, far from watchful eyes and the earshot of strangers, is a thousand times better than these white, carelessly designed buildings, where tens of residents reside on a square of land that is no more than one or two hundred meters.<sup>52</sup>

The "old ways" had the retrospective value of privacy that, Sa'id insisted, was among the most strident of the new generation's demands. Sa'id propagated the modern notion of the nuclear family by presenting privacy and distance "from strangers" as a lost value of past tradition. The village "ways" were located in an idealized past, to be selectively drawn upon in building the utopian future.

In "The Natural Location of the Home," Sa'id presented her listeners and readers with the building blocks of the utopian future. Hygiene, social selectivity, and nature combined to create the ideal site for rejuvenating elite women and their families. The good domestic manager would choose a house that was higher than ground level, "far from crowded and noisy neighborhoods," and swamps, which posed "extreme danger" to the family's health. Here, Sa'id referred to the "tuberculosis microbe that thins the ranks of one family after another."<sup>53</sup> Sa'id urged a resolute campaign against insects, flies, and other pests and pointed out that many "Europeans" had taken to placing screens on windows and doors.

Toufoul Abou-Hodeib has linked domesticity to urban reforms that focused on the "logic of the straight line" as a new mode of order in the late Ottoman period. The new logic of urban order had parallels in the spaces of the home.<sup>54</sup> These spatial renditions of the straight line resonated in Sa'id's lessons. The house, she taught, should look out over beautiful views; it should be open in more than one direction to the east or the west, and the other to the north. The rooms should be spacious—"a room that is four by four meters can sleep no more than two adults and a child"—and all bathrooms should face south. She implored women to not be deterred "because of your ignorance of architecture or your perception that it is a matter for men alone."<sup>55</sup> Women had a "natural disposition" to design the new Arab home. Her propensity to order, manage, and take part in science, once confined to the rooms of the house, would, Sa'id promised, become a "right that no one can contest."<sup>56</sup>

After designing her airy, sunny house, the domestic manager's next step was furnishing. Sa'id criticized the expensively furnished homes in Palestine, Egypt, and Syria, which resembled houses "we see on the large white screen of the cinema."<sup>57</sup> These houses contained "grandiose" furniture and decorations but were cold and uninviting. To make a house a home, the homemaker needed to furnish without great expense while creating a space that was soothing for "both the gaze and the body."<sup>58</sup> Thus, thrift and authenticity went hand in hand.

The disapproval of the "grand houses" furnished in the "latest fashion" did not mean, however, that Sa'id preferred old ways nor that she did not appreciate new art. The appropriate ideal was, again, among the English, who were "the least decorative of the Europeans" and whose furniture exhibited "sturdiness, sound design and composure."<sup>59</sup> Sa'id exclaimed: "I call upon you and myself to study and understand, as we are at the beginning of our *nahda* in domestic order."<sup>60</sup> Sa'id's call to "study and understand" is a powerful iteration of the kind of disciplined subject she hoped to mold.

### Keeping Your Man at Home

Sa'id, like the editors of *Iqtisadiyyat*, was deeply concerned with keeping men at home. The two most important sites to realize this containment were the kitchen and the dining room. The domestic manager had to constantly maintain aesthetic and culinary standards. Sa'id agreed with what she described as the English adage: "The way to a man's heart is through his stomach." She instructed women to rethink the foods they traditionally cooked, calling for new variations of *mahshiyyat*, *mu'ajjanat*, *maqliyyat*, and *kubba*, which burned time, energy, and kerosene.<sup>61</sup> Women had to be "systematic" and prepare nutritious but appetizing foods that would consume less of their time.

Being "systematic" also required the reform of the Palestinian kitchen. In the villages and mountains this was a neglected room facing a wall or an underground cellar. Along the coast, it was a small dark room in the back of the house. But in Europe, the kitchen was now the nexus for Sa'id's heroes—those engineers, chemists, and medical doctors who took precise measurements for windows, chimneys, and closets, who conducted experiments on nutrition, vitamins, and tonics, and who prescribed the best foods for a healthy and long life.

Industrial efforts had contributed innovations in iron ovens that run on coal, gas, and electricity and cooking utensils of “brass, aluminum, glass, and clay.”<sup>62</sup> The woman did her part with sheer window dressings, candles, attractive textiles, and colorful paint for closets and steps. The European kitchen was not a dark space of utility far from sight, but the most splendid room in the house, with sun, bright colors, and appliances that “ensured the joy of work.”<sup>63</sup> This was the model that “the new Arab kitchen must be based on.”<sup>64</sup> While this large task was intimidating due to the lack of new engineering in Palestine,<sup>65</sup> there was an immediate need to combat the Arab kitchen, which was

crammed with various cleaning utensils, uncovered trash containers, the servants’ *qayaqib*, dirty laundry, buckets, wet and dry mops of all sorts, and all types of other useless things that surround the gas *babur*, that we cook our food on. . . . This is how appetizing food is mixed with the waste and dust that flies from mops, buckets, and containers.<sup>66</sup>

Sa’id implored her “refined sister” to purify the Arab kitchen of health hazards and potential embarrassments to good housekeeping. But, the domestic manager also had to pay close attention to pleasing her husband’s gaze, especially when “these days” the accouterments of refinement and artistry abounded in “public houses, large restaurants, and foreigners’ homes.”<sup>67</sup> Like the editors of *Iqtisadiyyat*, Sa’id pushed for a new Arab home that could compete with proliferating spaces that offered the elite man new consumer experiences. The home functioned to morally and socially contain the man, who was perennially vulnerable to temptation.

The second crucial site to guarding proper aesthetic standards as well as male fidelity was the dining room. In this space, eating was a key social ceremony that affirmed ethical consumption and cultural refinement.<sup>68</sup> The dining room was both a public and a private space where a woman could assert her skill and elegance. It was a site of political and historic banquets, familial reconciliation, and the bringing together of newlyweds. This room was of “foremost importance to society” where the woman could deliver unity, harmony, and goodwill to the nuclear family and humanity at large.<sup>69</sup>

What was new about the dining table, if such historic banquets of high politics and familial reconciliation had already taken place there? The shift was in its function as a private space of the nuclear family. Sa’id chided her sisters for allowing their families to eat in the kitchen or in the

sitting room, without set times for collective meals at the dinner table. Elite women devoted the bounty of their finances to the dining room. They placed in it “grand cabinetwork and expensive silver urns,” for the “shallow joy of vainglory” rather than comfort and utility.<sup>70</sup>

Small acts such as setting the dinner table every day would yield meaningful results for the homemaker and her family. For her tablecloth, for example, she should choose a brightly colored fabric, which was recently becoming popular among the “rough classes” [*al-tabaqat al-wa'ra*] because it was inexpensive and easy to wash and iron.<sup>71</sup> Sa'id gave detailed explanations of place settings and the proper presentation of bread, fruit, and vegetables.

As for formal events, while each homemaker should prepare the dinner table according to “her means and social standing,” she should never leave “everything in the care of the maid” but should oversee every aspect of the preparations.<sup>72</sup> Thus, in Sa'id's world, even a woman lacking in means had at least one maid. In addition, the dinner table among “the refined peoples” was a space for spiritual union with God and family at morning and evening prayers. Here Sa'id disclosed her own Christian normative biases for the very possibility of the new Arab home, and the type of family circle that she envisioned.

Sa'id interpolated an imaginary “opposing homemaker” and her reactions to new regimes of lifestyle and aesthetics: “The modern dining room and its care . . . demands time and money, and we have neither, which makes initiative in this field impossible for us.”<sup>73</sup> In this hypothetical debate, her response was that if women were listening to her, they had enough money to buy a radio. Moreover, she was certain that each of her sisters had jewels on her ears, neck, or wrists. The needed effects for a modern dinner table would cost less than any given piece of jewelry. Sa'id implored young women to relinquish the long-held practice of expecting jewelry as engagement and wedding gifts and ask their grooms for silverware instead.<sup>74</sup>

## The Tyranny of Time

The calculation and management of time were central to Sa'id's project. She waged her most strident critique on what she described as Eastern notions of time and efficiency: “We Easterners, men and women, lose so much time every day that if others were like us the world would have remained as it was from the dawn of history in the advance of industry,

art, and civilization.”<sup>75</sup> Here she echoed the fixation on the value of time [*qimat al-waqt*] that had been in circulation in Egypt and throughout the Ottoman world since the late nineteenth century.<sup>76</sup> Sa‘id instructed her sisters on the “irreplaceable items” to remedy this lack.<sup>77</sup> Each house must have two clocks (one in the kitchen and one in the threshold or dining room), a set of clearly labeled keys, and three notebooks. The small black hands of the clock would rationalize household tasks.

Come, let us now resolve—and with our clock in hand—to awake . . . at an early hour that we have set before going to sleep so that we may begin our work with determination and energy. We will prepare breakfast in the necessary minutes, clothe the small ones in a set time, tidy the bedrooms, and then we will sit and eat. After that we go to the kitchen, calculating the rise in prices of kerosene and fuel, we assess how much time the type of food we are preparing will take. We make our choices based on these calculations. We do not light the fire until just before lunchtime so that the food is hot when the family members arrive. And so we have time for the rest of our tasks—washing and ironing clothes, inspecting closets and stairs, and cleaning—all the while calculating the time and energy for each task.<sup>78</sup>

Thus the domestic manager was entrenched in constant self-assessment, conducting a thorough inspection of her home just as she calculated her own time and efficiency. Her clearly labeled keys further cemented her “sovereignty” by helping her order, categorize, and lock away her possessions “far from the reach of servants and children.”<sup>79</sup> In her notebooks the homemaker could record her “personal and social” appointments and needed domestic provisions. Two other notebooks were to be devoted to the crucial task of home economics, discussed below. Sa‘id anticipated that some of her listeners and readers would find the new regimes of household order oppressive. The “opposing homemaker” might complain:

The order that you are calling for is like the order in school, which we could not wait to be rid of. Where is the freedom that we aspire to in marriage? Where is the comfort that we want in our own homes without restriction or supervision?<sup>80</sup>

Sa‘id here responded to the fear that calculation and self-assessment would transform the marital home into another house of discipline.<sup>81</sup> But, she promised, calculation would “give you freedom and lengthen your day [because] you will finish your housework in half the time.”<sup>82</sup> Thus discipline produced not just a particular kind of subject but new temporalities—such as spare time.<sup>83</sup>

Controlling one's time, Sa'id taught, was liberating. The homemaker could finally see to all those torn socks and clothes piling up in corners and hiding places. Then she could attend to herself. While the domestic manager could not fall short on pleasing her partner and ensuring "the residents of her precious castle a life of plenty and comfort," she also had to look after health, temperament, beauty, and mind.<sup>84</sup> In an echo of *Iqtisadiyyat*'s emphasis on cultural and literary "needs," Sa'id explained that for a woman to maintain her dignity and social stature, she must "participate in charitable and literary associations."<sup>85</sup> She should also spend at least one hour of the day in quiet solitude, reading [*mutalā'a*] the press in order "to increase her mental wealth."<sup>86</sup> Just as in the case of "The Family Budget," normative conduct was tied to the duty of contained and reflective individuality. If she were to neglect these duties, the homemaker would be an employee rather than a "respected lady" in her own home, which was, after all, "her private property" [*mulkiha al-khass*].<sup>87</sup> It is unlikely that these elite homes were the private property of women. Yet this reference is another iteration of how Sa'id linked the possibility of financial independence to domestic management.

Sa'id's call on the precise measurement of time sought as in other contexts to instate new disciplinary regimes, not in the factory, the school, or the prison, but in the home. It is important to here to qualify these disciplinary regimes and question their coherence. In Palestine and beyond, the attempts to shape empty, homogenous time would face adaptation and resistance as people crafted social knowledge and practice.<sup>88</sup>

## Home Economics

The two imperatives of "basic needs" and management framed much of Sa'id's interventions on the Arab home. Sa'id, like Palestinian businessmen and thinkers in the same period, was particularly concerned with defining the difference between need and luxury. Whereas "The Family Budget" presumed that men were in charge of the budget, Sa'id addressed women as the primary decision-makers in all household finances. She cried: "Yes, my sister, management is our forte!"<sup>89</sup>

The domestic manager's realization of order depended on her renunciation of conspicuous consumption and her resolute attention to thrift and saving. Women haphazardly stuffed their homes with furniture and decoration simply so that "it is in the eyesight of the visitor."<sup>90</sup> This chaos



resulted in women faltering in their roles as mothers; they could not properly dress and prepare children for school and daily life.

Sa'id explained that her insistence on beauty and comfort should not be "understood as a pursuit of luxury [*bathakh*]." <sup>91</sup> The woman had to repress her desire for the new technologies that rationalized housework. This would be difficult, Sa'id admitted, as even Europe's women stopped at every page of domestic magazines "with desire and yearning" [*raghba wa lahf*] for the new inventions in household appliances and utensils. <sup>92</sup> The balance between yearning for the rational regime of simplicity and being economic was tenuous but necessary. Domestic success hinged on being "victorious over spending," that "ailment in the East and among Easterners." <sup>93</sup> Since Sa'id and her ilk were "unable to participate in works external to the home," their duty was to reform past practices of "opulence [*taraf*], spending, and imitation." <sup>94</sup> To successfully lead this battle, women must rigorously engage home economics.

In "Economy and Providing Happiness and Comfort for the Least Expense," Sa'id explained the two central axes that enabled social production: economy and the home. <sup>95</sup> These two axes, she explained were parallel and codependent. Understanding the relationship between "the science of economy and domestic life" was crucial to social health and wellbeing. <sup>96</sup> Home economics, Sa'id preached, had become an established and recognized mode of management that provided women with the scientific bases to "guard against the evil of destitution and poverty." <sup>97</sup>

It was thus crucial that the management of money was in women's hands. Sa'id rigorously challenged women's perceptions that "they were not born" for the "science of accounting and calculating" [*hisab*]. <sup>98</sup> The diligent homemaker needed simple tools, such as notebooks, to record her household income and expenditures. <sup>99</sup> Managing home economics was the woman's natural role: "Nature made man to struggle for daily bread . . . and woman to manage the household spending." <sup>100</sup> Women were better positioned to economize than men, who were both naturally inclined to spend and exposed to wider arenas for consumption. Thus Sa'id here overturns the *Iqtisadiyyat* editors' presumption of men's hold on domestic finance. For her, it was women's "natural" disposition, which was less susceptible to temptation in spending and leisure, that rendered them the most effective financial managers.

Wartime-induced inflation demanded that women in this period "organize their homes" and guard against "the evil of destitution and pov-

erty in these critical times.”<sup>101</sup> Women would have to drastically decrease their consumption, as “the markets are slowly being emptied of luxuries [*kamaliyyat*] and tomorrow they will be empty of necessities [*daruriyyat*].”<sup>102</sup> Sa‘id urged austerity. Women should lessen their use of kerosene and replace “foreign ready-made products” [*mustahdarat ajnabiyya*], such as cleaning materials, with what they could “gather from among the rocks and thickets of our country.”<sup>103</sup> Sa‘id called on the consumer to forgo foreign imports and “open new doors for local production.”<sup>104</sup> Women should purchase their clothes from the textile factories in Ramallah and Jerusalem, which supplied the surrounding Arab countries and were *almost* as good as their exalted European counterparts.

Sa‘id’s encouragement of local production—“a basic necessity for any nation that wants success”—was at odds with her exuberant celebration of European models.<sup>105</sup> Intoxicated by all that colonial modernity, and having bombarded her listeners and readers with an inherently deficient Eastern essence, how would she now convincingly argue for locally produced goods? Another meaning of economy provided the way out of Sa‘id’s conundrum:

The battle raging in the world today is an economic battle. Each nation defends its own economy—men and women with brutal force. And today we suffer an unprecedented financial crisis [*azma maliyya*]. Fear increases day by day of what constraints tomorrow will bring upon our livelihood. It is unacceptable that we make up half of the nation but remain secluded from what is happening around us. We are able to provide our considerable assistance to that [other] half that is alone battling this crisis, which breaks the back and the spirit.<sup>106</sup>

Economy here is wedded to a national space that men defended with “brutal force” and that women guarded as domestic managers. The home, like the economy, was a space to be measured in order to ensure prosperity. Thus the spatializing of a national economy was in this case, as in many others, linked to the demarcation of the domestic as a parallel but separate domain.<sup>107</sup>

Sa‘id located her urgent call for domestic reform as a necessary response to a ubiquitous battle: “We cannot falter in moving forward in the battleground of these times of struggle, beginning with the home that is under our control and unlimited direction.”<sup>108</sup> Yet, Sa‘id’s battle was decidedly ambiguous. At times, it was a clear reference to World War II—this “destructive war.” At others, such as the case above, the battle was an economic one, a response to financial crisis. Palestinians had to face

upheaval with “fortified unity, steadfast hearts, enlightened minds, and ordered thought.”<sup>109</sup> But who were the actors in Sa‘id’s battleground and what was the source of the upheaval that threatened her so deeply?

### The Terms of Battle

The prescriptive accounts on the family budget and the ideal Arab home do not name the Zionist settlement project. Although European Jews turn up as a group of unnamed and rapidly increasing “foreigners,” it is the specter of social change that most informs both accounts. Indeed, Sa‘id lists a set of “unprecedented upheavals” that her elite sister could no longer afford to ignore. The expectations of individuals among the “third rank” [*al-daraja al-thalitha*], she warned, were shifting due to:

1. The spread of primary schools in villages and among *fellahin*.
2. The increase of cinema houses.
3. Listening to the radio.
4. Mixing with foreigners.<sup>110</sup>

Indeed, the Arab Revolt, which threatened Palestinian elites both old and new, remained invisible in these accounts. Sa‘id’s prescriptions paralleled the conventional historiographic insistence on elites as the agents of the Revolt.<sup>111</sup> She warned that the “ignorant classes” were particularly susceptible to the “declarations of politicians” who “intend only to light the fire of revolt among them.”<sup>112</sup> Thus the “illiterate,” “rough,” and “third” classes appeared in Sa‘id’s series as alternatively objects of sympathy or dangerous subjects, but never agents, of potential upheaval.

Sa‘id claimed that her lessons on contemporary taste and sound science did not depend on wealth. The home—for rich and poor in the villages, mountains, and along the coast of Palestine—was the site of protection and happiness.<sup>113</sup> She sometimes spoke directly, albeit condescendingly, to the less moneyed of her “sisters” whose “personal circumstances” deprived them of “independence in opinion.”<sup>114</sup> Thus, a woman’s capacity to make independent decisions was tied to her class standing. Nevertheless, Sa‘id tried not to forsake this dependent sister, advising her on the transformative power of “the needle” and “a small brush dipped in a bit of paint.” But these less-privileged sisters could never include the worker or the maid, as evident in the three-part special on the maid and the servant.

Maids and servants were neither her “sisters” nor “daughters of the nation.” The “toil and effort” that Sa‘id sought to rationalize inevitably fell on another’s shoulders. The toiling subordinate both made possible and threatened the exalted status of the “daughter of the nation.” This exalted daughter of the nation was now confronting a “crisis of service.” The “servant moves with the course of time just as we do.”<sup>115</sup> Maids now sought to be free and to enjoy the good things in life, Sa‘id explained. Access to media and education had influenced her “mentality.” “We know the power such things have over the educated class. Imagine, then, [their power over] the ignorant class [*al-tabaqa al-jahila*].”<sup>116</sup> Mass-mediated consumption was not a homogenizing civilizing force.<sup>117</sup> The “third rank’s” use of commodities and their potential capacity for desire and an eventual “sense of self” destabilized the divide between mistress and servant, refined and rough. Consumption was at once a means of social differentiation and a threat to it.<sup>118</sup>

Sa‘id spoke at great length of the maid’s fury and desperation and her longing to be free. She emphasized the servant’s humanity: “She is a daughter of Eve, like the rest of us.”<sup>119</sup> Yet the maid must remain isolated. For the much-touted “progress towards civilization” meant the maid’s potential arrival at a “sense of self.”<sup>120</sup> This arrival threatened the homemaker’s authority.

If the homemaker did not adjust to these new challenges, she risked a regression to being her husband’s servant, or worse yet, “slave.” First, the lady of the house had to shift her tone and language when speaking to her servants, for “most of them were listening to radio broadcasts every day.”<sup>121</sup> Servants were receiving from the radio all manner of dangerous notions about the “worker in Europe” who was attaining better wages and, worse yet, had even begun to “influence high politics.”<sup>122</sup> Second, the lady of the house should raise the maid’s standard of living by providing her with a proper place for sleep and rest, as well as giving her a private closet for her things. This type of conduct would “civilize” the maid and “slowly train her to respect herself.”<sup>123</sup> The self-respecting maid would then be hard-pressed to “conduct acts that debase her mistress.”<sup>124</sup> Lastly, the “self-respecting lady” should not demand complete obedience from her maid. She should treat the maid with respect, appreciate the maid’s work with “kindness and a smile,” and never forget that the maid is a “human being, like us.”<sup>125</sup> The discerning lady who treated her servants well “could radiate her esteem, like rays of the sun, directly into girls’ hearts, who will in turn flutter to

serve her.”<sup>126</sup> The relationship between mistress and servant hinged on the lady’s authoritative but humane power.

After all, the lady of the house “selects the maid and her tasks, chooses when she rests, sleeps, and eats . . . and guides her on her appearance and clothes, both at work and during her free time.”<sup>127</sup> Sustaining such intimate authority depended on changing “our relationship to this maid, which as long as it is marked by aversion, will only increase our own disdain for her occupation and her resentment of fate’s iniquity that has subjected her to this occupation and cast her between our hands.”<sup>128</sup> Sa‘id urged her sisters to take stock of their lives in comparison to that of their maids. In the following detailed depiction, what Sa‘id had earlier described as the homemaker’s toil became the harsh daily routine of the maid, whom she called a poor wretch [*miskina*]:

. . . as I sit here writing this letter to you in the early morning hours, I am still in bed, surrounded by all the means of a comfortable life from a snug bed to radiant light, from a child who gazes at me intently to an affectionate husband. . . . However, my maid has rushed from the cold dawn to open the windows, air the house, prepare the breakfast, wash the dirty pots, dishes, and utensils, sweep the piles of dirt and dust, and wash the soiled clothes. She does not finish preparing the food, and she is plunged again into another fight, without companion or sympathy save brushes, brooms, dusters, and mops. Night barely comes before the next day surprises her. And thus day after day passes, and this wretch has no hope for change in her program and no expectation of a life of freedom or the blessing of independence.<sup>129</sup>

In perhaps the clearest metaphor of class anxiety, Sa‘id conjured the “Russian princesses,” who having been dispossessed by “politics”—that is, the Bolshevik Revolution—“preferred to be gainfully employed as maids in [wealthy Egyptian] houses rather than give themselves over to houses of amusement and debauchery.”<sup>130</sup>

Imagine my countrywoman . . . this . . . treachery of fate. Imagine, God forbid a thousand times, that need steered us to [a fate akin] to these princesses, who had nobility, beauty, and intelligence. How would you want the lady of the house to treat you?<sup>131</sup>

Sa‘id’s sisterhood, like Russia’s “princesses,” sat atop a shaky precipice. Their battle was with the working and rural classes, whose existence in these accounts served to both sustain and threaten the elite’s domestic lifestyle [*ma’isha baytiyya*].

## Conclusion

Domestic reformers used economy, basic needs, and management to create possibilities as well as restrictions for both women and men in 1930s Palestine. To be an economic man was to be a father and husband who provided for the family's financial and "cultural" needs. To be an economic woman was to be a skilled and efficient mother and wife whose domestic knowledge and authority raised and sheltered the future of the social body while carefully guarding her husband's fidelity. The economic subject was a loyal patriot, an agent in control of the present and future, a civilized person who carefully managed her money in the march of and to progress.

"Economy" meant different things in these accounts: the effective management of money, a new culture of saving and spending, a new body of knowledge, and finally an emerging national space that was parallel and linked to the home. That site, the home, was a space of social order and moral containment. As in other cases, modern cooking techniques, scientific organization, an emphasis on hygiene, and the keeping of ledgers all constituted the homemaker's social responsibility, which became associated with making herself and her household calculable.<sup>132</sup> The home was her mirror, a reflection of her commitment to the broader unfinished national project. Here the myth of equality that nationalism often entails was at once reified and betrayed. Just as these reform projects confined the elite woman's participation and contributions within the walls of the home, so too was the toiling subordinate trapped in a silent "under rank" subject to constant surveillance.

However, the new "compelling opportunities" for consumer experience raised some ethical and social dilemmas. On the one hand, the idea of growing needs was compelling because it promised an increasing mastery of nature and an upward spiral of progress.<sup>133</sup> But elites were ambivalent about new consumer goods, practices, and technologies, which simultaneously troubled and enticed them. These elites saw a world around them in which needs had a new "plasticity," as Zygmunt Bauman has put it.<sup>134</sup> Needs were shifting, from being states of tension that could at once be gratified, to expressing something that could be impossible to gratify: desire.<sup>135</sup> This plasticity of needs and the power of desire were threatening for two reasons, both of which reveal shifting expressions of class and status in Palestine.

First, in most historical cases of consumer and domestic reform, it is the aspiring middle and working classes that are the intended address. In

Palestine, the subject and object of domestic reform was the prodigal elite whose exhibitionism threatened the wellbeing of the social body. The cases here of “The Family Budget” and “The New Arab Home” sought to reform the prodigal elite’s consuming patterns to craft a model middle class. To conduct this reform, Palestinian elites drew on both Arab and European philosophical debates on luxury, miserliness, and extravagance. Elites crafted the “model middle” by shaping social ceremonies, aesthetic stances, and linking consumer practices to social identity.<sup>136</sup> In this case, as in so many others, consumer practices and ideas worked as a stratification process that barred people from a rapidly shifting social body.<sup>137</sup> Culture—connoting schooling, upbringing, and refined manners—was key to the claims of social superiority these projects cultivated.<sup>138</sup> Forgoing certain consumer items, such as newspaper and literary journal subscriptions, was in Palestine a form of cultural deprivation.<sup>139</sup> The call to eschew exhibitionism was placed in opposition to what Maureen O’Dougherty has called an enlightened consumption in culture.<sup>140</sup> Thus “cultured” or “civilized” consumption was the distinguishing feature of a particular “class” and “rank,” which sought not simply to make distinctions but to secure them as stable and unchanging essences.

Second, the plasticity of needs and the force of consumer desire held a deeper threat to elite daily life, on the heels of the Great Revolt that challenged its dominance. Servants, peasants, and villagers, that amorphous “third rank,” stood outside but lingered dangerously close to that oft-repeated “progress of civilization.” It was the “illiterate” and inferior classes’ access to education and various media that was most threatening. New modes of consumption had the potential to imbue these “rough classes” with a sense of “self.” Rational consumption, based on contemporary taste and sound science, would deliver civilization to the Palestinian elite. Yet its mass accessibility in new forms, such as cinema, radio, and newspapers, threatened their power.<sup>141</sup>

New goods, practices, and technologies were sites for men and women to produce themselves and their relationships; for workers, villagers, and farmers to threaten class power; and for elites to confront these threats by naturalizing class differences. In defining “need” versus “luxuries,” these accounts provide a glimpse into Palestinian social hierarchy and how elites employed social differences to define men and women, self and other, needs and desires. They also expose the heavily policed contours of the civilized and the cultured. These contours proved resistant and were able across times and spaces to define and contain the political.

# 3

## A Nutritional Economy

### The Calorie, Development, and War

**THE FIRST TIME** a world war erupted, famine and extreme deprivation struck Greater Syria. Conservative estimates put the number of dead from starvation at half a million.<sup>1</sup> Tripoli, Jounieh, Haifa, and Acre “underwent years of extreme deprivation.”<sup>2</sup> Incidences of cannibalism were reported as the hungry perished on the streets. These were the memories that haunted Palestinians when World War II came knocking on their doors. They also haunted colonial officials, who faced the economic consequences of their brutal containment of the Great Revolt (1936–1939) and its innovations in guerilla warfare.

By 1938, the signs of economic devastation—from the closing of workshops, to the rise of unemployment, to the specter of famine—were everywhere to be seen.<sup>3</sup> The onset of the war compounded these conditions with further shortages and inflation that colonial officials hoped to confront with “extreme sensitivity and caution.”<sup>4</sup> Due to blockades and the effort to secure arms shipments, by 1940 everything from sugar to shoes was out of reach, prices had soared to unprecedented heights, shops were emptied, and trade routes had closed. To manage these crises, the British colonial government developed new institutions and technologies. It was a formative turning point that troubles the all-too-tidy narratives of Mandate governance and the rise of the developmentalist state.

Antony Anghie has called the Mandate system a great experiment in international management.<sup>5</sup> Economics had become, he argues, a “a new and powerful way of conceptualizing and managing the mandate territories and their peoples.”<sup>6</sup> Economics came to define the relationship



between the “civilized” and the “uncivilized,” and development punctuated its terms. Development “provided the forms and formulas”<sup>7</sup> that European colonial powers used to restructure their relationship with the colonies and reformulate their policies on the health and productivity of the colonized. Calculating and territorializing economy were central components of this managerial effort. Such an effort required a legibility that early twentieth-century innovations in conceptualizing and measuring economy made possible.<sup>8</sup>

Indices such as the cost of living, the standard of living, revenues, poverty rates, and gross national products worked to assess the status of states and empires. A prefiguring indicator that did not receive as much attention was the calorie, which measured and standardized bodies and the foods they consumed.<sup>9</sup> Through these numerical indicators, states and institutions hoped to acquire a “character of calculability”<sup>10</sup> that would ultimately facilitate productivity. This calculability was one component that enabled the excision of economy from society and culture and its relocation at the center of politics and ethics.<sup>11</sup> The politics, experiences, and understandings of “growth” were central to the process of calculation.

My concern here is not with capital accumulation and its crisis tendencies but with how economies are made visible and managed. Calculations of scarcity through the cost of living and the calorie were as important to the project of social welfare and development as were understandings of economic growth. Shifting the focus to the construction and provision of basic needs during war punctures the linearity of how calculation functioned. First, managing scarcity was just as central as tracking growth in the effort to make economy legible. Second, the attempts to territorialize economy as a discrete entity were not born of a managerial imperative to rationalize the colonies and organize the colonized. It was a result, at least in Palestine, of the exigencies of war and political discontent.

Through new technologies of rule such as the calorie, new austerity schemes such as rationing, and new institutions such as the Middle East Supply Centre, the British colonial government sought to realize economy as calculable and legible. They attempted to manage the crisis of war in Palestine through a broad austerity regime beginning in 1939 and an ambitious rationing scheme inaugurated in 1941. Throughout the war, British colonial officials introduced new conceptions of development, poverty, health, and productivity. Their failures reveal the politics of basic needs and disrupt the colonial panopticon that tempts us with its coherence.

## Colonial Development

Development, that elusive word that captures both increased output and improved welfare, came to prominence on 20 January 1949 with Harry Truman's presidential address. That day, in the words of Gustavo Estava, two billion people became underdeveloped.<sup>12</sup> The post–World War II period, as Nick Cullather has incisively shown, transformed the colonized subject into the developmental subject.<sup>13</sup> But development has a colonial genealogy that can tell us about the importance of scarcity and basic needs to formations of economy.

Colonial development has a long history that dates back to the nineteenth century and took the form of infrastructure building and increasing agricultural surpluses.<sup>14</sup> Initially the aim of these policies was to develop the natural resources of the colonies for the colonizer's benefit. As Heinz Arndt has argued, "native welfare" was distinct from the emphasis on economic progress or development, although both could indirectly benefit the colonized.<sup>15</sup>

The shift began to take shape with the British Colonial Development Act of 1929, which the British government used to mobilize imperial resources and restore its coffers, devastated by World War I.<sup>16</sup> A decade later, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 inaugurated a new emphasis on the wellbeing of the colonized. Arndt has argued that whereas in the nineteenth century development was a by-product of profit, in the twentieth it gave a positive content to the philosophy of colonial trusteeship. Timothy Mitchell contends that "development" changed from a transitive verb—that is, the colonizer's capacity to exploit resources and expand territories—to an intransitive political and economic process. In any case, empires were to be evaluated not just by their capacity to develop the colony, but also by the extent to which the colonized were "developed."

What drove the expansion of colonial development to include "welfare"? Was it the "needs of war"<sup>17</sup> as some have suggested? War was a powerful impetus that reformulated and intensified the notion of development, as I detail below. But the new component of "welfare" was primarily a reaction to the widespread demands for political independence that challenged British and French colonial power. Between 1935 and 1939, there were uprisings and strikes in West India, Northern Rhodesia, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam, and the Gold Coast. As Zachary Lockman has shown, the Colonial Office now faced a permanent class of laborers. In

an attempt to insulate unionism from radicalism and anticolonial nationalism, it recognized trade unions, promulgated labor legislation, and established labor departments.<sup>18</sup> In this way, the Colonial Office could postpone the demands for political independence by making it conditional on the realization of development. In Frederick Cooper's words, development became a statement about empire: "that it had a future, and it was a long and just one."<sup>19</sup>

The history of British welfare in Palestine is instructive on the impetus driving colonial development. The Great Revolt of 1936–1939 proved to the colonial government that their policy of maintaining Palestinian social life in a permanent stasis was no longer tenable.<sup>20</sup> The government appointed its first labor advisor in 1940 and established the Department of Labour in 1942.<sup>21</sup> But until 1939, the colonial government's "welfare" work was devoted to the administration of the delinquent and the imprisoned. An inspector of welfare services, appointed in 1921, administered delinquent girls and inspected women's prisons.<sup>22</sup> In 1935 the government appointed a probation officer who would ultimately supervise the government's four reform schools. But in 1939 and for the first time, the colonial government began administering direct relief; the beneficiaries were the families of political prisoners of the Great Revolt.<sup>23</sup> The provision of welfare was inextricable from political containment. Here then welfare as a disciplinary project is clear.

But what of welfare's links to productivity? Jacob Norris has convincingly argued that the emphasis on bolstering imperial economy as opposed to raising standards among the colonized predominated throughout British rule in Palestine.<sup>24</sup> Norris evidences the prioritization of infrastructure over welfare throughout the Mandate period. The colonial government often cited limited funds for what were their "mainly initiatory" schemes, even in Roza El-Eini's celebratory account.<sup>25</sup> Yet, time and again the colonial government proved adept at finding funds for security and military needs. Indeed, in May 1937 the government instituted what Charles Anderson has called "military developmentalism," paving roads into remote villages in an attempt to halt rebels' mobility and advance.<sup>26</sup> In Palestine, then, development's emphasis was primarily on increasing output and disciplining subjects. The Palestinians never actually became developmental subjects under British rule. This was due to the British colonial commitment to support the Yishuv's structures and institutions at the expense of any Palestinian claims to sovereignty.

Yet even in Palestine, the tension between increased output and well-being led to some divisions among colonial officials. What was the end goal of development? Was it to increase productivity? Or was the aim to turn the colonized subject “into a happier, healthier, more prosperous individual”?<sup>27</sup> Equally contentious was the determination of the “developed.” Here the ascendance of numerical indicators like the cost of living came to express “developmental authority.”<sup>28</sup> A new measurement, the calorie, would come to play a central role. In Palestine, it was war that made the calculation and regulation of wellbeing *and* productivity an imperative.

### Crisis Hits

As total war loomed on the horizon, Britain mobilized its empire. Heroic accounts depict a “nation standing bravely alone against the Nazi domination of Europe” until the Soviet Union and the United States joined the Allied forces in 1941.<sup>29</sup> But Britain was far from alone; its expansive empire provided the island with soldiers. The war inaugurated a series of experiments in social management, particularly when it came to food. The need for stronger soldiers and more productive workers inspired these experiments. British colonial officials’ most horrific example of mismanagement was in Bengal in 1943, when an estimated 3 million people died from famine.<sup>30</sup> Securing the food supply in the Middle East proved a more successful venture.

Toward the end of 1938, Harold MacMichael, the high commissioner for Palestine, anxiously wrote the Colonial Office pleading for funds to deal with potential food shortages.<sup>31</sup> Palestine was wholly dependent on imports for sugar; 45 percent of Palestine’s wheat and flour came from abroad during the Mandate.<sup>32</sup> Stocks of wheat and maize were rapidly decreasing, and given Palestine’s dependence on imports for basic goods, MacMichael feared scarcity and potential unrest. London dismissed his “dramatic” request for a year and a half.<sup>33</sup> But by the late summer of 1939, the cost of eggs and poultry had skyrocketed, and meat (due to insufficient rail from Iraq, the principal supplier of livestock) was becoming unavailable.<sup>34</sup> Food supply in Palestine, and the Middle East more broadly, had become an urgent matter.

Compounding these challenges was Italy’s entry to the war, which had immediate consequences for Palestinians. Mediterranean trade shut down, and Palestine’s imports were diverted primarily through the Suez

Canal, and occasionally overland from Iraq.<sup>35</sup> Hoping to damage the Allies' oil supply, Italy targeted the Haifa refinery, bombing the coastal city on 29 July 1940. Italian forces would continue to bomb Haifa and Jaffa/Tel Aviv until June of the following year, claiming at least 200 lives.<sup>36</sup>

The war escalated in the Middle East and North Africa the following year. In February 1941, Rommel and the Afrika Korps arrived at Tripoli. Three months later, Rashid Ali won his momentary bid to rule Iraq. Fighting broke out in Syria and Lebanon against the Vichy regime. Axis powers successfully sunk British supply ships in the Mediterranean, and the much-needed rain did not come that year. The stinging memory of hunger inspired farmers and villagers to stock their dwindling supplies of grain. Bread riots flared in Tehran, Damascus, Aleppo, and Beirut. Saudi Arabia reportedly witnessed some "awkward moments," and famine spread in Hadhramout.<sup>37</sup>

For Palestine, 1941 ushered in a period of complete trade paralysis due to the Axis bombing of the Suez Canal, the extended closures of Basra's port, and the trade limitations with the dying breaths of Vichy rule in Syria and Lebanon. Merchants dumped their cargo near the Palestine Railways depot at the Suez Canal on the off chance of securing a wagon. At one point, as much as 7,000 tons of goods lay in the open for weeks and in some cases had to be returned because of the expiration of export licenses.<sup>38</sup> The crisis would continue well after the decisive battle of El Alamein in 1942, which together with the Allies' victory at Stalingrad halted the Axis advance.<sup>39</sup>

World War II in the Middle East, as in many corners of the British empire, was a chance to "intervene more deeply in the lives of its colonial subjects than before."<sup>40</sup> In Palestine, wartime necessity led to the innovation of institutions and techniques that rendered economy legible and calculable. The diversity of people and practices confounded and resisted these attempts at every turn.

### Freedom from Want

It was the exponential rise in the relatively new but ubiquitous measurement of the cost of living that moved the Colonial Office to action. Scholars have thoroughly detailed the legacies of wartime austerity in Britain and Europe, but these interventions were just as significant in the colonies.<sup>41</sup> By 1942, austerity was enforced in most colonial territories.<sup>42</sup> Its goals were to curb inflation and balance military and civilian supplies. In

Palestine that balance would be one of the colonial officials' "most intimate problems"; military expenditure absorbed 30 percent of Palestine's national output, a proportion higher than most of its neighboring countries.<sup>43</sup>

Controlling production and consumption through austerity and rationing was also a matter of morale. As Mr. Davies of the Colonial Office explained,

For instance, although there is plenty of meat in the country it might be decided to ration meat in order to bring the conditions of life . . . more into line with the conditions in the United Kingdom, or in order to bring the discomforts of war home to the otherwise unwarmindeed inhabitants of that country.<sup>44</sup>

In Palestine and Greater Syria, bringing the discomforts of war to the otherwise "unwarmindeed" took place on multiple levels, from regional and national configurations and regulations, to the reshaping of the markets that people frequented, and to the regulation of the food that they ate.

Regionally, the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) was the most powerful colonial institution to introduce and implement regulatory economic regimes. MESC was an ambitious arm of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC), which in its marriage of state and private interest was a decisive turn to Keynesianism. During World War II, John Maynard Keynes made a call for increased governmental intervention and management of business cycles.<sup>45</sup> Keynes's model relied on tools of planning and advocated for government spending to stimulate demand in a depressed economy.<sup>46</sup> MESC's goals were to maintain the Middle East as a "secure base"; minimize demand on Allied shipping, labor, and materials; and guard the "moral obligation" to protect people from the worst hardships of war. "Our ultimate goal," explained MESC's director of food, "is . . . freedom from want."<sup>47</sup> At its inception, MESC was a British initiative, but by 1943 it had become an essential component of the various Anglo-American bodies that centralized wartime distribution. It would be a contentious site of internecine struggle until its dissolution in 1945.<sup>48</sup>

MESC worked in twenty-seven different territories from Cyprus to Sudan.<sup>49</sup> (After the defeat of the Vichy regime, MESC extended its scope to Syria and Lebanon through the Spears Mission).<sup>50</sup> This amorphous body included varying political statuses from independent states to colonies, comprised a territory larger than the continental United States, and contained a population of nearly 100 million.<sup>51</sup> By 1942, MESC had replaced more than a million tons of civilian cargo with munitions and had

become the central buyer and holder of goods in an area it was calling the “Middle East.”

Steven Heydemann and Robert Vitalis have argued that MESC’s “Keynesian views of economic intervention and management” left a lasting institutional imprint on the relationship between government regulation and capital in Syria and Egypt.<sup>52</sup> Eric Andrew Schewe, in his study of World War II’s legacy as a “state of siege” in Egypt, points out that the basic economic problem in Egypt was different from the classical questions Keynesianism addressed. In Egypt, the need was not for increased government spending to stimulate demand. The crisis was rather an influx of money that flooded to Egyptian contractors and laborers coupled with shortages of basic needs.<sup>53</sup> In Palestine, too, the crisis that officials faced was not one of demand, but of supply.

In what follows, I trace the techniques that MESC introduced to respond to this crisis. The first was to shape economic geographies. MESC’s territorial configurations came four decades after the U.S. military historian Alfred Thayer Mahan coined the term the “Middle East” but were similarly informed by military interest. Mahan’s “Middle East” stretched from Arabia, across Persia and Afghanistan, stopping at the borders of what is today Pakistan.<sup>54</sup> He distinguished this area from the “Near East,” in which he included the Balkans, Anatolia, and the lands of the eastern Mediterranean. These distinctions persisted to some extent until World War II, when for British colonial officials the Middle East meant Arabia, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Afghanistan while the Near East comprised Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey, the Levant states, Palestine, and Egypt.<sup>55</sup> In World War II, MESC officials dispensed with this distinction and adopted the Middle East to “designate a region that for strategic and economic purposes . . . could be conveniently treated as a unit.”<sup>56</sup>

MESC did not simply reconfigure the “Middle East,” a term officials admitted there was no accepted convention on. It also attempted to render that territory economically legible. As E. M. H. Lloyd, (the economic advisor to the British Minister of State in Cairo, assistant secretary at the Ministry of Food during World War II, and a leading figure in wartime regulations in Palestine and the Middle East) explained, one of the most important forces driving MESC was the forging of the Middle East “as a single economic unit.”<sup>57</sup> The *Economist*’s centennial 1943 issue hailed MESC’s effort to develop a unitary Middle East as “an international example” for “securing great economies.”<sup>58</sup>

A series of MESC conferences, all held in Cairo, were important to these regional consolidations. The Anti-Inflation Conference of 1942, the Middle East Conference on Control of Distribution and Rationing of 1943,<sup>59</sup> the Conference on the Middle East's Agricultural Development in 1944,<sup>60</sup> and the Middle East Financial Conference of 1944 gathered American and British officials alongside ministers of finance and senior officials from the very far west (Morocco) to the very far east (Iraq) of the Arab world. At the final Financial Conference of 1944, seventy senior officials from fifteen countries met to discuss postwar planning. At that meeting, Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister Habib Bey Abi Chahla suggested that Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq ought "to form an economic union to pool their resources and share according to their needs."<sup>61</sup> Perhaps it was for this reason that commentators would give MESC the dubious credit of directly influencing the establishment of the Arab League.<sup>62</sup>

MESC also attempted to forge economic coherence through the production and distribution of numerical indicators. MESC's monthly bulletins included statistical tables of trade returns, cost of living indices, notes in circulation, bank deposits, wholesale price indices, prices of gold, and net Allied military expenditure. The hagiographic accounts of MESC applaud the institution for providing numbers where none had existed before.<sup>63</sup> Such accounts miss two important points. First, both numerical and territorial configurations of economy were already at play. In Palestine, for example, men of capital envisioned a territory ranging from North Africa to the Hijaz as a utopia of profit and accumulation. They used numerical indicators and maps to present that territory as a unified whole. Second, MESC did not simply "provide numbers where none had existed before."<sup>64</sup> It in fact used numbers to create a shifting territory, called the Middle East, in economic terms.

The battle for freedom from want was not limited to regional configurations. From 1939 to 1947, over ten regulations empowered the colonial government to measure and control economy in Palestine.<sup>65</sup> In 1939, George Heron, the controller of supplies (who was also a senior medical officer)<sup>66</sup> led the effort to centralize all supplies under government regulation. Through a series of controversial regulations (such as the Past Trade Ordinance of 1939 that discriminated against Palestinian businessmen in favor of their Jewish counterparts), the government began regulating imports and centralizing distribution through the British-run Haifa-based Steel Brothers Incorporated. Steel Brothers distributed goods to consumers, shops, and



government-licensed wholesalers and retailers.<sup>67</sup> By 1940, the government boasted of taking over the traffic in both locally produced and imported commodities as well as establishing monopolies over sugar, wheat, and rice.

But the centralized control of supplies did not prove effective in controlling the cost of living index, which as calculated by the government statistician had throughout the 1940s increased to unprecedented heights.<sup>68</sup> As the majority of household spending came to be increasingly devoted to food, its supply and provision overshadowed all other considerations. The Central Advisory Committee, which consulted Heron on setting prices and controlling commodities, was convinced that the government's ownership of all "vital" commodities was necessary.

By 1942, the colonial government put a new structure in place. The war departments were organized into six major sections, each with its own controller.<sup>69</sup> The Conservation of Resources and Provision of Essential Needs section was the largest and included the food controller. Geoffrey Walsh, formerly the economic advisor, took on the new position and replaced Heron at the helm of austerity management. With its headquarters in Jerusalem and offices in each of Palestine's six districts, Food Control was an unwieldy venture with an annual budget of a quarter of a million pounds; a staff of over 800; and separate sections that dealt with specific commodities as well as finance, industry, legislation, statistics, import licenses, publicity, transport, accounts, and personnel.<sup>70</sup> A broad range of commodities came under control, and already controlled commodities were further standardized.<sup>71</sup> One notable example was the Control of Mills Order of 1942, which required the millers in Palestine to buy set quantities of wheat and flour from the government and mix the flour under "constant supervision."<sup>72</sup> Throughout these various innovations and schemes, colonial officials made tense linkages between food, basic needs, productivity, and development.

## The Science of Food

In 1896, Wilbur O. Atwater invented the calorimeter. In the nineteenth century, the study of food was called dietetics, and it had made considerable inroads in breaking down food into its chemical constituents (fats, proteins, carbohydrates) as well as applying conservation energy to all living organisms. Atwater's invention was a crucial turning point in the transition from dietetics to nutrition. Now food, as Nick Cullather has put

it, was a politically legible object.<sup>73</sup> The calculability of food, as Cullather and James Vernon have argued, made the very notion of development possible. Since there was no “unified conception of civilization or ‘the West,’” determining the “developed” was a fragmented process.<sup>74</sup> Numerical indicators worked to express developmental authority and determine norms.<sup>75</sup>

In its capacity to measure efficiency and discipline, nutrition intensified the regulation of the body.<sup>76</sup> It also had consequences for broader economic processes and prescriptions. As Egyptian biochemist ‘Ali Hassan put it, nutrition was “the economics not of production, but of consumption.”<sup>77</sup> Its measurements (the calorie, proteins, carbohydrates, fats) made possible a whole new world of calculations. The ends of that “caloric ‘bookkeeping’”<sup>78</sup> were controversial, ambiguous, and elusive.

From the outset, nutrition was inextricable from two main processes. One was the determination of basic needs. It was American nutritionists who worked alongside economists to develop criteria for the adequacy of wages, which they called “the standard of living.” Their goal was not to improve the lives of the poor but to contain the intense labor mobilization of the 1870s–1880s.<sup>79</sup> Thus determining basic needs functioned to maximize profits and maintain social hierarchies.

The second process was the study of poverty and its causes. British scientists such as Seebohm Rowntree used the calorie to measure and understand poverty. Rowntree, like many of his cohort, vacillated between identifying hunger as a structural problem versus an outcome of the moral weaknesses of the poor; the figure of the ignorant homemaker would be a recurring source of blame. Scientists and governing officials persistently identified the ignorance, laziness, and inefficiency of the poor as the primary causes of malnourishment.

Military needs brought nutrition to international attention as World War I shed light on the “physiological basis” of national efficiency.<sup>80</sup> Food could influence war’s outcomes; nutritionists later attributed the Italian army’s collapse at Caporetto in 1917 to the “low energy value of their rations.”<sup>81</sup> Figures such as Herbert Hoover, head of the U.S. National Food Authority in 1917, and his contemporary Keynes began linking basic needs to national security.<sup>82</sup> The discovery of vitamins around 1917, and the related realization that workers could not afford essential foods, made it more difficult to blame the poor for their hunger.<sup>83</sup> In the 1920s, nutritionists became embroiled in a debate between those who emphasized the quality of food (the biochemical school) versus those who focused on its

quantity (the thermodynamic school). Calculations on both sides never proved entirely accurate, and “nutrition was revealed to be a historically specific science whose universality was always breaking down in the process of its constitution.”<sup>84</sup>

What better place for scientists to test the universal than in the colonies? The modern science of nutrition emerged in some crucial ways in the colonial setting.<sup>85</sup> The prominent nutritionist John Boyd Orr, as Vernon points out, shaped his career traveling the empire from Palestine to New Zealand. However, the crystallization of the science was, as David Arnold has put it, “more than just an imperial monologue.”<sup>86</sup> And, as Michael Worboys shows, colonial medics more quickly came to the conclusion that treating malnutrition without changing structural conditions was an exercise in futility.<sup>87</sup>

While famines and jails in India were arenas for nutritional knowledge and debate between 1860–1914, the intensive work in colonial nutrition began in the 1920s.<sup>88</sup> In 1925, Orr investigated livestock losses in Kenya and concluded that colonial authorities’ greater attention to diet “would increase the value of the ‘native as an economic factor.’”<sup>89</sup> Thus, as Vernon argues, Orr influenced the Colonial Development Act of 1929. And it is in this way that nutrition was central to twentieth-century colonial development.<sup>90</sup> But recognizing the different meanings of “development” is crucial here. In 1925 Orr and his colleagues argued that malnutrition held back economic productivity; they measured minimum needs with the aim of maximizing profit. Nutrition was a way to bolster the productivity of imperial resources. It was not yet linked to the wellbeing of the colonized.

The influence of the idea of “welfare” grew in the interwar decades when there was an international shift away from charitable work to a search for scientific solutions to poverty.<sup>91</sup> A “brave new world” of international organizations came on the scene, and scientists engaged one another under the rubric of the League of Nations Health Organization to find those solutions.<sup>92</sup> For many, nutrition embodied the potential to realize universal or national benefit.<sup>93</sup>

The challenges and discoveries of the 1930s moderated this promise of health and growth. The depression made deciphering the links between food and “productive capacity” all the more urgent. At the same time, reports on the breadth and scope of malnutrition were ubiquitous. In 1938 the League of Nations Technical Commission on Nutrition, comprised of British and American scientists, reported that working people, even in the

most industrialized of countries, were inadequately nourished.<sup>94</sup> It was also in the 1930s that the League of Nations identified the problem of malnutrition in the colonies.<sup>95</sup> Nutritionists and governing officials struggled once again to identify the nature of malnutrition: Was it endemic to the moral and cultural flaws of the poor, the “native,” and the homemaker, or was it a modern epidemic?

Colonial medicine took shape as a site of critique and debate. The anthropologist Audrey Richards is notable here. She identified malnutrition as a modern epidemic. Her work showed that the health of Africans “had deteriorated in contact with white civilization.”<sup>96</sup> The Committee of Nutrition and Empire came to similar conclusions (at first at least).<sup>97</sup> Richards and Orr both served on the committee. Its Draft (Nutritional) Report of 1938, based on surveys conducted in forty-eight territories and covering 55 million people,<sup>98</sup> identified poverty, low wages, poor yields, and the ignorance of colonial governments (not that of the colonized) as the main causes of malnutrition. Some surveys, such as Richards’s study on the Gold Coast, connected colonial shifts in land tenure and the emphasis on monocrop agriculture to the starvation of farmers.<sup>99</sup>

In effect, the Draft Report was, in Worboys words, an indictment not simply of colonial policy but of colonialism itself.<sup>100</sup> The indictment was short-lived. After sustained pressure from a committee member, N. F. Hall, who objected to the document’s emphasis on the colonies’ low economic level,<sup>101</sup> the Final (Nutritional) Report of 1939 followed the League of Nations’ party line: Because of the backwardness and ignorance of the “native,” malnutrition had always existed in the colonies; all that was new was that the modern science of nutrition had brought it to light.

The debate was no less rife in Britain. The classic nutrition texts of the 1930s had shown that half of Britain’s population was malnourished.<sup>102</sup> One such text, Orr’s 1936 *Food, Health, and Income*, inspired a debate that lasted seven and a half hours in the House of Commons. As impoverished British women starved themselves to feed their children, the British Medical Council and the British Medical Association rigorously established the direct link between poverty and malnutrition. But the Ministry of Health denied that the two were related in an attempt to avoid the impact on wages, the cost of food, and the dole. The problem, the ministry argued, lay with “individual idiosyncrasies and ignorant housewives.”<sup>103</sup>

With the onset of war, identifying the cause of malnutrition, as either a structural problem or a moral failing, took a back seat to treating

it. Now nutrition had clear defense implications.<sup>104</sup> The League of Nation's emphasis on realizing the universal gave way to the imperative of an Allied victory. Food was central to that victory; managing its supply was crucial to maximizing resources and preventing famine and unrest.<sup>105</sup> And so, armed with the still-controversial science of nutrition and the mission of colonial development, Britain embarked on an ambitious and comprehensive experiment in national and imperial food control that promised a fair share for all.

### Food for All

As the Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire noted in its first 1938 report, there were no local committees working on nutrition, no preliminary surveys of nutrition, and no nutritional policy in Palestine.<sup>106</sup> The Yishuv, for its part, had established a Department of Nutrition, in the U.S.-supported Hadassah Medical Organization as early as 1933. The nutritionist, Sarah Bavly, ran this department, which by the early 1940s boasted an annual budget of 200,0000 pounds.<sup>107</sup> The Jewish Agency's Institute for Economic Research also had a Committee on Nutrition, which published a monthly magazine.<sup>108</sup> For its part, the British colonial government paid no attention to what officials would later call Palestine's nutritional economy. War forced the government's hand. Some kind of policy on food had become dire.

Rationing in Palestine went through three stages. The first was a coupon scheme, in which color-coded coupons for sugar, rice, and flour were distributed in Arabic, Hebrew, and English and labeled A (Arab), J (Jew), and O (Others).<sup>109</sup> The second was a "municipal market" scheme in which local authorities would oversee the direct contact between producers and consumers. Both of these schemes came at the early stages of the war. Under the leadership of Heron, the "great object" of rationing was to exclude the retailer and the wholesaler, both targeted as the main culprits of inflation. In the early stages of rationing, Heron was invested in avoiding the consumer–retailer link. In the meantime officials found that the

public [was] wandering at will though the towns and villages of Palestine with their ration cards and with an Order instructing merchants to the effect that they were compelled to supply sugar against the ration card and with yet another Order limiting the issues of sugar from wholesaler to retailer.<sup>110</sup>

The effort to exclude wholesalers and retailers would prove elusive. Prices continued to rise, just as unregulated markets flourished. By all accounts the “vegetable racket” was a central component of unregulated and inflated prices throughout Palestine.

When the coupon system collapsed, the government introduced the consumer–retailer link. Now consumers could only redeem their coupons for supplies with their registered retailer. But this system, even in the government’s ever-optimistic renditions of progress, led to bread lines and “illegal practices by retailers.”<sup>111</sup>

Colonial officials faced an additional “insuperable difficulty” in providing a fair share to all from “an Arab labourer requiring as much as one kilo of bread per day, to a European eating 150–200 grams a day.”<sup>112</sup> They searched for an approach to regulate production and consumption among what the Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire had called Palestine’s “fluctuating and diversified population.”<sup>113</sup>

The solution they found is an example of how wartime contributed to new conceptions of consumption. The leading British rationing expert, Lloyd introduced the much-acclaimed points-rationing scheme as the third and final stage of rationing in Palestine. As opposed to the more common straight rationing (based on a consumer–retailer link and coupons for basic goods), points served as a substitute for money; commodities were assigned points prices. Lloyd introduced the system in Britain in 1941 and assisted in its introduction in the United States in 1943. That same year, at the head of MESC’s Conference on Control of Distribution and Rationing in Cairo, he argued that his scheme assured freedom of consumer choice while realizing nutritional goals by enabling governments to group points into carbohydrates, proteins, and fats.<sup>114</sup> Points were hailed as “one of the big home front successes of the war.”<sup>115</sup> The League of Nations praised the “technical innovation” that adapted to individual “needs and desires” as opposed to Germany’s more rigid straight rationing.<sup>116</sup> Thus, it was in times of scarcity that access to desired commodities emerged as crucial to both individuality and freedom.

On 1 May 1942, the Palestine government imposed three meatless days per week on the people of Palestine.<sup>117</sup> The bread rules came into effect on 1 July 1942, limiting the baking of bread to one shape and two sizes. Prior to its enactment, the government complained, “some thirty-two varieties of bread were baked in Palestine in a multitude of shapes and sizes.”<sup>118</sup> The points scheme had begun; it was one of the “most ambitious schemes

of points rationing to be found in any country.”<sup>119</sup> Lloyd visited Palestine and “was considerably impressed.”<sup>120</sup> In ten months, the scheme went from covering twelve to thirty commodities, and by 1943 “points banks” were in operation in Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem.<sup>121</sup> Each person received the same number of points to use for the commodities of their choice.<sup>122</sup> Rural areas remained on the straight rationing scheme since those areas were “either wholly Arab or wholly Jewish.”<sup>123</sup> Colonial officials declared the realization of a “complete circle of control” that would account for different tastes and finally provide everyone their “fair share.”<sup>124</sup>

Just as the points scheme began, the Department of Health commissioned the first and only comprehensive survey on nutrition in Palestine to evidence their efforts at “development.”<sup>125</sup> W. J. Vickers, a senior medical officer in Palestine and deputy director of medical services in 1943,<sup>126</sup> directed the study, “A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine 1942–1943.” Vickers hoped to emulate Orr’s canonical work, *Food, Health, and Income*.<sup>127</sup>

Based on data gathered in 1942 and 1943, the survey examined 1,300 family budgets and four settlements each with a population of 1,300. It was based on three “racial expenditure groups”—Arabs, “Oriental Jews,” and European Jews—and its geographical scope included Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, and Haifa in addition to Safad, Acre, Bisan, ‘Afula, Tiberias, Nablus, Hebron, Gaza, and Khan Yunis. Villages surrounding Haifa, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Tel Aviv were also included. Two teams, one Arab and one Jewish, each with a doctor and a nurse, conducted the survey. While visits to Jewish settlements entailed a meeting with the trained “dietetic worker,” home visits were much more intrusive. Armed with a list of houses in each district, a nurse would visit families twice or three times a week. She weighed and recorded the food in the house and noted its preparation and disposal. She also gathered information on occupation, wages, loans, and debts. Surprise visits were common. Vickers visited each family for a final examination. Nutritionists interrupted people’s daily lives. Those subjected to similar surveys in Britain critiqued the “nosy parker” voyeurism of the poor.<sup>128</sup>

The survey set about to evidence rationing as a form of egalitarian nutritional policy while responding to the abiding concern with the rapidly rising cost of living. Its account contradicted the many business, consumer, farmer, and local officials’ petitions on austerity’s disruptive and, at times, violent interventions into daily life. Vickers was at pains to indicate

that Palestine's population was now living "better than ever before."<sup>129</sup> He argued that the income of the wage-earning classes had increased by up to 100 percent in some cases and that there was a marked rise in the poorest families moving up into medium expenditure groups. In 1942, only 19 percent of Arabs appeared in the two highest expenditure groups. But by 1943, 73 percent of Arab families had moved up to the highest levels. Vickers noted a similar movement among "Oriental Jews." The rural Arab, he noted, had greatly benefited from military demands for local produce and wartime employment. Garnering "undreamed of prices" for their goods, landowners and laborers alike were experiencing a period of "unbelievable prosperity."<sup>130</sup> Before the war, Vickers explained, farmers stored for the lean season, bartered with their neighbors for their basic needs, and sold something for his "simple luxuries, the extra coat, the bangle, the cigarette."<sup>131</sup> Now each village had "more money than it knows what to do with."<sup>132</sup> In comparison to townspeople, rural people were living in "abundance." Based on these increases in wages and expenditure, Vickers concluded that nutrition had materially improved across the board.

But this optimistic portrait of urban nutrition and rural prosperity is hard to reconcile with Vickers's own findings. The survey warned of the "gloomy picture" of "lower-income" groups especially with respect to housing. Rapid urbanization, large-scale immigration to towns, and wartime demands led to extensive building, soaring land values, overcrowding, and deteriorating housing conditions.<sup>133</sup> Flats replaced houses as pre-war building ventures and were turned into tenements in poorer districts. Large families were crowded into single rooms, sharing one kitchen and bathroom. Vickers also noted "a pernicious system of indebtedness" among the poor.

But the evidence that contradicts the study's optimism most strongly is Vickers's own conclusion that the majority of expenditures in the years under study were on food. Indeed food expenditure exceeded the total family income in all the lower income groups among both Arabs and Jews in 1942, and "a large section of the poor urban worker class found it impossible to exist on the income available to it."<sup>134</sup> As the government statistician G. E. F. Wood pointed out, while wages had risen, both food imports and local production due to the poor cereal harvest of 1943 had declined.<sup>135</sup> Yet despite all these indications of people's extreme vulnerability to unprecedented inflation, Vickers nevertheless concluded that people were getting more food than ever before.



What do wartime rationing schemes and nutritional surveys reveal about British rule in Palestine, colonial development, and the imperative of calculability? For one, they show the tremendous difficulties colonial officials faced in categorizing, measuring, and standardizing goods and people. The common units of measurement in Palestine and the Arab world were the *wuqiya*, the *ratl*, and the *kayl*; the units varied from one locale to another within and across national borders.<sup>136</sup> The government attempted to substitute this system of weights and measures with the metric system, to avoid differences between northern and southern Palestinian *wuqiyas*. This effort was one of the government's most contentious policies and revealed Palestine's resistance to standardization.

Counting people proved equally difficult. Jewish organizations had full population records, which only required transfer to the government. But when it came to Palestinians, the colonial government suddenly realized the gaping "absence of any comprehensive registration of population."<sup>137</sup> Faced with a lack of paper, trained staff, and time, the colonial government opted to register Palestinians by family.<sup>138</sup> To do so they enlisted help from many sources: local officials and religious bodies, businessmen and retailers.<sup>139</sup> Each family was identified and categorized with a letter system based on estimates of differential average monthly consumption.<sup>140</sup> The only locale where the government adopted individual card registration was Haifa because of the possibility of air raids and the separation of families. The haphazard effort and its uneven results revealed the colonial government's neglect and inaction over two decades of rule.<sup>141</sup>

Categorizing people was another challenge. In Palestine, Vickers explained, this problem was "more complex than in most countries":

[T]here are two elements, the Oriental and the European, not only the Jew and the Arab. Nutritionally, the Arab, both Moslem and Christian, and the Oriental Jew, come into the same category—the cereal eater; the European Jew has always been classed differently.<sup>142</sup>

The survey originally subdivided Arabs into Muslims and Christians, but when no "important differences in these diets could be discovered this further subdivision was discontinued."<sup>143</sup> Commonalities between Palestinian Muslims, Christians, and Jews troubled the internal coherence of the two separate "races"—Arab and Jew. Some markers defied categorization altogether. The survey's detailed graphs were divided vertically into "Moslems,

Jews, Christians, and others” and horizontally into “towns, villages, and Bedouins.” “Bedouin,” in this context, was a marker of place.<sup>144</sup>

The attempt to measure and realize a “nutritional economy” also revealed some telling disparities. The Vaad Leumi’s social services worked throughout Palestine, with offices in 40 districts and 150 social workers. Hadassah, in addition to its Department of Nutrition, had a broad-based prenatal, infant, and social health system. Palestinians had no corollary organizations; they relied on charity organizations, philanthropic efforts, and small private societies.<sup>145</sup> The deep schism between Palestinians and the Yishuv in terms of infrastructure and services is not a new insight.

But what interests me here is less this long-recognized disparity and more the gap between the Yishuv and the British colonial government. As discussed above, British “welfare” work was limited to administering jails and prisoners, and after 1939 it expanded to direct relief to detainees’ families. It was food, and the concerns around it, which drove a tentative expansion during World War II. At that point, a 1942 Department of Health report on the malnutrition of Arab children forced the government to establish “welfare committees” made up of government officials and “local notables.” Thirteen committees were reportedly formed.<sup>146</sup> The Jaffa Welfare Committee was the most organized and resourceful. Its work, like so much of social welfare services in Palestine across governmental and community lines, focused primarily on school lunch schemes and providing food to the poor. It was in this period as well that the government established “Arab School Feeding Schemes” in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa. Thus, the primary emphasis of British welfare work among Palestinians was centered on food until 1944; it was not until that late date that the colonial government established the Department of Social Welfare, and existing welfare committees were expanded to include social centers that provided adult education and literacy classes.

When faced with these disparities, colonial officials often chose the route of further inaction. Throughout the 1940s, Hadassah and the Vaad Leumi cited growing numbers of “needy” children in their bids for increased grants for school feeding schemes.<sup>147</sup> It became clear that despite attempts to build what the Director of Education Jerome Farrell called a “working system of universal relief,” there was still no agreement on “standard of reference,” for determining who was “needy.”<sup>148</sup> Colonial officials retorted that the Jewish community’s reports of increasing people in need of relief contradicted Zionist claims of Palestine’s “absorptive

capacity.”<sup>149</sup> The government then explained that amplifying its already substantial aid program to the Yishuv’s organizations would discriminate against the Arabs, who had no comparative welfare structure. This argument recurred in various instances, and while appearing to express the government’s equanimity, it reflected its reticence instead. The lack of Arab social organizations was not a problem to be treated but an incitement to further inaction.

The challenges of shaping a “nutritional economy” also revealed a crisis of expertise. After Vickers’s departure in 1944, there was no one in the Department of Health or in any other department in Palestine that had any expert knowledge of nutrition. The only experts were in Hadassah. Thus, in the field of social welfare and nutrition, Jewish expertise and capital far outstripped that of the colonial government. Finally, while development may have served as a venue to make some colonies “more productive and more ideologically stable,”<sup>150</sup> in Palestine, it only laid bare colonial incoherence, fragmentation, and neglect.

The attempts at forging a “nutritional economy” more broadly speaking are also telling of how the universal works as a category of exclusion. Rationing was a cornerstone of the British war effort’s egalitarian claims. In his nutritional survey of Palestine, Vickers argued that rationing was founded in the League of Nations’ “objectively ascertainable physiological requirements” and was also a way of providing for all “regardless of income.”<sup>151</sup> Vickers relied on the “optimum standard” for nutrition set by the League of Nations Technical Commission in 1938. But that commission had adjusted the levels of proteins, fats, and carbohydrates downward from higher Western standards due to the “dietary habits” of people in the Middle and Far East, who were primarily “vegetarian in mind.”<sup>152</sup> In addition, the average man in Palestine was smaller than his Western counterpart and deemed less active: “A proportion [of the country’s residents] are not even moderately active . . . by Western conceptions.”<sup>153</sup> Thus the “optimum standard” was contingent on “climate and race.”<sup>154</sup>

Moreover, despite the claims by Vickers and Heron of the developmental force of scientific rationing based on the modern science of nutrition, the record suggests otherwise. The League of Nations base requirement for caloric intake, even at its reduced Palestinian level, was well above the government’s rationing level. As late as 1944, the government was still trying to get the average caloric points content of purchases up to the necessary 2,500 calories a day. The point system had reached only

1,356 to 1,550 daily calories; the rest consumers had to purchase “on the free market.”<sup>155</sup> Setting the universal standard, and the unmet promises of its implementation, exposed the centrality of inequality and exclusion.

### The Last to Eat

In Britain, Palestine, and beyond, the impetus behind the science of nutrition was the determination and ultimate maximization of an individual's productive capacity. As Vickers put it, “The human body is a machine and cannot be maintained and work without a supply of energy.”<sup>156</sup> Malnutrition and, more broadly speaking, poverty itself were for most colonial officials in Palestine endemic problems. For Farrell, the director of education, there was an “irreducible and permanent minimum of endemic distress.” This “permanent problem” of poverty was due to “incurable maladies of character, mind or body.”<sup>157</sup> The approach to poverty as an incurable expression of moral or physical weakness, common to depictions of the poor in Britain, also had a colonial iteration in its links to the figure of the “Oriental.” Indeed, for W. Chinn, the director of social welfare, the Oriental mindset and lifestyle rendered void any clear correlation between improved economic conditions and social progress.<sup>158</sup>

But things were not so clear for nutritionists who were often torn between structural and cultural explanations for poverty and malnutrition. Vickers embodied that ambiguity to some extent. On the one hand, he emphasized the need for an improved standard of living. On the other hand, for him, poverty was ultimately and inextricably linked to custom, mentality, and diminutive mental capacities:

It is to be feared in addition that a state of mind once accustomed to a penurious existence added to a small intelligence is not the best of mediums for the adjustments of a new economy; that income may tend to outstrip expenditure whatever the rise on the minimum standards of life may be in such cases.<sup>159</sup>

The impossibility of social progress was then a cultural issue. It is here that the much-maligned figure of the homemaker transcended divides of colonizer and colonized, Jew and Arab, Oriental and European.

In Britain and the United States, even with the emergence of “social nutrition,” which identified poverty as opposed to the poor as the main cause of hunger,<sup>160</sup> the homemaker continued to be the primary culprit of malnutrition. Nutrition had provided an arena for women to practice

science.<sup>161</sup> The leaders behind the home economics movement in Britain and the United States hoped to create opportunities for women as experts in household management, and in doing so they took part in blaming malnutrition on the homemaker.<sup>162</sup>

Indeed, if we were to take “A Nutritional Economic Survey” at its word, most nutritional, health, and budgetary problems in twentieth-century Palestine were a result of bad cooking, inadequate mothering, and ignorant housekeeping, whether Arab or Jewish. Bad mothering and housekeeping in the Arab case was due to an undefined but innate cultural lack that led ultimately to the “evil” of “marasmic” infants.<sup>163</sup> While the Arab and the “Oriental” Jew were ignorant and overindulgent mothers, the European Jewish mother was cold and removed and “does not indulge in sufficient breast feeding.”<sup>164</sup> Enlightening the residents of Palestine on domestic science thus became essential to the war effort.

Cooking and stoppage of food-waste by propaganda and scientific housewifery in the schools are essential elements of the problem. The surprisingly low standard of cooking observed in the large majority of homes visited, both Arab and Jewish, has been commented on.<sup>165</sup>

A good homemaker, Vickers estimated, could save a family over 25 percent of its food budget. By starting her own garden plot and changing what she thought of as “waste,”<sup>166</sup> the homemaker could ensure both the domestic economy and the health of the family. Vickers argued that women stripped food of its essential vitamins and minerals through simple habits such as overcooking. In addition, “housewives should use more uncooked fruits and vegetables and begin leaving beans and peas out for longer periods to germinate.” Such strategies, and the homemaker’s knowledge of them, had broader implications for imperial security and victory:

If allowed to germinate and sprout these [beans and peas] could develop vitamin C. Wokes [a nutritionist] points out that in the siege of Kut in the last war dried beans were used extensively by both Indian and British troops, but while the Indians by custom allowed theirs to sprout, the British did not. Thus the latter got scurvy and this is said to have been one of the main causes of the surrender.<sup>167</sup>

In both Britain and Palestine, building wartime support was a heavily gendered exercise. Prescriptive directions to the female consumer proliferated. The food controller in Palestine issued weekly lists of rationed foods and commodities. He published in the Arabic and Hebrew press in-

serts such as “Food in Times of War,” which described the best way to cook foods in short supply, like potatoes, and make them last. Daily recipes and announcements were also advertised in the Arabic, Hebrew, and English press. In 1942 a new publicity section of Food Control began public demonstrations of government recipes, which attempted to “meet the tastes of the Arab and Jewish communities.”<sup>168</sup> That year, the “Household Front Broadcasts” began featuring wartime recipes and discussions six times a week in Arabic, Hebrew, and English.<sup>169</sup> Ultimately the homemaker and her adeptness at domestic science were the conditions for both nutritional health and social progress. She was in Palestine, just as in Britain, “the last to eat around the family table . . . [and] the first to garner responsibility for managing hunger.”<sup>170</sup>

## Conclusion

Forging economy as a distinct territorial space that was calculable and legible was an important part of the Mandate’s managerial experiment. The ascendance of numerical indicators that states and empires used to evaluate their status made this delineation possible. Through the Middle East Supply Centre, British and later American officials took part in shaping a new “Middle East”; conferences and indicators such as the cost of living expressed that territory in economic terms. In Palestine, the offices of Food Control had by 1943 organized the ownership of all “vital” commodities through a system that regulated import, supply, and distribution. Various regimes of rationing attempted to regulate consumption: what and when people ate, and even the very shape of their food, as the bread rules indicate. Colonial officials boasted of realizing a complete circle of control that would ensure the immediate urgency of an Allied victory. But their claims did not stop there. The circles of control would also set the foundations for healthy and productive economies and bodies.

The framework for these interventions was development. Before the outbreak of war, when people throughout the colonized world bid for independence in widespread strikes and uprisings, colonial officials attempted to prolong their waning rule. They broadened development’s previous emphasis on increased output to include wellbeing. Here again the indices of the twentieth century played a key role in measuring the developed. Colonial officials used this elusive goal to postpone decolonization. Part of this effort was the introduction of welfare and nutritional programs

that were inextricable from disciplinary processes. The index of the calorie had ramifications for the outcomes of war and the output of factories.

But the development of the “undeveloped” and the feeding of the malnourished was not a transparent process of economic amelioration. Governments and scientists would time and again conclude that poverty was endemic and that it was the poor, the native, the Oriental, and the homemaker who were to blame for their poverty and their hunger. War-time regulations and interventions provide insight into the specificities of British rule in Palestine, the formulas of the development paradigm, and the significance of basic needs to politics and economy.

If the Mandate system was an experiment in management, economics, and the calculability of basic needs, the case of Palestine shows just how incoherent and ill equipped this experiment was. The attempt to calculate Palestinian economy and make it legible was something British colonial officials did in spite of themselves. While the ascendancy of arithmetic measurements as a mode of social management may have inspired some bureaucrats to “dreams of omniscience,”<sup>171</sup> colonial officers in Palestine did not indulge those fantasies. War compelled British rule, if momentarily, to calculate and measure goods, people, exchanges, and economies. In doing so, the war exposed the force of military interests and the depth of two decades of apathetic rule.

There are two noteworthy points here. One is the responsibility of rule and the other is the envisioning of futures. Vernon argues that in disciplining subjects, “states also assumed an obligation for their welfare, if only to maintain them in a position of ‘bare life.’”<sup>172</sup> But in Palestine, British colonial officials shirked that responsibility until rebellion and war forced their hand. Additionally, colonial officials did not envision a future for Palestine or the Palestinians. In Africa development gave birth to a dualism of colonial thinking that placed “a modern future set against a primitive present.”<sup>173</sup> However, in Palestine that dualism existed simultaneously between the “primitive” Palestinian, whose future was so unclear that it would be better to not imagine it, and the “modern” European Jew whose expertise and capital, at least in the realm of social welfare and nutrition, outstripped that of the colonial government.

British austerity and its attempts to build a nutritional economy in Palestine also offer insights on development. As we have seen, food in the early twentieth century became a politically legible object that governments measured to assess their rule. From World War I to the anticolonial

uprisings of the 1930s and far into the Cold War, colonial and governing officials approached the lack of food as an incubator for revolution and war; its provision was central to various development regimes.<sup>174</sup> Was development a parable of colonialism? Cooper would say that it was not. Nationalists in Africa, he argues, used the paradigms of development to reject the premises of colonial rule, assert participation in global politics, and make claims to “a globally defined standard of living.”<sup>175</sup>

But perhaps there are different questions to ask. First, indices such as the standard of living, or as we have seen here in the League of Nations’ determination of daily caloric requirements, may have been global or universal, but only in ways that evidence how those categories constitute and enforce exclusion. Cooper and Packard have argued that development functioned as a formula for the colony and later the third world to become “normal.” But the biases of the normal continued apace; global determinations such as the calorie did not transcend these biases; they reinforced them. Moreover, anticolonial nationalists’ use of development did not strip the paradigm of its emphasis on political containment. Here we can trace the parallel between development regimes in the colonies and welfare regimes in Europe and the United States. Nutrition again provides a case in point. In its historical nineteenth-century origins in the United States, we ought to remember that nutrition’s moral imperative was “do not aspire to things that are above one’s station in life.”<sup>176</sup> Scientists and economists used nutrition to define a standard of living that would contain labor demands in the United States. Labor organizers later mobilized the “American standard of living” to identify the ideal worker as white, male, and native born.<sup>177</sup>

In the Middle East too, it does not take much to imagine how nutrition and the universal would work to maintain power. At MESC’s Conference on Agricultural Development in 1944, Egyptian biochemist and nutrition expert ‘Ali Hassan argued that while the object of improving nutrition “appears to be the eradication of food deficiency diseases,” it in fact had more far-reaching results. In the Middle East, he explained, “foreign propaganda” had created “a certain degree of discontent among the poorer classes.” Thus improving the nutrition of the poor would “convince them that the authorities are keenly interested in their affairs.”<sup>178</sup> In a motif that has persisted until the twentieth-first century, it was not inequality or injustice that fueled discontent, but rather foreign propaganda that created it! Nationalists may have used development to overthrow colonial rule, but



they did not change its foundational equation: Affect limited economic amelioration so as to maintain political and social hierarchies.

Lastly, there is the relationship between basic needs and economy. If we follow Estava's tip that the law of scarcity is not the lack of goods but "the technical assumption that man's wants are great, not to say infinite"<sup>179</sup> then we can locate the very idea of basic needs within the more common emphasis on growth. As the *Economist* explained in 1943, setting minimums—as governments were doing left and right—was not a repudiation of "individual responsibility and initiative" but rather the very condition of "maximum enterprise."<sup>180</sup>

Nutrition provides a case of how the minimum and the optimum constituted one another. During the war, under the gun of scarcity, nutritionists began to shift from determining the minimum to determining the optimum. This explains in part the growing link between advertising and nutrition. Throughout World War II, governments in London and the colonies targeted the homemaker as the responsible consumer. After the war, the relationship between advertisers and nutritionists would intensify, and advertisers would mobilize various techniques to cultivate among consumers the "desire to be nutritionally healthy."<sup>181</sup> The battle for freedom from want was a precursor for how consumption would later be elided with democracy and freedom.<sup>182</sup> Managing scarcity and determining basic needs were crucial to a longer process of creating needs and desires. Perhaps then the shift from the minimal to the optimal entailed less rupture and more continuity.

# 4

## A Public Good

### Palestinian Businessmen and World War II

**PARALYSIS, DESTRUCTION,** devastation, injustice, isolation, and conspiracy: These were the salient terms of the Palestinian economic lexicon in the 1940s. Just five years earlier, it was initiative, ambition, and vigilance that had occupied economic imaginations. In the 1930s, businessmen and reformers shaped Palestinian economy within a broader Arab horizon. Investment, savings, and scientific management would deliver Arab progress and regeneration or *nahda*. The enemy without, the usually unnamed Zionist enterprise, was secondary. The British colonial government was behind the scenes, conferring recognition and intervening, at times, to hasten the scientific development of productive individuals. The main characters were the wealthy, the educated, the “civilized.” The state of slumber was the primary enemy. The central aim was to awaken the forces within—heritage, culture, tradition, and a transhistorical “economic” essence. In mobilizing these latent “friends,”<sup>1</sup> as Amin al-Rihani called them, Palestinians could take part in an Arab economic arrival and enjoy a new world of commodities, markets, and technologies.

By 1939, the scene, the plot, and the characters were undergoing an irreversible shift. Profit and progress remained inextricable. Yet what Palestinian businessmen called the country’s “anomalous”<sup>2</sup> conditions and British interventions in consumption and production rendered that dyad secondary. The primary struggle was now over sustaining basic needs. Palestinian men of capital no longer presented themselves as the vanguard of progress. They became the managers of economic crises. The Arab Chambers of Commerce were the collective sites for this management. Chamber

reports, minutes, correspondence, press releases, flyers, and pamphlets, reveal what became of the guiding imperative of the Arab economic *nahda* in the 1940s. What did the ethical Palestinian consumer and his and her future look like now?

### The False Veneer

While one colonial survey described the war years as an “unprecedented period of prosperity,” the record was not so rosy.<sup>3</sup> The massive influx of capital that the war initiated came at the heels of the Great Revolt. The brutality of British containment of the Palestinian bid for national independence resulted in both economic devastation and mass incarceration, with over 50,000 Palestinians imprisoned.<sup>4</sup> By 1939, 10 percent of Palestine’s male population was injured, dead, imprisoned, or in exile.<sup>5</sup> That same year and until 1944, Palestine’s export of goods and services doubled, and its money supply grew almost sevenfold.<sup>6</sup> Due to international trade paralysis, food imports decreased from 41 percent in 1939 to 30 percent in 1943–1944.<sup>7</sup> Allied demands for agricultural products and the increase in local demand for import substitution drove expanding demand and money supply.

War expanded wage labor in construction, ground transport, the ports, and shipping; this expansion drew in Palestinian women as well. In Haifa, women found new opportunities in the oil refinery, banks, and the harbor alongside more common jobs in teaching, service, and clerical positions in education and government offices.<sup>8</sup> The two Arab banks grew faster in this period than any other financial institution in Palestine at the time.<sup>9</sup> Between 1939 and 1946, deposits and credits grew by a factor of twenty-six in the Arab Bank and fourteenfold in the Arab National Bank.<sup>10</sup>

But alongside these signals of “growth” was an unprecedented rate of inflation: Domestic price levels tripled.<sup>11</sup> And while some coffers got larger, for most Palestinians the war induced a particularly stark proletarianization.<sup>12</sup> Daily bread became an all-encompassing concern. By 1939 basic goods from sugar to shoes were either prohibitively expensive or unavailable, and the colonial government initiated its austerity program. It started with the regulation of supplies through measures such as the Past Trade Ordinance, detailed below, and through granting the British-run Steel Brothers Incorporated exclusive transport and distribution rights. By 1941, when Palestine was in a state of trade paralysis, the government had

instituted a Control Authority that oversaw an expansive rationing and distribution regime.

This Control Authority was part of the British and later Anglo-American Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), established in Cairo that same year. MESC originally intended to coordinate military and civilian supplies to reduce shipping space in an area it labeled “the Middle East.” As it became the principal buyer and seller of goods in this loosely labeled conglomeration of countries, MESC took part in shaping territory, economy, and the relationship between capitalists and governments. Its legacy is broad and, in Palestine, particularly understudied.<sup>13</sup>

The Conservation of Resources and Provision of Essential Meals was the largest section of Palestine’s Control Authority. It included the influential position of the food controller, a British official named Geoffrey Walsh, who was the Palestine government’s economic advisor from 1938 to 1941. For four years Walsh oversaw eight hundred employees and a budget of 250,000 Palestinian pounds.<sup>14</sup> The government’s various rationing strategies ranged from the coupon scheme for sugar, rice, and flour; to the ambitious but ill-fated municipal markets; and finally to the regionally exceptional “points” system that attempted to account for the wide variety of preferences in Palestine. Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, farmers, and small landowners all suffered under the weight of colonial austerity. It was perhaps the urban consumer who was most familiar with its sting.

The crisis of supply and the specter of scarcity came at the heels of the Great Revolt (1936–1939). The Revolt and its rebels threatened British imperial interests in the Middle East as well as thoroughly challenging Palestinian elite hegemony. The White Paper of 1939 was the British colonial attempt to at once appease Palestinian national demands while fortifying their military position in the Middle East. The White Paper of 1939, while ostensibly committing to a unitary and independent Palestinian state, with an Arab majority and a Jewish minority, delayed this unlikely eventuality for ten years and made it contingent on Zionist agreement.

At first glance it appears that the White Paper was, as Charles Anderson has argued, a useful tool to coopt the “nationalist stalwarts” of the Arab Higher Committee, the cross-factional elite party that attempted to lead the Revolt.<sup>15</sup> Among these stalwarts were the bankers Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim. Pasha and Ibrahim, alongside other Palestinian businessmen in the Arab Chambers of Commerce, used the

White Paper to claim rights based on majority status. But austerity policies rendered the already hollow promises of the White Paper suspect. As the decade wore on, Palestinian businessmen would claim: “Whereas the Arabs imagine that they enjoy general welfare and prosperity, we see the reality behind the false veneer.”<sup>16</sup> British facilitation of war-induced growth in industry and commerce favored Jews and marginalized Palestinians.

### Simplicity and Order

The thinkers who wrote in the Palestinian economic journal *Iqtisadiyyat* in the 1930s preached “simplicity, order, and organization” as the necessary requisites to realize what they called economic conduct. In these renditions, economic conduct was a vehicle for progress. Indeed, economy and progress appeared synonymous. In the 1940s, simplicity, order, and organization continued to be exalted norms. But in Palestine, just as elsewhere, survival and sustaining basic needs had displaced progress as the object of realization. And in Palestine, just as elsewhere, war functioned to heighten the regulation of basic needs as a central component of new technologies, strategies, and policies. The ever-approaching threat of national dispossession further complicated matters.

In response to this explosive amalgam of daily and national survival, businessmen like Ahmad Hilmi Pasha,<sup>17</sup> identified as “the authentic man of the nation” in 1930s narratives, activated the networks of the Chambers of Commerce and held annual economic conferences. There, these men made calls in the name of the “public good”; they hoped to “invigorate the country with good fortune.”<sup>18</sup>

Businessmen drew on a long history of merchant networks in activating these sites. Chambers of Commerce dotted the coastal and interior towns of Palestine in the early twentieth century; they were, as Michelle Campos has shown, sites for producing and enacting a “civic Ottomanism.”<sup>19</sup> In 1908 Muslims, Christians, and Jews established a Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce. The institution conducted the typical work of Chambers of Commerce, including legal advocacy and commercial networking on behalf of their members. In addition to mediating between local and international merchants and consulates, the Jerusalem Chamber also promoted public works and infrastructure. Its most notable success was in lobbying the Ottoman government to establish a mixed commercial court in 1910.<sup>20</sup>

Between 1912 and 1919, Palestinians established Chambers in Nazareth, Haifa, Nablus, and Acre. Jaffa followed suit in 1922 and Gaza in 1925. In both Haifa and Jerusalem, Chambers included Palestinian Muslims, Christians, and Jews as well as European Jews. These experiments would not survive the Mandate period and the consolidation of the Zionist movement. Institutional commercial “coexistence” in Haifa ended in 1921, when Chambers split along Jewish and non-Jewish lines. Jerusalemites conducted a longer experiment; their joint Chamber functioned until 1936 when as a result of the strike and Revolt, figures such as ‘Abd al-Bari Barakat and Shibli Jamal founded the Arab Chamber.<sup>21</sup> That same eventful year Hebronites also established an Arab Chamber of Commerce.<sup>22</sup>

Despite, underneath, and in symbiosis with the realities of settler colonialism and the exigencies of world war, the Palestinian social landscape was changing. In the 1930s and 1940s, the constituencies of the Arab Chambers in Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem shifted from primary landowning members to a growing group of manufacturing and commercial interests. In Jerusalem, landowners constituted about 10 percent of Chamber members, while in Jaffa they were 3 percent of the Chamber constituency.<sup>23</sup> Of the over 500 members that the Jerusalem Chamber listed in 1947, 118 were in manufacturing (tobacco, flour, carpets, shoes, and textiles). The remaining 260 were commercial enterprises including contractors, commission agents, importers, retailers, wholesalers, automobile sellers, and auto parts dealers.<sup>24</sup> This membership was a significant rise from the 234 listed the previous year, a further indication of heightened activity.<sup>25</sup>

An administrative board led the Jerusalem Chamber, and its membership included small and medium-sized service providers (manicurists to tailors), importers and retailers (grocers to department store owners), and ambitious if ephemeral finance initiatives (the Arab Bank).<sup>26</sup> The Jaffa Chamber had 670 members, including sixty-four manufacturers and forty contractors, machinery repairers, and printers.<sup>27</sup> The Jaffa Chamber also included larger enterprises such as the Golden Spindle Textile Factory, which employed 400 people, the Palestine Brass Foundry, and the Building and Construction Company.<sup>28</sup> The situation differed in the interior cities of Hebron and Nablus, where the executive council in the mid-1930s was “more or less a summary of the most important merchant families in the town.”<sup>29</sup> But in these locales as well, landowners were increasingly investing in enterprises like soap and milling.

The Jerusalem and Haifa Chambers were the most organized in the 1940s and left behind the most extensive records. The Jerusalem Chamber had a small budget, often functioned in deficit, and had two salaried employees.<sup>30</sup> During the late 1930s and early 1940s the Jerusalem Chamber underwent a massive “reorganization of Chamber work and increased member support.”<sup>31</sup> This work included issuing communiqués, statistical inquiries, and financial guarantees for trials, visas, and export licenses. Records show that the Haifa and Jerusalem Chambers met once to twice a month, depending on urgency. Smaller Chambers such as those in Acre often organized farmers from surrounding villages in representations to various colonial offices ranging from the high commissioner to district monitoring authorities.<sup>32</sup>

Scholars have argued that the Chambers were vehicles for the pan-Arabist Istiqlal (Independence) Party in the 1940s.<sup>33</sup> A closer look reveals a diverse constituency and a more complicated history. The Chambers encompassed a variety of political affiliations. They included figures such as Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, a member of the pan-Arabist Istiqlal Party, who ran both the Arab Bank and the Arab National Bank; Fakhri al-Nashashibi, a loyalist of the pro-British, pro-Hashemite National Defense; Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, an ‘Istiqlalist aligned with ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam;<sup>34</sup> and Shibli Jamal, who was associated with the St. Georges British Anglican School for Boys and a member of the Reform Party. Leading figures emerged in each of the Chambers, and businessmen fell in and out of the fold informally.

Beginning in 1932,<sup>35</sup> with a lapse between 1935 and 1939 and lasting into the late 1940s, Chambers congregated their members and other businessmen from the towns and villages of Palestine in Arab economic conferences. These annual events issued popular calls and campaigns in Acre, Nazareth, Safad, Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Hebron, Gaza, Jaffa, Bir al-Sabi’, and Ramallah. They were platforms for articulating demands to the colonial government from its district officers to the secretary of state for the colonies in London. Conferences were one-day events that began with a keynote address followed by a general session of three or four hours. The thirteenth annual conference evidences a broad-based attendance from Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, Nazareth, Acre, Nablus, Safad, and Haifa.<sup>36</sup> That day in December, Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim inaugurated the event with the reading of the *fatiha* and a prayer for the martyred souls of the nation.<sup>37</sup>

The work and agendas of these conferences had two parallel tracks. On the one hand, they focused on the exigencies of war and colonial aus-

terity. On the other hand, they invested in defining the normative Palestinian consumer and public as objects of reform and representation. Through these initiatives, businessmen claimed, “We have begun to sense the true meaning of organization . . . and its impact and influence on all aspects of our economic life.”<sup>38</sup> This search for the “true meaning” of organization reflected an acute need for institutions, bureaucracies, experts, and the power of producing and evidencing “basic facts and figures.” The territorial promises of an Arab capitalist utopia were now out of reach. The tangible fear of national dispossession was ubiquitous. Economy was no longer only an index of individual and collective progress; it was now necessary to assure a continued presence on the land.

### Paralysis and Crisis

How had the territorial promises of a broader Arab capitalist utopia so quickly eroded? Defence ordinances, Control Authority policies, and MESC’s broader endeavors changed the conditions of possibility. Whereas in the 1930s, Palestinian men of capital, as they called themselves, had painted a landscape of progress and growth, by the 1940s a state of paralysis was the best way to characterize the scene. MESC’s “restrictions and systems” obstructed the “natural” import and export between Arab countries.<sup>39</sup> The new mass of regulations imposed “barriers” on trade and “shackles” on import and export. Travel, transportation, and distribution were exceedingly difficult.<sup>40</sup> The commodity was “transformed into cash” [*amwal naqdiyya*] and “paralyzed without investment.”<sup>41</sup> The results were “monetary inflation,” an increase in workers’ wages, and above all an exponential rise in the cost of basic needs.<sup>42</sup>

Olive and citrus growers were denied export licenses, and their harvests lay accumulating in warehouses. Wheat was either unavailable for rationed prices or exorbitantly expensive on the informal market. Rationing threatened rice factories, making Egyptian rice more affordable than the local product. For about six months in 1941, vegetable prices were so inflated that door-to-door smuggling had become prevalent. Increasingly, retailers could only purchase lentils, oils, and cracked wheat from wholesalers who had inflated their prices under threat of having their licenses confiscated. Having granted Steel Brothers the transportation monopoly, the government proceeded to confiscate cars and licenses. These confiscations as well as petrol rationing devastated private owners and large service providers,



such as the Gaza Bus Company that traveled the coast to Syria. Hundreds “of cars lie idle awaiting their doom and rendering no service.”<sup>43</sup> The “car culture”<sup>44</sup> that emerged two decades earlier had come to a grinding halt.

“Each merchant and each village has a story,” businessmen argued.<sup>45</sup> But despite their claims to speak on behalf of the public and the consumer, Chambers spent most of their energies advocating for traders, wholesalers, retailers, and farmers. Their victories were modest. The Gaza Chambers advocated a “grove revival project” representing citrus growers who had received smaller loans than their Jewish counterparts or received no loans at all. The Acre Chamber secured limited relicensing of olive growers.<sup>46</sup> In Jerusalem, the Chamber wrestled an “agreement of principles” that allowed wheat merchants to grind their stored wheat for direct sale as flour.<sup>47</sup> It achieved similarly short-term gains in the distribution of goods such as ghee to wholesalers; cracked wheat to millers; and sesame oil, soda, ground rice, and lentils to retailers.<sup>48</sup> The Jerusalem and Haifa Chambers also negotiated import licenses for 4,000 tons of rice annually. It was a small result borne of much effort, falling far short of the demands of the Haifa-based Eastern Factory for Rice, which was pushed out of business by inflated prices.<sup>49</sup> The Gaza Chamber relentlessly advocated for the Gaza Bus Company, but was only able to secure the relicensing of some private cars.

In an attempt to consolidate these small and short-term efforts, the Chambers established a national Executive Committee in 1940.<sup>50</sup> Businessmen aimed to expand this group to a broader “Higher Economic Committee of Nationalists” [*lajna iqtisadiyya ‘ulya min al-wataniyyin*]. They envisioned a collective institutional body that would administer welfare to the poor, oversee rationing, manage price ceilings, and take part in policymaking and legislation.<sup>51</sup> In the meantime, the more modest Executive Committee oversaw the formation of smaller committees of retailers, textile merchants, and various others representing distributors, importers, and wholesalers.<sup>52</sup> Composed of “constituents . . . [who have] the experience, qualifications, and resolve to serve the public’s interest,” these committees were one venue to claim representative authority and demand colonial recognition.<sup>53</sup>

## Sleepless Men of Capital

Paralysis and crisis, the businessmen argued, had “diffused every aspect of our lives, individual, and collective.”<sup>54</sup> To better understand these crises, it is useful here to focus on three particular regulations: the Past Trade Ordi-

nance (1939), the imposition of income tax (1941), and the Textile Rationing Act (1942). Each of these inspired Palestinian discontent and mobilization.

The Past Trade Ordinance obligated importers and exporters to produce documentation proving their continuous activity from 6 September 1938 to 31 August 1939.<sup>55</sup> The ordinance gave the director the power to refuse licenses “without assigning any reason.”<sup>56</sup> The government, Palestinian businessmen noted, had singled out a period that “miraculously happened to coincide with depression in Arab trade,” that is, the period of the Great Revolt.<sup>57</sup> Palestinian businessmen across the political spectrum, from those who called the rebels “bandits”<sup>58</sup> to those who understood them as “revolutionaries” [*thuwwar*],<sup>59</sup> did not conduct business as usual during the Revolt. Men like Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Fu’ad Saba, who were closely linked to and funded the rebels, temporarily closed or relocated their ventures. The Chambers, for their part, joined the strike a week after the national committees called for civil disobedience.<sup>60</sup> Still for others like Imil Butaji (Emile Boutagy), who called the rebels “gangsters,” the Revolt delivered “dark days” on his firm.<sup>61</sup> As scholars have pointed out, and as these businessmen themselves argued, the Revolt was an “opportunity” for Jewish settlers to “develop their trade energetically.”<sup>62</sup>

The Past Trade Ordinance inspired the reemergence of the annual economic conferences in 1939. Palestinian businessmen were in an uproar; the ordinance threatened the livelihoods of importers and exporters as well as “anyone undertaking any handicraft or industrial activity.”<sup>63</sup> In an echo of the 1930s’ emphasis on progress, Palestinian businessmen patiently explained to the colonial government that such restrictions did not “suit the changing social circumstances.”<sup>64</sup> Indeed, they obstructed the teleological advance of consumer subjectivity. For as “the hands of the clock continue to move, so too do personal and social matters,” and “people’s desires, needs, and skills” changed.<sup>65</sup>

The ordinance did more than interrupt this neat historical march, which relied on the link between commodities and civilization. It also resulted in broad confiscations of goods. Even for figures closely aligned to British interests such as Butaji, the ordinance was “fantastic and illogical”; it was a form of “piracy pure and simple.”<sup>66</sup> Crucially, because the ordinance had “a great bearing on our economic life and general interest,” it was “directly connected to our very existence.”<sup>67</sup>

Chambers businessmen made multiple proposals to change the period for Past Trade Ordinance regulations. They offered to authorize importers’

good standing. The economic advisor, Walsh, consistently dismissed these proposals and complaints: "No Arab importers have suffered from licensing control," he insisted.<sup>68</sup> When the Jerusalem Chambers petitioned the high commissioner for recognition as a representative body in 1940, Walsh opposed the bid because it was "so soon after its separation from the joint Chamber."<sup>69</sup> This punitive and infantilizing impulse did not deter the Chambers' relentless evocation of British colonial justice. Indeed, the rhetorical basis for most petitions, at least in the early years of the decade, was the appeal to the colonial commitment to "justice" and "the spirit of democracy."<sup>70</sup>

Businessmen also made persistent bids for government recognition, usually through inclusion in the colonial government's Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry. The government established this advisory group in 1928. Its "official" members were all colonial bureaucrats. In 1932 membership was extended to the "unofficial" participation of three Arabs and three Jews.<sup>71</sup> The Arab members were Tahir Qaraman, Shukri al-Taji al-Faruqi, and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nabulsi. Both of the latter were affiliated with the Chambers.

In 1940, the government dissolved the Standing Committee and replaced it with the Department of Commerce and Industry.<sup>72</sup> The Chambers repeatedly made bids for both reactivating the Standing Committee and expanding its membership. Walsh dismissed these requests as well. He preferred what he called the "moderates" of the Standing Committee over the "radicals" of the Chambers, who for him were irrational opportunists who "held political meetings under the subterfuge of economic discussions."<sup>73</sup> However, even to Walsh's unsympathetic eyes, the Chamber businessmen's push for government inclusion was based on a need for a "training ground" so that when "the time came for giving effect to the White Paper," they would have experience "in framing the laws of the country" on "economic matters."<sup>74</sup> That time never materialized, as the businessmen in this circle would soon realize, but their attempt to access a type of state institutional training is significant.

In 1941, the Mandate government introduced a general progressive income tax. According to Jacob Metzger, this move intended to "offset the reduction in the war-induced decline in revenue from import duties."<sup>75</sup> The imposition of income taxes revealed both structural and conceptual disparities between Palestinians and the Yishuv.<sup>76</sup> By the mid-1940s, Jews were paying over five times more than Palestinians and getting three times more in local and municipal expenditure.<sup>77</sup> Earlier in the 1930s, the Jewish

Agency had argued that Jews should receive public services commensurate with the taxes they paid. The Palestine Royal Commission of 1937 pointed out that this approach ran counter to one of two principles:

Either it repudiates the basic idea of public finance in the democratic world—that the rich should be taxed to meet the needs of the poor—or it denies or ignores the theory that Arabs and Jews are members of one Palestinian society.<sup>78</sup>

How did Palestinians react to the imposition of income tax? Businessmen repeatedly drew on the “democratic maxim” that was “observed in the civilized world” of “no taxation without representation” to protest their exclusion.<sup>79</sup> In 1943, word of an increase in income taxes prompted the fourteenth economic conference in Jaffa. Businessmen from the Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa Chambers held a special interview with the financial secretary shortly thereafter.<sup>80</sup> Shibli Jamal represented the “fear of the people” in “the face of new taxes.”<sup>81</sup> People accepted the government’s previous increase of 50 percent of income (more than 2,600 Palestinian pounds a month) because of the war. But additional increases would be too heavy a burden. Was the government, Jamal queried, determined to impose additional income tax “whether or not the public approved?”<sup>82</sup> The financial secretary, Sanford, deferred the question with platitudes about the Chambers as one of the country’s “responsible parties.”<sup>83</sup>

Jamal responded with perhaps the clearest summary of what the world looked like in the 1940s: The “Arabs are not comfortable about their future after the war.” The “people” would comply if “a clear, honest policy on the future of the state was articulated.”<sup>84</sup> Thus, these Palestinians supported the “equity principal of fiscalism” precisely because they understood themselves as equal members of one Palestine. They were able to envision, if begrudgingly, Jews, European and otherwise, as members of that Palestine. Their most pressing fear was the lack of clarity on what sort of state would rule it.

In 1942, the Control Authority introduced a Textile Rationing Law as part of a wider “utility scheme.” Arab textile wholesalers, retailers, tailors, and consumers were in an uproar over the miniscule rations they received, particularly in comparison to their Jewish counterparts. Textile traders and manufacturers argued that they received only 9 percent of the allotted utility goods.<sup>85</sup> The Jerusalem Chamber held an emergency national meeting shortly thereafter. After some lobbying, the Chamber won a concession from the Department of Light Industries (DLI) allowing textile traders to

sell their stock textiles to licensed retailers.<sup>86</sup> But the disparities in shares continued, and in 1944 the Jaffa Chamber hosted textile figures from Jaffa and Majdal.<sup>87</sup> The Textile Executive Committee of the Arab Conference for Palestine was formed and began directly petitioning the high commissioner. The committee included the Jerusalem-based Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Hasan Khalqi al-Dajani, as well as Malik al-Masri from Nablus.

At this stage the resort to colonial integrity was no longer an option. The colonial government, the Textile Executive Committee argued, was favoring “Zionist commerce and industry”; instituting an “economic crisis unique in its kind”; and effectively “handing over the reins of power to a Zionist faction.”<sup>88</sup> The “utility scheme” was “simply a conspiracy” that was part and parcel of the broader wartime austerity, which had facilitated Jewish “prospectors” to “prosper into a rich and powerful class of industrialists at the expense of the Arabs.”<sup>89</sup>

Profiteering had become rife. Zionist institutions and British colonial officials blamed the lone Arab smuggler (see the following chapter for an explication of the lone smuggler) for the proliferation of unregulated and inflated prices. But the policies put in place to protect “local production” facilitated a more institutionalized profiteering. For example, the customs tax imposed in 1943 on imported cement was four times higher than its pre-war rate, 150–250 mills/ton as opposed to its wartime rate of 850 mills/ton.<sup>90</sup> The “local” cement market was limited to the sole cement factory, Nesher, a Jewish venture. Nesher sold cement based on quotas at lower prices to settlers, who sold them at inflated prices to Palestinians.<sup>91</sup> Thus, “local production” was not a transparent term. Steel Brothers was also complicit in profiteering; they purchased seed at low cost and sold it to small landowners at inflated prices.<sup>92</sup>

Palestinians were also excluded from the decision-making offices of the Control Authority. The government attributed the dominance of Jewish officers to “their technical qualifications” and the lack of similarly qualified Arabs. The businessmen retorted: “We fail to understand” the link between import licensing and “qualifications and high sounding German degrees.”<sup>93</sup> The question was not simply one of privileging between “Bakr and Zaid or Haim and Cohen”; it was rather “the choice of a colonial Zionist band from the very heart of the Jewish Agency” to take the administrative helm of the war departments.<sup>94</sup>

By the mid-1940s we can begin to trace growing charges of conspiracy. The economic regime had become so unbearable that it appeared

to be a “predetermined policy.”<sup>95</sup> If this policy continued, the businessmen feared, “Arab economic interest will gradually come to a halt.”<sup>96</sup> Austerity policies amounted to the denial of “Arabs’ natural economic rights in their national homeland [*al-watan al-qawmi*].”<sup>97</sup> The colonial government was “depriving the Arabs of sleep.”<sup>98</sup>

## The Peasant and the Bedouin

If the “enlightened” figures at the vanguard of progress were sleep deprived, what became of the slumbering masses they were to awaken? In the 1930s, the normative economic subject was the exalted elite who through his “civilized” character would foster and proselytize “social man.” An awakened Palestinian was one who would “curb the self,” do without luxury, and accumulate the largest possible profits. The discursive ends of these values were economy and progress or, more accurately, economy *as* progress. How did the landscape of paralysis and national peril in the 1940s influence notions of the normative and awakened consumer?

Representing the consumer was central to business claims of serving the public good.<sup>99</sup> But direct consumer petitioning to Chambers was uncommon. When it did occur, the Chambers took a dismissive tone toward the “grumbling residents.”<sup>100</sup> These businessmen were more interested in shaping consumer conduct than in responding to everyday concerns. The virtuous Palestinian consumer continued to be one who would do without.

Addressing itself to the “dignified and great Arab people” the thirteenth annual economic conference urged: “We ask you to reduce consumption [*istihlak*] to the furthest extent possible.” The conference encouraged the Palestinian public “to attend to farming their lands, [and] protecting their interests, business, industry, and economy.” A righteous consumer was one who would “be fulfilled with necessity and abandon luxury.”<sup>101</sup> Our “motto,” the businessmen preached, must be “produce, produce, produce!”<sup>102</sup> The time had come for the “slumbering masses” to wake up and shed “your sleeping clothes.”<sup>103</sup>

But those “sleeping clothes,” as we saw with the textile ordinance above, were themselves sites of contention. That contention was not only a site to make national claims to the colonial government. It also functioned as a way to form consumer and class categories. Textile allotments, the businessmen argued, had a broad influence on the “overwhelming majority of the people” in Palestine who resided “in the middle” [*fil wasat*].

There was a “Jewish middle” and an “Arab middle.” Except on Saturdays, the “Jewish middle,” wore “khaki and short pants . . . the women even more than the men.”<sup>104</sup> In the “Arab middle,” on the other hand, “both men and women” consumed “a larger quantity of wool.” The regulating authorities privileged “Jewish consumption” over “Arab consumption.” The Department of Light Industries’s differential allotment facilitated the production of “clothes for men and women” that fit “the needs of the Jewish worker and consumer” who had “suits, pants shirts, dresses, and socks” in a variety of “types and colors” to choose from. The Arabs, on the other hand, even though they “represent[ed] the majority” did not “attract the slightest attention.” Their “needs and desires” were denied.<sup>105</sup>

What were these needs and desires then? And who were the Arabs? According to these mostly urban businessmen, the Arabs were “peasants and Bedouins” (who were also apparently “in the middle”). In comparison to “the thousands of everyday needs [*hajiyyat*] produced for Jews,” there was “not one ‘*abaya*, not one ‘*hatta*, not one ‘*iqal*, *qunbaz*, not one robe, not one dress, that suits the peasant or the Bedouin and his desires,” they argued.<sup>106</sup> The neglect of these desires was unjust because the “peasants and Bedouins” were law-abiding, tax-paying subjects who followed the rationing ordinances, handed over their surpluses, and duly played their part in the war effort. Thus the conduct and comportment of the consumer was alternatively a register of nativity and a fulfillment of obligations for both the threatened nation and the Allied war effort.

While in Chambers representations the “hunger for goods” was to be tamed and guided, for figures such as Butaji, feeding this hunger was crucial to his economic interests. For him, luxury and consumption were synonymous with civilization and culture. For Chambers businessmen, it was thrift and an unwavering attention to basic needs that entailed “enlightened” consumption. In all renditions, voicing the consumer as a loyal, “authentic,” or civilized subject was one critical way that elites made demands upon the colonial government.

The symbol of the “peasant” was a tangible one for all of these men; many had just a few years prior abandoned the *tarbush* for the *kufiya*.<sup>107</sup> Some wore the ‘*abaya* and ‘*hatta* as gestures of solidarity and defiance during the Revolt.<sup>108</sup> But in the 1940s they were most likely dressed in suits and collared shirts. And as they preached simplicity and productivity, they constructed notions of the authentic self—a native of the land adorned in robes and wraps. Men of capital had turned away from the 1930s emphasis on the elite

enlightened figure as the main character of economic conduct. Now they evoked the marginalized subaltern, the “peasant”<sup>109</sup> and the “Bedouin,”<sup>110</sup> to define and differentiate Palestinian consumers and their needs and desires.

## The Naked Truth

By 1944, textile importers, exporters, and manufacturers warned, “the naked truth will appear in a short while and we will not like it.”<sup>111</sup> What was this naked truth? The primary contradiction for these businessmen was the diplomatic promise of a unified state on the one hand and the commercial policies that excluded not simply their capacities for profit but, as they saw it, their very existence on the land. What we can trace as a result of this colonial contradiction is a set of profound ruptures related to the accumulation of capital and profit.

One such rupture was a shifting landscape of the “foreigner” and the “native.” In the 1930s, men of capital could envision Jews either as “locals” or an incidental, and perhaps at times even beneficial, component of a broader landscape of economic promise. They spoke of the necessity of statistics to “all communities in the country, Arabs, Jews, and Mandatory alike.”<sup>112</sup> They discussed the restriction of immigration in the 1930s as crucial to protecting the “economic interests of Arab and Jewish local tradesmen, lawyers, [and] doctors.”<sup>113</sup>

But by 1939, the vocabulary of the “foreign” became ubiquitous. This was due in part to the exponential rise in Jewish immigration. It was also due to the growing consolidation of the Yishuv as a separate institutional parastatal force in Palestine. The estranged native was a recurring idiom: “We are like foreigners in our own country,” Palestinian businessmen often said. By 1945 the landscape was divided between “genuine and essential local industry” and a class of “newly created industrialists” who had amassed their riches in the most “scandalous” of ways and outside the bounds of “what is healthy and fair.”<sup>114</sup>

Another rupture was in the distinction between the undesirability of a Jewish national *home* versus the profound hazard of a Jewish national *state* in Palestine. On the project of a Jewish national home, businessmen were clear: “The Arabs appreciate the difficulties of oppressed constituents [*‘anasir*] in Europe, and they empathize with the idea of a refuge for these constituents.” However, “the Arabs do not agree that their country, Palestine, is that refuge.”<sup>115</sup>



It rapidly became evident that a refuge was not all the future had in store. In 1944, the Textiles Executive Committee argued that colonial austerity was working to realize the “Zionist plot” to establish “a Jewish state [*dawla yahudia*] and not just a national home [*maqam qawmi*].”<sup>116</sup> Similarly, in a direct address to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, delivered to the American consul, Palestinian businessmen condemned U.S. support of a Jewish “nation-state” [*watan yahudi qawmi*] in Palestine.<sup>117</sup>

It is here too that we should locate a heightened anxiety among Palestinian businessmen about their intensifying isolation from the Arab world, what they called their “sister countries.” For example, the Past Trade Ordinance discussed above was an important mechanism of regulating trade with the Arab world. In 1939 the government pushed to revise the Palestine–Syria Free Trade Agreement in place since 1921.<sup>118</sup> Some Arab businessmen, like their Jewish counterparts, advocated ending free trade so as to stop the flow of competitive imports from Syria, where labor and materials were less costly.<sup>119</sup> For the Chambers, however, maintaining this free trade and extending it to all Arab countries was a priority in both annual economic conferences and petitions. For them, cement imported from Syria was more of a local product than the prohibitively expensive product sold by the settler industry Nesher. While the fight for Palestine could have appeared in the 1930s as one stepping-stone to a broader vision of an Arab free market, by the 1940s the struggle had become all encompassing. Isolation from the broader Arab world shook the vision of economic arrival; it shrunk the territorial scope of economy to a national horizon.

The breadth of that national horizon was also shrinking. One indication of this attenuation was the pervasive division of what five years earlier had appeared as a unitary noun. Businessmen no longer spoke of an “economy” in Palestine as part of a broader Arab commercial unity, but of an *Arab* economy versus a *Jewish* economy. We can see this divide clearly as well in business complaints on press censorship. The colonial government, they argued, had created “two nations—one Jewish with a free press” and the other “an Arab nation whose press cannot freely express itself.”<sup>120</sup>

The foreign/native, state/home, Arab/Jewish bifurcations were all linked to shifting business understandings of colonial rule. In the 1930s, the colonial government appeared to be a temporary presence that could work to confer recognition and induce growth. In the early to mid-1940s, men of capital still held out hope for colonial recognition. They seemed, rhetorically, obstinately invested in colonial egalitarianism, at least for the

first part of the decade. They deployed notions of “democracy and the free world” to condemn British support of Zionism. Time and again, they pleaded with the colonial government to “take a stand” and reassure “the Arabs of their freedom and independence.”<sup>121</sup> After all, these were the very “principles based upon which the Allies are fighting this war.”<sup>122</sup> And the Palestinians, the argument went, had devoted “hearts and souls”<sup>123</sup> and accepted with resignation their “misery, privation, and sacrifices” to the “supreme” war effort.<sup>124</sup>

But as the decade wore on, begging the colonial government to “honor your promises”<sup>125</sup> proved time and again ineffective. The British colonial government was no longer a background force that could confer recognition of the modern. It was a facilitator of siege. That government, its officials, and its expertise were no longer the needed site of potential training for a future state but were, more clearly than ever, a structure of relentless exclusion. The Zionist enterprise was no longer just an enemy against which to compare the self. It was the force that would facilitate dispossession. By 1944, the businessmen’s tone had taken a turn. They now spoke of British austerity as realizing the “Zionists’ dreams . . . no longer in promises on paper, but on the ground.”<sup>126</sup> Soon they would implore that they were “the voice of a people who look their destruction in their own country in the face.”<sup>127</sup>

Had this impending destruction radicalized these men of capital? Colonial officials like Walsh certainly saw them as radicals. But how did they position themselves? In one telling address to the high commissioner, businessmen reminded their colonial overlords that their strategies constituted a “politics of patience and waiting.”<sup>128</sup> Indeed, many leading Chamber members had been involved in a long trajectory of a “politics of patience” through the various delegations to London in which elites called on British colonialism to mentor them in the struggle for self-determination. These included Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, Shibli Jamal, Sa‘id al-Shawwa, Shukri al-Taji al-Faruqi, and Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani. For instance, the first Palestinian delegation’s memorandum to London reminded Winston Churchill that the “the people of Palestine” had “welcomed the victorious British troops.” They believed those troops “had come to fulfill promises . . . and to safeguard their existence as a people and their right to self-determination.”<sup>129</sup> By the 1940s, some of these same men were intent on qualifying that such a politics indicated neither “the neutrality of nationalist demands” nor a “lack of persistence” in demanding “rights and independence.”<sup>130</sup>

There were also some important differences among businessmen. Alongside these rhetorical claims and attempts at diplomatic negotiation, some were involved in more radical endeavors that demanded national independence. Fu'ad Saba—the accountant, head of Saba and Company, and the editor of the economic journal *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya*—participated in the radical Youth Congress of 1932 as well as being the principal architect of the Palestine National Fund. Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim was a crucial Chamber figure and also headed the National Committee in Haifa during the Revolt.

The political defeat of the Revolt and the wartime crisis of scarcity and supply restricted political infighting in the halls of the Chambers. Yet even so, some basic differences came to the fore. The third stage of rationing, the points system, which substituted points for food and meant to account for the wide variety of tastes in Palestine, revealed some of these divergent approaches. Men like Malik al-Masri, the secretary for the fifteenth annual economic conference, and retailers such as Jad Suidan of the Haifa Chamber argued that the points system was contradictory to “mentality and habits” in Palestine.<sup>131</sup> Other figures such as Ibrahim criticized the government’s rationing innovations on structural, not cultural, grounds. The points system had deprived people of “vital commodities” and disadvantaged the poor more than anyone else.<sup>132</sup>

And admittedly, there were some unique if fleeting moments one should take note of. Take, for example, the rather rare occurrence of a conglomeration of textile interests calling for a one-day strike “in opposition to the work of the Department of Light Industries and its injustice to Arab rights.”<sup>133</sup> But we should not confuse such moments with a broader radicalism. These were businessmen not revolutionaries. Their bottom line was the call for stability. Ultimately, rebellion and uprising was “not in anyone’s interest, neither the people nor the government.”<sup>134</sup>

We can further trace these businessmen’s position in their understanding of the distinctions between the economic and the political. In the previous decade, men of capital understood economy as a vehicle of management that rested in the social realm, central to but clean of the partisanship and irrationality of the political. Yet, even in the optimism of the 1930s, these distinctions appeared feeble. By the 1940s, the façade had eroded. In each of their annual conferences in the 1940s—alongside concerns of battling inflation, securing basic goods, and promoting products—the Chambers took on land confiscation, the exponential in-

crease of Jewish immigration to Palestine, and government press censorship. The eighth economic conference, which took place in Gaza in 1940, emphasized the need for agricultural self-reliance but also focused on the release of political detainees.<sup>135</sup>

However, businessmen understood their engagement of the political alongside the economic as “anomalous.” As the textile merchants explained it, commercial and financial crisis would be “one thing in a country with only one kind of people” who shared “national, political, and social goals.” But in Palestine the crisis was not the product of “immoderate production or excessive consumption, or the protection of industrial capitalism.”<sup>136</sup> It was instead the “different inhabitants and their different goals, nationalities, and popular aspirations” that “rendered the crisis here as political.”<sup>137</sup> The economic and the political were clearly inextricable in the 1940s. But for these men of capital, this inextricability was an anomaly.

Businessmen also mobilized the category of the “natural” alongside the contested “social” and “political.” They retreated to that natural to make economic claims that they linked to the native/foreign bifurcation:

Those Arabs who make up a majority of the population in the country have a natural right to take their share of rights and privileges that are now being handed to individuals and companies who are not natives of this country.<sup>138</sup>

They conducted this retreat because the political itself, and the capacity to make political claims, were beyond reach. Indeed by 1942, figures such as Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim concluded:

The voices of the Chambers of Commerce have grown hoarse. . . . We do not hear the resonance of our voices. . . . We do not know details; we do not have any administrative power in the government, nor a parliamentary council to speak on our behalf.<sup>139</sup>

The lack of knowledge of the “details” here is crucial. Various businessmen throughout the 1930s and 1940s called for a “serious study” of “facts and figures” conducted by “experts and economists.”<sup>140</sup> Indeed in 1936 George Khadir (Khader), the secretary of the Jerusalem Chamber, had petitioned the treasurer for a schedule of tariffs, the names of protected industries, and the output of each protected industry. Khadir hoped to compile a report for the Royal Commission. The treasurer referred him to the Palestine Commercial Bulletin and later wrote the chief secretary that clearly the Chamber aimed to evidence that British protection of Jewish industries had “raised the cost of living to the Arab consumer.”

But surely, he went on, “it is for the Arab Chamber of Commerce itself to establish its case.”<sup>141</sup>

But did austerity really advantage Jewish industry? The Palestine government’s shift from centralized control of supply in 1939 to a broad system of commodity control by 1942 in most cases advantaged large Jewish industrial and distribution interests, such as the dairy monopoly and agricultural cooperative Tnuva and the cement company Nesher.<sup>142</sup> Indeed, the government monopoly on the civilian market and import and consumption control led to a further stimulation of Jewish industry. Jewish-manufactured textiles, leatherwear, confectionary, and pharmaceuticals were “guaranteed access to the Arab consumers in Palestine and the Middle East.”<sup>143</sup> Arab industrial development in light industries was far outweighed by Jewish manufacturers. Scholars who have engaged the settler colonial character of Palestine’s economic history have emphasized British protectionism as facilitating a “Jewish–Arab economic separatism” that led to an “economic apartheid.”<sup>144</sup> Others hail from a perspective that resonates with the elite and colonial visions studied here; they tie profit with progress and capital accumulation with civilization. In these narratives, British protective measures of Jewish industry were neither uniform nor consistent.

It is true that Palestine under British rule provides ample examples of colonial policy’s incoherent and haphazard character. If nothing else, British rule in Palestine teaches us that understanding colonial power lies in resisting the tendency to over-determine colonial coherence, scope, or efficiency. But none of this diminishes the inequality, and ultimate erasure, that the British colonial structure was borne of and gave birth to. Metzger betrays this inequality when he argues that British protective measures aimed to “promote the economic development of the modern Jewish settler community while caring for the well-being of the indigenous Arab population.”<sup>145</sup> In this rendition then the settlers were “modern” and more susceptible to “development” while the indigenous were subjects whose wellbeing was to be “cared for.” In such a worldview, capital accumulation is conditional on one’s standing along a civilizational spectrum. It is only a small jump to the conclusion that the growing hegemonic power of the settler industry in Palestine had more to do with cultural attributes (and their link to the very possibility of economic activity) than with structural conditions such as British protective measures. Metzger thus concludes: “The claims that the prime beneficiaries of the tariffs in Mandatory Pales-

tine were Jewish industrialists, and that these benefits were in any way consequential, are empirically unverified.”<sup>146</sup> While there *may* be a Palestinian story, Metzer seems to tell us, the documents that can reveal it are unavailable or do not exist. The fact, which may or may not be true, that there are no traces to unearth leads to the conclusion that there is no story to tell.

The lack of “facts and figures,” was something that Chamber businessmen throughout this period were deeply anxious to remedy. In the 1930s Palestinian men of capital were optimistic about taking part in producing statistics. During that period, they could celebrate the establishment of the Department of Statistics as the institutional framework that would make such production possible. But by the 1940s, these businessmen understood that they were on their own in any endeavor to evidence their claims. Much like their counterparts in Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century, Palestinian businessmen mobilized the Chambers as venues to enact a new form of collective action.<sup>147</sup> Outside the realms of managing the multiple crises of austerity, the Chambers also attempted to hone their institutional capacities. They acted as financial guarantors for commercial licenses, visa applications, and legal cases. In one year, the Jerusalem Chamber issued 366 such affidavits.<sup>148</sup> The Jerusalem Chamber also understood its role as safeguarding urban space, lobbying the municipality and the city architect to address “the lack of order” in the old city. The Haifa Chamber began conducting population censuses in the mid-1930s.<sup>149</sup> While there is little evidence to further detail this work, the efforts indicate business attempts to shape institutional spaces that they understood were both lacking and necessary.

These Palestinians understood their claims as irrefutable, but they did not have the institutional structures to evidence that irrefutability. Since the advent of the Mandate, the textile merchants explained, “the Arabs have feared for their economic futures.” They cited the Shaw Commission Report, which in 1929 identified precisely that fear as a primary reason behind the unrest of that year.<sup>150</sup> They quoted the Arab Higher Committee that “the primary reason for the riots was the deprivation of Palestine’s Arabs from enjoying their natural and political rights.”<sup>151</sup>

Palestinian businessmen were aware that the tools available to claim national rights were the very structures that erased the possibility of those rights. This is why the textile merchants, for example, found themselves in a colonial straightjacket. They rejected the Mandate document because of its “injustice” to Arab rights. They singled out in particular Article 2,

which recited the Balfour Declaration, as loathed “by anyone who remains Arab.”<sup>152</sup> Nevertheless, they were forced to cite Article 2’s promises of protecting “civic and religious rights.” For it was, as they themselves pointed out, the only legal basis they had for opposing colonial austerity.<sup>153</sup>

### The Normal Path

Just as in the previous decade, the businessmen of the Chambers of Commerce understood their economic interests as part of a broader Arab horizon. The fight for free trade [*hurriyat al-tijara*] with Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon was central to their work.<sup>154</sup> They coordinated efforts with their counterparts in Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. They traveled to North Africa, with the aim of collaborating in postwar business, an indication of the lingering hope for a pan-Arab capitalist utopia. They negotiated with the Egyptian consulate in 1941 to facilitate exports. In Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, and Nazareth they hosted consuls from Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, including figures such as the former Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Ahmed Yahya Pasha who was accompanied by Mahmoud Fawzi, Egypt’s consul in Jerusalem.<sup>155</sup> In Jerusalem and Haifa, Chambers welcomed proponents of the Anglo-Egyptian capitalist cooperation such as Hafiz ‘Afifi and depicted him in the press as a national hero.<sup>156</sup>

As in the decade before, these men of capital positioned themselves as serving a broader collective, a “public good.” The reiterated aim was to persevere with “energy and vigor” so as to restore the country’s “wellness.”<sup>157</sup> Businessmen presented their own interests as that of the collective. It was their task to guard the “health” and “prosperity” of what they often called “economic life.” The Chambers were “national organizations” aiming to “mend conditions” and serve the country.<sup>158</sup> Indeed they often addressed a broader Palestinian public: “Your Chamber . . . did not miss any opportunity to defend your interests and preserve your rights.”<sup>159</sup>

It was this sort of national service that Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, the president of the Haifa Chamber, feared when he heard of the Nablus Chamber’s potential dissolution. In “the name of the public good,” Ibrahim urged his colleagues to resume their “normal path” and represent the city’s invaluable political, literary, social, economic, and industrial contributions.<sup>160</sup> Indeed, throughout this period, Ibrahim, Hilmi Pasha, Jamal, and others pleaded with their counterparts in Safad, Tiberias, Jenin, and Tulkarm to establish Chambers so as to contribute to the broader “national

and collective effort.”<sup>161</sup> Only in unity could these men of capital “defend the country.”<sup>162</sup>

The imperative of collectivity was not confined to the protection of Palestinians’ rapidly dwindling arenas of economic maneuver. It also informed notions of capital accumulation. Many initiatives, such as the push to establish a capital-intensive Arab Trading Company with a minimum capital of 100,000 Palestinian pounds, were born of an understanding of the limited possibilities of “individual business” [*al-tijara al-fardiyya*]. Ibrahim reminded his colleagues that individual initiative would attain limited profit in such difficult times. It was only through collective endeavors encompassing a broad scope of capital and expertise that the Palestinian businessman could “confront the foreign companies working at his expense in this country.”<sup>163</sup>

Thus, men of capital in the 1940s, just as they were doing a decade earlier, connected capital accumulation and profit to “wellness.” Their work in facilitating and managing “economic and business matters” was itself an embodiment of progress, indicated through the repeated emphasis on energy and vigor. Palestinian men of capital had an ongoing faith in the “healthy” promises of a “normally” functioning economy. We can trace this investment in the postwar conception of the “economic field” as an organic body that could be nourished back to good health. Anis Nasr, the secretary of the Haifa Chamber, explained to the high commissioner in 1945 that now that the war was over and the “hopes of all free people might have been realized in the destruction of tyranny and the victory of right over might,”<sup>164</sup> it was high time to get back to business. Since austerity “precluded from the fields of economic activity new and energetic factors,” its time had ended. Palestine’s businessmen, Nasr argued were full of “fresh imagination” and “courage”; they were flexible, energetic, and experienced. It was only their return to the “economic field” that could ensure stability on the one hand and a “healthy system of free enterprise and competition” on the other.<sup>165</sup>

## Conclusion

The Chambers of Commerce were nascent institutional spaces in the 1940s. They brought together a variety of men of capital from different political backgrounds, ranging from pan-Arab nationalists to British-aligned forces. These men continued to be committed to some of the central tenets that inspired men of capital in the 1930s: an investment in capital



accumulation, free trade, and the components of a “healthy” economy. The self-defined social role of the Chambers and economic conferences was to guard the nation’s public good. Businessmen masked their interests as those of the general Palestinian public. However, local authorities, rural producers, and villagers would often identify the businessman as the primary beneficiary of colonial austerity. The Chambers’ self-described role as mediating authorities guarding the public good revealed some clear social hierarchies.

After the national defeat of the Revolt and in the throes of massive capital influx into Palestine, businessmen in Chambers of Commerce proselytized the possibilities of economic growth and a future state in Palestine. They invested, if momentarily in the promises of the White Paper and lobbied the colonial government for membership in its economic institutions, in the hopes of training for an independent future. The investment was fleeting. It was not long before wartime austerity came to the fore as a structure of exclusion. For these businessmen, this exclusion was not merely a signal of, but rather central to, the erosion of their very presence on the land.

In the face of growing Jewish consolidation, economy took shape as a site of national battle. Guarding the good of the Arab economy was the best way to defend the country, the businessmen claimed. Men of capital were no longer the vanguard of a profitable future. They were now the managers of a broad crisis of scarcity. They retreated to a “politics of patience,” calling on colonial integrity and Allied principles to demand their rapidly eroding rights. As they did so, the terms of their claims rapidly changed. Their central heroes were no longer the “civilized” and the “cultured” but the native authentic consumer, the honorable “peasant” and “Bedouin.” The lexicon of progress, ambition, initiative, and civilization gave way to conspiracy, paralysis, and injustice. The broad territorial expanse of economic regeneration from the Hijaz to Morocco rapidly attenuated. The realm of economic maneuver shrunk to a bifurcated space of an Arab economy versus a Jewish economy in an increasingly embattled Palestine. The “unknown territory of exile”<sup>166</sup> was now everywhere to be seen.

# 5

## The Vegetable Racket

### Scarcity and the Cost of Living

**FOR SIX MONTHS IN 1943**, in the midst of World War II, the police patrolled the streets of Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jaffa from the early hours of the morning until sunset. They posted checkpoints at every major thoroughfare. They went door to door in heavy pursuit of illicit activity, the definition of which changed rapidly and without warning. They dealt heavy fines and incarcerated men and women alike.

It was not rebellion or resistance but the rapidly rising cost of living that inspired this militarization. The British colonial government embarked on an effort to coercively control the production, distribution, and marketing of every vegetable in Palestine. In villages and settlements, farmers burned their crops or left them to rot in the field. Movement was restricted, basic goods were scarce, lines were long, and discontent was rife. For six long months in 1943, this was the scene in Palestine. The source of siege was not the conflict over land but the stuff of daily life—tomatoes and cucumbers.

The Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), a joint government and private venture established in 1940, introduced and intervened in modes of measuring and experiencing economy in an amorphous body of countries that it called the “Middle East.” In Palestine, government attempts to control production and consumption resulted in considerable discord among producers and consumers alike. Throughout, the distribution and sale of unregulated goods, what everyone in Palestine called the “black market,” were at once a justification for government intervention and its direct outcome.<sup>1</sup>

Who were the wartime profiteers who were holding the populace of Palestine “captive,” as one British official put it?<sup>2</sup> The British government’s

vegetable scheme of 1943–1944 reflected colonial ambitions of economic calculability and omniscience. A close read of the scheme's design and implementation as well as Palestinian and Jewish responses to it eviscerates these ambitions. It reveals the limits and failures of calculability and bares the gaping disparity between new techniques of economic measurement and social knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

## The Cost of Living

As Palestinian men of capital shaped new modes of economic thinking, categories such as the standard of living became important means to assess basic needs and to define social status. The colonial government also introduced and implemented categories, in what seemed at times harried attempts to define and organize people in Palestine as well as assess colonial rule and evidence its benefits. One such measurement, which the government introduced, was the “cost of living” index, comprised of wages and levels of relevant prices. Government statisticians used the term in both Britain and the United States as early as the 1860s but mostly to mean expenditure rather than as a way to measure if wages were increasing in the same proportion as expenses.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the earliest attempt to compile a numerical record of incomes was in 1805 at the hands of Leopold Krug, the first head of the Prussian statistical office.<sup>5</sup> The Reich's Statistical Office did not have a completed national figure for the cost of living until 1920, and despite “index number mania” in Germany, the cost of living index proved vulnerable to industrial and corporate resistance.<sup>6</sup>

In Britain, it was not until autumn 1914, after World War I, that such an index came into existence. War was crucial to measuring basic needs. The inflation of World War I made it clear that increases in the cost of living could be grounds for an increase in wages. Government officials were anxious about the social implications of their findings. In Britain, the Department of Labour, charged with determining the cost of living, was “careful to avoid seeming to endorse any principles of wage determination including the concept of a ‘living wage.’”<sup>7</sup> In Palestine as well, the increased cost of living index influenced the level of wages; it was the government's priority to reduce both the index and the wage level calculated from it.<sup>8</sup>

The cost of living index sought to determine basic needs. This measurement would shift from measuring the minimum to measuring the

optimum from the 1930s on. Just as nutrition went from the study of basic needs to the determination of optimal quantities, the cost of living index gave way to the more ambiguous, and highly controversial, “standard of living.” U.S. economists in the late nineteenth century first coined the standard of living as a means to end class conflict by developing “objective” criteria for the adequacy of wages.<sup>9</sup> It was the combined efforts of the Twentieth Century Fund, Henry Ford, and the International Labor Organization that would in 1929 begin promoting a particularly *American* standard of living in Europe.

In 1929, Henry Ford approached the International Labor organization in his pursuit of information on living costs in European countries where he had plants or intended to establish them. Ford had already used the high-wage strategy to clamp down on labor unrest in the United States. The “Ford–ILO Inquiry” would become the first attempt to compare workers’ living conditions in Europe and the United States. When the “Inquiry” was finally published in 1931, the 100 American workers who had been interviewed were mostly jobless and suffering from the fallout of the stock market crash. Capitalism was in crisis as it was being standardized. For Victoria de Grazia, the moment defined the ascendance of the “American Standard of Living” and the rise of the United States’ “irresistible empire” in Europe.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the nineteenth-century concept that measured the absolute minimum necessary for survival was shifting from valorizing thrift to maintaining money circulation: “Virtue was located within, rather than outside, the wage labor market.”<sup>11</sup>

But these shifts were slow. Indeed most countries were embroiled in maintaining basic needs during World War II. Thriving unregulated markets charging exorbitant prices for regulated goods were a source of deep anxiety for the British colonial government in Palestine. As for so many governments in this period, these markets revealed the failed attempts to manage scarcity as consumer and market responses to shortage and control proliferated.<sup>12</sup> In the face of rapidly increasing prices, inflation was the British colonial government’s enemy.

In 1943, the government went on the offensive, launching an attack on the rising cost of living through government bodies such as the Subsidization Committee and the Planning Committee on Anti-Inflation Measures. The harder the government tried to control prices, the more unregulated prices flourished. By all accounts, inflation and profiteering in the vegetable market were serious problems. The government’s recurring

concern was that without the institution of produce control, prices would rise to “fantastic heights” and have “disastrous” influence on the cost of living index.”<sup>13</sup> Food and Price Control officials persistently blamed the “vegetable racket” on the antisocial profiteer, which was synonymous with an unorganized Arab market.<sup>14</sup> In internal documents, but almost never in public statements, government officials, to varying degrees, were also critical of the Tnuva Central Cooperative for the Marketing of Agricultural Produce, created in 1926 when kibbutz movement leaders centralized the distribution and export of locally produced foodstuffs.<sup>15</sup> While Tnuva initially distributed dairy products, it expanded in the 1930s to include produce; government accounts estimated that the cooperative had centralized 60 to 80 percent of Jewish settlement production by the 1940s.

The control of local produce was a primary challenge from the initial moment of rationing in Palestine. Colonel Heron, the engineer of import and consumption control, tried various strategies for controlling locally produced foodstuffs. These strategies included an aborted initiative in 1941 to create municipal markets, eliminate the wholesaler and retailer, and bring the producer into direct contact with the consumer. While district commissioners reported at the time that they were taking provisions to establish these markets, they were never in fact implemented. The vegetable scheme of October 1943 was the government’s ambitious effort to control producing areas and consuming centers. The government undertook the regulation of the production, distribution, and consumption of vegetables throughout Palestine from the Galilee to the Naqab. Originally, while capping producers’ prices across the country, the scheme provided controlled prices only to consumers in Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. But from October 1943 until May 1944, and despite a great deal of discontent and resistance from producers, the government expanded the price control scheme to include Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, and Gaza. During the 1943 vegetable scheme, rationing and control were sites of contention between producers and the government, revealing the mechanisms and capacities of collective representation in Mandate Palestine.

### The Attack on Inflation

The colonial government’s attempts to control inflation began in 1940 with the establishment of the Subsidization Committee, which advised the high commissioner on price control.<sup>16</sup> The committee’s official

members included British colonial officers and the unofficial participation of two Yishuv figures and one Palestinian.<sup>17</sup>

The next attempt came in 1941. That year, in an ephemeral moment of Arab–Jewish mayoral consensus, ‘Umar Bitar (Jaffa), Yisra’el Rokach (Tel Aviv), Shabtai Levy (Haifa), and Mustafa Khalidi (Jerusalem) led a bid to increase their decision-making power in austerity policies. One of their main proposals was the establishment of a “People’s Court,” in which municipal authorities would try profiteers.<sup>18</sup> One week after their proposal, the high commissioner, the attorney general, and the acting chief secretary implemented the Municipal Tribunal Ordinance of 1941. It allowed for mayors to preside over the municipal tribunal, which had all the powers of a magistrate with regard to the summoning of witnesses, the arrest of accused persons, and any other matter concerned with the trial of a criminal case. The tribunals could issue a maximum penalty of 500 pounds and up to one year’s imprisonment.<sup>19</sup> The ordinance allowed for an executive officer, defined as any government officer or appointee, to confiscate any goods he deemed hoarded. The most problematic clause of the regulation removed the right of appeal unless the sentence was longer than three months. Government accounts report that the People’s Courts were functioning in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem well into 1947. The immediate enactment of such a drastic measure indicates the Palestine government’s growing anxiety about inflation.

The Defence (Prevention of Profiteering) Regulation of 1942 was a third strategy that attempted to confront inflation and unregulated markets. This ordinance came to be known as the Anti-Profiteering Order and would serially resurface with new adaptations until 1946. It created the post of price controller, which M. J. Flanagan occupied from its inception until 1947. The Anti-Profiteering Order was, like the People’s Courts, directed at policing the lone profiteer, that antisocial and disloyal fifth columnist. These ordinances left untouched the profiteering of “organized producers and distributors,” such as Yishuv interests, Tnuva, the cement factory Nesher, and the British-run Steel Brothers Incorporated, which had the monopoly on distribution in wartime Palestine.

Clearly then these ordinances could not stem the tide of the spiraling cost of living. In August 1943 the government began a vigorous campaign to combat inflation.<sup>20</sup> The Subsidization Committee met ten times between August 1943 and March 1944 to continue the task of the previous four years in an attempt to lower the general level of retail prices. The committee was

most concerned with meat and fish, flour and bread, rice, and vegetables. On the committee's suggestion, the government heavily subsidized flour and rice and maintained its standard policies with regards to other basic foodstuffs. But a vegetable crisis was ensuing, and soon the government would ignore the Subsidization Committee's work altogether. By August 1943, the Planning Committee on Anti-Inflation Measures, a closed government circle, would devote its time to the control of local produce.<sup>21</sup>

### Spring and Summer 1943

In his 1942 quarterly report, Geoffrey Walsh, the food controller, expressed his concern about vegetable prices; the situation seemed to be spiraling out of control.<sup>22</sup> Arabs were hawking vegetables and produce "from door to door"; they were holding the population of Palestine "captive."<sup>23</sup> The "Arab market" had made price control "next to impossible."<sup>24</sup> District commissioners in Haifa and Jerusalem repeated this refrain at the same time that they represented Tnuva, the centralized distribution agency, as a partner in the government's efforts to curb vegetable prices.

However, it was Palestinian farmers who predominated in grain and crop production throughout the Mandate.<sup>25</sup> The Yishuv were not self-sufficient in food production. Tnuva itself sometimes purchased from Palestinian farmers during shortages throughout the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>26</sup> Direct trade between Palestinian farmers and rapidly growing Jewish markets was also common throughout the 1930s, even during the six-month strike of 1936. Particularly in Haifa and Acre, many Jews shopped in Arab markets, "where the prices of various products were cheaper."<sup>27</sup> Yishuv produce was on average 21 percent more expensive than Palestinian produce before the war, in large part due to the higher wages in Jewish settlements.<sup>28</sup> Wartime demand led Palestinian cultivators to double the acreage devoted to vegetables.

At the same time, the government granted its increased agricultural loans during World War II primarily to Jewish settlement producers.<sup>29</sup> While Arab producers cultivated a considerable portion of the country's vegetables, it was Tnuva that set Palestine's ceiling prices. Tnuva members prospered to a considerable degree during the war "due to the prices charged to consumers for local produce."<sup>30</sup> Walsh approached the cooperative as an official body that was struggling to control its constituents in ways comparable to the government itself. The Registrar of Cooperative

Societies had a similar approach and explained that Central Tnuva's main difficulty was the loyalty of its members, which had weakened under the "strain of black market prices."<sup>31</sup>

The Registrar of Cooperative Societies suggested that the best way to contain the "vegetable struggle" was to appoint an "authoritative body" to negotiate between producers and government. The Jewish Cooperative Advisory Council,<sup>32</sup> which the government established in June 1942, also recommended a body that would control the distribution of agricultural products, fix prices, and determine any legal or policy changes.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, "no legislation of any kind" should be enacted without the "consent of the central body."<sup>34</sup> This body was to exclude Arab producers altogether.

The council advised the government to "give preference to the organised sections of the farmers" with regards to the supply of agricultural requisites, machinery, and tools.<sup>35</sup> According to this faulty logic, the government's refusal to grant licenses would "serve as an incentive for the



**FIGURE 3** Vegetable farming. Of 279,940 dunams (1 dunam is 1,000 square meters), 239,733 dunams were Palestinian-owned and cultivated. Source: *Walid Khalidi, Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), photo number 145. Courtesy of the Institute of Palestine Studies.



unorganised section of the farming population to organise.”<sup>36</sup> The council went one step farther and recommended that the distribution of essential agricultural products “should be turned over entirely to the agricultural marketing cooperatives, farmers’ organizations, and other organised channels of trade.”<sup>37</sup> Through such institutional representations as the Jewish Cooperative Advisory Council, Tnuva pushed for the exclusion of Palestinian production altogether. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies, for his part, was closely aligned with Jewish interests and argued that the council’s recommendations would hasten price control.<sup>38</sup>

In fact, the government had the hardest time controlling Jewish production under Tnuva. Beneath the veneer of governing partnership, Tnuva and the government often clashed. One example was the case of potatoes. The government’s set price was 50 pounds per ton. Tnuva advocated an increase of 10 pounds per ton. Walsh worried that if Tnuva did not receive its increase, growers would sell their potatoes “on the black market.”<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, if Tnuva received the requested price increase, the grower would accrue “an unreasonable profit.”<sup>40</sup> Nahum Verlinsky, the Director of Central Tnuva, reported that their settlements threatened to consume their crops if ceiling prices remained low.<sup>41</sup> After a month of debate, Walsh suggested that the correct thing to do was to “force sales through purchasing centers” at government set prices “under pain of withholding all food supplies from settlement.”<sup>42</sup> The success of such a scheme, as Walsh himself admitted, was “remote.”<sup>43</sup>

Tnuva’s role in vegetable prices also created discord among colonial officials. Flanagan, the price controller, had “sufficient evidence” to prosecute Tnuva for profiteering in dairy product in Haifa.<sup>44</sup> Walsh argued that it was the individual producers who were “the actual profiteers.”<sup>45</sup> Flanagan was adamant about Tnuva’s role in the vegetable crisis as well. In June, A. G. Dalglish, the acting chief secretary, wrote to Flanagan expressing concern about the “absurdly high price of vegetables” in Jerusalem. Dalglish had heard that a ring of shops on Mamillah Road determined prices every morning. Flanagan responded that after visiting “nearly all the vegetable markets in the country,” he found that prices were almost entirely dependent on the decisions of large distributors.<sup>46</sup> Tnuva, he asserted, was the main body to determine prices as it oversaw the largest portion of settlement distribution.

Flanagan advocated for prosecuting Tnuva throughout the spring of 1943. In July, he received approval from the chief secretary to proceed, but the record ends there.<sup>47</sup> It seemed that the immediate effect of fixing

prices was the disappearance of products in regulated markets.<sup>48</sup> This pattern would soon develop into a veritable “vegetable racket.”

## The Vegetable Scheme

In August of 1943, the Planning Committee on Anti-Inflation Measures designed the bold vegetable scheme of 1943–1944.<sup>49</sup> The scheme targeted Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Jaffa. It attempted to reestablish the first stage of rationing in Palestine, the municipal market, which aimed to cut wholesalers and retailers out of the picture. Vegetables and fruits were now controlled commodities. Reportedly, Arab and Jewish producers routinely destroyed crops to avoid selling produce at a loss. The new vegetable scheme prescribed five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 2,500 pounds for such acts.

The food controller fixed uniform price ceilings for produce, both wholesale and retail rates. The vegetable schemes entailed two operations. Food Control moved vegetables from producers, at times by force, into the main municipal areas. Municipalities were then responsible for marketing, selling, and distributing the vegetables. The government claimed that price ceilings, which were open to adjustment by localities, would “ensure that no unreasonable profit is made.”<sup>50</sup> One of the intentions of the scheme was to “force the hawker into the organised market” and “prevent back door sales at exorbitant prices.”<sup>51</sup>

The Planning Committee drew on the MESC liaison officer T. S. Powell’s experience of a road control scheme in Shanghai. As chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council, Powell took credit for the improbable success of reducing the cost of living in that city by 40 percent in six weeks.<sup>52</sup> In his experience, “coercion, or the threat of it, was soon succeeded by the co-operation of established traders.”<sup>53</sup>

The Planning Committee elaborated on these lessons. It established a special Transport Advisory Board to determine which goods would be eligible for free transport and ensure that they would not reach “the black market.”<sup>54</sup> The lorry transport of vegetables and fruits were restricted to the Haifa-based Steel Brothers, the government’s sole distributor. Colonial officials originally planned to subsidize the cost of transportation for three months but eventually extended this subsidization well into May 1944.

The government also brought settlement-owned lorries under the control scheme and subjected them to licensing. The movement of pro-

duce was prohibited between the hours of nine in the morning and seven in the evening. Movement without permit resulted in the confiscation of both the produce and all other motor transport “whether it be lorry, taxi, or private car.”<sup>55</sup> Producers had to contract with Steel Brothers-licensed drivers to transport their produce to approved municipal areas. Since Steel Brothers did not have the capacity to transport all produce, the government could not prohibit private transportation altogether, but it was subjected to an intricately designed system of licenses.

K. C. Tours, the acting food controller, officially announced the vegetable control scheme to his fellow officers on 14 September 1943. The complicated permit system generated a maze of paperwork. District food controllers would issue movement permits. The issuing office handed the applicant the original and the duplicate permit. The triplicate was dispatched to the government agents, Steel Brothers. The issuing office retained the quadruplicate. At the market, the food control inspector authorized the original and the duplicate. The driver delivered the original and the duplicate to the district control office. The district controller kept a register showing all vegetables received at the municipal markets. The original permit was transferred to Steel Brothers for payment.<sup>56</sup> Movement permits were valid for only one day, adding to the vegetable scheme’s bureaucratic burden.<sup>57</sup> In addition to the red tape, the vegetable scheme necessitated a corps of new staff, including twenty-five inspectors and twenty-four clerks.<sup>58</sup>

Food Control authorities were responsible for distributing vegetables from producers to municipal marketplaces. Food Control inspectors were also stationed at the municipal markets to verify delivered quantities. They were expected to be available from the evening until the early hours of the morning, guarding municipal markets. On delivery at the municipal market, the municipalities were to assume the responsibility for the marketing, sale, and distribution of vegetables. The Planning Committee suggested that the supply of produce was such an urgent issue that the government should penalize nonconforming municipalities by either withdrawing grants-in-aid or replacing the municipal council altogether.

### On the Ground

The government announced the vegetable scheme in the *Palestine Gazette* on 7 October 1943; it came into force four days later. Permit books were in circulation by the end of September. A notice advising producers

to apply for permits was published in the Arabic, Hebrew, and English press. District commissioners took applications for new staff. Municipalities and district officers rushed to set up makeshift municipal markets, but the “number and location of markets in each of the four municipal areas [remained] obscure.”<sup>59</sup>

The government had announced the transport scheme a month earlier on 9 September.<sup>60</sup> But there were various complications with the government’s planned subsidization of transport. Four days before implementation, the controller of road transport reported to the chief secretary that settlements and lorry owners were opposed to the scheme, which would entail considerable financial loss.<sup>61</sup> The controller of road transport estimated that the total number of non-cooperating lorry owners was 250 or 350. This factor, along with the army and the Royal Air Force’s heavy demand, rendered the vegetable scheme almost impossible to implement.

The vegetable scheme brought new significance to the criminalization of so-called profiteers. Its successful implementation depended almost completely on the cooperation of the police in checking the movement of produce.<sup>62</sup> A Haifa district commissioner report provides a glimpse of the heavy police presence in the vegetable scheme’s implementation on 11 October 1943. The police set up posts surrounding the city and inspected all incoming lorries. They patrolled all the main roads in the towns and rural areas of Tel Aviv and Jaffa beginning at three in the morning.<sup>63</sup> In the Galilee district, municipal authorities and Food Control inspectors joined forces to oversee prices in the markets; the police made rounds in residential areas and reportedly stopped “house to house hawking.”<sup>64</sup>

The reaction of producers was immediate. Jewish settlements organized under Tnuva withdrew their vegetables and boycotted the scheme. In Tel Aviv the vegetable market was “lifeless” the morning of the scheme’s first day.<sup>65</sup> Yisra’el Rokach, the mayor of Tel Aviv, began petitioning the high commissioner to cancel the vegetable scheme’s implementation in the face of the “danger [of the] population remaining without food.”<sup>66</sup> Jewish producers withdrew vegetables from all their usual markets in Tiberias, Safad, and ‘Afula. Tnuva retail shops in those areas were empty. In Jerusalem, the municipality had established the markets in Tnuva’s retail stores in the hope that such a concession “might obtain their cooperation to the scheme.”<sup>67</sup> But those stores were also empty of vegetables, except for uncontrolled apples. The Jerusalem district commissioner provided a more complicated reading of Tnuva as opposed to common

government portraits of a law-abiding association struggling with its disloyal members. The vegetable scheme revealed that it was in fact Tnuva's management that was the "main source of [internal] opposition."<sup>68</sup>

Arab producers attempted to withdraw their vegetables, but under government pressure and fear of penalties they sent half of the normal quantities to municipal markets in Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. In Haifa, the acting district commissioner claimed to be "impressed by the attitude of cooperation adopted by the Arab wholesalers." But he pointed out that a greater part of the vegetables on sale was "old stock."<sup>69</sup> In Jaffa, after some initial protest, Palestinian producers delivered some 50 tons of vegetables in licensed lorries to the municipal markets.<sup>70</sup> In Gaza, as well, Palestinian producers originally planned to withhold their produce. But as some vegetables started coming in, "they changed their minds and came straggling in late." Only about half of the rural producers delivered their supplies to markets in Gaza, Khan Yunis, and Majdal.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, most Palestinian producers came to market to sell uncontrolled foods like oranges, lemons, figs, and guava.<sup>72</sup> In Tiberias, Arab growers accepted the scheme, but with "considerable bitterness."<sup>73</sup> In the Acre area, producers' attempts to boycott the scheme were met with "heavy police action," which resulted in "several contraventions."<sup>74</sup> Meanwhile, in Nazareth, Safad, and Bisan, there was "grumbling" among the Palestinian growers.<sup>75</sup>

The scheme resulted in vegetable shortages in Gaza, Nablus, and Ramallah as free transport induced producers to divert vegetable supplies to the four towns. In addition, as a result of the continued Jewish boycott of the vegetable scheme, Jewish consumers and wholesalers took refuge in Arab markets, which raised prices considerably even in those controlled sites. The Jaffa vegetable market, for example, served both Jaffa and Tel Aviv, and retailers and consumers queued up from the early hours of the morning.<sup>76</sup> In Jerusalem, the Arab market was "flooded by Jewish buyers," who were "prepared to pay high prices."<sup>77</sup> Resentment was rife in the Arab market in Haifa where "retailers who had previously patronized the Jewish wholesale market were bidding in the open auction of vegetables at the Arab market."<sup>78</sup> The Haifa district commissioner struggled to find temporary solutions, all of which seemed to fail. For example, he allowed the market to remain open to all bidders each morning until "it was found that an unreasonable quantity was being purchased by retailers from those parts of the town normally supplied by Talpith [the Jewish market]."<sup>79</sup> At that point Food Control inspectors stopped open bidding and permitted only retailers

from the Arab market to purchase produce. As the scheme wore on, district commissioners in their fortnightly meetings with Flanagan and Walsh warned that in addition to the growing discontent of mayors and local officials and “the grave disaffection of the public,” vegetables were passing from the controlled municipal markets to the dreaded “black market.”<sup>80</sup>

## Government Discord

Government discord over the vegetable scheme reflected the differences between headquarters in Jerusalem and district commissioners throughout Palestine. Ever concerned with the rise in the cost of living, and what it reflected about colonial rule, the chief secretary and the high commissioner received the vegetable control scheme with “great pleasure.” MacMichael, reported the Acting Chief Secretary Robert Scott, was sure “that by united effort this bold and far-reaching contribution to the attack on the cost of living can be made to achieve the success it deserves.”<sup>81</sup> District commissioners were asked to “spare no effort” in carrying the vegetable scheme into execution.

The government was, however, cognizant that rural producers would attempt to close down vegetable markets. The chief secretary ordered that if “conditions in the markets on Monday show that produce is being withheld,” district commissioners should immediately make “a rapid survey of cold [storage] and other stores in both towns and rural areas and form an appreciation of the quantities available there.”<sup>82</sup> Municipalities that did not cooperate by providing for and controlling municipal markets would simply have to “go without vegetables.”<sup>83</sup> The chief secretary also ordered district commissioners to provide fortnightly reports on the scheme’s progress.

But the district commissioners and various other officials were more pessimistic about the scheme’s viability as well as their own capacity to enforce it. Some district commissioners sent buoyant reports on government progress, just as they had done two years earlier with the municipal market scheme, which never got off the ground. The Galilee district commissioner assured the chief secretary that he had made the necessary arrangements for permits and transport of vegetables from producing areas to consumer centers.<sup>84</sup> The Jerusalem district commissioner reported that there were marketing facilities for the controlled sale and distribution of vegetables.<sup>85</sup> The Haifa district commissioner repeated the well-worn complaints about an unorganized Arab market, but he went on to assure the chief secretary that

temporary provisions were available for a municipal market. The permanent site would take up to six months to construct, he claimed, an indication that some commissioners understood this scheme as a long-term measure.<sup>86</sup>

Other district commissioners were more open about the limits of their power. Five days before the vegetable scheme's implementation, the Lydda district commissioner claimed that he was waiting for clear orders from the food controller on "precisely what kind of municipal action I should attempt to ensure."<sup>87</sup> The Gaza district commissioner was the most explicit: "I have grave doubts as to the extent which the four large municipalities will really exercise energetically any present or future powers given to them."<sup>88</sup> Gaza served as a collection center for onward transport to Jaffa, and the district commissioner worried about impending shortages for local consumption.<sup>89</sup>

The Gaza district commissioner toured various settlements after the vegetable scheme's implementation. At Bir Tuvia settlement he reported tomatoes and cauliflowers rotting in the fields. Refuse on the ground showed that some cauliflower had been cut. Officially, the Jewish farmers explained that the cauliflower was sold within the settlement to non-producers. But "later a franker representative whispered that they had probably been sold either to Arabs who carry them away on animals or to the Army . . . who come and buy direct at pre-control prices."<sup>90</sup> The Gaza district commissioner concluded that it was wrong to continue to force prices down. Farming, he pointed out, is "a speculative business and cannot be costed like cotton piece goods or boots."<sup>91</sup> The Samaria district commissioner was also hesitant about taking measures against Jewish settlements and feared "requiring police assistance."<sup>92</sup>

Throughout the first two months of the vegetable scheme's implementation, district commissioners became more vocal in their opposition. They described the scheme as rigid and unrealistic. For one, the permit system was too complicated. Most producers and lorry drivers did not understand the transportation control system.<sup>93</sup> The overly strict control of transport had prevented the efficient distribution of vegetables. As public figures, such as the long-time business partners and Haifa municipal council members David HaCohen and Tahir Qaraman, became more vocal about their discontent, district commissioners' anxiety increased. The Haifa district commissioner, A. N. Law, pointed out that the vegetable scheme had "only been a partial success even among Arab producers and merchants." To achieve full success the government needed the "under-

standing and cooperation of leaders of public opinion.”<sup>94</sup> The advice of Powell, the MESC liaison officer, that coercion was a full-proof method to regulate markets had unequivocally failed, even among those whom it aimed to “rationalise”—that relentlessly “unorganised Arab trader.”

## Palestinian Representations

Palestinian producers protested the government scheme in direct petitions to local and central British authorities. Upon the scheme’s initiation, a delegation of Khan Yunis producers protested at the Gaza district commissioner’s office. Before control, the producers argued, they sold tomatoes for upwards of 40 mils per kilo (a Palestinian pound was comprised of 1,000 units or mils). The new controlled price of 17 mils per kilo would preclude any profit. The producers asserted that “they would sell the crops they now have ready but not plant again” if the scheme continued.<sup>95</sup> In Haifa district villages, Arab producers also threatened to discontinue their crops. At first they claimed that they could not afford the burdensome trip to Haifa to obtain movement permits. When the Haifa district commissioner arranged for Steel Brothers to service these villages directly, the producers refused to hand over their vegetables; the prices were so low that “they preferred to eat [the vegetables] themselves.”<sup>96</sup>

Sa’id Baidas of the Arabian Villages Agricultural Society met with the controller of agricultural production and promised detailed cost analysis of growers. There is no further record of Baidas corresponding or meeting with government officials, however.<sup>97</sup> Other than this attempt at institutional representation, the primary representatives of Arab producer interests were the local authorities.

Mustafa Khalidi, the mayor of Jerusalem, was outspoken in his opposition to the vegetable scheme. He asserted that retailers were selling poor-quality vegetables at the controlled government prices and the better varieties at “black market figures.”<sup>98</sup> Reasonable prices, he argued, would free better-quality vegetables for consumers. Khalidi argued that the government should gradually suspend the “mass of legislation” it had enacted.<sup>99</sup> Khalidi also presented the government with a list of recommended ceiling prices. The government ignored the Jerusalem municipal council’s detailed suggestions for raising ceiling prices. An angry Khalidi wrote again, saying that his municipality would be unable to act until the government’s ceiling prices were “raised from the floor.”<sup>100</sup> Khalidi wrote again several times



with no record of government response. The Acre mayor also sent the government several complaints that the people of his town were deprived of vegetables and fruits “while the black market was active with high prices.”<sup>101</sup>

Perhaps the representation that carried the most weight was the joint Arab–Jewish statement of HaCohen and Qaraman, who were both members of the Haifa Municipal Council and who held the posts of councilor and vice mayor, respectively.<sup>102</sup> They attended a Food Control meeting in Jerusalem in late October and subsequently forwarded their impressions to Shabtai Levy, the mayor of Haifa.<sup>103</sup> HaCohen and Qaraman complained that the meeting was unorganized. The food controller was away in London, and his acting representative Tours was not in attendance. District commissioners were in attendance, but there were a number of other British officials there who, HaCohen and Qaraman stated, “were not introduced to us.” Stedman-Davies, the controller of agricultural production, was the only official who clearly identified himself.

The municipal representatives explained to the attending British officials that “there are no vegetables coming in except eggplant, onions, and some uncontrolled vegetables.” Whereas people in the towns had previously complained of rural producers charging exorbitant prices, it was now clear to all that the government had “turned the situation into chaos.”<sup>104</sup> HaCohen and Qaraman posited several scenarios that illustrated the vegetable scheme’s impracticality:

A producer of say, peas or leeks, or carrots from Gor-El-Jiftlik would have to drive a donkey for 6 hours to Nablus with two boxes containing about 30 or 40 kilos of the above produce, sell it at the official prices of 17 mils per kilo, and spend another 6 hours going back to his village. Surely no sensible man would do that. Or where is the peasant who is going to pluck about 2,000 leaves of spinach to make it into a kilo and sell it for 9 mils? Surely it would pay the peasant, instead of buying straw at £10 per ton, to let his cows into the vegetable garden to eat the spinach, instead of plucking it for the market at £9 per ton.<sup>105</sup>

At the meeting HaCohen, Qaraman, and the remaining municipal representatives pushed for consultation with producers and opposed the government’s unilateral price setting. The government did not budge. HaCohen and Qaraman, however, noted the discord between headquarters and district officials: The district officers at the meeting “felt exactly as we did.”<sup>106</sup> The government’s attempts at control were nourishing unregulated markets and inflation.

HaCohen and Qaraman conveyed to Haifa mayor Levy that the entire operation was being dealt with “by incompetent people.” The charge of incompetence was not isolated. Powell, the MESC liaison officer, had not impressed a delegation of journalists at a press conference, where he appeared unable to answer questions about “the local economic situation.” Public figures more broadly were describing the vegetable scheme as an illustration of the government’s “haste in promulgating regulations” and the public’s “resultant loss of confidence.”<sup>107</sup>

### The Press

Arabs and Jews alike complained about the growing mass of regulations that the government produced throughout the war. As Jerusalem mayor Khalidi pointed out, regulation was so continuous in this period that “even the legal profession find it impossible to keep up-to-date; how much more ignorant therefore must be the mass of the general public?”<sup>108</sup> The *Palestine Gazette*, which announced the government’s ordinances, was issued weekly in English. The government took a full month before publishing the Arabic and Hebrew translations. But these translations could not have been of much use to the majority of Palestinian villagers. Some officials attempted different publicity strategies. The Galilee district commissioner, for example, reported using town criers to publicize the stringent new regulations.<sup>109</sup> The government’s poor record of publicizing and clarifying its seemingly endless stream of wartime regulations was a shared source of discontent.

Generally speaking, the Arabic press cautiously welcomed the vegetable scheme at first, in the hopes that it would decrease inflation. But as the scheme wore on, and unregulated markets and prices proliferated, the Arabic press became more critical. *Filastin* remarked that the “black market has become a general market.”<sup>110</sup> There was an “economic deadlock in respect to vegetables.”<sup>111</sup> Traders were buying vegetables at low prices in villages and smuggling them into towns at high prices. Neither the *fellah* nor the consumer was benefiting.<sup>112</sup> At the same time, individuals were unduly punished for taking part in what had become accepted practice. One woman was sentenced to three months imprisonment for selling eggs at 25 mils, the going black market rate.<sup>113</sup>

The Hebrew press was unequivocally opposed to the scheme from the beginning. One account insisted that opposition to the vegetable scheme enjoyed “complete unity between Jewish and Arab farmers and also among

Jewish and Arab mayors.”<sup>114</sup> The government had “encouraged farmers to produce more and granting them loans for this purpose, now disregards them entirely.”<sup>115</sup> *Mishmar* editors exclaimed: “You cannot cheapen eggs by killing the chickens.”<sup>116</sup> Whoever was going to win this struggle between the government and the producer, it was clear that the “public loses” and thousands “of tons of vegetables are rotting in the fields.”<sup>117</sup> In the war’s fifth year, “our money has dropped to less than a third of its value,” and drastic official measures “have only made the confusion worse.”<sup>118</sup>

### Jewish Institutional Responses

Beginning in the early stages of the scheme, Jewish institutions such as the Vaad Leumi (the National Council), the governing body of the Yishuv (the Jewish Agency), and the labor organization Histadrut began intensely petitioning the government on behalf of their constituents.<sup>119</sup> H. Halperin of the Agricultural Worker’s Organization wrote MESC liaison Powell to dispel the rumors that farmers were feeding vegetables to their cows rather than marketing them.<sup>120</sup> Arab and Jewish farmers “unanimously” ceased sending vegetables to market because the ceiling prices were so low. Farmers preferred leaving the yield in the field than selling at a loss. Powell responded that “financial adjustments” did not justify withholding foodstuffs “so badly required by humans,” who were, after all “the most important munitions of war.”<sup>121</sup>

In the first week of the scheme, J. Gurion, a Tnuva representative in Haifa, began petitioning the Haifa district commissioner. The government’s fixed prices, he argued, could not be reconciled with either costs or with market prices.<sup>122</sup> For example, the government’s ceiling price of 17 mils per kilo for tomatoes was almost half their pre-war price of 28 mils per kilo. The government’s expectation of producers to release their produce at half the pre-war price was all the more unrealistic since tomatoes were selling for 100 mils per kilo. Additionally the cost of fertilizer and seed had become increasingly prohibitive. Chemical fertilizer prices were up 300 to 400 percent, and seed prices had soared from 300 to 1,000 percent.<sup>123</sup>

Gurion also represented Tnuva’s concern that, while the government was controlling lorry and motor transport, it had not subjected “horse-carts, donkeys or camels” to licensing. According to Tnuva, if the government did not control such transport (a clear reference to smaller Arab traders), it would “lead directly to the opening of black markets.” The veg-

etale hawker/profiteer was synonymous with the “traditional” and “un-organised” Arab as the source of wartime inflation.<sup>124</sup> The establishment of a Central Committee, made up of producer representatives and agricultural experts working alongside the legislative and executive authorities, was Gurion’s primary demand and would be central to all Jewish official representations to government. It was only through such a committee that “reasonable prices [can] be fixed.”<sup>125</sup>

Tnuva Central began meeting with the director of agricultural production and district commissioners shortly after the scheme commenced. The reiterated Tnuva demand was the establishment of a representative and advisory body. Law, the Haifa district commissioner, pointed out that this demand was “put forward simultaneously in all parts of the country, probably as a result of a central directive.”<sup>126</sup> District commissioners began advising the government to activate the War Economic Advisory Council, discussed below, to act as an intermediary between the government and various economic interests. Another central point of disagreement between the government and Tnuva (as well as the Histadrut) was the issue of wage rates. The government was not willing to move beyond 600 mils per man-day while Tnuva would not budge below 700 mils per man-day.<sup>127</sup>

The Vaad Leumi stepped into the debate in November. In a meeting with the acting chief secretary, Vaad Leumi officials Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Abraham Katznelson, and Israel Jacob Kligler wanted to resolve the deadlock. In line with Jewish institutional representations, they advocated for an advisory committee to examine prices.<sup>128</sup>

The Vaad Leumi’s first objective was to get vegetables back on the market, especially since the temporary situation could lead to the permanent diminution of supply, if farmers continued to reduce planting. In mid-November, a month and a half after the scheme’s implementation, the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi jointly appointed a committee of “three independent persons with economic experience” to investigate the costs of vegetable production. The Vaad Leumi Committee was made up of S. Hoofien, D. Horowitz, and J. Shapiro. The Jewish committee referenced E. M. H. Lloyd, who was the government’s most esteemed colonial rationing and food control expert. In his “Experiments in State Control,” Lloyd argued that the farmer made profits in wartime on a larger scale than usual. But “profiteering” was a misnomer for this situation, as it suggested the deliberate intent and the power to manipulate prices. The committee quoted Lloyd’s position that the farmer “least of any one” possessed this

power, and he could “no more avoid making excessive profits when buyers outbid one another for his produce, than he can avoid making heavy losses when the market turns against him.”<sup>129</sup>

Even in Britain, the Vaad Leumi Committee argued, insurmountable obstacles hindered the “costings system” that the British government had implemented in an attempt to limit farmers’ profits. The farmer was “notoriously deficient” at keeping “proper accounts.”<sup>130</sup> The School of Rural Economy had attempted a few years before the war to compile a comparative study of farming statistics. But despite these efforts, the committee quoted Lloyd, “no figures as to costs could be obtained which were anything better than guess-work.”<sup>131</sup> In addition, analyzing farming costs presented great technical difficulties, as many of the items on the cost sheet were produced and consumed on the farm. Thus, the “cost of producing wool cannot be disentangled from the cost of producing mutton. The most that can be hoped for is the cost of producing sheep.”<sup>132</sup>

Lloyd’s conclusion for Britain, the Vaad Leumi Committee pointed out, was that price-fixing negotiations based on costings were not “mathematically accurate figures” but a “rough idea” of the basic total costs of production.<sup>133</sup> So much variety existed on different farms and in different districts, even in Britain, that “differential prices had to be fixed based on local variations in the estimated cost of production.”<sup>134</sup> In the case of Palestine, the committee “arrived at conclusions very similar to those of Mr. Lloyd.”<sup>135</sup>

The government, argued the Vaad Leumi Committee, had made *ex parte* calculations to fix vegetable prices. The “cost price” of a particular vegetable was “a highly nebulous conception.”<sup>136</sup> The government had ignored seasonal fluctuations, the varieties of farms in Palestine, and different market prices. (District commissioners, Arab producers, and Jewish committees and councils were in consensus on the government’s failure to account for seasonal shifts in vegetable supply. The Gaza district commissioner, for example, considered the imposition of control in the off-season—instead of during the time when supplies were “more normal”—quite simply “wrong.”<sup>137</sup>)

Accounting was also a problem. The Vaad Leumi Committee argued: “No vegetable grower, not even the Jewish settlement with their well-developed accounting system, can keep accounts which keep complete track of all the individual components of a cost price calculation.” The small farmer, who was usually a vegetable grower, “hardly keeps accounts

at all.” Thus, even the “admirable accounts of the Jewish settlements” could not include all the necessary data to define cost price.<sup>138</sup>

There was also the issue of measurements. The retailer did not sell by the kilogram but by the *wuqiya*, which was itself a flexible and heterogeneous measurement that in northern Palestine weighed about 213 grams versus about 37 grams in southern Palestine. Additionally, the estimates of “man-day” labor in vegetable production were also contentious.<sup>139</sup> This controversy was central to Jewish arguments about differences between settlements and Arab farms.

The Vaad Leumi Committee was particularly concerned with the government’s inflexible approach and warned against the “fault of pedantry.”<sup>140</sup> The government’s radical measures led to food queues that had a “psychologically . . . pernicious effect” and “inevitably drove the public into the black market.”<sup>141</sup> The producer could be easily driven to the “black market” if he felt unfairly treated. The government could only afford to disregard “the producer’s feelings” if it could do one of two things: Force him to produce or close the black market. But five years of experience had proven that the government “is unable to do either the one or the other.”<sup>142</sup>

The committee suggested a fortnightly revision of ceiling prices. It also approved the government’s set maximum margin of 8 percent profit for wholesalers and suggested that retail profit margins should be adjusted seasonally. While the final word would go to government, both producers and consumers would be consulted. The government was to give the producer and distributor the feeling that he had “a very full opportunity to present his case” and that his representations were “patiently and sympathetically” considered.<sup>143</sup>

The committee submitted a detailed estimation of vegetable production costs and prices. These recommendations were soon adapted by the local authorities, which consequently lobbied the government using the Vaad Leumi’s price adaptations. As Flanagan pointed out, it appeared that the costings the municipalities submitted “were all derived from a single source.”<sup>144</sup> Ultimately, the government implemented the Vaad Leumi’s price list almost to the last detail.

## The Government Concedes

In spite of the entrenched opposition from all sectors to the vegetable scheme, Tours, the acting food controller, suggested the expansion

of the vegetable scheme to Bethlehem, Nazareth, Acre, Tiberias, Safad, Nablus, Netanya, Tulkarm, and Jenin.<sup>145</sup> The chief secretary approved the expansion of the scheme on 25 November 1943. The food controller also added free transport services to Gaza and Ramallah in late November.<sup>146</sup> But under the increasing strain of criticism, the government began making concessions. Just a week after the vegetable scheme went into effect, the government withdrew its prohibition of movement during particular hours and minimally raised the wholesale and retail prices of tomatoes, cucumbers, and pumpkins.<sup>147</sup>

Another concession came in November 1943 when, in response to accusations of unilateralism, the government activated the War Economic Advisory Council, which it had established two months earlier. This body was to represent “public opinion” and to provide closer collaboration between government and the public in austerity policies.<sup>148</sup> The War Economic Advisory Council proved to be another consultative façade of representative power, and one that was highly contentious for its Palestinian members. The official government members included the price controller (Flanagan), the controller of agricultural production (Stedman-Davies), the MESC liaison officer (Powell), and the government statistician. As unofficial members, the high commissioner appointed the Tel Aviv mayor (Rokach), the Jewish Agency treasurer (E. Kaplan), a representative of the Haifa Jewish community (C. Levin), a representative of the Histadut (Golda Meyerson, later Meir), the Nablus mayor (Khalil Tuqan), and a representative of the Jerusalem Arab Chamber of Commerce (Shibli Jamal).<sup>149</sup>

The War Economic Advisory Council lobbied the government on controlled vegetable prices. Figures such as Rokach, Meyerson, and Kaplan pushed for various Jewish institutional interests such as raising the wholesale profit margin and extending control over Arab animal transport of vegetables. Tuqan and Jamal attempted to intervene on behalf of the Arab producer, lobbying for loans and irrigation. The government disregarded most of the council’s recommendations but acquiesced to the Vaad Leumi Committee’s demand for fortnightly price adjustments in consultation with a council of producers and consumers. The War Economic Advisory Council formed a Vegetable Price Committee.<sup>150</sup> This committee consisted of Arab and Jewish representatives from the ranks of wholesalers, retailers, and consumers; an Arab and a Jewish representative of municipal councils; an army representative; the price controller; the controller of agricultural

production; and the food controller.<sup>151</sup> The Vegetable Price Committee consulted with the government on price fixing and transportation control well into May 1944, when the record ends.

After representations from producers, municipalities, the Jewish Agency, and the Vaad Leumi, the government significantly adapted its prices on 1 December 1943. The food controller, price controller, and the controller of agricultural production were still adamant that the vegetable scheme had “achieved a substantial measure of success.”<sup>152</sup> But ultimately the government was forced to raise the ceiling prices. It did so closely following the recommendations of the Jewish Agency and Vaad Leumi.<sup>153</sup> To undertake these increases, the government decreased the uniform wholesale profit from the original 8 percent to a new 4 percent margin. It came to this decision based on its assumption that wholesalers had yielded profits from inflated prices that were “entirely disproportionate” to their work.<sup>154</sup> Even in these attempts, the government would run into problems. As Flanagan, the price controller, ever the realist, pointed out, it would be “well nigh impossible” to determine the profit margin of the vegetable wholesaler as he was at once “the farmers’ banker, money lender, [and] outfitter.”<sup>155</sup>

The government continued to supervise all vegetable distribution, particularly from wholesalers to retailers. The one exception to this rule was in the Galilee district where Tnuva maintained its own retail shops in Tiberias and Safad and was “reluctantly allowed” to distribute directly to them.<sup>156</sup> Despite initial concessions, the government continued its attempts to control vegetable production, consumption, and transport well into the spring of 1944. But in the end, it had lost the vegetable battle in another failed attack on the cost of living.

## Conclusion

Over a period of six months, the colonial government had unleashed a web of bureaucratic paperwork that aimed to “rationalise” the market for local produce and criminalize the door-to-door vegetable hawking that had become common. The stringent measures underline the shallowness of government renditions of the sole profiteer. In fact, it was the entire agricultural community that had benefited from inflated prices for vegetables and fruits.

In official explanations, both Jewish and British, the door-to-door hawker of the Arab vegetable trade was the source of the “black market.”



A closer look reveals that it was Tnuva that ultimately determined both regulated and unregulated prices of vegetables throughout Palestine. These assumptions are in continuity with common characterizations of the developed versus the underdeveloped—namely, that unregulated markets are remnants of an older order that the triumph of capitalism will ultimately dispel.<sup>157</sup> This case discloses the faultiness of this logic. It was not in fact the “unorganised” Palestinian farmer and trader who controlled the vegetable racket. It was the highly “rationalised” Tnuva cooperative. Thus, the proliferation of unregulated markets was not a transitory stage before the triumph of rationalization; it constituted it.

The story of the vegetable racket exposes the failures of British policy to transform regulatory practices into social knowledge. There were multiple reasons for this failure. The attempt to homogenize a population that included a broad range of Palestinians, as well as European and Eastern Jews, was untenable. The attempts to implement coercive means to wrest control over the production and consumption of goods was similarly far from viable. Colonial officials in Palestine failed to recognize the structural limits of their power. They could not on the one hand pronounce cooperatives like Tnuva as partners in the attack on cost of living and then unilaterally impose coercive measures. Tnuva did not accept this coercion and drew on its broader network of institutional resources. Ultimately, in the last few months of the vegetable crisis, the Yishuv held the decision-making power in the struggle over tomatoes and cucumbers. Thus its partnership with the settlement movement limited the breadth and scope of British colonial power.

This is also a story about the promises and problems of measurement. The cost of living index, and keeping it down, informed a great deal of the push and design of austerity. On the domestic front, the British government's concern with maintaining a low cost of living index was linked to the vagaries of war and the anxieties about demands for increasing wages. In Palestine, the attempt to tame the cost of living index reveals the limitations of British colonial power and its capacity to homogenize people and standards.

There is a related story of bookkeeping. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Palestinian thinkers and economists emphasized different forms of bookkeeping as necessary for progress, profit, and successful domestic management. The colonial government also heightened its investment in bookkeeping as one means to manage World War II in Palestine. Colonial

officials attempted to impose bookkeeping on farmers and distributors, but as they did throughout the entire crisis, the colonial government overreached. As the Vaad Leumi Committee put it: “Not even the Jewish settlement with their well-developed accounting system” could keep the accounts the vegetable scheme required.<sup>158</sup>

The intensification of colonial government interventions in Palestine through rationing and the emphasis on a “nutritional economy” were part of early twentieth-century attempts to mold “a character of calculability.”<sup>159</sup> Scholars have shown how new numerical indicators to measure revenues, education, population, and health “worked as assessments of relative status of states and empires” in the early twentieth century.<sup>160</sup> These numerical assessments were “neither constructed nor imagined but fabricated from a mix of cultural and material ingredients, [and] numerical indicators were tangible enough to mold facts.”<sup>161</sup> But the British colonial government’s construction of the “black market” and its culprits, its attack on the rapidly rising cost of living index, and its failure to categorize and count the relentless “intangibles and immeasurables” that the production and consumption of vegetables produced—together these expose just how elusive consolidating this character of calculability could be.<sup>162</sup> Indeed, this is one case that renders the “almost inevitable tendency to exaggerate the coherence of colonial governance” easy to resist.<sup>163</sup>

Finally the vegetable story reveals the differences between Jewish and Arab relationships to government regulations. The Arabs vacillated between partial cooperation with government mechanisms and stunted attempts to oppose government control. Palestinian representations to government came through direct petitions or local authorities. Arab local authorities, consumers, and producers did not have mediating institutions. Like the weaknesses evident in the Chambers of Commerce “facts and figures” on Arab business, the Arabian Village Agricultural Society was unable to provide the full statistical sweep of costs to Arab rural producers. Efforts to provide such information were limited to individuals and local authorities. While Palestinians may have made various attempts to establish institutional mediation, they did not build the capacity to mediate Palestinian needs.

Jewish interests represented their demands for representation as self-evident. The fact that the government had not consulted any official bodies in their assessment of price ceilings was a main bone of contention. Palestinian businessmen made similar claims through the venues of the Arab

Chambers of Commerce throughout this period, but the government consistently dismissed their representative legitimacy. Palestinian producers for their part expressed their discontent in an ad hoc manner; prior consultation was not among their immediate demands.

Jewish representations, in contradistinction, were mediated. Highly centralized in well-established associations, Jewish settlement producers escaped government control and wielded considerable power on the availability and cost of basic foods. Tnuva, in the vegetable case, sought to further consolidate its hold on the marketing and price setting of Palestine's vegetables by petitioning the government to isolate and penalize the "unorganised" sector. In the vegetable scheme of 1943–1944, Tnuva was a considerable force for the government to contend with. But Jewish producers' interests were not limited to Tnuva's petitions. The Jewish Agency, the Histadrut, and the Vaad Leumi all stepped in to the debate to represent various Jewish constituencies: consumers and producers alike.

The access to and relationship with British regimes of knowledge also differed in Jewish versus Arab articulations of consumer and producer demands. In the instance of the vegetable scheme, the Vaad Leumi and the Jewish Agency contracted an ostensibly independent committee to study the issue of vegetable ceiling prices. This committee's recommendations directly engaged the very expert, Lloyd, who was central to designing austerity in Palestine and the Middle East more broadly. The committee's success reflected the Yishuv's capacity to exercise and consolidate institutional power. Indeed, all of the local municipalities adopted the Vaad Leumi Committee's recommendations and promptly petitioned the government on these grounds. Jewish expertise in and heavy engagement with British regimes of knowledge became a unified "central directive."

Palestinians, for their part, were clearly aware of the need to develop bureaucratic systems of knowledge. They looked to the government to provide the frameworks for developing institutions and bureaucracies. Palestinian businessmen attempted to build their own institutions while participating in the various governmental bodies and committees that surfaced throughout the Mandate period. Shibli Jamal was one such figure. He was deeply invested in building nascent institutions through venues such as the Arab Chambers of Commerce and annual economic conferences. In the vegetable crisis, Jamal appears in the War Economic Advisory Council and on the Subsidization Committee alongside a mostly European Jewish constituency, and notably the future prime minister of Israel,

Golda Meir. For Jamal, participation in the council was an opportunity to represent and advocate for Palestinians as well as gain institutional experience. But for Meir, who represented the Histadrut, the council was not an institution-making space; it was a site of advocacy for an already-existing institutional network.

In November 1945 a year after the government had established the War Economic Advisory Council, its Palestinian members resigned. Although the extant minutes show only two Arab representatives, the government's survey indicates that there were four Arab members of the council; it was this very issue of parity that led to Arab nonparticipation.<sup>164</sup> Jamal, Tuqan, and the other unrecorded Arab members had agreed to serve on the council with an equal number of Jewish members on the condition that this equivalent representation would not be a "political precedent."<sup>165</sup> When it became clear that proposals for future advisory boards were implementing just that precedent, Jamal and Tuqan resigned.

Businessmen, like most Palestinians of all political stripes throughout the Mandate period, rejected the equivalence between Jewish and Arab representation in government bodies as opposed to representation based on the proportion of Arab and Jewish residents. Arab participation in institutional bodies was fraught with contradictions and compromises. Palestinian attempts to foster bureaucracy and institutional information making coincided with the consolidation of Jewish institutional power. There was nothing inevitable about this consolidation. It was a reflection of what many Palestinian businessmen and economic thinkers understood as an opponent who was not simply well versed in, but more importantly very much a part of, European flows of knowledge and capital.



## Conclusion

### Postwar Austerity and the Discipline of Detail

**TWO MONTHS BEFORE HIS DEATH**, the British colonial government's food controller in Palestine, Geoffrey Walsh, described a situation of widespread destruction, loss of life, and drastic shifts in the "world economic structure." World War II had left in its wake a "tangled skein" that would take years to unravel, he warned.<sup>1</sup>

For Palestinian businessmen in the 1940s, the clear and present danger of dispossession tangled that skein further. Just five years earlier men like Ahmad Hilmi Pasha and Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim believed themselves to be the vanguard of a new world of technologies, strategies, and possibilities in a broader Arab capitalist utopia. They envisioned economy as tool of social management through which they could shape the normative Palestinian. World War II tested these visions that tied profit to progress. As a result, men of capital mobilized the categories of "class" and "rank" and "needs" not just to shape subjectivity but to make political demands in an increasingly shrinking political horizon.

It was in wartime too that colonial officials shaped and regulated basic needs in new ways. Through new indicators such as the cost of living, the standard of living, and the calorie, colonial officials worked to make economy calculable and legible. They hoped to assess the achievements of colonial rule and postpone its rapid waning. Colonial officials and colonized elites found common ground. Both hoped to define and regulate the minimum so as to attain the optimum and contain political dissent.

What do the stories of economic thought and austerity reveal of the people subject to these elite and colonial projects? Nick Cullather has ar-

gued that war worked to politically mobilize citizens who demanded entitlements to welfare in return for their sacrifices.<sup>2</sup> But what happens when those making wartime sacrifices are not citizens but colonized subalterns? What did the tangled skein of austerity look like to these Palestinians? And how did the expansive regime of austerity ultimately unravel in British-ruled Palestine?

## The Salt of the Earth

Historiographic and contemporaneous accounts presented wartime as improving the standards of living for villagers and farmers and, more crucially, freeing them from longstanding structures of indebtedness.<sup>3</sup> A closer look reveals a more complicated picture. On the surface, the 1940s were a time of transformation in village life. During the previous two decades, colonial officials' objectives in rural Palestine were kept to an absolute minimum.<sup>4</sup> The colonial government strategy was that of no investment, no development, and no crisis. It was an approach Palestinians would become intimately familiar with well after the end of British colonial rule.

By the 1930s it was increasingly clear that this apathy was untenable. The agricultural depression and the lack of resources together coalesced into various Palestinian demands for expanding education, agricultural aid, and infrastructure.<sup>5</sup> It was the colonial government's dogged neglect in addition to the violence of settler colonialism that inspired the Great Revolt. As the government continued its intransigence, villagers with extra cash in the 1940s took matters into their own hands and built their own schools and roads.<sup>6</sup> The onset of World War II shook colonial officials to attention and forced them to confront decades of mismanagement and indifference. It was not colonial beneficence but the exigencies of war and the prospect that the sun might finally set on the British empire that inspired this confrontation. In its attempt to control and regulate Palestinian agricultural production, the colonial government compiled a record of failed attempts and mechanisms, each of which created new sites for contestation.

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the colonial government failed to invest in agricultural infrastructure. It rushed to reverse this pattern during the war in a typically haphazard manner. Before the war, the government granted farmers short-term loans only in cases of crop failure. But the fear of the possible collapse of supply due to wartime import restrictions

induced a change in the government's agricultural loan policy after 1940. As Amos Nadan has shown, 81 percent of wartime government loans went to citrus growers and were almost equally divided between Jews and Arabs. However, the non-citrus loans all went to Jewish farmers. This was despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of agricultural land devoted to grains, vegetables, and fruit was in Arab hands.<sup>7</sup>

In 1942, the colonial government began planning to secure a monopoly on purchasing wheat, barley, and millet despite the very real prospect of discontent.<sup>8</sup> By early 1943, the colonial government had assumed the sole right to purchase cereal crops. In Arab agriculture, grains followed by fruits and vegetables were the main crop. Wartime demand resulted in the doubling of Arab lands devoted to vegetables.<sup>9</sup> The government's policy was to estimate the standing crops while leaving enough cereal for villagers' food and seed requirements. What remained on the threshing floor was at "the disposal of Government to purchase."<sup>10</sup> The estimation of these surpluses ranged from 10,000 tons of wheat to 11,000 tons of barley and millet each. By September 1942, the government reported that throughout Palestinian villages it had successfully seized 65 percent of wheat, 92 percent of barley, and 65 percent of millet.<sup>11</sup>

But the control of cereals had broad ramifications. Two accounts illustrate these consequences here. One is that of a landowner, Mahmoud Barham, from Qilqilya in the Tulkarm subdistrict, who spoke on behalf of the "Arab fellah."<sup>12</sup> The other is from Muhammad Baidas, a landowner and the director of the Arabian Villages Agricultural Society,<sup>13</sup> which was founded in the 1940s, held national conferences, and established an Arab Agricultural Executive. Little information is available on the society, but it is clearly a continuation of prior efforts to organize agricultural interest. Prosperous farmers and merchants had in 1922 established an Arab Economic Development Society advocating for village education and health. They held annual meetings in the late 1920s and early 1930s and petitioned the colonial government with demands for schools and paved roads.<sup>14</sup> Figures, such as Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim and 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi, active in the Arab Chambers of Commerce and their annual conferences in the 1940s, were also involved in these earlier efforts.<sup>15</sup> These attempts at representing and organizing agricultural interests followed the same strategies of what Chambers members called a politics of patience: annual meetings, the composition of an Executive Committee, and the petitioning of the colonial government.



Barham argued that the low prices the government set for cereals in addition to the high cost of cultivation endangered the small farmer. By 1942, seed, fertilizer, feed, and tools had all become prohibitively expensive. Additionally, the government used its 1942 estimations to price its purchase of wheat, barley, and maize in 1943.<sup>16</sup> But in that one year, the cost of production had doubled and in some cases tripled. Baidas, on behalf of the Arab Agricultural Executive, argued that the government price was less than the cost of production and moreover did not account for additional costs of rent and taxes.<sup>17</sup> That winter had been particularly harsh, and farmers yielded half of their normal harvest.<sup>18</sup> Adding insult to injury, the government was purchasing Jordanian stocks for higher prices than it paid for locally grown cereals.<sup>19</sup> In order to contribute their cereals, Baidas argued, farmers would require government subsidies.

Government's rationing was also unjust. Baidas charged that Jewish settlements received more goods than villages. He also pointed out that town dwellers received more food and clothes rations than villagers. The discrepancy in urban versus rural rations is well documented. For example, the unequal distribution of flour was common in the initial stages of food control. Each town dweller received 350 grams per day while each villager received 175 grams per day.<sup>20</sup> The government rationale was that many villages produced cereal. It quickly became clear that the allocation in non-cereal producing villages would not suffice.<sup>21</sup> Deputy controllers were instructed to allocate surplus quantities from urban areas to make up for rural shortages. It was a stopgap measure that did not meet rural needs. As late as April 1947, villagers from Tubas, near Nablus, petitioned their district commissioner demanding basic needs such as oils, margarine, and milk.<sup>22</sup> For Baidas, however, there was a deeper disparity at play. The government failed to recognize that the *fellah* too was also a consumer, and just like the town dweller, his needs had become "manifold."<sup>23</sup>

In making these claims, both Baidas and Barham positioned the farmer as the energetic salt of the earth whose contributions were more valuable and authentic than those of the merchant and trader. Barham painted a landscape in which "merchants and employers" deprived the energetic and self-sacrificing farmer the fruits of his labor.<sup>24</sup> The former fixed both prices and wages, while the Arab *fellah* confronted "economic strangulation."<sup>25</sup> Farmers "toil[ed] throughout the year" whereas merchants and millers' work was "done in a few days."<sup>26</sup>

Instead of protecting this productive figure, the government was leading “him to bankruptcy,” dissuading production with its prescribed prices, and compelling him to “dispense with his land, which is his only capital and means of living.”<sup>27</sup> It was the *fellah* who had loyally and energetically served the war effort, and he who would be crucial to the post-war reconstruction of what was after all a “rural country.”<sup>28</sup> The merchant surfaced as the lazy, parasitic, and undeserving beneficiary of government policy, a far cry from the vanguard hero so prevalent in the periodical *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* in the 1930s and the halls of the Chambers of Commerce in the 1940s. Indeed, if anyone had cause to despise the merchant, it would be the *fellah*, whose relationship to his land was conditioned by his repayment of debts to the moneylender, who was often a merchant.<sup>29</sup> Ultimately then, while in certain villages there were “signs of some material prosperity,” Baidas argued, that prosperity was “limited to the non-cultivators.”<sup>30</sup>

Austerity also sheds lights on shifts of authority in Palestinian villages. Throughout the Mandate the colonial government created a body of officials in the countryside that included builders for the Department of Public Works, teachers for the Department of Education, and staff at the Department of Health’s clinics and hospitals. District officers were the highest-ranking among Palestinian administrators, and they linked villagers to the district commissioners.<sup>31</sup> The *mukhtars* became more overtly tied to the administration throughout the Mandate. The Ottoman government had created this office in the nineteenth century to replace the leadership of the sheikh. By the 1930s the colonial government’s interests in a new rural tax structure entailed closer attention to the *mukhtar*’s role. The government ultimately absorbed the *mukhtar* through an annual salary while also introducing technical experts like village tax collectors to limit his role. Some scholars claim that wartime austerity worked to mobilize villagers into “a more rational administrative structure.”<sup>32</sup>

What did this “rational administrative structure” look like? The Food Control Ordinance of 1939 assigned the village *mukhtar* the authority to collect and distribute rations. In 1942, another food control ordinance legislated village committees as “the body empowered to estimate the yield of all controlled articles.”<sup>33</sup> The ordinance allowed for the appointment of an inspector to check these committee’s estimates, but not to make the estimates himself. Yield estimation and crop confiscation quickly became sites of contention. Villagers in some instances “outwitted” the government,

hiding or disposing of their crops. In other cases, the government resorted to violent seizure.<sup>34</sup>

The attempt to forge a “rational administrative structure,” as befell many other attempts to make economy in Palestine legible, encountered far-ranging challenges to standardization.<sup>35</sup> Villagers used these discrepancies in disputes over property and authority. One illustrative case was a village dispute in Siris, in the Jenin–Nablus district, which had about 200 residents. In late 1946, Ahmad Iqtayt, along with a number of petitioners, asked for the dismissal of their village *mukhtar*, Talal al-Muslih al-‘Awwad.<sup>36</sup> They accused ‘Awwad of distributing less than the 300-gram monthly allotment, making distributions based on *wuqiya* rather than the metric system, and illegally stocking sugar then selling it on the black market. The Jenin assistant district commissioner and the controls inspector made an investigatory visit to Siris. There the village council informed them of an agreement that allowed ‘Awwad to retain sugar from each villager’s allotment for the entertainment of guests. The inspectors found the metric weights and measures in order. ‘Awwad was not stocking sugar, and he was not selling it on the black market. Later, the inspectors discovered that Iqtayt and ‘Awwad were embroiled in a property dispute over a village square. Iqtayt had mobilized rationing discontent in a failed attempt to oust the Siris *mukhtar*.<sup>37</sup>

In another case, a lawyer named Hanna Hawa represented his “Christian urban family of Acre” that owned land in the two Druze villages of Kfar Sami’ and Yanuh.<sup>38</sup> In his narrative, their “co-owners” methodically “usurped” what belonged to the Hawas, but rationing and supply control had further hampered the family’s interest. The Acre district officer, ‘Abd al-Razzaq Qalibu, had used austerity policies to encourage villagers “to encroach further on our property and produce.”<sup>39</sup> The Hawas’ share was underestimated, and they could not access their stocks. Government subagents collected wheat from the Druze villagers based on “a system of weights, which . . . is scandalous and dishonest.”<sup>40</sup> These subagents, synonymous in this rendition with “merchants,” were in cahoots with Qalibu. Together they led an incursion into both villages “to collect our crops” with the violent “assistance of a Force.”<sup>41</sup> This violent seizure evidenced Qalibu’s “policy of deceit.” Members of the “Force” insulted villagers and seized bread, eggs, and cheese “under the fear of force and threats.” As a result of this humiliation, the *mukhtar* of Yanuh submitted his resignation.<sup>42</sup>

The main culprits in the Hawas’ story were the Acre district officer, Qalibu, and the “merchants,” who together controlled crop distribution

and sales. Qalibu was a “remnant of the Ottoman regime” and a stain on the British characteristics “of fairness, frankness, and good administration.”<sup>43</sup> Hawa presented the Druze villagers as alternately hapless, manipulative, and violent. The cause of “unrest” and “injustice” was not colonial austerity but rather its faulty implementation at the hands of corrupt “remnants.”<sup>44</sup> The Hawa family was confident that urbanity, Christianity, and exposure to British culture assured speedy government protection for their threatened capital and power. That confidence faded as the matter dragged on “with no effective action.”<sup>45</sup> Thus, austerity served in this instance to temporarily dislodge landowners’ control over villagers and village production.

In other cases, yield estimates led to trouble. The government inspector’s faulty estimates drove villagers in the northern area of Bisan from Hamidiyya, Sakhna, Abu Hashish, Umm ‘Ajra, Safa, and Bawati to hire Hanna ‘Asfour, a well-heeled lawyer from Haifa, to represent them.<sup>46</sup> The “farming community,” ‘Asfour explained, believed that the surplus estimates were “fantastically exaggerated” and conducted illegally.<sup>47</sup> The Food Control Ordinance of 1942 had allowed for the appointment of an inspector to check village estimates but not to make the estimates himself. In these villages in the Bisan area, the inspector ignored the villagers’ estimates altogether. The villagers used the *kayl* system. The inspector’s conversion of *kayl* into kilo was the work of “inexperienced schoolboys,” and, as a result, his estimations of yield were greatly exaggerated.<sup>48</sup> Bawati village, for example, had a 10-ton surplus in 1942, but the inspector estimated the 1943 surplus at 160 tons.

These exaggerated figures were a result of the government’s disregard of longstanding practices of crop estimation. In northern Palestine, farmers determined yearly produce “per camel load of hay.” This was, indeed, the “sole means of determining” crop quantity. The plowman, the cameleer, and the cow herder all collected their remuneration on this basis.<sup>49</sup> When ‘Asfour relayed this practice to the district commissioner, the latter was “amused ironically” and dismissed the villagers’ claims. ‘Asfour was “astonished” to learn that the district commissioner was not even aware of this salient mode of measurement.<sup>50</sup> The acting chief secretary supported the inspector’s crop estimates.<sup>51</sup> Higher up the ladder, Walsh admitted that the “Food Control organization” was “handicapped by the absence of effective legislation on such important matters as weights and measures.”<sup>52</sup>

In the meantime, the families and residents of these smaller villages faced the eventuality of selling their lands. On 11 January 1944, the

people of Bawati directly petitioned the high commissioner. The government's persistence to collect their wheat was "a fatal blow to us and to our women and children."<sup>53</sup> The yield that year was less than one fourth of the inspector's estimate and barely sufficient for subsistence. The government's estimate amounted to 6,000 pounds, which, the people of Bawati argued, "the whole Sub-District of Burqa would be unable to meet."<sup>54</sup> They pleaded: "Save us from this great catastrophe." If the government was to insist on collecting its faulty surplus estimates, "we shall be compelled to sell our lands to the Jews and our fate will be dispersion and extermination."<sup>55</sup>

Colonial austerity's effects were many. In the Hawa case, austerity served as one way for landowners to critique village authority while attempting to gain British protection. In Siris, too, austerity was a vehicle to challenge village authority. It is true that the war increased demand for goods, but it also entailed the government's broad interventions in farmers' livelihoods, often with deleterious effects. As the case of the Bisan villages shows, the government placed villagers in untenable situations where land dispossession was the only way out of faulty estimates and crop confiscation. In these examples, the farmer appears as the productive salt of the earth, maligned by the parasitic merchant, and denied his status as "a consumer" as opposed to the town dweller whose proliferating needs were not only accounted for but privileged.

## The Town Dweller

Yet, by all accounts, the town dweller was the most vulnerable to rapidly shifting austerity measures and its consequences. In Palestine, just as in Britain, the working class benefited somewhat from a rise in nutritional standards due to rationing, but austerity hit the poor the hardest because of low stocks and limited funds.<sup>56</sup> The wealthy could supplement rations with extra income. But workers and the poor were stuck with government rations that consistently fell below basic nutritional requirements.

The war itself induced a change in the urban landscape. By 1944, Arab wage labor working full time outside agriculture was estimated at 100,000, about 30 percent of the entire Palestinian male population.<sup>57</sup> Villagers migrated to towns to provide labor for rapidly expanding military and industrial interests. The realities these migrants faced were already precarious and made even more so by wartime's unprecedented and unpre-

dictable inflation. Take, for example, the two days after Japan entered the war in 1941 when prices of basic goods experienced “a 300 percent” rise.<sup>58</sup>

Town dwellers, as we have seen with farmers above, also made claims as consumers. Urbanites did not use the tropes “productivity” and “authenticity” but rather made claims based on “class” and “majority.” For example, in 1946, in response to word of a decrease in monthly flour rations, 225 people from Nablus petitioned the food controller as “consumers.” They defined themselves as the “middle and working classes,” who were the “majority” in Nablus and whose access to “basic needs” was at stake.<sup>59</sup> Later that year a similar petition, signed or thumb-printed by 400 people from Nablus, demanded the provision of rice, sugar, and clarified butter.<sup>60</sup> The mayor, Sulayman Tuqan, forwarded the petition to the district commissioner; inflation was the most difficult for “the poor and middle classes,” Tuqan explained.<sup>61</sup>

Tuqan continued to write the district commissioner several times protesting the “food situation” in Nablus. He claimed time and again that the city was mostly made up “of the middle class and workers [*al-tabaqa al-mutawassita wal-‘ummal*].”<sup>62</sup> As some radical voices in the Chambers of Commerce insisted, rationing innovations such as the point system, where points were intended to substitute money, disadvantaged the urban poor more than any other group, depriving them of “vital commodities,” such as lentils, wheat, and dates.<sup>63</sup> In their bids to reform and represent the Palestinian subaltern, elites often made claims in which the “middle” was the “majority.” It appears that town dwellers, too, self-identified as both “middle and working class” and the “majority” to claim basic needs.

For a brief moment in 1941, the plight of the urban poor inspired an alliance that transgressed the increasingly impenetrable lines separating Arabs and Jews. Arab–Jewish joint efforts around austerity were rare. The food controller, Walsh, often celebrated the success of joint Arab–Jewish associations that the government had established. This assessment, like many of his overly optimistic renditions, was an overstatement. These associations hardly lasted longer than one or two meetings.<sup>64</sup> But in November 1941, the mayors of Jaffa (‘Umar Bitar), Tel Aviv (Yisra’el Rokach), Jerusalem (Mustafa Khalidi), and Haifa (Shabtai Levy) gathered to address the dire situation of basic needs.<sup>65</sup> It was the urban poor, they argued, whose daily lives were hardest hit. The “diet of ordinary working people” was their priority.<sup>66</sup> The mayors petitioned the high commissioner with two basic concerns: ensuring supplies and stabilizing prices. They hoped

above all to wield some power in the austerity regime over which the colonial government had maintained a strict unilateralism.

The Arab–Jewish mayoral consensus would not last long. Three years later, Rokach and his municipality opposed the colonial government’s points rationing for facilitating “Oriental” exploitation of European Jews’ access and cultural claims to imported goods.<sup>67</sup> But this moment of Arab–Jewish mayoral consensus did result in one significant shift that targeted the colonial government’s favorite scapegoat: the antisocial and lone smuggler.

### The Profiteer

The colonial government resisted the four mayors’ push for decision-making power in economic policy. It approved instead a system of municipal tribunals, known as the People’s Courts. The Municipal Tribunal Ordinance of 1941 allowed mayors to preside over these courts alongside two other members appointed by the high commissioner. The People’s Courts had the jurisdiction to try any person charged with “any offence against the Food and Essential Commodities (Control) Ordinance, 1939, or any rules or orders made thereunder.”<sup>68</sup> The People’s Courts had all the powers of a magistrate to summon witnesses, arrest accused persons, and oversee any other matter concerned with the trial of a criminal case. The tribunals could issue a maximum penalty of 500 pounds and up to one year’s imprisonment. The regulation removed the right of appeal unless the sentence was longer than three months imprisonment. In addition, the ordinance allowed for an executive officer, defined as any government officer or high commissioner appointee, to confiscate any goods he deemed “hoarded.”

The ordinance passed without the standard approval of the Colonial Office, and officials were distraught at the Palestine government’s propensity for unilateralism. The colonial secretary, Viscount Cranborne, pointed out that confiscation was itself a penal measure.<sup>69</sup> The Maltese government had recently served him a similar order, and his patience had worn thin. As in Malta, S. A. Abrahams at the Colonial Office pointed out, “The appointment of a popular tribunal to deal with unpopular offences is a risky proceeding.”<sup>70</sup> Colonial officials were effectively, in the eyes of their counterparts in London, setting up “special tribunals” with no “special skill.”<sup>71</sup>

Government accounts report that the People’s Courts functioned in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem well into 1947. The municipal tribunals

did not have exclusive jurisdiction over all control offenses. The Department of Supply remained at liberty to file cases before the ordinary courts. In 1942, Walsh described the People's Courts as yet another achievement, even if an inconsistent one: "Some of these Tribunals have done excellent work and have brought home to the public the gravity of such offences. Others appear reluctant to undertake this responsible if unenviable task."<sup>72</sup> That year there were 1,270 profiteering prosecutions, tried in both the municipal tribunals and the regular courts.<sup>73</sup> In 1944, colonial officials explained that the "congestion of [profiteering] cases" had eased since mayors were trying cases.<sup>74</sup>

The colonial government maintained a low ceiling on municipal power and repeatedly urged the mayoral quartet to instill in the public a "war morality," which it defined as the willingness to sacrifice personal comfort for the public good and the war effort. The People's Courts worked well to divert growing discontent. They effectively placed the burden of austerity policies, inflation, and unregulated prices on the shoulders of the lone smuggler. The government presented the antisocial profiteer as the disease that constrained the otherwise rational regime of austerity. But the lone smuggler was far from being the disease; he was a product of austerity and a symptom of its failure.

### Broken Promises

As the war came to an end, people in Britain and its colonies hoped for access to more commodities, a decreased cost of living, and a release from the strict control and rationing policies that had determined their daily routines. People throughout the colonized world anxiously awaited that "freedom from want" in which officials and elites alike seemed so deeply invested. The end of tyranny had arrived. Right had been victorious over might as Anis Nasr of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce put it.<sup>75</sup> The time for free trade and prosperity had arrived. Democracy and its promises of a morally sound world where capitalism reigned supreme were finally at hand. Or were they?

The disparity between the promising end of World War II and its realities were wide. The colonial secretary was sensitive to this disparity as evidenced by a secret memorandum he issued to all department heads, district commissioners, and the War Department on 29 November 1945. He strictly ordered that nothing from the memorandum should be quoted



or extracted. The Colonial Office feared public reactions to the realities of postwar austerity.<sup>76</sup> The end of the war was not going to mean the free-flowing access to products that consumers in the colonies were hoping for and that to a certain extent colonial governments had promised. The colonial secretary issued his memorandum just as the U.S. Lend-Lease program ended, bringing Britain's crisis of maintaining its external payments into sharp view.

Britain had mobilized its economic resources in two ways during the war. First, it diverted "productive effort from peace to wartime production."<sup>77</sup> Second, it received "without current payment in goods or services" supplies and services from the colonies.<sup>78</sup> Throughout the war, Britain had a minimum volume of exports that were "essential to the life of the Colonies."<sup>79</sup> But these exports could not pay for the goods and services Britain received. The U.S. Lend-Lease program and Canadian Mutual Aid covered some of these costs. The liquidation of some investments and the accruing of massive debt financed the remaining vast volume of imports. The accrued debt, as reported by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to the Parliament in 1945, was 3.5 thousand million pounds.<sup>80</sup>

The empire and "India above all—played a critical role in financing the war through the accumulation of sterling balances."<sup>81</sup> Frederick Cooper has explained Britain's wartime economic policy in Africa: Outside the sterling block, imports were limited by shipping constraints and not balanced by exports. Additionally, British military spending in the colonies generated balances that could not be spent. As we saw in the case of Palestine, businessmen repeatedly complained of cash accumulation "paralyzed without investment."<sup>82</sup> This was then what Cooper has called the economic meaning of colonialism.<sup>83</sup> The British consumer's considerable sacrifices would be redeemed after the war, but the same was not true for the colonized. After all, "the British consumer voted and the Nigerian did not."<sup>84</sup>

The cumulative effect of the processes was nothing short of revolutionary for Britain's financial position. In a matter of six years, it had gone from being "one of the major creditor countries of the world to one of the world's principal debtor nations."<sup>85</sup> As a result, and as long as the external balance of payments was "a matter of acute anxiety," austerity was necessary. The colonial secretary could not estimate the scope of this continued control, but he warned of the disappointment "of the natural expectation of Colonial populations for more ample supplies of consumer goods."<sup>86</sup> While the secretary assured that the need for continued austerity would

not shake Britain's commitment to "colonial development and welfare," the immediate postwar period would "entail the greatest strain."<sup>87</sup>

On 1 November 1945, the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) was dissolved. At that time over 270 commodities were under its control. The colonial government in Palestine officially ended food control on 15 September 1946.<sup>88</sup> By the end of that year, the government had loosened some of its monopolies, such as its control over cattle. But plenty was a distant fantasy no matter how energetically colonial officials eulogized scarcity. Indeed austerity would continue apace in the Middle East more broadly and in Palestine until the end of British rule.

In place of MESC, the Colonial Office established the British Supply Mission (BSM). Its stated aim was to facilitate access to goods in the Middle East. On the ground, the BSM controlled stocks and allocated supply of wheat, flour, barley, rice, and sugar until 30 June 1947.<sup>89</sup> In Palestine, too, the colonial government controlled bread, grains, vegetable seeds, oils, rice, and sugar until 1948. There are records of an unnamed food controller working until 1948. He received applications from individual businessmen, such as Michel Tuma from Haifa for flour; from larger endeavors such as the Jewish-run Argaman Textiles Dye Works Ltd. to increase their allotment of animal and vegetable fats needed to manufacture soaps;<sup>90</sup> and from the Golden Spindle Textile Mill based in Jaffa with a plea for increased food rations.<sup>91</sup> Indeed, as late as January 1948, the food controller urged London to increase the quotas on butter and cheese.<sup>92</sup>

But postwar austerity was not limited to these sporadic efforts. There was a broader mechanism in place that continued and in some cases intensified austerity well into the twilight of British rule. The Defence (Prevention of Profiteering) Regulations of 1942, which became popularly known as the Anti-Profiteering Order, was central to policing the lone smuggler. The order created the post of price controller, which was occupied by M. J. Flanagan from its inception until the end of British rule. The 1942 order was expanded and became the infrastructure for government austerity and control in postwar Palestine.

In 1944, the order transferred all food control powers to the price controller, who now worked under a newly constituted Control Authority consisting of the commissioner of commerce and industry, his deputy, and his assistant. The price controller administered the fixing of prices, the limiting of profits, and the prescription of maximum charges for controlled services. The 1944 order also upgraded profiteering from a misdemeanor to

a felony; the penalty for profiteering ranged from 500 to 2,500 pounds and carried a term of imprisonment from one to five years.<sup>93</sup> While reinstating the right to appeal, which had been revoked by the Municipal Tribunal Ordinance of 1941, the order extended further powers to try profiteers. Now in addition to the regular courts and the People's Courts, the district officer could also try smugglers. Thus, officers closely connected with prosecuting such cases were now trying them.<sup>94</sup>

The 1944 Anti-Profiteering Order also entailed an expansion of officers, controllers, and inspectors throughout the country. District price controllers were stationed in Lydda, Jerusalem, and Haifa. Prosecution officers were based in the cities of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, and Haifa. Price control inspectors were based in Jerusalem and Haifa.<sup>95</sup> Price Control headquarters in Jerusalem included a control establishments officer, a legal officer, and a "flying squad" of inspectors, who traveled "at short notice throughout the country."<sup>96</sup> While control was "mostly concentrated in urban areas," the flying squads also targeted the "outlying areas" and conducted a broad sweep of the country.<sup>97</sup> The flying squads set and regulated prices on heavy and light industrial materials as well as fruits and vegetables. They conducted daily inspections throughout the country on "commodities figuring largely in the food basket" and routinely conducted "drives on grocers."<sup>98</sup>

The price controller oversaw 162 investigations in November 1946 alone. These investigations were the fruit of inspectors' labor as "complaints received from the public were again negligible."<sup>99</sup> The congestion of profiteering cases was a result of inspections and not public cooperation. Thus, despite the assurances that the public approved of the People's Courts, it appears that people hesitated to report their grocers, retailers, or hawkers. All in all, the regular courts, the People's Courts, and the district courts actively prosecuted cases for not displaying prices, overcharging, and "other offences."<sup>100</sup>

The attempt to control the flows of capital continued until 1947, when the Palestine government issued its final defence ordinance. The Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Order of 1947 empowered the Control Authority to declare any service controlled and to regulate or prohibit its performance. Service providers were obliged to present the price controller with full records of invoices and receipts.<sup>101</sup> Thus, until its last hour, the colonial government continued its attempts to administer consumption and production in Palestine. Colonial rule came to an end in the

same haphazard manner that had characterized its rule. The last civilian officer who left Palestine was the attorney general and later chief justice, W. G. Fitzgerald. Under the duress of impending war, he parked his official car “on the quay at Haifa with the keys inside,” leaving behind him the mess that was British colonial rule in Palestine.<sup>102</sup>

### On Discipline and Detail

In the late 1970s, Edward Said pointed out an “unmistakable coincidence” between Palestinian experiences at the hands of Zionism and the experiences of those “black, yellow, and brown people” that nineteenth-century imperialists “described as inferior and sub-human.”<sup>103</sup> In a political landscape where the figure of the Israeli pioneer stood as a salve for various U.S. political anxieties, Said broke epistemological ground.<sup>104</sup> He presciently nodded to the ongoing debate on “design versus circumstance” by pointing out that the Nakba was not a “fact of nature.” Long before Benny Morris, Said argued that there was no evidence of the stale narrative that the Palestinians fled because Arab leaders ordered them to.<sup>105</sup> Said illustrated Zionism’s epistemological achievement of erasure. He then explained the significance of a “discipline of detail.” Zionists did not just see Palestine as the “promised land” but as a “specific territory with specific characteristics.” They surveyed it “down to the last millimeter”; they planned it, they built on it, and they settled it “in *detail*.”<sup>106</sup> The Palestinians, Said explained, did not understand that what they encountered was a “discipline by detail—indeed a very culture of discipline by detail.” They had no detailed counterproposal; they opposed a general policy on general principles.

I return to Said’s piece here not to reflect on the “the lengthening shadow of Zionism”<sup>107</sup> but to think again about the accumulation of capital and knowledge and its relationship to historical narration. The history of the conflict and settler colonialism has defined and limited the stories we can tell about Palestine and the Palestinians. In the overarching comparison to the Jewish settler, the Palestinian will always embody the marginal character, whose historical position is dictated, indeed, made visible by Jewish settlement.

Throughout the stories of Palestinians in the 1930s and 1940s, even as I have intentionally relegated Zionism and Zionists to the narratological background, the precision of that discipline is beyond dispute. The wiser comparison to make is not between Palestinians and the Yishuv but

between the British colonial government and Zionist institutions. The British relationship to Jewish settlers was not one of colonizer and colonized. It is a simple point. But it gets lost in various analytical depictions. For example, in describing the 1948 war, scholars fumble to explain the lexicon of Nakba versus the War of Independence. But from whom were the Zionists waging independence? After all, the British colonial government and the Zionist settler enterprise were partners for most of the period that the British ruled Palestine. Settler institutions were independent of and fostered by British colonial rule. In the realm of wartime austerity, colonial officials looked to their Zionist counterparts for guidance; they were cautious not to cross red lines. Throughout the period of World War II, for example, colonial officials were intent on prosecuting the lone profiteer. However, they knew full well that it was larger cooperatives, industries, and distributing agencies like Tnuva and Nesher that played a significant role in both regulated and unregulated prices. In the field of social welfare, and more specifically nutrition, Zionist institutional infrastructure outstripped the lethargic British colonial government in capital and expertise.

Perhaps that outstripping is clearest in the vegetable crisis of 1942–43 when the British colonial government thought it could force everyone to put their vegetables on government-controlled trucks for distribution in government-controlled markets and for sale at government-controlled prices. European Jewish expertise ultimately resolved the crisis; the Vaad Leumi's policy recommendations became the national directive that delivered Arabs and Jews from the mess of austerity. In this case, Palestinian farmers were accidental beneficiaries of Zionist directives. In most cases, however, austerity spelled exclusion for Palestinian elites, workers, town dwellers and villagers alike.

Businessmen identified high inflation, scarcity, and trade paralysis as alternatively a result of poor government administration or an alignment with and an enabling of Zionist interests. For rural producers as well as consumers in towns and villages, the businessman was the main beneficiary of austerity. Thus, for farmers, villagers, and the urban poor, austerity did more than reveal the force of settler colonial power; it exposed the failure of Palestinian leadership, the lack of Palestinian institutions, and the weakness of Palestinian representative power. It was in the midst of these economic crises that Palestinian capitalists became increasingly convinced that they faced national dispossession. It appeared to them then, as

it would appear to Edward Said four decades later, a meticulously orchestrated plan.

But this conclusion leaves little space for inefficiency and mismanagement, of which British colonial rule in Palestine offers a wealth of lessons. It is irresistible to look for the story of colonialism's panopticon, where power is so diffuse that subjects create themselves in colonialism's image. This temptation is understandable when we look to the lexicon of "economy." The forging of economy as a discrete and calculable site informs how subjects understand their worlds territorially as well as how they come to regulate their own bodies. But there are two crucial qualifications here.

First, categories of measurement and regulation must travel a long journey before they become markers of the "universal." A close look at British rule in Palestine reveals the dangers of overestimating colonialism's coherence, unity, and the breadth of its predetermined plans; this is crucial to understanding settler colonialism both historically and in the present. Certainly colonies functioned as laboratories of ideas, policies, and innovations. New ways of counting and regulating spaces and bodies in economic terms—through indicators such as the cost of living, the standard of living, and the calorie—were beginning to pervade daily routines. But it would take a long time before these practices would take root in people's social knowledge. In Palestine, the colonial government's efforts to regulate production and consumption met with a plethora of challenges to homogenization and standardization.

Moreover, colonial officials in Palestine were not guided by dreams of omniscience. They were low on resources, lacking in expertise, and bereft of ambition. The first two decades of British rule had strictly followed an apathetic strategy committed to maintaining the status quo. War exposed this lethargy. The increase in a relatively new indicator called the "cost of living" drove colonial officials' fears of shortage and political upheaval; they hoped instead to extend their waning rule while managing the heavy burdens of World War II. War had forced their hand; but even in those difficult circumstances the colonial government appears as incoherent in shaping its policies as it was in implementing them. As a group of textile businessmen and merchants put it in 1944, the British were "ruling but not governing."<sup>108</sup>

Second, territorial and corporeal articulations of the prosperous and healthy economy were not limited to colonial officials and thinkers. Indeed, economic imaginings were important sites of Palestinian visions. Scholars have pointed to the Palestinian turn to the economy in the 1930s

and 1940s as an internalization of “British and Zionist attempts to reduce Arab–Jewish antagonism to manageable factors.”<sup>109</sup> Certainly, the broad disparities of knowledge and power, well documented throughout the stories presented here, were the reality. But understanding Palestinians as primarily subjects limited to reacting to the primary movers and shakers of history, the British and the Zionists, is reductive. Moving beyond such an approach insists that there is a Palestinian history. However, stopping there would be a simple inversion of historical denial, the Janus face of denying its existence. Said’s plea for a Gramscian “inventory of traces” is impossible without a thorough *critique* of that history.

Scholars have illustrated, as I have here, Palestinian disorganization and an overall lack of capital and expertise. They have shown, as I have here, the central paradox that Palestinians struggled with: battling British colonialism while accounting for it as a site of tutelage and power.<sup>110</sup> We have seen here how businessmen like Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim funded the armed struggle against British colonialism in the 1930s and then rhetorically assisted the empire in its war effort in the 1940s. We have seen how businessmen like Shibli Jamal and George Khadir pushed for representation on various government bodies where they hoped to build their own institutional capacities. In these bodies, they met figures and worked alongside people like Golda Meyerson (later Meir) whose participation was not aimed at building institutional power but at representing an already existing institutional infrastructure. We have seen how these figures, in their claims to mediation and representation, failed time and again. Said was right. Palestinians had no chance of countering the European Jewish discipline of information making, surveying, and planning.

What then is there to learn from the study of Palestinian economic thought? Such an engagement reveals figures, norms, territories, understandings of politics, and narratives that, although otherwise invisible, continue to haunt the present. The projects of men of capital, self-defined economists, and thinkers emphasized discipline and detail as priorities.

A landscape of characters comes into view on the pages of the 1930s periodical *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya*. There was “social man,” who was scientific, rational, and pragmatic. He believed in private property, individual freedom, and self-responsibility. He was productive. He struck the proper balance between spending and saving. He was neither extravagant nor miserly. He embodied a set of values defined as “economic conduct” that allowed him to cultivate his familial and national obligations. By fol-

lowing the correct budgetary prescriptions, social man confronted the rapidly proliferating loiterers, or “false intellectuals,” who were the idealistic and unemployed products of an educational system that focused on literature. The “true intellectuals” were those judicious, prudent, and scientific capitalists, who in their capacity to rise above pageantry and ostentation, could alone deliver an “authentic nationalism.” The emphasis on science was ubiquitous, and economic thinkers predicted that chemical innovations in producing synthetic hormones would lead to “a revolution in the development of the human race.”<sup>111</sup>

Social man had a helpmate of course. She was not that spendthrift [*musrifā*] urbanite who frequented clothing and jewelry stores and “was born to spend” her husband’s money. She was instead the judicious woman [*hasifa*]. She was fashionable and frugal. She bought domestic products and had “a profound impact on national economy [*al-iqtisad al-qawmi*].”<sup>112</sup> She toiled alongside her man, and although ostensibly “equal in intelligence, skill, sharpness of will, and wisdom of politics,”<sup>113</sup> she was at her most sublime at home. The scientific domestic manager that Salwa Sa‘id inculcated in her radio program, “The New Arab Home” was the site of a parallel domestic *nahda*, a site, in fact *the* site, where women could contribute to the cause of “tireless and constant progress.”<sup>114</sup> The domestic manager was awakened. She was thrifty but refined, disciplined but cultured. Her inculcation in domestic management assured her access to independence, property, authority, and participation in economy and science—all within the four walls of her home. Through her scrupulous oversight over the family budget, she guarded national economy. She was both the subject and object of this broader edifice, her house of discipline. Entrenched in self-assessment, the domestic manager constantly inspected her home as she calculated her own time and efficiency. And in those “spare” moments, which Sa‘id’s world of notebooks and clocks created, she was contemplative and contained, either reading quietly or maintaining her social stature in literary and charitable associations. Most importantly perhaps, through these minute prescriptions, the Palestinian elite woman, that awakened domestic manager, could keep her man at home.

We see than an insistence on conceptualizing, surveying, and detailing the curiously parallel and carefully separated territories of a broader Arab economy and a minutely managed domestic economy. We see how the shaping of subjectivities became increasingly tied to class and rank. We



also see the molding of specific gendered norms. Man was inherently weak; his very nature made him susceptible to a dizzying sea of new temptations and possibilities. The woman's natural propensity to manage could transform the home into a vehicle of social and moral containment. Men were responsible for providing for both the "cultural" and financial needs of the family. But the man's fidelity was ultimately the woman's responsibility.

In this landscape of heroes (social man and scientific housewife) and villains (false intellectuals and spendthrifts) marching to a future of progress, a number of characters remained on the margins. The worker appears as at once an object of sympathy and a threat to the social order. Capitalism oppressed and liberated him. The maid similarly made possible and threatened the exalted status of the domestic manager. Sa'id identified the spread of primary schools in villages, the proliferating cinema houses and radios, and mixing with foreigners as inculcating a potential "sense of self" among the "third rank." The "refined" had to adjust themselves to these new realities or otherwise risk even further upheaval.

Throughout, the definition and regulation of needs versus desires were central to shaping the categories and exclusions of the ideal economic subject. While these elites imagined themselves as allowing for a limited mobility for the "worker" and the "poor class," those figures could never be agents themselves of progress. In this way, elite men and women did more than bolster existing hierarchies; they created new ones through a persistent emphasis on the "model middle." It was the wealthy, now scripted as the "middle," that were the "civilized people" [*ahl al-hadara*]. Indeed, the elite claim that this model middle—made up of "a family of an educated man who has a wife and two children and a servant"—was the "majority" was transparently absurd in Palestine.<sup>15</sup> The attempt to mold the appropriate conduct and aesthetics of a normative middle did not aim to "civilize" the subaltern but rather to consolidate her exclusion.

In the renditions of the "social man" and the "domestic manager," the British colonial government appears in the background, providing a model for ideal conduct at times and conferring recognition at others. But even in these optimistic renditions, when the colonial government's establishment of the Office of Statistics in 1936 was an event to celebrate, British colonial rule appeared sluggish. At the same time, many of the men who wrote on *Iqtisadiyyat's* pages, indeed the periodical's editor, funded armed rebellion against British colonialism and Zionist settlement. Officially, he presented the colonial government as a temporary enabler of a prosperous future.

In the 1930s, the future was one of promise premised on the metaphors of wakefulness and rebirth. As Palestine led the world spiritually, one economic thinker assured, so too would it be at the forefront of material rebirth.<sup>116</sup> A “general invigoration” was everywhere to be seen. The Arab people were in the throes of an economic revival, a *nahda*. Thus the horizon of rebirth was an Arab world that *Iqtisadiyyat*’s editors represented through maps, illustrations, and texts. They used a *nahda* narrative structure that began with diagnosing the disease of slumber; moved to affirming the overall health of Arab and Islamic civilization; turned to the description of the encroaching enemy; unearthed Arab civilizational superiority through a teleology of tolerance and triumph; and ended with revealing a concrete cultural essence, usually a transhistorical “commercial disposition,” which would deliver the Arabs from their slumber. In these renditions, the dissolution of the Ottoman empire was divisive and led to oppression; national borders between the Arab countries were “untenable and unnatural.” Thus, pan-Arabism was not only coupled with “socialism” as scholars have concluded.

Disciplinary divisions were also important in this period. The notions of economic revival, economic science, and economic conduct were premised on the separation of the economic from the political. The editors presented themselves as “alternates”; they were the “men of capital” who would deliver the pragmatism that “men of politics” could never realize, mired as they were in factionalism and extravagance. These men constructed the differences between the economic and the political that so much capitalist thought relied on. The façade of distinction was hard to maintain even in those heady days.

As war came to Palestine and the British colonial government began the painful transformation of the country into a veritable military base, the visions and projects of men of capital underwent some deep ruptures. Businessmen struggled to survive the exigencies of austerity. That difficulty was accompanied by an equally profound anxiety about a state in Palestine and what it may look like. The Arab horizon of a capitalist utopia rapidly attenuated. Palestinian businessmen no longer spoke of Palestine as part of a broader Arab commercial unity. They now spoke of a much smaller territory, itself split into a *Jewish* versus an *Arab* economy. Ambition, progress, and profit were no longer the salient terms. Paralysis, destruction, and conspiracy were now the watchwords. Businessmen no longer understood themselves as the vanguard of the future. They were now managers of crisis

in an embattled present. The British colonial government was no longer a background force conferring recognition. It was a facilitator of siege. A new mass of austerity regulations, unprecedented rates of inflation, smuggling and unregulated markets were all now depriving the awakened Palestinian businessman of sleep. Through the Chambers of Commerce, Palestinian businessmen attempted to create the institutions, bureaucracies, and expertise they needed to stave off the landscape of economic paralysis and national peril that enveloped them.

But there were some continuities as well. Whereas in the 1930s, capitalists attempted to shape economy as central to but distinct from the political, the businessmen of the 1940s could not maintain that premise. In their conferences and campaigns, they addressed land confiscation, European Jewish immigration, political prisons, and freedom of the press. However, this shift itself, this disciplinary blurriness, was only a result of the “anomalous” conditions of Palestine, where Zionism had rendered economic crises “political.” The shaping of subjectivity around class identities would also continue. At times urban working and poor people self-identified as the “middle” and in turn the “majority.” However, while in the 1930s the emphasis was on imbuing the “civilized” with “economic conduct,” by the 1940s, a crisis of authenticity crystallized. Now Palestinian businessmen turned to shaping the “Bedouin and peasant” as the subject in need of reform and awakening and, most of all, representation. The hierarchies of the awakened elite and the slumbering masses also continued uninterrupted. And despite the erosion of this capitalist pan-Arab utopia, the understanding of economy as an organic entity to be nurtured back to health also continued apace. It transgressed the crises of the 1940s and even the catastrophe of 1948. The causal link between civilizational status, progress, and profit continues to this day to be a central premise of capitalist thought, Palestinian and otherwise.

The rupture of 1948 and arguably the broader process of nation-state consolidation, worked to obscure the temporality of this enlightenment project. Writing after the majority of Palestinians had become refugees in the wake of the establishment of the Israeli state, the thinker and historian Qustantin Zuraiq struggled to define the catastrophe that had befallen his people. His text displayed a crisis of history and its narration. While the economic thinkers of the 1930s described a state of wakefulness and rebirth [*nahda*] and an insistence, even an obsession, with the utopic future, Zuraiq insisted: “They [the enemy] live in the present and the future, whereas we are still dreaming of the past, numbing ourselves with its bygone splendor.”<sup>117</sup>

Here, the narrative of sleep and historical intoxication tore the material continuity that *Iqtisadiyyat*'s editors celebrated. Indeed, whereas for the Palestinian capitalist of the 1930s the demise of the Ottoman empire was "unnatural," Zuraiq only a decade later described that empire as one of the causes of catastrophe. The enemy, he explained, had arrived to a "nation that was still in the beginning of its rebirth [*nahda*] and at the first stage of its social and political formation [*takwin*], a nation that spent centuries under authoritarian [*istibdadi*] rule."<sup>118</sup> Thus, the rupture of 1948 functioned to reshape understandings of historical narrative and continuity, not least of which were the stories of economic ideas that scholars would come to tell.

The stories of men of capital in Palestine reveal important points about economy as a site of meaning and national contestation in a settler colonial context. This context did not deter the drive for capital accumulation and profit. Men of capital knew all along that they needed institutions to calculate and encourage economic growth. They looked to a broader Arab horizon, banking on their vigilance, contacts, and ambition to make money and nation. They knew they had no options, even though they kept trying, to build institutions in the exceptional conditions of Palestine's Mandatory rule. Unlike the colonial mandate structures in Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Iraq, the Mandate in Palestine established and buttressed settler colonialism. Palestine was not only exceptional in the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire; it was the only mandate regime that the League of Nations approved as a settler colony. This is the point that scholars like Avi Shlaim and Jacob Metzger miss when they suggest that the Palestinians never did enough to build a state or the institutions that would make it work.<sup>119</sup>

The stories of these men expose the falseness of the continued claim that the British colonial investment in the modern Zionist settlement project either intended to or could benefit the Palestinian. If this were the case, British colonial officers would not have worked so diligently to destroy and foreclose the possibilities of Palestinian elite developmentalism. Palestinians could never become developmental subjects. This was not only because British colonial rule did not understand the Palestinian as endowed with politics, narrowly scripted as the capacity to realize national collectivity. It was also because the British commitment to the Jewish national home in Palestine—no matter how ambivalent, contentious, contingent, and at times incoherent—was a commitment to settler colonialism. This

commitment necessitated the erasure of the Palestinian, no matter how devoted he or she were to the ostensibly shared goal of economic growth.

This does not let men, and women, of capital off the hook. Their economic interests did not simply outweigh their bids for national sovereignty. Their investment in economic growth was contingent on creating and guarding new forms of class, status, and social hierarchy. It was only when it became undeniably evident that the bid for national sovereignty was a lost cause that these men, as *economic* leaders, deemed to address and claimed to represent the many others they had spent so much time naturalizing as essentially inferior: the worker, the maid, the nomad, the peasant. By that time, it was far too late to build viable solidarities that were in any way vested in guarding people's basic needs.

In the 1930s and 1940s in Palestine, capital accumulation and the *nahda* project went hand in hand. We should remember that these Palestinians—in their imaginings of territory, in their emphasis on detail, in their ideas of progress—did not live their world as shadows of the Jewish settler or the British colonial officer. Their realities were also part of a broader Arab project.

But it is time that we attend to this liberal age, with its utopian visions and its fashionable ideas, with more scrutiny. It was not simply or coincidentally exclusionary: It was contingent on exclusion. The poor and the hungry were then, as they are today, either invisible in utopian landscapes of progress or otherwise the very personifications of ugliness, to be reformed as supplements, not as actors in history. If we look to the foundational structure of the *nahda* as contingent on the maintenance of this exclusion and inequality, we may be able to stop eulogizing it just long enough to recognize that it never died.

## Notes

This study is primarily based on documents from the Israel State Archive (ISA), the Nablus Municipality Archive (NMA), the Public Records Office (PRO), and Rhodes House, Oxford. At the ISA, I looked at the files of Palestine government bodies such as the Department of Commerce and Industry, the Colonial Office (CO), the Foreign Office (FO), the Chief Secretary's Office, and the Economic Advisor files. There I found state and business documents as well as the various petitions and reports of local authorities, villagers, land-owners, and occasionally consumers. The PRO was particularly rich in sources on British wartime policies on import and consumption control. At the Rhodes House in Oxford, I gathered British government publications from the Blue Book Register such as the "Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine," which includes detailed surveys of various economic groups' consumption rates along with various governmental documents on wages and inflation. It was perhaps the NMA that held the richest, though still incomplete, collection of records of the Arab Chambers of Commerce and Arab Economic Conference. I also draw on the Arabic-language daily *Filastin* and its transcripts of "The New Arab Home" radio broadcasts. At the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, I found records of the periodical *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya*.

### Introduction

1. The Arab Higher Committee was first constituted in 1936 in response to the outbreak of the Great Revolt. In 1946, the Arab League reconstituted the committee. See Philip Mat-tar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), and Ilan Pappé, *A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

2. ISA AAD/RG65/al-Hussaini: Correspondence Fu'ad Salih Saba to Secretary of Arab Higher Committee, Jerusalem, 5 April 1948.

3. ISA AAD/RG65/al-Hussaini: Correspondence from National Committee of Bir al-Sab'i to Secretary of Arab Higher Committee, Jerusalem, 17 March 1948.

4. Rashid Khalidi, *Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 108.

5. Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984); R. Khalidi, *Iron Cage*; Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Refugee Problem 1947–49* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

6. Shira Robinson, *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel's Liberal State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

7. Interview with Fuad Saba (grandson), 21 January 2013.

8. Charles Anderson, "From Petition to Confrontation: the Palestinians National Movement and the Rise of Mass Politics, 1929–1936," PhD dissertation (New York University, 2013), 379; Alexander Schölch, "European Penetration and the Economic Development of Palestine, 1856–82," in Roger Owen, ed., *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 56.

9. Covenant of the League of Nations, Versailles, 28 June 1919, in force 10 January 1920, Article 22.

10. Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 31.

11. Susan Pederson, "Settler Colonialism at the Bar of the League of Nations," in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pederson, eds., *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (London: Routledge, 2005), 124. As Darryl Li pointed out to me, Namibia was also a settler colony under the Mandate system. The Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) envisioned Namibia as a fifth province of South Africa. However, because the PMC did not recognize South Africa as sovereign in Namibia, the settler state, in legal terms at least, violated the League of Nations Covenant's principles of trusteeship. See Pederson, *Settler*, 121.

12. Arthur James Balfour, Balfour Declaration, 2 November 1917.

13. Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 12.

14. As Campos puts it: "Many memoirs argued that 'native' Sephardi and Maghrebi Jews shared cultural, spatial, and everyday practices with their Muslim neighbors that sharply differentiated them from 'newcomer' Ashkenazi Jewish co-religionists." Ibid., 18.

15. Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims," *Social Text* 1 (Winter 1979): 7–58; at 14. I am grateful to Max Ajl for pushing me on the processual and incomplete process of partition.

16. James Renton, "Flawed Foundations: The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate," in Rory Miller, ed., *Britain, Palestine, and Empire: The Mandate Years* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010).

17. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State* (New York: Dover Publications, 1988 [1896]). See here discussions in Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and Said, "Zionism."

18. Herzl's contemporary, the cultural Zionist Ahad Ha'am, warned as early as 1891 that the promise of an empty land was a myth; the truth from the land of Israel, as he

titled his article, was that there was not one piece of tillable land that was not already being tilled. The Arabs, he explained, were not dupes, and they would most likely put up a fight. Across the political spectrum and several decades later, in 1923, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the father of the Revisionists, the forefathers of the Likud Party, weighed in on the debate on Zionism's relationship to the Palestinians. Zionist colonization would not happen, he explained, without the use of force. The Arabs who lived on the land of Palestine would not accept the imposition of Zionism. Ahad Ha'am, "The Truth from Eretz Israel," in Adam Shatz, ed., *Prophets Outcast: A Century of Dissident Jewish Writing about Zionism and Israel* (New York: Nation Books, 2004 [1891]), 31–34. Vladimir Jabotinsky, "The Iron Wall: We and the Arabs" [published in Russian in 1923]: <http://www.marxists.de/middleeast/ironwall/ironwall.htm>. Retrieved 14 December 2014.

19. See Hannah Arendt, "Antisemitism," in Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, eds., *The Jewish Writings* (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 46–121; and Gabi Piterberg, "Zion's Rebel Daughter: Hannah Arendt on Palestine and Jewish Politics," *New Left Review* 48 (November–December 2007): 39–57.

20. See Ammiel Alcalay, *After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Daniel Boyarin, "What Does a Jew Want?; or, The Political Meaning of the Phallus," *Discourse* 19(2) (Winter 1997): 21–52; Amnon Raz-Krakotzin, "The Zionist Return to the West and the Mizrahi Jewish Perspective," in Ian Davidson Kamilar and Derek Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jew* (New York: Brandeis University Press, 2005); Said, "Zionism"; Ella Shohat, "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims," *Social Text* 19–20 (Autumn 1988): 1–35.

21. Barbara J. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920–1929* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 94.

22. *Ibid.*, 46.

23. League of Nations Council, *Mandate for Palestine* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1922).

24. Ronen Shamir explores how electric current, poles, and networks *made* politics rather than simply transmitting it. Ronen Shamir, *Current Flow: The Electrification of Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

25. The concession to the Palestine Salt Company lasted until 1928, when the government extended the company's poor quality and expensive salt preferential treatment in the form of a protective customs duty on the higher-quality and lower-cost salt from Egypt. Smith, *The Roots*, 131.

26. *Ibid.*, 131, 164. See also David de Vries, *Diamonds and War: State, Capital, and Labor in British-Ruled Palestine* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010).

27. Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 183, fn. 9.

28. Smith, *The Roots*, 189.

29. *Ibid.*, 131, 167.

30. Yuval A. Ohana, *Fellahim ba-mered ha-'aravi be'eretz yisra'el, 1936–1939* [*The Fellahin in the Arab Uprising in the Land of Israel, 1936–1939*] (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1978).



31. Nahla Zu'bi, "The Development of Capitalism in Palestine: The Expropriation of the Palestinian Direct Producers," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13(4) (Summer 1984): 88–109.

32. S. N. Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), and Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).

33. Simha Flapan, *Zionism and the Palestinians* (New York: Croom Helm, 1979).

34. Owen, *Studies*, 1–9; Alexander Schölch, "European Penetration," in Owen, *Studies*, 10–87; Roger Owen, *The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914* (London: Methuen, 1981); and Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

35. Metzger, *Divided Economy*.

36. Metzger's postscript on the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 is a continuation of these convictions: "[T]he simple fact that the territories were economic lightweights meant that they stood to be the main beneficiary of the bilateral economic relations with Israel, which dominated their external trade. These relations were conducted under the control of the occupational administration." *Ibid.*, 208.

37. Amos Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy Under the Mandate* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2006). See also Riyadh Mousa, "The Dispossession of the Peasantry: Colonial Policies, Settler Capitalism, and Rural Change 1918–1948," PhD dissertation (University of Utah, 2006).

38. Metzger, *Divided Economy*, 154 (emphasis added).

39. Indeed, it is not coincidental that subsequently since 1948 Israeli incursions in Beirut, Nablus, and Gaza have often targeted archives. See Gish Amit, "Ownerless Object? The Story of the Books Palestinians Left Behind," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 33 (Winter 2008): 7–20; Lauren Banko, "Occupational Hazards, Revisited: Palestinian Historiography," *Middle East Journal* 66(3) (Summer 2012): 440–452; Beshara Doumani, "Archiving Palestine and the Palestinians: The Patrimony of Ihsan Nimr," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 36 (Winter 2009): 3–12; Hannah Mermelstein, "Overdue Books: Returning Palestine's 'Abandoned Property' of 1948," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 47 (Autumn 2011): 46–64; Tom Twiss, "Damage to Palestinian Libraries and Archives During the Spring of 2002," *International Responsibilities Task Force* (2 August 2002): <http://www.pitt.edu/ttwiss/irtfpalestinlibsdmg.html>. Retrieved 16 December 2014; Wahid Gdoura, ed., *Libraries of Jerusalem* (Tunis: Arab Federation for Libraries and Information, 2003). Thanks to Mezna Qato for leading me to these sources.

40. Jacob Metzger, "The Economy of Mandatory Palestine: An Overview of the Development of Research," in A. Bareli and N. Karlinski, eds., *Economy and Society in the Mandatory Period* (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2003 [in Hebrew]), 14.

41. Shamir, *Current Flow*, 137.

42. *Ibid.*, 138.

43. *Ibid.*, 134.

44. On approaching archives with skepticism, see Carolyn Steedman, "After the Archive," *Comparative Critical Studies* 8(2–3) (2011): 321–340.

45. On archival production as an act of governance, see Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the*

*Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

46. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Economy* (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1983) and *Zionism and Territory: the Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

47. Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

48. Abigail Jacobsen, *From Empire to Empire: Jerusalem between Ottoman and British Rule* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011); Mark LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Sandra M. Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920–1947* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); and Sandra M. Sufian and Mark LeVine, eds., *Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel–Palestine* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

49. An abridged list of such efforts includes but is not limited to: Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, *Arab Cultural Nationalism in Palestine During the British Mandate* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1973); Musa Budeiri, *Tatawwur al-haraka al-ummaliyya al-‘arabiyya fi filastin: muqaddima ta’rikhiyya wa-majmu’a wataha’iq* [*The Development of the Arab Workers Movement in Palestine: A Historical Introduction and Collection of Documents*] (Beirut: Dar ibn Khaldun, 1981); Musa Budeiri, *Shuyu’yin fi filastin: shathaya tarikh mansi* [*Communists in Palestine: Fragments of a Forgotten Narrative*] (Ramallah: Muwatin: The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy, 2013); Sarah Graham-Brown, *Palestinians and Their Society, 1880–1946* (London: Quartet Books, 1980); Tarif Khalidi, “Palestinian Historiography: 1900–1948,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 10(3) (Spring 1981): 59–76; Ylana Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1900–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985). And more recently: Ami Ayalon, *Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004); Ellen Fleischmann, *The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian Women’s Movement, 1920–1948* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003); Zeina B. Ghandour, *A Discourse on Domination in Mandate Palestine: Imperialism, Property, and Insurgency* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010); Noah Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism 1917–1948* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013); Mustafa Kabha, *The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929–38: Writing Up a Storm* (Edgware, UK: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007); Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*; Lockman, *Comrades*; Weldon C. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006); Jacob Norris, *Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development 1905–1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Andrea L. Stanton, “*This Is Jerusalem Calling*”: *State Radio in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013); Ted Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: The 1936–39 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2003); Salim Tamari, *al-Jabal didd al-bahr: Dirasat fi*

*ishkaliyyat al-hadatha al-filastiniyya* [*The Mountain Against the Sea: Studies in Palestinian Urban Culture and Social History*] (Ramallah: Muwatin, 2005); Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar, eds., *Madinat al-hujjaj wal-a'yan wal-mahashi: dirasat fi tarikh al-quds al-ijtima'i wal-thaqafi* [*Pilgrims, Lepers, and Stuffed Cabbage: Studies of Jerusalem's Social and Cultural History*] (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2005).

50. Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine*.

51. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*.

52. See, for example, Ghandour, *A Discourse*; Ilan Pappé, *The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Smadar Lavie, “Blowups in the Borderzones: Third World Israeli Authors’ Gropings for Home,” in Smadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg, eds., *Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Ihab Saloul, *Catastrophe and Exile in the Modern Palestinian Imagination: Telling Memories* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Camelia Suleiman, *Language and Identity in the Israel–Palestine Conflict: The Politics of Self-Perception in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); and Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt*. Zachary Lockman gently pointed out to me that my use of the term *aristocracy* was inaccurate many years ago. I have been grateful ever since.

53. Walid Kazzuha, “Another Reading into al-Husari’s Concept of Arab Nationalism,” in Marwan Buheiry, ed., *Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939* (Beirut: Center for Arab and Middle Eastern Studies, American University of Beirut, 1981).

54. Salim Tamari, “Factionalism and Class Formation in Recent Palestinian History,” in Owen, *Studies*, 199.

55. See Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974) and *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, 1929–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977); and Smith, *The Roots*, 14. For a critique of this depiction, see Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*.

56. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab*.

57. Whether or not the nineteenth century was the triumph of the bourgeoisie class was a heated debate in the historiography of Europe. For some canonical examples see: Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: 1789–1848* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1962); David Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1969); and A. J. Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981).

58. Robert Vitalis, *When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), and Robert Vitalis, “On the Theory and Practice of Compradors: The Role of Abbud Pasha in the Egyptian Political Economy,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22(3) (August 1990): 291–315.

59. Vitalis, “On the Theory.”

60. See the work of Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, “The Material Life of the Ottoman Middle Class,” *History Compass* 10(8) (2012): 584–595; Michael Gasper, *The Power of Representation:*

*Publics, Peasants, and Islam in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Athanasios Gekas, "Class and Cosmopolitanism: The Historiographical Fortunes of Merchants in Eastern Mediterranean Ports," *Mediterranean Historical Review* 24(2) (2009): 95–113; Will Hanley, "Grieving Cosmopolitanism in Middle East Studies," *History Compass* 6(5) (2008): 1346–1367; Aliye F. Mataraci, *Trade Letters as Instances of Economy, Ideology, and Subjectivity* (Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2005); Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon, 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Kevin Martin, "Enter the Future! Exemplars of Bourgeois Modernity in Post-World War II Syria," PhD dissertation (Georgetown University, 2005); Robert L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decolonizing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya 1945–1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Keith David Watenpugh, *Being Modern in the Middle East: Revolution, Nationalism, Colonialism, and the Arab Middle Class* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

61. Watenpugh, *Being Modern*, 18.

62. Keith Watenpugh, "Being Middle Class and Being Arab: Sectarian Dilemmas and Middle Class Modernity in the Arab Middle East, 1908–1936," in Barbara Weinstein and Ricardo Lopez, eds., *The Making of the Middle Class: Towards a Transnational History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012).

63. Weinstein and Lopez, *Making of the Middle Class*, 3.

64. *Ibid.*, 8.

65. ISA RG2/CSO/87/19: "Representations by the Arab Chamber of Commerce to the Control Department of Post-War Trade," 1945.

66. Rema Hammami, "Gender, *Nakbe*, and Nation: Palestinian Women's Presence and Absence in the Narration of 1948 Memories," in Ron Robin and Bo Strath, eds., *Homelands: Poetic Power and the Politics of Space* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2003), 35–60.

67. Hillel Cohen, *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism 1917–1948*, trans. Haim Watzman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 18.

68. *Ibid.*, 261, 263.

69. The big landowning families in this period were: Khuri (Haifa), 'Abd al-Hadi (Nablus), al-Taji al-Faruqi (Ramli), al-Ghusayn (Ramli), Baidas (Shaykh Mu'nis), Abu Khaddra (Jaffa, Gaza), Shawa (Gaza), Hanun (Tulkarm), Baydun (Acre), al-Fahum (Nazareth), al-Tabari (Tiberias), Jarrar, and Nimr (Nablus).

70. Shulamit Carmi and Henry Rosenfeld, "The Origins of the Process of Proletarianization and Urbanization of the Arab Peasants in Palestine," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 220 (1974): 470–485. Issa Khalaf provides a thorough critique of this conclusion (see following note).

71. Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939–1948* (New York: SUNY Press, 1991), 46.

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*, 49.

75. Metzger, *Divided Economy*, 154.

76. Khalaf refers to the work of Bayan N. al-Hout, "The Palestinian Political Elite Dur-

ing the Mandate Period,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9 (1979): 85–111. She surveys 100 political figures, including individuals in various political institutions throughout the Mandate: the Arab Executive, the Supreme Muslim Council, the Arab Higher Committee, Muslim Christian societies, National Committees, the Arab League, and delegations to the United Nations.

77. Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 52.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid., 52–58.

80. Ibid., 52.

81. Sarah Graham-Brown, “The Political Economy of the Jabal Nablus 1920–1948,” in Owen, *Studies*, 102.

82. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*, 52.

83. Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 74, 86.

84. Notable in this regard is Rashid Khalidi’s work, which details identity formation along the competing but not necessarily mutually exclusive lines of religion, locality, and family. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*. Musa Budeiri also provides an entry into the cross-fertilizations of Islamism and nationalism in Mandate Palestine. Musa Budeiri, “The Palestinians: Tensions Between Nationalist and Religious Identities,” in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds., *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

85. This definition of the *nahda* is adapted from Akram Fouad Khater’s work, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 155. The call for “awakening” had wide resonance in pan-Arab movements as well as Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and Palestinian Arab nationalist movements. “Awake, O Arabs, and arise!” were the first lines of the 1868 ode *Tanabbahu wa istafiqu* by the Syrian poet Ibrahim al-Yaziji. George Antonius later evoked these words in his treatise *The Arab Awakening* (London: H. Hamilton, 1938). This theme of awakening was to characterize the language of Arab nationalists and its historians for decades to come. In the wake of the 2011 uprisings and revolutions in the Arab world, this theme of awakening has again found dominance in intellectual and media circles.

86. T. Khalidi, “Palestinian Historiography,” 59.

87. For a taste of this debate: Onur Ince, “Colonial Capitalism and the Dilemmas of Liberalism: Locke, Burke, Wakefield, and the British Empire,” PhD dissertation (Cornell University, 2013); Domenico Losurdo, *Liberalism: A Counter History* (London: Verso, 2011 [first published in 2005 in Italian]); Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire*; Karuna Mantena, *Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Sankar Muthu, *Enlightenment Against Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Jennifer Pitts, “Free for All,” *Times Literary Supplement* 23 (September 2011): 8–9; Jennifer Pitts, “Theories of Empire and Imperialism,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 211–235; Andrew Sartori, “The British Empire and Its Liberal Mission,” *Journal of Modern History* 78(3) (September 2006): 623–642; and Andrew Sartori, *Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Scholars have convincingly

argued that the project of British and French liberalism cannot be fully understood outside of the material conditions of imperialism and colonial capitalism that informed it. Here, the shift is not to trace how European liberals understood and acted on the colonized, but how colonized elites adapted a variety of ideas and practices to navigate the promises and dangers of economic growth.

88. Tarif Khalidi punctured this narrative by detailing Palestinian intellectuals' turn to history. Khalidi, "Palestinian Historiography," 59, 60.

89. Subhi Yasin among others speaks of the post-Revolt period in Palestine as one of severe political stagnation. See Subhi Yasin, *al-Thawra al-'arabiyya al-kubra fi filastin, 1936–1939* [*The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–1939*] (Cairo: Dar al-Katib, 1967), 230. The "frustration trope" can be read in such works as Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, 1917–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); and Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*. For a critique of this narrative, see Munir Fakher Eldin, "Communities of Owners: Land Law, Governance, and Politics in Palestine, 1882–1948," PhD dissertation (New York University, 2008).

90. Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 335, fn. 10.

91. For Margaret Schabas, economy as "as an autonomous set of relations" is a configuration that is about "two hundred years old." Margaret Schabas, *The Natural Origin of Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 3. For Susan Buck-Morss as well, the conceptual elaboration of the economy as a distinct sphere takes place in the eighteenth century. Susan Buck-Morss, "Envisioning Capital: Political Economy on Display," *Critical Inquiry* 21(2) (Winter 1995): 434–467; at 439.

92. Chris Hann and Keith Hart, *Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), 4.

93. *Ibid.*, 6.

94. *Ibid.*

95. *Ibid.*

96. Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," *Cultural Studies* 12(1) (1998): 82–101; at 82.

97. Hugo Radice, "The National Economy: A Keynesian Myth?" *Capital and Class* 8(1) (Spring 1984): 111–140; at 121.

98. John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (Cambridge, UK: Macmillan and Cambridge University Press, 1936).

99. U. Kalpagam, "Temporalities, History, and Routines of Rule in Colonial India," *Time Society* 8(1) (March 1999): 141–159; at 151.

100. Julia Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); and Janet Lee Roitman, *Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 19.

101. Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 92. See also Janet Lee Roitman, *An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

102. J. Adam Tooze, *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
103. Catherine Gallagher, *The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
104. Roitman, *Fiscal Disobedience*, 8.
105. Louis Dumont, *From Mandeville to Marx—The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).
106. Koray Çalıışkan and Michel Callon, “Economization, Part I: Shifting Attention from the Economy Towards Processes of Economization,” *Economy and Society* 38(3) (August 2009): 369–398; at 369.
107. U. Kalpagam, “Colonialism, Rational Calculations and Idea of the Economy,” *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(4) (25–31 January 1997): PE-2–PE-12; at PE-2.
108. Gustavo Estava, “Development,” in Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 17.
109. Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
110. Kalpagam, “Colonialism, Rational Calculations,” PE-8.
111. *Ibid.*, PE-7.
112. Tooze, *Statistics*, 14.
113. Franco Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature,” *New Left Review* II(1) (2000): 54–68, as cited in Tooze, *Statistics*, 13.
114. Goswami, *Producing India*, 24.
115. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Books, 1986).
116. Watenpaugh, *Being Modern*, 301.
117. Here I am adapting Julia Elyachar’s critique of the use of neoliberalism as an epithet that stands for everything that is wrong with the present. Julia Elyachar, “Before and After Neoliberalism: Tacit Knowledge, Secrets of the Trade, and the Public Sector in Egypt,” *Cultural Anthropology* 27(1) (2012): 76–96.
118. It is useful to remember here Gayatri Spivak’s reflections on the intellectual’s complicity in constituting the other as the self’s shadow. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on Widow Sacrifice,” *Wedge* 7–8 (Winter/Spring 1985): 120–130.
119. Metzer, “Economy of Mandatory Palestine.”
120. Avi Shlaim, “The Debate about 1948,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27(3) (August 1995): 287–304; at 299.
121. Rhodes House, Blue Book Register: Palestine 905/12/6: “A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine, 1942–1943” (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer, 1943).

## Chapter 1

1. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), iv.
2. *Ibid.*, 345.
3. *Ibid.*



4. Ibid., 350–351.
5. Mark LeVine, “The Discourses of Development in Mandate Palestine,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 17(1–2) (Winter–Spring 1995): 95–104; at 103.
6. An abbreviated list includes but is not limited to: Orit Bashkin, *The Other Iraq: Pluralism, Intellectuals and Culture in Hashemite Iraq, 1921–1958* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Yoav Di-Capua, *Gatekeepers of the Arab Past: Historians and History Writing in Twentieth Century Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Michael Gasper, *The Power of Representation: Publics, Peasants, and Islam in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Dyala Hamzah, *The Making of the Arab Intellectual: Empire, Public Sphere, and the Colonial Coordinates of Selfhood* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013); Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Samah Salim, *The Novel and the Rural Imaginary in Egypt, 1880–1985* (London: Routledge Curzon Press, 2004); Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Post-colonial Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Jessica Winegar, *Creative Reckonings: The Politics of Art and Culture in Contemporary Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
7. Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean*.
8. Khuri-Makdisi cites here Middle East historians’ misreading of Samuel Smiles’s *Self Help* as a work of capitalist, liberal economics and in particular Donald Reid, “Syrian Christians, the Rags-to-Riches Story, and Free Enterprise,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1(4) (1970): 177–193. Ibid., 31; at 183, fn. 2.
9. Weldon C. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalities and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), and Charles Anderson, “From Petition to Confrontation: The Palestinians National Movement and the Rise of Mass Politics, 1929–1936,” PhD dissertation (New York University, 2013).
10. Anderson, “From Petition,” 7, 12.
11. Ibid., 32. Ghassan Kanafani, *Thawarat 1936–1939 fi filastin: khalfiyat wa-tafasil wa-tahlil* (Beirut: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 1972); Haim Gerber, *Remembering and Imagining Palestine: Identity and Nationalism from the Crusades to the Present* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); and Ted Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: The 1936–39 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2003).
12. Anderson, “From Petition,” 82–83.
13. “Ahamiyat al-iqtisadiyyat fil siyasa” [“The Importance of Economics in Political Affairs”] *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 1(4) (15 February 1935). *Al-Iqtisadiyyat* provided its readers with English tables of contents for each issue. The titles provided here are the editors’ translations. All other translations are mine.
14. Ibid.
15. *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 2(10) (7 March 1936).
16. Interview with Fuad Saba (the grandson). 21 January 2013.
17. Anderson, “From Petition,” 174.
18. Ibid. See also Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*.
19. Palestinian Jews, Muslim, and Christians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth



centuries did not simply live and make money together; they crafted an Ottoman brotherhood of sorts. Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

20. Ibid., 19.

21. Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876–1983* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 25.

22. See Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Philip L. Cottrell, Monika Pohle Fraser, and Iain L. Fraser, eds., *East Meets West: Banking, Commerce, and Investments in the Ottoman Empire* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008); Jens Hansen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005); V. Necla Geyikdagi, *Foreign Investment in the Ottoman Empire: International Trade and Relations, 1854–1914* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011); Halil Inalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

23. Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939–1948* (New York: SUNY Press, 1991), 46.

24. Ibid.

25. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 55.

26. Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 46.

27. Ibid., 49.

28. Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 154.

29. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 118.

30. Metzer, *Divided Economy*, 111.

31. Ibid.

32. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 118.

33. On Middle East Airlines and its location in broader questions of political economy, corporate interests, and foreign intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East during the immediate post–World War II period through 1958, see Irene L. Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945–1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 90–114. For a discussion of the location of Middle East Airlines in twentieth-century aviation, see: Keith Williams, “Commercial Aviation in Arab States: The Pattern of Control,” *Middle East Journal* (Spring 1957): 123–138.

34. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 121.

35. For an insightful study of Israel’s freezing of Palestinian bank accounts and the effects of statelessness on monetary and everyday life, see Sreemati Mitter, “A History of Money in Palestine: From the 1900s to the Present,” PhD dissertation (Harvard, 2014).

36. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, 121.

37. Advertisements for Arabia Insurance and the Arab Bank regularly appeared across various issues of *Iqtisad lubnan wa-al-‘alam al-‘arabi*, a bimonthly journal published by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry beginning in 1951. See in particular the January–February 1953 issue, in the special section listing all commercial establishments

registered with the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in which the Arab Bank is listed as a premium establishment among a four-tier classification system.

38. For an example of this narrative, see Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian–Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974) and *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, 1929–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977). For a good critique of Christians’ ostensible aloofness during the Revolt, see Noah Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine: Communalism and Nationalism 1917–1948* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).

39. NMA Mandate Documents/Chamber of Commerce 26/1: Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943; ISA RG2/CSO/65/15: Correspondence from Malik al-Masri to Chief Secretary, 12 November 1943, and Correspondence from Gead (Jad) Suidan to Chief Secretary, 15 February 1944. Anderson, “From Petition,” 645–646.

40. *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 2(10) (7 March 1936).

41. See Ami Ayalon, *Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004),

42. Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*; Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean*; Samir Seikaly, “Damascene Intellectual Life in the Opening Years of the 20th Century: Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali and *al-Muqtabas*,” in Marwan R. Buheiry, ed., *Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890–1939* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981); Georg C. Zaidan and Thomas Philipp, *Jurji Zaidan: Contributions to Modern Arab Thought and Literature* (Bethesda: The Zaidan Foundation Inc., 2013).

43. Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, 49.

44. *Ibid.*, 52.

45. ‘Adil Husayn Ghunaym, *Al-quwa al-ijtima’iyya fi filastin bayn al-harbayn al-‘alamiyyayn* (Cairo: Matb’at Jami’at ‘Ayn al-Shams, 1980).

46. Michelle Campos and Ami Ayalon cite a German archeologist visiting Palestine in 1914. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 137; and Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, 106.

47. Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, 62.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *Ibid.*, 64.

50. *Ibid.*, 158.

51. Haiduc-Dale, *Arab Christians*.

52. “Khawatir wa mulahathat” [“Current Topics”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 1(14) (15 September 1935).

53. The historian, orator, and translator Ajaj Nuwayhid translated two sections on communism and fascism from G. D. H. Cole’s *A Guide to Modern Politics*, coauthored by Cole and his spouse Margaret Cole. The latter is not credited or mentioned anywhere in *Iqtisadiyyat*. The work itself was published in 1934, and its translations appear in *Iqtisadiyyat* only one year later. G. D. H. Cole and Margaret Cole, *A Guide to Modern Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1934). The first translation “Communism: Extracts from ‘The Political System’ by Dr. D. H. Cole Translated by ‘Ajaj Nuwayhid” [“Al-shuyu‘ iyya: min kitab al-nitham al-siyasi lil duktur D. H. Cole, ta’rib al-ustath ‘ajaj afandi

nuwayhid"] appeared in *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(15) (1 August 1935). The second translation "Fascism: Extracts from 'The Political System' by Dr. D. H Cole Translated by 'Ajaj Nuwayhid" ["Al-fashiya: min kitab al-nitham al-siyasi lil duktur D. H. Cole, ta'rib al-ustath 'ajaj afandi nuwayhid"] appeared in *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(18) (15 September 1935). The mistranslation of the original text as well as the erasure of Margaret Cole are noteworthy.

54. "The Scope of Our Task," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 1(22) (15 November 1935).

55. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers*, 4.

56. *Ibid.*, 195.

57. Anderson, "From Petition," 180.

58. And in this sense the editors took part in what Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944) would later explain as economic "embeddedness." See Julia Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Timothy Mitchell, "Rethinking Economy," *Geoforum* 39 (2008): 1116–1121; Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon, "Economization, Part I: Shifting Attention from the Economy Towards Processes of Economization," *Economy and Society* 38(3) (August 2009): 369–398.

59. Louis Dumont, *From Mandeville to Marx: Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 24.

60. "Khawatir wa mulahathat" ["Current Topics"] *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(14) (15 September 1935).

61. *Ibid.*

62. "The Importance of Economics in Political Affairs," 1935.

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*

65. The formalists understood economy as a means-end relationship, a mental process of economizing. The substantivists saw economy as a general provisioning of material wants in society. See Chris Hann and Keith Hart, *Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011) and Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon, "Economization, Part I: Shifting Attention from the Economy Towards Processes of Economization," *Economy and Society* 38(3) (August 2009): 369–398; at 1.

66. "Bayn al-adab wal iqtisad" ["Between Literature and Economics"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 2(15–16) (18 April 1936).

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.* A more accurate history would engage economics in its relationship to moral philosophy and its offspring political economy.

69. *Ibid.*

70. Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, "Taste and Class in Late Ottoman Beirut," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43(3) (2011): 475–492; at 480; see also Joseph Massad, *Desiring Arabs* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007); Barbara Daly Metcalf, ed., *Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Omnia El Shakry, *The Great Social Laboratory*.

71. “Bayn al-adab wal iqtisad” [“Between Literature and Economics”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 2(15–16) (18 April 1936).

72. Ibid.

73. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, *Précis d'économie politique* (Paris: Libraire Ch. Delagrave, 1888). Hafiz Ibrahim and Khalil Mutran translated the book under the title *Al-mujaz fi ‘ilm al-iqtisad* (Cairo: Ma‘arif Press, 1913).

74. “Bayn al-adab wal iqtisad” [“Between Literature and Economics”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 2(15–16) (18 April 1936).

75. Ibid.

76. “‘Ilalat ‘ilm al-huquq bi ‘ilm al iqtisad” [“The Relation Between Law and Economics”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 1(20) (15 October 1935).

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Nancy Cartwright, *The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 142.

84. Omnia El Shakry, “The Arabic Freud: The Unconscious and the Modern Subject,” *Modern Intellectual History* 11(1) (April 2014): 89–118; at 115.

85. See Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*.

86. Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 15.

87. Shukri Bey Sha’sha’a, “Hajatuna ila al-iqtisad” [“Our Need for Economy”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 1(4) (15 February 1935).

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. See Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice in the *Wealth of Nations*: An Introductory Essay,” in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976 [1795]).

92. Shukri Bey Sha’sha’a, “Hajatuna ila al-iqtisad” [“Our Need for Economy”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 1(4) (15 February 1935).

93. Ibid.

94. Hont and Ignatieff, “Needs and Justice,” 12.

95. “Al-Thaqafa al-‘iqtisadiyya” [“Economic Culture”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-‘arabiyya* 1(3) (1 February 1935).

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. "Private Initiative in Enterprises," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 2(14) (4 April 1936).

99. "Bawadir al-nahda al-iqtisadiyya" ["Outlook of the Economic Revival"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 2(10) (7 March 1936).

100. Ibid.

101. "Al-mar'a wal iqtisad" ["The Position of Women in Economic Life"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(5) (5 March 1935).

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. Istvan Hont, "The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury," in Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 418.

108. "Hajat al-bashar" ["Human Wants"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(15) (1 August 1935).

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. See Catherine Gallagher, *The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 123.

115. Hermann Heinrich Gossen first coined the "law of substitution" in the late nineteenth century. Hermann Heinrich Gossen, *The Laws of Human Relations and the Rules of Human Action Derived Therefrom*, trans. Rudolph C. Blitz (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983 [1854]). Some have credited him with foreshadowing the Marginal Revolution, which William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger, and Léon Walras simultaneously but independently discovered in the 1870s. William Stanley Jevons, *The Theory of Political Economy* (New York: Kelley and Millman, 1957 [1888]); Carl Menger, *Principles of Economics*, trans. James Dingwall and Bert F. Hoselitz, with an introduction by F. A. Hayek (New York: New York University Press, 1981[c. 1867]); Léon Walras, *Elements of Pure Economics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954 [1874]). The marginal model presumes growth and then focuses on individual economic behavior. See Mark Blaug, *Economic Theory in Retrospect* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Susan Buck-Morss, "Envisioning Capital: Political Economy on Display," *Critical Inquiry* 21(2) (Winter 1995): 434–467; Gallagher, *The Body*.

116. "Hajat al-bashar" ["Human Wants"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(15) (1 August 1935).

117. "The Importance of Economics in Political Affairs," 1935.

118. "Human Wants," 1935.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid.
124. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*; Hann and Hart, *Economic Anthropology*.
125. Ibid.
126. "Human Wants," 1935.
127. Shukri Bey Sha'sha'a, "Our Need for Economy," 1935.
128. "Human Wants," 1935.
129. Buck-Morss, "Envisioning Capital," 456.
130. Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 92. See also Janet Lee Roitman, *An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
131. Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession*, 75.
132. "Government Control and Assistance in the Near East," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 2(4) (14 April 1936).
133. Ibid.
134. Rashid Khalidi, *Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 33.
135. Ibid.
136. T. P. Malouf, "The Role of Scientific Research in the Development of Palestine," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 1(22) (15 November 1935).
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid.
144. U. Kalpagam has pointed out that in order for economy to be "conceived as a kind of organic entity subject to change, growth, evolution, progress, development, or decay," it had to be temporalized and regulated. The rendering of accounts, the time-indexation of stocks, and other regulatory practices rendered this economy visible. Progress was no longer subjective but something that could be measured and assessed. U. Kalpagam, "Temporalities, History, and Routines of Rule in Colonial India," *Time Society* 8(1) (March 1999): 141–159; at 150. See also Kalpagam, "Colonialism, Rational Calculations and Idea of the Economy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(4) (25–31 January 1997): PE-2–PE-12.
145. "Khawatir wa mulahathat" ["Current Topics"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(14) (15 September 1935).
146. See "The 'Necessity' for Colonies," *Economist* (16 November 1935). The piece appears in translation as "Hal hunak haja iqtisadiyya lil musta'marat" ["Is There an Economic Need for Settlements"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 2(9) (29 January 1936).
147. Ibid. Joseph Schumpeter, *Imperialism and Social Classes*, trans. Heinz Norden (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1955). First published in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (Tubingen: Germany, 1919).

148. "Government Control and Assistance in the Near East," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 2(4) (14 April 1936).

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid.

151. "A Wise Step in Palestine Economy, Better Late than Never," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 2(14) (4 April 1936).

152. Ibid.

153. See in particular Samer Alatout, "From Water Abundance to Water Scarcity (1936–1959): A Fluid History of Jewish Subjectivity in Historic Palestine and Israel," in Sandra M. Sufian and Mark LeVine, eds., *Reapproaching Borders: New Perspectives on the Study of Israel–Palestine* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

154. "A Wise Step," 1936.

155. E. F. Nickoley, "Labor Versus Machinery in the Near East," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 1(22) (15 November 1935).

156. "Al-wihda al-iqtisadiyya lil aqtar al-'arabiyya" ["Economic Unity in Arab Countries"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(8) (15 April 1935).

157. Ibid.

158. Karuna Mantena, "On Gandhi's Critique of the State: Sources, Contexts, Con-junctures," *Modern Intellectual History* 9 (3) (2012): 533–563; at 558.

159. Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean*, 52.

160. "Jaza allah al-shada'id kul khair" ["May God Reward Adversity"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 2(5) (1 February 1936).

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid.

163. Ibid.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. "Economic Unity in Arab Countries," 1935.

167. Shukri Bey Sha'sha'a, "Our Need for Economy," 1935.

168. Ibid.

169. Hann and Hart, *Economic Anthropology*, 22.

170. Shukri Bey Sha'sha'a, "Our Need for Economy," 1935.

171. Ibid.

172. "Economic Unity in Arab Countries," 1935.

173. For a canonical example of Arab unity as linked to state socialism, see Yusef Sayigh's *Al-khubz ma' al-karama: al-muhtawa al-iqtisadi al-ijtima'i lil mafhum al-qawmi al-'arabi* (Beirut: Dar al-Tal'ia, 1961). See also, Youssef Chaitani, *Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007).

174. "Economic Unity in Arab Countries," 1935.

175. Ibid.

176. "The Scope of Our Task," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'Arabiyya* [English Issue] 1(22) (15 November 1935).

177. "Economic Culture," 1935.

178. "The Scope of Our Task," 1935.
179. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
180. Margaret Schabas argues that the denaturalization of the economic order made marking political economy as a separate and coherent discipline possible. It was not "until the mid-nineteenth century, [that] economic theorists regarded the phenomena of their discourse as part of the same natural world studied by natural philosophers." Margaret Schabas, *The Natural Origin of Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 2.
181. Michel Callon, "An Essay on the Growing Contribution of Economic Markets to the Proliferation of the Social," *Theory, Culture, Society* 24 (2007): 139–164.
182. Ellen Meiksins Wood, "The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism," *New Left Review* I (127) (May–June 1981): 67.
183. William Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement 1900–1941* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 3.
184. Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 41.

## Chapter 2

1. "Economic Culture," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(3) (1 February 1935).
2. For an insightful study of these older Ottoman traditions and discourses in nineteenth-century Beirut, see Toufoul Abou-Hodeib, "Taste and Class in Late Ottoman Beirut," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43(3) (2011): 475–492.
3. "The Family Budget," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(13) (1 July 1935). All translations are mine.
4. "Ahamiyat al-iqtisadiyyat fil siyasa" ["The Importance of Economics in Political Affairs"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(4) (15 February 1935).
5. Interview with Samira Khuri, Nazareth, 2005.
6. For more on the radio station and its history, see Andrea L. Stanton, *"This Is Jerusalem Calling": State Radio in Mandate Palestine* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013).
7. Issa Khalaf, "The Effect of Socioeconomic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29(1) (February 1997): 93–112; at 102.
8. Ibid.
9. Muhammad Rafiq al-Tamimi and Muhammad Bahjat, *Wilayat Bayrut* (vol. 1) (Beirut: Matba'at Iqbal, 1917). See Charles Anderson's discussion on this account in Charles Anderson, "From Petition to Confrontation: The Palestinian National Movement and the Rise of Mass Politics, 1929–1939," PhD dissertation (New York University, 2013).
10. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).
11. Ami Ayalon, *Reading Palestine: Printing and Literacy, 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 62. See also, Mustafa Kabha, *The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion 1929–38: Writing Up a Storm* (Edgware, UK: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007).
12. Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, 158.



13. See Stanton, "This Is Jerusalem Calling," 15; Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, 156.
14. "The Family Budget," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(13) (1 July 1935). All translations are mine.
15. Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations, Early Draft*, 5–6, as cited in Istvan Hont, "The Early Enlightenment Debate on Commerce and Luxury," in Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler, eds., *The Cambridge History of Eighteenth Century Political Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 4.
16. See Chris Hann and Keith Hart, *Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011).
17. Hont, "The Early Enlightenment Debate," 418.
18. In 1917 when the Allies occupied Palestine, they made the Egyptian pound and the British gold sovereign legal tender. The British colonial government established the Palestine Currency Board in 1927 and replaced the Egyptian gold pound and the British gold sovereign with the Palestinian pound. It is likely, however, that both the Egyptian pound or guinea were still in circulation in the 1930s. Ahmad K. Katanani, "Economic Performance of Palestine before 1948," *Dirasat* 13 (1986): 33–56; at 52.
19. Barbara Weinstein and Ricardo Lopez, eds., *The Making of the Middle Class: Towards a Transnational History* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012). See also Michael Gasper, *The Power of Representation: Publics, Peasants, and Islam in Egypt* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).
20. This was also the case in late Ottoman Beirut. See Abou-Hodeib, "Taste and Class," 481.
21. Judith Coffin points out the term "standard of living" did not appear in Europe before the 1920s. When it did emerge, its exact meaning was "far from clear" and could "variously signify a technical measure of purchasing power, an aspiration, or an entitlement." Judith G. Coffin, "A 'Standard' of Living? European Perspectives on Class and Consumption in the Early Twentieth Century," *International Labor and Working Class History* 55 (April 1999): 6–26; at 6. See also, Lawrence Glickman, "Inventing the 'American Standard of Living': Gender, Race, and Working Class Identity, 1880–1925," *Labor History* 34(2) (1993): 221–235.
22. Ayalon discusses the distinctions between *mutala'a* and *qira'a*, which both denote reading. *Mutala'a* can mean viewing, looking at, perusing, or "in William Lane's English Lexicon definition—'considering with the eyes.'" *Qira'a* connotes these meanings in addition to speaking, calling, summoning, or declaiming. *Qira'a* has throughout Islamic history served for recitation of the Qur'an. Ayalon, *Reading Palestine*, 114.
23. Julia Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 222, fn. 10.
24. A useful point of comparison would be with the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs who in the 1920s and 1930s concluded that the worker's role as head of the family was a social one to be distinguished from women's "animal instinct" to care for their young. Coffin, "A 'Standard' of Living?," 14.
25. Elyachar, *Markets of Dispossession*, 237, fn. 42.
26. "The Importance of Economics in Political Affairs," 1935.

27. *Filastin* (26 January 1941). There were nine programs in the series: “Household Management,” “The Natural Location of the Home,” “On Furniture,” “Household Planning,” “Cleanliness and Order,” “The Dining Room,” “The Economy,” “The New Kitchen,” and finally “The Maid and the Servant.”

28. Sa’id was a graduate of the American University of Beirut and the daughter of a Beirut mayor. She moved to Palestine after her marriage to a Palestinian-Lebanese man. Stanton, “*This Is Jerusalem Calling*,” 143.

29. Akram Fouad Khater, *Inventing Home: Emigration, Gender, and the Middle Class in Lebanon 1870–1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 224, fn. 88.

30. Abou-Hodeib, “Taste and Class.”

31. Khater, *Inventing Home*, 128.

32. Ibid.

33. *Filastin* (26 January 1941).

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. In her renditions of the home as kingdom, and her invocation of the English word “home,” Sa’id repeated verbatim the words of Julia Tu’ma Dimashqiyya, director of the Maqasid Islamic School for Girls, in a speech on 3 June 1910 at the Greek Orthodox Benevolent Society in Tripoli. Abou-Hodeib, “Taste and Class,” 479.

38. *Filastin* (26 January 1941). Sa’id’s “women’s kingdom” echoed an article published in Beirut forty years earlier: “The Women’s Kingdom: A Course on Domestic Politics.” Khater, *Inventing Home*, 224, fn. 79.

39. *Filastin* (26 January 1941).

40. *Filastin* (9 February 1941).

41. *Filastin* (24 January 1941).

42. Afsaneh Najmabadi quotes a woman teacher of one of the new girls’ schools in Iran at the turn of the twentieth century: “What is the difference between women of Iran and those of Europe except for science?” Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Crafting an Educated Housewife,” in Lila Abu-Lughod, ed., *Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 108.

43. *Filastin* (24 January 1941).

44. *Filastin* (23 February 1941).

45. As Omnia El Shakry has shown, *tadbir al-manzil* was common to the domesticity discourse in the twentieth century; it was the rationalization of the home as a space of order and cleanliness throughout the Middle East (and beyond). Omnia El Shakry, “Schooled Mothers and Structured Play,” in Abu-Lughod, *Remaking Women*, 143.

46. *Filastin* (24 January 1941).

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. *Filastin* (2 February 1941).

51. Sa’id’s choice to use *taglid*, or blind imitation, is noteworthy. Writers and thinkers

condemned *taqlid* throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and instead defended a pure, unadulterated Islam that was entirely compatible with modernity. (See Shakry, "Schooled Mothers and Structured Play," in Abu-Lughod, *Remaking Women*). Sa'id's brand of modernity was squarely located in a Christian framework, as discussed below, but used the broader *nahda* language of Qasim al-Amin and Huda al-Sha'rawi in envisioning modernity.

52. *Filastin* (2 February 1941).

53. *Filastin* (23 February 1941).

54. Abou-Hodeib, "Taste and Class."

55. *Filastin* (23 February 1941).

56. Ibid.

57. *Filastin* (9 February 1941).

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. *Filastin* (7 February 1941); *mahshiyyat*: vegetables and leaves stuffed with meat and rice, *mu'ajjanat*: pot pies or pasties, *maqliyyat*: fried foods, *kubba*: a kind of meatball made with bulgur, onions, minced meat, and pine nuts.

62. *Filastin* (30 March 1941).

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Sa'id was not incorrect on this point. The heavy speculation and building that took place in World War II Palestine exposed the gaps in the British educational system for Arabs. As Ylana Miller has shown, the "hastened pace of economic modern development" during World War II revealed the dearth of Arab engineers, architects, and skilled artisans. Miller quotes the district commissioner of Lydda: "This situation provides an outstanding example of the serious lack of qualified Arab engineers and technicians in this country . . . it reveals a serious fault in the educational system of the country if after twenty-five years of British administration, neither qualified engineers or artisans are obtainable." Ylana Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 158.

66. *Filastin* (30 March 1941).

67. *Filastin* (14 February 1941).

68. Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 196.

69. *Filastin* (9 February 1941).

70. *Filastin* (14 February 1941).

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. As Ellen Fleischmann shows, Palestinian women donated their jewelry in various moments of national struggle, "a not insignificant act where jewelry was a major source of security and financial independence for women." Ellen Fleischmann, *The Nation and Its "New" Women: The Palestinian Women's Movement 1920–1948* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 133; *Filastin* (14 February 1941).

75. *Filastin* (14 February 1941).
76. On Barak, *On Time: Technology and Temporality in Modern Egypt* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2013).
77. *Filastin* (23 February 1941).
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 113.
82. *Filastin* (23 February 1941).
83. See U. Kalpagam, "Temporalities, History, and Routines of Rule in Colonial India," *Time Society* 8(1) (March 1999): 141–159.
84. *Filastin* (23 February 1941).
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. *Filastin* (9 March 1941).
88. Kalpagam, "Temporalities, History, and Routines of Rule"; Barak, *On Time*.
89. *Filastin* (2 March 1941).
90. *Filastin* (26 January 1941).
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. *Filastin* (2 March 1941). Khater cites an earlier but similar rendition of home economics in 1914 Lebanon. As one writer put it, "The cause for the great gap between the peoples of the West and peoples of the East [is the relative knowledge] of home economics." Khater, *Inventing Home*, 133.
94. *Filastin* (26 January 1941).
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid. As Mary Nolan has shown, the home in Weimar Germany was an integral part of the national economy and not a sentimental sphere, as opposed to British conceptions that the home was "a peculiar sort of workplace, whose small size and frequent poverty made total rationalization an elusive goal." Housework education was a preventive remedy against economic distress, illness, demoralization, despair, and radicalism. Mary Nolan, *Visions of Modernity: American Business and the Modernization of Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 212.
98. *Filastin* (2 March 1941).
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.

107. Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," *Cultural Studies* 12(1) (1998): 82–101; at 93.

108. *Filastin* (26 January 1941).

109. *Ibid.*

110. *Filastin* (23 March 1941).

111. For a thorough critique of this historiography, see Anderson, "From Petition to Confrontation."

112. *Filastin* (16 March 1941).

113. *Filastin* (26 January 1941).

114. *Filastin* (9 February 1941).

115. *Filastin* (16 March 1941).

116. *Ibid.*

117. For a critique of the leveling power of mass culture and its transformation of different groups into one homogenized middle class, see Lizabeth Cohen's discussion of alternative modes of consuming in African American, Polish, Jewish, and Italian enclaves in the 1920s United States. Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For readings of mass culture in the Middle East, see Walter Armbrust, *Mass Culture and Modernism in Egypt* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and his edited volume *Mass Media-tions: New Approaches to Popular Culture in the Middle East and Beyond* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).

118. Consumerism as a mode of modernity has functioned, in many different contexts, as a means of social and racial differentiation. For postwar France, see Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995). The consumption of new goods by Africans, in the 1930s and 1940s, posed a serious challenge to the boundaries of racial and class privilege. Timothy Burke cites one white publisher fretting to a government commission that "Our civilization is in the shop windows, and if we don't guide them carefully, they will come and get it." Burke illustrates that African desire and usage of Western commodities, as mediated through advertisements, threatened distinctions between white/black, rich/poor, and ruler/subject. Timothy Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 102.

119. *Filastin* (9 February 1941).

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Filastin* (16 March 1941).

122. *Ibid.*

123. *Ibid.*

124. *Ibid.*

125. *Ibid.*

126. *Filastin* (23 March 1941).

127. *Ibid.*

128. *Ibid.*

129. *Ibid.*

130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 201.
133. Stephen Hugh-Jones, "Yesterday's Luxuries, Tomorrow's Necessities: Business and Barter in Northwest Amazonia," in Caroline Humphrey and Stephen Hugh-Jones, eds., *Barter, Exchange, and Value* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 42.
134. Zygmunt Bauman, "Consuming Life," *Journal of Consumer Culture* 1(9)(2001): 9–29; at 13.
135. Ibid. See also Susan Buck-Morss for an enlightening analysis of Hegel's writings on the "insatiability of needs" and the "system of needs" as a process with no qualitative limits. She also points out: "Not demand, instrumentally and rationally calculated, but desire, deceived by commodities as decoys, is the motor force of Smith's 'economy.'" Susan Buck-Morss, "Envisioning Capital: Political Economy on Display," *Critical Inquiry* 21(2) (Winter 1995): 434–467; at 458, fn. 59, and 453.
136. Carol Breckenridge and Arjun Appadurai encourage reading consumption as a work of imagination that draws attention to forms of expenditure and social identity. Carol A. Breckenridge, ed., *Consuming Modernity: Public Culture in a South Asian World* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 5.
137. For an incisive study of consumption as formative of class identity and political practices, as well as an "ongoing stratification process," see Maureen O'Dougherty, *Consumption Intensified: The Politics of Middle Class Daily Life in Brazil* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 11. For a beautifully written study on consumption, race, and poverty, see Elizabeth Chin, *Purchasing Power: Black Kids and American Consumer Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 32.
138. See here O'Dougherty's discussion of *cultura* and its connotations for the Brazilian middle class she studies. Brian Owensby's work, studying Brazil from the 1920s to 1950, also shows how the Brazilian middle class attempted to distinguish itself as superior through its claims to culture and education. Brian Owensby, *Intimate Ironies: Modernity and the Making of Middle Class Life in Brazil* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
139. This was also true in the case of the Brazilian middle class that O'Dougherty studies some fifty years later. O'Dougherty, *Consumption Intensified*.
140. Ibid., 44–45.
141. An interesting case of the ambivalence of big businessmen, local distributors, and social welfare reformers about working-class consumption is the 1930s United States, when social conservatives saw how working-class consumption could undermine traditional power relations and social structures. Meg Jacobs, "'Democracy's Third Estate': New Deal Politics and the Construction of a 'Consuming Public,'" *International Labor and Working Class History* 55 (Class and Consumption) (Spring 1999): 27–51; at 28.

## Chapter 3

1. Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, "The Famine of 1915–1918 in Greater Syria," in John Spagnolo, ed., *Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspectives: Essays in Hon-*

our of Albert Hourani (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1992), 230. For an insightful study on how World War I altered the relationship between state and citizen, see Melanie Tanielian, "Politics of Wartime Relief in Ottoman Beirut (1914–1918)" *First World War Studies* 5(1) (2014): 69–82. Revealing food as the subject of state policies, legislation, parliamentary debates, public discourse, and everyday interaction, Tanielian argues that World War I happened *to* the Middle East and not just in it. Melanie Schulze Tanielian, "Feeding the City: The Beirut Municipality and the Politics of Food during World War I," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 46(4)(Fall 2014): 737–758.

2. Ibid.

3. Charles Anderson, "From Petition to Confrontation: the Palestinian National Movement and the Rise of Mass Politics, 1929–1939," PhD dissertation (New York University, 2013), 970–971.

4. Schatkowski-Schilcher, "The Famine," 233.

5. Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 119.

6. Ibid., 178.

7. Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 84.

8. J. Adam Tooze, *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 14.

9. See Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," *American Historical Review* 112(2) (April 2007): 337–364.

10. Mitchell, *Rule of Experts*, 8.

11. The history of the economy as a bounded and external realm has a long tradition. Suffice it to say that the word originates in the Ancient Greek *oikonomia*, which meant the management of the household, although a complex division of labor that is based in markets and money can be traced back to the third millennium BCE in Mesopotamia. However, the dominant use of the term since the late nineteenth century has signified aggregates of goods and services bought and sold in national territory. Thus, economy moved from being a management of the household to a mode of governance. For economy to be produced as a separate and organic entity that could change and grow, temporalization and regulation were necessary. See Koray Çalıŝkan and Michel Callon, "Economization, Part I: Shifting Attention from the Economy Towards Processes of Economization," *Economy and Society* 38(3) (August 2009): 369–398; at 1; Louis Dumont, *From Mandeville to Marx: Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); Chris Hann and Keith Hart, *Economic Anthropology: History, Ethnography, Critique* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011); Gustavo Estava, "Development," in Wolfgang Sachs, ed., *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* (London: Zed Books, 1992); Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press); Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); U. Kalpagam, "Colonialism, Rational Calculations, and Idea of the Economy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(4) (25–31 January 1997): PE2–PE12; U.

Kalpagam, "Temporalities, History, and Routines of Rule in Colonial India," *Time Society* 8(1) (March 1999): 141–159; Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," *Cultural Studies* 12(1) (1998): 82–101; Timothy Mitchell, "Rethinking Economy," *Geoforum* 39 (2008): 1116–1121; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944); Janet Lee Roitman, *An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jean- Jacques Rousseau, *A Discourse on Political Economy* (West Valley City, UT: Waking Lion Press, 2006 [1775]); Tooze, *Statistics*.

12. Estava, "Development," 6.

13. Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

14. For examples of such projects and how they were couched in the language of moral and material development, see Aaron Jakes, "State of the Field: Agrarian Transformation, Colonial Rule, and the Politics of Material Wealth in Egypt, 1882–1914," PhD dissertation (New York University, 2014).

15. Heinz W. Arndt, *Economic Development: The History of an Idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 27–28.

16. See Jacob Norris, *Land of Progress: Palestine in the Age of Colonial Development 1905–1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Stephen Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914–1940* (London: Frank Cass, 1984); and E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939* (Hampshire, UK: Gregg Revivals, 1992).

17. Lizzie Collingham, *The Taste of War: World War Two and the Battle for Food* (London: Allen Lane, 2011), 121.

18. Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 282, 283.

19. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1996), 120.

20. Ylana Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 144.

21. Lockman, *Comrades*, 283.

22. PRO CO/859/112/6: Social Welfare Palestine: First Annual Report of Department of Social Welfare, 1945.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Norris, *Land of Progress*, 12.

25. Roza I. M. El-Eini, *Mandated Landscape: British Imperial Rule in Palestine, 1929–1948* (Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2006), 453. For a similar rendition of "military Keynesianism," see Tariq Moraiwed Tell, *The Social and Economic Origins of Monarchy in Jordan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

26. Anderson, "From Petition," 939.

27. Frederick Cooper, "Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept," in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 67.



28. Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 353.
29. Collingham, *The Taste of War*, 120. Here she is referring to Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939–1945* (London: Cape, 1969), the most-cited reference for a hagiographic account of Britain's role in World War II.
30. *Ibid.*, 11.
31. PRO CO/323/1592/39: Telegram from High Commissioner for Palestine (Harold MacMichael) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Malcolm H. MacDonald) 2 October 1938.
32. E. M. H. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation in the Middle East, 1940–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), 182. For a discussion of how Palestine went from being a net exporter to an importer of wheat, see Riyadh Mousa, "The Dispossession of the Peasantry: Colonial Policies, Settler Capitalism, and Rural Change, 1918–1948," PhD dissertation (University of Utah, 2006).
33. PRO CO/323/1592/39: Internal Notes, Colonial Office, Lee to Hewith, 16 February 1939. PRO CO/323/1592/39: Secret Memorandum from Secretary of State for the Colonies (Malcolm MacDonald) to High Commissioner for Palestine (Harold MacMichael), 13 March 1939. The author of the 1939 White Paper, MacDonald was aligned with Neville Chamberlain.
34. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."
35. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."
36. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 182. In September 1940, Italian forces bombed Tel Aviv when diverted from Haifa by British airplanes. One hundred and thirty seven people were killed. Earlier that month thirty-nine people were killed when Italian air raids hit the Istiqlal mosque in the port area.
37. George Kirk, *The Middle East in the War* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 180. See also Elizabeth Thompson, "The Climax and Crisis of the Colonial Welfare State in Syria and Lebanon during World War II," in Steven Heydemann, ed., *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
38. "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."
39. *Ibid.*
40. Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 8.
41. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska looks at how the British government administered rationing and controls and assesses its implications on consumption and dietary trends. She analyzes the public response to austerity by focusing on popular attitudes, women's experiences, and the black market. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, *Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption 1939–1955* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also see Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Rachel Duffett, and Alain Drouard, eds., *Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2011).
42. By 1942, the imposition of austerity in British colonies included, among others, Aden, Kenya, Cyprus, South Africa, Malta, Ceylon, and the Falklands. PRO CO/852/490/7: "Visit of Mr. Davies to Middle East: Report on Import and Consumption Control in Colonial Territories, 1942."

43. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 182.
44. "Visit of Mr. Davies to Middle East."
45. See Hann and Hart, *Economic Anthropology*.
46. See Julia Elyachar, "Before and After Neoliberalism: Tacit Knowledge, Secrets of the Trade, and the Public Sector in Egypt," *Cultural Anthropology* 27(1) (2012): 76–96, and Eric Andrew Schewe, "State of Siege: The Development of the Security State in Egypt During the Second World War," PhD dissertation (University of Michigan, 2014).
47. Middle East Supply Centre, "Proceedings of the Conference on the Middle East's Agricultural Development," 7–10 February 1944, Agricultural Report no. 6, 195.
48. On the heightening of Anglo-American tensions within MESC, see Robert Vitalis, *When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
49. These included Cyrenaica, Malta, Tripolitania, Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Transjordan, Aden Colony, Aden Protectorate, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, Muscat, Oman, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, British Somaliland, Eritrea, Ethiopia, ex-Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, and Sudan. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 4.
50. For an interesting account of the Free French Forces' bids for representation on the MESC, see Jennifer M. Dueck, *The Claims of Culture at Empire's End: Syria and Lebanon under French Rule* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
51. Martin W. Wilmington, *The Middle East Supply Centre* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971), 4.
52. They look in particular at the influence of the training of bureaucrats, the introduction of domestic price controls, the creation of credit facilities, the deepening of important substitution industrialization, and the establishment of a government monopsony on agricultural produce. Robert Vitalis and Steven Heydemann, "War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism: Explaining State-Market Relations in the Postwar Middle East," in Steven Heydemann, ed., *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 102. 53. Schewe, "State of Siege," 183–184.
54. Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97.
55. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 3.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., 81.
58. "An International Example," *Economist* 4 (September 1943).
59. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 218.
60. Middle East Supply Centre, "Proceedings of the Conference," i.
61. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 206.
62. R. G. A. Jackson, "Foreword," in Martin W. Wilmington, *The Middle East Supply Centre* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1971), x.
63. See Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*; Wilmington, *The Middle East Supply Centre*; and Kirk, *The Middle East*.
64. Kirk, *The Middle East*, 172.
65. These ordinances included but were not limited to Defence Regulation, 1939; Food and Essential Commodities (Control) Ordinance, 1940; Food and Essential Commodi-

ties Control Ordinance No. 2, 1940; Food Control Ordinance, 1942; Defence (Municipal Tribunals) Regulations, 1941; Defence (Prevention of Profiteering) Regulations No. 2, 1942; Defence (Prevention of Profiteering Regulations), 1944; Defence (Municipal Tribunals) (Amendment) Regulations, 1944; Supply and Service (Transitional Powers) Order, 1947.

66. Heron held both positions, according to government records and surveys. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: "Memorandum on Markets and Market Prices of Local Produce, Distribution of Food Commodities to Consumers Through a Government Agency," prepared by Sir Colonel Heron, Controller of Supplies, 28 October 1941; as well as Rhodes House, Blue Book Register: Palestine 905/12/6: "A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine, 1942–1943" (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer, 1943). See also Sandra Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation: Malaria and the Zionist Project in Palestine, 1920–1947* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 93, 135.

67. The government announced prices for basic commodities and licensed subagents on a weekly basis in the *Palestine Gazette*. For example, the issue of 17 June 1943 listed that year's subagents, which numbered thirteen smaller Arab subagents and four large Jewish subagents for wheat and barley. As listed in the *Gazette*, Galilee and Haifa districts: George Tawil and Muhammad Sharif Mansur and Sons; Jerusalem district: Yaghnani and Hamarneh and Ishaq 'Ali Hasna; Lydda district: Sharif and Mudawar, Hanna Ya'qub Sayigh; Samaria district: Jenin: Muhammad Abbushi, Nablus: Hajj Tahir al-Masri, Tulkarm: 'Abd al-Halim Gutali; Gaza and Bir al-Sabi' district: Gaza: 'Atta Shawa, Yusuf Sayigh; Bir al-Sab'i subdistrict: Hasan al-Jabir and Hasan al-Afranji. The "Sub-Agents for the Purchasing of Cereals Grown by the Jewish Farmers in Palestine" were: Hamashbir Hamerkazi Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd.; Haspaka Ltd.; Shuk Haklai, Agricultural Products Sale Co.; and Jewish Farmers Company Ltd. "Official Prices," *Palestine Gazette* (17 June 1943).

68. The cost of living index rose from 175 in January 1942 to 248 in June 1943. This was the highest point reached to that date. "A Nutritional Economic Survey," 19.

69. ISA RG9/DCI/100/8: "Annual Report: War Supply Board for the period of 1 January 1946 to 31 March 1947."

70. As the Arab Chambers of Commerce charged, the Yishuv dominated these offices. Of course, British officials ran the most important positions including Agricultural Production, Food Control, Road Transport, Price Control, Cost Accounting, and Movement Control. However Jews did dominate the wartime departments running the Lease-Lend Supplies Office; the Engineering, Building, and Industrial Materials Department; the Petroleum Products Department; as well as the following sections: Hides, Leather, and Footwear; Textiles, Diamonds, and Coal; and Coke. The one listed Arab controller was Haddad who ran the Drugs and Medical Supplies section. ISA RG9/DCI/100/8: "Annual Report: War Supply Board for the Period of 1 January 1946 to 31 March 1947." ISA RG5/EA/1456/23: Correspondence from Economic Advisor to the Chief Secretary, March 1946.

71. These included seeds and nuts (for oil and soap factories), sesame, tahini, meat, cheese, tea, coffee, beans, carobs, lentils, potatoes, dates, tin, industrial chemicals, soap, margarine, butter, tinned and fresh milk, eggs, and tobacco. The government also controlled beer, of which "only 1 percent . . . reaches civilian lips." Other commodities that were heavily controlled because their manufacture required sugar were jams, juices, aerated water, choco-

late, cocoa, artificial sweetening agents, and sugar substitutes. Coal, benzene, and kerosene were also heavily controlled. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942." The point system was subsequently expanded to include noodles, halva, tuna fish, white rusks, standard rusks, salted lakerda, camel sausage, kosher sausage, sardines, raisins, and pork. PRO FO/922/272: "Sisyphus (A Criticism on the Point System and Distribution of Foodstuffs in Palestine)," prepared by the Tel Aviv Municipality Department of Economics and Statistics, 30 June 1944.

72. Prior to the Control of Mills Order, the average flour extraction from wheat was 70 percent. The first standard flour produced consisted of "60 percent wheat flour locally milled to 85 percent flour extraction, 30 percent imported flour and 10 percent maize flour." The standard imposed on 1 June 1942 consisted of "55 percent wheat flour locally milled to 90 percent flour extraction, 35 percent imported flour and 16 percent barley flour." All "standard flour" and its by-products, bran and semolina, were controlled. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."

73. Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 338, 345.

74. *Ibid.*, 353.

75. *Ibid.*

76. Bryan Turner, "The Discourse of Diet," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 1 (1982): 23–32.

77. Middle East Supply Centre, "Proceedings of the Conference," 195.

78. Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 345.

79. Naomi Aronson, "Nutrition as a Social Problem: A Case Study of Entrepreneurial Strategy in Science," *Social Problems* 29(5) (June 1982): 478.

80. D. F. Smith is here quoting the Biological Secretary of the Royal Society W. B. Hardy. D. F. Smith, "Nutrition Science and the Two World Wars," in D. F. Smith, ed., *Nutrition in Britain: Science, Scientists and Politics in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1997), 150.

81. "A Nutritional Economic Survey," 13.

82. See Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 348, 350, 363.

83. Many figures are credited with the "discovery" of vitamins. Harmke Kamminga and Andrew Cunningham identify Casimir Funk with this achievement in 1912. Harmke Kamminga and Andrew Cunningham, "Introduction: The Science and Culture of Nutrition," in Harmke Kamminga and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *The Science and Culture of Nutrition, 1840–1940* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995). James Vernon credits American biochemist E. V. McCollum with announcing the arrival of the "newer knowledge of nutrition." Although Frederick Gowland Hopkins and Christiaan Eijkman received the Nobel Prize in 1929 for discovering vitamins, many others could be recognized for playing a vital role, including Hopkins's student Edward Mellanby who determined that rickets was caused by vitamin D deficiency. See James Vernon, *Hunger: A Modern History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 90.

84. *Ibid.*, 100.

85. Kamminga and Cunningham, "Introduction," 12.

86. David Arnold, "The 'Discovery' of Colonial Malnutrition and Diet in Colonial India," *Indian Economic and Social History Review* 31(1) (1994): 1–26; at 26.

87. Michael Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition Between the Wars," in David Arnold, ed., *Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1988).

88. For the view on the discovery of nutrition in the interwar period, see Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition." For an earlier periodization, see Arnold, "The 'Discovery' of Colonial Malnutrition."

89. Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition," 211.

90. Vernon, *Hunger*, 109.

91. Sufian, *Healing the Land*, 318.

92. Paul Weindling, ed., *International Health Organisations and Movements, 1918–39* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.

93. The hope for "universal or national benefit" is a quote from F. G. Boudreau, a League of Nations Health Organization staff member. F. G. Boudreau, "The International Campaign for Better Nutrition," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 15(2) (April 1937): 105. The vision of nutrition as a meeting ground for health and economy is found in Boudreau, citing a League of Nations report on Chile.

94. Ibid.

95. Worboys is referring here to the League of Nations Health Organization, *Report on Nutrition and Public Health* (1933). Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition," 214.

96. Audrey Richards, *Land, Labour, and Diet in Northern Rhodesia: An Economic Study of the Bemba Tribe* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1939) as cited in Worboys, who does not provide a page number. See Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition," 219. In exposing how wage labor caused male absenteeism in rural areas in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Richards was one of a handful of anthropologists who paved the way for the study of what we would come to know as "development." Hann and Hart, *Economic Anthropology*, 43–44.

97. The research subcommittee included some of the major British nutritionists in the field: Edward Mellanby, E. P. Cathcart, John Boyd Orr, T. Stanton, and Audrey Richards. Worboys, "The Discovery of Colonial Malnutrition," 225, fn. 48.

98. Vernon, *Hunger*, 113.

99. PRO CO/323/1571/3: Economic Advisory Nutrition Council, Research Subcommittee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire Draft Report, 13 January 1938.

100. Worboys, "The Discovery on Colonial Malnutrition," 219.

101. Ibid., 220.

102. Vernon, *Hunger*, 125.

103. Madeleine Mayhew, "The 1930s Nutrition Controversy," *Journal of Comparative History* 23(3) (July 1988): 452.

104. Ibid., 460.

105. League of Nations Secretariat Financial Section and Economic Intelligence Service, *Wartime Rationing and Consumption* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1942), 7.

106. PRO CO/859/112/6: Economic Advisory Council, Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire: Summary of Information Regarding Nutrition in the Colonial Empire [First Draft], 1938.

107. PRO CO/859/117/7: Social Service Palace Chambers, Nutrition: "Bavly Director of Hadassah School Luncheon to Hadassah WZO in America on the Hadassah School Luncheons, 1 October 1943 to 30 September 1943," 26 July 1944.

108. Sufian, *Healing the Land*, 287.

109. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: Controller of Supplies Memorandum on Food Rationing, 16 November 1941.

110. "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."

111. PRO FO/922/272: "Points Rationing Scheme: Talk by Assistant Deputy Food Controller to the Rotary Club of Jaffa Tel Aviv on 10.2.1944" (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer, 1944).

112. Ibid.

113. Economic Advisory Council, Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire: Summary of Information Regarding Nutrition in the Colonial Empire [First Draft], 1938.

114. PRO FO/922/272: Telegram to all territories from the Cairo Rationing Conference/Information on Palestine, 1943, n.d.

115. Zweiniger-Bargielowska, *Austerity*, 20.

116. League of Nations, *Wartime Rationing*, 64.

117. ISA RG5/EA/1457/48: "Opening Address to Iraqi Trade Delegation, February 1945."

118. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."

119. Lloyd, *Food and Inflation*, 230.

120. "Points Rationing."

121. Ibid.

122. There were four age groups for points books. Adults received books of 720 points; children age 9 to 12 received books of 600 points; children age 5 to 8 received books of 480 points; and children under a year to age 4 received books of 360 points.

123. Ibid.

124. Ideally, the circle functioned as follows: Consumers were issued points and spent them at retail centers. Importers and manufacturers submitted weekly statements of import, production, stock, and sales supported by points demand notes. Food Control issued import licenses and raw materials based on these returns. Retailers surrendered points to district point banks where 25 percent were diligently checked on a rotational basis. Every Thursday morning deputy food controllers called Food Control headquarters and gave figures of demand among retailers.

125. An earlier study was conducted by Israel Kligler, the leading Zionist microbiologist who is credited with eradicating malaria in the region. Kligler's study on nutrition was very limited in scope. Israel Kligler, A. Geiger, S. Bromberg, and D. Gurevitch, "An Inquiry into the Diets of Various Sections of the Urban and Rural Population of Palestine," *Bulletin of the Palestine Economic Society* 5(3) (1931).

126. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: *Palestine Gazette* (23 September 1943).

127. "A Nutritional Economic Survey."

128. Vernon, *Hunger*, 143.

129. "A Nutritional Economic Survey," 4.

130. Ibid., 3.

131. Ibid., 71.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., 95.

134. Ibid., 18.

135. PRO CO/859/114/2: Social Service Palace Chambers, "Nutrition in Palestine: Comment on the Report of Dr. Vickers," by G. E. F. Wood, government statistician, 22 June 1944.

136. The *wuqiya* in Egypt is 37 grams, in Aleppo it is 320 grams, in Beirut it is 213.39 grams, and in Jerusalem it is 240 grams. The *ratl* is 449.28 grams in Egypt, 462 grams in Saudi Arabia, 504 grams in Tunisia, 508 grams in Morocco, 1.785 kilograms in Damascus, and 2.566 kilograms in Beirut and Aleppo. Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Germany: Harrassowitz, 1979). The southern Palestinian *wuqiya* was closer to the Egyptian measurement, while the northern Palestinian *wuqiya* followed the Beirut measurement.

137. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: "Controller of Supplies, Memorandum on Food Rationing," 16 November 1941.

138. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: Minutes of a Meeting Held at Government Offices on 18 November 1941.

139. "Controller of Supplies."

140. The category "D" was designed for large towns comprised of family groups or individuals, but it was also applicable to rural areas. The ration coupons constituted a "half unit" of a half-kilo. A family of four adults was entitled to 1 kilo per head per month, and received 8 half units. In rural areas, a family of eight entitled to a half-kilo per head per month would receive the same card for 4 kilos. "E" was also for town areas; one whole unit of 1 kilo and one "half unit" for children would be used. In rural areas, a half-kilo card would be used for all persons. "A" was for rural areas where "consumption for family groups or individuals is below the standard," the total ration on the card and the coupon was left blank for the local authorities to fill out. Tel Aviv and Jaffa were assigned the ration card system "D." The Galilee-Acre and Samaria districts were both fully registered by family groups and assigned system "A" and "B" respectively. The Gaza district was fully registered by family groups with the name of the head of household, followed by the number of people in each family. The entry was supported by a thumbprint of the "head of household." "Controller of Supplies," 1941.

141. Rationing was the occasion for census taking in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt as well. In Greater Syria, these were to be "the first 'modern' censuses" and were later used in Syria to revise lists of eligible voters. Vitalis and Heydemann, "War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism," 123.

142. "A Nutritional Economic Survey," 4.

143. Ibid., 19.

144. Ibid., 10–11.

145. There is much more to learn about Palestinian charities, their institutions, and practices. One important venture that W. Chinn, director of social welfare, singled out for praise was the General Arab Committee for Orphans in Palestine, established in 1939 and

expanded in 1941 in Dair al-Qamar to a full-fledged orphanage. This independent effort at coordinated service, for Chinn, opened “wider prospects in the field of Arab welfare work than have hitherto been apparent.” “Social Welfare Palestine, First Annual Report of Department of Social Welfare, 1945.”

146. These included: Jerusalem, Hebron, Jaffa, Haifa, Nazareth, Acre, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Bisan, Gaza, Ramallah, and Lydda. PRO CO 859/117/7: Social Service Palace Chambers, “Nutrition: Extract of Memorandum on Activities of Department of Social Welfare,” 20 March 1945.

147. PRO CO 859/117/7: Social Service Palace Chambers, “Nutrition: Report by Dr. Clyde on Nutrition in Palestine,” 1945. The government contributed 12,000 pounds to Hadassah’s Department of Nutrition, and its 200,000-pound annual budget increased by an additional 30,000 pounds in 1943. “Bavly Director of Hadassah School Luncheon to Hadassah,” 1944.

148. PRO CO/733/449/1: Correspondence from Department of Education (Farrell) to Chief Secretary (MacPherson), 19 August 1942.

149. Ibid.

150. Frederick Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Development Concept,” in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 64.

151. “A Nutritional Economic Survey,” 12.

152. The Western protein daily allowance of 90–100 grams was adjusted to 69 grams in Palestine due to climate. (In India, the Technical Commission estimated that the basic requirement for adult women and men was 35–65 grams.) The League of Nations took a strong line on the animal protein requirement for pregnant and nursing women at 40 grams per day. Vickers claimed this was an “impossibility” in Palestine and throughout the Middle and Far East due to lack of availability and the dietary habits of most people who were “vegetarian in mind.” The average Western fat requirement was 85–125 grams per day but adjusted to 50 grams a day in “hot climates.” Ibid., 43.

153. Ibid., 43.

154. Ibid., 12.

155. “Points Rationing.”

156. “A Nutritional Economic Survey,” 13.

157. Correspondence from Farrell to MacPherson.

158. PRO CO/859/117/7: Social Service Palace Chambers, “Nutrition: Correspondence from Director of Social Welfare (Chinn) to Chief Secretary,” 7 February 1944.

159. “A Nutritional Economic Survey,” 92.

160. See Vernon, *Hunger*, 134.

161. See Rima D. Apple, “Science Gendered: Nutrition in the United States: 1840–1940,” in Harmke Kamminga and Andrew Cunningham, eds., *The Science and Culture of Nutrition, 1840–1940* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995).

162. See Naomi Aronson, “Nutrition as a Social Problem: A Case Study of Entrepreneurial Strategy in Science,” *Social Problems* 29(5) (June 1982): 474–487.



163. *Marasmic*: Uncommon adjectival form of *marasmus*, or the process of emaciation, a gradual wasting away of the body, generally associated with severe malnutrition or inadequate absorption of food and occurring mainly in young children. *Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary* (1913).

164. "A Nutritional Economic Survey," 63.

165. *Ibid.*, 61.

166. For an interesting study of shifting notions of waste and its relationship to domestic norms and modern appliances in a different context, see Susan Strasser's study of the garbage disposer in U.S. consumer culture. Susan Strasser, "The Convenience Is Out of This World: The Garbage Disposer and American Consumer Culture," in Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judd, eds., *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

167. "A Nutritional Economic Survey," 60.

168. "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."

169. *Ibid.*

170. Vernon, *Hunger*, 197.

171. Tooze, *Statistics*, 28.

172. Vernon, *Hunger*, 160.

173. Cooper, "Modernizing," 65.

174. See Cullather on Hoover here as well as Cooper and Packard on how McNamara's concern with rural poverty as he took over the World Bank in the 1970s may have been shaped by his experiences in Vietnam and his fear of rural-based revolution. McNamara's approach resonated with earlier policies when France and Britain used development to face "the threat of colonial rebellion and the spread of communism." Cullather, "The Foreign Policy"; Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, "Introduction," in Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, eds., *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 20.

175. Cooper, "Modernizing," 84.

176. Aronson, "Nutrition as a Social Problem," 483.

177. Lawrence Glickman, "Inventing the 'American Standard of Living': Gender, Race, and Working Class Identity, 1880–1925," *Labor History* 34(2) (1993): 221–235.

178. Middle East Supply Centre, "Proceedings of the Conference on the Middle East's Agricultural Development," 7–10 February 1944, Agricultural Report No. 6, 194–195.

179. Estava, "Development," 19.

180. "Standard of Living," *Economist* (4 September 1943).

181. Vernon, *Hunger*, 145.

182. In the cases of West Germany, the United States, and France, consumption functioned, particularly post–World War II, as a cultural and economic vehicle that sustained capitalism while fending off the threats of fascism and communism. Consumption held a certain utopian promise of an economic democracy where individuals could participate as good citizens, contributing to the national economy, and working to "freely" define themselves through the acquisition of commodities and lifestyles. The rhetoric that invited Europeans and Americans in the fifties and sixties to participate in an "economic democracy,"

when transposed to places like Zimbabwe, while self-evidently ridiculous were formative nevertheless. In the case of West Germany, France, and the United States, consumption meant a transfer of “sovereignty” from the state to individuals operating “freely” within the market. For minority communities in North America, as for Zimbabweans, this sovereignty rang hollow in the contexts of subordination and colonization. See Timothy Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Erika Carter, *How German Is She? Postwar West German Reconstruction and the Consuming Woman* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Elizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago 1919–1939* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Charles McGovern, “Consumption and Citizenship in the United States, 1900–1940,” in Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judd, eds., *Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

## Chapter 4

1. “Jaza Allah al-shada'id kul khair” [“May God Reward Adversity”], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 2(5) (1 February 1936).
2. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: “*Al-Lajna al-tanfidihiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*” (Brochure: Textiles Executive Committee of the Arab Conference for Palestine, Jaffa, 1 June 1944).
3. Rhodes House, Blue Book Register: Palestine 905/12/6: “A Nutritional Economic Survey of Wartime Palestine, 1942–1943” (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer, 1943).
4. Charles Anderson, “From Petition to Confrontation: The Palestinian National Movement and the Rise of Mass Politics, 1929–1939,” PhD dissertation (New York University, 2013), 1121.
5. Rashid Khalidi, “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure,” in Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12–36; at 26.
6. Jacob Metzger, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 106–111, 150–153.
7. Ibid., 96.
8. Ellen Fleischmann, *The Nation and Its “New” Women: The Palestinian Women’s Movement 1920–1948* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 197. Fleischmann cites that in 1946, 6,000 women were reported employed in the Haifa area alone. Lockman asserts that the total Arab wage labor force in Palestine was estimated at 100,000, a third of the entire Arab male population of working age. Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 267.
9. Metzger, *Divided Economy*, 111.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 106–11, 150–153.
12. Lockman, *Comrades*, 267.

13. Steven Heydemann, ed., *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

14. ISA RG5/EA/1456/23: Correspondence from Economic Advisor to the Chief Secretary, March 1946. Walsh was killed in the Irgun bombing of the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946.

15. Anderson, "From Petition," 1129.

16. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

17. Ahmad Hilmi Pasha was born in Sidon in 1878. He was a general in the Ottoman army and director general of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank in Syria and Iraq in 1908. He director the *waqf* under Hajj Amin in 1925, founded the Arab National Bank in 1930, and established the Arab National Fund in 1943. He was the first prime minister in the all-Palestine government established in September 1948 and district military governor under Jordanian rule of the West Bank. He died in Cairo in 1963.

18. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Al-Khitab alladhi alqahu ra'is al-ghurfa al-tijariyya bi-hayfa al-Sayyid Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim 'ind iftitah al-mu'tamar al-thalith 'ashar lil-ghurafat-tijariyya al-'arabiyya bi-filastin yawm al-sabt 12/5/1942*" ["The Speech Delivered by the President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim at the Commencement of the Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine held in the city of Haifa on Saturday 5/12/1942"].

19. Michelle Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Early Twentieth Century Palestine* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 6.

20. *Ibid.*, 174.

21. Rochelle Davis, "The Growth of the Western Communities, 1917–1948," in Salim Tamari, ed., *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighborhoods and Their Fate in the War* (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), 30–65.

22. F. J. Jacoby, ed., *The Anglo-Palestine Year Book: Including Also "The Middle East"* (London: Anglo-Palestine Publications Ltd., 1948), 358.

23. Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939–1948* (New York: SUNY Press, 1991), 54.

24. *Ibid.*, 52.

25. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Bayan al-masrufat wal-iradat lil-sana al-maliyya al-muntahiya fi 30 Huzayran sanat 1943*" ["Declaration of Expenditures and Incomes for the Financial Year Ending on 30 June 1943"].

26. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Taqrir majlis idarat al-ghurfa al-tijariyya al-'arabiyya fil-quds lil-sana al-khamisa al-muntahiya fi 13/5/1941*" ["Report of the Administrative Council for the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem for the fifth year ending on 13/5/1941"].

27. Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 52.

28. ISA RG9/DCI/100/13: Correspondence from N. Kayali to Assistant Commissioner for Commerce and Industry, Dajani, 5 February 1948.

29. Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Political Economy of the Jabal Nablus 1920–1948," in Roger Owen, ed., *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 138.

30. The Jerusalem Chamber had a capital of 232,769 Palestinian pounds, an annual income of 297,713 pounds, and an annual expenditure of 350,476 Palestinian pounds. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Bayan al-masrufat wal-iradat lil-sana al-maliyya al-muntahiya fi 13 Ayar sanat 1941*" ["Declaration of Expenditures and Incomes for the Financial Year Ending on 13 May 1941"]. In 1943 the capital was 245,007 pounds, the income was 518,043 pounds, and expenditure was 446,591 pounds. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Bayan al-masrufat wal-iradat lil-sana al-maliyya al-muntahiya fi 30 Huzayran sanat 1943*" ["Declaration of Expenditures and Incomes for the Financial Year Ending on 30 June 1943"].

31. NMA Mandate Documents/Chamber of Commerce 26/1: "*Shu'un al-ghurfat al-dakhiliyya 1942/43*" ["Internal Chamber Affairs 1942/43"].

32. ISA RG2/CSO/4305/22: "Representations by the Arab Chamber of Commerce Acre Regarding Salad Oil," 1945.

33. See Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, 1917–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 229.

34. 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam was a preacher from Syria who denounced the internecine factionalism of the Husayni–Nashashibi rivalry and organized dispossessed peasants, impoverished workers, and disaffected youth in various educational programs as well as military units. In Walid Khalidi's words, he was a "patriot, reformer, and religious teacher." Walid Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), 111. Qassam also provided education and religious instruction for schoolgirls and established a women's organization called Rafiqat al-Qassam [Comrades of al-Qassam]. Fleischmann, *The Nation*, 129. In 1935, Qassam "took to the hills" with a guerilla band and was killed in a clash with the police. His death and funeral were formative moments in the Palestinian nationalist movement.

35. May Seikaly, *Haifa: Transformation of Arab Society, 1918–1939* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 113–114.

36. Participants from Jerusalem: al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Bari Barakat, Shibli Jamal, Qustandi Salama, George Khadir; from Jaffa: Yusif Talib, Wahbi Tamari, Yusif al-Sawarni, 'Abd al-Majid al-Zayn; from Gaza: 'Abd al-Qimshawi, Muhammad Abu Sha'ban, Misbah al-Zamouli, Kahdir Tarazi; from Nazareth: Salih 'Awn Allah, Amin Khuri, Sim'an Nassar; from Acre: Kamil al-Mughrabi, Ahmad al-'Aki, Ahmad al-Baradi'i, and Ilyas al-Bahwa; from Nablus: 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nabulsi, Tawfiq Ahmad 'Arafat; from Safad: Ibrahim Mahmud, Fuad al-Khawli, Khalil al-Khawti; and from Haifa: the Administrative Board members [not listed by name]. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Al-Mu'tamar al-thalith 'ashar lil-ghuraf al-tijariyya al-'arabiyya bi-filastin al-mun'aqid fi madinat hayfa yawm 5/12/1942: waqa'i' jalsat al-mu'tamar*" ["The Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine held in the city of Haifa on 5/12/1942: Proceedings of Conference Session"].

37. NMA Mandate Documents/Chamber of Commerce 26/1: "*Shu'un al-ghurfat al-dakhiliyya 1942/43*" ["Internal Chamber Affairs 1942/43"].

38. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Al-Ghurfa al-tijariyya al-'arabiyya bil-quds taqrir majlis al-idara lil-sana al-sabi'a al-muntahiya fi 30/5/1943*" ["The

Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Report of the Administrative Board for the year ending 30/5/1943”].

39. Ibid.

40. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: “*Al-Khitab alladhi alqahu ra’is al-ghurfa al-tijariyya bi-hayfa al-Sayyid Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim ‘ind iftitah al-mu’tamar al-thalith ‘ashar lil-ghuraf al-tijariyya al-‘arabiyya bi-filastin yawm al-sabt 12/5/1942*” [“The Speech Delivered by the President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim at the Commencement of the Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine held in the city of Haifa on Saturday 5/12/1942”].

41. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: “*Al-Ghurfa al-tijariyya al-‘arabiyya bil-quds taqir majlis al-idara lil-sana al-sabi’a al-muntahiya fi 30/5/1943*” [“The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Report of the Administrative Board for the Year Ending 30/5/1943”].

42. Ibid.

43. NMA Mandate Documents/Chamber of Commerce 26/1: Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943.

44. Lockman addresses an emerging “car culture” in Palestine, which involved the intersection of rapidly developing motoring transportation in the late twenties and early thirties, with high gasoline prices, excessive government taxes, annual license fees, high custom duties on tires, and arbitrary traffic violations. Arab and Jewish drivers and owners, led by Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani, “a handsome young lawyer from a prominent Palestinian Arab family,” and Shraga Gorokhovsky, the director of the Histadrut (General Federation of Hebrew Labor) Cooperatives Center, organized a Vehicle Owners’ and Drivers’ Association. The short-lived association successfully led a nine-day strike in 1931. Arab and Jewish Chambers of Commerce both made appeals to the government to compromise with the drivers, and Arab and Jewish businessmen pressured the drivers to end their strike. While this moment of workers’ alliance did not lead to any lasting Arab–Jewish organization, it does show how Arab and Jewish business interests met at various junctures. Lockman, *Comrades*, 186–194.

45. “*Al-Lajna al-tanfidiyya li-mu’tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-‘arab fi filastin.*”

46. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: “*Taqir majlis idarat al-ghurfa al-tijariyya al-‘arabiyya fil-quds lil-sana al-khamisa al-muntahiya fi 13/5/1941*” [“Report of the Administrative Council for the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem for the Fifth Year Ending on 13/5/1941”].

47. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: “*Al-Ghurfa al-tijariyya al-‘arabiyya bil-quds taqir majlis al-idara lil-sana al-sabi’a al-muntahiya fi 30/5/1943*” [“The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943”].

48. Ibid.

49. “Report of the Administrative Council for the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem for the Fifth Year Ending on 13/5/1941.”

50. ISA RG2/CSO/65/15: “Arab Chamber of Commerce Representations,” 1940. The first meeting of the Executive Committee of the Arab Chambers of Commerce of Palestine was held in 1940. It was attended by ‘Abd al-Ra’uf al-Bitar, Hajj ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Nabulsi,

Shibli Jamal, and George As'ad Khadir (Khader). Membership in the Executive Committee slightly shifted three years later. See NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "Letter to the High Commissioner from the Executive Committee Office of the Conference of Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine," 1943.

51. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

52. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Hay'at majlis idarat al-ghurfa al-tijariyya al-'arabiyya bil-quds 'amm 43/44*" ["The Administrative Board of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem in 43/44"]. The Administrative Board was comprised of: Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Bari Barakat, Shibli Jamal, Shukri Dib, Qustandi Salama, Kamil Wafa al-Dajani, Antoine al-Halabi, Fu'ad al-Nashashibi, Yusuf al-Banna, Hasan Qalibu, Ilyas Jallad, Fayiz al-Muhtada, Muhammad Tahir al-Dawudi, and George As'ad Khadir. The Planning Committee for the Arab Economic Conference was comprised of: Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Shibli Jamal, al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Bari Barakat, and Qustandi Salama. The Bean Importers Committee was comprised of: Shukri Dib and Qustandi Salama. The Workers Committee was comprised of: Michelle Iykaryus, Kamil Wafa al-Dajani, and Anwar al-Nashashibi. The Retail Merchants Committee was comprised of: Muhammad Tahir al-Dawudi, Dawud Salim Ahram, Shakir al-Shakhshir, and Basili Istragalis. The Committee of Coffee Importers and Tea Distributors was comprised of: George Dib and Muhammad Tahir al-Dawudi. The Committee of Ghee Distributors was comprised of: Badr Sharaf, Muhammad Abu Hamda, Qustandi Yaghnem, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabsha, and Khalil Taqi al-Din. The Committee of Ghee Importers was comprised of: Shukri Dib and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabsha. The Committee of Textile Merchants was comprised of: al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Bari Barakat, Tawfiq Wafa al-Dajani, and 'Atallah Furayj. The Accounting Committee was comprised of: Ilyas Jallad and Fayiz al-Muhtada. The Distribution of Flour Committee was comprised of: Antoine al-Halabi, Fu'ad al-Nashashibi, and Fayiz al-Muhtada. The Committee for the Study of the Palestine Culture Project was comprised of: Qustandi Salama, Fayiz al-Muhtada, and Ilyas Jallad.

53. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

54. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

55. Supplement No. 2 to the *Palestine Gazette* (11 December 1939).

56. Ibid.

57. ISA RG2/CSO/87/19: "Representations of the Arab Chamber of Commerce to the Control Department of Post-War Trade," 1943.

58. Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943.

59. PRO CO/733/471/17: Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

60. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 117.

61. Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943.

62. Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

63. "Arab Chambers of Commerce Representations," 1940.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943.

67. "Arab Chambers of Commerce Representations," 1940.

68. ISA RG2/CSO/39/15: Correspondence from Economic Advisor to High Commissioner, 4 January 1940.

69. Ibid.

70. ISA RG2/CSO/65/15: Correspondence from Gead (Jad) M. Suidan to Chief Secretary, 1943.

71. The Standing Committee of Commerce and Industry was established in 1928 and consisted of the following British officials: the economic advisor; the director of agriculture and fisheries; the director of customs, excise, and trade; the general manager of the Palestine railways; a treasury representative; and the assistant secretary. In 1932, the following unofficial members were appointed: Tahir Qaraman, Shukri al-Taji al-Faruqi, and S. Hoofien. In 1935 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nabulsi and J. S. Shapiro were appointed. In 1936 Father A. Sacchetti was appointed. The British ultimately did not come through on promises of a rotating membership on the Standing Committee. ISA RG2/CSO/39/15.

72. PRO CO 733/471/17: Correspondence from the High Commissioner (Alan Gordon Cunningham) to the Secretary of State (G. H. Hall), 29 June 1946.

73. ISA RG2/CSO/39/15: Note of an Interview Between the Economic Advisor and a Deputation of the Arab Chambers of Conference, 17 January 1940.

74. Ibid.

75. Metzer, *Divided Economy*, 181.

76. For a study of the shift from a land-centered to a business-centered conception of income in British tax law, see Assaf Likhovski, "A Map of Society: Defining Income in British, British-Colonial, and American Tax Legislation," *British Tax Review* 1 (2005): 158–179.

77. Metzer, *Divided Economy*, 181.

78. Ibid., 188.

79. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Al-Ihtijajat wal-talabat allati qarara al-mu'tamar irsalihā ila fakhamat al-mandub al-sami*" ["The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner"]. See also: "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidihiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*."

80. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

81. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Bayan 'an wafid ghuraf tijarat al-quds wa Yafa wa Hayfa ma' al-sakritayr al-hali 13/1/43*" ["Statement of the Delegation of the Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa Chambers of Commerce to the Present [Financial] Secretary"].

82. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

83. "Statement of the Delegation of the Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa Chambers of Commerce to the Present [Financial] Secretary."

84. Ibid.

85. Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

86. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

87. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*." The committee's name in English [The Textiles Executive Committee of the Arab Conference for Palestine] is how it appears on the Arabic/English letterhead. A more accurate translation would be the Executive Committee of the Arab Textile Merchants' Conference.

88. Ibid.

89. Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

90. Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943.

91. ISA RG2/CSO/88/11: "Representations of Appeals Regarding Distribution, Allocation, and Price of Cement," March 1941.

92. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "Office of the Executive Committee of the Landowner's Conference (1943) in Jaffa: Statement to the High Commissioner."

93. Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

94. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*."

95. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

96. Ibid.

97. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*."

98. Ibid.

99. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

100. Ibid.

101. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Al-Mu'tamar al-thalith 'ashar lil-ghuraf al-tijariyya al-'arabiyya bi-filastin al-mun'aqid fi madinat hayfa yawm 5/12/1942: waqa'i' jalsat al-mu'tamar*" ["The Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine Held in the City of Haifa on 5/12/1942: Proceedings of Conference Session"].

102. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

103. Ibid.

104. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*."



105. Ibid.

106. 'abaya: a cloak-like woolen wrap; *hatta*: men's headgear; 'iqal: black headband for the *hatta*; *qunbaz*: a long-sleeved garment worn by men, open in front and fastened with a belt. Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Germany: Harrassowitz, 1979).

107. As Ted Swedenburg explains, the 1936 Great Revolt dramatically, if momentarily, overturned Palestinian status hierarchy based on rural–urban and class differences. The armed rebels of the highlands that began to operate just after the general strike took to donning the black-and-white checkered *kufiya* “as their insignia.” It provided anonymity and allowed rebels to evade capture from British forces. But when fighters slipped into towns, they became conspicuous. In August 1938, the rebels were beginning to take control of urban areas. As a result, on August 26 the rebels commanded all Palestinian townsmen “to discard the *tarbush* and don the *kufiya*.” The new headgear appeared everywhere throughout the country. See Ted Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: 1936–1939 Rebellion in the Palestinian Past* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2003), 32.

108. See Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora* for an image of the Greek Catholic lawyer, Hanna 'Asfour, who appears later in this study, alongside three other unidentified figures donning the 'abaya while in detention as a “gesture of defiance.” Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, 203.

109. The figure of the peasant as actor/symbol in the history and the historiography of pre- and post-1948 Palestine is a rich field of inquiry. Swedenburg and Rema Hammami, among others, have addressed the peasant in Palestinian nationalist narratives. There is still a great deal of work to do in rethinking “peasant studies” in the Palestinian context, where the backwardness of the rural farmer is either yet another cause for the failed nation or the symbol of the violated purity of Palestinian soil. On “peasant women” as a trope representing the lowest rank of multiple hierarchies, see Michael Gilsean, “Signs of Truth: Enchantment, Modernity, and the Dreams of Peasant Women,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 6(4) (December 2000): 597–615. On “peasant studies,” see Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). See also Rema Hammami, “Gender, *Nakbe* and Nation: Palestinian Women's Presence and Absence in the Narration of 1948 Memories,” in Ron Robin and Bo Strath eds., *Homelands: Poetic Power and the Politics of Space* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2003), 35–60; Martina Reiker, “Constructing Palestinian Subalternity in the Galilee: Reflections on Representations of the Palestinian Peasantry,” *Inscriptions* 6 (1992): [http://culturalstudies.ucsc.edu/PUBS/Inscriptions/vol\\_6/Reiker.html](http://culturalstudies.ucsc.edu/PUBS/Inscriptions/vol_6/Reiker.html); and Ted Swedenburg, “The Palestinian Peasant as a National Signifier,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 31(1) (1990): 18–30. In the European context, the disciplinary formation of ethnography was intricately linked to the study of the peasant. Nineteenth-century European nations that had colonies sent their intellectuals to “human laboratories” to develop anthropological studies of primitive societies. European nations that did not have colonies, such as Sweden, wanted to study the “primitive within.” In this way the field of ethnography was inspired by a desire to salvage a rapidly disintegrating peasant culture in order to construct a national past. For a fascinating look at the Oscarians' transformation of their subculture

into a hegemonic culture in the nineteenth century, see Jonas Frykman and Orvar Löfgren, eds., *Culture Builders: An Historical Anthropology of Middle Class Life*, trans. Alan Crozier (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

110. Palestinian southerners—"Bedouin" or residents of al-Naqab—are understudied as internal others in twentieth-century Palestine. The following excerpt from a letter of the Bir al-Sabi' National Committee to the Arab Higher Committee on 17 March 1948 speaks volumes:

. . . we are being attacked and the Jews are close to taking over all of the roads between Palestine and Egypt . . . please send someone to study the situation and keep Bir al-Sabi' Arab . . . to this day we have not seen military attention or organization, as if we are not of the people of Palestine . . . without a leader, a leadership, or direction. (ISA RG/65/AAD/990/11)

111. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

112. "A Wise Step in Palestine Economy, Better Late than Never," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 2(14) (4 April 1936).

113. Ibid.

114. Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

115. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

116. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

117. "The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Administrative Board Report for the Year Ending 30/5/1943."

118. Joseph Vashitz, "Jewish-Arab Relations at Haifa under the British Mandate," Ph.D. dissertation (Institute for Arab Studies, Giv'at Haviva, 1973), II, 2.

119. PRO BT/11/839: Revision of the Syria/Palestine Customs Agreement 1929, and the Syria/Trans-Jordan Customs Agreement 1923.

120. "The Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine Held in the City of Haifa on 5/12/1942: Proceedings of Conference Session."

121. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

122. Ibid.

123. "The Speech Delivered by the President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim at the Commencement of the Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine Held in the City of Haifa on Saturday 5/12/1942."

124. Correspondence from Emile Boutagy (Imil Butaji) to Secretary of War Economic Council, 23 November 1943.

125. Ibid.

126. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidhiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

127. ISA RG2/CSO/87/19: "Representations by the Arab Chamber of Commerce to the Control Department of Post-War Trade," 1945.

128. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

129. Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, 97.

130. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

131. ISA RG2/CSO/65/15: Correspondence from Malik al-Masri to Chief Secretary, 12 November 1943, and Correspondence from Gead (Jad) Suidan to Chief Secretary, 15 February 1944.

132. ISA RG2/CSO/65/15: Correspondence from Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim to Food Controller Walsh, 29 December 1942.

133. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidihiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

134. Ibid.

135. "The Protests and Demands to Be Addressed to His Honor the High Commissioner."

136. Ibid.

137. Ibid.

138. "The Speech Delivered by the President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim at the Commencement of the Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine Held in the City of Haifa on Saturday 5/12/1942."

139. Ibid.

140. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidihiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*"

141. ISA RG2/C/40/24: "Representations by the Arab Chamber of Commerce Regarding Protective Tariffs Imposed by Government," 1936.

142. One of the war-driven developments of Jewish industry in World War II Palestine was the diamond-cutting industry. See David De Vries, *Diamonds and War: State, Capital, and Labor in British Ruled Palestine* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).

143. Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 48.

144. Barbara J. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy, 1920–1929* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), and Metzger, *Divided Economy*, 46.

145. Metzger, *Divided Economy*, 46.

146. Ibid., 183, fn. 9.

147. Robert Vitalis, *When Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 40.

148. In 1941 the administrative council held twelve meetings; the Jerusalem Chamber received 473 letters and wrote 377 letters responding to various requests. They produced an additional 836 letters and pamphlets to members and others in Jerusalem, as well as statistical requests from the government: NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Shu'un al-ghurfa al-dakhiliyya 1942/43*" ["Internal Chamber Affairs 1942/43"]. In 1943, the administrative board held seventeen meetings, responded to 314 letters, wrote 421 letters, and certified 172 depositions for visas and licenses: NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Shu'un al-ghurfa al-dakhiliyya 1943*" ["Internal Chamber Affairs 1943"].

149. Vashitz, "Jewish–Arab Relations," II, 1.

150. "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidihiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin.*" See also the same argument in Khalidi, *Before Their Diaspora*, 102.

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Ibid.

154. "The Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine held in the city of Haifa on 5/12/1942: Proceedings of Conference Session."

155. "Internal Chamber Affairs 1942/43."
156. *Filastin* (15 December 1944).
157. "Internal Chamber Affairs 1943."
158. "Report of the Administrative Council for the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem for the Fifth Year Ending on 13/5/1941."
159. "Internal Chamber Affairs 1942/43."
160. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: Correspondence from Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim to Nablus Chamber of Commerce, 29 October 1942.
161. "The Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine Held in the City of Haifa on 5/12/1942: Proceedings of Conference Session."
162. *Ibid.*
163. "The Speech Delivered by the President of the Haifa Chamber of Commerce Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim at the Commencement of the Thirteenth Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce in Palestine Held in the City of Haifa on Saturday 5/12/1942."
164. Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.
165. *Ibid.*
166. ISA RG65/1/990/21: Correspondence from Muhammad Ahmad Gharbiya to Arab Higher Committee, 28 May 1946.

## Chapter 5

1. One definition of the "black market" is "A market in goods which are officially restricted and under official price control but where buyers and sellers defy the law to deal in greater quantities, for which they are prepared to accept higher prices. The expression is said to come from the Italian Fascist blackshirts who controlled scarce goods after 1923." Charles Arnold-Baker, *The Companion to British History* (London: Routledge, 2001).
2. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."
3. In her discussion of British colonial regulatory practices in India, U. Kalpagam has noted that regulatory practices generated the knowledge necessary for ruling but did not translate experience into social knowledge. That transformation occurred through practices such as censuses, health and epidemic control, and the collection of demographic experience. Through these practices, the life processes of birth and death changed from the metaphysical to the epistemological. U. Kalpagam, "Temporalities, History, and Routines of Rule in Colonial India," *Time Society* 8(1)(March 1999): 141–159; at 148.
4. J. F. Wright points out, however, that there were examples of the use of the cost of living in its modern sense. He discusses the trade unionist George Howell, who called for the establishment of an English Bureau of Statistics of Labour, which would deal with whether wages were changing in the same proportion as the cost of living. J. F. Wright, "Real Wage Resistance: Eighty Years of the British Cost of Living," *Oxford Economic Papers* 36 (November 1984): 152–167.
5. J. Adam Tooze, *Statistics and the German State, 1900–1945: The Making of Economic Knowledge* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 29–30.

6. Ibid., 91–92.
7. Wright, “Real Wage Resistance,” 156.
8. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Chief Secretary to Commanding General Officer, Palestine Base, 9 August 1943.
9. See Naomi Aronson, “Nutrition as a Social Problem: A Case Study of Entrepreneurial Strategy in Science,” *Social Problems* 29(5) (June 1982): 474–487. It was Wilbur O. Atwater, the founding American nutritionist and innovator of the calorimeter in 1896, who led the effort in the United States to set this ambiguous “standard of living” with the aim of containing wages “while maintaining a healthy, contented workforce.” As researchers amassed dietary surveys in the late nineteenth century, they found “an almost unclassifiable diversity of food customs.” Nick Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,” *American Historical Review* 11(2) (April 2007): 337–364; at 343.
10. See Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
11. Lawrence Glickman, “Inventing the ‘American Standard of Living’: Gender, Race, and Working Class Identity, 1880–1925,” *Labor History* 34(2) (1993): 224.
12. Kenneth Mouré, “Réalités Cruelles: State Controls and the Black Market for Food in Occupied France,” in Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Rachel Duffett, and Alain Drouard, eds., *Food and War in Twentieth Century Europe* (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 170.
13. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Report of Planning Committee on Anti-Inflation Measures, August 1943.
14. For an insightful study of the vilification of the wartime profiteer to dissuade dissatisfaction from agricultural profiteering and bureaucratic corruption in World War II Egypt, see Eric Andrew Schewe, “State of Siege: The Development of the Security State in Egypt During the Second World War,” PhD dissertation (University of Michigan, 2014).
15. Tnuva would subsequently become central to European Jewish and later Israeli constructions of industrial idealism and Zionist self-sufficiency. Tnuva provided the milk in the “land of milk and honey.” One indication of Tnuva’s hold on the post–1948 Israeli imagination is a popular children’s song about the cooperative entitled “Our Car Is Big and Green.” Fania Berstein, *Bo Elai Parpar Nehmad* [*Come to Me, Lovely Butterfly*] (Merhavia: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1945).
16. *A Survey of Palestine Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry* (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer, 1946), II, 1068.
17. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Subsidization Committee, 31 August 1943. The Palestine government’s 1946 survey lists the official membership as including Walsh (the food controller), P. J. Loftus (the government statistician), and W. F. Crawford (the MESC liaison officer). Its unofficial members were A. P. S. Clark, E. S. Hoofien, and Shibli Jamal. *A Survey*, II, 1068.
18. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: Record of a Meeting Between the High Commissioner and the Mayors of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and Haifa, 9 December 1941.
19. PRO CO/852/500/1: Supplement No. 2 to the *Palestine Gazette* (14 December 1941).

20. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: "Government Statistician Report on Food Control in Palestine, 28 March 1944."
21. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Acting District Commissioner, Samaria Secret Letter, 6 October 1943.
22. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."
23. "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."
24. Ibid.
25. Amos Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy under the Mandate* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2006), 95.
26. Ibid., 22.
27. Ibid.
28. Deborah S. Bernstein, *Constructing Boundaries: Jewish and Arab Workers in Mandatory Palestine* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 43–44.
29. Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant*, 22.
30. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Food Controller to Chief Secretary, 22 April 1943.
31. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Registrar of Cooperative Societies to Chief Secretary, 10 May 1943.
32. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies chaired this council. Its official members included the Jewish inspector of Cooperative Societies, the auditor of the Department of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, and the examiner of banks. Its nonofficial members are listed as "fourteen persons appointed by the High Commissioner." *A Survey*, II, 1059.
33. Correspondence from Registrar of Cooperative Societies to Chief Secretary, 10 May 1943.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Correspondence from Food Controller to Chief Secretary, 22 April 1943.
40. Ibid.
41. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Central Tnuva Limited (Verlinsky) to Food Controller (Walsh), 27 April 1943.
42. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Food Controller (Walsh) to Chief Secretary (Evans), 29 May 1943.
43. "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."
44. Correspondence from Food Controller to Chief Secretary, 22 April 1943.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Chief Secretary (Evans) to Food Controller (Walsh) and Price Controller (Flanagan), 20 July 1943.
48. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Chief Secretary (Dalglish) to Price Controller (Flanagan), 30 June 1943.

49. Extract from Report of Planning Committee on Anti-Inflation Measures, August 1943.

50. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Food Controller (Walsh) to Price Controller (Flanagan) and Controller of Agricultural Production, 13 September 1943.

51. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Food Controller to District Commissioners, 8 October 1943.

52. PRO CO/852/500/1: "Shanghai Municipal Council Prices Control Scheme," Report Prepared by T. S. Powell, 1 October 1942.

53. Ibid.

54. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Minutes of the First Meeting of the Transport Advisory Board, Jerusalem, 25 August 1943.

55. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Notice of Free Transport of Food, Fruit, and Vegetables, n.d.

56. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Express Food Notice from Acting Food Controller (Tours) to District Commissioners and Food Controllers in Jerusalem, Lydda, and Haifa and District Commissioners in Samaria, Galilee, and Gaza, 14 September 1943.

57. Ibid.

58. The district breakdown was the following: In Jerusalem there were six inspectors and three clerks; in Lydda there were fifteen inspectors and ten clerks; in Haifa there were two inspectors and three clerks; in Galilee there were one inspector and three clerks; in Samaria there were three clerks; and in Gaza there were one inspector and two clerks. The salary for inspectors was 240 pounds per annum and for clerks 120 pounds per annum. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Minutes of a Meeting Between District Commissioners and Food Controller, 2 October 1943.

59. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Progress Note by Acting Food Controller (Tours) to Chief Secretary (Evans), n.d.

60. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: *Palestine Gazette* (9 September 1943).

61. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from the Controller of Road Transport's Secret Letter, 7 October 1943.

62. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Chief Secretary to Inspector General of Police, 8 October 1943.

63. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Lydda District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 11 October 1943.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Telegram Correspondence from Tel Aviv Mayor (Rokach) to High Commissioner, 12 October 1943.

67. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Jerusalem District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 12 October 1943.

68. Ibid.

69. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 11 October 1943.

70. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Lydda District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 11 October 1943.

71. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Gaza District Commissioner to Food Controller, 11 October 1943.
72. Ibid.
73. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Galilee District Commissioner to Food Controller, 11 October 1943.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Acting Food Controller Note to Chief Secretary, 21 October 1943.
77. Ibid.
78. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 24 October 1943.
79. Ibid.
80. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Minutes of Price Control Meeting Held in Food Controller's Office, 17 November 1943.
81. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Chief Secretary (Robert Scott) to District Commissioners, 21 September 1943.
82. Ibid.
83. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Food Controller to District Commissioners, 8 October 1943.
84. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Galilee District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1943.
85. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Jerusalem District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1943.
86. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1943.
87. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Lydda District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1943.
88. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Gaza District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 6 October 1943.
89. Ibid.
90. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Gaza District Commissioner to Food Controller, 27 October 1943.
91. Ibid.
92. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Samaria District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 12 October 1943.
93. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Jerusalem District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 12 October 1943.
94. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 21 October 1943.
95. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Gaza District Commissioner to Food Controller, 11 October 1943.



96. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Haifa District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 24 October 1943.

97. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Controller of Agricultural Production (Stedman-Davies) to Chief Secretary, 25 October 1943.

98. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Mayor of Jerusalem (Mustafa Khalidi) to Chief Secretary, 1 November 1943.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Mayor of Acre to Chief Secretary, 26 January 1944.

102. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Secret Correspondence from Councilor (David HaCohen) and Vice Mayor (Tahir Qaraman) to Shabtai Levy, 16 October 1943. HaCohen subsequently forwarded this secret correspondence to Moshe Shertok at the Jewish Agency. The Palestine Police Force obtained the letter in "secret censorship" and forwarded it in translation to the chief secretary on 24 October 1943.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. Ibid.

107. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Palestine Police Force Headquarters to Acting Food Controller, 20 October 1943.

108. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Mayor of Jerusalem (Mustafa Khalidi) to Chief Secretary, 1 November 1943.

109. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Galilee District Commissioner to Food Controller, 11 October 1943.

110. *Filastin* (24 October 1943).

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. *Davar* (22 October 1943).

115. Ibid.

116. *Mishmar* (22 October 1943).

117. *Davar* (9 November 1943).

118. *Haboker* (9 November 1943).

119. The Vaad Leumi was the national assembly of the Jewish community in Palestine and would constitute the Israeli parliament, or Knesset, in 1949.

120. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Agricultural Worker's Organization (Histadrut) (H. Halperin) to MESC Liaison Officer (T. S. Powell), 20 October 1943.

121. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from MESC Liaison Officer (T. S. Powell) to Agricultural Worker's Organization (Histadrut) (H. Halperin), 21 October 1943.

122. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Tnuva Representative (J. Gurion) to Haifa District Commissioner (A. N. Law), 19 October 1943.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Haifa District Commissioner (A. N. Law) to Controller of Agricultural Production (Stedman-Davies), 21 October 1943.
127. Ibid.
128. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Note of an Interview Requested by Vaad Leumi with the Acting Chief Secretary, 8 November 1943.
129. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Report of Committee to Study the Cost of Vegetable Production, 19 November 1943.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Gaza District Commissioner to Food Controller, 11 October 1943.
138. Report of Committee to Study the Cost of Vegetable Production, 19 November 1943.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid.
144. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Minutes of the Third Meeting of the War Economic Advisory Council Held at the Secretariat, Jerusalem, 16 December 1943.
145. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Food Controller to Chief Secretary, 18 November 1943.
146. Ibid.
147. The rise in prices was as follows: The wholesale price of tomatoes and cucumbers (per kilo) went from 17 mils to 21 mils, and retail went from 23 mils to 27 mils; wholesale pumpkins went from 9 mils to 13 mils, and retail went from 15 mils to 19 mils. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Food Control Publicity, 17 October 1943.
148. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: *Palestine Gazette* (23 September 1943).
149. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Extract from Minutes of the Second Meeting of the War Economic Advisory Council, 2 December 1943.
150. Ibid.
151. Producers: Nafiz Husayni (Jerusalem) and I. Sekzer (Ashdot Ya'acov); wholesalers: Ribhi Mura (Jerusalem) and I. Gurion (Haifa); retailers: Sulayman Mutawalli (Jerusalem) and Aaron Bur (Jerusalem); consumers: Amin Jamal (Jerusalem) and F. Naphtali (Jerusalem). ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Price Controller (Flanagan) to Chief Secretary, 17 December 1943. Mas'ud Darhalli represented the Jaffa Municipal Council, and Moshe Schlus (Chelouche) represented the Tel Aviv Municipal Council. Colonel F. J.

Keith-Ellison represented the army. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Acting Chief Secretary to District Commissioners, 28 December 1943.

152. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Official Communiqué, 1 December 1943.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Official Communiqué, 1 December 1943.

156. ISA RG2/CSO/81/35: Correspondence from Galilee District Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 25 March 1944.

157. Alejandro Portes and Saskia Sassen-Koob, "Making It Underground: Comparative Material on the Informal Sector in Western Economies," *American Journal of Sociology* 93(1) (July 1987): 30–61; at 56–57.

158. Report of Committee to Study the Cost of Vegetable Production, 19 November 1943.

159. Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 82.

160. Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 377; Silvana Patriarca, *Numbers and Nationhood: Writing Statistics in Nineteenth-Century Italy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mary Poovey, *A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Tooze, *Statistics*.

161. Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 377–378.

162. Charles Beard, *The Open Door at Home* (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 28–29, as cited in Cullather, "The Foreign Policy," 364.

163. Robert Vitalis and Steven Heydemann, "War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism: Explaining State-Market Relations in the Postwar Middle East," in Steven Heydemann, ed., *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 107.

164. The refusal of parity was a concern throughout the Mandate period. In 1922, the Arab Executive, a committee of Palestinian Arab politicians who led the national struggle in the 1920s and early 1930s, rejected a draft constitution in which the Balfour Declaration formed part of the preamble. The delegation also objected to the composition of the proposed legislative council because the elected Arab members, both Muslims and Christians, could "always be outvoted by the combination of elected Jewish members and ex-officio members from the British Administration." Barbara Smith, *The Roots of Economic Separatism in Palestine: British Economic Policy 1920–1929* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 13.

165. *A Survey*, II, 992.

## Conclusion

1. ISA RG5/EA/1457/48: Food Controller Walsh, "Talk to Haifa Rotary Club," 15 May 1946.

2. Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," *American Historical Review* 11(2) (April 2007): 337–364; at 353.

3. Jacob Metzger, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 110–111.

4. Ylana Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 71.

5. *Ibid.*, 77.

6. Miller provides an example of village-funded educational development. She explains, The rapidity and hunger that characterized change in the forties is exemplified by Saf-Saf, which had a one room school from 1920 until 1943, when a second room was built. In 1944 villagers appointed a teacher (at their own expense), permitting the development of a fifth class, in which English was taught . . . boys from neighboring villages came to the school, bringing its enrollment to 150 in 1946. (*Ibid.*, 155)

7. Amos Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant Economy Under the Mandate* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 2006), 329.

8. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."

9. Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant*, 95.

10. PRO FO/922/163: "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."

11. *Ibid.*

12. ISA RG2/CSO/71/10: Correspondence from Mahmoud Barham to High Commissioner, 19 July 1943.

13. Arabian Villages Agricultural Society is the society's translation of *al-Jam'iyya al-zira'iyya fil qurra al-'arabiyya*. A better translation would probably be the Agricultural Society of Arab Villages. This society may have been part of the structure of Arab Cooperative Societies that the government encouraged throughout the Mandate as a failed strategy to reduce the *fellah's* dependence on the moneylender. The government, through the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, gave recommendations on which societies should receive loans from Barclay's Bank, which was the sole financial institution that dealt directly with these cooperative societies. The cooperative societies increased from fourteen in 1933 to 138 in 1948. See Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant*, 223–231.

14. These figures include Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim and 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi. See Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement, 1917–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), 74, and 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, *Watha'iq al-muqawama al-filastiniyya didd al-ihtilal al-baritani wa al-sahyuniyya, 1918–1939* [Documents of the Palestinian Resistance to the British Occupation and Zionism, 1918–1939] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968).

15. See Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 74, and 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, Documents of the Palestinian Resistance to the British Occupation and Zionism, 1918–1939.

16. The government's 1942 prices were 20 to 24 pounds per ton of wheat; 19 pounds per ton for maize; and 19 pounds per ton for barley. The Arab Agricultural Conference wanted to raise the government's set price of wheat, barley, and maize to 50 pounds per ton of wheat and 36 pounds per ton for barley and maize. ISA RG2/CSO/71/10: Telegram Dispatch from Muhammad Baidas to High Commissioner, 23 July 1943.

17. The conference conducted calculations for costs per *dunam* (1 *dunam* is 1,000 square meters) and kilograms of wheat, barley, and maize per *dunam* in Gaza, Bir al-Sabi', Lydda, Jerusalem, Tulkarm, Jenin, Nazareth, Safad, Bisan, Tiberias, Haifa, and Acre. The Arab Agricultural Conference's estimates for the cost of production per ton was 51.345

pounds per ton for wheat, 42.360 pounds per ton for maize, and 31 pounds per ton for barley. Telegram Dispatch from Muhammad Baidas to High Commissioner, 23 July 1943.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. "Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42."

21. Ibid.

22. NMA Mandate Documents/Rationing and Distribution in the Villages 21/36: Correspondence from Village Council of Tubas to Assistant District Commissioner, 14 April 1947.

23. Telegram Dispatch from Muhammad Baidas to High Commissioner, 23 July 1943.

24. Correspondence from Mahmoud Barham to High Commissioner, 19 July 1943.

25. Ibid.

26. Telegram Dispatch from Muhammad Baidas to High Commissioner, 23 July 1943.

27. Ibid.

28. Correspondence from Mahmoud Barham to High Commissioner, 19 July 1943.

29. Nadan discusses cases in the Galilee in the 1920s when moneylenders confiscated the *fellah's* land when he defaulted on loans. The *fellah* would continue farming his land but now as a tenant to the new landowner. According to the Johnson–Crosbie Committee report, family heads of Arab villages in the 1930s were split as follows: 23 percent solely owner-cultivators, 43 percent part owner-cultivators and part laborers, 29 percent non-landowner laborers, and 5 percent owners of trees only. Nadan, *The Palestinian Peasant*, 183.

30. Telegram Dispatch from Muhammad Baidas to High Commissioner, 23 July 1943.

31. Miller, *Government and Society*, 49.

32. Ibid., 149.

33. ISA RG2/CSO/71/10: Correspondence from Hanna 'Asfour to Chief Secretary, 1 October 1943.

34. "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."

35. U. Kalpagam, "Colonialism, Rational Calculations, and Idea of the Economy," *Economic and Political Weekly* 32(4) (25–31 January 1997): PE-2–PE-12; at PE-2.

36. NMA Mandate Documents/Rationing and Distribution in the Villages/21/36: Correspondence between Iqtayt, Nablus, and Jenin Assistant District Commissioners, and Samaria Deputy Food Controller, December 1946–January 1947.

37. The government team raised each villager's ration to 280 grams a month, allowing 'Awwad to retain 20 rather than 60 grams for the "general entertainment of guests." They allowed the petitioners to appoint one of their members to draw their allocations directly from Jenin. Ibid.

38. ISA RG2/CSO/71/10: Correspondence from Hawa to District Commissioner, September 1943–January 1944.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.
46. Hanna 'Asfour was a famous lawyer who acted as legal counselor for the Palestinian Arab Workers' Society (PAWS) for much of the 1930s and 1940s. PAWS moderate Sami Taha designated 'Asfour as the official delegate to the international trade union conference in London in 1945. The more radical communist-leaning Bulus Farah considered 'Asfour a "reactionary and a bourgeois." Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 318.
47. ISA RG2/CSO/71/10: Correspondence from Hanna 'Asfour to Chief Secretary, 1 October 1943.
48. According to 'Asfour, in northern Palestine a *kayl* was equal to 30 *artat* (plural, *ratl*) or 76.9 kilos. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."
53. ISA RG2/CSO/71/10: Correspondence from the People of al-Bawati to the High Commissioner, 11 January 1944.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, *Austerity in Britain: Rationing, Controls, and Consumption 1939–1955* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 97.
57. Lockman, *Comrades*, 267.
58. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: Correspondence from Mayors to High Commissioner, 23 November 1941.
59. NMA Mandate Documents/Food Control 26/2: Consumer Petition, 3 January 1946.
60. NMA Mandate Documents/Food Control 26/2: Consumer Petition to the Food Controller by Way of the Mayor of Nablus, 15 September 1946.
61. NMA Mandate Documents/Food Control 26/2: Correspondence from Mayor of Nablus (Tuqan) to Samaria District Commissioner, 15 September 1946.
62. Consumer Petition to the Food Controller by Way of the Mayor of Nablus, 15 September 1946.
63. ISA RG2/CSO/65/15: Correspondence from Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim to Food Controller (Walsh), 29 December 1942.
64. The few attempts at joint Arab–Jewish associations during the war were short-lived. A coffee trader association, for example, lasted for two months in 1942. "Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942."
65. Correspondence from Mayors to High Commissioner, 23 November 1941.
66. Ibid.
67. PRO FO/922/272: "Sisyphus: (A Criticism on the Point System and Distribution of Foodstuffs in Palestine)," prepared by the Tel Aviv Municipality Department of Economics and Statistics, 30 June 1944. This report was a detailed and dramatic memorandum on the points system, which divided Palestine into ambiguous and overlapping categories

of the “Oriental,” the “illiterates,” and the “Europeans.” In this report, the figure of the Arab was simultaneously illiterate and wily, oppressed but successful nevertheless in depriving European Jews of their “fair share.”

68. PRO CO/852/500/1: Supplement No. 2 to the *Palestine Gazette* (14 December 1941).

69. PRO CO/852/500/1: Principal Secretary of the State for the Colonies (Viscount Cranborne) to High Commissioner for Palestine, 8 September 1942.

70. PRO CO/852/500/1: Internal Notes, S. Abrahams, 2 April 1942.

71. Ibid.

72. “Food Control Progress Report to 31.6.42.”

73. There were 139 people fined less than 50 pounds, 14 people were fined 100 pounds, 10 people were fined more than 100 pounds, and an additional 139 people were imprisoned without the option of paying a fine. “Food Control Report for Quarter Ending 30 September 1942.”

74. ISA RG2/CSO/4331/8: Correspondence from Price Controller (Flanagan) to Chief Secretary (B. G. Bourdillon), 15 March 1944.

75. PRO CO 733/471/17: Correspondence from the Haifa Chamber of Commerce to the Right Honorable Secretary of State for Colonies Through His Excellency the High Commissioner, 30 September 1945.

76. ISA RG9/DCI/120/2: Colonial Secretary Secret Memorandum to the Government of Palestine, 29 November 1945.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1996), 123.

82. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: “*Al-Ghurfa al-tijariyya al-‘arabiyya bil-quds taqrir majlis al-idara lil-sana al-sabi’a al-muntahiya fi 30/5/1943*” [“The Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem Report of the Administrative Board for the Year Ending 30/5/1943”].

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Colonial Secretary Secret Memorandum to the Government of Palestine, 29 November 1945.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. ISA RG2/CSO/88/11: Correspondence from Chief Secretary to Controller of Heavy Industries, October 1946.

89. The commodities slated to return to “normal commercial channels” were coffee, tea, vegetable oils and oil seeds, fats, soap, fertilizers, cereals, animal feeding stuffs, cereal products, citric and tartaric acid, cocoa, dairy and poultry, essential oils, fish, dried fruit, and meat. ISA RG2/CSO/87/37: Memorandum from Chief Secretary to the British Goodwill Trade Mission to the Middle East, 26 November 1945.

90. ISA RG9/DCI/100/13: Michel Tuma's correspondence is dated 21 October 1947; the Argaman Textile Dye Works Ltd. correspondence is dated 31 July 1947.

91. ISA RG9/DCI/100/13: Correspondence from N. Kayali to Assistant Commissioner for Commerce and Industry (Dajani), 5 February 1948.

92. ISA RG9/DCI/100/17: Excerpt from *Ha'aretz* economic correspondent, n.d.

93. ISA RG2/CSO/433/8: High Commissioner Dispatch on Defence (Prevention of Profiteering Regulations), 1944.

94. ISA RG2/CSO/433/8: Correspondence from Chief Secretary (B. G. Bourdillon) to Price Controller (Flanagan), 4 March 1944.

95. ISA RG9/DCI/1-1/1-18: Correspondence from Director of Department of Commerce and Industry to Chief Secretary, 24 June 1947.

96. Ibid.

97. The "outlying areas" that the flying squads targeted included Bethlehem, Ramallah, Bayt Jala, and 'Ayn Karim in the Jerusalem district; the Tel Aviv suburbs of the Lydda district; Hadera, Kiryat Haim, and Kiryat Motskin in the Haifa district; Acre, Naharia, Tiberias, Bisan, and Samakh in the Galilee district; Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin, and Netanya in the Samaria district; and Gaza and Majdal in the Gaza district. ISA RG9/DCI/100/6: Price Controller's Monthly Report for November 1946.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. The table detailing "Prosecutions in November" are divided into districts (Jerusalem, Lydda, Haifa, and "Rural") and crimes ("non-exhibition of prices," "profiteering and overcharging," and "other"). Ibid.

101. ISA RG9/DCI/100/6: Chief Secretary Dispatch on Supplies and Services (Transitional Powers) Order, 1947.

102. A. J. Sherman, *Mandate Days: British Lives in Palestine 1918–1948* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 254. Fitzgerald discussed the postwar period as "the Reconstruction Era" that required the reform of the British legal system in Palestine. Assaf Likhovski, *Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 75.

103. Edward Said, "Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims," *Social Text* 1 (Winter 1979): 7–58; at 22.

104. See Melanie McAllister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

105. For more on this debate see: Joel Beinin, "No More Tears: Benny Morris and the Road Back from Liberal Zionism," *Middle East Research and Information Project* 34 (Spring 2004): <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer230/no-more-tears>. Retrieved 14 December 2014; Zachary Lockman, "Original Sin," in Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds., *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press, 1989); Nur Masalha, "Debate on the 1948 Exodus: A Critique of Benny Morris," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Autumn 1991): 90–97; Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington, DC: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1992); Joseph Massad, *The Persistence of the Palestinian Question: Essays on Zionism and the Pales-*



*tinians* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 27(3) (August 1995): 287–304.

106. Said, "Zionism," 36.

107. Tarif Khalidi, "Palestinian Historiography: 1900–1948," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 10(3) (Spring 1981): 59–76; at 62.

108. NMA Mandate Documents/Chambers of Commerce 26/1: "*Al-Lajna al-tanfidiyya li-mu'tamar tujjar al-aqmisha al-'arab fi filastin*" (Brochure: Textiles Executive Committee of the Arab Conference for Palestine, Jaffa, 1 June 1944).

109. Miller, *Government and Society*, 20. Miller refers in particular to Yusuf Haykal, *al-Qadiya al-filastiniyya: tahlil wa naqd* [*The Palestinian Case: Analysis and Criticism*] (Jaffa, 1937).

110. Weldon C. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006).

111. T. P. Malouf, "The Role of Scientific Research in the Development of Palestine," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* [English Issue] 1 (22) (15 November 1935).

112. "Al-mar'a wal iqtisad" ["The Position of Women in Economic Life"], *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(5) (5 March 1935).

113. Ibid.

114. *Filastin* (9 February 1941).

115. "The Family Budget," *Al-Iqtisadiyyat al-'arabiyya* 1(13) (1 July 1935). All translations are mine.

116. Malouf, "The Role of Scientific Research."

117. Qustantin Zuraiq, *Ma'na al-nakba* (Beirut: Dar al-'Ulum al-Malayin, 1948), 45.

118. Ibid., 10.

119. Jacob Metzger, "The Economy of Mandatory Palestine: An Overview of the Development of Research," in A. Bareli and N. Karlinski, eds., *Economy and Society in the Mandatory Period* (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2003 [in Hebrew]); and Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948."

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