
External and Internal Terror: The Effects of Terrorist Acts and Economic Changes on Intimate Femicide Rates in Israel

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Abstract

Most studies dealing with the effects of security stress (e.g., stress caused by war or terrorist attacks) on crime rates have tended to focus on violent crime in general. This article adds to the existing literature by extending the focus to the effect of security and economic stressors during the Second Intifada in Israel on intimate femicide. In addition, the study investigates temporal patterns in the representation of intimate femicide rates among various groups in Israeli society. The results show that during the Second Intifada, intimate femicide rates among immigrants from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union were significantly higher than in the preintifada period. Furthermore, the findings indicate that intimate femicide committed with a firearm among immigrants significantly increased during the course of the intifada period.

Keywords

intimate femicide, terrorism, economic changes, domestic violence, Israel, intifada, security stressors, immigrants, handguns

Most studies dealing with the effects of security stress (e.g., stress caused by war or terrorist attacks) on crime rates have tended to focus on violent crime in general (Fishman, 1983; Landau, 1998; Landau & Pfeffermann, 1988; Linsky, Bachman, & Straus, 1995; Ross, 1985; Sela-Shayovitz, 2005). This study focuses on a unique period in Israeli society, the Second Intifada, to examine whether external macrostressors associated

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with this time frame affected intimate femicide rates. The term *intifada* refers to the violent Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which have been under Israeli military control since 1967. The First Intifada took place between 1987 and 1993. After this, the Palestinian National Authority was established in 1994, pursuant to the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli government. In September 2000, the Second Intifada erupted, largely due to the failure of the Camp David political negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis (Pressman, 2003). During the Second Intifada, there was an intense wave of suicide terrorist attacks; 197 human bombers self-detonated and 475 terrorists were arrested on their way to committing suicide bomb attacks (Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Intelligence Center, 2008). Although the Second Intifada never ended officially, there has been a significant decrease in the number of suicide attacks inside of Israel's borders since 2005, mainly due to the erection of the security barrier, which consists primarily of concrete walls (Sachs, Sa'ar, & Aharoni, 2007). Israel also has been subject to an economic crisis largely brought on by the Second Intifada. This period was characterized by an unprecedented decline in economic indices, high unemployment rates, and a rise in economic inequality (Swirski, 2005).

Security has been one of the most central and problematic social stress factors affecting the country and impacting national morale, the economic situation, immigration, and crime (Landau, 2003). Research on the effects of security stressors has focused on violent and property-related crime and on short-term periods of conflict (Archer & Gartner, 1984; Landau, 1998; Landau & Pfeffermann, 1988; Linsky et al., 1995; Ross, 1985; Sela-Shayovitz, 2005). Studies show that poverty, unemployment, and social inequality lead to increased violent crime rates and overall criminal activity in society. Similarly, during periods of harsh economic conditions, such as high levels of unemployment or high social inequality, violent crime rates as well as property crimes tend to increase (Brenner, 1977; Herzog, 2005; Kramer, 2000; Melossi, 1998). Few studies, however, have analyzed the effect of security threats on domestic violence (Sachs et al., 2007; Shaloub-Kevorkian, 2004).

In Israel, intimate femicide rates are relatively lower than in other industrialized countries (on average 0.25 per 100,000; Landau & Rolef, 1998; Sela-Shayovitz, in press). A scrutiny of intimate femicide rates in Israel during the years 1990-1995 also indicates that immigrant populations from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia are highly overrepresented. A marked increase in femicide in 1991 following the Persian Gulf War (Landau & Rolef, 1998) led to the enactment of the Law for the Prevention of Family Violence (1991) in the Israeli Knesset. According to this law, women can obtain an immediate court order barring a violent husband from entering the home for up to 3 months. This legal procedure provides battered women with an effective instrument to protect them from imminent physical danger from an abusive family member (Landau & Rolef, 1998). Due to pressure applied by women's movements, a special parliamentary committee was also established and resulted in expanded welfare services, an increased number of shelters for battered women, additional hotlines (in different languages), placement of police investigators trained in the field of domestic

violence at every police station, and expanded law consultation centers for victims (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Women, 2004; Shadmi, 2003). Moreover, despite the Israeli government's general policy of cutting the welfare budget during the intifada period, the domestic violence budget was increased by 50%, amounting to approximately US\$10 million (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Women, 2004).

In view of the above circumstances, Israeli society is an excellent laboratory for analyzing the effects of war on human behavior (Landau, 2003; Sela-Shayovitz, 2005). The specific Israeli situation provides a unique opportunity to examine whether intimate femicide rates increased during the Second Intifada because of security-related stress factors that resulted from the social and economic changes in Israeli society during this time. The study also explores whether intimate femicide rates differed for immigrant women, specifically those from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union, because of the unique challenges these women face not only due to security-related stress but also because of the intersection of immigration status and other social structural variables. Finally, based on research that suggests that access to weapons is a major risk factor for femicide (Campbell et al., 2003; Frye, Manganello, Campbell, & Walton-Moss, 2006; Kropp, 2008), this study examines whether there were significant differences in cases of intimate femicide committed with firearms before and during the intifada period.

Theoretical Framework

Several theoretical approaches seek to explain the effects of security stressors. The traditional cohesion hypothesis (Coser, 1956; Selye, 1956; Simmel, 1955) argues that an external threat has a strengthening and unifying effect on society. External threat leads to a temporary decrease in existing internal social conflicts, such as violent crime. Therefore, in times of increased security-related stress, crime rates temporarily decrease as a result of these external pressures (Archer & Gartner, 1984; Landau, 1998; Landau & Pfeffermann, 1988). In contrast, the legitimization-habitation hypothesis (Archer & Gartner, 1984) contends that loss and death tolls generated by war lead to a devaluation of human life so that violent acts receive a certain legitimization and come to be accepted as part of the social framework. Thus, crime rates are expected to increase during periods of war or terrorist activity (Landau, 1998; Landau & Pfeffermann, 1988). Most studies support the legitimization-habitation hypothesis and indicate that during periods of conflict, rates of violent and property-related crime increase (Archer & Gartner, 1984; Fishman, 1983; Landau, 1998; Linsky et al., 1995; Ross, 1985; Sela-Shayovitz, 2005).

Feminist discourse offers further insight into the relationship between security stress and crime rates. Specifically, intersectional theory (Baca Zinn & Thornton Dill, 1996; Collins, 2000; Crenshaw, 1991; Higginbotham, 1997) suggests that women in general may be more vulnerable than men to the effect of macrostressors. This approach implies that coping with security stress is mediated by power relations within society, mainly

with respect to gender, ethnicity, and social class. Findings confirm this hypothesis and indicate that the effect of security stress on crime involvement and victimization differs among various social groups (Blanchard, 2003; Goldstein, 2001). Accordingly, women who are members of a minority or belong to marginalized groups tend to be more vulnerable to the security situation (Sachs et al., 2007). Examination of the impact of the Second Intifada on vulnerability to assaults among Palestinian-Israeli¹ and Jewish-Israeli women supports the intersectional hypothesis. The findings indicate that gender, poverty, minority status, and nationality exacerbate the trauma resulting from security stress. Palestinian-Israeli and immigrant women (from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia) are overrepresented among victims of both armed violence and domestic violence (Sachs et al., 2007).

The militarization approach also addresses domestic violence, specifically suggesting that crime rates are higher in countries where boundaries between the military and society are highly permeable (Adelman, 2003; Albanese, 2001; Shaloub-Kevorkian, 2004). Accordingly, men who possess weapons obtained through their employment in the security forces may be more inclined to use them against their female partners (Sachs et al., 2007). Findings confirm this hypothesis and indicate that following the first years of the Second Intifada (2000-2003) there was a dramatic increase in domestic violence in Israeli society. During this period, women's applications to court to obtain protective orders increased by 57% (Nagar, 2006).

In addition to security stressors, economic stressors are also a major factor that affects violent crime rates. Research shows that poverty, unemployment, and social inequality have considerable impact and lead to increased violent crime rates and overall criminal activity in society. During periods of harsh economic conditions, such as high levels of unemployment or high social inequality, violent crime rates as well as property crimes tend to increase (Brenner, 1977; Herzog, 2005; Kramer, 2000; Melossi, 1998). Rates of violence against women are higher in areas of greater overall economic distress and disruption (Flake & Forste, 2006; Jewkes, Levin, & Penn-Kakana, 2002). Women who live in areas of greater overall economic distress and disruption are subject to higher homicide victimization rates (Vieraitis, Britto, & Kovandzic, 2007). Furthermore, economic dependency on a batterer and women's perception that they must stay and suffer to assure an adequate income for themselves and their children (Bui & Morash, 1999) is a primary reason why women remain in abusive relationships (Anderson & Saunders, 2003; Kim & Gray, 2008).

Masculinity theory (Bourgois, 1996; Connell, 1987, 1995) also focuses on economic distress but considers the ways patriarchal relationships in the family and a failure to earn an adequate income may frustrate men who fail to perceive themselves as proper men. As a consequence of the frustrated masculinity syndrome, some men may use violence against women to achieve masculine ideals of control and power (Bui & Morash, 1999). Some findings support the frustrated masculinity syndrome, indicating that the disparity of a woman partner's higher occupational status or level of education may threaten the man, which is subsequently translated into marital tension and may lead to husband violence (Nash, 2005).

Migration is another risk factor related to violence against women and intimate femicide (Abraham, 2000; Crenshaw, 1991; Erez, Adelman, & Gregory, 2009; Erez & Bach, 2003; Landau & Rolef, 1998). Migration leads to multiple sources of distress, such as, unemployment, underemployment in low-income jobs, downward mobility, intergenerational tension, and a different pace of integration between husbands and wives—all of which can intensify violence against women (Abraham, 2000; Ben-David & Lavee, 1994; Bui & Morash, 1999; Erez et al., 2009). The interaction among the variables of lower socioeconomic status, limited power in the new society, gender inequality, cultural disparity, and racial inequality all may affect violent victimization among immigrant women (Crenshaw, 1991; Erez et al., 2009). Furthermore, lower socioeconomic status and immigrant men's lack of economic power, which may consequently result in women taking on roles previously associated with traditional (hegemonic) forms of masculinity (e.g., the family provider), may lead men to engage in violence to reinforce their dominant position in the family (Bui & Morash, 1999).

Having delineated the theoretical framework of the impact of macrostress factors on violent crime and particularly violence against women, the following discussion elaborates on stress factors during the period in Israeli society covered in this study.

Stress Factors in Israeli Society

After the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the security stress factor in Israel increased due to an intensive wave of suicide terrorist attacks. The greatest number of suicide attacks took place outside shopping malls, on buses, and at street corners. These attacks turned civilian life into a battlefield and affected internal violence levels in Israel (Landau, 2003; Sela-Shayovitz, 2005). The distribution of terrorist attacks by regions shows that suicide terrorists struck all over Israel. Jerusalem was the main target (approximately one third of the suicide attacks), although other big cities such as Tel Aviv and Haifa also suffered from severe terrorist attacks. The northern part of the country and the lowlands region were also a target for many terrorist actions (Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Intelligence Center, 2008).

The Second Intifada took a heavy economic and social toll on Israeli society. It led to an ongoing economic recession as well as an unprecedented decrease in economic indices. In the first 3 years of the intifada (until December, 2003), there was a 5% decrease in Israel's GDP per capita, whereas in 2004 the Israeli economy showed signs of a moderate recovery, and at the end of 2005, the GDP index returned to its preintifada level. It should be noted that Israel's GDP per capita rises by an annual average of 3% (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005). Findings show that during the years 1997-2006, the Israeli economy grew by 43%, whereas the U.S. economy expanded by 68% and the E.U. economy increased by 67% (Swirski, Konor-Atias, & Abu-Khala, 2008).

Although it can be assumed that the Israeli economy was also affected by the global economic decline at the end of the 20th century, studies have indicated that terrorist attacks had a direct influence on Israeli economy. Eckstein and Tsiddon

(2004) demonstrated how terrorism explains changes in Israeli economic trends. They found that high rates of terrorism had a statistically significant negative impact on the short-term dynamics of the economy (e.g., output, consumption, investment, and exports). Furthermore, during the first 3 years of the intifada, the output per capita declined by more than 5%, whereas (nondurable) consumption per capita declined by more than 10% (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004).

Analysis of these economic trends indicates that economic damage was particularly evident in the extent of foreign investments (a 28% decrease in investments), tourism (a 25% decrease in revenues), and in the increase in unemployment rates (a 4% increase in unemployment among the general population). The rise in unemployment rates during the Second Intifada was felt primarily among new immigrants from the former Soviet Union (prior to the intifada, 10.2%; during the course of the intifada, 13.5%) and Ethiopia (prior to the intifada, 12.8%; during the intifada, 18%; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2005; Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2003).

The intensity of terrorist attacks during the intifada led to an expansion of security services in public institutions and private businesses. This expansion enabled new immigrants to find jobs with security companies that did not require specialized knowledge or education. During the first 3 years of the intifada, there was an increase of 50% in the number of immigrants from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia who were employed as security guards. In 2003, 45% of the security guards hired by these companies were immigrants, and to date the extent of the immigrants among the security guards has increased to 60% (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2003; Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2009).

The security threat posed by the intifada resulted in an increase in the government's security budget (approximately US\$10 billion), which was achieved by cutting the budget in other areas, mainly education, health, and welfare. As a consequence of this policy, social services to disadvantaged population groups were largely eliminated. For example, since the outbreak of the intifada and until 2005, unemployment benefits were slashed by 47% (Swirski, 2005). Moreover, findings indicate that women reported that their economic status was more vulnerable over the course of the intifada: 39.8% of women responded that their economic situation had worsened, and 17% reported that they were afraid of losing their homes due to debts or loss of a source of income. However, many more Jewish women (29%) than Palestinian women (22.5%) reported that economic susceptibility was the source of their deteriorating situation (Sachs et al., 2007). Therefore, the impact of economic stressors on low-socioeconomic status groups, new immigrants, and women especially was severe.

Demographic changes are also a significant source of social stress in Israel, which is essentially a society of immigrants (Landau, 1998; Shuval & Leshem, 1998). During the past 3 decades, two massive waves of immigration settled in Israel: Approximately, 1,100,000 new immigrants arrived from the former Soviet Union and 75,000 arrived from Ethiopia (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2008). Yet immigration from

the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia happened over time, with two significant waves from each region. Furthermore, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia are very different, and each population displays its own variety of personal, economic, social, and cultural characteristics (Amir & Horovitz, 2003). However, it is important to note that, concurrent with these two waves of immigrants, the Israeli government policy with regard to the absorption process changed from a centralist bureaucratic model to a direct individual model. This policy aimed to reduce governmental involvement in the absorption process and services provided for immigrants. As a result, the role of social networks and immigrant voluntary organizations became more prominent (Leshem & Lissak, 2000).

The Ethiopian immigrants came to Israel in two major waves: in the early and mid-1980s and the larger wave of immigrants in the early 1990s. Most of the immigrants who arrived in the first wave came as small groups from the same district and as families, whereas in the second wave many immigrants had family members who were left behind in Ethiopia and many children arrived without their parents (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2003). Yet the Ethiopian immigrants have had a turbulent and traumatic migration process, which involved individual and collective experiences of loss in many areas, including family, family roles, friends, language, self-sufficiency, property, and sense of identity (Lerner, Mirsky, & Barasch, 1994). Research shows that the majority of Ethiopian immigrants arrived in Israel without a formal education and that they are employed in low-paying jobs that do not require an education or professional skills. Furthermore, there have been no significant changes in the past decade in Ethiopian immigrant unemployment rates, which are 10% higher than Israeli-born residents (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2009). Another main difficulty experienced by Ethiopian immigrants relates to their transition from traditional rural to a modern industrial society. Ensuing changes led to transformations in Ethiopian women's roles in the domestic and public spheres. Ethiopian women often find employment more easily than men, particularly in temporary unskilled jobs. However, the transformation in women's roles are the main source of conflict among immigrant couples and may lead Ethiopian men to engage in violence to reinforce their dominant position in the family (Weil, 2004).

The first wave of Russian immigrants arrived in Israel during the early 1970s, whereas the large wave of immigrants came during the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These two waves of immigrants are different mainly in the motivation for absorption and their linkage to Judaism. The motivation of the immigrants in the first wave was viewed as ideological Zionist, and they had stronger links to Judaism, whereas the motivation of the second wave was more of a pragmatic cost-benefit consideration, and they were less linked to Judaism (Al-Haj, 2004; Shuval & Leshem, 1998). The following description focuses on the former Soviet Union immigrants who arrived during the 1990s. Prior to immigration, two thirds of these immigrants were employed in scientific or academic jobs, which placed them in a better

situation in the absorption process. Nevertheless, Israeli professional markets are highly saturated, and former Soviet Union immigrants possess less technical and social skills (such as computers and foreign languages, respectively) than their Israeli counterparts. Consequently, many of them are unemployed or have low-paying jobs that are unrelated to their qualifications (Sosklone & Shtarkshall, 2002). In addition, their rate of employment in the academic professions is 50% lower, and their income is 30% lower than native-born Israelis (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2009). Thus, downward mobility, loss or deterioration of informal social networks, and intergenerational tension in extended families are the main sources of conflict among immigrant couples from the former Soviet Union (Remennick, 2004; Sosklone & Shtarkshall, 2002). It should be noted that in Soviet Russian society masculinity was traditionally defined by the men's status and position at work. Moreover, in post-Soviet Russian society, men and women still perceive men as providers, although they are not the sole breadwinners (Ashwin, 2000). Thus, loss of employment or a dramatic fall in earnings during the migration process may undermine Russian immigrant men's experience of masculinity (Kay, 2006). In addition, findings show that among these two groups of immigrants, the first 5 years of residence are critical in terms of femicide incidence. Furthermore, prior complaints of spousal violence among former Soviet Union immigrants were filed in 27.4% of the cases, and for Ethiopian immigrants, antecedent complaints were filed in only 16.7% of the femicide cases.

Moreover, half of the femicide cases (50%) among former Soviet Union immigrants occurred during the course of an argument between the partners, whereas the dominant motive among Ethiopian immigrants was economic problems (45.8% of the cases). The women's wish to end the relationship was the main reason of 19% of the femicide cases among former Soviet Union immigrants and 4.2% among Ethiopian immigrants (Sela-Shayovitz, *in press*). The findings regarding prior complaints of spousal violence are consistent with previous studies, which show that battered immigrant women are often reluctant to report crime and to cooperate with authorities due to an intricate combination of cultural, social, and legal reasons (Erez et al., 2009; Erez & Hartley, 2003). Thus, the literature suggests that the interaction between immigration difficulties, distress, and macrolevel stressors during the *intifada* made immigrants especially vulnerable and thus had an effect on femicide rates.

In summary, during times of war or terrorist activity, violent crime and domestic violence tend to increase. Moreover, poverty and economic distress have a considerable impact on victimization of women in violent intimate relationships. The period of the Second *Intifada* significantly differs from any other in Israeli history, primarily due to the fact that it involved multiple and intensive terrorist attacks. This period took a heavy economic and social toll on Israeli society and specifically affected immigrants and minority groups, who tend to be more vulnerable to this type of situation. The present study contributes to the existing literature through an analysis of the effect of macrolevel stressors on the microlevel crime of intimate

femicide. Based on the theoretical framework presented above, three research hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis 1: Intimate femicide rates are expected to increase significantly during the Second Intifada period. This hypothesis is based both on the legitimization hypothesis as well as on the militarization approach and previous research (Adelman, 2003; Albanese, 2001; Archer & Gartner, 1984; Fishman, 1983; Landau, 1998; Linsky et al., 1995; Sela-Shayovitz, 2005; Shaloub-Kevorkian, 2004).

Hypothesis 2: Intimate femicide rates will be significantly higher among two groups of immigrants (from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union) than among Israeli-born Jews and Arabs during the intifada period. This hypothesis is in light of the intersectional theory, which implies that coping with security stress is mediated by power relations within society and also based on previous research (Abraham, 2000; Erez et al., 2009; Erez & Hartley, 2003; Landau & Rolef, 1998).

Hypothesis 3: Rates of intimate femicide committed with a firearm are expected to increase significantly during the intifada period. This hypothesis is based on the militarization approach as well as on previous studies (Adelman, 2003; Albanese, 2001; Shaloub-Kevorkian, 2004).

Research Method

This study was based on the “natural experiment” created by the Second Intifada period and examines the impact of this period on intimate femicide rates. Theoretically, it would have been desirable to conduct a linear regression model that would include the effect of the security situation variable (such as, the monthly number of terrorist acts) and economic changes on intimate femicide rates. However, fitting an ordinary linear regression model assumes a normal distribution on the dependent variable, which did not exist in this case. Thus, the present analysis aimed to examine whether there were significant differences in intimate femicide rates between the preintifada period and the intifada period among various groups in Israeli society.

Data were based on monthly homicide and intimate femicide rates recorded in the official statistical records of the Israel police for the period 1995-2005. It should be noted that it was not possible for me to obtain data relating to intimate femicide prior to 1995. The data related only to cases in which women were killed by their intimate partner. Incidents involving honor killings among Israeli Arabs were therefore not included because, according to local Arab norms about gender and social control, in these cases the woman must be killed by a member of her own paternal nuclear family—usually her father or brother—and not by her husband (Landau & Rolef, 1998). Figures relating to intimate femicide committed with firearms were based on the statistical reports of the Israeli association that combats

violence against women. This data set does not contain any personal factors relating to the individual victims or perpetrators (except the ethnicity variable). In almost all cases (except two), the offender and victim were members of the same social category (e.g., Israeli-born Jews, Russian or Ethiopian immigrants, and Israeli Arabs). Intimate femicide rates for various population groups were calculated in relation to rates among the general population for each of the years examined in the study using data obtained from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Accordingly, three levels of analysis were used.

First level of analysis. The first level of analysis focused on the temporal patterns of annual homicide and intimate femicide rates in Israel for the period 1995-2005. This analysis also included the temporal patterns of intimate femicide rates among various groups in Israeli society (Israeli-born Jews, immigrants from Ethiopia, immigrants from the former Soviet Union, and Arabs) for each of the years examined in the study.

Second level of analysis. The second level of analysis aimed to examine whether there were significant differences in intimate femicide rates before and during the intifada period. At this level of analysis, the data were based on the monthly intimate femicide rates of the ethnic groups. Because a normal distribution assumption was inappropriate in this case, a *t* test for two independent samples was also not appropriate, as the required assumptions of normality could not be met (see Freund & Walpole, 1987). Therefore, the suitable alternative test was the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon two-sample test, which does not assume any parametric model on the data. This test determined whether the differences in intimate femicide cases between the two periods (before and during the intifada) were statistically significant. Furthermore, this test is not only sensitive to changes in location but also to changes in distribution (Siegel & Castellan, 1988).

Third level of analysis. The third level of analysis aimed to examine whether there were significant differences in cases of intimate femicide committed with firearms before and during the intifada period. In all of the femicide shooting cases over the past decade (with the exception of one case), the weapon was licensed to the partner. Furthermore, because the number of intimate femicide committed with firearms was small in each of the ethnic groups, the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon tests examine whether there were significant differences between immigrants (both from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union) and Israeli-born citizens (Jews and Arabs) before and during the intifada period.

Results

Figure 1 represents the temporal patterns of annual rates of homicide and intimate femicide rates for the years 1995-2005 in Israel. It reveals that following the first 2 years of the Second Intifada there was a considerable increase in homicide rates. As can be seen, no substantial differences were found for intimate femicide, although




Figure 1. Annual rates of all homicides and intimate femicide in Israel: 1995-2005 (1:100,000)

there was a slight rise during the first period of the intifada. Yet there is also a relative rise in homicide rates between 1996 and 1997. It should be noted that there were more terrorist acts in 1996 than in the subsequent three years.

Table 1 presents the proportions of various social groups in the Israeli population and their respective representation among intimate femicide offenders before and during the intifada period. The findings demonstrate that there is a large social-ethnic division between Israeli-born citizens (Jews and Arabs) and immigrants in the commitment of femicide. Although Israeli-born citizens are prominently underrepresented among femicide offenders, the two immigrant groups (from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia) are highly overrepresented. The findings show that this trend of underrepresentation among Israeli-born citizens occurred prior to the Second Intifada as well as during the Second Intifada period. Arabs are underrepresented by almost 47% during the Second Intifada period.

Table 1. Proportions of Various Social Groups in the Population and Among Intimate Femicide Offenders, 1995-2005, in Percentage ($N = 145$)

Social group	Average proportion in the population	Preintifada period		Intifada period	
		Proportions among femicide offenders	Over/under representation among femicide offenders	Proportions among femicide offenders	Over/under representation among femicide offenders
Israeli-born Jews	65.4	37.7	-42.3	35.5	-45.7
Russian immigrants	14	33.3	137.8	35.5	153.5
Ethiopian immigrants	0.9	15.9	1666.5	18.5	1,955.5
Arabs	19.7	13.1	-33.5	10.5	-46.7

Table 2. Intimate Femicide Among Various Groups in Israeli Society Before and During the Second Intifada Period ($N = 145$)

Social group	Pre-Second Intifada period			Second Intifada period			Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test
	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Israeli-born Jews	26	4.33	1.63	27	4.5	1.4	0.82
Ethiopian immigrants	11	1.83	0.75	15	2.33	1.21	0.02*
Russian immigrants	23	1.79	1.94	26	2.32	1.07	0.01*
Arabs	9	1.5	1.04	8	1.33	0.51	0.94

Note: Preintifada period: Jan 1995-Aug 2000; intifada period: Sept 2000-Dec 2005.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

As can be seen, former Soviet Union immigrants are overrepresented by 137.8% in the period prior to the Second Intifada and by 153.5% during the Second Intifada period. The relative overrepresentation of Ethiopian immigrants during the Second Intifada period is 20 times higher than their proportion in the population. These findings are in line with previous research showing high overrepresentation of the two immigrant groups among intimate femicide offenders (Landau & Rolef, 1998). Table 2 presents the differences in mean intimate femicide rates before and during the Second Intifada period among various population groups in Israel. The results in Table 2 reveal that the mean of intimate femicide cases among immigrants from the former Soviet Union during the Second Intifada ($M = 2.32$) is significantly higher than the mean during the preintifada period ($M = 1.79$). In addition, Ethiopian immigrants' intimate femicide rates are significantly higher during the second intifada period in comparison to the preintifada period ($M = 2.33$ vs. $M = 1.83$, respectively). Conversely, no significant differences were found in mean intimate femicide cases before and during the intifada among Israeli-born Jews ($M = 4.33$ vs. 4.5, respectively) and among Arabs ($M = 1.5$ vs. $M = 1.33$, respectively).

The findings in Table 3 demonstrate that cases of intimate femicide committed with firearms among immigrants were significantly higher during the intifada period in comparison to the preintifada period. The results show that the highest increase was found among Ethiopian immigrants who are overrepresented by 2,677.7%. Former Soviet Union immigrants are overrepresented by 150%. As can be seen, no significant differences were found between the two periods among Israeli-born Jews and Arabs, although there is a relative increase in firearm-perpetrated femicide among Israeli-born Jews during the intifada. Finally, the findings show that there was only one case of firearm-perpetrated femicide among Arabs. This can be explained by the fact that this particular social group generally does not have legal access to weapons in Israel because of security reasons.

Table 3. Intimate Femicide Cases by Firearms, Before and During the Second Intifada Period, in Percentage ($n = 31$)

Social group	Pre-Second Intifada period			Second Intifada period			Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test
	N	Proportions among femicide offenders	Over/under- representation among femicide	N	Proportions among femicide	Over/under- representation among femicide	
Israeli born	5	63.6	-2.75	8	40	-38.8	0.07
Jews	—	—	—	1	5	-99.9	
Arabs	5	27.2	94.2	7	35	150	0.05*
Immigrants	1	9.2	922.2	4	20	2,677.7	
Russian							
Ethiopian							

Note: Preintifada period: Jan 1995-Aug 2000; intifada period: Sept 2000-Dec 2005.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

Discussion

This article presents the findings of an exploratory study describing the effect of macrolevel stressors (e.g., security and economic pressures) during the Second Intifada period in Israel. According to the first hypothesis, intimate femicide rates were expected to increase during the intifada period; however, these expectations were not corroborated by the data. The results show that although there was a significant increase in homicide rates following the first years of the intifada, no substantial differences were found in the aggregate level of intimate femicide over the analyzed period. It is possible that these findings are the result of the changes in domestic violence policy that occurred during the studied period. As mentioned, Israeli law enables the court to issue an immediate restraining order barring a violent husband from entering the home (Landau & Rolef, 1998; Shadmi, 2003). In this context, previous findings have shown that warrantless arrest laws have been associated with a decrease in femicide rates (Campbell, Glass, & Sharps, 2007; Dugan, Nagin, & Rosenfeld, 2003).

Another possible explanation relates to the expansion of welfare services and prevention programs for domestic violence during the intifada period (Shadmi, 2003). However, despite these changes, the current findings show that intimate femicide rates did not decline. Thus, in line with the stress-support model (Landau & Beit-Hallahmi, 1983), it may be suggested that the Israeli social support system acted as a mediator between the two macrolevel stressors—terrorist attacks and economic recession—and the reactions they were presumed to generate.

The current study indicated that there was a significant increase in immigrant intimate femicide rates during the intifada. These results support the second hypothesis and indicate that Russian and Ethiopian immigrant women were particularly vulnerable to femicide, and their risk of being victims of femicide increased during the intifada period. A possible explanation for these findings relates to the availability of social services to immigrants who are less integrated in society. Based on domestic violence literature, it can be argued that despite the remarkable expansion of domestic violence services in Israel, these services failed to serve or reach battered immigrant women. Studies show that various causes might lead to this failure, such as the immigrant woman's lack of knowledge of the law and the existence of social services. Additional factors might be an insufficiency of translation services in criminal justice agencies and a lack of trust in the law enforcement system or social services (Bui, 2004; Erez et al., 2009). Furthermore, battered immigrant women are often reluctant to report crime and cooperate with authorities due to an intricate combination of cultural, social, and legal reasons (Erez et al., 2009; Erez & Hartley, 2003). They have to struggle with a number of barriers, such as embarrassment and shame about exposing their abuse and seeking assistance, reluctance to break up families, emotional and economic dependency on batterers, and a fear of myriad forms of violence (Erez et al., 2009). However, in view of the results of this study, the extent of the availability of social services to battered immigrant women in Israel requires further scrutiny.

In line with the intersectional theory, it may be suggested that coping with security and economic stressors is mediated by societal power relations. Accordingly, the interaction between macrostress factors during the intifada and gender inequality, low socioeconomic status, marginality, cultural disparity, and ethnic inequality, led to an increase in femicide victimization among immigrant women. Moreover, the literature shows that immigrants were specifically affected by the economic recession, which resulted from the security situation (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003). Thus, it may be assumed that economic pressures and migration stressors interacted to make Russian and Ethiopian immigrants especially vulnerable during the period of the intifada.

From the perspective of the masculinity theory, it may be suggested that coping simultaneously with both economic hardship and the absorption process reinforced the frustrated masculinity syndrome of immigrant men and in turn affected femicide rates. Notwithstanding the substantial differences in cultural, social, and economic background between immigrants from the former Soviet Union and those from Ethiopia, the literature shows that men from both groups may experience masculinity frustration (Ashwin, 2000; Weil, 2004). Thus, based on the literature and as a theoretical supposition, it may be assumed that immigrant intimate femicide was also affected by the frustrated masculinity syndrome, which was exacerbated by economic hardship.

The results also indicate a significant increase of intimate femicide rates involving firearms among immigrants during the intifada period. It may be assumed that the accessibility to firearms through the work in security companies affected the rates of intimate femicide committed with firearms. Although not every security guard is armed, the majority of them have access to firearms through their work (Israel Parliamentary Committee on the Status of Immigrants, 2009). Furthermore, the findings show that there was also a considerable increase of firearms femicide among Israeli-born Jews. These results clearly support the militarization approach and demonstrate that during periods of high-risk security the boundaries between military and society are highly permeable, and external violence may spill over into domestic violence. Another robust finding that supports this hypothesis is the fact that in all of the femicide shootings over the past decade (with an exception of one case), the partner had legal possession of the weapon. Thus, weapons obtained in consequence to external terror may in turn be utilized for internal terror, ultimately leading to femicide.

Notwithstanding the above explanations, it is important to bear in mind that this study analyzed the effects of security and economic stressors on intimate femicide rates over a relatively short time period. Moreover, the persistence of economic stressors in Israel complicates efforts to follow trends throughout the entire period. These limitations highlight the need for further research on the topic. In addition, the current study did not analyze the effect of changes in domestic violence policies on intimate femicide rates and the availability of social services to battered immigrant women in Israel. Expanding analysis to encompass these factors, as well as to the effects of further variables such as demographic factors relating to the victims and the perpetrators, would add to existing knowledge on the subject, in addition to shedding new light on the effect of national macrolevel stressors on intimate femicide rates.

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1. The term *Palestinian-Israeli* relates to Arab citizens of Israel, as some of the Arab citizens refer to themselves as Palestinians.

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