JCSS Study no. 16

The Intifada: Causes and Effects

Aryeh Shalev

First published 1991 by Westview Press

Published 2019 by Routledge

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Copyright © 1991 Tel Aviv University

Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

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ISBN 13: 978-0-367-29322-2 (hbk)

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)

The Center for Strategic Studies was established at Tel Aviv University at the end of 1977. In 1983 it was named the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Mel Jaffee. The objective of the Center is to contribute to the expansion of knowledge on strategic subjects and to promote public understanding of and pluralistic thought on matters of national and international security.

The Center relates to the concept of strategy in its broadest meaning, namely, the complex of processes involved in the identification, mobilization and application of resources in peace and war, in order to solidify and strengthen national and international security.

International Board of Trustees

Chairman: Melvin Jaffee

Immediate Past Chairman: Joseph H. Strelitz (deceased)

Robert H. Amow, Arnold Y. Aronoff, Newton D. Becker, Jack Berlin, Henry Borenstein, Edgar M. Bronfman, Simon Chilewich, Bertram J. Cohn, Stewart M. Colton, Lester Crown, Joseph K. Eichenbaum, Danielle and Shimon Erem, Allan Fainbarg, Dr. Gerald Falwell, Jacob Feldman, Arnold D. Feuerstein, David Furman, Guilford Glazer, Burton E. Glazov, Eugene M. Grant, Vernon Green, Martin J. Gross, Michael M.H. Gross, Irving B. Harris, Betty and Sol Jaffee, Philip M. Klutznick, Judy and Joel Knapp, Fred Kotek, Raymond Kulek, Max L. Kunianski, Mark Lambert, Rose Lederer, Fred W. Lessing, Morris L. Levinson, Edward Levy, Peter A. Magowan, Judd D. Malkin, Hermann Merkin, Stephen Meadow, Monte MonAster, Max Perlman, Milton J. Petrie, Gary P. Ratner, Raphael Recanati, Meshulam Riklis, Morris Rodman, Elihu Rose, Malcolm M. Rosenberg, Irving Schneider, George Shrut, Marvin Simon, Ruth Sinaiko, Walter P. Stern, Dr. Robert J. Stoller, Leonard R. Strelitz, James Warren, David Warsaw, Jack D. Weiler, Marvin A. Weiss, Emanuel A. Winston, Bert Wolstein, Paul Yanowicz

Contents

Summary

Preface

Introduction

Chapter One: Causes of the Uprising

Underlying Causes

Immediate Causes

The Israeli Factor

Conclusion

Chapter Two: Historical Background

The Arab Revolt of 1936–39

The Algerian War of Independence

Earlier Unrest in the Territories

Conclusion

Chapter Three: Violent Struggle and Civil Disobedience

Objectives

Violent Aspects

Women in the Uprising

Central Direction

Civil Disobedience

Conclusion

Chapter Four: The IDF and the Uprising

IDF Objectives

Impact of Military and Other Tactics

Materiel and Ordnance, and their Impact

IDF Punitive Measures and their Impact

Impact of Civil Administration Measures

Conclusion

Chapter Five: Ramifications of the Uprising

Domestic Ramifications in Israel

The Palestinian Issue on the International Agenda

Israeli Responses

Economic Repercussions in the Territories

Economic Repercussions in Israel

Social Upheavals in the Territories

Ramifications for Israel’s Arabs (excluding East Jerusalem)

Conclusion

Chapter Six: Strategic Implications for the Future

Stopping the Violence

Decline of the IDF’s Deterrent Profile

A Political Breakthrough?

Basic Dilemmas Stemming from the Israeli Initiative

Epilogue

Notes

Appendices

Appendix 1 (table)
Disturbances in Judea-Samaria and Gaza, 1967–1987

Appendix 2 (table)
Violent incidents in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada

Appendix 3 (table)
Israeli casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada

Appendix 4 (table)
Palestinian casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada

Appendix 5
Leaflet no. 9 issued by the UNL of the Popular Uprising

Appendix 6
Leaflet no. 28… “The Call of Independence”

Appendix 7 (table)
Number of incidents in Jerusalem Area monthly from December 1987 to March 1989

Appendix 8 (table)
Number of incidents of arson in Judea-Samaria and Gaza

Appendix 9 (table)
Number of houses demolished or sealed in Judea-Samaria and Gaza from December 1987 to May 1989

Appendix 10 (table)
Petrol bombs thrown in Judea-Samaria and Gaza from December 1987 to June 21, 1989

Appendix 11 (table)
Palestinians exiled from Judea-Samaria and Gaza, from December 1987 to June 21, 1989

Appendix 12
The Mubarak Plan

Appendix 13
The Shultz Initiative

Appendix 14
The PNC Declaration of Independence of Palestine

Appendix 15
PNC Political Statement Calls for Settlement of Arab-Israel Conflict, International Conference

Appendix 16
Excerpts from Remarks made by Salah Khalaf at a Closed Meeting of the Palestinian National Council

Appendix 17
Arafat’s Statement at Press Conference in Geneva

Appendix 18
Shultz Says US Prepared for Dialogue with PLO

Appendix 19
The Israeli Government Peace Initiative

About the Author

Tables

Table 1
Numbers of Palestinians in the Territories under detention during the first year and a half of the intifada

Table2
Comparative data regarding numbers of terrorist acts and petrol bomb incidents in Jerusalem in 1986, 1987,and 1988

Table3
Effect of house demolitions on scope of violent incidents during following month

Table4
Effect of deportations on scope of violent incidents during following month

Table5
Incidents in Judea-Samaria when schools were open/closed

Table6
Violent incidents and casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza: 1988-1990

Cover

Title

Copyright

CONTENTS

Summary

Preface

Introduction

Chapter One: Causes of the Uprising

Underlying Causes

Immediate Causes

The Israeli Factor

Conclusion

Chapter Two: Historical Background

The Arab Revolt of 1936–39

The Algerian War of Independence

Earlier Unrest in the Territories

Conclusion

Chapter Three: Violent Struggle and Civil Disobedience

Objectives

Violent Aspects

Women in the Uprising

Central Direction

Civil Disobedience

Conclusion

Chapter Four: The IDF and the Uprising

IDF Objectives

Impact of Military and Other Tactics

Materiel and Ordnance, and their Impact

IDF Punitive Measures and their Impact

Impact of Civil Administration Measures

Conclusion

Chapter Five: Ramifications of the Uprising

Domestic Ramifications in Israel

The Palestinian Issue on the International Agenda

Israeli Responses

Economic Repercussions in the Territories

Economic Repercussions in Israel

Social Upheavals in the Territories

Ramifications for Israel’s Arabs (excluding East Jerusalem)

Conclusion

Chapter Six: Strategic Implications for the Future

Stopping the Violence

Decline of the IDF’s Deterrent Profile

A Political Breakthrough?

Basic Dilemmas Stemming from the Israeli Initiative

Epilogue

Notes

Appendices

Appendix 1 (table) Disturbances in Judea-Samaria and Gaza, 1967–1987

Appendix 2 (table) Violent incidents in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada

Appendix 3 (table) Israeli casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada

Appendix 4 (table) Palestinian casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada

Appendix 5 Leaflet no. 9 issued by the UNL of the Popular Uprising

Appendix 6 Leaflet no. 28… “The Call of Independence”

Appendix 7 (table) Number of incidents in Jerusalem Area monthly from December 1987 to March 1989

Appendix 8 (table) Number of incidents of arson in Judea-Samaria and Gaza

Appendix 9 (table) Number of houses demolished or sealed in Judea-Samaria and Gaza from December 1987 to May 1989

Appendix 10 (table) Petrol bombs thrown in Judea-Samaria and Gaza from December 1987 to June 21, 1989

Appendix 11 (table) Palestinians exiled from Judea-Samaria and Gaza, from December 1987 to June 21, 1989

Appendix 12 The Mubarak Plan

Appendix 13 The Shultz Initiative

Appendix 14 The PNC Declaration of Independence of Palestine

Appendix 15 PNC Political Statement Calls for Settlement of Arab-Israel Conflict, International Conference

Appendix 16 Excerpts from Remarks made by Salah Khalaf at a Closed Meeting of the Palestinian National Council

Appendix 17 Arafat’s Statement at Press Conference in Geneva

Appendix 18 Shultz Says US Prepared for Dialogue with PLO

Appendix 19 The Israeli Government Peace Initiative

About the Author

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Guide

Cover

Title

Copyright

CONTENTS

Start of Content

Notes

Appendices

About the Author

Summary

The uprising is a war being waged by the Palestinians against Israel for control and rule in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The war is being prosecuted not only by the hard core of youthful activists; this is a broad “popular” war being fought against Israeli rule by virtually the entire population of the Territories. The beginning of the uprising took both Israel and the PLO by surprise. It is being centrally directed and it can be regarded as the Palestinians’ war of independence against Israel.

The interaction of basic conditions that worsened over time, together with circumstantial factors, triggered the violence of December 1987. Of the basic elements, the most important was the Palestinians’ national desire to divest themselves of Israeli rule, and the knowledge that external forces (the PLO, Jordan, other Arab states) will not solve the problem for them. A second motivating factor was the harsh living conditions in the Gaza Strip refugee camps, affecting a considerable proportion of the population in that region. To this must be added the organizational infrastructure created by the Palestinians in the preceding years and greatly expanded since the late 1970s; it was the driving force of the uprising. Once these basic elements had ripened, the rioting was sparked by a series of immediate or circumstantial causes. In terms of the basic factors, the uprising could have erupted a few months before December 9, 1987, or a few months later.

The riots that broke out on December 9, 1987 spread rapidly, became increasingly violent, and within days had become a full-fledged uprising. The Palestinians’ success was made possible by a number of Israeli mistakes, in part strategic and in part tactical. One was the very fact that the Israeli authorities were surprised that a popular uprising could erupt, and their confidence that the IDF could quell it using the means and methods that had been applied in past disturbances. Another was the failure to designate one single body as responsible for providing a general and national appraisal of trends and developments in the Territories. Yet another mistake was the failure to bring significant reinforcements into the Territories during the first two weeks of the rioting, a move that was obligatory, even on the basis of past experience (let alone in the case of a mass uprising). Finally, initial oscillations in operative policy regarding manifestations of civil disobedience allowed the uprising to develop.

The central strategic long-term goal of the uprising is to put an end to Israeli rule and establish a Palestinian state. Aware, however, that this is not feasible in the immediate future, the Palestinians have set short- and intermediate-term objectives aimed at “accumulating points” by preserving the momentum of the struggle and setting up a self-rule system in the Territories, thus progressing by stages toward the strategic goal.

The primary characteristics of the violent struggle are its duration, with no end yet in sight; its support by the vast majority of the population; its comprehensive geographical scope, encompassing all of Judea, Samaria, Gaza and East Jerusalem, and manifesting itself in every city and many villages; its intensity, with an average of about 60 violent incidents per day, directed chiefly at Israeli soldiers and civilians traveling in the Territories (most of the Israeli fatalities have been civilians); the large number of Palestinian casualties inflicted by the security forces’ countermeasures (by mid-1989 about 550 killed and 6,500 wounded, an average of one fatality and 12 persons wounded per day); large-scale riots by thousands in the first months, gradually declining to hundreds, dozens, and finally a handful in each demonstration, in the wake of the IDF’s actions; boldness and determination evinced by rioters far beyond anything known in the past; the avoidance of reliance on firearms in the course of disturbances, while terrorism continued separately; and the existence of a central organizing echelon that transmits its instructions to the population via leaflets and radio broadcasts from Arab states and over Radio Monte Carlo.

Manifestations of civil disobedience have supplemented the violent struggle almost from the outset, although the success of measures such as work stoppages has been at best partial due to certain basic limitations. The major problem in this regard is that much of the population derives its income solely from work in Israel, and no alternative is available. The aim of the civil disobedience campaign is to support the violent struggle and reduce Israel’s control in the Territories. Civil disobedience has taken diverse forms: general strikes; commercial strikes; a tax revolt (largely unsuccessful, due to pressures exercised by the Civil Administration); the resignation of most local policemen; the institutionalization of PLO organizations in the Territories; and the establishment and consolidation of supreme councils for the entire West Bank. The civil disobedience campaign is not all-inclusive and does not extend to all spheres of life. Its purpose is not to cause havoc in the Territories, but rather to demonstrate Israel’s inability to exercise control in many areas and to build an infrastructure for self-government, with a view to the establishment of a future Palestinian state.

Military actions and measures taken by the IDF within the framework of the law and the national consensus in Israel (including curfews and clampdowns, the use of riot batons, tear gas, rubber and plastic bullets, and in some cases live fire), and measures imposed in the civilian sphere by the Civil Administration, have proved unsuccessful in stopping the violence. The result is a weakening of Israeli control in the Territories. The IDF did manage to end the violent mass demonstrations in which hundreds or thousands took part. But the selective use of punitive measures that had a powerful impact during disturbances in the past — such as deportation, house demolition and the closing of schools — has proved largely ineffectual during the intifada.

The uprising constitutes the first significant success of the Palestinians for many years, and as such is fraught with political implications. Although the population in the Territories is experiencing considerable hardship, the balance of achievements and prospects far outweighs the price paid, with the result that the intifada has gone on unabated for a very lengthy period.

For many months, the State of Israel and the IDF have been conducting operations aimed at stopping the violence, according to the rules of conduct that prevail in a struggle against civilians. Effectively, Israel has been engaged in a military — and political — holding operation in the Territories, and has lost points in the struggle. Overall, time is working against Israel. The IDF’s deterrent image has been significantly hurt in its operations against the rioters. To this must be added the blow to the army’s morale and the scaledown in the IDF’s preparations for a possible future war due to the reduced training time available for units serving in the Territories. Although the IDF has continued to deter Arab states, and Syria in particular, from going to war, the longer the uprising continues with the IDF seen as unable to suppress it, the greater will become the danger of a decline in the IDF’s deterrent capability vis-a-vis the Arab states and their armed forces.

Basic contradictions between the sides seem to preclude a political breakthrough in the near future. In consequence, the intifada will continue. The emerging conception among the Palestinians is to continue the uprising: they assess that they have the ability to do so and that the population is capable of enduring much greater suffering than the current level. They believe that polarization inside Israel will thus be heightened and pressures generated that will eventually compel the government to agree in advance that a final settlement accord the Palestinians full sovereignty in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. However, the Palestinians’ assessment of the impact of the uprising and its violent aspects is fundamentally flawed and mistaken. True, internal polarization has grown, but at the same time the Israeli Right has been strengthened.

The continuation of the uprising has placed a considerable strain on Israel, the IDF and the Jewish population in the Territories, and this will be further aggravated in the future. Jewish settlers will intensify their active involvement against violence aimed at Jewish civilians in the Territories. The upshot will be an intensification of the confrontation, violent and otherwise, between the Jewish and Arab populations, and between the settlers and the IDF. Another serious ramification of the uprising is its incipient embrace of Israel’s Arab sector, manifested in the perpetration of acts of violence against Jewish targets inside the Green Line.

Clearly, Israel must consider every possible means to stop the violence in the Territories. It is unlikely that the military means and methods employed to date, even if they are stepped up, will produce the desired result. The integrated use of four nonviolent methods has a chance of eliciting positive results, despite their potential for causing considerable damage to Israel’s image. Underlying these four modes is the notion that the exertion of very heavy economic pressure on the entire population of the Territories might break its will to continue the uprising. These are admittedly and undeniably punitive measures of a collective nature; they are not aimed at selected point targets. This, because the uprising long ago became a strategic campaign, borne by the majority of the population. The four suggested measures are (1) to prevent the residents of the Territories from working in Israel; (2) to close the two bridges over the Jordan River; (3) to impose on a single town or city, where disturbances have been particularly intense and flagrant, a prolonged curfew of several months’ duration; and (4) a comprehensive and all-embracing effort by Israel to prevent the PLO from smuggling funds into the Territories to fuel the uprising.

Another crucial sphere of struggle is the political. The primary objective in stopping or significantly moderating the violence is to prevent additional damage to Israel. However, in the current state of political deadlock, a change of this kind in the field might well create the necessary conditions for the commencement of a political process, and could improve Israel’s bargaining position in negotiations.

The PLO was able to take advantage of the uprising to place the Palestinian problem on the international agenda and keep it “hot” for an extended period. Since the start of the intifada, the PLO has shifted its main effort from armed struggle against Israel (although this continues) to a popular political struggle. For the first time, the PLO in late 1988 expressed itself in moderate terms, notably in asserting its readiness for a peace settlement with Israel on the basis of two states coexisting side by side. This helped bring about a change in the US attitude, as manifested in the US-PLO dialogue.

The uprising, despite or perhaps because of its violent aspect and its success (in Palestinian eyes), has brought closer the start of political negotiations, as Israel, too, has grasped that the continuation of the status quo poses high risks. Israel found it necessary to come up with its own initiative for negotiations on an interim agreement between Israel and a Palestinian representation from the Territories whose members would be chosen in free and democratic elections. According to this framework plan, negotiations on a permanent settlement would begin following several years of an interim settlement.

After the publication in May 1989 of the Israeli government’s initiative, and during the subsequent political process, Israel’s political situation somewhat improved, with a concomitant regression from the Palestinians’ standpoint. About a year later, a continuation of political and geostrategic developments put an end to the process. Since then, both Israel and the Palestinians continue to face tough decisions. Their principal disagreement is over the substantive connection between the interim settlement and the permanent settlement: the Palestinians find it exceedingly difficult to reach agreement on an interim settlement without prior agreement on the essence of the final settlement, while Israel cannot commit itself in advance to Palestinian sovereignty in the Territories as part of a final settlement. Even a US undertaking (in itself improbable) supporting the Palestinians may not satisfy them. The positions of the two sides regarding an interim agreement derive from their conflicting principles concerning the terms of the final settlement. At this stage neither side appears capable of making the necessary concessions of principle that will enable the start of negotiations on the first stage of an autonomy plan.

Preface

In early 1988 I undertook, at the behest of the head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Major General (res) Aharon Yariv, to write a study of the Palestinian uprising, the intifada, that had erupted toward the end of the previous year.

Collection of the material for this study was begun in early 1988. The main sources were statements by Israeli and Palestinian personalities; the written press; statistical data supplied by the IDF Spokesman; visits to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip; and meetings and background briefings with Israeli officials (including some of those responsible for combatting the intifada) and with leading Palestinians in the Territories and East Jerusalem.

Although the intifada differs in character, scale, intensity, duration and ramifications from disturbances that had occurred in Judea-Samaria since 1967, my personal experience as commander of the Judea and Samaria Region from 1974 to 1976 was useful in enabling me to understand and evaluate the IDF’s activity in the field as it coped with the uprising.

Hard facts and data form the basis for the analysis. However, even current statistics are incomplete and in some cases inaccurate, or not fully known to the Israeli authorities themselves. For example, no precise or uniform figures exist regarding such a basic aspect of the uprising as the number of Palestinians killed and wounded. The IDF Spokesman provides information on casualties in the Territories that are inflicted in operations carried out by the security forces, but not about casualties inflicted by Jewish civilians or by other Palestinians. Moreover, a large disparity exists between IDF Spokesman data and Palestinian figures regarding fatalities. We chose to make our assessments on the basis of the different numbers, and arrive at a conjectural figure. With regard to the number of wounded, too, the IDF Spokesman’s figures are incomplete, as they refer only to persons receiving medical treatment in hospitals. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the total number of incidents recorded by the IDF is incomplete. IDF sources themselves acknowledge that due to the scale of the uprising, units do not always report each and every incident.

The problem is further compounded insofar as no single body in Israel is charged with collating all the data about all the disturbances and acts of violence in the Territories and in Israel. Three different institutions compile such statistics: the IDF for events in the Territories only; the Jerusalem District Headquarters of the Israel Police for events in the Greater Jerusalem area; and the National Headquarters of the Israel Police regarding incidents inside the Green Line. Furthermore, each institution uses its own criteria to define the incidents. Thus, the Israel Police includes the raising of the Palestinian flag in its list of hostile incidents, whereas IDF data do not. Similarly, IDF statistics do not include the throwing of petrol bombs, but Israel Police figures do. No less important, the IDF Spokesman’s data are collated by computer and are available within a time gap of only a few days, whereas police statistics lag further behind the pace of events. Hence the figures that appear in this study should be considered as indicative of general trends, and not taken as precise data.

Most of the hard data reported and analyzed in this study are updated through June 1989, and cover the evolution of the intifada until the announcement of Israel’s political initiative. Later political developments are assessed without reference to specific statistical material. Key developments that took place after publication of the original Hebrew version of this work in mid-1990, are also factored into the English version, and are analyzed specifically in a brief epilogue.

That the book was written while the events it describes were still in progress has both advantages and drawbacks. The primary advantage is that the researcher can observe events at first hand and discuss them with actors on both sides who are directly involved in developments. The main drawbacks are the absence of perspective and the unavailability of all the relevant information. At this early stage, documentation and archival material were sparse, where they existed at all. Because the uprising is an historical event that has not yet run its full course, assessments of future developments relate to the intermediate rather than a comprehensive time frame.

I wish to thank the senior research staff of the Jaffee Center, and particularly General Yariv, Head of Center, for their assistance and support in formulating and improving this research. Many thanks also to Joseph Alpher, JCSS deputy head and executive editor, for his professional editing of the English version. I am also grateful to Ralph Mandel for his fine translation of most of the Hebrew original.

It is my hope that this study will enable the reader to grasp more fully the nature of the war that has been waged in the Territories since December 1987. At the same time, the analysis should prove helpful for an understanding of the political process yet to come.

A. S.
February 1991

Introduction

After 20 years of Israeli rule in Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem — years that witnessed both civilian disturbances and acts of terrorism — there erupted in late 1987 a spontaneous uprising called by the Palestinians “intifada.”

The intifada is a stage in the Palestinian struggle against Israel. That struggle, in turn, has for long years been a part of an overall conflict between the Arab countries and Israel that has on several occasions taken the form of classic warfare. Major General (res) Professor Yehoshafat Harkabi wrote in this regard (in his Fundamental Aspects of the Arab-Israel Conflict), that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constituted the first, narrowest circle at the lowest level of material problems. This level, he noted, also comprised claims on property and assets, and the border issue. At the upper level was a spiritual, substantive and geopolitical conflict between two national movements, Israel and the Arab nation. The elimination of the state of Israel was conceived by the Arab states as a single solution to both conflicts.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict took on a new dimension after Israel conquered Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip in the Six-Day War. Israel became the ruler of the largest concentration of Palestinians, and of all of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River. Accordingly, from the Palestinian standpoint the problem became far more acute.

Since the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, a schism has developed in the Arab stand toward Israel, leaving two pressing conflict systems: the Israeli-Palestinian, and the Syrian-Israeli. Syria can continue to function as a sovereign state despite Israel’s rule — indeed, despite even the application of Israeli law—on the Golan Heights. In contrast, the pressure of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has constituted for the Palestinians an intolerable situation: the more time elapses, the more strongly they have felt that their chances were progressively decreasing to achieve their fundamental goal of establishing a Palestinian state.

The intifada was their reaction to this dilemma. It is a popular uprising against Israeli rule. It took both the Israeli authorities and the PLO by surprise. Though it emerged spontaneously, it quickly became centrally directed. It may be regarded as the Palestinian war of independence against Israel.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the uprising in the Territories and assess its ramifications for the future. The study aspires to address four main questions: 1) What motivates the intifada, and how long can it last? 2) What are the limits to the potential success of the intifada? 3) Can the violent aspects of the intifada be eliminated by applying military force? 4) What are the chances for the initiation of a political process on the basis of the government of Israel’s political initiative of May 1989?

The central thesis of this study holds that not only has neither side—Israel or the Palestinians — succeeded in imposing its will upon the other, but the Palestinians cannot, by throwing stones and Molotov cocktails, compel Israel to withdraw from the Territories. Nor can Israel, by employing military force within the bounds of legality and the moral code it follows, bring an end to the violence. While this study examines an alternative to the use of military force by Israel — the application of heavy economic pressure—the author’s overall assessment holds that the mutual struggle will continue. The only apparent way out is political: the opening of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians over an interim first stage settlement, followed by a permanent settlement.

★ ★ ★

Collection of the data analyzed in this study was completed in mid-1989. Since then, critical and even dramatic external political events have taken place in and around Israel that redound inevitably upon the Palestinian struggle. One key development has been the improvement in Israel’s relations with the Soviet Union, and the corresponding moderation of the Soviet position on the peace process, whereby the international conference is no longer viewed as the only means for solving the conflict. Most significantly, the thaw with the USSR has generated massive immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. Another key event is the Gulf crisis, in which the Palestinians seemed likely to pay heavily in the political sphere for their alliance with Saddam Hussein.

In the Palestinian and PLO view, it is imperative that Israel be weak and under pressure — both direct internal pressure in the Territories, and external political pressure — for it to feel obliged to offer political concessions to the Palestinians. Yet these developments appeared to be strengthening Israel and weakening the Palestinians, thereby constraining their potential to extract political gains from the intifada.

The author believes that Israel will be committing a grievous error if it builds its strategy around these recent developments in such a way that it avoids entering into a political process over the Palestinian issue. Serious fundamental factors that are analyzed in this study point to the impossibility of solving the complex and complicated Israeli-Palestinian conflict by any but political means. The sooner this is done, the better. Indeed, if recent strategic developments have somewhat improved Israel’s position, they render it both easier and more than ever necessary to begin the process.

Chapter One:
Causes of the Uprising

Anyone who examines those assessments of the causes of the uprising that were published within days of its outbreak, will be doubly impressed by the estimate of Rashad al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza City, who died in September 1988. Al-Shawa offered his views in two interviews that appeared within nine days of the start of the uprising. His analysis of the fundamental causes strikes us as accurate.

In an interview to Israel Radio’s English-language service on December 10, al-Shawa said: “One should expect such things after 20 years of miserable occupation. The people have lost all hope. They are absolutely frustrated. They don’t know what to do. They have taken a line of fundamentalists, being the last resort that they can look up. They have lost hope that Israel will ever give them their rights. They feel the Arab countries are unable to accomplish anything. They feel that the PLO, which they regarded as their representative, has failed to accomplish anything.”’¹

About a week later al-Shawa said, in an interview to the daily Ha’aretz: “People in the Gaza Strip have a sense of injustice and deprivation, they feel they have nothing to lose. They work for you as garbage men and dishwashers, and they feel like slaves. The feeling is that people have simply lost everything. The latest wave of riots is only one more expression of the people’s despair and frustration…. The present wave… is a spontaneous expression of popular rage, which begins with a small pupil in elementary school and concludes with the worker who returns every day from Israel, sees the good life there, but is forced to live here in subhuman conditions.”²

Like any large-scale, prolonged event, the uprising, too, had a number of underlying causes, together with more immediate, situational causes. It was the interaction of these two levels that triggered it. According to a view voiced by Arab inhabitants of the Territories—supporters of Jordan and the PLO alike—in the first months after the start of the uprising, initially the disturbances were indistinguishable from previous waves since 1967. But grave mistakes on the part of Israeli authorities handed the Palestinians successes which, in turn, generated the entire sequence of events that followed. While this explanation undoubtedly contains some truth, the primary underlying and situational causes still played the major role.

Underlying Causes

Nationalistic impulse. As Rashad al-Shawa noted, the fundamental causes were encapsulated in the despair that had seized the Arabs in the Territories after 20 years of Israeli rule and 40 years of refugee status for many in the Gaza Strip and Judea-Samaria. These Palestinians had despaired of everyone: the PLO, the Arab world and, naturally, Israel. This was compounded by a pervasive sense of humiliation, squalid living conditions (especially in the Gaza refugee camps), and the rise of a young generation no longer willing to remain submissive.

The primary motivation was national: the fierce desire of the approximately 1.7 million Palestinians — 900,000 in Judea-Samaria, 630,000 in the Gaza Strip and 130,000 in East Jerusalem — to divest themselves of Israeli rule. By the time of the uprising, Israeli control in the Territories (Military Government and Civil Administration) had extended more than 20 years, and during most if not all of this period Israel had implemented a policy of “creeping annexation.” That policy, particularly after 1977, when Jewish settlement was markedly expanded and the number of Jewish settlers increased dramatically, was perceived in the most negative manner by the Palestinians, as a direct challenge to their status.

Contrary to Israeli hopes, 20 years of “occupation” did not cause the Palestinian population to accept Israeli rule. No genuine coexistence emerged. On the contrary, over the years the Palestinians’ national consciousness intensified and deepened. In January 1988 UN Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs Marrack Goulding reported back to the UN, after talking to numerous Palestinians, that the riots were a reaction, supported by Palestinians of all ages and from all social strata, “to 20 years of occupation and an absence of hope that it will end in the near future.”³

Two weeks earlier, in early January, Jordan Premier Zayd al-Rifai had said that “the uprising was inevitable as the Palestinian people have reached a point at which they can no longer endure any more suffering from occupation.”⁴ Thus it was the nationalistic impulse, heightened by the fact that the population was nearly at the end of its tether in terms of its capability to accept Israeli rule, that was indeed the primary cause of the uprising and the explanation for its duration.

Living conditions. The second factor were the squalid living conditions in the refugee camps, especially in the Gaza Strip. These were made increasingly unbearable due to rapid population growth. The demographic factor is volatile: some 630,000 Gazans live in an area of 390 sq. km., a population density of 1,600 persons per sq. km. In 1987 over half the population in the Gaza Strip comprised refugees (about 365,000), as compared with about 40 percent (370,000) in Judea-Samaria.⁵ Even more relevant, in the Gaza Strip the refugee camps housed over 180,000 persons (about 25 percent of the total population), while in Judea-Samaria only about 92,000 persons (slightly more than 10 percent of the population) lived in refugee camps. Half of those in the Gaza Strip camps lived in subhuman conditions (typically a large extended family residing in a dwelling of 60–70 sq. meters, with no running water, and sewage flowing openly in the streets); of the other half, about two-thirds lived in poor neighborhoods.

Approximately 66,000 (one-sixth of all the refugees in the Gaza Strip) lived in more humane conditions — in houses they had built themselves on land given them by the Civil Administration, which also built, at Israel’s expense, a utility infrastructure (access roads, water supply, etc.). Notably, these refugees were initially less involved in the uprising, yet subsequently they could not “afford” to remain uninvolved, and in some cases evinced a higher level of violence than other refugees in Gaza.

Of the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip the largest is Jibalyah, with 40,000 inhabitants (on an area of 1,400 dunams, or 350 acres) and the smallest is Deir al-Balah, with a population of about 12,000. The 19 refugee camps in Judea-Samaria are far smaller than their Gazan counterparts. The largest of them is Balata, with 12,000 inhabitants (on only 252 dunams), followed by the Tulkarm camp with a population of9,950 (also on 250 dunams). The smallest refugee camp in Judea-Samaria is Ein Sultan, with 750 inhabitants (on 840 dunams).⁶

Generally speaking, it was the refugees, impelled by their harsh living conditions, who were initially in the forefront of the uprising, especially in the Gaza Strip. Studies show that political violence does not necessarily arise from a situation of relative or even absolute poverty, but is generated by the emergence or formation of a gap between expectations and reality due to changes in one or both of these variables. Thus on the one hand, demographic trends had produced a steady deterioration in the Gaza Strip refugees’ living conditions, while on the other hand, expectations of change had increased, if only because of the disparity between the refugees’ conditions and what they saw while working in Israel.

Notably, in Judea-Samaria refugees were not an impelling factor in disturbances between 1967 and 1982. Their behavior began to change in 1982 due in part to the failure of the Israeli authorities in Judea-Samaria to grasp the explosive potential latent in this population, and the resultant absence of a policy of support and aid for the refugee camps. In 1982, following the eruption of large-scale riots in Kalandiyah, Jalazoun, Deheishe, Balata and other camps, the Israeli government introduced a policy of refugee rehabilitation in Judea-Samaria. Minister Without Portfolio Mordechai Ben-Porat was named to head a Cabinet-level committee charged with implementing the new policy. Sites were located near refugee camps for new housing. Yet the entire project was shelved in 1984, primarily due to a budgetary shortfall, following the failure of a fund-raising campaign in the US. Still, the uprising erupted not only because the refugees wanted to improve their physical conditions; what grieved them most was the tremendous adversity they had suffered in living for 40 years with no rights at all. In particular, residents of the Gaza Strip remained stateless, unlike West Bank residents who bore Jordanian papers. All refugees sought to transform their status and perhaps even gain the “right of return” to their original homes in Israel.

Frustration. The third factor was an ongoing and powerful sense of humiliation, deprivation, frustration and discrimination. According to a Palestinian lecturer at an-Najah University in Nablus, personal humiliation endured by the populace was the chief catalyst of the uprising.⁷ This feeling of humiliation was pervasive in life under protracted occupation. Individuals felt humiliated when, for example, they were subjected to strip-searches in the course of security checks for residents returning from Jordan via the two Jordan River bridges. Inhabitants felt demeaned daily by the attitude of Israeli soldiers at roadblocks, especially in the aftermath of terrorist acts, and by ‘routine delays’ caused as those from the Gaza Strip bound for work in Israel were subjected to thorough checks. Most notorious in this regard, in the eyes of the population, was the Erez checkpoint at the northern entry to Israel.

A sense of deprivation and discrimination was discernible in many of the young Palestinians who worked in Israel. Over half the male workforce in the Gaza Strip (50,000 out of 90,000 men) and about one-third of the workforce in Judea-Samaria (50,000 out of 150,000) were employed in Israel. True, this virtually eliminated unemployment in the Territories, in sharp contrast to the pre-1967 period when unemployment had been rampant. Indeed, that so many from the Territories earned their living in Israel was one aspect of the total integration of the economy of the Territories into that of Israel: 88 percent of the goods imported into Judea-Samaria originated in Israel, while 65 percent of the exports from those areas were earmarked for Israel and 34 percent for Jordan. One possible source of employment, the Gulf oil producers, had nearly dried up because of the economic crisis the Gulf countries were experiencing.

But there was another side to the picture: the majority of the young generation, those born since 1967, worked in Israel, spoke Hebrew, and tended to compare themselves not with their peers in the Territories but with Israelis. The result was an inevitable sense of discrimination, as they received lower wages than Israelis, were ineligible for tenure and were often employed in menial labor. Those who did not find employment through the official Employment Bureau (about half of these workers) were not entitled to social benefits. The situation was aggravated because the workers from the Territories were generally employed in upper-income Israeli neighborhoods, and the contrast between their conditions in the refugee camps and the affluence they saw in Israel drove home their feelings of inferiority. Notably, many of those who worked in Israel did not take part in the sporadic waves of violence, for fear of losing their sole source of income.

A sense of discrimination also existed vis-a-vis the Israeli settlers. Again, this was most blatant in the Gaza Strip, where 2,500 settlers in the Katif Bloc received 27,000 dunams of state land and a steady water supply, whereas refugees were hard put to obtain any land to improve their living conditions/ and the residents of the camps had to endure terrible overcrowding. (The Khan Yunis refugee camp, for example, with 20,000 inhabitants, is situated on a smaller tract of land than each of the Jewish settlements in the Katif Bloc.) The fact that the new homes of the settlers in the Katif Bloc and elsewhere were generally built by the labor of Palestinians from the Territories was not calculated to allay tensions. An additional element was the strong sense of deprivation experienced by the refugee camps’ inhabitants when they compared themselves with wealthy urban Palestinians.

Fundamentalism. A fourth factor was a fierce enmity toward Israel on religious grounds. This was most potent in the Gaza Strip. A number of assessments conclude that the momentum for the uprising in the Gaza Strip was primarily religious, characterized by an uncompromising fanaticism and a burning hatred of Israel. Israeli authorities were aware of this attitude. A booklet issued in April 1986 by the Gaza Strip Civil Administration noted that Islamic fundamentalist groups in Gaza viewed Israel through an absolutely radical religious prism. In the perception of these groups, the “Jewish state” was a “manifestation of heresy which must be fought and expunged in a holy war, a jihad, and an Islamic [Palestinian] state established in the whole area of Palestine.”⁸ In January 1988 an unidentified leader of the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip told an Israeli journalist: “As distinct from other organizations in the Strip, such as the Muslim Brothers, we want to liberate the country and the land by force alone. We aspire to transform the entire world and make it Muslim through the use of arms, and to kill all nonbelievers in Islam including the Zionist Jews.”⁹

In Judea-Samaria a growing current of religious extremism was palpable by 1979 — about a year after the revolution in Iran, which some adopted as a model for emulation. The trend was sharply escalated beginning in 1986, as evidenced by developments in religious ritual and folklore. Construction of mosques was accelerated and religious festivals were increasingly dominated by traditional elements. Pornographic films, or films containing even a suggestion of nudity, were barred. Political organization by religious groups intensified, dominated by the Muslim Brothers, and religious students in the universities became an influential bloc.

New generation. A fifth factor was the emergence of a new generation of Arab youth since the advent of Israeli rule — youth who had no memory of the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, or of the heavy hand wielded by their security forces. Far more nationalistic and demanding than their parents, this generation had learned how to make use of Israel’s democratic mechanisms, notably the media and the Supreme Court. Having grown up under an Israeli policy of minimal intervention in local civil affairs, they had little sense of government. In effect, they spoke a different language than their parents, let alone their grandparents, and railed at them for their submissiveness during two decades of Israeli rule, and for shirking their national duty to rise up against the occupiers. The youngsters felt obligated to resist Israeli rule, even if this entailed personal risks. More than a year after the start of the intifada, Salah Khalaf, a member of the PLO’s Central Committee, asserted that “a new generation grew up. And this generation in fact does not know fear, is free of complexes that we have lived with in the Arab world…. This new generation learned accurate organization from the occupation itself.”¹⁰

Recession in oil states. Another cause, of limited influence, was the economic recession in the Arab oil states. About a year after the outbreak of the Gulf War, an economic recession struck the Arab oil-producing countries. The economic malaise was at its most intense in 1983 and its full impact was felt in the Territories the following year. The recession meant that fewer youngsters from the Territories could find work in the oil states, while wage cuts taken by those who still held jobs meant they could send less money to their families. Unemployment in the Territories rose marginally as a result of these developments, with high-school and university graduates most affected. These groups however were not the initial driving force of the uprising but became active later.

Despair. A seventh factor was the growing conviction of the Arabs in the Territories that neither the Arab states nor the PLO could advance their national interest. Twenty years of Israeli rule had heightened this sense of despair: the absence of any viable outside solution led the population to conclude that it must take its fate into its own hands. PLO terrorism was generally perceived as effective in revivifying the Palestinian cause, but some in the Territories considered terrorist acts counterproductive. Indeed, in a personal conversation one leading figure said that “it is precisely terrorism that is causing the occupation to be prolonged.”¹¹

The residents of the Territories were well aware that the Palestinian problem was not high on the agenda of the Arab states — indeed, that not a single Arab state desired the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In this context Israel’s deputy chief of staff said that “the uprising is an attempt to attain goals and objectives that Arab armies and terrorism were unable to achieve.”¹² Intensifying this state of affairs was the PLO’s weakness in the Arab arena in recent years, in the aftermath of the Lebanon War. This was reflected especially in its inability to reach an understanding with King Hussein that might hold out the prospect of a political process. Still, the PLO retained its veto power regarding any settlement of the Palestinian question that might be concluded.

Organizational infrastructure. An eighth element was the organizational infrastructure created by the Palestinians in the preceding years, without which it is doubtful whether the uprising would have broken out or lasted so long. The PLO had begun to forge this infrastructure immediately after the 1967 war, but a major catalyst was the resolution adopted by the 1978 Arab summit conference in Baghdad, which aimed at thwarting the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords. To this end, the Arab states decided to allocate $150 million annually for ten years to spur the creation of a national infrastructure in the Territories. This comprised a number of major components.

One involved former prison inmates: persons imprisoned by Israel for acts of terrorism who rehabilitated themselves, after their release, with the aid of the PLO, by becoming active in national organizations, or who joined Islamic groups. PLO-supported organizations included trade unions and other professional associations, student associations, lecturers’ committees, newspaper editorial boards, research institutes, and legal-aid organizations. An estimated 25,000 former prison inmates were involved, including some 600 terrorists released in the 1985 deal with the Jibril organization, who remained in the Territories or Jerusalem. They were, and remain, a highly motivated, quality group with operational capabilities.

Until 1979 trade unions in the Territories were dominated by communists. In 1980 Fatah, which was at loggerheads with the communists, began infiltrating existing trade unions in Judea-Samaria, then went on to form dozens of its own associations. Ultimately four federations of workers — run by Fatah, George Habash’s Popular Front, Naif Hawatima’s Democratic Front, and the communists — emerged, each comprising many parallel unions. By 1987 there were 180 unions in the Territories, operating in every city and large village. Much union activity was subversive in nature. The communists engaged in political subversion and instigated disturbances but did not perpetrate terrorist acts. The other three federations (including their senior officials) were involved in both subversion and terrorism. The leading activists in the unions are former prisoners.

In the Territories every newspaper is a national institution and every senior journalist a national figure. Even before the uprising, editorial boards served as a cover for maintaining ties with PLO institutions abroad — transmitting information in real time, receiving instructions and conveying them to lower operatives in the Territories, and distributing funds. The press is a center of power and the PLO supports each paper to the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars every month.

About 20 research and information institutes operate in the Territories, the majority based in East Jerusalem. These include Faisal Husseini’s Arab Studies Institute; the International Studies Institute directed by Mahdi Abd-al-Hadi; and an information center run by Sari Nusseibeh called Holyland Media. These institutes collect and computerize information, issue press communiques on diverse issues, handle foreign delegations organized by the PLO abroad, and employ former prison inmates.

Women’s organizations were established from 1972, with four separate frameworks corresponding to four PLO affiliates. The dominant influence is exercised by left-wing organizations, which preceded Fatah by some years in this regard. Recently the four organizations were unified under a single roof-organization called the “Supreme Women’s Council.” The Union of Women’s Work Committees, the dominant organization, was founded in 1978 by the Democratic Front. Its main activities include holding bazaars; training women in clerical work, household economics and other professions; providing medical aid via permanent and mobile clinics; supporting the Committee for the Protection of Prisoners; and assisting in information efforts by issuing leaflets and protest communiques, and delivering lectures and holding symposia to enhance women’s national consciousness.

The Union of the Palestinian Working Woman, founded by the Communist Party in 1978, is considered a pioneer in organizing women. Its activities are centered in Ramallah, Bethlehem, East Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza, although its “Volunteers’ Committees” operate primarily in refugee camps and villages in the Hebron area. The Woman’s Union for Social Work, a Fatah-affiliated group, was founded relatively late, in 1981. Fatah had initially abstained from setting up new women’s groups, preferring, for example, to take over existing bodies such as a Nablus women’s organization. The Woman’s Union has devoted most of its energies to “traditional” affairs — professional training for women, eradicating illiteracy, holding strikes on behalf of prisoners, and collecting funds for various causes — and less to direct efforts to enhance the status of women. The Palestinian Woman’s Union, affiliated with the Popular Front, commenced its activity in early 1981 in the Bethlehem area. Now headquartered in the Nablus casbah, the Union has 28 branches in Judea-Samaria. It also operates several sewing workshops, bakeries and small plants for the manufacture of foodstuffs.

Besides these four organizations, which are active throughout the Territories, a number of important local groups, many of them of long standing, also exist. In Judea and Samaria, the Arab Woman’s Union of Nablus, founded in 1921, is the oldest women’s organization in the Territories. It operates health and welfare institutions, orphanages, hospitals for invalids and the mentally retarded, and a women’s sports club. It assists the needy and families of “martyrs,” works to eradicate illiteracy, trains women for clerical work and other professions, and holds bazaars. A well-known institution run by the Union is Nablus’s Al-Ithihad Hospital, which has treated many casualties of the uprising. Nowadays the Union is identified with Fatah.

The El-Bireh Association for the Promotion of the Family was founded in 1965 and is considered the largest women’s organization in Judea-Samaria. More than 150 women are directly employed by the Association and its affiliated institutions, especially in sewing, weaving and embroidery. Some 5,000 women work at these crafts in their homes. The Association operates a vocational school, a day creche, bakeries, a beauty parlor, clinics, orphanages, training centers, a museum of Palestinian folklore and a workshop for textiles, weaving and embroidery.

In the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Women’s Union, founded in 1964 to attain equality for women, operates five centers (two in Gaza City, one each in Khan Yunis, Rafah and Beit Hanoun). The Union assists needy families, including families of persons killed or wounded in the uprising, works to eradicate illiteracy, and conducts courses in sewing, weaving, embroidery and foreign languages.

The Association of Women Academics in the Gaza Strip was founded in 1964 but commenced intensive activity in 1979. Its declared aims are to help women find employment, to raise the social and educational level of women in the Gaza Strip, to provide advanced training in diverse spheres and to hold conferences on a variety of topics.

The Association of Muslim Girls, founded in 1981, is active in the area of Islamic heritage and offers training courses for women (sewing, embroidery and clerical work). About 100 activists are registered with the Association, believed to be the only Muslim women’s organization in Gaza.

Charitable societies are considered an important tool by the national organizations, as they provide a means to control the large numbers of people who turn to them. A person who avails himself of the reduced rates offered by a clinic that is operated by a charitable society, is thereafter dependent on that society. Most of the societies have existed Since before the 1967 war, but were subsequently taken over by the PLO. Since 1978 these organizations have been undergoing a process of severance from the Israeli authorities (many societies operate without a license, while those that submit their books for auditing by the Civil Administration engage in double bookkeeping). There are several hundred charitable societies in the Territories. In March 1989 there were 206 societies in Judea-Samaria alone, of which 45 were operated by women and 94 jointly by men and women. The Judea-Samaria societies employ 2,240 men and women and can call on tens of thousands of activists and volunteers. Organizations that maintain branches in virtually every district include The Friends of the Sick Society, Red Crescent Society, Society of the Women’s Union in the Bethlehem Region, The Mansour al-Shawa Society in Gaza, The Orphanage Society, The Islamic Charitable Society, The Waqf Charitable Society, and The Christian Society.

Student unions. In June 1967 not a single university existed in the Territories; today there are six in the West Bank and one in the Gaza Strip. The universities became hothouses for Palestinian nationalism and revolutionary ideas, and over the years students were the primary instigators of disturbances, inciting high-schoolers and others to take part as well. Elections to student bodies are conducted according to a proportional system guaranteeing representation to PLO-affiliated organizations. Years before the uprising, student unions and student councils had achieved a measure of control within the institutions of higher learning, and were able to call out students for street demonstrations almost at will. The early 1980s saw the establishment of the West Bank General Council for Higher Education, which had the task of distributing funds arriving from the PLO. The Council’s membership consists of representatives from each of the PLO’s four leading affiliates and other national figures.

Fatah’s Shabiba youth movement, the largest and best established youth organization in the Territories, fueled the uprising, chiefly in the West Bank,¹³ where it was founded by Fatah in 1981 as “Lijan al-Shabiba l’al-Amal al-Ijtimai” (Youth Committees for Social Activity) — in short, Shabiba. The strategic objective was to “capture” the youth — among whom the Popular Front and the Muslim Brothers had already made inroads by setting up youth clubs — to expand the infrastructure for Fatah activity in the Territories, and to increase support for the organization. The first Shabiba committees were established in the Samaria village of Anabta, the Shuafat refugee camp adjacent to Jerusalem, and the town of Beit Sahour, near Bethlehem. Initially the organization comprised former security prisoners and other nationalist activists within the Fatah framework.

On January 1, 1983, with the infrastructure already in place, the General Association of Shabiba Committees was set up in the Territories. This marked the start of Shabiba’s activity as a Palestinian national organization possessing a directorship, an operations committee and a ramified organizational apparatus, including regional councils that were responsible for local committees. The Shabiba is estimated to have numbered several tens of thousands of members — any youth above the age of 14 was eligible to join — of whom several thousand were activists. More than 400 local “committees” were organized within eight regional councils that operated under a single roof-organization, the Union of Shabiba Committees. In short order the Shabiba took over social and sports clubs in every comer of Judea-Samaria. There was not a village, refugee camp or urban neighborhood that did not have a Shabiba club or other center.

The upshot was that the Shabiba emerged as the largest established organization in Judea-Samaria, with branches everywhere and the ability to bring youngsters into the streets in large numbers. In 1983–84 the organization began operating in the Gaza Strip (where Islamic elements are dominant), setting up 150 local committees. In contrast to Judea-Samaria, where no single personality stood out as the Shabiba leader, in the Gaza Strip the dominant figure in Shabiba was Abd al-Ali Shaheen (known as Abu Ali), who had been a close associate of Arafat’s since before 1967.

In the Gaza Strip Islamic movements, especially the Muslim Brothers and the Islamic Jihad, were the prime catalysts of the uprising.¹⁴ The Muslim Brothers operated under cover of an association called al-Mujamaa al-Islami, which was registered with the Israeli authorities in 1978. The Military Government had permitted its establishment in the hope that it would constitute a counterweight to the PLO. Its center of operations was in the Jurath al-Shams mosque in Gaza’s Zaitoun quarter. It became the major group within the Muslim Brothers and the most influential association in the Gaza Strip, with an estimated 1,200 activists as of early 1987. Al-Mujamaa utilized every legal means to advance its objectives, although it was not averse to using violence against its adversaries. For years the organization has operated kindergartens and schools and conducted sports and community activities. In 1981 the Association of Muslim Young Women was formed — Mujamaa’s “ladies’ auxiliary.”

A militant offshoot of the Muslim Brothers known as “Hamas” (Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement, also a word meaning fervent ardor) began operating in the Gaza Strip shortly after the start of the intifada. Hamas espouses views that are far more extreme than those of the PLO. It holds that the soil of Palestine is Islamic Waqf (religious trust) land; a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, even the idea of an international peace conference, conflict with the principle of Islamic resistance; hence “the only solution to the Palestinian problem is jihad.”¹⁵

Al-Jihad al-Islami, associated with the militant Islamic movement in Egypt, began operating openly in the Gaza Strip in 1981. Identified with the Khomeinist worldview, Islamic Jihad regards the Islamic revolution in Iran as a model for emulation and urges the immediate launching of a holy war against Israel. Its main base of operations is the Az al-Din al-Qassem mosque in the village of Beit Lahiyeh. Since 1984 operational links have existed between the terrorist wing of Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Fatah, with the aim of perpetrating “quality” attacks in Israel and the Territories.

The Islamic groups have been characterized by a high level of organization and strong internal discipline. In Gaza during the 1980s they relied chiefly on two power centers. The leading center was Islamic University in Gaza, the bastion of al-Muiamaa. In student elections there the Islamic bloc consistently outpoiled the rival pro-PLO bloc (a Fatah-Left coalition) by an overwhelming majority. In 1987 the religious bloc received 80 percent of the vote among both men and women students. The other major center of activity was the mosques, dominated by radical Islamic groups, notably al-Mujamaa.

Muslim groups also grew stronger in Judea and Samaria. The largest and most influential Islamic fundamentalist organization in the West Bank was the Muslim Brothers. Israel refrained from taking action against the Muslim Brothers, viewing it as a religious movement. Following Khomeini’s revolution in Iran the influence of the Muslim Brothers grew among the Muslim faithful and in institutions of higher learning. In student elections the “Islamic Bloc” (a coalition of fundamentalist groups) obtained more than 50 percent of the votes in Hebron University, where it wrested control from Fatah and the Left; 45 percent in the Hebron Polytechnion; about 45 percent in an-Najah University in Nablus; 33 percent in Birzeit University; and about 15 percent in Bethlehem University.¹⁶ In Nablus the Islamic Bloc gained control of the student council for a year, subsequently being replaced by a Fatah-Left coalition even though in absolute numbers support for the religious movement had grown.

The IDF’s deterrent profile. The ninth basic cause of the uprising can be traced to an erosion in the IDF’s deterrent profile in the year preceding the intifada. Successes scored by rioters and terrorists in 1987, and the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon under pressure of civilian violence, undermined IDF deterrence and undercut the traditional status of the Israeli soldier.

Here three phenomena stand out. One was the “Lebanon syndrome” which, as interpreted by the Palestinians in the Territories, meant that an indigenous popular uprising and a “smart” struggle, even if waged by a weak and downtrodden community (the Shi’ites in Lebanon), could force the most powerful army in the Middle East to withdraw its forces. This impression was fortified by internal dissent in Israel over policy in Lebanon and the government’s seeming loss of its decisionmaking ability, in the absence of a national consensus on major issues like withdrawal — all taken as indications of weakness in the Israeli polity. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat noted that Israel’s failure to maintain control in Lebanon after the invasion of 1982 had convinced the Palestinians that they had a chance for the future.¹⁷

A second phenomenon not lost on the inhabitants of the Territories was a gradual escalation in bold acts of terrorism perpetrated against Israelis by young individuals using knives and operating without an organizational base. In 1985 there were 20 incidents of this kind, seven of them in Jerusalem; in 1986, 17 incidents including four in Jerusalem; and in 1987, 15 incidents, two of them in Jerusalem.¹⁸

The third phenomenon was the shattering of the deterrent image of the General Security Service (GSS) in the wake of the extended crisis in the organization that ensued from the “Bus 300 affair” and led to the resignation of the GSS chief and senior agents. This damage was followed by the negative effects of the Nafsu affair, in which it was revealed that an IDF officer had been falsely convicted of serious charges due to improper GSS interrogation methods.

Beyond these three general phenomena, the period immediately preceding the uprising saw a number of flagrantly unusual incidents. In the Gaza Strip, an Islamic Jihad squad escaped in July 1987 from a military prison situated in the most heavily guarded military base in the area (the headquarters for both the IDF and the Civil Administration). The terrorists broke out of the prison, entered the military compound where they outwitted the soldiers on guard, and escaped. To the residents of the Territories, this was an act of heroism by the squad and a failure of the IDF. This was aggravated when the terrorists remained at large, some hiding not far from the Gaza District command. As fugitives, they proceeded to carry out a number of brazen attacks, including the murder in broad daylight of an IDF officer as he drove a military vehicle on the crowded main street of Gaza City (the first incident of its kind), and opening fire at a GSS vehicle, wounding its passengers. The squad’s successful prison break and its subsequent attacks on Israeli security personnel had a destabilizing effect throughout the Gaza Strip. Some of the squad died at the hands of Israeli security men while bearing arms, on October 6, 1987; others, including the son of Assad Siftawi, a veteran Fatah activist, succeeded in fleeing Israeli-controlled territory. All were subsequently enshrined in the pantheon of heroic martyrs. Indeed, Islamic Jihad would later cite October 6 as the date on which the intifada began.

In mid-November 1987 violent demonstrations on an unprecedented scale (in one case more than 2,000 people took part) were held in the Jibalyah refugee camp. The rioting broke out following the arrest of Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ouda, a leading ideologue of Islamic Jihad (he was later deported). For the first time demonstrators tried to break through the fence of the military base located near the offices of the Civil Administration. The mob hurled stones, iron bars and other missiles, and hoisted Palestinian flags. No revision in Israeli policy and no IDF countermeasures followed this demonstration. Within days, on November 24 there commenced a wave of attacks in which tens to hundreds of residents rained down stones on every IDF patrol in the camp day after day.¹⁹

The rioters drew encouragement from other local developments, involving schools and roads. In 1978 the defense minister had introduced a policy barring Israeli forces from entering, without special permission, schools where rioting had occurred. Beyond this, in 1987 the staff officer for education in the Gaza Strip paid fewer visits to schools. Israeli forces also took to using the Gazan coastal road instead of the main road, thus effectively abandoning the main artery in the Strip. Staff officers and Israeli civilian workers avoided traveling alone, and used convoys, usually with an armed IDF escort. Security forces resorted to using local license plates instead of Israeli plates to prevent being targeted by stone-throwers or other Arab attackers. A general guideline ordered officers to detour around barriers erected by demonstrators, to refrain from clashing with them and even to turn tail. By early December, just before the start of the uprising, certain roads were virtually off-limits for Civil Administration personnel and even for the IDF. These included the sea roads in Rafah and Khan Yunis, and entire sections of Jibalyah, where any Israeli vehicle (including military vehicles) was certain to encounter a barrage of stones. On the day the new head of the Gaza Civil Administration, Brigadier General Ramot, took office, the convoy in which he was traveling was attacked by stone-throwers in Khan Yunis on the sea road and was forced to retreat.

Turning to Judea and Samaria, in 1986 and 1987 three events occurred that appeared to signal to the local population IDF weakness and Israeli inability to cope with the organized mass. These developments were interpreted as reflecting a decline in Israeli involvement.

In April 1986, Israeli authorities received advance knowledge that Fatah activists intended to “take over” the funeral of assassinated Nablus mayor Jafr al-Masri and transform it into a major nationalist event. It was decided to avoid a confrontation and not deploy IDF troops on or near the funeral route. In the course of the huge procession, in which 10,000 people filled the streets of Nablus from one end to the other, banners and PLO flags were raised and masked individuals marched openly. Former security prisoners and the Shabiba played a major role in the event. Israel TV and Jordan TV screened reports on the funeral which were viewed by the population in the Territories.

Security personnel, alarmed by this event, warned against its recurrence. Thus in August 1988 (after the intifada began) the funeral of former Gaza mayor Rashad al-Shawa took place under close IDF supervision, and an attempt by various PLO committees to “seize control” of the event was thwarted. Yet in the meantime the lesson drawn by the local populace from the al-Masri funeral was that they controlled the street: if the masses could organize and rally to the flag, the Jews would be forced to beat a retreat.

A second event occurred in 1987, when for the first time the IDF allowed Birzeit University students and lecturers to hold a parade from the new to the old campus along a broad route three km. long. What took place was a nationalist demonstration, with the participation of about a thousand people, in which flags and banners were hoisted. The event was covered by the media and seen on television in the Territories. In the Palestinians’ perception, the very fact that the authorities had permitted a national demonstration was proof that the government had been weakened and could not cope. The third development was the deteriorating situation, reflected in serious rioting, that occurred in Nablus’s an-Najah University in 1987. The unrest spread outside the campus and for the first time extended as far as the Rafidiya Hospital area. Yet the authorities did not close down the university. To the students this showed that the IDF was disinclined to confront them.

Some observers maintain that the intifada actually began not in the Gaza Strip on December 9, 1987, but a few months earlier in the Balata refugee camp near Nablus. So sharply did the situation in this camp deteriorate in 1986 and 1987 that Israel’s very control there was called into question. Undoubtedly the Shabiba’s success in Balata constituted a milestone and a model for emulation by inhabitants of other camps.

Balata, in population the largest of the 19 refugee camps in Judea-Samaria, housed some 12,000 residents (originally from the Jaffa and Lod-Ramleh areas) on a small area of 252 dunams. In the course of 12–18 months in 1986–87 the camp gradually became virtually “off-limits” to the IDF. In 1987 the Shabiba decided to tansform Balata into a model for other camps in Judea-Samaria. As the showpiece of this process, the Shabiba would prevent IDF troops and GSS agents from entering the camp. The Shabiba took control of most spheres of life in the camp, shunting aside the Popular Front and the Democratic Front and even establishing its own police force. The Shabiba organized social welfare in the camp, conducted a campaign to eliminate drinking and prostitution, reopened the UNRWA club which had been closed for seven years by order of the Israeli authorities, initiated social activities, ran the sports club, and flushed out and punished informers and collaborators.

The Shabiba actively tried to divest the camp of Israeli rule. Every Israeli vehicle (including military vehicles) that accidentally entered Balata was stoned, and the IDF could not patrol the camp without incident. Finally, both the IDF and the Civil Administration no longer entered the camp. Israeli vehicles en route to Jerusalem on the road adjacent to the camp were also stoned, frequently sustaining smashed windshields. Nationalist elements had tried to take over refugee camps before (e.g., Deheishe, near Bethlehem, in early 1986), but these moves had been stymied by the Israeli authorities at an early stage. In Balata a situation of civil disobedience was created.

The Shabiba’s success in Balata was due to a number of reasons. Balata was the largest refugee camp in Judea-Samaria. It was located near Nablus with its highly developed and vigorous political consciousness and was close to an-Najah University, the largest institution of higher learning in Judea-Samaria and the leader in nationalist ferment. Finally, many Balata residents worked in Israel and experienced daily the immense disparity between the living standards in Israel and in their homes.

On the morning of May 31, 1987, Israel lost a key showdown in the camp. An IDF force exceeding two battalions in strength entered the camp in order to demonstrate Israeli sovereignty, seize wanted persons, uncover firearms and “cold” weapons and inflammatory material, and in general “teach them a lesson.” Balata was placed under curfew, house-to-house searches were carried out, and some 3,500 males were rounded up for identification. However the operation had to be halted when women in the camp staged a mass riot, which was joined by the detained men. In forcing the IDF to halt the operation the rioters scored a major success. Abut a year later the coordinator of government activities in the Territories stated: “In May there was a mini-intifada in the Balata refugee camp. An entire refugee camp defied a curfew and went outside, preventing us from carrying out our mission. The IDF outpost in this Jibalyah refugee camp was attacked. Today, we view these incidents as factors which led to the outburst.”²⁰ For the local residents this was an extraordinary event: for the first time they had forced the IDF to retreat, and in so doing had consolidated their self-rule in the camp. The broader ramification was a significant erosion in the IDF’s deterrent capacity in the eyes of the entire population of the Territories.

Even senior officers who were responsible at the time for imposing public order in Judea-Samaria admit that the security forces waited too long before striking at the root of the problem in Balata. Immediate action had been imperative. At all events it was not until October 9, fully four months after the IDF’s retreat and exactly two months before the start of the uprising, that a Border Police company was permanently deployed in the camp 24 hours a day. Its mission was to restore law and order and prevent the camp from remaining an “extraterritorial enclave” of the PLO. In fact, after months of control by Shabiba, the Israeli force was too small to reimpose authority in the volatile camp.

Immediate Causes

These underlying causes of the intifada interacted with a series of more immediate triggering events. In the first, a single hang glider operation near Kiryat Shmonah in the Northern Galilee on November 25, 1987, about two weeks before the start of the uprising, fired the imagination of the Palestinians. The attack, in which six Israeli soldiers were killed, was perceived in the Territories as a major success in the Palestinians’ struggle against Israel. There were two main reasons for this reaction. First, this was an exceptional case of a successful Palestinian armed attack against the IDF rather than against civilians; therefore it could legitimately be seen within the context of the armed struggle against the Israeli military—even causing the IDF painful losses. Secondly, the Palestinian population seemed to sense a loss of control on the Israeli side, reflected in flagrant mistakes made by officers and troops on the scene, and in a pronounced feeling of failure in the country as a whole. This had implications not only for the Palestinians’ sense of achievement; it also helped create the perception that the IDF was not invincible and, concomitantly, engendered an image of a new Palestinian hero.

A second immediate cause involved Palestinian disappointment with the November 1987 Arab summit conference in Amman. For the first time in years the Palestinian issue was given low priority on the summit agenda and the Arab leaders, preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq War, seemed in no mood to help the Palestinian cause. The Palestinians felt demeaned by the fact that, of all the Arab leaders, PLO Chairman Arafat was not received by King Hussein upon arrival in Amman. As far as the Palestinians were concerned, this portended a protracted impasse — unless they took matters into their own hands.

Rumors played a significant inflammatory role in generating the outbreak and spread of the riots, with the Israeli authorities unable to find an effective means to squelch them. The immediate spark for the riots, in the Jibalyah refugee camp on December 9, was a rumor concerning a road accident the previous day in which four Gazans were killed when their car collided with a truck driven by an Israeli. According to this rumor, the driver of the Israeli vehicle was the brother of an Israeli who had been killed two days earlier in a terrorist attack in Gaza; the four Arabs were from the Jibalyah camp, and the collision was an act of revenge, not an accident. In fact, the driver was not the brother of the murdered man and the Arabs who were killed were not from the Jibalyah camp but from a village of the same name. Further grist for the rumor mill was provided by reports that Minister Ariel Sharon was about to take up residence in the Muslim Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem. In addition, excavations in the Old City to create a new exit for the tunnel beneath the Western Wall generated religious ferment within the Muslim community.

The Israeli Factor

A series of Israeli mistakes at the outset of the uprising, in part structural and in part situational, contributed to the success of the intifada. As mentioned, some Palestinians maintain that in its initial stage the uprising was indistinguishable from previous disturbances and that only miscalculations by the Israeli establishment enabled the rioting to gather momentum.

The first mistake was the failure of the Israeli intelligence community to foresee the possibility that an uprising might break out. The IDF assistant chief of operations admitted that “the IDF was taken by surprise by the uprising in the Territories.”²¹ The principal reason for this was an ongoing conceptual fallacy encompassing both the political and military domains.

Politically, a series of misappraisals was made: that time was on Israel’s side concerning the Palestinian question (particularly in the aftermath of the Lebanon War); that because the Arab population in the Territories was almost totally dependent on Israel (especially in the economic sphere), its readiness and ability to engage Israel in a physical struggle were limited; that the inhabitants of the Territories had no choice but to accept Israeli rule and that Israeli-Palestinian coexistence was an evolving process; and finally, that the struggle of the Palestinian population would not exceed past parameters — sporadic disturbances.

The Jewish settlers in the Territories were also guilty of basic conceptual misappraisals. In an effort to convince Israeli public opinion (and perhaps themselves) that the government’s settlement policy was beneficial, the settlers maintained that a state of coexistence was emerging in which the local Arabs accepted the establishment of settlements, the accompanying land expropriations, and so forth. This tunnel vision heightened the illusion of a stable situation and contributed to the Israeli failure to note and understand the Palestinians’ gradual severance from Israel in virtually all spheres other than the economy and employment.

In the military realm, the riots were at first confidently viewed within the context of past waves of disturbances. It followed that the tactics employed by the security forces since 1967 would suffice to stop the violence in short order.

Organizationally, it seems in retrospect that the structural change effected in November 1981 in Israel’s deployment in the Territories — separating the “carrot” (the newly created Civil Administration) from the “stick” (the military) — was a mistake. The establishment of the Civil Administration in place of the Military Government not only failed to achieve the intended objective of spurring implementation of the Camp David autonomy plan, but entailed two saliently negative phenomena. First, Israel lost the advantage inhering in the fact that a single authority — the military governor — could wield either the carrot or the stick, i.e., offer incentives or the threat of punishment, in doses warranted by circumstances. Even though coordination was maintained between the military and the Civil Administration, the net effect of the creation of the new body was to reduce Israel’s operational efficacy in the Territories.

Secondly, whereas responsibility for overall situation evaluations in the Territories, including assessments of processes liable to generate unrest and civil disobedience, had in the past devolved upon the coordinator of activities,²² this function fell by the wayside when the Civil Administration was created. In April 1983 it was decided that the GSS would assume intelligence responsibility regarding disturbances. Possibly the GSS interpreted its task as involving active counterintelligence rather than the preparation of comprehensive evaluations concerning developments in the Territories. In any event, a new situation was tolerated in which no single body was charged with providing an overall intelligence evaluation of the situation in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. This may possibly have been due to the authorities’ conception that a dramatic change in the status quo was in any event not in the cards.

The Civil Administration was certainly aware of the growing influence of radical Islamic elements in the Gaza Strip. It even assessed that these developments were liable to result in anti-government activity in the form of agitation, disturbances, and terrorism. Yet the possibility of a full-scale uprising was not entertained.²³ That the Israeli authorities were not oblivious to the harsh conditions in the Gaza Strip is evident from a prediction offered one month before the start of the uprising by the head of the Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip: “One day,” he said in a press interview, “this creature [golem] will begin to thrash about and the result will be terrible. Their wretchedness is our problem.”²⁴

Some academics and senior retired officers who had previously dealt with the Territories warned publicly of the dangers latent in the continuation of the status quo, even raising the specter of civil disobedience.²⁵ But no one thought that a broad civil uprising might be imminent. Following are two examples of such assessments, both general in character, neither referring specifically to 1987. In 1985 Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit wrote: “No practicable solution is visible on the horizon — a solution achievable through understanding and good will and acceptable to both sides. This situation of deadlock is untenable and cannot continue indefinitely. Inevitably, sooner or later a radical process will be fomented that will trigger a massive explosion.”²⁶ Four years earlier the author had written: “There is definitely a danger that the future will see a development, perhaps gradual, in the direction of civil disobedience.”²⁷

All in all, there were three dimensions to the error of evaluation: the failure to assess that an uprising of these dimensions could or would occur; a concomitant failure to predict its timing; and, perhaps most seriously, a misplaced confidence that the IDF could handle any disturbances that might erupt. Admittedly, it was very difficult to foresee the exact timing of the uprising, but mistakes could certainly have been avoided regarding the perception of a situation that might produce an uprising, and regarding the IDF’s ability to suppress it. The conception, then, was flawed; it was assumed that any intensification of the struggle against Israel would take the form of increased terrorism rather than a popular insurrection.

That a new situation was emerging should have been evident from the surge in the number of incidents recorded in the Territories in 1987. The 1,250 incidents in the Gaza Strip (excluding December) represented an increase of 150 percent over the 500 incidents of the entire previous year.²⁸ The character of the incidents was also suggestive: attempts to grab weapons from soldiers, a steep rise in the number of petrol bombs thrown, an increase in the number of terrorist squads and, in November, the burning of two civilian vehicles belonging to Israeli workers. In Judea-Samaria, according to Border Police data, the number of incidents from January to mid-November 1987 was nearly double that of the comparable period in 1986. The same was true regarding the number of Jewish and Arab civilians wounded in demonstrations in the West Bank (the exact number was not published).²⁹ Fatalities among Jews and Arabs killed in the Territories (excluding East Jerusalem) increased sharply in 1987 as compared with 1986. In 1987, prior to the start of the intifada, nine Jews were killed as compared with 2 in 1986, while 50 Arabs were killed as compared with 22 the previous year, and 161 Arabs were wounded, up from 67 in 1986.³⁰ Yasir Arafat would later contend that the rumblings of the uprising could already be felt in 1986, although the full eruption occurred at the end of 1987.³¹

In the first half of October 1987, a period of considerable violence, the O/C Central Command stated that the majority (60 percent) of the attacks on Israeli targets in the West Bank in 1987 had been initiated locally and not in accordance with outside directives, but that this did not indicate a long-term tendency toward a popular insurrection.³² General Mitzna thus ruled out the likelihood of a popular uprising two months before it erupted.

Around the same time Defense Minister Rabin voiced a similar assessment: “Every so often we encounter manifestations of terrorism and disturbances of public order, but I believe that we have the strength to overcome them, and we shall overcome them.”³³ Another view was that a new situation could emerge in the Territories only through the onset of a political process. When a reporter asked the coordinator of activities in the Territories to comment on the assessment of a senior IDF source that recent incidents in Gaza had been sparked by the inhabitants’ frustration and that “according to this theory the disturbances and the terrorism will increase,” Shmuel Goren retorted: “For 20 years people have been frightening us with phenomena of all kinds…. In my opinion, it is when talks begin on a solution that tension in the Territories will soar.”³⁴

In mid-1988 Jerusalem’s Mayor Teddy Kollek admitted: “Yes, I was taken by surprise. I too did not feel that anything was afoot. True, I always said that this situation cannot possibly continue, that one day the pot will boil over, but I did not expect it to happen like this. I was quite shocked by the events.”³⁵ Even in the days immediately after the start of the riots, the prevailing assessment was that they did not constitute an uprising and that order would be restored shortly.³⁶ According to press reports concerning two consultations held on December 10, 1987, the second day of the rioting, in the offices of the defense minister and the chief of staff — prior to Rabin’s departure for a previously planned ten-day visit to the United States — both meetings concluded that developments need not engender special concern.³⁷ A few days later, on December 14, in the General Staff forum, with the participation of the head of the GSS and the coordinator of activities in the Territories, the latter spoke for the first time about a “new situation,” and Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ehud Barak expressed the view that the Territories were on the verge of civil disobedience — an assessment with which only the chief of military intelligence concurred.³⁸ Public statements by Israeli leaders were unwarrantedly optimistic, not only at the start of the uprising but even in its midst. Notably, in this period the PLO leadership too failed to grasp the import of events.

Another cardinal Israeli mistake centered in the first days and weeks of the intifada and stemmed from the evaluation that the riots were no different from past disturbances. It followed that the situation could be brought under control using the small forces permanently deployed in the Territories. As a result, it was not until two weeks after the rioting erupted that large forces were rushed to the Gaza Strip — even later in Judea-Samaria. Available testimony shows that the question discussed in the meeting chaired by the chief of staff on December 10 was how to quell what appeared to be one more wave of riots. The O/C Central Command thought that no reinforcements were required, whereas his counterpart in Southern Command from the outset requested a significant force buildup, a request approved only in part by the chief of staff.

Perhaps the most crucial lesson that should have been learned from disturbances and riots that had erupted since 1967, particularly in Judea-Samaria, was that the small forces permanently stationed in the Territories had to be beefed up the moment such unrest began; even earlier if advance information existed. The rapid reinforcement of garrisons, especially in the cities and towns, had two purposes: to serve, through the very presence of larger numbers of troops, as a deterrent against disturbances; and, in the event that the deterrent proved insufficient, to enable the authorities to act rapidly to quell the disturbances, if necessary at different points simultaneously. This lesson was not applied when the disturbances broke out on December 9, 1987, even though logic dictated its implementation, if only because at first these disturbances were indeed seen as indistinguishable from the past. The non-reinforcement of Israeli forces enabled the insurgents to score an initial success, further eroded the IDF’s deterrent image, and resulted in an intensification of the violence.

A third cardinal mistake was a direct result of the second. In the first days of the uprising the limited forces in the Territories were deployed in numerous small units. They frequently found themselves in life-threatening situations, facing large numbers of inflamed rioters, and had to open fire. The result was a relatively large number of casualties among the rioters — 12 killed and 108 wounded in the Gaza Strip in the first two weeks, and seven killed and 56 wounded in Judea-Samaria.³⁹ This high casualty rate spurred the rioters on, and even aggravated the situation. Defense Minister Rabin stated that the Israeli soldiers were insufficiently trained and therefore “found themselves in a position where they were too hasty to use their firearms.”⁴⁰

The fourth central mistake stemmed from the IDF’s policy of action and reaction regarding manifestations of civil disobedience. The local population viewed the military’s abrupt shifts and vacillations of policy in the early stages of the uprising as proof of the authorities’ confusion. In particular, no uniform policy existed on the response to the partial commercial strike held by merchants. In some cases it was decided not to intervene, in other instances shopkeepers were forced to open their businesses, and there were even instances in which troops closed shops that had opened. By February 16, 1988, Defense Minister Rabin concluded that “it was a mistake to try to force the merchants in the Territories to resume activity….”⁴¹ Faiz Abu Rahme, the chairman of the Gaza Bar Association, said in June 1988 that “if the Israelis would not interfere the merchants would open in the afternoon and then they would gradually open in the morning as well.”⁴² In East Jerusalem, some months after the start of the uprising, the authorities placed on trial shopkeepers who had obeyed the directives of the uprising leadership to open for business only three hours a day, from 9 a.m. until noon. By this time the authorities should have realized that the pressure exerted on the merchants by the street far outweighed any protection that Israel could grant them, and that they would go to prison rather than risk the consequences of opening for business. Jerusalem’s Mayor Teddy Kollek explained in August 1988: “The merchants came to us and said: ‘What can you do to us? Maybe the court will convict us. Maybe we will be sent to prison. But the others can burn down our business, destroy the buildings or do something even worse.’” Kollek added: “We make mistakes too. For example, we launched legal proceedings against merchants who closed their shops at the instructions [of the leadership]. This was obviously pointless.”⁴³

A similar mistake was made in dealing with the situation that developed at Shifa Hospital in Gaza. Shifa, the largest hospital run by the Civil Administration in the Territories, employed hundreds of Arabs and had come to symbolize Israeli rule. In the first days of the uprising the hospital was taken over by rioters and relatives of casualties, and the IDF steered clear of the site. Foreign correspondents reported that this gave local inhabitants the feeling that “we have captured Shifa.” The IDF assimilated this experience, and a few months later thwarted a similar takeover attempt in the government hospital in Ramallah.

A fifth major mistake occurred in the realm of Israeli counteractivities. Unlike past waves of unrest, the uprising was marked by instances of excesses by IDF soldiers. There were too many such “irregularities” for them to be characterized as sporadic, and they did not cease even after strict parameters for the use of force in quelling disturbances were laid down by the IDF chief of staff in February 1988. This resort to excessive violence by Israeli troops, particularly against persons who were not involved in rioting, was counterproductive, causing an expansion of the struggle against Israel.

The sixth mistake was in some ways unavoidable in the circumstances: the severe damage caused to Israel’s image in the international arena. This resulted primarily from the situation in the field rather than from the lack of effective information dissemination. Not even the most brilliant public relations campaign could have nullified or even moderated the powerful message generated worldwide by television images of the disturbances, and primarily violent behavior by IDF soldiers against stone-throwing youths and against women and children. The result was to drive home the point that the IDF was an occupation army facing a civilian population fighting for its political right of self-determination.

After about a month the IDF adopted a policy of closing off particular areas (cities or parts of cities) to all non-residents, including the media, according to on-the-spot security needs and for the length of time required to contain serious rioting. As a result, fewer instances of violent clashes between the local population and the IDF were filmed and screened abroad. One effect of the full and unrestricted freedom of movement the world media had enjoyed in the first weeks of the uprising had been to spur the rioters to escalate their activity. The Israeli authorities failed to grasp from the outset that the struggle was being played out not only on the ground, but was also directed at world public opinion. This in turn produced a mutual feedback effect within the Territories. Had this aspect of the uprising been taken into account from the start, the method of closing off areas for military purposes could have been adopted at a far earlier stage, and the damage caused by TV reports correspondingly reduced.

Compounding the problem was the considerable time that elapsed before the IDF’s information apparatus was placed on a footing enabling it to provide assistance and dispense reliable information to the foreign and Israeli press corps. The information branch of the defense establishment, it turned out, was as ill-prepared as the rest of the system to cope with the situation presented by the uprising. As a result, the primary and often only sources of information utilized by foreign correspondents were local residents and East Jerusalem-based Palestinian information centers. If a comprehensive Israeli conception had taken into account the possibility of a popular uprising, the information apparatus could have functioned effectively from the outset.

Conclusion

The uprising was generated by a combination of underlying causes that were aggravated over the years, along with more immediate situational causes. Four major reasons may be adduced to explain why the intifada erupted only after 20 years of Israeli rule: a rise in nationalism, increased frustration, the Palestinians’ creation of a national organizational infrastructure, and erosion in the IDF’s deterrent profile. Two decades of Israeli control, far from bringing about coexistence, had produced mounting resistance to Israel and a growing desire among the population to divest itself of Israeli rule. A new generation of Palestinians, born and brought up under Israeli occupation, proved ready to fight, take greater risks and make more sacrifices than their forebears.

To this must be added the Palestinians’ feeling that time was working against them (in the aftermath of the Lebanon War and Israel’s intensified settlement policy in the Territories), and that past modes of action, including terrorism, had done little to advance their cause. Even before the start of the uprising a Palestinian national infrastructure had been created in the Territories, thanks in large measure to funds provided after the 1978 Arab summit conference in Baghdad. A key element was the availability of a large pool of capable, highly motivated manpower. This comprised some 25,000 former security prisoners and some 600 terrorists released in the Jibril deal; activists in the trade unions that had consolidated their power over the years; Fatah’s Shabiba youth movement, which was founded in 1981 and played a key role in the uprising; and Islamic religious groups in the Gaza Strip, one of which, Islamic Jihad, began operating openly only in 1981, but provided much of the impetus for the intifada there.

A significant cause was the erosion of the IDF’s deterrent profile vis-a-vis the local population. Just as the deterrent image that had largely restrained the Palestinians from intensifying the struggle against Israel stemmed from the IDF’s performance in the Six-Day War, so its decline began in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War six years later. The process was escalated by the Lebanon War of 1982–85 in which, according to the Palestinians’ interpretation, an indigenous civilian population had forced the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon. The weakness projected by the GSS in 1986 and 1987, because of the Bus #300 affair, further diminished Israeli deterrence.

Once the underlying causes were ripe, the rioting itself was triggered by immediate situational causes. From this standpoint, the uprising could just as readily have broken out before or after December 1987.

Chapter Two:
Historical Background

The relevant historical background of the intifada encompasses events dating back some 50 years before its eruption in December 1987. These are principally the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–39), the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and disturbances and manifestations of civil disobedience in the Territories (Judea, Samaria and Gaza) in the two decades between the Six-Day War and the start of the uprising. These three phenomena are constantly cited as models by the Palestinians themselves. Naturally, the events of 1936–39 and the disturbances in the Territories are of direct significance for Israel because they occurred in the same locale as the intifada and because Jews (and the British) were their targets. The war in Algeria, which eventuated in that country’s independence, constitutes a model for emulation in the eyes of many Palestinians.

The Arab Revolt of 1936–39¹

Essential Facts

The current generation of Palestinians views the “Great Revolt” (as the Arabs call it) or the “Events of 1936–39” (in Jewish parlance) as a model. As such it appears to offer them both positive and negative lessons.

The Revolt extended sporadically for three years. Its aims were political and it affected the future of Palestine. Its immediate cause was a conflict between two national movements, Palestinian Arab and Jewish. And it ended with what was effectively a political victory for the Palestinians with the publication of the White Paper by the British colonial secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, on May 17, 1939.

Tension and hostilities between Palestinians and Jews had not been lacking even before the Revolt. In 1920, 1921 and 1929 Arabs attacked Jews and perpetrated atrocities. However, the events of 1936–39 far exceeded past unrest in intensity, scale and duration. The hostilities spread rapidly to every part of the country, and Arab operations gained the growing support of the rural population.

The Revolt began on the night of April 15, 1936, when armed Arabs stopped a number of cars near Tulkarm, robbed three Jewish passengers and then murdered one of them and seriously wounded the others. The following day two Arab laborers working in a Jewish-owned orchard near Petah Tikva were murdered. Although the insurrection began in the cities, the firm response there of the British Army soon caused it to spread to the rural sector.

The Revolt may be divided into three periods: The first lasted four days, from April 15 to 19, 1936 and was characterized by violent outbursts that were unorganized and uncoordinated by a central political body.

The second period consisted of a general strike declared by the “National Committee” in Nablus. This lasted from April 20 to October 11, 1936. The strike was a powerful expression of national will. Its declared aim was to ensure that Palestine remain eternally under Arab control. Throughout, the strike was accompanied by violence. It was halted under pressure from Arab merchants, who were on the verge of economic collapse. They initiated a move that brought about the intervention of Arab monarchs and an appeal to the public by the Arab Higher Committee.

The third period began with the publication of a report by a British Royal Commission in July 1937 and continued until the outbreak of World War H, at which time the Revolt faded. This period was characterized by an increase in the number of attacks, including the use of firearms, against government institutions and Jewish settlements, and by internal terrorism among the Palestinians; a quasi-civil war was fought by gangs, and ultimately about a quarter of all Palestinians killed during the Revolt were murdered by their fellow Palestinians. Today many Palestinian public figures still recall vividly the internal violence during the Revolt and fear a recurrence of the syndrome.

No reliable figures exist concerning the number of persons killed and wounded during the three years of the Revolt. According to the Book of the Haganah, the Jewish population suffered 520 killed and 2,500 wounded. The British government’s A Survey of Palestine contains data on the number of fatalities during the Revolt, but excludes the year 1937. According to this source, the insurgents’ actions resulted in the deaths of 211 members of the British security forces; 429 Jews; and 1,022 Arab civilian noncombatants. If estimated losses for 1937 are added, the latter figure probably totals approximately 1,300. The figure cited for losses inflicted on the rebels by the security forces is about 1,000 per year (in 1936 and 1938). On the assumption that the casualty rate for 1937 and 1939 was approximately the same, the total number of Arab insurgents killed was about 4,000. Certainly the number of Palestinian civilians killed as a result of operations by the insurgents was more than twice the number of Jewish fatalities (some 1,300 as compared with 520).

Detailed data concerning the scale of the rebels’ violent activity in 1938 and 1939 are provided in A Survey of Palestine. In 1938 there were 5,708 violent incidents, including 986 against the security forces, 651 against Jewish settlements, 381 bombs thrown, 215 kidnappings, 720 acts of sabotage against communications lines, 341 acts of sabotage against roads and railway lines, 430 murders and attempted murders, and 144 acts of sabotage against the oil pipeline.

The following year, 1939, saw a falloff in the overall number of incidents to 3,315, including 230 attacks on the security forces and 135 against Jewish settlements, 135 kidnappings, 245 acts of sabotage against communications lines, 136 murders and attempted murders, and 39 acts of sabotage against the oil pipeline.

The Arab Revolt and the Intifada: Similarities and Differences

Both the Arab Revolt and the intifada were motivated by nationalist impulses. Both erupted spontaneously without orders from above. Once they had begun, Palestinian leaders (the PLO in the case of the intifada) were able to take advantage of the events to further their political cause.

The Arab Revolt and the intifada were both nourished by rumors that spread through the Arab sector about alleged atrocities that in fact never occurred. Thus, in the Revolt, following the first incident on April 15, 1936, it was rumored in and around Jaffa that Jews had beheaded three (or five) Arab men and an Arab woman; in Tulkarm it was said that three Arabs had been murdered in nearby Kfar Yonah; and in Jerusalem it was claimed that Jews had killed between 30 and 50 Arabs and then concealed the bodies.

Manifestations of civil disobedience were discernible, too, in both the Arab Revolt and the intifada. In the former a general strike was called by the National Committee in Nablus, pressure was exerted on Arab civil servants to join the strike, and the public was urged to withhold tax payments and to boycott government institutions.

Both the Revolt and the intifada were directed against the authorities, the security forces and Jewish civilians. In both instances those Palestinians who violated orders of the leadership were subjected to pressure and physical force. In the Revolt, for example, the weapons of policemen were appropriated by authorities after most of them began to cooperate (whether by choice or by coercion) with the rebels. Internal liquidations were perpetrated in both periods, although on a far more massive scale during the Revolt, when special courts were actually set up by the leadership.

Supreme leaderships were established shortly after the outbreak of both the Revolt and the intifada. The earlier period saw the formation of the Arab Higher Committee, and its counterpart in the intifada is the United National Command of the Uprising.

In both cases the authorities’ assessment held that the problem was not amenable to solution by the use of military force alone. In a message to London dated August 30, 1936, the British High Commissioner wrote that the army had proved unable to restore order, and that there was little chance it could soon do so. Similarly, three months after the start of the intifada the Israeli chief of staff said: “As long as no decision is made to change Israel’s code of behavior to allow the use of firearms against unarmed civilians in the Territories, the IDF alone cannot bring about absolute quiet.”² In both periods authorities believed that military actions must be combined with political overtures. As noted, the Revolt ended in a political achievement for the Palestinians (the British White Paper). In the case of the intifada, the Palestinians have scored a number of political gains, most notably the onset of a dialogue between the US and the PLO.

In looking at the differences between the Arab Revolt and the intifada, we begin with the issue of locale. The Revolt took place primarily in the rural rather than the urban sector, and fellahin (peasants) were its main perpetrators, whereas the intifada encompasses both sectors. Then too, the intifada is for the most part a violent struggle, albeit without firearms (its symbols are the stone and the petrol bomb), whereas the Revolt was fought principally with firearms. The Revolt was waged mainly by gangs, but the intifada is a popular uprising. Further, the general strike during the Revolt caused a cessation of all economic activity — a situation the population found untenable — and was therefore called off after five and a half months. In the intifada a permanent general strike has not been declared, and the strike weapon has been utilized in a far more selective and more sophisticated manner. In 1936–39 the British made no attempt to make shops open forcibly or by administrative fiat; the Israelis at first tried to break commercial strikes, but relented after a few weeks.

During the intifada the Palestinians have been presented as the underdogs by the international media, thus generating a negative image for Israel (combat-ready soldiers vs. stone-throwing youths). In contrast, in the Revolt it was the Jewish Yishuv that was pictured as the underdog; the Palestinians’ image was almost universally negative due to their use of firearms against civilians.

The countermeasures employed by security forces were in part similar, but differed in one essential. During the Revolt, British military courts sentenced to death 364 Palestinians, and 54 of the sentences were carried out. In marked contrast, Israeli military prosecutors have continued to avoid demanding the death penalty.

The Palestinians’ national consciousness is infinitely more developed today than it was in 1936. The sense of solidarity displayed in the intifada is far greater than during the Revolt. At that time national cohesion was atomized by schisms and internal terror. Indeed, during the 1930s the British authorities found it relatively less problematic to suppress the Revolt because they were fighting armed gangs and did not have to confront stone-throwing women and children. At the time of the Revolt in 1936 there was a civilian government in Palestine and the police bore responsibility for preserving order. Only much later, after the unrest had greatly increased, was a military regime imposed and army units brought in as reinforcements. During the intifada, in contrast, a military government was in control in the Territories from the outset.

The number of fatalities among the insurgents during the Revolt far exceeded the number during the uprising. Approximately 4,000 deaths were recorded during 1936–1939, whereas some 550 Palestinians were killed in the first year and a half of the uprising — a third of the losses recorded in a comparable period 50 years earlier. It bears stressing that the majority of persons killed by the insurgents during the Revolt were Arab civilians, a statistic that reflects the intensity of the internal struggle. In contrast, fewer than 100 internal liquidations were perpetrated during the first year and a half of the intifada.

The Algerian War of Independence³

The Palestinians and the PLO cite Algeria as their model for a war of liberation. The Algerian war broke out on November 1, 1954, following 132 years of French rule, and ended seven and a half years later with Algeria’s independence.

Algeria is a vast land, more than four times the size of France and the tenth largest country in the world. Its status was not that of a French colony but of a district of France. In 1954 the country’s population comprised about nine million Muslims and about a million Algerian-born French residents (Pieds Noirs). Primarily, what made the Algerian problem so intractable was the impossibility of bringing about coexistence between two nations, the French and the Algerian, that differed in religion, culture, traditions and political philosophy.

The Course of the War

In late April of 1954 an organization called the Revolutionary Council for Unity and Action (CRUA) was formed with the aim of instigating an armed rebellion. The first plenum meeting of the organization’s leadership was held on the day that Dien Bien Phu fell to the North Vietnamese (May 7, 1954). This severe defeat suffered by the French Army at the hands of an anti-colonial resistance movement electrified Algerians. The CRUA decided that its revolt would be revolutionary in character and would continue until the achievement of independence.

The insurrection began as planned, with central direction, on the night of October 31-November 1, 1954, when some 70 violent incidents, including ambushes, attacks on police stations, and arson were perpetrated by small units in diverse areas of Algeria. The French were completely taken by surprise. The first communique of the FLN (National Liberation Front), which was broadcast over Cairo Radio, defined the aim of the uprising as “the reestablishment of a sovereign, democratic and socialist Algerian state within the framework of the principles of Islam.” An emergency meeting of the French authorities in Algeria, held on the morning of November 1, concluded that what had occurred during the night was a series of isolated incidents and not a general insurrection.

The period from 1954–1957, which the FLN called the “Years of Heroism,” can be divided into three parts. The first period witnessed the establishment of the FLN and its fight for sheer survival in the harsh winter of 1954, when it was badly mauled and reeling. In the second period, beginning in the spring of 1955, the FLN consolidated its ranks and expanded, as large numbers of new recruits joined up. The rebels now also showed a higher level of organization and fought as squads of 10 to 15 persons, and even in companies of 50. Their tactics became increasingly aggressive. The FLN extended its operations from attacks on army barracks and police stations to the murder of Muslim “friends of France;” in April, 88 such “collaborators” were liquidated.

The new French governor of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, concluded that the army could not execute its mission. The French government dispatched another ten battalions, raising the number of French troops in the country from 74,000 to 100,000. The rebels continued to intensify their activity, including massacres of French families, followed by retaliatory operations by the French Army.

The FLN scored its first diplomatic achievement in April 1955 when it took part in the Bandung Conference. Five months later, “Algeria” was formally placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly as the Algerian question was debated in the world body.

The third period saw the expansion and intensification of violent activity. The insurgents now benefited from friendly open borders to the east and west, thanks to France’s granting of independence to Tunisia and Morocco (the border with Tunisia was particularly useful), thus affording the rebels regular arms supplies. The adjacent friendly territory could also be used either to build and train large fighting forces, or as a safe haven. By early 1956 some 200,000 French soldiers were stationed in Algeria, yet the situation continued to deteriorate and the revolt encompassed most of the country. Already in January 1956 Soustelle reported that the morale of the French expeditionary force was at a nadir and that it was pointless to take casualties when a deal was clearly in the offing. Indeed, in 1956 the two sides entered into political talks. Five secret meetings were held between the French premier and the rebels (despite the objections of the new governor in Algeria, Robert Lacoste). It is unclear how serious these peace feelers were.

Until 1956 French public opinion was united in the view that Algeria should not be granted independence and should remain part of France. For its part, the French Army, still bearing the burden of its early setbacks in World War II, now compounded by Dien Bien Phu, was determined not to lose the Algerian war. Yet following France’s failure in the Suez Campaign (October 1956), FLN morale soared, while the French expeditionary force to Suez returned home in a state of low morale. In the view of French Premier Guy Mollet, the Suez fiasco spelled the end of any hope of military success in Algeria. In any case, by mid-1956 the insurrection had become a mass movement.

March 1957 was the first month since the start of the insurrection in which not a single charge exploded in the city of Algiers. The battle for the city ended that fall to the immense relief of the French inhabitants: workers returned to their jobs, schools reopened and the French resumed their former way of life. A major cause of the French forces’ urban success was their use of new and more sophisticated infiltration tactics to eliminate the rebel leaders in the city. One method was to outfit selected informers in blue work clothes and send them into the Casbah, where they mingled with their former terrorist comrades and led French intelligence personnel to the hiding places of their masters. Once the rebel leaders were located, paratroopers were called in to seize (or liquidate) them. In this way Yacef, the rebels’ supreme commander in Algiers, was captured.

Reeling under these setbacks, the FLN decided to abandon large-scale urban terrorism in Algeria, and to initiate attacks on purely French targets in France itself. From the French standpoint, the situation in Algeria had improved concretely; the French garrison was now reduced by 70,000, and regular military service was cut from 27 to 24 months. However the battle of Algiers, which had been covered by foreign TV networks, helped internationalize the conflict, and in 1957 and 1958 the Algerian problem featured prominently on the world agenda.

In September 1957 a barrier in the form of an electrified fence was erected along the Algerian-Tunisian border from the sea to the Sahara Desert (the Maurice Line) in order to prevent the smuggling of FLN arms and the infiltration of fighters from Tunis. The same year also saw a shift in official US policy regarding the Algerian question. This occurred following talks held by Vice President Nixon in Tunis in March and his recommendation to President Eisenhower that a plebiscite be held in Algeria to enable the people to choose among several political solutions, one of which was independence. In July Senator John F. Kennedy urged the president to use his influence to bring about a solution that would recognize Algeria’s independent character.

Following the battle for Algiers in early 1957, the French Army was dispatched to carry out key operations in the interior. It was only partially successful, and by year’s end the situation was close to stalemate. A fierce campaign was waged along the Maurice Line which was defended by a strong French force of about 80,000 soldiers. Both the French and the FLN considered this battle crucial. Attempts to breach the line, initially by small forces and then by large numbers, failed. In the spring of 1958 the French Army felt, for the first time since the outbreak of the revolt, that it was winning on virtually all fronts. Yet the military also sensed that Paris was not prosecuting the war in order to win it, and preferred to terminate the conflict through negotiations. The French Left was increasingly wracked by schisms, and a series of French governments were toppled over the issue of the war in Algeria.

In May 1958 General de Gaulle was called to the flag with a mandate — for which he received broad executive powers — to save the Republic and resolve the Algerian problem. In September the FLN declared the formation of a government-in-exile based in Cairo. On October 23, 1958, de Gaulle publicly proposed the “peace of the courageous.” Effectively, this was a call to the rebels to surrender and as such it was rejected by the ALN (National Liberation Army) and by the French Left, while the moderate Left condemned the offer as a move that would eventuate in negotiations with the FLN.

In early April of 1959 the French Army launched a campaign of offensive operations against ALN bases, including some large-scale raids, that continued for the rest of the year. The ALN was forced to revert from battalion-size operations to platoon-size guerilla attacks. The war and the guerilla campaign persisted despite severe hardships suffered by the Algerian fighters and civilians. A French assessment in early 1958 claimed that the ALN was fielding only 30,000 fighters (only half of them in Algeria), while the ALN claimed it had 100,000 troops. On September 16, 1959, at a time when the military situation on the ground was favorable to the French Army, President de Gaulle launched a political initiative, proposing to the Algerians that they choose between dissociation, full integration with France, or an autonomous government linked to France. He also stated, for the first time, that he was ready to countenance “a turn to the road of self-determination.” This was well received by the Algerians, but caused serious ferment within the French Army. At the end of September the Algerian government announced that it was ready to enter into negotiations with France for a ceasefire and for self-determination, but demanded a general withdrawal of all French forces from Algeria.

By 1960 France was gripped by war weariness. Public opinion tended increasingly to favor peace negotiations and a ceasefire. September 5 saw the appearance of the “121st Proclamation” which incited French conscripts to defect. The signatories included noted intellectuals and celebrities, such as Jean Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Francoise Sagan and Simone Signoret. In October a counter-proclamation was issued, this one bearing the signatures of 300 figures on the Right, including France’s “No. 1 soldier,” Marshall Juin. In April 1961 General Challe led an attempted coup in Algeria, and fears were raised of ah invasion of France. In a speech to conscripts and reservists, de Gaulle urged them to obey his orders, show loyalty to the state and use every means at their disposal to block the insurgents. An internal struggle, with incidents of violence, developed within the garrison in Algiers, and the coup failed. But the French Army was in tatters.

On May 20, 1961, negotiations between French and Algerian delegations commenced at Evian. Deep divisions were evident from the first: the French wanted to discuss practical details whereas the FLN preferred to deal with general principles. Autumn 1961 found de Gaulle at his most pessimistic. The FLN seemed determined not to leave France anything, not even its self-respect, and the talks foundered. Concurrently, terrorism and counter-terrorism campaigns in Algeria surged at the hands of the FLN and the OAS, the organization founded by the Pieds Noirs. By the end of 1961 French public opinion was thoroughly disillusioned with the entire Algerian affair. De Gaulle was bent on resolving the problem.

The second Evian Conference opened on March 7, 1962. The Algerians’ unwavering determination enabled them to realize the goals of their insurrection without compromising, while the French folded. In the negotiations France asked for a ceasefire prior to any settlement, a four-year gap between the ceasefire and Algerian self-determination, the assurance of dual nationality for the Pieds Noirs, and more. All these requests were rejected. Eleven days after the conference commencement, a 93-page agreement was signed and a ceasefire was set to go into effect the following day.

In the course of the war 42,090 acts of terrorism were perpetrated, resulting in civilian casualties on a large scale: 10,704 Europeans (among them 2,788 fatalities) and 43,284 Muslims (16,378 fatalities). The Muslim insurgents paid a heavy price to gain independence. According to a French estimate, 141,000 Muslims were killed by French security forces, 12,000 FLN members were liquidated in internal purges, and 50,000 Muslims were kidnapped by the FLN and listed as dead. Following the war one of the leaders of the insurrection claimed that the war had cost 300,000 Algerian lives. Nowadays the Algerians cite a figure of one million killed.

French Army figures show that their forces lost 17,456 killed, along with 64,985 wounded and about 1,000 missing in action.

Comparison with the Intifada

We note, at the outset, that the comparison that follows between Algeria’s war of independence and the intifada is necessarily incomplete, since the latter event has not yet run its course and the nature of its resolution is unclear at this writing.

The major similarity between the two struggles lies in their identity of goal: liberation and independence. In each case the struggle was waged by large segments of the population (Algerian, Palestinian) that demonstrated unwavering staying power, even at a high price in casualties and other hardships. Media coverage ensured that both campaigns were “internationalized” and that the insurgents could make inroads in world public opinion. Similarly, nearly all political establishments everywhere supported the Algerians and the Palestinians. The two struggles consisted not only of a war against armed forces (the French Army in Algeria, the IDF in the Territories); a violent struggle was also conducted against civilians of the ruling country living amidst the insurgent populations. In both Algeria and the Territories an ongoing clash developed with settlers who were identified with the ruling power. The settlers, seeking to protect vested interests, reacted sharply and forcefully against attacks by insurgents, took the initiative against them and became a (primarily political) force in the field — one with which the central government had to reckon.

Yet along with points of resemblance there are some major differences between the two struggles. For one, the sheer size of Algeria, certainly as compared with Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, required the deployment of French forces on a massive scale. Reinforcements were poured in and as early as 1956 there were a quarter of a million French soldiers in the country. Yet even with an expeditionary force of this size France was hard-pressed to preserve relative quiet in Algeria, with its vast area and large population, as compared with Israel’s ability to do so (with far fewer forces) in the Territories.

Secondly, the rebels in Algeria resorted to firearms as their main weapon, whereas in the Territories the most commonly used weapons are the stone and the petrol bomb. Moreover, far fewer persons have been killed, on both sides, in the intifada than was the case in Algeria. In the Territories 550 Palestinians were killed in the first year and a half of the intifada. In Algeria, the number of fatalities among the population, in seven and a half years of fighting, totaled between 300,000 and one million.

Finally, Algeria was formally an integral part of France, a full-fledged district, whereas the Territories have no such status vis-a-vis Israel. Furthermore, Algeria has no common border with France and indeed is separated from it by sea. In contrast, Judea and Samaria border on Israel and dominate it topographically in its narrowest section, which also constitutes its vital area.

Earlier Unrest in the Territories

After 1967 the Territories — especially Judea and Samaria — experienced disturbances and other violence, generally fomented by youths and students in the towns. The refugee camps began to take part in the unrest in 1982. There were also manifestations of civil disobedience, such as strikes in the educational, commercial and transportation systems. Indeed, even before 1967 the ruling Jordanians had to cope with violence against the regime in these same Territories, in the form of stone-throwing, burning of tires and the like. The Jordanians had no compunctions about using live fire and even tanks against rioters.

Under Israeli rule attempts at civil disobedience began almost immediately, in 1967. Major General (res.) Shlomo Gazit, the first coordinator of government activities in the Territories, notes that “civil disobedience in the West Bank broke out at an extremely early stage, within weeks of the cessation of hostilities in the Six-Day War.”⁴

The first and most noteworthy of these attempts was a school strike that lasted for more than two months. As a result, the 1967–68 school year opened in November instead of September. The strike was organized by teachers, headmasters and local boards of education. It was controlled by the traditional leadership that remained from the period of Jordanian rule. The strike was motivated by the fear that Israel would introduce in the Territories the curriculum of the Israeli Arab sector in place of the Jordanian curriculum. For their part the Israeli authorities feared that the school strike, if allowed to continue, would snowball into massive civil disobedience. In the event, the strike continued (with the exception of the Hebron region) even after local mayors and boards of education were assured that studies would be conducted on the basis of the Jordanian curriculum.

The center of resistance was Nablus, where a general strike was also held on September 19 (the day the General Assembly session opened). Two days later the Israeli military imposed a series of punitive edicts on Nablus. These included an open-ended night curfew; the shutting down of the public bus system; the closure of ten shops (which had closed during the strike) until further notice; the disconnecting of all telephone lines during curfew; search operations in the city’s residential quarters; the detention of notables for interrogation; a slash in the Military Government’s allocations for the municipal budget and the appointment of an Israeli chartered accountant to examine the municipality’s books; closure of the Adam (Damiya) Bridge over the Jordan River, which served primarily residents of Nablus and Samaria, to all vehicular traffic (including goods) to and from Jordan; and the deportation of the Kadi of Nablus.

These sanctions had the intended effect, and on October 11 the defense minister held a meeting with the mayor of Nablus and heads of Samaria local councils in which he demanded that they cease all political strikes and stoppages of public transportation, and put a stop to terrorism. He insisted that in future, in the event of problems or complaints, the local leadership not take demonstrative actions but request an immediate meeting with the relevant authorities to deal with the matter. The Arab officials accepted these conditions and it was agreed that the school year would begin not later than November 5, 1967⁵.

The first demonstration on record took place toward the end of 1967, not long after the start of the school year, again in Nablus. It was a small affair: three children walked past Military Government HQ in Nablus carrying a placard. The purpose was evidently to see how the Israeli authorities would react. This was followed by demonstrations and disturbances in which dozens and even hundreds of local residents took part. In early 1968 Jordan tried to foment an atmosphere of revolt by calling on the population to resist and take to the streets, but the response was meager.

Until September 1970, external incitement and local punitive measures (house demolitions, administrative detentions, and so on) produced sporadic unrest. This often took the form of a demonstration that started with pupils, encouraged by their teachers, shouting and milling about in a school. They would then go into the street, build stone barriers, bum tires and clash (by throwing stones and bottles) with IDF troops or Border Police who would rush to the scene. Often the unrest began in one school and then spread to a second, a third and so on. A typical demonstration would comprise a few hundred pupils and women, but no adult males. Women were especially active in Jerusalem and Ramallah, their activity initiated by several women’s associations. The refugee camps were calm for the most part and the Gaza Strip was generally quiescent.

Within this context the year 1969 proved difficult for the security forces. Demonstrations launched from schools sometimes comprised thousands of participants, with girls also taking part. The torching of al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem contributed to the mounting unrest. The entire West Bank seethed with riots, demonstrations and transportation strikes. But all this ceased in mid-1970.⁶

A document drawn up by the coordinator of government activities in the Territories, dated June 1, 1970, and submitted to the defense minister, contained a section entitled “Civil Disobedience.” According to this analysis, the aims of the civil disobedience campaign (which, in retrospect, were at least in part similar to those of the current uprising) were:

— to demonstrate broad popular unity and solidarity against the authorities;

— to voice protests of a dramatic nature that would shock international public opinion and the world’s conscience; and

— more concretely, to undermine normal life and cause havoc in order to thwart any possibility that orderly government could be maintained.

The report noted that the Palestinians

hoped to achieve a great deal through acts of civil disobedience. Above all, [they wanted to make] a clear contribution to the general pressures being exerted on Israel to withdraw its forces, as a supplement to the political campaign…. Their aim was to reinforce with arguments and concrete actions the struggle being waged in the international arena, at the UN, and to impress personalities visiting our region on various missions. Demonstrations were timed to coincide with such visits. At the same time, they hoped to enlist international support for their cause and their struggle — press, radio, TV and public opinion molders of all stripes, or vociferous groups of activists who could easily be recruited against the forces of reaction and imperialism, if only they could make them aware of the story, the drama.

Nor did they ignore the goal and hope of influencing public opinion inside Israel proper, by generating a movement of people of morals and conscience who would object to [Israel’s] very readiness to go on ruling an Arab population against its will, and would become a political force inside Israel demanding the evacuation of the Territories.

In time, strategic military goals were also added—to pin down Israeli forces in the interior of the Territories and thus to place a heavy logistic, budgetary and military burden on the Israeli government.⁷

The document summing up civil disobedience attempts until mid-1970 notes that “the Arabs’ failure in this campaign was complete.” Indeed, “the Israeli success in suppressing the riots and blocking the civil disobedience campaign” is described “as the most impressive Israeli success since the June 1967 war”⁸ — by implication even more impressive than Israel’s staying power in the concurrent War of Attrition with Egypt — a doubtful conclusion.

According to partial and incomplete data (no full records were kept), in the period from mid-1970 until after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, about 100 disturbances a year occurred in Judea-Samaria, and about twice that number in the Gaza Strip. Toward the end of 1974 (when Arafat made his first UN appearance) the number of incidents in Judea-Samaria began to climb steeply, totaling 1,000 in 1976/7 (following the imposition by Israeli revenue authorities of value-added tax), while in the Gaza Strip there was a sharp decline to a few dozen incidents a year.

In 1982, against the backdrop of the Lebanon War, the number of disturbances in Judea-Samaria rose dramatically from hundreds to thousands (over 4,000 in 1982, over 3,000 in 1983, over 2,500 in 1984) and from dozens to hundreds in the Gaza Strip (about 490 in 1982, 560 in 1983 and more than 700 in 1984). This level of unrest was maintained until the uprising (see Appendix 1). Manifestly, then, the intifada did not erupt from a situation of total quiet. In both Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip, each of the preceding 13 years, from 1974, had witnessed a relatively large number of riots and other disturbances.

Until 1981 responsibility for countermeasures designed to put a rapid stop to the riots and unrest was vested in the Military Government. It was up to the military governor and the district governors to utilize all available means (including the IDF and the Border Police) to quell disturbances. In November 1981 responsibility for routine security and internal security (including disturbances), was separated from responsibility for providing services in the civilian sector. Maintenance of security was placed in the hands of the generals commanding the central and southern sectors of Israel. The newly created Civil Administration was charged with the task of providing civilian services.

From the Six-Day War on, the Military Government employed a variety of tactics, singly or in combination, to prevent or quickly put down riots or disturbances. First, a constant dialogue was maintained with local leaders in order to know what issues of importance to the population might lead to unrest. Agreements were made, entailing mild Israeli concessions, to ensure calm and prevent rioting.⁹ Secondly, warnings were issued to public figures and notables (mayors, mukhtars, headmasters, clerics), especially in the towns and cities, in cases where it was assessed that disturbances were likely to erupt. The idea was to take advantage of these officials’ vested interest in maintaining calm and preventing harm to the population, and get them to use their influence on the younger generation. Third, when disturbances were deemed probable (on “sensitive” dates or following PLO calls to the population to stage strikes or take to the streets), the military forces in the area, which were normally quite small in number, were reinforced. Reinforcement of garrisons in the Territories had two purposes: to serve, by the very display of larger numbers of troops, as a deterrent against disturbances; and, in the event that the deterrent proved insufficient, to enable the authorities to act rapidly to quell the disturbances. In the early years the system included the deployment of a few tanks at a certain remove from the center of tension — yet visible to the population — as a deterrent.¹⁰ Fourth, arrests were made, some of them preemptive, based on information regarding organizers and instigators, mainly among pupils and college students (the main demonstrators in that period).

If disturbances broke out despite all these measures, a combination of additional measures was resorted to: curfew was imposed on the immediate area of the riots (or on a whole town) and was strictly enforced. The population at that time could still recall vividly the behavior of Jordanian forces during curfew, and this was one reason why a small force was sufficient to maintain the curfew. Such curfews had two basic aims: to restore calm and to “break” rebellious elements and deter them from making similar attempts in the future. Curfews were generally of three or four days’ duration, with local leaders soon requesting that the curfew be lifted, and pledging to preserve the quiet. Nevertheless, in 1969 Tulkarm endured a curfew of seven days and nights, and Nablus a nine-day curfew.¹¹ In addition, when called for, physical force was employed to disperse rioters, including (as of 1976) the use of tear gas and rubber bullets, followed by the direct engagement of the rioters from the rear or the flank with the use of riot batons (which were supplied only to the Border Police). Another measure was the closure, for periods of up to a few months, of one or two schools where riots had repeatedly occurred, causing the pupils involved to lose an entire year’s credit. (This measure was applied very selectively, and the authorities refrained from closing down all or even most of the schools in a given area.)

These methods, combined with administrative measures, generally produced the desired short-term result: the disturbances would cease, only to flare up again a few months later. The administrative measures included onerous sanctions directed against individuals, such as imposing heavy fines on parents of children who were caught rioting or demonstrating, closing the shops on a street where a demonstration had taken place, and the selective deportation of demonstrators or instigators to Jordan. The first deportation took place on September 21, 1967, and by the end of 1969, 71 persons had been deported (besides terrorists deported).¹² There was a single case in which the father of a boy who had thrown stones at an IDF patrol was deported, apparently in 1968.¹³ Other measures included barring the residents of a town where rioting had occurred from crossing into Jordan via the Jordan River bridges or from engaging in commercial transactions with Jordan.

These relatively limited measures seemed appropriate in the aftermath of the 1967 war, when the IDF enjoyed a significant deterrent profile in the Territories and the local population, including youths, were reluctant to take personal risks. The knowledge that the authorities could and would resort to harsher and more stringent measures if required, and that civil disobedience tactics inflicted serious damage on the population without generating any progress toward a political solution, helped ensure that an uprising did not erupt before the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, as we have noted already, the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War was marked by an intensification of the level and scale of disturbances, due to the erosion of Israel’s deterrent image in that war.

Conclusion

Our review of possible historical precedents for the intifada is instructive, but nevertheless inconclusive. The comparisons simply do not provide a uniform pattern. The Arab Revolt of 1936–39, the Algerian War of Independence, and the intifada, all stemmed primarily from nationalist motivations. The Revolt, the unrest in the Territories between 1967 and 1987, and the intifada all erupted spontaneously, without orders from above, whereas the Algerian insurrection was launched by decision of an Algerian organization established about half a year earlier.

The Arab Revolt took place largely in the rural sector and was waged primarily by fellahin. In contrast, the war in Algeria and the uprising in the Territories were enacted in both urban and rural settings. The Revolt and the Algerian struggle were conducted primarily with firearms, while the use of firearms as an integral part of the intifada has been rare. The Revolt and the disturbances were not comprehensive struggles and did not have immediate broad objectives. In contrast, the struggle in Algeria was total and was intended from the outset to obtain independence from French rule. This may also account for the fact that it was the longest of the confrontations under discussion (although no final comparison with the still ongoing intifada is possible at this time), as well as the most violent and the most intense, with the insurgent population suffering the greatest hardships and the largest number of losses.

The Revolt of 1936–39, which for the most part was waged against British rule and British security forces, failed at the operational level, and was halted after about three years. One major reason for this outcome was the schisms and internal terrorism among the Palestinian population. Yet the revolt produced a political achievement for the Palestinians in the form of MacDonald’s White Paper which imposed stringent restrictions on the Jewish Yishuv, particularly in the areas of immigration, land purchases from Arabs and permitted zones of settlement.

Because the struggle in Algeria succeeded in bringing about independence for that country, it is perceived as a positive model by Palestinians in the Territories. In part, the Algerians’ success was due to the war’s becoming an international issue and to internal pressures in France. One paramount lesson to be gleaned from this protracted and violent struggle is that when a people reaches a stage of ripeness for a violent confrontation and civil disobedience against a government it perceives as an occupier, and is ready to fight and endure hardship over a long period, the resultant dynamic situation has both ramifications in the international arena and domestic repercussions within the ruling country, that afford the insurgents a good chance to emerge victorious in their struggle.

Chapter Three:
Violent Struggle and Civil Disobedience

The uprising in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip thus differs from the historical events described in Chapter 2. The differences are primarily quantitative, but with key substantive implications. The present case constitutes a popular uprising encompassing the entire population of the Territories and characterized by violence on a broad scale (generally excluding firearms) boldly exercised by the assailants, and by manifestations of civil disobedience. To date, the uprising has shown no sign of abating despite the high price it has exacted from the local population; and the considerable efforts of the Israeli security forces have proved insufficient to halt the violence and restore the status quo ante.

We turn now to examine the principal characteristics of the uprising as compared with past disturbances.

Objectives

The uprising began spontaneously, with no central organizing element and without the initial involvement of the PLO, which ‘climbed on the bandwagon’ about a week later. Hence, no specific objectives were set — although, clearly, the inhabitants’ basic desire since June 1967 had been to divest themselves of Israeli rule. A variety of goals were enunciated as events took their course. These involved one fundamental long-term goal as well as several immediate or intermediate-range goals.

The essential long-term objective is sweeping in nature and goes far beyond the aims of past waves of unrest. It is, in short, release from Israeli rule and the establishment of a Palestinian state. The population believes that this is attainable through a protracted struggle. As PLO leader Yasir Arafat described the objective on two separate occasions in the early stages of the uprising, it is “to end the Israeli occupation, recover our land and our right to self-determination and an independent state;”¹ “Our people will continue this struggle and Holy Jihad until the Palestinian flag is raised over Jerusalem, the capital of our free independent state, on the basis of the PLO’s political program.”²

Arafat was ambivalent at the time about whether the Palestinian state he envisaged would be confined to the boundaries of June 4, 1967 or would incorporate all or part of the area within the Green Line as well. Ahmed Jibril’s Radio Al-Quds (broadcasting from Syria) declared, in the name of the Palestinian “national forces,” that the goal was the establishment of “an independent Palestinian state in the entire area of Palestine.”³ East Jerusalem Palestinian activist Hana Siniora, on the other hand, set forth as a “final goal” the “end of the occupation and the attainment of [a separate] Palestinian identity” to be grounded in an independent state in the territories captured by Israel in June 1967.⁴

To this must be added Palestinian references to the right of return. This would entail Israel’s permitting the three million Palestinians living in the Arab world, of whom 2.2 million are refugees (one million living in refugee camps), to reclaim their property in Israel, or, if they so choose, to receive compensation. Thus Arafat stated that one could not ignore “the Palestinian people’s inalienable national rights, including the right to return, self-determination, and the establishment of their independent Palestinian state on their national Palestinian soil with Jerusalem as its capital.”⁵

Leaflet No. 5 (and others) issued by the PLO/United National Command of the Uprising, and distributed in Judea-Samaria around the end of January 1988, called for an escalation of the struggle “so that the Palestinian people will secure its national rights, first and foremost the right of return, self-determination and the establishment of our independent state under the leadership of the PLO.”⁶ Dr. Yasir Ubayd, pro-Jordanian, noted that the right of return is one of three political objectives of the Palestinians — the other two being ending the occupation and self-determination. According to Dr. Ubayd, “the right of return is especially important to the Palestinians still living in refugee camps…. They do not come from the West Bank and Gaza; their homes are inside the green line. They seek to return to Jaffa, Lydda and Ramie.”⁷ Arafat refers repeatedly to the right of return, employing the term “right of repatriation.”

Manifestly, such a program, if carried out in full, would cause Israel to collapse from within. In a press conference with Israeli journalists in Cairo, Arafat termed the “right of return” a “sacred right…. You know and we know that not everyone will return, but it is important for them to know that the right of return still exists…. All this will be discussed in the negotiations.”⁸ Public figures in the Territories who are identified with the PLO make a point of telling Israelis, in private conversations or at conferences and symposia, that they view the right of return as a sacred principle which cannot be abandoned but whose actual scale is negotiable. These and other Palestinians admit that the demand for the refugees to return is unfeasible and would be tantamount to suicide for Israel. Suggested solutions include the return of a symbolic number of refugees to Israel or a population exchange (the Palestinians absorbing Jewish settlers and Israel absorbing Palestinian refugees). Such moderate attitudes on the part of individuals notwithstanding, the right of return is a formidable obstacle to be overcome in possible future negotiations on a permanent settlement.

The PLO, then, urged an escalation of the struggle to enable the Palestinians to obtain their national rights, above all the right of return. But both the PLO and the Palestinians are aware that the struggle will be long and drawn-out, and will undergo numerous permutations. An all-encompassing political breakthrough is impossible. Hence their resort to a number of immediate and intermediate-range goals to preserve the momentum of the struggle while advancing toward their fundamental strategic goal. These interim objectives have taken three forms: political, escala-tory, and the creation of tools for self-government.

Political goals. The first political goal was to forge a power base for the PLO and the Palestinians while weakening Israel politically. This was to be effected through a protracted struggle for world public opinion, mainly by exploitation of the mass media, particularly television. The uprising leadership spoke of “declaring the uprising a war of attrition against the occupation with the aim of inflicting losses of life and political, economic and morale setbacks.”⁹ At the same time, the Palestinian issue must be placed on the international agenda as a problem requiring an urgent solution.

A second objective was to induce the superpowers to coerce Israel into agreeing to an international peace conference under UN auspices, with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the parties to the conflict, including the PLO in an independent delegation. A third involved the strengthening of the PLO as the symbol and sole representative of the Palestinian cause, and the undercutting of King Hussein’s ability to represent the Palestinians and enter into negotiations with Israel.

A fourth political goal was to oblige the United States to enter into a dialogue with the PLO, without the organization first fulfilling the conditions set by the US (acceptance of Resolution 242, etc.) The dialogue would be instrumental in improving the Palestinians’ position, and would “compel the United States, under the Bush administration, to take qualitative steps,”¹⁰ i.e., to put pressure on Israel to begin resolving the Palestinian question. Furthermore, the PLO sought to generate an internal debate in Israel and polarize popular opinion there on the Palestinian issue. Ultimately, this would bring about a policy change, leading to Israeli readiness to negotiate with the PLO and, finally, acceptance of the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Intensifying the struggle. Here the PLO sought, first, to ensure that the struggle assumed a broad popular character and could continue indefinitely. This entailed the use of active and passive means to generate a willingness to fight and a readiness for a lengthy struggle, with its attendant suffering, in the face of Israeli countermeasures. The majority of the Palestinians in the Territories would have to become involved. The struggle should bring about “the withdrawal of the American-Zionist army from cities, suburbs, and streets and the lifting of the siege on the camps.”¹¹ This, as a stage toward the IDF’s evacuation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the PLO sought to obtain the release of detainees, the closure of the detention camps, and the abrogation of the 1945 British-promulgated Defense (Emergency) Regulations.

Another escalatory objective was to secure international protection, in the form of UN forces, for the Palestinians engaged in the revolt, and specifically “for our women and children, until the removal of occupation”¹² “to escalate the war of attrition against the occupation.”¹³ Yet another was to transform the uprising into a stage toward the onset of “comprehensive” civil disobedience, feasible only if residents from the Territories ceased to work in Israel even though they had no other source of income. This would require the Arab states to fulfill their financial obligations as stipulated by the November 1988 Algiers summit conference.¹⁴

Toward self-government. Here the goal was to reduce to a minimum Israeli control in civilian areas of life and to establish, gradually, local Palestinian bodies (associated with the PLO or Islamic Jihad) to administer routine civil affairs and replace the Israeli authorities. Self-rule would be forged through Palestinian institutions and popular committees in the towns and villages. However, as the Palestinians were unable in the interim to force Israel out, they were to avoid destroying the Civil Administration, which is based largely on local staff. Instead, their aim was to set up a parallel infrastructure that would eventually replace the present system. Meanwhile they sought to hold free municipal elections, under UN auspices, in order to ensure municipal domination by PLO supporters,¹⁵ thereby strengthening the PLO’s control over the population.

Violent Aspects

Duration. At the time of writing the intifada’s end was nowhere in sight — a fact that some local Palestinians regarded as its primary characteristic.¹⁶ In the uprising the Palestinian population has demonstrated that it has staying power and is willing to endure hardships in order to achieve a political goal. Thus when Bethlehem mayor Elias Freij suggested at the end of 1988 that the Security Council call for a year-long “full and comprehensive truce between the Palestinians and Israel” in order to improve the atmosphere for the start of peace talks under UN auspices,¹⁷ he was forced to retract this proposal under PLO pressure. The uprising is a process and not a single act. It is propelled by a self-nourishing internal dynamic. The feeling of many Palestinians is that things could not be worse than they were in the period preceding its outbreak. Hence the extreme difficulty (if at all possible) of stopping it by military means alone.

Geographical and quantitative scope. The uprising gradually came to encompass all of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, taking root even in previously tranquil locales. Indeed despite, or because of, their former good relations with Israel, some of the latter (e.g., the cities of Kalkilya, Tulkarm and Jenin) assumed leadership roles in the uprising. Some villages in Judea-Samaria actually sealed themselves off and declared their “independence” until the IDF forced its way in; often, after the army left, the pattern would be repeated. The intensity, the relentlessness and the sheer number of daily incidents are far beyond anything in the past. Statistics of the IDF Spokesman¹⁸ show an almost unbroken monthly increase in violence until the end of May 1989 (see Appendix 2). This is particularly striking in that about one-third of all incidents are not even reported by the IDF unit involved.¹⁹

The first 18 months saw 1,734 petrol bombings and 538 cases of arson. Notably, during two weeks in June 1989 (June 8–21) the number of violent incidents decreased by about one-third (1,221 incidents in half a month as compared with 3,519 incidents in May 1989).²⁰

Targets: Israeli soldiers and civilians and Palestinian collaborators. Whereas past disturbances had been aimed primarily at the Israeli authorities in the Territories, this time civilians were also targeted. In fact, since the violence is directed in the first place against Israeli vehicles in the Territories, its target is any Israeli — soldier or civilian—traveling on the roads. Data²¹ for part of the period under discussion show that Israeli civilians were the targets of more than half the violent incidents in Judea-Samaria.

IDF Spokesman statistics show that from the start of the uprising until April 8, 1989, 6,951 disturbances (not including the throwing of petrol bombs) were directed against soldiers and 7,216 against civilians. There were 11,031 incidents in which people were not the target (e.g., tire-burning, etc.). In the first 18 months nine Israeli civilians and six soldiers were killed. Although the number of soldiers wounded was 1.87 times greater than the number of civilians (1,188 vs. 634), a closer examination reveals that in Judea-Samaria, where the Jewish population far exceeds that in Gaza, the number of civilians wounded totaled 78 percent of the number of soldiers wounded (584 vs. 748 — see Appendix 3). In contrast, in the Gaza Strip, nine times as many soldiers were wounded (440 vs. 50).²² Two other reasons help account for the disparity between the number of Israeli civilian casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza. In Gaza, Jewish settlement is concentrated in the Katif District, whereas in Judea-Samaria it is scattered and fragmented. Secondly, the Gaza Strip access roads used by the Jewish population do not pass through densely populated Arab areas, whereas in Judea-Samaria the opposite is the case, and in Hebron a Jewish settlement is even located in the heart of an Arab city.

We have noted that Israeli vehicles were the main target of the violence in the Territories. According to data supplied by the Egged Bus Company, the first nine months of the uprising saw attacks on 1,650 of the firm’s buses of which 39 were torched, and 188 passengers and 24 drivers were wounded by stones.²³ By June 8, 1989, 3,136 Egged buses had come under attack and 337 passengers had been wounded.²⁴

Palestinian “collaborators” were also targeted, and in some cases violence was used to settle personal accounts. The residents of the Territories draw a distinction between persons who “collaborate” with the Israeli authorities, and those employed in Israel or by the Civil Administration (teachers, doctors, etc.) or who engage in commerce with Israelis. Collaborators are persons suspected of being informers for the General Security Service, or who sell land and property to Israelis, maintain close social relations with Israelis, or espouse political views conflicting with the Palestinian national interest.

Suspected collaborators had been attacked and assassinated throughout the period of Israeli rule in the Territories, but during the intifada the phenomenon has assumed new dimensions. In some cases such attacks were perpetrated in broad daylight with hundreds of people taking part for a prolonged period of hours. The first mass lynching was perpetrated in February 1988 in the Samarian village of Kabatiyah. The victim was savagely executed after defending himself with his Uzi submachinegun for several hours.

The first wave of lynch-liquidations in villages occurred a year after the uprising began, and concurrently with the advent of the phenomenon of villages declaring themselves “liberated areas.” Apparently, a public atmosphere of reduced fear of the Israeli authorities was a prerequisite. By the end of June 1989, about 90 Arabs had been murdered by fellow-Arabs. One-quarter to one-third of them were killed to settle personal accounts, some were disposed of for moral-religious reasons, and others because they were indeed suspected of collaborating with Israeli intelligence or engaging in economic collusion. Although the Israeli authorities take a very grave view of this phenomenon, measures taken to stop the practice have been ineffectual.

Scale of casualties and detainees. The high number of casualties among the rioters — far exceeding anything in the past — did not deter the population. The casualty rate among Israeli soldiers and civilians was also high, with official IDF figures showing 15 Israelis killed (including 6 soldiers) and 1,882 wounded (including 1,188 soldiers) in the first 18 months of the uprising.²⁵ The IDF Spokesman’s figures refer to casualties caused by IDF firearms only (see Appendix 4). Figures cited by the PLO and other Palestinian sources are far higher.

Clearly, considerable disparities exist regarding the statistics on Palestinian casualties. The figures published by the IDF Spokesman are necessarily incomplete, as they include only persons killed by IDF firearms. Not included are fatalities resulting from actions by Jewish settlers and other causes. The Palestinians’ figures are on the average 1.5 times higher than IDF data. According to B’Tselem, the Israel Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 477 Palestinians were killed from the start of the intifada until the end of June 1989 by the security forces and Israeli civilians. Taking all these figures into account, the total number of Palestinians killed by the IDF and Jewish settlers is probably about 550, with more than 6,500 wounded — a daily average of one killed and 12 wounded.

As noted, 15 Israelis were killed and 1,822 wounded in the period under discussion. The number of Israelis wounded is relatively high, constituting 28 percent of the number of Palestinians wounded. In contrast, the number of Israelis killed stands at 0.3 percent of the number of Palestinians.

Table 1 Numbers of Palestinians in the Territories under detention during the first year and a half of the intifada (from December 9, 1988-June 8, 1989), IDF Spokesman figures

First Month
First 6 Months
First Year
First 1 1/2 Years

Total under detention
1174
5411
5548
8077

Tried
No data
587
442
1373

Detained pending trial
No data
1136
1380
1533

Detained till end of proceedings
831
1172
2373
3663

Administrative detainees
No data
2516
1353
1508

In 1988 there was no direct correlation between the number of Israeli casualties and the number of Palestinian casualties. Even during months when Israeli casualties were relatively high, this generally had no effect on the behavior and response of the soldiers and hence did not result in an increase in local Palestinian casualties. Thus, for example, in July 1988 local casualties (killed and wounded) were at their lowest level, while the number of Israeli casualties (soldiers and civilians) was almost at its peak. The same pattern was discernible in May 1988. The only exception was during March 1988, when the highest number of Israeli casualties was recorded and the number of Palestinian casualties was also relatively high. In contrast, in the first months of 1989, which saw the highest casualty levels on both sides (March — 138 Israeli and 555 Palestinian casualties; April — 147 and 672; May — 140 and 606), there was a direct correlation between the casualty figures on the two sides.

As Table 1 shows, the number of arrests, including administrative detentions, rose steadily until mid-1988, when it leveled off.

Arrests were made on a large scale and rose steadily in number during the initial period. According to the Minister of Defense, a total of 30,000 residents of the Territories had been imprisoned as of February 1989. Press sources cite a figure of 49,000. In either case, 2,698 East Jerusalem residents who were imprisoned in 1988 have to be added to the total.

Scale of involvement. The extent and number of participants in riots was far greater than in the pre-intifada era, when a few dozen or at most a few hundred demonstrators would take to the streets. Some of the early intifada riots involved thousands of people — including one riot in the Gaza Strip in which more than 10,000 people took part — until the IDF began fielding large forces to prevent demonstrations swelling to this size. Another change from the past was that men and women aged up to about 30 participated, and not only youths as in the past. About 10 percent of the population became actively involved in the violence; they enjoyed the moral and material support of virtually everyone in the Territories.²⁶

Boldness. Greater determination was manifested by the population in revolt. Weapons employed — all potentially lethal — included stones, rocks, bricks, steel balls fired with slingshots, knives (either thrown or in stabbing attempts at close quarters), hatchets, petrol bombs, maces made of sticks with protruding nails, and nails and oil scattered on roads to bring traffic to a standstill. Infrastructure equipment was sabotaged and facilities and equipment belonging to the Civil Administration or to municipalities were torched. Weapons were well adapted to on-the-ground conditions in the towns (e.g., the casbah in Hebron or Nablus) where dense construction and narrow passages restrict the maneuverability of IDF patrols and produce life-threatening situations.

In the first weeks of the uprising, before the IDF deployed large forces to contain the rioters, the Israeli authorities disagreed amongst themselves about whether the Palestinians were really displaying a new level of daring. For combat officers, the criterion for boldness is readiness to charge against firearms. Thus some observers maintained that the rioters had not evinced daring because there were no attempts on their part to charge Israeli soldiers, and then trap and kill them. Stone-throwers invariably fled when soldiers pursued them. In this view, demonstrators were being merely impudent when they approached IDF patrols and threw stones at them, particularly insofar as they knew that the IDF’s regulations for opening fire barred soldiers from using firearms against stone-throwers. Indeed, when the IDF began dispersing demonstrations forcibly, rioters fled from units of 20 or 30 or even fewer soldiers.

In the author’s view, the Palestinians evinced growing daring as the uprising progressed, even when the risk of being wounded or killed was palpable. In contrast to the past, the population as a whole was more willing to tolerate casualties (including fatalities), hardships and adversity of all kinds in order to advance the uprising. Undoubtedly some of these manifestations of boldness were related to constraints of various kinds faced by Israeli troops in confrontations. Thus, for example, curfews were repeatedly and flagrantly violated, and in some cases riots occurred in curfew situations. This involved considerable daring, as the rioters knew that in strictly legal terms, soldiers were permitted to open fire at curfew violators the moment they stepped outside. In the two decades that had elapsed since Jordanian rule in Judea-Samaria and Egyptian rule in Gaza, the inhabitants had seemingly forgotten how quick on the trigger the security forces of those two countries had been in dealing with curfew violations (and of course the young generation had never even experienced Jordanian or Egyptian rule). The passage of time had eroded the deterrent effect of the curfew as a means of enforcement. Further, the years since the Yom Kippur War had witnessed a progressive deterioration in Israel’s deterrent image. This, combined with a vacillating Israeli policy enforcing curfews, fueled the inhabitants’ daring.

Overall, the Palestinians’ readiness to take high personal risks was heightened as the uprising persisted and their sense of achievement grew. In the past, activists had thrown stones at soldiers from a safe distance and from cover, whereas during the uprising rioters stood in the open to hurl stones, often engaging the soldiers at close range. Similarly, the continued widespread throwing of petrol bombs, even when the Palestinians knew about the revision in IDF regulations permitting soldiers to open fire in such cases, attested to a readiness to take risks. Defense Minister Rabin said as early as February 1988 that “the population has new methods of confrontation, mainly by means of tough and extremist nuclei.”²⁷

Use of firearms. Although the intifada itself did not involve the use of firearms, armed terrorism continued to be perpetrated in dissociation from the riots. Up to June 21, 1989, there were 41 terrorist incidents involving shooting (32 in Judea-Samaria, 9 in Gaza), 39 involving hand-grenades (32 in Judea-Samaria, 7 in Gaza), 127 involving bombs (75 in Gaza, 53 in Judea-Samaria), and 102 involving knives and hatchets (76 in Judea-Samaria, 26 in Gaza).²⁸

It is primarily a “street-smart” attitude (rather than PLO directives from outside) that accounts for the nonuse of firearms. The rationale for this tactic is threefold: the desire of the Palestinians to maintain the image of the uprising as a popular manifestation; fear that the use of firearms in demonstrations would result in a Palestinian bloodbath due to the IDF’s absolute superiority in this domain; and an insufficient quantity of firearms in the possession of organized cells to render their use effective (although light arms in the thousands are held by individuals, families and clans, particularly in villages). Against this backdrop of considerations, the PLO instructed the population from the outset of the intifada not to use firearms.²⁹

This was confirmed by Arafat in late January 1988 when he said that “on the first day of the uprising, we decided that our brother demonstrators should not use firearms.”³⁰ Hana Siniora also noted around the same time (February 1988) that the PLO had instructed the population not to use firearms but only sticks and stones.³¹ A year later, in February 1989, Arafat reaffirmed that “from the outset we gave strict orders that firearms were not to be used in the conflict.”³² Even Naif Hawatima, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, said that “we wanted to avoid a situation in which the occupation authorities would lose their self-control and perpetrate a massacre in the Territories.”³³

Nevertheless, there were cases in which firearms were used. Arafat himself admitted in February 1989 that during the first 14 months of the uprising, there had been two exceptions to the directive barring the use of firearms.³⁴ PLO leaders stated repeatedly that firearms would come into play when the time was ripe and that the decision to abstain from their use pertained to “a limited time.”³⁵ The Israeli assessment was that “as long as we succeed in containing the big demonstrations… ultimately more attempts will be made to strike with firearms too.”³⁶ Meanwhile, firearms continued to be employed parallel to the intifada as an additional means of “armed struggle” against Israel.

East Jerusalem.³⁷ Unrest in East Jerusalem (see Appendix 7) is not a new phenomenon. Disturbances there, together with acts of civil disobedience (such as commercial strikes) take place parallel to the events in Judea-Samaria, and in some cases on a larger scale and with greater intensity. This may derive from the assessment that fiercer opposition needs to be shown in East Jerusalem in order to annul Israel’s formal annexation of the area, and to demonstrate that it is an integral part of the West Bank.

In 1988 some 3,000 violent incidents were recorded in East Jerusalem, more than half (1,760) involving stone-throwing. Overall, 1988 saw an increase in the number of terrorist and petrolbomb attacks in Jerusalem, as Table 2 shows.

In Jerusalem the intifada began on December 19, 1987. It is differentiated from the uprising in the Territories by a number of features. First, the leadership of the uprising is based in East Jerusalem, and in the first months East Jerusalem was also the venue for the printing and distribution of the UNC leaflets. Secondly, as East Jerusalem is formally part of Israel, the Israel Police — trained in riot-control methods — are deployed there, rather than (as in the Territories) IDF soldiers untrained in police tactics, who undergo a heavy turnover. About 1,000 policemen are normally stationed in the Jerusalem area, though during the uprising these have been reinforced on occasion by hundreds of policemen from other districts. Third, world press coverage is far more intense than in the Territories, one reason being that the Police have refrained from declaring all or part of East Jerusalem a closed military zone in order to prevent media access — again, in contrast to IDF policy in the Territories. Nor have the Israel Police introduced the use of plastic bullets in East Jerusalem, as this has not been warranted by events. Experience shows that the appearance of security forces at the scene of a disturbance in Jerusalem has almost always brought about its rapid termination. In any case, the number of reinforcements was considerably higher in the early stages.

Table 2 Comparative data regarding numbers of terrorist acts and petrol bomb incidents in Jerusalem in 1986, 1987, and 1988, Israel Police figures

Incidents
1986
1987
1988
Increase in 1988 compared to 1987

Explosive charges
25
8
8
0

Other terrorist acts (shooting, knifing, hand grenades)
16
8
16
8

Petrol bombs
15
27
114
87

All in all, since Judea-Samaria is a far larger area than Jerusalem, and the scale of incidents and level of violence are far lower in Jerusalem, combatting the intifada there is less problematic. The number of casualties in Jerusalem is relatively small on both sides. As of March 1989 one Israeli had been killed and 42 wounded (none seriously). In the same period two Palestinians were killed (the police have no exact figures on the number of Arab wounded). Notably, few Arab policemen in Jerusalem heeded the calls in the leaflets to resign. Of 130 policemen in East Jerusalem, only eight resigned; four of these returned to work within a few days.

Both sides consider Jerusalem, with its many holy places, a symbol. A serious incident in Jerusalem has an almost immediate effect on the behavior of the Palestinians in the Territories. Clearly, the most sensitive site of all is the Temple Mount.

Torchings of forests and crops. The use of arson to destroy forests, orchards and field crops, and the sabotaging of agricultural equipment — for the most part in Israel proper but also in the Territories — began as a local initiative but quickly gained the support of the PLO leadership. The torchings began in May 1988, without any previous calls to the population to adopt this tactic either in UNC leaflets or PLO broadcasts. About a month later PLO chairman Arafat publicly gave this tactic his imprimatur, declaring: “The uprising has achieved results, especially last month by setting fire to 85,000 dunams in the occupied Arab territories.”³⁸ Two leaflets from July 1988 advocated the continuation of the torchings, even though by this time it was obvious to all concerned, including the PLO, that they were harming the Palestinian cause. UNC Leaflet No. 22 (July 20) praised Israeli Arabs for the arson and destruction of Israeli agricultural equipment. A leaflet issued five days later by the strike units in Hebron called for more torchings of Israeli property.

Data compiled by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) show that in 1988 the incidence of arson and the size of the areas affected exceeded all previous years. More than 1,300 forest and brush fires (30 percent of them set by arsonists) that year destroyed over 144,000 dunams³⁹ — nearly four times the area ravaged in 1987 (37,827 dunams). Israel has about 800,000 dunams of planted forest and 370,000 dunams of natural woodland (altogether constituting 5.5 percent of the country’s total area). The arson attacks from May through July ravaged approximately 1 percent of the forests and another 10 percent of the natural woodland and pasturage, each month.⁴⁰

In the first six months of 1989, however, the JNF recorded 485 fires which destroyed 44,611 dunams — a decrease of 60–70 percent relative to 1988.⁴¹ There were two main causes for this development. First, arson attacks adversely affected the image of the uprising in the West. In Western Europe left-wing groups that support the Palestinians also back environmental protection causes; in Israel, the Peace Now movement is in large part comprised of a farming population. These negative political ramifications led the uprising leadership to cease calling for arson activity. Beyond this, the fact that the majority of the torchings were perpetrated in Israel proper, undermined the notion that the intifada was aimed at the occupation in the Territories and not at Israel. Then too, the Israeli authorities stepped up their vigilance, and a number of arson squads were apprehended and imprisoned. Nevertheless, arson remained a weapon in the arsenal of the Israeli Arabs, and its use could well be intensified again in the future.

In the Territories, IDF data show that the first 18 months of the uprising saw 538 torchings, the overwhelming majority (453) in Judea-Samaria (see also Appendix 8). The practice has continued despite the sharp criticism it has elicited both in Israel and abroad: the ravaging of nature is condemned, and it is contended that whoever bums the land no longer has a claim to the land.

Women in the Uprising

Much of the activity carried out by women during the uprising was facilitated by the organizational infrastructure that the PLO had created in the Territories. As the uprising proceeded, the PLO endeavored to consolidate existing bodies under roof-organizations that would constitute the foundations for the governing institutions of a future Palestinian state.

On December 9, 1988, in Nablus, a leaflet was discovered declaring the establishment of the Supreme Women’s Council. It contained directives for women to carry out orders of the uprising leadership and set up district and regional women’s committees. One of the first activities organized by the new council (which encompassed the women’s organizations of the four main PLO factions) was a bazaar in East Jerusalem at which food, traditional garb, and knitting and embroidery were sold. Its purpose was to encourage women activists, find places of employment for women, and to sell local products at low prices.

Women had taken part in disturbances in the past, but without engaging Israeli troops at close quarters. In the uprising they were involved on a large scale in the rioting and in throwing stones and petrol bombs. In some cases riots were led by women; in others, demonstrations were comprised exclusively of women. The uprising leadership was undoubtedly aware that Israeli soldiers would react more moderately when confronted with women rioters. Notably, women from rural areas and refugee camps were more prone to violence than their urban counterparts. Other areas in which women were active included medical and other assistance for casualties, their families, and families of detainees; propaganda, education and instruction; smuggling in funds and serving as messengers and go-betweens; and organizing the “household economy” that was perceived as a stage toward full civil disobedience. The role of women in the “strike units” and the “popular army” was limited to indirect assistance. Notably, Hamas and the Muslim Brothers maintain that women should confine their activity to educating children in the tenets of Islam.

The primary sources of funding for women’s activities are derived from smuggled PLO funds, international organizations and friendly countries, Israeli/Arabs, bazaars featuring locally made products and handicrafts (small sums), and donations in the Territories.

Central Direction

The uprising erupted spontaneously, but within a short time local leaderships sprang up. Each neighborhood had its popular and revolutionary committees comprised of representatives of up to four organizations (Fatah, Popular Front, Democratic Front and Communists), or popular committees consisting of Islamic groups (in some cases working together with secular elements). These committees directed affairs in the neighborhood. Above them in each city was a central coordinating council (made up of the same factions as the popular committees). Beyond the city level was the United National Command of the Uprising, to which the leaders of each of the four main factions assigned representatives. The UNC was formed piecemeal, and remains a loosely knit coordinating body. Its first leaflet, drawn up by a single organization, was issued about three weeks after the start of the uprising for dissemination in the Territories. These leaflets, issued ever since in consecutive numbers, are drawn up following discussion with the PLO leadership in Tunis. The UNC also distributes some of the funds that arrive from PLO coffers; these are earmarked strictly for intifada bodies such as the strike units or popular committees.

Beyond or above the UNC, no supreme command with genuine authority, in which all four PLO factions were represented, was established. The leaders of each faction formulate policy on the basis of direct guidelines received from Tunis. These central figures do not meet and do not coordinate their actions. They act by issuing instructions to their representatives on the UNC. It is via the leaflets, which give directives to the general population, that coordination is achieved. The top-level leadership comprises about 45 persons based for the most part in East Jerusalem.⁴²

The first months of the uprising left the Israeli authorities with the feeling that they were up against “a business with no organization and no leadership…. It is highly localized…. Behind this business there are always five people who write a leaflet and no more than that.”⁴³ Within a few months, however (May 1988), this assessment was being revised, and the thinking held that “at this stage, I have not seen a leadership developing from the intifada…. We do not know who they [the leaders] are…. I suppose there is [a leadership].”⁴⁴ In time an overall indigenous West Bank leadership emerged that was wholly identified with the PLO, a development that was not lost on the Israeli authorities. Indeed, the IDF’s chief of military intelligence allowed that PLO influence was a central element, when he said that “the only leadership in the Territories is that of the PLO.”⁴⁵

The “leadership” that arose in the Territories is an arm of the PLO, directed by the PLO, if necessary threatened by the PLO, and operating within PLO guidelines. It is not an independent or alternative leadership. Even though the names of the political leaders of the intifada are known to the Israeli authorities, no attempt has been made to arrest them en bloc, and after a certain stage the most prominent of them were not detained. This policy seems to have been guided by several considerations. One was not to close the option of negotiations with local representatives to be chosen in democratic elections. There is no doubt that the political leadership of the uprising (whose identity is of course well known to the public in the Territories) will emerge victorious in such elections. Hence their arrest would scuttle Israel’s political initiative. Secondly, it was assessed that the detention of a few dozen leaders would be ineffectual. Defense Minister Rabin noted in this connection that the arrest of 20 or 30 leaders would not put a stop to an uprising that enjoyed broad popular support.⁴⁶ Then too, legal difficulties exist because the majority of the leaders are residents of East Jerusalem (formally annexed to Israel since 1967) and not of the Territories.

Central control over broad sectors of the population, as well as events, is achieved by leaflet, which is disseminated in writing and/or by broadcast. Beginning in August 1988 increasing use was made of “PLO Comer” broadcasts on Baghdad Radio, the Jibril organization’s Syria-based Al-Quds Radio, and even Radio Monte Carlo. The broadcasts also include calls and directives to the population of the Territories that are not included in the official communiques. The distribution of primary leaflets declined considerably as the Israeli security forces were able to trace them and arrest their authors. According to charge sheets subsequently submitted against members of the United Command, the communiques are drawn up by the leadership in the Territories and then faxed (via Europe) to PLO headquarters in Tunis. There they are vetted by a committee with the identical organizational makeup of the UNC, and each communique is also personally approved by Arafat.⁴⁷ Leaflets issued after December 1987 by bodies other than the UNC had a minimal influence.

As of June 1989 the UNC had issued about 40 communiques. The first leaflet signed by the “United National Command of the Uprising” was distributed in Judea-Samaria on January 8, 1988. Concerted efforts by the Israeli security forces to discover where the leaflets were being printed—in November 1988, for example, a clandestine printing press was discovered in the village of Issawiya on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem—were largely unsuccessful. The leaflets have continued to appear, although their impact has declined as compared with communiques broadcast by radio.

Backed up by the (violent) enforcement of popular committees and strike units, the leaflets constitute the principal mode through which the uprising is directed and controlled. They contain instructions for enacting civil disobedience (general strikes, commercial strikes, resignations from the Civil Administration, etc.) and directives for rioting — even explanations for making a petrol bomb (see appendices 5 and 6). Each leaflet details the actions to be taken in the coming week or two. Leaflets are issued by a number of groups, particularly PLO supporters and Islamic elements, and sometimes even contain contradictory directives. Moreover, the guidelines for implementing a popular struggle against Israeli rule have not always been carried out in full. Nevertheless, in general the uprising has been centrally directed from above since January 1988, and this is one of the features that differentiate it from past disturbances. Riots are subject to control above the local level, so that, rather than riots in one locale sparking riots elsewhere, there is on occasion coordination of timing and of targets. For example, on February 27, 1988, several towns and villages simultaneously tried to block the Bethlehem-Beersheba road — an action obviously requiring coordination among action committees in several places, if not actual central control. In this instance neither the leaflets nor the radio broadcasts directed to the Territories had called for the road to be closed.

Civil Disobedience

Origins. The first Palestinian activist to urge a boycott on the purchase of Israeli goods and on work in Israel, along with tactics of passive disobedience, was Dr. Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian-American who arrived in Jerusalem in 1984. Awad set up a center for the study of nonviolent resistance in East Jerusalem, and began voicing his ideas in lectures and position papers. In 1985 he published an essay entitled “Nonviolence in the Occupied Lands.” This outlined a program for a campaign of civil disobedience which in his view constituted “the most successful mode of struggle.” The tactics he advocated included severing all contact with the authorities; resignation from government jobs; boycotting of courts and litigation; refusal to pay taxes and government levies; a boycott on the purchase of Israeli products; demonstrations; and general and commercial strikes. Awad considered it crucial for the Palestinians to establish systems of self-rule, in particular by creating an all-inclusive infrastructure (universities, factories, hospitals, schools, etc.) which would be independent of Israel and “will be the core of the future Palestinian state.”

Hana Siniora drew on Awad’s ideas when he called for civil disobedience in early January 1988, preceding the uprising leadership. Siniora adduced realistic objectives which the PLO tacitly accepted. Like the violence, the ultimate objective of the civil disobedience campaign “would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation.”⁴⁸ A second aim was to forge another struggle option based on the assessment — and the apprehension — that the population would not have the staying power for a lengthy violent struggle.⁴⁹

Siniora urged the Palestinians to launch an immediate boycott of Israeli cigarettes as the first step in a “long march,” just as Gandhi’s “salt boycott” had been the first step in driving the British out of India. If the cigarette boycott proved ineffective, the next step, Siniora said, should be “a call on the residents of the territories to refuse to pay Israeli taxes.”⁵⁰

The total integration of the Territories’ economy with that of Israel tended to make Palestinians skeptical about the feasibility of civil disobedience. Two main counter-arguments were adduced: first, that if those in the Territories who were employed in Israel ceased working there for a full month, they and their families would perish of hunger; and secondly, that since 90 percent of the products sold in the Territories were Israeli-made or were imported via Israel, “it is very easy to talk about civil disobedience, but impossible to implement it.”⁵¹ Indeed, in some quarters Siniora’s cigarette boycott idea was ridiculed. It turned out, for example, that Dubek, the Israeli cigarette manufacturer, bought its tobacco from fellahin in the West Bank (and Galilee) and thereby provided them income, whereas the indigenous Palestinian cigarette factory in the town of Azariya (just east of Jerusalem) purchased its tobacco in Africa. Hence the proposed boycott would punish the local population and not hurt Israel.⁵²

Such forecasts and difficulties notwithstanding, Siniora’s program began to be implemented once it became possible for the uprising leadership to enforce the boycott by means of strike units and popular committees. As a result, manifestations of civil disobedience have been part and parcel of the uprising for far longer than past attempts. Tactics have included strikes and demonstrations, resignations of policemen and tax collectors, reduced purchases of Israeli goods, non-payment of taxes, and diminished contact with the Civil Administration, its functions being filled by the popular committees. The tactics have been implemented in accordance with directives included in the aforementioned leaflets, and under the threat of violent enforcement by the popular committees. True, some of the measures called for were purely demonstrative in character, but the majority sought to undercut Israeli civilian rule in the Territories and, if possible, to reduce and eventually eliminate the population’s economic dependence on Israel.

The struggle for the reopening of schools. Generally speaking, the population has carried out the directives of the UNC, but not all calls for civil disobedience have been obeyed. One example was the call to students, teachers and administrative staff of educational institutions in Judea-Samaria to break into the schools, “thus voiding the Zionist enemy’s decision [to close the schools]…, [and] to organize teaching on a national basis.”⁵³ This call was repeated after March 1, 1988 in various forms, some of them specifying action: “Each region will draw up a plan to break into classrooms in accordance with the specific conditions [in the area].”⁵⁴ The Israeli authorities were concerned at this development. Successful implementation of the directive would be tantamount to the creation of an alternative system. As a crucial element in the overall system of perceptions as to who controlled the street, this would in effect signify PLO control. Another formulation urged the population “to turn the mosques into centers of study.”⁵⁵ This call, too — which remained largely unimplemented — was fraught with potentially serious consequences for the Israeli authorities, as it was liable to turn the mosques into foci of confrontation between the population and the IDF. The damage that would accrue as a result of pitched battles being waged between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian students inside Muslim holy places was obvious to all.

Israel had closed the schools in the Territories in order to contain the uprising. The uprising leadership wanted to bring about a situation in which teachers and headmasters would violate the orders of the Civil Administration by breaking into schools and resuming studies. Significantly, this failed to occur in the 840 government and 100 UNRWA schools, although sporadic short-lived attempts were made. Evidently the teachers feared a direct confrontation with the authorities, with its high risk of their being dismissed. Furthermore, some schools had been seized physically by the IDF to accommodate certain units. In contrast, the 300 private schools, attended by about 11 percent of the pupils in Judea-Samaria, continued to operate normally.

Instances are known of studies being conducted in home circles or even via envoys and by correspondence. In September 1988, when serious fears arose that this “popular education” system would spread and form a concrete alternative to the official system, the authorities began to shut down centers and associations in which educational activity was being conducted in violation of orders. The universities, too, continued to function to some extent off campus, via classes organized in private schools in East Jerusalem and home circles in the Territories.⁵⁶

Cessation of work in Israel. Another demand of the leadership that the population ignored was to cease work in Israel. As early as January 18, 1988, the call went out to continue the strike “in factories inside Israel”⁵⁷ with the aim of “paralyzing the Israeli production line and undermining the Israeli economy.”⁵⁸ Toward the end of that month the call was extended to cover not only factories but all work in Israel.⁵⁹ Yet Palestinian Arabs employed in Israel continued to show up for work; the only significant exceptions were general strike days (and even then many slept over in Israel so they could work on the strike day) and when IDF curfews and clampdowns prevented their leaving the Territories.

Indeed, it is perhaps the uprising’s major failure that it has been unable to prevent Palestinians from the Territories from continuing to “build” Israel. Work in Israel is the major source of livelihood for the inhabitants of the Territories. About half the male work force in the Gaza Strip, some 50,000 persons, and a like number from Judea-Samaria—accounting for about a third of the male work force there — work in Israel. Manifestly, the cessation of work in Israel would mean mass unemployment, as no alternative exists. No one is willing to return to the pre-1967 situation, when 30 percent of the male work force in Judea-Samaria and 36 percent in the Gaza Strip were unemployed.⁶⁰ While Palestinian youth are ready to confront the IDF at great personal risk, the intifada has not yet reached the stage in which entire families are ready to cope with severe hardship. Thus work in Israel has not stopped.

The uprising leadership, grasping the impracticality of its demand, has moderated its call to workers by degrees. Already by mid-February 1988 work in Israel was prohibited only from Friday through Sunday, and even special exceptions to this rule were granted, provided they involved “not more than one worker per family.”⁶¹ Undoubtedly the leadership knew that this demand, too, was impractical — supervision was impossible — but thought it might score points in the media. In the second stage the ban on work in Israel was dropped altogether and was replaced by the call to support “our brave workers who boycott the Zionist settlements.”⁶² Even this dictum was honored mainly in the breach.

Manifestations of Civil Disobedience

The civil disobedience campaign continues, taking principally the following forms: First, general strike days on which all economic activity — including commerce, transportation, and labor — ceases. Strike days are set by the authors of the leaflets; they are fully and precisely carried out by the urban population, but less so as one moves away from the cities. Generally there are one or two such days each week, on which residents remain in their homes. On some occasions strikes last for several days in succession. One of the earliest strikes was declared by the uprising leadership in a leaflet of January 1988: “We call… for an escalation of the national awakening by declaring a general and comprehensive strike from the morning of Tuesday, January 19, 1988, until the evening of Friday, January 22, 1988.”⁶³ Another leaflet “declare[d] a general strike on Wednesday and Thursday, February 24–25, 1988, with everyone to remain indoors and all traffic and transportation to be paralyzed. No one is to leave his home except in an emergency.”⁶⁴

The general strikes are not intended to create chaos. Indeed, the leadership is cognizant of the need to confine them “to well-defined time frames, so that the local economy and day-to-day life will not be affected.”⁶⁵ The purpose of the general strikes, which are sometimes intensified by calls for a hunger strike, is not only to express resistance and anger in the face of ongoing Israeli rule,⁶⁶ but also to help unify ranks and heighten solidarity and motivation for the struggle. One leaflet termed these events “days of rage.”⁶⁷ In some cases the population was called upon to accompany a general strike with “tumultuous demonstrations in the cities, refugee camps and villages.”⁶⁸

Commercial strikes. In addition to the cessation of commerce during general strikes, merchants are called upon to “open shops, gas stations and vendors’ stalls each day for three hours.”⁶⁹ This began in East Jerusalem at the end of December 1987, spreading thereafter to the Territories. It was linked to the demand for a boycott of Israeli products⁷⁰ and, overall, had a dual purpose: to undermine and weaken the Israeli economy and, concomitantly, to strengthen and develop productive sectors in the Territories — economic staying power and manufacturing—while reducing the Territories’ economic dependence on Israel. Initially pressure was exerted on merchants to ensure that shops remained closed during the hours stipulated. Youths circulated to check on compliance and warn shopkeepers who did not comply with the orders. In some cases shops of recalcitrant merchants were stoned or even torched. The general atmosphere generated by the uprising, combined with these means of pressure, ensure that the ongoing commercial slowdown is upheld as ordered by the uprising leadership, despite the economic hardships sustained by shop-owners. The local population has learned to buy only what is absolutely necessary, mainly foodstuffs that they require for their immediate needs (flour, sugar, rice, oil, and so forth), and refrain from purchasing luxury items.⁷¹ While commercial strikes have been used as acts of defiance toward the Israeli authorities since 1967, never before have they become a continuous and virtually permanent tool, against which the military has proved ineffective (the authorities’ efforts in this regard are examined below.)

Tax boycott. The cessation of tax payments to the Civil Administration was first demanded in a leaflet of early March 1988, and has continued unabated. Merchants and craftsmen were called upon not to pay taxes, because taxes “are the lifeline of the occupation,”⁷² and they “subsidize the occupation but bring the inhabitants no benefit.”⁷³ At the same time, local tax collectors were urged to resign. (Notably, in the Gaza Strip it is primarily local employees who actually collect taxes, whereas in Judea-Samaria tax collectors are mainly Israelis.) A number of persons employed by the Staff Officer for Taxation in both regions heeded the call to resign.⁷⁴ According to a report drawn up by senior officials of the Israeli Internal Revenue Service, tax collection in the Territories ceased completely in March 1988, as a result of which measures were taken to enforce collection.⁷⁵ In mid-July 1988, Defense Minister Rabin told the Knesset that revenue from tax payments in the Territories had dropped by 40 percent since the start of the uprising.⁷⁶

Tax revenues later rose as a result of pressures applied by the Civil Administration in both Judea-Samaria and Gaza. In the Gaza Strip these measures included the issuance of new ID cards, new license plates for vehicles, and certificates enabling entry to Israel — with receipt of all of these contingent upon proof of payment of all taxes. In Judea-Samaria, Civil Administration taxation personnel accompanied IDF units on missions to enforce order in villages, taxes were collected at roadblocks in urban areas, and license plates were replaced as in the Gaza Strip. In both regions the handling of every request to the Civil Administration (regarding family unification, trips abroad, etc.) was made contingent upon prior payment of all outstanding taxes. These measures not only enabled the Civil Administration to reassert its ability to collect taxes and other fees, but broadened the tax base by rooting out longtime tax evaders, thus causing additional ferment.

Despite such actions, overall revenue from taxes declined significantly, due to the decline in the volume of commerce and the resultant steep fall in merchants’ profits. Taxes collected in 1988 amounted to 60 percent of the total collected the previous year. The budget of the Civil Administration was reduced by more than one-quarter, the planned budget of NIS 588 million being revised to NIS 420 million. This was also the figure set for 1989. The Civil Administration was therefore compelled to dismiss workers and slash its activity. The development budget was totally canceled in Judea-Samaria and drastically reduced in the Gaza Strip.

Forced resignations. Beginning in March 1988, leaflets of the uprising leadership called “on all policemen… to submit their resignations immediately,” threatening them with “the long hand of the punishment squads.”⁷⁷ Ad hominem pressures were in fact brought to bear on policemen to leave their jobs, including the murder of a Jericho policeman. Efforts at counter-persuasion by the Israel Police and the Civil Administration proved unavailing, and Palestinian policemen began resigning in large numbers in early March, with 500 out of the 800 Arab policemen serving in Judea-Samaria eventually leaving. Of the 430 local policemen in the Gaza region in December 1987, 20 remained on the job in May 1989. Even before this development, local policemen had virtually ceased to function since the beginning of 1988 — again, for fear of the consequences. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to say that those local policemen who did not resign, in effect refused to carry out their duties. This aggravated further the state of public security, already destabilized by the uprising, and the local judicial system functioned with reduced efficiency at all levels, from the civil courts to the high court.

That the demand for the resignation of local employees of the Civil Administration was restricted to policemen (in addition to tax collectors) stemmed from a desire not to disrupt completely the life of the population (the majority of the Palestinians employed by the Civil Administration were teachers and medical personnel). It also reflected the symbolic significance attaching to the Police: a Palestinian Arab wearing the uniform and insignia of the Israel Police constituted the most blatant legal manifestation of the local population’s integration into the Israeli occupation administration.⁷⁸ At the same time, the intifada leadership, fearing that the resignation of policemen would indeed bring about civil chaos, cautioned the population “to preserve completely national security.”⁷⁹ Some leaflets called for “organizing volunteer guard duty” and setting up “people’s security committees and popular committees for upholding justice.”⁸⁰

In the summer of 1988 the demand for resignations was widened to include Palestinian employees of the transportation, interior and survey departments in Judea-Samaria and Gaza, as well as all department directors in the Gaza Strip. Again the call was made via leaflets. The response was partial; Gaza department directors, for example, did not resign but took extended leave.

Pressure was exerted for the resignation of local municipal councils, especially those which had been appointed by the Civil Administration rather than having been elected. This tactic was employed primarily in Ramallah, Al-Bira and Nablus. The first such demand was contained in a leaflet issued in early February 1988 calling for “the immediate resignation of the appointed municipal councils,” adding that the aim was “holding democratic elections at the appropriate time.”⁸¹ Intensifying the campaign, a leaflet of early March asserted that the appointed councils “insist on continuing to betray their people and put themselves in the service of the enemy and its objectives.”⁸² PLO radio broadcasts from Baghdad repeatedly threatened council members who did not resign, especially those on the Kalkilya council.⁸³ One underlying purpose of the formation of popular committees was “to administer various affairs at the local level in place of the appointed municipal councils.”⁸⁴

The intifada leadership had only limited success in this matter. Only three of 88 village councils in Judea-Samaria resigned. Likewise, even though the mayor of Al-Bira was assaulted and wounded, only one of 25 mayors resigned⁸⁵—the mayor of Nablus, the largest city in Judea-Samaria. No appointed councils resigned en bloc, and very few individual councilors resigned. The main reason for this state of affairs was the assessment by local officials that if they left, they would be replaced by direct Israeli civil rule (as had already occurred in the past). Around the end of 1988 the PLO revised its tactics and ceased demanding the resignation of appointed councils. Instead, the organization tried to bring the mayors under its patronage and at least partial control by means of financial inducements to them and their municipalities, threats, and other tactics. Overall, the authority of the municipal councils has been greatly enfeebled during the uprising, and today it is not they but the uprising leadership that expresses the will of the population.

Self-rule

One development with far-reaching ramifications was the Palestinians’ attempt to establish a self-rule mechanism as an alternative to Israeli rule. Indeed, Palestinians in the Territories tend to assess that they have acquired effective rule in many fields and that, as a result of the uprising, they are on their way toward establishing a state of their own.⁸⁶ From the outset the intifada has witnessed the institutionalization of PLO bodies in the Territories and the formation (or consolidation) of supreme councils with authority for the entire West Bank. In education, for example, efforts have been made to subordinate to the Council for Higher Education 13 colleges — besides the universities already under its aegis — and in the longer term to incorporate the entire educational system under the authority of a “Council for Education and Culture.” In addition, a supreme students’ council has been established that unifies the separate student bodies run by the four leading PLO factions. Similarly, women’s organizations have been unified under a single roof-organization, and informal union has been achieved of bodies that operate in both Judea-Samaria and Gaza, notably the Red Crescent organization.

In actual practice, self-rule has been implemented only in a small number of fields, although this remains a major thrust of the uprising. “Auxiliary” committees (which the Israeli authorities at first mistook for “popular committees") were established in every locality and every neighborhood in order to administer community activities and, in general, “to look after all the affairs of the neighborhood.”⁸⁷ In part the purpose was to create an alternative to the Civil Administration, but in some cases the aim was to take responsibility for areas that were not within the purview of the Civil Administration and thus to bolster the staying power of the local population.

The committees in question are essentially nonviolent. One of their spheres of activity is maintaining cleanliness and order in the neighborhood (especially during general strikes). Another is organizing mutual aid, especially financial and material aid to the needy and those directly affected by the uprising, and collecting funds for this purpose. Another committee assures that each city has an educational committee to organize “popular education” and other educational services, such as arranging studies outside the closed schools,⁸⁸ thereby countering what is perceived as a deliberate Israeli policy of “inculcating ignorance.”⁸⁹ Yet another activity is forming a health committee in every city and an alternative health-care system — including extensive first-aid training for youths, and the establishment of a clinic in every village, neighborhood and quarter, each under the supervision of a qualified doctor — and the formation of a committee to steer persons badly wounded in the uprising to non-government hospitals (where they would not have to register and could thus avoid arrest for taking part in riots). These “auxiliary committees” operate primarily in Beit Sahour, Tulkarm and Jenin. Their members are generally in their 30s and the majority make their living in the liberal professions.

Also operating under the aegis of the UNC are so-called “strike units” or “shock forces” — popular committees. These underground nationalist groups are considered the organizational, operational and ideological infrastructure for a Palestinian people’s army in a future independent Palestinian state. The committees are “an integral part of the Palestinian striking forces that operate…in the occupied lands.”⁹⁰ Their function is to ensure the implementation of the directives in the communiques, employing violence if necessary, though in many cases adapting to local circumstances; to set up a network in villages and cities to warn of approaching IDF units, tax collectors, etc.; to collect information on collaborators and subject them to violent interrogations; to collect firearms and other weapons; to raise funds to underwrite their operations; and to mount a kind of civil guard in the form of security committees and observation committees⁹¹ against thieves, suspect persons and Jewish settlers.

The popular committees are widespread in both the urban and rural sectors. According to Defense Minister Rabin, at the end of August 1988 there were “five such [committees] in a given quarter or in a city.”⁹² Ultimately their ubiquity and power made them a threat to the authority of the Civil Administration, and in mid-August 1988 they were outlawed and hundreds of their activists arrested. As the defense minister explained at the time, not all the committees engaged in violence, and the new measures were aimed only at those that were attempting “to create the infrastructure [for alternative rule] and to continue the violence” — namely, the strike units.

PLO Funding of the Uprising

Funds on a huge scale are required to keep the uprising going. According to Muhammad Milhim, head of the Occupied Territories Section of the PLO’s Executive Committee, in 1988 the damage sustained in the Territories by inhabitants and institutions totaled $571 million. This represented the salaries of activists, PLO compensation to families of martyrs (an initial payment of about 2,000 Jordanian dinars and then 100 dinars a month) and to the owners of houses demolished by the IDF (their equivalent value, for purchasing or building a new house), and payments to the families of detainees (about 50 dinars a month if the detainee is unmarried, and 60 dinars to the family of a married detainee). The amount of compensation is not uniform and may fluctuate, depending on the PLO’s financial status, its ability to transfer funds into the Territories, the specific family in question, and other variables. The money is paid through the factions comprising the leadership of the uprising.

During the uprising, Israel has taken a number of steps to halt the smuggling of funds into the Territories via Jordan. Control has been tightened at the Jordan River bridges (and at the Rafah checkpoint on the Egyptian border), and the amount of money that may be brought in by a person entering from Jordan — either a local inhabitant or a visitor from an Arab state — has been reduced to 200 dinars (instead of $2,000). Anyone wishing to bring in a larger sum of money — up to 500 dinars — must apply in advance to the Israeli authorities for a permit. These may be granted in a short time, but permits to bring in sums in excess of 500 dinars, for building or business purposes, or for other needs, are issued after a lengthier process in which the request is examined thoroughly and provided there are no indications that the money in question originates with the PLO. A Palestinian inhabitant of the Territories entering the country via Ben-Gurion International Airport may bring in up to $400.

Despite these measures and close bank supervision, PLO funds continue to reach the Territories and fuel the uprising, and individuals have been caught trying to smuggle in large sums of money. According to a minimal estimate, over $10 million per month, or $120 million annually, enters the Territories in one way or another. That the figure is low is reflected in the fact that neither merchants nor workers receive financial support. A higher estimate puts the amount at about $300 million per year.

Among the suspected conduits are the Geneva-based Arab Aid Society, ultra-Orthodox Jews from Jerusalem’s Me’a She’arim quarter and from Bnei Brak, Christian clergymen, visiting Egyptians, Israeli Arab merchants (for Hamas), and UNRWA.

However the three primary conduits are (in ascending order) tourists arriving via Ben-Gurion Airport, who may bring in an unlimited sum of money and are “recruited” abroad by the PLO for this purpose; money-changers from East Jerusalem, the Territories and even the Me’a She’arim quarter, who have branches abroad through which the PLO can transfer funds; and western banks—a resident of Israel or the Territories with an account in an Israeli bank may legally transfer funds into the account from banks abroad (though the money can be withdrawn in Israeli shekels only). Funds are thus transferred directly to the Territories or, in some cases, via Israeli Arabs.

In 1988 the Israel Police clamped down on an offense that had been largely ignored in previous years: attempts by residents of the Territories to bring in money in excess of the amount permitted, in order to underwrite the uprising. The police unit at Ben-Gurion Airport confiscated about $500,000 from incoming Palestinian residents of the Territories and filed 46 charges relating to this violation. Defense Minister Rabin acknowledged the difficulty of blocking international bank transfers when he remarked that the privileged nature of bank information prevented Israel from discovering which banks were being used to transfer funds to the Territories, and thus from “putting its hand” on the culprits. Overall, the PLO is unable to pump huge amounts of money into the Territories. Yet the sums that do get in are sufficient, at least, to underwrite the Palestinians’ “national institutions” and the popular committees, and to compensate families directly affected by the uprising. In short, these funds enable the uprising to persist.

Conclusion

The civil disobedience campaign is not all-embracing; it does not cover all areas of life. Its purpose is not to foment chaos but to demonstrate Israel’s inability to rule in many spheres and to build a self-rule infrastructure for a future Palestinian state. Civil disobedience is not carried to extremes that are liable to enfeeble the population’s staying power; rather it is judiciously applied, staying within the parameters of the residents’ capacities. Since it is impossible at this stage to jettison Israeli rule, no attempt is made to eradicate completely the Civil Administration structure, which is largely based on local employees. Instead, efforts are made to affect narrow spheres considered vital to Israeli operations. The aim is to set up an alternative system capable of replacing the present infrastructure in the future. Thus the main purpose of the civil disobedience campaign to date has been twofold: to demonstrate the opposition of the entire people to continued Israeli rule while supporting violent activity against the Israeli authorities; and, in parallel, gradually to build an alternative system to Israeli rule in a number of areas and to unify the people around it.

Civil disobedience has been successful only in part; even Arafat remarked that “we are now at the stage of partial strikes and partial civil disobedience.” In April 1989 Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) explained why the intifada had not evolved into outright civil disobedience. Such a development would entail the destruction and replacement of the existing administration, he said, and as this would require funds on a scale not currently available, civil disobedience was being implemented only in part. All the same, a self-image was created of a people fighting for its liberty through the utilization of all means, including civil disobedience. To date, most of the local Palestinians employed by the Civil Administration are continuing on the job, but there are signs that their integration within the system is ebbing. At the same time, a large percentage of the working force in the Territories continues to work in Israel.

Summing up the primary elements of the uprising, they may be characterized as follows: violence; large-scale participation; the involvement of all the cities, villages and refugee camps in Judea-Samaria and the Gaza Strip; extended duration; central control and direction; well-defined political aims (liberation from Israeli rule, etc.); manifestations of civil disobedience; and the Palestinians’ struggle to take gradual control of sectors of civilian life. The end is not in sight.

Chapter Four:
The IDF and the Uprising

IDF Objectives

In the past, since 1967, the relatively small-scale military means and tactics employed by the IDF, combined with measures taken in the civilian sphere by the Military Government (and subsequently by the Civil Administration) had sufficed to contain sporadic outbreaks of violence in the Territories — but not to prevent their periodic recurrence. However, during the intifada the IDF, operating in accordance with the law and within the parameters of Israel’s national political consensus, has been unsuccessful in eradicating the pervasive violence, although by and large it has put a stop to massive demonstrations and riots. In this connection the IDF Chief of Staff noted that the only way to suppress completely a violent struggle waged by civilians is to employ extreme tactics, “such as [a population] transfer, starvation and genocide — and none of these means is acceptable to the State of Israel.”¹ In Syria, for example, this kind of insurrection has been suppressed within days by the authorities’ unbridled use of firepower and other violence, at the price of thousands of deaths among the rioters. The international community viewed the events as an “internal affair.”

At the outset of the intifada the Israeli leadership (including the defense hierarchy) still believed that the disturbances (they were not yet categorized as an “uprising") could be eradicated using the same methods as in the past. Although as early as mid-January 1988 the defense minister noted that “the solution to the problem must be political,”² he also declared that “our number one mission is to find ways to calm the situation in the territories down.”³ That same month the chief of staff assessed that collective punishment measures being implemented by the IDF would restore calm within two or three weeks. Lt. Gen. Shomron added that “the main question is not when this wave of riots will die down;” based on his evaluation that the riots were almost at an end, he ordered the IDF not only to liquidate the insurrection but “to implant in their [the residents] consciousness deterrent memories that will have an effect in the future”⁴ — that is, to quell the uprising in a manner that would dissuade the population from ever repeating it.

Only half a year later, Defense Minister Rabin stated that he had never instructed the IDF “to make sure that not a single stone or Molotov cocktail is thrown.”⁵ The army’s objective, he added, was “to bring about calm and lower violence to a reasonable level.”⁶ Practically speaking, this meant reducing the violence with the foreknowledge that it could not be eliminated by military means alone. In April 1989 Rabin explained that the defense establishment “is operating with the aim of restoring calm” and that “the sole qualifying factor toward the achievement of this goal is the law.” Rabin accepted that what was achieved on the ground was “the maximum and the best possible within the framework of the law.”⁷

This seems to have been the prevailing view within the Cabinet, although some disagreed. Dissenters included not only Ariel Sharon but also Moshe Arens who declared: “It is the army’s task to restore order, period.”⁸ In other words, it was incumbent upon the IDF to bring about total calm in the Territories. As foreign minister, Arens was probably intimating that the uprising must be stopped because of the political damage it was causing Israel. The chief of staff, who is responsible for the IDF’s operations in the field, pointed out that the IDF could not “completely eradicate a violent struggle conducted by a civilian population;” at best, it would be possible to lower “the level of their resistance and activity…”⁹ Shomron’s inference was apparently that the uprising could not be eliminated because it was motivated by the inhabitants’ will to liberate themselves from Israeli rule, “and that will cannot be forcibly uprooted.”¹⁰ Nevertheless, the broad range of means and methods employed by the IDF throughout the uprising (including punishments in the civilian realm) occasionally generated the hope that the violence could be stopped.

Impact of Military and Other Tactics

Changes in the IDF’s operational methods in the course of the uprising were usually due to one or more of three reasons: the need to respond to innovative tactics employed by the insurgents; developments in ordnance available to the IDF and their effect on reducing the violence; and international reactions and pressures. We turn now to a discussion of these IDF tactics.

For about three weeks after the rioting began, until early January 1988, field commanders felt that they lacked an adequate mode of response. Defense Minister Rabin said: “the soldiers found themselves in a position of “either fire or do nothing.”¹¹ At this stage there were still few forces deployed in the Territories, and the practical response was to open fire in life-threatening situations. The result was, according to Rabin, that in the first month of the uprising (Dec. 9-Jan. 8) 26 Palestinians were killed.¹² This high figure undoubtedly exacerbated the unrest. Less than a month after the start of the uprising, the IDF revised its tactics and significantly increased the number of troops in Judea, Samaria and Gaza: “the activity of thousands of soldiers is involved.”¹³ In addition, lengthy curfews were imposed and police tactics were adopted, including the use of steel helmets, tear gas, rubber bullets and riot batons; use of firearms was reduced.

The new concept held that the only way to halt or even reduce the violence was to engage the rioters at close quarters. Following a month of mass disturbances that had caught it unprepared, Israel was now organizing for a protracted struggle. The ongoing and combined use of riot-control tactics, together with civil sanctions, appears to be the dominant factor in bringing about the cessation of mass violence. A second possible explanation notes the institutionalization of the uprising and its resultant loss of spontaneity.

We shall now examine several key military tactics, followed by legal and administrative tactics.

Curfews. The IDF erred in not imposing curfews from the very start of the disturbances, but this was rectified beginning in early January 1988. A curfew, lifted each day for an hour or so to enable residents to stock up on essentials, can hamper and perhaps even prevent civilian violence, but it is also a collective punishment and as such has the effect of involving more residents in active opposition to the authorities. During past disturbances, curfews were not imposed on an all-inclusive scale, but rather in a limited area (part of a city or even a whole city) as a deterrent to other locales. Now the curfew was intended to stop the uprising, and therefore its scope was frequently all-encompassing. The curfew was an important means for reducing the scale of the uprising, but it also was counter-productive, in that it accelerated the spread of the uprising throughout the population. Moveover, its effect was local and temporary, not exceeding its own duration. In other words, it was tactical, and not deterrent or lasting. A supplementary measure was the “clampdown” imposed on a city or locality, a less severe measure under which residents were not permitted to leave the area affected, but could move freely within it.

Deployment of massive forces. The experience of the uprising, as well as of past disturbances, shows unequivocally that this is an essential measure. As long as relatively small forces were deployed in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, the uprising gathered momentum and intensity. The massive and permanent presence of IDF forces brought about the cessation of mass violence. The beefing up of Israeli forces toward the end of 1988 successfully prevented major outbreaks of violence on key dates on the Palestinian and PLO calendar, most notably on November 16, in the aftermath of the Palestinian National Council’s declaration of an “independent Palestinian state.”

The availability of larger forces also enabled the IDF to take the offensive, in the form of “initiated operations” against specific isolated villages in Judea and Samaria that had declared their “independence” and set up self-rule (there are some 420 villages and hundreds of additional tiny clusters of dwellings scattered throughout the West-Bank), and against refugee camps in the Gaza Strip. A reduction in the number of soldiers at the beginning of 1989 was accompanied by a falloff in this initiated activity.

Manifestly, then, the struggle against the uprising requires the IDF to commit forces on a large scale in order to ensure the success of each of the three main modes of suppressing the unrest: prevention, preemption and deterrence. Theoretically, one could say that if the majority of the IDF’s land reserves were mobilized and deployed, along with the regular army, in the Territories, the violence would almost certainly ebb as long as they were there. However, economic, political and other reasons preclude this possibility, nor indeed does Israel wish to station large forces in the Territories, as this impinges on combat training and warfighting preparations, and heightens friction with the local population. Nevertheless, relatively large forces still have to be committed to the Territories as a primary mode of combatting the uprising.

An alternative possibility — confining the battle to the cities and ceding control over the villages to the Palestinians — could allow the IDF to make do with smaller forces. But this is not feasible for two reasons. First, by a rough estimate, of the 420 villages in Judea-Samaria, 300 are located close to access roads to Jewish settlements. Therefore, if only to ensure the safety of those using the roads, the IDF cannot forego both a transportation and a security presence on them. A military presence in the remaining villages is indeed secondary, and in fact it is unlikely that the IDF is devoting significant forces or energies to them.

Secondly, although the politically aware Palestinian population is urban, the majority of the population is rural, and events in the villages often have a direct bearing on developments in the cities. It is inconceivable that a large number of villages be considered “off limits” to the IDF while the cities remain calm due to the IDF’s presence. Although, in general, priority should go to the counter-struggle in the cities (due to the high proportion of politically aware residents and because the main roads in use by the IDF and the Jewish settlers pass through the cities), operational measures in the rural sector, with brief respites, are unavoidable. This is so even though the presence of soldiers, settlers and the media in villages fuels unrest. It was reported, for example, that the level of violence in several Arab villages around Jerusalem tapered off significantly after the Israel Police withdrew its forces from them, causing the media to lose interest in them as well. Still, Israel’s counter-struggle is not only to scale down or stop the violence, but also to maintain and strengthen military and civilian control in the Territories.

Some would argue that the village population cannot long maintain a state of “independence” because it is dependent on the Civil Administration for many matters related to daily life. The facts are otherwise. Even though the rural population requires Civil Administration permits in various spheres (e.g., to export agricultural produce to Jordan, to invite visitors from Jordan and other Arab states, and, in future, perhaps also to work in Israel), it is basically less dependent on the Civil Administration than its urban counterpart. In a situation of war and a struggle for independence, the population could forego this dependence, perhaps for an extended period. Were a large number of villages to declare themselves “liberated” or “independent,” without an appropriate IDF response (i.e., reentry by Israeli forces), then political ramifications would follow. Thus as long as the uprising persists, the IDF will have to continue committing forces on a large scale to Judea, Samaria and Gaza — and the larger the forces the better their chance to moderate and limit the violence.

Dispersing demonstrations by force. Concurrent with the deployment of massive forces, countermeasures were introduced to disperse demonstrations, both large and small. The method of operation for breaking up a violent demonstration was for part of the IDF force to “charge” from the flank or from the rear, with the rest of the force deployed to prevent the demonstrators’ forward advance. Although this tactic had been in sporadic use in the Territories since the first disturbances in 1967, this time it was not employed immediately. As the defense minister said, “it took time for the IDF to adapt itself to this method of operation.”¹⁴ The reason for the delay was apparently that the lessons of the past were not enshrined in IDF doctrine and the high command took decisions based on personal experience. By January 1988 it was assessed that “the combination of charging and the use of force has proved itself.”¹⁵ Indeed, this tactic contributed to the cessation of the mass demonstrations, but did not stop small groups of rioters from throwing stones or petrol bombs.

Point “treatment” was effected by special units — called, according to the foreign press, “Cherry” and “Samson.” Their missions included: apprehending wanted Palestinians in cities and villages; capturing popular committee members during the night, their main time of activity; and combatting masked agitators. This activity led to the arrest of hundreds of insurgents, some of them bearing arms.

Intelligence warfare. By its nature such activity is clandestine and classified and little information is available. Here we can do little more than note its existence without elaborating. Residents of the Territories, for example, claim that Israel is combatting the leaflets issued by the uprising leadership by putting out fake leaflets of its own in order to sow confusion and doubt among the local population.

The law as a weapon. A few words are in order about Palestinian reliance on the legal weapon. At the start of the uprising an attempt was made by the Palestinians to sever contact with the Israeli judicial system as part of the general effort to disengage from Israeli rule. Gaza Strip lawyers launched a strike that lasted for more than six months, during which no petitions were submitted to the High Court of Justice (HCJ) and no appeals were filed against administrative detentions. Since that strike, there has been a reversal of tactics, with the Palestinians seeking to exploit the judicial system to advance the intifada. Palestinian lawyers now regularly petition the HCJ and submit appeals to review boards (regarding deportations), and in general take whatever legal steps they can in order to delay Israeli judicial measures. Review boards, for example, are bombarded with questions in an endeavor to hold up deportation. Thus deportation orders issued in August 1988 had not yet been implemented by the end of June 1989. About 25–30 percent of the appeals against administrative detention result in a reduction of the detention period, and in exceptional cases the detainee has been released.

As for Israel, it has availed itself of the legal weapon in the following areas. First, arrests: From the start of the intifada until the end of June 1989, about 35,000 Palestinian residents of the Territories had been arrested for offenses related to the uprising. Some 9,000 were under detention at the end of June 1989. Arrests are carried out on the basis of intelligence information and during demonstrations or other violent incidents.

Court action. As of the end of June 1989, approximately 15,000 Palestinians had faced trial for taking part in disturbances. The trials of about 8,000 had concluded. The punishment for stone-throwing in which no damage is involved (for persons above the age of 12) is generally 3–6 months’ imprisonment, a probationary period and a fine. Persons convicted of stone-throwing resulting in injury usually receive 1–2 years’ imprisonment. In cases where children below the age of 12 are convicted of perpetrating violence or taking part in disturbances, the parents are compelled (by administrative fiat) to guarantee the child’s good behavior for one year, or are fined.

Secondly, administrative detention: About 7,000 Palestinians had been placed under administrative detention from the start of the intifada to the end of June 1989, when there remained some 2,050 such detainees, of whom more than 500 were under detention for at least a second time. Administrative detention is for a period of six months, with the possibility of extension. Appeal is possible — to a military judge and then to the HCJ — but these options are only partially utilized. Administrative detention has a dual purpose: to deprive the detainee temporarily of freedom of action, and to deter others. The larger purpose is to prevent an increase in intifada-related violence.

The use of judicial measures does not seem to have acted as a deterrent or to have reduced the level of violence. In their absence, however, the scale of violence would have been far greater. A drawback of the system is that the prisons serve as hothouses for nationalist indoctrination and radicalization. They are virtually schools for the education of a new generation of Palestinian revolutionaries. The upshot is that in most cases Palestinians are more determined to pursue the struggle when they leave prison than they were when they entered.

Materiel and Ordnance, and their Impact

From the outbreak of the intifada, the means and materiel at the IDF’s disposal were adapted to the problems posed by the uprising. Few innovations were introduced. Most of the “technical” means discussed below had already been employed during earlier periods of unrest.

Protective equipment. As late as August 1988, eight months after the start of the intifada, IDF commanders were still complaining about a dearth of appropriate protective equipment for soldiers facing stones, petrol bombs and other objects thrown by rioters. The second-in-command of a company of reservists who did a month’s duty in the Tulkarm area was quoted as saying that “the IDF sends you to execute a mission that includes confronting petrol bombs without fireproof clothing and gloves. Most of the vehicles lack stone-proofing and don’t have the proper cover against petrol bombs. It is inconceivable that my soldiers and I should report for reserve duty and be exposed to dangers without any solution being offered.”¹⁶ Since then a marked improvement has occurred in this regard.

Use of riot batons. Prior to the uprising, riot batons were used to quell disturbances, but selectively. The defense minister’s decision to permit their massive use was made after IDF units in the field had resorted to this measure and had found it instantly effective and a useful deterrent. In the second half of January 1988, Rabin affirmed publicly that the use of riot batons had been officially sanctioned. The immediate reason for the shift to aggressive tactics in the form of batons was the security forces’ inability to cope with the surging violence in the first month of the uprising. In many situations, the constraints embodied in the rules for opening fire rendered soldiers helpless in the face of humiliating taunts. The defense minister directed that riot batons be wielded against violent demonstrators only, and only while a riot was in progress; rioters were not to be beaten as punishment once the incident had ended: “the use of force, including beatings, was ordered against those who engage in violence at the time when they are engaging in violence: a violent demonstration; a burning tire that serves as a roadblock, with people also throwing stones; curfew violators who violently oppose their detention; encountering resistance when coming to a suspect’s home to arrest him.”¹⁷

Soldiers were permitted to beat demonstrators on the hands and feet — not on the head. In practice the policy was to break rioters’ hands and feet, and casualties among the Palestinians from such beatings ran high. Many soldiers took the opportunity to vent their rage and frustration on demonstrators, and deviations occurred that resulted in deaths among the rioters.

The “beatings policy” triggered fierce criticism domestically and especially abroad. Yet it also had the effect of instilling fear into the rioters and among the Palestinian population as a whole, at least temporarily, and thus enhanced the IDF’s deterrent image in the Territories. The O/C Central Command stated in February 1988 that he found “physical confrontation” advantageous because “the moment the confrontation is physical, the soldier gains self-confidence and the other side begins to flinch.”¹⁸ The license to beat was perceived as essential in order “to redress the balance of terror.”¹⁹ As a commander in the field noted in February 1988: “If you ask me, blows are effective to disperse demonstrations.”²⁰

At the same time, however, this policy intensified hatred of Israel among the Palestinians, it failed to end the violence (although it did moderate it for a time), and it transformed the victims of beatings into local heroes. Another problem was the need to chase fleet-footed youths in maze-like areas where they could easily hide. A deputy commander of a reserve company, a captain, noted after serving in the Tulkarm sector: “Batons? You can’t get into contact range with them. Don’t forget that these are 30-year-old reservists who are up against kids of 15 to 17. These youths know every hole and alley in the refugee camps, and you can hardly ever get close enough to engage them.”²¹ When contact was made, the use of batons and brute force enabled soldiers to vent powerful feelings of resentment and frustration, but such tactics also had a negative psychological impact. As Defense Minister Rabin put it: “On the one hand, you see the hatred face-to-face, you hear the curses and see the spitting; on the other hand, you see far more clearly the pain involved in employing force, which is not so evident in true battle.”²²

At all events, this measure had a deterrent effect only for a short time. Its negative effects, mentioned above, along with the negative image that accrued to Israel in world public opinion, brought about a decline in the massive use of riot batons about two months after the beatings policy had been introduced. The new conception held that the rioters should be dealt with from a distance and not engaged at close quarters.

Rubber bullets and tear gas. These two means of riot control proved to be of limited efficacy. Rubber bullets were intended primarily for use against stone-throwers at relatively short distances. Experience showed that even at a range of 20 meters rubber bullets were ineffective. The IDF then introduced an “improved” version containing a quantity of lead. This ammunition, which became operational after the introduction of plastic bullets but is less lethal than them (see below), enables soldiers to disperse a riot from a distance. The effectiveness of tear gas, a traditional riot control means, has diminished because the local population has learned how to offset its effects (by sniffing an onion, protecting one’s eyes, etc.), and because shifting winds and other factors often cause tear gas to attack the soldiers who are employing it.

Plastic bullets. This new form of ammunition was added to the IDF arsenal on July 20, 1988. The plastic bullet is identical in every respect to regular ammunition, except for the cartridge, which is made of hard plastic and has a low muzzle velocity. Experiments conducted prior to its operational use showed that at a range of 70 meters or more it was not lethal. Defense Minister Rabin explained in August 1988 that “the most difficult problem now is the stones…. To cope with stones, and to reduce the soldiers’ frustration, the plastic bullet has been introduced. The order is to fire at whoever organizes or incites to stone-throwing.”²³ About five weeks later Rabin elaborated further: “It was demonstrated that the use of clubs, tear gas and rubber bullets was insufficient when confronting stone-throwers at a range of30–50 meters…. Therefore we added plastic bullets, which are intended to reach stone throwers, organizers and agitators.”²⁴ According to the IDF chief of staff, the new ammunition would also be effective against throwers of petrol bombs.²⁵ At all events, the evident intention was to use plastic bullets against point targets — organizers of demonstrations, stone-throwers, persons erecting barriers or burning tires — in order to reduce the violence and as a deterrent.

To preclude lethal casualties from the use of plastic bullets, an order was issued to fire at demonstrators’ legs below the knee, and at a range of at least 70 meters. Only officers or specially trained soldiers were permitted to use this ammunition. Nevertheless, dozens of persons were killed by plastic bullets (as of June 21, 1989, the number of fatalities caused by plastic bullets stood at 82 — 53 in Judea-Samaria and 29 in the Gaza Strip) — often because the bullets were fired at a range of less than 70 meters. No internal injuries were caused and life was not endangered when plastic bullets struck demonstrators’ legs. However, they were usually fatal, even when fired from over 70 meters, if they struck the head, the chest cavity or a main artery. Commanders in the field felt that plastic bullets gave the IDF the upper hand in the battle against stone-throwers and even served as a deterrent. As a result, children came to constitute a high proportion of the stone throwers, “because they know we will not fire plastic bullets at them.”²⁶ (In fact, children are occasionally hit by plastic bullets.) All in all, it was assessed that “there is a good prospect that the increased use of plastic bullets will decrease the number of stone-throwers. “²⁷

The introduction of plastic bullets and the revision of standing orders to allow live fire to be opened at throwers of petrol bombs seemed to have a salutary effect in one area: beginning in September 1988, the average number of petrol bombs thrown per month was halved, from 130 to 65. This however was not the case with stone-throwing. At the end of 1988 the defense minister admitted that the security forces still had no efficacious solution to this problem.²⁸ In January 1989 Rabin reiterated that the primary problem of the uprising remained stone-throwing, and the following month he added that “60 percent of the stone-throwers in the Territories are children aged 14–16.”²⁹ In a further elaboration around the same time, he explained that “85–90 percent of the violent incidents involve stones. Stones are thrown at Israelis traveling mainly in Judea-Samaria and less in Gaza, where there are fewer Jewish settlers. On the average, every trip from one settlement to another has to pass through three Arab villages, and the majority of the stone-throwing incidents (90 percent) occur in transit in an Arab locale, be it a city or a village.”³⁰ Instances of stone-throwing in open country were rare. Rabin stressed that petrol bombs were not the central problem; stone-throwing was “the backbone of the uprising — this is the [crux of the] violence.”³¹

A byproduct of the introduction of plastic bullets, and the consequent drastic decline in physical confrontations between soldiers and rioters, was that TV viewers around the world no longer saw clashes at close quarters, with the emotional wallop they carried.

Use of firearms. IDF orders for opening fire at rioters have always been highly restrictive; these have not been changed during the uprising. Firearms may be used only when necessary to escape from a life-threatening situation. A petrol bomb is considered as lethal as a grenade, and fire may be opened at either perpetrator. Although guidelines concerning the use of firearms are general in character, they are clear. The overall aim is to minimize the number of fatalities among insurgents. From the Palestinian standpoint, precisely because the Arabs, too, place a high value on human life, fatalities will not put a stop to the uprising and may well motivate the population to intensify it (as indeed occurred at the beginning). Moreover passions run high during funerals, as the rites include showing the body, anointing it with hena, dressing it with keffiyot and draping it with the Palestinian flag.

The question confronting the IDF is how to employ force to reduce the level of the uprising, and if possible to eradicate it, while enabling soldiers to avoid life-threatening situations that may compel them to open fire, however selectively. The larger the units in the Territories, the less necessity there is to field small squads that are more liable to be caught up in such life-threatening encounters.

To conclude our discussion of military means, we may assert that not even the use of all the materiel and ordnance described here has proved sufficient to stop the uprising. The primary component is the use of large forces (especially in Judea-Samaria, which is 16 times larger than the Gaza Strip) accompanied by a variety of tactical measures. Given the duration of the uprising and its many successes, it seems unlikely that any technical or technological solution will bring about its cessation.

IDF Punitive Measures and their Impact

Demolition of houses. For many years the prevalent view in Israel held that two particular forms of punishment—demolition of houses and deportation — constituted an especially effective deterrent. The former was implemented in reaction to terrorist attacks, and the latter was generally applied against political agitators. The intifada offers the possibility of examining the effectiveness of these punishments, by noting the presence or absence of a statistical correlation between the extent of the punishment involved and a reduction in the level of violence.

Table 3 Effect of house demolitions on scope of violent incidents during following month, IDF Spokesman figures

According to the IDF Spokesman, as of the end of June 1989, 228 houses had been demolished and 102 sealed since the start of the uprising. B’Tselem cited figures of 224 and 83, respectively. The IDF Spokesman’s figures indicate that of 204 houses demolished as of June 6, 1989, 148 were in Judea-Samaria and 56 in the Gaza Strip. (See also Appendix 9.) The peak months in this regard were March 1989 (27 houses) as well as April, August and November 1988. Table 3 lists those months in which 15 or more demolitions took place, in juxtaposition with the level of violent incidents for the month following, in order to evaluate the influence of demolitions.

(It should be borne in mind that what follows is not a comprehensive evaluation, as it takes into account the impact of one element only—house demolitions—on the level of violence in the next month. Other elements, such as the general state of the uprising at the time, political and other developments, an increase or decrease in the number of IDF troops in the Territories, the intensity of events and the number of casualties, are not factored in. Therefore the findings of this table and some of those that follow are not necessarily precise, although they are indicative of the thrust of events.)

House demolitions during the intifada revealed no correlation between the number of houses demolished and the number of violent incidents recorded, or the number of Israeli casualties, or even the number of petrol bombs thrown, during the following month. This, despite the fact that, unlike deportation, demolition usually takes place soon after the discovery of the persons responsible and often hard upon the incident itself.

Notably, during the first three months of the uprising (December 1987, January-February 1988) no houses were demolished or sealed. As the table shows, in later months the demolition of houses had no immediate effect in reducing levels of violence. Quite the contrary, looking at two months in which a large number of houses were demolished, after the demolition of 23 houses in April 1988 the level of violent activity during the following month rose by 244 incidents; likewise, after the demolition of 24 houses in November, the number of violent incidents in December increased by 1,186.

Nor did the demolition of houses have any immediate effect, at least during the first nine months of the uprising, in reducing the number of petrol bombs thrown in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Appendix 10 shows the peak months of petrol bomb attacks. During the first nine months of the uprising, between 98 and 164 petrol bombs were thrown per month, and generally there was no reduction in the number of petrol bombs thrown in the course of the month after the demolition of a large number of houses. Thus, for example, after the demolition of 23 houses in April 1988 the number of petrol bombs thrown during May rose to 163. Beginning in October 1988 there is a perceptible decline in the number of petrol bombs thrown, ranging from a low of 44 in December 1988 (in Judea-Samaria and Gaza combined) to a peak of 86 in May 1989. As mentioned, this stems from the revised directive permitting soldiers to open fire at throwers of petrol bombs.

To sum up, although relatively few houses were demolished in the period between 1980 and the start of the uprising (e.g., 17 demolitions in all of 1980), this measure appears to have had a deterrent value. (Still, there were years in which the GSS advocated its cessation because of its negative effects.) Over the course of time, and particularly since the start of the intifada, the deterrent effect of demolitions declined greatly, particularly after the PLO began compensating affected families. Indeed, demolitions were transformed into a stimulus to further escalation of resistance to Israeli rule. Notably, during the uprising the PLO succeeded in smuggling funds to the owners of houses that had been demolished to enable them to build anew, so the severe hardship imposed on the family by demolition was only of short duration.

Deportation. The second form of punishment associated with deterrence over the years consists of deportation from Judea, Samaria and Gaza to an Arab country. Table 4 shows the peak monthly figures of this form of punishment and the level of violence the next month (source: IDF Spokesman; see also Appendix 11).

Table 4 Effect of deportations on scope of violent incidents during following month, IDF Spokesman figures

While deportation may have deterrent value in the long term, the table shows a positive correlation between the number of residents deported — 45, all to Lebanon, until May 1989 — and an ensuing increase in the number of violent incidents and Israeli casualties. Thus, for example, after the peak month of deportations (16 in April 1988), the number of violent incidents in May rose by 244 (in both regions; there was actually a decrease of about 100 in Gaza), and after the 13 deportations of January 1989, the number of violent incidents rose by 384. At about this time Defense Minister Rabin said that the IDF had decided to reduce the number of deportations due to doubts about the efficacy of this measure.³² Clearly the deterrent effect of deportation, which was previously considered by Israeli security authorities to be the harshest punishment in Palestinian eyes, must be questioned. Notably, both deportation and the demolition of houses have been the subject of severe criticism abroad. In this connection, a further cause of the decline in the deterrent value of both forms of punishment was the Palestinians’ awareness that Israel was precluded from exercising either measure on anything even approaching a mass scale.

Impact of Civil Administration Measures

Most measures taken to combat the uprising were of a security/military character, with the Civil Administration relatively inactive in the punitive domain. The Civil Administration’s first problem was to survive and continue functioning, if only partially, through its 18,000 local employees in the Territories, and to prevent its replacement by alternative Palestinian institutions. A primary mission of the Civil Administration, undertaken both to balance its budget and to make a statement about its ongoing presence as the arm of Israeli rule, was to enforce payment of taxes. Another key measure, invoked by the Civil Administration to combat the intifada and reduce the level of violence, was to close the schools in Judea-Samaria. Additional pressure was brought to bear on villages and towns where violence had occurred through a series of punitive measures: cutting off their electricity; cutting off telephone communications abroad from the entire West Bank for six months, and selectively cutting off all phone services in various locales for shorter periods; preventing the marketing of agricultural produce to Jordan — a punishment accompanied by the closure of an area to prevent smuggling into Israel; preventing the export of stone from local quarries to Jordan; opening Civil Administration offices in towns (“subdistricts”) where none had existed previously; and, as already described, reducing the sum of money that residents could bring in across the Jordan River bridges to 200 Jordanian dinars. In addition, Civil Administration offices and vehicles were fitted with protective devices against the ubiquitous stones.

School Closures

In Judea and Samaria the primary means utilized by the Civil Administration to restrain the uprising was the closing of schools. In the Gaza Strip, in contrast, there were few cases of a comprehensive shut-down of the educational system. The difference in approach derived from two main reasons: in the Gaza Strip few schools are located on the roads used by Israeli traffic, whereas in Judea-Samaria hundreds of schools are located along arteries used by Israeli vehicles; and in the Gaza Strip the Islamic movements, which place a high premium on education, urged the population not to involve the schools in violence. At the level of higher education, all the universities in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip were closed at the beginning of the intifada, and remained so for an extended period of time.

Since 1967 schools and universities in the Territories have frequently been catalysts for disturbances. In periods of political tension or on key Palestinian dates the very fact that pupils and students are concentrated in one place has sparked violent disturbances. At such times masked agitators would enter the schools and incite pupils to take to the streets in violent activity. If such actions persisted, the authorities would temporarily shut down the school or university involved, and this restored quiet and deterred other institutions. Rarely were more than a few schools closed down simultaneously. Prior to the intifada, the prevailing concept held that there was no need for a blanket shutdown of the entire educational system.

Although the schools certainly served as hothouses for organization, incitement, indoctrination and violence, the mass shutdown of all the schools in Judea-Samaria was hardly convenient for Israel. This measure signified that under a continuing state of emergency, Israel was incapable of enabling regular studies to take place. Possibly if the measure had been implemented at the very start of the uprising against a small number of schools involved in particularly serious rioting (declaring such institutions closed for half a year to make it perfectly clear that the entire school year would be lost), others might have been deterred.

Here senior Civil Administration officials argue that in cases

Table 5 Incidents in Judea-Samaria when schools were open/closed, IDF Spokesman figures

Periods When Schools were Open
Periods When Schools were Closed
Number of Incidents Following the Opening/ Closing of Schools

Till Feb 2 1988

Incidents in January increased by 405 (1885 in Jan, compared with 1480 in Dec). Apparently this was one of the reasons for closing the schools on Feb 2.

From Feb 2 till May 23 1988
The number of incidents increased in Feb (2298 in Feb, compared with 1885 in Jan), During the following 3 months, however, the number of incidents decreased to the level before Feb (1977 in Mar; 1486 in Apr; and 1730 in May). One could therefore conclude that the closing was somewhat effective in restraining the intifada.

From May 23 till Jul 21 1988

There was no increase in incidents after the schools were reopened. In July there was even a decrease (of 179 incidents), rendering it a month with relatively few incidents (1543 incidents, compared with 1722 the previous month).

From Jul 21 till mid-December
Schools were closed due to irregular studies and a rise in disturbances within the schools (there was no overall rise in scope of incidents). After the closing there was a significant increase in the scope of incidents for 2 months (1997 in Aug, 2438 in Sep); then a decrease in Oct (1772) and Nov (1673), a development possibly affecting the decision to reopen.

From mid-December till Jan 22 1989

In Dec there was a significant increase in violence (increase of 1186 incidents -- from 1673 in Nov to 2859 in Dec). In Jan 1989 the number decreased to 2468.

From Jan 22 1989 schools were closed
Despite the closing, there was a significant increase in the number of incidents during Feb-May (2852 in Feb, compared with 3592 in March and a peak figure of 3836 in April).

where schools were shut down selectively after rioting (in Hebron and Nablus) pupils disrupted studies in other schools, and this contributed to the decision on the blanket closure. Thus the very first shutdown of schools during the intifada, in February 1988, encompassed all 840 schools run by the Civil Administration, although only 53 had been involved in rioting. At a certain stage the Israeli authorities thought about leaving the elementary schools open, but as the defense minister noted, “We saw that the high-schoolers would go to the elementary schools and incite the children.”³³ It was for this reason, and also because a good deal of the stone-throwing was perpetrated by young schoolchildren, that elementary schools were closed too. On at least one occasion (February 20, 1989) kindergartens were also shut down, but the defense establishment soon realized the mistake (and admitted it publicly) and the kindergartens reopened.

The Israeli authorities wanted to achieve the same situation in Judea-Samaria as prevailed in the Gaza Strip — open schools — to reduce the violence and scale down the uprising. According to the coordinator of government activities in the Territories, “we have a great interest in the resumption of studies throughout the Territories. If studies do not cause disturbances, we will renew them in Judea and Samaria just as we did in the Gaza Strip, where it has been most successful.”³⁴ However, when it became apparent that the opening of the schools was not conducive to quiet, they were reclosed. The attitude was not merely that “it is impossible to hold classes in an atmosphere of violence,”³⁵ but that the closure itself was intended to reduce the level of violence. The defense minister said in this connection that he preferred “that there be no schools and no violence.”³⁶

Did the closing of the schools tone down the level of violence? Was there an increase or decrease in the number of disturbances in Judea and Samaria? Table 5 attempts to correlate school closures with violent incidents (taking no other factors into account) during 1988 and the first half of 1989. Elementary, junior and high schools in Judea and Samaria were closed altogether in 1988 for eight months, and in 1989 throughout the first half of the year. They were first closed on February 2, 1988, and reopened May 23. The authorities closed them again on July 21, reopened them during the first half of December, and on January 20, 1989, closed them again until July-August 1989, when they were reopened. All told, pupils lost over a year of studies. Yet the uprising continued.

Table 5 reveals the following: (1) The first time schools were closed (February-May 1988) there was a limited restraining effect on the number of incidents. (2) There was no increase in the overall number of incidents in the West Bank when schools were opened for two months (May through July) although the number of violent incidents in the schools themselves rose. (3) Following the second closure, which lasted five months (July to December 1988), there was an increase in incidents for two months; then the number decreased. (4) The second time the schools were reopened (mid-December for a period of over a month) there was a significant increase in the number of incidents. (5) The third closure of the schools (January 1989) produced no moderating effect on the intifada; on the contrary, there was a significant increase in the number of incidents.

All told, the opening and closing of schools from early 1988 to early 1989 did not unequivocally affect the intifada. There was no increase in incidents after the first opening, though there was after the second. The first time schools were closed, the situation calmed down; after the second time, there was an acceleration of incidents. It is impossible to know how the violence would have been affected had the schools remained open, but in the light of developments toward the end of the period under discussion (from January 1989), it was clear that closing down schools no longer reduced the number and extent of intifada incidents. The uprising had reached a stage in which the closing of schools was immaterial; pupils were actively involved in the intifada even without the schools as centers of agitation and massing of demonstrators, although clearly the closing of a particular school had a moderating effect on the number of violent incidents emanating from that school.

Conclusion

The inevitable conclusion deriving from this survey of the efficacy of Israeli tactics in the face of the violent aspects of the uprising, is that despite IDF countermeasures — such as reinforcement of security details, curfews and clampdowns, use of riot batons, tear gas, rubber and plastic bullets and on occasion live ammunition, as well as sanctions by the Civil Administration (mainly the closing of schools)—the uprising was not suppressed, while Israeli rule in the Territories was weakened. At the beginning of 1989, the minister of defense and the IDF high command were forced to admit that they still had no effective response to the stone-throwing. The latest hope for a panacea — the use of plastic bullets, which by June 21, 1989 had resulted in the deaths of 82 Palestinians (53 in Judea and Samaria) — was equally ineffective in stopping the uprising. In May 1989 the defense minister stated: “The missions set for the IDF in the Territories were to lower the level of violence significantly and to allow the normal functioning of the government apparatus and the Civil Administration in the Territories. Unfortunately, I am unable to say today that these objectives have in fact been attained.

Chapter Five:
Ramifications of the Uprising

Domestic Ramifications in Israel

Tension between the settlers and the IDF. As a consequence of the uprising, a growing confrontation was discernible between Jewish settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and the IDF and the government. Its origins lay in conceptions harbored by the settlers that bore directly on their behavior, compounded by the fact that they were the prime target of much of the violence in the Territories.

The settlers insisted that every settler and every Jew throughout Judea, Samaria and Gaza be guaranteed full security. Their contention was that the government, which had spurred them to settle in the Territories, was now abandoning them. The IDF, while making a major effort to ensure the settlers’ safety on the roads in the Territories, was indeed unable to provide absolute security, and settlers were occasionally the victims of stones or petrol bombs thrown at their vehicles. As of June 8, 1989, nine Israeli civilians had been killed (all in Judea-Samaria) and 634 wounded (584 in Judea-Samaria).¹

Given these conditions, it was inevitable that the IDF and the settlers should periodically find themselves at total loggerheads. The settlers not only pressed the military and the government to retaliate in kind against Palestinian violence; they also launched their own countermeasures and sporadic provocations, including property damage to Arab vehicles and houses, beatings of local residents, and other actions. In time, this phenomenon increasingly resembled full-fledged reprisal raids. Ignoring, for the moment, a small ultra-nationalist fringe group, we can divide the Jewish residents of the Territories roughly into “ideological” and “nonideological” settlers. The latter are primarily the residents of the urban settlements of Ariel in Samaria, and Ma’aleh Adumim east of Jerusalem. Their actions stem from vested material interests and they lack both a leadership and a restraining ideology. It was they who were most resolute in demanding security for every settler and in retaliating, often violently, against attacks.

Then too, the settlers felt in general that the uprising had isolated them, both physically and politically. Indeed, one effect of the intifada has been to revivify the “Green Line” — the armistice demarcation lirie that defined the boundary of pre-1967 Israel with Judea-Samaria and Gaza. Concerned for their safety, many Israelis hesitate to go on outings in the Territories or even to visit family and friends living there. Similarly, Jerusalem has to all intents and purposes been repartitioned, in the sense that the number of Israelis visiting East Jerusalem has fallen drastically. As regards their political isolation, the settlers are apprehensive that the continuation of the uprising will force Israel to make territorial concessions in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. They are also fearful that the government is moving toward a political compromise with the Palestinians, a development they consider disastrous and totally unacceptable. They absolutely reject the Israeli government’s initiative of May 1989 which entails elections in the Territories.

Several situational causes underlie the confrontation between the settlers and the IDF: the settlers’ use of firearms against rioters even when this contravenes IDF regulations (i.e., not in life-threatening situations); their “punishment” of Palestinian demonstrators and their attacks on Arab property, usurping the punitive power vested exclusively in the Israeli authorities; and their attempts to carry out security and policing operations outside their settlements, again in defiance of the defense establishment.

Cases of physical confrontation between settlers and IDF officers and soldiers have become more frequent, although both sides have been careful not to bring firearms into play. Such clashes generally occur after Arab violence, when settlers decide to “restore order” and take revenge, and are blocked by soldiers. In such incidents settlers hurl insults (even at senior officers), there is some shoving and pushing, and blows may be exchanged. A particularly serious incident occurred in early 1989 when settlers from Ma’aleh Adumim clashed with soldiers in the nearby town of Azariyah. In the ensuing scuffle, settlers snatched the rifle of the area commander and tried to attack him.

A different form of violence manifested itself inside Israel from the beginning of 1989. An extreme right-wing group calling itself “Sicarii” (after a militant sect that operated in the Second Temple period) set fire to the doors of the homes of Israeli journalists, politicians and others who espoused views they found objectionable.

The tension between the settlers on the one hand, and the IDF and the government on the other, is very likely to be exacerbated under two basic scenarios. First, as the uprising persists it will bring with it casualties among the settlers, in some cases as a result of serious and dramatic attacks. Consequently the settlers will increasingly take the law into their own hands against local Arabs and will resist IDF dictates, at least passively. Secondly, if the Israeli government evinces a flexible political stance and proceeds to implement a plan involving elections in the Territories to choose representatives for negotiations with Israel, the danger will grow of a sharp confrontation, possibly involving violence, between the settlers and their supporters inside Israel on the one hand, and the authorities, including the IDF, on the other.

In sum, the behavior of the settlers, especially the militants among them, will continue to pose a problem for the security forces. The tension between the settlers and the authorities is liable to be aggravated, and a total rift could ensue between the settlers and the rest of the Jewish population. A government of national unity could exercise a moderating effect in this regard.

Political ramifications. The major consequence of the uprising has been the shattering of Israel’s political consensus. The fact that the uprising has continued for such a lengthy period despite all the IDF’s efforts, and the growing realization that it cannot be stopped by military force alone, have generated a new political situation. It is clear to all that the situation is irreversible.

For years the conception harbored by the majority of Israel’s political parties held that the Territories did not constitute a burden of any sort, and that the policy of creeping annexation could be pursued without fear of a popular revolt by the Palestinians. The uprising overturned this conception. More and more Israelis, including those on the political Right, accept that the status quo is untenable and understand the vital necessity for a political solution that will also fulfill Palestinian expectations. In parallel, the debate in Israel over the form of such a settlement and how to attain it has intensified. Indeed, with many realizing that the Palestinian question demands an all-encompassing solution, this subject has been placed on Israel’s public agenda, alongside the “interim settlement” concept.

The Labor Party has undergone a leftward shift, in the sense that more of its leading spokesmen are ready (at least, prior to the Gulf crisis) to state publicly — as they were unwilling to do before the intifada — that Israel must talk to the PLO. Similarly, before the uprising the Peace Now movement did not advocate negotiations with the PLO, whereas now it calls for talks with that organization and espouses the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Concurrently, the Right has tilted farther rightward and the “transfer” idea has gained legitimacy, as witnessed by the election to the Knesset of two members of Major General (res.) Rehavam Ze’evi’s Homeland “Moledet” Party, which openly advocates the “transfer” of the Arabs in the Territories to Arab states.

Polarization and radicalization in the population. The uprising produced a growing polarity within Israeli public opinion, and radicalization toward both Left and Right. Some Israelis have concluded that there is no possibility of restoring the previous situation, and believe that a political solution is essential, even if it entails concessions. For these groups the PLO has assumed legitimacy, and they have reconciled themselves to the emergence of a Palestinian state within a few years. At the other end of the scale are those in whom the intifada has instilled a despair of any political solution; they are more convinced than ever that force is necessary to eradicate the uprising and beyond. A gap is also discernible between the more extreme views held by the right-wing electorate and the relatively moderate Likud leadership. Extremists in Israel have attacked Palestinians in the streets, shouting “Death to the Arabs!” Such incidents are supported by large segments of the population, particularly if they are perpetrated in the wake of Palestinian violence, even though the entire political leadership, both Left and Right, denounces such actions.

Public opinion surveys show a toughening of attitudes regarding policy toward the Palestinians in the Territories during the uprising. A June 1989 poll indicated that 74 percent of Israelis favored a hardline approach, while 46 percent thought that Israel was too democratic in its attitude toward Arab civil rights (up from 36 percent two years earlier).² Other opinion surveys showed half the population supporting a political solution, and even talks with the PLO if it were to moderate its stands, and the other half urging a tough line and more force to quell the uprising. One key indication of this acute polarization was the deadlocked results of the Knesset elections of November 1, 1988, when neither the Left nor the Right could form a government, and Left and Right fringe parties registered gains. The majority of Israelis, however, still continue to oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Criticism of the army. A war against subversion and insurrection is fundamentally a political war, and as a result the IDF finds itself unwillingly caught up in a domestic political struggle. Both Right and Left are critical of the IDF’s performance in combatting the intifada. The Left speaks of brutalization; the Right faults the military for evading its duty to stamp out the uprising. Yet the public-at-large has been less critical of the IDF than the political leadership, and to date the uprising has not generated a crisis either within the IDF or between it and the Israeli public. Manifestations of refusal to do military service in the Territories are few. Still, besides the publicized cases, some reservists who object to serving in the Territories make an “arrangement” with their unit commanders in this regard. With one exception (MK Shulamit Aloni, from the Citizens Rights Movement, who stated publicly that she “understood” those who refused to serve in the Territories) politicians, even from the Left, have not espoused this approach.

Overall, the nation accepts the view that the struggle against the uprising was forced on Israel, involves the country’s survival, and that opposing it is therefore a necessary duty of citizens until such time as the political echelon reaches a political solution. The long-term danger is that the national consensus vis-a-vis the IDF will erode, particularly on the part of right-wing groups. In any event, the existence of a government of national unity in this period did much to ease the friction between the political echelon and the military. With the Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir as prime minister and Labor’s Yitzhak Rabin as defense minister, it was incumbent on the former to back the latter.

Several far-reaching political ramifications are already evident as a result of internal Israeli polarization, the political gains of the PLO and the Palestinians, and the erosion of Israel’s international standing in terms of the Palestinian issue. For one, the Israeli national consensus regarding the Palestinian question has been severely undercut. Then too, the Israeli political leadership finds it increasingly difficult to put forward and initiate a political process acceptable to the United States and certainly to Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinians in the Territories. The central element in such a process must be negotiations on a Palestinian (not Jordanian) option. Thus it was not until April 1989, 16 months after the start of the uprising, that Israel proposed a political initiative (discussed below).

Politically, as opposed to the situation in the field, and despite the government’s initiative, Israel finds itself fighting a rearguard battle regarding the Palestinian question. Soldiers in the Territories (especially reservists) are heard to say that the military situation is negative and that “it calls for an urgent political solution.” Others are more disposed toward counter-violence.

The Palestinian Issue on the International Agenda

A cardinal interim objective of the uprising is to set in motion, from a position of strength, a political process that can fulfill Palestinian aspirations. From the outset, the intifada was a major public relations success for the PLO in the international arena. The struggle of a civilian population against Israeli military rule, with images of children and youths throwing stones and Israeli troops reacting, at times with excessive force, was screened day after day on television around the world, and generated sympathy for the Palestinians and harsh criticism of Israel that occasionally took on political overtones. Indeed, the uprising placed the Palestinian issue on the international political agenda for the first time in years. Where the PLO’s terrorist and political tactics, and the Arab world’s wars, had both failed, the population of the Territories succeeded through a determined popular uprising that Israel was unable to suppress.

The uprising strengthened the Palestinians’ bargaining cards, but at the same time both compelled and enabled them, in order to exploit the political opportunity, to moderate their positions in order to render themselves acceptable to the US, and even to Israel, as possible negotiating partners. In short, the intifada forced the parties to the conflict to go beyond violence and counterviolence and embark on the path of a political solution. Eventually a series of political initiatives ensued, launched by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and US Secretary of State George Shultz. These were followed by a turnabout in the stand of the PLO, the onset of a US-PLO dialogue, and an Israeli political initiative.

The Mubarak initiative. Mubarak put forward his plan toward the end of January 1988, some six weeks after the start of the uprising. The main points of the initiative, which was intended to set in motion a political process, were³ (see also Appendix 12) a six-month moratorium on violence by the inhabitants of the Territories; a freeze on the establishment of new Israeli settlements in the Territories; and an Israeli declaration of readiness to accept steps toward an international conference and to recognize the Palestinians’ political rights. Mubarak said he was putting forward his plan because the uprising had lit a warning light: if no movement began toward a peace process, serious consequences might ensue in the region and elsewhere. The goal, he stated, should be peace and a solution to the Palestinian problem, not through the establishment of a Palestinian state but by restoring the West Bank to its pre-1967 status, by placing it “under a Jordanian mandate.”⁴

Israel responded to these ideas with more than one voice. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres saw in them an Egyptian (as opposed to an Israeli) point of departure, noting especially the aim of ending violence and searching for new roads.⁵ In contrast, the director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, when asked whether he found the initiative acceptable, replied, “definitely not.”⁶

The Shultz Plan. The second initiative was put forward on behalf of the United States by Secretary of State Shultz, following his visit to the Middle East at the end of February 1988. On March 4 Shultz forwarded what were apparently identical letters to Prime Minister Shamir (see Appendix 13) and Jordan’s King Hussein, and slightly different versions to the presidents of Egypt and Syria. The letter to Shamir was published in the Israeli press, and its operative points were as follows:

(1) An international conference would be convened in mid-April 1988 by the UN secretary-general, who would invite “the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.” The conference “will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached.”

(2) On May 1, 1988, negotiations between an Israeli delegation and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation “will begin on arrangements for a transitional period,” with the objective of concluding these talks within six months (i.e., by November 1).

(3) The “transitional period” would begin three months after the completion of negotiations (i.e., on February 1, 1989) and last for three years.

(4) “Final status talks” would commence on December 1, 1988 — before the start of the transitional period — and should be completed within one year.⁷

The Shultz initiative was never accepted by the sides directly involved in the conflict and therefore could not serve as a basis for the start of negotiations. Nevertheless, the very fact that it was undertaken, in the final year of the Reagan administration, constituted something of an achievement for the uprising. This success, coming against the background of a relaxation in tensions between the superpowers and attendant developments in other regions, signaled the incipient translation of the uprising into a political achievement. The culmination of that achievement occurred when the world’s leading power, the United States — which is in a position to exercise a great deal of influence on Israel due to the latter’s immense dependence upon it — concluded that the intifada had generated a new situation in the Middle East which it could not ignore. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the US to begin looking seriously for a political solution to the Palestinian problem.

Strengthening of the PLO and the end of the Jordanian option. Before examining the third US initiative, we must first take note of the events that enabled its launching: the strengthening of the PLO’s standing in the Territories and the disappearance of the Jordanian option. We have already noted that the uprising broke out spontaneously, without prior coordination or even the prior knowledge of the PLO leadership. Yet as a consequence of the uprising the influence of the PLO in the Territories grew by leaps and bounds, while that of Jordan waned to the point of disappearing. There were three reasons for the PLO’s gains:

(1) The infrastructure built by the PLO in the Territories over the course of years formed the principal organizational foundation of the uprising.

(2) By strengthening the position of the local population, the uprising by implication boosted the status of the PLO in the Territories, as the Palestinians regard the PLO as their sole representative. Moreover the local “leadership,” whose standing was consolidated by the intifada, regards itself as an integral part of the PLO and subordinate to its leadership.

(3) The PLO gradually assumed the leadership and control of the uprising, so that the success of the uprising was automatically translated into the direct success of the PLO. The upshot was that Jordan’s standing in the Territories faded to the point where Amman lost its former influence. Politically, then, the main losers as a result of the uprising were Israel and Jordan.

In November 1987 King Hussein hosted the first Arab summit meeting ever held in Jordan, as a result of which Hussein’s prestige soared in the Arab world and the PLO was virtually ignored. This attitude was publicly manifested when Hussein did not even bother to receive Arafat upon the latter’s arrival at Amman airport, although he personally welcomed all the other Arab leaders who arrived for the summit. This was a humiliating snub for the Palestinians. The uprising began a month later and gradually the situation was reversed.

In February 1988 King Hussein was still skeptical about “whether [the PLO] grasps correctly the aspirations and feelings of the Palestinian people.” He was still able to speak about the possibility that new realities might emerge at any time that would “take the PLO by surprise along with the whole Arab world,” this in the light of “new dynamics, a new ferment” in the Territories that must “produce the right answers as soon as possible.”⁸

By late May 1988 the impact of the uprising on the Jordanian authorities was clearly visible, their major priority now being to beef up the security of the East Bank. Speaking in the US, Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan said that Jordan had not abandoned its interest “in the Palestinian problem or the West Bank; but, in its order of priorities the security of the East Bank is the Hashemites’ most vital concern.” Hassan however also assessed that “the PLO will lose credibility among some residents of the West Bank if nothing concrete emerges from the uprising.” He also reiterated Jordan’s objection to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, noting that “[his] personal stand was identical to that of the Syrians who also do not want an independent Palestinian state.”⁹

Taking into account Jordan’s eroded standing in the Territories, King Hussein proposed at the next Arab summit meeting in Algeria (June 1988) the convening of an international conference in which the PLO would participate “through an independent delegation if possible, or in a joint Arab delegation if possible.” This marked a turnabout — previously Amman had always spoken of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in which it was taken for granted that Jordan would be the major principal. Hussein went farther, expressing his readiness, if the Arab leaders thought it necessary, to agree to “the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as a precondition to the convening of an international conference.”¹⁰

Finally, on July 31, 1988, in an address to the Jordanian nation, King Hussein announced Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank — as he put it, “the undoing of the legal and administrative bond between the two Banks” — in response “to the will of the PLO.” Hussein made it clear that his decision pertained solely to the occupied Palestinian land and its inhabitants but not to “the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom.”¹¹ In a press conference a few days later, he declared that Jordan no longer exercised any sovereignty over the West Bank, which belonged to “the Palestinians.”¹²

Ostensibly, this represented the annulment of the 1950 unification of the two Banks. Palestinian notables in Judea and Samaria maintained that Hussein had actually been planning this move since March 1988, and cited several reasons. Three years earlier, they noted, the king had become convinced that no Israeli option existed (i.e., that Israel wanted not peace but the continuation of the status quo). It had also become clear to Hussein that he could not reach a settlement with the PLO. US policy toward Jordan was also a factor, including Washington’s refusal to supply weapons that Hussein sought. Finally, the King understood that the uprising had weakened Jordan’s influence in the Territories.¹³

Hussein followed up his declaration of disengagement with a series of directives limiting contact between the West Bank and Jordan. Yet alongside the King’s acknowledgement of Jordan’s loss of status under the new state of affairs, he avoided completely burning bridges or limiting future options, thereby implying that there was a possibility, however unlikely, that the PLO and the Palestinians eventually would grant him a status according to his terms. The principal new directives were:

(1) Cessation of payments (supplementary salaries and/or grants) to civil service workers in the West Bank, and the termination of financial assistance to municipalities (excepting funds for Waqf expenses). This affected some 20,000 persons who had received stipends of 20–30 dinars a month. The severest blow was to disadvantaged families.

(2) Qualified annulment of Jordanian citizenship for residents of the West Bank and Jerusalem. In place of permanent passports, local residents were now issued temporary documents valid for only a year or two, and passport renewals entailed a complicated procedure. West Bank residents were now issued two types of Jordanian residency permits: a green one for visits of up to a month, and a yellow visa entitling those with jobs or families to remain for a year.

(3) Jordanian government ministries no longer dealt with requests and applications on the part of West Bank residents. The ministry dealing with the Territories was abolished, and its functions transferred to the Foreign Ministry.

(4) Jordanian imports from the Territories were limited to levels set by demand rather than by a policy of support for West Bank residents.

(5) Finally, the number of West Bank students in Jordanian universities was slashed from thousands to about 200.

The principal significance of Hussein’s proclamation and directives was political. Jordan lost its central position in the peace process as a potential negotiator in regard to the Palestinian problem — either on its own or as the major principal in a joint delegation with the Palestinians. At the same time, the PLO was compelled — in part by the elimination of the Jordanian-Palestinian option — to moderate its positions in order to qualify as a possible negotiating partner, at least in the eyes of the US.

The third initiative: new PLO and US positions. Within a few months from the start of the uprising, leading Palestinians in the Territories became increasingly aware of the need for a Palestinian peace initiative. They feared that in time the uprising would come to be viewed by the world as the new norm in the Territories, or that it would collapse under strong IDF countermeasures and that, in either case, the chance for a genuine political breakthrough would be lost. Hussein’s disengagement proclamation provided an additional incentive in this regard. Prominent Palestinians in the Territories pressed the PLO leadership, which was soon convinced of the need to launch a political process while the Palestinians were in the driver’s seat thanks to the intifada. Thus in mid-1988, following King Hussein’s withdrawal from an active role, a debate broke out within the PLO concerning a possible strategy change. It was decided to convene the Palestinian National Council (PNC) in Algiers to discuss the matter. Already in June 1988 Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat’s political adviser, had published a relatively moderate article¹⁴ designed evidently to prepare the ground for a change in the PLO’s stand at the forthcoming Algiers meeting, and to influence international and Israeli public opinion concerning PLO participation in peace negotiations.

Ambivalence marked key passages in Sharif’s article. He objected to Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel. Nor did he mention the boundary he envisaged between a future Palestinian state and Israel. And he ignored the issue of the “right of return.” Still, the article did sound a moderating note, calling for negotiations between Israel and the PLO in order to achieve peace between them and in the Middle East. Indeed, this was the first Palestinian document that recognized the existence of legitimate Israeli security concerns and a symmetry of interests between Israel and the Palestinians, and suggested ways to deal with these problems. Thus the main points of Abu Sharif’s article are worthy of note:

(1) Israel and the Palestinians have an identical goal — “lasting peace and security.” But “no one can build his own future on the ruins of another’s.” The goal is “a free, dignified and secure life not only for our children but also for the children of the Israelis.”

(2) The aim should be “not only non-belligerence but the kind of political and economic cooperation without which no state can be truly secure” (normalization, in Israeli terminology).

(3) The PLO accepts Resolutions 242 and 338 but only in the context of other UN resolutions and not unconditionally. This is because “neither resolution says anything about the national rights of the Palestinian people, including…their national right to self-determination.”

(4) Abu Sharif proposes “an internationally supervised referendum” in the Territories so that the population can choose between the PLO and any other group of Palestinians. The Palestinians will be represented in the negotiations by whichever group is chosen, the PLO or any other.

(5) Bilateral talks with Israel will be held within the framework of an international conference under UN auspices. The PLO will negotiate with any government elected by the Israelis in November 1988.

(6) The Palestinians are ready for a short transitional period, its duration to be determined in advance, during which “an international mandate would guide the occupied Palestinian territories to democratic Palestinian statehood.” The Palestinians will welcome “any reasonable measure that would promote the security of their state and its neighbors, including the deployment of a UN buffer force on the Palestinian side of the Israeli-Palestinian border.”

The positions espoused by Abu Sharif were severely assailed by Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Arafat’s deputy in Fatah, who stated: “What is important now is…to block the empty political gestures of Bassam Abu Sharif and his deviant statements in all areas.” Denying that Abu Sharif’s views represented PLO policy, Abu Iyad said that “these articles and statements have caused enough damage and have begun to arouse controversy in the Palestinian arena.”¹⁵ Radio Al-Quds, which reflects the views of Syria and Syrian-sponsored Palestinian terrorist organizations, lashed out at the Abu Sharif document. It argued that the document contained something that no Palestinian had ever proposed, namely, “direct negotiations with the Zionist enemy,” while ignoring the Palestinian Charter. By giving public recognition to the Zionist enemy, the document had utterly violated the Palestinian National Charter and the legal resolutions of the Palestinian National Council. It reflected “a policy of deviation” and signified the depth of “political submission and a relinquishment of the Palestinian people’s struggle.” It was “a blow to the bases of Palestinian national unity.”¹⁶

Despite these and other objections to the opinions expressed by Abu Sharif — which were considered to reflect in large measure the views of Arafat — the latter, and his supporters, persisted in their efforts to bring about a change whereby they could pluck the fruits of the uprising in the form of contacts with the United States, followed by negotiations with Israel. Around the middle of June 1988, the Israeli press published a so-called “document of independence” for a Palestinian state which had been drawn up by a “group of leading young intellectuals” in East Jerusalem. Heading the group was Faisal al-Husseini, the senior spokesman for Fatah in the area. According to what Arafat stated some nine months later, the idea of establishing a Palestinian state had been discussed as early as January-February 1988 — shortly after the start of the uprising — between the PLO and the uprising leadership. Position papers had been exchanged, and one of them “leaked from Faysal al-Husayni’s office.”¹⁷ The document in question was discovered by Israeli security authorities during a search of the East Jerusalem-based Center for Palestinian Studies, run by Husseini. The document’s declared purpose was “to shift the intifada from the realm of stones on the battlefield to the realm of political initiative.”¹⁸

Manifestly, the identical aim emerged almost concurrently within the PLO leadership: to exploit the uprising and score a major political achievement. A three-pronged approach was involved:

(1) Establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1947 partition boundaries.

(2) The president of the state would be Yasir Arafat, Farouq Qadoumi would be foreign minister, and the members of the PLO’s Executive Committee would form the provisional government (along with George Habash and Naif Hawatima, the leaders of the two “Front” movements).

(3) The provisional government would set up a delegation of experts (from the Territories and elsewhere) that would enter into negotiations with Israel “in order to arrive at a final solution.”¹⁹

The Husseini document was based largely on a plan for unilateral independence formulated by Dr. Jerome Segal, a fellow of the Institute for Philosophy and Public Studies at the University of Maryland. Segal’s plan had appeared in the East Jerusalem daily Al-Quds in April of 1988, after he sent copies of his program to “people in Israel and the Territories, PLO personnel in Tunis and prominent Palestinian Americans.”²⁰ The major difference between Segal’s proposal and the “Husseini document” was that the former spoke of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza within the boundaries of the 1949 armistice lines, whereas the latter based itself on the partition lines of 1947. The “document of independence” was almost certainly conveyed by its authors to the PLO in Tunis and perhaps even coordinated with the PLO leadership. Influences and traces of this document are discernible in the PNC independence resolution of November 1988.

The next stage was indeed the 19th meeting of the PNC in Algeria. Its declared objective was “convincing public opinion that the future is on our side,” because “a political statement alongside the rifle is essential in order to sway international public opinion.”²¹ On the night of November 15, 1988, the PNC adopted and published a series of resolutions, of which the two most significant are:

(1) The declaration of “the establishment of the State of Palestine over our Palestinian soil — and its capital Holy Jerusalem”²² (see also Appendix 14). The proclamation of statehood was based on UN General Assembly Resolution 181, of 1947 (rejected at the time by the Palestinians and the Arab states), which recommended the partition of Palestine into two states. The proclamation of state-hood recognized “the national rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return, the right of self-determination and independence, and of sovereignty over its national soil.”²³

(2) Politically, the intention was to achieve “a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its crux the Palestinian question,” within the framework of the UN Charter and Security Council Resolutions 605, 607 and 608. This “political statement” (see Appendix 15) calls for the convening of an international conference under UN auspices on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and “the guaranteeing of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people,” foremost among them the right to self-determination “in accordance with the UN resolutions on the Palestinian cause.”²⁴

Other principles adduced in the political statement include: Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it has occupied since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem, and Israel’s annulment of its formal territorial annexations (i.e., the Golan Heights); the placing of the occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem, under UN supervision for a specified period; resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with the UN resolutions (i.e., realization of the right of return); and, the Security Council “shall implement and guarantee security and peace arrangements” for all the states in the region. The declaration stresses the PNC’s “rejection of terrorism in all its forms,” while drawing a distinction between this and a liberation struggle against occupation in order to achieve independence.²⁵

The two PNC resolutions signify a more flexible PLO stance on two cardinal issues: establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel (even though the boundaries envisaged, based on the UN Partition Resolution, are unacceptable to Israel even as a starting point for negotiations); and the goal of “a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict” through direct negotiations with Israel.²⁶ About a month later, Arafat stated that “there will be a Jewish state and a Palestinian state on the soil of Palestine.”²⁷ Furthermore, for the first time specific reference is made, at US behest, to resolutions 242 and 338, but only as the basis for convening an international conference, whereas it is asserted explicitly that the basis for Palestinian independence is General Assembly Resolution 181 (with the 1947 partition lines as the border).

The PNC documents are not devoid of ambivalence and equivocation. The following explanation was adduced by Salah Khalaf at a closed session of the PNC on December 14, 1988: “There are few options. We all reject Resolution 242…. The incorporation of Resolution 242 in the political statement was accompanied by qualifications and reservations, such as the right to self-determination, [reference to] the other UN resolutions, national rights and the UN Charter”²⁸ (see Appendix 16). While Salah Khalaf may not necessarily have expressed Arafat’s stand on this occasion, his reading of the political statement reveals its built-in ambivalence. As regards terrorism, the document — as already noted — reiterates the PLO’s basic differentiation between terrorism, to which the organization is opposed, and a national-liberation struggle, which it supports and will continue to pursue. Nor does the statement annul the “strategy of stages” which apparently continues to underlie the PLO conception. In this regard Salah Khalaf stated: “This is the state for the generations to come, which at its genesis is small but God willing will grow large and expand to the east, west, north and south.”²⁹

The proclamation of a Palestinian state — obviously unworkable as long as Israel controls the Territories — was rejected by Israel, and neither Israel nor the US considered the political flexibility evinced in the resolutions as sufficient to warrant a change of attitude regarding talks with the PLO. Indeed, the US refused to grant Arafat entry to address the UN General Assembly, and the world body therefore held a special session in Geneva.

Addressing this meeting of the General Assembly on December 13, 1988, Arafat reiterated the main resolutions that had been passed by the PNC. He noted that:

(1) “The international conference will convene on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 to guarantee the legitimate national and political rights of the Palestinian people, foremost among them its right to self-determination.”

(2) The PNC had affirmed its adherence to the UN resolutions that stress “the Arabs’ right to resist foreign occupation, colonialism and racial discrimination, as well as their right to struggle for their independence. It reiterated its rejection of terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism.”³⁰

Arafat’s address to the UN still did not induce Washington to enter into a dialogue with the PLO. The change in the American stand occurred in the wake of a press conference held subsequently by Arafat in Geneva (apparently following prior coordination with the US) in which he moderated his stance on the terrorism issue (see Appendix 17). Arafat stated that “we totally and categorically reject all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism.” He offered no change, however, on the topic of Resolutions 242 and 338, continuing to maintain that the PNC had accepted these “as a basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of the international conference.” Arafat added that the PNC considered Resolution 181 “a basis for Palestinian independence.”³¹ US Secretary of State George Shultz, in a press conference of his own later that same day, announced Washington’s decision to open a dialogue with the PLO in the wake of Arafat’s statement (see Appendix 18). Shultz said: “The Palestine Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, and renounced terrorism. As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives.”³² Subsequently meetings were held in Tunis between an American delegation headed by the ambassador to Tunisia, and a PLO delegation.

For the PLO the onset of an official dialogue with the US constituted a major achievement. It was the most significant political gain to date of the intifada. To obtain the revision in the American stand, the PLO had to make concessions which it had refused to do for 14 years, and it was the uprising in the Territories that caused that turnabout. A shift to the realm of political negotiations was required in view of the danger that the uprising would come to an end without scoring a major political breakthrough; at the same time the uprising gave the PLO leverage that enabled it to make concessions (not all of them unequivocal) that Washington could accept as sufficient to launch a dialogue with the organization. That dialogue would test the extent to which the PLO had actually moved toward readiness to negotiate, and persuade it to keep moving in that direction.

Israeli Responses

Defense Minister Rabin’s plan. In late January 1989 Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin made public the main points of his plan for launching a peace process with the Palestinians. The Rabin Plan bears separate examination even though much of it was subsequently incorporated into the Israeli initiative of May 14, 1989. The elements that were not adopted by the government may prove germane in the future, and at all events they delineate the outer limits of the concessions that the national unity government could make. Rabin’s program was predicated on the following assumptions:

(1) “Israeli policy cannot be based on a single element: suppression [of the uprising] alone.” Israel must cope with the uprising “via two elements: a political element and a security element.” In other words, the uprising cannot be dealt with by military means alone; a political initiative is also required.

(2) “Deadlock naturally causes an explosion” and negotiations are required to break the status quo. Time, then, is not on Israel’s side, and Israel must move beyond the status quo.

(3) Jordan is no longer a major principal for negotiations on the Palestinian issue. There are only two alternatives: the PLO (an option opposed by the Israeli government) and “representatives from the residents of the Territories.”³³

(4) Peace on Israel’s eastern border is attainable only by political means. Two partners are required to this end: Jordan, without which a peace settlement on the eastern border is impossible, and representatives from the Territories.

The Rabin Plan consists of two principal stages based on the principles of the Camp David accords: an interim settlement (transitional period) and, following a specified time, negotiations on a permanent settlement. These two stages will be preceded by 3–6 months of calm and quiet in the Territories. Rabin later noted that if the residents of the Territories were to accept his plan, which entailed elections in the first phase, “calm would come automatically.”³⁴ The implication: there is no necessity for formal prior agreement (on the part of the Palestinian representatives) to stop the uprising. Elections would be held not at the municipal level, but for a “political representation”³⁵ that would negotiate with Israel on an interim settlement. What Rabin had in mind was “a political representation to stand for the 1.5 million Palestinians residing in the Territories.”³⁶ The object of the elections is “to find a partner [for negotiations] among the residents of the Territories.”³⁷

Rabin proposed two phases: First, negotiations would be held with representatives from the Territories, to be chosen in free elections, on an interim settlement and a transitional period. The settlement would involve “expanded autonomy or administrative authority and self-rule.”³⁸ Day-to-day affairs would be handled by the elected representatives, “while leaving security matters in Israel’s hands.”³⁹ Israeli settlements would remain in place, under Israeli responsibility. The elected Palestinian representatives would be the nucleus for the self-governing institutions within the autonomy framework or other plan.⁴⁰ Secondly, following the transitional period, negotiations would be held to work out the permanent solution. Here the principal actors would be “Jordan, the representatives from the Territories, and us,”⁴¹ and perhaps Egypt. The solution could take the form of “partnership with Jordan, federative or other,” or “an idea of a federation of some kind with Israel.”⁴²

The principals to the permanent solution ("comprehensive peace") would be “the residents living in the Territories.” The solution of the refugee problem would be separate from “the human and territorial totality of Israel, the Territories and Jordan.” After Jordan, Israel and the representatives from the Territories had reached agreement on the permanent solution, “an international conference [would be convened] to deal with the refugee issue.” Underlying this conception is the fact that Israel’s War of Independence produced not only Palestinian refugees but also “Jewish refugees from Arab states.”⁴³

The Rabin Plan was rejected, publicly at least, by the Palestinians, who adduced a list of counter-arguments. First, “there is no need to have elections.”⁴⁴ If Israel wants to hold negotiations, “it should hold them with the PLO.”⁴⁵ Elections can be contemplated only after Israel withdraws from the Territories;⁴⁶ the PLO objects to such elections until the IDF leaves.⁴⁷ Secondly, it is inconceivable to stop the uprising unilaterally: “It will cease only if a step is taken proving that a solution is possible.”⁴⁸ Third, the plan does not recognize the Palestinians’ political rights as a nation.⁴⁹ And finally, “the autonomy plan died in the wake of the PNC’s proclamation of a state, which has already been recognized by 90 countries.”⁵⁰ In other words, the Palestinians (and most of the Arab states) continue to reject the Camp David autonomy plan. However, the Palestinians did discern a few positive elements in the Rabin Plan, notably that the defense minister had moved toward accommodation with them, and that he displayed a readiness for a permanent solution in the form of a confederation between Jordan and the Territories, a solution going beyond Camp David.⁵¹

The Shamir Plan and the government’s initiative. In his meeting with US President George Bush in Washington on April 6, 1989, Prime Minister Shamir put forward a four-part plan that was accepted by President Bush as a starting point and basis for negotiations, and talks with both Israel and the PLO got underway. Israel was asked to formulate a more concrete and detailed proposal, and the result was the May 14 government initiative (Appendix 19), based on points adduced by the prime minister and the defense minister. The following are the principal points of the Israeli initiative:

Basic Premises

“(1) Israel yearns for peace and the continuation of the political process by means of direct negotiations based on the principles of the Camp David accords.

“(2) Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza District and in the area between Israel and Jordan.

“(3) Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO.

“(4) There will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with the Basic Guidelines of the Government.”

Subjects to Be Dealt with in the Peace Process

“(1) Israel views as important that the peace between Israel and Egypt…will serve as a cornerstone for enlarging the circle of peace in the region.”

(2) Israel calls for the establishment of peaceful relations with the Arab states. The initiative calls for “promoting a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israel conflict, including recognition, direct negotiations, ending the boycott, diplomatic relations….”

(3) On the refugee issue the language of the Israeli initiative is straightforward: “Israel calls for an international endeavor to resolve the problem of the residents of the Arab refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District in order to improve their living conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to be a partner in this endeavor.”

(4) On the subject of the elections, the government’s initiative states that “Israel proposes free and democratic elections among the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District…. In these elections a representation will be chosen to conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule.”

(5) It is stressed that this interim period will constitute “a test for coexistence and cooperation,” the implication being that a cooperative atmosphere will enable the sides to advance to the next stage.

(6) With regard to the permanent solution, the government’s initiative proposes that “[t]he transitional period will continue for five years,” and “not later than the third year” after its commencement, negotiations will begin for achieving a permanent solution “during which all the proposed options for an agreed settlement will be examined, and peace between Israel and Jordan will be achieved.”

Participants in the Negotiations

(1) The parties to the negotiations for an interim agreement “shall include Israel and elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants…. Jordan and Egypt will be invited to participate in these negotiations if they so desire.”

(2) The parties to the negotiations for the second stage — the permanent solution — “shall include Israel and the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, as well as Jordan. Egypt may participate in these negotiations.”

(3) The elected representatives of the Palestinian Arabs will take part in the peace negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

Substance of the Transitional Period

“During the transitional period the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District will be accorded self-rule, by means of which they will, themselves, conduct their affairs of daily life. Israel will continue to be responsible for security, foreign affairs and all matters concerning Israeli citizens in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.”

Implementation of the Initiative

(1) First, agreement will be reached on the part of the Palestinians in the Territories, as well as Jordan and Egypt, on the principles that make up the initiative.

(2) This will be followed immediately by preparations for and implementation of the election process in which the Palestinians will elect their representatives for negotiations.

(3) “In the period of the preparations and implementation [of the election process] there shall be a calming of the violence in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.”

(4) Immediately after the elections, negotiations will be held with the Palestinian representation “on an interim agreement.” In these negotiations “all the subjects relating to the substance of the self-rule” will be determined.

(5) Throughout the period of the negotiations on the permanent settlement (which will begin not later than three years after the start of the interim period) and “until the signing of the agreement for a permanent solution, the self-rule shall continue in effect as determined in the negotiations for an interim agreement.”⁵²

Differences between the Rabin Plan and the government’s initiative. Substantive differences exist between the Rabin Plan, which reflects views prevailing in the Labor Alignment, and the Shamir Plan, the later government initiative, and Shamir’s views as expressed to the media. For one, neither Shamir nor the Israeli initiative stipulate a period of calm of 3–6 months preceding the elections. However, on this point there appears to be no genuine difference, as Rabin assesses that once elections are agreed upon, the violence will effectively cease, while Shamir has stated that he does not “imagine elections being held in an atmosphere of violence.”⁵³ The government’s initiative refers to a calming of the violence in the period of preparations for and implementation of the election process.

Then too, the defense minister proposes “political” elections, while the government’s initiative speaks of “regional elections.” The prime minister leaves this issue open, noting that the modalities and right of participation in such elections “will have to be discussed.” In reply to a journalist’s question about whether he meant political elections or municipal elections, Shamir was noncommittal, saying only that “a decision will have to be made.”⁵⁴ This points to the likelihood that negotiations would not break down over this particular point.

Neither the prime minister’s plan nor the government’s initiative addresses the question of whether the Arab residents of East Jerusalem will participate in the elections. Shamir is adamantly opposed to their participation,⁵⁵ while Rabin would allow them to vote.

Finally, the prime minister has refrained from making public his ideas about the details of the permanent solution. He has said that “there is no point in talking about this” because if the issue of the permanent solution is raised, “no one will have an interest in talking to us about interim solutions.”⁵⁶ In a briefing to the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Shamir reiterated his basic stand that during negotiations on a permanent solution, Israel will claim sovereignty over all the Territories.⁵⁷ In contrast, Palestinians view favorably Rabin’s notion of a possible federation (or confederation) with Jordan, implying Israeli territorial concessions.

The Palestinians’ stand. Both Egypt and especially the PLO found it difficult to accept the Israeli initiative. As for President Mubarak, he proceeded to transmit to Israel a list of ten conditions for holding elections — terms that came to be seen as a peace plan in and of itself. The points comprised an Israeli commitment to accept the results of the elections; immunity for those elected; withdrawal of the IDF from the area of polling stations (not from the cities); Israeli agreement to a date for the start of negotiations on a permanent solution; a freeze on new settlements and on the expansion of existing settlements; participation of East Jerusalem residents in the elections; and prior Israeli agreement to four policy points adduced by the US, including the principle of territories for peace.⁵⁸ While these terms might have been acceptable to the Labor Party, they are opposed by the Likud, and indeed the national unity government was unable to accept Mubarak’s key ideas (especially territories for peace, the freeze on Jewish settlements and the participation of East Jerusalem residents in the elections).

As for the PLO, Arafat and other PLO leaders assailed the Israeli initiative publicly and rejected it in their dialogue with the US. Their virtually uniform line consisted of agreement to elections but only after “Israeli withdrawal from Palestine territory.”⁵⁹ Yasir Abd Rabu, a Democratic Front member of the PLO’s Executive Committee, listed additional conditions: prior Israeli withdrawal not only from the West Bank and Gaza but also from Arab land occupied in 1967 (meaning, apparently, the Golan Heights), assurance of Palestinian self-determination, and temporary international supervision in the Territories until the Palestinian people assumes responsibility for them.⁶⁰ Abd Rabu maintained that elections could be held as one element, to be integrated with others, in a comprehensive settlement. He also urged that a timetable be drawn up for implementing these stages and for Israel’s withdrawal from the Territories.⁶¹

Salah Khalaf and others insisted that elections should form part of a comprehensive solution, and could be integrated into a plan “whose beginning and end should be stipulated in advance.” In other words, agreement should be reached at the outset regarding the character or principles of the permanent solution. This is necessary so that “the length of time between start and finish will be known and defined”⁶² — that is, the sides would reach prior agreement on the timing of the next stage in the overall solution. In this view, elections would be a third stage, following Israeli withdrawal from the Territories and the stationing of international supervisors.⁶³

The PLO’s stand on elections in the Territories was summed up in an interview given by Arafat to an Egyptian newspaper. His four conditions included a radical approach toward key principles: (1) a partial IDF withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza prior to elections; (2) determination of a timetable for total Israeli withdrawal from the Territories, within 27 months; (3) elections to be held under UN supervision, and agreement to the Palestinian refugees’ right of return to their former homes; and (4) specifying a date for the proclamation of an independent Palestinian state.⁶⁴

Although these are difficult starting conditions and are unacceptable to Israel in their present form, it is in the nature of negotiations that the sides begin by presenting extreme positions.

In the Territories the Israeli initiative was criticized and rejected. Leaflet No. 38 of the United National Command of the Uprising expressed its “vigorous rejection of the Shamir Plan,” as it “includes holding elections in the shadow of the occupation and its aim is to eradicate the intifada.”⁶⁵ The leaflet added that there was no alternative to the PLO and that only through an international conference possessing full powers could a solution be achieved. The chairman of the Gaza Bar Association, Faiz Abu Rahma, stated: “We expressed our opposition to the idea of elections because this would mean dividing the Palestinians between those who are outside and those who are inside. We believe that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and that elections are not necessary.”⁶⁶ Around the end of April 1989, 80 prominent Palestinians from Judea, Samaria and Gaza signed a “political document” expressing strong opposition to the prime minister’s plan. An exception was Mansour al-Shawa (the son of the late Rashad al-Shawa, the former mayor of Gaza City) who proposed that elections be held without an Israeli withdrawal but under Egyptian-Jordanian-Palestinian supervision.⁶⁷

An original approach was evinced by the Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab around the middle of April 1989. Kuttab said that the Shamir Plan should not be rejected, but that the PLO should put forward counter-proposals (such as concrete guarantees of freedom of movement for those elected, and third-party supervision of the elections) and appoint residents of the Territories to the PNC.⁶⁸ This approach apparently won the support of leading personalities such as Sari Nusseibah, who published an article by Kuttab on the subject in his newsletter.⁶⁹

A survey conducted in the Territories by an East Jerusalem weekly in mid-1989 found that 83 percent of those polled supported the holding of elections under certain conditions. The conditions mentioned, which are largely congruent with the PLO’s stand, are: a general Israeli withdrawal; international supervision; PLO consent to the holding of elections, with their conditions to be set by the PLO; and the elections to be part of a comprehensive solution whose character will be determined in advance.⁷⁰

The Israeli initiative did not meet the PLO’s conditions, yet the organization did not blithely reject it outright. In their dialogue with the US, PLO representatives reportedly demanded that the negotiations on a permanent settlement open immediately after the conclusion of the talks on the interim agreement, and that the US supply the PLO with a memorandum of understanding pledging that the organization would participate in the negotiations on a permanent settlement.⁷¹

Economic Repercussions in the Territories

Since 1967 the economy of Judea, Samaria and Gaza has become dependent on, and in large measure determined by and complementary to, the Israeli economy. The national product of Judea and Samaria has always been minuscule as compared with Israel’s. Its primary component, agriculture, is equivalent to seven percent of Israel’s agricultural product, and its industrial product is only one percent of the Israeli output. Ninety percent of the goods and raw materials used for agriculture and for industrial production are imported from Israel.

During the intifada these economic bonds have been considerably weakened. This is due to the politically motivated desire of the uprising leadership to minimize economic dependence on Israel; the willingness of the local population to tolerate a lower living standard in order to continue the uprising; and the impact of the strikes called by the leadership, and of IDF curfews and clampdowns, on economic activity. These general trends form the background for the analysis that follows of economic developments and their ramifications in the Territories and Israel.

Dependence on Israel. The Territories’ economic dependence on Israel continues. These regions cannot survive without imports from and via Israel. The Territories are self-sufficient only in a few areas of agriculture, domestic animals, dairy products, various foods, and textiles. In industry, all the raw materials are imported from or via Israel, as are basic manufacturing components such as electric power, fuel and cement. Basic foodstuffs such as cereals, coffee, tea and sugar, and items such as cardboard, lumber and wood products, and steel are not available in the Territories.

Work in Israel. Employment in Israel continues to be the main source of income in both regions. In 1988 revenue from work in Israel constituted fully 34 percent of the gross local product (GLP) of Judea-Samaria (approximately NIS 700 million at a rate of $1=approximately NIS 2) and 70 percent of the GLP in Gaza (about NIS 500 million). No less than 37 percent of the workforce in Judea and Samaria and 47 percent of the workforce in Gaza is employed in Israel. Although these figures did not decline during the intifada, the number of workdays and work hours decreased by 20–30 percent due to the frequent strikes, demonstrations, curfews and clampdowns. Thus in 1987 residents of the Territories worked an average of 23.5 days per month, whereas in 1988 this dropped to 19.9 days. Looked at from a different perspective, in 1988 the portion of work hours put in by residents of the Territories came to 6.6 percent of the total for all workers in Israel, as compared with 8.8 percent the previous year. The falloff was felt most acutely in industry, where it was proportionally twice as high as in agriculture and construction (35 percent vs. 18 percent). The decline in the number of hours worked was steeper for residents of Gaza than for the West Bank (28 percent vs. 21 percent).

Purchase of Israeli goods. Following the sharp fall in the purchase of Israeli-made goods by residents of the Territories, some locally manufactured items regained the importance they had enjoyed in the past. The Palestinians are complying with the call of the uprising leadership to refrain from buying an Israeli product if the same item is manufactured locally. Consumer habits have also changed: people spend less time in cafes and dozens of restaurants have closed down — indeed, a whole restaurant culture is disappearing; shops are closed during most of the day; few luxury items are purchased; staples are the mainstay of the diet, and fewer clothes and toys are being bought.

Naturally, local industry has benefited from the boycott of Israeli merchandise. Existing local factories (even some that were on the verge of bankruptcy) suddenly received a new lease on life as part of the drive to find substitutes for Israeli-made goods. This was especially true in the initial stage for soft drinks, disposable diapers, chocolates and candies, plastics, disinfectants and medicines. However, as time passed and consumption declined, local factories once more found themselves in dire straits. The owner of one large factory said in early 1989 that his revenues had decreased by 30 percent.⁷²

Agriculture and exports to Jordan. The only area that showed a rise in production was agriculture. In 1988 the value of agricultural production increased by 13 percent in real terms in the Gaza Strip as compared with 1987 (by 50 percent in eggs and 45 percent in honey), and by 15 percent in Judea and Samaria (thanks largely to an exceptionally bountiful olive harvest). However, exports from Judea-Samaria to Jordan fell by 40 percent in the first nine months of 1988 (from $54 million to $33 million), as Jordan is today approaching self-sufficiency in agricultural needs. Exports from Gaza were unaffected as compared with 1987 (rising by $11 million).

Unemployment. Official figures put the unemployment level in Judea and Samaria during the uprising at an insignificant 3–4 percent — a good deal lower than in Israel. The real figure is probably far higher, and diverse methods have been assayed by the Palestinians to deal with the problem. Some workers who are no longer employed in Israel have turned to primitive agriculture or have been hired by small factories in Judea-Samaria. Others have found work in the intensive construction that is underway in the Territories — building was always considered a good investment for those with capital, and never more so than at present, when the value of the Jordanian dinar has plummeted by 42 percent. The construction boom has been aided indirectly by a significant decline in the Civil Administration’s ability to combat illegal building.

Residents have followed the advice of the uprising leadership to develop an emergency household economy in order to supply certain foods during the uprising, and perhaps also as part of an independent economic infrastructure. Courtyards and other empty areas adjacent to houses have been turned into vegetable patches, and plant nurseries have sprung up to supply seeds and saplings. Coops have been built on roofs of houses to raise chickens and rabbits, the latter an important source of meat nowadays. Indeed, vegetables, chickens and rabbits have taken on the status of revolutionary symbols. Nevertheless, by mid-1988 the opinion of some nationalist Palestinian economists was that the household economy “had become a joke” and a strain, and was bound to collapse.⁷³

Severe economic crisis. The uprising caused a decrease in the number of Palestinian workdays in the Territories as well as in Israel, and reduced commerce, transportation and economic activity generally. As a consequence, private consumption dropped and a situation of economic scarcity developed in the Territories. The inevitable result was a decline in the standard of living — by as much as 35 percent in some spheres.

All the data show that by the beginning of 1989 the West Bank was in the grip of a severe economic crisis. The situation was worse than the economic slowdown during the first year of the uprising. We have noted one primary cause of the crisis — the drastic fall of 40–42 percent in the value of the Jordanian dinar within a few months. This development has affected every sector of the population in Judea and Samaria, and in Gaza as well. Savings have been eroded, and all those who receive their wages in dinars have been harmed. Likewise, compensation payments, pensions, financial support from relatives working in the Persian Gulf and other forms of financial transfers have lost much of their worth. Raw materials and other imports have become more expensive. The problem is not only that the dinar, like the Israeli shekel, is legal tender in Judea and Samaria; in the absence of savings plans it is impossible to preserve the value of money—the method had been to hoard dinars and to exchange shekels for dinars. Hence the devastating effect of the dinar’s collapse.

But other processes are also at work. For one, there is a growing shortage of shekels. This stems from the slowdown in commercial activity and in income from work in Israel, together with extended demand for shekels to pay taxes and other fees to the authorities in the wake of the Civil Administration’s intensive tax collection campaign. Then too, a slash in subsidies for basic foods and fuel in Israel automatically raised the prices of these items in the Territories, too, further aggravating the situation. Worst affected were those subsisting below the poverty line.

Further, the value of dinar-linked salaries received by employees of factories and institutions in the West Bank declined sharply. In early 1989, leaflet no. 33 of the United National Command of the Uprising demanded that employers in the Territories raise wages by 40 percent at least, to compensate for the fall in the value of the dinar and the rise in the cost of living. Thus, despite the economic slowdown and a big shortfall in profits, most factory owners were compelled to raise wages under pressure of popular committees and trade unions.

Finally, restrictions on the amount of money that residents could bring in via the Jordan River bridges also had their effect. All told, the average income of residents of the Territories decreased by more than 30 percent, a major reason being the reduction of workdays in Israel. Among the byproducts of the economic hardships were a steep rise in the number of break-ins to shops, especially grocery stores, where often goods worth thousands of dinars are stolen. Many shopowners in East Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem closed their businesses due to heavy losses. Some went abroad. Savings have been depleted and food is hoarded for fear prices will continue to rise.

To sum up, the economic ramifications of the uprising are severe in the extreme. In the long term, the increasing pauperization of the population of the Territories may well constitute a greater threat to the continuation of the uprising than the IDF’s countermeasures.

Economic Repercussions in Israel

The Israeli economy lost at least NIS 1.5 billion due to the uprising in 1988, this according to the cautious estimate of then Minister of Economics and Communications Gad Ya’akobi.⁷⁴ His assessment held that the uprising exercised a dominant effect on Israeli economic developments in 1988. The loss represented about 2.5 percent of the GNF (some $900 million). In March 1989 Ya’akobi estimated the cost of the uprising to the Israeli economy at NIS 1.2 billion and added that it had absorbed the entire growth rate projected for the previous year (2.3 percent).⁷⁵ Minister of Finance Shimon Peres said in June 1989 that the intifada had cost Israel, directly and indirectly, between $1.5 and $2 billion per year, or NIS 5 million per day.⁷⁶

Economically, the uprising affected Israel in three main areas. First, an unusually large mobilization of reservists caused a sharp decline in production. This was aggravated by the falloff in workdays of residents of the Territories in Israel. Surveys indicate that the decline in workdays stood at 40 percent in the first third of 1988, 20 percent in the second third, and 8 percent in the final third. These fluctuations and the downward trend had several causes. In the first part of the year the uprising leadership called on the residents of the Territories not to work in Israel, and their savings were not yet depleted. In the second, and particularly the final third, a situation of hardship gradually developed, and sheer need obligated work in Israel.

Hardest hit were labor-intensive sectors such as construction and agriculture. Industry and the services sector were less affected by the absenteeism of workers from the Territories. Workers from the Territories constitute 40 percent of the labor force in Israeli construction (45,000 persons), and are indispensable in some areas of construction. According to a March 1988 memorandum from the president of the Contractors’ Association: “Since the start of the events in the Territories regular building activity has become impossible…. Our surveys show that… the scale of absenteeism ranges from 30–70 percent. Absenteeism is not uniform and is not predictable…. Each day’s work brings with it new disruptions…. The direct result is extensive construction delays and a very significant rise in the cost of labor.”⁷⁷

Secondly, Israeli exports to the Territories fell drastically. According to the director-general of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the sale of industrial goods to the Territories declined from $850 million in 1987, to $250 million in 1988.⁷⁸ The primary cause of this development was the boycott imposed on Israeli products for which a local substitute existed. The minister of agriculture said that the sale of agricultural produce to the Territories in 1988 had fallen by about 60 percent as compared with 1987 (from 68,000 tons to 31,000 tons). Sales of other items also decreased, including textiles (by 18 percent), rubber and plastic goods (11 percent), and clothing (8 percent).⁷⁹ The Manufacturers’ Association estimated that exports to the Territories from some factories had fallen by 60–70 percent, with the average decrease being 20–30 percent. One firm that was particularly affected was Carmel Carpets. In previous years the Territories had accounted for 40 percent of the company’s local market, totaling $120,000-$150,000 per month. The uprising destroyed this market as sales in the Territories fell to zero. The Teva pharmaceutical firm experienced a fall of 25 percent in sales in the Territories, which account for 15 percent of all sales. In the West Bank, sales of Israeli-made soft drinks stood at 10 percent of their volume before the uprising.⁸⁰

Third, incoming tourism to Israel decreased by 15 percent in 1988, a loss of $120 million. And finally, indirect outlays increased, such as National Insurance payments and wages paid by employers to the large number of reservists called up for service in the Territories. The deputy chief of staff remarked that in 1988 the IDF had deployed, on average, 10,000 soldiers per day (regulars and reservists) in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, a total of 3.5 million workdays as of December 1988.⁸¹

One sector that “benefited” from the uprising was Israel’s Arabs. This derived from the tarnishing of the commercial image of West Bank cities that had served as commercial centers for Israeli Arabs — and for many Israeli Jews as well. Thus the rapid growth of Tulkarm in Samaria had hindered the development of nearby Israeli Arab localities such as Baqa al-Gharbiyeh or Taibe. Israelis, both Jews and Arabs, fearing for their lives, now ceased almost completely to enter the West Bank for shopping. The result was that dozens of new shops opened for business in the Arab sector in Israel, and a general commercial boom ensued.⁸²

To sum up the economic ramifications, the economic hardship experienced by the residents of the Territories did not stop the uprising and has shown no sign of doing so. There are a number of explanations for this phenomenon. First and foremost is the refusal of the residents of the Territories to surrender, and their concomitant desire to register political achievements by means of the uprising. Then too, despite the financial crunch (above all due to the fall of 42 percent in the value of the dinar in 1988), money enters the Territories from PLO sources and there is no large-scale unemployment (many of those who lost their jobs in Israel have found work locally). Further, a household economy and primitive agriculture have reduced economic dependence on Israel and allowed the struggle to continue.

From Israel’s point of view, the economic damage caused by the intifada is bearable. Israel’s options for exerting counterpressure by barring or restricting the export of agricultural produce from the Territories are limited; for example, if Israel were to prohibit the export of grapes or olive oil to Jordan, these items would find their way into Israel, thus undermining the Israeli market.

Overall, then, the uprising is causing both sides economic difficulties — although these are certainly more severe in the Territories. Yet as long as the Palestinians feel that they are chalking up political successes, such difficulties will not suffice to stop the uprising.

Social Upheavals in the Territories

One effect of the uprising was to accelerate processes of social upheaval in the Territories. This was particularly evident in three areas. For one, the veteran leadership from the Jordanian period, whose status had already declined in the years preceding the intifada, now disappeared altogether. The new situation was clear for all to see when individual remnants of this group, such as Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij, felt compelled to realign their public stands with those of the PLO. The group was replaced by pro-PLO leaders and activists at the local level, and at the broader level by public figures, most based in East Jerusalem, who had been in the front rank of the national leadership even before the uprising.

Another result was a decline in the authority traditionally vested in the father as the head of the family and in the clan (hamula) system as a whole. This process had been taking place gradually for a long period, but the uprising brought it to a climax. The younger generation who led the uprising were deeply critical of their parents and grandparents for having lived under Israeli occupation for 20 years without fighting to liberate themselves. As the uprising developed, fathers lost all control over the activities of their sons. Yet the youngsters’ national struggle was not undertaken against the will of their elders; on the contrary, the older generation supported the uprising even as it eroded their status in the family. Indeed, family binds were replaced by ties of a nationalist-political nature. This left little doubt that the younger generation would exercise a greater influence than in the past with regard to eventual political decisions about the Territories.

The third area of social change concerned women, although the extent and nature of change is a matter of controversy. Civil Administration personnel contend that the status of women in Palestinian society has not undergone a basic change as a result of the uprising, notwithstanding that women are far more active than formerly in violent demonstrations and confrontations with the IDF. This analysis is reinforced by the fact that no new women political figures have emerged from the uprising, nor has there been a marked increase in women’s representation at the higher levels of the national bodies in the Territories. Yet even Civil Administration personnel agree that the foundation has been laid for a future social upheaval regarding the status of women. One consequence, for example, has been an increase in social contact between young men and women, with the result that in the future a young woman will probably enjoy greater independence in choosing a spouse, the age difference between spouses will be reduced, and social gaps will be narrowed (especially between the middle and lower classes).

In contrast, Palestinians, both men and women, contend that a social upheaval has already occurred in the status of Palestinian women in the Territories. Whereas a gradual process of change had been underway since 1967, the active and crucial role women played in the uprising from its very outset, their growing part in the struggle against Israel, and their contacts with Israeli society, all combined to accelerate the pace of developments. The result is that women have gained a status within Palestinian society approaching that of men.

Ramifications for Israel’s Arabs (excluding East Jerusalem)

Since the general strike, accompanied by demonstrations and violent disturbances, held by Israel’s Arab population within the framework of “Peace Day” on December 21, 1987, Israeli Arabs have become increasingly involved in assisting the struggle in the Territories. True, the scale of incidents is not great, but it is the very fact of their occurrence, i.e., the dramatic surge as compared with the pre-intifada period, that is significant. Israeli Arabs have come to identify increasingly with the Arabs in the Territories, and are undergoing a process of Palestinization and growing nationalism. Compounding the situation is the demographic weight of this population: in certain regions of Israel, Arabs constitute a majority or near majority.

At the end of 1987 the population of the minority groups living in Israel (including East Jerusalem) totaled approximately 794,000 (614,500 Muslims, 103,000 Christians, and 76,100 Druze and others), constituting 18 percent of the country’s population.⁸³ Geographically, they are located in very sensitive areas — proximate to both Judea and Samaria and to Lebanon—that lie outside the original partition boundaries of 1947. The four major areas are:

(1) The Northern District, where non-Jews constitute 51 percent of the population (375,400 non-Jews vs. 357,000 Jews at the end of 1987), and the mountainous area of Galilee where they constitute 75 percent of the total population.⁸⁴ In Western Galilee non-Jews constituted 65 percent of the population at the end of 1987 (202,800 non-Jews, 109,200 Jews).⁸⁵

(2) The Irron Valley (Wadi Arra) area, adjacent to the West Bank, where a string of Muslim villages, and the city of Umm al-Fahm (population 23,100), flank a key highway linking the center of Israel with the north. Several tens of thousands of Israeli Arabs reside here.

(3) Approximately the same number reside in the Eastern Sharon, a strip close to the West Bank, many in large villages such as Taibe (19,500), Baqa al-Gharbiye (13,200) and Tira (12,700).⁸⁶

(4) A large Bedouin population in the Northern Negev.

It is virtually inevitable that a violent confrontation between Palestinians and Israel in the Territories should generate feelings of solidarity among Israeli Arabs. Manifestations of this solidarity have included support in the form of delegations, fund-raising, and donations of food and medicine. These activities are organized by the Israeli Arab leadership, notably the heads of local councils. In addition, Israeli Arab youths, apparently acting spontaneously, have occasionally hoisted Palestinian flags, scrawled slogans on walls, thrown stones and petrol bombs, and erected road barriers.

We have noted that violent incidents inside Israel (excluding East Jerusalem) during the first year and a half of the intifada commenced on December 21, 1987, declared “Peace Day” by the Israeli Arab leadership. Particularly serious was the blocking of the Irron Valley highway for three hours. In contrast, the annual Land Day (March 30, 1988) passed without violence thanks to a concerted effort by the Arab municipal leadership, which had an interest in preventing adverse consequences liable to ensue from violent activity. The rest of the year was marked by a low level of hostile activity — but still significantly higher than in the past — centered in Western Galilee, Eastern Sharon, around Mount Gilboa, the Irron Valley, and the Northern Negev. In October 1988 leaflets were distributed in Western Galilee calling for an insurrection against the state; security forces found and confiscated the printing presses. Most of the nationalist incidents took place in the Israel Police’s Northern District (north of Hadera) and in the Irron Valley. Relatively few events were recorded in the south of the country.

Overall in 1988 there were 683 nationalist incidents and 34 cases of terrorism and sabotage by or among Israeli Arabs, as compared with 112 nationalist incidents and 58 terrorist attacks in 1987 — a more than fourfold increase. About 40 percent of the nationalist incidents in 1988 were of a nonviolent character (280 incidents, including 145 cases of writing slogans and 135 hoistings of the Palestinian flag, out of 683). Violent incidents took the form of stone-throwing (133 cases), arson (96 cases), throwing of petrol bombs (49), erecting barriers (48) and sabotage of property (26).⁸⁷ Arson occurred primarily in the areas of the Irron Valley, Nazareth-Mount Tabor, Central Sharon, Mount Gilboa, Western Galilee, Eila Valley, around Beit Shemesh, Beit Guvrin, and in woodlands around Jerusalem.

Israelis who follow events in the Arab sector are divided in their assessment of the effect the uprising has had on this population. One view holds that the intifada has not penetrated the Arab sector substantially, but that its influence is felt in the form of a growing number of disturbances, not all of them perpetrated by marginal groups. According to this view, neither the Arab public nor its leadership seeks nationalist objectives; rather, they wish to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians in the Territories and to protest the Israeli government’s opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Israeli Arabs want an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, believing that they will then stand a better chance of obtaining equality with the Jewish population. The Israeli Arab leadership, aware of Israel’s deterrent ability, is fearful that if violence inside the Green Line worsens, the government will relegate the Arab population to a status reminiscent of the period when Israeli Arabs were subject to military government. Arabs might be prevented from working with Jews, and other ramifications might follow.

Observers who put forward this assessment do not explain what objective Arab youths who resort to violence have in mind; the possibility cannot be ruled out that they seek more than the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Also, the situation is liable to deteriorate, with the leadership losing its authority and the younger generation taking matters into its own hands.

A second, and almost completely contrary view, holds that the struggle of the Israeli Arabs, however limited and cautious, is a national struggle. Its scale is limited because Israeli Arabs are aware of Israel’s strength and because they have far more to lose than their brethren in the Territories. But its objectives go beyond, say, merely obtaining greater government participation in budgets for local councils in the Arab sector, or expanding technological education for Arab youth. Thus, some Israeli Arabs say that their basic desire is not to secure technical equality with the Jews, but primarily to get back the lands that were taken from them during and after the War of Independence, and to allow the refugees to return to their former places of residence in Israel. Underlying this outlook is a desire, impelled by nationalist aspirations, to weaken and undermine Israel. Israeli Arabs who think along these lines envisage the incorporation of Arab villages near Israel’s eastern border into a future Palestinian state, and project the possibility of autonomy for large Arab concentrations inside Israel.

In sum, it is difficult to determine whether and to what extent the intifada has already filtered across the Green Line, but violent nationalist incidents that are occurring with greater intensity than in the past may portend the spread of the uprising. Dr. Ahmed Tibi, from Taibe, the chairman of the Association of [Israeli] Arab Academics, stated in this context: “The intifada in all its manifestations will penetrate the Israeli Arab street, it is only a question of time.”⁸⁸ The danger definitely exists that if the uprising in the Territories continues and intensifies, violence will also become more pervasive among Israeli Arab youths, and the leadership will be forced to submit to radical nationalist demands.

Conclusion

The cardinal political ramifications of the uprising are the emergence of a new situation that precludes a return to the status quo ante; the placing of the Palestinian issue on the international agenda; and serious polarization in Israel concerning policy toward the Territories and the Palestinian question. More flexible stances have been adopted by the PLO and the Israeli government, positions that probably would not have been forthcoming without the intifada: the PLO has agreed to the idea of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, and Israel has put forward a political initiative involving elections in the Territories for representatives to negotiate an interim settlement as a stage toward a final settlement. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether conditions are ripe for the start of such negotiations. This issue is discussed in the sixth and final chapter.

Chapter Six:
Strategic Implications for the Future

Stopping the Violence

Beyond its tactical missions, the defense establishment is responsible for maintaining quiet and security in the Territories, and has therefore searched for options for stopping the violence altogether. Yet extensive violence has continued in the Territories despite the military’s countermeasures.

The Palestinian uprising, which began on December 9, 1987 and has continued unabated, is a violent struggle against Israeli rule by the Arab population in the Territories and East Jerusalem, and to a lesser degree by the Arab minority inside Israel. It is a large-scale insurrection, including civil disobedience, which is intended to secure independence. The uprising is in fact a war against Israel by a large population, although, as the chief of staff points out, it is not a conventional war because of “limitations on the use of force” that do not apply in normal warfare.¹

The uprising has continued relentlessly despite the high price paid by the Palestinians in the form of casualties (about 550 killed and more than 6,500 wounded during the first 18 months), arrests (more than 30,000), serious hardships at the personal and local levels (curfews imposed by the authorities, strikes declared by the uprising leadership), and enormous economic difficulties caused by the decrease in the number of workdays in Israel and compounded by the drastic fall in the value of the Jordanian dinar. Among the achievements of the first 18 months of the uprising in the Palestinians’ perception are an intensification of national pride and self-confidence, based on their ability to confront the IDF; greater internal cohesiveness and a concomitant success in involving broad sectors in the struggle; polarization inside Israel over the Palestinian question for the first time; the placing of the Palestinian issue on the international agenda; the launching of a US-PLO dialogue; and the elimination of the Jordanian option.

Despite the IDF’s use of a broad range of tactics, military and civilian alike, and the deployment of massive forces, the violence has not been stopped. The uprising has become a national and political phenomenon, and as such resists eradication by military force alone. In this section we examine ways to stop the violence in isolation from other aspects of the uprising. The massive presence of IDF forces has brought about a considerable decline in the number of disturbances in which thousands of Palestinians take part. Yet the period discussed in this book saw no decline in the scope of the violence; indeed there were signs that violence was on the upsurge, and that youngsters were more willing than ever to take on the IDF with their primary weapon, the stone.

Why has the totality of the measures taken thus far not stopped the violence? The main reason lies in the disparity between the desire of a people to liberate itself from a state of occupation, and its perceived readiness to struggle and sacrifice to attain that objective, on the one hand, and the legal and self-imposed moral limits on Israel’s use of military and police power that have precluded the possibility of quelling the violence by force alone, on the other. Indeed, once the uprising took off and gained broad momentum in the initial stages — due in part to mistakes made by the defense establishment — there may no longer have been a possibility of terminating the violence. Certainly this objective was unattainable through the use of measures and punishments that had proven appropriate against past disturbances. In this sense the countermeasures employed by the IDF and the Civil Administration are largely irrelevant to the situation generated by the intifada, and hence are only partially effective. The Palestinians, and particularly the youngsters, are willing to bear the consequences in casualties, arrests, an economic crisis and the loss of a school year, and show no inclination whatsoever to stop the uprising.

The further application of the punitive means employed to date, including selective house demolitions and selective deportations, even if done on a broad scale, will not eliminate the violence. The achievements of the uprising so far, and the assessment that additional successes are possible, have motivated the population to continue on this path. Thus the violence can be expected to continue, and the use of military means alone, as long as these remain within the bounds of the law, will not stop it. Both Chief of Staff Shomron and Defense Minister Rabin (until he left office in March 1990) accept this assessment. Indeed, even the imprisonment of the uprising leadership would probably not be effective, as this is not a leadership in the classic sense.

Three different basic approaches are feasible in dealing with the violent aspects of the uprising.

The first approach takes as its underlying premise that the current “deadlock” (in which neither side can impose its will) and the difficulties that the uprising poses for both Israel and the Palestinians can be exploited gainfully. In this view, the situation that has emerged is a possible starting point — perhaps the only one that will present itself — for negotiations on a political settlement. Here a comparison is drawn with the situation prevailing between Israel and Egypt in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. If Israel had destroyed the Egyptian Third Army at the conclusion of the fighting in 1973, the political process which eventually led to peace could not have begun. Accordingly Israel, even if it could, should not subdue the intifada violence. In short, this approach holds that a policy of eradicating the intifada by force must be avoided in order not to eliminate the possibility of political negotiations bearing a prospect for success.

Two underlying premises inform the second approach. On the one hand the intifada, as a war against Israel, is inflicting serious damage, and therefore its violent aspect must be stopped; on the other hand, the situation should be addressed politically in order to create a new foundation for relations between Israel and the Palestinian people, although this does not mandate a continuation of the violence. (Again referring to 1973, it cannot be proved that a political process would have been precluded if Israel had indeed wiped out the Egyptian Third Army.) This approach sees no contradiction between a cessation of the violence and the commencement of a political process, and holds that for Israel it is desirable that negotiations begin only after the violence has abated. The proponents of this view do not ignore the risk that the prospects for political negotiations could be diminished if Israel (from a position of strength) assessed that they were less necessary and the Palestinians (being in a weaker position) did not wish to begin negotiations either. Furthermore, as the analysis below will show, it is extremely doubtful that negotiations are feasible in the foreseeable future, given the present conditions and the fundamental differences between the sides.

The underlying premise of the third possible approach holds that the intifada is a war on Israel that has as its ultimate objective not only the West Bank and Gaza but all the Land of Israel. Therefore it is essential to remove all limitations, legal and otherwise, and bring into play all the means at Israel’s disposal in order to stop the violence and break the uprising. This would involve, first and foremost, applying severe military-security punishments and other measures on a broad scale against perpetrators of violence against Israeli soldiers and civilians.

In the author’s view, the second approach stands the best chance of success. This is so, in the first place, because of the damage that will accrue to Israel if the violence persists, and the potential advantages inherent in its cessation. The principal forms of damage are the following:

(1) A serious setback in the IDF’s deterrent profile as perceived by the residents of the Territories, and to a lesser degree by Arab states and armies.

(2) A feeling among IDF officers and soldiers that the confrontation with the Palestinians cannot be won by military means. The axiom that stones and petrol bombs will never force Israel to make concessions is less credible now.

(3) Polarization in Israel over the Palestinian issue and the uprising, accompanied by a radicalization of stands and an exacerbation in the internal debate, which is already showing signs of violence. The polarization stems from the uprising as such, but primarily from the violence perpetrated against Israel as a cardinal element of the uprising.

(4) A deterioration in relations between Jewish settlers in the Territories and the IDF.

(5) Economic hardships.

(6) Foreign relations setbacks and a negative image abroad. On the other hand, possible advantages to Israel if the violence is stopped include a restored sense of security to the Jewish population, a strengthening of the IDF’s deterrent profile in the perception of both the Palestinians and the Arab states, and good initial bargaining cards to be played in possible political negotiations (even though there is no guarantee that a political process can begin without an on-the-ground situation of “deadlock”).

In the light of our interim conclusion — that Israel should put a stop to the violence, even if only for a few months, to enable a political approach to be assayed—the question arises of how best to achieve this goal. Our examination of possible means for stopping the violence should not be construed as advocacy of a substitute for a political process. The assumption is that, given the advanced state of progress of the intifada, even a forced cessation of the violence will be followed after a certain period (a few months, perhaps) by a renewal of the violent struggle. The goal, therefore, is to limit the damage to Israel while creating more congenial conditions for the start of negotiations.

First, what not to do: A massive mobilization of reserves and the “inundation” of the towns and villages of the Territories with troops for a few weeks will reduce the violence but will not stop it, and will heighten the friction between the IDF and the local population. Once the IDF pulls back to its current posture, the violence will almost certainly erupt again. Nor do we examine here operations that Israel can carry out in theory, but not in practice. These include killing thousands of Palestinians, a mass population “transfer” across the border, and the like. Israel is precluded from resorting to these options by its democratic character, the immorality of such actions, the ensuing fierce domestic strife that would erupt were they to be tried, the severe international damage that would ensue, and the incentive for war they would provide to the Arab states.

Manifestly, then, since the modes of operation employed to date have proved insufficient, and extreme military actions are precluded by internal and external considerations alike, we must, by elimination, turn to other means, even if there is no guarantee of their efficacy. It should be stated at the outset that very harsh measures will be necessary in order to convince the population that the price it will pay for continuing the violence is intolerable. The potential damage to Israel from the application of these measures is considerable, and this is discussed below.

Since military pressure within the parameters available to Israel cannot stop the violence, what remains is the exercise of heavy economic pressure. Four modes of action exist in this regard, and all must be applied in combination. The more time that passes without these measures being implemented, the less chance they will have to succeed.

(1) Preventing residents of the Territories from working in Israel. Employment in Israel, despite disruptions caused by strikes and curfews, continues to be the primary source of livelihood in the Territories. Obviously, depriving the population of this means of income will bring tremendous pressure to bear. This measure could also have negative ramifications, such as removing additional restraints upon the use of violence against Israel. Undoubtedly some in the Territories will respond with extreme action, feeling that they have nothing more to lose, and thus possibly intensifying the violence in the initial stage. However, in the course of time the economic pressure will have a moderating effect by generating a severe and intolerable crisis. In the best case, pressure from below would force the uprising leadership to conclude that a respite was essential. Prominent Palestinians might then ask Israel to rescind the order in return for an undertaking that the violence cease. Clearly, the stoppage of work in Israel by residents of the Territories might adversely affect the Israeli economy as well, as many industries and other enterprises are dependent on this labor. Hence a period of preparation may be necessary in order to offset possible negative consequences for Israel. But the advent of mass Jewish immigration from the USSR, and the existence of a large and persistent pool of unemployed workers in Israel, would mitigate against these consequences.

(2) Isolating the West Bank by preventing the movement of local Palestinians between it and Jordan (and from there to other Arab states) and stopping all trade with Jordan and the Arab world. This move, particularly if combined with an order preventing work in Israel, will produce profound psychological pressure in the Territories, and possibly harsh economic pressure as well. In the light of King Hussein’s disengagement from the Territories, this measure will not have a significant impact on Jordan’s standing there. On the contrary, it may be welcomed by Amman, which has a vested interest in the cessation of the uprising (for fear it will spread to Jordan) and would like Israel to take vigorous steps in this direction. Cessation of traffic across the Jordan River bridges will also put a stop to the smuggling of money from Jordan to support the intifada.

(3) Imposition of a protracted curfew of several months’ duration on a single town or city in which rioting has been particularly severe. This, to deter other locales. To date, curfews have been imposed for relatively brief periods for operational reasons, to put a stop to specific waves of violence. But this has not affected the overall violence. The population has learned to live with curfews of a few days’ duration, and in some cases has even dared to violate them without the IDF opening fire on the offenders. Enforcement of a full curfew lasting several months (with residents allowed out for only an hour or two each day to purchase food in the city itself) will require large forces. The local economic situation will deteriorate rapidly as the inhabitants are prevented from working, either in the city or elsewhere. This measure, particularly if dovetailed with the two actions already mentioned, could be effective in breaking the population’s steadfastness and resistance, and thus in stopping the violence.

(4) If the PLO had at its disposal very large sums of money which it could pump into the Territories, the principal mode of pressure on the inhabitants — preventing them from working in Israel — would be largely inefficacious. According to a rough estimate, to fill this role the PLO would require $50 million per month, or $600 million per year (calculated on the basis of $500 for the monthly salary of each of the approximately 100,000 Palestinians from the Territories employed in Israel). Therefore, a necessary condition for the application of the measures outlined above is preventing the inflow of funds into the Territories. This includes the blocking of bank transfers via Israeli banking and other financial institutions — a move that requires legislation and the establishment of a supervisory apparatus to allow for bank records to be examined. Measures taken to date to stop the inflow of funds have had only limited success. It bears stressing that the three aforementioned measures will be ineffectual if PLO funds in large sums continue to reach the Territories.

There are risks to Israel inherent in the use of these stringent measures. It will be accused of starving the population under its control, with all that this entails for its international image. Internal polarization will become even more acute, as some circles oppose these moves. And the Palestinians’ struggle is liable to become more extreme if they feel they have nothing more to lose.

To sum up this section on the steps needed to stop the violence, it must be reiterated that severe measures that might have worked in the past can no longer be completely effective — and will become even less so as time passes. Although there are no guarantees, the possibility exists that the implementation of the four measures outlined above, notwithstanding the collateral damage they cause, can produce positive results.

Decline of the IDF’s Deterrent Profile

There is no doubt that the IDF’s deterrent profile has declined immensely in the Territories. Even the presence of large Israeli forces has been unable to stop the violence. Worse, about half of the violent incidents perpetrated to date in Judea and Samaria had soldiers as their targets. Youngsters engage IDF troops in direct confrontations. Curfew, once observed religiously by the local population, is now frequently violated, as there is no fear that soldiers will open fire at offenders. In short, the Palestinians believe the IDF has failed and is incapable of stopping the intifada.

The uprising has also had a harmful impact within the IDF itself. We do not accept the chief of staffs contention that there has been no erosion of values in the IDF and that “values have even been intensified in the wake of difficult situations.”² True, by mid-1989 only about 60 soldiers (the overwhelming majority reservists) had openly refused to serve in the Territories during the uprising; but frustration and confusion remain rampant. This is not due to the absence of a national consensus; on the contrary, it is generally accepted that violence must be employed, within the limits of the law, to halt the uprising. The problem is that the confrontation between Palestinian civilians, whose weapon is the stone, and IDF soldiers, is played out on a psychological as well as physical level, and is mentally punishing to many soldiers. A company commander in the paramilitary Nahal Corps, whose unit foiled a terrorist infiltration attempt from Lebanon after having done a long term of duty in the Jibalyah refugee camp in Gaza, was quoted as saying, “The service in Jibalyah destroyed our soul.”³ A reservist in a paratroop battalion said: “This terrible situation is breaking us and strengthening them.”⁴ Two officers stated after completing military duty in the Territories: “The continued retention of the Territories, since the start of the uprising, is causing a process of bestialization, dehumanization and the abandonment of all restraint among a large minority of soldiers.”⁵ In a meeting with the O/C Central Command, senior officers in the reserves said that “a moment of truth has arrived when the army has to listen to us…. Soldiers find it difficult to strike children who are the same age as their own children.” And: “We are putting to an impossible test the values with which we were inculcated.”⁶ Although overall the IDF’s resiliency has not been seriously undermined — as evidenced by the fact that there has been no decrease in reservists’ response to callup orders for service in the Territories, and that volunteering for the IDF’s elite units remains high—the situation that is evolving will certainly be aggravated as the uprising continues.

Besides the mental damage, a certain degree of operational damage is also evident. This is manifested above all in the fact that the IDF as a whole, and its senior commanders in particular, are engaged primarily in combatting the intifada and less in preparing the army to fight a possible future war. The day-to-day preoccupation with the uprising has undoubtedly diverted the IDF from its principal strategic task, which is to build itself as a war machine. Training for reservists’ units has been disrupted (especially those units called up for lengthy duty in the Territories). The chief of staff admitted as much when he said that “in the [first] year of the uprising, reservists paid the highest price in training days that had to be slashed.”⁷

One of the consequences of the IDF’s decreased deterrence in the eyes of the population has been manifested in youngsters daring to confront combat-ready Israeli soldiers. However, it should not be inferred that in the event of the most likely constellation of a war — between Israel and Syria (even with Jordanian participation) — the Arab population in the Territories will resort to violence on an even larger scale. It is also clear to the Palestinians that in wartime the rules of the game will be very different from what they have been during the uprising. In a war situation, if the Palestinians in the Territories fear that violence on their part against the IDF will result in drastic measures being taken against them — including mass expulsion — they will most likely not resort to violence. Hence it could well be that precisely in wartime, relative quiet will prevail in the Territories as far as the behavior of the local population is concerned.

Is the continuation of the uprising bringing another war closer? Is Israeli deterrence vis-a-vis, say, the Syrians still effective? Even though the uprising (which followed the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon) significantly eroded the IDF’s deterrent posture with regard to a struggle against an insurgent civilian population, deterrence vis-a-vis Arab armed forces does not appear to have been seriously impaired. Syria, itself involved for years in trying to impose its will on a partially recalcitrant civilian population in Lebanon, has undoubtedly learned to distinguish between operational effectiveness against a civilian uprising, when the limitations on the use of force are tremendous, and operational capability on the battlefield, where “there are…hardly any limitations on the activation of forces.”⁸ Hence the judgment of the Syrian leadership about whether to launch a war against Israel does not appear to have been influenced by an assessment that the uprising has weakened the IDF operationally.

Damascus’ primary consideration continues to be pragmatic: the prospects of success measured against the possibility of failure. However, should the IDF be forced, at some time in the future, because of a serious deterioration in the Territories, to reduce its forces on the Golan Heights, the Syrians might think that the odds against failure were thereby reduced, leading them to chance a military operation. Beyond this, the emergence of a situation in which the uprising persists for some years to come, and the IDF becomes ever more deeply mired in the Territories and is compelled to direct its principal effort there, combined with a weakening of the IDF internally and indeed of the staying power of the country, could enfeeble the IDF’s deterrent ability vis-a-vis Syria and make more likely the possibility of a Syrian assault on Israel. On the other hand, even if the intifada continues, but without eliciting drastic IDF reactions or behavior against the local population, it is improbable that Syria will perceive the military situation as sufficiently favorable for it to launch a war against Israel because of that situation.

Nor does it seem likely that Egypt or Jordan would read such developments as conducive to launching a war. Meanwhile, Iraq’s known aggressive intentions toward Israel remain a secondary function of its strategic situation in the Gulf.

A Political Breakthrough?

The period of the intifada has seen a number of political moves and feelers. Externally, these have taken the form of a new-found FLO flexibility in the form of readiness to accept a two-state (Israel and Palestine) solution, the onset of a dialogue between the US and the PLO, and the Israeli political initiative to hold elections in the Territories.

Although the goals of the sides remain substantially different, indeed, and perhaps at polar removes, it is the uprising that has brought about these changes. The PLO and the Palestinians wish to exploit the uprising to score political gains. Israel, for many months fighting a rearguard battle (militarily and politically alike), after having preferred the status quo for years, found it necessary in the spring of 1989 to put forward a political program for the Territories which, if implemented, could break the status quo. Israel took this step in the wake of its assessment that the risk involved was lower than “if we continue to exist without proposing a solution, for this is ultimately liable to generate international pressure for concessions above and beyond what we can allow ourselves from the security standpoint.”⁹

Thus an incipient preliminary stage of the political process got underway. It was conducted publicly, by means of statements, proposals and responses, and through American good offices. The basis for negotiations was the Israeli government’s proposal to hold free elections in the Territories in order to form a delegation for negotiations with Israel on an interim settlement (autonomy), followed within a few years by negotiations on a permanent settlement. A year or so of contacts and discussions ended in mid-1990, with the severing of US-PLO contacts due to PLO terrorism, the advent of a right-wing government in Israel, and the region’s slide into the Gulf crisis. During that year, it was impossible to say if and when negotiations would begin, and whether they would produce compromise and understanding on the basis of the Israeli initiative. Sharp differences characterized questions of principle, framework, subjects of discussion and stages of implementation. However the point of departure was that both sides (Israeli and Palestinian) were approaching a stage of readiness to embark on a political path and begin looking for a solution to the Palestinian problem.

The balance of considerations reached separately by Israel and the Palestinians (and the PLO) could still induce each of them to move to the stage of negotiations in the not too distant future, despite the price each would have to pay. The transition to talks would probably demand mutual concessions even at the stage of “negotiations about the negotiations” (i.e., preliminary talks prior to the opening of negotiations on an interim agreement).

Will the sides prove capable of departing from deep-rooted stands and principles? The following discussion of the future of the political process is divorced from immediate considerations, and focuses on an attempt to summarize the conflicting factors involved.

Factors Favoring a Political Process

When neither side can force its will on the other, the only alternative is the political option. The intifada is causing immense damage to Israel and the Palestinians alike. Yet it is impossible to say precisely when one (or both) of the sides will decide that it cannot continue the struggle.

Difficulties for Israel. There is growing polarization within Israel regarding the political approach toward the Palestinian question, and indeed even about the character of operational countermeasures; The IDF’s war preparations have been adversely affected due to the cutback in training for units mobilized for service in the Territories. Morale in the IDF has been affected. The IDF’s deterrent profile has been seriously eroded in the eyes of the Palestinians in the Territories. The longer the uprising continues, and especially if it intensifies, the greater the danger of erosion in the IDF’s deterrent posture vis-a-vis the Arab states, too. Additional difficulties center on economic losses, and problems in Israel’s foreign relations. Domestically, the nationalist radicalization of Israel’s Arabs gained momentum during the intifada and sounded a warning bell for the future.

Difficulties for the Palestinians. The population in the Territories has paid a steep price for maintaining the intifada, in casualties, detainees, hardships in everyday life, and economic setbacks. These difficulties continue to grow and constitute an incentive for launching a political process. Meanwhile, the uprising has placed the residents of the Territories and the PLO in a relatively strong position, making it an appropriate time, from their point of view, to capitalize on the situation politically.

Risks and dangers in the continuation of the uprising. Both sides will face serious dangers if political negotiations do not begin and the intifada continues indefinitely. Thus as the Palestinian leadership is well aware, there is no guarantee that the population can continue the uprising indefinitely, let alone intensify it, in order to extract political concessions from Israel. The danger is that the situation of relative strength which the Palestinians currently enjoy will be wasted, and they will lose yet another opportunity.

As for Israel, a deterioration in the field, or in the political situation, might gradually bring about a number of risks and dangers: a Syrian-initiated war against Israel (if the IDF’s deterrent posture is enfeebled); tension in relations with Egypt; and growing difficulties in relations with the US and West Europe.

For both sides, the ongoing strengthening of elements more extreme than the PLO, particularly Hamas — the Islamic Resistance Front — in the Gaza Strip as well as in Judea-Samaria, will hamper the start of negotiations and render progress difficult. This is undesirable for both Israel and the PLO. There is also concern (largely unwarranted) in the PLO that an alternative secular leadership will emerge in the Territories.

Factors Militating Against a Political Process

The bitter legacy inside Israel of a decades-long national struggle (including brutal acts of terrorism perpetrated by the PLO) in which the Palestinian side wanted “everything” and was unwilling to compromise, while the Palestinians continued to perceive Israel as hungry to occupy territories and expand its borders, has generated mutual mistrust, suspicion and fears that are unconducive to negotiations. The basic goals of the two sides are divergent, not to say contradictory. The Palestinians seek, at the least, an independent Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and East Jerusalem, this to be attained through the medium of the PLO, which will then become the dominant force in the new state. The Israeli government opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Territories and East Jerusalem, and is unwilling to negotiate with the PLO. It is ready to accept an interim agreement (i.e., autonomy) under which the residents of the Territories will acquire broad powers, with the final settlement to be negotiated following 3–5 years of the autonomy regime. However, since the stands of each side regarding the terms of an interim settlement derive from their conception of the final settlement, contradictions between them arise immediately.

The governing institutions on both sides face considerable domestic problems. In Israel, the two major political movements are divided regarding the shape of the political solution (the Likud’s “not one inch” outlook vs. Labor’s “territorial compromise” approach). In the PLO, Arafat has serious internal difficulties, particularly within the Fatah leadership, as he tries to exercise political flexibility. Arafat’s freedom of action is further hampered by other PLO member-groups, notably George Habash’s Popular Front organization.

Basic Dilemmas Stemming from the Israeli Initiative

The Israeli initiative of Spring 1989 marked the limits of agreement possible within the unity government as it was constituted when the plan was put forward. The basic dilemmas posed by the initiative stemmed from the contradictory goals and interests harbored by the Palestinians and the PLO.

For one, the Israeli government is unwilling to negotiate with the PLO, which it sees as a terrorist organization to be neutralized. Israel proposes talks with representatives of the population in the Territories who will be chosen in free elections. As for the PLO, it is unable (or unwilling) to take steps that would convince Israeli public opinion to accept it as a legitimate negotiating partner, such as the annulment of those clauses in the Palestinian Covenant calling for Israel’s liquidation.

The PLO considers it vital to participate in negotiations for several reasons. It seeks achievements in the executive and organizational realms — essential because the PLO regards itself as the Palestinians’ sole official representative. It is apprehensive that the uprising, which is being waged by the population in the Territories, will lead to the emergence of an alternative leadership, and that in free elections Hamas and other fundamentalist religious groups will sharply reduce its share of the vote. It is aware that the residents of the Territories desire above all a solution that will remove Israeli rule, and are far less concerned about the problems of the Palestinian “diaspora.” Yet it is precisely this issue that the PLO insists is central, and requires its representation even at the stage of negotiations on an interim agreement, since the terms of that agreement will unavoidably be influenced by the parties’ perception of the final settlement. In other words, because of the total identity that exists between the PLO and the Palestinians’ demand for an independent state, Israeli agreement to negotiate with the PLO will enhance the prospects of that state being established.

Finally, the PLO assessment holds that elected representatives from the Territories will be in an inferior position vis-a-vis Israel because they are under Israeli rule, whereas the PLO leadership will have greater leverage and will be able to extract more in negotiations. Thus the problem of Palestinian representation in negotiations looms as an insurmountable obstacle. It is most improbable that the PLO will agree to sustained negotiations by a delegation that is made up of residents from the Territories with the addition of a few personalities from outside. The PLO will insist that senior representatives of the organization take part in the substantive talks, a demand which is unacceptable to Israel.

Further, for the PLO and the Palestinians, the participation of East Jerusalem residents in the negotiations is crucial for two reasons. The first is national: the Palestinians insist that in any political solution East Jerusalem must be under their control, and that nothing be done to jeopardize this outcome. Secondly, most of the PLO leaders in the Territories live in East Jerusalem. Thus even if the organization were to agree that members of the Tunis-based leadership not take part in talks on an interim settlement, it would be unable to countenance the leadership in the Territories also being excluded.

Before it collapsed in March 1990, the Israeli unity government was divided on the issue of the participation of East Jerusalem residents. Labor was willing, provided the polling booths were not located in East Jerusalem; the Likud was opposed on principle. Israeli agreement to the Palestinian demand on this issue would constitute a significant Israeli concession. The Palestinians, if they accept the principle of negotiations with Israel conducted by a Palestinian delegation to be chosen in elections (for them a significant concession, as their basic stand holds that these negotiations should be conducted by the PLO, thereby rendering elections unnecessary to begin with), will not be able to yield on the issue of East Jerusalem. While Israel would find it exceedingly difficult to accept the participation of East Jerusalem residents in the elections, its adamancy on this point would almost certainly rule out both elections and negotiations.

A third dilemma concerned the possibility of permitting the elected representatives to hold contacts with the PLO, both before and after the elections. This stemmed from PLO insistence that the elected representatives not act on their own — a demand seen as tantamount to Israel’s conducting indirect negotiations with the PLO. At the time, Defense Minister Rabin intimated that the Labor Party would not object to such contacts when, in reply to a reporter’s query whether representatives from the Territories would be able to hold consultations in Tunis (i.e., with the PLO), he stated that those representatives would be free “to consult with Egypt, Jordan or others.” The Likud was against this in principle, maintaining that it constituted negotiation with the PLO.

Probably the biggest stumbling block to the opening of negotiations is the Palestinians’ demand that Israel commit itself in advance regarding the essence of the permanent solution — a Palestinian state. Israel vehemently objects to giving any such undertaking. Its absence is the primary reason for the rejection voiced by the PLO and the Palestinians to the autonomy plan ever since it was put forward in the Camp David accords. They want a prior undertaking, to be given even before the start of negotiations on an interim agreement. The PLO would be satisfied if Israel acknowledged in advance the Palestinians’ right of self-determination at the end of the transitional period (the interim agreement), or stated that it would be willing to negotiate with the PLO on the comprehensive solution. Neither possibility seems likely from Israel’s point of view. “Self-determination” is perceived as a buzzword for a Palestinian state, and Israel’s view of the PLO in its current configuration is well known.

It is difficult to assess whether the Palestinians would be satisfied with an American commitment to support their demand for an independent state in due course. Some residents of the Territories say they have come to understand that the US cannot “sell Israel out;” they hold therefore that an American undertaking is insufficient, and they will be satisfied with nothing less than a direct commitment by Israel. At all events, the US has consistently refused to offer such an undertaking, pointing out that this is a matter for the sides involved to decide. Nor is it clear whether Washington would be ready to change its stand given altered circumstances.

Both Israel and the Palestinians are aware that if an interim accord is signed even without agreement having been reached on the final settlement, politically a process will have nevertheless begun that will probably evolve toward a permanent settlement in which Israel will cede large parts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to some sort of Arab rule. Although aware of this risk, the Israeli government nevertheless put forward its initiative, perhaps in the hope that future developments would enable it to block this outcome. Still, because the PLO and the Palestinians do not feel sufficiently optimistic that the dynamic of an interim agreement will necessarily produce a Palestinian state in the future, they insist on receiving a prior undertaking concerning the content of the comprehensive solution. Hence they risk the possibility that the political process will not begin while they are still in a relatively strong position thanks to the uprising.

It is this last difference of principle that constitutes the major stumbling block to the opening of negotiations on an interim settlement, although the previous three are formidable enough. Summing up the prospects for the political process, it is clear that the uprising generated an incipient revision in the stands of both sides (expressed for the most part verbally so far) and raised the possibility of a shift to a political process of negotiations. Fundamental contradictions between the sides are hampering the opening of negotiations, but at the same time vital interests militate in favor of their approaching commencement. Both sides accept that a political process is essential, although neither is ready, yet, to make the compromises this would entail. In order for negotiations to begin on the basis of the Israeli initiative, both sides must already, at this preliminary stage, make concessions on issues of entrenched principle. These are not merely technical problems of formulation; they involve bedrock issues.

Hence before negotiations can begin on the Israeli initiative (or even preliminary talks with a view toward negotiations), a change in the existing situation is required, involving one or more of the following possibilities:

(1) Palestinian successes in the uprising that will make it significantly more difficult for Israel to live with the status quo, or alternatively, an Arab-initiated war (with Syria in the forefront) that would leave Israel in an untenable military situation. In either case, the Israeli government might be forced to adopt a more flexible stance and be responsive to some of the cardinal demands of the PLO and the Palestinians. The prospects for such Israeli responsiveness would grow, were the PLO to annul clauses in the Palestinian Covenant that reject Israel’s very existence, and to strive to convince Israeli public opinion that it is a legitimate negotiating partner.

(2) Israeli success, without the use of radical military means, in suppressing or greatly scaling down the violent aspects of the uprising, or in repulsing an Arab attack while inflicting heavy casualties on the assailant and perhaps seizing enemy territory. In either case, the population in the Territories might well be compelled not only to moderate the intifada but to soften — together with the PLO — its opening negotiating stance.

(3) A third possibility depends on the issue being accorded a high priority in American foreign policy and Washington becoming directly involved at a high level vis-a-vis both sides, especially in one of the two situations just adduced as prior conditions for the start of negotiations.

Even in this scenario, in which conditions in the field “ripen” toward negotiations and mutual concessions, it is impossible to sketch the contours of a possible agreement regarding the primary stumbling block — the integral connection between a partial settlement and a full settlement. The way out of this trap may take the form of an American undertaking to both sides: to Israel, that as long as the interim settlement is not implemented properly (or perhaps in the event that it is torpedoed by the Palestinians) and is not accompanied, due to PLO opposition, by progress, calm and a meaningful thaw between the sides, the US will not support the start of negotiations on a permanent settlement; and to the PLO, that if the interim settlement is implemented as agreed by the Palestinians and if the sides move toward reconciliation, Washington will support the PLO’s claim to be the Palestinian representative in negotiations on a permanent settlement.¹⁰

In view of these constraints, we shall present here the possible shape of an agreement that could be achieved in preliminary negotiations with senior figures from the Territories on the less sensitive questions, involving elections and subsequent negotiations on an interim settlement. Almost certainly, such a settlement will have to be attained with active US assistance, and to be acceptable to the PLO, which will give the green light to the residents of the Territories. This opening agreement might include the following elements:

1. Elections

(a) Free elections will be held in Judea, Samaria and Gaza to choose the members of a political delegation for negotiations with Israel on a first stage, i.e., an interim settlement of 3–5 years. Political election propaganda will be permitted prior to the elections.

(b) All persons who reside in the Territories, and hold appropriate ID cards, as well as residents from the Territories who have received permission to travel to Arab states temporarily, can stand for election. Palestinian refugees in the refugee camps will be permitted to take part in the elections. (They were denied the vote in the municipal elections held in Judea and Samaria in 1972 and 1976).

(c) The Arab residents of East Jerusalem will have the right to vote and to be elected.

(d) The elections may be regional or general. If regional, those elected will constitute the Palestinian delegation for negotiations with Israel, or will choose the delegation in a second stage. If general, elections would be based on a personal or political party key.

(e) The administration of the elections in the field will be carried out entirely by local residents. These will be appointed by the Israeli Civil Administration, which will bear overall responsibility for the holding of the elections. To assure the residents that Israel does not attempt to influence results, the elections will be supervised by an external neutral actor, such as the US.

(f) Prior to the stage of preparations for the elections, negotiations will be held between the Israeli Civil Administration and a local representation composed of senior public figures, in order to reach agreement on the election format and on technical matters.

2. Negotiations on an Interim Agreement

(a) Negotiations will take place between the elected Palestinian representatives and the representatives of the Israeli government, with the probable participation of US representatives.

b) In order to work out their stand, the representatives from the Territories will be free to meet for an exchange of views with other personalities from the Territories, with citizens of foreign countries (abroad, if necessary), and with PLO officials. Permission for them to hold contacts with the PLO can be formulated in indirect, implicit language. At all events, it will be clear that the elected representatives may conduct negotiations on an interim settlement in coordination with the PLO, with an Israeli guarantee that they will not thereby risk arrest or trial. It is impossible to say exactly when negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, with active US support, will begin. Yet the intifada is burdensome to both sides. Whether the present “stalemate” continues or is modified (by Palestinian successes in the violent struggle, or Israeli success in stopping the violence), Israel cannot restore the status quo situation that existed before December 9, 1987, and the Palestinians cannot forcibly bring about Israel’s withdrawal from the Territories. Manifestly, negotiations are the necessary and unavoidable outcome of the intifada.

If this assessment proves correct, it will mean that, despite all the difficulties, the sides will embark on the road to a political process in the foreseeable future. It is unlikely that this process, once begun, will subsequently be halted following the execution of its first stage, an interim agreement. A process will have commenced which, despite fundamental and sometimes profound contradictions and differences between the adversaries, will constitute the first stage toward a full settlement. It is difficult to envision this settlement constituting anything other than the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

Epilogue

The reader has undoubtedly taken note that the operational analysis in this book is based to a considerable extent on statistical data regarding violent incidents and their physical consequences — dead, wounded, and the like. As the original Hebrew book analyzed data through mid-1989, and the English version of the book is being published only during the first half of 1991, this epilogue has been written with the aim of offering the reader, by way of an update, a short, overall comparative analysis of the intifada in the Territories during the years 1988, 1989 and 1990.

Further, since the epilogue was written several weeks after the beginning of the war between Iraq and the allied coalition in the Persian Gulf region — a war that caused the intifada to shrink to very modest proportions — it also deals with factors relevant to the war as they may affect the renewal of the intifada once the war is over.

The three-year comparative analysis is based on Table 6, which presents IDF Spokesman figures. A number of key conclusions may be drawn from the table. First, not only was there no reduction in the number of violent incidents during the first three years of the uprising, but the number rose from year to year. The figure for the second year, 1989, is nearly double that of the first year, 1988; the third year, 1990, registered nearly double again the figure of 1989. In terms of average daily incidents, the figure rose during the three years from 55 in 1988, to 110 in 1989, and 200 in 1990.

There was a drop of nearly 50 percent in the number of petrol bombs thrown in the second year, as against the first. This downward trend continued in 1990, though only slightly. This reduction may be attributed to the permission given Israeli security forces to open fire on petrol bomb throwers as they would upon hand grenade throwers.

There is almost no change in the number of arson incidents during the first two years, and a 15 percent reduction in the third.

The second year, 1989, registered a record number of Palestinian dead and wounded. The number of dead dropped dramatically during the third year, by over 60 percent, producing a level of one dead every three days. This decline was evidently the result of explicit orders to security forces to avoid causing deaths, particularly with regard to the use of plastic bullets. Even the number of wounded dropped by 12 percent from 1989 to 1990 (13 per day in 1990, as against 14 in 1989 and 10 in 1988).

The number of wounded Israeli soldiers rose from year to year; most recently, between 1989 and 1990, by 45 percent. In the third year there were three wounded a day, on average; one year earlier, just over two wounded a day, and during the first year, two per day. In contrast, the number of Israeli civilians wounded did not vary appreciably from year to year.

The number of Palestinians deported from the Territories as a deterrent punishment against sedition remained at the 20–30 mark during the first two years of the intifada; during the third year, 1990, no Palestinians were expelled. Presumably the Israeli authorities refrained from relying on this form of punishment because they concluded that, rather than deterring, it caused an increase in intifada violence. There was also a reduction during the three-year period in the number of houses destroyed as punishment; on the other hand, the number of houses sealed increased from year to year. This may reflect a conscious policy decision by the authorities to reduce reliance on the more onerous of these two punishments, the actual destruction of homes.

On a general level, we may conclude that the uprising was played out along fairly uniform lines during its first three years. The third year, 1990, was distinguished by an overall rise in violent incidents, a large drop in numbers of Palestinian dead and even wounded as against the second year, and the authorities’ avoidance of relying on deportation as a means of punishment.

We have noted that this epilogue was written about a month after the beginning of the Gulf war between the allies and Iraq. A few remarks are in order concerning the intifada during this period. Since the war began on January 17, 1991, the intifada has ceased, with almost no violent incidents registered. What caused this turnabout?

For one, a general curfew was declared by the Israeli authorities the moment the war began; this clearly had some restraining effect on the violence. This appears to reinforce somewhat the author’s

Table 6 Violent incidents and casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza: 1988-1990,* IDF Spokesman figures

proposal (see chapter 6) concerning the use of economic pressure on the population as a means of stopping intifada violence temporarily. In the author’s view, however, the principal explanation for this near freeze on intifada violence is the Palestinian population’s understanding that the ‘rules of the game’ in wartime differ totally from those in normal times, and that there is a high risk of provoking far more extreme Israeli reactions to Palestinian violence in the Territories when Israel is at war with one or more Arab countries. Indeed, the Palestinians assess that Israel will exploit a war situation to take extreme steps, even ‘transfer,’ against the Palestinians, if sufficiently provoked.

This presumed Palestinian assessment forms the backdrop, then, for the current cessation of the intifada. In an earlier instance, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when two powerful Arab armies (Egypt and Syria) attacked the IDF, the Territories were also almost completely tranquil due to the Palestinian population’s fears of an extreme Israeli reaction.

Clearly, while the Gulf war is in progress it is impossible to assess clearly the future of the intifada in the post-war period. In looking at the key factors that are likely to influence post-war developments, we can postulate that the war will end in one of two ways. A clear-cut victory for the allied coalition, and a corresponding setback for Saddam Hussein, is likely to weaken Iraq as well as those, like the PLO, who supported it. It would remove Saddam from power, and strengthen the hand of Syria. Alternatively, and less likely, Saddam could withstand the allied offensive, at least to an extent sufficient to allow him to remain in power and survive politically. Conceivably, in this case Iraq might become the leading nationalist force in the Arab East, with a strengthened PLO under its patronage; Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia would be correspondingly weakened, and Jordan would gradually become a full-fledged satellite of Iraq.

How would each of these scenarios redound upon the intifada? In the first case — an Iraqi defeat—the PLO and the Palestinians would be in a position of weakness in the Arab and international arenas alike, as a consequence of their unequivocal support for Saddam’s failed cause. Presumably the Palestinians would assess that their chances for achieving their political goals were receding. Accordingly they would probably seek to inject new energy into the intifada as a means of gaining new bargaining cards and generating incentives to deal politically with their plight. On the other hand, considering their presumed weakness and the absence of the sense of confidence and achievement that had characterized , the first three years of the intifada, we must query whether, in the post-war political atmosphere, the intifada leadership would be capable of inciting the Palestinian masses in the Territories to a renewed struggle. Quite the contrary, a renewed intifada might bring upon the Palestinians heavy political and economic damages.

In the second case, wherein Saddam Hussein withstands the allied offensive and survives politically—a less likely scenario — the PLO’s status would improve, as the Palestinians would be bolstered by the Iraqi success. Here the Palestinian calculations would be as follows. On the one hand, out of a sense of elation and achievement, they might renew the intifada on a large and extreme scale, in order to exploit the success of their Iraqi patron against the allies. On the other hand, the Palestinians would be obliged to take into account the interests and constraints of their Iraqi patron—which would not necessarily parallel their own.

To conclude this brief and admittedly speculative assessment of the fate of the intifada after the Gulf war, the uprising would appear likely to reemerge, indeed, even to become more acute. This eventuality is particularly probable to the extent that the war does not produce a resounding Iraqi defeat, but rather the appearance of an Iraqi political triumph that could be adopted by the Palestinians and the PLO. This would be seen as an opportunity to increase the pressure on Israel, by means of the intifada, in order to produce concrete achievements for the Palestinians in the form of Israeli concessions.

Notes

Chapter One

¹ Interview to the Voice of Israel in English, December 10, 1987, according to FBIS-NES-87–238, December 11, 1987, p. 24.

² Rashad al-Shawa, Ha’aretz, December 18, 1987.

³ Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary General in Accordance with Resolution 605 (1987), Security Council Document S/1943, January 21, 1988, p. 5.

⁴ Interview granted by the Prime Minister of Jordan to CBS, as broadcast by Amman Radio, in English, January 3, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–001, January 4, 1988, p. 38.

⁵ According to UNRWA figures, approximately 278,000 refugees reside outside refugee camps, in addition to 92,000 in the camps. Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria, The Refugee Camps in Judea and Samaria, p. ii (Hebrew).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Dr. Hisham Awertani, from Anabta, in a background talk with the author held durirtg a symposium at Oxford University, July 9, 1988.

⁸ The Gaza Strip: A Political Profile, Civil Administration in the Gaza District, April 1986, p. 44 (Hebrew).

⁹ Ha’aretz, January 20, 1988.

¹⁰ Salah Khalaf, interview to the Paris-based Al-Vattan al-Arabi , April 21, 1989, according to FBIS-NES-89–080-A, April 27, 1989, p. 5.

¹¹ Gaza Profile, p. 18.

¹² IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak, Ma’ariv, February 17, 1989.

¹³ The sources for the discussion of the Shabiba are: Avinoam Bar-Yosef, Ma’ariv, December 25, 1987; Roni Shaked, Yediot Aharonot , March 21, 1988; and Mordechai Artzieli, Ha’aretz, March 25, 1988.

¹⁴ Gaza Profile, pp. 40–43.

¹⁵ “Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement” (Hamas).

¹⁶ Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria, Islamic Activity in the Judea and Samaria Region, April 1988 (Hebrew).

¹⁷ Arafat interview, The Jerusalem Post, February 12, 1989.

¹⁸ Project on Low-Intensity Warfare, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University.

¹⁹ Ma’ariv, July 15, 1988.

²⁰ Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, Shmuel Goren, interview to The Jerusalem Post, May 30, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–105, June 1, 1988, p. 22.

²¹ IDF Assistant Chief of Operations Brig. Gen. Giora Rom, Ha’aretz, May 9, 1988.

²² Background talk with Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, August 3, 1988.

²³ “Gaza Strip--Islamic Activity,” evaluation of the Arab Affairs Department, Civil Administration, Gaza Strip, January 1987.

²⁴ Brig. Gen. Shaike Erez, head of the Gaza District Civil Administration, interview in Ma’ariv, November 13, 1987.

²⁵ “The status quo of continued Israeli military and civilian rule in Judea and Samaria cannot endure indefinitely,” Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev, The Vest Bank: Line of Defense (New Yorks Praeger, 1985), p. 1.

²⁶ Gazit, Carrot and Stick, p. 338.

²⁷ Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev, “Status Quo or Autonomy?” in Alouph Hareven, ed., Can the Palestinian Problem Be Solved? (Jerusalem: Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation, 1982), p. 90 (Hebrew; English ed., 1983).

²⁸ In 1987 there were 478 incidents of tire burning, as compared with 172 in 1986; 418 incidents of stone-throwing as compared with 174 in 1986; 82 incidents of the erection of road barriers as compared with 49, and 268 demonstrations and riots as compared with 114 in 1986.

²⁹ Ha’aretz, November 17, 1987. Data of the Border Police Command in Judea and Samaria as conveyed to the Minister of Police during a tour of the region.

³⁰ IDF Spokesman data, Ma’ariv, January 1, 1988.

³¹ Arafat, interview, The Jerusalem Post.

³² Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna in a briefing to journalists, The Jerusalem Post, October 12, 1988.

³³ Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Ha’aretz, October 14, 1987.

³⁴ Coordinator of Activities Shmuel Goren, interview in Hadashot, October 16, 1987.

³⁵ Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, interview in Der Spiegel, according to Ha’aretz, August 5, 1988.

³⁶ Brig. Gen. Shaike Erez, head of the Gaza District Civil Administration, IDF Radio, December 13, 1987, according to FBIS-NES-87–241, December 16, 1987, p. 27.

³⁷ Ha’aretz Weekly Magazine, end of January 1988, pp. 6–7.

³⁸ Ma’ariv, March 11, 1988.

³⁹ IDF Chief of Staff Shomron, Ma’ariv, December 23, 1987.

⁴⁰ Interview with Defense Minister Rabin, Davar, according to FBIS-NES-88–029, February 12, 1988, p. 33.

⁴¹ Defense Minister Rabin, Voice of Israel, February 16, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–030, February 16, 1988, p. 35.

⁴² Interview in the Labor Party monthly Spectrum, June 1988, p. 21.

⁴³ Jerusalem Mayor Kollek, Der Spiegel.

Chapter Two

¹ The discussion is based on Zvi Al-Peleg, “The Events of 1936–39: Riots or Revolt” (Shiloah Institute, Tel Aviv University, January 1977; Hebrew); Yehuda Slutzky, The History of the Haganah, II (Ma’arachot Publishing House, 1964; Hebrew) and A Survey of Palestine (British Government Printer, 1946).

² IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Shomron, in an interview to Davar, July 18, 1989.

³ The sources for this brief survey are: Alistair Horne, A Savage Mar of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (London: Macmillan, 1977; Hebrew translation, Ma’arachot Publishing House, 1989); Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France (New York: Praeger, 1963); and Edgar O’Ballance, The Algerian Insurrection, 1954‘1962 (London: Faber and Faber, 1962).

⁴ Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, Carrot and Stick (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1985; Hebrew), p. 269.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 316–317.

⁶ The description of the disturbances is based on a background talk with Maj. Gen. (res.) Raphael Vardi on January 19, 1988.

⁷ Document of the coordinator of government activities, Davar, January 8, 1988.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Vardi interview.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Gazit, Carrot and Stick, p. 276.

¹³ Background talk with Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, August 21, 1988.

Chapter Three

¹ Yasir Arafat, Le Monde, January 16, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–013, January 21, 1988, p. 4.

² Arafat to BBC Arabic Service, December 20, 1987, according to FBIS-NES-87–247, December 24, 1987, p. 4.

³ Al-Quds Radio, January 21, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-880–014, January 22, 1988, p. 4.

⁴ Ha’aretz, February 14, 1988, and IHT, February 7, 1988.

⁵ Yasir Arafat, Radio Monte Carlo, February 5, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–026, February 9, 1988, p. 6.

⁶ Leaflet No. 5 of the United National Command of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories (hereafter: UNC), distributed in Judea-Samaria on January 27, 1988.

⁷ Dr. Yasir Ubayd, “Building a Constructive Political Process: A Palestinian Perspective,” The Soref Symposium, April 17–18, 1988, p. 11, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

⁸ Yasir Arafat in a press conference with Israeli journalists in Cairo, Ha’aretz, February 24, 1988.

⁹ UNC Leaflet No. 7, February 13, 1988.

¹⁰ Interview with Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), February 3, 1989, FBIS-NES-89–022, p. 5.

¹¹ UNC Leaflet N. 6, Al-Quds Radio in Arabic, according to FBIS-NES-88–025, February 8, 1988, p. 3.

¹² Arafat, Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic, according to FBIS-NES-88–026, February 9, 1988, p. 4.

¹³ UNC Leaflet No. 9, as broadcast by Al-Quds Radio, Syria, March 1, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–041, March 3, 1988, p. 5.

¹⁴ Interview with Salah Khalaf, February 3, 1989, according to FBIS-NBS-89–012, p. 5.

¹⁵ UNC Leaflet No. 2, January 10, 1988, called “for the holding of democratic elections for all the municipal and village councils in the Vest Bank and Gaza.” See also Leaflet No. 9, ibid.

¹⁶ Ziad Abu Ziyad, background talk with the author, February 8, 1988.

¹⁷ Interview with Bethlehem Mayor Ellas Freij, Voice of Israel in Arabic, December 30, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-89–002, January 4, 1989, p. 28.

¹⁸ “Data on Riots,” as of April 8, 1989, document of the IDF Spokesman’s Information Branch.

¹⁹ Head of the IDF’s History Department, Col. Benny Michelson, Ha’aretz, February 2, 1989.

²⁰ “Data on Riots,” as of June 6, 1989, document of the IDF Spokesman’s Information Branch, June 22, 1989.

²¹ IDF Spokesman, background material, February, May, June 1988.

²² “Data on Riots,” April 8, 1989.

²³ Ha’aretz, August 29, 1988.

²⁴ Ibid., June 8, 1988.

²⁵ “Data on Riots,” June 6, 1989.

²⁶ Defense Minister Rabies statement in the Knesset, The Jerusalem Post, February 2, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–21, February 2, 1988, p. 27: “A majority of the Arab population sympathizes with the policy of violent confrontation.”

²⁷ Rabin, Voice of Israel, according to FBIS-NES-88–013, February 4, 1988, p. 30.

²⁸ “Data on Riots,” June 6, 1989.

²⁹ Arafat, Radio Monte Carlo, February 5, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–026, February 9, 1988, p. 5: “For now our decision is to refrain from using arms in this blessed uprising.” Similarly, George Habash, FBIS-NES-88–042, Annex, March 3, 1988, p. 1: “Veapons instead of stones in the Israeli Occupied Territories? No, for the present we believe that the political and mass struggle is producing good results.”

³⁰ Arafat in a press conference in Tunis, January 27, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–017, January 27, 1988, p. 5.

³¹ Hana Siniora, Ha’aretz, February 14, 1988.

³² Arafat in an interview to Stern, February 11, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–033, February 19, 1988, p. 2.

³³ Naif Hawatima, head of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in an interview to al-Safir, Lebanon, March 8, 1989, Hebrew trans. in Hatsav 843/0418/4, March 28, 1989.

³⁴ Arafat, interview in The Jerusalem Post, February 12, 1989.

³⁵ Arafat on Radio Monte Carlo, February 5, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–026, February 9, 1988, p. 5.

³⁶ Chief of Staff Shomron, Ha’aretz, March 21, 1988.

³⁷ Based on a background talk with the late Commander Yehudai of the Israel Police, March 17, 1989.

³⁸ Arafat, Radio Baghdad, June 17, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–118, June 20, 1988, p. 4.

³⁹ “Summary of Forest Fires--Summer 1988,” Letter No. 101–1320, December 13, 1988, signed by Gideon Kedar, Jewish National Fund’s Afforestation Department, fire-fighting unit; and a JNF spokesman document of July 1989.

⁴⁰ Ha’aretz, June 15, 1988.

⁴¹ JNF data, July 1989.

⁴² Minister of Industry and Trade Ariel Sharon, Ma’ariv, March 13, 1989, and The Jerusalem Post, March 30, 1989. Sharon said 43 intifada leaders were based in East Jerusalem.

⁴³ IDF 0/C Central Command Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, interview to the IDF weekly Bamachane, February 17, 1988.

⁴⁴ Interview with Shmuel Goren, Voice of Israel, May 14, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–094, May 16, 1988, pp. 23–24.

⁴⁵ Chief of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Amnon Shahak, Ha’aretz, June 30, 1988.

⁴⁶ Defense Minister Rabin to the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Ha’aretz, February 22, 1989.

⁴⁷ Israeli sources, quoted in The Jerusalem Post, February 16, 1989.

⁴⁸ Hana Siniora, Voice of Israel, January 7, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–006, January 11, 1988, p. 48.

⁴⁹ Background talk with Ziad Abu Ziyad, January 8, 1988.

⁵⁰ Siniora, Voice of Israel, January 7, 1988.

⁵¹ Bethlehem Mayor Elias Freij, Ma’ariv, January 8, 1988.

⁵² Background talk with journalist Danny Rubinstein, January 25, 1988.

⁵³ UNC Leaflet No. 9, broadcast by Al-Quds Radio, Syria, March 1, 1988.

⁵⁴ UNC Leaflet No. 10, March 10, 1988, Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria Region, Arab Affairs Department, “Leaflets as a Means of Directing the Population in Judea-samaria,” p. 57 (Hebrew).

⁵⁵ Hamas leaflet, “Leaflets,” March 13, 1988.

⁵⁶ Ha’aretz, April 19, 1989.

⁵⁷ UNC Leaflet No. 3, January 18, 1988, “Leaflets,” p. 15.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ UNC Leaflet No. 5, January 27, 1988, “Leaflets,” p. 23.

⁶⁰ Yaakov Lifschitz, Economic Developments in the Administered Territories 1967–1969, Ma’arachot Publishing House, pp. 47–48, 191–193.

⁶¹ “An Important Announcement Agreed to Unanimously by All the United Committees, Personalities and Leaders of the Uprising,” Al-Quds Radio, February 16, 1988.

⁶² UNC Leaflet No. 14, Radio Baghdad, April 20, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–077, April 21, 1988, p. 4.

⁶³ UNC Leaflet No. 3, January 18, 1988, “Leaflets,” p. 15.

⁶⁴ UNC Leaflet No. 8, February 20, 1988, ibid., p. 43.

⁶⁵ Leaflet distributed in Jericho on January 14, 1988 by the Popular Committee for a Civil Revolt, ibid., p. 82.

⁶⁶ Leaflet No. 7, February 13, 1988, ibid., p. 39.

⁶⁷ Leaflet No. 10, March 11, 1988, ibid, p. 58.

⁶⁸ Leaflet No. 7, ibid., p. 39.

⁶⁹ Leaflet No. 10, ibid., p. 57.

⁷⁰ In Leaflet No. 10 residents were urged “not to purchase Israeli and foreign goods for which local substitutes are available, such as cigarettes, sweets, dairy products, and so forth…to boycott Israel agricultural produce and purchase only local produce, in order to guarantee the steadfastness of our farmers.”

⁷¹ Ziad Abu Ziyad, interview, January 8, 1988.

⁷² Leaflet No. 9, March 2, 1988, “Leaflets,” p. 49: “March will be a month in which the inflow of our plundered money into the coffers of the occupation will stop.”

⁷³ Jericho leaflet, ibid.

⁷⁴ Leaflet No. 10, ibid.

⁷⁵ Ha’aretz, March 19, 1988.

⁷⁶ Rabin in the Knesset, IDF Radio, July 20, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–139, July 20, 1988, p. 30.

⁷⁷ Rabin in the Knesset, IDF Radio, July 20, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–139, July 20, 1988, p. 30.

⁷⁸ Fatah leaflet, December 7, 1987--two days before the start of the uprising--to the inhabitants of the Balata refugee camp, stating: “The uniform…represents a government institution that is not interested in serving the inhabitants.” “Leaflets,!! p. 133.

⁷⁹ Leaflet issued by the UNC in Bethlehem, March 22, 1988, ibid., p. 115. ibid., p. 112.

⁸⁰ Leaflet issued by the Coordinating Committee for the Popular National committee of the Uprising in the Occupied Lands, Raaallah, March 20, 1988, ibid., p. 112.

⁸¹ UNC Leaflet No, 6, February 5, 1988, ibid., p. 32.

⁸² Leaflet No. 9, March 2, 1988, ibid., p. 50.

⁸³ PLO Radio in Baghdad, March 10, 1988: “We say to the members of the [Kalkilya] municipal council: You who came at the decision of the military governor and took over the administration of the city--you must submit to the decision of the masses and resign immediately, Enemies of the revolution and the people, the hand of the revolution and the people is long and will execute the verdict of the people as it did in Kabatiyah.”

⁸⁴ Jericho leaflet, “Leaflets.”

⁸⁵ Brig. Gen. Erez, head of the Judea-Samaria Civil Administration, Ma’ariv, February 23, 1989.

⁸⁶ Views expressed by Palestinians at an international symposium held at Oxford University in England, July 8–10, 1988.

⁸⁷ Al-Quds Radio, September 17, 1988, “Announcement to Those Responsible for the Popular Committees in Ramallah and Al-Bira.”

⁸⁸ Ha’aretz, September 6 and 20, 1988.

⁸⁹ Al-Quds Radio, September 17, 1988, ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ The Paris-based weekly Al-Wafaq al-Arabi wael-Dawli, August 4, 1988; and Ma’ariv, August 25, 1988.

⁹² Interview with Defense Minister Rabin, Hadashot, August 26, 1988.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Muhammad Milhim, interview in the Kuwaiti A1-Natan, March 8, 1989, according to FBIS-NES-89–049, March 15, 1989, pp. 18–19.

⁹⁵ Ha’aretz, February 21, 1989.

⁹⁶ Ibid., February 22, 1989.

⁹⁷ Arafat, according to FBIS-NES-88–106, June 2, 1988, p. 2.

⁹⁸ Salah Khalaf, Voice of Palestine, Radio San’a, April 17, 1989, according to FBIS-NES-89–073, April 18, 1989, p. 6.

Chapter Four

¹ Interview with Chief of Staff Shomron, Ha’aretz, March 17, 1989.

² Defense Minister Rabin interviewed on Israel TV’s “Moked” program, January 13, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–009, January 14, 1988, p. 44.

³ Ibid., p. 46.

⁴ A Interview with Chief of Staff Shomron, Yediot Aharonot, January 15, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–011, January 19, 1988, p. 42.

⁵ Interview with Defense Minister Rabin, Educational TV’s “New Evening” program, July 14, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–139, July 20, 1988, p. 27.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Interview with Defense Minister Rabin, Ha’aretz, April 21, 1989.

⁸ Foreign Minister Moshe Arens in reply to a question from The New York Times, according to Ha’aretz, February 5, 1989.

⁹ Shomron, Ha’aretz, March 17, 1989.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Defense Minister Rabin, Jerusalem Post, February 16, 1989.

¹² Rabin, Voice of Israel interview, January 30, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–020, February 1, 1988, p. 46.

¹³ Rabin, Voice of Israel interview, January 26, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–017, January 27, 1988, p. 31.

¹⁴ Rabin, Bamachane, January 27, 1988.

¹⁵ Maj. Gen. Mitzna, ibid., February 17, 1988.

¹⁶ Capt. M., deputy company commander in the Armored Corps, Ha’aretz, August 4, 1988.

¹⁷ Rabin, Voice of Israel, January 26, 1988.

¹⁸ Mitzna, Bamachane.

¹⁹ Talk with an IDF commander in the field, February 1, 1988.

²⁰ Talk with an IDF commander in the field, February 4, 1988.

²¹ Capt. M., Ha’aretz.

²² Rabin, Ma’ariv, September 11, 1988.

²³ Rabin to the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Yediot Aharonot, August 31, 1988.

²⁴ Rabin press conference, according to Ha’aretz, October 5, 1988.

²⁵ Chief of Staff Shomron to the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Ha’aretz, October 5, 1988.

²⁶ Ha’aretz, March 3, 1989.

²⁷ Talk with an IDF commander in the field, February 11, 1988.

²⁸ Rabin to the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Ma’ariv, December 28, 1988. Rabin noted that the most difficult problem was that of stone-throwing and that no solution had as yet been found for it.

²⁹ Rabin, lecture at the Teacher’s Federation House in Tel Aviv, Ha’aretz, February 7, 1989.

³⁰ Rabin in a briefing to correspondents covering the Territories, January 19, 1989.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Rabin, Ha’aretz, February 7, 1989.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Coordinator of Activities Goren during a tour of the Gaza Strip, Ma’ariv, October 17, 1988.

³⁵ Judea-Samaria Civil Administration head Brig. Gen. Erez, lecture during a symposium at Ramat Efal, Ma’ariv, February 23, 1989.

³⁶ Rabin, Ha’aretz, February 7, 1989.

³⁷ Rabin in a lecture to a conference of the Religious Kibbutz Movement, Tel Aviv, Hadashot, May 3, 1989.

Chapter Five

¹ IDF “Data on Riots,” as of June 8, 1989.

² Survey conducted by Prof. Ephraim Yaar and Prof. Yochanan Peres, Ma’ariv, April 4, 1989.

³ Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak interviewed on US PRS-TV, January 19, 1988; The Washington Post, January 22, 1988; Middle East News Agency, January 22, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–015, January 25, 1988, p. 4.

⁴ Mubarak interview to US television, January 19, 1988.

⁵ Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Educational TV’s “New Evening” program, January 25, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–016, January 26, 1988, p. 24.

⁶ Yosef Ben-Aharon, director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, IDF Radio, November 24, 1988, according to FBISNES-88–015, January 25, 1988, p. 43.

⁷ Letter from US Secretary of State George Shultz to the Prime Minister of Israel, March 4, 1988, Yediot Aharonot, March 6, 1988.

⁸ King Hussein interview in Per Spiegel, according to Ha’aretz, February 3, 1988.

⁹ Remarks made by Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan during a visit in Atlanta, Georgia, May 22–26, according to the notes of one of those present.

¹⁰ King Hussein’s speech at the Arab summit meeting in Algiers, June 8, 1988, according to SWB ME/0174, June 10, 1988, p. A/6.

¹¹ King Hussein’s speech to the Jordanian people, July 31, 1988, text translated in Ha’aretz, August 5, 1988.

¹² King Hussein in a press conference in England, August 7, 1988, as reported by Jordan TV, according to FBIS-NES-88–152, August 8, 1988, p. 30.

¹³ Author’s talk with a West Bank mayor, August 24, 1988.

¹⁴ Distributed to journalists during the Arab summit conference in Algeria, June 7–9, 1988, originally published in the London Middle East Mirror, June 2, 1988, and quoted on June 15 by The Washington Post.

¹⁵ Reuters from Tunis, Ha’aretz, June 30, 1988.

¹⁶ Al-Quds Radio, according to FBIS-NES-88–119, June 21, 1988, pp. 6–7.

¹⁷ Arafat interview in Al-Nahar, according to FBIS-NES-89–041, March 3, 1989, p. 4.

¹⁸ Ha’aretz, August 12, 1988.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., August 9, 1988.

²¹ Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) in a closed session of the PNC, November 14, 1988, according to the Kuwaiti Al-Anba, December 13–14, Hebrew translation in Hatsav 843/0721/6, December 25, 1988, p. 3.

²² Proclamation of independence by Arafat, Ha’aretz, November 16, 1988; and Algerian TV, November 15, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–220, November 15, 1988, p. 10.

²³ “Declaration of the Independence of Palestine,” Ha’aretz, November 16, 1988.

²⁴ “PLO Corner” on Radio Baghdad, November 15, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–221, November 16, 1988, p. 4, and Hatsav 843/002, December 5, 1988, p. 30.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Arafat interview in Der Spiegel, according to Ha’aretz, December 28, 1988.

²⁸ Salah Khalaf at closed PNC session, November 14, 1988.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

³⁰ Arafat address to the UN General Assembly meeting in Geneva, December 13, 1988, Radio Monte Carlo, December 13, 1988.

³¹ Arafat press conference, December 15, 1988, according to SWB, December 17, 1988.

³² Press conference held by Secretary of State Shultz, November 15, 1988, according to USIS/C0MM, pp. 2–3, December 15, 1988.

³³ Defense Minister Rabin, Voice of Israel, April 27, 1989, and Rabin to the Alignment Knesset caucus, April 30, 1989.

³⁴ Rabin, interview in Ha’aretz, April 21, 1989.

³⁵ Rabin in Alignment caucus, April 30, 1989.

³⁶ Rabin, Israel TV interview, January 20, 1989, according to FBIS-NES-87–014, January 24, 1989, p. 28.

³⁷ Rabin, Voice of Israel, April 27, 1989.

³⁸ Rabin briefing to correspondents in the Territories, January 9, 1989.

³⁹ Rabin, Israel TV interview, January 20, 1989, p. 27.

⁴⁰ Rabin, briefing, January 9, 1989.

⁴¹ Rabin in Alignment caucus, April 30, 1989.

⁴² Rabin, briefing, January 9, 1989.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Sari Nusseibah, Jerusalem Post, February 6, 1989.

⁴⁵ Elias Freij, Ma’ariv, January 22, 1989.

⁴⁶ Sari Nusseibah, Jerusalem Post, February 6, 1989.

⁴⁷ Ahmad Abd al-Rahman, PLO official spokesman, Radio Baghdad, January 30, 1989, according to FBIS-NES-89–019, January 31, 1989, p. 3.

⁴⁸ A Gaza lawyer, Ma’ariv, January 22, 1989.

⁴⁹ Journalist Daoud Kuttab, Ma’ariv, January 22, 1989.

⁵⁰ Freij, Ma’ariv, January 22, 1989.

⁵¹ Nusseibah, Jerusalem Post.

⁵² Israeli government political initiative, Government Press Office, May 14, 1989.

⁵³ Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, interview in Yediot Aharonot, April 19, 1989.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Prime Minister Shamir to the Knesset’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee, Ha’aretz, April 18, 1989.

⁵⁶ Shamir, interview in Yediot Aharonot.

⁵⁷ Shamir to Knesset committee.

⁵⁸ Jerusalem Post, July 5, 1989.

⁵⁹ Arafat, Radio Baghdad, April 18, 1989, according to FBIS-NBS-89–074, April 19, 1989, p. 2.

⁶⁰ According to SVB, ME/0497/-A/5, July 1, 1989.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Interview in the Egyptian Al-Mussawar, May 12, 1989, Hebrew translation in Hatsav 843/007, May 16, 1989.

⁶³ Salah Khalaf, Interview to the Paris-based Al-Wattan, according to FBIS-NES-89–080, April 27, 1989, P-5.

⁶⁴ Arafat interview in the Egyptian Al-Ahram, according to Ha’aretz, July 28, 1989.

⁶⁵ UNC Leaflet No. 38, Ha’aretz, April 12, 1989.

⁶⁶ Faiz Abu Rahma, chairman of the Gaza Bar Association, in a meeting with the head of the Gaza District Civil Administration, Ha’aretz, April 12, 1989.

⁶⁷ Mansour al-Shawa, chairman of a charitable association, in a meeting with the head of the Gaza District Civil Administration, Ha’aretz, May 21, 1989.

⁶⁸ Ma’ariv, April 17, 1989.

⁶⁹ Daoud Kuttab in Monday Report, April 12, 1989, published in East Jerusalem and edited by Sari Nusseibah.

⁷⁰ Survey by the East Jerusalem weekly Al-Bayader As-Siyasi, according to Ha’aretz, July 21, 1989.

⁷¹ Ha’aretz, April 27, 1989.

⁷² Meeting with the owner of a large factory in the West Bank, January 29, 1989.

⁷³ Hisham Awartani, lecture at Tel Aviv University’s Dayan Center, Jerusalem Post, April 17, 1989.

⁷⁴ Minister of Communications and Economics Gad Ya’akobi, Ma’ariv, December 6, 1988. An identical assessment was given by the head of the Defense Ministry’s Budget Branch, Mafariv, July 12, 1989.

⁷⁵ Ya’akobi, Ha’aretz, March 12, 1989.

⁷⁶ Finance Minister Shimon Peres, lecture at the Press Club in Tel Aviv, Ha’aretz, June 2, 1989.

⁷⁷ Memorandum from the president of the Contractors’ Center, David Stern, to Housing and Construction Minister David Levy, March 1988, Ha’aretz, September 19, 1988.

⁷⁸ Jerusalem Post, December 21, 1988.

⁷⁹ Ibid., March 30, 1989.

⁸⁰ Ma’ariv, June 21, 1988.

⁸¹ Deputy Chief of Staff Barak, lecture at the Press Club in Tel Aviv, December 4, 1988, Ha’aretz, December 5, 1988.

⁸² Ma’ariv, June 21, 1988.

⁸³ Israel Statistical Abstract, 1988, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1988, p. 31.

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 36–38.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 60.

⁸⁷ Israel Police data.

⁸⁸ Yediot Aharonot, April 1, 1989.

Chapter Six

¹ Chief of Staff Shomron, interview in Ha’aretz, March 17, 1989.

² Ibid.

³ Ma’ariv, June 23, 1989.

⁴ A Reserve soldier in a paratroop battalion, Ha’aretz, January 18, 1989.

⁵ Meir Amir and Muki Gur, Ha’aretz, January 10, 1989.

⁶ Ma’ariv, February 15, 1989.

⁷ Shomron, Ha’aretz, March 17, 1989. In this regard, 1989 registered an improvement.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Minister Without Portfolio Ehud 0lmert, interview in Ha’aretz, May 12, 1989.

¹⁰ For a similar formulation, see Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution, Report of a JCSS Study Group, Joseph Alpher, Coordinator, 1989, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University (distributed by the Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem), p. 21.

Appendices

Appendix 1

Disturbances in Judea-Samaria and Gaza, 1967-1987, IDF Department of History figures*

Year
Judea-Samaria
Gaza
Total

1967/8
50
41
91

1968/9
330
242
572

1969/70
114
54
168

1970/1
143
267
410

1971/2
101
153
254

1972/3
108
36
144

1973/4
?
?
?

1974/5
205
16
221

1975/6
519
39
558

1976/7
1000
?
?

1977/8
550
?
?

1978/9
400
?
?

1979/80
427
?
?

1980/1
534
?
?

1981/2
1500
?
?

1982/3
4359
491
4850

1983/4
3092
560
3652

1984/5
2527
719
3246

1985/6
1984
843
1827

1986/7
1513
1341
2854

1987/8
1628
?
?

* Data are partial and inaccurate. Some data regarding this period are missing, and figures do not include PLO flag waving, proclamations, slogans or incitement literature.

Appendix 2

Violent incidents in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada, IDF Spokesman figures

Appendix 3

Israeli casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada, IDF Spokesman figures

Appendix 4

Palestinian casualties in Judea-Samaria and Gaza during the intifada, IDF Spokesman figures

Appendix 5
Leaflet no. 9 issued by the Unified National Leadership of the Popular Uprising

[Al-Quds Palestinian Arab Radio in Arabic, March 1, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–042, 3 March 1988, pp. 4–5)

…Our masses, we are running the battle with you and through you. That’s why the following has been decided:

1. The continued enforcement of the present arrangements with respect to the opening of businesses and shops from 2 to 3 hours daily in accordance with the circumstances of every area.

2. The need for our productive plants to operate at full capacity to enable the largest possible boycott of Zionist goods. These plants will suspend their activities only on the days of the general strikes announced by the Unified National Leadership.

3. With respect to industrial areas outside the cities which house shops, blacksmith workshops, garages, and others, these areas will open for business from the morning until 1300 with the exception of the days of general strike during which they will be closed.

4. The need to keep open all clinics, dispensaries, and health centers all the time.

5. The nonpayment of fines imposed by the fascist Zionist military courts on our sons the detainees.

We urge property owners to demonstrate the ethics of our heroic people by reaching an understanding with their tenants on the amount of rent due to them for the last 3 months.

We urge our people in the cities, villages, and camps to form collection funds under the supervision of national and popular committees in the various quarters of the cities, villages, and camps to offer assistance and aid to those who need it in their respective locations. We also warn against responding to those who collect such assistance from outside these committees which you have formed.

The Unified National Leadership calls for exposing all the methods of sedition and sabotage to which the Zionist enemy resorts, such as setting cars on fire or disseminating rumors or statements to fragment our people’s unity.

We address a militant greeting to the sons of Qabatiyah who have taught a lesson to those who betray their homeland and people. We call on those who work in the civil administration and the police departments to stop working there, to immediately resign, and to join our people in their struggle and heroic uprising.

Sons of the independent state, while it praises your struggle and pledges to pursue the struggle with you and through you until the establishment of our independent state, the Unified National Leadership calls on the masses of the uprising and our children wherever they may be to carry out the following:

1. To use all means to topple the appointed municipal and rural committees which are the tools of the power-sharing capitulatory plan.

These committees stand in the trench that is hostile to our people, particularly after they refused to submit to the will of the masses of the uprising which have given them the chance to resign before it is too late. However, these committees insisted on continuing to betray their people and put themselves in the service of the enemy and its objectives.

2. The proclamation of 5 March 1988 as the day of the return to the land, working on it and cultivating it collectively.

3. The proclamation of Sunday, 6 March 1988, as the day of the Palestinian flag on which Palestinian flags will be flown on all locations and on every house. Flags will also be flown during the tumultuous demonstrations.

The Unified National Leadership also calls on the Palestinian and Arab masses throughout the Arab homeland and abroad to hold demonstrations on this day, and to fly Palestinian flags.

4. The teaching staff and students working or studying in educational institutions should proceed to these institutions, thus voiding the Zionist enemy’s decision.

5. Let us escalate the war of attrition against the enemy, block the roads leading to the settlements, and put black paint over Hebrew inscriptions on walls, particularly inscriptions having a terrorist connotation.

6. The celebration on Tuesday of the 8 March anniversary, that of world women’s day, by having Palestinian women go to the streets in tumultuous demonstrations announcing their rejection of the occupation and setting the most splendid examples of how to confront the Zionist army.

7. The proclamation of martyrs day which falls on 9 March 1988 as a day of general strike and of mass demonstrations in the streets to celebrate the beginning of the 4th month of the glorious uprising and to commemorate the first group of martyrs of the popular uprising. Let this day become a new day of anger against the Zionists.

8. Holding tumultuous demonstrations starting from mosques and churches on Fridays and Sundays.

Glory and praise to the martyrs of our heroic people. Ignominy and defeat to the US settlement plans. God is with us. Victory is close. Let us proceed to liberate the land and man. Al-Quds, the Palestinian Arab Radio on the path of liberating land and man.

Appendix 6
Leaflet no. 28 issued by the PLO, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising: “The Call of Independence”

[Baghdad Voice of the PLO in Arabic, October 30, 1988, according to FBIS-NES-88–211, 1 November 1988 pp. 5–6]

…Our great masses: The Unified National Leadership would like to call the following points to your attention:

1. We would stress the importance of strict observance of the days of general strike called by the Unified National Leadership in its official statements instructing the strike forces to see to its implementation.

2. The Unified National Leadership would like to remind you that the partial strike hours run between 0800 and 1200.

3. The Unified National Leadership urges the sinking of marginal and side differences that may disrupt our blessed, militant march.

4. It stresses the common aim and destiny of all sectors of our people and national factions of establishing an independent state and of self-determination. We call for closure of ranks and directing all energies to defeating occupation.

5. We stress the importance of popular education and the need to condense it and making the required efforts to make it a success, given the shutdown of educational institutions by occupation authorities.

6. The need to keep the schools open in Jerusalem and Gaza and not to give further justifications to the occupation authorities to close them again.

7. We urge popular committees and strike forces to organize voluntary work and join assistance groups to help our farmers reap their olive harvests in all areas.

8. The Unified National Leadership stresses what was mentioned in its previous statements, the importance of commitment to boycotting the occupation’s circles as much as possible, and implementation of the instructions of the local leaderships of the Unified National Leadership in this regard.

o masses of the sacred uprising. The Unified National Leadership urges you to carry out the militant missions and activities as follows:

Tuesday, 1 November, is the day of the martyred child.

Wednesday, 2 November, is the day of overall strike on the occasion of the ill-starred Balfour Declaration, and the day of overall escalation.

Friday, 4 November, the day for harvesting the olive crop and on which assistance groups and the social work and voluntary committees will help our farmers to harvest the olive crop.

Sunday, 6 November, is the day of solidarity with Ansar 3 detainees and all our detainees.

Monday, 7 November, is the day of education on which denunciation cables will be sent regarding the continuation of the policy of making our people illiterate. Sit-ins and protest marches will also be staged against the continued closure of educational institutions.

Wednesday, 9 November, is the day of comprehensive strike to mark the passage of 12 months of our uprising. Marches will be held and visits to martyrs’ tombs and the families of detainees will take place.

Friday, 11 November, is the day of family and social cooperation. Needy families will be assisted and social visits will be exchanged.

Saturday, 12 November, is the day of the PNC. Festivals, meetings, and conferences will be held. Marches will be organized and militant cables will be sent to the PNC on the occasion of its session. The days of the PNC session will be days for special escalation. Throw more Molotov cocktails, firebombs, and stones. Let us bum the ground under the feet of the Zionist invaders.

Tuesday, 15 November, is the day of national independence on which the masses of our Palestinian people everywhere will center their attention on Algiers pending the national independence declaration. It will be a day of comprehensive celebrations, whose activities include:

A. Raising Palestinian flags over every house and place and writing national slogans in the name of the Unified National Leadership.

B. Visiting the tombs of the martyrs who sacrificed their souls for the sake of freedom and independence.

C. Organizing rallies in which national songs are sung and strike forces and scouts march.

D. All the masses of our people will take to the streets at 1600 on 15 November. They will use loudspeakers and chant: My country, my country, my country: My love and heart are for you. These activities will continue for 3 days.

Saturday, 19 November, is the day of comprehensive strike on the anniversary of the martyrdom of symbol leader ’Izz al-Din al-Qassam.

Fridays and Sundays are days of prayer for the souls of the martyrs. Sweeping demonstrations will be held in support of the extraordinary PNC session’s decisions.

O our masses, O sons of Al-Qassam, O brothers of martyr Abu Jihad and all our righteous martyrs: Make more sacrifices, throw more Molotov cocktails, and achieve more unity. We will continue to resist together on the martyrs’ path. Long live the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of our people wherever they may be, long live the 15th of November, the day of national independence, long live the brave uprising of our people.

[Signed] The PLO, the Unified National Leadership, 30 October 1988

Appendix 7

Number of incidents in Jerusalem Area monthly from December 1987 till March 1989, Israel Police figures

Month
Number of Incidents

January 1988
189

February
159

March
205

April
147

May
224

June
444

July
516

August
303

September
366

October
543

November
548

December
657

January 1989
449

February
281

March
279

Number of incidents in Jerusalem area during 1988, by type of incident, Israel Police figures

Type of Incident
Number of Incidents

Stone throwing
1760

PLO flag waving and slogans
1229

Roadblocks
708

Tire-burning
283

Petrol bombs
114

Arson
92

TOTAL
4186

Appendix 8

Number of incidents of arson in Judea-Samaria and Gaza, IDF Spokesman figures

Month
Judea-Samaria
Gaza
Total

1987

December
11
1
12

1988

January
18
7
25

February
42
8
50

March
36
7
43

April
37
11
48

May
33
5
38

June
23
6
29

July
24
1
25

August
32
-
32

September
20
7
27

October
9
2
11

November
19
1
20

December
22
3
25

1989

January
25
4
29

February
21
4
25

March
20
4
24

April
26
1
37

May
35
3
38

TOTAL
453
85
538

Appendix 9

Number of houses demolished or sealed in Judea-Samaria and Gaza from December 1987 to May 1989, IDF Spokesman figures*

Month
Judea-Samaria
Gaza

Demolished
Sealed
Demolished
Sealed

1988

Jan
-
-
-
-

Feb
-
-
-
-

Mar
10
-
1
-

Apr
21
-
2
1

May
1
6
2
-

Jun
10
9
5
-

Jul
10
6
6
1

Aug
13
2
7
-

Sep
16
1
-
-

Oct
3
-
7
1

Nov
17
12
7
9

Dec
4
1
5
-

1989

Jan
15
8
-
5

Feb
1
3
2
4

Mar
15
3
12
4

Apr
-
-
-
-

May
12
7
-
-

TOTAL
148
88
56
25

* No houses were demolished or sealed in December 1987.

Total houses demolished: 204.

Total houses sealed: 113.

The figures do not include demolition/sealing of a solitary room/store.

Appendix 10

Petrol bombs throvn in Judea-Samaria and Gaza from December 1987 to June 21, 1989, IDF Spokesman figures

Month
Judea-Samaria
Gaza
Total

1987

December
62
47
109

1988

January
85
13
98

February
121
43
164

March
126
26
152

April
83
36
119

May
138
25
163

June
94
27
121

July
62
46
108

August
81
32
113

September
51
32
83

October
42
16
58

November
49
9
58

December
36
8
44

1989

January
49
18
67

February
45
14
59

March
40
20
60

April
55
17
72

May
71
15
86

TOTAL
1290
444
1734

Appendix 11

Palestinians exiled from Judea-Samaria and Gaza, from December 1987 to June 21, 1989, IDF Spokesman figures*

Month
Judea-Samaria
Gaza
Total

1988

January
4
-
4

February
-
-
-

March
-
-
-

April
11
5
16**

May
-
-
-

June
-
-
-

July
-
-
-

August
6
6
12

September
-
-
-

October
-
-
-

November
-
-
-

December
-
-
-

1989

January
7
6
13

February
-
-
-

March
-
-
-

April
-
-
-

May
-
-
-

TOTAL
28
17
45

* No Palestinians were exiled in December 1987.

** Before the rioting began, 3 Palestinians had been served writs of exile. Due to legal proceedings, their exile was delayed until April 1988.

Appendix 12

The Mubarak Plan

[the main points of President Mubarak’s Plan, presented in an interview with The Jerusalem Post, January 22, 1988]

In his initiative, Mubarak said he will urge the Palestinians to stop all violent acts against Israelis in return for agreement by Israel to halt new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, to move toward an international peace conference and to “respect and strictly observe the political rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza” over the next six months. His proposal also would guarantee the protection of all inhabitants of the occupied territories.

“I know that not everybody will agree to all of this at first and that I will be criticized,” Mubarak said. “But we cannot sit by with our hands folded when the alarm is ringing. Perhaps this proposal can turn the wheel of the peace process.”

Shamir has rejected a peace conference under UN auspices and argues that only direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan can lead to peace. Mubarak used today’s interview to put new public emphasis on his belief that an international conference would be a ceremonial prelude to direct negotiations.

“If the Israelis want direct negotiations, I’m telling them, an international conference will start and the negotiations will be bilateral,” he said, gesturing emphatically with his right hand and leaning forward in his arm chair. Egypt and the United States would be available “to help if there is a problem,” but would not attempt to impose any solution, he asserted.

Appendix 13

The Shultz Initiative

[according to his letter to the Prime Minister of Israel]

The Secretary of State

Washington

March 4, 1988

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I set forth below the statement of understandings which I am convinced is necessary to achieve the prompt opening of negotiations on a comprehensive peace. This statement of understandings emerges from discussions held with you and other regional leaders. I look forward to the letter of reply of the Government of Israel in confirmation of this statement.

The agreed objective is a comprehensive peace providing for the security of all the States in the region and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Negotiations will start on an early date certain between Israel and each of its neighbors which is willing to do so. These negotiations could begin by May 1, 1988. Each of these negotiations will be based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, in all their parts. The parties to each bilateral negotiation will determine the procedure and agenda of their negotiation. All participants in the negotiations must state their willingness to negotiate with one another.

As concerns negotiations between the Israeli delegation and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will begin on arrangements for a transitional period, with the objective of completing them within six months. Seven months after transitional negotiations begin, final status negotiations will begin with the objective of completing them within one year. These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Final status talks will start before the transitional period begins. The transitional period will begin three months after the conclusion of the transitional agreement and will last for three years. The United States will participate in both negotiations and will promote their rapid conclusion. In particular, the United States will submit a draft agreement for the parties’ consideration at the outset of the negotiations on transitional arrangements.

Two weeks before the opening of negotiations, an international conference will be held. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be asked to issue invitations to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. All participants in the conference must accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounce violence and terrorism. The parties to each bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference, in a manner to be agreed. The conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached.

Palestinian representation will be within the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian issue will be addressed in the negotiations between the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations. Negotiations between the Israeli delegation and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation will proceed independently of any other negotiations.

This statement of understandings is an integral whole. The United States understands that your acceptance is dependent on the implementation of each element in good faith.

Sincerely yours,
George P. Shultz

Appendix 14

The PNC Declaration of Independence of Palestine

[SWB 16 Nov 88 at the PNC session in Algiers (2480): Algiers television in Arabic 0025 gmt 15 Nov 88]

Excerpt from relay including reading of the Declaration of Independence by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir Arafat at the Palais des Nations in Algiers on 15th November.

(After making some brief introductory remarks, PNC Speaker Abd al-Hamid al-Sa’ih calls Yasir Arafat to the platform to read the Declaration of Independence).

(Arafat) The reading of this declaration was supposed to have been given by my brother and great poet Mahmud Darwish, but he has given me the honour of reading this declaration.

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. The Declaration of Independence.

In the land of heavenly messages to mankind, in the land of Palestine, the Palestinian Arab people were born. They grew up, developed and introduced creativity into their human and national existence through an unbreakable and continuous organic relationship between the people, the land and history. By epic steadfastness during the course of time and in the place, the people of Palestine moulded their national identity, and rose through their steadfastness in the defence of this national identity to the level of a miracle.

Despite the ambitions, greed and invasions which were the outcome of the charm of this old land and its vital position along the lines of engagement between powers and civilisations and the ambitions, greed and invasions which used to result in depriving the people of the capability of realising their political independence, the everlasting adherence of the people to the land was what gave the land its identity and infused the people with the spirit of the homeland, fortified by the dynasties of civilisations and the multiplicity of cultures, inspired by its spiritual and historical heritage.

The Palestinian Arab people have throughout history continued to develop themselves by total unity between land and man. Following the continuous footsteps of the prophets in this blessed land, they raised their voice from every minaret with the prayers of thanks to the Creator and rang the bells of every church and temple for the hymns of mercy and peace. From one generation to another, the Palestinian Arab people never stopped their valiant defence of their homeland. The successive revolutions of our people were a heroic embodiment of the will of national independence.

At a time when the modern world was formulating a system of new values, the local and international balances of power were excluding the Palestinian fate from general destiny. It became clear yet again that justice alone does not turn the wheels of history. Thus the big Palestinian wound was ripped open to show a painful anomaly — people who have been deprived of independence and whose homeland has been subjected to a new type of occupation have been subjected to an attempt to spread the lie that Palestine is a land without people. Despite this historic falsification, the international community, in Article 22 of the Charter of the League of Nations of 1919, and in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, recognised that the Palestinian Arab people, like the rest of the Arab peoples who severed their relations with the Ottoman state, are a free and independent people. Despite the historical injustice which was inflicted on the Palestinian Arab people by making them homeless and by depriving them of their right to self-determination following Resolution 181 of 1947 passed by the UN General Assembly which partitioned Palestine into two States an Arab state and a Jewish state, this resolution still provides conditions for international legitimacy guaranteeing the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty and national independence.

The Israeli forces’ occupation of Palestinian territory and parts of Arab territory and uprooting of the majority of the Palestinians and their dispersal from their homeland by organised terrorism and the subjugation of the rest of them to occupation and oppression as well as operations to destroy the characteristics of their national life as a flagrant violation of the principles of legitimacy and of the UN charter and resolutions which recognise the national rights of the Arab Palestinian people, including the right to return, the right to self determination and to independence and sovereignty in the land of their homeland. Neither in the heart of the homeland nor at its boundaries, nor in far and near places, have the Arab Palestinian people lost their firm faith in their right to return nor their solid conviction in their right to independence. The occupation, massacres and dispersal were not capable of driving out awareness from the Palestinian nor of depriving him of his identity. He continued his epic struggle and pursued the definition of his national personality through growing militancy. The national will defined its political framework in the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people with the recognition of the international community represented by the UN and its institutions and other regional and international organisations. On the basis of faith in the inalienable rights and on the basis of the Pan-Arab unanimity and on the basis of international legitimacy, the PLO led the battles of its great people who are united in their national unity and their legendary steadfastness in the face of massacres and siege in the homeland and outside it.

The great and escalating popular uprising on the occupied soil, along with legendary steadfastness in the camps inside and outside the homeland, has raised human awareness of the Palestinian truth and Palestinian national rights to a higher level of absorption and maturity. It has drawn the final curtain on a whole stage of falsification and weak conscience. It has encircled the official Israeli mentality which has become addicted to the myth and the terror of denying the Palestinian existence.

With the uprising and the revolutionary and militant accumulation of all the positions of the revolution, Palestinian history has reached one of the important historic turning points at which the Palestinian Arab people can once again affirm their inalienable rights and exercise them over Palestinian soil.

On the basis of the natural, historic and legal right of the Palestinian Arab people to their homeland Palestine and the sacrifices of successive generations in defence of the freedom and independence of their homeland and proceeding from the resolutions of Arab summits and from the strength of international legality which are embodied in the UN resolutions since 1947 and in exercise of the right to self-determination and political independence and sovereignty over their soil by the Palestinian Arab people, the PNC declares in the name of God and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people the birth of the state of Palestine on our Palestinian soil with Holy Jerusalem as its capital. (Applause and chants). The PNC declares in the name of God and in the name of the Palestinian Arab people the birth of the state of Palestine on our Palestinian soil with Holy Jerusalem as its capital.

The state of Palestine belongs to Palestinians wherever they may be and in it they can develop their national and cultural identity and enjoy complete equality of rights and in it their religious and political beliefs and human dignity are safeguarded under a democratic parliamentary system that is based on the freedom of opinion and the freedom to form parties (applause and chants) with the majority protecting the rights of the minority and the respect of the minority for the decisions of the majority and based on social justice and equality and non-discrimination in general rights on the basis of race, religion, colour or between male and female (applause and chants), in the light of a constitution which ensures the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary (applause and chants), a constitution which ensures the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary and on the basis of complete loyalty to the spiritual and contemporary heritage of Palestine — tolerance and tolerant co-existence of religions throughout the centuries.

The state of Palestine is an Arab state. It is an indivisible part of the Arab nation from its heritage and civilisation and from its present aspirations for the realisation of its aims, liberation, development, democracy and unity. While it stresses its commitment to the Arab League Charter and its insistence on consolidating joint Arab action, it appeals to the sons of its nation to assist it in completing its practical birth by mobilising the energies and concentrating the efforts to end the Israeli occupation. The state of Palestine declares its commitment to the principles and objectives of the United Nations, and to the international declaration of human rights, and its commitment, too, to the principles of non-alignment and the latter’s (the NonAligned Movement’s) policy. The state of Palestine, while declaring that it is a peace-loving state, committed to the principles of peaceful co-existence, will work with all states and peoples for the realisation of a permanent peace based on justice and the respect for rights. Under this peace, the energies of mankind will be opened up to construction, and under this peace there will be competition for the beautification of life without there being fear for tomorrow as tomorrow does not hold anything except security for those who are just or inclined towards justice.

In the course of its struggle for the establishment of peace on the land of love and peace, the state of Palestine calls on the UN, which shoulders a special responsibility towards the Palestinian Arab people and its homeland, and calls on the peoples of the world and their peace and freedom-loving states to assist it to realise its aims and put an end to the tragedy of its people by providing them (the Palestinian people) with security and by working for ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. It also declares in this respect that it believes in the settlement of international and regional problems by peaceful means according to the UN Charter and its resolutions, and that it rejects threats of force or violence or terrorism or the use of these against its territorial integrity and its political independence or the territorial integrity of any other state, without infringing its own natural rights to defend its own territories and independence. On this immortal day, 15th November, 1988, while we are on the threshold of a new era, we bow out of respect and solemnly before the spirits of our martyrs and the martyrs of the Arab nation who with their pure blood lit the torch of this stubborn dawn and were martyred so that the homeland could live and we raise our hearts in hands to fill them with the light coming from the radiance of the blessed intifadah and from the epic of those standing their ground in the camps and in the diaspora and in exile and those who are carrying the banner of freedom — our children and our old people and our youth, as well as our people who have been taken prisoner and our detainees and our wounded who are living on the sacred soil and in every camp and in every village and in every town and the brave Palestinian woman — the guardian of our existence and our life and the guardian of our eternal fire.

We vow to our heroic martyrs and the masses of our Palestinian Arab people and our Arab nation and all the upright free men in the world to continue the struggle for the removal of occupation and for entrenching sovereignty and independence. We call on our great people to rally round the Palestinian flag, to rally round their Palestinian flag (applause).and to take pride in it and to defend it in order that it may remain for ever a symbol of our freedom, our dignity in a homeland that will always remain a free homeland for a nation of free men (applause). (Koranic verse omitted).

(The Palestinian and the Algerian national anthems are played amid tumultuous applause)

Appendix 15

PNC Political Statement Calls for Settlement of Arab-Israel Conflict, International Conference

[SWB ME/0331 17 Nov 1988: Voice of Palestine 1952 gmt 15 Nov 88]

Text of political statement issued by the PNC at the end of its 19th session in Algiers on 15th November and broadcast by the PLO central radio in Baghdad (ME/0310 A/3)

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. On heroic Algerian territory, and with the hospitality of its people and President Chadli Benjdedid, the PNC held its extraordinary 19th session — the session of the uprising and national independence, the session of the heroic martyr Abu Jihad [Khalil al-Wazir], from 12th to 15th November 1988. This session was crowned by the declaration of the establishment of the Palestinian state on our Palestinian territory, since this is the natural coronation of a popular, daring and stubborn struggle which has been continuing for more than 70 years and is characterised by the great sacrifices offered by our people in the homeland and on its border and in all the camps and areas of the diaspora. The session was characterised by its planning for the great national Palestinian uprising, since it is the most prominent militant event in the contemporary history of the Palestinian people’s revolution, alongside the epic and mythical steadfastness of our people in their camps inside and outside our occupied territory.

Ever since the first days of the uprising and in the 12 months during which it has continued, the basic outlines of our people’s great uprising have been clear. It is a comprehensive popular revolution which manifests the unanimity of the nation — men and women, children and the elderly, camps, villages and cities — to reject the occupation and struggle to overthrow and end it.

This great uprising has unveiled the deeply-entrenched national unity of our people and their total support for the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of our people — all our people — in all the places where they are concentrated inside and outside the homeland. This has been manifested in the participation of the Palestinian masses — all the national, professional, students, workers’, women’s, peasants’, businessmen’s, landlords’, vocational and academic unions and institutions — in the uprising through the unified leadership of the uprising and the popular committees which have been formed in all city districts, villages and camps.

Our people’s revolutionary furnace and blessed uprising, along with the continuous revolutionary and creative accumulation of our revolution in all its locations and arenas inside and outside the homeland, have destroyed the wagers and illusions of our people’s enemies, whose aim is to turn the occupation of the Palestinian land into a permanent fait accompli and to push the question of Palestine into a state of forgetfulness and oblivion. These are the generations who have been brought up on the goals and continuation of the Palestinian revolution and who have experienced all its battles since it started in 1965 up to the present day, going through its heroic steadfastness in the face of the Israeli invasion in 1982, the steadfastness of the revolution camps in Lebanon, and the siege of starvation and death.

These generations, the sons of the revolution and the PLO, affirm the vigour and continuity of this revolution, shaking the land beneath the feet of the occupants. These generations have proven that the militant asset of our people is unlimited and that their staunch belief is genuine and deep-rooted. Through this revolutionary harmony between the children of the RPG and the sacred stones inside and outside our occupied territory, our people have remained steadfast in the face of all attempts by the enemy authorities to stop our popular revolution. They have remained steadfast despite all these authorities’ terrorism, repression, killing, captivity, deportation, encroachment on the Islamic and Christian holy places, violations of the freedom of places of worship, stealing of land, demolition of houses, premeditated killings, sending armed settlers into our villages and camps, burning plants, cutting off water and electricity, beating women and children, use of banned gases that has resulted in the death and abortion of thousands, and practising a policy of stultification through the closure of schools and universities.

Our people paid a price through this heroic steadfastness — hundreds of martyrs; tens of thousands of wounded, prisoners and deportees. Our people’s genius was always present at all critical moments, innovating militant methods to reinforce their steadfastness and resistance and to enable them to confront the enemy’s crimes and measures, and then to continue their heroic, tough struggle.

Our people have proven — through their steadfastness, the continuation of their revolution and the escalation of their uprising — that their determination to continue the struggle, regardless of sacrifices, is unlimited. Our people are armed with a great militant heritage; an unwavering revolutionary will; a firm national unity that was further reinforced through and around the uprising inside and outside the homeland; a comprehensive rally around their national leadership, the PLO; our people’s adherence to their objectives of defeating and ending the Israeli occupation and achieving their inalienable national rights to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of the independent Palestinian state.

In all this, our people relied on the support of our Arab masses, their forces and their stand on their side and support for them. This has been demonstrated in the large-scale Arab support that the uprising has received and the official Arab consensus that was embodied in the Arab summit in Algiers and its resolutions. This affirms that our people are not alone in confronting the racist, fascist onslaught, thus foiling the Israeli aggressors’ attempt to isolate them from the Arab nation’s support for their struggle.

Alongside this Arab solidarity, our people’s revolution and their blessed uprising have won a wide-ranging international solidarity that was manifested by the increase in the understanding of the Palestinian people’s cause and also by the increase in the backing and support being voiced by the world’s peoples and states for our just struggle. In contrast, the world peoples and states condemned the Israeli occupation and its crimes; and this contributed to exposing Israel, to isolating it further and to isolating those supporting and backing it.

UN Security Council Resolutions 605, 607 and 608 and the UN General Assembly [UNGA] resolutions entrenching the Palestinian right against the expulsion of Palestinians from their land, against the Israeli repression and oppression being perpetrated against the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territories were a strong manifestation of the world public opinion’s growing support, including official support, for our people and their representative, the PLO, against the Israeli occupation and its racist practices.

Besides, UNGA resolution 21L43A dated 4th November 1988, which was issued by the session devoted to the uprising, was further evidence of the stance of the overwhelming majority of the world’s peoples and states against the occupation and in support of the just struggle being waged by the Palestinian people and also in support of their inalienable right to freedom and independence.

Through the crimes of the occupation and its brutal and inhuman practices, the lie propagated by the Zionist propaganda machine on the democracy of the Zionist entity has fallen — the lie which had deceived world public opinion for 40 years. Thus, the true image of Israel has emerged as a racist, fascist, settler state based on the usurpation of Palestinian territory and the extermination of the Palestinian people, and which even voices threats and carries out acts of aggression and expansion in neighbouring Arab states. Through this, it has been confirmed that the occupation cannot continue to reap the fruits of its occupation at the expense of the Palestinian people’s rights without paying a price for this on the ground and in the arena of world public opinion.

In addition to the democratic and progressive Israeli forces which rejected and condemned the occupation and also denounced its oppressive practices and measures, the world’s Jewish communities are no longer capable of continuing to defend Israel or of keeping silent over its crimes against the Palestinian people. Several voices from amongst these communities have been raised demanding that these crimes be stopped, that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories and that the Palestinian people be enabled to exercise their right to self-determination.

Through the overall results and effects brought about by our people’s revolution and their blessed uprising in the domestic, Arab and international arenas, the soundness and realism of the PLO’s national programme — the programme based on dismantling the occupation and the realisation of the rights to repatriation, to self-determination and to establish an independent state have been confirmed. It has also been confirmed that our people’s struggle is the decisive factor in guaranteeing the extrication of our national rights from the paws of the occupation.

The authority of the popular masses, represented by their committees, is controlling the situation in the face of the collapse of the occupation authority and its organs. It has also become clear that the international community has become more prepared than ever to help achieve a political settlement of the Middle East issue and its basis, the Palestinian question. The Israeli occupation authorities, backed by the US administration, cannot continue the policy of non-compliance with the international will, which today shows consensus on the need to hold an international conference for peace in the Middle East and to enable the Palestinian people to attain their national rights, foremost of which is their right to self-determination and the exercise of their national independence on their land.

In light of all this; in order to consolidate the steadfastness of our people and their blessed uprising; in response to the will of our masses in the occupied homeland and abroad; and in faithfulness to the martyrs, wounded and detainees, the PNC has decided:

(1) In the field of the continuation and escalation of the uprising:

To secure all means and capabilities to step up the uprising of our people at all levels and by all means to guarantee its continuation and escalation.

To support mass institutions and organisations in the occupied Palestinian territories.

To consolidate and promote the popular committees and mass and specialised trade organisations in order to increase their effectiveness and role, including the strike forces and the popular army.

To affirm the national unity which consecrated and manifested itself splendidly during the uprising.

To intensify work on the international scene to release the detainees, repatriate the deportees and end the acts of organised and institutionalised oppression and terrorism against our children, women, men and institutions.

To call on the United Nations to place the occupied Palestinian territories under international supervision to protect our masses and to end the Israeli occupation.

To call on the Palestinian masses outside the homeland to increase their support and… family solidarity.

To call on the Arab nation—its masses, forces, institutions and governments — to increase their political, material and media support for the uprising.

To call on all honourable and free men in the entire world to support our masses, revolution and uprising to confront the Israeli occupation, its means of oppression, and its fascist formal organised military terrorism, perpetrated by the occupation army, armed men and fanatic settlers against our masses, universities, schools, institutions, national economy and Islamic and Christian holy places.

(2) In the political field, and in light of all the aforementioned, the PNC, from a position of responsibility towards our Palestinian people, their national rights and their desire for peace; based on the Declaration of Independence issued on 15th November 1988; and in response to the human will that seeks to consolidate international detente, eliminate nuclear arms and settle regional conflicts by peaceful means, stresses the determination of the PLO to reach a comprehensive political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its crux the Palestinian question, within the framework of the UN Charter, the provisions and principles of international legitimacy, the rules of international law, and the UN resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolutions 605, 607 and 608, and the Arab summit resolutions in a manner that guarantees the Palestinian Arab people’s right to repatriation, self-determination and the establishment of their independent national state on their national soil, and that will secure security and peace arrangements for all the countries in the region. The attain this, the PNC stresses the following:

The need to convene an effective international conference on the Middle East cause, with the Palestinian cause as its essence, under UN supervision and with the participation of the UN Security Council permanent members and all the parties to the conflict in the region, including the PLO, the Palestinian people’s sole and legitimate representative, on an equal footing, and from the premise that the international conference convenes on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the guaranteeing of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, foremost being the right to self-determination in accordance with the principles and provisions of the UN Charter on the people’s right to self-determination, the impermissibility of seizing the lands of others by force or by armed invasion, and in accordance with the UN resolutions on the Palestinian cause.

Israel’s withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

Cancellation of all the attachment [ilhaq] and annexation measures, the removal of settlements Israel has set up on Palestinian and Arab territories occupied since 1967.

Endeavouring to place the occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem, under UN supervision for a specific period of time in order to protect our people and to create a suitable atmosphere which would render the international conference a success, lead to a comprehensive political settlement and achieve security and peace for all through mutual agreement and consent to enable the Palestinian state to exercise its real authority on these territories.

Resolution of the issue of the Palestinian refugees in accordance with the UN resolutions in this regard.

Securement of the freedom of worship and of the performance of religious rites in the holy places in Palestine for the followers of all religions.

The UN Security Council shall implement and guarantee security and peace arrangements among all the countries concerned in the region, including the Palestinian state.

The PNC reaffirms its previous resolutions on the unique relationship between the two fraternal peoples, the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, and the future relationship between the states of Jordan and Palestine will be established on confederal bases and also on the basis of a free and voluntary choice by the two fraternal peoples to entrench the historical bonds and the vital interests that they share.

The PNC reiterates its abidance by the UN resolutions that acknowledge the peoples’ right to resist foreign occupation, colonialism and racial discrimination, as well as their right to struggle for their independence. The PNC also reiterates its rejection of terrorism in all its forms, including institutionalised terrorism, stressing its commitment to its previous resolutions in this respect, to the resolution of the Arab summit in Algeria in 1988, UN Resolution 159/42 of 1967, Resolution 40/61 of 1985, and the contents of the Cairo declaration issued on 7th November 1985 in this respect….

Appendix 16

Excerpts from Remarks made by Salah Khalaf at a Closed Meeting of the Palestine National Council, November 14, 1988

[Al-Anbaa, Kuwait, 13–14 Dec. 1988]

On the final day of the PNC deliberations, November 14, 1988, 350 of the delegates met during the last hours before the declaration of the independent Palestinian state. The meeting took place behind closed doors. The speakers comprised Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), Faruq Qadumi, George Habash, Naif Hawatima, Samir Ghosha, Anis al-Saia, and Abu Ali Mustafa….

Abu Iyad reiterated that the political statement was intended primarily to recruit Arab and international public opinion, which, in view of Arab impotence, was the only weapon available to the Palestinians….

Abu Iyad emphasized the need for participation in the intifada, along with the need to protect the uprising and to recruit support from many countries. On the other hand, he promised that the political program contained no concessions. He reiterated that no Palestinian welcomed Resolution 242, but this was insignificant, as everything was devoted to aiding friendly countries to accept the decision, with the addition of the right of self-determination.

Abu Iyad did not conceal the fact that the Soviet friends required a flexible political statement. For, in order that they support the Palestinians, there is no alternative but to publish a realistic statement by means of which it will be possible to speak of international agreement. This, in order to show Western Europe that serious developments had indeed taken place….

Abu Iyad admitted that there was no magic formula for the political statement. But he also stated that the Palestinians were not blessed with many weapons. Since one could not rely on the political weapon alone, he advised emerging from the PNC with decisions that explain how to escalate the Palestinian armed struggle, and how to strengthen the struggle in the occupied territories and beyond them….

He noted that the political statement was meant for the Soviet friends. “The enemies will maintain their hostility until there are substantive changes in their positions, or until the two sides reach a general understanding regarding the Palestinians and their tragedy. Thus the PLO must hold on to its friends and strengthen their faith in the problem.” Abu Iyad made this statement with reference to the socialist countries that are renewing their relations with Israel. He added: are the Palestinians to fight alone, and say that Allah is with us and protecting us?…

In noting that the [Arab] doors were closed to the Palestinian struggle, Abu Iyad stated that “no doors are open to us, and all we are left with is the blood of the Palestinian people in the occupied land, in the camps and in South Lebanon. The options are few. We all reject Resolution 242, but that is not the issue on the PNC agenda, since we aspire to a political statement by means of which we can persuade public opinion to stand at our side. After all, it is a shame not to fight with all the weapons at our disposal. There is no alternative to a political statement alongside the rifle in order to talk to international public opinion."…

He promised that the inclusion of Resolution 242 in the political statement would be cloaked in reservations and limitations, such as the right of self-determination, the other UN resolutions, national rights and the UN charter.

Abu Iyad revealed that an Arab leader had told a high level Palestinian delegation after the Achille Lauro action that it was impossible to discuss a solution unless the Palestinians accepted Resolution 242 without additions. When the Arab leader was reminded of various promises made in the past, he said: “circumstances have changed, and the PLO’s name is at a low ebb, since the international community sees you as terrorists."…

“Will the political statement open new channels?” asked Abu Iyad, in emphasizing that he had no aspirations on this matter, and that the purpose of publication of the political statement was to appeal to the world within the framework of the political game.

Abu Iyad reemphasized that support for the international conference was the only and best way to promote discussion of Palestinian rights. He argued that this was not a case of choosing between the possibilities of 242 and alternative possibilities….

[Abu Iyad added that] “the Palestinian people needs victories. The Algerians declared their state in 1958, and four years later achieved their independence. True, our situation is difficult, but there is hope in our hearts. We are optimistic. To the people we say: here, this is your country. This is the country for future generations, initially it is small, but God willing it will be big and will expand east, west, north and south. We support unity with all the Arabs.

“Is Resolution 181 a good one? Is there anyone from our generation who did not demonstrate against it?” Abu Iyad asked those present, relating how, as a child, he had opposed the partition decision. Indeed, he had not entertained [supporting] it until three months ago, as he had always advocated the liberation of all of Palestine in one blow.

But today Abu Iyad believes, “I was a fool, I am indeed interested in the liberation of Palestine, but how? Step by step, we must propose the right way to liberation. When first we spoke of the strategy of stages, disputes erupted among us, and accusations of treason were traded. But today, all that we can do is limited. We must struggle for fulfillment.”

Appendix 17

Arafat’s Statement at Press Conference in Geneva

[SWB 17 Dec 88. PLO radio broadcasts text of Arafat’s statement (Voice of Palestine 1750 gmt 15 Dec 88)]

Text of report by the PLO central radio in Baghdad (ME/0336 A/1). Brother leader Abu Ammar (Yasir Arafat) arrived in Berlin from Geneva at dawn today on an official visit to GDR lasting several days. Before leaving Geneva, brother leader Abu Ammar held a press conference and read a press statement to reporters. The following is the full text of his statement:

Allow me to explain my viewpoints before you. Our desire for peace is strategic and not a temporary tactic. We work for peace regardless of whatever may happen, whatever may happen. Our state provides salvation for the Palestinians and peace for both the Palestinians and Israelis. The right to self-determination means the existence of the Palestinians, and our existence does not destroy the existence of the Israelis, as their rulers claim.

In my speech yesterday, I referred to UN Resolution No. 181 as a basis for Palestinian independence. I also referred to our acceptance of Resolution 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of the international conference. Our PNC accepted these three resolutions at the Algiers session. Also in my speech yesterday, it was clear we mean our people’s rights to freedom and national independence in accordance with Resolution No. 181 as well as the right of all parties concerned with the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, including — as I said — the state of Palestine, Israel and other neighbours in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338.

Regarding terrorism, yesterday I announced beyond doubt — and nevertheless I repeat for the sake of recording our stands — that we totally and categorically reject all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism. We explained our stand in Geneva and Algiers. Any talks to the effect that the Palestinians must offer more — do you remember this slogan—or that what was offered is public relations manoeuvres will be harmful and unfruitful. That is enough.

All outstanding issues should be discussed on the table and at the international conference. Let it be perfectly clear that neither Arafat nor anyone else can stop the uprising. The uprising will stop only when practical and tangible steps are taken towards the attainment of its national goals and the establishment of its Palestinian state.

Within this framework, I expect the EC states to play a more effective role in consolidating peace in our region. They assume a political and moral responsibility and they can deal with this.

Finally, I announce before you and request you to convey these words on my behalf: We want peace, we want peace, we are committed to peace, we are committed to peace, and we want to live in our Palestinian state and let others live.

Thank you.

Appendix 18

Shultz Says US Prepared for Dialogue with PLO

[Transcript: Shultz news conference: Official Text (US Information Service) 12/15/88]

Shultz’s statement at a Press Conference in Washington on December 15, 1988 on the beginning of a US-PLO dialogue.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization today issued a statement in which it accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, and renounced terrorism. As a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives.

I am designating our Ambassador to Tunis as the only authorized channel for that dialogue. The objective of the United States remains as always, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

In that light, I view this development as one more step toward the beginning of direct negotiations between the parties, which alone can lead to such a peace.

Nothing here may be taken to imply an acceptance or recognition by the United States of an independent Palestinian state. The position of the United States is that the status of the West Bank and Gaza cannot be determined by unilateral acts of either side, but only through a process of negotiations. The United States does not recognize the declaration of an independent Palestinian state.

It is also important to emphasize that the United States’ commitment to the security of Israel remains unflinching.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what was it today that changed your mind?

ANSWER: I didn’t change my mind. They changed their — they made their statement clear so that it doesn’t have the ambiguities in it that earlier statements had, which tended to allow various people to give different interpretations of what was meant.

Q: Well, what was different about it today?

A: It was clear. It was not encumbered.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what about the PLO’s record, which only two weeks ago you described as a terrorism record? You called Arafat an accomplice or an accessory to terrorism. You denied him a visa. Are you expunging the PLO record and saying “let bygones be bygone"?

A: No. When we have our dialogue, you can be sure that the first item of business on our agenda in that dialogue will be the subject of terrorism, and we’ll make it clear that our position about the importance of the renunciation of terrorism is central.

Q: But what can a dialogue do about people who are aleady dead? And how does your statement bear on the promise Kissinger made the Israelis?

A: The promise that Kissinger made the Israelis, which had to do with (Resolution) 242 and 338, and with the recognition of Israel’s right to exist. Since that time, we have added our insistence on a renunciation of terrorism.

Those conditions have been US conditions for a dialogue with the PLO going back to 1975. Our position has not changed. We have stayed with that position consistently. And now, today, we have an acceptance of those conditions in a clear-cut way.

Q: Mr. Secretary, have you told the State of Israel of your intentions? And can you tell us what their response was?

A: Everybody has been put on notice repeatedly since 1975, in effect, that if the PLO meets our conditions, then we’re prepared for a substantive dialogue. That is well-known.

Of course, we have had communications with Israel as we have with other states and we have been engaged in the last hour or so of trying to call people to tell them explicitly what we are prepared to do, now that there is this statement, but I don’t want to try to speak for others. I’m only speaking for the Untied States.

Q: Do you have any reason to believe that the Israelis would be willing to sit down with the PLO?

A: No, I don’t have any reason to believe that. But all I’m telling you is what the US policies are and this policy has been in place for — since 1975, and it has been consistently adhered to and now that we see a change in the posture of the all we’re doing is following through on that policy. Our policy remains unchanged.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you see this as a single meeting or as the beginning of a process in which there will be a series of meetings and aimed at what result? If it is going to be a series of meetings, where do you want it to be?

A: The meetings are not an end in themselves. Our object is a comprehensive peace and so our object in any dialogue that we have with the PLO will emphasize our desire for that and our views of what it takes to get there. I made a speech last September on behalf of the United States and set our views as a supplement to the views contained in the initiative that we worked on earlier this year. So our object is not a dialogue. Our object is peace and we will be talking to the PLO as to others in an effort to move things along toward that objective.

Q: Mr. Secretary, Kissinger was at the White House this morning. Was that why he was there?

A: No, it wasn’t. However, I did talk to Secretary Kissinger since we got word of this development.

Q: Mr. Secretary, your statement at the American Colony was addressed specifically to Palestinian residents in the West Bank and Gaza and specifically not to the PLO. Does this dialogue with the PLO now mean that the United States is prepared to address that sort of statement to the PLO leadership as well as to other Palestinians?

A: That was a statement to Palestinians that I made in Jerusalem last Spring, as I remember. Do you have the date in mind?

Q: February.

A: I forget. It’s been some while ago. Anyway, I sought a meeting with Palestinians, I went to their turf, so to speak and they would not meet and, of course, the word we got was that they were afraid to meet because they were afraid they would be killed if they did.

So I went and I made a statement that you referred to, saying, “Here is what I would have told you if you had come,” and we issued that statement as a statement of our efforts toward peace and of our recognition, which has been consistent. It’s obviously so, that if you’re going to get to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, you have to include Palestinians in the process from the beginning and at the end….

Q: As an example of this, Mr. Secretary, are you going to be willing to talk with Mr. Arafat, before you leave office?

A: What I am doing is authorizing our ambassador in Tunis to make himself available for a direct dialogue, and we are making it clear that this is the only authorized channel of communication. So anybody else who is representing themselves as a channel is not a channel. This is the authoritative channel representing the US government.

Now, what may evolve from this remains to be seen, but I think that when it comes to any genuine, substantive discussion, we are in a transition phase and it is basically for the next administration to decide what they do.

Q: When will the first meeting be held?

A: We have seen this PLO statement. I’m making this response on behalf of the president. I might say, the president, the vice president agree with this. And I’m authorizing now the ambassador in Tunis to undertake this dialogue, but when there will be a meeting, I don’t know. Q. Now that the United States has recognized the PLO as the legitimate partner for negotiations, do you feel that there’s any reason for Israel not to negotiate with the PLO?

A. What we are doing as a result of the PLO’s meeting our conditions, is establishing a substantive dialogue with them. We hope that dialogue may help bring about direct negotiations that will lead to peace. How those negotiations are structured, who is there to speak on behalf of the Palestinians is a subject that’s a difficult one. We’ve worked on it a long time. And I imagine it’ll continue to be difficult. But, at any rate, we’ll have a dialogue with the PLO, and that dialogue will be designed to find the answers to those questions.

Q: Now that the PLO has recognized Israel’s right to exist and the UN Resolutions, and renounced terrorism, do you feel there’s any reason that Israel should not now talk to the PLO?

A: Israel has made its own views and own policies, and Israel has always made it clear that these conditions that are US conditions are not necessarily theirs. So, I am not in any way speaking for Israel. It’s totally for Israel to make its own decisions about what it wants to do….

I’m only saying that for the period since 1975, the United States has had a position, in effect, that if the PLO meets these conditions, we will have a substantive dialogue and since they have met the conditions, we are carrying through on our policy and that’s the sum and substance of it.

Q: Have you conferred with the incoming administration, since you have insisted that you are in a transitional state? And would you be able to tell us what’s their stand on it?

A: The president and the vice president both have followed these developments very closely and they have reviewed each of them — this most recent development and they both agree that under these circumstances, the conditions for a substantive dialogue which we have had in place since 1975 have been met and so we should state that we are ready to undertake that dialogue. Now as far as what will be the efforts of the administration of President-Elect Bush, that is for them to determine and that remains to be seen.

Appendix 19

The Israeli Government Peace Initiative

[Source: The Jerusalem Post, Monday May 15, 1989; minor grammatical corrections introduced]

The Government’s Resolution:

It is decided to approve the attached peace initiative of the Government of Israel.

A Peace Initiative by the Government of Israel General

This document presents the principles of a political initiative of the Government of Israel which deals with the continuation of the peace process; the termination of the state of war with the Arab states; a solution for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; peace with Jordan; and a resolution of the problem of the residents of the refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

The document includes
a) The principles upon which the initiative is based.
b) Details of the processes for its implementation.
c) Reference to the subject of the elections under consideration. Further details relating to the elections as well as other subjects of the initiative will be dealt with separately.

Basic Premises

3. The initiative is founded upon the assumption that there is a national consensus for it on the basis of the basic guidelines of the Government of Israel, including the following points:
a) Israel yearns for peace and the continuation of the political process by means of direct negotiations based on the principles of the Camp David Accords.
b) Israel opposes the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan.
c) Israel will not conduct negotiations with the PLO.
d) There will be no change in the status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the Government.

Subjects to be Dealt with in the Peace Process

4. a) Israel views as important that the peace between Israel and Egypt, based on the Camp David Accords, serve as a cornerstone for enlarging the circle of peace in the region, and calls for a common endeavor for the strengthening of the peace and its extension, through continued consultation.
b) Israel calls for the establishment of peaceful relations between it and those Arab states which still maintain a state of war with it, for the purpose of promoting a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israel conflict, including recognition, direct negotiations, ending the boycott, diplomatic relations, cessation of hostile activity in international institutions or forums, and regional and bilateral cooperation.
c) Israel calls for an international endeavor to resolve the problem of the residents of the Arab refugee camps in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District in order to improve their living conditions and to rehabilitate them. Israel is prepared to be a partner in this endeavor.
d) In order to advance the political negotiation process leading to peace, Israel proposes free and democratic elections among the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District in an atmosphere devoid of violence, threats, and terror. In these elections a representation will be chosen to conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule. This period will constitute a test for coexistence and cooperation. At a later stage, negotiations will be conducted for a permanent solution during which all the proposed options for an agreed settlement will be examined and peace between Israel and Jordan will be achieved.
e) All the above-mentioned steps should be dealt with simultaneously.
f) The details of what has been mentioned in (d) above will be given below.

The Principles Constituting the Initiative Stages:

5. The initiative is based on two stages
a) stage A—A transitional period for an interim agreement.
b) Stage B — Permanent Solution.

6. The interlock between the Stages is a timetable on which the Plan is built: the peace process delineated by the initiative is based on Resolutions 242 and 338 upon which the Camp David Accords are founded.

Timetable:

7. The transitional period will continue for 5 years.

8. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations for achieving a permanent solution will begin.
Parties Participating in the Negotiations in Both Stages:

9. The Parties participating in the negotiations for the First Stage (the interim agreement) shall include Israel and the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Jordan and Egypt will be invited to participate in these negotiations if they so desire.

10. The Parties participating in the negotiations for the Second Stage (Permanent Solution) shall include Israel and the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District as well as Jordan; furthermore, Egypt may participate in these negotiations. In negotiations between Israel and Jordan, in which the elected representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will participate, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan will be concluded.

Substance of Transitional Period:

11. During the transitional period the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be accorded self-rule by means of which they will, themselves, conduct their affairs of daily life. Israel will continue to be responsible for security, foreign affairs and all matters concerning Israeli citizens in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Topics involving the implementation of the plan for self-rule will be considered and decided within the framework of the negotiations for an interim agreement.

Substance of Permanent Solution:

12. In the negotiations for a permanent solution every party shall be entitled to present for discussion all the subjects it may wish to raise.

13. The aim of the negotiations should be:
a) The achievement of a permanent solution acceptable to the negotiating parties.
b) The arrangements for peace and borders between Israel and Jordan.

Details of the Process for the Implementation of the Initiative

14. First and foremost, dialogue and basic agreement by the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, as well as Egypt and Jordan if they wish to take part, as above-mentioned, in the negotiations, on the principles constituting the initiative.

15.a) Immediately afterwards will follow the stage of preparations and implementation of the election process in which a representation of the Palestinian Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza will be elected. This representation:

I) Shall be a partner to the conduct of negotiations for the transitional period (Interim Agreement).

II) Shall constitute the self-governing authority in the course of the transitional period,

III) Shall be the central Palestinian component, subject to agreement after three years, in the negotiations for the permanent solution.

b) In the period of the preparation and implementation there shall be a calming of the violence in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.

16. As to the substance of the elections, it is recommended that a proposal of regional elections be adopted, the details of which shall be determined in further discussions.

17. Every Palestinian Arab residing in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, who shall be elected by the inhabitants to represent them — after having submitted his candidacy in accordance with the detailed document which shall determine the subject of the elections — may be a legitimate participant in the conduct of negotiations with Israel.

18. The elections shall be free, democratic and secret.

19. Immediately after the election of the Palestinian representation, negotiations shall be conducted with it on an interim agreement for a transitional period which shall continue for five years, as mentioned above. In these negotiations the parties shall determine all the subjects relating to the substance of self-rule and the arrangements necessary for its implementation.

20. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the establishment of the self-rule, negotiations for a permanent solution shall begin. During the whole period of these negotiations until the signing of the agreement for a permanent solution, the self-rule shall continue in effect as determined in the negotiations for an interim agreement.

About the Author

Brigadier General (res.) Aryeh Shalev. After the Israeli War of Independence, General Shalev became a member, and later head, of the Israel delegations to the Mixed Armistice Commissions with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. He was appointed IDF spokesman in 1963 and served in that post until after the Six-Day War. From September 1967 until April 1974 General Shalev headed the Production and Estimate Department of the Military Intelligence Directorate. From 1974 to 1976 he served as military governor of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).

General Shalev retired from the IDF in September 1977, after 33 years of military service. In January 1978 he joined the staff of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University as a senior research fellow. From 1981 to 1984 he was deputy head of the Center.

General Shalev’s most recent books are The West Bank: Line of Defense (New York: Praeger, 1985) and Cooperation under the Shadow of Conflict: The Israeli-Syrian Armistice Regime, 1949–1955 (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1989; Hebrew).

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies Recent Publications in English

1989 Subscription Series

Study no. 13 | Abraham Ben-Zvi, Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israel Conflict.
Study no. 14 | Joseph Kostiner, South Yemen’s Revolutionary Strategy, 1970-1985: From Insurgency to Bloc Politics.
JCSS Conference Summary | Shai Feldman, Technology and Strategy: Future Trends.

The West Bank and Gaza: Israel’s Options for Peace

and

Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: Toward a Solution

Reports of JCSS Study Groups (English and Hebrew). Coordinator: Joseph Alpher.

1990 Subscription Series

Study no. 15 | Dore Gold, ed., Arms Control in the Middle East.
Study no. 16 | Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada: Causes and Effects.
Study no. 17 | Aharon Klieman and Reuven Pedatzur, Rearming Israel: Defense Procurement through the 1990s.

Books

Anat Kurz, ed., Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism (New York: Praeger/Greenwood, 1987).

Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

Efraim Karsh, ed., Thelran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications (London: Macmillan, 1989).

Annuals

The Middle East Military Balance.

InTer: A Review of International Terrorism.

JCSS Publications

JCSS publications present the findings and assessments of the Center’s research staff. Each paper represents the work of a single investigator or a team. Such teams may also include research fellows who are not members of the Center’s staff. Views expressed in the Center’s publications are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center, its trustees, officers, or other staff members or the organizations and individuals that support its research. Thus the publication of a work by JCSS signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of conclusions or recommendations.

Editor Aharon Yariv | Executive Editor Joseph Alpher
Editorial Board
Mordechai Abir | Yuval Ne’eman
Yehezkel Dror | Yitzhak Rabin
Saul Friedlander | Aryeh Shalev
Shlomo Gazit | Israel Tal
Mordechai Gur | Saadia Touval
YehoshafatHarkabi | David Vital
Walter Laqueur |