



# **“Israeli-Arab” Political Mobilization**

Between Acquiescence,  
Participation, and Resistance

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**Nida Shoughry**



## “Israeli-Arab” Political Mobilization

Also by Nida Shoughry

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
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*NIDA SHOUGHRY*

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"ISRAELI-ARAB" POLITICAL MOBILIZATION  
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To the memory of Fuad Azar whose  
life ended prematurely



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# Chapter 1

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## Introduction

*We are the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the indigenous peoples, the residents of the State of Israel, and an integral part of the Palestinian People and the Arab and Muslim and human Nation. The war of 1948 resulted in the establishment of the Israeli state on a 78 percent of historical Palestine. We found ourselves within the borders of the Jewish state . . . and we were forced to become citizens of Israel. This has transformed us into a minority living in our historic homeland. Since the Al-Nakba of 1948 (the Palestinian tragedy), we have been suffering from extreme structural discrimination policies, national oppression, military rule that lasted till 1966, land confiscation policy, unequal budget and resources allocation, rights discrimination and threats of transfer. The State has also abused and killed its own Arab citizens, as in the Kufr Qassem massacre, the land day in 1976 and Al-Aqsa Intifada back in 2000.*

— *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*<sup>1</sup> (2006)

## It All Started with a Puzzle

This book began with a research puzzle that, for me as a Palestinian citizen of Israel, or what I call a 1948 Palestinian, had a profound existential quality. Growing up as a Palestinian in Israel, I was puzzled by what appeared to be a relatively passive behavior of my own community toward the many injustices they suffer by the state.<sup>2</sup> I always wondered why a minority of 20 percent of Israel's population had very little to say when it came to calling for equal rights, for example, or protesting existing grievances that ranged from sheer racism to targeted killing. Furthermore, why is this minority, as

compared to similar minorities in the world, or even to the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, not doing much to change their situation?

I tried to look for answers in existing literature. However, despite a rather rich scholarship on 1948 Palestinians, there was little available that explored their political mobilization. Even that, which did exist, was mostly missing the 1948 Palestinian narrative, or simply was not occupied with my puzzle. I therefore decided to search for my own answers by conducting academic research on the topic. I felt that my personal experience both as a 1948 Palestinian and as a journalist was not enough on its own and that I needed the relevant academic qualifications to better approach this topic. I wanted to produce a written piece of work that could, I hoped, fill in some of the gaps in the existing literature. At the same time, I wanted to create a reference that can be approached seriously by others and used as a resource. I felt the obligation to do so, not merely because of the shortage in literature on 1948 Palestinians, or the urgency of the topic, but also because I believed in my ability to contribute to a more comprehensive study using my firsthand and personal experience of growing up as a 1948 Palestinian, and being able to reflect on many of the events discussed in this book both as a scholar and as a witness.

In addition, my resort to academic research was to help me overcome some of the inevitable biases of writing on the Israeli-Palestinian topic. I was well aware that employing my personal experience might result in a biased representation of events. Thus, I wanted my work to be supervised by academic professionals with expertise, and I wanted to apply the research methods learnt during the course of my PhD studies to produce a more credible written work. Hence, upon completing my Master's studies in broadcast journalism in the United States, I decided to put my journalism career on hold, and I joined the postgraduate program at the department of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. I was ready to face all the challenges listed in academic research-methods books; however, being caught in the middle of a war was not something I expected. So, on July 13, 2006, with the launch of the Israeli air strikes on Lebanon following the seizure of two Israeli soldiers by Hizbullah and the beginning of the Second Lebanon War, I wrote to my supervisors saying:

You probably heard about the recent clashes between Israel and Lebanon. There is a feeling of uncertainty and we're doing nothing but following the news. Nobody knows exactly if we are moving towards war, but for now there seems to be escalation on both sides. A state of emergency is declared in north Israel where I live and people are advised to stay in shelters. Unlike Jewish towns, Palestinian villages are not equipped with shelters, so funnily

enough security measures for us state we should hide under stairways . . . perhaps I should include this in my thesis.<sup>3</sup>

At that time, my remark to include the obscure stairways order was merely a joke. However, days later, when two 1948 Palestinian children were killed this joke was no longer funny. The two children were killed by Hizbullah rockets outside their home in the city of Nazareth on July 19, 2006. Similar to other 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, and in contrast to Jewish settlements, Nazareth, the major and densely populated 1948 Palestinian city of 70,000 people in Northern Galilee, had no safe public shelters for citizens to seek refuge. The two children were the first deaths among 1948 Palestinians. By the conclusion of the (2006) Second Lebanon War, 43 Israeli civilians were killed out of which 42 percent or 18 deaths were 1948 Palestinians.<sup>4</sup>

Much of the public 1948 Palestinian anger at that time was voiced against the Israeli authorities for waging the war and leaving the 1948 Palestinian minority vulnerable.<sup>5</sup> While Jewish-Israeli civilians were warned by air raid sirens, protected in shelters, and evacuated when necessary, 1948 Palestinians had no safe haven. Some 1948 Palestinians even accused Israel of using them as human shields by situating its military sites close to 1948 Palestinian communities.<sup>6</sup>

The lack of shelters and means of protection for the civilian population in 1948 Palestinian towns and villages in critical times of war is only one example of the ways in which 1948 Palestinians are treated and resourced differently from fellow Jewish-Israeli citizens. In fact, the history of 1948 Palestinians is full of collective resentments strong enough to justify a resistant political mobilization. However, in the face of these many grievances, the instances in which 1948 Palestinians publicly mobilized against the injustices they suffered under the Israeli authorities appear to be very few. Indeed, evidence collected for the purpose of this book, especially concerning the years 1948–2000, shows that despite a whole range of Israeli government's discriminatory actions and policies 1948 Palestinians remained, by and large, an acquiescent and obedient minority that mostly adopted survival mechanisms.

This puzzling lack of action on behalf of the 1948 Palestinian minority despite the many injustices they suffered, which was the initial motivation of this book, called for an investigation into the contributing factors and conditions leading to this apparently acquiescent 1948 Palestinian behavior. This book, therefore, focuses on the political behavior of 1948 Palestinians; trying to understand its nature, and explain the contributing factors and dynamics of such behavior. This is done through the analysis of two specific case studies, the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October 2000<sup>7</sup>,

chosen from the modern history of 1948 Palestinians. As will be detailed later, the case studies in this book were chosen mainly because they were two of the most outstanding events in the history of 1948 Palestinians. In addition, the cycle of events in both case studies is rich with a variety of 1948 Palestinian political behavior ranging between everyday behavior to exceptional violent mobilization against Israeli injustices.

The political mobilization of 1948 Palestinians discussed in this book includes a wide variety of political behavior ranging between passive acquiescence (withdrawal) at one end, and violent resistance on the other. Also in this context, the terms "acquiescence," "participation," and "resistance" are understood in their broad sense, encompassing a spectrum of actions and inactions. For example, resistance discussed in this book ranges from public violence at one end of the spectrum and mundane actions, such as the private matter of carrying a photo or wearing a certain shirt or emblem, at the other end. Similarly, participation can be a pro-status quo at one extreme, and a way of resistance at the other. For example, while participation in the Israeli Knesset (the Israeli parliament) was an acquiescent action for some 1948 Palestinians, especially in the early stages after the establishment of Israel, it was an act of resistance for others.<sup>8</sup>

With the help of social-movement theory, the two case studies, the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October, are analyzed to understand the contributing factors and dynamics behind the resort to political mobilization by 1948 Palestinians in those incidents. A comparison is then drawn between the two case studies to locate any patterns or similarities in the contributing factors or dynamics that can perhaps be applicable to other incidents. I shall argue that the dynamics of mobilization, particularly if involving a set of variables, mainly the existence of strong grievances and the positive framing of resources and political opportunities, are most useful in explaining social movement. In addition, analysis will also relate to external factors, whether it is the Israeli policy, the Palestinian reality, or the regional context. Furthermore, the analysis of the case studies in this book will illustrate how the change in the way grievances are perceived and acted upon, on top of a gradual change in perceptions of what is possible (especially in the years leading up to the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October, but also throughout the events) has influenced the particular way a cycle of protest played out.

This book aims to augment insight into the dynamics and nature of the political behavior of 1948 Palestinians. More ambitiously, it hopes to draw conclusions that will enable a better understanding of future developments. As for the theoretical contribution, it aspires to contribute to the general understanding and applicability of social-movement theory, while hoping to develop some of its components. Finally, and more ambitiously,

this book hopes to draw conclusions that can perhaps be applied to future situations.

\* \* \*

## 1948 Palestinians: Definitions, Identity Crisis, and Historical Background

The 1948 Palestinians, commonly known as Israeli Arabs, are those Palestinians and their descendants, who remained on their land during and after the 1948 war, which led to the establishment of Israel on two-thirds of historical Palestine, or what used to be British Mandate Palestine. Those Palestinians found themselves, at the conclusion of the 1948 war, as a part of the newly established state of Israel, and were given Israeli citizenship, either immediately or, in many cases, some decades later. The 1948 Palestinians account for around 1.5 million (20.2 percent) out of Israel's population of more than 7 million.<sup>9</sup> Yet, despite holding Israeli citizenship, 1948 Palestinians suffered and continue to suffer from racism, discrimination, and neglect. This ranges from public expressions of hatred for the community by officials of the Israeli state to shortages or lack of services and funding, discriminatory laws, and even the targeting and killing of civilians.

The reference to 1948 Palestinians is a highly contested and politicized issue visibly reflected in the existence of over a dozen of terms, including self-identification labels to refer to this minority. "Israeli Arabs," "Arabs in Israel," "the Arab sector," "the Arabs inside the Green Line," "the Arab citizens of Israel," "Israeli Palestinian-Arabs," and "1948 Arabs" are only few of these terms.

In this book, I choose to use the term "1948 Palestinians" to refer to the Palestinian minority of Israel. I prefer using this term over the popular term of Israeli Arabs, which I find selective and loaded, as it disregards the Palestinian character of this minority, and is perceived by many, especially Arabs and Palestinians, as a synonym for disloyalty. I recognize that the 1948 Palestinian identity, like other national identities is a constructed/imagined identity,<sup>10</sup> and that the term chosen is not a neutral one, but one which counters the popular Israeli claim that those Palestinians living inside Israel are Arabs who could go anywhere in "the Arab world." The emphasis on the year 1948 is intended to acknowledge the unusual history of those Palestinians who lived in British Mandate Palestine, shaped by the borders that were imposed then, and afterward, the unifying experience of



al-Nakba, and the development of a Palestinian national identity, of which 1948 Palestinians are a central part.

This confusion about identity, as reflected in the multiplicity of terms, is only one indication of the identity crisis of 1948 Palestinians.<sup>11</sup> The identity crisis in the case of 1948 Palestinians started with the absurd reality created after the 1948 war, in which part of a non-Jewish Palestinian nation were annexed to become citizens of the Jewish-Israeli state, and enemies to the remainder of their nation. The 1948 Palestinians were an integral part of the Arab and Palestinian nation. They shared the same history, language, heritage, culture, and reality up until 1948 when Israel was established, and the 1948 Palestinians were cut off from the rest of their Palestinian and Arab nation.

Any attempt to understand the complex identity situation of the 1948 Palestinians, should take into account a number of factors. The 1948 Palestinians have never strived to establish or become part of the state of Israel. They have not immigrated to it, as usually ethnic minorities do, but on the contrary they were occupied by it. The 1948 Palestinians have neither given up their pertinence with their Palestinian people and Arab nation, nor have they given up their rights and the right of the Palestinian refugees in their homeland. Yet most importantly, the problematic 1948 Palestinian identity crisis goes to the heart of Israel's self-definition as both Jewish and democratic state that is in constant conflict with its Palestinian and Arab neighbors.

Given the profoundly Jewish identity of the nation-state and its Zionist character, it is impossible for 1948 Palestinians to gain meaningful political power or social equality. Israel's definition as a Jewish homeland with a "right of return" for Diaspora Jews but no one else, its national symbols with a Star of David flag and portraits of Zionists leaders on its currency and stamps, and a national anthem "yearning" for Jews for Zion, all further exclude 1948 Palestinians, and minimize their chances as non-Jews to ever be treated as equal and true citizens.

[1948 Palestinians] perceive a state that for the most part is unwilling either to respect their individual rights or to recognise their collective identity and seeks instead to limit their political weight and demographic presence. Increased tolerance within the Israeli polity for extremist rhetoric, combined with hostile legislation and participation in the government of parties openly advocating the transfer of Arab citizens beyond Israel's borders has further heightened tensions.<sup>12</sup>

The 1948 Palestinians are shattered between their given Israeli identity and their "imagined" Palestinian one.<sup>13</sup> Despite their official status as Israeli

citizens, the 1948 Palestinians are treated like enemies, and discriminated against in resources and policies. In addition, their willingness to come to terms with the existence of Israel is constantly being questioned, especially at times of conflict when their country (Israel) is at war with their people (Palestinians and Arabs).

The unfeasibility of becoming full citizens in a country that does not grant that right to a non-Jew has further pushed the 1948 Palestinians to turn to their original Palestinian identity. However, that identity became more imagined and less possible to retrieve. Together with the physical isolation from the Arab world, and the complexity of their political situation, 1948 Palestinians were stained by some as traitors for not resisting, for accepting the Israeli citizenship, and for joining the Israeli political system that gives legitimacy to the Zionist cause. At times, 1948 Palestinians were also looked upon by their fellow Palestinians in the Occupied Territories with an envious eye for enjoying the benefits of holding an Israeli citizenship, which granted better living conditions and freedom of movement.

So, in addition to not being welcomed as full citizens by the Israeli state, the 1948 Palestinians were growing further apart from their fellow Palestinians. Furthermore, despite voicing their solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the 1948 Palestinians became excluded from the Palestinian and Arab discourse, including the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiation, and were treated suspiciously. Hence, the identity crisis of 1948 Palestinians became a complex component affecting their framing and perception of what is possible and needed in their political mobilization.

Along with the elements of identity crisis, one cannot talk about a unified identity for all 1948 Palestinians because of the richly diverse character of this minority. Like other national groups and societies, 1948 Palestinians are subjected to differences inherently influenced and dictated by regional, historical, socio-economic, or political factors. Furthermore, there are subgroups within that minority, such as the Druze, for example, who have special status and relationship with the Israeli state. In Israel, the Druze are officially recognized as a separate ethnic/religious minority, and their men are conscripted into Israel's army.<sup>14</sup> So adding to the identity confusion faced by all 1948 Palestinians, is the existence of subgroups subjected to explicit Israeli policies aimed at excluding them from the rest of the 1948 Palestinian minority.

While 1948 Palestinians account for one-fifth of Israel's population (20.2 percent), demographic studies predict that by 2020, 1948 Palestinians together with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories will form the majority of Israel's population.<sup>15</sup> This demographic fact concerns Israeli officials who are constantly warning against the rising birth rate of Palestinians.<sup>16</sup> The natural growth of Palestinians, both within and

outside the borders of Israel, challenges the Israeli authorities' attempts to preserve its tactical Jewish majority within Israel, and threatens to change the Jewish nature of the state.

In addition, recent political key events, such as the mass protests of October 2000 or the unprecedented nomination of a 1948 Palestinian candidate for prime minister in the 1999 Israeli elections, have increased both the political awareness of 1948 Palestinians, and the suspicion of the Israeli authorities and the general public toward this minority. These events have also managed to attract the attention of the Arab and international community to this deserted minority, suggesting that the 1948 Palestinians who were long neglected now became candidates to play a bigger role in Israeli and Middle East politics.

There were many significant historical and political chapters in the lives of 1948 Palestinians, which shaped their identity and defined their relationship with the state of Israel. The 1948 Palestinians, who were simply Palestinians until the 1948 war, were isolated from their fellow Palestinians as a result of the establishment of Israel. Unlike Palestinians in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the 1948 Palestinians were given Israeli citizenship. However, their relationship with a state that was imposed on them became more complicated from that moment onward.

The 1948 Palestinians were placed under Military Rule until 1966, and were treated like enemies despite holding Israeli citizenship. During those years and long after, the 1948 Palestinians were heavily discriminated against and were subjected to a wide range of both overt and covert policies that widened the gap between them and the Jewish citizens of Israel. Together with the discrimination in the services provided, the 1948 Palestinians suffered from lower budgetary allocations and income, and fell behind in education and health. Furthermore, the 1948 Palestinians continued to be targeted by the Israeli policy of land confiscation and were faced with restrictions on individual rights and opportunities. The 1948 Palestinians could exercise their individual rights only as long as these rights did not conflict with the national goals or nature of the Jewish state.<sup>17</sup>

The 1948 Palestinians entered the Israeli political system right from the start, first through membership of different Zionist parties and the Israel Communist Party, and later, through their own 1948 Palestinian parties. However, 1948 Palestinians, who were citizens of a state that is Jewish in its essence, could not become part of the core of that state, since the relationship between the state and the individual was based on the common Jewish identity of both. In addition, the Israeli policy of land confiscation, which fiercely targeted 1948 Palestinians, did not make it possible for 1948 Palestinians to feel part of the state, nor could they relate to the Zionist

civic mission of building a national home for the Jewish people on the land of Palestine.

Furthermore, 1948 Palestinians, who were physically cut off from the rest of the Palestinians and Arabs, and subjected to a different political status, could not retrieve their Palestinian Arab nationality, even if they had wanted to. Besides, their fellow Palestinians and the Arab nations appeared to desert them for good. As a result, 1948 Palestinian political identity and behavior started to be mainly influenced by autonomous factors dictated by the complicated reality they faced within the Israeli-Jewish state.

The 1948 Palestinians went through various phases in the years that followed the creation of Israel. After 20 years of Military Rule that made 1948 Palestinians generally fearful of showing any Palestinian national sentiment, and between the years 1967 to the mid-1970s, came the reconciliation with their Palestinian identity as a result of the encounter with the West Bank and Gaza.

The increase in the political consciousness of 1948 Palestinians, in general, and in the context of Palestinian nationalism can be attributed, according to Mark Tessler and Audra K. Grant, in part, to the 1967 June war and the subsequent ease of contact with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Moreover, the growing international recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, together with the Israeli-Arab war of October 1973, contributed to the revival of Palestinian nationalism. In conclusion, Tessler and Grant argue that all of these developments significantly increased the Palestinian component of the political identity of 1948 Palestinians.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed, a few years later on March 30, 1976, on what became known as the Land Day, 1948 Palestinians used civil disobedience for the first time on such a significant scale to protest against the confiscation of their land for Jewish settlements in northern Israel. At the conclusion of the events, six 1948 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces. This was a pivotal moment in the history of 1948 Palestinian political mobilization, and the first time in which 1948 Palestinian public organizations came into conflict with state authorities.

The 1980s witnessed a phase of Israelization of some 1948 Palestinians. This was a time when Israel was prospering economically, and 1948 Palestinians were offered some economic opportunities. However, these economic opportunities were given in return for political acquiescence and they were not accompanied by integration into the Israeli society.

The marginalization of 1948 Palestinians became clearer during Yitzhak Rabin's government, 1992–1995, and the peace talks in the

mid-1990s. The peak came after Rabin's assassination (November 4, 1995) following the Oslo II agreement<sup>19</sup> in which Rabin was accused of giving away land while relying on the "illegitimate" votes of 1948 Palestinians.<sup>20</sup> The years that followed Rabin's assassination brought a lot of despair to those who supported the peace process and the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state. At the same time, Israel was becoming more Jewish in its character, pushing 1948 Palestinians from any sense of belonging and further away from the dream of full citizenship.

A key event in the history of 1948 Palestinians came in October 2000, in the wake of the second Intifada that marked the failure of the Oslo agreements. During the mass protest of what became known as Habbat October, 1948 Palestinians clashed with Israeli security forces. On the first day of the general strike announced in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Israeli police and armed forces surrounded 1948 Palestinian towns and villages. Within a week, they had killed 13 and injured hundreds of civilian protesters by using live ammunition, rubber-coated steel bullets, and tear gas.<sup>21</sup>

Many have identified the mass protests of Habbat October as a turning point for 1948 Palestinians, which had a major effect on their political mobilization.<sup>22</sup> 1948 Palestinians discovered that they would be dealt with by the Israeli security forces in the same brutal manner as the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, despite the fact that they are Israeli citizens.

Habbat October also affected the state's relationship with its 1948 Palestinian citizens. Following the events, Israel introduced new policies targeting 1948 Palestinians, and created new laws to ensure the Jewish character of the state. Together with proposed bills that aimed to place severe restrictions on citizenship rights of 1948 Palestinians, between October 2000 and July 2002 the Knesset enacted eight laws that discriminate against the 1948 Palestinian minority in various aspects. In addition, prosecutions of 1948 Palestinian Knesset members, the introduction of a new reunification law, the plans to transfer 1948 Palestinians or annex their towns to the Palestinian Authority, and the warnings against the 1948 Palestinian demographic growth, were only some of the Israeli measures directed against 1948 Palestinians.<sup>23</sup>

## Military Rule

The Bulk of Israel's Arab [1948 Palestinian] population is subject to a military rule that denies them the basic rights of any free citizen. They have no freedom of movement or residence; they are not accepted as equal members

in the trade unions and are not employed on the same basis as others in most organizations or government departments. Their entire life depends on the good graces of the military governors and their aides.<sup>24</sup>

– *Ihud* poster, 1958

The following discussion of Military Rule and some of its draconic practices and policies is meant to give the reader an idea of the 1948 Palestinian reality in the eighteen years following the establishment of Israel. This contextualization will hopefully situate the reader in a better position to understand the political reality of the 1948 Palestinians, which not only limited their political opportunities and choices during the Military Rule years, but also regulated, I argue, their future relationship with the state for years to come.

It is important to note that the virtual state of war between Israel and its neighbors has affected, and sometimes even dictated, the relationship between Israel and its 1948 Palestinian citizens. These circumstances have shaped the state's attitudes toward 1948 Palestinians, especially toward those who challenge its policies or even have the potential to do so. For that reason, the relationship between Israel and its 1948 Palestinian citizens, especially in the early years following Israel's creation, was regulated in military and security terms.

Despite their legal status as citizens, 1948 Palestinians were placed under Military Rule, which, as quoted earlier, put many restrictions on their freedoms and rights.<sup>25</sup> Military Rule served as an umbrella for a series of repressive and discriminatory measures against 1948 Palestinians. It severely limited 1948 Palestinian fundamental civil liberties, including freedom of movement, speech, and association, and resulted in the confiscation of much of their lands through rules and laws applied during the State of Emergency. The State of Emergency was declared following the establishment of Israel in 1948 and continues to be in operation at the time of writing (2011). The State of Emergency enables the executive branch, that is the government, to replace the Knesset's power in regulating a wide range of matters, and legitimizes derogations from fundamental human rights, such as the right to personal liberty and the right to freedom of assembly.

Military Rule which started in 1948 and ended in 1967, a decade before the 1976 Land Day, is discussed here as a key Israeli policy which reflects the relationship between the state and 1948 Palestinians. Military Rule, I argue, set the tone and nature for relations between Israel and its Palestinian citizens for years to come, a relationship based on fear and terror. In addition, examples from post-1960s state attitudes, which will be provided later in this book, will clarify the resemblance those attitudes have to Military

Rule. This comparison will further illustrate that the general state attitude toward 1948 Palestinians, both old and new, is regulated in a military mentality that deals with 1948 Palestinians as a security risk.

Under Military Rule, 1948 Palestinians were harassed and subjected to measures that reinforced their feeling of alienation from the state. The Defence Regulations Law assured a life of daily suffering and distress for 1948 Palestinians, who became more and more dependent on the mercy of Military governors. For instance, military governors used the authority invested in them by law<sup>26</sup> to impose curfews on any area they wished; they evacuated towns, restricted the movements of individuals, issued deportation orders, confiscated properties, and imposed restrictions on employment and business.<sup>27</sup>

Military Rule was not restricted to military matters only, but extended to marriage licenses, building permits, and work permits.<sup>28</sup> Testimonies, such as the one below, of 1948 Palestinians who lived under Military Rule reveal even more severe regulations:

They [the Military Governors] interfered in everything, even in our bread loaf and our wedding songs.<sup>29</sup> You could be detained or beaten for holding a photo of Abdel Nasser<sup>30</sup> or any *monadel* [freedom fighter] in your pocket. There were restrictions on freedom of expression and movement. Anything that needed permits was in their [the Military Governor's] hands: issuing blue identification cards, travel permits, overnight stay permits, even agricultural permits to plant tobacco. They controlled the local elections,<sup>31</sup> governmental jobs, and interfered in appointing teachers and headmasters.<sup>32</sup>

The interviewee in this case was detained and beaten in July 1957 for carrying a photo of the Algerian Jamila Bu Huraid who was fighting against the French colonization of Algeria. This adds to the evidence that the Israeli Military Rule targeted any revolutionary or nationalist sentiment regardless of its origin, fearing it may incite resistance among 1948 Palestinians.

More evidence released lately by Israeli sources confirms a systematic involvement of Israeli security agencies, such as the Shin Bet,<sup>33</sup> in controlling the 1948 Palestinian minority, and managing its local politics and life especially during the Military Rule period. The Israeli security involvement included security measures, such as setting up secret and other overt networks of 1948 Palestinian "informers," as well as more concealed measures to monitor and run 1948 Palestinian life.<sup>34</sup> One example of these measures is the involvement of Israeli security in the 1948 Palestinian educational system, which reflects yet another aspect of Israel's suspicious attitude toward 1948 Palestinians. Reuven Paz, a former Shin Bet officer,

recently revealed the degree of this involvement that lasted, according to him, for so many years and still does, saying the Shin Bet “not only determined and intervened in the appointment of principals and teachers, but even decided who the custodians and janitors that clean the bathrooms in the Arab schools would be.”<sup>35</sup>

Alongside Israeli security involvement, some of the articles of the Defence Regulations Law had immediate impact on 1948 Palestinians, placing restrictions on their basic human and civil liberties.<sup>36</sup> For example, warrants for arrest could be, and were, issued by any army or police officer, and individuals were searched, detained, and placed under police supervision for up to a year. Other articles of the Defence Regulations Law, however, such as those dealing with land and property confiscation, were used as tools to implement long-term Israeli policies.<sup>37</sup>

Under Military Rule, military courts were established and given exclusive authority to try those who broke these laws. Although the Military courts were based on English law,<sup>38</sup> Walter Schwarz notes they could “admit evidence that would be inadmissible in England, their trials were summary, could be held in closed session and their verdicts could not be called into question or challenged.”<sup>39</sup> Thus the prosecuted had little hope in most cases to have a fair trial or appeal. In addition, 1948 Palestinians saw the fact that military and not civil courts were in charge as another symbol of the tyranny of the Israeli authorities.

These Military courts, which were part of the Israeli ironfist policy against those who dared to protest, were apparently effective in limiting the political mobilization of Palestinians. The fear of punishment and the lack of trust in the credibility and fairness of these courts, which created more grievances and restricted the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinian, added, I argue, to restrictions on political mobilization.

On top of that, 1948 Palestinians did not need to break the law in order to be punished, since the defense regulations allowed the Israeli authorities and Military governors to perform administrative detention and exile. These arbitrary detentions caused widespread opposition among 1948 Palestinians, which, in some instances, forced the Israeli authorities to promise to remedy the situation.<sup>40</sup>

Acquiescence did not guarantee the safety of 1948 Palestinians, and during Military Rule there were numerous violent incidents in which 1948 Palestinians were harassed, beaten, arrested, or even killed. One example is the Kufor Qasim “massacre” committed by Israeli-border patrol against the background of the declared State of Emergency and the Suez Crisis.<sup>41</sup> In this incident Israeli-border patrol killed 48 1948 Palestinians, including women and children, in Kufor Qasim for allegedly violating a curfew of which they were not aware.



At 4.30 p.m. on October 29, 1956, only 30 minutes before the curfew was to come into effect on villages near the Jordanian border, the *mukhtars* (mayors) of these villages were informed of the curfew time. The mukhtar of Kufor Qasim notified the Frontier Guard officer who brought him the news that there were 400 villagers working outside the village that could not be notified of the curfew in time. The mukhtar was assured by the Israeli officer that the villagers will be allowed to pass. Instead, 47 villagers were killed at the entrances of Kufor Qasim in the first hour of the curfew, and two more were killed later in the village of Kufor Barra.<sup>42</sup>

In the course of two hours, border-patrol guards murdered nineteen men, six women, ten teenage boys (age 14–17), six girls (age 12–15), and seven young boys (age 8–13). In almost every killing wave at least one person survived with injuries, and a small number escaped unharmed. Late that night, while the curfew was still in effect, the army drove in between thirty and forty residents from the nearby village of Jaljuliya, provided them with hoes, and ordered them merely to dig as deeply and as quickly as possible. Although they did not yet know it, these men were standing in the middle of the village cemetery and digging the graves of the slain.<sup>43</sup>

The Israeli government imposed strict censorship on the massacre, and succeeded to keep the affairs out of the newspapers for a while, until the news about the massacre were leaked and published mainly due to the efforts of Communist Knesset member Tawfik Toubi and a group of Israeli intellectuals.<sup>44</sup> A word about the massacre reached Tawfik Toubi, who together with his Communist Party approached the Knesset presidency demanding a public discussion on the massacre in the Knesset. The Knesset presidency refused, and the Israeli government maintained a military cordon around Kufor Qasim for months to limit bad publicity and prevent journalists' access. However, Toubi accompanied by Communist Party leader Meir Vilner managed to bypass the military checkpoints and sneak to Kufor Qasim to investigate the massacre. Then, in a step that reflects a well developed activism strategy, Toubi wrote a detailed account of the massacre and privately published it. The letter, which later became known as Tawfik Toubi Memorandum, was translated, printed, and publicly distributed by post and hand, exposing the massacre to local and international public. As a result of the letter, which was first published on November 23, 1956, Israel was put under a lot of national and international pressure to investigate the massacre.<sup>45</sup>

Yet, although the incident was considered a massacre and killing in cold blood, even by the military institution, the Israeli government was reluctant to bring the commanders responsible for the massacre to trial.

Later, under the pressure of a public campaign and strike, a military court was held, but only for some of the officers and soldiers responsible for the killing. The punishments imposed on those committing the crime were not commensurate with the severity of their crimes, and the trial proved to be another source of 1948 Palestinian grievances.

Although the three senior officers found responsible for the massacre were sentenced by the court to serve lengthy prison sentences, they were released by November 1959 after spending a mere 14 months behind bars.<sup>46</sup> This includes the unit commander Major Shmuel Malinki, and Shalom Ofer. Major Malinki who gave the orders to open fire and was convicted of killing 43 1948 Palestinian citizens, was sentenced to 17 years in jail. Shalom Ofer, who was convicted of the murder of 41 civilians, including 14 women and children, was sentenced to 15 years in jail. The commuted sentence of Ofer came despite the fact that he had actively committed the murder, and had ordered his soldiers to shoot even the wounded to ensure they were all dead, and then, to throw their bodies away. Ofer never expressed regret for what he had done, and said that he and his soldiers were like German officers during World War II.<sup>47</sup>

In addition to the Israeli presidential amnesty granted to the convicted officers in 1959, the Israeli army reinstated the officers' ranks after their sentences were commuted. This was followed by another verdict of the Military Court in a separate trial of Brigadier Yshishkar Shadmi, the battalion commander who took the initiative and imposed the night curfew. As quoted in the court hearing, Malinki claimed that Shadmi told him:

[T]he curfew must be extremely strict and that strong measures must be taken to enforce it. It would not be enough to arrest those who broke it- they must be shot. In explanation he said, "A dead man [or according to other evidence 'a few dead men'] is better than the complications of detention." When Melinki asked what was to happen to a man returning from his work outside the village, without knowing about the curfew, who might well meet the Frontier Guard units at the entrance of the village, Shadmi replied: "I don't want any sentimentality" and "That's just too bad for him."<sup>48</sup>

Yet, despite these allegations Shadmi was only found guilty of a "merely technical" error for extending the curfew order without the Military governor's permission. He was sentenced to a reprimand and a ridiculous fine of one Israeli *grush*, then the equivalent of a penny.<sup>49</sup> The infamous trial became a source for 1948 Palestinian grievance; however this was not the end of the story. On November 20, 1957, and less than a month after the massacre, the "ceremony of reconciliation" was held in Kufor Qasim.

The ceremony, according to Shira Robinson, referred to as *solha* (a term with stereotypical usage and connotation) by government organizers, was advertised in Hebrew and the state-sponsored Arabic press as an occasion to heal the wounds and move beyond the tragedy for the sake of coexistence. However, behind the attendance of distinguished guests including government officials and 1948 Palestinian "notables" lurked, according to Robinson, "a heavy air of intimidation, anger, and pain." The ceremony was attacked by newspapers of the MAKAI (*HaMiflega HaKomunistit HaYisraelit* [Israeli Communist Party]) Communist Party and MAPAM (*Miflegat HaPoalim HaMeuhedet* [United Workers Party]) leftist Zionist party who denounced the ceremony as a fraud used to cover the inadequate government handling of the massacre. In addition, the newspapers accused Israeli military authorities of exercising immense pressure on members of the injured families to attend the ceremony. Others joined the newspapers in their criticism, accusing the Israeli authorities of using the ceremony to cancel the ongoing trial of the 11 soldiers.<sup>50</sup>

More than 50 years after the Kufor Qasim massacre and despite 1948 Palestinian calls for independent investigation, the Israeli authorities have yet to launch an official investigation or to accept full responsibility for the massacre. The Kufor Qasim massacre and the insensible Israeli handling of it turned into a strong source of grievance that affected 1948 Palestinian political awareness and increased their suspicion and distrust in Israeli authorities. It also helped shape the community's relationship and attitude toward the Israeli state and its authorities.

Yet, despite the feelings of injustice and insecurity, and despite the loss of life, 1948 Palestinians kept largely quiet, fearing even more fierce policies against them. Along with Military Rule practices, which deprived 1948 Palestinians of their civil rights, the murders in Kufor Qasim, Robinson argues, "sparked wide-spread fear that few social, political, or legal safeguards were in place to prevent the repetition of such an assault—a sentiment that won partial confirmation as a result of the government's heavy-handed responses to the crime."<sup>51</sup>

### *Restricting Laws under Military Rule*

Along with the restrictions on daily life imposed by Military Rule, there were clear Israeli policies regulated in a number of laws to target 1948 Palestinians. These were laws passed by the Israeli Knesset, and used together with the Defence Regulations Law and Emergency Regulations to legalize the unequal treatment of and discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel. Two examples of such laws under Military Rule are the Absentee Property Law, which permitted the confiscation of more

Palestinian land, and the Law of Return, which was enforced to control the demographics of Israel and ensure a Jewish majority.

The Absentee Property Law was among the laws with most severe effect on the rights of 1948 Palestinians. The law that was exploited by the Israeli authorities resulted in the confiscation of the vast majority of lands owned by Palestinians in the state of Israel. Absentee Property Law not only affected the Palestinian refugees outside Israel, but also those *nazeheen* (internal refugees or emigrants) who were displaced within the country and could no longer return to their towns and villages. In some cases, those *nazeheen* were unable to return because their towns were destroyed, while in other cases (like Iqrith, for example) the towns were evacuated and declared closed military areas. Yet, in most cases, Palestinian people lost their lands to the state because they were declared absentees by the very authority that prevented them from gaining access to their own land. In fact, the Absentee Property Law turned nearly 20 percent of the Palestinians in Israel into absentees, regardless of their citizenship.<sup>52</sup>

The Law of Return, enacted in 1950, grants every Jew, just because he/she is Jew and regardless of their country of origin or the time of immigration, the right “to come to his country [Israel] as an *oleh*.”<sup>53</sup> An *oleh* is a person who immigrates to Israel (makes *Aliyah*). *Aliyah* is an important Jewish and Zionist concept protected by Israel’s Law of Return and the Israeli Nationality law, which grants Jews and only Jews the legal right to assisted immigration and settlement in Israel, as well as automatic Israeli citizenship.<sup>54</sup> While these laws grant superior rights to any Jew, it denies those same rights to millions of indigenous Palestinian inhabitants and their descendants, including the Palestinian refugees.

The Law of Return, which does not apply to Palestinian refugees outside the country, also does not apply to those *nazeheen* within Israel. The 1948 Palestinian *nazeheen*, who hold Israeli citizenship and should therefore be allowed to live in any place they wish in their country, are still denied the right to return to their towns and villages. Even those who managed to obtain a court verdict to reclaim their land such as the case of Iqrith residents, are still prevented from returning to their homes. Iqrith, a village located near the Lebanese border, was “temporarily” evacuated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in late 1948. The inhabitants were then promised that they would be allowed to return, a promise reiterated at several levels by Israeli authorities and judicial institutions. The villagers and their descendants, however, like the residents of Bir’am have not returned to their village so far. In fact, on May 20, 2009, the Israeli Knesset voted against a law proposal submitted by Knesset member (MK) Mohammed Barakeh to guarantee the return of the residents of Iqrith and Bir’am.<sup>55</sup>

During the period of Military Rule, the Israeli authorities justified these kinds of laws which authorized the systematic discrimination against 1948 Palestinians, claiming that they were crucial to that period and necessary to the early stage of Jewish state building. However, similar laws were passed after the removal of Military Rule that, according to Jiryis, lends "a compelling weight to the traditional Arab interpretation of Zionism as a movement with an innately racist ideology."<sup>56</sup> One such example is the Agricultural Settlement Law,<sup>57</sup> which was passed in 1967 and placed restrictions on the use of agricultural land and water, mainly denying 1948 Palestinians any kind of share in Jewish-owned land.<sup>58</sup> In his review of Israeli legislation, Jiryis said it can be considered "domination rather than the expression of justice," which was used to support a situation of subordination of its 1948 Palestinian minority in the fields of security, nationality, and land holding. Jiryis adds that, "whether or not there exists an independent judiciary in Israel is less important than the fact that the laws which it is bound to implement are so broad as to give any Israeli government great leeway to implement discrimination toward the Arab minority."<sup>59</sup>

## A Note on the Methodology and Research Challenges

1948 Palestinians are the "invisible man"<sup>60</sup> or the often neglected facet of the Palestine conflict.<sup>61</sup> The relative shortage of literature on 1948 Palestinians mirrors the disregard this minority has long suffered from, both locally and internationally. While the world became occupied with the Palestinian refugee problem following the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel, 1948 Palestinians were deserted by all parties from the moment they were annexed to the new Israeli state. The international community was led to believe that 1948 Palestinians were guaranteed rights and full citizenship status under the new state. Israel's Declaration of Independence, announced on May 14, 1948, promised, "The Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel...equal citizenship and due representation." The reality, however, was different.

Even if that promise was to be kept by Israel, the problematic notion of imposing a completely foreign and "hostile" identity on an indigenous nation was rarely publicly challenged or discussed in those terms in the literature, not even when Israel employed double standards and denied the remainder of that Palestinian nation the right to return to their homeland in spite of the fact that all Jews, regardless of their country of origin, are

able to claim Israeli citizenship under Israel's "right of return." Not only the absurd idea of splitting the same nation into "citizens" and "foreigners/enemies" was not publicly challenged, but also 1948 Palestinians were expected to accept the new citizenship, which conflicts with their original Palestinian identity, adjust and fully integrate in a country that is Jewish by definition.

At the same time, as mentioned earlier in this book, 1948 Palestinians were almost abandoned by their own Arab and even Palestinian brethren mainly for ideological reasons. By and large, the new status of the 1948 Palestinians as citizens of the "enemy Zionist state," which conflicted with national Arab narratives, has further contributed to their exclusion from the political Palestinian and Arab discourse and official representation.<sup>62</sup> Slowly, the presence of a substantial Palestinian minority in the state of Israel became almost invisible and largely unspoken of in the Arab world.

Subsequently, the interest in studying this minority or acknowledging its role in the politics of the region by experts almost diminished, although in later years and in light of major political events and developments there was a significant shift in knowledge production by Palestinians and critical Israelis on the issue that should be acknowledged. Hence, the relative insufficiency of literature on 1948 Palestinians can be perhaps understood yet not justified, especially in light of recent political developments that forced itself on the academic and political agenda. These include Israeli-demographic forecasts, recurrent incidents of violent confrontations between 1948 Palestinians and the state, and the radicalization of Israeli politics toward 1948 Palestinians most evident in the 2009 election rhetoric and results, which turned Avigdor Lieberman's radical right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu into Israel's third largest party.<sup>63</sup> Such developments necessitate revisiting the 1948 Palestinian issues ignored or taken for granted in the past, and giving answers to pressing questions that will shape the future of the state of Israel and the region.

Hence, this book is part of an attempt to fill in the gaps in existing literature on 1948 Palestinians as well as to focus on their political behavior. This book aspires to explore the puzzling quiescent 1948 Palestinian behavior rarely investigated, and to provide a better, more comprehensive framework of analysis. Using a number of integrated theories of social-movement theory, this book seeks to explain the set of factors contributing to mobilization in two main case studies, the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October.

This book provides a multidimensional explanation to mobilization in addition to the analytical framework developed using a combination of social-movement theories. Together with considering the role of grievances, material resources, and political opportunities as mobilizing factors,

this book, in line with social-movement theory, acknowledges the role of psychological and ideational factors such as framing or the presence of ideational resources. By offering a more inclusive framework of analysis, and acknowledging the role of human agency in transcending some of the material barriers to mobilization, this book hopes to offer a more comprehensive explanation for the 1948 Palestinian political mobilization and clarify the puzzle of some of the unlikely mobilizing outcomes.

Part of the contribution of this book is in bringing an insider's perspective. In contrast to the dominant existing literature written from an outsider's point of view and depending primarily on Israeli archives and sources, this book uses authentic 1948 Palestinian documents, and analyzes 1948 Palestinian public and leadership rhetoric. In addition to acknowledging the 1948 Palestinian narrative, and using individual accounts for documentation, individual accounts are used in this book to better understand the 1948 Palestinian framing. For example, while testimonials can be used as supporting evidence for the existence of certain grievances, the textual and content analysis of some of these testimonials can provide useful insights into the motivations behind mobilization.

So far, the opportunity for a theoretically oriented study has not been fully seized, as, while most case studies of 1948 Palestinians generate a wealth of descriptive detail, individually they are not suited to the task of arriving at a generalized understanding of the factors that determine the dynamics of social movements. This book is an attempt to use some of the rich detail of the existing case studies, as well as primary sources gathered by the author, to construct a systematic comparison between the different case studies.

This book owes much to prior research, especially the work of Sabri Jiryis, one of the pioneering 1948 Palestinians to write on the topic. The book also benefited from the work of acclaimed scholars such as Asad Ghanem, Azmi Bishara, Ian Lustick, Majid al-Haj, Mohammed Amara, Nimer Sultany, Nadim Rouhana, Oren Yiftachel, Sammy Smooha, and many more.<sup>64</sup> While this book attempts to fill a gap in existing literature, it does not, however, claim to fill a total vacuum.

This book uses integrated qualitative research methods and relies on previous literature, surveys, and documentation. In addition, this book uses content and textual analysis of primary 1948 Palestinian sources I gathered, over the course of four years, to yield a deep and thorough insight into the complicated 1948 Palestinian reality. These sources include public and leadership statements, in-depth personal interviews and conversations, and meeting protocols, and are meant to explore a variety of 1948 Palestinian narratives and explanations.

Primary and secondary sources are also used to achieve some balance between sources that originate within the region and those with an external

perspective. The sources used include political, social, historical, and legal literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on 1948 Palestinians, in particular. Media, governmental, and NGO reports, archival material, laws and legal records, websites, and statistics, are also used in addition to interviews. As mentioned earlier, public statements and interviews are textually analyzed to explore 1948 Palestinian opinions, understand their perception and framing, and better reflect their authentic motivations for mobilization. My interview subjects include a variety of 1948 Palestinians, ranging from key political and social figures to individuals who either witnessed or took part in the events discussed in this book.

Some of the key challenges of this book lay in the research methodology and nature of in-depth interviews. Interviews are used in this book while bearing in mind their limitations, which include problems with sampling, objectivity, and selective memory. As a result of these limitations, and in its choice of interview subjects, this book is not claiming to be representative of 1948 Palestinians, but rather to reveal a range of narratives, explanations, and perceptions of the case studies and events. Great care had to be taken in choosing the interview subjects. A similar level of attention was needed while conducting the interviews, and in choosing the appropriate questions which can best cover the research queries. However, before progressing to the interview stage, I had to deal with other pressing research challenges.

One of the very first findings of the preliminary research on the topic was revealing the sheer diversity of the 1948 Palestinian minority. This diversity was not merely political as reflected in the range of identities, views, and representation by the various political parties including the Zionist ones; however, it was also a diversity influenced by socioeconomic, cultural, and geographical factors, in addition to the complex relationship that 1948 Palestinians have with the state of Israel. In this sense, 1948 Palestinians were found to be diverse in both their social and political stands and actions.

As a result of this diversity and complexity, there was a challenge in pointing at and classifying a 1948 Palestinian political behavior. What, for instance, counts as a general or even mass 1948 Palestinian political mobilization? Moreover, where can I, as a researcher, draw the line and confidently say that the political behavior chosen for this book is reflective of the majority of 1948 Palestinians, or can be labeled as 1948 Palestinian behavior? What is my test for mass mobilization? Is it the number of participants? If so, what about those who did not participate, and why should action account more than the lack of action, which, I argue, can be a political choice as well?

As part of overcoming this problem, the choice of case studies for this research was determined after scanning and surveying the history of



1948 Palestinians using a range of primary and secondary literature. The research findings revealed the prominence of three main events: Kufor Qasim massacre, the 1976 Land Day, and Habbat October. All three incidents have a strong presence both in existing literature and in 1948 Palestinian collective memory, demonstrating a high degree of consensus around the events.

However, due to research constraints, only two events could be chosen as case studies for this book. The Kufor Qasim massacre was excluded for a number of reasons. In contrast to the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October, the Kufor Qasim massacre took place during a period when Military Rule was still imposed on 1948 Palestinians. Therefore, it was better to choose the two incidents that occurred during a similar political era, that is after lifting Military Rule, to enable comparisons to be made.

Furthermore, the political behavior of 1948 Palestinians in relation to the Kufor Qasim massacre, which was largely characterized by acquiescence, involved a smaller segment of 1948 Palestinians and was more of a reaction rather than a predetermined decision to mobilize. Therefore, the choice fell on the other two case studies that were more likely to result in a nuanced analysis and better reflection of 1948 Palestinian social movement.

While the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October are more notorious for being acts of resistance, both case studies are composed of varied political behavior patterns (ranging between acquiescence, participation, and resistance) which were constantly changing with the changes in circumstances.<sup>65</sup> The fact that both case studies include a richer complex of 1948 Palestinian political behavior patterns that can be closely followed and analyzed, makes the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October more appealing and appropriate for a book attempting to understand the factors and dynamics behind the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians.

Finally, considering the fact that more than 50 years have passed since the Kufor Qasim massacre made it almost impossible, within the constraints of this book and its research resources, to obtain firsthand sources, documentation, or personal testimonials on the massacre. For all of the reasons outlined above, the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October were chosen as the two case studies for this research.

Once the case studies were chosen, the next challenge was to find relevant literature and supporting evidence. The need to conduct field research in Israel was instantly recognized due to the nature of the topic and the scarcity of relevant sources in the United Kingdom (where I did my PhD). I had to travel to Israel to gain access to documents and published sources, as well as to conduct interviews.

The field research in Israel included lengthy stays at the Hebrew University and Haifa University libraries. Yet, the available sources at these

libraries were not sufficient, especially for locating 1948 Palestinian insider accounts or literature. The problem with such insider evidence, however, is that in many cases it was either lost, or never even collected. This is due to the long history of wars, occupation, lack of resources, and the strength of oral tradition within the 1948 Palestinian community. Actually, up until this day, 1948 Palestinians do not have a national library or archive that documents their history and heritage.

The next challenge, therefore, was to try to recover some of the documented insider evidence through personal efforts. This was done with the help of individuals such as Mohammed Shoughry, the late Ahmad Saa'd, and the late Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh, who kindly granted me access to their private libraries and personal archival collections. In addition, both Adalah—the Legal Center for Arab Minority Right in Israel, and the Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA), have generously allowed me to use their archives.

Together with the interviews, which were conducted in Arabic, a large number of the sources gathered during the field research were in either Hebrew or Arabic and required translation.<sup>66</sup> Although my professional experience in this domain cleared many of the translation obstacles, there were still instances where translation was a challenge. This was especially true with idioms and collocations whose meanings cannot be completely transformed or understood in English, in addition to words that are culturally or politically loaded. Producing an accurate English translation was particularly vital to convey the original 1948 Palestinian framing to the reader. Therefore, extra efforts were made using the help of English native speakers to keep the English translation true, as possible, to the spirit of the original text.

The task of finding interview subjects was also challenging for a number of reasons. The passage of time was the main problem in the case of 1976 Land Day, which took place more than 30 years ago. The majority of the leadership involved in the organization of 1976 Land Day had passed away, and people who participated or witnessed the events were either hard to locate, or had difficulties remembering the details. Habbat October, which was a relatively new event compared to 1976 Land Day, involved additional challenges related mainly to confidentiality.

Due to the political nature of this research, confidentiality was a key ethical concern for me as a researcher. The confidentiality of my informants had to be guaranteed especially since we would be discussing political matters related to national consciousness and struggle, and possible incidents of violent resistance. Interview subjects were to be asked about delicate matters such as national identity and affiliation, national security, and political mobilization.

The 1948 Palestinians approached for in-depth interviews or even to answer a few questions on Habbat October were very suspicious of the purposes behind the inquiry. Some of them, especially those who are state employees like teachers or nurses, apologized fearing the information they provide might find its way to the Israeli authorities and might be used against them. Others, especially participants in Habbat October, agreed to talk off the record, after being promised confidentiality. While the few who agreed to expose their identities either were nonparticipants, or provided very limited or general information on Habbat October. In one incident, a former 1948 Palestinian political prisoner who was initially keen to speak when first approached, stopped answering my calls later, and refused to be interviewed.

Together with confidentiality issues, I needed to adhere to a code of professional ethics and be careful not to use my identity as a 1948 Palestinian to persuade, either intentionally or unintentionally, the interview subjects to expose details about themselves that they would not normally expose in the presence of non-1948 Palestinian. As mentioned earlier, my 1948 Palestinian affiliation could have resulted in unconscious or inevitable biases. The fact that I belong to the same minority group, which I am investigating, could have been encouraging to some interview subjects, leading them to speak more openly. In some cases, my national identity could have even given interview subjects extra assurance that their names, identities, or comments will not be revealed or used against them.

For those reasons, and regardless of the temptation of obtaining exclusive data, I could not allow myself to conduct an interview unless I was positive of my ability to grant the informants confidentiality, and take all the measures to hide and conceal their identity and details. Breaching the confidentiality in situations where political opinions and actions are revealed might cost informants their freedom or personal safety.

However, being part of this minority paved the way for several research related tasks such as: bringing an authentic firsthand perspective to the work, demonstrating a deep understanding of the topic, which makes it relatively easier to analyze and code the data, serving as a participant observer in some instances and reflecting on the events as a witness, and giving me, as a researcher, a degree of credibility that helped in establishing a useful network of contacts for my field research.

Finally, being a 1948 Palestinian meant I had to be constantly aware of the need to maintain a balanced view and academic approach regardless of my personal affiliation and biases. However, even with the endeavor to self-monitor this research, and in spite of the efforts of my supervisors to maintain impartiality, this research will most probably include some inevitable biases.

## Social-Movement Theory as a Theoretical Framework

Social-movement theory is the theoretical framework used in this book to analyze the specific social, economic, cultural, political, and even emotional dynamics contributing to the political behavior demonstrated by 1948 Palestinians during the period covered in this book. For this purpose, specific case studies from the history of 1948 Palestinians are analyzed using the three theoretical approaches of political opportunity, resource mobilization, and framing. The integrated use of the three different social-movement approaches in this book will help generate a stronger analysis than the one done using a single-dimensional theory.

Social movements are among the main forms of group actions used by collectivities to express their grievances. The various definitions of social movements may differ in terms of what is emphasized. One definition describes social movements as “informal networks, based on shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about conflictual issues, through the frequent use of various forms of protest.”<sup>67</sup> A more inclusive definition of social movements, however, refers to them as:

Collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part.<sup>68</sup>

The latter definition of social movements appears to be more flexible and capable of embracing a wider range and forms of social movements under its umbrella. Although both definitions are helpful in the case of 1948 Palestinians to distinguish social movements from other, more structured forms of collective action such as party politics or from single, isolated events.

Social-movement theory was chosen for this book after a quest for a multidimensional theoretical framework capable of encompassing the varied range of factors such as political, social, and psychological conditions and resources, which, I argue, feeds the political behavior of 1948 Palestinians. Social-movement theory provides a richer explanatory framework than other models or single-dimensional theories. Social-movement theory uses established comparative political theories and methodologies in an integrated, multidimensional framework that takes into account the complex dynamics that a movement operates in. Social-movement theory

enables a better understanding of actions and outcomes, by drawing upon processes and mechanisms from rational choice, structural, and cultural comparative political theories. It is important to note, though, that in this book I am not interested in one social-movement organization (SMO) but rather in the broader concept of social movement. SMOs are formal organizations that can be part of the larger informal social movements and share their goals and share in their promoting.

Finally, social-movement theory, especially as defined earlier, provides a useful framework that enables the classification and study of 1948 Palestinian political behavior. Social-movement theory is particularly useful in the 1948 Palestinian context because it does not confine social movements to organizations, which is largely not applicable in the 1948 Palestinian context. Rather, social movements are defined as networks of interaction between different actors, which, depending on shifting circumstances, may either include formal organizations or not.<sup>69</sup>

Social movements are carriers of grievances and through engaging in various types of collective actions and mobilization, social movements dramatize grievances and demand that something is done about them.<sup>70</sup> Mobilization is defined as "the process of creating movement structures and preparing and carrying out protest actions which are visible movement 'products' addressed to actors and publics outside the movement."<sup>71</sup> Mobilization is usually expressed in the forms of demonstrations or public gatherings, although it is not only confined to those forms. Examples from the history of 1948 Palestinians reveal a wider range of mobilization and various forms of civil disobedience including running awareness campaigns on the issue of land in the 1970s, the production of policy papers and documents such as *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*, issued in December 2006, or even the new trend of film production and rap music.

## Grievances

Grievances are among the alternative explanations given for the development of social movements. However, as Karl Dieter Opp argues, their role in generating social-movement participation is one of the most debated issues in the social movement literature. Opp summarizes the grievance debate into three main hypotheses. First, the classical-model hypothesis, according to Opp, assumes the unconditional effect of grievances and argues that grievances lead to increased political participation. Second, the resource-mobilization theorists, however, argue that grievances are everywhere and therefore cannot explain social-movement participation, or that

they at least have secondary importance. A similar view is favored among collective-action theorists, who argue that grievances cannot be incentives in large groups where a single member has only a negligible influence on providing collective goods. Finally, more recent social-movement theorists, Opp argues, bring grievances back into the resource-mobilization perspective. Grievances in this context are important factors in social-movement participation; however, their effects depend on social structure.<sup>72</sup> The latter is the hypothesis adopted in this book, which regards grievances as contributing factors in political participation in a broader context that takes into account the overall factors of resources, political opportunities, and framing.

These preliminary findings will be verified later in this book using the analysis of how grievances were framed by 1948 Palestinians, and what responses these perceived grievances were believed to require. The analysis of some of these grievances and their framing process will clarify the contributing role these framings had on the political behavior of 1948 Palestinians. However, such analysis of grievances and their framing could not be possible without introducing a new grievance model to the existing social-movement literature. I developed this new model to meet the shortage of grievances classifying tools needed to understand the dynamics of grievance framing.

Following a survey of the 1948 Palestinian research material, a number of grievances appeared to be strongly present and were highlighted by 1948 Palestinians themselves. The 1948 Palestinian research material included books, articles, and reports written by or about 1948 Palestinians, in addition to oral testimonies gathered during fieldwork. While recording the 1948 Palestinian grievances, which started after the 1948 war, two sub-dimensions of classifications emerged, appearing to play a major role in the perception, revival, and framing of grievances among 1948 Palestinians, and its contribution to encouraging one kind of political behavior or another. These dimensions were related to the type and timing of grievances.

The 1948 Palestinian grievances appeared to be classified, framed, stored (in both individual and collective memory), and remembered in categories of the same type, with an additional reference to time. For example, when facing a new grievance, 1948 Palestinians would first scan their grievance memory for something similar, yet old, to associate the new grievance to. If a similar old grievance is found, then the new grievance would be cataloged and registered under the same type or category of grievance, only with a new date. This process of grievance coding is an unconscious one, and the process described earlier is an attempt to produce a replication of the cognitive perception and production of grievances.

Nevertheless, the 1948 Palestinian classifying technique of grievances was not enough on its own to justify the need for developing new tools. The justification, however, came following the identification of an interesting framing process among 1948 Palestinians that revives old grievances based on new incidental ones. This interesting dynamic, which not only involves grievances and framing, but also appears to contribute to the 1948 Palestinian behavior, was the reason I developed the following grievance-classifying model. "Old" versus "new," and "permanent" versus "incidental" grievances, are the main terms of the new model.

The term "permanent" grievances is used in this book to refer to permanent or continuous injustices that are always present and vary in scale, while "incidental" grievances refer to significant occasional incidents that are usually perceived as outrageous in their scale or outcome by 1948 Palestinians. As will be illustrated later in this book, old permanent grievances serve as a dormant base, which are revived by 1948 Palestinians due to incidental grievances, and they together contribute to mobilization. These different types of grievances will be later analyzed to classify the collective discourse or frames used by 1948 Palestinians to justify or undermine mobilization. While this classification is particularly useful for the purpose of this book, it can be further developed to apply to social-movement theory in general, or in similar case studies.

Incidental 1948 Palestinian grievances are those significant occasional incidents that are mainly highlighted in the 1948 Palestinian literature suggesting a memorable and strong collective narrative. In general, these grievances are one-off occasional incidents, outrageous in their scale or outcome, yet not part of a continuous grievance. Incidental grievances, or more precisely their framing, which is widely spread either through word of mouth or through the media, become collectively shared among the target public, turning the incidental grievance into a collectively shared experience that calls for a response. This is in contrast to individual frames of grievances that may vary in the case of permanent grievances based on the different levels of injustices an individual is exposed to or affected by. It is not necessary that the grievance in itself is shared or experienced by every member of the group, but mainly that the frame or collective perception of that grievance becomes one that is widely spread and shared collectively.

Furthermore, the incidental grievances chosen for analysis in this book are usually the outcome or an extreme example that triggered some of the permanent grievances mentioned. The incidental grievance of the 1976 Land Day, for example, reflects a permanent grievance, namely that of the long-standing Israeli policy of land confiscation, which resulted in the loss of more than 1 million dunams<sup>73</sup> of land owned by 1948 Palestinians

between 1948 and 1972 and prior to the actual Land Day incident in 1976.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, the incidental grievances of the Kufor Qasim massacre or Habbat October 2000, which are related to permanent grievances concerning the state's general discriminatory attitude toward its Palestinian citizens, were outrageous in the scale of injustice, involving the killing and targeting of civilians by Israeli forces.

In addition, each of the incidental grievances chosen varies despite some similarities. The grievances vary in the circumstances surrounding them, in their framing, and in the response they attracted. The Kufor Qasim massacre, for instance, and despite the fact that it is still very much present in the collective memory of 1948 Palestinians, did not result in mass protests. Habbat October, however, apparently managed to revive both historic (old) and current (new) grievances, and resulted in one of the few massive collective mobilizations of 1948 Palestinians.

Some of the incidents also indicate a shift in political behavior of 1948 Palestinians. The Land Day, for example, was the first incident in which 1948 Palestinians used civil disobedience to protest the confiscation of their land. It was also the first time 1948 Palestinians united under one leadership and challenged the intimidating policies of the Israeli authorities toward them.

The focus of this book is mainly on the incidental grievances of the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October, although there is also a brief discussion of the major permanent grievances which will be used to demonstrate that 1948 Palestinians had many grievances that could justify mobilization. Together with space restraint that precludes an extended discussion of permanent grievances, there were other criteria behind this choice. Furthermore, the grievances discussed in this book took place over a long period of time. They include events from different political eras of the Israeli state, which is indicative of the continuity of the state policy toward 1948 Palestinians. The use of these case studies is meant to explain how successful framing affects the nature of political mobilization, rather than to determine whether 1948 Palestinians were acquiescent or not.

This book will argue, in line with McAdam et al., that grievance in itself is not enough for mobilization, and that for mobilization to occur there is a need for a shared perception or collective sense of dissatisfaction and an optimistic hope of change that will result from collective action.<sup>75</sup> However, low cost-benefit calculations of the protest situation, as Opp argues, can be systematically neglected in cases where there are not public good incentives.<sup>76</sup> This argument will be illustrated by searching for the presence or absence of such frames or collective perceptions in the examples, and examining the degree of optimism with regard to possible changes. Finally, it is important to clarify that grievances are also



subjective and may change depending on their framing and perception by the different narrators.

## Resource Mobilization

For mobilization to happen on a large scale and for sustained movement activities, mobilization requires resources such as people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technical tools to process and distribute information and to influence people.<sup>77</sup>

The resource-mobilization approach was developed by John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald during the 1960s as a reaction to traditional social-psychological theories of social movements,<sup>78</sup> and in an attempt to break with grievance-based conceptions of social movements.<sup>79</sup> Resource-mobilization theorists questioned the role of grievances as determinants of participation in social movements, and focused instead on the importance of structural factors and the rationality of participation in social movements.<sup>80</sup>

The resource-mobilization approach argues that grievances are always present; therefore, the amount of support available to aggrieved groups, rather than the fluctuation in the level of personal discontent, is more relevant in accounting for successful social movements than the existence of grievances alone.<sup>81</sup> According to the resource-mobilization approach, the likelihood of effective collective action increases with the availability of diverse kinds of resources and the privileged access of social actors to them.<sup>82</sup> Hence, a change in access to resources or in the macropolitical opportunity will enable people to mobilize.<sup>83</sup>

The resource-mobilization approach considers social movements as structured and planned movements, enabling their analysis in terms of organizational dynamics just like other forms of institutionalized action.<sup>84</sup> The range of mobilizing resources that should be available to collective actors is not confined to economic, social, and political resources; other resources include human time and effort,<sup>85</sup> and innovative mobilizational and movement tactics,<sup>86</sup> or ideational resources.

However, the availability of resources, according to Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, is not sufficient on its own, and there is a need for organization and tactical efforts that can bring together all the resources and utilize them for collective action.<sup>87</sup> In addition, Edwards and McCarthy explain how the creative deployment of human, cultural, and social-organizational resources by movement leaders can account for unlikely positive outcomes in cases where material resources cannot

possibly account for. In this context, they highlight "the crucial role of human agency in transcending the durable social and economic barriers to mobilizing underprivileged constituencies."<sup>88</sup>

Resource-mobilization theory assumes that social-movement participants act as rationally in the pursuit of their goals as do other participants in the political process.<sup>89</sup> Within this framework of rational choice, social-movement participants weigh the costs and benefits of movement participation before deciding whether or not to engage in any mobilization. Consequently, participation in a social movement is not perceived as the consequence of predisposing psychological traits or states.

However, as Bert Klandermans illustrates, the relationship between rational choice and movement participation is much more complicated. Klandermans attempts to reconcile the social-psychological and resource-mobilization approaches in a theory, which argues that for mobilization to happen goals have to be perceived as instrumental to the elimination of feelings of relative deprivation or frustration.<sup>90</sup> Klandermans's theory coincides with the framing-process approach adopted in this book to overcome the problem of the dilemma of collective behavior.

Klandermans presents a number of counterarguments to the rational-choice theory, which he says can be addressed by sustaining that a rational-choice framework does not imply feelings are insignificant to movement participation. Klandermans discusses a number of scenarios where rational choice did not lead to movement participation, and provides some further explanation for the unlikely outcomes. Agreement with the goals of the movement, Klandermans argues, does not necessarily lead to participation, just as the availability of Mancur Olson's selective incentives would not necessarily motivate rational persons to participate in social movement. Klandermans adds that while Olson argues that a collective good can motivate participation, people will participate if they expect others to participate as well. Yet, Klandermans explains the tension between collective good and expectancy, stating that if collective good is valued highly then a collective motive to participate can exist. Klandermans stresses that individuals construct their own functions based on their expectations; and while these expectations need not be real, they are real in their consequences. Klandermans then concludes that such expectations, in combination with selective costs and benefits, are of great importance for the choice a person makes among alternative forms of action. Finally, Klandermans maintains that even in cases where cost-benefit calculations are very positive, this will not necessarily motivate individuals as long as they do not believe that the outcome can be produced by their efforts. Klandermans's theoretical approach, which is very similar to the framing-process theory adopted in this book, provides

a useful framework for the explanation of 1948 Palestinian behavior and movement participation.<sup>91</sup>

## Political-Opportunity Structure

The political-opportunity structure approach, also known as the political-process model, was developed in social-movement theory to refocus on the wider political and structural context within which movements operate. This approach, which continues to dominate the social-movement research, argues that the amount of resources available to a movement is not of primary importance in determining social-movement mobilization; rather it is a question of what a movement can achieve with those resources given external conditions.

Sidney Tarrow argues that the success or failure of social movements depends on the correspondence of a number of significant factors rather than the legitimacy or strength of their demands.<sup>92</sup> In line with that argument, McAdam maintains that grievances or discontent over injustice exist perennially, therefore, without encouraging external conditions, grievances will not necessarily lead to social movements.<sup>93</sup> These conditions, or what Jeroen Gunning defines as "the wider political and socio-economic structure within which [social movements] operate,"<sup>94</sup> constitute another vital mobilization factor, which will be explored in this book.

Political-opportunity structure, according to Herbert P. Kitschelt is "comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others."<sup>95</sup> The political-opportunity structure theorists place emphasis on the strategic (political) situation within which people decide whether or not to become active.

Political-opportunity structure theorists maintain that social movements are vastly affected by external political opportunities, and explain how some types of behavior are facilitated and others impeded, by analyzing the historical- and current-structural context a movement finds itself operating within. The main argument is that movements do not operate in a vacuum, but rather in a context with influential elements such as state structures, political systems, and socioeconomic developments. Furthermore, the political-opportunity structure assertion is that social conditions do not directly translate into protest, and movements are perceived as rather a dynamic and complex system of relationships, interests, and perceptions.<sup>96</sup> This book will explore the way in which political-opportunity structure influenced the choice of protest strategies among 1948 Palestinians and the

impact of social movements on their environments. Furthermore, it will investigate why social movements arise in the 1948 Palestinian context and what makes some of them more successful than others.

Political-opportunity structure theorists argue that the political situation in a country sets the possibilities and limits for the developments of social movements. In line with this argument, this book will seek to confirm that despite external changes, the main Israeli policy toward 1948 Palestinians had its effects on the political opportunities and class relationship, contributing to the overall acquiescent behavior of 1948 Palestinians. For this purpose, I will expand on elements borrowed from the political-opportunity structure theory to discuss the choice to resort to one type of political behavior or another.

There is a general agreement among social-movement theorists such as McAdam, Wisler, and Kriesi<sup>97</sup> that political opportunity involves three elements:

1. The degree of openness of political institutions in the state
2. State attitude, or state's coercive capabilities and the strategies of authorities to deal with challengers
3. Class relationship (which includes both interclass and state/elite relationships, the presence/ absence of alliances, and the degree of its stability)

## Framing

One of the key concepts used in this book to understand the dynamics of 1948 Palestinian behavior is "framing." The concept of framing, originally borrowed from Erving Goffman, signifies the dependency of social movements upon the social construction and portrayal of reality.<sup>98</sup> This concept of framing was reintroduced by David Snow, modified, and applied to the study of social movements, giving more power to the role of ideas and sentiments in collective action.<sup>99</sup>

As summarized by Robert Entman, "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation."<sup>100</sup> In media studies, Todd Gitlin defined frames as "principles of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters."<sup>101</sup>

Frames draw on already existing cultural codes, and can be a template or filter through which one encounters new experiences, or processes new

information based on the interpretation of past events.<sup>102</sup> For example, the perception of an act as racist or the belief that legal action is inefficient is partly based on processing old experiences and interpreting past events.

Without frame analysis, political opportunities and resource mobilization will not be sufficient to account for collective action of 1948 Palestinians. Shared perceptions and socially constructed ideas, that is frames, are integral to a better understanding of social-movement mobilizations. McAdam et al. argue that for mobilization to take place, it is not enough for people to feel aggrieved about some aspect of their lives; people also need to feel optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the problem. Without these two components, McAdam et al. argue, it is highly unlikely that people will mobilize even when afforded the opportunity to do so.<sup>103</sup> Hence, for mobilization to happen as Snow et al. explains, "The issue is not merely the presence or absence of grievances, but the manner in which grievances are interpreted, and the generation and diffusion of those interpretations."<sup>104</sup>

Framing is a powerful leadership mechanism displaying how discourse can be used as a leadership resource. This factor aids in the ability to generate resonance and support for mobilization. The ability of a movement to transform the potential for mobilization into actual action depends on the movement's ability to frame their issues in a way that resonates with potential participants. While more space is perhaps given in this book to the 1948 Palestinian framing of grievances, the argument is that the framing of both resources and opportunities in addition to grievances is crucial in accounting for 1948 Palestinian social-movement participation.

Frames are constructed using three main stages: "diagnostic," "prognostic," and "motivational" framing.<sup>105</sup>

- (a) *Diagnostic framing*: Identifies the problem and the cause of the problem, and assigns blame.
- (b) *Prognostic framing*: Suggests solutions, strategies, and tactics to address the problem identified, in order to bring about the desired change.
- (c) *Motivational framing*: or the rationale for action, suggests a rationale for engaging in collective actions by identifying those who are capable of solving the problem.<sup>106</sup>

The extent to which these elements are accomplished will determine mobilization. For example, framing a grievance in a way that diagnoses the problem without suggesting strategies to solve it is less likely to mobilize people. Yet, as is the case with grievances, the presence of frames alone is also not enough, and in order to mobilize potential social-movement

components there must be some “degree of resonance” between the interpretive social movement and the individuals.<sup>107</sup> This resonance, or “frame alignment,” is a necessary condition for movement participation. It is defined as “the linkage or conjunction of individual and SMO interpretive frameworks.”<sup>108</sup> In other words, it is the extent to which a received frame is properly aligned with the recipient.

There are four processes of frame alignment as identified by Snow et al., which include “frame bridging,” “frame amplification,” “frame expansion,” and “frame transformation.”<sup>109</sup>

1. *Frame bridging*: Refers to the “linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem,”<sup>110</sup> and is the least ambitious form of framing.<sup>111</sup>
2. *Frame amplification*: Refers to “the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events.”<sup>112</sup>
3. *Frame extension*: When a movement tries to incorporate participants by enlarging the boundaries of the proposed frame, and portraying its objectives and activities so as to include or encompass the views, interests, or sentiments of potential adherents.<sup>113</sup>
4. *Frame transformation*: Happens when a movement wishes to put forward a radically new set of ideas. This implies that new values, meanings, and understandings may be required to secure participants and support.<sup>114</sup>

In summary, frames are constructed using three main stages: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing; and the degree of alignment or linkage between these constructed frames and social movements’ individuals is mostly determined by the above four frame-alignment processes.

Moreover, the above interaction process between frames is also a component of transforming individual frames into collective and master frames or vice versa. Master frames revolve around issues such as nationalism, liberalism, religion, individualism, and identity, and aligning movement agendas with master frames, or “more enduring”<sup>115</sup> cultural themes is one of the ways to incorporate participants and encourage mobilization.

Frames organize new encounters based on old interpretations or previously held beliefs. For instance, due to the existing collective frame of injustice and discrimination in the Israeli-Palestinian context together with the struggle over land, issues such as land confiscation become more sensitive. In such a context, land confiscation, for example, is more likely

to be linked to master frames such as nationalism and occupation of land, while in a different context such an issue might pass as a development or planning necessity.

McAdam et al. argue that without the framing process, the combination of political opportunities and mobilizing structures remains insufficient to account for collective action, even if this combination affords the groups a certain structural potential for action.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, to explain the collective action of 1948 Palestinians, there is a need to understand the 1948 Palestinian account for grievances and the way in which they perceived and formulated their problems, resources, and opportunities to encourage or discourage mobilization.

Finally, it is important to note that framing is a continually changing factor affected by the changing political opportunities and resources on the course of the events. Ferree and Miller, for example, argue, "Once an action is taken the movement can capitalize on the participants' tendency to attribute behavior to dispositional states rather than to forces in the situation."<sup>117</sup> They also argue that ideological commitment of movement action's participants can arise from action, rather than action following from ideological commitment.<sup>118</sup> As will be illustrated later in this book, this process of ideological commitment following participation can be seen in Habbat October where people who initially participated for nonideological reasons changed their framing and perception after witnessing the harsh state attitude.

In the following chapters, the three social-movement approaches discussed earlier will be used as a theoretical framework for analysis of the two case studies of the 1976 Land Day, and Habbat October. The integrated use of the three factors was chosen for this book to generate strong and inclusive analysis of the 1948 Palestinian political behavior, and to enable better identification of its contributing factors and dynamics. The theoretical approaches will serve as guidelines to analyze and better understand the contributing factors and dynamics behind the 1948 Palestinian mobilization on these incidents. By employing the same theoretical tests to both case studies, this research will yield results, which can be later compared to identify any similarities or patterns. Finally, it is important to note that while this book is occupied with political behavior of 1948 Palestinians, it is not in a position to determine the dominant nature of such behavior, which is too complex and diverse.

## Chapter 2

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### 1976 Land Day

#### 1976 Land Day, the Day 1948 Palestinians Mobilized against State Policies

On March 29 and 30, 1976, the Israeli security forces killed six 1948 Palestinians during a general strike and demonstrations against a policy of land confiscations by the government.<sup>1</sup> The peak of these confiscations was in October 1975, when the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture published The Galilee Development Plan, which spelled out the government's intention to expropriate over 20,000 dunams<sup>2</sup> (more than 5,000 acres), most of which was located in the Galilee where the highest concentration of 1948 Palestinians lived. The vast majority of the land expropriated was to be turned over for the construction of a military training camp and Jewish industrial zones.

Despite the deaths, no investigation was held in the aftermath of the 1976 Land Day, no government official accepted responsibility, and none from the security forces who committed the killings was punished. This was in contrast to the official response to the 1956 Kufor Qasim massacre, for example, which provided some investigation and punishment of the guilty, however partial. Ever since 1976, March 30, is celebrated as Land Day, a national day for all Palestinians worldwide.

Although the literature marks March 30, 1976, as Land Day, I will argue in this chapter that Land Day was in fact a long-drawn-out mobilization process, rather than a single event, that started at least a year before, in early 1975, following a wave of land confiscation in the 1970s. In addition, I will argue that the 1976 Land Day was not a premeditated 1948 Palestinian plan of a day of violent resistance, but the outcome of a long



protest cycle. As will be detailed later in this chapter, the initial official mobilization of 1948 Palestinians on this topic came on July 29, 1975, when a group of 1948 Palestinians held a meeting in Haifa to discuss the Galilee Development Plan. In this meeting, the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land in Israel (hereinafter, the Land Defence Committee) was established. Then on August 15, 1975, the Land Defence Committee held another meeting in Nazareth to discuss ways to stop the Israeli plan. This was followed by a national conference held in Nazareth on October 18, 1975, to protest against the confiscation, and decide on a strategy for action.<sup>3</sup>

The 1948 Palestinian community was attempting to have a dialogue with the Israeli authorities to persuade them to halt the confiscation. However, after the failure of their attempts to convince the Israeli authorities to change their plans, or even meet with the 1948 Palestinian leadership to negotiate, the Land Defence Committee met in Nazareth on March 6, 1976, and called for a general strike later that month. The strike was planned for March 30, 1976, in an attempt to put some pressure on the Israeli authorities to negotiate. However, the Israeli authorities' response, as will be detailed later, tried without success to prevent the strike from happening through a number of ways including putting pressure on the 1948 Palestinian leadership to cancel the strike decision, threatening to dismiss workers who strike on that day, and using police and security forces to intimidate participation.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, Israeli police and military forces entered Palestinian towns and villages in the days before the strike and killed two Palestinians on March 29, 1976. Then, on March 30, 1976, a number of violent confrontations between Israeli police and security forces and 1948 Palestinian demonstrators took place. In some cases, like in the 1948 Palestinian town of Sakhnin, Israeli soldiers declared siege and used force to enforce it. By the conclusion of the day's events, four more Palestinians had been killed and hundreds had been injured and arrested.<sup>5</sup>

In the aftermath of the 1976 Land Day, a confidential Israeli government policy document aimed at reducing the number and influence of 1948 Palestinians in the Galilee was leaked revealing the Israeli government's intentions and plans for the 1948 Palestinians. The Koenig Memorandum, named after its main author Israel Koenig, then the North District Commissioner, was based on a peculiar reading of the status of 1948 Palestinians in Israel and recommendations regarding the state's policy toward the minority. The memorandum, leaked to the Israeli newspaper *Al-Hamishmar* and published on September 7, 1976, is the first publicly available document that shows that the policies of discrimination and containment, to which the 1948 Palestinian citizens have been subjected since 1948, reflect planning and

deliberations by policy-making circles. Its publication exposed the policy options that Israeli policy makers were considering prior to the 1976 Land Day, as its first and main section was finalized on March 1, 1976, one month prior to the Land Day's events.<sup>6</sup> The memorandum, which "describes the Arab mentality as oriental, Levantine, supervisonal and backward,"<sup>7</sup> was intended to provide Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with an array of policy options. The Koenig Memorandum included a plan to confiscate 1948 Palestinian lands and change the demographic balance in the Galilee with the intention to Judaize the area. This was in addition to reference to other matters such as encouraging the 1948 Palestinian immigration from Israel, increasing the obstacles in the way of 1948 Palestinian admission to Israeli universities, and setting a 1948 Palestinian political party that will secretly serve the Israel government's interests.<sup>8</sup> When approached for denial that this was Israeli policy, the then prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, refused to do so.<sup>9</sup> The language of the memorandum and its draconian suggestions was another reason to reinforce preexisting 1948 Palestinian convictions that the state's attitude toward them was hostile.

This chapter will further detail the events portrayed above, while seeking to explain how 1948 Palestinians came to mobilize on the 1976 Land Day. It will analyze the dynamics of the 1948 Palestinian mobilization on the 1976 Land Day while looking for reasons why this event was different from previous, similar occasions on which the 1948 Palestinians might have mobilized but did not. Using the analytical framework of the social-movement theory and with the help of primary documents, and testimonies gathered from 1976 Land Day witnesses, this chapter will try to explain how the sum of grievances, political opportunities, resources, and their framing affected the political behavior of 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day. It is worth noting, at this point, that despite all attempts to avoid repetition, the overlap between the various contributing factors and their applicability to more than one social-movement approach required that some factors be discussed under more than one theoretical category. For example, while Military Rule can be seen as a 1948 Palestinian grievance, it is at the same time an indication of the political opportunities available for 1948 Palestinians. Therefore, resources and political opportunities are discussed in this chapter under the same section, because the two categories are so interlinked.

## 1976 Land Day: Motivation and Timing

Perhaps, the first question to be raised here is why did the 1948 Palestinians mobilize on the Land Day? As detailed earlier, social-movement theory

presents grievances as the matters around which social movements develop. In other words, for mobilization to happen on the 1976 Land Day there must have been a grievance or a number of grievances that affected the 1948 Palestinians and required their attention and response. A brief review of the 1948 Palestinian history generates a large number of strong 1948 Palestinian grievances, both permanent and incidental, which existed prior to the 1976 Land Day and that could have motivated the political mobilization.

The 1948 war, which is a landmark in the history of 1948 Palestinians, is the core of the 1948 Palestinian permanent grievances with consequences on their political and social life that are apparent more than 60 years later. At the conclusion of the war, the 1948 Palestinians found themselves faced with a new political reality. Not only were they defeated, but also the size of the new state of Israel was much larger than the territory of the Jewish state that had been specified in the United Nations (UN) Partition Plan,<sup>10</sup> and it included areas that were inhabited almost entirely by Palestinians, mainly the Galilee and the Triangle.<sup>11</sup> The 1948 Palestinians went from being a majority to a minority, and only 150,000 of them remained in what became the new borders of the state of Israel, out of the 800,000 Palestinians who used to live in that area.<sup>12</sup>

In addition, as detailed earlier, most Palestinians who remained in what became the state of Israel became reluctant Israeli citizens but were not granted full rights, in contradiction to the UN Partition Plan and the Israeli Declaration of Independence. The 1948 Palestinians were expected to become obedient citizens and integrate within the new social and political structure. While given certain rights by the state, such as the right to vote, the 1948 Palestinians were deprived of many others.<sup>13</sup>

Adding to that, the series of discriminatory Israeli policies and attitudes, together with the fresh memories of wartime atrocities, served as a constant reminder for the 1948 Palestinians that they were not welcome in the new Israeli state. In best case scenarios, the 1948 Palestinians could not be more than second class citizens, repeatedly treated like a potential fifth column, and "oftentimes simply as enemies of the state."<sup>14</sup> The 1948 Palestinians were constantly required to prove their loyalty to the state of Israel, and to the Zionist cause, which calls for the restoration of the Jewish national home in Palestine.

An important element of the permanent 1948 Palestinian grievances was related to their status and relationship with the state. The 1948 Palestinians were asked to relate to a country, which is Jewish by definition, where citizenship status is based on religion, rather than on the rights and responsibilities of citizens as is the case in democratic countries. Israeli national symbols, such as the flag or the national anthem, for example, reflect a combination of Jewish and Zionist beliefs that do not encompass and in some respects

do not tolerate other beliefs or nations. Yet still, 1948 Palestinians, who are obviously not Jews, were asked to sympathize with and pay respect to these symbols. Even the official language of Israel turned, in practice, solely into Hebrew, despite the fact that by law Israel is a bilingual country with Arabic as an official language alongside the Hebrew.<sup>15</sup>

The above policies and many more were only the tip of the iceberg of systematic Israeli attempts to target the Palestinian character of the place and population within the borders of the new state. Among the most serious of these policies in this context, was the Military Rule applied to 1948 Palestinians from 1948 to 1966, and the long established policy of land confiscation that resulted in the loss of more than 1 million dunams of land belonging to the 1948 Palestinians between 1948 and 1972, and prior to the actual Land Day incidents in 1976.<sup>16</sup>

This range of Israeli state policies and others, which will be detailed in length later under the political opportunities and resources sections, constituted the vast majority of the permanent 1948 Palestinian grievances prior to 1976 Land Day. Together with these permanent grievances, there was a number of incidental grievances formed close to the timing of 1976 Land Day as a result of significant occasional incidents. The main occasional incidents which turned into strong incidental grievances included the Galilee Development Plan to confiscate 21,000 dunams, and later, the killing of two 1948 Palestinians on March 29, 1976. This cumulative effect of these 1948 Palestinian permanent and incidental grievances, I argue, had laid the foundation for the potential mobilization of 1948 Palestinians.

Yet, before moving on to the conditions and factors that encouraged the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day, it is important to understand the 1948 Palestinian framing of the Galilee Development Plan and its perception as a new incidental grievance, and part of a hostile policy of land confiscation aiming to change the demographics and "Judaize" the Galilee. To add to the past experiences of land seizure and confiscations, which contributed to the negative 1948 Palestinian framing of the Galilee Development Plan, the Israeli government did not hide the national objective behind the plan. The plan published in the Israeli ministry of agriculture quarterly, in October 1975, outlined that "the current situation in terms of the demographic balance between the Jewish and non-Jewish population must be changed by means of a long-term program."<sup>17</sup> In sum, the Galilee Development Plan, which was perceived by 1948 Palestinians as a strong incidental grievance, revived old grievances, and turned the dormant base of old permanent 1948 Palestinian grievances into an active one and provided direct motivation for mobilization.

The next question to be answered relates to the timing of the 1948 Palestinian mobilization on the 1976 Land Day. If, indeed, the 1948

Palestinian grievances were so rife and justified a reaction, then why did the 1948 Palestinians wait for so long to react? This point was raised by 1948 Palestinians themselves in the National Conference to Defend the Arab Lands in Israel that was held on October 18, 1975:

It is truly strange to hold this conference after twenty seven years of the establishment of the State, to protest against the confiscation of new lands and the condemnation of government plans to seize areas of Arab farmers' lands.<sup>18</sup>

In the following sections, this chapter will explain why it took the 1948 Palestinians 27 years and the confiscation of more than 1 million dunams to mobilize. Using the social-movement theory, the book will demonstrate how the conditions set up by the various grievances, together with the political opportunities and resources and their framing enabled the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day. The response to grievances, as social-movement theory argues, is in large part determined by the three main factors of opportunity, resources, and framing. This chapter will illustrate how the sum of grievances, political opportunities, and resources, and their framing by 1948 Palestinians translated into mobilization on the 1976 Land Day. As I argued earlier, the whole episode of the 1976 Land Day was a long process with multiple events, varied reactions, and mixed range of political behavior. Therefore, the contributing factors, especially the way 1948 Palestinians framed events, were also not stable, but were rather constantly changing over the course of the events. The next part of this chapter will introduce some of the contributing factors that help to explain the political behavior of the 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day.

## 1976 Land Day: Political Opportunities and Resources

### The Regional Context

Identifying the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians requires examining their internal situation in the state as well as reviewing the regional atmosphere. The regional context is something often ignored in the social-movement theory and needs to be more emphasized. The regional conditions in the Middle East, I argue, have a direct effect on the internal political opportunities and resources within the state, and play a contributing role in influencing the framing of these

opportunities and resources by the 1948 Palestinians. While some of the primary evidence suggests that the regional context had but a minor effect, it is more likely that its effect was an unconscious one. Below is a brief overview of the major relevant regional events that took place between 1948 and 1976, prior to the 1976 Land Day, and influenced, I argue, the political mobilization of 1948 Palestinians.

In 1948, the first war in a series of Arab-Israeli wars took place following the termination of the British Mandate of Palestine and the declaration of Israel's independence. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war witnessed the defeat of the Arab states and resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel on most of historical Palestine. While originally and according to the UN Partition Plan the Galilee, where the highest concentration of Palestinians lived, was intended to be part of the Arab Palestinian state, following the defeat even this plan was no longer an option. Hence, in an unexpected development the 1948 Palestinians became a subordinate minority on their own land. In a matter of days, their status was reduced from a majority to a minority outnumbered and controlled by a population of Jewish immigrants who before the 1948 constituted a negligible minority. In addition, the 1948 Palestinian war resulted in the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem, which also left its marks on the 1948 Palestinians.

On July 23, 1952, a group of young Egyptian army officers led a military coup overturning the monarchy of King Farouq starting the Egyptian Revolution of 1952. The group of officers named *al-Dubbat al-Ahrar* (The Free Officers) was headed by Colonel Jamal Abdel Nasser, who later became Egypt's president and a prominent Arab leader. The loss of the 1948 war with Israel, which revealed the ineptitude of the ruling Egyptian regime, served to build support for the 1952 Revolution.<sup>19</sup>

The years from 1956 to 1967 witnessed the rise of Arab nationalism following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt's president Jamal Abdel Nasser on July 26, 1956, which ended the British/French foreign control of Egypt. The Suez Canal, completed in 1869, is a strategic water pathway connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Nasser's nationalization of the Canal provoked a military attack on Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France. The attack known as The Suez Crisis, or the *al-Idwan al-Thulathi* (Tripartite Aggression) was condemned at an international level forcing the British and French to withdraw their forces.<sup>20</sup> As a result, Nasser had won a significant victory, and became a hero in the Arab world. His stand against Western imperialism brought him huge popularity in Egypt and the Arab world.<sup>21</sup> The immediate effect was that Britain and France were finally out of Egypt, and the Egyptians had full control of the Suez Canal and its revenues. Nasser went on to nationalize all other foreign assets in Egypt and constructed the Aswan Dam. Later in

1958, The United Arab Republic (UAR) was created bounding Egypt and Syria together into a united state. However, the UAR, which was a first step toward a pan-Arab state, existed only until 1961. Nevertheless, this period witnessed the increasing popularity of Nasser and the major influence of his pan-Arab nationalist socialist political ideology, also known as Nasserism. Palestine was the central political issue of Arab nationalism generally and of Nasserism particularly.<sup>22</sup>

From June 5 to 10, 1967, a third Arab-Israeli war took place involving Israel and its neighboring states, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, with other Arab countries contributing arms and troops to the Arab forces. The Six-Day War more commonly known in Arabic as *An-Naksah* (The Setback) ended with the sour defeat of Arabs by Israel resulting in placing about 1 million Arabs under Israel's direct control. By the conclusion of the war on June 10, Israel had increased its territory by a factor of three after occupying the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, and the Syrian Golan Heights.<sup>23</sup> While making possible the reunification of Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line,<sup>24</sup> the An-Naksah's defeat severely damaged the pan-Arab nationalism ideology and led to the discreditation of Nasserism.<sup>25</sup> Following the death of Nasser, a popular leader who united most of the Arab people with his ideology, in the 1970, an end was put to the possibility of actual Arab unity.<sup>26</sup>

In October 1973, the fourth Arab-Israeli war (Yom Kippur war, Ramadan war, or October war) erupted between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria resulting in the first defeat of Israel since its establishment in 1948. The war started on the holy Jewish Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan, with a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack that took Israel by surprise. Following the war, Anwar Sadat, Nasser's vice president, who had become president following Nasser's death in 1970, was "hailed at home for taking action to end the defeatism and immobilism that had reigned in Arab capitals since 1967."<sup>27</sup> While achieving a major Arab psychological breakthrough, the Yom Kippur war, according to Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, failed to secure victory partly as a result of entering into indirect diplomatic contact with Israel.<sup>28</sup>

The year 1974 witnessed one of the most remarkable events in the history of the Palestinian issue. In October 1974, the UN General Assembly voted unanimously to invite the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat to attend a future assembly to discuss the Palestinian problem. By then, this privilege had never been granted to any nonmember other than the pope.<sup>29</sup> However, as Heikal notes, "the invitation was a consolation after a year [in] which international attention had been focused on every aspect of the Arab-Israel conflict other than the Palestinian cause."<sup>30</sup> The following month, on November 13, 1974, Arafat made his historic address before the UN General Assembly in New York

city. Arafat pleaded for the Palestinian rights, including an independent Palestinian state in Palestine where Muslims, Christians, and Jews could live together in peace.<sup>31</sup> Dressed in his trademark uniform and holster, Arafat raised a figurative olive branch and a gun and addressed the UN Assembly saying, "I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand." The PLO chairman received a resounding standing ovation from the delegates of 140 nations.<sup>32</sup>

The significance of Arafat's address to the UN lies in a number of new political shifts. Together with defending the right of Palestinians, in this address Arafat accepted the need for compromise, agreeing to an international conference for peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. In fact, Arafat's unprecedented compromise marked a shift in Palestinian and Arab thinking with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and had de facto recognized Israel and the two-state solution. In addition, Arafat's address led to the internationalization of the Palestinian problem. On November 22, 1974, UN General Assembly Resolution 3236 was adopted affirming the "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people," including their "right to national independence and sovereignty" in Palestine. The resolution, which added the Palestinian issue on the UN agenda, recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and granted it a nonvoting observer status. This was the first time the UN granted such status to a nonnation political and paramilitary organization. In 1975, the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People was founded. Soon after the speech, many nations followed the steps of the UN in recognizing the PLO and allowing PLO diplomatic offices in their countries.<sup>33</sup>

When asked about the regional context and its effect on the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians on 1976 Land Day, Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh, one of the 1976 Land Day leaders, was quick to dismiss the influence of regional events, or any connection between their struggle, and the bigger Palestinian or Israeli-Arab conflict. For instance, when asked about the effect of the 1973 war, Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh said, "our ideas were never ideas of war," and he cynically added that the 1973 war was more likely to depress 1948 Palestinians and not the opposite. Rev. Shehadeh said that he did not think that there should be a link between their struggle at the Land Defence Committee to stop the land confiscation, and what happened in 1973 or other events, not even on the Palestinian level:

When I look at it, I do not see a connection between us...between our struggle and methods, and what happens in the West Bank and Gaza. I do not think there is a connection. I even remember in 1992 or 1991, I attended a lecture by Dr. Haider Abdel Shafi<sup>34</sup> in Chicago in which he



talked about the Peace negotiations. I asked him: "You are working on the Palestinian case and towards a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but what about us the Palestinians inside Israel!?" He could not answer!! Then Dr. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, who was chairing the talk, told me: "Reverend, you have the answer. Your struggle is different". And I knew it. Perhaps I asked to cause embarrassment more than any thing else, but I wanted to know [Haider's] point of view.<sup>35</sup>

The above testimony reflects the feeling of neglect or betrayal among the 1948 Palestinians for being deserted by the Palestinian and the Arab leadership. In fact, the "lack of connection" that Rev. Shehadeh talks about is in itself an indication of a strong connection between the regional context and the 1948 Palestinian mobilization. While Rev. Shehadeh was trying to dismiss the effects of the regional context, he was in fact providing evidence that the framing of grievances, political opportunities, and resources, was influenced by the same events he tried to dismiss. If indeed the 1973 war was a source for depression among the 1948 Palestinians, then it meant a change in the political opportunities and resources available to their struggle, and an increasing awareness that the 1948 Palestinian grievances could only be addressed by 1948 Palestinians themselves. Moreover, if indeed 1948 Palestinians felt neglected or excluded from the Palestinian leadership or a proposed solution, then their political opportunities would have become limited to those channels available within the Israeli state framework, because the resources of the wider Palestinian leadership or even the opportunity to tie the 1948 Palestinian struggle with the larger Palestinian struggle was no longer available.

Additional evidence of the effect of the regional context on 1948 Palestinian framing can be found in Hanna Naqara's<sup>36</sup> report to the national conference held in Nazareth on October 18, 1975. In his address, Naqara, a prominent 1948 Palestinian lawyer who led many legal campaigns to defend 1948 Palestinian rights, asserted that there was no room for despair in the minds of 1948 Palestinians despite the defeats and the rifts caused by the Interim Agreement in Sinai.<sup>37</sup> Naqara was referring to the rift caused by the post-cease-fire negotiations between Egypt and Israel following the 1973 war, and its effect, together with that of the many defeats of the Arab states by Israel, on 1948 Palestinians.

### Lifting of Military Rule and the Creation of New Political Opportunities

Military Rule, which is chosen here as an example of a policy rather than a time period, reflects both grievances and state attitudes that limited the

political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians, and affected their framing and political behavior. The Military Rule has characterized both the Israeli state's interactions with the 1948 Palestinians and the latter's attitude toward the state. The Military Rule was the first state policy after the 1948 war that openly targeted the Palestinian citizens of Israel. This policy, as mentioned earlier, set the tone of the relationship between Israel and its Palestinian citizens for years to come.

Israel's attitudes and policies toward its Palestinian citizens, especially those in the two decades following the establishment of Israel, I argue, have largely encouraged, and sometimes even imposed an acquiescent 1948 Palestinian behavior. The 1948 Palestinians were in a state of shock following the war atrocities in 1948 and the loss of their land and loved ones, and Military Rule was used, I argue, to control 1948 Palestinians and limit their participation and development in the state of Israel.

Grievances accumulated during approximately two decades in which Military Rule was applied to 1948 Palestinian residents of the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev. A main source of grievance was the need of 150,000 Palestinians to go through the process of naturalization, which included, among others, stating allegiance to the Jewish state and commanding a foreign language, Hebrew. By the same token, 1948 Palestinians' prospect of becoming full citizens in the Jewish state became nonexistent since this right was *de facto* conditioned upon being Jewish. The 1948 Palestinian citizens faced endless restrictions under Military Rule, which stood in the way of them becoming full citizens as promised in Israel's Proclamation of Independence.

However, even with all the grievances, inequality, racism, and public hostility toward them, the 1948 Palestinians found it difficult to resist under Military Rule. Military Rule's capacity for repression, together with the severe strategies of the Israeli authorities to deal with challengers, had limited the number of resistance incidents and assured, a generally acquiescent response from the 1948 Palestinian minority. This fits with Muller and Weede's findings that violent protest is less likely to occur in free/participatory and repressive regimes, and is more likely in semirepressive regimes. Repressive regimes both actively prevent mobilization and make it more costly, regardless of whether it is violent.<sup>38</sup> In this case, the Israeli state did not seriously allow civil rights to limit its repressiveness toward 1948 Palestinians.

Israel's treatment of the 1948 Palestinians under Military Rule and the harsh policy adopted against those who challenged Israel's authority, legitimacy, or actions, served as a reminder for those 1948 Palestinians who considered opposition or resistance. It also sent the message that the Israeli authorities expected compliant behavior from its citizens, or else strict measures, including collective punishment would be used.

Consequently, when Military Rule was lifted in 1966, it eased some of the restrictions and created new political opportunities for 1948 Palestinians. Therefore, compared to previous grievances where acquiescence was the response, the main grievances that contributed to the 1976 Land Day occurred after the lifting of Military Rule, and at a time when there was at least the perception among 1948 Palestinians of greater state openness to legitimate protest.

Regardless of the fact that the mentality behind Military Rule continued for decades after it was lifted, in principle, the lifting of Military Rule meant giving people more freedom, more space to express themselves, to organize, and to protest, as well as easier access to state institutions. The new political reality created better conditions for 1948 Palestinians and led to changes in the political opportunities and resources available to them. For instance, the new reality enabled 1948 Palestinians to enhance their unity as well as social and political organization and participation. The greater freedom of movement, for example, enabled Palestinians to organize and attend meetings and conferences such as the National Conference to Defend the Arab Land on October 18, 1975. It also made it easier for groups like the Land Defence Committee to exist and operate, which would have been far more difficult during Military Rule.

The end of Military Rule, I argue, led to a perceived openness to protest. By the time of the 1976 Land Day the repressive Israeli regime of Military Rule was largely lifted and replaced with what was perceived by 1948 Palestinians as a more democratic regime with emphasis on institutions and the rule of law. This led to a change in 1948 Palestinian resource-mobilization opportunities partly because 1948 Palestinians thought that they would now be treated more like real citizens, with apparently similar rights to use legitimate protest like the Jewish citizens.

In reality, however, the Israeli state attitude and response to any suggestion of political opposition or protest by the 1948 Palestinian community was very hostile, despite the end of Military Rule. The Israeli government ignored petitions and refused to meet with representatives of the Land Defence Committee. Later, on March 6, 1976, when the strike was declared, government officials, the Israeli media, the Histadrut,<sup>39</sup> and the Ministry of Education, all joined forces and threatened those who planned to join the general strike with strict measures against them, including loss of jobs.

The Israeli authorities also successfully pressured some of the 1948 Palestinian council heads, who staged a meeting and issued a statement calling for the cancellation of the planned general strike. Israeli police and military forces entered Palestinian towns and villages, days before the strike, declared a siege, and used force to enforce it, and this is mainly how Palestinians were killed.<sup>40</sup>

## Socioeconomic Changes and the Development of 1948 Palestinian Minority

Socioeconomic developments are among the elements that, according to political-opportunity structure theory,<sup>41</sup> compose the context in which social movements operate within. While social conditions do not directly translate into protest, they do however affect the political situation, and influence the choice of protest strategies. Furthermore, socioeconomic developments can lead to changes in the available resources and political opportunities, in addition to changing the framing of grievances or creating new ones. In his original political process model, Doug McAdam focuses on broad socioeconomic changes as a necessary element for the formation of a social movement. McAdam argues, "Any event or broad social process that can serve to undermine the calculations on which the political establishment is structured occasion a shift in political opportunities."<sup>42</sup>

While reviewing the main socioeconomic developments of the 1948 Palestinian society prior to the 1976 Land Day, this section will demonstrate the various effects of these developments on the 1948 Palestinian society, and illustrate how these changes ultimately affected the political behavior of the 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day. In addition to highlighting cases where socioeconomic changes had created further reasons for dissent, this section will illustrate how socioeconomic changes, together with other factors, affected the political opportunities of 1948 Palestinians and allowed for their mass mobilization on the 1976 Land Day.

The years between the 1948 war and 1967 witnessed major changes in the structure and lifestyle of the 1948 Palestinian society. Perhaps, the most important of all was the increase in the size of the 1948 Palestinian community from 150,000 in 1948 to around 400,000 in 1967.<sup>43</sup> In addition, as a result of the policy of land confiscation, the 1948 Palestinian society was transformed from an agricultural society to an industrial one. Before 1948, the majority of Palestinians, especially in the Galilee and the Triangle, were farmers. Yet, with a clear Israeli policy of land confiscation, and the introduction of laws, such as the Absentee Property Law, the vast majority of land owned by Palestinians was confiscated by the state of Israel.

According to Sa'ad, when Israel was established in 1948 almost 75 percent of 1948 Palestinian workforce was farmers, as opposed to only 10 percent in 1988. Furthermore, the remainder of 1948 Palestinian farmers, Sa'ad says, could no longer compete with the Israeli market when having to face discriminatory policies targeting their farms and products while promoting Jewish ones. Sa'ad adds that not only farmers were targeted, but also Palestinian fishermen who were required to apply for Israeli licenses

and obtain permits to fish, and were rarely given any. The main ports of Haifa, Tiberius, and Jaffa, were shut down for the 1948 Palestinian fishermen for security reasons. Furthermore, Sa'ad says that Palestinian industries and factories that existed before 1948 and survived the war, were either confiscated by the state or forced to close by a targeted Israeli policy to destroy the Palestinian economy.<sup>44</sup>

Based on policies cited, Israel was evidently hoping to control the 1948 Palestinians and perhaps even encourage more Palestinians to leave the country. The following excerpts taken from the Koenig Memorandum highlight some of the principles behind the Israeli policy with regard to 1948 Palestinian economy and employment.

The social and economic security that relieves the individual and the family of economic worries and day-to-day pressures, grants them [1948 Palestinians], consciously and subconsciously, leisure for "social-nationalist" thought which is taken advantage of by hostile elements for various forms of incitement, a sense of power and the possibility of public protest...

By having significant control over various spheres of the economy there is the possibility of striking or of non-cooperation and thus causing serious damage to the economy of the state, and especially political damage by emphasizing their [the 1948 Palestinian] strength as factor in the country's economy...

Suggestions... Make trips abroad for studies easier, while making the return and employment more difficult- this policy is apt to encourage their [1948 Palestinian] emigration.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the transformation of 1948 Palestinians from an agricultural society, it would not be completely accurate to say that the 1948 Palestinian society had been fully transformed into an industrial one since 1948. Palestinians only provided work force for Jewish Israeli industries, rather than establishing or developing their own. Again, this was due to Israeli restrictions imposed solely on 1948 Palestinians for security reasons to evidently prevent them, as suggested by the Koenig Memorandum, from building an independent economy.

However, despite their inability to improve their economic status, the 1948 Palestinians became an increasing force in the Israeli market. Israel's economy became more dependent on the cheap 1948 Palestinian labor to provide public services and in the building sector.<sup>46</sup> The forced reliance of the 1948 Palestinians on the Israeli labor market, together with the formation of a poor and despaired working class, I argue, increased the political awareness of the Palestinian workers that they were being discriminated against on the grounds of their ethnicity, race, and social class. This led 1948 Palestinian workers to combine their national struggle with

their class struggle, a fact that I argue highly contributed to the popularity of the Communist Party among 1948 Palestinians. Gunning and Younis note similar processes that took place in the West Bank and Gaza, during the 1970s and the 1980s, and resulted in Palestinian unity, which, Gunning argues, transcended class and geographical barriers and facilitated "the emergence of national consciousness which (partially) replaced the geographical, clan and class loyalties that have preceded it."<sup>47</sup>

Together with the emergence of a proletarian 1948 Palestinian community, there was a process of forced modernization, which led to an increase in education levels. For example, thanks to laws passed in 1949, 1953, and 1972, the compulsory and free education was introduced to both Jewish and non-Jewish population. As a result, the total number of 1948 Palestinian schoolchildren increased from 11,129 in the years 1948/9 to 177,447 in 1978/9.<sup>48</sup> However, despite the fact that educational opportunities were expanding, "the numbers remained disturbingly small in absolute terms, with only 330 [1948 Palestinian] students graduating from Israeli institutions of higher learning between 1961 and 1971."<sup>49</sup> In his review of the Israeli education services for 1948 Palestinians, Jiryis argues that apart from the laws there has been no significant advance in the 1948 Palestinian education in Israel. On the contrary, the education of 1948 Palestinians, Jiryis argues, is unsatisfactory, and the official relations and attitudes of the state to the 1948 Palestinians in this field has been worse than in any other.<sup>50</sup>

Yet, even with the Israeli state policies that discriminated against the development of schools and educational opportunities for 1948 Palestinians, there was a visible 1948 Palestinian "intelligentsia" in the 1970s that played a vital role in the political and community life of the 1948 Palestinians. The emergence of this intelligentsia can be attributed to a number of factors, including the forced urbanization of 1948 Palestinians, and the resort to university education abroad especially through scholarships funded by the Communist Party to the former Soviet Union. In addition, the loss of Palestine in 1948, as Nachleh argues, has made education an attractive and urgent option for the politically deprived Palestinian who found in education an essential source of power.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, Al-Haj argues that the intense contact of 1948 Palestinians with the Jewish population who represent for 1948 Palestinians "the agents of westernization, has exposed Arabs (1948 Palestinians) to a new socio-cultural experience which [had] great potential influence on many aspects of their lifestyle."<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, socioeconomic changes had their effect on the traditional 1948 Palestinian hierarchies. The loss of agricultural lands and the continued proletarianization resulted in "marginalizing traditional elites and eroding the traditional patron-client relationships associated with the

*hamula* system."<sup>53</sup> On top of that, the electoral system in Israel helped to pass political power from the clan to the extended family.<sup>54</sup> In turn, the need to recruit a large number of votes for the elections required to establish alliances that crossed village/town boundaries and led to the emergence of a more-regional leadership. While these alliances mainly depended on family or religious affiliation, changes in traditional hierarchies were still evident. These changes not only affected the social hierarchy, but also had political consequences as well:

The head of the hamula has continued, indeed, to enjoy the respect appropriate to an elder person, but his political influence has diminished to a greater or lesser extent, as the case may be; this has paralleled the declining status of the family heads, whose sons live at home and gain their livelihood in salaried work.<sup>55</sup>

Together with the change in traditional hierarchies, there was a shift to more educated and less traditional elite. According to Tessler and Grant, during the 1970s, many 1948 Palestinians were members of trade unions and professional organizations, including some oriented toward women. These organizations constituted, according to Tessler and Grant, "social and quasi-political networks that were crucial for disseminating information and articulating community-wide concerns." The small but growing 1948 Palestinian middle class, Tessler and Grant argue, together with the increasing number of 1948 Palestinians admitted to university, and the escalating political and economic discontent, encouraged the emergence of "new modes of political activity and organization and a new political culture."<sup>56</sup>

The new and relatively better 1948 Palestinian conditions described above, which created new political opportunities, facilitated the formation of a number of 1948 Palestinian professional and political associations, including informal networks. Alongside involvement in party politics, 1948 Palestinians managed to establish nonparty political organizations and committees, which further increased the political opportunities of 1948 Palestinians and served as a mobilizing resource on the 1976 Land Day. Among the new 1948 Palestinian leadership resources were: the National Committee of Arab Local Council Heads (NCALCH), Arab Students' Committees, the National Committee for the Defence of Lands, the High Follow-Up Committee, and al-Ard Group. These organizations will be discussed further in the next section on "Presence of Strong Leadership."

Moreover, the democratic system in Israel created new institutional actors such as the Histadrut Labour Federation and the various political parties, which exercised both direct and indirect influences over the lives

of 1948 Palestinians. The new institutional frameworks entered the 1948 Palestinian community providing services on the one hand, and forcing themselves on 1948 Palestinian political life on the other. The Histadrut, for example, was the only body available for workers to guarantee and protect their rights. Anyone who was outside this union could not get social services, health insurance, or unemployment benefits.<sup>57</sup> Therefore, 1948 Palestinians had to join the Histadrut and be part of the new framework in order to survive. However, for a long time, they were not allowed to become full members of the Histadrut.<sup>58</sup> This system, I argue, enabled a better control of the 1948 Palestinian community by the state that could use the Histadrut or other professional organizations to put pressure on 1948 Palestinians, as was the case in 1976 Land Day.

With these institutions providing the services, the political context, and the channel to communicate with the authorities, there was no longer a distinctive political function left for the traditional 1948 Palestinian leadership. In order to retain some relevance for their communities and the chance to influence their future direction, the old 1948 Palestinian leadership was forced to integrate into the new frameworks, even though such frameworks clashed with the traditional political structure. The old leadership realized that unless they adapted, they would lose their authority. Therefore, they tried to regain their power through the framework available. Using their clan votes, or even their connections with Israeli officials, they attempted to seize key positions within the new institutions. The traditional structures thus became dependent upon the new frameworks, and therefore sought to adapt.<sup>59</sup>

Yet, alongside these changes in traditional hierarchies and the shift to new forms of political culture, old practices continued to exist. For instance, Military Rule had contributed to the reemergence of *wasta* (nepotism) due to the recurrent need of 1948 Palestinians for official services and documents, such as work permits, or travel papers. These restrictions and bureaucratic requirements of Military Rule created the need for a mediator between the average 1948 Palestinian citizen and the Israeli authorities, and increased the dependency of 1948 Palestinians on the new elite, which usually occupied key positions within the state's official institutions, and was "loyal" to the state.

Seif E-Din E-Zoubi, for example, was one of the traditional leaders who managed to adapt to the new rules of the game. He was among the first members of the Knesset and served as mayor of Nazareth from 1959 to 1974.<sup>60</sup> Zoubi was a "Hagana intelligence agent"<sup>61</sup> affiliated with Zionist officials. The Hagana is the underground military wing of the Jewish leadership during the British Mandate, which later became the basis for the Israeli Defence Force. He later became the first Israeli Arab deputy



minister of health. Zoubi derived his power from the Zoubia clan, which was concentrated in Nazareth and the surrounding villages. He was one of the few local leaders who succeeded in acquiring influence that extended beyond his clan, his city (Nazareth), or even the region (the Galilee), but nevertheless was not able to attain the stature of a truly national leader. Zoubi did not derive his power from public support but rather from his affiliation with Israeli officials and the support of his clan.<sup>62</sup> Those "loyal" leaders, I argue, had inspired a counterleadership, and had emerged with sufficient resources to use them, as will be detailed later, in the 1976 Land Day protests.

In summary, the 1948 Palestinian minority in Israel went through socioeconomic changes, which affected both their mobilizing resources and political opportunities. The 1948 Palestinians went through a process of modernization and democratization. The drastic economic changes that took place in the 1948 Palestinian community, and resulted in what Al-Haj calls "the occupational transformation from agricultural work within Arab localities to wage labour in the Jewish sector,"<sup>63</sup> have increased the dependency of 1948 Palestinians on the state. While this, I argue, may have resulted in negative cost-benefit calculations, which could have restrained 1948 Palestinian political mobilization or contributed to a general acquiescent response to grievances, the dynamics of mobilization on the 1976 Land Day were different. By 1976, the time of the Land Day, the 1948 Palestinians were a working force, more educated and organized, with a better economic situation, and professional and political networks. These socioeconomic changes, led to the expansion of mobilizing resources and created better political opportunities for the 1948 Palestinians, which combined with other factors created the appropriate conditions for mobilization on the 1976 Land Day.

### Presence of Strong Leadership

The 1976 Land Day was the first time that 1948 Palestinians united under one leadership and challenged the Israeli authorities. Together with the Communist Party, which initiated the Land Day campaign and served as a strong mobilizing resource, there was a range of political, social, and professional leadership resources that contributed to the mobilization of the 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day. Among those was the Land Defence Committee, which called for the general strike and consisted of a wide spectrum of 1948 Palestinians including farmers, academics, students, doctors, lawyers, politicians, writers and poets, and many more. The unity of 1948 Palestinians in this case helped provide the goals and

articulate the grievances that cut across class, sociopolitical, and religious lines.

Together with the socioeconomic changes that affected the 1948 Palestinian class balance, the abolition of Military Rule, which had supported the traditional leadership, enabled the emergence of new players who in turn encouraged more resistant behavior. The presence of a strong leadership, according to the social-movement theory,<sup>64</sup> can be used as a resource for mobilization, as well as an indicator of better political opportunities available to the social movement.

### *Post-1948 Leadership Crisis*

*With the creation of the state of Israel, the Arab intellectuals refrained from all political activity or contact with the Israeli government, so that the latter had to encourage every other initiative. Thus, it was that the Arab candidates and the Arab lists in the first Knesset election did not represent the choice of the Arab community. Three precedents were then established: the Arab intellectuals relinquished their natural role in politics; the Arab members of the Knesset were not in fact chosen by the Arab community; and the Arab members of the Knesset and the Arab lists were not independent agents.*<sup>65</sup>

— Yehoshua Palmon, former advisor on Arab Affairs

The 1948 Palestinians entered the Israeli political system right from the start with three representatives in the first 1949 Knesset, Amin Salim Jarjoora, Seif E-Din E-Zoubi, and Tawfik Toubi.<sup>66</sup> While the official Israeli account portrayed this fact as an accomplishment and an indication of the state democratic nature and full representation of ethnic and religious groups, the quote above tells a different story. In fact, two of the three 1948 Palestinian Knesset members (MKs) in the First Knesset, Amin Salim Jarjoora and Seif E-Din E-Zoubi, were MAPAI (*Mifleget Poalei Eretz Yisrael* [Workers' Party of the Land of Israel]) affiliated.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, Zoubi's affiliation was not only with MAPAI but also with Zionist and state bodies pre-1948. According to Jiryis, Zoubi's first contact with Zionist organizations began in the late 1930s through selling a piece of land he owned to the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet). From then on, Zoubi became a broker for Keren Kayemet buying Arab land on the company's behalf. Eventually, Jiryis says, Zoubi became "the most important collaborator with the military government in Nazareth after the fall of the city in 1948," and was later awarded Israel's Freedom Fighters' Medal for his efforts.<sup>68</sup>

Alongside the MAPAI-affiliated members, there was one 1948 Palestinian MK, Tawfik Toubi, of the Israel Communist Party. Toubi, a communist

politician, was also one of the founders of the League for National Liberation in 1943 and the publisher and editor of the major Arab language Communist newspaper *al-Ittihad*.<sup>69</sup> Toubi was among "small but cohesive cadre of 1948 Palestinian leaders,"<sup>70</sup> who played a major role in 1948 Palestinian politics. However, the road to that small leadership cadre was long and full of challenges considering the post-1948 war leadership crisis.

Fred Khouri notes that during the period before 1976 Land Day, 1948 Palestinians "achieved little unity and produced few effective leaders."<sup>71</sup> The traditional leadership of 1948 Palestinians was almost entirely local or communal. No national 1948 Palestinian leadership appeared in Israel until the establishment of the NCALCH<sup>72</sup> in the late 1974.<sup>73</sup> There were various reasons that delayed the emergence of the national 1948 Palestinian leadership. Following the 1948 war, the 1948 Palestinian leaders were left outside Israel, either because they were prosecuted, had fled, or simply because they lived in cities outside the borders of the new Israeli state. The status of the old leadership also suffered as a result of the defeat in the 1948 war, while the very fact that a Zionist state had been established also helped to undermine the authority of the old leadership in the eyes of many in the 1948 Palestinian community. Furthermore, the traditional leaders who came to power after the establishment of the Israeli state faced complex challenges, and found it difficult to extend their influence beyond the family, village, or area upon which their power was based.

The geographic fragmentation of the 1948 Palestinian population also made it hard for various political groups to unify and successfully coordinate their activities. The distance between the Galilee, the Negev, and the Little Triangle, especially with the presence of Military Rule, and the lack of a public transportation network,<sup>74</sup> prompted a rather segmented leadership. This of course, was in addition to the Israeli overt and covert policies, which prevented the emergence of a national leadership. Until 1965, attempts to organize the 1948 Palestinian community in Israel into pan-Arab movements were forcibly stopped and these associations were outlawed.<sup>75</sup> In 1965, for example, the Socialist List, organized by the Palestinian nationalist movement al-Ard sought to participate in the Knesset elections held in that year, but was disqualified for its ideology.<sup>76</sup>

However, Palestinian politics, even during the British Mandate, did not solely depend on traditional structures. Factors such as urbanization and the appearance of a working class, which according to social-movement theory create new political opportunities and serve as mobilizing resources, had helped in the formation of various political movements. One of the parties established in 1924 was *Azurra*, the farmers' party, which was created to promote the rights of farmers and Bedouins, and which called for equal rights with city residents.<sup>77</sup> The existence of this party suggests a

level of awareness among Palestinians, even those living in rural areas, of the importance of political participation. The Zionist threat and the ongoing process of Jewish immigration were also important factors in raising the national awareness of Palestinians. Yet, political parties in Palestine between the years 1918 and 1948 were not mature. They were, in general, a nationalist retort rather than political parties with a clear integral agenda and a strategic plan. Besides, most of these parties were victims to internal long-standing disputes between elite Palestinian families, which in most cases led to the dissolution of these parties.<sup>78</sup>

Under Military Rule, the 1948 Palestinian participation in Israeli elections was largely a forced one dictated by authorities or state officials who had the power to reward or punish this minority. In those rare cases where representatives of non-Zionist parties were elected or looked likely to make some gains, elections were cancelled, and on occasion local elected bodies (councils) were abolished. Furthermore, special efforts were made by the Israeli authorities to "prevent the communists from dominating the Arabs."<sup>79</sup> For example, no local councils were established in villages like Kufor Kana where there was a prospect of a Communist majority in the council, despite the many petitions by 1948 Palestinians protesting against this policy.

Until 1965, the only Palestinian political parties that participated in national elections were hamula—(extended family) based lists affiliated with Zionist parties, primarily with MAPAI.<sup>80</sup> In addition, 1948 Palestinian efforts to form their own political parties were opposed by the state from the beginning.<sup>81</sup> For example, in the aftermath of Nazareth May Day in 1958, the Arab Front party, which was backed by the Communists, was formed. Short of officially outlawing the party, the Israeli authorities, according to Schwarz, made every effort in their power to prevent the party from functioning. Among the successful attempts to suppress the party, on the day of its inaugural meeting all the known leaders were confined to their home villages by order of the military.<sup>82</sup>

Even after the lifting of Military Rule, 1948 Palestinian candidates in Zionist parties such as MAPAI or the Arab lists established by it, had little say in the party and in the composition of the lists. In an interview with Seif E-Din E-Zoubi following changes made in MAPAI's Arab list and Arab Knesset representation, Zoubi said, "I do not believe that we count for anything in this... We are bound by the decisions made at party headquarters."<sup>83</sup>

### *The Communist Party as a Strong Political Leadership*

One of the most popular political movements that gained a speedy momentum post-1948 among 1948 Palestinians was the Communist

Party. Pre-1948, the Communist Party was not very popular in Palestinian villages, and did not have a real influence even in the cities. However, after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, a number of factors such as the dispersion of the Palestinian leadership, the banning of political Palestinian parties, and the introduction of a new political and electoral framework, contributed to the popularity of the Communist Party. Following the establishment of Israel, the Communist Party managed to gain popularity, especially among workers and farmers, thanks to its support for workers' rights and its opposition to land control and the Israeli policy of land confiscation.

Unlike other Palestinian political parties and movements that existed before 1948, the Communist Party was the only non-Zionist party legally active in Israel after 1948, a fact that made the party appealing to 1948 Palestinians. Furthermore, the Communist Party had Jewish members, and a long tradition of Communist Party activity among the Jewish community, thus making it much more difficult for the state to outlaw this movement. The Communist Party had a clear agenda and political plan, with extended international affiliations and connections. It was not controlled by any prominent family as was the case with the majority of the old Palestinian parties, and thus, it was more stable. Conflicts between prominent Palestinian families in the past, like the one between Husseini and Nashashibi, for example, have caused the collapse of Palestinian political parties.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, a political party was more likely to gain credibility among 1948 Palestinians if it was independent of family or clan influence, since it was less likely to favor personal gains over political ones.

The disengagement of Nablus and Jerusalem, that were major Palestinian political headquarters, from the rest of Palestine as a result of the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel, in addition to the destruction of Jaffa, had turned the Galilee into the new center for 1948 Palestinian political activism. The Galilee, with the highest concentration of 1948 Palestinians, and compared to other 1948 Palestinian areas, was more urbanized, educated, and developed, and as a result less conservative and dependant on traditional leadership. It included the highest concentration of educated 1948 Palestinian working class, together with the largest number of cities and mixed Jewish Palestinian population. Therefore, the Galilee was a fertile ground for the Communist Party, and the fact that the party's headquarters were based in the Galilee further contributed to the popularity of the party among 1948 Palestinians in that area. These conditions, I argue, created new political opportunities and mobilizing resources, which allowed not only the development of the Communist Party but also contributed to the political mobilization, in general, of 1948 Palestinians.

With the establishment of the Israel Communist Party (MAKAI [*HaMiflega HaKomunistit HaYisraelit*]), 1948 Palestinian leaders took senior positions in the party alongside the Jewish comrades against whom, Stendel argues, they had struggled so bitterly before Israel gained its independence.<sup>85</sup> MAKAI reembraced the remnants of the old Palestinian Communist Party (PCP), the active members of the National Liberation League's (NLL) two factions, and the Jewish Communists who had masterminded the formation of the party. The presence of old Palestinian communist community and members meant that there was a basis for the new Communist Party to build on.

The Communist Party provided an opportunity for 1948 Palestinians to function within the new Israeli system, without having to make many compromises over national causes. In its early years, the Communist Party functioned with great momentum. It was the only 1948 Palestinian political framework in independent Israel that managed to restore itself with relative speed and enthusiasm after the war. From its first steps in Israel, the Communist Party exhibited its solidarity with the Arab National Movement, viewing it as an effective path to support the Palestinians in Israel. The Jewish membership in the Communist Party had given it legitimacy in the eyes of the state and made it easier for the party to function and survive. The Jewish members served as a resource, as well as sympathetic elite, which by its presence could create better political opportunities for the movement. Furthermore, the Communist Party was the exception to the traditional hamula-Zionist affiliation parties that were present until 1965. Moreover, despite its Jewish fraction, it was still seen as a movement "which had been taking on more and more the character of a Palestinian party."<sup>86</sup>

The Communist Party supported the autonomy of both peoples in the state of Israel, calling for the establishment of an independent and democratic Palestinian state on the other side of Palestine, or the West Bank and Gaza. The Communist Party's position on Israel's right to exist was also sympathetic to the views of the 1948 Palestinian community. The 1948 Palestinian communists within MAKAI tried to oppose the formation of the state of Israel within its present boundaries, but this strategy was met with opposition from MAKAI's Jewish leaders. However, in 1952, the MAKAI convention adopted a platform that included the position that 1948 Palestinians have the right to self-determination, up to and including secession. The platform also included a demand to revoke the territorial annexations and to recognize the right of the Palestinians to establish their own state, and the Palestinian refugees' right to return.<sup>87</sup>

In addition, according to Stendel, MAKAI's internal disputes continued at each of the party's conventions. The 1948 Palestinian leaders did not

conceal their support for the Egyptian president, Jamal Abdel Nasser, repeatedly stressing their ultranationalist attitude against Israel. There were also attempts by the 1948 Palestinian Communists in the late 1957 to secretly form a nucleus of a national liberation movement that would undermine Israel with the help of an underground military arm that would operate alongside the political struggle. The new enterprise matured in early 1958, at which point the Jewish members of MAKAI leadership discovered it.<sup>88</sup>

In a significant case of 1948 Palestinian political mobilization, the MAKAI May Day parades in Nazareth and Umm el-Fahm in 1958 were accompanied by violent uprisings and clashes with Israeli police leading to several arrests. As a result, 1948 Palestinian Communists quickly established an Arab Public Committee for the Protection of Detainees and Deportees. The formation of this committee, which suggests a level of organization, gradually led to the emergence of a new communist list. The new Communist List, Rakah, came into being alongside MAKAI and effectively created two Israeli Communist parties. The two sister parties were, rather, two divided factions. MAKAI remained chiefly a "Jewish" Communist Party while Rakah, in contrast, focused its attention on the 1948 Palestinian population, although one-third of its members were Jewish, and it maintained headquarters in the Jewish sector. However, the conflict between the two factions had not been resolved and the schism persisted despite constant attempts to gloss it over. Finally, in 1965, the party split again into two separate parties, as a consequence of the internal contradiction of its composition. MAKAI eventually disappeared from the political landscape.<sup>89</sup>

The Communist Party, which started as a marginal movement in 1919 and was subject to internal disputes and fractions, became the key player in 1948 Palestinian political life. In addition to all the reasons behind its popularity discussed above, was the fact that the Communist Party managed to provide a safe umbrella for the 1948 Palestinians to work under. The 1948 Palestinians could openly tout their nationalist Arab sentiment as long as they had the support of the Jewish members. In addition, throughout the history of the party, the Palestinian members did not limit themselves to the party's ideology and were moving freely between the call for Arab and Palestinian nationalism, and the idea of a secular state for both Jews and Palestinians.

The Communist Party, which took a more Palestinian character, managed to mobilize large crowds of 1948 Palestinians to demand equality and better conditions similar to those of Jewish citizens.<sup>90</sup> Together with the support of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party offered scholarships for 1948 Palestinian students. As a result, the communist ideology became dominant and popular among the 1948 Palestinian intelligentsia and

contributed to further support for the party from the community. Unlike other political parties at the time that were affiliated with Zionism, the Communist Party was seen as a national popular movement that strived for equal rights and national goals. This view of the Communist Party was largely what made it appealing to the larger 1948 Palestinian population especially during the years of Military Rule, and with the repeated calls by the Communist Party to remove it.

### *1948 Palestinian Political and Professional Organizations and Informal Networks*

On 1976 Land Day, a range of 1948 Palestinian representative bodies and individuals joined forces to mobilize against a strong incidental grievance. The main components in this alliance were the Communist Party and the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land (the Land Defence Committee). The 1976 Land Day, I argue, reflects a case in which 1948 Palestinians formed what social-movement theorists<sup>91</sup> call elite alliances to help them mobilize.<sup>92</sup> These alliances were formed mainly among the 1948 Palestinian community rather than between them and the Jewish or international supporters. On 1976 Land Day, a number of political, social, and professional groups came together and served as additional resource for the Land Defence Committee campaign. By and large, the Land Defence Committee, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter, derived its legitimacy and popularity from its alliance with and representation of a wide spectrum of the 1948 Palestinian minority.

Alongside party politics, and the role played by the Communist Party, the new political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians on 1976 Land Day were in part the product of the presence of nonparty political and professional organizations and committees. These organizations provided 1948 Palestinians with leadership, political, professional, and ideational resources, which, I argue, facilitated their mobilization on 1976 Land Day. While highlighting a number of these organizations and committees, which existed on 1976 Land Day, a special emphasis will be put on the case of al-Ard movement.

### **The al-Ard Movement**

The al-Ard movement was established during Military Rule, and even though it ceased to exist by 1976 Land Day, its experience is detailed in this section as an example of a unique 1948 Palestinian mobilization, which, I argue, contributed to future 1948 Palestinian behavior and served as an ideational and political resource. Furthermore, I argue that the Israeli state



response and handling of this movement have contributed to the 1948 Palestinian framing of Israeli state attitudes and handling of challengers. This framing, I argue, was crucial for the cost-benefit calculations of 1948 Palestinian future-movement participation.

The al-Ard movement is an all-Arab organization established in the aftermath of the violent clashes between 1948 Palestinians and Israeli security on 1958 May Day. The al-Ard was established to articulate the 1948 Palestinian grievances, especially those along national lines. The movement derived from the Arab Public Committee for the Protection of Detainees and Deportees, set up to protest the imprisonment of 1948 Palestinians following 1958 May Day.<sup>93</sup> The various unsuccessful attempts over the years of the al-Ard to officially register had made the movement the subject of "the most important legal and public debate regarding the freedom to organize."<sup>94</sup> Despite the dissolution of the al-Ard, some of its leaders, such as Muhammed Mi'ari and Sabri Jiryis became well known. Mi'ari, for example, later became a Knesset member, and Sabri Jiryis the head of the PLO research center in Beirut.<sup>95</sup>

The following lengthy quote taken from Jiryis' *The Arabs in Israel*, summons the experience of al-Ard from its creation in 1958 until its dissolution in 1965, in the words of one of its prominent leaders and founders, Sabri Jiryis. The choice to tell the story of al-Ard in Jiryis' original wording and narration is made to reflect the al-Ard leadership framing of grievances, political opportunities, and resources, and illustrate the dynamics of the 1948 Palestinian political mobilization in that case. Finally, it is important to stress that all of the following political activism described below was taking place under the restricting conditions of Military Rule.

The al-Ard [group] was hindered in beginning its practical work by a delay in the official response to its application for a license to publish [its own weekly] newspaper. Under strong pressure from the Communist Party and its supporters in the Popular Front, al-Ard decided to publish each weekly issue under the editorship of a different member of the group, on the assumption that this procedure did not require a license. To help the public reorganize the source of the publication, the word al Ard was incorporated into the names of the different issues, such as This Earth, Call of the Earth, and so on. The tone of the newspaper was severely critical of Israeli policies and of the Zionist movement generally. It openly called on the Arabs in Israel to handle their own affairs, leaving no room for doubt that al-Ard was an Arab nationalist group. The official reaction was to regard this as an open provocation, especially since the call to Arabs in Israel to organize, apart from its nationalist aspect, was a denial of the most venerated principle of Israel's official policy. Retaliation was prompt.<sup>96</sup>

The above quote reflects a developed and sophisticated level of political activism in which the al-Ard members who were faced with limited political opportunities for activism tried to work their way through the loopholes of the system to achieve their goal. In addition, the idea to use the word al-Ard to signify the groups' identity to the reader is a unique way of a fairly secretive yet less confrontational resistance.

Jiryis proceeds, detailing the al-Ard main activities, and recording its quest for securing the necessary resources for its existence. The al-Ard leaders realized the need for three main resources in order to survive, namely, the financial resource, the communication medium, and the official recognition of the state:

[The al-Ard continued its attempts] to form an independent organization and a publication... Except for participation by its supporters in protest meetings and in the organization of lectures and study groups, and so on, its work was generally limited to trying to break through restrictions... and to obtain some kind of legal standing in Israel so that it could work openly among the 1948 Palestinians. After its initial defeat, al-Ard began to reorganize by establishing a commercial printing and publishing firm called the al-Ard Company Ltd. This was to be a source of funds for political work. [Despite major challenges the company was finally registered]... The group's next undertaking was to apply, again, for a license to publish a weekly paper. [The battle took a year without success]. Without a paper, al-Ard could not reach the masses and its work was crippled.<sup>97</sup>

Together with the persistence of al-Ard leaders to fight within the existing Israeli system, the leaders resorted to external international resources in an attempt to pressurize the state to change its attitudes:

In retaliation the group prepared a memorandum on the conditions of [1948 Palestinians] explaining most of their grievances. Copies were sent to the Secretary of the United Nations, to a large number of newspapers and internationally known personalities, as well as foreign embassies in Israel, members of the Knesset, and various Israeli institutions.

The appeal to international bodies was considered viscous, although this was neither the first nor the last time that Arabs in Israel had sent memoranda with their grievances to various international associations. The authorities had apparently decided to wipe out al-Ard. The group's decision to register as a political party, however, temporarily stayed the government's hand. As a political party al-Ard would be able to work openly and express its views without depending on a newspaper, since it could call political meetings and publish manifestos. Thus in the middle of July 1964 the formation of the al-Ard movement was announced. For the first time its objectives were clearly stated and the authorities apprised of them.<sup>98</sup>

The above quote suggests a high level of leadership political maturity and development. It also implies that the al-Ard leaders, who knew the Israeli political system and its limitations well, were trying to take advantage of all the available political opportunities, to create better conditions for their movement.

The authorities viewed al-Ard's wish to be registered as a political party as an act of extreme provocation. Two days after notice of the movement's formation had been received the district commissioner of Haifa said that after studying its objectives... "I declare that the al-Ard movement... has been formed with the intent of violating the security and very existence of the state of Israel." It was therefore illegal and if it continued, the necessary measures would be taken against it.<sup>99</sup>

Yet still, despite the many failed attempts and vicious battles with the state legal and political authorities, the al-Ard leadership was not swayed to stop its attempts. In fact, at that stage the al-Ard leadership was preparing to use/misuse the same system that restricted their movement by forming alliance with the Socialist party and taking advantage of parliamentary immunity of office.

[The] final chapter in the history of al-Ard [was] in 1965. [In that year], the Knesset elections were set for early November and members of al-Ard resolved to try to win at least one seat. If one of their members could resume political activity through the immunity of office, they would have made a breakthrough.

[Fulfilling the requirements for nominating any electoral list were relatively easy, however], official reaction was the same as in the past. Before the formal registration of the list, an order from the military governor banished four of the candidates as "instigators of activities hostile to the nation." They were sent into exile in Arad, Beisan, Tiberias, and Safad, four towns with no [1948 Palestinian] population, until some time after the elections. Simultaneously, orders of compulsory residence were meted out to many of the activists in the movement... Despite this, the list was assembled and its confirmation requested from the Central Elections Committee... [The committee refused to grant the Socialist list permission because its sponsors] "condemned the existence of Israel and were a threat to its security". When al-Ard appealed to the Supreme Court, the court upheld the decision of the committee. Al-Ard thereupon abandoned its efforts to attain legitimacy within the Israeli system.

The dissolution of al-Ard did not stop the campaign against the movement and any of its surviving pockets.<sup>100</sup>

Finally, while Jiryis summarizes the experience of the al-Ard movement as unsuccessful in terms of achievements, he argues it had a major effect

on both the state and the 1948 Palestinians. Jiryis, who was among the leading figures of the al-Ard movement, also points some of the mistakes made on the way.

Unable to break through the restrictions that bound it, al-Ard did not leave a memorable record of achievement. At times the group may have miscalculated the vehemence of its tone and the frankness of its attitude, antagonizing all political parties; to have Mapai as an enemy was dangerous. Indeed to protect its own interests Mapai opposed any organization wishing to work among [1948 Palestinians].

The al-Ard experiment did not pass without leaving some mark both on the Israeli regime and on a section of the 1948 Palestinian community. The fact of its existence and the repercussions resulting from its elimination were among the factors that led to a more [Israeli] liberal Arab policy in the mid-sixties, aimed at containing the impact of al-Ard and preventing similar movements in the future.<sup>101</sup>

Jiryis' observation with regard to the more liberal Israeli policy in the mid-1960s toward 1948 Palestinians could explain the shock effect of 1948 Palestinians that followed the killings and brutal handling of strikers on the 1976 Land Day. If the state indeed shifted toward a more liberal and tolerant attitude after 1965, then one would expect to find a 1948 Palestinian perception of state tolerance to challengers and better political opportunities to mobilize. This factor together with the important factor of ending Military Rule could have resulted in encouraging cost-benefit calculations initially favoring participation on 1976 Land Day.

### The National Committee of Chairman of Arab Local Authorities

Also known as the NCALCH, it is one of the 1948 Palestinian organizations involved in 1976 Land Day. The committee was established in 1974 by 1948 Palestinians following a report that indicated a substantial gap allocation of state budgets between Arab and Jewish local authorities. While initially occupied with this gap, the committee's attention, especially after 1976 Land Day, shifted to political activity and was involved in both national and municipal issues.<sup>102</sup> Unlike the al-Ard movement, the creation of this committee, according to Al-Haj, was supported by the government who "aimed to channel the national awakening of [1948 Palestinians] to local issues and...create a counterbalance for growing power of the Communist Party."<sup>103</sup> However, this support came to an end following the 1976 Land Day after the committee was declared an

independent organization. Despite its self-perception as a 1948 Palestinian representative body, the committee, according to Ghanem, "serves as an assemblage of local leaders and not as national leadership, even though its leaders clearly have national aspirations."<sup>104</sup>

### The National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land in Israel (The Land Defence Committee)

As mentioned earlier, the Land Defence Committee was set up in 1975 to protest against the Israeli government moves for the expropriation of 1948 Palestinian land. Among its founders were professional individuals, especially lawyers and political activists like Muhammed Mi'ari, Hanna Naqara's, and Saliba Khamis, who had a rich experience in political activism. The formation and work of the Land Defence Committee, which is discussed throughout this chapter, was characterized by its high level of professionalism. Moreover, the wide representation of the committee, which marked an innovation in 1948 Palestinian activism, I argue, was one of the crucial factors contributing to the success of the 1976 Land Day movement. Together with the inclusion of national, political, and professional leadership, the Land Defence Committee provided the chance even for some of the old traditional elites (*wujahaa* وجهاء) to join. The *wujahaa* who saw in this a chance to retrieve some of their influence, were used in part by the Land Defence Committee as a resource. Together with the expertise of some in land issues, the connections of others with state officials could have been used to negotiate with the government. Yet, as will be detailed later in this chapter, those elites failed to persuade the Israeli authorities to cooperate with them. Still, their presence along with others, I argue, gave the Land Defence Committee legitimacy, and encouraged the membership of even those who were normally reluctant to participate in political organizations. According to Landau, the Land Defence Committee which was dominated by communists for year, "has served both moderates and extremists as a framework for protests against the expropriation of Arab lands [and] was largely instrumental in organizing the first Land Day in 1976, and also subsequent ones, as well as demonstrations, strikes, and meetings."<sup>105</sup>

### Student Associations and Intellectual Leadership

The increase in the number of 1948 Palestinian university students, together with the changing socioeconomic conditions, and the continuation of 1948 Palestinian grievances, have all created the need for 1948 Palestinian

student associations that could advise the 1948 Palestinian students on educational, social, and political problems. In addition, the contact with Jewish students at Israeli universities has further intensified the 1948 Palestinian feeling of discrimination. The 1948 Palestinian students were able to compare their position with that of their Jewish counterparts, and recognized discrimination in university lodging, employment opportunities, treatment of the university administration, and the attitudes of Jewish classmates.<sup>106</sup>

In 1959, the Arab Students' Committee at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem was established, followed later by similar committees in each of the other Israeli universities, and the election of a national student committee. The committee, which started by offering advice to new students on academic issues, expanded its agenda to include social and political matters.<sup>107</sup>

Unlike independent 1948 Palestinian organizations, the 1948 Palestinian student associations were not restricted by the Israeli government. In contrast, they were left to organize and extend their activity beyond the campus. For example, the Union of Arab Academic was formed jointly by the Arab Students' Committee of Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University on December 1, 1971. According to Jiryis, the Union was fundamentally nationalist and included a number of former members of the al-Ard. However, its continued existence, Jiryis argues, indicates a change in official policy after 1967.<sup>108</sup>

Furthermore, the committee organized political protests voicing the 1948 Palestinian grievances, and at times of wars, and during 1970 it became increasingly politically identified with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.<sup>109</sup> Yet, the official response continued to be surprisingly tolerant:

When, for example, the prime minister's deputy advisor on Arab affairs, Uri Stendel, objected to the union, his opinion was disregarded, and when he handed his resignation in protest it was accepted. Inevitably, the students' committees also turned to politics- attending protest meetings against military government and land expropriations, prodding the authorities on certain unresolved difficulties, supporting the al-Ard movement, and voting for the Communist Party in elections. Despite this and on no occasion did the Israeli authorities oppose the formation of a committee to try to eliminate it by force. They went no further than to apply the usual pressures exerted against those disapproved of by the government, although several leaders were charged with security violations.<sup>110</sup>

Regardless of state's objectives behind its relatively lenient policy, the better political opportunities enabled the development of the 1948 Palestinian student association, which was very active during 1976 Land Day, publicly

supporting the Land Defence Committee campaign to stop the expropriation.<sup>111</sup> Together with 1948 Palestinian student associations, a number of professional bodies and individuals, including prominent lawyers, poets, writers, and journalists, have played a key role in the planning and execution of 1976 Land Day political activities. These bodies and individuals served as a vital resource for the Land Day movement, providing their professional services and advice.

The organization of movements like al-Ard during the 1950s and the 1960s were the beginning of new 1948 Palestinian leadership building by poets, writers, and intellectuals. The end of Military Rule created better political opportunities for the 1948 Palestinians to express their views. And the results of the 1976 war especially regarding 1948 Palestinian relations with their fellow Arabs and Palestinians have increased, according to Koren, the self-confidence of the 1948 Palestinians. During that time, there was a rapid increase in 1948 Palestinian writers, poets, journalists, and political leaders, like Emile Habibi, Mahmoud Darwish, and Samih al-Qasim.<sup>112</sup> At that stage, the large-scale confiscation of 1948 Palestinian land by the state created the background that gave rise to overt 1948 Palestinian political action.<sup>113</sup> Moreover, the combination of great 1948 Palestinian literary talent and commitment to Arab cause, have created in literature, according to Koren, "an important showcase for national journalism with a high quality of writing."<sup>114</sup> The efforts of journalists, poets, and writers, combined with that of lawyers and other professional experts, facilitated the range of campaigning, networking, education, and research activism on 1976 Land Day.

## Positive Framing of Opportunities and Resources

*The Arab [1948 Palestinian] public in Israel now, possess the legitimate tools for opposition and struggle. It has tens of local councils and the forum of local council heads, it has hundreds of university graduate intellectuals, tens of thousands of conscious workers and farmers. It now has public organizations of democratic lawyers, academics, university and high-school students, and artisans and merchants. The [Israeli] authorities have to realize they cannot continue confiscating our lands and displacing us.*<sup>115</sup>

— The National Conference to Defend the Arab Lands in Israel, October 18, 1975

Framing theory argues that together with the shared perception or collective sense of dissatisfaction, there is a need for optimistic hope of change

that will result from collective action. This is accomplished when framing exceeds the diagnostic level, to prognostic and motivational levels, which suggest solutions and tactics for action.<sup>116</sup> McAdam argues, "Segments of society may very well submit to oppressive conditions unless that oppression is collectively defined as both unjust and subject to change. In the absence of these necessary attributions, oppressive conditions are likely, even in the face of increased resource, to go unchallenged."<sup>117</sup> McAdam called this process, which is comprised of feelings of injustice and efficacy, "cognitive liberation" process. Cognitive liberation is usually attributed to cognitive processes between "social actors and larger movements or activist organizations."<sup>118</sup> The following quote taken from the Land Defence Committee public address to the National Conference held on October 18, 1975, illustrates the 1948 Palestinian framing in the early stages of the Land Day:

We are a persecuted minority, but we declare that the Arab [1948 Palestinian] public will not keep silent about this injustice, and that it will continue its struggle by all its force to foil this unfair policy. A delegation from this conference will go to the Knesset to explain our fair case, and if the authorities do not listen to us then we will protest with our public, in Jerusalem, and will "turn the world upside-down" against this danger that threatens our entity. Our struggle is a fair struggle, and we hope that all honourable sectors in Israel will raise their voices with us to serve the case of real peace and coexistence which is based on justice and equality between the two nations. From this conference, we greet the Jewish democratic powers that united with us, and supported our fair struggle and raised their voices calling to end the confiscations whether in the Negev, the Galilee, or the Triangle.<sup>119</sup>

The framing of 1976 Land Day, I argue, did not stop at identifying the problem (the policy of land confiscation) and assigning blame (the Israeli authorities). It also proceeded to the prognostic and motivational levels, and thus, enhanced the optimism that collective action would be successful in solving the problem.

At the prognostic level, solutions and strategies were offered to solve the problem, which included establishing a consultative committee of lawyers, which included Hanna Naqara; setting up a subcommittee of the Land Defence Committee to follow up on the campaign; asking for the support of Druze; using expert reports in public meetings and conferences such as the conference held on October 18; organizing a delegation to the Knesset; and, finally, planning a general strike and mass demonstrations. At the motivational level, a rationale for engaging in collective action was suggested by identifying those who were seen as capable of solving the



problem. The Land Defence Committee established the need to pressure the government to end the policy of land confiscation. In addition, frames were extended to incorporate other participants, such as the Jewish population.

### Analysis of Leadership Framing, Mobilization Tactics, and Repertoire Innovation

The following section seeks to recognize the dynamics of the political mobilization of 1976 Land Day by analyzing the 1948 Palestinian framing of grievances, resources, and opportunities as seen through the eyes of one of the prominent figures of the 1976 Land Day leadership—Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh, who was the chairperson of The National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land, which led the 1976 Land Day campaign. Together with other members of the committee, Shehadeh had a major role in the decision making and in mobilizing the 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day.

I met Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh at his house in Kufor Yassif on October 11, 2007, and had an outstanding occasion to get an insight into the 1948 Palestinian leadership mindset and thinking at the time. Rev. Shehadeh's testimony offers details on the unfolding of the 1976 Land Day events; the dynamics and motives for the political mobilization; the organization and planning of the leadership; and the dilemmas and challenges they were faced with. Rev. Shehadeh's interview is detailed in length in this section both for its historical value, and also to bring together all the mobilizing factors explained earlier. This testimony draws a more comprehensive image of the dynamics of the mobilization of the 1948 Palestinians on the 1976 Land Day. By analyzing Rev. Shehadeh's testimony, this section aims to explain how the different mobilizing factors were interpreted and worked together in this context to contribute to a certain political behavior. I argue, in line with McAdm et al., that while changes in mobilization conditions are objective, for movement actors these changes are rather subjective interpretations. For this reason, it was important to reveal part of the 1948 Palestinian leadership interpretation on 1975 Land Day as reflected in Rev. Shehadeh's testimony.

Following the declaration of more land expropriations in the Galilee in 1975, Rev. Shehadeh received an invitation to attend a consultative meeting on the issue. The initiative came from the Communist Party, which, regardless of its motivations, was trying to abort the government's plans to confiscate further 1948 Palestinian lands. Instead of running its own campaign, the Communist Party was interested in creating a representative

1948 Palestinian body that could lead the struggle. Most of the people invited to attend the consultative meeting, according to Rev. Shehadeh, were neither members of the Communist Party, nor were they necessarily affected by the confiscation plan:

I personally was not affected by the plan. I did not even own a piece of land... I am not a member of the Communist Party, I was never a member. Yet I was invited together with others like Jarmas Dalleh, and Dr. Saleem Makhoul... none of them were members [of the Communist Party]... and there was for example Masaad Kassis, openly a Ma'arakh<sup>120</sup> supporter.

According to Rev. Shehadeh, at the time, the Communist Party was mainly interested in people with nationalist sentiments and a potential for long-term commitment. This suggests a Communist Party perception, if not even a general 1948 Palestinian perception, of limited political opportunities, and the expectation of unresponsive state attitudes toward the 1948 Palestinian demands.

By widening the participation of various actors, the Communist Party was hoping to secure a larger support base for the initiative, and promote the land case as one relevant to the entire 1948 Palestinian community and not only to the Communist Party or those landowners personally affected by the confiscation plan. This activism tactic of frame extension on behalf of the Communist Party made the land case relevant to a wider target audience who, later, even saw in the campaign a form of identity and affiliation.

In addition, the party tried to benefit from existing alliances with certain elites to gain solidarity for the 1948 Palestinian requests. This is why people like Masaad Kassis, for example, were used in the campaign. Kassis was a former head of Ma'aliya town council (1969), and a former member of the Knesset (1951–1959).<sup>121</sup> Like other 1948 Palestinian parties at the time, his party, Democratic List for Israeli Arabs, was associated with David Ben Gurion's Zionist MAPAI party.<sup>122</sup> While Kassis did not fall within the "nationalist" category, his connections and alliances with certain ruling elites and with the Israeli government were exactly what the campaign needed to increase its chances of success. As Rev. Shehadeh put it:

Kassis, perhaps was not among those affected by the plan, but he had a great knowledge of land, land issues and distribution, and he was once a Knesset member and had his own connections. It was necessary to get the help of everyone to be able to stop such a dangerous plan.

The differences or sometimes the clash in ideological conviction did not appear to be an obstacle to joint cooperation on the issue, as long

as it increased the chances of success. Perhaps, at this stage the ideological differences could be overcome because the threat was perceived as more imminent than ever before. Therefore, on July 29, 1975, a diverse group of 1948 Palestinians attended a meeting in Haifa to discuss the government's expropriation plan. There were twenty-five people of different affiliations and backgrounds present at that meeting including 1948 Palestinian local council heads and members of town councils, lawyer, doctors, intellectuals, landowners, and journalists. In that gathering, the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land was established, and the participants vowed to continue with the work against the expropriation plan.

Yet, the committee realized that such a small group could not do much on its own, and that it needed a wider support base. To gain more support the committee had to share its convictions regarding the Israeli plan with as many 1948 Palestinians as possible. The committee's framing of the expropriation grievance extended from the incidental grievance of confiscating some land, and was affiliated with the permanent grievance of the bigger battle over land and existence. Hence, the committee's framing of the incidental grievance was in the context of a systematic Israeli policy of land confiscation, which affected all 1948 Palestinians, or as Rev. Shehadeh put it:

It was not simply a matter of confiscating some land that I use to plant cucumbers; they were confiscating part of a homeland, part of our homeland that was slowly being robbed from under our feet leaving us with nothing."<sup>123</sup>

It appears that by the 1970s a tipping point had been reached, that the latest government confiscation plan made people more aware than before that if they did not take a stand now, their entire existence would be under threat. Such framing, which portrayed the confiscation plan as an existential threat with imminent consequences to 1948 Palestinians, was among the factors contributing to the widespread support of the committee's campaign among 1948 Palestinians. However, this framing was not sufficient on its own to guarantee public support, not even that of the landowners affected by the plan.

The committee members, who saw in the campaign a battle of all 1948 Palestinians and not only that of the Communist Party or the twenty-five who attended the meeting, wanted to involve more actors. Therefore, they decided to invite all the landowners affected by the confiscation plan to attend a follow-up meeting in Nazareth. However, according to Rev. Shehadeh, to their dismay not all landowners attended.

The meeting was held on August 15, 1975, in the Grand New hotel in Nazareth with a turnout of around 120 people, which reflected an advance over the first meeting. Yet, according to Rev. Shehadeh, the committee was not content with the turnout, and was hoping for a much wider support and participation. The committee was convinced the battle was about securing a homeland, and a just demand for identity, which should concern all 1948 Palestinians. Therefore, it was decided in that meeting to hold a national conference on October 18, 1975, and issue a public petition supporting the conference and opposing the expropriation. Yet, to secure better and wider support for the cause and help mobilize the masses, the committee needed additional work tactics:

We wanted to enlarge the circle of support and involve more people. We said at the Committee that this was the people's battle, all [1948 Palestinians] people. Therefore, we had to start and reach out for the people. That is what we did do. We raised awareness!<sup>124</sup>

The committee started a massive campaign to raise the awareness of 1948 Palestinians and educate them about the consequences and dangers of the Israeli land confiscation plan.<sup>125</sup> Committee members went to each and every 1948 Palestinian village and town, holding public meetings and networking with influential local individuals who could convince more 1948 Palestinians.

Rev. Shehadeh remembers that the response at the beginning was limited, yet gradually over a period of two months, things started to change:

Later and with the frequent committee meetings held in various places, people saw this was a nationalist case. People understood what they were not able to understand before due to their lack of basic awareness. And our job was to raise people's awareness, to explain the aims and dangers of the expropriation on our people...we did not want to become only dwellers in our villages...and we believed in the saying that land comes before honour. Our land is our honour, and whoever gives up his land gives his honour away. This was our rationale behind mobilizing and stopping the confiscation.

The committee was in need for additional resources besides public support to run the campaign against the expropriation and increase the chances of success, yet unfortunately, the resources available to 1948 Palestinians were scarce. Therefore, and in a move that reflects advanced leadership thinking, the committee chose unity as a means to increase their resources. By joining forces and combining their efforts with that of other groups, the

committee could increase its resources through sharing the existing tools available to these groups. For that reason, the committee approached the Negev Population Committee to Defend Land, another small committee working against expropriation of Bedouin Land in the Negev,<sup>126</sup> and offered to unite the efforts of the two committees and work together.

As the committee carried on with its efforts, it managed to gather thousands of signatures for its petition against the plan and in support of the national conference to be held, however, it did not foresee what would happen at the national conference. The National Arab-Jewish Conference to Defend the Land was held on October 18, 1975, in Nazareth. Rev. Shehadeh recalls that the decision to rent a cinema hall in Nazareth was because the committee was expecting the participation to increase from 100 to perhaps 500. However, the numbers were unprecedented:

**Five thousand** came!! The cinema hall was full. All the corridors were full. The squares around the cinema, the coffee shops, the streets, the pavements... the place was packed. We put up speakers outside the cinema so that people could hear the meeting. We declared our intention to establish a solid Land Defence Committee not the small one we had. We wanted to expand it to include the different sectors of our nation. We wanted it to represent us all from North to South. And this is indeed what happened. The nomination was democratic, whoever wanted to work could apply, and whoever knew someone capable of contributing could nominate him or her. The result was a Committee with more than 300 members representing the various sectors of our nation.

Rev. Shehadeh's words reflect a better developed resistance action on behalf of the initial committee members who were not only concerned with the full representation of 1948 Palestinians, but also exercised democratic values in the selection process. Rev. Shehadeh's words also raise a query as to the reasons behind the unprecedented widespread participation at the conference, when only two months earlier not even all landowners participated. Making the effort to not only show solidarity but also be physically present at the meeting reflects a positive framing on behalf of the 5,000 participants. These participants had to overcome the political barriers as well as the logistic ones of making the trip to Nazareth at a time when not everyone owned a car, and public transportation to serve 1948 Palestinian communities was almost nonexistent.

Yet, the unexpected participation at the conference could be attributed to a number of factors including the presence of the Communist Party, which initiated the campaign, together with the strength of the Land Defence Committee alliance, and the developed mobilization ideas, which built upon past experience such as that of the al-Ard movement. In addition, the long-term structural changes, both political and socioeconomic,

had created a larger potential pool of activists, and with the spark of land confiscation plans, a newly united leadership, and the innovative more developed framing/mobilization ideas, all enabled the potential pool to be mobilized.

Rev. Shehadeh, who believes the Communist Party had a leading position and long history of defending the rights of 1948 Palestinians, said the committee was not aiming to replace any existing leadership. The committee according to Rev. Shehadeh managed to do what other parties failed to do:

The committee could unite people, which is something other parties failed to do regardless of whether they were Zionist or not. The committee was the mobilizing instrument that unified all the sectors of our nation who gathered around it. Nonpartisans in particular saw in the Land Defense Committee a form of national leadership that they can affiliate to. It was an affiliation issue...affiliation only. The Committee managed to unite the people based on national affiliation.

The better developed campaigning and recruiting techniques, which the committee used prior to the conference, and the efforts put into especially education and raising public awareness seemed to have repaid. Also, and as mentioned earlier, the Land Day leadership was trying to make the land case relevant to all 1948 Palestinians. In other words, it was trying to achieve what framing theory describes as a shared perception of dissatisfaction,<sup>127</sup> which became clear in the National Conference.

Together with the shared perception of dissatisfaction, which managed to attract people to the Land Defence campaign, many 1948 Palestinians saw in the campaign a form of identity and affiliation. This according to Rev. Shehadeh can be an additional reason for the popularity of the conference and campaign, in general, among the 1948 Palestinians:

We [1948 Palestinians] in this country lack identity. Some of the people used to gain their identity by affiliating to various places, parties, clubs, churches, mosques, or a family [clan]. The National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land became a form of identity. People would come to me and say: Reverend, I do not like to be affiliated to this political party or that, can I say I am a member of the Land Defence Committee, that I am a part of this good national stream adopting the values of truth and justice and working to stop the expropriation?

Perhaps, the openness and full representation within the committee enabled the 1948 Palestinians to identify and unite under the umbrella of the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land and its campaign. The chances of appealing to 1948 Palestinians perhaps increased

as a result of framing the battle in terms of justice and rights, and more importantly, due to land being the source of grievance. Extending the framing and turning the land confiscation into a broader nationalist issue over land increased the support for the Defence Committee and its campaign. Even those affiliated with Zionist parties such as Massad Kassis<sup>128</sup> or Jamal Tarabeh, then the head of Sakhnin municipal council, got involved. While the motivations behind the involvement of such actors varied, Rev. Shehadeh attributed it to the fact that the issue of land was nonnegotiable regardless of political affiliation:

It does not matter if you are a member of a Zionist party or not. If you are an Arab (1948 Palestinian) you are against expropriation. Of course, I do not know how long a person can stand firm in his/her position against the expropriations especially with all the temptations. And there were many temptations, especially for those who were weak, or poor, or those desperate for land who felt the battle was already lost and their land would definitely be confiscated. People like those were likely to compromise, to agree on some sort of a poor land settlement, and wander from the firm position we all had to take at the time.

The diagnostic level of framing, however, that the committee achieved was only the first step, and the 1948 Palestinian framing, according to the social-movement theory, had to advance to prognostic and motivational levels, which suggest solutions and tactics for action for mobilization to happen. Thus, following the conference, and with more than 300 members, the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land continued with its campaign while maintaining some of the old working tactics and developing new ones to adjust to the changing political opportunities and resources. Although there is a need for further research on this topic, the work of the committee detailed here illustrates a long learning curve among 1948 Palestinians with regard to political mobilization.

Social-movement theorists<sup>129</sup> argue that under certain conditions the resort to violent means of protest can be avoided when the legitimate channels of protest are open in the face of those protesting the grievance. After the conference, and together with sustaining its awareness campaign in the 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, the Land Defence Committee intensified its communications with the Israeli authorities and threatened to hold a strike if the expropriation was not stopped.

Rev. Shehadeh said that the committee made use of all the available official channels, yet the state was irresponsible:

I wrote all the letters which were sent to all Knesset members, to every one including the prime minister and the various political parties, with my own

hands. It was a letter with a simple request: please stop the expropriation! It explained how the expropriation would harm our Arab sector, that we were in desperate need of that land, and it appealed to them to meet a delegation of our Committee.

The Land Defence Committee appears to have used what social-movement theory calls the openness of political institutions, and used the Knesset as a platform to register its grievance. Rev. Shehadeh says that the committee even turned to those channels that were not necessarily relevant, in order to take advantage of all the political opportunities possible. However, and as the committee expected, the state attitude was unresponsive, and the few replies they received included the Communist Party and Shulamit Aloni, a left-wing politician and a Knesset member of the Ya'ad—Civil Rights Movement party at the time.<sup>130</sup> However, these were individuals affiliated with organization that were already sympathetic to the cause.

Rev. Shehadeh cynically recalls getting a response from the Knesset Speaker:<sup>131</sup>

He wrote back saying: "I received your letter, it seems like you called the wrong address, thank you" . . . and that was it!! Perhaps he ran out of ink!!

The case was not that we did not know to whom we should turn; we knew perfectly well, but the problem was that nobody answers, the authorities did not respond.

The state attitude was not surprising for the committee and was in line with the Israeli state attitude and past practices of marginalizing the 1948 Palestinians. Rev. Shehadeh attributed the unresponsive state attitude at the beginning of the Land Day campaign to a number of reasons. The Israeli authorities, according to Rev. Shehadeh, were determined to implement the Galilee Development Plan due to its significance in Judaizing the Galilee. In addition, Rev. Shehadeh argues that the Israeli authorities underestimated the committee's requests and threats, especially at the beginning:

Perhaps they [the government] thought: "if we ignore these people [the committee]", as they always do, "they will shout for a while, make a mess, and then they will go back to being silent". However, we persevered and insisted on stopping the expropriation.

The above tactic, which Rev. Shehadeh suggested the Israeli government was using to deal with public 1948 Palestinian resentment, corresponds with what social-movement theory counts as a nonviolent form of successful state repression of social-movement organizations. Rev. Shehadeh's



words can further confirm the predominant climate of acquiescent behavior of 1948 Palestinians prior to the 1976 Land Day, a climate further detailed in the Koenig Memorandum.

In spite of the fact that the campaign intensified and gained more support, the Israeli authorities continued to ignore the committee. According to Rev. Shehadeh, they did this in order to avoid recognizing the committee as the leader of the 1948 Palestinian community or as a representative body. The committee was not a governmental or elected body. It was neither legal, nor was it registered as an Ottoman association. Therefore, there was nothing to compel the Israeli authorities to negotiate with it.

As a result of the state attitudes and the limited degree of openness of the political institutions to the 1948 Palestinian demands, the committee decided on a series of escalating protest actions, including a general strike and a protest in front of the Israeli Knesset. At this point, the state attitude changed and the Israeli authorities tried to abort the strike plans while insisting on avoiding any negotiations or meeting with the committee.

The prime minister at the time was Yitzhak Rabin, of the *HaMa'arakh* party.<sup>132</sup> The committee demanded that Rabin declares the termination of the expropriation plan on radio and television before the committee would cancel any strike or demonstration plans. Instead, according to Rev. Shehadeh, the committee received an oral message from the prime minister conditioning any negotiations regarding the Galilee plan on halting the committee's plans to strike and demonstrate. The message was indirectly delivered to the committee through some of the council heads who were in contact with Rabin. However, the committee refused Rabin's negotiation terms, and in a meeting held on March 6, 1976, in Nazareth, it declared March 30, 1976, as the date for the general strike. The committee also called on the 1948 Palestinian public to form delegations to participate in the demonstration in front of the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem. These calls received, according to Rev. Shehadeh, unprecedented widespread support from the 1948 Palestinian community, who started organizing and expressing support. A large number of letters and statements expressing solidarity with the committee's actions were issued by political and professional bodies including municipal councils, student unions, and even political prisoners who said they would strike on March 30, 1976, in solidarity with the National Conference decisions.<sup>133</sup>

Following these developments, the Israeli state attitude did not stop at ignoring the committee and its demands, but included several attempts to spoil the protest plans. Together with threatening to use force to suppress the general strike and the planned demonstration in front of the Knesset, the Israeli government tried to bypass the committee and pressure the 1948 Palestinian council heads to cooperate with it. Shmuel Toledano,

the Arab Affairs advisor under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,<sup>134</sup> called for a meeting of the 1948 Palestinian council heads in Shafa Amr on March 25, 1976. The meeting was described by the committee as a government orchestrated show. It is worth noting here that Shmuel Toledano was the one who initiated the establishment of the NCALCH in 1974. According to Shany Payes, Toledano saw the committee (NCALCH) as an instrument for coordinating the relationship with the Palestinian minority and a channel for exerting governmental influence.<sup>135</sup>

Yet, despite the authorities' threats, Rev. Shehadeh said that the Land Defence Committee did not expect bloodshed:

I was surprised to receive a phone call on the morning of Land Day [March 30, 1976] telling me: Reverend there is blood!! People have been killed in Sakhnin and Arrabeh. I decided to go immediately to Sakhnin. I arrived, and the situation was horrifying. We had a meeting at the municipal council, and were given an update on what happened. Army assemblage started to appear at the entrances of the villages of Sakhnin, Arabeh, and Deir Hanna, and there were provocations from Israeli security. That was not what we planned. We even instructed people to stay home during the strike. Do not go out to the "lovely gardens" [sarcastically speaking] that the government built for you, but stay home. However, the presence of security forces had immediately caused a state of vigilance. "Come and see", one person tells another and crowds would start to form. And the crowds were peaceful. We do not have guns, or carry swords... we have nothing.<sup>136</sup> But the army entered the villages and there were killings. One was killed in Arrabeh, and three were killed in Sakhnin. And then, we heard about killings in Tayybeh, and Kufor Kanna.

Instead of deterring people from resisting, or causing the committee to reconsider its working tactic, Rev. Shehadeh said that the killings increased the leadership's determination to continue.

At first, I could almost see the blood on my hands. At first, I accused myself. I was one of those who declared the strike, which meant I was responsible for this and for the killings. But of course, after talking to the council heads who were present at the time in Sakhnin, Arrabeh, and Kufor Kanna, we all concluded that the criminal act which happened, and the military presence, was planned to silence our Arab Palestinian public using force.

Most of the literature on the 1976 Land Day stops at this stage after the killings. In a statement by Mahmoud Saied Na'amneh, the head of Arrabeh municipal council, he says that the 1948 Palestinian leadership called upon the Israeli government to set up an official inquiry committee to investigate the events, and that they sent letters and petitions to Israeli officials including the prime minister and to the heads of all parliamentary

political parties. However, their requests were ignored, and instead the government had an internal police inquiry, which voted against setting up an independent inquiry committee.<sup>137</sup>

Rev. Shehadeh described what happened in the aftermath of the killings and the refusal of the Israeli government to investigate the events. Rev. Shehadeh said that the land campaign did not stop after the killings. The committee turned to a new tactic trying to pressure the local council heads, who did not want any more protests, to take charge of the campaign to stop the expropriation on the grounds that the lands to be expropriated fall under their jurisdiction. The committee did a thorough and detailed study on the lands to be expropriated and provided the different municipalities with their findings, and asked them to act. The committee still monitored the work, interfering when necessary, maintaining contact with landowners, and encouraging them not to give up.

Some landowners, as Rev. Shehadeh recalls, did not want to cooperate hoping to settle their cases individually through *wasta* and personal connections with Israeli governmental officials. Others chose to use the legal channels. Yet those individual attempts were proven unsuccessful. The resort of some 1948 Palestinian landowners to individual, rather than collective, solutions indicates a retreat and lack of confidence in the committee's strategies following the bloody outcomes of the nonviolent Land Day campaign. In addition, it shows a change in cost-benefit calculations as a result of the shock effect and fear for personal safety, which considering the killings became more probable.

Rev. Shehadeh says that the committee's work continued:

There were always public meetings and demonstrations, and each year on the memory of Land Day, we would call for a public strike and convention. The first Land Day public conventions, until the fifth, were massive. We would have between 40,000–50,000 people attending.

Rev. Shehadeh recalls hearing what he described as extreme random voices in one of these demonstrations calling for armed struggle:

I was leading the demonstration when I heard some people shout, the cannon is the only answer! I went to this group and said to one of them, do you have a cannon? [Meaning 1948 Palestinians did not have the resources for an armed struggle or violent resistance] So why use these empty slogans that can only hurt our cause.

Rev. Shehadeh said the Land Day campaign was peaceful and rational. The following words by Rev. Shehadeh summarize what he, as a 1976

Land Day leader, perceived to be the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians,

Our capabilities were within the demonstrations and the unified voice of our public. We used all resources. We would invite TV reporters, hold press conferences with local and international press. Every year on Land Day, we would give interviews to international press. That would put pressure on Israel. We were revealing what was happening to us, and reflecting an image of Israel contrary to that which it had been trying to maintain. And Israel does not like that. But we were ready to do even more... We used the international public opinion. I remember in one of the meetings on land issues, which were normally held with local council heads, I raised the issue of the provocations of Israeli security forces. During that time, the state was using special security forces that would insult and terrorize the 1948 Palestinian public. So I suggested we approach the Israeli government on this matter, and if it does not cooperate, I suggested forming a delegation that will head to the United Nations and expose Israel's treatment of its 1948 Palestinian citizens. The proposal was adopted by a majority of votes. Next day, I received a phone call from Ibrahim Nimr Hussein,<sup>138</sup> saying he received massive number of calls from ministers and state officials, including the prime minister, begging us not to appeal to the United Nations. They [the Israeli government] are afraid of [international] public opinion, and we took advantage of this fact in a right, polite, and democratic way that had its effect on our struggle. We did not stop [after at the killings], we were not silenced. On the same hand, we did not want more killings... we did not want blood. Also, just because there were killings does not mean our struggle was wrong.

Eventually, the Land Day campaign, which took more than six years, ended, according to Rev. Shehadeh, with success. The work of the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land in Israel, together with the help of municipal councils, and the efforts of landowners, managed to convince the government to cancel around 80 percent of the original expropriation plans. The committee also managed to preserve and revive the memory of the 1976 Land Day by issuing a number of documents and books, like *The Black Book on Land Day, 30 March 1976*, which was revised and republished by the committee in consecutive years.

In summary, and as illustrated throughout this chapter, the 1976 Land Day was a long mobilization process rather than a preplanned act of violent resistance. Throughout this process, which took almost a year before the violent clashes on March 30, 1976, the framing of the 1948 Palestinian grievances, the political opportunities, and the resources were continuously changing, and the political behavior and resistance strategies of the 1948 Palestinians were adjusting accordingly. The cognitive liberation process, or the collective framing of grievance as "unjust and subject to

change,"<sup>139</sup> together with the dynamics between the various mobilizing factors, both the perceived and the objective, have all contributed to the 1976 Land Day.

Among the important factors that I argue made the mobilization on the 1976 Land Day successful was the presence of the Communist Party, which took the initiative to mobilize following the publication of the Israeli land expropriations plans. In addition, there was the creation of the National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land in Israel, which took the initiative of the Communist Party and developed it using its strong alliance, and the developed mobilization ideas. Finally, the long-term structural changes, both political and socioeconomic, which took place in the years before the 1976 Land Day, had created a larger potential pool of activists ready to mobilize once the cognitive liberation process becomes available.

## Chapter 3

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### Habbat October

#### Was Habbat October Unique? Developments in the Political Movement up to Habbat October

Up until Habbat October, the political mobilization of 1948 Palestinians was largely characterized by its acquiescent nature and resistance through the most mundane methods, especially in confrontational situations with the state. However, while the outcome of Habbat October might be extraordinary in its scale or impact, Habbat October in itself was not the first confrontational incident since the 1976 Land Day. In fact, the period between the Land Day and Habbat October saw more protests by 1948 Palestinians than in any previous period.<sup>1</sup>

Between 1976 and 2000 there were number of confrontations between 1948 Palestinians and the Israeli state, which included violent confrontations in 1998 in Um Essahalie and al-Roha, the Dignity Battle against the Umalaa' in Baqa al-Gharbieh in 1999, the 2000 Land Day and the bloody confrontations between 1948 Palestinian university students and the Israeli security forces. In addition, there were a number of landmark events following the 1976 Land Day that were mainly mobilized by the Communist Party. These include: the Arab public conference in the 1980; demonstrations against the war on Lebanon starting from June 5, 1982, including a wave of demonstrations that broke out in October 1982 in response to the massacres in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon<sup>2</sup>; Equality Day, June 24, 1987; and various solidarity events during the first Palestinian Intifada.<sup>3</sup> The preceding examples, therefore, indicate that the context of Habbat October was not exceptional.

In addition to these physical confrontations, the 1948 Palestinians took a number of daring steps such as issuing the June 6, 1980, document;<sup>4</sup> their loud opposition of the 1982 invasion of Lebanon; their public support for the first Intifada in 1987; their partial identification with Saddam Hussein in 1991; and, finally, the declaration of Israel's Independence Day as al-Nakba (the calamity). This bold statement, which came out following Yasser Arafat's inauguration of the day in 1998, 50 years after the occupation of Palestine, points to a change in political behavior and a shift to more openly resistant behavior.

From 1998 onward, the Israeli Independence Day has been commemorated by 1948 Palestinians as Nakba Day, which symbolizes the expulsion and displacement of the Palestinian people from their homeland, and the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem. On this day, 1948 Palestinians recall the massacres,<sup>5</sup> the destruction of their villages, and the displacement of their people. It is a day of mourning on which visits are made to ruins of villages or sites where these Palestinian villages were located.

In 2001, a bill was introduced in the Knesset to prohibit the commemoration of Nakba Day. The bill proposed to ban by law any acts commemorating Independence Day or the founding of the state as a day of mourning, and to impose harsh punishment on any person "who exploits the democratic and enlightened nature of the state of Israel to bring about its collapse from within."<sup>6</sup> The firm Israeli response to the 1948 Palestinian commemoration of Nakba demonstrates that the state saw this commemoration as a serious 1948 Palestinian act of political resistance that had to be controlled.

As shown above, the image portrayed from the evidence collected for this book suggests a tense relationship between the state of Israel and the 1948 Palestinian minority in the years leading to Habbat October, with a number of confrontational and violent incidents.

However, despite the condemnatory language used by the 1948 Palestinian leadership in response to state hostilities, the patterns of the political actions suggested by the 1948 Palestinian leadership on Habbat October remained the same as on previous, comparable occasions. The political actions or reactions of the High Follow-Up Committee stayed within the framework of "general, responsible, and calm" strikes. Furthermore, in order to ensure that things did not get out of control, and to prevent any actions beyond those agreed by the committee, the High Follow-Up Committee formed local committees responsible for "maintaining order" in 1948 Palestinian villages and towns. The High Follow-Up Committee wanted to prevent actions that might harm the 1948 Palestinians' "legitimate struggle for the land and peace and equality." This is the rhetoric usually used by the High Follow-Up Committee in its public statements. The committee consistently worked to maintain calm within the 1948 Palestinian community, and on

many occasions, as Karzam argues, it even worked together with the Israeli government and police to restore acquiescent behavior.<sup>7</sup>

Such framework of political behavior is reflected in the case of Um Essahalie, another confrontational incident leading up to Habbat October in which 1948 Palestinians protested against the illegal demolition of houses in Um Essahalie, an unrecognized village<sup>8</sup> near the city of Shafa Amr. The statements issued by the High Follow-Up Committee in Um Essahalie used similar intense language that accused the Israeli police of demolishing three houses on April 2, 1998, in Um Essahalie without any warning, while accompanied by "hundreds of soldiers and border police who were heavily equipped with weapons and batons."<sup>9</sup>

The actions proposed by the High Follow-Up Committee to this incident, however, remained within the limitations of what was permitted by the Israeli state, and possible within the existing political framework. The committee statement issued following the events started with the usual condemnation of Israeli state policies, followed by calls for actions including fund-raising campaigns to rebuild the demolished houses. The committee called on the general public and building contractors to volunteer to rebuild the houses in Um Essahalie on April 4, 1998, and to take part in a solidarity protest. The statement specifically called upon the "democratic and progressive Jewish forces" to join the 1948 Palestinian public and leadership, and participate in the rebuilding. The mention of the mutual Arab-Jewish struggle by the committee in its statement was meant, I argue, to set the boundaries for 1948 Palestinians. It was a reminder that the 1948 Palestinian political action had to be bound to their status as Israeli citizens, and that they could not afford to undermine that status.

The committee framed their response actions within the existing restrictions, and used the resources and channels available. The daring tone of the statement, which called for the immediate rebuilding of the demolished houses in Um Essahalie, was moderated by pointing out that this rebuilding would be done under the umbrella of legal and professional protection.

As was the case in previous struggles such as the 1976 Land Day, in Um Essahalie, the 1948 Palestinian leadership still believed that the presence of Jewish activists would give legitimacy to the protest actions, and perhaps moderate the state's response to demonstrators. However, this was not the case, and the peaceful protests and voluntary solidarity day in Um Essahalie on April 4, 1998, on which some Jewish activists were present, turned into violent clashes.

The statement issued by the High Follow-Up Committee following the clashes on April 4, 1998, was similar to that issued on Habbat October,



and followed the same pattern of using intense rhetoric to frame the events, while advocating for moderate actions. The April 1998 statement<sup>10</sup> called the police attacks a "pogrom," which reflects an interesting framing that borrows from the Jewish experience. "Pogrom" in Russian means "riot" or "devastation," and it is a mob attack approved or condoned by authority, frequently against religious, racial, or national minorities—most often against Jews. Pogroms were conducted on a large scale in Germany and Eastern Europe after Hitler came to power, and ultimately led to the Holocaust.<sup>11</sup> The 1948 Palestinian leadership tactics of using such emotive terms in their statements, I argue, aims at creating frame bridging by using similar rhetoric to that used by Jews, in order to appeal and reach out to a wider audience, including the international and Jewish one. In addition, these statements, I argue, also have an educating role. So, together with addressing the local, the international, and the larger Arab community, the statements are used to raise the awareness of 1948 Palestinians and to strengthen their counterarguments against Israeli claims.

Furthermore, the April 4, 1998, statement reflects the important role of cost-benefit calculations in determining the nature of the 1948 Palestinian political behavior and response to the events in Um Essahalie. It appears that in their calculations of the best way to achieve a successful protest with limited costs, the 1948 Palestinian leadership took into account the political situation of their community, as well as economic and social considerations.

By providing conditions conducive to participation, the High Follow-Up Committee would guarantee a successful strike and high levels of participation in the protest. This would not have been possible without further taking into consideration factors such as the holiday season and the difficult economic situation of 1948 Palestinians.

Usually, holiday periods are when 1948 Palestinian businesses are more likely to make some profit. In general, 1948 Palestinian businesses are small businesses located mainly in Palestinian villages and towns, and struggling to compete with Israeli business and shopping malls. Therefore, if 1948 Palestinian shops were to be closed during the holidays because of the strike, their potential shoppers would turn to and benefit neighboring Jewish businesses instead.

Therefore, had the committee called for a strike during a holiday season forcing shops and businesses to shut down, it would have caused huge economic loss to 1948 Palestinians, and would have risked a poor response and participation in the strike. For those reasons, the committee called upon 1948 Palestinian shops and business to strike for only half a day instead, to reduce the economic damage, and enable the 1948 Palestinian public to prepare for the holiday celebrations.

Also evident in the statement, was the committee's recognition and use of the media as a "new" resource by its decision to hold a press conference in Um Essahalie. The media had been used before as a 1948 Palestinian resource for political mobilization, but it was never highlighted in statements or clearly employed as a tool for resistance. In this instance, the media was used more efficiently than in the past as a tool to reach out to local and international audiences. Even the target audience in the statement issued was broader than usual, and included the "Arab (1948 Palestinian) public and the public opinion everywhere."

Unlike Habbat October, the confrontations in Um Essahalie did not develop into widespread violent clashes, despite the fact that they extended over a period of time as a result of the continuation of solidarity visits called for by the 1948 Palestinian leadership.<sup>12</sup> However, there is evidence in the Um Essahalie statement<sup>13</sup> of developments in the repertoire of 1948 Palestinian struggle tools used in pursuit of their political goals.

The follow-up statement issued on April 8, 1998, and addressed, once more, to the Arab public and general national and international public opinion, demonstrates the kind of political actions that the 1948 Palestinian leadership believed to be available to them in incidents similar to Habbat October. The framing of events, resources, and opportunities available was still similar, and maintained the usual format of first, describing the events, and then, listing the planned protest actions.

The April 8, 1998, statement, however, contained more developed ideas of political protest and recognized new resources, such as using legal means available to follow up on the case of Um Essahalie and house demolitions in general, giving legal advice and support to those arrested or injured by the "bloody police attack," establishing a fund to collect donations, demanding the establishment of an investigation committee, preparing a full report on Um Essahalie to be handed to the Israeli President, in addition to raising the level of coordination with the Negev. All of the mentioned new ideas and resources suggest that a new type of 1948 Palestinian organization was being formed, and that new resources and political opportunities were being identified and used in support of the 1948 Palestinian public.

Some of the actions suggested in this statement were daring in comparison to previous statements. They include the call for an independent investigation committee,<sup>14</sup> and the insistence to refuse any settlement in general and in Um Essahalie in particular, that did not guarantee the survival of 1948 Palestinians on their land and homes. Other proposed actions in the statement, however, suggested a more cooperative approach rather than confrontational struggle with the state. The statement called upon 1948 Palestinians to take advantage of the planned visit of the Israeli president to Um Essahalie to hand him a detailed report on the Um

Essahalie problem, and to discuss with him the main grievances of the 1948 Palestinian public.

Throughout this statement not only is there a clear evolution of the 1948 Palestinian resistance tools, but also there is evidence of greater national awareness. By this time (April 8, 1998), 1948 Palestinians were aiming to expand their support base and unify 1948 Palestinian forces in order to form a more stable front. The 1948 Palestinian leadership saw Um Essahalie as part of a bigger struggle with the state over the land. In order to win that battle there was a need, according to the leadership, for 1948 Palestinians to unite, join forces, unify their resources, and cooperate with the different 1948 Palestinian groups, in order to turn the various battles into one main struggle.

The statement called upon the 1948 Palestinian public to reach out for the Negev, linking the Um Essahalie incident to the bigger agenda of the struggle over land and existence. It called for cooperation with the Bedouins in the Negev and their institutions with regard to issues concerning land and the case of the unrecognized villages. I argue that the 1948 Palestinian leadership was trying to challenge the Israeli policy of "divide and rule" by using the tactic of frame extension to attract the marginal groups within the 1948 Palestinian minority. This was a new strategy not seen before in previous statements, which indicates progress in the development of resistance tools among the 1948 Palestinian leadership. This strategy, I argue, reflects the 1948 Palestinian identification of new resources and tools, and perhaps also the recognition of the inefficiency of old practices. Therefore, the 1948 Palestinian leadership was trying to consolidate similar grievances into one struggle and to share the resources and tools available to various groups to maximize the chances of a successful resistance.

Another change that can be noted in this statement is the development in resistance tools and strategies. Instead of using strategies involving short-term response to the grievance, there is a resort to new long-term resistance tools that could bring a permanent solution, even if only in the long term. The call to establish a fund rather than simply raising money, I argue, reflects long-term planning, and marks a change from previous practices that focused on shorter-term goals. There was also a recommendation to establish an extended and inclusive organization to deal with issues of housing and home demolitions, and the unrecognized 1948 Palestinian villages. It was envisioned that this organization would cooperate with existing specialized and active institutions and bodies. So once more, this is a long-term strategy plan that combines grievances under one framework and calls to use and share the resources available in order to secure better achievements and have better chances of a successful struggle.

Also clear from the statement is the interest of the 1948 Palestinian leadership in securing an alliance with Israeli Jews. There is a salute in

the statement to the “progressive and democratic Jewish forces” that took part in the Um Essahalie and in defending the Arab houses threatened to be demolished. Although this gesture on behalf on the 1948 Palestinian leadership is not new and can be found in previous incidents, it demonstrates that the 1948 Palestinian leadership, and despite the progress in the development of its resistance tools, still recognized that their struggle must be accomplished within the framework of their Israeli citizenship and coexistence with the Jewish public.

By sustaining the resource of recognition and support of members of the Jewish public, the 1948 Palestinian leadership was establishing what political opportunity structure approach calls “elite alliance.” Forming alliances with elites who can be sympathetic to the movement goals increases the political opportunities and resources available to that movement. This is achieved when the movement employs those alliances to gain wider support and legitimacy and exercise more pressure on decision makers.

One of the main social-movement resources that, I argue, could have major contributing effect on the success of the 1948 Palestinian mobilization, in general, is the level of 1948 Palestinian representation. I argue that the more 1948 Palestinian groups are involved in the decision making the better their mobilizing strategies are, and the wider public support their movement gains. This diversity of representation is reflected in the lists of attendance of High Follow-Up Committee meetings, found in the meeting protocols I obtained. Together with the usual representatives of the High Follow-Up Committee, which typically include Knesset members (MKs) and local council heads, the committee’s meetings, especially in the 1990s, brought together a diverse array of individuals and bodies concerned with the issues under discussion. This diversity, as it reads from the statements and meeting protocols, I argue, benefited the matters in discussion and influenced the 1948 Palestinian decision making as to the responses to certain grievances, or the choice of political mobilization tactics.

In fact, the years before Habbat October witnessed the involvement of more 1948 Palestinian social, legal, and advocacy NGOs and groups in the internal decision making. Together with creating new political resources and strengthening 1948 Palestinian elite alliances, this participation, I argue, contributed to raising the levels of political consciousness of the 1948 Palestinian public, and to developing their mobilizing tools. So, in addition to the increase in the number of 1948 Palestinian NGOs, the 1990s also witnessed the development of those NGOs’ activities. As discussed earlier, 1948 Palestinian NGOs became more professional in response to new political opportunities.<sup>15</sup> They started to seize the chances to engage and get more involved, and adjust its mobilization strategies based on the available opportunities.

On March 10, 2000, the High Follow-Up Committee held a meeting to discuss and plan the twenty-fourth Land Day anniversary commemoration. In addition to the usual political participants, two representatives of the Regional Council of the Unrecognized Villages, and the director of Mossawa (the Advocacy Center for Arab Citizens in Israel) were present.<sup>16</sup> That participation was echoed in the public statement issued as a result of this meeting on March 23, 2000.

The statement issued following the meeting was a lengthy and detailed one, three pages long, calling for an annual general strike to commemorate the Land Day on March 30, 2000. The statement, addressed to both 1948 Palestinians and the general public in Israel, reflects the atmosphere in the months before Habbat October. The statement gives a summary of the relevant issues and concerns of the 1948 Palestinian public during the time before Habbat October. It reveals the framing of resources and opportunities available to 1948 Palestinians, and enables the identification of existing and old permanent 1948 Palestinian grievances. The statement focused on grievances related to land, municipal budgets, and the growing anti-Arab sentiments in Israeli society, which were present grievances added to the already-existing old permanent grievances.

In addition to the continuing daily struggle with unfair state policies and practices, the last few years before Habbat October were full of incidental 1948 Palestinian grievances related to land. The struggle over land in the Israeli–1948 Palestinian conflict remained one of the main confrontational issues. While the state's techniques for seizing land owned by 1948 Palestinians developed over the years, the state goals appeared to remain unchanged decades after the 1976 Land Day.

The 1948 Palestinian land in general and the Galilee in particular were the target of many Israeli projects that guaranteed the state's control over land. That is why, 24 years later, the 1976 Land Day was still relevant and present in the collective 1948 Palestinian memory. Not only it was present, but also perhaps it became stronger as the old permanent grievance of the 1976 Land Day fed on frequent incidental grievances, reviving the old grievance and ensuring it continued to be seen as relevant.

The twenty-fourth Land Day anniversary was celebrated in complex circumstances as 1948 Palestinians were facing what they framed as, the most dangerous plans to confiscate the remainder of their lands and target their very existence.<sup>17</sup> The more pressing plans at that time involved the confiscation of land and displacement of 1948 Palestinians, and included:

- The Israeli government's plans to build a highway (The Trans-Israel highway project) between the Galilee and Negev on 20,000 dunams of land, 17,000 of which were owned by 1948 Palestinians.

- An Israeli national plan (National Master Plan Tama-35) that defined the planning of the entire area of the state of Israel. The plan addressed, among other things, the purposes and uses of land and included directives concerning land preservation, holy places, landscape, and natural areas; sites for factories and public use at the national level; and a projection of changes in the state's population distribution. However, the 1948 Palestinians said that similar to previous national plans, Tama-35 ignored the 1948 Palestinian minority, and excluded it from the planning activities and decision making essential for shaping the physical, social, and economic space of the state.<sup>18</sup>
- The confiscation of 28,000 dunams of Roha lands, in The Triangle, in 1998, as part of the ongoing Israeli practice of confiscating 1948 Palestinian land to build military bases and new settlements.
- The plan to expel the Palestinian Bedouins in the Negev by "concentrating" them in two main compounds for the seizure of their lands.
- Establishing settlements and military camps at the expense of 1948 Palestinian land, as is the case with the lands of Sakhnin, a 1948 Palestinian town situated at the heart of the Galilee.
- Surrounding and blockading the municipal areas of 1948 Palestinian cities and villages.
- The refusal of the state to recognize over 40 villages inhabited by more than 70,000 1948 Palestinian Bedouins, or almost 8 percent of the Palestinian population. The Israeli government plans were, and still are at the time of the writing, to forcibly resettle 70,000 of Israel's remaining 120,000 Bedouins from their "unrecognized villages" in the Negev, and concentrate them in three new townships.<sup>19</sup>
- Refusal to allow the 220,000 displaced Palestinian refugees in Israel to return to their homes and villages.
- The escalation in violating 1948 Palestinian sanctuaries including mosques, churches and cemeteries, and the continuing seizure of Islamic endowments (*awqāf*<sup>20</sup>) in particular.

These specific incidental grievances were combined with permanent grievances, such as the persistent policy of racial discrimination, and national suppression exercised by the official governmental departments and institutions. As 1948 Palestinians framed it, this was a permanent Israeli policy escalation despite "beautification attempts to improve its face and image."<sup>21</sup>

Discrimination in the allocation of budgets was another permanent 1948 Palestinian grievance that reached a new climax in the year 2000 with 1948 Palestinian municipal councils suffering from severe budget deficits. The High Follow-Up Committee blamed the deficit on an Israeli

policy of "financial suffocation" aimed at the 1948 Palestinian local councils, and on the failure of the Israeli government to respect agreements signed on the state's behalf, which consequently affected the minimum public services offered to 1948 Palestinians.

There was a growing feeling of disappointment and despair among the 1948 Palestinians. Decades after the removal of military rule, and despite the introduction of Israeli "peaceful-left wing" political parties, the state continued to deal with 1948 Palestinians with great suspicion. It also discriminated against them in the rights and services given, and in comparison with the Jewish citizens of the state. More than 50 years of citizenship still did not grant the 1948 Palestinians the recognition of equal citizens.

The 1948 Palestinians accused government policies of increasing anti-Arab sentiments in Israeli society, and spreading racist trends in the country among state officials and public spheres. The incidental grievances listed above reflect the 1948 Palestinians' perception of the state's attitudes toward them in the period leading to Habbat October. The feeling of 1948 Palestinian disappointment was enhanced by the failure of a relatively pro-Palestinian Israeli government to act in ways that would solve internal 1948 Palestinian issues and the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At that time, the Israeli government in power included parties described by 1948 Palestinians as the "so called 'peaceful-leftist' political forces' that call for equality and seek peace."<sup>22</sup> However, these parties that represented perhaps the last hope for 1948 Palestinians for change within Israeli politics, let the 1948 Palestinian public down. These parties applied similar discriminatory and racist policies, thus failing to put an end to the major 1948 Palestinian grievances.

The enormous disappointment of the 1948 Palestinian public in the policies of Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his government, were in proportion to the high expectations 1948 Palestinians had following their massive support for Barak in the 1999 elections. Yet, as Ahmad Sa'ad,<sup>23</sup> the chief editor of *al-Ittihad* daily newspaper and a former Knesset member, put it, Ehud Barak ridiculed his 1948 Palestinian voters and their parliamentary representatives:

- In the elections before Habbat October, 90 or even more than 90 percent voted for Barak. We supported this man who turned out to be a right wing hawk... because after our 90 percent support for him he went and negotiated (for governmental coalition) with every one except for the representatives of the [1948 Palestinian] public.
- **Why do you think this disregard for Palestinian MKs?**
- It is an ideological and racial logic that we [1948 Palestinians] do not play part... this is a Jewish state, a Zionist state.<sup>24</sup>

By March 2000, the 1948 Palestinian public had mixed feelings of disappointment and a sincere "fear of the future."<sup>25</sup> This meant that by the time of the 2000 Land Day, the 1948 Palestinian framing of the opportunities and resources had changed.

In contrast to previous instances, the 1948 Palestinians' plea to the democratic progressive Jewish forces in 2000 made the distinction between "the true and the pretentious ones." The disappointment of the 1948 Palestinians with the "Israeli left" over the years made them mature politically, and they became more aware of their options. If previously 1948 Palestinians favored the Israeli "left" over the "right" based on political promises made during election campaigns, in 2000 they were asking the "left" to take actions corresponding to their promises to the Palestinian public. The 1948 Palestinians were dissatisfied with the performance of the "left" governments and parties, which, on the one hand, took the support of the 1948 Palestinian public for granted, while appearing sometimes, on the other hand, to be worse than right-wing Israeli governments in relation to their policies toward the 1948 Palestinians and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Therefore, the language of the 1948 Palestinian plea in 2000 was firm, asking "the real" democratic progressive Jewish forces to take a clear and definite stand against racism and in support of full equality, just and comprehensive peace, social justice, and a peaceful coexistence on the basis of mutual respect.<sup>26</sup> The plea warned that "the enmity of the widely spread apartheid<sup>27</sup> racism in the Israeli society will not be confined to 1948 Palestinians, but will exceed them to get and seriously hurt the democratic and progressive Jewish forces."<sup>28</sup> The use of the word "apartheid" in this statement reflects a development in the 1948 Palestinian framing that aims to educate, attract the sympathy of, and appeal to a larger audience, by drawing parallels between incontrovertible matters like the condemned South Africa's apartheid system and Israeli racism.

The presence of both permanent and incidental grievances referred to above, in addition to many others, made it particularly vital, according to the 1948 Palestinian leadership, to commemorate the Land Day on that year in a special way.<sup>29</sup> The 1948 Palestinian leadership stressed the importance of adding a unified character to the planned Land Day protests. The leadership said that for the Land Day struggle to succeed there is a need for a clear work plan and vision. In addition, the leadership said, the struggle must be carried under the framework of unified slogans with the aim to reinforce national unity.

The special commemoration of the Land Day in the year 2000 was called for by the 1948 Palestinian leadership based on the above principles, and as a result of what they described as the state's attitude of overlooking



their 1948 Palestinian "fair rights" and the state's "clear disregard" of their demands.<sup>30</sup>

A comparison between the March 23, 2000, statement<sup>31</sup> and calls in previous years for political action shows a significant change in the nature and scope of the proposed protest actions. Although the actions maintained some familiar patterns, the statement, I argue, reflects development in 1948 Palestinian nonviolent resistance tools. Furthermore, the actions proposed in response to existing grievances of 1948 Palestinians appear to have been carefully chosen to suit the political opportunities and resources available to them at that time. Most of these actions, strived to accomplish long-term rather than short-term goals.

In 2000, the 1948 Palestinian leadership focused on three main dimensions of resistance: politics, education, and the media. In effect, the leadership in this struggle realized that working on the political level, as they usually did in the past, was not enough on its own. The leadership saw the need to accompany the political actions with new forms of action, related to education or media campaigns. Combined with political actions, the new forms of action were aimed at enhancing the struggle and recruiting more support to the 1948 Palestinian cause, both locally and internationally.

This is an indication of a more mature framing of resistance, which widens the scope and prospective goals of the 1948 Palestinian struggle by incorporating the various resources available to them (political, educational, and media) and taking advantage of the limited political opportunities present. This also illustrates a development in 1948 Palestinian framing and in political speech, one that is alert to the importance of working on different levels to enable the success of resistance.

The scale of the protests planned for the 2000 Land Day was big, and included several marches and festivals in the Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev, covering all the 1948 Palestinian areas in north, central, and south Israel. The protest locations were chosen carefully to include places affected either by past or present grievances. Sakhnin and Kufor Kanna, for example, were the towns that witnessed the killings of 1948 Palestinians during the original 1976 Land Day. In the March 23, 2000, High Follow-Up Committee statement, Sakhnin, which was the home of three of the six 1976 Land Day victims, was described as the "Mother of Land Day Martyrs." Additionally, several central public protests and festivals were planned to take place in the Triangle and Rouha areas, which were the subject of recent and new land-related grievances. Another major protest festival was also organized in the unrecognized villages of al-For'aah and al-Zaa'rurah in the Negev.

Expanding the usual 1948 Palestinian forms of commemoration of the Land Day in 2000 to include these geographically and historically

dispersed sites, I argue, contributed to reviving the memories of the old grievances. It also implied that the past grievances of the 1976 Land Day were still relevant in the year 2000, and that 24 years onwards not much had changed in the state's attitude toward its 1948 Palestinian citizens. In addition, linking the past with the present enabled to draw parallels between the different grievances, old and new. On this occasion, these parallels probably enhanced and intensified the present 1948 Palestinian grievances over the land, especially since the present grievances were being compared to that of the 1976 Land Day. And in the collective memory of 1948 Palestinians, the 1976 Land Day is associated with the hostility shown by the Israeli state, and with its bloody outcome.

The 1948 Palestinian leadership proposed to engage in the educational aspect of resistance not only by targeting the younger generations, but also by restoring and reviving the collective memory of the 1976 Land Day. The 1948 Palestinian leadership called upon the (1948 Palestinian) schools and the regional and local educational organizations to dedicate some time, especially the first two hours of the school day on March 28, 2000, to teach the history of the 1976 Land Day and inform the students about the reality of the 1948 Palestinian people and land. The leadership also called for the organization of related local public educational activities that would unify all the different political frameworks. In addition, the leadership called to issue the "Land Day Dictionary," and to republish the "Black Book" that documents the 1976 Land Day, in order to "enrich the collective memory and educate the young generations."<sup>32</sup>

The 1948 Palestinian leadership tactics described here indicate a development in the tactics of peaceful resistance that were aimed at enriching and reviving the collective memory of the 1948 Palestinian public. This suggests that the 1948 Palestinian leadership became more aware of the importance of collective memory in their struggle, and were trying to develop this memory and use it as a resource by investing in the younger generation who did not witness the grievance concerned, and by restoring the memory of the 1976 Land Day in the minds of those who did.

Another aspect that the 1948 Palestinian leadership found necessary to the success of their resistance was the search for additional sources of support both nationally and internationally. As important as it was to recruit local support, there was a need to form national and international alliances that would guarantee the existence of sympathetic elites to advance the 1948 Palestinian cause.

As it happened, in the year 2000 one of the world's most prominent religious figures, Pope John Paul II, was due to visit the city of Nazareth as part of his trip to the Holy Land. Nazareth, which is a center of Christian pilgrimage, is also one of the main 1948 Palestinian cities. Therefore, the 1948 Palestinian leadership decided to take advantage of the pope's visit to

Nazareth on March 25, 2000, to lobby their case. The leadership planned to hand the pope a thorough document detailing the history and situation of the Palestinian Arab public in Israel. Additionally, this "historical" document was to be distributed to all foreign ambassadors in Israel, and circulated around "the international forums, the media, and the international public opinion."<sup>33</sup>

In trying to advance their cause and attract more public attention and support, the 1948 Palestinian leadership decided to organize a press conference in Jerusalem on Monday, March 27, 2000, on the eve of the Land Day anniversary. Normally, 1948 Palestinian conferences were held in the Galilee, so the choice of Jerusalem on this occasion, in addition to its symbolic significance, was intended to maximize the potential media coverage and attendance of the press conference because Jerusalem is the center of media bureaus and attention.

All of the planned actions described above were part of more developed protest tactics created by the 1948 Palestinian leadership following the identification of additional resources that could contribute to the success of the 1948 Palestinian struggle. Among these actions were symbolic ones, such as calling on the 1948 Palestinian public to organize solidarity visits on the Land Day anniversary to the unrecognized and abandoned Palestinian villages all over the country.<sup>34</sup> Giving weight to such symbolic actions in the 1948 Palestinian struggle, I argue, reflects further advancement in resistance tools that borrows from other experiences, like the Jewish visits to Nazi concentration camps, for example, and forms a way of frame bridging that targets potential audiences outside the 1948 Palestinian local circles.

The leadership called upon the 1948 Palestinian public to widely and actively take part in the "immortal national struggle anniversary."<sup>35</sup> The leadership stressed that assuring the success of these protest actions would require the cooperation of all 1948 Palestinian political parties and movements, in addition to the 1948 Palestinian local authorities and their public organizations. All of these actors, according to the 1948 Palestinian leadership, should work under a unified collective vision and in persistent and steady steps, in order to create a different reality and better future.<sup>36</sup>

Most of the demonstrations on March 30, 2000, were peaceful;<sup>37</sup> however despite the advanced planning and the development in peaceful resistance tools, the twenty-fourth Land Day anniversary did not pass entirely peacefully. The town of Sakhnin was one of the main protest hot spots. In addition to the town being the burial ground of three of the six who died in the 1976 Land Day, Sakhnin was the subject of a continuing Israeli land confiscation intended to build military bases in the Galilee. This fact perhaps can explain the more violent responses in Sakhnin.

The clashes between the police and young protestors in Sakhnin resulted in the death of an old woman, Sheikha Abu-Saleh, from tear gas inhalation, and injury to 18 others. Some newspaper reports described the clashes in Sakhnin as an “Intifada-like” confrontation with young protestors throwing stones at the contested military base and Israeli police hiding behind bushes and firing tear gas and rubber-coated steel bullets.<sup>38</sup>

Following the incident in Sakhnin, the 1948 Palestinian leadership issued a statement condemning “the racist police aggression on protestors” and calling on the government to establish an independent investigation committee and punish those responsible.<sup>39</sup> Israeli government officials, by contrast, called for a ban on any future Land Day commemorations. These calls were met with more condemnation from the High Follow-Up Committee, which warned the “government of Israel from the threat of explosion” and laid on it full responsibility for the outcomes.<sup>40</sup>

The 2000 Land Day demonstrations, which witnessed a new form of resistance, were followed by a series of protests organized by the 1948 Palestinian leadership. The leadership, together with 1948 Palestinian student bodies, cooperated to maintain a momentum of protests in the various Israeli universities. Student protests, such as the one held at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, were dispersed by force, resulting in the injury and arrest of some 1948 Palestinian students.<sup>41</sup>

Although the days following the death of Abu-Saleh did witness a wave of intense demonstrations by 1948 Palestinian students at Israeli universities, the 2000 Land Day did not escalate like Habbat October despite the similarities between the two incidents. However, although there were no widespread confrontations following the 2000 Land Day, the relationship between the state and its 1948 Palestinian citizens deteriorated in the months leading to Habbat October.

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## Habbat October: Multiple Names and a Single Indiscriminate Israeli Bullet

In September 2000, the al-Aqsa Intifada started following the visit of Ariel Sharon, then the leader of the Likud opposition party, to the al-Haram al-Sharif<sup>42</sup> compound in Jerusalem. A day after the visit, on September 29, 2000, clashes erupted between Palestinians and Israeli security forces in the old city of Jerusalem during which at least 5 Palestinians were

shot dead and 200 more injured.<sup>43</sup> Following these violent events, the 1948 Palestinian leadership called for a general strike in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and to protest the deaths of Palestinians in al-Haram al-Sharif. The strike received wide support, and initiated the spread of protests and clashes in 1948 Palestinian towns and villages throughout Israel.

The protest soon turned out to be the largest in the history of 1948 Palestinians. The general strike and demonstrations across northern Israel continued for several days. They became more intense and violent as the events unfolded and what was perceived by Palestinians as Israeli police brutality increased. Thirteen unarmed Palestinians were killed in Um el-Fahem, Jatt, Arrabeh, Sakhnin, Nazareth, Kufor Kanna, and Kufor Manda on October 1, 2, 3, and 8, 2000. According to legal reports issued by the Adalah Legal Center, none of the individuals shot by the police posed a danger or threat to life to the police or to others.<sup>44</sup> Following the events and the intense 1948 Palestinian public request for an independent inquiry into the events, the Official Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes between Security Forces and Israeli Citizens in October 2000 (Or Commission) was appointed on November 8, 2000. However, the Or Commission took almost three years to present its findings and recommendations. The 1948 Palestinian public was critical of the commission and its work, and was highly disappointed with its conclusions and recommendations.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the conflicting testimonies over what really happened in the mass protests of October 2000, or Habbat October, there is an unprecedented consensus around the significance of the events. Analysts on both sides of the spectrum argued that Habbat October was a landmark in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel with a major effect on the politicization of 1948 Palestinians and on their relationship with the state. The official summation of the Or Commission<sup>46</sup> report, for example, described the events as ones that "shook the earth."<sup>47</sup> In an article published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* Azmi Bishara,<sup>48</sup> a key 1948 Palestinian political and academic figure, called the events "a landmark in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel."<sup>49</sup>

This chapter follows the unfolding of events of Habbat October, and analyzes the conditions that contributed to its development and bloody ending. It pays close attention to the 1948 Palestinian framing of grievances, political resources, and opportunities in an attempt to understand the dynamics of interaction and the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians in that incident. The emphasis on the 1948 Palestinian framing is essential to reflect a better image of what was going through the hearts and minds of 1948 Palestinians, and contributed to their mobilization in

Habbat October. After reviewing what happened in Habbat October, the chapter will then proceed to examine some of the contributing factors of Habbat October mobilization, and will conclude by displaying the 1948 Palestinian framing of events and conditions, mainly by analyzing the relevant primary resources.

There are varied reasons behind choosing Habbat October as a case study in this book. Habbat October, which was referred to by the Israeli public discourse as the “October events” or the “October riots,” was an appalling revelation for both the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian populations in Israel. The majority of the Jewish Israeli public and media considered the Habbat October events hostile and anti-Israeli, reinforcing existing views of “Arabs [1948 Palestinians] as a fifth column.” For 1948 Palestinians who had so far acted within the limits of the Israeli law, it was shocking to realize that they would receive the same treatment as noncitizen Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, and that the state would not hesitate to use force against them, including live ammunition.

Habbat October has spurred an ongoing debate over the future of the 1948 Palestinians in Israel and their relationship with the state, and has been one of the most covered, discussed, and debated issues. In his political monitoring report on Israel and the Palestinian minority, Nimer Sultany says Habbat October greatly affected the consciousness of the Palestinian citizens, and influenced the state’s attitude toward the Palestinian minority, in addition to affecting majority-minority relations. Sultany describes the protests as a milestone in the relations between Israel and the Palestinian citizens of the state. Both the scale and the intensity of the October 2000 events were unprecedented.

According to the Or Commission report, which on the whole reflects the official Israeli government point of view, thousands of people participated, at many locations, and at the same time. The report also describes the intensity of “the violence and aggression” expressed in the events as extremely powerful:

Against security forces, and even against civilians, use was made of a variety of means of attack, including a small number of live fire incidents, Molotov cocktails, ball bearings in slingshots, various methods of stone throwing and the rolling of burning tires. Jews were attacked on the roads for being Jewish and their property was destroyed. In a number of incidences, they were just inches from death at the hands of an unrestrained mob.<sup>50</sup>

More references to the intensity of the events and also of the unprecedented scale of overt state violence against 1948 Palestinian is found in Adalah’s report in March 2003 in which a number of legal violations including

excessive use of force by the Israeli police are recorded. The report indicates that during the demonstrations:

[T]he police and special police sniper units killed 13 unarmed Palestinian citizens of Israel and injured hundreds more using live ammunition, rubber-coated steel bullets ("rubber bullets"), and tear gas. The firing of live ammunition and rubber bullets at protestors, including the use of snipers, are all prohibited by law and even violate internal police regulations.<sup>51</sup>

Furthermore, Habbat October also marked the peak in revenge and hate crimes in modern history against 1948 Palestinians by Israeli Jewish citizens who targeted 1948 Palestinians and their property. Similar acts were also directed against 1948 Palestinian holy sites such as the historic mosque of the city of Tiberias that was burned by Jewish Israelis.<sup>52</sup> The violence also spread to mixed Jewish-Palestinian towns such as Akka, Yafa, and Haifa. The clashes between 1948 Palestinians and Jews reached their peak in the city of Nazareth resulting in the deaths of two 1948 Palestinians.<sup>53</sup>

Habbat October has also contributed to the politicization and national self-definition of 1948 Palestinians. Habbat October, which started with a general strike, called for by what Azmi Bishara calls "a leadership generally known for caution in dealing with the Israeli state," has encouraged a level of national awareness and solidarity of national identity that the national movement would have required years to develop in ordinary times.<sup>54</sup>

Finally, the fact that Habbat October is a fairly recent event that has been documented by a number of official and academic records on both sides of the spectrum makes this case study easier to research. This fact enables better access to information and potential interviewees, and helps include a range of sources such as media, legal records, and oral testimonials that were not available in other case studies discussed in this book.

In line with the discussion in the introduction of this book regarding impartiality, any attempt to represent a balanced or objective account of what happened in Habbat October, especially given the length constraints of the book, is doomed to failure. It is impossible, I argue, to create a replica of the Habbat October events that would take into account all the different parties involved. Habbat October in particular and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general is packed with grey areas of complicated and sensitive details that can hold more than one interpretation. The difficulties in representing a balanced account of events is due to endless factors starting with, yet not confined to, choice of terminology, methods of gathering facts, problems with documentation, and access to sources, in addition to language and cultural barriers.

For example, when trying to create a timeline account for Habbat October, I was faced with challenges related to conflicting testimonies and gaps in timeline accounts. There were difficulties with conveying the exact meaning when translating from one language to another, and when transferring the events to a different social and cultural context. The writer and editor's task in this case is a hard one; what to include and what to omit, what event counts more, and whose testimony is more reliable. There are already biases and subjectivity bound within each and every decision made.

As explained before, throughout this book, the aim is not to determine who is right or wrong, but rather give a brief account that can serve as an informative introduction for the purpose of the latter analysis. Therefore, and bearing in mind those limitations, the narrative introduced in this book is not claiming such objectivity. The aim of this study is to understand the factors that encouraged the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians, therefore, the book will primarily focus on the way 1948 Palestinians perceived and framed the events/situation. Of course, when appropriate the official Israeli narrative will also be discussed.

The range of names given to the events of October 2000 is one indication of the controversy over the events. The official narrative articulated by Israeli officials and Israeli media generally refers to Habbat October as violent "riots" mainly inflamed by the incitement of the 1948 Palestinian leadership.<sup>55</sup> This terminology continued to be prevalent in spite of the findings of the Or Commission (emphasis mine):

The Or Commission concluded that all Israeli governments have discriminated against the Arab minority. However, the October 2000 riots were to a great degree the **result of incitement and ideological radicalization of the Israeli Arab sector by local Arab political and religious leaders**, the Palestinian Authority, the Islamic Movement in Israel, and foreign radical Islamic groups.<sup>56</sup>

In addition, there are those who prefer the term "October 2000 events," which can be an attempt to apply a less loaded language, or to use the blurred term "events" to avoid assigning responsibility for the escalation and the tragic killings.

However, the 1948 Palestinian framing of the events is fairly different. In general, Habbat October is remembered as a grievance, starting as nonviolent mass demonstrations that were met with excessive use of force by the Israeli police, who targeted and killed Palestinian protesters. Therefore, the 1948 Palestinian term "Habbat October," which is favored in this study, is a reflection of this 1948 conviction and framing.



In choosing the terminology, this book follows similar lines to Nimer Sultany's<sup>57</sup> attempt to avoid the language used as part of the hegemonic discourse in Israel in describing the events. It also borrows from Sultany's argument about the importance of language in creating knowledge, and agrees with the distinction he makes between the terms used to describe the October events. Sultany prefers to use the term "mass protests of October 2000," rather than the commonly used phrase "the events of October" or "the October riots," arguing that "the term *events* gives a neutral and accidental facade to the demonstrations, removing the sting of protest from them," while the term "*riots* seeks to attach a negative, illegitimate label to the political demonstrations."<sup>58</sup>

Yet as will be argued later, the October 2000 events account for more than simply mass protests or violent clashes. They were a significant occasion for all parties involved, with various developments and major implications, especially on the politicization of 1948 Palestinians and their relationship with the Israeli Jewish public, leadership, and the state.

The word *Habbah* (هبة) in Arabic means an outburst or a blast, and it is the term that was later introduced by some 1948 Palestinians who saw in the events an awakening similar to the Palestinian Intifada. Furthermore, the term is meant to reflect the grassroots nature of the protests in October 2000, which contradicts with the Israeli claim of the events being orchestrated by the 1948 Palestinian leadership and external players. Ahmad Sa'ad, the chief editor of *al-Ittihad* daily newspaper, recalls the discussions over the term "Habbah" that he thinks best describes what happened in October 2000. Sa'ad says that when the 1948 Palestinian public took to the streets it was not organized by parties, "but was rather a spontaneous action to express their opinion, to protest, and condemn the massacre against our nation."<sup>59</sup>

Besides favoring the 1948 Palestinian framing for the reasons explained earlier, this study is trying to make a counterhegemonic endeavor to challenge the Israeli consensus on this issue. For all these reasons, the term Habbat October will be used hereinafter in this book, aside from certain cases where the original terms are preserved when quoted to reflect the point of view of the narrator.

It is worth noting that Habbat October was considered by some commentators as part of the al-Aqsa Intifada, and that the names of the 1948 Palestinians killed were included amongst the list of Palestinian martyrs issued by the Palestinian Authority.<sup>60</sup> However, while I recognize the strong link between the two events, I still felt the need to set the two apart, partly by assigning different names to the events. Habbat October, I believe, has to be singled out and not simply labeled as adherent of the al-Aqsa Intifada.

This point of view is prevalent amid 1948 Palestinians, who wanted to emphasize their contribution to the Intifada while distinguishing and stressing their own loss and grievance. 1948 Palestinians wanted to mark the events of Habbat October and their extreme nature, and turn them into an authentic 1948 Palestinian collective memory. This distinction also implies that while 1948 Palestinians are linked to the larger Palestinian national cause, importantly, they are relatively separate from the politics of the rest of the Palestinians, and are not orchestrated by the same leadership regardless of what may appear to be a similar outcome.

In addition, the 1948 Palestinian insistence on commemorating the events as distinct from the al-Aqsa Intifada, I argue, contains a message to the Israeli public and authorities as well, namely, that Habbat October was the responsibility and the outcome of failed Israeli policies to deal with state citizens. There are indications that the 1948 Palestinians understood that if Habbat October was to be included as part of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the event would have lost its legitimacy, and would have simply turned into another violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontation with little significance or worth. The 1948 Palestinians wanted both the Israeli public and authorities to recognize the difference between 1948 Palestinians as citizens practicing their legitimate right to protest, and the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Habbat October, therefore, had to be defined as another incident of state violence against its 1948 Palestinian citizens added to a long history of similar incidents, and a further example of the mistreatment and discrimination against the 1948 Palestinian citizens of Israel.

\* \* \*

## Habbat October: Political Opportunities and Resources

### Regional and Internal Context, and Chronology of Events

In this section, a timeline and summation of key regional and internal events is given to clarify the political context of Habbat October. In addition to identifying some of the 1948 Palestinian grievances, the main purpose of this summation is to provide a brief overview of the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians in Habbat October. This will help situate the reader within the larger political framework of events. In

addition, the following chronology will shed some light on the timing and motivations behind the 1948 Palestinian participation in Habbat October.

Habbat October can be divided into four main episodes: preevents, initial demonstrations and killings, Jewish revenge actions, and the aftermath of the killings. However, this chronology section will emphasize the pre-Habbat October phase, as the remainder will be covered in subsequent sections in this chapter.

While most Habbat October chronologies start from the visit of Ariel Sharon on September 28, 2000, to al-Haram al-Sharif, this chronology takes into account the range of events that took place before that date and were of great relevance to the 1948 Palestinians. These events left their marks on the 1948 Palestinian grievances, and influenced the available resources and political opportunities and their framing.

### *Pre-Habbat October Events*

*September 25, 1996:* The Tunnel Intifada erupted in the wake of the Israeli government opening of a new tunnel under the al-Haram al-Sharif, claiming the lives of 14 Israelis and more than 60 Palestinians.

*April 2, 1998:* Israeli police demolished three houses in Um Essahalie, one of over 40 unrecognized 1948 Palestinian villages. The demolitions led to confrontations between Israeli police and 1948 Palestinians protesting against the Israeli policy of house demolitions.<sup>61</sup>

*September 27, 1998:* Confrontations between 1948 Palestinians and the Israeli police over an Israeli plan to expropriate 10,000 acres of land, known as al-Roha land, in Um el-Fahm. The violent clashes started on September 27, 1998, when Israeli police tried to break up a peaceful 1948 Palestinian demonstration against the expropriation. The clashes lasted for three days, during which Israeli forces used live ammunition, rubber-coated bullets, tear gas, and baton charges, resulting in the injury of hundreds. According to 1948 Palestinians, Israeli police prevented Israeli ambulances from entering the town to evacuate the injured, and raided a local school that was used as a first aid clinic, firing at students, and school property.<sup>62</sup>

*October 23, 1998:* The Wye River Memorandum was signed by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, in a summit hosted by US president Bill Clinton.<sup>63</sup>

*May 16, 1999:* "The Dignity Battle against the *Umalaa*" (معركة الكرامة ضد العملاء)<sup>64</sup> in the 1948 Palestinian town of Baqa al-Gharbieh. The term "*Umalaa*" is used to describe Palestinian "traitors" or collaborators with Israeli intelligence. Israel's attempts to rehouse *Umalaa*' from the Occupied Territories in 1948 Palestinian towns were

in many cases exposed and protested. In the case of Baqa al-Gharbieh, residents drove the Umalaa' out of the town, and burnt their houses following an assault on a local resident by some Umalaa' who attacked the man and fired at his house. Two local residents, Jamal Bayadseh and Jalal abu-Hussein, who got trapped in the fire died, and were named by locals as "martyrs of the Dignity Battle against the Collaborators."<sup>65</sup> While the reasoning for burning the houses, which were owned by local residents, was questioned, driving the collaborators out of the town was celebrated. In fact, it was marked by some as part of the 1948 Palestinian national struggle.<sup>66</sup>

*May 25, 2000:* Israel ended its 22 years occupation of Lebanon, and withdrew its troops from South Lebanon. An Israeli inner cabinet agreed to implement UN Resolution 425 following an electoral pledge by the new Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak. UN Resolution 425, issued in 1978 five days after Israel's first invasion of Lebanon, called for Israel's immediate withdrawal.<sup>67</sup> The withdrawal was celebrated by many, especially the Arabs, as a victory for the Lebanese resistance, and the beginning of the end of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Syrian land.<sup>68</sup>

*July 25, 2000:* The Camp David peace summit hosted by US president Bill Clinton broke down after two weeks of one-to-one negotiations between prime minister Ehud Barak and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. "Israeli security officials predicted violent unrest in the Occupied Territories."<sup>69</sup>

*September 12, 2000:* Alik Ron, northern district police commander, requested the authorization of the head of the investigations department, Yossi Sedbon, to begin an investigation of Hadash (*HaHazit HaDemokratit LeShalom VeLeShivion* [The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality]) chairman, MK Mohammed Barakeh. Barakeh was suspected of inciting 1948 Palestinian citizens in the north of the country to attack policemen.<sup>70</sup>

*September 13, 2000:* The High Follow-Up Committee convened in Kufor Manda following the decision to investigate MK Mohammed Barakeh. According to the Or Commission, at the end of the meeting MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe (representing the United Arab List in the Knesset) said, "We will beat or forcefully attack any policeman and we will break his hands if he comes to demolish an Arab house... we are on the verge of an Intifada among Israel's Arabs following Alik Ron's incitement."<sup>71</sup>

*September 19, 2000:* Israel suspended its peace talks with the Palestinians indefinitely, claiming Yasser Arafat should make critical concessions on outstanding issues, particularly the sovereignty of Jerusalem.<sup>72</sup>

*September 14, 2000:* A total strike held in Nazareth following the murder of Nabieh Nussier, aged 52. The official reason for the strike was to protest the "police's incompetence in handling violence and crime."<sup>73</sup>

*September 28, 2000:* Ariel Sharon, the hawkish leader of the Likud opposition party, made a controversial visit to the al-Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem surrounded by hundreds of Israeli soldiers and accompanied by a Likud delegation. Sharon toured the al-Haram, provoking Palestinians and Moslem worshippers who protested and clashed with Israeli police in the worst violent confrontations for years at the site. Sharon's visit to the compound came to emphasize Israel's sovereignty over it, and "was clearly intended to underline the Jewish claim to the city [of Jerusalem] and its holy sites."<sup>74</sup>

*September 29, 2000:* Marked the beginning of al-Aqsa Intifada, when violent confrontations developed after Friday prayer in the compound between Israeli forces and worshippers protesting Sharon's visit. Israeli police used rubber-coated bullets and live ammunition killing 4 Palestinians and injuring at least 96.<sup>75</sup>

*September 30, 2000:* Mohammed al-Durrah, a Palestinian boy aged 12, died in his father's arms by Israeli bullets after being caught in cross fire in Gaza between Israeli army and Palestinian militants. Al-Durrah's tragic death caught on camera by French TV cameraman, and screened worldwide evoked widespread feelings of sympathy and anger, and "became one of the most powerful and enduring symbols of the conflict."<sup>76</sup>

### *The 1948 Palestinian Demonstrations and Violent Clashes*

Initially, this part of the chapter was to be based on the summation presented by the Or Commission of inquiry.<sup>77</sup> However, despite its remit, the commission's work has been controversial and was not widely accepted by the 1948 Palestinian community, and therefore it does not reflect their perceptions and understandings of the unfolding of events. The attempt to understand and analyze those 1948 Palestinian perceptions is a key purpose of the book, and thus, the Or report could not be used as a sole source for chronology information.

Prior to the publication of the Or report on September 1, 2003, a poll of 1948 Palestinians indicated that the majority of respondents, 64 percent, expressed low to moderate trust in the Or Commission's ability to justly investigate the deaths of the 13 demonstrators in Habbat October. The poll, which was published by Mada al-Carmel<sup>78</sup> in August 2003, asked the respondents to predict what the commission's conclusions would be. Eighty-one percent of the respondents believed that the commission would assign a heavy responsibility to the Arab leaders for the events.<sup>79</sup> These

fears were realized after the publication of the Or Commission report, and another survey by Mada al-Carmel showed widespread Palestinian dissatisfaction with the commission's report and recommendations.<sup>80</sup>

Indeed, after reading the commission's report, I recorded a number of observations in relation to its language and representation of events. For example, the report uses moderate language when reporting on violent events against 1948 Palestinians, while using loaded language with full details of the Jewish Israeli victims when relating to 1948 Palestinians' actions. When reporting injuries on the Jewish side, for instance, the cases are presented with the full names and details of the victims and the circumstances that led to their injury. For example (emphasis mine): "**Ya'akov Ben-Hamo** from Kibbutz Beit-Alpha is **attacked** by Arab youths while driving from Um el Fahm toward the junction. **The Arabs force him out** of the car and **set fire** to it."

However, in the Or report, the 1948 Palestinian victims are no more than numbers with very little or no details or even names mentioned. For example, (emphasis mine) "Um el Fahm: **Three demonstrators** are killed and 75 wounded in a **demonstration in the town**. Most are **lightly** wounded by **rubber-coated** bullets and **receive medical attention** at the local clinic." Here as well, the emphasis is on the fact that the demonstrators were not seriously injured; that the bullets were not live bullets (keeping in mind that rubber bullets can kill and have done so); and that medical treatment was available and received.

Comparing the Or Commission's report to other 1948 Palestinian narratives in a number of secondary and primary sources revealed a wide gap between the Israeli narrative and the 1948 Palestinian one. In general, media coverage and official accounts of Habbat October from both sides (Israeli and 1948 Palestinian) were contradictory and one-sided. The only piece of information that did not seem to be contested was the fact there were 13 killed, but the details around how the killings occurred, or who was responsible for the killing could not be more varied. Further analysis of media coverage of the events will be addressed later in this chapter as part of the discussion of the framing process.

It is worth noting, though, that with the passage of time and development of events, the story presented by the 1948 Palestinian narrative, especially following the killings, became more selective and less detailed in the personal and collective 1948 Palestinian memory. This stage of selective memory fits the grievance dynamics, explained earlier, which is used to form the base for permanent grievances.

Usually, the visit of Ariel Sharon on September 28, 2000, to al-Haram al-Sharif is marked as the starting point for many of the Habbat October chronologies reviewed.<sup>81</sup> This is probably due to the direct impact this

event had on the beginning of the violent clashes. Yet, knowledge of the regional and interpolitical situation starting months before the actual events on October 1, is essential for understanding the political opportunities available to 1948 Palestinians at that time. For that reason, the summary of events, which was given earlier, will help situate the reader within the larger context of events, and more inclusive account of the contributing factors, and a better understanding of the dynamics of Habbat October.

The events from October 1 to 6, 2000, were marked by massive demonstrations in 1948 Palestinian towns and villages throughout Israel in sympathy with the second Intifida. In the course of these demonstrations, 13 unarmed 1948 Palestinian citizens were shot dead by Israeli security forces. A thousand more were wounded, and hundreds were arrested.

### *Jewish Revenge Actions*

Jewish revenge actions that took place mainly from October 6, to 15, 2000, involved violent assaults by Jewish citizens on 1948 Palestinian citizens, including attacks on mosques, clinics, stores, and homes. In addition, there were calls by Jewish residents to boycott 1948 Palestinian businesses. According to the Or Commission,

[On] Friday, 6 October 2000, hundreds of Jewish youths begin rampaging through the streets of Tiberias. They hurled burning tires at a mosque in the town, and trying physically to assault Arabs. In Jerusalem dozens of ultra-Orthodox youths throw stones at Arab vehicles passing through Shmuel Hanavi Street and Ma'alot Daphna Street, and police forces are called to the scene. Jewish Haredi youths also attacked Palestinian workers in Shmuel Hanavi Street. The Palestinians flee to the roof of a nearby building and were rescued, uninjured, by the police. On Saturday, 7 October 2000, dozens of Jewish and 1948 Palestinian youths threw stones at each other near the shopping mall in Upper Nazareth, which is close to the eastern neighborhood of the Arab part of Nazareth. Stones are thrown at 1948 Palestinian vehicles in the center of Upper Nazareth. In the Jewish town of Or Akiva, a scuffle erupted between Jews and Arabs at a shopping mall in the town. A police force that arrived on the scene was attacked. A Molotov cocktail was thrown at one of the buildings in the town. Sunday, 8 October 2000 - Thousands of Jews participated in violent acts against 1948 Palestinians. In the Hatikva neighborhood in Tel Aviv, three apartments belonging to 1948 Palestinians were set on fire. Hundreds of the neighborhood's residents confronted police, chanting "death to the Arabs." The demonstrators forced the 1948 Palestinian employees of the Avazi restaurant to evacuate the building and then set the restaurant on fire. Two 1948 Palestinian owned vehicles parked in front of the restaurant were also set alight. Jews rampaged in Jaffa, Bat Yam, and Petah Tikva. Two 1948

Palestinians from Nazareth were killed in confrontations between 1948 Palestinians and Jews in Upper Nazareth. Police denied responsibility for the shootings, and investigate the possibility that the shootings were carried out by the Jewish demonstrators. Monday, 9 October 2000, hundreds of Jewish residents entered the shopping mall at the southern entrance to the town, breaking windows and burning two vehicles. Approximately 1,000 Jews rampaged in Karmiel. Police report that Mayor Rafi Eldar, who came to the area in an effort to calm the violence down, was attacked and lightly wounded. Jews rampaged and damaged 1948 Palestinian -owned property in Bat Yam and Petah Tikva.<sup>82</sup>

### *In the Aftermath of the Killings*

The fourth and final episode of Habbat October concerns the aftermath of the killings and the end of the violence, which includes the 1948 Palestinian mobilization to prosecute those responsible for the bloody outcome. On October 11, 2000, a relatively low turnout was noticed during the ceremonies held in several 1948 Palestinian communities throughout the country to commemorate the death of the 13 demonstrators. Many believed the brutality and racial discrimination, demonstrated so clearly in the clashes earlier and the campaign of arrests that followed, had frightened people into keeping a low profile. As a matter of fact, the treatment of 1948 Palestinian suspects in the preceding weeks had confirmed that Palestinian citizens could not be certain that Israeli authorities would respect or protect their basic human rights. This realization not only pushed the 1948 Palestinian population further away from their Jewish neighbors, but also led the community to fear for their security.

In the aftermath of the violence and killings, a group of 1948 Palestinian lawyers and organizations lobbied the Israeli government to appoint an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the events. On November 8, 2000, the Or Commission was appointed.

However, the Committee of Martyrs' Families made up of the families of the victims, which was part of the lobbying effort to demand a commission of inquiry, ultimately boycotted the proceedings. This was done in part because families' participation in the proceedings was severely restricted. Families of the victims could not attend the trials, and could not contribute to questioning witnesses. Yet, despite all, and unlike the case of 1956 Kufor Qasim or the 1976 Land Day, the agreement of the Israeli government to establish inquiry commission is considered an achievement for 1948 Palestinians, and a sign of change in Israeli state's policy.

Later, on February 6, 2002, 1948 Palestinians decided to boycott the elections. At that time, 1948 Palestinians accounted for 13 percent of voters in Israel, most of whom voted for Ehud Barak in the 1999 elections.



Interestingly though, the boycott was not sustained in the subsequent elections.

In September 2003, almost three years after Habbat October, the Or Commission released its findings and conclusion. The commission was criticized for failing to identify or punish the specific officers responsible for the deaths of the 13 Palestinians. Despite recognizing state discrimination against 1948 Palestinians in various areas, the Or Commission's final report legitimized and legalized state repression. Still, eight years after the publication of the report, not a single police officer has been charged over the deaths of the 13 1948 Palestinians. Even the commanders who illegally authorized the use of an antiterror sniper unit against demonstrators were not punished.

## State Attitudes

### *Anti-Arab Rhetoric and the Intense Relationship with the Police*

This section details the anti-Arab rhetoric and the intense 1948 Palestinian relationship with the state, as part of the Israeli state attitudes and its strategies to deal with challengers that, I argue, restricted the political opportunities available to 1948 Palestinians. The years between the 1976 Land Day and the Habbat October 2000 witnessed an increase in the levels of hostility toward the 1948 Palestinian minority and its leadership exhibited by the Israeli public and in the official statements by the state officials and the media. This hostility, I argue, contributed to the feeling of 1948 Palestinian alienation and fear for their personal safety during Habbat October, and resulted in more confrontational behavior on their part. The Israeli hostile attitude was not confined to verbal expressions, but was translated into state's policies and laws limiting 1948 Palestinian rights and freedoms. In addition, these hostile expressions and the legitimacy given to them, I argue, further justified, and even encouraged, the Jewish attacks on 1948 Palestinians in Habbat October.

In his book *Citizens without Citizenship*, Sultany describes how hostile attitudes held by a large part of the Jewish majority toward the 1948 Palestinian minority found expression in the enactment of new laws, the submission of proposed bills, and the silencing of 1948 Palestinian representatives. These attitudes were realized in government decisions, and public opinion surveys held relatively close to Habbat October and showed the extent to which the Israeli Jewish public held antidemocratic, antiliberal, and racist attitudes toward 1948 Palestinians. Sultany studied the "public culture" of hatred, racism, and racial discrimination against Palestinians,

as it is expressed by a wide array of political leaders and public figures as well as by the general public in Israel.

Sultany analyzed worrying examples of statements, articles, websites, and other expression of hatred, racism, and verbal and physical violence toward 1948 Palestinians by Israeli politicians, academics, journalists, rabbis, and other public and lay figures. The examples, which vary in their extremism, clearly reflect a dominant theme. Sultany argues that the violent speech and writing effectively positions the 1948 Palestinians as outcasts in the workplace, in society in general, and in the centers of political decision making.<sup>83</sup>

One of the example provided by Sultany are the comments of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the founder and spiritual leader of Israel's ultraorthodox Shas party. Rabbi Yosef provoked outrage among 1948 Palestinians several times for his anti-Arab comments. In August 2000, the month preceding Barakeh's incitement charges, Rabbi Yosef called the Arabs "vipers" whom God regrets ever having created.<sup>84</sup>

Such hostile statements, together with state discriminatory actions transmitted a daily message to 1948 Palestinians that they were not entitled to equal rights, and that they were unwanted guests in Israel. Such statements and actions also helped to form the context of the relationship between 1948 Palestinians and the state establishments.

Therefore, when such hostile statements came from a key Israeli official, such as Police Northern District Commander Alik Ron, it added to the already tense relationship between the Israeli police and the 1948 Palestinian public. This relationship was best described by the Or Commission report, which concluded that the police are conceived by the 1948 Palestinian population not as a service provider, but rather as a "hostile element serving a hostile government."<sup>85</sup>

The Palestinian leadership called upon the government to remove Alik Ron from office following his provocative statements against 1948 Palestinians in 1999. In a letter addressed to the minister of internal security, MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe called for the dismissal of Ron following Ron's threats in the Israeli press against Moslems in Nazareth. In Dahamshe's letter, Ron was quoted in saying: "We will drown the Moslems... we will suppress them... I see danger." Dahamshe said Ron's statements posed a serious threat to the lives of the Arab (1948 Palestinian) population in general and the Muslims in particular. Dahamshe accused Ron of incitement and said, "His policy had caused the tension between Nazareth residents, Moslems and Christians alike, and had led to the recent injuries and arrests in Nazareth."<sup>86</sup>

The relationship between Ron and the 1948 Palestinian leadership continued to be marked by accusations and counteraccusations. On September

12, 2000, Ron asked for authorization from the head of the Investigations Department, Yossi Sedbon, to begin a police investigation into MK Mohammed Barakeh, one of the prominent 1948 Palestinian leaders of Hadash party, on the grounds that he had incited 1948 Palestinians to attack policemen in 1999.

In its summation, the Or Commission found that as commander of the Northern District prior to the outbreak of Habbat October, Major General Ron contributed to the "muddled relationship, and the break off in communication between himself and the Arab [1948 Palestinian] leadership in his district." Ron's "words and deeds," according to the Or Commission, "exceeded the permissible and desirable for a district commander, and also made it more difficult for the police to deal with the events of [Habbat October]."<sup>87</sup>

Adding to the history of police brutality and state hostility, the tension between the Israeli police and 1948 Palestinians was building up, approaching a breaking point in Habbat October. This tension had its effect on the general Jewish public, and 1948 Palestinians and their leadership came under public Jewish attack. By Israeli officials creating and allowing a platform for hate speech, 1948 Palestinians were openly delegitimized not only by state officials and Israeli media but also by the general Jewish public.

On January 10, 2000, for example, in a mass demonstration in Rabin square in Tel Aviv against the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Golan Heights, flyers were distributed with the photo of MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe labeled "Dangerous to the state of Israel."<sup>88</sup> The flyers asserted, "Israel Arabs (1948 Palestinians) who deny Israel's right to exist, whose leader is Arafat, and who fetch terrorists to blow cars in Haifa and Tiberias, will not determine our future in the Golan."

The distribution of flyers was followed by threats to kill MK Dahamshe, who wrote complaining to the minister of internal security, Shlomo Ben-Ami. In his letter, Dahamshe asked Ben-Ami to investigate the issue and prosecute those threatening his life and the life of his parliamentary assistant.<sup>89</sup> However, Dahamshe's letter was ignored, which is typical to cases involving 1948 Palestinian complaints.<sup>90</sup> According to Sultany, in the great majority of instances, those who cite violence against the 1948 Palestinian community are not afraid of criminal prosecution; "quite the opposite, they can expect to benefit politically from their actions."<sup>91</sup>

Dahamshe's incident reflects the Israeli system's closed nature to the requests of 1948 Palestinian citizens and their representatives. In theory, this factor, which in political opportunity structure approach terms represents the inadequate degree of openness of political institutions in the state, should limit the development of social movements. The undermining, marginalization, and delegitimization of the 1948 Palestinian

leadership echoes the general discriminatory situation experienced by the 1948 Palestinian minority in Israel. It also demonstrates that the presence of channels or resources, such as the presence of an Israeli complaint system, does not necessarily mean that these channels are open to 1948 Palestinians. In summary, the conditions described earlier confirm social-movement theory conditions regarding the presence of grievances, state attitudes, and openness of the political institutions in the state.

In this regard, it is important to highlight that the tense relationship between the Israeli police and 1948 Palestinians intensified during Habbat October. According to the Arab Association for Human Rights (Arab HRA) report published in November 2000,<sup>92</sup> since September 28, 2000, over 600 Arabs (1948 Palestinians) were arrested, and more than 400 of them remained in custody. Incidents of police brutality in the manner of arrests and detention were reported across the 1948 Palestinian sector.

If the aim of such police tactics was to create a climate of fear amongst the 1948 Palestinian community in Israel, to a certain extent, the Arab HRA report says, the tactics did succeed. The fear was not limited to those involved in the clashes, but to their families, friends, and those who were witnesses to the events. No one was quite sure when a phone call might come, or when they will wake up to a knock at the door. Terror induced by the police campaign of arrests was effective as a mechanism of control and restraint amongst the 1948 Palestinian population.

Moreover, according to the Arab HRA report, following the clashes on Habbat October at least 30 minors were detained, the majority of whom were 1948 Palestinians. The detention of children was in spite of the fact that Israel is party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37[b] of which states that "Arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child should only be used as a measure of last resort, must be in conformity with the law and for the shortest appropriate time."<sup>93</sup>

In detaining children and the manner in which they did so, the Israeli police also violated their own codes regarding the special treatment of juvenile offenders (under-18 years). Police Standing Order 14.01.05 states, for example, that children should generally be questioned by a specially trained officer in the day and in the presence of a parent. Children should only be handcuffed in exceptional circumstances. Yet, in Habbat October children were arrested during the night, and reportedly beaten by police officers. Moreover, in many cases there was no specially trained youth investigator present in interrogation, according to the Arab HRA report.

Amnesty International reported that in comparison with the number of Jews detained for similar offences, a very high proportion of 1948

Palestinians were refused bail and remained in custody until trial. Article 9[3] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) emphasizes that people awaiting trial should not normally be held in police custody, however, 1948 Palestinian citizens of Israel arrested and accused of participation in the Habbat October clashes were routinely detained. This shows the adoption of a harsher strategy by the authorities in Habbat October, as previous Israeli policy for offences such as stone throwing and illegal gathering was to release the suspects on bail and place them under house arrest. According to testimony given by human rights lawyer Muannis Khoury, and published by Kull al-Arab newspaper, "There [was] a clear policy of the prosecutor and the police to deny the release of the suspects until a bill of indictment [was] set against them and they [were] subsequently convicted."<sup>94</sup>

This policy was openly confirmed by Israeli attorney general Elyakim Rubenstein, as reported by the Israeli *Jerusalem Post* on October 31, 2000. "We will study the situation on the ground in the near future and on a routine basis. The data we have so far does not indicate that the time is right to change our policy," Rubenstein said.<sup>95</sup> Rubenstein asserted that the policy of detention was applied equally to 1948 Palestinians and Jews detained for participation in the clashes, despite the fact that statistics showed otherwise.

The Israeli newspaper *Ha'aretz* published a substantial report in November 2000 comparing the cases of three 1948 Palestinians and three Jewish teenagers. Both Palestinians and Jews were arrested for similar offences connected with the clashes in Nazareth and Afula. Over a month later, the three Palestinians remained in custody whilst the Jewish youngsters were granted bail. All six youths were represented by the same lawyer, Attorney Ahmed Masalha, who brought to media attention the severe imbalance in punishment meted out by the justice system, despite the similarities in the cases. In the case of the Jewish teenagers, it was decided that the situation in the region had calmed down, and that it was appropriate to release the three from detention. However, when the 1948 Palestinian teenagers were brought to court, after the Jewish boys, the prosecution presented a police document claiming that the situation was highly volatile. The fact that the Palestinian teenagers remained in detention after the end of the violent clashes is symptomatic of the double standards applied by the Israeli justice system.<sup>96</sup>

Finally, in the aftermath of Habbat October, on October 21, 2000, Amnesty International sent a delegation to the region to gather and document information regarding the arrests and detentions that had taken place in Israel and East Jerusalem. The Amnesty International delegation report supported the 1948 Palestinian demands for an independent investigation into the alleged violation of their human rights in Israel.

*The Role of the Israeli Media  
during Habbat October*

A report published by the I'lam media center for Arab Palestinians in Israel<sup>97</sup> found that the Israeli media coverage of the events of October 2000 contributed to an atmosphere of war inside Israel, presenting 1948 Palestinians as rioters displaying their disloyalty to the state through violent protest. The report said that the entire 1948 Palestinian population was treated in blanket fashion as a rioting fifth column, despite the fact that the vast majority of 1948 Palestinian citizens were engaged in peaceful protest during Habbat October.<sup>98</sup>

In March 2001, the Keshev center<sup>99</sup> for the protection of democracy in Israel published a report in which it assessed the performance of the Israeli press and television during Habbat October.<sup>100</sup> The report, which was sent to members of the Or Commission, critiqued the functioning of the Israeli media during the al-Aqsa Intifada. In a letter attached to the report and sent on January 26, 2005, Keshev summarized the findings of its study shedding some light on the role the Israeli media played in escalating the events.

The research findings indicated that, if not responsible for their creation, the Israeli media contributed to the enflaming of passions and to increasing the sense among Jewish Israeli society of fear and danger to the state's existence. The vociferous and hysterical design and content of the Israeli media coverage channeled these powerful feelings primarily in one direction: casting blame on Israel's 1948 Palestinian population.<sup>101</sup>

According to Keshev report, the Israeli media acted as a representative of the Jewish majority, rather than a tool to represent all of the citizens, Arabs and Jews alike. The reporters who covered the events were military/police/defense reporters and were fed information by defense establishment sources. Often, their point of view and coverage of the events passed through the prism of the defense establishment. As a result, the Hebrew media's coverage of the Habbat October events was frequently directed against 1948 Palestinians. The presentation of the events as a violent protest by 1948 Palestinians that endangered Israel's existence, thus returning the state to the time of the War of Independence, gave symbolic approval to the killing of 1948 Palestinians.

The poor performance of the Israeli media and its stand in favor of the Israeli defense establishment and against 1948 Palestinians helped create an atmosphere in which the killing of 1948 Palestinians was accepted by the Israeli public with relative indifference. The media failed to ask the relevant questions shortly after the events occurred. Additionally, the police who faced 1948 Palestinian demonstrators in early October 2000 acted within a hostile anti-Arab public atmosphere that the media played a large role in forming.

## The Role of Some of the New Resources in Habbat October

The following section will demonstrate how the availability of new resources in October 2000 have partly shaped the political opportunities and choices of 1948 Palestinians during Habbat October, and have affected the development of events. These new resources provided, I argue, organizational, ideational, networking, and other logistic support that enabled the sustainability of the 1948 Palestinian protest both violent and nonviolent, and increased its chances of success.

### *The 1948 Palestinian NGOs*

Between the Land Day in 1976 and 2000, the 1948 Palestinian minority gained a number of new resources that had a major effect on their mobilization. These resources were partly the product of 1948 Palestinian attempts to develop their own society and improve their social and political living conditions. In addition to the development of new political parties and leadership,<sup>102</sup> various 1948 Palestinian sociopolitical bodies, such as the High Follow-Up Committee, or al-Aqsa institution, emerged.<sup>103</sup> All of these in general, provided 1948 Palestinians with more resources and new tools, including better ideational resources. Ideational resources in this context refer to the complex combination of norms, values, beliefs, knowledge, and customs, which can be used as a resource to create, among others, mobilizing strategies in the face of grievances.

Since the 1976 Land Day, and the revelation of the state's intentions and plans for its 1948 Palestinian minority, 1948 Palestinians realized the need to develop their own community, and invest in self-building without expecting much from the state. Joseph Schechla argues that the killings on the 1976 Land Day, commemorated annually ever since, spurred the creation of local organizations addressing various aspects of discrimination in entitlements and development opportunity against the 1948 Palestinian citizens.<sup>104</sup> By 2000, there was a development in the 1948 Palestinian civil action that took place especially in the 1980s and the 1990s.<sup>105</sup> In a study of the 1948 Palestinian (NGOs), Shany Payes argues that the creation of 1948 Palestinian NGOs during the 1970s demonstrated the shift by the community toward greater independence within Israeli society in general at that time. The 1973 Israeli-Arab War shook the community's previous high dependency on the Israeli political establishment, she argues, and created a new public mood that legitimized extraparlimentary protest, and allowed interest groups to exercise more direct pressure on the government. These developments encouraged the establishment of Jewish as well

as 1948 Palestinian NGOs in Israel. Payes argues that the establishment of 1948 Palestinian NGOs also resulted from other factors including the abolition of military rule in 1966, the role of the Communist Party, and changes in education levels.<sup>106</sup>

Indeed, the abolition of military rule created new opportunities for political action. In particular, by increasing the space of freedom of movement and speech, the opportunities for better assembly and organization without fear of prosecution were enhanced. This corresponds with the political opportunity structure approach, which argues that the political situation in a country sets the possibilities and limits for the developments of social movements. The Communist Party, which was a mobilizing force in the 1976 Land Day, was also imperative in initiating a varied range of NGOs including the Palestinian Authors' Union, student organizations, and the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands.<sup>107</sup> Finally, the rising levels of education and standards of living throughout the 1980s and 1990s consequently increased the level of political participation of 1948 Palestinians.<sup>108</sup> Thus, the 1948 Palestinian experience conforms to the precondition set by social-movement theory for potential successful mobilization.

However, the availability of new 1948 Palestinian leadership actors and new set of ideas in Habbat October, I argue, was largely the outcome of the existence of advanced 1948 Palestinian NGOs. In addition to being a mobilizing resource, 1948 Palestinian NGOs provided new ideational resources through introducing alternative tools for 1948 Palestinian protest and advocacy. The leading 1948 Palestinian NGOs learned from civil liberty experiences worldwide. In general, they adopted international standards and mechanisms, and established international links while seeking local and international support. Several leading 1948 Palestinian NGO activists and lawyers, including those associated with Adalah, received their postgraduate education through scholarship programs<sup>109</sup> in American universities, and as a result they were introduced to the American civil liberties movement. Their exchange experience abroad, I argue, also helped them establish good international networks for support and funding. Furthermore, some of these activist and lawyers received their training at the Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) and were influenced by its legal mobilization strategies. However, part of them were dissatisfied with ACRI's focus on universal, individual rights, and thought instead that the objective of legal mobilization should be Arab communal rights in face of the Jewishness of the state.<sup>110</sup>

Nongovernmental 1948 Palestinian organizations, or NGOs, were one of the main new resources available to 1948 Palestinians in Habbat October that contributed to their mobilization. The availability of legal



and advocacy NGOs created new opportunities for political action. In addition, these NGOs provided new ideational resources enabling better developed 1948 Palestinian mobilizing strategies.

The cooperation between the various 1948 Palestinian groups and the sharing of the resources available to the different groups, created greater opportunities for 1948 Palestinian political mobilization and increased the chances for success.<sup>111</sup> Perhaps one of the most outstanding roles in Habbat October was that played by local 1948 Palestinian NGOs, such as Adalah, Mossawa, Arab HRA, and Ittijah, which mainly provided legal and advocacy support, and contributed to empowering the 1948 Palestinian minority.

The 1948 Palestinian NGOs got involved in the Habbat October conflict as soon as its scope was revealed. I'lam, a communication center operated by the Haifa-based NGO Mossawa, video-filmed acts of police violence toward demonstrators, and distributed the pictures in Israel and abroad. Adalah used the legal mobilization tool to establish itself as a leading 1948 Palestinian NGO representing collective 1948 Palestinian goals. It took upon itself to provide free legal representation to 1948 Palestinians confronting the state. Thus, in the aftermath of Habbat October, Adalah volunteered to represent the bereaved 1948 Palestinian families.

When the state of Israel decided to probe the events, 1948 Palestinian NGOs exerted pressure for the establishment of a high-level and official commission of inquiry. When such a commission was initiated, several 1948 Palestinian NGOs, headed by Adalah, assisted the commission's work by submitting witnesses to the events. In addition, Adalah represented the elected 1948 Palestinian officials, MK Azmi Bishara, MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe, and Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, who received warning letters from the Or Commission.

The 1948 Palestinian NGOs continued to play an important role in the years following Habbat October, especially facing the growing hostile state attitudes in the aftermath of these events. In 2003, for example, Adalah appealed to the Supreme Court on behalf of disallowed 1948 Palestinian electoral lists and MKs who were disqualified by the Elections Committee prior to the 2003 parliamentary elections.

In August 2001, Preparatory Committee of 1948 Palestinian NGOs headed by Ittijah (The Union for Arab Community Based Organizations) submitted a declaration to the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR). The declaration included three demands: a call upon Israel to respect the civil rights of 1948 Palestinians; a demand to recognize 1948 Palestinians as a distinct national minority group, and consequently respect their collective rights in addition to individual ones; and a call for

the UN to ensure the human dignity and liberty of 1948 Palestinians, as enumerated for all peoples in UN human rights conventions.

The latter two demands voiced by 1948 Palestinian NGOs for the first time in an international forum like the UN, mark the diminishing 1948 Palestinian trust in the power of citizenship alone to ensure their human rights in Israel. This step on behalf of 1948 Palestinian NGOs came less than a year after the killings in Habbat October. The demands put forward for the recognition of 1948 Palestinian minority as a national, indigenous minority, and for the international protection of their human rights, instructed much of the future 1948 Palestinian NGO work afterwards.

In addition to being a new resource providing greater political opportunities for mobilization, NGOs such as Adalah are pursuing the state recognition of the 1948 population as a collective national community. In doing so, these NGOs empower the 1948 Palestinian minority and raise its collective consciousness.<sup>112</sup> However, although there have been some victories in court and international forums, it is too early to determine whether this type of NGO driven mobilization will make a significant difference in the status of 1948 Palestinians or the Israeli state policy toward them.

### *Radio 2000*

There was a special acknowledgment of the role played by Radio 2000, an immature regional 1948 Palestinian radio station, at the emergency meeting of the High Follow-Up Committee, held on October 1, 2000, following the killing of the first 1948 victim. The High Follow-Up committee praised the coverage of the station, and included "a special salute to the media role of Radio 2000" in the conclusion and decision section of its meeting protocol.<sup>113</sup> This exceptional acknowledgment of the role of a media outlet points to the identification of a new mobilization resource during Habbat October that later proved to be of great value to 1948 Palestinian mobilization.

Unfortunately, except for the mention in the committee's protocol to Radio 2000, no official documentation could be found of the radio station or its archival material. Interview subjects recalled that Radio 2000 was then one of a number of illegal immature local radio stations that emerged around the year 2000. Like most of these radio stations, Radio 2000 started as a "light" station broadcasting Arab pop music. However, later on during Habbat October the station played a different role, reporting on the events and keeping the 1948 Palestinian public informed of the "real" developments.

All audiovisual media in Israel require legal permission in the form of an operating license. According to I'lam, only one public radio station

in Israel broadcasts programs in the Arabic language, as opposed to five Jewish-owned radio stations broadcasting nationally, and tens of such radio stations broadcasting regionally. The Arabic public radio *Reshet Dalet*, also called *Sawt Israel* or the Voice of Israel, broadcasts in Arabic with its stated aim being the promotion of Israel's image amongst Arab populations, regionally and domestically—a goal that often conflicts with serving the needs of the local Arab citizenry.<sup>114</sup>

This conflict is echoed in the following interview with a 1948 Palestinian:

- I do not listen to Sawt Israel because they are not objective, and because I do not think they are credible when it comes to covering events in the Arab [1948 Palestinian] sector. Their coverage totally does not reflect what happens [in reality]. I mean, whatever happens here they turn it into something big. This is part of their exaggeration. For example, during the [Habbat October] events they made it sound as if the Arabs here were shutting down the country... you should not go into [1948 Palestinian] villages and towns, it is dangerous [they said]. They turned the debate into how dangerous Arabs [1948 Palestinians] are. And when the events happened in Jisr al-Zarqa and two guys were accused of throwing stones on a passing vehicle, and the car crashed and those inside it were killed, they [the Israeli media] turned Jisr al-Zarqa into Gaza. So the exaggeration of the Israeli media is very disgusting.
- **Does this apply to the official media in both Hebrew and Arabic?**
- The Arabic radio (Sawt Israel—broadcasting in Arabic) works more on terminology... reinforcing terms like riots, irresponsible, irrational, [Israel's] "defence" army... They work on the establishment of certain notions and concepts inside our psychological self. But the Jews... the Jewish radio-stations have a power approach... aggression power, they attack. There are two roles, one of the Israeli radio which exaggerates and attacks, and the other of the Arab radio belonging to Israeli authorities whose role is to tame and nothing else... they do not have a position.<sup>115</sup>

Even though they remember Radio 2000 played an important role by informing and mobilizing the 1948 Palestinian public in Habbat October, none of those interviewed for this book could recall what exactly happened to Radio 2000 afterward.

- There was a local radio station here called Radio 2000, which played a big role. This station covered the events in all the villages. On that

radio there was always something to listen to on what was happening, where, and so forth. So for me as someone local, I will not hear on al-Jazeera that something happened in Kufor Manda for example [meaning al-Jazeera will not cover local news]. But because I live here, when I hear of something in Kufor Kana [on Radio 2000]... when I hear the noises and hustles [as were reported on Radio 2000], I immediately go out wanting to do something. The other difference from al-Jazeera, for example, was that this radio station was airing a lot of (national) songs... all of Marcel [Khalife's] <sup>116</sup>songs... songs all the time. So it created a general atmosphere. The station later disappeared after Habbat October, but during the events there was a general atmosphere... to come and see what we could do, and this radio had a great influence.

- **Do you remember a specific incident where you felt that the image the radio carried to you made you feel like joining a demonstration?**
- Yes, yes... when I heard about Um el-Fahem and that a martyr fell, I thought... and us! what about us [meaning when will we follow the same path]? In my village the martyrs fell after Mohammed al-Durrah... on 2 October... it means four days after... So the fall of additional martyrs from other 1948 Palestinian villages [and the radio coverage of it] have greatly resulted in that matter [the escalation of events].<sup>117</sup>

Clearly, Radio 2000 was part of the 1948 Palestinian Habbat October scenery. Even those who did not normally listen to Radio 2000 followed its coverage during Habbat October:

I am a regular listener of al-Quds radio airing from Syria, but the general atmosphere made me listen to Radio 2000. I think then [to follow what was happening locally during Habbat October] you had no choice but either to listen to Sawt Israel or Radio 2000. And people here prefer listening to a radio [station] where they do not say terrorists, and riots and so forth.<sup>118</sup>

As mentioned in the interview, the unlicensed Radio 2000 vanished from air shortly after Habbat October, but I could not verify whether it was shut by the Israeli authorities.

While the atmosphere created by the Israeli media in Habbat October proved to have contributed to the escalation of events, the I'am media report wondered whether the manner of the coverage at the beginning of the events had an enflaming effect on the way the police acted, and perhaps contributed to a "light-trigger-finger."

### *Al-Jazeera*

Despite being an international rather than a local 1948 Palestinian television channel, the Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, had an indirect effect on the framing of a national Palestinian identity among 1948 Palestinians during Habbat October. The 1948 Palestinians, who had been for long largely neglected and misrepresented by the Arab media, became, and for the first time, the focus of attention. The coverage of Al-Jazeera put the 1948 Palestinians under the spotlight, and managed to influence 1948 Palestinian framing, especially in the heat of events following the first killings. Suddenly, the images coming from the Occupied Territories and the "inside" (the term used to describe the 1948 Palestinian territories) were the same. On television screens, it looked like another Intifada was taking place "inside," using the same means of protests, and against the same "enemy." During Habbat October, 1948 Palestinians' loyalty and identity, which was before questioned, became more evident, and 1948 Palestinians received the recognition of both the Palestinians and Arab world.

Al-Jazeera covered the events... It focused a lot on what was happening here. This was... the first time, it was very moving for me to see in the media that a demonstration was taking place in Ramallah [in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank] in solidarity with Nazareth. This had a great effect... that they covered us. After the [Habbat] October events the image of the Arabs [1948 Palestinians] here changed a lot... I felt part of the Palestinian nation and the Arab nation as well... the October events proved to the entire Arab world that "oops"!!... I mean those in Yemen suddenly saw that there were Arabs inside Israel who fell martyrs, or saw demonstrations or saw martyrs. al-Jazeera had a great space here, especially that afterwards al-Jazeera started to get interested in everything that happens here [with 1948 Palestinians]... sometimes they even cover a conference or a lecture, they cover anything.<sup>119</sup>

### *Health Services and Nazareth Hospitals*

The presence of 1948 Palestinian health services such as hospitals and emergency medical services was vital to 1948 Palestinians in Habbat October. Together with the key role these services had, mainly in decreasing the number of casualties and protecting 1948 Palestinians from prosecution, the presence of these new mobilizing resources has further enabled the sustenance of the 1948 Palestinian resistance.

The fact that the police uses medical records to identify and prosecute people who take part in demonstrations is well known among the Palestinian community. According to my interviews, many of those

wounded in Habbat October refused to seek medical help fearing their names would be reported to the police. Indeed, in Habbat October the Israeli police demanded three private hospitals in Nazareth to provide a detailed list of those injured in the clashes.

In an interview with *Al-Sinnara* the Arabic daily newspaper, the spokesperson of Holy Trinity hospital in Nazareth announced, "It is one of the basic rights of patients not to have the cause of their hospitalization disclosed."<sup>120</sup> However, the fact that the hospitals did not disclose the names and details of patients was not enough to reassure many of those 1948 Palestinians who were injured in Habbat October. The fear that medical records would be used as evidence of participation in protests led to contingency plans being made for any future such events. One 1948 Palestinian NGO reported that it was preparing itself to operate an anonymous medical service should occasion demand.

\* \* \*

## Framing and Dynamics of Mobilization

### Habbat October Framing: Beginning and Evolution of Events

So far we examined the overall atmosphere leading to Habbat October, considering some of resources and political opportunities available to 1948 Palestinians. The discussion, however, did not include the framing that takes into consideration the 1948 Palestinian readings of and feelings toward certain events, grievances, resources, and political opportunities, and the 1948 Palestinian perception of necessary or feasible political behavior to address the grievance. In this section, we will discuss the mobilization during the actual Habbat October events by examining the ways in which 1948 Palestinians framed the conditions and goals in Habbat October. Additionally, we will try to understand how this 1948 Palestinian framing contributed to, or sometimes even triggered, a certain kind of political behavior.

To help situate the reader within the Habbat October setting and reflect the general feeling among 1948 Palestinians in the two weeks leading to Habbat October, I will start by giving a sample of the 1948 Palestinian framing of some of the prominent grievances during that time. I will then proceed by observing the 1948 Palestinian framing of past

incidental grievances that were similar to the incidental grievances that triggered Habbat October. This section will also analyze the unfolding of Habbat October events, and the dynamics of the 1948 Palestinian political behavior and its framing. The section will conclude by comparing previous political mobilization of 1948 Palestinians with that in Habbat October, and summarizing the factors contributing to the widespread participation and the escalation of events during Habbat October. The main purpose of the comparison between Habbat October and previous 1948 Palestinian political mobilization is to identify and outline any similarities or differences in political framework or proposed reaction that can assist in classifying the characteristics of the 1948 Palestinian political behavior. In addition, the comparison will help clarify whether Habbat October was part of an intended act of political resistance as opposed to a series of reactions that were part of a protest cycle that escalated.

The following analysis is based on the examination of official documents and reports, governmental letters, meeting protocols, newspaper reports, and interviews with 1948 Palestinians who either witnessed or took part in Habbat October. These documents and testimonials, which were gathered during visits to political and legal institutions, libraries, archives, and individuals in Israel, are essential in shedding a new light on Habbat October and recording voices not often heard.

By including these new testimonials, this book is hoping to reflect more thoroughly on what was happening in October 2000 when 1948 Palestinians took to the streets; what was going through people's minds as they confronted the Israeli security forces; the aim of the demonstrations; the role played by the 1948 Palestinian leadership; and most importantly the factors contributing to Habbat October as reflected in these documents and personal testimonials.

While some of the key events that will be highlighted in this section date back to 1996, this is not an attempt to define this year as a starting point of Habbat October. Some of the events highlighted in this section were mentioned previously in the discussion of the pre-Habbat October period. In this section, they will be examined more closely to determine the ways in which these events were perceived and framed by 1948 Palestinians, and how that framing built up to Habbat October. This will provide a basis for explaining 1948 Palestinian motivations, aims, expectations, disappointments, and political actions, or lack of action. In addition, it will reflect the changes in resources and political opportunities structure as time passed and events unfolded. Some of these changes are explicit, such as the police strategy to deal with demonstrators, which can be evident in the growing use of force against 1948 Palestinian demonstrators. While others, such as ideational resources, are implicit, and will be highlighted by the analysis.

## Sample of the 1948 Palestinian Framing Pre-Habbat October

Evidence collected from various sources portray a strong collective feeling, prior to Habbat October, among the 1948 Palestinian public and their leadership that they were the victims of a systematic state policy of racist incitement. This view was echoed on many occasions by the 1948 Palestinian leadership as it was by the 1948 Palestinian press and public.

Borrowing the title of Emile Zola's famous *J'accuse*<sup>121</sup> (I accuse), MK Issam Makhoul wrote an article which appeared on September 15, 2000, in *al-Ittihad*,<sup>122</sup> one of the leading 1948 Palestinian newspapers, in which he accused the Israeli government of systematically inciting against its 1948 Palestinian citizens. Makhoul said that instead of treating the 1948 Palestinians as an ethnic minority or a political or social phenomenon, the state viewed and treated its 1948 Palestinian citizens as a security threat that required "terrorist security answers." He said it was time for the state to give answers regarding its own loyalty to its 1948 Palestinian citizens and their equal citizenship and basic rights, which derive from international law and human rights. Makhoul wondered if the state of Israel recognized the right of its 1948 Palestinian citizens to the very basic humanitarian right to shelter, for example, and questioned the reasons behind the policy of house demolition. He accused the state of failing to find answers to the needs of the Arab sector, such as the housing crisis, even though more than 50 years had passed since the establishment of the state of Israel. He also accused the Israeli right-wing of trying to use incitement against the 1948 Palestinians to win the elections, and warned against the state's attempts to confuse the legitimate struggle of the 1948 Palestinian public to protect their land and shelter, with "terrorism" and "antistate" actions. Makhoul said such attempts aimed on the one hand, to terrorize the Arab public and deter it from protesting, and to mislead the Jewish Israeli public on the other. These attempts, he argued, fall in line with the efforts to delegitimize the 1948 Palestinian minority in Israel, and question its legitimacy and right to have a say in crucial issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, Makhoul warned at the beginning of his article that "the tactic of cheap racist incitement against the leadership of the Arab public will rebound on the heads of those who released it, and this fanatic campaign against the legitimacy of the Arab public and its citizenship will turn into a state scandal, and a shameful stain on the forehead of the official policy and its ruling ideology in Israel."<sup>123</sup>

In addition to this prevailing feeling amongst the 1948 Palestinians and their leadership that was reflected by Makhoul, some voiced their fears of



an expected attack or plan against the 1948 Palestinian public. Ahmad Sa'ad, the chief editor of *al-Ittihad* daily newspaper, remembers that at that time, and before the "massacre" in Jerusalem, there was an escalation in the authority's "aggressive incitement" against the 1948 Palestinian public. Sa'ad mentioned Alik Ron's press conference, which, according to Sa'ad, was part of the escalation:

- We thought, apparently, this government is planning for a certain attack on the Arab [1948 Palestinian] public, especially that earlier, in 1997, the discussion of transfer of the Arab Public and Palestinians started openly.
- **So you think the 1948 Palestinian public sensed some danger?**
- Yes
- **And there was a policy...**
- There was an aforethought Israeli policy against the Arab public...and it was no accident that the Or Commission revealed [the Kessem Ha-Manginah operational plan].<sup>124</sup>

Sa'ad was referring to an Israeli police plan that permits the use of snipers and the heightened use of force to disperse 1948 Palestinian demonstrators. The Or Commission revealed that during Habbat October, the police acted in accordance with a 1998 operational plan titled "Kessem Ha-Mangina" (The magic of Melody). This plan was developed by the Israeli police to deal with mass demonstrations of 1948 Palestinians in general, and specifically, in the event of an Israeli military suppression of a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state.<sup>125</sup>

Further evidence of the intention to target 1948 Palestinians can be found in a police statement at the opening of a police exercise, the war game "Rouah Searah," in the 1948 Palestinian city of Shafa Amr on September 6, 2000:

Welcome to the war game "Rouah Searah." We are hosted and hosting all of you today in the Centre for Police Education, and 52 years ago, this area, which we are [on] now, was conquered by Division 7 and the Golani Division. The exact date was 14 July 1948. And here, 52 years later, we are almost dealing with the same issues, although not conquering the country, but preserving it.<sup>126</sup>

In light of the above, and to understand the contributing factors of Habbat October, the next section will focus on the 1948 Palestinian framing of grievances and mobilizing conditions as the events unfolded. Statements by the 1948 Palestinian leadership will be analyzed to determine whether

that framing contributed to the mobilization of the masses in Habbat October. In addition, statements of the 1948 Palestinian officials will be tested against that of participants and nonparticipants to highlight any resemblance in framing that can clarify the contribution of the leadership rhetoric to Habbat October mobilization.

## Framing of Habbat October Public Statements versus Framing of Past Incidental Grievances

Contrary to the expectations of the Or Commission<sup>127</sup> of finding a more extreme tone or different proposed political actions in Habbat October in comparison with past incidents, the evidence gathered suggests there was nothing out of the ordinary in the preparations or calls for political action in Habbat October. Despite several accusations by Israeli officials that the 1948 Palestinian leadership engaged in incitement against the state, a comparison between the Habbat October statement issued by the High Follow-Up Committee on September 30, 2000, and others issued on comparable or even less volatile occasions, show strong similarities.

For the sake of illustration, the Habbat October statement<sup>128</sup> is compared here with several statements issued by the High Follow-Up Committee under similar conditions. On September 26, 1996, a statement<sup>129</sup> was issued calling for a general strike on Jerusalem Day on September 27, 1996. The Jerusalem Day statement was issued following the three-day violent clashes that erupted in September 25, 1996, and claimed the lives of more than 60 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories<sup>130</sup> (i.e., not 1948 Palestinians) and 14 Israeli soldiers.<sup>131</sup> The clashes, also known as Habbat al-Nafaq or The Tunnel Intifada, erupted over the opening of a new tunnel on the orders of the then Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu on September 24, 1996, close to Muslim shrines in Jerusalem. Yasser Arafat, then the president of the Palestinian National Authority, opposed the opening, and said the real aim of the tunnel was to make the al-Haram al-Sharif collapse.

The Habbat October and Jerusalem Day statements were both issued in response to similarly violent confrontations over a sensitive religious incident. The Or Commission's conclusions with regard to Habbat October, was that the 1948 Palestinian leadership praised "violence as a means of attaining goals." But if this was the case, then one would expect to find evidence of "adopting a strategy of threatening violence or using illegal means to attain goals"<sup>132</sup> in those statements.

If indeed the 1948 Palestinian leadership calls did incite the public to take to the streets, then a comparison between the two statements should reveal more extreme rhetoric in the Habbat October statement, considering the widespread participation and the deadly results in Habbat October as compared to the 1996 Jerusalem Day. Also, the visit of Ariel Sharon to al-Haram on September 28, 2000, which the 1948 Palestinian community regarded as equally or even more provocative than the opening of the tunnel in September 1996, should have provoked a stronger condemnation or increased protest action. Finally, the violent clashes that followed the visit of Sharon on September 28, 2000, directly involved 1948 Palestinians as opposed to (non-1948) Palestinians in the 1996 tunnel case. Therefore, all of these factors combined should, according to this logic, provoke a more intense language or response by the 1948 Palestinian leadership.

The findings, however, are different. Although the framing of the events in the Habbat October statement was not apologetic and blamed the Israeli state, it did not vary from the rhetoric usually used in such statements. The similarities between the two statements are not only in the wording, but also in the political actions suggested, which reflect comparable working tactics, and perhaps even some helplessness in the face of hostile state attitudes. None of the actions proposed in the statements involved adopting a strategy of threatening violence or using illegal means as the Or Commission suggested.

Both the Jerusalem Day and Habbat October statements were issued following an emergency meeting of the High Follow-Up Committee, and both called for a general strike. The language used in the statements is similar in both. For example, according to the Jerusalem Day statement, the committee's meeting was held following the "massacre which the Israeli government conducted and continues to conduct in the Palestinian territories." A strike was called in protest against the "aggressive practices of the Israeli government toward our Palestinian Arab people and against the sanctuaries of its lands." The strike, which marked the opening of what the committee called "al-Quds year,"<sup>133</sup> was to condemn not only the actions of the Israeli government, but also the Jerusalem municipality that "works to destroy the Islamic and Christian holy places and change the Arab landmarks and civilization of Jerusalem in order to prevent it from becoming the capital of the Palestinian state."<sup>134</sup>

The Habbat October statement used similar language, also describing as a massacre the confrontations that followed Sharon's visit to al-Haram. Both statements blamed the Israeli state and its security forces for the violence. A strike in both cases was one of a series of protest actions carefully chosen to fit the limitations and resources available. All of the proposed protest actions fell within the category of nonviolent resistance

and legitimate legal protest. These proposed actions included organizing demonstrations, donating blood, and visiting al-Aqsa (and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre) in Jerusalem for vigils (prayer) and solidarity.

In the Habbat October statement there is evidence to suggest that the 1948 Palestinian leadership was not expecting widespread participation or an escalation of events. The leadership called on the general 1948 Palestinian public to go to al-Aqsa on the following Friday, and take part in the Friday prayer as a sign of solidarity.<sup>135</sup> The statement was issued on a Saturday, so if the leadership was planning a violent confrontation with the state or an escalation, then heading to Jerusalem later that week would no longer have been possible.<sup>136</sup> Friday prayers at al-Aqsa are highly affected by political events and are closely monitored and controlled by Israeli security, which usually restricts the entrance of Moslem worshipers, especially when the political situation is heated. Therefore, a heated confrontation with the police during that week would have risked the free access to al-Aqsa on the Friday.

In fact, the framing of events and proposed actions in the two incidents, generally reflect the ways in which the 1948 Palestinian leadership was realistic in its protest plans and demands. It also shows the leadership was well aware of the limitations of the openness of the Israeli system and the resources available. The proposed actions of demonstrations, vigils, and blood donation are all nonviolent means to which the 1948 Palestinian leadership usually resorts in order to avoid costly violent confrontations with the state.

In the framing of their political statements, the 1948 Palestinian leadership maintained a certain balance between adherence to their Palestinian national identity and their duties as Israeli citizens, as reflected in the following passage from the 1996 statement:

Despite our condemnation of the policy of the Israeli government which is hostile to the just peace and to its requirements, we call upon the peace forces/powers<sup>137</sup> among the Jewish people to act immediately against this policy, since peace is a necessity not only for the Palestinians but for Israel as well.

- Let the government stop its dangerous actions immediately!
- Get out of the Palestinian Territories and remove your settlements!
- Lift your hands off Arab Jerusalem!
- Two countries for two nations: Israel and Palestine, and that is the only way to achieve a just peace and real security for all!<sup>138</sup>

The similarities in the framing of events and proposed political actions in the two statements<sup>139</sup> suggest that, despite the fact that Sharon's visit and the confrontations that followed were seen by the 1948 Palestinians as serious hostile assaults, the incidents themselves were still considered part

of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "routine," even though Sharon's visit to al-Haram was unprecedented. So while the direct cause for the clashes was "unusual," the "usual" practice of clashes between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers which followed Sharon's unprecedented visit did not receive a special reaction from the 1948 Palestinian leadership or public, but rather the usual reaction as practiced in similar past incidents. In other words, while the direct cause of the clashes was shocking, the clashes right after the visit and their bloody results were not as shocking. The lack of shock effect at the beginning of Habbat October could be linked to constant 1948 Palestinian expectations of state hostility and intolerance to challengers, together with low expectations of successful resistance within the existing constraints and conditions.

The similarity in the two statements also suggests that their effect on participation was minimal and thus, could not have encouraged the widespread participation and resort to violent clashes, which took place in Habbat October. Despite some clashes in the 1948 Palestinian cities of Nazareth and Yaffa, the general strike and demonstrations in 1996 ended "peacefully and without any special events"<sup>140</sup> and did not escalate as in Habbat October. The significantly different reactions or actions of 1948 Palestinians in the Habbat October and the 1996 Jerusalem Day, suggest that the tone of the statements calling to action were not responsible, and that other factors influenced the nature and extent of political mobilization of 1948 Palestinians on Habbat October.

The Habbat October statement<sup>141</sup> can help shed some light on the feelings of solidarity on the part of 1948 Palestinians with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. After the reunification of Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and in particular following the 1976 Land Day, this feeling of solidarity with the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza had intensified. It reached an unprecedented level in 1987 during the first Intifada, when 1948 Palestinians openly expressed their support for the national Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation, supporting the right of Palestinians to an independent Palestinian state.

The reflection of these feelings of solidarity in the Habbat October statement, which were present among 1948 Palestinians at the very first stage of Habbat October, helped later in reinforcing this solidarity rhetoric, which appears to have played a major role in mobilizing 1948 Palestinians during Habbat October. The initial feelings of solidarity turned into a strong rhetoric and mobilizing factor, especially when the handling by the state of its 1948 Palestinian citizens became similar to that practiced in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. As will be shown below, for some 1948 Palestinians this feeling of solidarity turned into a feeling of unity as the violent images reflected on both sides of the border became more similar.

This unity is reflected in Dahamshe's words in an article in *Sawt el-Haq* newspaper in which he said, "The Israeli government operational arms (the police), tried to injure hundreds and kill tens of the sons of our nation inside the Green Line which was erased as a result for these actions and blood shed."<sup>142</sup>

The framing in the first Habbat October statement, issued on September 30, 2000, following the confrontations inside al-Haram in protest against Sharon's visit, reflects the strong bond and solidarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The statement includes an apparent reference to this special bond, which was strengthened as a result of the joint opposition to Sharon's visit to al-Haram. Sharon's visit was perceived as provocative by Palestinians on both sides of the border, especially due to his role in the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon.<sup>143</sup>

The timing of the Sharon's visit was also crucial, coinciding with the Israelis suspending their peace talks with the Palestinians<sup>144</sup> and the visit being close to the anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacre.<sup>145</sup> In addition, the visit was made on a Friday, which is a sacred day for Moslems and the busiest day of the week at al-Haram, with Moslem worshippers coming from all over Israel and the Occupied Territories for the Friday prayer. It is important to note that the atmosphere at Friday prayer at al-Haram in Jerusalem is usually tense due to Israel's constant monitoring and control over the participation of Muslim worshippers. However, despite the heightened tension, the timing of Sharon's visit enabled the involvement of the 1948 Palestinian worshippers (who were present at the time at al-Haram for the Friday prayer) in the confrontations with the Israeli security. In a unique act of joint and unified protest, worshippers from both sides of the Green Line, Palestinians and 1948 Palestinians, took part in a confrontation with Israeli security. This unity was described in a statement issued by the 1948 Palestinian leadership:

The blood of our injured has mixed with that of our fellow Palestinians (the sons of our nation) and bypassed the Green Line in defending the blessed al-Aqsa. No borders shall separate us from our fellow Palestinians in defending the sanctuaries and resisting the occupation.<sup>146</sup>

The Or Commission also commented on this issue:

The messages transmitted during the October disturbances blurred and sometimes erased the distinction between the state's Arab citizens and their legitimate struggle for rights, and the armed struggle against the state being conducted by organizations and individuals in the West Bank and Gaza. More than once, the two struggles are presented by leaders of the Arab

community as one struggle against one adversary, often an enemy. The committee emphasized that the concept of citizenship is incompatible with the presentation of the state as the enemy.<sup>147</sup>

While evidence for the above argument can be found in the 1948 Palestinian leadership statements, it is important to note that the rhetoric used by the leadership before the escalation of Habbat October was part of a hollow nationalist language usually used by the 1948 Palestinian leadership in these kinds of occasions to condemn Israeli policies against Palestinians. However, this same hollow rhetoric used at later stages of Habbat October started to carry more weight because of the Israeli escalation and violent handling of protests that made 1948 Palestinians feel they face the same threat and share the same fate like the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Hence, once the Israeli state created a duplicate Intifada inside the Green Line by sending its police forces, special units, and snipers to the 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, the solidarity referred to in early leadership statements turned from abstract to concrete.

The solidarity turned into feelings of unity as a result of what 1948 Palestinians saw as targeted killings of civilians. The distinctions between 1948 Palestinians and the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories was diminishing with every new 1948 Palestinian martyr that fell. Even the images on the television screens resembled the images of the Palestinian Intifada. It was unprecedented to see 1948 Palestinians at the center of attention, especially in the Arab media. Not only that, but perhaps for the first time the Palestinians on both sides of the border switched roles and demonstrations took place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in solidarity with 1948 Palestinians, when the norm so far had been the reverse.<sup>148</sup>

While this can be used as evidence to support the existence of a more widespread feeling of unity than before among 1948 Palestinians and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, it is still not enough to suggest that the language in the statement issued by the High Follow-Up Committee on September 30, 2000, or the statement itself was a key contributing factor to the Habbat October violent confrontations. On the contrary, the language of the statement was similar to that which had been normally used in the parallel past incidents. Yet, those incidents did not escalate as Habbat October did, and so the language used could not have contributed to mobilization as it is supposedly argued to have done in Habbat October.

In addition, mistaking the name of al-Haram al-Sharif with that of al-Haram al-Ibrahimi,<sup>149</sup> especially in the very first lines of the statement (see below), is an indication of carelessness in the production of the statement. This carelessness of confusing the names of two famous holy places, especially when one, al-Haram al-Ibrahimi was the site of a massacre<sup>150</sup>

in 1994, may as well suggest that the leadership were not paying special attention to the production of this statement. The September 30, 2000, statement issued by the High Follow-Up Committee following the clashes at al-Haram al-Sharif started as follows:

To our steadfast nation public ... the sons of the Galilee, the Triangle, the Negev, and the mixed cities ... to the sons of this homeland: the Israeli security apparatuses, the devices of Barak and Ben-Ami,<sup>151</sup> have committed a terrifying massacre at al-Haram al-Ibrahimi al-Sharif.<sup>152</sup>

If the above statement was meant to be used by the 1948 Palestinian leadership as a tool to recruit or incite people, then such a reckless mistake should have been avoided to ensure more credibility, and avoid possible dismissive or sarcastic responses from the target audience. Having said that, the effect of solidarity feelings with Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, however, seems to have gained momentum as the events unfolded. Those feelings intensified with every new "martyr" that fell.

The similarities in framing between the events in Habbat October and other incidents, which are discussed here, concern the official statements issued at the beginning of Habbat October events. Further discussion of official statements issued during Habbat October, or unofficial ones, might validate or refute this argument and show differences in the framing of events or proposed protest actions. As shown above, the feelings of solidarity, for example, appear to be framed differently by Palestinians in the middle of Habbat October events. The borders between 1948 Palestinians and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories became more blurred as events unfolded, and the solidarity turned stronger.

## Contributing Factors and Dynamics Immediately Preceding Habbat October

This section will cover mainly two events, the 1948 Palestinian response to Alik Ron's incitement, and that to the killing of Nabieh Nussier, a 1948 Palestinian from Nazareth, whose murder sparked 1948 Palestinian protest against the police and its incompetence in handling violence and crime when it relates to 1948 Palestinians.

One of the vital documents in understanding the dynamics and contributing factors of Habbat October is the September 13, 2000, meeting protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee.<sup>153</sup> This was an emergency meeting held following what the committee described as Alik Ron's<sup>154</sup> incitement



against the 1948 Palestinian public and against MK Mohammed Barakeh, the leader of Hadash (The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality).

In a press conference on September 12, 2000, Ron announced the arrest of 41 1948 Palestinians from Um el-Fahm for arms smuggling and attempting to kill "collaborators."<sup>155</sup> Ron announced that among those arrested were senior members of the Islamic movement, and said the arrests were indicative of "nationalist activities unprecedented in their scope since the 1980s." Ron also accused MK Mohammed Barakeh of inciting 1948 Palestinians to attack the police, and called for an official investigation against him. Barakeh denied Ron's accusations, and endorsed the statement believed to have provoked Ron's accusations. Speaking to the crowd in a protest against house demolitions in the Galilee, Barakeh said that "the right to a roof over one's head takes precedence over the duty to obey the law."<sup>156</sup>

The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee meeting held in light of Alik Ron's accusations summarizes the grievances of the 1948 Palestinian public, and reflects their general feeling of being under attack. It is also possible, through analyzing the protest actions suggested in the protocol, to identify the resources and opportunities, which the leadership believed to be available to 1948 Palestinians at that time, and the kind of response they chose to advance. In this sense, there is a difference between the "objective" and the "perceived." What 1948 Palestinians believed to be available is not necessarily what an outsider might think is available. In addition, the protocol illustrates the framing of the grievances, resources, and opportunities by the diverse 1948 Palestinian representatives, and reflects the unified or collective framing of the 1948 Palestinians in the weeks preceding Habbat October.

One of the interesting observations about this protocol is its firm unapologetic language, which reflects a shift from previous acquiescent behavior of 1948 Palestinians. The language of the protocol was rather confrontational and daring, suggesting an escalation in resistant actions that were not necessarily violent, but were firm against the hostile Israeli policies.

This protocol is relevant for various reasons and not just because of its timing in close proximity to the Habbat October events. It is evident from the protocol of the meeting attended by the different 1948 Palestinian representatives that there was a predominant feeling that the 1948 Palestinian public were being targeted by Israeli officials and public figures. The incidental grievances, which the meeting was held to discuss, mainly Alik Ron's statements against MK Barakeh, were linked to the permanent grievance of constant incitement against the Palestinian public and its leadership, and therefore was put into the larger perspective of discriminatory and

racist policies against the 1948 Palestinians. This framing would make the incidental grievance on this occasion more inclusive and appealing to the larger 1948 Palestinian public, and thus would guarantee more solidarity and unity around that incidental grievance.

The strong support for MK Barakeh amongst those present at the meeting further illustrates how the link between the incidental grievance of Barakeh and the permanent grievance of anti-Arab incitement was made. Ramez Jaraysi, the mayor of Nazareth, who called for the meeting, said there was a systematic policy of incitement against the 1948 Palestinian citizens and their leadership. Jaraysi gave a briefing on the racist and provocative statements made by Alik Ron and other key Israeli officials to stress the need to situate this grievance within the larger frame of anti-Arab incitement. The fact that Jaraysi, who is a Christian, spoke out against Ron demonstrates a consensus among the different 1948 Palestinian representatives, regardless of their political or religious affiliations, about the targeting of the 1948 Palestinian public by Israeli officials. Jaraysi defended Barakeh, saying his statement was "right, legal and legitimate and we support him."<sup>157</sup>

Mohamed Zidan, the head of the High Follow-Up Committee at the time, said Ron's statements against the 1948 Palestinian public and its leadership, such as his remarks about MK Barakeh, were dangerous, and that there was "a need to put an end to this phenomenon." MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe, from the Islamic Party, said that there was an escalation in dangerous incitement against 1948 Palestinians, and that Ehud Barak should not take the continued support of 1948 Palestinians and their representatives for granted.<sup>158</sup> Dahamshe's comment about not taking the support of 1948 Palestinians for granted was hinting to the introduction of policies by Barak and his government, which were seen by 1948 Palestinians as hostile to their community. As mentioned earlier, the disappointment of the 1948 Palestinians with the "Israeli left" over the years made them more mature politically and better aware of their limited options. Even though Dahamshe did not specify the options available then, 1948 Palestinians opted to boycott the upcoming prime ministerial elections in 2001.

MK Issam Makhoul, a representative of the Hadash party, described Ron's accusation against Barakeh as "a planned attack which will not scare us" and accused Israel of treating its Palestinian citizens as a security threat.<sup>159</sup> A similar point of view was expressed by Raja Ighbarieh, the secretary general of Abna al-Balad movement. Ighbarieh said, "The problem does not end at Alik Ron," and that Ron represented an official Israeli policy. Ighbarieh also linked the incident to the arrests in Um el-Fahm in September 2000, saying they were just as serious as the accusations against Barakeh.<sup>160</sup>

The opinion offered by Shawqi Khatib, then the chairman of the National Committee of Arab Local Council Heads (NCALCH),<sup>161</sup> perhaps best summarizes the 1948 Palestinian grievances, and perfectly establishes the link between the incidental and permanent grievances of 1948 Palestinians at the time. Khatib's opinion was later echoed by other members of the 1948 Palestinian leadership. Khatib said that the real background of the problem was Barakeh's statements against the Israeli policy of house demolishing. Khatib argued, "the issue was not personal," or only concerned Ron and his actions, but that the dispute and controversy was between the 1948 Palestinians, and the Israeli official, governmental, and institutional policy. Khatib said that the 1948 Palestinians will not surrender, and linked Ron's incidental grievance with the permanent grievance of state hostility that he said aimed at restricting the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians. According to Khatib, the Israeli aim was to "swing the Arab public and restrict its effect on political decisions" through the targeting of its political leadership, such as the Knesset members who have the potential to affect Israeli political decision making. But these attempts, Khatib said, will not succeed, "they will not succeed in hurting our durability, existence, and development on our own land."<sup>162</sup>

Another interesting point that Khatib made can serve as an indication of the escalation on Habbat October, and could shed some light on Habbat October's timing. In the meeting held on September 13, 2000, Khatib warned "from [Israeli] attempts of pushing the Arab public into a corner which will cause a determined reaction."<sup>163</sup> Khatib's words reflected a general feeling at the time that the 1948 Palestinians were satiated with grievances, yet lacked the political opportunities and resources to protest or change. Therefore, 1948 Palestinians were at the edge of explosion. Indeed as social movement theory argues, under certain conditions, the resort to violent means of protest is more likely to happen, when the legitimate channels of protest are limited or shut in the face of those affected by the grievance.

Despite what might appear as advancement in political involvement of 1948 Palestinians since the abolition of military rule or even since the 1976 Land Day, it is also important to note that the relationship between 1948 Palestinians and the Israeli state at that point was framed in terms of struggle, and characterized with suspicion and mistrust. There was a belief, at least among some 1948 Palestinians, in the persistence of several state attitudes toward them, which were characteristics of military rule period. This belief is reflected in the words of a key 1948 Palestinian official Shawqi Khatib, who said 1948 Palestinians have to be careful of "the attempts to divide and rule which aim to target [their] unity and struggle."

Even the rhetoric that was repeatedly used by the 1948 Palestinian leadership talked about a battle over "the land, the residence, and rights." In addition, the leadership framing of the 1948 Palestinians' status within the Israeli state was not that of citizens, but generally that of victims of police brutality and state policies, defending their rights and existence.<sup>164</sup>

Finally, if in past incidents the 1948 Palestinian leadership was reaching out to the Israeli left to join forces and support their struggle, this time the 1948 Palestinian leadership condemned the "shameful silence" of some of the Israeli left and their attitude. Thus, by September 2000, and compared to their situation in the 1976 Land Day, the 1948 Palestinians perceived fewer political opportunities to protest or to improve their situation. This was in part due to the 1948 Palestinian realization that the sympathetic elites, which they previously believed to be able to provide practical support to the 1948 Palestinian struggle and protest efforts, did not actually exist.<sup>165</sup>

Yet, despite the firm language of the meeting protocol (held in light of Ron's accusations to Barakeh) that indicates a shift from acquiescent behavior, the proposed political actions in response to these grievances were still within the limits of nonviolent resistance. These actions include the ones proposed by more hard-line 1948 Palestinian groups such as Abna al-Balad and the northern wing of the Islamic movement.<sup>166</sup>

Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, mayor of Um el-Fahm and the head of the northern wing of the Islamic movement, demanded an investigation committee to examine the work of Ron's investigation committees, the police, and the security services. Salah said there were systematic attempts to distort "certain issues and facts," and called for regular demonstrations in front of Ron's office until Ron was fired. Salah also suggested resorting to legal tools, by calling to file a complaint against Ron for endangering the life of Barakeh. Finally, Salah proposed to establish a pan-Arab committee to discuss the security of the Arab citizen. In spite of the fact that the Islamic movement was being prosecuted and targeted by Israeli officials through attempted bans, its leaders were not calling for an escalation to confrontational or violent action in response.

The representative of Abna al-Balad Raja Ighbarieh also expressed a relatively restrained position. Ighbarieh called for the adoption of Barakeh's statement and position, and emphasized the need for a firm and thorough political response not only to Barakeh's case, but also against the Israeli attempts to ban the Islamic movement.

In addition to the consensus over Barakeh's case, there was a sense of unity and agreement amongst the different members of the 1948 Palestinian leadership on the main grievances. For instance, it was Dr. Hanna Swaid, a Christian and a member of Hadash communist party,

rather than a representative of the Islamic movement, who emphasized the need to pay attention to the issue of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem. Swaid, then the head of Eilaboun local council, demanded that a delegation of the High Follow-Up Committee meets with the minister of internal security, Shlomo Ben-Ami, to discuss the issue of incitement against 1948 Palestinians and their leadership in general, and their treatment through what he described as "military prism."<sup>167</sup> Swaid's framing of the state's attitude in those terms suggests a perception of continuation of military rule mentality toward 1948 Palestinians in the year 2000, decades after the official abolition of military rule, and only a few weeks before Habbat October. This perception of the state's attitude affected the framing of not only the grievances, but also the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians, and enhanced the 1948 Palestinian belief that they were left with few political opportunities or legitimate channels to express their dissent.

In addition, the prosecution of Barakeh and other members of the 1948 Palestinian leadership were perceived as typical conducts of the Israeli state. They were in line with the state's attitude toward 1948 Palestinians, and its strategy in dealing with those who challenge the system, that together contribute to narrowing the political opportunities available to 1948 Palestinians. This framing of the state attitude was strengthened as a result of what 1948 Palestinians considered double standards on the part of the Israeli authorities when dealing with Israeli Jews as opposed to them. For instance, while members of the 1948 Palestinian leadership were being prosecuted, the state did not act against Jewish Israeli officials such as Rabbi Ovadia Yosef who publicly incites against 1948 Palestinians.

The protest actions proposed by the 1948 Palestinian leadership in the September 13, 2000, meeting reflect both the political opportunities and resources available to 1948 Palestinians at the time. Due to the perceived hostile state attitudes and limited political opportunities and mobilization resources, the 1948 Palestinian leadership believed it could only use the handful nonviolent resources available. These resources were mainly limited to expressing solidarity or dissent through the permitted and state-acceptable channels of issuing public statements, or taking part in state-authorized protests.

Even the decision to resort to legal or governmental resources was relatively reluctant and cautious, due to the limited degree of openness of the Israeli political institutions toward 1948 Palestinians. Past experiences of the tendency of the Israeli state to undermine the political 1948 Palestinian leadership, refusing to meet up with it, and ignoring its political demands, made the leadership aware of their limitations within the

Israeli political and legal systems. These limitations were reflected in the framing of the proposed 1948 Palestinian actions, and in the use of indecisive language in the protocol. For example, instead of saying that a lawsuit would be filed against Alik Ron, the protocol suggested, "verifying the legal options" for filing a lawsuit. Furthermore, the proposed actions in the protocol included "requesting an emergency meeting"<sup>168</sup> with the minister Ben-Ami, perhaps hinting that such meetings with Israeli ministers are either rare, or reserved for emergency cases.<sup>169</sup>

The use of vague or general language by the 1948 Palestinian leadership was noted not only in this protocol, but also in many other occasions examined in this study. There are several possible reasons for the use of such language, although, so far no research has been published on this topic. For example, it is possible that the 1948 Palestinian leadership tries to avoid making specific promises for which they can be held accountable, when in fact they are aware of their very little power to influence Israeli politics or bring it to change. At the same time, and especially in critical circumstance when there is public pressure on the leadership to show action, the leadership is reluctant to publicly admit their inability to act. Therefore, the 1948 Palestinian leadership, which appears to know its limitations well, may have felt the need to respond in a way that would sound appropriate to the grievance in question, yet at the same time be nonbinding. Therefore, the tension between the limited resources and political opportunities available to the leadership and the public pressure to provide a response might be the reason for using such language, especially when discussing proposed resistance tools or actions.

Another reason for the use of such vague language could be the fact that the 1948 Palestinian leadership is held accountable by both its Palestinian public and by the Israeli Jewish public, as well as by the Israeli laws. In fact, most of the 1948 Palestinian leadership is part of the Israeli governmental or administrative system. The 1948 Palestinian Knesset members, for example, took the oath to be faithful to the state of Israel.<sup>170</sup> Therefore, in situations where their two loyalties clash, the 1948 Palestinian MKs might resort to careful calculations of cost and benefit that may result in such indecisive language. On those occasions, and mainly due to their perception of the firm state attitude in dealing with challengers, the 1948 Palestinian leadership should be careful with their statements and open positions, or else they could be prosecuted or condemned by the Jewish Israeli public. This has happened to a number of 1948 Palestinian leaders such as Tawfiq Ziad, Sheikh Ra'ed Salah, Mohammed Barakeh, and Azmi Bishara. To sum up, the reasons behind using such language can be attributed to a number of factors, mainly related to identity crisis, fear of prosecution, and cost-benefit calculations.

Part of the proposed protest campaign actions in the High Follow-Up meeting held on September 13, 2000, were to discuss Alik Ron's statements against the 1948 Palestinian public and its leadership. The proposed actions were symbolic in their nature and included some gestures of support such as accompanying Barakeh to investigation; adopting his position and statement; and putting forward the declaration that "hurting one 1948 Palestinian leader equals hurting the entire 1948 Palestinian public."<sup>171</sup>

A growing public solidarity with the Islamic movement is reflected in that protocol, with two proposed actions—one "rejecting the calls to outlaw or punish the Islamic movement", and the other calling on the general 1948 Palestinian public to participate in al-Aqsa rally to be held by the Islamic movement on September 15, 2000, in Um el-Fahm. The general public participation was to give a response to the incitement against the Islamic movement and to emphasize the 1948 Palestinian stand with regard to Jerusalem and al-Aqsa.

In general, the committee vowed that huge protests would be organized should Barakeh be called for interrogation by the police; however, the proposed actions at the committee meeting did not suggest an escalation in protest actions, despite the strained relationship between 1948 Palestinians and the state. These proposed actions included setting a campaign to remove Alik Ron from office, joining forces with the Jewish democratic forces, and holding a grand protest gathering in addition to staging warning strikes primarily of local councils during specific times.

The tense relationship with the state, in general, and with the Israeli police, in particular, grew stronger on September 14, 2000, when a one-day commercial strike was held in Nazareth following the murder of Nabieh Nussier, a money changer. The strike was to protest what the 1948 Palestinians described as the police inaction and incompetence in handling violence and crime in their sector.

In contrast to the antagonism toward the state's hostile actions and actors, there was a sense of unity and growing national identity among 1948 Palestinians who found in the shared grievances a reason to unite. On September 15, 2000, for example, and in a rare display of unity between the Islamic movement and the Communist-led Hadash, MK Mohammed Barakeh spoke to the audience of al-Aqsa rally organized by the Northern wing of the Islamic movement. The rally held at Um el-Fahm's soccer stadium and attended by 40,000 people was in defense of the al-Haram al-Sharif compound in Jerusalem, and also in solidarity with Sheikh Ra'ed Salah of the Islamic movement. By that time, the Islamic movement was the most popular movement among 1948 Palestinians, commanding the support of nearly 25 percent of their electoral vote, and with municipal control over three of the biggest 1948 Palestinian towns: Nazareth, Um

el-Fahm, and Kufor Qasim. Even in the Negev, where local elections were held for the first time in four 1948 Palestinian townships on September 20, 2000, the Islamist movement won two of them.<sup>172</sup>

*September 28, 2000: Beginning of Confrontations*

The day after then, MK Ariel Sharon's visit to the al-Haram al-Sharif compound, the Jerusalem Bureau chief of *The Guardian*, Suzanne Goldenberg, wrote:

Dozens of people were injured in rioting on the West Bank and in Jerusalem yesterday as the hawkish Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, staged a provocative visit to a Muslim shrine at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Surrounded by hundreds of Israeli riot police, Mr. Sharon and a handful of Likud politicians marched up to the Haram al-Sharif. . . . He came down 45 minutes later, leaving a trail of fury. Young Palestinians heaved chairs, stones, rubbish bins, and whatever missiles came to hand at the Israeli forces. Riot police retaliated with tear gas and rubber bullets, shooting one protester in the face. The symbolism of the visit to the Haram by Mr. Sharon - reviled for his role in the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in a refugee camp in Lebanon - and its timing was unmistakable.<sup>173</sup>

Following the incident on September 28, 2000, MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe, who was present and attacked in the compound, wrote to the minister of internal security, Shlomo Ben-Ami, calling for the establishment of an investigation committee into the violent police behavior against Moslems, including against Dahamshe himself, at al-Aqsa mosque.

In his letter, MK Dahamshe wrote:

Once again, the police continue to behave in a violent and provocative way against the Arab and Moslem citizens, and against me personally.

This morning as I arrived to the al-Aqsa mosque quarter in Jerusalem, I was ruthlessly attacked by members of the police, Yassam, and border police. Police members attacked other citizens and public figures including deputy head of the Islamic movement in Israel Sheikh Mohammed Dahamshe, and deputy mayor of Nazareth Salman Abu Ahmad (also from the Islamic movement).

It is unthinkable that the police will continue to act in such a way without anyone taking the suitable measures against it.

This is my fourth plea to his Excellency on the issue of Police behavior such as that at the recent demonstration of Ein Mahel residents a few days ago, in which I was hit on both legs by policemen; and also at the demonstration of Mahtzevet Kneret workers, and in many other places and occasions where the police have treated public figures and protesters in excessive brutality.



I ask you to take the required measures, to put an end to this phenomenon, and to direct the police to do its job as required in a proper way, and not to dig for opportunities to attack public figures and hurt them.

In addition, I demand to establish a special investigation committee over today's events to examine the behavior of policemen and Magav, and to prosecute and fully punish those who attacked me and acted violently.

As it is apparent from the framing of MK Dahamshe's grievance, the physical attacks by Israeli security on him and on other public figures on that day were not a rare or isolated incident, but rather part of the permanent grievance of the targeting of public 1948 Palestinian figures. Indeed, this was not the first time that 1948 Palestinian MKs, who in principle should enjoy parliamentary immunity, complained that the tolerance of the Israeli authorities toward such violations against them, and the open public stage offered to anti-Arab sentiments, were the causes for more similar violations. Yet their complaints, as was indicated by MK Dahamshe, hardly ever received an official or legal response. The ridicule and mistreatment of the 1948 Palestinian MK members by security personnel or even by the general Israeli public, especially in years leading to Habbat October, was in part made possible due to the constant anti-Arab incitement especially by key Israeli officials and media.

Furthermore, the fact that this address was the fourth official letter sent by a Knesset member to an Israeli minister without receiving a response illustrates that some of the resources or legitimate protest channels, which exist according to Israeli law, are not in reality available to 1948 Palestinians, not even to those in key official positions like Knesset members. Moreover, if such a common conviction is shared by the 1948 Palestinian leadership, then the ordinary 1948 Palestinian would be left with even fewer resources to express solidarity or dissent. The disregard of the 1948 Palestinian leadership in such a way also sends the message to the larger public of the weakness and inability of the 1948 Palestinian leadership to affect Israeli policy making.

In line with social-movement arguments, the overall conditions mentioned so far and the lack of positive framing with regard to achieving goals through the legitimate channels, were likely to encourage the 1948 Palestinians to choose either acquiescence or violent resistance as means of political action. The choice between the two extremes largely depends on cost-benefit calculations, or the rational choice or motives of participants to join. Low cost support is usually a key factor in encouraging potential participants to join social movements to achieve their goals. However, high cost support and fear of consequences can withhold participation and encourage acquiescent behavior. Cost-benefit calculations usually take

into account factors such as the grievances, the political opportunities, the available resources, and framing. In the following section this book will closely analyze the events of Habbat October as they unfolded, seeking first to understand the goals 1948 Palestinians were trying to achieve, and the reasons behind their resort to “illegitimate” channels of protest, if indeed that was the case.

## The Unfolding of Events Based on the 1948 Palestinian Framing

I had great difficulty conceiving this part of the book due to the challenge in organizing people’s motives behind political mobilization on Habbat October within a cohesive framework that includes both the ideological and emotional motives. While the richness of the interview material on Habbat October is an asset to this book, it did, however, create a dilemma over the best way to transfer these testimonials into a solid and logical account of events without misrepresenting or misinterpreting my interview subjects. At first, I tried to filter the interview material and only select the contributing factors in people’s testimonials; only to later realize I was going in the wrong direction. In contrast to the 1948 Palestinian leadership, which apparently based its actions on a certain political vision, the evidence collected shows that the behavior of the man on the street was mostly a series of reactions that depended on the context an individual or a group of individuals were put in.

Therefore, isolating the motives from the range of detailed personal observations and emotions would create a distorted account of the mobilizing factors for Habbat October. It would have also led to situations in which the same single factor could have pointed to different or even contradicting behaviors. For example, the use of excessive force by Israeli security was a contributing factor for a resistant behavior for some people in certain conditions, and a deterrent from action in others. Therefore, it would be incomplete to simply say that the state’s attitude toward 1948 Palestinian demonstrators, for example, was a contributing factor without explaining the overall conditions that made some 1948 Palestinians favor one kind of behavior over the other. While attempting to do that, I had to approach the dangerous territory of not only trying to understand what was going on in people’s minds and hearts during Habbat October, but also trying to convey those emotions and thoughts on paper.

I did this while keeping in mind the unfeasibility of creating a replica of the reality of Habbat October, simply because there is more than one reality. The perception of reality in general, in both the individual and

the collective mind, is bound to endless effects including, subjectivity or personal perception, interpretation, and framing. These effects result in creating a number of different subjective "realities" or recollections of the same exact event, which can all be equally genuine and sincere.

Finally, despite the similarities I am not in a position to argue that the testimonials gathered are reflective of the majority of 1948 Palestinians. Human behavior beyond collective identity and politics is subject to endless individual personal and psychological effects that vary from one person to another. In addition, Habbat October involved various and accelerating range of events that extended over time and a broad geopolitical area with a diverse population. Therefore, it would be impossible to enclose this multiplicity and rapid changing of events, actions, motives, and emotions.

Having said this, the 1948 Palestinian testimonials used in this book, however, are a sincere attempt to shed some light on the hearts and mindset behind resorting to a particular political behavior in a certain context or timing during Habbat October. For that reason, I found it necessary, sometimes, to expand on a personal testimony beyond the borders of mobilizing factors, simply to try and situate the reader within a similar setting that will further help illustrate and understand the unfolding of events and reactions from the point of view of the 1948 Palestinian witnesses.

It is important to remember that the call of the High Follow-Up Committee for a general strike was made against the background of the 1948 Palestinian grievances discussed earlier. However, the call for protest, therefore, did not include any internal 1948 Palestinian grievances such as the incitement against their public and leadership, the policy of land confiscations, house demolishing, the levels of unemployment, or the unfair allocations of budgets. In other words, those "internal" grievances that reflect the long-standing neglect and discrimination policy highlighted by the Or Commission as central underlying reason for Habbat October<sup>174</sup> were not mentioned in the committee's protocol<sup>175</sup> nor were they mentioned in the general statement to the 1948 Palestinian public, which followed and called for the strike.<sup>176</sup>

Instead, the statement said that the protest actions and general strike were to protest the "continuous massacre," to defend the sanctuaries (holy places), to show solidarity with "our Palestinian nation suffering under the occupation," and in defense of a just and comprehensive peace.<sup>177</sup>

Originally, the 1948 Palestinian leadership plans were for nonviolent protest actions to be held in response to the bloody events in al-Haram following Ariel Sharon's visit. This position was expressed in the protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda on September 30, 2000.

As already discussed, there was nothing unusual about this protocol, it was similar in its language and suggested actions, to previous protocols. While there was consensus that the "massacre" was planned by the Israeli authorities, the protest actions proposed were modest and included a call for a general strike, in addition to protests and marches. Overall, the leadership was interested in nonviolent resistance and not escalation.

Despite Israeli official and media accusations of the 1948 Palestinian leadership of inciting the public, the meeting protocols of the committee reflect a leadership interested in restoring peace rather than escalation, despite the killings and despite police brutality. Some of the leadership members, according to my interviews, were present at the demonstrations in attempts to prevent the targeting of civilians.

From the start, the 1948 leadership identified the presence of the police as the cause of the escalations; however, their calls to keep the security forces away were ignored by the state. In addition, their requests to meet with the government were ignored. Instead, the presence of the security forces was intensified, and the coverage of the Israeli media became more hostile condemning the 1948 Palestinian community.

The image portrayed in the interviews with 1948 Palestinians who took part in Habbat October was that of a spontaneous mobilization of the masses that started on October 1, 2000, following the call of the High Follow-Up Committee, increased later as a result of the presence of the security forces, and intensified with the violent handling of protesters.

There were a number of interesting common observations made by the interview subjects concerning the participation in Habbat October demonstrations and what followed. The 1948 Palestinians, most of whom were closely following the developments of the al-Aqsa Intifada starting from the failure of the peace negotiations followed by Ariel Sharon's visit and the airing of news footage showing the killing of the 12-year-old Muhammed al-Durrah by Israeli forces, answered the call to strike and protested initially in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The strike and demonstrations, which were organized in the different 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, received a surprisingly widespread participation. Some interviewees reflected on the political affiliation of the participants:

Out of all the events, what I remember the most is the unplanned public outburst (Habbah). It was spontaneous, with very ordinary people participating, not necessarily those who were politicized or who belonged to specific parties...and this was reflected in the injuries, because the people who were injured were not politicized, or members of a party, nor did they belong to anyone.<sup>178</sup>

By "politicized," the interviewee meant people with a 1948 Palestinian national agenda. Indeed, a quick look at the profiles of those who were killed during Habbat October shows mixed affiliations and levels of political participation. Aseel Asli, for example, was a member of Seeds of Peace, an Israeli-Palestinian coexistence program, and was wearing the group's T-shirt when he was killed.<sup>179</sup> However, Ramez Bushnaq, according to his father, had wished to become a martyr: "Since three months he has been asking God in his morning prayers to become a martyr, and a day before he was killed he left telling his siblings I am going to become a martyr for the sake of God."<sup>180</sup>

Some of the interviewees who were politically active and usually took part in demonstrations were amazed not only by the high level of participation in Habbat October, but also by the fact that people who normally did not take part in demonstrations were present. The involvement of new participants was attributed to a number of factors. As one activist put it:

Sharon's visit to al-Aqsa had a religious output and was an incentive to many people who do not normally take part. Many people took to the streets because what they cared most about was religion... that Sharon entered al-Aqsa which is sacred to them... in addition to what people saw on television, the killing of Muhammed al-Durrah had a great impact on people... and we were also on the verge of ignition/outburst (Habbah هبة).<sup>181</sup>

In addition to the growing dissent over Israel's occupation and the continuous killing of Palestinians, the wide participation in Habbat October, especially at the very beginning of the demonstrations, could be also attributed to perceived favorable cost-benefit calculations. Initially, answering the call of the High Follow-Up Committee and taking part in the organized demonstrations involved minimal risk to 1948 Palestinian participants. The planned demonstrations were part of ordinary, peaceful civil disobedience actions, which were to be held inside 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, meaning that the chances of violent escalations or contact with opposition that would justify the presence of security forces for example were minimal. In addition, the fact that the strike was organized by the 1948 Palestinian leadership, I argue, was reassuring to many people who normally feared challenging the Israeli policies. Participating in a general strike that carried the signature of the 1948 Palestinian leadership was more legitimate and less likely to develop into violent clashes because of the leadership's involvement and close monitoring.

However, these initial 1948 Palestinian calculations could not have possibly anticipated the Israeli decision to use the 1998 police operational plan "Kessem Ha-Manginah," which goes to the extreme of giving a license to kill, and permits the use of snipers and the heightened use of force to

disperse 1948 Palestinian demonstrators. 1948 Palestinian demonstrators were surprised by what they described as a provocative presence of Israeli security forces at the entrances of their 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, and shocked by the violent handling of the 1948 Palestinian public by the Israeli authorities.

None of the participants interviewed, especially those who normally take part in demonstrations, expected the presence of the Israeli security forces, especially in places which according to them did not pose any threat to the police or to the Jewish public.<sup>182</sup> One of the participants from the 1948 Palestinian village of Arrabeh said that he did not think the army or police would come, because his village is situated between Deir Hanna and Sakhnin, both of which are 1948 Palestinian towns. He said that after the official demonstration ended a group of youth gathered and blocked Arrabeh Street. "[Normally] you could sit from morning till evening burning tires without anyone interfering," he said.<sup>183</sup>

However, what happened in Habbat October was against all calculations. The following testimony of a young male demonstrator gives an example of the unfolding of Habbat October events, and the shift from an organized peaceful demonstration to a chaotic and spontaneous set of 1948 Palestinian responses. The demonstrator is from a 1948 Palestinian village in north Israel, who was 22 years old at the time,

- We went back after taking part in the peaceful demonstration. We sat at home and opened the television to see if the demonstration will be mentioned, or if someone will cover it. As we were sitting [they] said there were confrontations in town, so we went out.
- **You went out with whom?**
- A friend of mine and I.
- **So you were both of the same age?**
- Yes, but even my young brother went out. And when we arrived I did not ask much or think of how to behave. My response was, as usual, to carry stones as well... and at some point I immediately went looking for an open shop or anything, or houses, to get some onions<sup>184</sup> for the guys. So the reactions or behavior were entirely unstudied.
- **So initially you went out, what did you see, what were the confrontations like?**
- There were guys down [at street level] facing army on top of a hill... the scenery was so funny, we were in fact throwing stones almost 50 meters upwards, so the stones were coming back to us. And it was so obvious that you could not hurt anyone, but it was simply part of having confrontations... and many times even till this day I could say that those were indeed confrontations.

- **With whom, ordinary police troops?**
- No, with border guard forces...and there was a police car as well. In addition, the army...I arrived at the first stages of the confrontations, and the army did not use any kind of warning. They were armed and when I first arrived there was smoke and rubber bullets.
- **Smoke!**
- Teargas bombs...that is what the onions were for. And there were no cautionary warnings from the police. We always say...if you work in the field of human rights...that the police has to warn and warn and warn...use water canon and so forth...none of this exists...there was nothing like this when we first arrived. It is always the same, at any [1948 Palestinian] events first thing [used] are rubber bullets...and this was not the first time I get hurt. I was hurt in Shafa Amr as well before October...in a sit-in protest against celebrating Israel's independence. I was hurt in the head and once more in my hand at Land Day in March 2000...then a woman called Khadija [Sheikha] abu-Saleh fell martyr...I was hurt there as well. So there was no organization. I arrived and there was stone throwing so I threw stones, there were people wounded so I tried my best to help. We remained for around four hours or something like that until we returned, but I think we returned because...nothing [there was no point]...the stones were not getting to them [the army].<sup>185</sup>

This testimony raises a number of interesting points as to the changing factors and goals behind the mobilization in Habbat October. Here, we have an example of demonstrators who were mobilized by the call for protest in solidarity with the Palestinians. Initially, they were planning to take part in a peaceful civil disobedience action and send a message of dissent. And indeed, they took part in the official demonstration, and were hoping for some acknowledgment. For this reason they were interested in the media coverage of their strike. In addition, they were looking for recognition especially from the Arab media of their Palestinian Arab identity.

However, what happened following the presence of the security forces, still before the bloody confrontations, was a series of "unstudied" spontaneous reactions of 1948 Palestinians involving many factors such as youth enthusiasm, shock, peer pressure, and curiosity, which will be further illustrated later. It is clear from the testimony that those who took part in the "confrontations" did not have a clear aim behind their actions. Their stones could not even reach the army on the other side, yet still they remained for around four hours despite the risk of getting injured. At that stage, it seems like the participants were enthused by emotions rather than strategy, and did not digest the risks involved.

As the Habbat October events were unfolding with new elements being introduced, such as the hostile state and media attitude, there was an interesting and accelerating change of resources, political opportunities, and even grievances. Initially, the calculations of the 1948 Palestinian leadership and the public who answered the call for strike did not expect a violent state response. The demonstrators at the first stage were out to protest the grievance of the Israeli occupation and practices against their fellow Palestinians using the protest resources available to them as Israeli citizens, and with the support of their elected 1948 Palestinian leadership.

Despite the anti-Arab hostile atmosphere, which preceded the call for strike, both the leadership and the demonstrators saw a political opportunity to mobilize in a peaceful protest. This was in part due to the peaceful and modest goals, which the 1948 Palestinian leadership wanted to achieve from this strike. Furthermore, there was a 1948 Palestinian perception of a certain tolerance within the Israeli system toward such a protest act, especially that they witnessed the delicate handling by the police of Jewish settlers. Perhaps, 1948 Palestinians thought that if the settlers were not hurt then they, as Israeli citizens, should also be safe from harm as long as they followed the rules and used the legitimate resources of protest, and did not challenge or disturb the Israeli Jewish public agenda.

However, with the unexpected hostile state attitude, the events took a chaotic and dreadful turn. Suddenly, the political opportunities changed, and the resources that 1948 Palestinians thought were available to them no longer existed, or became illegitimate. Even the grievances changed, and the state attitudes and the hostile media coverage awakened permanent 1948 Palestinian grievances, which were not present before, including the reviving of old incidental grievances such as the 1976 Land Day. "We remembered the events of the massacre (1976 Land Day) which happened in area 9 and the martyrs who fell on its land more than twenty years ago. On the same dust and the same land Aseel fell," said the eyewitness who told the story of the two martyrs.<sup>186</sup>

Yet, despite the unforeseen developments and even the first confrontations with the Israeli security forces, among the 1948 Palestinians who participated, there was no expectation or a plan for the events to further escalate or continue.

I was there [in a 1948 Palestinian village] at the beginning of the events when they [the High Follow-Up Committee] called for a strike. I was there at the strike and demonstration. I took part in writing the slogans and in the preparations. I thought at the beginning that was it. There were confrontations and they ended. I did not think there will be a continuation.<sup>187</sup>



Following the violent developments on October 1, 2000, which resulted in the killing of 23-year-old Mohammed Jabareen, who was shot in the buttocks with a live bullet in Um el-Fahm,<sup>188</sup> the 1948 Palestinian leadership held an emergency meeting in Kufor Manda. The meeting was attended by most of the 1948 Palestinian Knesset members, council heads, and members of the High Follow-Up Committee. The protocol of that meeting identifies the 1948 Palestinian framing of events in addition to the resources and political opportunities perceived to be available to 1948 Palestinians at that point of the Habbat October events, following the killing of the first 1948 Palestinian.

In the protocol, Mr. Mohammed Zidan the head of the committee confirmed that the presence of the police in a provocative stance in some of the 1948 Palestinian villages and towns was the main cause for "exploding the public anger." Mr. Zidan said the burden of responsibility for the confrontation and its results falls on the police, its command, and the government of Israel.<sup>189</sup>

Yet, once more the leadership's decisions during that meeting did not point at any escalation or expectations that the confrontations would last beyond that point. The outcome of the first day of demonstrations with tens of injuries and arrests and the fall of one martyr was already costly and shocking to the leadership, which was interested in maintaining quiet and restoring peace. The 1948 Palestinian leadership saw the October 1, as an abnormal day, and decided to commemorate it and even gave it a name, "al-Aqsa and Jerusalem Day."

Again, this proves that the 1948 Palestinian leadership believed that the events would not be repeated, and that the worst was already behind. In addition, the 1948 Palestinian leadership called for a general mourning strike on October 2, 2000, which included the 1948 Palestinian schools. As will be shown later, had the leadership sensed an escalation in the confrontations they would have not decided to call for a strike in schools. Later, when the events were going in the direction of escalation, the 1948 Palestinian leadership clearly excluded the schools from the protest actions.<sup>190</sup> Two of those killed on October 2, 2000, were high school students,<sup>191</sup> and clearly the strike of schools and the presence of students in the streets during those events would have meant increasing chances of confrontations and casualties.

The leadership, which recognized that the presence of police was the main factor behind the bloody confrontations, called from the very beginning for the withdrawal of the Israeli security forces from the 1948 Palestinian towns and villages, especially during the mourning strike planned for the October 2, 2000.<sup>192</sup> Together with the public calls, the 1948 Palestinian leadership sent a letter to the minister of internal security

concerning this matter. The leadership also called for the immediate release of those arrested, and called on the police to refrain from filing charges against them.

Yet, the Israeli authorities ignored these calls, and refused to meet with the 1948 Palestinian representatives. An attack was launched with the help of the Israeli media on the 1948 Palestinian public, which confused the boundaries between what was happening inside Israel and the al-Aqsa Intifada outside. The image presented by the Israeli media portrayed an imminent threat, both internal and external, to the existence of the state of Israel. In addition, the terminology used in the media coverage had connotations of the 1948 war and the struggle over the state's establishment and right to exist during that period.<sup>193</sup> One of the main headlines, for example in *Yediot Ahronot* daily newspaper was "Yesterday, for the first time since 1948, The Galilee was disconnected from the centre of the country after thousands of Arab protestors blocked most of the roads. The severe riots spread to the Negev and Yaffa"<sup>194</sup>

This kind of coverage resulted in distorting the distinction between the 1948 Palestinians as citizens of the state of Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who are subject to the Israeli occupation. It is an interesting mirror image to the strong feelings of solidarity between the 1948 Palestinians and the rest of the Palestinians. The distortion of the protest actions and the confusion between the citizens and noncitizens gave legitimacy to the police and security forces to use harsh means against the 1948 Palestinian citizens. If the coverage of the events on both sides of the border was similar, meaning if the protestors on both sides are the same "Arabs, who pose the same kind of threat," then they both should be handled by the same means.<sup>195</sup>

This framing of the conflict by the Israeli side affected the 1948 Palestinians as well who started to sense an imminent threat to their existence. The state's hostile attitudes, which reached the level of killing, created great panic and anger among 1948 Palestinians, especially that this hostile treatment came from a prime minister who was elected with the help of 1948 Palestinian votes.

Following the refusal of the government to withdraw the security forces or meet with the Palestinian leadership, and with the fall of martyrs, a number of mixed feelings filled the 1948 Palestinian public. 1948 Palestinian NGOs including, Arab HRA, Adalah,<sup>196</sup> and Mossawa,<sup>197</sup> have cited the "deep rooted frustration [of 1948 Palestinians] at their own status as second class Israeli citizens," as an underlying factor accounting for the widespread involvement of 1948 Palestinians in the protests.<sup>198</sup> Once more, 1948 Palestinians realized that they were treated as a fifth column rather than citizens, simply because they were not Jewish. The

1948 Palestinians could clearly point to a double standard in the handling of Jewish and 1948 Palestinian protesters. Hatem Gurrah, who lost his son Rami in Habbat October, wondered:

Had the guy been from Shas or Kach,<sup>199</sup> would the police and border guards have acted the same way? They [the settlers] closed Maa'siyahu prison and the soldiers carried them away and did not harm them in any way.<sup>200</sup>

Rami Gurrah from Jat village was 20 years old at the time when he was shot in the eye by Israeli border guards at close range and without any warning. He was shot on October 1, 2000, and succumbed to his injuries the following day.<sup>201</sup>

The handling of the protest by the police not only increased the sense of 1948 Palestinian solidarity but also provoked permanent grievances, and caused the demonstrators to shift their protest grievances and aims.

What happened in the days following the first killing appears to be a chaotic and angry reaction to police brutality on behalf of protesters, who sometimes resorted to destroying 1948 Palestinian public properties such as banks, or health clinics. This stage, which was characterized by more violent and chaotic actions, was explained by my interview subjects as *fashet kholee*. At this stage, participants could not explain much or justify their actions.

At this stage, the initial cost-benefit calculations were changed due to the risk of getting killed by the security forces. This is when it became evident that the presence of the security forces would cost the loss of lives. Dr. Hanna Swaid said the Israeli authorities issued a death sentence against every Arab (1948 Palestinian) citizen.<sup>202</sup> What is interesting in this period, is that it was not only the resources and opportunities that were changing, but also the grievances. So, if the grievance at the beginning was the violation of the al-Haram compound and the violent suppression of protests in the Occupied Territories, it later became more complex, involving a number of 1948 Palestinian permanent grievances, which were awakened.

This is when, perhaps, the events went against all calculations, and various emotions were involved in contributing to the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians. It is hard to account for all of these emotions and their dynamics and effects; however, it is necessary to echo some of them as they were expressed by 1948 Palestinian interviewees. These emotions appear to be critical in encouraging some people to take part in the violent confrontations with the Israeli security despite the consequences. However, other or sometimes even the same emotions prevented people from taking part and encouraged acquiescent behavior.

These emotions and motivations were constantly changing during the three phases of Habbat October: before the first killing, the shock

phase with the continuation of the killing and the continuation of state hostility, and the aftermath phase following the end of 1948 Palestinian protests. Originally, when the 1948 Palestinian public answered the calls of the High Follow-Up Committee to go on a general strike, they were protesting in solidarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and against the visit of Ariel Sharon to al-Haram and the "massacre" that followed. However, later, when the strike turned violent following the deployment of the Israeli security forces to 1948 Palestinian villages and towns the emotions were mixed, and the motivations for participation became different.

Perhaps, the important question at this phase is to know the motivations behind people's participation despite the change in cost-benefit calculations, and despite the risk of getting killed. When asked about the reasons for taking part in violent resistance most of the 1948 Palestinian interviewees failed to give a clear answer, especially when asked to compare their participation in Habbat October with their acquiescent behavior on similar previous occasions. It was clear from the testimonies that the minute the protest actions went against the initial planning of ordinary peaceful demonstrations, people's reactions or actions became very subjective and varied.

In addition to confusion, some participants said they went out on the streets because they were witnessing something unusual: "There was a group of guys at the entrance of the village and more people joined when the police came."<sup>203</sup> Others pointed out that their actions were motivated by deep anger: "When I entered the village there was a group of guys burning the forest... there was a feeling that we need to take revenge or react against anything related to the authority."<sup>204</sup> There was also evidence to suggest the presence of a peer pressure factor, "It was the thing to do."<sup>205</sup> Perhaps, that is why the leadership decided to end the strike in schools to prevent students from hanging around and being under threat. However, there were cases such as those in Arrabeh village where students decided to strike on their own, especially following the killing of a classmate.

While the vast majority of participants of Habbat October appeared to be young males under the age of 30, testimonials show that the elder generation was trying to prevent the youth from taking part in the confrontations with the Israeli security. In this regard there were also examples of great pressure against joining the protests that was exerted by parents on their children out of concern for their children's safety. In one incident, a mother said she locked her son inside the house, and hid the key so he will not be able to take part in the confrontations.<sup>206</sup> In addition, there was also evidence of indifferent behavior among some elderly members of the community. In fact, according to my interview material the father of one

of the Habbat October victims was visiting his brother-in-law and enjoying a glass of whisky when he heard the news about the death of his son.

Also related to the generational gap, or perhaps the gap between the leadership and the public, was the exasperation expressed by some interview subjects at the restrained strategies of the leadership: "We had enough and we are tired of the leadership." Other participants felt an increase in nationalist feelings and great sympathy with the Palestinians after what they saw of similar Israeli practices against them in Habbat October. However, there were those who sympathized but did not take part in the events out of either fear, or negative framing of the chances of a successful protest.

Yet, despite the mixed feelings and motivations, the testimonials portray a common, dominant feeling of confusion: "People did not realize what was happening. It was the first time such a thing took place. Some even did not know the difference between a martyr and an injured person."<sup>207</sup>

## Habbat October—Similarities, Differences, and Dynamics

So far, I have set the main factors that played a key role in the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians in Habbat October. However, this is not enough on its own to account for the different responses and patterns of 1948 Palestinian political behavior, and there is a need to recognize the dynamics and interplay of the range of these factors within a context-specific case. The 1948 Palestinian dynamics of mobilization in Habbat October, I argue, is case specific, and is mainly influenced by the framing of social-movement participants of the grievances, political opportunities, and resources, as well as the constantly changing cognitive and emotional processes that include the cognitive liberation process, the cost-benefit calculations, as well as the shock effect.

For instance, attempting to understand any case of 1948 Palestinian mobilization in Habbat October has to take into account both the general conditions and the more specific circumstance in which movement participants are in. For example, in Habbat October the 1948 Palestinian community relationship with the police was very tense prior to the events, the disillusionment with the Israeli left was at an all-time high, and the confidence of the Land Day 2000 had largely evaporated. But these are all general conditions. The specific conditions, however, were the unfolding and development of events, filtered through the cognitive and emotive system of movement participants and contributing to the creation

and limitation of political opportunities and resources, which affected the nature of political mobilization.

Finally, recognizing the dynamics of political mobilization can be helpful in accounting for the different political behavior and outcomes of events that have similar general conditions. I argue that despite the similarities in the general conditions and mobilizing factors which can be found between Habbat October and other events that took place during the same time, or for the same reasons, the dynamics of mobilization in each context is what contributed to the different outcomes in Habbat October.

Initially, following the analysis offered by conventional sources, I was expecting to find evidence to support theories proposed by these sources, which suggest a planned 1948 Palestinian mass violent resistance in Habbat October. Among others, the Or Commission's report, for example, suggests that the 1948 Palestinian leadership had played a role in mobilizing 1948 Palestinians and inciting for violent clashes with state security forces. However, primary sources revealing the point of view and framing of 1948 Palestinians, offer a different narrative.

Official statements and documents issued by the 1948 Palestinian leadership, together with interview material gathered for this book, indicate that the leadership was trying to calm down the 1948 Palestinian public, and keep events under control. The statements analyzed showed that the 1948 Palestinian leadership were pragmatic in their protest actions and aware of the limitations and resources available. Furthermore, despite incidents during the early confrontation where grassroots lost patience with the leadership, and the latter lost control, the 1948 Palestinian leadership had played a major role in restoring peace and ending the events in Habbat October.

While leadership often says one thing in official statements yet says another off the record, subsequent to all the killings and despite the violent turn of events, the 1948 Palestinian leadership maintained its calls for peaceful protest, and insisted once again on removing the security forces to calm down the 1948 Palestinian street. A closer look into the committee's protocols shows how much the leadership was interested in maintaining quiet and preventing any escalation or further deterioration. In the October 3, 2000, committee meeting protocol, for example, there was a clear call for discipline, maintaining order, and preserving public property. It is also evident in this protocol that the leadership was faster to recover from the shock than the 1948 Palestinian public. The protocol illustrates a move toward better-studied tactics, and recognition and resort to new resources, such as the local 1948 Palestinian NGOs and health service, which can benefit the 1948 Palestinian mobilization in the aftermath of the killings in Habbat October.

Furthermore, as demonstrated earlier, similar protests took place in the past for similar reasons and grievance, however, they did not gain much 1948 Palestinian public attention, attract unprecedented hostile state response, or most importantly, escalate, spread, or last for a long period of time, like Habbat October did. So what contributed to the unprecedented 1948 Palestinian mobilization in Habbat October?

As shown in the public statements and meeting protocols of 1948 Palestinian leadership, there was nothing special about the general call for a strike in October 2000. The evidence collected suggests that the aims and plans of the initial protests of Habbat October were modest and similar to ordinary past solidarity protest events. There was nothing unusual about the language of the statements, and nothing in them suggested a confrontational 1948 Palestinian struggle against the state.

Similarity in framing of 1948 Palestinian public statement is also another indication that Habbat October was not a preplanned event of violent resistance, as the Israeli version claims. The similarities in framing were indeed visible, as demonstrated; in the case of Habbat October and Um Essahalie where both statements had detailed description of the violent clashes, and contained the use of words such as fascist, massacre, and pogroms. In both cases, similar protest actions were proposed and included demonstrations and general strike. In addition, there was an indication to the resort to more developed ways of protest and better use of resources.

In the case of Um Essahalie there were also people who got injured and arrested, yet, events did not escalate like Habbat October. Some explanation, therefore, might be in the scale and intensity of events. In Habbat October the police surrounded the main Palestinian villages and towns. Psychologically, there was a feeling of massive threat and fear amongst 1948 Palestinians. Moreover, while in previous cases the confrontations were restricted to specific areas and could be contained, in Habbat October the protest spread over a large geographical area of Israel. Yet, while killings (as opposed to injuries) may have spurred the anger and continuous response of 1948 Palestinians, it was at the same time the reason for acquiescence and the ending of the confrontations. The killings in Habbat October intimidated 1948 Palestinians, and led to the ending of confrontations in the villages where the killings took place. The Or report mentions how police thought the use of snipers was efficient to intimidate protestors.

While the 2000 Land Day statement reflected a progress and development in 1948 Palestinian political awareness and action, the framing of events and suggested actions in the initial Habbat October statement were not similar to the 2000 Land Day statement. I argue that the fact

that the framing of the initial Habbat October statement reflects rather a retreat from the 2000 Land Day statement, is additional evidence that Habbat October was not planned in terms of how it actually developed. I also argue that it was rather the shock effect, due to the unprecedented level of state hostility, that made the Habbat October protests take a violent turn. The initial killings of Palestinians in Jerusalem did not have a great shock effect because they corresponded with Israeli actions against Palestinian in the Occupied Territories. However, the shock was in applying the same course of action against 1948 Palestinian citizens of the state.

In the 2000 Land Day, we have an example of a developed and well studied 1948 Palestinian protest plan. This plan takes into consideration both the limitations and open channels and resources that are available and can be used on local, state, and international levels. The reason for the well-calculated plan, I argue, was partly because the anniversary of the Land Day is a recurrent event that was expected to take place, and required planning in advance. In the year 2000, especially, the anniversary came during complicated conditions that the leadership thought demanded commemorating the occasion with more emphasis. The leadership, therefore, invested in the planning of the protest actions by joining the resources available to the various groups and unifying them into one. Even the incidental grievances were tied up together and linked to the bigger picture and the larger struggle over the land and equal rights.

Hence, if Habbat October initially was as important, or similarly important to the 2000 Land Day occasion, or if it was an intended act of confrontation, then the 1948 Palestinian leadership should have, at least, used similar working tactics to that in the 2000 Land Day, and involved the various actors, and unified the resources. Otherwise, why would the leadership not use all the resources available to them, as they did in the Land Day 2000, if they were at the edge of a confrontation with the state? However, what we see instead in the first Habbat October statement issued on September 30, are low-key protest plans typical to those taken usually in similar past incidental grievances, like the Jerusalem Day.

The Habbat October protest plans were issued following an emergency meeting, which means that the 1948 Palestinian leadership did not have enough time to fully study the situation and plan ahead. Unlike the Land Day 2000, where a wider array of actors attended, especially legal and advocacy activists, the protocol of Kofor Manda meeting suggests that those who attended were mainly political players. Therefore, the factors contributing to the existing framing of Habbat October initial public statement were a combination of political goals, lack of time for planning, and absence of diverse nonparty voices.



However, better planning and use of resources can be noticed in more advanced stages of Habbat October, in the heat of events after the killings happened. Apparently, the new tools were used amid the events when the shock effect was fading. The 1948 Palestinian political leadership and organizational bodies pulled themselves together; and started adopting the better developed advocacy and resistance techniques they would have used initially had they known that Habbat October was to escalate in that way. What happened in the midst and aftermath of events was remarkable, 1948 Palestinians used almost all the possible resources available to them with emphasis on legal mobilization, media, and international advocacy. 1948 Palestinians recruited different actors, and for the first time, had their own independent investigation, and gathered forensic evidence. In addition, in the aftermath, there was an unprecedented political advocacy work joined with NGOs' efforts to pressure the government to establish an investigation committee.

While examples discussed above showed similarities between the general conditions in Habbat October and other incidents, the main puzzle remains in the unprecedented confrontational mobilization of 1948 Palestinians despite the killings and the risks involved. In previous incidents, 1948 Palestinians gave weight even to holidays, economic situation, or fears of arrests, so what was different in Habbat October that contributed to the violent outcomes?

The 1948 Palestinian leadership and protesters in the street, were both critical of the state handling of events in Habbat October, blaming the state and police for the hostility and the excessive use of force. While there is evidence to suggest that the older generation in general was trying to calm down and prevent the youth from participating, there is still no evidence that the young demonstrators wanted to violently resist. In addition, interviews suggest that protesters were largely intimidated and went back home whenever killings happened.

Considering the high level of dissatisfaction and the tense relationship with the police, the 1948 leadership warned state officials against the presence of police and security forces during the 1948 Palestinian demonstrations, but their calls were ignored. Initially, protests were going according to plan, and in many places where the police was not present or did not interfere, there were no confrontations, and the demonstrations ended peacefully. However, the events took a confrontational turn as the police and snipers showed up, and the killings and arrests took place. From the point of view of the Israeli state, there were justifications for its hostile policies in Habbat October. The state clearly had its reasoning to fear the 1948 Palestinian public. In addition to the regional conditions

and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, by the year 2000 there was a growing sense of national and political awareness among 1948 Palestinian. 1948 Palestinians were voicing their national identity and requesting national and cultural rights more openly, while only a few years ago an increasing number of them were displaying Israeli flags on their cars on Israel's Independence Day.

However, Israel's overt justifications for its policy toward 1948 Palestinians during Habbat October can be, and were, challenged. For example, the Police stated during the "Rouah Searah" training that they could not allow the blocking of roads "because the Jewish people must travel there," and in order to "prevent a territorial continuity between Nablus and Lebanon." However, villages like Arrabeh, for example, were not on a highway, yet demonstrators were surprised by the presence of security forces. Moreover, on the 2000 Land Day, the central march in Sakhnin started near the Land Day martyr's memorial and headed west toward the Jewish Misgav Regional Council, passing through the internal Sakhnin main road, yet the state response was not like that during Habbat October. Finally, acting according to the "Kessem Ha-Mangina" order suggests the Israeli state had a preemptive intention to use an ironfist policy with the 1948 Palestinian demonstrators.

Another contributing factor to the Habbat October unexpected widespread participation and outcomes can be linked to the strike in schools, like the one initiated by schoolchildren in Arrabeh, for example. Students in this case did not necessarily participate in Habbat October out of awareness or ideology. While some students did, others may have taken part in protests as a result of curiosity, peer pressure, or simply because they had nothing better to do when out of school but to hang around in the streets. 1948 Palestinian children and youth severely suffer from the shortage in recreational activities, clubs, libraries, or play fields in their towns and villages. The profile of Aseel Asli, for example, one of the Habbat October victims, who was a teenage student in school, does not fit that of a "freedom fighter," or someone who would violently confront with the state security forces. An eyewitness who saw Aseel on the day he was killed said that Aseel who was an active member of Seeds of Peace, was teased by other protesters for going out. And while Aseel was not throwing stones or taking active part in the protests, he did get killed.

The increase in national awareness and the increase in participation and spread of protests during the Land Day 2000, can be an additional factor explaining the spread of the activities and the sense of collective solidarity in Habbat October. By October 2000, 1948 Palestinians had better developed resources and political awareness. By then, there were

new ideational resources introduced and available. For example, in 1999 Azmi Bishara, was the first and the only 1948 Palestinian to run for the post of prime minister.<sup>208</sup> There was also more unity as reflected in the Druze decision to participate in the Land Day 2000 strike. Despite serving in the Israeli army and sharing a "blood bond" with Jews, the Druze suffer from similar discrimination, and do not get their full rights. A better harmony was also reflected in the unity with the Bedouins in the Negev and their struggle. However, this better unified relationship between the various 1948 Palestinian groups should be put into perspective, and is not intended to portray a false image of a strong unity among the different 1948 Palestinian political and sectarian fractions. Because, while there was a change in the 1948 Palestinian consciousness the case may be still that the 1948 Palestinian unity was stronger on the 1976 Land Day.

Finally, there is more evidence to suggest that the political behavior in Habbat October was context specific. The grievances alone cannot explain the mobilization, and neither would the new resources. It is rather a combination of factors that gathered in this specific incident. The main ones would be: the police plan practiced in the demonstrations; the shock effect; the mirror effect (the similarity with the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories); the diffusion of the demonstrations over a big geographical area and isolated spots (unlike in past events). The combination of all of these factors together, joined by the general resource and political opportunities, the grievances and the positive framing of action, all led to Habbat October. It is a delicate formula, which may have not worked if one or more of these components were to be removed. The finding that a context matters in political mobilization is important in viewing and understanding other events.

However, to better understand the dynamics of political mobilization in Habbat October, there is a need to take into account the interplay between the various mobilizing components of grievances, political opportunities, resources, and their framing. These mobilizing components were constantly changing with the passage of time and the development of events, contributing to changes in the cognitive liberation process and cost-benefit calculations, and leading to changes in the nature and strategy of political mobilization.

As discussed earlier, the relationship between the 1948 Palestinian community and the state, especially the police, before Habbat October was highly tense for a number of reasons. The regional and internal context, especially with relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the termination of the peace negotiations, the provocative visit of Ariel Sharon to al-Haram, and the tragic death of Mohammed al-Durrah

repeatedly screened on TV, have all contributed to the general anger and discontent of 1948 Palestinians with Israeli policies. Furthermore, the situation internally added to the already existing discontent, due to a number of factors including the continuous discrimination against 1948 Palestinians by the state, the increasing racist Israeli anti-Arab rhetoric, the persistence of collision between 1948 Palestinians and the state over land issue such as in Rouha area or Negev, the targeting of some of the 1948 Palestinian leadership, and the tense relationship with the police. All of the above were instantly affecting the political opportunities of 1948 Palestinians. In addition, the presence of a number of new resources, such as independent 1948 Palestinian media and health services, which could better facilitate the political mobilization had also affected the dynamic of mobilization including the cognitive liberation process and cost-benefit calculations.

Despite arguments that indicate a shift in the political mobilization of 1948 Palestinians following Habbat October toward a more confrontational and violent political resistance, the findings of this book suggests otherwise. The Habbat October clashes became more violent after the first killings happened, however, if there was a major change in 1948 Palestinian activists' behavior then events should have lasted longer, or even erupted again in similar circumstance. However, this did not happen, not even with the persistence of 1948 Palestinian grievances after October 2000, and the availability of similar political opportunities and resources like in Habbat October. This further indicates that Habbat October was mainly a response rather than a planned resistant behavior. Moreover, while there was a change in the grassroots, in the profile of protesters, and in the framework of actions in Habbat October, this change appeared to be temporary and not drastic, and was contained by the fear of similar violent state responses.

Interestingly, when asked about not participating in past protests due to safety worries, interview subjects could not provide an answer, and sometimes gave contradicting responses. One explanation might be that Habbat October was a subtle gradual progress, and participants did not quite realize why or what they were doing. Other explanation suggests that Habbat October was a very special context specific incident, influenced by the dynamics between its mobilizing factors and conditions, and thus, cannot entirely measure to other cases.

Finally, it is important to stress that the mobilization of 1948 Palestinians in Habbat October was not limited to violent resistance as it is usually reported. The political mobilization in Habbat October was rather a very diverse political behavior that was constantly changing according to the context and the unfolding of events. The political mobilization of 1948

Palestinians in Habbat October ranged from withdrawal, on one end, to violent resistance, on the other. And while this chapter focused mainly on resistant or unprecedented 1948 Palestinian mobilization in Habbat October, other forms of mobilization in Habbat October, including acquiescence, should not be undermined.

## Chapter 4

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### Conclusion

The initial puzzle that triggered this book was the ostensible lack of political response of the 1948 Palestinians to the many injustices they suffered under Israeli rule. The sum of 1948 Palestinian grievances, this book argued, which started with the occupation of Palestine in 1948, and persisted ever since with a range of Israeli practices and policies against this minority, justified and sometimes even necessitated a political response. However, the preliminary observations, including those of an insider like myself, suggested an overall acquiescent 1948 Palestinian behavior especially when compared to that in the Occupied Territories. Yet, after concluding the research conducted for this book, this initial hypothesis has been challenged, revealing a more complex reality with some intriguing evidence about the nature and extent of the 1948 Palestinian forms of resistance.

Evidence collected on the political mobilization of the 1948 Palestinians mainly between the years 1948 and 2000 disclosed rich and varied types of behavior, ranging between passive acquiescence (withdrawal) on one end, and violent resistance on the other. It also revealed the problematic aspect that lies in the terms, and suggested the need for a broader interpretation of acquiescence, participation, and resistance. An interpretation, in which, sometimes the borders between the three types of behavior (acquiescence, participation, and resistance) become distorted, or even overlap. In that context, for example, resistance discussed in this book included public violence, as well as more private and mundane actions such as carrying a photo in private. In addition, there were examples where participation was in fact an act of resistance, like in the case of the al-Ard movement.

These revelations demanded reconsidering the initial hypothesis and putting things into a new perspective. In addition, these revelations prompted a key question as to the dynamics behind the 1948 Palestinian mobilization that could explain this varied range of 1948 Palestinian political behavior and response to grievances. Yet, before proceeding with the observations on the contributing factors behind mobilization, it is essential to first understand this mobilization in light of the 1948 Palestinian complex political reality.

On the one hand, 1948 Palestinians are "inferior" Arab and non-Jewish citizens in a Jewish and "democratic" country that is in an unremitting virtual state of war with its Arab neighbors. As discussed earlier, the 1948 Palestinians are discriminated against and targeted by Israeli state policies. They are often considered a fifth column and treated like state enemies. On the other hand, 1948 Palestinians are part of the Arab and Palestinian nation. While they sympathize with the Palestinian national plight for independence, they realize they are abandoned by all outside players and must, therefore, conduct their own battle for survival against or within the state of Israel.

Furthermore, the 1948 Palestinians had to regulate their relationship with the new Israeli state. At odds with placing them under Military Rule, the 1948 Palestinians were given the right to vote, and to have, in theory, a say in Israeli politics. The dilemma of political participation in the Israeli Knesset continues to be a tricky one. By participating in Israeli elections, 1948 Palestinians give legitimacy to the Israeli Knesset and its discriminatory nature and laws. Alternatively, their parliamentary presence in the Knesset could be said to contribute to their recognition by the state, and the protection of some of their civil rights. While the latter has proven to be of limited effectiveness, especially following the enactment of racist and discriminatory laws, one cannot determine, for instance, whether the presence of the 1948 Palestinian representatives has managed to block more severe laws.

Bearing in mind the above, it would seem that the 1948 Palestinians who found themselves defeated and deserted after the 1948 war had the choice of withdrawal or passive acquiescence, participation within the existing structures, or resorting to open resistance. However, none of these options were fully available or affordable to 1948 Palestinians. Withdrawal meant giving up their national identity, rights, and existence as Palestinians in the state of Israel. Political participation and full integration was not possible in a country where the granting of civil rights is made conditional upon being Jewish. Finally, open resistance was costly and required the presence of enabling political, social, and economic conditions and resources, which were not available to a weak minority who just survived the war.

Therefore, the 1948 Palestinian answer was to largely adopt survival mechanisms, which could assure them a decent level of personal safety and existence. While this might be directly understood as an acquiescent behavior, the execution of this survival mechanism, as this book found, was more complex—revealing forms of more mundane resistance. The state of affairs of the 1948 Palestinians, especially under Military Rule, reflects a multifaceted reality with mixed 1948 Palestinian behavior ranging between acquiescence, participation, and resistance.

Even though at that stage the 1948 Palestinians did not seem to have the political opportunities or resources necessary to make open resistance feasible, and while they by and large acquiesced to Israeli sovereignty and put up with Military Rule's discriminatory practices, there were still occasions on which the 1948 Palestinians resisted openly. Resistance under Military Rule and during the state of war and emergency declared in Israel was costly, especially in the early stages of the state's establishment. However, and against all odds, one can find spontaneous as well as planned the 1948 Palestinian mobilization incidents against state policies that targeted them, as part of their survival attempts.

While it seems like the most dominant mode of response was withdrawal or acquiescent participation, there is a big challenge in attempting to determine the dominant behavior of the 1948 Palestinians. To start with, the 1948 Palestinians cannot be referred to as one entity with a unified political stand or action. This minority is varied politically and socially, with fluctuating responses and political behavior.

The main purpose of this book is to understand the nature of the political behavior of the 1948 Palestinians, and explain its mobilization dynamics. This was done with the help of three social-movement theory approaches: political-opportunities structure, resource mobilization, and frame analysis. These approaches provided a useful theoretical framework to understand the varied and sometimes conflicting responses of the 1948 Palestinians to their predicament. The core argument of these three approaches is that the presence of grievances is not enough on its own to generate mobilization. For people to mobilize, they need to have the opportunity and resources to do so, and they need to frame their grievances, and their predicament more broadly, in such a way that political mobilization becomes possible.<sup>1</sup>

In line with this theoretical argument, there were plenty of incidents that gave rise to grievances justifying mobilization, yet, the 1948 Palestinian response to them was total acquiescence. This was, in part, due to the fear of a hostile state response from the Israeli authorities to those who challenge its policies, or due to limitations in the political opportunities or resources perceived to be available to the 1948 Palestinians.



Alongside this, however, this book disclosed incidents, such as the Red Identification Document (ID) battle or the al-Ard movement, in which the 1948 Palestinians mobilized notwithstanding the many opposing circumstances. Many times, and despite the limited political opportunities and resources, the 1948 Palestinians took the risk and mobilized despite the low chances of success and the costly price of challenging the state. The social-movement theory refers this kind of outcome to the positive framing or optimism of social-movement participants that by acting collectively they can redress, or at least more explicitly address, the problem. This kind of positive framing, or cognitive liberation process, encourages social-movement participants and helps them transcend the costly price of mobilization.<sup>2</sup> In addition, evidence from the case studies in this book suggests that participants disregarded cost-benefit calculations in the heat of the events or as a result of a shock effect. This was true, for example, in incidents where 1948 Palestinians were met with unexpected state violence, and participation was recorded despite circumstances with discouraging mobilization conditions.

The detailed analysis of the case studies of the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October enabled identifying some of the factors that contributed to the 1948 Palestinian mobilization. Together with the existence of a strong grievance, these factors included, as social-movement theory argues, the sum of political, social, and economic resources and opportunities, as well as positive framing. However, while the contributing mobilizing factors were similar in most incidents, the dynamics of mobilization varied. More interestingly, the analysis provided a better understanding of the mobilization dynamics of the 1948 Palestinians. These mobilization dynamics are better understood when taking into account the interplay between the various mobilizing components of grievances, political opportunities, resources, and their framing, which constantly changes, contributing to changes in the cognitive liberation process and cost-benefit calculations, and leading to changes in the nature and strategy of political mobilization.

The case study analysis also pointed at two types of 1948 Palestinian mobilization, preplanned and spontaneous, with each kind appearing to have its own mobilizing dynamics. The preplanned 1948 Palestinian mobilization is a more rational and better-calculated response, which self-consciously takes into account the political opportunities and resources available and works within their limits. Whereas, the spontaneous or the reactionary 1948 Palestinian mobilization usually includes impulsive reactions, and takes place at either the beginning or middle of a particular protest cycle. In contrast to preplanned mobilization, these impulsive reactions, seen during the violent clashes in both the 1976 Land Day and

Habbat October, are less likely to take into account cost-benefit calculations, or act rationally in accordance with the available political opportunities, or by efficiently using the sum of resources available for mobilization. Yet, as shown in this book, in both case studies, even the spontaneous response built on preexisting networks, resources, and even, up to a point, perceptions of what was possible (e.g. unity across parties, areas, etc.).

One of the aims of this book was to compare the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October events hoping to reach some conclusions that can be generalized or applied to the wider 1948 Palestinian context. The 1976 Land Day and Habbat October were chosen because they stand out as among the most prominent cases of mass 1948 Palestinian mobilization since 1948, allowing to gain an insight into how these two events occurred and why they panned out the way they did. Their prominence in the collective memory and their mass nature ensured that information was more readily available than in other cases. In addition, more than any other, these two events represent examples of nationwide collective behavior, thus making it easier to generalize about dominant behavior (though even on these occasions the 1948 Palestinians acted in diverse and contradictory ways).

The comparative study of the two cases allowed some general observations about the dynamics of the 1948 Palestinian mobilization to be made. A third case study where such mobilization did not occur, would have enabled this comparative study to make more general observations about why mass mobilization happens on some occasions and not on others. However, the minicomparisons with similar events to those analyzed in the case studies where mass mobilization did not occur allows this book to make some limited claims on this matter.

This book suggests that the political behavior of the 1948 Palestinians is highly context specific, or in other words it is dependent upon the circumstances of the case in question, and therefore, it is difficult to use the triggers for past behavior in order to predict future behavior. As an example, while the presence of the security forces in Habbat October appears to have contributed to the escalation of events, it does not necessarily mean that their presence is likely to have the same outcome in future contexts.

Nevertheless, a number of general observations can be drawn from the two case studies of the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October. For instance, in both case studies police brutality and violence, and a breakdown in police-community relations, affected the mobilization dynamics. In addition, national-level organization around specific issues proved to be of great importance, enabling denser networks, which in turn enabled the new formulation of grievances, and action frames. National consciousness appeared to be crucial for transcending class, party, and area difference, and forming a more unified mobilization.

Yet having said so, the changing political behavior which took place during the events of both the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October provided an interesting insight into the perception and understanding of the 1948 Palestinian participants, and enabled the identification of the 1948 Palestinian mobilization dynamics. Compared to the 1976 Land Day, which was at its initiation a preplanned, sophisticated, and ambitious campaign to peacefully resist the Israeli policy of land confiscation and halt the Galilee Development Plan, Habbat October, as illustrated in this book, had less ambitious goals at its beginning.

In that sense, Habbat October does not represent, as some argue, an advance or turning point in the 1948 Palestinian behavior toward a more violent and confrontational mobilization. In fact, while Habbat October was unprecedented in the sense that it spread over a large geographical area, and lasted for a number of days, I argue that its real value lies in the aftermath phase, which included the campaign to establish an independent investigation commission and prosecute the guilty. These steps represent advancement in resistance mechanisms by the 1948 Palestinians. The sophisticated 1948 Palestinian campaign run by the High Follow-Up Committee, the Committee of the Victim's families, and a number of NGOs, but mainly Adalah, was an example of a highly sophisticated social movement in which participants joined forces and used the sum of resources available to them to pressure the Israeli government and achieve their goals.

Habbat October, therefore, reflected advancement in the 1948 Palestinian resistance—yet, crucially, not violent resistance, but rather a nonviolent form of resistance. As summarized by Marwan Dwairy, the chair of Adalah's board of directors, in the aftermath of Habbat October, the 1948 Palestinians were no longer satisfied with protest and keeping the memory of the victims alive, but they were working to secure the punishment of the guilty using "a new mechanism of response" that contains "the necessary ingredients for achieving progress."<sup>3</sup> Alternatively, in social movement terms, the new mobilization mechanism was trying to maximize its chances of success by taking advantage of the political opportunities and resources available to the 1948 Palestinians at the time.

Moreover, Dwairy highlighted a further advancement in the 1948 Palestinian mobilization strategies in the aftermath of Habbat October with the focus on, what he called, three coordinated pathways that include the judicial, the popular, and the international pathway. In other words, the advance in the 1948 Palestinian mobilization strategy can be seen in their simultaneous work on more than one advocacy level and their expansion into the international realm. Securing the presence of sympathetic elites by creating alliances with international bodies, and borrowing from

international experiences and applying it to the 1948 Palestinian context is needed to further increase the chances of movement success.

It is important to note that this Habbat October mobilizing mechanism does not represent a radical advancement since similar working mechanisms, for example, the resort to international channels, were used in the past. For instance, Tawfik Toubi and the Communist Party resorted to international channels during their campaign to expose the 1956 Kofur Qasim massacre. In addition, the al-Ard movement used international advocacy in the 1960s when it prepared a memorandum on the situation of the 1948 Palestinians and sent it to the secretary of the United Nations, and to international newspapers as well as foreign embassies in Israel, members of the Knesset, and various Israeli institutions. Furthermore, reaching out to international organizations took off in earnest in the 1990s.

Therefore, the resort to international advocacy in itself is not new, but the change is rather in the development of a more organized and efficient way of cooperation, which makes use of these resources and channels on a more regular basis. Indeed, in the years following Habbat October there has been an increasing and intensive movement to involve international bodies in the 1948 Palestinian struggle. These efforts have included running campaigns, forming international alliances, organizing field trips (to countries such as Ireland and South Africa), and briefings on the 1948 Palestinian issues, in addition to participating in international conferences such as the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (WCAR), also known as Durban I, which was held in South Africa under the auspices of the United Nations. The language of the final "Declaration and Programme of Action" produced by the WCAR was highly critical of Israel and its discriminatory actions both against 1948 Palestinians and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. A delegation of 1948 Palestinian NGOs, led by Adalah, took a very active role in this conference.<sup>4</sup>

The resort of the 1948 Palestinians to international solidarity resources is both material and ideational, and was driven by a number of factors. The Habbat October violent outcome and killings, the Jewish revenge actions, the disappointment with the Or Commission's investigation and results, and the failure to prosecute those in charge of the killings, in addition to the presence of new resources and the closure of Israeli system, all of these factors made the 1948 Palestinians turn to international advocacy.

Another development that can be noted in the 1948 Palestinian mobilization strategy is the clear pattern of adaptation and learning from other similar experiences. While this book focused closely on two cases in which the 1948 Palestinians used frame extension and frame bridging to appeal to a larger audience, the 1948 Palestinians new mobilizing

mechanisms progressed to a more developed level of framing where framing is used to exercise pressure rather than simply gain more sympathy. In this context, for example, Dwairy argues that the announcement that the 1948 Palestinians intend to follow the example of the Irish Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign, in their attempts to prosecute those responsible for Habbat October, "had a great impact on the Israeli establishment as well as on public opinion."<sup>5</sup>

The new level of cooperation between the 1948 Palestinians, especially NGOs, and international players since 2000 is remarkable. It comprises of advocacy and support campaigns, including receiving open messages of sympathy from international activists, such as the one received from Tony Doherty, the member of the Bloody Sunday Justice Campaign in February 2001, and publicized in Adalah's publications.<sup>6</sup> Together with public and media advocacy, these NGOs are consulting, communicating, and liaising with international professionals to benefit from other experiences and strengthen their position in front of the Israeli establishment. In the Habbat October campaign, for example, NGOs used international expert opinions in legal and other professional domains. For instance, in its investigation and advocacy, Adalah used the work of legal and human right experts such as Lord Gifford, or police management expert Dr. Stephen Males. Dr. Males was part of a delegation sent by Amnesty International to examine policing of public order in Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank in the critical period of escalation of violence in October 2000.

In addition to international legal advocacy work and cooperation with countries that have similar experiences such as Ireland and South Africa, the mobilization of the 1948 Palestinians in the aftermath of the killings witnessed the resort to cultural advocacy as well. A number of 1948 Palestinian artists and directors, such as Muhammed Bakri or Kamal al-Jafari, chose a new tool of resistance through the production and screening of documentaries and films inside Israel and abroad. This new tool of resistance, according to Magid Shihade, represents the resilience of the 1948 Palestinians who view history in centuries and not in decades, and who view history as the making of human deeds and its challenge by human misdeeds.<sup>7</sup>

Yet, perhaps even more interesting than the alliances formed between the 1948 Palestinian and international actors, are the alliances and sophisticated levels of cooperation between the various 1948 Palestinian actors both during Habbat October and the 1976 Land Day. On 1976 Land Day, the various 1948 Palestinian representatives and leadership met together, overcoming political and class differences, to work on the land issue. Habbat October also witnessed a unique cooperation between the political leadership, represented by the High Follow-Up Committee,

and professional actors represented by Adalah and other 1948 Palestinian NGOs. This cooperation resulted in the formation of the Committee for the Victim's Families, which brought a personal dimension to the Habbat October campaign for justice, and worked alongside Adalah and the High Follow-Up Committee to bring about the prosecution of the guilty.

This level of cooperation was possible during the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October, due to two main factors. First, the overall conditions and political opportunities improved, especially with the removal of Military Rule and the development of new opportunities including the freedom of movement and assembly, and the introduction of new resources. The new resources were the result of, among other things, the expansion of educational opportunities, and a proliferation of NGOs and other civil society organizations. Second, the grievances in question in both case studies were very strong, and were perceived as posing an existential threat to personal 1948 Palestinian safety or existence, and thus, encouraging the various players to transcend their differences and unite against their mutual enemy. While being overall united, this 1948 Palestinian coalition, especially in the case of Habbat October, had its moments of conflict over issues such as commemoration activities, or the level of involvement and representation of the various actors.

In this regard, both the 1976 Land Day and Habbat October allowed the unification of the 1948 Palestinians around a single issue. This was in part because in these events the 1948 Palestinians were crystallized around a very specific and immediate threat that resonated with a set of permanent grievances. Furthermore, such single-issue mobilization did not directly threaten the position of each of the participants, especially the leadership. In other words, there was no direct danger of being usurped by the new mobilizing structures, but rather they were seen as strengthening existing structures.

A third factor in both cases appears to have been the emergence of a more self-conscious and confident Palestinian national identity, strengthened not only by internal changes, such as the increase in resources and freedom of movement mentioned above, but also by regional events. The 1976 Land Day appears to have been facilitated by a growing recognition that neither the wider Palestinian national movement nor the Arab regimes in the region would come to the rescue of the 1948 Palestinians. Habbat October was similarly influenced by the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada and the increased sense of solidarity felt by both 1948 Palestinians and Palestinians from the Occupied Territories toward each other.

Although not much has changed since 2000 in the scale or intensity of the 1948 Palestinian mobilization, the introduction of new resources and the slightly more daring 1948 Palestinian rhetoric do represent significant

developments. The years since 2000 have witnessed the emergence of a more self-conscious and confident Palestinian national identity, strengthened by both regional events, and by internal events such as the Land Day and Habbat Octobers. For example, in December 2006, a document entitled the "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel" was released calling on the state of Israel to recognize the 1948 Palestinians as an indigenous people with collective rights. Supported by the United Nations, the document was prepared by the National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in Israel (the National Committee of Arab Local Council Heads—NCALCH), using a committee of 1948 Palestinians that included academic researchers and social activists representing a wide range of the 1948 Palestinian society.<sup>8</sup>

The document defined Israel as an ethnocracy and advocated a binational democratic state, thus sparking concerns among Israeli security, political, and academic circles, and attracting the attention of Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) investigators while enjoying limited public attention.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps, the Shin Bet's interest in the "Future Vision" can be justified when realizing this document was one in a number of legal and political documents issued by 1948 Palestinians relatively soon after Habbat October. The other documents included "The Democratic Constitution" published by Adalah, "A Constitution that Gives Equal Rights to All" published by Mossawa centre, and "Haifa Document" published by Mada al-Carmel Arab Centre for Applied Social Research. In fact, a meeting was held between the then prime minister Ehud Olmert and the head of Shin Bet, Yuval Diskin, to discuss the documents. Diskin, who attributed elements of extremism to the documents, accused the 1948 Palestinian community of "posing a strategic threat to Israel."<sup>10</sup>

However, these accusations of 1948 Palestinian radicalization after October 2000 are put in a different perspective when reminded of "The 6 June 1980 Document," issued by the 1948 Palestinian leadership in Haifa and signed by thousands of 1948 Palestinians. Considering its timing, and the circumstances in which it was issued, "The 6 June 1980 Document" reflected a courageous and daring language. The document, which condemned the Israeli occupation and the building of illegal settlements, was highly critical of Israeli practices against the Palestinian people. While it did not call for a binational state, it did refer to the 1948 Palestinians as the indigenous people who remained on their land despite all the discriminatory practices and the attempts to uproot them.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, this document, which was issued only four years after the 1976 Land Day, could perhaps reflect a radicalization in 1948 Palestinian positions more than the "Future Vision" document could. Furthermore, while being more daring rhetorically, actionwise nothing much has changed.

The political situation in Israel at present continues to push the 1948 Palestinians further away from the prospect of normalcy or full citizenship rights. There is a growing Jewish-Israeli radicalization and shift toward the right, evident in the latest election results and the rise to power of Avigdor Lieberman, a right wing Zionist pioneer of Arab Transfer. In addition, the demographic predictions continue to constitute an existential threat to the Jewish nature of the state of Israel. Furthermore, the high level of 1948 Palestinian political awareness together with the continuation of Israeli discriminatory and racist practices against them, increases the chances of future confrontations.

However, considering the available political opportunities and the limited 1948 Palestinian resources, and the costly price for participation especially under a radical right-wing government, which is trying to condition citizenship with loyalty and recognition of the Jewish character of the state, it is less likely that the 1948 Palestinians will initiate a preplanned openly resistant movement in the near future. A living example to this theory is the recent clashes in Aka, or the containment of the Shafa Amr massacre protests in 2005.

Future test for this theory would be in the 1948 Palestinian response to the Israeli prosecution of the 12 Shafa Amr massacre survivors, accused of "lynching" Eden Natan-Zada. Dubbed a "Jewish terrorist" by the then prime minister Ariel Sharon, IDF soldier Natan-Zada targeted 1948 Palestinian passengers on a bus in the Palestinian town of Shafa Amr, and opened fire from his M-16 rifle killing 4 1948 Palestinians, including 2 sisters, and injuring 22. The prosecution is another indication to 1948 Palestinians of the double standards of the Israeli authorities.

The crowd who was, according to 1948 Palestinians, able to overpower Natan-Zada and kill him was acting in self-defense to spare more lives. Moreover, the prosecution of the massacre survivors is brought against the prosecution decision to formally close an investigation into possible assistance Natan-Zada received from Jewish extremist groups. In addition, this prosecution will add to the eroded faith of the 1948 Palestinians in the Israeli justice system, considering the failure to prosecute any of the Israeli police officers responsible for the killing of 1948 Palestinians during Habbat October despite the recommendations of the Or Commission.<sup>12</sup> Hopefully the mobilization dynamics explained in this book will be helpful in understanding future case studies such as this one.

Finally, this book should be seen as part of an effort to bring insights of the social-movement theory to the study of Middle Eastern political mobilization.<sup>13</sup> The social-movement theory has been useful in illuminating the 1948 Palestinian mobilization dynamics in terms of the questions it asks, and its foci. Furthermore, the integrated use of the three



social-movement approaches (Political-Opportunities Structure, Resource Mobilization, Frame Alignment) has generated a strong and more inclusive analysis of the 1948 Palestinian political behavior. While applying social-movement theory to this thesis, a new theoretical model was introduced and developed to account for the interesting dynamic of grievance framing. I argued that the 1948 Palestinian grievances appeared to be classified, framed, stored (in both individual and collective memory), and remembered in categories of the same type, with an additional reference to time. I then introduced my new grievance-classifying model, with the terms "old" versus "new," and "permanent" versus "incidental" grievances, as its main components. Furthermore, the analysis of the case studies in this book highlighted the heat of the moment or the shock effect, which was found to have a temporary paralyzing effect on the cost-benefit calculations of social-movement participation. In addition, this book recognized the importance of looking at the regional situation as part of the political opportunities of a movement, something the social-movement theory has traditionally neglected.

# Notes

## I INTRODUCTION

1. (2006). *The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel*. The National Committee of Arab Local Council Heads (NCALCH) in Israel. p. 3.
2. This preliminary perception of 1948 Palestinian behavior is later contested following the results of a thorough field research that revealed instances of 1948 Palestinian civil disobedience, and provided evidence of a more complex 1948 Palestinian political behavior.
3. My doctoral dissertation on which this book is based.
4. "Second Lebanon War." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved January 3, 2009, from: <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/IsraelUnderAttack/Lebanon+North/attacklebanonnorth.htm>.
5. (September 9, 2006). "1948 Arabs: Victims of War and Racism." *CNN*, Dubai. Retrieved January 3, 2009, from: [http://www.newsarchiver.com/calendar/2/2006/html/ind\\_2012.htm](http://www.newsarchiver.com/calendar/2/2006/html/ind_2012.htm). (In Arabic).
6. Cook, Jonathan (Thursday, July 20, 2006). "Israeli-Arabs Killed in Attack." Retrieved January 3, 2009, from: <http://www.jkcook.net/Articles2/0260.htm>.
7. As will be explained later, the term Habbat October was introduced by some 1948 Palestinians to describe the October 2000 protests, which escalated into days of clashes between Israeli security forces and 1948 Palestinians, resulting in 13 deaths.
8. See, for example, the case of al-Ard movement and their unsuccessful attempt to join the Knesset, discussed later in the 1976 Land Day chapter.
9. According to figures released on April 27, 2009, by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Jewish population of Israel stood at 5,593,000 and the Arab population was listed at 1,498,000, or 20.2 percent of the general population. Retrieved May 4, 2009, from: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1081532.html>.
10. See, Christison, K. M. (1987). "Myths about Palestinians." *Foreign Policy* (66): 109–127.
11. For more on the identity crisis of 1948 Palestinians see the International Crisis Group report (March 4, 2004). "Identity Crisis: Israel and Its Arab

- Citizens." Middle East report number 25. Also available online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2528&l=1>.
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  13. The terms are borrowed from Benedict Anderson's concept of imagined community, which states that a nation is a community socially constructed or imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of the same group. See, Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London; New York, Verso.
  14. For more on the Druze in Israel and their special relationship with the state, see, Al-Qasim, N. (1995). *The Druze in Israel: The Historical and Current Dimension*. (in Arabic); Parsons, L. (2000). *The Druze between Palestine and Israel, 1947–49*. New York, St. Martin's Press.
  15. See, for example, Sofer, Arnon (2000). *Israel: Demography 2000–2020*. Haifa, University of Haifa.
  16. According to HRA, a conference held on security issues, in December 2003, and organized by the Institute of Policy and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center in Hertzilya, proved that demographics have become a favorite topic among Israel's political elite. See, Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA) press release issued on January 14, 2004.
  17. Minns, A. and N. Hijab (1990). *Citizens Apart: A Portrait of the Palestinians in Israel*. London, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd; Zughaib, Y. (2003). *1948 Palestinians: Identity, Reality, and Future*. Beirut, Baheth Centre for Studies. (in Arabic); Jiryis, S. (1972). *Democratic Freedoms in Israel*. Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies; Masalha, N., ed. (1993). *The Palestinians in Israel: Is Israel the State of All Its Citizens and "Absentees?"* Haifa, Galilee Center for Social Research.
  18. Tessler, Mark and Audra K. Grant. (1998). "Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555: 97.
  19. Also known as the Taba agreement. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed September 24, 1995, in Taba, Egypt.
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  21. Dalal, M. (2003). *October 2000: Law and Politics Before the Or Commission of Inquiry*. Israel, Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel.
  22. See, for example, Sultany, Nimer (2003). *Citizens without Citizenship: Mada's First Annual Political Monitoring Report: Israel and The Palestinian Minority 2000–2002*. Haifa, Mada al-Carmel—The Arab Centre for Applied Research; Louer, Laurence. (2007). *To Be an Arab in Israel*. New York, Columbia University Press; Zughaib, *1948 Palestinians: Identity, Reality, and Future*; Dwairy, Marwan (October 2005). "October 2000: Defined Goals and New Mechanisms." *Adalah's Newsletter* 19; Raphael Israeli. (2002). *Arabs*

- in Israel: Friends or Foes?* Israel, ACPR Publishers (in Hebrew); Rabinowitz, Dan, Asad Ghanem, and Oren Yiftachel, eds. (2000). *After the Break: New Directions to the Government's Policy towards the Arabs in Israel*. An emergency report presented to Prime Minister Ehud Barak.
23. Sultany, *Citizens without Citizenship*.
  24. From a poster issued by *Ihud* denouncing Military Rule. *Ihud* (Union) was a historically significant political party for Palestine/Israel reconciliation calling for a binational state in Palestine instead of partition. The poster issued in 1958, ten years after the introduction of Military Rule, complained about the exploitation of power by Military governors, and called for the abolition of Military Rule. The poster signed by Prof. Martin Buber, Prof. E. Simon, Prof. A. Bonné, of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem and others. See, Schwarz, W. (1959). *The Arabs in Israel*. London, Faber and Faber. p. 11 and 79.
  25. Shafir, G. and Y. Peled (2002). *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. p. 112.
  26. (September 27, 1945). *Palestine Gazette* No. 1442. pp. 1055–1098.
  27. For more on the many restrictions of 1948 Palestinian freedoms under Military Rule, see, Jiryis, S. (1981). "Domination by the Law." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11(1): 67–92.
  28. Schwarz, *The Arabs in Israel*.
  29. Palestinian national songs or those that might carry national messages (i.e. with reference to land, homeland, family reunification, or right of return) were banned in private and public events. According to oral testimonies gathered for this book, many were arrested for singing such songs or even attending gatherings where such songs were sung.
  30. Jamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970), the late Egyptian president who promoted the idea of Arab nationalism.
  31. For more on Military Rule practices see, Lustick, I. (1980). *Arabs in the Jewish State. Israel's Control of a National Minority*. Austin, TX, University of Texas Press.
  32. Interview, Mohammed Shoughry (June 6, 2005), Kufor Yassif.
  33. General Security Services or Shabak, is Israel's domestic security agency.
  34. For more on the network of 1948 Palestinian informers, and Shin Bet involvement to control the 1948 Palestinian minority, see Cohen, H. (2006). *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Services and the Israeli Arabs*. Jerusalem, Ivrit - Hebrew Publishing House.
  35. Melman, Y. (May 25, 2004). "Even the Shin Bet Is Against Discrimination." *Haaretz*, Also available online at <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=431606&contrassID=2&subContrassID=20&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y>.
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39. Schwarz, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 61.
40. Jiryis, "Domination by the Law," 67–92.
41. An alliance of Israel, United Kingdom and France fought a war against Egypt following Jamal Abdel Nasser's declaration to nationalize the Suez Canal Company.
42. Jiryis, S. (1976). *The Arabs in Israel*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
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47. Karpel, D. (2000). "Yes, We Are from the Same Village." In *Kufor Qasim: Events and Myths*. Edited by R. Rosental. Tel Aviv, Hakibutz Hameuhad. pp. 178–195. (In Hebrew); Rosental, R. (2000). "Who Killed Fatmah Sarsur." In *Kufor Qasim: Events and Myths*. Edited by R. Rosental. Tel Aviv, Hakibutz Hameuhad. pp. 11–51. (In Hebrew).
48. Jiryis, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 141.
49. For more information on the Kufor Qasim massacre from different aspects, see, Rosental, Rubik (2000), *Kufor Qasim: Events and Myths*. Tel-Aviv. The account is taken mainly from two articles in the book: Karpel, "Yes, We Are from the Same Village," pp. 178–195; Rosental, "Who Killed Fatmah Sarsur," pp. 11–51.
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51. Ibid.
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53. *Sefer Ha-Chukkim* No. 5714, p. 174 - LSI vol. VIII, p. 144.
54. The Law of Return 5710 (1950).
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58. For a more thorough discussion of this law see, Jiryis, "Recent Knesset Legislation and the Arabs," 53.
59. Jiryis, "Domination by the Law," 67–92.
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90. Klandermans, “Mobilization and Participation,” 583–600.
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## 2    1976 LAND DAY

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9. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*.
10. The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine adopted by a decision of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended dividing Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and an international zone of Jerusalem and its environs under United Nations Jurisdiction. According to Sami Hadawi, the Jewish state was to comprise 56.47 percent when in fact, at the time, Jewish land ownership within the frontiers of the proposed Jewish state was less than 10 percent and less than 6 percent in the whole of Palestine. For more see, Hadawi, S. (1989). "The Palestine Problem before the United Nations (1947–1948)." In *Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine*. Essex, Scorpion Publishing Ltd. pp. 64–81. Also see, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 session-1 "Future Government of Palestine," November 29, 1947.
11. During the British Mandate, the Triangle was that part of the Samaria District enclosing Nablus, Tulkaram, and Jenin. In the 1948 war, the villagers in the Triangle successfully resisted the entry of the Israeli forces. However, in the Rhodes Agreement of 1949, half of the Triangle was incorporated by Israel. This Israeli Triangle, or the Little Triangle as the Israelis call it, lies about 25 miles to the east of Tel Aviv on the Jordanian border (Jiryis, 1969).
12. Toma, E. (1988). "The Political and Ideological Development of the Palestinians in Israel." In *The Palestinians in Israel 1948–1988*. Edited by K. Khalefeh. Shafa Amr, Dar al-Mashreq. pp. 15–29.
13. Jiryis, S. (1981). "Domination by the Law." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11(1): 67–92.
14. Adalah. "History of the Palestinians in Israel." Retrieved April 19, 2008, from: <http://www.adalah.org/eng/backgroundhistory.php>.
15. For more on the situation of the Arabic language in Israel and the discrepancy between its formal status and its de facto marginal status, see Spolsky, B. (1994). "The Situation of Arabic in Israel." In *Arabic Sociolinguistics: Issues and Perspectives*. Edited by Y. Suleiman. Richmond, VA, Curzon Press. pp. 227–236; Amara, M. (2006). "The Vitality of the Arabic Language in Israel from a Sociolinguistic Perspective." *Adalah's Newsletter*. 29.
16. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, p. 160.

17. Olive Trees in "Zion," Discrimination Diary Series, No. 2, The Arab Association for Human Right. Available online at <http://www.arabhra.org/Hra/SecondaryArticles/SecondaryArticlePage.aspx?SecondaryArticle=1632&Language=2>.
18. The general statement of the National Conference to defend the Arab lands in Israel, held on October 18, 1975 (in Arabic). Also available in, (1976), *The Black Book*, p. 143.
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21. Neff, D. (1981). *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East*. New York, Linden Press.
22. Ismael, T. (1998). *International Relations of the Contemporary Middle East: Contemporary Issues in the Middle East*. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press.
23. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*; Shemesh, M. (2007). *Arab Politics, Palestinian Nationalism and the Six Day War: The Crystallization of Arab Strategy and Nasir's Descent to War, 1957–1967*. Brighton, UK, Sussex Academic Press; Heikal, M. H. (1996). *Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations*. London, Harper Collins Publishers.
24. The name given to the 1949 Armistice lines that constituted the de facto borders of pre-1967 Israel. "Glossary: Israel," Library of Congress Country Studies, Retrieved June 16, 2009, from: [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/israel/il\\_glos.html](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/israel/il_glos.html).
25. Dawisha, A. (2002). *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
26. Aburish, S. K. (2004). *Nasser: The Last Arab*. New York, St. Martin's Press.
27. Tessler, M. A. (1994). *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press. p. 478.
28. Heikal, *Secret Channels: The Inside Story*, p. 9.
29. Zarley, K. (1990). *Palestine Is Coming: The Revival of Ancient Philistia*. Garland, TX, Hannibal Books.
30. Heikal, *Secret Channels: The Inside Story*, p. 320.
31. Zarley, *Palestine Is Coming: The Revival*.
32. Hirst, D. (1984). *The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East*. London, Faber and Faber. p. 13.
33. Shultz, R. H. (1989). *Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices and Regional Comparisons*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press; Zarley, *Palestine Is Coming: The Revival*; Farsoun, S. K. and C. E. Zacharia (1997). *Palestine and the Palestinians*. Westview Press.
34. A Palestinian community and political leader who was the head of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid Conference of 1991.
35. Interview, Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh, (October 11, 2007) Kufor Yassif.

36. PASSIA Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. "Naqara, Hanna (1912–1983)." Retrieved March 22, 2009, from: [http://www.passia.org/palestine\\_facts/personalities/alpha\\_n.htm](http://www.passia.org/palestine_facts/personalities/alpha_n.htm). For a more detailed biography of Hanna Naqara see, Ibrahim, H., ed. (1985). *Hanna Naqara, the Land and Nation Lawyer*. Akka, Dar al-Aswar. (in Arabic).
37. Karkabi, *The Land Day*, p. 26 (in Arabic).
38. Carey, S. C. (2009). *Protest, Repression and Political Regimes: An Empirical Investigation*. US, Taylor & Francis; Hafez, M. M. and Q. Wiktorowicz (2004). "Violence as Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement." In *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Edited by Q. Wiktorowicz, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press. pp. 61–88.
39. Workers General Union.
40. See further discussion of state response to the Land Day campaign later in this chapter.
41. Also known as the political-process theory or the political-opportunity theory.
42. McAdam, D. (1999). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press. p. 41.
43. Toma, "The Political and Ideological Development," pp. 15–29.
44. Sa'ad, A. (1988). "The Economic Situation of the Arabs in Israel." In *The Palestinians in Israel 1948–1988*. Edited by K. Khalefeh. Shafa Amr, Dar al-Mashreq. pp. 107–125 (In Arabic).
45. (1976). "Top Secret: Memorandum-Proposal-Handling," 195–196.
46. Israel "resolved" this dependency in later years when it replaced 1948 Palestinian workforce with cheaper labor of Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, which was replaced in recent years with foreign labor for both security and dependency justifications.
47. Gunning, J. (2007). *Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence*. London, Hurst & Company. pp. 38–39 (also pp. 247–248); Younis, M. (2000). *Liberation and Democratization: The South African and Palestinian National Movements*. Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press. p. 155 (also pp. 148–150).
48. Landau, J. M. (1993). *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991: Political Aspects*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. p. 60.
49. Tessler, M. and A. K. Grant (1998). "Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555: 97–113. p. 103.
50. Jiryis, S. (1976). *The Arabs in Israel*. New York, Monthly Review Press.
51. Nachleh, K. (1988). "The Palestinian Academics and the Revolutionary Change." In *The Palestinians in Israel 1948–1988*. Edited by K. Khalefeh. Shafa Amr, Dar al-Mashreq. pp. 38–63. (In Arabic).
52. Al-Haj, M. (1987). *Social Change and Family Processes: Arab Communities in Shfar-A'm*. CT, Westview Press. p. 3.
53. Tessler and Grant, "Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle," 103.
54. According to Al-Haj, "The formal definition of the extended family or the joint family is: a familiar unit composed of three generations, the father,

- the mother, the unmarried children, one or more of the married sons and their wives and children. Sometimes the extended family includes as well a single uncle or aunt. Several characteristics of the extended family identified as the main characteristics of the extended family: common residence, property, common workshop or other economic base, kitchen, patriarchal authority, and mutual commitments among the family members." Al-Haj, *Social Change and Family Processes*, p. 85.
55. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*, p. 50.
  56. Tessler and Grant, "Israel's Arab Citizens: The Continuing Struggle," 103.
  57. For more on the Histadrut see, Louer, L. (2007). *To Be an Arab in Israel*. New York, Columbia University Press; Schwarz, W. (1959). *The Arabs in Israel*. London, Faber and Faber; Stendel, O. (1996). *The Arabs in Israel*. Brighton, Sussex Academic Press; Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*.
  58. Relations between the Histadrut and 1948 Palestinians began during the British rule in Palestine. In 1953, the Histadrut opened its trade unions to 1948 Palestinian membership. In 1958, a small number of 1948 Palestinians, 883 in all, mostly Druze, were accepted for full Histadrut membership. Since 1959, others have also been registering as members with equal rights. In 1965, 1948 Palestinians participated for the first time as delegates to the Histadrut convention and were placed in its various component bodies, chiefly the Arab Department. After 1976 Land Day, further steps were taken to integrate the 1948 Palestinian population into the Histadrut on a basis of complete equality. In 1991, the Arab Department of the Histadrut was disbanded to allow giving all services directly to Jews and 1948 Palestinians alike. However, 1948 Palestinian members of the Histadrut still complain of discrimination. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*, pp. 154–155.
  59. Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*; Al-Haj, *Social Change and Family Processes*.
  60. The Knesset. "Knesset member, Seif E-Din E-Zoubi." Available online at [http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk\\_eng.asp?mk\\_individual\\_id\\_t=251](http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=251).
  61. Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 166.
  62. Ibid; Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*.
  63. Al-Haj, *Social Change and Family Processes*, p. 3.
  64. McAdam, D., J. D. McCarthy et al., eds. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
  65. *Ha'arets*, January 14, 1966, in, Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 165.
  66. "Knesset members in the First Knesset." Available online at [http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mkindexByKnesset\\_eng.asp?knesset=1](http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mkindexByKnesset_eng.asp?knesset=1).
  67. Gabbay, R. E. (1959). *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem*. Geneva, E. Droz.
  68. Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 166.
  69. Knesset Member, Tawfik Toubi, Available online at [http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk\\_eng.asp?mk\\_individual\\_id\\_t=430](http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=430).
  70. Arian, A. and A. Arian (1983). *The Elections in Israel, 1981*. Tel Aviv, Ramot. p. 153.

71. Khouri, F. J. (1976). *The Arab Israeli Dilemma*. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press. p. 20.
72. Al- Lajnah al-Qutreiyah le-Ro'asaa' e-Sultat al-Mahaliyah al-Arabiyyah اللجنة القطرية لرؤساء السلطات المحلية العربية is an elected body which includes all the elected mayors of Arab municipal councils, representing and defending the rights of the Arab minority in Israel.
73. Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*.
74. Interview material suggests the lack of public transportation was part of a deliberate Israeli policy to fragment 1948 Palestinians and keep them isolated from each other. Interview with Ahmad Shehadeh revealed that the Red ID (identification document) "battle" in Kufor Yassif, for example, and the Israeli authorities' attempts to deport, among others, the owner of the bus company in Kufor Yassif was partly intended to control the bus company, and cut the public transportation between Akka city and Kufor Yassif. The Red ID battle refers to 1948 Palestinian attempts to resist Israeli plans to deport more 1948 Palestinians after the establishment of Israel by giving part of them temporary red ID cards that had to be renewed by the Military Governor, as opposed to permanent blue ID cards that granted their holder the right to reside in Israel. Ahmad Shehadeh (October 19, 2007) Kufor Yassif.
75. See the historical and legal background of the Palestinian minority in Israel, available online at <http://www.adalah.org/histlegal.htm>, and also see the joined statement of the Palestinian Israeli NGO's submitted to the World Conference Against Racism, held in Durban, South Africa, August–September 2001.
76. Shafir, G. and Y. Peled (2002). *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. Further discussion of al-Ard movement will follow in this chapter.
77. Al-Qasimia, K. (1990). "The National Palestinian Movement." *The Palestinian Encyclopedia* 5(2) (in Arabic).
78. Al-Kayyali, A. W. (1983). *Palestine Modern History*. Beirut, The Arab Institute for Research and Publishing (in Arabic).
79. Cohen, H. (2006). *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Services and the Israeli Arabs*. Jerusalem, Ivrut-Hebrew Publishing House. p. 60. (in Hebrew).
80. Shafir, G. and Y. Peled (2002). *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
81. Jiryis, S. (1968). *The Arabs in Israel*. Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies.
82. Schwarz, *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 68.
83. *Davar*, October 6, 1968, and interview with Zoubi. In, Jiryis (1968), *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 165.
84. Al-Kayyali, *Palestine Modern History*.
85. Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*.
86. Shafir and Peled, *Being Israeli*, p. 130.
87. Stendel, *The Arabs in Israel*.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.

90. For more on Communist party campaigns to protect 1948 Palestinian rights see, Ibrahim, *Hanna Naqara*.
91. McAdam et al., eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements Opportunities*.
92. See for example, Morris, A. D. (1984). *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York, Free Press; McAdam, *Political Process and the Development*.
93. Zureik, E. (1979). *The Palestinians in Israel: a Study in Internal Colonialism*. London, Routledge.
94. Sharfman, D. (1993). *Living without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel*. New York, M. E. Sharpe. p. 140.
95. Koren, H. (2003). "The Arab Citizens of the State of Israel: The Arab Media Perspective." In *The Israeli Palestinians: An Arab Minority in the Jewish State*. Edited by A. Bligh, London, Routledge. p. 214.
96. Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*, p. 188.
97. Ibid. p. 189.
98. Ibid. p. 190.
99. Ibid. p. 192.
100. Ibid. pp. 193–194.
101. Ibid. p.195.
102. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel 1967–1991*.
103. Al-Haj, M. (1993). "The Changing Strategies of Mobilization among the Arabs in Israel: Parliamentary Politics, Local Politics, and National Organizations." In *Local Communities and the Israeli Polity: Conflict of Values and Interests*. Edited by E. Ben-Zadok. Albany, NY, SUNY Press. p. 81.
104. Ghanem, A. (2001). *The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel: A Political Study*. Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, SUNY Press. p. 151.
105. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*, p. 103.
106. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*.
107. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*.
108. Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*.
109. Landau, *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991*.
110. Jiryis (1976), *The Arabs in Israel*.
111. (1976), *The Black Book*; Karkabi, *The Land Day*.
112. Koren, "The Arab Citizens of the State of Israel," 212–225.
113. Zureik, *The Palestinians in Israel*.
114. Koren, "The Arab Citizens of the State of Israel," p. 215.
115. (1976), *The Black Book*, p. 144.
116. Snow, D., E. Burke, S. Worden, and R. Benford (1986). "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation." *American Sociological Review* 51: 464–481; Snow, D. and D. Benford (1988). "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* 1: 197–217.
117. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development*, p. 34.
118. Stanczak, G. C. (2006). *Engaged Spirituality: Social Change and American Religion*. New Brunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press. p. 43.

119. (1976), *The Black Book*, p. 151.
120. *HaMa'arakh* or The Labour Alignment was an alliance of the major Zionist left-wing parties in Israel between the 1960s and the 1990s.
121. Retrieved October 23, 2008, from: [http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk\\_eng.asp?mk\\_individual\\_id\\_t=605](http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=605).
122. The Israeli Labour Movement website [http://tnuathaavoda.info/zope/home/11/galleries/gallery\\_1170699164/](http://tnuathaavoda.info/zope/home/11/galleries/gallery_1170699164/).
123. Interview, Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh (October 11, 2007) Kufor Yassif.
124. Interview, Rev. Shehadeh Shehadeh (October 11, 2007) Kufor Yassif.
125. Some similarities can be drawn between this campaign and the campaign organized by the Communist Party in the West Bank to use students to educate villagers. See, Sahliyah, E. (1988). *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics*. Washington, The Brookings Institution.
126. 1.5 million dunams of the Negev Bedouin land was to be expropriated. Karkabi, *The Land Day*.
127. McAdam, D., J. D. McCarthy et al., eds. (1996). "Opportunities Mobilizing Structures and Framing Process—Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements." In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–40.
128. The participation of Kassis was mentioned in the Koenig Memorandum as a new and hideous phenomenon reflecting a dominant wish of 1948 Palestinians to protest against the institution and against the Israeli government.
129. Hafez and Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention," pp. 61–88.
130. Retrieved November 10, 2008, from: [http://knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk\\_eng.asp?mk\\_individual\\_id\\_t=132](http://knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=132).
131. Most probably, Yisrael Yeshayahu who was the speaker of the 8th Knesset, and a member of the *HaMa'arakh* or The Labour Alignment Party (January 21, 1974–June 13, 1977).
132. Retrieved November 10, 2008, from: [http://knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk\\_eng.asp?mk\\_individual\\_id\\_t=168](http://knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=168).
133. Karkabi, *The Land Day*.
134. Toledano was also one of the heads of the Mosad, 1953–1976. Retrieved September 22, 2008, from: [http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk\\_eng.asp?mk\\_individual\\_id\\_t=431](http://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/mk_eng.asp?mk_individual_id_t=431).
135. Payes, S. (2003). "Palestinian NGOs in Israel: A Campaign for Civic Equality in a Non-Civic State." *Israel Studies* 8(1): 60–90.
136. More testimonies on the nature of resistance and the development of the clashes on the 1976 Land Day can be found in (1976), *The Black Book*; Ibrahim, *Hanna Naqara*.
137. Mahmoud Saied Na'amneh, head of Arrabeh municipal council, statement in (1976), *The Black Book*, pp. 49–55.
138. Then the chairman of the National Committee of Heads of Arab Municipal Councils.
139. McAdam, *Political Process and the Development*, p. 34.

### 3 HABBAT OCTOBER

1. Yiftachel, O. (1997). "The Political Geography of Ethnic Protest: Nationalism, Deprivation and Regionalism among Arabs in Israel." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 22(1): 91.
2. This protest enhanced the position of the National Committee of Arab Local Council Heads (NCALCH), and led to the establishment of an umbrella organization in which the NCALCH constitutes a core part—the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens, composed of Arab mayors, members of the NCALCH, and other elected 1948 Palestinian politicians, such as members of the Knesset. Landau, J. M. (1993). *The Arab Minority in Israel, 1967–1991: Political Aspects*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 101–105; Kaufman, I. (1997). *Arab National Communism in the Jewish State*. Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, pp. 102–103.
3. On June 24, 1987, the 1948 Palestinians community held a successful countrywide general strike. The "Equality Day" strike was called by the National Committee of Arab Local Council Heads (NCALCH) to demand an end to all forms of racial discrimination. As a result of its leadership of the strike, the NCALCH has emerged with enhanced authority as the representatives of the 1948 Palestinians. See, Beinun, J. (1988). "From Land Day to Equality Day." *MERIP Middle East Report*(150): 24.
4. Available at <http://www.baqoon.com/w10/6.htm>.
5. The most famous is Deir Yassin April 9, 1948.
6. The Proposed Independence Day (Amendment—Prohibition on Commemorating Nakba Day) Law- 200, Proposed Bill No. 2899.
7. Karzam, G. (August 31, 2007). "The Location of 1948 Palestinians in the 'Democratic' Israeli Game." Retrieved June 15, 2007, from: <http://www.yafanews.net/arabic/pages/article.php?articleID=120>.
8. Over 40 1948 Palestinian villages of Bedouin citizens in the Negev and the Galilee that Israel does not recognize as legal settlements.
9. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, April 2, 1998.
10. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, April 5, 1998.
11. (2000). *A Dictionary of World History*. Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press.
12. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement issued on April 8, 1998.
13. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, April 8, 1998.
14. A similar demand was made in Habbat October.
15. Payes, S. (2003). "Palestinian NGOs in Israel: A Campaign for Civic Equality in a Non-Civic State." *Israel Studies* 8(1): 60–90.
16. See, The High Follow-Up Committee meeting protocol, March 10, 2000, The Cultural Centre, Yaffa-Tel Aviv.
17. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000.
18. For more see Hamdan, Hana and Yosef Jabareen (March 2006). "A Proposal for Suitable Representation of the Arab Minority in Israel's National Planning



- System.” *Adalah’s Newsletter* 23. Available online at <http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/mar06/ar1.pdf>.
19. See, The Association for Recognition of the Unrecognized Arab Villages. Available online at <http://www.assoc40.org/en/>.
  20. A *waqf* (plural: *awqāf*) is an inalienable religious endowment in Islam, typically devoting a building or plot of land for Muslim religious or charitable purposes.
  21. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000.
  22. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000.
  23. Dr. Ahmad Sa’d, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel, and chief editor of its Arabic-language daily newspaper *al-Ittihad* (Unity). In addition to being a Knesset member between June 17, 1996, and June 7, 1999, Sa’d wrote numerous studies and newspaper articles on the Israel-Arab affairs, and published a number of books.
  24. Interview, Ahmad Sa’d (September 30, 2007), Abu-Snan.
  25. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000.
  26. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 2.
  27. Apartheid is a social and political policy of racial segregation and discrimination enforced by white minority governments in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. The term *apartheid*, from the Afrikaans word for *apartness* was coined in the 1930s and used as a political slogan in the early 1940s, but the policy itself extends back to the beginning of white settlement in South Africa in 1652. The Encyclopedia of the African and African American Experience. Available online at <http://www.africanaencyclopedia.com/apartheid/apartheid.html>.
  28. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 2.
  29. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 2.
  30. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 2.
  31. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000.
  32. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 3.
  33. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 3.
  34. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 3.
  35. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 3.
  36. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, March 23, 2000, p. 3.
  37. As reported by some major media outlets including The Associated Press. UNISPAL Monthly Media Monitoring Review March 2000. Available online at <http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/1ce874ab1832a53e852570bb006dfaf6/5b228ec7af69a21c85256dc100676bf!OpenDocument>.
  38. Usher, Graham (2000). “One Land, One People.” *Al Abram Weekly* April 6–12(476). Available online at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/476/re1.htm>.
  39. The original handwritten copy of the public statement issued by the High Follow-Up Committee after the death of Sheikha Abu-Saleh (obtained through Adalah centre, October 2007).
  40. The High Follow-Up Committee statement, April 5, 2000.
  41. (April 12, 2000). “Maintaining a Protest Momentum.” *Ha’aretz*. p. 6A (in Hebrew).

42. The Noble Sanctuary or Temple Mount is the third holiest site for Moslems, and is one of the most contested religious sites in the world due to its importance for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The site, which is currently under the management of the Palestinian Waqf (Muslim Council), remains a key issue in the Arab-Israeli conflict with both Israel and the Palestinians claiming sovereignty over it. The site contains two major Muslim religious shrines: the Dome of the Rock (built c. 690) and al-Aqsa Mosque (built c.710). The entrance of Jews to the site has been a sensitive political and religious issue since 1948, when the site was under the Jordanian rule of East Jerusalem who following the Israeli-Arab war banned the entrance of Jews and other non-Arab people to the Old City of Jerusalem.
43. See Amnesty's October 2000 report on Israel's excessive use of force: "Israel and the Occupied Territories: Excessive Use of Lethal Force." Available online at [http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE150412000ENGLISH/\\$File/MDE1504100.pdf](http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE150412000ENGLISH/$File/MDE1504100.pdf).
44. See, Dalal, M. (July 2003). *October 2000: Law and Politics Before the Or Commission of Inquiry*. Israel, Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. Also see Adalah's report "The Accused" (2007), which addresses the shortcomings and failures of the Israeli law enforcement authorities since October 2000 in all related to the investigation into the incidents involving the killings during Habbat October.
45. Al-Maslami, A. (2004). "The Consequences of the Or Report." *Journal of the Palestinian Planning Centre* 4(13): 141–157. (in Arabic).
46. The Or Commission was appointed on November 8, 2000.
47. (September 2, 2003). *Ha'aretz*. Available online at <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=335594>.
48. Dr. Azmi Bishara, a key 1948 Palestinian political and academic figure, a member of the Israeli Knesset, and a leader of the Balad party from 1996 to 2007, headed the Philosophy and Cultural Studies Department at Bir Zeit University from 1990 to 1992, and has written several books and numerous articles on democracy, civil society, and Middle East politics. He is one of the principal founders of Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Research of Democracy, and a social sciences journal, *Theory and Criticism*, founded together with Israeli colleagues.
49. Bishara, A. (Spring, 2001). "Reflections on October 2000: A Landmark in Jewish-Arab Relations in Israel." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30(3): 54–67.
50. The official summation of the Or (September 1, 2003). "The Official Or Summation Report." *Haaretz.com*. Retrieved February 9, 2007, from: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=335594>.
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52. An official Israeli acknowledgment of this can be found in the official records of the UN General Assembly Tenth Emergency Special Session, thirteenth meeting held on Wednesday, October 18, 2000, 3 p.m. in New York (A/ES-10/PV.13 October 18, 2000).

53. Slone, M. (December, 2003). "The Nazareth Riots: Arab and Jewish Israeli Adolescents Pay a Different Psychological Price for Participation." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(6): 817–836.
54. Bishara, "Reflections on October 2000," 54–67.
55. See, for example, the Knesset website (2003). "The Main Events and Issues during the Fifteenth Knesset." Retrieved April 22, 2008, from [http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng\\_hist15.htm](http://www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng_hist15.htm). Also see examples of the coverage of the two leading Israeli newspapers, *Ha'aretz*. Available online at <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1026288.html> and *Yedioth Ahronot*. Available online at <http://www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3499341,00.html>.
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57. Nimer Sultany, an attorney and coordinator of the Political Monitoring Project at Mada al-Carmel—The Arab Centre for Applied Social Research.
58. Sultany, *Citizens without Citizenship*, p. 11.
59. Interview, Ahmad Sa'd (September 30, 2007), Abu-Snan.
60. Published by the Palestinian National Data Bank, SIS (State Information Service), Palestinian National Authority. Available online at [http://www.pnrc.gov.ps/arabic/quds/arabic/shohada\\_aqsa/shohada\\_aqsa.asp](http://www.pnrc.gov.ps/arabic/quds/arabic/shohada_aqsa/shohada_aqsa.asp).
61. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, April 2, 1998. بيان عام دعوته ونداء لجنة ام السحالي المنبثقة عن سكرتارية لجنة المتابعة
62. Meehan, Maureen (1998). "Israeli Forces Open Fire on Arab Citizens of Israel Protesting Land Confiscations Inside Israeli Borders." *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. Retrieved June 15, 2007, from: <http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/1298/9812025.html>.
63. For more see, "The Wye River Memorandum." *The State Department Website*. Retrieved August 8, 2008, from [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/981023\\_interim\\_agmt.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/981023_interim_agmt.html).
64. Also known as the al-Habbah al-Shaa'biah' (the public outburst) against collaborators.
65. See appendix with photo of the Jamal Bayadseh's grave. The grave stone reads: "The grave of the martyr Jamal Husni Munieb Bayadseh, who fell at the Dignity Battle against collaborators on May 16, 1999. Courtesy of <http://www.eqraa.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=25383&pid=161178&mode=threaded&show=&st=&c>.
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- will speed them on their way." See, <http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/7/27/122828.shtml>.
85. "The Official Or Summation Report."
  86. See, MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe's letter to Avigdor Kahalani, minister of internal security, April 21, 1999, and copied to Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu.
  87. "The Official Or Summation Report."
  88. The flier obtained from Adalah centre, is signed by "Komemiout Yisrael" and a phone number.
  89. See, MK Abdulmalik Dahamshe's letter to Minister of Internal Security, Shlomo Ben-Ami, January 12, 2000, copied to Knesset Officer.
  90. For further discussion of this issue see Dahamshe's letter sent to the minister of internal security, Shlom Ben-Ami on September 28, 2000, and analyzed later in this chapter.
  91. Sultany, *Citizens without Citizenship*, p. 141.
  92. Arab HRA (November 25, 2000). "Response to the Intifada Inside: Arrests, Detentions and Human Rights Violations in the Arab Community." *Discrimination Diary*. Also available online at <http://www.arabhra.org/hra/SecondaryArticles/SecondaryArticlePage.aspx?SecondaryArticle=1433>.
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  94. Kull al-Arab, Nazareth, Friday, October 20, 2000.
  95. Quoted in Amnesty's International Report, "Israel and the Occupied Territories."
  96. (Tuesday, November 7, 2000). "Two Laws for Two People." *Ha'aretz*. Tel Aviv.
  97. For more on I'lam, see, <http://www.ilamcenter.org/eng/>.
  98. (August 2003) "The Or Commission: A Media Report." I'lam (Hebrew and Arabic).
  99. Keshev was founded after the killing of Yitzhak Rabin on the initiative of a group of writers, legal advocates, and academics, with the aim to defend the democratic values in Israel.
  100. Neiger, Zandberg, and Abu-Ra'iyyeh, *Civil or Ethnic Media?* (In Hebrew).
  101. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
  102. Including: political leaders such as Azmi Bishara and Raed Salah, and political parties, for example, the Islamic party and the National Democratic Assembly (NDA-Balad).
  103. Operated by the Islamic movement and was shut in August 2008 after a raid by the Israeli security.
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  106. Payes, S. (2003). "Palestinian NGOs in Israel," 60–90.

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108. Payes, S. (2005). *Palestinian NGOs in Israel: The Politics of Civil Society*. London; New York, Tauris Academic Studies.
109. Mainly Fulbright, Israeli Arab Scholarship Program (IASP), and Association of Civil Rights in Israel's (ACRI's) New Israel Fund Scholarship.
110. Haklai, O. (2004). "Palestinian NGOs in Israel: A Campaign for Civic Equality or 'Ethnic Civil Society'?" *Israel Studies* 9(3): 157–168.
111. As it was demonstrated earlier in this chapter, in the analysis of the Um Essahalie High Follow-Up Committee statement from April 8, 1998, which illustrated the introduction of new resources and tools.
112. Haklai, "Palestinian NGOs in Israel," 157–168.
113. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on October 1, 2000.
114. "Media in Israel," I'am—Media Centre for Arab Palestinians in Israel. Retrieved July 12, 2008, from: <http://www.ilamcenter.org/>.
115. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
116. Marcel Khalife, a Lebanese composer, singer, and oud player who dedicated much of his music to the Palestinian cause. Khalife twinned with the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, and composed and sang on nationalism and revolution.
117. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
118. Interview, Habbat October witness E (June 19, 2007). Sakhnin.
119. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
120. *Al-Sinnara*, Nazareth, Friday, October 27, 2000.
121. J'accuse was an open letter published by Emile Zola, addressed to the French president, in which Zola accused the French government of anti-Semitism and the unlawful jailing of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French Officer who was accused of selling military secrets to Germany. Zola's letter was published on January 13, 1898, in the first page of the newspaper *L'Aurore* causing a stir in France and abroad. The popularity of the letter has turned J'accuse into a common generic expression of outrage and accusation against a powerful person.
122. *Al-Ittihad* (Unity), the Communist Party's newspaper.
123. Makhoul, Issam (September 15, 2000). "We Accuse!" *al-Ittihad*. p. 5.
124. Interview with Ahmad Sa'd (September 30, 2007). Abu-Snan.
125. Dalal, *October 2000: Law and Politics*.
126. Ibid.
127. Based on a number of observations made by the Or Commission's report, see the report in Hebrew, or the official summation of the Or Commission's report (in English) particularly the paragraphs 30, 31, and 32 under the Arab Sector and its Leadership section, "The Official Or Summation Report." Also see, Israeli, R. (2002). *Arabs in Israel: Friends or Foes?* Israel, ACPR Publishers. p. 189.
128. A statement issued by the High Follow-Up Committee on September 30, 2000, following an emergency meeting in Kufor Manda municipality.
129. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, September 26, 1996.

130. "Habbat al-Nafaq 1996." Palestine Martyrs' Institution. Available online at [http://riaaya.org/index\\_files/Habbatelnafak1996.htm](http://riaaya.org/index_files/Habbatelnafak1996.htm).
131. The Fourteenth Knesset, Selected Events. Available online at <http://www.knesset.gov.il/review/ReviewPage3.aspx?kns=14&lng=3>. Other reports say the number of Israeli military casualties was 16. Available online at <http://www.benjamin-netanyahu.com/כהונתו-כראש-ממשלה>
132. These were some of the conclusions of the Or Commission as published in the official summation of the Or Commission's report (in English), "The Official Or Summation Report."
133. The statement indicates that the High Follow-Up Committee decided to call the school academic year 1996–1997 in the 1948 Palestinian sector the al-Quds year. However, there are no details in the statement as to why or how the al-Quds year would be celebrated in schools, in particular.
134. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, September 26, 1996.
135. "The Arab High Follow-Up Committee calls to donate blood to save those injured, and to head to al-Aqsa mosque next Friday and throughout the week to those of you who can." See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement, September 30, 1996.
136. Going to al-Aqsa on October 6, 2000 was among the protest actions the High Follow-Up Committee called for in its statement.
137. The term is literally translated from Arabic in order to retain the tone of the original, which is rather vague. The 1948 Palestinian leadership sometimes uses such broad terms when they address the public. See similar point made on page 67 of this chapter.
138. The High Follow-Up Committee statement, September 26, 1996.
139. The Habbat October statement issued on September 30, 2000, will be discussed in full detail later in this section.
140. As reported in *Ha'aretz* Israeli daily (in Hebrew) on September 29, 1996, "A General Strike in the Arab Sector; Massive Marches in Most of the Towns." *Ha'aretz* also reported on the arrest of 21 in Nazareth, including 8 minors, suspect of throwing stones and burning tires in a nearby junction.
141. Issued on September 30, 2000.
142. (October 6, 2000). *Sawt el-Haq*. p. 19  
 حاولت الذراع التنفيذية لحكومة اسرائيل (الشرطة) اسالة الدماء وجرح المنات وقتل العشرات  
 مؤدية الى استشهد العشرات من ابناء شعبنا داخل الخط الاخضر الذي قد محي نتيجة لهذه الاعمال  
 وسفك الدماء
143. In addition, clashes erupted on the same day in East Jerusalem and outside Ramalla. See Goldenberg, Suzanne (September 29, 2000). "Rioting as Sharon Visits Islam Holy Site." *The Guardian*. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/sep/29/israel>.
144. (September 19, 2000). "Israel Calls Off Talks with the Palestinians." *The Guardian*. Available online at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/sep/19/israel>.
145. The Sabra and Shatila massacre was carried out between, September 16, 1982, and September 18, 1982. During which Palestinian and Lebanese

- civilians were killed by Christian Phalangists under the shield of the Israeli army.
146. The High Follow-Up Committee statement, September 30, 2000.  
 “لقد اختلطت دماء جرحانا مع جرحى أبناء شعبنا في الدفاع عن الأقصى المبارك متجاوزة الخط “  
 “الاخضر - فلا حدود تفصل بيننا وبين ابناء شعبنا في الدفاع عن المقدسات وفي مقاومة الاحتلال”
  147. While the evidence collected in this book supports the commission’s claims of blurred boundaries, some of the claims made by the commission will later be contested.
  148. This point is discussed in further details under the role of media in Habbat October.
  149. Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi (Sanctuary of Abraham), also known as the Cave of the Patriarchs, is located in the ancient city of al-Khalil (Hebron). It is a holy site for Muslims, Christians, and Jews, whose traditions maintain that the site is the burial place of a number of prophets and their wives. It is considered to be the fourth holiest site in Islam and the second holiest for Jews.
  150. On February 24, 1994, and during the holy Muslim month of Ramadan, Dr.Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish American Israeli settler, walked into Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi Mosque, and opened fire killing 29 Palestinians including 3 children in the midst of their prayer.
  151. Ehud Barak was then Israel’s prime minister, and Shlomo Ben-Ami was the minister of internal security.
  152. The High Follow-Up Committee statement, September 30, 2000.
  153. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation).
  154. See the discussion of Ron’s tense relationship with the 1948 Palestinian minority earlier in this chapter.
  155. Palestinians who collaborate with the Israel’s security forces and intelligence.
  156. Usher, Graham (September 23, 2000). “Israel’s Palestinians and the Politics of Law and Order,” *Middle East Report Online*. Available online at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092300.html>.
  157. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation), p. 1.
  158. Dahamshe: “a message to Barak that the Arabs and their representatives are not in his pocket” (translated from the protocol in Hebrew). The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation).
  159. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation), p. 1.
  160. According to Graham Usher two days after the press conference the district prosecutor in Haifa, and the local commanders of Shinbet (Israel’s internal security service), “quietly informed the frantic media that 33 Um el-Fahm



- residents had been detained and twelve indicted but that none of them had been charged with nationalist offences.” Nor was there any connection between the detainees and the Islamist movement, whether the Southern wing headed by Sheikh Abdallah Nimer Darwish or the more radical Northern wing headed by Sheikh Ra’ed Salah. Usher, “Israel’s Palestinians and the Politics of Law and Order.”
161. Khatib later became the chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee of the Arab population in Israel.
  162. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation).
  163. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation).
  164. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation).
  165. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13 2000 (a Hebrew translation).
  166. The Northern wing of the Islamic movement as opposed to the Southern wing refuses to participate in national elections for the Israeli Knesset.
  167. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation), p. 2.
  168. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation), p. 3.
  169. As will be discussed later in this chapter, calls of the 1948 Palestinian leadership to meet up with governmental officials during Habbat October and following the first killings were ignored by the state officials including the prime minister.
  170. Every member of the Knesset is required to take the declaration of allegiance upon his or her selection to the Knesset. The declaration reads, “I pledge myself to bear allegiance to the State of Israel and faithfully to discharge my mandate in the Knesset.” “I declare to be faithful to the State of Israel and to fulfill, in good faith my mission.” Basic Law: The Knesset. Available online at [http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2\\_eng.htm](http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm).
  171. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on September 13, 2000 (a Hebrew translation), p. 3.
  172. Usher, “Israel’s Palestinians and the Politics of Law and Order.”
  173. Goldenberg, “Rioting as Sharon Visits Islam Holy Site.”
  174. See the official summation of the Or Commission’s report (in English), “The Official Or Summation Report.” Also see, Diker, “Lessons from the Or Commission.”

175. See, The High Follow-Up Committee meeting protocol, September 30, 2000, Kufor Manda local council.
176. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement—a call for a strike on October 1, 2000.
177. See, The High Follow-Up Committee statement—a call for a strike on October 1, 2000  
 لقد قررت لجنة المتابعة العليا للجماهير العربية في جلستها يوم السبت 30/9/00 دعوة الجماهير العربية الى الاضراب العام والشامل يوم غد الاحد 1/10/00 – دفاعا عن المقدسات وتضامنا مع ابناء شعبنا الرازح تحت الاحتلال ودفاعا عن السلام العادل والشامل  
 كما قررت لجنة المتابعة العليا تنظيم مسيرات ومظاهرات موحدة في كل قرية ومدينة عربية احتجاجا على المجزرة المستمرة”
178. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
179. Aseel Asli, 17 years old, served as the Seeds of Peace guide and active representative for the Middle East. President Bill Clinton presented Aseel with a special award for his activities in the Seeds of Peace program. He was a member of the group until he died. See, Aseel Asli: 100 Shaheed Memorial Exhibition, Khalil Shakini Cultural Centre. Available online at <http://www.sakakini.org/shaheed/aseel.htm>. Also see, Aseel's official website <http://www.slider17.com>.
180. (October 6, 2000). “The Father of Kofor Manda Martyr: Ramez Left Home Saying I Am Going to Become a Martyr for the Sake of God.” *Sawt el-Haq*. p. 16.
181. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
182. Interviews: Habbat October witness E (June 19, 2007). Sakhnin; Habbat October witness F (October 8, 2007). Sakhnin; Habbat October witness L (October 17, 2007). Haifa; Habbat October witness M (June 22, 2007). Arrabeh; Habbat October witness P (July 27, 2007). Majd el-Kuroom; Habbat October witness C (September 16, 2007). Abu Sinan; Habbat October witness K (August 20, 2007). Jdaydeh-Makr.
183. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
184. Onions, I was told, are used by Palestinian demonstrators as a defensive mechanism against Israeli teargas.
185. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
186. (October 6, 2000). *Sawt el-Haq*. p. 18.
187. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh. This is confirmed by the rest of the interview subjects who did not expect escalation despite the tension.
188. Summary of the Findings and Conclusions of Adalah's “The Accused” Report, prepared October 2006, p. 8.
189. The protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on October 1, 2000.
190. See the protocol of the High Follow-Up Committee emergency meeting held in Kufor Manda municipal council on October 2, 2000, following more escalations and the killings of eight 1948 Palestinians.
191. Ala Nassar (18) and Aseel Asleh (17) were both shot on October 2, 2000, in Arrabeh village.

192. See, The High Follow-Up Committee meeting protocol, October 01, 2000.
193. Neiger, Zandberg, and Abu-Ra'iyeh, *Civil or Ethnic Media?* (in Hebrew), p. 7.
194. (October 2, 2000). *Yediot Ahronot*, main page.
195. Neiger, Zandberg, and Abu-Ra'iyeh, *Civil or Ethnic Media?* (in Hebrew), p. 8.
196. Dwairy, Dr. Marwan (October 2005). "October 2000: Defined Goals and New Mechanisms." *Adalah's Newsletter* 19.
197. Mossawa on the forty-first killing, available online at <http://www.mossawacenter.org/default.php?lng=3&q=the+41st+killling>.
198. Arab HRA (October 25, 2000). "Delusions of Coexistence in the Galilee: The Aftermath of the Events of October among the Arab Community in Israel." *Discrimination Diary*.
199. *Shas*: the Hebrew acronym for the Sephardic Guardians of the Torah—is an influential leading ultraorthodox Israeli party. *Kach*: a far right-wing Israeli party founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane in the early 1970s, and later banned for inciting to racism. Kach (together with its Kahane Chai fraction) are considered terrorist organizations by Israel, Canada, the European Union, and the United States. For more, see, Public Safety Canada. Available online at <http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-en.asp>; US Department of State. Retrieved October 11, 2005, from: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm>; Official Journal of the European Union. Retrieved December 23, 2005, from: [http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/L\\_340/L\\_34020051223en00640066.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/L_340/L_34020051223en00640066.pdf).
200. (October 6, 2000). *Sawt el-Haq*. p. 12.
201. Adalah's report "The Accused," p. 79 (Arabic version).
202. (October 6, 2000). *Sawt el-Haq*. p. 19.
203. Interview, Habbat October witness T (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
204. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
205. Interview, Habbat October witness M (June 22, 2007). Arrabeh.
206. Interview, Habbat October witness W (August 28, 2007). Kufor Yassif.
207. Interview, Habbat October witness H (October 16, 2007). Arrabeh.
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## 4 CONCLUSION

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